    [Senate Hearing 111-184]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 111-184

     FROM STRATEGY TO IMPLEMENTATION: STRENGTHENING U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

    FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, FEDERAL SERVICES,
                    AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

                                     of the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                   HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                                     of the

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  JULY 7, 2009

                                   __________

           Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

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            COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                   JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
    CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    MARK PRYOR, Arkansas                 GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
    MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    JON TESTER, Montana
    ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
    MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado

                      Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
         Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
                      Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
                                     ------

     SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION,
                  FEDERAL SERVICES, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

                      THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman
    CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
    MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas              GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
    ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois

                        John Kilvington, Staff Director
                   Velvet Johnson, Professional Staff Member
        Bryan Parker, Staff Director and General Counsel to the Minority
                       Deirdre G. Armstrong, Chief Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statements:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Carper...............................................     1
        Senator Akaka................................................    14
        Senator Levin................................................    16
        Senator Burris...............................................    19
    Prepared statements:
        Senator Carper...............................................    47
        Senator Burris...............................................    50

                                   WITNESSES
                             Tuesday, July 7, 2009

    Hon. Mark Udall, a U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado.......     4
    Paul W. Jones, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and
      Pakistan, and Deputy Assisant Secretary of State for South and
      Central Asia, Office of the Special Representative for
      Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State.............     7
    Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The
      Heritage Foundation............................................    25
    Nicholas Schmidle, Fellow, New America Foundation................    27
    Shuja Nawaz, Director, South Asia Center, The Atlantic Council...    29
    Nathaniel Fick, Chief Executive Officer, Center for a New
      American Security..............................................    32
    Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
      International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
      Harvard University.............................................    34

                         Alphabetical List of Witnesses

    Curtis, Lisa:
        Testimony....................................................    25
        Prepared statement...........................................    56
    Fick, Nathaniel:
        Testimony....................................................    32
        Prepared statement...........................................    75
    Jones, Paul W.:
        Testimony....................................................     7
        Prepared statement...........................................    51
    Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf:
        Testimony....................................................    34
        Prepared statement...........................................    78
    Nawaz, Shuja:
        Testimony....................................................    29
        Prepared statement...........................................    71
    Schmidle, Nicholas:
        Testimony....................................................    27
        Prepared statement...........................................    66
    Udall, Hon. Mark:
        Testimony....................................................     4

                                    APPENDIX

    Questions and Answers for the Record from:
        Mr. Jones....................................................    81
        Ms. Curtis...................................................    92
        Mr. Schmidle.................................................    96
        Mr. Nawaz....................................................    98
        Mr. Fick.....................................................   102
        Mr. Mowatt-Larssen...........................................   104

     FROM STRATEGY TO IMPLEMENTATION: STRENGTHENING U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, JULY 7, 2009

                                     U.S. Senate,
            Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management,
                  Government Information, Federal Services,
                                  and International Security,
                              of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                            and Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
    room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R.
    Carper, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Carper, Levin, Akaka, and Burris.
        Also Present: Senator Mark Udall.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER

        Senator Carper. The Subcommittee will come to order. I want
    to welcome a very good friend--Senator Udall from Colorado.
    Thank you very much for joining us. He and I were part of a
    congressional delegation about a month and a half ago that went
    to Afghanistan and Pakistan. We learned a lot and came back
    with a special interest in the issues we will be discussing
    today. So I very much want to welcome you today.
        I am going to start off with a statement, and we will be
    joined by some others of our colleagues. I would like for
    Senator Udall to stay for as long as his schedule permits, and
    we welcome him to participate with us as we go through
    statements.
        Before I begin, I really want to give my thanks to the men
    and women serving in the U.S. embassies in Pakistan and
    Afghanistan. We certainly want to give our thanks to the men
    and women serving in uniform, particularly in Afghanistan
    today. We are grateful for the sacrifice both on the civilian
    side and on the military side in that country.
        We were in both countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, back
    in May. I can say with great confidence that our new Ambassador
    there, Karl Eikenberry, and his wife who has joined him there,
    and Ambassador Anne Patterson in Pakistan are very impressive
    people with a very highly effective staff. We commend them for
    their leadership, and all of our personnel that are serving
    there capably.
        An Islamic insurgency rages, as we know, in western
    Pakistan, and senior U.S. officials are concerned about the
    declining security situation and new vulnerabilities for
    Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenal, although I must say I am
    pleased, I think we are encouraged, by the way the Pakistan
    military has turned on the Taliban with the strong support of
    all the political parties of any consequence and the strong
    support of the voters and the electorate and the population of
    Pakistan.
        But the insurgency, particularly in Afghanistan but also in
    Pakistan, the political instability in that region, the
    devastating humanitarian crisis as a couple million people in
    Pakistan have been dislocated from their homes, and an
    intensely anti-American population threaten an already fragile
    Pakistani Government. These factors present unique challenges
    to the United States and the strategy of our President laid out
    in late March.
        In my view, the Administration has developed a strategy
    that addresses the region's concerns while understanding that
    the challenges of Afghanistan and Pakistan are indeed linked.
    This hearing will examine implementation of that new strategy.
        When we were leaving, Senator Udall and I were doing a
    press conference with our colleagues, and I was asked by one of
    the reporters, ``What is the exit strategy for the United
    States?'' And I said that the exit strategy is our new
    strategy, the new strategy outlined by the President in March.
    It has military components, training components, and civilian
    components, and we need to do all three.
        Our focus today will be on the hardest and most critical
    problem of the region, and that is Pakistan. Most national
    security experts agree that Pakistan is maybe the most
    dangerous country in the world today for one primary reason:
    Nowhere else in the world is there such a lethal combination of
    Islamic extremism, terrorist groups with global reach, nuclear
    proliferation, and nuclear weapons.
        In late March, President Obama said that Pakistan's lawless
    border region has become the most dangerous place in the world
    for Americans. Admiral Mike Mullen, the Chairman of our Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, has called the border region between Pakistan
    and Afghanistan ``the site of planning for the next attack'' on
    the United States.
        General David Petraeus, who oversees the wars in both Iraq
    and Afghanistan, said recently that Pakistan has become the
    ``nerve center'' of al Qaeda's global operations, allowing it
    to reestablish its organizational structure, build stronger
    ties with offshoots in Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, and
    in parts of Europe.
        Pakistani officials acknowledge that their country is
    facing perhaps the greatest threat since its creation in 1947:
    A growing virulent threat from al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other
    Islamic groups.
        In the months since our delegation was in Pakistan, the
    Pakistani military, as I mentioned earlier, has launched an
    offensive in the North-West Frontier Province, specifically in
    the Swat Valley, and in South Waziristan, an agency in the
    Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
        Many experts have been skeptical whether Pakistani
    officials understand the existential threat to their own
    country. But as I said earlier, an extraordinary thing has
    happened in the last month and a half. For the first time
    President Zardari, opposition leader Sharif, the Pakistani
    military, and more than 80 percent of Pakistanis view the
    Taliban and al Qaeda as a critical threat to Pakistan. Those
    numbers are almost double what they were about a year ago.
        I agree with Secretary Napolitano's recent statement from
    Pakistan that the Pakistani Government's crackdown on the
    Taliban has improved U.S. security. The Obama Administration
    has promised Pakistan $1.5 billion in aid for the next 5 years
    in humanitarian and economic assistance; and although the
    Senate unanimously passed the Kerry-Lugar bill that I
    cosponsored. The bill is now stuck in Congress with a list of
    conditions with which many Pakistanis are uncomfortable. This
    bill is both vital to the U.S. national security and to
    Pakistan's 175 million people, and I urge the conferees to send
    the President a bill to sign, and soon.
        Finally, it goes without saying that the safety and
    security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is of utmost importance
    to all of us. As the insurgency spreads in Pakistan, senior
    American officials are increasingly concerned about new
    vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear weapons, including the
    potential for militants to insert sympathizers into
    laboratories or fuel production facilities or to seize a weapon
    in transport. Preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and
    technology from falling into the wrong hands should be, must
    be, the top priority for both of our countries.
        These facts lead to a series of urgent questions. Let me
    mention a couple of them.
        One, the Obama Administration has recognized that the
    United States needs a long-term comprehensive plan to address
    the terrorist threats in Pakistan. How is the implementation of
    the President's strategy proceeding?
        Two, there is a complex network of extremist groups
    operating in the lawless regions near the Afghanistan-Pakistan
    borders, including the Pakistani Taliban, the Afghan Taliban,
    al Qaeda, and other affiliated and sectarian groups. How should
    policymakers prioritize which of these groups to target? Who is
    reconcilable among them?
        Three, since September 11, 2001, the United States has
    allocated billions of dollars to non-military assistance
    programming in Afghanistan and Pakistan. What should our goal
    be for distribution of the Kerry-Lugar assistance? And what
    should the delivery mechanisms be?
        Four, what can our government do to address the problems
    caused by anti-American sentiment in Pakistan? Does the current
    humanitarian crisis present the United States with an
    opportunity in this regard? What additional actions might
    reverse widespread distrust of the United States among
    Pakistanis?
        Five, in the past the Pakistani Government and army have
    undertaken only sporadic militarized efforts punctuated by
    lulls when truce deals allowed the militants to regroup and
    grow stronger. How should we assess what now appears to be a
    fairly robust Pakistani effort to combat extremism inside their
    country? Are current military operations a sign of meaningful
    change in this pattern? We sure hope so.
        And, six, some analysts argue that the Pakistani military
    has been slow to reorient itself toward modern
    counterinsurgency planning. How does this affect U.S. regional
    interests? Has our military assistance to Pakistan sufficiently
    bolstered that country's counterterrorism capabilities?
        And, finally, what is the probability of al Qaeda and other
    terrorist groups acquiring a warhead or enough radioactive
    material to create a dirty bomb? What is the possibility of an
    insider threat at Pakistani nuclear facilities?
        Today, with these questions in mind, I would like for us to
    try to do the following: Assess the status of the
    implementation of President Obama's new strategy toward
    Pakistan; examine the complex set of threats from western
    Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan; discuss the most effective
    short-and long-term policy options regarding Pakistan; solicit
    ideas about how Congress can play a more robust role in the
    path forward, specifically in non-military assistance to
    Pakistan.
        If our national security is linked to the success, the
    security, and the stability of a democratic Pakistan, we have
    no choice but to engage in a smart, sustained, and long-term
    partnership. The United States needs and is finally on the path
    to achieving, a Pakistan-based policy as opposed to a leader-
    or government-based policy.
        Thanks again to our witnesses for taking this opportunity
    to talk with us today about the nature of the challenges before
    us and how best to address them.
        Before I introduce our first witness, I am going to call on
    my friend and colleague from Colorado, Senator Mark Udall.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK UDALL, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
                           STATE OF COLORADO

        Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Carper, and good
    afternoon to you, Mr. Jones, and to this very interested and
    interesting audience, Mr. Chairman. I note a lot of young
    people here interested in policymaking, and clearly they are
    going to shoulder some of the challenges in the near and the
    far term as we work in very difficult but important settings to
    overcome the threat of extremism and violence and chaos.
        I want to thank the Chairman and Ranking Member McCain for
    inviting me to address the Subcommittee briefly today. I was
    very honored to be a part of Chairman Carper's congressional
    delegation trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we have
    memories and experiences that will stay with me forever.
        I did want to share my impressions of the trip with you
    here today and with the broader Congress. As the Chairman
    mentioned, the purpose of our trip was to get an updated view
    of the U.S. military and civilian operations, particularly
    focusing on President Obama's new strategy, and we did get an
    updated view. I came away believing we have a window of
    opportunity to arrest deteriorating security conditions in both
    countries and to work with the civilian governments in both
    Afghanistan and Pakistan to achieve stability and security in
    the region, which I really think is our goal.
        Let me further add some specific ideas and impressions. I
    think I will probably, for the most part, echo the Chairman's
    comments, but perhaps I will also augment some of his insights.
        In Pakistan, our strategic challenge is different than it
    is in Afghanistan. We cannot allow extremists to destabilize
    this nuclear armed state that has the world's second largest
    Muslim population. By the estimation of many experts, the
    possibility that Islamic radicals could destabilize and
    undermine the Pakistani state has become, frankly, all too
    real. But we do not have troops on the ground in Pakistan, nor
    are Americans very popular. Mr. Chairman, a recent poll
    indicates that the new Administration is no more popular than
    the last, with 90 percent of the Pakistani population agreeing
    that the United States is trying to weaken the Muslim world.
        One difference between Pakistan and Afghanistan is that our
    leverage is much less in Pakistan than it is in Afghanistan,
    and, thus, our options are fewer. Yet there are a number of
    steps we can and we should take to improve our relationship
    with Pakistan, and in so doing, enhance our reputation and our
    influence in this critical part of the world.
        We can demonstrate an interest in a long-term strategic
    partnership with Pakistan, a relationship that goes beyond
    fighting a common enemy but assisting as well with police
    reform and training and sustainable economic development. There
    is no better demonstration of this than the recently passed
    Kerry-Lugar bill, which will invest in non-military projects
    that will directly benefit the Pakistani people and help
    build--and rebuild, frankly--trust and cooperation. We heard
    quite a bit about some of these opportunities from the business
    community and other leaders in Pakistan.
        We can also continue to provide accountable military
    assistance--underlining ``accountable''--to ensure that
    Pakistan's military and police have the training and the
    equipment that they need. And we should encourage India-
    Pakistan rapprochement both to demonstrate our commitment to
    the region as well as to help the Pakistan people and
    government focus on the real and imminent threats.
        I was, in that regard, really encouraged to hear during our
    visit that the Pakistani people, the government, the business
    community, and the journalists we met with are very much
    concerned with the growing insurgency on their western border
    and less concerned than they have been about their eastern
    border with India. There is a much larger recognition that
    there is an existential threat posed by extremism to Pakistan
    itself, not just to these ungoverned areas on the western edges
    of Pakistan, and a sense that the civilian government really
    has to reassert itself in this perilous environment. Pakistan's
    recent military actions are an indication of this new
    commitment.
        Having said that, I still have concerns about the way
    forward. I am concerned that the Pakistani army lacks the will
    to sustain its fight against insurgents within its borders. The
    army has driven the enemy out of Swat, but unless it protects
    the area, the enemy could return for another day. It is not
    enough to clear; the Pakistani army also needs to hold and
    build. And I know Senator Carper and I are also very concerned
    about the 2.5 million Pakistanis who have been forced to flee
    their homes and the areas in which they live because of the
    fighting.
        Islamist groups are infiltrating the refugee camps, but at
    this point, the authorities in Pakistan will not allow American
    officials or planes to deliver aid because of anti-American
    sentiment and security risks. Pakistani Lieutenant General
    Ahmad, who heads up the Pakistani army's disaster management
    group, has said that the United States is seen as part of the
    problem. But if we cannot help deliver U.S. aid to the
    refugees, as we did in the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, this is
    a tremendous lost opportunity for us. We are essentially
    competing with Islamist groups for the loyalty of these people,
    and we are losing, despite contributing more than any other
    country to the U.N. effort.
        So let me close by saying I believe the President's
    combined civil-military strategies are our best hope to turn
    the tide in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but we should not
    overestimate our abilities to rebuild broken states and
    transform entire regions of the world. Ensuring our security
    here at home and serving our interests abroad means that we
    need to be both tough and smart as we engage with our allies
    and adversaries.
        So, Mr. Chairman, thank you again for letting me have a
    chance to share my impressions in this important hearing. I am
    scheduled to preside on the Senate floor in about 15 minutes,
    but I am going to stay and listen to Mr. Jones before I am
    required to leave.
        One last comment. I see, again, so many young people here
    who obviously are very interested in foreign policy and how to
    build a tough and smart international security policy. I just
    had a chance to reread a book entitled ``Three Cups of Tea,''
    and I would recommend it to all of you here as one of the ways
    forward. The author Greg Mortensen would be the first to tell
    you that his programs and his successes in northern Pakistan
    are not the only strategy that we ought to fund and implement.
    But it is a fascinating account of how to build societies in
    ways that let those societies then fend for themselves. So I
    recommend ``Three Cups of Tea'' to everybody here and, of
    course, to my fellow Senators as one of the ways forward.
        Thank you again.
        Senator Carper. Thank you so much. Thanks again for being
    here today and for your comments. I think we are going to have
    a partnership on these issues for a long time, and I look
    forward to that.
        Our first witness, panel one in its entirety, Paul Jones.
    Mr. Jones serves as both Deputy Special Representative for
    Afghanistan and Pakistan and Deputy Assistant Secretary of
    State for South and Central Asia at the U.S. Department of
    State. That is quite a title. He is a career member of the
    State Department's Senior Foreign Service, formerly served as
    Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Manila,
    Philippines; as a U.S. Representative to the Organization for
    Security and Cooperation in Europe, in Vienna, Austria; and as
    Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Macedonia. While
    working for the State Department, Mr. Jones was Director of the
    Office of Central Europe, responsible for the U.S. policy in
    the Balkans. There is a lot more I could add to that, but I am
    going to stop right there so we will have an opportunity to
    hear from you and our other witnesses today. We are honored and
    thankful for your service and very much pleased that you could
    be here today.
        Thanks so much. Welcome. Please begin.

     TESTIMONY OF PAUL W. JONES,\1\ DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
    FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
        STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
    REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                                 STATE

        Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you so much, and,
    Senator Udall, a great honor to appear before both of you and
    your Subcommittee, Mr. Chairman. I really appreciate the
    opportunity.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Jones appears in the Appendix on
    page 51.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I want to bring greetings from Ambassador Holbrooke who is
    currently winding his way back from consultations in Egypt to
    further our outreach to key countries for our strategy in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan. But it is a great opportunity for us
    to explain a little bit of the strategy and get into a
    conversation, because we would really welcome your views. So I
    will be quite brief in my opening statement, and I look forward
    to your questions and your comments.
        Secretary Clinton and Special Representative Holbrooke are
    very much committed to working closely with Congress as we
    implement the President's new strategy in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan. We acknowledge and very much appreciate the deep
    interest and firsthand experience among Members of your
    Subcommittee.
        Since January 20, Special Representative Holbrooke has
    assembled a very diverse interagency team to implement this new
    strategy, leveraging the expertise of representatives from nine
    U.S. Government agencies as well as leading academics. Our
    early efforts have supported Pakistani efforts to enhance
    political and economic stability as well as Pakistani efforts
    to roll back the Taliban threat and respond to the need of the
    growing numbers of displaced persons.
        More specifically, the United States has, over the past
    couple of months, established regular cabinet- and summit-level
    trilateral consultations to build trust and cooperation between
    Afghan and Pakistani leaders. We have deepened relations with
    leading Pakistani politicians across the political spectrum. We
    have worked with Japan and Pakistan to organize a Pakistan
    Donors Conference in Tokyo in April of this year, resulting in
    $5.8 billion in pledges to assist Pakistan as it addresses
    significant macroeconomic challenges.
        We have helped rejuvenate Pakistan-Afghanistan transit
    trade negotiations, which have the potential to enhance
    economic opportunity in both countries. We have encouraged the
    first direct contacts in the context of these trilateral
    discussions between ministers of agriculture, interior, and
    finance of Pakistan and Afghanistan. And we have provided
    military assistance to support renewed Pakistani efforts to
    defeat insurgents, and we have led the international effort to
    mobilize relief for Pakistan's internally displaced persons.
        At the same time, Pakistan itself has taken a number of
    very important steps. Pakistan has resolved a political crisis
    in mid-March, resulting in the reinstatement of the Pakistani
    supreme court justice. Pakistan political leaders held an All-
    Party Conference on May 19, which resulted in a declaration
    supporting military action against insurgents and extremists.
    Pakistan has conducted a sustained counterinsurgency operation
    with wide public support, and it has assisted about 2 million
    displaced persons under the civilian-military leadership of the
    same Pakistani officer who directed Pakistan's effective
    earthquake relief effort in 2005.
        In the coming months, we plan to enhance our support for
    Pakistani efforts to address significant economic and
    governance challenges. We deeply applaud the Senate's unanimous
    passage of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, which
    authorizes $1.5 billion per year in non-military assistance for
    5 years. Final passage of this legislation will be a powerful
    demonstration of our long-term commitment to helping the
    Pakistani people and reinforce our desire for a long-term
    partnership based on common interests.
        It is vital that we help address the economic and social
    conditions that extremists exploit in western Pakistan with
    more and more consistent economic aid. Our assistance will
    support Pakistani efforts to hold and build in western Pakistan
    as part of its counterinsurgency efforts so extremists do not
    return to fill the vacuum once military operations have ended.
    But more than helping rebuild homes and businesses, we must
    also enhance bilateral and regional trade potential by
    encouraging foreign investment in vital sectors such as energy
    and by implementing Reconstruction Opportunity Zones to provide
    incentives for investment in critical regions by offering duty-
    free imports to certain products made in the border regions.
        Legislation before the Senate today would establish
    Reconstruction Opportunity Zones in areas directly affected by
    the fighting and would boost confidence in economic
    opportunity, including for displaced persons who will be
    returning. The President called for passage of this ROZ
    legislation when he announced his new strategy on March 27, and
    again during the trilateral summit meetings with Presidents
    Zardari and Karzai on May 7. It is a critical aspect of our
    strategy to bring economic opportunity to what would otherwise
    be the heart of al Qaeda's safe haven, and it is vital for
    protecting our national interests.
        The challenges in Pakistan and Afghanistan are, of course,
    very complex, and we cannot expect results overnight. Signaling
    and demonstrating our long-term commitment to a true
    partnership is essential for our success. The Administration is
    committed to working closely with Members of this Subcommittee
    and Congress generally on every aspect of implementing the
    President's strategy.
        I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity,
    and I welcome your questions and your comments.
        Senator Carper. Thank you so much for that statement and
    for the responses that we are about to receive.
        If you could just summarize for us briefly the
    Administration's changes in strategy for Pakistan. Just go back
    several months, rewind and pick it up right there.
        Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There are several
    aspects that I would highlight. One is the level of political
    engagement. We are presented with an opportunity of a new
    civilian democratically elected government in Pakistan, and as
    the Administration came in, very quickly we moved to engage the
    entire spectrum of civilian political leadership in addition to
    our ongoing conversations with the security sector and other
    sectors of society at both the summit and the cabinet level,
    and we have had a tremendous response from the Cabinet of the
    U.S. Government who are directly engaged with their
    counterparts in Pakistan and Afghanistan to raise the level of
    our dialogue.
        We have also put forward a plan and we are detailing it now
    in a series of assessments for how we would increase quite
    significantly our economic assistance to Pakistan, focusing
    more on people-to-people exchanges and efforts that have a real
    impact immediately for people on the ground.
        In particular, some things have changed since the strategy.
    Obviously, the development of the insurgency and the quite
    dramatic change, as you have highlighted, Mr. Chairman, in
    public opinion led to other challenges and opportunities that
    we have responded very quickly to in terms of assisting with
    displaced persons. But I would generally say that we are
    looking at increasing our engagement both in terms of
    assistance and in political activities, and also, as I had
    mentioned when speaking about Ambassador Holbrooke's travel, we
    are engaging at very serious and high levels with all of the
    many countries who have relationships and interests in Pakistan
    and Afghanistan in order to get us all sort of on the same page
    politically speaking; and complementing that, we are engaging
    in a new effort to try to raise the level of our donor
    coordination for these countries so that we can make better use
    of all international donor assistance.
        Senator Carper. When we were in Pakistan, I was struck--
    even now--at the enduring distrust and concern that the
    Pakistani political leaders and military leaders still view
    India with. They have had a change of leadership in India as
    you know, maybe the strongest central government they have had
    there in a long time, and it seems to me and to those of us who
    were on our delegation trip that this was maybe a unique
    opportunity--hopefully not the only opportunity--for some kind
    of rapprochement between Pakistan and India, a chance to begin
    to ratchet down levels of distrust, to be able to refocus
    Pakistani military preparedness not on their eastern borders,
    but where the real problems lie with respect to the insurgency
    groups that are in the western part of the country.
        I was struck by the apparent reluctance of the Pakistani
    Government and military leaders to accept our help, direct or
    indirect, even with respect to helicopters and the need for
    mobility to go after the bad guys in the northwestern parts of
    the country. They have in Pakistan only a handful of
    helicopters that apparently are operable. I do not know if they
    are willing to accept more helicopters from us. I do not know
    if they are even willing to accept our support for parts and
    for training their maintainers to be able to extend more
    effectively their counterinsurgency operations.
        But we have been presented--and I think the Pakistani
    people have been presented--with a great opportunity here given
    the fact that the Taliban overplayed their hand in Pakistan,
    there has been a sort of uprising, popular uprising that has
    led to the military taking a very strong role and I think a
    very successful role thus far.
        But when you look at what we are trying to do to further
    bolster the Pakistani military hand in going after the bad
    guys, a real help here could be to go after once and for all
    this distrust--more than distrust between Pakistan and India,
    but this long-time focus almost to the exclusion of everything
    else on India. How do we move into this situation? If we cannot
    convince them to take our helicopters or our aid in making sure
    that the half-dozen or dozen helicopters they have will work,
    what can we do on the positive side with respect to ratcheting
    down the tension between Pakistan and India? Just lay that out
    for us if you would. Because to the extent that they spend less
    money and less time thinking about India and having to worry
    about that flank, that gives them more time and more resources
    to go after the people they really need to be going after.
        Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I need to
    state clearly for the record that Ambassador Holbrooke's
    mandate is for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we treat India,
    which has been very interested in--obviously, as a major
    neighbor, has invited Ambassador Holbrooke to visit on each
    occasion that he has been in the region and continues to be
    very interested in the implementation of our strategy. But he
    does not have a specific mandate for the relationship between
    Pakistan and India. That is handled in other parts of our State
    Department.
        I think, as you suggest, there clearly is some recognition
    in the governments that they would like to open up more
    dialogue. There was a meeting recently between President
    Zardari and Prime Minister Singh.
        Senator Carper. Where did that occur? And I think there may
    be another opportunity down the road.
        Mr. Jones. Yes, that was in Yekaterinburg, Russia, on the
    margins of dual meetings. There was a summit of the Shanghai
    Cooperation Organization and what is called the BRIC--Brazil,
    Russia, India, China. There was a summit meeting there that
    presented an opportunity.
        I would like to comment about the other elements of your
    question. Clearly, Pakistan has laid out some very clear red
    lines in terms of the assistance that it would like to accept,
    and I think this goes to the heart of what you were discussing
    in terms of the distrust that has a lot of historical baggage
    in our relationship. But Pakistan actually has been welcoming
    helicopters and other hardware to support the counterinsurgency
    operations--we have made a huge priority in this Administration
    to support that request. We have delivered four MI-17
    helicopters to Pakistan just in the last few weeks. We have two
    more coming, I believe later this month, and a couple more
    behind that. It is not a helicopter that we use or stock, so it
    is not so easy to go around and try to identify and find the
    helicopters to assist Pakistan with. We have also gone out to
    countries around the world to see who else could help with
    helicopters that are in their inventory, and there are other
    ongoing efforts in that regard.
        But I think what we will see is, as we are able to
    demonstrate both in terms of our response to the humanitarian
    crisis and the assistance that Pakistan is open to receiving
    our consistency and commitment to supporting their efforts, I
    think we will see gradually greater openness, and that is, I
    think, how we overcome the distrust. But that will not be a
    short-term process, but it is an important one that we are
    embarked on. And I think really a key to this is the
    legislation that we have discussed, the commitment of not just
    $1.5 billion per year, but over a 5-year period of assistance,
    that I think will allay a lot of the concerns in the political
    class in Pakistan that we are there for short-term benefits
    rather than a long-term partnership.
        Senator Carper. Well, I do not mean to be critical of the
    priorities that the Pakistanis are setting for their own
    military. Just look at our own. We are going to be debating in
    the next week or two on the Senate floor the defense
    authorization bill, and we are going to be trying to determine
    whether or not if we are going to continue to buy weapons
    systems, build weapons systems, very expensive weapons systems,
    to fight last decade's wars instead of spending monies to fight
    this decade's and next decade's more likely
    counterinsurgencies.
        The F-22 is a perfectly good aircraft. We have been
    building them for years, flying them for years. I do not
    believe we have ever used one in combat. Now we are faced with
    a question of continuing to build more of them. We will see
    where that ends. But I am encouraged to hear that there is
    willingness to accept some helicopters, and maybe the
    willingness of some other countries to provide that kind of
    mobility.
        We are putting, as you know, 17,000 additional Marines and
    Army troops into Afghanistan. They will be aided by 150
    helicopters to go after the bad guys, especially in the
    southern part of that country. I think there are four new
    helicopters. That is good. Two more after that. Well, that is
    good as well. A hundred and fifty in Afghanistan just to help
    the 17,000 men and women that we are putting into that country.
        One last thing before I move off of this. We met at a
    wonderful lunch, and I think it was hosted by the governor of
    Lahore, and I recall sitting at a table with the former Foreign
    Minister from Pakistan, and he talked to us about back-channel
    negotiations with the Indians over a decade ago which he
    thought led very closely to some kind of rapprochement between
    Pakistan and India. We have learned of a similar kind of
    initiative maybe 2 or 3 years ago in that country--the same,
    again, trying to find some meeting of the minds between
    Pakistan and India. I would just urge us to use whatever
    influence that we have, direct or indirect, to move that along.
        I think it was in April 2008, GAO reported that the United
    States lacked the comprehensive plan encompassing all elements
    of national power. What progress has been made in developing
    such a plan for addressing the situation in Pakistan? How well
    are the various agencies coordinating their efforts in
    developing a comprehensive plan? And what interagency
    agreements, if any, have been reached?
        Mr. Jones. Thank you. I think to start with one element,
    Ambassador Holbrooke's team is, as I said, located in the State
    Department, but consists of representatives of nine U.S.
    Government agencies detailed out, selected by the member of
    Cabinet--the head of agency to represent in Ambassador
    Holbrooke's office. So we are not conducting this operation by
    an interagency committee but actually have a whole-of-
    government approach nested under Ambassador Holbrooke to whom
    President Obama entrusted the implementation of the civilian
    aspect of the plan.
        In addition to that quite remarkable--in my experience, the
    first in my 23 years with the government--experience of such an
    interagency operation, we have a tremendous level of
    interagency coordination and cooperation. We have instituted a
    weekly meeting that we just had last night--it goes on for
    about an hour and a half--where Ambassador Holbrooke and
    General Lute from the National Security Council (NSC) chair--
    and I co-chair in Ambassador Holbrooke's absence--of very
    senior members from a remarkable number of agencies, much more
    than the nine represented on our team, with a very open and
    quite remarkably free-flowing conversation.
        We discuss, for example, as just referenced, the visit of
    Secretary Napolitano, and the points that she was planning to
    make, we were talking about them in terms of how do we add into
    her points, how do we reinforce the message there, how do we
    make it part of our broader context. So there is that going on,
    which I think is really quite a remarkable effort, in my
    experience.
        Then, finally, I would note the civ-mil coordination.
    General Petraeus, entrusted with implementing the military
    aspects of the President's strategy, is in constant touch with
    our team, with Ambassador Holbrooke, and members of his team
    are in touch with ours. And our embassies, our missions in both
    countries are developing civ-mil implementation plans for the
    strategy that are quite detailed and expensive and bring in at
    the post level in our missions out there all the agencies
    required.
        So I submit that it is quite a remarkably successful
    interagency effort going on now, and I think we are drawing
    on--to cite one example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture is
    putting forth a remarkable increase in the number of people out
    in Afghanistan and looking at a strategy for Pakistan because
    these are two countries that depend hugely on agriculture. So
    we are bringing in agencies that were not so directly involved
    before and marrying them up with the agencies that we are----
        Senator Carper. Good. One last question, and then I am
    going to recognize Senator Akaka and then Senator Levin, and
    welcome to you both, gentlemen. Thank you both for joining us.
        I think it was Einstein who said in adversity lies
    opportunity. We have got the Pakistani military going after
    Taliban and other extremist militant outfits in the western
    part of the country. That is the good news. The bad news is we
    have seen a couple million people displaced from their homes. I
    am impressed by how many of those displaced people are
    literally taken into people's homes, as opposed to shuttling
    them off into refugee camps.
        But there is a great opportunity for us to help relocate
    from the Swat Valley and other places where people have been
    displaced, helping people get back to their homes, rebuild
    their homes, their communities, and get their lives back to
    something close to normal.
        I understand that there is a reluctance for the Pakistani
    Government to even accept U.S. aid that is clearly identified
    as from the United States; perhaps we need to work maybe
    through nongovernmental entities, NGOs, to provide that
    assistance.
        But having said that, to the extent that the Pakistani
    military has driven out the bad guys and gotten them on the
    run--we have a lot of people displaced--to the extent that we
    can go in and be seen, directly or indirectly, as helping to
    improve that situation, it is a great plus for us and obviously
    a great plus for the Pakistani people.
        Your thoughts, please? How is it going? What are we doing?
        Mr. Jones. Yes.
        Senator Carper. How successful are we being?
        Mr. Jones. Normally, in such humanitarian situations, most
    of our aid does go through the United Nations and
    nongovernmental organizations, and in this case it is no
    different. So we have pledged a total of $381 million,
    disbursed currently a little over $160 million, to assist the
    displaced people, some 2 million people.
        I think it is quite well known and recognized in Pakistan
    that we are the leader in that effort. You are quite right,
    some of these areas, in contrast to the earthquake situation,
    are still not secure. It is not a very safe situation for us to
    send out American personnel much beyond Peshawar. In fact,
    there are quite a number of threats right now. So we are
    somewhat limited by other factors as well.
        The Pakistani Government has said that they want to pay for
    the side that is their responsibility and, in fact, have
    disbursed an equivalent of about $380 per family to the
    displaced people so that they would have the opportunity on
    their own to live outside of their homes.
        As you mentioned, some 80-, 90-plus percent are living in
    people's homes, so it is not always the easiest place to access
    people. It is much better in homes, but there are fewer central
    points to provide assistance. But we believe the U.N. and NGOs
    have really spread out their assistance in a way that is
    helpful.
        I would say that, as you suggest, we do want the people of
    Pakistan to know that America is assisting. We also want the
    people of Pakistan to know that their own government is
    assisting. And I think that is coming across quite clearly and
    is a very important effort to counter the attempts by
    extremists to influence displaced persons. It is very important
    for the displaced persons to see that their own government is
    actually providing assistance. And I think that is in one
    respect why Pakistan is possessive about that effort, and they
    are doing, by all accounts, quite well at it.
        I was just speaking to a member of our team who recently
    came back from Pakistan who said, in contrast--because this
    gentleman served in Pakistan a couple of years ago. He said you
    just flip through the channels on TV or you hear of what people
    are talking about on the radio and we see it in the print
    media, and you see both public service ads and editorials that
    very much praise the role of the Pakistani military and the
    Pakistani Government in responding to this situation, the
    military in terms of the offensive against the insurgents and
    the government in terms of the assistance to people. And that I
    would say is also very important because that is what is going
    to keep people from being influenced by extremists who are
    seeking to take advantage of vulnerable people who are
    displaced. So we are very pleased with that.
        You are right. It is also important for people to see the
    American Government as playing its appropriate role in
    assisting, and I think that is coming along. But I think it is
    also important, as I say, that the Pakistani Government is
    rightly seen as being helpful to the citizens.
        Senator Carper. All right. Thanks, Mr. Jones.
        Mr. Jones. Thank you.
        Senator Carper. Senator Akaka, welcome. If you would like
    to make an opening statement, feel free. Senator Akaka, thank
    you.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA

        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    thank you for holding this hearing. The implementation of an
    effective policy toward Pakistan is a very significant and
    important national security priority.
        I just want to mention that there are two issues in
    particular that I want to highlight.
        First, if we pursue an engagement strategy with Pakistan to
    reduce the threat of terrorism and nuclear proliferation, we
    must be prepared for a long-term commitment. I am pleased that
    President Obama supports efforts to strengthen Pakistan's civil
    institutions and security. These efforts will help address the
    short-term and the long-term challenges facing Pakistan.
        Second, the United States should forge lasting,
    international partnerships to bring security and prosperity to
    both Pakistan and Afghanistan. We must listen to the needs of
    our partners as we define and refine the implementation of our
    strategies. History has shown us that nations working toward
    the same goals in a well-coordinated manner bring a greater
    likelihood of success.
        I am keenly interested in Pakistan. For me, it goes back to
    the year 2000 when I visited Pakistan, and at that time
    President Musharraf was in charge there. It started for me a
    good relationship with Pakistan.
        Mr. Chairman, this is my opening statement.
        Senator Carper. Fair enough. Would you like to go ahead and
    ask some questions?
        Senator Akaka. Yes. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Jones, Mr. Fick's written testimony--he is the CEO from
    the Center for a New American Security--states that the costs
    of the unmanned aerial vehicle air strikes inside Pakistan
    outweigh the benefits and these air strikes are, on balance,
    harmful to the U.S. and allied interests.
        What is your view on this issue? And, what steps should the
    United States take to reduce the potential loss of good will in
    Pakistan and Afghanistan if these air strikes continue?
        Mr. Jones. Senator, thank you so much. Thank you for the
    question. I would have to say on that particular subject I
    would need to defer speaking about that in any specific sense
    for a closed session, if you would understand that. I would say
    that a very important part of our strategy is to, with
    strategic communications, influence information as it is termed
    in various aspects.
        I think that in that area overall we are making some
    progress. We have plans to increase quite significantly our
    assistance to Pakistan in terms of helping it get its own
    information and its own information out in the tribal areas and
    among displaced persons, and we are working closely with
    international organizations and with the Government of Pakistan
    to try to help do that through various means of assistance in
    procuring local radios and helping with Pakistan public service
    announcements, things that will help people understand what
    actually are the goals of the Pakistani Government and the
    international community and how they are helping the country of
    Pakistan.
        Senator Akaka. Mr. Jones, in the President's strategy for
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, he stated that the United States will
    set clear metrics to measure progress and be accountable. I
    agree that metrics are important and that we need to focus on
    measuring effectiveness and not just effort. How are these
    metrics being designed and implemented?
        Mr. Jones. Yes, thank you for that. We have been working
    hard on metrics so I appreciate the question, Senator.
        There are a couple of different levels of metrics,
    obviously. One, as I was mentioning just a little bit earlier,
    both in Pakistan and Afghanistan our embassy and our military
    counterparts are developing implementation plans at the field
    level, and embedded in those plans will be specific metrics
    that we will be able to assess how we are doing in implementing
    our plans.
        Then at the higher level, at the strategic level here in
    Washington, the National Security Council is taking the lead in
    pulling together the higher-order metrics that we will measure
    against on a regular basis and report both to the Executive
    Branch and to Congress on how we are doing against those
    metrics. Our effort is to try to focus on metrics that there
    are metrics that measure inputs, metrics that measure outputs,
    and metrics that measure actual effects on the ground. We want
    to focus on the latter, recognizing that we need a certain mix
    of those three metrics because the effects on the ground are
    usually somewhat delayed from the inputs, and so you want to
    see that the activities that we have pledged to undertake are
    actually happening, that there is some output from it, and then
    there is effect on the ground.
        So we are heavily engaged in that process, and I think
    pretty shortly we will be able to come to Congress and explain
    the metrics that we have devised. We welcome input, and I think
    there has been quite a number of consultations at the staff
    level on what sort of metrics would be most useful. And we have
    also received that feedback in terms of appropriations
    legislation.
        Senator Akaka. Mr. Jones, in the President's strategy for
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, he articulated his goal: To disrupt,
    dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and
    to prevent their return to either country in the future. A
    primary focus on al Qaeda, of course, makes sense. Are there
    any other significant organizations that may negatively impact
    regional or international security that must also be
    considered?
        Mr. Jones. Yes, Senator, there certainly are, and the
    organizations that have in the past and currently aid and abet
    al Qaeda, such as the Taliban, are of great concern to us,
    organizations such as LeT and others that have been engaged in
    terrorist operations that are on sanctions lists. There is a
    variety of opinion about to what extent some of these
    organizations coordinate and cooperate, but I think it is safe
    to say that there is the--as long as you have organizations
    that are inclined toward extremism and terrorist acts in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan, that increases the vulnerability to
    cooperation with al Qaeda and organizations that actually have
    the ability to and the intent to inflict harm on the United
    States, on our allies and our interests.
        And that is clearly what we see currently as the threat in
    this region, and so we take a broader view than just al Qaeda,
    as you mentioned, Senator.
        Senator Akaka. The President's strategy states that the
    United States must pursue constructive diplomacy with both
    India and Pakistan. This is an important issue considering the
    historic tensions between these two countries.
        What is the strategy for pursuing constructive diplomacy
    between these two countries? What steps already have been made?
        Mr. Jones. Thank you, Senator. We are very encouraged to
    see some of the steps that have been taking place on their own
    between India and Pakistan. There has been the recent meetings
    we were discussing just a short while ago between the leaders
    of those two countries in Russia on the margins of a summit,
    and the possibility of future such meetings appears, according
    to their statements and according to their stated interests, in
    improving their relationship.
        Under Special Representative Holbrooke's office, our
    primary responsibility is implementing the President's strategy
    in Afghanistan and Pakistan and working with all the countries
    and neighbors that have an impact on that. Obviously, India is
    a very important neighbor, and the Indians have specifically
    requested Ambassador Holbrooke to stay in very close contact
    and to visit New Delhi whenever he can on his trips out to the
    region. So we are in very close contact. The Indians are
    obviously also a significant donor in Afghanistan, major
    players in the region.
        I think what is most encouraging is seeing the interest on
    both these countries, India and Pakistan, to improve their
    relationship.
        Senator Akaka. Thank you very much.
        Senator Carper. Senator Akaka, thank you very much again
    for joining us, for your statement, for your questions, and
    your interest in this issue.
        I am delighted that the Chairman of the Armed Services
    Committee is here. Senator Levin, please proceed.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN

        Senator Levin. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for
    holding this hearing. It is a very important subject, and it
    needs a great deal of attention.
        It has been my concern for a long time that unless
    Pakistan's leaders, both civilian and military, commit in deeds
    and words to eliminating the threat from militant extremists
    and make clear that they are doing so for the sake of their
    country's own security interests and not for the sake of the
    United States, then no amount of assistance will be effective.
    I raised this point directly with Pakistan President Zardari
    when he was in Washington in May. If Pakistan makes the fight
    against extremists their own fight, then we ought to be willing
    to help Pakistan achieve a more stable and secure future. But
    we cannot buy their support for our cause, or appear to do so,
    since that would only play into the hands of their and our
    enemy.
        Now, in the last few weeks, Pakistan's military operations
    in the North-West Frontier Province and more recently in the
    Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs), suggests that the
    Pakistan Government may now recognize that the terrorist threat
    posed by extremist groups in the western border region is an
    existential threat and must be confronted.
        Yesterday, it was reported that President Zardari said he
    wants to create a ``Pakistan where militancy is defeated,'' and
    Pakistan Army Chief of Staff General Kayani was quoted as
    saying that ``the immediate internal threat'' of Taliban
    extremism was greater than any external threat, which was
    understood to be a reference to India.
        Where do they make these statements? The interview
    yesterday, with the the President of Pakistan, was in the
    London Daily Telegraph. Is he making the same statements to the
    Pakistan public? Do you know, Mr. Jones?
        Mr. Jones. Senator, thank you. I do not know specifically
    if he is saying those words. I would note that there has been,
    as I am sure you have noted, quite a change in the whole
    political dialogue in Pakistan among the leaders and among the
    media that have changed quite considerably to recognize the
    Taliban as an enormous threat.
        Senator Levin. Is that well known to the Pakistani public
    that their government considers the Taliban the major threat to
    their existence?
        Mr. Jones. According to the polling that I have seen--and I
    have not seen anything very authoritative--there has been a
    remarkable shift in public perception of the Taliban as being a
    threat to their government and society, to the order of 30
    percent to 80 percent. I have had, as I am sure you have, the
    experience of meeting with quite a number of Pakistanis out in
    Islamabad who are really quite scared for the future of their
    country. And as I understand it, that certainly would not have
    been the case a year or more ago.
        So I think there has been quite a dramatic turnaround. It
    is an iterative process. I do not think we can say that has
    turned the corner, but it is something that I think we have a
    great interest in encouraging what we would say is the correct
    analysis of their national security interests.
        Senator Levin. Would you agree that unless they make it
    clear that is their view, not something that we are imposing or
    buying from them, that it is not going to be effective?
        Mr. Jones. I completely agree, yes.
        Senator Levin. Does the Government of Pakistan have any
    intention of confronting the Afghan Taliban in Baluchistan to
    deny them safe haven and prevent cross-border attacks against
    U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan?
        Mr. Jones. Senator, the history and relationships along the
    border area are remarkably complex with a lot of historical
    baggage, and I think what we have seen is the government and
    the army of Pakistan taking some significant steps against the
    Pakistani Taliban. I think it is in our interest to encourage
    those steps and look toward widening the aperture so that the
    activities go much broader to all the various extremist groups
    that threaten Pakistan in the region.
        So I think we are headed in the right direction. It is
    going to take some time to overcome some of the history and
    relationships that have developed since the time of the Soviet
    invasion.
        Senator Levin. Do you know whether the Government of
    Pakistan has sought to prevent the Afghan Taliban leadership or
    the Shura from meeting openly in Quetta, Pakistan?
        Mr. Jones. I think in order to fully address your question,
    we would have to--I would want to go into a closed session to
    talk about what we know and on what basis. But as I say, I
    think the important statement to make in this setting is that
    we think that there are opportunities here that are being
    recognized in Pakistan. As you say, the most important part is
    what is being recognized there, but that we can encourage.
        Senator Levin. Are you familiar with a group that is, I
    think, called the ``Nazir Group in South Waziristan?
        Mr. Jones. Yes.
        Senator Levin. Is it true that the Pakistan military
    considers them as a good group of Taliban? And do we? They have
    a goal of attacking us in Afghanistan, us and NATO. I am just
    wondering whether or not--what our attitude is towards that
    group, and what is the Pakistan Government's attitude towards
    the Nazir Group?
        Mr. Jones. Yes. Obviously, Senator, we place an extremely
    high priority on working with Pakistan against groups that pose
    a direct threat to our troops, and there are quite a number of
    individual clans, groups, offshoots, in that region who do pose
    such a threat.
        The complexity of the relationships and the historical
    approach that Pakistan has taken to this region lead to
    shifting alliances, shifting attitudes. So if the Pakistan
    Government is going after, for example, in one moment Baitullah
    Mehsud, one individual organization that is credited with the
    assassination of Prime Minister Bhutto, at that moment they may
    cooperate with other groups that would also be encouraged to go
    after that particular organization, while at other moments they
    may shift to another approach.
        Senator Levin. Do you know whether or not--and I will
    conclude; my time is up. But just on the same subject, do you
    know whether the Pakistan military, both at this moment but
    also in the recent past, considers that group, the Nazir Group
    in South Waziristan, as a friendly, good group of Taliban?
        Mr. Jones. I do not know that.
        Senator Levin. OK. Fair enough. Thank you.
        Mr. Jones. Thank you.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Carper. Senator Levin, thank you very much for
    being here and for all those questions.
        Senator Burris has joined us from the State of Illinois. It
    is great to see you, and thank you so much for being a part of
    this hearing. Senator Burris, you are recognized. If you would
    like to make a brief opening statement, feel free, and then you
    will have time for a number of questions.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS

        Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very
    interested in the situation and came more to listen to the
    testimony than to raise what I think would be some difficult
    questions. So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Carper. Thanks so much for being a part of this.
        Let me come back to you with a couple more questions, Mr.
    Jones, and if any of my other colleagues have them, fine, and
    after that you are done. But thanks for your presence here.
        I remember, I think it was December 2007, being in Iowa. I
    was there during the run-up to the Iowa caucuses. I was there
    with the senior Senator from Delaware, who was running for
    President at the time. And I was with him the morning when
    former Prime Minister Bhutto was assassinated. I remember being
    with him at a press conference, a hastily called press
    conference, I believe in Des Moines. And I remember the words
    that he said that day. Among other things he said that what we
    need in Pakistan is not a Musharraf policy, we need a Pakistan
    policy.
        And what I think I heard you describing earlier today when
    you talked about the interagency cooperation on our side, I
    thought you mentioned that you co-chair this working group, and
    one of the other co-chairs you mentioned is a military leader,
    and certainly when Ambassador Holbrooke is not there, I think
    you fill in for him.
        That sounds to me a lot more like a Pakistan policy than a
    Musharraf policy.
        Mr. Jones. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I could not agree more, and
    as mentioned earlier, I think Congress plays an incredibly
    important role in that in the legislation and the attention
    that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives have
    paid to broadening our engagement. And I think now when we
    visit Pakistan, we are engaging with the entire political
    spectrum, and also looking, as I referred to earlier, to deepen
    our engagement with the Pakistani people.
        We had in a recent congressional delegation--the mayor of
    Karachi came up.
        Senator Carper. It was ours.
        Mr. Jones. Yes, it was yours--came up from Karachi, the
    head of the MQM party. Another great opportunity to engage
    across the political spectrum with leaders of Pakistan, which
    makes a more firm basis of a policy. And I think when you look
    at the different levels of support within Pakistan for their
    different leaders, obviously, as in ours, it is dynamic, it
    shifts, and it is to our benefit to really make our engagement
    as broad as possible.
        Senator Carper. The last issue I want to discuss is, if you
    will, the safeguarding of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. It is a
    matter on which they certainly have a lot of interest, a lot at
    stake, and as it turns out, so does the rest of the world.
    Where does the United States rank the issue of the security of
    Pakistan's nuclear arsenal given the numerous priorities that
    we have in Pakistan? And what is the probability of militants
    inserting sympathizers into Pakistan's laboratories or fuel
    production facilities?
        Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would say just in a
    very general sense that, obviously, that is among our very top
    priorities, and we have within the U.S. Government and within
    the State Department people dedicated who are following that
    problem and working on it, following that issue very closely.
    We obviously pay attention to that on Ambassador Holbrooke's
    team and work closely with other personnel in the State
    Department and other agencies following that.
        I think overall I can say that we have confidence that the
    nuclear weapons of Pakistan are being safeguarded by the
    Pakistani authorities. To go into more detail, I think we would
    want to bring the people who are particular experts on that
    into a closed session, but I completely agree with the level of
    interest and appreciate the question.
        Senator Carper. What has been the level of cooperation
    between U.S. agencies and their counterparts in the Pakistani
    Government to ensure oversight and accountability over U.S.
    funds?
        Mr. Jones. The relationship between the Pakistani
    Government?
        Senator Carper. Not with respect to nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Jones. Right.
        Senator Carper. Just talk to us about the level of
    cooperation between our U.S. agencies and their counterparts in
    the Pakistani Government to ensure oversight and accountability
    over U.S. funds.
        Mr. Jones. Yes.
        Senator Carper. We want to know how our funds are being
    spent.
        Mr. Jones. Yes.
        Senator Carper. And I am not sure that other countries to
    whom we provide aid or assistance are all that interested in
    allowing us, through transparency, to actually know how the
    money is being spent.
        Mr. Jones. Yes. As I am sure you are aware, Mr. Chairman,
    in addition to the historical inconsistency in our levels of
    assistance, we have also shifted back and forth with the way we
    have delivered assistance in Pakistan. We had previously
    offered quite a great deal of budget support. We went through a
    period not too long ago of actually breaking that down into
    projects, projectizing the budget support, which allowed us to
    have greater oversight and a greater window of visibility into
    exactly how funds are being spent.
        What we are doing now is we are going to quite
    significantly increase the number of USAID direct hire
    personnel in Pakistan, consonant with the planned increases in
    economic assistance. But that, we believe, will give us a
    greater level of oversight into the assistance that we provide.
        We have some issues that are--we feel we have good
    cooperation from the government, but in any situation where one
    is providing assistance, we have to have internal controls. And
    we have a great deal of interest from the Inspector General of
    USAID and the State Department and DOD in following exactly
    that question.
        We also have some restrictions in terms of our ability to
    physically get out in some insecure areas where we particularly
    want to target our assistance. But we have tried to overcome
    that by sort of a tiered approach of having local nationals who
    work for us, having a number of different windows into how the
    money is being spent, and getting photographic and other
    evidence that the projects that we have supported are actually
    coming to fruition. So it is a complex environment, but it is
    one that we follow very closely.
        I would simply add that another element of the
    Administration's strategy is to try to reduce the large
    contracts, break them down into smaller units that can be
    monitored more effectively on a short-term basis and have more
    direct effect, whether it is implemented through government
    agencies or civil society and NGOs.
        Senator Carper. All right. Thank you. Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. I know you have indicated that the question
    of drone attacks, UAV attacks--much of which can only be dealt
    with in a classified setting. But something which has been in a
    very unclassified setting has been the attacks on us for those
    attacks that the Pakistani leaders have engaged in. And I do
    not doubt for one minute that they are aware of the fact that
    we are going to be using these attacks against targets. And yet
    when they attack us publicly for doing what I believe is
    obvious, they are very well aware of and support, what it does
    is make our situation a lot worse in Pakistan in terms of the
    Pakistani public view of the United States. And we can have all
    the humanitarian assistance in the world, hope that the
    Pakistani people understand the source of it, and that is fine,
    providing we are effective in that effort. But it just wipes
    out a lot of the value of that if the Pakistani leaders are
    publicly attacking us.
        I am just wondering whether or not we have raised this
    issue with the Pakistani leaders. They do not want us to use
    UAVs, tell us privately we are not going to be using UAVs in
    Pakistan if they oppose it. But for them to look the other way
    or to give us the green light privately and then to attack us
    publicly leaves us, it seems to me, at a very severe
    disadvantage and loss with the Pakistani people.
        I am wondering what your thoughts are on that.
        Mr. Jones. Thank you. I appreciate the comment, Senator. We
    have those discussions with the leadership in Pakistan because
    the Pakistani leadership raises those issues directly with us.
    And I think it strengthens our hand to be able to refer to the
    comments that you just made and have made on other occasions,
    Members of Congress have made on other occasions to have those
    conversations in ways that will benefit both our countries. So
    I will take that comment, if I could, sir, and relay it to
    Ambassador Holbrooke, and we will factor that----
        Senator Levin. I have already relayed it to Ambassador
    Holbrooke. My question is whether he has relayed it to them.
        Mr. Jones. Well, as I say, during the meetings that I have
    been in in Pakistan, the subject certainly comes up, and there
    is quite a wide-ranging discussion on it.
        Senator Levin. Well, I have got to tell you, if they do not
    want us to do this, they should flat out tell us privately. Do
    not look the other way and then attack us publicly. It is
    wrong. It is not just wrong morally. Put aside that. It is
    wrong in terms of American security for us to be attacked by
    Pakistani leaders for doing something which they quite
    obviously know we are going to do and support, either
    implicitly or privately, explicitly. That affects my view, I
    have got to tell you, on the kind of support that we ought to
    provide to Pakistan because one of the reasons for that support
    is that hopefully the view of the Pakistani people of our
    motive will be improved if they see we care about their
    economic situation. But that is just wiped out if their leaders
    are blaming us for the loss of civilian life inside Pakistan.
        These are very difficult issues. I know they are. And they
    ought to be limited, if not eliminated, these UAV attacks. They
    surely should be limited and handled with incredible care, if
    they are going to be used at all. But it is unacceptable to me
    to be pilloried by the Pakistani leaders, criticized in their
    public for carrying out these attacks. And I just want to let
    you know, and you can let them know, if you want. That approach
    of theirs affects the view of this Senator in terms of the kind
    of support which I am willing to vote for.
        Mr. Jones. We certainly will let them know that. Thank you.
        Senator Levin. Thanks.
        Senator Carper. Just a quick comment. We had rather
    extensive discussions 4 or 5 or 6 weeks ago when we were there
    on this subject and highly classified briefings as well. One
    thing I think we can all agree on is that to the extent that
    there are drones or pilotless aircraft used in these attacks,
    it is imperative that we minimize as greatly as we can any
    civilian casualties.
        A second thing, it appears to me that if we had better
    intelligence--and as you know, we try to use electronic
    intelligence, we try to use human intelligence to be able to
    verify where the most highly dangerous of insurgents are
    located, where they are operating, where they might be
    gathered. To the extent that we can be provided more accurate
    information and more timely information through the Pakistani
    intelligence services themselves, we can, I think,
    significantly reduce the potential that people, civilians, are
    going to be harmed in those attacks.
        Senator Levin. I agree.
        Senator Carper. Senator Burris, any closing comments here
    before we excuse our witness?
        Senator Burris. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Just one thought.
        Senator Carper. Please.
        Senator Burris. It is not a question. It is just a concern
    in terms of what the Taliban are doing: That is, surrounding
    themselves with civilians, and that makes our task even more
    difficult when the evidence shows, Mr. Jones, that this does
    take place, where Taliban forces will be in homes or villages
    and launch their activities from those sources where there are
    civilians. And it makes our job that much harder, and then we
    end up launching a drone or a missile, and 18 or 19 civilians
    are killed, and then we are the bad guys. So in some way, we
    have to try to solve that situation.
        Senator Carper. I could not agree more.
        Mr. Jones, I was meeting with some folks in Delaware the
    other day, and as we were ending our meeting, this fellow said
    to me, well, I would not be doing my job if I did not give you
    my final order--not a direct but an actual request for what we
    might do in the Congress to address the concerns that were
    raised at our visit.
        I am going to give you an opportunity to close it out here
    from your panel. What do you need from us? Not just this
    Subcommittee or not just this Committee, but what do you need
    from the Congress particularly with respect to Pakistan? We
    will not get into Afghanistan. What do you need from us?
        Mr. Jones. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me just
    say before commenting on that, I am really heartened and
    encouraged that I think we are in complete agreement between
    the Executive and Legislative Branches, as discussed in this
    hearing, with the goals of our policy, and we are really
    committed to working together with you to achieve them.
        The support has been tremendous. I think enactment of what
    is known as the Kerry-Lugar legislation in the Senate and the
    Berman bill on the House side would be very important. I think
    that is critically important to conveying the kind of strategy
    that you enunciated.
        Obviously, passing the President's request for the 2010
    budget--it contains significant assistance that we need to
    incorporate into our strategy.
        And then, finally, as I mentioned, the Reconstruction
    Opportunity Zone legislation, which is attached to the House
    version, to the Berman legislation. Obviously, there are other
    vehicles, but we think that is something that really carries a
    lot of resonance in Pakistan, and it is particularly targeted
    at the border areas and would encourage confidence, would
    encourage some economic activity that we think would show
    people that it is not only about assistance but it is about
    opening up what for us is a very small opportunity of duty-free
    trade for the Pakistanis, a very big symbol, and we think it
    would help our mutual efforts.
        So I really appreciate this opportunity and look forward to
    being in close contact with you, Mr. Chairman, and your
    Subcommittee.
        Senator Carper. Good. Thank you so much. Thank you for
    joining us and for your efforts. And you are excused.
        We would like to invite the second panel to join us at this
    time, please. Thank you.
        Mr. Jones. Thank you again.
        Senator Carper. As our second panel is joining us at the
    table, I am going to go ahead and begin some introductions of
    our panelists.
        I will start off with Lisa Curtis. Lisa Curtis is a Senior
    Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation where she focuses
    primarily on India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. It is a great
    portfolio for this panel. From 2001 to 2003, she served as a
    Senior Adviser in the State Department's South Asia Bureau,
    where she advised the Assistant Secretary on India-Pakistan
    relations. In the late 1990s, Ms. Curtis served in the CIA as a
    political analyst on South Asia. She also served as a political
    officer to U.S. embassies in Islamabad and in New Delhi from
    1994 to 1998, and during her tour in Islamabad, she earned a
    Meritorious Honor Award from the State Department for
    contributions to a year-long four-nation endeavor to free
    hostages held by militants in Kashmir.
        Next, welcome to Nicholas Schmidle. Mr. Schmidle is a
    Fellow at the New America Foundation. He is the author of ``To
    Live or To Perish Forever: Two Tumultuous Years Inside of
    Pakistan,'' which just came out, I am told, in May, about 2
    months ago. My staff has read it and highly recommends it to
    me. I understand that you regularly contribute to the New York
    Times Magazine, to Slate, to the New Republic, the Washington
    Post, the Virginia Quarterly, and many other publications. In
    2008, I am told Mr. Schmidle received the Kurt Schork Award for
    freelance journalism based on his reporting in Afghanistan and
    Pakistan, where he lived throughout 2006 and 2007 as a Fellow
    of the Institute of Current World Affairs.
        Next is Shuja Nawaz. Mr. Nawaz, a native of Pakistan, was
    named the first Director of the South Asia Center at the
    Atlantic Council in Washington this past January. Mr. Nawaz has
    contributed his experience to RAND, the United States Institute
    of Peace, the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
    the Atlantic Council, and other leading think tanks. While
    attending Gordon College, he was named the Cabot Fellow and won
    the Henry Taylor International Correspondent Award. His latest
    two books are ``Crossed Swords: Pakistan and Its Army, and the
    Wars Within'' and ``FATA--A Most Dangerous Place.''
        Next, Nathaniel ``Nate'' Fick. Mr. Fick was named Chief
    Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security
    about a week ago. Congratulations. Before joining the Center
    for a New American Security, Mr. Fick served as a Marine Corps
    infantry officer--Semper Fi--leading a reconnaissance unit
    during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. I understand you are the
    author of the 2005 New York Times best-seller entitled ``One
    Bullet Away.'' The Commanding General of the U.S. Marine Corps
    Forces Central Command has made your book required reading for
    officers deploying to Afghanistan and to Iraq. Mr. Fick,
    previously an on-air national security consultant to CBS News,
    is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the
    International Institute for Strategic Studies. I understand you
    serve on the boards of the Marine Corps Scholarship Foundation,
    whose mission is to provide opportunities for children of
    marines killed in action. Good for you. Thanks for doing that.
        And, finally, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen.
        Mr. Mowatt-Larssen served over 3 years as Director of
    Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of
    Energy. You served, I am told, for 23 years as a CIA
    intelligence officer in various roles, including Chief of the
    European Division in the Directorate of Operations, Chief of
    Weapons of Mass Destruction Department, and Deputy Associate
    Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support. Mr.
    Mowatt-Larssen's overseas assignments include Stockholm,
    Moscow, Athens, Yerevan, Zurich, and Oslo. Before his career
    with the CIA, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen served as an officer in the
    U.S. Army. He has been awarded the CIA Director's Award,
    Secretary of Energy's Exceptional Service Medal, the
    Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, among others.
        That is quite a line-up, and we are honored to have each of
    you before us this afternoon to continue this conversation.
        I am going to ask you to please stick to your 5 minutes,
    and if you go much beyond that, I will have to rein you in. But
    I will ask you to stick to that so we will be sure to be able
    to ask you some good questions later on.
        Ms. Curtis, I understand you are just back from the region,
    having participated in a Transatlantic Opinion Leaders tour of
    Afghanistan, and we want to invite you to begin your testimony.
    Welcome and thank you.

      TESTIMONY OF LISA CURTIS,\1\ SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN
                STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

        Ms. Curtis. Thank you, Chairman Carper, Senator Levin, and
    Senator Burris. It is an honor to be here today. My remarks
    will focus on developments in both Pakistan and Afghanistan
    where, as you mentioned, I recently returned.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis appears in the Appendix on
    page 56.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Containing the global terrorist threat in South Asia
    requires the United States to forge a trusting and cooperative
    partnership with Pakistan. The future direction of the region,
    including the outcome of the war in Afghanistan, pivots on
    Pakistan's ability to overcome multiple socioeconomic
    challenges as well as its willingness to fight terrorism in all
    its forms within its own borders.
        There has been a welcome change in the Pakistan military's
    attitude toward confronting the Pakistani Taliban in the
    northwest part of the country in just the last 10 weeks. In
    late April, under both Pakistani public and U.S. pressure, and
    following Taliban advances into new districts close to
    Islamabad, the Pakistan army began an offensive that has since
    ousted the Taliban from the Swat Valley. A combination of
    events, including the Taliban declaring democracy in Pakistan
    as ``infidel,'' has begun to change the Pakistani public's
    attitude toward the Taliban, thus prompting the army to take
    them on militarily.
        The fighting, however, has led to a severe humanitarian
    crisis with nearly 3 million people fleeing their homes. The
    United States has provided substantial aid to help relieve the
    crisis, $380 million, as we heard previously, but the United
    Nations is still far short of the funds it needs to address the
    crisis. There are reports that banned extremist organizations
    have access to refugee camps and will use the plight of the
    displaced people as a recruiting tool. The United States must
    insist Pakistan restrict extremist groups' access to these
    camps.
        The Pakistan army also is preparing for an additional
    offensive in the tribal areas in South Waziristan. This is
    where insurgent forces of Pakistani leader Baituallah Mehsud
    reside. Baituallah Mehsud is an ally of both al Qaeda and the
    Afghan Taliban, but has focused his attention more recently on
    targeting the Pakistani state through a spate of suicide
    bombings. The United States must encourage Pakistan to
    implement hold and build strategies in the tribal areas
    following any military operations. The United States also
    should discourage the Pakistan military from striking
    additional peace deals, pointing out that past deals have only
    undermined Pakistan's position strategically.
        During my recent visit to Afghanistan, several NATO
    commanders expressed the view that Pakistan military operations
    in the tribal areas are helping reduce the flow of militants
    and insurgents into eastern Afghanistan. Still, NATO commanders
    acknowledge that the command and control of the Afghan Taliban
    resides in and around Quetta, Baluchistan, and provides
    leadership and critical access to money flows for insurgent
    operations in Afghanistan. They said that if the Taliban
    leadership in Quetta was neutralized, it would deal a
    significant blow to the insurgency in southern Afghanistan,
    depriving it of guidance, focus, and legitimacy.
        Therefore, the United States must convince Pakistan to
    crack down on Afghan Taliban leadership and should determine
    the level and type of further U.S. military aid to Pakistan
    based on Islamabad's efforts in this regard.
        One of the major problems in garnering full Pakistani
    cooperation against the Afghan Taliban is continued paranoia
    among security officials about India's role in Afghanistan. The
    United States views Indian development activities, like road
    and dam construction, and humanitarian assistance as helpful
    while Pakistan security officials view it as an attempt to
    encircle Pakistan.
        Let me just say a few words on Afghanistan, if I may, based
    on my observations from my trip.
        I think there has been improvement in the coordination of
    the international effort that I could perceive, and I think
    there is support among the NATO partners for the evolving U.S.
    strategy, namely, the focus on a population-centric approach.
    Allies such as the U.K., Canada, the Netherlands, Denmark, and
    Poland are providing invaluable contributions to the fighting.
        The new push by U.S. forces into Helmand Province is part
    of a broader effort to regain the initiative from the Taliban
    in the south. The NATO commanders I met with in Regional
    Command South were enthusiastic about the arrival of the
    additional U.S. troops to southern Afghanistan. They noted that
    up until now they had lacked sufficient resources to implement
    an effective counterinsurgency strategy. The commanders we met
    with believe the U.S. troop influx will help shift the momentum
    against the Taliban, perhaps as early as late summer or early
    fall.
        It is important that the August 20 elections in Afghanistan
    are carried out in a credible manner and that the Afghan people
    believe the democratic process can bring change to their
    everyday lives. It would be devastating if, just as the
    international community is getting its act together and
    implementing a winning strategy, the Afghan people lose faith
    in the democratic process because of a flawed election.
        As I said at the beginning of my remarks, containing the
    global terrorist threat requires us to partner closely with
    Pakistan. In this regard, Congress should move quickly to
    reconcile the two separate pieces of Pakistan legislation that
    have recently passed the House and the Senate to demonstrate
    the U.S. commitment to a long-term partnership. The Afghanistan
    and Pakistan Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Act that would
    provide U.S. duty-free access to items produced in zones in the
    border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan also is an integral
    part of changing security perceptions in the region and should
    be a priority for this Congress.
        Thank you.
        Senator Carper. Ms. Curtis, thank you. Mr. Schmidle,
    welcome.

        TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS SCHMIDLE,\1\ FELLOW, NEW AMERICA
                               FOUNDATION

        Mr. Schmidle. First, I would like to thank you, Chairman
    Carper, Senator Levin, and Senator Burris. I am honored for the
    opportunity to share some thoughts on the subject of
    strengthening U.S.-Pakistan relations today with a specific
    focus on explaining the character and dynamics of jihadist
    militancy in Pakistan.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Schmidle appears in the Appendix
    on page 66.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The United States is dependent on Pakistan for
    accomplishing its objectives in Afghanistan. Many of the
    insurgents fighting against American soldiers in Afghanistan
    are either based in Pakistan or being commanded from Pakistan.
    Top Afghan Taliban leaders use Quetta, the capital of
    Pakistan's Baluchistan Province, as their headquarters from
    where they direct operations in southern Afghanistan. And
    insurgents in eastern Afghanistan are being supported and led
    by networks in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas
    and, to a lesser extent, the North-West Frontier Province.
        I am going to focus my testimony today on those insurgent
    and jihadists fighting against the Pakistani Government,
    however. I often hear U.S. military officials describe their
    adversaries along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in general
    terms such as ``the enemy,'' while in the same sentence
    proposing to isolate specific ``irreconcilable'' militants from
    specific ``reconcilable'' ones. But what is the character of
    the jihadist threat in Pakistan? I want to take a few minutes
    to answer this question in two parts. The first part is who
    constitutes the enemy in Pakistan, and the second part is how
    does the Pakistani military conceptualize the enemy.
        So who are the jihadists and insurgents fighting against
    the Pakistani Government? The Pakistani militants are not a
    monolithic, disciplined entity. They are probably best
    understood as belonging to one of three categories, each with
    different safe havens, objectives, and vulnerabilities. Those
    three groups are: First, foreign al Qaeda elements; second,
    Kashmiri and sectarian militants; and, third, Tehreek-e Taliban
    Pakistan, or the Pakistani Taliban Movement.
        The foreign militants--which are predominantly Arabs and
    Uzbeks, with a smaller number of Turks, Chechens, Africans, and
    some Europeans--can be classified as al Qaeda and are estimated
    to account for several hundred fighters. They are suspected of
    being based in South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Mohmand
    Agency, Bajour, and in Swat. Owing to their internationalist
    backgrounds, most of them have international aims, whether it
    is committing terrorism abroad; committing terrorism against
    international targets in Pakistan and Afghanistan; or in order
    to consolidate their own control over these areas, committing
    violence against the traditional tribal authorities. Of the
    three categories of militants in Pakistan, these are by far the
    least interested in reconciliation.
        The Kashmir and sectarian groups have long enjoyed a
    symbiotic relationship with the Pakistani State. In the mid-
    1980s, the main anti-Shia outfit, Sipah-e-Sahaba, was formed
    with military support with the goal of transforming Pakistan
    from being a Muslim state into being an explicitly Sunni Muslim
    State. However, Sipah-e-Sahaba members spent a considerable
    amount of time in Afghanistan during the Taliban era,
    participating in pogroms against Afghanistan's Shia Hazara
    minorities. In the early 1990s, a Sipah-e-Sahaba splinter
    group, known as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, was created with an even
    more ambitious and murderous agenda and has been accused in the
    abduction and murder of Daniel Pearl and the bombing of a
    church in Islamabad in 2002 and, to some extent, the
    assassination of Benazir Bhutto. Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-
    Jhangvi are the homegrown Pakistani equivalent of the sectarian
    death squads that have terrorized Iraq for years.
        Within the second category are also the Kashmiri militant
    groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad, Harakat-ul-Jihadi-Islami, and
    Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. Most of these groups, Kashmiri and sectarian
    ones alike, are based in southern Punjab, in and around Multan,
    Bahawalpur, and Jhang. The Kashmiri groups receive substantial
    support from the Pakistani intelligence agencies to carry out
    attacks against Indian forces in Kashmir, and this support and
    training makes them now particularly dangerous. So unlike many
    of the Pashtuns who call themselves Taliban and are fighting
    against the State, these fighters are simply more than just
    disgruntled men with guns.
        The uprising at the Red Mosque in July 2007 was critical
    for this reason, for not only did it bring together sectarian
    and Kashmiri militants from southern Punjab, but it also
    brought together Pashtuns from the border and Arab jihadist
    ideologues. But, second, and most importantly, it exposed the
    limitations of the Pakistani intelligence agencies, for while
    senior leaders of the state-supported jihadist groups went to
    the mosque to plead with the brothers who were in charge to
    halt their activities, the foot soldiers from these state-
    supported jihadist groups had already switched sides. In other
    words, the state may have succeeded in its bid to reconcile the
    leaders of some groups, but what good is a leader with no one
    to lead? Those who survived the final raid on the mosque
    ultimately fled to the tribal areas, where they have taken up
    refuge with the Taliban.
        This brings us now to the Pakistani Taliban, which have
    evolved into the lethal force they have become primarily
    because they represent a fusion of al Qaeda, Kashmiri and
    sectarian jihadist groups, and Pashtun discontent. Consider the
    case of Baituallah Mehsud and his organization based in the
    Mehsud areas of South Waziristan. Mehsud's deputy, Qari
    Hussein, belongs to Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, the anti-Shia sectarian
    group. When his men kidnapped almost 200 Pakistani soldiers in
    August 2007, they looked through the soldiers' gear, found at
    least one of them who was carrying Shia literature, and
    proceeded to have his head cut off--by a teenage boy with a
    knife. This sectarian facet is critical to understand because
    now we see most of the fighting in the Kurram Agency of the
    tribal areas occurring between Sunni Talibs and local Shia
    fighters.
        So who is reconcilable? There are two groups of combatants
    who fall into this category: Those Pashtuns currently fighting
    alongside the Taliban who joined the Taliban out of a sense of
    ethnic identity and Pashtun nationalism, and those bandits and
    criminals who realized that donning a turban and beard provided
    some legitimacy to actions otherwise considered ``banditry.''
    But the most important group that the Pakistani Government
    should be targeting with aid and security are those Pashtun-
    populated areas in the North-West Frontier Province and
    Baluchistan where the Taliban are not a significant presence
    yet. The more that Islamabad can portray the insurgency as
    being led by foreign religious extremists and not by local
    Pashtuns, the better chance it has of success.
        Could I have two paragraphs to talk about the Nazir Group
    here in the end?
        Senator Carper. If they are short.
        Mr. Schmidle. OK. Publicly, the Pakistani military and
    intelligence establishment has maintained a certain amount of
    confidence that it can pit various groups against one another.
    But as we were mentioning, as Senator Levin was mentioning
    earlier, in the Pakistani threat perception there are ``good''
    and ``bad'' Taliban, and this case certainly applies in South
    Waziristan, where right now the military is talking about an
    offensive there, and we see Baituallah Mehsud and his fighters
    coming under attack, and yet Maulvi Nazir being seemingly
    unfazed.
        Now, this relationship between Maulvi Nazir and the
    Pakistani military really dates back to the spring, April 2007,
    when Maulvi Nazir drove the Uzbek foreign al Qaeda elements out
    of his territory with support from the Pakistani army. The
    general who was in charge of this territory later confided to
    me that he had commanded his soldiers to take off their
    uniforms, to take AK-47s, to look like locals, and to fight
    ``as Taliban'' with the Taliban against these foreign fighters.
    So this story should show that the new-found vigor on display
    by the Pakistani army only pertains to some militant factions.
        I will end on that.
        Senator Carper. Thanks very much. Mr. Nawaz.

     TESTIMONY OF SHUJA NAWAZ,\1\ DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIA CENTER, THE
                            ATLANTIC COUNCIL

        Mr. Nawaz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators Levin and
    Burris. I am honored to appear before you today to share my
    thoughts with you on what works and what could work in
    Pakistan, and how we can make the United States a better
    partner in building Pakistan safer and stronger. I speak as a
    Pakistani but also as someone who has lived and worked in the
    United States since 1972.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Nawaz appears in the Appendix on
    page 71.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        While the situation in Pakistan may appear bleak, I do not
    think it is hopeless. Pakistan is a complex country, struggling
    nearly 62 years since independence to define its nationhood.
    Repeated military and autocratic rule, both civil and military,
    has left its key institutions stunted. The limitations of its
    military rulers have been matched by the short-sightedness of
    its civil leadership. Most political parties are run as
    personal fiefdoms and family businesses or on feudal patterns.
    Rarely do they allow internal democratic systems to emerged.
    Ironically, only the major religious party, the Jamaat-i-
    Islami, actually holds elections at various levels and
    routinely elects new leaders from the rank-and-file.
        I welcome President Obama's and the U.S. Congress' moves to
    change the relationship with Pakistan to focus on a longer-term
    commitment to the people of Pakistan and not on an alliance
    with any single person, party, or institution. In this season
    of bipartisan support for help to rebuild Pakistan and reshape
    U.S. policy, I offer some information and suggestions.
        First, we must recognize the emerging demographic shape of
    Pakistan: Over 60 percent of its population is below 30 years.
    Most of its youth are disenfranchised, disconnected with the
    economy and polity, and unemployed. They are disaffected and
    vulnerable to the blandishments of their radical co-
    religionists, who have used a convoluted interpretation of
    Islam to attract Pakistani youth to their side.
        Yet Pakistani society has strong sinews. When given the
    chance, its people work hard and do well. They helped build
    Britain's textile factories and help run the economies of the
    Gulf States and the Arabian Peninsula. They remit about $6
    billion a year to their homeland. A recent World Bank study
    showed that from 1980 to 2007, Pakistan ranked second only to
    China's 9.9 percent average GDP growth rate with a growth rate
    of 5.8 percent. All this in spite of government. Today Pakistan
    has a middle class of some 30 million with an average per
    capita income of $410,000 a year on a purchasing power parity
    basis.
        So how do we engage this complex Pakistan so we can
    leverage its strengths and build a long-lasting relationship?
    Certainly not by threats or coercion, for Pakistanis are a
    proud people and do not respond well to the carrots-and-sticks
    approach. In any case, such an approach is not employed by most
    of us in our personal friendships. Why would we use it with
    another country? Rather, we need to build trust on the basis of
    understanding.
        Pakistan's military now appears to have recognized that the
    internal threats are more immediate than the looming presence
    of a powerful India to the east. But it does not have the full
    training nor the equipment to fight an insurgency. When the
    United States talks of counterinsurgency training, it sounds to
    the Pakistanis that they must abandon conventional defense. We
    must clarify that this is not the case.
        Until Pakistan's threat perceptions change, we must be
    prepared to support its military in creating a hybrid force,
    ranging across the spectrum of capabilities. This will allow
    them to shift from the Committee on Information Needs (COIN) to
    conventional, as needed.
        Now, how can the United States become more effective? USAID
    is broken badly by years of neglect. It must be rebuilt,
    empowered, and given the staff to strategize and manage its
    projects, develop relationships inside Pakistan, and
    effectively deliver aid where it is needed. USAID is aptly
    named in my view. Most of its aid money stays in the United
    States. This must stop. USAID needs to stop being a contract
    management agency and become again a powerful partner of U.S.
    diplomacy, working with local counterparts.
        We must also better coordinate assistance, so DOD, State,
    Treasury, Commerce, USTR, DOE, and other agencies work together
    rather than autonomously or at cross purposes. So Congress
    needs to support the Special Representative's work in this
    regard.
        Trade can be a huge supplement to aid. Politically
    difficult moves such as the Free Trade Agreement and removal of
    quotas on textile imports would allow Pakistan to help itself.
    A study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics
    supports this idea. But we must encourage Pakistan to move up
    the value-added chain towards manufacturers if it is to stay
    ahead of the population growth curve.
        The ROZs fall in the same category. It is a very expensive
    solution, but it is not a permanent solution to the problem. So
    we must encourage Pakistan to move up the value-added ladder
    towards manufacturers, as I said, and to have these ROZs
    located near population hubs and communications.
        There is a better way of creating jobs in FATA, and we have
    a calculation that if you create 300,000 jobs in FATA, you have
    basically eliminated the entire pool of unemployed youth in the
    area which are being recruited by the Taliban.
        On retraining the military, we must recognize that the
    Pakistan army also needs help in keeping up its conventional
    force even while we build up its mobility and ability to fight
    militants. Mr. Chairman, four helicopters will not do the
    trick. The United States can and should divert larger numbers
    of helicopters and COIN-oriented equipment to Pakistan as it
    replaces the fleets of European Allies, for example.
        We must also replace the coalition support funds with
    regular foreign military funding with milestones and benchmarks
    proposed by Pakistan's military and agreed to by the United
    States. This will help transform the current patronage
    relationship from an army for hire to an army that is fighting
    Pakistan's own war.
        How do we attract the aid monies and make their use
    transparent? I believe in accountability, Mr. Chairman, and
    responsible use of domestic and foreign funds. Pakistan does
    not have the ability to track its civil or military
    expenditures effectively; we must help Pakistan to create these
    systems. A comprehensive financial tracking system in the
    Ministry of Finance and in the Ministry of Defense will help
    strengthen civilian control and supremacy inside Pakistan.
        Chairman Carper. Mr. Nawaz, I am going to ask you to wrap
    up your testimony please.
        Mr. Nawaz. Yes, sir.
        The Pakistani Diaspora can provide the backbone for such
    efforts. On its part, the U.S. Government needs to make its aid
    transparent. Finally, Mr. Chairman, I return to the complexity
    of Pakistan, its strategic choices and external and domestic
    challenges. The United States must work behind the scenes to
    understand Pakistan's security concerns and to alleviate them,
    and India is a key player in this region. The United States
    must use its influence with India so that it shows, in the
    words of my friend Peter Jones at the University of Ottawa,
    ``strategic altruism.'' Both India and Pakistan must leapfrog
    the hurdles of historical distrust and conflicts to fight the
    common enemies of poverty, terror, and religious extremism.
    There is no alternative.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Carper. Thank you very much. Mr. Fick, welcome.

    TESTIMONY OF NATHANIEL FICK,\1\ CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, CENTER
                      FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

        Mr. Fick. Thank you, Chairman Carper, distinguished Members
    of the Subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you today.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Fick appears in the Appendix on
    page 75.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        My comments this afternoon are based largely on a research
    project I have just completed with my colleagues David
    Kilcullen and Andrew Exum. I know you are familiar with Dr.
    Kilcullen's work in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Mr. Exum is
    currently serving on General McChrystal's assessment team in
    Kabul. I have submitted our entire formal report as written
    testimony.
        Avoiding the worst outcomes in Pakistan over the coming
    year demands that we focus on securing areas that are still
    under government control, build up the police and civil
    authority, and measure progress against realistic benchmarks so
    that we know what is working and what must be changed.
        The near-term challenge for the United States and its
    allies is to stop the extremist advance, both geographically
    and psychologically. If the militant advance is not at least
    halted in the coming year in the Pakistani State, including the
    supply routes supporting the coalition in Afghanistan and
    Islamabad's nuclear arsenal could face an existential threat.
        The first priority is to change two policies that have
    proven especially destabilizing: Drone strikes against targets
    beyond al Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and
    the North-West Frontier, and unconditionally aiding the
    Pakistani military at the expense of other security forces.
        Remote attacks by unmanned aerial vehicles are currently
    the U.S.'s primary method of combating violent extremism in
    northwest Pakistan. The appeal of drone attacks for
    policymakers is clear, their positive effects are measurable,
    and they avoid coalition casualties. They create a sense of
    insecurity among militants and constrain their interactions
    with each other.
        Despite these advantages, the costs of drone attacks as
    they are currently being conducted inside Pakistan outweigh the
    benefits, and they are in the current context harmful to U.S.
    and allied interests. U.S. officials vehemently dispute,
    rightly, the civilian casualty figures used by the Pakistani
    press, and it seems certain that far more militants and far
    fewer civilians have been killed than is reported there.
        What matters as much as the real numbers, however, is the
    perception of these operations among the people in the FATA and
    the northwest frontier, as well as among the people of
    Pakistan's other provinces. Even beyond the Pashtun belt, drone
    strikes against Taliban targets as opposed to al Qaeda excite
    visceral opposition across a broad spectrum of Pakistani
    opinion. The U.S. reliance on drones also displays every
    characteristic of a tactic or, more accurately, a piece of
    technology substituting for a strategy.
        Currently strikes from unmanned aircraft are being carried
    out in a virtual vacuum without a concerted information
    operations campaign or an equally robust strategy to engage the
    Pakistani people more holistically. Killing terrorists is
    necessary. Expanding the target list beyond al Qaeda, as
    happened in the wake of Benazir Bhutto's assassination,
    empowers the very people the coalition seeks to undermine.
        With militant attacks spreading east of the Indus River and
    threatening the urban centers of Punjab and Sindh, where much
    of the Pakistani middle class lives, the United States and its
    Pakistani allies should build on their strengths by drawing a
    notional line at the Indus River to defend those people already
    under the control of the central government. One element in
    this strategy should be the reallocation of funds from the
    Pakistani military and intelligence services--which continue to
    view India as Pakistan's most pressing threat--and toward the
    police.
        The Kerry-Lugar Act is a welcome step in the right
    direction. It decouples military from non-military aid, triples
    that non-military aid to $1.5 billion a year, and includes
    increased allocations for the police, independent judiciary,
    and anticorruption efforts. It also--and I will cover this in
    more detail shortly--requires benchmarks and criteria for
    measuring the effectiveness of U.S. assistance.
        To be sure, short-term aid to the police forces is not a
    long-term fix for Pakistan. In the coming year, however, the
    neglected Pakistani police forces must be bolstered so that
    they can credibly secure the populations of Punjab and Sindh
    from militant attacks.
        All strategies require constant assessment, and President
    Obama's plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan is no exception. In
    the speech unveiling his new approach, the President promised
    to set clear metrics and consistently assess the impact of U.S.
    policies.
        Effective benchmarks, as Mr. Jones correctly stated
    earlier, should measure outcomes for the population rather than
    inputs by governments. Too often, the international community
    has measured progress by tracking money raised, money spent, or
    troops deployed. These are inputs, not outcomes, and they
    measure effort not effectiveness.
        Better benchmarks track trends in the proportion to the
    population that feels safe, can access essential services,
    enjoys social justice and the rule of law, engages in political
    activity, and earns a living without fear of insurgents, drug
    traffickers, or corrupt officials.
        Because perception matters in politics and the coalition's
    goals are political--to marginalize the extremists, bolster the
    government, and wean the population away from armed struggle--
    perceived outcomes matter the most. It is not enough to make
    people objectively safer and better off. Before they are
    willing to put down their weapons and support the government,
    the population must feel safer and must perceive the government
    as the winning side.
        Key metrics to watch in Pakistan include the rate at which
    Taliban chapters continue to open in the Punjab and whether the
    balance of 2009 sees more attacks in the urban centers of
    Karachi and Lahore. These developments would indicate that
    instability is increasing in the Punjab and Sindh heartlands
    and would suggest that the situation on the ground is
    worsening.
        The assassination rate of maliks is another indicator. The
    Taliban have killed hundreds of maliks since 2004, a sign of
    intimidation and illustrating the erosion of civil society and
    the collapse of law and order. A drop in killings might simply
    indicate that most maliks have been killed or driven away from
    their districts, but continued high assassination rates would
    indicate ongoing insecurity.
        In closing, I would like to make an overarching suggestion.
    During the campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan, one
    slogan unified all efforts of the U.S. Government: ``Get the
    Russians out.'' For this campaign we should consider using
    ``Build local capacity,'' which, while maybe not as catchy, has
    the virtue of being clear and one word shorter.
        Thank you for the privilege of testifying before you today.
        Senator Carper. Thanks very much. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen.

      TESTIMONY OF ROLF MOWATT-LARSSEN,\1\ SENIOR FELLOW, BELFER
     CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY
                SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

        Mr. Mowatt-Larssen. Thank you. Good afternoon, gentlemen.
    The Subcommittee asked me to address three issues: First, to
    assess the security challenge to Pakistani nuclear weapons;
    second, address the nuclear terrorism threat, in other words,
    the terrorist nuclear intent and capability; and, third, to
    make some recommendations on what might guide stronger
    cooperation between the United States and Pakistan.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mowatt-Larssen appears in the
    Appendix on page 78.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To that end, I wrote a paper with my Harvard colleague and
    nuclear security expert, Matthew Bunn. I provided that paper as
    a restricted document to the Subcommittee so we could go in
    full into this topic, particularly the cooperation, without
    hyping or otherwise exacerbating any sensitivities,
    particularly when cooperation entails issues that affect
    national sovereignty as well as specific nuclear sensitivities
    that obviously, whether we are talking about Pakistan, the
    United States, or any other country, are very relevant.
        It is also, I think, for context, important to bear in mind
    that it is very dangerous to hype the issue of losing control
    of Pakistani nuclear weapons. I think any statement I have made
    certainly has stressed that the Pakistan military that protects
    the nuclear arsenal is a very professional organization. It
    takes its duties extremely serious, and I do not think anything
    I would say would question the degree of effort that they have
    put into this or their intent.
        I think the bigger question here is the problem we face
    itself has a zero tolerance standard, which applies
    particularly when we are looking at Pakistan but also globally.
    It is a standard that President Obama laid out very clearly in
    Prague, and I think changed the entire nuclear landscape. He
    described it as ``a single bomb threshold,'' where a bomb going
    off, a terrorist bomb, in any city of the world changes life
    for everybody. That is the standard that we are worried about
    when we think about upgrading security in any country in the
    world and the nature of the cooperation. I think that demands
    to cooperate are enhanced.
        The essential challenge we face is that terrorists only
    have to be successful one time, we have to be successful every
    time. And there is no such thing as perfect security or perfect
    anything if my 36 years in the government are of any relevance.
        I would like to summarize just a few of the highlights of
    things I think would be germane to say publicly. First, there
    are three trends that Pakistanis face that in particular affect
    them. They are not unique to Pakistan, but they are trends that
    are particularly worrisome. First is the increasing levels of
    extremism in the country that exacerbate the threats for
    insiders working with outsiders, the insiders in the nuclear
    establishment working with outsiders to either take out
    material or facilitate people's access inside.
        Second, their program, unlike many programs in the world,
    is an expanding program, a rapidly expanding program. More
    weapons in more places means more potential for things to go
    wrong.
        And third is the potential threat to a change in government
    and the challenges that might pose that have not been fully
    considered. The challenge to the national command authorities
    who control the nuclear command and control is not trivial at
    all. Now again, I am sure that the Pakistani establishment is
    taking it extremely serious and working through all the
    scenarios they think could occur.
        Second area of broad interest, what can terrorists do? Can
    terrorists, in fact, detonate a nuclear weapon? It is very hard
    for a terrorist group to do this. No one is saying it is easy.
    Is it more than 1 percent? If it is, it is an existential
    problem, and that is what we face.
        Terrorists have three pathways to do this. They can steal a
    bomb, they can attack a facility, or they can steal enough
    material to construct a bomb. We know since Aum Shinrikyo in
    the early 1990s and al Qaeda as early as 1993 that the intent
    is clear, terrorist groups want to do this. The only thing we
    think that they have not been able to do, which is significant,
    is overcome the barriers in terms of having the capability. And
    that is what we are trying to stop by ensuring security of all
    nuclear facilities globally, but particularly in unstable
    areas.
        Finally, in looking at cooperation, just to discuss in a
    more general sense, I think one thing in particular I would
    stress is the insider threat. We have seen in the United
    States, itself, that we have had arrests in my time in the
    Department of Energy, for example, of employees that had
    issues. So, therefore, again, we think we have something to
    share. We think all countries should share more about nuclear
    security-related upgrading. The Pakistan-U.S. effort in this
    regard, from my standpoint, is a model for how countries need
    to think. And I think the International Atomic Energy Agency
    should play a bigger role.
        Second, how do they strengthen protection against
    outsiders, particularly outsiders who will attack a facility?
        Third, talking about winning the battle of hearts and
    minds--and I have heard some of that here today. And most
    notably with hearts and minds is making the point that Islam as
    a great religion in no way would condone the slaughtering of
    innocents that is part and parcel of a nuclear terrorist
    attack. Groups like al Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Tayyiba or others
    cannot get a free ride expressing the intent as a legitimate
    expression under Islam, and it is important that clerics and
    groups worldwide, particularly nongovernmental groups, work
    against that trend.
        Fourth, increasing threat awareness, the fact that nuclear
    terrorism is not still regarded as a real threat in many parts
    of the world, as I alluded to earlier.
        And, finally, the improvement of joint communications and
    reducing misunderstandings. If the United States and Pakistan
    do nothing else than have a robust trust and communication that
    is created through these exchanges, by my standard, again, of
    the most important things we need to do, that would be at the
    top of the list. We can resort to those mechanisms,
    particularly in a crisis where there is a suggestion--whether
    it has happened or not--that there may be a lost nuke or an
    attack on a facility, and we are dealing with reports that have
    to be confirmed and the only way we are going to really be able
    to do that is through trusted channels between Pakistan and the
    United States.
        Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Carper. Yes, thank you for excellent testimony from
    all of you. And Senator Levin, who has been here in the U.S.
    Senate for a long time, heard a lot of witnesses, a lot of
    panels of witnesses, said to me just before he slipped out
    during Mr. Mowatt-Larssen's testimony, he said, ``These are
    damn good witnesses.''
        And I have sat next to him in a bunch of hearings over
    time, and I do not think I have heard him ever say that. I am
    sure he has thought it. But this is really exceptionally a good
    panel, and thank you all for sharing your thoughts with us.
        I am going to yield to Senator Burris if he has any final
    questions or comments. I have a number of questions I want to
    ask before we conclude. I think we are going to vote at 4:45,
    about 20 minutes from now. But I would like for us to get in
    more questions. Senator Burris, any comments or questions you
    would like to ask, feel free.
        Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am listening to
    this excellent testimony and thought I knew a lot until now.
    Mr. Schmidle, maybe you can help me out here. I am trying now
    to distinguish between whether or not the Pakistanis or al
    Qaeda or the Afghans or the Talibans or each of these groups,
    are these Pakistanis that are what we would call militants and
    they are joining the anti-force within their own government
    that are now fighting for or against our troops that would
    cross over the border and go back into Afghanistan? Could you
    clear this up for me since now I have listened to such
    excellent testimony and am trying to sort it out?
        Mr. Schmidle. Senator Burris, thank you. I am not sure that
    I can totally clarify it. I think that it is incredibly murky,
    as you suggested.
        Those who are fighting in Pakistan, there are very few
    Afghans who are crossing the border to fight with the Taliban
    against the Pakistani Government. There are, however, many
    Pakistanis who up until the time--really we have to look at
    this July 2007 government raid of the mosque in Islamabad as a
    turning point when the insurgency against the government became
    popular for a while amongst the various militant groups, who up
    until that point, even though they thought that President
    Musharraf was doing the work of the Americans and there was
    still some opposition to him, still primarily focused their
    attention on fighting American and NATO forces across the
    border in Afghanistan.
        So since that event, though, it did attract a great amount
    of attention from the various militant groups. Those Pashtuns,
    however, who are fighting in the North West Frontier Province
    are not necessarily militants. I mean, some of them are simply
    tribesmen who, over the course of the past several years, have
    in an accidental bombing raid by the Pakistanis had their house
    destroyed and have then said, OK, well, I have now sworn the
    rest of my life to avenging my wife's death, or whatever.
        It is multi-layered as to who the actual belligerents are
    in this struggle. I do not know if that clarifies things at
    all.
        Senator Burris. It does not. Can anyone help me out here?
        Ms. Curtis. If I might?
        Senator Burris. Sure, please, Ms. Curtis.
        Ms. Curtis. I think you have hit on a major crux of the
    problem, sir, and this has been that we have seen from the
    Pakistan Government, the military in particular, a dual policy
    of fighting some terrorists and supporting others. And it has
    not worked, sir. It is threatening to our interests in the
    region, threatening to their own interests in the region. And I
    think that is why we see such a confused situation----
        Senator Burris. Is the Taliban--they are al Qaeda?
        Ms. Curtis. What I am saying, sir, is that Pakistan has
    supported and elements of the security services probably are
    supporting parts of the Afghani Taliban to protect their own
    interests vis-a-vis India. They do not want India to have a
    foothold in Afghanistan, so this is part of the problem that we
    do have different objectives, and I think what we need to see
    from Pakistan is a more holistic approach to militancy and a
    willingness to confront the militancy and confront all militant
    groups on the same level rather than, as we heard from one of
    the other witnesses, shifting alliances, supporting some groups
    on one day, other groups on another day.
        It seems this policy has failed. It has failed to provide
    security in this region, and it is threatening to global
    national security interests.
        Senator Burris. Mr. Nawaz, can you help me out a little
    bit?
        Mr. Nawaz. Yes, Senator, if I can just simplify it, the
    Afghan Taliban comprised the so-called Quetta Shura and then
    the Haqqani group, which is in North Waziristan and the group
    belonging to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar that operates in the northern
    regions of FATA from Nuristan and Kunar Valley.
        The Afghan Taliban have not gotten into any battles with
    the Pakistan army. They have avoided it, and the Pakistan army
    has returned the favor. They have not made it difficult for
    them to seek sanctuary in Pakistan. The local Taliban, the ones
    that Mr. Schmidle was referring to----
        Senator Burris. When you say ``local,'' you mean the Afghan
    Taliban?
        Mr. Nawaz. The Pakistani Taliban.
        Senator Burris. Oh, the Pakistan Taliban.
        Mr. Nawaz. They are known, in fact, as the Tehreek-e
    Taliban of Pakistan or the Taliban Movement of Pakistan. They
    emerged only in the last couple of years. They have aligned
    themselves as franchisees of al Qaeda at times as well as
    aligned themselves with the Punjabi militant groups, the Sunni
    groups that were previously supported by the Pakistan
    intelligence services in Kashmir against India. So new
    alliances have been formed that are now operating inside
    Pakistan against the Pakistani State.
        But just to be clear, the Afghan Taliban have not taken up
    arms generally against the Pakistan army, and the army has not,
    therefore, chosen to attack them. This is a sort of
    oversimplified view. There are areas where there are some
    crossovers, but this is probably the best that one can do in--
    --
        Senator Burris. So this is what our combatants over there
    are trying to deal with it?
        Mr. Nawaz. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Fick. Senator Burris, could I add one comment----
        Senator Burris. Please, Mr. Fick.
        Mr. Fick [continuing]. From the perspective of a former
    combatant. I would suggest that one easy way to think about it
    is almost like the concentric rings of a target. And if at the
    center of the target you have the groups with ambitions beyond
    the theater, Afghanistan and Pakistan, specifically al Qaeda,
    an organization with global ambition, the next concentric ring
    going out would be organizations with ambitions perhaps
    throughout Pakistan, and then wider still are groups with more
    local and limited ambitions.
        And as you get closer to the heart of that bull's eye, the
    heart of that target, the greater is the threat to the United
    States and the more latitude we should have to deal with it
    militarily. As you get closer out to the edges there, to the
    groups that have more local and limited ambition, we have to be
    much more careful militarily for risk of turning the people
    against us.
        Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Carper. You bet. Thank you. Thank you so much for
    joining us today, Senator Burris.
        I was just saying to Wendy Anderson, our senior staff
    person on these issues, it seems to me--and I have sort of
    moved toward this thought as I listened to the first panel and
    now our second panel--the importance of reducing tensions
    between Pakistan and India and sometimes I think in terms of a
    two-fer, or I think we may have a three-fer here in this case:
    One, to the extent that those tensions are significantly
    reduced; first, reduce the likelihood of a war between those
    two countries and potential for nuclear exchange.
        Second, it allows the Pakistan military to focus on
    counterinsurgency rather than fighting a war with the country
    of India. One of you talked about helicopters and we need more
    than just four helicopters. The Pakistanis need more than four
    or six, for that matter. But then it would be, folks, the kind
    of military equipment and capabilities that frankly have not
    much at all to do with India.
        The third is that one of you spoke about how the Pakistanis
    provide almost a safe harbor for--I think it was through the
    Afghan Taliban so that the Afghan Taliban can go back and forth
    and really destabilize the Government of Afghanistan, keep them
    occupied in an effort to reduce the presence or the successful
    involvement of India in Afghanistan. If I were the Pakistanis,
    I would not want to be surrounded on one side by a hostile
    India and on the other side, on my other flank, by an
    Afghanistan that is allied with India.
        I think that those are potentially at least three good
    things that flow from reducing tensions. My hope going forward
    is that the efforts that have been started before in the 1990s
    and even in this decade that they will not just begin anew, but
    will begin with our strongest support and encouragement.
        Anybody have a thought on what I just said? You do not have
    to, but if you do I welcome it. Yes, Ms. Curtis?
        Ms. Curtis. Yes, I think the India-Pakistan rivalry, deep-
    seated, historical, three wars, military crisis, so I think to
    try to say that, ``Well, if we could just get Pakistan to not
    have to worry about its border with India, then it could focus
    on militants,'' is just too simplistic. We have to look at what
    led to the derailing of the dialogue. We had a very productive
    Indo-Pakistani dialogue from 2004 to 2007. The Mumbai attacks,
    a Pakistan-based group conducting a rampage, killing 160 people
    in India in November 2008.
        Senator Carper. Excuse me for interrupting, but do you
    think that attack had anything to do with trying to undermine
    the discussions that were going on?
        Ms. Curtis. I think it probably did. I think it probably
    was aimed at causing conflict between the two countries and
    probably was aimed at taking Pakistani forces away from
    fighting the militants in the tribal areas to having to focus
    on the India border. But India also has to think about its
    security, and if it is being attacked and the elements are
    coming from Pakistan, then it has to prepare itself as well. So
    we have to keep this in mind.
        I think the role that the United States can play is to
    quietly encourage them to get back to talks, but talks that
    will really allow them to view the region differently, focus on
    non-state actors that destabilize both countries. Rather than
    trying for the United States to insert itself into the very
    sensitive Kashmir issue.
        Senator Carper. Notice I have not mentioned Kashmir at all.
        Ms. Curtis. Yes. I think this issue has been dealt with in
    the past through the back-channel negotiations that were
    mentioned before; there has been movement. So encouraging the
    two sides to get back to those talks bilaterally I think should
    be the focus of the United States.
        Senator Carper. Another comment? Mr. Nawaz.
        Mr. Nawaz. Yes, Senator. I am often referred to as an
    optimist. But then a friend----
        Senator Carper. So am I.
        Mr. Nawaz. A friend reminds me that a pessimist is an
    optimist with experience.
        Senator Carper. Yes, I think you noted that in your
    comments. I wrote that down. I hope you do not mind if I use
    it.
        Mr. Nawaz. Not at all. Senator, I think the key is not
    simply in making this a linear equation between opening up the
    dialogue between India and Pakistan and getting Pakistan to
    focus on militancy.
        The longer-term goal really must be to strengthen both
    Pakistan and India so that they can achieve their economic
    potential. India has 300 million people living at absolute
    poverty; Pakistan has also huge gaps between the rich and the
    poor, and the opportunity cost of their defense expenditures is
    extremely high. So whatever can be done by the United States
    and other friends of both countries in opening up a dialogue
    between the two countries, opening up trade, for instance,
    which would create vested interest groups on both sides, which
    would make war impossible, should be encouraged.
        Economics 101 dictates that neighbors should be major
    trading partners. Neither India nor Pakistan is each other's
    major trading partners. India's major trading partner is the
    United States or China, depending on how one counts the
    figures. Pakistan's major trading partner is the United States.
    And neither are neighbors of the United States.
        So it is very critical to try and reopen the dialogue that
    had begun, that was near fruition, at least on three of the
    four key areas where there was conflict, with Kashmir having
    been decided as an issue that was best left to settle by itself
    and to grow organically so that the line of control would
    become irrelevant. I think that is the approach that needs to
    be encouraged. And that will allow Pakistan to become
    economically and politically stronger and, therefore, be able
    to deal with the militancy at home.
        Senator Carper. Good. Thank you. Let me return to the issue
    of security of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and particularly
    with the points I think raised by Mr. Mowatt-Larssen with
    respect to insider threats at nuclear facilities.
        I am going to ask you to try and be brief; we are going to
    start voting in about 5 minutes. So please be brief in
    responding. But as I think, as you rightly point out in your
    testimony, the Pakistani military intelligence and nuclear
    establishment are not immune to rising levels of extremism in
    Pakistan.
        Do you believe that increasing levels of extremism create
    or exacerbate the insider threat at nuclear facilities? We will
    just start with you, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen.
        Mr. Mowatt-Larssen. Yes, I would Mr. Chairman. In fact, I
    would describe the insider threat from the standpoint of my
    background in intelligence and security and counterintelligence
    as their No. 1 threat. It is a far more likely possibility
    than, say, the more hyped problems of losing control of a nuke
    or a convoy being ambushed. Those things are things that have
    to, of course, be eliminated from possibility, but the
    possibility of the insider who is able to gain access to a
    facility and, say, over time bring out material or technology,
    we have already seen in Pakistan. And I know it does not help
    to raise this all the time, but the A.Q. Khan network where, of
    course, the father of the Pakistan program was working outside
    the control of the Pakistan establishment, that is, of course,
    something that is always going to be there, as well as the
    group that worked with al Qaeda and bin Laden specifically
    after September 11, 2001, that was trying to do the same thing.
    So we have already seen very scary examples of the insider
    threat.
        What exacerbates it even more--and I will close with this
    thought--is the fact that we know that nuclear materials have
    been out there, accessible for terrorists to buy on the black
    market. There have been 19 incidents of weapons-usable material
    that have been seized on the black markets in the last 15
    years. So we know that there is a problem, and in all 19 of
    those cases, to the best of my knowledge, they were not
    reported as missing from the facilities that they started at.
    So we do have a problem, and it is very important for the
    Pakistanis to simply exclude the possibility that insiders
    could take material out so terrorists can construct a nuclear
    bomb.
        Senator Carper. All right. Thanks. Mr. Schmidle, and then
    Ms. Curtis.
        Mr. Schmidle. I just want to comment on whether the
    scientists, the army, the intelligence agencies are more or
    less prone to extremism than anyone else in society. I do not
    think that is the case. I think when you look at who is
    composed of the scientists, who is composed of the army, and
    even in the case of the ISI--which is often labeled as being
    excessively Islamist. The ISI is picked from the army; the army
    is picked from the population. The population, up until very
    recently, was sympathetic to the idea of the Taliban, was
    sympathetic to the idea of them as righteous Muslims, slightly
    misguided, but at least doing what they thought was in the
    right way.
        I think that the game has changed in the past couple of
    months with the idea of the Taliban and the reality of the
    Taliban have collapsed. I also do not know to what extent there
    was ever really sympathy. I never heard common sympathy from
    common people for al Qaeda. Maybe for al Qaeda leaders as
    symbols, but not for al Qaeda tactics.
        Senator Carper. Ms. Curtis.
        Ms. Curtis. Yes, I agree with Mr. Mowatt-Larssen that the
    biggest threat is the insider threat rather than the idea that
    somehow the government or the military is overthrown by
    extremists.
        But that said, I think it is important for the military
    leadership to be clear on how much of a danger extremists are
    posing to the country. And this gets back to the point--Senator
    Burris is not here--but the fact is in the past the Taliban has
    been seen as a strategic asset for Pakistan, and so it is
    incumbent on the military leadership to explain to the public
    that ``no, these are threats to the country.''
        And we are beginning to see that General Kayani did state
    last Friday, in his speech to Staff College, to upcoming
    military officers, that while there still were external
    threats, the most immediate threat to Pakistan right now was
    internal.
        So I think these kinds of statements are extremely
    important because they do in a sense form the thinking within
    the military, which is very important.
        Senator Carper. Thank you.
        A question for Mr. Schmidle, if I could. Maybe two
    questions. First of all, how resilient or dedicated are the
    people of Pakistan to continue supporting the nation's campaign
    in South Waziristan?
        Mr. Schmidle. I think that the test case is ultimately the
    plight of the refugees. I think that the plight of the refugees
    is more important right now than any military operation and the
    government can do because the Pashtuns on either side of the
    border right now in Afghanistan and Pakistan are watching to
    see whether the Pakistani army is, (A) serious about actually
    catching the heads of the Swat-based Taliban, Maulana Fazlullah
    and his associates, and, (B) serious about bringing the people
    back to their homes, convincing them the Pakistani army may
    have messed up once, but it will not mess up again, that it is
    now there for their security.
        I think this is the most critical thing. I think that if
    the army takes its eye off the ball and now goes into South
    Waziristan, leaves these 2.5 million refugees in Swat, creates
    another couple of hundred thousand refugees in South
    Waziristan, I think the public support will begin dissipating
    very quickly.
        Senator Carper. Mr. Fick, any thoughts on that?
        Mr. Fick. I agree.
        Senator Carper. Short answer, isn't it? Right to the point.
    That is good. No, you can stop right there. I have more
    questions, so thank you.
        Again back to Mr. Schmidle, if I could. Could you just
    elaborate for us, if you will, on your recommendation that
    Pakistan refrain from launching a campaign in South Waziristan?
    You talked about this in what you just said, but help me again.
    You may have said this, but again, what alternatives would you
    offer to that?
        Mr. Schmidle. The alternatives I think are--I feel like the
    problem is overextension more than anything else. I feel like
    you fail to consolidate what has been a military success, to a
    certain degree, in Swat.
        Senator Carper. It reminds me just a little bit of our
    involvement in Afghanistan----
        Mr. Schmidle. I would agree wholeheartedly, that taking the
    eye off the ball into Iraq----
        Senator Carper [continuing]. In 2001.
        Mr. Schmidle. Definitely. But I think that it then
    complicates--I think that it also exposes the inherent
    incompatibilities of U.S. and Pakistan priorities and perhaps
    creates more short-term problems for collaboration, and right
    now there is some level of momentum, there is some level of
    support. I think that when the United States sees that the
    Pakistani army is only going after some of these Taliban
    leaders and leaving others to cross the border at ease, it then
    resuscitates some of these bilateral problems between the two
    countries.
        Senator Carper. Please, Ms. Curtis.
        Ms. Curtis. I would disagree somewhat, sir. I think that
    what you risk is if you are squeezing the Swat Valley, taking
    operations there, a lot of these people are going to be able to
    still find safe haven in South Waziristan--or North Waziristan
    for that matter.
        So I think it is important while the Pakistani public is
    supporting the military in these operations that they do carry
    the fight to South Waziristan as well. I understand the plight
    of the refugees. That has to be dealt with, but that is mainly
    an issue for the civilian government to be dealing with.
        So I have to say I see it a bit differently, and I do not
    compare it to the situation with the United States and Iraq and
    Afghanistan because I think that you would have synergy in
    terms of if the Pakistanis are squeezing the militants in South
    Waziristan, you have the coalition forces on the other side in
    Afghanistan, and then we can finally have this hammer and anvil
    strategy that we have been working toward for so long. And you
    do have the Pakistani public behind these operations in Swat
    Valley, so I would just have to disagree, and I think we should
    be encouraging them to also start squeezing the militant safe
    haven in the tribal areas as well.
        Senator Carper. Just very briefly, go ahead.
        Mr. Schmidle. I think we should not mistake what is a
    change in will on the part of the Pakistani army with what is
    not a change in capacity. The Pakistani army does not have the
    ability to take on the entire tribal belt if it is inflamed
    with Taliban insurgency, which it would be if they went into
    South Waziristan.
        Senator Carper. OK, thanks. Let me just follow up on that
    with a question of Mr. Nawaz and probably Ms. Curtis, and that
    is, your assessment, please, of the ability of Pakistan to
    adopt and integrate counterinsurgency doctrine.
        Mr. Nawaz. Senator, I think there has been some attempt,
    but it is going to take a long time. The army is still very
    much conventional and its stance is conventional, and it is
    still looking at most of these actions as low-intensity
    conflict and not as counterinsurgency. They do not have the
    equipment nor the training. And, therefore, I do not think that
    they are quite ready.
        If you look at Swat, it was really conventional use of the
    military and it is not counterinsurgency. In my own
    conversation with senior military leaders, they tell me that
    they do not have the capacity to hold Swat or Bajour or other
    parts of FATA, that they need to have civilian counterparts and
    the police force that will be there--which is why the new move
    to induct ex-servicemen into the police force is probably a
    good idea.
        Senator Carper. Good. Ms. Curtis and then maybe a former
    marine would share a thought on this. Ms. Curtis, please.
        Ms. Curtis. Well, obviously----
        Senator Carper. I do not know if you are ever a former
    marine. At least I do not think so.
        Mr. Fick. Just never an ex-Marine.
        Senator Carper. There you go.
        Ms. Curtis. Well, obviously the capability issue is an
    enormous one, and I think the United States is going to have to
    play a very large role in assisting the Pakistanis with
    counterinsurgency training, with equipment, more helicopters,
    as you specified, and then also encouraging the military to
    work with the civilian leadership to develop a comprehensive
    approach to be able to hold and build areas. And this is
    definitely going to be an uphill battle, but I think it is
    something that has to be done. We cannot really hesitate in
    following through on this.
        But it is my understanding that there has been some measure
    of resistance within the Pakistan military to receive this kind
    of training. This may be starting to change, but I think it is
    something we need to keep working toward because it will be
    absolutely critical because now that they have gone in,
    militarily, particularly the Swat Valley, they will have to
    work on a hold and build strategy. They cannot allow the
    Taliban to come back in. This would be, I think, sort of
    devastating for security in the country and the future
    stability of the rest of the country.
        Senator Carper. Mr. Fick, please.
        Mr. Fick. I would suggest that the use of heavy artillery
    is inversely correlated with effective counterinsurgency, and
    the Pakistani army right now is using a lot of heavy artillery
    in the west, which is why I am suggesting that we look at the
    police. And we should not get too wrapped up over the question
    of whether the Pakistani army can effectively conduct a
    counterinsurgency campaign. We should look at whether the
    Pakistani Government can do it. And that requires using
    different tools.
        For most people, especially in rural areas, contact with
    the police is the only contact or the most frequent contact
    they have with their government, and this is the first line of
    contact and defense for the Pakistani Government. In terms of
    training the police, we should not look to our military. Posse
    Comitatus works. Our military is not good at training police,
    so we need to find other ways to do it.
        Senator Carper. Well, we have some experience in training
    police in Iraq.
        Mr. Fick. And Afghanistan.
        Senator Carper. And now in Afghanistan.
        Mr. Fick. And we are much better at training militaries
    than we are at training police.
        If I could get back to your earlier question with regard to
    South Waziristan and suggest that you look at the work that
    then-Colonel Mick Nicholson, now Brigadier General in RC
    South----
        Senator Carper. We know him.
        Mr. Fick. The work he did in RC East when he was a brigade
    commander, effectively influencing tribes across the border in
    Waziristan, is another model. He had great success.
        Senator Carper. That is a good point. Thank you. As we come
    to the end here, we have a vote underway, and so we are going
    to excuse you very shortly.
        One of the things I like to do when we have a panel this
    diverse, and frankly this well regarded and thoughtful, one of
    the things I like to do is to ask you to say--just run down the
    list really quick, Ms. Curtis, as you listened to your other
    four colleagues here on the panel, I am sure they said some
    things you agree with, some things that you do not agree with.
    Just think back to maybe one of the points or two that you most
    agree with, that the other panelists, your colleagues, have
    suggested. Anything come to mind? There has to be one or two.
        Ms. Curtis. Well, I think that Mr. Schmidle did an
    excellent job of explaining the different Pakistani militant
    groups and clarifying a lot of those issues. So I think I agree
    with everything he said in his oral remarks. And I think he
    spelled out clearly how complex this situation is and
    demonstrated from the Pakistani viewpoint what exactly they are
    dealing with.
        And Mr. Mowatt-Larssen, I think I agree with how he
    characterized the threat of the safety and security of
    Pakistan's nuclear weapons, the dangers of hyping that threat.
    I think too often we focus on that. What I say is it is a low-
    probability but high-risk scenario. I think the Pakistan
    military takes the safety and security of its nuclear weapons
    very seriously, and there is no reason to panic, but at the
    same time, obviously, it is an issue that we have to stay
    attuned to.
        Senator Carper. Great, thanks. Mr. Schmidle, among the
    comments of your colleagues, what really stands out in your
    mind that you want to reinforce with us?
        Mr. Schmidle. Mr. Fick's point about the police and about
    thinking of the Indus River as a conceptual line. I think it is
    a lot less threatening for the Pakistani Government and for the
    Pakistani military and intelligence establishment to accept
    American police trainers in the Punjab, which is a much less
    politically sensitive area to be working with police there,
    training, building up capacity in areas that have not been hit
    by the Taliban yet, but could be the next line. And I think
    that is a very good point and something that should be taken
    into consideration.
        Senator Carper. OK, thanks. Mr. Nawaz, same question,
    please.
        Mr. Nawaz. I agree with Mr. Fick's point that
    counterinsurgencies are won by police and not by the military,
    and also that the nuclear threat will always be there because
    there is no perfect security. But there are enough very serious
    minded people in the military and in the Government of Pakistan
    that are devoted to ensuring that the Nuclear Command Authority
    and the Strategic Plans Division remains active and totally
    involved.
        Senator Carper. Thank you. Mr. Fick.
        Mr. Fick. I like to look at things in terms of the most
    likely course of action and the most dangerous course of
    action. And Mr. Schmidle addresses the most likely course of
    action, one of the Pakistani army and government supporting
    some groups while fighting others; that is something I am going
    to take away.
        The most dangerous course of action here, the existential
    threat, if there is one, is nuclear. And Mr. Mowatt-Larssen's
    point about the insider threat is something that I am going to
    look more into.
        Senator Carper. Good. Thank you. Mr. Mowatt-Larssen.
        Mr. Mowatt-Larssen. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it has been
    fascinating for me just what my colleagues have discussed that
    directly pertains to the ultimate effectiveness of nuclear
    security, and that is my biggest takeaway. As that battle goes,
    particularly the battle for the control of the country and the
    hearts and minds and the antipathies towards the United States,
    lowering those reduces that insider threat.
        I also agree, actually, with the comment by Mr. Schmidle
    that there is no greater propensity for the use of nuclear
    weapons to be extremist than any other segment of society. I do
    not even know what the statistics are, but it is that the
    consequences are that much higher in that actuarial calculation
    if one or two are.
        Finally, I would have to pile on to the police equation
    from the stand point of something we have talked about as well
    on the nuclear security side? It is good to get out of
    sometimes the mentality of nuclear security as the nuclear
    security people look at that, whether that is in the
    intelligence services or in the military, and the police do
    have a role and can play a bigger role in nuclear security as
    well in Pakistan.
        Thank you.
        Senator Carper. All right. In closing, we have about 5
    minutes left to vote. I just want to say to each of you, thank
    you for the work you have done with your lives to date. Thank
    you for sharing some of what you have learned with us here this
    afternoon. I appreciate very much where you have agreed because
    it is helpful to us to reinforce the messages that you all
    reinforced here, especially in the last several minutes. My
    colleagues and I are grateful for your work, and I want to say
    to our first witness from the Administration, we very much
    appreciate that input.
        In the next couple of weeks, we are going to have the
    hearing record open for 2 weeks--for the submission of
    additional statements and questions from my colleagues. If you
    get any of those questions, I would just ask for your
    cooperation in providing prompt responses to those questions
    that might be submitted for the record.
        Again, our thanks to each of you. This has just been
    illuminating, certainly interesting, and I think very
    important. Thanks so much.
        With that, this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:58 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

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