    [Senate Hearing 111-100, Part 7]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 111-100, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2010

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1390

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
        PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                   ----------

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   ----------

                            MAY 20 AND JUNE 3, 2009

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                         2010--Part 7  STRATEGIC FORCES

                                                      S. Hrg. 111-100 Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2010

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1390

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
        PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   __________

                            MAY 20 AND JUNE 3, 2009

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman

    EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts     JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut     JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
    EVAN BAYH, Indiana                   ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    JIM WEBB, Virginia                   RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska
    ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois

                       Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director

                   Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director

                                     ______

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

                         BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman

    ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia        DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    JACK REED, Rhode Island              JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
    E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska         JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    MARK UDALL, Colorado                 LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska

                                      (ii)
    ?

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
                            Military Space Programs
                                  may 20, 2009

                                                                       Page

    Payton, Gary E., Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for
      Space Programs.................................................     4
    Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, Air Force Command.......     9
    James, Lt. Gen. Larry D., USAF, Commander, 14Th Air Force, Air
      Force Space Command and Commander, Joint Functional Component
      Command for Space, United States Strategic Command.............    15
    Harris, VADM Harry B., Jr., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
      for Communication Networks.....................................    19
    Chaplain, Cristina T., Director, Acquisition and Sourcing
      Management, Government Accountability Office...................    22

                           Strategic Forces Programs
                                  june 3, 2009

    D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear
      Security Administration, Department of Energy..................    49
    Alston, Maj. Gen. C. Donald, USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff,
      Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration...................    99
    Carpenter, Maj. Gen. Floyd L., USAF, Commander, 8th Air Force,
      Air Combat Command.............................................   102
    Johnson, RADM Stephen E., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
      Programs.......................................................   104

                                     (iii)

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2010

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                            MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m., in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
    Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Sessions,
    and Vitter.
        Committee staff member present: Jennifer L. Stoker,
    security clerk.
        Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
        Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw,
    professional staff member; and Daniel A. Lerner, professional
    staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Brian F.
    Sebold.
        Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
    assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Caple, assistant to
    Senator Bill Nelson; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator
    Udall; Rob Soofer, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Pete Landrum,
    assistant to Senator Sessions; and Michael T. Wong, assistant
    to Senator Vitter.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Bill Nelson. Good afternoon. I will insert my
    prepared statement for the record at this point, and now turn
    to our ranking member, Senator Vitter.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]
                   Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson
        I would like to welcome all of our witnesses today to the Strategic
    Forces Subcommittee hearing on military space programs and issues.
    Today we have Gary Payton, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force
    for Space; General Robert Kehler, Commander of Air Force Space Command;
    Lt. Gen. Larry James, Commander of 14th Air Force and the Joint
    Functional Component Commander for Space; Vice Admiral Harry Harris,
    the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communications Networks; and
    Cristina Chaplain, the Director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management
    at the Government Accountability Office. All of your statements will be
    included in the record.
        I would also like to welcome Senator Vitter, who, as of last week,
    is the new ranking member on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
    replacing Senator Sessions. I look forward to a productive working
    relationship.
        It has been a pleasure to work with Senator Sessions over these
    past several years. We have tackled a lot of difficult issues together.
    I am glad he will stay on the subcommittee.
        Space is essential for modern life and for a modern military, but
    getting satellites built and on orbit is not easy and not cheap.
        Most of the space programs continue to struggle, although there has
    been improvement in some programs, others, such as Space-Based Infrared
    Satellite-Geosynchronous Orbit and the advanced extremely high
    frequency satellite continue to be delayed. What are the problems and
    how do they get fixed?
        While the United States has been very lucky that satellites, once
    launched, generally have a history of lasting longer than planned, in
    some cases much longer. With the delays in the replacement programs
    there is a potential for gaps in the various programs. This is
    particularly true for missile warning.
        We will also look at what role small satellites can play in meeting
    certain requirements, augmenting or replacing capabilities, and in
    reducing the overall size, complexity, and cost of space systems.
        We look forward to hearing from all of you this afternoon.
        We will have a very short closed session in the Office of Senate
    Security relating to the launch of the North Korean missile at the
    conclusion of the opening session. We will plan on moving over there at
    a little after 3 o'clock.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAVID VITTER

        Senator Vitter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is
    great to be here as the ranking member of this subcommittee for
    the first time. I look forward to working with you and all the
    other members on these significant issues.
        I will submit my full opening statement for the record, but
    I do want to highlight a number of concerns.
        The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is here today,
    and I look forward to hearing from all the witnesses, including
    them. For sometime, they have highlighted a number of systemic
    problems associated with our major space acquisition programs.
    Generally, they have said that competition for dollars leads to
    low-cost estimation and unrealistic scheduling, and then that
    gets us in a bind down the line when the true costs of programs
    and true schedules come into clear focus. So I would like
    everyone's reaction to that ongoing critique and what we should
    do in light of it.
        I want to thank Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain
    for their acquisition reform bill, which I am happy to support
    and would love folks' reaction to what is in that bill, how
    that can make a difference and what more we need to do.
        I am also encouraged with many--not all, but certainly
    many--of Secretary Gates' strong recommendations to cancel
    certain programs that were not proving out like the
    Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program and to focus
    resources and certainly would like folks' detailed thoughts on
    that and how we move forward in a productive way.
        Then finally, I would point out a recent Institute for
    Defense Analyses (IDA) report, chartered by the Department of
    Defense (DOD), to address significant congressional concerns.
    One conclusion of the report is an assertion that ``no one is
    in charge,'' that leadership is fragmented with respect to
    strategy, budgets, requirements, and acquisitions, and it
    recommends that the President establish and lead the execution
    of a much more focused national space strategy. It also
    recommends a top-to-bottom overhaul, and I very much look
    forward to hearing everyone's reaction to that critique and
    those recommendations.
        But, again, Mr. Chairman, thanks for your leadership and I
    look forward to working with you.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator David Vitter

        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our
    witnesses. This is my first hearing as ranking member of the Strategic
    Forces Subcommittee and I look forward to working with you on the many
    important issues under this subcommittee's jurisdiction.
        The administration's fiscal year 2010 budget provided a significant
    funding increase for Defense-wide, ``white space'' programs. This
    year's request at about $11.1 billion--$9.2 billion of which is for Air
    Force space programs represents a $412 million increase over fiscal
    year 2009 appropriated levels. I look forward to hearing from our
    witnesses today how this money will be spent wisely and what will be
    done to guarantee that the programs we fund in fiscal year 2010 break
    away from past practices of cost overruns and long delays.
        The Government Accountability Office (GAO), which I am pleased is
    here today to testify, has for some time highlighted a number of
    systemic problems associated with our major space acquisition programs.
    GAO has found that because the Department of Defense (DOD) starts more
    weapon programs that it can afford--competition for dollars lead to low
    cost estimation and unrealistic scheduling. GAO notes that DOD tends to
    start many of its space programs before it has a sound understanding
    and the appropriate assurance that the technologies it seeks are
    achievable within available funding. As a result of this broken
    acquisition process, the Department all too frequently puts itself in a
    bind with respect to supporting the warfighters' needs. Not only are we
    constantly underestimating cost, but according to GAO, delays in
    schedule are increasing the overall risk for capability gaps in areas
    such as positioning, navigation, and timing; missile warning; and
    weather monitoring.
        Under the leadership of Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain,
    this committee broadly recognized those problems in developing the
    ``Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.'' That bill emphasizes
    starting major weapons systems off right by having them obtain reliable
    and independent cost estimates and subjecting them to rigorous
    developmental testing and systems engineering early in their
    acquisition cycle. In so doing, the bill (which will likely be signed
    into law by the President within the next few days) intends to ensure
    that programs not proceed from one stage of the acquisition cycle to
    the next until they have achieved the maturity to clearly lower the
    risk of cost growth and schedule slippage. I look forward to hearing
    from our witnesses how they believe the bill will help manage
    technology and integration risk in DOD military space programs.
        I am encouraged by Secretary Gates' recommendation to cancel the
    Transformational Satellite (TSAT) program, an example of an overly
    ambitious project, lacking a meaningful technology, schedule, and
    funding path. I am also pleased to hear that the Department will not
    let the $3.3 billion already invested in TSAT go to waste. With the
    recommendation to eliminate TSAT and purchase two additional advanced
    extremely high frequency satellites, it is clear that the Department
    recognizes that smaller, more incremental steps forward, are far less
    risky ventures, and are a significantly more responsible path forward
    with respect to the taxpayers' money. I am encouraged that the
    Department does not plan to let our hefty investment in TSAT go to
    waste and does plan to harvest some of TSAT's more successful research
    and development efforts. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
    more about the plan to address our satellite communications needs, how
    we will utilize TSAT technologies on the procurement of already proven
    and technologically mature systems, and how TSAT can be a lesson moving
    forward for our future space acquisition endeavors.
        A recent Institute for Defense Analyses report charted by DOD to
    address congressional concerns with the leadership, management, and
    organization for National Security Space found that ``significant
    improvements are imperative . . . in order to maintain U.S. space
    preeminence and advert the loss of the U.S. competitive national
    security advantage.'' The report asserts that ``no one's in charge,''
    leadership is fragmented with respect to strategy, budgets,
    requirements, and acquisition, and recommends that the President
    establish and lead the execution of a national space strategy. The
    report recommends a top-to-bottom overhaul and I look forward to
    hearing from the witnesses what steps are being taken to address the
    report's recommendations.
        I recognize that space acquisitions are inherently risky and are
    like no other venture the DOD undertakes. The challenges are many and
    the unknown and need for pushing the technology envelope is great.
    However, we must do a better job at managing the risk and spending the
    taxpayers' money wisely. Nonetheless, I look forward to hearing from
    the witnesses what is being done to address the space acquisition
    shortcomings, if you believe the condition is getting better, and what
    more needs to happen within the Department.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.

        Senator Bill Nelson. As is the procedure, each of your
    statements will be entered in the record at this time.

    STATEMENT OF GARY E. PAYTON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE AIR
                        FORCE FOR SPACE PROGRAMS

        [The prepared statement of Mr. Payton follows:]

                      Prepared Statement by Gary E. Payton

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Chairman Nelson, Senator Vitter, and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before this subcommittee as the
    Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for Space Programs, and to
    discuss with you our military activities. I support the Secretary of
    the Air Force with his responsibilities as the Service Acquisition
    Executive for Space Programs.
        1I believe the overall soundness of our Air Force space program is
    best illustrated by our consecutive string of 61 successful national
    security space launches over the past 10 years and the sustainment of 4
    distinct satellite constellations over the past 3 decades (navigation,
    weather, missile warning, and military communication). This record is
    the result of a world-class team of space professionals across our
    government and industry, all dedicated to the single purpose of
    providing essential capabilities to our joint warfighters and allies
    around the world. As a Nation, we have cultivated, modernized, and
    integrated space capabilities for over a half century into our national
    instruments of power--diplomatic, information, military, and economic.
    The nation's reward for this commitment is a space capability which
    tilts the geopolitical and military advantage to our leaders with the
    most current and accurate information around the world. With superior
    space systems we provide our leadership with intelligence that
    otherwise would be impossible to collect. Space enables us to employ
    military force in both irregular warfare and conventional situations--
    we see the battlefield more clearly and destroy targets with greater
    precision. While acknowledging the ever increasing advantages that
    these space capabilities provide, we acknowledge that many of the
    satellites and associated infrastructure have outlived their intended
    design lives.
        To ensure the availability of these systems, the military space
    portion of the President's fiscal year 2010 budget submission is
    focused on the continuity of key mission areas including global missile
    warning, worldwide communication, global positioning and timing,
    weather, and launch. Simultaneously, we are taking added measures to
    enhance the protection of our space capabilities through improved Space
    Situational Awareness (SSA), defensive counterspace, and reconstitution
    efforts.
        Global Missile Warning through Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR)
    is our unblinking eye ensuring that we know whenever a rocket launches
    from anywhere on Earth. Our missile warning system is fast, persistent,
    and accurate in determining missile vectors. At the strategic level, it
    quickly aids leadership as they determine courses of action to defend
    America and our allies, and at the tactical level our real-time warning
    provides theater commanders with superior battlespace awareness.
        Worldwide communication is enabled through a ubiquitous space-based
    system with government and commercial platforms. Our users stretch from
    the Oval Office to the mountains of Afghanistan. Using protected,
    wideband, or narrowband communications, the President can command the
    Nation's nuclear forces, our UAV pilots can fly Predators over Iraq and
    Afghanistan from the United States, and Special Forces teams can call
    for exfiltration or tactical air support.
        Global positioning and timing is a free worldwide service. It
    provides position accuracy down to the centimeter and time accuracy to
    the nanosecond over the entire planet, 24-hours a day, 7-days a week,
    and in any weather. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the
    Intelligence Community depend on our Global Positioning System (GPS) to
    support a myriad of missions and capabilities including weapon system
    guidance, precise navigation, satellite positioning, and communication
    network timing. The civil and commercial communities are equally
    reliant on GPS as the underpinning for a vast infrastructure of
    services and products including search and rescue, banking, map
    surveying, farming, and even sports and leisure activities.
        Weather observation and forecasting has greatly improved over the
    last four decades primarily due to space-based environmental sensing.
    Global, high resolution measurements of atmospheric temperature,
    density, and humidity populate mathematic models for weather
    prediction. Our warfighters need accurate, time-sensitive weather data
    as a key enabler for maneuver planning, weapons employment, and
    intelligence collection.
        With events like the Chinese ASAT demonstration and the Iridium/
    Russian satellite collision as examples of the increasing political and
    physical complexity of the space environment, our on-orbit assets face
    greater threats that could deny, damage, or destroy our access to space
    capabilities. We must anticipate potential disruptions, either
    accidental or intentional, to our space operations or risk losing
    continuity of service. As such, we are expanding our ability to detect,
    identify, characterize, and attribute threats, as well as clearly
    discriminate between a hostile act and one that is naturally occurring.
    In parallel, we are developing the organizational, operational, and
    technical enablers including command and control architectures that
    will allow us to react swiftly and decisively when threats materialize.
        Though challenges remain, Congress' support has been a vital
    component in improving our acquisition of space systems, maintaining
    continuity of service, and charting a course for the next generation of
    space capabilities that will enhance American security, freedom, and
    prosperity.

                                UPDATE ON SPACE

        I would like to briefly discuss some of the achievements we have
    had over the last year and the progress we are making with regard to
    the mission areas I described earlier.

    Missile Warning
        For over 35 years, our legacy Defense Support Program (DSP)
    satellites, in conjunction with ground based radars, have unfailingly
    met the Nation's missile warning needs. This legacy constellation,
    however, continues to age, while threats such as the proliferation of
    theater ballistic missiles and advanced technologies continue to grow.
    These threats are driving the need for increased coverage and
    resolution provided by the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS).
        SBIRS supports four mission areas: missile warning, missile
    defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace awareness, and is
    comprised of both geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites and
    highly elliptical orbit (HEO) payloads. In 2008, the first HEO payload
    was fully certified by United States Strategic Command to perform the
    strategic missile warning mission. The second HEO payload is on-orbit
    and proceeding through operational checkout. Launch of the first SBIRS
    GEO satellite is scheduled for late 2010.
        Our funding request continues development of the GEO satellite, HEO
    payloads, plus the necessary ground elements. Additionally, this budget
    requests advanced procurement for a fourth GEO satellite, and
    procurement of our fourth HEO payload. We continue to work with our
    industry partners to resolve challenges on the SBIRS GEO-1 spacecraft,
    specifically with respect to the Flight Software Subsystem. Our budget
    request also funds Wide Field-of-View (WFOV) technology development
    within the Third Generation Infrared System funding line. By partnering
    with the commercial space industry, we will have the opportunity to
    conduct early on-orbit scientific experiment of WFOV infrared data
    phenomenology using a Commercially Hosted IR Payload (CHIRP) in 2010.
    WFOV offers considerable potential for reducing cost, schedule, and
    performance risks for the next generation of missile warning
    satellites.

    Communications
        The United States military is a highly mobile and dispersed force
    that relies heavily on wideband, protected, and narrowband satellite
    communications (SATCOM) for command, control, and coordination of
    forces. SATCOM enables forces to receive real-time images and video of
    the battlefield, thereby accelerating decision-making from the
    strategic to the tactical levels. These images and video often come
    from Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) controlled via SATCOM links,
    allowing the UAVs to fly far beyond the line of sight and to collect
    information without endangering U.S. forces.
        On April 3, 2009 we successfully launched the second Wideband
    Global SATCOM (WGS) satellite as part of the Department's constellation
    of wideband satellites providing increased capability for effective
    command and control of U.S. forces around the globe. In August 2009 we
    are planning to launch the third WGS satellite. As we populate the WGS
    constellation, each individual satellite provides greater wideband
    capacity than the entire legacy Defense Satellite Communications System
    (DSCS) III constellation. Our fiscal year 2010 funding request
    continues on-orbit support for WGS-2 and WGS-3, as well as, non-
    recurring engineering development and advanced procurement for WGS-7.
        In the protected SATCOM portfolio, we are completing testing of the
    first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system with a projected
    launch in late 2010. This initial AEHF launch will complete the
    worldwide Medium Data Rate (MDR) ring, increasing the data-rate for low
    probability of intercept/detection and anti-jam communications from
    tens-of-kilobytes per second to approximately a megabyte per second.
    Last September, the Secretary of the Air Force declared a critical
    breach of the average procurement unit cost (APUC) against the AEHF
    Acquisition Program Baseline. The cost growth was dominated by the 4-
    year production break between the SV-3 being placed on contract in
    January 2006 and SV-4 contract award projected for early 2010.
    Subsequently, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L) led a team of DOD organizations
    that reviewed the AEHF program to determine if: (1) the program was
    essential to national security, (2) there were any alternatives that
    could provide equal capability at less cost, (3) the new estimates of
    the unit cost were reasonable, and (4) the management structure was
    adequate to control costs. On 29 December 2008, USD (AT&L) certified
    the AEHF program as a four satellite constellation with the launch
    dates of: SV-1 in September 2010, SV-2 in September 2011, SV-3 in
    September 2012, and SV-4 in September 2016. Also as part of the
    recertification, AEHF costs were rebaselined per DOD Cost Analysis
    Improvement Group estimates. Our funding request supports the assembly,
    integration, and test of AEHF SV-1 through SV-3 as well as the launch
    and start of on-orbit check out of SV-1, continued development,
    integration, and test of the AEHF Mission Control Segment, and the
    production contract award for SV-4.
        On 6 April 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced key decisions
    and recommendations for the fiscal year 2010 President's budget
    submission. Among them was the cancellation of the Transformational
    Satellite Communications program in favor of two more AEHF satellites
    (SV-5 and SV-6). This recommendation was the result of careful
    consideration to balance valid warfighter requirements against fiscal
    constraints. The Air Force plans to work closely with the other
    Services, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and the
    combatant commands to meet the DOD's protected and wideband
    communication needs. To this end, the Air Force will evolve the
    MILSATCOM architecture to provide connectivity across the spectrum of
    missions, to include land, air and naval warfare; special operations;
    strategic nuclear operations; strategic defense; homeland security;
    theater operations; and space operations and intelligence.

    Positioning, Navigation, and Timing
        The United States Global Positioning System (GPS) continues to be
    the world standard for positioning, navigation, and timing. As a
    result, GPS has been incorporated into military, commercial, and
    civilian applications, to include navigation, agriculture, banking,
    cartography, telecommunications, and transportation. Last year the GPS
    Program Office seamlessly implemented the Architecture Evolution Plan
    upgrade to the existing GPS Operational Control System. This upgrade
    increased sustainability and provided the ability to control the new
    GPS IIF satellites. Perhaps most notably, these upgrades were
    implemented with no impact to day-to-day operations and did not require
    any modifications to existing user equipment.
        This year we are going to launch the final GPS IIR satellite, a
    program which was initiated over 20 years ago and represents one of our
    most successful, enduring space acquisition programs. This year, we
    will also begin launching the next generation GPS IIF satellites which
    will sustain the constellation over the next 10 years. GPS IIF will
    also populate the GPS constellation with additional M-code capability
    and introduce a new ``L5'' civil signal.
        Moving beyond GPS IIF, GPS III will offer significant improvements
    in navigation capabilities by improving interoperability and jam
    resistance. The procurement of the GPS III system will occur in
    multiple blocks, with the initial GPS IIIA contract award in May 2008.
    GPS IIIA includes all of the GPS IIF capability plus up to a ten-fold
    increase in signal power, a new civil signal compatible with the
    European Union's Galileo system, and a new spacecraft bus that will
    support a graceful growth path to future blocks.

    Weather
        The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) continues to be
    the Nation's workhorse for terrestrial forecasting and space
    environmental sensing. We have three DMSP satellites remaining with
    DMSP Flight 18 scheduled for launch this October. Flight 19 and 20 are
    currently undergoing a Service Life Extension Program to repair,
    replace, and test components that have exceeded their shelf life.
    Flight 19 will launch in October 2012 and Flight 20 will launch in May
    2014 or October 2016, depending on operational requirements.
        In the future the Nation will transition to the next workhorse for
    terrestrial weather--National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental
    Satellite System (NPOESS)--a tri-agency effort with National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and Department of Commerce.
    Similar to the previous generation of satellites, NPOESS will provide
    visible and infrared cloud imagery and other atmospheric,
    oceanographic, and terrestrial information. It will become the Nation's
    primary source of global weather and environmental data for operational
    military and civil use.
        Seemingly a straightforward idea to integrate DMSP and POES (Polar
    Operational Environmental Satellite) in the early 1990s, the NPOESS
    program has encountered unforeseen engineering challenges. Integration
    of requirements across the spectrum of space and terrestrial weather
    into several `first-of' sensors partially caused the 2006 Nunn-McCurdy
    breach whereby two sensor suites were de-manifested from the program.
    Currently, the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) sensor
    has bedeviled the program, but it is planned to deliver later this
    year. As a result, NASA's NPP (NPOESS Preparatory Project) satellite
    will become a defacto operational spacecraft when it is launched in
    2011. Like the DSP/SBIRS missile warning architecture, NPOESS C-1 and
    C-2, scheduled to launch in 2013 and 2016, respectively, will initiate
    the phase out of four decades of DMSP service to the country.

    Operational Responsive Space
        As a complement to the Nation's assured access to space, the
    Operational Responsive Space (ORS) program builds on the ``back-to-
    basics'' approach we have cultivated over the past several years by
    providing enhanced mission capability through incremental blocks of
    small satellites and integration of other responsive space
    capabilities. Key tenants of the ORS program are to keep costs low,
    react rapidly to urgent warfighter needs, and reconstitute capability
    in contested environments. A clear example of these tenants is
    exemplified in the first ORS (ORS-1). It is being built for United
    States Central Command (USCENTCOM) to monitor denied areas and will be
    taskable like other USCENTCOM organic airborne ISR assets.
        Leveraging on the ORS-1 experiences, the Air Force will apply this
    model to other mission areas like communications and space situation
    awareness. In the fiscal year 2010 budget request we will begin the
    steps of on-demand space support with Rapid Response Space Capability,
    whereby plug-and-play satellite busses will be assembled, integrated,
    and tested with Modular Open System Architecture payloads.

    Launch and Ranges
        National Space Policy requires assured access to space. Currently
    this requirement is satisfied by the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
    (EELV) program from the United Launch Alliance (ULA) consisting of the
    Delta IV (developed by Boeing) and Atlas V (developed by Lockheed
    Martin) launch vehicles. The first 23 EELV launches have all been
    successful, and are part of our consecutive string of 61 successful
    national security space launches. ULA achieves efficiencies through
    combined engineering, production, and launch operations while
    maintaining the separate Delta IV and Atlas V families of launch
    vehicles. The fiscal year 2010 budget request funds EELV launch
    capability, or infrastructure activities for two EELV launch systems
    and on going support for over twelve launch services ordered by the Air
    Force that are working toward launch. In addition, DOD requests funding
    for five EELV launch services which will take place in 2012.

    Space Protection
        The need for increased space protection of our space assets is
    paramount and requires enhanced SSA capabilities--improved accuracy,
    responsiveness, timeliness, and data integration to support the
    warfighter. To do this we must combine various inputs into a single
    picture for decision makers. Currently, operators and warfighters must
    assemble an understanding of the global space picture from many
    disparate sources, including e-mails, telephone calls, classified chat
    rooms, intelligence web sites, and imagery feeds. We have acknowledged
    this shortcoming, and in our fiscal year 2010 budget request we are
    consolidating the Integrated Space Situational Awareness, Rapid Attack
    Identification Detection Reporting System Block 20, and Space Command
    and Control (C2) programs into a new program element--the Joint Space
    Operation Center (JSpOC) Mission System (JMS). The JMS program will
    continue risk reduction engineering and focus on incremental deliveries
    to deploy a services-oriented architecture (SOA) environment and tools
    to progressively advance operational capabilities toward an integrated
    JMS. JMS produces and delivers services in four major categories:
    Infrastructure provides a SOA net-centric collaborative information
    environment at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information,
    Secret, and Unclassified levels; Mission Applications enhance and
    modernize accuracy, sustainability, and responsiveness of space
    surveillance capabilities from the legacy functionality; Command &
    Control (C2) provides design, development, and integration functions
    that create, visualize, and share decision-relevant views of space
    operational environment at all echelons; and, Data Integration migrates
    non-traditional sensors and data sources into a net-centric based
    enterprise enabling distribution of data obtained across traditional
    sensors within the space surveillance network critical to the JSpOC
    mission.
        Two programs critical to providing SSA data to the JMS are the
    Space Fence and Space-Based Space Surveillance (SBSS). The Space Fence
    is a three station, worldwide, radar system to detect and track smaller
    sized space objects, while the SBSS satellite is an optical system to
    search, detect, and track objects in earth orbit, particularly those in
    geosynchronous orbit. The Space Fence replaces the Air Force Space
    Surveillance System and SBSS builds upon our success with the Space
    Based Visible technology demonstration. In the fiscal year 2010 budget,
    the Space Fence program will complete a System Design Review and the
    SBSS program will support on-orbit operations of SBSS Block 10 which is
    expected to launch this summer.

    Space Industrial Base
        A stable industrial base is vital to successful space systems.
    Numerous studies and reports have documented that the U.S. market share
    of the global space business is steadily decreasing (CSIS Study,
    January 2008). Maintaining a stable space industrial base is not solely
    an Air Force or even DOD concern, and must be addressed with our civil
    and commercial partners as one team.
        We are working with our agency and service partners to strengthen
    interagency awareness and support processes to better synchronize
    efforts across the civil, commercial and national security space
    domains. The Space Industrial Base Council and its subsequent working
    groups consistently address industrial base and critical technologies
    risks and opportunities. Their efforts lead to better management
    practices, identification of cross-cutting technology risk areas and
    subsequent mitigations, and improve communication with industry.
    Specifically, the DOD is working to support U.S. industrial capacity in
    several areas key to space including batteries, radiation hardened read
    out integrated circuits, energy efficient solar cells, and traveling
    wave tube amplifiers.
        Continued and enduring attention to the space industrial base,
    particularly the sub-tier industry, is vital to maintaining a robust
    and viable capability to respond to national security space interests.

    Space Cadre
        DOD has over 15,000 military and civilian space professionals. They
    are essential to our full spectrum of operations from keeping the peace
    to fighting the overseas contingency operations, or engaging a peer
    competitor. Consequently, we are committed to providing the best
    possible education, training, and career development to these
    professionals who operate, acquire, and enable our systems.
    Institutions like the Naval Postgraduate School, the Air Force
    Institute of Technology, Defense Acquisition University, and the
    National Security Space Institute are at the forefront of our efforts
    to educate and train these warriors. These organizations provide
    education and training throughout a space professionals' career.
        We recognize that we must be able to measure how we are doing with
    respect to Space Professional Development. We have a set of metrics
    that help us gauge the numbers of cadre needed, our current supply, and
    the health of our cohort in terms of accessions and separations. All of
    these measures will help make us more efficient and better at
    developing our cadre, and ensuring we have the right professionals to
    fill billets across DOD.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Our space systems are the envy of the world. Our infrared
    surveillance satellites are able to detect missile launches anywhere in
    the world; no other nation can do that. Our strategic communications
    systems allow the President precise and assured control over nuclear
    forces in any stage of conflict, and our wideband SATCOM systems
    rapidly transmit critical information between the continental U.S. to
    our front line forces; no one else has global, secure, anti-jam
    communications. Our weather satellites allow us to accurately predict
    future conditions half a world away as well as in space. Our GPS
    constellation enables position knowledge down to centimeters and timing
    down to nanoseconds; no one else has deployed such a capability. These
    sophisticated systems make each deployed soldier, sailor, marine, and
    airman safer, and more capable.
        In the fiscal year 2010 budget, continuity of service across our
    space portfolio and improved space protection is paramount. Our `back
    to basics' strategy over the recent years is demonstrating results, as
    we continue toward securing the world's best space capabilities today
    and ensuring the same for our Nation's future.
        The space constellations and the space professionals that deliver
    these capabilities are our critical asymmetric advantage. We must
    ensure the recapitalization and health of these constellations and
    continue the professional development of our future space leaders.
    Delivering space capabilities is complex, challenging, costly, yet
    rewarding. Although we have faced significant challenges, we are also
    making significant progress. I am honored to represent a dedicated
    cadre of space professionals who are delivering space capabilities that
    support our deployed warfighters, our allies, and our Nation.
        I look forward to continuing to work with this committee and thank
    you for your continued support of military space programs.

    STATEMENT OF GEN. C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR FORCE
                                COMMAND

        [The prepared statement of General Kehler follows:]

               Prepared Statement by Gen. C. Robert Kehler, USAF

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Mr. Chairman, Senator Vitter and distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today as an Airman
    and as the Commander of Air Force Space Command (AFSPC).
        I am proud to lead and represent the nearly 40,000 Active Duty,
    Guard, and Reserve airmen; government civilians; and contractors who
    assure strategic deterrence and deliver space-based capabilities to
    United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), Joint Force Commanders,
    the Services, the Intelligence Community, civil agencies, commercial
    entities and allies. The men and women of AFSPC serve around the globe
    from AFSPC Headquarters, 14th Air Force (14 AF), 20th Air Force (20
    AF), the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC), the Space Innovation
    and Development Center (SIDC), and a host of deployed and forward
    locations.
        This has been an exciting and eventful year for AFSPC. Within the
    Air Force, we witnessed two historic decisions in 2008: the assignment
    of cyberspace responsibilities to AFSPC and the establishment of Air
    Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC). While in the midst of implementing
    these decisions for the nuclear and cyberspace missions, reinvigorating
    the Air Force's Nuclear Enterprise remains the highest priority for the
    Air Force and Air Force Space Command.
        Our mission is to provide an integrated constellation of space and
    cyberspace capabilities at the speed of need, and our vision is to be
    the leading source of emerging and integrated space and cyberspace
    capabilities. At AFSPC, we look forward to assuming the lead role for
    cyberspace within the USAF. Air Force operations in the air, space, and
    cyberspace domains are mutually-supporting and reciprocally-enabling;
    the cyberspace domain is inextricably linked to the other domains in
    which the U.S. military operates. Not only must we protect these
    domains, we must also properly integrate them with the other
    operational domains to create joint warfighting effects significantly
    greater than the sum of the parts. Our capabilities are woven through
    Joint operations, weapons networks, and civil and economic activities
    ranging from missile warning to the position, navigation, and timing
    signals we provide both for military use and as a free, international
    utility.
        Space and cyberspace capabilities shape the American approach to
    warfare, are embedded in an ever-more effective arsenal of modern
    weaponry and are threaded throughout the fabric of our warfighting
    networks. Our space-based capabilities are absolutely vital to the
    joint fight. Yesterday's irregular warfare is today's regular warfare;
    asymmetric warfare is the new norm. Space capabilities contribute
    across the spectrum of regular and irregular combat and non-combat
    operations and provide Joint commanders a decisive advantage. Space is
    no longer just the high ground; it is a critical joint enabler and
    force multiplier.
        The airmen of AFSPC provide land-based strategic deterrence through
    our Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) fleet led by 20 AF,
    conduct space operations and acquisition via 14 AF and SMC, and will
    soon execute cyberspace operations as part of the future 24 AF. These
    missions are being accomplished by our space professionals every day at
    15 wings and 44 locations spanning the globe. It is my distinct
    pleasure to outline the strategic way forward for AFSPC and to describe
    for you our plan to develop, acquire, employ and execute Air Force
    space, missile, and cyberspace capabilities in an increasingly complex,
    dynamic and challenging global environment. The space, nuclear, and
    cyberspace capabilities acquired with your help and support, and
    delivered by AFSPC airmen, will help maintain America's freedom,
    security, and prosperity.

                                THE WAY FORWARD

        AFSPC activities in 2008 included comprehensive, concerted efforts
    to deliver space and missile capabilities, develop and care for our
    airmen and their families, and encourage collaboration across the space
    enterprise. In addition, we made significant progress in modernizing
    our force and made great strides toward improving our acquisition
    processes with new strategies and actions. AFSPC is proud of its 2008
    achievements; achievements that will serve as building blocks towards
    progress in 2009. AFSPC's strategic way forward will focus on
    delivering the space, nuclear, and cyberspace capabilities our Joint
    Force Commanders require today and into the future. To do this, we have
    outlined five goals that serve to guide our efforts.

     AFSPC Goal: Guarantee a Safe, Credible, Ready Nuclear Deterrent Force
                        with Perfection as the Standard

        To support the Air Force's priority of ``Reinvigorating the Air
    Force Nuclear Enterprise,'' AFSPC will guarantee a safe, credible,
    ready, nuclear deterrent force with perfection as the standard. Nuclear
    deterrence remains the ultimate backstop of U.S. security, dissuading
    opponents and assuring allies of America's military commitment to
    defend our Nation, its allies and friends. Our Nation's security relies
    heavily on the remarkable attributes of the ICBM force and the
    dedication and professionalism of those who proudly secure, maintain,
    and operate the Minuteman III weapon system. Over the course of 2009-
    2010, we will meet daily USSTRATCOM operational requirements; invest in
    sustainment, infrastructure, and our industrial base; continue to
    restore our nuclear culture; and transition the ICBM force to Air Force
    Global Strike Command.
        In response to feedback and direction from the Secretary of
    Defense, Air Force Blue Ribbon Panel, Defense Science Board, Admiral
    Donald Investigation and others, we undertook a comprehensive set of
    actions to address deficiencies and re-establish excellence across the
    Air Force nuclear enterprise. Our roadmap, ``Reinvigorating the USAF
    Nuclear Enterprise,'' is the strategic plan to restore a culture of
    discipline, establish clear organizational structures, and increase
    investment in critical operational and sustainment areas. Perfection,
    precision, and reliability are our performance standards. In recent
    months, all of our missile wings have undergone rigorous Nuclear Surety
    Inspections (NSI) to ensure the utmost standards--and all three wings
    satisfactorily passed their follow-on inspections.
        As for the Minuteman III fleet, we are within 2 years of completing
    an extensive 10-year sustainment effort. As part of this comprehensive
    initiative, all three solid propellant motor stages have been removed
    and re-poured. In addition, the guidance systems and post-boost
    vehicles have been replaced with current technologies. These upgrades
    will ensure the Minuteman III is fully operational until at least 2020.
        The American people depend on the U.S. Air Force to deliver safe,
    credible and reliable nuclear deterrence capabilities, and we will do
    so. Our airmen perform the nuclear deterrence mission with pride,
    professionalism, and a solemn commitment to the highest standards.

          AFSPC Goal: Deliver Assured Combat Power to the Joint Fight

        AFSPC will continue to deliver assured combat power to the joint
    fight. In addition to the airmen deployed ``in-place'' manning ICBM
    launch control centers and space operations centers around the clock,
    in 2008 we forward-deployed nearly 4,000 AFSPC airmen to Operations
    Enduring and Iraqi Freedom and Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa in
    support of ongoing counterinsurgency operations. As a result, 49 AFSPC
    airmen were awarded Bronze Stars while engaged in military operations
    in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of
    responsibility. Today, we have over 1,200 AFSPC airmen continuously
    forward-deployed.
        In an environment that's more uncertain, complex, and changing than
    ever before, most historic military leaders would not recognize today's
    irregular warfare landscape. Although our Nation and its interests must
    still be protected from hostile forces and strategic threats, today's
    security challenges are more diverse and dispersed. Emerging threats
    are fleeting, scattered globally, may strike anywhere, anytime, and
    increasingly take advantage of the space and cyberspace domains. There
    is a growing reliance from Joint Force Commanders on space-based
    capabilities to provide vital services across the global commons. Our
    airmen are enabling GPS signals to ensure we're putting Joint Direct
    Attack Munitions on targets from aerial platforms and assuring the
    reliability of Blue Force Tracking for soldiers on the ground.
    Warfighters depend on military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) in
    austere environments for data, imagery, and streaming video feeds from
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Today, our forces are interconnected,
    have world-wide cognizance, and strike with greater speed and precision
    than any military in history providing overwhelming and decisive
    results with minimal collateral damage. Our continuous need for global
    communications, GPS, missile warning, weather forecasting and world-
    wide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance continues to be met
    by space systems in the face of evolving warfare.
        In 2009-2010, we will continue to improve Space Situational
    Awareness (SSA), execute the Space Protection Strategy, increase GPS
    navigational accuracy and signal security, modernize MILSATCOM, assure
    and exploit new Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) capabilities, and
    transform the launch enterprise.

    Space Protection Program
        Another history-making ``first'' occurred in March 2008 when AFSPC
    and the NRO established the Space Protection Program (SPP). The purpose
    of this program is to develop an integrated approach to protect
    critical defense, intelligence, civil, and commercial space systems
    that support national security.
        In response to Congressional direction, AFSPC and the NRO delivered
    the first Space Protection Strategy to Congress in August 2008. The SPP
    strategy was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and identified
    mission critical investments, capability improvements, and critical
    interdependencies. Complementing the SPP Strategy, AFSPC also finalized
    a new roadmap for the SSA mission area along with an interim
    architecture.

    Space Situational Awareness
        In concert with the SPP initiative, AFSPC continued efforts to
    develop a cost effective strategy to protect space capabilities, while
    striking the right balance among awareness, hardening, countermeasures,
    reconstitution, and alternate means. The Integrated Space Situational
    Awareness (ISSA) program provides USSTRATCOM, Joint Functional
    Component Command for Space and the joint community an integrated
    source of historical, current and predictive space events, threats, and
    space activities.
        In a dramatic display of teamwork and excellence, AFSPC developed
    the first-ever training procedures and exercises for a real-world
    intercept mission, Operation Burnt Frost. We ensured personnel at the
    Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA,
    were properly trained and our senior leaders possessed accurate and
    timely location of the target satellite, potential impact locations,
    and possible environmental effects. During the mission, we provided a
    glimpse of the future by transforming the legacy ``hub and spoke''
    space surveillance network into a collaborative, net-centric operation
    providing real-time SSA and sensor-to-sensor hand-offs. Through
    subsequent orbital tracking and cataloguing efforts, we've determined
    every bit of debris created from the intercept has since de-orbited.
        The importance of SSA continues to grow as the space domain becomes
    an increasingly contested and crowded environment. Issues common to
    other domains remain unresolved for space. As a Nation, we have gaps in
    the operational space domain not found in other domains across the
    global commons. The Iridium collision with a Russian communication
    satellite is a recent example highlighting the critical need for
    advanced Space Situational Awareness.
        Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) support is one of our top
    initiatives. The CFE Support Program was created in 2004 to focus on
    safety of flight in orbit for government, commercial, and foreign
    satellite operators in the US and around the world. Under our current
    pilot program, we are equipped, manned, and resourced to provide
    Conjunction Assessment (CA) analysis for capabilities critical to
    national security and homeland defense. An ever-changing space
    environment continues to become further crowded with increasing amounts
    of debris and new entrants. This has challenged our capability in the
    midst of declining resources and greater demand for basic CA and
    advanced services.
        In an effort to improve our capabilities, we are augmenting our CFE
    resources and communicating the expanded services to the CFE community.
    AFSPC will expand and automate our processing and analytical
    capabilities thereby enabling expanded CA services and in the fall of
    2009, we will transition our CFE pilot program to USSTRATCOM to
    continue long-term operations and support from the JSpOC. Our goal
    remains to provide SSA services to legitimate and trusted CFE users
    ensuring space flight safety and freedom of action in space.

    Schriever War Game Series
        The recurring AFSPC Schriever Title 10 War Game series has proven
    insightful in identifying key operational and policy issues. Having
    just wrapped up our Schriever V War Game in March 2009, we are now
    reviewing key issues involving space deterrence, capability employment,
    and national space policy considerations with senior Air Force and
    other national decisionmakers. Schriever V clearly identified areas
    requiring additional emphasis, policy development, resources and
    analysis. It also demonstrated the far-reaching importance of space to
    combat operations, policy execution, and diplomacy. We are now underway
    with plans for Schriever VI, and we look forward to increased
    international and industry participation.

    Position, Navigation and Timing
        The Global Positioning System (GPS) continues to provide highly
    accurate position, navigation and timing signals enabling Joint combat
    operations around the world. GPS is a free global utility that serves
    as an enabler for economic transactions influencing the global economy
    by more than $110 billion annually. Throughout 2008, AFSPC operated the
    most precise, largest-ever GPS constellation and took its first big
    step towards deploying GPS III when we awarded a contract in May 2008
    to build eight of the Block IIIA satellites. Complementing the space
    segment, we replaced the unsustainable legacy GPS Master Control
    Station ground segment with the Architecture Evolution Plan (AEP) and
    Launch Anomaly and Disposal Operations (LADO) Systems. AEP improves GPS
    accuracy, provides the capabilitiy to operate the GPS IIF satellites,
    and affords increased protection of the military's GPS M-code. LADO
    provides critical launch operations support and on-orbit operations for
    the GPS constellation. The transition to both the AEP and LADO system
    was seamless and transparent to users across the globe. In 2008, our
    acquisition team began developing the Next-Generation Operational
    Control Segment (OCX). This segment is not only required to launch and
    sustain GPS IIIA space vehicles on orbit, but is essential to moving
    the GPS towards robust, effects-based operations.
        At the same time, plans are well underway to launch, deploy and
    begin operating the first GPS IIF space vehicle by December 2009. These
    new vehicles will broadcast the first operational L5 signals, thereby
    providing civilian users an additional, higher powered signal. This
    signal is protected by internationally recognized safety of life
    spectrum rules ensuring robust quality of service with minimal
    interference.

    Military Satellite Communications
        As our MILSATCOM capability continues to grow, so does the age of
    our fleet. Aged in many cases beyond their design lives, the Military
    Strategic and Tactical Relay Satellite (MILSTAR) and the Defense
    Satellite Communications System-III (DSCS-III) will have to continue to
    provide critical communications services for the Nation's protected and
    non-protected military and diplomatic activities while we deploy the
    next generation of advanced MILSATCOM capabilities.
        With the commencement of mission operations over the first Wideband
    Global SATCOM (WGS) satellite in April 2008, we demonstrated a ten-fold
    increase in our wideband SATCOM capabilities providing the warfighter
    increased data, voice, video, and imagery. Additionally, we validated
    and accepted the geographically separated Backup Satellite Operations
    Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base. This $2.7 million effort supports
    MILSTAR, DSCS, and WGS operations.
        Looking towards the future of MILSATCOM, we began preparations to
    accept the first Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
    communications satellite in 2010. We look forward to the AEHF system as
    it will increase the protected communications data rate more than five-
    fold and afford more coverage opportunities than what MILSTAR provides
    today. Not only will AEHF provide enhanced national command and control
    satellite networks for the President, Secretary of Defense, and our
    combatant commanders, it will also ensure warfighters receive critical
    information such as the air and space tasking orders, operational
    plans, and time-phased force and deployment data. We transitioned to an
    innovative $1.25 million operations center and began training Subject
    Matter Experts (SME) in preparation for our next generation satellite
    system. Deployment of WGS and AEHF allows us to close the gaps in the
    areas of volume, data rates, protected communications, and net-
    centricity for the warfighter and our Nation's leadership.
    Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
        The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) will provide the Nation
    with critical comprehensive missile warning, missile defense, technical
    intelligence, and battlespace awareness information well into the 21st
    century.
        In November 2008, the SBIRS Mission Control System Backup--Highly
    Elliptical Orbit (HEO) facility and HEO-1 payload were accepted for
    operational use, followed by USSTRATCOM certification in December 2008.
    The second HEO payload is now on-orbit and undergoing checkout. The
    exceptionally high quality of HEO infrared data has led to additional
    exploitation initiatives providing major long-term benefits to our
    Joint Force Commanders.
        As the SBIRS HEO-1 system was certified for operations and is
    providing critical data to warfighters, the SBIRS Geosynchronous Earth
    Orbit (GEO-1) and GEO-2 space vehicles made significant assembly,
    integration and test progress. We will continue satellite testing and
    integration and look forward to launch readiness testing in fiscal year
    2010.
        The future of OPIR is the Third Generation Infrared Satellite
    currently undergoing research and development. In 2009-2010, we will
    continue down the path of wide field of view technology maturation
    activities. We have received wide field of view sensor prototypes and
    are on contract for a scientific experiment on a commercial rideshare
    mission in 2010.

    Space Control
        As the Air Force enters its 18th year of continuous combat
    operations in the Persian Gulf, AFSPC continues to provide sustained
    counterspace capability to USCENTCOM and is in its fifth year of
    continuous presence in theater with the defensive counterspace system--
    Silent Sentry. The resounding success of the Silent Sentry has led to
    the Rapid Attack Identification Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS)
    Block 10 program, which detects and geolocates satellite communications
    interference via fixed and transportable ground systems.
    Operationally Responsive Space
        The Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program is also focused on
    the joint fight. AFSPC partnered across the space enterprise and
    responded to three urgent warfighter needs in communications, SSA, and
    ISR. We addressed the warfighters' requirements through a variety of
    innovative approaches to include: accelerated delivery of demonstration
    efforts, explored alternative uses of on-orbit capability, expanded use
    of commercial assets, and military utility experimentation with a
    tactical communications satellite. In addition, we began development of
    ORS Sat-1 to meet a critical USCENTCOM ISR requirement.

    Launch Enterprise Transformation
        Assured access to space is paramount to providing space
    capabilities to the warfighter. AFSPC continues to deliver 100 percent
    space launch mission success--one mission at a time. Within our launch
    community, we witnessed the continuation of our winning streak with an
    unprecedented string of 61 successful national security space launches
    including the 23rd consecutive successful launch of the Atlas V and
    Delta IV Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELVs). Following a 22-
    month, $300 million launch site modification effort, the first west
    coast Atlas V successfully delivered a critical NRO satellite into
    orbit. We recently launched the GPS IIRM-20 onboard a Delta II in
    March, as well as the second WGS satellite in April onboard an Atlas V.
    Additionally, AFSPC supported two world-wide tests of the Ground-based
    Mid-course Defense long-range missile interceptor system.
        In a broader context, AFSPC continues to advance our Space Launch
    Enterprise Transformation (LET) effort to posture our command for the
    future of assured access to space. The LET focuses on three
    initiatives: transformation of launch services acquisition, upgrading
    the launch range architecture, and fully leveraging Total Force
    Integration (TFI). While the military launch business has long been
    recognized as a key contributor to space, we understand the
    significance of fostering the growth of commercial launch capabilities.

      AFSPC Goal: Forge a Battle-Ready Team by Attracting, Developing and
                            Retaining America's Best

        To support the Air Force's priority of ``Developing and Caring for
    Airmen and Their Families,'' AFSPC is forging a battle-ready team by
    attracting, developing and retaining America's best. During 2009-2010,
    we will improve training and professional development programs,
    establish viable career pathways, and guarantee quality of life
    programs for our members and their dependents. We are taking the
    necessary steps to care for our airmen and their families. While we
    undertake comprehensive organizational realignment, AFSPC is working
    hard to ensure a seamless transition of the land-based nuclear
    deterrent to Air Force Global Strike Command and to establish processes
    for deliberate development of nuclear expertise among our ICBM
    professionals. At the same time, we're preparing for the integration of
    the cyberspace mission by carefully crafting a professional development
    program that guarantees appropriate education, training and skill sets
    for this unique and challenging mission area and its synergies with our
    space professionals.

    Developing Airmen
        AFSPC further defined space and missile training as well as
    professional qualification and development relationships with Air
    Education and Training Command allowing us to focus on our Organize,
    Train and Equip (OT&E) activities. Contributing to our educational
    efforts, the National Security Space Institute (NSSI) continued to
    enhance its reputation as the center for top-quality space education
    and training for students of all ranks across the Department of Defense
    and related government agencies. In 2008, the NSSI taught 77 courses to
    over 1,500 students. We also established an ICBM Advanced Course at the
    NSSI providing 2 weeks of mission-focused education for the operations,
    maintenance, security and helicopter personnel who operate, sustain and
    secure our ICBM force. Furthermore, we institutionalized attendance at
    the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center's Nuclear Management Fundamentals
    Course for all inbound commanders who will serve at our nuclear units,
    and we are developing a focused ICBM Weapons Instructor Course (WIC) at
    the USAF Weapons School (USAFWS) at Nellis Air Force Base, NV.

    Families and Quality of Life
        AFSPC recognizes the critical roles our families play as integral
    members of the Air Force team. In AFSPC, we extended the Air Force's
    wingman culture to our families to help nurture success on the home
    front. AFSPC aggressively improved the quality of life where airmen
    work and live by awarding $143 million in 2008 for a host of
    revitalization initiatives to include family housing, a dormitory, and
    child development center. In addition, American Recovery and
    Reinvestment Act stimulus funds of $145.5 million are being invested
    across the command for modernization of base infrastructure and
    military construction (MILCON). For 2009, we have $31.5 million in
    MILCON projects for dorm renovation, facilities construction, and other
    key projects across the Command.

    AFSPC Goal: Modernize and Sustain AFSPC's Enduring Missions and Mature
                               Emerging Missions

        To support the Air Force's priority of ``Modernizing Our Air and
    Space Inventories, Organizations and Training,'' AFSPC will modernize
    and sustain AFSPC's enduring missions and mature emerging missions.
    Throughout 2009-2010, we will transition cyberspace capabilities to
    AFSPC and standup a new operational Numbered Air Force (NAF). We will
    also finalize a basing location and establish cyberspace training and
    acquisition processes through which we will present cyber forces to the
    Joint Force Commanders.
        In 2008, AFSPC increased the depth and breadth of Air Reserve
    Component (ARC) support to AFSPC missions. AFSPC's first-ever TFI
    Strategy was developed to fully leverage the unique strengths of the
    ARC in both existing and emerging missions. New TFI partnerships are
    underway across the launch, SSA, space control, and cyberspace
    operational mission sets. In April 2008, we activated the 310th Space
    Wing at Schriever Air Force Base, CO, as the Air Force's first-ever
    Reserve space wing. In addition, we activated the 380th Space Control
    Squadron at Peterson Air Force Base, CO, as the Reserve Associate Unit
    for the RAIDRS mission.

     AFSPC Goal: Reengineer Acquisition to Deliver Capability at the Speed
                                    of Need

        To support the Air Force's priority of ``Acquisition Excellence,''
    AFSPC will reengineer acquisition to deliver capability at the ``speed
    of need.'' During 2009-2010, we will continue working a ``back to
    basics'' philosophy and block-build approach, fund to the most probable
    cost, increase our acquisition work force, improve relations with
    industry, and control requirements. Our Space and Missile Systems
    Center will deliver five major new systems and mission capabilities in
    the next 6 to 24 months for SBIRS, AEHF, WGS, GPS IIF, and the Space-
    Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) system. The GPS III and OCX programs
    are on the right vectors for success, and we are improving our space
    development expertise, processes and culture.
        In today's world of rapid technological advancement and
    proliferation, we cannot afford to do business as usual when it comes
    to delivering space capabilities. The nature of warfare, as influenced
    by the information age, has changed dramatically in terms of symmetry,
    ambiguity, time, distance, and boundaries. This environment requires a
    paradigm shift necessary to deploy space capabilities at the ``speed of
    need'' while still executing efficient acquisition practices.

                                   CONCLUSION

        Defending the United States of America and its allies and friends
    is a continuous mission that requires the utmost planning and
    execution. As technology advances, so do the means that can be employed
    by those who threaten our way of life. AFSPC seeks to perfect the most
    formidable, capable and remarkable military space, missile and
    cyberspace force the world has ever known. This will allow warfighting
    commands to meet the challenge of protecting the American people, their
    livelihoods and interests with precision at the moment of need. With
    the continued support of Congress, AFSPC is postured to maintain a
    crucial leadership role as we realize our vision to be the leading
    source of emerging and integrated space and cyberspace capabilities.

    STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. LARRY D. JAMES, USAF, COMMANDER, 14TH AIR
    FORCE, AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND AND COMMANDER, JOINT FUNCTIONAL
      COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

        [The prepared statement of Lieutenant General James
    follows:]

              Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Larry D. James, USAF

        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Vitter, and distinguished members of
    the subcommittee, I am honored to be here today for my first
    opportunity to appear before you as United States Strategic Command's
    (USSTRATCOM) Commander of the Joint Functional Component Command for
    Space (CDR JFCC SPACE).
        It's a distinct privilege to address you on our space posture, and
    to represent the men and women of JFCC SPACE who employ space
    capabilities around the globe every day. These soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, and marines are a dedicated and innovative joint force, working
    hard to ensure efficient and effective space operations. Their
    professionalism ensures our joint forces can exploit space-based
    capabilities to the maximum extent.
        Today I will focus my discussion on employment of space
    capabilities, the events shaping our future planning, and identify some
    of the challenges we face as we work to operate effectively and safely
    in an increasingly complex and congested space environment.

                        EMPLOYMENT OF SPACE CAPABILITIES

        USSTRATCOM provides space effects to Department of Defense (DOD)
    global users that are critical to military operations. CDR JFCC SPACE
    is designated by CDRUSSTRATCOM as the single point of contact for
    military space operations. As such, I am tasked to provide tailored,
    responsive, local, and global space effects to the various combatant
    commanders. My USSTRATCOM-delegated authorities include Global Space
    Coordinating Authority, which makes me the primary interface with
    supported joint commanders for operational-level planning and execution
    to provide space effects in support of those combatant commanders'
    objectives. CDR JFCC SPACE also is assigned Operational Control and
    Tactical Control authorities for designated worldwide space forces.
    These authorities provide USSTRATCOM a single, globally focused
    component commander to enhance functional integration of space
    capabilities for the joint warfighter and for the Nation.
        Every significant military operation uses space capabilities in
    some way--space capabilities are truly integral to military operations
    in the 21st century. The criticality of space effects to the warfighter
    is readily apparent in ongoing operations in Afghanistan where Global
    Positioning System (GPS) services provide foundational data, enabling
    us to track the location of U.S. and coalition forces. But it is not
    just Blue Force Tracking; for the military users, there are multiple
    examples of space-based successes.
        For example, precision accuracy of the GPS-guided Excalibur
    artillery rounds have enabled the U.S. Army to strike top al Qaeda
    operatives in close proximity to our infantrymen, without exposing
    soldiers to undue risk. On 27 March 2009, following an enemy ambush
    against a coalition unit, a B-1B Lancer used GPS-guided 500 lb. bombs
    to destroy a series of enemy fighting positions and a fortified heavy
    machine gun position near Tarin Kowt, Afghanistan. On 26 April 2009,
    four F/A-18 Super Hornets flown from the deck of the Eisenhower Carrier
    Strike Group delivered four 500 lb. GPS-guided JDAMs onto enemy
    fortified compounds and machine gun fighting positions, ending a fire
    fight with coalition forces. Clearly, the GPS constellation enables our
    forces worldwide to maneuver into a militarily advantageous position
    and then, through various GPS-aided munitions, exploit that tactical
    advantage to create effects ranging from tactical to strategic.
        Our military satellite communications capabilities provide ample,
    readily accessible bandwidth, delivering joint warfighters secure
    military communication, and enabling the free-flow of battlespace
    characterization data and critical intelligence. The recent
    introduction of Wideband Global Satellite Communication operations
    boosted area of responsibility communications tenfold for 140,000
    warfighters. Wideband satellites allowed theater commanders to rely on
    real time, high-capacity broadcast video feeds from Predators to
    enhance their execution of tactical battlespace management, and to
    providecombat support information for deployed forces.
        Our space-based missile warning systems were absolutely essential
    to providing tracking and assessment of the latest Taepo-Dong 2 (TD-2)
    missile launch from North Korea. Multiple space-based missile warning
    systems provided initial launch detection, enabling rapid threat/non-
    threat characterization, and confirming the event as a space launch.
    Clearly, space-based assets provide critical data to produce effects
    for successful military operations across a multitude of engagements.
    Strong communication links, operational relationships, and reach back
    to the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) ensure USSTRATCOM is able
    to provide users the effects they need.
        Space capabilities are no longer just the province of large
    nations. Access to space and space products becomes cheaper and more
    widely available every year. The commercialization of space has allowed
    many developing nations and non-state actors to acquire space-based
    capabilities, such as imagery and satellite communications, that were
    previously the exclusive purview of superpowers. With more space
    players, space is more crowded than ever. In 1980 only 10 countries
    were operating satellites in space. Today, 9 countries operate
    spaceports, more than 50 countries own or have partial ownership in
    satellites and citizens of 39 nations have traveled in space. In 1980
    we were tracking approximately 4,700 objects in space; 280 of those
    objects were active payloads/spacecraft, while another 2,600 were
    debris. As of 1 May 2009 we are tracking approximately 19,900 objects;
    1,300 active payloads and 8,700 pieces of debris. In 29 years, space
    traffic has quadrupled. We have already seen one catastrophic collision
    in space with the Iridium/COSMOS conjunction, and as the number of
    objects in space increase, so do the chances of another collision.
    Clearly, managing this environment and our assets is a key focus of our
    efforts.

                            KEY EVENTS OF 2008/2009

        Although we have made progress in improving our space situational
    awareness (SSA), February's unfortunate collision between an active
    Iridium communications satellite and an inactive Russian satellite, and
    last month's test of another North Korean TD-2 missile, continue to
    tangibly demonstrate the complexity of the environment, the challenge
    of emerging space faring nations, and the demands on our space systems.
    To date we have cataloged over 940 pieces of debris that resulted from
    the Iridium/COSMOS collision and there are likely thousands of smaller
    pieces our sensors can't track. Only 18 items of debris have reentered
    so far, with the remainder expected to be in orbit for decades. This
    debris will slowly decay due to natural forces, but it will remain a
    hazard to manned and unmanned spaceflight in low Earth orbit, and to
    satellites transiting that region, for several years.
        We've derived many lessons from the TD-2 missile event, chief among
    them the requirement to integrate and fuse many sources of space,
    ground and intelligence data, in many disparate systems and security
    channels. This is a lesson we identified during the 2007 Chinese anti-
    satellite (ASAT) test, and experienced again during the 2008 NRO
    satellite intercept, and although we have implemented tactics,
    techniques, and procedures to mitigate potential delays in information
    flow, the challenge of collecting, integrating and fusing this data
    still exists. It again took the significant efforts of many to manually
    assemble information and then pass it to senior decision makers. While
    we were very successful once again due to outstanding cooperation
    between the intelligence and operations communities, we clearly need
    improved processing and analytic systems that can continually compile
    and automatically fuse SSA, intelligence and other all-source
    information in real-time to keep us abreast of space events. Our
    lessons learned from the TD-2 test will continue to guide future
    improvements and our developmental efforts for the JSpOC to ensure
    USSTRATCOM is able to provide users the effects they need.
        However, collisions and space traffic growth are not the only
    challenges or threats to our space assets. The January 2007 Chinese
    test of an ASAT demonstrated the kinetic kill capability of space
    assets and this capability will continue to be a threat in the future.
    Even more ubiquitous is the capacity to jam satellite communications
    links; this is within the capability of many nations, as well as non-
    state actors. Space-related ground sites can be damaged by direct
    attack. Several nations are working on high-energy lasers that could
    damage or destroy our satellites. With the exception of the high-energy
    laser, all of these threats to our space systems exist today. Our
    Nation's growing dependence on space-based capabilities, coupled with
    the increasing threats and operational risks we face, creates
    corresponding potential military and economic vulnerabilities. We must
    protect our space assets against intentional and unintentional acts in
    order to preserve our essential space capabilities, and accordingly, we
    must change our mindset from passive to active protection measures to
    ensure USSTRATCOM's ability to execute and integrate operations across
    all lines of operations.

                          SPACE SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

        Space situational awareness is more than understanding the space
    environment, tracking objects, and conducting conjunction assessments.
    We need to be able to discriminate between natural and manmade threats.
    We need to understand the location, status and purpose of these
    objects, their capabilities, and their owners' intent. This
    comprehensive knowledge enables decision makers to rapidly and
    effectively select courses of action to ensure our sustained freedom of
    action and safety in what is clearly a contested space environment.
        The U.S. space surveillance architecture currently detects and
    tracks thousands of objects, but critical gaps remain in our ability to
    fully track and characterize all on-orbit objects, analyze and predict
    conjunctions, and protect not just military satellites, but also the
    commercial and civil satellites that are critical to national security.
    The Space Surveillance Network provides acceptable coverage in the
    northern hemisphere, but we have a significant coverage gap in the
    southern hemisphere. By filling this gap we increase the JSpOC's
    ability to rapidly detect, track, and characterize new payloads and
    maintain awareness of maneuvering spacecraft.
        Our sensor network is currently able to track objects as small as
    10 centimeters across. We do this well for low Earth orbits; however,
    our ability decreases as we track objects in the more distant
    geosynchronous orbit. We need to improve our capability to track and
    assess smaller objects in all orbits if we are to keep pace with the
    potential threats from emerging small satellite technologies, and to
    gain better awareness of the hazards posed by small space debris.
        We must sustain the momentum gained through investments such as the
    Space Fence and Space-base Space Surveillance system and strive to
    close SSA gaps, bringing us ever closer to combining an operational
    picture of space with command and control systems, and moving us from
    ``watching and reacting'' to ``knowing and predicting'' in the space
    domain.

                 INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

        Obtaining intelligence of other nations' intentions in space is a
    particularly challenging issue. Our Intelligence Community is working
    towards building the necessary foresight to improve our ability to
    anticipate what others may do in space, whether to use the space
    environment to benefit their military operations, terrorist attempts,
    or to deny the U.S. space-provided services which we have grown
    dependent on.
        Improved analytic systems and connectivity will help us fuse
    operations and intelligence data. Backing that up must be a cadre of
    space intelligence experts, both within the Intelligence Community (IC)
    and within the JSpOC, who can readily focus and apply information to
    support our command and control activities, and ultimately provide
    necessary support to the warfighter. The DOD, IC, and National Air and
    Space Intelligence Center are working together to improve systems and
    develop our intelligence experts. These efforts are a tremendous start,
    but must remain a priority in order to provide near real time,
    actionable intelligence to the warfighter.
        Furthermore, we have barely begun to scratch the surface in terms
    of the potential data to be exploited from current and future space
    systems. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) has recognized this need and
    formed a Battlespace Awareness and Technical Intelligence Capability
    Team to develop the exploitation and dissemination systems, processes
    and architecture that will allow us to more fully integrate AFSPC
    sensor capabilities with those of the rest of the Air Force, our sister
    Services, and the IC, to provide multi-source intelligence from DOD
    space-based sources to support joint warfighters and national
    decisionmakers. We fully endorse these efforts and are partnering
    closely with AFSPC to prepare ourselves for the key role JFCC SPACE
    will play in commanding and tasking these assets.

                        SPACE AND CYBERSPACE INTEGRATION

        Emerging threats may originate anywhere, at anytime, and
    increasingly take advantage of space and cyberspace domains. Global
    effects, speed of attack, availability of information, and the ability
    to strike from remote locations are common attributes across both
    domains. As such, our adversaries have unprecedented, immediate access
    to information utilizing minimal resources. Space and cyberspace are
    truly contested domains, and our Nation's critical information is more
    vulnerable than ever and must be protected.
        Space and cyberspace capabilities continue to shape the world's
    approach to warfare. They are embedded in an increasingly, diverse
    arsenal of modern weaponry, and are threaded throughout warfighting
    networks. When integrated, space and cyberspace operations will become
    an even more powerful force multiplier. We must take actions to
    integrate space and cyberspace operations to protect the United States'
    freedom of action and information.
        We will continue to face many challenges in space and cyberspace.
    To ensure their integration, we must take the same operational
    mentality we have of the space environment and apply this mindset to
    cyberspace.

                              COMMAND AND CONTROL

        JFCC SPACE commands and controls worldwide space forces to ensure
    space-based effects meet warfighter needs. To ensure we can continue to
    effectively support the warfighter and senior decisionmakers, we
    require more automated, net-centric capabilities to command and control
    space forces, and networked sensors and information systems that
    seamlessly share information to more effectively leverage our current
    resources. This will give us the ability to rapidly react via real-time
    dataflow to the JSpOC for processing and analysis, and then real-time
    flow of the refined product back to the user.
        We are aggressively pursuing command and control capabilities to
    consolidate intelligence information, predict adversary threats to U.S.
    space systems, improve our ability to monitor assigned and attached
    force status, and predict impacts to operational users due to system
    outages. Together, these capabilities provide a predictive knowledge of
    the space operating environment and impacts to operations, as well as
    enable a broader set of options to proactively posture U.S. space
    forces to mitigate threats.
        The U.S. must continue to lead the community of space-faring
    nations and encourage responsible behavior in all facets of space
    operations. The JSpOC is the focal point for ensuring safe, effective
    operation of our space forces and those of our partners. We need to
    gather real-time, quality data, have the ability to exploit that data
    rapidly and accurately, and then export decision-quality information
    across a range of customers from the intelligence community to deployed
    forces to produce effects for the warfighter in an integrated, holistic
    way.
        Finally, we must continue to focus on capability requirements of
    the joint warfighter. Matching future users' requirements with
    technological advances will allow USSTRATCOM to provide the most
    advanced and reliable space effects in response to the growing demands
    of the Nation's warfighters.

                                   CONCLUSION

        The nature of space operations is rapidly evolving, as is the
    United States' and coalition partners' dependence on space. While we
    continue to exploit current space-based capabilities to the maximum
    extent, we still need increased efforts to close intelligence and SSA
    gaps, and increased efforts to enhance our command and control
    capabilities, ensuring USSTRATCOM's ability to continually provide the
    right effect, to the right user, at the right time anywhere on the
    globe. Working in collaboration with other departments and agencies in
    the U.S. Government, the DOD must continue to build the relationships,
    processes, and capabilities within the global space community that
    allow us to operate effectively together to meet our national security
    objectives. I am truly honored to lead such a talented group of men and
    women. Perfection is our standard and you can be proud of your
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that expertly tackle the
    challenges we face every day. I thank the subcommittee for your
    continued strong support as we work to preserve our vital space
    capabilities for our Nation.

     STATEMENT OF VADM HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
              NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR COMMUNICATION NETWORKS

        [The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Harris follows:]

                Prepared Statement by VADM Harry B. Harris, USN

        Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, as the
    Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Communication Networks, I am
    honored to appear before you today to address your Navy's space
    activities. Let me begin by thanking Congress for its sustained and
    significant support to the men and women in our Armed Forces. I am the
    Navy's resource sponsor for space; in that capacity, I am responsible
    for funding Navy space programs. This sponsorship includes the Mobile
    User Objective System (MUOS), which is the next generation Ultra High
    Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communication system. MUOS will provide more
    capable tactical communications to our joint, mobile warfighter. I am
    also responsible for developing the Navy Space Strategy, writing the
    Navy's Space Needs letter, and supporting the Navy Space Cadre.
        If I had to summarize my testimony to you today in a one sentence
    sound bite, it would be that the Navy is critically dependent on space
    to conduct not only our wartime mission, but also our core capabilities
    of forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection,
    maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. A
    day without space is a long day, indeed. A wide array of national,
    joint, and commercial satellites currently provides Navy commanders
    with essential worldwide communication capabilities; navigation;
    missile warning; meteorological data; and over-the-horizon
    intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Although the Navy is one
    of the largest `users' of space in DOD, we rely on the Air Force and
    the Intelligence Community to develop and field the majority of our
    space systems.

                              NAVY SPACE STRATEGY

        Let me now address the Navy Space Strategy. One of the Navy's
    primary goals is to shape the outcome of joint deliberations on future
    space capabilities to maximize naval combat effectiveness. Within the
    Navy, space-related functions and responsibilities are distributed
    among different commands, which together constitute a functional ``Navy
    Space Team'' that works collaboratively to advance our many goals in
    space.
        In 2008, the Chief of Naval Operations published the Navy Space
    Strategy, which provides key elements and guidance to implement the DON
    Space Policy. The Navy Space Strategy focuses on two broad themes.
    First, to influence the large DOD and national investments in space
    systems through direct, active participation in the National Security
    Space enterprise. Second, to leverage DOD and national space resources
    through improvement of the integration of space systems capabilities
    into the Navy's combat systems. Our strategy addresses five key goals:
    (1) mitigating the impact of the risk that adversaries pose to critical
    space systems upon which the Navy depends; (2) identifying,
    documenting, and advocating Navy's specific requirements for future
    space systems; (3) posturing the Navy Space Cadre to ensure we place
    the right person in the right job at the right time; (4) prioritizing
    and funding essential science, technology, research and development
    efforts to meet Navy's needs in space; and (5) expanding Navy
    leadership engagement with senior Department of Defense, Joint, and
    National Intelligence Community space leaders to better advocate for,
    and positively influence, Navy issues in space.
        Your Navy is actively engaged with key national and joint space-
    related organizations to ensure current and future Navy needs in space
    are identified. Venues for this engagement include the DOD Space
    Posture Review, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and National Security
    Space Program assessments.
        A specific example of this is our active participation with other
    Services and the intelligence community in addressing the current and
    future electro-optical satellite architecture. Secretary Gates' and
    Director Blair's recent decision on electro-optical modernization
    validates the importance these systems play in our national security.
    Through this modernization we will create an enabling collection of
    capabilities to support current and future naval operations. In
    addition, we continue to assess the military utility of commercial
    sensing capabilities to support our current operations worldwide. For
    example, within the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility we are currently
    looking at the value of commercial sensing to support Theater Security
    Cooperation and Maritime Domain Awareness.
        Navy is also working with the newly established Space Protection
    Program sponsored by Air Force Space Command and the National
    Reconnaissance Office.

            ULTRA HIGH FREQUENCY NARROWBAND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

        The Navy's major space segment responsibility to the joint
    community is the UHF narrowband satellite communications constellation.
    Today this constellation consists of eight UHF Follow-On satellites,
    two residual Fleet Satellites (FLTSAT), one Leased Satellite (LEASAT
    5), and leased capacity on SKYNET 5C. The MUOS will begin to replace
    these systems in 2011.
        MUOS, which is designated as a Major Defense Acquisition Program,
    is the next generation UHF satellite constellation; it will consist of
    four operational satellites and an on-orbit spare. MUOS will support
    Unified Commands and Joint Task Force Components, DOD and non-DOD
    agencies, and allied and coalition users. With both a legacy UHF
    payload that provides the same capability as the current UHF Follow-On
    satellite, and a new UHF waveform payload, MUOS will significantly
    increase the number of accesses and throughput available to the
    warfighter by more than an order of magnitude while retaining backward
    compatibility with legacy UHF terminals. It will provide tactical
    narrowband netted, point-to-point, and broadcast services of voice and
    data worldwide in challenging environments including double canopy
    foliage, urban environments, and high sea states, as well as mitigate
    threats to deny use of the satellite.
        MUOS is critical to satisfying the demand for tactical satellite
    communications. During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom,
    the UHF system (UHF Follow-On, FLTSAT, and LEASAT 5) was only able to
    support 20 percent of the narrowband tactical UHF satellite
    communication capability requested by operators even though 80 percent
    of the capacity was devoted to these operations. LEASAT 5 will reach
    its end of service life in early 2011, and the UHF Follow-On
    constellation is predicted to reach an unacceptable level of
    availability in May 2010. The good news is that the FLTSAT and UHF
    Follow-On satellites are operating well past their design lives--we are
    getting every bit of our investment out of them . . . and then some. In
    order to minimize the operational impact of any gap in UHF satellite
    availability, we are executing a mitigation plan, and developing
    further paths to maximize system capability until MUOS satellites and
    MUOS-capable terminals come online. We have increased the use of leased
    commercial bandwidth on LEASAT 5, and have recently added a lease on
    Skynet. One of our major mitigation efforts involves the maximization
    of available satellite communications channels on the newest UHF
    Follow-On satellite. The program office for UHF Follow-On took
    advantage of the satellite's digital capability and component
    redundancy to allow use of 10 additional channels, beginning 5 months
    ago in December 2008. This was achieved at virtually no cost. Similar
    gains may be possible on the legacy payload that MUOS satellites will
    carry, once on orbit. We are now exploring this option as part of our
    effort to maximize accesses during the transition from legacy to MUOS-
    capable terminals. The MUOS advanced waveform will deliver capabilities
    such as increased capacity, higher data rates, and ability to operate
    with smaller terminals. The fielding of MUOS-capable Joint Tactical
    Radio System terminals, and/or the upgrade of existing UHF legacy
    software-programmable terminals, are required for the use of this new
    MUOS capability.
        Today, the UHF Follow-On satellite supports approximately 600
    simultaneous accesses worldwide. Based on evolving warfighting concepts
    in support of the Guidance for Development of Forces, UHF satellite
    communications requirements are expected to grow, and MUOS, as
    designed, will be able to support that requirement.
        The MUOS program office currently projects a schedule delay to
    satellite #1's on-orbit capability, from March 2010 to no earlier than
    February 2011. The prime contractor has experienced challenges with two
    of the key pieces of technology. Several challenging technical hurdles
    still remain, including final satellite assembly and certification. The
    program office has been aggressively addressing and mitigating cost and
    schedule issues.
        The delivery of MUOS is a high priority for Navy. Warfighters need
    MUOS not only for the advanced capabilities that it will provide, but
    also for the warfighter-critical legacy payload, which will replenish
    our rapidly aging UHF Follow-On constellation.

                         OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

        With regard to Operationally Responsive Space (ORS), satellites
    provide global access and are a key enabler for our Navy's worldwide
    missions. To maintain our asymmetric expeditionary advantage, we must
    be able to surge additional space-based capabilities such as
    intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; position, navigation,
    timing; and satellite communications, on accelerated timelines. We must
    be able to add capabilities in any area of focus, as well as rapidly
    reconstitute lost capability. ORS solutions have the potential to fill
    the gaps for warfighters going in harm's way, and represent a
    capability which the Navy needs to maintain our operational advantage.
        We are excited about the potential of the ORS concept, as it offers
    maritime forces the flexibility to meet critical warfighting
    capabilities and counter increasingly agile adversaries. As part of the
    joint Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) and ORS effort, the Office of Naval
    Research invests $15 million of science and technology funds each year
    in moderate-to-high-risk projects that result in significant prototypes
    through the Space Innovative Naval Prototype program. Investments are
    focused on naval capability gaps that space-based systems can fill,
    such as ship tracking, acoustic data exfiltration from sonobuoys,
    mobile communications, submarine detection, red force cueing, and
    littoral environment characterization. The Naval Research Laboratory is
    managing the ORS Payload Technology initiative for the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense.
        TACSAT-3, which is scheduled to launch this month, includes a
    payload sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, which provides an
    IP-based data exfiltration capability to collect information from a
    wide variety of underwater, surface, and land-based sensors.
        The Office of Naval Research and the Naval Research Laboratory are
    leading development of TACSAT-4 for the joint community, and funding a
    UHF Communications payload which will support mobile communications as
    well as sensor data exfiltration. TACSAT-4 uses a prototype spacecraft
    bus which was designed as part of a government-industry team effort to
    develop and mature standards for increased modularity. The TACSAT-4
    spacecraft is scheduled to be launched this September. It will
    primarily support the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility,
    although other combatant commanders may benefit from its coverage as
    well.
        The TACSAT series of experiments reflect the partnerships that must
    be developed and nurtured between the services, combatant commanders,
    the Intelligence community, and industry, to produce innovative
    solutions that leverage the best talent available across the national
    security space community to solve warfighting challenges.
        The ORS attributes of flexibility and agility not only provide
    advantages in the current operational environment but also have the
    potential to positively affect the space industrial base. The shorter
    project cycles should provide a broader base of rapid response
    experience for the space industry and space cadre, and will establish a
    faster acquisition rhythm in the long run.

                                    SUMMARY

        In summary, space systems are a critical enabler for maritime
    operations. Your Navy has a long and proud history in space, having
    developed a number of technological breakthroughs. The list of Navy
    `firsts' in space includes: the first space communications used for
    operations; the first controllable space launch vehicle; the first
    satellite tracking system; the first successful electronic intelligence
    reconnaissance satellite; the first space object tracking system; the
    first demonstration of on-orbit atomic clocks; the first military
    broadcast satellite; and the first astronauts to orbit the earth, orbit
    the moon and crew the Space Shuttle. The Navy looks forward to more
    innovative space ``firsts'' to come in the decades ahead.
        The Navy's mission of keeping air and sea lanes open and ensuring
    the security of our citizens at home and abroad requires a global reach
    and persistent presence. We must be constantly ready, whether it is to
    deliver on a mission of mercy on one hand, or more lethal measures in
    combat on the other . . . and everything in between. Our ability to
    respond, as well as work with our Sister Services and coalition
    partners, depends on space capabilities with inherent flexibility and
    speed to support our worldwide responsibilities.
        The Navy must leverage DOD's and the intelligence community's space
    capabilities and must be involved in future space developments to
    ensure our ability to successfully conduct maritime operations. Future
    U.S. satellite programs are now being developed that promise additional
    benefit and capabilities to Navy warfighters. Due to the long lead
    times involved in complex space programs, it is even more critical that
    naval requirements and maritime missions continue to be factored into
    the pre-launch design and planned on-orbit operation of all future
    satellite systems being considered for acquisition. Without active Navy
    involvement today in ongoing deliberations over future satellite
    programs, your Navy risks operating in future scenarios with space
    systems not optimized for the maritime environment and ill-equipped to
    contribute to key important issues affecting our national security.
        Thank you for the opportunity to share our efforts with you today.
    So let me end as I began--the help of Congress in general, and this
    subcommittee in particular, is deeply appreciated.

     STATEMENT OF CRISTINA T. CHAPLAIN, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND
         SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        [The prepared statement of Ms. Chaplain follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Cristina T. Chaplain

        Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be
    here today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DOD) space
    acquisitions. The topic of today's hearing is critically important.
    Despite a growing investment in space, the majority of large-scale
    acquisition programs in DOD's space portfolio have experienced problems
    during the past two decades that have driven up cost and schedules and
    increased technical risks. The cost resulting from acquisition problems
    along with the ambitious nature of space programs has resulted in
    cancellations of programs that were expected to require investments of
    tens of billions of dollars, including the recently proposed
    cancellation of the Transformational Satellite Communications System
    (TSAT). Moreover, along with the cost increases, many programs are
    experiencing significant schedule delays--at least 7 years--resulting
    in potential capability gaps in areas such as positioning, navigation,
    and timing; missile warning; and weather monitoring.
        My testimony today will focus on the condition of space
    acquisitions, causal factors, and recommendations for better
    positioning programs for success. Many of these have been echoed by the
    Allard Commission,\1\ which studied space issues in response to a
    requirement in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2007, and by a study by the House Permanent Select
    Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI),\2\ among other groups. The two
    studies highlighted concerns about diffuse leadership for military and
    intelligence space efforts and declining numbers of space engineering
    and technical professionals. Members of the Allard Commission were
    unanimous in their conviction that without significant improvements in
    the leadership and management of national security space programs, U.S.
    space preeminence will erode ``to the extent that space ceases to
    provide a competitive national security advantage.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Institute for Defense Analyses, Leadership, Management, and
    Organization for National Security Space: Report to Congress of the
    Independent Assessment Panel on the Organization and Management of
    National Security Space (Alexandria, VA: July 2008).
        \2\ House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on
    Challenges and Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture
    (Washington, DC: October 2008).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       SPACE ACQUISITION PROBLEMS PERSIST

        Figure 1 compares original cost estimates and current cost
    estimates for the broader portfolio of major space acquisitions for
    fiscal years 2008 through 2013. The wider the gap between original and
    current estimates, the fewer dollars DOD has available to invest in new
    programs. As shown in the figure, estimated costs for the major space
    acquisition programs have increased by about $10.9 billion from initial
    estimates for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. The declining investment
    in the later years is the result of the Evolved Expendable Launch
    Vehicle (EELV) program's no longer being considered a major acquisition
    program and the cancellation and proposed cancellation of two
    development efforts that would have significantly increased DOD's major
    space acquisition investment.

        Figures 2 and 3 reflect differences in total life-cycle and unit
    costs for satellites from the time the programs officially began to
    their most recent cost estimate. As figure 2 notes, in several cases,
    DOD has had to cut back on quantity and capability in the face of
    escalating costs. For example, two satellites and four instruments were
    deleted from National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
    Satellite System (NPOESS) and four sensors are expected to have fewer
    capabilities. This will reduce some planned capabilities for NPOESS as
    well as planned coverage.

        Figure 4 highlights the additional estimated months needed to
    complete programs. These additional months represent time not
    anticipated at the programs' start dates. Generally, the further
    schedules slip, the more DOD is at risk of not sustaining current
    capabilities. For this reason, DOD began a follow-on system effort, now
    known as Third Generation Infrared Surveillance, to run in parallel
    with the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) program.

        This fiscal year, DOD launched the second Wideband Global SATCOM
    (WGS) satellite. WGS had previously been experiencing technical and
    other problems, including improperly installed fasteners and data
    transmission errors. When DOD finally resolved these issues, it
    significantly advanced capability available to warfighters.
    Additionally, the EELV program had its 23rd consecutive successful
    operational launch in May. However, other major space programs have had
    setbacks. For example:

             In September 2008, the Air Force reported a Nunn-
            McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical cost growth threshold
            \3\ for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
            communications satellite because of cost growth brought on by
            technical issues, schedule delays, and increased costs for the
            procurement of a fourth AEHF satellite. The launch of the first
            satellite has slipped further by almost 2 years from November
            2008 to as late as September 2010. Further, the program office
            estimates that the fourth AEHF satellite could cost more than
            twice the third satellite because some components that are no
            longer manufactured will have to be replaced and production
            will have to be restarted after a 4-year gap. Because of these
            delays, initial operational capability has slipped 3 years--
            from 2010 to 2013.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2433 establishes the requirement for unit cost
    reports. If certain unit cost thresholds are exceeded (known as Nunn-
    McCurdy breaches), DOD is required to report to Congress and, in
    certain circumstances, if DOD determines that specific criteria are
    met, certify the program to Congress.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) communications
            satellite estimates an 11-month delay--from March 2010 to
            February 2011--in the delivery of on-orbit capability from the
            first satellite. Further, contractor costs for the space
            segment have increased about 48 percent because of the
            additional labor required to address issues related to
            satellite design complexity, satellite weight, and satellite
            component test anomalies and associated rework. Despite the
            contractor's cost increases, the program has been able to
            remain within its baseline program cost estimate.
             The first Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF
            satellite is now expected to be delayed almost 3 years from its
            original launch date to November 2009. Also, the cost of GPS
            IIF is now expected to be about $1.6 billion--about $870
            million over the original cost estimate of $729 million. (This
            approximately 119 percent cost increase is not that noticeable
            in figures 2 and 3 because the GPS II modernization program
            includes the development and procurement of 33 satellites, only
            12 of which are IIF satellites.) The Air Force has had
            difficulty in the past building GPS satellites within cost and
            schedule goals because of significant technical problems--which
            still threaten its delivery schedule--and challenges it faced
            with a different contractor for the IIF program, which did not
            possess the same expertise as the previous GPS contractor.
            Further, while the Air Force is structuring the new GPS IIIA
            program to prevent mistakes made on the IIF program, the Air
            Force is aiming to deploy the GPS IIIA satellites 3 years
            faster than the IIF satellites. We believe the IIIA schedule is
            optimistic given the program's late start, past trends in space
            acquisitions, and challenges facing the new contractor.
             Total program cost for the SBIRS program is estimated
            around $12.2 billion, an increase of $7.5 billion over the
            original program's cost, which included 5 geosynchronous earth
            orbit (GEO) satellites. The first GEO satellite has been
            delayed at least 7 years in part because of poor oversight,
            technical complexities, and rework. Although the program office
            set December 2009 as the new launch goal for the satellite, it
            is currently assessing the satellite launch schedule and
            expects to have a new plan in place by June 2009. Subsequent
            GEO satellites have also slipped as a result of flight software
            design issues.
             The NPOESS program has experienced problems with
            replenishing the current constellation of aging weather
            satellites and was restructured in July 2007 in response to a
            Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical cost-growth
            threshold. The program was originally estimated to cost about
            $6.5 billion for six satellites from 1995 through 2018. The
            restructured program called for reducing the number of
            satellites from six to four and included an overall increase in
            program costs, delays in satellite launches, and deletions or
            replacements of satellite sensors. Although the number of
            satellites has been reduced, total costs have increased by
            almost 108 percent since program start. Specifically, the
            current estimated life-cycle cost of the restructured program
            is now about $13.5 billion for four satellites through 2026.
            This amount is higher than what is reflected in figure 2 as it
            represents the most recent GAO estimate as opposed to the DOD
            estimates used in the figure. We reported last year that poor
            workmanship and testing delays caused an 8-month slip in the
            delivery of a complex imaging sensor. This late delivery caused
            a delay in the expected launch date of a demonstration
            satellite, moving it from late September 2009 to early January
            2011.

        This year it is also becoming more apparent that space acquisition
    problems are leading to potential gaps in the delivery of critical
    capabilities. For example, DOD faces a potential gap in protected
    military communications caused by delays in the AEHF program and the
    proposed cancellation of the TSAT program, which itself posed risks in
    schedule delays because of TSAT's complexity and funding cuts designed
    to ensure technology objectives were achievable. DOD faces a potential
    gap in ultra high frequency communications capability caused by the
    unexpected failures of two satellites already in orbit and the delays
    resulting from the MUOS program. DOD also faces potential gaps or
    decreases in positioning, navigation and timing capabilities because of
    late delivery of the GPS IIF satellites and the late start of the GPS
    IIIA program. There are also concerns about potential gaps in missile
    warning and weather monitoring capabilities because of delays in SBIRS
    and NPOESS.
        Addressing gaps in any one of these areas is not a simple matter.
    While there may be opportunities to build less complex ``gap filler''
    satellites, for example, these still require time and money that may
    not be readily available because of commitments to the longer-term
    programs. There may also be opportunities to continue production of
    ``older'' generation satellites, but such efforts also require time and
    money that may not be readily available and may face other challenges
    such as restarting production lines and addressing issues related to
    obsolete parts and materials. Further, satellites on orbit can be made
    to last longer by turning power off at certain points in time, but this
    may also present unacceptable trade-offs in capability.

                UNDERLYING REASONS FOR COST AND SCHEDULE GROWTH

        Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost
    growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First,
    on a broad scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford,
    creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost estimating,
    optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and, for
    space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess
    potentially more executable alternatives. Programs focus on advocacy at
    the expense of realism and sound management. Invariably, with too many
    programs in its portfolio, DOD is forced to continually shift funds to
    and from programs--particularly as programs experience problems that
    require additional time and money to address. Such shifts, in turn,
    have had costly, reverberating effects.
        Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that
    is, before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing
    can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. This
    tendency is caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition
    programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on
    proving technologies. Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend
    technology invention into acquisition, programs experience technical
    problems that require large amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover,
    when this approach is followed, cost estimators are not well positioned
    to develop accurate cost estimates because there are too many unknowns.
    Put more simply, there is no way to accurately estimate how long it
    would take to design, develop, and build a satellite system when
    critical technologies planned for that system are still in relatively
    early stages of discovery and invention.
        While our work has consistently found that maturing technologies
    before a program's start is a critical enabler of success, it is
    important to keep in mind that this is not the only solution. Both the
    TSAT and the Space Radar development efforts, for example, were seeking
    to mature critical technologies before program start, but they faced
    other risks related to the systems' complexity, affordability, and
    other development challenges. Ultimately, Space Radar was cancelled,
    and DOD has proposed the cancellation of TSAT. Last year, we cited the
    MUOS program's attempts to mature critical technologies before the
    program's start as a best practice, but the program has since
    encountered technical problems related to design issues and test
    anomalies.
        Third, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all
    requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or
    the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full
    capability. DOD has preferred to make fewer but heavier, larger, and
    more complex satellites that perform a multitude of missions rather
    than larger constellations of smaller, less complex satellites that
    gradually increase in sophistication. This has stretched technology
    challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases and vastly
    increased the complexities related to software. Programs also seek to
    maximize capability because it is expensive to launch satellites. A
    launch using a medium- or intermediate-lift EELV, for example, would
    cost roughly $65 million.
        Fourth, several of today's high-risk space programs began in the
    late 1990s, when DOD structured contracts in a way that reduced
    government oversight and shifted key decisionmaking responsibility onto
    contractors. This approach--known as Total System Performance
    Responsibility (TSPR)--was intended to facilitate acquisition reform
    and enable DOD to streamline its acquisition process and leverage
    innovation and management expertise from the private sector.
    Specifically, TSPR gave a contractor total responsibility for the
    integration of an entire weapon system and for meeting DOD's
    requirements. However, because this reform made the contractor
    responsible for day-to-day program management, DOD did not require
    formal deliverable documents--such as earned value management reports--
    to assess the status and performance of the contractor. The resulting
    erosion of DOD's capability to lead and manage the space acquisition
    process magnified problems related to requirements creep and poor
    contractor performance. Further, the reduction in government oversight
    and involvement led to major reductions in various government
    capabilities, including cost-estimating and systems-engineering staff.
    The loss of cost-estimating and systems-engineering staff in turn led
    to a lack of technical data needed to develop sound cost estimates.

        ACTIONS NEEDED TO ADDRESS SPACE AND WEAPON ACQUISITION PROBLEMS

        Over the past decade, we have identified best practices that DOD
    space programs can benefit from. DOD has taken a number of actions to
    address the problems on which we have reported. These include
    initiatives at the department level that will affect its major weapons
    programs, as well as changes in course within specific Air Force
    programs. Although these actions are a step in the right direction,
    additional leadership and support are still needed to ensure that
    reforms that DOD has begun will take hold.
        Our work--which is largely based on best practices in the
    commercial sector--has recommended numerous actions that can be taken
    to address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended
    that DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an
    incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and
    requirements at program's start, and use quantifiable data and
    demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. We
    have also identified practices related to cost estimating, program
    manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array
    of other aspects of acquisition-program management that could benefit
    space programs. Table 1 highlights these practices.

        DOD is attempting to implement some of these practices for its
    major weapon programs. For example, as part of its strategy for
    enhancing the roles of program managers in major weapon system
    acquisitions, the department has established a policy that requires
    formal agreements among program managers, their acquisition executives,
    and the user community that set forth common program goals. These
    agreements are intended to be binding and to detail the progress a
    program is expected to make during the year and the resources the
    program will be provided to reach these goals. DOD is also requiring
    program managers to sign tenure agreements so that their tenure will
    correspond to the next major milestone review closest to 4 years. Over
    the past few years, DOD has also been testing portfolio management
    approaches in selected capability areas--command and control, net-
    centric operations, battlespace awareness, and logistics--to facilitate
    more strategic choices for resource allocation across programs.
        Within the space community, cost estimators from industry and
    agencies involved in space have been working together to improve the
    accuracy and quality of their estimates. In addition, on specific
    programs, actions have been taken to prevent mistakes made in the past.
    For example, on the GPS IIIA program, the Air Force is using an
    incremental development approach, where it will gradually meet the
    needs of its users, use military standards for satellite quality,
    conduct multiple design reviews, exercise more government oversight and
    interaction with the contractor and spend more time at the contractor's
    site, and use an improved risk management process. On the SBIRS
    program, the Air Force acted to strengthen relationships between the
    government and the SBIRS contractor team, and to implement more
    effective software development practices as it sought to address
    problems related to its flight software system. Correspondingly, DOD's
    Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
    and Logistics is asking space programs to take specific measures to
    better hold contractors accountable through linking award and incentive
    fees to program milestones. DOD interim space guidance also asks space
    programs to make independent technology readiness assessments at
    particular points in the acquisition process and to hold requirements
    stable.
        Furthermore, the Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command, and other key
    organizations have made progress in implementing the Operationally
    Responsive Space (ORS) initiative. This initiative encompasses several
    separate endeavors with a goal to provide short-term tactical
    capabilities as well as identifying and implementing long-term
    technology and design solutions to reduce the cost and time of
    developing and delivering simpler satellites in greater numbers. ORS
    provides DOD with an opportunity to work outside the typical
    acquisition channels to more quickly and less expensively deliver these
    capabilities. In 2008, we found that DOD has made progress in putting a
    program management structure in place for ORS as well as executing ORS-
    related research and development efforts, which include development of
    low cost small satellites, common design techniques, and common
    interfaces.
        Legislation introduced in recent years has also focused on
    improving space and weapon acquisitions. In March, the Senate Committee
    on Armed Services introduced an acquisition reform bill which contains
    provisions that could significantly improve DOD's management of space
    programs. For instance, the bill focuses on various measures, including
    increasing emphasis on systems engineering and developmental testing,
    instituting earlier preliminary design reviews and strengthening
    independent cost estimates and technology readiness assessments. Taken
    together, these measures could instill more discipline in the front end
    of the acquisition process when it is critical for programs to gain
    knowledge. The bill also requires greater involvement by the combatant
    commands in determining requirements and requiring greater consultation
    among the requirements, budget, and acquisition processes. In addition,
    several of the bill's sections, as currently drafted, would require in
    law what DOD policy already encourages, but it is not being implemented
    consistently in weapon programs. In April, the House Committee on Armed
    Services introduced a bill to similarly reform DOD's system for
    acquiring weapons by providing for, among other things, oversight early
    in product development and for appointment of independent officials to
    review acquisition programs. Both bills are moving forward in the
    Senate and House.
        The actions that the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of
    Defense have been taking to address acquisition problems are good
    steps. However, there are still more significant changes to processes,
    policies, and support needed to ensure reforms can take hold. With
    requirements, resource allocation, and acquisition processes led by
    different organizations, it is difficult to hold any one person or
    organization accountable for saying no to a proposed program or for
    ensuring that the department's portfolio of programs is balanced. This
    makes it difficult for DOD to achieve a balanced mix of weapon systems
    that are affordable and feasible. For example, diffused leadership has
    been problematic with the GPS program in terms of DOD's ability to
    synchronize delivery of space, ground, and user assets. GPS has a
    separate budget, management, oversight, and leadership structures for
    the space, ground, and user equipment segments. Several recent studies
    have also concluded that there is a need to strengthen leadership for
    military and intelligence space efforts. The Allard Commission reported
    that responsibilities for military space and intelligence programs are
    scattered across the staffs of the DOD and the Intelligence Community
    and that it appears that ``no one is in charge'' of national-security
    space. The HPSCI expressed similar concerns in its report, focusing
    specifically on difficulties in bringing together decisions that would
    involve both the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of
    Defense. Prior studies, including those conducted by the Defense
    Science Board and the Commission to Assess United States National
    Security Space Management and Organization (Space Commission) \4\ have
    identified similar problems, both for space as a whole and for specific
    programs. While these studies have made recommendations for
    strengthening leadership for space acquisitions, no major changes to
    the leadership structure have been made in recent years. In fact, an
    ``executive agent'' position within the Air Force that was designated
    in 2001 in response to a Space Commission recommendation to provide
    leadership has not been filled since the last executive resigned in
    2007.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Department of Defense. Report of the Commission to Assess
    United States National Security Space Management and Organization
    (Washington, DC: Jan. 11, 2001).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition, more actions may be needed to address shortages of
    personnel in program offices for major space programs. We recently
    reported that personnel shortages at the EELV program office have
    occurred, particularly in highly specialized areas, such as avionics
    and launch vehicle groups. Program officials stated that 7 of 12
    positions in the engineering branch for the Atlas group were vacant.
    These engineers work on issues such as reviewing components responsible
    for navigation and control of the rocket. Moreover, only half of the
    government jobs in some key areas were projected to be filled. These
    and other shortages in the EELV program office heightened concerns
    about DOD's ability to use a cost-reimbursement contract acquisition
    strategy for EELV since that strategy requires greater government
    attention to the contractor's technical, cost, and schedule performance
    information. In previous reviews, we cited personnel shortages at
    program offices for TSAT as well as for cost estimators across space.
    While increased reliance on contractor employees has helped to address
    workforce shortages, it could ultimately create gaps in areas of
    expertise that could limit the government's ability to conduct
    oversight.
        Further, while actions are being undertaken to make more realistic
    cost estimates, programs are still producing schedule estimates that
    are optimistic while promising that they will not miss their schedule
    goals. The GPS IIIA program, for example, is asking the contractor to
    develop a larger satellite bus to accommodate the future GPS increments
    and to increase the power of a new military signal by a factor of 10,
    but the schedule is 3 years shorter than the one achieved so far on GPS
    IIF. We recognize that the GPS IIIA program has built a more solid
    foundation for success than the IIF program. This foundation offers the
    best course to deliver on time, but meeting an ambitious schedule goal
    should not be the Air Force's only measure for mitigating potential
    capability gaps. Last year, we also reported that the SBIRS program's
    revised schedule estimates for addressing software problems appeared
    too optimistic. For example, software experts, independent reviewers,
    as well as the government officials we interviewed agreed that the
    schedule was aggressive, and the Defense Contract Management Agency has
    repeatedly highlighted the schedule as high risk.

                               CONCLUDING REMARKS

        In conclusion, senior leaders managing DOD's space portfolio are
    working in a challenging environment. There are pressures to deliver
    new, transformational capabilities, but problematic older satellite
    programs continue to cost more than expected, constrain investment
    dollars, pose risks of capability caps, and thus require more time and
    attention from senior leaders than well-performing efforts. Moreover,
    military space is at a critical juncture. There are critical
    capabilities that are at risk of falling behind their current level of
    service. To best mitigate these circumstances and put future programs
    on a better path, DOD needs to focus foremost on sustaining current
    capabilities and preparing for potential gaps. In addition, there is
    still a looming question of how military and intelligence space
    activities should be organized and led. From an acquisition
    perspective, what is important is that the right decisions are made on
    individual programs, the right capability is in place to manage them,
    and there is someone to hold accountable when programs go off track.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
    happy to answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may
    have at this time.

                         CONTACTS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

        For further information about this statement, please contact
    Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact
    points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Pubic Affairs may
    be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key
    contributions to this statement include Art Gallegos, Assistant
    Director; Maria Durant; Arturo Holguin; Laura Holliday; Rich Horiuchi;
    Karen Sloan; Alyssa Weir; and Peter Zwanzig.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Once Senator Vitter and I get through
    with our questions, we are going to adjourn to the Office of
    Senate Security for a discussion on classified matters. So I
    will start out with just a couple of questions, and then flip
    it to you, and we will just keep going back and forth.
        Ms. Chaplain, GAO recently issued a report about a
    potential gap in the Global Positioning System (GPS)
    satellites. Can you explain that gap and what happens in the
    gap period and the assumptions that you made in determining
    there is potential for a gap?
        Ms. Chaplain. Thank you. We recently reported on the GPS,
    and the bottom line, in terms of the gap analysis we did, we
    did an analysis that replicates what the aerospace corporation
    does, and we even matched up our results with the aerospace
    corporation. So we have a lot of confidence in the results of
    our gap analysis.
        With regard to the potential gap in satellite capability,
    our analysis showed that if both the GPS IIF and the GPS IIIA
    programs are executed on schedule, there is still just an 80 to
    90 percent probability that the constellation will stay above
    24 satellites, which is the commitment the United States has to
    provide. If there were a 2-year delay--our analysis in the 2-
    year delay in the GPS IIIA program, that is--our analysis
    showed that the probability would drop to as low as 10 percent.
        I have a couple parameters on this. I think our analysis
    has been exaggerated in some of the recent media reports. They
    are painting a bit more dire picture than we had in our report.
    There are also measures that can be taken to extend the life of
    satellites, such as turning off secondary payloads, but they
    need to be discussed among all the players involved with that
    action.
        Our concerns are with the issue of aging satellites in the
    constellation, the delays in the IIF program, and whether that
    schedule can even be achieved as it is now because they still
    have some technical problems they are working on.
        Then on the IIIA program, we were very pleased to see the
    Air Force has taken a lot of actions to prevent mistakes that
    were made on the IIF programs, and those actions mirror the
    things that we all want done for all the space programs,
    including trying to keep requirements manageable, hold more
    design reviews, follow military design standards, and things of
    that nature.
        But even with that, the schedule, in our view, will be
    challenging, given the nature of satellite development, the
    fact that they want a bigger satellite bus on the IIIA program,
    they are increasing the signal by a power of 10. It is a lot of
    challenge for the contractor to meet and there may be not
    enough room in the schedule to accommodate problems that could
    come up. So that is where we had a concern on the IIIA program.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary and General, what is
    your assessment of a probability of a gap, and how can you
    mitigate it?
        Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. The GAO concerns are the same
    concerns that we had initially going back 3 years ago as we
    were architecting the IIIA program, the GPS III program. That
    was the first program where the Air Force applied what we call
    ``back-to-basics'' in our space acquisition. Back-to-basics
    includes intense conversations with the warfighters to
    understand their needs. It includes evolutionary block
    deliveries of new capabilities and GPS III, for example, has
    three separate blocks, and each one delivers more capabilities
    for the warfighter as opposed to trying to leap dramatically to
    a brand new, almost Battle Star Gallatica kind of a delivery.
        So additionally, we have gone through independent cost
    estimates. We went through 4 years of systems engineering and
    technology risk reduction in a competitive industrial
    environment to buy down the risks on the program and to better
    understand how different designs can satisfy the warfighters'
    needs. So we have much more confidence in the acquisition of
    GPS III due to these back-to-basics fundamentals that we are
    implementing compared to the systemic problems that prior space
    programs had suffered. So GPS III, IIIA, IIIB, and IIIC is the
    first and currently still successful implementation of the
    back-to-basics philosophy in our space acquisition.
        To date, it has IIIA. The GPS III design work has been
    progressing faster than schedule. In fact, today is the first
    major design review on the IIIA spacecraft, and the program is
    progressing much faster and with much higher confidence simply
    because of those 4 years we spent before we settled on a
    particular industry team and before we settled on a particular
    spacecraft design.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General, do you have anything to add?
        General Kehler. Sir, just a couple of things. First of all,
    thank you for inviting us today--you and Senator Vitter both.
    We appreciate the committee's attention and concern on all the
    space issues. I would just add a couple things to what
    Secretary Payton has said.
        First, the world depends on GPS. We know it. We are
    responsible for it. We take that responsibility seriously and
    we are committed to keeping the level of service and actually
    improving the level of service that the world has come to
    expect out of us.
        The second thing I would point out to you is that today we
    have the largest, most capable GPS constellation on orbit that
    we have ever had. There are over 30 satellites on orbit today,
    and they are performing well. They are not all in the same
    state of health. Some are older than others. Some have some
    problems that others that are newer do not have, but it is a
    large and very robust constellation on orbit today.
        That gives us a little bit of breathing space, if you will.
    We understand where the problems are here. We know and believe
    that we have worked through the problems on the IIF satellites.
    We are not disagreeing with GAO over the nature of the problems
    that have arisen, but we are ready by the end of the summer/
    early fall to put the first GPS IIF satellite on orbit. We
    believe, as Mr. Payton said, that GPS III is progressing very
    well. There are other steps that we can take and will take to
    work through the gap if this gap arises.
        By the way, it is not a gap in terms of coverage. It is a
    reduction in the global coverage. It is hard to explain, but
    characterizing it as a gap, I think, is a little bit of a
    mischaracterization.
        But having said that, we are not pushing back on where the
    issues have been. We do think that we have measures in place to
    work our way through this time period. We are looking forward
    to GPS III because we have brought forth the very acquisition
    improvements that have been suggested to us into that program
    and believe that will be very helpful for us.
        I think as we look at this today and we look at IIF now
    getting ready to launch, III going through its acquisition
    cycle, and us having committed the right people, the right
    funding, the right cost estimates, et cetera, sir, as you had
    mentioned earlier on, the fact that we have new signals
    entering into the constellation, the fact that we have some
    ways to manage power and other things, we think that we can
    manage our way through this.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Vitter?
        Senator Vitter. Thank you.
        Just to follow up directly on that, Mr. Secretary, in
    general, what would be your bottom line on this in terms of,
    what do you think the probability is of any sort of gap,
    however broadly defined developing? Is there, in fact, a backup
    plan besides just the roll-out of what you have scheduled? If
    that slows, if that fails to continue to meet targets, what is
    the backup plan to mitigate or avoid any so-called gap?
        Mr. Payton. Senator, I would suggest we push that question
    to General James because he is the operator of the
    constellation, the warfighter that delivers that GPS
    capability, and he has those sorts of operational mitigations
    that you referred to.
        General James. Yes, sir. Just to address that, there are
    several things that we look at. First of all, we manage the
    constellation in totality, as General Kehler said, 30
    satellites. If we start to lose satellites before we can launch
    replacements, we can adjust those orbits to ensure that we
    provide the best possible coverage for GPS. The fundamental
    requirement is 24 satellites. So we will continue to manage
    that constellation to make sure that we adjust orbits to
    improve and provide the best possible GPS capability we can.
        In addition, we actually have----
        Senator Vitter. I do not mean to interrupt. But the best
    capable. What is the possibility of falling short of what is
    our expectation and defining a gap as anything short of that?
        General James. Sir, again, the fundamental requirement is
    24 satellites. We are at 30 now. Plus, we have three on-orbit
    spares that we can actually bring back into the mix. So again,
    just an opinion that the probability is relatively low that you
    would see major problems with a GPS signal worldwide. There
    could be areas where, for example, over the poles or northern
    latitudes that you have less accurate coverage, but still
    within requirements, et cetera. So again, it is a very dynamic
    position, as the satellites move around in the sky, in terms of
    the coverage you get and what you would see. But you would
    really have to drop from 33 today, 30 plus 3 on-orbit spares
    that we have, down to that 24, which is the very basic
    requirement that we are required to meet and provide from the
    United States.
        Senator Vitter. Gentlemen, any of you can respond. What are
    your general thoughts regarding this IDA report and the
    specific conclusion that we suffer from no one really being in
    charge in a global sense with regard to space? Do you think
    there is some fairness in that? What should be done about it?
    How can we bring more focus in terms of developing an overall
    space road map and investment plan?
        Mr. Payton. I would say, Senator, when we say no one is in
    charge, that is a misnomer. I would say the warfighter is in
    charge. Those of us on the acquisition side turn to the
    warfighter to determine what capabilities we deliver, at what
    pace we deliver those capabilities, and at what price. Again,
    part of our back-to-basics is a very tight integration of
    warfighter conversations with the acquisition community so that
    we do satisfy those needs that they advertise.
        Senator Vitter. Let me ask it a little differently.
    Warfighter is a lot of different people, and we salute them and
    we certainly want to service them. Who is in charge of
    integrating all of that input and those needs into a clear,
    unified road map?
        Mr. Payton. Since space is global inherently, we turn to
    Strategic Command for that.
        Senator Vitter. Do you think they are effective in truly
    integrating that into an overall road map and investment plan?
        Mr. Payton. Yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. Where is that sort of overall road map laid
    out and defined?
        Mr. Payton. Through the normal Pentagon planning processes.
    Strategic Command quantifies their priorities, representing the
    theater combatant commanders. They quantify their priorities
    and the pace that they need those priorities filled, and
    whether it is Air Force or Navy or even the National
    Reconnaissance Office, we marry our deliveries to those
    warfighter needs.
        General Kehler. Sir, if I could add a little bit to that as
    well. Again, on the DOD side of this equation, Strategic
    Command, as a combatant command, sits in a very critical place
    in terms of space operational capabilities. That is where the
    requirements originate, and when the warfighting requirements
    for space-related things originate, there is a process that
    ultimately hands those requirements, once they're validated, in
    large part--not exclusively, but in large part--to the Air
    Force. When they come to the Air Force, then the Air Force
    Space Command, my command, is responsible for taking those
    requirements and turning them into actual capabilities.
        On the operational side, a very similar thing happens.
    Strategic Command is responsible for the day-in and day-out
    operations of our space assets as well, our DOD space assets.
    General James is the commander day-in and day-out that
    exercises that operational responsibility, the operational
    control, if you will, over those assets.
        So there are two chains here. In terms of the warfighters
    and warfighting requirements, we think this works pretty well.
    This is something we have arrived at after a great deal of
    effort to get us into this particular position where
    warfighting requirements follow the standard chain that other
    warfighting requirements follow, and space operations follow a
    standard set of activities that actually puts the capability in
    the hands of the people who are forward who need it.
        So we are pretty comfortable that, as we sit here today, we
    understand how requirements turn into programs that turn into
    capabilities and who is responsible for that. We are also
    pretty comfortable today that the operational use of these
    platforms and how we make that available to the warfighters is
    also pretty well understood.
        General James. Sir, if I could just expand quickly. Again,
    under the Joint Forces Component Commander, then we have
    responsibility for Army, Navy, and Air Force space forces. We
    also reach out to the combatant commanders around the globe. We
    receive inputs from them on a daily basis in terms of what are
    the requirements for current operations today, and we build all
    that into a tasking order and provide those capabilities on a
    regular basis. So we are, indeed, integrating those space
    capabilities across all the Services, provide that combatant
    commander with what he needs on a regular basis.
        General Kehler. I would add one final point, sir, if I may.
    The IDA reports and other reports have really not just looked
    inside the DOD, but they have looked across the interagency
    where they have raised some of their concerns. You have a
    defense activity. You have an intelligence activity. You have
    other activities. The question that they have raised is how do
    those interact, and those are questions that, among other
    things, will be looked at in the space posture review.
        Senator Vitter. The final question for now. I would love
    thoughts from any of you, including the GAO, about the
    suggestion by some that we do not have enough focus--it is not
    all or nothing--but enough focus on small satellites, things
    that are more focused, simpler, much cheaper, and we focus too
    much on mega, extremely complex systems, and that we could get
    some benefit in certain areas from focusing on smaller, simpler
    things, including spurring more entrants in the field and more
    competition because not everyone is going to get in the
    business of building the mega, most complicated satellites. Do
    you have reactions to that very broad suggestion?
        Mr. Payton. It is a very timely topic, Senator. Last night
    we launched out of Wallops Island a spacecraft called Tactical
    Satellite (TACSAT)-3, a small satellite launched off of a
    Minotaur to low-earth orbit. It was a project run by Air Force
    Research Lab but with participation from Navy Research Lab, and
    it was part of our operational responsive space program. Again,
    a technology demonstration, but demonstrating that we can field
    and deploy a spacecraft for a particular theater combatant
    commander's needs.
        So that demonstration, again launched last night, will have
    about a year of on-orbit operation to demonstrate some new
    technologies, but mostly how to operate more efficiently with
    an on-orbit asset. So, again, that is one example of small
    satellites through the operational responsive space program,
    how small satellites can benefit military combatant commanders.
        General Kehler. Sir, we would agree. We see that there is
    great potential in smaller platforms that do single-purpose
    kinds of things that can be put up faster and at lower cost.
    The warfighters have said that there are requirements for
    platforms like that. The Commander of Strategic Command has
    told us that he is interested in being able to augment or
    reconstitute pieces of the constellations that the warfighters
    depend on.
        As Mr. Payton said, this is a next step that we just took
    last evening on this road. We are very encouraged by what we
    are seeing so far. We would like it to go faster, and we are
    trying to work on that in terms of investment, but we see the
    great potential in being able to put another strategic arrow in
    our quiver with smaller satellites. In some cases, we may be
    able to do a substantial amount of some of these missions. In
    some cases, we are going to have to have larger platforms.
        General James. Sir, just from an operational perspective,
    we are preparing, once they are done with the experimental
    phase of these, to actually take them over operationally and
    build the concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures to
    actually provide that data right into the theater and develop
    those procedures where we accept requests from the theater and
    use these operationally as well as experimentally. So we are
    all on board with moving forward in that arena.
        Admiral Harris. Sir, from the Navy's perspective, we are a
    strong believer in the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS)
    concept. Our Navy Research Lab, in conjunction with the Office
    of Naval Research and the Air Force Research Laboratory and
    various applied physics labs across the country--we partner
    with them to participate in the ORS program. We think it is
    great for the country. It is great for industry, and it gives
    the warfighter the potential for on-call services down range.
    So we are committed to it, and we happily participate in it.
        Ms. Chaplain. We have been generally supportive of the ORS
    program, not just because of the focus on small satellites, but
    because it also provides the potential to standardize design
    techniques and to also lower the costs of launch, which is very
    important to reducing acquisition costs overall, and also of
    the potential of the program to bring in new players into the
    space business.
        Also, just by virtue of working on smaller programs that go
    faster, you are providing a lot of learning opportunities for
    people that do not have those opportunities on these longer
    kinds of efforts. It encourages just more learning and risk-
    taking in general.
        You have to be cautious in applying this concept across all
    of space because some of the requirements are very demanding
    and the solutions inherently have to be different at this point
    in time.
        Senator Vitter. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is
    good to be back with you, and I am glad that my colleague,
    Senator Vitter, is your ranking member. I am sure you can get a
    lot more productive work out of him than you were able to get
    out of me. He is committed to our country's defense and has the
    brain power to understand the complexities that we deal with.
    [Laughter.]
        General Kehler, you point out in your testimony that Air
    Force Command provides land-based strategic deterrence through
    the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) fleet. Could you
    outline for us, briefly, how you maintain the reliability of
    this force over time and what are the challenges in what you
    do?
        General Kehler. Sir, first of all, we are about to complete
    a very substantial investment in the Minuteman ICBM force that
    will take it to 2020. We are looking at what it might take in
    additional investment to take it to 2030.
        Now, how do we do that? We do that through a variety of
    programs that sustain this force and analyze the force and
    where it may need investment and then take those investment
    steps. One of the key activities that we have is an aging and
    surveillance program. That aging and surveillance program looks
    very hard at the boosters themselves and the supporting
    equipment that goes with those to try to predict where failures
    might occur in the future.
        For example, three times a year--and we are looking at
    going to a fourth, but for right now three times a year--we
    operationally test fly a full-up Minuteman round, if you will,
    from one of the operational bases where it is disassembled,
    taken to Vandenberg Air Force Base, reassembled, shot down the
    western range. We also fire static test assets at various
    locations around the country. We also dissect some of these
    missiles. We do analysis on the chemical content of the fuels,
    and we constantly look at the electronics. The system, as it
    sits there deployed operationally in the field every day, is
    constantly going through a set of self-checks and self-analysis
    to tell us what its health is.
        Senator Sessions. I think you are to be commended for that.
    I think that has been an important part of the confidence we
    have in that system.
        So you are doing as many as three flights a year?
        General Kehler. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. I remember we cut the ICBM force from 500
    to 450. Part of the agreement to do that was that we needed
    those launches for testing. I believe that is right.
        General Kehler. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. So, Mr. Chairman, I do not know if we
    have lined up enough in our Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    program for testing. You have always felt we probably should
    have more rigorous testing, and then if we are going to keep
    this system in place for a while, we will need to make sure we
    have enough when we look at that number on testing.
        Senator Bill Nelson. We are going to bring General O'Reilly
    in here.
        Senator Sessions. Okay, very good.
        ORS is something I know that the chairman has been
    interested in and supportive of. You announced, Secretary
    Payton, a launch yesterday?
        Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. Last night.
        Senator Sessions. So far, so good?
        Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. It was a successful routine launch
    out of Wallops Island. The satellite separated from the last
    stage of the Minotaur launch vehicle. Solar rays unfurled, and
    they are going through on-orbit checkout right now.
        Senator Sessions. Just briefly, how do you feel about how
    the progress is going on this? I think you said that earlier,
    but would you summarize that for me what your best judgment is?
    Are we on schedule?
        Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. In addition to the TACSAT operational
    experiments, we have another program that is responding to an
    urgent need from Central Command, a project we call ORS
    satellite number 1, not very descriptive. It is intended to
    respond to an urgent need from Central Command. So we have
    selected an industry team to go out and build the spacecraft
    with very mature technology, piece part technology designs.
    Part of that is to even use the existing link from space to the
    ground, use the existing link that the U2 uses today, so that
    when this satellite flies over Central Command, they will be
    able to receive it as if it is a very high altitude U2. It fits
    right into their analytical work stations for Central Command.
    So it is a very fast-paced program that the ORS program is
    managing.
        Senator Sessions. Space News reported May 18 that the 2010
    funding request is insufficient to launch the ORS 1 satellite
    mission planned for 2010. Is that a disappointment? How did we
    let that slip?
        Mr. Payton. No, sir. We have a decision point in the
    program, again, part of our back-to-basics. If the program is
    still making good progress on its design evolution and its
    subcontracting and delivery of the piece parts for the
    spacecraft and the sensors, if that is going well in early
    July, we will make a conscious decision about how fast to
    continue that program. So the budget requests necessary to keep
    that program on a fast pace are in the process to come to
    Congress for approval.
        Senator Sessions. So you have an urgent request. The
    original plan, as I understood it, was to do it by 2010, but
    our warfighter now is not going to have it.
        Mr. Payton. No, sir. Again, we do not want to spend money
    to keep a program on a pace that technically it will not
    deliver. So the decision point this summer is what pace to
    deliver that spacecraft on.
        Senator Sessions. It is not a question of money but a
    technological capability?
        Mr. Payton. It is a question of can the industry prove that
    they can deliver on that 2010 pace.
        Senator Sessions. If they can, you will have the money to
    fund it?
        Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. If not, our plan is to continue the
    program, but not on the rapid pace.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General Kehler, you were mentioning
    other agencies. Of course, DOD has an imminent interest in
    knowing what the weather is. We have not had too good of an
    experience with a National Polar-Orbiting Operational
    Environmental Sensing Satellite (NPOESS). General James, how
    important is it that these sensors get fielded?
        General James. Sir, from the warfighting perspective,
    weather it is absolutely essential and maintaining our
    awareness of the weather in theater and out is extremely
    critical to planning and conducting operations. So it is
    certainly critical.
        Looking to the ground weather perspective, there are many
    weather satellites that we rely on, of course, the current
    Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) constellation,
    which we will have three satellites to be launched. So that
    will carry us forward for some period of time. Then other
    National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and civil
    weather satellites that we can utilize for weather forecasting.
    But it is absolutely critical to military operations and also
    space operations because there is space weather that our space
    satellites conduct and determine and monitor solar wind, solar
    flux, those sorts of things that are important for satellite
    operations that we also need to maintain the capabilities for
    from the warfighter and operational perspective.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The structure on NPOESS between the
    Air Force and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
    (NOAA) and NASA has not worked. There is a committee or a task
    force report that is coming out in a week or so headed by a
    very respected person in these matters, Tom Young. That report
    is going to say that basically, since it is underfunded, it
    needs to be funded, but that between the DOD and NOAA and NASA,
    they have to get their act together. The recommendation is
    going to be that basically NASA design and operate the
    satellite for NOAA with the cooperation of DOD. Do you have any
    problem with that?
        General James. Sir, I will just speak from the warfighter
    perspective. The warfighter has weather requirements. As long
    as the acquisition process meets those requirements, then no.
    But I would turn to the acquisition side to talk about the
    management of the program itself, but the requirements will
    still be the requirements and they need to be addressed in
    whatever form or program management structure exists.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Mr. Secretary and General
    Kehler?
        Mr. Payton. I would suggest that today NOAA operates not
    only the polar-orbiting satellite that they have sponsored, but
    also the DMSP military spacecraft. So from a shared operational
    perspective of constellation management and flying the
    spacecraft and tasking the spacecraft, NOAA does that for both
    the Air Force and the rest of the world right now. We rely on
    European sensors also from their program they have called
    MEDOP. So the operational relationship is already established.
        The difficulty with NPOESS has been a very complex and
    sophisticated suite of sensors that have been troublesome in
    their development, in their engineering, most notably a sensor
    called visible and infrared sensor. That is the shared
    difficulty that NASA and NOAA and the Air Force have right now,
    and the delivery and development of that sensor has been the
    cause of our frustrations with the NPOESS program.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I would suggest to you that another
    problem is its management by committee, and you have to have a
    lead. The Tom Young report is going to suggest that NASA be the
    lead.
        Mr. Payton. If we do march down that path, we will have to
    have very strong confidence and guarantees from NASA that they
    could satisfy the warfighters' requirements. We would have to
    work out mechanisms to ensure that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Where does Ash Carter play into this?
        Mr. Payton. Senator, I honestly do not know. He would be a
    critical decision-maker if we moved down that path.
        Senator Bill Nelson. What I would like you to do is maybe
    we will get him and you back up here after you have looked at
    this Tom Young report. But this thing is going to take another
    billion, billion and a half dollars, to complete. I think the
    management structure has in large part been the problem, as
    well as the technical challenges. So we will visit that one on
    another day.
        Mr. Payton. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In the meantime, I think it would be
    well if you would get with Ash Carter and you all get Dr.
    Young's report and see what conclusions and reach out to NOAA
    and to NASA.
        Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. His organization is already working
    with us to scrutinize to date his suggestions and to look at
    alternative implementations.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let us talk about protected
    communications. It appears there may be a gap in 2018. What is
    the likely potential for this gap? General Kehler and Mr.
    Secretary?
        General Kehler. Sir, protected communications remains a
    critical warfighting requirement. That has not changed here
    recently, although some of the budget decisions with the fiscal
    year 2010 budget have adjusted the demand date for increased
    protected communications. Some of it was tied to the Army's
    future combat system and some other Service programs that have
    now been altered with other budget decisions.
        Nevertheless, the requirement for protected communications
    for the forward forces remains an especially growing
    requirement for communications on the move that are protected.
    We have two programs underway right now. One is not protected.
    That is the Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) system. We have put
    two of those satellites on orbit. The first one was turned over
    to Pacific Command almost a year ago and is functioning very
    well. The second one is on orbit and going through its checkout
    phase, and all indications are that that one will be very
    successful. We have four more of those to launch in the coming
    several years to put much more unprotected capability on orbit,
    which is important for the warfighters as well.
        Protected communications today is the Military Strategic
    and Tactical Relay satellite. That is the name of the satellite
    that does that. We are going to replace that with the Advanced
    Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite. We expect to launch
    the first of the AEHF satellites within the next year or so,
    perhaps a little bit longer, the fall probably of 2010, and
    that will be the first of four AEHF satellites. Now with the
    budget decisions on TSAT, which was to be the follow-on, we are
    looking very hard at an architecture that will continue to put
    upgraded, if you will, AEHFs into the system beyond number 4.
        So sitting here today, I am not concerned about a gap, as
    we would think of no satellites on orbit. The question is how
    quickly can we bring additional capability into AEHF as the
    warfighters' need goes up. I think we have a way forward to do
    that. I think it was Mr. Payton who used a great word a week or
    so ago in another appearance where he talked about
    ``harvesting'' the technology out of the TSAT program. We will
    need to go do that, find out how quickly we can infuse some of
    that technology, both in WGS and in AEHF, and continue to rely
    on commercial as well and approach this in the sense of an
    architecture.
        So I am not overly concerned, sitting here today, about a
    gap, if you will, in 2018 or 2019. I think the challenge for us
    is to decide how do we go forward here with advanced EHF and
    what does that mean in terms of being able to pull new things
    into advanced EHF. Those decisions have to be made and brought
    back probably in the next budget, not this one.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Chaplain, do you think there is a
    gap?
        Ms. Chaplain. We have not done a formal gap analysis on
    this issue and would like to, but we are concerned about the
    potential gap in protected communications, as well as the ultra
    high frequency (UHF) communications, as well as missile warning
    capabilities, and of course, the GPS and the weather
    satellites.
        AEHF is still not out of the woods yet either in terms of
    technical problems, it is important to remember that. While you
    can add evolutionary over-time capabilities to AEHF, you have
    to also be aware that at some point you might be adding so much
    you need, again, a larger satellite bus and more redesign that
    might take more time than you think to answer.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I want to talk about TSAT. It was
    canceled, but after we spent $2 billion on it. Mr. Secretary,
    what plans are in place to preserve the work that was done for
    TSAT?
        Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. The TSAT program had matured what I
    call piece part technologies to a very high technical readiness
    level. These are irradiation hardened processors, laser com, a
    multitude of technologies that the GAO identified several years
    ago and the Air Force agreed with, and we spent over $2 billion
    maturing those technologies before we would set the
    configuration of the spacecraft itself and before we would
    select a single particular industry to go build the spacecraft.
        Those are the technologies that I used the term ``harvest''
    from the TSAT program so that we collect the intellectual
    property that the government has rights to, we collect the
    equipment that the government justly, rightfully owns, and we
    start laying in the plans and the designs on how to apply those
    harvested technologies to both AEHF and WGS.
        So that is in front of us over the next months, and again,
    we will turn to the warfighter to prioritize which new
    capabilities we add when out of that harvested collection of
    intellectual property and piece part technologies from the TSAT
    program.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is AEHF next?
        Mr. Payton. Yes, sir. The first launch is a little bit more
    than a year from now. The fiscal year 2010 budget request
    includes money for the fourth AEHF, and again, our intention is
    to look at continuing that constellation with the properly
    phased upgrades to satisfy the warfighter needs.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General Kehler, what are the lessons
    learned from the cancellation of TSAT?
        General Kehler. Sir, that is a really good question. We had
    begun the TSAT program, I think, doing a lot of things right.
    We were insisting on technology readiness that was high. We
    were dedicated to locking down requirements, et cetera. We
    thought that if TSAT had continued, that we had started the
    program correctly and that we had addressed many of the
    concerns that GAO and others have raised about programs like
    this.
        I think the lesson learned is this is, in part, an issue, I
    believe, about synchronizing capability with need over the
    longer term. We were producing TSAT on a schedule that was
    going to have it ready to provide increased support for
    warfighting systems that are now perhaps taking a little bit
    different direction. So I think it is about synchronizing need.
        At some point, I think Ms. Chaplain is also correct here in
    that you can only add to advanced EHF to a certain point, and
    from there on, we will have to look at a follow-on system to
    advanced EHF. So we will see where this will have to go in the
    future, but certainly for the near term, continuing with
    advanced EHF through number 4 or perhaps beyond that, as we
    look at the next budgets, will be the right thing to do.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral, do you have heartburn as a
    result of TSAT being canceled?
        Admiral Harris. No, sir, we do not have heartburn that TSAT
    was canceled as long as AEHF proceeds on the course that
    Secretary Payton and General Kehler have outlined. Protected
    communication, obviously, is important to the Navy, as it is to
    all the Services; and we are confident, sir, that the Air Force
    will manage AEHF through to fruition.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have heartburn that the Mobile
    User Objective System (MUOS) is 11 months late?
        Admiral Harris. Yes, sir, we do have heartburn with MUOS.
    The Air Force does not have a monopoly on delayed satellite
    systems. MUOS is suffering an 11-month delay right now. I
    believe that we will get through it. There are some technical
    challenges that the builder is experiencing with the critical
    path through the antenna di-plexer. After it goes through that,
    the next phase of MUOS testing will involve the thermal vac
    where a lot of problems could come up; but right now, the
    problem is in the antenna piece. It is mating the legacy UHF
    payload to the new antenna bus, and that is a very significant
    problem.
        The Air Force has offered to help us in that, and we are
    grateful for that offer of assistance. The Assistant Secretary
    of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition has
    determined that he needs to put together a team of national
    experts to help industry to go through this problem that we are
    having with MUOS. We recognize the importance of the satellite
    to the warfighter for the UHF communications, and we are
    grateful for the assistance that the Air Force has offered in
    that regard.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is the Air Force going to pay for it
    for you?
        Admiral Harris. No, sir. That is our program.
        Senator Bill Nelson. How much extra is it going to cost?
        Admiral Harris. Sir, I do not have that information now;
    but as soon as I get it, I will get that back to you as soon as
    we know what it is.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        There is no additional Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) funding
    required in fiscal year 2010. The MUOS Program Manager is currently
    projecting Satellite #1 On-Orbit Capability in 2011. Satellite
    subsystem testing has uncovered technical problems that are being
    addressed by the prime contractor; not surprisingly, this is causing
    delivery date slippage. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
    Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN RD&A) has chartered a
    national team of space experts to assess the program and provide
    recommendations to reduce schedule and technical risks. Following the
    team's report, ASN RD&A will work with OPNAV N6 on a budget to meet
    MUOS requirements in support of PRESBUD 11. Since this assessment is
    ongoing the budget figures are not yet ready. Therefore, this is an
    interim response. Once the new cost is fully understood, I will forward
    the difference for fiscal year 2011 to you.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. We need to know that.
        Admiral Harris. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The legacy UHF satellite is not
    lasting as long as it was supposed to. So now there appears to
    be the possibility of a UHF gap. Tell us about that.
        Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. Sir, if MUOS suffers this 11-
    month delay, the first on-orbit capability will be in February
    2011. The projected 70 percent line from which we would call a
    gap will happen in mid-2010.
        There is a bit of good news here and that is that we are
    using the legacy satellites and our fleet satellites. Every day
    that those satellites do not fall out of the sky or fail, that
    extends that gap point further to the right. I think it is a
    tribute to good satellite design and acquisition practices that
    those satellites, as old as they are, continue to remain in
    orbit and are continuing to produce for us.
        The Navy has also put in place several mitigation
    procedures, including using the digital part of UFO F11 in
    order to increase channel accesses. So that is good news.
        We are optimistic that we will be able to manage through
    this, and if there is a gap, below 70 percent, that will be
    minimized, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Have you thought about putting a UHF
    transponder on a commercial satellite?
        Admiral Harris. Yes, sir, we have. What we have determined
    is that the cost of doing that and the availability of a
    satellite to do that in terms of time--the earliest we could
    put one up would be in the 2012 timeframe, which is after the
    first MUOS should be on orbit.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Are there other contractors involved
    besides Boeing?
        Admiral Harris. For MUOS, the prime is Lockheed Martin.
    What we are trying to do with MUOS, sir, is put the legacy UFO,
    UHF payload onto the MUOS satellite, on the antenna bus. So the
    industry is trying to mate a Boeing legacy payload to a
    Lockheed Martin antenna bus, and that is where the first
    challenge, the critical path challenge, that we are facing is.
        Senator Bill Nelson. We are going to go in just a minute
    over to the Office of Senate Security.
        General James, we had an Iridium satellite collide with a
    Russian satellite. Joint Space Operations Center has the job to
    track and to warn of collisions. DOD submitted to us a
    legislative proposal that would enlarge and expand the program
    to assist commercial entities with additional support. Will
    this expanded program result in additional information being
    provided to the Joint Space Operations Center?
        General James. Sir, the commercial and foreign entity
    program is that to which you refer, and that is a program for
    us to provide data to various users who sign agreements, and
    that data would be the location of your satellite, the possible
    conjunction of your satellite with another object, and then
    anomaly supports if you have a problem with your spacecraft.
        The potential for data coming into the Joint Space
    Operations Center would be that, as a part of those agreements,
    we would look to possibly share data from the commercial
    providers of the world such as INTELSAT, INMARSAT, and SES
    Americom, where they have very accurate knowledge of their
    satellite location and they could then provide that into the
    Joint Space Operations Center freeing up our sensors to go look
    at other satellites from which we do not have very accurate
    information. So from an information-sharing perspective, we are
    looking at some agreements that we would like to foster with
    the commercial entities to gather some of that location
    information on their satellites.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Would the Air Force get reimbursed for
    the services you provide to nongovernmental entities in that
    Joint Space Operations Center?
        General James. Sir, the law allows that. At this point, the
    Department has not elected to charge for those services. I
    believe that will be a policy decision that needs to be made at
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense and above on how we
    implement that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In that operation center, do you not
    need upgrades?
        General James. Yes, sir. As we look at expanding our
    conjunction assessment capability, we are looking at additional
    processing capability requirements, as well as additional
    analyst capability requirements in order to meet some of those
    needs.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In order to avoid these collisions, do
    you think anything else needs to be done?
        General James. Sir, where we are today is that we are
    bringing on that additional processing capacity here in the
    near term. We are adding, through funding provided by Air Force
    Space Command, additional analyst capability, and we are
    planning to be able to do this conjunction assessment for
    roughly 800 satellites, those that can maneuver, by this fall.
    So that is our current plan that we are marching down.
        But in the broader sense, we certainly need to increase our
    capability for space situational awareness, increased sensor
    capability, increased radar capability, increased on-orbit
    sensor capability, because we do have shortfalls today in terms
    of how often we can track objects, how small of an object we
    can track, and how accurately we can track those objects. So
    broadly speaking, we need increased space situational awareness
    capacity.
        General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, may I add just a quick remark
    to this? Space is more crowded than ever. We catalog over
    19,000 objects that are on orbit today. There are most likely
    thousands more that we do not catalog because of their size,
    nuts, bolts, washers, that sort of debris, if you will, that is
    up there, fragments from things that have gone wrong, for
    example. We know that all of them are traveling at extreme
    speed, 17,000 miles an hour roughly, and this problem is
    growing for us.
        We have now an investment road map for how we improve our
    space situational awareness. You will see some of that
    investment request in this budget that comes to you this year.
    That includes not only some improvements in sensors, but there
    is a piece of this investment that will go to General James so
    he can fuse the data that is out there better. To get better,
    faster, it is not about putting more sensors out, although we
    will do some of that. It is about using the sensors we have
    more effectively. We have plans in place to do that that will
    be included in this investment plan that you see from us this
    year.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you all for your public service.
    We are grateful. This is highly technical stuff that we are
    getting into. We are going to get several layers deeper now. So
    the subcommittee will stand in recess and we will reconvene
    over in the Office of Senate Security area. Thank you. We are
    adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Udall

                            AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND

        1. Senator Udall. General Kehler, is there a need for a strategy to
    rapidly develop and deliver cyber capabilities for the Air Force
    missions?
        General Kehler. Yes, there is such a need. The cyber domain is
    characterized by a rate of change that is orders of magnitude faster
    than the other domains of military operations. The cyberspace threats
    are constantly changing and require rapid response in order to blunt
    attacks and secure our ability to fight in air, space, and cyberspace.
    Every day, Air Force systems are threatened from a variety of sources.
    It is essential that we have effective capabilities to protect
    ourselves and respond. Our abilities in this area are limited at this
    time and enhancements are underway. We are developing a strategy, in
    conjunction with the acquisition community, to strengthen and improve
    our capabilities in the burgeoning cyber arena.

        2. Senator Udall. General Kehler, what is Air Force Space Command's
    plan for rapidly developing and delivering cyber capabilities?
        General Kehler. Our plan is to quickly improve upon the
    capabilities and processes we currently have and define new ones where
    needed. We will do this by developing improved processes for rapid
    decisionmaking, making our capability delivery processes more
    responsive, better resourcing the real-time response capabilities we
    already have, and bringing in more cyber smart people and developing
    them as cyber warriors. We want to fully leverage the finest expertise
    of U.S. industry, academia, and national laboratories, as well as our
    sister Services and coalition partners.
        Air Force Space Command is taking on the cyber mission for the Air
    Force, and the ensuing standup of 24AF, will enable development of
    improved processes for rapid decisionmaking. The dispersed Air Force
    cyber community will be unified under a single major command, providing
    efficient command and control of cyber. We must be able to operate
    faster than our adversaries' decision processes.
        We need to strengthen our teaming relationships with key
    organizations by closely integrating intelligence, operations,
    requirements, acquisition, and testing. We need to streamline processes
    to eliminate existing seams in the rapid prototyping development and
    test environment.
        Improved processes are not the total solution. The United States
    has some of the finest cyberspace minds in the world, and the Air Force
    has tremendously bright military personnel, civilians, and contractors
    executing the Air Force missions in cyberspace today. We intend to
    continue to recruit America's best and brightest, and develop them into
    technically skilled cyber warriors. We will develop within them the
    operational arts necessary to ensure mission dominance in the cyber
    domain. Finally, we will provide them the world-class tools and
    networks necessary to successfully execute their missions.

        [Whereupon, at 3:07 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                                      2010

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3, 2009

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                           STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m. in
    room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill
    Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson, Sessions,
    and Vitter.
        Majority staff member present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel.
        Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
    professional staff member.
        Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Breon N.
    Wells.
        Committee members' assistants present: Ryan Ferris,
    assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Rob Soofer, assistant to
    Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions;
    Matthew R. Rimkunas, assistant to Senator Graham; and Michael
    T. Wong, assistant to Senator Vitter.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Bill Nelson. Good afternoon. We're going to welcome
    Tom D'Agostino, the Administrator of the National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA), and General Donald Alston, Air
    Force Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear
    Integration, General Floyd Carpenter, Commander of the 8th Air
    Force, and Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson, Director of the Navy
    Strategic Systems Programs. It's a pleasure to have you.
        My opening statement will be put in the record, and when
    Senator Vitter arrives, his will, as well, and we'll ask him if
    he would like to make any comments.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Bill Nelson follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator Bill Nelson

        We welcome our witnesses this afternoon. Today we have with us Tom
    D'Agostino, the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration; Major General Donald Alston Assistant Air Force Chief
    of Staff, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration; Major General
    Floyd Carpenter, Commander, 8th Air Force; and Rear Admiral Stephen
    Johnson, Director of Navy Strategic Systems Programs. It is a pleasure
    to have you all here.
        I note that this is the last subcommittee hearing prior the markup
    of the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2010, which
    will occur the week of June 22.
        We have a number of topics to cover including the actions taken by
    the Air Force to improve its management of nuclear weapons and the
    nuclear weapons enterprise; long-range bomber and ballistic missile
    programs and the programs at the National Nuclear Security
    Administration. An overarching question and one that in many ways was a
    root cause of the problems that the Air Force had in the fall of 2007
    is the need to maintain rigor in the management of all things nuclear
    while reducing the role of nuclear weapons in national security
    strategy. We are no longer in the Cold War but the care with which
    nuclear weapons are managed and maintained can never be diminished. In
    many ways a smaller stockpile will be more difficult to maintain and
    ensure that it remains safe, secure, and reliable.

        [The prepared statement of Senator David Vitter follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Senator David Vitter

        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our
    witnesses. This is my first hearing as ranking member of the Strategic
    Forces Subcommittee and I look forward to working with you on the many
    important issues under this subcommittee's jurisdiction.
        The administration's fiscal year 2010 budget provided a significant
    funding increase for Defense-wide, ``white space'' programs. This
    year's request at about $11.1 billion--$9.2 billion of which is for Air
    Force space programs represents a $412 million increase over fiscal
    year 2009 appropriated levels. I look forward to hearing from our
    witnesses today how this money will be spent wisely and what will be
    done to guarantee that the programs we fund in fiscal year 2010 break
    away from past practices of cost overruns and long delays.
        The Government Accountability Office (GAO), which I am pleased is
    here today to testify, has for some time highlighted a number of
    systemic problems associated with our major space acquisition programs.
    GAO has found that because the Department of Defense (DOD) starts more
    weapon programs that it can afford--competition for dollars lead to low
    cost estimation and unrealistic scheduling. GAO notes that DOD tends to
    start many of its space programs before it has a sound understanding
    and the appropriate assurance that the technologies it seeks are
    achievable within available funding. As a result of this broken
    acquisition process, the Department all too frequently puts itself in a
    bind with respect to supporting the warfighters needs. Not only are we
    constantly underestimating cost, but according to GAO, delays in
    schedule are increasing the overall risk for capability gaps in areas
    such as positioning, navigation, and timing; missile warning; and
    weather monitoring.
        Under the leadership of Chairman Levin and Ranking Member McCain,
    this committee broadly recognized those problems in developing the
    ``Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.'' That bill emphasizes
    starting major weapons systems off right by having them obtain reliable
    and independent cost estimates and subjecting them to rigorous
    developmental testing and systems engineering early in their
    acquisition cycle. In so doing, the bill (which will likely be signed
    into law by the President within the next few days) intends to ensure
    that programs not proceed from one stage of the acquisition cycle to
    the next until they have achieved the maturity to clearly lower the
    risk of cost growth and schedule slippage. I look forward to hearing
    from our witnesses how they believe the bill will help manage
    technology and integration risk in DOD military space programs.
        I am encouraged by Secretary Gates' recommendation to cancel the
    Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT) program, an example of
    an overly ambitious project, lacking a meaningful technology, schedule,
    and funding path. I am also pleased to hear that the Department will
    not let the $3.3 billion already invested in TSAT go to waste. With the
    recommendation to eliminate TSAT and purchase two additional Advanced
    Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellites, it is clear that the
    Department recognizes that smaller, more incremental steps forward, are
    far less risky ventures and are a significantly more responsible path
    forward with respect to the taxpayer's money. I am encouraged that the
    Department does not plan to let our hefty investment in TSAT go to
    waste and does plan to harvest some of TSAT's more successful research
    and development efforts. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
    more about the plan to address our satellite communications needs, how
    we will utilize TSAT technologies on the procurement of already proven
    and technologically mature systems, and how TSAT can be a lesson moving
    forward for our future space acquisition endeavors.
        A recent Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) report charted by DOD
    to address congressional concerns with the leadership, management, and
    organization for National Security Space found that ``significant
    improvements are imperative . . . in order to maintain U.S. space
    preeminence and advert the loss of the U.S. competitive national
    security advantage.'' The report asserts that ``no one's in charge,''
    leadership is fragmented with respect to strategy, budgets,
    requirements, and acquisition and recommends that the President
    establish and lead the execution of a national space strategy. The
    report recommends a top-to-bottom overhaul and I look forward to
    hearing from the witnesses what steps are being taken to address the
    report's recommendations.
        I recognize that space acquisitions are inherently risky and are
    like no other venture DOD undertakes. The challenges are many and the
    unknown and need for pushing the technology envelope is great. However,
    we must do a better job at managing the risk and spending the
    taxpayers' money wisely. Nonetheless, I look forward to hearing from
    the witnesses what is being done to address the space acquisition
    shortcomings, if you believe the condition is getting better, and what
    more needs to happen within the Department.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Gentlemen, we will put all of your
    opening statements in the record, so the record will be
    complete, and we'll get right into it.

    STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
         NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        [The prepared statement of Mr. D'Agostino follows:]

                   Prepared Statement by Thomas P. D'Agostino

        Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our vision for the
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). My remarks today focus
    on the fiscal year 2010 President's budget request. The budget
    requested today will allow the NNSA to continue to achieve the mission
    expected of it by the President, Congress, and the American people.
        In a recent trip to Prague, President Obama outlined his vision of
    a world without nuclear weapons. To this end, the United States will
    take concrete steps towards achieving such a world by reducing the role
    of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and urging others
    to do the same. Until that ultimate goal is achieved, however, the
    United States will maintain nuclear forces sufficient to deter any
    adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies. To support this
    vision, the NNSA will continue to:

             Ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear
            weapons stockpile, even if that stockpile is reduced under a
            Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Follow-On Treaty.
             Reduce the threat to the United States posed by the
            proliferation of nuclear weapons, and related nuclear materials
            and expertise.
             Provide safe, reliable, militarily-effective
            propulsion systems to the U.S. Navy.

        By pursuing its mission to achieve these ends, and by providing our
    unique knowledge and support to our partners in national security, the
    NNSA will continue to meet its current statutory responsibilities while
    supporting the long-term goal of a world free from the threat of
    nuclear weapons.
        While the President's long-term objectives are clear, the role of
    the nuclear weapons stockpile and America's deterrence policy are being
    reviewed as part of the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Efforts
    are underway in the NPR to establish the size and composition of the
    future stockpile and the means for managing geopolitical or technical
    risk--NNSA is fully engaged in these activities. Its role is to provide
    the technical and scientific input to inform policy decisions, and then
    to enable the implementation of the decisions.
        NNSA is advancing our knowledge of the physical; chemical, and
    materials processes that govern nuclear weapons operation and is
    applying that knowledge in extending the life of existing weapons
    systems. We have recently completed construction of the National
    Ignition Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to
    explore weapons-critical regimes of high temperature and pressure and
    will begin our first ignition campaign to improve our scientific
    understanding of phenomena that could previously only be explored
    theoretically or in full-scale nuclear testing. The NNSA is also
    conducting warhead Life Extension Programs to ensure that our country
    remains secure without the production of new fissile materials, and
    without conducting underground nuclear tests. On the basis of the most
    recent assessment by the directors of our national nuclear weapon
    laboratories, today's nuclear stockpile remains safe, reliable, and
    secure. At the same time, we are concerned about increasing challenges
    in maintaining, for the long term, the safety and reliability of the
    aging, finely-tuned warheads that were produced in the 1970s and 1980s
    and are well past their original planned service life.
        I am committed to continuing to transform our national laboratories
    and production plants into a smaller and more cost-effective Nuclear
    Security Enterprise. However, I am mindful that our design laboratories
    and production facilities are national assets that support a large
    number of defense, security, and intelligence activities. As the role
    of nuclear weapons in our Nation's defense evolves and the threats to
    national security continue to grow, the focus of this enterprise must
    also change and place its tremendous intellectual capacity and unique
    facilities in the service of addressing other challenges related to
    national defense. We are taking steps to move in this direction,
    including functioning as a national science, technology, and systems
    engineering resource to other agencies with national security
    responsibilities.
        The NNSA fiscal year 2010 congressional budget request will allow
    continued progress in obtaining the essential goals I have outlined. It
    will allow us to:

             Continue transforming into a Nuclear Security
            Enterprise by:

                     Involving the next generation of our Nation's
                    scientific, engineering, and technical professionals in
                    the broad sweep of technical challenges;
                     Operating the National Ignition Facility,
                    allowing the use of innovative technology to provide
                    answers to important scientific questions;
                     Shrinking the Cold War complex by preparing
                    buildings for decommissioning and decontamination, and
                    replacing these antiquated facilities with modern and
                    efficient facilities; as well as disposing of excess
                    real property through demolition, transfer and the
                    preparation of process-contaminated facilities for
                    transfer to the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of
                    Environmental Management (EM) for final disposition ;
                     Initiating a Site Stewardship program to
                    ensure that NNSA increases the use of renewable and
                    efficient energy, and reduces the number of locations
                    with security Category I/II Special Nuclear Materials,
                    including the removal of these materials from the
                    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by the end of
                    2012, and
                     Reducing security, safety, and environmental
                    risks by consolidating and disposing of excess nuclear
                    materials wherever possible.

             Support the development and implementation of arms
            control, nonproliferation, and civil nuclear energy agreements
            by:

                     Providing technical and policy support to U.S.
                    delegations negotiating arms control, nonproliferation,
                    and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation agreements;
                     Developing the technologies and approaches
                    needed to verify compliance with negotiated treaties
                    and agreements, and
                     Providing training and technical support to
                    the International Atomic Energy Agency.

             Support U.S. commitments through construction of the
            Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility and Waste Solidification
            Building to provide a disposition pathway for excess U.S.
            fissile materials, and to help Russia implement its reciprocal
            commitments.
             Continue our successful programs to secure and/or
            eliminate vulnerable nuclear and radioactive material in other
            countries, enhance nuclear/radiological material detection
            capabilities at borders, airports, and seaports, and strengthen
            nonproliferation practices and standards worldwide.
             Embark on the design and development of an advanced
            reactor core and propulsion plant supporting the timely
            replacement of the Ohio class submarine.
             Overhaul of the land-based prototype reactor plant
            used to test advanced materials and techniques in a realistic
            operating environment prior to their inclusion in propulsion
            plants.
             Honor the commitments made to those who won the Cold
            War by ensuring their pensions are secure in times of financial
            uncertainty.

        Today, I'd like to testify on our efforts in Weapons Activities,
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Naval Reactors.

                          WEAPONS ACTIVITIES OVERVIEW

        The NNSA will ensure that our nuclear stockpile remains safe,
    secure and effective to deter any adversary, and provide a defense
    umbrella to our allies. At the same time, NNSA will continue to pursue
    a modern more flexible Nuclear Security Enterprise that is
    significantly smaller than the Cold War complex, but is able to address
    a variety of stockpile scenarios.
        As I have committed to you previously, NNSA continues to retire and
    dismantle nuclear weapons. By 2012 our stockpile will be one-quarter of
    the size it was at the end of the Cold War. As the United States
    prepares for the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation
    Treaty, this fact alone should emphasize the commitment we make to both
    our Nation and to the world.
        As a full partner in the NPR, the NNSA is working with the
    Departments of Defense and State to establish the plans, policies, and
    programs that will govern the future posture of our nuclear forces and
    supporting infrastructure. The recently issued report of the Bipartisan
    Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States
    will help guide these efforts. These reviews will assist the U.S.
    Congress and the administration in clearly defining our future
    direction.
        As the NPR proceeds, NNSA continues to carry out a number of
    activities in support of the stockpile including warhead surveillance,
    assessment, replacement of limited life components in existing weapon
    systems, and dismantlements. We are also continuing the W76 Life
    Extension Program and a feasibility study with the Air Force for a Life
    Extension Program for some models of the B61 gravity bomb. There are
    also activities planned in the six campaigns and the studies needed for
    Annual Assessment of the stockpile.
        The NNSA will also continue transforming the Nuclear Security
    Enterprise into a modern, smaller, and more flexible complex. The NNSA
    inherited a system of laboratories and production plants designed to
    produce large volumes of weapons and designs needed to counter Soviet
    aggression. We have initiated a major effort to right-size the
    enterprise to meet the new, anticipated requirements. The NNSA is
    consolidating Category I and II Special Nuclear Materials; removing
    these items from selected sites and providing safe, secure storage for
    this material.
        In fiscal year 2010, we will be reducing our infrastructure
    footprint through the deactivation and decommissioning of buildings
    such as buildings 9206 and 9201 at Y-12. We will also plan for the
    future infrastructure through continuing design of the Uranium
    Processing Facility at Y-12, the Pit Disassembly and Conversion
    Facility at the Savannah River Site, and the Chemistry and Metallurgy
    Research Replacement Facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory,
    and begin the process of planning for an orderly migration of missions
    to a smaller and more flexible facility at the Kansas City Plant.
        The NNSA has received assistance in our ability to alter our
    infrastructure in the form of an increase in the General Plant Projects
    limit. We are pleased with the decision to increase the ceiling on
    General Plant Projects from $5 million to $10 million. We believe that
    this aids in the maintenance and repair of the enduring enterprise.
    Following on this increase, the NNSA is submitting a legislative
    proposal to similarly increase the design cost limit for these
    construction projects from $600,000 to $1,500,000. We seek your support
    for the proposal.
        But while NNSA is reducing its footprint, and while the total
    number of warheads in the stockpile continues to decline, there are
    capabilities that must be preserved. Not only are these capabilities
    needed to support the maintenance of any stockpile, but they are also
    needed to support the Nuclear Security Enterprise's initiatives in
    nonproliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, nuclear forensics, and
    nuclear incident response. It's important to note that the enterprise
    does not scale linearly with the size of the stockpile; and the need
    for baseline functional capabilities is not eliminated with cessation
    of research into new designs and the cessation of any production of new
    weapons systems. These capabilities are needed whether we have a few
    warheads, or a few thousand.
        Although NNSA did not receive any funds directly from the American
    Recovery and Reinvestment Act, we are assisting other parts of the
    Department in implementing their plans for stimulus work at the NNSA
    sites and stand ready to do more.
        As NNSA prepares for the future, we must focus on the retention of
    our scientific, technical, and engineering personnel throughout the
    complex. Without experienced scientific, technical, and engineering
    personnel, NNSA cannot succeed at its mission. Throughout the cold war
    we were able to attract the Nation's brightest scientists, engineers,
    and technical professionals by providing challenges, facilities, and
    opportunities that were unique, were on the forefront of science, and
    that allowed them to put their talents to work to serve their country.
    Today we are transitioning our emphasis to a broader nuclear security
    mission, but our need to attract the best scientists, engineers and
    technical professionals remains. By developing new scientific tools
    such as the National Ignition Facility, new challenges such as the
    detection of smuggled uranium and plutonium, and the modernization of
    facilities such as the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
    Facility, we can continue to attract bright technical minds who wish to
    serve their country. We believe that our response to the spectrum of
    threats to national security is not only the right steps for us to take
    to make the Nation more secure, but also will provide a significant set
    of technical areas that will motivate young scientists to join us in
    our mission.
        The challenges are huge and meeting them calls upon both basic
    science and applied technology. Approximately 70 years ago, Hans Bethe
    advanced the state of science with his critical work explaining the
    physical processes governing the life cycles of stars. Today the
    National Ignition Facility (NIF) stands on the threshold of producing
    stellar conditions in the laboratory. By moving the enterprise forward
    in advancing the boundaries of science, we will continue to attract our
    Nation's brightest minds to our scientific endeavors. In fiscal year
    2009, two significant technological milestones were achieved; crossing
    the one mega joule threshold with NIF and the one petaflop threshold in
    the Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign.

                   DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION OVERVIEW

        As part of the President's comprehensive strategy to address the
    international nuclear threat, the President also called for
    strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, accelerating our
    efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear materials around the world, and
    increasing our work to detect, deter, and eliminate illicit trafficking
    of nuclear materials. The NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise is actively
    engaged in these and other nonproliferation missions and will provide
    the technical expertise to ensure they are successful.
        The movement of funding for the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication
    Facility and the Waste Solidification Building into the Fissile
    Materials Disposition budget is the largest change in the fiscal year
    2010 Congressional Budget for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program.
    These critical facilities provide the nonproliferation programs a
    disposition pathway for at least 34 metric tons of surplus U.S. weapons
    grade plutonium. I'm pleased to report that the U.S. and Russia have
    agreed on a revised Russian program to dispose of Russia's 34 metric
    tons of their surplus weapons plutonium. These changes will be codified
    in a Protocol that will amend the 2000 U.S.-Russian Plutonium
    Management and Disposition Agreement, and we expect to sign the
    Protocol this summer. In light of President Obama's recent statements
    in Prague and London, I am particularly pleased that the U.S. and
    Russian plutonium disposition programs are coming together at this
    time. As a result of these efforts, the U.S. and Russia will ultimately
    dispose of enough weapons plutonium for at least 17,000 nuclear
    weapons.
        I should note also that with this budget request, we are submitting
    our last request for funding to eliminate the production of weapons-
    grade plutonium production in Russia by December 2010, through the
    shutdown of Russia's last weapons-grade plutonium production reactor in
    Zheleznogorsk.
        The NNSA directly supports President Obama's goal to accelerate
    efforts to secure all vulnerable nuclear material from around the world
    within 4 years, including the expansion and acceleration of our
    existing efforts. The NNSA is the key agency supporting the
    administration's goal of minimizing the use of highly-enriched uranium
    (HEU) in the civil nuclear sector through our program to shutdown
    entirely or convert HEU fueled research reactors to the use of low-
    enriched uranium fuel. In fiscal year 2010, we will direct significant
    funding to the Global Threat Reduction Initiative mission to eliminate
    and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials located at
    civilian sites worldwide.
        In fiscal year 2010, we will also improve the physical security of
    nuclear material, as well as facilitate the development and
    implementation of material control and accountability procedures, and
    train personnel, to protect a total of 73 nuclear sites throughout
    Russia and the former Soviet republics. The NNSA will fulfill the
    administration's goal of securing nuclear weapons-usable material by
    ensuring that the material possessed by the Russian Navy, the Russian
    Ministry of Defense, Rosatom and Russian civilian sites is secured.
        But improving the security of weapons-usable material at its source
    is only the start. We must also develop a Second Line of Defense in
    order to anticipate the possibility that nuclear weapons-usable
    material could be smuggled out and transported across international
    borders. In fact, we know that illicit trafficking in nuclear and other
    radioactive materials continues, especially in Eastern Europe, the
    Caucasus, and Central Asia. In response to the President's charge to do
    more to combat nuclear trafficking, we will install additional
    radiation detection equipment at 42 foreign sites across Europe, Asia,
    and North America, and provide detection equipment in 15 additional
    ports where cargo is loaded for shipment to the U.S.
        This work started several years ago. Technology advances and
    foreign personnel turnover have occurred since NNSA first began
    securing sites and borders in foreign countries. Funds will be used not
    only to perform new installations and train personnel at new sites, but
    will also be used to upgrade older equipment at existing sites, and to
    provide refresher training to foreign security professionals.
        Additionally, in fiscal year 2010, NNSA will expand and accelerate
    its Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), adding $15 million to
    revitalize the U.S. technical and human capital base necessary to
    strengthen the international safeguards system and the International
    Atomic Energy Agency, in line with President Obama's charge in Prague.
    The NGSI complements related NNSA priorities to reduce proliferation
    risks associated with growing international interest in the use of
    nuclear power; to expand export control training and outreach; to
    develop and implement reliable fuel services as an alternative to the
    further spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities; and--
    consistent with the President's call for progress towards a world
    without nuclear weapons--to provide technical support for negotiations
    of the START follow-on agreement, Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
    Treaty, and a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.

                            NAVAL REACTORS OVERVIEW

        The NNSA also contributes to national security through the Naval
    Reactors Program. This program ensures that the nuclear propulsion
    plants aboard our Navy's warships remain safe and reliable for their
    complete service lives. Over 40 percent of the Navy's major combatants
    are nuclear-powered. All of the Nation's aircraft carriers, attack
    submarines, guided missile submarines, and ballistic missile submarines
    enjoy the significant operational advantage afforded by nuclear power,
    including speed, endurance, and enhanced combat payload. Through NNSAs
    efforts, nuclear-powered warships are on station where American
    interests are threatened, and ready to conduct sustained combat
    operations.
        For over 60 years, the Naval Reactors program has had complete
    responsibility for all aspects of Naval Nuclear Propulsion. The Naval
    Nuclear Propulsion Program currently supports 82 active nuclear-powered
    warships and 103 operating reactors. This represents eight propulsion
    plant designs, in seven classes of ships, as well as a training
    platform.
        Naval Reactors funding supports safe and reliable operation of the
    Nation's Nuclear Fleet. This includes providing rigorous oversight,
    analysis of plant performance and conditions, as well as addressing
    emergent operational issues and technology obsolescence for 71
    submarines, 11 aircraft carriers, and 4 research and development and
    training platforms. This funding also supports new plant design
    projects (i.e., reactor plant for the Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft
    carrier and alternative lower-cost core for Virginia-class submarines),
    as well as ensuring proper storage of naval spent nuclear fuel, prudent
    recapitalization of aging facilities, and remediation of environmental
    liabilities.
        The Ohio-class SSBNs, which are the most survivable leg of the U.S.
    Strategic Forces, are approaching the end of their service lives. The
    Navy recently completed studies for a follow-on replacement to the
    Ohio-class and is funding the commencement of design work in fiscal
    year 2010. NNSA funding in fiscal year 2010 supports reactor core and
    propulsion plant design and development efforts to support this
    replacement.
        Since 1978, the land-based prototype reactor plant (S8G) has
    provided an essential capability to test required changes or
    improvements to components and systems prior to installation in
    operational ships. The prototype has also provided required, high-
    quality training for new sailors preparing to operate the Nation's
    nuclear-powered vessels. This land-based prototype will run out of fuel
    and require a refueling overhaul starting in 2018. This overhaul and
    the resultant opportunity to test advanced materials and manufacturing
    techniques in a caustic operating environment will significantly
    mitigate risk in the Ohio Replacement reactor plant design. To support
    the refueling overhaul schedule, concept studies and systems design and
    development efforts will begin in 2010.
        The Expended Core Facility, located at the Naval Reactors Facility
    on the Idaho National Laboratory, is the central location for Naval
    spent nuclear fuel receipt, inspection, dissection, packaging for dry
    storage, and temporary storage, as well as detailed examination of
    spent cores and irradiation specimens. Continuous, efficient operation
    of this facility is vital to ensure the United States can support fuel
    handling operations in our shipyards conducting construction, repair,
    and restoration of nuclear ships. The existing facility and related
    infrastructure is over 50 years old and requires recapitalization. The
    mission need for recapitalizing this capability has been approved and
    conceptual design efforts begin in 2010.
        The Program continues to explore and develop potentially advanced
    technologies that could deliver a compellingly better energy source for
    nuclear ships. For example, using a supercritical carbon dioxide energy
    conversion as a replacement for the traditional steam cycle is
    envisioned to be significantly smaller for the same power output,
    simpler, more automated, and more affordable. Leveraging existing
    university, industry, and Nuclear Security Enterprise scientific and
    engineering work in this technology, conceptual development and small-
    scale testing is underway to support eventual megawatt-scale testing
    and prototyping.
        Acquisition of a new surface combatant (i.e., cruiser) in support
    of new ballistic missile defense and anti-air warfare mission
    requirements are currently under evaluation by the Navy. Based on these
    mission requirements, this new ship will potentially require higher
    energy capacity and output than is currently available from traditional
    fossil fueled power plants. Further, the National Defense Authorization
    Act (NDAA) for 2008 authorizes the Navy to construct all future major
    combatant vessels with integrated nuclear power systems unless this
    requirement is waived by the Secretary of Defense. The Navy is
    currently analyzing alternative shipboard systems that will determine
    final power plant requirements. Should the Navy decide to pursue a
    nuclear-powered cruiser in its current long-range shipbuilding plan,
    DOE-cognizant reactor core and propulsion plant design and development
    will be required.
        The value of nuclear power for naval propulsion is well recognized
    and the demand for its inherent capabilities remains strong. By taking
    every opportunity for economies in our work and business practices, we
    have made a concerted effort to meet the Navy's demand for new
    propulsion plant designs while assuring the safe and reliable operation
    and maintenance of the existing fleet. However, the need to deal with a
    formidable collection of new challenges coupled with the Program's
    aging infrastructure and environmental legacies requires a fortified
    level of resource commitment.

    STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. C. DONALD ALSTON, USAF, ASSISTANT CHIEF
         OF STAFF, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION

        [The prepared statement of Major General Alston follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. C. Donald Alston, USAF

                                  INTRODUCTION

        Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, distinguished members of
    the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss Air Force
    strategic programs.
        In the Executive Summary of the Final Report of the Congressional
    Commission of the Strategic Posture of the United States, the
    commission stated: ``In addressing the challenges of nuclear security
    for the decades ahead, the United States must pursue a comprehensive
    strategy. So long as nuclear dangers remain, it must have a strong
    deterrent that is effective in meeting its security needs and those of
    its allies.''
        The Air Force contributes to effective deterrence by operating,
    maintaining, securing, and sustaining intercontinental ballistic
    missiles (ICBMs), dual-role bombers and dual-capable fighter aircraft.
    Although the numbers of systems are dramatically smaller than at the
    height of the Cold War, the Air Force provides national leadership with
    the most responsive, flexible and visible nuclear deterrence
    capability.
        Strategic deterrence is in an airman's DNA; we were born with this
    mission in 1947. For the past 61 years, we have successfully provided
    our Nation and our allies diverse and effective nuclear deterrence
    capabilities. Today, the international security environment is more
    complex than during the Cold War, with more nations in possession of
    nuclear weapons and non-state actors in pursuit of weapons of mass
    destruction.
        Our continued ability to provide a safe, secure, reliable, and
    credible nuclear deterrence capability underpins our national defense,
    a sober responsibility that the Air Force, with responsibility for two
    legs of the traditional TRIAD, executes with skill and commitment on a
    consistent basis.
        The Air Force depends on a nuclear enterprise that involves
    thousands of professionals to include dedicated airmen operating,
    securing, maintaining and sustaining our operational forces; our
    partners in the industrial base; the exceptional capability at the
    national laboratories; and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization
    partners.
        The airmen and civilians involved in the nuclear mission area are
    uniquely qualified to execute the significant responsibilities
    associated with nuclear weapons and are known for their discipline,
    rigor, precision and reliability. Thousands are certified under the
    Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) and many others have critical
    duties supporting PRP. All our nuclear units across five different
    major commands undergo rigorous and unforgiving Nuclear Surety
    Inspections with necessarily high standards that demand consistent
    precision and reliability. It's a tough business, but the stakes are
    too high for it to be any other way
        Over this past year, the Air Force made a series of key decisions
    to address systemic weaknesses in its nuclear mission area. The US Air
    Force Posture Statement 2009 states: ``Through a back-to-basics
    approach, the Air Force is re-emphasizing accountability, compliance,
    and precision in the nuclear enterprise. We are reorganizing our
    nuclear forces in a manner that reduces fragmentation of authority and
    establishes clear chains of supervision for nuclear sustainment,
    surety, and operations. These changes include: (1) consolidating all
    nuclear sustainment matters under the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center;
    (2) establishing a new Air Staff nuclear directorate responsible for
    policy oversight and integration of our nuclear enterprise activities;
    and (3) standing up Air Force Global Strike Command, which is already
    operating in a provisional status at an interim location. Global Strike
    Command will consolidate Air Force ICBMs and nuclear-capable bombers
    under a single command, and is on track to activate later this year.''
        The basis for these three key organizational decisions, as well as
    additional institutional direction can be found in the nuclear roadmap
    published last fall, ``Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear
    Enterprise.'' The roadmap represents a comprehensive approach to
    address root causes of documented deficiencies to ensure we are
    aggressively working to reclaim our legacy of excellence in the nuclear
    mission area. The roadmap-related efforts well underway in the Air
    Force to reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise can be categorized into
    six broad strategic objectives: (1) Develop adequate nuclear-related
    expertise and properly man the enterprise: right experience, right job;
    (2) Implement a process for ensuring sustained advocacy, focus, and
    commitment; (3) Establish clear lines of authority; (4) Implement a
    disciplined, comprehensive enterprise system-of-systems methodology to
    ensure day-to-day sustainment excellence; (5) Implement processes to
    uncover, analyze, address, and review systemic weaknesses; and (6)
    Sufficiently invest in the nuclear deterrence mission area. By
    accomplishing these objectives, we will continue to build on the
    confidence that our Nation and allies have in our commitment to this
    critical mission.
        Our first strategic objective, to improve the professional
    development of our nuclear experts, is a multi-year effort involving
    education, training, and the assignment process.
        All professional military education courses, both officer and
    enlisted, have been reviewed and modifications are underway to ensure
    the appropriate level of content regarding the nuclear mission area.
    Additionally, Air Force nuclear doctrine has been updated to include a
    greater focus on deterrence.
        It is vital to assign the best qualified people to key positions.
    We are aligning our training, education, and career force development
    with significant work completed by our personnel directorate on the Air
    Staff in conjunction with the Air Force Personnel Center in San
    Antonio, TX; truly an ongoing effort that must be continually re-
    evaluated with the ultimate goal is to ensure the right expertise is
    matched to the right job. Also, the Air Force has identified billets
    both inside the AF and across joint and interagency positions that
    require key nuclear expertise, and these authorizations will be given
    priority for filling. Additionally, nuclear experience identifiers are
    being added to personnel records to ensure we are able to track
    individual experience levels, which aides our efforts to properly
    develop our people to take on positions of greater responsibility in
    the future.
        We are achieving our second strategic objective--to implement a
    process for ensuring sustained advocacy, focus, and commitment for the
    nuclear enterprise--with a series of process changes. The internal AF
    resourcing process has been changed to now include a new Nuclear
    Operations Panel, whose role is to ensure a thorough assessment of
    nuclear funding requirements. The Air Force Strategic Plan, a key
    planning document to link future capabilities to the programming
    process, established reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise is the
    number 1 priority of the Air Force. Additionally, the Secretary of the
    Air Force and the Chief of staff, at their initiative, established and
    co-chair the Nuclear Oversight Board, composed principally of the
    nuclear Major Command Commanders, to ensure proper focus and advocacy
    is maintained Air Force-wide.
        To effectively manage the nuclear enterprise, it is necessary to
    ensure our third objective is achieved, establishing clear lines of
    authority. Discussed earlier, these changes include: (1) consolidating
    all nuclear sustainment matters under the Air Force Nuclear Weapons
    Center; (2) establishing a new Air Staff nuclear directorate
    responsible for policy oversight and integration of our nuclear
    enterprise activities; and (3) standing up Air Force Global Strike
    Command.
        A significant force-wide challenge is encompassed in the fourth
    objective, implementing a disciplined, comprehensive system-of-systems
    methodology to ensure day-to-day sustainment excellence. A large
    component of this effort is being achieved by consolidating our nuclear
    sustainment activities under the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. The
    Center is working in conjunction with our Air Staff maintenance and
    logistics experts on a comprehensive positive inventory control
    methodology and a fusion center for maintaining continuous oversight of
    nuclear weapons related material.
        Critical to our day-to-day excellence in the nuclear mission area
    is our fifth objective, implementing processes to uncover, analyze,
    address and review systemic weaknesses throughout the nuclear
    enterprise. Regardless of the size or structure of our nuclear force,
    every action by every airman must be executed with precision and
    reliability. The Air Force is rebuilding a nuclear culture with a
    robust self-assessment and inspection process in order to effectively
    uncover, analyze, and address systemic weaknesses within its nuclear
    enterprise. The Air Force has developed standardized training,
    qualification, and certification requirements for nuclear inspection
    team members. Where appropriate, common checklists will be used across
    all nuclear commands. When significant deficiencies are noted, common
    root cause analysis techniques are implemented to fix the problem and
    improve related processes. Today, every AF Nuclear Surety Inspection
    (NSI) is performed under the oversight of the Air Force Inspection
    Agency. Also, a core team of inspectors will be attached to each MAJCOM
    NSI team to ensure consistency across all MAJCOMs. In addition to the
    increased depth of inspections, ``no-advanced-notice'' inspections are
    now occurring across nuclear major commands.
        The Air Force has taken aggressive actions to achieve our sixth
    objective, sufficiently investing in the nuclear deterrence mission
    area, an area that numerous studies have identified as being
    significantly under-resourced. Ensuring continued reliability and
    credibility of our nuclear systems requires a sustained commitment to
    funding weapons and platforms while simultaneously investing in a
    credible deterrent capability for the future. We have already
    programmed resources to address many of the recommendations provided by
    the various assessments of the nuclear enterprise and continue to focus
    and prioritize future investments.
        Expanding upon our sixth objective, the fiscal year 2010 PB
    represents significant progress toward addressing many issues and
    recommendations made by numerous internal and external reviews and
    investigations. This includes funding and investment to bring all 76 B-
    52s in our inventory to a common configuration with updated
    communications and flight systems making all aircraft capable of
    nuclear and conventional missions. We are revitalizing our
    intercontinental ballistic missile force, the Minuteman III, with
    additional resources for sustainment, aging and surveillance. We have
    funded improvements to the rural missile complex gravel roads to bring
    them up to standards which ensure safe transport of our critical
    systems to and from base, as well as our most precious asset, our
    airmen, who travel thousands of miles on these roads every day. Other
    initiatives include the Air Force study of the B61 Life Extension
    Program that will look at options to extend the service life of the
    oldest weapon in our inventory. Finally, we are introducing a program
    to replace our Vietnam-era helicopters for missile field complex
    security operations with an airframe that will provide required lift
    capacity, speed and range.
        Additionally, with your support, we requested and received
    permission to reprogram over $100 million to address immediate and
    achievable needs to the nuclear enterprise in fiscal year 2009. With
    these funds, we were able to accelerate procurement of armored security
    vehicles for the missile complexes and weapons storage areas, complete
    overdue electromagnetic pulse protection work on critical
    infrastructures, upgrade weapons security systems in Europe, and
    develop software that will enable our Nuclear Weapons Center to track
    all Nuclear Weapons Related Material from cradle to grave.

                                    CLOSING

        According to the Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on
    DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, ``the strategic role of nuclear
    capability is to deter and dissuade current and emergent enemies from
    attacking the United States and its vital interests. To be successful
    in this critical national objective, the Nation's nuclear forces must
    be demonstrative and credible, and be survivable against a preemptive
    attack. This combination of capability, credibility, and survivability
    presents high uncertainty to a potential adversary in attempting to
    anticipate the success of executing one or more courses of action.''
        Collectively, all of the actions described above are ultimately
    focused on deterrence. Strategic deterrence is vital to America's
    security, and the Air Force is an essential provider of strategic
    deterrence. Our actions will ensure the Air Force continues to deliver
    the unique, effective strategic capabilities of stable, flexible and
    visible nuclear deterrence, thereby instilling confidence in the
    American people and national leadership; assuring allies; and
    dissuading and deterring potential adversaries. The Air Force is fully
    committed to the nuclear deterrence mission.
        Thank you for the committee's continued support of the U.S. Air
    Force.

    STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. FLOYD L. CARPENTER, USAF, COMMANDER, 8TH
                     AIR FORCE, AIR COMBAT COMMAND

        [The prepared statement of Major General Carpenter
    follows:]

            Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Carpenter, USAF

        Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Vitter, and distinguished members
    of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to represent the
    men and women of the Eighth Air Force and to answer your questions
    regarding the use of bomber aircraft in the United States Air Force. A
    key component in our Nation's ability to conduct long-range strike
    missions is found within our Air Force bombers. This unique capability
    is not possessed by any other branch of our armed services or by any
    other nation. Globally, the distance of our potential adversaries and
    lack of basing options hampers our ability to perform in a variety of
    theaters and scenarios. Long-range strike aviation is one of the few
    hedges our Nation maintains to mitigate these fundamental challenges.
    Air Force strategic bombers are a critical element of our National
    Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, providing unique
    capabilities to fulfill combatant commanders' mission objectives from
    shaping and deterring to large scale conventional operations and even
    nuclear scenarios.
        Despite the age of our Nation's three bombers, the Air Force long-
    range bomber force is unmatched in its ability to provide conventional
    power for initial response to regional crises within hours.
    Additionally, our bombers can provide sustained operations in any
    region of the world employing either conventional or nuclear options.
    As we move away from forward overseas basing, the speed, range, and
    payload of today's manned bombers allow for a U.S. presence anywhere on
    the globe within 24 hours.
        The end of the Cold War brought about a false feeling of global
    security, especially surrounding the long feared use of nuclear weapons
    between the Cold War superpowers. Shortly after the end of the Cold War
    we saw the world in its new form--violent and unstable. Different from
    the last century, non-state actors, specifically radical
    fundamentalists, moved to the forefront of the international stage. Our
    national security debates centered on not only how to counter this
    threat, but whether insurgent radical fundamentalism is the likely
    dominant form of warfare for the 21st century. These are critically
    important questions when deciding the best national military force
    structure size and composition. But in an effort to ``tailor'' our
    force structure we would be remiss if we were to assume this type of
    warfare will totally dominate the global security horizon for the
    foreseeable future. For at least the first 25 years of the 21st
    century, instability, violence, proliferation of weapons of mass
    destruction, and cultural/religious clashes will be center stage on the
    global arena. However, we must guard against absolute predictions of
    what forms of warfare may occur in the future.
        As we moved into the 21st century, the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review
    revealed that the Cold War's Triad was limited in scope and in need of
    an update. Our deterrence foundation still relies on our strike
    capability composed of a formidable balance of Intercontinental
    Ballistic Missiles, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, and manned
    recallable and retargetable bombers. In today's threat environment
    where non-state actors and counterinsurgency operations are center
    stage, the importance of our bomber force to deterrence is often
    overlooked and little understood. The strategic bomber is unique in its
    ability to assure allies, shape the environment, dissuade potential
    adversaries, complicate adversary strategy, provide the President and
    Secretary of Defense escalation control options, and ultimately offer
    alternatives to the insertion of precious ground forces on foreign
    soil.
        Unquestionably, there are a myriad of applications for the use of
    bombers. These include but are not limited to: (1) the demonstration of
    national resolve through force generation and arming with either
    conventional or nuclear weapons; (2) upon order, covert, or overt
    dispersal within the U.S. or deployment to forward locations; (3)
    strike operations from single-aircraft to multi-aircraft conventional
    and/or nuclear packages, which, most importantly, can be executed,
    retargeted, or recalled; and (4) employment of a vast array of weapons
    to include conventional unguided general purpose bombs, cluster
    munitions, precision-guided munitions, hard target penetrators, nuclear
    gravity weapons, and conventional or nuclear cruise missiles. Further,
    bombers have a unique ability to communicate de-escalation through
    visible downloading and removal from alert status and/or redeployment
    to home stations. Overall, and possibly most notable, bombers are
    differentiable from other strategic nuclear weapon systems--thereby not
    forcing an enemy into assuming a worst case nuclear scenario.
        In the new Strategic Triad, it is the bomber that provides the most
    flexibility to U.S. command authorities, with this flexibility being
    multifaceted and unique among the triad components. Air Force bombers
    are recallable, scalable, directional, and visible and provide our
    President and Secretary of Defense with both assurance and deterrence
    at the same time. This deterrence flows not only from the bombers'
    nuclear strike capability but also from the robust demonstrated
    conventional capability that can hold any target on the planet at risk.
    Another unique feature of our bomber force is the ability to deter even
    while strike operations are being executed. Simply put, deterrence from
    bombers can continue despite shots being fired. Furthermore, by
    enabling the effectiveness of other U.S. and partner instruments of
    power, bomber conventional capability can provide alternatives for
    deterrence beyond the obvious threat of annihilation. The most
    illustrative example is U.S. bombers operating in conjunction with
    indigenous ground forces in Serbia, which ultimately helped facilitate
    enemy capitulation without large scale North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization ground force insertion.
        To be sure, all components of the Strategic Triad are critical to
    our National Security Strategy but the bomber force has and will
    continue to be unique in its ability to assure allies, shape
    environment, dissuade potential adversaries, complicate adversary
    planning, provide escalation control, and offer alternatives to our
    combatant commanders and the President and Secretary of Defense.
    Bombers are the only platform in the Strategic Triad which can be
    employed in either conventional or nuclear roles. As our forces
    continue to redeploy from forward bases around the world, long-range
    strike aviation will remain one of our Nation's key power projection
    capabilities in the foreseeable future. This long-range strike
    capability provides the Nation the most powerful means to rapidly
    respond or attack around the globe and offers our Nation's leaders
    freedom of choices and freedom of action in the new world environment.
    Our national security will increasingly depend on strategic bombers to
    meet the demands of responding rapidly and decisively to security
    threats. Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to your
    questions.

    STATEMENT OF RADM STEPHEN E. JOHNSON, USN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
                            SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

        [The prepared statement of Rear Admiral Johnson follows:]

                Prepared Statement by RADM Stephen Johnson, USN

        Chairman Nelson, Senator Vitter, distinguished members of the
    Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Thank you for this opportunity to appear
    before you to discuss our Navy's nuclear enterprise, today's force and
    the efforts to ensure the continued reliability of our submarine
    strategic forces, and the Ohio class replacement to maintain continuous
    strategic deterrence.

                            NAVY NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

        The Navy remains vigilant in executing our nuclear strategic
    deterrent mission. The Department of Defense nuclear enterprise has
    gone through several important events over the last year. Through
    numerous reviews, both internal and external, the Navy has been found
    satisfactory in executing our responsibilities although there are areas
    where improvement is required. These efforts included an in-depth
    review of nuclear weapon custody and accountability procedures, weapons
    handling procedures, training, and flight test non-nuclear verification
    requirements. These reviews have confirmed the Navy has maintained a
    safe and secure environment for our strategic assets As a result of
    these reviews, the Navy has established two new three Star level
    councils chaired by the Director Navy Staff to provide central
    coordination to focus and address policy, operational and acquisition
    issues associated with our nuclear weapons enterprise, and ensure the
    Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) receives comprehensive recommendations
    for nuclear weapons governance. The first council involves the three
    Star Admirals on the CNO's direct staff and is called the Operational
    Navy Nuclear Weapons Council. The second brings together the
    Operational Navy leadership, the Fleet leadership, and acquisition
    leadership and is called the Navy Nuclear Weapons Senior Leadership
    Oversight Council. These new councils demonstrate the Navy leadership's
    continued focus and commitment to this mission area.
        I have focused Strategic Systems Programs on six major areas to
    continue to sustain high standards which include: (1) rigor; (2) field
    activity oversight; (3) self-assessment; (4) corrective action; (5)
    material management; and (6) personnel. These six areas of focus form
    the guiding principles by which we will manage our day to day
    operations and set the culture to sustain this mission for the long
    term. The men and women of Strategic Systems Programs and our industry
    partners remain dedicated to implement these guiding principles to meet
    the mission of our sailors on strategic deterrent patrol and our
    marines and sailors who are standing the watch to ensure the security
    of the weapons we are entrusted with by this Nation.

                                 TODAY'S FORCE

        Our 14 Trident Submarines, eight of which are homeported in the
    Pacific and 6 in the Atlantic fleet, continue to provide a credible,
    survivable, and reliable sea-based strategic deterrent for our national
    leadership. Two of our submarines, USS Nevada (SSBN 733) and USS
    Tennessee (SSBN 734) are undergoing Engineering Refueling Overhauls
    which will maintain the viability of these platforms through the end of
    the class. USS Alaska (SSBN 732) has recently completed her overhaul
    and post availability testing and is preparing for her Demonstration
    and Shakedown Operation with a Replacement strategic outload and return
    to the operational cycle next spring.
        The men and women of Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) are committed
    to maintaining the high reliability of our 14 Ohio class SSBNs with
    their Trident II D5 Missiles, as well as the four Ohio class SSGNs that
    have been converted to carry Tomahawk missiles and support Special
    Operating Forces (SOF) missions as directed by our combatant
    commanders. In February the USS Alabama (SSBN 731) conducted the 126th
    consecutive successful flight test of the Trident D5 missile as part of
    her Demonstration and Shakedown Operation. This record of successful
    flight tests is unmatched by any previous missile launch system.
    Therefore, I am pleased to report to you that the Trident Strategic
    Weapons Systems continues to meet the operational requirements
    established for the system almost 30 years ago. However, it is my
    military opinion that the overall health of the D5 weapons systems is
    not without cause for pause, as the weapon system is nearing its 20th
    year of deployment and now enters an era of its lifecycle where age-
    related issues may impact its reliability. With D5 planned for
    operational deployment to match the Ohio class hull life extension, D5
    hardware will age beyond our previous experience base and will be
    operational almost twice as long as any previous sea-based strategic
    deterrent. Age related concerns have been validated by several
    technical issues that have arisen over the past year that remind us
    that the Trident weapons system requires increased vigilance to
    maintain the demonstrated high reliability of the system. I am
    confident that the dedicated SSP team is up to this challenge.

                           D5 LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM

        Our efforts to extend the life of the Trident II D5 missile
    continue. We are procuring additional missiles, due to the Ohio class
    hull life extension, to ensure that our Ohio class submarines are fully
    out loaded throughout their service life. This is being accomplished
    through continuous production of critical components such as rocket
    motors, major requalification efforts when necessary, and an update to
    missile electronics and guidance packages to address obsolescence.
    However, even with continuous production of solid rocket motors, we are
    experiencing cost challenges today as both NASA and Air Force demand
    declines and will continue to experience those cost increases as demand
    continues to shrink in future years. We are approaching the Critical
    Design Review for our missile electronics update and are evaluating
    various options to determine the most cost effective implementation
    into the fleet. These updated electronic packages form a large part of
    the life extension strategy which supports the deployment of the
    Trident II D5 weapons systems on the Ohio class submarine and its
    impending replacement program.
        Key to the success of the Trident II, D5 Life Extension is the life
    extension of the W76, Mk4 warhead refurbishment known as the W76-1
    which we are executing in partnership with the Department of Energy.
    This program is on track to provide the Navy with the weapons we need
    to meet operational requirements throughout the Ohio class deployment
    and the planned follow-on platform.

                            NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY

        As technical program manager responsible for the Navy's Nuclear
    Weapons Security, SSP has actively pursued technologies which will
    provide credible, cost effective security for the nuclear assets
    entrusted to our watch. Our Marines and Navy Master-at-Arms are
    providing an effective and integrated elite security force at both of
    our strategic weapons facilities. We have begun construction of our
    Limited Area Production and Support Complex at Strategic Weapons
    Facility Pacific, Bangor, WA. When complete, this facility will provide
    a higher degree of security for our ashore operations.
        The United States Coast Guard, Maritime Protection Force Units have
    been commissioned at Kings Bay, GA, and Bangor, WA. These Coast
    Guardsmen and the Navy vessels they man provide a security umbrella for
    our Ohio class submarines as they deploy and return from their
    deterrent patrols. They form the basis of our Trident Transit
    Protection System.

                             OHIO CLASS REPLACEMENT

        In 2027, the Navy will retire the oldest of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs
    when it reaches the end of its service life. Over the subsequent 13
    years the Navy will retire the remaining Ohio-class SSBNs at a rate of
    approximately one per year. The Ohio class replacement is the
    replacement capability for the Ohio class ballistic missile submarine.
    It will be a strategic national asset whose endurance and stealth will
    enable the Navy to provide continuous uninterrupted survivable sea-
    based strategic deterrence. Appropriate investment in the Ohio class
    replacement research and development and concept development is
    essential to a reliable, survivable and adaptable sea-based strategic
    deterrent prepared to face an uncertain future. The Analysis of
    Alternatives study commenced on 13 Aug 2008 and will complete this
    summer. The Navy's fiscal year 2010 budget provides the required RDT&E
    investment to support the lead ship construction.
        The U.S. will maintain its strong strategic relationship with the
    U.K. for follow-on platforms, based upon the Polaris Sales Agreement of
    1963 and recently reinforced by the Presidential, Prime Minster and
    Secretary of Defense exchange of letters. The U.K. has provided funding
    in 2008 and 2009 to support the design and development of a Common
    Missile Compartment that supports both the Ohio class replacement and
    the successor to the U.K. Vanguard class.

                                      SSGN

        Although SSGN is not a strategic asset, the program synergizes off
    of the Trident system. This highly successful program, authorized by
    Congress as a method to maintain the viability of four Ohio class
    submarines and bring a major advance in tactical submarine overseas
    presence is almost complete. All four of these submarines have
    completed their conversion to SSGN Attack and SOF Platforms. USS Ohio
    (SSGN 726) completed a highly successful 14 month forward deployed
    period, USS Florida (SSGN 728) just returned from her deployment in 5th
    Fleet, USS Michigan (SSGN 727) is forward deployed in 7th Fleet, and
    USS Georgia (SSGN 729) will depart on her maiden deployment later this
    year. By any measure, these platforms have delivered on the promise to
    provide high volume strike and high capacity SOFs capability to our
    combatant commanders. I am in the process of turning over the day-to-
    day maintenance operations and future spiral development efforts of
    these fine ships to the Naval Sea System Command In-Service Submarine
    Organization as these platforms are no longer considered part of the
    Nation's Strategic Forces.
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I
    sincerely appreciate your continued support of the Navy's nuclear
    enterprise. Your efforts will ensure the continued credibility and
    reliability of our Trident II Weapons System and its remarkable Trident
    II D5 Missile, maintaining an unmatched record of success by any
    missile system. The men and women of Strategic Systems Programs are
    committed to the highest standards of safety, surety, and reliability
    of this remarkable system. Thank you again for the opportunity to
    appear before you today and am prepared to answer any questions you may
    have.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, there's an article in
    the New York Times and in a bunch of other papers about the
    publication of the Government Printing Office (GPO) Web site of
    a report that, according to the article, ``gives detailed
    information about hundreds of the Nation's civilian nuclear
    sites and programs, including maps showing the precise location
    of stockpiles of fuel for nuclear weapons.'' I understand that
    they've taken this report down from the Web site.
        Tell us about this, and tell us your assessment of any
    vulnerability that was disclosed in the report.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Mr. Chairman, I'd be glad to.
        First of all, the report that you mentioned is the United
    States declaration associated with the additional protocol,
    which is a more rigorous inspection regime set up to assist in
    our nonproliferation efforts around the world. In fact, it's
    not a report about our nuclear weapons activities or sites,
    specific locations of nuclear weapons or nuclear security; it's
    civil nuclear materials that exist around the United States. It
    is a sensitive, but unclassified, report. Ultimately, it would
    have gone after 60 days here in Congress, it would go over to
    the International Atomic Energy Agency. We think the report's a
    great demonstration of U.S. leadership and wanting to be
    upfront, wanting to be the first one to get on to these more
    rigorous inspections. We're certainly dismayed that the
    sensitive information was displayed publicly, but I can assure
    you, sir, I've looked at the actual report--in fact, this
    morning again--to make sure that I was very clear, particularly
    at sites that are the responsibility of my organization, to
    make sure that the information there is all unclassified. It
    went through a detailed interagency review. So, while I'm
    dismayed that it's out, I can assure you, sir, that it doesn't
    release weapons information.
        Senator Bill Nelson. So, it's just an easy locator for
    where nuclear weapons complexes are.
        Mr. D'Agostino. It's an easy locator for the civil side of
    what I would say the research and development that the Nuclear
    Energy Program does in the Department of Energy (DOE); some of
    that work is done at the NNSA site, some of it is done at the
    laboratories. There is some commercial power plant information
    that's out there. But, it does not reveal any classified
    information. Unfortunately, it's a nice compilation of
    information dealing with civil nuclear, and we are always very
    sensitive--and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is, as well,
    very sensitive--to how much information gets out there that
    doesn't necessarily need to be out there. Unfortunately, this
    is one of those cases.
        The real concern, I think, has to do with, how did this
    information get out onto the GPO Web site, and that's something
    I'm sure we'll be working very closely with Congress on, trying
    to figure that out.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have any idea how this would
    have appeared in the paper? Did they just cobble together a
    bunch of unclassified information?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I think what probably happened is, this
    sensitive, but unclassified, report that was sent was
    inadvertently placed on the GPO Web site. Another group--I
    believe it was the Federation of American Scientists--picked
    that up and placed it on their Web site, and from there it
    spilled into the media. It has since, as I understand it, been
    taken off of the GPO Web site. It's all unclassified
    information, but it's sensitive. It details where the country
    is doing some of its civilian research in nuclear areas, so it
    has information about materials and things like that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do we have to worry about any enhanced
    security, or do you feel like the security is adequate?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I'm very comfortable with the security at
    our NNSA sites. Those are the ones I know about the most. We
    design our security posture fairly rigorously against--the
    details, of course, are classified--a pretty broad set of
    threats. It would certainly cover the potential threats that
    might be here.
        We don't want to make things easier for people. I think,
    unfortunately, something like this does make some things
    easier. It just means that we have to maintain our security
    posture and keep it strong and continue to check on how we're
    doing, per our own standards.
        So, I'm very comfortable with the security of our NNSA
    sites, even with this report out, because I've looked at the
    ``maps,'' if you will, and there's--on all of our sites--really
    nothing there, quite frankly. It just shows a corridor, for
    example, in a building, nothing else around it, so you have no
    idea of those kinds of details.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is
    underway, and each of you have a role in the process. So, why
    don't we start with you, Admiral, and you all just go right
    down the line and tell us about your role in the process.
        Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. The Navy assigns a flag officer
    to each of the working groups for the NPR. I am assigned,
    appropriately, to the Stockpile and Infrastructure Working
    Group, and I support Mr. Henry and Dr. Harvey, who are the
    chairmen of that group. Then, the Strategic Systems Programs
    has key individuals supporting all parts of the NPR. We meet
    weekly. In my opinion, it's good communication, it's a good,
    healthy process, and I expect a good outcome.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. Now, you said you're assigned
    and that you meet weekly. What's your role in the process?
        Admiral Johnson. I provide the answers to postulated
    scenarios provided by the other groups primarily who are the
    force structure groups. In the case of change in weapons
    loading, we would analyze: where would we store weapons; how
    many would have to be moved; how long would it take; what would
    it cost; et cetera. Those sort of practical answers. In the
    group that I'm in, we also help illuminate the investments
    necessary within the infrastructure for the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program and for it to carry on into the future.
        General Carpenter. Sir, like the Admiral, I have no real
    direct role, other than as a technical advisor, if you will, or
    a subject matter expert on the bomber side, since 8th Air Force
    is the nuclear bomber leg, which we consider a critical part of
    the triad. I act as an advisor when there are questions about
    that particular part of the triad, and how many weapons would
    be appropriate for that part of the triad. So, I'm removed, at
    Barksdale Air Force Base, from the NPR process itself, but very
    much engaged, through STRATCOM and through the air staff, with
    General Alston.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do you get involved in the design of
    the new bomber?
        General Carpenter. No, sir, I have not.
        Senator Bill Nelson. How about you, Admiral? With regard to
    the new submarine?
        Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You get involved in the design?
        Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. I have been responsible, on the
    Navy side, for all the pre-milestone work, the system-
    engineering work that preceded the start of the analysis of
    alternatives, and I will be responsible for the design and the
    operation of the missile compartment.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General?
        General Alston. Mr. Chairman, I am responsible for the Air
    Force support to the NPR process, so I ensure that we have
    proper representation on all of the working groups that are
    working the NPR. Admiral Johnson and I have found ourselves, in
    my 21 months, together very often, because of our somewhat
    common responsibilities, and we also share seats in some of the
    NPR forums. But, my responsibility would be not only to ensure
    that we have active engagement at every level within the NPR,
    but that I ensure that, as discussions and propositions and
    excursions would develop, that whatever would be asked of the
    Air Force, in terms of replies, that I would help manage those
    replies to that process.
        I, too, agree that this has been a very collaborative
    process. I think it's been a very transparent process. It is
    bona fide that the Services have been invited to participate
    fully. I'm very encouraged that, with this level of
    collaboration and a focus on strategy and policy-leading force
    structure, that I, too, am confident that we will get a very
    competent outcome for the Nation.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I'm a member of the
    Senior Integration Steering Group (SISG). We meet weekly.
    Essentially, there are a series of working groups--the
    Stockpile and Infrastructure Working Group, as you heard
    Admiral Johnson describe, Policy Working Group, Force Structure
    Working Group, an International Working Group. We have this
    organization above that worries about the interagency
    coordination between these detailed working groups. So, I sit
    on that group. We do tradeoffs. We make sure that the strategy
    force structure feeds the number of warheads, types of
    warheads, and then do the iteration back and forth and make
    sure all these pieces tie together. Then, occasionally I've sat
    in as acting for the Deputy Secretary in deputies' committee
    meetings at the National Security Council (NSC) to be on the
    receiving side of some of this. I would agree with General
    Alston, I've seen a tremendous level of collaboration, not only
    between the Services and OSD policy, acquisition technology,
    and logistics, but State Department and international partners,
    as well. So, it's been a great process.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Jeff, do you want to ask any questions
    at this point?
        Senator Sessions. You can go ahead.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Mr. D'Agostino, you know
    that there is a reasonable chance that we're going to reduce
    the nuclear stockpile. That's going to increase the size of the
    backlog of the nuclear weapons waiting to be dismantled. How
    would NNSA handle that increased number of dismantlements?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely right, sir, we do expect some
    increase in our dismantlement queue. As I've mentioned publicly
    before, we have a pretty sizable dismantlement queue. The
    actual number is classified, but at the pace that we're on,
    we'll take apart our last warhead in that dismantlement queue
    in 2022. That actually is a fairly accelerated rate from where
    we were about 4 years ago, on the pace that we were on. Our
    plan--we submitted a report last year with the classified
    details to Congress, and every 2 years we'll re-up that report.
    The way we would handle the increased rate is to continue to
    use what we call a special tool set. It's what we call
    ``Seamless Safety for the 21st Century.'' It's a series of
    special tools that assist us in working on our warheads, where
    we don't have to move the warhead around so much, but it sits
    in a special toolcase where it allows us to take it apart
    fairly rapidly. But, most importantly, more important than
    speed, is the safety piece of this. Many of these warheads,
    particularly these old warheads, were built 40-plus years ago
    of fairly exotic materials, and have been in very hot silos and
    up in cold airplanes and back and forth. It's a very
    complicated job. So, my primary concern is not if I can take
    them apart faster every single year, but can I continue on the
    safety record that we've held essentially since the program
    started, because we're dealing with conventional high
    explosives that don't have the safety--on old systems that
    don't have the safety features of our more modern systems.
        So, I can assure you, safety is number one, not how fast I
    can do them. Clearly it's going to require us to maintain a
    good set of production technicians who are trained in this
    area. I think we have that crew in place right now.
        What I don't want to do is hire up essentially 300 people,
    because it's going to take me a few years to get them trained
    up--have them work really hard for 6 years to take everything
    apart, and then have to lay them off, because it doesn't make
    sense economically.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have enough pit storage at
    Pantex?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, right now, our expectation is
    that we will be able to handle our expected future pit capacity
    not only today on our current plans, but the expectations of
    the NPR. I don't want to be predisposed that I know the answer
    before the review is done, and I don't. But, we're going to
    reevaluate all of these questions on storage facility locations
    as soon as we get the exact numbers. So, I'm anxiously waiting,
    frankly, to get this review done, get the details out, because
    that assists me greatly in my 5-year planning.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Why did you move the responsibility
    for the construction of the pit disassembly facility from one
    office to another?
        Mr. D'Agostino. In many cases, the pit disassembly and
    conversion facility move was directed by Congress, so we had a
    shift. I'm never a big fan of moving large projects from one to
    the other, because what you do is, you disrupt teams. These are
    very complicated facilities. They require a certain set of
    consistency over years of time. Both of those organizations are
    in the NNSA, so I am ultimately responsible for it and
    ultimately that's going to be my objective.
        Senator Bill Nelson. In disassembling the nuclear weapons,
    do you want to do some of that in Nevada or do you want to do
    all that at Pantex?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I want to do that at Pantex, because first
    of all, my production technicians are at Pantex. Next, the
    facilities that I have at Pantex are actually certified by
    ourselves and checked by the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety
    Board to be able to do what I would call the highest level of
    nuclear safety work, because safety is primarily number one. If
    we're ever in a situation where we have, I would say, a problem
    disassembling a particular warhead, for example, because it's
    just been together for so long and we are in a situation where
    we need to get it out of the system because it's stopping a lot
    of other disassembly work from happening, we do have the
    option, and it will be on a case-by-case basis, to say, ``Let's
    use our device assembly facility at the Nevada Test Site, fly
    some technicians out there, do this specialty work on this
    particular warhead while we continue to work away this larger
    bucket of dismantlement work.''
        So, Nevada is always a nice contingency plan for us. I
    don't see anything in the near future that would cause us to
    use it right now.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions?
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Mr. D'Agostino, when we talk about nuclear stockpile
    reductions, which will be part of the President's talks with
    the Russians--have they already begun?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The Assistant Secretary, Rose Gottemoeller,
    from the State Department, has started working with the
    Russians. Yes, sir, she has.
        Senator Sessions. It's on a fast track. I would just note
    that there's no reason that that has to be done this year. It's
    a self-imposed goal. We can extend the Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty (START) for up to 5 years with little problem. But, at
    any rate, the President seemed to be determined to move forward
    with that, and announced some reductions. But, the question I
    think we're hearing from various experts in the field, that any
    reduction done by current stockpile should be tied to some sort
    of modernization plan of our existing nuclear weapons. Do you
    share that view?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I think that's a discussion that I'm
    currently having right now. One statement I would make is, I
    feel very strongly that we are in a fragile position, if you
    will, from an infrastructure and people standpoint. There's a
    Perry-Schlesinger report that has come out recently that has a
    fairly accurate portrayal of the infrastructure and people
    concerns that they have. One thing to do is make--we have great
    people in our outfit. The people want to know that they're
    doing work that the country cares about and that they're doing
    work that exercises their skills. So, an element of that is
    extending the life of the warhead. The way that Perry-
    Schlesinger Commission report describes life extension is a
    continuum of activities, from refurbishment to replacement. I
    think working in that continuum is where we're going to end up
    and what the NPR is going to end up showing us.
        So, all of these pieces are tied together. In my view, you
    can't just talk about one piece, just talk about size only, and
    not address, frankly, the whole integrated situation, not only
    on the NNSA side, but my colleagues in DOD who also have
    concerns with critical skills.
        Senator Sessions. Former Secretary Perry, on May 28--who's
    been, frankly, very aggressive, more than I would suggest, is
    required to draw our weapons systems down--said this in his
    article: ``The U.S. should maintain a safe, secure, and
    reliable nuclear deterrent for itself and its allies, and that
    this deterrent should be adequately funded and staffed with
    topnotch managers, scientists, and engineers.'' I know that you
    are challenged with making sure that there's no waste, every
    dollar is spent wisely. But, is the budget before us today
    that's been proposed, is that sufficient to meet the standards
    that Secretary Perry made?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The budget we have before us today meets
    the standard for today, for the year that we're talking about,
    2010. I would like to note, though, that particularly when one
    looks at the out-year plan--typically we submit a 5-year series
    of numbers to show direction, if you will, on our programs.
    This program, you'll note that our out-year numbers are
    exactly, in some cases, in science and technology, fairly
    identical with the 2010 number. That is done because I
    recognize that changes are going to have to be made in the out-
    years in order to make Mr. Perry's statement a sustainable and
    true statement out in the out-years.
        So, the way I would describe this is as a 1-year budget
    submittal to Congress, that once the NPR comes out, my plan,
    Tom D'Agostino's plan, is to make sure that the challenges of
    securing nuclear materials in 4 years, the challenges
    associated, as the Perry-Schlesinger report puts out, on doing
    life extensions on our warhead and exercising our people, are
    duly reflected in the science element of my program, the
    infrastructure element of my program--not ``my program,'' but
    the program that the country has entrusted me with for now, as
    well as the direct stockpile work piece, the life-extension
    piece.
        Senator Sessions. Is there money in it sufficient to do
    those things in the out-years?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Not in the out-years, but in 2010, yes,
    sir.
        Senator Sessions. Secretary of Defense Gates, just last
    October, said, ``The U.S. is experiencing serious brain drain
    in the loss of veteran nuclear weapons designers and
    technicians.'' He went on to say, ``To be blunt, there is
    absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and
    reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either
    resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization
    program.'' Do you agree with that?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I largely agree with that statement.
    There's details below some of those statements. A modernization
    effort, in my view, encompasses a wide variety of activities,
    from reuse of components that we've previously made, exercising
    our scientists, to making sure that when we do a life extension
    on our program, we modernize the safety and security elements
    of our warheads. That's absolutely important. The last thing I
    think is--as we maintain our deterrent, put warheads into our
    stockpile that are based on 1970s- or 1980s-era safety and
    security efforts, because we know that things have changed in
    the last 30 years.
        Senator Sessions. A modernization program should result
    into weapons being more reliable and significantly more safe,
    should they not?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely, Senator. I agree 100 percent
    with that statement.
        Senator Sessions. What objections are you getting to
    modernizing, even as we draw down some of the numbers?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I think making sure that it's put in the
    context of the President's overall strategic direction, making
    sure that it fits in. We have an integrated framework to talk
    about nuclear security.
        Senator Sessions. Yet, you don't have a commitment for
    funding that would allow you to do that. Is that what you're
    saying?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The program I have right now puts us in a
    position to be able to respond to the NPR. I'm very confident--
    and that's why I'm very excited about being able to get a NPR
    out, because we want that detail and that information in there.
    That's why Dr. Harvey, who is co-leading the stockpile and
    infrastructure group, understands this program, has my views--
    is working that in the NPR process, because I have these views
    that I want to be reflected in, ultimately, the
    administration's position for the future.
        So, I have no objection to modernization. I think it's
    important. We need to put safety and security into our
    stockpile. We have some in already. We want to make sure that,
    if we're going to extend the lives and maintain our deterrent,
    that continues out into the future.
        Senator Sessions. You also would acknowledge that we're the
    only nuclear weapons country in the world that doesn't have a
    modernization ongoing program. Is that right?
        Mr. D'Agostino. That's correct, but we do have a life
    extension program. I want to make sure that that's clear. Some
    of this is not semantics--there are some details behind the
    difference between a pure refurbishment life extension and a
    reuse life extension or a replacement life extension activity.
    So, it's absolutely correct, if we're talking about what I
    would call advancing the ball dramatically on safety, security,
    and reliability. But, we do have a life extension program
    underway; in fact, we're supporting the Navy, Admiral Johnson's
    requirements, for the W-76 warhead, in that respect.
        Senator Sessions. We just need to do what is necessary to
    move forward with these programs. I just am not seeing a firm
    commitment from the administration that that's what's going to
    happen. We hear some positive talk. I think you guys hope that
    the NPR will help move us in that direction, but I haven't seen
    it yet, and it makes me somewhat nervous.
        Admiral Johnson, tell us briefly about missile defense,
    about your requirements to test submarine-launched missiles,
    how often do you launch those, how many you do, and why you
    think that's necessary to guarantee the reliability of those
    systems.
        Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. The Navy tests four missiles per
    year in a program we call a Follow-on Commander's Evaluation
    Test. The submarines are on patrol. They are notified. They're
    selected at random. They're notified by message. They return to
    port. Two missiles are selected--again, randomly. Those
    missiles are then--the warheads are removed, and the
    appropriate test instrumentation, telemetry, and destruct
    capability are installed. It takes a couple of days, a matter
    of days, and the ship proceeds to the range area and conducts
    normally two missiles from that submarine. We do that twice a
    year, a total of four.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Tell us where that range is, Admiral.
        Admiral Johnson. There are two ranges. The one we used
    yesterday is off the coast of Florida. It's the same operation
    center the Air Force runs for a variety of tests. They share
    that facility with us at the 45th Space Wing, and it's the
    eastern range. We fired, in this case, from Her Majesty's ship,
    Victorious, a Royal Navy submarine fired off the coast of
    Florida for a 5,000-mile test splashing down off the coast of
    Africa.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, I think, one thing we will
    need to look at is that the national missile defense--they
    reduced the number to 30. If that goes forward, which I'm not
    comfortable with, I think it puts an even greater requirement
    that we have enough missiles that we have tested over the
    years, because all of our other areas test. You've been a
    critic, I know, for some time, and then--that we haven't
    probably tested that system enough. So, however we come out
    with national missile defense, I think we're going to have to
    produce those things while the assembly line is hot so they can
    be used for testing.
        Thank you. I appreciate your leadership. You are
    exceedingly knowledgeable on all these issues, and I'm pleased
    that you're chairing our committee.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Just for you students, here, this is
    the famous Senator whose picture is on the front page of the
    Washington Post this morning. [Laughter.]
        Mr. D'Agostino, we're not only reducing the number of
    nuclear warheads, but we're going to reduce the actual types of
    nuclear warheads. So, how do you go about reducing the weapons
    types and reducing redundant warheads?
        Mr. D'Agostino. What I would say now is, there is
    discussion about reducing types, but that will be left for the
    NPR ultimately to come out. But, I would offer the following,
    if I could. Ultimately, it gets driven by DOD's requirements,
    the types of targets that are part of the algorithm that
    determines the size of the stockpile, whether or not certain
    targets can be covered by multiple warheads, are there backups
    needed. From my standpoint, reducing the numbers of types makes
    the maintenance element a lot easier. I don't have to make X
    number of different types of neutron generators or thermal
    batteries or other particular components that we have to
    replace on a periodic basis. So, the maintenance piece becomes
    easier. There's a downside, of course, to reducing the types,
    and that is, you become more and more dependent on the types
    you have remaining. Therefore, that drives you to want to make
    doubly sure or triply sure that you know exactly what's going
    on with those particular warheads you've decided you're going
    to retain in your arsenal, both in numbers and types. So, I've
    always emphasized the point that as--if our stockpile gets
    smaller, and if the numbers of types go down, that more and
    more reinforces the need to have this discussion on having a
    very sustainable workforce and infrastructure that does that.
    Right now, we don't have that in the out-years, in my opinion,
    but that's what we have to get to.
        General Chilton ultimately can provide a more fullsome
    answer, sir, to your question on reducing the types.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. We'll take that up with him.
        Historically, each lab has been responsible for the weapons
    that it designed. What do you think of the idea of having all
    the data on all of the weapons available to each of the
    laboratories and having each lab do an independent review of
    each weapon?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I like that idea, sir. I think it's a great
    idea. We discussed, last year, on how we make our annual
    assessment process stronger as our stockpile size changes. We
    believe we've reached that point where our stockpile size is
    small enough that we need two independent checks, full sets of
    experiments run independently by both labs, keeping the
    responsibility, of course, for the design with one laboratory,
    because we always want one organization responsible. But,
    having another institution do that--Secretary Chu has looked at
    this idea. In his first month or so as the Secretary, I talked
    to him about that. He was convinced enough that he signed out,
    essentially, a piece of paper that directed us to go off and
    establish the system where we work that in. It means a little
    bit more science work, it means a few more experiments, it
    means a bit more analysis, and it means a bit more back and
    forth between our two laboratories, but that's a good thing. I
    think the country will be better off because of that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Sessions?
        Senator Sessions. Just briefly. The Wall Street Journal, on
    June 2, has an article that the U.S. and Russia talks appear
    headed for a framework agreement by July 6, and a final treaty
    by December. That's moving right along.
        Mr. D'Agostino. I would agree with that, sir.
        Senator Sessions. Have you been involved in that?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, at what we call the interagency
    meetings we have at the NSC and advising the Assistant
    Secretary of State--that is the prime negotiator for the
    administration.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director
    of the Arms Control Association here in Washington, which is a
    private group, I think, that apparently knows a lot about it,
    described the atmosphere at these meetings, usually tedious, as
    ``electric.'' White House officials wouldn't say what their
    targets are on a treaty with Russia, but Mr. Kimball said the
    deployed nuclear weapons in each country could be reduced by 30
    percent to 40 percent from their current limit of 2,200 warhead
    delivery systems, Admiral Johnson, would be cut by half.
    General Alston and team, let me ask the military witnesses
    whether they've conducted any analysis on the implications of
    these reductions for their leg of the triad.
        Who wants to start?
        General Alston. Senator, I'd be happy to start.
        The process so far with regard to the NPR has been looking
    at the existing treaty limits with regard to Moscow and the
    combatant commander has been involved in his assessment as to
    force levels, but the discussions have not gotten so specific
    yet as to identify specific force levels. It has been a
    priority, certainly of the Air Force, and I will let Admiral
    Johnson speak for his service, but that we are ensuring that
    our responsibilities to maintain nuclear surety at lower levels
    is a very important matter to us. You would have, in your
    workforce, their ability to perform their roles and
    responsibilities. It's a sensitivity that we have. As we get
    deeper into this discussion and deeper into the NPR, I know
    we're going to reach a point where we're going to have to be
    able to make the assessments that you indicate we will need to
    make.
        Senator Sessions. But, you haven't been asked to, and have
    not completed an assessment to reduce your delivery systems by
    one-half?
        General Alston. No, sir, we have not. There have been some
    excursions to see what would be the art of the possible, but I
    really would not qualify those as reaching the point where they
    would be sufficiently mature for force-structure
    recommendations. But, for half of the force, no, sir, there
    hasn't been that level of detailed discussion involved in the
    Air Force.
        Senator Sessions. General Carpenter?
        General Carpenter. I agree with everything General Alston
    said. Our position basically has been that we have been
    promoting a balanced triad, whatever the numbers are, that the
    end result should end with a triad, as we have today, that is a
    balanced triad, so that every leg has a sufficient number of
    weapons to make it sustainable.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Johnson?
        Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir, I agree with the same position.
    I do make the observation that, in the case of the missile tube
    numbers, the current numbers are set higher than the number of
    missile tubes that we have today, and that may provide some
    insight into the way--I haven't read the article, so I can't
    exactly respond to it.
        Senator Sessions. They just speculated. They talked about
    delivery systems being reduced by half. Let me ask you--you're
    aware--and I know when you've been promoted and had hearings,
    you've been asked whether or not you would give your honest
    assessment, regardless of what the politicians tell you, so I'm
    going to ask each one of you three uniformed personnel, will
    you, if asked about whether or not you can accept a 50 percent
    reduction in the delivery systems of our triad, will you give
    your best military judgment?
        General Alston. Yes, sir.
        General Carpenter. Yes, sir.
        Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Sessions. All three of you said ``Yes.'' I
    appreciate that.
        Also, Secretary D'Agostino, on the question of nuclear
    weapons, the numbers slip my mind right now; perhaps you can
    recall how many tactical nuclear weapons the Russians have and
    how many we have.
        Mr. D'Agostino. The actual numbers are classified, but I
    will say there's a 10-to-1 ratio, roughly, give or take. It's a
    big difference between the two.
        Senator Sessions. If the START goes forward, we're talking
    about the strategic nuclear weapons primarily being reduced,
    and there's no plan to narrow the gap in the tactical nuclear
    weapons, is there?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The administration is focused--you
    described the timeframe earlier, which is correct, sir.
    Addressing the tacticals would be very difficult to do in the
    time period. There's other implications. Russia's been very coy
    about the role of their tactical nuclear weapons, vis-a-vis
    their overall national defense. It's a different approach than
    what we have.
        Senator Sessions. Oh, I see. The Russians don't want to
    talk about it? That's right, the Russians don't want to talk
    about tactical nuclear weapons. That's off the table. They're
    willing to talk about strategic nuclear weapons, and that's the
    fact of the matter. The administration is determined to reach
    this treaty, for reasons that baffle me. Hopefully we can go in
    that direction and move forward in that direction. I'm
    supportive of that. But, we're not under any pressure to do
    this. This is a self-imposed pressure that worries me. So,
    these are important issues. I know you will work on them, and
    give your best judgment.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
        Originally, under START II, there was a general
    understanding that once we got to START III, they would take up
    the tactical nuclear weapons, but we never got around to
    ratifying START II. So, this is something you have brought up
    in a most timely fashion, and I thank you for bringing it up.
    We need to keep it out there on the table and ultimately get to
    that issue.
        The idea was to address the strategic weapons first and
    then get to the tactical. Well, we never got there. So, thank
    you, Senator Sessions.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Senator Vitter?
        Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome, to all of you. In particular, General Carpenter,
    welcome to you, and thanks for your new leadership of the
    Mighty 8th in Louisiana. We're very proud of that.
        My first question goes to something focused there, which is
    of the Air Force's movement on Global Strike Command, which is
    slated for Barksdale and obviously we hope that moves along and
    continues, in terms of the new major command that is clearly a
    significant high national priority, and it's a national
    priority to stand it up in a timely way. Can you give us a
    view--and/or, General Alston--an update on how that's
    progressing?
        General Carpenter. I can give you a timeline, and General
    Alston can fill in any gaps I missed.
        June 27 is the end of the environmental assessment period.
    Assuming that all comes out as we hope, then it will be
    announced as the final location. Once that happens, then you
    will start seeing people and resources being moved there.
    General Kowalski, who's the vice commander now of Global Strike
    Command, I believe is scheduled to arrive the first week and a
    half of July, followed by General Klotz, the new commander, and
    he is to arrive by early August. We're going to have a standup
    of the command, an activation of the command, and I believe
    August 7 is the planned date right now, tentatively at least. I
    think you know that the initial operating capability is
    scheduled for September. Come December of this year, the
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) wings move over to
    Global Strike Command out of Space Command, and then followed,
    in February 2010, the bomber units will be moved from Air
    Combat Command into Global Strike Command, with, finally, full
    operating capability in September 2010. So, that's the schedule
    as I know it today.
        Senator Vitter. Thank you very much, and thanks for your
    leadership in that important transition. Again, thanks for your
    leadership of the Mighty 8th and your being part of our
    military community in Louisiana. We're very proud to have you.
        General Carpenter. Thank you.
        Senator Vitter. Gentlemen, I share many of Senator
    Sessions' concerns about some of this work toward treaties with
    regard to START. I can support the concept, and I can support
    the goal, I just want to make sure we do it right and don't set
    deadlines or timetables or goals with PR in mind, versus
    substance, and basically put politics and PR ahead of
    substance.
        With respect to that, I'm concerned about this schedule of
    trying to get to a new START in December, when the current NPR
    isn't slated to be done yet. It isn't slated to be completed
    until early next year. Isn't that potentially putting the cart
    before the horse? Shouldn't we have the new NPR finalized to
    understand the landscape with regard to what we should agree
    to, in terms of a new START?
        General Alston. Senator, I'll be glad to take a first
    answer there. Sir, I think the process that we have, that we
    are participating in with the NPR, has been a very
    collaborative process. It has been a very transparent process.
    Personally, I see very talented people that are trying to work
    these issues very much in earnest, very much in the open, and
    the Services have been a part of this process from the
    beginning. So, the dynamic that is helping work through these
    issues, I think, is a very positive dynamic, so I can't comment
    on assessing the pace. But, for the efforts that are underway,
    there's been very good, deliberate effort, and I think the work
    is moving towards a productive outcome from DOD for the
    participation that the Air Force is having in this process
    right now.
        Senator Vitter. I appreciate that. My question is about
    timing. Is it correct that that process is slated to be
    finalized early next year?
        General Alston. Sir, I think the NPR is supposed to be
    complete by the end of this year, but clearly there's a
    relationship between the analysis that is underway with the NPR
    and the START activities. It's just the way the process is
    working right now.
        Senator Vitter. I'm not sure I understand what that means.
    Let me ask it a different way. Does it make any sense to agree
    to a new START product before the NPR is completed and digested
    and understood, including by the START negotiators?
        General Alston. Sir, I can't speak to that, I can only
    speak to the Air Force role contributing to that process. The
    Department would be ultimately responsible for the quality of
    the NPR product.
        Senator Vitter. Mr. D'Agostino, maybe that's more
    appropriate for you to comment on that. It seems pretty logical
    that you want to complete and digest and understand the NPR
    before you agree to a new START. What's the matter with that
    assumption?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I think there clearly are two activities
    happening. In fact, one does inform the other activity. But,
    there's overlap. I think it is not unreasonable to say--there's
    a lot of detail that would have to happen in the NPR that
    doesn't have anything necessarily to do with START. If I can
    give an example or two, it might help, examples associated with
    maintenance of how we recapitalize our infrastructure, on what
    pace we would recapitalize our infrastructure, the actual
    different types of warheads themselves, where it depends on if
    the focus on the START number--the situation is a number and an
    agreement in a general direction. We can get the President,
    who's already said publicly that he is looking at a lower
    number than what the Moscow Treaty was and that he's interested
    in certain verification measures, as well. That framework is
    already established, in essence, and that provides a framework,
    so you don't have to wait until the NPR is exactly done, until
    the books are closed on it, because my expectation, frankly,
    what we want to do in the NPR process is, in fact, fairly
    accelerated.
        The DOE, the NNSA, need elements of that NPR understood
    before we develop our budget for fiscal years 2011 through
    2015, our 5-year budget. That is a program and budget that
    we're working on to get done by September of this year, so it's
    an element of the NPR process that's accelerated to get to that
    answer sooner so we can develop an actual program. In fact,
    that's exactly what we're going to do, and that's why General
    Alston described the NPR largely being completed by the
    beginning of the fiscal year later on this fall, if you will,
    because that's going to inform us as we develop, with DOD, our
    joint programs.
        So, there's certainly some parallelism going on. I can't
    deny that, and I don't want to deny that. I don't want to send
    that signal. But, at the same time, because we have such very
    good collaborative process, frankly, and we've gone through,
    already, a couple of iterations of how policy drives the force
    structure and how the force structure drives the warheads,
    numbers, and types, we've gone through an iteration that way.
    We have some sense of where things may end up. We don't want to
    give an answer right now.
        Ultimately there's a negotiation piece with Russia; that's
    important. So, I'm very confident, because of the transparency
    and because of our desire to get that NPR largely done later
    this year, so we can finish our budget preparations, because we
    submit that to you, sir, in January, that we are on a very
    tight path, but doable, is how I would describe it. It's not
    just one finishes and then the other starts, sir.
        Senator Vitter. I'm not suggesting it should be one
    finishes and then the other starts. I'm suggesting it should
    not be that the treaty finishes before the NPR finishes.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, I understand.
        Senator Vitter. Do you understand the difference? I'm not
    saying the NPR has to finish before treaty discussions start,
    but it does seem a little odd for the detailed treaty
    negotiations potentially to finish before the NPR is finished.
    What am I missing?
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let me interject, here. I think
    there's an element of this that the NPR discussions will inform
    the START negotiations, and the box that they find themselves
    in, that neither the Russians nor the Americans want this START
    extended. Under the terms of the treaty, it can only be
    extended for 5 years. Five years only. It can't be extended 1
    year, it can't be extended 10 years. It can only be extended 5
    years. So, the expectation may well be, according to the
    implication of your question, which I think is right on the
    money, is that these negotiations own what may end up being
    several treaties will be informed by the NPR discussions. Is
    that in the ballpark, Mr. D'Agostino?
        Mr. D'Agostino. That's my understanding, sir. I'm not an
    expert on the extension parts of the treaties, frankly, but
    that is, in essence--we can be informed enough by the work
    we've actually done to date on the NPR to start on the treaty
    discussions. Details do matter.
        Senator Vitter. Start. But my question is about the
    finishing of the treaty discussions before you finish the NPR.
    Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your comment, and you make some very
    good points. But, forgive me, as a recovering lawyer, the first
    thing I would say is, I don't care what the current START says.
    You can sign a new treaty that's the same as the old one, with
    one comma missing, and it can last 6 months if you want to, if
    that's the smart thing to do, and it can be a new treaty that
    can just bridge to the next treaty, if that is the right thing
    to do, substantively. My only suggestion is, let's put
    substance first, whatever that is.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, absolutely.
        Senator Vitter. I have a similar question about the
    Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Now, I have to say, right
    off, my impulse about that is a lot different from START, which
    is--I questioned the whole premise of the soundness of the
    CTBT. But, Secretary Gates has said that, without testing, it
    will, ``become impossible to keep extending the life of our
    arsenal.'' Given that, do you think any consideration--
    ratification of a CTBT should be preceded by plans for a new
    redesigned and more reliable warhead?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Sir, I would look at the question. I'm
    going to answer your question, but I would say, for the last
    13-plus years--or longer than that, frankly, 16 years--we have
    been operating, in effect, without underground testing, as a
    matter of policy. So, we have a program, a Stockpile
    Stewardship Program, designed to take a deep look inside our
    warheads, do an annual assessment.
        In an earlier question, Chairman Nelson asked about beefing
    up our peer-review process to make sure that we can do that. I
    am comfortable that, with what I could call a sustainable
    effort on science, a sustainable effort on the facilities that
    are required that the country is going to need, and a
    sustainable effort on modernization activity for our stockpile,
    that we can maintain the stockpile well on out into the future,
    without underground testing. I would add that that's one
    element of the CTBT discussion, sir, that the Senate will be
    looking at, I'm sure. Another element, of course, is the
    verification questions, which are fairly complicated, deal with
    seismic issues and being able to find out what the rest of the
    world is doing.
        The one comment I would like to make on that is, the same
    people that maintain our current stockpile and that we need to
    beef up, if you will, over the next few years, are the exact
    same people that do the intelligence analysis, the seismic
    analysis, as well. So, having a NNSA infrastructure that is
    taken care of out into the future is going to be an important
    part of a CTBT. That's the piece I'm going to make sure I
    communicate very clearly in this administration. That is my
    job, sir.
        Senator Vitter. Okay. I take it from what you said that you
    just disagree with Secretary Gates that it will ``become
    impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal,'' without
    testing.
        Mr. D'Agostino. That's if we just leave the arsenal the way
    it is. In other words, to just do the day-to-day maintenance, I
    would agree with the Secretary, if we do what I would call the
    life-extension approach, which is a reuse or replacement
    approach--and I think this is where Secretary Gates was going,
    in effect, was modernizing, driving more reliable performance
    margins in there so we're sure we don't have to test--then my
    view is that we can do that in a nontesting future.
        Senator Vitter. I just want to make clear, his comment was
    not about that, it was about testing. He said, ``Without
    testing, we won't have this.'' You're disagreeing with that,
    correct?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I don't know the context of Mr. Gates's
    statement, so I think we are actually agreeing that if I can't
    modernize the stockpile, we're going to find ourselves where
    every year we're getting closer and closer to the point where
    the scientists and engineers in my organization--they're going
    to get to a point that say, Mr. President or Mr. Secretary,
    first, and then we tell the President, we're facing a moment of
    truth here with respect to testing, but we believe, in DOE or
    in the NNSA, that an integrated program of fixing the
    infrastructure, of working on the stockpile, and modernizing
    pieces of it, together with a science program to back it up,
    can take care of our nuclear deterrent out into the future
    indefinitely without testing.
        Senator Vitter. I will try to get that full context to you.
    But, my understanding is, he wasn't talking about this, he was
    talking about testing. Without testing, we can't do this. But,
    I will get that.
        Mr. D'Agostino. I would love to come back on that.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I would be surprised, Senator Vitter,
    if it were said in that isolated context, because I've had
    lengthy discussions with General Cartwright, the Vice Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs, on this very issue, and I think he has
    every confidence to feel that, with the appropriate
    modernization program, that we can have the reliability we have
    to have. That's my impression.
        Senator Vitter. I will get that context to you and follow
    up on the discussion.
        Mr. D'Agostino. I would love to do that.
        Senator, I'd appreciate that.
        Senator Vitter. Admiral, if I can ask you--and thank you
    for your visit yesterday; I enjoyed that very much--the fiscal
    year 2010 budget continues funding for the next-generation
    follow-on to the Ohio-class SSBN. Can you discuss the Navy's
    current plans for that next generation, and steps, in
    particular, that have been taken early on to try to ensure we
    don't experience cost overruns or scheduling delays?
        Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. This budget includes a request
    for $495 million to begin the work for the replacement of the
    Ohio class. The Ohio class is tremendously capable submarine
    today. It has no particular shortcomings. This request is based
    on the end of service life of that ship, which has been
    extended to 40 operational years. This is an on-time--it's not
    early, it's not late--it's an on-time start for the engineering
    and the research and development work to support and start
    construction in 2019. It's also on time with respect to the
    industrial base, and it's timed well to support our ally the
    United Kingdom. The work that we're doing early is concept work
    and missile launcher development prototype work, and it can be
    guided by the decisions of the NPR and the other events we talk
    about. I think it is well-timed to accommodate all the work
    that is going forward. It includes the early propulsion work
    for a ship of that size.
        Senator Vitter. Great.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.
        Senator Bill Nelson. I want to take your previous question
    and now ask that of the Admiral. How can you start the design
    of the new submarine if you don't know the outcome of the NPR?
        Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. The very early work is concept
    work, layout, and qualification of vendors. In the case of the
    Ohio class, the youngest of the Ohio class is the Louisiana,
    delivered in 1996, so we have been out of production of large,
    heavy missile tubes and the launching equipment for about 25
    years. So, this early work is a combination of laying out how
    we will make that part of the submarine acoustically quiet, and
    other characteristics because, of course, we have very quiet
    attack submarines, but they do not have a missile compartment.
    It will be assessing how to do design and build that part of
    the ship, the missile compartment, with the same labor-saving
    techniques that we used on the attack submarines, in that
    section of the ship that we have not looked at in our Navy for
    almost 40 years.
        So, the exact number of tubes, the exact number or
    dimensions of those tubes, the exact speeds, none of those
    things need to be known in the first year of concept and
    research and development. Instead, we do things like we find a
    vendor capable of doing a missile hatch of that size out of the
    type of materials that we need to do--a core test article,
    which is representative, but not identical--and then
    destructively test it to make sure that vendor can give us a
    device or a hatch without flaw.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston, the same question. How
    can you design a future airplane without knowing the results of
    the NPR?
        General Alston. Sir, we won't do that. The follow-on bomber
    requirements--we heard the Secretary of Defense loud and clear,
    in terms of our requirement to improve and take a harder look
    at the requirements that we had already posited, as well as the
    technology that would be available at the time that we need
    this penetrating platform to be available. This platform would
    be informed by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), probably
    even more so than the NPR, but we do see linkages between both
    of those examinations, and we think that we will be better
    informed as the QDR and the NPR analysis continues. So, we
    think there's a strong relationship between the two studies,
    and the outcome of that, with a better set of requirements for
    that platform in the future.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Is the B-1 bomber going to be part of
    the Global Strike Command?
        General Alston. No, sir, it's not. It's a conventional-only
    platform, and that will remain in the Air Combat Command.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Did you have a question, Senator
    Vitter?
        Senator Vitter. I just have one followup.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Go ahead.
        Senator Vitter. I just wanted to follow up on the Senator's
    line.
        Admiral, I take it from what you're saying, you would
    never, for instance, finish design of a submarine before the
    NPR was finished.
        Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Vitter. General, similarly, you would never finish
    design of a new aircraft before this NPR is finished.
        General Alston. No, sir.
        Senator Vitter. I was just suggesting, earlier, that
    logically it seems pretty clear to me we shouldn't finish a new
    START before the NPR is finished. That was my earlier point.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General Carpenter, from an operational
    perspective of the 8th Air Force, what are your plans to
    balance the conventional and nuclear excellence of the bomber
    force?
        General Carpenter. Sir, we've been doing that for a long
    time, ever since we took on the conventional mission in full
    force, starting around the Operation Desert Storm timeframe,
    but with the recent issues with the nuclear mission, obviously
    we've put a lot more focus on the nuclear side, and we designed
    the global deterrent force to address that issue. But, we've
    put a wing in the bucket, if you will, for the nuclear mission,
    and they stayed there for a whole year. So, while Minot Air
    Force Base is in North Dakota, the 2nd Bomber Wing at Barksdale
    is focused on the nuclear mission. So, we have that balance
    now.
        The 4th Squadron becomes a big issue now. When we stand up
    the 4th Squadron at Minot, it fills out that force, so we have
    enough force structure to separate that mission as we can.
        So, while neither are always exclusively focused, we always
    have to keep the nuclear certification, the crews ready to go,
    and the nuclear and on the conventional side, both, but the
    focus shifts from day-to-day, or from year-to-year, if you
    will. So, while the Global Deterrent Force, 2nd Bomber Wing
    right now--or, I'm sorry--and I got that backwards--2nd Bomber
    Wing is in Guam today, and Minot is in the Global Deterrent
    Force, kind of really focused on the nuclear mission, and that
    swaps back and forth. The B-2s don't have the luxury of having
    two separate wings, but they have two separate squadrons. So,
    those two squadrons rotate back and forth, as well, where one
    is always assigned the Global Deterrent Force mission, and they
    focus, primarily at least, on the nuclear mission. When they do
    the training, they really go out and focus on the nuclear side.
    Then, the other squadron is the conventional role. So, we're
    able to do that with the force structure we have today.
        General Alston. Sir, I just might add that, to the credit
    of 8th Air Force and General Elder and now General Carpenter,
    all three of our bomber wings have undergone no-notice nuclear
    surety inspections and have all passed those inspections. Those
    are exceptionally rigorous tests of nuclear requirements, and
    so, we are showing some positive results in that regard.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Now, we're expecting B-52s
    and B-2s to take us all the way through 2030. Are we going to
    be able to sustain their viability?
        General Alston. Yes, sir, we will. I would ask General
    Carpenter to comment on this, as well, but first let me just
    say that the B-52 has a lot of life left in it, and we have
    plans in place to ensure its vitality in both the nuclear and
    conventional roles into the out-years. The B-2 ultimately will
    be facing threats that will exceed its capability as a
    penetrating platform; hence, the reason that we believe we need
    a penetrating platform to take on that responsibility when the
    B-2 may no longer be as effective at that role as we believe it
    is today.
        General Carpenter. I would agree, sir. The great programs
    we have in place now, with the radar programs and all three
    bomber platforms--the B-2 specifically, and the B-52 on the
    books, and the B-1, as well, and the communications upgrades we
    have planned for all those platforms--it will take them well
    into the 2040 timeframe. So, yes, sir, we can sustain those
    weapon systems.
        Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston, you've had to work
    overtime to straighten out the loose nukes and all of that.
    Have you got it under control?
        General Alston. Sir, we absolutely have it under control.
    As you may know, I came into my Pentagon tour about 21 months
    ago, which happened to coincide within days of the challenge
    that we had with the unauthorized munitions transfer. So, I've
    been personally focused on this through this entire assignment.
        My responsibilities have shifted, and right now, as a
    consequence of Secretary Donley's and the Chief of Staff,
    General Schwartz's, decision last fall, I work directly for the
    Chief of Staff now in my responsibilities, on their behalf.
    Their personal leadership drove us to prepare a roadmap that we
    published last fall to set the course, with six principal
    strategic objectives to help the institution focus better and
    achieve the outcomes that we are starting to achieve at this
    time.
        General Carpenter's folks and our other deployed
    commanders, with a lot of very aggressive personal leadership,
    are ensuring the success that we have today. But, we need to
    move forward with the personnel development changes that we
    have underway. We're bringing an additional 2,500 people into
    the nuclear mission over the course of this next year.
        General Chilton has pointed out in previous Defense Science
    Board studies, there has been an erosion of nuclear deterrence
    skills. So, the people component of our effort will continue to
    require the kind of vigilance and focus that we have in motion
    right now, and I believe it will take several more years before
    we feel that we have completely overcome some of the skill
    challenges we have.
        But, we have aggressive inspection programs, we have 100
    percent oversight of all of our inspections. We've changed the
    Air Force corporate structure to have a dedicated nuclear
    operations panel. This is going to ensure a very thorough
    vetting of nuclear-related requirements so that they compete
    well for Air Force resources. Air Force leadership intervention
    has ensured very good resourcing of the nuclear mission at this
    time. So that's a thumbnail of the number of programs that we
    have underway that is fulfilling the Chief and Secretary's
    establishment of reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise as the
    Air Force's number-one priority in the strategic plan.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Part of our labs need to help out the
    intelligence community to support the analysis of foreign
    nuclear capabilities. There's no funding in your budget for
    2010 in the NNSA fiscal year 2010 budget request. Are you going
    to be needing funding for this, coming up in the future?
        Mr. D'Agostino. For intelligence analysis, sir?
        Senator Bill Nelson. For analysis of foreign nuclear
    capabilities and the proliferation challenges.
        Mr. D'Agostino. In a way, the intelligence funding request
    comes through another part of the Department, not through the
    NNSA. But, what I would say, with respect to your question, the
    funding that we do--the same people that do this intelligence
    analysis are the same people that are either experienced
    weapons designers, people that understand the physics behind
    how to understand timers, special detonator devices--these are
    the same people that we start off with in the NNSA. Ultimately,
    as they go through our program, they can shift to other
    divisions in the laboratory. So, Z Division, for example, at
    Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, funded through the
    intelligence program, essentially contained people that started
    off in my program in the NNSA.
        So, the funding that I have ultimately supports
    intelligence, but in an indirect way, by exercising the
    capabilities, by getting these folks exercised, not only
    experiments, but having this design experiment.
        That essentially goes to the previous questions we talked
    about, is, are we sustainable, in the long term? That is why I
    want to get the science and the infrastructure pieces
    essentially on the right track.
        We've turned it around in this budget. We've shifted $130
    million back into the science area, for this very reason. My
    view is, in the out-years we'll ultimately need more, and that
    will be, ultimately, my job within the administration, to work
    this problem in the out-years.
        Senator Bill Nelson. You're going out to outside financing
    for a number of the buildings that you need. Why wouldn't you
    ask for a government line item?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I'll go. For an example, one of the
    facilities you probably allude to, sir, is our Kansas City
    project. That is a General Services Administration project.
    There are a couple of reasons, but let me focus on one that is
    particularly attractive to me as we look at transforming
    ourselves from a kind of a Cold War nuclear weapons complex
    into a 21st-century nuclear security enterprise, and that is, I
    don't know what the future brings with respect to unclassified
    parts that the Kansas City plan may need to make. We may find,
    as a result of our modernization efforts, that we can reduce
    the number or the complexity of these non-nuclear parts and
    find ourselves much more efficient, 20 years from now, if you
    will, from being able to make those parts at our laboratories.
        There's a certain attractiveness that I find in driving
    efficiency in the program if I have a 20-year lease that is
    approved, of course, appropriately--there's a financial
    payback, in this case, of $100 million a year that has been
    audited, we believe--but being able to say, 20 years from now,
    I'm not building a facility that the Nation does not need way
    out into the future. So, from my standpoint, there's a certain
    attractiveness in being able to say, 20 years from now, turning
    that manufacturing facility back over to the developer, and not
    having to worry about maintaining the structure out on the
    taxpayers' burdens.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let's talk about Los Alamos and Y-12.
    That's where the problems are. Tell us about that.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Los Alamos has a proposal that I have not
    approved yet. It's a proposal, right now, for a science
    complex. It's a proposal that we agree that we need to get
    people out of trailers at the laboratory. These are our world-
    class scientists, and yet, we have them in facilities, frankly,
    that I'd be embarrassed to have any of these folks go into. So
    the laboratory is looking at--and we agree that there's a need,
    but now we're in the process of examining--should it be a
    third-party-financed facility, should it be a line-item
    facility, do the numbers work, does the analysis come through?
    General Harencak, who's with me, who's running defense
    programs--I talked to him this morning, frankly, about, where
    are we on our third-party-financed projects? He's looking at
    this--DOD calls it an alternative analysis. What are our
    options with respect to acquisition? Doing what we need for our
    scientists.
        One thing that's clear to me, though, is, for facilities
    that are--we have to be very careful about employing this
    technique. For one thing, it has to be done judiciously.
    Obviously, it has to make a lot of sense, financially, for the
    taxpayers. Obviously, it can't put us in the position where we
    have to be moving large fences around and having pockets of
    uncleared spaces, because, ultimately, if the country decides
    it doesn't need it anymore, then we turn it back over to the
    developer, and then we have an issue of fencelines and the
    like.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The lease would probably provide that,
    if you can't fill it up with the government activities, that
    they could lease it on their own.
        Mr. D'Agostino. If the government walks away from the
    lease, and each arrangement is, in effect, different.
    Certainly----
        Senator Bill Nelson. But, let me just cut to the chase.
        Theoretically you wouldn't have the space leased; they
    could lease the space. You'd be inside the fence.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Theoretically, if we ended up that way,
    yes, sir. Theoretically, yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. You have to watch that.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, absolutely.
        Senator Bill Nelson. We had some very serious problems at
    Air Force bases, on Air Force housing, with the result that,
    inside the fence, at the Air Force base, you could have private
    housing, because the housing could be rented to non-Air Force
    personnel. Now, there's a pecking order that they would have to
    go through, but, theoretically, at the bottom of the pecking
    order, you could have somebody just off the street renting a
    house inside an Air Force base. That's what our present
    condition is. So, we don't want that, especially when you start
    fooling around with facilities in your line of work.
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center,
    an accelerator facility that produces protons for a variety of
    scientific and weapons research, was supposed to have an
    upgrade beginning in fiscal year 2010, but the upgrade was not
    funded. Is this upgrade necessary to maintain nuclear weapons?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Sir, the facility is definitely necessary
    to maintain our stockpile. The upgrade reduces the risk that
    the facility will not--reduces the risk. We want the facility,
    of course, online to support our deterrent out into the future.
    So, the upgrades approach was to take away a fair amount of
    risk associated with the facility going down. You're right,
    sir, first of all, we continue to operate that facility. Second
    of all, you're absolutely right, we need it for neutron cross-
    section measurement for doing material science, nuclear
    science.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. So, you're saying you need it.
    So, what happens to the facility without the upgrade?
        Mr. D'Agostino. What happens without the upgrade is
    increased risk associated with operations. It's a fairly old
    facility. It's something that I believe is an important part of
    maintaining a deterrent and maintaining a laboratory, quite
    frankly, that can attract scientists that want to work in
    material science and in nuclear science.
        Senator Bill Nelson. All right. How much will the full
    upgrade cost, and how long will it take?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I'll give you a sense, sir, but I would
    like to take that for the record, if I could.
        There's rough numbers of $150 to $200 million or so, as
    preconceptual design activities, but I don't have the
    particulars. If I could take that for the record, I will
    provide the answer.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center refurbishment project would
    replace major components of the accelerator and accelerator control
    system that are required to maintain reliable operations and extend the
    life, but would not alter the design capability or capacity. The cost
    is currently estimated at $149 million, and the project could be
    completed within a few years of receiving full funding. This estimated
    cost places the project within the oversight guidelines of the
    Department of Energy order for project management. This order requires
    the cost for a project of this size to be validated; therefore, it is
    possible this estimate could fluctuate.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have a guess on how long?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Multiple years. It's not a 2-year activity.
    It's probably 3 to 5 years, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Let me ask each of you, were your top
    five unfunded priorities--if funds were available, what would
    your top five be?
        Admiral Johnson. Sir, I would like to take that question
    for the record, if I may.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. So, you have to counsel up the
    chain of command?
        Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
        General Alston. Sir, the Air Force would have to do the
    same. We would like to take that for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Admiral Johnson. The President's budget represents the best balance
    of resources to requirements. The Chief of Naval Operations' top
    unfunded priorities includes SSP's considerations and represents the
    top priorities of the Navy if additional funding should become
    available.
        General Alston. Currently we have identified only one unfunded
    strategic deterrence-related requirement for fiscal year 2010, the B-52
    1760 Data Bus Internal Weapons Bay programs, which is on the unfunded
    requirements list submitted by the Chief of Staff on 18 May 09. The B-
    52 1760 Weapons Bay unfunded requirement totals $30.6 million which
    funds modification of the bay to add internal carriage capability for
    smart weapons and overall bomb-load capacity on the B-52. We will
    continue to identify areas requiring additional funding, and develop
    strategies to meet all combatant commanders' requirements.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Do you want to take a stab at it?
    [Laughter.]
        Mr. D'Agostino. I'd like to provide the details for the
    record, but what I would like to iterate--and I can give you
    my--three broad priorities, are----
        Senator Bill Nelson. Modernization?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. Modernization. It's the science
    and the infrastructure that need to do that. But, we'll take
    the question for the record, sir.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        Our top five unfunded priorities, if funds were available,
    would be to: (1) fully satisfy our Directed Stockpile Work
    program of work, including targeted life extensions for the
    weapon systems which support the Navy and Strategic Command
    needs and meet our extended deterrent obligations to our
    allies; (2) protect, replenish, and sustain the science,
    technology, and engineering capabilities required to leverage
    the Nation's significant investment in science-based tools to
    assess the state of the stockpile and certify it's safety,
    security, and reliability; (3) recapitalize our Cold War
    infrastructure so that our special nuclear materials (plutonium
    and uranium) processing capability is assured for the unknown
    future, including actions that will greatly reduce the size of
    the complex and reduce our security costs; (4) begin work on
    specific projects in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative
    that will help achieve some of the goals in the President's
    speech in Prague; and, (5) support International Materials
    Protection and Cooperation activities to reduce special nuclear
    material inventories through down-blending, and initiate
    activities to upgrade security in countries outside of the
    Former Soviet Union.

        Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.
        Thank you all very much. The record will be kept open for 3
    days.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

                   Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson

                          AIR FORCE NUCLEAR ENTERPRISE

        1. Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston, are there any authorities
    that you need or that your successor will need to fully manage,
    oversee, and coordinate the Air Force nuclear enterprise?
        General Alston. I am confident we have the requisite authorities
    and structure in place to ensure enduring stewardship, manage, oversee,
    and coordinate the Air Force nuclear enterprise. The establishment of
    AF/A10 sends a clear and visible signal that the Air Force is committed
    to resolving the fragmented lines of authority across all levels of the
    nuclear enterprise and provides a headquarters Assistant Chief of Staff
    that reports directly to the Chief of Staff with authority to drive
    nuclear enterprise policy, guidance, requirements, and advocacy across
    the Air Staff. I am the single Air Staff authority for all nuclear-
    related issues and have lead responsibility for nuclear operations,
    plans, policy, and requirements.

                                  INSPECTIONS

        2. Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston and Admiral Johnson, the
    Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) also has a role in conducting
    inspections at nuclear facilities. How are the DTRA inspections
    coordinated with the service inspections, what do the DTRA inspections
    cover that the service inspections do not, and what is the benefit from
    each type?
        General Alston. DTRA inspects Air Force nuclear certified units in
    accordance with T.O. 11N-25-1, Department of Defense (DOD) Nuclear
    Weapons Technical Inspection System. These inspections are coordinated
    with the Air Force Inspection Agency (AFIA) and the appropriate nuclear
    major command. DTRA inspections encompass those criteria established in
    T.O. 11N-25-1. The Air Force inspects using the same guidance, as well
    as that contained in AFI 90-201, Inspector General Activities, and
    major command specific supplemental guidance. Additionally, AFIA
    conducts independent oversight of Air Force nuclear surety inspections.
    DTRA inspections allow for an independent assessment, validation, and/
    or oversight of DOD nuclear weapon surety for the Chairman, Joint
    Chiefs of Staff. Air Force inspections, in line with their supplemental
    guidance, validate mission readiness as well as nuclear weapon surety
    for the major command commander and the Secretary of the Air Force.
        Admiral Johnson. There are two types of DTRA inspections associated
    with Navy nuclear weapons certified units. A Defense Nuclear Surety
    Inspection (DNSI) is conducted on a not-to-exceed 5-year basis for each
    certified unit. DTRA is also tasked to conduct Surveillance Inspections
    (SI) that involve DTRA inspection team members providing an over-the-
    shoulder assessment of the Navy's inspection team performance during a
    scheduled service Navy Technical Proficiency Inspection (NTPI).
        DTRA inspections of Navy nuclear weapons units are coordinated
    annually through direct liaison with the organizations responsible for
    Navy inspections. DTRA coordinates inspection scheduling of Navy afloat
    units with the type commanders for submarine inspections and with SSP
    for Strategic Weapons Facility inspections.
        DTRA inspections evaluate the 10 areas directed by the Joint Staff
    (JS) approved Special Weapons Ordnance Publication 25-1 which includes
    Management and Administration; Technical Operations; Tool, Test,
    Tiedown, and Handling Equipment; Condition of Stockpile; Storage and
    Maintenance Facilities; Security, Safety, Supply Support; Nuclear
    Weapon Personnel Reliability Program; and Logistics Movement. A NTPI
    covers an additional four areas which include Nuclear Weapons
    Radiological Controls; Radiation Health; Command and Control; and
    Nuclear Weapons Accident/Incident procedures.
        The benefit of DNSI is subjective and has been called into question
    by recent DOD level reports: Defense Science Board Report of Nuclear
    Surety Inspections, Schlesinger Commission Report, and others.

        3. Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston and Admiral Johnson, do you
    see any use in joint Air Force-Navy inspections? Would joint
    inspections address, among things, the shortage of skilled inspectors?
        General Alston. The Air Force fully supports the current joint
    inspection process performed by DTRA. Any new joint inspection
    requirement for Air Force personnel would have limited applicability
    due to Service-specific mission requirements and weapon systems.
        Admiral Johnson. Joint inspections occur today in the form of DTAR
    DNSI.
        Variations exist in technical operations and weapons system
    facility design between Air Force and Navy. A more consistent Office of
    Secretary of Defense (OSD)/Navy/Air Force criteria for inspection will
    better support a more streamlined DNSI process in the future.

                       BOMBERS AND GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

        4. Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston and General Carpenter, the
    new Global Strike Command, which will stand up at the end of the year,
    will eventually have responsibility for the B-52 and B-2 aircraft. It
    will not have responsibility for the B-1 aircraft. While I understand
    that the B-1 is no longer nuclear capable, on many occasions we have
    been told that the new Global Strike Command is not a reincarnation of
    the old Strategic Air Command and is not ``nuclear command''. In any
    event, the majority of the B-1, B-2, and B-52 sorties is, and will
    continue to be, conventional. I would like to get your personal and
    professional views on whether the B-1 should or should not be part of
    the new command and why?
        General Alston and General Carpenter. The Air Force is reversing
    the trend of declining nuclear mission focus and erosion of nuclear
    expertise. One of the root causes of this trend was fragmented lines of
    authority and responsibility of our nuclear forces. Global Strike
    Command was created to align all nuclear forces under a single command
    and demonstrate full commitment to the global strike mission.
        While our primary focus is on reinvigorating the nuclear
    enterprise, we do realize there is a vital conventional mission for our
    B-52s and B-2s that must not be compromised. The B-1 is currently being
    used as a combat support aircraft in today's operations, and related
    organize, train, and equip responsibilities will be retained by Air
    Combat Command. Additionally, Global Strike Command will provide the
    necessary leadership and focus to effectively balance the nuclear and
    conventional missions of the B-2s and B-52s to ensure they are ready to
    support the warfighter when called upon by combatant commanders.

                       LOS ALAMOS NEUTRON SCIENCE CENTER

        5. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the Los Alamos Neutron
    Science Center (LANSCE), an accelerator facility that produces protons
    for a variety of scientific and weapons research, was supposed to have
    an upgrade beginning in fiscal year 2010, but the upgrade was not
    funded. Is the LANSCE upgrade necessary to maintain nuclear weapons?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The LANSCE facility is currently used to conduct
    experiments to answer specific stockpile-relevant questions, the
    answers to which are required to improve the science-based tools which
    allow certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile without resorting
    to underground nuclear testing. Those experiments include precision
    measurements of nuclear data on special materials important to nuclear
    weapons performance, classified experiments, and experiments utilizing
    high explosives and proton radiography. The weapons program requires
    data from LANSCE. The loss of the data from LANSCE would seriously
    affect our ability to improve our stockpile stewardship tools and
    therefore our capability to maintain the stockpile without testing.
    Unfortunately, the LANSCE accelerator facility has not received
    adequate preventive maintenance for years. Many of its components are
    long past their expected lifetimes and spares are in short supply. In
    the opinion of experts, the accelerator is ``running to failure.'' The
    failure of any one of the major components could result in a loss of
    continued operation of the facility for an extended period. The
    probability of a failure grows each year without refurbishment; yet
    other funding priorities within funding constraints have required that
    the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) continues to absorb
    this risk. It was a Presidential initiative to cancel the original
    LANSCE refurbishment partly because we acknowledged that cheaper
    approaches to ameliorate these problems were available. These are now
    under consideration.

        6. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, what happens to the LANSCE
    facility without the upgrade?
        Mr. D'Agostino. It isn't really possible to know how long the
    accelerator will be able to operate without refurbishment. All of the
    individual components are in principle repairable indefinitely, but in
    practice, we expect that the reliability of the facility will continue
    to decay without further investment. Without the refurbishment, we are
    accepting increased risk of major component failures affecting
    continued operations and increasingly large downtime.

        7. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, how much would the full
    upgrade cost and how long would it take to complete?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The LANSCE refurbishment project would replace
    major components of the accelerator and accelerator control system that
    are required to maintain reliabe operations and extend the life, but
    would not alter the design capability or capacity. The cost is
    currently estimated at about $150 million, and the project could be
    completed within a few years of receiving full funding. This estimated
    cost places the project within the oversight guidelines of the
    Department of Energy order for project management. This order requires
    the cost for a project of this size to be validated; therefore, it is
    possible this estimate could fluctuate.

            NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION REORGANIZATION

        8. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the Strategic Posture
    Commission made several recommendations with respect to the
    organization of the NNSA. One in particular was focused on the
    regulatory environment. It appears that there might have been some
    confusion on the part of the Commission with respect to the role of the
    Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), which is not a
    regulatory body, when they suggested that the nuclear weapons complex
    be regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) rather than the
    DNFSB. Have you looked at the cost and the impact of having the nuclear
    weapons complex regulated by the NRC in lieu of the self-regulation
    that is in place today?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The NNSA has considered the impact of having the
    weapons complex regulated by the NRC in lieu of self regulation. We
    have not evaluated the cost impact of NRC regulation as opposed to
    self-regulation; however, there are several reasons that continued
    self-regulation is advisable.
        The first is that self-regulation has demonstrated an enviable
    nuclear safety record. Although the Commission was critical of our
    treatment of requirements, it did not question the safety of our
    operations.
        The second is that self-regulation permits the operational
    flexibility we need with respect to nuclear safety requirements to
    ensure we meet our mission. Following recommendations from the Colombia
    Accident Investigation and those of the DNFSB, we have established a
    Central Technical Authority and associated safety infrastructure to
    evaluate and concur on requests for relief from nuclear safety
    requirements where appropriate. Since September 2005, we have received
    and evaluated 20 requests for related exemptions. Only two were
    ultimately denied. Our streamlined evaluation process allows a quick
    turnaround where warranted, and exemptions have been concurred on in
    less than a day from receipt. Such responsiveness would not be possible
    with external regulation. Our demonstrated ability to grant relief
    where warranted provides effective control over the requirements under
    which we operate.
        Finally, external regulation would not relieve NNSA from the need
    to oversee nuclear safety. Most of our nuclear facilities are unique
    and provide products and services that are vital to our mission and
    that cannot be obtained elsewhere. In addition to possible damage to
    personnel, public, and the environment, a serious accident in one of
    our facilities would result in a loss of capability that would
    jeopardize our mission. If a public power utility has an accident,
    power can be obtained at a higher cost from other utilities. The same
    is not true for our operations. If our plutonium facility (for example)
    shuts down there is no replacement for the lost services and our
    mission is crippled. The same is true of most of our facilities. Thus,
    from a business perspective, our mission responsibilities require us to
    ensure that our nuclear facilities are operated safely. External
    regulation would result in more oversight, not less. These and similar
    considerations have led us to conclude that it is best if NNSA
    continues to self-regulate.

                              TRIDENT D-5 MISSILES

        9. Senator Bill Nelson. Admiral Johnson, the Navy is moving towards
    more fixed-price type contracts to purchase the D-5 ballistic missile,
    which is used on the Trident ballistic missile submarine. In making
    this transition what are the issues that concern you most?
        Admiral Johnson. SSP recognizes the potential value of using fixed-
    price type contracts for mature production efforts and has committed to
    transition to the use of such contracts beginning in fiscal year 2011,
    where appropriate. As we make this transition there are several issues
    that concern us.
        First, there is a concern that the contractor may be motivated to
    make cost, performance, and safety tradeoffs that might not be in the
    best interest of the program or the Nation. Through the years, SSP has
    developed and implemented an acquisition strategy that maintains a
    primary focus on safety and reliability, while managing cost risk at or
    below budget. Because of the strategic importance of the system, any
    deviation from this successful acquisition strategy could engender
    unintended consequences that could impact the safety and reliability of
    the weapon. SSP will closely monitor contractor performance to ensure
    we maintain the optimal balance between contractor assumption of
    significant cost risk and managing an acceptable level of technical
    risk.
        Our second concern is maintaining the affordability of the system.
    While Trident II (D5) is a mature production program, the nature of the
    technical requirements leads to a program that still contains
    significant risk. The technical requirements of the D5 missile are
    unique in many respects. The volume limitation of the launch tubes
    combined with the stringent range performance requirements dictate the
    need for high energy class 1.1 propellants in the rocket motors. This
    technology is unique to the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM)
    systems, and is not otherwise supported by other DOD or commercial
    (space) applications. A similar situation exists for the Trident Post
    Boost Control System components. Driven by the requirement for a
    Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle capability and the
    submarine safety requirements of using solid propellants, the designs,
    materials, and processes are unique to the SLBM system and are not
    supported by other government or commercial applications. Additionally,
    the electronics designs are driven by the need for radiation hardened
    components capable of performing in hostile environments. These unique
    requirements combined with very low production rates driven by budget
    constraints result in an increasingly fragile supplier base which
    requires constant management and oversight by the prime contractors to
    ensure a continuous supply of safe, reliable components. The ever
    present potential for complex, expensive efforts to requalify
    substitutes for legacy technologies and loss of suppliers represents
    significant cost risk along with the attendant technical risk which, in
    a fixed-price environment, would inevitably result in higher prime
    contractor cost proposals.
        Finally, we are concerned about the potential degradation of the
    open communication between SSP and its prime contractors. The success
    of the Trident program is due in no small measure to the cooperative
    government/contractor partnership developed over the past 50 years.
    When potential problems are identified they are discussed openly and
    solutions are developed through a collaborative effort. In a fixed-
    price environment, our contractors may be more motivated to
    unilaterally increase technical risk in an effort to save costs. This
    incremental increase in program risk may not be immediately apparent,
    but could lead to a cumulative unacceptable level of risk in the
    program.

                        HELICOPTERS FOR THE ICBM FIELDS

        10. Senator Bill Nelson. General Alston, for years the Air Force
    has been searching for replacement helicopters for use in the ICBM
    fields. In your prepared statement you are introducing a program to
    replace the old, Vietnam-era helicopters. What is the new program and
    what is the fiscal year 2010 funding?
        General Alston. The Common Vertical Lift Support Platform (CVLSP)
    program will replace the existing 39 year old UH-1N helicopter fleet.
    CVLSP will provide vertical lift support for a number of missions
    including: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) nuclear weapon
    convoy escort, ICBM emergency security response, and National Capitol
    Region emergency response support. The UH-1N has deficiencies in
    carrying capacity, speed, range, endurance, and survivability for
    meeting mission requirements.
        The fiscal year 2010 budget requests $9.5 million of RDT&E for the
    CVLSP program. This funding supports development of statutory and
    regulatory acquisition documentation along with activities to support a
    request for proposal and source selection.

                         MISSILE AND COMPONENT TESTING

        11. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, General Alston, and
    Admiral Johnson, the Services and NNSA work together to establish and
    conduct a minimum number of missile and component tests to ensure
    reliability. Most years there are not enough tests to meet the minimum
    standards. What is the minimum number of tests, including the number of
    joint test assemblies (JTAs), that are needed in fiscal year 2010 and
    are all of these tests funded? If not, why not?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Each weapon system has a testing plan that will
    feed the reliability model so a proper reliability assessment can be
    made. The number and type of tests for each weapon system varies every
    year based upon trends that are discovered and data gaps from previous
    years. NNSA accomplishes system, component, material, margin, aging,
    and flight tests as well as performing modeling and simulation
    programs. Joint flight testing with the DOD has the highest priority
    within the surveillance and assessment program. There are currently 19
    joint flight tests planned for fiscal year 2010. All are fully funded.
    While additional laboratory tests would certainly enhance our
    confidence in the stockpile, NNSA must also prioritize this testing and
    assessment work against all of the other NNSA workload to maximize the
    benefit of the budget allocation.
        General Alston. Reliability testing involves both the delivery
    system and the warhead or bomb. DOD's portion of weapon system
    reliability is computed using the delivery system reliability combined
    with the weapon's or bomb's reliability. Warhead and bomb reliability
    testing requirements are NNSA's responsibility, with the number of
    associated JTAs determined in consultation with the Services.
        A minimum of four ICBM tests, all using JTAs, are required to
    determine weapon system reliability. The Air Force conducts
    approximately one test every 4 months, resulting in a 16-month cycle to
    determine weapon system reliability. This frequency meets the minimum
    requirement for nuclear weapons planning activities.
        A minimum of eight gravity weapon tests per year (five strategic
    and three non-strategic), all using JTAs, are required to determine
    reliability.
        A minimum of eight Air Launched Cruise Missile tests per year,
    three using JTAs, are required to determine reliability.
        In total, the Air Force has 19 fully funded reliability tests
    scheduled in fiscal year 2010, 14 of which will also contribute to
    warhead reliability testing, requiring NNSA support with JTAs.
        Admiral Johnson. Reliability is determined by a combination of
    flight test and ground test activities. The Navy performs four Trident
    II Follow-on Commander Evaluation Tests to validate that the weapons
    system continues its demonstrated performance in terms of reliability
    and accuracy as required by U.S. Strategic Command Instruction 526-1.
    Within the Navy flight test program, we fly four test heads (three NNSA
    JTAs and one Navy Enhanced Navy Test Bed) per weapon type to maintain
    reliability of Navy/NNSA components. These flight tests and hardware
    are funded in the President's budget request. The Navy requirement for
    ground test evaluation is 11 warheads per year to be disassembled,
    tested, and 10 reassembled into war reserve units. The Navy portion of
    the cost of this testing is in the President's budget, the NNSA portion
    should be in the NNSA budget.

                                      B-2

        12. Senator Bill Nelson. General Carpenter, the B-2 budget request
    for fiscal year 2010 includes $16.8 million to integrate the Massive
    Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) on the B-2. Has DTRA completed the MOP
    development program?
        General Carpenter. No, the DTRA technology demonstration is
    scheduled to complete in calendar year 2009. The MOP is being developed
    in three phases. Phase I (Concept Refinement) and Phase II (Design and
    Preliminary Testing) have been successfully completed. Phase III,
    Weapon Performance Demonstration, is underway and will culminate with
    MOP research and development flight tests from a B-52 aircraft.
        B-2 integration efforts are occurring concurrently with the DTRA
    effort and will culminate with final hardware buildup and testing
    during the Air Force program.

        13. Senator Bill Nelson. General Carpenter, what is the capability
    and purpose of the MOP and why is it being integrated on the B-2?
        General Carpenter. MOP will provide the B-2 with a capability to
    defeat very hard and deeply buried targets such as deep bunkers and
    tunnel facilities. MOP is designed to improve weapon survivability,
    lethality, and penetration compared to existing Air Force penetrator
    weapons.
        The purpose of MOP technology demonstration program is to
    demonstrate the survivability, lethality, and penetration of a 30,000-
    lb. class penetrator weapon. The purpose of the MOP Quick Reaction
    Program is to deliver an improved Hard and Deeply Buried Target (HDBT)
    defeat capability beyond the Air Force's current (2,000-lb. and 5,000-
    lb. class) penetrator weapons.
        MOP is being integrated on the B-2 to provide a capability to
    defeat high value assets in HDBTs in a high threat environment.

        14. Senator Bill Nelson. General Carpenter, what is the requirement
    that the MOP is satisfying?
        General Carpenter. MOP requirement is captured in the following
    Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated documents: HDBT-Defeat
    Mission Area Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) dated January 20,
    2005; and in HDBT Characterize, Engage and Assess ICD dated September
    19, 2005. Those documents specify a requirement for improved HDBT
    defeat capability beyond the Air Force's current (2,000-lb. and 5,000-
    lb. class) penetrator weapons. Additionally, the 2006 HDBT Analysis of
    Alternatives Weapons Effectiveness Study found that MOP provides
    greatly improved HDBT defeat capability and the 2007 Air Force
    Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment highlighted the need for HDBT
    defeat capability. Most recently, the Air Force received an Urgent
    Operational Need (UON) request for a HDBT capability. The UON has been
    endorsed by multiple COCOMs.

                                FUTURE CONCEPTS

        15. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, General Alston, and
    Admiral Johnson, in thinking about the future of the life extension
    programs for nuclear weapons in a smaller stockpile without testing,
    there may be opportunities to fundamentally improve the safety,
    security, and reliability of the weapons. This could include having a
    complete inventory of weapons with fire-resistant pits, insensitive
    high explosives, and other safety and security features. To do this
    could require replacing or rebuilding the pit or the secondary and
    other components of a weapon or slightly reducing the yield of the
    weapon. Have there been discussions about this type of approach for the
    future?
        Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, NNSA is working closely with DOD to study
    opportunities for life extension programs (LEPs) that would increase
    surety (safety, security, anti-use control) and reliability in the
    nuclear weapons stockpile. Within the context of the joint NNSA-DOD
    Phase 6.x acquisition process, NNSA iterates the military requirements
    with the DOD and conducts design and trade studies. These studies
    examine trade-offs between improvements in surety and potential
    reductions in performance (yield), as well as other impacts to both DOD
    and NNSA. The amount of rework required to improve weapon surety varies
    between weapon system and detailed assessments already required to
    understand the trade space. The optimal technical approach for the
    future involves modernizing the stockpile by selecting from among the
    spectrum of options described in the Perry/Schlesinger Congressional
    Posture Review Report. Success in improving the safety, security, and
    reliability of the nuclear weapon stockpile will require all of the
    tools developed in the stockpile stewardship program and support for
    the Nation's nuclear weapons enterprise. The affordability of making
    such improvements in safety and surety must ultimately be considered in
    relation to other priorities. Such investment decisions should be made
    on the best available analysis as derived from the planned studies.
        For example, the current B61 LEP Phase 6.2 (Feasibility Study and
    Option Down-Select) was initiated by the Nuclear Weapons Council in
    September 2008, and is conducting an assessment to determine
    requirements and options for improving safety, security, use control,
    and reliability. This study is examining the amount of pit and
    secondary work that would accompany certain proposed surety
    enhancements. Although the B61 is an insensitive high explosive (IHE)
    weapon, and contains some of the most advanced surety features in the
    stockpile, additional features are being considered to address current
    and postulated future threats. Other weapons could require even more
    extensive nuclear explosive package (NEP) modifications to update their
    surety features, to include, for instance, replacing conventional high
    explosive with IHE. LEPs would require more extensive NEP rework, which
    would be assessed during the study phase and in conjunction with DOD.
    Preliminary discussions on such improvements to the W78 ICBM warhead
    are already underway with the Air Force, prior to entering its LEP
    study phase.
        Accomplishing these improvements to the safety, security, and
    reliability of the stockpile without nuclear testing is understandably
    challenging and will integrate all of the tools developed under the
    stockpile stewardship to ensure success. In addition, understanding the
    overall enterprise capacity for design and production drives the time
    to achieve a stockpile with modern safety and security features.
    Optimizing the order and priority of weapons is an ongoing conversation
    between the NNSA and DOD communities and requires all participants for
    success. However, a modernized stockpile with improved safety,
    security, and reliability is achievable and should be actively pursued.
        General Alston. Yes. The Air Force has established long-term goals
    with NNSA to incorporate enhanced surety features (safety, security,
    and use-control features) and reliability in life extension programs.
    Additional considerations include reduced maintenance workload,
    complexity, and cost. The use of alternative pits and major components,
    along with the possibility of reduced yield (which may be offset by
    increased accuracy) or other performance trade-offs would also be
    factors in planning for the long-term viability and reliability of the
    future nuclear deterrent stockpile, consistent with congressional
    direction and support.
        Admiral Johnson. The Navy, in coordination with NNSA through the
    Project Officers Group, is evaluating options for maintaining the
    Navy's nuclear deterrent that include improving weapon safety,
    security, and reliability. For example, in coordination with the NNSA,
    the Navy, Air Force, and United Kingdom are working on a joint fuze
    effort to leverage technologies across Services. In addition, the Navy
    is coordinating with NNSA to look at safety and security technology
    applications in the planning and development of current and future
    Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) weapons.

                         COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

        16. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the United States has
    maintained nuclear weapons for 17 years without explosive nuclear
    weapons testing. As one lab director recently said, ``we know how to do
    this.'' On the other hand, there are many experimental and
    computational tools, and skilled people needed to do this task. What is
    needed in the way of tools, people, and funding to continue to maintain
    the stockpile over the next 5 to 10 years without nuclear testing, and
    does the fiscal year 2010 budget support this? If not, why not, and
    what is missing or not funded?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The Stockpile Stewardship program has invested in
    improved experimental and simulation capabilities--e.g., Dual-axis
    Hydrodynamic Radiographic Test (DAHRT) facility, National Ignition
    Facility (NIF), and Advanced Simulatilon and Computing (ASC) tools--as
    key elements of a comprehensive science-based approach to the nuclear
    mission. Employing these capabilities is essential to deliver the
    robust, scientific underpinning needed to maintain the legacy stockpile
    over the coming decade. Additional resources would enable us to
    recapitalize major production facilities and enhance the science and
    engineering and Directed Stockpile Work needed to transform the
    stockpile to a smaller, more reliable deterrent without Underground
    Tests (UGTs). We incur more risk each year as the stockpile ages,
    critical skills erode, and historic UGT data becomes less relevant. The
    recent Perry Schlesinger Report indicates that in order to keep a vital
    skills base we will need to evolve the legacy stockpile by
    demonstrating capability to field modern warheads that have no new
    military capabilities. We have not fielded a modern warhead in two
    decades, and critical skills are deteriorating. Activities are needed
    now to ensure experienced designers and engineers can mentor a new
    generation. Additionally, the growing dependence on scientific
    understanding for the future stockpile will require additional experts
    in theory, experiments, and simulation.
        Each year the NNSA evaluates its ability to accomplish its mission
    and prioritizes its work scope within available resources across a 5-
    year horizon. Our fiscal year 2010 request is sufficient to assure the
    safety and reliability of the current stockpile and sustain critical
    skills as we wait for the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to conclude and
    the national level direction to be provided for the future stockpile.
        We anticipate that identified funding levels for the out-years may
    not be sufficient to meet the post-NPR stockpile requirements--
    including directed stockpile work, science-based stewardship, and
    recapitalization of NNSA's aging plutonium and highly-enriched uranium
    facilities--along with the requisite skills to be successful.

                      MAINTAINING CRITICAL SKILLS AT NNSA

        17. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, maintaining critical
    skills throughout the NNSA complex is necessary to maintain a smaller
    stockpile in absence of nuclear weapons testing. This is not a new
    revelation but the Strategic Posture Commission (the Perry-Schlesinger
    Commission) has raised this issue again as one of their highest
    priority issues. What specifically is the NNSA plan to maintain these
    skills and transfer them to a next generation?
        Mr. D'Agostino. I am committed that the talents and facilities of
    the NNSA can and should be brought to bear on science and technology
    for the full complement of national security challenges. I am working
    to broaden the NNSA mission to become a science and technology arm for
    national security issues, a resource to which other agencies with
    national security responsibilities turn. By taking on the additional
    challenge of national security science and technology, we can provide
    the next generation of graduate students in science and engineering
    with exciting and relevant scientific challenges at premier research
    facilities such as Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National
    Laboratories, so that they may contribute to the security of our
    Nation.
        In the absence of nuclear testing, the mission of the Defense
    Programs laboratories is focused on Science-Based Stockpile
    Stewardship. The success depends on the ability to show that
    simulations can credibly be used to replace nuclear testing as a means
    of ensuring stockpile confidence. Universities recognize the challenge
    in developing new kinds of simulation tools across a number of related
    disciplines to accomplish this mission.
        Multitude of university collaboration programs are being conducted
    by NNSA that include establishing focused center of excellence at
    universities performing leading-edge research to graduate and
    undergraduate internships and summer institutes in various disciplines
    at the laboratories. In addition, NNSA funds fellowships, Research
    Centers of Excellence, Minority Serving Institution partnerships, post-
    doctoral appointments, and critical skills development programs. These
    activities not only engage academic communities in advanced research in
    areas of critical importance to NNSA but also maintain hiring pipelines
    from university graduates to the national laboratories. NNSA's
    investment in key critical skills pipeline programs exceeds $74 million
    annually.
        NNSA also offers unique capabilities and facilities such as the
    Roadrunner, the world's fastest computer; National Ignition Facility,
    the most powerful laser in the world; the Microsystems Engineering
    Science Applications facility, a premier micro-electronics facility;
    and the LANSCE, doing research that helps maintain the Nation's nuclear
    deterrent, counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and lay
    the foundation for many of the products we use in our daily lives by
    supporting materials, sciences, and technology. These are but a few of
    the capabilities and facilities that attract university researchers and
    in turn, universities develop cutting-edge simulation tools,
    experimental methods, et cetera that are critical to NNSA's mission.
    Specific examples of collaboration include the Advanced Simulation and
    Computing (ASC) Program's 10-year $220 million Academic Strategic
    Alliance Program (ASAP) (1997-2007) and the followup, 5-year $87
    million Predictive Science Academic Alliance Program (PSAAP) (2008-
    2013); and the Science Campaign's Stockpile Stewardship Academic
    Alliances Program (SSAA). These programs engage multiple universities
    in the country and research conducted through these partnerships
    contributes to the knowledge base required to demonstrate the
    capabilities of predictive modeling and simulation across a broad
    spectrum of science and engineering applications using some of the most
    powerful computers in the world. The ASAP, PSAAP, and SSAA encourage
    collaboration between the national laboratories and universities in the
    advancement of multi-disciplinary predictive modeling and simulation
    technologies, and educating and recruiting individuals with skills
    critical to the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

                       STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS-STOCKPILE MIX

        18. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, with the possibility of a
    smaller stockpile there is the possibility that there will be fewer
    types of nuclear weapons in the future. In preparation for the NPR, is
    NNSA looking at the technical feasibility of reducing the total number
    of weapons types and how technically feasible it is to reduce the
    number of redundant warheads? For example would it be possible to have
    an ICBM warhead serve as a backup for an SLBM warhead?
        Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA's Defense Programs is a force provider to the
    DOD and does not establish the mix of weapons or the stockpile
    quantities needed to support the mission. As an active participant in
    the DOD-led NPR, NNSA is assisting DOD in assessing the nuclear weapons
    stockpile needs of the future. NNSA will be supporting DOD in the
    process to define options for force size and mix of weapons in the
    future stockpile. Currently, the operational environments of ICBMs and
    SLBMs differ significantly and no current warhead meets the
    requirements of both. The DOD would be the appropriate agency to
    determine if warfighting needs for such things as military targeting,
    weapon effects against targets, and military characteristics such as
    reliability and survivability could be met by having an ICBM warhead
    serve as a backup for an SLBM warhead.

        19. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, would the overall
    stockpile be easier to maintain if there were fewer types of nuclear
    weapons, and if so, why?
        Mr. D'Agostino. While ``easier'' is subjective, there are
    sustainment advantages to having fewer types of nuclear weapons. Fewer
    warhead types would reduce the variety of surveillance and maintenance
    activities. Furthermore, it would reduce the number of life extension
    programs. Over the long-term, it would also reduce the diversity of
    weapons capabilities and expertise needed across the Nuclear Security
    Enterprise. Once the entire inventory of a particular weapon type is
    retired, NNSA could eliminate recurring activities and funding needed
    to support such efforts as maintenance, core surveillance, assessment,
    and other design and production support; however, NNSA will need
    continued funding for associated weapons experts, safety, surveillance,
    and dismantlement and disposition of weapon components until all
    activities associated with the retired weapon type are complete.
        There are counterpoints to these advantages. Fewer weapons types
    will reduce the capabilities provided to the DOD. The DOD would have to
    respond regarding the impact this reduction of capability would have on
    mission effectiveness. For the NNSA, even though there are potential
    cost avoidances by reducing nuclear weapon types in the stockpile,
    there are also potential investments needed. For example, having
    multiple nuclear weapon types available for each weapon system in the
    triad does provide confidence that one technical failure will not
    completely negate one leg of the triad. By eliminating redundancy, the
    confidence in the reliability of each remaining system will be much
    more critical. Modernization of the stockpile and an even greater
    reliance on surveillance and the tools of Stockpile Stewardship will be
    essential to provide credibility of deterrence.

                           COMPUTATIONAL CAPABILITIES

        20. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. D'Agostino, the computational
    capabilities of all the labs have proved to be the real game changer
    for maintaining nuclear weapons in the absence of nuclear testing. As
    you move from two-dimensional modeling to three-dimensional modeling,
    is NNSA able to fund fully the code development and hardware needs of
    the stockpile stewardship program?
        Mr. D'Agostino. The NNSA Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC)
    Program and DOE Office of Science's Advanced Scientific Computing
    Research have recently established a long-term collaboration and have
    charged a steering committee of laboratory technical experts to
    identify the impediments to exascale and strategies for overcoming
    them. Once the steering committee's analysis is properly vetted, we
    will understand the schedule and resources required to achieve exascale
    computing and move our trusted codes to this next generation of
    computing.
        One of the greatest successes of the ASC program has been the
    successful addition of three-dimensional capability in the codes and
    the corresponding computer power to run highly resolved, three-
    dimensional calculations. So while many of the day-to-day calculations
    run in two dimensions for practical computing purposes, three-
    dimensional capability also exists to explore detailed weapons
    characteristics and explore scientific phenomena. Because of the grand
    challenge nature of the modeling and simulation in ASC, this will
    continue to be a balancing act for code development and hardware--as
    well as other aspects of the program.
        For the near future, the ASC program is working to maintain
    expertise, utilize peer-review, and sustain healthy code teams to
    improve the scientific underpinnings of the codes and meet the
    simulation needs of the SSP for key applications. This will be
    supported by the Roadrunner, Zia, and Sequoia platforms slated to run
    these simulations.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter

                             NEXT GENERATION BOMBER

        21. Senator Vitter. General Alston, 20 B-2s are the only long-range
    strike assets in the Air Force inventory that can access high threat
    environments and survive. These aircrafts have not been in production
    since 1997 and so there are no viable replacements to backfill losses.
    When a B-2 crashed in Guam in 2007, the Air Force lost 5 percent of its
    stealthy long-range strike fleet. The B-52 and B-1 have been upgraded
    numerous times to take advantage of new technology such as precision
    strike, global positioning systems, and targeting pods. However,
    stealth can never be incorporated into these aircrafts and they could
    remain vulnerable to attacks by surface-to-air missiles and fighters.
        It is important to remember that in the final days of Vietnam, the
    Air Force lost 15 B-52s in 12 days during Operation Linebacker II. Air
    defenses have advanced markedly since then, but 47 percent of the long-
    range strike fleet is comprised of these same B-52s. While aircrafts
    such as the F-22 are certainly useful in certain scenarios, tactical
    strike assets require access to regional bases and forward deployed
    logistical support.
        As recent events at Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan and K2 in
    Uzbekistan have illustrated, access to regional operating bases is
    becoming increasingly tenuous. Furthermore, potential adversaries have
    anti-access and area denial capabilities that could severely curtail
    operations at these forward bases. Taking all of this into
    consideration, what were the original Air Force recommendations in the
    Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) for the Next Generation Bomber?
        General Alston. The Air Force manages Long Range Strike (LRS)
    capability through execution of its three-phase strategy: sustain and
    modernize the legacy bomber fleet, develop a mid-term LRS capability
    survivable in a high threat environment, and create a long-term
    solution using advanced technologies to generate revolutionary LRS
    capabilities. The existing bomber fleet, while aging, uses focused
    sustainment and modernization programs to maintain mission relevance,
    addressing issues with communications, navigation, electronic attack,
    and weapons delivery systems, as well as for integrating new weapons
    onto the B-52. While these aircraft do face survivability concerns
    against advanced air defenses, this can be mitigated by using
    complementary capabilities, such as standoff weapons. To address this,
    the Air Force has funded in fiscal year 2010 an Analysis of
    Alternatives (AOA) for a Long Range Standoff follow-on capability that
    will mitigate the high threat scenarios. America's bombers retain
    superior direct attack capability in lower threat environments. These
    continuing Air Force efforts ensure the bomber fleet continues to be a
    responsive, flexible, adaptive, and lethal platform able to support the
    Nation's LRS requirements.
        Concerning the Next Generation Bomber (NGB), as part of its second
    phase, the Air Force was actively pursuing LRS capability to meet
    emerging operational requirements. One specific initiative within this
    effort, completed in 2007, was an AOA that identified the most
    promising of many possible aircraft designs. In April 2009, OSD
    cancelled the NGB program with Secretary Gates citing the need to
    better define the need, requirement, and technology required for this
    complex program. As a next step, the Air Force is fully committed to
    supporting and participating in the ongoing 2009 Quadrennial Defense
    Review (QDR) and accompanying NPR. After completion of the reviews, the
    Air Force will reevaluate its LRS strategy based on direction and
    findings from the reviews.

        22. Senator Vitter. General Alston, what threat-based analysis
    changed this requirement?
        General Alston. The decision to cancel the Next Generation Bomber
    was directed by the Secretary of Defense in the fiscal year 2010 budget
    submission until we have a better understanding of the need, the
    requirement, and the technology. The Air Force supports the QDR and NPR
    to assess future strategic requirements.

        23. Senator Vitter. General Alston, stand-off weapons are key
    enablers for legacy bombers that are increasingly less survivable in
    defended air space. Conventional air launched cruise missiles (CALCM)
    comprise the majority of the Air Force's stand-off weaponry inventory,
    but recent comments by Air Force leaders suggest that these systems
    will not be viable over the long-run. This year's budget paused joint
    air to surface standoff missile (JASSM) acquisition, the replacement
    for CALCM. Why did this pause occur?
        General Alston. JASSM went through Nunn-McCurdy certification in
    fiscal years 2007-2008 based on unit cost increases. Defense
    Acquisition Executive direction out of Nunn-McCurdy was to test Lot 5
    missiles prior to awarding the fiscal year 2009 contract. This test
    resulted in 6 successes out of 10 shots. Based on the test results, the
    program was paused to incorporate fixes identified during the Nunn-
    McCurdy certification, determine root causes of the failures on Lot 5,
    and incorporate necessary fixes on Lot 5, Lot 6, and Lot 7 missiles.
    With the delay of the Lot 8 award, fiscal year 2010 production money
    was removed.

        24. Senator Vitter. General Alston, will the Air Force continue to
    invest in JASSM?
        General Alston. Yes, the Air Force is committed to the JASSM
    program as it is the Nation's only stealthy, conventional, precision,
    launch-and-leave, standoff missile capable of being launched from
    fighter and bomber aircraft. As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification,
    OSD certified the JASSM program's importance to Congress and stated
    that there are no alternatives to the JASSM program which will provide
    equal or greater military capability at less cost.

        25. Senator Vitter. General Alston, is the Air Force investigating
    new technologies that enhance or supersede JASSM?
        General Alston. Yes, the Air Force is investigating both
    enhancements to JASSM and technologies to supersede JASSM.
        The Air Force is committed to the JASSM program as it is the
    Nation's only stealthy, conventional, precision, launch-and-leave,
    standoff missile capable of being launched from fighter and bomber
    aircraft. As part of the Nunn-McCurdy Certification effort, OSD
    certified the JASSM program's importance to Congress and stated that
    there are no alternatives to the JASSM program which will provide equal
    or greater military capability at less cost. Near-term enhancements to
    the baseline JASSM missile include extended range (ER) and Anti-Surface
    Warfare (ASuW) variants. Currently in development, JASSM-ER uses a
    different engine and larger fuel tanks to significantly increase
    standoff capability. In addition, the Air Force is investigating a
    JASSM/ASuW variant that would integrate a datalink onto the weapon and
    update JASSM software to enable attacking moving surface ships.
        The Air Force, in conjunction with the Air Force Research
    Laboratory (AFRL) and other national laboratories, is constantly
    looking at the next level of technologies. The Air Force is researching
    technologies for higher survivability weapons, high speed (up to
    hypersonic) weapons, and directed energy but none are planned to be
    operational within the Future Years Defense Plan. One example is an Air
    Combat Command (ACC) coordinated effort working with AFRL on a
    Technologies for Responsive Precision Air Strike (TRESPAS)/Technologies
    for Responsive Precision Air-Land-Surface Strike (TRESPAL2) concept
    which will examine future technologies that can be developed to strike
    fixed and mobile targets with varying degrees of weapon effects.

        [Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]