[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
111th Congress Printed for the use of the
2d Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
_______________________________________________________________________
LEGAL HOOLIGANISM--IS THE
YUKOS SHOW TRIAL FINALLY
OVER?
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
SEPTEMBER 29, 2010
Briefing of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
_______________________________________________________________________
Washington: 2015
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-1901
[email protected]
http://www.csce.gov
Legislative Branch Commissioners
SENATE HOUSE
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland, ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida,
Chairman Co-Chairman
CHRISTOPHER DODD, Connecticut EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
ROGER WICKER, Mississippi G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island ROBERT ADERHOLT, Alabama
TOM UDALL, New Mexico DARRELL ISSA, California
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
MICHAEL POSNER, Department of State
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, Department of Defense
(ii)
* * * * *
ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki
Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European
countries, the United States and Canada. As of January 1, 1995, the
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to 56 partici- pating States, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet
Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.
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the participating States' permanent representatives are held. In
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Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the fields
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on initiatives designed to prevent, manage and resolve conflict within
and among the participating States. The Organization deploys numerous
missions and field activities located in Southeastern and Eastern
Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The website of the OSCE is:
.
* * * * *
ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the
Helsinki Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to
monitor and encourage compliance by the participating States with their
OSCE commitments, with a particular emphasis on human rights.
The Commission consists of nine members from the United States Senate,
nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member each
from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. The positions of
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when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff assists the
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The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of
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tions to OSCE meetings. Members of the Commission have regular contact
with
parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-
governmental organizations, and private individuals from participating
States. The website
of the Commission is: .
(iii)
LEGAL HOOLIGANISM--IS THE YUKOS SHOW TRIAL FINALLY OVER?
------------
September 29, 2010
COMMISSIONER
Page
Hon. Alcee Hastings, Co-Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe..................................................
1
WITNESS
Vadim Klyuvgant, Lead Defense Attorney for Mikhail Khodorkovsky........
1
PARTICIPANTS
Kyle Parker, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe.................................................................
7
Robert Herman, Freedom House...........................................
7
Ron McNamara, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe.................................................................
11
(iv)
LEGAL HOOLIGANISM--IS THE YUKOS SHOW TRIAL FINALLY OVER?
------------
September 29, 2010
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The briefing was held from 2:00 to 3:30 p.m. EST in 1539 Longworth
House Office Building, Washington D.C., Congressman Alcee Hastings, Co-
Chairman, presiding.
Mr. Hastings. Ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of the U.S. Helsinki
Commission, I want to thank you for joining us this afternoon in a very
important briefing.
Today we look at what is now the second Yukos trial of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky. My hope is that by shedding a light on this case, we will
not only see the gross injustice committed against Mr. Khodorkovsky,
but also against the entire Russian judicial system. The trial against
him and Yukos began in 2003 as what many saw to be a politically
motivated attack by the Kremlin. After almost a decade, the case
against Mr. Khodorkovsky has evolved into a complete show trial where
the accusations against the defendant have become absurd. Although we
would entertain the arguments of the prosecution, today, we find
ourselves unable to do so.
Despite recent rhetoric on human-rights reform from the Russian
president, very little has yet been accomplished. So it is with concern
we look towards Russia's future with concern for a fair hearing for Mr.
Khodorkovsky and concern for a society based on the rule of law. It is
my belief that the case against him is not only the trial of one man,
but a trial of the integrity of Russia's courts and judges.
With that, my thanks to Freedom House, who is assisting and
sponsoring this briefing with the Helsinki Commission. But I'd like to
welcome our esteemed guests, Vadim Klyuvgant and Anton Drel. Vadim has
served as the lead trial lawyer on the defense team for Mr.
Khodorkovsky. Before practicing law, he served as a member of Russia's
upper house of parliament. Mr. Drel has also served as Mr.
Khodorkovsky's lawyer and is a graduate of Moscow State University Law
Department.
Thank you, and with that, Vadim, you have the floor.
Mr. Klyuvgant. Please allow me, on behalf of Mikhail Khodorkovsky's
team of lawyers. We thank you for the kind invitation extended to us to
brief the high commission and those interested in what's going on at
the trial. We see this as a very high honor.
And also, at the outset, I would like to thank the distinguished
human rights organization, Freedom House, both for us and organizing
this briefing; and, much more importantly, for the assistance they
generously provided to us as we have sought to defend the interests of
our house.
Later in my remarks I intend to, once again, mention why we need
assistance, why such assistance is important to us, have long come from
human rights organizations, whether multinational--U.S.-based, European
or Russian human rights organizations.
Ladies and gentleman, I've been greatly impressed by the title
assigned to this meeting today. I would like to give credit to the
optimism of the others who seem to believe that this trial will
actually come to an end at some point. Hence, our vision--when I say
``our,'' I'm referring to those participating on trial on a pretty much
daily basis in Russia--is unclear, and we, quite frankly, do not quite
see this trial coming to any kind of end whatsoever.
What can be referred to as a ``second trial'' for both. It's a
formality, if you will. The reason I'm saying that the second trial is
not a genuine second trial is that the Yukos case, more broadly which
can be described as a legal massacre, is something that started as the
distinguished co-chairman said almost seven years ago in 2003, has been
going on. Whether it's trial number one or trial number two does not
really matter that much, because this case has only been gathering
momentum and, at this point it's not really clear to see it will ever
come to an end. So far, it's only been gathering momentum and getting
deeper and worse.
A number of those who become hostages to this legal massacre, and
those who've been sacrificed, I'm not referring to any kind of physical
situations, but, be that as it may, many, many lives, and an
increasingly large number of lives have been broken in this legal
massacre.
So what is formally referred to as a second trial is slowly moving,
dragging. It's a legal proceeding, a courtroom procedure. Whether or
not there will be a third trial, or even another one, is not yet known.
But we've seen this so-called second trial as part and parcel of what
was unleashed more than seven years ago, and what constitutes a legal
massacre.
We don't yet know the outcome and the possible implications of the
second trial. Speaking of the specific results of this trial, in legal
terms, as far as our defendants are concerned, the worst-case scenario,
under the Russian law, is that a new sentence may be handed down that
can leave them behind bars for another 15 years.
It was driven by politics and for Russian considerations, the case
remains the same. What is happening in that courtroom now is, as
before, driven by political considerations and those of Russia.
There is yet another factor and there is yet a third motivation for
what is going on, and that concerns individuals who took office
together and started all this many years ago. I'm quite sure that right
now they are sitting down and thinking as to what the implications
might be for them, personally, of this case finally coming to its end.
Each of these is crying and hedging their bets and figuring out what
the implications will be.
However, it is already increasingly clear what the world thinks of
what is happening, has transpired in the decisions made by and
statements made by various political bodies, and governmental bodies.
Which may lead to, again, more human rights. Probably the Russian
public and the Russian Federation will offer a similar assessment to
those already voiced.
And as the defense--and by defense I mean not only the attorneys,
but also the defendants themselves, as we try to fight in the courtroom
in Moscow for lives that have largely been already ruined, but lives
that others are trying to continue to ruin and sustain a defense
against those efforts.
As we're doing that, we're setting yet another goal, which in a way
transcends and which reaches beyond the efforts to salvage the human
rights goal, and that goal is our efforts to expose and to not leave
unpunished the corrupt and criminal behavior of those government
officials and public servants who, through using a vast array of these
methods which have involved threats of all kinds of criminal action,
falsification, forgery, and of torture, have used all of that to try
and execute the plan to legally massacre.
We--and when I say we, include Mikhail Khodorkovsky--view this kind
of behavior as criminal. We also believe what we're doing in court is
we're not defending the innocence, we're not holding the innocence of
the defendant. Rather, we are trying to prove the criminal nature of
the actions taken against them.
That this case, this situation is not going to be domestic error of
the Russian Federation. The reason being that what's at stake here is
universal, fundamental human rights values, values that underlie the
very foundation of Western civilization. Among those values, I would
primarily call your attention to the freedom of the individual, and the
law, as the body of laws and as a major component of human
civilization.
As my personal opinion to emphasize that what we have in mind is
not what is referred to as legal hooliganism, because in Russian and
Russia the word ``hooliganism'' refers to the radical instances of
extreme--mistreatment. Those that are sporadic not systemic. What we
have here is a systemic effort to trample underfoot the very
fundamental values of civilization.
And we have been mentioned by the veterans the more courageous and
more lawyers--on these efforts of the country.
What is especially tragic and traumatic is that such insistence
grave as they are, have been made against a background of rhetoric and
lip service paid to the rule of law. Fortunately, the authorities
started talking about the rule of law, and seeing it as supreme value
was hailed by the rest of the world, and they were praised for trying
to establish the rule of law in Russia. It is especially alarming--that
what's happening is happening in that very background.
That is exactly why we believe that the case at hand is not a
domestic affair for Russia, but rather it is an issue, a problem that
should be put on the agenda of an international context, and
international relationships, one party to which is the Russian
Federation, the other being other countries at every and all levels of
international context.
We have referred to the trial of the city of Moscow as a sham
trial, a pretend trial, if you will, because while appearances are
being and things are allegedly occurring in the context of a trial, it
is in fact just a smokescreen, a cover-up for people's lives being
destroyed.
To begin with, the charges are fake and pretend charges, because
essentially they accused the defendants not only of something that they
never did, but, as a matter of fact, they're self-defeating because
what they have accused the defendants of is something that was simply
impossible, to never having done.
I'll be happy to give you a certain level of detail and explain
specific questions of why I'm saying this. I will say that the sham
nature of the charges that was quite consistent with the quality of the
so-called evidence produced by the prosecution, which had been produced
using forgery, falsifications, distortion on the facts and the forgery
of documents.
The methods that the prosecution has employed to gather this so-
called evidence have involved threats, blackmail, torture and
prosecution, and threats of prosecution towards just about everybody
that they--including, of course--accountants, lawyers and witnesses so
as to force these individuals to provide information that could be used
by the prosecution in building their false case.
By that token, this case is yet again not a domestic affair of the
Russian Federation. Because the methods in putting pressure on those
arrested and all kinds of similar techniques are not only being used
against Russian citizens, but against foreign nationals, including U.S.
business and against foreign corporations.
I will only cite one example out of a vast number, so it is
available. I will simply mention the name of the well-known company,
Pricewaterhouse, and what happened to it in Russia. When the management
of the Moscow--some individuals--Pricewaterhouse, most of those
individuals, who were foreign nationals, had their arms twisted in a
very, very cruel way and under threat of criminal prosecution, and the
threat of destroying the company's business in Russia to get them to
sign what the prosecution needed them to sign. The statement that ended
up being signed was a false statement and we have plenty of evidence to
prove that the statement was forced out and that it was given under
tremendous pressure.
There has been many propaganda train employed if you will, that has
been used to justify what is being done to Khodorkovsky, and that is
that he is being equated with a rich protector the likes of whom would
be Madoff; and the authorities will claim that individuals like that
have been and are prosecuted everywhere in the world.
The statement is untrue. Again if the right question as to why it
is untrue, I'll be happy to explain the details. It's a completely
different situation, one in which there's not a single inference of not
only criminal behavior, but even unlawful behavior--even misdemeanor
type of behavior on the part of our defense. These so-called facts have
been copied and falsified.
Therefore, the consequences and implications of the Khodorkovsky
case and the Yukos are very far reaching. Of course, they operate what
will happen to the victims and the hostages of that trial for Mikhail
Khodorkovsky.
We think also the consequences and implications of this case are
also of very direct relevance for the prospects of my country--the
Russia Federation--whether we'll use the buzz word organization to
refer to those prospects or you can just say the future of Russia. The
choice of words is not important in this case.
This case has ramifications for the business community, for
investors, for Russian international partners and, of course, for the
United States as one of Russia's international partners.
Again, the Khodorkovsky and Yukos case presents an impediment and
an obstacle for what is long overdue in the Russia-U.S. relationship. I
prefer more to talk about improving and enhancing the relationship.
This case creates a major impediment--to be done. Simply, I cannot
visualize a successful effort to improve this relationship with this
case remaining what it is and where it is.
And yet, another role that this case plays is that of an indicator
as to what is happening in Russia and which direction it is moving.
Whether this case will end justly or unjustly will be a very clear
signal of where Russia is headed.
That is why we have said that it is of great importance that the
national--public voice its opinions in the sense that the issue must be
put on the agenda of international context in Russia and the rest of
the world at any and all levels. It should be on the agenda of both
public and private diplomatic interactions. A report from human rights
NGOs all over the world--Europe, in the Americas, everywhere--is very
badly needed.
These things are critically important if the problem that we are
discussing here today is to see some kind of a fair ending. We believe
that the United States, as a major partner of Russian Federation, is in
a position to make a significant contribution to this. Both through
parliamentary action and through the channels used by the executive
branch of the United States and on the part of the civil society of the
United States, which is very well known for being vigilant, active and
invariable--intolerant--to the fundamental human rights violations.
As the Helsinki Act was signed in 1975, yours truly was still a
fairly young individual. Yet, I was very aware and watchful of this
kind of development. As a matter of fact, in 1975, I enrolled in law
school and all those things I found extremely interesting and
important.
And I remember the great importance--including in my then country,
the USSR--attached to the so-called third basket, which of course,
incorporated human rights issues that was very heavily discussed as
part of the framework of the Helsinki Act. I remember very vividly how
things were moving and improving along the lines of the Helsinki
process and was a better human rights situation in what was then a
superpower--not just a superpower, but an evil power, an evil empire,
on that felt extremely strong. Yet, it was listening to what was being
said as far as the Helsinki process and improving its track record on
human rights.
I have to be completely sincere and honest--why what happened--what
was capable of happening back in the 1970s did not--set--itself in the
context of the 21st century. Now that we are in Congress--in U.S.
Congress--has the context of this still fairly new initiative--that of
presenting the Russian-U.S. relationship.
I believe it will serve our national interests and we need it very
badly and it is very important to us.
Thank you very much for your attention.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you all so very much.
First, to underscore what you have said about the international
implications, when Yukos was taken over, there were investors from
around the world and a lot of them from America. It's estimated that
upwards of $7 billion was lost by international investors, including
those in the United States. That, in my judgment, underscores your
feelings regarding what I believe true too, to be that this is an
international matter of substantial consequence that should have
continued to be addressed, as it has been in other governments--two
that come to mind are the Swiss courts and the Dutch courts have
indicated that they felt it was illegal.
You know, Vadim, either 15 or 16 years ago would have been my
second visit to Russia. Like you, I felt the effects of glasnost and
the changes that were taking place. Like many Americans and other
citizens around the world, I felt that there would be progress in that
third basket from the Helsinki Accords.
Not by myself, but with three other colleagues--one a Democrat and
two other Republicans--we had a meeting with Yury Luzhkov, who was then
and until two days ago, the mayor of Moscow. When I met you today, I
told you that I was personal friends with Gennady Solezhno. Gennady
Solezhno was in the Duma and I became good friends.
And over the course of that time, I personally have witnessed--
having met regional officials and countless others--and recognize now
the government has changed and I think for the worse.
I want to say two further things: In reviewing the testimony of an
earlier hearing held by Sen. Wicker and attended by the chairman that
I'm co-chairman of the CSCE, Sen. Cardin, remarks were made by Sen.
Wicker wherein he quoted your client. Footnote right there for you and
Freedom House and for the brave and courageous lawyers that are in
pursuit of fairness and justice. You are now noticed and you are
supported by all of us that believe that all citizens of the world are
entitled to human rights.
Sen. Wicker quoted Mr. Khodorkovsky, which is almost poetry. He
says, and I quote your client: ``I really do love my country--my
Moscow. It seems like one huge apathetic and indifferent anthill, but
it's got so much soul. Inside I was sure about the people and they
turned out to be even better than I thought.''
I read recently, that in spite of that glass enclosure that he is
in during this trial, with those of you that are there, that at least
having served several years in a Siberian prison, that his spirit is
not broken.
Please convey to him that the law is our will to continue to point
out the injustice that he and Mr. Lebedev and your other clients are
experiencing.
But then, Sen. Cardin closed with what I close with here today--
just quoting him--he says, ``I think that Sen. Wicker and I both
believe''--and I'll now add myself to the list; I was not at the
hearing with them that day--``believe in the Russian people. We believe
in the future of Russia. Well, the future of Russia must be a nation
that embraces its commitments under the Helsinki Final Act. It has to
be a country that shows compassion for its citizens and shows justice.
Russia can do that today by doing what is right for Mr. Khodorkovsky
and his co-defendant. Release them from prison; respect the private
rights and human rights of its citizens. Russia then will be a nation
that will truly live up to its commitment, to its people, to respect
human rights and democratic principles.''
I don't know any way to say it anymore concisely or in a manner to
convey why it is that the United States Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe continues to put a lamp on this particular trial,
show trial--shameless trial--and will continue our efforts in that
regard in the future, both in Russia, elsewhere around the world and
here in the United States as well--lest you think we don't criticize
this group from time to time when injustices occur. Please note that we
do and will continue.
You have my best wishes and I'm hopeful that you will stay as
strong as you have been and I deeply, deeply appreciate Freedom House.
Mr. Klyuvgant. Thank you.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you.
Mr. Parker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Vadim, for a very moving and informative statement.
We're certainly very grateful to be able to put you on the record here
today.
Over the years--over these trials since 2003--we have certainly
heard from a number of very qualified people on the team. We certainly
very honored here to have Anton Drel in attendance; Mr. Drel is the
personal attorney--the first attorney to meet with him following his
arrest in 2003.
At this time, I would like to recognize my colleague Bobby Herman
from Freedom House. Freedom House contacted us about this a month ago.
We certainly were very happy and excited to hear that one, most
importantly, Vadim, you would be here in town. I know when we met last
year in Moscow, I was very much hoping that this would be possible. I'm
very glad to see it come to fruition.
We're certainly honored, in a sense share a podium with Freedom
House. We go back to 1976; Freedom House goes back to 1941. Certainly
quite pleased at the announcement of new executive director who happens
to have been a recent, former and very active member of our commission.
So we were very happy to have those wires crossed, as it were. I'd like
to recognize you for a statement.
Mr. Herman. Thank you very much, Kyle. I appreciate it.
And the co-organizing that we did this time was great, because we
co-organized, but you did all the work. So we like that.
Let me thank you and offer a couple of comments on what is a very
timely and important briefing. You've said, on behalf of Freedom House,
where I'm the director of programs in support of fundamental rights and
freedoms worldwide.
The subject of this session is of particularly intense interest to
us, because it focuses the attention on the critical question of
whether a citizen of the Russian Federation is able to access justice
to the extent guaranteed in the Russians' constitution.
The case that we're discussing today is but one data point, albeit
a high-profile one. The manner in which the defendant, Mr.
Khodorkovsky, has been subjected to a barrage of new charges,
deliberately timed to prolong his incarceration beyond the six years
he's already served, has with good reason raised concerns in Russia and
internationally about the sad state of the rule of law in present-day
Russia.
Last year, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev himself expressed
concern about what he called legal nihilism in his country. He was
right to raise it. Notwithstanding some modest gains in a few areas in
reforming Russia's judicial system, the overall picture is quite grim.
In Freedom House's annual survey of democratization in Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, nations in transit, Russia
continues to receive a low score for its legal framework and judicial
independence for several reasons: The troubling lack of independence
among judges, about which we've heard quite a bit, remains a serious
shortcoming of the Russian legal system; political interference by
high-level--high-level government officials is commonplace. There are
numerous reliable reports of judges being pressured or coerced until
rendering a particular decision and then generally conforming to
Kremlin preferences.
At the same time, the culture of impunity prevails in Russia. One
manifestation of this is that the mastermind behind the murders of
prominent Kremlin critics have yet to be brought to justice.
The inability of the courts to enforce judgments is another
systemic failure. Nearly half of the European Court of Human Rights
judgments against Russia pertain directly to the failure to comply with
the court's decisions. Pretrial detention often on baseless legal
grounds is also a major weakness of Russia's judicial system--as was
tragically highlighted by the death of Sergei Magnitsky last year. The
use of torture or other forms of coercion to extract confessions from
those in custody is wide spread.
Delayed legal proceedings--the matter with which Mr. Klyuvgant is
no doubt frustratingly familiar--is yet another obstacle to obtaining
justice in contemporary Russia. Finally, the lack of public information
about the court cases seriously erodes citizens' confidence in the
judicial process.
Legislation limiting the types of cases that go to jury trials has
also moved in the wrong direction. The fact that, according to
independent Russian research organizations, a full one-third of
Russians believe that the current raft of charges brought against Mr.
Khodorkovsky are political in nature--while another 50 percent say they
don't have enough information to form an opinion--underscores the need
for Russian authorities to be more, not less, transparent about the
machinations of the legal system if anyone inside Russia or beyond its
borders is to see it as a legitimate instrument of justice.
Let me close by observing that it's too easy to criticize from
afar. Mr. Klyuvgant works within the Russian legal system in an effort
to obtain justice for his client. We've listened intently to his
account of the challenges that that entails.
Going forward, I think we share--we all share an interest in
supporting those dedicated and courageous men and women in Russia who
are working to establish the rule of law and to make the judicial
process more transparent, accessible and fair.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Parker. Thank you, Bobby.
The way we planned this briefing, we have a little bit of time,
certainly, for some interactions, some audience questions. That's one
of the features I like most about the briefing is we're able to get a
little deeper into the topic. We are able to take public questions--
which, by the way, will be transcribed and printed in our official
hearing record.
Before we do that, I'd like to take a few comments and then open it
up.
One of the things I was quite happy to see come out in your
testimony was the human cost, the human dimension of this trial. It is
a legal process that's being carried out, but it has a real profound
human cost, certainly on the families of Mr. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev
and certainly others involved. That for us is really a priority.
Here at the Helsinki Commission we have three dimensions as were
set up in the Helsinki process: security dimension, the economic and
cultural and the human dimension. But we were mandated by Congress,
when we were set up, to focus on the human dimension.
And also, just to mention that this is not just a domestic affair.
This is not something that just concerns Russia. Attention to it cannot
be construed as interference in internal affairs. As the Russians would
say, ``kak ne stranno.'' The 1991 Moscow document that was unanimously
agreed to by all the participating states in the OSCE enshrines that
messages that human rights are of sufficient importance and attention.
That this type of interest cannot be construed or dismissed as the old
interference in internal affairs.
This time of year, the OSCE usually holds the annual Human
Dimension Implementation Meeting where everybody gets together in
Warsaw, talks about how things were going last year, how commitments
are being implemented. It's a large event, very interesting and lively,
with lots of NGOs. It's also a forum where NGOs are able to speak on an
equal basis with states. We line up in the morning and if the U.S. may
be behind Freedom House or Tajikistan or whoever participates.
This year, because we have a summit for the first time since the
1999 Istanbul Summit, it has taken the form a review conference. I
believe these issues--rule of law, access to justice--will be discussed
on Monday, October 4th. I certainly expect the Yukos case and situation
involving because it's obviously the case against Yukos oil, the
conflict in The Hague and then there's also the personal prosecution
of--might even say persecution of Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev.
One other thing I wanted to mention just along the lines of the
human cost. One of my favorite pieces on this whole case, in the many
years it's been written about, is an interview that Khodorkovsky did
through an exchange of letters with Boris Akunin of the Russian
Esquire.
I continue to go back to this piece and just mine it for the very
moving, again, illustration of the human cost of it. Also, in a sense,
the remarkable--the transformation, as it were, of Mikhail Borisovich
from Russia's richest oligarch--someone who, as is commonly said, may
have been no saint--to what appears to me as possibly the freest man in
Russia: having had it all, having lost it all and remaining unbroken
and being able to say those words that are really quite optimistic and
almost seem incongruent with the situation.
I remember when he was transferred to Matrosskaya Tishina for the
beginning of his trial, there was a picture, carried in the newswires,
as he got out of a cramped prison van--he gets out and he gives a smile
to the cameras. It's not a cynical smile. It's not an in-your-face
smile. It's a warm smile to his country. Just a couple quotes and then
we can open it up to question-and-answer.
Mikhail Borisovich says here, ``I could have left, but after
Platon's arrest, I regarded it as a betrayal. At the end of the summer,
I took a trip and said my good-byes to my colleagues who were already
beyond the border, and returned to Russia.'' Akunin asked, were there
minutes when you regretted that you hadn't left? A very human answer: I
don't know. There are probably two modest answers. Yes, I regret it
every day; no, I don't regret it, because having left, I would not be
able to live.
He's asked about his parents. And we have had the great privilege
of meeting his mother when she was in town. ``For them, honor was
always dearer than their own life, definitely, and maybe even mine. So
here I had no doubts.'' He talks about his children. ``I very much hope
that my children, too, knowing well since preschool that papa was in
jail, will grow up understanding why I could not have done otherwise.
My wife promises that she'll be able to explain this to them.''
Another comment that struck me here: ``Scoundrels are often more
successful than decent people, but are they happier? That's the
question. If they were happier, then we'd be living among nothing but
scoundrels. In the world would triumph strength and meanness, but it's
not at all like that after all. Strength loses out to courage, meanness
to honesty, hatred to love--not at first, but always in the end. The
world becomes a better place.''
And he talks about what's going on. ``What is taking place is the
advancement of the whims of the ones projecting downwards and into
society their distorted moral principles. Well, what can you say about
them? Pitiful, miserable people who, in their old age, will be scared
of death.''
These, to me, are just profoundly moving words from someone who is,
on one level, a vulgar businessman, in the business of making money.
What could be more crass, particularly in the crazy '90s in Russia? And
yet, they sound similar to a Russian literary thinker, to someone who--
circumstances, history, fate has chosen him for a different role. He's
in good company, frankly, having sat--as the Russians say--in Siberia.
Again, I'm very struck by it and I think it's possibly one of the
most interesting aspects of this case. To me, it's far more interesting
than rebutting ridiculous, absurd legal charges, particularly in the
second case. I know, obviously, Vadim, you have to litigate those
absurdities, so you must get involved in that drudgery.
But I'll just finish on this vein, to quote the famous words of a
beloved Russian Silver Age poet, Anna Akhmatova, and her ``Requiem''
that was written around the crucible and the tragedy and the nightmare
of the Stalin era. Her son, Lev Gumilyov, was imprisoned. To me,
there's so much, sort of, appropriate in this comment that begins
``Requiem'': ``Not under foreign skies, not under foreign wings
protected. I shared all this with my own people, there where misfortune
had abandoned us.''
It's obviously far more beautiful in Russian, but I think of a
Mikhail Borisovich who doesn't leave Russia and wage a proxy war from a
foreign country, who returns and faces his fate with his people,
through severe, turbulent and difficult years. With that, I don't want
to take any more time that we have for question and answer. I'd like to
open it up to anything--comments, questions. Josh, you said there's a
mike. If you could come up to the mike, that would make it easier for
the transcribers. Who wants to start?
If no one has a question, I will start with a question. I wonder
what your take is on this--is there any sense or any speculation on the
part of the architects of this fiasco that maybe it was a mistake? That
the damage to Russia's reputation has been too big and we're beginning
to have someone who is unbroken, is not admitting guilt. It makes it
difficult even to pardon him. Or is this not the case, and will there
be more? Could Luzhkov be next? Could Medvedev be next?
Mr. Klyuvgant. I can say the following. We have no doubt whatsoever
that there is quite a number of individuals among the Russian
authorities, in the Russian government, who understand that this was a
tragic, huge mistake, and one that needs to be amended and rectified
anonymous individuals who make the final decision.
These individuals cannot make a decision themselves, but they are
in a position to help the president make the decision, should the
president wish to receive their help. As far as the actual architects
of this situation, you're exactly right. We are not in touch with them,
but there is indirect evidence that even among them, there is not as
much cohesion as there was two or three years ago, let alone seven
years ago.
As far as the pipeline goes, I have no intention to try and
forecast the future. What I can say is that in a situation where an
individual cannot find justice in his or her own country, the judicial
system is such that anybody and everybody can be next. It also means
that people are not free and do not feel free when they live in such a
society like that, and with a government like that, because they are
driven by fear. People who are not free cannot engage in genuine
modernization.
Mr. Parker. Thank you. We have probably 20 minutes. I will offer
another question because I have quite a few. As I imagine what it must
be like to defend a client like Mikhail Borisovich, have you faced any
type of harassment in Russia?
Obviously, it's very high-profile, so the other question is, as an
attorney, I assume it must be impossible for you to plot out a
confidential legal strategy with your client. You can't go through a
walk-talk with him. Is there anything that might be able to, sort of,
shed some light for us on the daily grind of representing what the
Moscow Times called Medvedev's Sakharov?
Mr. Klyuvgant. Sorry, what was the point about Medvedev's Sakharov?
Mr. Parker. Well, I said, representing a client who was called, a
year or so ago in the Moscow Times, Russia's most famous political
dissident.
Mr. Klyuvgant. Thank you for this question. There was a USSR movie
where a school student, a boy wrote that, quote, ``happiness is when
they understand you,'' unquote. In that sense, I feel happy right now,
which almost sums up the entire answer to your question.
I don't think it would be appropriate to go into any kind of detail
as to the difficulty of attorneys working with their clients. This
having said, we--and I am referring to all members of the team--have
been subject to pressure and harassment. Unfortunately, some of the
members of the team cannot even live in their own country.
And we, of course, also understand that as we interact with our
clients, sometimes there are more than two parties to the dialogue. The
results of this invisible hand, this invisible presence, are very
obvious because not infrequently, in the court room, the prosecutors
will hint at or will simply show very clearly that they are informed of
our meetings with our clients, and the substance of those meetings that
we have with our clients, even though they were not there, or only as a
fly on the wall.
And as far as Medvedev's Sakharov, or Sakharov of the Medvedev era,
at the Matrosskaya Tishina prison, where Khodorkovsky is being held,
there is no telephone in his cell, either landline or a cell phone.
Should Medvedev wish to make a phone call to Khodorkovsky, as Mikhail
Gorbachev once famously made a phone call to Sakharov, I believe the
nanotechnology in question will come in very handy and make such a
phone call feasible.
And if he can get through to Khodorkovsky on the phone, I will be
happy to answer the call and act as a go-between and make sure that
they connect. There's just one small problem, and that is that this
phone call should actually be made. I think that for that to happen,
President Medvedev needs help and assistance.
Mr. Parker. Well, we know Russia is a leader in nanotechnology,
so--anyone else? Ron, please?
Mr. McNamara. Thank you very much. Ron McNamara with the Helsinki
Commission. It seems as though there are many dimensions to Mr.
Khodorkovsky's case, and can be looked at from many different levels.
Certainly it has been pledged never to forget the truly human
dimension, as has been touched on here.
In a certain sense, it might be easily dismissed as sort of a
political vendetta, if you will, by certain powers that be that for
whatever reason may have received Mr. Khodorkovsky's support of certain
elements of Russian society as potentially a threat.
There was a mention made regarding the lawsuits of investors in
Yukos, and I guess I want to raise the maybe indelicate question,
because one thing I've learned from working on Capitol Hill for 30
years is that when you're dealing with people in society, when there is
money involved, people pay attention very quickly. Obviously, we're
talking about huge sums in the case of your client's potential foreign
business.
So who has really benefited in a financial sense from the legal
pursuit and hounding of your client? And while we see President
Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin going through sort of the normal
functions of their offices, it seems to me, it strikes me, as though
they're involved in a lot of other transactions and things of that
nature, and perhaps their modest financial-disclosure statements don't
quite reveal the true attitude of the wealth and resources that they
have been able to accumulate while serving in the public sphere in the
Russian Federation. I realize it's somewhat indelicate, but why not?
Mr. Klyuvgant. Actually, this is not such a hard question to answer
because there are facts that suggest an answer, and those facts are
well known. The bulk of what was taken away from Yukos and the
individual shareholders, all ended up in one place. That place is known
as the Rosneft Company--because chairman of the board is Mr. Igor
Sechin, who, at the time the prosecution was just beginning, was deputy
chief of staff of the Russian president, and these days he is deputy
chairman of the Russian government.
So Rosneft Oil Company, which has since emerged as Russia's largest
primarily because of the Yugos assets that it inherited, wanted to give
official statements by Russian government officials. This company is
now being scheduled for privatization. To what it extent it will be
privatized has not been announced. However, the fact that it will be
privatized is beyond doubt at this point.
I am not going to set out the dominoes any further in this logical
game And as far as misreporting personal income, I've just read today,
in a matter of fact, in news, that the Russian president has sacked a
Russian general exactly for that, for lying on his resume. So I guess
if that is the general happened to be the person that this kind of
sacking practice had started with, apparently he must have been a most
dishonest individual. But then of course, it suggests that I am
thinking is possible, because I don't really have backstory there.
If I were to be more serious, I would simply say that we have yet
to find out a lot of information and facts about this, especially on
transparent aspect of the Yugos case that you had just asked a question
about.
Mr. McNamara. Thank you. I certainly would like to thank everybody
for coming, and Vadim, it has certainly been a real pleasure to have
you here. We receive you with great pleasure. This is obviously a very
important case, it's a historic case for the development of modern
Russia. I am not so optimistic about Washington's leverage or ability
to affect the outcome of the case. Maybe I'm wrong, maybe it doesn't
matter, maybe somehow, as you said, it can end justly.
But certainly, for our part, we will tell the story for the record,
and I can assure you that this commission will not forget your client
and the importance of this whole. So with that, the briefing is
adjourned.
[all]
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