[Senate Hearing 111-427]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-427
PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS: PROTECTING OUR SHIPS, CREWS, AND PASSENGERS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION
AND MERCHANT MARINE INFRASTRUCTURE,
SAFETY, AND SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 5, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas,
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts Ranking
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BILL NELSON, Florida JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
Ellen L. Doneski, Chief of Staff
James Reid, Deputy Chief of Staff
Christine D. Kurth, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
Paul Nagle, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
INFRASTRUCTURE, SAFETY, AND SECURITY
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey, JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Ranking
Chairman Member
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
BARBARA BOXER, California ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
TOM UDALL, New Mexico SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MARK WARNER, Virginia MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
MARK BEGICH, Alaska
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on May 5, 2009...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Udall....................................... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 37
Witnesses
Philip J. Shapiro, President and CEO, Liberty Maritime
Corporation.................................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Captain Richard Phillips, Master, MAERSK ALABAMA................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Michael A. Perry, Chief Engineer, MAERSK ALABAMA................. 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Hon. Roy Kienitz, Under Secretary of Policy, U.S. Department of
Transportation................................................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno, Assistant Commandant for Marine
Safety, Security, and Stewardship, United States Coast Guard,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security........................... 22
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African
Affairs........................................................ 28
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Appendix
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV, U.S. Senator from West Virginia,
prepared statement............................................. 47
Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii, prepared statement... 48
American Maritime Officers, International Organization of
Masters, Mates and Pilots, Marine Engineers' Beneficial
Association and Seafarers International Union, prepared
statement...................................................... 48
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg to:
Philip J. Shapiro............................................ 50
Hon. Roy Kienitz............................................. 51
Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno................................ 52
Response to written questions submitted to Rear Admiral Brian M.
Salerno by:
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 57
Hon. Olympia J. Snowe........................................ 58
Response to written questions submitted to Theresa Whelan by:
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 58
Hon. Tom Udall............................................... 63
PIRACY ON THE HIGH SEAS: PROTECTING OUR SHIPS, CREWS, AND PASSENGERS
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 5, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation, Merchant
Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank R.
Lautenberg, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. This is the Surface Transportation
Subcommittee, and the subject today is ``Piracy on the High
Seas.'' I thank all of you, those of you who are appearing as
witnesses, for being here today, for helping us understand what
we have got out there by way of a threat and what we do to deal
with it.
Many of us thought that pirates were something from the
past, found only in history books and movies. The pirates are
back on the high seas. And on April 8th, the U.S.-flag ship
MAERSK ALABAMA was transporting food to hungry people in Kenya
when it was attacked by four Somali pirates. The 20 crewmembers
stood up to the pirates and eventually retook their ship. But
their captain, Captain Phillips, was taken hostage.
So we look in wonderment. I had the chance to talk to
Captain Phillips and his wife the other night, and she assured
me that she had all the confidence in the world, that there
wasn't any doubt that the captain was going to stand up to
these people and lead his ship and his crew and himself back
home. We congratulate you for that.
The U.S. Navy's Special Forces were called upon to secure
the captain's release, and they succeeded. Captain Richard
Phillips and his Chief Engineer--Michael Perry from the ALABAMA
are with us today, and I thank you both for being here and
commend you for your bravery at sea.
But as the Nation focused on the ALABAMA incident, another
attack on a U.S.-flag ship occurred. Only 5 days after the
ALABAMA attack, Somali pirates again attacked a U.S.-flag ship,
the LIBERTY SUN. The vessel and its crewmen were fired on by
pirates, and they escaped by outmaneuvering them.
We have video footage, which you will see in a couple of
minutes, from that attack that we are going to play today. And
while the video is not Hollywood perfect, it certainly shows
how the crew acted decisively to ward off the attack by the
pirates.
Despite the LIBERTY SUN's daring escape, the ship was stuck
at a port in Kenya as the attackers waited offshore for its
return to the seas. They were waiting for their quarry to show
up. It is outrageous. The LIBERTY SUN was docked in Kenya for
nearly 3 weeks, and the ship finally left the port this past
Sunday.
So, today, I hope the Navy can tell us how they can ensure
safe passage in the future. In 2008, just last year, there were
111 pirate attacks off the Horn of Africa, almost double the
number in 2007. And this year alone, there have already been 86
attacks.
As a result of these attacks, nearly 300 non-U.S.
crewmembers are being held prisoner by Somali pirates. Pirates
are now attacking ships over more than 2 million square miles
of ocean, more than half the size of the United States. In
addition to the lives they threaten, these pirates threaten
supplies for American troops who are serving abroad,
humanitarian relief bound for East Africa, and commercial
shipping across the world.
These bandits have to be stopped. Violence and lawlessness
will not be tolerated, whether on land, in the sky, or at sea.
We have a duty to protect the ships that proudly fly America's
flag, and our Nation's military is our partner in fulfilling
that duty, and we are going to talk about that in just a little
bit.
A timid approach, an agreement, acquiescence will not do
it. We need to take bold action to keep our seas and our ship
crews safe. And I understand that the Coast Guard is in the
process of updating their security policies for commercial
ships in the program known as the MARSEC security directive.
This is long overdue, and it needs to be completed.
And the international community needs to have a strong,
united front against these bandits of the sea. The
International Maritime Organization has 168 member nations.
They must all join together to prosecute and stop piracy in
this region.
Now I look forward to hearing from our witnesses so that we
can learn what appropriate steps we can take to eliminate these
threats to our passengers, the ships, the crew, the cargo, and
we are delighted to have you here. I just want to make mention
of all of those who are here with us.
Mr. Philip Shapiro, who we will hear from first, president
and CEO of Liberty Maritime Corporation, whose ship, the
LIBERTY SUN, was attacked by pirates on April 14, 2009.
Captain Richard Phillips of the MAERSK ALABAMA, and his
colleague Michael Perry, the Chief Engineer of the MAERSK
ALABAMA. And we thank you both for showing us the way to get
out of a situation like that.
Both the captain and the engineer--Captain Phillips and Mr.
Perry--faced incredibly trying circumstances. I commend you for
your leadership, your courage, and your commitment to your
crew. The career of a merchant mariner is often
underappreciated, but these incidents remind us of the role
that you play in our Nation's security and commerce.
And Mr. Roy Kienitz, Under Secretary of Transportation for
Policy at the U.S. Department of Transportation, is here. We
welcome you.
And Rear Admiral Brian Salerno, Assistant Commandant for
Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship at the U.S. Coast
Guard.
We have Ms. Theresa Whelan, who is the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for African Affairs.
Now we are going to try and keep the testimony to 5
minutes. If you run over a little bit, you have a tolerant
Chairman here, but not too much. And first, what we would like
to do is hear from Mr. Shapiro.
And Mr. Shapiro also has a film that he is going to show us
when he finishes his remarks, and it will not be charged to
your time at the table.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP J. SHAPIRO, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
LIBERTY MARITIME CORPORATION
Mr. Shapiro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify on
the important issue of piracy. As you know, one of our vessels,
the LIBERTY SUN, was attacked by pirates off the coast of
Somalia on April 14, just 2 days after the incredible rescue of
Captain Phillips of the MAERSK ALABAMA.
Thankfully, no one on the crew of the SUN was injured,
despite the vessel having been hit by four rocket-propelled
grenades and automatic weapons fire, and the SUN arrived safely
in Mombasa, Kenya, on April 15.
The LIBERTY SUN was on a mission of mercy to deliver much-
needed food aid to East Africa. The vessel carried 47,000 tons
of food as a gift from the American people. The SUN's cargo
alone is enough to feed more than a quarter of a million people
for a year in several African countries, including Somalia.
Without revealing the operational details, for fear of
assisting the pirates, I can say that one of our vessels is
almost always in or near the danger area at any given time. And
so, we take the threat of piracy very, very seriously. Our
company and our crew implemented enhanced precautions to make
our vessels difficult pirate targets prior to the recent
incidents.
Captain Don Grosse and the rest of the crew followed the
company's security plan and kept their cool under fire. No
boarding occurred, and the crew did everything that could
reasonably be asked of them.
We also wish to thank the U.S. Navy for their prompt and
effective response to the incident. We are especially grateful
to General Duncan McNabb and Vice Admiral Ann Rondeau of U.S.
TRANSCOM, as well as Deputy Secretary of Transportation Admiral
Tom Barrett and Admiral Thad Allen, the Commandant of the Coast
Guard.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, at this point, I would
like to introduce and show a short video of the attack on the
LIBERTY SUN, taken by the chief mate, Bill Kenneweg.
[Video begins.]
Mr. Shapiro. You can see here the skiff containing the
boatload of pirates that is off the starboard side.
That was the first RPG hitting.
At this point, the vessel security plan is in effect. The
crew is being mustered in the steering gear room and the engine
control room, and the captain and some of the mates are staying
on the bridge.
The captain tells one of the mates to go down to the secure
room, and he says, ``No, I am staying here with you.'' And they
begin an evasive course. And they are yelling over a voice-
activated phone to the engine control room, where the vessel is
being steered from.
Commanding the movement of the rudders to begin the evasive
maneuvering.
Saying, ``stay on the phone so you hear the orders,'' if we
have to move.
``Stay on the phone.''
``Left 15,'' he is commanding a rudder movement.
At this point, they have already been hit by the four RPGs.
They have been signaled by the pirates to stop, and they
continue sailing and ignore them.
Now they see a second pirate boat that they hadn't seen.
[Video ends.]
Mr. Shapiro. Well, initially, you saw one of the skiffs,
and the second one appears later in the video. As you can see,
Mr. Chairman, pirate attacks come out of nowhere and end just
as suddenly. The video is dramatic and showcases the type of
risk our crewmen face every day when delivering food aid in
this part of the world.
It also demonstrates the preparation, training, and courage
of our crew in responding to lethal fire. The only thing they
could not do was shoot back, Mr. Chairman.
And so, with the balance of my time, I would like to
address what I regard as the pressing U.S.-flag piracy issues.
First, we have heard some suggestions that U.S.-flag ship
owners have not done enough to protect their vessels. That
view, with all due respect, sir, is flat wrong.
Our company adopted every measure recommended by the
International Maritime Organization and required by the Coast
Guard's approved security plan for making the vessel a
difficult piracy target and more. And the fact is, they did not
board our vessel.
For example, the crew of the SUN had rigged fire hoses to
cover the stern of the vessel to create a virtual floodwall of
water coming off the ship. When the BAINBRIDGE arrived, their
crew informed Captain Grosse that none of them had ever seen so
much water coming off a vessel.
Critics have also charged that U.S.-flag vessels should
carry firearms for the crew or private security teams. Please
let me address this issue directly. Merchant vessels simply do
not routinely carry firearms in this day and age. In my view,
however, the MAERSK ALABAMA incident constitutes a game changer
in this regard.
After the incident, self-proclaimed pirate leaders issued
direct threats of violence against American merchant mariners.
It is true that U.S.-flag vessels and their crews have an
unquestioned right of self-defense under a United States
statute dating back to 1819. However, more recently enacted
State Department arms export regulations effectively prohibit
the arming of vessels.
Additionally, ship owners risk being second-guessed in both
U.S. and foreign courts for self-defensive measures that were
common in 1819.
In light of the recent threats to U.S. merchant mariners,
we respectfully request that Congress consider clearing the
obstacles that currently block ship owners from arming our
vessels in self-defense to protect our crews when it is
appropriate.
I believe that U.S.-flag ship owners have done all they can
within the law to protect their crews. I look forward to
working together with you, sir, and other members of the
Committee and other Congressional leaders to bring U.S. law up
to date and give us the legal framework we need to be able to
protect ourselves.
I also hope that we can come to an understanding that
private industry cannot switch from a no firearms regime to an
armed protection regime overnight. Our ships need protection
now, not months from now.
In the interim, we will need either naval escorts or
Government security teams for U.S.-flag vessels on high-risk
transits. And in that regard, we are grateful to both the
Department of Defense and the European Union for their
cooperation, which we have received to date.
The piracy problem has correctly been described as an
international problem that needs an international solution. But
we should not let the complexity of that problem deter us from
addressing what we can do in the United States right now to
protect American merchant mariners on U.S.-flag vessels.
Thank you again, sir, for inviting me to appear here today,
and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shapiro follows:]
Prepared Statement of Philip J. Shapiro, President and CEO,
Liberty Maritime Corporation
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this
Subcommittee on the important and pressing issue of piracy. As you
know, one of our vessels--the LIBERTY SUN--was attacked by pirates off
the coast of Somalia on April 14, just 2 days after the incredible
rescue of Captain Phillips of the MAERSK ALABAMA. Thankfully, no one on
the crew of the LIBERTY SUN was injured, despite the vessel being hit
by four rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) and automatic weapons fire,
and the SUN arrived safely in Mombasa, Kenya on April 15.
I am also very pleased to be in the company of the other
distinguished guests on this panel and most especially Captain,
Phillips and Michael Perry, the Master and Chief Engineer of the MAERSK
ALABAMA. I look forward to their remarks as they and the other crew
members of these ships are the true heroes in these incidents.
The LIBERTY SUN--like many other U.S.-flag vessels which transit
the pirate danger zone--was on a mission of mercy--a mission to deliver
much needed food aid to alleviate famine in East Africa. The LIBERTY
SUN carried 47,000 metric tons of food as a gift from the American
people to be distributed by the U.N. World Food Programme and other
relief agencies. The SUN's cargo alone is enough to feed more than
250,000 people for a year in several African countries including
Somalia.
Our company has five other U.S.-flag vessels that were specifically
built to transport U.S. Government international food aid as
efficiently and economically as possible. Without revealing operational
details for fear of assisting the pirates, I can say that we almost
always have one of our vessels in or near the danger area at any given
time and so we take the threat of piracy very, very seriously.
In this whole incident, we are most proud of our U.S. citizen crew.
In the case of the LIBERTY SUN, we had a typical geographically diverse
crew with members hailing from Lynn, Massachusetts--Tracy City,
Tennessee--Plano, Texas--Denham Springs, Louisiana and many places in
between. Capt. Don Grosse and Chief Mate Bill Kenneweg, whom you will
see in a short video, are from Williamsburg, Virginia and Port
Townsend, Washington, respectively.
These men and women are all trained to the highest levels of
seamanship and technical skill by our country's service and maritime
academies and by the continuing education systems of their unions--the
Marine Engineers Beneficial Association or MEBA and the Seafarers
International Union or SIU. Our 20-member crew performed exceptionally
during the incident and in the highest traditions of the long and
illustrious history of the U.S. merchant marine.
Our company and our crew implemented enhanced precautions to make
our vessels difficult pirate targets prior to the recent incidents.
Indeed, Liberty went well beyond the best management practices
recommended by a consensus group of international ship owners'
associations representing virtually the entire world's fleet.
Captain Don Grosse and the rest of the crew followed the company's
security plan and kept their cool under fire. We don't know if those
actions deterred a boarding. But we do know that no boarding occurred
and the crew did everything that could reasonably be asked of them
before, during and after the attack.
We also wish to thank the U.S. Navy for their prompt and effective
response to the incident. We are especially grateful to General Duncan
McNabb and Vice Admiral Ann Rondeau of the U.S. Transportation Command
as well as Deputy Secretary of Transportation, Adm. Torn Barrett, who
have been very supportive throughout this incident and in its
aftermath. Many other leaders in government, like Adm. Thad Allen, the
Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, have focused their time and
attention to solving this serious problem and we thank them as well.
I could go on with many more thank you's and with my own
description of what happened on the LIBERTY SUN. But a picture is worth
a thousand words and video tells a tale that no words can tell. So,
with your permission, Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to
introduce and show a short video of the attack on the LIBERTY SUN taken
by the Chief Mate, Bill Kenneweg.
Initially, you will see one of the pirate skiffs from which rocket
propelled grenades and automatic weapons were fired at the ship. And
you will see the aftermath of one of the RPGs fired at the vessel. The
voices you will hear in the video are those of Captain Don Gross, Chief
Mate Bill Kenneweg and Lee Hall on the bridge or command center of the
LIBERTY SUN.
You will note that Capt. Gross asks Kenneweg to join the rest of
the crew in the designated safe area of the ship and that Bill tells
the Capt. that he is staying by his side.
Then you will hear the two talking about maneuvering the vessel to
make it more difficult for the pirates to board the vessel. Those
instructions are in turn transmitted by phone to the engine room
because control has been transferred there in accordance with the
vessel's security plan.
I hope you will forgive some of the language which I understand may
have been bleeped out in any event--even our highly trained crews are
after all, sailors. Please also forgive some of the camera pointing--
it's not easy for a crew member who is not a professional war
photographer to get good camera angles when he is being shot at!
[show video]
As you can see, Mr. Chairman, pirate attacks can come suddenly and
end just as suddenly. The consequences of that incident and the one
aboard the MAERSK ALABAMA are, however, still with us.
So, Mr. Chairman, with the balance of my time I would like to
address what I regard as the pressing issues facing U.S.-flag vessels
with regard to piracy.
First, we have heard some suggestions since the incident that U.S.-
flag ship owners have not done enough to protect their vessels. That
view--with all due respect, Sir,--is flat wrong. Our company adopted
every measure recommended by international organizations and required
by the U.S. Coast Guard's approved security plan for making the vessel
a difficult piracy target and more.
For example, the crew of the LIBERTY SUN had rigged fire hoses to
cover the stern of the vessel where many boardings in fact occur to
create a virtual flood wall of water coming off the vessel. When the
BAINBRIDGE arrived, their crew informed Capt. Grosse that they had
never seen so much water coming off of a vessel. For this and other
reasons, Coast Guard Admiral Baumgartner praised our crew's execution
of the security plan in testimony before a House Committee last week.
There has also been criticism in some quarters of the government to
the effect that U.S.-flag vessels should carry fire arms for the crews
or armed private security teams. Please let me address this issue
directly.
Merchant vessels simply do not routinely carry fire arms in this
day and age. Many key ports, like Singapore, bar weapons on board
vessels as do many canals. The International Maritime Organization and
ship owning associations all actively discourage the carriage of arms
for fear that they will escalate violence and put crews at increased
risk of injury or death. The overwhelming weight of professional
opinion has been, for better or worse, against arming crews or hiring
private security detachments. Thus, given the threat as it existed
before the MAERSK ALABAMA incident, the judgment of virtually all ship
owners around the world was that carrying arms was counter productive
because the risk of violent escalation far outweighed the deterrence or
protective value of firearms.
In my view, however, the MAERSK ALABAMA incident constitutes a game
changer in this regard. After the incident, self-proclaimed pirate
leaders issued direct threats of violence against American merchant
mariners. Indeed, the attack on the M/V LIBERTY SUN may very well have
been an act of revenge for the killing of the three pirates in the
ALABAMA incident.
Moreover, the U.S. Government has publicly announced that it will
neither pay nor will it permit U.S. companies to pay ransoms. Although
we understand and respect this policy, it may well mean that American
merchant mariners face a greater risk of violence if they are seized as
hostages as the MAERSK ALABAMA incident indicates.
Given these conditions, our company and other U.S.-flag companies,
have renewed our focus on the issue of fire arms and the use of
specially trained security personnel whether employed by the U.S.
Government or by private contractors. Since the LIBERTY SUN incident,
our company has been engaged in intense discussions with the U.S.
Transportation Command, the Navy, DOT, the Coast Guard and other
governmental agencies about how to achieve better protection for our
crews from pirates. In that process, it has become obvious that
prohibitions contained in U.S. and foreign laws and existing legal
liability make arming crew members or having armed private security in
the near term very difficult if we are to abide by current law.
I have also heard it said that there should be no issue because the
vessel and its crew have an unquestioned right of self-defense. And,
indeed, we agree. Vessels and crews have that right. However, the right
of self defense cannot be exercised with the benefit of fire arms under
existing law.
Today's U.S. legal framework actually prevents ship owners from
arming their vessels for self-defense. While the maritime right of self
defense is enshrined in U.S. law in a statute dating from 1817, more
recently enacted State Department arms export regulations effectively
prohibit the arming of vessels. Additionally, ship owners risk being
second-guessed in U.S. courts for self defensive measures that were
common in 1817. Mr. Chairman, in light of the recent threats to U.S.
merchant mariners, we respectfully request that Congress consider
clearing the obstacles that block ship owners from arming our vessels
in self-defense to protect our crews when it is appropriate.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that U.S.-flag ship owners have done all
they can within the law to protect their crews. The safety of our crews
is paramount. We need to work together--private industry and
government--to give those crews all of the protection they deserve.
I hope that we can work together with you, Senator Rockefeller,
Senator Hutchison, Senator Thune and the members of this Committee and
other Congressional leaders to bring U.S. law up to date and give us
the legal framework we need to be able to protect ourselves.
I also hope that we all can come to an understanding that private
industry cannot switch from a no-firearms regime to an armed protection
regime overnight. Our ships need protection now--not 6 or 9 months from
now. In the interim, we will need either naval vessel escorts or
government security teams for U.S.-flag vessels on high risk transits.
And in that regard, we are very grateful to both DOD and NATO for the
cooperation we have received with regard to protecting the LIBERTY SUN
when it leaves Mombasa and for other Liberty vessels entering the
region.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, we all have some work to
do--but we can achieve much together. The piracy problem is, of course,
much bigger than just protecting U.S. crews on the high seas. It has
correctly been described as an international problem that needs an
international solution. But we should not let the complexity of the
international problem deter us from addressing what can be done in the
United States right now to protect American merchant mariners on U.S.-
flag vessels.
Thank you again for inviting me to appear here today. We greatly
appreciate the opportunity to discuss these matters with you and I
would be pleased to answer any questions you or your colleagues may
have now or after the rest of the panel has make their statements.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Mr. Shapiro.
I won't start the questions right now, but just to say the
observation that one makes in seeing this video is that the
pirates kept changing course and accelerating speed. And I
assume that the LIBERTY SUN was able to outrun these people,
even though they were in a light skiff that usually has plenty
of power to accelerate rapidly.
Mr. Shapiro. Absolutely, sir. They were able to outrun it.
The skiff is faster than the boat, the ship. The boat is much
faster than a ship.
However, with the freeboard that we had, having discharged
17,000 tons in Port Sudan before we headed down to Mombasa, we
had 32,000 tons still in the vessel. But this is a large bulk
carrier, and there was 26 feet of freeboard. That is the
distance between the water and the deck.
And with the water going over the sides from the water
cannons and fire hoses, with the evasive maneuvering, we were
not an easy target to board at that point, sir.
Senator Lautenberg. Very good. Well, thank you very much
for your testimony and for bringing us that video.
And now I welcome Captain Phillips. We ask you to give your
testimony and, again, try and keep it within the time limit--I
will be the watchman here. But I won't be too harsh, I promise.
Please.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN RICHARD PHILLIPS, MASTER, MAERSK ALABAMA
Captain Phillips. OK. Mr. Chairman and members of the
Subcommittee, I am Captain Richard Phillips. I am a graduate of
the Massachusetts Maritime Academy----
Senator Lautenberg. Pull that microphone a little closer,
please.
Captain Phillips.--OK--a member of the International
Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots, and a licensed
American merchant mariner. I was the Captain of the MAERSK
ALABAMA when it was attacked by pirates off the coast of
Somalia on April 8.
Thankfully, that episode ended with the successful return
of the ship, its cargo of U.S. food aid for Africa, and, most
importantly, my crew. All of us have returned home safely, and
for that, we all appreciate the actions taken by the
Administration, the Department of Defense, and, most
especially, the U.S. Navy, the Navy SEALs, and the crew aboard
the USS BAINBRIDGE.
I want to thank the management of Maersk and Waterman
Steamship Corporation, who handled the situation, the crew, and
our families with great care and concern. Equally important, I
want to commend the officers and crew aboard the MAERSK
ALABAMA, who responded with their typical professionalism in
response to this incident.
The deck officers who are members of the Masters, Mates,
and Pilots Union; the deck officers and engineers who are
members of the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association; and the
unlicensed crew who belong to the Seafarers International Union
are dedicated, well-trained merchant mariners who acted to
protect the interests of our country.
In fact, I want to make sure that everyone understands that
due to the quick response by the crew, led by the Chief
Engineer, Mike Perry and Chief Mate, Shane Murphy, the pirates
never took control of the MAERSK ALABAMA. Chief Engineer Perry,
Chief Mate Murphy, and the entire licensed and unlicensed crew
of the MAERSK ALABAMA did what American mariners are always
ready to do--put themselves at risk to protect the vessel and
its cargo.
I am honored to come before you and your Subcommittee, Mr.
Chairman, to discuss my views on making commercial shipping
safer and worldwide sea lanes more secure from the threat of
piracy. I cannot, however, discuss various specific details of
the MAERSK ALABAMA incident because it is itself an ongoing
investigation and pending legal action against one of the
pirates.
Therefore, the focus of my comments will be my beliefs
based on my years of experience at sea as to what can or should
be done to respond to piracy and to protect American vessels
and crews.
I believe that the best solution for protecting U.S. and
foreign vessels from the threat of piracy is to end piracy
itself. I know that this will require an intensive
international effort to address the root causes of piracy
within Somalia. But unless the root causes of piracy are
addressed, piracy will continue to expand and evolve into an
even greater threat for American and foreign seamen.
I also ask that Congress consider what steps should be
taken to address the issues of piracy. You remember that there
are almost 300 foreign mariners who are still being held
captive by pirates. Like the crew of the MAERSK ALABAMA, these
merchant seamen were simply trying to do their jobs, but their
families, unlike ours, are still living with the stress and
pain of not knowing if or when their loved ones will be
returned home safely.
Our Government should use every resource at its disposal to
encourage the international maritime community to come together
in a strong showing of support of international response to
piracy. In this way, all mariners, American and foreign, will
have the same protections and an equal chance to do their jobs
in peace.
Of course, there is an immediate need to protect American
vessels and their crews. This need to protect U.S.-flagged
vessels, which are, by definition, an extension of the United
States, should be met first and foremost by our Government. I
believe that the most desirable and appropriate response to
piracy is for the U.S. Government to provide protection through
military escorts and/or military detachments aboard U.S.
vessels.
That said, I am well aware that there may be a limit to any
Government resources, even America's. In fact, due to the
vastness of the area to be covered--and the areas of threat are
continually growing larger--our Navy and a coalition of other
navies currently positioned in the Gulf of Aden region may
simply not have the resources to provide all the protection
necessary to prevent and stop the attacks.
So what other things can be done? In my opinion, the
targets--that is, the vessels--can be hardened to make them
even more structurally resistant to pirates. In addition, more
can be done to develop anti-piracy procedures. Tools and
training for American crews beyond the up-to-date training they
already receive at their educational training facilities
jointly run by the maritime unions and shipping companies.
As for armed security details aboard vessels, I believe
that this could be an effective deterrent. My preference would
be Government protection forces. But as long as they are
adequately trained, I would not be opposed to private security
onboard. Of course, I realize that very clear protocols would
have to be established and followed.
For example, as a captain, I am responsible for the vessel,
cargo, and crew at all times, and I am not comfortable giving
up command authority to others, including the commander of a
protection force. In the heat of an attack, there can only be
one final decisionmaker. So command is only one of many issues
that would have to be worked out for security forces to operate
effectively.
Finally, I have heard a suggestion that all we have to do
to counter piracy is just arm the crews. In my opinion, arming
the crews cannot and should not be viewed as the final and only
solution to this problem. Rather, arming the crew should be
viewed as only one component of a comprehensive plan and
approach to combat piracy.
It would be my personal preference that only a limited
number of individuals aboard the vessel have access to
effective weaponry and that these individuals receive special
training on a regular basis. I realize that even this limited
approach to arming the crew opens up a very thorny set of
issues. I will let others sort out the legal and liability
issues. However, we all must understand that having weapons
onboard merchant ships fundamentally changes the model of
commercial shipping, and we must be very cautious about how it
is done.
While there is much discussion going on about how to deal
with piracy, I would respectfully ask the Subcommittee to be
mindful that seafarers I have met and worked with over my
career are resourceful, hard working, adventurous, courageous,
patriotic, and independent. There are a great many other
masters, mates, engineers, and crew who have the knowledge and
insight to help this Subcommittee and the Congress address the
issue of piracy.
In fact, I am pleased to let you know that one such
individual, Captain James Staples, is with me today and is
available to answer some committee questions. Captain Staples
is the master of an American-flagged commercial vessel, and he
has the seafaring and command experience and perspective that
the Committee may find useful.
Merchant mariners appreciate whatever help you can offer to
make the sea lanes more secure and our work environment safer.
But we realize that while preparation is absolutely critical,
not every situation can be anticipated. And as merchant
mariners, we accept this as a part of the seafarer's life.
So I will just close with a request for you to please
continue to include us in your discussions and debates.
Thank you for this opportunity to speak, and I look
forward, as does Captain Staples, to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Captain Phillips follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Richard Phillips, Master,
MAERSK ALABAMA
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am Captain Richard Phillips. I am a graduate of the Massachusetts
Maritime Academy, I have been a member of the International
Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots Union since 1979, and I am a
licensed American merchant mariner. I was the captain of the MAERSK
ALABAMA when it was attacked by pirates off the coast of Somalia on
April 8. Thankfully, that episode ended with the successful return of
the ship, its cargo of U.S. food aid for Africa and, most importantly,
my crew. All of us have returned home safely and for that my entire
crew and I are deeply appreciative of the actions taken by the
Administration, the Department of Defense and, most especially, the
U.S. Navy, the Navy SEALS and the crew aboard the USS BAINBRIDGE. All
of the U.S. military and government personnel who were involved in this
situation are clearly highly trained and motivated professionals. I
want to use this opportunity to again say ``thank you'' to everyone
involved in our safe return.
I want to thank the management of Maersk and Waterman Steamship
Corp. who handled the situation, the crew and our families with great
care and concern.
Equally important, I want to publicly commend all the officers and
crew aboard the MAERSK ALABAMA who acted with their typical
professionalism in response to this incident. The Deck Officers who are
members of the Masters, Mates & Pilots Union, the Deck Officer and
Engineers who are members of the Marine Engineers' Beneficial
Association, and the unlicensed crew who belong to the Seafarers
International Union are dedicated merchant mariners. They are typical
of America's merchant seamen who are well-trained and ready to act to
protect the interests of our country.
In fact, I want to make sure that everyone understands that due to
the quick response by the crew, led by Chief Engineer Mike Perry and
Chief Mate Shane Murphy, the pirates never--I repeat, never--took
control of the MAERSK ALABAMA. The entire crew did what American
mariners are always ready to do--put themselves at risk to protect
their vessel and its cargo. Chief Engineer Perry, Chief Mate Murphy and
the entire licensed and unlicensed crew of the MAERSK ALABAMA deserve
our thanks and praise.
I am honored to come before you and your Subcommittee, Mr.
Chairman, to discuss my views on making commercial shipping safer, and
worldwide sea lanes more secure from the threat of piracy. Under your
leadership, this Subcommittee can play a key role in focusing attention
on this issue and in developing solutions to the problem of piracy.
I need to make clear at the outset that I am unable to discuss
various specific details of the incident itself because of the ongoing
investigation and pending legal action against one of the pirates. But
I've had a lot of time to think about the difficult and complex issues
of protecting vessel, cargo and crew in crime-ridden waters. Therefore,
the focus of my comments will be my beliefs, based on my years of
experience at sea, as to what can or should be done to respond to
piracy and to protect American vessels and crews.
I should also say at the outset that my personal opinions may
differ in some ways from other recommendations you have heard before
and may hear from others. Nevertheless, I do believe that all of us in
the maritime industry agree that we must work together to address this
complex problem, and that we must keep the crew, cargo and vessel safe.
I believe for example that most people agree that the best solution
to protecting U.S. and foreign vessels from the threat of piracy is to
end piracy itself. This will require an intensive international effort
to address the root causes of piracy within Somalia and that this
effort will undoubtedly be long and difficult. But unless the root
causes of piracy are addressed, it will continue to expand and to
evolve into a greater and greater threat for American and foreign
seamen.
Along these same lines, as Congress considers what steps should be
taken to protect American vessels and crews, I would ask that you
remember the approximately 300 foreign mariners who are still being
held captive by pirates. Like the crew of the MAERSK ALABAMA, these
merchant seamen were simply trying to do their job but unlike our
families, their families are still living with the stress and the pain
of not knowing if or when their loved ones will be returned home
safely.
Unlike most nations of the world, the United States has the
capability to protect its vessels and their crews from piracy. And our
government should do so. But at the same time, we should use every
resource at our disposal to encourage the international maritime
community to come together in support of a strong international
response to piracy. In this way, all mariners, American and foreign,
will have the same protection and a better chance of being able to do
their jobs in peace.
Of course, until there is an international agreement to combat
piracy or we get to the day when the threat of piracy no longer exists,
there is an immediate need to protect American vessels and their crews.
This need should first and foremost be met by our government because I
believe it is the responsibility of our government to protect U.S.-flag
vessels which are, by definition, an extension of the United States.
So, it follows that the most desirable and appropriate response to
piracy is for the U.S. Government to provide protection, through
military escorts and/or military detachments aboard U.S. vessels. That
said, I am well aware that some will argue that there is a limit to any
government's resources--even America's. In fact, due to the vastness of
the area to be covered--and the areas of threat are continually growing
larger--our Navy and the coalition of other navies currently positioned
in the Gulf of Aden region may simply not have the resources to provide
all the protection necessary to prevent and stop the attacks.
So what other things can be done?
In my opinion, the targets--that is, the vessels--can be
``hardened'' even beyond what's being done today to make them even more
structurally resistant to pirates. In addition, more can be done in
terms of developing anti-piracy procedures, tools and training for
American crews. I do however want to emphasize that contrary to some
reports that I've heard recently, American mariners are highly trained
and do receive up-to-date training and upgrading at the private
educational training facilities jointly run by the maritime unions and
their contracted shipping companies. I believe that discussions are
underway now between the industry and government on the details of
specific proposals to harden the vessels (the specifics of which should
remain secret) and I am confident that we will soon have additional
methods for protecting vessel and crew. And while they will be an
improvement, there is no way they can be foolproof.
As for armed security details put aboard vessels, I believe that
this idea could certainly be developed into an effective deterrent. My
preference would be government protection forces. However, as long as
they are adequately trained I would not be opposed to private security
on board. Of course, I realize that very clear protocols would have to
be established and followed. For example, as a captain, I am
responsible for the vessel, cargo and crew at all times. And I am not
comfortable giving up command authority to others . . . including the
commander of a protection force. In the heat of an attack, there can be
only one final decisionmaker. So command is only one of many issues
that would have to be worked out in for security forces to operate
effectively.
Finally, I've also heard the suggestion that all we have to do to
counter piracy is ``just arm the crews.'' In my opinion, arming the
crew cannot and should not be viewed as the final and only solution to
this problem. Rather, arming the crew should be viewed as only one
component of a comprehensive plan and approach to combat piracy. To the
extent we go forward in this direction, it would be my personal
preference that only a limited number of individuals aboard the vessel
have access to effective weaponry and that these individuals receive
special training on a regular basis. I realize that even this limited
approach to arming the crew opens up a very thorny set of issues. I'll
let others sort out the legal and liability issues. However, we all
must understand that having weapons on board merchant ships
fundamentally changes the model of commercial shipping and we must be
very cautious about how it is done. Nevertheless, I do believe that
arming the crew, as part of an overall strategy, could provide an
effective deterrent under certain circumstances. I believe that a
measured capability in this respect should be part of the overall
debate about how to defend ourselves against criminals on the sea.
While there are many new ideas and much discussion going on about
how to deal with piracy, I would respectfully ask the Subcommittee to
be mindful that the seafarers I've met and worked with over my career
are resourceful, hardworking, adventurous, courageous, patriotic and
independent. There are in fact a great many other Masters, Mates,
Engineers and crew who have the knowledge and insight to help this
Subcommittee and the Congress address the issue of piracy. In fact, I
am pleased to let you know that one such individual, Captain James
Staples, is with me today and is available to answer the Committee's
questions. Captain Staples is also the Master of an American flag
commercial vessel and he has the seafaring and command experience and
perspective that the Committee may find helpful.
In closing, I would say again that no one person has all the
answers. Merchant mariners want whatever help you can offer to make the
sea lanes more secure and our work environment safer. But we realize
that while preparation is absolutely critical, not every situation can
be anticipated. And, as merchant mariners, we accept this as a part of
the seafarer's life. So, I will just close with a request for you to
please continue to include us in your discussions and debates.
Thank you for this opportunity to speak and I look forward, as does
Captain Staples, to answering your questions.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you. I deliberately wanted to let
you continue to give your statement.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lautenberg.--And now we have the Chief Engineer,
Michael Perry, who was also on the crew of the MAERSK. Please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. PERRY, CHIEF ENGINEER, MAERSK ALABAMA
Mr. Perry. I appreciate the opportunity to come before you
to discuss measures that will protect our ships, crews, and
passengers. My name is Michael Anthony Perry, and I was the
Chief Engineer onboard the MAERSK ALABAMA on April 8, when it
was attacked by pirates off the coast of Somalia.
I am the last in a long line of proud U.S. mariners. My
grandfather was a sailor in the U.S. Navy. My father was a U.S.
Merchant Marine throughout World War II. Attaining the rank of
Lieutenant Commander, I served in the United States Navy for 23
years, receiving a meritorious commission in 1989. I am a
member of the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association and have
been a licensed U.S. Merchant Marine since 1995.
First and foremost, I would like to extend my gratitude
toward my colleagues aboard the MAERSK ALABAMA, including my
fellow licensed engineers, deck officers, and crew. The skills
in training, and bravery were integral in maintaining the
highest possible level of safety and security.
Further, the leadership and determination demonstrated by
Captain Phillips attest to his strong character. Second, the
personnel at Maersk and Waterman Steamship Corporation handed
the situation with the highest level of class and
professionalism. From the moment they knew the vessel had been
boarded to the moment I arrived at home, I knew that me, my
fellow crewmembers, and our families were their top priorities.
Finally, it goes without saying that the Administration,
the Department of the Defense, and the U.S. Navy operated with
skill, expertise that they have proven to possess time after
time.
The views that I express in my testimony are my own, and I
hope that all sectors of the industry will be considered and
included when forming a comprehensive policy to address the
issues of piracy.
As demonstrated by the incident involving the MAERSK
ALABAMA, when called to action, U.S. Government military
personnel are the best equipped and most able to provide
security to U.S.-flagged vessels. They possess the training,
the weaponry, and authority to provide the security needed in
order to address the immediate threat.
Further, it is the obligation of the American Government to
protect the vessels that fly the U.S. flag, carry U.S.
mariners, and transport U.S. cargo. Military escorts or
detachments should be implemented as part of a comprehensive
international plan to combat piracy.
Unfortunately, we have seen that the pirates? methods have
become more sophisticated and unpredictable. This, coupled with
the increase in pirate attack, has made the issue more urgent.
Our Government must step up and act now to ensure that the
U.S.-flag vessels that operate in these waters have the force
resources necessary to protect the vessel, its cargo, and crew.
As demonstrated by the attack on the LIBERTY SUN, the
pirates are no longer solely interested in financial
transaction. They are willing to use deadly weapons, and that
put the crew, cargo, and vessels in immediate danger.
I recommend that straightforward procedures be put in
place. A well-trained watch team can spot danger far in
advance, which, coupled with strengthened piracy procedures,
would help to minimize the risk to the vessel, cargo, and, most
importantly, the crew.
The long-term comprehensive solution calls for a response
both at sea and ashore. The root cause of piracy must be
addressed internationally. There are hundreds of mariners being
held hostage aboard pirated vessels across the world, and the
U.S. Government's resources alone are not enough to fix the
problem.
I am very proud of my colleagues onboard the MAERSK
ALABAMA. Although the crew was able to survive the incident
relatively unscathed, the threat posed by the armed pirates was
very real. In fact, Captain Phillips was taken hostage and
spent 5 days aboard the lifeboat with an AK-47 in his back. Due
to the heroic actions of the entire crew, however, the pirates
were at no point in control of the vessel.
Although the U.S. Government threw the last punch in the
fight, the battle was won much earlier by the combined efforts
of the crew. I would like to express my gratitude to them.
Overcoming extreme fatigue due to heat exhaustion, they
willingly carried out their duties in order to rescue their
shipmates throughout this 33-hour ordeal.
Thank you again for the opportunity to share my thoughts
with you, and I look forward to answering any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Perry follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael A. Perry, Chief Engineer,
MAERSK ALABAMA
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to come before you to discuss measures
that will protect our ships, crews, and passengers. My name is Michael
Anthony Perry and I was the Chief Engineer on board the MAERSK ALABAMA
on April 8th, 2009 when it was attacked by pirates off the coast of
Somalia. I am the latest in a long line of proud U.S. Mariners. My
grandfather was a Sailor in the U.S. Navy and my father was U.S.
Merchant Marine throughout World War II. Attaining the rank of
Lieutenant Commander, I served in the U.S. Navy for 23 years and
received a meritorious commissioning in 1989. I am a member of the
Marine Engineers' Beneficial Association (MEBA) and have been a
licensed U.S. Merchant Marine since 1995.
First and foremost, I would like to extend my gratitude toward my
fellow colleagues aboard the MAERSK ALABAMA including my fellow
licensed engineers, deck officers, and crews. Their skills, training,
and bravery were integral in maintaining the highest possible level of
safety and security. Further, the leadership and determination
demonstrated by Captain Phillips attests to his strong character.
Second, the personnel at Maersk and Waterman Steamship Corp. handled
the situation with the highest level of class and professionalism. From
the moment they knew the vessel had been boarded to the moment I
arrived home, I knew that me, my fellow crew members, and our families
were their top priority. Finally, it goes without saying that the
Administration, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Navy operated
with the skill and expertise that they have proven to possess time
after time.
The views that I express in my testimony are my own and I hope that
all sectors of the industry will be considered and included when
forming a comprehensive policy to address the issue of piracy. Through
my years of service at sea, I hope to offer a firsthand account for you
to take into consideration.
As demonstrated by the incident involving the MAERSK ALABAMA, when
called into action, U.S. Government military personnel are the best
equipped and most able to provide security to U.S.-flag vessels. They
possess the training, weaponry, and authority to provide the security
needed in order to address an immediate threat. Further, it is the
obligation of the American government to protect the vessels that fly
the U.S.-flag, carry U.S. mariners, and transport U.S. cargo. Military
escorts or detachments should be implemented as part of a comprehensive
international plan to combat piracy.
Unfortunately, we have seen that the pirates' methods have become
more sophisticated and unpredictable. This, coupled with the increase
in pirate attacks, has made the issue more urgent. Having a large
freeboard and maintaining speeds above 15 knots is no longer sufficient
to ward off attacks. Also, the utility of traditional ``hardening''
measures such as fire hoses has decreased due to advancing techniques
used by the pirates. Rather, our government must step up and act now to
ensure that the U.S.-flag vessels that operate in these waters have the
force protection necessary to protect the vessel, its cargo, and crew.
As demonstrated by the attack on the LIBERTY SUN, the pirates are no
longer solely interested a financial transaction. They are willing to
use deadly weapons and that put the crews, cargo, and vessels in
immediate danger. On Friday, May 1, a Portuguese warship reported
stopping a pirate attack against an oil tanker involving explosives.
This type of attack would be disastrous. The pirates have clearly
raised the stakes.
While carriers are implementing new, advanced hardening measures
more must be done in order to minimize or eliminate the threat posed by
piracy. I recommend that straightforward procedures be put in place
should the pirates be able to board a vessel in the future. A well-
trained watch team can spot danger far in advance which, coupled with
strengthened piracy procedures, would help to minimize the risk to the
vessel, the cargo, and, most importantly, the crew.
The crews aboard U.S.-flag vessels are highly trained and have
specific roles and responsibilities when at sea. Simply ``arming the
crew'' would place an undue physical, mental, legal, and moral burden
on the crew. Arming the crew should only be considered as part of a
larger comprehensive strategy and only then as a last resort.
I am very proud of my colleagues aboard the MAERSK ALABAMA.
Although the crew was able to survive the incident relatively
unscathed, the threat posed by armed pirates was very real. In fact,
Captain Phillips was taken hostage and spent 5 days aboard a life boat
with an AK-47 in his back. Due to the heroic actions of the entire crew
however, the pirates were at no point in control of the vessel. Going
forward, strong preventative measures must be enacted in order to
protect the lives of U.S. Merchant Mariners. In the short term, this
can best be accomplished through military escorts and/or detachments.
The long-term comprehensive solution calls for a response both at
sea and ashore. The root causes of piracy must be addressed
internationally. There are hundreds of mariners being held hostage
aboard pirated vessels across the world and the U.S. Government's
resources alone are not enough to fix the problem.
Every mariner aboard the MAERSK ALABAMA deserves credit for the
safe return of the ship and crew and I look forward to sailing with
each and every one of them in the future.
Thank you again for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you
and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
We will hear now from the Honorable Roy Kienitz, who is the
Under Secretary of Transportation for Policy from the U.S.
Department of Transportation.
Mr. Kienitz, thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY KIENITZ, UNDER SECRETARY OF POLICY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Kienitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators.
Once again, a pleasure to be here today to add what we can
to this.
The Department of Transportation is involved in these
matters principally through the U.S. Maritime Administration,
which is an agency that has liaison with and regulates in
certain ways commercial--U.S.-flagged commercial shipping. And
so, in my testimony today, I think I am principally going to
reference the work that the Department of Transportation has
done to help promulgate management practices throughout the
industry for U.S.-flag vessels and at the international level
to try to make commercial vessels resistant to piracy to the
greatest degree possible.
Obviously, this problem right now, the worst place in the
world is in the Gulf of Aden, which is one of the busiest
shipping lanes in the world. On a given day, there might be 50
commercial vessels in this area. A very small percentage of
these vessels are U.S.-flag vessels, but there still may be
approximately one per day in the area.
Over the course of last year, our data show that we had
probably about 55 United States ships pass through that area
for a total of several hundred transits one way or another.
Currently, at least 18 commercial ships are being held hostage
in this region, and there were, I believe, 2 more successful
ship takings this weekend, in the last several days. So that
number may be higher now.
Ransom-taking obviously has been traditionally the economic
model that the pirates are pursuing here, and we believe that
that is what primarily motivates them.
Data we have looked at from this busy period has shown
several things, the first of which was mentioned briefly. The
ships most vulnerable to attack are those with low top speeds,
both proceeding slowly through the highest-risk areas and
unable to accelerate to a high rate of speed, which both--
doesn't necessarily allow them to outrun the vessels but allows
for aggressive maneuvering when attempts to board are
occurring.
The second thing was also referenced by the gentleman,
which is ships that are low to the water, with a low freeboard,
make boarding over the side easier. So in the case of ships
that have both of those characteristics, which is to say speeds
under, say, 18 knots and low to the water, that is where we see
the greatest success rate in pirate attacks.
Estimates are that it is perhaps one-third of one percent
of the ships transiting through this area that are subject to
attacks, but the effects are serious, nonetheless. Obviously,
ship owners and captains and crew experience great risks.
There are also costs involved both due to increased
staffing costs, increased insurance costs, and in some cases,
some ship owners are diverting ships to avoid the region,
including diverting around the southern end of Africa, which
adds many days to the transit going that direction. And that
can have a significant cost.
To address these challenges, the U.S., acting through our
sort of commercial shipping arrangements, has been part of the
leadership of the international effort to promulgate best
management practices, and that is something that we have done
by virtue of the U.N. process involving 25 other nations. And I
might, for a moment, go through what some of those best
management practices are.
For example, they fall into several categories. Number one,
there are recommended defensive preparations for ships before
they get anywhere near a high-risk area, and that includes
putting together security plans, making sure the members of the
crew are properly trained about what to do in a certain
situation, making sure the proper communications channels are
known to everyone onboard.
Second, there are protocols for proper communications with
naval forces, both several days out from the highest-risk areas
and while in the region. There are navies of at least 12
nations operating in this zone right now, and so there is
obviously a significant coordination challenge that occurs
there. And so, relatively streamlined procedures have been made
available to ships of various nationalities in order to
communicate their position and plans so the various navies are
aware of them.
Obviously, there are operational practices that have been
recommended while in high-risk areas--things like whether it is
having the fire hoses prepared and to eject water over the
side, extra manning for watches, particularly during dawn and
dusk when attacks might be more difficult to detect,
maneuvering during an attack, things like that.
Obviously, contingency plans about what to do if attacked
or boarded. And finally, what are the protocols for personnel
onboard ship if military action ensues as a result of a pirate
attack?
Much of this activity is created through international
institutions--the Maritime Security Center for the Gulf of
Aden, which is located in the United Kingdom, as well as the
United States Navy presence in Bahrain and the UK maritime
office in Dubai.
Obviously, one potential set of security measures that has
received significant attention, including here today, has been
the presence of armed security onboard ships, whether provided
by a government or a ship owner, or the arming of crews.
Obviously, with the arming of crews, I think some of the
obvious issues have been raised. Among those including many
foreign ports don't allow vessels with armed crews to enter
into their territorial waters, and so that could be a real
hampering effect.
With private security forces, some ship owners have chosen
voluntarily to embark armed security. And we saw an example of
that with an Italian ship about 10 days ago. But that obviously
raises issues. There are liability issues for the ship owners.
There are liability issues for the masters, training issues.
And so, I think it is the job of the government here to try
to provide guidance as best as possible to ship owners at a
minimum about what the best practices are for deploying persons
like this. I will leave questions of our diplomatic and
military responses to the folks who know more about that.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kienitz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Roy Kienitz, Under Secretary of Policy,
U.S. Department of Transportation
Chairman Lautenberg, Ranking Member Thune, and Members of the
Subcommittee:
I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the serious threat stemming from the ongoing piracy problem on
the high seas.
Throughout 2008 and continuing into 2009, the global piracy
situation has grown substantially worse--particularly in an ever-
expanding area off the coast of Somalia, where more than 20,000 vessels
transit the region each year. The impact of piracy has been very
significant but the American public has only recently been made more
aware of the situation with the attacks on two American flag vessels,
the MAERSK ALABAMA and the LIBERTY SUN (both of which were carrying
food aid for Somalia).
Acts of piracy threaten freedom of navigation and the flow of
commerce. Pirates frequently demand millions of dollars in ransom for
the release of hostages, ships and cargoes. Press reports indicate that
in 2008, pirates received an estimated $30 million dollars in ransoms
for the release of pirated vessels. In 2008, 42 vessels were seized by
pirates operating off the coast of Somalia. Globally, 889 mariners were
held hostage by pirates (815 in Somalia) as part of ransom demands. The
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports that in 2008, globally, 11
mariners were murdered by pirates and another 21 are missing and
presumed dead. The IMB also reported that during the same period, off
the Horn of Africa, four mariners were killed and 14 are missing and
presumed dead.
The vessels most vulnerable to piracy attacks are those traveling
slowly (with limited speed capabilities) and with low freeboard--that
is to say, there is not much height between the water and the deck
level. At any given time during the past 9 months, more than a dozen
vessels and their crews have been held hostage off the Somali coast.
Currently, 18 commercial ships are being held for ransom by pirates in
Somalia, along with more than 300 crewmembers. One reason for the
success of piracy and ransom taking is that the government in Somalia
is ineffective and this has enabled pirates to operate with virtual
impunity.
The Gulf of Aden, which links the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez
Canal with the Indian Ocean, is one of the busiest shipping choke
points in the world. On average, 50 commercial vessels transit the Gulf
daily. Many of these vessels are potential targets. More than 3.3
million barrels of oil pass through the Gulf of Aden every day,
representing 4 percent of the world's total daily production and 12
percent of all the oil transported by water daily around the world by
sea. In addition, numerous other cargoes and container freight pass
through the Gulf daily.
Approximately 80 percent of the vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden
carry cargo destined to and from Europe, East Africa, South Asia, and
the Far East. However, a significant portion of cargoes is also
destined to or from the United States. In addition, U.S. citizens serve
as crew or are passengers on vessels transiting the area.
On average, at least one U.S. commercial vessel transits the area
each day. Many of these U.S.-flag vessels carry Department of Defense
cargo bound for Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom. U.S.-flag
vessels transiting the region also carry humanitarian cargoes generated
by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or
international organizations to the Horn of Africa, including Djibouti
and, Somalia and to other countries in East Africa or South Asia.
As mentioned, piracy off the Horn of Africa significantly increased
through 2008 and into 2009, with more than 150 attacks and 55
successful piracies. The cost and disruption to the flow of commerce
overall are significant. Press reports indicate that, in addition to
merchant mariners killed or presumed dead, hundreds, including American
mariners, have been traumatized by being attacked and held hostage, and
even by the uncertainties generated by the growing instability of the
region.
Ship owners and operators are also adversely affected by rising
daily operating costs, due to increased insurance premiums and
operational delays caused by longer transit times or diversions to
avoid the area. In many cases, there are additional costs related to
transiting or circumventing the higher risk area. This is particularly
true where vessels are diverted around the Cape of Good Hope in an
effort to avoid the Gulf of Aden altogether, which increases labor
costs, fuel consumption and the carbon footprint of marine
transportation. Higher shipping costs also raise the costs of
commodities for local populations.
The United States has been a leader in promoting collaborative
international action to combat the current piracy crisis. Historically,
it has been our Nation's long-standing policy to support freedom of the
seas. In July 2008, the United States took a leadership role in the
United Nations fight against piracy. This resulted in United Nations
(UN) Security Council Resolution 1816, which authorized countries
cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia,
for which advance notification has been provided to the Secretary-
General, to enter Somali territorial waters to repress piracy. This was
followed by additional Security Council Resolutions 1838 and 1846 in
the fall of 2008. In December 2008, the United States drafted U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1851, which authorizes countries
cooperating with the TFG of Somalia to enter Somali territory to
repress piracy. The Security Council subsequently, adopted this
resolution.
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1851, also encouraged the
establishment of an international cooperation mechanism--known now as
the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS). The CGPCS
has 28 nations as members, 6 international organization observers, with
7 additional countries pending requests to participate.\1\ The
Department of State leads the United States participation in the CGPCS.
The CGPCS acts as a common point of contact between and among states,
regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating
piracy and armed robbery at sea off Somalia's coast, and specifically
includes outreach to the commercial maritime industry. The CGPCS held
plenary meetings in January at the United Nations in New York City and
in Cairo in mid-March. The CGPCS will meet again on May 29 in New York
City.
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\1\ The Contact Group for Piracy off the coast of Somali was
created in New York City on January 14, 2009 and currently numbers 28
nations (Australia, Belgium, China, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, France,
Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, Norway, Oman Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia TFG,
Sweden, Spain, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United
States, Yemen) and 6 international organizations (African Union, Arab
League, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United
Nations Secretariat, International Maritime Organization) with 7
additional countries (Canada, Cyprus, Liberia, Nigeria, Malaysia,
Panama, Singapore) pending requests to participate.
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The CGPCS established four working groups that are providing
recommendations to the CGPCS. Working Group #1 is addressing activities
related to military and operational coordination and is chaired by the
United Kingdom. Working Group #2 is addressing judicial aspects of
piracy and is chaired by Denmark. The United States has the lead for
Working Group #3, which focuses on shipping self-awareness and
interaction with industry. The Department of Transportation's Maritime
Administration (MARAD) and the Department of Homeland Security's U.S.
Coast Guard have been co-leading efforts with this Working Group.
Working Group #4 is tasked to offer recommendations to improve
diplomatic and public information efforts and is chaired by Egypt. The
U.S. will propose on May 29, the creation of Working Group #5 to
explore the feasibility of tracking and freezing the assets of pirates
and those who support them.
The U.N. Security Council resolutions called for greater
cooperation between governments and industry to reduce the incidence of
piracy. In January 2009, former Secretary of State Rice stated that,
``Once a hostage situation develops, the stakes in military operations
increase. Consequently, an important part of counter-piracy efforts
must be measured in enhancing self-defense capabilities of commercial
vessels, increasing the odds of success against pirates until warships
arrive.'' This sentiment certainly still holds true today and we saw
evidence of this in the highjacking of the MAERSK ALABAMA.
Because of its specialized knowledge, such as operation of our
mobility sealift vessels, and established relationships with U.S. and
international shipping, maritime unions, the marine insurance community
and global maritime industry associations, MARAD has considerable
experience in dealing with the diverse interests of the global maritime
industry and is actively involved in the fight against piracy. MARAD
operates a fleet of Ready Reserve Force (RRF) vessels which have
transited the Gulf of Aden region in support of Operations Iraqi and
Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF). As OIF winds down, RRF vessels may be
called upon to play a significant role again in support of the
demobilization of forces, with a consequence of exposing the vessels
and crews to threats from pirate attacks.
Further, many vessels supported by MARAD's Maritime Security
Program (MSP), participate in the Agency's Voluntary Intermodal Sealift
Agreement (VISA) and transit the Gulf of Aden on a routine basis. The
MAERSK ALABAMA is one of the 60 vessels enrolled in the MSP. MARAD also
has oversight over government cargoes transiting the region--
particularly food aid and military cargoes that are carried mainly
aboard U.S.-flag commercial vessels transiting the Gulf. Finally, as an
interface between U.S. maritime labor and the Federal Government, MARAD
also has great interest in protecting the welfare of U.S. mariners who
sail aboard vessels in the region.
MARAD provides operational advice to U.S.-flag owners and
operators, including counter-piracy measures and awareness, on a
regular basis through MARAD Advisories, through a comprehensive and
frequently updated website, and through MARAD's electronic ``MARVIEW''
system which is available to registered users. We also play a key role
in the training of merchant mariners through the development of
International Maritime Organization (IMO) maritime security courses and
workforce development. Working with the Coast Guard and IMO, Vessel
Security Officer, Company Security Officer, and Facility Security
Officer, courses were developed by the United States Merchant Marine
Academy (USMMA). MARAD continues to certify maritime security training
providers who meet the criteria established by the Coast Guard. To
date, more than 50 training providers have been certified across the
country. Efforts are also being made to include anti-piracy and
security training in the academic programs at USMMA and the state
maritime schools.
In late December 2008, the Department of State asked MARAD to
assist with the CGPCS Industry Outreach Working Group. To this end,
MARAD has met on numerous occasions with industry to help shape best
management practices to counter piracy and to share industry concerns
with U.S. Government agencies. In late December, the National Security
Council published an action plan entitled, ``Countering Piracy off the
Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action Plan'' (CPAP). MARAD was actively
involved in developing this plan, and posted the CPAP on its website
for the benefit of industry.
MARAD strongly supported the Military Sealift Command's proposal to
create and implement ``Anti-Piracy Assessment Teams'' for commercial
vessels. These teams consist of personnel from the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service, and MARAD. On a voluntary basis, these teams
board U.S.-flag vessels and offer recommendations on how to improve a
vessel's physical defenses against piracy, and review security tactics,
techniques and procedures. To date, a number of successful Anti-Piracy
Assessment Team vessel assessments and recommendations have been
completed. We expect this process to be embraced by the international
community for similar implementation.
MARAD's continuing outreach to the maritime industry on the piracy
issue has taken many forms. In addition to leading informal meetings
and participating in international forums, MARAD has hosted several
collaborative meetings with both the American and international
maritime industry community and appropriate Federal agencies. For
example, in October and November 2008, MARAD and the Department of
State sponsored meetings with representatives from the maritime
industry to specifically discuss piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
Participants included company security officers from major U.S. flag
carriers, including American President Lines (APL), Horizon Lines,
Maersk, Intermarine, Interamerican Ocean Shipping, American Roll On/
Roll Off, Crowley, American Overseas Marine, and Ocean Shipholdings.
Flag states with U.S.-owned vessels or with vessels serving strategic
U.S. interests also participated, including representatives from
Denmark, Marshall Islands, Liberia and Panama. The U.S. Navy's Maritime
Liaison Office Bahrain and the United Kingdom's Maritime Transport
Office were also included. Topics specifically addressed at these
meetings were maneuvering and speed, illumination, communication,
duress terminology, armed force protection, and self- defense devices
which may be used to deter piracy.
At the request of the maritime industry, MARAD facilitated
extensive discussions on piracy with the Department of State,
Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the
Department of Homeland Security's Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and Coast Guard. In November 2008, MARAD
participated in a public hearing hosted by the Coast Guard, focused on
piracy initiatives being considered by the International Maritime
Organization's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). In December 2008, MARAD
staff played an instrumental role in several other international
planning events related to piracy. MARAD participated in the NATO
Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee (SCEPC) meeting held in
Brussels, Belgium, which included piracy as an agenda item. MARAD
chairs the NATO Planning Board on Ocean Shipping, which reports to the
SCEPC.
On December 2, 2008, MARAD hosted a Piracy Round Table meeting to
discuss industry ``self-help'' and best practices to counter piracy.
This meeting brought U.S. Government agencies together with the
maritime industry to develop a mutual understanding of the problem and
to develop best practices recommendations. Members of the industry
included shipping associations, registries, carriers, marine insurance
companies and representatives from the European Union. U.S. Government
representatives included personnel from the Coast Guard, Department of
State, Department of Defense, Office of Naval Intelligence, USAID, the
National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council. MARAD
established an Anti-Piracy portal on the Agency's website, which is
continuously updated. MARAD Advisories are posted on this site as are
any recent developments and key contact information.
MARAD hosted an international maritime industry Piracy Summit on
December 11, 2008, with representatives from more than 50 industry
associations, insurers, shipping companies, and labor to encourage them
to further develop best management practices to combat piracy and to
implement these strategies. Representatives from government included
the Department of State, the Coast Guard, U.S. Transportation Command,
Office of Naval Intelligence and Military Sealift Command.
In late December, MARAD joined the Department of State for
discussions in London between representatives of European Union navies
and maritime trade associations. The purpose of these discussions was
to further develop and implement best management practices and to
improve communication between maritime companies and military forces in
the Gulf of Aden region. MARAD continues to meet with industry to
finalize best management practices and share industry concerns with
government agencies.
In early 2009, MARAD intensified its efforts in the fight against
piracy to further improve coordination between industry and the various
navies participating in the Gulf of Aden, to provide voluntary
assessments of security on U.S. vessels, and to further establish best
management practices to prevent piracy and to bring industry's
perspectives and ideas to the interagency. Additional industry
meetings, U.N. meetings, meetings hosted by the Baltic International
Maritime Council (BIMCO) and a counter-piracy meeting held in Dubai and
hosted by the Maritime Liaison Office in Bahrain, have all pursued
these objectives. Since maritime labor is uniquely vulnerable to pirate
attacks, with mariners having been killed or held hostage as part of
ransom demands, MARAD has included maritime labor in many of the
discussions and meetings.
The Maritime Administration led the U.S. delegation of Working
Group #3 at the meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia in March of 2009 and presented the international industry
developed (and MARAD facilitated) ``Best Management Practices'' (BMPs)
to counter piracy. MARAD also supported the dissemination of counter
piracy guidance and supported better coordination between military and
civilian operators in the region.
MARAD has further developed its electronic information system
``MARVIEW'' and contributed to the Maritime Safety and Security
Information System (MSSIS) for the purposes of providing more efficient
piracy related data. MARAD is providing U.S. flag projected schedules
in the waters off Somalia to the National Maritime Intelligence Center
(NMIC) and vessel tracking information on U.S. flag carriers to
appropriate military authorities.
Given limited military resources available to fully protect
commercial shipping in the waters off Somalia, there is an increasing
focus on the issue of shipping companies hiring private armed security
personnel to protect their vessels while transiting the waters off
Somalia. There are many complicated factors which must be addressed
before the industry, as a whole, can adopt this recommendation. These
include the need to develop appropriate standards for armed security
providers, compliance with port state restrictions on arms aboard
merchant vessel entering many ports in the world, and consideration of
potential escalation of violence due to the presence of arms onboard
commercial vessels, issues of safety for the crew and vessel, rules on
the use of force, design constraints of vessels to carry additional
personnel, union contract issues, insurance and liability issues and
many other related factors. We recognize that in appropriate
circumstances, on certain vessels determined to be at high risk,
properly screened and certified third-party security providers with
firearms, operating in compliance with applicable coastal, port and
flag state laws can be an effective deterrent to pirate attacks.
The Government is examining the options of recommending, or
possibly directing U.S.-flagged vessels to use armed security teams
while transiting near Somalia. Some U.S.-flagged owners and operators
have used armed security teams while transiting near Somalia and have
found it to be an effective anti-piracy tool.
Most recently, MARAD has engaged the marine insurance industry to
determine the effects of the piracy situation on insurance rates and to
determine the effects on insurance if vessels carry armed security
personnel aboard. MARAD will continue to work with industry to
determine whether and to what extent armed security might be used
aboard commercial vessels in certain circumstances.
It is clear that combating international piracy is no small effort,
evidenced by its long history. Much work has already taken place, but
much remains to be done, before international piracy can be eliminated.
Due to its unique and positive relationship with U.S.-flag and
international vessel owners, MARAD has maintained a vital role in the
development of U.S. anti-piracy policy. Additionally, through its
training role, MARAD provides a valuable service to the commercial
fleet.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Transportation stands ready to
assist in any way possible to address piracy and any other issue that
threatens the national and economic security of the United States and
our allies.
Thanks you again for holding this hearing today. I will be happy to
answer any questions you might have.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Admiral Salerno, we anxiously await your testimony because
the challenges have been raised on all sides here.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL BRIAN M. SALERNO,
ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR MARINE SAFETY, SECURITY, AND
STEWARDSHIP, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Salerno. Thank you, sir.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the
Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to
discuss maritime piracy and the Coast Guard's role in
addressing this threat to freedom of the seas and to the safety
of shipping and, most importantly, to the mariners themselves.
In response to the threat of piracy off the Horn of Africa,
the U.S. Coast Guard has been working very closely with our
Government and industry partners, with the International
Maritime Organization, and through the international Contact
Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to strengthen
protective measures for merchant ships and to develop
international regimes for the prosecution of apprehended
pirates.
We have also been involved operationally by providing
forces to U.S. Central Command, which have, in turn, been
assigned to unseen counterpiracy efforts.
Although many nations have provided naval forces to the
region to counter the threat of piracy, it remains equally
important for merchant vessels to take appropriate measures to
reduce their vulnerability to attacks. To best identify
realistic measures, particularly in light of evolving pirate
tactics, the Coast Guard has been working closely with the
domestic and the international maritime industry, leveraging
longstanding relationships forged in our transportation,
safety, and security roles.
As new security guidance is developed, the Coast Guard
updates its requirements for U.S.-flag vessels to modify their
vessel security plans, plans which are required by the Maritime
Transportation Security Act. The mechanism by which we convey
specific anti-piracy planning requirements is the Maritime
Security Directive.
The most recent directive pertaining to anti-piracy
measures was issued approximately one year ago. We are
presently updating that directive with new information and
anticipate releasing it in the very near future.
It is important to note that the MAERSK ALABAMA and the
LIBERTY SUN each had self-protective procedures and plans in
place. Their crews were prepared, and they took the appropriate
actions. It exemplifies the type of pre-planning that we want
all U.S. ships to undertake.
Internationally, the International Maritime Organization
has been very active on this issue. As head of the U.S.
delegation to IMO, the Coast Guard has been deeply involved
with other flag states and industry NGO's to revise anti-piracy
guidance applicable to the international merchant fleet.
The Coast Guard has also actively participated in IMO-
sponsored regional initiatives to improve international
governance, including the development of the Djibouti code for
regional cooperation. We have assisted the State Department in
the development of bilateral agreement with Kenya for the
prosecution of apprehended pirates, and we have been heavily
engaged in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of
Somalia.
In this latter effort, we co-led with the U.S. Maritime
Administration a working group focused specifically on the
industry's self-protection measures. Many of the details were
just relayed by Under Secretary Kienitz.
When piracy events do occur, swift communication among
involved U.S. Government agencies is extremely important. The
mechanism for doing this is the Maritime Operational Threat
Response protocol, or MOTR. MOTR has been used in over 600
cases since it was first established in 2005. However, the
recent MAERSK ALABAMA and LIBERTY SUN cases were the first ones
related to piracy.
Post-incident debriefs with the interagency indicate the
process worked extremely well. It ensured complete coordination
among multiple agencies having direct responsibilities for
different aspects of the Government's response.
As mentioned earlier, the Coast Guard has forces in the
region under the operational control of Central Command. Coast
Guard law enforcement detachments have been specifically
assigned to Combined Task Force 151, where they augment U.S.
Navy vessel-boarding teams. These teams have been directly
involved in the apprehension of pirates in several recent
cases.
Our experience in law enforcement boardings--in particular,
collecting evidence, providing witness statements, and handling
suspects--has been an asset to CENTCOM. Coast Guard Activities
Europe, a parent command located in Rotterdam, is responsible
for the safety and security compliance of U.S.-flag vessels
operating in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
Marine inspectors and investigators from this unit
routinely interact with vessels operating in the region. This
extends to performing immediate post incident interviews with
the crews.
In closing, I would like to assure you that the Coast Guard
is committed to fulfilling its statutory responsibilities for
the safety of U.S. merchant vessels and crews.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Salerno follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno, Assistant
Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship, United States
Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
Committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss
piracy on the high seas.
Counter-piracy operations are primarily a maritime law enforcement
activity that the Coast Guard is trained and equipped to support. We
are the competent authority for the U.S. Government on more than 30
bilateral agreements with foreign partners. These agreements underpin a
wide range of Coast Guard operations including counter-drug, migrant
interdiction, fisheries enforcement, and Proliferation Security
Initiative missions. The Coast Guard understands the domestic and
international legal frameworks and the associated boarding and
enforcement requirements necessary to ensure the successful negotiation
and implementation of agreements to facilitate counter-piracy
operations on the water and the delivery of legal consequences to the
pirates ashore. The Coast Guard's international training teams and
deployable law enforcement detachments offer tailored maritime law
enforcement training that can be easily integrated in regional capacity
building initiatives, and which is tied directly to at- sea operations.
Domestically the Coast Guard works with and regulates the U.S. merchant
fleet to reduce its vulnerability to acts of piracy.
Maritime piracy is a universal crime under international law
because it places the lives of seafarers in jeopardy and affects the
shared economic interests of all nations. In addition to placing the
lives and safety of seafarers in jeopardy, a single piratical attack
affects the interests of numerous countries, including the flag State
of the vessel, various States of nationality of the seafarers taken
hostage, regional coastal States, owners' States, and cargo shipment
and transshipment States. In the case of Somalia-based piracy,
increasingly brazen attacks in 2.5 million square miles of ocean from
land-based enclaves along an under-governed and economically devastated
2,300-mile coast pose a threat to global shipping. Eliminating piracy
and other transnational threats requires stronger law enforcement
capacity and rule of law in Somalia.
Beyond disrupting shipping activities, these threats come at a
great economic and human cost. In 2008 there were 293 incidents of
piracy against ships worldwide--an increase of 11 percent from the
previous year. As of mid-April, 16 ships and almost 200 mariners were
being held captive by pirates in the Horn of Africa region where
piratical attacks have tripled in recent years. As piratical activities
increase, so do insurance costs for vessels transiting in high risk
areas. The alternatives, however, are not inexpensive either. According
to Lloyd's List, ships that elect to transit around the Cape of Good
Hope to avoid piracy in the Horn of Africa will incur an additional
$250,000 in fuel costs per trip and an additional seven to 10 days of
transit time. While these expenses are high, they may become
sufficiently attractive to shipping companies to justify as the cost of
doing business.
Small vessels are the vehicle of choice for pirates to conduct
their attacks. These vessels are fast, readily available, relatively
inexpensive, and blend in well with other small vessels commonly
operating in the area. The Coast Guard recognizes the vulnerabilities
these vessels present and therefore requires vessel operators to
address tactical methods for avoiding small vessel attack in their
Vessel Security Plan.
In addition to developing tactical plans to deter and respond to
piracy, the Coast Guard uses its statutory authorities to address the
piracy threat. This involves a two pronged approach that relies on both
domestic and international law. Domestically, the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 provides the legal authority for
the Coast Guard to regulate safety and security of cargo, ships, and
most importantly seafarers. Under this authority, the Coast Guard
developed regulations that require U.S. ship owners and operators to
assess and plan for a wide range of security threats, including threats
of piracy. This plan, known as a Vessel Security Plan, is received and
approved by the Coast Guard.
When the Coast Guard determines that additional security measures
are necessary to deal with a specific threat, it can issue a Maritime
Security, or MARSEC, Directive. MARSEC Directives can be global or
regional in scope. In April 2008, the Coast Guard issued MARSEC
Directive 104-6 Rev. 1. This Directive provides direction to Company
Security Officers of U.S. vessels that engage in international voyages
to, or through, areas at risk for terrorism, piracy and armed robbery
against ships. The Coast Guard, in consultation with industry, is
currently increasing this designated high risk area to extend further
offshore.
Title 18, Section 1651 of the U.S. Code also makes piracy a crime.
Consistent with international law, any vessel engaged in piracy may be
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States regardless of whether
the vessel is foreign flagged. The United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) is currently using this statute to prosecute a Somali pirate for
his alleged participation in the recent attack upon the MAERSK ALABAMA.
Operating at all times as a military service and maritime law
enforcement agency, the Coast Guard has authority to conduct counter-
piracy operations against any vessel engaged in piratical acts,
including conducting boardings, searches, seizures and arrests.
In addition to being the subject of domestic legal regimes, piracy
is a crime of universal jurisdiction under conventional and customary
international law. Accordingly, every nation has the legal authority to
establish jurisdiction and punish the offenders, regardless of
nationality of the perpetrator or the victims, or of the vessels
involved.\1\ This has been a basic tenet of customary international law
for centuries, and is also enshrined in treaties such as the 1958
Geneva Convention on the High Seas and the 1982 United Nations
Convention on Law of the Sea. United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 1846 and 1851, issued in December 2008, have provided
Chapter VII authorities to certain states and international
organizations, for which advance notification has been provided by the
Somalia Transitional Federal Government to the U.N. Secretary-General,
to enter Somali waters and territory to repress piracy.
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\1\ See 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
arts. 100-107
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Yet many nations do not have sufficient legal structures in place
to adjudicate piratical acts and punish offenders. The Coast Guard has
been actively engaged in supporting the development of legal frameworks
to facilitate the prosecution of suspected pirates. This work included
facilitating development of the U.S./Kenya Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), the Djibouti Code [for regional cooperation], the Contact Group
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, and a number of International
Maritime Organization initiatives.
Of course, legal authority alone does not ensure success. Victim
states must have the political will to prosecute. Furthermore,
combating the threat of piracy requires well-coordinated interagency
and international use of the lawful authority in operations that
account for the unique problems presented by the logistics and
geography of the region, as well as the vast expanse of ocean on which
pirate attacks have taken place. The coordinated application of legal
authorities must also address the complex challenges of evidence
collection and potential prosecutions under differing legal regimes.
and the dangers to innocent seafarers and hostages inherent in any
response actions intended to wrest control of a victim ship from
pirates.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) continues to lead
international efforts to combat the Somali-piracy threat. By delegation
from the State Department, the Coast Guard provides the Head of the
United States (U.S.) Delegation for IMO meetings and activities. The
IMO has passed resolutions establishing a framework for international
cooperation, updated counter-piracy guidance to industry, and, perhaps
most importantly, promoted judicial consequence delivery mechanisms so
that pirates, once caught, face meaningful and just punishment under
the rule of law. United Nations (U.N.) Security Council Resolution 1851
specifically encourages nations to employ the operative provisions of
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA) Convention, to which the United States is a Party. All
of the States within a 1,000 nautical mile radius of the Gulf of Aden
are signatories to the Suppression of Unlawful Acts (SUA) Convention,
with the notable exceptions of Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.
In December 2008, the National Security Council released the
National Strategy for Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa:
Partnership and Action Plan. The Plan lays out operational objectives
for responding to the threat of piracy in three lines of action: (1)
prevent pirate attacks by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime
domain to piracy; (2) interrupt and terminate acts of piracy consistent
with international law and the rights and responsibilities of coastal
and flag States; and (3) ensure that those who commits acts of piracy
are held accountable for their actions by facilitating prosecution of
the suspected pirates in a just forum. Accomplishing the objectives of
this Plan requires a coordinated government approach that integrates
military, law enforcement, judicial, diplomatic, and commercial
interests in and beyond the affected region.
Several elements are critical to the success of an effective and
lawful consequence delivery plan: (1) ensuring that victim states
exercise jurisdiction under the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA
Convention); (2) supporting and encouraging the use of other applicable
international instruments and customary international law; (3) securing
agreements and arrangements with regional partners to formalize custody
and prosecution arrangements for cases in which victim states cannot
establish jurisdiction; and (4) enhancing capabilities of regional
states to accept suspected pirates for prosecution, extradition, and
incarceration in these limited cases. The Coast Guard is actively
engaged with the White House and other agencies in ongoing efforts to
support each of these elements.
The Coast Guard was instrumental in facilitating broad
international support for using the SUA Convention as a mechanism for
effective consequence delivery. Under international law, an act of
piracy is defined as a criminal act of violence, detention, or
depredation committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of
a private ship in or over international waters against another ship or
persons and property on board. The SUA Convention applies more broadly
to acts of violence against ships regardless of the motive of the
actor, but covers acts of piracy. It is designed to ensure appropriate
action is taken against persons committing unlawful acts against ships,
including, the seizure of ships by force; acts of violence against
persons onboard ships; and the placing of devices on board a ship which
are likely to destroy or damage it. Most importantly, though, the SUA
Convention establishes a framework whereby masters of ships may deliver
suspected offenders to a coastal State that is party to the SUA
Convention. The coastal State is then obliged under the SUA Convention,
with few exceptions, to accept custody and either extradite the
suspected offender or submit the case to their competent authorities
for the purpose of prosecution.
In support of the United States' objectives, the Coast Guard is
contributing to ongoing efforts to secure arrangements with regional
partners to facilitate the expeditious investigation, prosecution and,
as appropriate, punishment of apprehended pirates. On January 16, 2009,
the United States, and the Government of Kenya completed a MOU
concerning the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates, armed
robbers, and seized property in the western Indian Ocean, the Gulf of
Aden, and the Red Sea. The United Kingdom and European Union have
concluded similar MOUs with the Government of Kenya.
In March 2009, under the terms of this MOU, the Government of Kenya
accepted custody of seven of the pirates after their alleged attack on
the MN POLARIS, a Marshall Islands flagged vessel. The pirates were
apprehended by a joint Coast Guard and Navy vessel boarding search and
seizure team embarked on the USS VELLA GULF. Kenya agreed to prosecute
all seven pirates under its national criminal laws. The United States
hopes to conclude similar arrangements with other countries in the
region to ensure that no single country bears the burden of
prosecution.
Additionally, in January 2009, the Coast Guard led the U.S.
Delegation to observe final negotiations in Djibouti on regional
cooperation to combat piracy.The meeting resulted in adoption of the
Djibouti Code of Conduct, which provides a legal framework for the
interdiction and prosecution of pirates. The Code also contains
practical law enforcement measures, including a shiprider program to
share scarce patrol resources and information sharing and operational
coordination mechanisms. Nine of the twenty-one regional nations signed
the agreement in Djibouti, allowing the Code to immediately enter into
force. Each signatory intends to review its national legislation with a
view toward ensuring there are laws in place to criminalize piracy, and
adequate guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of
investigations, and prosecution of alleged offenders.
With regard to our current forces in the Gulf of Aden region, the
Coast Guard is operating off the Horn of Africa through two
organizational structures. Coast Guard forces (patrol boats and
boarding teams) are operating in support of U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) based on a Request For Forces. CENTCOM has operational
control of these forces and has directed they conduct operations with
Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151). Second, Coast Guard Activities
Europe is responsible for a number of marine safety and security
functions across Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
CENTCOM established Combined Task Force 151 to conduct counter-
piracy operations in response to the growing threat in January 2009.
CTF 151's mission is to ``Deter, disrupt, and suppress piracy in order
to support U.N. Security Council resolutions, protect global maritime
commerce, prevent future attacks, enhance maritime security, and secure
freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.'' The Task Force
considers this mission to be law enforcement related. Coast Guard Law
Enforcement Detachments (LEDETS) currently operate in support of CTF
151 since establishment. LEDETS augment Navy Visit Board Search and
Seizure (VBSS) teams near the Horn of Africa and provide training in
maritime laws, boarding policies and procedures, evidence collection
and preparation, and tactical procedures. It is important to note that
both the Coast Guard and Navy have independent authority to conduct
counter-piracy operations against any vessel engaged in piratical acts,
including conducting boardings, searches, and seizures.
The integration of Coast Guard boarding team personnel with Navy
VBSS teams takes advantage of the unique competencies, capabilities,
and authorities of our two services in a manner that offers a
comprehensive boarding capability that is ready to address a broad
spectrum of threats in the maritime domain. Coast Guard/Navy
cooperation in counter-piracy operations is an example of how our two
services are working together to ensure interoperability and readiness
to operate as an effective force to address the international issue of
piracy.
The second structure through which the Coast Guard is involved off
Africa is through our office in Europe. Coast Guard Activities Europe
is a 26 person unit located in Rotterdam, Netherlands. It is
responsible for marine safety and security functions in Europe. the
Middle East, and Africa. Marine Inspectors from this office conduct
incident investigations and inspect U.S.-flag merchant ships. Marine
inspectors are critical in the event a U.S.-flag and Coast Guard-
certificated vessel intends to implement hardening techniques that
improve the vessels ability to mitigate pirate attacks. The Coast Guard
must ensure that the security techniques do not impede safety of life
at sea, interfere with the use or deployment of safety equipment, or
otherwise impose a detriment to maritime safety. Additionally,
Activities Europe provides International Port Security Liaison Officers
who work with the U.S. Embassy, foreign government officials, and port
representatives to share information and enhance port security.
Following the MAERSK ALABAMA and LIBERTY SUN incidents, a team of
U.S. Coast Guard personnel studied the incidents with interested
parties, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Navy Criminal
Investigative Service (NCIS), vessel owners and operators, shipping
agencies, and others acting on behalf of owners and operators. Our team
also visited the vessels in Mombasa, Kenya to verify the material
condition, status of safety equipment, effectiveness of the vessel
security plan, and to conduct an incident investigation.
Counter-piracy forces must be informed and have as complete an
operational picture as possible. As the piracy cases off Somalia have
illustrated, there is a continuing need for maritime domain awareness--
the ability to detect, classify, and identify vessels at sea. We need
greater awareness of maritime activities around the world, as well as
along our coastlines, for both safety and security purposes. We also
need better integration of systems and operations among maritime
partners. Specifically, we need to continue to employ a layered
approach to maritime domain awareness, using complementary systems to
increase overall capability. We need to accelerate deployment of a net-
centric tactical system that implements Department enterprise standards
for the sharing of situation data and services across multiple
interagency domains and Coast Guard systems.
The Coast Guard currently uses correlation technology that is
continuously evaluating data received from multiple sources including,
but certainly not limited to, position reports, radar tracks, Automatic
Identification System (AIS) and Long Range Identification and Tracking
(LRIT) positions, and other external and internally collected data
feeds, to correlate and best detect, classify and identify vessels at
sea. The correlation capability in the Coast Guard's Common Operational
Picture provides a comprehensive display of tracks which is a vital
piece of the Coast Guard's maritime domain awareness capability, a
capability that is shared with the Navy and other homeland and national
security partners.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) authorizes the
Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and implement a long-range
automated vessel tracking system, so MTSA provides the Coast Guard with
authority to implement the IMO's LRIT system. The United States has
successfully completed testing on and is receiving position data from
153 U.S.-flag ships with LRIT. Approximately 600 U.S. flag ships fall
under the LRIT regulation and will be tracked by the end of Current
Year (CY) 09. The quicker vessels are equipped with this secure means
of position reporting, the quicker this capability will be available to
enhance maritime domain awareness in areas like the Gulf of Aden and
Horn of Africa.
Maritime threats, including piracy and the use of small vessels to
conduct attacks can be mitigated through greater maritime domain
awareness. Coordination among U.S. Government agencies and with our
international partners is exceptionally important in our anti-piracy
efforts. The United States' Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR)
process was established to address the full spectrum of 21st Century
maritime security and defense threats to, or directed against, the
United States and its interests globally. The MOTR Plan establishes an
integrated network of national-level maritime command centers to
achieve coordinated, unified, timely, and effective planning and
mission accomplishment by the U.S. Government, and to ensure a
coordinated response consistent with desired national outcomes. The
Plan sets forth lead and supporting Federal agency roles and
responsibilities for MOTR based on existing law; desired U.S.
Government outcome; greatest potential magnitude of the threat; the
response capabilities required; asset availability; and authority to
act. The MOTR Plan also directs clear operational coordination
requirements and sets forth protocols for interagency coordination,
consultation, and assessment throughout MOTR execution.
The national interagency successfully employed the MOTR Plan nearly
in over 600 maritime cases since 2005. These cases include drug
interdiction, migrant interdiction, fisheries violations, violence at
sea, bomb threats, radiation/nuclear alarm resolution, piracy, and
complex multi-disciplinary events.
During the recent MAERSK ALABAMA piracy case, the Coast Guard
participated in interagency coordination via the Maritime Operational
Threat Response (MOTR) process and was the lead agency responsible for
industry outreach. The post incident debriefs with MAERSK and our MOTR
partners indicate that the MOTR process worked very well.
To strengthen international coordination as called for by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1851 and to fulfill a key objective of the
national counter-piracy Plan, the United States created an
international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to
coordinate international counter-piracy efforts. The participants
agreed to establish four working groups to address the following focus
areas: (1) activities related to military and operational coordination
and information sharing; (2) judicial aspects of piracy (chaired by
Denmark); (3) measures to strengthen shipping self-awareness and other
capabilities (chaired by the United States Coast Guard and the Maritime
Administration); and (4) improvement of diplomatic and public
information efforts on all aspects of piracy (chaired by Egypt).
In addition to co-chairing a working group, the Coast Guard has
participated in plenary sessions of the Contact Group, and all of the
Working Groups. Through this mechanism, we have worked in concert with
the shipping industry to develop preventative measures that reduce
their vulnerability to attack. There are numerous examples of these
measures succeeding in thwarting piratical attacks in the Gulf of Aden
and Horn of Africa region. While we are still examining the attacks on
the U.S. vessels, MAERSK ALABAMA and LIBERTY SUN, I can tell you that
the preventative measures they took before the events in accordance
with their vessel security plans and industry best practices
contributed greatly to a successful resolution in both cases.
The threats that piracy poses to the United States, our
international partners, and the industry and seafarers who make their
living on the last global commons are multi-faceted. The response to
these threats requires a broad array of legal authorities, operational
capabilities, skills and competencies, and the support and expertise of
numerous U.S. Government, international, and commercial entities. The
Coast Guard has a unique role to play, and remains committed to working
with our military, government, and industry partners to bring these
criminals to justice and forge long-term solutions for regional
maritime safety and security.
Thank you for the opportunity to address you today and for your
attention. I look forward to your questions.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Admiral Salerno.
And now, Ms. Whelan, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for African Affairs. We look forward to your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Ms. Whelan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee.
I appreciate this opportunity to testify about the growing
problem of piracy on the high seas. Reducing incidents of
piracy is important both to the United States and to the
international community. As a general matter, freedom of the
seas is critical to our national security and international
commerce, and it is also a core principle of international law,
one that all nations have a stake in supporting.
Piracy endangers innocent mariners, disrupts commerce, and
can cause severe economic damage to shipping companies and
contribute to instability ashore. Recent pirate attacks in the
Gulf of Aden and along Somalia's east coast have targeted U.S.
and U.S.-supported ships transporting food aid and other
humanitarian supplies to Somalia and other vulnerable
societies, disrupting the flow of aid to those who need it
most.
Recent incidents, including the dramatic rescue of Captain
Phillips by the U.S. Navy, have increased public and
international attention to piracy, and resolve has grown for
finding durable solutions to this problem.
At the Department of Defense, we are working closely with
other agencies and departments to develop comprehensive
counterpiracy strategies, and the United States is not alone in
this effort. Already more than 28 other nations are conducting
counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia.
From a Department of Defense perspective, our strategic
goals with regard to Somalia piracy include deterrence,
disruption, interdiction, and prosecution. Achieving these
goals will be challenging for several reasons.
First, the geographic area affected is vast. The pirates
operate in a total sea space of more than 1 million square
nautical miles, making it difficult for naval or law
enforcement ships and other assets to reach the scene of a
pirate attack quickly enough to make a difference. In that vast
expanse of ocean, tracking a few dozen low-tech pirate skiffs
and intervening to stop attacks that can last only a few
minutes is exceptionally difficult.
When they are not actively engaged in piracy, pirate
vessels easily blend in with ordinary shipping. When they
return to land, pirates become still more difficult to locate.
Second, there is no effective and reliable central
governing authority or capacity in Somalia. Consequently,
pirates can operate with impunity from coastal fishing villages
as long as they have support of the local Somali clan
leadership.
Third, even when pirates are captured, serious gaps remain
in the international community's ability to prosecute them for
their crimes and thus create an effective legal deterrent.
Although all states may exercise jurisdiction over pirates as a
matter of international law, some states still lack the
appropriate domestic laws to prosecute pirates in their own
courts when the act of piracy occurred on the high seas. Other
states have appropriate domestic legal frameworks but lack the
prosecutorial and judicial capacity to effectively hold pirates
accountable.
These varied and complex challenges should make it clear
that there will be no simple solution to the growing problem of
piracy off the Somali coast. That said, a few statistics help
keep the problem of piracy in perspective.
Each year, more than 33,000 vessels transit the Gulf of
Aden, and in 2008, there were 122 attempted pirate attacks, of
which only 42 were successful. In other words, pirates attack
less than 0.5 percent of the shipping in the Gulf of Aden, and
their attacks have succeeded only about a third of the time.
While it is important that we find effective ways to
address the growing problem of piracy, with particular
attention to preventing piracy from becoming a funding source
for violent extremist groups, we need to ensure that
effectively addressing piracy does not come at the expense of
other ongoing critical defense commitments. We believe that
this can be done.
Already we are taking effective steps to address the
challenges outlined above. Through the creation of the Combined
Task Force 151, which focuses exclusively on counterpiracy, we
are actively seeking engagement from other states, and we are
pleased that so many states are beginning to play a role in
counterpiracy efforts.
Denmark, Singapore, South Korea, Turkey, and the United
Kingdom have joined our efforts in CTF-151. Others have
indicated they will do so as well. Canada, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, the People's
Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Yemen,
and others have all contributed forces, either individually or
through NATO or the European Union.
Most important in the short run, we are actively working
with merchant shipping lines to help ensure that all vessels
take appropriate measures to protect themselves from pirates.
Here again, some statistics are instructive.
When we look at patterns of pirate attacks in the region,
we see that of the unsuccessful pirate attacks, a full 78
percent were thwarted simply by effective action taken by the
crews of the ships under attack. Only in 22 percent of
unsuccessful attacks were military or law enforcement
interventions related to the positive outcome.
This highlights the fact that the single most-effective
short-term response to piracy will be working with merchant
shipping lines to ensure that vessels in the region take
appropriate security measures themselves.
In so vast an expanse of ocean and with so many other
critical national security priorities, it is not possible for
our military to prevent or intervene in each and every pirate
attack. But with the appropriate onboard security measures in
place, the vast majority of pirate attacks can be thwarted
without any need for military intervention.
We will continue to be prepared to respond as appropriate
when U.S.-flag vessels and U.S. citizens are involved, but the
context in which our actions will be most effective exist when
private partners take proactive measures themselves.
Most pirates are opportunistic criminals. When possible,
they will focus on the easy target and avoid the difficult
targets. Our main task is to assist commercial carriers in
making their ships hard targets.
Thank you for offering me this opportunity to testify, and
I welcome your questions or comments.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Theresa Whelan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for African Affairs
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, we appreciate this
opportunity to testify about the growing problem of piracy on the high
seas.
Piracy is a growing problem, but not a new one. Since humans first
began to travel and move valuables by ship, there have been pirates.
Julius Caesar himself was seized by pirates in 75 B.C., and released
after ransom was paid. Piracy on the high seas was also a major
preoccupation of the early American republic; by 1800, the young United
States was paying about 20 percent of total Federal revenues to the
Barbary States, as ransom and tribute.
International efforts to combat piracy also have an ancient
pedigree. Since Roman times, pirates have been deemed hostes humani
generis: the enemies of all humankind. As a matter of customary
international law, piracy is the classic crime of ``universal
jurisdiction,'' meaning that every state has the right to capture and
prosecute piracy on the high seas, even if its own ships or nationals
are not involved.
In the modern era, piracy has become a relatively unusual crime,
dropping to only 100 to 200 reported incidents annually during the
1970s and 1980s. In the 1990s, however, piracy began to increase, and
we are now seeing a dramatic and sudden upswing in reported pirate
attacks worldwide, as well as geographic shifts in areas of high pirate
activity. As recently as 2007, the Gulf of Guinea was the most active
part of the world for piracy, but pirate activity is increasingly now
found along the Somali coast. In the first quarter of 2009, 102
incidents of piracy were reported to the International Maritime Bureau,
nearly double the number of incidents reported during the same period
in 2008. And nearly all of that increase appears to stem from increased
pirate activity off the coast of Somalia.
Reducing incidents of piracy is important both to the United States
and to the international community. As a general matter, freedom of the
seas is critical to our national security and international commerce,
and it is also a core principle of international law, one that all
nations have a stake in supporting. Piracy endangers innocent mariners,
disrupts commerce, can cause severe economic damage to shipping
companies and contribute to instability ashore. Recent pirate attacks
in the Gulf of Aden and along Somalia's East Coast have targeted U.S.
and U.S.-supported ships transporting food aid and other humanitarian
supplies to Somalia and other vulnerable societies, disrupting the flow
of aid to those who need it most.
Recent incidents--including the dramatic rescue of the captain of
the MAERSK ALABAMA by the U.S. Navy--have increased public and
international attention to piracy, and resolve has grown for finding
durable solutions to this problem. At the Department of Defense, we are
working closely with other Agencies and Departments to develop
comprehensive counter-piracy strategies. And the United States is not
alone in this effort: already, more than 28 other nations are
conducting counter-piracy operations off Somalia, as are international
organizations such as NATO and the EU.
We are seeing concrete results from our efforts: since August 2008,
international efforts have led to the destruction or confiscation of 36
pirate vessels and the confiscation of numerous weapons, including
small arms and RPGs. The international community has also turned 146
pirates over to law enforcement officials in various countries for
prosecution.
From a Department of Defense perspective, our strategic goals with
regard to Somali piracy include deterrence, disruption/interdiction,
and prosecution.
Achieving these goals will be challenging for several reasons.
First, the root causes of Somali piracy lie in the poverty and
instability that continue to plague that troubled country, and
addressing these root causes will be a lengthy, complicated and
difficult process. At the moment, pirates can operate with impunity
from coastal fishing villages as long as they have the support of the
local Somali clan leadership. Though regional governments in Somaliland
and Puntland have demonstrated some capacity to provide services,
including law enforcement services, in most respects Somalia remains
ungoverned, allowing pirates to use coastal villages as safe havens.
Pirates also operate in a cash economy, making their profits difficult
to track and interdict.
Conflict, instability and drought have caused a humanitarian crisis
of long duration in Somalia, where an estimated 3.2 million people now
rely on international food assistance to survive. In an environment
where legitimate economic opportunities are scarce, piracy and other
forms of crime can flourish. In the long run, effectively combating
piracy off the Somali coast will be linked to our ability to help the
Somalis themselves increase government capacity and find appropriate
ways to meet the population's basic needs.
Second, the geographic area affected is vast: Somali pirates
operate in a total sea space of more than a million square nautical
miles, making it difficult for naval or law enforcement ships and other
assets to reach the scene of a pirate attack quickly enough to make a
difference. In that vast expanse of ocean, tracking a few dozen low-
tech pirate skiffs and intervening to stop attacks that can last only a
few minutes is exceptionally difficult. When they are not actively
engaged in piracy, pirate vessels easily blend in with ordinary
shipping. When they return to land, pirates become still more difficult
to locate.
Third, even when pirates are captured, serious gaps remain in the
international community's ability to prosecute them for their crimes
and thus create an effective legal deterrent. Although all states may
exercise jurisdiction over pirates as a matter of international law,
some states still lack the appropriate domestic laws to prosecute
pirates. Other states have appropriate domestic legal frameworks, but
lack the prosecutorial and judicial capacity to effectively hold
pirates accountable, or lack the political will required.
We appreciate Kenya's role in prosecuting suspected pirates
captured the region. But Kenya should not bear the burden for the
international community. Other affected nations must step up and
prosecute pirates in their domestic courts as well, just as the United
States has when our citizens were the victims of an attack.
Finally, although the merchant shipping industry has made
significant improvements in on-ship security measures over the last few
months, far more is needed. Ships from all over the world transit the
Gulf of Aden and use the shipping lanes along the east coast of
Somalia, but many assume unrealistically that there is no need for more
robust shipboard security measures, because military forces will always
be present to intervene if pirates attack. As a result, many in the
industry have so far been unwilling to invest in the basic security
measures that would render them less vulnerable to attack.
These varied and complex challenges should make it clear that there
will be no simple solution to the growing problem of piracy off the
Somali coast. That said, a few statistics help keep the problem of
Somali piracy in perspective. Each year, more than 33,000 vessels
transit the Gulf of Aden, and in 2008, there were 122 attempted pirate
attacks, of which only 42 were successful. In other words: pirates
attack less than one half of one percent of shipping in the Gulf of
Aden, and their attacks have succeeded only about a third of the time.
That does not mean that we can ignore piracy in the region, of
course. To safeguard the principles of maritime freedom and the lives
of innocent mariners, the U.S. Government is taking action to address
the problem of piracy--particularly at a moment when attacks have been
increasing, both in numbers and in ambition.
At the moment, Somali piracy appears to be motivated solely by
money, not by ideology, and we do not see meaningful links between
pirates and organized violent extremist groups, inside or outside
Somalia. Nonetheless, we know that in other contexts, narcotics
production and other forms of criminal activity are sometimes ``taxed''
by extremist groups, as in Afghanistan. We need to ensure that piracy
does not evolve into a funding source for violent extremist
organizations.
The relatively low incidence of pirate attacks has implications for
how we allocate military assets. As the members of this Committee know,
the Department of Defense has urgent priorities around the globe. We
face two ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we continue multi-
faceted overseas contingency operations against violent extremism. In
the Horn of Africa, our existing and planned counterterrorism
activities remain vital to that global struggle against extremism. Many
of resources most in demand for counter-piracy activities, such as
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, are the same
assets that are urgently required elsewhere.
While it is important that we find effective ways to address the
growing problem of piracy--with particular attention to preventing
piracy from becoming a funding source for violent extremist groups--we
need to ensure that effectively addressing piracy does not come at the
expense of other ongoing, critical military commitments.
We believe that this can be done. Already, we are taking effective
steps to address the four challenges outlined above. Through the
creation of Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151), which focuses
exclusively on counter-piracy, we are actively seeking engagement from
other states, and we are pleased that so many states are beginning to
play a role in joint counter-piracy efforts. Denmark, Singapore, South
Korea, Turkey and the United Kingdom have joined our efforts; others
have indicated that they will do so as well. In fact, Turkey has taken
command over CTF 151 aboard USS GETTYSBURG. Canada, France, Germany,
Greece, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, the People's Republic of
China, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and others have all
contributed forces--either individually, or through NATO or the
European Union.
Although not without challenges, coordination between allies and
the merchant ships that transit the area has been impressive, with
outstanding communications between industry and the EU's Maritime
Security Center for the Horn of Africa, which is based in Northwood,
United Kingdom. The EU's Maritime Security Center plays a key role in
relaying critical information from merchant ships to operational
forces. Moreover, the international array of forces and their ability
to work together has been impressive, as demonstrated by the Combined
Maritime Forces monthly Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE)
meetings in Bahrain. These involve over 20 nations and ensure that our
international responses will be as effective as possible.
Most important in the short run, we are actively working with
merchant shipping lines to help ensure that all vessels take
appropriate measures to protect themselves from pirates. Here again,
some statistics are instructive: when we look at patterns in pirate
attacks in the region, we see that of the unsuccessful pirate attacks,
a full 78 percent were thwarted simply by effective action taken by the
crews of the ships under attack. Only in 22 percent of unsuccessful
attacks were military or law enforcement interventions related to the
positive outcome.
This highlights the fact that the single most effective short-term
response to piracy will be working with merchant shipping lines to
ensure that vessels in the region take appropriate security measures
themselves. In so vast an expanse of ocean, and with so many other
critical national security priorities, it is not possible for our
military to prevent or intervene in each and every pirate attack. But
with appropriate on-board security measures in place, the vast majority
of pirate attacks can be thwarted without any need for military
intervention.
Effective merchant ship security includes both passive and active
defense measures, and we are committed to working with commercial
carriers who operate in the region to undertake vulnerability
assessments and disseminate best practices. Effective passive security
measures can include developing a comprehensive security plan;
including risk assessment; the removal of external ladders; posting
lookouts at all times; limiting lighting; rigging barriers (such as
barbed wire and fencing) in low freeboard areas; varying routes taken
and avoiding high-risk areas when possible; securing hatches to limit
access to crew and control spaces; creating ``safe rooms'' and
maintaining good communications with maritime security authorities.
Active defense measures can range from rigging fire hoses to repel
boarders to maintaining professional civilian armed security teams on
board. While there is some concern within the shipping industry about
armed security teams, we are working with industry representatives in
conjunction with other agencies to explore how contracted security
teams can be a useful and viable option for highly vulnerable ships,
such as low-freeboard and slow vessels.
As part of this effort, it may be useful to develop incentives that
will help encourage merchant ships to invest in security measures.
These could range from tax credits to reduced insurance rates for ships
with enhanced security. Ultimately, it may be appropriate to mandate
some of these actions, beginning with passive self-defense. Regardless,
we will continue to develop partnerships within the shipping industry
to make sure that information on best practices is disseminated widely
and that vessels have the information they need to adequately assess
and mitigate risk.
We will continue to be prepared to respond as appropriate when
U.S.-flag vessels and U.S. citizens are involved. But this is a context
in which our actions will be most effective when private partners take
proactive measures themselves. Most pirates are opportunistic
criminals: whenever possible, they will focus on the easy targets, and
avoid the difficult targets. Our main task is to assist commercial
carriers in making their ships hard targets.
We will also continue to focus on longer-term efforts to prevent
and punish piracy in the region. We will continue to work with allies
and regional states to develop their capacity to patrol the seas and
protect their own shipping, and we will encourage them to fill any gaps
in their legislative frameworks, so that they can prosecute pirates in
their own domestic systems. We will also work with regional states to
increase prosecutorial and judicial capacity to try pirates, since
effective and fair prosecutions are part of creating a long-term
deterrent. And we will work when possible with local authorities in
Somalia to address the on-shore components of piracy, tracking the on
shore-investors and safe-havens that enable piracy on the high seas.
Finally, the United States continues to work with the international
community to better address the root causes of piracy that arise out of
poverty and instability in Somalia.
Many of these efforts dovetail with our existing development and
counterterrorism goals in the region. While none of them will be quick
fixes, over the long term, increasing local government and law
enforcement capacity and fostering sustainable economic development are
all part of reducing the threat of violent extremism, as well as
reducing the threat of piracy.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, we recognize that the
problem of piracy is not just a problem of Somalia. In recent years,
pirate activity has also occurred in the Caribbean, the South China
Sea, and other places around the globe. Although the complete
elimination of piracy on the high seas would be as difficult to achieve
as the complete elimination of all robberies and assaults, we believe
that we can, and must, reduce the likelihood of successful pirate
attacks through deterrence, disruption, interdiction and punishment.
This will require coordinated international action and a variety of
innovative public-private partnership, but we are confident that
progress can be made. Congress can help facilitate our efforts by
encouraging and incentivizing the commercial shipping industry and
their insurers to take appropriate passive and active measures to
protect their ships.
Thank you for offering us this opportunity to testify, and we
welcome your questions and comments.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much, Ms. Whelan.
To my colleagues, what I propose to do is to give each
member 6 to 7 minutes, including any part of that that they
choose to do for an opening statement.
And what I will do is I will start off with some questions
and then go to Senator Thune, who is the Ranking Member, and
then Mr. Isakson and Mr. Udall.
Ms. Whelan, we heard your comments, listened with interest,
and when you say only a third of the time were pirates
successful in some of these attacks, that is not very
reassuring, I must tell you. And what I am trying to figure out
is why the timidity to these acts of theft and brutality?
I mean, when they are shooting those guns, they are not
saying, ``Oh, these are only meant for the deck or for the
bridge.'' They are out to kill people. That is what the threat
is. And it is really hard to understand.
We know there was an incident with the Portuguese navy when
they prevented takeover of one of their ships, captured all of
the pirates, and took them home to Somalia. What does that say?
It says, ``All right, we paid the ransom. Now we gave you your
lives back.''
It is outrageous. They wouldn't have done the same, and we
commend the courage and the ability of all the merchant
mariners and all, particularly singling out those who avoided a
takeover or responded as did the crew, the captain, and the
engineer from the MAERSK ALABAMA.
Now, Ms. Whelan, recent comments by General Petraeus seem
to suggest that it is outside the U.S. military's
responsibility to protect our U.S.-flag vessels. Now is that
the position of the Department of Defense? Or does the U.S.
military have a different obligation?
Is an American-flagged ship something that resembles a
piece of American territory, a sovereign condition, or do we
say, as was suggested in your testimony--and I don't mean to
add any sarcasm to it--but you said that we respond as it is
appropriate to do so. That is not very comforting.
And so, what is the position of the Department of Defense?
Don't they consider that an extension of American and I will
use the term ``territory'' is to be protected? We have sent in
crews all over the world. Marine helicopters have landed in
foreign lands, picked people up off of the roofs of the
embassy, done all kinds of things to protect our citizens. Why
here are we saying that we are like an alarm company, and you
sound the alarm, we will get there as soon as we possibly can?
I don't want to extend your remarks, but please give me
your view of what it is that doesn't permit our naval forces to
intervene or other forces, Air Force perhaps? I don't know.
Ms. Whelan. Thank you for the question, Senator.
Of course, the United States Navy certainly has its Title
10 mission to advance U.S. national security interests by
protecting and advancing and promoting freedom of the seas and
free sea lines of communication. And certainly, under
international law, we have the right to provide protection and
use of proportionate force whenever necessary in order to
protect U.S. citizens, U.S.-flag vessels, U.S. aircraft if they
come under attack.
And as demonstrated in the case of the MAERSK ALABAMA, we
moved quickly and expeditiously to do so as soon as there was
notification that the MAERSK ALABAMA was under attack. So most
definitely, we do, when we are able to do so, move on the
Defense Department side to protect U.S.-flag vessels.
There are some legal issues with regard to whether or not a
vessel is technically sovereign immune. Commercial U.S.-flag
vessels that are not carrying U.S. Government cargo are not
sovereign immune.
Senator Lautenberg. Ms. Whelan, when is the Navy unable to
provide that support? You say ``when able.'' That qualifier is
very disturbing, I have got to tell you.
Ms. Whelan. What I mean by ``when able,'' sir, is simply
the physics of being in the right place at the right time in
order to address an attack, whether the attack is in progress
or at whatever stage. The issue with the MAERSK ALABAMA, we
fortunately had our vessels in at least reasonable proximity so
they could react quickly, although, unfortunately, they were
not close enough to be able to react upon notification of the
attack.
Normally, we--if notified of an attack, we can deploy
helicopters and other mechanisms to improve the speed of our
response. But there is a physics----
Senator Lautenberg. I hear you. And with all due respect,
the comments by General Petraeus seem to suggest that that is
not the Navy's responsibility, talk about being short of
resources. I think that letting our crews know that they are
going to be protected by all of the might that the United
States can bring to the situation.
And to suggest that--and by the way, the largest percentage
of ships in those waters is material being sent by the
Government to relieve hunger and suffering in these areas. So
we say, ``OK, we will pay you to carry this. But listen, if it
gets taken along the way, that is your risk.''
I am going to defer my questions now for my colleague,
Senator Udall from New Mexico.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I very much appreciate you, Mr. Chairman, having this
hearing. I would like to put my full statement in the record
and then ask a few questions and make a few comments here.
[The prepared statement of Senator Udall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Udall, U.S. Senator from New Mexico
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing.
I welcome the opportunity to hear testimony from two members from
the crew of the M/V MAERSK ALABAMA, which suffered a Somali pirate
attack last month.
I am especially pleased that Captain Phillips is able to testify to
this committee today. His presence may not have been possible without
the highly skilled Navy Seals and sailors of the USS BAINBRIDGE who
participated in his dramatic rescue off the coast of Somalia.
I would like to state my appreciation for America's merchant
mariners who are not often recognized for the work they do. The
merchant marine is important to not only our economy but also our
national defense. Although Captain Phillips was rescued, hundreds of
those merchant seaman taken hostage in pirate attacks are still being
help in captivity.
I also want to express my deep gratitude for the men and women of
the U.S. Navy. In particular, I want to thank the 2,400 sailors from
New Mexico, one of whom currently serves on the USS BAINBRIDGE.
Thank you.
Senator Udall. First, let me say to Captain Phillips, I
thank the entire panel here today for your testimony. But I
think, Captain Phillips, one of the things your capture and
rescue has shown to us is obviously your courage. And it has
also shown us the courage and bravery of our naval forces and
the USS BAINBRIDGE and the Navy SEALs that were involved in
that.
And so, that is something that I think we should think
about and contemplate and understand here. I am very proud that
there is one New Mexican serving on the USS BAINBRIDGE, and we
have, I think, 2,400 New Mexicans serving in the United States
Navy.
So the issue I wanted to focus on with you has to do with
what is--and it goes to what the Chairman is asking. What is
the solution here? How do we get our ships protected?
And you mention in your testimony, you probably discussed
it a little bit earlier, the idea that some have advocated all
you have to do is arm the crew. And you have talked about the
corresponding responsibilities of a captain when you have an
armed crew and the tradeoffs there and the tension that goes
on.
Could you talk a little further about what you think the
solution really is in terms of this kind of shipping and
whether you think arming the crew is the solution to the
problem?
Captain Phillips. Senator Udall, as I said, it is going to
take a comprehensive, multifaceted plan to combat this. There
is no silver bullet. There is no one way that will solve it. We
talked about the international response that is required.
I believe arming the crew, and by this, I think there is a
misnomer here. This isn't the ``Wild West.'' Crews aren't
walking around with holsters and guns in their pockets. The
guns are under lock and key by the captain. He is the only one
who has access to it. It is a misnomer that you can't bring
certain weapons into these countries. I have been to these
countries. I have done it.
But just arming the crew is not--that is just putting the
onus on the crew. I believe the primary step would be military
and/or civilian if they are properly trained, as the military
are, as chief engineer Perry has mentioned. If they are
properly trained, they are the primary preventer.
Armed crew would be backing them up, and by armed crew, I
am meaning a limited number of trained crew and assets, which I
don't want to go into, not to divulge anything.
The third thing would be more training and hardening of the
ship. I am a firm believer in training, and I think we can do
more on the ship side. But to put all the onus onto the ship
and its crew will not solve it. We have to get the nonlethal
capabilities, an LRAD, Long Range Acoustic Device. We have to
have--we talked about other preventive measures, fire hoses.
MAERSK ALABAMA had fire hoses. They go to where they aren't
there.
We talked about speed. I think the parameters, you can
throw them out the window. The MAERSK ALABAMA was going 18.3
knots when we were boarded. We had a freeboard very much close
to the LIBERTY SUN. I was 3 miles from the LIBERTY SUN when the
Navy got there, and our freeboard was probably around 22 to 25
foot, in that area.
So you can throw that parameter out because they had a
wonderful, brand-new ladder, which I questioned them frequently
about where did they get it? And if that is the evolution, a
brand-new ladder doesn't cost as much here in Sears as it does
to the Somalis.
And they are evolving, as one of the panel members said.
They are now doing a night or what I call a ``stealth attack,''
which is our most vulnerable. And they have started that for
the first time in the last few days.
So it is evolving. There is no silver bullet. Each of these
steps must be taken. And in unison and in concert, that will
help--not eliminate--that will help prevent these, and it will
be a pre-incident and not a post-incident reply.
And I think Chief Engineer Perry or Captain Staples could
further some of those items, but that is what I believe. There
is not one answer. It is a comprehensive, faceted--multifaceted
plan that will vastly, much lower than the 0.5 percent or so we
have heard today, will make it close to zero, which I think we
all want.
Senator Udall. Captain Phillips, what would you say to
other captains that are operating in the Horn of Africa and in
the particular area today about what they should be doing, what
precautions they should be taking? What recommendations do you
make in that respect?
I ask this question thinking of, you know, we saw your
rescue. But we also know today that there are 300 people that
are captive, that are in a situation that you could have very
well been in, and we don't know when they are going to be
freed. It is hard to tell.
And I am just wondering if you would, if there is any
preventive advice you could give to other captains or what you
would have to say to them?
Captain Phillips. I would never presume to tell a captain
anything, to be honest.
[Laughter.]
Senator Udall. I thought you might say that. But please----
Captain Phillips. But I will say--and Chief Engineer Perry
and Captain Staples can say their word. But I would say the
things that we have learned and many of the things we put in
place, as Chief Engineer Perry can say, were done during our
security drills, where we listened to what mariners thought.
From the cook to the third mate to the third engineer to the
QMED, we listened to everybody's ideas when we did our drills
and critiqued our drills.
And that is where a lot of the things that we came up with
in our incident actually were derived from. It is the
imagination, the capability as the individuality of the seamen.
We actually came up on these ideas as a critique of our
security drills.
Senator Udall. Thank you very much.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. We establish one thing in these moments
here is that you don't have to be in a coastal State in order
to be concerned about the well being of our sailors and our
vessels and our reach to do the right thing.
With that, Senator Thune, also not from a seacoast.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Thune. We are a long way from the coast, Mr.
Chairman, but I appreciate you holding the hearing today.
And I want to thank the panel for your input and your
insights.
This is not a new problem, of course. But I think the
recent attack has really captured the Nation's attention and
focus and sort of underscored the increasing violence and the
range of Somali piracy that is operating off the Horn of
Africa. And again, fortunately, thanks to the courageous
efforts of Captain Phillips and his crew and the heroic actions
of the U.S. Navy, the merchant mariners were returned safely to
their families.
But piracy does continue to threaten the vital shipping
interests and the freedoms of navigation for all nations, and
the numbers have already been alluded to here today. There are
300 non-U.S. crewmembers on 18 hijacked vessels in Somali
captivity currently, and the range of the pirates now expanding
with the attacks on merchant ships taking place cover over more
than 2.2 million square miles.
I think we all agree that the absence of stable government
in Somalia remains the single greatest challenge to regional
security, but that is probably not likely to change in the near
term. And so, I think it is appropriate for us to consider what
steps we can take to protect against the immediate threat of
piracy, while we work with the international community to try
and resolve the larger humanitarian issues in the region.
I do appreciate very much the testimony of our witnesses
today, and I hope that you will continue to give us your best
suggestions about how we can address the situation and further
protect U.S. shipping interests.
I would like to pose a couple of questions, if I could, and
start with Admiral Salerno. The Coast Guard establishes and
enforces requirements for vessel security plans under the
Maritime Transportation Security Act and the International Ship
and Port Facility Security Code. Do these security plans
include anti-piracy measures, and how frequently are those
plans updated or adjusted?
Admiral Salerno. Senator, both the MTSA and ISPS
requirements both include vessel security plans. They do not
specifically talk about piracy, but the language in each of
them is written broadly enough so that piracy can be included
as a security concern.
The way we have structured that under MTSA, the plans are
on a regular refresh rate of every 5 years. However, when
specific security threats are identified, the Maritime Security
Directive can be issued, which would direct the updating of
plans to address the specific threats.
That is exactly what we are doing in the case of piracy so
that with the measures that have been identified, the best
practices, some maybe unique U.S. practices would be conveyed
to the U.S.-flag fleet. They would be directed to update their
security plans.
What happens then is each company would assess their own
ships' vulnerabilities, apply the appropriate measures, work it
into their plans, train their crews, conduct drills, as was
described by Captain Phillips routinely occurred on his ship.
And that way, when a ship is entering a high-threat area, those
measures are required to be put in place.
That is the basic process. It is something that you don't
just do it once and you are done because pirate tactics do
evolve. You have to continually watch this, update the Maritime
Security Directives as needed, and keep in constant dialogue
with the industry, the people who are operating in the area, as
well as naval forces and other government entities that have a
stake in this.
Senator Thune. So, typically, it would be every 5 years,
but in circumstances like these, there is going to be, again, a
continual statement?
Admiral Salerno. That is correct, sir. That is right. It is
done more frequently as needed.
Senator Thune. The Coast Guard has deployed at least one
law enforcement detachment to the U.S. task force currently
patrolling off of the Horn of Africa, Combined Task Force 151.
I am interested, and maybe you could explain to the Committee
the role of the Coast Guard? How many, for example, boardings
has it conducted? Does the Coast Guard law enforcement
detachment function primarily as a reactionary force or as a
protective force? And do you see the use of these teams or
other military teams most effective as boarding teams, or could
they be better used as protective teams onboard U.S. merchant
vessels?
Admiral Salerno. Senator, the Coast Guard is a force
provider to geographic combatant commanders. So when our U.S.
Coast Guard capabilities are in theater, they work for CENTCOM
or, more specifically, NAVCENT. So we actually have two LEDETs
working for NAVCENT. We have half a dozen patrol boats in the
Northern Arabian Gulf and even have a high-endurance cutter
currently assigned in theater.
Their tasking for the mission assignments actually come
from the combatant commander, not directly from the Coast
Guard. They are basically on loan. And the reason they are over
there is because they have certain capabilities which are
useful to the combatant commander.
In this case, the law enforcement detachments are located
on U.S. Navy vessels, and they integrate with U.S. Navy VBSS
teams. That is ``visit, board, search, and seizure'' teams. So
when the boardings are conducted, it is a combined team of Navy
and Coast Guard personnel.
So far, Coast Guard personnel have been involved in four
interdictions of pirates and have apprehended I believe it is
28 pirates, which are pending disposition. I think some have
actually been turned over to Kenya.
The capabilities they provide are really drawn from their
law enforcement expertise. This is what we do domestically in
the drug trade in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. That
is what they are trained to do, to apprehend pirates, make sure
that they are accorded their rights, protect evidence and chain
of custody, and make sure that we have a good, solid package
that can be used in prosecution. So that is the value that they
offer, sir.
Senator Thune. Do you see that role as protective in
nature, or is it more reactionary?
Admiral Salerno. Well, the way they are being used now, it
could be either. Predominantly, they are responding to--when
they are onboard the Navy vessel and the Navy vessel is
responding to an incident or a potential threat, that is when
they are being inserted. And boarding either pirate skiffs or I
don't know if they boarded a mother ship, but that is basically
the kind of activity that they would be used for.
They are not there to be used as a special--like a special
forces team that would go and try to retake a ship that has
been overcome by pirates. That would be left to other
capabilities within the U.S. Government.
Senator Thune. Mr. Shapiro, beyond ransom demands, the
Congressional Research Service reports that Lloyd's of London
has designated the waters adjacent to the Horn of Africa a
``war-risk zone.''
Mr. Shapiro. That is correct, sir.
Senator Thune. And as a result, subject to special
insurance premiums that could cost shippers $10,000 to $20,000
more per ship through the area. To what extent have insurance
and operating costs for the U.S. merchant fleet operating in
the area increased as a result of the piracy threat?
Mr. Shapiro. Well, Senator, they have increased
dramatically over the last few weeks. Obviously, since the
MAERSK ALABAMA, the rates have increased.
The problem, though, is not just related to the Gulf of
Aden. We are now talking about the entire Indian Ocean coast of
Africa. This is expanding well beyond the original million
miles that they were talking about to an area much bigger.
And I think one of the witnesses, if I can just relate
that, talked about the difficulty of getting naval assets to
respond in a timely fashion. But an embarked security team that
was on each American vessel going through that area would
protect the crew and would prevent, I believe, the hijackings
and the attempting hijackings that are taking place.
There is also a discussion about diverting to avoid that
area. The problem for our company is we are bringing--our
destination is that area. We are bringing cargo into the danger
pirate zone to be distributed to governments there to relieve
famine. So we don't have the ability to re-route our ships to
another discharge port because we are bringing it to the area
where the food is required.
Insurance costs go up, but insurance is not--I think, from
my perspective, I am not as concerned about the cost of
insurance, the increase in the cost of insurance as I am the
protection and safety of our crew. They are American citizens,
and they are entitled to be protected.
And I believe that fundamental to the notion of sovereignty
is the obligation of a sovereign to protect its shipping. And
if they can't do it, if our military can't do it, then we need
to have the statutory framework, the legal framework in which
we can arm our vessels with either private security or arming
the vessels for the crew.
Although, personally, I must tell you, we do not, as a
company, believe that the crew should be armed. Maybe one or
two people or a few people, a select group of the crew. The way
to protect these vessels is to put an armed security team on.
Mr. Kienitz spoke about the Italian cruise ship. Well, the
Italian cruise ship had an Israeli security team on, and the
reason it had an Israeli security team on is it is not
encumbered by United States law, which prohibits you from
putting on an armed security team.
Senator Thune. Just maybe one more question, Mr. Chairman,
if it is OK? And I direct this to Captain Phillips.
You mentioned earlier in response to questions about having
security teams that you can only have one captain of the ship,
which I appreciate in terms of the chain of command.
You are the person with ultimate responsibility for the
vessel and its crew. As you think about the whole issue and
others, ships are going to be moving through that area. Other
vessels are going to be moving through that area.
What other options are there--in terms of protecting U.S.
mariner interest in that region?
Captain Phillips. Well, as I said, I believe it is a
comprehensive, multifaceted program you would have to do, and
we have talked about many things here. There are other
nonlethal assets that are out there, and that is why I
encourage more people in the industry to come forward because
they have ideas, too.
But there is no silver bullet here, and I can't stress that
enough. It has to be to the limit of the danger that we can use
certain forces and assets. And I think one thing here is
usually before an incident, you know at a certain time that you
are in that incident. There is no question.
There are fishermen out there. There are other boats out
there doing legal things. But by actions that we take on, as
any captain would take, you have identified the threat and know
what the threat is. In our case, we knew it well over a mile
what the threat was by certain things we did.
So that is why I would say the thing that is most important
is the force protection team, and this force protection team
could be two or three people. And I think they would stop an
incident before it ever got to even a boarding situation.
They would have that capability and ability, and that would
eradicate the notion of that you are actually shooting at
people who are doing legal things. As I said, well at a mile,
you will know. Day before we were taken, we were chased by
three boats and pirates also, and we knew then what the
incident was.
So well before they get in any kind of range, you know what
the situation is ongoing and what is happening.
Senator Thune. And do you subscribe to the same view that
Mr. Shapiro expressed about arming the crew?
Captain Phillips. I subscribe to a multifaceted regime of,
first, force protection team, two or three people, talented and
trained; arming the crew to a certain extent. And again, it is
not crew walking around with guns in their pockets. It is the
captain with a much like some of us have at home, a gun
cabinet. He unlocks the key, and there are certain--it doesn't
have to be a lot of arms.
I believe in deterrence. I am a firm believer in making a
hard target. I thought we were a pretty hard target, and we
weren't. I believe, as we have talked about, evolving. Now
there are nighttime or stealth activities going on.
So that is why I say there is no one silver bullet. There
is no one answer. It has to be multifaceted to evolve with the
danger, and the danger is out there. And I believe with some of
the things we have talked about that it will not stop. I don't
think anything will eradicate it, but it will prevent and lower
the number of incidences.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
I am sure you are getting weary of answering all of these
questions. So thank you for your indulgence.
Thank you all very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Senator Thune.
Captain Phillips, we all admired the courage that you and
your chief engineer showed, and the composure that you showed
in this circumstance. Of course, we didn't feel it and we
didn't know what was going on in your mind, but we know the
stories that are now legendary about you when you were in the
water and out of the water. And fortunately, the Navy applied
its resources, and they did one incredible job.
Now you said that you were aware a couple of days, 3 days
before, that this pirate activity was around. Did I understand
what you just said?
Captain Phillips. No. Earlier, what I had just said is the
day before we had an incident with three boats, and it was a
pirate situation, yes. But the activity had increased. I mean,
I am inundated on the ship, as all captains in that area are,
with report, many-paged report. And to be honest, I can't even
read them all. There are so many reports about incidences,
everything that is happening, reported some mother ships.
Senator Lautenberg. Do you dial 911?
Captain Phillips. I wish we had 911. We talked about that
at the other committee, and there is no direct call to the
Navy. I basically had to call UKMTO, United Kingdom Maritime
Transportation----
Senator Lautenberg. Good thing you paid your cell phone
bill, huh?
Captain Phillips. Well, the company paid that bill, yes.
[Laughter.]
Senator Lautenberg. Because I don't get it. I mean, we now
know that there is all kinds of radar attachment to aircraft to
tell them when they are getting too close on the ground, too
close in the air and so forth. And I don't know whether that
kind of basic equipment is available for ships to say, ``Hey,
these guys are getting too close, and we ought to take a second
look.''
But it is odd to me. We have air marshals--everybody knows
it, there is no secret--who carry guns. They are welcome on an
airplane. Heaven forbid they have to shoot in that airplane.
The damage can be total. And nevertheless, we feel a compulsion
as a country to say that when people are flying on American
airlines that we want to protect them to the fullest extent
possible.
And yet here, it seems that we kind of say, ``OK, listen,
when available''--and I don't trivialize the Navy's
obligations. They are severe and distant and very tough
assignments. But part of their mission, I think, and I address
this directly to Ms. Whelan--you are part of the policy team
there--when does it suggest that for the mission that we are
undertaking especially in this area, a humanitarian issue, that
we have got American citizens who are doing their job under an
American flag, at what point do we say it is our
responsibility?
We have to have cops on the beat there because we know that
there is trouble on these streets. What is wrong with
organizing ourselves to protect these ships, whether they are
two-person squads or helicopters nearby or what have you?
Ms. Whelan. Senator, there is actually very active
discussion underway right now within the interagency involving
the Department of Defense, Coast Guard, DOT, NSC, State
Department on exactly the issue you just raised. What is the
most appropriate way to ensure the security of U.S.-flag
vessels?
And there are a number of potential ways to address this
problem. The U.S. Navy or the U.S. military certainly may have
a role to play in this, but it is not necessarily the only
solution to the problem.
There are, of course, resource, time, distance, space
issues with regard to the U.S. Navy's ability to cover the vast
amount of territory that we are talking about, and that was
really the issue with regard to the ALABAMA. The BAINBRIDGE,
the time-distance ratio between the ALABAMA and the BAINBRIDGE
was such that the BAINBRIDGE responded as quickly as it
possibly could.
And that is what I meant when I said the vessel is
available. The BAINBRIDGE was one of several Navy vessels, U.S.
Navy vessels and a number of international vessels patrolling
in this area as part of the counterpiracy mission. But the
location of the MAERSK ALABAMA when it was attacked versus the
location of the BAINBRIDGE was just too far for the BAINBRIDGE
to react to deter the attack.
But there have been numerous occasions when the U.S. Navy
and other navies have reacted in response to distress calls and
have successfully deterred attacks. They have chased them away
either by the destroyer or the frigate or whatever vessel is
there showing up on the scene or oftentimes, more effectively,
with a helicopter that has been dispatched from a vessel being
able to chase the pirates away.
This is one method of protection, but there are many
others, as I think Captain Phillips----
Senator Lautenberg. Well, I never criticize the bravery,
the courage, the loyalty to duty that our service people have,
our military people. We have seen it in the present war in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Our people are subject to the most difficult
conditions.
And shouldn't we feel the responsibility to say those who
are crewmembers, we are going to be looking out for you? Or do
we say, listen, that is the risk of the business?
I don't think that is the way we want to react. I would ask
both the captain and the engineer what kinds of things do you
recommend others who are operating in the high-risk area off
the coast of Somalia?
You know, this underlies the question of how valuable it is
to America to be able to send ships out there, ships of mercy,
military ships? To not be satisfied to stay within our borders,
but rather to reach out and say to Americans across the globe,
``You are an American citizen. We have obligations to tend to
your needs, to protect your lives, to rescue you if you are
taken advantage of no matter where that is.''
Whether it is on the high seas or we know that the
capability is there, the bravery is there of our troops. Is it
easy to get crews today on your vessels, Captain?
Mr. Shapiro. It has been easy. I think people are getting a
little more nervous in the last 3 weeks, Senator.
If I could just--I know you directed it at Captain
Phillips, but I would just like to say I agree. This is a
multifaceted approach, and we need to clean up along shore.
I am reminded of the Marine Corps hymn. ``From the halls of
Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli.'' That was the Barbary
pirates, the Barbary Coast. And they were cleaned out by I
believe it was Thomas Jefferson.
There is an obligation of a sovereign to take care of their
ships, and I think all I am asking for as a ship owner today
flying the U.S. flag and employing wonderful American seafarers
is to have the tools available that I can arrange for
protection for them if our Government can't. And that is why we
are asking for a change in the legislative framework to allow
us to do that.
Mr. Perry. Senator, if I may answer your question?
Senator Lautenberg. Sure.
Mr. Perry. I am the engineer, and to me, it is inevitable
we are going to be boarded again. We can take all the action we
want to prevent it and protect us, but they are going to come
onboard the ship.
Having said that, to all sailors, to all shippers, the
houses must be fortified, strengthened. More locks. We need at
least three layers of doors coming down to safe rooms. All
ships do not have safe rooms. We did not have a safe room in
our plan. That was something we improvised right then and
there.
Other ships have safe rooms. Everybody needs safe rooms.
They need to know how to use them. They need at least three
layers of armored doors to get there.
To the point of arming people or putting--I may have to
have, and I am glad to see the Navy around. I may have to have
them onboard, and I was glad that they were there. I will
never, ever want to see a rented cop onboard my ship. They
don't have the vested interest that we have.
Having said that, there are people that should never, ever
have a weapon. There are people that will never, ever pick up a
weapon. I have sailed for them and with them. They will not
unlock that safe no matter what. They have told me so.
There are people that are trained, people that are wired
and know how to do these things that are willing to go through
certification programs to continue to be certified to carry
weapons. Let us say they must be within the officer corps of
this merchant marine.
Those people need to be identified not by position, but by
character. They need to be trained. They need to be certified.
They need to be allowed to have a weapon. That weapon needs to
be under lock and key in their cabin or in the safe room
because when that third door gets breached and those people are
coming in the safe room, I don't want to have to meet them with
a pocketknife.
Senator Lautenberg. The ballgame is over at that point.
Well, we thank each one of you for your appearance here and
for your testimony. We will keep the record open for some time
and submit questions in writing to you for which we would ask
promptness in response.
My hat is off to all of you. I once sailed on a troop ship.
It was in 1944. And we were a large ship, about 800 feet, I
think, 8,000 soldiers aboard, and we went fast. That was our
protection, and we went through some pretty funny waters there.
So speed, all kinds of things can be employed, but there is
nothing--nothing, in my view--like making sure that someone who
is trying to take your life stands a chance of losing theirs,
and that goes beyond all the written codes and everything else.
Senator Thune. Mr. Chairman, clarification, if I might? Am
I right in what you are saying is that you don't have
authority? We would need a change of the law to allow you to
have firearms on the vessel?
Mr. Shapiro. Can I clarify that, Senator?
Senator Thune. Yes.
Mr. Shapiro. There is an 1819 statute which permits vessels
to defend themselves. The problem is twofold. There is a
subsequent State Department arms regulation, which requires you
to get a license in order to take a weapon out of the United
States. And part of the requirements are that you get a
certification from every port that you are going to that it is
legal to import them.
Out of curiosity, I called indirectly the embassy from
Kenya and found out that in order to bring a weapon into
Mombasa legally, one has to have the handwritten permission,
the personal permission of the minister of the interior.
So there are regulations which prevent us from going into
certain ports, Captain, with weapons. Moreover, we can't go
through certain canals and most canals with weapons unless they
are declared. The crew is allowed to bring a single or I guess
it is up to three weapons, correct? But it has got to be less
than 50-caliber. It can't be an automatic weapon.
So I think the line of defense that is being talked about
for weapons for officers is a last line of defense. I don't
think that is the first line of defense, at least it is not
from my point of view.
We need embarked security teams, armed escort security
teams. I understand the issues that the captain and the chief
have with surrendering command and control of their ship
because the military embarked teams are not responsive to the
captain. They respond to the military people that are onboard
that they report to.
And I think with private, well-vetted, well-trained
security, we would be able to have the captain and the chief in
charge of the ship, which I think would solve the problem. It
is not going to solve the entire problem, but it will certainly
save American lives.
Senator Thune. But the captain and you and the engineer
both said as a last resort, if you had a gun case--not
everybody packing heat on the vessel. But if you had a gun
case, is that something that is allowable today?
Captain Phillips. I have been on ships where we have had it
and gone to many countries. I have been to Mombasa with a
weapon. I won't say what kind. You do have to declare it, and
then you have to put it in bond or seal it.
I haven't been to too many countries, including Japan, that
caused a problem. It is basically you declare it. It goes in
bond or in my safe usually, and it is locked up and sealed
until you sail.
Senator Lautenberg. We can't continue to go like this, but
I have one more thing. If we have had successful missions in
preventing or interrupting piracy attacks, how come the numbers
continue to escalate so rapidly of these attacks taking place?
There is obviously not a sufficient deterrent out there. Maybe
there can't ever be, with hungry people or what have you.
But certainly we are not offering deterrence in any way
that would say to them, ``Hey, you could pay a heck of a price
for this, maybe your life.'' We don't do that.
We thank each and every one of you. You have contributed a
lot to the debate, and we will follow on with this. Thank you
very much for being here.
With that, this hearing is over.
[Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senator from West Virginia
I am excited about today's hearing and regret that I cannot be in
attendance. I would like to thank Senator Lautenberg for calling this
critical hearing to examine piracy on the high seas today. We both
believe it is our duty to protect American mariners, vessels and right
of access to the shipping lanes around the Horn of Africa. The Commerce
Committee will use today's hearing to examine issues within its
jurisdiction spanning the operations of the commercial maritime
industry, the Coast Guard, and the safety and security of our merchant
fleet and their crews.
I would also like to thank all of our witnesses for agreeing to
testify today. I appreciate each of you taking the time to be here, and
I'm honored to have two American heroes among us today. Joining us are
the Master of the M/V MAERSK ALABAMA, Captain Richard Phillips, and the
vessel's Chief Engineer, Mr. Michael Perry. These men have dedicated
their lives to service at sea in support of our national and economic
security. I want to personally thank you and your families for being
with us and for the selfless service and countless sacrifices you make
for our country.
As a maritime nation it is imperative that the United States and
our trading partners maintain unimpeded access to the world's shipping
lanes. It is this access that enables us to move commerce, provide
humanitarian assistance and, when necessary, fight and win wars. It is
unacceptable for our ships, crews, and passengers to be threatened and
put at risk in international waters by various groups of
unsophisticated pirates from unstable nations. I will not sit by as men
in speed boats abuse the most powerful and advanced Navy in the world.
We have the ability and responsibility to end all piracy; specifically
around the Horn of Africa and along the Coast of Somalia.
With the full force of the U.S. Navy alongside a coalition of
nearly twenty other nations, we can take back these critical shipping
lanes. It is of the upmost importance that we keep our U.S. mariners,
passengers and vessels free from harm and free to move about
international waters.
Arming the crew is not an option. Instead the U.S. military should
provide the support and protection of our men and women at sea. And let
us not forget there are still roughly 18 vessels and another 300 people
still being held hostage in Somalia.
I realize the maritime industry has been facing this threat for
several years now, especially as attacks began to escalate in the
summer of 2008. Our maritime community took responsibility and worked
together to share best practices for avoiding and disrupting pirate
attacks.
Yet this is not enough. U.S. officials and international experts
believe that addressing the threat of piracy will require strengthening
regional security capabilities, improving intelligence gathering and
sharing, and enhanced multilateral coordination, both at sea and on
land.
The absence of a functioning government in Somalia and the ability
to prosecute captured pirates are the greatest challenges to maritime
security in the region. By all accounts, pirates will likely continue
to find sanctuary in Somalia until basic governance and security
conditions there change.
The international community has responded with multinational naval
patrols, diplomatic efforts, and enhanced private security by members
of the commercial shipping industry. I believe we must do more. As a
nation we have a responsibility to take action and protect our
citizens. And as history shows, without a forceful response pirates
reign supreme in the high seas.
Today our witnesses will paint a fuller picture of what we've done
so far and guide us on the road ahead. We will bear witness to the
personal impact of piracy on our citizens at sea, and listen to their
advice on what more needs to be done.
I look forward to hearing from all the witnesses.
______
Prepared Statement of Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii
I would like to thank Senator Lautenberg for calling this hearing
today, and I would also like to thank all of our witnesses for agreeing
to testify.
The ability to access U.S.-flag Merchant Marine ships and seafarers
is essential to our national and economic security interests, and
provides an invaluable diplomatic and humanitarian assistance role for
our Nation. In a time of national emergency or military conflict, the
U.S. Merchant Marine becomes vital to our national security by
projecting America's military power. U.S. ships transport more than
ninety-five percent of all equipment and supplies supporting the
deployment of armed forces. A strong, organic sealift capability that
is available to the Defense Department on demand saves the tax payer
over $8 billion in capital outlay, and millions more in annual
operating and maintenance costs.
The history of the twentieth century demonstrates our Nation's
reliance on a strong U.S. Merchant Marine. In the Second World War, the
U.S. Merchant Marine was crucial to getting our personnel, equipment
and supplies to the various theaters around the globe.
The need was so great that the Merchant Marine grew from 55,000 to
215,000 trained mariners, in order to crew the surge of vessels that
were being rapidly built to support the war effort. Likewise, in the
first Gulf War, the U.S. Merchant Marine carried nearly 700,000 tons of
equipment on 123 voyages. Today, the U.S. Merchant Marine has
successfully supported simultaneous operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
moving nearly ninety-seven percent of all equipment and supplies. It is
for these reasons that the U.S. Merchant Marine is considered the
fourth arm of defense, as first characterized by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt.
Merchant Mariners, trained in ship operations and as logistics
professionals, ensure the economic security of the largest trading
nation in the world by guaranteeing our access to foreign and domestic
sources of raw materials, and domestic and foreign markets for sale of
U.S. manufactured goods. Annually, our mariners move more than 2.3
billion tons of domestic and international cargo with $2 trillion, in
addition to 3.3 billion barrels of oil to meet our energy demands.
In addition, our U.S. Merchant Marines provide an effective
humanitarian assistance. Domestically, merchant mariners provided
critical support response following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Internationally, our U.S.-flag ships carry food aid and other supplies
to countries in need. These types of diplomatic missions serve to
support people in need, and projects our U.S. government's positive
humanitarian presence overseas.
The U.S. Merchant Marine is an essential part of who we are as
Americans, and must be protected from the interference of pirates on
the high seas in international waters.
I look forward to hearing from all the witnesses here before this
Committee today.
______
Prepared Statement of the American Maritime Officers, International
Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, Marine Engineers' Beneficial
Association and Seafarers International Union
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
The American Maritime Officers (AMO), the International
Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots (MM&P), the Marine Engineers'
Beneficial Association (MEBA) and the Seafarers International Union
(SIU) appreciate the opportunity to submit this statement in
conjunction with your Subcommittee's hearing on piracy. The licensed
and unlicensed merchant mariners our labor organizations represent crew
working aboard United States-flag vessels that must operate in waters
where the threat of piracy is the greatest. Consequently, the officers
and members of our unions deeply appreciate your leadership, Mr.
Chairman, in scheduling this hearing. We look forward to working with
you and your Subcommittee to formulate responses to the threats posed
by piracy which offer the greatest measure of protection for U.S.-flag
vessels and their U.S. citizen crews.
In fact, American mariners working aboard U.S.-flag vessels
operating in that region continue to face an immediate and ongoing
threat from international pirates. As our American mariners simply
attempt to do their jobs, their lives are in constant peril as these
pirates decide when--not if--to take further aggressive action against
commercial ships.
Consequently, our unions recently asked the Administration to
continue to treat this situation and the ongoing threat posed by
pirates with the utmost urgency. In a letter to the President dated
April 24, 2009, we stated that it is our position that ``the most
effective step that must be taken to prevent further aggressive action
against U.S.-flag commercial vessels and their crews is for our
government to immediately provide U.S.-flag vessels with the force
protection necessary to prevent any further acts of piracy against
them.'' We strongly believe it is first and foremost the responsibility
of the U.S. Government to provide the protection necessary to ensure
the safety of life and property aboard United States-flag vessels. When
a vessel flies the United States flag it becomes an extension of the
United States itself, regardless of where in the world the vessel is
operating.
Clearly, the actions taken by the Administration and, most
specifically, the Department of Defense in response to the recent
attacks against the U.S.-flag vessels MAERSK ALABAMA and LIBERTY SUN
demonstrate that the United States Navy and its personnel have the
capability and expertise to respond quickly and effectively. In both
instances, the pirates never took control of the U.S.-flag vessel and,
as everyone is now aware, the Navy SEALS executed a dramatic rescue of
Captain Richard Philips, master of the MAERSK ALABAMA, which has
attracted the worldwide praise it deserves.
This is important not only because no American ship, cargo or crew
member was lost but because our country unequivocally demonstrated that
we will protect our U.S.-flag fleet which contributes to the economic,
political and military security of the United States. Our country
cannot allow pirates to force the U.S.-flag off the high seas or to
drive American citizens out of our industry. All too often the role
that our organizations and the United States citizen merchant marine
officers and crew we represent play in protecting the economic security
of our Nation and supporting the Department of Defense and our troops
overseas is overlooked. Without a United States-flag merchant fleet and
without the American citizen licensed officers and crew who sail aboard
these vessels, our armed forces overseas would be dependent on others
for the supplies, equipment and other cargo they need to do their job
to protect America's interests.
In the case of the LIBERTY SUN and the MAERSK ALABAMA, the vessels
and crews were on a mission of mercy, carrying U.S. food aid cargo to
some of the world's neediest people. These vessels and other vessels
carrying American aid proudly fly the United States flag in foreign
ports to help demonstrate that Americans are a compassionate people. It
shows that American ships and their crews will work to make sure that
the less fortunate of the world who need our aid will in fact receive
our aid--U.S. produced agricultural commodities. The American taxpayer
must have the assurance that the aid they provide to those in need will
in fact reach the intended recipients and will in fact work to achieve
its stated purpose. U.S.-flag ships and their crews play a key role in
the process which must continue.
Notwithstanding the outcomes of the MAERSK ALABAMA and LIBERTY SUN
incidents, it is important for all Americans to understand that the
threat presented by piracy is a fact of life for American mariners and
for seafarers around the world. It has recently been reported by the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the International Chamber of
Commerce that compared to the first quarter of 2008, piracy incidents
have almost doubled in the first quarter of 2009, from 53 to 102.
According to the IMB, this increase is due almost entirely to increased
pirate attacks off the Gulf of Aden and the east coast of Somalia,
where 61 of the 102 attacks occurred.
We agree that the increased level of piracy in this region of the
world is due largely to the political and economic conditions within
Somalia. There is, at best, tremendous political instability which is
coupled with severely depressed economic conditions that do not offer
the level or measure of opportunity necessary to discourage individuals
from pursuing this life of crime.
This is not, of course, a situation that can or will be solved
quickly, or just by the United States. It will require a coordinated
international effort to try to reverse the conditions within Somalia
that have led to this increased level in piracy. But while the world
works to confront the root causes of piracy, it is critical that the
United States and the rest of the world act to address piracy itself--
to develop an international approach that entails uniform response
procedures when pirates are discovered in waters near a vessel; that
includes a uniform approach to protecting vessels and crews; and which
covers the prosecution for piracy and penalties for those convicted. We
also believe that all flag nations, including those which do not have
military forces to contribute to this effort, must therefore
participate in this effort financially. They should pay their fair
share to help offset the cost of protecting their flag vessels that the
United States and other countries will incur.
It is also important to reach an international agreement that
applies and enforces any new requirements equally to all vessels in
order to ensure that U.S.-flag vessels are not economically
disadvantaged. It is important to remember that shipping is a business;
ship owners and operators, and cargo shippers are interested in moving
their cargo from point to point safely and at the lowest possible cost.
If the requirements necessary to respond to piracy are applicable only
to U.S.-flag vessels, and these anti-piracy measures result in
increased costs, it is logical to conclude that foreign flag vessels
will achieve an unfair competitive advantage over their U.S.-flag
counterparts. If the threat posed to merchant mariners by piracy is not
given the same seriousness by all vessel owners and operators and flag
states, and if these same vessel owners and operators and flag states
choose to sacrifice the health and safety of their mariners for the
bottom line, American vessel owners and operators will be disadvantaged
as they try to do the right thing, and the number of U.S.-flag vessels
will likely diminish, taking American maritime jobs with them. To the
degree this happens, more and more of American cargo will be carried by
foreign vessels that are more susceptible to pirate attacks, and more
and more of American cargo will be at risk. Simply put, we believe that
the response to piracy must be international, the steps taken and the
requirements imposed must be applied to all vessels, and the costs of
protecting vessels, cargo and crew must be borne equally and not
disadvantage any one flag.
Nevertheless, as we said previously, the immediate threat to
vessels and crews posed by piracy is real, and action must be taken now
to protect U.S.-flag vessels and American mariners. Until and unless
the international maritime community acts, there is no effective
alternative to U.S. Government involvement and action working in
concert with our shipping industry and maritime labor organizations. We
agree with the statements made by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton:
``We have to act swiftly and decisively to combat this threat. These
pirates are criminals. They are armed gangs on the sea. And those
plotting attacks must be stopped, and those who have carried them out
must be brought to justice. Defending against piracy must be the joint
responsibility of governments and the shipping industry.''
Consequently, it is our position that as an essential first step,
the U.S. Government should immediately provide protection for the
United States-flag vessels that are and will be operating on sealanes
where piracy remains a serious threat. This protection should entail
military escorts or military security detachments placed aboard the
vessel.
We further believe that the utilization of a private security
detachment aboard a vessel may also provide necessary protection. In
fact, a force protection detachment of a few highly qualified,
experienced personnel, with armed forces background and training, to
serve as first responders in the event pirates are detected can be
effective in repelling the attack. These individuals can and should be
equipped to take aggressive action when it is confirmed that pirates
are approaching the vessel and an attack against the vessel may be
imminent. However, it should be noted that there are serious concerns
and risks associated with this approach throughout the maritime
industry. The employment of private security detachments can, for
example, raise command and liability issues which must be thoroughly
considered before proceeding in this fashion.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we would like to address the proposal that
the answer to the threat posed by pirates is to simply arm the crew. We
categorically reject the notion that this should be considered the best
or even a primary solution to the problem of piracy. Rather, we believe
that to the degree this option is considered, it should be considered
as only one part of an overall, comprehensive response. Even then, it
should entail no more than a few highly trained individuals who have
extensive training and expertise in the use of weapons.
In conclusion, we again wish to express our appreciation for your
efforts, Mr. Chairman, and the efforts of your Subcommittee to focus
attention on this extremely serious problem and to bring shipping
management, maritime labor and the U.S. Government together to begin
discussing effective and appropriate responses to piracy. We stand
ready to continue to work with you and your Subcommittee and ask that
our statement be included in your hearing record.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Philip J. Shapiro
Question 1. Do you have a position on the use of military armed
guards verses the use of private security forces or arming the crew on
your vessels to improve security while operating off Somalia? Can you
please provide the Committee an assessment of the positives and
negatives of each alternative?
Answer. Yes, Liberty Maritime's position is that the U.S.
Government should protect U.S.-flag vessels on high-risk transits
through the region where pirate attacks have occurred. As an initial
matter, it is the traditional responsibility of the sovereign, the
United States of America, to protect U.S.-flag vessels from pirate
attacks on the high seas. Indeed, the United States Navy traces its
origins under the Constitution of the United States to battling the
Barbary Pirates in the early years of the nineteenth century.
Next, considering the seriousness of recent pirate attacks where
multiple pirate vessels armed with automatic weapons, rocket-propelled
grenades, and most recently high-explosives, have been used to attack
merchant vessels, Liberty Maritime's position is that the armed forces
of the United States are much better equipped and trained to meet this
evolving threat than private security. Additionally, in the event of a
further escalation in the use of force by pirates, the U.S. Government
will surely back-up military personnel embarked on U.S.-flag vessels.
By contrast, private security forces simply do not have that
capability. Considering the fact that most U.S.-flag vessels transiting
the region are carrying U.S. Government cargoes, it is particularly
ironic that the Navy has declined to protect these ships with embarked
security teams.
Liberty Maritime's position is that private security represents a
much less desirable alternative than the armed forces of the United
States. Private security cannot provide personnel with the same
training and weapons provided by the armed forces, nor do they provide
the back-up in the event pirate forces threaten to overwhelm private
security. Additionally, because of legal prohibitions of most of the
countries in the region where Liberty Maritime vessels trade, it is
practically impossible for Liberty Maritime to arrange for private
armed security. For example, on a recent voyage of a Liberty Maritime
vessel in the region we were unable to arrange for private armed
security because of prohibitions by all of the relevant countries in
the region. Therefore, as a matter of law and practice, the barriers
Liberty Maritime has encountered have prevented the use of armed
private security.
Furthermore, because the United States Navy indicated that it will
not provide embarked military security on U.S.-flag vessels because it
does not have the resources, Liberty Maritime recommends that the U.S.
Coast Guard provide embarked military security for the U.S.-flag
vessels on high-risk transits through the region. The U.S. Coast Guard
has the capability and only awaits the tasking. Additionally, the
Congress has recently provided supplemental funding to the U.S. Coast
Guard for counter-piracy operations overseas. These resources should be
devoted to protecting the lives of American merchant seamen serving on
U.S.-flag vessels. Failing to apply this ounce of prevention risks
putting American lives at risk and will likely require the U.S.
Government to expend far greater resources in response to another
hostage-taking like that which occurred on the MAERSK ALABAMA.
Question 2. During an era when it is routine to criminalize
mariners, do you have any concerns about arming mariners for self
protection, with respect to the inevitable response and treatment of
mariners by the maritime law enforcement and military organization?
Answer. Yes. Leaving merchant mariners to their own devices and
suggesting that they should simply be armed for self-defense ignores
the responsibility of the U.S. Government to protect its citizens and
the U.S.-flag fleet against pirates. Moreover, it subjects merchant
mariners to legal proceedings in foreign countries for actions in self-
defense they take against piratical acts. That is why we have proposed
legislation that would immunize U.S. merchant mariners for actions
taken in self-defense of piratical acts from legal actions in the
United States.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Hon. Roy Kienitz
Question 1. ere are approximately 200 U.S.-flag vessels with U.S.
crews that sail through the Horn of Africa region on an annual basis,
which is about one vessel every other day. What would you say is the
best use of U.S. resources to assist in keeping the sea lanes open for
trade and protecting our U.S. mariners and vessels?
Answer. A risk-based matrix is the best way to ensure appropriate
measures are being utilized to assist in keeping the sea lanes open for
trade and protecting our U.S. mariners and vessels. Speed is the most
important factor to avoid and prevent pirate boarding.
There are very few U.S.-flag vessels which operate near the HOA
that have a top speed of less than 20 knots. MARAD estimates eight (8)
such vessels operate off the HOA. Of those eight, only one operates
full time in the west Indian Ocean. The others typically enter the
region on a quarterly basis. For this small number of vessels, they
should work with the Maritime Security Centre-Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA),
the U.S. Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration to make sure they
have the latest guidance and are using the most appropriate counter
measures.
Question 2. Will you please outline for the Subcommittee your
efforts to coordinate intelligence, capitalize on best management
practices and disseminate mariner advisory messages? What else can be
done to assist and protect U.S. mariners and the maritime industry?
Answer. For U.S.-flag vessel owners and operators, the Maritime
Administration sends Advisories concerning operational issues globally.
Several advisories have been sent and updated based on input from the
intelligence community. Our primary source is the National Maritime
Intelligence Center (NMIC) in Suitland, MD for matters regarding
piracy.
MARAD Advisories are not classified and are broadcasted using the
services of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and
distributed by e-mail. We also forward applicable updates from the
NMIC, Combined Maritime Force, MARLO Bahrain, and the Maritime Security
Centre-Horn of Africa (MSC-HOA)
The Maritime Administration communicates with the MSC-HOA Chief of
Staff as needed via e-mail and telephone. The Maritime Security Centre-
Horn of Africa uses a password protected website as their primary means
of communication with commercial shipping including the U.S.-flag
vessels. U.S.-flag vessels are required by the USCG to register on the
website.
Question 3. The majority of our discussions have revolved around
the immediate need for protecting our mariners, vessels and cargos.
Please provide us with an explanation of the larger issue of piracy, as
it relates to the specific impacts of the flow of commerce and
associated costs.
Answer. For all of 2008, out of over 20,000 transits through the
Gulf of Aden and the East Coast of Africa, there were 111 attacks and
42 successful hijackings. Although this risk may seem low with only
about 0.6 percent of ships moving through the area coming under attack,
the persistence and aggressiveness of the pirates demand active
countermeasures by ship operators and governments to ensure freedom of
the seas, which is essential to protect global commerce.
If an operator transits through the high risk area, it may opt for
qualified security guards or deterrent equipment (e.g., a sonic
deterrent device or razor wire), and additional war risk and kidnap and
ransom insurance. Rerouting around the Gulf of Aden area via the Cape
of Good Hope could be another option for some carriers.
Rerouting around the Gulf of Aden area via the Cape of Good Hope is
the other way that piracy causes specific impacts to the cost of
shipping goods. This routing could add 14 days or more to the voyage
depending on the destination which increases the fuel and operating
expenses of the vessel. These costs do not include the disruption in
the logistics chains to the users of cargo or the cost of chartering
additional ships to maintain regular schedules.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno
Question 1. Please explain the Coast Guard's role at the
International Maritime Organization to prevent and respond to acts of
piracy?
Answer. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), a
specialized technical body of the United Nations, has been a leading
force in improving maritime safety internationally for decades. Most
recently, it led numerous efforts aimed to suppress the piracy threat
in the Horn of Africa. By delegation from the State Department, the
Coast Guard provides the Head of the U.S. Delegation for IMO meetings
and activities. The IMO works throughout the region to foster
cooperation between stakeholder countries and to create the legal and
operational framework for regional States to combat piracy. The IMO
established a framework for international counter-piracy cooperation;
updated counter-piracy guidance to industry and governments; and
promoted judicial consequence delivery mechanisms so that pirates, once
caught, face meaningful and just punishment under the rule of law.
Djibouti Code of Conduct
During the week of 19 January 2009, the Coast Guard led the U.S.
delegation to a meeting convened by the IMO in Djibouti on regional
cooperation to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships off the
coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. At the meeting, the 21
regional nations adopted an agreement for cooperation in the
interdiction, investigation and prosecution of pirates, as well as the
establishment of information and training centers. The Djibouti Code of
Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (the Djibouti
Code) specifically endorses the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) as the
effective legal framework. The Djibouti Code also contains practical
law enforcement measures, including a ship rider program to share
scarce patrol resources and information sharing and operational
coordination mechanisms. Although not eligible to be a party to this
instrument, the U.S. delegation played an important supporting role in
the effort.
Nine of the twenty-one regional nations signed the agreement in
Djibouti, allowing the Code of Conduct to immediately enter into force.
Each signatory intends to review its national legislation with a view
toward ensuring there are laws in place to criminalize piracy, and
adequate guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of
investigations, and prosecution of alleged offenders. Consistent with
international law, signatories espouse an intent to fully cooperate in
the arrest, investigation and prosecution of persons who have committed
piracy or are reasonably suspected of having committed piracy; seize
suspect ships and the property on board such ships; and rescue ships,
persons, and property subject to acts of piracy.
Counter-piracy Guidance
Through the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), the Coast Guard,
in close cooperation with our interagency and international partners,
is leading efforts to enhance and update counter-piracy guidance to
industry, encouraging all vessels to address the piracy safety and
security threat via the existing domestic and international law
architecture. The IMO guidance to ship owners, ship operators, masters,
and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed
robbery against ships is contained within MSC Circular 623 (Rev.3). The
Coast Guard is leading the U.S. delegation to the 86th session of the
MSC, which is meeting in London from 27 May to 5 June 2009. The MSC is
expected to complete its review and approve a fourth revision to the
guidance.
The 86th session of the MSC is also is expected to approve
revisions to existing recommendations to Governments for preventing and
suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships (IMO MSC Circular
622 (Rev. 1), as well as a Resolution updating guidance on evidence for
prosecution of suspected pirates. The Coast Guard led development of
the U.S. position on all documents and matters expected to be
considered by the MSC (piracy is one of several items on the agenda),
and will play a lead role during discussions and drafting conducted by
the Committee.
ISPS Code
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, at the urgent request of the
U.S., the IMO rapidly developed the International Ship and Port
Facility Security or ``ISPS'' Code to better safeguard international
shipping from acts of terrorists and others who would threaten
commercial shipping and the safety of innocent seafarers. The Coast
Guard worked tirelessly to effectively develop and implement the ISPS
Code. The purpose of the ISPS Code is to provide a standard, consistent
framework for evaluating risk. It enables governments to flexibly
accommodate changes in threats to shipping with changes to reduce
vulnerability of ships and port facilities through determination of
appropriate security levels and corresponding security measures. The
ISPS Code provides a valuable and time-tested mechanism for industry,
in cooperation with the IMO, to harden targets against pirate attacks.
The Coast Guard uses a variety of authorities, including the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002, to ensure the security of vessels
via regulations at 33 CFR Part 104. The ISPS Code and 33 CFR Part 104
regimes provide the architecture necessary to implement security
measures to address piracy threats.
Question 2. What is the current status of negotiations on acts of
piracy and revitalization of the SUA Convention to assist in the
prosecution of pirates?
Answer. The International Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA), 1988,
has 152 Parties, including nearly every country bordering piracy High
Risk Waters, with the notable exceptions of Somalia, Eritrea, and
Ethiopia. The SUA Convention provides excellent tools for use in
combating piracy and bringing suspected pirates to justice, including
mechanisms for the criminalization of piratical acts and the delivery
of suspected pirates to appropriate jurisdictions for prosecution.
However, in order to fully implement SUA, State parties must enact
domestic implementing legislation, particularly with regard to the
criminalization of piratical acts. Thus, not every State party to SUA
is able to fully exercise the benefits of the Convention to which they
are a party.
The U.S. has taken a lead role in advocating and supporting full
implementation of the Convention through the creation of domestic
criminal law frameworks by State parties. With U.S. support and
intervention, the U.N. Security Council specifically recognized the
value of SUA by express references in the relevant Security Council
Resolutions (See UNSCR 1846 and 1851). Further, due to very strong U.S.
leadership in the development of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the
signatories to that Code also recognized the value of SUA with similar
language. Last, with U.S. support and intervention, the IMO has
repeatedly encouraged ratification and effective implementation of SUA
by its member States as a mechanism to suppress piratical acts.
Certain States have found SUA to be an effective tool during
prosecutions of pirates. These countries include Denmark, Kenya, and
the U.S. For example, Denmark stated it found the SUA mechanism for
delivery of suspects to be helpful when transferring five suspected
pirates to the Netherlands for prosecution. The U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York in Manhattan charged the suspected
pirate, arrested after the MAERSK ALABAMA incident, under our domestic
implementing legislation for SUA, 18 U.S.C. 2280, (among other
charges).
The United States will continue to aggressively promote the full
implementation of SUA in all appropriate international forums.
Question 3. What was the reaction of our international partners
when the Coast Guard suggested supplementing the crew with armed
security forces?
Answer. To date, there has been little international enthusiasm for
the U.S. position that the use of armed private security, in certain
appropriate circumstances, can be an effective deterrent. Generally
speaking, neither foreign governments, nor industry organizations have
been willing to support our views in their entirety. However, there is
a growing recognition that some individual international ship owners
have either employed, or expressed interest in employing, armed private
security teams. This has begun to somewhat alter the discussions, as
certain major open registries seek to accommodate the needs of their
registered ship owners. Additionally, there is a much broader
recognition that military or law enforcement armed security, provided
by governments, can be useful.
The present U.S. Government position on the issue, in relevant
part, is:
``We recognize that in appropriate circumstances, on certain
vessels determined to be at high risk, properly screened and
certified third-party security providers with firearms,
operating in compliance with applicable coastal, port and flag
state laws can be an effective deterrent to pirate attacks off
the Horn of Africa.''
Question 4. Is the Coast Guard concerned that the increased use of
arms on board vessels will escalate the type of weaponry and the use of
force by pirates?
Answer. No. The 14 April 2009 attack on the M/V LIBERTY SUN (U.S.)
demonstrated the Somali pirates' willingness and ability to employ
Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and automatic weapons fire against
unarmed targets with U.S. citizens on board. This occurred before
publication of MARSEC Directive 104-06 rev. 2, which called for armed
or unarmed security. While there have been public reports of pirates
threatening to retaliate against U.S. shipping post-MAERSK ALABAMA,
there have been no changes seen in weaponry or use of force to date.
The successful employment of defensive fire by an embarked private
security team has not resulted in an escalation of the use of weapons
by the pirates.
Question 5. In light of the lessons learned from the pirate attacks
on the MAERSK ALABAMA and LIBERTY SUN, do you recommend any changes to
Maritime Security Directive 104-06? If so, what specifically do you
intend to address and when will a revised directive be issued to better
assist in the protection of our crews?
Answer. MARSEC Directive 104-06 (Rev 2), was recently updated with
input from the maritime industry. The Directive was published on May
11, 2009 and came into effect on May 26, 2009. This revision was based
on the lessons learned from the pirate attacks on the MAERSK ALABAMA
and LIBERTY SUN and includes security requirements for U.S. flagged
vessel operating in high-threat areas, including the Horn of Africa The
Coast Guard will continue to monitor the issues related to piracy and
if needed, update the MARSEC Directive.
Question 6. There are a lot of overlapping interests and
responsibilities regarding the piracy issue, within the United States
and internationally. How are you working to provide the commercial
maritime industry with one single point of contact when an incident
takes place and who will that contact person be? Is the industry
receiving a consistent message on what they should be doing and who
they should be working with in a given circumstance? Please provide
examples.
Answer. The single point of contact for industry when an incident
occurs is through the Ship's Security Alert System (SSAS). When any
piracy incident occurs on a U.S. vessel worldwide, the Ship Security
Alert System (SSAS) should be activated by the ship's crew and the
regional liaison or anti-piracy organization for the region informed.
The alert from the SSAS is received by the Coast Guard Regional Command
Center in Alameda, CA, and authenticated with the Company Security
Officer.
U.S. vessels operating in the Horn of Africa (HOA) high risk
waters, owners and operators shall register with and provide movement
plans on the Maritime Security Center-Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) website.
Additionally, they shall establish contact by e-mail or phone with U.K.
Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) which maintains a 24/7 e-mail/phone
watch and coordinates assistance in the event of an incident. If they
are unable to contact UKMTO, the U.S. Maritime Liaison Officer (MARLO)
should be contacted.
For U.S. vessels operating in the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman,
and the Persian Gulf, the Maritime Liaison Office (MARLO) located in
Bahrain, facilitates the exchange of information between the United
States Navy, Combined Maritime Forces, and the commercial maritime
community in the Middle East. For vessels in Asia, the Regional
Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy against Ships in Asia
(ReCAAP) facilitates the exchange of information and is able to
facilitate appropriate responses to incidents. The Coast Guard is then
able to assist in the coordination of a response and provide inter-
agency notifications.
When U.S. vessels are operating in regions with no liaison,
operators are encouraged to contact the nearest coastal state as
advocated in the MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3, (Guidance to shipowners and ship
operators, shipmasters and crews for preventing and suppressing acts of
piracy and armed robbery against ships) or the National Geo-Spatial
Agency (NGA) Pub 117.
Industry is receiving a consistent message from the Coast Guard on
who or what entity they should contact when an incident occurs. The
procedures for notification of a piracy incident are provided in the
MARSEC Directive 104-06. (Rev 2).
Question 7. Considering the Coast Guard's current mission
requirements and current resources, what role do you see the Coast
Guard playing in future counter-piracy operations?
Answer. The threats piracy poses to the United States, our
international partners, and the industry and seafarers who make their
living on the last global commons are multi-faceted. The response to
these threats requires a broad array of legal authorities, operational
capabilities, skills and competencies, and the support and expertise of
numerous U.S. Government, international, and commercial entities. The
Coast Guard has a unique role to play, and remains committed to working
with our military, government, and industry partners to bring these
criminals to justice and forge long-term solutions for regional
maritime safety and security. Operating at all times as a military
service and maritime law enforcement agency, the Coast Guard has
authority to conduct counter-piracy operations against any vessel
engaged in piratical acts, including conducting boardings, searches,
seizures and arrests.
The Coast Guard uses its statutory authorities to address the
piracy threat. This involves a two pronged approach that relies on both
domestic and international law. Domestically, the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 provides the legal authority for
the Coast Guard to regulate safety and security of cargo, ships, and
most importantly seafarers. Under this authority, the Coast Guard
developed regulations that require U.S. ship owners and operators to
assess and plan for a wide range of security threats, including threats
of piracy. This plan, known as a Vessel Security Plan, is received and
approved by the Coast Guard. When additional security measures are
necessary to deal with a specific threat, it can issue a Maritime
Security, or MARSEC, Directive. MARSEC Directives can be global or
regional in scope. In April 2008, the Coast Guard issued MARSEC
Directive 104-6 Rev. 1. This Directive provides direction to Company
Security Officers of U.S. vessels that engage in international voyages
to, or through, areas at risk for terrorism, piracy and armed robbery
against ships.
The second structure through which the Coast Guard is involved off
Africa is through Coast Guard Activities Europe, a 26-person unit
located in Rotterdam, Netherlands. It is responsible for marine safety
and security functions in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Marine
Inspectors from this office conduct incident investigations and inspect
U.S. flagged merchant ships. Marine inspectors are critical in the
event a U.S. flagged and Coast Guard certificated vessel intends to
implement hardening techniques that improve the vessels ability to
mitigate pirate attacks. The Coast Guard must ensure the security
techniques do not impede safety of life at sea, interfere with the use
or deployment of safety equipment, or otherwise impose a detriment to
maritime safety. Additionally, Coast Guard Activities Europe provides
International Port Security Liaison Officers who work with the U.S.
Embassy, foreign government officials, and port representatives to
share information and enhance port security.
Operationally, counter-piracy operations are primarily a maritime
law enforcement activity for which the Coast Guard is trained and
equipped to support. We are the competent authority for the U.S.
Government on more than 30 bilateral agreements with foreign partners.
The Coast Guard understands the domestic and international legal
frameworks and the associated boarding and enforcement requirements
necessary to ensure the successful negotiation and implementation of
agreements to facilitate counter-piracy operations on the water and the
delivery of legal consequences to the pirates ashore. The Coast Guard's
international training teams and deployable law enforcement detachments
offer tailored maritime law enforcement training that can be easily
integrated in regional capacity building initiatives. Domestically the
Coast Guard works with and regulates the U.S. merchant fleet to reduce
its vulnerability to acts of piracy.
Coast Guard forces are operating in support of U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM). CENTCOM has operational control of these forces and has
directed they conduct operations with Combined Task Force 151 (CTF
151). Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETS) currently
operate in support of CTF 151. LEDETS augment Navy Visit Board Search
and Seizure (VBSS) teams near the Horn of Africa and provide training
in maritime laws, boarding policies and procedures, evidence collection
and preparation, and tactical procedures. Both the Coast Guard and Navy
have independent authority to conduct counter-piracy operations against
any vessel engaged in piratical acts, including conducting boardings,
searches, and seizures. The integration of Coast Guard boarding team
personnel with Navy VBSS teams takes advantage of the unique
competencies, capabilities, and authorities of our two services in a
manner that offers a comprehensive boarding capability that is ready to
address a broad spectrum of threats in the maritime domain. Coast
Guard/Navy cooperation in counter-piracy operations is an example of
how our two services are working together to ensure interoperability
and readiness to operate as an effective force to address the
international issue of piracy.
Question 8. What value has the Coast Guard contributed from the
LEDETs participation in the counter-piracy operations around the Horn
of Africa and the coast of Somalia?
Answer. Coast Guard LEDETS current serve as part of CTF 151, a
multinational task force that conducts counter-piracy operations in and
around the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. The
Task Force was established to create a lawful maritime order and
develop security in the maritime environment.
Coast Guard LEDET are currently deployed to CENTCOM and are
available, as directed, to support CTF 151 efforts to deter and
disrupt acts of piracy. LEDETS are viewed as the subject matter
experts in the conduct of boarding's by U.S. and coalition
partners.
CG LEDETs are currently embarked in U.S. combatants serving
within CTF 151. Their role is to augment U.S. Navy and
coalition VBSS teams, and provide training on:
Maritime Laws
Boarding policies and procedures
Evidence Collection and preparation
Tactical procedures
CTF 151 describes counter-piracy activities as law
enforcement related operations in which all forces will be
expected to collect evidence, provide witness statements, and
respect the rights of the apprehended as they are duly
processed for trial.
CG forces possess the requisite capabilities and skill sets
to support the Combatant Commander's efforts to combat piracy
in the region.
Recent Counter Piracy Events with Coast Guard LEDET Participation
February 2009--CG LEDET operating with USN VBSS teams from USS
Vella Gulf apprehend 16 suspected pirates.
The team conducted a boarding of a suspected pirate skiff
and found several weapons. The seven suspected pirates were
brought aboard Vella Gulf, where they were processed and then
transferred to a temporary holding facility on board the supply
ship USNS Lewis and Clark.
Nine additional suspected pirates were apprehended after
VBSS teams from Vella Gulf and Mahan boarded a vessel that
contained assorted weapons and one rocket propelled grenade
launcher. Those suspected pirates were also transferred to a
temporary holding facility on board Lewis and Clark.
In both events, the VBSS teams were comprised of Coast
Guardsmen and Sailors and marks the first time CTF 151 has
apprehended suspected pirates.
March 2009--CG LEDET operating with USN VBSS teams from USS
Gettysburg apprehend six suspected pirates.
At approximately 4:30 a.m., the Philippines-flagged Motor
Vessel Bison Express sent a distress call to all ships in the
area reporting they were being pursued by a small skiff
containing six heavily-armed suspected pirates.
The six suspected pirates were apprehended and transferred
onto the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer.
April 17, 2009--CG LEDET operating with USN VBSS team apprehend
eight suspected pirates.
Danish-flagged dry cargo carrier M/V PUMA sent a distress
call indicating an ongoing attack by a pirate speedboat while
transiting the Gulf of Aden.
PUMA's crew of three Danes and four Filipinos zigzagged the
vessel and used flares to avoid the speedboat carrying five
armed pirates. The speedboat returned to the Mother Ship.
A Maritime Patrol Aircraft located the Mother Ship and
speedboat, and directed a USN asset with embarked LEDET to
intercept. Upon boarding, the LEDET discovered 80 people: 8
Somali Pirates and 72 people being smuggled into Yemen.
The LEDET detained the Pirates, and confiscated automatic
weapons, Rocket Propelled Grenades, and ammunition.
Disposition for detained people, evidence, and pirate
vessels are pending at this time. PUMA's crew was uninjured.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno
Question. Our witnesses have focused this Committee's attention on
the threat to merchant vessels from Somali pirates. I am concerned,
however, about the vulnerability of cruise ships to pirate attacks, and
not necessarily in the Horn of Africa region. What Federal and private
sector efforts are being taken to ensure the safety of cruise ships and
their passengers from pirate attacks?
Answer. The U.S. Coast Guard examines security measures for cruise
ships that visit U.S. ports to verify that security plan implementation
on these vessels meet the requirements of 33 CFR Subchapter H (Maritime
Security) and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS)
Code. Very few of these vessels operate in areas subject to pirate
attack. Typically, these vessels visit Caribbean ports, Pacific ports
in Mexico, and ports in Canada and Alaska and never visit high risk
areas.
The Coast Guard works closely with the Cruise Line International
Association (CLIA) on maritime security matters and meets regularly (at
least once every 2 months) to discuss piracy, intelligence, and best
practices. CLIA represents 24 major cruise lines which own or operate
97 percent of the cruise capacity in North America. CLIA recommended
its members reduce ship exposure to high risk areas. CLIA reports that
the few member vessels that transit high risk areas will soon cease
transits of the Gulf of Aden and the waters off the Horn of Africa. The
Coast Guard also provides updated threat information cleared for
industry use to CLIA so they may inform their members of piracy threats
worldwide.
Cruise ships possess a number of built-in features that deter
piracy. These ships have very high freeboards, which create an obstacle
for illegal boarding at sea by pirates. Additionally, cruise ships have
top speeds in excess of 20 knots, and maneuvers at such speeds create
an additional obstacle for pirates to overcome. Cruise ships have large
crews that include dedicated full-time security personnel. Cruise ship
security programs exceed the minimum requirements of the ISPS Code.\1\
In addition, cruise ship companies have put in place additional and
closely-guarded security provisions that are considered proprietary
information. These security provisions may include armed security
personnel having strong military and anti-terrorist training, and new
technologies such as the Long Range Acoustical Device that was used by
the SEABOURN SPIRIT to ward off pirates on November 5, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Following the ACHILLE LAURO incident in 1985, the cruise
industry took pro-active steps to deter terrorism. In 1986, IMO, with
cruise line cooperation, created the first security plan requirement
for cruise ships. When the ISPS Code created enhanced security plan
requirements for all ships, the cruise industry had well-established
security programs and was poised to comply with the new standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Olympia J. Snowe to
Rear Admiral Brian M. Salerno
Question 1. Some have suggested that arming crews or placing
military personnel or armed security teams on board would help protect
our sailors, vessels, and cargo. Others have said that insurance costs
would be prohibitive.
Please specify the benefits, drawbacks, and any other complications
affiliated with the following three options:
Arming the crew;
Shipping companies providing armed security personnel; and
Posting U.S. military personnel on board U.S. flagged vessels
transiting dangerous waters?
How would the Coast Guard deal with the complications of regulating
the safety of life at sea complications affiliated with carrying
additional personnel on board merchant vessels, for portions of a
voyage?
Answer. The issues associated with embarking armed security
personnel or arming vessel crews on board U.S. flagged vessels
transiting high risk waters are addressed at length in the Coast
Guard's Port Security Advisory (4-09) and Maritime Security Directive
104-6. Copies of these documents are available upon request, but in
precis they maintain the U.S. position that vessel security is first
and foremost the responsibility of vessel owners and operators. The
largest challenge to such actions is actually two-fold: reluctance on
the part of owners and operators to arm their crews, and difficulties
with individual sovereign State laws respective of weapons.
In certain instances, e.g., when shipping U.S. Government cargo,
U.S. military personnel are already embarked on U.S.-flagged vessels in
certain high risk waters, or vessel crews are trained and armed, under
a claim of sovereign immunity.
U.S. Coast Guard Certificates of Inspection (COIs) for U.S. Flagged
Vessels allow persons to be carried ``in addition to the crew.'' As
long as these limits are not exceeded, additional security personnel
will be adequately covered by the International Convention of Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS) required lifesaving equipment. If additional
personnel are needed beyond these established limits, the ``persons in
addition to the crew'' limit would need to be revisited, and possible
additional equipment provided to be in compliance with SOLAS equipment
requirements.
Question 2. It is frequently reported that one of the clear root
causes of the piracy epidemic in the Gulf of Aden and off Somalia's
Indian Ocean coast is the inherent instability of the Somali
government. What steps, if any, has the Coast Guard taken to assist the
Somali government in the training and development of a Somali coast
guard that could help combat piracy and carry out all safety and
security missions as well? Is the Coast Guard considering any
additional activities in this regard?
Answer. The Coast Guard has not received a request from the
Department of State or the Department of Defense to support this
mission; therefore no assistance has been provided. Additionally, the
Coast Guard can not unilaterally conduct operations in AFRICOM's area
of responsibility (AOR) or in the country of Somalia without the
permission of the President of the United States Representative. Since
Somalia does not have a President of the U.S. Representative, AFRICOM
is the cognizant authority to determine and request appropriate U.S.
Forces.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Theresa Whelan
Question 1. Recently, General Petraeus, Commander U.S. Central
Command, testified that the shipping industry should consider hiring
armed guards to increase the security of U.S. vessels operating off
Somalia. What is the Department of Defense (DOD) position on the use of
military forces versus armed private guards as a preferred security
mechanism?
Answer. In general, DOD does not support providing military forces
as embarked security teams (ESTs) aboard commercial vessels. This
course of action is tantamount to providing a service to the commercial
shipping industry at no cost to the companies. The practical effect is
that the U.S. taxpayer provides point security service to a private,
for-profit entity, free of charge. Moreover, the logistics of
transporting military members to a commercial vessel, transiting them
through the high-risk area, and then transporting them back to the
point of embarkation for the next vessel would both remove assets from
service performing other critical missions and be highly inefficient.
Question 2. Why is the DOD reluctant to supplement the crew of
U.S.-flag vessels operating in High Risk Areas off the Horn of Africa
when there is a similar and existing mechanism for DOD vessels under
Military Sealift Command or DOD charter?
Answer. Provision of point security for Military Sealift Command
(MSC) or DOD-chartered vessels is qualitatively different than
providing security for purely commercial enterprises. DOD provides
military embarked security teams (ESTs) for MSC USNS government-owned
ships and U.S. flag vessels chartered by MSC during certain transits.
These ships are operated by the United States and used on exclusive
government noncommercial service. We do so as a force protection
measure, but it obviously also protects against piracy.
We have examined the issue concerning whether to provide ESTs for
other U.S. commercial vessels. After the MAERSK ALABAMA incident, U.S.
Naval Forces Central Command developed a risk matrix to evaluate ships
at risk and what actions might be appropriate regarding such ships.
The conclusions reached were that DOD will not provide ESTs for
other U.S. commercial vessels for several reasons. First, defense of
the U.S. shipping industry is a shared responsibility. Industry has the
ability to hire security teams; that is, the services are not uniquely
military in nature and the threat that pirates create is one that
private security forces can counter effectively. Second, the
requirement to provide teams is better allocated to industry, as
industry dictates which vessels enter the high-risk region (high/fast,
which do not require security, or low/slow, which do require security),
what cargo they carry, what destinations they sail to, what routes they
take, etc. Industry controls the most important variables that make a
vessel at risk. Third, our analysis indicates that DOD costs would be
high, particularly in view of the staging and repositioning costs
involved with the personnel and weapons.
Question 3. The DOD is using embarked security teams of up to 12
people to protect against pirate attacks on MSC chartered vessels,
which sail through the Horn of Africa region. Please explain what
specific training these forces receive to operate in the marine
environment; what rules of engagement they operate under; and what
their chain of command is while assigned to the ship.
Answer. DOD uses embarked security teams (EST) in dangerous waters,
including the Horn of Africa region, to protect against pirate attacks
on Military Sealift Command (MSC) chartered vessels. The following
outlines specific training these ESTs receive to operate in the marine
environment; the rules of engagement they operate under; and their
chain of command while assigned to the MSC ship.
1. EST Training:
All personnel assigned to ESTs complete expeditionary combat
skills training. This prepares them for all facets of security
operations ranging from extensive weapons training including
small arms to crew-served weapons, convoy operations, and
combat medical training. They also receive training on
employment of warning shots and rules of engagement (ROE).
Training includes both live fire ranges and the use of
simulators.
EST personnel conduct 2 weeks of intense weapons training.
Other training involves mobile and fixed defensive
operations, visit-board-search and-seizure, and maritime
interception operations exploitation teams.
2. Rules of Engagement: ESTs operate according to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff standing ROE:
ESTs have the right and obligation to act in self-defense in
response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.
A hostile act is an attack or other use of force against the
United States, U.S. forces or other designated persons or
property.
Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force
against the United States, U.S. forces or other designated
persons or property.
3. EST Chain of Command while embarked on the ship:
Ultimate responsibility for safety and security of the ship,
his or her crew, and the cargo rests with the ship's master.
The ship's master plays a key role in determining what
actions are necessary and appropriate for physical security of
his or her ship, but the EST mission commander has overall
responsibility for the EST and its security mission. All
actions are coordinated between the tactical supervisor and the
master. However, pre-planned responses can be executed
automatically in accordance with established ROE.
Weapons release authorization resides within the military
chain of command of the EST. If the master disagrees with the
military response, he or she would need to address it through
the EST mission commander's military chain of command.
Question 4. The MSC owned vessels are sending specific members of
their crews to the Naval Expeditionary Command for training in anti-
piracy measures and small arms handling. What specific training is
given; who is certifying it; and how are the members of the crew
selected to participate?
Answer. Military Sealift Command (MSC) is not sending crew members
to the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) for training. The MSC
has two small arms schools along with instructors in other locations,
where the crewmembers are trained to Navy standards. Some of the unions
have also set up small arms training to Navy standards. Each year they
are required to train on the Navy small arms course. They also are
required to do simulator training and to receive a quarterly use-of-
force brief. The instructors certify the crew members' training. The
company operating the vessel selects the crew members to receive the
training.
Question 5. I understand from the Maritime Administration that
there are only 15 U.S.-flag vessels in regular service and an
additional five to eight tramp vessels servicing this region at any
given time, for an estimated total of 200 to 225 transits per year. If
the DOD were to supplement the crew with military forces, what would be
the recommended number of service members per team, per vessel; how
many teams would be required to fulfill this mission annually under the
projected total transits listed above; and what would the estimated
cost to the military be, to provide such teams to prevent piratical
attacks on U.S.-flag vessels?
Answer. We note that the Maritime Administration (MARAD) has
provided us with different information on the number of transits (over
350 transits by over 70 vessels). We have also seen at least nine U.S.
vessels transiting the area at any one time, but we are always working
to refine our numbers.
Moreover, as stated in response to an earlier question, DOD does
not provide embarked security teams (ESTs) for non-U.S. Government
contracted, U.S. commercial vessels for several reasons. First, defense
of the U.S. shipping industry is a shared responsibility. Industry has
the ability to hire security teams, especially since the services
required are not uniquely military in nature and the threat that
pirates create is one that private security forces can counter
effectively. Second, industry is better poised to undertake the
requirement to provide teams since they dictate what vessels enter the
high risk region (high/fast, which don't need security, or low/slow,
which do need security), what cargo they carry, what destinations they
sail to, what routes they take, etc. Industry controls the most
important variables that make a ship an at-risk vessel. Third, our
analysis indicates that DOD costs for providing such security teams
would be high, particularly because of the staging and repositioning
costs involved with the personnel and weapons. This analysis indicates
that a single team costs approximately $1.7M per year and that with a
two-to-one dwell, three teams are required to cover a 365 day
commitment for a total of $5.1M per team year--and this provides
coverage for only one vessel. As we are still working to refine the
number of vessels transiting through the region, it is difficult to
determine the total cost for this mission.
In creating the ESTs for force protection, the manning was
established at 12 per team to ensure proper 24-hour coverage in all
expected threat conditions. At this point, there would be no change to
this for anti-piracy operations because as stated above, we are still
working to refine the numbers.
Question 6. What was the total cost to the military in the rescue
operation of Captain Phillips of the M/V ALABAMA? What was the total
cost to the military in the response to the M/V LIBERTY SUN? How were
these costs determined and what is the breakdown by expense?
Answer. The combined incremental cost for the Navy's response to
the M/V ALABAMA and M/V LIBERTY SUN piracy incidents is $3.114 million.
The majority of the costs are attributable to the M/V ALABAMA. The M/V
LIBERTY SUN situation was resolved before naval forces reached the
vessel. The $3.114 million is composed of the below expenses.
Incremental fuel costs: $1.191 million
Flying hours: $1.6 million
SCAN EAGLE units: $0.3 million
Linguists support, communications, and temporary duty: $0.006
million
Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchanges System
support (CENTRIXS) to allow vital communication between
coalition partners to coordinate and deconflict operations:
$0.017 million
These costs were derived from actual expenses incurred during the
M/V ALABAMA and M/V LIBERTY SUN operational events. These costs do not
include personnel salaries, benefits, etc., that would have been
incurred in the ordinary course of operations.
Question 7. Since its inception, the U.S. Navy has impressively met
its responsibility to protect and defend the right of the United States
and our allies to move freely on the oceans. What is the DOD doing to
maintain the free flow of commerce around the Horn of Africa and ensure
U.S. mariners and maritime interests are protected?
Answer. In August 2008, when we saw an upsurge in piracy attacks,
the Combined Maritime Forces initiated a maritime security patrol area
and assigned warships to try to deter and prevent piracy incidents. In
October 2008, U.S. Central Command emphasized the need to monitor U.S.
vessels through the Gulf of Aden in an order to its naval forces. In
addition, in January 2009 NAVCENT established a new Combined Task
Force, designated CTF-151, with the exclusive mission of conducting
counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden region.
The task force continues to disrupt pirate attacks, capture suspected
pirates, and turn them over for prosecution. In addition, Combined
Maritime Forces co-hosted a meeting in Bahrain with all the other
navies operating off the coast of Somalia in order to de-conflict and
coordinate operations. All of these initiatives are in support of
protection of U.S. shipping and freedom of navigation off the coast of
Somalia.
Question 8. Even after the MAERSK ALABAMA attack generated
worldwide attention on the threat of piracy, several pirates involved
in subsequent attacks were released after being apprehended because of
legal uncertainties surrounding potential prosecution. In addition to
the recent agreements with Kenya that provide for some prosecutions in
that country, how are the United States and other countries working to
ensure that suspected pirates will not be released in the future?
Answer. The challenges surrounding prosecution include transferring
suspected pirates for prosecution where there are agreements with other
nations to accept them for prosecution, the willingness of these states
to accept them, and being able to provide evidence, i.e., catching them
in the act or having witnesses to testify. Our primary effort in this
matter is through the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia,
which includes 28 countries and six international organizations. The
Contact Group's Working Group 2--chaired by Denmark--makes efforts to
identify practical and legally sound solutions to ensure prosecution of
persons suspected of piracy. DOD sends a legal representative to the
group (the other members of the U.S. delegation are from State,
Justice, and Homeland Security).
The United States continues efforts to establish prosecution
agreements with other relevant States, similar to the one we now have
with Kenya. We also recognize, however, that in many cases, substantial
legal and judicial capacity building is needed among states in the Horn
of Africa region, and we are working with our international partners,
in particular in the context of the Contact Group for Counter Piracy
off the Horn of Africa, to build such capacities. This is a medium-to-
long term effort, however. We anticipate that in the interim,
effectively prosecuting a high volume of suspected pirates will
continue to be challenging. Therefore we also continue to press victim
states (states whose vessels or citizens have been involved in a piracy
incident) to accept responsibility for trying the perpetrators of the
piracy in their own countries. A certain number of suspected pirates
will continue to be released, even when suitable prosecution venues
have been established, when evidence is lacking or due to an otherwise
weak case for prosecution.
At its next session, the Contact Group's Working Group 2 will: (1)
draw up detailed terms of reference for an international trust fund to
help defray the expenses associated with prosecution of suspected
pirates; (2) develop a generic template for use by interdicting states
in collecting evidence in a piracy incident (in order to assist states
in fulfilling the relevant evidentiary standards); (3) share
information about relevant bilateral arrangements and agreements
between states with a view to assessing their functioning at a relevant
point in time; (4) continue consideration of possible international or
regional mechanisms for the prosecution of suspected pirates as an
addition to options for national prosecution; and (5) continue
gathering information on relevant national legal systems, including in
coastal states, to ensure that nations have the ability to prosecute
pirates.
Question 9. The Navy's response to the MAERSK ALABAMA pirate attack
and kidnapping was situationally appropriate and successful, but was
reactive in nature. How can the Navy effectively provide preventative
protection of U.S.-flag vessels and mariners, while keeping the sea
lanes open?
Answer. Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (NAVCENT)
established the maritime security patrol area in the Gulf of Aden in
August 2008, marking the beginning of a major, enduring commitment by
Department of Defense to provide for the safe passage of both U.S.-
flagged and other vessels passing through this region. In addition, in
January 2009 NAVCENT established a new combined task force, designated
CTF-151, with the exclusive mission of conducting counter-piracy
operations in the Horn of Africa/Gulf of Aden region. NAVCENT has also
established a shared awareness and deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism in
order to coordinate and share information more effectively among the
numerous entities (other States and international organizations)
conducting counter-piracy operations in the same maritime region.
We have made efforts to disrupt pirate attacks, capture suspected
pirates, and turn them over for prosecution. However, the best
preventive efforts can be done by industry--not military forces. For
example, from February 25 to April 20, 2009, 78 percent of the
unsuccessful piracy attempts were the result of merchant vessel self-
protection--only 22 percent were due to direct naval presence and/or
intervention. While naval presence can be helpful, given the large
ocean area in which the pirates operate, the Navy has and will continue
to advocate that U.S. flag vessels and mariners follow best practices.
The data on piracy incidents has made it clear that the most effective
means of avoiding capture by pirates off Somalia is a robust program of
self-protection by individual vessels.
Question 10. If the merchant ships begin embarking contracted armed
security forces, what concerns or reservations will the DOD have when
considering whether or not to assist a U.S.-flag vessel being attacked
by pirates?
Answer. The presence or absence of embarked armed security forces
aboard merchant vessels will have no bearing on DOD forces' decisions
to assist U.S.-flagged vessels under attack. DOD does not view self-
protection measures taken by commercial shippers to be a substitute for
a robust response by our naval forces to an ongoing act of piracy
against a U.S. vessel. Rather, DOD views self-protection measures by
shippers and an enduring, interdiction-capable naval force as
complementary, mutually supporting measures that, together, can
significantly diminish the threat of pirates successfully taking U.S.
vessels.
Question 11. Does the DOD classification of pirates as criminals
affect how DOD responds to the actions of pirates?
Answer. It is international and U.S. law, not DOD, that has
classified acts of piracy as criminal acts. As a result, our response
must comply with a law enforcement paradigm authorizing actions against
those engaged in piracy while at sea. Nonetheless, there are sufficient
authorities enabling DOD to use force against suspected pirates,
including in self-defense, and this paradigm has not negatively
affected our operations.
Question 12. Does the DOD consider U.S.-flag vessels to be
sovereign U.S. territory? Why or why not? When the cargo is government
impelled or specifically military cargo does that make a difference?
Answer. A flag state exercises jurisdiction and control over ships
flying its flag as reflected in article 94 of the Law of the Sea
Convention. Although this is not equivalent to considering U.S.-flag
vessels as sovereign U.S. territory, there are immunities for U.S.
Government vessels.
DOD and the Department of State have taken the position, at least
since 1985, that U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command (MSC) U.S.-flag
chartered vessels are entitled to sovereign immunity. In practice
(because of the administrative burden and advance notice required when
filing diplomatic clearance requests), except in unusual circumstances
the United States asserts full privileges of sovereign immunity only
for MSC U.S.-flag time charters (this includes immunity from boarding
and search of the vessel, jurisdictional control over persons on board,
not flying the port state flag, and freedom from arrest and taxation),
and only limited privileges of immunity for MSC U.S.-flag voyage
charters (freedom from arrest and taxation). Though privately owned,
MSC U.S.-flag chartered vessels are (1) operated by the Department of
Defense (MSC), and (2) used for the time being exclusively for
government noncommercial service.
Depending on the terms of the charter party (the contract), and the
degree of operational control granted to the government thereby, it may
be reasonable to assert that U.S.-flag chartered vessels (under charter
by U.S. Government Departments other than DOD) and carrying only
government cargo for government noncommercial purposes are also
entitled to sovereign immunity.
U.S.-flag vessels that are chartered by private entities are NOT
entitled to sovereign immunity as they are NOT operated by the U.S.
Government and are being used in commercial service.
U.S.-flag liner service vessels are not entitled to sovereign
immunity because they are not, even for the time being, used
exclusively for government noncommercial service. They generally
solicit and carry commercial as well as government cargo and thus
remain in commercial service. Further, even if they are carrying only
government cargo at a particular time, it is more difficult to argue
that they are operated by the U.S. Government as there is very little
operational control by the U.S. Government over the vessel. As a
result, ownership of the cargo is only one necessary factor--the other
factor is government control of the vessel. Without both factors, we
cannot exert sovereign immunity over the vessel or voyage.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Tom Udall to
Theresa Whelan
Question 1. Given that merchant vessels carry supplies for our
overseas military operations, how significant is the impact of piracy
in the Horn of Africa region on U.S. military operations in the Middle
East and South Asia?
Answer. Some assets are needed to combat piracy in the Horn of
Africa region, but the impact on U.S. military operations in the Middle
East and South Asia is not significant at this time. The additional
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance that might be needed to
more effectively hunt pirates, as well as the additional Special Forces
that might be required to conduct other piracy-related missions in the
AOR, could potentially impact the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.
U.S.-flag vessels transiting the region carry Department of Defense
cargo bound for operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom and U.S.-flag
vessels transiting the region carrying humanitarian cargoes destined
for Somalia are also at risk.. This is a particular issue because the
food aid cargoes themselves are in the low and slow variety in most
instances so they're very vulnerable.
Ultimately, there needs to be a balance of resources.
Question 2. Are pirate operations in the Indian Ocean and Middle
Eastern waters supported by terrorist groups?
Answer. Even before the most recent spike in piracy off the Horn of
Africa, relevant intelligence agencies were closely and persistently
monitoring the piracy situation in Somalia to determine whether there
is a link between piracy and terrorist organizations inside Somalia or
elsewhere. The result of this ongoing analysis makes it clear that no
such nexus exists. DOD recognizes the potential for the development for
such links and will ensure that the intelligence community continues to
closely monitor for their development. Similarly, we have no
indications of the involvement of Somali warlords in the piracy
equation.
Although Somali piracy currently appears to be motivated solely by
money, not ideology and we see no meaningful links between Somali
pirates and violent extremists, we must ensure that piracy does not
evolve into a future funding source for terrorism. To this end, we will
continue to work with the international Contact Group on Piracy Off the
Coast of Somalia to determine ways to deter piracy of the coast of
Somalia.
Question 3. Only a handful of those captured by Somali pirates have
returned home safely. Captain Phillips was rescued by brave Navy Seals
and sailors from the USS Bainbridge. Yet others were freed following
ransom payments. Has the payment of ransoms for hostages and ships
actually increased the risk of pirate attacks?
Answer. It remains true that commercial shipping companies and
their insurers continue to pay ransoms to have their vessels released,
thus providing a powerful incentive and the financial wherewithal to
perpetuate the pirates' activities. The United States has actively
pressured flag and victim States to take action to prevent the payment
of ransom, but it remains a critical and largely unresolved enabling
mechanism. U.S. policy is not to pay ransom under any circumstances.
We will coordinate with all stakeholders to deprive pirates and
those supporting the pirates of any illicit revenue and the fruits of
their crime, advocating the development of national capabilities to
gather, assess, and share financial intelligence on pirate financial
operations, with the goal of tracing payments to and apprehending the
leaders of pirate organizations and their enablers. To this end, we
will collaborate with governments and the shipping industry to develop
a consistent response to the payment of ransom demands. There are
substantial long term risks in surrendering to the ransom demands of
pirates. Paying ransoms put other seafarers at increased risk, enable
to pirates to apply the financial leverage to increasing capability and
capacity, incentivizing piracy, and ultimately provides support to
criminal organizations. Any strategic communications strategy must
convey these concerns. We will improve our ability to collect and share
intelligence on pirate financial operations, coordinating with other
stakeholders to trace pirate revenue. We will consider taking action to
apprehend, prosecute, and punish persons or entities that aid or abet
or conspire with pirates in violation of national law.
We will also press our partners in the international Contact Group
on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia to play a more aggressive role in
stopping the payment of ransoms and otherwise facilitating the flow of
money to pirates, because that, in fact, is what is enabling the
pirates to get more arms and undertake even greater levels of attack.