    [Senate Hearing 111-678]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 111-678

                        VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM--2009

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                   HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                                     of the

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 11, 2009
         VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM: AL-SHABAAB RECRUITMENT IN AMERICA

                               SEPTEMBER 30, 2009
        EIGHT YEARS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE
                                    HOMELAND

                                   __________

           Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

                           Printed for the use of the
            Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

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    49-640 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2010
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    20402-0001

    COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS AS OF MARCH 11,
                                      2009

                   JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
    CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    MARK l. PRYOR, Arkansas              GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
    MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    JON TESTER, Montana
    ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
    MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado

    COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS AS OF SEPTEMBER
                                    30, 2009

                   JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
    CARL LEVIN, Michigan                 SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
    DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii              TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
    THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
    MARK l. PRYOR, Arkansas              GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
    MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana          JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri           LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
    JON TESTER, Montana                  ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
    ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
    PAUL G. KIRK JR., Massachusetts

                      Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
        Todd M. Stein, Legislative Director, Office of Senator Lieberman
                          Gordon N. Lederman, Counsel
                Christian J. Beckner, Professional Staff Member
                   Seamus A. Hughes Professional Staff Member
         Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
                    Ivy A. Johnson, Minority Senior Counsel
                        John K. Grant, Minority Counsel
                      Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
             Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
                        Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statements:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Lieberman............................................ 1, 51
        Senator Collins.............................................. 3, 54
        Senator Bennet...............................................    15
        Senator Voinovich............................................    15
        Senator Burris.............................................. 17, 68
        Senator Kirk.................................................    51
        Senator Tester...............................................    71
        Senator Levin................................................    75
    Prepared statements:
        Senator Burris...............................................    68
        Senator Lieberman.......................................... 89, 138
        Senator Collins............................................ 92, 140
        Senator Bennet...............................................   143

                                   WITNESSES
                           Wednesday, March 11, 2009

    Andrew M. Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence, National
      Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National
      Intelligence...................................................     5
    J. Philip Mudd, Associate Executive Assistant Director, National
      Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S.
      Department of Justice..........................................     8
    Ken Menkhaus, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, Davidson
      College........................................................    25
    Osman Ahmed, President, Riverside Plaza Tenants Association,
      Minneapolis, Minnesota.........................................    31
    Abdirahman Mukhtar, Youth Program Manager, Brian Coyle Center,
      Pillsbury United Communities, Minneapolis, Minnesota...........    35

                         Wednesday, September 30, 2009

    Hon. Janet A. Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
      Security.......................................................    56
    Hon. Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of
      Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice......................    58
    Hon. Michael E. Leiter, Director, National Counterterrorism
      Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence........    60

                         Alphabetical List of Witnesses

    Ahmed, Osman:
        Testimony....................................................    31
        Prepared statement...........................................   119
    Leiter, Hon. Michael E.:
        Testimony....................................................    60
        Prepared statement...........................................   165
    Liepman, Andrew M.:
        Testimony....................................................     5
        Prepared statement...........................................    93
    Menkhaus, Ken, Ph.D.:
        Testimony....................................................    25
        Prepared statement...........................................   105
    Mudd, J. Philip:
        Testimony....................................................     8
        Prepared statement...........................................   100
    Mueller, Hon. Robert S. III:
        Testimony....................................................    58
        Prepared statement...........................................   158
    Mukhtar, Abdirahman:
        Testimony....................................................    35
        Prepared statement...........................................   125
    Napolitano, Hon. Janet A.:
        Testimony....................................................    56
        Prepared statement...........................................   144

                                    APPENDIX

    Hon. Keith Ellison, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Minnesota, prepared statement...............................   133
    Omar Hurre, Executive Director, Abubakar As-Sadique Islamic
      Center, letter dated March 12, 2009............................   135
    Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
        Mr. Liepman..................................................   171
        Mr. Mudd.....................................................   172
        Mr. Menkhaus.................................................   178
        Secretary Napolitano.........................................   179
        Mr. Mueller..................................................   193
        Mr. Leiter...................................................   198

         VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM: AL-SHABAAB RECRUITMENT IN AMERICA

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 11, 2009

                                         U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Homeland Security
                                      and Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in
    room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
    Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Lieberman, Burris, Bennet, Collins, and
    Voinovich.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN

        Chairman Lieberman. Good morning, and welcome to this
    morning's hearing, which we have called ``Violent Islamist
    Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America.''
        This hearing falls, coincidentally, on an important date.
    This is the fifth anniversary of the Madrid, Spain, train
    bombings that killed 191 people and wounded another 1,800. The
    Madrid train bombings were a turning point in Islamist
    terrorism, turning from a centrally controlled movement to one
    that had also begun to act through autonomous cells, in some
    cases with direct links to al-Qaeda or other international
    terrorist groups, but in some others cases with no or very
    slight contact. This expanded the reach of violent Islamist
    ideology and made terrorism that much harder to detect and
    prevent.
        We have, for instance, seen the al-Qaeda franchise itself
    around the world, in the now effectively defeated al-Qaeda in
    Iraq--although there is some lingering elements still in a few
    of the cities--in al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb operating in
    North Africa, and in al-Shabaab fighting and training
    terrorists in Somalia, which is in part the subject of the
    hearing today. But the turn toward more diffuse international
    terrorism is the reason why the radicalization and recruitment
    of individuals in the United States by Islamist terrorist
    organizations has been a major focus of this Homeland Security
    Committee's work over the past 2\1/2\ years.
        The Committee has held seven hearings to date, the most
    recent only last July that focused on Islamist ideology as the
    essential ingredient to Islamist terrorism. Last May, the
    Committee released a report titled ``Violent Islamist
    Extremism: The Internet and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat''
    that described the influence of online content produced by al-
    Qaeda, al-Shabaab, and other Islamist terrorist groups on
    individuals like those who have now gone missing from the
    Somali-American community in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
        Today, we are going to focus on what appears to be the most
    significant case of homegrown American terrorism recruiting
    based on violent Islamist ideology. The facts, as we know them,
    tell us that over the last 2 years, individuals from the
    Somali-American community in the United States, including
    American citizens, have left for Somalia to support and in some
    cases fight on behalf of al-Shabaab, which, incidentally, was
    designated as a foreign terrorist organization by our
    government in February 2008.
        There are ideological, tactical, financial, and also
    personnel links between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab was
    credited with sheltering some of those responsible for the
    embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Just last month, al-
    Qaeda released a video titled ``From Kabul to Mogadishu'' in
    which al-Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, praises
    al-Shabaab and calls on Muslims throughout the world to join
    their fight in Somalia.
        Al-Shabaab, meanwhile, continues to release recruiting
    videos targeting Westerners, and those videos are surely being
    watched by some potential followers here in the United States.
        In the most graphic and deadly example of a direct
    connection between the Somali-American community and
    international terrorism, Shirwa Ahmed, a naturalized U.S.
    citizen living in the Minneapolis area, returned to Somalia
    within the last 2 years and killed himself and many others in a
    suicide bombing last October. According to Federal Bureau of
    Investigation (FBI) Director Robert Mueller, Shirwa Ahmed, who
    was radicalized in Minnesota, is probably the first U.S.
    citizen to carry out a terrorist suicide bombing.
        One of the witnesses on our second panel, Abdi Mukhtar, who
    is the youth program manager at the Brian Coyle Center in
    Minneapolis, which is a gathering place for young Somalis, was
    friends and attended Roosevelt High School in Minneapolis with
    Shirwa Ahmed. In his testimony, which I find very compelling
    and important, Abdi Mukhtar will explain how he and Shirwa
    Ahmed had similar internal identity conflicts about being
    Somali and American, but in the end resolved those conflicts in
    very different ways. Abdi Mukhtar chose America, and Shirwa
    Ahmed chose Islamist terrorism.
        This morning, we want to understand why, to the best of our
    ability, each made this choice and what we together can do to
    make sure that others, including succeeding generations of
    Somali-Americans and, more generally, Muslim-Americans make the
    right choice.
        I do want to say here that there is no evidence of
    radicalization of the Somali-American community generally. In
    fact, in my own vision of this, the Somali-American community
    are victims of a small group of extremists who are essentially
    terrorizing their own community, who are recruiting and
    radicalizing young people within that community. And, of
    course, our hope here this morning is to figure out how we can
    work together with the Somali-American community, with the
    Muslim-American community, and with law enforcement, as
    represented on our first panel, to protect young Somali-
    Americans and perhaps other Muslim-Americans--though we have
    noted in our earlier hearings that the Muslim-American
    community, because it is more integrated seems to have been
    much less vulnerable than Muslim communities in Europe to
    recruitment and radicalization. Nonetheless, the hearing today
    and other evidence that this Committee has compiled shows that
    the problem, though it may be less severe here in America, is
    here. And that I think is what is jarring about the story that
    we are going to hear described today.
        There obviously are people here in the United States
    recruiting young Somali-Americans to go over to Somalia to be
    trained to fight and, of course, as we will hear from our
    witnesses and this Committee will ask, perhaps--worrisome
    particularly to us--being trained to return to the United
    States to carry out terrorist attacks here.
        The primary questions for this hearing, as I see them, are:
    Who influenced these young men, apparently at least 20 of them,
    maybe more, to return to Somalia and join al-Shabaab? Who
    financed their trips? What, if any, role did local mosque
    leadership play in recruiting the young men to join al-Shabaab?
    What role did the Internet play, both in the form of online
    content and e-mail communications from those who have already
    returned to Somalia, in recruiting and radicalizing the young
    men? What influence does Islamist ideology in Minneapolis play
    in creating a fertile ground for al-Shabaab recruiters? Will
    those who have disappeared use their American passports to
    return and then plan and execute terrorist attacks here in our
    homeland? And why does al-Shabaab want American and other
    recruits from the West, when there are presumably plenty of
    young men willing to fight in Somalia?
        Those are important questions. They go directly to the
    mandate that this Committee has had to protect the homeland
    security of the American people. I thank all the witnesses who
    have come before us, particularly those who have come from the
    Somali-American community in Minneapolis. It takes some courage
    to do so. I think it is both love of their own ethnic community
    and dedication to America that brings them here, and for all of
    that, we are grateful and look forward to hearing them.
        Senator Collins.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS

        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The most effective border security system cannot protect
    our Nation from ``homegrown terrorists,'' individuals already
    living in our country who become radicalized and committed to a
    violent ideology. Three years ago, as the Chairman has
    mentioned, this Committee launched an investigation into
    homegrown terrorism and the process by which individuals within
    our country could become radicalized and commit terrorist
    attacks.
        Our investigation has examined radicalization among prison
    populations, the efforts by Federal, State, and local law
    enforcement to counter the homegrown threat, as well as the
    role of the Internet in the radicalization process. This past
    October, however, the threat of homegrown terrorism took
    another disturbing turn when a young man from Minnesota carried
    out a suicide bombing in Somalia. As the Chairman has noted,
    FBI Director Mueller believes that this suicide bombing marked
    the first time that a U.S. citizen had carried out a terrorist
    suicide bombing. Although the bombing took place in Somalia,
    Director Mueller stated that it appears that the individual had
    been radicalized in his hometown of Minneapolis. Even more
    disturbing, this young man apparently was not the only American
    citizen to have traveled to Somalia to join the terrorist group
    known as al-Shabaab.
        The danger brought to light by these revelations is clear.
    Radicalized individuals, trained in terrorist tactics and in
    possession of American passports, can clearly pose a threat to
    the security of our country.
        Our discussion today is not just a consideration of the
    counterterrorism tactics and intelligence gathering needed to
    counter this growing threat, but also should serve to remind us
    that there is a personal side to this story. These young men
    left behind families who care deeply for them and who want to
    see them come home unharmed. They left behind a community which
    lived, worked, and worshipped with them and which now in some
    ways lives under a cloud of suspicion, worrying that perhaps
    tomorrow their own children might not come home.
        Two of our witnesses have traveled from Minneapolis to talk
    about this side of the story with us today. Like so many Somali
    immigrants, these are patriotic American citizens who have
    bravely come forward to tell their story and to help us find
    the answers to the questions that trouble all of us, the
    questions that the Chairman has so eloquently outlined. Let me
    add a few more questions.
        We need to better understand what drew these young men to
    adopt a violent extremist ideology with such fervor that they
    traveled thousands of miles to join a terrorist group. As the
    Chairman indicated, I am particularly interested in the
    question of why terrorist groups thousands of miles from our
    shores would recruit Americans when there are plenty of willing
    recruits in their own country.
        Is there an individual or a network operating within the
    United States facilitating recruitment or providing financial
    support for al-Shabaab?
        How can we better work with the Somali-American community--
    and with any other community where a violent extremist ideology
    might take root--to ensure that other young Americans do not
    stray down the same path?
        These are among the important questions that we will
    explore as our Committee continues to examine the threat of
    homegrown terrorism.
        Again, I want to thank the Chairman for his leadership in
    this area and our witnesses for appearing today. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.
        In fact, this Committee's investigation to answer the
    question of is there recruitment of Islamist terrorists and
    radicalization occurring in the United States began under
    Senator Collins' chairmanship and leadership, and it has been
    my pleasure to continue this important work in partnership with
    her.
        Let's go right to the first panel. We have Philip Mudd,
    Associate Executive Assistant Director, National Security
    Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation with us. Mr. Mudd,
    thanks for being here again, and we welcome your testimony now.
    Or are you going to yield to Mr. Liepman? Based on age or----
        Mr. Mudd. Looks. [Laughter.]
        Chairman Lieberman [continuing]. Lack of hair? OK. On the
    top of his head, I meant. All right. Let me just introduce you.
    You can rebut if you would like, Mr. Liepman.
        Andrew Liepman is the Deputy Director of Intelligence of
    the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). For those who do
    not know, the NCTC was created as part of the post-September
    11, 2001, reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission. It is the
    central place, along with the Office of the Director of
    National Intelligence, but this is really the place where all
    of America's intelligence and intelligence-related agencies are
    working together 24/7 to share information, to raise
    information, and to make sure that the dots are connected in a
    way that they were not before September 11, 2001, which meant
    we were not able to prevent that tragic event.
        So, with that, Mr. Liepman, thank you.

         TESTIMONY OF ANDREW M. LIEPMAN,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
     INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE
                   DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

        Mr. Liepman. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member
    Collins. We welcome the opportunity to appear before you today
    to share our perspectives on the radicalization of Somali youth
    in America. And I do appreciate the opportunity to appear
    beside my longtime colleague Mr. Mudd from the Bureau. I will
    focus on what factors contribute to the radicalization and some
    of the particularly vulnerabilities of the Somali-American
    community. I will defer to Mr. Mudd to talk about the FBI
    activities. Let me start with a bit of context, a very brief
    history of events in Somalia.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Liepman appears in the Appendix
    on page 93.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The turmoil and instability in Somalia dates back to the
    collapse of the government there in 1991, which resulted in a
    descent into factional fighting and anarchy. In 2006, following
    multiple failed attempts to bring stability, a loose coalition
    of clerics, local leaders, and militias known as the Council of
    Islamic Courts took power in much of Somalia. The Somali
    Transitional Federal Government joined with Ethiopian forces
    and routed the Islamic Court militias in a 2-week war. It is an
    important milestone. It also represents an important rallying
    point for Somalis, both in Somalia and in the diaspora.
        Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab--the militant wing of the
    council--has led a collection of clan militias in a violent
    insurgency, using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics
    against the transitional government and the Ethiopian presence
    in the region.
        Just to give you some sense of the Somali-American
    diaspora, they began arriving in the United States in
    significant numbers in 1992 following the U.S. intervention in
    Somalia's humanitarian crisis. The Somali-American population
    is distributed in clusters throughout the United States, with
    the heaviest concentrations in Minneapolis, Columbus, Seattle,
    and San Diego. There are a variety of estimates of the size of
    the Somali-American population. It is a fairly difficult number
    to give you with some precision. I think generally we accept
    the range from 70,000 to as many as 200,000.
        Despite significant efforts to facilitate their settlement
    into American communities, many Somali immigrants face
    isolation. The adjustment to American society has reinforced
    their greater insularity compared to other, more integrated
    recent immigrant communities and has aggravated the challenges
    of assimilation for their children.
        One of the main reasons that Mr. Mudd and I are here today,
    obviously, is the concern we have over the travel by some tens
    of Somali-American young men back to Somalia, some of whom have
    trained and fought with al-Shabaab. The involvement of this
    foreign terrorist organization, al-Shabaab, means we cannot
    simply categorize this as homegrown violence. We are concerned
    that if a few Somali-American youth can be motivated to engage
    in such activities overseas, fellow travelers could return to
    the United States and engage in terrorist activities here.
        Let me stress we do not have a body of reporting that
    indicates U.S. persons who have traveled to Somalia are
    planning to execute attacks in the United States. We do not
    have that credible reporting. But we do worry that there is a
    potential that these individuals could be indoctrinated by al-
    Qaeda while they are in Somalia and then return to the United
    States with the intention to conduct attacks. They would, in
    fact, provide al-Qaeda with trained extremists inside the
    United States.
        One of the main questions that we try and answer is: What
    causes the radicalization of a small but significant number of
    Somali-American youth? The answer is complex. It is the result
    of a number of factors that come together when a dynamic,
    influential, and extremist leader gains access to a despondent
    and disenfranchised group of young men. Sophisticated extremist
    recruiters target these individuals who lack structure and
    definition in their lives. The recruiters subject them to
    religiously inspired indoctrination to move them toward violent
    extremism. They target vulnerable young men--many of them
    refugees who came here as small children or who are the
    children of immigrants--torn between their parents' traditional
    ethnic, tribal, and clan identities and the new cultures and
    traditions offered by American society.
        Among Somali-Americans, the refugee experience of fleeing a
    war-torn country, combined with isolation, perceived
    discrimination, marginalization, and frustrated expectations,
    as well as local criminal, familial, and clan dynamics, make
    some members of this community more susceptible to this sort of
    extremist influence.
        And let me stress, just as you said, Mr. Chairman, we are
    not witnessing a community-wide radicalization among Somali-
    Americans. When I speak of the Somali-American community, I do
    not mean to generalize; rather, I am describing a problem
    limited to a small fraction of the community, most of which
    came to America to get away from violence, not to commit it.
    The overwhelming majority of Somali-Americans are or want to be
    contributing members of American society, trying to raise their
    families here and desperately wishing for stability in their
    ancestral homeland.
        But as I said, the Somali community is in some respects
    more susceptible to the influence of extremist elements. A
    number of factors that have mitigated radicalization among
    other ethnic religious American communities are less evident in
    the Somali community here. These include some level of faith in
    the American political system, access to resources to defense
    civil rights and civil liberties, and interaction with non-
    Muslims, and a greater focus on domestic rather than
    international events.
        You asked about the role that the Internet plays in
    radicalizing Somali youth. It is not an easy metric for us to
    measure. It is clear, though that access to the Internet and to
    such material on the Internet alone is rarely enough to cause
    an individual to become radical himself. It is also clear,
    though, that the Somali-American youth who have traveled abroad
    to join in fighting for al-Shabaab were exposed to al-Shabaab's
    extremist ideology here in the United States, both in terms of
    face-to-face contact with extremist elements and on the
    Internet. And they tended to reinforce each other. The easy
    availability of extremist media on the Internet provides a
    range of themes that extremist recruiters can use to appeal to
    disenfranchise young men. As you mentioned, al-Qaeda senior
    leadership in recent months have weighed in with their own
    support for al-Shabaab, praising it and depicting Somalia as a
    local manifestation of the broader conflict between the West
    and Islam.
        I should note that this al-Qaeda stamp of approval does not
    guarantee either greater success or enhanced impact. In fact,
    it could backfire. Many potential ethnic Somali recruits would
    prefer to join a group that is focused explicitly on Somali
    issues rather than signing up for the global jihad and joining
    an al-Qaeda affiliate.
        Let me end with a couple of comments on NCTC's role in this
    process and address your reference to this being a turning
    point, the fifth year of the anniversary of the Madrid attack.
        Indeed, it is a turning point in many respects. I think in
    2004, if we remember back, the Office of the Director of
    National Intelligence did not yet exist. NCTC was in its
    infancy. It was then called the Terrorist Threat Integration
    Center. And I would like to think that the community has come a
    long way since then. In fact, Somalia represents a great
    example of the type of challenge that I think NCTC can assist
    in. It is the intersection between a foreign problem that parts
    of our community study in Somalia and a homegrown problem that
    our domestic organizations are focused on. And we, in NCTC, are
    trying to bridge those two communities and, I would like to
    think, helping in that effort.
        With that, what I would like to do is turn the floor over
    to Mr. Mudd for some comments on what the FBI is doing.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Liepman. That was a good
    beginning.
        Now to Phil Mudd of the FBI.

     TESTIMONY OF J. PHILIP MUDD,\1\ ASSOCIATE EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
         DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY BRANCH, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
               INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

        Mr. Mudd. Thank you for having me here. I think in the
    interest of full disclosure, it is a great pleasure to be
    sitting at the table with Mr. Liepman. He and I have known each
    other for almost a quarter century, so having him refer to me
    as ``Mr. Mudd'' is going to be the source of great amusement
    later today, and I must appreciate that.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mudd appears in the Appendix on
    page 100.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I do not really have an oral statement. Senator Collins
    talked about people telling stories. I wanted to tell a story
    of how this looks to someone who in the past has looked at
    terrorism overseas and who for the past 3\1/2\ years has been
    posted at the Bureau, to tell you the story of a complicated
    picture and, if I succeed, make it coherent in 9 minutes and 23
    seconds, so I will give it a try.
        Think of this as an example of globalization. If you wake
    up in the morning and want to know what is happening in the
    stock market, you look at the DAX in Germany, you look at what
    is happening in the European and Asian exchanges. This is an
    example of globalization on a different front.
        I will talk about a couple of intersecting trends: The
    first Mr. Liepman talked about, in 1991, the fall of the Siad
    Barre government; the rise of warlordism in the 1990s; and the
    rise of the Islamic Courts in the 1990s and into this century.
    So the first trend, if you will, is ``ungoverned space,'' as
    people refer to it, a place where somebody like al-Shabaab can
    develop training camps, a place that looks something like the
    tribal areas of Pakistan, for example, or the Sahel--Mali,
    Chad, and southern Algeria. So that is your first piece; places
    around the world that lack governance happen to correspond with
    places where you have problems. Yemen would be another example.
        The second trend I would point to is, if you look at Bosnia
    or Kashmir or Afghanistan from the 1980s after the Soviet
    invasion, you have magnets of activity for Islamic extremists.
    Somalia is a bit different. For example, Somali-Americans and
    Somalis in general did not flock to jihads elsewhere but,
    nonetheless, al-Shabaab has linkages to this global Islamist
    movement. Its leadership has linkages to al-Qaeda leadership.
    So I think the second trend I would point to, again, in the
    context of globalization, this is another example. After
    examples in places like Bosnia or Chechnya, of Islamist
    activity serving as a magnet for international jihadists, I
    would point out that not only are Americans showing up; we have
    Western Europeans, Brits--we had a Brit blow himself up
    recently in Somalia. We have Nigerians, Chadians, and Malians.
        And the third and perhaps the most significant--and I want
    to emphasize this because I think some will say, well, this is
    just another example of global jihad--is the nationalist aspect
    of this. We saw a change in the American community in 2006 when
    the Ethiopians invaded, and part of the draw for people in this
    country is to go fight for their country against a foreign
    invader. So global issues, issues in the Horn of Africa having
    an immediate impact, a ripple effect on communities in
    Columbus, Ohio; in Cincinnati; in Seattle; in San Diego; and in
    Minnesota--it is a real example of what globalization means in
    the new information world. And I use the phrase ``information
    world'' advisedly. You have direct connectivity between Somalia
    and the United States. It does not have to be by the Internet.
    It can be Skype or e-mail, friends talking to each other. And
    this is a very tight community where that kind of information
    is getting around independent of any Internet websites.
        Let me overlay some more micro issues onto that sort of
    macro witch's brew of these trends of ungoverned space and an
    Islamist magnet nationalism. You have a community that comes
    here, in contrast to some other immigrant stories--immigrant
    stories, for example, of Indian communities or Pakistani
    communities, communities with doctors and engineers. These are
    folks who come here because they are escaping great trauma in
    their home country. They are working here in meatpacking
    plants, poultry processing plants, there is often not a great
    command in the first generation of the English language among
    their parents.
        If you look at many of the people we are talking about,
    they are coming from single-family homes, in particular, homes
    that are led by sisters or grandmothers or mothers, where there
    is not a father figure.
        There are echoes of what we see overseas. Again, I want to
    emphasize that we are not alone in looking at this problem. I
    want to sign up to what Mr. Liepman said. This is not a
    community problem. In a sense, we do not have radicalized
    communities. We do have radicalized clusters of people,
    typically youths between, let us say, 17 and above, although we
    have seen efforts to radicalize kids as young as 12, 13, or 14
    years old in this country.
        Like what you would see in Europe, it is not necessarily an
    al-Shabaab person in Somalia radicalizing a youth in the United
    States. These are issues within the community where people from
    these kinds of families might see an older brother or father
    figure who starts to spot-assess and recruit--as we say in the
    spy business--someone who might be vulnerable and eventually
    sets them on a path to take a plane ticket to Somalia or
    Ethiopia or someplace else that is an avenue to get into
    Somalia.
        This is important because this is the kind of thing you
    might see in Western Europe or Britain. And, in fact, in
    talking to my friends in even the Arabian Peninsula, we may
    think that we are much different from a place like Saudi
    Arabia, but you see that kind of cluster recruitment by
    friends, older brothers, or community figures elsewhere around
    the world.
        I think there is a popular conception from people in this
    country reading books or watching movies that there are
    terrorist cells with an established leader and somebody to
    provide finance and communication. In fact, whether it is this
    problem of al-Shabaab activity or extremism in the United
    States or other Sunni extremism in the United States, more
    often you have clusters of people who are talking to each
    other. They do not have assigned roles. They do not know what
    they are going to do. They may never do anything, but they are
    talking about committing acts of violence. They may radicalize
    off each other, as kids do in environments across the United
    States. In schoolyards, when I was growing up, I went to throw
    rocks at cars because the kid next to me said let's go do it.
        So you have clusters of youths who are talking to each
    other. There may be a center in the community of
    radicalization. There is not radicalization and then
    recruitment, typically. It is recruitment into this circle, and
    then kids are radicalized and spotted and maybe seen as someone
    who will go overseas.
        The last thing I would tell you to put this in context is
    we are talking about a particular aspect of this issue, which
    is the Somali diaspora. We are here to work with communities.
    We are here to work with our State and local partners. We get
    terrific support on our Joint Terrorism Task Forces from the
    Minneapolis police, the police in Columbus, from county
    officials in Minneapolis, for example, who are working within
    the communities. But we are not talking about radicalization
    among an entire community.
        We need help from the communities. We need them to talk to
    us. It is of concern to us that people like this are coming
    from areas where Federal authorities are suspicious people. We
    have to break that down. We are not here to look at a mosque. A
    mosque is a building, a church is a building, a synagogue is a
    building, and a temple is a building. We are here to look at
    people who might be thinking about or have committed acts of
    violence or are supporting those who do so. This is about
    individuals who are small segments of a community and who do
    not represent the beauty that this country brings to
    immigrants.
        I come from an Italian-Irish-Dutch-British family, and I
    see these folks in the same context that my family might have
    been in this country 100 years ago.
        And, last, context within the FBI. This is a priority for
    the FBI. It is one of a handful or more of priorities. We also
    have issues in this country about violent crime, expanding gang
    activity in this country--Mara Salvatrucha, for example, and
    other Latin American gangs. We have a major public corruption
    problem in this country. We have massive mortgage fraud we are
    looking at in this country. And we have other aspects of
    extremism--extremism that might be linked to one of our key
    concerns, that is, continued al-Qaeda core activity in Pakistan
    and Afghanistan. We have fundraising for Palestinian groups. So
    I want to emphasize that we are not looking at a community. We
    are looking at individuals who are sending kids in the wrong
    direction. We want to work with families who are as concerned
    or more concerned than we are. And I want to put this in the
    context of a lot of priorities we have. This is not one of a
    couple. This is one of many. And we will continue to focus on
    it, but in the context of other priorities we have.
        Thanks again for having me here today, and I look forward
    to talking to you with my friend, Mr. Liepman.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Mudd.
        Let me begin the round of questioning. We will do 7-minute
    rounds and keep going as long as Senators want to ask
    questions.
        I heard you say this is a priority. It is one of several
    priorities, obviously. That is what we understand, the priority
    being not just the Somali-American community, but the prospect
    of recruitment and radicalization of Islamist terrorists from
    America. Am I correct in that?
        Mr. Mudd. That is right. I think if you look at one of the
    contrasts with the European experience, if you look at a
    country like Britain, for example--and people have drawn
    parallels--I think there are significant differences that make
    extremism a challenge in this country.
        If you look at Britain, you have pockets of people on the
    extremist side, first, second, and sometimes third-generation
    folks, very dense, interconnected in places like Birmingham or
    Manchester.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right.
        Mr. Mudd. In this country, we see more dispersed
    communities, more dispersed activity. Activity in Los Angeles
    might not have linkages or typically will not have linkages to
    what we see in New York, Arizona, Florida, or Georgia.
        Chairman Lieberman. Let me pursue this, and I hear you. Am
    I correct in assuming that the FBI is on the ground, so to
    speak, in the Somali-American community, both in terms of
    outreach to the community, at which the Bureau has really done
    very well generally, but also investigating recruitment and
    radicalization?
        Mr. Mudd. That is correct. I would point to outreach,
    first. The second is we do have partnerships with the local
    police in Minneapolis and Columbus. And third is we have a
    substantial amount of investigative resources looking not only
    at recruitment but also the issue of fundraising in this
    country.
        Chairman Lieberman. I take it there is no doubt that there
    have been some Somali-Americans recruited, radicalized here who
    have gone to Somalia. Correct?
        Mr. Mudd. That is correct.
        Chairman Lieberman. And the number is a bit vague. I have
    heard some people say as many as 20, some people say maybe a
    lot more because families are hesitant to report people gone to
    Somalia for fear that they will not be able to come back. What
    is your best estimate of how significant this problem is?
        Mr. Mudd. I would talk in terms of tens of people, which
    sounds small, but it is significant because every terrorist is
    somebody who can potentially throw a grenade into a shopping
    mall.
        I would point out the reason this is fuzzy, as Mr. Liepman
    said, there are as many as a few hundred thousands just in this
    community of Somalis in the United States. There are thousands
    of people, thousands going to the Horn of Africa every month.
    You can go to Kenya to look at game parks, and it is hard for
    me to tell you somebody is going to a game park or going to al-
    Shabaab.
        So I am sure that there are people out there we are
    missing. It is a country with 300 million people, with a lot of
    travel to this area. But I would put it in the range of tens of
    people.
        Chairman Lieberman. Tens, OK. So accepting that as a
    baseline for purposes of discussion, assuming that tens of
    Somali-Americans have gone to train and presumably fight with
    al-Shabaab in Somalia, I assume from what you both said that,
    therefore, we can assume that there are recruiters or leaders
    in the Somali-American community who are responsible, at least
    in part, for that movement of people. Is that right?
        Mr. Mudd. I think that is fair.
        Chairman Lieberman. OK. So now let me go to the question
    both Senator Collins and I asked, which is: Why would an
    Islamist terrorist organization like al-Shabaab want to recruit
    and radicalize Somalis in America when presumably they can and
    there are ample numbers to recruit and train for terrorism in
    Somalia?
        Mr. Liepman. I am not sure that it is to fill their ranks.
        Chairman Lieberman. Really.
        Mr. Liepman. I do not think they are looking at America as
    a broad recruiting ground to collect hundreds or thousands of
    fighters that are the vanguard of their force.
        I think they are looking--first of all, it is a two-way
    street. I think they are accepting non-Somali fighters from all
    over Africa, from the United States, and from Europe. In a way,
    I think it adds to their credibility. It raises their profile.
    It is a public relations bonanza for them to have a
    multinational force fighting the Ethiopians, for example. It
    makes it appear that it is not just Somalia versus Ethiopia,
    but a broader conflict, particularly on the continent of
    Africa.
        And I do think that they are looking for small numbers, and
    it is not just the recruiters coming to America to try and
    bring people. They are reacting to a demand among the small
    fraction of the Somali community who have said they are
    interested in going. So there is a meeting of the minds there.
        Chairman Lieberman. From what we know about the way these
    groups operate, do you assume--I understand the difficulty of
    making a judgment about the motivation. Your answer is helpful
    to us. But seeing the recruitment that we see, do you assume
    that the local recruiting is being done at the request of al-
    Shabaab leadership in Somalia? Or is it self-generated here?
        Mr. Mudd. I would think of it--I think Mr. Liepman is
    right--as more push than pull at this point. A couple quick
    points. This is a global jihad.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right.
        Mr. Mudd. There are people from Chad, Mali, and Nigeria,
    and we should look at that in that context. But it is not like
    people in East Africa are saying, ``I wish I had another five
    Americans.''
        The second point that is important, the first wave of
    people we saw from 2006 to 2007 roughly, were not Somali-
    Americans. The first wave of people we saw were Americans,
    people like Chris Paul--not in this circumstance, but somebody
    who was prosecuted earlier for fighting overseas.
        Chairman Lieberman. Going to Somalia?
        Mr. Mudd. That is correct.
        Chairman Lieberman. For training?
        Mr. Mudd. That is correct, underscoring the point that this
    is a jihad issue that is not simply restricted to American
    Somalis.
        Third and final point, it is important, when we try to put
    this in the context of terrorism, to understand what these kids
    are doing out there: Ambushes, convoys, and improvised
    explosive devices (IEDs).
        Chairman Lieberman. Right.
        Mr. Mudd. This is a paramilitary conflict and they are not
    necessarily getting training on how to develop a covert cell in
    Minneapolis.
        Chairman Lieberman. So the final question from me in this
    round, obviously some of these Somali-Americans are traveling
    with American passports or papers that would enable them more
    easily to get back into the United States. I understand, Mr.
    Liepman, you said we have no evidence now that any of this
    recruitment for training in Somalia is being done with the aim
    of sending them back here to carry out terrorist acts. But it
    would be easier for them to get back in, and my question is--
    and this really goes to the NCTC with all the cooperation among
    agencies you have: Are we putting up any special filters to
    watch out for the return of some of these Somali-Americans to
    America for fear of what they might be inclined to do here?
        Mr. Liepman. I would go back to something that Mr. Mudd
    said.
        Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
        Mr. Liepman. I think the most important tool for us is the
    outreach to the Somali-American community to know who is going
    to the Horn of Africa, and for what purposes.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right.
        Mr. Liepman. And you are absolutely right. They are
    traveling under American passports, which enables them to
    travel rather freely.
        In terms of looking at travelers who appear to have gone to
    Somalia, for example, I think that there is an effort to make
    sure that that is being scrutinized fairly closely, to
    understand what it is they did there. And just to reinforce a
    point I made earlier, the intentions of Somali kids who are
    going to Somalia may be very different than what happens once
    they get there and they are trained with al-Shabaab. And that
    is, I think, what we worry about.
        Chairman Lieberman. OK. My time is up. Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Let me pick up where the Chairman left off. Mr. Liepman, we
    know that in 2007 poor information sharing by the Centers for
    Disease Control and Prevention with the Department of Homeland
    Security prevented DHS from identifying an individual with
    drug-resistant TB who was traveling back and forth on
    international flights. And 2 weeks ago, ABC News reported that
    some of the individuals who had fought in Somalia had returned
    to the United States.
        Now, regardless of the validity of that particular report,
    it raises the question of whether information sharing is
    sufficient within the Federal Government to ensure that
    immigration authorities at the U.S. border handle any returning
    Somali-Americans in an appropriate way. And this is complicated
    by the fact that they are Americans with American passports.
        So what is being done to flag these individuals should they
    attempt to return if there is concern that they have been
    engaged in terrorist training overseas?
        Mr. Liepman. I would just make two quick points on that.
    The first is, Senator Collins, you are absolutely right, this
    is a problem that is complicated by our attention to civil
    liberties and our desire not to restrict the travel of
    Americans without pretty good reason.
        I do think that the information-sharing system that we are
    operating under now is far superior to that of 3 or 5 years
    ago. We are not perfect. But we are much better, and we are
    much better in terms of knowing when an individual should be
    watchlisted, for example, understanding when we have a piece of
    information, that information is shared with the appropriate
    agencies.
        What I think we are most concerned about is what we do not
    know about those travelers who are going to the Horn of Africa,
    who visit Kenya, and who we do not know went into Somalia. That
    makes it much more difficult to control their ability to travel
    back and forth if we are not aware of what their activities
    were.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Mudd, when our Committee staff visited
    Minneapolis, the local police officials expressed concern that
    they were providing information to Federal officials but were
    getting little in return. Just yesterday, the Chairman and I
    were briefed by the Markle Foundation, which was particularly
    critical of information sharing across the levels of law
    enforcement, the FBI with State and local law enforcement in
    particular.
        Could you comment on information sharing in this case with
    State and local officials? Because obviously this is very
    critical. There is no one who is more tuned in to what is going
    on in the Somali community in Minneapolis than the local police
    force. And it seems to me that a greater understanding could
    result if there were more information sharing.
        Mr. Mudd. I think a couple things here. First, I want to
    thank again the police departments in places like Columbus and
    Minneapolis. They participate with task force officers who are
    on our Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). They have
    visibility from these task force officers into our
    investigations against violent extremists in the United States.
    They should have visibility into every aspect of those
    investigations. We also have participation at fusion centers
    across the country.
        In terms of cooperation with State and local law
    enforcement, I would point out, the Somali community in
    Minneapolis is probably 100,000 plus, and in many respects, in
    places like Hennepin County or Ramsey County, where you have
    Minneapolis-St. Paul, the police are going to have better
    insights into the community than we do--not just because they
    are looking at the extremist problem with us, but because you
    have gang and drug activity. There is more than a handful of
    Somali gangs in Minneapolis alone.
        So I think there is visibility on the task force. There is
    visibility from the JTTF executives in those cities. I could
    not tell you how strong that is across an entire large police
    force. We have relatively small offices in these cities. But
    they are participating full-time on our Joint Terrorism Task
    Forces, and this is a priority for those JTTFs.
        Senator Collins. Do you see Somali gangs as being a
    precursor to the kind of radicalization that we are talking
    about?
        Mr. Mudd. I do not see a one-to-one correlation between
    gang activity and terrorist recruitment and radicalization.
        Mr. Liepman. In many cases, they are actually alternatives
    to each other. They will go down two different avenues.
        Senator Collins. One or the other.
        The New York City Police Department (NYPD) has done a lot
    of work on domestic terrorism, homegrown radicalization, and,
    in general, the police department has found that individuals
    generally begin the radicalization process on their own. But in
    each case that NYPD examined, there was what the department
    called ``a spiritual sanctioner'' that provided the
    justification for jihad that is essential to a suicide
    terrorist. It is essential to the progression of the
    radicalization process.
        Have you seen that in the case that we are discussing
    today, Mr. Liepman?
        Mr. Liepman. Senator Collins, I agree entirely with the New
    York study on radicalization. I think it was an excellent
    study, and we have actually worked very closely with NYPD with
    their perspective on the ground. And as I mentioned, it would
    be a mistake to look at either the Internet in a vacuum or at
    the influential leaders of the community in a vacuum. It is the
    interaction between the two.
        And I think we found both domestically and overseas as
    well--and it is the experience of most of our partners in the
    United Kingdom and Canada--that perhaps the most important
    element of the radicalization process is that charismatic
    leader who intervenes and who, as Mr. Mudd said, spots and
    recruits a vulnerable young man and gets to him at the right
    point with the right message.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Mudd.
        Mr. Mudd. This is really important to understand because
    the suggestion earlier, I think there is a popular
    misconception about terrorism among people who sort of watch
    movies or read books, and that is that there are these cells of
    people who operate clandestinely. I used a word that I learned
    from NYPD, and they have some extremely talented analysts up
    there. That word is ``clusters''--there are clusters of people
    who bounce off each other.
        Internet content, in my experience, might help feed an
    emotional sense in a kid who is already bouncing off
    individuals. This is a people business. So I would see the
    Internet often as a tool that helps someone along a path, but
    not the proximate cause that leads someone to get a ticket to
    go to Mogadishu.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
        I appreciate that there are three other Senators here. We
    will call on them in order of arrival: Senator Bennet, Senator
    Voinovich, and Senator Burris.
        Senator Bennet, thank you.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BENNET

        Senator Bennet. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I apologize for
    being late. This is fascinating testimony, and I do not have
    any questions yet.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Bennet. Senator
    Voinovich.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH

        Senator Voinovich. I thank the witnesses for being here.
    Has there been any kind of a declaration by al-Shabaab as Osama
    bin Laden did in 1998 and declare war against the United
    States?
        Mr. Liepman. No, Senator. And I will take the opportunity
    to just emphasize, al-Shabaab is a very different organization
    than al-Qaeda. It is really an alignment of a variety of
    different groups. The individual fighters on the ground in
    Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia may not actually reflect the
    views of their top leadership. And the top leadership does have
    identified linkages to the leadership of al-Qaeda in Pakistan.
    But whether that trickles down to the average 17 or 20-year-old
    fighter on the streets of Somalia is really quite questionable.
        They are devoted to the fight in Somalia. They are not yet,
    most of them, devoted to Osama bin Laden's global jihad.
        Senator Voinovich. So the fact is that, to your knowledge,
    there may be some indirect linkages but no formal linkages. And
    in terms of someone's intent of having people come back from
    there and do something bad here in terms of some of the things
    that we are trying to defend against, terrorist attacks and so
    forth, is there any indication at all of anything like that?
        Mr. Liepman. Clearly, one of the reasons why we are looking
    so closely at this issue is the linkages between the al-Shabaab
    leadership with the al-Qaeda leadership and the possible
    influence on al-Shabaab agenda, which has to date been quite
    local, and then ultimately the trickle-down effect on the
    recruits that are being trained with al-Shabaab.
        But, no, as I said in my testimony, we do not have a
    credible body of reporting right now to lead us to believe that
    these American recruits are being trained and instructed to
    come back to the United States for terrorist acts. Yet
    obviously we remain concerned about that, and watchful for it.
        Senator Voinovich. Well, one of my concerns--and this is
    tough because we are concerned about things and we are in a
    dilemma, and the dilemma is the more we talk about it, does it
    become a self-fulfilling prophecy? It is like neighbors that do
    not talk to each other, and before you know it, they do not
    like each other. And I think more than anything else, I would
    be interested in what we are doing to make sure that we do not
    have something like that radicalized era here in the United
    States. And what is the community trying to do in terms of
    making sure that this does not happen? That is the big issue
    here.
        It has, I think, more to do with it than intelligence to
    handle this, and we will be hearing from another panel, but I
    would be interested in your observations about where are we
    right now and what can we do to make sure that we have a better
    situation, including maybe improving our relationships with the
    Somalis overseas.
        Mr. Liepman. I think you have that exactly right. We really
    cannot solve the problem simply through outreach to the
    American Somali community. It is an essential ingredient of the
    solution. I think this is essentially a Horn of Africa problem,
    and without attention to that decades-long crisis, we cannot
    attend one or the other end of this. It is really both.
        Mr. Mudd. I think that is right. From the Bureau's
    perspective, there are a lot of issues here that are well
    beyond our control, issues overseas that have to do with the
    motivation of these individuals. For example, what is the
    impact of the Ethiopian withdrawal on a community in the United
    States? I think the impact is probably substantial because a
    lot of these kids are going over--as I said, there are
    intersecting themes, not only for an international jihadist
    movement but also for nationalist purposes, to fight the
    Ethiopians.
        Domestically, there are issues here I talked about that put
    us in common with people and places like Europe, and that is,
    when you have families--this is a very traditional clan-based
    culture, a patrilineal culture, where there is no father figure
    there, and where somebody comes in and plays the father figure,
    where the mother does not speak English very well, where you
    are working at a meatpacking plant or have to work a couple
    jobs as a taxi driver. I mean, this is a classic immigrant
    experience in some ways, and it is a difficult social
    environment for these folks.
        And so we can talk about looking at people after it is too
    late, those who are going overseas--but the underlying cause is
    motivations from the Ethiopian invasion or motivations from the
    environment of people who are escaping violence and difficult
    economic conditions. Those are things obviously that are well
    beyond our control.
        Senator Voinovich. So a lot of it has basically to do with
    some concerns about people that have come here that are
    concerned about what is going on over there. It is like a lot
    of other nationality groups. The Armenians still want to do
    something about--go back to what the Turks did, and the
    Kosovars and the Serbs--we have a lot of ethnic groups in Ohio.
    You can try to deal with them, but there are still things that
    are really ringing bells in those communities, and people are
    upset about them. Where does that level go to some other kind
    of activity?
        Mr. Mudd. That is right, and I should be blunt, there are
    other concerns about dealing with Federal officials, for
    example, in a community where many people have immigration
    problems. So we are trying to build bridges through outreach
    and working with police departments, for example, and having
    people like our Special Agent in Charge in Minneapolis meeting
    with community leaders.
        I was just talking to one of the leaders behind me about
    traveling to Minneapolis soon, although I would like to wait
    until after the snow melts, as a native Floridian. But the
    issue has to do with, as I say, things within the community--it
    is a very closed community--and their concerns as well about
    dealing with us because they are worried about whether we are
    going to collar a kid if they come and tell us or whether there
    are other Federal issues like immigration fraud that might come
    up. And, again, we have to work through that with our partners
    in places like DHS.
        Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Voinovich. Senator
    Burris, good morning.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS

        Senator Burris. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to welcome you to the Committee. This is a
    very complicated subject, and I want to commend you all for the
    work that you are doing. My questions may seem a little naive
    because of the difficulty of the subject, but generally what I
    am concerned about is we are talking about two separate
    situations, are we not? The Somalis that voluntarily or
    forcibly go back to get trained and, second, whether or not we
    are talking about normal American disgruntled citizens that are
    volunteering to go over there? Is that what we are looking at?
        Mr. Liepman. To my knowledge, we are not aware of a
    situation where someone has been forcibly repatriated to
    Somalia. These are volunteers. And I do think there are two
    things going on. One is that you have a generational struggle
    in Somalia; and, on the other hand, you have an American Somali
    community that is in many ways different than other ethnic
    communities in the United States in that they tend to be a bit
    more isolated and more attached to their homeland than many
    others.
        So the combination of isolation and a difficult process of
    integration into the United States and this linkage back to
    their homeland has resulted in a tendency to be more willing to
    volunteer to go back than in many other communities. But they
    are not being forced to return, as far as I can tell.
        Mr. Mudd. It might interest you to know some of the
    experiences they are having when they get there to give you a
    sense of what they think going over.
        First, some get there and believe this is a place where
    Sharia law--that is, the law of Islam--is being practiced and
    it is a great place to live. And some of these folks will never
    come back.
        Some get there and become cannon fodder. We talked about
    the difference between terrorism and insurgency/
    counterinsurgency. These folks are not going over there to
    become part of terrorist cells. A lot of them are being put on
    the front line, and some of them from the United States. I
    think, have been killed on the front line.
        And, last, some are going over there saying, ``Whoa, this
    is a serious war, there is serious lead flying,'' and they sort
    of lie, cheat, and steal their way to get back because they are
    in an environment where they say, ``I cannot take this.'' So
    they are coming home saying, ``That is not what I signed up
    for.''
        So there is a range of responses when these kids actually
    get out there.
        Senator Burris. So this question may have been asked, but
    you are saying that they are over there either for the war or
    to defend their homeland. What is the danger then of some of
    those really coming back here, having been trained or given
    indoctrination to come back and try to do some of the jihad or
    September 11, 2001, activities in America? And can we detect
    that type of person coming back or if he was not a part of it,
    how do you distinguish that Somali as a person who wants to
    come back and repatriate himself with America and not then be
    classified as a terrorist who would do danger to our homeland?
        Mr. Liepman. It is a tough problem. To set the groundwork,
    though, going to Somalia to fight with al-Shabaab, al-Shabaab
    is a designated terrorist organization. So the distinction
    between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda is an important one, but those
    who volunteer to fight with al-Shabaab are also materially
    contributing to a terrorist organization.
        That evolution from volunteering to fight against the
    Ethiopians in Somalia to embracing the global jihad and the al-
    Qaeda message that espouses attacking the West, that is a
    difficult thing to detect. It happens inside their heads, and
    it is very difficult for us to know unless they tell someone,
    and I think reinforces the importance of outreach and
    interaction with the community and with the families who likely
    will be the first people to detect this transition from Somali
    defense to the global jihad.
        Mr. Mudd. I think this story will have a ways to play out.
    I had an interesting conversation last week with an
    acquaintance of mine who is a psychologist in Saudi Arabia who
    deals with their deradicalization program. And he made a
    distinction between disengagement--in other words, for example,
    somebody coming back here disengaged from al-Shabaab--and
    deradicalization. His view, from working with many people--in
    this case, in Saudi Arabia--was if you want long-term stability
    with people like this, you cannot have that stability if you do
    not deradicalize.
        So what I am saying is if someone disengages from the fight
    but does not deradicalize, long term you have to think how
    psychologically is that going to play out in a year or 2 years.
    What if they find when they get back that the job environment
    is closed to them? What if there is another Ethiopian invasion?
    And as a security service, we cannot only be concerned about
    someone who has committed a Federal violation. If someone has
    gone overseas to fight and comes back in this month, seems like
    he has disengaged, should we assume that person is
    deradicalized after he has already committed an overt act to go
    fight a foreign enemy? Boy, that is a tough one long term. So I
    expect that we will have some echoes of this for a while.
        Senator Burris. And another area in terms of the Somali
    community, which my briefing tells me that it is primarily in
    Minneapolis, Minnesota, there is a major community there, and
    that is where a lot of recruiting is going on. Has the
    community really stepped up to come forward from the Somali
    community to give information and say, look, we know that we
    have to work in conjunction with all the U.S. forces to try to
    prevent something of this magnitude, even the young person
    going over there?
        Mr. Mudd. We have made progress, but we have a ways to go.
    The progress says you have communities with parents and
    grandparents and siblings who are concerned. We have FBI
    officers and people from police and our task forces who are
    watching people shed tears in our offices when they find out
    their kids have gone. Communities are concerned about
    recruitment from within, and I think that will become even
    greater with the Ethiopian withdrawal, because you cannot now
    say, ``I am going to fight the foreign invader.'' You are going
    to fight more in clan fighting. Especially in the past few
    weeks or months, there have been some very positive political
    developments in Somalia that I would think would make it a bit
    harder to recruit.
        That said, we have a ways to go. Again, you have
    communities that, first, for I think very defensible reasons,
    are concerned about interacting with Federal authorities. They
    are concerned about what we will do with their children. There
    is a lot of disinformation out there, and I should put this on
    the record. I hope some of the community folks in Minneapolis
    are watching. There are people out there saying that we will
    take their kids and put them in orange jumpsuits and send them
    to Guantanamo. This kind of propaganda from people who want to
    corrupt kids is hurting us.
        So there are community concerns in additional areas, as I
    said earlier, about things like are we going to look at
    immigration problems as part of this. So we have made progress.
    We have great relations with some of the community folks that
    you will see later today--a really great and heartening
    immigrant story--but we still need more community help to
    understand what is going on within communities. This is not
    simply a law enforcement or intelligence problem. This is a
    problem about integration of a community over decades.
        Senator Burris. Mr. Chairman, my time is up, and if there
    is a second round, I might have some more questions. But I
    would like to thank the witnesses for their candid and
    forthright statements. I think we really have something we have
    got to deal with here.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Burris.
        I want to ask just one or two additional questions. If any
    other members wants to, we will do that in a quick second
    round, because I want to get to the next panel.
        I do want to make clear first, Mr. Liepman, I think you
    answered a specific question from Senator Burris, and it may
    appear inconsistent, though I do not believe it is, when you
    said these young people are volunteering, that they are not
    being coerced. But this is not purely volunteering because, as
    both of you have said, they are being recruited, they are being
    affected by a spiritual sanctioner or leader. Right?
        Mr. Liepman. That is right, and I did not mean to suggest
    that--what I wanted to say was they were not being tied up and
    bundled into a plane.
        Chairman Lieberman. Exactly. Understood.
        Mr. Liepman. But it is a process of mental coercion.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right, it was not a thought that they
    just had on their own to say, ``I want to go over and fight
    with al-Shabaab.''
        Mr. Liepman. Right.
        Chairman Lieberman. Either they got it over the Internet or
    usually a combination of Internet and a spiritual sanctioner.
        By total coincidence, yesterday the Senate Armed Services
    Committee had its annual hearing with the Director of National
    Intelligence, Admiral Dennis Blair, and with the Director of
    the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), General Michael Maples.
    Senator Collins and I, both members of that Committee, were
    there.
        General Maples actually testified that from information
    that he has received, DIA has received, he believes a formal
    merger between al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab is forthcoming soon. We
    have obviously seen an increasing connection between these two
    terrorist organizations over the last year, particularly in
    online content; the statement made by Ayman al-Zawahiri just a
    month ago in a video embracing al-Shabaab.
        So here is my concern: If there is a former merger between
    al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda, doesn't that raise our concern about
    the potential that the recruiting going on of Somali-Americans
    here will result in people being sent back here--or perhaps to
    other countries--because people are traveling with American
    passports?
        In other words, if we accept the premise that al-Qaeda has
    made clear that its intention is not primarily about the
    Ethiopian invasion of Somalia but really is about world jihad,
    isn't there a concern that if al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab merged,
    this is really a game changer, and that the possibility of
    these recruits from America being sent back here for purposes
    of attacking gets higher?
        Mr. Liepman. The conversations between al-Shabaab and al-
    Qaeda have been occurring now for quite some time. We have
    heard rumors of an imminent merger, and it has been imminent
    for a while.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right.
        Mr. Liepman. It could happen very soon. It could happen
    sometime down the road.
        We have several precedents of organizations that have
    merged with al-Qaeda, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is
    the most recent example. It is a couple years old.
        Two years ago, when they merged, I think we had the same
    concerns as you have just stated, that group would suddenly
    look beyond Algeria and North Africa, and start targeting
    Europe and the United States. And it has been much slower to
    happen than I think we feared.
        I think that a merger certainly increases that danger, and
    as the global jihadist philosophy evolved into the
    organization, they will be mindful of additional targets
    outside Somalia. We see al-Shabaab really focused right now on
    the fight in the Horn of Africa. And I think it would take some
    time to develop the capabilities and really to change that
    mind-set.
        Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Mudd
        Mr. Mudd. Yes, I keep wanting to contradict Mr. Liepman,
    and I am looking for an opportunity to do so. But I think he is
    right here. I think the word ``merger'' can be a bit misleading
    because, I agree, I am not sure this will happen. But merger
    does not necessarily mean operational linkage to al-Qaeda. I
    think people who look at al-Qaeda through the lens of it being
    just a terrorist organization are mistaken. This is a
    revolutionary movement, and having someone on a beachhead of
    the Horn of Africa who, regardless of operational linkages,
    raises their hand and says, ``I am part of the movement,'' as
    they have done in al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda of
    the Two Rivers of Sudan, and al-Qaeda in Iraq. These are
    representative of an effort by al-Qaeda to push out the
    movement, not necessarily always representative of direct
    operational linkages that might represent a clear increase in
    threats to the United States, although as Mr. Liepman says, we
    have got to watch out for this. This is long term.
        Chairman Lieberman. A final point, if I may, to you, Mr.
    Mudd, and then a question. I want to report to you that my
    staff, which has spent some time in Minneapolis on the ground
    in preparation for the hearing, has found some concern among
    the Minneapolis Police Department that they are not adequately
    involved in the FBI work there, and that they have more than
    they can bring to the table with regard to their own longer-
    term interactions in a positive way with the Somali community
    in Minneapolis. I know you are on the Joint Terrorism Task
    Force with them, but they feel that they can contribute more.
        The second is just to wrap this part of the hearing up, in
    a sense, in a way of reassurance, because we may have said some
    things to alarm people here, but that the FBI is involved in an
    investigation which is aimed at--we understand you are involved
    in outreach, as I said, to the community. But you are involved
    in an investigation which may result in the arrest of some
    individuals who are involved in the recruiting and
    radicalization. Is that correct?
        Mr. Mudd. There are ongoing investigations, and I think I
    will sort of defer any further comment on them. But it is a
    significant concern to us.
        Chairman Lieberman. Good enough. Thank you. Senator
    Collins.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Mudd, it is expensive to take someone
    from Minneapolis to Somalia. It is complicated to get a person
    there. The evidence we have is that the plane ticket for the
    young man in question cost around $2,000. That is money he
    clearly did not have personally.
        Where is the money coming from?
        Mr. Mudd. I do not think that the people who are going over
    there are all supplying all their own cash. I think it is worth
    understanding that, like other diaspora communities, there are
    informal ways--you are probably familiar with the hawala
    method, for example, which exists in this community to pass
    money that is very difficult to follow. The vast majority of
    this money is going for remittances, the same thing you would
    see, for example, in a Sri Lankan or a Bangladeshi community.
        Some small portion of that money, I think, is probably
    going to help fund these folks going over. I am not sure I
    would buy your suggestion that this is really expensive. If you
    are talking about tens of people who are going over in pretty
    difficult environments over there, not for high-end terrorist
    training but to become in some cases cannon fodder, you have a
    ticket, you have somebody at the other end who will be a
    facilitator, and then somebody who is in a general training
    camp with other folks.
        Given the extensive amount of money raised in large
    diaspora communities here, I personally would not think it
    would be that hard to skim off a little bit of that in various
    places and fund some plane tickets for tens of people.
    Terrorism is cheap.
        Senator Collins. Well, I guess what I meant is compared to
    the income of the young men in question, it is not as if they
    have this funding.
        Mr. Mudd. I am agreeing that I do not think they are self-
    funding all this.
        Senator Collins. Right.
        Mr. Mudd. This is part of the apparatus that we are talking
    about here.
        Senator Collins. That is my point.
        I want to end my questions on this round by going back to a
    fundamental question: Why recruit Americans? As Mr. Liepman
    said, it is not to fill up the ranks. There are plenty of
    people in-country who would perform this role.
        It also does involve expenditures that would not otherwise
    be incurred. It is difficult. There is a risk of being caught.
    And that is why I am wondering if part of the reason is to sow
    seeds of fear within the Somali diaspora. I wonder if part of
    the reason is to create the kind of dissension within the
    community that we have seen in Minneapolis. I wonder if it is
    in part the terrorists wanting to cast a cloud of suspicion
    over the Somali-American community that might lead to further
    alienation of some of the young people.
        Could you comment on this issue further?
        Mr. Mudd. Sure. I think it is pretty straightforward. This
    is a push, not a pull. It is a pull in the sense that you have
    a jihadist environment where people from Somalia in this
    country, a few people, might say, ``I want to go fight,'' as
    others from other communities might have said, ``I want to
    fight in Afghanistan'' in the 1980s. But by push, I mean people
    here who are saying, ``I want to do this''--maybe because this
    is an example of a place where we have a foreign invader, or an
    example of a place where we can live in a country that is ruled
    by Sharia law. You mentioned recruitment. I do not see people
    out there saying, ``Can we have another 10 Americans?''
        So I think it is a simple story of people saying, ``I
    either want to fight for my country'' or ``I want to go live in
    a different social kind of religious environment,''--and it is
    relatively inexpensive to get there--not people at the other
    end saying, ``I wish I had more Americans.'' In fact, in some
    cases the Americans can be a security risk for them. Who are
    these folks who are traveling from outside, traveling from
    roots that might be vulnerable to exploitation? So it is not
    always a plus for the guys on the other end.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Liepman.
        Mr. Liepman. I agree with that, and I think that is the
    case not just with Americans but the British recruits. There
    are communities around the world of Somalis who feel very
    attached to their homeland, some of whom have expressed a
    desire to go back and fight. And I think that desire is being
    facilitated.
        Senator Collins. But that is the key to me. I agree with
    you that, based on our investigation, individuals generally
    begin the radicalization process on their own. But based on our
    intensive study, there is almost always a catalyst, a person,
    the ``spiritual sanctioner,'' in the words of the NYPD; the
    operational leader in cases where the plot becomes operational.
        Mr. Mudd. I see where you are going. If I could take
    another shot at this, sometimes we think of these
    organizations, whether it is al-Shabaab or al-Qaeda, as
    hierarchical, sort of pyramid-like, which is classic American
    concept. You might want to think of this as hub and spoke.
    These are first-generation folks, whether they are the small
    sliver who are involved in extremism or just people sending
    remittances back. All of them in independent communities across
    the United States have linkages back home. So they all would
    have an independent way to call somebody and say, ``I am going
    to send a few folks over. Can you facilitate them when they get
    there, get to the right camp?'' It is close linkages back home,
    close clan linkages, and those linkages have persisted since we
    have had the diaspora community starting probably in the early
    1990s.
        Mr. Liepman. Just to reinforce, I said before that it would
    be a mistake to correlate al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab too closely.
    They are very different kinds of organizations. Al-Shabaab is
    more of a movement of young people with a wide variety of goals
    and clan affiliations. So as Mr. Mudd said, you can make
    connections with al-Shabaab much easier than you can with the
    leaders of al-Qaeda in Pakistan.
        Senator Collins. But don't you think that there is also a
    public relations angle, for lack of a better word, to this,
    that if al-Shabaab can say, ``See, we have Americans. America
    pretends it is the best country in the world, and yet we have
    Americans coming here to join in jihad?'' Isn't that a play
    here, too?
        Mr. Liepman. Sure, I think that is a factor. And it would
    be easier for the folks back in Somalia to respond to the
    desire to come by saying, ``You are actually more of a burden
    than you are a help in our fight.'' But they do, they welcome
    them, not just Americans but Brits, South Africans, and
    Nigerians.
        So I do think there is an element of broadening the base of
    that opposition, first, to the invasion by the Ethiopians, and
    now to the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia. I do
    think they are doing propagandizing.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Mr. Mudd. If I could flip your optic, I would think of it
    instead, if you look at statements by people like Ayman al-
    Zawahiri, the second in charge of al-Qaeda, as an
    organization--and I talked about it as a revolutionary
    movement, saying if you want to join the movement, if you are
    Nigerian or Malian, whoever you are, one of the forefronts is
    Somalia. And some of that echo effect, ripple effect, reaches
    people in the United States who might be predisposed to join
    the movement already.
        So their perception is al-Zawahiri in a sense might see
    himself as a statesman. He is the statesman responsible for the
    revolutionary message of al-Qaeda, and that message is there
    are beachheads in Pakistan, which is a difficult place to be as
    a foreign fighter now; Iraq, which, as you said, Senator
    Lieberman, a difficult place. There is another beachhead. So
    whether you are American, British, Danish, Nigerian, come on
    down, we have got a place for you.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.
        Senator Voinovich, do you have any further questions.
        Senator Voinovich. I would just follow up on the same
    thing. In other words, the recruitment or the encouragement is
    coming to Somalis all over the world. So it is not just
    concentrating on the United States.
        Mr. Liepman. That is right.
        Senator Voinovich. This is come on in and help your country
    out, and incidental thereto may be that you are going to be
    helping al-Qaeda. But you said earlier that there was not, to
    your knowledge, any formal links between them but there may be
    some informal relationships there.
        Mr. Liepman. There is a formal link between the top leaders
    of al-Shabaab and the leaders of al-Qaeda, but not
    organizationally yet, no.
        Senator Voinovich. In terms of al-Shabaab doing what al-
    Qaeda would like to do or something of that sort.
        Mr. Liepman. Right. We do not see that at this point.
        Senator Voinovich. And that the young people that are
    leaving here, the motivation for them is that they see a cause
    of some sort, and to your knowledge, there is not some big
    organized effort here to go out and find as many people and
    send them over to Somalia, but that it is kind of a
    spontaneous--coming from groups of people around that have
    different little tribes or it is that they have moved here to
    the United States, and some are more involved than others.
        I remember after the declaration of the Bosnian War that we
    had certain ethnic groups here in the United States that got
    involved, and they were not really trying to do anything to us.
    They were just trying to do something to the other people that
    were here in this country.
        So I would like that to be very clear because I do not want
    anybody to think that somehow the Somalis--that it is an
    organized effort, they are sending them over here, they are
    sending them back here, and look out because they are going to
    get involved in some terrorist type of activity. And that is
    where it is at right now, and as I mentioned earlier, our goal
    right now is to look at some of the reasons why some of them
    maybe pop up and say, ``I have to get out of here, and I have
    to go overseas and see if that can be responded to.'' And
    probably that has to be done right in the community among their
    own people to say, ``Here is the deal.''
        Mr. Liepman. Senator, I think you described it well. They
    are going to Somalia to fight for their homeland, not to join
    al-Qaeda's jihad against the United States--so far.
        Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Senator Burris, do you have any further
    questions?
        Senator Burris. Not this round.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks. Mr. Liepman and Mr. Mudd, thank
    you for your testimony. I am sure we will see you again before
    long. Or we will subpoena you if you will not come back
    voluntarily. [Laughter.]
        We will call the second panel now: Ken Menkhaus, Professor
    of Political Science at Davidson College; Osman Ahmed,
    President of the Riverside Plaza Tenants Association; and Abdi
    Mukhtar, Youth Program Manager at the Brian Coyle Center.
        Thanks very much, gentlemen, for your willingness to be
    here.
        Dr. Menkhaus, we would like to begin with you. We
    appreciate it. You have spent some time, probably more than
    most, in developing expertise, doing research, and doing some
    writing in the general subject matter area that we are covering
    here today. We are grateful that you could come, and we welcome
    your testimony now.

      TESTIMONY OF KEN MENKHAUS, PH.D.,\1\ PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
                       SCIENCE, DAVIDSON COLLEGE

        Mr. Menkhaus. Senator Lieberman, Senator Collins, I thank
    you both for the opportunity to speak here today. I would like
    to offer a few observations about the current Somali crisis,
    the role of the diaspora in Somalia, and the question of
    recruitment of diaspora youth into the extremist group al-
    Shabaab.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Menkhaus appears in the Appendix
    on page 105.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Somalia has been beset by one of the longest and most
    destructive crises in the post-Cold War era. The Somali people
    have endured 19 years of complete state collapse, civil war,
    chronic insecurity, and recurring humanitarian crises. An
    estimated 1 million Somalis are today refugees scattered across
    the globe. This has been an exceptionally traumatic period for
    the Somali people.
        Over the course of this long period of statelessness,
    Islamic institutions--charities, schools, sharia courts, and
    political movements--have helped to fill the vacuum left by the
    collapsed state. Somalis increasingly look to Islam as an
    answer to their plight. The ascendance of political Islam is an
    enduring trend in Somalia, and in general terms, this need not
    be viewed as a problem for or a threat to the United States.
        The period since 2006 has been especially violent and
    destructive. In 2006, an Islamic administration briefly arose
    in Mogadishu and for 6 months provided very impressive levels
    of public order. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU), was very
    popular with Somalis as a result. Ultimately, hard-liners in
    the ICU, including political figures commanding a small
    committed militia, known as al-Shabaab, marginalized political
    moderates in the Islamic movement and took actions which
    threatened the security of neighboring Ethiopia. With U.S.
    support, Ethiopia launched an offensive in December 2006,
    routing the ICU and militarily occupying the Somali capital,
    Mogadishu.
        Predictably, Somalis of all political persuasions deeply
    resented the Ethiopian occupation, and within weeks an armed
    insurgency arose. The counterinsurgency by Ethiopian forces and
    the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was very
    heavy-handed, and within months Mogadishu was the site of a
    catastrophe. Seven hundred thousand residents of the city were
    displaced by the violence. Much of the capital was damaged.
    Thousands died, and an epidemic of assassinations and assaults
    by all sides gripped the city. By 2008, the violence spread
    throughout the countryside. Three million Somalis are now in
    need of humanitarian aid, prompting the U.N. to declare Somalia
    the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
        For our purposes, two important developments arose from
    this catastrophe. First, it generated an enormous amount of
    anger among Somalis, both at home and abroad. This has
    manifested itself in high levels of anti-Ethiopian, anti-
    American, anti-Western, and anti-U.N. sentiment. Second, one
    group--the hardline Islamist militia, al-Shabaab--emerged as
    the main source of armed resistance to the TFG and the
    Ethiopian occupation. Al-Shabaab successful conflated its
    radical Islamist ideology with Somali nationalism. In the eyes
    of most Somalis, al-Shabaab was a legitimate national
    resistance to a foreign occupation. Al-Shabaab was seen by many
    Somalis as freedom fighters, not terrorists, even by Somalis
    who found their radical policies appalling and their rumored
    links to al-Qaeda very worrisome.
        In March 2008, the United States declared al-Shabaab a
    terrorist group. The many Somalis who had provided indirect or
    direct support to al-Shabaab were thereby immediately
    criminalized. In May 2008, the United States launched a
    Tomahawk missile attack which killed the top al-Shabaab leader,
    Aden Hashi Ayro. Thereafter, al-Shabaab announced an intent to
    attack U.S., Western, and U.N. targets, both inside and outside
    Somalia. Its principal focus remains the national struggle, but
    we are now formally a target of them as well.
        Al-Shabaab is today the strongest single armed group in the
    country, controlling territory from the Kenyan border to the
    outskirts of Mogadishu. It has links to al-Qaeda. But recent
    developments are working against al-Shabaab. Ethiopia withdrew
    its forces in Somalia in December 2008. The unpopular TFG
    President, Abdullahi Yusuf, resigned in December 2008. A new
    U.S. Administration has taken office and is reviewing its
    policies on Somalia. And a peace accord, known as the Djibouti
    Process, has forged a new governing alliance of moderates from
    the TFG and Islamist opposition, now led by President Sheikh
    Sharif.
        Al-Shabaab has been deprived from its main raison d'etre
    and now faces growing resistance from Somali militias allied
    with the new unity government. Al-Shabaab also faces internal
    divisions, including tensions between hard-core members and
    those who joined the cause mainly to rid their country of a
    foreign occupation.
        Put another way, not all al-Shabaab members are committed
    jihadists, making it problematic to label the entire group
    ``terrorists.'' Somalis who were willing to support al-Shabaab
    when it represented the main source of resistance to Ethiopian
    occupation appear uninterested in supporting al-Shabaab in its
    bid to grab power and impose its extremist policies on Somalia.
    Al-Shabaab may well have hit its high watermark in 2008 and now
    faces declining support and possible defections. If so, this is
    good news. It would mean that the threat of al-Shabaab
    recruitment among the diaspora will be less of a threat in the
    future.
        An assessment of the threat of terrorist recruitment among
    the Somali diaspora must start with an understanding of the
    diaspora's role in Somalia today. The principal role the
    diaspora has played over the past 20 years has been an economic
    lifeline to Somalia. Its remittances are by far and away the
    most important source of income in Somalia, estimated at $1
    billion remitted to Somalia each year.
        Chairman Lieberman. Is that just from the U.S. or
    worldwide?
        Mr. Menkhaus. Worldwide. It is fair to say that the
    diaspora keeps much of Somalia alive. The diaspora is also
    pressured to contribute to communal fundraising, some of which
    is used for good causes like community projects. In other
    cases, the fundraising can support militias or even extremist
    groups like al-Shabaab. The diaspora does not always control
    how their money is used.
        Somali business, political, and civic life is increasingly
    dominated by the diaspora. An estimated 70 percent of the new
    TFG cabinet, for instance, holds citizenship abroad, and the
    new Prime Minister himself is a Canadian Somali, who has
    resided for years in Virginia.
        In sum, Somalia has become a diasporized nation. Many
    Somalis with citizenship abroad return to Somalia often to
    visit family, check on business investments, manage nonprofits,
    or pursue political ambitions. This makes it increasingly
    difficult to draw meaningful distinctions between the Somalis
    and the Somali diaspora. Virtually every Somali enterprise,
    whether the shareholder group of the Coca-Cola bottling plant
    in Mogadishu, which is still working, or the new TFG
    administration, or al-Shabaab itself, is likely to have a
    significant diaspora component. Extensive travel to Somalia and
    financial and other interactions by Somali-Americans with their
    home country should not constitute, therefore, a high-risk
    profile.
        The Minneapolis case of Shirwa Ahmed and other youth who
    have been recruited into al-Shabaab raises a basic question
    that you have both asked this morning. Why would al-Shabaab
    actively recruit diaspora members? What can a diaspora recruit
    do that a local militia fighter cannot?
        First, it is clear that the diaspora are not much value as
    rank-and-file militia for al-Shabaab or any other fighting
    force in Somalia. Somalia is already saturated with experienced
    teenage gunmen and has no need to import more. In fact,
    evidence from the ICU in 2006 suggests the Somali diaspora as
    well as foreign fighters were as much a liability as an asset.
    They were unfamiliar with the countryside, often spoke the
    Somali language poorly, were more likely to become sick, and
    required a fair amount of oversight.
        But the diaspora are useful to other al-Shabaab and other
    armed groups in Somalia in other ways. Their familiarity with
    computers and the Internet is a valuable communications skill,
    and to come to the point of our hearing, a young diaspora
    recruit is, upon arrival in Somalia, entirely cut off socially
    and, therefore, in theory, easier to isolate, indoctrinate, and
    control for the purpose of executing suicide bombings. Were
    this not the case, it would be much less risky and expensive
    for al-Shabaab to simply recruit locals.
        From this perspective, a young diaspora member who heeds
    the call by a recruiter to ``join the cause'' of fighting to
    protect his nation and religion is not so much a terrorist as a
    pawn, exploited by the real terrorists, those who are unwilling
    themselves to die for their cause but who are happy to
    manipulate a vulnerable and isolated youth to blow himself up.
        In my assessment, a Somali diaspora member groomed to be a
    terrorist is of most utility to al-Shabaab for suicide
    operation either inside Somalia or in the region of the Horn of
    Africa--Kenya, Djibouti, and especially now Ethiopia. The
    reason for this is that these recruits would need ``handlers''
    both to help them navigate through unfamiliar situations and to
    ensure that they go through with the attack. I am much less
    convinced that al-Shabaab would be willing to risk sending a
    trained and indoctrinated diaspora member back to the United
    States as a ``sleeper'' for a future terrorist attack in the
    United States. The risks to al-Shabaab would be enormous. They
    would not be in a position to easily manage and control their
    recruit. The recruit could even defect and provide damaging
    information on al-Shabaab to U.S. law enforcement. And even if
    al-Shabaab managed to send totally committed recruits back to
    the United States, a al-Shabaab-directed terrorist attack
    inside the United States would almost certainly have disastrous
    consequences for al-Shabaab, not only in terms of the U.S.
    response, but from Somali society as well. Recall that
    remittances from the diaspora are the economic lifeline of
    Somalia. Anything that jeopardizes the status of Somalis living
    abroad imperils the entire country, and al-Shabaab would face
    enormous blowback from within the Somali community.
        In sum, my sense is that the threat of an American of
    Somali descent joining al-Shabaab and then returning as a
    sleeper to the United States is quite low. The threat still
    requires careful law enforcement attention, but should not be
    overblown. There is one exception to this assessment. A Somali-
    American who joins al-Shabaab and who has then proceeded to
    Pakistan or Afghanistan and who becomes an al-Qaeda operative
    is of much greater concern. The reasoning for this is
    straightforward. Al-Shabaab's agenda is still essentially a
    nationalist one, while al-Qaeda's is global. Al-Qaeda would not
    weigh the costs of a terrorist attack in the United States on
    the Somali economy and the Somali diaspora, whereas al-Shabaab
    would. A Somali-American acting through the ideological prism
    of al-Qaeda would be more willing to serve as a sleeper than
    would a al-Shabaab member.
        I would like to conclude with just a few thoughts on the
    Somali experience with and response to law enforcement
    authorities, much of which has already been alluded to this
    morning.
        First, Somalis have a long and unhappy experience with the
    state and the police back in their country of origin. As a
    result, not all Somalis view the State, law enforcement, and
    the law as a source of protection and order; some view law
    enforcement with fear, as something to avoid. Behavior which
    appears to be evasive or untruthful can often be traced back to
    this generic fear of law enforcement and should not be
    misinterpreted. Sustained police programs to socialize Somali-
    American communities and reshape their perception of the state
    and the law are essential if this is to be overcome. They need
    to appreciate the difference between ``rule of law'' and ``rule
    by law'' and feel confident that the U.S. law enforcement
    system reflects the former and not the latter.
        Some Somali households are likely to be nervous about any
    attention from law enforcement not because of links to
    terrorism, but because of the risk that U.S. law enforcement
    will in the process uncover other ``irregularities,'' including
    illegal immigration, putting the community's interests at risk.
        All communities have their ``dominant narratives'' and
    Somalis are no exception. Their dominant narrative is a story
    of victimization and persecution both at home and abroad. It is
    very easy for some in the Somali-American community to
    interpret current U.S. law enforcement attention as yet another
    instance of witch hunting and persecution, reflecting a
    combination of anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, anti-African
    sentiments. Some flatly deny there is a problem with al-Shabaab
    recruitment at all. The only way to produce better cooperation
    with this community is through routinized communication that
    builds trust with local law enforcement and which gives Somalis
    a clearer sense not only of their legal and social obligations
    as citizens but also of their legal rights.
        The U.S. Government needs to provide much clearer
    guidelines to Somalis about what constitutes legal and illegal
    behavior with regard to political engagement in their country
    of origin. If not, we run the risk of criminalizing routine
    diaspora engagement in Somalia. The fact that al-Shabaab was
    not designated a terrorist organization before March 2008 but
    then was so designated is an example of the legal confusion
    facing Somalis. Something that was legal in February 2008 is
    now aiding and abetting terrorism. As you know, this is a
    question of relevance to many other immigrant communities in
    the United States whose country of origin is embroiled in war
    or whose charities have come under suspicion of serving as
    terrorist fronts. The U.S. Government cannot ask its citizens
    to abide by the law if the laws themselves are too opaque to be
    understood, and this is especially the case if legal charges
    can be made retroactively for affiliations with groups which
    were acceptable in the past but then designated terrorist.
        Finally, it goes without saying that the main
    responsibility for policing Somali youth to ensure they do not
    become members of criminal gangs or terrorist groups falls
    squarely on the shoulders of Somali parents and community
    leaders. To the extent that Somali communities need additional
    outside support to provide for a safe and controlled
    environment for their children to grow up, we should try to
    provide it. Most importantly, we need to ensure that first-
    generation Somali-Americans are growing up with a strong sense
    of being American citizens with all the rights and
    responsibilities that entails. A Somali diaspora population
    that feels it belongs neither here nor in Somalia will be much
    more susceptible to radical movements promising their own sense
    of identity and belonging.
        I hope these brief observations are of help as you exercise
    oversight on a topic with both important implications for
    national security and civil liberties. Like many U.S. citizens,
    I was greatly moved by President Obama's promise in his
    inaugural speech: ``We reject as false the choice between our
    safety and our ideals.'' I am confident that we can address the
    security concerns raised by Somali-American recruitment into
    al-Shabaab without violating their civil rights and those of
    the community. Thank you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. I agree. That was very
    helpful. I will have questions for you in the question and
    answer period, but let me just as a baseline ask you to give
    the Committee a sense of the size of the global Somali diaspora
    as compared to the population in Somalia.
        Mr. Menkhaus. Our estimates of the global Somali population
    are about 1 million out of a total Somali population--Somalis
    citizens, not the 4 million who are Ethiopian Somalis and
    400,000 who are Kenyan Somalis--of about 9 to 10 million. So
    roughly one in 10 or more are abroad now.
        Chairman Lieberman. OK. Thanks very much.
        The next witness has come to us from Minneapolis. We again
    thank you, as I did in my opening statement, for being here to
    make this personal, to help us to understand what is happening
    within the community. Obviously, as I said at the outset, we
    consider you our allies, our fellow Americans, and in a very
    direct sense the victims of those who are recruiting from among
    your families.
        First, we are going to hear from Osman Ahmed, who is the
    President of the Riverside Plaza Tenants Association in
    Minneapolis. Thank you very much for being here.

    TESTIMONY OF OSMAN AHMED,\1\ PRESIDENT, RIVERSIDE PLAZA TENANTS
                  ASSOCIATION, MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

        Mr. Ahmed. Senators Lieberman and Collins, I would like to
    thank you on behalf of the family members of the children who
    were recruited to Somalia, members of the Somali community, and
    on my own behalf for inviting us to the congressional hearing
    committee. I would like to also thank Omar Jamal, who is the
    Director of Somali Justice Advocacy Center, who helped us, and
    worked a lot of time.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Ahmed appears in the Appendix on
    page 119.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We would also like to thank the senatorial officials who
    came all the way to Minneapolis on February 28, 2009, to meet
    with the family members and the community. Also, I want to
    acknowledge the FBI office in Minneapolis and its agents who
    work day and night to locate our children. We do indeed feel
    grateful of their extreme efforts.
        The first time we became suspicious was when we received a
    message from Roosevelt High School saying that our kid, Burhan,
    missed all school classes on November 4, 2008.
        Chairman Lieberman. Excuse me, Mr. Ahmed. Say his name
    again so we get it clear.
        Mr. Ahmed. Burhan Hussan.
        Chairman Lieberman. Was he a relative of yours?
        Mr. Ahmed. Yes, he was my nephew.
        Chairman Lieberman. OK.
        Mr. Ahmed. It was November 4, 2008. That to us sounded
    strange and we were stunned. We roamed around the metropolitan
    area and even beyond, nationwide. We went to Abubakar As-
    Saddique Mosque and Dawa Mosque, called our building security,
    called Hennepin County Medical Center, hospital emergency
    rooms, and the airport. After that, his mother looked into his
    room and found that his travel luggage was missing, his clothes
    were not there, and his passport was missing also. We
    immediately notified respective law enforcement agencies. We
    immediately contacted the local police office and the FBI
    office in Minneapolis.
        We have been up on our heels since we have realized that
    one of our children was mentally and physically kidnapped on
    November 4, 2008, on Election Day.
        Understanding challenges the Somali community in
    Minneapolis faces today--there are many challenges that the
    Somali community in Minnesota faces like other first-generation
    immigrants. These include limited language proficiency, limited
    skills, and the cultural barrier, as well as the Minnesota
    weather. Most of these Somali-American families are headed by
    single mothers.
        The system is an alternative approach, but understanding it
    is also a barrier. The neighborhood, particularly the West
    Bank/Cedar/Riverside area, has limited resources that could be
    of value to the community members.
        Perspective of family members of the recruited kids--the
    missing Somali-American children created anguish and fear to
    the immediate family members and in the general communities. No
    one can imagine the destruction this issue has caused for these
    mothers and grandmothers. They are going through the worst time
    in their lives. Imagine how these parents feel when their
    children are returned back to the country were they originally
    fled from the chaos, genocide, gang rape, and lawlessness.
        There are five children among the many that were sent to
    Somalia: Burhan Hassan, 17 years old, senior at Roosevelt High
    School; Mohamud Hassan, 18 years old, studying engineering at
    the University of Minnesota; Abdisalam Ali, 19 years old,
    studying health at the University of Minnesota; Jamal Aweys, 19
    years old, studying engineering at Minneapolis Community and
    Technical College, and later at Normandale College here in
    Minnesota; as well as Mustafa Ali, who is 18 years old,
    studying at Harding High School in St. Paul.
        These Somali-American kids were not troubled kids or in
    gangs. They were the hope of the Somali-American community.
    They were the doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists, and
    leaders of the future of our strong and prosperous nation. For
    instance, Burhan Hassan was a brilliant student with straight
    A's and on top of his class. He was taking college courses--
    calculus, advanced chemistry--as he was about to graduate from
    high school. These classes were sponsored by the University of
    Minnesota. He was an ambitious kid with the hope to go to
    Harvard University to study medicine or law and become a
    medical doctor or a lawyer.
        All these youth shared common things. They all left Somalia
    in their infancy like my nephew, Burhan Hassan. He was 8 months
    old when they arrived in Kenya. He was less than 4 years old
    when he arrived in the United States, February 12, 1996. Like
    his peers, Burhan Hassan was never interested in Somali
    politics or understood Somali clan issues. Burhan grew up in a
    single-parent household. His immediate family members,
    including his mother and siblings, are educated. He studied
    Islam at a nearby Abubakar As-Saddique Mosque like the rest of
    the kids since 1998. Abubakar As-Saddique was opened a couple
    of years ago. Before then, it used to be called Shafi'e Mosque
    in the Cedar Riverside neighborhood area when Burhan started.
    He attended its youth group. These kids have no perception of
    Somalia except the one that was formed in their mind by their
    teachers at the Abubakar Center. We believe that these children
    did not travel to Somalia by themselves. There must be others
    who made them understand that going to Somalia and
    participating in the fighting is the right thing to do. To
    address the issue from a factual perspective, it is the dream
    of every Somali parent to have their children go to the mosque,
    but none of them expected to have their children's mind
    programmed in a manner that is in line with the extremist's
    ideologies. In the case of Burhan, he spent more than 10 years
    going to the mosque. This is evidenced by others who also
    attended the mosque.
        One thing for sure is that the methods of indoctrination
    are highly sophisticated. The plan of al-Shabaab is basically
    to destroy the world peace, and they will turn every leaf to
    achieve that. Their mission is not isolated into Somalia but
    has far-reaching goals.
        The Somali-American youth were isolated because they have
    been told that if they share their views with others, including
    their family members, they will not be understood and might as
    well be turned over to the infidel's hands. These children are
    victims on every side. They have been lied to. They were told
    that they will be shown the Islamic utopia that has been hidden
    from them by the infidels and the brainwashed parents. Our
    children had no clue they were being recruited to join al-
    Shabaab. We are getting a lot of information back home from
    Somalia. We also heard that when kids arrive, they are
    immediately shocked at what utopia is, and all their documents
    and belongings are confiscated. They are whisked to hidden
    military camps for trainings. They are also told if they flee
    and return home that they will end up in Guantanamo Bay. They
    do not know anyone in Somalia.
        Why is al-Shabaab interested in American and Western kids?
    We believe the reason al-Shabaab is interested in American and
    Western kids is that these kids do not have any relatives in
    Somalia. They cannot go back to their countries for they will
    be reported to the authorities by local al-Shabaab recruiters.
    They are also very valuable in interpreting for al-Shabaab
    trainers of American and Western descent.
        They could be used for anything they want. They could be
    trained or forced to become suicide bombers in Somalia, and
    they can do it out of desperation. For many of them, Burhan,
    for example, have no idea where to go for help in Somalia. This
    is the first time he has been to Somalia in his life. These are
    basically the main reasons why al-Shabaab is recruiting from
    the Western countries.
        Another issue of paramount importance is the fact that we
    are the first family members who informed the law enforcement
    about the missing of these youth. Family members whose children
    sent to Somalia were scared to even talk to the law
    enforcement. We have been painted as bad people within the
    Somali community by the mosque management. We have been
    threatened for just speaking out. Some members of Abubakar As-
    Saddique Mosque told us that if we talk about the issue, the
    Muslim center will be destroyed, and Islamic communities will
    be wiped out. They tell parents that if they report their
    missing kid to the FBI, the FBI will send the parents to
    Guantanamo jail. And this message has been a very effective
    tool to silence parents and the community.
        They do have a lot of cash to use for propaganda machine.
    They strike fear on a daily basis, here in Minneapolis, among
    Somali-speaking community in order to stop the community to
    cooperate with the law enforcement agencies. Public threats
    were issued to us at Abubakar As-Saddique Mosque for simply
    speaking with CNN, Newsweek, and other media. The other mystery
    is that they say one thing on Somali TVs and at their
    congregations, they say something contrary to that in English
    while speaking to the mainstream media or community.
        They also told us not to talk to the media because that
    will also endanger the Muslim leaders. We have been projected
    as pariah within the community by these mosque leaders. We are
    tormented by the fact that our children are missing and
    imperiled. These members are scaring us so that we stop talking
    to law enforcement.
        Perspective on al-Shabaab to attract young people to their
    cause--The most important factor on how al-Shabaab attracts the
    young Somali-Americans is the indoctrination of the children.
    They are programmed to understand that it is their duty to
    confront the infidels. There are youth programs that in some
    instances have some hidden agendas. These agendas include that
    whatever issues that might come across in life is twisted as
    being the work of the infidels. They have been told to
    understand that the Ethiopian troops in Somalia are an act of
    aggression against the Islamic religion. Al-Shabaab is not only
    interested in recruiting Somali-American youth but others in
    other Western countries, such as the United Kingdom, Germany,
    Canada, and Australia. The main reason for al-Shabaab to
    recruit from these countries is that these youth have different
    views than a typical Somali in Somalia. They do not know much
    about Somali clan and have no political affiliation whatsoever.
        There are some radical groups who were a minority in their
    thinking. However, when the Ethiopian troops came to Somalia,
    some Somali-American professors clearly declared the war
    against Ethiopian troops. This has been a scapegoat for their
    extremist political views. It encouraged radical Islamic groups
    in the United States who previously were not active in the
    political activities here and in Somalia.
        In conclusion, we the families of the missing kids have
    been conducting an outreach campaign to reach out to those
    families that have not come forward. We believe this is the tip
    of the iceberg. In our outreach, we have been very successful
    to help some families to come forward and trust the law
    enforcement like we did.
        Recommendations for preventing recruitment in the future:
    Educate members of the Somali community on the importance of
    cooperation between law enforcement and the community.
        Empower the families of the missing kids to continue the
    outreach to those families who did not come forward.
        Bring to justice those who are responsible.
        Create special task forces to combat the al-Shabaab
    recruitment in Minnesota, Ohio, Seattle, Washington, and
    Boston.
        Scrutinize the funding of suspicious nonprofit agencies
    that undertake youth activities possibly related to radical
    views.
        Investigate if taxpayers' money was involved in the
    brainwashing of our kids because Abubakar Center is a nonprofit
    that might have been getting taxpayers' money for youth
    programs.
        The mosque controls a large amount of money, which is
    raised in these mosques, quarterly or sometimes yearly
    fundraising which lacks transparency--huge amounts of cash--and
    portions of that money could have gone to al-Shabaab groups.
    Second, we are requesting more connection between our community
    and the FBI, so the FBI has to do more outreaching programs to
    the community.
        We need a protection for our children so that they can
    escape enemy hands.
        We need our U.S. Government to forgive these youth to
    enable us to find ways and means to bring them back to their
    homes. And this will give confidence to many more families to
    come out of darkness.
        Warning: Al-Shabaab recruiters have the agility and ability
    to change form. They usually are well represented not only in
    certain mosques but wherever Somali children and young adults
    are concentrated, such as community centers, charter schools
    operated by Somalis. They could sometimes pose as Somali
    community leaders and advise politicians and other agencies
    that are outreaching to the Somali community. Al-shabaab
    recruiters can be active and target the youth at where ever
    Somalis are. Definitely, we don't know who is exactly behind
    this crazy venture. Nonetheless, we need to be vigilant at all
    times. Again, I want to thank you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Ahmed, I want to thank you for your
    courage in standing up in a dangerous situation, including
    against some in the community, and the U.S. Government really
    owes you exactly the kind of support and outreach that you ask
    for. I will say this--I will have questions for you, but the
    picture you paint is clearly not a situation--the word
    ``volunteer'' was used before, and I know the witness on a
    previous panel said he meant to say that they were not coerced.
    But you are describing a situation--and we will get back to
    it--where these were not just young people who stood up, woke
    up, and after a period of time talking to their families and
    said, ``I want to go back to Somalia.'' They were clearly, by
    your telling, radicalized, recruited, and then if I heard you
    correctly, in the case of your nephew, Burhan Hassan, he just
    disappeared. He did not tell anybody he was going, correct?
        Mr. Ahmed. Yes. He did not tell anybody.
        Chairman Lieberman. OK. We will come back to that.
        Our final witness today is Abdi Mukhtar, Youth Program
    Manager from the Brian Coyle Community Center, which I gather
    is a community center at which a lot of young Somali-Americans
    in Minneapolis congregate. Thanks for being here, sir.

      TESTIMONY OF ABDIRAHMAN MUKHTAR,\1\ YOUTH PROGRAM MANAGER,
    BRIAN COYLE CENTER, PILLSBURY UNITED COMMUNITIES, MINNEAPOLIS,
                               MINNESOTA

        Mr. Mukhtar. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins,
    and Members of the Committee, thank you. Before I start my
    statement, also as a parent who has children, I emphasize, and
    I send my sympathy with the family members who are missing
    their kids, and the majority of the Somali-American community,
    sends their sympathy for the families.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mukhtar appears in the Appendix
    on page 125.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
        Mr. Mukhtar. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before
    you today. The Somali youth issue is very important for me
    personally and professionally, and I am honored to have a
    chance to share my experience and expertise about this issue as
    a Somali youth issue expert.
        My name is Abdirahman Mukhtar. I was born in Somalia. I
    fled Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia, when the civil war
    started early January 1991. I went to a refugee camp in Liboa,
    Kenya. I stayed 7 years in refugee camps and the capital city
    of Nairobi in Kenya. I moved to the United States in August
    1998. After moving to the United States, I attended and
    graduated from Roosevelt High School in Minneapolis, and I went
    on to pursue higher education from the University of Minnesota
    with a degree in kinesiology. I am planning to go back to
    graduate school for doctorate of physical therapy in the near
    future.
        I have been working with youth for over 8 years--first with
    the Minneapolis Park and Recreation Department, then with the
    Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota as a Youth
    Diversion Coordinator, and currently as the Youth Program
    Manager at the Brian Coyle Center.
        The Brian Coyle Center serves as a central hub for
    resettlement assistance, social services, adult education,
    employment counseling, youth programming, recreation, and civic
    engagement for the Somali community in the Minneapolis
    metropolitan area. The center includes a gymnasium, community
    room, commercial kitchen, numerous classrooms, a food shelf,
    and a computer lab. Along with Pillsbury United Communities,
    the organization that I work for, there are other organizations
    that have their offices in the building, which includes the
    Confederation of Somali Community in Minnesota; the Oromo
    Community, which is an ethnic Serbian community; Emerge
    Community Development (EMERGE); Somali Youth Network Council;
    Cedar Riverside Neighborhood Revitalization Program; the West
    Bank Community Coalition; Somali Education and Social Advocacy
    Services; East African Economic Development Center; Haboon
    Magazine; and the Somalia Family Advocacy Group. All are
    nonprofit organizations.
        Assimilation to the Minneapolis Community--The main
    difficulty I had assimilating to the mainstream community was
    the language barrier, because I did not speak in English and at
    times people had difficulty understanding me. Second, I
    experienced racial and cultural misunderstandings; many people
    in the American society were not well educated and did not know
    about my culture, religion, and other differences. Many of the
    Somali youth and their parents have similar experiences such as
    limited formal education caused by the Somali civil war and
    settlement in different refugee camps. Somali students like me
    were enrolled into classrooms in the United States based on age
    rather than academic level, making it very difficult to
    succeed. When classes are challenging beyond a person's current
    capability, it often leads to students skipping school and
    dropping out.
        Since parents have to support their families and provide
    food and shelter, but can only get lower-wage jobs--such as
    assembly work, cleaning, temporary jobs, and some of them
    struggle with small businesses that barely make a sustainable
    income--they do not have the time to be involved in their
    children's academic and recreational activities. Not only are
    families working hard to meet the basic needs to support their
    children in the United States, they also are responsible for
    sending money to extended families back in Africa. The
    expectation of the school system on parents for parent
    involvement adds to the challenges for Somali families and
    students. Somali parents and the Somali community value
    education.
        When I started high school, I was fortunate enough to have
    bilingual teachers to assist me in my education and adaptation
    to the education system in America. Now, due to the cutbacks
    and policies, Somali students don't have culturally appropriate
    programs and the support of bilingual teachers in their
    schools.
        It was not easy for me to attend high school because my
    family back home expected me to support them, even though I was
    in my teens. I was encouraged to get a GED instead of finishing
    high school, so I could get a full-time job. Instead, I started
    working 20 hours a week at the Mall of America and continued to
    work towards my high school diploma.
        During the summer, I worked full time while also attending
    summer school to pass the basic standards tests in math and
    English. In my senior year, I took a commanding English class
    at the University of Minnesota in order to improve and be ready
    for college. I was able to take this class through the post-
    secondary options program. Because of my GPA, leadership, and
    extracurricular activities, I was accepted to attend the
    General College of the University of Minnesota, which no longer
    exists.
        Somali youth today experience the same barriers I faced as
    a new immigrant in the United States; however, they do so with
    even fewer resources than what was available for me. Language
    is still a barrier as young Somalis try to achieve success.
    Identity crisis and cultural conflict are a reality for Somali
    youth--for example, Somali culture at home versus American
    culture at school. Parents expect you to keep your culture,
    while the American education system and way of life forces you
    to assimilate. Many have difficulties adjusting to the new way
    of life while facing cultural barriers that seem hard to
    overcome. As a result of identity crisis and frequent
    challenges, many youth lose hope and start making poor choices.
    The current economic situation also adds to the problem since
    jobs are not available for youth. They become truant, getting
    involved in gangs and using drugs like their peers. However,
    there are many successful Somali youths who overcame these
    obstacles.
        Somali families tend to be large, mostly with single
    parents who are working to make ends meet. Many Somali parents
    also provide for relatives, thus reducing their income status
    and livelihood. Even though parents care deeply for their
    children, this continues to be a strain on the support provided
    to Somali youth.
        Somali families for the most part live in high-density
    housing in the lowest-income neighborhoods in the city. The
    Cedar Riverside neighborhood where I live and work has a median
    household income of just $14,367 a year. Let me say that again.
    It is a median household income which is $14,367 a year. The
    unemployment rate is 17 percent--that is according to the 2000
    census--so it is much worse, especially in the economic crisis
    we are facing now. Across the street from the Brian Coyle
    Center, in one apartment complex there are 3,500 residents, of
    which 92 percent are immigrants and 1,190 are under the age of
    18.
        This is the highest concentration of low-income children in
    Minnesota, some people say in the Midwest, and most of them are
    Somalis. Many opportunities and resources are not available in
    neighborhoods that Somalis reside compared to other areas in
    the city. Services are often inaccessible due to lack of
    appropriate local, city, and State agencies offering culturally
    competent services to Somalis. We operate our programs in a
    city-owned building for which the park department doesn't even
    cover the expenses they are required to by contract, so we
    manage with minimal resources.
        When youth don't have access to healthy options to fill
    their free time, they fall into the typical trappings
    associated with youth culture, for example, the Internet--peer
    pressure and cyber predators. Many Somali youth are nowadays
    involved with drug use and gang violence. This seems to be the
    biggest distraction because resources and many important
    opportunities are not available for these youth.
        People without college degrees are limited with regard to
    employment. They are reduced to manual labor and factory work.
    Moreover, racism and employment discrimination still exist in
    many blue-collar establishments. This leads to problems such as
    high divorce rates and child neglect because they are unable to
    provide for their families and other family members.
        Somali youth report a high level of discrimination across
    the board. This includes schools, colleges, the media, in the
    community. and by law enforcement. Discrimination is based on
    ethnicity, culture, and religion. When I asked a group of youth
    ranging in ages 10 to 20 what were their greatest challenges,
    50 percent answered harassment by the police. Because of how
    young Somali-Americans dress, even some of their own community
    members stereotype them.
        Second-generation immigrants are different than first-
    generation. Like many immigrant communities, there is a stark
    difference between first and second-generation Somali
    immigrants. Parents maintain a lifestyle that essentially is
    like living from a suitcase; they hope to return. They
    experience language barriers and have difficulty interacting
    with the larger society. Second-generation Somalis are more
    settled and hope to build their lives here; they are more
    immersed in American culture and they are fully engaged.
        Somali immigrants experience frustration with the education
    system, and new sets of barriers occur for second-generation
    immigrants. Institutions often are not empowering, for example,
    keeping students in English language learner (ELL) even if they
    don't need such courses. Second-generation Somali youth often
    speak English well, but are stereotyped and wrongly assigned to
    low-level classes. Inner city schools still have a graduation
    rate for Somali students well below their white American peers.
    Second-generation Somalis consider themselves Somali-Americans,
    but they experience stereotyping by the broader society who
    sees only their ethnicity and religious affiliation.
        Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Mukhtar, excuse me for
    interrupting. You are considerably over the time we normally
    allow the witnesses. I do not want to cut you off. Let me
    suggestion two things.
        First, you are getting to the Shirwa Ahmed story. I would
    like to ask you to tell us that story. We will then print your
    entire statement in the record, and then we will draw out some
    of your recommendations for solutions in the questions and
    answers. So why don't you proceed and see if you can tell us
    about Shirwa Ahmed.
        Mr. Mukhtar. Shirwa Ahmed and I went to Roosevelt High
    School together, and we are both from Somalia. Recently, it was
    reported, as we said earlier today, that Shirwa was the first
    American citizen known to be a suicide bomber.
        The Somali community is not a monolithic community; it is
    highly diverse. As a first-generation immigrant, I faced many
    challenges in my life, and I had many responsibilities with
    regard to supporting my life. I made decisions that reflect my
    history and experiences. It is difficult to map out the lives
    of people. Many of my classmates took different paths in life
    and ended up in different roles. Some are highly trained
    professionals, some are in jail, some are in the workforce
    earning low wages, and some are in the U.S. Army.
        When learning about Shirwa's role as a suicide bomber,
    people were shocked and angry because it goes against the
    Somali culture and it is also inherently anti-Islamic. Many
    Somalis are not convinced that it happened because the idea
    seems too far out of people's comprehension. Throughout
    Somalia's history, particularly in times of war, suicide
    bombings never occurred, and this is this case.
        I have been asked, ``Do Somali youth talk about Shirwa?''
    Somali youth talk more about March Madness, Kobe Bryant, the
    NFL draft, and basic things. They face different local
    challenges than what the topic of this hearing is today.
        I will just stop there so I can answer the questions since
    I went over my time.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, and we will
    include your full statement and those of the other witnesses in
    the record.
        Let me begin my questioning, and let me begin it with you,
    Mr. Mukhtar. So you knew Shirwa Ahmed. He was your classmate, I
    gather, at Roosevelt High School in Minneapolis, correct?
        Mr. Mukhtar. Actually, he graduated a year ahead of me, but
    we went to the same high school.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right. And I gather a good student,
    serious student?
        Mr. Mukhtar. He was a very quiet guy, good student, but as
    I told you, he was a class ahead of me.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right. So am I correct, as in the case
    of Mr. Ahmed's nephew, that this was a surprise when he left
    for Somalia?
        Mr. Mukhtar. I only heard from the media about his suicide,
    and when the FBI Director mentioned it was the first American
    suicide bomber.
        Chairman Lieberman. OK, I understand. So your contact with
    him was not close. Based on your interaction with Somali-
    American youth in Minneapolis, how do you explain what happened
    to Mr. Ahmed?
        Mr. Mukhtar. You mean what happened to Shirwa Ahmed?
        Chairman Lieberman. Yes, Shirwa Ahmed. Yes, how did he end
    up going to Somalia? I mean, you assume he was recruited by
    somebody?
        Mr. Mukhtar. No. That is why I made my own personal choice,
    and there are a lot of my classmates who also are in jails or
    in gangs. So I don't know how he ended up in that situation.
        Chairman Lieberman. Let me go now to Osman Ahmed, because
    in your testimony--let me ask about Mr. Hassan first, your
    nephew. Am I correct that he has called at times now from
    Somalia to talk to his family to tell him he is there?
        Mr. Ahmed. Yes.
        Chairman Lieberman. And I thought your testimony was very
    interesting. I think I have it right--well, here is what it
    said to me: That when they get there, basically their identity
    is taken away, their papers are taken away. So in some sense,
    they are trapped, and that may be one reason why the recruiting
    of Americans goes on because they are left with no way to get
    out, so they are much more controlled by al-Shabaab.
        Mr. Ahmed. Yes, that is the main reason they are recruited,
    because the local Somalis, if they desired to flee from their
    terrorist group, they have a place to return. They have a
    family, and also they have a protection.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right
        Mr. Ahmed. But these kids, they don't have a protection,
    they don't have their clan, they don't have any family members
    back home. So they have nowhere to go.
        Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Mr. Ahmed, in your testimony, you
    used the word ``they'' several times, ``they'' when describing
    those who recruited and radicalized both your nephew and other
    young men in the Somali community in Minneapolis. And I wanted
    to ask you if you could say a little bit more about who you
    think ``they'' are?
        Mr. Ahmed. There are different minority groups who are
    spreading this ideology of extremism. And before, they never
    came up and shared their views to the community until the
    Ethiopian troops entered Somalia. So at that time, they got
    excused.
        After 2006, those minority groups, they started spreading
    to two mosques in Minneapolis----
        Chairman Lieberman. Mostly through the mosques.
        Mr. Ahmed. Two mosques, even though we also suspect at some
    other mosques around the United States.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right.
        Mr. Ahmed. They changed the management of those two mosques
    to have influence to the community, and that is how we believe
    after 2006 they started recruiting the kids, and also spreading
    their ideology of extremist.
        Chairman Lieberman. So you are convinced that it is people
    within the mosque who are having this effect on some of the
    young men in the Somali community in Minneapolis.
        Mr. Ahmed. Of course, let me give you an example. These
    kids, especially my nephew, he was well connected to the
    mosque. He does not have any friends outside. He used to go to
    school, home, and the mosque.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right.
        Mr. Ahmed. And there is no way he could get that ideology
    from the school or home.
        Chairman Lieberman. Yes, and that is a very important
    point. So his family does not believe in this Islamist
    extremist ideology.
        Mr. Ahmed. No way.
        Chairman Lieberman. Obviously, he was not getting it in
    school.
        Mr. Ahmed. Nothing.
        Chairman Lieberman. Also, again, to point this out--and it
    seems to be a pattern as you described some of the young men
    who had gone, these were, generally speaking, young men who
    were doing pretty well at school, correct?
        Mr. Ahmed. Yes. All of them, they were A students.
        Chairman Lieberman. Yes. And were all of them regular
    attenders at one or more of the mosques?
        Mr. Ahmed. As far as we heard from their families, yes.
        Chairman Lieberman. You also advocated in your testimony
    for more transparency with regard to the funding for the
    Abubakar mosque because, as you suggest, you are worried that
    some of the money may have been sent to al-Shabaab. Why do you
    think that that is so?
        Mr. Ahmed. Actually, that money, it is not only for the
    Abubakar Mosque. There is another mosque which is Da'wan, in
    St. Paul.
        Chairman Lieberman. In St. Paul?
        Mr. Ahmed. Yes. They are collecting quarterly, sometimes
    monthly, sometimes yearly, and they are telling the community
    that they are spending the money for expenses of the mosque and
    the salaries. But the community have questions about where that
    money really is going. And there is no transparency at all.
        Chairman Lieberman. Yes. So your concern, obviously, is
    that some of the money being contributed to the mosque is going
    to al-Shabaab.
        Mr. Ahmed. Actually, we are cautious about that, because,
    one, there is no transparency. They can use that money wherever
    they want to use it.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right. I have a feeling Senator Collins
    is going to ask this question, so I will begin it. But as we
    trace this rather remarkable path that we believe from people
    who have followed it that Burhan Hassan, your nephew, took, he
    went with a group of other young men. They split up. Some went
    to Boston. Some went to Chicago. They had many stops along the
    way before they got to Somalia. And the estimate is that this
    was being coordinated as a way to perhaps deceive people who
    would be following them, but also it cost a fair amount of
    money, an estimated at least $2,000.
        Is it fair to say that you would be surprised if Burhan
    Hassan himself had $2,000 to spend on the trip?
        Mr. Ahmed. No way, no way he could get it. He never worked,
    so definitely there is a group who are going to organize these
    kids, funding, arranging even the travel stuff. Even some of
    them, they cannot call the travel agents and get tickets
    because of their age.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. I am now going to yield to
    Senator Collins. You have been very helpful to the Committee.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Mukhtar, let me pick up where the Chairman left off.
    You gave us some very compelling statistical information about
    the low level of income of the Somali households in your
    region. So would you agree that it is very unlikely that these
    young men were able to finance their own trips?
        Mr. Mukhtar. Actually, allow me to say that Abdisalam, who
    is one of the kids that left, I know him very well. He was in
    my youth program when I used to work at Elliott Park. So
    Abdisalam used to work. He had a job while he was a full-time
    student at the university of Minnesota. Some of the older
    youth, according to community members, had jobs. But I am not
    sure who--I don't exactly know who paid their trip and why,
    because I deal with the challenges that face the young people
    every day. And the mosques, the issue of the mosques, the
    mosques are the essential life of Muslims--not only the Somali
    community. Every Muslim, their essential life is the mosque
    because we pray five times a day.
        My kid goes to the mosque to learn his Islamic roots. So
    what happens is that these mosques, they are community built,
    not individuals. So we cannot blame the mosques. We can blame
    individuals. You can create friends and foes, as it happened on
    September 11, 2001.
        So, please, I am encouraging you--I personally want to know
    who is recruiting these kids because every day that is what I
    do. I want to make sure that these young people make the right
    decisions and want these young people to be productive
    citizens. So I have the right to know who is recruiting them.
        Senator Collins. You do believe that they are being
    recruited, though.
        Mr. Mukhtar. There are rumors within the community. The
    only recruitment that I know, I know gangs who are recruiting
    these kids.
        Senator Collins. Right.
        Mr. Mukhtar. And that is the local challenge that I face as
    a youth manager.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Ahmed, you made a really important
    point in your testimony that was different from the previous
    panel whom we heard earlier. You make the point that for these
    young people, America is their homeland, that your nephew was 8
    months old when he came to America.
        Mr. Ahmed. Yes
        Senator Collins. That he had never been to Somalia. Is that
    correct?
        Mr. Ahmed. Yes.
        Senator Collins. So, in your judgment, this was not a case,
    as far as you know, of his feeling this connection to Somalia
    that would lead him to volunteer to go fight for his homeland,
    because America is his homeland. Is that correct?
        Mr. Ahmed. Yes.
        Senator Collins. I think that is a very important point
    here, because it leads to your conclusion that there is
    indoctrination or radicalization going on. And I am not trying
    to put words in your mouth, but is that correct?
        Mr. Ahmed. Yes, that is correct.
        Senator Collins. Obviously, the events of the last several
    months have clearly heightened the awareness of the Somali
    community in Minneapolis of the dangers of radicalization and
    the risk to the young people, your relatives, your friends,
    your family members.
        A key to combating that radicalization is for individuals
    and communities, youth leaders, and local mosque leaders to be
    aware of the dangers before this radicalization process occurs.
    To your knowledge--I am going to ask both of you this
    question--was that awareness in existence prior to the
    disappearance of these young people? Mr. Mukhtar.
        Mr. Mukhtar. In this case, there was not much awareness,
    no, because we were focusing on the local violence issues. In
    the last year, while the Minneapolis mainstream violence went
    down by six points, the Somali youth violence went up six
    points. It is totally the opposite. We had six Somali young men
    who were killed by Somalis, gangs or other ways, last year
    alone. I personally lost a volunteer who was a work/study I
    recruited, Ahmed Nur Ahmed Ali, on his first day of his job in
    front of Brian Coyle Center.
        So I focused on the local issues, but, on the other hand,
    we control our computer lab because Internet plays a role in
    this issue, as this Committee reported in May in your report.
    So we control our computer lab--you cannot go to YouTube. You
    cannot watch anything. We don't allow MySpace or other social
    things.
        So we are aware youth are very vulnerable when it comes to
    the Internet, but as to this issue, I focus on the local issues
    which actually the community talked more about before this
    happened.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Ahmed, in your judgment, was there an
    awareness of this risk to the Somali youth in Minneapolis prior
    to the disappearance of these young men?
        Mr. Ahmed. Before I answer that question, I want to
    clarify.
        Senator Collins. Yes.
        Mr. Ahmed. We are not blaming the mosque.
        Senator Collins. Right.
        Mr. Ahmed. Mosques are our places we worship. What we are
    blaming is the management. The mosque itself cannot
    indoctrinate for the kids.
        Senator Collins. That is an important distinction.
        Mr. Ahmed. Yes. The answer to this question is we do not
    have to mix it, the gang activities going on in Minnesota and
    the missing kids. It is two separate issues. These kids, they
    can harm us in United States and our security. But the gangs,
    they can only harm us with the gang stuff. So we don't have to
    always mix it for those two issues, those kids who are
    traveling back home and the kids who are in gangs.
        When it comes to the Internet, I do not believe that the
    Internet played a big percentage. First time we believe they
    get indoctrinated might be the end when they get brainwashed 10
    percent or 15 percent a day, they could get somebody from the
    Internet. That is what we believe.
        Senator Collins. When your nephew has called back home from
    Somalia, has he given any indication of why he left or what he
    is doing or whether he plans to return?
        Mr. Ahmed. He looks like somebody who was being instructed
    by another person who is in there. His mom tried to ask him a
    couple of questions, and he just keep returning, ``Mom, I am
    safe. I am in Mogadishu, Somalia. I will call you back.'' So
    couple of times he has called his mom, she tried to ask couple
    of questions, and somebody maybe was instructing him what to
    say.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.
    Senator Burris.
        Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Menkhaus, I want to thank you for your insightful
    information about that whole situation. It was really
    educational and informative. My questions probably will be
    directed at the other witnesses.
        Either one of you, do you know if any adult Somalis have
    volunteered to go back for the war?
        Mr. Ahmed. There is no way that somebody who has the best
    hospitals, best schools, and lives with best society, can go
    back and join a terrorist group.
        Senator Burris. Do I understand, you do not know of any of
    your----
        Mr. Ahmed. There is no way a person who is in the United
    States that has the best schools in the world, best hospitals,
    live with best society in the world, can go back and join a
    terrorist group. There is no way.
        Senator Burris. OK. Because at times you will see this has
    happened in America where the various ethnic groups are here as
    Americans, and they have gone back to their homeland
    voluntarily sometimes to assist. So you said you know of no
    Somali adults that have gone back to say that we now want to
    try to defend our homeland or join the services. Is that what
    you are saying?
        Mr. Ahmed. Yes, even though some people justify going back
    for fighting with Ethiopian troops. Let me give you example.
    Last year, October 29, 2008, there were two explosions in
    Somalia, and that area, it is a peace area; there is no
    Ethiopian troops. So what are they justifying those who are
    saying we want to go back and fight the Ethiopian troops? There
    is no Ethiopian troops in Somalia there.
        Senator Burris. Do you two gentlemen feel any danger as a
    result of your coming here and testifying? You mentioned gangs
    and----
        Mr. Mukhtar. No, I personally--as a Somali community member
    and a Somali-American, I have the responsibility, and we all
    care about the safety of America. Let me be clear about that.
    The Somali community is very peaceful, and we care about--and
    that is why I decided to come for the sake of the American
    country and the Somali-American community who have been
    victimized because we have an issue of guilt by association,
    not only the people that left, but in Minnesota and everywhere,
    Somalis are being considered as homegrown terrorists. But that
    is not who we are. There are people like us, there are people
    like Osman, who are here to testify about this issue.
        Senator Burris. That is admirable on your part. That is
    what we do as Americans, and the Somalis have adopted this as
    their country, and I see that you are saying that this is your
    country now, and you are going to speak up for your country of
    America. Is that what you are saying?
        Mr. Mukhtar. Not only me but the whole Somali community.
        Senator Burris. Terrific.
        Mr. Mukhtar. Yes, and that is why maybe this small number
    of people that have different ideas, but the majority of the
    Somali-Americans and the Muslim community is very safe, and
    they consider this their homeland, and that is why some of them
    are even in the army, to protect this country.
        Senator Burris. And that is what we call America, and I am
    so proud of the Somalis who are here and who have adopted this
    country because I am a descendant not of Somalia but somewhere
    out of Africa, which I do not even know where. And for you all
    to come to the country voluntarily and adopt this country as
    your own and to say you are going to make America even greater
    and make your family greater, that is what it is all about. I
    do not want to seem like I am lecturing to you, but you bring
    tears to my eyes when I see you are committed in that fashion.
        So you do not feel any danger, and you are seeking to try
    to stop these young people from being recruited. Do you know
    who is really doing the recruiting to get them over there? If
    it is the managers of the mosque or somebody has been taking
    them out, who is doing it?
        Mr. Ahmed. First of all, I am comfortable coming here and
    testifying even though I was getting big pressure from the
    minority group who are leading some of the mosques. But I am
    not really in danger at all.
        The other question, which is who is recruiting, it is
    definitely clear. These kids, they were American mainstream
    kids. They did not come up with their own idea to go back to
    Somalia and have a ticket. Definitely, there is a minority
    group who are working, recruiting, financing. And I hope the
    law enforcement agencies will bring them to justice soon.
        Senator Burris. So you are saying that there are
    investigations going on as to who----
        Mr. Ahmed. That is what we believe, of course, yes.
        Senator Burris. Thank you, gentlemen. No more questions,
    Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Burris. First, I want
    to say Senator Burris really was speaking for all of us. You
    are an inspiration. Each one of us is from ethnic communities
    that immigrated here, and I was raised in a family that said
    that in America, you did not have to be like everybody else to
    be a good American. Part of the strength of America was to be
    yourself, that from that diversity--cultural, religious,
    whatever--that you made America stronger. And the Somali-
    American community is contributed to that.
        Incidentally, may I say to the two of you that you are
    setting a great role model for the young people coming up in
    the community after you. I appreciate what you said about the
    mosques, and just to clarify, from the Committee's point of
    view, the problem here is not the mosques. The problem is that,
    from what you have said, there may be some people--one or two
    or however many--inside the mosque who are using the mosque to
    recruit, essentially to take away some of your children. I
    mean, obviously, one of the great things about America is the
    First Amendment right to freedom of religion, and that is what
    the mosques are all about. So we approach the mosques with
    respect. If we have any concerns, it is about the people who
    are operating within them.
        First off, we have good reason to believe that there is law
    enforcement work going on and that it is aimed at some of the
    people who are causing this problem and who obviously are a
    minority and do not reflect the interests or the opinions of
    the Somali-American community.
        But, generally speaking, tell us what the community is
    doing to try to combat this--I will call it ``an evil
    influence'' aimed at your children and what, if anything, local
    or State government is doing to help you and what can anyone do
    to help you bring your children to the right path.
        Mr. Ahmed. The reality, it is not an easy task to find out
    really those who are involved. But as a parents, we tried every
    angle that we can get information and working with the law
    enforcement agencies. We even contacted people back home in
    Somalia to get some information. And still we are working to
    the law enforcement agencies. We are trying to speak to
    families that do not come forward and explain they are not in
    danger and explain if they come forward and talk to the law
    enforcement agencies and register their kids, in the future,
    they may get protection from the American Government.
        So it is not really an easy task, but we are trying to work
    and knock on every door. And I hope one day we will succeed
    that idea.
        We did not get that much help from the authorities back
    home in Minnesota, what I am talking, from mayor or other
    officers.
        Chairman Lieberman. Yes.
        Mr. Ahmed. We only have contact with the FBI and some of
    the local law enforcement agencies. And I hope we will try to
    go everywhere that you can get help.
        Chairman Lieberman. Well, if there is a way we can help, I
    hope you will let us know. It is a remarkable story because we
    found that in previous hearings--you would not expect it, but
    the agency of the Federal Government that has the most outreach
    and, I would say, positive outreach to the Muslim-American
    community--in this case, the Somali-American community--is the
    FBI, surprisingly.
        I want to ask you, Mr. Mukhtar, a final question. From the
    work you are doing at the community center, what is your
    judgment about the extent to which radical websites, Islamist
    websites, extremist websites are having some effect on
    children? Are the kids going to use them a lot?
        Mr. Mukhtar. I mean, kids are tech savvy nowadays, and they
    would rather use the Internet than listen to radio or watch TV.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right.
        Mr. Mukhtar. So the only thing I would say is also in my
    statement under the recommendations. But I would say is that
    extreme--you should be able, this Committee, the FBI, or the
    law enforcement should be able to control the Internet use.
    Last year alone in America, 6,000 cyber predators have been
    reported by families. So you can imagine that is the only
    people that are reporting that they know they cannot report
    this to the law enforcement.
        My community, my parents, they do not speak English, so
    there is no way they can report such things like that. They do
    not know anything about computers. So it is very important that
    we protect our kids from the Internet, whether it is the
    Islamic extremists or other issues. But it is very important
    that we do that.
        Chairman Lieberman. Very good. Incidentally, this Committee
    made some protests about YouTube--which is now owned by
    Google--and they created a process where, when we and any of
    you who want, you can do it through us, can identify a website,
    they will check it. And if they believe it is encouraging
    violence, they will take it down.
        Mr. Mukhtar. It is not only YouTube, but it is also local
    media. Each ethnic group has their own media that influence. So
    you can also add to that. You can filter that, too.
        Chairman Lieberman. That is a good point.
        Dr. Menkhaus, thank you for being here. Your testimony was
    very helpful. I want to clarify, because you have described a
    changing picture on the ground in Somalia, with al-Shabaab
    somewhat in--I would not say ``retreat,'' but waning somewhat
    because of changes, and particularly because the Ethiopians are
    not there anymore.
        Is al-Shabaab effectively in control of some parts of
    Somalia now still?
        Mr. Menkhaus. Absolutely. It controls, again, all the
    territory from the Kenyan border down to the outskirts of
    Mogadishu. It has some strongholds inside Mogadishu as well.
    There were fears that when the Ethiopians withdrew in December
    that al-Shabaab might overrun the capital. That has not
    happened. What we have seen is that there has been pushback, by
    clan militias affiliated with this new emerging unity
    government. And we suspect that is because Somali political,
    social, and business leaders in the country understand full
    well the severe consequences of an al-Shabaab takeover. They
    were willing to see al-Shabaab used to fight the Ethiopians,
    but are not interested in seeing them come into power.
        It is going to take some time to deal with al-Shabaab.
    There is a process of both negotiation, to co-opt some of the
    members of al-Shabaab, and then marginalize the rest. But we do
    have some reason to believe that they are not as strong as they
    were and they are likely to get weaker.
        Chairman Lieberman. So let me suggest this to you. As I
    listened to you and think about what we heard, somewhat on the
    first panel, but particularly from General Maples, the head of
    the Defense Intelligence Agency, who coincidentally testified
    for the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday. He testified
    about all the trouble spots in the world, but this idea that
    al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab have been growing closer together and
    there may well be an actual ``merger,'' insofar as that is an
    accurate term--that is the term he used yesterday, I believe.
        Having heard that from him yesterday and putting it in the
    context of what you have told us today makes me wonder whether
    this is essentially a marriage of convenience, not only
    ideology, and to the extent that these both have jihadist or
    revolutionary world elements in them, but that you have one
    group, al-Shabaab, which is now in some difficulty in Somalia,
    but still in control of part of the country. You have al-Qaeda
    now perhaps looking for a foothold, a sanctuary somewhere. It
    obviously does not have it anymore in Afghanistan, nor in Iraq.
    They are coming under great pressure in Pakistan's Federally
    Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), but still they are there. And
    I wonder whether they are thinking that this may be, to the
    great detriment to the people of Somalia, a kind of sanctuary
    for them.
        Mr. Menkhaus. I don't think that they will attempt to use
    Somalia as a base and a major safe haven.
        Chairman Lieberman. Interesting.
        Mr. Menkhaus. They tried that earlier. In 1993-94, there
    was an attempt by the East African al-Qaeda cell to penetrate
    Somali-inhabited areas of the Eastern Horn, and it went badly
    for them, actually. It turned out to be as non-permissive an
    environment for them as it is for those of us who work in
    relief agencies and embassies.
        As for al-Qaeda, I think you are exactly right. This is a
    marriage of convenience. This is a low-cost, high-yield region
    of the world in which to cause mischief for the United States.
    There are a lot of soft targets in places like Nairobi,
    Ethiopia, and Djibouti, that we have to worry about because of
    al-Qaeda's involvement there. But they have not demonstrated to
    date a level of commitment to, for instance, making Somalia
    into an equivalent part of Afghanistan or Pakistan. And I don't
    think they would want to. I think that there are other roles
    that Somalia can play for them--as a transshipment point, as a
    temporary base for a handful of operatives--but not a major
    base.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right.
        Mr. Menkhaus. For al-Shabaab, I think it makes sense that
    they would be looking to al-Qaeda now because their strength
    has always been their ability to project themselves as the
    Somalis fighting the foreigners--the Ethiopians, the West,
    whoever. And so for them, globalizing their struggle is really
    the only currency that they have got left.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right.
        Mr. Menkhaus. For instance, I worry now, as their fortunes
    decline inside Somalia, that they are going to be spending more
    time fighting in Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia, because
    there they can portray it as the Somalis versus the Christian
    highlander Ethiopian imperialists, etc.
        Chairman Lieberman. Yes, it frankly makes it all the more
    heartbreaking said in that context, the story of these young
    Somali-Americans, good kids, good students, religious, getting
    swept up in this, ending up somewhere where they are basically
    trapped, and they become pawns in a game much larger than
    themselves, but in which their lives are either ruined or
    endangered, unless we can somehow get them out. Thank you.
        Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank all of our witnesses today for deepening
    our understanding and for your willingness to come forward, and
    I am going to ask just one final question of each of you, and
    that is, if you had one recommendation to Federal, State, or
    local law enforcement how they could best work with the Somali-
    American community to combat this terrible problem that is
    robbing the community of some of its most promising young
    people, what would that recommendation be? Professor, we will
    start with you.
        Mr. Menkhaus. I will go back to a recommendation that I
    made at the conclusion of my written remarks, and that is, if
    we can provide clarity to the Somali community as to what is
    legal and what is illegal behavior, that would go a long way
    toward helping them understand how they can be constructively
    engaged in their home country and not risk crossing a line when
    they do not know where the line is. Somalis used al-Barakat, a
    remittance company, for years to remit money. And then in late
    2001, we froze its assets and declared that it was an
    organization that was linked to al-Qaeda. That was an example
    of the problem: ``Who do I work with in terms of remitting
    money?'' Al-Shabaab poses the same problem for them. There is
    an enormous amount of confusion as to just what they can and
    cannot do.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. Mr. Ahmed.
        Mr. Ahmed. All right. I think unless we involve the Somali
    community, the law enforcement agencies alone cannot achieve
    the goal. So what I would like to say is now we have a place to
    start. We have the parents that will come forward, those whose
    kids have been already exploited and are gone, recruited by a
    minority group. So I would say if we empower the parents, those
    who already have experiences, it is the truth that you can
    reach the community and also to work with the law enforcement
    agencies. Unless the community comes up and works with the law
    enforcement agencies, only the law enforcement agencies cannot
    reach these goals.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Mr. Mukhtar. I also made those recommendations in my
    statement, but the first recommendation is the law enforcement
    itself to work together, whether it is local, Federal, that
    itself helps. And in terms of the Somali community, the Somali
    community has the experts and the capacity to work with the law
    enforcement and a Committee like you guys.
        And, last, I will say Somali communities should be educated
    about their rights and responsibilities. And what we really
    need is a true partnership with a Committee like this and the
    law enforcement.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. I
    thank all of you for being here. I appreciate what you have
    said. We extend our hand to you in the partnership that you
    have suggested. We want you to keep in touch with our staff. We
    will keep in touch with you.
        Bottom line, there is a problem here, and it is a problem
    that not only threatens American security, but it threatens
    something more fundamental, which is the American dream, the
    reality of the American dream for all the children who grow up
    here, including, of course, Somali-American children or Muslim-
    American children generally.
        So this, as I say, is the most graphic and clear evidence
    that we have had thus far of a systematic campaign of
    recruitment of American youth, and in some ways, the most
    promising of American youth, to leave the country to go fight a
    war that really will bring them to no good, and potentially
    could threaten us here at home as well, but certainly will
    bring them to no good.
        So we have learned a lot. We thank you for your courage. We
    thank you for your testimony. In the normal course of what we
    do here, we leave the Committee record open for 15 days if you
    want to add anything to what you said. Some Members of the
    Committee, either those who were here or those who were not
    here, may ask you questions in writing. We will ask you to
    respond to those. But I really thank you all for what you have
    contributed to our effort to protect the security and the
    freedom of the American people.
        Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

        EIGHT YEARS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE
                                    HOMELAND

                                  ----------

                         WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2009

                                         U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Homeland Security
                                      and Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
    room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
    Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Lieberman, Levin, Pryor, Tester, Burris,
    Kirk, Collins, and McCain.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN

        Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. Good
    morning to everyone.
        Secretary Napolitano, if you can believe this, is stuck in
    traffic. [Laughter.]
        This is probably not a major threat to our homeland
    security. She is totally plugged into all communication
    networks. She will be here in a couple of minutes. But I
    thought in the interest of time we will proceed and she will
    understand.
        Before I give my opening statement, I want to welcome to
    this Committee the newest Member of the U.S. Senate, Senator
    Paul Kirk of Massachusetts. I have had the privilege of knowing
    Senator Kirk for a long time. He is an extraordinary, able,
    honorable individual with a great skill set. Obviously, he
    comes to the Senate for reasons that are sad for all of us,
    most particularly for him because he was such a dear, long-time
    friend, and confidant of Senator Ted Kennedy. But I do not
    think anybody would be happier or prouder than Teddy to know
    that Paul Kirk is here.
        I just joked with him that Teddy is probably up there in
    heaven sort of laughing and saying, ``OK, Kirk. Now let me see
    what you can do in the Senate.'' [Laughter.]
        So, Senator Kirk, it is a great honor to welcome you here
    to this Committee.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KIRK

        Senator Kirk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is
    really my honor as well to be part of a body that is so
    important to our democracy and which Senator Kennedy obviously
    loved as an institution. And as you say, the circumstances of
    my being here provide me with an incredible honor as part of my
    own life, and I hope to be able to work closely with you and
    Senator Collins.
        I know this Committee enjoys a great record and has an
    important mission as we look out for our security here at home
    and protect our troops abroad. And if I can contribute in any
    way to what we are doing here as an important body of the
    Senate, I will be delighted.
        So I thank you for your kind comments and look forward to
    working with you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Kirk. I am sure you
    will contribute substantially, and I am delighted that you have
    chosen to be on this Committee.
        Today's hearing, which is titled ``Eight Years After 9/11:
    Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland,'' was
    scheduled and planned more than a month ago as part of our
    Committee's responsibility to monitor the terrorist threat to
    our homeland and to oversee our government's defense of us from
    that threat.
        In fact, for the last 3 years, our Committee, under Senator
    Collins' leadership and then mine, has had a particular focus
    on the threat of homegrown Islamist terrorism, that is, the
    threat of attacks planned against America by people living in
    our country, as opposed to the attackers of September 11, 2001,
    who, obviously, came from outside.
        Then, quickly, in the last 2 weeks, we have had arrests in
    very serious cases of homegrown terrorism: Two lone wolves--
    Michael Curtis Finton and Hosam Maher Smadi--and one more
    ominous cell led by Najibullah Zazi.
        These are certainly not the first such plots against our
    country that have been broken since September 11, 2001. In
    fact, we have been a Nation regularly under attack in this
    unconventional war with terrorists. Just in the last few
    months, going back to May, a group was arrested who were
    quartered around Newburgh, New York, who had planned to launch
    an attack against an Air National Guard base there, and then
    was caught in the act, they thought, of planting a bomb at a
    synagogue in the Riverdale section of the Bronx.
        In June, another homegrown terrorist, who, in fact, had
    gone to Yemen for training, walked into a U.S. Army recruiting
    station center in Little Rock, Arkansas, shot and killed an
    Army recruiter, and wounded another.
        And in July, there was an arrest of seven people in North
    Carolina who were planning an attack on our base at Quantico.
        So in a way that is dispersed and, therefore, I think often
    not seen by the public, we have regularly been under attack
    since September 11, 2001. But these three cases in the last
    several days were significant and in some senses different and
    bring a sense of real-time urgency to our hearing today.
        Mr. Finton, who is the gentleman from Illinois, was about
    to detonate a bomb against the Federal building in Springfield,
    Illinois, and Mr. Smadi was in the process of what was thought
    to be an attack with explosives against the Wells Fargo Motor
    Bank in Dallas, Texas.
        These three cases realize both our worst fears about
    homegrown Islamist terrorist attacks against America and, I
    add, our best hopes for our government's capacity to defend us
    from them.
        The Zazi case is the scenario that many of us have worried
    about and watched out for: A legal permanent resident of
    America, free, therefore, to travel in and out of our country,
    going to Pakistan, connecting with al-Qaeda there, receiving
    training and perhaps directions, and returning to America to
    join with others here in an attack on New York City.
        When Senator Collins and I were first briefed on the Zazi
    case, we each had the same reaction, which was a sense of
    gratitude that all the things that have been done by Congress,
    the Bush and Obama Administrations, and hundreds of thousands
    of U.S. Government employees since September 11, 2001, worked
    in the Zazi case.
        The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National Counterterrorism
    Center (NCTC), and a lot of others, such as the Director of
    National Intelligence (DNI), the Central Intelligence Agency
    (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and many others,
    worked smoothly with each other and, where relevant, with State
    and local law enforcement to stop Zazi and his cell before they
    could attack. Those working for us in the government brought a
    wide range of resources--technical and human--brilliantly to
    bear on this group of attackers and literally connected the
    dots in a way that I do not think they would have been
    connected before September 11, 2001, and in a way that led them
    from New York to al-Qaeda in South Asia and then back to New
    York.
        The Finton and Smadi cases are less complicated but, from a
    law enforcement point of view and in the contemplation of our
    Committee that has been focused on homegrown terrorism, also
    quite daunting because they involve individuals operating,
    incidentally, outside of the major metropolitan areas that we
    have assumed were the priority targets for terrorists, such as
    New York, Washington, DC, Los Angeles, and Chicago--individuals
    operating alone who we call ``lone wolves'' because they
    apparently did act alone in these two cases and were,
    therefore, less likely to turn up on the many technological and
    human walls we have built since September 11, 2001, to protect
    our homeland and our people.
        And yet their lonely terrorist plots were discovered by the
    people in the Federal Government working for us, and they were
    stopped. So as we convene this hearing, I hope these three
    cases will lead us to two conclusions.
        The first is obvious, which is that, although we have won
    significant victories over al-Qaeda around the world since they
    attacked us on September 11, 2001, and we thereafter declared
    war against them, al-Qaeda is still out there, and, in fact,
    they are in here, and they maintain a patient and hateful
    desire to attack the people of the United States as well as
    every other segment of humanity that does not share their
    fanatical and violent theology, ideology, and ambition for
    conquests and suppression of freedom. This war, and its
    attendant threats to our homeland, is not over and will not be
    for a long time.
        I think the second conclusion that we should take from
    these recent cases is that we have together made enormous
    progress in our ability to protect our people from terrorism.
    For this, I particularly, this morning want to thank the three
    leaders who are before us as witnesses and their organizations,
    those who preceded them, and all those who work with them,
    including the men and women of our intelligence community who
    necessarily are unseen.
        In this war, however, in which our enemy requires only a
    small number of fanatics who do not care about their lives or,
    obviously, the lives of others, we require enormous numbers of
    people to defend our free and open country against those
    terrorists, we are only as good as our ability to have stopped
    the last terrorist plot against us.
        Eternal and extensive vigilance is, in this war, truly the
    price of our liberty. So the work of homeland security goes on
    365 days a year, but this morning, I want to pause as we begin
    this hearing to say thank you to Secretary Napolitano, Director
    Mueller, and Director Leiter, and all who work with you for all
    you do every day to protect the American people.
        I look forward to your testimony and to hearing your
    evaluation of the current state of the terrorist threat to our
    country and what we are doing about it and ultimately what
    Congress can do to help you do your jobs for us. Thank you.
        Senator Collins.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS

        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have given an
    excellent overview of why we are here today. Let me start by
    welcoming our new colleague to the Committee. This Committee
    likes to have a minimum number of New Englanders on it.
    [Laughter.]
        And with the addition of Senator Kirk, we have finally met
    the minimum allotment.
        And I will now begin my formal remarks.
        Deter, detect, disrupt, and defend--these four simple words
    form the core of our Nation's mission to prevent terrorist
    attacks.
        Their simplicity, however, belies the complexity of the
    challenge. They fail to capture the dedication and perseverance
    that the men and women of our military, intelligence, law
    enforcement, and homeland security agencies must demonstrate
    constantly to stay ahead of the evolving terrorist threat.
        Eight years removed from the attacks of September 11, 2001,
    our Nation must remain vigilant against the Islamist terrorist
    threat we face. Recent cases drive home the reality of this
    threat. Four separate terrorist plots have been uncovered in
    the past month alone.
        The allegations against Mr. Zazi raise particular concerns
    because his level of planning reportedly was quite
    sophisticated. According to the FBI, Zazi received training in
    an al-Qaeda camp in Pakistan and had purchased bomb-making
    components. In his car, a computer that the FBI recovered
    contained images of handwritten notes that contained
    instructions for manufacturing explosives.
        Investigations in Springfield, Illinois, and Dallas, Texas,
    have not only resulted in arrests, but may have prevented
    horrific casualties.
        Details of a new plot in an ongoing case also came to light
    last week. Prosecutors filed a new indictment in the case
    against Daniel Boyd and Hysen Sherifi, alleging that they
    conspired to murder Marines at Quantico.
        While these and other cases are cause for alarm, as the
    Chairman has pointed out, recent successes demonstrate that our
    vigilance, our strategies, and our hard work to date have paid
    off. Authorities identified suspects who intended to commit
    terrorist acts, they initiated sting operations, and they
    prevented the attacks.
        Our antiterrorism work must be relentless. It requires
    effective coordination across the Federal Government and with
    our State and local partners. As the Chairman has noted, these
    recent successes demonstrate the considerable progress that we
    have made since 2001. By creating the Department of Homeland
    Security, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
    and in some ways most important of all, the National
    Counterterrorism Center, we have encouraged information sharing
    and collaboration across the Federal Government to ensure that
    the dots will indeed be connected. We have also strengthened
    the relationship with our partners in State and local
    governments. These successes represent significant strides in
    what will be a long war against terrorism.
        Despite these successes, however, some of these recent
    domestic plots demonstrate that coordination among Federal
    agencies and State and local law enforcement may have been
    uneven.
        For example, the perpetrator of the shootings that the
    Chairman mentioned at a military recruiting center in Little
    Rock was under investigation by the FBI. But it is less clear
    whether State and local law enforcement, who responded to the
    shooting, knew of this investigation.
        We need to examine how we can build on the improved
    information sharing with State and local officials, including
    whether technology gaps hinder current efforts.
        We must ask what further resources are necessary to allow
    us to be better prepared to respond to threats. And we must
    always remember that while our Nation has been hard at work
    realigning our defenses and strengthening our response systems,
    the terrorists have been busy, too.
        Disturbingly, the perpetrators in these recent cases are
    mostly homegrown terrorists. We must work to better understand
    the path that leads to violent radicalization in this country
    and increase our efforts to interrupt this deadly cycle. Our
    intelligence and law enforcement officials must carefully
    analyze how the next generation of terrorists is being funded,
    trained, and supplied.
        Outreach to communities affected by violent radicalization
    will have to continue to be a priority. These outreach efforts
    were evident when the Committee examined how more than 20 young
    Somali-American men from Minneapolis were recruited to travel
    to Somalia to join the militant Islamist group.
        The FBI and State, and local law enforcement have engaged
    in outreach to the Somali community in this country, and recent
    events underscore the critical importance of such efforts. As
    we meet, the FBI is investigating reports that a Somali-
    American from Seattle carried out a suicide bombing in
    Mogadishu just a few weeks ago. Last October, a Somali-American
    from Minneapolis allegedly participated in a similar attack.
    And, of course, the fear is that if these Americans are
    traveling overseas for training, they may use this training to
    come back and attack our homeland.
        For this reason, we must strengthen our efforts to work
    with community leaders to understand what factors caused these
    young men to travel halfway around the world to participate in
    terrorist attacks. Understanding is necessary to our hopes of
    breaking the cycle of violent radicalization.
        Mr. Chairman, I share your pride in what has been
    accomplished. I had the same reaction that you did in the
    briefing. The kind of coordination that we heard in the Zazi
    case, the sharing of information, the connecting of the dots,
    simply did not occur 8 years ago. But I am also concerned that
    complacency, that our very success in thwarting these attacks,
    could cause us to back off on the effort. The absence of large-
    scale attacks in the United States and our success in thwarting
    terrorist plots should not lull us into a false sense of
    security.
        We must not return to a pre-September 11, 2001, mentality.
        I look forward to discussing these critical issues with our
    witnesses today, and I thank you for your leadership.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Collins,
    for that statement.
        Secretary Napolitano, good morning. Thanks for being here,
    and we welcome your statement now.

       TESTIMONY OF HON. JANET A. NAPOLITANO,\1\ SECRETARY, U.S.
                    DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman,
    Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee, for this
    opportunity to testify on the Department of Homeland Security
    and our actions to address these threats to our homeland.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Secretary Napolitano appears in the
    Appendix on page 144.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        As Senator Collins just said, the threat of terrorism is
    always with us, but recent weeks have reminded us of the
    importance of our continuing work--the New York plot, Colorado
    plot, the Illinois plot, the Texas plot, by way of example. And
    I would like to compliment not only my colleagues here, but
    also the many men and women, in the Federal, State, and local
    governments, who have been working tirelessly on these and
    other efforts.
        These episodes have shown that the threat of terrorism can
    come from people in many different areas of the country with a
    broad range of backgrounds. And within this threat environment,
    the Department's role is to build up our overall national
    capacity to counter any threat that may arise.
        Security from terrorism is a shared responsibility, and DHS
    is designed to strengthen our many layers of defense to address
    terrorism, to participate in and support Federal law
    enforcement action, but also to help build up the capacity of
    State, local, and tribal governments, particularly through
    information sharing. And, also, government cannot do it alone.
    We must engage communities. We must engage our international
    partners. We must have outreach as well as intelligence
    gathering in these efforts.
        Now, in terms of Federal law enforcement, the law
    enforcement components engage in a number of aspects of
    counterterrorism. These include the Secret Service, Immigration
    and Customs enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection
    (CBP), the Coast Guard, the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA), and the Federal Air Marshals Service.
    They are our boots on the ground in terms of securing the
    aviation and marine sectors and also in terms of collecting
    data that can be shared with our law enforcement partners.
        We also are part of integrated Federal law enforcement
    approaches. For example, we participate in the Joint Terrorism
    Task Forces (JTTF) that are led by the FBI.
        Now, in terms of strengthening State and local law
    enforcement, we do this in a number of ways, but information
    sharing is particularly important in bridging the gap between
    the intelligence community here and law enforcement nationwide,
    helping law enforcement make sense of what they may see on the
    beat, and helping secure their communities against terrorist
    threats.
        We are in the process of realigning our own intelligence
    and analysis function to focus on meeting the needs of State
    and local partners and to strengthen our role in Fusion
    Centers, where Federal, State, local, and tribal law
    enforcement can meet and share threat-related information.
        We now have a Joint Fusion Center Program Management Office
    to help coordinate those efforts. And instead of keeping all of
    our intelligence and analysis function here in Washington, DC,
    we have deployed 70 analysts already to Fusion Centers. And all
    72 Fusion Centers will have access to the Homeland Security
    Data Network by the end of fiscal year 2010.
        We have just announced a partnership for select Fusion
    Center personnel to access classified terrorism-related
    information from the Department of Defense's (DOD) Secret
    Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) program, and my goal
    is for all Fusion Centers to be centers of analytic excellence,
    focused on law enforcement needs throughout the country.
        Now, in terms of working with communities and individuals,
    as I mentioned, communities share a responsibility to ensure
    that our country is not a place where violent extremism can
    take root. We have now a Violent Extremism Working Group to
    coordinate throughout the Department our actions on this issue,
    and particularly through our Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
    Section, we do important outreach work with communities such as
    Arab-Americans, Somali-Americans, and Muslim leaders. Within
    these communities, we are working to help preempt the
    alienation that many believe is the necessary precursor to
    violent extremism.
        We have engagement teams now active in eight metropolitan
    areas, and we also are working to help improve our cultural
    awareness and competency throughout the Department.
        Our Citizenship and Immigration Services Department is also
    providing assistance to organizations that aid immigrants. This
    is also part of increasing the capacity, the potential to
    reduce the alienation that so often can lead to violent
    extremism. And our Science and Technology Directorate is
    conducting research on that violent radicalization and
    informing partnerships with other countries in this regard.
    Indeed, I have had meetings with my colleagues and many of our
    European allies who have also suffered from this same
    extremism.
        So as you can see, our Department's actions are focused on
    building up all of the Nation's rings of defense against any
    terror threat that arises.
        Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I will be
    happy, of course, to answer any questions that you have. I have
    a more complete statement that I ask be included in the record
    of this hearing.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Secretary Napolitano. Your
    statement and all the other witnesses' statements will be
    included in the record in full.
        I just want to note in passing my appreciation for what you
    have done to strengthen and deepen the ties, the working
    relationship between your Department, the Federal Government,
    and State and local law enforcement. From September 11, 2001,
    we have all felt that we had a resource out there, hundreds of
    thousands of boots on the ground, if we brought them in and
    worked with them. And I think through the Fusion Centers and
    the deployment of your now 70 personnel from your intelligence
    unit, you have taken some very significant steps forward in
    that regard, so I thank you for that.
        Director Mueller, before I call on you, it is very rare
    that reading an indictment of someone makes me smile. But you
    probably saw this part, but I just want to mention it for the
    record. In the indictment of Mr. Finton, who is the individual,
    the lone wolf, who was planning to blow up the bombs near the
    Federal building in Springfield, Illinois, there are statements
    recorded by him where he is telling his co-conspirator, who
    turns out to be an undercover agent, all his anger toward
    America and this bomb that he is going to set off will not be,
    as he says, ``as big as those on 9/11, but will be up there
    with 9/11.''
        And then in Section 57 of the document, he says, ``Finton
    said that he had wondered at first whether this was all a set-
    up, but he knew it was not because law enforcement authorities
    in America were not that smart.''
        You had the last laugh on our behalf.
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Director Mueller.

     TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER III,\1\ DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
          BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

        Mr. Mueller. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, and thank you,
    Ranking Member Collins and Members of the Committee, for having
    me here today. I am happy to be here with my colleagues Janet
    Napolitano and Mike Leiter to discuss the current terrorist
    threats to the homeland and our efforts to protect the United
    States from future terrorist attacks.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller appears in the Appendix
    on page 158.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The 8 years since September 11, 2001, have seen significant
    changes at the Bureau. While we remain committed to the
    criminal programs, including violent crimes, gangs, and white-
    collar crime, we have shifted our priorities with national
    security at the forefront of our mission. Today, the FBI is a
    stronger organization combining greater capabilities with a
    longstanding commitment to the security of the United States
    while upholding the Constitution and protecting civil
    liberties.
        The nature of the terrorist threat facing the United States
    has also changed in the last 8 years. We still face threats
    from al-Qaeda and many of its affiliated groups and receive
    credible reports that they remain committed to attacking the
    United States and U.S. interests abroad. And while several
    factors have combined to diminish al-Qaeda's core operational
    capabilities, we and our partners continue to monitor, collect
    intelligence, and investigate their reach into the United
    States.
        As both of you have pointed out, threats also come from
    self-directed groups not part of al-Qaeda's formal structure
    which have ties to terrorist organizations through money or
    training. An example is the case that was in the news last week
    where individuals in Denver and New York were plotting to
    undertake an attack, and one of the individuals, as has been
    pointed out in that indictment, apparently received training in
    Pakistan and brought that skill set back to the United States.
        Since 2001, we also face a challenge in dealing with
    homegrown extremists in the United States. These individuals
    are not formally part of a terrorist organization, but they
    accept the ideology and wish to harm the United States. Often,
    that ideology is a result of their interest in what they see on
    the Internet.
        While the intent and capability of homegrown extremists
    varies widely, several FBI terrorism subjects with no known
    nexus to overseas extremist networks or groups have taken steps
    to move from violent rhetoric to action. An example already
    pointed out is the May 2009 arrest of four individuals for
    plotting to detonate explosive near a Jewish community center
    and synagogue in New York. And as Senator Lieberman has pointed
    out, they also planned to attack military planes at the Stewart
    Air National Guard Base, also in New York.
        And just last week, we arrested two individuals at various
    stages of planning activities to do harm within the United
    States, as you both pointed out, and a Dallas, Texas,
    individual was charged with attempting to bomb an office tower.
    A coordinated undercover law enforcement action thwarted this
    effort and ensured that no one was harmed.
        And, separately, a 29-year-old Illinois man targeting a
    Federal building was charged after attempting to detonate a
    vehicle bomb without knowing it contained inactive explosives.
        These cases illustrate not only the threats but the
    challenges presented by the self-radicalized homegrown
    extremists. They lack formal ties to recognized groups, making
    them particularly difficult to detect.
        Our mission at the Bureau is not only to disrupt plots but
    to dismantle networks so that they no longer pose a threat. And
    targeted intelligence gathering takes time, requires patience,
    precision, and dedication. It is a labor-intensive process that
    often does not provide a complete picture quickly, but it is
    the core of understanding the threats to the homeland, and it
    is a picture that was put together not only by us but with our
    Federal counterparts and without a doubt our State and local
    counterparts as well.
        Indeed, our partnerships are critical to protecting our
    Nation and its citizens here at home through our Joint
    Terrorism Task Forces and abroad with our legal attaches and
    international partners. We share real-time intelligence to
    fight terrorists and their supporters.
        We use eGuardian, a threat-tracking system, for State,
    local, and tribal law enforcement agencies which provides a
    central location for law enforcement suspicious activity
    reporting in an unclassified environment. Our local community
    outreach program, along with the DHS outreach program, enhances
    our efforts. And working closely with DHS, whether it be
    through the Fusion Centers, working closely with NCTC, and
    working closely with other intelligence community partners, we
    are engaging communities to address concerns and to develop
    trust in the Federal law enforcement intelligence agencies and
    our efforts to protect the homeland.
        In closing, the Bureau has long recognized that it is a
    national security service responsible not only for collecting,
    analyzing, and disseminating intelligence, but for taking
    timely action to neutralize threats within the homeland to
    prevent another terrorist attack.
        In so doing, however, we also recognize that we must
    properly balance civil liberties with public safety in our
    efforts, and we will continually strive to do so.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, Members of the Committee, I
    appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and I
    also look forward to answering your questions.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Director Mueller.
        Our final witness is Michael Leiter who is the Director of
    the National Counterterrorism Center. This is probably the
    least well known of the three organizations before us.
    Everybody knows about the FBI. Most people today probably know
    about the Department of Homeland Security. The National
    Counterterrorism Center is less well known, but plays a
    critically important role. It is a post-September 11, 2001,
    creation recommended by the 9/11 Commission and created by
    legislative enactment that I am proud to say came out of this
    Committee. It is really the place ultimately where the dots are
    connected.
        Interestingly, just for the record and for those who are
    here and listening and watching, NCTC reports to the Director
    of National Intelligence in its intelligence analytical work
    but, in its role as a strategic counterterrorist operational
    planner, reports directly to the President of the United
    States.
        Mr. Leiter, thanks for your work, and we will welcome your
    testimony now.

      TESTIMONY OF HON. MICHAEL E. LEITER,\1\ DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
      COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
                              INTELLIGENCE

        Mr. Leiter. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins,
    and Members of the Committee. Thank you for those very kind
    words about NCTC, and although I know that will do a great deal
    to continue to bolster our already high morale, I will say none
    of us are ready to pat ourselves on the back for a job done.
    The job has, I think so far, been relatively well done with our
    very close partners, Janet Napolitano and Bob Mueller. But
    there is much work that remains.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Leiter appears in the Appendix on
    page 165.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        From our perspective, al-Qaeda is under more pressure today
    and is facing more challenges and is more vulnerable than at
    any time since September 11, 2001. But that being said, they
    remain a robust enemy, and although I believe we have done much
    to deter attacks and defend against attacks, attacks in the
    United States remain quite possible. Most importantly, al-
    Qaeda's safe haven in Pakistan is shrinking and becoming less
    secure, complicating their ability to train and recruit people
    and move them within Pakistan.
        Al-Qaeda and its allies have suffered significant
    leadership losses over the last 18 months, interrupting
    training and plotting and potentially disrupting plots. But
    again, despite that progress, al-Qaeda and its allies remain
    intent on attacking U.S. interests at home and abroad.
        We assess that the al-Qaeda core is actively engaged in
    operational plotting and continues recruiting, training, and
    transporting operatives to include individuals from Western
    Europe and the United States.
        Three years ago, the British, with U.S. help, disrupted a
    plot in the late stages that could have killed thousands of
    people flying across the Atlantic. Two years ago the United
    States, working with the Germans, helped disrupt a plot that
    was also near execution. And I think, as has already been made
    clear by your statements and the statements of Director Mueller
    and Secretary Napolitano, the case of Najibullah Zazi again
    highlights the threat that we continue to face.
        Now, beyond what I refer to as ``core al-Qaeda,'' the
    group's affiliates continue to develop and evolve, and many of
    these have now begun to pose an increased threat to the
    homeland. The affiliates have proven capable of attacking
    Western targets in their regions, and they aspire to expand
    operations further.
        In Yemen, we have witnessed the reemergence of al-Qaeda in
    the Arabian Peninsula and the possibility that it will become a
    base of operations for al-Qaeda.
        In Somalia, as has been mentioned previously, the leaders
    of the Somalia-based insurgent and terrorist group al-Shabaab
    are working with a limited number of East Africa al-Qaeda
    operatives. Al-Shabaab has obviously engaged in terrorist
    attacks against Somali Government and its supporters, including
    troops from the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). And
    although al-Shabaab's rank-and-file fighters remain focused on
    removing the current government of Somalia by pursuing al-
    Qaeda's agenda, we are particularly concerned with training
    programs run by al-Shabaab that have attracted violent
    extremists from throughout the globe, including the United
    States.
        In North Africa, al-Qaeda has expanded its operational
    presence beyond Algeria and has conducted more than a dozen
    attacks against Western interests in the region.
        And in Iraq, although we assessed that al-Qaeda's ability
    to attack beyond its borders has been substantially diminished,
    it continues to pose a force in the region. And although we
    have focused on al-Qaeda today, I think it is worth noting that
    in Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Taiba, an al-Qaeda ally, continues to
    pose a threat to a variety of interests in South Asia. The
    group's attacks in Mumbai last year resulted in U.S. and
    Western casualties, and the group continues to plan attacks in
    India that could have major geopolitical consequences for the
    U.S. fight against terrorism.
        Again, as has been noted, here in the United States,
    homegrown extremists have sought to strike within the homeland
    since September 11, 2001, and although they have lacked the
    necessary tradecraft and capability to effect significant
    attacks, the recent events, again, point to the very real
    danger that they pose.
        It is this threat environment and the future threats that
    we discern that, as the Chairman noted, NCTC seeks to counter
    through our coordination responsibilities to the President. Our
    responsibility to all elements of national power, including
    diplomatic, financial, military, intelligence, homeland
    security, and law enforcement activities, goes to that
    responsibility to make sure that we have a synchronized effort
    against all of these threats.
        Now, there is a baseline strategy which covers four basic
    areas: Protecting and defending the homeland, attacking
    terrorist capabilities overseas, undermining the spread of
    violent extremism, and preventing the acquisition of weapons of
    mass destruction (WMD).
        But rather than going through that plan, I would simply
    like to briefly highlight a few of the more focused efforts
    that we have undertaken, again, working with partners such as
    DHS and the FBI, to ensure these efforts are synchronized.
        In July 2007, at the White House's request, NCTC, with our
    partners, created an interagency task force that looks at
    current threats and ensures that current defensive measures,
    domestically and overseas, are well synchronized. At the same
    time, this interagency group, including members of DHS and the
    FBI, looks at threats as they come into the center and
    determines whether or not new elevated measures are required.
        In response to last year's attack in Mumbai, again, working
    with DHS and the FBI, NCTC formulated and facilitated exercises
    for State and local officials to respond to evolving terrorist
    tactics to ensure that they could, in fact, respond if a
    similar event occurred in their locality.
        On the front of combating violent extremism, we have
    attempted to coordinate efforts both domestically and abroad.
    In particular, in dealing with Somali-Americans, we have worked
    closely with DHS and the FBI to help take best practices from
    throughout the country and export those to other communities.
        And, finally, near and dear to budgetary hearts, we work
    closely with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to
    ensure that programs, current programs and future programs are
    well aligned to these threats.
        In conclusion, and as I had opened, although I think the
    past months and years and the fantastic work of the FBI and DHS
    show that we have indeed, made progress, many of these efforts
    must continue and accelerate.
        I do very much thank both you, Senator Collins and Chairman
    Lieberman, who we know affectionately as ``the parents of
    NCTC,'' for all you have done to enable some of the progress
    that we have made.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Director Leiter. I appreciate
    that very much. We will start the questioning and have 7-minute
    rounds.
        I want to ask a few questions coming off of the Zazi case.
    I understand that there is a limit to how much you can say
    about an ongoing investigation. Perhaps I should ask that
    question first. Is the Zazi case, Director Mueller, an ongoing
    investigation at this time?
        Mr. Mueller. It is.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks. And just to clarify, there has
    been some discussion in the media as to whether there remains
    an imminent threat related to the Zazi plot.
        Mr. Mueller. We do not believe there is an imminent threat.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. And, Secretary Napolitano, I
    think it would be interesting if you take a moment to just tell
    us, to the extent you can, about the role or roles that various
    components of the Department of Homeland Security played in the
    investigation of the Zazi case.
        Secretary Napolitano. Well, again, it is an ongoing
    investigation, and my comments will be limited by that.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right.
        Secretary Napolitano. But different components of the
    Department did play different roles.
        For example, CBP and TSA, now because they are in the same
    Department, are able to facilitate checking things like travel
    records, immigration records, and the names that are developed
    during the course of any investigation, and those names spill
    out to us, and we are able to very quickly pursue those names
    at that level.
        One of the most important roles was to provide State and
    local law enforcement, particularly through the Fusion Centers,
    with contextual information about even an ongoing
    investigation, and so I think we have now delivered or sent out
    at least 11 different products related to the Zazi
    investigation, to State and local law enforcement.
        The whole goal, of course, is creating this web between
    State, local, and Federal law enforcement, not just for this
    investigation but for other matters involving any type of
    terrorist activity.
        So those give you some sense of the dimension of DHS's
    involvement, and literally dozens of our employees were
    involved.
        Chairman Lieberman. I appreciate that.
        Director Mueller, I have tremendous regard for the FBI and
    the New York Police Department (NYPD). There were some news
    media reports about some disagreements between the FBI and the
    NYPD in the investigation of Zazi. I have had the occasion to
    talk to both you and NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly about these,
    and I wanted, to the extent you are comfortable, just to ask
    you to respond briefly for the public record on that. How are
    your relations with the New York Police Department?
        Mr. Mueller. I believe our relations are exceptionally
    good, as good as they have been in a long time. I do believe
    the news media exaggerates issues that come up in any
    investigation. We talk ourselves, through our New York office,
    with NYPD. It is not just daily, but because we are embedded in
    each other's shops, we are working closely together day in and
    day out.
        The New York Police Department has done a remarkable job in
    understanding the domain and allocating resources to address
    threats. And the relationship, I think, is as good as it has
    ever been at this juncture, and the exchange of information
    through the Joint Terrorism Task Force has been fulsome and
    enabled us to take the steps that we have taken to disrupt this
    latest threat.
        Chairman Lieberman. I appreciate hearing that. As I said to
    you when we talked about this, I had occasion to be with
    Commissioner Ray Kelly of the New York Police Department. I
    asked him the same question, and he gave exactly the same
    answer. You are just two national treasures in terms of law
    enforcement and counterterrorism, and I am reassured to hear
    that you are working well together.
        Following the investigation and arrest of Zazi, the FBI and
    the Department of Homeland Security issued a bulletin warning
    transit systems and railroads to be on the lookout for
    improvised explosive devices. That bulletin included
    recommendations such as increasing random sweeps and patrols
    for heightening security measures.
        I wonder, Director Mueller and Secretary Napolitano, how
    you at this moment today would assess the current threat to
    transit agencies, either specifically in New York or more
    generally around the country.
        Mr. Mueller. I will speak with regard to the timing of this
    bulletin going out and say that there was no direct threat
    information in the course of this investigation as to a
    particular threat, or to the transit systems, in general.
        However, when you have an investigation and an activity
    that has gone as far as this, I believed it important that we
    identify vulnerabilities, and I will turn it over to the
    Secretary to follow up on that.
        Chairman Lieberman. OK.
        Secretary Napolitano. That is right. Because we did not
    have specifics about location, time, or target of any potential
    attack, what we were doing was providing a situational
    awareness, to use the Senator's term, on an area that we know
    has been from other intelligence raised as a possibility for
    attack. And so it is all about leaning forward. It is all about
    thinking ahead. It is all about using the hundreds of thousands
    of eyes and ears we have out there in law enforcement,
    particularly in an environment such as this one where we did
    not have specifics.
        Mr. Mueller. Could I add one other thing, Senator?
        Chairman Lieberman. Sure.
        Mr. Mueller. And it goes to a certain extent, in the course
    of the investigation, you identify certain explosives, and as
    you identify those explosives and see how those explosives may
    have been used in the past on a subway system, that raises a
    red flag in terms of the possible use of the explosives that
    were being developed in this particular case, which then
    results in the generation of that warning.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right. Obviously, we have seen some
    evidence of a trend which is of al-Qaeda, and perhaps other
    international terrorist groups, attempting to recruit
    Westerners or people who live in Western countries, not just
    Zazi but the arrest and indictment 2 months ago of Bryant Neal
    Vinas from Long Island who traveled to Pakistan also and
    trained in an al-Qaeda camp and participated in an attack
    against the U.S. military in Afghanistan before his capture.
        I want to ask you, how concerned are you, any or all of the
    three of you, with this dimension of the al-Qaeda threat? And
    what, if anything, can we do to try to disrupt their use of
    Westerners to carry out attacks?
        Mr. Mueller. I think it fair to say that all of us are
    concerned by it. For the last several years, we have picked up
    intelligence that al-Qaeda has made a concerted effort to
    recruit Europeans and Westerners, understanding that they can
    fly under the radar in terms of passing through border
    controls. And, on the other hand, the Internet, as I alluded
    to, is also a recruiting tool that initiates persons not
    contacted by anybody in Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia, but
    radicalizes people to the point where they reach out to get the
    training and fall into exactly what core al-Qaeda wants, which
    is additional operatives.
        Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman, I would say, over the past
    several years, travel of Westerners, particularly U.S.
    citizens, to either Pakistan or Somalia has been our single
    biggest concern. They obviously bring with them an
    understanding of our society which enables them to operate more
    easily here. They obviously do not have to go through the
    border controls that non-Westerners and non-U.S. citizens have
    to go through. And, clearly, simply the ability to go and
    travel provides them with a potential level of sophistication
    of training that they might not otherwise be able to obtain. So
    it is the issue at which we look closest.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Senator Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Leiter, let me start with you. Our Committee has
    focused a great deal recently on the threat of a terrorist
    group obtaining access to a biological agent that could be used
    in an attack, and we have introduced a bill to tighten the
    regulation of labs that may contain such pathogens as the Ebola
    virus, smallpox, or anthrax.
        The Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction has projected
    that it is more likely than not that somewhere in this world
    within the next 5 years we will experience a biological attack.
        What is your assessment of that threat?
        Mr. Leiter. Senator, I think the threat is very real,
    although, frankly, I am loathe to assign some sort of
    percentage as to the likelihood.
        I think with the spread of biological technology for good,
    it can also be used for nefarious means, and the sophistication
    of biological understanding is increasing exponentially across
    the world. So I think some of the elements of your bill, in
    fact, provide some very valuable measures to protect against
    some of those risks domestically. I think now that the Director
    of National Intelligence is providing some support with that
    bill, some technical assistance, and I think that is quite
    valuable.
        We have yet to see a sophisticated effort beyond core al-
    Qaeda on most of these biological weapons, and, happily, since
    September 11, 2001, some of the work that has gone on in
    Afghanistan and Pakistan we believe has disrupted some of their
    most advanced efforts.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Director Mueller, in assessing the threat of homegrown
    terrorists in this country, we have always taken comfort in our
    tradition of integrating new populations--new immigrants--into
    our broader population. And we have contrasted the American
    experience with that in Western Europe, where immigrant groups
    tend to be more isolated and not assimilated.
        Two years ago, the NYPD testified before this Committee
    that this longstanding tradition of absorbing the diaspora
    population of other countries has protected the United States
    and retarded the radicalization process at home.
        Do we need to rethink that theory in light of what we have
    seen in the Somali community in Minnesota and perhaps in
    Seattle as well?
        Mr. Mueller. I think much of what is said in terms of the
    fact that we are a Nation of immigrants, we are a part of the
    diaspora, puts us in a different place than, say, the United
    Kingdom and some other countries where there are more insular
    communities than you have in the United States.
        That being said, we do have some communities--you pointed
    out the Somali community that has been perhaps more insular
    than some others--that warrant greater outreach, efforts at
    assimilation, understanding, and education. But, for the most
    part, I think we do stand somewhat differently than other
    countries. But, again, we cannot be complacent, as you pointed
    out at the outset.
        I will also say that some 2 or 3 years ago--I think it was
    2006--where in Canada they arrested approximately 15 or 16
    individuals who were going to undertake an attack against the
    parliament, and that plot was well along. And so the extent
    that one thinks that it is individuals from insular communities
    that can undertake such attacks, that is not altogether true,
    believing that Canada is much like us, is a Nation of
    immigrants with the same type of combination of immigrant
    groups that generally seek to assimilate.
        So that was a warning that you cannot be complacent and
    rely on the fact that we have very few, I would say, groups
    that are insulated.
        Senator Collins. Some of the cases that we have referred to
    this morning involve individuals who appear to have been
    radicalized in prison, and the very first hearing that we did
    to look at homegrown terrorism examined violent radicalization
    within the prison communities.
        What is the FBI doing to try to identify radicalized
    prisoners and to prevent radicalization within prison?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, we work very closely in the Federal
    prison system to identify pockets of radicalization. The
    Federal prison system has a fairly substantial intelligence
    operation in the sense that it is not just radicalization but
    gang violence and the like. And so utilizing those same
    capabilities to identify gang members and potential places of
    violence, we work with the Federal system, and then each of our
    Joint Terrorism Task Forces has as one of its responsibilities
    outreach to the State and local places of incarceration and to
    develop liaison and to keep track and to alert and educate
    those who are responsible for the State and local prison
    systems to be alert to this possibility and to let us know when
    there is that eventuality.
        Senator Collins. Let me switch to a different issue. We
    want to make sure that the FBI has the tools that it needs to
    be effective. In 2007, however, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
    Inspector General (IG) revealed that there were problems in how
    the FBI had used one of its intelligence-gathering tools, the
    one known as National Security Letters (NSLs). And the IG found
    that in some cases the FBI agents did not understand or follow
    the required legal procedures when using the NSLs.
        What steps have you taken to ensure that there is better
    compliance? This is so important because, otherwise, Congress
    is likely to act to restrict the use of what may be an
    invaluable tool.
        Mr. Mueller. As was pointed out in previous IG reports, we
    did not have a management system in place to assure that we
    were following the law or our own internal protocols--reports
    that began, I believe, in 2006.
        There is another class of NSL called an ``exigent letter''
    that I will talk about in a second, but generally, in handling
    NSLs, what we have done is put in a completely different
    software package that leads agents through the process to
    assure that all the i's are dotted and the t's are crossed.
        Every one of our NSLs, as they are prepared in the field
    offices, are reviewed by the division counsel. Most importantly
    for us, we established a compliance department office. It would
    have been something recommended by outside attorneys to
    corporations that get into problems, but it was one that we
    needed where we identify those vulnerabilities in other areas
    and move to fix them before they are found by somebody else.
    And so those are three of the steps we have taken.
        There is still a report to come out which addresses the
    issue of exigent letters. The statute allowed us back then--
    still does--in an emergency to request from a communications
    carrier specific information. We, at that time, had issued
    those letters indicating that either a grand jury subpoena or
    other paper would follow. It did not follow our protocol.
        We have put an end to those letters as of 2006, but my
    expectation is there is another report that will say that
    particular individuals who are involved in this were not
    following appropriate management procedures. I will tell you it
    is my responsibility to put into place those procedures, and
    those procedures have been put into place.
        Senator Collins. Thank you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
        In this Committee, we call Members in order of their
    arrival without regard to seniority. By this calculus, Senator
    Kirk would be next, but he has asked to go last among the
    Senators. And I would simply say that this respect for
    seniority will carry you far rapidly here in the Senate.
    [Laughter.]
        So we go to Senator Burris, then to Senator Tester, and
    then to Senator Kirk.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS

        Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I did have an opening statement. I would like
    unanimous consent that it be submitted for the record and then
    go into my questions.
        Chairman Lieberman. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Burris follows:]
                      PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BURRIS
        Thank you Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins.
        Violent extremism does not threaten one nation, one race, or one
    religion--it threatens the entire world order. Combating this evolving
    threat therefore requires close collaboration between all levels of
    government, law enforcement agencies, and everyday citizens.
        I am eager to learn more about the anti-terror efforts being made
    at the highest level of government, but I am also looking forward to
    hearing about the efforts being taken at the ground level. We must
    continue to encourage our local governments and law enforcement
    agencies to work with communities to address potential threats and
    develop working relationships based on trust. After all, we are all
    working toward the same goal, and that is to secure our communities and
    make sure our homeland is safe.
        Today's terrorists are not always easily identifiable and are
    utilizing more innovative means to carry out their destructive
    missions. This is no more evident than in the case of Michael Finton, a
    man from my home State, who was recently arrested after trying to set
    off explosives in a van outside a Federal courthouse in Springfield,
    Illinois. The case of Mr. Finton, who exhibited the typical ``lone
    offender'' characteristics, illustrates how far reaching the ideals of
    al-Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations have spread.
        It is my hope that we will be able to curb this type of activity in
    our homeland. I look forward to learning more about our progress from
    today's expert witnesses, and I will have a few questions.
        Thank you.

        Senator Burris. My question would be directed to Secretary
    Napolitano initially in terms of your comment where you say
    that we want all the communities to be vigilant and try to help
    us identify some of this local domestic terrorism that is
    coming up.
        Madam Secretary, I just wonder, in terms of this young man
    that the FBI just caught in my State capital trying to blow up
    an Illinois Federal building, how do we reassure our
    communities that you all are doing what you can to catch these
    people and that fear does not set in that? It would cause just
    total chaos, especially in smaller communities. We take care of
    New York and we take care of Chicago. But I come from a small
    town of 14,000 people, Centralia, Illinois, and if they had a
    homegrown terrorist there, and they strike there, I think that
    would send panic throughout the entire country.
        So are we dealing with the first responders to train--how
    are we handling this, Madam Secretary? Can you help me out?
        Secretary Napolitano. Yes, Senator Burris, and the point
    you make is so vital. We cannot limit our efforts to a few
    urban areas, and so the Department's responsibilities extend
    nationwide, urban and rural, throughout the country. And it is
    the Fusion Centers where we collocate Federal, State, and local
    law enforcement. It is training that includes officers from
    departments large and small. It is exercises that cover both
    urban scenarios, and also rural scenarios and scenarios where
    you may have several events happen simultaneously, both in
    urban and rural areas. And it is also communicating that our
    security is a shared responsibility. No one Federal department
    can do it, no matter how good it is; that we need State, local,
    tribal, and territorial partners, and we need the citizenry to
    be involved as well.
        And when you do that, and when everybody recognizes it is a
    shared responsibility and that training, preparation,
    exercising, collocation, Fusion Centers, and all the rest are
    all happening, then they can address this issue out of a sense
    of preparation and not out of a sense of fear. And that is the
    way the Department operates.
        Senator Burris. Now, are we possibly having a resource
    problem when it comes to this? Because I am just trying to
    anticipate the magnitude that would be involved, and some
    taxpayers may say, this is a waste of money, this is a waste of
    time. But all it takes is one incident, one thing to happen.
    Oklahoma City really woke us up, but now we almost had another
    Oklahoma City in Springfield, Illinois, in my State capital.
    And thank God, I do not know how all of it was coordinated, but
    Mr. Mueller says that the FBI antiterrorist force was the one
    that set this thing up. So--yes, go ahead.
        Secretary Napolitano. I am sorry to interrupt. But,
    Senator, yes, and Oklahoma City is such a powerful reference to
    me because I was the U.S. Attorney in Arizona at the time, and
    we were heavily involved in the investigation of Oklahoma City
    since a lot of the planning was done in our State.
        But to your point, it is really a sense of everybody
    leaning forward and not being complacent and recognizing that
    these events can happen anywhere in our country at any time;
    that there are those who ascribe to al-Qaeda who are in our
    country and have operational training, as Mr. Leiter just said;
    but there are others as well.
        And so every law enforcement department is vested in this
    and invested in this. Our job is to make sure that those
    investments are sound, efficient, and coordinated.
        Senator Burris. Which follows up on the other question,
    because we have to have so many agencies involved. Homeland
    Security has to let the FBI know something, or we have to let
    the local law enforcement officers know something. Is the
    coordination really there? Or are there other barriers that you
    all are running into that may seem to be and could be
    challenged or that Congress can help out with in order to try
    to clear the path with bureaucracy?
        Secretary Napolitano. I will let my colleagues answer that
    question as well, because coordination is an easy word to say.
    It is a difficult thing to achieve.
        Senator Burris. Absolutely.
        Secretary Napolitano. But it is something that I think is
    much better than it was prior to 1995, when the Oklahoma City
    bombing happened; it is much better than it was prior to
    September 11, 2001. And, indeed, things have happened even in
    the last 8 or 9 months that I think have even improved
    coordination. But it is something that we are always working
    on.
        Senator Burris. Director Mueller.
        Mr. Mueller. If you look at the disruptions in the last 2
    weeks--Denver, New York, Springfield, Illinois, Dallas, North
    Carolina--every one of those cases was handled by the Joint
    Terrorism Task Force which has a number of Federal agencies
    represented and, most particularly and most importantly, in
    every one of those communities it has State and local agencies
    as participants in it.
        Senator Burris. Can you say whether or not it was
    originated with local or was it originated from the top?
        Mr. Mueller. Some of the cases have been originated from
    the local and then brought to the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
        Senator Burris. OK.
        Mr. Mueller. Others come from the community directly into
    the Joint Terrorism Task Force. There are a number of ways we
    get the cases.
        But one point you did make in terms of resources is
    important, and that is, with the budget woes that many
    communities have now, and police departments, there is a
    squeeze on in terms of manpower. We think it is tremendously
    important that we continue to have the participation of State
    and local law enforcement in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces,
    but it is becoming increasingly more difficult for a police
    chief to assign that officer.
        Senator Burris. Some of them are cutting back. They are
    laying off local law enforcement----
        Mr. Mueller. Well, and if there is one thing that I do
    think would be helpful, it is as monies are allocated from
    Congress through the Department of Justice that would be
    allocated to encourage State and local law enforcement to
    participate in Federal task forces, despite the budget concerns
    that the individual department might have.
        Mr. Leiter. Senator, if I may on the coordination point.
        Senator Burris. Yes.
        Mr. Leiter. I think both the Secretary and Director Mueller
    are exactly right, that the coordination over the past month or
    2 months is markedly improved over just 3 years ago.
        The second point I would make is in terms of sharing
    information with State and local officials so they know what
    they should be looking for, although the press just picked up
    over the past 2 or 3 weeks some of the information that was
    passed to State and local officials about some of the
    improvised explosives that might be involved in current
    threats, roughly those same products for State and local
    officials were provided more than a year ago--not based on what
    we are seeing here now today, but based on the integration of
    foreign intelligence, seeing what terrorists were doing
    overseas, taking those lessons learned, and providing them to
    State and local officials here.
        Senator Burris. That is terrific. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I see my time has expired. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Burris. It just
    makes the point that we have talked about in this Committee--
    and the Springfield case does--that when you are dealing with
    lone wolves and homegrown terrorism, every part of America is
    vulnerable. Naturally, we know that there is a higher
    probability that great metropolitan centers like New York,
    Washington, Los Angeles, and Chicago may be higher-priority
    targets for the terrorists, but, here you go in these cases,
    Springfield, Illinois, and Dallas, Texas. Now, Dallas, Texas,
    is a big city, but it would not probably be on anybody's list
    of the top 10 targets for terrorism.
        So this speaks to the great importance of the national
    coverage that the Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the Fusion
    Centers and all the work that you are doing gives us.
        Senator Tester.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER

        Senator Tester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not mean to
    disagree with your analysis of Senator Kirk's deference, but
    being the most junior Senator not too long ago, my
    recommendation would be if you get a chance to jump ahead, do
    it. [Laughter.]
        I want to thank Secretary Napolitano and Director Mueller
    and Director Leiter for being here today. I was over at the
    Veterans' Affairs Committee, and so I apologize for being late.
    I very much appreciate the work you do in helping make this
    country more secure and as secure as I think it possibly can
    be. So thank you for that.
        Madam Secretary, good to see you again. I want to get at
    something you said in your written testimony. You stated that
    DHS is reinvigorating collaboration with the State, local, and
    tribal law enforcement. I think to be bluntly honest, I do not
    know if we are where we need to be yet. At least in Montana, I
    think that there is a ways to go.
        There is no doubt that in many Northern border areas our
    law enforcement up there are first responders because the
    reality is the Border Patrol cannot be everywhere, even though
    they try to be.
        Last year, the sheriff of Toole County, which is right up
    on the northern Canada border--right at the port of Sweet
    Grass, in fact--told the Committee that on any given week
    deputies from his agency assist Federal authorities in
    apprehending port runners, border jumpers, and locating
    undocumented foreign nationals. So the role of local law
    enforcement is critical. I think you know that.
        But that means that our local folks need to know what to
    look for. They need to know about drug smuggling. They need to
    know if the folks in Director Leiter's office issue an advisory
    that relates to the Northern border. My understanding is that
    that information is not well shared between CBP and local
    communities.
        There is a Fusion Center in Montana. Unfortunately, it is
    200 miles away from the border in Helena, so it is difficult
    for local law enforcement folks to go to a 1-hour meeting at a
    Fusion Center when it is a 4 to 6-hour drive round trip, and
    sometimes longer. If you lose an officer in some of these small
    counties, like Phillips County, for an entire day, that takes a
    chunk out of your law enforcement duties. The Operation
    Stonegarden grants help alleviate equipment and overtime needs.
    We like those. But how can we actually improve intelligence
    sharing among local law enforcement areas when they are,
    frankly, in my opinion, as much a part of border security, or
    could be, as the Border Patrol itself?
        Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Senator, and I totally
    agree with you that this is an evolving issue, and we do not
    rest on where we are, but we continue to work.
        Sparsely populated rural areas are some of the most
    difficult to cover because of long distances. And you are
    right. Sparsely populated areas typically have small economic
    bases, they have small law enforcement departments. They do not
    have a plethora of Federal agents there, so everybody has to
    work together.
        First, there is the increasing use of technology is going
    to help us bridge these gaps. For example, a secure video
    teleconferencing capacity so that people do not have to drive
    to meetings is something that we are improving and enlarging.
        Second, making sure that our own agents, as they are
    deployed in these border areas, have their own training and
    understanding this culture of sharing that we must have and are
    having their own outreach to local law enforcement.
        The third thing is to recognize--and I think it is good to
    explain the difference between a JTTF and a Fusion Center. A
    JTTF is really focused on terrorism and terrorism-related
    investigations. Fusion Centers are almost everything else. And
    some Fusion Centers are very good, very mature, others are not,
    but the whole concept of a Fusion Center is still a relatively
    new concept.
        Our plan is over the next years to really work with those
    Fusion Centers, concentrate funding on those Fusion Centers,
    recognizing the differences between one that is in a rural area
    and one that is in an urban area, and how it makes outreach to
    small towns.
        Senator Tester. Thank you for that. I want to get to port
    modernization, which I am sure you knew we were going to talk
    about.
        Eight years ago in Montana, before September 11, 2001,
    those ports were secured, in the most loosest term, by putting
    down an orange cone. That was on September 10, 2001. Since that
    time, we have got gates. We are somewhat better off. But those
    have their holes also, as you well know.
        A lot of folks, including myself, have been asking for port
    modernization and how much that is going to cost. Frankly, we
    are looking forward to the answers to those questions on how
    that money is to be used by the CBP. And, quite frankly, we
    still have questions on some of the legitimate oversight. You
    know that. We still have questions that have to be answered.
        On this border it is critically important. There have been
    a lot of reports and there are a lot of folks up there that
    know that we need to spend some money on these ports. They are
    not doing a suitable job today under the threats we have--
    asbestos-contaminated wells. At one of the ports, you probably
    know, they detain the bad guys by locking them up in a
    bathroom. It does not meet 21st Century threats.
        So I guess the question is that we are in the middle of a
    30-day reassessment of those dollars. I have been told that
    those costs are going to come back lower than they were first
    as in April. I just think that it is important that we spend
    the money to match the threat. Let us just put it that way.
    Spend the money to match the threat. I do not think a cookie-
    cutter approach can be used at all. I think you have the people
    in your office who can determine what that threat is and how to
    deal with it.
        I just want to know how that assessment is really changing
    the CBP ports and what you anticipate will be coming out of
    that 30-day assessment.
        Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Senator. Yes, because
    questions were raised, we put a 30-day assessment in there. And
    to give the taxpayers confidence that these monies were not
    being wasted, the press was characterizing these as $15 million
    for five-car-a-day ports, and that was not a correct
    characterization. These are not cookie-cutter ports, and they
    do have threats that they have to match.
        What I hope comes out of this is a fair and objective look
    at the planning that has already been done and the contracts
    that already have been let. If changes need to be made,
    obviously, to the extent we can, we will make them. But I will
    share with you, Senator, I have been through those northern
    ports now with a fine pencil and feel very confident that this
    review will overall show that these ports match the threats for
    the areas for which they are designed.
        Senator Tester. OK. Well, I look forward to those reports,
    and hopefully we can get detail as far as how the money is to
    be spent, what it is to be utilized for, and, quite frankly,
    hope it will not be classified information and we know what
    those threats are.
        Just one last question, if I might, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Lieberman. Sure.
        Senator Tester. And I apologize. When I first got here, the
    input that we got, Director Mueller, was that the threats on
    the Northern border dealt with drugs and terrorism, mainly. The
    threats on the Southern border revolve around immigration. I
    think when you look at Canada, where 90 percent of their
    population lives within 100 miles of the border, and the fact
    that you just talked about, I think 16 terrorists were going to
    do some damage to their parliament, I guess the question I
    have: Has that assessment changed at all over the last 3 years
    or 2\1/2\ years as far as what the threats are and what we
    really need to focus on as far as those two borders?
        Mr. Mueller. In my mind, that threat has always been there,
    and look back to when Ahmed Ressam, who came down from
    Montreal, was caught on the border coming in to Washington on
    his way to blow up the Los Angeles airport. And with the
    breathing of new life into al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and some of
    the communities not only in Europe but also represented in
    Canada, and the experience before with Ressam, that means in my
    mind that we have to be aware of the threats from the Northern
    border. As people tend to concentrate on the Southern border,
    we have to be equally aware of the threats on the Northern
    border.
        Senator Tester. Thank you, and I appreciate that. I have
    always said that the border is only as strong as its weakest
    link, and we need to make sure that we secure it in a way that
    makes sense, not only to this country's national security but
    also to the taxpayers of this country. So I appreciate that
    very much. I appreciate you guys being here.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the flexibility.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Tester. Senator
    Kirk, it is an honor to call on you for questions for the first
    time.
        Senator Kirk. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    associate myself with other Members of the Committee who have
    given well-deserved salutes to the panel here this morning for
    all the work they have been doing improving this process of
    vigilance going forward.
        One of the questions that came up in the Zazi case, at
    least as I understand it, there was some speculation about Zazi
    and his associates having in mind densely populated, non-
    governmental entities like fashion week or sports stadiums and
    so forth--I was just wondering, as we head into the baseball
    league championship series and the National Football League is
    underway, is there some coordination, conversation with the
    league officers or their individual franchises with hints of
    difficulty; or even if there are not, that secure measures are
    taken in those densely populated venues?
        Mr. Mueller. Whenever we get information relating to a
    possible threat to--it can be a State--collegiate football,
    National Football League, or other venues, baseball--that is
    passed on to the security directors of the various leagues, and
    it is coordinated.
        As I said, there is no imminent threat that we see at this
    juncture, but, again, as I stated before, we do not want to
    become complacent. But there is coordination with the league
    offices when we do get a threat.
        Senator Kirk. Thank you very much.
        A question on the Fusion Centers. In the testimony there
    are references to the densely populated urban areas, like
    Boston, or State of Massachusetts offices and so forth and a
    reference to sometimes the Federal judicial districts.
        Is the Fusion Center just a coordination of those various
    levels in sort of a task force? Or are we envisioning some sort
    of a new regional office when we talk about Fusion Centers?
        Secretary Napolitano. Senator Kirk, Fusion Centers take
    many different appearances. The classic form of a Fusion Center
    is a collocated Federal, State, local, tribal--or territorial,
    if that is relevant--facility where not only do you have
    officers collocated, but you have access to databases and you
    have a certain number of State and locals who are cleared to
    receive some types of classified information. Some Fusion
    Centers meet that; others are, quite frankly, very small and
    very isolated, and, as Senator Tester indicated, perhaps not as
    able of receiving and getting the kind of information that we
    need.
        So as we now have decided--and this is a fairly recent
    decision--that the Fusion Centers will be the focus and a major
    portal through which we share information, particularly non-
    terrorist-related information, now we will work through the
    grant process and otherwise to make sure all of them reach a
    certain basic standard.
        Senator Kirk. Good. Thank you very much. The other question
    that I had is in terms of the outreach to communities in
    Boston. We have a significant Somali-American community, and
    without getting into any information that should not be
    disclosed--I understand it is sort of a proactive outreach. Is
    it more to encourage the members of those communities to fully
    understand their rights and responsibilities as American
    citizens? Is it that kind of affirmative outreach? Or is it
    basically intelligence gathering or a combination of the two?
        Mr. Mueller. When we talk about outreach, we talk about our
    special agents in charge. We have 56 of them around the
    country. They are not co-extensive with the 93 judicial
    districts, unfortunately--or fortunately. But there are 56
    field offices, and each of our special agents in charge has a
    mandate to educate, meet, learn about, become friends with the
    members of the Muslim-American community, Arab-American
    community, and Sikh-American community so that the communities
    understand what we do and why we do it, and the efforts we
    spend protecting civil liberties and civil rights.
        We have a class that is a citizens academy in each of our
    offices where we will bring members of the community for a
    several-weeks course where one night a week we will explain
    various aspects of the Bureau.
        In the wake of learning about the travel of Somali youth to
    Somalia to participate in the actions there, we would make a
    specific concentrated outreach to that community through
    specialists, and that is far different than developing sources.
    This is an effort to educate, explain, and to have them
    understand our concerns in a way that makes them a partner with
    us in addressing the threat.
        Mr. Leiter. And, Senator, if I may, I think it really is
    worth noting, of the more than 100,000 Americans of Somali
    descent here in the United States, we are talking about
    literally minute percentages that have been drawn to the fight
    in Somalia and al-Qaeda's messages--in the dozens at most, 20
    or so. So I think it is particularly important. This outreach
    is very much designed not to develop sources, but instead to
    explain to them the rights of American citizens, ensure that
    they understand the immigration system, and ensure that they
    understand the dangers of their sons being associated with
    groups like al-Shabaab and what can happen to them.
        So it is really not meant to develop intelligence. It is
    much more to ensure that they do not become a group like some
    of the South Asian communities in the United Kingdom, isolated
    from the larger U.S. society.
        Senator Kirk. Thank you. Very helpful. I appreciate it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Kirk.
        Senator Levin, welcome.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN

        Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome
    to Senator Kirk. We are delighted to see him here, and we will
    welcome him on the Armed Services Committee, more
    appropriately, since I am Chairman there. I am sure our
    Chairman here has already done the honors.
        Senator Kirk. Thank you very much.
        Senator Levin. Secretary Napolitano, first let me raise
    questions with you about the Fusion Centers. You have already
    testified about them. We have, I think, two of them now in
    Michigan, and the question is the funding. And you have
    indicated, I think in your last testimony, that we are going to
    make sure that we reach a basic standard through the grant
    process in terms of financial support for these centers. And
    the problem is that the grant process does not guarantee a
    steady stream of funding for the Fusion Centers because there
    is a lot of competition for those grants.
        And so there is a real stress on the Fusion Center that we
    have. The one I am most familiar with is the Michigan
    Intelligence Operations Center, which is Michigan's Fusion
    Center. We have State, local, and Federal agencies all
    represented there. But in terms of funding, there are some real
    problems in terms of future funding.
        How are you going to assure through a grant process that
    Fusion Centers are going to be adequately funded given the
    competition for dollars?
        Secretary Napolitano. Senator, obviously we cannot provide
    a guarantee, but what we can do and are doing is steering the
    dollars that we have discretion over in the grant process to
    fund the things that we think should receive priority.
        Now, with respect to Fusion Centers, let me put on my
    former governor's hat for a moment. Of course, every budget is
    under stress, and Michigan's is under more stress than perhaps
    any other State. But they are a good deal from a law
    enforcement expenditure perspective in terms of basically the
    yield per officer, in terms of what you get particularly from a
    prevention standpoint.
        So we will have a very active outreach program with
    governors and mayors, and part of that is making sure they know
    what the Fusion Centers do and how they, really from a
    budgetary standpoint, are a very good expenditure of the
    limited dollars they have.
        Senator Levin. I hope you will really take a look at that.
    It should be a priority. Coordination is what has been so
    lacking over the years. I know everyone is making an effort to
    improve coordination, integration of information, and that is
    where it is done in terms of these assessments at a State and
    local level. So I hope that you will really pay some attention
    to that issue.
        On the operational side, where are operations coordinated?
    And here I will look to Mr. Mueller on this. We have task
    forces. Is that where operations are coordinated?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes. We have now, I think, 106 Joint Terrorism
    Task Forces. Represented on those task forces are the other
    Federal agencies in that area and the State and local law
    enforcement. Any threat information comes in, it is immediately
    investigated. And so it is a combination of intelligence
    gathering and then the immediate investigation to follow
    whatever leads there are about a potential threat. And that is
    where it is coordinated.
        Senator Levin. All right. Now, looking at the information
    side of this, is there one place where all information about
    potential threats is centralized now? Can a law enforcement
    person call one number and say, ``Hey, there is a guy here at
    the border'' or ``We have just arrested somebody. What do we
    have on him?'' Is there one place in this country with people
    from Customs, the Treasury, the FBI, Homeland Security, State
    police, and you name it, where all the information goes?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes, I would say that my friend to the left
    from the National Counterterrorism Center, who has access to
    all of our databases----
        Senator Levin. No, not access to. Is there one database
    where somebody can make a phone call, a cop at a local level
    calls up and says, ``Hey, we have got a guy''?
        Mr. Leiter. The answer is yes, Senator. A cop at a local
    level in Michigan or Connecticut or Maine or Massachusetts, a
    consular official checking a visa in Islamabad, a Customs and
    Border Protection agent, they type into their own computer and
    they will get information about that person, whether or not
    they are associated with terrorists. And if they have a
    question, they are going to pick up the phone----
        Senator Levin. And that information comes to the NCTC?
        Mr. Leiter. That comes to the NCTC and is supported by the
    Terrorist Screening Center of the FBI. So, yes, there is one
    place that it all comes together at NCTC.
        Senator Levin. OK. With one phone number, that person gets
    all the information about that individual from all sources.
        Mr. Leiter. Correct.
        Senator Levin. Are there any missing pieces? Are there any
    sources that are not inputting their information into that
    single computer?
        Mr. Mueller. There are no sources of information that the
    U.S. Government holds about known or suspected terrorists that
    are not there.
        Senator Levin. Secretary, did you want to add something?
        Secretary Napolitano. No. I would echo what Mr. Mueller
    said.
        Senator Levin. Now, going back to the Zazi case, I know,
    Director, you have commented on this, saying that it was
    overblown that there was any kind of disconnect between, I
    guess, the local police in that case and the FBI. Is that
    correct?
        Mr. Mueller. I believe so.
        Senator Levin. Putting aside whether it was overblown or
    not, was there a problem?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, in every investigation, and particularly
    a fast-moving investigation, there are steps that are taken
    that may or may not work out. This is no different than any
    other investigation, and----
        Senator Levin. Is there any procedural or structural
    failure at all here?
        Mr. Mueller. I do not believe that there is a procedural or
    structural failure. There is one thing that happens in an
    investigation--an investigation never goes the way you want it
    to, and----
        Senator Levin. I understand that, and I know you understand
    it better than I will ever understand it. Is there something
    that somebody should have done or not done?
        Mr. Mueller. In retrospect, there will always be things
    that you would do differently, but----
        Senator Levin. Is there a lesson to be learned----
        Mr. Mueller [continuing]. It does no good to----
        Senator Levin. I understand.
        Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Go and dissect----
        Senator Levin. No. It does do good. We want to learn
    lessons. I am just asking. I know things are overblown. That
    does not mean there is nothing there.
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Senator Levin. Is there a lesson to be learned?
        Mr. Mueller. On this one, I do not think so.
        Senator Levin. Good. That is responsive to my question, and
    that is all I needed to hear. Thank you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Levin.
        If you can put up with it, we will do one more round, which
    will be quick because there are fewer of us here.
        Let me go back to the question of infiltration of
    terrorists from abroad who come from the United States, and I
    want to deal with the al-Shabaab case. This is the most unusual
    case of the Somali-American community in Minneapolis and
    elsewhere. We have had testimony here. Mr. Leiter, you are
    right, this is a very small fraction of that community. In
    fact, the community is feeling a combination of outrage, anger,
    and fear that this has happened.
        But this is an unusual case because they also seemed to be
    recruited to be part of the conflict over in Somalia. But,
    naturally, we are concerned that once they are there and
    involved in a terrorist group--which al-Shabaab does have ties,
    we had testimony here, to al-Qaeda and others--because they are
    American citizens and they have legal status here, they will be
    able to return to carry out attacks against us.
        Do you share that concern, Director Mueller?
        Mr. Mueller. Absolutely. And not just with those who travel
    to Somalia but those who travel, say, to Yemen to maybe train,
    those who travel to the western part of Pakistan, the Federally
    Administered Tribal Areas. We had the example of an individual
    by the name of Vinas from New York who was trained in the
    camps, and----
        Chairman Lieberman. In Pakistan?
        Mr. Mueller. In Pakistan, but then participated in an
    operation, as I think you or others pointed out, in
    Afghanistan.
        Chairman Lieberman. I mentioned it, right.
        Mr. Mueller. And then returned to the United States--well,
    actually was returned to the United States. But our concern
    would be the same.
        Chairman Lieberman. Yes. So is there any evidence that
    there is any intention by al-Shabaab to send these recruits
    back to the United States for this purpose?
        Mr. Mueller. I think at this juncture--I would defer to Mr.
    Leiter on this, but I think that we have seen some information
    that the leaders would like to undertake operations outside of
    Somalia, but no hard information or evidence that has been
    effectively pursued. And I would defer to him on whether he----
        Chairman Lieberman. Do you want to add anything, Mr.
    Leiter?
        Mr. Leiter. I think Mr. Mueller is exactly right. There is
    al-Shabaab, and the leadership of al-Shabaab is clearly
    associated with al-Qaeda elements in Somalia.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right.
        Mr. Leiter. And it is those al-Qaeda elements that we fear
    will push al-Shabaab members----
        Chairman Lieberman. To send people back.
        Mr. Leiter [continuing]. To change their focus.
        Chairman Lieberman. And we are obviously watching that to
    the best of our ability.
        Mr. Mueller. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Lieberman. Let me ask a different kind of
    question, Secretary Napolitano, related to the Zazi case. The
    Homeland Security Advisory Council, as you well know, recently
    completed its review of the color-coded threat level system,
    and I guess I would ask you what your reaction to their
    recommendations is or where you are in the process of deciding
    what to do with that. But in regard to the Zazi case, I am
    interested in knowing whether at any point you considered
    raising the threat level in response to what we are learning
    about the Zazi plot, even perhaps for a particular region or
    sector--well, of course, once it became public, it was
    essentially raising the threat level.
        So I am interested in the extent to which the color-coded
    system was in your mind as you were learning about this really
    significant, and in some sense unprecedented since September
    11, 2001, plot to attack the United States.
        Secretary Napolitano. Two parts to your question. One is,
    yes, I did appoint a task force to review the color-coded
    system. It has been in place a number of years now, and it is
    time to take a fresh look. They have given me their
    recommendations. I am in the process of reviewing those. Then I
    will submit those into the interagency process and ultimately
    to the President. So that review is ongoing.
        Chairman Lieberman. OK.
        Secretary Napolitano. And that is where it is right now.
        In terms of Zazi, we thought about it and rejected it,
    because we did not have in the Zazi investigation any kind of a
    specific location, time, threat that in our view would justify
    actually raising the color code. So it was contemplated and
    rejected, given the nature of the investigation and the nature
    of the intelligence that we had.
        Chairman Lieberman. OK. Good enough.
        Let me ask a final series of questions about how some of
    the people in these cases become radicalized, because
    obviously, to the extent that we are able, if we could figure
    that out, we try to stop it from happening or counteract it.
        Am I right that in Zazi's case there is no evidence that he
    was radicalized when he came here 10 years ago or that he was
    sent here on a mission 10 years ago?
        Mr. Mueller. I do not believe there is any evidence of
    that.
        Chairman Lieberman. So that he became radicalized here.
        Mr. Mueller. Well, much of his family resides in Pakistan,
    and he visited Pakistan, so I think it is----
        Chairman Lieberman. Good point. So I guess I would say he
    became radicalized after he came here in 1999, but it may well
    not have happened here. It may have happened over there.
        Mr. Mueller. Yes, I think that is fair to say.
        Chairman Lieberman. So that may be a somewhat unique case
    because he was traveling--we do not have any particular
    information now, I gather, about whether he became radicalized
    in a mosque, over the Internet, here, or wherever.
        Mr. Mueller. Well, at this point, because of a continuing
    investigation, I am hesitant to go into any more detail on it.
        Chairman Lieberman. OK, understood. And in the case of
    Finton in Illinois, as was discussed with Senator Collins,
    there was a case where, to the best of our knowledge, we know
    he converted in prison. Is there evidence yet that he was
    radicalized in prison, or did that come later?
        Mr. Mueller. I think, again, it is in the stages of
    litigation, but I do believe that the conversion and
    radicalization is principally attributable to that time that he
    was in jail.
        Chairman Lieberman. Incarcerated.
        Mr. Mueller. But there were probably other factors
    afterwards that continued to contribute to it.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right. Obviously, that raises exactly
    the questions that you answered that Senator Collins raised
    about what prison authorities should be doing to try to deter
    that from happening.
        Mr. Mueller. Yes.
        Chairman Lieberman. And in the case of Smadi in Texas, I
    gather he is a Jordanian citizen who came here on a student
    visa.
        Mr. Mueller. I believe that he was in the United States on
    a B2 temporary Visitor Visa.
        Chairman Lieberman. And then he overstayed. Is that right?
        Mr. Mueller. Yes, that is right. It expired in September
    2007.
        Chairman Lieberman. But do we have any knowledge of what
    turned him into a bomber?
        Mr. Mueller. I think with Finton and Smadi, as you say, the
    Internet played somewhat of a role, particularly with the one
    in Dallas.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right. I know this is tough stuff, but
    what kinds of lessons can we draw about what possibly we can do
    to deter--I mean, we are talking about large communities here
    in which there are a very small number of people who become
    radicalized. How do we fight it? And do, for instance, the
    engagement teams that you are sending out fight it.
        Now, incidentally, as I told you the other day, Director
    Mueller, we had a hearing here earlier in the year with leaders
    of the Muslim American community, and I was interested and, I
    will tell you, surprised to hear that the Federal agency that
    they had the most extensive and, they thought, constructive
    relations with was the FBI, which is a tribute to your special
    agents around the country. But tell me about the engagement
    teams and whether you think they are having any effect on
    deterring the radicalization process.
        Secretary Napolitano. Well, Senator, these are teams that
    are sent out to have outreach in a way, as described by Senator
    Kirk, to talk to people about America, the rights, the
    liberties that people have here, the responsibilities that
    people have here, get to know them, get them to know us.
        One of the things we have learned from the United Kingdom,
    for example, is that alienation is a factor or an element that
    is present oftentimes when someone is in the process of
    becoming radicalized. And so to the extent that we can engage
    undercuts at least that feature of the radicalization process.
        We are really working with some of our partners such as the
    United Kingdom, who have had more experience with this kind of
    domestic radicalization than we have, to see what other
    practices that they have begun or started that we could
    profitably employ here.
        Chairman Lieberman. Good. Thank you. My time is up. Senator
    Collins.
        Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We have had a great deal of discussion this morning about
    the importance of coordination and information sharing.
    Obviously, a great deal of progress has been made, but there
    are some areas that are still rough and not perfect, and,
    Director Mueller, I want to ask you about one of those. The
    Justice Department's Inspector General recently released a
    report on the FBI's weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
    coordinator program, and the report found that even though the
    WMD coordinators are supposed to serve as the Bureau's WMD
    experts in the field, many of them were unable to even identify
    the top WMD threats and had not received adequate training.
    According to the report, there was little interaction between
    the WMD coordinators and the intelligence analysts who compiled
    the WMD assessments.
        What is your reaction to the findings in that report and
    the recommendations?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, I think there are 13 recommendations, if
    I am not mistaken, in that report, and we have followed up on
    each of those recommendations.
        It must be 2 or 3 years ago that we established with the
    consent and approval of Congress a WMD Division and have stood
    that up from scratch, pulling the personnel from a variety of
    other divisions to focus on weapons of mass destruction. This
    is in part as a result of the anthrax attacks in 2001.
        And so it has some birthing pains as it grew, and what we
    now have throughout the country in each of our 56 field
    offices, I believe, is not only interested but educated and
    have professional persons who can address these particular
    issues.
        Whenever there is--and we still get a ton of them--an
    envelope with white powder, there is a response that brings in
    not only our experts but experts from DHS and other experts to
    find its way in response to that particular threat. Key to that
    are our personnel on the ground, but also key to it is being
    able to get back on a coordinated call with the experts in this
    field to decide what you are going to do in each step.
        So we have grown the division, the WMD Division. The
    recommendations that the IG made we have followed up on, and I
    think we still have a ways to go, but are doing much better in
    terms of response to any threat in the WMD arena.
        Mr. Leiter. And, Senator, if I may.
        Senator Collins. Yes.
        Mr. Leiter. Just to give you an anecdote of something that
    would have been, I think, unheard of before September 11, 2001,
    the FBI's WMD operational component at headquarters is actually
    collocated with NCTC's WMD analysts, who are collocated with
    the foreign operators and intelligence analysts who work on
    WMD. So they are literally side by side sharing that
    information.
        Senator Collins. That is terrific to hear.
        Mr. Leiter, you mentioned earlier the creation of the NCTC,
    which I always thought was the most important part of the 2004
    reforms in addition to the creation of the Director of National
    Intelligence. And I really commend you and everyone who is
    working there for bringing our concept to life in such an
    effective way.
        I do want to ask you, because there was so much controversy
    at the time, how the authority to engage in strategic
    operational planning is working. There is no doubt that the
    other side of the shop, the sharing of information and having
    the analysts sit side by side, is working very well. But are
    you engaged in strategic operational planning?
        Mr. Leiter. Senator, we are, but I would agree with you, it
    is not nearly as advanced as the intelligence sharing that in
    many ways was an evolutionary responsibility; whereas, the
    strategic planning responsibilities are really revolutionary
    since they cut across all departments and agencies and are a
    direct report to the President.
        What it requires, because of the way in which the law is
    written, without a command authority--which I think is quite
    appropriate--is a true partnership. And what I have seen over
    the last 8 months with the change of the Administration is a
    new set of eyes and new approaches from people who may have not
    been as wedded to doing things the old way and an appreciation
    that there must be slightly stronger synchronization of
    activities across the worlds of law enforcement, homeland
    security, but also diplomacy, military, and so on.
        So the planning is going on at a high level strategically.
    It is going on at a more granular level, as I said, in helping
    to ensure that our outreach efforts both domestically and
    overseas are speaking to the challenges we see in some of our
    Somali population, and then all the way down to the budget
    level to make sure those programs are well aligned.
        Senator Collins. I hope that you will keep in close touch
    with this Committee on that issue.
        Let me just ask one final question of all of our panelists,
    and it is a variation of the ``What keeps you up at night?''
    question, which the Chairman is very fond of asking our
    witnesses. But let me make it more precise.
        What gaps in our knowledge or our capabilities concern you
    the most? We will start with you, Madam Secretary.
        Secretary Napolitano. Well, thank you. I was going to say
    what keeps me up at night is preparing for hearings.
    [Laughter.]
        But I think I want to go back to Senator Levin's question
    about is there one number you call where you can get all
    relevant information. Our ability to do that I still think is
    in the developmental stage. I think that for any well-trained
    law enforcement official, he knows several places to call which
    will get him to the right answers. But in some instances there
    may be classified information that cannot be shared. In some
    instances the information may be spread among different
    departments still.
        So our ability to really not only collect information but
    to fuse it is really part and parcel of where the Department is
    moving so you have that direct connectivity with an officer on
    the street.
        Right now I think officers on the street or State police
    officers may know to call the JTTF, they may call a Fusion
    Center; they may call the Department of Homeland Security in
    Washington, DC. They know to call somewhere, that somewhere
    someone can get them to the right information. But the whole
    business of fusing consolidation and making sure that we have
    streamlined this as much as possible given that some
    information will have to remain classified is, in my view,
    still a work in progress.
        Senator Collins. Mr. Mueller, gaps in capabilities or
    knowledge?
        Mr. Mueller. Well, my greatest concern still is the ability
    of al-Qaeda to use western Pakistan and Afghanistan as a
    sanctuary. To the extent that I worry, and do, about a weapon
    of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist, it is that
    orchestrated out of that sanctuary there will be the capability
    of either developing or obtaining a weapon of mass destruction.
        If you look at the most serious case we have had recently,
    which is the Zazi case, it was training in Pakistan that gave
    him the capability of undertaking the attack. And the ability
    to obtain intelligence, to reduce the threat from that area is,
    in my mind, absolutely key to protecting the homeland.
        Senator Collins. Thank you. Mr. Leiter.
        Mr. Leiter. Senator, I think what keeps me up at night, the
    capability that is a challenge, is that in a country of more
    than 300 million people, where the overwhelmingly vast majority
    finds terrorism abhorrent, how do we as a team locate those
    one, two, 10, or 20 who feel differently? And how do we do that
    in a way that is not invasive of those other 300 million plus?
    And how do we ensure that you as a Congress and those 300
    million plus people have sufficient trust in our organizations
    that we can do this with a level of secrecy so it is not played
    out in the press but individuals like yourself and others in
    the Congress and the public believe that we are not
    inappropriately invading their privacy and their civil
    liberties in a way that should not be done.
        Ensuring that we can strike that right balance remains a
    challenge, and I think even 8 years after September 11, 2001,
    remains a very significant one.
        Senator Collins. Thank you for that very thoughtful
    response.
        I think the issue of the lone wolf, the individual who has
    been radicalized perhaps using the Internet, is so difficult
    for us to deal with, and I commend all of your efforts and the
    progress that you have made. Thank you.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Levin.
        Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What is going to
    keep me up tonight is a number of things, but one of them will
    be the difference in the answers that I received to my question
    from you, Secretary Napolitano, and you, Director Leiter, as to
    whether or not there is a place where all information
    concerning potential terrorists or people who might threaten us
    is accumulated and can be given promptly to, immediately to
    somebody who is in law enforcement who has arrested somebody.
    We all know the story of what happened before September 11,
    2001, where the CIA had information it would not share with the
    FBI. I know we are way beyond that. I hope we are way beyond
    that.
        But talking about fusion, now there is some confusion
    because----
        Mr. Leiter. And if given an opportunity, I would be happy
    to clarify.
        Senator Levin. Yes, let me give you that opportunity.
        Mr. Leiter. Senator, I tried to phrase my answer quite
    precisely, which is there is one place in the U.S. Government
    where all information about known and suspected terrorists
    comes, which is the National Counterterrorism Center, which is
    subsequently shared with the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center.
    So if any one of those screeners come across someone and they
    have a question, they should know to call the Terrorist
    Screening Center, and, in fact, that data will be held at NCTC,
    and they will be able to provide information to that police
    officer or consular official.
        What I think Secretary Napolitano said, and which I would
    agree with wholeheartedly, is really two challenges. One,
    ensuring that the police officer on the beat understands that
    system and knows to whom to turn, which is different from
    asking whether or not there is a place within the U.S.
    Government where all that information resides. It is reaching
    that last tactical mile to ensure there is an understanding and
    a streamlined way in which it can be done, and that police
    officer or that port official understands that.
        The second piece that I think is equally important,
    Senator, is that my organization holds statutorily that
    responsibility to hold information about known and suspected
    terrorists. The U.S. Government, ranging from the Internal
    Revenue Service (IRS) to the Department of Homeland Security
    and every other acronym that we have here in Washington, DC,
    holds other data. What we do not hold is all of that data
    together. Is there a piece of data out there at DHS or at the
    IRS, for that matter, that might in some way be a bit of data
    that relates to someone that we do not yet know is a terrorist?
    Absolutely.
        Senator Levin. Well, obviously, there is.
        Mr. Leiter. And that is a challenge.
        Senator Levin. I can see that, but as soon as it does
    relate to an individual, presumably it is sent to your Fusion
    Center.
        Mr. Leiter. That is correct.
        Senator Levin. I do not understand, then, your answer as to
    how that answer is the same as Secretary Napolitano's answer,
    which is that--we better get to Secretary Napolitano.
        Secretary Napolitano. Well, Director Leiter and I spend a
    lot of time together, so I think our answers are very
    consistent.
        Senator Levin. Good. Try your answer again. What is
    missing?
        Secretary Napolitano. What I am saying, Senator, is the
    process of training and attuning all law enforcement, no matter
    what level or where located, about where to call or where to go
    is still ongoing and is one of the functions, I think, or one
    of the great things that will happen when, as the Fusion Center
    concept develops, whatever it is, you will have something right
    there that everybody knows at least to call there.
        But I will share with you that the hypothetical you raise,
    someone at the border who comes in, those screeners are going
    to know.
        Senator Levin. I said the cop on the street. I said, Is
    there a number he can call where all the information that is
    known about a particular information has been centralized? That
    was my question, and the answer I thought was yes coming from
    Director Leiter, and I thought that you said we have got quite
    a ways to go in that regard. I understand that maybe there are
    some law enforcement officers out there who are not aware that
    they could call that number. That is just a matter of educating
    every----
        Mr. Leiter. The beauty of the system, Senator, is it is
    transparent to that cop on the street. When that cop----
        Senator Levin. That was not my question, whether it is
    transparent. My question is: Is it complete? Is all the
    information that all the agencies have about individuals who
    might constituent a threat to this country filtered or supposed
    to be filtered into that one number? That was my question.
        Mr. Leiter. All of the information about known and
    suspected terrorists is held by the National Counterterrorism
    Center.
        Senator Levin. And it is supposed to all go there and all
    the agencies know it.
        Mr. Leiter. Correct.
        Senator Levin. Maybe every police officer does not know to
    call that number, but every agency--State, local, Federal--
    knows all information about potential threats to the United
    States is supposed to go to that central place.
        Mr. Leiter. Correct.
        Senator Levin. Now, is that true?
        Secretary Napolitano. That is true. The National
    Counterterrorism Center holds the raw data, and so a trained
    police officer ought to know either to call there or to call
    his local Fusion Center to get connectivity there.
        Senator Levin. That is fine. That is what you said, too,
    Director Leiter. He may not know to call there, but if he knows
    to call there, it will all be there.
        Mr. Leiter. Yes.
        Secretary Napolitano. Yes.
        Senator Levin. OK. Well, I think I have a minute left, so
    let me just ask a question about these demonstration projects.
        Chairman Lieberman. A minute and a half.
        Senator Levin. These international interoperable
    demonstration projects, Secretary. I have forgotten how many,
    like four or six we have funded. Do you know the status of
    those cross-border projects between us and Canada and us and
    Mexico? We have these demonstration projects which apparently
    are somewhere in the works. Do you know what the status is of
    that? And if not, would you give us that for the record?
        Secretary Napolitano. Yes, we will.
        Senator Levin. And, also, if you would, Madam Secretary,
    for the record--you indicated that there are some discretionary
    funds that you could steer to the Fusion Centers, and if you
    could for the record identify what those sources are.
        Secretary Napolitano. I would be pleased to do so.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The information submitted for the record from Secretary
    Napolitano in responses to questions from Senator Levin appears in the
    Appendix on page 189.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Senator Levin. Thank you all.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Levin.
        Since Senator Collins asked a variation of my ``What keeps
    you up at night?'' question, I want to exercise the prerogative
    of the Chair and ask you a quick question, which is in terms of
    what we can do to help you further.
        Is there one thing that we can do that you need, either by
    way of additional statutory authority or resources for a
    particular program that we are not supporting now that would
    assist you in the work of counterterrorism that you do? Mr.
    Mueller.
        Mr. Mueller. I will leap into the fray and say, yes, the
    PATRIOT Act is going to be debated. I know it has been--those
    provisions have been very essential to us, particularly the
    first two which relate to the business records provision.
        Chairman Lieberman. Right.
        Mr. Mueller. And, second, the roving wiretaps. And a third,
    while it has not been used on lone wolf, it will be and is
    important if we get the similar situation that we had with
    Moussaoui in 2001. So I would urge the reenactment of those
    provisions.
        I also would make a point in terms of National Security
    Letters. Our success and our information is in large part
    attributable to the information we can gather not of
    substantive conversations but of the telephone toll data that
    we obtain by reason of National Security Letters. And so it is
    really retaining these capabilities that is important.
        The other point that I did make, tried to make, and that
    is, in terms of continuing the vigilance and the participation
    of State and local law enforcement on the Joint Terrorism Task
    Forces in a time where their budgets are being hit, I would
    encourage as Congress and the Administration allocate monies to
    State and local law enforcement, that it is done as an
    incentive to participate in that which is very important to the
    national well-being but not so important when the police chief
    is more concerned about violent crime on the streets.
        Chairman Lieberman. Sure. That is very helpful. To me it is
    very significant that your first answer was about the PATRIOT
    Act reauthorization and then the National Security Letters. I
    hope our colleagues will keep that in mind.
        Secretary Napolitano.
        Secretary Napolitano. Well, I would add to Director Mueller
    that supporting funding that assists not just the JTTFs but the
    Fusion Centers as well.
        And then to build on something that was mentioned earlier,
    we call it homeland security, but homeland security begins in
    many instances abroad. And particularly what happens in
    Pakistan and Afghanistan is a source for many of the threat
    streams ultimately that we are expending resources on, there is
    an impact here in the homeland.
        So really commending that understanding, that homeland
    security does not actually start at the borders of the United
    States.
        Chairman Lieberman. Well said. Mr. Leiter.
        Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman, two quick areas I would say.
    First, continuing to enable the softer elements of national
    power domestically and overseas, so we have the diplomatic
    corps and the foreign aid, so you can get to these areas and
    try to undermine the spread of violent extremism before it
    occurs.
        Second, more theoretical and less tangible, something you
    cannot put into a law, but continue to urge, as you always do
    on this Committee, to approach counterterrorism with a truly
    bipartisan spirit. Really, the fact that Mr. Mueller and I
    served in the Bush Administration and serve now today I believe
    is testament to the fact that it matters not what party you
    are. Certainly Zazi or any of these other fellows we have been
    talking about would not have cared whether or not they were
    Democrats or Republicans in charge. And what we do is in almost
    every instance nonpartisan anyway.
        Chairman Lieberman. That is a very important statement. A
    perfect one to end on. We try our best to reflect that attitude
    of national interest first on this Committee, and generally
    speaking on these matters, I think that is reflected throughout
    the Congress.
        I thank you for the time you have given us. I come back to
    my thanks to you at the beginning for the extraordinary
    progress I think we have made in the 8 years since September
    11, 2001, but we know that we have a patient and persistent and
    fanatical enemy out there, and it is going to be a long time
    before we can really declare victory here against this
    particular enemy.
        Senator Collins, would you like to say anything?
        Senator Collins. Thank you. You said it well.
        Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much.
        The hearing record will be kept open for 15 days for
    additional statements or questions. The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

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