[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NOBEL PEACE PRIZE LAUREATE LIU XIAOBO AND THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL
REFORM IN CHINA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 9, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate
House
BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Cochairman
Chairman MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
MAX BAUCUS, Montana MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
CARL LEVIN, Michigan TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California DAVID WU, Oregon
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
BOB CORKER, Tennessee DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
GEORGE LeMIEUX, Florida
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Department of State, To Be Appointed
Department of Labor, To Be Appointed
Department of Commerce, To Be Appointed
At-Large, To Be Appointed
At-Large, To Be Appointed
Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Staff Director
Douglas Grob, Cochairman's Senior Staff Member
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Opening statement of Hon. Byron L. Dorgan, a U.S. Senator from
North Dakota; Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China.......................................................... 1
Appiah, Kwame Anthony, President, PEN American Center............ 5
Economy, Elizabeth C., C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director for
Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations..................... 7
Gilley, Bruce, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Mark O.
Hatfield School of Government, Portland State University....... 10
Kine, Phelim, China Researcher, Human Rights Watch............... 12
Appendix
.................................................................
Prepared Statements
Appiah, Kwame Anthony............................................ 30
Economy, Elizabeth C............................................. 32
Gillley, Bruce................................................... 36
Kine, Phelim..................................................... 38
.................................................................
Levin, Hon. Sander, a U.S. Representative from Michigan;
Cochairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China........ 41
Submission for the Record
Leaflet submitted by Kwame Anthony Appiah........................ 43
NOBEL PEACE PRIZE LAUREATE LIU XIAOBO AND THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL
REFORM IN CHINA
----------
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2010
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:30
a.m., in room 628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron
L. Dorgan, Chairman, presiding.
Also present: Representative Sander Levin, Cochairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
NORTH DAKOTA; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
CHINA
Chairman Dorgan. Good morning. We're going to begin the
hearing. This is a hearing of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China. I'm Senator Dorgan and we will have
Congressman Levin join us in a few moments. I think in the
interest of time, I want to begin on time, and he is
necessarily delayed, but I am pleased that he's on his way, and
will be here shortly.
We've called this hearing for one reason, and one reason
only, and that is that, as much of the world celebrates the
awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a remarkable man, that
remarkable man stares at the rest of the world from behind a
prison door in the country of China.
It's sending very substantial messages to the rest of the
world, it seems to me, that someone so talented, so fervent in
his support of human rights and democratic values is awarded a
Nobel Peace Prize, and learns of it while in a prison cell.
The question is, what does all that mean? Is it unusual?
What can we expect in the future with respect to the government
of China and the country of China and the path of human rights?
In announcing the award that was given to Mr. Liu Xiaobo,
he was celebrated for what is called ``a long and non-violent
struggle for fundamental human rights in China.'' It's a short
little phrase that speaks so much about work that has gone on
for so long by Mr. Liu.
I hope that a number of you who have come to this hearing
have been able to pick up a copy of the large collection of
articles that have been published by this Commission available
at the door of this hearing room, along with a copy of the
Commission's most recently released 2010 Annual Report. That
covers Mr. Liu's case in detail. As you will see, this
Commission has followed and publicized Mr. Liu's case for
several years.
The Chinese Government now is punishing this man in part
for his role in something called ``Charter 08,'' a document
that calls for human rights and political reform in China. Mr.
Liu is currently serving an 11-year sentence in a Chinese
prison on the charge of ``inciting subversion of state power.''
This Commission, which is charged by law to monitor the
Chinese Government's progress toward the development of
institutions of democratic governance, today will assess
debates over political reform in China to ask what do Mr. Liu's
writings and advocacy mean for China, and what impact, if any,
his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize may have on democracy and
human rights in China.
These questions have become highly important now not only
as a result of the actions of the Nobel Committee, but also
China's Premier Wen, himself, was recently quoted as saying,
``If there is no guarantee of reform of the political system,
then results obtained from the reform of the economic system
may be lost.'' I find that a peculiar sentence to read from the
Premier in as much as the Nobel Peace Prize recipient is behind
a prison door in his country.
When China's leaders make reference to ``reform of the
political system'' what do they mean? What exactly do they
mean? As China prepares now for major leadership changes in
2012, we need to understand exactly what the prospects for
political reform in China would be today. And as we prepare to
do that, I just wanted at this hearing to take a moment to say
a few words about Mr. Liu.
He was born in 1955. He grew up in Changchun, an industrial
city in China's northeast. As a young man, he wanted to study
literature, and he moved to Beijing. He earned a Ph.D. degree
in Comparative Literature, became a professor, and devoted his
days to teaching and to writing.
By 1989, he had the good fortune to travel abroad as a
visiting scholar. When demonstrations began to grow that year
in Tiananmen Square, he was a visiting scholar at Columbia
University, here in the United States. He cut short his stay in
New York, and he returned home to China, joining students on
Tiananmen Square in a hunger strike. Then on the night of June
4, a scholar whom the students had grown to trust, negotiated
the last minute withdrawal of the group of students from the
Square, convincing them to leave the Square and to save their
lives. That scholar was Mr. Liu.
Authorities immediately branded him as a subversive and
sentenced him to 18 months in prison. On his release from
prison he could neither publish nor teach. And he described his
plight in these words:
Simply for expressing divergent political views and taking part
in a peaceful and democratic movement, a teacher has lost his
podium, a writer has lost his right to publish, and an
intellectual has lost the chance to speak publicly.
Upon his release from prison in 1991, he continued to
write, however, and again he was placed under house arrest in
1995, then ordered to a labor camp where he was detained--
imprisoned until 1999.
In December 2008 after supporting a call for political
reform known as Charter 08, he was detained once again, later
formally arrested, and then sentenced to 11 years in prison.
Let it be known that Charter 08 is a call for such things
as ``guarantee of human rights,'' ``separation of powers,''
``independent judiciary,'' ``rural urban equality,'' ``freedom
to assemble,'' ``freedom to form groups,'' ``freedom of
expression,'' ``freedom of religion,'' ``civic education,''
``protection of private property,'' ``financial and tax
reform,'' ``social security,'' and ``protection of the
environment.'' None of which seems subversive to me.
And so the Chinese Government now tells us that these are
things--the aspirations--which the people in China have
witnessed for some while, these are things for which people may
be sent to prison. And so we ask what does that mean? What does
it mean for the country of China? What does it mean for our
country's dealings with the country of China? What does it mean
for people like Mr. Liu who today stares outward from the
depths of a dark Chinese prison cell.
In a recent interview with CNN, Premier Wen stated:
``Freedom of speech is indispensible. The people's wishes for,
and needs for, democracy and freedom are irresistible.''
That from the lips of Premier Wen. And so one asks, how can
one say that? How can one assert that? How can one believe that
when Mr. Liu is in a Chinese prison while the rest of the world
celebrates the Nobel Peace Prize given to this remarkable man.
Again, we've held this hearing for one purpose and one
purpose only. And that is to demonstrate and show the absurdity
and cruelty of having one of the celebrated people in this
world, someone who has now been honored with the Nobel Peace
Prize being held this morning in a prison in China in the
second year of an 11-year prison sentence for advocating for
human rights and the principles of democracy and free speech.
My hope is that the Chinese Government and Chinese
officials will understand and listen and hear the voices from
around the world, the voices from this country, and the voices
from in this room that say you can't talk about these
principles and then continue to imprison someone like Mr. Liu
and have the rest of the world have any belief at all in what
you say.
We are joined today by a number of witnesses we have
invited to this hearing. We will hear from four of them and
then have some questions. And I appreciate very much their
willingness to be here. I'm going to introduce all four and
then we'll go down the list. And let me hope that I have the
names correct--pronounced correctly, at least.
Kwame Anthony Appiah. Mr. Appiah is President of PEN, P-E-
N, American Center, a global literary and human rights
organization. He's Lawrence Rockefeller University Professor of
Philosophy at the University Center for Human Values at
Princeton University. It was Professor Appiah who nominated Mr.
Liu for his Nobel Peace Prize. And I have a copy of that
nomination letter. And Mr. Appiah, it is an extraordinary piece
of writing and I appreciate as I am sure do most Americans
appreciate your nomination of Mr. Liu. And as you know the
Committee obviously looked at that nomination as a very
significant nomination as well. That's the basis on which they
awarded the Peace Prize to Mr. Liu.
Professor Appiah has received his B.A. and Ph.D. from
Cambridge University in philosophy. He's taught at Yale,
Cornell, Duke, Harvard, lectured all over the world, joined the
Princeton faculty in 2002. He's done extensive writing and
lecturing and traveling. And I won't read all of it, if you
don't mind. You have a remarkable background.
Then we will hear from Mr. Bruce Gilley, Assistant
Professor of Political Science in the Mark Hatfield School of
Government at Portland State University. Mark Hatfield is a man
with whom I have had the privilege of serving here in the
Congress for some many years. An extraordinary American and I
am pleased to be able to say that you represent part of his
lineage as well in public service. You do research on democracy
that is legitimacy in global politics. You've been a specialist
on the comparative politics of China and Asia; written a number
of books, ``The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose
Legitimacy,'' Columbia Press 2009; ``China's Democratic Future:
How it Will Happen and Where it Will Lead'' in 2004. You've
traveled extensively, lectured extensively, and if people want
to know more about you they can go to Google, I assume. But you
have a very impressive background as well.
Elizabeth Economy is Director for Asian Studies at the
Council on Foreign Relations. She is C.V. Starr Senior Fellow
and Director for Asia Studies. Her most recent book, ``The
River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's
Future,'' published by Cornell University Press, 2004 with the
second edition just this year. She was named 1 of the top 50--
excuse me, it was named 1 of the top 50 sustainability books in
2008 by the University of Cambridge, won the 2005 International
Convention on Asia Scholar's Award for the best social sciences
book. Published in Asia, it is one of the top 10 books of 2004
by the Globalist. And you've published articles in foreign
affairs and scholarly journals, and you likewise have been
involved in so many organizations and traveled extensively. And
we very much appreciate your being here. You have an honorary
doctorate of law from Vermont Law School and Ph.D. from
University of Michigan. And enough about you, but I'm
impressed.
And finally, Mr. Phelim Kine, is that correct?
Mr. Phelim Kine is a researcher, a China researcher at
Human Rights Watch, a really outstanding organization. He works
in the Asia Division, a former newswire bureau chief in Jakarta
and worked as a journalist for more than a decade in China,
Indonesia, Cambodia, and Taiwan prior to joining Human Rights
Watch in April 2007. He has written extensively on human
rights, military impunity, corruption, child sex tourism, human
trafficking, and more. He's been printed extensively and in so
many journals and newspapers and spoken publicly on many of
these issues for a long, long while. I understand you are based
in Hong Kong, Mr. Kine. We appreciate very much your taking the
time and willingness to be with us today.
So that is a description of four pretty extraordinary
people. And we appreciate your taking the time to spend part of
the morning with us. And I'm going to begin with Mr. Appiah.
Mr. Appiah, why don't you proceed and I'm told I may have your
name pronounced incorrectly; is that right? There may be a
North Dakota pronunciation----
Mr. Appiah. Given the job that we're going to do in
massacring Chinese names, I can hardly complain. I normally say
Appiah, but----
Chairman Dorgan. Appiah.
Mr. Appiah [continuing].--There are many ways of
pronouncing it.
Chairman Dorgan. All right. Mr. Appiah, thank you very
much. Why don't you proceed.
Mr. Appiah. Thank you very much, Chairman Dorgan.
STATEMENT OF KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, PRESIDENT, PEN AMERICAN
CENTER
Mr. Appiah. So I have the honor of being the president of
the PEN American Center and I am very grateful for the
opportunity to speak to you today.
Our center is one of 145 centers in more than 100 countries
of International PEN which is the world's oldest literary and
human rights organization. And for nearly 90 years we've
sustained literary fellowship between the writers of all
nations and defended free expression at home and abroad. Part
of this effort involves supporting our colleague Liu Xiaobo who
served as president of our affiliated independent Chinese PEN
Center from 2003 to 2007, held a seat on its board until late
2009, and remains an Honorary President as he's an honorary
member of our own center here in the United States. In late
January 2010, in connection with our support for him and the
cause of democracy in China, I wrote to the Norwegian Nobel
Committee to urge them to give serious consideration to him as
a candidate for the Peace Prize. I should say that I wasn't
alone in doing this. I know that Vaclav Havel, President of the
former Czechoslovakia and Nobel Laureate Desmond Tutu of South
Africa made similar appeals.
And, if I may, I'd like to summarize briefly the arguments
I made in that letter on behalf of my organization.
As you mentioned, on December 25, 2009--I don't have to
draw attention to the significance of the date--a Beijing court
sentenced Liu to 11 years in prison and an additional 2 years
deprivation of political rights for inciting subversion of
state power. This so-called incitement, the verdict made clear,
consisted of 7 phrases--a total of 224 Chinese characters--that
he had written over the last three years. Many of these words
came from Charter 08, which the Chairman mentioned, a
declaration modeled on Vaclav Havel's Charter 77 that calls for
political reform and greater human rights in China and has been
signed, at considerable risk, by more than 10,000 Chinese
citizens.
Liu Xiaobo has a long history as one of the leading
proponents of peaceful democratic reform in the People's
Republic of China. A poet and literary critic, he served as a
professor at Beijing Normal University and was a leading voice
and an influential presence during the student protests in
Tiananmen Square in 1989; indeed, his insistence on non-
violence and democratic process are widely credited with
preventing far more catastrophic bloodshed during the
subsequent crackdown.
Charter 08 which he coauthored is a testament to an
expanding movement for peaceful democratic reform in China.
This document is a remarkable attempt, both to engage China's
leadership and to speak to the Chinese public about where China
is and where she needs to go.
As I say, more than 10,000 Chinese citizens, not only
dissidents and human rights lawyers, but also prominent
political scientists, economists, writers, artists, grassroots
activists, farmers, and even government officials have endorsed
the document despite the fact that almost all of the original
300 signers have been, at one point or other, detained or
harassed. In doing so they exhibited exceptional courage and
conviction.
We all recall the period of the Cultural Revolution in
which millions were uprooted, millions died, and we all
acknowledge that there's been substantial progress from that
horrendous nadir. We know, too, that there are voices within
the regime, urging greater respect for free expression.
Chairman Dorgan, you mentioned one statement recently, it
should be pointed out that that segment is not available on the
Web in China so Chinese people can't even know that their own
Premier has said those things. It's been removed from the Web
in China.
China wants--and needs--to be heard in the community of
nations. I--and all of my PEN colleagues--in every one of those
more than 100 countries believe in a cosmopolitan conversation
in which we hear from every nation. But we also believe we must
let China's rulers know that we can only listen to them
respectfully if they offer to their own citizens the
fundamental freedoms we all claim from our governments.
Since the announcement of the Peace Prize the government of
China has behaved with exactly the sort of contempt for the
rights of her people that Liu Xiaobo has long protested. The
Chinese Communist Party has demonstrated that it remains
unfortunately willing to revert to its least attractive
traditions.
The Chinese Government blacked out television broadcasts on
CNN and the BBC and the French station TV5 that reported Liu's
Nobel Prize. They censored sites on the Web that mentioned him
or published Charter 08. Indeed, as I said, comically, they
have censored references to free expression in the recent
speeches of their own premier. Much less comically, they have
harassed Liu Xia, Liu Xiaobo's wife, destroying her cell phone,
denying her Internet access, surrounding her house and placing
her effectively on house arrest. Her friends and family have
not been able to be in touch with her since October 20.
The Chinese authorities have also stepped up pressure on
members of the Independent Chinese PEN Center [ICPC] as part of
their campaign to limit information about the awarding of the
prize. Since the prize was announced on October 8, dozens of
ICPC's China-based members have been visited by police and
harassed and several of its leading members are living
effectively under visual house arrest. Most have been warned
against speaking out about the award, a move that appears
calculated to keep the Chinese people in the dark.
We believe that it is right that President Obama and
Secretary of State Clinton have raised Liu's case with their
Chinese counterparts, both before and after his most recent
sentence, as we at PEN American Center wrote and asked them to
do. We are grateful that Ambassador Jon Huntsman in Beijing
sent representation to Liu's trial last year, though the
diplomat that was sent was denied access to what's supposed to
be a public court in China. We believe that China should live
up to the promise made in its own Constitution; promises it
made when it signed the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which we hope it will ratify at some point.
And we believe that it is America's obligation, as a party to
the Covenant, to hold China to that standard. But the most
fundamental reason why we should do this is that these demands
are right. They are demands of justice.
The Chinese Government argues that their treatment of Liu
Xiaobo is an internal matter, and that international awards and
advocacy on his behalf amount to what they call ``meddling in
China's internal affairs.'' But the treatment he has endured is
by definition an international matter, because as all
violations of human rights are matters of legitimate concern to
the whole world, to the people of the world. By detaining Liu
Xiaobo for more than a year and then by convicting and
sentencing him to 11 years in prison in clear violation of his
most fundamental, internationally recognized rights, the
People's Republic of China itself has guaranteed that his case
is not and cannot be a purely internal affair.
We have no hostility toward China or the Chinese. Indeed,
it is our respect and concern for China and her people that
leads us to urge their government to allow them--all of them--
the freedom to write and to read and to organize that will
allow them to be responsible citizens of a democratic society,
and will then allow China to be a responsible and respected
colleague in the community of democratic nations. Thank you
very much.
If I may ask to enter into the record one leaflet on the
basis of which somebody was arrested in China recently, his
name is Guo Xianliang and it's just an example of the sort of
thing that's going on and the sort of harassment that the rest
of people are exercising their fundamental democratic rights.
Thank you.
Chairman Dorgan. Without objection, that will be included
in the record.
Let me just say that the full statement that you submit
will be a part of the record and we'll also include your oral
testimony.
Elizabeth Economy is the Director for Asia Studies at the
Council on Foreign Relations. Thank you very much for being
with us and you may proceed.
[The leaflet appears in the appendix.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Appiah appears in the
appendix.]
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, C.V. STARR SENIOR FELLOW AND
DIRECTOR FOR ASIA STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Ms. Economy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a
pleasure to have the opportunity to speak before you this
morning on this very important and timely issue of political
reform in China.
In my five or so minutes, I will make three points.
First, while China's leaders are committed to reforming
their political system, they have not arrived at any clear
roadmap for this reform. There is significant debate over what
reform means and what it should look like.
Second, as Beijing tries to figure out its path to
political reform, there is enormous political change occurring
outside the system's formal political institutions. This change
also contributes to the reform of the political system.
Finally, political change in China is going to come
primarily from within the country. However, there are several
ways in which the United States and the rest of the
international community can exert real influence on this
process.
To my first point, what does the consensus around political
reform look like? Above all, China's leaders want political
reform because they want to root out corruption, which is the
major source of social unrest and instability in the country.
They want it to help address their wide-ranging social problems
related to the environment, healthcare, education, and income
inequality. They recognize that the middle class is demanding a
greater voice within the political system and that the Internet
is facilitating this in ways that pose a real challenge to the
current system. They are beginning to understand that their
political system is a liability to their international
reputation.
Although there is consensus on this need for political
reform, there is a fair amount of debate over what constitutes
the greatest problem and what ought to be the fundamental
solution. I would argue that the dominant preference of the
current political leadership is what I call ``political
modernization'' which I see as an effort to transform
institutions of governance to make them more efficient, but at
the same time to retain the primacy of the party. Political
modernization includes what we see today; experiments in public
consultation, for example, in the form of polling local people
about their preferences for how to spend the local budget, have
real impact in some small cases.
Political modernization also includes improvements in
transparency. China's 2008 Public Disclosure Law, for example,
allows data collected by government bodies to be accessed by
the public. In the environmental realm, a couple of NGOs in
China, coupled with the U.S.-based Natural Resources Defense
Council combined to produce the document study, ``Breaking the
Ice on Environmental Open Information,'' which uses the 2008
law to force cities in China to report the data on levels of
pollution and others. It's a path-breaking document based on
this new law.
There's also more comprehensive reform under way in
Shenzhen though other political experiments, reducing the size
of the government and eliminating dual positions for political
officials so the head of a charity cannot also hold office. In
some cases, Shenzhen is even outsourcing some traditionally
governmental responsibilities in social welfare to local NGOs.
There's also talk about holding direct elections but this has
yet to materialize.
At the same time, the government faces pressure from other
strains of political thought among loose organizations of
intellectuals and activists. One group, often termed the ``New
Left,'' focuses on issues of economic justice, the rights of
the poor, and the emergence of crony capitalism. In many ways,
these are the very issues that have driven President Hu
Jintao's concept of a ``harmonious society.'' This group,
however, tends to favor a strong state-hand in the market. In
other words, they have a prescription for a political system,
yet they are relatively suspicious of Western democracy.
Then, of course, there are the liberal intellectuals,
activists, and media elite such as Liu Xiaobo or Hu Shuli from
Caixin. This group advances what I would call ``revolutionary
reform'': Political reform that would fundamentally transform
the political institutions of the state, universal values,
constitutional democracy, and separation of powers.
China's leaders' current political modernization efforts
draw upon both of these strains of thought but don't abide by
either completely. I would argue that there's a third and
important source of pressure on China's leaders as they attempt
to plot out a relatively controlled path to political reform:
The growing role of the Internet in civil society. The Internet
is a politically organizing force. It can inform debate, as in
the case of the online discussion of the Dalai Lama and
Twitter. It can help bring more than 7,000 people to protest in
Xiamen and it can bring pressure to bear on authorities for
unjust decisions by a swell of outrage on the Internet. In a
sense, every Chinese citizen with a cell phone and Internet
access becomes a journalist. As a result, it is becoming far
more difficult and in some cases impossible for officials to
hide blatant wrongdoing.
In addition, iconic cultural figures such as the blogger
Han Han and Ai Weiwei use their public stature and the Internet
as a bully pulpit to advocate for greater openness. China's
leaders are forced to respond to this dynamic force for
political change on a daily basis.
Finally, how does the international community fit into all
of this? There are several potential avenues.
First, and most important, we should openly support those
who are fighting for change in China such as Liu Xiaobo or Hu
Jia making it not a criticism, but rather a suggestion to China
about how it can and should live up to its own best ideals as
represented in its own Constitution.
Second, we should continue our longstanding practice of
working with those who are trying to strengthen the rule of law
transparency and official accountability.
Third, it is important to help Beijing understand that its
political system matters to the rest of the world. It is not
simply ``an internal affair.'' What it does domestically has
global ramification in terms of product safety, the
environment, intellectual property rights for every
transnational issue. China's global actions are derived from
its domestic political system.
Finally, advancing the cause of political reform in other
Asian countries can bring pressure to bear on China by
undermining the idea that there is something uniquely Western
in universal values and by demonstrating the limited
attractiveness of an authoritarian state. Political reform is
an issue that is going to be decided in China by the Chinese
people, but I also think we have significant ability to help
them along in this process.
Thank you.
Chairman Dorgan. Dr. Economy, thank you very much. We
appreciate your testimony.
Next we'll hear from Mr. Bruce Gilley, Assistant Professor
of Political Science at Portland State University. And Mr.
Gilley is an Asian scholar. You may proceed.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Economy appears in the
appendix.]
STATEMENT OF BRUCE GILLEY, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, MARK O. HATFIELD SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, PORTLAND STATE
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Gilley. Thank you. I am very grateful to have the
opportunity to address the Commission this morning. The
perspective I'd like to offer on Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Peace Prize
is simple and can be stated as follows:
Liu Xiaobo's award is important because it is a reminder to
us in the free world, in the West, and even in the United
States that even though we are entering a period of intense
rivalry and possibly conflict with a rising China, the forces
of modernization and liberalization are at work in that
country. This means that in the coming decades, even as we
manage and challenge potentially disruptive behavior by China's
rulers, its people continue to march toward a democratic
society.
I do not believe the Nobel Prize will have any measurable
effect on political reform in China, any more than the award of
the same prize to His Holiness the Dalai Lama in 1989 had any
effect on Chinese rule in Tibet. But I do believe it will serve
as an important beacon to policymakers outside of China,
reminding them to engage and target, and to retain faith in,
Liu Xiaobo's China. The temptation to believe that we are
engaged in a life-or-death struggle with a hostile new Oriental
juggernaut will be strong in the coming decades. We should
instead use Liu Xiaobo's award to think carefully about what is
going on in China which I will briefly address here, and to
retain a certain Reaganesque optimism about the potential for
human freedom everywhere. We should respond to a rising China
the same way that Liu Xiaobo responded to his state security
captors before he was sent to jail: we have no enemies, only
acquaintances who are still trapped in yesterday's modes of
thought and action, acquaintances whom we hope and fervently
believe will someday become our friends.
Honored Commission member, the year is 1975. Russia's GDP
in that year is about the same as China's today. Andrei
Sakharov has just been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and in a
few years he will be sent to Gorky under house arrest. Global
geo-political rivalries are intensifying. The international
politics of the Soviet Union are entering its most difficult
period. We have an Afghanistan, proxy wars in Africa, the arms
race, martial law in Poland, KAL 007, and Chernobyl yet to
come. Earlier claims that the Soviet Union is modernizing and
liberalizing because of the post-totalitarian reforms under
Khrushchev are now scoffed at. Smart people, like Harvard
professor Samuel Huntington, are saying that the chances for
democratic change in the Soviet Union are ``virtually nil.''
Looking back, we now realize we missed something
fundamental. By focusing on the international politics of the
Soviet Union, we ignored what was happening inside the Soviet
Union. The message of Sakharov's prize, as should be the
message of Liu Xiaobo's prize, was that we should have been
better Marxists, trusting in the ineluctable forces of
modernization that would bring about political change. Instead,
we were Hobbesians, believing we needed to prepare home defense
against an increasingly cold and competitive world of enemies
and invaders. Had we been more ready to respond to the good
luck of history, perhaps some of the democratic regress that
we've seen in Russia could have been avoided.
China's in the same position today. It is easy to get
carried away by the imagery of China challenging the West. But
China is not a juggernaut. China is a juggler. Behind the
assertiveness and the rhetoric is a country that is struggling
mightily with the implications of development--social,
environmental, financial, economic, cultural, and political.
The West will retain its indispensability and will continue to
do so, so long as it continues to represent basic humanistic
impulses better than any other part of the world.
The CCP [Chinese Communist Party] leadership is entering a
delicate leadership transition in 2012. There are two visions
of political reform competing within the leadership today. One
of these associated with Premier Wen Jiabao who is making a
sort of final crie de coeur before retiring in 2012 is what we
might call grassroots democracy vision. Professor Economy, Dr.
Economy has called this the Internet and Civil Society vision.
This is a bottom up view of political reform. It stresses civil
society, elections at the grassroots level and is some ways
consciously modeled on the experiences of Taiwan. It will be
represented in the new leadership by Xi Jinping who will be the
party general secretary and perhaps depending on who else joins
him by two others on the standing committee.
The second vision is a more top-down view. It stresses
party democracy. Ironically, this is the approach that
Gorbachev himself adopted in seeking political reform in the
Soviet Union.
What is important about this debate, as Dr. Economy
mentioned, the debate about political modernization is that
China's Communist Party takes political reform seriously. They
are divided on how to do it, but they believe they can maintain
their rule through a constant innovation of governance and
governing mechanisms. And to some extent that's true. The party
has stayed in power longer than expected after 1989 by
improving its governance, by processing passports more
efficiently, by providing more open information, by
liberalizing more internal migration. I think the mistake is to
believe it can maintain its legitimacy forever through such
governance reforms. That's where Liu Xiaobo comes in. His
vision is the third vision of political reform. What Dr.
Economy refers to as a revolutionary reform. What I refer to as
the liberal democracy vision. It, of course, stresses the same
aspects of universal rights and democracy that were raised in
1989 and harkens back to the revolutionary thinking of the
republic era prior to 1949.
Liu is a reminder of this outcome that awaits China. Just
as it is hard to imagine that outcome today, it was hard to
imagine that in the Soviet Union of 1975. Liu Xiaobo helps us
to focus on this China, not to imagine that the insecure and
increasingly aggressive external China is the one of the
future. He's a reminder that the reason we should not confront
or contain China is not some relativistic argument that the
Chinese are different or prefer tyranny to democracy, not that
we need to reach some realistic accommodation with this titan
of the East. Instead, we need to respond thoughtfully to the
China of the current regime because we have faith that its days
are numbered.
Reagan, who came into office as a Cold Warrior
extraordinaire, instinctively realized this about the Soviet
Union and changed tack in his second term. Liu Xiaobo reminds
us of the need to retain Dutch's infectious optimism about the
fate of Communist regimes especially rapidly modernizing ones.
He matters because he will appeal to our better instincts in
dealing with China to celebrate positive change, to defend
individuals and rights supporters, and to have confidence in
the universality of freedom and democracy and their triumph
everywhere, that's Liu Xiaobo's challenge to us. Thank you.
Chairman Dorgan. Mr. Gilley, thank you very much. We
appreciate your being here and your testimony.
And, finally, we will hear from Mr. Kine.
I welcome my colleague, Congressman Levin. Congressman,
thank you for being here and we are about to hear from Mr. Kine
who is the fourth witness and then we'll begin to ask some
questions. Mr. Kine.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilley appears in the
appendix.]
STATEMENT OF PHELIM KINE, CHINA RESEARCHER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
Mr. Kine. Thank you very much. I would like to thank you
very much, the Commission, for your--you know, inexhaustible
efforts to promote human rights in China and to expose the
ongoing abuses that are occurring there, which today we're
talking about the emblematic abuse of the rights of Liu Xiaobo.
I guess the best way to get into this because I'm fourth
here and there's been some really good information--I'm a
little bit intimidated. But I'll just say that I think the best
way to get into this is to talk about how Human Rights Watch
works human rights in China and works with people like Liu
Xiaobo.
Wherever we work in 90 countries that we cover, we look for
natural allies, people who support the same types of beliefs
and ideals that we do; people who support peaceful evolutionary
change who work tirelessly for universal rights and freedoms.
And in China Liu Xiaobo has been the epitome of that. And in
another society, Liu Xiaobo would be a natural leader in China
for holding dear these views and for espousing them and
articulating them so well.
Unfortunately, in China Liu Xiaobo isn't particularly well-
known. His political critiques, his political writings, to a
large extent have left him marginalized and censured. He is not
the Thomas Freeman or the Christopher Hitchens of China. He is
much less than that, unfortunately, on a public stage. And, of
course, the Chinese Government has devoted massive financial,
technological, and human resources to ensure that remains the
case.
Up until his--well, the only thing you would find about
him, until recently after his sentencing would be state media
reports behind the firewall about his sentencing. And so it's
very difficult to get critical mass and get Chinese people to
really have an idea of who he is. And the fact is that it's
actually dangerous to be known in China as a supporter and
someone who knows and respects Liu Xiaobo. We know that because
the report that came yesterday from the Chinese non-
governmental organization [NGO], Chinese Human Rights
Defenders, has updated us on information that more than 100
people since the October 8 Nobel Prize victory have been
detained, interrogated, or placed under house arrest merely for
expressing support for Liu Xiaobo.
Now, how does the Nobel Prize change this? What's the hope
for change in this dynamic? Well, from the outset it looks a
little bit intimidating because, of course, the Chinese
Government has made sure that very few people really know about
Liu Xiaobo. From the outset the Chinese Government, after the
announcement of Liu Xiaobo's Nobel Prize, state media was
silent. Chinese Central Television, Xinhua, said nothing. Even
the nominally independent Phoenix Television in Hong Kong chose
not to make any statement about that. The Chinese Government
didn't make any statement, which means the vast majority of
Chinese people who are dependent on state media for their
information didn't know until the next day. And that was a
short, terse statement from the Ministry on Foreign Affairs
that identified Liu Xiaobo as a criminal and referred to the
Nobel Prize award as profane.
Now, since then the Chinese Government has only ramped up
its propaganda offensive against both the Nobel Prize Committee
and Liu Xiaobo. In short order, on the 14th Xinhua ran an
article describing the Nobel Committee and the Nobel Prize as a
``political tool.'' A few days later we had a Xinhua report
describing the Nobel Prize--Nobel Committee as politically
motivated, as politically biased. And then things really
changed, and they really ramped it up on October 28. Xinhua ran
a fairly sophisticated, almost a Fox News style ``expose'' of
Liu Xiaobo called ``Who is Liu Xiaobo? '' And what it was, was
a selection of quotations allegedly taken from a 30-year plus
writing career which appeared to show Liu as someone who
disrespected Chinese culture, as someone who appeared to be in
the employ of foreign organizations working against China.
Now, what does that mean? Well, what it means is that to a
large extent the information that people get about Liu Xiaobo
is pretty negative. But what's interesting is, we know that
activists in China, in Beijing, have gone out onto the streets
of Beijing, have gotten onto buses in China in Beijing and
asked people, do you know about Liu Xiaobo? Have you heard
about the Nobel Prize? To a large extent in the days after they
didn't know. And the reflex answer from most people was that
they were proud that a Chinese person had been honored in this
way by an international organization with a prize as auspicious
as the Nobel Prize.
And the second thing is that even if they disagreed, if
they knew something about Liu Xiaobo, had some idea of the
media's smear campaign against him, they expressed support for
his willingness and his right to express his ideas. So what
does that mean?
Well, looking farther down the road, we're looking at this
idea of this debate that this award is prompting within China.
Now, I think--and in the long-term we're probably going to see
this, is that this attention the Chinese Government has placed
on Liu Xiaobo, this vitriol is inevitably going to pique
curiosity amongst people who have access to the Internet, who
have Internet circumvention techniques so they can get
information that's not state controlled, to find out more about
him. Which means inevitably his ideas and the ideas embodied in
Charter 08 are going to be disseminated far more widely.
The second idea is, the Nobel Prize indicates, and the
Chinese Government's reaction to it really shows how the
Chinese Government miscalculated badly. This has really put the
Chinese Government on the back foot. They did not expect this.
They thought that when they dispatched a senior foreign
ministry official to Norway to intimidate and browbeat the
Norwegian government into not allowing the Norway Committee to
give Liu the Nobel that they had won. But that hasn't happened.
And the fact that this has happened has given an attraction for
people within the government or the elites in society to
express support for Liu Xiaobo and the ideas in Charter 08.
One excellent example is within days of Liu's Nobel a
public letter issued by 23 senior retired, former Communist
party officials and intellectuals called Liu a splendid choice
and called on the government to end its censorship regime.
So these are--this is the beginning of a trend that we're
going to see. Obviously the Chinese Government right now
there's going to be discussion between moderates and the people
who really fought for and won in terms of punishing Liu Xiaobo.
There's going to be discussion in terms of how this can be
handled.
What the Liu Xiaobo Nobel has created for the Chinese
Government is a running sore that's going to continue as long
as he is imprisoned, as long as there's a new story that refers
to imprisoned Chinese Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo this is a huge
embarrassment for the Chinese Government. So the Hu Jintao/Wen
Jiabao regime is passing on a real toxic legacy to the next
group of leaders in 2012 that's going to force this new
leadership of Xi Jinping and Li Kejiang to do a cost benefit
ratio of whether it's worth keeping him in prison in the short-
term and the long-term in terms of their damage control. And in
the longer term it's going to hopefully provoke more debate and
more openness in the Chinese Government and more support for
rule of law and obeying and respecting laws and the same
principles in China's own Constitution that Liu Xiaobo has
advocated.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kine appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Dorgan. Mr. Kine, thank you very much. We
appreciate your being here.
I wanted to mention at the outset a couple of things.
Number one, this Commission, the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, maintains the most extensive database of
those who are imprisoned or those who have been affected by
actions of the Chinese Government and we have a database of
5,500 Chinese citizens, 1,400 of them are currently detained or
in prison, the remainder have been released, have escaped, have
finished their terms, or died in custody. But we have
maintained this extensive database which we think is very
important in order that the world know that these are people
who are not forgotten.
And we have testimony here about the Internet, the
difficulty that the Chinese Government is now having keeping a
lid on the free flow of information. The extensive efforts they
have made to censor the Internet traffic in China. And at a
previous hearing just some months ago, we had a hearing at
which we had representatives of Google, representatives of a
company that registers domain names and others to talk about
this very issue because I think that, perhaps more than any
other issue, is going to determine what happens inside China.
Are they able to effectively, in this new age of
communications--are they able to effectively, for a long period
of time, contain the information they want to contain behind
the curtain? I think not.
But I have a lot of questions here and I know my colleague
will as well when he is back.
First of all, Mr. Appiah, do you know Liu Xiaobo?
Mr. Appiah. No, I don't. I mean, we communicate, usually,
through the independent Chinese PEN Center of which he's the
ex-president and through in particular, Tienchi Martin-Liao who
is their current president. She's an exiled Chinese writer.
Chairman Dorgan. Is he able to communicate, and if so, how
can he communicate while he's in prison?
Mr. Appiah. Not now. I mean, he was. His wife, Liu Xia, was
visiting him regularly, as you know, as I mentioned, she's not
been seen since the 20th of October by anybody. So we don't
know when she'll be able to meet him next. But she was able to
tell him about the prize. She was able to go and tell him. And
he, in a characteristic way, I think, responded by dedicating
it to the--what he called the martyrs of Tiananmen and also
weeping.
Chairman Dorgan. Now, a number of you have made the point
that Premier Wen has made certain statements and
representations that seem pretty unusual and nearly
unbelievable given the circumstances. But you've also indicated
that the Chinese Government itself has taken steps to censor
those expressions. Can you give me a little more information
about that? What do we know about that censorship? Just that
steps were taken to try to prevent most of the Chinese people
from hearing what Premier Wen said, is that----
Mr. Appiah. Well, the parts--I mean, you quoted, I think,
from an interview that he did on CNN----
Chairman Dorgan. Yes.
Mr. Appiah [continuing].--with Fareed Zakaria. I believe
that the parts--those parts of that interview are not available
in the transcription that the Chinese people can see. So----
Chairman Dorgan. And then we conclude from that that the
Chinese Government has affirmatively decided to exclude them,
is that----
Mr. Appiah. Yes, I mean, it's part of the sort of irony of
the present situation. Because there's a dispute going on
between the various positions within the regime it's possible
that they don't, you know--as though one part of the apparatus
can decide that it doesn't want another part of the apparatus
to be seen within China and so they may have asked him, they
may not. But they certainly have took it off the----
Chairman Dorgan. Dr. Economy, did you want to----
Ms. Economy. I would add that Southern Weekend ran a
summary of Premier Wen's interview with Fareed. Hu Shuli from
Caixin has referenced his remarks openly. While the full text
may not be available easily to the Chinese public there are
ways to go around the firewall and get access to CNN or many
other sites with access to the full set of his remarks. There
have been media in China that have referenced it and talked
about what he said. In some forms, his remarks are in the
public domain.
Chairman Dorgan. And it represents the internal struggles.
Let me ask about corruption. You indicated that the reforms
that some leaders in China want are to root out corruption.
What kind of corruption are you referring to?
Ms. Economy. Corruption is at the root of virtually any
challenge that China faces today. If you're looking at land
appropriation, environmental protests, or other social
instability throughout the country, the issue that's driving it
fundamentally has to do with officials behaving corruptly,
whether appropriating money or appropriating land. The
government recognizes this and there is some effort by people
to campaign against corrupt officials by rooting them out
wholesale. Increasingly, however, those in the Chinese
Government are realizing that the way to root out corrupt
officials is, again, by working with NGOs, offering public
disclosure of data, and working through public consultation.
So Beijing is beginning to try to find a way--still by
maintaining the primacy of the party--to increase transparency
and official accountability within the system.
Chairman Dorgan. Would corruption include the judicial
system that decides to send Mr. Liu to prison?
Ms. Economy. Absolutely. In many instances protests within
China don't simply occur because something happens to somebody
one day. Oftentimes protests come after groups of people have
already sought redress through the legal system to no avail.
The protest may come after one or two years' worth of seeking
redress, until people's frustrations erupt.
Chairman Dorgan. It's interesting, I was in Hanoi, Vietnam
at one point and met, among others, the Chamber of Commerce,
American Chamber of Commerce, AmCHAM, and the American Chamber
of Commerce in Vietnam had a very unusual message for me. They
said, ``We need more government.'' Not something you hear from
Chambers of Commerce very often. And I said, ``What do you mean
by that?'' They said, ``This is a country that's a Communist
country attempting to develop a market system. But in order for
a system to work, you've got to have government. You've got to
have administrative practices and, you've got to have courts
that will enforce contracts.'' They went through a whole series
of things. And it is the case that you need all of that and you
need to have confidence in that before you risk your
investments and so on.
So, that happened to be Vietnam. I assume the same
circumstances exist in China as it moves with a Communist
government toward a market system. It's now moved in that
direction for a good number of years.
Mr. Gilley, you indicated that the issue is for us to
respond thoughtfully to China. And I guess I want to try to
understand, because you indicated that you have an effervescent
sense of optimism that things are going to change and
ultimately the Chinese people will throw the boot off their
chest--the boot of Communism off their chest and we will see
some other kind of approach that moves more in a democratic
system. What--and maybe you're right. I don't know. I mean, I
think we need to continue to try to hasten that along to the
extent that we can through our sets of policies. But what is
your view of how we respond thoughtfully to the Chinese--the
current Chinese Government?
Mr. Gilley. Great question. First of all, I think it's
important not to mistake efforts, namely the efforts of the
regime to censor, to jail a thousand people, for the overall
state of information or political freedoms in China. Indeed,
the efforts are a response to the increasing inability to
manage information.
If human rights were as bad today as they were 20 years
ago, I would guess that a third of the population would need to
be jailed for what they do today. So the regime--the response
of the regime can't be mistaken for what's going on in China.
It's precisely because they've lost the ability to control
information. They've lost the ability to limit discussions of
political reform, human rights. People like Qin Xiao, prominent
retiring Chairman of China Merchants Bank, one of the five
major state banks, goes to Xinhua University last--in June and
issues a clarion call for implementation of universal values,
human rights and democracy. So the important thing to do is to
not mistake----
Chairman Dorgan. Did anything happen to him?
Mr. Gilley. No. No. He's now a hero and is widely discussed
and is making a second career now as an advocate of universal
values and human rights in China.
Chairman Dorgan. Might you think if he threatens the
government of China might they decide that he should join Mr.
Liu?
Mr. Gilley. I'd say if he organizes a group he might find
himself in trouble. But the idea of saying that is acceptable,
that that speech is widely available online. And I must say Wen
Jiabao has been calling for political reforms, democracy, and
human rights since at least 2007 when he issued a People's
Daily editorial on that topic. Earlier this year he issued a
memoir essay on his time with the Party General Secretary Hu
Yaobong--Hu Yaobong has been a person who is not discussed
publicly for many years. He's now been rehabilitated in part
because of Wen Jiabao. So parts of Wen Jiabao have been
censored. And I think that the censoring of his speech in
Shenzhen was simply because the Party General Secretary Hu
Jintao was coming the next week, and it was his speech which
was going to be the official speech. Lots of pro-reform
statements from Wen Jiabao are easily available to Chinese
Internet readers and online readers.
So my point is that it's precisely because they've lost
control of the ability to manage political speech and
information that we see this stepped-up effort to try and plug
the holes in the dam. But we have to focus, I think, on what's
happening to the dam rather than the holes they're trying to
plug. So my question is how to respond thoughtfully? Well, this
has to do with how we view China internationally and being
aware that policies we adopt with respect to China's
international posture, it's security posture in the South China
Sea, it's security posture with respect to Taiwan, it's
currency manipulation. That we have to think carefully about
the implications of those policies on domestic reform in China
and in part to realize that Chinese people are less interested
and indeed don't want their country to become an international
pariah.
It's exactly as Mr. Kine has said, they're very proud to
get the Nobel Peace Prize, they want their country to be a
respected country. And responding thoughtfully for China means
in some ways trying to respond to China's need for
respectability and for acceptance, and that's really what is
driving the international politics of China.
Now, how you do that in concrete terms we can discuss for a
long time. But the point is that just as we in some ways
mistook what was happening in the Soviet Union in the 1980s,
we're in danger of mistaking what's happening in China today.
Chairman Dorgan. I have a couple of more questions then I'm
going to call on my colleague. I would observe that there is no
question that things have changed in China for the vast
majority of the Chinese people in a positive and beneficial way
over the last 20 years. There's no question about that.
I would also observe that the issue of human rights is for
Mr. Liu or Mr. Gao or others as bad as it was 20 years ago
today because in both cases--in Mr. Liu's case he's in prison,
we're not quite sure what they've done with Mr. Gao at this
point. But for those for whom the Chinese Government has
decided to take action and trump up charges and throw them in a
dark cell somewhere, and not to be heard from by the rest of
us, the human rights situation is abysmal, not changed at all.
Mr. Kine, you talked about that there's even some support
among government officials and then you described some retired
government officials which is a little different. You were
talking about statements by some retired government officials.
I assume the testimony we've heard from others here is that
inside the Chinese Government itself they are struggling to try
to determine where are we headed and how do we contain what we
know to be the most significant threat to our regime and that
is the free flow of information and what it does to incite the
thirst among the population for freedom and the capability of
free speech, human rights and so on.
So, give me your assessment of what you think is happening
inside the government?
Mr. Kine. Excellent question. I'd like to start by echoing
what Mr. Gilley said, and your comments, you know, we are the
first to say that things have changed for the better over the
last 20-30 years in China in terms of human rights. It's a much
better place. But I think moving into your question, the record
really shows that from early 2007 human rights in China have
really been under attack. And what we've seen and what we have
documented and what you have documented in this Commission is
that it appears that within the government that the security
agencies have been in the ascendant. This is a--probably a
result of both the government's response and shock at the
ethnic unrest in Tibet in March 2008 which was compounded by
the bloody ethnic violence that occurred in Urumqi, Xinjiang in
July 2009. So to a large extent this means that the
government's response to citizens' legitimate quest for access
to human rights, and particularly those with high profiles who
are seen as threatening as with reference to those with the
comments who might be able to form movements or groups have
been targeted--high profile dissidents.
I think it's important to note that reform in China--it's
really not--it's not rocket science. I mean we can talk about
it for days, but the bottom line is we're talking about rule of
law. We're talking about the Chinese Government respecting its
own laws, respecting the tenets and the principles embodied in
it's own constitution. It's not something the United States,
the EU, or the international community is trying to impose on
China. It's China's own laws and principles.
So I think the important thing for us to realize is that
what we're dealing with in terms of this idea of reform and
what's going on in the government is overall the--you know, the
overarching main concern and obsession of this government which
is the world's first evolutionary Communist Party is
maintenance of power. They want to maintain their 61-year
monopoly on power and they will do anything that they need to
get that done. And so in terms of--so are there voices? Are
there more moderate voices from the government? Obviously.
Okay. Are they in the ascendant? Absolutely not. This is a
government that, as you can see from its furious reaction to
the Nobel Peace Prize of Liu Xiaobo, something that, to a large
extent could have not gone away, but could have been much
better handled if they'd just shut up about it. You know, this
indicates a government that is not particularly confident, that
is concerned about where it's going and what the threats are to
its own power.
So in the end what does that mean? It means that reform in
China comes down to the same meaning, the same currency as
words like harmony and stability. These are shorthand for
mechanisms for the Chinese Communist Party to identify
potential threats to its power, to target them, to silence them
and to make sure that they maintain that power.
Chairman Dorgan. One last question then I'll call on
Congressman Levin.
Ms. Economy, I think I've heard two different views here,
one Mr. Kine says we have a Communist government--a government
that is going to do everything it can to retain its power. And
I think Mr. Gilley's feeling is it is inevitable over time that
things will change in China in the direction of greater human
rights. Your assessment of those two issues.
Ms. Economy. I think they're both right. As I suggested
earlier, the party's efforts at reform are largely toward
modernization. How do we make the party more effective? How do
we bring in transparency and official accountability, and to
some extent the rule of law without challenging our own
authority for the next 60 years? At the same time, I think Dr.
Gilley is right that looking ahead, it is going to be
impossible for them to do that. This is in large part because
there are forces within the Party that think differently.
As for the media as a whole--one of the interesting things
about that group of retired officials, if you look at the list
of signatories that sent the letter to the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress--calling for freedom of
speech and an open press, you will find many former senior
media officials, people who 15 or 20 years ago we would have
thought were the ones responsible for controlling information.
You can see that some place deep inside them, even as they were
controlling information, they actually were interested in
releasing more information.
It is therefore difficult for us to assess what people are
actually thinking, believing, and arguing for behind the
scenes, when based solely on what we see in public
documentation. Because of the Internet, because of domestic
pressures emanating, and because of forces within the party, I
do think that Dr. Gilley is right. There is going to be change.
Chairman Dorgan. Thank you very much. Prior to this
Congress the lead on this Commission was Congressman Levin.
He's done a lot of work in this area and a lot of really good
work. So Congressman, it's good to see you here.
And I'd just mention to you that Dr. Appiah, as I mentioned
in his introduction, is one of those who had recommended Liu
Xiaobo for the Nobel Peace Prize. I'm sure he must feel pretty
good about that recommendation. But I appreciate your being
here. Why don't you proceed?
Representative Levin. Thank you, Mr. Dorgan. I'm so glad
that you called this hearing. And you've been so devoted to the
work of the Commission. I prepared an opening statement which
I, of course, will not read, and I ask that it be submitted for
the record.
Chairman Dorgan. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Representative Levin appears in
the appendix.]
Representative Levin. I do in the statement cover this
imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo. And also I talk about the work of
the Commission and I thank the increasingly valuable, if I
might say, invaluable work of the Commission and all of its
talented staff. And I discuss to some extent the database, the
political prisoner database which is increasingly utilized and
I think validates its creation.
But let me just ask a question. I'm sorry I have to kind of
pick up at this point. I said at the beginning of my statement
that Liu Xiaobo's imprisonment is a personal tragedy, a
national shame, and an international challenge. So let me just
follow up, I haven't been to China now for quite a few years.
And you've said, some of you, that they seek international
respectability, and also that it's a much better place for
human rights--much better.
I don't know how all of this fits together. If they seek
international respectability and imprison somebody who is
speaking up and expressing his views, I don't quite know how
they expect to attain international respectability.
And number two, if it's really a much better place, I don't
know how that fits into this imprisonment because I think the
signal that it sends is that if anybody speaks up and is likely
to make a difference, you'll end up in prison. And in terms of
the international challenge, I think all of this graphically
raises the question as to what we do. So I think you've already
covered some of this ground, but how does this all fit
together? And why don't we go right to left?
Thank you very much for coming.
Mr. Kine. Thank you very much. Thank you for your question.
Let me start by talking about, yes, what is this, there seems
to be some contradictions here.
Well, let's take a look at the record. I mean, 20-30 years
ago what rights do Chinese--most Chinese people--Chinese people
have that they didn't have back then? Well, now human rights is
now enshrined in China's Constitution. People are able to----
Representative Levin. It was in the Soviet Constitution,
too.
Mr. Kine. People are able to legally buy and own property.
Okay. People are able to have passports and travel. People are
able to access at least portions of the Internet. People have
freedom of internal mobility which they did not have, to the
extent of which they didn't have 20-30 years ago. So I think
the key idea to remember in terms of how things have changed,
but how things seem not to have changed with Liu Xiaobo's
imprisonment is that there are red lines and gray lines that
citizens are not supposed to cross. And so the unspoken compact
that the Chinese Government has made with the Chinese people in
the 30 years of reform and opening is that you can go out,
prosper, multiply, make money, but be quiet. Don't push the
envelope in terms of asking for rights in terms of voting,
elections, don't ask us to do things that could make us think
that you're a threat to our maintenance of power. So this is
the dynamic that we're looking at.
Representative Levin. But some of those references are
really more to economic rights than to human rights.
Mr. Kine. Exactly. But to the vast majority--to most
Chinese people you have to remember that, you know, this is--
the 20th century was an absolute catastrophe for the Chinese
people. We've had the civil war, the Great Leap Forward, the
Cultural Revolution, you know, Chinese people are at a place
now where they've had extended peace, an extended period which
has been absent of the dreaded chaos which haunted their
fathers, their grandfathers. So they are grateful and they
understand that this is a special time. And they are willing--
to a large extent most Chinese people are willing to accept
that status quo.
Representative Levin. I mean, that's--we could discuss
that, but that isn't quite the same as saying it's a much
better place for human rights. I mean, the fact that they can
move, the fact that they can get a passport under certain
circumstances doesn't--and the fact that these changes are
popular with the people--that all doesn't mean that in terms of
human rights it's a much better place. Unless your definition
of ``human rights'' is so broad that it encompasses virtually
everything. I mean, it's surely a better place economically for
huge numbers. But I think his imprisonment really sends the
signal that, in terms of the basic human right of expression,
it isn't a much better place.
Mr. Kine. I think it's significant to--and I don't want to
look like I'm defending the Chinese Government's human rights
record, but I think that it's significant that we're talking
about one person who obviously is emblematic of wider abuses,
but the fact is that we no longer see except in areas such as
Tibet and Xinjiang, you know, mass arrests. To a large extent
most Chinese citizens don't need to worry about the general
issue of kicking in the door just for sitting around the
kitchen table criticizing the government. It's only when they
cross these red and gray lines, when they start to mobilize, or
look like they are forming networks or groups which could be
seen as a threat to the government, when they cross that line
and are under a threat and under persecution.
Representative Levin. Of course, in Myanmar it's ``just one
person,'' and she symbolizes what's true for anybody who tries
to do what she did. And doesn't his arrest, his imprisonment
with essentially the house arrest of his wife indicate to
citizens throughout China, if you try to do anything like he
did, you'll have the same fate?
Mr. Kine. That's the message in the lesson, exactly.
Representative Levin. So therefore, it isn't necessarily a
much better place for human rights?
Mr. Kine. You know----
[Simultaneous conversation.]
Mr. Kine. I think the key message is that we really need to
look at China realistically. And I think that we need to give
the Chinese Government credit where credit is due in the sense
that life is much better for the vast majority of Chinese
people than it was 20, 30 years ago. It is no longer a
totalitarian state in which millions are in poverty and which
millions are subject to forced migrations. I mean, if we're
going to talk about changes over time, that's what we need to
discuss. I'm happy to talk with you all day about the abuses
that are occurring in China today. But when you ask for a
comparison from past to present, it's really important to say
things are better for the vast majority of Chinese people.
People no longer--to a large extent don't live under a sense of
palpable fear. Okay. They don't. The vast majority don't. It's
only those who push the envelope who violate this unspoken
compact and want access to those rights and freedoms which we
at Human Rights Watch and which you here on this Commission
advocate for so strongly, freedom of media, freedom of
association, freedom of expression. Those are and remain bit
problems in China. But the status quo today is far better than
it was 30 years ago and it's important to recognize that.
Representative Levin. I think we do. But the essence of
this hearing is those issues that you mentioned. We're not
discussing their economic policy.
[Simultaneous conversation.]
Representative Levin. Who else wants to chime in? Go down
the line.
Mr. Gilley. I think we can restrict ourselves to political
and civic freedoms and note that there have been vast
improvements. More than 1,000 people signed Charter 08 and
continue to go about their daily lives without interference or
police surveillance of any sort today. So for those people the
right to express support for that charter has been realized.
That's political expression. There are----
Chairman Dorgan. Can I just--I apologize for interrupting--
--
[Simultaneous conversation.]
Chairman Dorgan. Could I ask a question on that point? I
thought I had heard previously in the testimony that about 100
of those who have signed have been detained or have been
otherwise tracked by the government. So, I mean, if you've got
1,000 people that sign and 900 are not bothered, but 100 are
detained, that's really not progress; is it?
Mr. Gilley. Well, I think--I don't know what the numbers--a
number of people were questioned, brought in, asked, put under
surveillance, I think the number of people who have been
imprisoned for their part in Charter 08 is, I believe, a few,
including Liu Xiaobo. To me if that number of people can issue
support for such a clarion declaration of liberal democracy,
that is--that is something they could not have even imagined
doing 10 years earlier.
Second of all, I think you have to think carefully about
the policy toward Liu Xiaobo. The likely end game for him is
exile. And I think from his standpoint that would be a
wonderful outcome, he would be able to live freely and express
himself.
Representative Levin. Why don't they do that tomorrow?
Mr. Gilley. I think they will shortly. I mean, I don't
know, this year, next year. But they do crave international
respectability. Liu Xiaobo will continue to be a thorn in their
side. They will calculate, as they did previously with people
like Wei Jingsheng that it's simply not worth it. They know
that exile implies irrelevance for Chinese dissidents and he'll
be sent abroad.
That will respect--that will reflect a sensitivity to
international opinion. It will also reflect the fact that
they're aware of how easy it is to marginalize dissidents
through exile or silencing. The point is to keep in mind that
this gray line has to do with forming an organization that
could challenge the party, challenge its leadership. That's the
line that hasn't moved. Of course it should move. International
human rights suggest China is under obligation to not jail
people for organizing peacefully. But, nonetheless, represents
a substantial increase in freedom compared to 20 years ago.
You asked about international policy. All I'd say is, my
point is, the important approach to China that we need to adopt
is to maintain consensus with allies in dealing with China on
international issues. So we're careful, and I think the
administration has done an excellent job on the South China Sea
in acting with our allies in Southeast Asia in standing up to
China's territorial claims in that region, making sure that
that is seen not as a U.S. policy, but as a regional policy, a
regional response. Likewise in our treatment of human rights in
China, we need to be aware that we have allies in particular in
the rest of the Western world who have similar concerns and
work in coordination with them in dealing with China.
The point is not to reestablish a cold war mentality, or
more specifically allow China to use a cold war international
opinion climate to justify continued repression at home.
Representative Levin. In terms of cold war climate, I think
there's agreement. But you can use that argument to essentially
respond very little.
All right. Let's keep going.
Ms. Economy. I'll briefly address each of your three
questions. First, how does China balance its desire for
international respect with its decision to imprison a Nobel
Peace Prize winner? I think it weighs the costs and benefits.
In the case of Liu Xiaobo, the challenge to its own rule
outweighs its desire for international respect. It's a simple
calculation. In the eyes of China's leaders, it's far better to
imprison Liu than it is to let him speak freely for the sake of
international respect.
Second, is the situation in China better now than it was 20
years ago? We've heard good argumentation for why it is in
terms of the expansion of economic opportunities. It would be
interesting to look at what was going on between 1986 and 1989
in terms of the flowering of ideas. This was the time of Zhao
Ziyang, and in 1987 there was a movement during the 13th Party
Congress toward political reform, marking the first time there
was a slate of ideas put forward on political reform.
All the arguments here are probably correct. I think it's
worth a serious look, however, to think back 20 years or so at
the ideas that were flowering about political reform and
compare that to what's happening now.
Finally, what do we do? In my written testimony and oral
remarks, I make four recommendations. One, individual support
for people like Liu Xiaobo or Hu Jia and others; the United
States has to continue to press when President Obama and
Secretary Clinton meet with their counterparts. Second,
continue to work on all of those programs that promote
transparency in the rule of law and we have a lot of them
underway now.
I was just talking with Jennifer Salen, who works for the
American Bar Association, and those rule of law programs are
hugely important.
Dr. Gilley is correct that we have to be careful not to box
China into a corner. Putting pressure on China is important,
however, because China responds to pressure. If you don't
pressure them, if you step back, they will take full advantage
and press forward. Indicating to China, for example, that what
they do domestically has global ramifications is important. We
need to point that out continuously.
Last, it's been interesting to see how the Chinese press
has reported on elections in Vietnam or Burma/Myanmar. To the
extent that we can push forward on political reform in other
Asian countries, in particular, that also will bring pressure
to bear on China because it's embarrassing to them.
Mr. Appiah. Thank you very much, Cochairman, Congressman
Levin. I just wanted to say a couple of things. One is, it is
important, I think to mention, by name, the people who are
currently being harassed as a result of the Nobel Prize in
particular. So I want to mention that Guo Xianliang in
Guangzhou is actually under criminal charge now for inciting
subversion of state power for circulating that document that I
asked to have entered into the record. So there's a real--there
are individuals here and also Ye Du or--well, his pen name is
Ye Du, his real name, as it were is Wu Wei, who is the network
committee coordinator and Internet expert for the Independent
Chinese PEN Center which is the corresponding organization to
ours in relation to China has been taken in for questioning,
his house was raided, they confiscated PCs and CDs including
information about a Congress that I had the honor of attending
on behalf of the American PEN Center in Tokyo a month--a week
before the Prize where we--all of us from 100 countries voted
for a resolution condemning the Chinese Government for its
treatment not just of Liu Xiaobo but of named other people. I
mean, some 10, a dozen, 20 other people whose names we know who
have had their fundamental rights of free expression limited in
one way or another. There's more than one member of the ICPC in
prison today essentially for free expression offenses. So I
think it is important to underline the point that not just--
it's not just Liu Xiaobo as you said, you have a list of 1,400
people in prison, but just in relation to his Prize, there are
people who are currently under criminal charge simply for
circulating the information, the truth, that he won this prize.
On the question of sort of what we should be doing, I'm a
philosopher and not an expert on foreign policy, but I happen
to have written a book recently about the ways in which
foreigners influenced China in the late 19th century and I do
think this question of--this question of holding the regime's
feet to the fire about Chinese honor, about the respectability
of their country, there's a historical precedent for thinking
that that will work eventually. It worked with foot binding in
the late 19th century and early 20th century, I believe. It's
arguable that it worked in relation to opium there though the
issues there are somewhat different.
So I think that this is very important. I'm an American
citizen, but I have three sisters who are not and they live in
three different African countries and in every one of those
African countries China has interests that have to do with
economic interests. And they're trying to mine in these
countries to take resources out of them and they need to be
well respected in order for those countries, some of which are
seriously democratic places, like Ghana where my youngest
sister lives, the people care--ordinary people care about
whether they're dealing with a government that's respectable,
that's worthy of respect. Ordinary people in these places care.
To the extent that we can make it clear to those in the
regime who are resisting change that this will be extremely
costly to them, not just in their dealings with us, though that
should matter to them, but in their dealings with absolutely
everybody in the free countries of the world. I think that's
something that we can do and it will resonate because Chinese
people care about China being respected as has been mentioned
all the time, as Americans care about the United States being
respected, of course. It's a normal part of the psychology of
someone who cares about her country. So I believe that that's a
very powerful weapon. And I don't think we should back off.
It's perfectly consistent, both to do that and to say, that is
not a cold war issue, we are not--we don't hate China, this is
about caring about the Chinese people. It's not about being
against them, it's about being in favor of them. And it's about
helping them to move forward. In the end they will only move
forward if the Chinese people themselves are allowed to or
choose to or mobilize themselves to move forward. But we can
help as we have helped in the past and as this country was
helped in our revolution by people from outside the colonies.
This happens all the time in world history. All the time
people in one place can help people in another place move
forward. And I believe we should do that, we should stick with
that, we should not back off because we're worried about their
threats to make us pay costs in terms of trade or something.
They can't afford to do that really and it's very important, I
think, that we stick to our principles, principles that are
universal principles and principles that are largely present in
the Chinese Constitution itself. Though, of course, the Chinese
Constitution does protect the privilege of one party which is
not something that I believe should be part of our
international practice.
Chairman Dorgan. You know, I'm thinking about our response
to apartheid and the years in which we very aggressively, in
most cases, said we will not sit idly by and say it doesn't
matter. It does matter to us and we'll take appropriate actions
and apply appropriate pressure to the extent that we can,
whatever mechanisms we have to try to affect change.
I was thinking also about the gray line you just described
about organizations that the Chinese Government might well
think could threaten them. And in the case of Mr. Gao who we
have worked on and discussed at some length, he was not forming
an organization. He was a lawyer who was supporting in court
and taking cases for people who were charged with human rights
violations. And so that's a circumstance that's well outside of
the gray line that you've described.
It's really interesting to me and I suspect to Congressman
Levin to listen to four people who study an area intensely,
understand it in substantial detail, we have the attention span
of gnats, you know, we just--in the Congress. We try to learn
as much as we can and try to keep up with a lot of issues, but
100 issues come at you in a week. So we're not Asian scholars.
We're not working in areas where you work. But your ability to
come and give us perspectives from four different points on the
compass, as Asian scholars, is really interesting to me. I
mean, there are differences, obviously, nuanced differences in
how you interpret and make judgments about things. But this has
really been interesting for me to be able to hear your
presentations today. And some of you have come some long ways
to be here and I admire--I didn't mention how much I admire
Human Rights Watch. You know, I don't--I don't know how much
money you make working for them, but my guess is you've not
chosen a life of wealth, you've chosen a life of advocating on
behalf of an organization and people around the world. I just--
I admire all that you do--all four of you, and the work that
that represents.
I do want to just finally mention today that Charlotte
Oldham-Moore--if I get her name right--has worked with me for
some while--some long while as the Staff Director of this
Commission and has now left and is now working in the State
Department. And she's going to do well there as well. She's an
extraordinary talent and this Commission was very blessed to
have her work with us. And Doug Grob is similarly someone who
has been Staff Director for us and will now continue in
Charlotte's stead. Doug does extraordinary work. So we've got a
couple of people plus a larger staff, all of whom speak
Mandarin, all of whom study what is happening, trying to
understand for this Congress and interpret for the Congress and
the Executive Branch what are the changes, what are the
nuances, what can we expect? What does it mean? What are the
hints that we get?
I think all of you have said, properly so, China is going
to be a significant presence in the life of the United States
going forward. The question is, what kind of presence and to
what effect? And so for someone to suggest we take our eye off
this, we'd be fools. We need to--we're going to live in a
future and in a life with China as a significant presence and
it's in all of our interests to try to pressure and prod and
continue to apply the right kind of approach to move China in
the right direction.
Congressman, I said when I started, there's only one reason
that I wanted to hold this hearing today. And that is because
the Chinese authorities have a Nobel Peace Prize winner behind
a prison door. And that ought to be a profound embarrassment to
them. And to the extent that we can hold up for the world the
absurdity of that circumstance I want to continue to try to do
that.
Mr. Gilley may well be right that they may exile Liu
Xiaobo, I don't know. But my hope is that whatever the fate of
Mr. Liu Xiaobo, whatever his fate, I hope that very soon he's
released from a Chinese prison. This man ought to be
celebrated, not imprisoned.
So, let me thank all of you. Congressman, thank you very
much and this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon at 12:03 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Kwame Anthony Appiah
November 9, 2010
Chairman Dorgan, Co-Chairman Levin, Members of the Commission:
My name is Professor Kwame Anthony Appiah, and I have the honor of
being President of PEN American Center. I am very grateful for the
invitation to speak to you today. Our center is one of the 145
centers--in more than 100 countries--of International PEN, the world's
oldest literary and human rights organization. For nearly 90 years we
have sustained fellowship between the writers of all nations and
defended free expression at home and abroad. More recently, we have
worked with particular assistance from our colleagues in the
Independent Chinese PEN Center (ICPC), to advance the cause of free
expression in China. Part of this effort has involved supporting our
colleague Liu Xiaobo, who served as President of ICPC from 2003 to
2007, held a seat on its Board until late 2009, and remains an Honorary
President. In late January 2010, in connection with our support for him
and the cause of democracy in China, I wrote to the Norwegian Nobel
Committee, to urge them to give serious consideration to him as a
candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. I was not, of course, alone in
doing this. Vaclav Havel, President of the former Czechoslovakia, and
Nobel Laureate Desmond Tutu of South Africa, among many others, made
similar appeals. If I may, I would like to summarize briefly the
arguments I made in that letter on behalf of my organization.
On December 25, 2009, a Beijing court sentenced Liu to 11 years in
prison and an additional 2 years' deprivation of political rights for
``inciting subversion of state power.'' This so-called incitement, the
verdict made clear, consisted of seven phrases--a total of 224 Chinese
characters--that he had written over the last three years. Many of
these words came from Charter 08, a declaration modeled on Vaclav
Havel's Charter 77 that calls for political reform and greater human
rights in China and has been signed, at considerable risk, by more than
10,000 Chinese citizens.
Liu Xiaobo has a long history as one of the leading proponents of
peaceful democratic reform in the People's Republic of China. A poet
and a literary critic, Liu served as a professor at Beijing Normal
University and was a leading voice and an influential presence during
the student protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989; indeed, his
insistence on nonviolence and democratic process are widely credited
with preventing far more catastrophic bloodshed during the subsequent
crackdown.
Liu's writings express the aspirations of a growing number of
China's citizens; the ideas he has articulated are ideas that are
commonplace in free societies around the world, and while the Chinese
government claims they are subversive they are shared by a significant
cross section of Chinese society. Charter 08 itself is a testament to
an expanding movement for peaceful political reform in China. This
document, which Liu co-authored, is a remarkable attempt both to engage
China's leadership and to speak to the Chinese public about where China
is and needs to go. It is novel in its breadth and in its list of
signers--not only dissidents and human rights lawyers, but also
prominent political scientists, economists, writers, artists,
grassroots activists, farmers, and even government officials. More than
10,000 Chinese citizens have endorsed the document despite the fact
that almost all of the original 300 signers have since been detained or
harassed. In doing so they, too, exhibited exceptional courage and
conviction.
We all recall the period of the Cultural Revolution, in which
millions were uprooted, millions died. We should acknowledge that there
has been substantial progress from that horrendous nadir. We know, too,
that there are voices within the regime, urging greater respect for
free expression. China wants--and needs--to be heard in the community
of nations. I--and all of my PEN colleagues--believe in a cosmopolitan
conversation in which we hear from every nation. But we also believe we
must let China's rulers know that we can only listen respectfully if
they offer to their own citizens the fundamental freedoms we all claim
from our governments. This is the right moment for the world to show
those in China who do not understand that history is on freedom's side
that all the world's friends of peace and democracy are watching. And
that is why this was the right moment to give this peaceful campaigner
for democratic freedoms the Nobel Peace Prize.
Since the announcement of the Peace Prize, the government of China
has behaved with exactly the sort of contempt for the rights of her
people that Liu has long protested. The Chinese Communist Party has
demonstrated that it remains unfortunately willing to revert to its
most unattractive traditions.
The Chinese government blacked out television broadcasts on CNN and
the BBC and the French station TV5 that reported Liu's Nobel Prize.
They censored sites on the Web that mentioned him or published Charter
08. Indeed, comically, they have censored references to free expression
in the recent speeches of Wen Jiabao. Much less comically, they have
harassed Liu Xia, Liu Xiaobo's wife, destroying her cell phone,
surrounding her house and placing her effectively under house arrest.
Her friends and family have not been able to be in touch with her since
October 20th.
The Chinese authorities have also stepped up pressure on members of
the ICPC as part of their campaign to limit information about the
awarding of the prize. Since the prize was announced on October 8,
dozens of ICPC's China-based members have been visited by police and
harassed and several of its leading members are living under virtual
house arrest. On November 2, Wu Wei (whose pen name is Ye Du), ICPC's
Network Committee coordinator and the organization's webmaster, was
summoned for questioning by the Guangzhou Public Security Bureau after
Internet writer Guo Xianliang was arrested for ``inciting subversion of
state power'' on October 28 for handing out leaflets about Liu's Nobel.
Police reportedly believe that Wu Wei is behind the leaflets, and he
stands accused of ``disturbing public order.'' He was questioned for
four hours and his home was raided. Police confiscated two computers
and information from PEN's annual international congress, which took
place last month in Tokyo, Japan, including a video clip that was shown
at the conference of Liu Xia reading a letter from Liu Xiaobo, as well
as a video about ICPC that included clips of Liu Xiaobo speaking about
freedom of expression in China in 2006.
On November 4, exiled poet Bei Ling, who is a co-founder of ICPC
and recently wrote movingly about his friend Liu Xiaobo in a Wall
Street Journal editorial, arrived at Beijing International Airport on a
flight from Frankfurt for a brief stopover on his way to Taipei, where
he was invited to participate in a discussion at Dongwu University and
stay as a writer in residence. He was met by 20 police officers as soon
as he disembarked and was taken to an empty room at the airport, where
he says he was questioned for two hours and told that someone high in
the government ordered that he not be permitted to travel on to Taiwan.
He was instead manhandled and put on a plane back to Frankfurt. His
baggage, which included two manuscripts about underground and exile
literature, was confiscated and not returned.
These are only a few of the outrages of recent weeks--many of which
appear calculated to keep the Chinese people in the dark about Liu
Xiaobo's award.
We believe that it is right that President Obama and Secretary of
State Clinton have raised Liu's case with their Chinese counterparts,
both before and after his most recent sentence, as we at PEN American
Center have asked them to do. We are grateful that Ambassador Jon
Huntsman in Beijing sent representation to Liu's trial last year, as we
urged him to do. We believe that China should live up the promises made
in its own Constitution; promises it made when it signed the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. And we believe
that it is America's obligation, as a party to the Covenant, to hold
China to that standard. But the most fundamental reason why we should
do this is that these demands are right.
We specifically recommend to the Commission and to the Obama
administration and Members of Congress, that in all communications with
the Chinese government, you:
1. Continue to press for the release of Liu Xiaobo at all
available opportunities;
2. Call for the release of all other writers imprisoned in
violation of their right to freedom of expression;
3. Urge the government of the People's Republic of China to
ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
The Chinese government argues that their treatment of Liu Xiaobo is
an internal matter, and that international awards and advocacy on his
behalf amount to meddling in China's internal affairs. But the
treatment he has endured is by definition an international matter, just
as all violations of human rights are matters of legitimate concern to
the whole world. By detaining Liu Xiaobo for more than a year, and then
by convicting and sentencing him to 11 years in prison in clear
violation of his most fundamental, internationally recognized rights,
the People's Republic of China itself has guaranteed that his case is
not and cannot be a purely internal affair.
We have no hostility toward China or the Chinese. Indeed, it is our
respect and concern for China and her people that leads us to urge
their government to allow them--all of them--the freedom to write and
to read and to organize that will allow them to be responsible citizens
of a democratic society, and will then allow China to be a responsible
and respected colleague in the community of democratic nations.
______
Prepared Statement of Elizabeth C. Economy*
November 9, 2010
INTRODUCTION
Within China, there is widespread agreement on the need for
political reform. There is no agreement, however, on precisely what a
``politically-reformed'' China should look like, much less a road-map
for how to get there.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional position
on policy issues and has no affiliation with the US government. All
statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained herein are the
sole responsibility of the author.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While discussions of political reform have been ongoing in one form
or another since the Chinese Communist Party assumed power in 1949, the
debate has assumed new life over the past few months. A series of
commentaries by Premier Wen Jiabao raising the issue more directly than
previously, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to political
dissident and activist Liu Xiaobo, and calls for bolder political
action by retired party elders and intellectuals have all placed the
reform issue front and center in Chinese political discourse. Such
discussion is given added weight by the fact that it is occurring
against a backdrop of a far more vibrant print and Web-based media and
an engaged civil society. China's rise and obligations as a global
power also mean that foreign policy experts are now entering into the
country's domestic policy debate. They realize that China's global
image and impact-on the environment, health, and security-rests in
large part on Chinese domestic politics and practices.
POLITICAL MODERNIZATION
In most official contexts--leaders' speeches and officially-
sanctioned editorials--political restructuring or reform means making
the system more efficient and representative, while at the same time
preserving the authority of the Communist Party. The communique of the
fifth plenum of the 17th Party Congress in mid-October 2010, which sets
the tone for the work of the party over the next five years, stated,
``Great impetus will be given to economic restructuring while vigorous
yet steady efforts should be made to promote political restructuring.''
A series of People's Daily editorials published in October articulated
the central party leadership's interest in a reasonably constrained
version of political reform. The editorials argued that in the process
of political restructuring, it is ``imperative to adhere to party
leadership, to the socialist system and to socialism with Chinese
characteristics,'' \1\ and that the aim of political reform is to
``enhance the vitality of the Party and the country and to mobilize
people's enthusiasm.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Vigorous, steady efforts urged to advance political
structural reform,'' People's Daily Online (October 27, 2010).
\2\ Qingyuan Zheng, ``Political orientation crucial,'' People's
Daily Online (October 29, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In practical terms, Beijing has launched several notable
initiatives to develop a system of official accountability and advance
transparency within the political system. There have been anti-
corruption campaigns; regulations to promote public access to
information in areas such as the environment and to govern ``the
convening of Party congresses, selection for and retirement from
official posts, and fixed-term limits''; \3\ and experiments in
budgetary reform. Beijing has also permitted a few non-Communist Party
members to hold key positions within the government, including Wan
Gang, the Minister of Science and Technology, and Chen Zhu, the
Minister of Health.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ C. Fred Bergsten et al. China's Rise: Challenges and
Opportunities. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International
Economics and Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008: p.
62. Web. Accessed 1 November 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With social unrest on the rise, the Party is also searching for
ways to be more responsive to the interests of the Chinese people,
without transforming the system. One effort is a online bulletin board,
``Direct Line to Zhongnanhai,'' where the Chinese people can leave
messages for the top leaders, and both President Hu Jintao and Premier
Wen Jiabao have participated in active Web-based dialogues with the
Chinese people. Local officials may appear on radio shows and some
delegates to the National People's Congress (NPC) and District
Congresses have also established times to meet with their constituents
to listen to their concerns, although there has been discussion within
the NPC that these meetings are problematic because officials may
develop individual constituencies and popular followings.
REVOLUTIONARY REFORM
While a significant segment of China's political elite works to
``modernize'' the political system, others seek to revolutionize it.
Political activist and Nobel Peace prize winner Liu Xiaobo represents
the boldest of those who call for such revolutionary reform with his
online human rights manifesto, Charter 08, and his calls for universal
values, direct elections, and multi-party democracy.
Fundamental political reform is viewed as a necessity by many
Chinese intellectuals and media elite. After Liu's award, a group of
100 journalists, scholars, writers and ordinary citizens signed a
public letter calling on the Party to realize the goals of democracy
and constitutional government espoused by Liu. Just prior to Liu's
award, a group of retired Party elders submitted a letter to the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress calling for
freedom of speech and press, and the abolition of censorship. This
group included many former senior media officials, such as the former
director of People's Daily, editor-in-chief of China Daily, deputy
director of Xinhua News Agency, and even the former head of the News
Office of the Central Propaganda Department.
Such reformers clearly view Premier Wen Jiabao as their patron
within the Chinese leadership. Premier Wen, in a set of speeches over
the past year, as well as a much heralded interview with CNN, has
argued that freedom of speech is ``indispensable for any country,'' and
that ``continuous progress and the people's wishes for and needs for
democracy and freedom are inevitable.'' He further has noted that the
Party has to evolve--one that served as a revolutionary party should
not look the same as a governing party. Wen's concluding remarks in the
CNN interview further suggest that he was pushing for change outside
generally-accepted party principles: ``I will not fall in spite of a
strong wind and harsh rain, and I will not yield till the last day of
my life.''
These highly public calls for revolutionary reform are not taking
place in isolation. There is also a vibrant discourse in the print and
online media that supports such high profile efforts. Journalists,
scholars and Web activists all maintain a constant stream of advocacy
for more fundamental political reform. They lodge their calls for such
reform as essential to the achievement of key Communist Party
priorities.
One popular argument for revolutionary political reform, for
example, is that it is necessary for continued economic growth. An
editorial ``The Only Answer is Political Reform,'' published by the
board of the Economic Observer in late October 2010, makes precisely
this point: ``Without reforming the political system, we cannot
guarantee the benefits that economic reform brings, nor will we be able
to continue to push ahead with reforms to the economic system and
social reform will also fail. . .In fact, whether it's breaking the
deadlock on economic reform or making a breakthrough on social reform,
both rely on pushing ahead with political reform.''
Political reform advocates also often suggest that stability--one
of the Party's top priorities--can only be ensured by more fundamental
reform. Hu Shuli, the outspoken editor of Caixin and Century Weekly,
for example, argues that political reform has stagnated because of
``fears that a misstep would lead to social unrest.'' She goes on to
note, however, that ``Overblown worries that delay what's needed only
exacerbate the very tensions threatening to destabilize society.''
Similarly, Liang Wendao, a host on Phoenix Satellite TV, wrote an
editorial detailing a number of social challenges, such as
``carcinogenic tea oil being sold in supermarkets, rumors of deadly
tick bites and the resistance to forced demolitions'' and argued that
all of these are counterproductive to the official goal of
``maintaining stability.'' His conclusion is that ``If these subjects
are open for discussion and criticism, the darkest truth from these
three events may finally arise: the stability that the authorities were
trying to maintain is precisely a kind of instability.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Wendao Liang, ``The Etymology of Social Stability,'' Caixin
online (October 18, 2010). Accessed at http://english.caing.com/201O-
10-18/1001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The role of political reform in improving China's foreign policy
and image is also becoming a popular theme. Wang Jisi, head of Peking
University's International Relations Department, for example, has
stated that the only way to overcome the unfortunate oscillation within
Chinese political thinking and commentary between claiming superiority
and inferiority or victimization is by more exposure to the outside
world, better education within China and improving ``our own society
and rule of law.'' An editorial in Century Weekly, entitled ``At Last,
A Magic Moment for Political Reform,'' echoes this theme, noting that
social problems, such as forced evictions, have strained relations
between the government and people, causing people to lose faith in
their country and damaging China's image abroad.
A VIRTUAL POLITICAL SYSTEM
The growing role of the Internet in Chinese political life poses a
significant challenge to the Party's efforts to constrain political
reform. While the Internet is a valuable tool for the Party, both in
learning what the Chinese people are thinking and in promoting
transparency within the political system, it raises serious concerns as
well. Central Party School official Gao Xinmin raised several issues in
an off-the-record speech that was later made public on the Web:
``Against a backdrop of a diversity of social values, new media have
already become collection and distribution centers for thought, culture
and information, and tools for the amplification of public opinion in
society. They are a direct challenge to the Party's thought leadership
and to traditional methods of channeling public opinion. Traditional
thought and education originates at the upper levels, with the
representatives of organizations, but in the Internet age, anyone can
voice their views and influence others. Many factual instances of mass
incidents are pushed by waves of public opinion online, and in many
cases careless remarks from leaders precipitate a backlash of public
opinion.''
The Internet is, in fact, evolving into a virtual political system
in China: \5\ the Chinese people inform themselves, organize, and
protest online. As the blogger Qiu Xuebin writes, ``When the interests
of the people go unanswered long term, the people light up in fury like
sparks on brushwood. The internet is an exhaust pipe, already spewing
much public indignation. But if the people's realistic means of making
claims are hindered, in the end we slip out of the make-believe world
that is the internet and hit the streets.'' In July 2010, bloggers
provided firsthand accounts of a large-scale pollution disaster in
Jilin Province, contradicting official reports. Thousands of people
ignored government officials, angrily accusing them of a cover-up, and
rushed to buy bottled water. Chinese are also ``voting'' online. In one
instance, a journalist sought by the police on trumped-up charges of
slander took his case to the Internet. Of the 33,000 people polled, 86
percent said they believed he was innocent. The Economic Observer then
launched a broadside against the police, condemning their attempt to
threaten a ``media professional.'' The authorities subsequently dropped
the charges against the journalist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The following discussion is taken from Elizabeth C. Economy,
``The Game Changer: Coping With China's Foreign Policy Revolution,''
Foreign Affairs (November/December 2010), p. 145.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Activists have also used the Internet to launch successful
canpaigns--some involving physical protests--to prevent the
construction of dams and pollution factories and to oppose the removal
of Cantonese on television programs airing in Guangdong. Most striking
perhaps, has been the emergence of iconic cultural figures who use the
Internet for political purposes. The renowned artist Ai Weiwei, for
example, has pursued justice for families whose children died in the
Sichuan earthquake, even documenting his encounters with recalcitrant
officials on YouTube. The racecar driver and novelist-turned-blogger,
Han Han, routinely calls for greater media and cultural freedom. Since
its launch in 2006, his blog has received more than 410 million hits.
The social network site Twitter, despite being blocked in China,
has become a particularly politicized Internet venue. According to the
popular netizen Michael Anti, Twitter is the most important political
organizing force in China today. He notes that more than 1.4 million
yuan was raised for the beleaguered NGO Gongmeng (Open Constitution
Initiative) via Twitter. And he points to the uncensored discussion
held between the Dalai Lama and Chinese citizens in May 2010 as an
example of the political influence that Twitter can exert. According to
Anti, the people who participated stopped referring to the Dalai Lama
as Dalai and now call him by the more respectful Dalai Lama. Anti
reports that there are over 100,000 active Chinese Twitter users, and
he anticipates that there will be 500,000 or more within the next two
to three years.
Anti's claim of the importance of Twitter as a political force is
supported by others. A poll of 1,000 Chinese Twitter users found that
of the top twenty reasons why people access the site, almost a third of
them are political: ``to know the truth and open the horizon''; ``no
censor here''; ``this is the taste of freedom that I enjoy''; ``it
allows me to keep my independent citizen conscious''; ``feel that as a
party member I should learn more about this world''; ``it is an
inevitable choice for a journalism student''. Moreover, according to
the media critic Hu Yong, as Beijing has moved to strengthen its
censorship efforts, Twitter has become more political in its
orientation. He sees Twitter as particularly important because it
brings together opinion leaders from around the world to sit at a
virtual table. There, public intellectuals, rights advocates, veterans
of civil rights movements and exiled dissidents can all converse
simultaneously.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Yong Hu, ``The Revolt of China's Twittering Classes,'' Project
Syndicate (October 14, 2010). Accessed at http://
www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/hu2/English.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LOOKING AROUND THE BEND
Implicit, and often explicit, in the debate over the nature of
China's future political reform is the role of the outside world. A
recurrent theme is a willingness to learn from the West but a rejection
of a Western model. Qin Xiao, the former Chairman of China Merchant
Bank Group, speaks the need for such a balance: ``An historic theme in
modern China is the search for a unique model and way to modernize. A
major part of this theme revolves around a `dispute between the west
and China and a debate of the ancient and modern.' . . . It misreads
and misinterprets universal values and modern society. It is a kind of
narrow-minded nationalism that rejects universal civilization . . .
Adhering to universal values, while creating Chinese style approaches,
is truly the objective for our time.'' \7\ And the Global Times notes,
``China has to continue its political reforms in the future, including
drawing beneficial experiences from Western democratic politics,
however, China will never be a sub-civilization, and it will only
follow its roadmap in a gradual manner.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Xiao Qin, ``In China, A Rising Tide for Universal Values,''
Caixin online transcript (October 25, 2010) from a speech presented by
Qin at the Seminar on Enlightenment and China's Social Transition on
July 4,2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This cautious blending of political modernization and revolutionary
reform will most likely find a home in China's system of experiments.
Much in the way that China began its economic reform process with
special economic zones, it may well be initiating similar special zones
for political reform.
In Shenzhen, where Premier Wen delivered one of his recent speeches
on political reform, there is a novel political experiment underway.
Supported by both Wen and Guangdong Party Secretary Wang Yang,
Shenzhen's political reform is at the outer edge of the political
modernization approach. The stated goal is strictly in line with the
Party's constrained vision of political reform: to build a socialist
democracy and a rule-of-law system, to develop a clean, efficient and
service-oriented government, and to construct a complete market system,
a socialist advanced culture, and a harmonious society.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Zhiyue Bo, ``Guangdong Under Wang Yang: `Mind Liberation' and
Development,'' East-Asia Institute Background Brief No. 405 (September
12, 2008), pp. 10-11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, the approach has some potentially revolutionary
reform elements: gradually expanding direct elections, introducing more
candidates than there are positions for heads of districts, and
considering allowing candidates to compete for positions of standing
members of district or municipal Party committees by organizing
campaigns within certain boundaries.\9\ Already, Shenzhen has ``cut
one-third of its departments, transferred or retired hundreds of
officials, and forced officials to give up parallel positions on
outside associations and charities.'' Shenzhen's greatest innovation,
however, has been to allow civic organizations to register without a
government agency oversight, to seek private funding outside China, to
hire foreigners, and to sell their services to the city in areas such
as the mental health of migrant laborers.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Zhiyue Bo, ``Guangdong Under Wang Yang: `Mind Liberation' and
Development,'' p. 10-11.
\10\ Jeremy Page, ``China Tests New Political Model in Shenzhen,''
Wall Street Journal (October 18, 2010). Accessed at http://
online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702304250404575558103303251616.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Shenzhen experiment and the others that will follow may provide
at least part of the much needed roadmap for China's political future.
Even as the Party attempts to keep up with the demand for change
generated by the Chinese people, as the Global Times points out, the
life of ``an ordinary Chinese'' has been transformed over the past
thirty years: the way of accessing information, freedom of speech, the
right to decide his own life and protect individual property are
``drastically different from 30 years ago.'' \11\ Whether led by the
party, the people, or both, it is clear that political change of an
equal magnitude is well underway.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ ``China has to pursue gradual political reform,'' Global Times
(October 15, 2010). Accessed at http://opinion.globaltimes.cn/
editorial/2010-10/582245.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The role of the international community in encouraging and
bolstering those who seek to transform China is limited but not
inconsequential. As those within China push for their country to
respect and adhere to the ideas of universal values, there are several
avenues through which the outside world can engage with China's process
of political change:
International recognition for those who work within
China to promote these values, such as the decision to award
the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, sends an important signal
that the outside world supports their efforts and sends a
message to Beijing that the country is not living up to the
best of its own ideals.
The international community should establish the
linkage between China's governance failures domestically on
issues such as environmental protection, public health, and
product safety and its impact abroad reinforces to the Chinese
leadership why China's political practices at home matter to
the rest of the world.
The United States should continue its traditional
efforts to raise the cases of individual Chinese human rights
activists who have been imprisoned and to work with Chinese
partners to advance political reform through the legal system
or through efforts to promote transparency. At the same time,
it is important to remove the human rights issue from a
uniquely bilateral focus and work with other democratic
countries in and outside Asia to raise issues of political
reform with Chinese officials.
To the extent that the United States and others can
advance the cause of political reform in other non-democratic
states in Asia, such as Vietnam, this may also serve as an
important source of pressure on Chinese elites.
______
Prepared Statement of Bruce Gilley
November 9, 2010
Liu Xiaobo and Dutch's Optimism
Honored Commission Members,
I am grateful to have the opportunity to address the committee this
morning on the important and inspiring award of the 2010 Nobel Peace
Prize to China's Liu Xiaobo. The perspective I would like to offer is
simple and can be stated as follows: Liu Xiaobo's award is important
because it is a reminder to us in the free world, the West, and the
United States that even though we are entering a period of intense
rivalry and possibly conflict with a rising China, the smiling forces
of modernization and liberalization are at work in that country. This
means that in the coming decades, even as we manage and challenge
potentially disruptive behavior by China's rulers, its people continue
to march toward a democratic society.
I do not believe that the Nobel prize will have any measurable
effect on political reform in China, any more than the award of the
same prize to His Holiness the Dalai Lama in 1989 had any effect on
Chinese rule in Tibet. But I do believe it will serve as an important
beacon to policy-makers outside of China, reminding them to engage and
target, and to retain faith in, Liu Xiaobo's China. The temptation to
believe that we are engaged in a life-or-death struggle with a hostile
new Oriental juggernaut will be strong in the coming decades. We should
instead use Liu Xiaobo's award to think more carefully about what is
going on in China, which I will address briefly here, and to retain a
certain Reaganesque optimism about the potential for human freedom
everywhere. We should respond to a rising China the same way that Liu
Xiaobo responded to his state security captors before he was sent to
jail: we have no enemies, only acquaintances who are still trapped in
yesterday's modes of thought and action, acquaintances whom we hope and
believe fervently will someday become our friends.
Honored Commission members, the year is 1975. Russia's GDP per
capita in that year is about the same as China's today. Andrei Sakharov
has just been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and in a few years will be
put under house arrest in Gorky. Global geo-political rivalries are
intensifying. The international politics of the Soviet Union is
entering its most difficult period--we have the invasion of
Afghanistan, proxy wars in Africa and Latin America, arms races,
martial law in Poland, KAL 007, and Chernobyl yet to come. Earlier
claims that the Soviet Union is modernizing and liberalizing because of
the post-totalitarian reforms ushered in by Khrushchev are now scoffed
at. Smart people, like Harvard professor Samuel Huntington, are saying
that the chances for democratic change in the Soviet Union are
``virtually nil.''
Looking back, we see that we missed something fundamental. By
focusing on SALT talks, or by dismissing Sakharov as a vain hope of the
West, we did not see how this great authoritarian creation was entering
its last decades. The message of Sakharov's prize, in retrospect, was
that we should have been better Marxists, trusting that the ineluctable
forces of modernization would bring political change, although not the
sort Marx imagined. Instead, we were Hobbesians, believing we needed to
prepare home defense in the face of a Spanish Armada, an increasingly
cold and competitive world of enemies and invaders. Had we been more
ready to respond to the good luck of history, some, but not all of the
democratic regress that subsequently occurred in Russia, might have
been avoided.
China is in the same position today. Externally, whether in its
assertive claims in the South China and East China Seas, its attempts
to use coercive economic diplomacy, or its domestic silencing of
dissent, we see another juggernaut. Yet this is not a juggernaut. This
is a juggler. Behind the assertiveness and rhetoric is a country
struggling mightily with the implications of development--social,
environmental, financial, economic, cultural, and, political. It is
easy to get carried away in the Orientalist imagery of Moors or Mongols
challenging the West. But China represents no fundamental challenge to
the West. It's contributions to key global issues like terrorism, the
environmental, financial restructuring, global health, disaster relief,
peacebuilding, and weapons proliferation are marginal. The West retains
its indispensability and will continue to do so as long as it continues
to represent the basic humanistic impulse better than any other part of
the world. Internally, while the CCP continues to suppress dissent and
control information, it does so against the backdrop of an increasingly
outspoken and informed citizenry.
The CCP leadership, which is entering a delicate transition in
2012, is deeply divided on the question of political reform. There are
two visions of political reform competing within the leadership today.
One, associated with premier Wen Jiabao and earlier with his mentor
Zhao Ziyang, purged in 1989, is what we might call the grassroots
democracy vision. This vision imagines a China with an increasingly
vigorous electoral and civil society-based democracy at the local level
up to and including provinces. This vision is all about bottom-up
accountability. It is often consciously modeled on the Taiwan
experience, and includes a leading role for the CCP at the national
level for some transitional period. Wen has championed the expansion of
direct elections to the township level. It is the approach likely to be
favored by incoming party general secretary Xi Jinping, who experienced
and supported the lively civil society and local politics in Zhejiang
and Fujian provinces during his periods there.
The second vision is what we might call the party democracy view,
which is promoted by party general secretary Hu Jintao. It is about
top-down accountability. Ironically, this is the approach that was
adopted by Gorbachev. The focus here is on fighting corruption within
the party, increasing internal debates and even elections within the
party, and using party mandates to strengthen the accountability of
local governments. In the new leadership of 2012, this vision will be
represented by premier Li Keqiang.
What is important about this debate is that it reminds us of the
party's race against time to maintain its legitimacy. We often assume
that the regime's legitimacy comes from economic growth and nationalism
alone. It does not. It also comes from the steady expansion of social
and economic freedoms as well as real improvements in governance that
have been seen in the last 20 years. The amount of energy and
creativity being poured into both the grassroots democracy and the
party democracy visions of political reform tell us that China's
leaders--if not China's foreign admirers--think that political reform
matters to their future. And to be sure, this same authoritarian
adaptability has succeeded in delivering improvements in rights and
governance that have satisfied most Chinese for the past 20 years.
The mistake is to think that the party can satiate the thirst for
freedom forever with, for instance, fewer limits on internal migration
or more efficient passport processing bureaucracies. There is still
probably several more years in which such performance will work to
maintain legitimacy. But experience elsewhere tells us that social
demands for democracy will eventually delegitimize the current regime--
and then it is a question of how long the regime decides to cling to
power or how quickly it undertakes preemptive moves toward real
democracy.
This is where Liu Xiaobo comes in. Liu represents a third vision of
political reform, one of liberal democracy. Emerging from the 1989
Tiananmen movement, and tracing its origins back to the late 19th
century and early republican thinkers of China, this vision seeks a
deliberate transition to a liberal democratic political system, in
today's situation through a gradual implementation of existing PRC
constitutional provisions, minus the CCP's messianic leading role. Liu
is a reminder of this stirring outcome that plausibly awaits China at
the end of this long race--namely a thoughtful, tolerant, inventive,
and liberal social and political system, infused with the richness and
wisdom of Chinese civilization. That outcome seems impossible to
imagine at present just as it was of the Soviet Union of 1975. Yet it
is more likely to occur and (unlike Russia) to endure because, unlike
the Soviet Union, China has already completed its transition to a
market economy and it will not face a humiliating loss of its world
power. Political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel
conclude in their 2005 book on ``The Human Development Sequence,''
using extensive cross-national data on value transformation and
democratization, that ``China will make a transition to a liberal
democracy within the next two decades.'' As Moshe Lewin presciently saw
in his 1988 book ``The Gorbachev Phenomenon'' about Russian society and
the CPSU, Chinese society will slowly outgrow the CCP.
Liu Xiaobo helps us to focus on this China, and not to imagine that
the insecure and increasingly aggressive external China is the one of
the future. He is a reminder that the reason we should not confront or
contain China is not some relativistic argument that the Chinese are
different or prefer tyranny to democracy, nor that we need to reach
some realistic accommodation with this titan of the East. Instead, we
need to respond thoughtfully to the China of the current regime because
we have faith that its days are numbered.
Reagan, who came into office as a Cold Warrior extraordinaire,
instinctively realized this about the Soviet Union and changed tack in
his second term. Liu Xiaobo reminds us of the need to retain Dutch's
infectious optimism about the fate of communist regimes, especially
rapidly modernizing ones. He reminds us of the need to have confidence
in the universal values of elections, the rule of law, pluralism, and
human rights that are today so widely discussed in China. Who truly
could imagine, just a few years ago, that the outgoing chairman of key
state enterprise would choose to use his valedictory address to urge
China's young people to reject the so-called ``China Model'' of
authoritarian development and instead embrace ``universal values'' with
democracy at their core, as retiring China Merchants Group chairman Qin
Xiao did at Tsinghua University's School of Economics and Management
this past summer? For China's communist regime, the Cold War never
ended and it never will. Our role is to avoid that same mistake, to
realize that the Cold War is in fact over and that China's regime is
being swept along by the forces of modernization like dozens before it.
Recently, a Zhejiang University professor named Liu Guozhu, who is
a senior fellow of that institution's Center for Civil Society and of
the China Foundation for Human Rights, wrote an essay on the National
Endowment for Democracy. The essay attacked the NED as a relic of the
Cold War. It was quickly reprinted in party and Maoist Web sites and
periodicals in China. After making some inquiries, I learned that Dr.
Liu had originally written quite a different article, one with a
largely positive view of the NED and its role in promoting democracy in
Latin America, Africa, and East Asia. It was based on research that he
conducted while visiting at San Diego State University in 2007 and
2008. But no official publication would run the original article. Only
after party editors rewrote the article in a critical tone was it
published. This is a microcosm of contemporary China--the exterior face
can seem oppositional, bellicose, and deeply illiberal. It is easy to
see much evidence of hostile intent and behavior. But the interior mind
is swirling, changing, seeking acceptance, and humanistic.
Liu Xiaobo matters because he appeals to our better instincts in
dealing with China. To celebrate positive change, to defend individuals
and rights supporters, and to have confidence in the universality of
freedom and democracy and their triumph everywhere is his challenge to
us. ``I have no enemies,'' his words, should be ours too.
______
Prepared Statement of Phelim Kine
November 9, 2010
The Nobel Committee's October 8, 2010, decision to award the Nobel
Peace Prize to imprisoned Chinese writer and human rights activist Liu
Xiaobo has put China's human rights deficit squarely back on the
international agenda. It does so at a time when rights and freedoms
guaranteed by both China's constitution and international law are under
renewed attack by the Chinese government.
Liu Xiaobo is an outspoken critic of the Chinese government, a 54-
year-old former university professor imprisoned in 2009 on
``subversion'' charges for his involvement with Charter '08, a
political manifesto calling for gradual political reforms in China. Liu
was also jailed in 1989 for his role in the Tiananmen Square protests
and again in 1996 for criticizing China's policy toward Taiwan and the
Dalai Lama. Human Rights Watch honored Liu Xiaobo with the 2010 Alison
Des Forges Award for Extraordinary Activism for his fearless commitment
to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly in China.
WHAT DOES THE AVERAGE CHINESE PERSON KNOW ABOUT LIU XIAOBO? WHAT DO
THOSE WHO KNOW WHO LIU XIAOBO IS THINK ABOUT HIM?
To a large extent, the debate about Liu Xiaobo and his winning the
Nobel Prize has occurred outside China due to strict censorship of
state media and the Internet.
Inside China, Liu Xiaobo has been relatively unknown outside of
literary and intellectual circles, dissidents, human rights defenders,
and civil society activists. That's because even prior to his arrest in
December 2008, his works as a writer were officially marginalized or
censored because of their implicit or explicit political critiques.
Those in China who might want to learn about him are only able to
access a government-approved portrait. After his arrest in December
2008, Internet searches on Liu's name in China behind the government's
so-called ``great firewall'' resulted overwhelmingly in state media
reports on his sentencing. As recently as March 2010, Internet searches
on references to Liu Xiaobo behind the firewall produced nothing more
than a frozen Web browser. The vast majority of Chinese citizens
cannot--without considerable difficulty--know of his struggle for
universal human rights, rule of law, and respect for the freedoms
embodied in China's constitution. The government's 21-year cover-up of
the June 1989 massacre of unarmed protesters in Beijing and other
cities means that most Chinese know little about the event at all, let
alone that it was Liu Xiaobo who brokered the agreement with military
authorities that allowed the peaceful exit of thousands of students
from Tiananmen Square on the night of June 3, 1989. That intervention
saved countless lives.
For those Chinese citizens who do know Liu and who have worked with
him, he is renowned as a tireless advocate of universal rights and
freedoms and of peaceful political reform. More importantly, they see
him as a high-profile symbol of the silent struggle of millions of
others in China for the same goals. He has come to represent countless
Chinese citizens languishing in secretive ``black jails,'' under house
arrest, in re-education through labor camps, or serving prison
sentences for advocating those same rights and freedoms.
what does the average chinese person know about his winning the nobel?
WHAT DOES HE OR SHE THINK ABOUT IT?
For the majority of Chinese citizens, whose news come via censored
media, news of Liu's Nobel Prize was not immediate, as would occur in
most countries, but came the following day.
That's because the immediate official Chinese government reaction
to Liu's Nobel Prize was silence. Neither Chinese China Central
Television nor Hong Kong's nominally independent Phoenix TV mentioned
Liu's Nobel Prize on the day of the announcement. Chinese censors
quickly scrubbed, or ``harmonized'' Chinese-language Internet
commentary, text messages, Web pages, and foreign television broadcasts
which broadcast news of Liu's Nobel Prize.
The only official comment available to Chinese citizens came later
that day in the form of Ministry of Foreign Affairs' October 9, 2010,
statement that described Liu as a ``criminal'' and criticized Liu's
Nobel Prize victory as an act that ``profanes the Nobel Peace Prize.''
Chinese journalists were told to report only on the basis of the
official statement.
However, since October 9, the Chinese government has expanded its
coverage of Liu winning the Nobel Prize. That coverage has been
uniformly unflattering, including an October 14 Xinhua report
describing the Nobel Prize as a ``political tool of the West.'' Three
days later, Xinhua published a round-up of foreign commentary from
countries including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Russia, and even Norway
that criticized Liu's Nobel as politically motivated and inappropriate.
On October 24, Xinhua described the members of the Nobel Committee as
politicized and ``ignorant of world affairs.''
The most detailed official media coverage of Liu's Nobel Prize is
an October 28, 2010, Xinhua report titled ``Who is Liu Xiaobo? '' The
article intensified the official smear campaign against Liu by listing
a selective survey of quotes allegedly taken from Liu's three decades
of written work designed to cast doubt on his credibility, patriotism,
and even his sobriety. According to the article, Liu is a ``traitorous
operative'' for foreign organizations such as the National Endowment
for Democracy. The piece featured quotes allegedly sourced from Liu's
works that appeared to make him sympathetic to China's colonization by
foreign powers and critical of the physical and psychological strength
of the Chinese people. Among some Chinese citizens, this intensifying
official smear campaign is triggering a combination of cynical
dismissal and angry nationalism about the award.
At the same time, the award is also piquing curiosity in China
about who Liu really is and why the government is so critical of him
and his work. We know that Chinese activists have gone out onto the
streets of Beijing and boarded buses to fake informal surveys of
people's knowledge of Liu and his Nobel Prize. The majority of those
quizzed in this very unscientific poll have never heard of Liu Xiaobo,
but they express reflexive pride that a Chinese has won a Nobel Peace
Prize and for endorsing rights and freedoms which they themselves
support. Those individuals who have heard of Liu Xiaobo and have
negative opinions of him through official state media coverage relate
that they are still supportive of Liu's right to speak out despite
their apparently divergent views.
Paradoxically, the Chinese government's intensifying smear campaign
of Liu Xiaobo is boosting Chinese citizens' awareness of who he is and
an interest in what he had done to be the target of such official
vitriol. This curiosity will inevitably prompt those citizens with
Internet access and the interest and capability to use firewall
circumvention tools to search for information about Liu Xiaobo that
doesn't come from the Chinese government. Human Rights Watch's Chinese-
language website has registered a record number of browsers accessing
our site (blocked in China) through proxy servers since the October 8
Nobel announcement. On that day alone, our Chinese-language website
recorded more than 1,600 visits by Internet-users in China, compared to
a usual daily average of about 60 visits.
WHAT DEBATE, IF ANY, HAS LIU XIAOBO'S WINNING THE NOBEL SPARKED IN
CHINA AMONG BOTH ORDINARY PEOPLE (LAOBAIXING) AND ELITES?
Among elites interested in peaceful political change, Liu Xiaobo's
Nobel Prize has provided a platform for expressing support for him and
the ideals embodied in Charter '08. Just days after the prize was
announced, a group of 23 senior Communist Party officials and
intellectuals issued a public letter that praised Liu as a ``splendid
choice'' for a Nobel Peace Prize, and echoed calls for his immediate
release and an end to the ``invisible black hand'' of official
censorship.
Within the Chinese leadership, Liu's Nobel Prize appears to have
been profoundly unsettling. Confident that its warning to the Norwegian
government prior to the Nobel Prize announcement had averted any chance
of Liu's victory, senior leaders appear to have been taken aback by the
Nobel Committee's decision.
On October 3, 2010, in a CNN interview, Premier Wen Jiabao
advocated easing government restrictions on basic rights and freedoms,
and stated that ``freedom of speech is indispensable.'' Wen's views, at
odds with the policies of a government that since 2007 has steadily
tightened its chokehold on dissidents, civil society activists, and
journalists, suggested ongoing divisions in the leadership about those
restrictions. Official censors responded by purging all video and
transcripts of the CNN interview from Chinese Internet sites.
Liu's Nobel Prize is a globally-known example of the gap between
the Chinese government's lofty rhetoric on support for rule of law and
human rights and the grimmer reality on the ground--an image the
Chinese government has strenuously worked to cover up for over a
decade, particularly in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. As
Liu's writings and the text of Charter '08 circulate virally across
China's blogosphere among those interested in the country's most famous
political prisoner, familiarity and support with universal rights and
freedoms and the Chinese government's unwillingness to deliver on those
becomes more widespread.
The Chinese leadership will no doubt be debating whether it was a
mistake to imprison Liu in the first place. Hardliners decided to make
an example of Liu Xiaobo by sentencing him in 2008 to the longest
possible prison term for ``inciting subversion'' since it became a
crime in 1996; moderates, who had argued that Liu could continue to be
tolerated though kept under surveillance, probably resisted imprisoning
him for fear he would become a cause celebre. Those fears have now come
to pass, but it remains unclear whether officials such as Xi Jinping
and Li Kejiang, due to take over the leadership of China in 2012, will
think seriously about freeing Liu before his imprisonment does even
more damage to the Chinese government's reputation.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sander Levin, a U.S. Representative From
Michigan; Cochairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China
November 9, 2010
We hold this hearing today not only to shine a light on the Chinese
government's mistreatment of Nobel Laureate, Liu Xiaobo, but to
underline that China once again is at an important crossroads, and
seems to be turning in the wrong direction. This has implications not
only for the development of institutions of democratic governance in
China, which it is the charge of this Commission by law to monitor, but
also for the United States in managing our relations with China.
The imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo is a personal tragedy, a national
shame, and an international challenge. The answer is clear: Mr. Liu
should be released immediately. For his more than two decades of
advocating for freedom of speech, assembly, religion, peaceful
democratic reform, transparency and accountability in China, Mr. Liu is
currently serving an eleven-year sentence in a Chinese prison for
``inciting subversion of state power.'' Those in China, like Mr. Liu,
who have penned thoughtful essays or signed Charter 08 seek to advance
debate, as the Charter states, on ``national governance, citizens'
rights, and social development'' consistent with their ``duty as
responsible and constructive citizens.'' Their commitment and
contribution to their country must be recognized, as the Nobel
Committee has done, and as we do today and their rights must be
protected.
The Chinese government has said that awarding the Nobel Prize to
Liu Xiaobo ``shows a lack of respect for China's judicial system.'' I
would like to take a moment to examine this claim. For it seems to me
that what truly showed a lack of respect for China's judicial system
were the numerous and well-documented violations of Chinese legal
protections for criminal defendants that marred Mr. Liu's trial from
the outset. I refer here to matters such as the failure of Chinese
prosecutors to consult defense lawyers, and the speed with which
prosecutors acted in indicting Mr. Liu and bringing him to trial,
effectively denying his lawyers sufficient time to review the state's
evidence and to prepare for his defense. Chinese officials prevented
Mr. Liu's wife from attending his trial, in which she had hoped to
testify on behalf of her husband. Mr. Liu's lawyers reportedly were
ordered by state justice officials not to grant interviews. It is these
abuses, committed by Chinese officials in China, not the actions of a
committee in Oslo, that demonstrated ``a lack of respect for China's
judicial system.''
All nations have the responsibility to ensure fairness and
transparency in judicial proceedings. The effective implementation of
basic human rights and the ability of all people in China to live under
the rule of law depend on careful attention to, and transparent
compliance with, procedural norms and safeguards that meet
international standards. It is in this connection that I would like to
take a moment also to say a word about this Commission's Political
Prisoner Database. The database, which is available to the public
online via the Commission's Web site, contains information on thousands
of political prisoners in China. These are individuals who have been
imprisoned by the Chinese government for exercising their civil and
political rights under China's Constitution and laws or under China's
international human rights obligations. The enhancement of the Database
that the Commission announced this past summer roughly doubled the
types of information available to the public, enabling individuals,
organizations, and governments to better report on political
imprisonment in China and to more effectively advocate on behalf of
Chinese political prisoners. And people around the world have been
doing just that. The number of ``hits'' to the database from individual
users, NGOs, academic institutions and governments around the world has
skyrocketed. The Database makes clear that political imprisonment in
China is well-documented, it is a practice whereby the Chinese
government has shown disrespect for human rights and the rule of law in
case after case, and it must end.
Unfortunately, that does not appear likely. Since the Nobel
Committee's announcement, Mr. Liu's wife, Liu Xia, has been harassed
relentlessly, and remains under what appears to be house arrest. In the
weeks following the Nobel Committee's announcement, several people who
signed Charter 08 also have been harassed and detained. Chinese
authorities have attempted to limit the dissemination of information
about Liu's receiving the Nobel Prize, harassing members of the
Independent Chinese PEN Center, a group that advocates for the rights
of writers, whose American counterpart organization we are pleased to
have represented on our panel here today. Diplomats report that the
Chinese Embassy in Oslo has sent official letters to foreign embassies
in the Norwegian capital asking them not to make statements in support
of Liu, and not to attend the Nobel awards ceremony on December 10.
This is not the behavior of a strong, responsible government.
As Liu Xia said the morning her husband was selected to receive the
Nobel Prize, ``China's new status in the world comes with increased
responsibility. China should embrace this responsibility, and have
pride in his selection and release him from prison.'' As Nobel laureate
Vaclav Havel correctly noted, ``intimidation, propaganda, and
repression are no substitute for reasoned dialogue. . . .'' And as
Nobel laureate Desmond Tutu recently wrote together with Vaclav Havel,
We know that many wrongs have been perpetrated against China
and its people throughout history. But awarding the Nobel Peace
Prize to Liu is not one of them. Nor is the peaceful call for
reform from the more than 10,000 Chinese citizens who dared to
sign Charter 08. . . . China has a chance to show that it is a
forward-looking nation, and can show the world that it has the
confidence to face criticism and embrace change. . . . This is
a moment for China to open up once again, to give its people
the ability to compete in the marketplace of ideas. . . .
In a recent interview with CNN, Premier Wen Jiabao stated that,
Freedom of speech is indispensable. . . . The people's wishes
for, and needs for, democracy and freedom are irresistible.
We ask our witnesses today to help us assess the likelihood that
these words will become the new basis for government action in China,
and to describe for us their understanding of the prospects for
political reform in China today.
Submission for the Record
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