    [Senate Hearing 111-448]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 111-448

                         AVIATION SAFETY: THE ROLE AND
                          RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMERCIAL
                           AIR CARRIERS AND EMPLOYEES
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

           SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY

                                     of the

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JUNE 17, 2009

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

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           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
    DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii             KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
    JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts             Ranking
    BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota        OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
    BARBARA BOXER, California            JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
    MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey      ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    MARK PRYOR, Arkansas                 JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
    TOM UDALL, New Mexico                MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
    MARK WARNER, Virginia                MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska
                        Ellen L. Doneski, Chief of Staff
                       James Reid, Deputy Chief of Staff
                       Bruce H. Andrews, General Counsel
       Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
                  Brian M. Hendricks, Republican Chief Counsel
                                     ------

           SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION OPERATIONS, SAFETY, AND SECURITY

    BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota,       JIM DeMINT, South Carolina,
        Chairman                             Ranking Member
    DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii             OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
    JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts         JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
    BARBARA BOXER, California            JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
    BILL NELSON, Florida                 ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
    FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey      DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
    MARK PRYOR, Arkansas                 SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
    AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota             MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
    MARK WARNER, Virginia
    MARK BEGICH, Alaska
                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on June 17, 2009....................................     1
    Statement of Senator Dorgan......................................     1
    Statement of Senator DeMint......................................     3
    Statement of Senator Lautenberg..................................     4
    Statement of Senator Johanns.....................................     4
    Statement of Senator Begich......................................     5
    Statement of Senator Thune.......................................     5
    Statement of Senator Klobuchar...................................    48
    Statement of Senator McCaskill...................................    51

                                   Witnesses

    James C. May, President and CEO, Air Transport Association of
      America, Inc...................................................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................     8
    Roger Cohen, President, Regional Airline Association.............    10
        Prepared statement...........................................    12
    Captain John Prater, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
      International..................................................    16
        Prepared statement...........................................    17
    Scott Maurer, Father of Lorin Maurer, Representative of the
      Families of Continental Flight 3407............................    27
        Prepared statement...........................................    29

                                    Appendix

    Letter dated June 12, 2009 to Hon. Byron L. Dorgan from Dan
      Hanley, Former United Airlines B-777 Captain...................    59
    Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill
      to James C. May................................................    63
    Response to follow-up written questions submitted by Hon. Claire
      McCaskill to James C. May......................................    64
    Response to written question submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
      James C. May...................................................    65
    Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill
      to Roger Cohen (Submitted July 22, 2009).......................    65
    Response to follow-up written questions submitted by Hon. Claire
      McCaskill to Roger Cohen.......................................    66
    Response to follow-up written question submitted by Hon. Claire
      McCaskill to Roger Cohen dated August 7, 2009..................    67
    Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
      Roger Cohen....................................................    68
    Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
      Captain John Prater............................................    76

                         AVIATION SAFETY: THE ROLE AND

                          RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMERCIAL

                          AIR CARRIERS AND EMPLOYEES

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JUNE 17, 2009

                                   U.S. Senate,
      Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and
                                              Security,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in
    room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L.
    Dorgan, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH DAKOTA

        Senator Dorgan. We'll call the hearing to order.
        This is a hearing of the subcommittee of the Senate
    Commerce Committee, the Subcommittee on Aviation.
        I want to thank all of you for joining us today to talk
    about the importance of the issue of aviation safety. This is
    the second hearing that we have held this month to discuss the
    subject of aviation safety, with a particular focus on the
    safety of regional carriers.
        In this hearing, we will receive testimony from
    representatives of the Nation's network carriers and regional
    carriers from the Air Transport Association and from the
    Regional Airline Association, respectively. We'll also hear
    from the Air Line Pilots Association and from Mr. Scott Maurer,
    representing the Families of Continental Flight 3407, which
    crashed on February 12 of this year in New York.
        I do want to say, as well, as we start this hearing, that I
    had intended and wished to have representatives of the carriers
    themselves at a hearing. And so, we did not accomplish that
    today. I'm not minimizing at all the representatives of the
    two--the ATA and the RAA, but I will wish to extend invitations
    and have representatives of the airlines themselves in here
    within the next month or so. It is important, I think, that
    they would accept an invitation to come, and so, I will extend
    those invitations again.
        In this country, I think it is safe to say that we have a
    remarkably safe system of air travel. It's not my intention,
    with hearings about aviation safety, to alarm anyone about
    taking a flight on a regional carrier or a network carrier. We
    operate aircrafts all across this country every day, and
    provide critical air service to many people who would not
    otherwise have that kind of transportation service or that kind
    of option. But, we do have a responsibility, it seems to me, to
    ask questions and to get answers to the questions of, Do we
    have one level of safety, do we have one standard of safety
    that now exists, or have we drifted some?
        If the traveling public ever has doubts about the
    consistency of safety in our airspace system or with airline
    travel, the airline industry inevitably will suffer. So, we
    have to move together to make certain that people have no
    reason to question the oversight or the application of aviation
    safety across the country.
        I've said before that I've read extensively about the most
    recent crash that occurred in our country, the crash by Colgan
    Air in Buffalo, New York. Frankly, a number of things happened
    on that flight that caused me great, great concern. There were
    a number of mistakes that occurred, a number of things that, to
    me, were revelations that were quite stunning and led me to
    question, Is this--was it an aberration, was it something that
    happened only in the cockpit of this one plane, or is there
    something else at work? Is there a set of standards that is
    applied one way in one set of carriers and another way in
    another set of carriers? I don't know the answer to that, but I
    think it is important that we ask those questions.
        The plane that crashed in New York was a Bombardier Dash 8
    Q400 operated by a captain and a copilot who had commuted--both
    commuted long distances to get to work, and were found to have
    had reasonably little rest before the flight. The copilot
    raised issues, in the transcript that I read of the
    conversation in the cockpit, of her inexperience with icing
    conditions. They, clearly that evening, were flying in
    significant icing. The captain had failed a number of flight
    tests during his career, which the carrier themselves were
    unaware of and did not have information about.
        We're going to hear from those that are investigating this.
    The NTSB, I know, is doing substantial investigations. But, the
    larger question for me, here, is, What about the airlines and
    the FAA's ability to prevent a double standard or two different
    standards of experience in the cockpit? What about the
    enforcement of rules with respect to familiarity with certain
    kinds of conditions, familiarity with equipment? We are
    supposed to have, dating back to the mid-1990s, ``one level of
    safety,'' for both regional and major carriers. And I want to
    hear, from our witnesses today, whether you think that is
    actually the case, whether the system has kept up with changes,
    or whether there have been changes that have occurred that have
    drifted us away from one standard?
        I'm particularly concerned, from some of the things I've
    learned in the last hearing--for example, that a carrier does
    not easily have full access to the records of pilots they are
    considering hiring. I'm talking about all of the records. They
    have access to the records of everything that has occurred with
    respect to an airplane. An airplane that comes off the line and
    is put in service, everything that happens to that particular
    airplane is a matter of record that anyone can access. And that
    is not the case with respect to the record of the pilot or the
    people in the cockpit.
        I think that there is some reason to be encouraged by what
    the new administrator, Randy Babbitt, has done. He called for a
    meeting, Monday of this week, which reflects a concern that he
    wants to understand these things quickly and take whatever
    action is necessary. It is also the case that he indicated
    that, after--2 years after the NTSB suggested a rulemaking on
    access to records for pilots, that Mr. Babbitt indicated to me
    that the next time he came to a hearing and I asked the
    question, ``Have you begun a rulemaking?'' he indicated that he
    expected the answer to be affirmative rather than negative.
        So, I think we're making some progress, here. But, this is
    very, very important, and it's something that we have to ask
    questions about. They are tough questions, but necessary and
    important questions.
        I want to thank the witnesses for being with us.
        Senator DeMint is the Ranking Member of our Subcommittee,
    and I know Senator DeMint wishes to make a comment and then, I
    think, also introduce Mr. Maurer, more formally, who is a
    member of your state.

                     STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DeMINT,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

        Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you
    again for conducting these hearings.
        And I would just add my comments to yours. I agree with
    everything you said about the concerns about this flight. A lot
    of us get on regional flights ourselves, every week, going back
    and forth to our home states, and we assume a lot when we get
    on a plane. And I know all Americans do. And we do need to make
    sure there is a standard of safety for every American.
        I'm looking forward to working with the Chairman on
    language that would reveal all the pilot records, just as we
    have them for an airplane. And some things seem to make common
    sense right now.
        But, I do have the pleasure of introducing Mr. Scott Maurer
    this morning. Mr. Maurer is the father of a 30-year-old woman
    who was on Flight 3407 crash, Lorin Maurer. Mr. Maurer was born
    and raised in Reading, Pennsylvania, where he and his wife
    raised their daughter, Lorin. He currently lives in South
    Carolina.
        I appreciate him taking the time to come to Washington. I
    think this is his third trip here, and I know this is very
    difficult for him to continue to recount this tragedy in
    public, as well as private.
        Mr. Maurer comes before this Committee this morning as a
    representative of over 150 people and the families of the
    Flight 3407 group. They've come together as a result of the
    terrible tragedy, with the goal of making changes in the
    airline industry and the FAA, hoping to keep an accident like
    3407 from happening again, and saving many other families the
    sadness that they are continuing to endure. Mr. Maurer is also
    joined this morning by his wife, Terry, and Lorin's boyfriend,
    Kevin Kuwik.
        I am deeply impressed with the work of the Maurers and Mr.
    Kuwik and all the families of the victims of Flight 3407. As a
    father of four and a grandfather of two, I can't begin to
    imagine the pain that comes from so tragically losing a loved
    one. It speaks very highly of all the families here today that
    you're working to take what must be such a deep sorrow and
    focusing it on improving airline safety and helping other
    Americans.
        I'm looking forward to hearing your testimony, Mr. Maurer,
    and the recommendations, this morning. And both the Chairman
    and I--and I know I speak for everyone on the Committee--thank
    you for the sacrifice that you're making to try to improve the
    system for others.
        Senator Dorgan. Senator DeMint, thank you very much.
        I would--let me ask others if they would limit opening
    comments to 2 minutes, and then we'll have 7-minute rounds for
    questions when we've heard from the witnesses.
        Senator Lautenberg?

                STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

        Senator Lautenberg. Yes, Mr. Chairman, very quickly, thank
    you for calling this hearing, because, though our flight safety
    record is so outstanding, when we look at the total of aviation
    and its services, the situation with the Colgan flight is one
    that is--shook our bodies, our minds.
        The plane took off from Newark-Liberty International in
    February. It cost the lives of 50 people. Flight 3407 taught us
    that we need to improve pilot training, address flight-crew
    hours of service, and implement consistent safety standards for
    both regional and large air carriers. And just last year, we
    saw disturbing reports about safety inspection failures, where
    the FAA let planes filled with passengers take off with cracked
    hulls. And these failures forced the cancellation of thousands
    of flights by airlines who may not have taken safety as
    seriously as they should have.
        And so, we're anxious to learn whatever we can about the
    failure of good precautions, with Flight 3407, and we extend
    our sympathies, also, to Mr. Maurer, and that we would like to
    be able to make the promise, when we're finished with these
    hearings, Mr. Chairman, that we will have done whatever we can
    to make this excellent safety record that exists with American
    aviation even better. And we look with interest at what our
    witnesses----
        Senator Dorgan. Senator Lautenberg----
        Senator Lautenberg.--have to say.
        Senator Dorgan.--thank you very much.
        Senator Lautenberg. Thank you.
        Senator Dorgan. Senator Johanns?

                    STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE JOHANNS,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA

        Senator Johanns. Mr. Chairman, thank you. My comments will
    be very, very brief.
        But, let me tell you what I'm thinking about and hoping to
    accomplish through this process. I think the burden is on the
    airlines to prove to the American people that, when we get on,
    for the price of our ticket, whatever that is, that we're going
    to have a well-experienced crew, who will treat us politely and
    decently, an airplane that is safe as can possibly be. And I
    think, really, the burden is there.
        When I think about this flight in--and I feel so badly for
    these families, but this hearing is bigger than that one
    flight--I think about questions like, Is the plane safe? What's
    the inspection background of this airplane? What would the
    service records show me if I were to take a look at them? I ask
    myself, Has the crew got the training, the talent, the
    background, the discipline, have they gotten a good night's
    sleep, so they can handle all situations?
        I had a pilot at--a dear friend of mine; he flew small
    planes--who said to me, ``You know, flying is hours and hours
    of boredom followed by moments of sheer terror.'' And, you
    know, that always stuck with me.
        I ask myself, Does the crew know when they are entering a
    situation that is beyond their capability, or their airplane's
    capability? Are they trained well enough, and do they have the
    talent and experience and background, to see this situation and
    say, ``I'm not going to expose my passengers to that risk. I
    don't care what somebody above me is trying to say?''
        And those are the things that I hope to accomplish in this
    hearing. So, my hope is, we can focus on some of those
    questions, and others.
        And I'll wrap up by just saying, Mr. Chairman, thanks for
    calling this--such an important topic. And--just glad to be
    here today.
        Thanks.
        Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much.
        Senator Begich?

                    STATEMENT OF HON. MARK BEGICH,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will
    be very, very brief. I'll look forward to the questions and
    answers.
        But, I'll be looking at this from two perspectives. One is
    United States Senator, but also someone who lost a family
    member, my father, in a plane crash. So, I look at it from two
    different perspectives. And I will be anxious to ask several
    questions. And I don't want you to take them, any of them,
    personally. I think this is an important issue, as just
    described by several Senators here, of--in regards to safety
    for our air flights, because people do walk onto the planes
    assuming they are safe transportation modes, and it's going to
    be important that we make sure they continue to improve on the
    record you have today.
        But, again, I'm going to be coming from two perspectives,
    and I hope you recognize that.
        Thank you very much.
        Senator Dorgan. Senator Thune?

                     STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

        Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, I, too, want to thank you for
    calling the hearing.
        And I want to thank our panelists for being here,
    especially you, Mr. Maurer. Again, our condolences to you and
    your family and all the families. A very tragic, tragic
    incident, and I applaud you for committing yourself to making
    sure this doesn't happen to any other families. Thank you for
    your efforts and for the courageous work that you're doing.
        Coming from a state like mine, we have a heavy reliance on
    regional airlines. They play an important role in transporting
    passengers from smaller communities who otherwise would not
    have scheduled air service. And, while I don't, you know,
    think, again, that we can--no one's arguing that we shouldn't
    take our overall aviation safety record for granted, I also
    believe there's room for improvement. And we want to ensure
    that the FAA and the airlines are doing everything they can to
    improve the overall safety record, when it comes, not only to
    regional airlines, but to all airlines.
        And I particularly want to home in on something that we
    discussed at the Subcommittee hearing last week, Mr. Chairman,
    and that is the need to incorporate more information regarding
    the background of pilots. I think it just makes sense that we
    work to ensure that the FAA incorporates a more accurate
    picture of a perspective--prospective pilot's flight history
    when an airline is looking to make a hiring decision. And
    voluntarily requesting this information just isn't good enough.
    I think there is more that Congress can require, when it comes
    to updating the Pilot Records Improvement Act, and I hope that
    we can work on that in this Committee to make some of those
    changes, because, I think, clearly that came into play in this
    very tragic incident.
        But, again, thank you for holding the hearing, and I want
    to thank our panelists, and I'll look forward to hearing from
    you.
        Thanks.
        Senator Dorgan. Senator Thune, thank you very much.
        As several of my colleagues have mentioned, we look at
    these issues through the lens of tragedy, regrettably. But, in
    many cases, I--and I expect Mr. Maurer is here in the hope that
    what we learn will save other lives and improve airline safety.
    And I--all of us would, I think, embrace that goal.
        So, with that in mind, we have four witnesses, and I want
    to call on Mr. Jim May first today. Mr. Jim May is President
    and Chief Executive Officer of the Air Transport Association of
    America.
        Mr. May, you and I have discussed all of the issues that
    have been discussed this morning. I--the same is the case with
    Mr. Cohen; we've had these discussions.
        Let me call on you--let me say, to all four of you, that
    your entire statements will be made a part of the permanent
    record, and we would ask that you summarize your remarks.

             STATEMENT OF JAMES C. MAY, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
               AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, INC.

        Mr. May. Thank you, Mr.----
        Senator Dorgan. And would you pull that very close and turn
    that on.
        Thank you.
        Mr. May. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning.
        Let me also share my condolences with Mr. Maurer and the
    other representatives of the families that lost loved ones
    aboard the Colgan Air flight. It is a terrible, terrible
    tragedy.
        In the airline industry, safety is our highest priority. We
    try very hard to assure that we never compromise safety because
    of economic conditions. We work closely with all members of the
    aviation community, including regional airlines, to achieve
    extraordinary records--no fatalities for mainline carriers in
    the past number of years. And it really is in that spirit that
    I appear before you today, with an understanding that no
    accident is acceptable. We have a responsibility to understand,
    through rigorous and searching inquiry, the causes of the
    Buffalo accident, and then to take whatever single or multiple
    corrective measures are needed.
        In light of that responsibility, we're very fortunate that
    there are three expert government forums in which scrutiny is
    happening today, right now. This is as it should be. The public
    needs to be confident in the responses to aviation safety
    issues.
        The National Transportation Safety Board's ongoing
    investigation is going to produce a far more complete picture
    than we have today. In this, as in previous accidents, the
    Board is the authoritative source for making that determination
    and recommending corrective action.
        In addition, the Department of Transportation's Inspector
    General recently began an assessment of the Federal Aviation
    Administration's oversight of certification, pilot
    qualification, training, and other issues. That is in response,
    Mr. Chairman, to your very direct inquiry.
        When this review was announced, we immediately offered our
    resources and full cooperation to the inspector general. His
    evaluation and constructive suggestions that we know will
    result from it will augment the NTSB's effort.
        Finally, the FAA's Call to Action, held on Monday of this
    week, is a broad-based initiative to look at safety issues,
    including those raised at this morning's hearing. We attended--
    multiple representatives of ATA attended Monday's meeting and
    were impressed by the participants' focus on concrete issues
    and their understanding of the need for very prompt solutions.
    We look forward to being engaged with the FAA and other
    interested stakeholders in this vital work.
        Now, I don't believe that any topic should be off the table
    in the Call to Action. We need to have a full and frank
    discussion about safety and the factors that contribute to it.
    If there are disparities between mainline and regional safety
    programs they should be closed, and closed quickly.
        Let me suggest six or seven steps that need to be pursued
    right now, today.
        First, I think we need to apply FOQA, Flight Operational
    Quality Assurance programs used by major carriers, to regional
    airlines. FOQA works. The collection and analysis of data
    recorded during flight improves safety.
        Second, apply ASAP, Aviation Safety Action Programs, which
    encourage voluntary reporting of safety issues and events that
    come to the attention of employees, to those regional airlines
    that don't currently have such a program.
        Third, identify advanced-training best practices of
    mainline carriers to be used by regional carriers. It's an AQP
    program, in the jargon.
        Fourth, we need a centralized database of pilot records, to
    give airlines easy access to complete information about
    applicants from the time they begin their flying career.
        Fifth, let's see if the FAA needs to increase compliance
    with the ``sterile cockpit'' rule, and what measures it should
    use to do that.
        Sixth, let's examine flight-crew preparedness when pilots
    report to work. This means looking at crew-member commuting. If
    this means examining flight and duty-time issues, I think
    that's perfectly appropriate--but, tie it to the commuting side
    of the equation--as long as any examination is based on
    science, not anecdotes.
        Each of these initiatives can and should be achieved in
    short order. We're looking forward to working with this
    Committee, the FAA, the IG, and the NTSB in as cooperative a
    fashion as possible.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be pleased to answer any
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. May follows:]

            Prepared Statement of James C. May, President and CEO,
                   Air Transport Association of America, Inc.
        The crash of the Colgan Air aircraft near Buffalo on February 12,
    2009, was a tragedy that has produced heartache for the relatives and
    friends of the victims of that accident. Words are faint consolation
    for their grief.
        Two basic considerations need to guide us in the aftermath of that
    tragedy.
        The first consideration is that in the aviation community, no
    accident is acceptable. We need to understand through rigorous and
    searching inquiry the cause of the Buffalo accident. Completion of the
    ongoing National Transportation Safety Board investigation will produce
    a far more complete picture than we have today of what so tragically
    unfolded that evening. Moreover, the Department of Transportation
    Inspector General recently began an examination of Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) oversight of certification, pilot qualification,
    training and other issues that will augment the NTSB effort. The ``call
    to action'' initiative that the Secretary of Transportation announced
    last week will enhance these two efforts. The call to action meeting
    that the FAA held this Monday enabled stakeholders to review pilot
    training, cockpit discipline and other issues associated with flight
    safety. We enthusiastically support this initiative. ATA and its
    members actively participated in last year's FAA runway safety ``call
    to action.'' We look to the same type of involvement with this latest
    ``call to action.''
        The second consideration is that it is the certificate holder--the
    air carrier that has received the authority from the FAA to serve the
    public--that is ultimately responsible and accountable for the safety
    of its operations and for complying with the requirements that the FAA
    imposes on air carriers.
        It goes without saying but I will say it: We do not compromise
    safety for economic reasons. ATA members and their employees have
    achieved an extraordinary safety record because of their single-minded
    focus on safety. This has occurred, I would emphasize, during the most
    turbulent era in our industry's history. It is in the spirit of the
    pursuit of safety that I appear before you today.
        Understandably, much has been written about the Buffalo accident.
    Speculation, however, is not the foundation for a meaningful response
    to any aviation accident. We need to get it right. That is why we all
    rely on the NTSB in these situations. After its investigation is
    concluded, the Board will prepare and issue a detailed narrative report
    that analyzes the investigative record, identifies the probable cause
    of the accident and makes specific recommendations for fixing the
    causes of the accident.
        That kind of rigor is indispensable in developing a fact-based,
    informed and effective response to the accident. It is the kind of
    diligence that characterizes other safety-related efforts in our
    industry. We approach safety issues collaboratively with commitment and
    know-how within the bounds of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs).
        In the airline industry, safety is the highest priority. That is a
    shared commitment and we work closely with other members of the
    aviation community to achieve it. Together with the FAA, manufacturers,
    labor unions and other interested parties, we have achieved an
    extraordinary safety record. That impressive accomplishment, however,
    does not mean that we can rest on our laurels. We continuously pursue
    safety. Improving safety is work that is never done; we always seek to
    improve.
        Commercial aviation has built this record through a disciplined and
    analytical approach to improving safety performance. That scrutiny
    includes benefiting from experience and from a forward-looking search
    to identify emerging issues. The Commercial Aviation Safety Team
    (CAST), for example, brings together stakeholders to improve safety
    performance by applying data-driven analyses to spot issues before
    accidents occur and to establish safety priorities. Increasing reliance
    on two industry-led safety programs, the Aviation Safety Action Program
    (ASAP), which encourages voluntary reporting of safety issues and
    events that come to the attention of employees of certain certificate
    holders, and the Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program,
    which involves the collection and analysis of data recorded during
    flight to improve safety, have also added immeasurably to our
    knowledge. This empirical approach, coupled with the expertise and
    commitment of our frontline employees, provides the underpinning for
    industrywide safety efforts.
        Participation in these programs underscores that ATA members'
    efforts go well beyond compliance with governmental regulatory
    directives. This willingness to exceed minimum requirements is often
    overlooked. It is tightly woven into the safety culture of airlines,
    whether they are mainline or regional.
        No accident or incident is acceptable. We seek to learn from each
    event. Consequently, ATA has formed a Senior Advisory Task Force to
    address the matters raised during the recent NTSB hearing about the
    Buffalo accident. The task force is comprised of airline presidents,
    chief operating officers and their peers. It will ensure that our
    support of the FAA, airlines, unions and others is responsive, targeted
    and thorough.
        ATA member airlines highly value their relationships with regional
    airlines and the customer benefits those arrangements provide.
    Customers, communities and the marketing and operating carriers benefit
    immensely.
        The bedrock principle in civil aviation is that the entity to which
    the FAA has issued a certificate is solely responsible for its
    activities. Whether that entity is an air carrier, an airman or a
    dispatcher, that responsibility cannot be delegated or assumed by
    others. That principle avoids any confusion about ultimate
    responsibility, an absolutely essential consideration in promoting
    safety. It is a principle that dates back to 1938, when Congress
    created the Civil Aviation Authority, the predecessor of the FAA.
        As separate regulated entities, regionals are independent of
    mainline airlines. As I noted previously, they hold operating authority
    that the FAA has granted them. The FAA certificates regionals under
    Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121. This means that the certificate
    holder--the regional airline--maintains the responsibility for, and
    direct control of, its operations and safety programs. The FAA has the
    mandate to assure compliance with Part 121 and other FAR requirements.
        We should also remember that in the mid-1990s, in evaluating the
    need for improvements in the regulatory structure under which commuter
    airlines--the former term for regional airlines--operated, the FAA
    responded with the support of ATA and its members by requiring them to
    adhere to FAR Part 121, the same regulation under which mainline
    airlines operate. As a result, the rule that became effective on
    December 20, 1995 imposed a ``one-level-of-safety'' standard that
    continues to this day. It required aircraft with 10 or more passenger
    seats and all turbojets operated in scheduled passenger service to
    operate under and comply with FAR Part 121 operational requirements.
    These included dispatch requirements and the use of certificated
    dispatchers, new flight/duty time rules, manuals and procedures for
    flight and ground personnel, cabin safety and flight attendant
    requirements for 20- to 30-seat airplanes, and new training rules.
        Moreover, the Department of Transportation, for more than a decade,
    has required in 14 CFR Part 257 that codeshare arrangements be
    disclosed to customers before they purchase a ticket. This ``operated
    by'' language underscores the importance that the government has
    recognized in maintaining the distinction between the mainline airline
    and the regional airline.
        FAA implementation of uniform mainline and commuter regulatory
    requirements has raised questions about mainline and regional operating
    environments. The most significant of those concerns and our responses
    follow.
        ``Two-tiered safety environment.'' As noted previously, since 1995
    the FAA has imposed one level of safety on the air carrier industry--
    whether with respect to training, flight deck crew competency, etc. If
    the NTSB or FAA determines that regional airline performance within
    that unitary regulatory structure requires additional attention, it
    should reformulate its compliance efforts as necessary.
        Flight/duty time regulations. An issue that has arisen in the
    Buffalo accident is the role of flight-deck personnel commuting. That,
    it should be clear, is not a flight/duty time issue. Commuting is
    within the exclusive control of the pilot or copilot. It is expected,
    and the law assumes, that they will report fit to work. It is the
    responsibility of the crew member to inform the carrier if he/she is
    unable to fly because of fatigue, whether because of commuting or for
    any other reason. That is why Part 121 airlines staff reserve crew
    members.
        Flight deck crew compensation. With but one exception, pilots at
    all larger regional airlines are represented by unions and they work in
    a seniority-based system. Compensation is a function of collective
    bargaining. Neither legislation nor regulation can effectively peg what
    is the right compensation in such a system of negotiated wages,
    benefits and working conditions.
        Sterile cockpit rule. The FAA imposed the sterile cockpit rule in
    1981. Its longstanding prohibition against ``nonessential conversations
    within the cockpit'' is well-known. To the extent that compliance with
    the rule is a concern at any Part 121 carrier, it is a matter for the
    FAA to pursue.
        Centralized pilot record database. A centralized database of pilot
    records would make it easier to evaluate the backgrounds of applicants
    for flight deck positions. We urge the FAA to determine if such a
    database can be efficiently implemented. To be successful, however, it
    must be complete. Results of all pertinent actions relating to the
    pilot's competency must be recorded and accessible to an airline
    evaluating an applicant.
    Conclusion
        We will work diligently with other stakeholders in evaluating and
    responding to the results of the NTSB investigation of the Buffalo
    accident and the Inspector General's assessment of the FAA regulatory
    oversight program. This week's FAA ``call to action'' meeting was part
    of a vital initiative that we believe will contribute appreciably to
    this effort. It is in that informed context that any further action to
    improve safety should be examined.

        Senator Dorgan. Mr. May, thank you very much.
        And next, we'll hear from Mr. Cohen.
        Mr. Cohen, you may proceed.

                 STATEMENT OF ROGER COHEN, PRESIDENT,
                      REGIONAL AIRLINE ASSOCIATION

        Mr. Cohen. Thank you. Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, and
    members of the Subcommittee, I'm Roger Cohen, and I'm President
    of the Regional Airline Association.
        I want to express our deepest sympathies for the lives of
    the passengers and crew of Flight 3407 that were lost, and for
    the families affected by the crash. We deeply share in their
    grief.
        And I also want to express, today, not only for our member
    airlines, but for our 60,000 highly trained professionals, our
    total unwavering commitment to safety.
        As we work toward ensuring this post---as we work toward
    this--let's make sure this post-accident process does not have
    to be repeated. We will take whatever steps are necessary so
    that our flight crews and our aircraft are as safe as humanly
    possible.
        The safety of our Nation's skies is a shared
    responsibility. At Monday's FAA summit, five of our regional
    airline CEOs and other senior leaders in--five of our CEOs
    joined with Federal agencies, major airlines, and union
    representatives to candidly explore all of the issues making
    headlines over these past few months. Regional airlines have
    but one objective, and that's to prevent any future accidents.
        And as we do that, as this Committee has noted, it's
    important to keep our perspective and to reassure the American
    public that flying is extremely safe. In fact, until this
    recent tragedy, commercial airlines had gone the longest period
    in aviation history without a fatal accident.
        Working collectively, rolling up our sleeves with all
    parties--government, labor, manufacturers--airlines have
    steadily improved our safety record over the course of many
    decades of safety initiatives, investigations, and reviews of
    accidents and incidents, large and small. Nevertheless, we can
    and must do better. Our industry's number-one goal has been,
    and always will be, zero accidents and zero fatalities.
        Mr. Chairman, at your request, our member airlines provided
    the Committee very detailed information about their operations,
    their training, their hiring, and their employees. Today, we
    will try to better define the airline--the regional airline
    industry to clear up some of the misconceptions. More
    importantly, we will talk about the steps that regional
    airlines have already taken and the actions we plan to take to
    further focus our total commitment to safety and accident
    prevention.
        Our airplanes typically carry up to 100 passengers. More
    than 50 percent of all of the scheduled airline passenger
    flights in the United States are on regional airlines. And,
    most notably, three out of every four commercial airports in
    this country are served exclusively by regional airlines.
        Our airlines, as you've indicated, largely operate in
    seamless partnership with the major airlines. Regional airlines
    provide the crew and the aircraft, while major airlines set the
    flight schedules, the fares, and the customer-service policies.
        Regional airlines and our major airline partners operate as
    a single, integrated system. One ticket, one trip, one safety
    standard. All passenger airlines are subject to the exact same
    FAA safety standards and requirements. It has been this way for
    more than a decade.
        Our goal is to prevent accidents, and that's why we are
    earnestly and eagerly supporting the FAA's Call to Action, and
    why the Regional Airline Association has embarked on our own
    Strategic Safety Initiative to underscore our safety culture
    and to help prevent accidents.
        This Strategic Safety Initiative has four elements:
        First, we'll be bringing together our safety professionals
    to review all of the procedures and address any issue that can
    even be perceived as a contributing factor to an accident.
        Second, we will conduct a thorough review of fatigue,
    looking at all the human factors in the scientific field to
    minimize the risks associated with fatigue.
        Third, we will implement a Fatigue Awareness Management
    Program so that our airlines keep this issue top-of-the-mind
    for both our flight crews and, just as importantly, airline
    management.
        Fourth, we will reach out in partnership, with you in
    Congress, across the government, and to our fellow stakeholders
    in labor and throughout the aviation industry, to explore the
    full range of issues which could help us improve safety and
    prevent future accidents. And among those are, number one,
    establish a single integrated FAA database of pilot records.
    Second, explore random fatigue testing. Third, examine the
    practice of commuting. Fourth, extend the period for background
    checks from 5 to 10 years. And fifth, seek to analyze the
    information from cockpit voice recorders in settings other than
    accident investigations. And mine all this tremendous data of
    check rides to look for trends to help prevent future
    accidents.
        Mr. Chairman, the Regional Airline Association thanks you
    for the opportunity to testify today and for opening the
    dialogue on these critical issues. We look forward to keeping
    you informed. And I welcome any questions you might have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Roger Cohen, President,
                          Regional Airline Association
        Good morning Mr. Chairman, Senator Hutchison, and Members of the
    Committee. My name is Roger Cohen. I am the President of the Regional
    Airline Association. Our 31 member airlines carry more than 90 percent
    of the passengers traveling on regional aircraft.
        The circumstances that prompted the Committee to convene today's
    hearing are tragic. We share the Committee's concern for the lives of
    the passengers and crews that have been lost and the grief suffered by
    their families and loved ones.
        The challenge now facing this Committee, Federal aviation safety
    agencies, and the aviation industry is to review all of the issues and
    take whatever steps are necessary to prevent accidents in the future.
        We appreciate the open lines of communication this Committee has
    kept with our industry, including the opportunity to meet with Aviation
    Subcommittee Chairman Dorgan to share our thoughts in advance of this
    hearing as well as the opportunity to include our members in a survey
    of commercial airline safety programs and industry best practices. We
    hope you find this continuing dialogue to be as valuable as we do.
        Federal safety statistics clearly show that flying is the safest
    mode of travel. A person is far more likely to have a fatal accident
    traveling in a car, train, or bus than traveling by air. According to
    the National Safety Council, the fatality rate for cars is 7,700
    percent higher than for commercial aircraft and the fatality rate for
    trains and buses is 300 percent higher. This remarkable safety record
    is the result of decades of dedicated work from aviation safety
    professionals, both in the government and in the industry.
        Nevertheless, the pursuit of improved aviation safety is a shared
    and continuous effort, to which regional airlines are committed, along
    with everyone else in the commercial airline industry. The industry's
    overarching goal has been and always will be zero accidents and zero
    fatalities. We are committed to working with Congress, the FAA, the
    NTSB, and aviation safety experts in academia to ensure that we can
    meet this goal.
        Mr. Chairman, for the purposes of aiding this Committee with its
    inquiry, our testimony will focus on two broad areas.
        First, we will take a few moments to reacquaint the Committee with
    the regional airline industry. Anyone who has done background research
    on the industry prior to this hearing would have found a large number
    of inaccuracies portrayed in the media, and such misconceptions will
    not help the Committee carry out its responsibilities.
        Second, we will talk about the steps regional airlines have already
    taken and the actions they plan to take to even further intensify their
    focus on aviation safety. The regional airlines are launching a new
    initiative to advance industry safety standards. We also believe that
    Congress can provide additional safety tools for the industry.
    Regional Airlines
        Regional airlines operate regional jets or turboprop aircraft
    ranging in size from about 10 to 100 seats and provide scheduled
    passenger service on short- and medium-haul routes that connect more
    than 600 smaller towns and mid-size cities to each other as well as to
    the Nation's major hub airports. This network offers passengers
    seamless service to almost every community in the country and many
    around the globe, serving 160 million passengers last year.
        Shorter flights to less heavily populated areas on smaller aircraft
    should not be equated with fewer flights or limited reach. Over the
    last 20 years, the industry has worked to match aircraft size to the
    market, leading to vast improvements in service to many communities
    that would otherwise not have air service. Today, more than 50 percent
    of all scheduled flights are operated by regional airlines and three
    out of every four commercial airports in the United States are served
    exclusively by regional airlines.
        Regional airlines operate in full partnership with major airlines.
    Indeed, major airlines either contract with regional airlines to
    provide service on selected routes or have an ownership stake in
    regional airlines.
        In this relationship, a regional airline is responsible for
    providing the crew and maintaining the aircraft. The major airline, for
    which the regional carrier is providing service, determines flight
    schedules and fares and sets customer service standards.
        From the passenger's perspective, the brand of the major airlines
    is in full view throughout the travel experience. In most cases, the
    passenger buys the ticket from the major airline, typically checks in
    at the major airline's counter, may find the in-flight magazine of the
    major airline, and may even sip a beverage placed on the cocktail
    napkin of the major airline.
        Regional airlines and their major airline partners operate as a
    single, integrated system. The notion of two separate systems is a
    misconception.
        That misconception extends to safety standards and it needs to be
    corrected if Congress is to have an accurate grasp of the situation.
    The fact is that all carriers are subject to the same strict FAA safety
    standards and requirements and receive the exact same level of safety
    oversight, notwithstanding so many erroneous press accounts.
        Pilot Qualifications. Regional airline pilots are subject to the
    same training requirements that apply to pilots working for major
    carriers. The rules are the same for all airlines.
        Pilots must complete rigorous classroom and simulator training and
    regularly pass extensive flight checks given by FAA-approved examiners
    throughout their careers. Each and every check tests a pilot's
    knowledge and ability to perform both routine and emergency procedures.
    Each and every question, procedure and maneuver must be executed fully
    to FAA standards. Unlike many professional tests, the checks that
    airline pilots must complete are unforgiving. What this means is that
    airline pilots must complete every aspect of their flight check
    successfully, in effect scoring a grade of 100 percent, or they cannot
    fly for the airline. If any aspect of the flight check is not passed,
    the pilot must receive remedial training and successfully complete a
    recheck before being allowed to fly again.
        The FAA also requires pilots to be separately trained and qualified
    on every type of airplane that they will be operating.
        Regional airlines comply with these strict safety standards and
    regularly operate under internal standards above and beyond FAA
    requirements. For example, the average experience of the RAA member
    airline flight crews is 3,075 total flight hours for first officers and
    8,500 for captains, which far exceed the FAA minimum requirements of
    500 and 1,500 hours, respectively.
        Pilot Background Checks. All airlines conduct in-depth background
    and safety checks on pilots before they are hired. Two separate sources
    are consulted.
        The FAA maintains a database of pilot information established by
    the Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996 or PRIA. This database
    includes information about a pilot's certificates, ratings, medical
    status and any rule violations for the previous 5 years. In addition,
    this law requires airlines to contact the pilot's previous airline
    employer to obtain information about his or her training performance,
    drug and alcohol tests, and employment status. FAA maintains a separate
    database, not subject to the PRIA law, which includes a pilot's history
    of FAA check ride disapprovals. Certainly, integrating a real-time
    database containing all pilot records would improve access to this
    vital information.
        Pilot Fatigue. Rested, alert, and focused pilots are essential for
    aviation safety. All parties--the FAA, airlines, and pilots--have a
    role to play in ensuring that pilots are well rested.
        The FAA has rules in place to avoid fatigue. These rules apply to
    all pilots and all airlines.

       Pilots cannot fly more than 100 hours per month. In
            practice, pilots typically fly less than that--80 to 82 hours
            during a month.

       Pilots can fly no more than 8 hours per day.

       Pilots are required to get at least 9 hours of time off
            between trips.

        All airlines construct their pilot schedules in strict adherence to
    Federal rest rules. In addition, many airlines have agreements with
    their pilot unions, further limiting the length of their scheduled
    working days. Computers are used to track pilots' flight and duty time
    to ensure that they are working within the FAA rest rule limits. Pilots
    are also required to maintain their own log books and are directed to
    alert airline management if they are approaching a limit. These systems
    alert airline management if a pilot is approaching FAA limits.
        Additionally, airlines provide training to pilots so that they can
    accurately recognize the signs of fatigue. It is the professional
    responsibility of every pilot, if he or she does not feel sufficiently
    well rested, to say so and not fly. Airlines have non-punitive policies
    in place that allow pilots to drop the trip if the pilot feels
    incapable of flying alertly. Backup flight crews are in place
    specifically for this purpose.
        Pilots must maintain this professional responsibility and ethical
    obligation to passengers and their fellow crewmembers to conduct
    themselves in a manner that ensures they are well rested. In fact, the
    great majority of regional airline pilots are consummate professionals
    that embrace their responsibilities without hesitation and without
    compromise. While there are strict FAA rules and regulations in place
    to ensure pilots have enough time off between duty periods, it is the
    pilot's responsibility to ensure they get enough rest during their time
    off and to notify the airline promptly in any case where the pilot did
    not get sufficient rest.
        Among the other issues of interest to this Committee, which I would
    like to review, is pilot compensation.
        Pilot Pay. The entire airline industry--regional, majors, and low-
    cost airlines--has a highly unionized workforce that is paid a fair and
    reasonable wage. Pay levels, the option to commute, and virtually all
    other work rules are negotiated through the collective bargaining
    process.
        The average salary for a regional pilot with the rank of Captain at
    an RAA member airline is $76,000 a year. This salary is comparable to
    other professions that utilize similar skills. For example, according
    to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average salary in the
    architecture and engineering fields is $71,430 per year. In the
    computer industry or in mathematical sciences the average annual salary
    is $74,500.
        A First Officer has less seniority and responsibility than a
    Captain. The average salary for a First Officer, working at an RAA
    member airline, is $32,000 a year. Again, this salary is in line with
    comparable professions. The average salary for a paramedic is $31,980;
    medical assistants average $29,060 per year.
        Pilots earn a fair and reasonable wage and also receive valuable
    benefits such as free airline travel, paid leave, and comprehensive
    benefits. Also, pilots, while on duty, receive collectively-bargained
    per diem expenses.
        Commuting. Some pilots choose to commute and live away from their
    crew base, which is the airport from which they will begin and end
    every flight assignment. In fact, commuting is a common and long-
    standing practice among crewmembers at all airlines, regional and
    major.
        Whether to commute and what constitutes an acceptable commute is a
    choice made by each individual crewmember. In fact, the ability to live
    where they want to and to fly to where they work is a valuable perk
    that attracts pilots to the profession. It is important to note that,
    while many pilots commute, many others do not. Commuting is not
    necessitated by economics. In fact regional airlines have crew bases in
    dozens of attractive and affordable communities across the country.
        On the other hand, those who choose long commutes have a
    professional responsibility to arrive at work properly rested. As I
    mentioned earlier, the airlines have non-punitive policies in place to
    relieve a pilot who is not rested or feels fatigued.
    Moving Forward: Strategic Safety Initiative
        RAA is a strong supporter of and full participant in the FAA's call
    to action. At the request of the Administrator, senior officials from
    the regional airlines, including five RAA member CEOs, attended the
    FAA's Call to Action meeting on Monday, June 15. The consensus reached
    at Monday's meeting is that safety is a shared responsibility. In fact,
    many specific safety objectives discussed at Monday's meeting were
    already included as part of the Strategic Safety Initiative (discussed
    in detail below) launched by RAA member airlines last week.
        We will continue to support and participate in this valuable
    dialogue as FAA conducts similar safety summits across the Nation this
    summer, at which we will address our shared safety goals with our
    partners within labor and government and with our mainline partners.
        Indeed, the purpose of the Regional Airline Association's Strategic
    Safety Initiative is to study and recommend actions responsive to
    challenges facing the airline industry. The initiative has four
    elements:

        1. Review Safety Procedures
          The Regional Airline Association will form a task force comprised
                of safety directors and operations directors from the
                regional airlines to review safety procedures, giving
                particular attention to any issue or procedure cited by the
                NTSB as a contributing factor to any accident.

        2. Study Impact of Fatigue
          RAA will commission a study to look at the impact of fatigue and
                other human factors on pilot performance. The study will be
                conducted by an independent and expert organization, in all
                likelihood a university with a respected aviation program.
          The study will be framed by a Strategic Safety Advisory Board
                comprised of industry experts drawn from the ranks of
                academia, industry, and safety regulators.

        3. Fatigue Awareness Management Program
          The Regional Airline Association will create a fatigue awareness
                management program for use by its member airlines.

        4. Recommendations to Congress
          We are committed to working with Congress on this initiative and
                believe that Congress can provide the aviation industry
                with additional safety tools, including:

          a. Single Data base of Pilot Records
                    Requiring the FAA to maintain a single, integrated
                    database of pilot records would provide airlines with
                    critical, real-time information about pilot
                    qualifications and performance, thereby improving the
                    process of recruiting, hiring, and training new pilots.

          b. Random Fatigue Tests
                    Airlines are already required to conduct random drug
                    and alcohol tests on pilots. RAA recommends exploring
                    with FAA and all industry stakeholders the concept of
                    random fatigue tests on pilots to help ensure that
                    pilots are indeed rested before flying.

          c. Commuting
                    We believe it would be prudent for Congress, working
                    with all stakeholders, to examine commuting in depth,
                    including the possibility of limiting commuting time
                    prior to beginning a work assignment.

          d. Extend Background Check Time Frame
                    Under current law, an airline conducting a background
                    check on a pilot can only review the last 5 years of
                    the pilot's safety records, qualifications, and
                    training. Extending the review period to 10 years will
                    help airlines identify safety risks.

          e. Explore Use of Cockpit Voice Recordings for Accident
                Prevention
                    Currently, cockpit voice recordings can be reviewed
                    only as an accident investigation tool, and RAA clearly
                    understands the sensitive privacy issues involved and
                    the years-long debate about access to the CVRs. Yet, as
                    we saw in the flight 3407 accident, pilots have
                    violated the rule requiring sterile cockpit below
                    10,000 feet. In our collaborative safety effort,
                    stakeholder groups must look at all potential tools to
                    improve flight safety, including reaching out to our
                    employee groups to explore random, non-punitive ways in
                    which this essential information can be used to prevent
                    accidents. Similar to ASAP and other diagnostic
                    preventative safety programs, an initiative permitting
                    random audits could provide valuable information.

          f. Improved Tracking and Analysis of Check Rides
                    Current discussion suggests confusion relating to check
                    rides--the image of pilots who have failed check rides
                    continuing to fly aircraft. Every airline pilot is
                    required to pass frequent check-rides during their
                    airline service, and pilots cannot fly until they have
                    successfully completed their required check rides. We
                    believe FAA and the airlines may be able to increase
                    the level of safety through a more detailed analysis of
                    this testing over the entirety of a pilot's career. By
                    working with regulators and the employee groups, the
                    industry may develop a better methodology for assessing
                    pilot performance and instituting remedial training
                    programs that will ensure a higher level of safety.

        We will be moving expeditiously to implement this initiative and
    have already begun compiling a list of aviation experts as candidates
    for our Strategic Safety Advisory Board. We will keep the Committee
    informed of these activities.
        Mr. Chairman, the Regional Airline Association appreciates the
    opportunity to testify before the Committee this morning and I welcome
    any questions you might have.

        Senator Dorgan. Mr. Cohen, thank you very much for your
    testimony.
        Next, we will hear from Captain John Prater, the President
    of the Air Line Pilots Association.
        Mr. Prater----
        Captain Prater. Thank you----
        Senator Dorgan.--you may proceed.

             STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JOHN PRATER, PRESIDENT,
               AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL

        Captain Prater. Thank you, Chairman Dorgan.
        We commend this Committee for calling this hearing to take
    a closer look at some of the critical issues affecting airline
    pilots and our charges. Many of these issues--pilot screening
    and hiring standards, training and mentoring--were at the top
    of the agenda at the FAA's Call to Action Summit in which we
    participated, on Monday. While this meeting was a critical
    first step toward developing solutions to these problems, we
    encourage the FAA to take a more structured approach in working
    with the airlines and labor to establish an agreed-to
    implementation plan for all parties to adopt.
        In recent years, we have to look more at the system. The
    major airlines have come to rely heavily on codeshare
    arrangements with the so-called regional airlines to connect
    large, mid-sized, and small cities in the U.S., in Canada, in
    Mexico, to their international hubs. This has resulted in the
    exponential growth of the regional sector of the industry.
    Still, the major carriers exert a great deal--almost total
    pressure on the regional airlines to provide their service at
    the lowest possible price. They control ticket pricing and
    schedules, and they regularly move flying between their
    regional partners. This exacerbates breaking the chain of pilot
    experience. Couple that with 160 or more bankruptcies in the
    airline industry, and airline pilots leaving the industry
    because there has been no way to protect and retain that
    experience in the cockpit, we start over again and again.
        Some of the major airlines, even today, are outsourcing
    their flying to the regionals and laying off their own pilots,
    losing those decades of experience to the profession. These
    experienced pilots cannot afford to work for one of these so-
    called ``regional carriers'' as a newly hired first officer. As
    a result, many of the smaller regional carriers hire pilots
    near the FAA minimum standards and do not employ adequate
    screening processes during hiring that identify that ideal
    candidate.
        As was brought out during the NTSB's recent hearing on the
    tragic accident in Buffalo, many pilots who fly for the
    regional airlines are not getting adequate training or enough
    rest. Airlines are requiring pilots to work longer days, and
    more of them each month. Fleet and frequent base changes are
    forcing pilots to decide between commuting or possibly taking
    another pay cut to train on new equipment.
        The consequences? The quality of airline pilot careers has
    been greatly diminished, and the severe erosion of benefits and
    quality of life are motivating experienced aviators to move to
    other professions.
        Current training practices do not take into account the
    drastic change in pilot applicants' experience. Instead, they
    assume that pilots are far more experienced than they may
    actually be. ALPA believes there must be a new focus on
    standardization and even on fundamental flying skills.
        To meet this challenge, airlines and other training
    providers must develop methodologies to train for that lack of
    experience and to train for judgment. Current training
    practices may also need to be adjusted to account for the
    source and the experience level of that new pilot entering into
    initial training with his or her airline.
        ALPA also believes there should be more stringent academic
    requirements to obtain both commercial and airline transport
    pilot ratings in preparation to starting a career as an airline
    pilot. The FAA should develop and implement a structured and
    rigorous ground school and testing procedures for pilots who
    want to qualify to fly for Part 121 airlines.
        ALPA also recommends that airlines provide specific command
    and leadership training courses for new captains, to instill in
    them the necessary skills and traits to be a real leader on the
    flight deck. Airlines should also implement mentoring programs
    for both captains and first officers as they first enter
    operations in their new crew positions to help them apply the
    knowledge and skills to line operations from their more
    experienced peers.
        Flight experience and pilot capabilities cannot be measured
    by mere flight hours. We must remember that each and every
    pilot out there today has met the FAA standards, has met and
    trained and exceeded the standards of their airline, who's
    responsible for certifying them.
        Turning to another area of concern, for two decades you
    have heard me and my predecessors speak about the pilot--
    problem of pilot fatigue. It's time. We need to address those
    rules, and we need to change them.
        Other means to enhance safety and improve airline
    operations, we agree with Mr. May, data collection and analysis
    programs, such--in FOQA and ASAP--we need to share that
    information across the industry and then modify our practices
    to make sure that the best practices are being used by the
    entire family of airlines. In order to allow those programs to
    grow and make these reports more readily obtainable, additional
    legislative protections will be needed to limit the use of ASAP
    and FOQA data in civil liability cases and to ensure that the
    information is used to increase safety.
        The best safety device on any airplane is a well-trained,
    well-rested, highly motivated pilot. A strong safety culture
    must be instilled and consistently reinforced from the highest
    levels within an airline and among its codeshare regional
    partners.
        Thank you for the opportunity to address you, and I'll be
    ready to take any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Captain Prater follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Captain John Prater, President,
                   Air Line Pilots Association, International
        Good morning. I am John Prater, President of the Air Line Pilots
    Association, International (ALPA). ALPA is the world's largest pilot
    union, representing nearly 54,000 pilots who fly for 36 airlines in the
    U.S. and Canada. ALPA was founded in 1931 and our motto since its
    beginning is ``Schedule with Safety.'' For more than 77 years, ALPA has
    had a tremendous impact on improving aviation safety. ALPA is a
    founding member of the International Federation of Air Line Pilots
    Associations (IFALPA) and the U.S. and Canada representative to the
    Federation which joins the pilots of over 100 nations together in
    safety and security harmonization efforts. Today, ALPA continues to be
    the world's leading aviation safety advocate, protecting the safety and
    security interests of our passengers, fellow crewmembers, and cargo
    around the world. ALPA has lived up to its mandate to the extent that
    many in the industry, including a former FAA administrator, have
    referred to us as the ``conscience of the airline industry.''
        We applaud the Committee for holding this hearing and appreciate
    this opportunity to testify about ``Aviation Safety: The Role and
    Responsibilities of Commercial Air Carriers and Employees.'' We would
    like to begin our testimony by discussing crewmember fatigue.
    Crewmember Fatigue
        Fatigue may adversely affect every flight crew member every time
    they fly. Due to airline economic conditions which require pilots to
    work longer days and more of them than ever before, fatigue has reached
    alarming levels within the industry. The FAA's flight and duty time
    regulations are woefully inadequate to address today's situation and
    have not significantly changed in over 60 years, since well before jet
    transports came into use in the late 1950s. The current U.S. flight and
    duty time rules are a patchwork of regulations that are intended to
    address disparate domestic, international flag, and supplemental
    operations. There have been a number of attempts to revise the
    regulations over the past 25 years, but those attempts have met with
    generally abysmal results because of the contentious disagreement by
    the stakeholders as to which changes were appropriate or needed.
        One fact about pilot fatigue that is not widely known is that
    airline pilots frequently spend much more time at work each day than
    the number of hours recorded actually flying an airplane. This is
    especially true in the regional industry although the work schedules at
    the so-called ``legacy carriers'' are by no means free of these same
    concerns. Currently, airline pilots are routinely assigned duty days of
    up to 15 hours. During a typical 14- to 15-hour duty day, a pilot can
    expect to be assigned fewer than 8 hours of flying but up to 8
    individual take offs and landings, in various types of weather and
    across multiple time zones. The time not flying may be spent performing
    duties such as checking weather, dealing with routing, dispatch and
    flight paperwork, overseeing aircraft loading and unloading, dealing
    with mechanical issues, waiting on the ground between flights, and
    similar activities. Thus, although a pilot may have only flown 7 or
    fewer flight hours by the end of a duty day, he or she could easily
    have been on duty 14 or 15 hours. This work pattern may be repeated
    over a period of several days. The weight of the scientific evidence
    accumulated over the last 20 or so years has firmly established that
    the vast majority of humans simply cannot be expected to reliably and
    safely perform operational tasks beyond 12 to 14 hours on duty. It
    cannot be overstated that pilots are making their most critical
    decisions on landings at the very end of their duty day which, due to
    unplanned circumstances, can easily be 20 hours or more since their
    last rest period. It is worth noting in this context that most fatal
    accidents occur during the landing phase of flight.
        The airlines are required to give pilots only an 8-hour break after
    any duty day, regardless of its length. Unfortunately, this 8-hour
    minimum break does not provide an adequate opportunity for recuperative
    sleep because the break is not an opportunity for 8 hours of sleep, but
    rather a period of time away from the aircraft. During the 8-hour
    break, it is not unusual for a pilot to be left with a maximum 4 or 5
    hours of sleep opportunity. This occurs because the FAA has defined all
    time away from the airplane (``release to report'') on a trip as
    ``rest.'' Incredible as it may seem, the time a pilot spends waiting
    for a hotel shuttle and going through airport security screening is
    defined as ``rest'' under the current FAA regulatory scheme. A pilot
    must also attend to all of his or her other non-work-related daily
    physical and nutritional needs and requirements during this 8-hour
    break away from the aircraft. It is not at all unusual for a pilot to
    elect to forego a meal so as not to further reduce their sleep
    opportunity. This situation is highly objectionable-sleep experts agree
    that most adults require 7 to 8 hours of sleep each night to meet their
    physiological needs and restore their alertness. Pilots need a longer,
    and genuine, daily rest period than is allowed under current
    regulations.
        Another serious deficiency in current regulations is the failure to
    acknowledge circadian rhythms. Every human has an internal circadian
    cycle that determines sleep and wakefulness. Typical ``circadian low''
    cycles (i.e., a period of reduced wakefulness and energy) will occur
    from approximately 3 to 5 a.m. and again from 3 to 5 p.m. Performance
    and alertness may be decreased during the nocturnal window, which is
    from approximately 2 a.m. until 6 a.m., depending on individual
    variability. Flight and duty regulations need to acknowledge this
    cycle.
        Because the FAA's present fatigue regulations are antiquated and
    outmoded, they have frequently been augmented by contractual work rules
    negotiated between pilots and their employers in the decades from 1960
    to the mid 80s. Through the restructuring of pilot contracts in
    corporate bankruptcies (note: over 160 U.S. airlines have gone through
    bankruptcy since 1980) and the complete absence of negotiated work rule
    improvements at many carriers, there has been non-uniform treatment of
    flight duty and rest limitations at the various airlines, leaving only
    the antiquated Federal Aviation Regulations to govern maximum duty days
    and minimum rest periods for thousands of airline pilots. Further
    exacerbating the problem is the fact that pilot wage rates and pensions
    were slashed by more than 30 percent in corporate bankruptcies forcing
    pilots to accept even more flights or face their own financial crisis.
    Fatigue provisions are rarely found within any pilot contract,
    especially within a regional airline agreement. Of the regional
    contracts that do have such provisions, only one of which we are aware
    allows a pilot to recoup his or her lost pay. All contracts of which we
    are aware contain real threats of disciplinary action if the company
    determines that a pilot's claim of fatigue was fraudulent.
        In recent times, there has been severe pressure on individual
    airlines to slash pilot staffing and reduce rest periods to minimum
    levels due to a belief that such actions would result in
    ``productivity'' increases necessary for economic survival. The demands
    for more monthly and yearly flight hours flown by fewer pilots has lead
    to endemic fatigue levels, and with fewer pilots staffed on reserve or
    standby duty for weather disruptions, pilots are forced to fly more
    flights to the upper limits of the FARs or watch as scheduled flights
    are canceled for lack of available rested crews. The fatigue cushion
    once provided by negotiated work rules has been virtually eliminated
    largely due to a single-minded focus by airline managements on
    minimizing the labor costs associated with flight operations. This
    elimination of the fatigue protections once provided by negotiated work
    rules that were developed over decades of experience at most
    established air carriers means that today, for more and more pilots,
    the bare minimum protections afforded by the FAA flight and rest
    regulations have become a daily way of life.
        The current cumulative effects of reduced rest resulting from
    working to minimum FAA limits, combined with the effect of personal
    financial stress and uncertainty brought about by nearly 8 years of
    severe economic downtimes in the industry, have taken a severe toll
    upon pilots. Many pilots feel that they are just hanging on to a barely
    tolerable job instead of pursuing a once-promising career. Today's
    airline pilot is typically working substantially more hours for less
    money and spending more hours away from home than his or her
    predecessors. In addition, regularly required training events are
    crammed on top of the monthly flight schedule often paying less than 3
    hours of pay for 8 hours of training with none of that time counting
    toward the FAR flight time limits. The repeated attempts by airline
    managements in recent years to return U.S. airlines to an era of
    profitability by cutting labor costs continues to be paid for by the
    daily sacrifices and toil of airline pilots and other workers.
        ALPA joins the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which
    since 1990 has identified reducing accidents and incidents caused by
    human fatigue as one of its ``Most Wanted Transportation Safety
    Improvements'' in the United States, in calling for revisions to the
    current FAA regulations based on fatigue research, circadian rhythms,
    and sleep and rest requirements. The current FAA rules glaringly fail
    to adequately address any of these issues and reform is decades
    overdue. Other U.S. Federal agencies have moved toward scientifically-
    based worker fatigue regulations; the FAA is simply lagging behind
    other agencies when it comes to the need to modernize its fatigue
    rules.
        When addressing possible revisions to the current FAA flight duty
    and rest regulations applicable to pilots, airlines and their pilots
    are immediately at cross-purposes. Managements are looking for more
    availability and ``productivity'' from flight crews. For flight crews,
    safety advocates and scientists, the question is often not whether to
    change the current rules, but rather how much to reduce the current
    maximum flight and duty limitations to enhance safety, raise human
    performance to acceptable levels, and reduce risk. Hence, the past
    approach of creating proposed regulations on notions of operational
    necessity without the assistance of scientists and technical advisors,
    or reference to the technical literature, has failed. Needed are rules
    which are grounded in the results of scientifically based fatigue
    studies and safety reports.
        The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has enacted
    standards that will become effective in November 2009 which will
    require participating states to adopt rules limiting airline pilot duty
    periods that are based on science. The United States' airline pilot
    fatigue rules currently do not meet this new international standard and
    the FAA will be under pressure to comply. In Europe, new regulations
    governing airline pilot flight time limitations were enacted in 2008.
    While implementation of these new regulations in individual European
    Union member states is an ongoing process, the design and
    implementation of scientifically-based airline pilot fatigue rules has
    been underway in Europe for some time. For example, the United Kingdom
    has for years had science-based airline pilot flight and duty time
    regulations. The U.K.'s rules, embodied in Civil Aviation Authority
    document CAP 371, account for human circadian rhythms and adjust
    maximum pilot duty periods based on time of day, number of flight legs,
    time zones crossed, acclimatization to local time and other factors.
    Under these scientifically-based rules, if a pilot who is normally
    awake during the day and asleep at night reports for duty during the
    middle of the night, he or she is simply not permitted to work as long
    as if he or she reported during normal daylight hours. The current FAA
    rules incorporate none of these modern, scientifically-justified
    fatigue protections.
        Pilots performing commercial flying duties must have regulatory
    safeguards which provide them with an opportunity to get an adequate
    night of sleep before each duty day of flying. In some cases, pilots
    may lack access to adequate rest facilities to obtain needed
    recuperative sleep in order to prepare to safely operate the next
    flight or series of flights. Unfortunately, the combination of duty
    periods and personal or industry economic circumstances may in some
    cases operate to deny a pilot a realistic opportunity to obtain
    facilities for needed rest. Ensuring that a meaningful opportunity for
    rest is provided combined with a scientifically determined maximum
    length duty day, including provisions for the type of flying
    accomplished--whether it be traditional short haul, multiple sector
    flying or flights across multiple time zones--is essential to ensure
    that the U.S. air transportation system continues its envied record of
    safety. We believe it is possible to implement needed regulatory
    changes that will adequately address safety needs and the issues
    related to pilot fatigue without negatively impacting the ability of
    the Nation's airlines to serve the needs of the public.
        To that end, we were pleased the Commerce Committee included a
    provision in S. 1300 to arrange for a study by the National Academy of
    Sciences on pilot fatigue which will examine recommendations made by
    the NTSB and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
    on this subject, and provide recommendations concerning the FAA's
    flight and duty regulations. ALPA stands ready to work with regulators
    and the industry to develop science-based rules that will adequately
    address the problem of fatigue.
    Fatigue Risk Management Systems
        A fatigue risk management system (FRMS) is a science-based, data-
    driven process used to continuously monitor and manage fatigue risks.
    An FRMS is intended to be implemented within an airline's safety
    management system (SMS) to allow operational efficiency for unique and
    specific operations when needed while also mitigating fatigue-inducing
    factors. An FRMS offers an effective, alternative means of evaluating
    and managing risk when compared to a purely prescriptive scheme but it
    is intended to be built upon--and create synergy with--defined,
    prescriptive flight and duty time regulations. I would invite the
    Committee to review ALPA's white paper on FRMS, published in June 2008,
    for additional information on this subject.
        Revised regulations must provide guidance based on science that
    accounts for start and stop times related to crew circadian rhythms,
    the number of takeoffs and landings related to crew duty days, and any
    time zones that must be crossed. Science-based regulations, coupled
    with an FRMS, can allow some flexibility in unusual flight operational
    situations.
        Since fatigue is such a critical factor in daily airline
    operations, ALPA published The Airline Pilots' Guide to Fighting
    Fatigue in October 2008. This booklet may be carried by crews and
    provides guidance to understanding and dealing with fatigue.
    Understanding and mitigating fatigue is extremely important and assists
    crews in flying in as rested a state as possible, given the inadequate
    regulations governing the tempo of operations. We are presently
    updating this document to give pilots guidance on ``responsible
    commuting.''
    Airline Training Programs
        Most airlines, which include many of the major or ``legacy''
    carriers and the larger, ``mature,'' regional airlines, do an
    outstanding job of hiring and training pilots. They normally require
    significant flight experience including substantial amounts of multi-
    engine and turbojet time. However, some smaller regional airlines which
    may have very thin profit margins due to the economics of the contract
    between them and their major airline, have traditionally not offered
    compensation packages which enable them to hire experienced pilots. As
    a result, they must often employ pilots with little experience and bare
    minimum qualifications who are willing to take these low-paying
    positions in exchange for an opportunity to build experience so that
    they can move to a career airline.
        Some airline training programs, including those at mature regional
    airlines, are extensive and exceed the regulatory minimums. When pilot
    experience at the new-hire level dropped severely below 1,000 hours, or
    less than a year's worth of total flight experience, these airlines
    wisely extended their training process and doubled the initial
    operating experience (IOE) program requirement for these pilots.
    However, this cannot be said for all airlines.
        Economic pressures push some airlines to train to the minimum
    requirements set by regulations. These minimums were established
    decades ago and were based on pilots coming into the airlines with much
    more experience than many pilots have today. Experience allows pilots
    to broaden their approach to problem solving and decisionmaking above
    the technical proficiency needed to fly the aircraft. It allows for the
    recognition of outside patterns and trends that develop during the
    course of routine flights and permits crewmembers to accomplish tasks
    specific to their cockpit position as well as be aware of the tasks
    being performed by other crewmembers. Experienced pilots tend to
    identify more pertinent clues and generate more alternatives in problem
    solving and decisionmaking than inexperienced pilots
        ALPA believes the licensing and training methodologies used
    successfully in the past may not work where airline pilots entering
    airline operations do not have the background or experience that
    previous generations of incoming airline pilots possessed. In meeting
    this challenge, the airlines and other training providers must develop
    methodologies to ``train experience'' that in the past was acquired in
    the traditional maturation and progression to becoming an airline
    pilot. This training should include extensive and detailed academic
    courses of learning taught in classrooms by well-qualified instructors.
    Screening
        Few, if any, airlines tailor their training programs based on their
    new hires' past flying experience. The airline industry has seen
    significant changes--some of which involve pilot demographics--that
    have not been reflected in our training practices. For example, there
    are considerably fewer former military pilots in the airline ranks than
    in years past. The military services extensively screen their
    candidates, who are generally required to have a four-year college
    degree, before being accepted into pilot training. Once accepted,
    military training provides intense and rigorous classroom academic
    instruction as well as in-depth flight instruction that takes over 1
    year. Additionally, pilots today coming from non-military backgrounds
    often do not have the challenging experience of their predecessors on
    which to build--e.g. flying corporate, night freight, or flight
    instructing--before being hired at entry-level, or regional air
    carriers. These demographic changes require a new focus on
    standardization and professionalism training and even some fundamental
    flying skills. The previous training programs based on the assumption
    of more experienced pilot candidates will not be sufficient; ``one-
    size-fits-all'' training is ill suited to the task.
        The financial commitment of training and the historical time
    commitment to build experience to qualify to be hired by an airline
    through the civilian route and the considerable time and sacrifices
    needed to serve in the military acted as a screening process to
    eliminate those only marginally interested in becoming an airline
    pilot. However, with new pilots being hired with as little as 200 hours
    total flight time (much of which could have been in a simulator) and
    fewer military pilots seeking airline jobs, this de facto screening
    process that helped ensure only the highest performing people make it
    to the airlines is no longer effective. Today, many regional airlines
    do nothing to discourage their experienced pilots from quitting so as
    to hire lower-paid replacements.
        Flight experience and pilot capabilities cannot be measured by mere
    flight hours. Airlines used to have an extensive screening process that
    included psychological tests, academic knowledge tests, simulator
    flying skill evaluations and medical conditioning exams. As the number
    of pilot applicants declines and airlines become more desperate to fill
    the positions, these screening processes have been reduced and some
    elements completely eliminated.
        Airlines need to reestablish thorough screening processes, or their
    equivalent, to ensure that the applicants they hire will be able to
    maintain an equivalent or better level of safety, professionalism and
    performance than their predecessors. Flight schools need to implement
    extensive screening processes for students pursuing a professional
    pilot career. Regulators need to provide the oversight to ensure that
    these screening tools are implemented effectively by the airlines and
    flight training organizations, as well as modify pilot qualification
    regulations to include much more rigorous education and testing
    requirements in order to provide a screening process that begins prior
    to initial pilot certification and continues at the airlines.
    Command and Leadership Training
        The FAA does not currently require command training for pilots who
    upgrade to captain. The agency does require that an applicant for an
    airline transport pilot certificate have knowledge of aeronautical
    decisionmaking and judgment, as well as crew resource management, to
    include crew communication and coordination. We do not consider these
    requirements to rise to the level of command training. The difference
    between the two approaches is a focus on knowing what to do versus
    knowing how to do it. Training in decisionmaking, for example, might
    emphasize all the things that a pilot must investigate in order to make
    a sound decision, but might not provide strategies for how to stick to
    that good decision in the face of pressure from outside entities to
    compromise.
        The role of captain includes far more than the ability to fly the
    aircraft from the left seat and perform the checklists. Some airlines
    have courses for teaching prospective captains how to lead a crew,
    exercise command authority, take charge of a situation, and so forth,
    all of which are critical safety skills that must be learned. They are
    not simply inherent to being the one ``in charge.'' Specific training
    should include emphasis on setting the tone for compliance by adhering
    to standardized procedures. Other topics that should be trained include
    reinforcing the skills, aptitude, and character necessary to lead
    fellow crewmembers (informally or otherwise) in compliance with
    procedures.
    Need for Stronger Academic Emphasis
        The Joint Aviation Authority (JAA), now the European Aviation
    Safety Agency (EASA), and FAA pilot licensing requirements are both
    ICAO-compliant. The single biggest difference between EASA and FAA is
    knowledge requirements. The FAA theoretical knowledge is simply not as
    demanding as EASA, which has 14 written exams versus one by the FAA,
    which is a multiple-choice exam. The EASA exams require the student to
    be tested for 30-40 hours. By stark contrast, the FAA publishes its
    exam questions with answers provided so a student can purchase them,
    study the questions, and pass its single exam. Examination questions
    are not available for EASA exams in such a manner.
        The least demanding Federal Aviation Regulations which govern
    commercial pilot license requirements (i.e.,  61.125 and  61.155)
    specify the aeronautical knowledge requirements for commercial and
    airline transport pilot ratings. These rules were written decades ago,
    when there was no expectation that they would be used as minimum
    standards to train pilots to take jobs as airline first officers. The
    requirements emphasize weather and navigation, including interaction
    with air traffic control. There is some mention of aircraft
    aerodynamics and human factors, including aeronautical decisionmaking
    and judgment as well as crew resource management. The regulations allow
    self-study and many such training courses emphasize passing the test
    rather than learning the material. We do not feel these requirements
    are adequate to prepare a professional airline pilot. The ground
    instruction of these subjects needs to be strengthened with required
    formal classroom academic instruction and more extensive testing and
    examination.
        The EASA-approved training course for a commercial airline pilot
    tends to be rather structured and rigorous. FAA should develop and
    implement a corollary ground school and testing process in FAR Part 121
    for all pilots who seek commercial airline careers. Testing akin to the
    quality of the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) exams or bar exam for
    attorneys would benefit aviation by serving as a screening tool to
    ensure that, in the future, only the most knowledgeable and dedicated
    pilots join the ranks of airline pilots.
    Airline Relationships
        The past several years have been very turbulent ones for the major,
    legacy airlines which have experienced numerous bankruptcies and
    changing operations. Rather than using their own pilots on the mainline
    seniority list to fly the 50- to 90-seat jet aircraft or modern 76-seat
    turboprop aircraft into mid-size and smaller cities in the U.S., Canada
    and Mexico, they have established economic relationships with regional
    airlines to provide this service and feed the major carriers through
    their hub cities. The major carriers exert a great deal of economic,
    and other pressures on the regional airlines to provide their service
    at the lowest possible price. The major carrier controls all aspects of
    ticket pricing and schedules and regularly moves flying between their
    regional partners, which forces major changes of pilot domiciles among
    the regional carriers. An operational and safety relationship providing
    surveillance and oversight of regional airline operations must be
    required and maintained by those major carriers who either own or
    contractually use regional airlines. Even with these relationships,
    there is no guarantee that ``One Level of Safety'' will be provided by
    the dependent carriers. Safety comes not just from oversight from an
    outside airline or organization but is an intrinsic value built into an
    airline from the highest levels of internal management. Given
    operational criteria and guidance, this value must be recognized and
    nurtured to realize true safety in operations. ALPA's endeavors to
    establish One Level of Safety and contract standards have been rebuffed
    by the managements of some mainline and regional carriers.
        Before the practice of codesharing with regional partners began,
    ALL flying was done by the pilots of an airline on one, single pilot
    seniority list. This practice ensured that several years of airline
    operations experience for newly hired airline pilots--even those with
    military or thousands of hours of previous civilian flight time--was
    earned before assuming the command responsibilities of an airline
    captain. The pilots of the name brand airline were trained and met the
    same high standards, whether they flew 70-seat DC-9's or 400-seat B-
    747's, or they were not promoted to be an airline captain. The pilots
    that once flew for such regional airlines (which were in the 70s and
    80s referred to as ``national carriers'') as Ozark, Southern, North
    Central, Hughes AirWest, AirCal , Allegheny, Piedmont, PSA, and
    Frontier, held career jobs at those carriers. They flew 40-50 seat
    propeller-powered aircraft and 70- to 100-seat jet aircraft. They had
    good jobs with pensions, work rules, and wages that made them career
    destinations. Those pilots were not just trying to gain experience to
    get a job with a major airline. Their pilot seniority list operated to
    guarantee stability and years of cockpit experience before assuming
    command. The merger mania of the 80s saw those carriers swept into the
    major or legacy airlines.
        Then, as competitive cost concerns increased with the post-
    deregulated upstart carriers, the legacy airlines began to outsource
    the flying to as many as a dozen new ``regional'' partners flying 30-
    to 50-seat props and 50- to 90-seat jets. The name brand airline then
    began the practice of having their ``partners'' bid against each other
    to maintain these ``fee for departure'' outsourcing contracts. As the
    legacy airlines replaced more and more mainline flying by this
    outsourcing scheme to regional operators, they furloughed hundreds of
    highly experienced pilots, and refused to allow these experienced
    pilots to fly for the contractor carrier, effectively replacing them
    with lower paid and lower experienced pilots.
        With this overriding concern on lowering costs by the legacy
    carrier, the stable and experienced regional partners were whipsawed
    against each other and forced to continually lower their costs to
    today's substandard levels or be replaced by another newly created
    contractor. This system of replacing one regional with another has
    created unprecedented, rapid growth at a few low-cost regionals where
    newly hired pilots are upgraded to Captain with less than 1 year of air
    line flying experience. A copilot seeking to upgrade to captain with
    the minimum of 1,500 total hours has not been through several years of
    thunderstorms and winter storms despite the fact that they meet the FAA
    minimums. He or she has not flown with hundreds of other Captains nor
    been through several years of annual training and checking events.
    Before this unconscionable focus on outsourcing mania began, most
    airline pilots would have 10 or more years of airline experience as a
    co-pilot before qualifying for command.
        The legacy airlines grant these outsourcing contracts to the
    regional carriers for short periods from 2 to 7 years so that higher
    costs and their experienced pilots can once again be replaced by new
    airlines with new pilots. Today, even though the ``regional'' carriers
    are flying up to 40 percent of the U.S. airline domestic system, few of
    the regional airline pilot jobs created by the outsourcing schemes are
    worthy of an experienced aviator career. The duties and responsibility
    of a captain and a co-pilot flying 30 to 100 passengers for a regional
    partner airline is just as important to their passengers as a Captain
    flying a B-777 or Airbus 330 for a legacy carrier. In a further example
    of this safety compromising business practice, the legacy airline, will
    oftentimes during growth periods refuse to hire the experienced
    ``regional'' pilot from one of their fully owned or contract partners
    to become a co-pilot on a 100-120 seat mainline airplane. However, that
    same pilot may be a captain flying a complex jet aircraft with 70
    passengers on 5 or 6 flights per day in the service of the codeshare,
    mainline airline which sold the ticket to the passengers. This cycle of
    outsourcing with very little oversight by the ticket-selling carrier
    has created a very unstable environment which has broken the One Level
    of Safety mandate.
        The NTSB has performed several safety studies of the regional, air
    taxi, and air carrier industry. As a result of those studies, the Board
    called upon major airlines and their code-sharing partners to establish
    a program of operational oversight that would include periodic safety
    audits of flight operations, training programs, and maintenance and
    inspection as well as emphasize the exchange of information and
    resources that will enhance the safety of flight operations. The Board
    believes that there may be large differences between code-sharing
    partners in terms of the knowledge, expertise, and other resources for
    assuring safe operations. They noted that this is particularly true
    when a code-sharing carrier uses the brand identity name and paint
    scheme of the larger carrier. Passengers have no choice but to fly on
    the code-share carriers even though they purchased their ticket from
    the major carrier and deserve the same level of operational oversight,
    control and service, which the code-share partner may not be able to
    deliver.
        The regional airlines, in their own cost-saving measures, have gone
    to extraordinary lengths to provide their product at the lowest
    possible price. As an example, Trans States Holdings, which operates
    Trans States Airlines, established a second subsidiary airline, GoJet
    Airlines, which operates United Express flights from United Airlines
    hubs at Chicago O'Hare, Denver, and Washington Dulles airports flying
    Bombardier CRJ700 Regional Jets. A passenger buying a ticket on United
    Airlines may very well, unwittingly, end up on a GoJet flight. As a new
    airline, GoJet can abrogate prior relationships their parent airline
    may have with service providers to provide cheap airline seats for
    their codeshare partner.
        Another example of this type of cost pressure can be seen at
    Midwest Airlines which has outsourced over 75 percent of its flying to
    regional partners. They have laid off 75 percent of their experienced
    pilots and replaced them by contracting with Republic and Skywest
    Airlines. Midwest Airlines refuses to train their long-time pilots in
    the new smaller jet aircraft. This has the effect of the Midwest pilots
    with over 15 years of airline experience being replaced by pilots with
    less than 3 years experience in a blatant disregard for the value of
    its own employees. Economics of outsourcing to cheaper contractors has
    clearly trumped the safety value of maintaining experience in the
    cockpit.
        Pilots flying for airlines like GoJet, Gulfstream, Colgan and
    others are at the bottom of the economic scale with starting salaries
    below $20,000 per year. In many cases, pilots have accumulated
    extraordinary costs just to earn the basic FAA licenses of commercial,
    instrument and multi-engine ratings. A 4-year flight education at a
    college or university can cost from $120,000 to $180,000, or more. It
    is difficult to repay these expenses and maintain any sort of
    reasonable lifestyle on the starting pay of a regional pilot. So these
    jobs frequently end up as a stepping stone to a major carrier, an
    opportunity to build valuable flight time before moving on to a more
    lucrative job with a major carrier. In fact, some airlines publicly
    call themselves ``stepping stones'' without reservation, as could be
    heard in a recent NTSB public hearing. This type of relationship
    effectively represents a disincentive to provide more than the bare
    minimum training or to provide any motivation for experienced employees
    to remain. Typical wage differences between major and regional carriers
    can be as much as $70,000 for a Captain and $50,000 for a first officer
    at 5 years of service. The differentials increase dramatically the
    longer the pilot is employed.
        When an economic downturn comes, operations contract, major
    airlines park their airplanes, and employees are furloughed. These
    furloughed employees will generally not take the jobs in the regional
    industry; they have other skills to market. It is a telling factor that
    as pilots were called back from furloughs following the 9/11 downturn,
    a majority chose not to return even to the major airlines; they found
    other jobs, many times in an entirely different industry, or returned
    to full-time military service. In today's economic and outsourcing
    business practices, pilots with decades of experience are laid off from
    the legacy airlines and cannot afford to work for one of the regional
    partner airlines as a newly hired first officer. Their experience is
    not given any value for employment at the legacy carrier's codeshare
    partners and they are faced with starting over as a first officer for
    less than $20,000 per year.
        In today's airline industry, the legacy major airlines have farmed
    out the flying to the lowest regional bidder while rejecting any
    attempts to retain their experienced pilots within their extended
    airline systems.
        Retirement benefits have also been reduced within the regional
    industry. Managements have refused to grant sufficient improvements for
    retirement benefits due to, among other reasons, the (assumed) belief
    that the pilot will not be there long anyway. However, as we have seen,
    the overall longevity of pilots staying at the regional level has
    increased as the economic outlook has changed. Major carriers have
    reduced their overall capacity steadily in recent years, and at the
    same time reduced their pilot headcount. When combined with the
    increase in retirement age to 65, the regional pilot may have little
    choice but to maintain employment at a carrier that offers lower wages,
    with lower health and retirement benefits and far less in quality of
    life.
    Commuting Pilots
        Aviation is a turbulent industry; numerous cost and operational
    pressures occur daily. Airlines frequently make adjustments to their
    fleets' size and geographical distribution. Crew bases open, close, or
    change, sometimes with little or no notice to employees stationed
    there. An airline that services a city or town with a Bombardier CRJ700
    jet today may serve it with an ATR-42 turboprop tomorrow and next week,
    service may cease entirely. As these operational decisions are made,
    crew bases move, change, or close. A CRJ base may become an ATR-42 base
    and the CRJ base may move to a different part of the country. When
    companies make such changes, the pilots involved may have several
    alternatives. They can move to the new base where CRJs are being flown,
    they can remain where they live and commute to the new base, or, if
    permitted by their employer, they can be trained in the new airplane
    now being flown out of their old base, which may require a large pay
    cut. Any of these can be very disruptive for the pilots and in turn,
    their families.
        A pilot may want to stay on the CRJ, for example, but cannot or
    does not want to move to the new base. Any number of factors can
    influence that decision, including children in school, relationships
    with friends, or housing costs. For instance, the cost of living in Des
    Moines, Iowa is considerably less than the cost of living near JFK in
    New York. Thus, the pilot is more likely to maintain his home in Des
    Moines and commute to work, reducing his days off, his free time and
    his overall lifestyle. That decision to stay on the CRJ will
    necessitate commuting to the new base. The pilot may share or lease an
    apartment, plan to stay with friends, or use a hotel for accommodations
    in the new base. Generally, economic factors determine the course of
    action, but the basic problem of a relocated crew base is out of the
    pilot's control; it is forced by the industry and pilots cope as best
    they can. Most regional carriers, while they offer some expenses toward
    the moving of displaced crewmembers, offer little if anything to
    voluntary moves. The difference between voluntary and displaced
    movement is often a blurred line between having a job and losing a job.
    However in today's circumstances, even the limited monetary help a
    regional carrier may provide does not cover the costs of moving a
    family many times over a pilot's career.
        Commuting has a number of complicating factors, which include:

       employer's sick leave and attendance-reliability policies

       very few seats are available for pilots forced to commute on
            today's full airplanes,

       airline policies which prohibit positive-space
            transportation,

       inadequate or non-existent relocation provisions, and

       commuting policies which require pilots to depart home base
            with several backup flights.

        This difficult reality adds to the creation of stress and further
    increases pilot fatigue factors. ALPA encourages airline managements to
    work with their pilots to establish new or improved commuting policies
    and scheduling practices that take into account these lifestyle issues.
    Safety Data and Reporting Programs
        What should be done to make improvements now while we are
    implementing the previously discussed changes in training and
    qualifications? There are programs available to the aviation industry
    today, such as Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) and Aviation
    Safety Action Program (ASAP), that can provide important and needed
    oversight information, not only internally within air carriers, but
    also for the overall air transportation system. The safety data
    provided by these programs are making differences in safety and
    efficiency of air carrier operations. Approximately 90 percent of the
    data provided through ASAP is sole-source data. This is safety data
    that will not and cannot be gathered by other means and it can be
    critical and essential to improve the safety performance of our
    industry.
        Safety Management Systems (SMS) are mandated by ICAO standards. SMS
    programs are being developed for use by U.S. aviation entities. Safety
    reporting and safety data are intrinsic in SMS programs and ASAP and
    FOQA should be an integral part of any SMS.
        In order to make the data more readily obtained and available for
    safety improvements only, protections need to be put in place that will
    limit the data use in civil liability cases. Restraints also need to be
    strengthened for the use of the data for safety purposes only. The data
    has an important safety benefit and it must not be compromised. Unless
    there are improved protections that will limit the use of the data to
    solely safety purposes, the flow of reports will cease. These programs
    are a critical safety benefit for the industry that need to be
    nurtured, protected, and promoted at all levels of the air carrier
    industry.
    Promoting Professionalism in the Industry
        The best safety device on any airplane is a well trained, well
    rested, highly motivated pilot. A safety culture at an airline must be
    instilled and consistently reinforced from the highest levels within
    the organization. An organizational safety culture will encourage the
    highest levels of performance among professional pilots.
        This high level emphasis must go hand-in-hand with appropriate
    training. Standard operating procedures must be just that; they should
    be the operating norm for all flight crewmembers and deviations should
    not be allowed except for extraordinary circumstances. Pilots-in-
    command should be encouraged to mentor their first officers and instill
    in them the desire to maintain the highest standards of operational
    safety.
        ALPA offers professional standards programs and structure which
    reinforce professional conduct in the cockpit. Similarly, airlines need
    to provide special command training courses for new captains to instill
    in them the necessary traits to be a real leader on the flight deck. In
    addition to basic required skills such as aeronautical decisionmaking
    and crew resource management, new captains should receive training to
    reinforce the skills, aptitudes, and character necessary to properly
    lead a crew, exercise command authority, and maintain the highest
    levels of safety in the face of internal or external pressures that may
    tend to lower operational safety margins.
        In the case of the Colgan Air accident, the pilot group was new to
    ALPA, and unfortunately the professional standards structure was just
    being established.
    Mentoring Programs
        In addition to promoting professional conduct among crewmembers, at
    least one airline whose pilots ALPA represents has a detailed,
    structured, pilot-mentoring program. This program provides a wide
    variety of resources and benefits to new-hire crewmembers as they
    become acquainted with their airline and becoming an airline pilot. The
    program pairs experienced line pilots with new hire pilots in an effort
    to answer many of the frequently asked questions, such as bidding, jump
    seat travel, vacation, etc., from new hires. Pilot mentors also assist
    new hires as they transition from the training environment to flying
    the line, and throughout their first, probationary year. There is also
    another aspect of the program that assigns a senior captain or check
    airman to newly upgraded captains once they are online and out on their
    own. This greatly assists new captains as they become accustomed to
    requirements for command.
    Call to Action
        On Monday, June 15, 2009, the FAA held a meeting, a ``Call to
    Action'', for industry and FAA to identify a few key initiatives that
    can be incorporated voluntarily by operators. The subjects discussed
    included many of the very issues we are discussing here; crew
    education, professional standards and flight discipline, training
    standards, and mentoring. This was an important first step toward
    recognizing and acknowledging problems and developing and implementing
    solutions. We stand ready and look forward to future meetings so we can
    truly and thoroughly address airline safety issues and make real
    progress toward realizing One Level of Safety.
    Conclusions and Recommendations
        In conclusion, ALPA believes that it is essential, and long
    overdue, that the flight and duty time rules for commercial aviation
    operations be revised based on readily available science. Issues that
    must be addressed include providing crewmembers a minimum rest period
    that will allow an opportunity for 8 hours of sleep, and there should
    be provisions for operations on the back side of a pilot's circadian
    rhythms. Additionally, a pilot's duty day length should be based on
    when the day begins and how many flight segments are scheduled.
        In regard to training, we feel there should be more stringent
    academic requirements in FAR Part 121 to obtain both commercial and
    airline transport pilot ratings. Airlines should provide specific
    command training courses for new captains to instill in them the
    necessary skills and traits to be a real leader on the flight deck.
    Airlines should also implement mentoring programs for both captains and
    first officers as they first enter operations in their crew position to
    help them become comfortable and reinforce the knowledge and skills
    learned in training and apply them to line operations.
        Airline training needs to account for the source of their pilots
    and assume the minimum experience level. There should be structured,
    in-depth oversight of code-share partners by the major carriers to
    include periodic safety audits of flight operations, training programs,
    and maintenance and inspection. The best practices in use by major
    carriers need to be mentored into their smaller codeshare partners.
        Safety data provided through important data sharing programs such
    as FOQA and ASAP needs to be vigorously protected from inappropriate
    use and preserved for the sole purpose of improving safety and
    operational efficiency. Further, these programs need to be promoted at
    all levels of the industry.
        Finally, airline managements and their pilots should work closely
    together to promote policies and practices that instill a strong safety
    culture throughout the organization; reinforce the importance of
    professionalism in all aspects of operations; and recognize the value
    of well trained, well rested, and highly motivated employees.
        Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify today. I would be
    pleased to address any questions that you may have.

        Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much, Captain Prater.
        And finally, we will hear from Mr. Maurer, Mr. Scott
    Maurer, who is a representative of the Families of Continental
    Flight 3407.
        Mr. Maurer, I know that your daughter, Lorin, was a
    passenger on that flight, and I know that it is likely
    difficult for you to speak publicly about these issues, but, on
    behalf of the families, I believe that all of you wanted an
    opportunity to do that, and I am pleased to give you that
    opportunity. And our thoughts and sympathies are with you and
    the families.

          STATEMENT OF SCOTT MAURER, FATHER OF LORIN MAURER,
       REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FAMILIES OF CONTINENTAL FLIGHT 3407

        Mr. Maurer. Thank you. And bear with me.
        On behalf of the Families of Continental Flight 3407, we
    would like to thank you, Chairman Dorgan and Ranking Member
    Senator DeMint and all of the other subcommittee members of
    aviation, for the opportunity to speak to you today.
        My name is Scott Maurer, and, you've heard, my daughter,
    Lorin Maurer, was a passenger on Continental Flight 3407.
        Tomorrow night, at 10:17, it will be 18 weeks since our
    lives were changed forever. The minutes, hours, days, and weeks
    that have passed since this tragedy have been an unbelievable
    nightmare for all of us. It's a pain that you will never know,
    and certainly one we hope no one else will face.
        We believe very strongly the crash did not have to happen,
    and was preventable. As such, we are here today, and will be
    here tomorrow and beyond, to ask for your help and push for
    change so that other families can be spared this pain.
        When my 30-year-old daughter, Lorin Maurer, an athletics
    fundraiser at Princeton University and future athletic
    director, purchased her ticket from Continental Airlines, she
    assumed the pilots would fly--who would fly that plane were
    competently trained. She thought they had significant
    experience and knowledge of the plane and all of the flight
    control features. As she took her seat in 3A for an exciting
    Valentine weekend to join her boyfriend, Kevin Kuwik, in
    Buffalo, I am sure she believed that the pilots at the controls
    had been trained to handle cold-weather flight conditions,
    stalls, and other emergency situations that all pilots are
    expected to be prepared to confront. There are many other
    examples I could share from the victims' perspective, but time
    limits will not allow, today.
        The critical message I do want to relay to you here today
    is that when the American public buys a ticket from an airline,
    they assume and expect that safety is in their--that their
    safety is in good hands. Sadly, we find that that is not always
    the case, and we are here today imploring you for assistance
    and action.
        So, how can you help?
        Number one, let's put the best pilots in the cockpit and
    set them up for success. Now, this sounds very simple, but, in
    reality, it takes money to do this, and the airline industry
    has not stepped up to the plate. Pilot hiring procedures,
    training, fatigue management, and compensation have all been
    discussed throughout these hearings. The media attention
    focused on the failures of Colgan Air and its flight crew have
    resulted in a hastily called emergency summit meeting, earlier
    this week, bringing together representatives of the FAA and the
    airline industry to discuss these very same issues.
    Unfortunately, meetings of this magnitude have been done
    before, resulting in little change, as the costs have always
    been too high for implementation. The breakdown--to break down
    the bureaucratic logjam, the families of the victims are now
    forced to ask Congress to intervene and do the right thing for
    public safety.
        Number two, better aviation oversight by the Federal
    Government. Americans believe that the role of the FAA is that
    of a gatekeeper, an agency that is technically trained and
    expertly qualified to watch over the airline industry for the
    safety of the American public. We have certainly identified
    leaks in this dike. While we are optimistic that the newly
    appointed administrator hears our pleas for action, we fear
    that the obstacles thrown up by the airline industry and pilot
    unions will be very hard to overcome. Again, we are asking for
    Congressional intervention, as history of these organizations
    voluntarily taking action to improve safety has been woefully
    inadequate.
        Number three, NTSB recommendations. Why are we willing to
    accept an 85-percent implementation rate of NTSB
    recommendations by the FAA, when 100-percent would save lives?
    Would I even be sitting here talking to you today, had previous
    recommendations for training and cold-weather flight management
    been acted on? These recommendations must be taken seriously
    and acted on jointly by the FAA and the NTSB. We must learn
    from accidents so we can prevent future occurrence.
        My wife, Terry, my son, Christopher, and Lorin's boyfriend,
    Kevin, miss Lorin every minute of every day. I will not have
    the opportunity to walk my daughter down the aisle and give her
    away in marriage. She will not experience the joy of a growing
    child within and raising a loving family, as we did. Our
    traditional Christmas Eve visit to New York City for some last-
    minute shopping and taking in Mass at Saint Patrick's Cathedral
    will be--will probably come to an end this year; it'll just be
    too painful to make that trip without Lorin.
        Many of my fellow crash-victim families sitting behind me
    also have similar stories and similar losses.
        So, now it's up to you to make a difference. Everyone in
    this room today, and those who were here last Wednesday,
    expressed that they have come before you to make the necessary
    changes in safety. Winter is coming. If we do not implement
    critical safety changes before then, and another accident
    occurs, we can only blame ourselves for the losses of those
    families. I do not wish to shoulder that burden, and hope and
    believe that you agree with me.
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Senator DeMint, and all of the
    other Aviation Subcommittee members, thank you for your time.
    And I'm open, also, to answering questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Maurer follows:]

          Prepared Statement of Scott Maurer, Father of Lorin Maurer,
           Representative of the Families of Continental Flight 3407
        On behalf of the Families of Flight 3407, we would like to thank
    Chairman Dorgan, Minority Leader Senator DeMint, and all other members
    of the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation for the opportunity to speak to
    you today. My name is Scott Maurer. My daughter, Lorin Maurer, was on
    board Continental Flight 3407.
        Tomorrow night at 10:17 p.m. will be 18 weeks since our lives were
    changed forever. The minutes, hours, days, and weeks that have past
    since this tragedy have been an unbelievable nightmare for all of us.
    It is a pain that you will never know, and one that we hope no one else
    must face. We believe very strongly that the crash did not have to
    happen and was preventable. As such, we are here today, and we will be
    here tomorrow and beyond, to ask for help and to push for change so
    that other families can be spared this pain.
        When my 30-year-old daughter, Lorin Maurer, an Athletics Fundraiser
    at Princeton University and future Athletic Director, purchased her
    plane ticket from Continental Airlines, she assumed that the pilots who
    would fly the plane were competently trained. She thought they had
    significant experience and knowledge of the plane and all of the flight
    control features. As she took her seat in 3A for an exciting Valentine
    weekend trip to join her boyfriend, Kevin Kuwik, in Buffalo, NY and
    attend the wedding of his brother, I am sure she believed that the
    pilots at the controls has been trained to handle cold weather flight
    conditions, stalls, and other emergency situations all pilots must be
    prepared to confront.
        When 45-year-old Darren Tolsma, father of two beautiful young
    children and a highly specialized defense systems engineer, took the
    opportunity to board an earlier flight than originally planned to
    return home sooner to be with his wonderful family, he believed that
    all airlines use thorough pilot hiring practices to ensure competent
    and qualified employees. This would include a review of previous
    employment experience and demonstrated proficiencies to insure the
    skill levels necessary to transport civilian passengers on commercial
    aircraft safely.
        When 33-year-old Coleman Mellett and 64-year-old Gerry Niewood, two
    very gifted musicians for the Chuck Mangione jazz band, climbed aboard
    Continental 3407 to join fellow band members in Buffalo to perform a
    concert for a very excited western New York community, they thought
    that the FAA had conducted due diligence in its oversight of airlines,
    pilot training and operations to ensure the safety of all air
    travelers. They believed, as most Americans do, that there are enough
    checks and balances in place between government officials and the
    airline industry to ensure proper management of aviation safety. These
    wonderfully talented individuals were completely unaware of codeshare
    ticketing and the regional airline alliances with major airlines, and
    they were certainly unaware that such arrangements result in trickle
    down airline management that directly has an adverse effect on safety
    standards and procedures.
        As 57-year-old Beverly Eckert, an advocate for the victims of the
    September 11, 2001 terror attacks after she lost her husband Sean in
    the South Tower of the World Trade Center, made plans to journey to
    Buffalo to celebrate his birthday anniversary with family and friends,
    she was unaware that many pilots commute great distances to start their
    work day. The commute can be from Seattle, Washington to Newark, New
    Jersey, as was the case for the First Officer on Continental Connection
    Flight 3407, and can occur on the same day the pilot is scheduled to
    fly. This commute time is not part of the work schedule time
    established by the FAA to manage the dangerous condition of flight crew
    fatigue.
        When Doug Wielinski, father of four lovely daughters, intended to
    end his day enjoying his hobby with sports memorabilia and collectibles
    in the dining room area of his home on Long Street, he knew little of
    the low wages regional airline pilots are paid to begin an aviation
    career. Such low wages might deter talented and skilled pilots from
    pursuing an aviation career or cause those who do accept the entry
    level wage to moonlight with a second job to make ends meet, which
    might also contribute to pilot fatigue.
    How Can You Help???
        1. ``Put the Best Pilots in the Cockpit and Set Them Up for
    Success''--We need to ensure that only the best pilots are placed in
    the cockpits of planes carrying passengers over American skies. Airline
    hiring practices must be reviewed and upgraded to bring more
    experienced pilots with demonstrated skills to the regional airlines.
    It is imperative that flight crews' full piloting histories are
    disclosed and/or readily accessible to airlines considering applicants
    for hire. PRIA provides some of this history, but other means of
    disclosure must be developed to allow the airlines to know who they are
    hiring. For example, requiring an authorization to obtain a pilot's
    complete airman file is one way to ensure that the prospective airline
    is fully aware of the pilot's history.
        At the NTSB public hearings, some of the testimony and comments
    from the witnesses and board members gave us a glimpse into the reality
    that the major airlines have substantially better training protocols,
    methods, and procedures than their regional partners. Additional
    simulator time and the most advanced training programs all cost money,
    and consequently are seen with much more frequency in the training
    departments of the major carriers. These major carriers also benefit
    from all the years of experience and knowledge that have accrued in
    their training departments due to their longevity. And their greater
    resources allow them to take full advantage of the most modern safety
    data analysis programs like FOQA (Flight Operation Quality Assurance
    program) and LOSA (Line Observation Safety Audits) where their regional
    partners can not. We simply ask is it too much for these major airlines
    to work closely with their respective codeshare partners to ensure that
    they provide their pilots with the best safety tools possible in terms
    of training and other industry best practices.
        Federal regulations regarding management of fatigue need to be
    updated to reflect the most recent scientific research information on
    this issue. Time to commute to duty work stations, flying during day
    time versus at night, and crossing multiple times zones all should be
    considered in updating this regulation of work time limits and rest.
        Compensation wages should be reviewed and upgraded to promote the
    attraction and retention of highly skilled pilots without concern for
    dual employment to make ends meet.
        2. ``Better Aviation Oversight by the Federal Government''--
    Americans believe that the role of the FAA is that of a gatekeeper,
    staffed by people who are technically trained and expertly qualified to
    watch over the airline industry for the safety of the American public.
    We have studied numerous accidents over the past fifteen years in which
    the NTSB has provided safety recommendations to the FAA designed to
    prevent the same accidents from reoccurring. Many of these
    recommendations are still classified by the NTSB as having an
    unacceptable response to this day. Because the rulemaking process is so
    cumbersome, the FAA often attempts a workaround solution known as a
    Safety Alert (SAFO). Unfortunately, these SAFO's are offered to the
    airline industry to adopt or administer voluntarily. During testimony
    by Colgan's FAA Principal Operations Inspector at the NTSB hearing, we
    learned that because SAFO's are voluntary, they are not monitored for
    implementation and, in practice, they are routinely not adopted.
    Voluntary safety recommendations made to cash-strapped airlines cannot
    protect the flying public. It is imperative that the mechanism for
    translating NTSB safety recommendations into mandated practice be
    streamlined to eliminate what is often years of delay between
    recognition of a safety concern and action to correct it.
        From the transcript of the cockpit voice recorder, we learned of
    the ongoing and extended conversation between both pilots below the
    10,000 feet altitude sterile cockpit requirement. The current self-
    reporting process used to monitor and address this FAA requirement
    clearly has gaping holes that invite abuse. An audit process must be
    implemented. Despite all of the commentary regarding pilot
    professionalism, we must recognize that these individuals are human and
    susceptible to human fault. Without implementing a true check system
    with accountability, it is improbable that this safety requirement will
    ever be met as intended. Indeed, violations of sterile cockpit are seen
    all too often in fatal crashes.
        We are encouraged by the appointment of a new FAA administrator,
    Randy Babbitt. Some of the family members were fortunate enough to meet
    Mr. Babbitt prior to his confirmation, and we are hopeful that he will
    offer a NEW beginning in leadership for the FAA. We hope he employs the
    ``One Level of Safety'' attitude he used as president of the Air Line
    Pilots Association. Even the best-run companies are better served by
    audits and double checks on how they conduct business. The above
    examples only reconfirm to the families the need for the FAA to become
    more ``hands on'' in its oversight of the airline industry.
        3. NTSB recommendations--Earlier we mentioned that several NTSB
    recommendations were made with unacceptable responses returned by the
    FAA. To the families, it appears as though the NTSB and FAA are not
    working jointly together in the best interest of aviation safety. We
    ask that Congress intercede to get these agencies functioning like the
    team they were intended to be. Airline safety now and tomorrow is
    depending on it. We know you can learn from mistakes. Under the process
    as we understand it, the NTSB conducts an unbiased investigation to
    identify recommended solutions/actions to the FAA for development and
    implementation. On paper this process looks very good and should work
    but through the years we have seen very little progress.
        In regards to the safety recommendations derived from the Flight
    3407 investigation, the families and public wish to see immediate
    action. We expect 100 percent resolution between recommendations made
    by the NTSB and timely implementation by the FAA. We have repeatedly
    heard the proud commentary of ``85 percent implementation of all NTSB
    recommendations to date.'' We believe if both agencies work together
    they can find solutions that will yield 100 percent implementation and
    make airline safety much improved.
    Summary
        In summary, the Families of Continental Connection Flight 3407
    would again like to thank the members of the Aviation Subcommittee for
    this opportunity to express our concerns and desires. Following
    previous accidents of a similar nature, the airline industry and the
    FAA have had ample time to do the right thing in terms of addressing
    threats to aviation safety, but still, our loved ones perished in a
    preventable crash. Now we must ask Congress to intervene in the
    interest of public aviation safety. As you make aviation policy
    decisions moving forward, please consider our requests and do NOT react
    to the influence of economics, lobbyists, personal interest groups, the
    airline industry, the airline pilots unions, or others with personal
    agendas. The families do NOT have such financial or influential
    resources as those listed above, putting us at a significant
    disadvantage.
        So we ask that these policy decisions be made by each of you
    individually as though your wife, husband, son, daughter, mother,
    father, brother, sister, other family member or loved one are boarding
    a plane. Please ``DO'' make changes that will prevent a tragedy like
    Continental Connection Flight 3407 from happening again. This tragedy
    was and is preventable. You can make a difference . . . please do.
        Chairman Dorgan and Minority Leader, Senator DeMint, I will
    entertain any questions the Committee might have at this time for the
    families.
                                     ______

                       In Memory--Continental Flight 3407

    Mary Julia Abraham                   Georges Abu Karam
    Clarence A. ``Larry'' Beutel III     David Borner
    Ronald and Linda Davidson            Alison Des Forges
    Beverly Eckert                       John J. Fiore
    Ronald Gonzalez                      Brad S. Green
    Zhaofang Guo                         Steven L. Johnson
    Kevin W. Johnston                    Ruth Harel Katz
    Ellyce Kausner                       Nicole Korczykowski and Johnathan
                                          Perry
    Jerome Krasuski                      Brian Kuklewicz
    Beth Ann Kushner                     Sean Lang
    Madeline Linn Loftus                 Lorin Maurer
    Don McDonald                         Coleman Mellett
    Dawn Monachino                       Donald, Dawn, and Shawn Mossop
    Jennifer Neill (and Baby Neill)      Gerard Niewood
    Mary ``Belle'' Pettys                Donna Prisco
    Matilda Quintero                     Ferris Reid
    Capt. Marvin D. Renslow              Julie Ries
    John G. Roberts III                  Kristin Safran
    Rebecca Lynne Shaw                   Dipinder Sidhu
    Jean Srnecz                          Darren Tolsma
    Susan Wehle                          Ernest West
    Douglas C. Wielinski                 Shibin Yao
    Clay Yarber                          Joseph J. Zuffoletto

                                     ______

                             The Gaping Hole . . .
        . . . left in our lives by the needless loss of 51 loved ones on
    the night of February 12, 2009.

        They came from all over the country and world . . .

            8 countries--USA, Canada, Jamaica, Israel, Lebanon, India,
            China, and Liberia

            9 states--NY, NJ, CT, PA, OH, CA, WA, FL, TX

        They valued education . . .

            2 were undergrads, 1 was in Law School, 2 were pursuing an MBA

            There were 5 Ivy League degrees among them

        They made the world a better place . . .

            There was a 9/11 activist and a human rights activist

            6 veterans of our armed forces, 7 combat tours, and 2 purple
            hearts

            4 defense contractors dedicated to protecting our soldiers
            lives

        They were talented . . .

            2 members of the Chuck Mangione Jazz band

            2 former collegiate athletes

        They were faith-filled . . .

        A cantor at a Jewish temple and an elder in a Jehovah's Witness
    congregation

        Most of all, they loved their families . . .

            21 left behind spouses, and 3 were engaged

            There were 2 married couples and one young boyfriend/girlfriend
            couple

            1 passenger was 6 months pregnant

            20 children under the age of 18 lost a parent

            14 children lost a grandparent

            11 daughters lost their fathers and will never have their Dad
            walk them down the aisle

            8 fathers lost their daughters and will never be able to give
            their hand away in marriage

            17 mothers had to say goodbye to their sons

        . . . And we loved them.
                    ``FAMILIES OF CONTINENTAL FLIGHT 3407''

        Senator Dorgan. Mr. Maurer, thank you very much.
        I indicated, in the last hearing, that I have some
    discomfort about a good many things, here. Reading the
    transcript of the cockpit recording demonstrated to me a number
    of errors occurred, a number of deficiencies occurred, in the
    management of that flight. I also said that that young copilot
    and pilot perished in that accident, as well, and they're not
    here to speak, they're not here to speak for themselves, and
    they have families who miss them terribly. And so, I'm
    discomforted by that. And yet, we have no choice but to proceed
    aggressively to find out, What are the standards, here? And are
    these accidents--was this an accident that could have been
    prevented? How do we prevent future accidents in circumstances
    like this?
        Let me ask a few questions, if I might. My understanding--I
    would say to Mr. May and Mr. Cohen, my understanding is that
    we're hiring pilots to put in a cockpit of commercial airlines
    with 30, 50, 80, 90 passengers behind the cockpit--we're hiring
    some of them for $10 an hour. Is that correct?
        Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, the pay--the average pay of a
    regional airline captain is $72,000 per year. The average pay
    of a first officer at a RAA-member airline is $32,000 a year.
    That's very comparable to other professions that have lives at
    stake--medical assistants, paramedics----
        Senator Dorgan. But, Mr. Cohen, I'm asking what your--is it
    the case that we're hiring pilots to put in the cockpit of
    commercial airplanes and paying them $22-23,000 a year? That's
    $10 an hour, roughly. Isn't that the case? And if that's the
    case, one wonders, What is the capability of pilots that are
    coming out of school with a good many hours, who meet the
    technical qualifications, get hired for $10 an hour, and then
    live with their parents in Seattle and fly to Newark to a duty
    station, all night long. And at that salary, are they to going
    to hire a crash pad or maybe rent a hotel to get some sleep?
    Don't think so.
        So, my question is--a very specific question--isn't there a
    significant issue, here, about experience and funding and
    salaries at the entry level on some of these airplanes, where
    we're getting--all of us are getting on? The name is the same.
    We think it's--you know, it's Northwest, it's Continental, it's
    Delta, the same name; it's just--it's a different carrier, with
    a completely different standard, it seems to me, of hiring new
    pilots that are entering that cockpit. Am I wrong about that?
        Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, I think I heard a couple of
    questions in there--let me just try to expand on a couple of
    things.
        First of all, and most importantly, compensation and safety
    are not related. The NTSB has never, in all of its accident
    investigations, ever cited compensation or pay as a causal
    factor, even a contributing factor, to an aircraft accident.
    The pay is fair and competitive in a very difficult industry. I
    am a 35-year veteran of the airline industry, and I will tell
    you that it is as Captain Prater pointed out, a very difficult
    industry. For the first time opportunity that a person comes
    into, these people are proficient, they are well trained, they
    are well qualified or we would not put that person in charge of
    that airplane, in charge of that crew, the safety of that
    flight--we would not do it, if that person weren't well trained
    and prepared.
        Senator Dorgan. Well, let me ask--do you have the chart
    with respect to commuting?
        [The information referred to follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Dorgan. Let me ask a question of Captain Prater.
    The--this chart shows the commuting for Colgan Airlines, but I
    assume it's a chart that applies to most airlines, people
    flying all over the country to get to their duty station. That
    shows Newark, and it shows the pilots, where they're living in
    order to fly to Newark to get to a duty station. Does that make
    any sense to you, Captain Prater? I understand you might say,
    ``Well, you know what, it has always been that way. People need
    to get there. They've got be on their own, they've got to get
    adequate rest,'' and so on. But, this case had a copilot that
    flew all night long to get to her duty station. And so, does
    that make sense?
        Captain Prater. It makes sense. And I would agree with you
    that that is--represents the reality of our air transportation
    system and our pilots. However, I think we have to take a very
    close look, again, at the system that has created this. You
    can't open and close domiciles on a regular basis and transfer
    flying and lay off pilots at one airline and not give them some
    ability to either move to their new station or to get to work.
    Even if I am based in Houston and the company needs me out of
    Newark, they will deadhead me to Newark, they will get me to
    where I should start my flight. There is a huge responsibility
    that professional aviators take very near and dear. None of us
    get into a cockpit believing that we're going to fail that day.
    Every one of these aviators face the weather, the same weather
    and the same situation; engines fail, we have emergencies, and
    our pilots do it.
        Senator Dorgan. But, with very different levels of skill
    and experience. Do you agree?
        Captain Prater. Yes, without a doubt.
        Senator Dorgan. All right. Look, I have very limited time.
    I'm going to stay here and ask all my questions, at the end of
    this. I don't want to disabuse--or abuse, rather, the--my
    colleagues. But, the question of pilot records--Captain Prater,
    do you have a problem with--if we know everything about an
    airplane, that we--that a potential employer should know
    everything about a pilot's records?
        Captain Prater. I believe that the Record Act can be
    improved. I do think that history and performance is necessary
    and good, but don't look at that in a--as the entire story. We
    are constantly going through training, and must meet the
    standards every month, every week, every year. So, just like
    when you create an airplane, you test it to destruction; as
    pilots, we are trained to a point outside of what we can do. We
    must find our limit. You must push pilots, in their training,
    to be able to meet and succeed. But, many times that takes a
    lot of training, more than we're getting today.
        Senator Dorgan. You seem to imply, in your testimony, that
    there were two standards with respect to commercial--excuse me,
    commercial aviation. One would be the trunk carriers or network
    carriers, and the other, the regional. Do you believe there are
    two standards in the cockpit?
        Captain Prater. I'll say it succinctly. We have one level
    of regulation. We do not have one level of safety.
        Senator Dorgan. So, different levels of enforcement.
        Captain Prater. Yes.
        Senator Dorgan. Mr. May, do you agree with that?
        Mr. May. Mr. Chairman, I do agree, to this extent; FAR Part
    121 is the single standard that the FAA has promulgated, to
    which we all must adhere. I don't think there is any question
    that mainline carriers exceed that FAR Part 121 base far more
    often than most.
        Senator Dorgan. But, that which exists in law or rule is
    relevant, only to the extent you have a Federal agency that
    says, ``You know what, we're going to force you to own up
    to''--
        Mr. May. That is--
        Senator Dorgan.--``the law and the rule, and we're going to
    enforce it, and enforce it aggressively.''
        Mr. May. That is correct.
        Senator Dorgan. Do you believe that's the case now?
        Mr. May. I think that we could have greater enforcement.
    And if the Committee and the FAA choose, you can even change
    some of the parameters. We've suggested, as I said in my
    testimony today, you ought to have FOQA programs, ASAP
    programs, required as part of the base. I think you can use AQP
    programs on training. I think there are a number of issues on
    pilot records that you can resolve. All of those things could
    be done to further improve the environment.
        Senator Dorgan. One final point. Mr. Cohen and Mr. May, as
    I indicated when I started this hearing, I want to invite the
    folks that run the carriers, themselves, to come to that table.
    And we have made some invitations, and apparently have not had
    acceptance of those invitations. And we'll remake them, fully
    understanding that they will be accepted, and have another
    hearing with the airlines themselves.
        Captain Prater. Mr. Chairman, you have our commitment.
    Whoever you want, whenever you want, we will provide them here.
        Senator Dorgan. Thank you very much.
        Senator DeMint?
        Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I think we need to get a little more specific. And, Mr.
    May, I appreciate you mentioning specifics about what we can do
    with training. But, what I'm not hearing here today are
    specific ideas about, what do we need to change to prevent
    something like this from happening again? There have got to be
    things that come to mind that we need to change. Obviously we
    have some situations of violating current rules--no sterile
    cockpit, in this particular crash--that the pilots themselves
    violated rules. We need to make sure that that doesn't happen
    again. But, what do we need to do? What do the carriers need to
    do? What do we need to do, from a regulatory perspective? And
    do we need legislation that the regulators can't carry out? So,
    what we're looking for here is what we can do.
        And so, I would just like--Mr. May, starting with you,
    because you mentioned training--but, what we need are
    specifics, here, of things that can be done to improve safety,
    perhaps that this crash brings to light, that we're currently
    not doing or not requiring or not auditing. We have, so far,
    gotten a lot of assurances that safety is our main concern, but
    the reason we're here is that that broke down. So, I'm just
    looking for some ideas. We need to know if we need to push the
    regulators to do something different, we need to pass
    legislation, or do we need to insist on the carriers to do
    something that they're not doing?
        Mr. May, I'll go with you and then go----
        Mr. May. Senator DeMint, I think I made seven very specific
    recommendations in my oral testimony. I'll recap them for you
    today.
        I think there needs to be a requirement that regional
    carriers implement FOQA programs and ASAP programs, both of
    which Captain Prater, I think, would agree are all fully in use
    at mainline levels, and would make a marked difference, if
    applied at the regional levels.
        I think, number three, we need to put in a new training
    standard, if you will. There's a long, open NPRM on training at
    the FAA. I think probably it would be wise for the FAA to
    implement an ARC, an Aviation Rulemaking Committee, and take a
    hard look at AQP programs--Advanced Qualification Programs, if
    you will--that are--have been developed by mainline carriers,
    could be mentored and transported to regional carriers to
    improve safety, in terms of training.
        Number four, I think you need to take--or, have the--direct
    the FAA to take a hard look at how they'd better enforce the
    sterile cockpit rule. We recognize that there are privacy
    issues involved, here, but I think there needs to be some kind
    of monitoring of cockpit tapes, on a frequent basis, that we
    can----
        Senator DeMint. Just random----
        Mr. May.--adjust that.
        Senator DeMint.--auditing of----
        Mr. May. Yes, at some point. And I suspect Captain Prater
    would acknowledge that, as long as we protect the privacy of
    the pilots, there's a way that can be done.
        Next, I think you need to have a very specific program
    promulgated by the FAA on records so that when a carrier goes
    out to hire an individual pilot, they have access to all of
    that pilot's records in the same place and in the same format,
    so that they can have a complete look at what has gone on
    there.
        And finally, I think you need to make sure that we have a
    very close look at the whole process that is used by the FAA to
    regulate 121, and how many of these issues need to be
    incorporated in it, or whether or not the standard is fine, it
    just needs to be an enforcement issue. So, those are some very
    specific----
        Senator DeMint. That's very----
        Mr. May.--recommendations----
        Senator DeMint.--very helpful. I think we need to somehow
    get that in a--some joint letter to the FAA, to make sure that
    we're at least reviewing those recommendations.
        The other witnesses, do you agree some things----
        Mr. Cohen. Senator DeMint, I----
        Senator DeMint.--need to be added?
        Mr. Cohen. Senator DeMint, members of the Committee--we
    would wholeheartedly support the points that Mr. May pointed
    out. I think the industry--again is, one industry, and in full
    concurrence on these type of issues.
        Let me also point out two specific things, in addition. The
    integrated database of pilot records is something that Congress
    can direct the FAA to do, and to do it immediately, so that the
    access to this information is readily available about the
    people as we hire. As we have better information about
    everybody in the system, the safer it will be.
        And as to the other issue, let me please underscore the use
    of CVRs. And, I think, as you all talked about in your remarks,
    it is a tragedy that we are here, and all of the issues that
    Congress, the FAA, are learning about had to be after the
    tragedy. And that is a shame, because if there is a tool out
    there that can be used to help prevent accidents, that is
    getting information about how to prevent accidents before they
    happen, and we are not even touching it, that is a real
    tragedy.
        Senator DeMint. Captain--
        Captain Prater. Sir, I'd like to respond. We're talking
    Band-Aids, here, and we need to look at the system. The thought
    that somehow we can monitor cockpit voice recorders and somehow
    improve the safety or the compliance of pilots, let us focus on
    the professionalism and the training of those airmen who do
    this day in and day out. We're missing something, here. We're
    missing that these airmen have been doing their job.
        Now, let's not take this accident and try to say it was
    caused because pilots were talking in the cockpit. You have to
    communicate, you have to relay. I'm not going to talk about
    this one, obviously, because it's still under investigation and
    we're analyzing. Do we want to improve it? Yes. But, where do
    you learn to become a professional? You learn it from the men
    and women that you respect. You break the chain, and you keep
    moving around, flying, and where do you get that experience?
    All of a sudden, a new first officer is flying with somebody
    who's only been flying for 3 years. That wouldn't have happened
    if the airlines wouldn't keep pushing flying around the system.
    It took me 12 years to make captain. That used to be the norm.
    We went through 12 years or 8 years or 5 years of airline
    operations. Now it's much quicker.
        Senator DeMint. Let me just be clear. You object to random
    reviews of cockpit recordings just to verify that we're keeping
    sterile cockpits and following other rules? You object to that?
        Captain Prater. I don't object to it, as long as it's done
    in a system like an ASAP program, where it can be protected and
    we learn about safety. If you want to use it to monitor--you'll
    actually create a cockpit that may not be as safe. Let's not
    mistake that ``sterile cockpit'' means we're focused upon
    flying the airplane at critical points. That is standard.
    That's what goes on. I think we're assuming a little bit too
    much. If it's protected and used as safety data, then we should
    be able to find a way to make the system safer. And that is our
    shared goal.
        Senator DeMint. Because I know just about every service
    company I call on the telephone now, bank or whatever, is going
    to say, ``This call may be audited for quality purposes.'' And
    you can't improve what you don't measure. And I think, to
    assume that a one-time training scheme is going to monitor
    potential problems over the lifetime of a pilot is like
    assuming the same thing for an airplane. So, I'm a little
    concerned that you consider that a Band-Aid. Do you consider
    getting the records--keeping records of pilots over their
    career--is that a Band-Aid?
        Captain Prater. Again, are we going to compare apples with
    apples? Which training school did they come out of? You don't
    want to create a system, where, ``Hey, Joe, go to X, Y, Z
    Training School, because they don't flunk anybody. You won't
    have anything on your record.'' Or, do you want them to go to
    the hardest school out there, where they push you to your
    limits, push you to a failure, not of a check ride, but all
    these are maneuvers that we must be trained in over and over,
    whether they're emergencies or back-to-basic flying skills. So,
    you don't want to create a system that actually finds a way of
    getting around that. Don't create a loophole----
        Senator DeMint. I know I'm over time, but can we allow Mr.
    Maurer just to comment to the suggestions in the----
        Mr. Maurer. I guess I'd just like to remind everybody, when
    you're sitting in the passenger section of the plane--again,
    you're unaware of who's up there on the other side of those
    doors. Is full disclosure too much of a thing to ask when your
    life is at hand?
        Another comment. Chairman Dorgan had that chart up there.
    My commute to work is 7 miles. Members of the Senate, I know
    that you've--you come from pretty far away, but you have a
    residence here, you have someplace here. Perhaps the airline
    industry needs to consider providing for that kind of thing if
    we're going to allow pilots to commute these great distances.
        I happen to travel probably every other week, and it's not
    uncommon for me to be sitting side by side with pilots who are
    commuting to their base location. They're tired. I get in
    conversations with them all the time. They're tired. Those
    hours don't count toward the critical restrictions. I mean,
    these are things that we've got to take into account. We
    learned, in our accident, of long hours that were taken just
    getting to work, and then you're going to climb on a plane and
    fly.
        So, I just--let's keep the human element in mind, let's not
    be defensive.
        Senator Dorgan. Senator Lautenberg?
        Senator Lautenberg. Thanks.
        I think there was a response to a question by Senator
    Dorgan that kind of missed the boat, about the relatively
    modest wage that--or, wages that are paid to people, such as
    the fellow who flew copilot in that flight, 3407, because it--
    you said it's kind of a pay scale that might be applied in
    other professions and--but, I think the point was missed,
    because if someone is not making enough money to take care of
    themselves and their families, it will typically mean a second
    job, a second opportunity to earn some more money, is in the
    cards. As a consequence, there is more effort, there is more
    opportunity for fatigue to creep into the individual's
    operation.
        And so, I think that when we talk about a profession that,
    in the year, might pay $20,000 a year, we're talking about,
    that's almost minimum wage for any kind of a job, whether it's
    a janitor or otherwise, a bank teller. So, we have to look at
    these in realtime.
        And, you know, I--at the previous hearing that we held on
    aviation safety, one of the questions that I raised was, How
    many times does an inability to pass a test be allowed at--
    before it's three strikes, or whatever the number is, and
    you're out? I mean, would you--would anyone here want to go
    into major surgery--heart, head, whatever--and have a physician
    there who flunked his tests five times before he--they squeezed
    him through the operation and put him--put life in his hands? I
    don't--I think there's a point in time when you have to say,
    ``Hey, if you can't master this in two or three times, then
    this is--then find something else to do.'' People love to fly.
    I know a lot of pilots. I sat a lot in second seats in small--
    second seats in small airplanes. And flying is--it's a
    glamorous job, it really is. I don't know how it is as,
    commercial operation when you're sitting in seats to fly back
    home or otherwise away from home, et cetera, but I think
    there's a point in time, Mr.--Captain Prater, that--say, ``Hey,
    this is not the kind of a''--the simulators have--replicate
    emergency situations?
        Captain Prater. Very much so. You can really do a good job
    of training for emergencies. It doesn't replicate, though, the
    fact that, when you're in an airplane, it's much more three-
    dimensional, all the forces on you. So, sometimes you have to
    go to--back to that basic airmanship.
        But, to your point, sir, at most of the airlines, that
    ``three strikes and you're out'' is just about the way it
    works. That's oversimplified, but we give an airman two
    chances, there's a training review board, where the company,
    the industry--we may even send the pilot out for a physical, a
    psychological exam, a fitness for duty--is there something else
    going on why that individual--but, basically, by the third time
    of that failure, trying to master the same maneuver or the same
    airplane--and pilots' jobs are at risk at that point.
        Senator Lautenberg. The--so, this was an oddity, that had
    the captain of this flight failing five times over a period of
    years. The records didn't go back far enough to dig out the
    information.
        Captain Prater. Again, I think we have to make sure that we
    are comparing apples with apples. If he had problems in his
    private pilot license or commercial pilot license, with basic
    airmanship skills, and had to be retrained there. But, we can't
    get away from the fact that he met--all of them met the FAA
    standards, and they met the standards that their employer had
    set, as required by the FARs.
        Senator Lautenberg. The--is the testing--the training for a
    regional pilot the same as it is for pilots in the major
    airlines?
        Captain Prater. Yes, it is, Senator.
        Senator Lautenberg. It is. Would the--do the regular
    airline companies--aviation companies pay as little as $20,000
    a year and put someone, even alongside a trained captain, in
    the cockpit?
        Mr. May. Senator, as a practical matter, the pilots that
    are hired by the mainline have significantly more seniority, on
    average, and are paid at a higher level. Pay is a function of
    collective bargaining, and it's generally also conditioned on
    number of hours, number of hours in a particular type of
    aircraft, whether or not they've been a pilot in command,
    whether or not they're a first officer. So, there are a number
    of factors involved in pay, but it is effectively the exclusive
    jurisdiction of collective bargaining and seniority.
        Senator Lautenberg. Before someone achieves the status of
    captain, is there a requirement in the regionals that they fly
    a particular number of hours--have flown a particular number of
    hours?
        Mr. Cohen?
        Captain Prater. Basic FARs require 1,500 hours of total
    flight time, to be age 23 years old. That's the basics. That's
    not a lot of time. In many cases, pilots do exceed that before
    they check out as captain, but in rapidly expanding
    environments, it is of a concern. It's also of a concern of how
    much actual experience. Time isn't the only generator. If you
    flew a B-52 for 20-hour missions, it's not the same amount of
    training as making six take-offs and landings a day in an
    airline environment. So, time doesn't cure all here.
        Mr. Cohen. Senator, excuse me, if I might.
        Senator Lautenberg. Yes, go ahead.
        Mr. Cohen. For the record, our average captain at a
    regional airline has 8,500 hours. That's pretty experienced.
    And our average first officer is well over 3,000 hours.
        Senator Lautenberg. Maybe not dealing with averages, but
    rather with specifics might be called for, to say, ``Well, the
    captain of an airplane that's got a less-skilled copilot has to
    be--have had more experience than the basic experience.'' And
    that might be a good rule to put into play, that if you're
    going to take someone who's new at this job--and, again,
    considering all of the factors, and they're complicated as
    could be--but, when you look at what is required of the
    passenger flow today in major airlines, that--or regionals--the
    passengers are examined so thoroughly to make sure that they
    can't bring down an airplane. And when we look at the skills
    and the training and the reaction ability of a pilot, well,
    that's much more casually done. And I think we can learn from
    that. Not to change the security process, but, rather, to say
    that the person who's up in the front of that airplane has to
    really be able to manage all situations.
        Mr. Maurer, I know that it's painful for you to review
    this, but you're doing a noble job when you say, ``Let my loss
    be a lesson for others,'' and I think we have to take that very
    much to heart. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Dorgan. Thank you. Senator Johanns.
        Senator Johanns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cohen, how many regional airlines are in operation out
    there today? How many would that be?
        Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, Senator, as it has been talked
    about, the term ``regional airline'' is more of a term almost
    of art rather than of science. There are 31 RAA member
    airlines, and those 31 members carry 90-plus percent of the
    passengers in scheduled service.
        Senator Johanns. OK. How many of those would be profitable
    today? How many are actually making money?
        Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, Senator, many of them are
    privately held, so they do not report their finances publicly.
    And I just don't have that information available to me.
        Senator Johanns. Of those who are not privately owned,
    could you get that information for us?
        Mr. Cohen. We would be glad to get it to you and provide it
    to the Committee, absolutely.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                   Regional Airline Association
                                                        Washington, DC.
    Hon. Mike Johanns,
    Russell Senate Office Building,
    Washington, DC.

    Dear Senator Johanns:

        On behalf of the Regional Airline Association member airlines,
    thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the Senate
    Aviation Subcommittee hearing on June 17, 2009. Our industry is
    committed to the constant improvement of safety in commercial aviation.
        Following up on your request for information, please find attached
    a spreadsheet outlining the profitability of publicly traded RAA member
    airlines. The chart was compiled from public data available through the
    Morningstar rating service. It summarizes the financial performance of
    the six publicly traded, Part 121 passenger airline members of RAA.
    These include: ExpressJet Holdings; Gulfstream International Group:
    Great Lakes Aviation; Pinnacle Holdings; Republic Holdings and Skywest.
    (Publicly traded Mesa Air group is not currently an RAA member, so is
    not included here). Also included are website links providing
    additional information on each company. Please note that a number of
    RAA member airlines are wholly or partially owned subsidiaries of major
    airlines, including American Eagle, Comair, Compass, Horizon, Mesaba,
    Piedmont, and PSA.
        Again, thank you for taking the initiative to increase airline
    safety. We would welcome a chance to further discuss this information
    and other issues with you directly and will contact your office to
    arrange a convenient time.
                Respectfully,
                                                   Roger Cohen,
                                                             President,
                                              Regional Airline Association.
    CC: Hon. Byron L. Dorgan

                     Regional Airline Association (RAA): Publicly Traded, Member Reported Net Income
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Net Income   Net Income   Net Income   Net Income   Net Income   Net Income
                                           (Loss)       (Loss)       (Loss)       (Loss)       (Loss)       (Loss)
                                 Stock     FY2004       FY2005       FY2006       FY2007       FY2008     FY2009 Q1
    Company Name   City  State  Symbol -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        in Millions  in Millions  in Millions  in Millions  in Millions  in Millions
                                           of USD       of USD       of USD       of USD       of USD       of USD
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ExpressJet    Houst  TX     NYSE:X        122.8         98.0         92.6       (70.3)       (88.2)       (10.6)
     Holdings,     on            JT
     Inc.
    Gulfstream    Ft.    FL     AMEX:G         N/A*         N/A*          1.2        (3.1)       (14.8)          0.7
     Internation   Laud          IA
     al Group      erda
     Inc.          le
    Great Lakes   Cheye  WY     OTC             5.6          1.2         15.7         19.2          1.9         0.09
     Aviation,     nne           BB:
     LTD                         GLUX
    Pinnacle      Memph  TN     Nasdaq         40.7         25.7         77.8         34.6        (4.9)         18.8
     Airlines      is            GS:PN
     Corp.                       CI.
    Republic      India  IN     Nasdaq         44.8         60.7         79.5         82.8         84.6          2.2
     Airways       napo          GS:RJ
     Holding,      lis           ET
     Inc.
    Skywest Inc.  St.    UT     Nasdaq         82.0        112.3        145.8        159.2        112.9          9.4
                   Geor          GS:SK
                   ge            YW
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Gulfstream International Group Inc. was incorporated in December 2005.
    Information provided by Morningstar, Inc.

        Senator Johanns. OK. Let me understand your business model,
    because I think that bears on some issues, here.
        As I understand it, the cost of the ticket that I would
    purchase is not determined by that regional, it's determined by
    the carrier they contract with. Is that correct?
        Mr. Cohen. For the vast majority of business operations,
    yes.
        Senator Johanns. How are your revenues determined, then?
    How--is it based on that ticket cost?
        Mr. Cohen. There are a variety of business arrangements,
    which are proprietary in nature, but it's my general
    understanding that it can be one of a couple of ways. Probably
    the predominant way is now what's called ``fee for departure''
    or--that, basically, the regional airline is given a schedule
    and is paid, in some fashion, based on the number of flight
    hours, the number of trips, the performance of those trips, and
    so forth. There are regional airlines that are wholly owned
    subsidiaries of major airlines. That may be a different
    relationship. There are some independent flying regional
    airlines; that's a smaller group. There are some business
    models that actually have a little bit of a mix--where the
    ticket price may be split; but, that is a very small
    percentage.
        Senator Johanns. Is it impacted by the number of people on
    the plane? So, if you're flying 50, versus 5, your revenues are
    going to be better?
        Mr. Cohen. Only in those instances where the regional
    carrier would be sharing in the risk of the revenue for the
    flight.
        Senator Johanns. OK. What's----
        Mr. Cohen. But, again, these are proprietary. I've never
    seen one. That's just my general understanding.
        Senator Johanns. There are statistics as to how many of
    these regionals have gone bankrupt, because, of course, that's
    a public sort of event. How many would that be?
        Mr. Cohen. I've been the president of the Regional Airline
    Association for a little over two and a half years, and, of our
    members, I believe two may have gone out of business in those
    two years, of our members.
        Senator Johanns. OK. On the pilots themselves--you know, I
    started out as a young lawyer, and, had you asked me, at age
    23, ``Are you ready to handle the most complex cases in a
    courtroom setting?'' I would have said, ``Absolutely. I've got
    my law degree, I've got my bar certificate. Let's go.'' I
    wasn't anywhere near ready.
        Is the regional airline regarded as the training ground for
    pilots? Kind of, you go there, you pick up some hours, you do
    some flying back and forth to whatever you're--and you pick up
    those hours, and then eventually you, hopefully, get to a big
    carrier, and maybe eventually go transcontinental--I don't know
    what the next steps would be. Is that the case?
        Captain Prater. Unfortunately, that's what this system has
    produced. And it's not the safest model, sir.
        Senator Johanns. Yes. You see, Mr. Cohen, averages mean
    nothing to me. You know, when I walk on that airplane, and I
    stick my head in the cockpit and say, ``Boy, I feel so good
    that the average salary here is'' whatever you told me it was--
    I would never say that. I want to know that they are trained
    and ready and can handle thunderstorms and icing and keep me
    out of trouble. So, your averages just don't land anywhere with
    me; they miss the mark completely.
        What would be the minimum salary per year that a pilot
    would be hired to come onboard?
        Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, I don't have--Mr. Chairman,
    Senator Johanns, I don't have the minimum. Again, the average,
    which is--we--I believe we provided some information to the
    Committee. I can get you that of our member airlines. We can
    provide that to you.
        Senator Johanns. I want you to get that.
        Your averages mean nothing.
        Captain Prater. That new--that new pilot, sir, would be
    making between $16- and $18,000 a year for a full-time job, and
    less if he or she is on reserve.
        Senator Johanns. And doing that kind of commuting.
        Captain Prater. Yes, sir.
        Senator Johanns. OK.
        Now, I traveled extensively when I was in the Cabinet. I
    must admit, I got tired of it. But, one of the things that
    really, really hammered me was the constant time changes, the
    poor diet, the lack of exercise, because you can never have a
    schedule. When these folks are traveling from out at the West
    Coast over to the East Coast, and they've gone through all
    those time changes, how does that compute? If you see somebody
    that has spent the whole night, can they literally land in New
    Jersey and get on an airplane and start flying?
        Maybe the pilot. Captain?
        Captain Prater. While it is possible, it's also true that--
    may have flown that flight across the country--5-hour flight in
    the middle of the night--and then be expected to sit around for
    a couple of hours, as many as 5 or 6 hours, and then fly the
    trip. So, I would put it in the terms of, Where is it more--is
    it any more restful sitting in coach seat trying to get to work
    for 2 hours, or driving to an airport for 2 hours? I think we
    have to look at that.
        Obviously, the subject of commuting has some focus,
    especially on our first duty day. Is--that first duty day, are
    you sufficiently rested to do your next 16 hours of duty?
    That's what we have to look at, those extensive periods.
        But, I think, in this case, what also is forgotten is, that
    copilot could have flown that trip instead of just ridden on
    it, and been legal to fly, that afternoon, and fly that trip.
    That's a fact.
        Senator Johanns. Let me--and I'm out of time, so I'm going
    to zero on this in a very focused way. But, let's say I grew up
    in Florida, and I get my training in Florida, and I'm used to
    thunderstorms, but I have no idea of what icing is about, never
    flown in it, maybe got a little bit of training on it, but no
    experience whatsoever. Could a regional hire me to fly a
    northern route?
        Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, no, that person would be trained
    extensively in the type of operations that he or she is going
    to be flying in.
        Senator Johanns. Now, Captain, how much----
        Captain Prater. I would disagree with that statement, from
    this point. That pilot has check-passed the minimums for all
    types of operations and all types of weather, and if his or her
    experience has been specifically in one area or one region of
    the country, they could be thrown into the worst weather of the
    Northeast or the mountain flying, or whatever, without further
    training. And that's--we have to talk about specific training
    at different points.
        When you move pilots around this system, we must continue
    that training cycle. And I think it's deficient in that area.
        Senator Johanns. OK. I'll just wrap up, Mr. Chairman, with
    this very, very quick thought.
        I ask these questions--and I'll be very candid about it--
    because I worry that, because of economics, or whatever, we're
    trying to do this on the cheap. And we are hiring pilots at a
    very low wage. I don't know how you'd live on that salary. And
    you know what you're ending up with? People who are trying to
    build their hours to move out of the regional system. If that
    is the case, that's very worrisome.
        Now, Mr. Cohen, you represent these fine folks. Prove to me
    I'm wrong. The burden is on the airlines to prove the safety of
    our travel.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Dorgan. Senator Begich?
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        And, Mr. Maurer, thank you very much for your testimony.
        And, as I said in my opening, you know, I have experienced
    tragedy in my family and--in a plane crash with my father, but
    even to a more extreme, that the plane was never recovered. And
    it took a tragedy, back then, to change the rules of requiring
    locator beacons in planes, because of that incident. And it was
    the largest air recovery attempt in this country's history. And
    so, it seems, always, when we deal with air traffic safety,
    it's always a tragedy that moves us to the next stage.
        So, I appreciate you being here. I'm very, very
    sympathetic, from personal reasons.
        But, you know, as I was listening to the testimony, Mr.
    Cohen--and I feel like you're, like, on the hotseat, and I
    appreciate your being here--but, as I was listening to you, I
    asked my staff--because I know all associations have
    conferences and meetings and so forth--so, while you were
    testifying, I said, ``Go get me a copy'' of your last
    conference, which was held in mid-May. And it was a 4-day, 5-
    day conference. This is now 2, 3 months after the significant
    incident--as you described it, a very significant incident in
    the regional airlines' history. But, yet, when I looked through
    the conference agenda of four and a half days, I see very
    little mention of safety, except in the last--let me just
    finish--in the last couple of days.
        Now, I'm assuming, through the discussion of the
    conference, you had conversations. I know, as a former mayor,
    when the Katrina disaster happened, we spent a whole conference
    on that, because of the importance of safety in our
    communities.
        And so, as you talk about the ideas and suggestions, I want
    to--and I think Mr.--Senator Johanns said it very clearly--it's
    on you. And I can only look at what's been done and your
    comments today.
        So, I want to take a couple of steps. And if you want to
    quickly comment on the convention, that's great. It's--and I'm
    not going to read the agenda, because you know what was there
    and the kind of things you covered, but it just seems that that
    should have been forefront. And maybe it was, and your agenda
    that's on your website doesn't show that. And I just--it seems
    such an important issue.
        Mr. Cohen. If I might.
        Senator Begich. Yes.
        Mr. Cohen. To that point, Senator, the reason why RAA was
    created, and every year for the last 34 years, has been to
    promote the safety within the industry. The safety directors of
    our member airlines meet for the entire length of that
    conference. That is a meeting at which everything is shared--
    among the airlines--with the FAA, with members of the NTSB that
    are there. And it is not a public meeting, so that they can
    share those experiences.
        And so, you are exactly correct, that was not on the public
    website. They meet for 10 hours a day, and in a windowless
    room. And we would urge you when--the next time, when they meet
    here--they meet regularly--I would urge members of this
    Committee to come to--you are invited. We would love to have
    you there.
        Senator Begich. Would you share the outcome of your last
    conference meetings from that with the Committee?
        Mr. Cohen. We will do so.
        Senator Begich. And if it needs to be confidential, or
    whatever the rules are, I'm happy to oblige.
        Mr. Cohen. Yes.
        [The information is maintained in Committee files.]
        Senator Begich. Let me go to another issue, again Senator
    Johanns asked, and that was regarding the pay rate. And I--I'm
    not going to debate you. I--it surprised me that you did not
    know the beginning salary, or a range. So, do you have--has the
    Association ever done a salary study? I'm just guessing they
    must have had some analysis over the many years you've been in
    existence. And if so, can you provide that to the Committee?
        Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, Senator, we will provide you the
    information of our member carriers, what is publicly available,
    and we'll get that to you.
        Senator Begich. And I guess I would push you a little bit
    further. I mean, we have rules here; we can keep things
    proprietary information. So, I would like you to stretch
    further, if you can.
        Mr. Cohen. Will do so.
        Senator Begich. The issue on the pay. And I know you
    mentioned that the compensation is not necessarily a driving
    factor. I would disagree with you, just so it's clear on that
    fact, because as, again, a former mayor, managing over 500
    police officers, 300 public safety people in the area of
    paramedics and fire, what I never wanted them to have was a
    second job. I wanted one job. And one job was doing the safety
    of the community. So, we paid them very well. The net result
    was, we had very limited or--limited problems, because of that,
    because they didn't have to worry about their family and taking
    care of them.
        So, I want to disagree with you on that and ask you this
    simple question, and taking it--as the Chairman has talked
    about $22-23,000. In Alaska, small planes, regionals--and we
    have some great regionals in Alaska, from the ones that operate
    currently there--but, the pay seems to me an important factor
    in creating quality, so the quality of a pilot doesn't
    literally--and I'll use these words carefully--``fly'' to the
    majors, to keep them for long-term careers. Do you honestly
    think--and I'm going off the Pilots Association, because they
    obviously know, because they get the paycheck--that $22-23,000
    is adequate for us to have people flying planes with--I don't
    care if it's one person or 20 people or 50 people?
        Mr. Cohen. Two points to that, Senator, that the pay at
    virtually every one of our member airlines, all but one, is
    collectively bargained.
        Senator Begich. That's not my question. I--again, as a
    former mayor, I deal with collective bargaining all the time.
    Is it the right kind of pay to have? And should we require
    minimums that are guaranteed pay levels for pilots in regional
    planes? This is a question I asked last week to folks.
        Mr. Cohen. Senator, again, it's a very complex issue--we
    believe, fundamentally, that the quality of the people that we
    have flying is good. We would like to get even better. That's
    one of the reasons why we strongly support a number of the
    issues that have been discussed today, to get better training,
    to get better--there is an investment, here, too. It's
    interesting that this committee, which is, responsible for so
    much of the next generation of technology and spending billions
    of dollars, that we believe that there can be some money spent
    on the human capital in our aviation safety system, and we
    would strongly support that.
        Senator Begich. And I'm running out of time, so let me ask,
    if I can, to both of you, I guess--to you, and also--oh, Mr.
    May, you could answer this, too, and also Mr. Prater, if you--
    Captain Prater, if you want to answer this very quickly. And
    it's a very simple question. And that is the whole issue of
    downtime and FAA's minimums that they currently have. And I
    know each one of you have mentioned the FAA minimum standard
    requirements for pilots. Do you think the minimums are too low?
    The minimum standards of FAA for pilots for downtime, as well
    as other training and other issues, do you think they're too
    low and need to be raised up?
        And, Mr. May, can we start with you? Is that OK?
        Mr. May. Certainly, Senator Begich, I assume you're talking
    about flight and duty time now?
        Senator Begich. Yes.
        Mr. May. I think they're probably appropriate, one.
        Two, we made a commitment, at the FAA's Call to Action on
    Monday, to enter into a science-based study to determine
    whether or not they are currently appropriate or not. There has
    been a recent proceeding, on ultralong flying, that the FAA has
    done. It was science-based. Plenty of skilled people available
    to do that. I think we probably ought to incorporate--the
    Chairman has raised this issue of commuting--I think we ought
    to incorporate that into the process.
        And so, we would strongly endorse a process being
    established by FAA to look at flight and duty time, current
    standards, how they might differ for regionals, for example,
    with lots of takeoffs and landings, versus long haul. All of
    that needs to be put on the table.
        Senator Begich. Mr. Cohen? Mr. Prater? And my time is
    definitely up, so if you can be very quick on the response.
        Mr. Cohen. Totally agree with what Mr. May said.
        Senator Begich. OK. Mr. Prater?
        Captain Prater. And we believe there has been enough study.
    We're ready to move forward with it. We do believe there's
    enough science on the record. We're going to make our
    recommendations directly to the FAA and work with the
    associations to move that process forward.
        Senator Begich. Can you share that with the Committee when
    you do that?
        Mr. Cohen. Of course.
        Senator Begich. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Dorgan. Senator Klobuchar?

                   STATEMENT OF HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

        Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
    you for having this hearing.
        The tragedy of the Colgan Air flight brought the safety of
    our airlines back into the public eye. I can tell you, for--
    Senator Begich has his own very personal story. For me, it was
    eerily reminiscent of the crash of Paul Wellstone's plane. He,
    as you know, was the Senator from Minnesota. While that was a
    private plane, the issues were ice, the issues were pilot
    training, and the issues were fatigue. So, when I hear all this
    from our hearing last week, of underpaid pilots, pilots that
    are tired, and pilots that aren't earning enough money, it
    reminds me very much of that.
        In addition to that, here you have the factor of pilots
    living far away from their bases leading to long commutes and a
    lot of time spent waiting in the airports. I know there have
    been some questions about fatigue, but I had a question about
    the reimbursement for hotel rooms in the evenings. I mean, I
    know that some of the larger airlines pay for hotel costs so
    that the pilots can get sleep before shifts. Are regional
    carriers doing the same thing?
        Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, Senator Klobuchar, when pilots are
    on duty, the minute they check in, all their--their hotel costs
    on duty are paid for, 100 percent, by the company. They also
    receive a per diem expense to cover travel costs. It's the
    same, mainline and regional. There's no distinction between the
    way those policies are done between the major airlines and the
    regional airlines.
        Senator Klobuchar. Anyone else have something to add on
    that?
        Captain Prater. Well, I would say there is a fair amount of
    difference. But, I think where you're going is, is the pilot
    getting adequate rest, and a place to get that adequate rest,
    before he or she begins her first trip out of whatever domicile
    they've been assigned to? And the answer, quite simply, is, no,
    they're not provided by the airlines.
        Senator Klobuchar. Because that is--so, what they do is,
    they fly to start their first trip, from somewhere, and there
    may not be a way for them to get reimbursed for flight--for a
    hotel then, because it's not in between flights. Is that----
        Captain Prater. That's----
        Senator Klobuchar.--right?
        Captain Prater.--correct.
        Senator Klobuchar. And was that the case here, do we know,
    with the Colgan flight? Because I know she was spending the day
    in the airport----
        Captain Prater. I seriously doubt whether there is--in
    fact, it was--I can say, without a doubt, they were not given a
    place to get adequate rest, or provided for or compensated for
    a hotel room so that they could get adequate rest.
        Senator Klobuchar. OK. We heard, last week, that regional
    pilots are more likely to become tired and fatigued by flying,
    because they are flying more flights per day, rather than one
    long flight. And I'm sure that could happen with major
    carriers, too. And, in other words, they are doing more
    takeoffs and landings in one day, and they may be, actually,
    more prone to fatigue. Do you think that that's true? Anyone
    want to take that on?
        Captain Prater. Having spent more time fatigued than
    anybody else up here at the panel, I can say that there are a
    lot of different ways of lowering your readiness level, if you
    will. The fatigue of a 16-hour flight is different, but just as
    important as a pilot who's flying seven legs--seven different
    landings and takeoffs in the middle of the winter weather or
    summer weather. It is different, but to all adds to the same
    place, that a tired or fatigued pilot is not at the peak of his
    or her performance.
        Senator Klobuchar. And I----
        Mr. Cohen. Senator----
        Senator Klobuchar. Go ahead, Mr. Cohen.
        Mr. Cohen. The issue of fatigue is a very serious one and
    why it is right at the top of our Strategic Safety Initiative.
    There's a lot of new science out there on fatigue, and the
    possibility of exploring fatigue testing. Let's start gathering
    the data, let's start testing people for fatigue. We have the
    ability to do that now, but we don't, currently. And we would
    strongly urge it.
        Senator Klobuchar. Well, I think that we know. I mean, I've
    read enough sleep studies to know that if people have--don't
    have enough sleep, I don't--I mean, I'm not at all disputing
    that testing is good and finding more details about long
    flight, short flights, is good. But, the bottom line is, if
    they don't have enough sleep, because they're sitting there in
    an airport, and they haven't slept the night before, because
    they were flying from far away and they don't have enough money
    to pay for a hotel room, then I think you're going to have a
    problem. So, that's why I was glad that Administrator Babbitt,
    this past Monday, said he's going to propose a new rule on
    pilot rest requirements, which I think would be very helpful.
        I wanted to talk briefly about the de-icing issues, because
    that was clearly an issue here. I think--what was it, that the
    first officer told the pilot, in this crash, ``I've never seen
    icing conditions. I've never de-iced. I've never experienced
    any of that.'' And this was clearly a factor in the crash.
        Are regional aircraft more susceptible to problems
    associated with icing than some of the larger aircraft? Is it
    because of where they're flying or at what levels they're
    flying? Any thoughts on that?
        Captain Prater. Certainly, some of the airplanes that fly
    in the lower levels, the, if you will, surface to 18-20,000
    feet, are more likely to pick up--and spend a lot of time at
    that altitude--will pick up more icing. Certain turboprops are
    more susceptible to it, even though I believe that most of them
    are more than adequate to handle those conditions. But, you
    can't stay in it forever. And the fact that the first officer--
    you know, I--this will sound strange, but there has been such a
    focus on some sterile cockpit violations--I am relieved that we
    know that that first officer in that airplane said, ``I've
    never seen icing like this before,'' because we've all learned
    something that's just as apparent as whether it's the CVR--we
    have learned something. She felt she wasn't prepared.
        Senator Klobuchar. So, what you're saying is, you can have
    violations, things go wrong, but that she was--that she said
    this is such an indication that there are problems in training
    that you really don't need anything more than that.
        Captain Prater. That, plus sharing information between
    pilots, knowing what's going on. We talk regularly so that we
    know that you know what I'm thinking. You have to voice some of
    the things that are going on in your head so that your first
    officer or your captain knows what you're doing or what you're
    planning to do. That is not a violation of sterile cockpit.
    That actually leads us to knowing what's going on between the
    two, the dynamic.
        Senator Klobuchar. What do you think--maybe someone else
    can answer this--could be done to train our regional pilots
    efficiently on how to fly in icing conditions? Anyone want to
    take that?
        Mr. Cohen?
        Mr. Cohen. Senator, we are strongly supportive, the
    training programs at our airlines are very robust. We are
    working with the FAA, our mainline partners, our employees, to
    make them as robust as they possibly can be. All--more training
    is always good.
        Senator Klobuchar. OK.
        Mr. Maurer?
        Mr. Maurer. I guess what I would comment on is, we learned,
    in the NTSB hearings, that there is software available to take
    inexperienced pilots and put them with experienced pilots. So,
    a mentoring program of some sort, where you've got an
    experienced pilot who has flown in ice, who has seen it, who
    understands it, knows what to do--put an inexperienced pilot
    with them, and perhaps we might have a better outcome. I mean,
    that's a hands-on way of learning about these things. There's
    only so much that can be done in a simulator. Let's face it.
        Senator Klobuchar. I would think icing would be harder
    condition to simulate than----
        Mr. Maurer. Right.
        Senator Klobuchar.--some of the--maybe I'm naive about it,
    but it seems like it would be.
        Mr. Maurer. And, along that line, I just wanted to make one
    other comment. The regional airlines typically are flying less
    than 2-hour-type flights, et cetera--you mentioned it--more
    takeoffs, more landings. As I've interviewed and talked to
    pilots, I mean, this is the critical time of flight, taking off
    and landing. Where, then, should we have the best skill? And
    I'm not trying to talk anything away from the majors, but
    should we not have the best pilots, the most skilled pilots,
    flying these short trips? Particularly if you're flying in
    these altitudes----
        Senator Klobuchar. That are more----
        Mr. Maurer.--where----
        Senator Klobuchar.--difficult----
        Mr. Maurer.--are more susceptible to ice----
        Senator Klobuchar. Interesting.
        Mr. Maurer.--which--that's another issue that--you know,
    pilots don't like to fly in it, but they have to.
        Senator Klobuchar. Right.
        OK, thank you very much.
        Senator Dorgan. Senator McCaskill?

                  STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I'd like to talk a little bit about maintenance. I have
    worked on this issue since I came to the Senate, on foreign
    repair stations. And I'm sure you all are aware that the IG has
    determined that regional carriers are depending on outsourcing
    maintenance, to a large extent. And my question to you, Mr.
    Cohen, is, How much of the outsourced maintenance--I believe
    the IG said that 50 percent of the regional airlines'
    maintenance is being outsourced--what percentage of that
    outsourced maintenance work is going to FAA-certified repair
    stations?
        Mr. Cohen. I'm glad you asked that question, Senator,
    because it's a good opportunity to clarify some things in that
    IG report that I think the hearing in the other body didn't
    quite get straight.
        First of all, 100 percent of all the maintenance is being
    done in an FAA-certified maintenance operation. Otherwise, it
    wouldn't be allowed to fly.
        Number two, to augment the IG study regional airlines
    outsource less maintenance overseas than even the mainline
    carriers do. Virtually all of the maintenance by the regional
    airline members is done here in this country, either by
    themselves or at their own FAA-certified maintenance operation
    here in the United States, including our manufacturers, which
    have locations in the United States--in Miami, in Tennessee,
    and in West Virginia.
        So, I hope--that may be a long way of answering your
    question, but I----
        Senator McCaskill. No.
        Mr. Cohen. But----
        Senator McCaskill. No. But, I'm interested in what you
    said, though, because I'm sure you're aware that it is
    perfectly acceptable to the FAA for the repair work to be done
    in noncertified stations. You--I mean, you're aware of that,
    right? But, you're maintaining, today, that all of the
    maintenance work is being done--because we--this is one of the
    problems we have right now, is that a repair station does not
    have to be certified by the FAA in order for it to be utilized
    by either the commercial carriers or the regional carriers. Are
    you aware of that?
        Mr. Cohen. Senator, again, it's my understanding, on the
    maintenance, that the heavy maintenance, here, that we're
    talking about the C&D checks, are conducted by what I'm
    assuming are FAA-certified facilities.
        Senator McCaskill. If you would check that, because I----
        Mr. Cohen. I will----
        Senator McCaskill.--think--I would be surprised if that
    were the fact.
        Mr. Cohen. I will----
        Senator McCaskill. I mean, we've done a fair amount of work
    on this issue, and there are a large number of--not just ``kick
    the tires,'' but serious and substantial maintenance and repair
    work that is being done by noncertified repair stations, both
    foreign and domestic. And so, I would certainly appreciate you
    following up on that, because one of the issues, of course, is,
    why do we have certified repair stations if people aren't
    required to use them? And that's, in fact, what the legislation
    that Senator Specter and I have introduced would require you to
    use, the certified repair stations. As I said to FAA a couple
    of different times in this room, I assume getting one certified
    is a good thing. Well, if it's a good thing, why aren't we
    requiring people to use them? And if it's not a good thing, why
    are we spending taxpayer money supporting them? It doesn't make
    sense to me, just using good, old-fashioned common sense, that
    we would go through a certification process and then not
    require it.
        So, if you would get back to me, I would really appreciate
    it. Because the FAA does not have good data on this. They will
    admit they do not know how much of the maintenance is being
    done at certified versus noncertified repair stations.
        Mr. Cohen. Senator, we'll get you all the information.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you very much.
        And, Mr. May, same question to you, for the national
    carriers. Can you give me any kind of figure as to what
    percentage of the maintenance is being done in certified versus
    noncertified repair stations?
        Mr. May. I do not have that number at hand, but I would be
    happy to provide it to you, Senator.
        Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific. And while you're
    at it, Mr. Cohen has represented that none of this is being
    outsourced beyond the United States, in terms of the regional
    carriers. I am confident it is being outsourced beyond the
    United States for the large commercial carriers.
        Mr. May. That is----
        Senator McCaskill. And do you have--does your association
    have a number of what percentage of that maintenance is being
    outsourced?
        Mr. May. I don't--I'm sure we have the answer to that. I
    don't happen to have it with me. I'd be happy to provide it
    for----
        Senator McCaskill. If you have it, that would be terrific.
    It has been a very difficult amount--the information is
    difficult to come by from the FAA. They have not, I don't
    think, prioritized looking at this issue, and I don't think the
    American flying public realizes to what extent maintenance has
    been outsourced in an effort to cut costs. And what--one of the
    problems is that, in many of these places, there's not even
    alcohol and drug testing, and it seems weird to me that we have
    domestic certified repair stations, and, because we don't have
    as many of them anymore because so many have been outsourced,
    there are FAA inspectors that hang out there, that are really
    looking over the shoulder.
        And then you travel to Indonesia, and if there is ever an
    FAA inspector that shows up--by the way, the United States pays
    for that, the taxpayers pay the costs of the FAA inspector to
    go look at foreign repair stations, not the airlines. So, the
    taxpayers are actually underwriting this outsourcing. They
    aren't even doing drug and alcohol tests. And, as we have
    talked about in this hearing before, there are actually
    locations that have been on the State Department's Watch List
    for terrorist activity, where there have been repair stations
    that have been utilized.
        So, if you would get back to us with whatever information
    your associations have on this information, I think it will be
    helpful as we move forward, trying to get these important
    reforms done in the area of maintenance and repair.
        Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Dorgan. Senator McCaskill, thank you very much.
        We will attempt to get all of that information. I'm well
    familiar with the issue of the inspections and the repair
    stations. I mean, we have--in fact, I've written about one of
    the carriers that flies an empty Airbus 320 to El Salvador for
    repair, and then flies an empty 320 back to the United States
    after having had it repaired in El Salvador, or inspected or
    maintained in--my guess is, that's probably another issue of
    dollars and cents.
        And let me go back to just a moment ago, on icing. I just
    pulled the transcript again of this. This copilot said, ``I've
    never seen icing conditions. I've never de-iced. I've never de-
    iced. I've never experienced any of that. I don't want to have
    to experience that and make those kind of calls. You know, I
    freaked out. I'd have seen this much ice and thought, `Oh, my
    gosh, we're going to crash.' ''
        The actual transcript is of a copilot that appears to me to
    have had minimum training in icing conditions.
        Now, the reason I mention this is because the training
    issue has been on the table, here. What kind of training does
    someone have in that cockpit to fly in the conditions into
    which that airplane is headed? If they're flying to Buffalo,
    New York, in the winter, one would expect you would encounter
    icing conditions of some sort.
        I come from the State of North Dakota. I learned to fly,
    many, many years ago, and, you know, I've been on airplanes,
    small airplanes, with a lot of buildup on the wings, and
    watching it with flashlights. So, I--you know, I've flown in a
    lot of icing, with pilots and with others.
        And so, I think it's an important question. How much
    training exists before someone is put in a cockpit for the
    specific kind of conditions they are likely to encounter?
        I want to ask about this issue of the time in an airplane,
    because I think that's also important. In the Buffalo crash, we
    were told that that carrier had had training. They trained
    their pilots on the stick-shaker, but not the stick-pusher. And
    so, if that's the case, I guess the first question of mine is,
    If you're in a cockpit with a device called a ``stick-pusher,''
    which is going to be a device that is going to automatically
    move you toward some sort of safety function in a--in that
    flight, and have never had experience with it, or not been
    trained in it, is that a--isn't that a significant deficiency?
    And how could that happen?
        Captain Prater, can you tell us?
        Captain Prater. I'd be glad to, Senator.
        First of all, every airplane has different characteristic,
    different safety features, and pilots should be trained to the
    proficiency in each and every one of those.
        I cannot testify toward the conditions on the training of
    this individual airman or crew, but I can say, more generally,
    is that there is a huge cost to training airmen, so it does
    come down to dollars and cents.
        I have severe concerns that the regional industry, who
    looks at their pilots as, if you will, part-time help, training
    help, may not want to spend as much money making sure they're
    aware of each and every facet. Training has been shortened over
    my three decades as an airline pilot. I think we need to look
    at it very seriously and say, Have we reduced it to below what
    should be the standards?
        Senator Dorgan. Mr. Cohen?
        Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, in defense of the training
    programs at our regional airlines--is the Committee--this
    committee was provided with very detailed information about the
    training programs, which are every bit as robust. One of the
    things we talked about at Monday's Call to Action was to look
    at all of these type of training issues that have been laid on
    the table, certainly today and over the last several weeks, and
    to look at it, whether it's environmental--you know, additional
    training in environment, additional training on whatever--and
    that, in all my years in the airline industry--and I've been in
    it since 1971--I have never seen, ever seen, a decision by any
    airline regarding safety that--you know, that would jeopardize
    safety because of cost. I just want to lay that on----
        Senator Dorgan. Mr. Cohen, Senator Johanns was making the
    point, and a perfectly reasonable point, that if we're flying
    through very difficult economic conditions, if regional
    carriers are smaller companies having substantial difficulty,
    isn't it likely that you have substantially less experience in
    that airplane, you're paying lower salaries, and so on? And
    does that have an impact on the capability of that airplane to
    fly through difficult circumstances?
        Look, the airline industry has created, for the most part
    in this country, two different systems. One is a hub-and-spoke
    system, and the other is flying between city pairs, with some
    localized carriers.
        In the hub-and-spoke system, in the old days, Northwest
    Airlines, which served my State, would fly its jet carriers
    into that city, one of four cities in North Dakota, with 727s,
    had a pilot, a copilot, and a flight engineer. And I assume
    that the pilots that bid on those routes were probably pilots
    with less time in the company than somebody that bid on a San
    Francisco to Narita route. So, I understand that, you know, the
    longer routes and the bigger planes, and so on, are going to
    get the pilots with more experience. But, it just seems to me,
    the way this hub-and-spoke system has morphed is that the
    network carriers have decided, ``You know what, we're going to
    move a lot of these spokes off onto a commuter carrier, and
    that commuter carrier is going to be out there with smaller
    planes, in most cases. It's going to cost us less, although
    they're going to wear our name on the fuselage, but it's going
    to cost us a lot less, because, frankly, it can be a carrier
    that we have, perhaps 100 percent ownership of, or substantial
    ownership of, but not the same contracts we have.'' So, it will
    have pilots with less experience that they can hire for an
    entry level of $18,000 a year.
        I--it seems to me, just inevitably, that you do you have,
    then--again, without demeaning a pilot or a pilot's ability--
    you do have the potential of a separate standard of capability.
    I'm not talking about training to safety minimum standard, I'm
    just talking about separate standard of capability.
        And so, the major question that we started with today is,
    the FAA said, in the mid-1990s, one standard. And passengers
    that get on an airplane, when they walk through that airplane
    door, should expect the same standard on the cockpit of a
    commuter carrier or a network carrier.
        The--I think Mr. Prater says he believes that the
    enforcement of that standard is not as rigorous as passengers
    would expect or as we would expect.
        Mr. May, what's your impression of that?
        Mr. May. Mr. Chairman, we all adhere to FAR Part 121, which
    is the single standard that was established in 1995. I think
    the reality is that mainline carriers more regularly far exceed
    that standard in Part 121 than our regional partners do. We
    have, in--with virtually no exceptions--FOQA programs, ASAP
    programs, more robust training, et cetera. And, as part of the
    recommendations that we have made before you today, and in the
    House last week, and at the FAA, we would suggest that many of
    those programs be instituted at the regional level for our
    partners.
        Senator Dorgan. But, let me ask you--I mean, the fact is,
    it is your name--that is, the name of your companies that you
    represent--on the fuselage of these airplanes.
        Mr. May. That is correct.
        Senator Dorgan. And, in many cases, you own the regional
    carrier, or own substantial portions of equity in the regional
    carrier. So, it would seem to me that it would be in the
    interest of the network carriers to require the things that you
    have recommended today prior to these recommendations.
        Mr. May. I understand that thought, Senator. There was
    actually a proposal made by NTSB, back in about 1994, when this
    whole debate came to pass and when Part 121 was created and
    putting the regionals under Part 121, to have the mainline
    carriers be the enforcement of Part 121 for their regional
    partners. That was specifically rejected by the Congress and
    the FAA, because they wanted to have a single level of
    enforcement, as well as a single level of achievement. And I
    think that decision was the correct one at the time, and I
    think it remains correct, that the FAA needs to be the
    principal enforcer. We have openly said, here today, and will
    continue to say, if we need to change those standards and
    upgrade them, then that is something that we ought to look at
    doing. By the same token, I think the enforcement needs to rest
    with the FAA.
        Senator Dorgan. Yes. Well, you know, I'd--was just in
    another committee earlier this morning and described a Federal
    agency that was willfully blind and cheerfully ignorant for
    about 10 years. And I'm--I don't ascribe that to the FAA,
    except to say that I've had a bellyful of enforcement
    requirements by certain agencies that have completely neglected
    the opportunity or the requirement to do so.
        The FAA, as we said to Randy Babbitt, the new
    administrator, last week, we need new diligence here, a new
    level of interest in making certain that we have one standard,
    that passengers can rely on one standard when they board an
    airplane. And I think that's going to require some effort by
    the FAA, and may require some effort by this Committee.
        Senator Rockefeller and Senator Hutchison, myself, Senator
    DeMint, and others, are going to be working on--I'll be putting
    together, along with my colleagues, the FAA Reauthorization
    Act. We're right in the middle of that process now, which will
    include modernization of the air traffic control system and
    many other things, all of which have to do with safety. And so,
    we're going to--I would say, to those that have raised the
    questions this morning about pilots' records and so on, my
    first expectation is that Administrator Babbitt is going to
    move quickly to address some of those issues, but we will
    introduce legislation to be certain that it is done the right
    way, as well.
        So, Senator Begich, did you wish to make any other
    comments?
        Senator Begich. No, just thank you for the opportunity.
        Senator Dorgan. Yes, I--let me thank the witnesses for
    being here.
        Again, we'll have one additional hearing, at some point,
    with the airline companies themselves. We appreciate, Mr. May
    and Mr. Cohen, your representation of them here at this
    hearing. And, Captain----
        Well, there is one other question I've not asked. And I--I
    know there's a term of art called ``crew rest,'' vis-a-vis
    fatigue, and we've talked a lot about fatigue today, and I
    think one of the Senators raised the issue of crew rest. But, I
    have been on plenty of airplanes, plenty of airplanes that fly
    in here late because of storms and so on, and we land at
    midnight at Washington National. And I know that there's a
    requirement for a certain number of hours of rest. But, I've
    sat with pilots and walked out of the plane with pilots who
    say, ``Well, I've got to be back here at X hour. That meets the
    test of the number of hours I have for rest. But, by the time I
    get to the hotel, by the time I check in, by the time I get to
    bed, I'm going to have probably 4 hours of sleep tonight.''
    That is a crew-rest issue. And that is a regulatory issue. And
    I don't want people to think that only--that fatigue is the
    only issue here. I think there are other issues with respect to
    crew rest that we want to talk about as we go forward.
        Captain Prater. Yes, sir. I mean, it leads to the fatigue
    of that next day. If you're not allowed adequate time to
    recuperate from the up to 16-hour duty day that you had the day
    before, and you're only away from the airplane for 8 hours, 8
    and a half hours, it's not enough. We need to ensure that the
    pilots are getting at least an adequate opportunity, behind the
    hotel door, to get 8 hours of rest.
        Senator Dorgan. One thing is certain about this country, we
    are all pretty mobile, we rely on a transportation system that
    is modern and safe and reliable. And no insignificant part of
    that is the commercial airline industry. It's very important to
    our country, very important to all regions of our country. And
    we want it to be made as safe as is possible.
        I think the tragic crash in Buffalo, New York, has
    activated a lot of interest in asking questions. Did we drift
    along, here, and allow the creation of a couple of different
    standards in training, and so on, on enforcement? We'll know
    more about the answer to that as more disclosures come from the
    NTSB and so on. And we're learning some from last week's
    hearing and this week's hearing. And for that, we're indebted
    to the people who are witnesses.
        And, Mr. Maurer, we are especially indebted to you and the
    families who have decided to, in the name of those you loved,
    find a way to make a difference and make certain that others do
    not experience the same fate.
        So, we appreciate all four of you being here.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                                A P P E N D I X

                                              June 12, 2009, Newnan, GA
    Senator Byron L. Dorgan--Chairman
    Senate Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security,
    Washington, DC.

    Dear Senator Dorgan,

        In a June 10, 2009 e-mail from your staffer Mr. Rich Swayze to me,
    it was requested that I forward to your office an affidavit concerning
    commercial aviation safety issues pertaining to your upcoming June 17th
    hearing.
        I have enclosed this affidavit for perusal by your subcommittee
    members in hopes that it will be included in congressional records for
    your upcoming hearing, since I was previously advised that I would not
    be permitted to testify before your committee in open or closed
    session, nor would any other whistle blowing airline pilots from other
    airlines that I am presently in contact with through our
    `Whistleblowing Airline Employees Association.'
        As mentioned before, I am currently a federally unprotected whistle
    blower whose rights as such have been denied on multiple counts. I am
    merely asking my government to perform their duties in protecting my
    rights as such, given where I am in matters at present.
        If this information, as well as previously submitted correspondence
    and information is excluded from congressional records associated with
    this hearing, it is respectfully requested that the reason(s) why be
    addressed to me by separate correspondence from your staff. A certified
    copy of this correspondence is forthcoming to your office via United
    Parcel Service.
        Your thoughtful consideration is greatly appreciated.
                Very respectfully submitted,
                                                    Dan Hanley,
                                  Former United Airlines B-777 Captain.
    Encl: My affidavit dated June 12, 2009
                                     ______

    Affidavit of Daniel W. Hanley for Inclusion as Part of Public
    Congressional Record for Hearing Conducted by Senate Aviation
    Operations, Safety, and Security Subcommittee Chairman Senator Byron
    Dorgan of June 17, 2009

        I, Daniel W. Hanley, being first duly sworn, on oath, states as
    follows:

        1. I am of legal age and competent. This affidavit is made on my
    personal knowledge of all matters set forth and referenced herein. If
    sworn and called as a witness in this case, I could, and I would,
    testify competently as to each fact set forth and incorporated herein
    by reference.

        2. The alleged facts supported with evidence are true and correct
    to the best of my personal knowledge of the facts, evidence,
    information and belief.

        3. On June 9, 2009 at 11 a.m., I was advised by Mr. Rich Swayze, a
    staff member on the Senate Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security
    Subcommittee, that I would not be permitted to testify in either open
    or closed session of said committee, hence this affidavit is being
    provided for inclusion as part of public congressional record for this
    hearing.

        4. I am of information and belief that in October 2003, I was
    ushered through the United Airlines Employee Assistance Program (EAP)
    at United Airlines directly as a result of my submission of federally-
    mandated Aviation Safety Awareness Reports which, among other issues,
    addressed concerns regarding crew fatigue, reckless scheduling of
    aircrews, aircrew morale issues, and alleged stonewalling of
    communication processes within the company, that included the Federal
    Aviation Administration Principle Operation Inspector.

        5. I currently possess documentation, mental health records, prior
    military flight and health records, and availability of credible
    witnesses in support of what I state herein. I allege that, in 35-years
    of flying civil, naval, and commercial jet aircraft, I have never
    failed a check ride, flight physical, or any psychological screening
    and have an untarnished record with no flight violations. I estimate to
    have flown over 20,000 flight hours in numerous civilian and naval
    aircraft including the P-3 Orion, as well as the B-737, B-727, A-320,
    B-757/767, and B-777 commercial jet aircraft at United Airlines.

        6. My U.S. Navy service record is available on request, which
    demonstrates that I consistently ranked in the top 1 percent of my peer
    group throughout my 10 years as a Naval Officer and aviator, and was
    recommended for accelerated promotion on all but one or two officer
    evaluation reports in 10 years. In 1978, I was selected for the
    Operations Research Program at the Naval Postgraduate School at
    Monterey, California and was nominated for the Navy Weapon System
    Acquisition Management Program (WSAM), but declined these tempting
    assignments to pursue a career in commercial aviation.

        7. Upon graduation from Primary Flight Training at NAS Saufley
    Field in Pensacola, Florida in 1973 while flying the T-34B, I was
    selected as `Student of the Week' out of 228 graduating students. Upon
    graduation from Advanced Flight Training at NAS Corpus Christi, Texas
    flying the TS-2A Tracker, I was selected as `Student of the Month'.
    Upon graduating from Replacement Air Group Training Squadron flying the
    P-3 Orion, I was ranked number one in my class. In my fleet squadron, I
    became the youngest and only Lt (jg) Plane Commander/Mission Commander
    well in advance of schedule and of that of my contemporaries.
    Additionally, I was the youngest and junior ranked instructor pilot in
    the squadron, as well as a NATOPS Safety Instructor and maintenance
    functional check pilot. Additionally, I served as a P-3 Subject Matter
    Expert in development of a training syllabus for fleet wide use for the
    P-3C Update II Project. In 1984, I received a Navy Achievement Medal
    serving as Operations Officer while attached to Patrol Squadron Sixty
    at NAS Glenview, Illinois.

        8. I was on the Dean's List at Southern Illinois University and
    graduated in 1973 with a Bachelor of Science in Applied Mathematics.
    Upon expulsion as a United Airlines B-777 Captain, during the time-
    frame 2004-2006, I attended Georgia State University full-time while
    majoring in Psychology and World Religious Studies and maintained a
    near straight-A average. I am a few hours short of receipt of a
    Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology, and have reenrolled for the fall
    2009 semester for continuance of my education.

        9. The Air Line Pilots Association motto is ``Schedule with
    Safety''. I allege, based on my own perceptions and personal
    experiences, as well as inputs received from many other aircrew members
    at United Airlines in 2003, that United Airlines Flight Operations
    management personnel engaged in a crew scheduling process during
    bankruptcy that may have endangered the lives of the traveling public,
    due to crew fatigue, poor morale, inadequate and unconcerned management
    leadership, massive problematic downgrade of pilots, and many other
    issues. These situations were precipitated by the alleged leveraged
    position of management in making outrageous concession demands of
    employees in an effort to receive an ATSB loan guarantee that was never
    granted, and which propelled United Airlines into Chapter 11
    bankruptcy. It was these and other legal, financial, and political
    pressures that greatly diminished the ability of ALPA to adequately
    address safety issues and legally support those pilots who did via
    appropriate Federal communicative processes. This perception was gained
    by me from actual statements made at the time by both my JFK Chief
    Pilot, ALPA council chairman, and others.

        10. I allege that commercial aviation safety must necessarily be
    maintained in a vacuum without external financial, legal, and political
    pressures and influences exerted on aircrew members wishing to report
    known safety deficiencies for fear of undue recriminations.

        11. The first sentences of the Air Line Pilots Association Code of
    Ethics are thus stated:

            AN AIRLINE PILOT will keep uppermost in his mind that the
            safety, comfort, and well-being of the passengers who entrust
            their lives to him are his first and greatest responsibility.

         He will never permit external pressures or personal
                desires to influence his judgment, nor will he knowingly do
                anything that could jeopardize flight safety.

         He will remember that an act of omission can be as
                hazardous as a deliberate act of commission, and he will
                not neglect any detail that contributes to the safety of
                flight, or perform any operation in a careless or reckless
                manner.

         Consistent with flight safety, he will at all times
                operate his aircraft in manner that will contribute to the
                comfort, peace of mind, and well-being of his passengers,
                instilling trust in him and the airline he represents.

         Once he has discharged his primary responsibility for the
                safety and comfort of his passengers, he will remember that
                they depend upon him to do all that is possible to deliver
                them to their destination at the scheduled time.

         If a disaster should strike, he will take whatever action
                he deems necessary to protect the lives of his crew and his
                passengers.

        12. The Federal Aviation Administration website states:

            Our Mission

            Our continuing mission is to provide the safest, most efficient
            aerospace system in the world.

            Our Vision

            We continue to improve safety and efficiency of flight. We are
            responsive to our customers and are accountable to the taxpayer
            and the flying public.

            Our Values

         Safety is our passion. We are the world leaders in
                aerospace safety.

         Quality is our trademark. We serve our stakeholders, our
                customers, and each other.

         Integrity is our character. We do the right thing, even
                when no one is looking.

         People are our strength. We treat people as we want to be
                treated.

        13. I allege that beginning in 2002 until July 12, 2003 when I
    wrote my first formal letter of complaint to Captain Paul Whiteford,
    United ALPA MEC Chairman, I had countless face-to-face and phone
    conversations and e-mail exchanges with both United flight management
    and ALPA representatives regarding a whole host of safety concerns,
    many of which had been expressed to me by other aircrew members, but
    were not being adequately addressed by company management personnel. It
    must be emphasized that throughout this ordeal that ended in December
    2003, I was attempting to be most cautious not to draw media attention
    or initiate litigation of any sort, as I feared that such actions might
    compromise the success of United's emergence from bankruptcy, since the
    company was allegedly teetering on the brink of Chapter 7 liquidation.

        14. I further allege that my actions and conduct were commensurate
    with the stated Air Line Pilots Association motto and Code of Ethics,
    in consonance with the Federal Aviation Administration Mission
    statement, and was in keeping with the highest standards of United
    Airlines stated number one priority of safety. I genuinely believed
    that what I was doing was in keeping with every legal, moral, and
    ethical principle engrained in me as a pilot since I first took flight
    in a Cessna-150 in 1968 and carried throughout my entire Naval flying
    experiences, and through my career at United Airlines. I honestly
    believed that I would have the full support of ALPA and the FAA since I
    was sustaining the legal, moral, and ethical high ground in reporting
    this to United Airlines management and the FAA Principle Operation
    Inspector assigned to the airline.

        15. On the ground while at the gate, aircraft security is
    coordinated by the captain and the ground security coordinator with the
    final decision made by the captain regarding continuance of a flight.
    Shortly after 9/11, United Airlines senior management authorized flight
    crew members, who felt they were at risk due to security concerns, to
    deplane with pay protection for that segment of their schedule. In
    2003, due to a security breach on my flight at the gate in London,
    wherein the flight attendants perhaps averted a north Atlantic
    diversion due to advisement to me of a passenger condition, I happened
    to notice flight attendant supervisors who had boarded the plane that
    was being inspected without passengers onboard that were badgering my
    cabin crew for allegedly delaying the flight. I asked them to step
    aside so that I could explain just how helpful this crew was to me in
    my making the decision to have the aircraft inspected (most of the
    passengers told me that if this passenger remained on board, they
    weren't going to take the flight). I then asked them a hypothetical
    question regarding what their actions would be if both I and the ground
    security coordinator were agreeable to taking the flight but had flight
    attendants who still experienced consternation and wanted to deplane.
    They responded that they would give the flight attendant in question a
    direct order to take the flight and, if she refused, she would be
    terminated from employment at United Airlines. I asked them both if
    this was stated United Airlines upper-management policy, and they both
    agreed that it was. Believing that this might just be a local London
    base policy, I queried both the Newark and JFK in-flight offices and
    actually saw the intimidating policy in writing. A Newark-based in-
    flight supervisor wrote a stinging letter to my JFK Chief Pilot just
    because I asked to see this policy in writing, which I felt impinged on
    the CLR concepts that include effective cockpit-cabin communications.

        16. To keep this matter in house, I filed a Captain's Report to
    address my concerns, as the flight attendants serve as the eyes and
    ears in the back of the cabin since the promised TV cameras were never
    installed. A week or so later, I received a call from an ALPA safety
    representative telling me that management and ALPA had reviewed my
    report, and although they agreed with what I stated, felt that ALPA was
    somewhat restricted due to the fact that United Airlines was in the
    midst of attempting to receive post-9/11 ATSB loan moneys.
    Paraphrasing, he remarked, ``C'mon Dan, be a team player . . . we're in
    bankruptcy and need this loan. Why don't you just drop this issue?
    Management thinks that you're just being a big-mouthed whistleblower.
    How do you want me to dispose of this report?'' I told him what he
    could do with the report, but only after querying him as to where ALPA
    was drawing the distinction between aviation safety and airline
    financial survival concerns. I emphasized to him that I wasn't willing
    to compromise my principles as a captain with regard to safety issues
    in spite of the financial condition of United Airlines and the
    unfavorable negotiating position that ALPA found itself in at present.
    Subsequent discussions with numerous chief pilots and ALPA officials
    indicated to me that the entire bankruptcy process was impinging on
    aviation safety issues, hence, after repeated stonewalls of all issues,
    I intended to write CEO Glenn Tilton a letter addressing this concern.
    The remaining tragic conclusion of my aviation career may be found in
    the previously submitted affidavit.

        17. Since 2006, I have been contacted by numerous airline pilots
    from all carriers who have shared their similar stories with me.
    Additionally, other pilots who have not personally had such
    experiences, but are knowledgeable of the EAP process for removing
    `dissident' pilots have provided much information and insight and are
    willing to provide sworn testimony.

        18. In light of ASAP program cancellations last year at Delta,
    UsAir, and American, with the current pending litigation hanging over
    the head of United pilots, coupled with the exposure of whistleblower
    suppression at Colgan Air that could have possibly prevented that air
    disaster, other pilots and myself feel morally and ethically compelled
    to speak out. We already have and will continue to do so until this
    problem is rectified by the Department of Transportation and the
    Federal Aviation Administration.

        19. I could have turned my back on aviation and walked away from
    all of these concerns 5 years ago, but my conscience would not allow
    it. I may have been retired from the left seat in 2003, but I will
    always be a captain in my heart and in my soul, just as I will always
    be a Naval Aviator. It does count just how many times an airline pilot
    walks down the jet way with regard to airline safety. Poor pay and
    working conditions do very much contribute to poor morale, which also
    adds stress and distraction into the safety equation, which hasn't been
    addressed by the Transportation subcommittee.

        20. While concerns are being expressed regarding the impact of
    commuting on airline safety, please be advised that it has come to my
    attention that most first officers at the trunk carriers are working
    full-time outside the airline as their primary source of income. Many
    have told me that once they get their business established, that they
    are going to resign from their airline jobs, as the continued hassle is
    no longer worth it. Additionally, many line captains that I've talked
    to are working absolute minimum hours to keep the job since their
    pensions were stolen from them in bankruptcy. Apathy and poor morale in
    the airline industry amongst pilots is a cancer to safety more
    insidious than most of the issues addressed by the committee to date.

        21. For airline CEOs who recently stated that pilot pay has no
    impact on the level of safety in flight operations, I would suggest
    that they try living on $25,000 for a year without access to any other
    financial assets, and see what `happy campers' and just how effective
    and focused they are at their jobs.

        22. Further affiant sayeth naught.
                                               DANIEL W. HANLEY
    SWORN before me on

    This        day of June 2009

    _____________________

              NOTARY PUBLIC

        Other documents submitted by Mr. Hanley may be found at http://
    airline-whistleblower.blogspot.com/.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
                                  James C. May
        Question 1. How much of the maintenance work that your member
    companies outsource is performed at part 145 certificated repair
    stations, and how much is performed elsewhere?

        Question 2. How much of your member companies' outsourced
    maintenance work is performed abroad? Of the work performed abroad, how
    much is done at part 145 certificated repair stations, and how much is
    done by entities other than part 145 repair stations?

        Question 3. How do your member companies determine when to
    outsource maintenance and where to send that maintenance work once they
    have decided to outsource? Accounting for differences in the type of
    work outsourced, how much more does it cost to send work to a part 145
    certificated repair station than to a non-certificated facility? How
    much less does it cost to send work to a part 145 certificated repair
    station located abroad? How much less to send the work to non-
    certificated facility abroad?

        Question 4. How do your members verify the quality of work
    performed at non-certificated facilities?
        Answer. Based upon data collected by the Department of
    Transportation's Research and Innovative Technology Administration
    (RITA) Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), in 2008, thirty-eight
    percent of total aircraft maintenance expenditures by airline members
    of the Air Transport Association (ATA) went to third party maintenance
    providers.
        That figure, alone, does not provide true insight to this complex
    subject. The level of contract maintenance utilized by individual
    airlines varies significantly based on factors such as the type--or
    types--of aircraft used, the geographic region of operations, business
    philosophies, labor agreement limitations, internal cost structures,
    and commercial relationships with airframe, engine and component
    manufacturers. Without exception, all airlines rely to some extent on
    contract maintenance providers. Airlines are by no means unique in this
    regard. For example: trains, buses and cruise ships are predominantly
    maintained by companies other than those who operate them; the U.S.
    Department of Defense contracts with private companies for the
    maintenance of its aircraft, in many cases with the same companies
    utilized by commercial airlines.
        Although the majority of narrow-body aircraft maintenance work
    contracted for in the past few years has stayed within North America--
    maintenance performed outside North America is limited primarily to
    wide-body which routinely transit locations abroad--it is worth noting
    that the work must always be performed in accordance with the U.S. air
    carrier's maintenance program and the applicable portions of its
    required manual--regardless of location.
        Under existing FAA regulations, all repair stations are treated as
    extensions of the air carrier's maintenance organization, air carriers
    cannot delegate the responsibility for the airworthiness of their
    aircraft and they are required to provide a level of oversight to
    ensure the standards are met.
        While some view maintenance contracting as undermining safety, the
    data reflects otherwise. U.S. airlines have logged an exceptional
    safety record while steadily expanding their use of contract
    maintenance.

        Question 5. Describe your members' programs to audit the policies
    and performance of the facilities to which they send their maintenance.
    How widely do these policies vary across your membership? Describe the
    most rigorous audit program. Describe the least rigorous.
        Answer. We're not in a position to describe our members specific
    policies on auditing, we simply don't have that kind of detailed
    information. Additionally, we would not characterize any of our members
    as having ``more'' or ``less'' rigorous programs.
                                     ______

             Response to Follow-up Written Questions Submitted by
                     Hon. Claire McCaskill to James C. May
        Question. We would like to get more clarity from the ATA about the
    following issues:

        1. Neither of the witnesses addressed the second half of our first
    question; namely, how much work is done at part 145 certificated repair
    stations, and how much is done by entities other than part 145 repair
    stations?
        2. We would like both witness to better address the audit questions
    (the fifth question). In particular, the following passages from the
    Inspector General's report on ``Air Carriers' Outsourcing of Aircraft
    Maintenance'' issued on September 30, 2008 outline concerns about
    airline audits on the policies/performances of the facilities to which
    they send their maintenance. We would like to get a more definitive
    answer on how the airlines are addressing these issues:
        ``While all the carriers we visited had audit programs, we found
    that these programs were not always effective. As a result, maintenance
    problems either went undetected or reoccurred.
        For example, at one heavy airframe repair station, all three types
    of oversight failed-FAA, air carrier, and repair station. We found that
    two air carrier audits and two FAA inspections (CMO and FSDO) failed to
    detect significant weaknesses at this facility. These were not
    discovered until another major air carrier's pre-contract award audit
    found problems in the repair stations' maintenance practices, such as
    not properly overseeing subcontractor maintenance. The problems
    identified were so serious that repair station management stopped
    operations for over a month so it could take corrective actions.''. . .
        ``For example, on-site personnel for two carriers we reviewed only
    performed undocumented, on-the-spot inspections of work at repair
    stations. As a result, the air carriers could not use the data for
    trend analysis or ensure the repair station took corrective actions.''
        Answer. In essence, there are two separate oversight schemes, one
    regulatory and one independent, both effective in ensuring satisfaction
    of applicable FAA regulations. This comprehensive, multilayered
    approach to oversight ensures the highest levels of quality and
    safety--regardless of who does the work or where that work is
    performed.
        Initial levels of protection are contained in the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) regulations which provide a basic framework to
    ensure competence among those certificated to perform aircraft
    maintenance (ref. 14 CFR parts 121, 145 and 65). Prior to granting this
    certification, the FAA confirms that an entity or individual has
    fulfilled specific regulatory requirements.
        Related to that approval process, the FAA issues Operations
    Specifications (OpSpecs) which adapt the general terms of applicable
    regulations into the specific requirements for an individual
    certificate holder (OpSpecs are as legally binding as the regulations).
    Air carrier OpSpecs contain a specific section to address aircraft
    maintenance, and repair station OpSpecs delineate the ratings and
    limitations for the maintenance that can be performed.
        Second, once certificated, air carriers and repair stations are
    inspected and monitored by the FAA for verification of their continued
    conformity with the rules.
        Third, certificated air carriers acquire the non-delegable
    responsibility for the airworthiness of the aircraft in their fleet
    (see 14 CFR  121.363). Aircraft maintenance is the primary ingredient
    of airworthiness, and FAA regulations contain detailed maintenance
    program and manual requirements (See 14 CFR  121.365; 121.367;
    121.369) which validate the related air carrier processes and
    procedures. When work is sent to a repair station, it must follow the
    maintenance program of the air carrier with whom it has contracted (See
    14 CFR  145.205).
        Fourth, air carriers conduct preliminary investigations of
    potential repair station vendors which typically include verification
    of repair station capabilities (OpSpecs) and a thorough review of FAA
    mandated Repair Station Manuals, Quality Manuals and Training Manuals.
    If that examination is satisfactory, it is normally followed by an on-
    site visit to verify compliance with applicable regulations, industry
    standard audit programs and adherence to the repair station's own
    manuals. Some areas of investigation include:

       Validation FM certificates held by persons directly in
            charge of maintenance and/or those who perform maintenance

       Inspection of training records of Inspectors, Technicians
            and Supervisors

       Examination of procedures for technical data, documentation
            and maintenance record control

       Examination of procedures for work processing, disposal of
            scrap parts, tool calibration and handling material with a
            limited shelf life

       Review of repair station internal inspection and quality
            programs

       Review of previous inspection program results and corrective
            actions

        If the repair station is selected to perform maintenance for the
    air carrier, similar on-site audits would be conducted on a regular
    basis.
        Finally, a fifth layer of oversight is provided by on-site air
    carrier representatives. These individuals monitor the day to day
    operations and coordinate the activities of the repair station related
    to the air carrier's equipment. Final inspections, and ultimately air
    carrier approval for service are also normally accomplished by these
    on-site airline personnel.
        [Note: Senator McCaskill does not feel the answers to any of the
    above questions were sufficient.]
                                     ______

         Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
                                  James C. May
        Question. Mr. May, please share any recommendations the Air
    Transport Association may have regarding flight duty time and rest time
    with the committee.
        Answer. Fatigue is a risk to airline safety that is taken seriously
    and must be managed effectively. The Colgan Air accident, although
    still under investigation by the NTSB, has prompted renewed focus on
    the issue of fatigue and the associated flight/duty time regulations.
    The FAA recently convened an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to
    recommend changes to the current regulations and ATA members are
    actively engaged in that effort. We remain convinced that any changes
    to the flight/duty time regulations must be based on scientific data
    and reflect operational realities.
                                     ______

      Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Claire McCaskill to
                     Roger Cohen (Submitted July 22, 2009)
        Question 1. How much of the maintenance work that your member
    companies outsource is performed at Part 145 certificated repair
    stations, and how much is performed elsewhere?
        Answer. As noted in our attached June 26 letter to Senator
    McCaskill also provided to the Committee, we can assert that virtually
    all of the substantial airline maintenance work on RAA member aircraft
    is conducted at FAA certificated repair stations. (See Attachment A.)

        Question 2. How much of your member companies' outsourced
    maintenance work is performed abroad? Of the work performed abroad, how
    much is done at Part 145 certificated repair stations, and how much is
    done by entities other than Part 145 repair stations?
        Answer. The attached chart from our June 26 letter to Sen.
    McCaskill indicates the percentage of maintenance conducted by region.
    (See Attachment B.)

        Question 3. How do your member companies determine when to
    outsource maintenance and where to send that maintenance work once they
    have decided to outsource? Accounting for differences in the type of
    work outsourced, how much more does it cost to send work to a Part 145
    certificated repair station than to a non-certificated facility? How
    much less does it cost to send work to a Part 145 certificated repair
    station located abroad? How much less to send the work to non-
    certificated facility abroad?
        Answer. The decision to contract for maintenance is largely
    dependent on the size of an airline's fleet. For example, in deciding
    to contract for heavy maintenance checks (C & D checks) is the fleet
    sufficient in size to retain a dedicated group of mechanics that
    specialize primarily in structural inspections and that there is
    sufficient work to keep them employed through the year. The same
    principal applies to specialists for landing gears, engines,
    electronics, etc. If an airline's fleet is not large enough to support
    the inventory of parts and components to keep a specialized group of
    mechanics continually employed throughout the year, an airline may
    choose a specialized contract maintenance provider to accomplish the
    work. As stated, virtually all heavy maintenance work (landing gear
    work, engine work, electronics work) for all our members is
    accomplished by FAA approved repair stations located in the U.S. and
    Canada. Non-certificated work is very limited, such as when an aircraft
    requires service or repair at a remote outstation where the individual
    airline would not have technical staff available. In such case, the
    work must be done by an FAA approved mechanic under the direction of
    the airline's maintenance control staff.
        We have no information comparing the cost of an FAA approved repair
    station in Canada compared to one in the U.S.

        Question 4. How do your members verify the quality of work
    performed at non-certificated facilities?
        Answer. Non-certificated work is very limited to those instances
    when an aircraft may require service or repair at an outstation at
    which the airline would not have technical staff available. In such an
    example, the work done would be by an individual FAA approved mechanic
    under the direction of the airline's maintenance control staff. The
    work is accomplished in accordance with the individual airline
    operator's maintenance manuals located at all airports served by our
    members.

        Question 5. Describe your members' programs to audit the policies
    and performance of the facilities to which they send their maintenance.
    How widely do these policies vary across your membership? Describe the
    most rigorous audit program. Describe the least rigorous.
        Answer. Audit capability and oversight practices for contract
    substantial maintenance work is described within each airline's FAA-
    approved Operations Specification D91. This includes an on-site
    inspection audit of the contract facility, as well as audits of the
    organizational structure, competency and training of personnel,
    manuals, facility and ability to transfer and receive data to support
    the carrier's continuing analysis and surveillance program, reliability
    program and other programs required by the carrier's manual. Every
    contract for substantial maintenance is approved by that carrier's FAA
    principal maintenance inspector via approving the OpsSpec. Also, many
    of RAA member airlines participate in CASE--the coordinating agency for
    supplier evaluation in which airlines share on-site audit results among
    participating operators. Since every operator is required to have an
    FAA approved D91 if they are to contract for substantial maintenance,
    the process is standardized among all the operators, so there are ``no
    least rigorous'' programs.
                                     ______

             Response to Follow-up Written Questions Submitted by
                      Hon. Claire McCaskill to Roger Cohen
        Question. We would like to get more clarity from the RAA about the
    following issues:

        1. Neither of the witnesses addressed the second half of our first
    question; namely, how much work is done at Part 145 certificated repair
    stations, and how much is done by entities other than Part 145 repair
    stations?
        2. We would like both witness to better address the audit questions
    (the fifth question). In particular, the following passages from the
    Inspector General's report on ``Air Carriers' Outsourcing of Aircraft
    Maintenance' '' issued on September 30, 2008 outline concerns about
    airline audits on the policies/performances of the facilities to which
    they send their maintenance. We would like to get a more definitive
    answer on how the airlines are addressing these issues:

        While all the carriers we visited had audit programs, we found that
    these programs were not always effective. As a result, maintenance
    problems either went undetected or reoccurred.
        For example, at one heavy airframe repair station, all three types
    of oversight failed-FAA, air carrier, and repair station. We found that
    two air carrier audits and two FAA inspections (CMO and FSDO) failed to
    detect significant weaknesses at this facility. These were not
    discovered until another major air carrier's pre-contract award audit
    found problems in the repair stations' maintenance practices, such as
    not properly overseeing subcontractor maintenance. The problems
    identified were so serious that repair station management stopped
    operations for over a month so it could take corrective actions.''. . .
        ``For example, on-site personnel for two carriers we reviewed only
    performed undocumented, on-the-spot inspections of work at repair
    stations. As a result, the air carriers could not use the data for
    trend analysis or ensure the repair station took corrective actions.''
        Answer (dated August 5, 2009). This is the first time we have been
    asked this specific question or even notified about it, and as you know
    we replied directly to Sen McCaskill some 6 weeks ago and were not
    advised of any additional information needed.
        We will provide further information but will not be able to meet
    the deadline of day after tomorrow. Please call me with any questions.
    Thank you.
        Answer (dated August 5, 2009). In response to your request
    yesterday August 5, I am resending the following:

        Our transmission and your ``thank you'' acknowledgment of our
    response to your request from July 22.
        A pdf copy of the letter faxed to Clark Porter in Sen. McCaskill's
    office on June 26. (See Attachment A.)
        I have highlighted in yellow the answers regarding maintenance
    previously provided the Committee in our July 22 transmission. I have
    added in red additional comments further to the questions provided us
    yesterday. We have no record of receiving these questions prior to
    yesterday, and to our knowledge, Sen. McCaskill has not contacted RAA
    seeking additional information or clarification as we offered in our
    June 26 letter. (See Attachment A.)
        As to the questions regarding findings from the DOT IG report
    citing unnamed air carriers, RAA cannot respond since the specific
    carriers are not named.
        Thank you and please acknowledge receipt of this message for our
    records.
                                     ______

              Response to Follow-up Written Question Submitted by
           Hon. Claire McCaskill to Roger Cohen dated August 7, 2009
        Question. We received the fax in June, and recognize that we did
    not acknowledge it at the time. However, we believe the questions we
    asked were legitimate and that they addressed an important issue,
    namely: does the current regulato framework ensure the safety of
    aircraft maintenance. It is unclear to us whether this is information
    that you would prefer not to provide, cannot provide, or did not have
    enough time to provide. If the latter is the case, we can petition the
    committee to hold the record open.
        Our specific criticism is this; throughout your statements you fail
    to distinguish between certificated and non-certificated repair
    stations. You state your maintenance is ``conducted by or under the
    direct supervision of certificated FAA repair stations.'' Additionally,
    the chart you submitted to us makes no distinction between certificated
    and non-certificated repair stations. We would like to determine the
    breakdown of maintenance performed at the certificated repair stations
    themselves and how much is performed by Part 65 mechanics who are not
    employed by a certificated repair station or other subcontractors. Part
    65 mechanics are not required to have the same quality control systems,
    etc. as Part 145 or Part 121 certificated stations. Subcontracting
    oversight requirements for Part 121 repair stations differ
    substantially from those imposed on Part 145 repair stations. If,
    indeed, all maintenance is performed at Part 145 repair stations or at
    Part 121 repair stations, rather than by subcontractors, please state
    so clearly.
        Also, we mentioned the IG report because it indicates that at least
    some airlines are not doing a good job of adhering to the FAA
    requirements to which you referred. Conceivably, airlines would have
    different policies within the Operation Specification framework. We
    were asking you to account for disparities between airlines.
        Please let us know whether you could provide us with more clarity
    on these issues if given more time. Thank you.
        Answer (dated August 11, 2009). First and most importantly, RAA has
    never and would never question the legitimacy of any question,
    particularly one dealing with the airline industry's highest priority
    of safety. So in response to your question ``does the current
    regulatory framework ensure the safety of aircraft maintenance", our
    answer is yes.
        Further, please be assured that there is no information that ``we
    would prefer not to provide". RAA has provided and will continue to
    provide you and the Committee--to the best of our ability--the
    information you request. To that end, the attached (in highlights)
    responds to the questions posed in your August 7 e-mail (below).
        Thank you, and please call me if you need anything additional.

        Question. Please respond to our concern that you ``fail to
    distinguish between certificated and non-certificated repair
    stations.''
        Answer. All substantial maintenance (as defined by FAA and listed
    in an air carrier's Operations Specification D091) by RAA members that
    is contracted to an outside vendor, is accomplished by an FAA
    certificated repair station located either in the U.S. or in Canada.

        Question. What do you mean when you state your maintenance is
    ``conducted by or under the direct supervision of certificated FAA
    repair stations.''
        Answer. The maintenance is accomplished by the employees of the
    certificated repair station. However it is not uncommon that small (but
    important) tasks may be contracted out by the repair station. Welding,
    for example may be accomplished by a third party vendor but the work
    would be ``under the direct supervision'' of the repair station.

        Question. We would like to know how much of maintenance is
    performed at the certificated repair stations themselves and how much
    is performed by Part 65 mechanics who are not employed by a
    certificated repair station or other subcontractors.
        Answer. RAA does not possess information regarding the amount of
    maintenance that is performed by Part 65 mechanics who are not employed
    by a certificated repair station. However, since the overwhelming
    majority of the work that Is contracted out by our members is
    accomplished by Bombardier repair facilities in Bridgeport, WV and
    Phoenix, AZ, and by the Embraer repair facility in Nashville, TN, we
    believe this ``third party'' maintenance is less than 5 percent of the
    total work accomplished. The Committee may wish to contact these
    providers independently to gain further information.

        Question. Is any maintenance accomplished at Part 121 repair
    stations, rather than a Part 145 repair station?
        Answer. The ``Part 121 repair station'' to which your are referring
    to, is one in which a Part 121 operator will supervise and sign off the
    work of a non certificated repair station under the air carrier's Part
    121 certificate. It is a legal option for an air carrier to do so, but
    as we stated in our earlier correspondence, none of our members
    reported to RAA that they do this. It is our understanding that all
    substantial maintenance accomplished by our members that is not done by
    their own employees is contracted out only to FM approved Part 145
    repair facilities.

        Question. What about different policies within the Operation
    Specification framework?
        Answer. With some limited exceptions, we understand our members
    list their substantial maintenance providers in OpsSpec D091.
        [Note: Senator McCaskill does not feel the answers to any of the
    above questions were sufficient.]
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
                                  Roger Cohen
        Question 1. Mr. Cohen, please provide documentation on the average
    starting salary for pilots and first officers of RAA airlines.
        Answer. As we indicated in our attached June 26 letter to Senator
    Begich also provided to the Committee, RAA does not have information
    regarding starting salaries for regional airline pilots. In our letter,
    we referred to the website www.airlinepilotcentral.com which has
    compensation information for all airlines, regional, mainline and
    cargo.

        Question 2. Mr. Cohen, as you committed to during the hearing,
    please provide documentation on the outcome of the most recent Safety
    Directors meeting at RAA's annual conference.
        Answer. In the attached June 26 letter, we also provided
    information from our recent safety director meetings. (See Attachment
    C.)

        Question 3. Mr. Cohen, during the hearing you invited members of
    the Committee to attend the next Safety Directors meeting. As soon as
    it is available, please provide the Committee with the details of
    upcoming Safety Directors meetings.
        Answer. The agenda has not been finalized for the next RAA safety
    directors' meeting which we will provide the Committee once finalized.
    As noted in our June 26 letter, we have extended an invitation to
    Senator Begich and we extend the same invitation to all committee
    members and staff.

        Question 4. Mr. Cohen, as you committed to during the hearing,
    please provide any RAA salary studies and carrier salary information
    (starting salary, average salary, and high salary) for the Committee.
        Answer. As RAA testified on June 17, information provided us from
    responding member airlines showed an average annual salary of more than
    $73,000 for Captains and more than $32,000 for First Officers. (This
    does not include benefits, including per diem expenses). As noted in
    our attached June 26 letter, complete comparative information on all
    airline pilot salaries is publicly available at
    www.airlinepilotcentral.com.
                                     ______

                                  Attachment A
                                   Regional Airline Association
                                          Washington, DC, June 26, 2009
    Senator Claire McCaskill,
    Washington, DC.

    Senator Byron Dorgan,
    Washington, DC.

    Dear Sen. McCaskill:

        On behalf of the Regional Airline Association (RAA) member
    airlines, including St. Louis-based Trans States and GoJet, thank you
    for the opportunity to appear before the Senate Aviation Subcommittee
    on June 17, 2009.
        We can confidently assert that virtually all of our substantial
    aircraft maintenance is conducted by or under the direct supervision of
    certificated FAA repair stations in the U.S. or approved maintenance
    organizations in Canada (which are approved by the FAA under a
    reciprocal agreement with Transport Canada).
        If you'll indulge me a personal perspective, I have great memories
    about what many once considered the finest aircraft maintenance
    facility in the world--TWA's overhaul base in Kansas City. I began my
    airline career based in St. Louis, but spent several days each week at
    that facility. The work performed there was exemplary. More
    importantly, the thousands of highly skilled professionals who worked
    there, many my close friends, were the best in the business. I am just
    as confident in the reliability and safety of the maintenance conducted
    on RAA's member airline aircraft today.
        Thank you again for your consideration, and please let us know if
    we can provide anything additional. We will be contacting your office
    to schedule a time where we can discuss these and any other issues in
    greater depth.
                Respectfully,
                                                   Roger Cohen,
                                                             President.
    CC: Faye Malarkey Black, VP Legislative Affairs, Regional Airline
                Association
                                     ______

                                  Attachment B

                                     ______

                                  Attachment C

                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Begich to
                              Captain John Prater
        Question 1. Capt. Prater, as you committed to in the hearing,
    please share ALPA's recommendations to the FAA regarding flight duty
    and rest time with the Committee.
        Answer. ALPA's position on Flight Time regulations is that the
    regulations must be science based and insure a safe level of alertness,
    as required by ICAO. This would insure that flight crewmembers are
    allowed an adequate sleep opportunity, which would require maximum duty
    and minimum rest breaks, that there are safeguards to prevent
    cumulative fatigue, and that circadian rhythms are addressed. These
    issues should be addressed in a proscriptive rule. However the
    proscriptive rule needs to also provide the basis to move to the
    ultimate solution which would be a Fatigue Risk Management System.

        Question 2. Captain Prater, does ALPA have any statistics on the
    average commute of its membership from home to duty station?
        Answer. ALPA does not have data on the average time pilots spend
    commuting from their homes. Where a pilot lives is a personal lifestyle
    choice. We do support that pilots report to work fit for duty and they
    are required to certify that they are fit for duty when they sign the
    flight release for each flight.