[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NO WAY HOME, NO WAY TO ESCAPE: THE
PLIGHT OF IRAQI REFUGEES AND OUR IRAQI ALLIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE:
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 22, 2010
__________
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
HOUSE
SENATE
ALICE HASTNGS, Florida,Co-Chairman BENJAMIN CARDIN, Maryland,Chairman
EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts CHRISTOPHER DODD, Connecticut
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
JOSEPH PITTS, Pennsylvania ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
ROBERT ADERHOLT, Alabama JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
DARRELL ISSA, California SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
TOM UDALL, New Mexico
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
MICHAEL POSNER, Department of State
ALEXANDER VERSHBOW, Department of Defense
NO WAY HOME, NO WAY TO ESCAPE: THE PLIGHT OF IRAQI REFUGEES AND OUR
IRAQI ALLIES
----------
July 22, 2010
MEMBERS
Page
Hon. Benjamin Cardin, Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 01
Hon. Alcee Hastings, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 02
Hon. Jim McDermott, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 05
Hon. Chris Smith, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe.......................................... 07
WITNESSES
Eric P. Schwartz, Assistant Secretary, Population, Refugees, and
Migration, U.S. Department of State............................ 05
L. Craig Johnstone, President Ad Interim, Refugees International. 11
Kirk Johnson, Founder and Executive Director, The List Project to
Resettle Iraqi Allies.......................................... 15
Michael A. Newton, Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt
University Law School.......................................... 18
NO WAY HOME, NO WAY TO ESCAPE: THE PLIGHT
OF IRAQI REFUGEES AND OUR IRAQI ALLIES
----------
July 22, 2010
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was held from 2:30 to 4:00 p.m. EST, 385
Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Senator
Benjamin Cardin (D-MD), Chairman, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
Commissioners present: Senator Ben Cardin, Chairman,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Alcee
Hastings, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe; Hon. Chris Smith, Commissioner, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. Jim McDermott,
Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe;.
Witnesses present: Eric P. Schwartz, Assistant Secretary
Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State;
L. Craig Johnstone, President Ad Interim, Refugees
International; Kirk Johnson, Founder and Executive Director,
The List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies; and Michael A.
Newton, Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University
Law School.
HON. BENJAMIN CARDIN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Cardin. Well, good afternoon everyone and welcome to
the Helsinki Commission on the plight of the Iraqi refugees and
our Iraqi allies. The hearing titled, ``No Way Home, No Way to
Escape'' describes the situation of hundreds of thousands of
Iraqi refugees still languishing in neighboring countries,
particularly Jordan and Syria more than seven years after the
beginning of the war.
Our Iraqi allies--those who have risked their lives to work
for our government in Iraq, including alongside our military as
interpreters--face uncertain and threatening futures as forces
are redeployed. At a time when our country's attention has
turned to the conflict in Afghanistan, we must not forget
Iraqis who continue to suffer as refugees and those Iraqis who
are threatened for helping us.
Time is of the essence. The refugees become more desperate
by the day, as what resources they had are becoming exhausted.
They are not permitted to work in their host countries and most
feel that the current situation in Iraq remains too unstable to
afford real security.
The attacks near Baghdad last Sunday that killed 48 people
and wounded more than 40 others are a grim reminder that
violence is still a real part of the everyday life in Iraq.
Since January of this year, more than 1900 Iraqi civilians have
been killed, 3800 wounded in violent attacks according to the
Iraq Body Count Project.
By the end of next month, the United States will have
withdrawn half of its 100,000 troops in Iraq. Military bases
will be closed, including those where many of our Iraqi
employees have been living due to the death threats from
terrorists who see them as collaborators and traitors. Many
other U.S.-affiliated Iraqis currently live in hiding in order
to continue to work in country. All of these Iraqi allies are
targeted for assassination by organizations like al-Qaida in
Iraq and will systematically be hunted down as the military
withdraws.
The United States has increased funding for humanitarian
assistance to Iraqi refugees, providing more than $500 million
since fiscal year '09. The number of Iraqis resettled in the
United States has also increased dramatically over the past
several years, greatly assisted by the opening of an office in
country processing in Baghdad.
Nevertheless, I understand the average processing time for
most applications for resettlement is one year. And those
seeking SIVs are even more frustrated. The SIV legislation
enacted in 2007 provides for 5,000 visas each fiscal year
through 2012, which carry over any unused allotment. Yet to
date only 2145 special immigrant visas have been issued to
their Iraqi principal applicants. Looking at the length of time
to take advantage of these programs, it is totally inadequate
knowing the urgency that Iraqis will have for their safety as
the United States continues to withdraw its military forces.
We have a distinguished panel of witnesses here today who
will address these critical issues. The first panel will be
Honorable Eric Schwartz, the Assistant Secretary of State for
Population, Refugees and Migration. Our second panel features
Ambassador L. Greg Johnstone, interim president of Refugees
International, Mr. Kirk W. Johnson, founder and executive
director of the List Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies and
Michael A. Newton, Esq., professor of the practice of law at
Vanderbilt University Law School and the former brigade judge
advocate with the U.S. Army Special Forces.
With that, let me first turn to my cochairman, Congressman
Hastings.
HON. ALCEE HASTINGS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Hastings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Senator,
if you will permit me, you did identify some, a few of our
visitors and guests. And we're grateful to all of you. But I
would also ask that we be mindful that Ambassador Mustafa from
Syria is in the audience with us. I visited Syria and saw a
significant number of Iraqi refugees in Syria, as I have, in
Jordan and in Lebanon and Egypt and even in Sweden and
elsewhere.
Thank you for convening this very timely hearing. Sadly I
recall making the same comment about timeliness during the
commission's April 2008 hearing, Sen. Cardin, on Iraqi
refugees. Sadder still, as you've indicated, hundreds of
thousands of Iraqi refugees remain stranded, primarily in
Jordan and Syria. I might add, there are a significant number
that are also internally displaced in Iraq.
Furthermore, there are hundreds of thousands of displaced
children. What does this mean for the future of Iraq? I'm
deeply concerned about the many Iraqi children who have been
forgotten, who are not attending school either in Iraq or in
host countries in the region. Some of these children have not
been in school for three or four years. The world needs to pay
close attention to this. We need to make certain that these
children are adequately taken care of because extremist groups
will stop at nothing to take advantage of this vulnerable
population, which will have long-term ramifications for Iraq,
the region and the rest of the world.
At the beginning of the 111th Congress, I introduced House
Resolution 578, the Iraqi Refugee and Internally Displaced
Persons Humanitarian Assistance or Resettlement and Security
Act of 2009. Initially the legislation that I fostered was
carried on the Senate side by former commissioner, now
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. I was very pleased in the
legislation more recently filed that Sen. Cardin and the late
Sen. Kennedy sponsored the legislation here in the United
States Senate. This legislation addresses the crisis and a
potential security breakdown resulting from the mass influx of
Iraqi refugees into neighboring countries and the growing
internally displaced population in Iraq and also facilitates
the resettlement of Iraqis at risk. Unfortunately, there has
been a shift in focus in Congress toward Afghanistan and
Pakistan and further away from Iraq.
Considering that this is the largest displacement of
individuals in the Middle East since 1948, it is a crisis that
today still demands our immediate attention and is one we
cannot ignore. Our government must, in my opinion, redouble its
efforts to ensure effective humanitarian assistance for the
displaced, expedite the resettlement process for those who want
to come to our country, work with the government of Iraq to
ensure that it provides for the needs of its displaced
citizens, and encourage the international community to do its
share to alleviate this regional crisis.
I had a very spirited and helpful conversation with
President Assad in Syria about what Iraq needs to do for Iraq
refugees. In May, I successfully offered an amendment to the
National Defense Authorization Act for 2011 that addresses the
plight of Iraqis who have worked for the United States in Iraq
and whose lives have been placed in grave danger for their
service.
Under the status of forces agreement signed in November of
2008, there is not one mention of Iraqis who have worked with
the United States, which I find to be most unsettling. And
while the December 2011 date for withdrawal of our troops seems
far away, there is another benchmark of August the 31st, 2010,
when nearly 50,000 troops will be withdrawn from Iraq, which
will limit our ability to protect U.S.-affiliated Iraqis at
risk. These brave Iraqi persons have risked their lives to work
alongside our troops, alongside our diplomats, alongside our
aid workers to help build a more stable and democratic Iraq. As
the chairman has indicated, all U.S.-affiliated Iraqis are
considered traitors and are marked for assassination by
terrorist groups in Iraq. Many have made the ultimate sacrifice
for their work.
The United States can't turn its back at this critical
juncture. We must put in place a plan to ensure that those
Iraqi allies who have helped our country are protected. Turning
our backs now would be fatal for our Iraqi allies and would set
a negative precedent for other theaters of war, in particular,
as I have mentioned, Afghanistan, where we need to win the
loyal collaboration and hearts and minds of the population.
This past May marked a turning point in that the number of
troops in Afghanistan exceeded those in Iraq for the first time
since 2003. Reports now suggest that Afghans working as
interpreters for the United States are increasingly facing the
same lethal risks endured by our Iraqi employees. We will be
hard-pressed to find more help in Afghanistan if the United
States is seen as quick to abandon its friends.
In my visits, along with our tremendous staff that have
done amazing work in this regard and the list of organizations
and countless others without mentioning everybody in this room,
I have come across, as have you, situations that remind of us
of our immense responsibilities.
The more poignant one took place in Lebanon when I had the
opportunity at UNHCR to visit with women particularly who were
helping other women in Lebanon during this refugee crisis. I
came across a lady and her son. Her son had been kidnapped in
Baghdad. Her husband was working in Syria. Time went by. The
kidnappers wanted a tremendous amount of money. A Christian
organization helped them to raise some of the money. The father
got home from Syria three or four days later and when he got
home, he submitted himself in return for the boy being
released. The boy was released and the money was continued to
be sought. Ultimately, the father was beheaded and his head was
thrown into the family yard. The mother then was thought to
have caused it because she did, in fact, go to the authorities.
And so the dead man's family accused her of causing the problem
and she had to flee Baghdad and wound up first in Egypt and
then in Lebanon. On that day, I gave that boy a $100 bill. I
talked about it and it was written about in the Wall Street
Journal. The only reason I didn't give him a $1000 was that I
didn't have it. I felt that I was as responsible for his plight
as anybody else. I just tell that story because of its
poignancy.
Thank you for letting me take the time, Senator. I am very
passionate about this. I have spent a considerable amount of
time along with our tremendous staff and you and your staff in
making sure that this issue is addressed appropriately by our
government. I thank you and I look forward to hearing from the
distinguished witnesses that you have identified.
Mr. Cardin. Congressman Hastings, we appreciate not only
your leadership but your passion on this issue. It is
desperately needed. Congressman McDermott.
HON. JIM McDERMOTT, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. McDermott. Thank you, Senator. I didn't come here to
make a speech, I came to hear people talk about an issue than I
care about.
I recently had a case in my office of a young woman who was
a translator for the embassy and got out, but all her family
was left in Iraq. I have spent a lot of office time getting
that family first to Syria and then finally into the United
States. It has not been an easy road. And when I see those
kinds of situations, I think about a reporter in Seattle who
told me many, many years ago--he was a Special Forces officer
in Korea--that when things changed in Korea, we walked away and
left a lot of people who helped our soldiers. I'm very
frightened that what may happen in this process as we leave
Iraq is that an awful lot of people are going to be left
vulnerable to an experience that we put them into. We asked
them to help us, they did and then we paid them back by walking
away. That's not right and that's why I came to hear what was
going on.
Mr. Cardin. Well, we very much appreciate your
participation. Let me acknowledge that we do have in the
audience many of our Iraqi allies and we welcome them very much
to the committee room. And we very much express our
appreciation.
With that, Secretary Schwartz, we'd be glad to hear from
you.
ERIC P. SCHWARTZ, ASSISTANT SECRETARY POPULATION, REFUGEE, AND
MIGRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Schwartz. Chairman Cardin, Cochairman Hastings, Rep.
McDermott, I'm very pleased to have the opportunity to appear
before you to discuss our commitment to finding solutions for
displaced Iraqis. As President Obama has stated, the United
States has a strategic interest and a moral responsibility to
sustain assistance and to promote protection for this
population. The president has also said when he was here in
this institution that we have an obligation to keep faith with
those Iraqis who have kept faith with us.
This issue is among and has been among my most important
priorities as assistant secretary. I want to affirm to members
of the commission that while our military may be drawing down,
our concern for and our commitment to the humanitarian and the
protection needs of displaced Iraqis will remain robust. We
will sustain significant levels of overseas humanitarian
assistance inside and outside of Iraq, which amounted last year
to almost $400 million. My bureau spent about $300 million,
nearly a quarter of our worldwide refugee assistance budget.
Within the region, those monies helped more than 200,000 Iraqi
refugees who are registered with the U.N. high commissioner for
refugees and an undetermined number who are not.
And while the number of individuals fleeing Iraq,
thankfully, has decreased significantly, the food, the
education and the health needs of Iraqis in neighboring
countries has actually increased due to personal assets that
are being depleted.
Our funds will also help Iraqis displaced within the
borders of Iraq, some 1.6 million of whom were displaced by
sectarian violence following the Samarra mosque bombing in
early 2006, in addition to the displaced who were there before.
And while new internal displacements, also thankfully, have
also diminished, these people remain very vulnerable and need
food and relief items, they need livelihood programs and they
need assistance in accessing public benefits that are
available.
We are working very closely with the Iraqi government, with
our international partners to encourage conditions for safe and
sustainable return and reintegration of both the internally
displaced and the refugees. But let me hasten to add that
returns must be voluntary. That being said, they have been
ongoing. Returns have been ongoing. From 2008 until May of this
year, there were nearly half a million voluntary returns of
IDPs and refugees, which the vast majority of returnees being
internally displaced persons.
Beyond all of these efforts, we will continue to engage
directly with international organizations, with NGOs and with
displaced persons in Iraq and refugee populations and officials
outside of Iraq to ensure that we are making our best efforts
to meet the needs of refugees and displaced persons. One of my
trips as assistant secretary was to Iraq, Jordan and Syria last
fall. My deputy, Kelly Clements, returned from the region last
week or a couple of weeks ago. And this remains an issue of the
highest importance to us.
We'll continue to press other donors to provide assistance.
I have met with officials of more than 15 governments to press
the case, though I have to be honest and say it's an uphill
battle. I think that it's likely that we will continue to
provide the lion's share of aid to the displaced in the years
to come.
And we will continue to urge Iraqi officials to do more to
assist the displaced and the refugees. In fact, over the last
year, the Iraqi government appointed a senior coordinator for
displacement, they increased the budget for the Ministry of
Displacement and Migration and they increased their returnee
grants by about 50 percent. These are all good signs and will
encourage the new government to do even more.
Finally and critically, we will sustain and strengthen our
efforts at U.S. resettlement. We believe that the most
appropriate, durable solution for the vast majority of Iraqis
will be return to a safe and a stable Iraq. But we know--we
know that Iraqis, some Iraqis will never be able to return and
that third-country settlement will need to remain a viable
option for many of them.
Our Iraqi resettlement program is now the largest refugee
resettlement program in the world. And about one quarter of all
of the refugees whom resettle in the United States come from
Iraq. We have improved the efficiency of the in-country refugee
resettlement program. That is the program that resettles Iraqis
directly from Iraq, not from neighboring countries. And this
year we expect to triple the number of refugees who will be
resettled through this mechanism.
We have doubled the size of our refugee and internally
displaced affairs office in Baghdad over the past two years, so
that it is now the largest U.S. refugee coordination office in
the world.
And finally, it's vital that Iraqis are provided sufficient
support when they get here to enable them to become productive
members in their new communities. In January of this year and
with the strong support from within the Congress, I authorized
a doubling of the one-time per capita grant that we provide to
refugees to address the challenges they face during their first
30 to 90 days in the United States.
This was the largest increase by far in the more than
three-decade history of our refugee resettlement program. It
won't eliminate the enormous challenges faced by new arrivals,
nor will it address the longer-term adjustment needs that are
addressed by the Department of Health and Human Services, but
it will help to ensure that incoming arrivals have a roof over
their heads and have sufficient provisions for their first
months in the country.
In a detailed report on Iraqi resettlement that I have
reviewed very carefully, one of the witnesses in your
forthcoming panel, Kirk Johnson, notes that our department has
taken, and I quote, ``laudable steps towards bringing allies
out of Iraq.'' And I was deeply gratified by that
characterization. But I also took very careful note of the
recommendations in that report and in other reports about what
more we can and should be doing in terms of current and future
responses. And I assure you that we will review carefully each
and every one of those recommendations.
In closing, I want to thank you for your interest, your
commitment, your actions on behalf of Iraqi displaced and
refugees and for your support for the activities that assist
and protect these vulnerable populations. I'd be very happy to
respond to your questions.
Mr. Cardin. Secretary, thank you very much for your
testimony. Before turning to questions let me acknowledge the
presence of the ranking Republican member, Congressman Chris
Smith and turn to him if he has any opening comments.
HON. CHRIS SMITH, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, chairman. First, I want to
welcome our very distinguished assistant secretary for PRM,
Eric Schwartz, who, over many years, I know I and my staff have
worked very closely with him. I just want to thank him publicly
for the tremendous work he has done over the course of a
lifetime. It's been an honor to work with you, Mr. Secretary.
Last week, I met with Gewargis Sliwa, His Beatitude, the
Metropolitan of Iraq and Russia of the Assyrian Church of the
East. He told my staff and I, very calmly, that some 69
churches have been bombed in recent years, 800 Christians
killed including clergy. He went on to talk about how there is
a rising tide of violence perpetrated against people of the
Christian faith. He also spoke in great length about the
trafficking situation and that many of those who do flee find
themselves very quickly put into a trafficking situation when
they get into Syria. Perhaps during the course of the Q&A, you
could speak to that.
I'm always concerned that whether it be in refugee camps,
whether they be with the borders around them or makeshift
refugee camps, traffickers are always on the prowl looking for
individuals to devour and send out to or abuse right in
country. So I would hope you could speak to that. And again, I
want to thank you for your leadership. It has been
extraordinary. This Republican has a great deal of respect for
you.
Mr. Schwartz. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Chairman.
Mr. Cardin. Congressman Hastings.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, may I make a most unusual request and ask your
consideration of same. I know that Secretary Schwartz is
probably on limited time, but I also know that we're going to
begin votes on the House side in about 20 minutes. With your
permission and if Secretary Schwartz would agree that we hear
the other witnesses so that we have an opportunity to hear
them, I would forgo any questioning so that I do have an
opportunity to hear them. I don't know whether that's feasible.
Mr. Cardin. Let me see if I can move quickly and we'll try
to move this along. First, let me acknowledge Secretary
Schwartz. I agree with you, our first priority is to deal with
the displaced individuals and the refugees to return to Iraq in
a safe environment. I have been to both Syria and Jordan with
the Helsinki Commission and we visited the refugees and we know
the plights.
I really want to compliment both the Jordanian and the
Syrian governments. They have done what I think has been
reasonable. Could they do more? Absolutely. But where the
leadership is needed is not just with the United States, but
with the Iraqi government. And if I have one complaint, it is
that I don't believe this has been a high enough priority of
the Iraqi government itself in dealing with the refugee issues.
I would just urge you to continue to urge the government to pay
more attention to the return of displaced individuals and
refugees. I think that's a critically important part.
Secondly, in regards to the visa programs that allow Iraqis
to come to the United States, I worked very closely with my
former colleague Sen. Kennedy in developing not only the
special immigrant visas, but also the payments so to be more
convenient for those who helped our country to find refuge
here. I guess my question to you is that there could have been
as many as 15,000 settled under the SIVs. In reality, I believe
it's a little over 2100. The question is, why hasn't there been
more issuance of the special immigrant visas?
I also know that there was a directive that came out of the
consulate that restricted the use of the SIVs to direct hires--
contractors and subcontractors--excluding employees of other
U.S. entities and government-funded organizations. I don't
recall that being in the legislation and I would welcome your
thoughts as to why the numbers aren't higher than the 2100.
Mr. Schwartz. Well, first let me address your second
question first: the issue of how expansive the SIV authority
is. The issue you raised has been raised in a couple of the
reports that we've looked at and the policy you describe in
terms of how it's restricted has been a policy that's been in
effect for several years. I think the issue bears examination,
and I think it merits review.
The SIV issue will have certainly more than a colorable
claim in the refugee program. The refugee program
administratively is just easier to navigate. That may be one of
the reasons why the SIV program is undersubscribed. There are
also requirements in the SIV program because the legislation
essentially grafted Iraq onto an existing U.S. government
program. There are a series of requirements that have created a
certain slowness in the process, such as a chief of mission
letter requirement.
We have taken a lot of actions to try to expedite this
process, to make it go faster. But it remains an
undersubscribed program. I think it is an issue that we need to
look at and to figure out where there are ways we can make it
easier and quicker. We may need the help of the Congress on
this because some of these requirements are legislative. We
just couldn't get around them without legislative fixes.
Mr. Cardin. We look forward to working with you on that. We
know we've done some programs to try to expedite this. We
particularly appreciate the presence within country, which
makes life a lot easier on the immigrant issue. Let me just
remind you that in 1996 we had an airlift of Iraqis in the
Kurdish community because of the urgent safety issues.
I am concerned with the redeployment of U.S. troops and the
closing of military facilities that we could have some urgent
issues that will not await the niceties of the bureaucratic
forms and may require some urgent responses. Is that under
consideration and do you need congressional support in order to
be able to implement such a plan if it becomes necessary?
Mr. Schwartz. Well, Sen. Cardin, I think the more
congressional interest we have on this issue, from my
perspective, the better.
We take very seriously concerns expressed by many that
there will be increased reprisals against Iraqis who have
worked for us in Iraq. We currently have a range of robust
resettlement and visa programs that benefit Iraqis, as you
know. I think we need to bolster them and strengthen them and
increase contingent capacity in neighboring countries. We need
to do all of that and think about ways that adapting these
programs to changes in circumstances to enhance capacity to
move people who are at imminent risk because we have capacity,
but it's limited. At the same time, we do need to look at
options for the kind of contingencies that your question
addresses.
Mr. Cardin. Good. There's significant congressional support
for measures being taken if the circumstances require it. We
have a strong obligation to protect the Iraqis that are at
risk. I would just urge you to keep us informed and to have
those types of plans available.
Mr. Schwartz. Certainly.
Mr. Hastings. Senator I'm going to forgo, but I would want
to submit questions and ask the secretary if he would get back
to us with those answers.
Mr. Schwartz. I'd be happy to and I also want to say before
you go, Congressman, that I deeply appreciate your dedication
and interest in this issue. I looked at your legislation very
carefully. I think, again, my general proposition on this is
the more engagement we have from the Congress, the happier I
am.
Mr. Cardin. Congressman Smith.
Mr. Smith. The U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom released its 2010 report on April 29th and it noted,
quote, ``Despite the overall drop in violence in the country,
violence against religious minorities and their religious sites
continued in '09 and 2010, particularly in the northern
disputed areas.'' The report further stated that the vast
majority of displaced religious minorities within Iraq have
gone to Nineveh, where there has been a pattern of violence
against religious minorities prior to elections and obviously,
it's an ongoing problem.
Could you speak to that issue? I was in Baghdad several
years ago and met with a group of Christians who had the same
complaint then as they do now, that the government does not
provide adequate protection, that many of their people were put
into flight. They get a knock on the door and they're told, you
be gone by tomorrow or your house and your life will be
destroyed. And they pack up and they leave. So while we try to
deal with, obviously, refugees and IDPs as they cluster or as
they go across borders, stopping that in the first place seems
to be the highest priority in terms of mitigating this terrible
situation.
Mr. Schwartz. I couldn't agree with you more, Congressman
Smith. Let me start from the area that I know, which is the
refugee and displaced perspective, which is, yes, we see that a
very high percentage of those who are in fear of persecution
from Iraq do come from communities of religious minorities. And
that is a great source of concern and these are populations
which we are seeking to find protections solutions and
assistance solutions for.
I think the issue of stopping persecution before it happens
has got to be and is a subject of discussion and dialogue
between our government and the government of Iraq. The more we
press for reconciliation and policies of tolerance and respect
for democratic principles, the greater over time the provision
of rights to these communities will be, but it has to be a
critically important part of our conversation with Iraqi
authorities. And with your permission, I'd like to get back to
you with more on that for the record.
Mr. Smith. If you could. I was struck by Metropolitan Sliwa
who made the comment that when people visit his house now,
there is a room that used to be the guestroom that's adjacent
to the street and he has nobody sleep there because of so many
bomb attacks. The targeting is, I believe, getting worse. So if
you could get back, that would be very much helpful.
The UNHCR issued a statement recently that about a hundred
people have been forcibly returned from four European
countries.
Mr. Schwartz. What it's about is our European friends have
somewhat different perspectives on this issue than we do. We
believe that all returns to Iraq at this point should be
voluntary. That includes--of course, anyone who is deemed to
fear persecution, under no circumstances should that person be
returned, but our position is broader than that:
At this point, despite the encouraging signs that we see in
Iraq--and as I said before, we've seen the numbers of displaced
people leaving has diminished and we applaud that and that's
encouraging. But despite that, we think that all returns to
Iraq at this point should be voluntary. We have a different
perspective on this issue than some of our European friends.
Mr. Smith. And finally, money-wise, how much unmet need is
there in terms of providing for the IDPs and the refugees?
Mr. Schwartz. Well, let me get back to you on that for the
record. But Samantha Power, my counterpart at the National
Security Council and senior director for multilateral affairs
and human rights, and I hosted a big meeting with governments
here in Washington to press the case for providing humanitarian
assistance. We continue to provide the lion's share of
responses to UNHCR appeals. And we'll continue to do so. But it
shouldn't be that way. Other governments need to be doing more.
Since they're not, UNHCR appeals and other appeals tend to be
undersubscribed and we're doing everything we can not only to
do far more than our fair share, but to encourage others to do
more.
Thankfully, the Congress has been very generous. We're
probably the only bureau in the government that the Congress
for whatever reason decides, we need more money than we ask
for. The support for the humanitarian role of U.S. foreign
policy from the Congress has been incredibly important to the
work of the department on these issues.
Mr. Smith. As you know, the UNHCR itself always in its
requests goes for what it thinks it can get rather than what it
absolutely needs.
Mr. Schwartz. Well, let me just say something about that
too because it's relevant to the budget issue generally. That
has traditionally been true, but our encouragement, UNHCR has
moved towards needs-based budgeting as opposed to what it
thinks it can get. As a result, their budget requirement now is
much larger. It's gone from something like 2 (billion dollars)
to $3 billion dollars. We applaud that because even if it's not
fully funded, we think an international humanitarian
organization has an obligation to say what the requirements
are. But that has created great stresses for our budget
because, you know, their budget has increased by a third, but
it is definitely the way to go.
Mr. Smith. That's good. Thank you so much.
Mr. Cardin. Congressman McDermott? Secretary Schwartz,
thank you very much. Now, there may be some written questions
and I would appreciate if you would respond to those timely.
Mr. Schwartz. Thank you, Sen. Cardin. I would be remiss if
I didn't thank you for your extraordinary efforts on behalf of
this population.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you very much. We appreciate your work
and your dedication. I know it's a tough area.
Mr. Schwartz. Thank you.
Mr. Cardin. Thanks for being so concerned. We'll now turn
to our second panel, which will consist of Ambassador L. Craig
Johnstone and from the president of Refugees International, Mr.
Kirk W. Johnson, founder and executive director of the List
Project to Resettle Iraqi Allies and Michael A. Newton,
professor of law at Vanderbilt University Law School. Please
make yourself comfortable.
Ambassador Johnstone, we'd be glad for you to begin.
L. CRAIG JOHNSTONE, PRESIDENT AD INTERIM, REFUGEES
INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Johnstone. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I have
submitted my written remarks for the record and I just would
like to make a few personal observations on the issue we have
before us here today. I am here as a member of the board of
directors of Refugees International, standing in as the
president of the organization pending the imminent, I hope,
replacement of our former president.
And therefore, I come to you only temporarily in this
position, but I have not, at all, temporary with respect to the
issue of refugees as a whole or the issues in Iraq
individually. I first testified before the U.S. Congress on
refugee issues 45 years ago, almost to the day, which is both
shocking to me and maybe even a little bit disturbing.
I now am here representing Refugees International. I don't
know how much you know about the organization, but Refugees
International was set up at the impetus of Lionel Rosenblatt
after he and I went AWOL from the State Department. We both
worked in Henry Kissinger's office in 1975 just before the fall
of Saigon.
In order to take out the people who had worked for us in
Vietnam during the time that we had been there--each of us
having spent some five years in Vietnam--we went to Vietnam
because the state of planning to take care of the people who
worked with and around the U.S. government there was
appalling--absolutely appalling. Very, very little had been
done on their behalf. In fact, I would characterize the U.S.
government attitude towards the Vietnamese employees of the
U.S. government at that time as one of callous disregard. And
we were shocked by that. We also went because we believed that
the United States had a residual humanitarian obligation not
just to the people who worked with us, but to the Vietnamese
people as a whole as a consequence of our participation in the
war.
I will tell you that I remain, to this day, upset by how
poorly we did in planning for the fall of Saigon. But I will
also tell you that I am intensely proud of how the American
people responded to the fall of Saigon once it began to take
place, welcoming people into their homes across all 50 states,
the U.S. government mobilized in exceptional ways past, you
know, all kinds of provisions went into effect that allowed us
to deal with the problem.
Because of the lack of planning, we left a lot of people
behind. But I must say, to this day, I am incredibly proud of
the magnificent job that our country did in being responsive to
the Vietnamese crisis once we began to mobilize on it. It was
marvelous, fantastic and quite frankly, I think it was
something that would happen in America. And I think we can all
take great pride in that.
We face an analogous situation in Iraq. We are leaving the
country, as you have pointed out. We have a lot of people that
have been associated with us and maybe even more importantly,
to some extent, we have millions of people who have been
displaced by this war--a million-and-a-half internally and at
least a half-a-million outside of Iraq who have been displaced
by this war and who are living in absolutely horrible
circumstances.
Not all of them, but many, many of them in absolutely
horrible circumstances. When I visit some of the settlements in
Iraq, the squatter villages, there's no running water, there is
no electricity. There is open sewage. People are living under
cardboard. And we're not talking, here, about people who are
used to living in that kind of deprivation before.
We are talking about people who constituted a middle class
that is not unlike that which we have in the United States
before. And today, they are living in absolutely terrible
circumstances. And almost to a person, when I ask the questions
in these places in Iraq, when I ask the questions of people, do
you have sanitation? The answer is no. Do you have water? No.
Do you have sufficient food to eat? The answer is no. Do you
have any prospects of a job? The answer is no.
So what can we do to help, I say. It's really a middle
class that has been tortured down into a subsistence living in
Iraq. And we're finding the same situation, sometimes less
difficult, in Syria and Jordan, less difficult because the
international organizations have more access to the people
there and therefore can provide a basic modicum of services.
But even there, it is totally insufficient. Women are being
forced into prostitution. People are going into begging. The
difficulties that they are facing are extraordinary. The
government of Syria, the government of Jordan have done
absolutely spectacular jobs trying to deal with this enormous
influx of people. I think you have to give credit where
credit's due.
There have been shortcomings in how the government of Iraq
has handled the refugee issue, though I think they've done
materially better with respect to the internally displaced
people within Iraq, it still is hopelessly inadequate. So we
have this analogous situation. The important message, I think,
for us today, is as we disengage from this conflict, we cannot
disengage from our humanitarian obligations. We have a special
obligation in this case and we need to step up to it.
We stepped up to it too late in Vietnam in many respects,
but we did step up to it and we need to be sure that we are
ready this time and we step into it in a timely way and that we
leave the situation honorably. And I think it'll go a long way
toward helping us, you know, come to terms with the situation
that we have faced in Iraq.
In practical terms, what does it mean? It means we have to
ensure that we have adequate funding. The U.N. appeals for the
refugees and internally displaced in Iraq have come to a little
over 700 million. The U.S. has an obligation as it has tried to
do in the past, of meeting at least 50 percent of that appeal.
It's not currently on track to be able to meet that 50 percent
this year. But it's coming close and I commend the U.S. for
everything that it has done, but it could do more and should do
more to be able to meet the requirements of these refugee
situations. As Assistant Secretary Schwartz pointed out, the
rest of the world is not doing its part at all.
It's a pittance, what some of the other countries are
contributing and that increases the burden on us. It would be
easy to say, well, you know, they should do more. But the fact
is, they're not and this is a situation that is a special
situation for us. So ensuring that we have adequate funding, I
think, is one of the things that needs to be done.
Secondly, we need to get the people who are working on the
issue, particularly within Iraq, out of the Green Zone. The
problem in Iraq today--and it's a problem that affects both the
U.S. side as well as the U.N. side, but in particular, the U.N.
side--is that the security restrictions on travel within Iraq
are so stringent, that people are not able to get out to
actually see for themselves what is taking place and to work
the issues where the issues actually are. We need to break
this. It's particularly true of the U.N. organization. That is
to say, the U.N. has a lot of very capable people in Iraq who
are trying to get the job done right, but they are restricted
in terms of how they travel. At Refugees International, we
travel around Iraq. We visit the same places where the people
are and we do it without the same kind of security restrictions
that the U.N. puts on itself or that the U.S. puts on itself.
Are our people so different? They're not. They're the same
people, in fact, the same kind of people. They're humanitarian
workers who want to get the job done and who go out there and
yes, they do take a certain level of risk in doing it. It comes
with the territory of humanitarian work in crisis situations.
The U.N. is not in Iraq and the U.S. is not in Iraq on the
humanitarian side to keep itself secure. It is in Iraq to
service a humanitarian need and it needs to pay a lot of
attention to the issue of security. I don't deny that for a
moment. But we need to put a little bit of pressure on the U.N.
and need to look at ourselves at what we can do to improve the
access that people have to the humanitarian need within Iraq
itself.
We need to keep the numbers up as well on the resettlement
in the United States. I testified before the U.S. Congress,
back when I was the deputy high commissioner for refugees at
the United Nations I was asked, do you think the U.S. is going
to be able to meet its target of 16,000 resettlements? And the
answer was yes, I was sure that the U.S. would because a
commitment had been made. It didn't look like it was possible,
but it was done. And I commend the United States for that. But
those numbers are still too low and quite frankly, we're now
approaching the age when we need those numbers to come up in
order to be able to service what are going to be increased
demands as the U.S. withdraws its forces from Iraq.
I think, to give a nod to the two people who will speak
after me whom I think will address this issue in much greater
detail; we need to be especially mindful who associated
themselves with us during the course of the Iraq war. These
people are at extraordinary risk. We need to take every measure
that we possibly can to ensure that they can leave Iraq and
that they can be resettled adequately in the United States.
I guess in sum, I would say, simply, I've been there; I've
done it; I've seen it in Vietnam. I know that the American
people can respond. When Lionel and I got back to the United
States after our rescue mission to Vietnam, we were first fired
and then rehired and then received commendations from Secretary
Kissinger. And having been through that emotional
rollercoaster, he did say one thing in the course of our
citation and that was he thought that we had salvaged a small
measure of our honor in Vietnam. I don't think that was so
appropriate for us, but I think it was very appropriate for the
overall effort that U.S. put into place after the Vietnam War
to resettle Vietnamese refugees in the United States. I would
say the same thing applies for Iraq in doing the right thing
with respect to the humanitarian responsibilities in Iraq, we
will have salvaged our honor in Iraq. Thank you.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you for your testimony. I appreciate it
very much. Mr. Johnson.
KIRK JOHNSON, FOUNDER AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE LIST PROJECT
TO RESETTLE IRAQI ALLIES
Mr. Johnson. Chairman Cardin and Hastings, ranking members,
I thank you for the opportunity to address you today and for
the attention that you're giving to an issue that despite
popular perceptions, increases in importance with each passing
day of withdrawal.
Let me begin with the obvious. We are leaving Iraq. By the
end of next month, we will have reduced our military footprint
to roughly 50,000 troops. Hundreds of bases and outposts
throughout the country are being dismantled. Our young men and
women serving there are redeploying. The blast walls are coming
down, the tanks and Humvees shipping out.
We are in the thick of what the Pentagon has declared the
largest movement of troops and materiel since our departure
from Vietnam. The logistics operations underway are
staggering--tens of thousands of troops have been reassigned to
support that effort, which is so advanced that the Pentagon
apparently has the capacity to track a coffeepot on its long
journey home.
Impressive as this might be, it ignores a fundamental
oversight in our nation's withdrawal strategy. There are no
serious contingency plans to evacuate the thousands of Iraqis
who've worked for the U.S. and lived alongside our troops and
civilian officials as interpreters, engineers and advisors. As
we shutter our bases, these Iraqis are being cut loose to run
the gauntlet of a refugee resettlement process which typically
takes a year or more. This process will not work quickly enough
when it is needed most.
Since my return from Iraq, I've been trying to help
thousands of Iraqis who fled the assassin's bullet. They have
been tortured, raped, abducted and killed because they worked
for America. My organization, the List Project, assists these
imperiled Iraqis in navigating the straits of the winding U.S.
refugee resettlement bureaucracy.
Although it is the largest single list in existence of
U.S.-affiliated Iraqis, at several thousand names, our list is
only a reflection of a much larger community. It is likely that
thousands have already been killed as traitors or agents of
America.
I have a separate list which documents hundreds of
assassinated interpreters who worked for just one contractor, a
small but gruesome glimpse. And while I once thought that the
dark years of Iraq's 2006-to-2008 civil war were the bleakest
for these Iraqis who have helped us, I am increasingly
concerned that the worst days are yet ahead.
Now, Secretary Schwartz has outlined a number of
significant steps forward that the State Department has taken
in the past few years. To be sure, we have gone from a program
that admitted one or two refugees a month, to one or two
thousand a month now. Unfortunately, however, the vast majority
of Iraqis admitted here are not those who have assisted the
U.S. A recent GAO assessment puts the figure of resettled Iraqi
allies at less than 10 percent of the whole.
Why is this? Why, after our work which has mobilized tens
of thousands of pro-bono hours from the nation's top law firms,
are only a few hundred out of the 19,000 Iraqis admitted to the
U.S. last year from my list? I wake up each morning struggling
to make sense of this.
I speak today not to dwell on the perceived successes and
failures of recent history, however, but rather to focus on the
next 16 months, the final months of the war. This coming period
has the shuddering potential to overshadow any of the positive
strides we've made in the past few years, and if we numb
ourselves to the lessons of history, our withdrawal will be
unjust, and bloodily so.
This is not conjecture. I have lost many former colleagues
to assassination, and the steady grind of murder continues
apace in today's Iraq, despite the misperceptions that the
surge has pacified the country. The Islamic State of Iraq, the
umbrella organization which is composed of numerous insurgent
and terrorist groups, including al-Qaida in Iraq, just released
its own plans in a strategic document published out of
Fallujah.
Their manual proceeds with chilling simplicity. Quote,
``Step one, nine bullets for the traitors and one for the
crusaders. Step two, cleansing and step three, renewed
targeting.'' They are practical, stating that this cannot be
accomplished within one or two months, but requires continuous
effort.
Those who believe this group's threats have been rendered
hollow by the surge might reflect upon the hundreds of Iraqis
that have been slaughtered in the past several weeks by
bombings and assassinations throughout the country. Upon a
recent string of attacks that killed another hundred Iraqis,
the Islamic State of Iraq's minister of war declared that what
is happening to you nowadays is just a drizzle.
We know where this road leads. When British forces drew
down from southern Iraq just two years ago, militias conducted
a systematic manhunt for their former Iraqi employees.
Seventeen interpreters were publicly executed in a single
massacre, their bodies dumped throughout the streets of Basra.
This predictable churn of violence against those who
collaborate with an occupying power has been repeated again and
again through history, coursing through the lands of Iraq,
Vietnam, Algeria, Europe, all the way back to our own soil,
when British loyalists were hunted by American militias after
the Revolutionary War.
In Vietnam, an examination of President Ford's declassified
NSC transcripts reflect an administration that did not
seriously turn its attention to the plight of the South
Vietnamese who aided the U.S. until the final weeks of the war,
by which point it was surely too late.
Now, my colleague, Ambassador Johnstone, has humbly
understated his service to our nation in the final days of the
Vietnam War. He and Lionel Rosenblatt recognized that the South
Vietnamese who had risked their lives in the service of America
were about to be abandoned. They holed up in a hotel room,
posing as French businessmen, and conducted an unofficial
underground railroad to spirit out our embassy employees who
would surely be primary targets upon our departure.
For such efforts, they were rewarded with an arrest warrant
issued by the embassy, as sure a sign there is that, in the
absence of leadership, our nation's moral compass is easily
shattered. Our refugee policy that emerged in those final hours
reflected a Darwinian cruelty. Whoever was persistent and
strong enough to break through the gates at our embassy could
have a seat on one of the few choppers remaining.
We eventually did the right thing, by admitting hundreds of
thousands of Vietnamese refugees to our country, but not before
too many were lost to assassination and reeducation camps and
not before we suffered a horrendous blow to our nation's image.
What ensued in those early morning hours on the rooftops of
Saigon, as desperate Vietnamese clamored beneath departing
helicopters, would be rebroadcast by Al-Jazeera throughout
2005, when I worked for the USAID in Baghdad and Fallujah. My
Iraqi colleagues were demoralized by the footage, and asked us
if the same would happen to them when we left.
Depressing as this history is, it is not inevitable. The
U.S. is not evacuating, but withdrawing, a distinction which
provides us with an opportunity to avoid the mistakes of the
past. There are many encouraging precedents to build upon.
After the bloodletting in Basra, for instance, the British
responded by airlifting its surviving Iraqi staffers directly
to a RAF base in Oxfordshire, England, whereupon they were
offered asylum. Indeed, each of America's principal coalition
partners--Britain, Poland, Denmark--has honored its moral
obligation to endangered Iraqi employees through airlifts to
military bases.
We have employed the Guam Option, as we've discussed today,
routinely in our own history. Secretary Schwartz himself was
intimately involved in the '96 Operation Pacific Haven, which
airlifted 7,000 Iraqis to Guam in a matter of weeks. We must
ensure that he has the tools to do so again.
In a war that has presented few silver bullet solutions,
this comes close. We can save the lives of those who've helped
us, while maintaining security as processing occurs on a remote
base. We cannot make the mistake of thinking that the systems
currently in place will work quickly enough for those Iraqis
who are cut loose in the coming months.
The implication for inaction extends well beyond Iraq. Each
of us in this room has strong opinions about how the war in
Afghanistan, now the longest war in our nation's history,
should be prosecuted. Wherever you stand, however, there are no
strategies that do not involve reliance upon Afghan civilians
in many capacities similar to how we've employed Iraqis.
If we allow the thousands of Iraqis who have risked their
lives to help us to perish, or to spend the coming years in
hiding, in peril, in flight, in waiting, we are fools to think
that we can expect support from Afghans.
But the urgency of this situation demands frankness.
Nobody's ever won an election by admitting refugees to our
country. The fulfillment of such moral and strategic
obligations serves the nation, not any particular constituency.
In doing so, we raise our status as a country that is still
capable, even amidst our struggles, of honoring our principles
by protecting our friends against those who wish to spill their
blood.
President Obama once summoned the words of Martin Luther
King when talking about the need to end the war in Iraq and I
quote, ``In this unfolding conundrum of life and history, there
is such a thing as being too late.'' Let us hope that he and
his administration embrace these words as they bring this war
to a close and thank you for the opportunity to address you
this afternoon.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Johnson. Mr.
Newton.
MICHAEL A. NEWTON, PROFESSOR OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, VANDERBILT
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
Mr. Newton. Thank you, Mr. Chair. It's a great a privilege
to be here and I would offer to submit a written statement.
Mr. Cardin. Your written statement is made part of the
record.
Mr. Newton. Thank you, sir. Sir, I'm a graduate of the U.S.
Military Academy and I served in uniform for more than 21 years
and I would add my voice to those that have already said,
today, that our obligation and our responsibility to our Iraqi
friends and allies is a moral and a strategic imperative.
I believe that we have every obligation to protect them, to
respect them, to help them and at our present rate, we're not
meeting those obligations in a way that we're capable of doing.
This hearing today represents, I think, a beacon of hope for
those Iraqis whom we all know and we have worked with. And I
respect the leadership and the vision to convene this hearing.
I would also respectfully submit that the focus of this
hearing ought not to be on our shortcomings, but on the way
ahead as we begin a concrete glide path, I would strongly urge
that specific planning and specific implementation of specific
responsibilities to help specific Iraqis cannot be relegated to
an inconvenient afterthought.
It has to be a central focus and part of the planning, and
today, from my observations and my experience, it is not. We
can do better and we should do better and I believe we have a
moral imperative to do better. In that context, if you remember
any--one single thing that I have to say, it is this, that a
successful process in strategy for assisting Iraqis, in my
view, needs to be a robust interagency process that fully
integrates all stakeholders.
We've heard, today, of course, from the distinguished
assistant secretary in PRM at State. He's been very busy. There
are stakeholders in the Department of Defense. There are
stakeholders in Homeland Security. I strongly believe that the
failure to include a systematic planning may very well have
strategic consequences.
And to summarize, our government has to work together so
that things don't fall apart. And again, at present, we are
not. I do hope that this hearing leads to both an increased
awareness, but also a unified and a swift congressional
response. And I will conclude my testimony by offering four of
what I see is four very specific, very concrete mechanisms,
some of which require statutory assistance to move forward.
As has been observed in the very recent past, we've seen a
specific focus on targeted assassinations, targeted killings of
our Iraqi friends and those who worked with us. And
particularly, any American service member or woman who has
served in Iraq has legendary stories. American lives have been
saved in so many examples by these friends and allies.
We owe it to them to assist them rather than simply turning
our backs upon them. Within the last three days, it was in a
reported account of a translator who was murdered by his own
son. And the reported quote was, ``Everybody hated him because
he worked for the Americans.''
These targeted reprisals indicate that the concerns that
have been expressed today are not just theoretical concerns.
They're very real. They're very tangible. But I would also
offer the hopeful caveat that the suffering that we foresee is
foreseeable, but not inevitable. We can, in fact, mobilize
resources from this great country to do better and to do more.
As a quick aside, I will tell you--let me pause to admit
that this also comes from the wellspring of personal
experience--my book on the trial and execution of Saddam
Hussein is called ``Enemy of the State.'' It is the definitive
account of the trial of Saddam.
In the dedication, in the forward page, as follows--it says
and I quote, ``To Riyadh and to John and to all those who have
suffered at the altar of freedom and human dignity.'' Neither
Riyadh, an Iraqi, nor John, the American, who are named are
fictitious individuals. They're real individuals, but they're
emblematic of so many thousands of others who have suffered and
sacrificed.
Riyadh was the most distinguished, noble translator in the
embassy working with the Iraqi judges preparing the trial. He
was threatened. He was told, as so many other Iraqis were,
don't wear your uniform clothes. Don't hide. Blend in. Because
of his leadership and his perspective, he was one of the most
respected Iraqis. He didn't follow that advice. He wanted to
set the example for those who were watching him, so he wore his
work clothes. He carried himself with pride and a great sense
of distinguished presence. The Iraqis followed him; they looked
up to him.
On my second trip to Iraq, he pulled me aside--literally,
grabbed me by the elbow, pulled me aside--he said, Newton, be
very careful. It is more dangerous today than it was the last
time you were here. And within 48 hours, he was murdered on his
doorstep, literally, as he left to go to work. And as I say, he
is emblematic of so many others. We could spend a great amount
of time telling you concrete illustrations.
So the focus has to be, what can we do and what should we?
We know what we should do. The focus has to be, what can we do?
One thing is clear and I want to reiterate it, that we need
much, much greater integration of effort and mutual support
between the Departments of State and Defense and Homeland
Security.
At present, there are delays and there are inefficiencies
which no single agency can address, nor should address. And I
firmly believe that with the coordinated efforts of our
government, we can, in fact, make great strides in addressing
this problem. And to reiterate, I do believe it's a moral and a
strategic imperative that does, as has already been pointed
out, have implications for our current counterinsurgency
operations in Afghanistan and in other parts of the world.
So Mr. Chair, let me conclude with four specific
recommendations. Number one: As a first priority, the amendment
offered by the distinguished co-chair, Mr. Hastings, needs to
become the law of the land. That amendment would require the
Department of Defense to compile a consolidated report--the
database of information, if you will, which, in fact, is
resident within the Department of Defense--of which individuals
have, in fact, worked alongside us, which individuals have
suffered, which individuals have sacrificed and therefore,
which individuals within Iraq are the most in danger.
Despite the laudable, the tremendous logistical planning,
the compartmentalization of the refugee issue, at present,
leaves us in a hauntingly similar position to where we were in
1975. And I so appreciate Ambassador Johnstone's sentiment in
that regard. This is a preventable crisis. As I said before, it
is foreseeable but not inevitable. So step one, the Hastings
amendment needs to become the law of the land.
Step two: I do believe that we need to empower the
Department of Defense to capitalize on its efficiencies. To
that end, the Hastings report within DOD is a necessary first
step. But I also believe that within the Department of Defense,
there should be a consolidated focal point of expertise, to
consolidate the expertise, to help cut through the interagency
bureaucracy that, at present, prevents Iraqis from knowing
where to go and who to turn to.
Just one small example, the process of getting a chief-of-
mission letter: The urgency of that may very well be felt
within DOD channels. And in my experience there are many people
at the lower levels of DOD who know the sacrifices, who know
the people who have sacrificed and who desperately want to help
them because they're bonded by fire.
They've ridden in the same vehicles. They've walked the
same patrols. They've talked to the same people. They've been
under fire by the same enemy. They desperately want to help.
And at present, within DOD channels, there is no office; there
is no focal point to help. Conversely, from outside DOD, there
is no single focal point for other agencies to coordinate or to
make synergy of efforts. And I believe that we can and should
fix that.
Also, secondly, a designated focal point within DOD would
also give a focus point of expertise to be able to push
expertise out to the combatant commanders and I think that's a
really important need.
Thirdly, the corollary to a focal point for administrative
and logistical purposes is a designated funding stream. We were
very successful in the surge. The surge was not just a surge of
people; it was a surge of ideas. And one of the most critical
tools on the ground, at the tactical level--as you well know,
Mr. Chairman--was the commander's emergency response fund: a
quick, focused mechanism at the tactical level for a local,
tactical commander to focus on immediate needs that were a
priority to the immediate local population.
I believe that in this context, a local tactical commander
in the military chain of command should have exactly the same
type of legislative statutory authority. It may very well be
nothing more complex than bulletproof windows in a car or hotel
accommodations. But at present, there's no streamlined funding
authority at the tactical level for commander's emergency
response, to assist the translators that are under danger.
Food, whatever the need, they're best equipped to do it--to
meet that need--but at present, they have no ability to meet
that need. As a corollary, I do believe that the focal point
within DOD should have a designated funding stream to allow it
to do its job, on the larger scale, for the same kinds of
reasons and for the same kind of moral imperative.
And lastly, I do believe that there needs to be a focused
interagency ability to synergize the efforts of our government
with the tremendous willingness and the tremendous capacity of
our local civil societies. As has been pointed out in Operation
Pacific Haven, that succeeded with a great deal of support from
the local population. There are volunteers; there are
university groups; the List Project work at the local level.
There are churches; there are community organizations that
will do heroic things to help these people once they're on the
ground and once they're safe, but they can't do it without the
assistance of the government to get them here, to get them to
safety. As has been pointed out, this window of opportunity
represents a fortuity--one of the rare fortuities, frankly--
where our strategic interest straight, directly aligns with our
moral imperatives.
We cannot let this opportunity slip away. And to reiterate,
it's our moral duty to stand by those who have stood by our men
and women in uniform. I deeply believe that. And I do believe
that a focused and revitalized national effort to save our
Iraqi allies will, in the long run, save American lives, both
in Iraq and in Afghanistan and in other theaters.
I thank you so much for taking the time from your busy
schedules to attend and for your leadership and your vision in
calling for this hearing. I'm honored to know so many wonderful
Iraqis who have suffered so much to share their needs with you
today and I welcome your questions.
Mr. Cardin. Well, first let me thank all three of our
witnesses. I think the advice that you have given us is very,
very valuable. There's clearly a willingness in this country to
step up to our responsibility as it relates to those who helped
us in Iraq. There's certainly a willingness in this country to
deal with the refugee issue internationally. America's always
been in the forefront.
But there doesn't seem to be the type of planning that
Ambassador Johnstone said we should have learned from Vietnam,
in trying to know the numbers, know the consequences, plan for
this in an orderly way. I'm interested whether any of you have
reliable numbers that you think represent Iraqis who helped
America that are at risk, and who have a desire to seek refuge
here in the United States. Does anyone have those? Now, I know
you have lists, Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. I think this underscores the urgency of
getting Rep. Hastings's amendment through because that's one of
the first things that it calls upon the U.S. government to get
at. The estimates that I've seen range between 40,000 and
120,000 Iraqis who have helped us. I personally have received
appeals from several thousand.
The other relevant fact here is that when the British
offered two things to the remaining Iraqi staffers: Either
we'll put you on an airplane next week to come to the U.K. and
we'll give you asylum, or we'll give you something on the order
of, like, 10 or $15,000. There was a buyout. And to my
understanding, only roughly 10 percent of the Iraqis that
worked for the Brits availed themselves of the airlift.
It's hard for me to say whether or not the same percentages
would hold with those who have helped us, but I know that out
of the gates we have authorization to bring 25,000 Iraqis over
who have helped us. And we're nowhere close to exhausting that
limit. So part of me thinks we ought to just, at least, use
those up before we start exploring beyond it.
Mr. Cardin. We understand the Hastings Amendment would give
us at least some objective information from the Department of
Defense to figure out where we go from there. Does either one
of the other two have any numbers that you think differ from
that, or is that within the ballpark of what we should be
planning?
Mr. Johnstone. I think there isn't really a solid ballpark
to be had. And I think those are as good numbers as we're going
to get for right now. I think once the Hastings Amendment
passes, we'll do much better. But I want to underline the fact
that U.S. involvement in Iraq has not just touched the lives of
the people who have worked with us. I think we have a special
responsibility to them; there's no question in my mind on that.
It's an issue very close to my heart.
But we have destroyed the lives, in the course of all the
military activity that was precipitated by our actions in Iraq,
of about 2 million people. And it's 1.5 million people whose
lives have been destroyed within Iraq because they've been
forced to move from their neighborhoods with the outbreak of
sectarian violence, et cetera, and another half million or more
outside of Iraq.
And we need, in our moral obligations, I think, to give
priority to those who have worked with us, but not to neglect
also the people who have been displaced as a result of the
military actions in Iraq during the course of the war. That's
part of our moral obligation. I just want to underline that as
we conclude this particular session, that we not neglect the
people that are suffering the very, very most in Iraq.
Mr. Cardin. I'm going to get to the refugee issue, but let
me stick, if I might, to those who may well wish to come to the
United States. One of the frustrating parts is that there are
these so-called background checks that need to be done on
people who come to America.
And Ambassador Johnstone, you've been involved in this.
It's my understanding that there's already been security
background done on people who have had a close relationship
with the United States in Iraq. So we already know something
about the people who helped us. Am I right about that?
Mr. Johnstone. That certainly is right. The U.S. government
does not employee employees, or even the organizations that
work with the U.S. government without checking into their
backgrounds.
Mr. Cardin. So is that information routinely made available
when an individual wishes to come to the United States under
these programs? Or do they do duplicate and do new checks that,
perhaps, could have been expedited by just using the material
that's already available, the files already available?
Mr. Johnstone. I can speak to the issue of refugees. And
let's not confuse the fact that most of the people who are
coming to the United States, who had been associated with the
United States, do not come under the exceptional programs that
have been developed.
They come under refugee programs. That information is being
shared with the UNHCR, with IOM, with the people who are doing
the basic background checks on people who are designated to
potentially come to the United States and for whom a decision
needs to be made.
So that information is being done. And I think that that
process has become far more expeditious than it has been in the
past. In fact, I would say that of all of the programs that
exist in the world for refugees, none move faster on the
refugee track than the refugees currently fleeing Iraq, or even
internally displaced people within Iraq.
Is it good enough? Of course it's not good enough. It could
be better. But it is moving well. What is not moving nearly as
fast--and in fact, I think, Secretary Schwartz pointed out the
fact that it is a much slower process to avail yourself of the
programs that were designed specifically to help there.
Mr. Cardin. Why is it taking so long under the special
programs?
Mr. Johnstone. Well, I'm not the right guy to ask because I
haven't had to handle the special program.
Mr. Cardin. My point is that it looks like it's restricted
to those who have had direct involvement to the United States.
We would have had a background check on those individuals.
Mr. Johnstone. I would have thought so as well and I don't
understand it. It seems to me that that should be something
that could be expedited very quickly and I suspect that, when
the day comes, will be expedited, but will it be in time?
Because I think we do have a way of breaking through
bureaucratic hurdles when it reaches crisis levels, but that's
often too late to be able to solve the problem for everyone.
Mr. Newton. Mr. Chair, let me add, I think your insight is
exactly right, which is one of the reasons why it's so
disturbing to me that we have a gap between DOD assets and the
assets that are processing special immigrant visas. I hear from
service members all the time that are frustrated at the delays
and the inefficiencies.
One of the things that we did, as has been referenced, in
Operation Safe Haven was, we took about a two-year process and
we reduced it, for those Kurdish refugees, to between 90 and
120 days. And the task-force commander, at the conclusion of
that operation, said, I hope that the lessons that we've done
today serve as a model for future operations. And we've lost
that.
And what made that operation work successfully was the
integration between State resources and DOD, that
communication--exactly what you're talking about. For example,
a refugee who did have all those background checks and knows
that it's resident in such-and-such commander's files in such
and-such unit--he has no idea, no way to get to that. So he has
to start all over again. And it does create inefficiencies.
Mr. Cardin. Well, that's something we're going to try to
overcome because I mean, it makes no sense that there's delays.
Let me transition into Iraq's government's help, here. And let
me start first with those who helped the United States. It
seems to me that if your 10-percent number is accurate--I don't
know whether it would be 10 percent or 15 percent or 20
percent--still, the majority that have assisted the United
States, for whatever reasons, will want to remain within Iraq.
Mr. Johnson. It's really difficult to tell. I can only
speak for those who are desperately trying to get out, but what
I do know is that the lethal stigma that these Iraqis have
incurred by working with us is harbored within the government
of Iraq as well. I know of Iraqis who have left their work with
the U.S. government--let's say in the education or health
sectors--and they've gone to that relevant ministry and tried
to apply for work. And in doing so, they've exposed that they
worked for the U.S. and they've received threats as a result.
And keep in mind that a lot of these ministries, for much
of the last few years, have been run as, you know, fiefdoms for
the different sects within Iraq. I don't see the government of
Iraq as a great ally in terms of protecting the Iraqis who have
helped us. And I think they have an incredible obligation to
work with us on facilitating returns and protecting the other
IDPs, but I would never bank on the Iraqi government to protect
those who have been serving our Marines and diplomats.
Mr. Cardin. So what should the United States be doing in
order to change that? If, as a practical matter, most of the
Iraqis who assisted us are going to remain in Iraq, what should
we be doing to make sure that those who helped us, who want to
stay in Iraq, have the best chance of some degree of protection
within the Iraqi system? What should the U.S. be doing?
Mr. Johnson. I think the cold reality is that with every
soldier and Marine that comes home, every day our ability to
shape the situation on the ground in Iraq decreases. You'll
remember that one of the central dimensions of the surge was
the reliance upon the Awakening. We funded roughly 100,000,
most of them former Sunni insurgents, to basically flip and
fight al-Qaida. And they're seen as one of the central reasons
for the success in Iraq.
There is now a systematic campaign underway to hunt and
kill those Sahwa, or Awakening, members.
Most of them are fleeing across the state borders. They're
going to Sweden and other countries and they're asking us for
help. We're not taking up the Awakening cause at this point.
But if we look just at their plight, which are potentially
comparable numbers, We've not been able to provide protection.
And we've certainly made a lot of requests to the government of
Iraq to ensure that these Awakening members are integrated into
Iraqi society, but it hasn't happened.
Mr. Cardin. Well, I would just suggest that there will be a
continuing U.S. presence in Iraq for many years to come. I
don't know of anyone who's suggesting that we want to isolate
Iraq, from the point of view of our involvement. We're
absolutely removing our combat troops, but I expect there'll be
significant U.S. involvement.
I know that our government has raised frequently the issue
of the internally displaced people and their safe return to
their communities. Quite frankly, I think, without the
international community raising this issue as frequently as it
has been raised, the progress that has been made to date would
not have been as much.
Not that we don't have a long way yet to go--we still have
a long way to go--but it hasn't been a top priority for the
Iraqi government. I would think it should be, but it has not
been a top priority for the Iraqi government. So I guess my
point is, how do we get the Iraqis to pay more attention to the
crisis they have in their own country, with so many people
being displaced by the war who have not been able to return to
their homes?
Mr. Johnstone. Well, I think we're talking here about all
of the facets of diplomatic persuasion that you can bring to
bear. That is to say, from jawboning the issue all the way
through to withholding funding for programs that the Iraqis
want if they do not live up to their obligations.
And it isn't hopeless, in the sense of jawboning. And I
think we have seen some progress latelybecause quite frankly,
it's inherently in the interest of the government of Iraq to resolve
both the internally displaced people issue, as well as the refugee
issue, in a favorable way to the government of Iraq.
I think to close their eyes to the presence of Iraqis
outside of Iraq--which is essentially what they've done--is
very shortsighted. They need to reintegrate these people into
Iraq. They represent a wealth of capabilities and they're
needed by Iraqi society. And we just have to keep hammering
these points home and hope that we will end up with a
leadership in Iraq, ultimately, that is responsive to these
requirements.
Mr. Cardin. When I was in Syria about a year ago, there
were a significant number of Iraqi refugees who were traveling
back and forth between Syria and Iraq. Is that continuing; does
anyone know? Are there refugees who do return home, but cross
back over the border for safety, but need to do it for economic
reasons? Is that still taking place?
Mr. Johnstone. Yes.
Mr. Newton. I've heard anecdotal evidence of that, sir.
Mr. Johnstone. There's no question about it and it's
particularly prevalent between Iraq and Syria.
Mr. Cardin. And then my last question is on the
international community. It seems to me that much more could be
done by the international community. We've had the
representatives from the refugee services from the
international organizations and we've talked to them.
And they're trying to do what they can, but the number of
countries that have really stepped up here have been rather
small, as far as their financial contributions, here--outside
of the region and outside of the United States. Am I correct in
my observations, or is this an issue which really needs to be
resolved by the United States and Iraq, principally?
Mr. Johnstone. You're certainly correct in your
observations, but unfortunately, I suspect, in the final
analysis we're not going to be as successful as we would want
to be or as we should be with respect to getting other
countries to step up to their obligations. We have allies that
were allies of ours going into Iraq in the first place who have
not stepped up to their obligations.
And I have spoken with them all. And sometimes the argument
is, well, we did our part and now we are withdrawing and we
don't want anything more to do with this issue--very blind to
the humanitarian responsibilities. Other cases, where it hasn't
been an ally of ours, they'll say this was a U.S. war and the
U.S. should pick up the costs associated with it.
I hear every imaginable argument from others, but I must
say, it is extremely disappointing to see how little support
the rest of the international community has given to the Iraqi
refugee and displaced person issue.
Mr. Newton. I agree, Mr. Chairman. Let me also add that
sometimes we inadvertently mischaracterize the need in saying,
these are refugees. Therefore, they have nothing. Their human
capital is going to be an ultimate net drain on your society.
In fact, in my experience, in my observations from working with
these people, these really are many of the best and brightest.
They're patriotic; they're hardworking; they're courageous.
They have moral principles. They want to plug in and take care
of their families. They're a net positive for society and I
think it's in part how we frame the debate. They have much,
much to offer both to other societies and, in fact, to the
fabric of United States culture.
Mr. Cardin. Oh, and I agree with you completely. And you're
absolutely correct and we should underscore that point. Because
where it is looked at as a cost factor, it could be turned into
an asset factor. Having met with the governments of Jordan and
Syria on this issue, it's a cost issue for their budgets.
And they don't see this as a permanent population in their
country and therefore, they look at it as a responsibility
that's been thrown upon them without the participation of the
international community and without any game plan on the long-
term impacts. But you're correct. From the point of view where
you have permanent placement in other countries, or the
assistance to get people back to their homes, it's going to be
an economic plus. There's no question about that.
Let me, again, thank our three witnesses. This is a
continuing interest to the commission. I've been told that the
amendment offered by Mr. Hastings is working its way through
the Congress and that there have been, at least, indicators of
support from the committee chairs of the committees of
jurisdiction. So we will obviously be following that bill very
carefully.
I couldn't agree more with our witnesses: The first thing
we need to do is get the numbers and have a reliable number, so
we all can work on that. Then it's a little bit easier to get
areas of responsibility, or focal points or funding flows that
you have suggested all need to be part of that. But we need to
know the type of numbers that we're talking about and whether
the programs and resources are currently adequate in order to
deal with that.
And we thank you all for your leadership on this area. And
with that, the Helsinki Commission will stand adjourned. Thank
you all very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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