[Senate Hearing 111-101]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-101
CONFRONTING PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 30, 2009
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Republican Leader designee
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Clancey, John, chairman, Maersk, Inc., Charlotte, NC............. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Mull, Hon. Stephen D., senior adviser to the Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs with oversight responsibility for
the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs and its related State Department
bureaus........................................................ 28
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Responses to questions for the record from Senator Richard
Lugar...................................................... 38
Phillips, Capt. Richard, master of the MV Maersk Alabama, Maersk
Line, Limited, Burlington, VT.................................. 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
(iii)
CONFRONTING PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, John Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Lugar, Feingold, Webb, Shaheen,
Corker, Risch, Wicker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM
MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. Thank you very much. This hearing will come
to order. Captain Phillips and Mr. Clancey, we're delighted to
welcome you here today. We have a little complication in the
schedule, which is that the Senate is going to have a vote at
2:45.
I'll make my opening statement. Senator Lugar will make
his, and then we will recess for about 10 minutes only while we
go over to vote and come back. And the minute we get back here,
we'll pick up with your testimony. So I'd like to hold off on
your testimony until we're able to get back here, if we can.
Just a few years ago, most Americans viewed piracy as a
scourge of centuries past or as the focus of a Hollywood
introduction. Many people were not even aware of modern piracy;
they thought of it largely as being contained to Southeast
Asia, and no longer a serious problem even there.
But recent events off the coast of Somalia have made piracy
not just front-page news, but a major concern, once again, for
shippers and for policymakers alike. Almost every day brings
news of yet another attack on a cargo ship or a tanker carrying
humanitarian aid, oil, or even weapons, as well as an attack on
a usually defenseless crew.
Today, the committee is going to consider the threat of
maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa and examine the
solutions available to the United States, to foreign
governments, and to shippers, in order to confront this growing
challenge. These attacks have claimed innocent lives and
they've imposed a very significant financial cost on companies
engaged in shipping, not to mention on countries engaged in
trying to deal with this problem.
Off the coast of Somalia last year, 42 vessels were taken.
In 2008, pirates made an estimated $30 million hijacking ships
for ransom. Companies are paying additional millions of dollars
on additional insurance costs, on hiring private security, on
retrofitting ships to make them more difficult to capture, and
on taking vessels thousands of miles out of their way,
sometimes all the way around the African Continent, just to
avoid small bands of pirates.
And the threat is not geographically contained, either.
It's true that even as incidents of piracy off the coast of
East Africa have skyrocketed, they've actually plummeted just
about everywhere else. But Somali pirates are now operating
over a thousand miles from the shores of Somalia in an area of
more than 1 million square miles, and in shipping lanes that
were even recently considered safe.
To make matters worse, we know that pirates used much of
the ransom money paid to them to buy heavier and larger caliber
weapons and bigger engines for their skiffs to make it even
easier for them to overtake larger vessels. They also used
ransom money to arm and equip private militias. This is a
dangerous and a vicious cycle and it needs to be addressed.
Piracy goes to the heart of national security and economic
interests. America has always been a seafaring nation, and
securing the world's sea-lanes has been a source and a symbol
of our strength. In the face of instability and humanitarian
crises around the world, our ability to project our naval power
to help ensure the free passage of goods and humanitarian aid
is as important as it's ever been.
Thriving on chaos and ungoverned spaces, perpetrated by
small groups of nonstate actors, international piracy combines
several of the great security challenges of our age.
It's noteworthy that while our battleships could level a
city, it came down to the precise aim of three Navy snipers
killing all three pirates in a single moment before any of them
could harm Captain Phillips. It came down to that sort of
microeffort, if you will, that ultimately proved effective in
resolving this particular incident. But no one can count on
that in any future incident.
We must also recognize that Somali piracy is in part a
byproduct of the absence of the rule of law or a functioning
government in Somalia. As chair of the Subcommittee on Africa,
Senator Feingold is going to hold a hearing shortly that
explores these critical questions in the broader context of
American policy toward that country.
And like so many of today's challenges, the renewed threat
of piracy demands a multifaceted, multinational effort, one
that coordinates the world's naval powers, the United Nations,
the international shipping community, and the nations that
border Somalia.
At its core, piracy is a criminal act. International law is
clear in its condemnation of piracy. This is an opportunity for
all nations to come together and work in order to effectively
respond. In fact, we have made significant process in
marshaling an international enforcement effort. The men and
women of Combined Task Force 151, which is expected to grow to
22 nations, work hard to patrol the Indian Ocean and the Gulf
of Aden to keep it free of pirates and to assist vessels in
distress or under attack.
The Contact Group on Piracy off the coast of Somalia has
brought two dozen countries together to improve operational
support to antipiracy operations, to strengthen judicial
frameworks for arrest and prosecution of pirates, and to track
financial activities related to piracy.
I'm very confident that today's hearing will provide
insight into some of the policy options available for
addressing this immediate challenge and for laying the
necessary groundwork for an effective long-term solution.
I might add that with criminal proceedings underway, we are
not looking here for witness testimony with respect to the
blow-by-blow of what occurred, though indirectly, there will be
some reference to that, obviously. We are much more interested
in the larger issues that Captain Phillips and others can
examine with us and help shed light on with respect to the
policy implications here.
We're very honored to have Captain Richard Phillips with
us. As everybody knows, he was the captain of the merchant
vessel Maersk Alabama, and he personally confronted pirates
intent on holding him and his crew hostage, during which time
they repeatedly threatened his life and the lives of crew
members. Captain Phillips risked his own life to ensure the
safety of his crew, knowing full well the potential
consequences of his actions. And those actions, selfless and
heroic, are an example for all of us. Captain, it's a great
pleasure to have you with us today.
And joining Captain Phillips on our first panel is John
Clancey, the chairman of Maersk, Inc. And on our second panel,
we will have Ambassador Stephen Mull, the Senior Advisor to the
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
And I might mention we also have in the audience here--I
had the pleasure of sitting with him and chatting with him for
a little while--Shane Murphy, a resident of Massachusetts, who
was the No. 2 officer on board the Maersk Alabama,, and
literally from the moment that Captain Phillips was a prisoner,
a hostage, Shane took over and also operated the ship, I might
add, in a most heroic manner. We're delighted to welcome you
here, Shane, and we thank you for the way in which you acted in
the greatest traditions of a seaman.
I welcome the insights that you bring us today because this
is a matter of real concern for many of us and something we
need to deal with. Senator Lugar.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I join you in
welcoming our first panel to the committee. Captain Phillips'
leadership, his bravery during and after the pirate assault on
his ship have been justifiably praised around the world. His
dramatic rescue by the Navy has again demonstrated the skill
and courage of our sailors, and he has frequently commended
them.
This is the only committee, Mr. Chairman and the Senate, I
believe, where both the chairman and the ranking member have
served in the Navy. So we come to this topic with some
understanding of the Navy's historic mission. But piracy is not
a new issue for our country. Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution gives Congress the power to ``define and punish
pirates and felonies committed on the high seas''; one of the
few crimes named specifically in that document. What is new and
vexing is the rapid increase in piracy and extortion targeting
shipping off the coast of Somalia. I look forward to the
insights of our second panel, which will address our
government's interagency antipiracy strategy.
These pirates, like all others before them, are motivated
by profit. Their targets, in one of the most heavily trafficked
seas of the world, are plentiful and soft. The payoffs are
huge, running, as the chairman pointed out, to the millions of
dollars in a region where the average per capita income is less
than $2 a day. So far, piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the
coast of Somalia has been largely a nonlethal activity. Ashore
in lawless Somalia and its disputed territories of Somaliland
and Puntland, pirates have sanctuaries from prosecution, and
the tools of their trade, small arms, skiffs, and longer range
fishing trawlers, are plentiful as is the supply of poor young
men willing to become pirates. Many villagers in the region are
sympathetic to the criminals, viewing them as modern-day Robin
Hoods, who spread their loot and don't harm their hostages.
Ending piracy in the region will require multilateral
cooperation. This cooperation must include the military
coordination, but it also must involve the governments of
proximate nations, and the shipping companies, who must change
their practices and procedures. And while military means may be
necessary, it is important to understand that the root cause of
this problem is the breakdown of law and order in Somalia,
which is what allows the pirates to operate from shore with
impunity. This underscores the point that I and other members
of this committee have long made. The existence of failed
states directly threatens the national security interest of the
United States. Failed states exist as potential safe havens for
terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking, and piracy. Failed
states can destabilize surrounding nations, spawn tribal or
sectarian conflict, and intensify refugee flows.
President Obama and Secretary Clinton, like President Bush
before them, have emphasized that development must be an
important pillar of our foreign policy. The Senate this year,
in agreeing to fully fund President Obama's budget request for
international affairs, also recognizes that if we don't sustain
the long-term investments necessary to prevent failing states
and to reduce the poverty that can spawn instability and
extremism, we run the risk of paying a far higher price down
the road.
I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished
witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. Let me
note that the vote has started. So, Captain, we invite you and
Mr. Clancey to come back here and wait in the back as you were
before. And we will recess for about 10 minutes.
[Whereupon a recess was taken from 2:48 p.m. to 3:06 p.m.]
The Chairman. I was going to wait for Senator Lugar, but I
thought if I waited any longer, you might be under further
assault here, so I'll rescue you.
So, Captain, again we're delighted to welcome you here, and
we look forward to hearing what you have to say.
STATEMENT OF CAPT. RICHARD PHILLIPS, MASTER OF THE MV ``MAERSK
ALABAMA,'' MAERSK LINE, LIMITED, BURLINGTON, VT
Captain Phillips. Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, I am Capt. Richard Phillips. I'm a graduate of the
Massachusetts Maritime Academy. I have been a member of the
International Organization of Masters, Mates, & Pilots Union
since 1979, and I'm a licensed American merchant mariner.
I was captain of the Maersk Alabama when it was attacked by
pirates off the coast of Somalia on April 8. We've returned
home safely, and for that, my entire crew and I greatly
appreciate the actions taken by the administration, the
Department of Defense, and most specifically, the U.S. Navy
SEALs, the Navy SEALs and the crew aboard the USS Bainbridge. I
want to thank the management of Maersk and Waterman Steamship
Corp., who handled the situation, the crew, and our families
with great care and concern.
And equally important, I want to publicly commend all the
officers and crew aboard the Maersk Alabama, who responded with
their typical professionalism in response to this incident; the
licensed deck officers, who are members of the Masters, Mates,
& Pilots Union; the licensed deck officer and licensed
engineers, who are members of the Marine Engineers Beneficial
Association; and the unlicensed crew, who belonged to the
Seafarers International Union. They are dedicated merchant
mariners, typical of America's merchant seamen who are well-
trained and who are ready and able to respond when necessary to
protect the interests of our country.
I need to make it clear at the outset that I am unable to
discuss the incident itself because of the ongoing
investigation and pending legal action against one of the
pirates. But I've had a lot of time to think about the
difficult and complex issues of protecting vessel, cargo, and
crew in crime-ridden waters. So the focus of my comments will
be my beliefs based on years of experiences at sea and what can
or should be done to respond to piracy and to protect American
vessels and crew.
I should also say at the outset that I realize my opinions
may differ in some ways from other recommendations you've heard
before and may hear today from others on the panel.
Nevertheless, I do believe that all of us in the maritime
industry understand that it is imperative that we work together
to address this complex problem, and I believe we are in
general agreement on the main principles of keeping crew,
cargo, and vessels safe.
First, I believe it is the responsibility of the Government
to protect the United States, including U.S.-flag vessels that
are by definition an extension of the United States, their U.S.
citizen crews and our Nation's worldwide commercial assets. So
it follows, then, that the most desirable and appropriate
response to piracy is for the U.S. Government to provide
protection through military escorts and/or military detachments
aboard U.S. vessels.
That said, I am well aware that some will argue that
there's a limit to any government resources, even America's. In
fact, due to the vastness of the area to be covered, and the
areas of threat are continually growing larger, our Navy, and a
coalition of other navies currently positioned in the Gulf of
Aden region, may simply not have the resources to provide all
the protection necessary to prevent and stop the attacks.
So what other things can be done? In my opinion, the
targets, the vessels, can be hardened, even beyond what's being
done today, and made even more structurally resistant to
pirates. In addition, more can be done in terms of developing
specific antipiracy procedures, tools, and training for
American crews. I do, however, want to emphasize that contrary
to some reports I've heard recently, American mariners are
highly trained and do receive up-to-date training and upgrading
at the private educational training facilities jointly run by
the maritime unions and their contracted shipping companies.
I've also heard as a suggestion that all we have to do to
counter piracy is just arm the crews. In my opinion, arming the
crew cannot and should not be viewed as the best or ultimate
solution to the problem. At most, arming the crew should be
only one component of a comprehensive plan and approach to
combat piracy.
To the extent we go forward in that direction, it would be
my personal preference that only a limited number of
individuals aboard the vessel have access to effective
weaponry, that these individuals receive special training on a
regular basis. I realize that even this limited approach to
arming the crews opens up a very thorny set of issues. I'll let
others sort out the legal and liability issues.
We all must understand that having weapons aboard a
merchant vessel fundamentally changes the model of commercial
shipping, and we must be very cautious about how it is done.
Nevertheless, I do believe that arming the crew as a part
of an overall strategy could provide an effective deterrent
under certain circumstances, and I believe that a measured
capability in this respect should be part of the overall debate
about how to defend ourselves against criminals on the sea.
As for armed security details put aboard vessels, I
believe, as I indicated earlier, that this idea could certainly
be developed into an effective deterrent. My preference would
be government protection forces. However, as long as they are
adequately trained, I would not be opposed to private security
on board.
Of course, I realize that very clear protocols would have
to be established and followed. For example, as a captain, I am
responsible for the vessel, cargo, and crew at all times, but I
am not comfortable giving up command authority to others,
including the commander protection force. In the heat of an
attack, there can only be one final decisionmaker. So command
is only one of the many issues that would have to be worked out
for security forces to operate effectively.
While there are many new ideas and much discussing going on
about how to deal with piracy, I would respectfully ask the
committee to be mindful that the seafarers I've met and worked
with over my career are resourceful, hard-working, adventurous,
courageous, patriotic, and independent. They want whatever help
you can offer to make the sea-lanes more secure and their work
environment safer.
But we realize that while preparation is absolutely
critical, not every situation can be anticipated, and we accept
that as part of a seafarer's life. So I will just close with a
request for you to please proceed carefully and to please
continue to include us in your discussions and debates.
Thank you for this opportunity to speak, and I look forward
to answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Captain Phillips follows:]
Prepared Statement of Capt. Richard Phillips, Master, ``Maersk
Alabama'' Maersk Line, Limited, Burlington, VT
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Capt. Richard
Phillips. I am a graduate of the Massachusetts Maritime Academy, I have
been a member of the International Organization of Masters, Mates &
Pilots Union since 1979, and I am a licensed American merchant mariner.
I was the captain of the Maersk Alabama when it was attacked by pirates
off the coast of Somalia on April 8. Thankfully, that episode ended
with the successful return of the ship, its cargo of U.S. food aid for
Africa and, most importantly, my crew. All of us have returned home
safely and for that my entire crew and I are deeply appreciative of the
actions taken by the administration, the Department of Defense and,
most specifically, the U.S. Navy, the Navy SEALS and the crew aboard
the USS Bainbridge. All of the U.S. military and government personnel
who were involved in this situation are clearly highly trained and
motivated professionals and I want to use this opportunity to again say
``thank you'' to everyone involved in our safe return.
I want to thank the management of Maersk and Waterman Steamship
Corp. who handled the situation, the crew and our families with great
care and concern.
And equally important, I want to publicly commend all the officers
and crew aboard the Maersk Alabama who responded with their typical
professionalism in response to this incident. The Licensed Deck
Officers who are members of the Masters, Mates & Pilots Union, the
Licensed Deck Officer and Licensed Engineers who are members of the
Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association, and the unlicensed crew who
belong to the Seafarers International Union are dedicated merchant
mariners, typical of America's merchant seamen who are well-trained and
who are ready and able to respond when necessary to protect the
interests of our country.
I am honored to come before this committee today to discuss my
views on making commercial shipping safer, and worldwide sea-lanes more
secure from the threat of piracy.
I need to make clear at the outset that I am unable to discuss the
incident itself because of the ongoing investigation and pending legal
action against one of the pirates. But I've had a lot of time to think
about the difficult and complex issues of protecting vessel, cargo, and
crew in crime-ridden waters. So instead of a recount of the Maersk
Alabama incident, the focus of my comments will be my beliefs, based on
my years of experience at sea, as to what can or should be done to
respond to piracy and to protect American vessels and crews.
I should also say at the outset that I realize that my opinions may
differ in some ways from other recommendations you have heard before
and may hear today from others on the panel. Nevertheless, I do believe
that all of us in the maritime industry understand that it is
imperative that we work together to address this complex problem, and I
believe we are in general agreement on the main principles of keeping
crew, cargo, and vessel safe.
First, I believe it is the responsibility of our Government to
protect the United States, including U.S.-flag vessels that are by
definition an extension of the United States, their U.S. citizen crews,
and our Nation's worldwide commercial assets. So, it follows then that
the most desirable and appropriate solution to piracy is for the United
States Government to provide protection, through military escorts and/
or military detachments aboard U.S. vessels. That said, I am well aware
that some will argue that there is a limit to any government's
resources--even America's. In fact, due to the vastness of the area to
be covered--and the areas of threat are continually growing larger--our
Navy and the coalition of other navies currently positioned in the Gulf
of Aden region may simply not have the resources to provide all the
protection necessary to prevent and stop the attacks.
So what other things can be done?
In my opinion, the targets--the vessels--can be ``hardened'' even
beyond what's being done today and made even more structurally
resistant to pirates. In addition, more can be done in terms of
developing specific antipiracy procedures, tools, and training for
American crews. I do however want to emphasize that contrary to some
reports that I've heard recently, American mariners are highly trained
and do receive up-to-date training and upgrading at the private
educational training facilities jointly run by the maritime unions and
their contracted shipping companies. I believe that discussions are
underway now between the industry and government on the details of
specific proposals to harden the vessels (the specifics of which should
remain secret) and I am confident that we will soon have additional
methods for protecting vessel and crew. And while they will be an
improvement, there is no way they can be foolproof.
I've also heard the suggestion that all we have to do to counter
piracy is ``just arm the crews.'' In my opinion, arming the crew cannot
and should not be viewed as the best or ultimate solution to the
problem. At most, arming the crew should be only one component of a
comprehensive plan and approach to combat piracy. To the extent we go
forward in this direction, it would be my personal preference that only
the four most senior ranking officers aboard the vessel have access to
effective weaponry and that these individuals receive special training
on a regular basis. I realize that even this limited approach to arming
the crew opens up a very thorny set of issues. I'll let others sort out
the legal and liability issues but we all must understand that having
weapons on board merchant ships fundamentally changes the model of
commercial shipping and we must be very cautious about how it is done.
Nevertheless, I do believe that arming the crew, as part of an overall
strategy, could provide an effective deterrent under certain
circumstances and I believe that a measured capability in this respect
should be part of the overall debate about how to defend ourselves
against criminals on the sea.
As for armed security details put aboard vessels, I believe, as I
indicated earlier, that this idea could certainly be developed into an
effective deterrent. My preference would be government protection
forces. However, as long as they are adequately trained I would not be
opposed to private security on board. Of course, I realize that very
clear protocols would have to be established and followed. For example,
as a captain, I am responsible for the vessel, cargo, and crew at all
times. And I am not comfortable giving up command authority to others--
including the commander of a protection force. In the heat of an
attack, there can be only one final decisionmaker. So command is only
one of many issues that would have to be worked out for security forces
to operate effectively.
While there are many new ideas and much discussion going on about
how to deal with piracy, I would respectfully ask the committee to be
mindful that the seafarers I've met and worked with over my career are
resourceful, hardworking, adventurous, courageous, patriotic, and
independent. They want whatever help you can offer to make the sea-
lanes more secure and their work environment safer. But we realize that
while preparation is absolutely critical, not every situation can be
anticipated. And we accept that as a part of the seafarer's life. So, I
will just close with a request for you to please proceed carefully and
to please continue to include us in your discussions and debates.
The Chairman. Thank you, Captain. We look forward to having
that exchange.
Mr. Clancey.
STATEMENT OF JOHN CLANCEY, CHAIRMAN, MAERSK, INC., CHARLOTTE,
NC
Mr. Clancey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee. I am John Clancey, chairman of Maersk, Inc., the
parent of Maersk Client, Limited, whose ship, the Maersk
Alabama, was attacked in the Indian Ocean on April 8. And I
thank you for this opportunity to address this increasing
problem of maritime policy.
And on behalf of our entire company, I would like to add my
sincere appreciation to the Defense Department, the Navy, and
the SEALs, and the entire team of people that brought Captain
Phillips and his crew home safely. I also congratulate Captain
Phillips and the crew of the Maersk Alabama for their courage
and their resolve. They, like all seafarers that serve on our
vessels, are highly valued members of our team. We are
dedicated to making their jobs as safe as possible.
Today's focus is on the waters of the Horn of Africa and
the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, a size of geography
equivalent to the Mediterranean. Piracy has been with us for
many years--the Malacca Strait, for example. And our Nation and
the U.S. Navy has learned over 200 years that piracy is not
easily eliminated.
Our industry is currently working diligently in conjunction
with the Defense Department, though, in particular, regarding
security of the high-risk areas for a U.S.-flag fleet.
In general, though, piracy is an issue that our country and
our entire industry takes very seriously. As attacks in the
Gulf of Aden have increased in the last few years in both
numbers and level of sophistication, we have changed our
response, as well, and it is continuing to evolve.
And we have been working within the industry and with
effective governments to develop a more effective response. But
an effective response to piracy must, as you said, Mr.
Chairman, and as President Obama has said, has to be an
international one.
Most of the vessels that face this threat do not fly the
U.S. flag, and most of the naval vessels assigned to counter
piracy off the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden are those of
other nations. The National Laws of Ports, at which vessels and
international commerce call, control all of ours and our
competitors' incoming ships, and most, if not all, prevent the
introduction of arms and arm mariners in their territory.
The structure of maritime insurance is also an issue that
has to be dealt with, because it also has concerns regarding
this issue. Vested cooperation of all maritime nations and the
international community is critical to any effective response.
The limited number of vessels now deployed off the Horn of
Africa and the Indian Ocean make it impossible to adequately
protect the transportation in this area.
In our view, and that of many other shipping companies or
seafarers and the maritime security experts, we believe that
piracy not only threatens the lives of mariners, but the safety
of major international shipping lanes and the national
interests of the countries involved. It's important to note
that 90 percent of the world's commerce is carried by water.
Let's begin what we believe is not helpful, an approach
that applies only to the United States. Piracy is an
international problem and requires an international response.
The efforts of the United States must strengthen these
international efforts on both legal and law enforcement fronts.
There should be an international legal framework for the
prosecution of captured pirates. Ships carry U.S. military and
government--cargos may require unique protection, but cargo in
general requires an international solution.
Arming the crews of merchant vessels, I know that captain
and crew members may prefer an arm-capability for the crew on
board, and I respectfully understand their perspective. But the
IMO has pointed out, and we agree, that firearms are only
useful in the hands of those who are properly trained, who
practice regularly, and understand when and how to use the
moment at that point of intersection.
Our belief is that arming merchant sailors may result in
the acquisition of even more lethal weapons and tactics by the
pirates, and a race that merchant sailors cannot win. In
addition, most ports of call will not permit the introduction
of firearms into the national waters.
Now I'd make a separate point. As I mentioned earlier, we
are currently in discussion with the Department of Defense as
it applies to U.S.-flag vessels, and those discussions are
ongoing, and hopefully we'll have a solution in the near term.
What would be helpful, on the other hand, is prompt and
accurate reporting. This sounds very simplistic, but what is
necessary is a single 911-like number so that our military and
other militaries and governments currently examining the system
today would work together to address this in full cooperation
with these international navy forces charged with international
shipping. There's many navies out there today, and I think it's
critical to all of the maritime interests to ensure that they
have a process to work together, to communicate together, so
that when one navy spots a pirate or comes across an incident,
everyone knows simultaneously.
In addition, there are emerging techniques to harden the
vessels. These are evolving measures that may buy additional
time for the Navy forces to respond while protecting ships'
crews. These include certain additional protective measures on
each vessel and give them an opportunity to resist the pirates
while help is coming. These techniques will be developed and
evaluated and approved, and we will work in concert with the
Navy, the Coast Guard, and other experts and share with the
industry.
Last, remaining flexible and alert. This is evolving.
Things are happening on a regular basis, and who knows what
will happen today or tomorrow in the Gulf of Aden.
Mr. Chairman, all of us take a great deal of pride in our
Navy's rescue of Captain Phillips, the safe return of the
Maersk Alabama, and in the bravery of the crew. What we need to
do now is to improve our antipiracy efforts, find solutions
that work for maritime shipping on a global basis, and move
forward. I thank you for your time, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Clancey follows:]
Prepared Statement of John P. Clancey, Chairman of Maersk Inc.,
Charlotte, NC
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am John Clancey,
chairman of Maersk Inc, the parent company of Maersk Line, Ltd., whose
ship--the Maersk Alabama was attacked in the Indian Ocean on April 8. I
thank you for this opportunity to address the increasing problem of
maritime piracy. On behalf of our entire company, I would also like to
add my sincere appreciation to the Department of Defense, the Navy, the
SEALS and the entire team of people that brought Captain Phillips and
his crew home safely. I also congratulate Captain Phillips and the crew
of the Maersk Alabama for their courage and resolve. They--like all
seafarers that serve on our vessels--are highly valued members of our
team and we are dedicated to making their jobs as safe as possible.
Today's focus is the waters off the Horn of Africa, in the Gulf of
Aden and in the Indian Ocean, but piracy has been a serious threat in
the Strait of Malacca and around the world for many years. Our Nation,
and the U.S. Navy, learned over 200 years ago that piracy is not easily
eliminated. And our industry is currently working diligently in
conjunction with the Department of Defense regarding immediate security
in the high-risk areas and we are not at liberty today to discuss those
potential strategies.
But the piracy problem is multifaceted and requires
multidimensional solutions. At a minimum, any solution must deny
pirates their safe haven and promises consequences. In my remarks today
I would like to present a few overarching principles that are necessary
to effectively deal with modern piracy.
Piracy is an issue that our company--and our entire industry--takes
very seriously, I can assure you. As the attacks in the Gulf of Aden
have increased over the last couple of years in both numbers and level
of sophistication, we have changed our response as well. And we have
been working within the industry and with affected governments to
develop a more effective response. An effective response to piracy must
[as President Obama has said], be an international one. Most of the
vessels that face this threat do not fly the U.S. flag, and most of the
naval vessels assigned to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa and in
the Gulf of Aden are those of other nations. The national laws of ports
at which vessels in international commerce call control all incoming
ships and most prevent the introduction of arms or armed mariners into
their territory. The strictures of maritime insurance contracts also
have global effect. Thus, the cooperation of all maritime nations and
of the international community, is critical to any effective response.
The limited number of naval vessels now deployed off the Horn of
Africa, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden make it impossible to
adequately protect maritime transportation in this area.
In our view, and that of many other shipping companies, our
shipboard labor unions, and many maritime security experts, piracy
threatens the lives of our mariners, the safety of major international
shipping lanes, and the national interest of every country that relies
on maritime transportation of goods. Antipiracy measures, to be viable,
must address each of these concerns. The International Maritime
Organization, the U.N. body that monitors pirate attacks and recommends
policies to combat it, has identified measures--in place for 15 years--
that are helpful as well as others that are not.
Let me begin with what is not helpful:
An approach that applies only to the United States. Piracy
is an international problem and requires an international
response. The efforts of the United States must strengthen
international efforts on both the legal and law enforcement
fronts. There should be an international legal framework for
prosecution of captured pirates. Ships carrying U.S. military
and government-impelled cargoes may require unique protections,
but piracy affects the global community and requires solutions
that work for all stakeholders. And, of course, pirates
generally don't check the flag and origin of a ship before
attacking.
Arming the crews of merchant vessels. I know Captain
Phillips prefers an armed capability for the crew onboard and I
respectfully understand his perspective. And Captain Phillips
is in agreement with vessel operators, his labor union, and the
IMO which points out that firearms are useful only in the hands
of those who are properly trained, who regularly practice in
their use, and who are fully capable of using them as required.
Our belief is that arming merchant sailors may result in the
acquisition of ever more lethal weapons and tactics by the
pirates, a race that merchant sailors cannot win. In addition,
most ports of call will not permit the introduction of firearms
into their national waters. And I suspect others that you will
hear from this afternoon will address this issue in more
detail.
What would be helpful is:
Prompt and accurate reporting. This sounds simplistic but in
international waters, the ability to dial one 911-like number
is critical and so far nonexistent. Our military and other
governments are sorting out what is currently an incident-
reporting scheme that is way too complex and uncertain. We look
forward to progress on this front very soon.
Full cooperation with those international naval forces
charged with protecting international shipping--e.g. the
provision of accurate positioning information and course plots
to international naval forces, the use of designated sea-lanes
patrolled by international forces, the rapid reporting of
attacks by merchant vessels, the availability of failsafe
emergency communications protocols, expanded naval intelligence
collection, and other cooperative measures.
Emerging techniques to ``harden'' the vessels. There are
evolving measures that may buy additional time for naval forces
to get into place to assist while protecting ships' crews.
These include certain additional protective measures that each
vessel can employ both to evade and to resist pirate attacks.
In our view, the less said about this in public, the more
effective they are likely to be. But over the past several
years the industry has added procedures and tactics to make our
crew and vessels less vulnerable. And more techniques are on
the horizon. These techniques are generally developed,
evaluated, and improved in concert with the Navy, the Coast
Guard and other experts--and then shared within the industry.
Last, remaining flexible and alert. We at Maersk do not
claim to know all the answers, but we do feel that the lessons
of modern day antipiracy efforts are valuable and should be
followed in ways that work for U.S. and foreign mariners
equally.
Mr. Chairman, all of us take a great deal of pride in our Navy's
rescue of Captain Phillips, in the safe return of the Maersk Alabama,
and in the bravery of its crew. This is the right time to reexamine
antipiracy policy, because we know that we may not always be as
spectacularly successful next time. We have short-term tactical needs
and, of course, the longer term policy and strategy requirement to
deter piracy completely. What we need to do to improve antipiracy
efforts is find solutions that work for maritime shipping across the
board, that can be put into place now, that are sustainable, and, most
critically, that will increase the safety and security of mariners and
the ships they sail. If we stick to those criteria, we will have
learned, not merely adapted to, the hard lessons of piracy.
The Chairman. Well, we thank you very much, Mr. Clancey.
Captain Phillips, I want to just remark, I so noted a very
pleasant mixture of Massachusetts, Maine, and New Hampshire in
your accent, which may be why you live in Vermont, but----
Captain Phillips. Mainly Massachusetts.
The Chairman. Mainly Massachusetts. Mr. Clancey, I'm having
trouble with this arming issue a little bit, and I want you to
help me as a layperson, just in terms of common sense, I guess.
On a lot of vessels, we put young men and women with less
than a year's training, and sometimes very little time at sea,
and they become the armed personnel on a particular vessel with
responsibilities for protecting it. We arm guards who pick up
money in an armored car. We have any number of different kinds
of armed people in the course of our civil society who get the
training, whether it's border guards or people involved in
other professions.
I'm having trouble understanding why qualified seafarers,
with all of the training they get and discipline they get, at
the Merchant Marine Academy or elsewhere, who can perform as
Shane Murphy did under great duress and risk of life, who feels
that he might have been better off if he'd been able to take a
shot at these guys, because they are not particularly well-
trained or capable in many regards, are not given weapons
training.
Why is that training not worthwhile? It seems to me that if
the pirates upgrade their weapons to a level above 50-caliber
and start destroying ships, they haven't got anything
ransomable. So they've got to take the ship without destroying
it or harming the hostages or taking the goods they want to
hold for ransom. Therefore, they have some limitations. And it
would seem to me you'd be significantly more advantaged if you
were able to defend yourself.
Mr. Clancey. You make some very good points, Mr. Chairman.
We have, international and United States, hundreds and hundreds
of ships. Our crews on U.S.-flags rotate every 3 or 4 months
with a different crew. It is true that usually the masters and
maybe the first mate return to the same ship, but the balance
of the crew might rotate out.
Training all of these people and ensuring that they're
qualified, that they have the time to practice, which would be
on land, which right now, no one has facilities to do so, and
to ensure that they have the training necessary to know when
and how to use the weapon, we think is a very difficult task.
It's really complicated by the fact that most ports, if not 95,
80 percent of them, you can't bring weapons into the port.
You've got export licenses and requirements on weapons that
just simply don't allow it.
We are also not a sovereign, and if something should
happen, I mean, we put the company at risk. But I think that
you focused on the training issue. We think the training is a
very tall order. It's not something that we discount out of
hand----
The Chairman. May I ask you--if I can interrupt you for a
minute--how many ships do you have out at sea?
Mr. Clancey. At any given time, it could be 5 or 600.
The Chairman. Five or six hundred----
Mr. Clancey. U.S.-flags, it's far less. It's in the 30s,
and one or two of them or three of them may be in port at any
given time. But the issue on an international basis is we're
not allowed to have the weapons on the ships.
The Chairman. Well, maybe that's something we have to think
about in terms of international convention. That's why we have
treaties and multilateral agreements. It seems to me if piracy
is an increasing problem, the alternative is, as you've said, a
far more expensive form of protection, which is to have the
military diverted from other activities.
Mr. Clancey. And as we're doing today--4 years ago, we were
100 miles off the coast. Two months ago, we were 200 miles off
the coast. Now we're 600 miles off the coast on a round trip,
doubling the time and doubling the expense.
The Chairman. I understand. But that's what I'm getting at.
Historically, we have deputized citizens to engage in certain
law enforcement activities going way back to the time of
posses.
Mr. Clancey. Correct.
The Chairman. Again, I get back to the training issue here.
It costs somebody something for this protection, correct?
Mr. Clancey. Correct. Yes.
The Chairman. So the taxpayer is going to pay for it
through tax dollars to the U.S. Government, and the taxpayer
pays for it in the cost of the goods that are sold to them. One
way or the other, the question is, What's the most feasible way
to provide the protection?
The Chairman. Captain Phillips, what do you think? Let me
ask you as a skipper. And I don't want to get you in trouble
with the company, but what's your feeling about it?
Captain Phillips. As I said, I believe there is not one
silver bullet here. One solution is not going to solve this
problem. But as part of a coordinated approach, I believe that
there should be some arming of the crews. Training would have
to go on. It's being done today. The training could be there.
It is a cost increase.
I have been on ships in the last 18\1/2\ years as a captain
where we did carry guns, and it's just another you have to
declare when you go into a lot of these countries, bonded seal
type thing. And some of the crew is capable and can be trained,
but to just expect arming the crew to be the final solution
is----
The Chairman. No, no, no, I'm not suggesting that.
Captain Phillips. OK.
The Chairman. This is a conglomeration of things, and I
want to get----
Captain Phillips. A limited number of crew, I believe,
could be trained. As I said, basically what I call the top
four: Chief mate, chief engineer----
The Chairman. What are the other steps to harden a ship
that you think might have an impact?
Captain Phillips. Anything--basically what we've done in
the past is fire hoses, but I think we can evolve beyond these
items, and develop additional nonlethal items.
The Chairman. Some people have talked about concertina
wire, razor wire on the rails, and/or electrified rails.
Captain Phillips. I think that is impractical. I believe
concertina wire or barbed wire is not going to stop them,
because you can't put it around the whole ship. On my incident,
we had fire hoses. The pirates just went to where the fire
hoses weren't, and that's what they would do if there were
concertina wire. Concertina wire is not going to stop someone
climbing up with a ladder.
The Chairman. Now, again, speak--so for the average person
sitting around, saying, ``What do you mean, an American ship
was taken by a bunch of guys in a little''----
Captain Phillips. Well, if I could interrupt you, Senator.
The Chairman. Yes.
Captain Phillips. The ship was never taken. Never taken.
The Chairman. Fair enough. I agree with that. I completely
agree. Let me rephrase that. What do you mean by these guys got
on the ship? How did they get on it? What happened? When people
hear that, they're sort of saying, ``Where's the shield?
Where's the force of our overflight? Where's the early
detection, and therefore, the summoning of somebody to check it
out? Where's the protection, the joint effort of 22 countries
that have joined together in a task force?
It's difficult, and maybe you can explain so that people
have a better understanding of that. Why is it so difficult for
those response factors to cut in quicker and to have an impact?
Captain Phillips. One thing we do, as I've instructed my
crew all along, our biggest asset is what we do anyway, and
that is to maintain a lookout navigation capability. And as
this incident here, we first noticed them 3\1/2\ miles from our
vessel. You do have visibility restrictions. You do have
limitations on radar. So keeping an eye out the window is the
No. 1 precursor to stopping these incidents.
But piracy is evolving, and I think what we're going to see
next is a stealth type invasion, which would be the next step
up. So that's why I say just arming the crews is not a final
solution or silver bullet. We have to have a cohesive approach
that will take into account the evolution of piracy.
Three months ago, we said that if a vessel had a speed of
more than 15 knots and more than 12-foot freeboard that would
keep you from being taken over. Yet the Maersk Alabama was
doing 18.3 knots and had approximately 26 feet freeboard. So we
can throw those parameters out the window. The pirates and
their tactics are evolving--and we must stay with the curve and
evolve with them to stop these incidents from happening.
The Chairman. Fair enough. Freeboard, for all the land
lubbers, is the distance between the water and the rail,
correct?
Captain Phillips. Correct.
The Chairman. Can I ask one other question just before we
do that? What did you wish you'd had, or what is the most
significant intervention that you think could be the most
effective at this point that you would recommend?
Captain Phillips. Again, I just want to stress, there is no
silver bullet. There's no one step. But I would say a force
protection. And I don't mean a security guard. I don't mean a
mall cop. I would--I mean, someone who's specifically trained,
maybe retired Special Forces, GERKAS, SSA retired.
And I understand that this can cost a lot of money. But we
don't need 8 or 10 or 12 individuals. We need perhaps two,
maybe three, so they can be in a watch situation. If you had
those type of caliber people, I would say that would be the
most important aspect of a deterrent, but not the complete
solution.
The Chairman. Well, I must say, that's one thing that
struck me as being perhaps particularly potentially available.
We have a lot of near-retired, newly retired ex-military folks,
people who are well-trained and disciplined, some of whom want
to work, and they're unemployed and might, in fact, be
available for something like that.
Captain Phillips. And again, I just want to stress, it's
not a mall cop that I'm looking for. I don't want to denigrate
anybody, but a little higher trained personnel is what we need,
because these are high-caliber people. And with my experience,
someone like the SEALs or Special Forces is what you're talking
about, and you would not need 10, 12, 18 people. Three would be
plenty. Plus, we also have limitations on the number of rooms
on the ship and the capability of the ship to carry extra
people.
The Chairman. Sure.
Captain Phillips. So I just don't want it to be a Band-Aid.
Specifically trained people would have to be vetted in the
event they are hired from a private firm.
The Chairman. Fair enough.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, sir.
Senator Lugar. Well, just following through on Senator
Kerry's questioning and your responses, Captain Phillips,
obviously, there are private security firms now offering
security in Iraq, for example, and through other phases of
foreign policy. Some of these firms presumably are available,
although maybe being on shipboard is so vastly different that
they wouldn't qualify. But I gather you're not rejecting the
idea of a private security firm. You're saying, however, that
the costs of having more personnel, first of all, just to
accommodate them aboard ship, but then beyond that, are the
costs of these security people so great a percentage of
whatever the commerce is worth that it is prohibitive? In other
words, help me with the economics, either one of you, of why
there has not been a thought of hiring a private security firm
with people aboard each of your ships. Please.
Captain Phillips. I would want to defer to Mr. Clancey
there. I am only concerned with my ship, my crew, and my cargo.
Senator Lugar. Very well.
Captain Phillips. So I defer to Mr. Clancey.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Clancey.
Mr. Clancey. As a percentage of the cost of operation, it
would be small. As a percentage of revenues collected, it would
be very small. I would only refer back to my earlier comments.
If that was the course the United States wanted to take, we
would need to ensure that our allies were in sync with us and
the international community was in sync with us----
Senator Lugar. Now, why would they need to be----
Mr. Clancey. [continuing]. Accept the practice.
Senator Lugar. Why would they need to be in sync with that?
Mr. Clancey. Well, the IMO, which is a branch of the United
Nations, strongly recommends against the arming of crews or
providing security forces. They don't say ``no,'' but they--all
of their literature and their conferences, they keep on hinting
on this theme.
And this is an evolving situation. The world is changing.
It's becoming more dangerous. They would have to reconsider
their stance so that the governments and the ports and the
customs officials around the world who are in and out thousands
of times a week understand that it is the position of the
larger maritime nations of the world that this is necessary.
Senator Lugar. Why wouldn't it be a good idea, perhaps, for
our Nation, maybe our Secretary of State the next time she
meets with the Russian Foreign Minister, suggest that the two
of us, maybe as a starter, plus others that have large oil
vessels, get together and establish a new understanding on
this? Piracy off Somalia is a new challenge. It's a common
threat to all of us. And whatever may have been the
premonitions of disaster before in the literature, as a
practical matter, we've all had ships that have been meeting
pirates out there.
Mr. Clancey. I mean, I would leave that to the experts in
international relations. But we do need an international
solution. There may be a concern that this would take too long.
If that's the belief of this committee and of the Senate, they
may prescribe a different alternative, and we're open to any
solution.
Senator Lugar. Following through on the cost situation, try
to describe what the insurance business is in relationship to
your shipping. What kind of insurance do you buy? How is that
affected by the piracy business?
Mr. Clancey. The premiums have gone up a percentage. Let's
say it's between 10 and 25 percent. And that's just our case. I
don't know what the situation with other companies are. And
costs like that over the course of the year annualized are
eventually passed through to the end user, which is the
customer.
Senator Lugar. Well, this--it gets back to--I posed the
point that there are costs involved here, and it is important
where they finally are paid. I assume that could be the case
with the private security forces if they were aboard the ship.
Your point with that was that other nations haven't either
adopted such a principal or would reject it unless we all got
together and indicated this is different.
And I think it's not unreasonable to think that there would
be such successful negotiations, because rural shipping is
being vilely affected by this.
Mr. Clancey. Right.
Senator Lugar. And it's not going to go away. And
unfortunately in this region, as I mentioned in my opening
remarks, you have failed states, and other states are perhaps
on the verge of failing. So this may be something that prompts
an international situation that will not be interminable
because of the interests of each of the countries involved.
Now, without trying to engage whether losses to United
States shipping have been greater than that of the Russians or
anybody else conveying oil shipments or other cargo, but my
guess is that, as you say, our U.S. flags are a small portion
of the international fleet that is affected that is now
diverting course and being hit 200 miles out, 400, now 600,
increasing costs for everybody, for, that is, the constituents
of countries in the region, likewise.
Mr. Clancey. Correct. I mean, Senator, I don't understand
why any country would be opposed to a solution that addressed
the piracy issue. I don't.
Senator Lugar. I think it's important, though--and this
hearing is able to sort of pin down that there are costs to
this.
Mr. Clancey. Yes, there are.
Senator Lugar. And we're trying to define those, and then
for the more diplomatic problems, in terms of international
law, of which we need to be cognizant. Now, what about the
ports that say, ``Well, we don't want ships, whether they're
yours or the Russians' or anybody else, coming into port if you
have armed guards, whether they're a private security team or
whoever they are.'' How do we deal with that?
Mr. Clancey. Well, I think if it was the position of all
the major shipping nations, which relates to the companies,
took a position, we are the customers of the ports. I think the
ports would be willing to evaluate different alternatives. We
pay their fees.
Senator Lugar. I appreciate that, because you're in the
business, and this is going to have to be a very technical
matter, but one that's not beyond the principles of governance.
And so we appreciate your testimony.
Mr. Clancey. Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I'd like to
express my appreciation to you for holding this hearing. I
think it's a very important issue for us to look at. I'm also
in the Armed Services Committee. I think there's going to be a
more militarily oriented hearing next week on this as well.
Mr. Clancey, in following the line of questioning, I
clearly get the notion of liability issues with respect to
arming crew members or putting weapons on board a ship and
having some sort of incident that might not even be related to
the defense of the ship and those sorts of things.
But at the same time, this is so clear, I think to
everyone, that we all have an inherent right to self-defense in
international waters, and the idea that there wouldn't be
protection on board these vessels with these hugely expensive
cargos and all the rest of it just doesn't seem to make a lot
of sense.
I got in only when the questions began, but was there any
discussion about this cruise ship that has Israeli security on
it? Are you familiar with that incident?
Mr. Clancey. Correct.
Senator Webb. What would be your observation of that?
Mr. Clancey. I'm familiar with the incident. I'm familiar
with the company, and they chose to have an armed force
protection on the cruise ship, which prevented the hijacking of
the ship.
Senator Webb. And they were not perceived as being in
violation of any of these international agreements that you
were talking about?
Mr. Clancey. Well, it wasn't in the water and it wasn't--
they didn't injure anybody that has been reported or
acknowledged. And I don't think they did. The pirates left. So
there wasn't a reaction to that.
Senator Webb. But the international agreement that you're
talking about is essentially that those sorts of people
shouldn't be on these kinds of ships?
Mr. Clancey. Well, I'm saying that if the international
community could agree that the arming of commercial ships,
whether it's by the crew, but more preferably, with armed
guards, security firms, and it was an accepted practice that
would change the set of circumstances. This is a situation
that's evolving very quickly. I mean, this is not that old when
Captain Phillips saved the Alabama. Six months ago, we weren't
thinking or talking like this.
Senator Webb. So you don't see any strong reaction in your
business community to the notion that that cruise liner had
armed security on board?
Mr. Clancey. No.
Senator Webb. And I would----
Mr. Clancey. Because it wasn't an incident, nothing
happened. But there has been----
Senator Webb. But the capability--I mean, they are for the
purpose of defending people on the ship.
Mr. Clancey. Exactly.
Senator Webb. And whether the pirates got smart and left,
you know, is not the relevant point in terms of whether these
people were being employed. And to me, it makes a tremendous
amount of sense to get small groups of highly trained people to
work in a synergistic fashion with the military.
I take your point in your testimony when you were talking
about full cooperation, sharing information so that if there
are going to be periods, obviously, where you're going to be on
more heightened alert with respect to these activities, and you
can be coordinating in two different ways, really, with when
you would be putting private security people on board a ship,
but also, how you'd be coordinating with military forces.
Mr. Clancey. Correct. There have been incidences, though,
where innocent bystanders were injured or killed, and they're
the subject of fairly extensive legal cases today. So there is
exposure, and maybe--again, I think the solution is one that I
would hope that the international community could address. I
mean, it's--everyone's at risk.
Senator Webb. Right. Well, we're obviously concerned about
that, but principally concerned about American shipping. And
there may be a model, I would suggest, with respect to how
independent contractors have been used in some of these combat
theaters. I'm speaking contractually and in terms of liability,
as well as to quality of people.
Mr. Clancey. Yes. Before you arrived, I did mention that we
are in discussions with the Department of Defense about our
U.S.-flag shipping operations. And hopefully, we'll come to a
conclusion on that sometime in the next 10 days.
Senator Webb. Good. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Webb.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you both for coming, and Captain
Phillips, it's great to be in someone's presence who's so
highly esteemed. All of us in the public sphere can use that
from time to time. So thank you very much for being here and
bringing so many colleagues with you.
Mr. Clancey, you mentioned that your company, which is a
Danish company, I think--is that correct?
Mr. Clancey. Correct.
Senator Corker. Has about 600 ships?
Mr. Clancey. Well, more than that, yes. But owned and
chartered, order of 8 or 900.
Senator Corker. So, just so that we're all educated as to
how do you decide--you've got 30 or so that have a U.S. flag, I
think you've said. Two or three might be in port right now. How
is it that one decides, for those of us who don't do this on a
daily basis, whether it's flagged U.S.-flag or some other
country?
Mr. Clancey. We have contracts with the U.S. Government
that require capacity and frequency in the oceans of the world.
So we build a network around those requirements, the customer's
requirements, the Department of Defense's requirements, food
aid, et cetera. And those ships are purchased by our affiliate,
Maersk Line, Limited, which is an independent subsidiary. And
they fly the American flag and they serve, for the most part,
the military.
But they're in commercial loops, so that--it's economically
viable to combine the commercial cargo and the military cargo,
run a system that supports both customers' needs, and that it
is economically viable. That's how the decision is made.
Senator Corker. So you would, from time to time, be
carrying cargo that's of benefit to the U.S. military?
Mr. Clancey. Correct.
Senator Corker. OK. But not all the time?
Mr. Clancey. Correct. For example, if we go to Asia with
military cargo, we're not coming back with military cargo.
We're coming back with what you find in Wal-Mart and Penney's.
Senator Corker. But you still have a U.S. flag on the----
Mr. Clancey. Correct.
Senator Corker. Yes. OK. And so you're a company that deals
with, obviously, flags throughout the world or different
countries, and you're carrying military cargo for Russia and
for China and other places, too; would that be correct?
Mr. Clancey. Very, very small.
Senator Corker. But you would have the Chinese flag----
Mr. Clancey. 99 percent of our cargo would be U.S. military
cargo, for the use of our military forces on a----
Senator Corker. Well, then, how do you determine only 30 of
your ships, if the majority of it is U.S. military cargo, only
30 of your ships are flagged with U.S. flags. How do you
determine the flags for the other ships?
Mr. Clancey. In some cases, where they're built. In some
cases, where they're operated. And in many cases, they fly the
Danish flag and the U.K. flag and Singapore. It's historical. A
company goes--and it goes back to 1907. And once the vessel is
flagged in the country, it's expensive to reverse it. So they
left that.
Senator Corker. Is there anything about that whole process
that you think would be informative for us to know?
Mr. Clancey. No; and you don't have the time for me to
explain it to you.
Senator Corker. OK. So let me move on to the next issue.
Mr. Clancey. It's long and complex.
Senator Corker. So for each of those different flags, it's
my understanding that you would buy insurance from different
companies. It's my understanding that----
Mr. Clancey. Right.
Senator Corker. [continuing]. For instance, if you're
buying insurance for a U.S.-flagged ship, then there's no
proceeds for hostage-taking or anything like that. But if you
were doing it with a London-based entity, they would maybe
supply up to $20 million or some amount of money to actually
pay those who take hostages, pirates; is that correct?
Mr. Clancey. The insurance premium structure is based on
your activity and your history and your experience, your loss
experience.
Senator Corker. But I'm not talking about the premium. I'm
talking about the----
Mr. Clancey. Policy?
Senator Corker. [continuing]. The actual payments. It would
be my understanding, if you have 600 ships with 30 in the
United States, that you'd probably have some that actually have
policies that pay when pirates demand money for the hostages;
is that correct?
Mr. Clancey. I don't have the insurance policies in front
of me. I would think most of them, the only way they pay is
through negotiations, and hard-pressed negotiations. They would
say that was a decision you made. But it's not something that
we have learned to deal with. This is a brand new world.
Senator Corker. Well, maybe I'm--well, let me ask you this.
Is it a fact that in the industry, that there are many
companies who do buy that kind of coverage, and that, in some
ways, encourages some of the activity we saw off of the
Somalian coast?
Mr. Clancey. I couldn't answer that question and give you a
factual answer. I'm not sure what other companies negotiate
with their insurance companies and whether they are able to buy
a surcharge for hostages. I just don't know.
Senator Corker. Would that be interesting for you to know
after what just happened?
Mr. Clancey. Well, our insurance people are working on that
and they were briefing me this morning. So yes, it--they're
looking at it right now. They're--it's--the insurance companies
are thinking about it.
Senator Corker. Would you mind sharing that with us once
they have----
Mr. Clancey. Not at all, sir. We'll provide that.
Senator Corker. So if I heard the line of thinking,
questioning from Senator Lugar and Senator Webb and beginning
with Senator Kerry, it seems to me that actually, there is no
law whatsoever that would prevent--and it sounds like it's a
very minimal expense based on what you said, based on the
overall cost of a shipment.
It doesn't sound like to me there is actually any
international law that would keep you from having the kinds of
folks on board that Captain Phillips alluded to. It sounded
like, to me, it's a--you're free to do that, and there isn't
anything that actually keeps you from being able to do that.
Mr. Clancey. It's the entry and departure from certain
ports, where if you have weapons, the Captain alludes that if
you put them in bond, which they come and take them or hold
them or you lock them up. But there are countries that I have
been told and briefed upon that they say you will not bring--
you will not have armed mariners on your ship.
Senator Corker. Well, let me ask you this. On this last
trip, are those that typically originate on the other side of
Somalia and end up here in the United States, are those two
ports--are they ports that allow you, in those specific cases,
to have people--or Captain Phillips may want to jump in here--
that would be trained to the extent we're talking about, that
would be able to protect their crew?
Mr. Clancey. That's a new world. We've just been dealing
with this now for a very short period of time, but that issue
has been raised by numerous people in numerous areas. But we
don't have a definitive answer today as to what countries
around the world would say to our request to have an armed
security unit on the vessel.
I think at some geographies, we would meet resistance, from
my experience living and working overseas. If it was something
that our Department of State could find a way to convince
others, they may open the door. Right now, I think that it's
subject to questioning.
Senator Corker. Well, listen, we thank you for coming to
testify today. My guess is that Captain Phillips and some of
the folks like him that serve within your company might ask
those questions before the next particular trip again.
Mr. Clancey. They're asking those questions right now.
Senator Corker. OK.
Captain Phillips. Yes, and I'd like to add that I have been
sailing for 18\1/2\ years as captain and I've been to those two
ports. I have had an asset there. I don't want to say what I
have. It wouldn't have helped, I don't believe, in the
situation I was just in on the Maersk Alabama, but in all the
countries I've been, it's just another formality that you have
to go through, but that being a smaller asset than what I think
is needed on----
Senator Corker. Which is two or three.
Captain Phillips. And Mr. Clancey may be right that a
larger asset may be a problem.
Mr. Clancey. An automatic weapon.
Senator Corker. Yes. Well, listen, thank you both for
educating us. Again, Captain Phillips and all those who have
served with you, thanks for your extreme professionalism and
the way all of you conducted yourself. It's been an
inspiration. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Mr. Clancey, if there's an issue as far as
armed people in the ports, as I look at this, it would seem to
me that we have a fair number of warships there that they could
put a few U.S. marines on each ship as it--American flagships
as it entered the area, and have another ship take them off at
the other end. That way, you wouldn't have armed people going
into the ports. Has there been any discussion given to that?
Mr. Clancey. Yes, there are, and those discussions are
taking place today in this town.
Senator Risch. OK, good. Because it seems to me--I agree
with you. With three people, and you're up 30 feet, from a
small boat attacking it, it would seem to me three of our
marines could probably do the job from the fantail or from any
other place that they----
Mr. Clancey. I think they could do the job from 200 yards
away, yes.
Senator Risch. Yes. The other question I had was--is I
heard the description of the difficulty because there's so many
square miles to patrol. Has any thought been given to creating
a lane using a GPS-type system, and then having them--have
everybody stay in the lane so that the military could patrol
that lane, and they wouldn't have all the square mileage to
patrol?
Mr. Clancey. At this time, there is the GOA lane, the Gulf
of Aden, that has been established, and there are military
ships there. That's the Gulf of Aden on that chart there.
They're still being attacked, and that's with the military
there.
I think one situation we're seeing--we talk about
evolution. Originally, it was down south where I was, a little
closer to land, where the problem started. Then the pirates
evolved and the target-rich environment are all the ships
coming from the Suez Canal out the Red Sea. It's a target-rich
environment. There are less miles to get back to Puntland and
Somalia, where they do have havens. So you saw them go up there
and actually, the activity slowed down back where I was and
where I was taking.
Now you see--and the policeman is in town, and now the
bullies are going back down 600 miles off Somalia, which is the
Satchells, and they are actually out there. So you're seeing
the deterrent that started in the Gulf of Aden, I think, has
sent a lot of the business back down to where it started
because the policeman is in town.
Senator Risch. I think that if these talks are successful
and they can put a few people on each of those ships, and they
took aggressive action in the case of an attack, I would
suspect that's going to slow them down, particularly if they
see a ship with an American flag on it and they know we've
got--that there is a substantial possibility that they're going
to be looking at three marines on the deck of that, it would
seem to me that that's going to give them pause as to whether
or not they're going to want to do this anymore.
Captain Phillips. I don't want to disagree with you, but
the pirates have attacked the grey ships, what I call the grey
ships, or U.S. Navy ships, the--I'm not going to mention the
name. They were attacked by pirates. The pirates will evolve
and learn to recognize that the grey ships are the ones they
want to stay away from. And the pirates do not read the stern,
and we don't fly a flag at sea. So as far as the flag the ship
sails under, it is irrelevant because piracy is just a crime of
opportunity, and that is what's going on here.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Risch.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Captain, I didn't understand what you meant
about the grey ships.
Captain Phillips. The grey ships are the U.S. Navy ships, I
mean, I think most of us here would recognize a Navy ship, and
if we were pirates, we would stay away from them. But the
pirates have actually attacked, not just U.S. Navy, but other
countries' navy ships. But the pirates and their tactics are
evolving and they are learning not to do that.
Senator Wicker. I see.
Captain Phillips. My point was, they aren't picking out a
flag. It's a crime of opportunity, and that's what they're
going for.
Senator Wicker. OK. Did I just understand you to say that
you don't fly a flag?
Captain Phillips. At sea, we do not fly a flag. In port,
we're required to fly a flag of the port we're in and the flag
we have. But at sea, no, we do not fly a flag. You would end up
spending thousands of dollars on flags if we did that.
Senator Wicker. Well, it might be worth it.
Captain Phillips. That may be part of the comprehensive
plan, but a very small part of it.
Senator Wicker. So when Mr. Clancey says of course pirates
generally don't check the flag and origin of a ship before
attacking, there's a reason for that because you can't tell
the----
Captain Phillips. I don't want to discount the evolution of
piracy. We talk about evolving. I think there is going to be
inside information made available to pirates from various
people in ports, and certain ships could be targeted. I believe
that will be the evolution of these pirates as they increase
their abilities and intelligence.
Senator Wicker. Well, do you think they're less likely--if
they could figure out which one is the American ship--do you
think they're now less likely to attack that American ship?
Captain Phillips. I think that the only thing that will
stop them from attacking a ship is showing them that the ship
is a hard target, and that's it.
Senator Wicker. Did the pirates speak English?
Captain Phillips. They spoke a manner of English, yes.
Senator Wicker. Were you able to have a conversation with
them about what their goals were?
Captain Phillips. This is a pending investigation, so I
can't divulge, but we had many conversations, yes.
Senator Wicker. I see. Well, would I be fair in making the
assumption that they were hoping somebody would come along and
pay them a bunch of money to release you?
Captain Phillips. Yes; you would be. Yes. It's a business
plan for them. It's a crime of opportunity. As the gentleman
spoke up here--I think it was Senator Lugar--they can support
towns. If you can feed people in that area of the world, you
have an army.
Senator Wicker. So let me ask both of you--no, I think I'll
ask Mr. Clancey.
Maersk has a bunch of ships?
Mr. Clancey. Yes, sir.
Senator Wicker. What percentage of the traffic does your
company control worldwide?
Mr. Clancey. It's actually by segment. In the container
shipping business, which is the largest part, we have about 13,
14 percent.
Senator Wicker. I see. How many companies, including major
companies, are there like Maersk?
Mr. Clancey. Ten.
Senator Wicker. Ten? OK. I've had to come in and out, so
I'm not sure that this has been addressed, but I don't think it
has. Has anyone asked you your opinion yet today about the
payment of ransoms and what effect that might have had over
time in encouraging this practice?
Mr. Clancey. I think that the payment of ransoms has led to
the sophistication of the pirates, probably increased the
number of the pirates and their willingness to take larger
risks.
Senator Wicker. What is the policy of Maersk in that
regard?
Mr. Clancey. There was one instance with a tugboat where
they captured a crew and guests, and they had it in Somalia.
And we couldn't get it by land, and the only way to get the
people back was to pay a ransom, and they did.
Senator Wicker. So one instance is the only one that you're
aware of?
Mr. Clancey. Right.
Senator Wicker. Do other companies have a more liberal
policy, or other countries have a more liberal policy?
Mr. Clancey. I don't think it's that specific. I think it's
a case-by-case basis, and it's been all over the globe, in
terms of who's paying and who's not. A lot of times, it's the
case of the owner. Is the owner willing?
Senator Wicker. Is the owner of the cargo, or the owner of
the shipping company?
Mr. Clancey. Owner of the ship.
Senator Wicker. Of the ship.
Mr. Clancey. That's who they negotiate with.
Senator Wicker. I see. So in your case, that would be your
corporation.
Mr. Clancey. Correct.
Senator Wicker. So have there been--so there's only this
one instance----
Mr. Clancey. A small, small boat.
Senator Wicker. [continuing]. In which Maersk has paid. And
so in other instances where--I would have to assume this is not
the first instance of piracy involving Maersk--what happened in
those other instances?
Mr. Clancey. We evaded the pirates. There's only three
other incidents.
Senator Wicker. I see. OK. And--and so really, you've only
had to face that decision the one time?
Mr. Clancey. Once, and it was in the very beginning of
this. It was, bingo, the ship was in port.
Senator Wicker. Yes. Well, I think you--I think, Mr.
Chairman, the questions today sort of reflect a view on both
sides of this table, on both sides of the aisle. There's got to
be a solution out there, and the status quo is unacceptable to
this panel. So to the extent that you've enlightened us with
some information that might get us going in the right direction
and show us some of the pitfalls in trying to address it,
you've been very helpful to us. I, too, want to join the other
Senators in thanking both of you, and also thanking the
chairman for calling the hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator. Let me follow
up with a few questions if I can.
The Chairman. On the issue of flying the flag, this area is
apparently the single biggest pirating area on the planet; is
that correct?
Mr. Clancey. Correct.
The Chairman. And while it covers a million square miles,
it's really in the area here as you're approaching the Gulf of
Aden, correct?
Mr. Clancey. Correct.
The Chairman. There are only three approaches to that
fundamentally. You come up from Madagascar, the southern part
of Africa, or you come up from Australia, straight over like
that, or you come in out of the Mumbai/Karachi area, or around
the cape here, the Persian Gulf, and come around, go up into
the canal, ultimately.
Let me come back to the sea-lanes issue for a minute here.
Isn't it possible to have a rendezvous spot outside of the
reach of those small skiffs where you could come up with
military cover, perhaps even in convoy? Has that been
considered?
Mr. Clancey. There is a great deal of discussion about a
corridor, like they have now, coming out of the Red Sea into
the Gulf of Aden. And I think that there's a lot of promise in
the idea of a corridor.
The Chairman. And it seems that we could cover that pretty
effectively.
Mr. Clancey. Yes. And I think that our other maritime
nations' navies would be willing to respond, but that's just my
personal opinion. I have not certainly spoken to them.
The Chairman. Well, I think there ought to be some urgency
to the effort internationally to pull people together. I know
there's the task force, but, Captain, I know you're a brave
soul, and maybe you're willing just to go at it again the same
way, but are you going to be comfortable going out there again?
Is this your wife here that I see behind you?
Captain Phillips. This is my wife, Andrea.
The Chairman. She wants you to go out there again, exactly
the way things were before?
Captain Phillips. She's a good wife. She supports whatever
my decision is.
The Chairman. And what's your decision?
Captain Phillips. What's that?
The Chairman. You didn't even turn to consult with her. I
couldn't get away with that.
Captain Phillips. I will be going back to sea, yes. That's
what I do.
The Chairman. OK. And with or without some changes that you
want put in place?
Captain Phillips. I expect and anticipate changes will be
in place. I've received some information that they are working
on it, as Mr. Clancey has talked about. And it behooves them
and us to take the measures.
As I said, there's not one single aspect of this. It's got
to be a cohesive, comprehensive plan with multiple facets. And
to develop that plan, I think your job, and the job of the
gentlemen here today, is to hear from other people, and not
just myself.
As I've mentioned to a few committee aides, I have some
names of much more articulate people than me that have more
ideas. I've also received many ideas from other people in my
mail and by telephone in the last few weeks, and although many
of them have to be thrown out, we have to do things that are
practical, capable, and truly efficient. But it can't be one
solution. There's going to be a comprehensive--a multiple-
faceted plan.
The Chairman. Well, I respect that enormously, and I
couldn't agree with you more. And we welcome that input and
those ideas, and we will follow up on it, because we want to
exhaust the remedies here.
But it seems to me that if this is a concentrated area and
you were coming through some shipping lanes, how many nights
and how many days are we talking about once you enter the
danger zone until you're through?
Captain Phillips. Pretty much in the Maersk Alabama, we
were in the zone the whole time of our transit. But as I said
earlier, even in the GOA, the Gulf of Aden transit zone, which
is already in place, and a convoy type situation is set up,
they are still being attacked. Just not as much as before they
set up the lanes. Because, again, the Suez Canal is at the end
of the Red Sea.
The Chairman. I understand. But as of this moment----
Captain Phillips. Yes.
The Chairman. [continuing]. They believe they can attack
with relative impunity, if they get onto the ship or get in
there.
Captain Phillips. I think part of their business plan
assumes that once they get on a ship, nobody's going to do
anything.
The Chairman. Correct. And I think personally, that has to
change. And my judgment is that for the period of time you're
in that zone, it seems to me flying a flag, you're not going to
go through all that many flags that it's so prohibitive that it
isn't of value, particularly if they know that that particular
flag carries with it a certain risk if they attempt to board.
It seems to me that we have it within our power and within
our faculties of reasoning to be able to fairly rapidly come up
with a means of safeguarding the ship's interests with respect
to weapons at the same time that we safeguard these ships and
their cargos and the vast expenditures of the military. That's
a big expense too and it also carries risks.
With respect to the weapons, it seems to me that you are,
as a captain, entrusted with a vessel's worth? How much is a
vessel worth?
Mr. Clancey. Oh, anywhere from $20 to $60 million.
The Chairman. That's what I thought; $20 to $60 million,
and how many members of the crew are there?
Captain Phillips. On the Maersk Alabama, 20, and it varies
on different ships.
The Chairman. Twenty members of the crew, and you're
carrying how many millions of dollars of cargo on a particular
vessel worth $20 to $60 million? In the multimillions?
Captain Phillips. Yes.
The Chairman. So it seems to me that if you have one person
as a skipper in charge of that ship, that value and the value
of those lives, you can trust that captain with a key and a
lock and an armory, which is what ships have. They have an
armory. We keep weapons under lock and key, and it's the
captain's order that breaks those weapons out when they are
under attack or at risk.
It seems to me that that ought to be possible. A certain
level of training ought to be possible. Obviously maybe your
preference to have it be military people loaded on to an
American-flag vessel before they go into the zone and they're
taken off when they get out of it. That's one way to handle it.
Another is you have a crew that goes through the whole way. But
I certainly hope you will take our thoughts to that discussion
that you're going to have, and we will weigh in with
appropriate people accordingly.
But besides that particular issue, did your insurance
company pay the ransom?
Captain Phillips. I'm not familiar with it, because it was
an affiliate. It was a tug-assist vessel that was helping in
the oil fields. But I would take a guess that no, the insurance
company did not.
The Chairman. OK. Is there anything else, Mr. Clancey, that
you need from the government that would make a difference in
this, in your judgment?
Mr. Clancey. I do think, because of the scope of the
geography and just deterioration of certain economies around
the world, that we do need an international resolution or an
international agreement that deals with piracy. The
prosecution, the penalties, the crime, what you can do and what
you can't do. And I would think with the threat level
increasing, that hopefully, that is doable. And that would be
of great benefit to all the shipping----
The Chairman. Well, one of the things we're going to be
considering here at some point in time is the Law of the Sea
Convention, and the Law of the Sea Convention states that all
states shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the
repression of piracy on the High Seas or any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any state.
It's my understanding that the U.S. Navy is currently
operating in a manner consistent with the Law of the Sea
Convention, even though we are not a party to it. Is that
accurate, do you know?
Mr. Clancey. Yes, that is accurate, and we think that it
would be a great benefit if we were a party to it.
The Chairman. Well, the two of us sitting here both believe
that, and we hope before long that the Senate will deal with
that issue.
Captain Phillips, again, you have our admiration and
respect. We're, needless to say, thrilled that you're in good
health, as is your crew, and your ship was protected, and we
admire so much the way in which you conducted yourself. We hope
you never have to go through that again, and we hope we can get
some policies in place that ensure that.
Captain Phillips. Well, I hope that's what this day
started, and we'll soon end up with comprehensive and
coordinated policies. And I just want to mention again, it
wasn't just me on my ship. It was my crew, my chief mate, my
chief engineer, first engineer, who were integral in the
outcome of this.
And again, I can't say enough about the military. We need
to support them. And they are at the point of the spear. We
need to support them.
The Chairman. We all respect what they did enormously. And
Shane Murphy, thank you again for being with us. Everything I
said about the captain goes to you too. And we thank you for
the way you conducted yourself.
So we're going to recess for 2 minutes while we switch the
panel. And again, thank you very much, Captain, and Mr.
Clancey. Thank you. It's very helpful.
Captain Phillips. Thank you.
The Chairman. If we could bring in the next panel, that'd
be terrific.
[Whereupon a recess was taken from 4:12 p.m. to 4:14 p.m.]
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. Ambassador
Mull, thank you very much for being here with us. We appreciate
it. If you could summarize your testimony, then we'll follow
up. Thanks.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN D. MULL, SENIOR ADVISER TO THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS WITH OVERSIGHT
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND ITS
RELATED STATE DEPARTMENT BUREAUS
Mr. Mull. Absolutely. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Senator Lugar. It's a pleasure to be here today to talk about
this very urgent issue of national security.
It's an interesting thing about the problem of piracy. It's
really linked to the preeminent and really the oldest
interests, foreign interest that the United States has, that of
freedom of the seas, and converges with the very real 21st
century threat of--a very typical, asymmetric threat to our
national security that the pirates pose.
Our goal on behalf of the government in approaching this
problem is to reclaim the freedom of the seas from the pirates
and to build on that what we hope will be a permanent maritime
security arrangement in the region so that this problem will be
permanently dealt with. And we've adopted a number of tactics
over the course of the past 6 months in pursuit of that goal.
We've worked very closely within the United Nations to pass
a number of new U.N. Security Council resolutions with
authorities, giving national states the right to take military
action on the seas and on smaller territory, if necessary.
We've worked with our partners to substantially increase
the number of ships that are deployed to the region, and we've
worked with those ships to establish a maritime safety
protective area, the so-called corridor that the last panel
discussed. We've also simultaneously engaged with the problem
of what do you do when you catch the pirates? And here, we've
run into a problem of a patchwork of various national legal
authorities and intents and policies on what to do with these
pirates once you catch them.
Very early on in January, we signed an agreement with the
Government of Kenya, at which they agreed to take pirates that
we apprehend. They signed a similar agreement with the British
Government and with the European Union. So now there are 52
pirates that are apprehended awaiting trial. They're in Kenya.
We're in various stages of negotiation with other countries in
the region, as well, to play a similar role.
We've also worked to engage with the industry, working
through the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration, to get
more adherence to best practices that we've learned in these
lessons that we've had over the past few months about some of
the measures, both passive and active, that they can take for
self-defense.
And, of course, this is all part of the much broader issue
of Somalia. This is a symptom of the problem in Somalia that
really requires urgent attention to be fixed. Now, in pursuing
these tactics, we've achieved a number of successes. The number
of interdictions--successful interdictions of pirates since
January 1 of this year has been 15. In all of 2008, there were
only eight, so we've almost doubled the number of successful
interdictions.
There's also been--although there's been an increase in the
number of attempted attacks, the number of successful attacks
has actually dropped by nearly half in contrast to last year.
But we have to do more. The inflow of ransom very quickly
translates into more sophisticated weapons, larger numbers of
pirates who then only increase their attack. And in response to
this growth in the threat, Secretary Clinton's identified a few
more measures that we're taking in the process very urgently
right now.
One, you may be familiar with the International Contact
Group that we formed in January. The U.S. Government took the
lead in forming that group. It's grown to now 28 governments
and 6 international organizations that break into subgroups to
look at all these different facets: The legal facet, the
military coordination facet, the--and we hope soon the whole
aspect of financial transfers of pirates.
We're going to be convening an emergency session of the
contact group within a few weeks' time at New York. At that
meeting, we're going to press for additional donations of
military forces to the territory. We're going to work at
redoubling our efforts right now. Next week, there's going to
be an effort--one of the subgroups that focuses on legal
authorities is going to be meeting. We hope to build on that.
Then at the contact group meeting later this month----
The Chairman. What's missing in the legal authorities?
Mr. Mull. Well, each country has--as you, Senator, pointed
out earlier, the law of the sea, in fact, calls on all states
to take action. But each state takes different policy decisions
on how they're going to apply that. For example, let's say--
there was one recent case in which one European Navy ship
apprehended some pirates in the process of attacking a ship
that was not flagged of that country and which had no nationals
of that country on the ship.
The prosecutors in that country said, ``Well, this wasn't
in our waters. This isn't our nationals. This isn't our ship.
Let's just let the pirates go.'' So we need to work with our
partners to just convey just what you have said in your opening
statements, that this is a problem requiring all of us to work
together so that we aren't catching and releasing pirates, that
we're delivering them either to Kenya or other countries, or to
the victim states themselves. They have an obligation and a
responsibility to take that----
The Chairman. Did that occur in international waters?
Mr. Mull. Pardon me?
The Chairman. Was that in international waters?
Mr. Mull. Yes, it was, sir.
The Chairman. Under international law, isn't an attack on a
ship in international waters a crime?
Mr. Mull. Yes, it is. According to the Conventions, it is.
But the decision to prosecute, to apprehend, is a national
policy decision, much as the process we went through with the
pirates that attacked the Maersk Alabama.
The Chairman. I interrupted you. I'm sorry.
Mr. Mull. Oh, no, sir. That leads me, actually, to my next
point, that one of the challenges we face with the other
members of this contact group is in convincing them that victim
states really do have an important responsibility to carry out
in bringing these pirates to justice.
Secretary Clinton also mentioned that we need to work
harder to track the flow of assets that pirates get. There was
more than $30 million in ransoms paid to these pirates last
year, and they're off to a mark--to exceed that mark this year
if current trends continue. Of course, this is a hard thing to
do. Most pirate assets are delivered in suitcases stuffed full
of pounds or euros or dollars flung onto the decks of ships
from helicopters, and then they go into the hawala system, and
it gets very difficult to track.
But nevertheless, there are a number of measures that we're
considering with the Treasury Department. I can't go into some
of them in open session, but we're looking at it very
carefully. And I think we'll have some practical measures that
we can take with our partners.
And then finally, you discussed in the last session the
whole problem--one of the root problems of this is the payment
of ransoms. And we have to find a way to discourage the payment
of ransoms. This isn't an easy question. When we first stood at
the contact group and the diplomacy we were conducting in
Europe, this was very much at the top of our list with our
European friends. The Europeans responded, ``Look, for many of
our businesses, this has become an acceptable business
expense.'' And we're talking about human lives, and so none of
the hostages had been executed by any pirates so far, and
they're worried that by cutting off ransom, the pirates will
respond by then taking action to kill hostages, which has not
happened up until now.
Nevertheless, in the emergency contact group meeting, we're
going to continue to press to see if we could at least put
limits that all could voluntarily adhere to.
The Chairman. Mr. Mull, let me just give you a heads-up.
We've got a vote that's begun, so we've got about 10 minutes.
Mr. Mull. All right. Why don't I just stop? That's really
the end, the summary of my testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mull follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Stephen D. Mull, Senior Adviser to
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, DC
Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Senator Lugar, and members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me today to provide an overview of
our initiative to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia.
Over the past year, concern has grown over the threat that piracy
poses to international security, to the global economy, and as we have
seen recently, to U.S. citizens and commercial interests. In addition
to the Maersk Alabama incident, attacks on ships in this region have
disrupted both U.S., and U.S.-supported United Nations World Food
Programme, transports delivering aid to some of the world's most
vulnerable populations; placed innocent mariners from countries across
the globe in immediate danger; posed environmental threats as pirated
ships may be damaged or run aground; and jeopardized commercial
shipping interests. The vast majority of Somali pirates are motivated
by money, not ideology, and the continued payment of ransoms fuels this
affront to human security and dignity.
Fighting piracy is an important element of our strategic objectives
in Somalia, which focus on helping Somalia regain political and
economic stability, eliminating the threat of terrorism, and responding
to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people. American leadership in
efforts to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia is entirely
consistent with our traditional interest in ensuring freedom of
navigation and safety of the seas, which have long been cornerstones of
U.S. foreign policy and which is now an urgent priority for Secretary
of State Clinton. Furthermore, beyond protecting our citizens and
ensuring the security of maritime trade and access to the critical
energy resources upon which our national and the global economies
depend, collaboration with both traditional and nontraditional partners
on counter-piracy efforts in this region offers strategic opportunities
to strengthen existing alliances and coalitions and to create new ones.
We hope to be able to leverage our collaborative counterpiracy efforts
into increased security cooperation in the maritime domain with
nontraditional partners such as China, India, and Russia, and bring
added focus to regional capacity-building programs.
The United States has a multifaceted strategy to suppress piracy
that many Departments and agencies are working hard to implement, and
the Department of State is working with interagency partners to
integrate our maritime and land-based efforts in Somalia into a
comprehensive strategy. Our strategic goals are to protect shipping,
particularly American's and U.S.-linked ships; capitalize on
international awareness and mobilize cooperation to address the
problem; and create a more permanent maritime security arrangement in
the region. Significant factors affect our pursuit of these goals,
including the enormous difficulties inherent in patrolling, or even
monitoring through technical means, such a huge expanse of open sea;
and, of course, the broader problem of Somalia itself. Legal challenges
also exist, including inadequate domestic legal authorities in some
states as well as a lack of willingness on the part of some to
prosecute suspected pirates.
In light of these complexities, we seek to use every means at our
disposal to pursue our goals. We have worked effectively with the
United Nations to obtain Security Council resolutions that maximize our
ability to take appropriate action. We created and will continue to
work through the Contact Group for Piracy off the coast of Somalia
(Contact Group) to internationalize the problem and its solutions. We
actively support the NATO and European Union counterpiracy missions,
and the U.S. Navy created Combined Task Force 151 to focus U.S. naval
forces on counterpiracy efforts. We secured a formal arrangement with
Kenya to accept pirates for prosecution, and our Department of Justice
has demonstrated America's willingness to prosecute when our people and
interests have been attacked. We continue to work with and through our
interagency partners to improve U.S. and international commercial
shipping self-protection capability. And we are working with United
Nations agencies like the International Maritime Organization and the
U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, as well as partners in the region, to
support the capacity development of their coastal security forces.
Concerned by the recent upsurge in pirate activity, Secretary
Clinton has directed us to do more. We are seeking emergency
consultations with Contact Group partners and are finding notable
receptivity to our outreach. Through this venue, we will intensify our
efforts to persuade victim states to prosecute pirates. We are working
both internally and with other countries to develop the ability to deny
pirates the benefits of concessions, including tracking and freezing of
their ill-gotten gains. We are working to expand the regional capacity
to prosecute and incarcerate pirates, both by helping to fund
multilateral programs to build judicial capacity and by direct
unilateral assistance to countries who have expressed a willingness to
adapt their laws and processes to accommodate prosecution and
detention. We will continue to press the importance of a No Concessions
policy when dealing with pirates. We are working in political-military
channels to ensure that military counterpiracy operations are as robust
and well-coordinated as possible, and we are intensifying our efforts
to support Somali assistance processes. We are also exploring
strategies to actively seek the release of captive ships and hostages,
some of whom have been held for months.
We've had some success. Naval patrol interventions are increasingly
active; international naval forces have intervened to stop dozens of
attempted piratical attacks in the past 9 months, and we're seeing a
significant upswing in the number of countries willing to commit assets
to the effort. On the other hand, we face political and legal obstacles
to a shared understanding of the imperative for prosecution in and by
victim states, and significant logistical issues in prosecution by
countries who actually have the will to prosecute pirates. Regional
states face challenges with regard to detention and prosecution.
Tracking and freezing pirate ransoms is even harder than tracking
terrorist finances, given that pirates are most often paid off in the
form of air-dropped bags of cash. And the shipping industry--as well as
some of our partners--has vigorous objections to, and few incentives
for, arming their ships and crews. We need to make progress in these
areas.
Fortunately, we sense a growing international consensus to do more,
and we'll keep working at it. Ultimately, we hope these cooperative
efforts will result in a new maritime security regime that will feature
enhanced regional capacity and cooperation. We are considering now what
such a regime would include, but anticipate that it would entail
voluntary multilateral cooperation and collaboration. For instance, we
envision a maritime security sector assistance framework building on
programs already in place to provide, among other capacity-building
efforts, training and equipment to regional coast guards, supported by
a consortium of donor and regional states; international coastal and
naval exercises to improve interoperability; and pooling of
surveillance assets and information-sharing to develop a shared
maritime security picture. The regional approach was highly successful
in combating piracy in the Strait of Malacca, and although the
situation off the coast of Somalia is quite different because of the
incapacity of the Somali Government, the need for a coordinated
regional approach is apparent. In fact, it is urgent, and we would like
to see such an approach applied to other maritime security challenges,
including smuggling, trafficking in persons, and disaster response.
As Secretary Clinton emphasized in her recent public statement, we
recognize that there will be no long-term solution to piracy in the
region unless progress is made in addressing the larger political,
security, and governance challenges facing Somalia, its government and
its people. We also recognize that sustainable change in Somalia
requires a political solution that is authored and implemented by
Somalis themselves and not by outsiders. In this regard, the United
States continues to support the U.N.-led Djibouti peace process, which
has facilitated important progress on the political and security fronts
in recent months, and to work with a broad international group of
donors. The United States also remains committed to supporting the
Somali security sector and the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM). Secretary Clinton dispatched a high-level envoy, Acting
Assistant Secretary Phillip Carter, to the Donors' Conference on
Somalia in Support to the Somali Security Institutions and AMISOM,
where we will reaffirm our commitment to building security and
governance in Somalia.
We are also working directly with the Transitional Federal
Government of Somalia and regional authorities to develop both
incentives to actively suppress pirate activities and disincentives to
support for this malignant enterprise that threatens Somali and
regional security and sustainable development. We are exploring the
feasibility of tracking and freezing pirates' assets, and encouraging
implementation of the U.N. sanctions already in place. None of this is
easy, but it is all worth doing for the sake of the security and
prosperity of Americans and the international community.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator Lugar, and members of the
committee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to provide an
overview of our efforts. I am happy to answer any questions you may
have.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this quickly, because I think
we can get to the heart of this fairly quickly. First of all,
when do we expect the impact of the changes that are currently
being considered by the contact group? When would we expect
those to take effect off the coast of Somalia?
Mr. Mull. Well, I think there's already been--and, in fact,
in terms of reducing the number of successful attacks, in terms
of the gross number of attacks, we hope--well, depending on how
successful we are in getting more ships to agree to take these
self-defense measures.
The Chairman. What about the recommendations you've heard
us talking about? What's your reaction to the notion of either
the sea-lanes or the convoys or the arming of the crews, the
flying of the flag? What do you think about those?
Mr. Mull. Well, we believe the principle under girding all
of that is this isn't just a problem for national or
international militaries to solve. Individual shipping
companies also have a responsibility for their own self-
defense. That self-defense can consist of many different
things. Passive sonic measures. It can consist of armed guards.
We're very persuaded by the arguments that many members of
this committee have made, but there's a lot of opposition to
it, as well, in the shipping industry. What we're in the
process of doing right now between the Defense Department, the
Transportation Department, and shipping industry is trying to
forge a united U.S. position that we will then take to the
contact group and try to get others to agree on the
circumstances under which armed guards----
The Chairman. What's the most significant legal challenge
that the United States and the international community face in
terms of combating piracy?
Mr. Mull. The most significant legal challenge is
convincing other countries to take the policy decision--the
governments of victim states to take the policy decision to
prosecute and if convicted, incarcerate pirates.
The Chairman. And are there particular countries that are
more problematical than others on that list?
Mr. Mull. Yes. There are many countries in the region, for
example--and Kenya, I mentioned, is a very positive example.
They're willing to take all pirates that the world is willing
to offer them. There are other countries in the region,
however, who believe that this is a problem for the Western
shipping industries, and they don't want to take responsibility
for the expense of trying and prosecuting pirates. We're
working through our assistance programs with our partners----
The Chairman. How long do you think it'll take you to get
something in place? The captain says he's going back to sea.
You've got a lot of ships out there right now. What's the level
of urgency that's being applied to this?
Mr. Mull. Well, it's very, very urgent, given the threat
that this poses to all of us. So we did manage to conclude this
agreement with Kenya within about 2 weeks. There are two other
governments that we're in the process of negotiating with. I
hope that we will have those concluded within the nearest
future, but I can't predict when we'll succeed.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. You mentioned a moment ago that you believe
that shipping companies have a responsibility, and we've
discussed that with our first witness, of what kind of costs
might be involved. And I gathered part of the reticence to
adopt this still was the feeling that other countries would
look amiss at this, ports of entry that know that there are
armed persons on ships, or other countries that haven't adopted
this.
But at the same time, is there a dialogue--I wouldn't say
an argument--between owners of shipping companies and say the
U.S. Government in terms of who is responsible and how the
responsibility should be shared?
In other words, you've mentioned that they ought to take up
certain responsibilities or costs, but at the same time,
they're pushing back and indicating reticence to do this. Now,
how do you perceive some resolution of this as a commonsense
matter, to get back to the chairman's thought that we have
ships at sea, the captain's about to go out again, and so
forth?
Mr. Mull. Well, we are in the process, and this is being
managed at a relatively senior level within the interagency of
the government. We very firmly believe that we first and
foremost must represent not only the U.S. Government's
particular views, but U.S. industry, as well. And so we are in
very intense consultations with industry. I believe those will
be concluded within about a week. And then following that, we
will take the united position. The government will decide the
position based on the input and consultation, and we will take
that to the contact group later in May and use that as a basis
for persuading the other countries to agree.
Senator Lugar. Well, that's a fairly tight timeframe that
you point out.
Mr. Mull. Yes, sir.
Senator Lugar. That's helpful to know. Now, the chairman
also asked with regard to the Law of the Sea Treaty, is that
helpful in terms of arriving at some type of international
agreement or in any other definitions of the problem?
Mr. Mull. You mean U.S. ratification of it?
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Mr. Mull. The Law of the Sea--in practice, we are--on these
issues, we're already abiding by the Law of the Sea. And while
the administration very supports as quick as possible
ratification, whether it is ratified or not will probably not
have an effect. The biggest challenge for us is getting other
victim states to shoulder their burden of prosecution.
Senator Lugar. I see. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. But we can't assert the Law of the Sea in any
regard with respect to any country because we're not a party to
it. So that is some handicap, is it not?
Mr. Mull. Yes, I would agree with that.
The Chairman. Even though we live by it. We live by it, but
we can't assert it.
Mr. Mull. That's right. But we find that in our dealings
with other governments, I mean, even though we have not
ratified it, we all start from that operating assumption that
it is in effect. But you're absolutely right. We cannot assert
it from a legal point of view.
The Chairman. There is an Islamist group called al-Shabaab
that is trying to exert control over Somalia and has been
designated by the State Department as a terrorist group.
Mr. Mull. Yes.
The Chairman. Are there any signs of that group cooperating
with al-Qaeda?
Mr. Mull. This is a question of vital interest to us that
we monitor very closely with all of the available resources
that we have. There have been some troubling rhetorical
indications of possible elements within al-Shabaab trying to
exploit pirate disaffection with the United States, in
particular, since the rescue of Captain Phillips. However, we
have not seen any information thus far indicating any
operational coordination or any financial support between the
two.
The Chairman. Do we know of any money from the ransoms
going to al-Shabaab?
Mr. Mull. We have not seen any evidence of that. Many
al-Shabaab leaders have, in fact, publicly criticized pirates
as being un-Islamic.
The Chairman. OK. Well, we're not only going to leave the
record open, we're going to let this hearing stay open for
another 5, 10 minutes. I think Senator Feingold, who is the
chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction in that area, is
going to be here. So we're going to leave the hearing. If you
don't mind sitting here, we'll just recess until Senator
Feingold gets here. And if he doesn't get here, then we'll
adjourn and close out in his absence. You could be here at 7
o'clock, right?
Mr. Mull. I'm at your disposal.
The Chairman. Say, ``Well, I'm waiting for Senator
Feingold.'' So if we could just recess momentarily. And I'll
check when I go over the floor to vote. Thanks. I sure
appreciate it. We stand in recess.
[Whereupon a recess was taken from 4:30 p.m. to 4:41 p.m.]
Senator Feingold [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Mull, for
being here. Sorry about the delay, but we did have a vote
suddenly come up. And I just want to take an opportunity,
obviously, to participate in this important hearing. Let me
begin by saying how pleased I am that we're gathered here to
discuss this important issue, and I want to thank our chairman
for organizing the hearing.
For years, I've been expressing my concern about the
growing problem of lawlessness in and around Somalia, and this
problem finally hit home for all of us earlier this month with
the attack of the Maersk Alabama and the capture of Capt.
Richard Phillips after his courageous actions to ensure the
safety of his crew.
I am grateful that our armed services, particularly members
of the Navy and Navy SEAL teams, were able to rescue Captain
Phillips, and that he came before the committee today to share
his thoughts on how to make the ships on the high seas safer.
While the episode involving the Maersk Alabama was
resolved, we're likely to see many more such episodes if we do
not take immediate measures to address not only piracy, but the
conditions on land that have made the waters off Somalia a
haven for pirates.
A recent spike in piracy off the coast of Somalia is an
outgrowth of the state collapse, lawlessness, and humanitarian
crisis that have plagued the country for over a decade. Until
we address those conditions, we will be relying on stopgap
measures at best to stamp out piracy or stop the growing
violent extremism in Somalia, which poses a direct threat to
our own national security.
As Senator Kerry mentioned earlier, I plan to hold a
hearing soon of the Africa Subcommittee that will look at the
problem of piracy in the context of the broader challenges that
we face in Somalia, such as the growth of al-Shabaab, a
terrorist group, some of whose leaders have links to al-Qaeda.
In the long term, the best way to eliminate piracy and
extremism in and around Somalia is to help establish stability,
the rule of law, and functional inclusive governance there.
Nonetheless, there are intelligence capabilities,
diplomatic measures, and security enhancements that can help us
to combat piracy and protect maritime traffic and trade in the
short term. And I'm glad that we have this opportunity to
examine this today.
Ambassador, in Secretary Clinton's statement about steps
that the State Department is taking to combat piracy off
Somalia's coast, she mentioned exploring ways to track and
freeze piracy assets. I want to ask how we might do this, but
before I do so, I'd like to look at the larger question of
whether we know who is behind the spike in piracy, who is
benefiting, who is getting payoffs, and how hostage ransoms are
transferred.
Ambassador, obviously, we are in an unclassified setting.
But in your assessment, do we have that intelligence? How
critical is this type of information to enabling effective
actions, whether sanctions or others, to combat piracy in the
near term?
Mr. Mull. Thank you, Senator. In this setting, I can only
go so far as to say that the picture is very murky indeed. The
ransoms, which amounted to more than $30 million in 2008 and if
current trends continue this year, we're well on track to
exceed that this year, and this, of course, is recycled back
into the purchase of more sophisticated weaponry, building the
pirate organizations to even more sophisticated organizations.
And part of the problem of tracking it is it's all paid in
cash, in suitcases of euros and pounds and dollars dropped onto
the decks of ships held hostage, and then very quickly are
filtered through the cash handling systems, the hawala system
that's popular in that part of the world, and it very quickly
becomes difficult to track where it goes. However, you can see
the impact of it in the dramatic spike in attempted piracy
attacks.
There are a number of measures that we can take. Again, I'm
sorry, I can't go into it in this setting, but we'll be happy
to work with our Treasury colleagues to brief you in another
setting, on some of the measures that we think we will be able
to take in terms of working with other financial centers in the
region.
Senator Feingold. I look forward to getting that
opportunity. To determine which measures can be most effective
in combating piracy, it's helpful to look at other regions
where there has been success. As you know, just a few years
ago, the combined forces of Malaysia and Indonesia and
Singapore worked together to end a spike in piracy in the
Malacca Strait. And when I was on a trip to Indonesia in 2006,
I had a very good opportunity to discuss this issue in some
detail with Admiral Fallon, who was then the Commander of
Pacific Command.
While there are many differences between that case and the
current situation in the Gulf of Aden, namely, stronger
governments and a narrower waterway, in your view, what lessons
can be drawn from successful efforts in the past to combat
piracy, and is the ongoing interagency working group on piracy
going to review those lessons?
Mr. Mull. The principal lesson is that as we experience
every day in our diplomatic work on this, is that there is very
broad consensus that this is a problem that challenges the
whole world's security, and that on the basis of that
consensus, we're able to accomplish a lot in terms of coming up
with coordinated action.
The problem, however, is in capacity. And as you may have
been briefed on your visits to Southeast Asia, those countries,
especially Indonesia, which has come a long way in developing
as a modern democracy in the past 10 years, has made important
strides over the course of this decade in terms of developing
the capacity to get the intelligence and surveillance assets in
the region to work with Singapore and Malaysia and Brunei in
monitoring the Malacca Strait.
Somalia, of course, fits the definition of most people as a
failed state, does not have the capacity, and there it is,
right at the crossroads of the whole problem. However, our
long-term strategic goal--the contact group that we've pulled
together to monitor this problem has 28 countries in it. It's
probably going to grow to more than 30. There are six
international organizations.
That's a lot of potential that we can work with with the
countries in the region, as well as donor states. We have some
unlikely partners, military partners, in this effort. China,
very much interested in playing a broader role. And the
interest of all of these normally competing states really
offers a great opportunity to build a consortium that could
systemize security assistance, capacity-building, and improving
the capabilities of the coast guards of these states, and, of
course, addressing the broader problem of Somalia that you
mentioned yourself.
Senator Feingold. In that spirit, from these past cases, it
seems very clear that it was imperative to work with
governments in the region to enhance their law enforcement and
judicial capabilities. In our current efforts to combat piracy
off Somalia's coast, in your view, what opportunities exist for
the building of Somalia's transitional government and regional
Puntland government, and also, to what extent are we engaging
with other governments in the region, including countries like
Yemen and Djibouti?
Mr. Mull. Our engagement ranges across the whole number of
spheres. First, in the legal area, one of the challenges that
we were discussing earlier in the hearing is figuring out what
to do with pirates when we catch them. With this growing naval
force in the region, what to do with them? We've signed an
agreement with Kenya. The European Union has, as well, and the
European Union in particular is providing a lot of capacity-
building to the Kenyan judicial sector so that they can play
more and more of an active role in doing these prosecutions.
We are, of course, in discussions with other countries in
the region to work out similar arrangements. I hope that we'll
succeed on those very soon. In Yemen and in Djibouti, we
believe that Yemen in particular has shown a real interest in
playing a role. In fact, their coast guard was involved just in
the past week in terms of stopping an attempt at piracy
hijacking close to its territorial waters. But it needs a lot
more assistance. And we're studying right now with the Defense
Department ways that we can build the capacity of the Yemeni
Coast Guard to make it a more effective partner.
Djibouti, of course, is the home of the Combined Joint Task
Force, and we, I think, have made great progress with them, but
it's a much smaller country with fewer forces to work with.
Senator Feingold. And given the administration's stated
commitment to combat piracy and the recent statements by
national security leaders expressing concern that al-Qaeda is
trying to gain new footholds in Somalia, don't we need a more
serious and sustained diplomatic effort in the region? And to
that end, do you think it makes sense to appoint a senior envoy
for the Horn of Africa with full-time staff and adequate
resources?
Mr. Mull. Well, I don't know what my personal view on that
is. My competency isn't in African politics. I'll be happy to
take that question back, and look forward to having the
appropriate officials address that in your hearing on----
Senator Feingold. Yes, sir. Thank you very much for your
help, and thank all the panelists today. That concludes the
hearing.
Mr. Mull. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 4:49 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ambassador Stephen Mull to Questions Submitted for the
Record by Senator Richard Lugar
Question. I understand the Horn of Africa strategy is under review.
When will it be completed? Does it promote new solutions to the
challenges ashore in Somalia, including the regions of Puntland and
Somaliland?
Answer. The Horn of Africa faces numerous and complex challenges,
and the situation in the region is a significant priority for our
national security. To achieve our foreign policy goals in the region,
the Department believes that the United States must implement a
comprehensive strategy that involves all elements of the United States
Government. The National Security Council has brought together the
Department of State, the Department of Defense, USAID, the intelligence
community, and a variety of other agencies to work to develop a Somalia
strategy that is both comprehensive and sustainable, and this strategy
review is being conducted within a regional framework, as Somalia's
challenges are intertwined with other conflicts and issues throughout
the Horn of Africa. This process is underway, and the Department will
brief and consult with Congress as it unfolds.
In taking a comprehensive approach, we will ensure we work with
governments in the region and the international community to address
instability, terrorism, humanitarian, and governance challenges. In
particular, we recognize that terror threats to U.S. interests are
exacerbated by insecure, poorly governed areas. All of these goals are
mutually reinforcing, and all must be simultaneously addressed. We will
also look at how we can strengthen our engagement with those seeking to
improve security and stability in Somalia, including regional
authorities in Somaliland and Puntland.
Question. What international efforts ashore can we support that may
help reduce the sanctuary ashore, establish viable livelihoods and
establish the rule of law? What are the roadblocks? Are nations backing
fully relevant UNSCRs? Are additional resolutions necessary?
Answer. The key to long-term peace and stability in Somalia lies in
the establishment of effective governance based on a process of
inclusive political dialogue and reconciliation between the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and other moderates, and on
achieving a successful conclusion to the transitional process through
the drafting of a constitution and fair and transparent elections by
the end of 2011. The United States is supporting these efforts through
the Djibouti peace process and the provision of significant political,
economic, development, and humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Security
must improve in order for political stability to take hold, for large-
scale economic development to become possible, and for the dire
humanitarian situation to turn the corner to recovery. To this end, the
United States is supporting the deployment of the African Union Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM) and the development of the TFG's security
institutions, including the National Security Force, Somalia Police
Force and National Security Committee.
The international community is fully behind the relevant UNSCRs, as
demonstrated by the unanimous adoption of four counterpiracy
resolutions in the last year. At present, we believe we have all the
authorities required to take the actions we deem necessary and prudent.
However, in the future if we believe additional legal authorities are
necessary or there is a need to renew existing authorities, we will not
hesitate to seek new resolutions from the Security Council.
Question. Anyone familiar with Navy history has heard of the daring
exploits of young Navy lieutenant, Stephen Decatur, in Tripoli Harbor
in 1804. His bold mission, the Mediterranean squadron's vigorous
prosecution of hostilities, and a shore invasion led to victory,
restoration of peace and brought an end to tribute payments by the
United States to the Barbary states. I bring this up because some may
have suggested land attack at private sanctuaries ashore is needed to
bring these activities under control. What is the administration's view
of this suggestion?
Answer. While combating piracy on the Barbary Coast focused on the
use of military force ashore and at sea, ending piracy off Somalia
requires addressing stability issues ashore, including ensuring the
establishment of state authority in Somalia. We sought and won in UNSCR
1851 the authority to take action in Somali territory, but given the
political and military risks of such operations, we believe the current
approach of enhanced and coordinated international military presence on
the sea, along with improved self-defense measures by shipping, is our
preferred method of dealing with the problem at present. If that
changes in the future, we will have the authority to act as necessary.
We are discussing piracy with national and regional leaders in Somalia
and working with them to combat pirates operating from within their
territory. We strongly believe that improving the security situation on
land is the key to resolving piracy in this region.
Question. As the administration's spokesman here, what new
consensus is being drawn on counterpiracy? Has the administration
determined that halting piracy in this region is a national security
priority? What cost-benefit analysis have you conducted on this problem
set?
Answer. There is strong international consensus that piracy off the
coast of Somalia is a shared threat that demands concerted and
coordinated action. This administration strongly believes that halting
piracy in this region is a priority and is seeking ways to apply
attention and resources to the problem without detracting from equally
urgent efforts in the region. From a political perspective, we are
firmly committed to containing and eventually defeating piracy in this
region. We will continue to encourage political support for a continued
multinational naval presence in areas off the coast of Somalia. The
areas in which we most urgently require action are improving merchant
ship self-protection, national policies that support pirate detention
and prosecution, willingness of affected states to accept
responsibility to prosecute piracy in their domestic courts, and the
adoption of No Concessions policies. We are also pursing the use of
financial levers against the financiers of pirate operations and pirate
leaders.
With respect to cost/benefit analysis, while we defer to DOD on
accounting for costs of U.S. military operations in the region, it is
probably not possible to calculate the costs of American inaction on
this issue. The rising tide of ransoms will encourage even more piracy;
shipping costs will rise as shipping moves to other less efficient
routes; and insurance costs will continue to increase as shipping
security is seen to diminish. The human costs of hostage taking will
continue to mount. We risk the development of connections forming
between pirates and terrorists. And not least, we risk damage to our
standing as the world's leading maritime power, and therefore to other
broader U.S. interests, if we do not assume a strong leadership role in
combating piracy and lawlessness on the high seas.
Question. Are counterpiracy EXORDs up to date and sufficient for
the current situation? What is the total cost of our participation in
the Maritime operations in the Somalia region?
Answer. State will defer to DOD to respond to these questions.
Question. How are the trials in Kenya progressing? What would you
estimate is the monetary cost of that evolution to the U.S. taxpayer
(capture, transport, care, support, etc.)?
Answer. We understand that the trial of seven suspected pirates
delivered by U.S. naval forces to Kenya on March 5 is scheduled to
begin in July. However, with a total of seven cases and more than 60
suspected pirates in custody, including an appeal of a 2006 case, the
Kenyan system is nearing its limits in prosecutorial capacity and
infrastructure. It is critical that more affected states begin to step
up and take responsibility to prosecute suspected pirates. The
Government of Kenya is currently bearing the costs of detaining and
caring for these suspects. We defer to DOD for estimates of the costs
associated with capturing and transporting suspected pirates.