[Senate Hearing 111-150]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-150
RESPONDING TO PAKISTAN'S IDP CRISIS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 29, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JAMES M. INHOFE, OKLAHOMA
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Ali, Imtiaz, Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow, United States
Institute of Peace, Washington, DC............................. 39
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Brause, Jon, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency
for International Development, Washington, DC.................. 14
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
opening statement.............................................. 1
Report from Oxfam International dated July 28, 2009.......... 2
Chamberlin, Hon. Wendy, president, Middle East Institute, former
Ambassador to Pakistan, Washington, DC......................... 34
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Schwartz, Hon. Eric, Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees
and Migration, Department of State, Washington, DC............. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 9
(iii)
RESPONDING TO PAKISTAN'S IDP CRISIS
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P.
Casey, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Casey, Feingold, Cardin, Shaheen,
Kaufman, Corker, Risch, and Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. This hearing of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and
Central Asian Affairs, will now come to order.
I want to welcome everyone this morning. Thank you for
being here. We're trying to get started pretty close to the
hour. And thank you for taking the time to be with us.
Today, our subcommittee meets to assess the scope of the
internally displaced persons, or as we know them, by the
acronym IDPs. This is a crisis that confronts the people of
Pakistan in the aftermath of a sustained army offensive to
drive Taliban extremists out of the Swat Valley and neighboring
regions.
In recent days, we've seen the start of small-scale returns
of IDPs back to their homes, but the situation remains fragile.
There are still reports of isolated fighting. And for all the
success of the Pakistani military in regaining control of the
area, none of the extremist leaders were arrested or killed
during the military operations of the past 2 months.
While precise numbers are difficult to pin down, experts
assess that more than 2 million--more than 2 million--civilians
have been forced from their homes after a series of Pakistani
military offensives in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas,
as we know as the FATA, and, more recently, the North West
Frontier Province, home to the Swat Valley. The scale of this
IDP crisis is underscored by the fact that it is the largest
movement of civilians on the subcontinent since the bloody
events of the 1947 partition.
We must also recognize that this IDP crisis did not just
emerge suddenly this spring after the Pakistani Army went into
the Swat Valley to oust Taliban militants. Nearly half of the
450,000 residents of the Massoud territories of South
Waziristan were driven from their homes by a prior military
incursion in the early part of 2008. This IDP crisis has been
building now for some time.
Given so much suffering that takes place around the world,
and given the large sums of U.S. assistance we already provide
to Pakistan, it is natural to question why an IDP crisis there
materially affects the interests of the United States. I would
offer at least two compelling reasons.
First, the humanitarian dimensions of this emerging
catastrophe are, indeed, vivid. And I want to give you some
examples in a couple of moments. Up to 90 percent of the
displaced individuals have been welcomed into the homes of
distant relatives, a byproduct of the proud tradition of
hospitality that exists there. However, a small but significant
number of IDPs are located in sweltering camps, where the
temperature often rises to an unbearable 110 degrees. The
families who are in these camps often do not have enough time
to take more than their rudimentary possessions, leaving them
at the mercy of government assistance. Although the camps so
far have not proven to be vectors for disease epidemics, that
threat remains.
And I'd also offer--I'll make this part of the record,
among other things we offer today as part of the record--a
report from Oxfam International, dated July 28 of this year.
[The article submitted for the record follows:]
Pakistan: Three Months After Clashes Began, Oxfam International
Emphasizes Need for Voluntary and Safe Returns of Displaced People
FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS SHOW DISPLACED WOMEN FEAR RETURN TO UPPER SWAT
DISTRICT
Three months after the clashes in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier
Province (NWFP) began, aid agency Oxfam International emphasized the
right of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) to return voluntarily and
the need to establish sustainable security in their home villages.
Oxfam International praised the Government for agreeing to uphold
international standards on the return of IDPs, but said a clear
information campaign is needed to help displaced people make informed
decisions about returning. Now in the third week of the Government's
phased plan for returns, there are an estimated 1.5 million displaced
people yet to be repatriated who need reassurance that their safety
will be respected and humanitarian assistance will continue.
After speaking to nearly 100 IDP women in focus group discussions
held in camps and host communities over the last two weeks, Oxfam
International found that despite a strong desire to return home, many
still fear for the safety of their families. The displaced women living
in Swabi and Mardan districts said that relatives in Swat district
contacted them by mobile phones to say that homes and livelihoods have
been destroyed and sporadic fighting is continuing. Others spoke of
confusion on the returns process and its implications, with only
limited information provided at short notice. ``We hear that we should
return to Swat. But there are no options for us except to go and sit on
our destroyed house,'' said Zemit, 52, after she learned that her
family home was bombed last week.
Oxfam Country Director in Pakistan Neva Khan said, ``After the
largest internal displacement crisis in Pakistan's history, everyone
wants to see a return to normalcy including a secure and dignified
return for all displaced people. We are encouraged that the Government
has agreed to international guidelines but stress that the information
campaign is also vital to the repatriation process.''
The voluntary, safe, informed and dignified return of the IDPs is a
paramount consideration for Oxfam International which, along with other
members of the humanitarian community, is working with the government
to help meet the needs of displaced people and particularly vulnerable
women. Oxfam International is providing water, cash, cooking materials,
latrines and hygiene kits for up to 360,000 men, women and children
affected by fighting.
Adhering to the three-phase plan of return set up by the
government, buses and security vehicles have been taking families back
to the NWFP since 13 July, first from displacement and spontaneous
camps followed by those staying with host families. As the IDPs return
to their villages, Oxfam International will shift its focus with local
partners to help provide shelter in devastated areas. In particular,
assisting people who have lost their crops, livestock, shops and other
livelihoods.
Women's Stories
Between 15th and 25th July, Oxfam International staff spoke to
nearly 100 IDP women in focus groups discussions in Yar Hussain camp in
Swabi district and in three host communities in Mardan district. The
displaced women came from Upper Swat villages including Aliadab, Khalam
and Khabal. Their stories include:
ZWAHARA (70) from Upper Swat
``I fear my husband and son are dead. I have no income and five
daughters so I must get them married quickly.'' When Zwahara and her
five daughters were given just 30 minutes notice to vacate their
village, she had to leave her paralysed son behind with his father.
Taken in by a distant relative living in Swabi district, her family and
20 others of the extended family are sharing one toilet and water tap.
The women are sleeping on the ground in the courtyard and desperately
want to be allowed into one of the official camps for displaced
families, where they believe conditions will be better. Because Zwahara
has no male family member with her and no official ID card, the family
have been turned away from the camps. Every member of the family
suffers from diarrhoea and skin infections due to the heat and poor
hygiene. Zwahara has learned from former neighbours that her house has
been destroyed. No one has seen her husband or son for several weeks.
The family do not plan to return to Swat.
RAHMATUN (22) from Upper Swat
Rahmatun's husband returned to their village several weeks ago. He
told her that there is shooting in their village and the curfew makes
it too dangerous for him to go out to buy food. He plans to leave their
village and travel south to join her in Mardan if they can find a place
to live. Rahmatun said, ``The militants will behead us if we peek our
heads outside of the door--we cannot send our girl children to school
or anywhere with this being the case. They warned communities that if
they fled during the fighting that would mean that they had sided with
the Government.'' Rahmatun and her three small children were staying in
Yar Husseim displacement camp in Swabi district.
SAHIB (80) from near Mingora in Swat district
Eighty-year-old Sahib, her daughter and granddaughter walked for
two days and two nights to escape the fighting in Swat. For the last
three months they have been living in the empty home of a wealthy
family in Swabi district, the relatives of a family friend in their
home village. All the family suffer from diarrhoea and the skin rash
scabies because of the intense heat and lack of mobility from living in
purdah. Sahib said: ``I don't know what will happen to us if we go
back. I want to stay here--there are too many problems in Swat.''
ZEMIT (50) from Upper Swat
``We hear that everyone should return to Swat. But there are no
options for us except to go and sit on our destroyed house,'' said
Zemit, 52, after she learned that her family home was destroyed by
bombing last week. Living with 90 family members in a temporary home,
Zemit says that she misses baking bread for her family at home and
desperately wishes to return. But family members who remained in Swat
tell her not to return because fresh hostilities coupled with a
volatile curfew order makes it dangerous for them to get food and other
necessities. A local administrator in Marden district invited Zemit and
her large family to stay in his guesthouse, where they've lived for
nearly three months and relied on the generosity of neighbours.
Notes to Editors
1. Between 15th and 25th July, Oxfam International staff spoke to
nearly 100 IDP women in focus groups discussions in Yar Hussain camp in
Swabi district and in three host communities in Mardan district. The
displaced women came from Upper Swat villages including Aliadab, Khalam
and Khabal.
2. The Government's national response plan outlined in May sketches
a positive picture in many respects, with progressive references to
safe, voluntary returns, community ownership, transparency and
accountability, as well as the distinct needs of women and other
vulnerable groups. This requires sustained support and commitment to be
turned into a detailed reality. Recovery and rehabilitation plans must
involve the active participation of affected. On 27 July 2009, the
Government estimated that 700,000 people had returned to NWFP.
3. The Pakistani army's operations against militants in NWFP
beginning in late April triggered an exodus of over two million women,
men and children especially after 2 May. The flight of civilians from
the province's Malakand Division (mainly the districts of Swat, Dir,
Malakand and Buner) represents the biggest conflict-induced
displacement in the country's 62-year history.
4. Oxfam International is a relief agency working in 70 countries
to fight poverty and end suffering. Oxfam International has funded
relief and development work in Pakistan since 1973 and two affiliates,
Oxfam Great Britain and Oxfam Novib, are working in the country.
Senator Casey. And just a quick summary that I'll read
highlights of--to give those in the audience who may not sense
the size of the human situation we're dealing with.
Vignettes, after interviews by Oxfam of--in a kind of
focus-group approach to this crisis, but even excerpts from the
Vignettes tell the story. The story of a 70-year-old woman from
Upper Swat--and I'm reading, ``When she and her five daughters
were given just 30 minutes' notice to vacate their village, she
had to leave her paralyzed son behind with his father.'' And
then it goes on to talk about her house being destroyed.
Another vignette, an 80-year-old woman in a Swat district,
her daughter and granddaughter walked for 2 days and 2 nights
to escape the fighting in the Swat.
Another vignette, from a 50-year-old living with 90 family
members in a temporary home.
So, it goes on and on from there, and you--those of you in
the audience who have studied this understand what we're
talking about. This is a humanitarian crisis.
Fortunately, America is usually at her best when it comes
to reacting when we have a humanitarian crisis. And I think
this is one of those examples. I'll talk about what some other
countries are not doing, in a moment.
The second reason why this is a crisis that the American
people should be concerned about is this. The response to the
crisis offers the Government of Pakistan an opportunity to
consolidate the gains achieved so far this year in extending
its writ of authority over territories where the government
previously ruled in name only. All of us commend the leadership
of President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani in sending
military forces to oust Taliban leaders who have gone too far.
But, the sacrifices made by the army will be for naught if
large numbers of IDPs turn against the government for lack of
assistance during their time of need.
It's incumbent upon the Government of Pakistan to
reestablish security and provide basic services in the Swat
Valley and surrounding areas to facilitate an orderly and
voluntary return of the displaced.
It is my hope that today's subcommittee hearing can shed
light on three critical challenges the United States must
address together with Pakistan and the international community.
First, I've been disappointed, to say the least, by the
lackluster response of the international community to date,
especially that of the gulf states. Less than 50 percent--less
than 50 percent--of the U.N. appeal has been met with pledges
from the international community. And the United States is, far
and away, the largest donor. We're not talking about military
forces, here; just financial assistance. It's time our allies
and friends step up to the plate and help out, here.
Second, I'm concerned by recent news reports that the fact
that the United States is providing so much of this assistance
seems not to be understood by the Pakistani people. Following
the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, the United States helped
organize an overwhelming response, earning a significant public
diplomacy victory for hearts and minds of the Pakistani
population. It's unfortunate that a similar scenario is not
playing out today.
And, of course, when we talk about a public diplomacy
victory, we're not just talking about something to pat
ourselves on the back as Americans. That's all--that's
wonderful. But, we're talking about changing hearts and minds
so that we can create better security situations, both in
Pakistan and, therefore, in the best interests of--the national
security interests of the United States.
Finally, our third worry is that the lack of official
coordination and resources in the crowded IDP camps is
providing an opportunity for extremist groups to fill any
vacuum. Indeed, I'm concerned by the reports that banned
organizations have beaten the Pakistan Government to the punch,
organizing these camps to provide delivery of needed medicine
and food, and using the opportunity to spread a message of
extremism and hate in the camps. I look forward to hearing from
our witnesses on the first panel on the accuracy of this
report, if you dispute those reports, and what, if anything, is
being done to counter this disturbing development.
We are pleased, today, to have an excellent group of
witnesses to explain the dimensions of the crisis and how the
United States and the international community can work to
assist the Pakistani Government in addressing this urgent
crisis.
Our first panel will feature the Honorable Eric Schwartz,
the Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and
Migration--we welcome him here, and all of his experience and
commitment--and Jon Brause, the Deputy Assistant Administrator
at the U.S. Agency for International Development, which we all
know as USAID, responsible for overseeing much of the United
States assistance to help ameliorate the Pakistani IDP crisis.
Assistant Secretary Schwartz just returned from the region
yesterday and can provide us a firsthand account of the
situation on the ground in the Swat Valley and to what extent
the small-scale returns we have seen in recent days heralds a
more significant resettlement trend.
Both men can explain what the United States is doing to
respond to the immediate crisis and provide for future
contingencies associated with the oncoming monsoon season and a
potential military incursion into South Waziristan.
I will save, for now, the introduction of our witnesses for
the second panel, but I am eager to hear their testimony, as
well, and their perspective.
With that, let me take the opportunity that we'll probably
have, I guess, in a few moments, to turn to our ranking member,
Senator Risch, for his opening statement. And I want to welcome
Senators Shaheen and Kaufman here today, and others who will be
with us today to examine this challenge that we have.
Maybe, at this time--until Senator Risch arrives--we'll go
to opening statements.
And, Assistant Secretary Schwartz, maybe you can start. I
put a number of 8 minutes on you. We'll try to hold you to that
as best we can. There'll be no--as you know, there'll be no
bang of the gavel, necessarily, but if you can stick to
something close to 8 minutes, that would help.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERIC SCHWARTZ, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Schwartz. Your letter invited me to speak for 10
minutes, so if I come in under 10, I hope that's OK.
Senator Casey. I just made a slight amendment. [Laughter.]
Mr. Schwartz. Senator Casey and members of the panel, thank
you for the opportunity to appear today on the humanitarian
situation in Pakistan.
I was in the job for less than 8 days when, with the strong
endorsement of the Secretary of State and our Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, I went on this
trip. I went because this is such a critically important issue
confronting the United States.
I spoke to Ambassador Holbrooke this morning and told him
about the hearing. He was aware of the hearing. He asked me,
personally, to convey to you all his deep appreciation for the
very strong support of the Senate with respect to our approach
on Pakistan and Afghanistan, and for your support for the
supplemental critical assistance.
I traveled last week to both Pakistan and Sri Lanka to
assess the humanitarian situation in each country, and to
consider how the United States can best sustain and enhance our
efforts to provide relief and promote the conditions for
sustainable recovery.
For most of my visit in Pakistan, I was with Ambassador
Holbrooke. And over the course of the trip, I visited the
Jalozai camp for displaced persons, east of Peshawar, where
some 87,000 of the displaced are located. Our delegation also
met with President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani and other
senior officials. I met separately with Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmed,
the head of a military special support group that is playing a
key role in the assistance effort. I saw other Pakistani
officials involved in relief, senior representatives of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, and other international
organizations, as well as representatives of international and
local aid providers that are partnering with the Government of
Pakistan to manage this humanitarian response.
I think it's very important that I first acknowledge those
on the ground who have responded so generously and effectively
to this huge challenge, including Pakistani families, who have
hosted most of the more than 2 million internally displaced
persons. It's important to realize that most of the displaced
are not in camps; they're being hosted by families.
On the other side are extremists who bomb mosques and
markets, destroy schools, murder teachers because they allow
girls in the classroom, and kill aid workers. This month, at
the Kacha Gari camp for displaced persons, gunmen killed a
Pakistani employee of UNHCR. His name was Zill-e-Usman. They
also killed a Mr. Allauddin, a guard employed by the Office of
the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, an agency of the Pakistan
Government.
Mr. Usman, of UNHCR, had worked for that organization for
25 years, and left behind a wife and four children. He was one
of three UNHCR employees killed in Pakistan this year, and his
death and the plight of his family is emblematic of the
suffering that the Taliban has visited on so many in Pakistan.
Let me now turn to a background of the crisis, describe and
assess the current situation, including our response, and
present my view of the near-term challenges.
As you know, in response to the widespread abuses and
lawlessness of the Pakistani Taliban, the government launched a
military campaign in late April to break the Taliban's hold on
Buner and, soon after, Swat, in the North West Frontier
Province.
By June, displacement reached a plateau of more than 2
million people, as you said, including about half a million
people who had been displaced in earlier conflict. About 15
percent were living in official camps, but the overwhelming
majority, 85 percent, was living in host communities. People in
both camps and host communities endured, and continue to
experience, crowded conditions, lack of privacy, and often poor
sanitation and shortages of safe drinking water and other
supplies, but there have been no major outbreaks of disease or
instances of widespread hunger among the many displaced persons
living within and outside the camps.
Now, the crisis has entered a new phase, in two respects:
Return of the recently displaced and the new displacement from
South Waziristan, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
On the first of those issues, as the military retook
territory from militants, people began returning to their home
districts in large numbers. On July 13, the authorities
launched an operation to provide transport, security, and, with
the assistance of humanitarian organizations, essential
supplies to returnees. Although these are estimates, which are
in flux and, in any event, have a margin of uncertainty, the
government reports that, in all, well over 700,000 displaced
persons have returned home to the agencies of the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas and to the North West Frontier
Province.
Uncertainty about security, basic services, and prospects
for restoring their incomes are deterring some people from
returning home, and some individual family members are making
trips home to gather information on whether to bring their
families back.
On July 11, Pakistani and U.N. officials agreed on a policy
framework for returns, stipulating that returns should be
voluntary, informed, dignified, safe, and sustainable. I have
discussed with officials reports that some displaced persons
may have felt undue pressures to return. This issue will remain
an important part of our bilateral dialogue with the Government
of Pakistan. However, it is encouraging that Pakistani
authorities have continued to emphasize their commitment to
this principle of voluntariness, and have made clear their
willingness to take seriously and investigate concerns about
the repatriation process.
On the second issue: South Waziristan; sporadic fighting on
the ground and air attacks have displaced about 60,000 people
or more, and this number will increase with the expected
offensive against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan group.
So, what are the conclusions from this analysis?
First, the humanitarian response has been inadequate. The
U.N. appeal of $543 million is only 38 percent funded, and
other governments must come forward to help. This was one of
the largest rapid displacements of people in recent memory.
And, while Pakistani authorities and partners responded
effectively and returns have begun, there are still 1\1/2\
million who have not returned.
I should note that the United States has very much met our
responsibility, leading the way in the international response,
with more than $320 million committed since May of this year.
The Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration that I lead at
the State Department has already provided about $60 million for
this response to support key international partners, and we're
prepared to do more this fiscal year.
Second, the principal immediate challenge is to create
conditions to support voluntary and durable returns. This
includes reestablishing security, utilities, civil
administration, providing food, restoring livelihoods. We're
supporting international organizations that are already
focusing on this return and rehabilitation issue. And Jon
Brause, my colleague, will tell you more about USAID efforts in
this area.
I see I have 14 seconds remaining; I've got about 45
seconds more of prose. So, if you will indulge me.
Third----
Senator Casey. You have----
[Laughter.]
Senator Casey [continuing]. My indulgence.
Mr. Schwartz. Third, relief organizations must be prepared
to continue to meet the needs of those displaced persons who
may not be able to return home promptly, especially as the
monsoon season is beginning.
Fourth, the government and the humanitarian community must
prepare for displacement from South Waziristan, and possibly
neighboring areas. The displacement may reach 150,000 people,
or more, once full-scale military operations begin.
Finally, the longer term task of rebuilding infrastructure
must begin now. The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank
are preparing an assessment of damages that should be available
at the beginning of September, and Pakistan will need
substantial support from donors to rebuild.
In closing, let me note that the Taliban's atrocities have
turned many Pakistani citizens against them. A public opinion
poll conducted in May revealed that 81 percent of those
surveyed considered the Taliban a critical threat to the vital
interests of Pakistan, compared with only 34 percent in 2007.
By sustaining and strengthening humanitarian assistance to its
displaced population, by ensuring return, in safety and in
dignity, and promoting the conditions for sustainable recovery
and development, the Government of Pakistan can offer the
prospect of a brighter future for millions of its citizens and
further diminish support for misguided and dangerous extremism.
We stand ready to continue to assist in this effort, and I
welcome your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schwartz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eric P. Schwartz, Assistant Secretary of State
for Population, Refugees, and Migration, Department of State,
Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, last week, I
visited Pakistan with Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to assess the
humanitarian crisis and the response of the Pakistani Government and
international community. I am grateful for this opportunity to share
with you my perspectives on the humanitarian situation and to consider
what more we and others can do to ameliorate the suffering of those
displaced from their homes, as well as to create conditions for their
return and the sustainable recovery of their communities.
Let me first acknowledge those on the ground who have responded so
generously and effectively to this huge humanitarian challenge. Most of
the more than 2 million internally displaced persons found refuge in
homes of thousands of Pakistani families. Humanitarian workers from
Pakistan and around the world are working tirelessly under difficult,
and often dangerous, conditions to save lives. They have our admiration
and our gratitude.
On the other side are extremists who bomb mosques and markets,
destroy schools, murder teachers because they allow girls in
classrooms, and kill aid workers. When extremists bombed the Pearl
Continental Hotel in Peshawar in June, UNICEF Pakistan Chief of
Education, Peseveranda So; U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
employee, Aleksandar Vorkapic; and three members of a U.N. Population
Fund implementation team were among the 18 people killed; many other
U.N. humanitarian workers were wounded, at least one seriously. This
month at the Kacha Gari camp for displaced persons, gunmen killed a
Pakistani employee of UNHCR, Mr. Zill-e-Usman, and Mr. Allauddin, a
guard employed by the Office of the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees,
an agency of the Pakistani Government. Another UNHCR staff member and
another guard were wounded. Mr. Usman had worked for UNCHR for 25
years. He left behind a wife and four children. He was one of three
UNHCR employees killed in Pakistan this year.
Allow me now to offer background on the humanitarian crisis,
describe and assess the current situation--including the U.S. and
international response--and present my view of the near-term
challenges.
BACKGROUND
In response to the widespread abuses and lawlessness of the
Pakistani Taliban, the government launched a military campaign in late
April to break the Taliban's hold on Buner, and soon thereafter, Swat
in the North West Frontier province (NWFP). Within a few weeks, the
fighting caused about 1\1/2\ million people to flee. They joined more
than half a million others who had fled fighting in the summer and fall
of 2008 between the military and Pakistani Taliban in Bajaur and
Mohmand Agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and
Lower Dir. By mid-June, more than 2 million displaced persons, or
approximately 300,000 families, were living within an arc of 100 miles
north and east of Peshawar.
In June, the displacement reached a plateau of more than 2 million
people. About 15 percent were living in official camps; 85 percent were
living in host communities, with families in rental housing or public
buildings. Displaced persons have used nearly 4,000 schools as
shelters.
People in both camps and host communities endured and continue to
experience crowded conditions, lack of privacy, and often, poor
sanitation and shortages of safe drinking water. Supplies of essential
medicines and numbers of medical personnel, particularly female medical
personnel, are insufficient. The main health problems are
gastrointestinal disorders, respiratory infections, and skin diseases.
Camp management, which includes the NWFP government, UNHCR, and the
Pakistani Red Crescent Society among others, keeps the camps in good
order. While camps tend to be better served than host communities,
there have been no major outbreaks of disease or instances of
widespread hunger among the many displaced persons living within or
outside the camps.
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE STRUCTURE
The Emergency Response Unit (ERU) of the NWFP government is
responsible for overall coordination of relief activities. At the
federal level, a Special Support Group (SSG), under the leadership of
Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmed, assists the NWFP government and coordinates
operationally with international organizations and NGOs.
The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
ensures coordination and information-sharing among the various service
providers through the mechanism of the U.N. cluster system. This system
organizes U.N. agencies, NGOs, and government agencies into thematic
groups (camp coordination and management; emergency shelter and nonfood
items; water, sanitation and hygiene; food security; health;
protection; education; logistics; agriculture; and early recovery) to
address needs in particular sectors more coherently and effectively. A
representative from the appropriate government department and from a
U.N. agency cochair each cluster. The World Food Programme (WFP), which
leads the logistics cluster for the U.N., manages most of the 36
humanitarian hubs to deliver supplies. U.N. agencies are operating from
Peshawar with a reduced presence in the aftermath of the bombing of the
Pearl Continental Hotel on June 9.
AFGHAN REFUGEES
The current humanitarian crisis in the NWFP is not the only
challenge of displacement in the region. Some 1.7 million registered
Afghan refugees live in Pakistan, in addition to up to 500,000
unregistered Afghans. Most of them have lived in Pakistan for more than
20 years; many were born there. Like the displaced Pakistanis in the
NWFP, they are principally ethnic Pashtuns, although they live in
separate camps or communities throughout NWFP and in eastern
Baluchistan.
UNHCR protects and assists Afghan refugees in Pakistan in
cooperation with the Pakistani Government and with NGOs funded directly
by donors, including the United States. One effect of the fighting has
been the temporary suspension of UNHCR's program of voluntary
repatriation from Peshawar because of the security risks. While more
than 275,000 Afghans were repatriated from Pakistan in 2008, the number
so far this year has been only 44,000. UNHCR's Afghanistan repatriation
and reintegration program is still able to receive those willing to
return, but we remain concerned that recent events in Pakistan have
disrupted returns at a key point in Afghanistan's own reconstruction.
We look forward to seeing the resumption of the repatriation program in
NWFP when security permits.
NEW PHASE
Pakistan's internal displacement crisis has now entered a new phase
in two respects. First, as the military retakes territory from
militants, people are returning to their home districts in large
numbers. As is typical in cases of large and ongoing population
movements, estimates have a margin of uncertainty. The government
reports that, in all, well over 700,000 displaced persons have returned
home to the FATA Agencies and NWFP. Also according to the government,
some 100,000 people have returned to Bajaur Agency in the FATA; limited
areas within the region remain unsafe and are still producing
displacement. More than 300,000 people--about two-thirds of the
district's population--have returned to Buner.
Earlier this month, the government announced the completion of its
offensive in Swat. On July 13, Pakistani authorities launched an
operation to provide transport, security and, with the assistance of
humanitarian organizations, essential supplies to returnees. The
operation began with camp populations and then expanded to assist
displaced people in host communities. Two camps in Mardan district have
closed as their inhabitants returned home. At least 300,000 people have
returned to the more secure, less damaged areas of Lower Swat. The vast
majority of returnees have traveled in private vehicles rather than in
government-provided transport. The government has stated that it plans
to complete its operation of assisted returns by the third week in
August.
U.S. Government personnel have conducted assessments in Buner
district and report light to moderate damage, although police stations
and some schools have suffered severe damage. Electricity and
telecommunications are largely restored, but the water supply
infrastructure requires repair.
Early reports indicate that damage to infrastructure in Swat is
more severe than in Buner, although varied by location. USAID teams
that entered Swat on July 16 observed little damage south of Mingora,
but heavier destruction in the city itself, home to more than 200,000
people, particularly to buildings targeted or occupied by the Taliban.
Areas north of Mingora are inaccessible and insecure.
Uncertainty about security, basic services, and prospects for
restoring their incomes are deterring some people from returning home.
Humanitarian agencies report that some individual family members are
making trips to gather information for a decision on whether to bring
their families back. This is typical in such situations--we call them
``go and see visits.'' Another factor slowing returns is that many
families are waiting to receive their $300 debit card from the
government. As of July 25, the Pakistani Government had distributed
about 220,000 debit cards to eligible families. The Pakistani
Government is allocating $100 million to fund this program. The
military has committed to staying in the Malakand division, which
includes Swat, Buner, and Lower Dir, for 12 months to provide security.
On July 11, the Provincial Relief Commissioner, on behalf of the
Chief Secretary of the NWFP, and a representative of UNHCR, on behalf
of the humanitarian community, signed an official statement that sets
out a policy framework for returns. The core of the return policy
framework is that the return of displaced persons should be voluntary,
informed, dignified, safe and sustainable, which we strongly endorse.
During my visit, government officials told me they are committed to act
in accordance with these principles. I discussed with officials reports
that some displaced persons may have felt undue pressure to return (for
example, as a result of the reduction or elimination of services in
some camps), and this issue will remain an important part of our
bilateral dialogue. However, it is encouraging that the Pakistani
authorities have made clear their willingness to take seriously and
investigate concerns about the repatriation process and other issues
affecting displaced persons.
A second development is the increase in displacement from South
Waziristan and neighboring areas of the FATA. Sporadic fighting on the
ground and air attacks in South Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai, and Bannu
have displaced about 60,000 people, and this number will increase with
the expected main offensive against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
group headed by Baitullah Mehsud. Although international humanitarian
organizations are prepositioning supplies in Bhakkar in nearby Punjab,
they have no direct access to Tank and D.I. Khan, the areas receiving
most of the displaced people. Pakistani authorities are responsible for
registering them and providing assistance. The authorities do not
intend to establish camps, and we believe that the displaced have no
interest in going to camps. They are staying with host families, in
second homes, in rented accommodations, or in schools.
ASSESSMENT
Nearly 3 months into this humanitarian crisis, one can draw some
conclusions about the response and the situation more broadly. First,
the initial conditions presented huge challenges: A large and rapidly
developing displacement in an area of heavy fighting between the
Pakistani military and well-armed groups, as well as several deadly
terrorist attacks beyond the area of military operations. Many of the
affected areas, while rural, were densely populated. The outflow of
people represented one of the heaviest displacements in recent history.
Second, Pakistani authorities, assisted by humanitarian
organizations, responded rapidly and effectively to the emerging
crisis. The NWFP government established an Emergency Response Unit
(ERU) and declared that it would devote its entire development budget
for 2009 for humanitarian relief. The federal government established
the Special Support Group (SSG) and appointed Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmad,
who managed the relief effort for the 2005 earthquake, to head the
operations of the group and oversee on-the-ground coordination between
the government and international humanitarian organizations.
At the request of the Pakistani Government, the U.N. issued an
emergency appeal for $542 million some 3 weeks after the Swat offensive
began. International agencies such as UNHCR, the World Food Programme
(WFP), UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and Pakistani and international
NGOs, set up camps, activated the humanitarian cluster system, helped
the Pakistani Government register displaced people, and distributed
food and emergency supplies. It was helpful that several of these
organizations already had a presence and emergency response capability
in the area because of their participation in the relief effort for the
Bajaur displacement in 2008, the earthquake in 2005, and their
continuing support for Afghan refugees.
Third, in spite of massive displacement in one of the poorer areas
of Pakistan, the humanitarian response has been effective in preventing
dire outcomes, while providing shelter, protection, and critical
medical attention to hundreds of thousands of people. There has been
neither widespread hunger nor outbreak of epidemic disease. This is due
in great part to the hospitality and generosity of the many ordinary
Pakistani citizens who took in not only relatives but often complete
strangers and shared what they had. But it is also due to a rapid
response by humanitarian organizations--both international and
Pakistani.
Fourth, despite its success, the humanitarian response lacks
sufficient funding. As of July 27, the U.N. appeal of $542 million was
only 38-percent funded, at $203 million. Donors have also contributed
$104 million to the Government of Pakistan and to organizations outside
of the U.N. appeal. To date, the U.S. Government has provided more than
half of the total humanitarian assistance to Pakistan. Although we can
take satisfaction in our support for the Pakistani people, other
governments need to do more.
Fifth, the Taliban's atrocities have turned many Pakistani citizens
against them. A public opinion poll \1\ conducted in May revealed that
81 percent of those surveyed considered the Taliban a critical threat
to the vital interests of Pakistan, compared with 34 percent in
September 2007. Asked whom they supported in the Swat conflict, 70
percent preferred the government compared to 5 percent for the Taliban.
Where fighting raged in the NWFP, nearly every day we read in the
Pakistani press of villagers and tribal militias turning against
Taliban militants. In May, the government convened an All-Parties
Conference that resulted in a declaration supporting military action
against insurgents and extremists and condemning violent extremism and
challenges to the state's authority in any part of Pakistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Ramsay, et al., ``Pakistani Public Opinion on the Swat
Conflict, Afghanistan and the United States,'' July 1, 2009, http://
www.worldpublicopinion.org/, a project managed by the Program on
International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Further, following press reports in May that charities with links
to extremist groups, such as Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FIF), were
engaged in some IDP camps in NWFP, we raised this issue with the
Government of Pakistan, which agreed to address it. We understand that
in general terms, the GOP, through its security presence, is monitoring
this kind of activity in camps and other IDP settings, and that due to
government pressure specifically, FIF was made to restrict its
activities with IDPs in the camps. The Pakistani Government's response
to the crisis, including its close work with humanitarian
organizations, has been an important factor in its ability to maintain
public support for a strong response to the Taliban insurgency.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES
In this crisis, the administration, its agencies, and Congress have
acted in concert to generate the resources and deliver them effectively
to the people of Pakistan. The substantial U.S. response demonstrates
our solidarity with the Pakistani people and support for the Pakistani
Government in these trying times. Early on, USAID deployed a DART team
to assess conditions and recommend where to direct emergency
assistance. By the time that the U.N. had issued its appeal in May,
Secretary Clinton had developed and announced a $110 million U.S.
assistance package, nearly all of which was disbursed within a few
weeks. The Secretary, Ambassador Holbrooke, and our Embassies around
the world urged other governments to meet the humanitarian challenge
with additional resources. USAID, USDA, DOD, and my Bureau at the State
Department have all mobilized to deliver vital assistance to our
partners on the ground on a timely basis--shelter, protection, food,
medical supplies and services, electric generators, and transport and
logistics support.
Following Ambassador Holbrooke's visit to Pakistan in early June,
the President requested an additional $200 million in emergency
assistance, and Congress passed a supplemental appropriation shortly
thereafter. Those funds are now beginning to flow. I thank you for
appropriating these additional funds. Congressional support has been
critical to our assistance efforts. We applaud the Senate's passage by
unanimous consent of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (S.
962), which authorizes $1.5 billion per year in nonmilitary assistance
for 5 years. Final passage of this legislation will be a powerful
demonstration of our long-term commitment to helping the Pakistani
people and reinforce our desire for a long-term partnership based on
common interests.
Since May, the United States has pledged more than $320 million in
humanitarian assistance to Pakistan to meet the needs of conflict-
affected people. Last week in Islamabad, Ambassador Holbrooke outlined
how we will spend $165 million of funds available (most from the FY
2009 supplemental appropriation) to meet ongoing needs of displaced
persons in camps and host communities, and also to address needs as
people return to build their homes and communities.
The bureau I head, Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), has
committed nearly $60 million for humanitarian relief efforts this
fiscal year, $25 million of which has already been provided to
humanitarian organizations and $35 million of which Ambassador
Holbrooke announced last week in Pakistan. We are currently in the
process of providing these new funds to our principal partners in
Pakistan--UNHCR and the ICRC. Within the U.N. system for this
emergency, UNHCR has lead responsibility for protection, camp
coordination and management, emergency shelter, and provision of
nonfood items (which include blankets, cooking sets, mosquito nets, and
jerry cans) to people in camps and host communities.
Protecting vulnerable populations is a global priority for PRM. In
Pakistan, UNHCR's protection function includes assisting the government
to register displaced people and helping people with special needs,
particularly the elderly, women, and children. UNHCR has set up child
protection committees in camps to protect children from violence and
abuse, and has reunited separated children with their parents.
Since the Bajaur crisis in August 2008, ICRC has provided
assistance in insecure areas where most other providers, including U.N.
agencies, have been unable to operate. ICRC was the first humanitarian
organization to enter Swat in areas where fighting was still underway.
In cooperation with its national partner, the Pakistan Red Crescent
Society (PRCS), ICRC provides medical assistance, food, and other
emergency assistance to people in camps, host communities and, where
possible, people trapped by fighting. They also administer several
camps, trace missing family members, and reunite families. The
Department of State is proud to support UNHCR and ICRC on behalf of the
American people.
LOOKING AHEAD
Let me close by identifying the main challenges for the
humanitarian effort over the next few months.
First, the humanitarian response is underfunded; other donor
governments must do more to help. While about 700,000 people have
returned home, there are still approximately 1.5 million displaced
people. And we should not forget that Pakistan is still generously
hosting 1.7 million registered Afghan refugees. Even with substantial
returns of displaced persons, current operations require additional
resources, and donors should support early recovery in areas of return.
The long-term reconstruction needs are greater and will require
coordinated and sustained engagement from international donors.
Second, the new and principal challenge is to create conditions to
support voluntary and durable returns. These conditions include
reestablishing security, utilities, and civil administration, providing
food, and restoring livelihoods. The World Food Programme (WFP)
estimates that many returnees will need food assistance for 6 to 12
months to compensate for lost crops and income. While many people will
continue to rely on food and other consumable relief supplies,
resources will have to shift progressively to support interventions
that restore normal daily life. In this respect, UNHCR is assisting
Pakistani authorities by funding transportation for voluntary returns
and supplying nonfood items for returnees. It plans to provide
protection and advocacy through an information and referral service for
returnees.
The ICRC is helping 217,000 people in 31,000 households restore
their livelihoods by distributing seeds and tools for the next planting
season. USAID is providing assistance for debris removal, medical and
agricultural programs, repair of infrastructure, and cash-for-work
programs. These efforts at early recovery are absolutely essential, and
you will hear more on this from my colleague, Jon Brause.
Third, relief organizations must be prepared to meet the needs of
those displaced persons who may not be able to return home promptly--
especially as the monsoon season is beginning. Humanitarian
organizations estimate that perhaps 30 to 50 percent of those displaced
will not be able to return home before the onset of winter, and will
need continuing assistance.
Fourth, the government and the humanitarian community must prepare
for displacement from South Waziristan and possibly neighboring areas.
This displacement may reach 150,000 people or more once full-scale
military operations get underway. The relief effort will require a
different supply chain from that established for NWFP. Humanitarian
organizations have begun to preposition supplies in Punjab, but the
military has not authorized the setup of delivery points closer to the
areas of displacement. We will work with the Pakistani authorities and
international assistance providers to promote ease of assistance to
these populations.
Finally, the longer term task of rebuilding infrastructure must
begin now. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank are preparing an
assessment of damages that should be available at the beginning of
September. Pakistan will need substantial support from donors to
rebuild. Timely reconstruction is critical to ensuring our
humanitarian, development, and security objectives.
It is clear that the people and Government of Pakistan and their
partners around the world have accomplished much. But much remains to
be done. The administration is committed to sustaining and
strengthening our efforts to support recovery and development in
Pakistan.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
Mr. Brause.
STATEMENT OF JON BRAUSE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU
FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Brause. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. Thank you for the opportunity to update you on the
internal displacement in Pakistan and on the U.S. Government's
humanitarian assistance efforts.
With your permission, I'd like to submit written testimony
for the record and provide a brief overview of our assistance
efforts in my oral statement.
Senator Casey. Both of your statements will be incorporated
into the record in their--in the full capacity.
Mr. Brause. Thank you very much.
We appreciate the continued support of Congress and the
supplemental funding recently enacted for both disaster
assistance and food aid. Both have permitted us to aggressively
respond to the current crisis in Pakistan.
Operating in support of the Government of Pakistan, the
whole of the United States Government is working to ensure
assistance is provided to Pakistanis in need. In particular,
USAID is working in close coordination with Assistant Secretary
Schwartz and his staff in responding to this complex and
rapidly evolving crisis, which requires both flexible and
creative solutions. Since August 2008, the United States
Government has provided more than $171 million, of more than
$320 million pledged, for humanitarian assistance to conflict-
affected individuals in Pakistan.
Dollar figures, however, do not convey the true breadth of
U.S. humanitarian assistance. Mr. Chairman, as you pointed out,
the United States is usually at our best when it comes to
humanitarian response. With the combined resources of agencies,
the U.S. Government is uniquely prepared to respond to
international crises on the ground--with on-the-ground
expertise and resources, and that is true today in Pakistan.
Let me give you some examples. When the Government of
Pakistan requested large tents, generators, and meals ready to
eat, the United States Department of Defense responded by
immediately airlifting air-conditioned tents, generators, and
Halal meals to Islamabad. The U.S. Department of Agriculture,
through its Food for Progress Program, is providing over 50,000
metric tons of U.S. wheat and 6,800 tons of vegetable oil,
totaling $43.5 million in assistance to help feed the displaced
and returnees through the end of the year. They shifted a
program, that wasn't originally focused on the displaced, and
transferred the commodities to meet the sudden onset needs that
took place in May.
And as you've heard from Assistant Secretary Schwartz, the
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration has already
provided $24.6 million in assistance through UNHCR and ICRC,
and will be provided an additional $35 million.
PRM's partners are critical to the success of the
humanitarian assistance operations in Pakistan. Within the U.N.
coordination system in Pakistan, UNHCR has the lead
responsibility of protection, camp coordination and management,
emergency shelter, and the provision of relief supplies within
the camps. ICRC has provided assistance in insecure areas,
where most other providers, including U.N. agencies, have been
unable to operate. In cooperation with its national partner,
the Pakistan Red Crescent Society, ICRC provides medical
assistance, food, and other emergency relief assistance to
people in camps, host communities, and, where possible, people
trapped by conflict. They also administer several camps, trace
missing family members, and reunite families, when possible.
With a unique range of expertise, assistance mechanisms,
and partner organizations, USAID had provided a broad range of
assistance, primarily from three offices: The Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance, the Office of Food for Peace, and the
Office of Transition Initiatives. To date, these offices have
provided approximately $122 million in assistance.
OTI's programs support the Government of Pakistan's efforts
to strengthen civil society and improve basic services, helping
the government build stronger relationships with communities.
As the crisis escalated in May, USAID, with the endorsement
of Ambassador Holbrooke, deployed a Disaster Assistance
Response Team to Pakistan. The team was composed of USAID
personnel with over 15 years of Pakistan and regional disaster
response experience in food aid, shelter, and displacement. The
DART was charged with managing U.S. Government assistance and
coordinating our efforts with those of the Pakistani Government
and the international community.
Our disaster response expertise is embodied in staff like
Bill Berger, OFDA's principal regional adviser for South Asia,
who has just arrived from Islamabad and is here with us today.
Bill was our DART team leader in the aftermath of the 2005
Pakistan earthquake, and he has been highly involved in our
response to the current crisis. As in 2005, USAID continues to
work closely with General Nadeen, who is the head of Pakistan's
Special Support Group and someone who Bill Berger has a very
close relationship.
Upon arrival, the DART found the typical U.N.-led
coordination mechanisms were not operational. The DART stepped
in to fill the void--calling coordination meetings, discussing
priorities with the Government of Pakistan, and working to
ensure needs were being met. To emphasize the need for U.N.-led
efforts, USAID provided funding for coordination and held
discussions with the U.N. Under Secretary General for
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, John
Holmes. Shortly after our discussions, the United Nations
appointed Mr. Martin Mogwanja as the U.N. humanitarian
coordinator for Pakistan, and he is now managing the
international coordination efforts for the United Nations.
With the strong support of Anne Patterson--Ambassador Anne
Patterson--and the USAID mission director, Bob Wilson, the DART
spent its first days on the ground assessing the humanitarian
situation and partner capacities. Building on an existing OFDA
program to detect signs of an epidemic at an early stage in
order to prevent disease outbreaks, the DART increased support
to the World Health Organization's Disease and Early Warning
System. On July 3, U.N. officials reported that the system has
identified and controlled more than 30 potential communicable
disease outbreaks.
When food availability was identified as a continuing
issue, the DART food officer quickly called forward 4,000
metric tons of Title II food aid by diverting shipments already
on the water and transferring commodities from prepositioned
stocks in Djibouti. Through the World Food Programme, this food
was distributed to IDP camps and hubs within the week of
arrival at port.
In addition, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
provided funds from the local and regional--pardon me--for the
local and regional procurement of food aid, which is a
critically needed complement to our traditional food aid. With
our funding, WFP was able to locally purchase and distribute
over 55,000 metric tons of wheat and 3,300 metric tons of
beans. This quickly addressed acute food needs, and it had the
added benefit of stimulating the local economy, keeping farmers
employed.
Field assessments, when possible, help identify any gaps in
assistance and ensure USAID programs are meeting emerging
humanitarian needs. Though fluid security conditions forced the
cancellation of many scheduled trips, the DART was able to make
over 17 assessment trips to conflict-affected areas.
After 2 months on the ground, and despite enormous security
constraints, the DART had successfully provided assistance
through 6 U.N. agencies and 12 nongovernmental organizations,
including Mercy Corps, International Medical Corps, and Save
The Children.
As displaced families return home, pressures on the camps
and host families are likely to diminish. According to Pakistan
Government officials, up to 700,000 displaced individuals have
returned to their homes in recent weeks. As we look ahead, we
must be mindful of the security situation for returnees and the
possible uptick in displacements from Waziristan.
The security situation is the No. 1 challenge to
humanitarian operations. We continuously consult with our
partners, and we remain willing to support additional security
training, increased operational security analysis, and efforts
to improve humanitarian security coordination. We are helping
the Government of Pakistan establish a presence in conflict-
affected areas and restore essential services, and we are
working to identify and repair roads, educational institutions,
and hospitals damaged during the conflict.
Many of the displaced lost their harvest and may not be
able to plant for the coming year, so the Office of Food for
Peace is providing an additional $20 million of U.S. food aid
in August to support returnees, as well as those who remain
displaced. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance will also
continue to support the provision of farming tools and seeds,
as well as hygiene kits and household toolkits.
By creating jobs, rebuilding infrastructure, and providing
other necessary assistance, USAID programs will help foster
sustainable returns.
To ensure the ability of our--to respond rapidly to
changing circumstances, USAID has supported prepositioned
relief supplies, including food, household toolkits, emergency
kitchen sets, water containers, et cetera. USAID has also
provided support for WFP logistics hub and warehouse in Punjab
province to ensure that our partners are ready to respond to
potential displacement from Waziristan.
Our previous experience in Pakistan, and the strong
relationships we have built, enhance our ability to provide
assistance in support of the Pakistan Government. We are making
a positive impact in Pakistan, and our programs are an
effective and visible demonstration of the goodwill of the
American people.
Thank you, and I'll be happy to answer any questions you
might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brause follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jon C. Brause, Deputy Assistant Administrator for
Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, United States Agency
for International Development, Washington, DC
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to update you on Pakistan's internally displaced
persons and the humanitarian assistance efforts of the United States.
Operating in support of the Government of Pakistan, the whole of the
United States Government--from the State Department and Department of
Defense, to USAID and the Department of Agriculture--is working to
ensure assistance is provided to Pakistanis in need.
Assistant Secretary Schwartz and his staff are dedicated to
providing assistance to refugees, conflict victims, and stateless
people worldwide. Throughout the recent crisis in Pakistan, USAID has
worked in close coordination with Assistant Secretary Schwartz's bureau
to ensure the needs of the displaced are being met in a complex and
rapidly evolving environment.
We appreciate the continued support of the Congress and the
supplemental funding recently enacted for both humanitarian assistance
and Public Law 480 Title II food aid, which has permitted us to
aggressively respond to this crisis.
USAID is the lead agency within the U.S. Government for providing
assistance to, and promoting the protection of, internally displaced
persons (IDPs) internationally. With its strong operational presence in
the field and decades of experience responding to a broad range of
complex emergencies, natural disasters, and post-conflict situations
throughout the world, USAID is at the forefront of the humanitarian
community's effort to place greater emphasis on protection during the
immediate humanitarian response to population displacement, as well as
during the longer term transition toward development and stability.
Since USAID adopted an agencywide policy for internally displaced
persons in October 2004, we have worked with other U.S. Government
agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the international
community, and the United Nations to implement and strengthen
protection activities and mobilize funding for vulnerable populations.
A broad, integrated approach is required to reduce the human costs
of population displacement and to foster sustainable long-term
development. The provision of coherent, comprehensive assistance and a
durable solution to internal displacement is a USAID priority.
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN A CHALLENGING ENVIRONMENT
The U.S. Government has pledged more than $320 million in
humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected individuals in the North
West Frontier province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA). Of that amount, the United States has already provided more
than $171 million in humanitarian assistance, $122 million of which was
programmed by USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian
Assistance.
The USAID response began in August 2008, when monsoons and military
operations resulted in the displacement of more than 420,000 people.
USAID supported the Government of Pakistan efforts to assist not only
those who were displaced, but also the conflict-affected communities.
Our assistance included water, sanitation, and hygiene programs, basic
health care, and short-term employment activities.
In early 2009, the number of people displaced by conflict continued
to increase, and food was identified as the most urgent need. In
response, USAID provided nearly $30 million in food assistance, $21
million from USAID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) and nearly $9
million from USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
for the local and regional purchase of food aid. The food aid purchased
locally, which is a critically needed complement to our traditional
food aid, quickly addressed the acute food needs of those displaced
while having an added benefit of stimulating the local economy. USAID
also increased assistance for other identified needs, including basic
health care, shelter, and emergency relief commodities.
As the crisis rapidly escalated in May, USAID and other U.S.
Government agencies responded swiftly. With the endorsement of
Ambassador Holbrooke, and at the request of Ambassador Patterson, OFDA
deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) to Pakistan.
On May 18, Secretary Gates approved $10 million in Overseas
Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic funding to assist relief efforts. On
May 20-21, three U.S. Air Force C-17 sorties delivered 50 tents and
120,000 Halal meals to Pakistan. This was followed shortly thereafter
with DOD's delivery of locally purchased air conditioners, generators,
water trucks, and other items, such as sandbags and shovels, for
follow-on distribution to assist Pakistani IDPs.
The DART team--composed of USAID experts with over 15 years of
Pakistan and regional disaster response experience in food aid,
shelter, and displacement--was charged with managing U.S. Government
assistance and coordinating efforts with the Government of Pakistan and
the international humanitarian community.
Upon arrival, the DART found that there were no field assessments,
which provide the data needed to make informed funding decisions.
Security conditions prevented travel to conduct assessments in the
affected areas. The typical coordination mechanisms were not
operational, and other donors were providing only promises of
assistance.
The team knew from experience working in Pakistan on the 2005
earthquake response that the displaced would shelter with host
families. And the DART's experience proved true. The majority of
internally displaced persons--more than 87 percent--had moved to host
communities, while the remainder resided in 32 organized camps, more
than 4,000 schools, and numerous spontaneous camps or transit
locations.
The DART moved immediately and decisively to provide rapid, robust,
and creative assistance programs.
With the strong support of Ambassador Anne Patterson and USAID
Mission Director Bob Wilson, the DART spent its first days on the
ground assessing the humanitarian situation and partner capacities. Due
to significant security constraints, the team devised creative ways to
gather the necessary information, gleaning facts from regular
consultations with humanitarian partners and government officials,
supplemented by--and ground-truthed with--limited field assessment.
Because coordination is critical, the DART assumed responsibility
for partner coordination efforts in support of the Government of
Pakistan. Combined with USAID's funding to strengthen the humanitarian
coordination system, these efforts helped fill the initial coordination
gap in Pakistan.
Once the DART identified needs and reviewed proposals from
partners, they were able to fund programs within 3 to 5 days. After 2
months on the ground and despite enormous security constraints, the
DART successfully programmed more than $116 million in assistance
through 12 nongovernmental organizations and 6 U.N. agencies.
As the IDP crisis unfolded, the DART--working in collaboration with
the Embassy and Mission--ensured our emergency assistance increased to
keep pace with the needs. When displacement increased from 290,000
people in February to nearly 550,000 in March, USAID humanitarian
assistance doubled--from $9.4 million to nearly $20 million. After
Pakistani Taliban advances and the Government of Pakistan's military
response nearly quadrupled the number of displaced individuals in May
2009, USAID again responded by quadrupling humanitarian assistance to
more than $90 million. This does not include the assistance that
Assistant Secretary Schwartz has described from State's PRM Bureau,
which is also supporting the IDP populations.
USAID humanitarian assistance is driven by needs identified in the
field. When the security situation allowed, we pushed to make regular
visits to the affected areas to assess the situation. Our assessments
and those of our partners provided us with necessary information to
modify or target our assistance based on changing needs.
The DART provided assistance to address the needs in displaced
persons camps, but we focused our resources to support the displaced
residing in host communities and to the host communities themselves.
Our assistance included water, sanitation, and basic health care
programs. We also provided relief supplies such as hygiene kits and
shelter materials to the displaced and their hosts. We also provided
rent subsidies to reduce host family burdens and ensure that the
displaced did not place an untenable strain on host families.
In Mardan district, host families, communities, religious
organizations, and local charities were providing assistance to
displaced individuals. USAID targeted its assistance to meet the needs
of the displaced and host families through the provision of $45
vouchers to households. The vouchers were distributed to more than
90,000 displaced Pakistanis residing in host communities and schools
and to 5,000 host families struggling to provide not only for
themselves but also for those displaced. The vouchers enabled
Pakistanis to purchase exactly what they needed at local markets.
Something as simple as a voucher program can provide a much-needed
sense of self-reliance, and it helps stimulate the local economy, which
is critical to longer term recovery.
In already overstressed host communities, houses meant for 10
people were inhabited by 30 and sometimes more. So USAID provided
assistance that included training and supplies for the construction of
bamboo shelters, which families can easily disassemble and carry with
them when they return to their homes.
When displaced Pakistanis identified food as a continuing need,
USAID was able to quickly provide an additional $26.6 million for the
local purchase of food aid. The food, which consisted of wheat and
beans, was purchased in Pakistan--again bolstering the local economy.
During a recent DART assessment mission to Buner, the team noted
that there were few income-earning opportunities in the area, thus
those who returned would not be able to make a living. To help provide
jobs and boost the local economy, USAID is reprogramming funds and
allocating additional resources for further cash for work programs for
returnees.
Providing humanitarian assistance quickly and creatively is not
sufficient. Our assistance mechanisms must also remain flexible to
adequately respond as the crisis evolves or subsides. By providing the
majority of our assistance through grants to partner organizations, we
maintain the flexibility needed to respond to rapidly changing
situations by reprogramming or retargeting our funding as needs are
identified.
To ensure our ability to respond rapidly to changing circumstances,
USAID has supported prepositioned relief supplies--including food,
household tool kits, emergency kitchen sets, water containers, and
blankets--for distribution should the situation change and currently
unknown humanitarian needs develop. This includes USAID support for a
World Food Programme logistics hub and warehouse in Punjab province to
ensure that our partners are ready to respond to potential displacement
from Waziristan.
USAID also realizes that unknown needs will continue to be a
challenge in Pakistan. To prepare for possible future needs, USAID has
established an umbrella grant that allows for subgrants to local NGOs,
international NGOs, or U.N. agencies. This mechanism is designed to
provide rapid response funds for possible humanitarian needs anywhere
in the country.
There are significant operational challenges to providing
assistance in Pakistan, but USAID continues to address the challenges
head on, allowing us to provide timely and appropriate assistance to
Pakistanis in need. Operating in support of the Government of
Pakistan's efforts, USAID's singular ability to quickly respond to the
Pakistan IDP crisis with fast, flexible, and creative programming
prevented further destabilization in NWFP and FATA.
Before discussing our returns and early recovery programs, I want
to point out that the security situation is the No. 1 challenge to
humanitarian operations in Pakistan.
The fluid security situation in NWFP and FATA means limited, and at
times no, humanitarian access to the conflict-affected communities. The
risks are high, with recent kidnappings and killings of humanitarian
staff. Just this month, gunmen killed a United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees staff member and his guard, while wounding
another staff member. Sadly, other aid workers have also been killed or
wounded while working to meet humanitarian needs. NGOs are reluctant to
hire personal security details or use armored vehicles for fear of
negatively impacting programs and becoming larger targets. U.N.
agencies are using armored vehicles, but even these do not adequately
mitigate all risks.
Our NGO partners report that their ability to travel in the
affected areas has become significantly more difficult since April.
Security incidents have targeted both local and international aid
workers, and the female Pakistani staff are particularly concerned for
their safety. Since the June 9 bombing of the Pearl Continental Hotel
in Peshawar, increased responsibility has been placed on host country
nationals to carry out operations in areas considered unsafe for
international staff.
The security challenges faced by our implementing partners in
Pakistan are real, and we continuously consult with them to learn what
additional options might be available to mitigate their risks. USAID
remains willing to support additional security training, increased
operational security analysis, and efforts to improve humanitarian
security coordination. USAID also continues to work with the donor
community to ensure security precautions are adequately resourced.
SUPPORTING RETURNS AND EARLY RECOVERY
As displaced families return home, the pressures on the camps and
the host communities are likely to diminish. USAID is committed to
ensuring sustainable returns and successful recovery. USAID continues
to assist the displaced while simultaneously refocusing programs to
meet changing needs.
According to Pakistan Government officials, up to 700,000 displaced
individuals, representing approximately 30 percent of the government-
verified displaced population, have returned to areas of origin in
recent weeks, including areas in Buner, Swat, and Lower Dir districts
in NWFP and Bajaur Agency in FATA.
The majority of unassisted returns are families previously living
with host communities in Mardan and Swabi districts. The number of
spontaneous returns to Swat remains unknown; however, the Buner
District Coordination Officer reported to our DART team leader that up
to 320,000 people, approximately 65 percent of Buner's displaced
population, have returned to date. An additional 59,000 families
returned during the July 13-22 Government of Pakistan-assisted returns
process. As a result of these large-scale returns, the government
closed two camps in Mardan, and announced plans to close two more. On
July 21, OFDA's Principal Regional Advisor for South Asia flew over
these camps and described them as ``desolate.''
The DART was the first donor to assess the situation in Buner and
Swat, seeing the rapid spontaneous returns firsthand. After the
assessment, the DART quickly reprogrammed funds to assure that U.S.
assistance would follow those who were returning home.
Knowing the importance of assisting returnees and preventing a
secondary wave of displacement, USAID will support quick-impact
projects for the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure in areas of
return. An important aspect of our early recovery strategy is to
support projects designed and driven by the communities in which they
will be implemented, helping provide returnees a sense of ownership and
self-sufficiency.
USAID is working with communities to rebuild critical
infrastructure that also provides short-term employment opportunities
for affected populations. USAID funding is helping rehabilitate
electrical systems, wells, and irrigation channels that are necessary
before families are able to return to their homes.
Additionally, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives is
supporting the Government of Pakistan's efforts to reestablish a
presence in conflict-affected areas and restore essential services. We
are helping rebuild public buildings and return civil servants to
conflict-affected areas. And we are working with the Government of
Pakistan to identify and repair the roads, educational institutions,
and hospitals damaged during the conflict. By creating jobs and
rebuilding infrastructure, USAID programs will help foster sustainable
returns.
Due to the local economies' dependence on agriculture, USAID will
also support the provision of farming tools and grain and vegetable
seeds, as well hygiene kits and tool kits to be used for small home
repairs.
The Pakistan Government estimates that the private sector comprised
over 60 percent of the health sector in Buner alone and that the
private sector will be slow to return. In an effort to provide
necessary health care while services remain damaged and without staff,
USAID will support mobile clinics, basic medicines, and staff--
particularly female doctors and nurses--to provide assistance in areas
of return.
Through the World Food Programme's new food distribution hub in
Buner district, food aid provided by the United States will continue to
support monthly family food rations for returnees until agriculture and
livelihood activities in affected areas resume. USAID's Food for Peace
Office will contribute an additional $20 million of food aid in August,
which will mean the consistent flow of U.S. food shipments into
Pakistan through February 2010. Additionally, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture has pledged a total of $43.5 million in food assistance,
which will be added to the WFP food aid pipeline until the year's end.
In total, the U.S. Government has pledged $135.5 million in food aid in
response to the crisis. Our significant and timely food contributions
will ensure sufficient food support to the large numbers of displaced
who are now returning home and starting to rebuild their lives and
livelihoods.
Humanitarian agencies are formulating strategies and refocusing
assistance to support early recovery and returns. The key challenges
include security, accurate and timely information dissemination to
displaced populations, and ensuring that the returns process is
voluntary and sustainable.
To help ensure that accurate and timely returns information is
widely disseminated, USAID is working with the United Nations
protection cluster to develop rights- and return-based messages and key
information for release to affected populations. These messages, which
provide information on relief assistance and returns, will be
coordinated with the relevant Pakistan Government departments including
the NWFP Government's Emergency Response Unit.
Coordination between USAID disaster experts and the USAID Mission
on reconstruction, health, livelihoods, agriculture, and education will
facilitate the transition of short-term activities to longer term
development programming. USAID Mission staff are also actively engaged
in initiating and expanding immediate and medium-term activities.
This emergency assistance is in addition to the more than $4.4
billion the United States has provided to Pakistan since 2002 to
improve economic growth, education, health, and governance and to
assist with earthquake reconstruction.
CONCLUSION
Working in support of Government of Pakistan efforts, USAID--
alongside our U.S. Government partners--provided a rapid response to a
complicated, challenging, and swiftly evolving crisis. Now that the
situation has transitioned from displacement to returns and early
recovery, Pakistan will soon begin to focus on near- and long-term
reconstruction efforts.
As the United States shifts to longer term programs, USAID has
transitioned the DART to an OFDA field office. Like the DART, the field
office will continue to identify and respond to priority humanitarian
needs, work to enhance coordination and cohesion throughout the
humanitarian community, and evaluate response effectiveness. The field
office will remain engaged and prepared to meet emerging humanitarian
needs in Pakistan, while working closely with the Embassy and USAID
Mission during the transition from relief to development.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much, Mr. Brause.
I wanted to--for the benefit of our colleagues, we'll limit
the question round to--first question round to 5 minutes, so--
if people have to go. But, I do want to welcome, as well,
Senator Cardin, Senator Corker, and Senator Barrasso, who
joined with us, along with Senators Shaheen and Kaufman, that
we welcomed earlier.
One thing that I wanted to make clear for the record, just
so I'm understanding it correctly, is the number we have
asserted I want to make sure this number is, again, on the
record. The U.S. Government has pledged more than $320 million
in humanitarian assistance. I want to compare that to this
chart, which has a total of U.S. Government funding at $171
million. I guess that is the money spent to date. We talk about
numbers, and that's important. It's important that the American
people know what they're doing to help, here. We also talk
about the violence, I guess, from a distant perspective. But, I
was struck by the front page of yesterday's Wall Street
Journal, a really stunning picture of what we're talking about
here and you won't be able to see it in the audience, but I'll
just read the caption and then the headline over the picture.
The headline over the picture says, ``Returning Refugees in
Pakistan Conflict''--or, ``in Pakistan Confront Renewed Taliban
Violence.'' The caption reads as follows, ``Three girls at a
checkpoint Sunday are part of the flood of refugees returning
to Pakistan's Swat Valley after the military declared it
secure, but Taliban militants are again infiltrating the
region, kidnaping and beheading perceived enemies, and
ambushing soldiers,'' a graphic summary of the violence and the
threat and the stunning implications of what's happening over
there.
But, fortunately, the picture tells another story. These
three young girls, three beautiful girls, two of them, you can
see them--one is obscured a little bit, but two of them
smiling, in the midst of all that violence and all that trauma.
So, if those children, those young women, can smile in the
midst of all that violence and displacement and horror, really,
we've got to stay focused on this problem.
And for those out there who say, ``Well, this is something
distant and halfway across the world,'' they ought to take a
look at that picture and also understand the grave reality of
what a crisis like this does in its threat to our own national
security.
So, I was struck by that picture, I guess, because I'm the
father of four daughters. Maybe that hit me in a particular
way.
But, I wanted to talk, first of all, about a troubling
development here, about what I would argue--and I--if I'm wrong
about this, I'd ask either of our witnesses to correct me if
I'm wrong, but--what I perceive, and I think what a lot of
people perceive, is a deliberate attempt to obscure the United
States role here by some officials in Pakistan.
American officials are not permitted inside IDP camps. And
some of this was outlined in a recent New York Times story.
They're not permitted in those camps to help supervise the
distribution of U.S. aid. American military planes are not
allowed to deliver the assistance, and U.S.-supplied products
are not identified as such, as coming from the people of the
United States.
First, and I'll start with you, Assistant Secretary
Schwartz--can you explain the Government of Pakistan's policies
in obscuring the United States role? And second, Are they
asserting, in that obscuring of our role, any legitimate
security reasons for these kind of restrictions? If I can get
your perspective on that.
Mr. Schwartz. First, I'm a pretty senior American official,
and I was in the Jalozai camp, with 80,000-87,000 displaced
persons, several days ago with pretty extensive media
attention. So, that would be my first point.
My second point is that this is, as it should be, a subject
of careful dialogue and discussion between the Government of
the United States and the Government of Pakistan. So, for
example, our food deliveries do indicate that that assistance
is from the people of the United States. As a general matter--
and Jon can speak in greater detail about this--USAID
implementing partners are expected to indicate that assistance
is provided by the people of the United States of America. But,
in very many instances, to do so could put assistance providers
at grave risk. In those circumstances, discretion is the
appropriate policy course.
I think that we absolutely have public diplomacy objectives
in Pakistan, and I think the Pakistani Government appreciates
those objectives. And I think the government also shares those
objectives. But, in the actual implementation, we have to be
careful, because lives are at stake. It's a complicated issue,
but I think we're handling it responsibly.
Senator Casey. Mr. Brause.
Mr. Brause. As the Assistant Secretary said, all of the
food assistance, whether it's in-kind commodities provided from
the United States or the local and regionally procured
commodities, they're all marked very clearly as gifts from the
people of the United States, as are most of the resources that
are provided by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.
There are cases where our partners can come to us and ask--
as, again, the Assistant Secretary has said--for security
reasons, not to mark U.S. commodities. But, as a general rule,
the predominance of U.S. assistance is marked.
There are also cases, though, where we recognize that we
want to put the Government of Pakistan's face on certain
activities, because it's very important that they demonstrate
their presence and their capacity to provide services to the
people. And so, there are some activities that we support,
where we're not advertising the role of the United States, we
want the Government of Pakistan to be seen as an effective
government. So, there is a balance, depending on the activity
that we're undertaking. But, on the humanitarian side, in
particular, the vast majority of the U.S. assistance is clearly
marked.
Senator Casey. Thank you for addressing that, both of you.
I'm actually over. Violating my own rules, here.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank both of
you for your service.
I know the chairman alluded to a story read in the Wall
Street Journal. I think most of us probably read that, and have
had other stories--there have been other stories regarding the
violence that is taking place as these people return home from
the camps. And, at the end of the day, I know you want to see
that happen as quickly as possible. What kind of--what ability
does the Pakistani Government have to actually provide security
for folks that are returning? I know the chairman mentioned one
side of it, but, as they are returning home, does the
government actually have the ability to provide security for
these folks over the long haul?
Mr. Schwartz. First of all, thank you for your question,
Senator Corker; it is a very important one. There is a security
presence of the government in areas of return, and government
officials and the military are providing security in particular
areas. Ultimately, the objective is to create conditions in
areas of return in which there is enough diminished violence
that people feel comfortable going back, and that the risk is
diminished. In some parts of the territory, there is a much
greater level of security; and in others, less so. In more
populated areas, Swat and Buner in particular, we see larger
numbers of people going back, because the areas are less
threatened by the Taliban. In areas in the north of Swat and
less populated areas, conditions are more difficult, which is
why the return must be voluntary, and which is why, for the
time being, the Pakistani military authorities need to be
present in areas of return.
Senator Corker. And, at present, are they building trust
among the folks that are returning? Obviously, the thing that
turns these camps into permanent locations for folks is the--
people going back, and the security not being there. So far,
the folks that are returning to the areas that are more
populated, that is building trust, within the camps, for more
folks to come back to their normal locations, or not?
Mr. Schwartz. That is the policy objective. This is a
process that has started over the past couple or few weeks, and
I think the proof will be, as they say, in the pudding. As
people go back, and as people are able to resume their normal
existence, more and more people in the camps will have greater
and greater levels of confidence about going back as well. So,
it is a key policy priority for the Government of Pakistan
right now to both create the conditions for safe returns, and
in those areas, provide a measure of protection. The initial
reports are that people who are going back to very populated
areas are beginning to resume their lives. But, I think this is
going to be an effort that we, and the Government of Pakistan
and the Pakistani military, are just going to have to sustain,
and it is very much a work in progress.
Senator Corker. And it's probably actually, sort of, the
key issue, really, isn't it, as far as the long haul goes?
On another front, I guess, as people go back to their
homes, my understanding is, two-thirds of the crops were
actually destroyed during this period of time. So, what is
happening there? I mean, as people go back to their homes,
that--you know, agriculture was a big part of the economic
activity--two-thirds of the crops, obviously, were destroyed,
or at least that's what I understand. What are we doing to
actually--after they get home, if there is security, what are
we doing to ensure that they actually have the ability to have
a livelihood?
Mr. Schwartz. I'm going to invite my colleague to answer
some of that question, because some of it involves the work of
USAID. I think your questions really go to the package of
assistance for people who are going back under conditions of
uncertainty; even under the best circumstances, these are
conditions of uncertainty. In the first instance, the
Government of Pakistan provides transport for returnees; and in
the second, the Government of Pakistan has pledged to provide a
military presence until a police presence can be established.
The UNHCR provides nonfood items, focused in areas of return.
And local and provincial authorities in the North West Frontier
Province are involved in the effort of reestablishing services,
including the kind of agricultural activity to which you
allude.
But, my colleague Jon may have more on that.
Mr. Brause. Senator, for returnees, there's always a
hierarchy of issues that they look at before they decide
whether or not to return. And it's the same in Pakistan.
So, the first one is obviously security. If the areas
aren't secure--and the displaced tend to have their own
networks of information, they'll find out if the area is
secure--if it's secure, they'll begin to go back. But, the
second issue they look at is livelihoods. And in the case of
the farmers, we have to help them bridge that gap, since they
lost this harvest, and then give them the resources to plant
and tend the fields appropriately for the next harvest. So, the
World--we have provided resources to the World Food Programme.
Again, I think 90 percent of the resources provided for food to
date are from the United States. And the World Food Programme
is prepared to provide food packages to returnees for up to a
year, if necessary, to ensure that they get back and are able
to tend their fields and support their families while they're
preparing for the next harvest. At the same time, as I
mentioned in my statement, the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance is preparing return kits through its partners that
would include seeds and tools and other materials that they
might need to reestablish their livelihoods.
So, it's a major focus of the international community to
make sure that livelihoods can be reestablished, and that will
draw the people back.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the time.
The work that you all are doing is very, very important,
and I appreciate the way you're carrying it out. I just was in
Darfur and saw a camp that's been there for a long time. And
the security issue and the ability for people, because of that,
to actually make a living back in their homeland is--those are
permanent. I mean, they--I hope, not permanent forever, but
right now they're permanent structures being built. I was just
in Gaza with the United Nations, and there are camps there that
have been there 50 years. So, while the work that you are doing
is important, from a humanitarian standpoint, I hope that we
will have a robust effort to do everything we can to cause
these camps to dissipate and go away and not become permanent
by making sure that, as people come home, they are secure and
they have the ability to make a living doing what they've been
doing in the past. But, again, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the time.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Corker.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Schwartz, I'm concerned that the Pakistani
military continues to remain at the forefront of the recovery
efforts for internally displaced Pakistanis. And on your recent
trip, you said that coordination between civilian and military
agencies was effective. But, you know, I've also heard reports
that, in fact, poor coordination has hindered effective
recovery efforts. It troubles me that, although we have seen
some support among the local population for the recent military
operation, that civilian capacity is actually still pretty
lacking.
Can you tell me whether Pakistan's civilian agencies are
participating in long-term planning for recovery? And what is
the likelihood that the return and recovery efforts will be
managed by--actually by civilian agencies down the line?
Mr. Schwartz. Let me answer your question and address a
related issue.
First, I think the short answer is that as we move from the
emergency phase to the recovery and development phase, we will
see the increased predominance of civilian agencies of
government in those kinds of activities. For example,
discussions about reconstruction are mostly within the civilian
agencies.
Right now, I would say it is a joint effort between
civilian and military authorities. There is a special support
group, which is very ably run by Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmed. He
works very closely with an emergency unit of the North West
Frontier Province. The Pakistani Government cochairs the
international ``clusters'' in sectoral areas, focusing on the
relief effort with U.N. agencies. There is also a Pakistani
Government Returns Task Force. This overall structure is very
much military and civilian, and the military is playing a large
role. I do believe that, over time, as we move from the
emergency phase to recovery and reconstruction, you'll see a
much greater engagement of civilian authorities.
I also want to raise the issue of coordination; in
particular, coordination of international donors and assistance
providers. Right now, I would say it's adequate, but the
challenges in this regard, especially as we get into a
multibillion-dollar reconstruction effort, will be formidable.
I think that the Pakistani Government deserves to know who it's
dealing with in the decisionmaking process. We have been
talking to the Pakistani Government and international
organizations about coordinating more effectively the
humanitarian, recovery, relief and development efforts from the
international community.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. And recognizing that it's very
difficult to obtain precise numbers of those Pakistanis who are
returning, because many of them have been living in the host
community and not in camps, it would seem that if the United
Nations is reporting that some 400,000 people are returning
home, there are still over 1 million who remain displaced and
will be in need of continuing assistance. So, what plans are
underway to ensure this portion of the population, as well as
those in the host community that are providing support, are
adequately taken care of and have access to critical amenities?
And how can the United States work with the Pakistani
Government, at the federal and local level, to ensure that they
actually receive sufficient support?
Mr. Schwartz. First of all, the latest numbers are actually
even larger than the 400,000 you identified. The latest numbers
we saw were 700,000 returnees. But, I think your point is
absolutely right; we will still see hundreds of thousands of
displaced persons who won't be able to go home over the next
many weeks or months, even if we have continued large-scale
returns. Right now, as I mentioned, the donor community has
only funded the humanitarian appeal at about 40 percent. That
is inadequate. What we need to do first is continue to go to
other governments and press them as hard as possible to support
the relief effort. Second, we need to be prepared to do more in
the months to come, not only in this fiscal year, but in the
next fiscal year. I think this is where we are going to need to
turn to the Congress for support.
Senator Feingold. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Feingold.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you
for holding this hearing.
The internally displaced persons in Pakistan represent a
real challenge for the stability of the Pakistani Government,
and it is of great interest to the United States. So, I thank
you both for your work in this area. I think it's extremely
important. And I certainly support our bilateral effort with
Pakistan to enhance Pakistan's capacity. I'm a cosponsor of the
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, which would provide
additional resources.
But, I think the challenge here--and we've had some of the
questions back and forth--the challenge, I think, is twofold in
our bilateral efforts, on what we do directly. One, there is
the point that the chairman brought up in his questioning as to
the political reaction within Pakistan. It seems like that if
there is a direct U.S. involvement, it has a negative political
consequence, from the point of view of the local political
establishment, which is troubling to us and can compromise the
effectiveness of our work.
And second, nothing substitutes for Pakistan's capacity to
deal with its own issues, whether it's security, economics, or
the humanitarian issues of dealing with the displaced
individuals.
So, it seems to me that the preferred course is what you've
been referring to in some of your responses to questions--to
enhance the international capacity, obviously, with U.S.
involvement and leadership.
We saw in the Balkans that the OSCE played a critical role
in developing the capacity of governments to deal with the
problems of security, economics, and humanitarian issues.
They're prepared to do it. There are international
organizations that can help us in developing this type of
capability, whereas the United States does not have the direct
services that can be as effective as the international
community in making progress.
In Afghanistan, we've found that Afghanistan is a partner
for cooperation with the OSCE, and there's a mission working
currently dealing with border security that is having some
effectiveness. My point is that engaging the international
community seems to be a preferred route.
Pakistan is not a partner for cooperation with the OSCE. I
think that's regrettable. I think Pakistan should be a partner,
and it would be in its interest to do that.
My point and my question to you is this, ``Is the political
response within Pakistan to the involvement of the
international community--is there more hope that it would be
acceptable to the political establishment in Pakistan--if we
did more through the international community than direct United
States involvement?'' And what has been the attitude of the
Pakistani Government to the assistance from the international
community?
Mr. Schwartz. Well, you've asked a big question. First of
all, I would not diminish the significance of the extent of
Pakistani engagement with the international community on these
issues. I think there is a willingness and a receptiveness to
such engagement, and I think the best evidence of that is on
the ground. There are a broad range of international assistance
providers and international organizations, on the humanitarian
side, as well as the recovery and development side, that
Pakistani officials, both at the very senior level, in
Islamabad, and also in the field, are engaging effectively.
That happens every day of the week, involving organizations
from UNHCR to the ICRC, with which the government has a
longstanding relationship. Not all governments have this
relationship, but the Government of Pakistan does. It also has
relationships with the World Food Programme, as well as UNICEF,
nongovernmental assistance providers, and of course, the World
Bank and the Asian Development Bank.
There is this level of comfort in Pakistan with
international organizations, so the kind of engagement and
capacity-building to which you allude, is very possible, and is
largely ongoing. In fact, I think the principal limitations at
this point for further engagement and presence of a lot of
international organizations, in many respects, is the security
situation.
Senator Cardin. Would it be a preferred route for the
United States policy to strengthen the international presence
within Pakistan rather than trying to do this on a bilateral
basis?
Mr. Schwartz. I think the answer is both, which is
reflected in the two witnesses that you have in front of you.
My Bureau, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration,
works primarily through international organizations, such as
UNHCR and the ICRC, and others. And that has great value, both
for our relationship with Pakistan and for Pakistanis, and for
our ability to leverage other governments to do more. At the
same time, USAID works largely bilaterally through implementing
partners. I think both are important. Both serve valuable
purposes, and I think we need to sustain both sets of efforts.
As valuable as is the notion of capacity-building, we shouldn't
diminish the fact that there is a good deal of capacity in the
Pakistani Government already, and not only on the military
side. In this particular case, the North West Frontier Province
government heads up the civilian side of the IDP effort. On the
issue of Afghan refugees, there is a Commissionerate for Afghan
Refugees, which is a Pakistan Government entity working with
both IDPs and refugees. There is a massive registration process
in Pakistan, with the provision of cards for the displaced
persons, in which each displaced person receives, I believe the
equivalent of about $300 in the return process. This is a
massive undertaking, wholly being carried out by Pakistan
Government civilian authorities.
There is considerable capacity there, but I think--the kind
of engagement you're talking about is critical, and we need to
sustain it, both at the international organization level, as
well as in our bilateral programs.
But, let me defer to my colleague on the latter.
Mr. Brause. Just one additional comment. I strongly support
what the Assistant Secretary said. Having that two-pronged
approach is very helpful.
With regard to what AID does on the ground, we have seen
that the Government of Pakistan, from the time of the Pakistan
earthquake until today, has absorbed many critical lessons in
the management of a crisis. And so, because they've gotten
information and support from the international community, and
because they get bilateral support from the United States,
they're very much more able, now, to take over some of these
programs, and they don't need as much help. We're there to
guide them, but they have demonstrated, in this crisis--which
we all know was extremely rapid-onset, and has now begun to
show that it might be, to some extent at least, extremely rapid
in defusing, at least for some of the people--that the
Pakistanis really have picked up a lot of the burden on
themselves, and have shown some significant capacity to manage
the problem.
Senator Cardin. Well, I thank you for the response. I'm
still not particularly clear as to the effectiveness of the
international commitment to Pakistan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Senator Cardin, thank you very much. And I
want to note, for the record, that Senator Cardin's work on
other refugee issues--we had a hearing earlier this year on
Iraqi refugees, and I appreciate his work in this area.
And Senator Shaheen has demonstrated great patience here,
arriving early and--because of the rules of the committee, we
go by seniority, and I know what it's like to be at that end of
the table in the full committee.
So, Senator Shaheen, thank you for your patience, and we
might actually give you a couple of extra minutes because of
that. [Laughter.]
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I've
actually moved up today, so I feel pretty good.
Thank you both for all of the efforts underway in Pakistan
to help the refugees.
Mr. Schwartz, as I'm sure you remember at your confirmation
hearing, we talked about the challenge facing your agency. And
I especially appreciate how quickly you have responded, and
your recent visit there.
One of--after visiting Pakistan at the end of May--we were
there at a time--with a delegation from the Senate--when public
opinion had flipped, as you pointed out in your polling, in
your remarks, so that there was a change in support for the
Taliban and a change in support for the military operation in
Swat. Do you have a sense, from your recent visit, of how the
public opinion currently is, relative to supporting a military
operation, and how much time you think we have, and the
Government of Pakistan has, in terms of continuing that
operation in a way that maintains their public support?
Mr. Schwartz. The honest answer is I don't have
information, beyond the polling data to which I referred. I do
know that time is a critical issue here, which is why we are
both very supportive of what the Pakistani Government is trying
to do in Swat and other districts of the North West Frontier
Province and agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas, including the military campaign underway and the effort
to make areas safe. But, there is a tension, and there is no
easy answer to this tension. On the one hand, nobody wants
these camps to be around for very long, and the government is
determined to see that people go back. At the end of the day,
that is the best recipe for sustaining support among the
people, especially if they have real opportunities for early
recovery and development.
At the same time, worse than keeping people in displaced
person camps is sending them back prematurely, the result of
which is they cannot restart their lives. Even worse, we may
encourage secondary migration out, which is why in addition to
supporting the Government of Pakistan, we have emphasized the
importance of the voluntariness of return. The government
understands why we have emphasized that, and that is also the
government's policy. But, there is this great tension, and time
is a critical element.
What I can say is that our support has been absolutely
essential in sustaining the fragile progress we have seen. And
what are we talking about, here? What we are talking about is--
especially in this border area--groups that threaten our
interests directly in the region. They are prepared to attack
our soldiers in Afghanistan, and are in close contact with
elements that threaten our homeland. It is difficult to
overstate the importance of the exercise in which we're
engaged.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I appreciate that reminder that
we should all be committed to this effort.
There has been some concern expressed, in recent weeks, as
we have ramped up our military push in the south of
Afghanistan, that that will push more Taliban into Pakistan and
further destabilize Pakistan. You mentioned the second--the new
phase of this crisis, where we are already seeing more
displaced persons from South Waziristan. And what are we doing
to ensure that our military efforts in Afghanistan can address
the humanitarian crisis--a new phase of this humanitarian
crisis that I'm sure is also, as you pointed out, exacerbated
by the Pakistani efforts in Waziristan?
Mr. Schwartz. Well, you're getting a little bit--more than
a little bit--into the area that is really the responsibility
of our Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
Ambassador Holbrooke. I think he should really speak to you
about this. What I can say, and I think he would not object to
my saying so, is that I believe, for the first time in a long
time, we really are developing what I would call a ``whole-of-
government effort'' on Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Senator Shaheen. But, you--when you--let me just stop you
for a minute--when you say ``we are developing,'' you mean the
United States----
Mr. Schwartz. The United States of America.
Senator Shaheen [continuing]. Effort is a whole----
Mr. Schwartz. I'll explain what I mean. A whole-of-
government effort on Pakistan and Afghanistan includes two
dimensions. No.1, it means, with the Office of the Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, making sure that
all of the agencies that are operating in this area are
operating to a common end. I saw evidence of that in my trip to
Pakistan with Ambassador Holbrooke. In his meetings and in our
meetings, with AID officials and with other officials, he
sought to ensure that a coherent strategic approach was guiding
all of the organizations. The second component is viewing the
region as a region, and therefore, understanding that what we
do in Afghanistan is going to have an impact in terms of
Pakistan, and vice versa, which means a much greater degree of
contact and communication with the Government of Pakistan and
Afghanistan about what's happening in the other country, and a
greater degree of coherence and coordination.
I think the issue you raised is critical. On the details,
you really should speak to Ambassador Holbrooke. This is his
terrain.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. And we also saw good
evidence that we have a much more unified and coordinated
approach to the region now, on our visit.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
I wanted to move slightly off topic into another region,
but, I think, the same issue, and that's refugees in a terrible
conflict. I was saying to Assistant Secretary Schwartz that I
wanted to ask him, because of his recent travels, not only in
Pakistan, but also in Sri Lanka. And I just wanted to get a
brief update on what you saw there, in terms of the IDP camps
for the Tamil civilians in the south in Sri Lanka. And I guess
a couple of basic concerns, if you could address these in your
response--the conditions, in there, of those camps, No. 1; No.
2, the continued detention of individuals, if you have a
perspective on that; and what I would assert as a lack of any
real movement by the Sri Lankan Government toward genuine
political reconciliation with the Tamil minority. If you could
address those, and then I'll get back to a couple of questions
on Pakistan.
Mr. Schwartz. Thank you for that question. I think we had a
really rich and rewarding visit in Sri Lanka.
First, on the conditions. I think our major concern is that
the 280,000 Tamils who are in the northern part of the country
in displaced persons camps are confined to the camps, and that,
in and of itself, is a great source of concern. As a general
principle, under international humanitarian principles,
displaced persons should not be confined; if they want to
leave, they should leave. That's not very complicated. Second--
--
Senator Casey. Right now, it's 280,000?
Mr. Schwartz. About 280,000 of whom about 220,000 are in
one camp complex, called Manik Farm, the one that I visited.
Second, we're concerned that international humanitarian
organizations don't have as comfortable and easy access to
those camps as we would like them to have. They do have access,
but it's not as robust as it should be.
The conditions in the camp are not great, but the
government and international and local partners are doing their
best to meet basic needs, but there are problems that need to
be addressed, which I discussed with the government.
The government told me they are committed to the return of
this population as quickly as they can do it. Our position is
that it should be quicker; it should be as quick as possible. I
was encouraged. I learned, on this trip, that the government
intends to return as many as 40,000 or more displaced persons
to their homes over the next 4 weeks. If that happens, it's a
good thing. It's not as much as we want, but it would at least
demonstrate a degree of seriousness about the prospects for
return.
When we got there, we had this issue of how do we thread
the needle. On the one hand, how do we provide assistance to
people who need it without creating the implication that we're
supporting a process that we have fundamental concerns about?
What we've done, and what we announced during our visit, was an
additional commitment of $8 million for State and AID resources
for the return process. We want to do what we can to accelerate
and promote and send the signal that it is now about return.
This money will be used to promote return, to promote a
recovery in areas to which people are going.
I also told the government, and the government welcomed
this, which was good news to me, that I will come back, over
the next several months. I will try to keep as much of the
pressure on as we possibly can.
Senator Casey. Thank you for that response. Because of what
I just heard from our staff, we're going to have a rollcall
vote at 11:30, I may have to switch gears to the second panel
quickly.
Before we leave--and I want to offer each of you a minute
to make any concluding remarks, if you wanted to--and we'll
submit other questions for the record.
Please speak to this question of the failure of more
countries within the international community to respond
positively, as the United States has--if either of you have a
perspective or an opinion on that, I wanted to do that, and
then we'll wrap up.
Mr. Schwartz. I'll say, very briefly, I think that we have
seen some progress on the international aid effort. Other
governments have committed to about $330 million in assistance.
Only about $150 million of that has come forward.
Senator Casey. Let me just interject for 1 minute--is it
correct to say that only 42 percent of the overall appeal,
which I guess the original appeal was about $543 million----
Mr. Schwartz. That's exactly right.
Senator Casey [continuing]. Only 42 percent of that appeal
has been pledged, to date, by the international community
overall. Is that about right?
Mr. Schwartz. That is correct.
I can't explain, completely, why other governments are not
doing what they should in this instance. But, I think we need
to continue to press as hard as we can.
The other thing I think we need to do is demonstrate
leadership. This year, for assistance for Pakistan and
Afghanistan, my Bureau will have spent about $150 million in
fiscal year 2009. The numbers that are being discussed for
fiscal year 2010 are not nearly that high. They are about half
that total. We need to be prepared to expect the same level of
need over those next 12 months. And I think we're going to have
to figure out ways to demonstrate continued leadership on this
issue.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
Mr. Brause, I wanted to----
Mr. Brause. I just have----
Senator Casey. I wasn't ignoring you. I was just----
Mr. Brause. No, that's OK. I have to support what the
Assistant Secretary said. We make every effort to encourage the
other donors, whenever we meet with them in our bilateral
meetings--there have also been numerous demarches--but, we
can't wait to let the--wait for the other donors to respond. We
do have to demonstrate leadership on these critical issues. And
I think we will continue to do that.
Senator Casey. Thank you. And I know I'm cutting our first
panel short, but in order to get to the second panel, and not
to interrupt them by leaving for a vote, I wanted to make a
transition.
Thank you both for your testimony, and especially for your
public service at a critical time in our Nation's history,
especially with regard to Pakistan and the challenges there,
and as well as in the region.
We will now move to our second panel, and I'll start, by
way of introduction, so they can be seated in place for their
testimony.
I wanted to welcome our second panel. Our second panel will
provide a nongovernmental perspective on the IDP challenge in
Pakistan. We're fortunate to have two leading experts and
scholars with us today.
Our first witness is no stranger to this witness table,
Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, who has enjoyed a remarkable
career, spending almost 30 years serving our Nation as a
Foreign Service officer. She became the U.S. Ambassador to
Pakistan in July 2001, only weeks before the terrible events of
September the 11, 2001, transformed our bilateral relationship.
Ambassador Chamberlin subsequently served in senior leadership
positions at USAID and UNHCR before assuming the presidency of
the Middle East Institute.
Ambassador, thank you for being here.
Our second witness, Imtiaz Ali, is a Jennings Randolph
Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Mr. Ali is a
Pakistani journalist who has spent a significant amount of time
in Pakistan's tribal belt bordering Afghanistan, and is one of
the leading experts on the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan and
its links with al-Qaeda.
We welcome both witnesses today to proceed with their
testimony. In the interest of time, I'd ask you to be as short
as you possible can. Both of your statements will be submitted
for the record.
So, why don't we first start with Ambassador Chamberlin.
Thank you so much for being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. WENDY CHAMBERLIN, PRESIDENT, MIDDLE EAST
INSTITUTE, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO PAKISTAN, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Chamberlin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I will try to be brief.
I'll tell you, it's an honor to be here, and thank you for
holding this hearing on such an important subject. And it's an
honor for me to be here with Imtiaz Ali.
Look, I'll try to make just a couple of points that I think
were not made by my very able colleagues on the first panel.
First, there are a number of positive developments as we
look at the IDP situation, and they're worth mentioning. This
has been the first time in recent history when most parts of
the Pakistani society have come together in support of their
government's operation against the militants. The--all parties
conference, in April, followed by a religious conference of
religious leaders. And then, the world opinion poll that we
have remarked upon in the previous panel all show a solidarity
of the people of Pakistan for the army's move into the region.
Second, the army has showed resolve. It sent 15,000 troops.
It put the lie to those that thought that it might not move,
that there were elements within the army--that we've read about
in the press, speculation--it might not move against the
Taliban. They did. And they developed a hard smack to the
Taliban, there.
And third, there are factors within the Swat Valley that
will make reconstruction a little bit easier than it would be,
let's say, in FATA or Afghanistan. The highest literacy rates
in Pakistan are in the Swat Valley. There's a large middle
class from this area. And the infrastructure is more developed
than it is elsewhere. Need to rebuild it, but at least it was
there in the first place.
But, there are points of concern, and I'll try to be very
brief.
One, yes, security, I agree, I don't think the security is
there. People are returning, and it is not yet secure. The
government is talking about doing the right things. It's
talking about augmenting the police, doubling the salary, the
miserable salaries that the police get. They're talking about
doubling it and recruiting, to augment the police, from retired
army sergeants. That's great, but it hasn't happened yet. We
ought to be mindful of that.
They're talking about establishing a cantonment--a
permanent cantonment of military officers in the region to
secure the area in case the Taliban come back. But, it hasn't
happened yet.
These are important. And it is exceedingly important that,
as you point out--and I'd just like to underscore your point--
that you get the security piece right, because this feeds right
into the Taliban narrative, that only they can provide
security, that only they can provide law and order and justice.
They have to do it their way, the harsh way. But, the
government must move in, and it isn't, yet.
I'd like to see a plan for rebuilding and reconstruction.
I'm not sure there is one yet. We know it's going to require a
lot of money. We've heard, on the previous panel, that the
Congress has been extremely generous in the relief phase. But,
we'll be entering into the reconstruction phase. That will
require more United States funds, more Pakistani funds, more
international funds. And, as yet, I'm not sure there's a very
clear plan for reconstruction yet. That's another concern.
And a final concern is to look a little bit longer into the
future, Mr. Senator. And I will stop at this. But, there are--
with any major conflict and movements of refugees, there are
social disruptions that the society never really bounces back
to the way it was before. The way it was before in the Swat
Valley was romantic. People went there for their honeymoons. It
will never--every hotel has been damaged. It is unlikely that
the landlords will return to the valley. It's been,
traditionally, a feudal society. We saw the article, in the New
York Times the other day, that the landlords have resettled and
feel too unsafe to go back.
But, what will happen, then? Because as landlords leave, as
the feudal--in a feudal society, as they leave, the systems,
the mechanisms, the social mechanisms for resolving disputes,
et cetera, won't be there. And it offers--it opens up an
opportunity--perhaps Imtiaz can speak to this--for the Taliban
to move in, to do their own redistribution of land, to offer
their own disputes settlement mechanisms. This can't be,
because the army's move into this region just to defend a
system that it can--that is a vacuum is not sustainable. We
need to think about the unthinkable. You don't mention land
reform in Pakistan, because so many of the elites and
parliamentarians are landowners, and it has such an impact on
other regions of the country. But, it's worth starting that
dialogue.
And then, my final point--because I see my light is
flashing--is the poor. The poorest of the poor have left. They
had nothing when they left, they have nothing now--except for,
perhaps, $300, but only some of them have that--and they have
nothing to go back to. We ought to consider the fact that
perhaps they won't go back, that they will stay in the ridges
of Pakistan, where they've sought shelter. These are impacted
areas. And perhaps some of our assistance ought to be
redirected to help those areas, as well.
A lot more to say, but we can get to that in the question
and answers.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Chamberlin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Wendy J. Chamberlin, President of the Middle
East Institute, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, I would sincerely like to thank you for holding the
hearing this morning aimed at calling attention to the humanitarian
situation of internally displaced people in Pakistan. I welcome the
opportunity to speak to the subcommittee on the compelling situation of
internal refugees and to comment on measures the United States could
take with the Pakistani Government to advance our mutual interests.
Mr. Chairman, a great deal of international attention is riveted on
the plight of the 1 million-plus refugees who were driven from their
homes in Malakand Division last April. These refugees fled to avoid
getting caught in the cross-fire as the Pakistani Army moved into the
region to restore the writ of government.
There are two other groups of internal refugees who add to the
swollen numbers of people victimized by extremist actions. An estimated
500,000 people left the Swat Valley region last year to escape the
persecution of extremists affiliated with the TNSM. Often called
``Taliban'' in our media, TNSM extremists, led by Maulana Fazlullah and
supported by his father-in-law, Sufi Muhammed, openly targeted and
terrorized anyone who resisted their harsh code of behavior and
repressive rule including the Army, police, civil servants, and even
little girls attending schools.
Fighting between the Pakistan Army and Taliban leader Baitullah
Mehsud in northern Waziristan drove a third group of several tens of
thousands of refugees from their homes over a year ago. Substantial
numbers have not yet found it safe enough to return home. All three
waves of internal refugees are victims of extremist violence. All three
groups need assistance from their government and international donors
to provide security, rebuild communities, and reclaim lost livelihoods.
Mr. Chairman, as the United States engages with the Government of
Pakistan to assist civilian victims of terrorism, we must also be
mindful that we are facing a common enemy. The militant fighters, who
declared war on the Pakistan Government as the ``near enemy,'' also
attack the United States and Western interests as the ``far enemy.''
While the Pakistan Army is making concerted progress toward routing the
Taliban in Malakand, the threat in Waziristan, FATA and indeed, deep
inside Pakistan's cities is still quite worrisome. Our immediate
priority is to assist Islamabad to rebuild the Malakand Division so
that the refugees can return in safety and dignity. At the same time,
we must also prepare for the eventuality that other large groups of
civilians in the future may have to flee extremist violence elsewhere
in Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman, there are a number of developments regarding the
situation in the Swat Valley and Malakand Division that are positive.
For the first time this last May the Pakistani public, security
forces, and civilian political and religious leaders united against
extremist groups and ideology that threatened the idea of Pakistan as a
moderate, democratic state. Nearly all political parties joined the All
Parties Conference in mid-May in support of the Army's push into Swat.
A week later religious leaders led by cleric Sarfaraz Naeemi held a
national conference and declared suicide bombings and beheadings to be
un-Islamic. When extremists assassinated Sarfaraz Naeemi 2 weeks later,
the overwhelming majority of Pakistan's public condemned the Taliban. A
sea change in public opinion moved against extremist Taliban, as
confirmed by the recent World opinion poll.
A second point of optimism is that the Pakistan Army showed resolve
in its operation against the Taliban in Malakand. Tamping down doubts
that the Army would not move against the Taliban, the Army deployed
15,000 troops. Militant fighters were hit hard and dispersed quickly.
People are now returning.
Third, the government understands the critical need to provide
security for the people of Malakand and that local police play a unique
role for domestic security. Islamabad has taken several landmark moves
to augment local police by establishing a plan to engage retired Army
sergeants and doubling police salaries that had been dismally low. The
police augmentation has not yet been deployed. Cost and implementation
difficulties are obstacles. Again, the United States should make police
training a priority in its aid programs to Pakistan. A point that I
cannot emphasize enough is that a surge in police is necessary but it
should also be accompanied by an immediate deployment of judges and
courts. The returning population must feel protected by all aspects of
their government. A fourth point is that rapid reconstruction of
infrastructure damaged by military shelling is vital for recovery and
to solidify public confidence in the government. In many ways, the
speed of recovery will define the success of the operation against the
extremists. A great deal of work must be done, but some early reports
are that rebuilding will be less difficult in the Swat Valley than in
other conflict areas like Afghanistan or even FATA. The Swat Valley
stands out in Pakistan for having a large middle class, high literacy
rate, and relatively developed infrastructure.
A final advantage as the people of the Malakand Division begin to
return to their homes is that the United States is generously and
swiftly preparing to provide substantial aid to rebuild. Secretary
Hillary Clinton and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke have announced an
additional $165 million in aid for immediate refugee and reconstruction
needs. It is important that U.S. reconstruction teams be permitted to
assess the damage so that American aid can quickly assist returning
refugees. If U.S. and other international aid are used effectively, and
there is no reason to think otherwise, the aid could have a stimulus
impact on the local economy. However, there are a number of other
issues that continue to raise concern.
Security is still inadequate. The Pakistan Army hit the extremists
hard, but there are credible reports that Taliban remnants have
regrouped and are again targeting civilians, particularly those they
believe supported the government. The military objective of
establishing a ``cleared zone'' may not necessarily mean it is a ``safe
zone'' for returning families. It is, therefore, encouraging that the
Pakistani Army has understood the need to remain in the region for many
months to assure security and is talking about maintaining
semipermanent cantonments. Talk has not turned into a concrete plan and
our government can help by providing protective gear and specialized
equipment for the military in those areas.
Related to the need for continued military presence is the
requirement for an augmented community police force in anticipation of
an uptick in crime as refugees return to the conflict areas. The local
Pushtoon culture in the Malakand Division has a tradition of reprisals
against perceived injustices to family members. Once people return, we
could expect to see an upsurge in retaliatory violence against
individuals and family members believed to be involved in the conflict.
The government may want to consider programs to encourage
reconciliation.
A final concern is the likelihood that the conflict will have
launched social forces that will permanently change the society and
culture of the Swat Valley. The Pakistan people and government
demonstrated solidarity in its action to prevent the spread of
extremism, but there has been no public dialogue about the future of
the region. The Swat Valley is well regarded as a favorite vacation
spot for Pakistanis. It is also known for its feudal system, only
recently integrated into the federal Pakistani state. Mr. Chairman, the
Taliban have been very shrewd in winning support by exploiting local
peasant resentment of a feudal system. If the government action is not
more than reestablishing the status quo, little has been accomplished.
Mr. Chairman, Pakistanis ought to engage in a serious dialogue on the
future of feudalism in modern times. The issue of land reform has long
been consider a ``no go subject'' within government circles dominated
by elite landowners. The Taliban have demonstrated that the appeal of
land reform to impoverished people is a powerful political motivator.
I doubt the status quo is even a possibility. Many landowners who
for centuries were at the center of administrative and judicial
traditions, will not find it safe enough to return anytime soon.
Targeted and terrorized by the extremists over the past year, tens of
thousands had already moved their families from the region long before
the April military operations. It is important that the government move
swiftly to provide a responsive administrative and judicial system to
fill a vacuum created by the breakdown of traditional mechanisms to
resolve disputes. It goes without saying that failure to do so will
provide an opening for the extremists who have proved adept in
exploiting not only the people's resentment of feudalism, but also the
modern state's inability to provide an efficient, just judicial system.
A final word on permanent social disruption; there is a real
possibility that the poorest of the poor may never return to their
homes in the Malakand Division. Beyond the stipend of about $300
provided by the government to refugee households, many of the poor do
not have the means to return to their homes. They own nothing, and have
no incentive to return. Some analysts speculate that many poor will
remain in the districts and communities where they fled, thereby adding
to the social burden of other affected areas in Pakistan. U.S. aid
programs must consider aid projects throughout these regions as well.
Mr. Chairman, as the committee requested, I would like to conclude
with a few recommendations for the United States as it aims to
ameliorate the suffering of Pakistan's internally displaced. My remarks
will be addressed to the three Ds that Secretary Clinton has
identified--development, diplomacy, and defense.
Mr. Chairman, as an American citizen and one who understands the
importance of our good relations with the Pakistani people, I am proud
of the swift and generous support the Congress and our government have
provided to meet the critical needs of destitute civilians displaced by
war.
Most of this aid is channeled through nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) and the United Nations who are committed to working under
dangerous conditions to help the needy.
My recommendation is that we find a way to make the generousity of
the American people more visible to the Pakistani public.
Our recent experience during the 2005 earthquake relief operations
proved that the Pakistani public is genuinely appreciative of American
humanitarian and development aid. Favorable opinion of the United
States more than doubled immediately after the earthquake emergency,
greatly aided by then-President Musharraf who stood before the
Pakistani media and called U.S. helicopters ``angels of mercy. Mr.
Chairman, I agree with the position of InterAction, (an umbrella group
of American NGOs), that U.S. aid should not be delivered with the
purpose of ``winning hearts and minds.'' Aid rarely wins people over in
military scenarios; and, importantly, ``winning hearts and minds'' for
political purposes distracts from our central mission of administering
to those in need.
However, Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe that our Government's
humanitarian and development aid projects should have an American face.
Our people should work directly with those we are assisting. Yes, it is
very risky for Americans to work in the field in places like Iraq,
Afghanistan, and parts of Pakistan. For this reason only humanitarian
volunteers should be asked to deploy in particularly dangerous areas.
Far too many times, even volunteers are prevented from directly serving
the neediest by our government, and in this scenario, by the host
government. The point I would like to make is that we should have an
informed dialogue on the levels of acceptable risk for our aid workers.
U.S. officials are asked to stay behind compound walls when the aim is
to help people in distress. There is a very large community of
Pakistani-Americans who could help. Many are eager to serve both their
country of nationality and the country of ethnic origin.
Mr. Chairman, just as a large bulk of our funding for the internal
refugees in Pakistan is delivered by United Nations Agencies and is not
visible as aid from the people of the United States, another chunk of
our aid passes through Pakistani Government ministries. I understand
the value of using our aid to build the human and organizational
capacity of federal ministries to manage projects. On the other hand, I
also believe the Pakistani public would feel reassured if they saw more
American citizens on the ground distributing aid directly to the needy.
Mr. Chairman, turning to the second D of diplomacy, I believe
Ambassador Holbrooke and Ambassador Anne Patterson are extremely
effective representatives and are both highly regarded by the people of
Pakistan. The paradox is that while the United States is doing more
than any other nation to help the refugees and support the government's
campaign against unpopular Taliban, the United States is still deeply
distrusted.
The World Opinion Poll conducted in May of this year reported that
a very large majority of Pakistanis are united in supporting Army
operations against the Taliban, are overwhelmingly against a Taliban
regime ruling Pakistan, and reject al-Qaeda bases on Pakistani soil.
Yet, at the same time, the same polls also found large majorities
holding an unfavorable view of the current U.S. Government.
The most persuasive explanation for this disconnect is that the
historical ``trust deficit'' between our two governments and people is
still quite pervasive. I believe the trust deficit is the single
biggest obstacle to both our nations attaining our goal--the goal we
share--of guaranteeing a stable, prosperous, democratic Pakistan.
Effective public diplomacy can play a role in closing the trust gap.
Pakistan has a vibrant and free press that has enormous influence
over the population of 170 million. We saw the power of the Pakistani
media in the swift reversal of public opinion in April after the media
broadcast the savagery of so-called Taliban justice. Our public
diplomacy could do more to address the disconnect between public
rejection of the Taliban and public distrust of the one international
partner who is doing the most to help Pakistan resist this extremist
threat. We should carry our message directly to the Pakistani people
through direct engagement with their own media and minimize coverage as
part of our meetings with high ranking officials.
Finally, on the third D of defense--a consistent element of the
trust deficit is the stubborn view in Pakistan that the United States
is a fickle ally. Most of the population believes we use Pakistan when
it suits us and readily abandon our friend when we have achieved our
objectives. They believe we will do so again by pulling up stakes in
Afghanistan. A substantial element, although not all, of Pakistan's
establishment believes there is an Israeli/Indian/American collusion to
squeeze Pakistan from its eastern and western borders, break up the
state, and seize its nuclear weapons.
Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the United States
and Pakistan are fighting a common enemy in both Pakistan and
Afghanistan. We seek the same outcome--a stable prosperous and
democratic Pakistan.
My recommendation, Mr. Chairman, is that the United States speaks
with one clear voice. Our consistent message is that we are joined with
the Pakistanis against a common enemy. The Taliban and al-Qaeda are
dead-end movements that threaten their people and state and force
people to flee their homes. Our unfaltering message is that we will
stay in Afghanistan until the extremist Taliban threat there is spent,
however long it takes. Those within the Pakistani establishment that
still cling to historic relations with Taliban as a hedge on the day
the United States will leave the region must understand that that day
will not come. We wish to work with a Pakistan ally that understands
the value of our partnership and supports our joint efforts to defeat
extremist who aim to bring down the Government in Islamabad and do harm
to the far enemy in the West.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Ambassador Chamberlin.
And, Mr. Ali, welcome.
STATEMENT OF IMTIAZ ALI, JENNINGS RANDOLPH SENIOR FELLOW,
UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Ali. Thank you, Senator Casey and distinguished
members, though there are no other members here at the moment.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Ali. I will be brief.
Senator Casey. Let me say this for the record, though, we
had seven Senators here today----
Mr. Ali. OK.
Senator Casey [continuing]. At various times. [Laughter.]
And for those who keep score on subcommittee attendance,
that's way above the average. [Laughter.]
I do appreciate the colleagues who were here and----
Mr. Ali. That came--yes.
The most of the important points have already been
addressed. I will be brief and will summarize my written
remarks.
One of the lesser known, but equally critical, facts about
the IDP crisis, that less than 20 percent of the IDPs took
shelter in the refugee camps, which were established by the
Pakistani Government with the help of aid organizations. The
majority of the IDPs have sought refuge in the homes of local
Pashtun host families. And the Pashtun villages in Mardan and
Swabi elders have assembled meetings and pooled their resources
to provide shelter for the IDPs from Swat, despite their
limited resources. Whenever people would talk about the IDPs or
refugees, they were reminded, ``They--the Pashtun--are our
host.''
Last month, I went to Pakistan with Special Envoy
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as part of the Presidential
mission to assist the IDP crisis. I went with Ambassador
Holbrooke to the IDP camps in Mardan, and we talked to a number
of people residing there.
After the official trip, I stayed on for a few days to
visit my hometown in District Mardan, which has a huge influx
of the IDPs. I saw firsthand the hospitality my own village
people extended to the IDPs from Swat. Lower and middle-class
families in Mardan and Swabi districts shared food, bedrooms,
and washrooms. When asked about the IDPs, even the poorest
Pashtun in Mardan and Swabi said, ``They are our guests. Don't
call them IDPs. Don't call them refugees. It is part of our
Pashtun tradition and culture to help them out.''
Now, we see that IDPs have started returning to their homes
on July 13. And according to some official figures, 600,000
individuals have, so far, been returned to Mingora, the capital
of Swat, and to the adjacent areas in Swat and neighboring
parts of Buner.
What are the big challenges? First, the big challenge is
security. Of course, IDPs want to go back to their homes. They
want to live again in the place they lost to the Taliban
militants. But, their concern is the resurgence of the
militants. The big concern raised not only by the IDPs, but
throughout Pakistan, is the threat of the Taliban leadership.
If Maulana Fazlullah, the Taliban leader in Swat, and his top
commanders are still at large, and they are able to make
headlines through their audio messages and resurfaced illegal
FM radio stations, then it will be hard for the IDPs or those
who are still living in the camps with the host families, to go
back.
The second important challenge is employment and economic
development. It is too early to assess the actual damages to
economic development and employment. However, initial reports
suggest large-scale destruction and robberies of businesses and
homes. The government's initial figure mentioned losses to
infrastructure of $390 million.
The third important challenge is education. Close to 200
girls' schools have been destroyed by the Taliban militants.
This has left thousands of girls without any means of
education. When the IDPs go back, there will be no schooling
for many girls. That is a very important area.
How was the response of the United States during this
crisis? The United States has a good model: The 2005 earthquake
in the northern Pakistan and Kashmir. It was the first time
that America found a good rating among the Pakistani people for
the work they did for the affected people in the earthquake
zone.
In my opinion, the Obama administration realized the scope
of the IDP crisis quickly, and its response, thus far, has been
encouraging. President Obama's special envoy went twice to the
region to see the IDP situation. If local newspapers are to be
believed, Ambassador Holbrooke spent more time in the refugee
camps talking to the IDPs than the Pakistani politicians.
Dr. Nasim Ashraf, of the Middle East Institute, who works
with Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, conducted a survey about the
IDPs. He found that when Pakistanis were asked if they had
received any help from the United States, 72 percent said,
``No.'' He was quoted in a news article, saying, ``The common
man in Pakistan doesn't know that, you know, Secretary Clinton
here has announced $200 million, because they don't know that
it ever gets there to them.'' This is a big dilemma for the
United States. The people on the ground do not know about
American aid. The Obama administration should work on how to
reach out to the Pakistani people.
In terms of recommendations, I suggest focusing on several
key issues.
Policing. This is a very critical area. The United States
should help the NWFP and the Pakistani Government develop
community policing at the village level. There is an urgent
need for a strong, well-trained, and well-equipped police
force. This is the case not only in the Swat Valley, but in the
Frontier and the whole of Pakistan. When the Taliban extended
their writ in Swat a few months ago, the police force
completely collapsed and put up no resistance.
Compensation. The United States should help the Pakistani
Government and local NGOs give a compensation package to the
victims of military oppression. The package should include
enough money to reconstruct damaged homes, restart businesses,
and meet the living requirements of a meaningful period for a
time for the IDPs. The amount should be much larger than the
current $312 for an IDP family, which the amount the Pakistani
Government is providing at this time.
Schools, Hospitals, and Roads. Most people are aware that
the United States has been using drones and missiles in the
tribal region to target and attack militants' hideouts. The
attacks also sometimes have civilian casualties, loss of lives,
and injuries to the civilian population, including woman and
children. As a part of the rehabilitation of the IDPs, the
United States should help rebuild schools, hospitals, and roads
destroyed by the Taliban militants.
Microfinance Banking. With the help of the Pakistani
Government and NGOs, the United States can help launch
microfinance facilities for the people of Swat and FATA.
Local Pashtun Media. Establishing, promoting, and
encouraging local Pashtun media is needed at this time. In the
absence of a strong local Pashtun media, people of Swat and
FATA have become a captive audience to the pirated Taliban FM
radio stations. Fazlullah's radio station, which earned him the
nickname of ``FM Mullah,'' contributed to the fall of Swat into
the hands of the Taliban.
Cultural Sport Activities. This area has been long ignored
by the successive Pakistani regimes, as well as by the
international donors. There is a lack of sports and cultural
facilities for the youth in tribal regions and many parts of
the NWFP. But, this is one of the potential areas in which a
long-term investment can stop the drift of young people into
extremism. I think the revival of a secular Pashtun culture and
tradition is essential for stopping the march of the Taliban in
the border region.
In conclusion, I salute the IDPs and the rest of Pakistan's
people, particularly the Pashtuns of Mardan and Swabi, for
their sacrifices in helping the IDPs. The future of the war
against terrorism in Pakistan now depends more profoundly than
anyone expected on how well the situation of the IDPs is
addressed. If properly treated, these Pashtuns can be a bulwark
against Taliban militants. Irrespective of their ethnic
background, the Pashtuns have long been accused as the
supporters and sympathizers of the Taliban and
al-Qaeda. However, because of the IDP crisis, that situation
has changed. Now they should be regarded as the bulwark against
militants.
I wish that all the people of Swat, Buner, and other parts
of the tribal region will return to their homes and once again
start living a peaceful life in their valley once known as the
``Switzerland of Pakistan.'' Being a Pashtun myself, I would
like to believe that one day they will say that during their
most difficult times, not only the whole of Pakistan, but the
whole world, stood with them.
Thank you. And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ali follows:]
Prepared Statement by Imtiaz Ali, Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow, U.S.
Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington, DC
Thank you, Senator Casey and distinguished members of the
subcommittee for providing me with the opportunity to testify before
you on the IDP crisis in the Swat Valley and the North West Frontier
province of Pakistan. This is a phenomenon that poses serious threat to
Pakistan and ultimately to the American security interests, but if
handled correctly, can be an opportunity to promote them.
I am currently a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the U.S.
Institute of Peace. I am a journalist by training and have spent a
great deal of time reporting on Pakistan's tribal belt and North West
Frontier province along the Afghan border. The views I express today
are my own and not those of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not
advocate specific policy positions.
As you know, the crisis in Pakistan is by most metrics the biggest
internal displacement in recent history. According to Pakistani
officials and several U.N. agencies, the number of people forced to
flee since fighting began this spring between Taliban militants and the
Pakistani Army is more than 2 million. Most of these refugees fled to
the neighboring districts of Mardan and Swabi, the closest and most
accessible regions still unaffected by the fighting.
A lesser known, but equally critical fact, is that less than 20
percent of the IDPs took shelter in the refugee camps set up by the
government and aid organizations. Instead, the majority of the IDPs
have sought refuge in the homes of local Pashtun ``host'' families. In
many of the Pashtun villages in Mardan and Swabi, elders have assembled
meetings and pooled resources to provide shelter for the IDPs from
Swat, despite limited resources. Tellingly, these ``host families''
tend not to refer to the new guests as IDPs or refugees, but as
community members entitled to the benefits of the centuries-long
tradition of Pashtun hospitality.
The Pakistani Government did a good job responding to this crisis,
especially considering its limited resources--which is why it was
compelled to solicit international aid. Though, many Pakistanis have
mixed feelings about the fair distribution of aid and some other aid-
related concerns. However, it is clear that the overwhelming majority
of the people supported military operations in the Swat Valley.
Last month I went to Pakistan with the special envoy, Ambassador
Richard Holbrooke, as part of the Presidential mission to look into the
IDP crisis. I went with Ambassador Holbrooke to the IDP camps in Mardan
and talked to a number of people residing there. After the official
trip, I stayed on for a few days to visit my hometown in District
Mardan, where I saw firsthand the hospitality my own village people
extended to IDPs from Swat. Lower- and middle-class families in Mardan
and Swabi districts shared food, bedrooms, and washrooms. When asked
about the IDPs, even the poorest Pashtun in Mardan and Swabi said,
``They are our guests. Don't call them IDPs. Don't call them refugees.
It is part of our Pashtun tradition and culture to help them out.''
And yet it was evident that hosting so many people has put an
immense strain on these predominantly poor communities. Meanwhile, most
of the well-intentioned national and international aid is being
directed toward camps serving only a small portion of the community in
need, with too few resources reaching the communities absorbing the
majority of the IDPs. Many fallacious reports underrepresented the
number of IDPs living with the local host families, which has led to a
lack of focus on communities as de facto refugee camps.
One attempted means of reaching out to the overwhelming majority of
the IDPs in need of aid was to employ the network of District
Government system led by an elected district Nazim (Mayor). But, it was
not properly used because of an ongoing power struggle between District
Nazims and the bureaucracy.
Pakistani higher ups and international dignitaries paid visits to
some of the camps which, in my opinion, were what I would call ``VIP
Camps'' because they were set up as showcases with all the necessary
facilities and more than enough food, deliberately hiding the real
situation on the ground.
Few of the influential people who have visited Pakistan have gone
to see host families in order to thank them for their generosity in
giving shelter to the IDPs in their moments of need. That said, this
was a unique crisis in many ways: The sheer number of the displaced
people, the speed of the mass exodus, and then the overwhelming
response from the local people and the rest of Pakistan to support the
displaced people.
The problems of the displaced people are both short term and long
term. In the short term, the problem was to provide immediate relief,
especially shelter, food, drinking water, medicine, etc. That part will
soon come to an end with the repatriation of the Swat IDPs. However,
the long-term problem is a daunting task: The IDPs need rehabilitation
in their hometowns and substantial help is needed to rebuild and
reconstruct the damaged infrastructure.
IDPs started returning to their hometowns on July 13 and, according
to official figures, over 600,000 individuals have so far been returned
to Mingora, the capital of Swat, and to the adjacent areas in Swat and
neighboring parts of Buner. However, the problem is still far from
over.
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
As the intensity of military operation in the Swat Valley winds
down and the displaced people make their way back to their hometowns,
the next phase involving the rehabilitation of the IDPs is expected to
be as challenging as the first phase of immediate relief. The
provincial government in the North West Frontier province (NWFP) has
set up a Provincial Relief, Rehabilitation and Settlement Authority
(PaRRSA) which, according to official statements, will be responsible
for planning and coordinating the overall rehabilitation and
resettlement of internally displaced persons and reconstruction of the
areas affected by military operations. PaRRSA is part of the Provincial
Disaster Management Authority (PDMA)--a separate body already set up
for dealing with the IDPs issue.
IDPs will face three immediate problems when returning and reaching
their home areas:
Security;
Economic development and employment;
Education.
SECURITY--TALIBAN LEADERSHIP STILL AT LARGE
Of course, IDPs want to go back to their homes. They want to live
again in the place that they lost to the Taliban militants. The
Pakistani Government has also been telling people that most areas have
been cleared of militants and now they can go back to their homes.
However, despite the government claims of clearing Swat from militants,
many IDPs regard the situation as somehow deceptive--people are still
confused about whether to return or not, mainly because of the security
concerns.
Repatriation of the IDPs to their hometowns will largely depend on
the security situation. The Army claims that militants have been routed
from most parts of Swat. Local journalists have confirmed that several
important Taliban commanders have been killed and many had been
arrested during the operation. According to them, however, the
situation is still far from stable. Still, there are some pockets of
resistance that scare the returning IDPs. Reports reaching Washington
suggest that Taliban militants are still holding their positions in the
Kabal area of Swat. However, the big concern raised by not only the
IDPs but throughout Pakistan is the fate of the Taliban leadership. If
Maulana Fazlullah--Taliban leader in Swat--and his top commanders are
still at large and they are able to make headlines through their audio
messages and sometimes through their resurfaced illegal FM radio
stations, then it will be hard for those IDPs who have gone back to
safely live there, and next to impossible for those who are still in
the camps and with host families to safely return.
A shortage of food and continuous curfew in many areas where people
have recently returned are also serious problems. Curfews prevent
people from leaving their homes after dark in Kabal, Matta, Kanjoo,
even though a family member may have become seriously ill. When those
still living in camps come to know about this situation, they will
likely be frightened and reconsider returning.
Another problem, as I see it, is that many of the politicians and
landlords with second homes in Islamabad or Peshawar have also left
Swat in the wake of fighting and are not willing to go back. They are
influential layers of society. If they do not return, the ordinary
people will be unable to ward off the militants, especially when the
top leadership of the Taliban is still intact.
Not only the people of Swat, but the overwhelming majority of
Pakistanis has been demanding a more effective military operation
against the Taliban so that the militants and their leadership do not
find ways to flee the conflict areas and then filter back into Swat
Valley when quiet has returned. This is, I believe, a critical issue in
the wake of unprecedented sacrifice by the IDPs.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT
It is too early to assess the actual damages to economic
development and employment. However, initial reports suggest large-
scale destruction and robberies of businesses and homes. The
government's initial figures mention losses to infrastructure at $390
million. Crops have been ruined in many areas. According to local
journalists, the Army has now told people not to grow the maize (corn)
crop this season because it is used by Taliban as cover to hide
themselves in the fields. But, people say they have no other means of
ensuring sufficient food and if the government stops them from sowing
maize and other food crops, then the government should support them
with cash to support their families. In this situation, many people who
go back to their homes in farming areas will not have jobs or crops in
their fields. This is one of the most important areas to be addressed.
By some conservative estimates, the rehabilitation of the IDPs will
cost billions of dollars. Earlier estimates mentioned by the government
were over $60 billion--both infrastructure and compensations. However,
assessments are underway and new figures are yet to be made public. The
government has provided IDPs families with ATM cards each worth $312.00
(25,000 Pakistani rupees) to get cash for their daily use. Twenty-five
thousand Pakistani rupees is fine for a few days when a family goes
back to its ruined home, but it cannot feed a family for any longer
period of time. Many families have problems getting the cards because
of wrong registration numbers, nonregistration as IDPs, etc.
EDUCATION
Close to 200 girls' schools have been destroyed by the Taliban
militants. This has left thousands of girls without any means of
education. Reconstructing schools and providing security necessary for
parents to be comfortable sending their daughters to school is a
significant project in its own right. Before the uptick in violence,
around 70,000 to 80,000 girls were enrolled in schools in the Swat
district. Following Taliban threats, many stopped going to school
because of fear for their safety.
IDPS CRISIS--THE U.S. RESPONSE
The United States was a good role model of 2005 earthquake in
northern Pakistan and Kashmir when it acted expediently and tactfully
and found a favorable rating among Pakistanis for the first time in
recent history. This spring the United States was again presented with
an opportunity to prove itself a positive force when the IDP crisis
began in the northwest of Pakistan. The United States has a much bigger
opportunity today to improve its image in a region that is reeling
under the deep-rooted anti-Americanism.
In my view the Obama administration realized the scope of the
crisis quickly and its response thus far has been encouraging.
President Obama's special envoy went twice to the region to see the IDP
situation. If local newspapers are to be believed, Ambassador Holbrooke
spent more time in the refugee camps talking to the IDPs than the
Pakistani ruling elites did. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
announced a ``Text Swat'' SMS campaign--whereby you could text the word
``SWAT'' to the number ``20222'' and $5 would be donated to the U.N.
Pakistan Relief Fund to provide food, water, medicine, clothing,
shelter, and other basic necessities to the IDPs.
These efforts are commendable, and to those in Pakistan that are
aware of them, an example of the United States capacity and inclination
to render aid. Still, there is a persistent question of whether the aid
has been effective, especially whether it has gone to the right people.
It's pertinent to mention here that Nasim Ashraf, executive
director of Pakistan Studies Center at the Middle East Institute, has
been quoted in the media that he has conducted a survey about the IDPs
and found that when they were asked if they had received any help from
the United States, 72 percent said ``No.'' He was quoted in a news
article saying, ``The common man [in Pakistan] doesn't know that, you
know, Secretary Clinton here has announced $200 million [dollars of
aid] because they don't think that it ever gets there to them.''
This is a big dilemma for the United States. The people on the
ground do not know about American aid. The Obama administration should
work on how to reach out to the Pakistani people.
SUGGESTIONS FOR THE BEST UTILIZATION OF U.S. AID
Winning hearts and minds of the Pakistani people will take years
and will require long-term as well as short-term policies.
Policing: United States should help the NWFP government develop
community policing at the village level to give people a sense of
security. There is an urgent need for a strong, well-trained and well-
equipped police system in the Swat Valley that can resist intimidation
and overcome violence on the street. When the Taliban extended their
writ in the Swat region few months back, the police force completely
collapsed and put up no resistance. One sympathizes with the ill-
prepared and ill-equipped policeman confronting the relatively well-
equipped and adept Taliban fighters. There has already been an interest
on the part of the U.S Government in reforming the Pakistani police
system. However, the fall of the Swat to the Taliban and now its
takeover by the Pakistan Army makes it urgent to have a strong regular
police force in the valley to protect the return of militancy. The Army
can launch military operations at anytime, but its police
responsibility is to maintain law and order and do the routine
patrolling in the streets and keep a vigilant eye on miscreants and
militants. The Pakistani Government has decided to increase the number
of police stations and police forces in Swat in order to fulfill the
requirements of the people. The United States can assist in these
efforts.
Compensation: The United States should help the Pakistani
Government and local NGOs to give a compensation package to the victims
of military operations. The packages should include enough money to
reconstruct damaged homes, restart businesses, and meet the living
requirements for a meaningful period of time as former IDPs get back on
their feet. It should be much larger than the current amount of $312
for a family that can range in size from 4 to 8 and sometimes 10
members. Since Pakistani Government officials have a trust problem due
to the widespread accusations of corruption even in this humanitarian
crisis, I suggest that it would be useful to involve local NGOs in Swat
and the Malakand region to help conduct loss assessments and then
involve local community leaders for the distribution of financial and
other aid and rehabilitation support.
Schools, Hospitals, Roads: Most people are aware that the United
States has been using drones and missiles in the tribal region to
target and attack militant hideouts. The attacks also incur collateral
damage--loss of lives and injuries to innocent civilians including
women and children. As a part of the rehabilitation of the IDPs, the
United States should help rebuild schools and hospitals destroyed by
the Taliban militants. This will be a great help to the people of war-
hit areas of Swat and other parts of the tribal region. The United
States should also help the Pakistani Government rebuild the destroyed
buildings from the Swat conflict on an accelerated basis.
Microfinance/Banking: With the help of the Pakistani Government and
NGOs, the United States can also help launch microfinance banking
facilities for the people of Swat and FATA to create sustainable
livelihood opportunities, including support farmers, small industries
and skill development programs for men and women. Local NGOs can be
involved in the interest-free loans for launching small businesses.
Local Pashtun Media: Establishing, promoting and encouraging local
Pashtun media is needed at this time. In the absence of a strong local
Pashtun media, people of Swat and FATA have become ``captive audience''
to the Taliban-pirated FM radio stations. Fazlullah's FM radio station,
which earned him the nickname ``FM Mullah,'' contributed to the fall of
Swat into the hands of the Taliban. A local independent Pashtun media
is necessary to provide alternative radio stations and content that
people will want to listen to. This will also help improve the U.S
image in the long run by engaging Pashtuns in the political discourse.
A Pashtun media would ultimately support Pashtun nationalism, which is
one way to help combat Taliban militancy. I would argue that a Pashtun
social movement is needed to raise the voices for their identity,
culture, and heritage--which are the antithesis of the Taliban.
Cultural/Sports: This area has long been ignored by the successive
Pakistani regimes as well as international donors. There is a lack of
sports and cultural facilities for the youth of tribal region and many
parts of NWFP. But this is one of the potential area in which a long-
term investment can stop the drift of young people to extremism. The
revival of secular Pashtuns culture and traditions is must for stopping
the march of Taliban in the border region.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I salute the IDPs and the rest of the Pakistani
people, particularly the Pashtuns of Mardan and Swabi for their
sacrifices in helping the IDPs. I must say that the future of the war
against terrorism in Pakistan now depends more profoundly than anyone
expected on how well the situation of IDPs is addressed. If properly
treated, these Pashtuns can be a bulwark against Taliban militants,
irrespective of their ethnic background. The Pashtuns have long been
accused as the supporters and sympathizers of Taliban and al-Qaeda
militants. However, because of the IDP crisis that position has changed
and now they should be regarded as the bulwark against militants. I
wish and pray that all the people of Swat, Buner, and other parts of
the tribal region will return to their homes and once again start
living a peaceful life in their valley once known as Switzerland of
Pakistan. Being a Pashtun myself, I would like to believe that one day
these IDPs will say that during their most difficult times, not only
the whole of Pakistan but the world, stood with them.
Senator Casey. Mr. Ali, thank you very much.
We have to take a break to vote, and we'll resume in a few
minutes. I do want to thank our ranking member, Senator Risch,
for being here. We both have to vote now. We'll come back, and
I'll have at least three questions, and then we'll be able to
wrap up.
So, if anyone needs a break, this is the time to take it.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Senator Casey. OK, thank you very much. We'll resume. And
thank you for allowing me to vote. Pretty important thing to do
around here.
We're grateful for both of our witnesses and for your
statements. And, of course, your full statements will be in the
record of this hearing.
I wanted to focus, Ambassador Chamberlin and Mr. Ali on the
question of the possible scenario that was outlined by Rebecca
Winthrop, of the Brookings Institution. Her assessment, which
is an assessment which is counterintuitive--but, she asserts,
in her recent piece, that the scale and magnitude of the
current IDP crisis in Pakistan could present an unexpected
opportunity to improve the lives of woman and children in
Pakistan. She cited the lessons of humanitarian crises in other
places, like Darfur and Afghanistan. And the essence of her
argument is this. The disruption of established family and
community structures that occurs during a mass displacement
allows women to assume new roles and freedoms. The IDP camps
may facilitate greater access to schooling.
A, What do you think of that analysis? And b, Could you
provide your perspective, not just on that theory or that
analysis, but how would you recommend structuring U.S. and
international assistance to the IDP population in a manner that
enhances the role of women and enhances the protections
provided to children? I know it's not an easy question, but----
Ambassador Chamberlin. No, no, it's--I'm happy to have it.
It's an exciting question. I both disagree and agree with what
she's saying.
My experience--3 years' experience with UNHCR and close-
hand experience with a number of refugee situations in the
world, I tend to agree with her overarching theory, and perhaps
even for other situations within Pakistan, but not this one.
As I said earlier, Swat Valley and the Malakand district,
but Swat particularly, is an exceptional little pocket in
Pakistan, where you had higher education, some of the highest
literacy, some of the highest literacy for women, already,
there. You had a thriving middle class--larger, more productive
than in other places of Pakistan. And you had infrastructure,
you had girls' schools.
One of the reasons, of course, why the Taliban attacked
girls' schools in this area--over 300, I think, was the
statistic--is because they--these extremists tend to get a lot
of money from external donors for the madrassas. So, if they
discourage the public schools and the girls' schools by blowing
them up, you're going to funnel more students into the
madrassas. And I heard a statistic from one very prominent
Pakistan economist, who said that it can be as high as $10,000
per student in the madrassas, donations coming in from the
gulf. So, that's not going to stop just because people are no
longer in the area where they had schools and are now in camps
where they don't have schools.
I believe that the opportunities that present themselves by
this disruption will be if you actually begin to reform some of
the institutions in the area that the Taliban had truly
exploited to win the allegiance of the peasants. Land reform, I
mentioned in my statement, is one of them.
But, if nothing is done to reform some of the institutions
that the Taliban are exploiting, if all of this is nothing more
than the defense of the status quo, then people will return to
the same situations, the Taliban will return to the same
situation, and we will have a long-term problem.
But, in terms of women's schooling, it was better before.
Senator Casey. Mr. Ali.
Mr. Ali. I agree with the Ambassador. First of all, Swat
had some of the best schools in the Frontier Province.
In terms of the IDPs' situation and providing schooling to
the girls, I visited a couple of the IDP camps, and there was
some schooling system for girls. But, the problem is, as I
mentioned before, less than 20 percent of the IDPs are living
in the camps. So, you can provide schooling to those who are
living in the camps, with the help of UNHCR or some other
donors. But what to do with the other IDPs who are living with
the host families? There is no school system for them. And that
is a big challenge.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much.
I wanted to also ask you about--as we've heard this
morning--the asserted policy of the Pakistani Government to
support a quote ``voluntary, safe, and dignified returns.''
But, in the North West Frontier Province, the provincial
government, in conjunction with the United Nations, illustrated
their commitment to supporting voluntary returns with the
signing of a Returns Policy Framework. However, the reality on
the ground doesn't necessarily reflect that policy. NGO groups
on the ground have reported people being denied assistance in
the camps, and have been told they will not be eligible for
further assistance unless they return home.
I'd ask both of you about whether or not--and I'm assuming
the answer is ``Yes''--but, whether or not our government
should be concerned that the Pakistani Government will not
guarantee the voluntary, safe, and dignified return of
displaced people, and how our government can best encourage the
Pakistani Government to give meaning to that asserted policy.
Ambassador, do you have a sense of that, or do you have an
opinion on that?
Ambassador Chamberlin. Yes, thank you for the question. I
think there are a number of things that the United States can
do in partnership with the Pakistan Government.
You know, I don't think that we're in disagreement with the
Pakistan Government on this. I think the Pakistan Government
would also like to see the people return as quickly as possible
so that the problem not fester. The Pakistan Government and the
United States would--knows that they must return in security.
The question is, How do you provide that security?
The ideas are there. I mentioned, in my opening statement,
the idea is to augment the police force, recruit retired army
sergeants, increase the salary--they're all there. The idea of
posting a permanent cantonment of Pakistani Army--it's there.
The money is not. The training for the police is not. The money
for the salary is not there. These are things that we can do,
with the Pakistan security forces, to assure security for the
people. It's actually past due, because people are going home
to less-than-secure areas, as I said in my statement. The idea
of a cleared zone may not be the same thing as a safe zone.
But, that doesn't mean that we shouldn't ramp up now, appeal to
the Congress for perhaps some more money, both for the midterm
for security and for the long-term reconstruction.
Senator Casey. Let me have Mr. Ali respond.
Mr. Ali. Well, in terms of the distribution of aid, you
first mentioned it. For example, when I went to the IDP camps
with Ambassador Holbrooke, there were concerns about aid
distribution. This is a huge crisis and there will be this
element of corruption and these things. But, I think the crisis
is so huge. Still, the United States and the international
community should come forward to help the Pakistani Government.
There are two ways to provide aid. One is through the
government agencies, and the other is through the NGOs. There
will be this element, again and again, of corruption. You
cannot eliminate that element. But, one way is to work with the
Pakistani Government to help establish its legitimacy and its
writ. It is a matter of writ why the United States is helping,
why this whole issue is now before us. It is because the
Pakistani Government lost its state in Swat Valley. And that is
why now the Pakistani government is trying to reestablish its
writ.
And the other way to provide aid is to work with the local
NGOs. There will be concerns. But, still we have to deal with
this problem, because this is a huge problem. As I mentioned,
it will decide the future of the war on terror in Pakistan.
Senator Casey. I guess, just as a followup to that, is this
a question of whether or not the government's going to be
committed to that kind of safe return? Is this a lack of
commitment by the Pakistani Government when that happens, or is
it a lack of both commitment and the resources that the
Ambassador mentioned? Do you have any sense of that?
Ambassador Chamberlin. Yes. I think it's a little bit of
both, sir. The community policing throughout Pakistan has been,
by anybody's judgment, miserably weak. So has the court system;
the judicial system's judges have been very, very weak as you
go further into the countryside. You have your elite police
corps in Lahore. You have the tollway police, that are first-
rate. But, community policing throughout rural Pakistan, almost
not there at all. It's an institution that, nationally, must be
strengthened as one of the important components to a rule of--a
system that's based on rule of law.
The other component, of course, is courts and judges, also
extremely weak. These two weaknesses have been exploited by the
militants, who can go into rural areas and say, ``Look, you
don't have a government, you don't have access to courts or
judges for your land disputes or for whatever disputes. We will
provide shariah law, our law, our version of shariah law, for
fast, swift judgments.'' And in a vacuum, it's preferable. And
in a vacuum, people prefer, sometimes, a harsh policing,
provided by the Taliban, to nothing at all. So, in many ways,
it's not reestablishing policing or reestablishing of court
systems, it's establishing it in the first place. And this
could be true in many places in Pakistan.
It's going to require enormous investment. I've argued,
since I was there as Ambassador in 2001, that that ought to be
an American priority. We don't have an institution in the
United States that does police training, frankly. AID ought to,
in my opinion, but, for a number of reasons since the 1970s,
has been prohibited from doing police training. It's not well
located in the Pentagon. Secretary Gates agrees with that,
although the Pentagon did do a great deal of it during Iraq and
Afghanistan. And, of course, the State Department does
diplomacy.
So, I think we ought to think about how we can structure
ourselves to support police training and police aid in a
country where it needs it so badly. And I would suggest--my own
personal view is that we build up that capacity within USAID.
Mr. Ali. Senator, let me reinforce the point Ambassador
Chamberlin raised about the policing. It is critically
important. I think what happened in Swat Valley is just a
snapshot of the whole of Pakistan. It can happen anywhere,
because the police system is not well trained. It is not
trained for that purpose. It is supposed to be the first line
of defense against militants, miscreants but it is not used for
that purpose. It is highly politicized. The only purpose of the
police system in Pakistan is when the politicians and ministers
use it for their political vested interests. So, it is not
being used for the purpose we are talking about here. I think
we need to inject some new thinking into the Pakistan police
system, reform it, and make it a better line of defense against
the militants. And Swat Valley can be the first place where one
can have this role model.
Senator Casey. I wanted to ask you a question about the
role played by the Pakistani military in this refugee crisis.
The very real potential for failing to allow local and
provincial entities to hold up their end of the bargain, so to
speak, to be as helpful as they can be to organize relief
efforts, Do you buy that theory, that if the military gets too
involved, they don't allow other entities within Pakistan to
fulfill their responsibilities or to take over the work that
the military obviously plays a role in but can't carry on its
own, in addition to the fact that if the military is spending a
disproportionate amount of time on relief efforts, it will be
less and less effective on the battlefield? What's your sense
of that?
Ambassador Chamberlin. Mr. Senator, I find the current
situation in Swat to be very different from our recent
experience with the earthquake emergency, which was also run
very effectively by the military. But that was a natural
disaster, this is a security situation, and the military has a
role, but its role is security. We've just had an exchange. I
think both of us, all of us, agree that much more can be done
to provide security, and ought to be done; that there is a
challenge to the military to step up even more to provide
security, to stay and provide security for the people who are
returning.
But, yes, I think that--I believe that if we simply--if we
don't use this crisis to actually build the kind of
infrastructures that the Taliban are exploiting with the
peasantry there, then we're actually deeper in the hole, and
that, yes, local government infrastructures ought to be built,
capacities ought to be raised. But, I also believe that the
United States ought to have a face in it. We ought to be
visible.
Senator Casey. Mr. Ali.
Mr. Ali. Again, it is a security problem and the military
will be there. For example, when the IDPs are returning, they
will need security on the way back to their homes. There will
be convoys of the army or the paramilitary that should
accompany them back to Swat Valley. However, as far as their
involvement in the relief and distribution of aid is concerned,
what I saw in the IDP camps was them just holding security. I
mean, they were responsible for the security of those refugees
in the IDP camps, for example, where the VIP people were
visiting. So, they were there for that purpose. The civilian
administration is there. They are actually in charge of the
refugee camps. For example, if you are going to an IDP camp,
you have to make a call to someone in charge of the IDP camp
who most probably will be a civil servant.
Senator Casey. Well, thank you very much. I know we have to
wrap up sooner than we might have thought. I know you both have
very busy schedules. We're grateful for your presence here, and
your testimony and your commitment on educating those of us on
Capitol Hill about these issues, and especially appreciate the
time you gave us when we had to go and vote.
So, on behalf of Senator Risch, our ranking member, who's
with us today, as well as members of our subcommittee, thank
you very much.
Mr. Ali. You're welcome.
Ambassador Chamberlin. Thank you.
Senator Casey. We're adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]