[Senate Hearing 111-448]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-448
AVIATION SAFETY: THE ROLE AND
RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMERCIAL
AIR CARRIERS AND EMPLOYEES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 17, 2009
__________
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Chief of Staff
James Reid, Deputy Chief of Staff
Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Brian M. Hendricks, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota, JIM DeMINT, South Carolina,
Chairman Ranking Member
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
BILL NELSON, Florida ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK WARNER, Virginia
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on June 17, 2009.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Dorgan...................................... 1
Statement of Senator DeMint...................................... 3
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 4
Statement of Senator Johanns..................................... 4
Statement of Senator Begich...................................... 5
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 5
Statement of Senator Klobuchar................................... 48
Statement of Senator McCaskill................................... 51
Witnesses
James C. May, President and CEO, Air Transport Association of
America, Inc................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Roger Cohen, President, Regional Airline Association............. 10
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Captain John Prater, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International.................................................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Scott Maurer, Father of Lorin Maurer, Representative of the
Families of Continental Flight 3407............................ 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Appendix
Letter dated June 12, 2009 to Hon. Byron L. Dorgan from Dan
Hanley, Former United Airlines B-777 Captain................... 59
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill
to James C. May................................................ 63
Response to follow-up written questions submitted by Hon. Claire
McCaskill to James C. May...................................... 64
Response to written question submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
James C. May................................................... 65
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill
to Roger Cohen (Submitted July 22, 2009)....................... 65
Response to follow-up written questions submitted by Hon. Claire
McCaskill to Roger Cohen....................................... 66
Response to follow-up written question submitted by Hon. Claire
McCaskill to Roger Cohen dated August 7, 2009.................. 67
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Roger Cohen.................................................... 68
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Captain John Prater............................................ 76
AVIATION SAFETY: THE ROLE AND
RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMERCIAL
AIR CARRIERS AND EMPLOYEES
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and
Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L.
Dorgan, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA
Senator Dorgan. We'll call the hearing to order.
This is a hearing of the subcommittee of the Senate
Commerce Committee, the Subcommittee on Aviation.
I want to thank all of you for joining us today to talk
about the importance of the issue of aviation safety. This is
the second hearing that we have held this month to discuss the
subject of aviation safety, with a particular focus on the
safety of regional carriers.
In this hearing, we will receive testimony from
representatives of the Nation's network carriers and regional
carriers from the Air Transport Association and from the
Regional Airline Association, respectively. We'll also hear
from the Air Line Pilots Association and from Mr. Scott Maurer,
representing the Families of Continental Flight 3407, which
crashed on February 12 of this year in New York.
I do want to say, as well, as we start this hearing, that I
had intended and wished to have representatives of the carriers
themselves at a hearing. And so, we did not accomplish that
today. I'm not minimizing at all the representatives of the
two--the ATA and the RAA, but I will wish to extend invitations
and have representatives of the airlines themselves in here
within the next month or so. It is important, I think, that
they would accept an invitation to come, and so, I will extend
those invitations again.
In this country, I think it is safe to say that we have a
remarkably safe system of air travel. It's not my intention,
with hearings about aviation safety, to alarm anyone about
taking a flight on a regional carrier or a network carrier. We
operate aircrafts all across this country every day, and
provide critical air service to many people who would not
otherwise have that kind of transportation service or that kind
of option. But, we do have a responsibility, it seems to me, to
ask questions and to get answers to the questions of, Do we
have one level of safety, do we have one standard of safety
that now exists, or have we drifted some?
If the traveling public ever has doubts about the
consistency of safety in our airspace system or with airline
travel, the airline industry inevitably will suffer. So, we
have to move together to make certain that people have no
reason to question the oversight or the application of aviation
safety across the country.
I've said before that I've read extensively about the most
recent crash that occurred in our country, the crash by Colgan
Air in Buffalo, New York. Frankly, a number of things happened
on that flight that caused me great, great concern. There were
a number of mistakes that occurred, a number of things that, to
me, were revelations that were quite stunning and led me to
question, Is this--was it an aberration, was it something that
happened only in the cockpit of this one plane, or is there
something else at work? Is there a set of standards that is
applied one way in one set of carriers and another way in
another set of carriers? I don't know the answer to that, but I
think it is important that we ask those questions.
The plane that crashed in New York was a Bombardier Dash 8
Q400 operated by a captain and a copilot who had commuted--both
commuted long distances to get to work, and were found to have
had reasonably little rest before the flight. The copilot
raised issues, in the transcript that I read of the
conversation in the cockpit, of her inexperience with icing
conditions. They, clearly that evening, were flying in
significant icing. The captain had failed a number of flight
tests during his career, which the carrier themselves were
unaware of and did not have information about.
We're going to hear from those that are investigating this.
The NTSB, I know, is doing substantial investigations. But, the
larger question for me, here, is, What about the airlines and
the FAA's ability to prevent a double standard or two different
standards of experience in the cockpit? What about the
enforcement of rules with respect to familiarity with certain
kinds of conditions, familiarity with equipment? We are
supposed to have, dating back to the mid-1990s, ``one level of
safety,'' for both regional and major carriers. And I want to
hear, from our witnesses today, whether you think that is
actually the case, whether the system has kept up with changes,
or whether there have been changes that have occurred that have
drifted us away from one standard?
I'm particularly concerned, from some of the things I've
learned in the last hearing--for example, that a carrier does
not easily have full access to the records of pilots they are
considering hiring. I'm talking about all of the records. They
have access to the records of everything that has occurred with
respect to an airplane. An airplane that comes off the line and
is put in service, everything that happens to that particular
airplane is a matter of record that anyone can access. And that
is not the case with respect to the record of the pilot or the
people in the cockpit.
I think that there is some reason to be encouraged by what
the new administrator, Randy Babbitt, has done. He called for a
meeting, Monday of this week, which reflects a concern that he
wants to understand these things quickly and take whatever
action is necessary. It is also the case that he indicated
that, after--2 years after the NTSB suggested a rulemaking on
access to records for pilots, that Mr. Babbitt indicated to me
that the next time he came to a hearing and I asked the
question, ``Have you begun a rulemaking?'' he indicated that he
expected the answer to be affirmative rather than negative.
So, I think we're making some progress, here. But, this is
very, very important, and it's something that we have to ask
questions about. They are tough questions, but necessary and
important questions.
I want to thank the witnesses for being with us.
Senator DeMint is the Ranking Member of our Subcommittee,
and I know Senator DeMint wishes to make a comment and then, I
think, also introduce Mr. Maurer, more formally, who is a
member of your state.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DeMINT,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you
again for conducting these hearings.
And I would just add my comments to yours. I agree with
everything you said about the concerns about this flight. A lot
of us get on regional flights ourselves, every week, going back
and forth to our home states, and we assume a lot when we get
on a plane. And I know all Americans do. And we do need to make
sure there is a standard of safety for every American.
I'm looking forward to working with the Chairman on
language that would reveal all the pilot records, just as we
have them for an airplane. And some things seem to make common
sense right now.
But, I do have the pleasure of introducing Mr. Scott Maurer
this morning. Mr. Maurer is the father of a 30-year-old woman
who was on Flight 3407 crash, Lorin Maurer. Mr. Maurer was born
and raised in Reading, Pennsylvania, where he and his wife
raised their daughter, Lorin. He currently lives in South
Carolina.
I appreciate him taking the time to come to Washington. I
think this is his third trip here, and I know this is very
difficult for him to continue to recount this tragedy in
public, as well as private.
Mr. Maurer comes before this Committee this morning as a
representative of over 150 people and the families of the
Flight 3407 group. They've come together as a result of the
terrible tragedy, with the goal of making changes in the
airline industry and the FAA, hoping to keep an accident like
3407 from happening again, and saving many other families the
sadness that they are continuing to endure. Mr. Maurer is also
joined this morning by his wife, Terry, and Lorin's boyfriend,
Kevin Kuwik.
I am deeply impressed with the work of the Maurers and Mr.
Kuwik and all the families of the victims of Flight 3407. As a
father of four and a grandfather of two, I can't begin to
imagine the pain that comes from so tragically losing a loved
one. It speaks very highly of all the families here today that
you're working to take what must be such a deep sorrow and
focusing it on improving airline safety and helping other
Americans.
I'm looking forward to hearing your testimony, Mr. Maurer,
and the recommendations, this morning. And both the Chairman
and I--and I know I speak for everyone on the Committee--thank
you for the sacrifice that you're making to try to improve the
system for others.
Senator Dorgan. Senator DeMint, thank you very much.
I would--let me ask others if they would limit opening
comments to 2 minutes, and then we'll have 7-minute rounds for
questions when we've heard from the witnesses.
Senator Lautenberg?
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, Mr. Chairman, very quickly, thank
you for calling this hearing, because, though our flight safety
record is so outstanding, when we look at the total of aviation
and its services, the situation with the Colgan flight is one
that is--shook our bodies, our minds.
The plane took off from Newark-Liberty International in
February. It cost the lives of 50 people. Flight 3407 taught us
that we need to improve pilot training, address flight-crew
hours of service, and implement consistent safety standards for
both regional and large air carriers. And just last year, we
saw disturbing reports about safety inspection failures, where
the FAA let planes filled with passengers take off with cracked
hulls. And these failures forced the cancellation of thousands
of flights by airlines who may not have taken safety as
seriously as they should have.
And so, we're anxious to learn whatever we can about the
failure of good precautions, with Flight 3407, and we extend
our sympathies, also, to Mr. Maurer, and that we would like to
be able to make the promise, when we're finished with these
hearings, Mr. Chairman, that we will have done whatever we can
to make this excellent safety record that exists with American
aviation even better. And we look with interest at what our
witnesses----
Senator Dorgan. Senator Lautenberg----
Senator Lautenberg.--have to say.
Senator Dorgan.--thank you very much.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Johanns?
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE JOHANNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Johanns. Mr. Chairman, thank you. My comments will
be very, very brief.
But, let me tell you what I'm thinking about and hoping to
accomplish through this process. I think the burden is on the
airlines to prove to the American people that, when we get on,
for the price of our ticket, whatever that is, that we're going
to have a well-experienced crew, who will treat us politely and
decently, an airplane that is safe as can possibly be. And I
think, really, the burden is there.
When I think about this flight in--and I feel so badly for
these families, but this hearing is bigger than that one
flight--I think about questions like, Is the plane safe? What's
the inspection background of this airplane? What would the
service records show me if I were to take a look at them? I ask
myself, Has the crew got the training, the talent, the
background, the discipline, have they gotten a good night's
sleep, so they can handle all situations?
I had a pilot at--a dear friend of mine; he flew small
planes--who said to me, ``You know, flying is hours and hours
of boredom followed by moments of sheer terror.'' And, you
know, that always stuck with me.
I ask myself, Does the crew know when they are entering a
situation that is beyond their capability, or their airplane's
capability? Are they trained well enough, and do they have the
talent and experience and background, to see this situation and
say, ``I'm not going to expose my passengers to that risk. I
don't care what somebody above me is trying to say?''
And those are the things that I hope to accomplish in this
hearing. So, my hope is, we can focus on some of those
questions, and others.
And I'll wrap up by just saying, Mr. Chairman, thanks for
calling this--such an important topic. And--just glad to be
here today.
Thanks.
Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much.
Senator Begich?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will
be very, very brief. I'll look forward to the questions and
answers.
But, I'll be looking at this from two perspectives. One is
United States Senator, but also someone who lost a family
member, my father, in a plane crash. So, I look at it from two
different perspectives. And I will be anxious to ask several
questions. And I don't want you to take them, any of them,
personally. I think this is an important issue, as just
described by several Senators here, of--in regards to safety
for our air flights, because people do walk onto the planes
assuming they are safe transportation modes, and it's going to
be important that we make sure they continue to improve on the
record you have today.
But, again, I'm going to be coming from two perspectives,
and I hope you recognize that.
Thank you very much.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Thune?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, I, too, want to thank you for
calling the hearing.
And I want to thank our panelists for being here,
especially you, Mr. Maurer. Again, our condolences to you and
your family and all the families. A very tragic, tragic
incident, and I applaud you for committing yourself to making
sure this doesn't happen to any other families. Thank you for
your efforts and for the courageous work that you're doing.
Coming from a state like mine, we have a heavy reliance on
regional airlines. They play an important role in transporting
passengers from smaller communities who otherwise would not
have scheduled air service. And, while I don't, you know,
think, again, that we can--no one's arguing that we shouldn't
take our overall aviation safety record for granted, I also
believe there's room for improvement. And we want to ensure
that the FAA and the airlines are doing everything they can to
improve the overall safety record, when it comes, not only to
regional airlines, but to all airlines.
And I particularly want to home in on something that we
discussed at the Subcommittee hearing last week, Mr. Chairman,
and that is the need to incorporate more information regarding
the background of pilots. I think it just makes sense that we
work to ensure that the FAA incorporates a more accurate
picture of a perspective--prospective pilot's flight history
when an airline is looking to make a hiring decision. And
voluntarily requesting this information just isn't good enough.
I think there is more that Congress can require, when it comes
to updating the Pilot Records Improvement Act, and I hope that
we can work on that in this Committee to make some of those
changes, because, I think, clearly that came into play in this
very tragic incident.
But, again, thank you for holding the hearing, and I want
to thank our panelists, and I'll look forward to hearing from
you.
Thanks.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Thune, thank you very much.
As several of my colleagues have mentioned, we look at
these issues through the lens of tragedy, regrettably. But, in
many cases, I--and I expect Mr. Maurer is here in the hope that
what we learn will save other lives and improve airline safety.
And I--all of us would, I think, embrace that goal.
So, with that in mind, we have four witnesses, and I want
to call on Mr. Jim May first today. Mr. Jim May is President
and Chief Executive Officer of the Air Transport Association of
America.
Mr. May, you and I have discussed all of the issues that
have been discussed this morning. I--the same is the case with
Mr. Cohen; we've had these discussions.
Let me call on you--let me say, to all four of you, that
your entire statements will be made a part of the permanent
record, and we would ask that you summarize your remarks.
STATEMENT OF JAMES C. MAY, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.
Mr. May. Thank you, Mr.----
Senator Dorgan. And would you pull that very close and turn
that on.
Thank you.
Mr. May. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning.
Let me also share my condolences with Mr. Maurer and the
other representatives of the families that lost loved ones
aboard the Colgan Air flight. It is a terrible, terrible
tragedy.
In the airline industry, safety is our highest priority. We
try very hard to assure that we never compromise safety because
of economic conditions. We work closely with all members of the
aviation community, including regional airlines, to achieve
extraordinary records--no fatalities for mainline carriers in
the past number of years. And it really is in that spirit that
I appear before you today, with an understanding that no
accident is acceptable. We have a responsibility to understand,
through rigorous and searching inquiry, the causes of the
Buffalo accident, and then to take whatever single or multiple
corrective measures are needed.
In light of that responsibility, we're very fortunate that
there are three expert government forums in which scrutiny is
happening today, right now. This is as it should be. The public
needs to be confident in the responses to aviation safety
issues.
The National Transportation Safety Board's ongoing
investigation is going to produce a far more complete picture
than we have today. In this, as in previous accidents, the
Board is the authoritative source for making that determination
and recommending corrective action.
In addition, the Department of Transportation's Inspector
General recently began an assessment of the Federal Aviation
Administration's oversight of certification, pilot
qualification, training, and other issues. That is in response,
Mr. Chairman, to your very direct inquiry.
When this review was announced, we immediately offered our
resources and full cooperation to the inspector general. His
evaluation and constructive suggestions that we know will
result from it will augment the NTSB's effort.
Finally, the FAA's Call to Action, held on Monday of this
week, is a broad-based initiative to look at safety issues,
including those raised at this morning's hearing. We attended--
multiple representatives of ATA attended Monday's meeting and
were impressed by the participants' focus on concrete issues
and their understanding of the need for very prompt solutions.
We look forward to being engaged with the FAA and other
interested stakeholders in this vital work.
Now, I don't believe that any topic should be off the table
in the Call to Action. We need to have a full and frank
discussion about safety and the factors that contribute to it.
If there are disparities between mainline and regional safety
programs they should be closed, and closed quickly.
Let me suggest six or seven steps that need to be pursued
right now, today.
First, I think we need to apply FOQA, Flight Operational
Quality Assurance programs used by major carriers, to regional
airlines. FOQA works. The collection and analysis of data
recorded during flight improves safety.
Second, apply ASAP, Aviation Safety Action Programs, which
encourage voluntary reporting of safety issues and events that
come to the attention of employees, to those regional airlines
that don't currently have such a program.
Third, identify advanced-training best practices of
mainline carriers to be used by regional carriers. It's an AQP
program, in the jargon.
Fourth, we need a centralized database of pilot records, to
give airlines easy access to complete information about
applicants from the time they begin their flying career.
Fifth, let's see if the FAA needs to increase compliance
with the ``sterile cockpit'' rule, and what measures it should
use to do that.
Sixth, let's examine flight-crew preparedness when pilots
report to work. This means looking at crew-member commuting. If
this means examining flight and duty-time issues, I think
that's perfectly appropriate--but, tie it to the commuting side
of the equation--as long as any examination is based on
science, not anecdotes.
Each of these initiatives can and should be achieved in
short order. We're looking forward to working with this
Committee, the FAA, the IG, and the NTSB in as cooperative a
fashion as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be pleased to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. May follows:]
Prepared Statement of James C. May, President and CEO,
Air Transport Association of America, Inc.
The crash of the Colgan Air aircraft near Buffalo on February 12,
2009, was a tragedy that has produced heartache for the relatives and
friends of the victims of that accident. Words are faint consolation
for their grief.
Two basic considerations need to guide us in the aftermath of that
tragedy.
The first consideration is that in the aviation community, no
accident is acceptable. We need to understand through rigorous and
searching inquiry the cause of the Buffalo accident. Completion of the
ongoing National Transportation Safety Board investigation will produce
a far more complete picture than we have today of what so tragically
unfolded that evening. Moreover, the Department of Transportation
Inspector General recently began an examination of Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) oversight of certification, pilot qualification,
training and other issues that will augment the NTSB effort. The ``call
to action'' initiative that the Secretary of Transportation announced
last week will enhance these two efforts. The call to action meeting
that the FAA held this Monday enabled stakeholders to review pilot
training, cockpit discipline and other issues associated with flight
safety. We enthusiastically support this initiative. ATA and its
members actively participated in last year's FAA runway safety ``call
to action.'' We look to the same type of involvement with this latest
``call to action.''
The second consideration is that it is the certificate holder--the
air carrier that has received the authority from the FAA to serve the
public--that is ultimately responsible and accountable for the safety
of its operations and for complying with the requirements that the FAA
imposes on air carriers.
It goes without saying but I will say it: We do not compromise
safety for economic reasons. ATA members and their employees have
achieved an extraordinary safety record because of their single-minded
focus on safety. This has occurred, I would emphasize, during the most
turbulent era in our industry's history. It is in the spirit of the
pursuit of safety that I appear before you today.
Understandably, much has been written about the Buffalo accident.
Speculation, however, is not the foundation for a meaningful response
to any aviation accident. We need to get it right. That is why we all
rely on the NTSB in these situations. After its investigation is
concluded, the Board will prepare and issue a detailed narrative report
that analyzes the investigative record, identifies the probable cause
of the accident and makes specific recommendations for fixing the
causes of the accident.
That kind of rigor is indispensable in developing a fact-based,
informed and effective response to the accident. It is the kind of
diligence that characterizes other safety-related efforts in our
industry. We approach safety issues collaboratively with commitment and
know-how within the bounds of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs).
In the airline industry, safety is the highest priority. That is a
shared commitment and we work closely with other members of the
aviation community to achieve it. Together with the FAA, manufacturers,
labor unions and other interested parties, we have achieved an
extraordinary safety record. That impressive accomplishment, however,
does not mean that we can rest on our laurels. We continuously pursue
safety. Improving safety is work that is never done; we always seek to
improve.
Commercial aviation has built this record through a disciplined and
analytical approach to improving safety performance. That scrutiny
includes benefiting from experience and from a forward-looking search
to identify emerging issues. The Commercial Aviation Safety Team
(CAST), for example, brings together stakeholders to improve safety
performance by applying data-driven analyses to spot issues before
accidents occur and to establish safety priorities. Increasing reliance
on two industry-led safety programs, the Aviation Safety Action Program
(ASAP), which encourages voluntary reporting of safety issues and
events that come to the attention of employees of certain certificate
holders, and the Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program,
which involves the collection and analysis of data recorded during
flight to improve safety, have also added immeasurably to our
knowledge. This empirical approach, coupled with the expertise and
commitment of our frontline employees, provides the underpinning for
industrywide safety efforts.
Participation in these programs underscores that ATA members'
efforts go well beyond compliance with governmental regulatory
directives. This willingness to exceed minimum requirements is often
overlooked. It is tightly woven into the safety culture of airlines,
whether they are mainline or regional.
No accident or incident is acceptable. We seek to learn from each
event. Consequently, ATA has formed a Senior Advisory Task Force to
address the matters raised during the recent NTSB hearing about the
Buffalo accident. The task force is comprised of airline presidents,
chief operating officers and their peers. It will ensure that our
support of the FAA, airlines, unions and others is responsive, targeted
and thorough.
ATA member airlines highly value their relationships with regional
airlines and the customer benefits those arrangements provide.
Customers, communities and the marketing and operating carriers benefit
immensely.
The bedrock principle in civil aviation is that the entity to which
the FAA has issued a certificate is solely responsible for its
activities. Whether that entity is an air carrier, an airman or a
dispatcher, that responsibility cannot be delegated or assumed by
others. That principle avoids any confusion about ultimate
responsibility, an absolutely essential consideration in promoting
safety. It is a principle that dates back to 1938, when Congress
created the Civil Aviation Authority, the predecessor of the FAA.
As separate regulated entities, regionals are independent of
mainline airlines. As I noted previously, they hold operating authority
that the FAA has granted them. The FAA certificates regionals under
Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121. This means that the certificate
holder--the regional airline--maintains the responsibility for, and
direct control of, its operations and safety programs. The FAA has the
mandate to assure compliance with Part 121 and other FAR requirements.
We should also remember that in the mid-1990s, in evaluating the
need for improvements in the regulatory structure under which commuter
airlines--the former term for regional airlines--operated, the FAA
responded with the support of ATA and its members by requiring them to
adhere to FAR Part 121, the same regulation under which mainline
airlines operate. As a result, the rule that became effective on
December 20, 1995 imposed a ``one-level-of-safety'' standard that
continues to this day. It required aircraft with 10 or more passenger
seats and all turbojets operated in scheduled passenger service to
operate under and comply with FAR Part 121 operational requirements.
These included dispatch requirements and the use of certificated
dispatchers, new flight/duty time rules, manuals and procedures for
flight and ground personnel, cabin safety and flight attendant
requirements for 20- to 30-seat airplanes, and new training rules.
Moreover, the Department of Transportation, for more than a decade,
has required in 14 CFR Part 257 that codeshare arrangements be
disclosed to customers before they purchase a ticket. This ``operated
by'' language underscores the importance that the government has
recognized in maintaining the distinction between the mainline airline
and the regional airline.
FAA implementation of uniform mainline and commuter regulatory
requirements has raised questions about mainline and regional operating
environments. The most significant of those concerns and our responses
follow.
``Two-tiered safety environment.'' As noted previously, since 1995
the FAA has imposed one level of safety on the air carrier industry--
whether with respect to training, flight deck crew competency, etc. If
the NTSB or FAA determines that regional airline performance within
that unitary regulatory structure requires additional attention, it
should reformulate its compliance efforts as necessary.
Flight/duty time regulations. An issue that has arisen in the
Buffalo accident is the role of flight-deck personnel commuting. That,
it should be clear, is not a flight/duty time issue. Commuting is
within the exclusive control of the pilot or copilot. It is expected,
and the law assumes, that they will report fit to work. It is the
responsibility of the crew member to inform the carrier if he/she is
unable to fly because of fatigue, whether because of commuting or for
any other reason. That is why Part 121 airlines staff reserve crew
members.
Flight deck crew compensation. With but one exception, pilots at
all larger regional airlines are represented by unions and they work in
a seniority-based system. Compensation is a function of collective
bargaining. Neither legislation nor regulation can effectively peg what
is the right compensation in such a system of negotiated wages,
benefits and working conditions.
Sterile cockpit rule. The FAA imposed the sterile cockpit rule in
1981. Its longstanding prohibition against ``nonessential conversations
within the cockpit'' is well-known. To the extent that compliance with
the rule is a concern at any Part 121 carrier, it is a matter for the
FAA to pursue.
Centralized pilot record database. A centralized database of pilot
records would make it easier to evaluate the backgrounds of applicants
for flight deck positions. We urge the FAA to determine if such a
database can be efficiently implemented. To be successful, however, it
must be complete. Results of all pertinent actions relating to the
pilot's competency must be recorded and accessible to an airline
evaluating an applicant.
Conclusion
We will work diligently with other stakeholders in evaluating and
responding to the results of the NTSB investigation of the Buffalo
accident and the Inspector General's assessment of the FAA regulatory
oversight program. This week's FAA ``call to action'' meeting was part
of a vital initiative that we believe will contribute appreciably to
this effort. It is in that informed context that any further action to
improve safety should be examined.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. May, thank you very much.
And next, we'll hear from Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF ROGER COHEN, PRESIDENT,
REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION
Mr. Cohen. Thank you. Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, and
members of the Subcommittee, I'm Roger Cohen, and I'm President
of the Regional Airline Association.
I want to express our deepest sympathies for the lives of
the passengers and crew of Flight 3407 that were lost, and for
the families affected by the crash. We deeply share in their
grief.
And I also want to express, today, not only for our member
airlines, but for our 60,000 highly trained professionals, our
total unwavering commitment to safety.
As we work toward ensuring this post---as we work toward
this--let's make sure this post-accident process does not have
to be repeated. We will take whatever steps are necessary so
that our flight crews and our aircraft are as safe as humanly
possible.
The safety of our Nation's skies is a shared
responsibility. At Monday's FAA summit, five of our regional
airline CEOs and other senior leaders in--five of our CEOs
joined with Federal agencies, major airlines, and union
representatives to candidly explore all of the issues making
headlines over these past few months. Regional airlines have
but one objective, and that's to prevent any future accidents.
And as we do that, as this Committee has noted, it's
important to keep our perspective and to reassure the American
public that flying is extremely safe. In fact, until this
recent tragedy, commercial airlines had gone the longest period
in aviation history without a fatal accident.
Working collectively, rolling up our sleeves with all
parties--government, labor, manufacturers--airlines have
steadily improved our safety record over the course of many
decades of safety initiatives, investigations, and reviews of
accidents and incidents, large and small. Nevertheless, we can
and must do better. Our industry's number-one goal has been,
and always will be, zero accidents and zero fatalities.
Mr. Chairman, at your request, our member airlines provided
the Committee very detailed information about their operations,
their training, their hiring, and their employees. Today, we
will try to better define the airline--the regional airline
industry to clear up some of the misconceptions. More
importantly, we will talk about the steps that regional
airlines have already taken and the actions we plan to take to
further focus our total commitment to safety and accident
prevention.
Our airplanes typically carry up to 100 passengers. More
than 50 percent of all of the scheduled airline passenger
flights in the United States are on regional airlines. And,
most notably, three out of every four commercial airports in
this country are served exclusively by regional airlines.
Our airlines, as you've indicated, largely operate in
seamless partnership with the major airlines. Regional airlines
provide the crew and the aircraft, while major airlines set the
flight schedules, the fares, and the customer-service policies.
Regional airlines and our major airline partners operate as
a single, integrated system. One ticket, one trip, one safety
standard. All passenger airlines are subject to the exact same
FAA safety standards and requirements. It has been this way for
more than a decade.
Our goal is to prevent accidents, and that's why we are
earnestly and eagerly supporting the FAA's Call to Action, and
why the Regional Airline Association has embarked on our own
Strategic Safety Initiative to underscore our safety culture
and to help prevent accidents.
This Strategic Safety Initiative has four elements:
First, we'll be bringing together our safety professionals
to review all of the procedures and address any issue that can
even be perceived as a contributing factor to an accident.
Second, we will conduct a thorough review of fatigue,
looking at all the human factors in the scientific field to
minimize the risks associated with fatigue.
Third, we will implement a Fatigue Awareness Management
Program so that our airlines keep this issue top-of-the-mind
for both our flight crews and, just as importantly, airline
management.
Fourth, we will reach out in partnership, with you in
Congress, across the government, and to our fellow stakeholders
in labor and throughout the aviation industry, to explore the
full range of issues which could help us improve safety and
prevent future accidents. And among those are, number one,
establish a single integrated FAA database of pilot records.
Second, explore random fatigue testing. Third, examine the
practice of commuting. Fourth, extend the period for background
checks from 5 to 10 years. And fifth, seek to analyze the
information from cockpit voice recorders in settings other than
accident investigations. And mine all this tremendous data of
check rides to look for trends to help prevent future
accidents.
Mr. Chairman, the Regional Airline Association thanks you
for the opportunity to testify today and for opening the
dialogue on these critical issues. We look forward to keeping
you informed. And I welcome any questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roger Cohen, President,
Regional Airline Association
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Senator Hutchison, and Members of the
Committee. My name is Roger Cohen. I am the President of the Regional
Airline Association. Our 31 member airlines carry more than 90 percent
of the passengers traveling on regional aircraft.
The circumstances that prompted the Committee to convene today's
hearing are tragic. We share the Committee's concern for the lives of
the passengers and crews that have been lost and the grief suffered by
their families and loved ones.
The challenge now facing this Committee, Federal aviation safety
agencies, and the aviation industry is to review all of the issues and
take whatever steps are necessary to prevent accidents in the future.
We appreciate the open lines of communication this Committee has
kept with our industry, including the opportunity to meet with Aviation
Subcommittee Chairman Dorgan to share our thoughts in advance of this
hearing as well as the opportunity to include our members in a survey
of commercial airline safety programs and industry best practices. We
hope you find this continuing dialogue to be as valuable as we do.
Federal safety statistics clearly show that flying is the safest
mode of travel. A person is far more likely to have a fatal accident
traveling in a car, train, or bus than traveling by air. According to
the National Safety Council, the fatality rate for cars is 7,700
percent higher than for commercial aircraft and the fatality rate for
trains and buses is 300 percent higher. This remarkable safety record
is the result of decades of dedicated work from aviation safety
professionals, both in the government and in the industry.
Nevertheless, the pursuit of improved aviation safety is a shared
and continuous effort, to which regional airlines are committed, along
with everyone else in the commercial airline industry. The industry's
overarching goal has been and always will be zero accidents and zero
fatalities. We are committed to working with Congress, the FAA, the
NTSB, and aviation safety experts in academia to ensure that we can
meet this goal.
Mr. Chairman, for the purposes of aiding this Committee with its
inquiry, our testimony will focus on two broad areas.
First, we will take a few moments to reacquaint the Committee with
the regional airline industry. Anyone who has done background research
on the industry prior to this hearing would have found a large number
of inaccuracies portrayed in the media, and such misconceptions will
not help the Committee carry out its responsibilities.
Second, we will talk about the steps regional airlines have already
taken and the actions they plan to take to even further intensify their
focus on aviation safety. The regional airlines are launching a new
initiative to advance industry safety standards. We also believe that
Congress can provide additional safety tools for the industry.
Regional Airlines
Regional airlines operate regional jets or turboprop aircraft
ranging in size from about 10 to 100 seats and provide scheduled
passenger service on short- and medium-haul routes that connect more
than 600 smaller towns and mid-size cities to each other as well as to
the Nation's major hub airports. This network offers passengers
seamless service to almost every community in the country and many
around the globe, serving 160 million passengers last year.
Shorter flights to less heavily populated areas on smaller aircraft
should not be equated with fewer flights or limited reach. Over the
last 20 years, the industry has worked to match aircraft size to the
market, leading to vast improvements in service to many communities
that would otherwise not have air service. Today, more than 50 percent
of all scheduled flights are operated by regional airlines and three
out of every four commercial airports in the United States are served
exclusively by regional airlines.
Regional airlines operate in full partnership with major airlines.
Indeed, major airlines either contract with regional airlines to
provide service on selected routes or have an ownership stake in
regional airlines.
In this relationship, a regional airline is responsible for
providing the crew and maintaining the aircraft. The major airline, for
which the regional carrier is providing service, determines flight
schedules and fares and sets customer service standards.
From the passenger's perspective, the brand of the major airlines
is in full view throughout the travel experience. In most cases, the
passenger buys the ticket from the major airline, typically checks in
at the major airline's counter, may find the in-flight magazine of the
major airline, and may even sip a beverage placed on the cocktail
napkin of the major airline.
Regional airlines and their major airline partners operate as a
single, integrated system. The notion of two separate systems is a
misconception.
That misconception extends to safety standards and it needs to be
corrected if Congress is to have an accurate grasp of the situation.
The fact is that all carriers are subject to the same strict FAA safety
standards and requirements and receive the exact same level of safety
oversight, notwithstanding so many erroneous press accounts.
Pilot Qualifications. Regional airline pilots are subject to the
same training requirements that apply to pilots working for major
carriers. The rules are the same for all airlines.
Pilots must complete rigorous classroom and simulator training and
regularly pass extensive flight checks given by FAA-approved examiners
throughout their careers. Each and every check tests a pilot's
knowledge and ability to perform both routine and emergency procedures.
Each and every question, procedure and maneuver must be executed fully
to FAA standards. Unlike many professional tests, the checks that
airline pilots must complete are unforgiving. What this means is that
airline pilots must complete every aspect of their flight check
successfully, in effect scoring a grade of 100 percent, or they cannot
fly for the airline. If any aspect of the flight check is not passed,
the pilot must receive remedial training and successfully complete a
recheck before being allowed to fly again.
The FAA also requires pilots to be separately trained and qualified
on every type of airplane that they will be operating.
Regional airlines comply with these strict safety standards and
regularly operate under internal standards above and beyond FAA
requirements. For example, the average experience of the RAA member
airline flight crews is 3,075 total flight hours for first officers and
8,500 for captains, which far exceed the FAA minimum requirements of
500 and 1,500 hours, respectively.
Pilot Background Checks. All airlines conduct in-depth background
and safety checks on pilots before they are hired. Two separate sources
are consulted.
The FAA maintains a database of pilot information established by
the Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996 or PRIA. This database
includes information about a pilot's certificates, ratings, medical
status and any rule violations for the previous 5 years. In addition,
this law requires airlines to contact the pilot's previous airline
employer to obtain information about his or her training performance,
drug and alcohol tests, and employment status. FAA maintains a separate
database, not subject to the PRIA law, which includes a pilot's history
of FAA check ride disapprovals. Certainly, integrating a real-time
database containing all pilot records would improve access to this
vital information.
Pilot Fatigue. Rested, alert, and focused pilots are essential for
aviation safety. All parties--the FAA, airlines, and pilots--have a
role to play in ensuring that pilots are well rested.
The FAA has rules in place to avoid fatigue. These rules apply to
all pilots and all airlines.
Pilots cannot fly more than 100 hours per month. In
practice, pilots typically fly less than that--80 to 82 hours
during a month.
Pilots can fly no more than 8 hours per day.
Pilots are required to get at least 9 hours of time off
between trips.
All airlines construct their pilot schedules in strict adherence to
Federal rest rules. In addition, many airlines have agreements with
their pilot unions, further limiting the length of their scheduled
working days. Computers are used to track pilots' flight and duty time
to ensure that they are working within the FAA rest rule limits. Pilots
are also required to maintain their own log books and are directed to
alert airline management if they are approaching a limit. These systems
alert airline management if a pilot is approaching FAA limits.
Additionally, airlines provide training to pilots so that they can
accurately recognize the signs of fatigue. It is the professional
responsibility of every pilot, if he or she does not feel sufficiently
well rested, to say so and not fly. Airlines have non-punitive policies
in place that allow pilots to drop the trip if the pilot feels
incapable of flying alertly. Backup flight crews are in place
specifically for this purpose.
Pilots must maintain this professional responsibility and ethical
obligation to passengers and their fellow crewmembers to conduct
themselves in a manner that ensures they are well rested. In fact, the
great majority of regional airline pilots are consummate professionals
that embrace their responsibilities without hesitation and without
compromise. While there are strict FAA rules and regulations in place
to ensure pilots have enough time off between duty periods, it is the
pilot's responsibility to ensure they get enough rest during their time
off and to notify the airline promptly in any case where the pilot did
not get sufficient rest.
Among the other issues of interest to this Committee, which I would
like to review, is pilot compensation.
Pilot Pay. The entire airline industry--regional, majors, and low-
cost airlines--has a highly unionized workforce that is paid a fair and
reasonable wage. Pay levels, the option to commute, and virtually all
other work rules are negotiated through the collective bargaining
process.
The average salary for a regional pilot with the rank of Captain at
an RAA member airline is $76,000 a year. This salary is comparable to
other professions that utilize similar skills. For example, according
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average salary in the
architecture and engineering fields is $71,430 per year. In the
computer industry or in mathematical sciences the average annual salary
is $74,500.
A First Officer has less seniority and responsibility than a
Captain. The average salary for a First Officer, working at an RAA
member airline, is $32,000 a year. Again, this salary is in line with
comparable professions. The average salary for a paramedic is $31,980;
medical assistants average $29,060 per year.
Pilots earn a fair and reasonable wage and also receive valuable
benefits such as free airline travel, paid leave, and comprehensive
benefits. Also, pilots, while on duty, receive collectively-bargained
per diem expenses.
Commuting. Some pilots choose to commute and live away from their
crew base, which is the airport from which they will begin and end
every flight assignment. In fact, commuting is a common and long-
standing practice among crewmembers at all airlines, regional and
major.
Whether to commute and what constitutes an acceptable commute is a
choice made by each individual crewmember. In fact, the ability to live
where they want to and to fly to where they work is a valuable perk
that attracts pilots to the profession. It is important to note that,
while many pilots commute, many others do not. Commuting is not
necessitated by economics. In fact regional airlines have crew bases in
dozens of attractive and affordable communities across the country.
On the other hand, those who choose long commutes have a
professional responsibility to arrive at work properly rested. As I
mentioned earlier, the airlines have non-punitive policies in place to
relieve a pilot who is not rested or feels fatigued.
Moving Forward: Strategic Safety Initiative
RAA is a strong supporter of and full participant in the FAA's call
to action. At the request of the Administrator, senior officials from
the regional airlines, including five RAA member CEOs, attended the
FAA's Call to Action meeting on Monday, June 15. The consensus reached
at Monday's meeting is that safety is a shared responsibility. In fact,
many specific safety objectives discussed at Monday's meeting were
already included as part of the Strategic Safety Initiative (discussed
in detail below) launched by RAA member airlines last week.
We will continue to support and participate in this valuable
dialogue as FAA conducts similar safety summits across the Nation this
summer, at which we will address our shared safety goals with our
partners within labor and government and with our mainline partners.
Indeed, the purpose of the Regional Airline Association's Strategic
Safety Initiative is to study and recommend actions responsive to
challenges facing the airline industry. The initiative has four
elements:
1. Review Safety Procedures
The Regional Airline Association will form a task force comprised
of safety directors and operations directors from the
regional airlines to review safety procedures, giving
particular attention to any issue or procedure cited by the
NTSB as a contributing factor to any accident.
2. Study Impact of Fatigue
RAA will commission a study to look at the impact of fatigue and
other human factors on pilot performance. The study will be
conducted by an independent and expert organization, in all
likelihood a university with a respected aviation program.
The study will be framed by a Strategic Safety Advisory Board
comprised of industry experts drawn from the ranks of
academia, industry, and safety regulators.
3. Fatigue Awareness Management Program
The Regional Airline Association will create a fatigue awareness
management program for use by its member airlines.
4. Recommendations to Congress
We are committed to working with Congress on this initiative and
believe that Congress can provide the aviation industry
with additional safety tools, including:
a. Single Data base of Pilot Records
Requiring the FAA to maintain a single, integrated
database of pilot records would provide airlines with
critical, real-time information about pilot
qualifications and performance, thereby improving the
process of recruiting, hiring, and training new pilots.
b. Random Fatigue Tests
Airlines are already required to conduct random drug
and alcohol tests on pilots. RAA recommends exploring
with FAA and all industry stakeholders the concept of
random fatigue tests on pilots to help ensure that
pilots are indeed rested before flying.
c. Commuting
We believe it would be prudent for Congress, working
with all stakeholders, to examine commuting in depth,
including the possibility of limiting commuting time
prior to beginning a work assignment.
d. Extend Background Check Time Frame
Under current law, an airline conducting a background
check on a pilot can only review the last 5 years of
the pilot's safety records, qualifications, and
training. Extending the review period to 10 years will
help airlines identify safety risks.
e. Explore Use of Cockpit Voice Recordings for Accident
Prevention
Currently, cockpit voice recordings can be reviewed
only as an accident investigation tool, and RAA clearly
understands the sensitive privacy issues involved and
the years-long debate about access to the CVRs. Yet, as
we saw in the flight 3407 accident, pilots have
violated the rule requiring sterile cockpit below
10,000 feet. In our collaborative safety effort,
stakeholder groups must look at all potential tools to
improve flight safety, including reaching out to our
employee groups to explore random, non-punitive ways in
which this essential information can be used to prevent
accidents. Similar to ASAP and other diagnostic
preventative safety programs, an initiative permitting
random audits could provide valuable information.
f. Improved Tracking and Analysis of Check Rides
Current discussion suggests confusion relating to check
rides--the image of pilots who have failed check rides
continuing to fly aircraft. Every airline pilot is
required to pass frequent check-rides during their
airline service, and pilots cannot fly until they have
successfully completed their required check rides. We
believe FAA and the airlines may be able to increase
the level of safety through a more detailed analysis of
this testing over the entirety of a pilot's career. By
working with regulators and the employee groups, the
industry may develop a better methodology for assessing
pilot performance and instituting remedial training
programs that will ensure a higher level of safety.
We will be moving expeditiously to implement this initiative and
have already begun compiling a list of aviation experts as candidates
for our Strategic Safety Advisory Board. We will keep the Committee
informed of these activities.
Mr. Chairman, the Regional Airline Association appreciates the
opportunity to testify before the Committee this morning and I welcome
any questions you might have.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Cohen, thank you very much for your
testimony.
Next, we will hear from Captain John Prater, the President
of the Air Line Pilots Association.
Mr. Prater----
Captain Prater. Thank you----
Senator Dorgan.--you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JOHN PRATER, PRESIDENT,
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
Captain Prater. Thank you, Chairman Dorgan.
We commend this Committee for calling this hearing to take
a closer look at some of the critical issues affecting airline
pilots and our charges. Many of these issues--pilot screening
and hiring standards, training and mentoring--were at the top
of the agenda at the FAA's Call to Action Summit in which we
participated, on Monday. While this meeting was a critical
first step toward developing solutions to these problems, we
encourage the FAA to take a more structured approach in working
with the airlines and labor to establish an agreed-to
implementation plan for all parties to adopt.
In recent years, we have to look more at the system. The
major airlines have come to rely heavily on codeshare
arrangements with the so-called regional airlines to connect
large, mid-sized, and small cities in the U.S., in Canada, in
Mexico, to their international hubs. This has resulted in the
exponential growth of the regional sector of the industry.
Still, the major carriers exert a great deal--almost total
pressure on the regional airlines to provide their service at
the lowest possible price. They control ticket pricing and
schedules, and they regularly move flying between their
regional partners. This exacerbates breaking the chain of pilot
experience. Couple that with 160 or more bankruptcies in the
airline industry, and airline pilots leaving the industry
because there has been no way to protect and retain that
experience in the cockpit, we start over again and again.
Some of the major airlines, even today, are outsourcing
their flying to the regionals and laying off their own pilots,
losing those decades of experience to the profession. These
experienced pilots cannot afford to work for one of these so-
called ``regional carriers'' as a newly hired first officer. As
a result, many of the smaller regional carriers hire pilots
near the FAA minimum standards and do not employ adequate
screening processes during hiring that identify that ideal
candidate.
As was brought out during the NTSB's recent hearing on the
tragic accident in Buffalo, many pilots who fly for the
regional airlines are not getting adequate training or enough
rest. Airlines are requiring pilots to work longer days, and
more of them each month. Fleet and frequent base changes are
forcing pilots to decide between commuting or possibly taking
another pay cut to train on new equipment.
The consequences? The quality of airline pilot careers has
been greatly diminished, and the severe erosion of benefits and
quality of life are motivating experienced aviators to move to
other professions.
Current training practices do not take into account the
drastic change in pilot applicants' experience. Instead, they
assume that pilots are far more experienced than they may
actually be. ALPA believes there must be a new focus on
standardization and even on fundamental flying skills.
To meet this challenge, airlines and other training
providers must develop methodologies to train for that lack of
experience and to train for judgment. Current training
practices may also need to be adjusted to account for the
source and the experience level of that new pilot entering into
initial training with his or her airline.
ALPA also believes there should be more stringent academic
requirements to obtain both commercial and airline transport
pilot ratings in preparation to starting a career as an airline
pilot. The FAA should develop and implement a structured and
rigorous ground school and testing procedures for pilots who
want to qualify to fly for Part 121 airlines.
ALPA also recommends that airlines provide specific command
and leadership training courses for new captains, to instill in
them the necessary skills and traits to be a real leader on the
flight deck. Airlines should also implement mentoring programs
for both captains and first officers as they first enter
operations in their new crew positions to help them apply the
knowledge and skills to line operations from their more
experienced peers.
Flight experience and pilot capabilities cannot be measured
by mere flight hours. We must remember that each and every
pilot out there today has met the FAA standards, has met and
trained and exceeded the standards of their airline, who's
responsible for certifying them.
Turning to another area of concern, for two decades you
have heard me and my predecessors speak about the pilot--
problem of pilot fatigue. It's time. We need to address those
rules, and we need to change them.
Other means to enhance safety and improve airline
operations, we agree with Mr. May, data collection and analysis
programs, such--in FOQA and ASAP--we need to share that
information across the industry and then modify our practices
to make sure that the best practices are being used by the
entire family of airlines. In order to allow those programs to
grow and make these reports more readily obtainable, additional
legislative protections will be needed to limit the use of ASAP
and FOQA data in civil liability cases and to ensure that the
information is used to increase safety.
The best safety device on any airplane is a well-trained,
well-rested, highly motivated pilot. A strong safety culture
must be instilled and consistently reinforced from the highest
levels within an airline and among its codeshare regional
partners.
Thank you for the opportunity to address you, and I'll be
ready to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Captain Prater follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain John Prater, President,
Air Line Pilots Association, International
Good morning. I am John Prater, President of the Air Line Pilots
Association, International (ALPA). ALPA is the world's largest pilot
union, representing nearly 54,000 pilots who fly for 36 airlines in the
U.S. and Canada. ALPA was founded in 1931 and our motto since its
beginning is ``Schedule with Safety.'' For more than 77 years, ALPA has
had a tremendous impact on improving aviation safety. ALPA is a
founding member of the International Federation of Air Line Pilots
Associations (IFALPA) and the U.S. and Canada representative to the
Federation which joins the pilots of over 100 nations together in
safety and security harmonization efforts. Today, ALPA continues to be
the world's leading aviation safety advocate, protecting the safety and
security interests of our passengers, fellow crewmembers, and cargo
around the world. ALPA has lived up to its mandate to the extent that
many in the industry, including a former FAA administrator, have
referred to us as the ``conscience of the airline industry.''
We applaud the Committee for holding this hearing and appreciate
this opportunity to testify about ``Aviation Safety: The Role and
Responsibilities of Commercial Air Carriers and Employees.'' We would
like to begin our testimony by discussing crewmember fatigue.
Crewmember Fatigue
Fatigue may adversely affect every flight crew member every time
they fly. Due to airline economic conditions which require pilots to
work longer days and more of them than ever before, fatigue has reached
alarming levels within the industry. The FAA's flight and duty time
regulations are woefully inadequate to address today's situation and
have not significantly changed in over 60 years, since well before jet
transports came into use in the late 1950s. The current U.S. flight and
duty time rules are a patchwork of regulations that are intended to
address disparate domestic, international flag, and supplemental
operations. There have been a number of attempts to revise the
regulations over the past 25 years, but those attempts have met with
generally abysmal results because of the contentious disagreement by
the stakeholders as to which changes were appropriate or needed.
One fact about pilot fatigue that is not widely known is that
airline pilots frequently spend much more time at work each day than
the number of hours recorded actually flying an airplane. This is
especially true in the regional industry although the work schedules at
the so-called ``legacy carriers'' are by no means free of these same
concerns. Currently, airline pilots are routinely assigned duty days of
up to 15 hours. During a typical 14- to 15-hour duty day, a pilot can
expect to be assigned fewer than 8 hours of flying but up to 8
individual take offs and landings, in various types of weather and
across multiple time zones. The time not flying may be spent performing
duties such as checking weather, dealing with routing, dispatch and
flight paperwork, overseeing aircraft loading and unloading, dealing
with mechanical issues, waiting on the ground between flights, and
similar activities. Thus, although a pilot may have only flown 7 or
fewer flight hours by the end of a duty day, he or she could easily
have been on duty 14 or 15 hours. This work pattern may be repeated
over a period of several days. The weight of the scientific evidence
accumulated over the last 20 or so years has firmly established that
the vast majority of humans simply cannot be expected to reliably and
safely perform operational tasks beyond 12 to 14 hours on duty. It
cannot be overstated that pilots are making their most critical
decisions on landings at the very end of their duty day which, due to
unplanned circumstances, can easily be 20 hours or more since their
last rest period. It is worth noting in this context that most fatal
accidents occur during the landing phase of flight.
The airlines are required to give pilots only an 8-hour break after
any duty day, regardless of its length. Unfortunately, this 8-hour
minimum break does not provide an adequate opportunity for recuperative
sleep because the break is not an opportunity for 8 hours of sleep, but
rather a period of time away from the aircraft. During the 8-hour
break, it is not unusual for a pilot to be left with a maximum 4 or 5
hours of sleep opportunity. This occurs because the FAA has defined all
time away from the airplane (``release to report'') on a trip as
``rest.'' Incredible as it may seem, the time a pilot spends waiting
for a hotel shuttle and going through airport security screening is
defined as ``rest'' under the current FAA regulatory scheme. A pilot
must also attend to all of his or her other non-work-related daily
physical and nutritional needs and requirements during this 8-hour
break away from the aircraft. It is not at all unusual for a pilot to
elect to forego a meal so as not to further reduce their sleep
opportunity. This situation is highly objectionable-sleep experts agree
that most adults require 7 to 8 hours of sleep each night to meet their
physiological needs and restore their alertness. Pilots need a longer,
and genuine, daily rest period than is allowed under current
regulations.
Another serious deficiency in current regulations is the failure to
acknowledge circadian rhythms. Every human has an internal circadian
cycle that determines sleep and wakefulness. Typical ``circadian low''
cycles (i.e., a period of reduced wakefulness and energy) will occur
from approximately 3 to 5 a.m. and again from 3 to 5 p.m. Performance
and alertness may be decreased during the nocturnal window, which is
from approximately 2 a.m. until 6 a.m., depending on individual
variability. Flight and duty regulations need to acknowledge this
cycle.
Because the FAA's present fatigue regulations are antiquated and
outmoded, they have frequently been augmented by contractual work rules
negotiated between pilots and their employers in the decades from 1960
to the mid 80s. Through the restructuring of pilot contracts in
corporate bankruptcies (note: over 160 U.S. airlines have gone through
bankruptcy since 1980) and the complete absence of negotiated work rule
improvements at many carriers, there has been non-uniform treatment of
flight duty and rest limitations at the various airlines, leaving only
the antiquated Federal Aviation Regulations to govern maximum duty days
and minimum rest periods for thousands of airline pilots. Further
exacerbating the problem is the fact that pilot wage rates and pensions
were slashed by more than 30 percent in corporate bankruptcies forcing
pilots to accept even more flights or face their own financial crisis.
Fatigue provisions are rarely found within any pilot contract,
especially within a regional airline agreement. Of the regional
contracts that do have such provisions, only one of which we are aware
allows a pilot to recoup his or her lost pay. All contracts of which we
are aware contain real threats of disciplinary action if the company
determines that a pilot's claim of fatigue was fraudulent.
In recent times, there has been severe pressure on individual
airlines to slash pilot staffing and reduce rest periods to minimum
levels due to a belief that such actions would result in
``productivity'' increases necessary for economic survival. The demands
for more monthly and yearly flight hours flown by fewer pilots has lead
to endemic fatigue levels, and with fewer pilots staffed on reserve or
standby duty for weather disruptions, pilots are forced to fly more
flights to the upper limits of the FARs or watch as scheduled flights
are canceled for lack of available rested crews. The fatigue cushion
once provided by negotiated work rules has been virtually eliminated
largely due to a single-minded focus by airline managements on
minimizing the labor costs associated with flight operations. This
elimination of the fatigue protections once provided by negotiated work
rules that were developed over decades of experience at most
established air carriers means that today, for more and more pilots,
the bare minimum protections afforded by the FAA flight and rest
regulations have become a daily way of life.
The current cumulative effects of reduced rest resulting from
working to minimum FAA limits, combined with the effect of personal
financial stress and uncertainty brought about by nearly 8 years of
severe economic downtimes in the industry, have taken a severe toll
upon pilots. Many pilots feel that they are just hanging on to a barely
tolerable job instead of pursuing a once-promising career. Today's
airline pilot is typically working substantially more hours for less
money and spending more hours away from home than his or her
predecessors. In addition, regularly required training events are
crammed on top of the monthly flight schedule often paying less than 3
hours of pay for 8 hours of training with none of that time counting
toward the FAR flight time limits. The repeated attempts by airline
managements in recent years to return U.S. airlines to an era of
profitability by cutting labor costs continues to be paid for by the
daily sacrifices and toil of airline pilots and other workers.
ALPA joins the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which
since 1990 has identified reducing accidents and incidents caused by
human fatigue as one of its ``Most Wanted Transportation Safety
Improvements'' in the United States, in calling for revisions to the
current FAA regulations based on fatigue research, circadian rhythms,
and sleep and rest requirements. The current FAA rules glaringly fail
to adequately address any of these issues and reform is decades
overdue. Other U.S. Federal agencies have moved toward scientifically-
based worker fatigue regulations; the FAA is simply lagging behind
other agencies when it comes to the need to modernize its fatigue
rules.
When addressing possible revisions to the current FAA flight duty
and rest regulations applicable to pilots, airlines and their pilots
are immediately at cross-purposes. Managements are looking for more
availability and ``productivity'' from flight crews. For flight crews,
safety advocates and scientists, the question is often not whether to
change the current rules, but rather how much to reduce the current
maximum flight and duty limitations to enhance safety, raise human
performance to acceptable levels, and reduce risk. Hence, the past
approach of creating proposed regulations on notions of operational
necessity without the assistance of scientists and technical advisors,
or reference to the technical literature, has failed. Needed are rules
which are grounded in the results of scientifically based fatigue
studies and safety reports.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has enacted
standards that will become effective in November 2009 which will
require participating states to adopt rules limiting airline pilot duty
periods that are based on science. The United States' airline pilot
fatigue rules currently do not meet this new international standard and
the FAA will be under pressure to comply. In Europe, new regulations
governing airline pilot flight time limitations were enacted in 2008.
While implementation of these new regulations in individual European
Union member states is an ongoing process, the design and
implementation of scientifically-based airline pilot fatigue rules has
been underway in Europe for some time. For example, the United Kingdom
has for years had science-based airline pilot flight and duty time
regulations. The U.K.'s rules, embodied in Civil Aviation Authority
document CAP 371, account for human circadian rhythms and adjust
maximum pilot duty periods based on time of day, number of flight legs,
time zones crossed, acclimatization to local time and other factors.
Under these scientifically-based rules, if a pilot who is normally
awake during the day and asleep at night reports for duty during the
middle of the night, he or she is simply not permitted to work as long
as if he or she reported during normal daylight hours. The current FAA
rules incorporate none of these modern, scientifically-justified
fatigue protections.
Pilots performing commercial flying duties must have regulatory
safeguards which provide them with an opportunity to get an adequate
night of sleep before each duty day of flying. In some cases, pilots
may lack access to adequate rest facilities to obtain needed
recuperative sleep in order to prepare to safely operate the next
flight or series of flights. Unfortunately, the combination of duty
periods and personal or industry economic circumstances may in some
cases operate to deny a pilot a realistic opportunity to obtain
facilities for needed rest. Ensuring that a meaningful opportunity for
rest is provided combined with a scientifically determined maximum
length duty day, including provisions for the type of flying
accomplished--whether it be traditional short haul, multiple sector
flying or flights across multiple time zones--is essential to ensure
that the U.S. air transportation system continues its envied record of
safety. We believe it is possible to implement needed regulatory
changes that will adequately address safety needs and the issues
related to pilot fatigue without negatively impacting the ability of
the Nation's airlines to serve the needs of the public.
To that end, we were pleased the Commerce Committee included a
provision in S. 1300 to arrange for a study by the National Academy of
Sciences on pilot fatigue which will examine recommendations made by
the NTSB and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
on this subject, and provide recommendations concerning the FAA's
flight and duty regulations. ALPA stands ready to work with regulators
and the industry to develop science-based rules that will adequately
address the problem of fatigue.
Fatigue Risk Management Systems
A fatigue risk management system (FRMS) is a science-based, data-
driven process used to continuously monitor and manage fatigue risks.
An FRMS is intended to be implemented within an airline's safety
management system (SMS) to allow operational efficiency for unique and
specific operations when needed while also mitigating fatigue-inducing
factors. An FRMS offers an effective, alternative means of evaluating
and managing risk when compared to a purely prescriptive scheme but it
is intended to be built upon--and create synergy with--defined,
prescriptive flight and duty time regulations. I would invite the
Committee to review ALPA's white paper on FRMS, published in June 2008,
for additional information on this subject.
Revised regulations must provide guidance based on science that
accounts for start and stop times related to crew circadian rhythms,
the number of takeoffs and landings related to crew duty days, and any
time zones that must be crossed. Science-based regulations, coupled
with an FRMS, can allow some flexibility in unusual flight operational
situations.
Since fatigue is such a critical factor in daily airline
operations, ALPA published The Airline Pilots' Guide to Fighting
Fatigue in October 2008. This booklet may be carried by crews and
provides guidance to understanding and dealing with fatigue.
Understanding and mitigating fatigue is extremely important and assists
crews in flying in as rested a state as possible, given the inadequate
regulations governing the tempo of operations. We are presently
updating this document to give pilots guidance on ``responsible
commuting.''
Airline Training Programs
Most airlines, which include many of the major or ``legacy''
carriers and the larger, ``mature,'' regional airlines, do an
outstanding job of hiring and training pilots. They normally require
significant flight experience including substantial amounts of multi-
engine and turbojet time. However, some smaller regional airlines which
may have very thin profit margins due to the economics of the contract
between them and their major airline, have traditionally not offered
compensation packages which enable them to hire experienced pilots. As
a result, they must often employ pilots with little experience and bare
minimum qualifications who are willing to take these low-paying
positions in exchange for an opportunity to build experience so that
they can move to a career airline.
Some airline training programs, including those at mature regional
airlines, are extensive and exceed the regulatory minimums. When pilot
experience at the new-hire level dropped severely below 1,000 hours, or
less than a year's worth of total flight experience, these airlines
wisely extended their training process and doubled the initial
operating experience (IOE) program requirement for these pilots.
However, this cannot be said for all airlines.
Economic pressures push some airlines to train to the minimum
requirements set by regulations. These minimums were established
decades ago and were based on pilots coming into the airlines with much
more experience than many pilots have today. Experience allows pilots
to broaden their approach to problem solving and decisionmaking above
the technical proficiency needed to fly the aircraft. It allows for the
recognition of outside patterns and trends that develop during the
course of routine flights and permits crewmembers to accomplish tasks
specific to their cockpit position as well as be aware of the tasks
being performed by other crewmembers. Experienced pilots tend to
identify more pertinent clues and generate more alternatives in problem
solving and decisionmaking than inexperienced pilots
ALPA believes the licensing and training methodologies used
successfully in the past may not work where airline pilots entering
airline operations do not have the background or experience that
previous generations of incoming airline pilots possessed. In meeting
this challenge, the airlines and other training providers must develop
methodologies to ``train experience'' that in the past was acquired in
the traditional maturation and progression to becoming an airline
pilot. This training should include extensive and detailed academic
courses of learning taught in classrooms by well-qualified instructors.
Screening
Few, if any, airlines tailor their training programs based on their
new hires' past flying experience. The airline industry has seen
significant changes--some of which involve pilot demographics--that
have not been reflected in our training practices. For example, there
are considerably fewer former military pilots in the airline ranks than
in years past. The military services extensively screen their
candidates, who are generally required to have a four-year college
degree, before being accepted into pilot training. Once accepted,
military training provides intense and rigorous classroom academic
instruction as well as in-depth flight instruction that takes over 1
year. Additionally, pilots today coming from non-military backgrounds
often do not have the challenging experience of their predecessors on
which to build--e.g. flying corporate, night freight, or flight
instructing--before being hired at entry-level, or regional air
carriers. These demographic changes require a new focus on
standardization and professionalism training and even some fundamental
flying skills. The previous training programs based on the assumption
of more experienced pilot candidates will not be sufficient; ``one-
size-fits-all'' training is ill suited to the task.
The financial commitment of training and the historical time
commitment to build experience to qualify to be hired by an airline
through the civilian route and the considerable time and sacrifices
needed to serve in the military acted as a screening process to
eliminate those only marginally interested in becoming an airline
pilot. However, with new pilots being hired with as little as 200 hours
total flight time (much of which could have been in a simulator) and
fewer military pilots seeking airline jobs, this de facto screening
process that helped ensure only the highest performing people make it
to the airlines is no longer effective. Today, many regional airlines
do nothing to discourage their experienced pilots from quitting so as
to hire lower-paid replacements.
Flight experience and pilot capabilities cannot be measured by mere
flight hours. Airlines used to have an extensive screening process that
included psychological tests, academic knowledge tests, simulator
flying skill evaluations and medical conditioning exams. As the number
of pilot applicants declines and airlines become more desperate to fill
the positions, these screening processes have been reduced and some
elements completely eliminated.
Airlines need to reestablish thorough screening processes, or their
equivalent, to ensure that the applicants they hire will be able to
maintain an equivalent or better level of safety, professionalism and
performance than their predecessors. Flight schools need to implement
extensive screening processes for students pursuing a professional
pilot career. Regulators need to provide the oversight to ensure that
these screening tools are implemented effectively by the airlines and
flight training organizations, as well as modify pilot qualification
regulations to include much more rigorous education and testing
requirements in order to provide a screening process that begins prior
to initial pilot certification and continues at the airlines.
Command and Leadership Training
The FAA does not currently require command training for pilots who
upgrade to captain. The agency does require that an applicant for an
airline transport pilot certificate have knowledge of aeronautical
decisionmaking and judgment, as well as crew resource management, to
include crew communication and coordination. We do not consider these
requirements to rise to the level of command training. The difference
between the two approaches is a focus on knowing what to do versus
knowing how to do it. Training in decisionmaking, for example, might
emphasize all the things that a pilot must investigate in order to make
a sound decision, but might not provide strategies for how to stick to
that good decision in the face of pressure from outside entities to
compromise.
The role of captain includes far more than the ability to fly the
aircraft from the left seat and perform the checklists. Some airlines
have courses for teaching prospective captains how to lead a crew,
exercise command authority, take charge of a situation, and so forth,
all of which are critical safety skills that must be learned. They are
not simply inherent to being the one ``in charge.'' Specific training
should include emphasis on setting the tone for compliance by adhering
to standardized procedures. Other topics that should be trained include
reinforcing the skills, aptitude, and character necessary to lead
fellow crewmembers (informally or otherwise) in compliance with
procedures.
Need for Stronger Academic Emphasis
The Joint Aviation Authority (JAA), now the European Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA), and FAA pilot licensing requirements are both
ICAO-compliant. The single biggest difference between EASA and FAA is
knowledge requirements. The FAA theoretical knowledge is simply not as
demanding as EASA, which has 14 written exams versus one by the FAA,
which is a multiple-choice exam. The EASA exams require the student to
be tested for 30-40 hours. By stark contrast, the FAA publishes its
exam questions with answers provided so a student can purchase them,
study the questions, and pass its single exam. Examination questions
are not available for EASA exams in such a manner.
The least demanding Federal Aviation Regulations which govern
commercial pilot license requirements (i.e., 61.125 and 61.155)
specify the aeronautical knowledge requirements for commercial and
airline transport pilot ratings. These rules were written decades ago,
when there was no expectation that they would be used as minimum
standards to train pilots to take jobs as airline first officers. The
requirements emphasize weather and navigation, including interaction
with air traffic control. There is some mention of aircraft
aerodynamics and human factors, including aeronautical decisionmaking
and judgment as well as crew resource management. The regulations allow
self-study and many such training courses emphasize passing the test
rather than learning the material. We do not feel these requirements
are adequate to prepare a professional airline pilot. The ground
instruction of these subjects needs to be strengthened with required
formal classroom academic instruction and more extensive testing and
examination.
The EASA-approved training course for a commercial airline pilot
tends to be rather structured and rigorous. FAA should develop and
implement a corollary ground school and testing process in FAR Part 121
for all pilots who seek commercial airline careers. Testing akin to the
quality of the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) exams or bar exam for
attorneys would benefit aviation by serving as a screening tool to
ensure that, in the future, only the most knowledgeable and dedicated
pilots join the ranks of airline pilots.
Airline Relationships
The past several years have been very turbulent ones for the major,
legacy airlines which have experienced numerous bankruptcies and
changing operations. Rather than using their own pilots on the mainline
seniority list to fly the 50- to 90-seat jet aircraft or modern 76-seat
turboprop aircraft into mid-size and smaller cities in the U.S., Canada
and Mexico, they have established economic relationships with regional
airlines to provide this service and feed the major carriers through
their hub cities. The major carriers exert a great deal of economic,
and other pressures on the regional airlines to provide their service
at the lowest possible price. The major carrier controls all aspects of
ticket pricing and schedules and regularly moves flying between their
regional partners, which forces major changes of pilot domiciles among
the regional carriers. An operational and safety relationship providing
surveillance and oversight of regional airline operations must be
required and maintained by those major carriers who either own or
contractually use regional airlines. Even with these relationships,
there is no guarantee that ``One Level of Safety'' will be provided by
the dependent carriers. Safety comes not just from oversight from an
outside airline or organization but is an intrinsic value built into an
airline from the highest levels of internal management. Given
operational criteria and guidance, this value must be recognized and
nurtured to realize true safety in operations. ALPA's endeavors to
establish One Level of Safety and contract standards have been rebuffed
by the managements of some mainline and regional carriers.
Before the practice of codesharing with regional partners began,
ALL flying was done by the pilots of an airline on one, single pilot
seniority list. This practice ensured that several years of airline
operations experience for newly hired airline pilots--even those with
military or thousands of hours of previous civilian flight time--was
earned before assuming the command responsibilities of an airline
captain. The pilots of the name brand airline were trained and met the
same high standards, whether they flew 70-seat DC-9's or 400-seat B-
747's, or they were not promoted to be an airline captain. The pilots
that once flew for such regional airlines (which were in the 70s and
80s referred to as ``national carriers'') as Ozark, Southern, North
Central, Hughes AirWest, AirCal , Allegheny, Piedmont, PSA, and
Frontier, held career jobs at those carriers. They flew 40-50 seat
propeller-powered aircraft and 70- to 100-seat jet aircraft. They had
good jobs with pensions, work rules, and wages that made them career
destinations. Those pilots were not just trying to gain experience to
get a job with a major airline. Their pilot seniority list operated to
guarantee stability and years of cockpit experience before assuming
command. The merger mania of the 80s saw those carriers swept into the
major or legacy airlines.
Then, as competitive cost concerns increased with the post-
deregulated upstart carriers, the legacy airlines began to outsource
the flying to as many as a dozen new ``regional'' partners flying 30-
to 50-seat props and 50- to 90-seat jets. The name brand airline then
began the practice of having their ``partners'' bid against each other
to maintain these ``fee for departure'' outsourcing contracts. As the
legacy airlines replaced more and more mainline flying by this
outsourcing scheme to regional operators, they furloughed hundreds of
highly experienced pilots, and refused to allow these experienced
pilots to fly for the contractor carrier, effectively replacing them
with lower paid and lower experienced pilots.
With this overriding concern on lowering costs by the legacy
carrier, the stable and experienced regional partners were whipsawed
against each other and forced to continually lower their costs to
today's substandard levels or be replaced by another newly created
contractor. This system of replacing one regional with another has
created unprecedented, rapid growth at a few low-cost regionals where
newly hired pilots are upgraded to Captain with less than 1 year of air
line flying experience. A copilot seeking to upgrade to captain with
the minimum of 1,500 total hours has not been through several years of
thunderstorms and winter storms despite the fact that they meet the FAA
minimums. He or she has not flown with hundreds of other Captains nor
been through several years of annual training and checking events.
Before this unconscionable focus on outsourcing mania began, most
airline pilots would have 10 or more years of airline experience as a
co-pilot before qualifying for command.
The legacy airlines grant these outsourcing contracts to the
regional carriers for short periods from 2 to 7 years so that higher
costs and their experienced pilots can once again be replaced by new
airlines with new pilots. Today, even though the ``regional'' carriers
are flying up to 40 percent of the U.S. airline domestic system, few of
the regional airline pilot jobs created by the outsourcing schemes are
worthy of an experienced aviator career. The duties and responsibility
of a captain and a co-pilot flying 30 to 100 passengers for a regional
partner airline is just as important to their passengers as a Captain
flying a B-777 or Airbus 330 for a legacy carrier. In a further example
of this safety compromising business practice, the legacy airline, will
oftentimes during growth periods refuse to hire the experienced
``regional'' pilot from one of their fully owned or contract partners
to become a co-pilot on a 100-120 seat mainline airplane. However, that
same pilot may be a captain flying a complex jet aircraft with 70
passengers on 5 or 6 flights per day in the service of the codeshare,
mainline airline which sold the ticket to the passengers. This cycle of
outsourcing with very little oversight by the ticket-selling carrier
has created a very unstable environment which has broken the One Level
of Safety mandate.
The NTSB has performed several safety studies of the regional, air
taxi, and air carrier industry. As a result of those studies, the Board
called upon major airlines and their code-sharing partners to establish
a program of operational oversight that would include periodic safety
audits of flight operations, training programs, and maintenance and
inspection as well as emphasize the exchange of information and
resources that will enhance the safety of flight operations. The Board
believes that there may be large differences between code-sharing
partners in terms of the knowledge, expertise, and other resources for
assuring safe operations. They noted that this is particularly true
when a code-sharing carrier uses the brand identity name and paint
scheme of the larger carrier. Passengers have no choice but to fly on
the code-share carriers even though they purchased their ticket from
the major carrier and deserve the same level of operational oversight,
control and service, which the code-share partner may not be able to
deliver.
The regional airlines, in their own cost-saving measures, have gone
to extraordinary lengths to provide their product at the lowest
possible price. As an example, Trans States Holdings, which operates
Trans States Airlines, established a second subsidiary airline, GoJet
Airlines, which operates United Express flights from United Airlines
hubs at Chicago O'Hare, Denver, and Washington Dulles airports flying
Bombardier CRJ700 Regional Jets. A passenger buying a ticket on United
Airlines may very well, unwittingly, end up on a GoJet flight. As a new
airline, GoJet can abrogate prior relationships their parent airline
may have with service providers to provide cheap airline seats for
their codeshare partner.
Another example of this type of cost pressure can be seen at
Midwest Airlines which has outsourced over 75 percent of its flying to
regional partners. They have laid off 75 percent of their experienced
pilots and replaced them by contracting with Republic and Skywest
Airlines. Midwest Airlines refuses to train their long-time pilots in
the new smaller jet aircraft. This has the effect of the Midwest pilots
with over 15 years of airline experience being replaced by pilots with
less than 3 years experience in a blatant disregard for the value of
its own employees. Economics of outsourcing to cheaper contractors has
clearly trumped the safety value of maintaining experience in the
cockpit.
Pilots flying for airlines like GoJet, Gulfstream, Colgan and
others are at the bottom of the economic scale with starting salaries
below $20,000 per year. In many cases, pilots have accumulated
extraordinary costs just to earn the basic FAA licenses of commercial,
instrument and multi-engine ratings. A 4-year flight education at a
college or university can cost from $120,000 to $180,000, or more. It
is difficult to repay these expenses and maintain any sort of
reasonable lifestyle on the starting pay of a regional pilot. So these
jobs frequently end up as a stepping stone to a major carrier, an
opportunity to build valuable flight time before moving on to a more
lucrative job with a major carrier. In fact, some airlines publicly
call themselves ``stepping stones'' without reservation, as could be
heard in a recent NTSB public hearing. This type of relationship
effectively represents a disincentive to provide more than the bare
minimum training or to provide any motivation for experienced employees
to remain. Typical wage differences between major and regional carriers
can be as much as $70,000 for a Captain and $50,000 for a first officer
at 5 years of service. The differentials increase dramatically the
longer the pilot is employed.
When an economic downturn comes, operations contract, major
airlines park their airplanes, and employees are furloughed. These
furloughed employees will generally not take the jobs in the regional
industry; they have other skills to market. It is a telling factor that
as pilots were called back from furloughs following the 9/11 downturn,
a majority chose not to return even to the major airlines; they found
other jobs, many times in an entirely different industry, or returned
to full-time military service. In today's economic and outsourcing
business practices, pilots with decades of experience are laid off from
the legacy airlines and cannot afford to work for one of the regional
partner airlines as a newly hired first officer. Their experience is
not given any value for employment at the legacy carrier's codeshare
partners and they are faced with starting over as a first officer for
less than $20,000 per year.
In today's airline industry, the legacy major airlines have farmed
out the flying to the lowest regional bidder while rejecting any
attempts to retain their experienced pilots within their extended
airline systems.
Retirement benefits have also been reduced within the regional
industry. Managements have refused to grant sufficient improvements for
retirement benefits due to, among other reasons, the (assumed) belief
that the pilot will not be there long anyway. However, as we have seen,
the overall longevity of pilots staying at the regional level has
increased as the economic outlook has changed. Major carriers have
reduced their overall capacity steadily in recent years, and at the
same time reduced their pilot headcount. When combined with the
increase in retirement age to 65, the regional pilot may have little
choice but to maintain employment at a carrier that offers lower wages,
with lower health and retirement benefits and far less in quality of
life.
Commuting Pilots
Aviation is a turbulent industry; numerous cost and operational
pressures occur daily. Airlines frequently make adjustments to their
fleets' size and geographical distribution. Crew bases open, close, or
change, sometimes with little or no notice to employees stationed
there. An airline that services a city or town with a Bombardier CRJ700
jet today may serve it with an ATR-42 turboprop tomorrow and next week,
service may cease entirely. As these operational decisions are made,
crew bases move, change, or close. A CRJ base may become an ATR-42 base
and the CRJ base may move to a different part of the country. When
companies make such changes, the pilots involved may have several
alternatives. They can move to the new base where CRJs are being flown,
they can remain where they live and commute to the new base, or, if
permitted by their employer, they can be trained in the new airplane
now being flown out of their old base, which may require a large pay
cut. Any of these can be very disruptive for the pilots and in turn,
their families.
A pilot may want to stay on the CRJ, for example, but cannot or
does not want to move to the new base. Any number of factors can
influence that decision, including children in school, relationships
with friends, or housing costs. For instance, the cost of living in Des
Moines, Iowa is considerably less than the cost of living near JFK in
New York. Thus, the pilot is more likely to maintain his home in Des
Moines and commute to work, reducing his days off, his free time and
his overall lifestyle. That decision to stay on the CRJ will
necessitate commuting to the new base. The pilot may share or lease an
apartment, plan to stay with friends, or use a hotel for accommodations
in the new base. Generally, economic factors determine the course of
action, but the basic problem of a relocated crew base is out of the
pilot's control; it is forced by the industry and pilots cope as best
they can. Most regional carriers, while they offer some expenses toward
the moving of displaced crewmembers, offer little if anything to
voluntary moves. The difference between voluntary and displaced
movement is often a blurred line between having a job and losing a job.
However in today's circumstances, even the limited monetary help a
regional carrier may provide does not cover the costs of moving a
family many times over a pilot's career.
Commuting has a number of complicating factors, which include:
employer's sick leave and attendance-reliability policies
very few seats are available for pilots forced to commute on
today's full airplanes,
airline policies which prohibit positive-space
transportation,
inadequate or non-existent relocation provisions, and
commuting policies which require pilots to depart home base
with several backup flights.
This difficult reality adds to the creation of stress and further
increases pilot fatigue factors. ALPA encourages airline managements to
work with their pilots to establish new or improved commuting policies
and scheduling practices that take into account these lifestyle issues.
Safety Data and Reporting Programs
What should be done to make improvements now while we are
implementing the previously discussed changes in training and
qualifications? There are programs available to the aviation industry
today, such as Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) and Aviation
Safety Action Program (ASAP), that can provide important and needed
oversight information, not only internally within air carriers, but
also for the overall air transportation system. The safety data
provided by these programs are making differences in safety and
efficiency of air carrier operations. Approximately 90 percent of the
data provided through ASAP is sole-source data. This is safety data
that will not and cannot be gathered by other means and it can be
critical and essential to improve the safety performance of our
industry.
Safety Management Systems (SMS) are mandated by ICAO standards. SMS
programs are being developed for use by U.S. aviation entities. Safety
reporting and safety data are intrinsic in SMS programs and ASAP and
FOQA should be an integral part of any SMS.
In order to make the data more readily obtained and available for
safety improvements only, protections need to be put in place that will
limit the data use in civil liability cases. Restraints also need to be
strengthened for the use of the data for safety purposes only. The data
has an important safety benefit and it must not be compromised. Unless
there are improved protections that will limit the use of the data to
solely safety purposes, the flow of reports will cease. These programs
are a critical safety benefit for the industry that need to be
nurtured, protected, and promoted at all levels of the air carrier
industry.
Promoting Professionalism in the Industry
The best safety device on any airplane is a well trained, well
rested, highly motivated pilot. A safety culture at an airline must be
instilled and consistently reinforced from the highest levels within
the organization. An organizational safety culture will encourage the
highest levels of performance among professional pilots.
This high level emphasis must go hand-in-hand with appropriate
training. Standard operating procedures must be just that; they should
be the operating norm for all flight crewmembers and deviations should
not be allowed except for extraordinary circumstances. Pilots-in-
command should be encouraged to mentor their first officers and instill
in them the desire to maintain the highest standards of operational
safety.
ALPA offers professional standards programs and structure which
reinforce professional conduct in the cockpit. Similarly, airlines need
to provide special command training courses for new captains to instill
in them the necessary traits to be a real leader on the flight deck. In
addition to basic required skills such as aeronautical decisionmaking
and crew resource management, new captains should receive training to
reinforce the skills, aptitudes, and character necessary to properly
lead a crew, exercise command authority, and maintain the highest
levels of safety in the face of internal or external pressures that may
tend to lower operational safety margins.
In the case of the Colgan Air accident, the pilot group was new to
ALPA, and unfortunately the professional standards structure was just
being established.
Mentoring Programs
In addition to promoting professional conduct among crewmembers, at
least one airline whose pilots ALPA represents has a detailed,
structured, pilot-mentoring program. This program provides a wide
variety of resources and benefits to new-hire crewmembers as they
become acquainted with their airline and becoming an airline pilot. The
program pairs experienced line pilots with new hire pilots in an effort
to answer many of the frequently asked questions, such as bidding, jump
seat travel, vacation, etc., from new hires. Pilot mentors also assist
new hires as they transition from the training environment to flying
the line, and throughout their first, probationary year. There is also
another aspect of the program that assigns a senior captain or check
airman to newly upgraded captains once they are online and out on their
own. This greatly assists new captains as they become accustomed to
requirements for command.
Call to Action
On Monday, June 15, 2009, the FAA held a meeting, a ``Call to
Action'', for industry and FAA to identify a few key initiatives that
can be incorporated voluntarily by operators. The subjects discussed
included many of the very issues we are discussing here; crew
education, professional standards and flight discipline, training
standards, and mentoring. This was an important first step toward
recognizing and acknowledging problems and developing and implementing
solutions. We stand ready and look forward to future meetings so we can
truly and thoroughly address airline safety issues and make real
progress toward realizing One Level of Safety.
Conclusions and Recommendations
In conclusion, ALPA believes that it is essential, and long
overdue, that the flight and duty time rules for commercial aviation
operations be revised based on readily available science. Issues that
must be addressed include providing crewmembers a minimum rest period
that will allow an opportunity for 8 hours of sleep, and there should
be provisions for operations on the back side of a pilot's circadian
rhythms. Additionally, a pilot's duty day length should be based on
when the day begins and how many flight segments are scheduled.
In regard to training, we feel there should be more stringent
academic requirements in FAR Part 121 to obtain both commercial and
airline transport pilot ratings. Airlines should provide specific
command training courses for new captains to instill in them the
necessary skills and traits to be a real leader on the flight deck.
Airlines should also implement mentoring programs for both captains and
first officers as they first enter operations in their crew position to
help them become comfortable and reinforce the knowledge and skills
learned in training and apply them to line operations.
Airline training needs to account for the source of their pilots
and assume the minimum experience level. There should be structured,
in-depth oversight of code-share partners by the major carriers to
include periodic safety audits of flight operations, training programs,
and maintenance and inspection. The best practices in use by major
carriers need to be mentored into their smaller codeshare partners.
Safety data provided through important data sharing programs such
as FOQA and ASAP needs to be vigorously protected from inappropriate
use and preserved for the sole purpose of improving safety and
operational efficiency. Further, these programs need to be promoted at
all levels of the industry.
Finally, airline managements and their pilots should work closely
together to promote policies and practices that instill a strong safety
culture throughout the organization; reinforce the importance of
professionalism in all aspects of operations; and recognize the value
of well trained, well rested, and highly motivated employees.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify today. I would be
pleased to address any questions that you may have.
Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much, Captain Prater.
And finally, we will hear from Mr. Maurer, Mr. Scott
Maurer, who is a representative of the Families of Continental
Flight 3407.
Mr. Maurer, I know that your daughter, Lorin, was a
passenger on that flight, and I know that it is likely
difficult for you to speak publicly about these issues, but, on
behalf of the families, I believe that all of you wanted an
opportunity to do that, and I am pleased to give you that
opportunity. And our thoughts and sympathies are with you and
the families.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT MAURER, FATHER OF LORIN MAURER,
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FAMILIES OF CONTINENTAL FLIGHT 3407
Mr. Maurer. Thank you. And bear with me.
On behalf of the Families of Continental Flight 3407, we
would like to thank you, Chairman Dorgan and Ranking Member
Senator DeMint and all of the other subcommittee members of
aviation, for the opportunity to speak to you today.
My name is Scott Maurer, and, you've heard, my daughter,
Lorin Maurer, was a passenger on Continental Flight 3407.
Tomorrow night, at 10:17, it will be 18 weeks since our
lives were changed forever. The minutes, hours, days, and weeks
that have passed since this tragedy have been an unbelievable
nightmare for all of us. It's a pain that you will never know,
and certainly one we hope no one else will face.
We believe very strongly the crash did not have to happen,
and was preventable. As such, we are here today, and will be
here tomorrow and beyond, to ask for your help and push for
change so that other families can be spared this pain.
When my 30-year-old daughter, Lorin Maurer, an athletics
fundraiser at Princeton University and future athletic
director, purchased her ticket from Continental Airlines, she
assumed the pilots would fly--who would fly that plane were
competently trained. She thought they had significant
experience and knowledge of the plane and all of the flight
control features. As she took her seat in 3A for an exciting
Valentine weekend to join her boyfriend, Kevin Kuwik, in
Buffalo, I am sure she believed that the pilots at the controls
had been trained to handle cold-weather flight conditions,
stalls, and other emergency situations that all pilots are
expected to be prepared to confront. There are many other
examples I could share from the victims' perspective, but time
limits will not allow, today.
The critical message I do want to relay to you here today
is that when the American public buys a ticket from an airline,
they assume and expect that safety is in their--that their
safety is in good hands. Sadly, we find that that is not always
the case, and we are here today imploring you for assistance
and action.
So, how can you help?
Number one, let's put the best pilots in the cockpit and
set them up for success. Now, this sounds very simple, but, in
reality, it takes money to do this, and the airline industry
has not stepped up to the plate. Pilot hiring procedures,
training, fatigue management, and compensation have all been
discussed throughout these hearings. The media attention
focused on the failures of Colgan Air and its flight crew have
resulted in a hastily called emergency summit meeting, earlier
this week, bringing together representatives of the FAA and the
airline industry to discuss these very same issues.
Unfortunately, meetings of this magnitude have been done
before, resulting in little change, as the costs have always
been too high for implementation. The breakdown--to break down
the bureaucratic logjam, the families of the victims are now
forced to ask Congress to intervene and do the right thing for
public safety.
Number two, better aviation oversight by the Federal
Government. Americans believe that the role of the FAA is that
of a gatekeeper, an agency that is technically trained and
expertly qualified to watch over the airline industry for the
safety of the American public. We have certainly identified
leaks in this dike. While we are optimistic that the newly
appointed administrator hears our pleas for action, we fear
that the obstacles thrown up by the airline industry and pilot
unions will be very hard to overcome. Again, we are asking for
Congressional intervention, as history of these organizations
voluntarily taking action to improve safety has been woefully
inadequate.
Number three, NTSB recommendations. Why are we willing to
accept an 85-percent implementation rate of NTSB
recommendations by the FAA, when 100-percent would save lives?
Would I even be sitting here talking to you today, had previous
recommendations for training and cold-weather flight management
been acted on? These recommendations must be taken seriously
and acted on jointly by the FAA and the NTSB. We must learn
from accidents so we can prevent future occurrence.
My wife, Terry, my son, Christopher, and Lorin's boyfriend,
Kevin, miss Lorin every minute of every day. I will not have
the opportunity to walk my daughter down the aisle and give her
away in marriage. She will not experience the joy of a growing
child within and raising a loving family, as we did. Our
traditional Christmas Eve visit to New York City for some last-
minute shopping and taking in Mass at Saint Patrick's Cathedral
will be--will probably come to an end this year; it'll just be
too painful to make that trip without Lorin.
Many of my fellow crash-victim families sitting behind me
also have similar stories and similar losses.
So, now it's up to you to make a difference. Everyone in
this room today, and those who were here last Wednesday,
expressed that they have come before you to make the necessary
changes in safety. Winter is coming. If we do not implement
critical safety changes before then, and another accident
occurs, we can only blame ourselves for the losses of those
families. I do not wish to shoulder that burden, and hope and
believe that you agree with me.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator DeMint, and all of the
other Aviation Subcommittee members, thank you for your time.
And I'm open, also, to answering questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maurer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Scott Maurer, Father of Lorin Maurer,
Representative of the Families of Continental Flight 3407
On behalf of the Families of Flight 3407, we would like to thank
Chairman Dorgan, Minority Leader Senator DeMint, and all other members
of the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation for the opportunity to speak to
you today. My name is Scott Maurer. My daughter, Lorin Maurer, was on
board Continental Flight 3407.
Tomorrow night at 10:17 p.m. will be 18 weeks since our lives were
changed forever. The minutes, hours, days, and weeks that have past
since this tragedy have been an unbelievable nightmare for all of us.
It is a pain that you will never know, and one that we hope no one else
must face. We believe very strongly that the crash did not have to
happen and was preventable. As such, we are here today, and we will be
here tomorrow and beyond, to ask for help and to push for change so
that other families can be spared this pain.
When my 30-year-old daughter, Lorin Maurer, an Athletics Fundraiser
at Princeton University and future Athletic Director, purchased her
plane ticket from Continental Airlines, she assumed that the pilots who
would fly the plane were competently trained. She thought they had
significant experience and knowledge of the plane and all of the flight
control features. As she took her seat in 3A for an exciting Valentine
weekend trip to join her boyfriend, Kevin Kuwik, in Buffalo, NY and
attend the wedding of his brother, I am sure she believed that the
pilots at the controls has been trained to handle cold weather flight
conditions, stalls, and other emergency situations all pilots must be
prepared to confront.
When 45-year-old Darren Tolsma, father of two beautiful young
children and a highly specialized defense systems engineer, took the
opportunity to board an earlier flight than originally planned to
return home sooner to be with his wonderful family, he believed that
all airlines use thorough pilot hiring practices to ensure competent
and qualified employees. This would include a review of previous
employment experience and demonstrated proficiencies to insure the
skill levels necessary to transport civilian passengers on commercial
aircraft safely.
When 33-year-old Coleman Mellett and 64-year-old Gerry Niewood, two
very gifted musicians for the Chuck Mangione jazz band, climbed aboard
Continental 3407 to join fellow band members in Buffalo to perform a
concert for a very excited western New York community, they thought
that the FAA had conducted due diligence in its oversight of airlines,
pilot training and operations to ensure the safety of all air
travelers. They believed, as most Americans do, that there are enough
checks and balances in place between government officials and the
airline industry to ensure proper management of aviation safety. These
wonderfully talented individuals were completely unaware of codeshare
ticketing and the regional airline alliances with major airlines, and
they were certainly unaware that such arrangements result in trickle
down airline management that directly has an adverse effect on safety
standards and procedures.
As 57-year-old Beverly Eckert, an advocate for the victims of the
September 11, 2001 terror attacks after she lost her husband Sean in
the South Tower of the World Trade Center, made plans to journey to
Buffalo to celebrate his birthday anniversary with family and friends,
she was unaware that many pilots commute great distances to start their
work day. The commute can be from Seattle, Washington to Newark, New
Jersey, as was the case for the First Officer on Continental Connection
Flight 3407, and can occur on the same day the pilot is scheduled to
fly. This commute time is not part of the work schedule time
established by the FAA to manage the dangerous condition of flight crew
fatigue.
When Doug Wielinski, father of four lovely daughters, intended to
end his day enjoying his hobby with sports memorabilia and collectibles
in the dining room area of his home on Long Street, he knew little of
the low wages regional airline pilots are paid to begin an aviation
career. Such low wages might deter talented and skilled pilots from
pursuing an aviation career or cause those who do accept the entry
level wage to moonlight with a second job to make ends meet, which
might also contribute to pilot fatigue.
How Can You Help???
1. ``Put the Best Pilots in the Cockpit and Set Them Up for
Success''--We need to ensure that only the best pilots are placed in
the cockpits of planes carrying passengers over American skies. Airline
hiring practices must be reviewed and upgraded to bring more
experienced pilots with demonstrated skills to the regional airlines.
It is imperative that flight crews' full piloting histories are
disclosed and/or readily accessible to airlines considering applicants
for hire. PRIA provides some of this history, but other means of
disclosure must be developed to allow the airlines to know who they are
hiring. For example, requiring an authorization to obtain a pilot's
complete airman file is one way to ensure that the prospective airline
is fully aware of the pilot's history.
At the NTSB public hearings, some of the testimony and comments
from the witnesses and board members gave us a glimpse into the reality
that the major airlines have substantially better training protocols,
methods, and procedures than their regional partners. Additional
simulator time and the most advanced training programs all cost money,
and consequently are seen with much more frequency in the training
departments of the major carriers. These major carriers also benefit
from all the years of experience and knowledge that have accrued in
their training departments due to their longevity. And their greater
resources allow them to take full advantage of the most modern safety
data analysis programs like FOQA (Flight Operation Quality Assurance
program) and LOSA (Line Observation Safety Audits) where their regional
partners can not. We simply ask is it too much for these major airlines
to work closely with their respective codeshare partners to ensure that
they provide their pilots with the best safety tools possible in terms
of training and other industry best practices.
Federal regulations regarding management of fatigue need to be
updated to reflect the most recent scientific research information on
this issue. Time to commute to duty work stations, flying during day
time versus at night, and crossing multiple times zones all should be
considered in updating this regulation of work time limits and rest.
Compensation wages should be reviewed and upgraded to promote the
attraction and retention of highly skilled pilots without concern for
dual employment to make ends meet.
2. ``Better Aviation Oversight by the Federal Government''--
Americans believe that the role of the FAA is that of a gatekeeper,
staffed by people who are technically trained and expertly qualified to
watch over the airline industry for the safety of the American public.
We have studied numerous accidents over the past fifteen years in which
the NTSB has provided safety recommendations to the FAA designed to
prevent the same accidents from reoccurring. Many of these
recommendations are still classified by the NTSB as having an
unacceptable response to this day. Because the rulemaking process is so
cumbersome, the FAA often attempts a workaround solution known as a
Safety Alert (SAFO). Unfortunately, these SAFO's are offered to the
airline industry to adopt or administer voluntarily. During testimony
by Colgan's FAA Principal Operations Inspector at the NTSB hearing, we
learned that because SAFO's are voluntary, they are not monitored for
implementation and, in practice, they are routinely not adopted.
Voluntary safety recommendations made to cash-strapped airlines cannot
protect the flying public. It is imperative that the mechanism for
translating NTSB safety recommendations into mandated practice be
streamlined to eliminate what is often years of delay between
recognition of a safety concern and action to correct it.
From the transcript of the cockpit voice recorder, we learned of
the ongoing and extended conversation between both pilots below the
10,000 feet altitude sterile cockpit requirement. The current self-
reporting process used to monitor and address this FAA requirement
clearly has gaping holes that invite abuse. An audit process must be
implemented. Despite all of the commentary regarding pilot
professionalism, we must recognize that these individuals are human and
susceptible to human fault. Without implementing a true check system
with accountability, it is improbable that this safety requirement will
ever be met as intended. Indeed, violations of sterile cockpit are seen
all too often in fatal crashes.
We are encouraged by the appointment of a new FAA administrator,
Randy Babbitt. Some of the family members were fortunate enough to meet
Mr. Babbitt prior to his confirmation, and we are hopeful that he will
offer a NEW beginning in leadership for the FAA. We hope he employs the
``One Level of Safety'' attitude he used as president of the Air Line
Pilots Association. Even the best-run companies are better served by
audits and double checks on how they conduct business. The above
examples only reconfirm to the families the need for the FAA to become
more ``hands on'' in its oversight of the airline industry.
3. NTSB recommendations--Earlier we mentioned that several NTSB
recommendations were made with unacceptable responses returned by the
FAA. To the families, it appears as though the NTSB and FAA are not
working jointly together in the best interest of aviation safety. We
ask that Congress intercede to get these agencies functioning like the
team they were intended to be. Airline safety now and tomorrow is
depending on it. We know you can learn from mistakes. Under the process
as we understand it, the NTSB conducts an unbiased investigation to
identify recommended solutions/actions to the FAA for development and
implementation. On paper this process looks very good and should work
but through the years we have seen very little progress.
In regards to the safety recommendations derived from the Flight
3407 investigation, the families and public wish to see immediate
action. We expect 100 percent resolution between recommendations made
by the NTSB and timely implementation by the FAA. We have repeatedly
heard the proud commentary of ``85 percent implementation of all NTSB
recommendations to date.'' We believe if both agencies work together
they can find solutions that will yield 100 percent implementation and
make airline safety much improved.
Summary
In summary, the Families of Continental Connection Flight 3407
would again like to thank the members of the Aviation Subcommittee for
this opportunity to express our concerns and desires. Following
previous accidents of a similar nature, the airline industry and the
FAA have had ample time to do the right thing in terms of addressing
threats to aviation safety, but still, our loved ones perished in a
preventable crash. Now we must ask Congress to intervene in the
interest of public aviation safety. As you make aviation policy
decisions moving forward, please consider our requests and do NOT react
to the influence of economics, lobbyists, personal interest groups, the
airline industry, the airline pilots unions, or others with personal
agendas. The families do NOT have such financial or influential
resources as those listed above, putting us at a significant
disadvantage.
So we ask that these policy decisions be made by each of you
individually as though your wife, husband, son, daughter, mother,
father, brother, sister, other family member or loved one are boarding
a plane. Please ``DO'' make changes that will prevent a tragedy like
Continental Connection Flight 3407 from happening again. This tragedy
was and is preventable. You can make a difference . . . please do.
Chairman Dorgan and Minority Leader, Senator DeMint, I will
entertain any questions the Committee might have at this time for the
families.
______
In Memory--Continental Flight 3407
Mary Julia Abraham Georges Abu Karam
Clarence A. ``Larry'' Beutel III David Borner
Ronald and Linda Davidson Alison Des Forges
Beverly Eckert John J. Fiore
Ronald Gonzalez Brad S. Green
Zhaofang Guo Steven L. Johnson
Kevin W. Johnston Ruth Harel Katz
Ellyce Kausner Nicole Korczykowski and Johnathan
Perry
Jerome Krasuski Brian Kuklewicz
Beth Ann Kushner Sean Lang
Madeline Linn Loftus Lorin Maurer
Don McDonald Coleman Mellett
Dawn Monachino Donald, Dawn, and Shawn Mossop
Jennifer Neill (and Baby Neill) Gerard Niewood
Mary ``Belle'' Pettys Donna Prisco
Matilda Quintero Ferris Reid
Capt. Marvin D. Renslow Julie Ries
John G. Roberts III Kristin Safran
Rebecca Lynne Shaw Dipinder Sidhu
Jean Srnecz Darren Tolsma
Susan Wehle Ernest West
Douglas C. Wielinski Shibin Yao
Clay Yarber Joseph J. Zuffoletto
______
The Gaping Hole . . .
. . . left in our lives by the needless loss of 51 loved ones on
the night of February 12, 2009.
They came from all over the country and world . . .
8 countries--USA, Canada, Jamaica, Israel, Lebanon, India,
China, and Liberia
9 states--NY, NJ, CT, PA, OH, CA, WA, FL, TX
They valued education . . .
2 were undergrads, 1 was in Law School, 2 were pursuing an MBA
There were 5 Ivy League degrees among them
They made the world a better place . . .
There was a 9/11 activist and a human rights activist
6 veterans of our armed forces, 7 combat tours, and 2 purple
hearts
4 defense contractors dedicated to protecting our soldiers
lives
They were talented . . .
2 members of the Chuck Mangione Jazz band
2 former collegiate athletes
They were faith-filled . . .
A cantor at a Jewish temple and an elder in a Jehovah's Witness
congregation
Most of all, they loved their families . . .
21 left behind spouses, and 3 were engaged
There were 2 married couples and one young boyfriend/girlfriend
couple
1 passenger was 6 months pregnant
20 children under the age of 18 lost a parent
14 children lost a grandparent
11 daughters lost their fathers and will never have their Dad
walk them down the aisle
8 fathers lost their daughters and will never be able to give
their hand away in marriage
17 mothers had to say goodbye to their sons
. . . And we loved them.
``FAMILIES OF CONTINENTAL FLIGHT 3407''
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Maurer, thank you very much.
I indicated, in the last hearing, that I have some
discomfort about a good many things, here. Reading the
transcript of the cockpit recording demonstrated to me a number
of errors occurred, a number of deficiencies occurred, in the
management of that flight. I also said that that young copilot
and pilot perished in that accident, as well, and they're not
here to speak, they're not here to speak for themselves, and
they have families who miss them terribly. And so, I'm
discomforted by that. And yet, we have no choice but to proceed
aggressively to find out, What are the standards, here? And are
these accidents--was this an accident that could have been
prevented? How do we prevent future accidents in circumstances
like this?
Let me ask a few questions, if I might. My understanding--I
would say to Mr. May and Mr. Cohen, my understanding is that
we're hiring pilots to put in a cockpit of commercial airlines
with 30, 50, 80, 90 passengers behind the cockpit--we're hiring
some of them for $10 an hour. Is that correct?
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, the pay--the average pay of a
regional airline captain is $72,000 per year. The average pay
of a first officer at a RAA-member airline is $32,000 a year.
That's very comparable to other professions that have lives at
stake--medical assistants, paramedics----
Senator Dorgan. But, Mr. Cohen, I'm asking what your--is it
the case that we're hiring pilots to put in the cockpit of
commercial airplanes and paying them $22-23,000 a year? That's
$10 an hour, roughly. Isn't that the case? And if that's the
case, one wonders, What is the capability of pilots that are
coming out of school with a good many hours, who meet the
technical qualifications, get hired for $10 an hour, and then
live with their parents in Seattle and fly to Newark to a duty
station, all night long. And at that salary, are they to going
to hire a crash pad or maybe rent a hotel to get some sleep?
Don't think so.
So, my question is--a very specific question--isn't there a
significant issue, here, about experience and funding and
salaries at the entry level on some of these airplanes, where
we're getting--all of us are getting on? The name is the same.
We think it's--you know, it's Northwest, it's Continental, it's
Delta, the same name; it's just--it's a different carrier, with
a completely different standard, it seems to me, of hiring new
pilots that are entering that cockpit. Am I wrong about that?
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, I think I heard a couple of
questions in there--let me just try to expand on a couple of
things.
First of all, and most importantly, compensation and safety
are not related. The NTSB has never, in all of its accident
investigations, ever cited compensation or pay as a causal
factor, even a contributing factor, to an aircraft accident.
The pay is fair and competitive in a very difficult industry. I
am a 35-year veteran of the airline industry, and I will tell
you that it is as Captain Prater pointed out, a very difficult
industry. For the first time opportunity that a person comes
into, these people are proficient, they are well trained, they
are well qualified or we would not put that person in charge of
that airplane, in charge of that crew, the safety of that
flight--we would not do it, if that person weren't well trained
and prepared.
Senator Dorgan. Well, let me ask--do you have the chart
with respect to commuting?
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Dorgan. Let me ask a question of Captain Prater.
The--this chart shows the commuting for Colgan Airlines, but I
assume it's a chart that applies to most airlines, people
flying all over the country to get to their duty station. That
shows Newark, and it shows the pilots, where they're living in
order to fly to Newark to get to a duty station. Does that make
any sense to you, Captain Prater? I understand you might say,
``Well, you know what, it has always been that way. People need
to get there. They've got be on their own, they've got to get
adequate rest,'' and so on. But, this case had a copilot that
flew all night long to get to her duty station. And so, does
that make sense?
Captain Prater. It makes sense. And I would agree with you
that that is--represents the reality of our air transportation
system and our pilots. However, I think we have to take a very
close look, again, at the system that has created this. You
can't open and close domiciles on a regular basis and transfer
flying and lay off pilots at one airline and not give them some
ability to either move to their new station or to get to work.
Even if I am based in Houston and the company needs me out of
Newark, they will deadhead me to Newark, they will get me to
where I should start my flight. There is a huge responsibility
that professional aviators take very near and dear. None of us
get into a cockpit believing that we're going to fail that day.
Every one of these aviators face the weather, the same weather
and the same situation; engines fail, we have emergencies, and
our pilots do it.
Senator Dorgan. But, with very different levels of skill
and experience. Do you agree?
Captain Prater. Yes, without a doubt.
Senator Dorgan. All right. Look, I have very limited time.
I'm going to stay here and ask all my questions, at the end of
this. I don't want to disabuse--or abuse, rather, the--my
colleagues. But, the question of pilot records--Captain Prater,
do you have a problem with--if we know everything about an
airplane, that we--that a potential employer should know
everything about a pilot's records?
Captain Prater. I believe that the Record Act can be
improved. I do think that history and performance is necessary
and good, but don't look at that in a--as the entire story. We
are constantly going through training, and must meet the
standards every month, every week, every year. So, just like
when you create an airplane, you test it to destruction; as
pilots, we are trained to a point outside of what we can do. We
must find our limit. You must push pilots, in their training,
to be able to meet and succeed. But, many times that takes a
lot of training, more than we're getting today.
Senator Dorgan. You seem to imply, in your testimony, that
there were two standards with respect to commercial--excuse me,
commercial aviation. One would be the trunk carriers or network
carriers, and the other, the regional. Do you believe there are
two standards in the cockpit?
Captain Prater. I'll say it succinctly. We have one level
of regulation. We do not have one level of safety.
Senator Dorgan. So, different levels of enforcement.
Captain Prater. Yes.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. May, do you agree with that?
Mr. May. Mr. Chairman, I do agree, to this extent; FAR Part
121 is the single standard that the FAA has promulgated, to
which we all must adhere. I don't think there is any question
that mainline carriers exceed that FAR Part 121 base far more
often than most.
Senator Dorgan. But, that which exists in law or rule is
relevant, only to the extent you have a Federal agency that
says, ``You know what, we're going to force you to own up
to''--
Mr. May. That is--
Senator Dorgan.--``the law and the rule, and we're going to
enforce it, and enforce it aggressively.''
Mr. May. That is correct.
Senator Dorgan. Do you believe that's the case now?
Mr. May. I think that we could have greater enforcement.
And if the Committee and the FAA choose, you can even change
some of the parameters. We've suggested, as I said in my
testimony today, you ought to have FOQA programs, ASAP
programs, required as part of the base. I think you can use AQP
programs on training. I think there are a number of issues on
pilot records that you can resolve. All of those things could
be done to further improve the environment.
Senator Dorgan. One final point. Mr. Cohen and Mr. May, as
I indicated when I started this hearing, I want to invite the
folks that run the carriers, themselves, to come to that table.
And we have made some invitations, and apparently have not had
acceptance of those invitations. And we'll remake them, fully
understanding that they will be accepted, and have another
hearing with the airlines themselves.
Captain Prater. Mr. Chairman, you have our commitment.
Whoever you want, whenever you want, we will provide them here.
Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much.
Senator DeMint?
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think we need to get a little more specific. And, Mr.
May, I appreciate you mentioning specifics about what we can do
with training. But, what I'm not hearing here today are
specific ideas about, what do we need to change to prevent
something like this from happening again? There have got to be
things that come to mind that we need to change. Obviously we
have some situations of violating current rules--no sterile
cockpit, in this particular crash--that the pilots themselves
violated rules. We need to make sure that that doesn't happen
again. But, what do we need to do? What do the carriers need to
do? What do we need to do, from a regulatory perspective? And
do we need legislation that the regulators can't carry out? So,
what we're looking for here is what we can do.
And so, I would just like--Mr. May, starting with you,
because you mentioned training--but, what we need are
specifics, here, of things that can be done to improve safety,
perhaps that this crash brings to light, that we're currently
not doing or not requiring or not auditing. We have, so far,
gotten a lot of assurances that safety is our main concern, but
the reason we're here is that that broke down. So, I'm just
looking for some ideas. We need to know if we need to push the
regulators to do something different, we need to pass
legislation, or do we need to insist on the carriers to do
something that they're not doing?
Mr. May, I'll go with you and then go----
Mr. May. Senator DeMint, I think I made seven very specific
recommendations in my oral testimony. I'll recap them for you
today.
I think there needs to be a requirement that regional
carriers implement FOQA programs and ASAP programs, both of
which Captain Prater, I think, would agree are all fully in use
at mainline levels, and would make a marked difference, if
applied at the regional levels.
I think, number three, we need to put in a new training
standard, if you will. There's a long, open NPRM on training at
the FAA. I think probably it would be wise for the FAA to
implement an ARC, an Aviation Rulemaking Committee, and take a
hard look at AQP programs--Advanced Qualification Programs, if
you will--that are--have been developed by mainline carriers,
could be mentored and transported to regional carriers to
improve safety, in terms of training.
Number four, I think you need to take--or, have the--direct
the FAA to take a hard look at how they'd better enforce the
sterile cockpit rule. We recognize that there are privacy
issues involved, here, but I think there needs to be some kind
of monitoring of cockpit tapes, on a frequent basis, that we
can----
Senator DeMint. Just random----
Mr. May.--adjust that.
Senator DeMint.--auditing of----
Mr. May. Yes, at some point. And I suspect Captain Prater
would acknowledge that, as long as we protect the privacy of
the pilots, there's a way that can be done.
Next, I think you need to have a very specific program
promulgated by the FAA on records so that when a carrier goes
out to hire an individual pilot, they have access to all of
that pilot's records in the same place and in the same format,
so that they can have a complete look at what has gone on
there.
And finally, I think you need to make sure that we have a
very close look at the whole process that is used by the FAA to
regulate 121, and how many of these issues need to be
incorporated in it, or whether or not the standard is fine, it
just needs to be an enforcement issue. So, those are some very
specific----
Senator DeMint. That's very----
Mr. May.--recommendations----
Senator DeMint.--very helpful. I think we need to somehow
get that in a--some joint letter to the FAA, to make sure that
we're at least reviewing those recommendations.
The other witnesses, do you agree some things----
Mr. Cohen. Senator DeMint, I----
Senator DeMint.--need to be added?
Mr. Cohen. Senator DeMint, members of the Committee--we
would wholeheartedly support the points that Mr. May pointed
out. I think the industry--again is, one industry, and in full
concurrence on these type of issues.
Let me also point out two specific things, in addition. The
integrated database of pilot records is something that Congress
can direct the FAA to do, and to do it immediately, so that the
access to this information is readily available about the
people as we hire. As we have better information about
everybody in the system, the safer it will be.
And as to the other issue, let me please underscore the use
of CVRs. And, I think, as you all talked about in your remarks,
it is a tragedy that we are here, and all of the issues that
Congress, the FAA, are learning about had to be after the
tragedy. And that is a shame, because if there is a tool out
there that can be used to help prevent accidents, that is
getting information about how to prevent accidents before they
happen, and we are not even touching it, that is a real
tragedy.
Senator DeMint. Captain--
Captain Prater. Sir, I'd like to respond. We're talking
Band-Aids, here, and we need to look at the system. The thought
that somehow we can monitor cockpit voice recorders and somehow
improve the safety or the compliance of pilots, let us focus on
the professionalism and the training of those airmen who do
this day in and day out. We're missing something, here. We're
missing that these airmen have been doing their job.
Now, let's not take this accident and try to say it was
caused because pilots were talking in the cockpit. You have to
communicate, you have to relay. I'm not going to talk about
this one, obviously, because it's still under investigation and
we're analyzing. Do we want to improve it? Yes. But, where do
you learn to become a professional? You learn it from the men
and women that you respect. You break the chain, and you keep
moving around, flying, and where do you get that experience?
All of a sudden, a new first officer is flying with somebody
who's only been flying for 3 years. That wouldn't have happened
if the airlines wouldn't keep pushing flying around the system.
It took me 12 years to make captain. That used to be the norm.
We went through 12 years or 8 years or 5 years of airline
operations. Now it's much quicker.
Senator DeMint. Let me just be clear. You object to random
reviews of cockpit recordings just to verify that we're keeping
sterile cockpits and following other rules? You object to that?
Captain Prater. I don't object to it, as long as it's done
in a system like an ASAP program, where it can be protected and
we learn about safety. If you want to use it to monitor--you'll
actually create a cockpit that may not be as safe. Let's not
mistake that ``sterile cockpit'' means we're focused upon
flying the airplane at critical points. That is standard.
That's what goes on. I think we're assuming a little bit too
much. If it's protected and used as safety data, then we should
be able to find a way to make the system safer. And that is our
shared goal.
Senator DeMint. Because I know just about every service
company I call on the telephone now, bank or whatever, is going
to say, ``This call may be audited for quality purposes.'' And
you can't improve what you don't measure. And I think, to
assume that a one-time training scheme is going to monitor
potential problems over the lifetime of a pilot is like
assuming the same thing for an airplane. So, I'm a little
concerned that you consider that a Band-Aid. Do you consider
getting the records--keeping records of pilots over their
career--is that a Band-Aid?
Captain Prater. Again, are we going to compare apples with
apples? Which training school did they come out of? You don't
want to create a system, where, ``Hey, Joe, go to X, Y, Z
Training School, because they don't flunk anybody. You won't
have anything on your record.'' Or, do you want them to go to
the hardest school out there, where they push you to your
limits, push you to a failure, not of a check ride, but all
these are maneuvers that we must be trained in over and over,
whether they're emergencies or back-to-basic flying skills. So,
you don't want to create a system that actually finds a way of
getting around that. Don't create a loophole----
Senator DeMint. I know I'm over time, but can we allow Mr.
Maurer just to comment to the suggestions in the----
Mr. Maurer. I guess I'd just like to remind everybody, when
you're sitting in the passenger section of the plane--again,
you're unaware of who's up there on the other side of those
doors. Is full disclosure too much of a thing to ask when your
life is at hand?
Another comment. Chairman Dorgan had that chart up there.
My commute to work is 7 miles. Members of the Senate, I know
that you've--you come from pretty far away, but you have a
residence here, you have someplace here. Perhaps the airline
industry needs to consider providing for that kind of thing if
we're going to allow pilots to commute these great distances.
I happen to travel probably every other week, and it's not
uncommon for me to be sitting side by side with pilots who are
commuting to their base location. They're tired. I get in
conversations with them all the time. They're tired. Those
hours don't count toward the critical restrictions. I mean,
these are things that we've got to take into account. We
learned, in our accident, of long hours that were taken just
getting to work, and then you're going to climb on a plane and
fly.
So, I just--let's keep the human element in mind, let's not
be defensive.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Lautenberg?
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks.
I think there was a response to a question by Senator
Dorgan that kind of missed the boat, about the relatively
modest wage that--or, wages that are paid to people, such as
the fellow who flew copilot in that flight, 3407, because it--
you said it's kind of a pay scale that might be applied in
other professions and--but, I think the point was missed,
because if someone is not making enough money to take care of
themselves and their families, it will typically mean a second
job, a second opportunity to earn some more money, is in the
cards. As a consequence, there is more effort, there is more
opportunity for fatigue to creep into the individual's
operation.
And so, I think that when we talk about a profession that,
in the year, might pay $20,000 a year, we're talking about,
that's almost minimum wage for any kind of a job, whether it's
a janitor or otherwise, a bank teller. So, we have to look at
these in realtime.
And, you know, I--at the previous hearing that we held on
aviation safety, one of the questions that I raised was, How
many times does an inability to pass a test be allowed at--
before it's three strikes, or whatever the number is, and
you're out? I mean, would you--would anyone here want to go
into major surgery--heart, head, whatever--and have a physician
there who flunked his tests five times before he--they squeezed
him through the operation and put him--put life in his hands? I
don't--I think there's a point in time when you have to say,
``Hey, if you can't master this in two or three times, then
this is--then find something else to do.'' People love to fly.
I know a lot of pilots. I sat a lot in second seats in small--
second seats in small airplanes. And flying is--it's a
glamorous job, it really is. I don't know how it is as,
commercial operation when you're sitting in seats to fly back
home or otherwise away from home, et cetera, but I think
there's a point in time, Mr.--Captain Prater, that--say, ``Hey,
this is not the kind of a''--the simulators have--replicate
emergency situations?
Captain Prater. Very much so. You can really do a good job
of training for emergencies. It doesn't replicate, though, the
fact that, when you're in an airplane, it's much more three-
dimensional, all the forces on you. So, sometimes you have to
go to--back to that basic airmanship.
But, to your point, sir, at most of the airlines, that
``three strikes and you're out'' is just about the way it
works. That's oversimplified, but we give an airman two
chances, there's a training review board, where the company,
the industry--we may even send the pilot out for a physical, a
psychological exam, a fitness for duty--is there something else
going on why that individual--but, basically, by the third time
of that failure, trying to master the same maneuver or the same
airplane--and pilots' jobs are at risk at that point.
Senator Lautenberg. The--so, this was an oddity, that had
the captain of this flight failing five times over a period of
years. The records didn't go back far enough to dig out the
information.
Captain Prater. Again, I think we have to make sure that we
are comparing apples with apples. If he had problems in his
private pilot license or commercial pilot license, with basic
airmanship skills, and had to be retrained there. But, we can't
get away from the fact that he met--all of them met the FAA
standards, and they met the standards that their employer had
set, as required by the FARs.
Senator Lautenberg. The--is the testing--the training for a
regional pilot the same as it is for pilots in the major
airlines?
Captain Prater. Yes, it is, Senator.
Senator Lautenberg. It is. Would the--do the regular
airline companies--aviation companies pay as little as $20,000
a year and put someone, even alongside a trained captain, in
the cockpit?
Mr. May. Senator, as a practical matter, the pilots that
are hired by the mainline have significantly more seniority, on
average, and are paid at a higher level. Pay is a function of
collective bargaining, and it's generally also conditioned on
number of hours, number of hours in a particular type of
aircraft, whether or not they've been a pilot in command,
whether or not they're a first officer. So, there are a number
of factors involved in pay, but it is effectively the exclusive
jurisdiction of collective bargaining and seniority.
Senator Lautenberg. Before someone achieves the status of
captain, is there a requirement in the regionals that they fly
a particular number of hours--have flown a particular number of
hours?
Mr. Cohen?
Captain Prater. Basic FARs require 1,500 hours of total
flight time, to be age 23 years old. That's the basics. That's
not a lot of time. In many cases, pilots do exceed that before
they check out as captain, but in rapidly expanding
environments, it is of a concern. It's also of a concern of how
much actual experience. Time isn't the only generator. If you
flew a B-52 for 20-hour missions, it's not the same amount of
training as making six take-offs and landings a day in an
airline environment. So, time doesn't cure all here.
Mr. Cohen. Senator, excuse me, if I might.
Senator Lautenberg. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Cohen. For the record, our average captain at a
regional airline has 8,500 hours. That's pretty experienced.
And our average first officer is well over 3,000 hours.
Senator Lautenberg. Maybe not dealing with averages, but
rather with specifics might be called for, to say, ``Well, the
captain of an airplane that's got a less-skilled copilot has to
be--have had more experience than the basic experience.'' And
that might be a good rule to put into play, that if you're
going to take someone who's new at this job--and, again,
considering all of the factors, and they're complicated as
could be--but, when you look at what is required of the
passenger flow today in major airlines, that--or regionals--the
passengers are examined so thoroughly to make sure that they
can't bring down an airplane. And when we look at the skills
and the training and the reaction ability of a pilot, well,
that's much more casually done. And I think we can learn from
that. Not to change the security process, but, rather, to say
that the person who's up in the front of that airplane has to
really be able to manage all situations.
Mr. Maurer, I know that it's painful for you to review
this, but you're doing a noble job when you say, ``Let my loss
be a lesson for others,'' and I think we have to take that very
much to heart. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Thank you. Senator Johanns.
Senator Johanns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cohen, how many regional airlines are in operation out
there today? How many would that be?
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, Senator, as it has been talked
about, the term ``regional airline'' is more of a term almost
of art rather than of science. There are 31 RAA member
airlines, and those 31 members carry 90-plus percent of the
passengers in scheduled service.
Senator Johanns. OK. How many of those would be profitable
today? How many are actually making money?
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, Senator, many of them are
privately held, so they do not report their finances publicly.
And I just don't have that information available to me.
Senator Johanns. Of those who are not privately owned,
could you get that information for us?
Mr. Cohen. We would be glad to get it to you and provide it
to the Committee, absolutely.
[The information referred to follows:]
Regional Airline Association
Washington, DC.
Hon. Mike Johanns,
Russell Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Johanns:
On behalf of the Regional Airline Association member airlines,
thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Senate
Aviation Subcommittee hearing on June 17, 2009. Our industry is
committed to the constant improvement of safety in commercial aviation.
Following up on your request for information, please find attached
a spreadsheet outlining the profitability of publicly traded RAA member
airlines. The chart was compiled from public data available through the
Morningstar rating service. It summarizes the financial performance of
the six publicly traded, Part 121 passenger airline members of RAA.
These include: ExpressJet Holdings; Gulfstream International Group:
Great Lakes Aviation; Pinnacle Holdings; Republic Holdings and Skywest.
(Publicly traded Mesa Air group is not currently an RAA member, so is
not included here). Also included are website links providing
additional information on each company. Please note that a number of
RAA member airlines are wholly or partially owned subsidiaries of major
airlines, including American Eagle, Comair, Compass, Horizon, Mesaba,
Piedmont, and PSA.
Again, thank you for taking the initiative to increase airline
safety. We would welcome a chance to further discuss this information
and other issues with you directly and will contact your office to
arrange a convenient time.
Respectfully,
Roger Cohen,
President,
Regional Airline Association.
CC: Hon. Byron L. Dorgan
Regional Airline Association (RAA): Publicly Traded, Member Reported Net Income
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net Income Net Income Net Income Net Income Net Income Net Income
(Loss) (Loss) (Loss) (Loss) (Loss) (Loss)
Stock FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 Q1
Company Name City State Symbol -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
in Millions in Millions in Millions in Millions in Millions in Millions
of USD of USD of USD of USD of USD of USD
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExpressJet Houst TX NYSE:X 122.8 98.0 92.6 (70.3) (88.2) (10.6)
Holdings, on JT
Inc.
Gulfstream Ft. FL AMEX:G N/A* N/A* 1.2 (3.1) (14.8) 0.7
Internation Laud IA
al Group erda
Inc. le
Great Lakes Cheye WY OTC 5.6 1.2 15.7 19.2 1.9 0.09
Aviation, nne BB:
LTD GLUX
Pinnacle Memph TN Nasdaq 40.7 25.7 77.8 34.6 (4.9) 18.8
Airlines is GS:PN
Corp. CI.
Republic India IN Nasdaq 44.8 60.7 79.5 82.8 84.6 2.2
Airways napo GS:RJ
Holding, lis ET
Inc.
Skywest Inc. St. UT Nasdaq 82.0 112.3 145.8 159.2 112.9 9.4
Geor GS:SK
ge YW
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Gulfstream International Group Inc. was incorporated in December 2005.
Information provided by Morningstar, Inc.
Senator Johanns. OK. Let me understand your business model,
because I think that bears on some issues, here.
As I understand it, the cost of the ticket that I would
purchase is not determined by that regional, it's determined by
the carrier they contract with. Is that correct?
Mr. Cohen. For the vast majority of business operations,
yes.
Senator Johanns. How are your revenues determined, then?
How--is it based on that ticket cost?
Mr. Cohen. There are a variety of business arrangements,
which are proprietary in nature, but it's my general
understanding that it can be one of a couple of ways. Probably
the predominant way is now what's called ``fee for departure''
or--that, basically, the regional airline is given a schedule
and is paid, in some fashion, based on the number of flight
hours, the number of trips, the performance of those trips, and
so forth. There are regional airlines that are wholly owned
subsidiaries of major airlines. That may be a different
relationship. There are some independent flying regional
airlines; that's a smaller group. There are some business
models that actually have a little bit of a mix--where the
ticket price may be split; but, that is a very small
percentage.
Senator Johanns. Is it impacted by the number of people on
the plane? So, if you're flying 50, versus 5, your revenues are
going to be better?
Mr. Cohen. Only in those instances where the regional
carrier would be sharing in the risk of the revenue for the
flight.
Senator Johanns. OK. What's----
Mr. Cohen. But, again, these are proprietary. I've never
seen one. That's just my general understanding.
Senator Johanns. There are statistics as to how many of
these regionals have gone bankrupt, because, of course, that's
a public sort of event. How many would that be?
Mr. Cohen. I've been the president of the Regional Airline
Association for a little over two and a half years, and, of our
members, I believe two may have gone out of business in those
two years, of our members.
Senator Johanns. OK. On the pilots themselves--you know, I
started out as a young lawyer, and, had you asked me, at age
23, ``Are you ready to handle the most complex cases in a
courtroom setting?'' I would have said, ``Absolutely. I've got
my law degree, I've got my bar certificate. Let's go.'' I
wasn't anywhere near ready.
Is the regional airline regarded as the training ground for
pilots? Kind of, you go there, you pick up some hours, you do
some flying back and forth to whatever you're--and you pick up
those hours, and then eventually you, hopefully, get to a big
carrier, and maybe eventually go transcontinental--I don't know
what the next steps would be. Is that the case?
Captain Prater. Unfortunately, that's what this system has
produced. And it's not the safest model, sir.
Senator Johanns. Yes. You see, Mr. Cohen, averages mean
nothing to me. You know, when I walk on that airplane, and I
stick my head in the cockpit and say, ``Boy, I feel so good
that the average salary here is'' whatever you told me it was--
I would never say that. I want to know that they are trained
and ready and can handle thunderstorms and icing and keep me
out of trouble. So, your averages just don't land anywhere with
me; they miss the mark completely.
What would be the minimum salary per year that a pilot
would be hired to come onboard?
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, I don't have--Mr. Chairman,
Senator Johanns, I don't have the minimum. Again, the average,
which is--we--I believe we provided some information to the
Committee. I can get you that of our member airlines. We can
provide that to you.
Senator Johanns. I want you to get that.
Your averages mean nothing.
Captain Prater. That new--that new pilot, sir, would be
making between $16- and $18,000 a year for a full-time job, and
less if he or she is on reserve.
Senator Johanns. And doing that kind of commuting.
Captain Prater. Yes, sir.
Senator Johanns. OK.
Now, I traveled extensively when I was in the Cabinet. I
must admit, I got tired of it. But, one of the things that
really, really hammered me was the constant time changes, the
poor diet, the lack of exercise, because you can never have a
schedule. When these folks are traveling from out at the West
Coast over to the East Coast, and they've gone through all
those time changes, how does that compute? If you see somebody
that has spent the whole night, can they literally land in New
Jersey and get on an airplane and start flying?
Maybe the pilot. Captain?
Captain Prater. While it is possible, it's also true that--
may have flown that flight across the country--5-hour flight in
the middle of the night--and then be expected to sit around for
a couple of hours, as many as 5 or 6 hours, and then fly the
trip. So, I would put it in the terms of, Where is it more--is
it any more restful sitting in coach seat trying to get to work
for 2 hours, or driving to an airport for 2 hours? I think we
have to look at that.
Obviously, the subject of commuting has some focus,
especially on our first duty day. Is--that first duty day, are
you sufficiently rested to do your next 16 hours of duty?
That's what we have to look at, those extensive periods.
But, I think, in this case, what also is forgotten is, that
copilot could have flown that trip instead of just ridden on
it, and been legal to fly, that afternoon, and fly that trip.
That's a fact.
Senator Johanns. Let me--and I'm out of time, so I'm going
to zero on this in a very focused way. But, let's say I grew up
in Florida, and I get my training in Florida, and I'm used to
thunderstorms, but I have no idea of what icing is about, never
flown in it, maybe got a little bit of training on it, but no
experience whatsoever. Could a regional hire me to fly a
northern route?
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, no, that person would be trained
extensively in the type of operations that he or she is going
to be flying in.
Senator Johanns. Now, Captain, how much----
Captain Prater. I would disagree with that statement, from
this point. That pilot has check-passed the minimums for all
types of operations and all types of weather, and if his or her
experience has been specifically in one area or one region of
the country, they could be thrown into the worst weather of the
Northeast or the mountain flying, or whatever, without further
training. And that's--we have to talk about specific training
at different points.
When you move pilots around this system, we must continue
that training cycle. And I think it's deficient in that area.
Senator Johanns. OK. I'll just wrap up, Mr. Chairman, with
this very, very quick thought.
I ask these questions--and I'll be very candid about it--
because I worry that, because of economics, or whatever, we're
trying to do this on the cheap. And we are hiring pilots at a
very low wage. I don't know how you'd live on that salary. And
you know what you're ending up with? People who are trying to
build their hours to move out of the regional system. If that
is the case, that's very worrisome.
Now, Mr. Cohen, you represent these fine folks. Prove to me
I'm wrong. The burden is on the airlines to prove the safety of
our travel.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Begich?
Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Maurer, thank you very much for your testimony.
And, as I said in my opening, you know, I have experienced
tragedy in my family and--in a plane crash with my father, but
even to a more extreme, that the plane was never recovered. And
it took a tragedy, back then, to change the rules of requiring
locator beacons in planes, because of that incident. And it was
the largest air recovery attempt in this country's history. And
so, it seems, always, when we deal with air traffic safety,
it's always a tragedy that moves us to the next stage.
So, I appreciate you being here. I'm very, very
sympathetic, from personal reasons.
But, you know, as I was listening to the testimony, Mr.
Cohen--and I feel like you're, like, on the hotseat, and I
appreciate your being here--but, as I was listening to you, I
asked my staff--because I know all associations have
conferences and meetings and so forth--so, while you were
testifying, I said, ``Go get me a copy'' of your last
conference, which was held in mid-May. And it was a 4-day, 5-
day conference. This is now 2, 3 months after the significant
incident--as you described it, a very significant incident in
the regional airlines' history. But, yet, when I looked through
the conference agenda of four and a half days, I see very
little mention of safety, except in the last--let me just
finish--in the last couple of days.
Now, I'm assuming, through the discussion of the
conference, you had conversations. I know, as a former mayor,
when the Katrina disaster happened, we spent a whole conference
on that, because of the importance of safety in our
communities.
And so, as you talk about the ideas and suggestions, I want
to--and I think Mr.--Senator Johanns said it very clearly--it's
on you. And I can only look at what's been done and your
comments today.
So, I want to take a couple of steps. And if you want to
quickly comment on the convention, that's great. It's--and I'm
not going to read the agenda, because you know what was there
and the kind of things you covered, but it just seems that that
should have been forefront. And maybe it was, and your agenda
that's on your website doesn't show that. And I just--it seems
such an important issue.
Mr. Cohen. If I might.
Senator Begich. Yes.
Mr. Cohen. To that point, Senator, the reason why RAA was
created, and every year for the last 34 years, has been to
promote the safety within the industry. The safety directors of
our member airlines meet for the entire length of that
conference. That is a meeting at which everything is shared--
among the airlines--with the FAA, with members of the NTSB that
are there. And it is not a public meeting, so that they can
share those experiences.
And so, you are exactly correct, that was not on the public
website. They meet for 10 hours a day, and in a windowless
room. And we would urge you when--the next time, when they meet
here--they meet regularly--I would urge members of this
Committee to come to--you are invited. We would love to have
you there.
Senator Begich. Would you share the outcome of your last
conference meetings from that with the Committee?
Mr. Cohen. We will do so.
Senator Begich. And if it needs to be confidential, or
whatever the rules are, I'm happy to oblige.
Mr. Cohen. Yes.
[The information is maintained in Committee files.]
Senator Begich. Let me go to another issue, again Senator
Johanns asked, and that was regarding the pay rate. And I--I'm
not going to debate you. I--it surprised me that you did not
know the beginning salary, or a range. So, do you have--has the
Association ever done a salary study? I'm just guessing they
must have had some analysis over the many years you've been in
existence. And if so, can you provide that to the Committee?
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, Senator, we will provide you the
information of our member carriers, what is publicly available,
and we'll get that to you.
Senator Begich. And I guess I would push you a little bit
further. I mean, we have rules here; we can keep things
proprietary information. So, I would like you to stretch
further, if you can.
Mr. Cohen. Will do so.
Senator Begich. The issue on the pay. And I know you
mentioned that the compensation is not necessarily a driving
factor. I would disagree with you, just so it's clear on that
fact, because as, again, a former mayor, managing over 500
police officers, 300 public safety people in the area of
paramedics and fire, what I never wanted them to have was a
second job. I wanted one job. And one job was doing the safety
of the community. So, we paid them very well. The net result
was, we had very limited or--limited problems, because of that,
because they didn't have to worry about their family and taking
care of them.
So, I want to disagree with you on that and ask you this
simple question, and taking it--as the Chairman has talked
about $22-23,000. In Alaska, small planes, regionals--and we
have some great regionals in Alaska, from the ones that operate
currently there--but, the pay seems to me an important factor
in creating quality, so the quality of a pilot doesn't
literally--and I'll use these words carefully--``fly'' to the
majors, to keep them for long-term careers. Do you honestly
think--and I'm going off the Pilots Association, because they
obviously know, because they get the paycheck--that $22-23,000
is adequate for us to have people flying planes with--I don't
care if it's one person or 20 people or 50 people?
Mr. Cohen. Two points to that, Senator, that the pay at
virtually every one of our member airlines, all but one, is
collectively bargained.
Senator Begich. That's not my question. I--again, as a
former mayor, I deal with collective bargaining all the time.
Is it the right kind of pay to have? And should we require
minimums that are guaranteed pay levels for pilots in regional
planes? This is a question I asked last week to folks.
Mr. Cohen. Senator, again, it's a very complex issue--we
believe, fundamentally, that the quality of the people that we
have flying is good. We would like to get even better. That's
one of the reasons why we strongly support a number of the
issues that have been discussed today, to get better training,
to get better--there is an investment, here, too. It's
interesting that this committee, which is, responsible for so
much of the next generation of technology and spending billions
of dollars, that we believe that there can be some money spent
on the human capital in our aviation safety system, and we
would strongly support that.
Senator Begich. And I'm running out of time, so let me ask,
if I can, to both of you, I guess--to you, and also--oh, Mr.
May, you could answer this, too, and also Mr. Prater, if you--
Captain Prater, if you want to answer this very quickly. And
it's a very simple question. And that is the whole issue of
downtime and FAA's minimums that they currently have. And I
know each one of you have mentioned the FAA minimum standard
requirements for pilots. Do you think the minimums are too low?
The minimum standards of FAA for pilots for downtime, as well
as other training and other issues, do you think they're too
low and need to be raised up?
And, Mr. May, can we start with you? Is that OK?
Mr. May. Certainly, Senator Begich, I assume you're talking
about flight and duty time now?
Senator Begich. Yes.
Mr. May. I think they're probably appropriate, one.
Two, we made a commitment, at the FAA's Call to Action on
Monday, to enter into a science-based study to determine
whether or not they are currently appropriate or not. There has
been a recent proceeding, on ultralong flying, that the FAA has
done. It was science-based. Plenty of skilled people available
to do that. I think we probably ought to incorporate--the
Chairman has raised this issue of commuting--I think we ought
to incorporate that into the process.
And so, we would strongly endorse a process being
established by FAA to look at flight and duty time, current
standards, how they might differ for regionals, for example,
with lots of takeoffs and landings, versus long haul. All of
that needs to be put on the table.
Senator Begich. Mr. Cohen? Mr. Prater? And my time is
definitely up, so if you can be very quick on the response.
Mr. Cohen. Totally agree with what Mr. May said.
Senator Begich. OK. Mr. Prater?
Captain Prater. And we believe there has been enough study.
We're ready to move forward with it. We do believe there's
enough science on the record. We're going to make our
recommendations directly to the FAA and work with the
associations to move that process forward.
Senator Begich. Can you share that with the Committee when
you do that?
Mr. Cohen. Of course.
Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator Klobuchar?
STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you for having this hearing.
The tragedy of the Colgan Air flight brought the safety of
our airlines back into the public eye. I can tell you, for--
Senator Begich has his own very personal story. For me, it was
eerily reminiscent of the crash of Paul Wellstone's plane. He,
as you know, was the Senator from Minnesota. While that was a
private plane, the issues were ice, the issues were pilot
training, and the issues were fatigue. So, when I hear all this
from our hearing last week, of underpaid pilots, pilots that
are tired, and pilots that aren't earning enough money, it
reminds me very much of that.
In addition to that, here you have the factor of pilots
living far away from their bases leading to long commutes and a
lot of time spent waiting in the airports. I know there have
been some questions about fatigue, but I had a question about
the reimbursement for hotel rooms in the evenings. I mean, I
know that some of the larger airlines pay for hotel costs so
that the pilots can get sleep before shifts. Are regional
carriers doing the same thing?
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, Senator Klobuchar, when pilots are
on duty, the minute they check in, all their--their hotel costs
on duty are paid for, 100 percent, by the company. They also
receive a per diem expense to cover travel costs. It's the
same, mainline and regional. There's no distinction between the
way those policies are done between the major airlines and the
regional airlines.
Senator Klobuchar. Anyone else have something to add on
that?
Captain Prater. Well, I would say there is a fair amount of
difference. But, I think where you're going is, is the pilot
getting adequate rest, and a place to get that adequate rest,
before he or she begins her first trip out of whatever domicile
they've been assigned to? And the answer, quite simply, is, no,
they're not provided by the airlines.
Senator Klobuchar. Because that is--so, what they do is,
they fly to start their first trip, from somewhere, and there
may not be a way for them to get reimbursed for flight--for a
hotel then, because it's not in between flights. Is that----
Captain Prater. That's----
Senator Klobuchar.--right?
Captain Prater.--correct.
Senator Klobuchar. And was that the case here, do we know,
with the Colgan flight? Because I know she was spending the day
in the airport----
Captain Prater. I seriously doubt whether there is--in
fact, it was--I can say, without a doubt, they were not given a
place to get adequate rest, or provided for or compensated for
a hotel room so that they could get adequate rest.
Senator Klobuchar. OK. We heard, last week, that regional
pilots are more likely to become tired and fatigued by flying,
because they are flying more flights per day, rather than one
long flight. And I'm sure that could happen with major
carriers, too. And, in other words, they are doing more
takeoffs and landings in one day, and they may be, actually,
more prone to fatigue. Do you think that that's true? Anyone
want to take that on?
Captain Prater. Having spent more time fatigued than
anybody else up here at the panel, I can say that there are a
lot of different ways of lowering your readiness level, if you
will. The fatigue of a 16-hour flight is different, but just as
important as a pilot who's flying seven legs--seven different
landings and takeoffs in the middle of the winter weather or
summer weather. It is different, but to all adds to the same
place, that a tired or fatigued pilot is not at the peak of his
or her performance.
Senator Klobuchar. And I----
Mr. Cohen. Senator----
Senator Klobuchar. Go ahead, Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. The issue of fatigue is a very serious one and
why it is right at the top of our Strategic Safety Initiative.
There's a lot of new science out there on fatigue, and the
possibility of exploring fatigue testing. Let's start gathering
the data, let's start testing people for fatigue. We have the
ability to do that now, but we don't, currently. And we would
strongly urge it.
Senator Klobuchar. Well, I think that we know. I mean, I've
read enough sleep studies to know that if people have--don't
have enough sleep, I don't--I mean, I'm not at all disputing
that testing is good and finding more details about long
flight, short flights, is good. But, the bottom line is, if
they don't have enough sleep, because they're sitting there in
an airport, and they haven't slept the night before, because
they were flying from far away and they don't have enough money
to pay for a hotel room, then I think you're going to have a
problem. So, that's why I was glad that Administrator Babbitt,
this past Monday, said he's going to propose a new rule on
pilot rest requirements, which I think would be very helpful.
I wanted to talk briefly about the de-icing issues, because
that was clearly an issue here. I think--what was it, that the
first officer told the pilot, in this crash, ``I've never seen
icing conditions. I've never de-iced. I've never experienced
any of that.'' And this was clearly a factor in the crash.
Are regional aircraft more susceptible to problems
associated with icing than some of the larger aircraft? Is it
because of where they're flying or at what levels they're
flying? Any thoughts on that?
Captain Prater. Certainly, some of the airplanes that fly
in the lower levels, the, if you will, surface to 18-20,000
feet, are more likely to pick up--and spend a lot of time at
that altitude--will pick up more icing. Certain turboprops are
more susceptible to it, even though I believe that most of them
are more than adequate to handle those conditions. But, you
can't stay in it forever. And the fact that the first officer--
you know, I--this will sound strange, but there has been such a
focus on some sterile cockpit violations--I am relieved that we
know that that first officer in that airplane said, ``I've
never seen icing like this before,'' because we've all learned
something that's just as apparent as whether it's the CVR--we
have learned something. She felt she wasn't prepared.
Senator Klobuchar. So, what you're saying is, you can have
violations, things go wrong, but that she was--that she said
this is such an indication that there are problems in training
that you really don't need anything more than that.
Captain Prater. That, plus sharing information between
pilots, knowing what's going on. We talk regularly so that we
know that you know what I'm thinking. You have to voice some of
the things that are going on in your head so that your first
officer or your captain knows what you're doing or what you're
planning to do. That is not a violation of sterile cockpit.
That actually leads us to knowing what's going on between the
two, the dynamic.
Senator Klobuchar. What do you think--maybe someone else
can answer this--could be done to train our regional pilots
efficiently on how to fly in icing conditions? Anyone want to
take that?
Mr. Cohen?
Mr. Cohen. Senator, we are strongly supportive, the
training programs at our airlines are very robust. We are
working with the FAA, our mainline partners, our employees, to
make them as robust as they possibly can be. All--more training
is always good.
Senator Klobuchar. OK.
Mr. Maurer?
Mr. Maurer. I guess what I would comment on is, we learned,
in the NTSB hearings, that there is software available to take
inexperienced pilots and put them with experienced pilots. So,
a mentoring program of some sort, where you've got an
experienced pilot who has flown in ice, who has seen it, who
understands it, knows what to do--put an inexperienced pilot
with them, and perhaps we might have a better outcome. I mean,
that's a hands-on way of learning about these things. There's
only so much that can be done in a simulator. Let's face it.
Senator Klobuchar. I would think icing would be harder
condition to simulate than----
Mr. Maurer. Right.
Senator Klobuchar.--some of the--maybe I'm naive about it,
but it seems like it would be.
Mr. Maurer. And, along that line, I just wanted to make one
other comment. The regional airlines typically are flying less
than 2-hour-type flights, et cetera--you mentioned it--more
takeoffs, more landings. As I've interviewed and talked to
pilots, I mean, this is the critical time of flight, taking off
and landing. Where, then, should we have the best skill? And
I'm not trying to talk anything away from the majors, but
should we not have the best pilots, the most skilled pilots,
flying these short trips? Particularly if you're flying in
these altitudes----
Senator Klobuchar. That are more----
Mr. Maurer.--where----
Senator Klobuchar.--difficult----
Mr. Maurer.--are more susceptible to ice----
Senator Klobuchar. Interesting.
Mr. Maurer.--which--that's another issue that--you know,
pilots don't like to fly in it, but they have to.
Senator Klobuchar. Right.
OK, thank you very much.
Senator Dorgan. Senator McCaskill?
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to talk a little bit about maintenance. I have
worked on this issue since I came to the Senate, on foreign
repair stations. And I'm sure you all are aware that the IG has
determined that regional carriers are depending on outsourcing
maintenance, to a large extent. And my question to you, Mr.
Cohen, is, How much of the outsourced maintenance--I believe
the IG said that 50 percent of the regional airlines'
maintenance is being outsourced--what percentage of that
outsourced maintenance work is going to FAA-certified repair
stations?
Mr. Cohen. I'm glad you asked that question, Senator,
because it's a good opportunity to clarify some things in that
IG report that I think the hearing in the other body didn't
quite get straight.
First of all, 100 percent of all the maintenance is being
done in an FAA-certified maintenance operation. Otherwise, it
wouldn't be allowed to fly.
Number two, to augment the IG study regional airlines
outsource less maintenance overseas than even the mainline
carriers do. Virtually all of the maintenance by the regional
airline members is done here in this country, either by
themselves or at their own FAA-certified maintenance operation
here in the United States, including our manufacturers, which
have locations in the United States--in Miami, in Tennessee,
and in West Virginia.
So, I hope--that may be a long way of answering your
question, but I----
Senator McCaskill. No.
Mr. Cohen. But----
Senator McCaskill. No. But, I'm interested in what you
said, though, because I'm sure you're aware that it is
perfectly acceptable to the FAA for the repair work to be done
in noncertified stations. You--I mean, you're aware of that,
right? But, you're maintaining, today, that all of the
maintenance work is being done--because we--this is one of the
problems we have right now, is that a repair station does not
have to be certified by the FAA in order for it to be utilized
by either the commercial carriers or the regional carriers. Are
you aware of that?
Mr. Cohen. Senator, again, it's my understanding, on the
maintenance, that the heavy maintenance, here, that we're
talking about the C&D checks, are conducted by what I'm
assuming are FAA-certified facilities.
Senator McCaskill. If you would check that, because I----
Mr. Cohen. I will----
Senator McCaskill.--think--I would be surprised if that
were the fact.
Mr. Cohen. I will----
Senator McCaskill. I mean, we've done a fair amount of work
on this issue, and there are a large number of--not just ``kick
the tires,'' but serious and substantial maintenance and repair
work that is being done by noncertified repair stations, both
foreign and domestic. And so, I would certainly appreciate you
following up on that, because one of the issues, of course, is,
why do we have certified repair stations if people aren't
required to use them? And that's, in fact, what the legislation
that Senator Specter and I have introduced would require you to
use, the certified repair stations. As I said to FAA a couple
of different times in this room, I assume getting one certified
is a good thing. Well, if it's a good thing, why aren't we
requiring people to use them? And if it's not a good thing, why
are we spending taxpayer money supporting them? It doesn't make
sense to me, just using good, old-fashioned common sense, that
we would go through a certification process and then not
require it.
So, if you would get back to me, I would really appreciate
it. Because the FAA does not have good data on this. They will
admit they do not know how much of the maintenance is being
done at certified versus noncertified repair stations.
Mr. Cohen. Senator, we'll get you all the information.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
And, Mr. May, same question to you, for the national
carriers. Can you give me any kind of figure as to what
percentage of the maintenance is being done in certified versus
noncertified repair stations?
Mr. May. I do not have that number at hand, but I would be
happy to provide it to you, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific. And while you're
at it, Mr. Cohen has represented that none of this is being
outsourced beyond the United States, in terms of the regional
carriers. I am confident it is being outsourced beyond the
United States for the large commercial carriers.
Mr. May. That is----
Senator McCaskill. And do you have--does your association
have a number of what percentage of that maintenance is being
outsourced?
Mr. May. I don't--I'm sure we have the answer to that. I
don't happen to have it with me. I'd be happy to provide it
for----
Senator McCaskill. If you have it, that would be terrific.
It has been a very difficult amount--the information is
difficult to come by from the FAA. They have not, I don't
think, prioritized looking at this issue, and I don't think the
American flying public realizes to what extent maintenance has
been outsourced in an effort to cut costs. And what--one of the
problems is that, in many of these places, there's not even
alcohol and drug testing, and it seems weird to me that we have
domestic certified repair stations, and, because we don't have
as many of them anymore because so many have been outsourced,
there are FAA inspectors that hang out there, that are really
looking over the shoulder.
And then you travel to Indonesia, and if there is ever an
FAA inspector that shows up--by the way, the United States pays
for that, the taxpayers pay the costs of the FAA inspector to
go look at foreign repair stations, not the airlines. So, the
taxpayers are actually underwriting this outsourcing. They
aren't even doing drug and alcohol tests. And, as we have
talked about in this hearing before, there are actually
locations that have been on the State Department's Watch List
for terrorist activity, where there have been repair stations
that have been utilized.
So, if you would get back to us with whatever information
your associations have on this information, I think it will be
helpful as we move forward, trying to get these important
reforms done in the area of maintenance and repair.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dorgan. Senator McCaskill, thank you very much.
We will attempt to get all of that information. I'm well
familiar with the issue of the inspections and the repair
stations. I mean, we have--in fact, I've written about one of
the carriers that flies an empty Airbus 320 to El Salvador for
repair, and then flies an empty 320 back to the United States
after having had it repaired in El Salvador, or inspected or
maintained in--my guess is, that's probably another issue of
dollars and cents.
And let me go back to just a moment ago, on icing. I just
pulled the transcript again of this. This copilot said, ``I've
never seen icing conditions. I've never de-iced. I've never de-
iced. I've never experienced any of that. I don't want to have
to experience that and make those kind of calls. You know, I
freaked out. I'd have seen this much ice and thought, `Oh, my
gosh, we're going to crash.' ''
The actual transcript is of a copilot that appears to me to
have had minimum training in icing conditions.
Now, the reason I mention this is because the training
issue has been on the table, here. What kind of training does
someone have in that cockpit to fly in the conditions into
which that airplane is headed? If they're flying to Buffalo,
New York, in the winter, one would expect you would encounter
icing conditions of some sort.
I come from the State of North Dakota. I learned to fly,
many, many years ago, and, you know, I've been on airplanes,
small airplanes, with a lot of buildup on the wings, and
watching it with flashlights. So, I--you know, I've flown in a
lot of icing, with pilots and with others.
And so, I think it's an important question. How much
training exists before someone is put in a cockpit for the
specific kind of conditions they are likely to encounter?
I want to ask about this issue of the time in an airplane,
because I think that's also important. In the Buffalo crash, we
were told that that carrier had had training. They trained
their pilots on the stick-shaker, but not the stick-pusher. And
so, if that's the case, I guess the first question of mine is,
If you're in a cockpit with a device called a ``stick-pusher,''
which is going to be a device that is going to automatically
move you toward some sort of safety function in a--in that
flight, and have never had experience with it, or not been
trained in it, is that a--isn't that a significant deficiency?
And how could that happen?
Captain Prater, can you tell us?
Captain Prater. I'd be glad to, Senator.
First of all, every airplane has different characteristic,
different safety features, and pilots should be trained to the
proficiency in each and every one of those.
I cannot testify toward the conditions on the training of
this individual airman or crew, but I can say, more generally,
is that there is a huge cost to training airmen, so it does
come down to dollars and cents.
I have severe concerns that the regional industry, who
looks at their pilots as, if you will, part-time help, training
help, may not want to spend as much money making sure they're
aware of each and every facet. Training has been shortened over
my three decades as an airline pilot. I think we need to look
at it very seriously and say, Have we reduced it to below what
should be the standards?
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Cohen?
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, in defense of the training
programs at our regional airlines--is the Committee--this
committee was provided with very detailed information about the
training programs, which are every bit as robust. One of the
things we talked about at Monday's Call to Action was to look
at all of these type of training issues that have been laid on
the table, certainly today and over the last several weeks, and
to look at it, whether it's environmental--you know, additional
training in environment, additional training on whatever--and
that, in all my years in the airline industry--and I've been in
it since 1971--I have never seen, ever seen, a decision by any
airline regarding safety that--you know, that would jeopardize
safety because of cost. I just want to lay that on----
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Cohen, Senator Johanns was making the
point, and a perfectly reasonable point, that if we're flying
through very difficult economic conditions, if regional
carriers are smaller companies having substantial difficulty,
isn't it likely that you have substantially less experience in
that airplane, you're paying lower salaries, and so on? And
does that have an impact on the capability of that airplane to
fly through difficult circumstances?
Look, the airline industry has created, for the most part
in this country, two different systems. One is a hub-and-spoke
system, and the other is flying between city pairs, with some
localized carriers.
In the hub-and-spoke system, in the old days, Northwest
Airlines, which served my State, would fly its jet carriers
into that city, one of four cities in North Dakota, with 727s,
had a pilot, a copilot, and a flight engineer. And I assume
that the pilots that bid on those routes were probably pilots
with less time in the company than somebody that bid on a San
Francisco to Narita route. So, I understand that, you know, the
longer routes and the bigger planes, and so on, are going to
get the pilots with more experience. But, it just seems to me,
the way this hub-and-spoke system has morphed is that the
network carriers have decided, ``You know what, we're going to
move a lot of these spokes off onto a commuter carrier, and
that commuter carrier is going to be out there with smaller
planes, in most cases. It's going to cost us less, although
they're going to wear our name on the fuselage, but it's going
to cost us a lot less, because, frankly, it can be a carrier
that we have, perhaps 100 percent ownership of, or substantial
ownership of, but not the same contracts we have.'' So, it will
have pilots with less experience that they can hire for an
entry level of $18,000 a year.
I--it seems to me, just inevitably, that you do you have,
then--again, without demeaning a pilot or a pilot's ability--
you do have the potential of a separate standard of capability.
I'm not talking about training to safety minimum standard, I'm
just talking about separate standard of capability.
And so, the major question that we started with today is,
the FAA said, in the mid-1990s, one standard. And passengers
that get on an airplane, when they walk through that airplane
door, should expect the same standard on the cockpit of a
commuter carrier or a network carrier.
The--I think Mr. Prater says he believes that the
enforcement of that standard is not as rigorous as passengers
would expect or as we would expect.
Mr. May, what's your impression of that?
Mr. May. Mr. Chairman, we all adhere to FAR Part 121, which
is the single standard that was established in 1995. I think
the reality is that mainline carriers more regularly far exceed
that standard in Part 121 than our regional partners do. We
have, in--with virtually no exceptions--FOQA programs, ASAP
programs, more robust training, et cetera. And, as part of the
recommendations that we have made before you today, and in the
House last week, and at the FAA, we would suggest that many of
those programs be instituted at the regional level for our
partners.
Senator Dorgan. But, let me ask you--I mean, the fact is,
it is your name--that is, the name of your companies that you
represent--on the fuselage of these airplanes.
Mr. May. That is correct.
Senator Dorgan. And, in many cases, you own the regional
carrier, or own substantial portions of equity in the regional
carrier. So, it would seem to me that it would be in the
interest of the network carriers to require the things that you
have recommended today prior to these recommendations.
Mr. May. I understand that thought, Senator. There was
actually a proposal made by NTSB, back in about 1994, when this
whole debate came to pass and when Part 121 was created and
putting the regionals under Part 121, to have the mainline
carriers be the enforcement of Part 121 for their regional
partners. That was specifically rejected by the Congress and
the FAA, because they wanted to have a single level of
enforcement, as well as a single level of achievement. And I
think that decision was the correct one at the time, and I
think it remains correct, that the FAA needs to be the
principal enforcer. We have openly said, here today, and will
continue to say, if we need to change those standards and
upgrade them, then that is something that we ought to look at
doing. By the same token, I think the enforcement needs to rest
with the FAA.
Senator Dorgan. Yes. Well, you know, I'd--was just in
another committee earlier this morning and described a Federal
agency that was willfully blind and cheerfully ignorant for
about 10 years. And I'm--I don't ascribe that to the FAA,
except to say that I've had a bellyful of enforcement
requirements by certain agencies that have completely neglected
the opportunity or the requirement to do so.
The FAA, as we said to Randy Babbitt, the new
administrator, last week, we need new diligence here, a new
level of interest in making certain that we have one standard,
that passengers can rely on one standard when they board an
airplane. And I think that's going to require some effort by
the FAA, and may require some effort by this Committee.
Senator Rockefeller and Senator Hutchison, myself, Senator
DeMint, and others, are going to be working on--I'll be putting
together, along with my colleagues, the FAA Reauthorization
Act. We're right in the middle of that process now, which will
include modernization of the air traffic control system and
many other things, all of which have to do with safety. And so,
we're going to--I would say, to those that have raised the
questions this morning about pilots' records and so on, my
first expectation is that Administrator Babbitt is going to
move quickly to address some of those issues, but we will
introduce legislation to be certain that it is done the right
way, as well.
So, Senator Begich, did you wish to make any other
comments?
Senator Begich. No, just thank you for the opportunity.
Senator Dorgan. Yes, I--let me thank the witnesses for
being here.
Again, we'll have one additional hearing, at some point,
with the airline companies themselves. We appreciate, Mr. May
and Mr. Cohen, your representation of them here at this
hearing. And, Captain----
Well, there is one other question I've not asked. And I--I
know there's a term of art called ``crew rest,'' vis-a-vis
fatigue, and we've talked a lot about fatigue today, and I
think one of the Senators raised the issue of crew rest. But, I
have been on plenty of airplanes, plenty of airplanes that fly
in here late because of storms and so on, and we land at
midnight at Washington National. And I know that there's a
requirement for a certain number of hours of rest. But, I've
sat with pilots and walked out of the plane with pilots who
say, ``Well, I've got to be back here at X hour. That meets the
test of the number of hours I have for rest. But, by the time I
get to the hotel, by the time I check in, by the time I get to
bed, I'm going to have probably 4 hours of sleep tonight.''
That is a crew-rest issue. And that is a regulatory issue. And
I don't want people to think that only--that fatigue is the
only issue here. I think there are other issues with respect to
crew rest that we want to talk about as we go forward.
Captain Prater. Yes, sir. I mean, it leads to the fatigue
of that next day. If you're not allowed adequate time to
recuperate from the up to 16-hour duty day that you had the day
before, and you're only away from the airplane for 8 hours, 8
and a half hours, it's not enough. We need to ensure that the
pilots are getting at least an adequate opportunity, behind the
hotel door, to get 8 hours of rest.
Senator Dorgan. One thing is certain about this country, we
are all pretty mobile, we rely on a transportation system that
is modern and safe and reliable. And no insignificant part of
that is the commercial airline industry. It's very important to
our country, very important to all regions of our country. And
we want it to be made as safe as is possible.
I think the tragic crash in Buffalo, New York, has
activated a lot of interest in asking questions. Did we drift
along, here, and allow the creation of a couple of different
standards in training, and so on, on enforcement? We'll know
more about the answer to that as more disclosures come from the
NTSB and so on. And we're learning some from last week's
hearing and this week's hearing. And for that, we're indebted
to the people who are witnesses.
And, Mr. Maurer, we are especially indebted to you and the
families who have decided to, in the name of those you loved,
find a way to make a difference and make certain that others do
not experience the same fate.
So, we appreciate all four of you being here.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
June 12, 2009, Newnan, GA
Senator Byron L. Dorgan--Chairman
Senate Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Dorgan,
In a June 10, 2009 e-mail from your staffer Mr. Rich Swayze to me,
it was requested that I forward to your office an affidavit concerning
commercial aviation safety issues pertaining to your upcoming June 17th
hearing.
I have enclosed this affidavit for perusal by your subcommittee
members in hopes that it will be included in congressional records for
your upcoming hearing, since I was previously advised that I would not
be permitted to testify before your committee in open or closed
session, nor would any other whistle blowing airline pilots from other
airlines that I am presently in contact with through our
`Whistleblowing Airline Employees Association.'
As mentioned before, I am currently a federally unprotected whistle
blower whose rights as such have been denied on multiple counts. I am
merely asking my government to perform their duties in protecting my
rights as such, given where I am in matters at present.
If this information, as well as previously submitted correspondence
and information is excluded from congressional records associated with
this hearing, it is respectfully requested that the reason(s) why be
addressed to me by separate correspondence from your staff. A certified
copy of this correspondence is forthcoming to your office via United
Parcel Service.
Your thoughtful consideration is greatly appreciated.
Very respectfully submitted,
Dan Hanley,
Former United Airlines B-777 Captain.
Encl: My affidavit dated June 12, 2009
______
Affidavit of Daniel W. Hanley for Inclusion as Part of Public
Congressional Record for Hearing Conducted by Senate Aviation
Operations, Safety, and Security Subcommittee Chairman Senator Byron
Dorgan of June 17, 2009
I, Daniel W. Hanley, being first duly sworn, on oath, states as
follows:
1. I am of legal age and competent. This affidavit is made on my
personal knowledge of all matters set forth and referenced herein. If
sworn and called as a witness in this case, I could, and I would,
testify competently as to each fact set forth and incorporated herein
by reference.
2. The alleged facts supported with evidence are true and correct
to the best of my personal knowledge of the facts, evidence,
information and belief.
3. On June 9, 2009 at 11 a.m., I was advised by Mr. Rich Swayze, a
staff member on the Senate Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security
Subcommittee, that I would not be permitted to testify in either open
or closed session of said committee, hence this affidavit is being
provided for inclusion as part of public congressional record for this
hearing.
4. I am of information and belief that in October 2003, I was
ushered through the United Airlines Employee Assistance Program (EAP)
at United Airlines directly as a result of my submission of federally-
mandated Aviation Safety Awareness Reports which, among other issues,
addressed concerns regarding crew fatigue, reckless scheduling of
aircrews, aircrew morale issues, and alleged stonewalling of
communication processes within the company, that included the Federal
Aviation Administration Principle Operation Inspector.
5. I currently possess documentation, mental health records, prior
military flight and health records, and availability of credible
witnesses in support of what I state herein. I allege that, in 35-years
of flying civil, naval, and commercial jet aircraft, I have never
failed a check ride, flight physical, or any psychological screening
and have an untarnished record with no flight violations. I estimate to
have flown over 20,000 flight hours in numerous civilian and naval
aircraft including the P-3 Orion, as well as the B-737, B-727, A-320,
B-757/767, and B-777 commercial jet aircraft at United Airlines.
6. My U.S. Navy service record is available on request, which
demonstrates that I consistently ranked in the top 1 percent of my peer
group throughout my 10 years as a Naval Officer and aviator, and was
recommended for accelerated promotion on all but one or two officer
evaluation reports in 10 years. In 1978, I was selected for the
Operations Research Program at the Naval Postgraduate School at
Monterey, California and was nominated for the Navy Weapon System
Acquisition Management Program (WSAM), but declined these tempting
assignments to pursue a career in commercial aviation.
7. Upon graduation from Primary Flight Training at NAS Saufley
Field in Pensacola, Florida in 1973 while flying the T-34B, I was
selected as `Student of the Week' out of 228 graduating students. Upon
graduation from Advanced Flight Training at NAS Corpus Christi, Texas
flying the TS-2A Tracker, I was selected as `Student of the Month'.
Upon graduating from Replacement Air Group Training Squadron flying the
P-3 Orion, I was ranked number one in my class. In my fleet squadron, I
became the youngest and only Lt (jg) Plane Commander/Mission Commander
well in advance of schedule and of that of my contemporaries.
Additionally, I was the youngest and junior ranked instructor pilot in
the squadron, as well as a NATOPS Safety Instructor and maintenance
functional check pilot. Additionally, I served as a P-3 Subject Matter
Expert in development of a training syllabus for fleet wide use for the
P-3C Update II Project. In 1984, I received a Navy Achievement Medal
serving as Operations Officer while attached to Patrol Squadron Sixty
at NAS Glenview, Illinois.
8. I was on the Dean's List at Southern Illinois University and
graduated in 1973 with a Bachelor of Science in Applied Mathematics.
Upon expulsion as a United Airlines B-777 Captain, during the time-
frame 2004-2006, I attended Georgia State University full-time while
majoring in Psychology and World Religious Studies and maintained a
near straight-A average. I am a few hours short of receipt of a
Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology, and have reenrolled for the fall
2009 semester for continuance of my education.
9. The Air Line Pilots Association motto is ``Schedule with
Safety''. I allege, based on my own perceptions and personal
experiences, as well as inputs received from many other aircrew members
at United Airlines in 2003, that United Airlines Flight Operations
management personnel engaged in a crew scheduling process during
bankruptcy that may have endangered the lives of the traveling public,
due to crew fatigue, poor morale, inadequate and unconcerned management
leadership, massive problematic downgrade of pilots, and many other
issues. These situations were precipitated by the alleged leveraged
position of management in making outrageous concession demands of
employees in an effort to receive an ATSB loan guarantee that was never
granted, and which propelled United Airlines into Chapter 11
bankruptcy. It was these and other legal, financial, and political
pressures that greatly diminished the ability of ALPA to adequately
address safety issues and legally support those pilots who did via
appropriate Federal communicative processes. This perception was gained
by me from actual statements made at the time by both my JFK Chief
Pilot, ALPA council chairman, and others.
10. I allege that commercial aviation safety must necessarily be
maintained in a vacuum without external financial, legal, and political
pressures and influences exerted on aircrew members wishing to report
known safety deficiencies for fear of undue recriminations.
11. The first sentences of the Air Line Pilots Association Code of
Ethics are thus stated:
AN AIRLINE PILOT will keep uppermost in his mind that the
safety, comfort, and well-being of the passengers who entrust
their lives to him are his first and greatest responsibility.
He will never permit external pressures or personal
desires to influence his judgment, nor will he knowingly do
anything that could jeopardize flight safety.
He will remember that an act of omission can be as
hazardous as a deliberate act of commission, and he will
not neglect any detail that contributes to the safety of
flight, or perform any operation in a careless or reckless
manner.
Consistent with flight safety, he will at all times
operate his aircraft in manner that will contribute to the
comfort, peace of mind, and well-being of his passengers,
instilling trust in him and the airline he represents.
Once he has discharged his primary responsibility for the
safety and comfort of his passengers, he will remember that
they depend upon him to do all that is possible to deliver
them to their destination at the scheduled time.
If a disaster should strike, he will take whatever action
he deems necessary to protect the lives of his crew and his
passengers.
12. The Federal Aviation Administration website states:
Our Mission
Our continuing mission is to provide the safest, most efficient
aerospace system in the world.
Our Vision
We continue to improve safety and efficiency of flight. We are
responsive to our customers and are accountable to the taxpayer
and the flying public.
Our Values
Safety is our passion. We are the world leaders in
aerospace safety.
Quality is our trademark. We serve our stakeholders, our
customers, and each other.
Integrity is our character. We do the right thing, even
when no one is looking.
People are our strength. We treat people as we want to be
treated.
13. I allege that beginning in 2002 until July 12, 2003 when I
wrote my first formal letter of complaint to Captain Paul Whiteford,
United ALPA MEC Chairman, I had countless face-to-face and phone
conversations and e-mail exchanges with both United flight management
and ALPA representatives regarding a whole host of safety concerns,
many of which had been expressed to me by other aircrew members, but
were not being adequately addressed by company management personnel. It
must be emphasized that throughout this ordeal that ended in December
2003, I was attempting to be most cautious not to draw media attention
or initiate litigation of any sort, as I feared that such actions might
compromise the success of United's emergence from bankruptcy, since the
company was allegedly teetering on the brink of Chapter 7 liquidation.
14. I further allege that my actions and conduct were commensurate
with the stated Air Line Pilots Association motto and Code of Ethics,
in consonance with the Federal Aviation Administration Mission
statement, and was in keeping with the highest standards of United
Airlines stated number one priority of safety. I genuinely believed
that what I was doing was in keeping with every legal, moral, and
ethical principle engrained in me as a pilot since I first took flight
in a Cessna-150 in 1968 and carried throughout my entire Naval flying
experiences, and through my career at United Airlines. I honestly
believed that I would have the full support of ALPA and the FAA since I
was sustaining the legal, moral, and ethical high ground in reporting
this to United Airlines management and the FAA Principle Operation
Inspector assigned to the airline.
15. On the ground while at the gate, aircraft security is
coordinated by the captain and the ground security coordinator with the
final decision made by the captain regarding continuance of a flight.
Shortly after 9/11, United Airlines senior management authorized flight
crew members, who felt they were at risk due to security concerns, to
deplane with pay protection for that segment of their schedule. In
2003, due to a security breach on my flight at the gate in London,
wherein the flight attendants perhaps averted a north Atlantic
diversion due to advisement to me of a passenger condition, I happened
to notice flight attendant supervisors who had boarded the plane that
was being inspected without passengers onboard that were badgering my
cabin crew for allegedly delaying the flight. I asked them to step
aside so that I could explain just how helpful this crew was to me in
my making the decision to have the aircraft inspected (most of the
passengers told me that if this passenger remained on board, they
weren't going to take the flight). I then asked them a hypothetical
question regarding what their actions would be if both I and the ground
security coordinator were agreeable to taking the flight but had flight
attendants who still experienced consternation and wanted to deplane.
They responded that they would give the flight attendant in question a
direct order to take the flight and, if she refused, she would be
terminated from employment at United Airlines. I asked them both if
this was stated United Airlines upper-management policy, and they both
agreed that it was. Believing that this might just be a local London
base policy, I queried both the Newark and JFK in-flight offices and
actually saw the intimidating policy in writing. A Newark-based in-
flight supervisor wrote a stinging letter to my JFK Chief Pilot just
because I asked to see this policy in writing, which I felt impinged on
the CLR concepts that include effective cockpit-cabin communications.
16. To keep this matter in house, I filed a Captain's Report to
address my concerns, as the flight attendants serve as the eyes and
ears in the back of the cabin since the promised TV cameras were never
installed. A week or so later, I received a call from an ALPA safety
representative telling me that management and ALPA had reviewed my
report, and although they agreed with what I stated, felt that ALPA was
somewhat restricted due to the fact that United Airlines was in the
midst of attempting to receive post-9/11 ATSB loan moneys.
Paraphrasing, he remarked, ``C'mon Dan, be a team player . . . we're in
bankruptcy and need this loan. Why don't you just drop this issue?
Management thinks that you're just being a big-mouthed whistleblower.
How do you want me to dispose of this report?'' I told him what he
could do with the report, but only after querying him as to where ALPA
was drawing the distinction between aviation safety and airline
financial survival concerns. I emphasized to him that I wasn't willing
to compromise my principles as a captain with regard to safety issues
in spite of the financial condition of United Airlines and the
unfavorable negotiating position that ALPA found itself in at present.
Subsequent discussions with numerous chief pilots and ALPA officials
indicated to me that the entire bankruptcy process was impinging on
aviation safety issues, hence, after repeated stonewalls of all issues,
I intended to write CEO Glenn Tilton a letter addressing this concern.
The remaining tragic conclusion of my aviation career may be found in
the previously submitted affidavit.
17. Since 2006, I have been contacted by numerous airline pilots
from all carriers who have shared their similar stories with me.
Additionally, other pilots who have not personally had such
experiences, but are knowledgeable of the EAP process for removing
`dissident' pilots have provided much information and insight and are
willing to provide sworn testimony.
18. In light of ASAP program cancellations last year at Delta,
UsAir, and American, with the current pending litigation hanging over
the head of United pilots, coupled with the exposure of whistleblower
suppression at Colgan Air that could have possibly prevented that air
disaster, other pilots and myself feel morally and ethically compelled
to speak out. We already have and will continue to do so until this
problem is rectified by the Department of Transportation and the
Federal Aviation Administration.
19. I could have turned my back on aviation and walked away from
all of these concerns 5 years ago, but my conscience would not allow
it. I may have been retired from the left seat in 2003, but I will
always be a captain in my heart and in my soul, just as I will always
be a Naval Aviator. It does count just how many times an airline pilot
walks down the jet way with regard to airline safety. Poor pay and
working conditions do very much contribute to poor morale, which also
adds stress and distraction into the safety equation, which hasn't been
addressed by the Transportation subcommittee.
20. While concerns are being expressed regarding the impact of
commuting on airline safety, please be advised that it has come to my
attention that most first officers at the trunk carriers are working
full-time outside the airline as their primary source of income. Many
have told me that once they get their business established, that they
are going to resign from their airline jobs, as the continued hassle is
no longer worth it. Additionally, many line captains that I've talked
to are working absolute minimum hours to keep the job since their
pensions were stolen from them in bankruptcy. Apathy and poor morale in
the airline industry amongst pilots is a cancer to safety more
insidious than most of the issues addressed by the committee to date.
21. For airline CEOs who recently stated that pilot pay has no
impact on the level of safety in flight operations, I would suggest
that they try living on $25,000 for a year without access to any other
financial assets, and see what `happy campers' and just how effective
and focused they are at their jobs.
22. Further affiant sayeth naught.
DANIEL W. HANLEY
SWORN before me on
This day of June 2009
_____________________
NOTARY PUBLIC
Other documents submitted by Mr. Hanley may be found at http://
airline-whistleblower.blogspot.com/.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
James C. May
Question 1. How much of the maintenance work that your member
companies outsource is performed at part 145 certificated repair
stations, and how much is performed elsewhere?
Question 2. How much of your member companies' outsourced
maintenance work is performed abroad? Of the work performed abroad, how
much is done at part 145 certificated repair stations, and how much is
done by entities other than part 145 repair stations?
Question 3. How do your member companies determine when to
outsource maintenance and where to send that maintenance work once they
have decided to outsource? Accounting for differences in the type of
work outsourced, how much more does it cost to send work to a part 145
certificated repair station than to a non-certificated facility? How
much less does it cost to send work to a part 145 certificated repair
station located abroad? How much less to send the work to non-
certificated facility abroad?
Question 4. How do your members verify the quality of work
performed at non-certificated facilities?
Answer. Based upon data collected by the Department of
Transportation's Research and Innovative Technology Administration
(RITA) Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), in 2008, thirty-eight
percent of total aircraft maintenance expenditures by airline members
of the Air Transport Association (ATA) went to third party maintenance
providers.
That figure, alone, does not provide true insight to this complex
subject. The level of contract maintenance utilized by individual
airlines varies significantly based on factors such as the type--or
types--of aircraft used, the geographic region of operations, business
philosophies, labor agreement limitations, internal cost structures,
and commercial relationships with airframe, engine and component
manufacturers. Without exception, all airlines rely to some extent on
contract maintenance providers. Airlines are by no means unique in this
regard. For example: trains, buses and cruise ships are predominantly
maintained by companies other than those who operate them; the U.S.
Department of Defense contracts with private companies for the
maintenance of its aircraft, in many cases with the same companies
utilized by commercial airlines.
Although the majority of narrow-body aircraft maintenance work
contracted for in the past few years has stayed within North America--
maintenance performed outside North America is limited primarily to
wide-body which routinely transit locations abroad--it is worth noting
that the work must always be performed in accordance with the U.S. air
carrier's maintenance program and the applicable portions of its
required manual--regardless of location.
Under existing FAA regulations, all repair stations are treated as
extensions of the air carrier's maintenance organization, air carriers
cannot delegate the responsibility for the airworthiness of their
aircraft and they are required to provide a level of oversight to
ensure the standards are met.
While some view maintenance contracting as undermining safety, the
data reflects otherwise. U.S. airlines have logged an exceptional
safety record while steadily expanding their use of contract
maintenance.
Question 5. Describe your members' programs to audit the policies
and performance of the facilities to which they send their maintenance.
How widely do these policies vary across your membership? Describe the
most rigorous audit program. Describe the least rigorous.
Answer. We're not in a position to describe our members specific
policies on auditing, we simply don't have that kind of detailed
information. Additionally, we would not characterize any of our members
as having ``more'' or ``less'' rigorous programs.
______
Response to Follow-up Written Questions Submitted by
Hon. Claire McCaskill to James C. May
Question. We would like to get more clarity from the ATA about the
following issues:
1. Neither of the witnesses addressed the second half of our first
question; namely, how much work is done at part 145 certificated repair
stations, and how much is done by entities other than part 145 repair
stations?
2. We would like both witness to better address the audit questions
(the fifth question). In particular, the following passages from the
Inspector General's report on ``Air Carriers' Outsourcing of Aircraft
Maintenance'' issued on September 30, 2008 outline concerns about
airline audits on the policies/performances of the facilities to which
they send their maintenance. We would like to get a more definitive
answer on how the airlines are addressing these issues:
``While all the carriers we visited had audit programs, we found
that these programs were not always effective. As a result, maintenance
problems either went undetected or reoccurred.
For example, at one heavy airframe repair station, all three types
of oversight failed-FAA, air carrier, and repair station. We found that
two air carrier audits and two FAA inspections (CMO and FSDO) failed to
detect significant weaknesses at this facility. These were not
discovered until another major air carrier's pre-contract award audit
found problems in the repair stations' maintenance practices, such as
not properly overseeing subcontractor maintenance. The problems
identified were so serious that repair station management stopped
operations for over a month so it could take corrective actions.''. . .
``For example, on-site personnel for two carriers we reviewed only
performed undocumented, on-the-spot inspections of work at repair
stations. As a result, the air carriers could not use the data for
trend analysis or ensure the repair station took corrective actions.''
Answer. In essence, there are two separate oversight schemes, one
regulatory and one independent, both effective in ensuring satisfaction
of applicable FAA regulations. This comprehensive, multilayered
approach to oversight ensures the highest levels of quality and
safety--regardless of who does the work or where that work is
performed.
Initial levels of protection are contained in the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) regulations which provide a basic framework to
ensure competence among those certificated to perform aircraft
maintenance (ref. 14 CFR parts 121, 145 and 65). Prior to granting this
certification, the FAA confirms that an entity or individual has
fulfilled specific regulatory requirements.
Related to that approval process, the FAA issues Operations
Specifications (OpSpecs) which adapt the general terms of applicable
regulations into the specific requirements for an individual
certificate holder (OpSpecs are as legally binding as the regulations).
Air carrier OpSpecs contain a specific section to address aircraft
maintenance, and repair station OpSpecs delineate the ratings and
limitations for the maintenance that can be performed.
Second, once certificated, air carriers and repair stations are
inspected and monitored by the FAA for verification of their continued
conformity with the rules.
Third, certificated air carriers acquire the non-delegable
responsibility for the airworthiness of the aircraft in their fleet
(see 14 CFR 121.363). Aircraft maintenance is the primary ingredient
of airworthiness, and FAA regulations contain detailed maintenance
program and manual requirements (See 14 CFR 121.365; 121.367;
121.369) which validate the related air carrier processes and
procedures. When work is sent to a repair station, it must follow the
maintenance program of the air carrier with whom it has contracted (See
14 CFR 145.205).
Fourth, air carriers conduct preliminary investigations of
potential repair station vendors which typically include verification
of repair station capabilities (OpSpecs) and a thorough review of FAA
mandated Repair Station Manuals, Quality Manuals and Training Manuals.
If that examination is satisfactory, it is normally followed by an on-
site visit to verify compliance with applicable regulations, industry
standard audit programs and adherence to the repair station's own
manuals. Some areas of investigation include:
Validation FM certificates held by persons directly in
charge of maintenance and/or those who perform maintenance
Inspection of training records of Inspectors, Technicians
and Supervisors
Examination of procedures for technical data, documentation
and maintenance record control
Examination of procedures for work processing, disposal of
scrap parts, tool calibration and handling material with a
limited shelf life
Review of repair station internal inspection and quality
programs
Review of previous inspection program results and corrective
actions
If the repair station is selected to perform maintenance for the
air carrier, similar on-site audits would be conducted on a regular
basis.
Finally, a fifth layer of oversight is provided by on-site air
carrier representatives. These individuals monitor the day to day
operations and coordinate the activities of the repair station related
to the air carrier's equipment. Final inspections, and ultimately air
carrier approval for service are also normally accomplished by these
on-site airline personnel.
[Note: Senator McCaskill does not feel the answers to any of the
above questions were sufficient.]
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
James C. May
Question. Mr. May, please share any recommendations the Air
Transport Association may have regarding flight duty time and rest time
with the committee.
Answer. Fatigue is a risk to airline safety that is taken seriously
and must be managed effectively. The Colgan Air accident, although
still under investigation by the NTSB, has prompted renewed focus on
the issue of fatigue and the associated flight/duty time regulations.
The FAA recently convened an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to
recommend changes to the current regulations and ATA members are
actively engaged in that effort. We remain convinced that any changes
to the flight/duty time regulations must be based on scientific data
and reflect operational realities.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
Roger Cohen (Submitted July 22, 2009)
Question 1. How much of the maintenance work that your member
companies outsource is performed at Part 145 certificated repair
stations, and how much is performed elsewhere?
Answer. As noted in our attached June 26 letter to Senator
McCaskill also provided to the Committee, we can assert that virtually
all of the substantial airline maintenance work on RAA member aircraft
is conducted at FAA certificated repair stations. (See Attachment A.)
Question 2. How much of your member companies' outsourced
maintenance work is performed abroad? Of the work performed abroad, how
much is done at Part 145 certificated repair stations, and how much is
done by entities other than Part 145 repair stations?
Answer. The attached chart from our June 26 letter to Sen.
McCaskill indicates the percentage of maintenance conducted by region.
(See Attachment B.)
Question 3. How do your member companies determine when to
outsource maintenance and where to send that maintenance work once they
have decided to outsource? Accounting for differences in the type of
work outsourced, how much more does it cost to send work to a Part 145
certificated repair station than to a non-certificated facility? How
much less does it cost to send work to a Part 145 certificated repair
station located abroad? How much less to send the work to non-
certificated facility abroad?
Answer. The decision to contract for maintenance is largely
dependent on the size of an airline's fleet. For example, in deciding
to contract for heavy maintenance checks (C & D checks) is the fleet
sufficient in size to retain a dedicated group of mechanics that
specialize primarily in structural inspections and that there is
sufficient work to keep them employed through the year. The same
principal applies to specialists for landing gears, engines,
electronics, etc. If an airline's fleet is not large enough to support
the inventory of parts and components to keep a specialized group of
mechanics continually employed throughout the year, an airline may
choose a specialized contract maintenance provider to accomplish the
work. As stated, virtually all heavy maintenance work (landing gear
work, engine work, electronics work) for all our members is
accomplished by FAA approved repair stations located in the U.S. and
Canada. Non-certificated work is very limited, such as when an aircraft
requires service or repair at a remote outstation where the individual
airline would not have technical staff available. In such case, the
work must be done by an FAA approved mechanic under the direction of
the airline's maintenance control staff.
We have no information comparing the cost of an FAA approved repair
station in Canada compared to one in the U.S.
Question 4. How do your members verify the quality of work
performed at non-certificated facilities?
Answer. Non-certificated work is very limited to those instances
when an aircraft may require service or repair at an outstation at
which the airline would not have technical staff available. In such an
example, the work done would be by an individual FAA approved mechanic
under the direction of the airline's maintenance control staff. The
work is accomplished in accordance with the individual airline
operator's maintenance manuals located at all airports served by our
members.
Question 5. Describe your members' programs to audit the policies
and performance of the facilities to which they send their maintenance.
How widely do these policies vary across your membership? Describe the
most rigorous audit program. Describe the least rigorous.
Answer. Audit capability and oversight practices for contract
substantial maintenance work is described within each airline's FAA-
approved Operations Specification D91. This includes an on-site
inspection audit of the contract facility, as well as audits of the
organizational structure, competency and training of personnel,
manuals, facility and ability to transfer and receive data to support
the carrier's continuing analysis and surveillance program, reliability
program and other programs required by the carrier's manual. Every
contract for substantial maintenance is approved by that carrier's FAA
principal maintenance inspector via approving the OpsSpec. Also, many
of RAA member airlines participate in CASE--the coordinating agency for
supplier evaluation in which airlines share on-site audit results among
participating operators. Since every operator is required to have an
FAA approved D91 if they are to contract for substantial maintenance,
the process is standardized among all the operators, so there are ``no
least rigorous'' programs.
______
Response to Follow-up Written Questions Submitted by
Hon. Claire McCaskill to Roger Cohen
Question. We would like to get more clarity from the RAA about the
following issues:
1. Neither of the witnesses addressed the second half of our first
question; namely, how much work is done at Part 145 certificated repair
stations, and how much is done by entities other than Part 145 repair
stations?
2. We would like both witness to better address the audit questions
(the fifth question). In particular, the following passages from the
Inspector General's report on ``Air Carriers' Outsourcing of Aircraft
Maintenance' '' issued on September 30, 2008 outline concerns about
airline audits on the policies/performances of the facilities to which
they send their maintenance. We would like to get a more definitive
answer on how the airlines are addressing these issues:
While all the carriers we visited had audit programs, we found that
these programs were not always effective. As a result, maintenance
problems either went undetected or reoccurred.
For example, at one heavy airframe repair station, all three types
of oversight failed-FAA, air carrier, and repair station. We found that
two air carrier audits and two FAA inspections (CMO and FSDO) failed to
detect significant weaknesses at this facility. These were not
discovered until another major air carrier's pre-contract award audit
found problems in the repair stations' maintenance practices, such as
not properly overseeing subcontractor maintenance. The problems
identified were so serious that repair station management stopped
operations for over a month so it could take corrective actions.''. . .
``For example, on-site personnel for two carriers we reviewed only
performed undocumented, on-the-spot inspections of work at repair
stations. As a result, the air carriers could not use the data for
trend analysis or ensure the repair station took corrective actions.''
Answer (dated August 5, 2009). This is the first time we have been
asked this specific question or even notified about it, and as you know
we replied directly to Sen McCaskill some 6 weeks ago and were not
advised of any additional information needed.
We will provide further information but will not be able to meet
the deadline of day after tomorrow. Please call me with any questions.
Thank you.
Answer (dated August 5, 2009). In response to your request
yesterday August 5, I am resending the following:
Our transmission and your ``thank you'' acknowledgment of our
response to your request from July 22.
A pdf copy of the letter faxed to Clark Porter in Sen. McCaskill's
office on June 26. (See Attachment A.)
I have highlighted in yellow the answers regarding maintenance
previously provided the Committee in our July 22 transmission. I have
added in red additional comments further to the questions provided us
yesterday. We have no record of receiving these questions prior to
yesterday, and to our knowledge, Sen. McCaskill has not contacted RAA
seeking additional information or clarification as we offered in our
June 26 letter. (See Attachment A.)
As to the questions regarding findings from the DOT IG report
citing unnamed air carriers, RAA cannot respond since the specific
carriers are not named.
Thank you and please acknowledge receipt of this message for our
records.
______
Response to Follow-up Written Question Submitted by
Hon. Claire McCaskill to Roger Cohen dated August 7, 2009
Question. We received the fax in June, and recognize that we did
not acknowledge it at the time. However, we believe the questions we
asked were legitimate and that they addressed an important issue,
namely: does the current regulato framework ensure the safety of
aircraft maintenance. It is unclear to us whether this is information
that you would prefer not to provide, cannot provide, or did not have
enough time to provide. If the latter is the case, we can petition the
committee to hold the record open.
Our specific criticism is this; throughout your statements you fail
to distinguish between certificated and non-certificated repair
stations. You state your maintenance is ``conducted by or under the
direct supervision of certificated FAA repair stations.'' Additionally,
the chart you submitted to us makes no distinction between certificated
and non-certificated repair stations. We would like to determine the
breakdown of maintenance performed at the certificated repair stations
themselves and how much is performed by Part 65 mechanics who are not
employed by a certificated repair station or other subcontractors. Part
65 mechanics are not required to have the same quality control systems,
etc. as Part 145 or Part 121 certificated stations. Subcontracting
oversight requirements for Part 121 repair stations differ
substantially from those imposed on Part 145 repair stations. If,
indeed, all maintenance is performed at Part 145 repair stations or at
Part 121 repair stations, rather than by subcontractors, please state
so clearly.
Also, we mentioned the IG report because it indicates that at least
some airlines are not doing a good job of adhering to the FAA
requirements to which you referred. Conceivably, airlines would have
different policies within the Operation Specification framework. We
were asking you to account for disparities between airlines.
Please let us know whether you could provide us with more clarity
on these issues if given more time. Thank you.
Answer (dated August 11, 2009). First and most importantly, RAA has
never and would never question the legitimacy of any question,
particularly one dealing with the airline industry's highest priority
of safety. So in response to your question ``does the current
regulatory framework ensure the safety of aircraft maintenance", our
answer is yes.
Further, please be assured that there is no information that ``we
would prefer not to provide". RAA has provided and will continue to
provide you and the Committee--to the best of our ability--the
information you request. To that end, the attached (in highlights)
responds to the questions posed in your August 7 e-mail (below).
Thank you, and please call me if you need anything additional.
Question. Please respond to our concern that you ``fail to
distinguish between certificated and non-certificated repair
stations.''
Answer. All substantial maintenance (as defined by FAA and listed
in an air carrier's Operations Specification D091) by RAA members that
is contracted to an outside vendor, is accomplished by an FAA
certificated repair station located either in the U.S. or in Canada.
Question. What do you mean when you state your maintenance is
``conducted by or under the direct supervision of certificated FAA
repair stations.''
Answer. The maintenance is accomplished by the employees of the
certificated repair station. However it is not uncommon that small (but
important) tasks may be contracted out by the repair station. Welding,
for example may be accomplished by a third party vendor but the work
would be ``under the direct supervision'' of the repair station.
Question. We would like to know how much of maintenance is
performed at the certificated repair stations themselves and how much
is performed by Part 65 mechanics who are not employed by a
certificated repair station or other subcontractors.
Answer. RAA does not possess information regarding the amount of
maintenance that is performed by Part 65 mechanics who are not employed
by a certificated repair station. However, since the overwhelming
majority of the work that Is contracted out by our members is
accomplished by Bombardier repair facilities in Bridgeport, WV and
Phoenix, AZ, and by the Embraer repair facility in Nashville, TN, we
believe this ``third party'' maintenance is less than 5 percent of the
total work accomplished. The Committee may wish to contact these
providers independently to gain further information.
Question. Is any maintenance accomplished at Part 121 repair
stations, rather than a Part 145 repair station?
Answer. The ``Part 121 repair station'' to which your are referring
to, is one in which a Part 121 operator will supervise and sign off the
work of a non certificated repair station under the air carrier's Part
121 certificate. It is a legal option for an air carrier to do so, but
as we stated in our earlier correspondence, none of our members
reported to RAA that they do this. It is our understanding that all
substantial maintenance accomplished by our members that is not done by
their own employees is contracted out only to FM approved Part 145
repair facilities.
Question. What about different policies within the Operation
Specification framework?
Answer. With some limited exceptions, we understand our members
list their substantial maintenance providers in OpsSpec D091.
[Note: Senator McCaskill does not feel the answers to any of the
above questions were sufficient.]
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Roger Cohen
Question 1. Mr. Cohen, please provide documentation on the average
starting salary for pilots and first officers of RAA airlines.
Answer. As we indicated in our attached June 26 letter to Senator
Begich also provided to the Committee, RAA does not have information
regarding starting salaries for regional airline pilots. In our letter,
we referred to the website www.airlinepilotcentral.com which has
compensation information for all airlines, regional, mainline and
cargo.
Question 2. Mr. Cohen, as you committed to during the hearing,
please provide documentation on the outcome of the most recent Safety
Directors meeting at RAA's annual conference.
Answer. In the attached June 26 letter, we also provided
information from our recent safety director meetings. (See Attachment
C.)
Question 3. Mr. Cohen, during the hearing you invited members of
the Committee to attend the next Safety Directors meeting. As soon as
it is available, please provide the Committee with the details of
upcoming Safety Directors meetings.
Answer. The agenda has not been finalized for the next RAA safety
directors' meeting which we will provide the Committee once finalized.
As noted in our June 26 letter, we have extended an invitation to
Senator Begich and we extend the same invitation to all committee
members and staff.
Question 4. Mr. Cohen, as you committed to during the hearing,
please provide any RAA salary studies and carrier salary information
(starting salary, average salary, and high salary) for the Committee.
Answer. As RAA testified on June 17, information provided us from
responding member airlines showed an average annual salary of more than
$73,000 for Captains and more than $32,000 for First Officers. (This
does not include benefits, including per diem expenses). As noted in
our attached June 26 letter, complete comparative information on all
airline pilot salaries is publicly available at
www.airlinepilotcentral.com.
______
Attachment A
Regional Airline Association
Washington, DC, June 26, 2009
Senator Claire McCaskill,
Washington, DC.
Senator Byron Dorgan,
Washington, DC.
Dear Sen. McCaskill:
On behalf of the Regional Airline Association (RAA) member
airlines, including St. Louis-based Trans States and GoJet, thank you
for the opportunity to appear before the Senate Aviation Subcommittee
on June 17, 2009.
We can confidently assert that virtually all of our substantial
aircraft maintenance is conducted by or under the direct supervision of
certificated FAA repair stations in the U.S. or approved maintenance
organizations in Canada (which are approved by the FAA under a
reciprocal agreement with Transport Canada).
If you'll indulge me a personal perspective, I have great memories
about what many once considered the finest aircraft maintenance
facility in the world--TWA's overhaul base in Kansas City. I began my
airline career based in St. Louis, but spent several days each week at
that facility. The work performed there was exemplary. More
importantly, the thousands of highly skilled professionals who worked
there, many my close friends, were the best in the business. I am just
as confident in the reliability and safety of the maintenance conducted
on RAA's member airline aircraft today.
Thank you again for your consideration, and please let us know if
we can provide anything additional. We will be contacting your office
to schedule a time where we can discuss these and any other issues in
greater depth.
Respectfully,
Roger Cohen,
President.
CC: Faye Malarkey Black, VP Legislative Affairs, Regional Airline
Association
______
Attachment B
______
Attachment C
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
Captain John Prater
Question 1. Capt. Prater, as you committed to in the hearing,
please share ALPA's recommendations to the FAA regarding flight duty
and rest time with the Committee.
Answer. ALPA's position on Flight Time regulations is that the
regulations must be science based and insure a safe level of alertness,
as required by ICAO. This would insure that flight crewmembers are
allowed an adequate sleep opportunity, which would require maximum duty
and minimum rest breaks, that there are safeguards to prevent
cumulative fatigue, and that circadian rhythms are addressed. These
issues should be addressed in a proscriptive rule. However the
proscriptive rule needs to also provide the basis to move to the
ultimate solution which would be a Fatigue Risk Management System.
Question 2. Captain Prater, does ALPA have any statistics on the
average commute of its membership from home to duty station?
Answer. ALPA does not have data on the average time pilots spend
commuting from their homes. Where a pilot lives is a personal lifestyle
choice. We do support that pilots report to work fit for duty and they
are required to certify that they are fit for duty when they sign the
flight release for each flight.