[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
GOOGLE AND INTERNET CONTROL IN CHINA:
A NEXUS BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRADE?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate House
BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Chairman SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Cochairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio DAVID WU, Oregon
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
BOB CORKER, Tennessee EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
GEORGE LeMIEUX, Florida JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Department of State, To Be Appointed
Department of Labor, To Be Appointed
Department of Commerce, To Be Appointed
At-Large, To Be Appointed
At-Large, To Be Appointed
Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Staff Director
Douglas Grob, Cochairman's Senior Staff Member
(ii)
CO N T E N T S
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Page
Opening statement of Hon. Byron L. Dorgan, a U.S. Senator from
North Dakota; Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China.......................................................... 1
Smith, Hon. Christopher H., a U.S. Representative from New
Jersey; Ranking Member, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China.......................................................... 3
Wu, Hon. David, a U.S. Representative from Oregon; Member,
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.................... 5
LeMieux, Hon. George, a U.S. Senator from Florida; Member,
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.................... 6
Davidson, Alan, Director of U.S. Public Policy, Americas, Google,
Inc............................................................ 7
Jones, Christine, Executive Vice President, General Counsel, and
Corporate Secretary, The Go Daddy Group........................ 9
Hom, Sharon, Executive Director, Human Rights in China........... 11
Black, Edward, President and CEO, Computer & Communications
Industry Association........................................... 15
Palmer, Hon. Mark, former U.S. Ambassador to Hungary............. 17
Appendix
Davidson, Alan................................................... 34
Jones, Christine................................................. 37
Hom, Sharon...................................................... 41
Black, Edward.................................................... 45
Palmer, Hon. Mark................................................ 49
Dorgan, Hon. Byron............................................... 52
Levin, Hon. Sander............................................... 53
Smith, Hon. Christopher H........................................ 54
Submissions for the Record
Select List of Political Prisoners Punished for Online Activity,
March 24, 2010, submitted by Senator Byron Dorgan.............. 56
Statement by Chinese Internet Bureau of the Information Office of
the State Council.............................................. 67
Written statement submitted by Rebecca MacKinnon, Visiting
Fellow, Center for Information Technology Policy, Princeton
University..................................................... 68
Questions and Answers submitted for the record................... 76
GOOGLE AND INTERNET CONTROL IN CHINA: A NEXUS BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND
TRADE?
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WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2010
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:06 p.m.,
in room 628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Byron L.
Dorgan, Chairman, presiding.
Also present: Senator George LeMieux; Representatives
Christopher H. Smith; David Wu; and Michael Honda.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
NORTH DAKOTA; CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
CHINA
Chairman Dorgan. The purpose of today's hearing is to
examine China's censorship of the Internet and the challenge it
poses both to advocates of free expression and to U.S.
companies doing business in China. The recent controversy over
Google's operations makes clear that the Chinese Government's
regulation of the Internet is both a human rights and trade
issue.
In the spring of 2000, Congress debated whether to support
PNTR [permanent normal trade relations] for China. Supporters
argued that opening China's markets would improve human rights
and level the playing field for U.S. companies. The Internet
was expected to lead the way, and it has brought some important
changes. Today, China has 400 million Internet users, the most
in the world. The Chinese Government, to its credit, has
invested heavily in Internet infrastructure and sought to
bridge the digital divide between rich and poor.
Yet, the larger hopes for genuine openness and freedom have
gone unrealized. China's Internet users remain subject to the
arbitrary dictates of state censorship. More than a dozen
agencies are involved in implementing a host of laws,
regulations, and other tools to try to keep information and
ideas from the Chinese people.
The government also continues to strengthen controls over
the Internet and to harshly punish citizens such as Liu Xiaobo,
who use the Internet to advocate for human rights and political
reform. I have a list here of political prisoners in China
punished in recent years for Internet activities. It was drawn
from the Commission's publicly accessible Political Prisoner
Database. I request that this list be included in the hearing
record.
As this list vividly shows, China's censorship practices
and control of the Internet have had a terrible impact on human
rights
advocates. These include ordinary people who promote political
freedoms or try to organize on line, or ethnic groups such as
Uyghurs and Tibetans attempting to share information about
ongoing government repression.
We also are learning that Internet censorship and
regulation in China have serious economic implications for many
U.S. companies, such as Go Daddy. China's Internet regulations
often run against basic international trade principles of
nondiscrimination and maintaining a level playing field.
Testifying before the Commission today is a representative
from Google, perhaps the most potent Internet company in the
world. In mid-December, Google was a victim of a highly
sophisticated and targeted attack on its corporate
infrastructure originating from China. Google announced this
week that it will stop censoring its Chinese search engine, by
rerouting its China searches to its Hong Kong site. The company
also said it would also monitor and publicize any attempts at
censorship of its Hong Kong site by the Chinese Government.
Google's decision is a strong step in favor of freedom of
expression and information. It is also a powerful indictment of
the Chinese Government's insistence on censorship of the
Internet.
The Commission is dedicated to understanding the
connections between trade and human rights in China. For that
reason, we have called on five prominent American business
leaders and human rights experts to discuss the impact of
Internet censorship in China today. I look forward to hearing
from the witnesses about possible ways for the U.S. Government,
policymakers and businesses to respond to China's regulation of
the Internet from both human rights and trade perspectives.
I wanted to say at the start of this hearing that we asked
the Chinese Embassy if they would like to send a representative
to appear before us today. They declined, as they always have.
They did, however, send a statement. I want to move now to have
that statement included in the hearing record. It is the first
time that they have done so, and I want to include that in the
record. Without objection, we will do so.
Chairman Dorgan. Yes?
Representative Wu. Can we read a short section of it?
Chairman Dorgan. It's in your packet. I think we'll just
include it in the record. In fact, there will be much of the
statement with which we will disagree, but I do want it to be,
nonetheless, a part of the formal hearing record. I also want
to include, as a part of the formal hearing record, the
prisoner list that is in your packet today and a submission of
a testimony for the record by Rebecca MacKinnon, Visiting
Fellow of the Center for Information Technology Policy at
Princeton University.
So without objection, I will include all of those.
If we have comments--brief comments, opening comments--by
others on the panel, I'd be happy to recognize them.
Representative Smith. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Dorgan. Yes, sir.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Dorgan appears in the
appendix.]
[The letter from the Chinese Internet Bureau of the
Information Office of the State Council appears in the
appendix.]
[The prisoner list appears in the appendix.]
[The prepared statement of Rebecca MacKinnon appears in the
appendix.]
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW JERSEY; RANKING MEMBER, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION ON CHINA
Representative Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As Ranking
Member of the Commission, I applaud you for holding this very
important hearing on Internet freedom.
As we know, Reporters Without Borders documents that in
China alone at least 72 people are known to be imprisoned for
Internet postings. The victims of the Chinese Government's
assault on Internet freedom include the entire Chinese people,
denied their right to freedom of expression, denied access to
information, and often self-censoring out of fear.
Even beyond this, the Chinese Government's victims include
other peoples, tyrannized by governments with which the Chinese
Government sells or gives its advice on technologies and
techniques of Internet repression. Reportedly, these include
Cuba, Vietnam, Burma, Belarus, and Sri Lanka.
Yet we have seen some positive developments. We have seen
that some U.S. IT companies really want to do the right thing.
Yahoo! has established much stricter policies governing its
interactions with repressive governments, especially with
Vietnam. Yesterday, we had a hearing--and I chaired it--in the
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission on human rights in Vietnam.
They have put personally identifiable information out of the
hands of Vietnam.
Even while we were meeting, a member of the Human Rights
Watch organization got an e-mail that Dr. Phan Hong Son, and I
met with his wife when I was in Vietnam, obviously another
country but borrowing from China, that he had just had his
house
invaded after spending four years in prison for posting on the
Internet ``What is Democracy,'' translated and downloaded from
U.S. Embassy Hanoi. For that so-called crime, he got a jail
sentence. Yesterday they raided his home. But Yahoo! has
learned from that and put that personally identifiable
information outside the reach of the secret police.
Google's transformation has been perhaps the most
impressive over these last couple of years. In 2006, I chaired
the first hearing on Internet freedom called ``The Internet in
China: A Tool for Freedom or Suppression? '' The hearing
responded to Yahoo!'s cooperation with Chinese Internet police
tracking down the journalist Shi Tao, who is still serving a
10-year prison term for disclosing ``state secrets,'' that is,
e-mailing to the United States the Chinese Government's orders
on what not to say on the 15th anniversary of Tiananmen Square.
Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft, among others, Cisco as well,
testified at the hearing, which broke new ground on the issue
of Internet freedom. Since 2006, we have had meetings with
Google executives. They have taken actions on their own accord,
realizing, I believe, that the view that somehow the Internet
would transform and open up China; when the Chinese secret
police, the government, and the censors took over, it was doing
precisely the opposite.
Two days ago, Google fulfilled its January commitment to
stop censoring results on its Chinese search engine. This is a
remarkable, historic, and welcomed action, and an important
boost of encouragement for millions of Chinese human rights
activists. Mark Palmer will testify in a few moments and will
tell us how some 11,000 of the most influential people in China
have signed onto Charter 08, not unlike Charter 77 in the Czech
Republic, or Block 8406. It is a statement of human rights
principles.
Well, every one of those people, every one--and I believe
by extension the Chinese public--are greatly heartened by what
Google has done. Despite the fact that they have gotten push-
back from some, especially Microsoft--and we went into this
last week at a hearing--they need to get with the program and
join with the side of human rights rather than enable tyranny,
which regrettably they're doing now.
Today, Go Daddy, the world's largest domain registrar,
announced in its submitted testimony that it has decided to
discontinue new .CN domain names at this time out of concern
for the security of the individuals affected by the Chinese
Government's new requirement for domain registration.
Go Daddy is the first company to publicly follow Google's
example in responding to the Chinese Government's censorship of
the Internet by partially retreating from the Chinese market.
Google fired a shot heard around the world, and now a second
American company has answered the call to defend the rights of
the Chinese people. Go Daddy deserves to be praised for this
decision. It is a powerful sign that American IT companies want
to do the right thing in repressive countries.
Go Daddy and Google deserve more than praise for doing the
right thing in China, they deserve our government's support--
not lip service, but tangible, meaningful support. We want to
see American IT companies doing the right thing, but we do not
want to see them necessarily forced to leave China for doing
so. That is why I have introduced the Global Online Freedom
Act, a bipartisan bill that would seek to protect nonviolent
political speech and nonviolent religious speech.
It will do so by requiring those IT companies doing
business in China to disclose what it is that they're
censoring. It will ensure that Radio Free Asia, Voice of
America, and other American broadcasts are not censored. I, Mr.
Chairman, was actually at an Internet cafe right before the
Beijing Olympics and tried to access in that cafe one
prohibited word after another, like the Dalai Lama, the
Uyghurs, Wei Jingsheng.
I even tried to find out what they were saying about
Manfred Nowak, the Special Rapporteur for Torture for the
United Nations. What did I get? When I went to Manfred Nowak, I
got what he said about Gitmo, not what he said about China,
which was a scathing UN-backed report about the pervasive use
of torture in the People's Republic of China.
This legislation would also hold to account those who
have--once they've been designated as an Internet-restricting
country--the companies would have to put personally identifying
information out of reach of the secret police, thus protecting
the dissidents and the religious believers and others who want
to build a new China that is free and unfettered from the
tyranny that currently exists.
So I would hope members of this distinguished panel might
touch on the issue of the Global Online Freedom Act, but also
obviously on China, which is why you are here. We thank you so
much for taking the time to give us the benefit of your wisdom.
Chairman Dorgan. Are there others who wish to make
statements? Congressman Wu.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID WU, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM OREGON;
MEMBER, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Representative Wu. Thank you very much, Senator. I normally
forego the opportunity to speak, but I think that this is truly
a singular moment.
Let me make it clear that I'm not here to criticize any
company, I'm here to praise Google in its singular action, its
unique action in favor of Internet freedom and the tremendous
example that it sets for others. It is heartening to hear that
Go Daddy has decided to be number two. Two points define a
line, three points define a plane, and pretty soon you have a
cascade going.
Of course, I agree with the Chinese Government that every
Chinese person and entity ought to obey the laws of the
jurisdiction. It is clear to me that Google is in full
compliance with Chinese law as far as its counsel can
determine, and there is a difference between compliance and
complicity. One can comply, and at great cost and risk, do so
in a manner which is consistent with the values of the Internet
and of Silicon Valley culture.
I think that what we need to do is to encourage the better
angels of our nature, whether it is in corporate culture or in
Chinese
culture. One of the reasons why I think it's important for me
personally to come here is to demonstrate that there is no
historic or cultural incapability and no genetic incapability
in advocating for and living a life of democracy for any
particular culture or people.
So I want to salute Google's contribution to this ongoing
debate. I want to encourage those in China, because it is a
large, complex society, those in China who are in favor of both
the rule of law and the enlargement of the sphere of civic
freedom.
I want to encourage everyone in the Internet culture, which
I
believe is a very open culture that believes in the competition
of information and ideas, to express themselves so more and
more organizations, businesses will follow Google's example.
Of course, every company is different and will come to
their own conclusions, but I think that on the divide between
compliance and complicity, history will judge and one should be
careful to be on the right side of history.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE LeMIEUX, A U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA;
MEMBER, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Senator LeMieux. Mr. Chairman, thank you for hosting this
bicameral, bipartisan Commission meeting today. It's the first
one I've had the opportunity to attend as a new Senator. But I
want to add my voice in thanking Google for the great work that
it is doing. I want to applaud them, as well as Go Daddy that
we heard about today.
I want to just say to the Government of China, the message
has to be that with great power comes great responsibility.
They have a responsibility to allow their people to live freely
and to have the information they need. We know that
information, free information, is the beginning of the end of
repression. It's the beginning of the end of tyranny.
So it is our responsibility, representing the government of
this country, to insist upon that, whether it's in Venezuela,
where yesterday a former opposition leader who ran for
president was arrested, and the last television network in
Venezuela is afraid of being shut down.
Whether it's in Cuba, where there is no free speech, where
today the Ladies in White are protesting the arrest of
political prisoners and the death of Zapata, who died. His
mother is being arrested for protesting the death of her son.
Whether it's in China, where political prisoners are being
taken for the simple alleged sin of posting on the Internet and
the chance to bring new ideas to this huge and important
country in the world.
With great power comes great responsibility. So, I thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for calling and chairing this hearing today,
and look forward to the testimony of the witnesses.
Chairman Dorgan. Senator LeMieux, thank you very much.
Anybody else want to make a statement, a very brief
statement? [No response.]
All right. Let me begin with Alan Davidson, Director of
U.S. Public Policy with Google. He is the head of U.S. Public
Policy. Prior to joining Google, he was Associate Director of
the Center for Democracy and Technology. He is also an Adjunct
Professor at Georgetown University's program in Communications,
Culture, and Technology. He is trained as a computer scientist.
He holds degrees in mathematics and computer science from MIT,
and a J.D. degree from Yale Law School.
Mr. Davidson, let me join others on this panel who have
complimented Google for its decision, a difficult but
nonetheless a courageous decision, one that I think is
absolutely correct. Thank you for being here. You may proceed.
I would say to all of the witnesses, that your entire
statement will be made a part of the permanent record and you
may summarize.
STATEMENT OF ALAN DAVIDSON, DIRECTOR OF U.S. PUBLIC POLICY,
AMERICAS, GOOGLE, INC.
Mr. Davidson. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
Dorgan, Cochairman Levin, members of the Commission, thank you
for inviting Google here today, and thank you for your
commitment to a free and open Internet. I would also say,
particularly, thank you for your very supportive comments just
now. They are very meaningful to our company at this time.
Last summer, a young woman was shot on the streets of
Tehran during protests over the Iranian elections. No film crew
witnessed her death, no reporter was there to cover her story,
but a bystander with a cell phone captured it on video. That
video was posted on YouTube and it was watched by literally
tens of millions of people around the world.
Despite the government crackdown on communications, Neda
Agha-Soltan's tragic death became a galvanizing force for
international outrage. This is the essence of expression
online: unexpected, unpredictable, but capable of capturing the
minds and the hearts of millions of people around the world. It
is for this reason that the growing restrictions on speech
online demand a commitment from companies, civil society, and
governments together to protect Internet freedom.
I would like to make three points today. First, Internet
censorship is a global threat to human rights and economic
opportunity. The growing problem with Internet censorship is
not isolated to one country or one region. As Secretary Clinton
recently expressed, the impact on human rights and the global
marketplace is profound.
At Google, we have experienced this first-hand. In the last
few years, more than 25 different governments have blocked
Google services, including YouTube and Blogger. For example,
YouTube has been blocked in Turkey for over two years because
of videos that allegedly insult Turkishness. In 2009, during
the elections in Pakistan, the government ordered service
providers there to block opposition videos on YouTube.be.
Then there was our experience in China, where the last year
has witnessed a measurable increase in censorship in every
medium, including the Internet. That leads me to my second
point, which is that the situation in China has led Google to
implement a new approach there.
In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated attack
on our corporate infrastructure originating from within China.
While Google is frequently a target of attacks, it soon became
clear that this was not a routine security incident. We
discovered that at least 20 companies from a range of
industries had been similarly targeted. The attack was
unusually sophisticated, with a principal but unsuccessful goal
of accessing G-mail accounts.
In our investigation, we discovered that entirely separate
from these attacks, the accounts of dozens of G-mail users who
were advocates for human rights in China had been compromised
through malware and phishing attacks--again, totally separate,
but very disturbing.
These circumstances, as well as the increasing attempts
over the past year to limit speech online, led us to announce
in January that we no longer felt comfortable censoring our
search results in China. So earlier this week we stopping
censoring our search services on Google.CN, our search site in
China. Users visiting Google.CN are now being redirected to
Google's site in Hong Kong, where we are offering uncensored
search in simplified Chinese designed specifically for users in
China.
Figuring out how to make good on our promise to stop
censoring search on Google.CN has been difficult. We believe
this new approach is a sensible solution to the challenges that
we face. We very much hope that the Chinese Government respects
our decision, although we are well aware that at any time its
great firewall could prevent users from accessing our services.
Indeed, we have already seen intermittent censorship of certain
search queries on our Hong Kong site.
My third point is that government should do more to protect
Internet freedom around the world. Internet, government, and
nonprofit groups have a shared responsibility to protect a free
and open Internet. We strongly support the Global Network
Initiative [GNI], which is a unique collaboration of human
rights groups, investors, and companies to create standards for
engagement that protect privacy and free expression.
More corporate members are needed to reach the Global
Network Initiative's full potential, but no single company and
no single industry can tackle Internet censorship on its own.
Government action is needed. Specifically, we believe that
Internet freedom must become a major plank of our foreign
policy. The free flow of information should be an important
goal of diplomacy, of foreign assistance, and our engagement on
human rights.
Internet censorship should also be a key part of our trade
agenda, as we lay out in some further detail in our testimony.
Governments around the world should themselves be transparent
when they make demands to censor or when they request
information about users. Finally, Google also supports efforts
of Congress and the Administration to fund technical solutions
to counter censorship.
In conclusion, I want to thank you for your continued
leadership in the fight against censorship online. We look
forward to working with you to maximize access to ideas and to
promote Internet freedom around the world.
Thank you.
Chairman Dorgan. Mr. Davidson, thank you very much. We
appreciate your testimony.
Next, we will hear from Christine Jones, Executive Vice
President, General Counsel, and Corporate Secretary of the Go
Daddy Group. She is responsible for all legal affairs of the Go
Daddy Group, as well as domain services, network abuse,
government relations compliance, and legal departments.
She previously was an attorney specializing in private
commercial litigation, and before that worked for the Los
Angeles District Attorney's Office. In addition to being a
lawyer, Ms. Jones is a CPA with degrees from Auburn University
and Woodyear Law School.
Ms. Jones, welcome.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Davidson appears in the
appendix.]
STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE JONES, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, GENERAL
COUNSEL, AND CORPORATE SECRETARY, THE GO DADDY GROUP
Ms. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Commission.
For a few years now we have noticed that from time to time
it is not possible to access Go Daddy.com in China. We are not
sure why. One could infer it is because we register and host
human rights and other Web sites that are deemed improper by
Chinese officials, but we have never actually been told the
reason.
Regardless, every time it happens, millions of Chinese
nationals who try to visit our Web site, or the Web sites of
our customers, are disappointed to find that Chinese censorship
has kept them from free access to the Internet sites of their
choice.
This is frustrating, as you might imagine. But I am not
going to dwell on that. Instead, I want to briefly touch on
five issues that are explained in more detail in my written
testimony, specifically: monitoring and surveillance of
Internet activities in China; DDoS [distributed denial of
service] attacks originating in China; spam; payment fraud; and
then finally what we feel the U.S. Government can do to help
alleviate some of these issues. Then, of course, I would be
happy to answer any questions you may have.
So, first, China's examination of Internet activities of
its citizens has increased in recent months, and I mean very
recently. Let me give you an example. This, Congressman Smith,
plays into what you talked about in your opening statement.
We have been offering the .CN domain name extension for
about six years. So, for instance, chairmandorgan.CN, that type
of thing. In the beginning, the .CN authority, which is called
CNNIC [China Internet Network Information Centre], required us
to collect the first and last names of the registrant, a
physical address, a telephone number, and an e-mail address.
That was it. That is very typical of what is normally required
by that type of domain name extension.
In December of last year, CNNIC announced that we'd have to
start collecting a photo ID, in color, from the head to the
shoulders, a business ID, and a physically signed registration
paper for all new .CN registrations.
In February, two months later, CNNIC announced that we had
to provide the increased documentation for all current .CN
registrations. So, in other words, we were going to have to
retroactively apply those rules, and if we failed to provide
it, the domain names were going to stop working. Now, keep in
mind, some of these names had pointed to fully functioning Web
sites for as long as six years.
We were immediately concerned, of course, about the motives
behind the increased level of registration verification
required by CNNIC. It didn't make sense to us that the
identification procedures that had been sufficient and in place
since 2005 were apparently no longer sufficient from China's
standpoint, and no convincing rationale for the increase in
documentation was ever provided to us.
We were also concerned by the sort of ex post facto or
retroactive nature of the new requirement. In other words, at
the time the affected Chinese nationals registered their domain
names they weren't required to provide the photo ID or the
business identification and the other identification now being
required by CNNIC.
Because the new documentation requirement was to be
retroactively applied to registrants who had previously
registered their Web site, as I said in some cases years
before, it appeared to us the intent of the new procedures was
based on a desire by the Chinese authorities to exercise
increased control over the subject matter of domain names
registered by Chinese nationals.
Now, Go Daddy has been registering domain names since 2000.
We serve as an accredited registrant for dozens of domain name
extensions. We have 40 million domain names under management,
by far the most of any company in the history of the Internet.
We've done this a lot. This is the first time any registry has
ever asked us to retroactively obtain information on
individuals who registered a domain name through our company,
the first time.
We are concerned for the security of the individuals
affected by CNNIC's new requirement. Not only that, but we are
concerned about the chilling effect we believe the requirements
could have on new domain name registrations, and therefore the
free exchange of ideas on the Internet.
For these reasons, as you mentioned, Congressman, we have
decided to discontinue offering .CN domain names at this time.
We will, however, continue to manage the .CN domain names of
our existing customers, those people whose identifications are
now in the process of being revealed to the Chinese officials.
Second, I want to touch on DDoS attacks that was briefly
mentioned by my colleague from Google. In the first three
months of this year, we have repelled dozens of extremely
serious attacks on the systems that host our customers' Web
sites, attacks that apparently originated in China.
Of course, that number only includes the attacks that we
had to get involved in. That does not include the attacks where
our systems automatically averted the attack. The recent cyber
attacks on Go Daddy and Google and other U.S. companies are
troubling, but they are not new. They reflect a situation that
Go Daddy has been combating for many years.
Third, on the spam issue, we found that an overwhelming
majority of Web sites promoted through spam are hosted in
China, often at service providers that choose to completely
ignore complaints of spam and other types of illegal activity.
We see no assistance from Chinese officials to combat this
problem. In fact, it seems to be just the opposite. The force
of the Chinese Government appears to be being used to justify
the activities of those who engage in spam as a business model
as opposed to helping to stop it.
Fourth, on payment fraud, there is significant payment
fraud originating in China. The payment fraud trends associated
with China-based users include the widespread use of
compromised U.S. and U.K. credit cards, for example, as well as
gift cards, other online payment forms like Allipay, which
would be the Chinese version of PayPal. Substantial payment
fraud originating in China. Again, no action by Chinese
officials to help us combat that problem.
Fifth and finally, we want to talk about what we think the
U.S. Government can do to help us. Our primary mission at Go
Daddy, of course, is to promote secure, easy, equal access to
the Internet to people around the world and we wholeheartedly
agree with Google on that principle. We are also committed to
ending the improper use of the Internet, including for the
invasion of personal privacy or to limit freedom of expression.
It is a big problem.
We hope the U.S. Government will use its influence with
authorities in China to increase Chinese enforcement activities
relating to Internet abuse while encouraging the free exchange
of ideas, information, and trade. This would include the
retraction of China's recent policies relating to the
registration of .CN domain names.
We were encouraged to see there is a briefing this
afternoon to discuss the mission of the new Senate Global
Internet Freedom Caucus, which we hope will seek to promote
online freedom in China and other countries. We are also
following closely Congressman Smith's online freedom
legislation which purports to put the U.S. Government on the
side of U.S. companies and human rights activists when they
deal with repressive governments, so we applaud you for that.
Of course, we are sincerely grateful for this Commission's
attention to these important issues. We understand there is no
silver bullet, but we are proud to at least be part of the
process.
Thank you.
Chairman Dorgan. Ms. Jones, thank you very much.
Next, we'll hear from Sharon Hom. Sharon is the Executive
Director of Human Rights in China and Professor of Law,
emeritus, City University of New York School of Law. She has
testified on a variety of human rights issues before the U.S.
Congress and the E.U. Government body. She has led Human Rights
in China, an organization, in its consultations with companies
doing business and investing in China. In 2007, the Wall Street
Journal named her as ``One of the 50 Women to Watch for Their
Impact on Business.''
Ms. Hom, welcome. You may proceed.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jones appears in the
appendix.]
STATEMENT OF SHARON HOM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CHINA
Ms. Hom. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
members of the Commission for your solidarity, your leadership,
and your support for the very difficult struggle and challenges
to promote freedom of expression in China.
I would like to request that my written statement be
entered into the record and I would like to use my oral time to
briefly comment on some of the Chinese official responses to
Google's actions. I will then focus on the case of Liu Xiaobo,
and conclude with some recommendations for discussion. I
welcome your questions.
As the comprehensive and excellent CECC 2009 Annual Report,
the State Department China Country Report, and recent UN human
rights reviews of China demonstrate, the human rights
violations in China are serious, systematic, and widespread.
In addition to the economic, political, and increasingly
soft power leverage of China, China is exerting enormous
control over expression on the Internet through state-of-the-
art technology, its state secrets and state security system,
the police and security apparatus, and resulting self-
censorship. All of this has been extensively mapped and
inventoried in these reports. Rebecca MacKinnon's submitted
testimony provides a very good map-out of the technology.
The Chinese responses on Google's decision are obviously a
complex story still in progress, as attested to by the
headlines this morning. After an initial effort to accuse
Google of being a CIA operative--that didn't last very long--
the official Chinese responses reflect a combination of: an
effort to rhetorically repackage the Google decision; stating
the obvious and asserting that the Chinese authorities are
acting in accordance with law; and finally, making some
ludicrous statements, such as there is no censorship in China,
and that the Internet is fully open, et cetera, and claiming
this development of events has no impact on China's
international image or on U.S.-China relations. Clearly,
Google, as a major economic player, is very important and has
an impact not only on the Internet, which is global, but also
on innovation and creativity in development of the IT sector in
China, with implications for the region.
So what is at issue here, in addition to the role of the
marketplace of ideas, is whether China is really ready and
willing to be a mature, responsible member of the international
community, one that respects its international obligations,
including human rights obligations, as well as under the WTO
and other trade obligations.
Despite the official mantra that any foreign company doing
business in China has to comply with local Chinese law--which
is quite complex--the Chinese answers to date to the key
question of whether Google's actions are in fact in compliance
with Chinese law are vague and unclear. Ironically, Google's
decision does comply with certain aspects of Chinese law,
particularly constitutional provisions that protect human
rights, freedom of expression, and privacy rights. So, I think
it is important to ask, what Chinese law are we talking about
when we say that companies have to comply with Chinese law?
Regarding the cross-border impacts that have already been
referred to by Representative Smith, the experience of Human
Rights in China's [HRIC] own staff illustrates that the Chinese
authorities' repressive tactics at home, both low-tech and
high-tech, extend to Chinese nationals and human rights
defenders abroad. Such tactics include blacklisting,
surveillance, and even inhumane denials of permission to return
to China for family funerals. This is not part of a
``harmonious society'' and does not reflect Chinese cultural
values.
Additionally, the Chinese authorities have been very
active, and increasingly so, in preventing independent human
rights groups from successfully applying for UN accreditation.
We welcome the U.S. Government's renewed commitment to engage
with the human rights system at the United Nations.
My written testimony outlines some of the ways in which
HRIC is focusing on supporting Chinese lawyers, activists,
journalists, writers, and other rights defenders, specifically
through our technology initiatives, including the distribution
of over 200,000 electronic biweekly newsletters into China, in
which HRIC publishes Chinese writers and censored news and
discussion. We have also built an HRIC YouTube channel and use
social networking tools like Twitter--all accessible from
inside China. Even though YouTube is blocked, an estimated
26,000 to 30,000 people still reach YouTube, and some of the
protest videos that are posted on our YouTube station have
gotten hundreds of hits.
Let me move quickly to the case of Liu Xiaobo, who really
exemplifies the challenges facing the front line in the
struggle for freedom of expression. We welcome the CECC list
featuring individuals who, because of their Internet
activities, are paying a very heavy price.
Liu Xiaobo is a prominent independent intellectual. He has
been a long-time advocate of political reform and democracy and
human rights, and he has been an outspoken critic of the
Chinese Communist regime and one of the key drafters and
organizers of Charter 08.
Under the full glare of international attention, with
international diplomatic representatives outside the courtroom,
on Christmas day, a court in Beijing convicted Liu Xiaobo of
inciting subversion of state power and sentenced him to 11
years in prison and 2 years deprivation of political rights.
What was this for? It was for six essays that he had published
online between 2005 and 2007, in addition to his key Charter 08
role.
HRIC's bilingual quarterly publication, the China Rights
Forum--copies are available today for Members of the
Commission--translated these six articles and all of the legal
documents of Liu Xiaobo's case. We asked the question, so what
does constitute inciting subversion of state power in China?
In his article ``The Many Aspects of CPC Dictatorship,''
Liu Xiaobo describes the post-Mao regime and argues that,
unlike the era of Maoist totalitarianism, this regime is more
skillful in using pragmatic, flexible control to maintain
stability. But it is a loyalty that is bought by the promise of
a comfortable life that has a soul that is rotten to the core.
His article ``Can It Be That the Chinese People Deserve
Only Party-Led Democracy,'' not only presents a critique of the
party, but actually raises a challenge to the Chinese people
ourselves: Liu powerfully reminds the readers that no
totalitarian, authoritarian state stayed in power because of
the power of the ruler, but rather, because the people knelt
down.
Finally, the articles, ``Changing the Regime By Changing
Society: The Negative Effects of the Rise of Dictatorship,''
and ``Further Questions,'' Liu's article about child slavery,
expose the extreme government corruption and the lack of
accountability that continues to persist for thousands of
children who are kidnapped and used as slaves.
The verdict sentencing Liu Xiaobo actually cites the number
of online clicks registered for each article, ranging from 57
to 5,000 clicks. Those do not necessarily translate into the
number of individual readers. However, all of these articles
were posted on Web sites that are censored in China. So that
means Liu Xiaobo has been convicted to 11 years in prison for
inciting subversion of state power based in part upon the
``evidence'' of between 57 to 5,000 clicks on Web sites that
can't be accessed from inside China. This is a testament about
the insecurity of those in power, but it is also a testament to
the power and the necessity of freedom of expression.
I know my time is up, so let me quickly conclude with a few
points for discussion.
First, on individual cases, the CECC Political Prisoner
Database is extremely important and we would urge the
Commission to link your advocacy work on behalf of these cases
with decisions that have been reached by international
independent expert bodies. Shi Tao, who is still in prison, in
fact, received a decision from the UN Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention back in 2006, determining that his
detention is arbitrary and in violation of international human
rights. We would urge that you press for his release based on
this determination by a UN independent expert body. This is not
interference in China's ``internal'' affairs or the Chinese
legal system.
Second, we urge greater support for developing specific
technologies, for example, expanding uncensored online
platforms, developing more circumvention tools and safe
dissemination methods, and promoting expanded use of social
networking tools.
Finally, in terms of the companies, there needs to be more
encouragement to companies to join multi-stakeholder
initiatives. We especially appreciate the letter from Senator
Durbin to 30 technology companies, urging them to join the
Global Network Initiative, of which Human Rights in China was
one of the founding participants.
The Google decision this week really illustrates the
possibility of moving beyond an either/or mentality and of
thinking that the choices are to stay and censor or to leave
the country, because technically Google has not left the
country. We do not know if this One Country, Two Systems move
will actually work, but technically Google is still in China
and Google has been able to act in a principled way. Whether
this will work is uncertain, but as Sergei Brin has stated,
``The story is not yet over and the future is a long time.''
Chairman Dorgan. Ms. Hom, thank you very much for your
testimony.
Next, we will hear from Mr. Edward Black, the President and
CEO of Computer & Communications Industry Association. He has
been President and CEO of that organization since 1995. He
serves on, and previously chaired, the State Department's
Advisory Committee on International Communications and
Information Policy. He has also served in the Office of
Secretary in both the Commerce Department and the State
Department. He holds a B.A. from Muhlenberg College and a J.D.
from American University, Washington College of Law.
Mr. Black, it is good to see you. Thank you. You may
proceed.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hom appears in the
appendix.]
STATEMENT OF EDWARD BLACK, PRESIDENT AND CEO, COMPUTER &
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
Mr. Black. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
Commission. It is an honor to be here today to have a chance to
testify on this very important subject of Internet freedom in
China.
For too long the U.S. business community has had
insufficient support from the U.S. Government in responding to
other nations' efforts to censor or spy on their citizens and
to interfere with the reasonable flow of services, products,
and information. Companies are on the front lines in the battle
for Internet freedom, but when they are confronted with foreign
government demands, the governments that represent these
companies must lead in the defense of Internet freedom and free
trade.
Our Nation founded the Internet. Our government should have
been, and now needs to be, out there promoting multilateral
international understanding in order to maximize freedom of the
Internet.
Totalitarian regimes depend on controlling the flow of
information, both domestically and from the outside world. The
Internet is no exception, and it is a tempting target to turn
into a tool of state control. We must protect Internet openness
from those who want to use it for repression and for many
seemingly noble, well-meaning efforts to control specific
content or monitor Internet traffic that also may chip away at
its openness.
My testimony today is designed to focus on human rights
aspects of censorship, on the trade aspects, and the underlying
principle of Internet freedom.
The Internet can be the greatest tool in history for people
to gather information, communicate, and do many other things
that the human race has tried hard to improve on over the
years, or the Internet can be among the greatest tools for
political repression, depending on how it is used. If we fail
to take actions, others may pervert the Internet and finally
bring about the Orwellian future we thought we had avoided, one
in which governments perpetually spy, surveil, censor, and
control, and say they are doing it for our own good.
The U.S. Government must consistently treat Internet
freedom as a priority human rights issue in its dealings and
communications with foreign governments. We are here today
partly because of the high-profile battle of Google in China,
but the number of companies and countries impacted are far
greater.
There are few easy answers for companies as they try to
bring their technology services and communication tools into
nations that have different rules about free speech and freedom
of expression. Without the backing of their own government,
companies often are faced with the unappealing decision to
follow local laws or else exit the market. Staying and engaging
can in some cases offer appealing choices to citizens in a
repressive country, so the choices are not always simple or
easy.
As a trade issue, censorship has been ignored. The United
States is an information economy. U.S. companies are leading
vendors of information products and services. Filtering
American content and services has the effect of filtering
American competition, and combating it should also be on the
top of our trade agenda.
Restrictions of Internet traffic affect trade in a number
of ways. Such restrictions may constitute a non-tariff barrier,
may be an unfair rule of origin, may be a violation of the
Principle of National Treatment. The violation of the WTO's
very strong rules on transparency and access and administrative
review of regulations has had no impact in the world of
Internet review and regulation.
There must be a trade remedy when a country blocks access
to a U.S. Web site and the advertising on those sites is also
being blocked and the trade in the products and services
advertised are interfered with. The European Union, by the way,
should be praised at this point, because in 2008 they passed,
overwhelmingly, a resolution recognizing Internet censorship as
a trade barrier. The vote was 571 to 38. There needs to be
further implementation of that resolution, but it was an
important step in the right direction.
These are some steps that we think can be taken to promote
Internet freedom. First of all, the U.S. Government should, on
an ongoing basis, investigate cases when Internet censorship is
brought to their attention. The U.S. Trade Representative
[USTR], the State Department, and the Commerce Department all
have responsibility to raise Internet restrictions in the
dealings they have with countries on many issues around the
world on an ongoing basis.
Our Nation has missed the opportunity to use existing trade
agreements to constrain Internet restrictions, censorship, and
surveillance. The USTR should be highlighting Internet
censorship in its trade reports. In 2006, the USTR issued a
report that was billed as a top-to-bottom review of U.S.-China
trade relations. The report discussed simple infringement of
intellectual property, which we don't support, yet did not
mention Internet censorship policies.
The USTR has a very important annual Special 301 review
process focused on identifying intellectual property problems
around the world. I think we should replicate that process for
Internet freedom and violation thereof.
The USTR should review foreign government restrictions on
the Internet, taken in the name of censorship or otherwise, and
seek ways to take appropriate action. We need to negotiate
provisions that promote Internet commerce, openness, and
freedom in our trade agreements and in other agreements. I will
not go into the details on the need for supporting GNI, but
it's a great initiative and we do actively support it.
I want to make another point. The Internet freedom begins
at home as well. The United States must lead by example. We
need to discourage censorship and surveillance ourselves. We
need to restrict intrusive practices such as deep packet
inspection and think twice before attempting to block content
which we perceive as unsavory. Once openness erodes, it is very
hard to get it back.
When we go abroad advocating these principles we cannot go
with dirty hands. Our credibility is critical if we are to be
an articulate advocate in the international community. If our
government leads the fight for international freedom by example
at home and negotiations around the world, it can support U.S.
companies who are trying to ethically compete in challenging
markets.
In conclusion, let me just say that China's policy of
coerced censorship has now become a matter of global public
concern. If the U.S. Government does not push Internet freedom
to the top of our priority list now, foreign governments all
over the globe will conclude that they are free to pick off
individual companies and intimidate them into submission.
We need to elevate this issue to the top of our diplomatic
and trade agenda. We must be consistent with our own Internet
freedom policies and fight for Internet freedom as a common
principle so other nations understand our commitment to curbing
censorship of the Internet and threats to Internet freedom in
whatever form they manifest.
Thank you.
Chairman Dorgan. Mr. Black, thank you very much.
Finally, we will hear from Ambassador Mark Palmer.
Ambassador Palmer served in the U.S. State Department from 1964
to 1990, and was formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and U.S. Ambassador to
Hungary. He was instrumental in the establishment of the
National Endowment for Democracy, and currently is president of
Capital Development Company, LLC, and vice chairman of the
Center for Communications, Health, and the Environment. He is a
graduate of Yale and a widely cited author.
Mr. Ambassador, welcome.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Black appears in the
appendix.]
STATEMENT OF MARK PALMER, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO HUNGARY
Ambassador Palmer. Thank you, Senator.
French diplomats actually try to speak last in the hope
that they will be remembered best, so I'm glad to be speaking
last.
My written testimony emphasizes in the outset my optimism
about China. I think, having served and lived in Communist
countries a good part of my life, that we often underestimate
what is going on among elites, and we know what's going on
among the publics, 400 million of whom are on the Internet.
Even Hu Jintao brags that he's on the Internet. So I think it's
a mistake for us to assume that this very strong reaction to
the admirable actions of Google or Go Daddy now, that that's
the end of the story. I think there's a lot going on in China
that we should be optimistic about.
But I want to focus in my oral remarks today on a story. I
want to tell a story. Some of the students who were present on
Tiananmen Square during 1989 came to the United States and
earned doctoral degrees in computer sciences from leading
American universities. They realized the enormous popularity
and the potential of the Internet in China and were urged by
Chinese still in China to find ways to use their computer
engineering skills to combat growing censorship and the overall
decline in human rights.
Beginning in the year 2000, they have developed a system of
software and servers which, over the past decade, has grown to
be the world's largest circumvention system, providing for
roughly 90 percent of anti-censorship traffic in China and
worldwide.
About a million Chinese today and hundreds of thousands of
Iranians are using this system. It works through the
distribution of encrypted, secure, free software and by
constantly switching IP addresses, up to 10,000 times per hour,
on dedicated servers located across the world. They have built
and staffed this system with volunteer labor and virtually no
financial support from anyone else.
The major limitation on this Global Internet Freedom
Consortium's [GIF] ability to serve even much larger numbers of
users and to bring down the firewall altogether is simply
money. They have had to make hard choices between serving a
surge in Iranian users last summer and fall and reducing their
availability to Chinese users as their servers were crashing.
GIF needs to buy many more servers and finally to be able
to support full-time staff. Competing with and staying ahead of
over 50,000 heavily financed engineers and censors in China
requires a dedicated and properly financed team. We spend, Mr.
Chairman, $800 million a year on Voice of America, Radio Free
Asia, and other old media and we spend $1.7 billion on U.S.
AID's democracy programs. Surely we can, and should, spend $50
to $100 million a year on a system or systems to circumvent
Internet censorship and bring down this firewall.
Realizing the enormous success of this Global Internet
Freedom Consortium and its potential, a bipartisan group of
your colleagues, Senators and Congressman, appropriated $15
million in 2008 to begin to scale up this system and any others
which could demonstrate proven ability to circumvent Internet
censorship in China, Iran, and elsewhere.
In 2010, as you know, another $30 million was appropriated.
In my 26 years within the State Department and 20 years outside
working on democracy and human rights, I have never been more
convinced of the power of any innovation to help those still
living in one of the world's 43 remaining dictatorships, half
of them Chinese, with the ability to liberate themselves. And I
also have never been more appalled--I repeat, appalled--at the
State Department's refusal to do what is so clearly in the
national interest of the United States.
In flagrant and now repeated violation of congressional
legislation, my old home, the State Department, has refused to
use the appropriated funds to scale up an existing successful
circumvention system. State Department staff-level officials
have made a mockery, first of Secretary Rice's, and now of
Secretary Clinton's, frequently voiced and sincere commitments
to help ensure freedom of the Internet.
Let us take just one dimension of American national
interest. There is a profoundly false understanding of the
Google-China issue, as if Google must lose its China market
because it no longer accepts Google.CN censorship. If the
United States acts in the manner that we seek and people in
China can access Google.com, whether in Hong Kong or here, you
should sell your Baidu stock short and watch Google pick up
support from Iran, Syria, and elsewhere.
Google is in a fight, and a martyred defeat will not help
the cause. It, too, should be pressing the State Department in
working with GIF. If it does so, its franchise throughout the
world will be enhanced by orders of magnitude for being not
merely a wounded victim, but the provider of enhanced closed
society access to the Internet.
Fortunately, five of your colleagues here in the Senate
wrote to Secretary Clinton on January 20, Senators Brownback,
Casey, Kaufman, Kyl, and Specter, and they, in the strongest
possible terms, have said enough is enough to the State
Department, that they have to begin to fund the existing
circumvention systems.
Senator Brownback placed holds on four senior State
Department appointments and is prepared and took it off when
some people in the Department indicated a willingness at least
to talk. But he and Senator Kyl and others are willing to put
the holds back on if, within a week or so, we don't get a
serious indication that they're engaging and are going to
respect the will of this Congress on this critical national
issue.
Let me just conclude by urging this Commission, which does
such wonderful work, that you join your colleagues in urging
the State Department to do what we all agree with, which is to
circumvent this censorship.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Palmer appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Dorgan. Ambassador Palmer, thank you very much. We
will do just that. We appreciate your testimony and your
appearance.
I am told that there are four votes that have just begun in
the U.S. House. What I'd like to do, with the consent of my
colleagues, is to recognize the three House Members for a
series of lightening-round questions before they have to rush
out of here. I do want to have them have the opportunity to ask
questions of the witnesses.
Representative Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
really appreciate it.
Ms. Hom, you mentioned the outrageousness of the Chinese
Government saying that there was no censorship on the Internet.
When Chi Haotian was here in town during the Clinton
Administration and made the same statement: that no one died at
Tiananmen Square. We put together a hearing, and like you, Mr.
Chairman, invited the Chinese to testify. He was a no-show. We
even had a People's Daily editor say how he saw and witnessed
people dying.
Hopefully it's so laughable and so embarrassing to the
Beijing leadership that such outrageous statements will cease.
The Universal Periodic Review was last done on February 9,
2009, on China. It only takes, as you know, one-third--one-
third--of the member states on the UN Human Rights Council to
call for a hearing on any country.
The U.S. Government should call for that vis-a-vis China to
look at this. It could be done. It would bring the great
spotlight on what they're doing on the Internet and on other
human rights abuses. Your thoughts on that. I have so many
questions, but we don't have time, so I'll just leave it at the
one.
Representative Wu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to ask one question of the witnesses, and that
is for each of you, whether it's Google or Go Daddy or the
organizations that you represent, if you have one, two, or
three things that we could do, that the Federal Government
could do in an operational way to help you in each of your
respective efforts, different efforts, I would be very
interested in hearing your responses. I suspect, Ambassador,
that I know what your top one will be, but I'll look forward to
hearing it.
I just want to take one moment to say that I couldn't help
but notice that four out of five witnesses are legally trained.
There is a lot of criticism at times about the litigious nature
of American society and the number of lawyers we have, and so
on and so forth. I just want to say that my response to that
has been, in the international context, show me a society where
there are more attorneys than generals, and that's probably
going to be a democracy. Show me the reverse and the story is
not so good. So, you know, everything has its price. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Dorgan. Congressman?
Representative Honda. Thank you. I can think of a country
that's been led by a teacher. They haven't had the need for a
military since they started. So, on behalf of teachers, I think
that we can learn. I guess my mother says it best: ``You've got
two eyes, two ears, one mouth. Use them accordingly.''
My question would be Mr. Smith's question regarding the
Universal Periodic Review asked to Mr. Edward Black and to
Ambassador Mark Palmer. In closing, I would like to thank you
for a nice, well-balanced presentation for us to be able to
listen, learn, and act.
Thank you.
Representative Smith. Mr. Chairman, just very briefly. The
Chinese statement submitted for the record cites international
norms that they feel that they ought to, and you, like Google
and Go Daddy, ought to live up to. Your views on the Global
Online Freedom Act. If you all could provide us with that I'd
appreciate it. I am sorry we have to go.
Chairman Dorgan. Let me thank my colleagues from the House.
They are active participants in this Commission and we're sorry
they have to go to vote, but appreciate their being here.
Mr. Davidson, can you tell us a little about how this works
with the Chinese coming to an American company saying, we need
your cooperation in censoring certain things. What types of
information have authorities asked be to censored? How do they
instruct? How do they deliver the information of what they want
censored? I mean, can you give us some organic notion of how
this works?
Mr. Davidson. Well, let me try and give a general notion,
because in some ways actually we are not actually permitted to
talk about all of the requests that we get that are given to
our employees in China, or not even necessarily our employees.
Chairman Dorgan. Permitted by the Chinese, you mean?
Mr. Davidson. Right. So I think I'd be happy to
characterize it.
Chairman Dorgan. But are you permitted to do it outside of
China? [Laughter.]
Mr. Davidson. We actually don't share a lot of information
outside of China about what's happening. It puts us--and I
think that gets to the heart of it--in a terribly difficult
position, which is that there's not very much transparency at
all about what's being requested and whether it's being
requested of everybody, whether there are special requests or
not. That places us in a terribly difficult position. I would
say, outside observers have been able to derive quite a bit
about the kinds of requests that come.
I think you can see that they're far-ranging, political in
nature, and quite different from the kinds of results that
we've had at other hearings that have showed the differences in
the results that one gets from a censored version of the large
search engines, including ours, and the uncensored versions. So
I think that's part of why we ultimately felt that we needed to
make this change, because the lack of transparency particularly
makes it extremely difficult.
Chairman Dorgan. Well, I admire the judgment, and I've
indicated that to you. What I'm trying to understand is, when
you go to China to do business is there someone in China that
says, all right, you are here now, you are on Chinese soil, we
do business the Chinese way, and here is a set of written
instructions, and by the way, in order to do business here you
will follow them to the letter. Is there something in writing
someplace that describes to your company what your obligations
are under what they perceive to be Chinese law?
Mr. Davidson. We operate under a license in China and I
think, in part, the problem that I think we all--the companies
that operate there--are trying to address in things like the
GNI is dealing with the fact that the requests can be brought
and that they do not always appear to be operating through the
rule of law. So it's not like getting a court order from a U.S.
judge, so I think that part of the concern is that we would
like there to be more transparency and a clearer process than
there has been. I could leave it to others who have had this
experience as well in China.
Chairman Dorgan. Ms. Jones, you indicated that there was
substantially increased Chinese Government activities December
of last year and February of this year. Was there any
discussion by the Chinese authorities about why they were doing
this? Was there, in fact, admission that they were increasing
activities or did the Chinese say, all right, here are the new
rules?
Ms. Jones. No. In fact, if I could briefly respond to your
question earlier, we wish there was a rule book. We wish there
was the book that you could set on the table and say, here's
what you have to do. But to your knowledge, that doesn't exist.
We just, from time to time, get a directive. In this case,
two days before the new rule came out, we got a communication
that said, ``Oh, by the way, we're going to change the rules.
We're not really sure what the rules are going to be yet, but
we're going to change them.'' Two days later, we got the new
rules, then we were supposed to implement them a few days after
that.
So there's not really a build-up. There's not any
indication. As I said earlier, when our Web site gets shut down
in China we never get told why. We'd love to know why. We'd
like for them to tell us what the rules are. But it's
impossible to find out because they simply won't answer the
question.
Chairman Dorgan. Have you had intellectual property stolen?
I understand Google has. You indicated that attacks have been
made on your system repeatedly. Have you had intellectual
property stolen?
Ms. Jones. Well, I'm not exactly sure what you mean by
intellectual property. It could be a broadly defined term. We
do know that a lot of the IP that is stolen comes from Web
sites that are hosted in China, but most of the attacks on our
system are designed to disable Web sites of our customers.
Those tend to be human rights sites, Tiananmen Square
anniversary sites, Web site blogs that
discuss Tibetan monks, any of the things that the Chinese
Government deems inappropriate. They rarely ask us to shut down
counterfeit goods, for example, or other IP violations because,
frankly, I think they support that. Now, have we had software
or other information in our systems stolen? Not yet.
Chairman Dorgan. Thank you.
Ambassador Palmer, why do you think the State Department is
so reluctant in addressing this issue of the circumventable
systems for which funding exists, but the State Department
seems to have little interest in programming? What is your
sense of State's reasons? I mean, you worked down there. For 16
years, you worked in the State Department, right?
Ambassador Palmer. Twenty-six.
Chairman Dorgan. Twenty-six years. I'm sorry.
So what could explain the State Department's behavior at
this point?
Ambassador Palmer. One State Department official was quoted
in the Washington Post, saying that the Chinese authorities in
Beijing would be, to use my previous word, appalled, would be
outraged, if the Global Internet Freedom Consortium's systems
were financed by the State Department. So it's clear, from
talking to my friends both in the State Department and in the
White House, that one of the concerns that has led to this is
concern about the Chinese reaction.
Chairman Dorgan. So this is an old story, isn't it? Don't
offend them.
Ambassador Palmer. Right.
Chairman Dorgan. We see this routinely in trade
negotiations, but it's an old story and now surfaces with
respect to this issue.
Ambassador Palmer. Then there's another issue, I believe.
That is that the Department didn't ask for this money, didn't
want this priority. It feels put upon. It still doesn't
recognize that we have this long-term challenge in front of us
that's going to require, year after year, major resources of
financing and human talent, and they're just not into that yet.
They haven't made that transition conceptually.
Chairman Dorgan. Ms. Hom, you, at least with respect to one
Chinese citizen, Liu Xiaobo, put a human face on the victims
here whom might be targeted by the requests made of Go Daddy to
describe who these people are, names, photographs, et cetera. I
assume that what the Chinese are attempting to do with that is
to intimidate and to track down certain dissidents in China who
are behaving in ways that the Chinese Government finds
inappropriate.
But can you tell me, what's your sense of how many citizens
in China have been tracked down by their government,
apprehended, tried, sent to prison for Internet transgressions?
Ms. Hom. Your question is related to the overall lack of
transparency about numbers in the criminal justice system and
in the extrajudicial detention system, including reeducation
through labor [RTL] and other detention camps. It's very
difficult to answer because statistics about the total number
of detentions are not reported in a comprehensive, clear way.
However, if you just look at one area, as we have looked
recently, with an eye toward detentions related to Internet
activities, if you look at a list of individuals in prison or
in detention, or convicted for incitement to subvert state
power, subversion, or for leaking state secrets, it would be
quite clear that a great majority of them will have engaged in
activities on the Internet.
The draft revised state secrets law that was released in
June made it clear that the state secrets law provisions apply
to the Internet, including activities of disseminating and
acquiring information. So the proposed revisions would make the
current law more restrictive of freedom of expression on the
Internet.
Chairman Dorgan. Mr. Black, you are involved in, among
other things, a substantial amount of commercial transactions
by your member companies. I'm wondering whether the censorship
and regulation of the Internet in China has an impact, and if
so, how, on companies that wish to sell goods in China?
Mr. Black. Yes. We are convinced that this is an important
avenue to pursue, not only because it is important but because
existing trade agreements, and possibly future trade agreements
we will negotiate, will be able to deal with some of these
issues in an already established legal framework.
I think the easiest example is any Web site, frankly, that
is blocked, that Web site, in the modern Internet era, has a
variety of companies--it could be automobile companies, could
be Proctor & Gamble--who advertise there, who are there but are
unable to adequately reach an audience if they're blocked.
There could be, if you have a magazine article, if you go
to a Business Week site and there's an article in Business Week
that is politically untenable, well, theoretically all of the
advertisers in Business Week, all those companies would in fact
have their ability to do commerce affected.
We think the reality is, that electronic commerce is a
multi-billion-dollar business activity, perhaps a trillion-
dollar one. So if you have a significant impact on the
communication of data and information on our products and
services, you are going to be having a significant impact on
trade, yes.
Chairman Dorgan. Mr. Black, is there a tension for you to
come here and speak on these issues? I mean, there are some in
the business community--not all, but there are some--who think,
you know what? It's a whole lot better for us to kind of tone
it down a little bit, be quiet, hope things improve, don't be
critical, because the fact is, China is a big market and the
Chinese Government can just make the decision to change, limit,
or close your access to that market. So isn't there a tension
for you to come and speak out? I am talking about a tension
with respect to your constituency and your foundation, or your
association, rather.
Mr. Black. Well, I think it's clear that within the private
sector there are many companies, which also internally are
divided on how to deal with doing business in regimes where
local laws conflict with our values, yes. But I think----
Chairman Dorgan. But over time, if I might interrupt you,
there have been many occasions in this country where we say,
you know what? Business is business. The rest, we will deal
with later. Business is business and human rights is separate.
Mr. Black. Well, I think these issues are way beyond the
Internet and technology issue and affect all businesses. But I
guess I'd probably put a good word in for the technology and
Internet world. I really do think the culture of our sector of
the industry is one of openness and freedom, and I think
there's a greater willingness, therefore, to say that is what
we are about. We are not just about selling something, but we
are about using this tremendous great industry to advance
people's well-being.
But yes, you are absolutely correct. There is certainly a
constant pressure, not necessarily on me, but internally in the
corporate dialogue, about how to deal with this problem, and
with the reality that it can have a significant impact on
stockholders, on the ability of a company to survive.
Chairman Dorgan. I want to ask a question of the
representative from Google, and perhaps Go Daddy as well. You
have both now announced that you are changing the way you
operate in China. I'm going to first ask Google. Number one, I
assume some think you are just daft, right? I mean, what are
you thinking about?
Mr. Davidson. Yes.
Chairman Dorgan. You're there, you do business. You don't
like it, but you follow the local customs. Tough luck. So stop
crying and move on. You're setting a bad example for those that
decide business is business. You're messing things up for us
within the Chinese market. Do you hear others say that?
Mr. Davidson. Well, I think every company has to make its
own decisions about how to operate. I think we have made no
secret that this has been a difficult decision and process for
Google, and we went into the market originally hoping that we
could make a big difference.
We were pleased, I think, initially about some of the
changes we were able to bring to the market, and ultimately
over time, as we described in our testimony, we came to a
different conclusion about what was right for our business. We
have gotten some good feedback and our hope is that this is a
process where other companies will also get involved. We need
more help in the GNI.
Chairman Dorgan. So you're hoping to start a trend here?
Mr. Davidson. Our long-term hope is the same hope we've
had, which is that we can offer our services in China.
Chairman Dorgan. Let me ask, tell me how you think this
plays out at this point. You're an executive with a big,
successful, growing, worldwide company. We read the news at the
moment right up to the moment, as Ms. Hom indicated. So we know
what has happened so far and we know the discussion about the
move to Hong Kong. But tell me how you see this playing out in
the end for your company.
Mr. Davidson. I think we've been very clear also: we don't
know how it will play out. We have moved our servers to Hong
Kong.
Chairman Dorgan. Can you give me the best and worst case?
Mr. Davidson. Sure. I think one of the better-case
scenarios is that people in China are able to access our
uncensored search engine based in Hong Kong and have access to
all the information that it provides. I think a bad-case
scenario would certainly be that that search engine is blocked
outright and that other services are as well, and that others
rush in to fill the void with censored products that don't
provide a lot of information to Chinese users. Our hope is
that, over time, it will be more of the former.
Chairman Dorgan. All right. One final question and then
Senator LeMieux will ask a question.
Ms. Jones, the decision Go Daddy has made, that's a very
recent decision I assume, you announced today. Can you tell me
the thinking that went into that decision? Is it related to
Google? Tell me the judgment. I know you've talked about the
attacks and you talked about the increasing demands by the
Chinese Government. All of that has happened recently, so this
puts you in a decisionmaking point here?
Ms. Jones. Well, with all due respect to Google, it really
didn't have anything to do with them. This was a decision we
made in our own right based on our experience of having to
contact Chinese nationals, collect their personal information,
and grudgingly return it back to Chinese officials. We just
made a decision that we didn't want to act as an agent of the
Chinese Government, and that's really why we stopped offering
the .CN domain name. Honestly, we wish that there were a better
way to negotiate.
In fact, you know what? I read a book once called ``Take
This Job and Ship It,'' and I remember there was a discussion
in it about an unequal playing field in negotiations between
the United States and other countries, and I think we ought to
revisit that discussion because we can't let them be strong and
us be weak all the time. We just have to stop it, and then
we'll start offering .CNs again.
Chairman Dorgan. Are you recommending people read that
book? [Laughter.]
Ms. Jones. Sure.
Chairman Dorgan. Full disclosure: that's a book I wrote.
But I think it does raise the question of the kind of
negotiations that should exist.
Senator LeMieux, let me ask you to inquire.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we all
should read that book. It's a great idea.
Well, again, I want to commend you, Mr. Davidson, Ms.
Jones, your companies, for the work that you're doing. It
occurs to me, Mr. Chairman, that if there were attacks on the
bricks and mortars of these businesses and we believed that a
government was behind them, we'd be acting a lot differently.
We need to be cognizant of the fact that this is not just
something out in the ether, it is the way that you do business.
We treat it differently when it's in the ether than we do if it
was bricks and mortars.
Mr. Davidson, I want to ask you about these cyber attacks
in mid-December 2009 and learn more from you about what
happened and where you think those attacks were directed from.
Mr. Davidson. Well, sure. We tried to lay it out a little
bit in our public statements and in our testimony. I'd be happy
to amplify further also afterward if it's helpful for you and
your office. I guess I would best characterize it as quite
sophisticated and very unusual.
As we tried to explain and as Ms. Jones has explained,
companies like ours are attacked all the time, but this was
quite different because of the sophistication, because of the
fact that we discovered that other companies had been targets,
and that we also knew that part of the target seemed to be the
ability to access G-mail accounts, and particularly we knew
that G-mail accounts had been compromised for folks who are
affiliated with human rights groups in China or working on
Chinese issues.
So that was very disturbing to us, and I think that's part
of why we felt it was so important to make a change in our
policy, but this is really part of an ongoing process over the
course of a year.
Senator LeMieux. Do you believe the Chinese Government was
behind the attacks?
Mr. Davidson. We have no evidence, and we have not said,
that we believe this. We have no evidence that this is a state-
sponsored attack. We may never know. Google may never know who
ultimately was behind this attack, but that's partly why this
is really about a totality of circumstances over the course of
a year, where Google was blocked. YouTube has been blocked in
China since March, the Green Dam activities over the course of
a summer, public attacks on Google in the media, this cyber
attack in December.
I think, taken all together, we felt it was time for a
change in our policies.
Senator LeMieux. I can see your legal training in your
response to that question. [Laughter.]
I am a fallen engineer, if that counts for anything.
Chairman Dorgan. Senator LeMieux, can I just, on that
point, the statement that was put out by Google on January 12
indicates the theft of intellectual property did not just
involve Google, but also involved a couple dozen other
companies. But also, part of the investigation, if I can quote:
``We have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-China
Europe-based G-mail users who are advocates of human rights
appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties,'' and
so on.
I mean, when you ask who might have been responsible, the
obvious question is, who would have had an interest in this
sort of thing? It appears, to the outsider at least, that only
the Chinese Government would have this kind of interest. I am
not asking you to answer that, because I'm sure you don't want
to. [Laughter.]
Senator LeMieux. Let me ask, Ms. Jones. You described that
there were cyber attacks on Go Daddy as well.
Ms. Jones. Yes. The December attack, of course we were
involved in that. As I said, we have had a couple of dozen
since the first of the year as well. What stood out to us about
the December attack, again, was the sophistication, the level
of organization, the way the traffic was routed to us. We don't
know who did it, but we will go so far as to say it was quite
sophisticated and there were resources behind it from
somewhere.
The difference between the attack on our system and the
attack on Google's system appears to be, the Google attack was
aimed at infiltrating e-mail accounts. The attack on our system
was designed to disable Web sites that somebody doesn't like.
Senator LeMieux. Yes, sir?
Mr. Davidson. I don't want to be too cute with my answer,
sir. I would just say it is actually a very complex environment
there. There are lots of different groups that operate,
nationalist groups, groups that do things. So it really is the
case that we don't know, and it is also the case that I think
there were a whole set of circumstances, starting with the fact
that in 2006 we would be continually evaluating these
circumstances and doing business that led to our decision, but
I will leave it to others to draw their own conclusions.
Senator LeMieux. Let me ask that question of Ms. Hom, if
she has an opinion as to where these attacks are coming from.
Ms. Hom. I think that it's important not to get fixed on
the question of whether it's the Chinese Government behind the
attacks. It is true that in a number of these attacks,
particularly against human rights groups, including Tibetan
groups and some Falun Gong groups, the attack control server
has been traced back to control servers located inside China.
However, the real issue is the responsibility of a government
in terms of cross-border crimes. So I would say that it's
important that China has an obligation to investigate and to
ensure that those responsible for these attacks are held fully
accountable.
Mr. Davidson said that China is a complex environment. I
think it's also true that when we say ``the Chinese
Government'' we have to keep in mind it's not monolithic. In
the IT Internet area there are turf battles between the
different ministries, for example, the Ministry of Industry and
Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, and
the Ministry of State Security. So in the current negotiations
with Google, it may not even be clear who and what interests
are represented at the negotiating table. I would guess it is a
complex negotiation.
In the discussion about cyber attacks, and the technical
solutions that have to be developed, we need not only access
and circumvention tools. We need safe, secure, and anonymous
access, access that ensures that our identity is not
compromised.
Therefore, I would add to Ambassador Palmer's call for the
need for more support for the development of a suite of
technology tools. I don't think any one tool alone is going to
work. DRL [Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor] and
the State Department has issued and closed an RFP [Request for
Proposal] for the development of new mobile technologies, but
it is a very limited pot and many groups have applied.
There needs to be a lot more resources devoted to the
development of technology solutions. This will require
governments and the donor community to step up to the plate.
Unfortunately, some private donors that are trying to maintain
their presence in China are moving away from supporting work,
including human rights work, that might be perceived as
sensitive by the Chinese authorities. Yet there is a very
important role and need for support for human rights-related
technology development, coming from government as well as the
private sector.
Senator LeMieux. Mr. Black or Ambassador Palmer, do you
care to take a shot at that?
Mr. Black. Yes. First of all, we would endorse the--what
has just been mentioned. We think, to the extent you can have
technological assets to bring to bear in this battle, that's
great. I think it's important and valuable. It is,
nevertheless, going to be a difficult fight when you are in a
fight with a government with the tools governments have
available. So again, we do think it is important to engage at
the governmental level.
What I would suggest is--and while we all recognize, I
think, that China has the most sophisticated firewall and
technological assets that they bring to bear in this area, and
thus make it a more difficult problem--they are not the only
country we want to focus on. I would suggest, while not de-
focusing on China, that we also focus on some other countries
where we may have the greater opportunity to use leverage and
create some precedents that then can be turned back and used on
others.
We have identified Burma, Tunisia, Thailand, Uzbekistan,
Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and I have a longer list of
countries who are doing very clear things which we think are
violations of not just Internet freedom conceptually, but could
be actionable under trade agreements.
I understand the U.S. Government, for various reasons, is
reluctant to pick a big fight, maybe at any given point bring a
trade case against China or do other things, but some of these
countries we may well have some influence with and they are
members of the WTO. Those rules can work for us at times.
I think if we create a pattern of precedents and create, in
essence, a climate that makes China even more clearly the
outrider, the outlier on this, I think in the long run that may
well be more effective. Confrontation may work sometimes. We
all know confrontation sometimes makes it harder to do things.
But coming in from the side and from other places globally, I
think, is an avenue that really can actually begin to make some
progress.
Senator LeMieux. Ambassador?
Ambassador Palmer. On the question of who's doing this, it
seems to me, clearly, obviously the Chinese Government. If you
look at the history of censorship and of this kind of
intervention in many countries, in dictatorships, it's always
the government. Who else, as you said, Senator, has the
interest? This is a sophisticated, large-scale effort. It is
clear that Beijing is doing this as a matter of government
policy.
On the question that Ms. Hom touched on, and that is, is
there sort of a solution, a technological solution, I think the
answer to that is, no, there isn't a single answer. But the
State Department now, which I find really quite piquant and
wonderful, is saying that they want to do venture capital. I am
a venture capitalist. I have been running, and own, a venture
capital firm for the last 20 years. There is a role for venture
capital in this field.
I mean, it is true that in order to keep up with the
engineering skills in Beijing, the Chinese skill in this, that
the Communists are abusing, we are going to have to keep
innovating ourselves. But it's also true in the investment
world that there are products that already exist that you want
to get behind with large-scale investments because they're
proven and they're beyond the R&D phase. They're beyond the
venture capital phase.
That is the case with the Global Internet Freedom
Consortium, which is already serving all together several
million people on a daily basis. If they only had the servers,
they could serve 50 to 100 million people on a daily basis. It
would be criminal, in my judgment, to wait to find some brand-
new, sexy little thing out there that may take five more years
to develop and not go ahead right now and build up an existing,
proven system and devote some money. We should not devote 100
percent to the existing proven; I'd be opposed to that. But
spend serious money to build up, to scale up an existing proven
system.
The only other potential competitor is Tor, which was
partly developed by the U.S. Government. Tor has, in my
judgment, about one-tenth as many users, but that's not
insignificant either. So I think there may be two build-up
possibilities that exist today, along with the R&D stuff.
Senator LeMieux. Well, thank you, Ambassador. Thank you for
your candor. It seems to me that it's hard to imagine, Mr.
Chairman, that there could be an entity inside of China that
was not controlled by the Chinese Government that would be
sophisticated enough to bring these attacks forward.
I have one last question, if I may, that I wanted to direct
to our friends from Google. That is, you have a lot of
employees, as I understand it, in China. I want to know,
because I saw how this announcement was made on the blog, and
there seems to be a reference to your employees. Do you have a
concern about their safety?
Mr. Davidson. Of course we have a concern. That's why----
Senator LeMieux. Beyond the normal security you have for
employees.
Mr. Davidson [continuing]. Right. Sure. I think it is very
important to us, and that's partly why we made this
announcement in January, but we took action this week. It was
important for us to do this in an orderly fashion that was
really sensitive to the employees that we have on the ground.
We made it clear in our announcement that these decisions have
been made entirely by Google executives in the United States
without the involvement of our employees in China.
I think going forward, our hope is that they'll continue to
be there and that they'll continue to be able to contribute. We
have some fantastic engineers. We have an R&D center and a
sales force there, and we'd like to continue to grow that great
group of employees. But we will be watching the situation on
the ground very carefully.
Senator LeMieux. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again. I
think that you have brought a lot of light and attention to
this issue by chairing this hearing today. I want to thank all
the witnesses for being here.
As I said in my opening statement, with great power comes
great responsibility. We need for the Chinese Government to
stand up and not have the censorship anymore. I believe that
the Internet is going to be the greatest tool of the modern
time to promote communication, and eventually democracy,
throughout the world. I applaud both of your companies, again,
for the good work that you're doing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Dorgan. Senator LeMieux, thank you very much.
Mr. Ambassador, when you began today you said some
encouraging things about China. Most, however, of the rest of
this hearing has been rather discouraging when we're talking
about Internet freedom, censorship, people going to prison. So
tell me again, what do you see for China? You've watched
diplomatic issues and worked in the State Department 26 years.
What do you see going forward here? I mean, it's pretty
clear, it seems to me--and everybody in the room--however
critical one might be of China, all of us understand that
things in China are marginally better. Things have improved
over the last 25 years in a number of areas. However, there are
many other areas where you still have the authoritarian fist of
a regime that wants to protect itself.
As you answer this, let me ask you, looking at the regimes
in Eastern Europe that prevented their citizens from hearing
and seeing what was happening in the rest of the world, my
understanding is the landscape changed with the introduction of
the video cassette recorder [VCR].
When the VCRs came in and video cassettes could be moved
around the world, people in their living rooms in Eastern
Europe could run a cassette and watch a movie or see
programming. It was impossible for those governments to prevent
information from getting to people.
The Internet, of course, is the video cassette recorder on
super steroids, right? How effective can the Chinese Government
be regarding censorship, given the power of the Internet? What
is your impression? I'm sorry for the lengthy question.
Ambassador Palmer. No. I think that's absolutely right,
they will not succeed. It is simply impossible in a modern
society, which China increasingly is a modern society, an
extraordinary society which has been transformed in the last
generation. It's a totally different country. It is impossible.
I spent much of my foreign service career living in Eastern
Europe and we learned the power of rock and roll, not only
video cassettes, but rock and roll.
I mean, you know, kids are kids and they don't want this
nonsense. They're skeptical of the political leaders and they
are the children of the leaders, and the nephews and nieces.
Over the dinner table, they tell some homely truths to the
people who live in Zhongnanhai, to the leadership of China. So
I see so much evidence that we're basically winning.
I mean, when you have 11,000 people with their own names
sign Charter 08, which is the most important written document
in modern Chinese history--not since Sun Yat-sen founded modern
China has there been a piece of paper more explicit, clear, and
more powerful than that is. And 11,000 of the leading people in
the country--what we learned in Eastern Europe is that among
elites, when things look so dark, there is a whole lot of
foment going on.
I just finished reading Zhao Ziyang's book when he was the
General Secretary of the Communist Party of China at Tiananmen.
He's written a book. He dictated, in secret, his memoirs before
he died. It's called, ``The Prisoner of the State,'' and I
would recommend everybody to read it. He and his predecessor,
Hu Yaobang, who was the previous General Secretary of the
Communist Party, after all--I mean the top party official in
the country--both of them wanted ultimately complete democracy
in China, with everything that we call a democracy.
So when you've got really senior people, now you can see
what their thinking was, I am certain that today in Zhongnanhai
you have all kinds of people who recognize that this oppression
of Google is a mistake and they don't want it. Eventually they
will be the rulers of the country.
Chairman Dorgan. Let me, in conclusion, ask a question of
both Google and Go Daddy. The decisions you have now made, are
these decisions for the moment, interim decisions, or are there
things the Chinese Government can do that would convince you
that that decision should be modified or changed? Give me your
assessment of where you are now relative to conditions in China
and what the Chinese Government might or might not do that
would change these decisions.
Mr. Davidson. Well, I would say our hope is what it's
always been, which is to be able to offer our services and
access to information to our users in China. If, tomorrow, we
were able to offer an uncensored version of our search engine
in China, we would absolutely consider that. I think that would
be a welcome move.
But throughout our conversations the Chinese Government has
indicated that that's not a negotiable point, so we are where
we are. Our hope is that the way we've done this, the solution
we've put forward, operating out of Hong Kong, will be a way
that will give people access to information, and over time they
will.
If I could actually, just to amplify the point that the
Ambassador just made, to just say that I think we actually do
have a little bit of a hard road ahead. In the mid-1990s there
was this great saying floating around the Internet that ``the
Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around
it.'' That was John Gilmore, who's an engineer, not a lawyer.
It was this great idea, that the Internet was this unstoppable
force for freedom. If you have the Internet, you can't stop
people from getting information.
What we've discovered, and I think the point in my
testimony was, that in the last 15 years governments have
started to learn how to exert more control and it's going to
take a lot of work to combat that censorship. But I am an
optimist, as well I think we are optimists, that human nature
demands information, that people will seek information
regardless of frontiers, to paraphrase the UN Declaration of
Human Rights, and that ultimately that Internet freedom will be
something that we'll be able to achieve. But it's going to take
a lot of work and we need your help.
Chairman Dorgan. All right.
And Ms. Jones, what do you believe is Go Daddy's future
relationship with business in China?
Ms. Jones. We would say something similar. We have been
doing this for six years. We see no reason why we shouldn't
continue to do it for six more, and six more after that. But
again, we have to have a reasonable expectation from officials
in China as to what level of information is going to be
required. If they want to go ahead and repeal the new rules,
we'll probably open up the .CN name the next day. It's just a
flip of a switch for us.
But it's really discouraging to us that we've been able to
help people in China get their message out for six years, and
then suddenly, in the snap of a finger, the service has to
become unavailable because it looks like we need to operate, as
I said before, as the agent of the Chinese Government, and
we're not interested in being that.
We really exist to enable people to share their thoughts
openly and we agree that the Internet demands the open exchange
of ideas. Some of them are good and some of them aren't, but
nevertheless they are all ideas and they deserve to be shared.
So we would strongly urge this Commission to work with the
authorities in China to repeal that rule, and if you can
accomplish that we'll be happy to flip the switch and turn it
back on.
Chairman Dorgan. Well, thank you very much.
Let me thank all of the witnesses. Senator LeMieux, thank
you for your participation. I'm just looking at this CECC
document that our Congressional-Executive Commission on China
will be putting in the record today of political prisoners in
China, with their photographs and data. These are people who
have gone to the Internet and published articles and journals,
and for that they are sitting in a dark prison cell somewhere
in China.
It demonstrates that this issue is not just some
theoretical issue over which we should just have an interesting
discussion or debate. It is, in some cases, life and death, and
it is always about freedom. This Commission scheduled this
hearing to try to understand what is happening in China,
especially as a result of the Google decision. Again, I
compliment Google and compliment Go Daddy for making decisions
that I'm sure are difficult to make, but yet reflect companies
that are willing to make the right decisions.
It is our hope that things in China will improve. It's not
our lot in life to decide that we should just beat up on China
every time we have a hearing, but China is going to be a big
part of our future. It's a significant, important part of the
world. And, it's going to be a significant, important part of
the future of our country, the United States. If not for that
reason alone, we must examine what is occurring inside China
today.
It has always been our intention, especially through trade,
travel, and also through information, to pursue what is called
``constructive engagement'' with China and similar countries,
believing that constructive engagement would move these
countries toward greater respect of human rights. Yet, we find
ourselves, in March 2010, still talking about a country that
censors the Internet and throws people into the dark cells
because of what they think or what they publish. This behavior
by a state seems so out of touch with the modern world.
Today the Commission engaged a discussion about Internet
freedom in China and how we might persuade that country to move
toward greater human rights. So all of you have contributed
significantly to the hearing, and we appreciate your testimony
and your attendance.
This hearing is adjourned.
[The questions and responses submitted for the record
appear in the appendix.]
[Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Alan Davidson
march 24, 2010
Chairman Dorgan, Chairman Levin, and Members of the Commission.
Thank you for bringing attention to the important issue of Internet
censorship, and for giving Google the opportunity to discuss today's
global challenges to freedom of expression and access to information
online. Internet censorship is a growing global problem. It not only
raises important human rights concerns, but also creates significant
barriers for U.S. companies doing business abroad. As Google's Director
of Public Policy in the Americas, I am part of the Google team that
works to promote free speech both in the United States and globally.
The number of governments that routinely censor the Internet has
grown from a handful in 2002 to more than 40 countries today. Even in
countries that are just beginning to make the Internet available to
their citizens, governments are simultaneously building sophisticated
tools for blocking and censoring content. Repressive regimes are
developing ever more advanced tools to use against dissidents and are
sharing censorship tactics across borders. Human rights observers have
noted that these governments are ``baking in'' censorship tools for the
Internet rather than chasing after criticism that has already been
aired.
The lack of transparency and accountability in blocking and
censoring is also a grave concern. Over the last several years, we have
seen an increasing number of governments, even democratic ones, choose
to blacklist certain sites they deem harmful without providing any
formal oversight of process or meaningful ability to appeal. In the
next few years, the Open Net Initiative predicts that we will see more
targeted surveillance and increasingly sophisticated malware being used
to make the monitoring and documentation of government activity even
harder.
But despite these challenges we remain optimistic about the ability
of technology to empower individuals and realize the potential for a
global Internet community. We believe that maximizing the free flow of
information online can help to increase openness and prosperity even in
closed societies.
As Google invests in new countries, we look to the following three
principles to help us protect online freedom of speech and increase
access to information:
Access--maximizing access to information on the Web
and tools for the creation of content.
Transparency--notifying users when information has
been removed by government demand.
Trust--retaining the trust of our users by protecting
their privacy and security from governmental acts intended to
chill speech.
With those principles in mind, we would like to address four main
issues in this testimony:
First, Google's situation in China.
Second, the global challenges Google and other U.S. companies face
every day from governments who seek to limit free expression online.
Third, the economic implications of censorship.
And finally, the need for governments around the world to do more
to reduce Internet censorship and support free expression online.
china update
Let us start with an update on Google's situation in China.
We launched Google.cn, our Chinese search engine, in January 2006
in the belief that the benefits of increased access to information for
people in China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in
agreeing to censor some results. While we have faced challenges,
especially in the last 12 to 18 months, we have also had some success.
Google has become the second most popular search engine in China,
behind Baidu, and we were the first search engine in China to let users
know when results had been removed to comply with Chinese law. Use of
our maps, mobile and translation services has grown quickly. And from a
business perspective, while our China revenues are still small in the
context of our larger business, the last quarter of 2009 was our most
successful quarter ever in China.
However, in the last year we have seen increasing attempts to limit
free speech on the Web in China. Numerous sites including YouTube, The
Guardian, Facebook, Twitter, Blogger and Wikipedia have been blocked,
some of them indefinitely. In addition, last June the Chinese
government announced that all personal computers sold in China would
need to be pre-loaded with software that could be used to censor online
content. After a public outcry and pressure from companies, the
proposal was later withdrawn.
Most recently, in mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated
and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from
China. What at first appeared to be an isolated security incident--
albeit a significant one--turned out upon investigation to be something
quite different.
First of all, at least twenty other large companies from a wide
range of businesses--including the Internet, finance, technology, media
and chemical sectors--were similarly targeted.
Second, we believe that a primary, albeit unsuccessful, goal of the
attack was to access Gmail accounts surreptitiously.
Third, we discovered in our investigation that the accounts of
dozens of U.S.-, China- and European-based Gmail users who are
advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely
accessed by third parties. I want to make clear that this happened
independent of the security breach to Google, most likely via phishing
scams or malware placed on the users. computers.
The attack on our corporate infrastructure and the surveillance it
uncovered--as well as attempts over the past year to limit free speech
on the Web even further--led us to conclude that we were no longer
willing to censor our search results in China. This decision was in
keeping with our pledge when we launched Google.cn that we would
carefully monitor conditions in China, including new laws and other
restrictions on our services.
I want to stress that while we know these attacks came from China,
we are not prepared to say who carried out these attacks. We do know
such attacks are violations of China's own laws and we would hope that
the Chinese authorities will work with US officials to investigate this
matter.
Earlier this week we stopped censoring our search services--Google
Search, Google News, and Google Images--on Google.cn. Users visiting
Google.cn are now being redirected to Google.com.hk, where we are
offering uncensored search in simplified Chinese, specifically designed
for users in mainland China and delivered via our servers in Hong Kong.
Figuring out how to make good on our promise to stop censoring
search on Google.cn has been hard. We want as many people in the world
as possible to have access to our services, including users in mainland
China, yet the Chinese government has been crystal clear throughout our
discussions that self-censorship is a non-negotiable legal requirement.
We believe this new approach of providing uncensored search in
simplified Chinese from Google.com.hk is a practical solution to the
challenges we've faced--it's entirely legal and will meaningfully
increase access to information for people in China. We are well aware
that the Chinese government can, at any time, block access to our
services--indeed we have already seen intermittent censorship of
certain search queries on both Google.com.hk and Google.com.
In terms of Google's wider business operations, we intend to
continue R&D work in China and also to maintain a sales presence there,
though the size of the sales team will obviously be partially dependent
on the ability of mainland Chinese users to access Google.com.hk.
Before moving on to the broader, global challenges Google faces, we
would like to make clear that all these decisions have been driven and
implemented by our executives in the United States, and that none of
our employees in China can, or should, be held responsible for them.
Despite all the uncertainty and difficulties they have faced since we
made our announcement in January, they have continued to focus on
serving our Chinese users and customers. We are immensely proud of
them.
other global challenges and economic implications
China is simply one example of a global phenomenon that raises
concerns. Google has become a regular focus of governmental efforts to
limit individual expression because our technologies and services
enable people with Internet connections to speak to a worldwide
audience.
More than 25 governments have blocked Google services over the past
few years. Since 2007, YouTube has been blocked in over a dozen
countries. We have received reports that our blogging platform has been
blocked in at least seven countries, and that our social networking
site, Orkut, has been blocked in several countries.
Iran provides a prominent recent example of political censorship.
This past June, during the protests that followed the presidential
election in Iran, the government of Iran ejected foreign journalists,
shut down the national media and disrupted Internet and cell phone
service. In spite of this, YouTube and Twitter were cited by
traditional journalists and bloggers alike as the best source for
firsthand accounts and on-the-scene footage of the protests and
violence in Tehran.
The Iran example demonstrates why it's imperative for governments,
companies, and individuals to do more to ensure that the Internet
continues to be a powerful medium for expressing political opinions,
religious views and other core speech without restriction.
But the debate on Internet censorship is, of course, not only about
human rights. At issue is the continued economic growth spurred by a
free and globally accessible Internet. Barriers to the free flow of
information online have significant and serious economic implications:
they impose often one-sided restrictions on the services of U.S. and
global Internet companies, while also impeding other businesses who
depend on the Internet to reach their customers.
When a foreign government pursues censorship policies in a manner
that favors domestic Internet companies, this goes against basic
international trade principles of non-discrimination and maintaining a
level playing field. Local competitors gain a business advantage, and
consumers are deprived of the ability to choose the best services for
their needs. And when a government disrupts an Internet service in its
entirety--e.g., blocking an entire website because of concerns with a
handful of user-generated postings--the government is restricting trade
well-beyond what would be required even if it had a legitimate public
policy justification for the censorship.
Opaque censorship restrictions can also be very damaging to the
``host'' nation, because they undermine the rule of law and make it
very hard for foreign companies to navigate within the law, which has
negative consequences in terms of foreign direct investment.
The U.S. Government has taken some positive steps to address the
means and effects of censorship through trade tools. The United States
Trade Representative (USTR) has sought explicitly to address some of
these issues in trade agreements--most recently, in the U.S.-Korea Free
Trade Agreement--and we applaud these efforts. And the Commerce
Department and USTR have been helpful in the context of particular
incidents we have encountered in the past.
But governments need to develop a full set of new trade rules to
address new trade barriers. We encourage further efforts along these
lines, by the U.S. Government and other governments to redress
favoritism shown by some governments for indigenous companies over
U.S.-based corporations. We should continue to look for effective ways
to address unfair foreign trade barriers in the online world: to use
trade agreements, trade tools, and trade diplomacy to promote the free
flow of information on the Internet.
how governments can support free expression
Internet censorship is a challenge that no particular industry--
much less any single company--can tackle on its own. However, we
believe concerted, collective action by governments, companies and
individuals can help promote online free expression and reduce the
impact of censorship.
As I noted previously, our business is based on the three
principles of access, transparency, and retaining the trust of online
users. These principles are not exclusive to Google, and there are ways
that the public and private sectors can work together to advance them.
First, making every effort at both the grassroots and government
level to maximize access to information online. The State Department
recently issued a request for proposals on projects to help citizens on
the ground access information they would not otherwise be able to share
or receive. Google supports the joint commitment of Congress and the
Obama Administration to provide funds to groups around the world to
make sure people who need to access the Internet safely get the right
training and tools. This is a great step forward, and we believe much
more can be done to support grassroots organizations that develop
technology to combat Internet censorship.
Second, establishing transparency as a norm when governments
attempt to censor or request information about users, or even when a
company's network comes under attack. This is a critical part of the
democratic process, and governments must strike a balance between law
enforcement and proper disclosure, allowing citizens to hold their
lawmakers accountable. In many cases the cloud of secrecy around cyber
attacks only works to the attackers. advantage because it enables them
to operate more easily under the radar. Some of the sensible ideas
we've heard discussed to improve transparency include: requiring annual
company reports on the levels of filtering being complied with and
requests for personally identifiable information from government
officials; and greater engagement by the U.S. Government with countries
that censor the Internet, so any company disclosures result in concrete
actions by the U.S. government.
Third, retaining users. trust by committing to protect their
privacy and security. There is nothing new about governments using
surveillance and intimidation tactics to chill speech about
uncomfortable ideas. What is new is the growing deployment of online
surveillance toward these ends. To be clear, we fully support lawful
investigation by government authorities to protect individuals and
companies. But we are committed to protecting our users against
unlawful and overbroad government demands for their personal
information and ensuring the security of our networks. The global trend
toward increasing government access to online communications is of
great concern and demands serious review and oversight. In addition,
the United States should push for improved international cooperation to
protect user privacy.
We are also grateful for the efforts of lawmakers to bring more
companies into the Global Network Initiative (GNI). As a platform for
companies, human rights groups, investors, and academics, the GNI
requires its members to commit to standards that respect and protect
user rights to privacy and freedom of expression. Additional corporate
participation will help the GNI reach its full potential--and we look
to the Members of this Commission for continued leadership.
And finally, ensuring that the U.S. Government makes the issue of
Internet openness, including the free flow of information, an important
part of foreign policy, trade, development and human rights engagement.
This includes prioritizing the issue as a matter of U.S. foreign
policy, including in various dialogues that the U.S. Government pursues
with regimes that are heavy Internet restrictors; using trade tools
where possible; and perhaps also making it part of the criteria for
receiving development aid. Ultimately, governments that respect the
right to online free expression should work together to craft new
international rules to better discipline government actions that impede
the free flow of information over the Internet. We need forward-looking
rules that provide maximum protection against the trade barriers of the
new technology era.
On the multilateral human rights front, enforcing and supporting
the mechanisms of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and others under the UN system (e.g., the UN Human Rights
Committee) to demand accountability from governments for Internet
censorship is helpful. At the very least, these mechanisms can be
better used to shine light on government abuses.
conclusion
We would like to thank Chairman Dorgan, Chairman Levin, the members
of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, and other Members
of Congress who have spoken in support of upholding the right to online
free expression around the world. It is only with the attention and
involvement of leaders like yourselves that we can make real progress
in the effort to protect these basic human rights. We look forward to
working with you and other government officials to find viable
solutions to maximize access to information, increase transparency and
protect users around the world.
______
Prepared Statement of Christine Jones
march 24, 2010
introduction
Thank you, Chairman Dorgan, and members of the Commission, for the
honor of testifying here today. We at Go Daddy applaud the actions of
the Commission to support the continuing global exchange of information
and trade on the Internet.
background
The recent cyber attacks on Google and other U.S. companies are
troubling, but they reflect a situation that The Go Daddy Group has
been combating for many years. Go Daddy is an Arizona company which
consists of eight ICANN-accredited registrars, including GoDaddy.com,
Inc., the world's largest domain name registrar. This month, Go Daddy
passed a major Internet milestone--we now have more than 40 million
domain names under management, more than any other company in the
history of the Internet. We are also the largest provider of shared
website hosting. We have more than 7 million paying customers located
all over the globe. So, if you are an active Internet user with a
domain name or a website, the likelihood is that at some point you have
utilized Go Daddy's services to engage on the Internet.
Go Daddy's customer base includes tens of thousands of Chinese
nationals. We work with Chinese customers on a daily basis to help them
to establish an identity on the Internet, and to ensure the secure and
seamless operation of their hosted websites. We are also constantly in
the process of repelling cyber attacks against the systems and
infrastructure that secure our customers' websites and Internet
activities. A large percentage of those attacks can be traced to China,
as can other illegal activities that interfere with our customers' safe
and productive use of the Internet. I am here today to share some of
our experiences as they relate to China, specifically with respect to
the following: increased monitoring and surveillance of .CN domain name
registrations; increasing DDoS attacks originating in China; spam;
payment fraud; and, what we would like to see the U.S. Government do to
help alleviate some of these issues.
increased monitoring and surveillance of .cn registrations
There appears to be a recent increase in China's surveillance and
monitoring of the Internet activities of its citizens. As a domain name
registrar, Go Daddy provides registration services for numerous top
level domain names. Top level domains, or ``TLDs,'' are the suffix that
appears at the end of a domain name (for example, .COM, .NET, etc.).
One of the TLDs we have historically offered is .CN, the Chinese
country code top level domain (or ``ccTLD''). Go Daddy is authorized by
the China Internet Network Information Centre (known as the CNNIC), a
quasi-governmental agency in China, to offer registration services for
the .CN ccTLD. Go Daddy began to offer the .CN ccTLD in April of 2005
and, at this time we have approximately 27,000 .CN domain names under
management. Registering a domain name with the .CN ccTLD is an
important step for any individual or company wishing to establish an
audience or business foothold in the Chinese market.
When Go Daddy started registering the .CN TLD in 2005, CNNIC
required us to collect the contact information of the individual or
company registering the domain name. The required contact information
included first and last names of the registrant, his or her physical
address, telephone number and email address. The extent of the personal
information collected was typical of what is normally required by
.ccTLD registries.
A little over four months ago, on December 12, 2009, CNNIC
announced that it was implementing a new policy relating to the
registration of .CN domain names, and that it would begin to enforce
the new policy effective December 14, 2009. The policy required that
any registrants of new .CN domain names provide color headshot photo
identification, business identification (including a Chinese business
registration number), and physical signed registration forms. This
information was to be collected by the registrar, and then forwarded to
CNNIC for its review prior to the activation of the registration.
Less than a month later, on January 5, 2010, CNNIC announced that
Chinese nationals were no longer permitted to register domain names
through non-Chinese registrars. In accordance with the new policy, Go
Daddy halted all new .CN registrations.
On February 3, 2010, CNNIC announced that it would reopen .CN
domain name registrations to overseas registrars. However, the
stringent new identification and documentation procedures would remain
in effect. CNNIC also announced an audit of all .CN domain name
registrations currently held by Chinese nationals. Domain name
registrars, including Go Daddy, were then instructed to obtain photo
identification, business identification, and physical signed
registration forms from all
existing .CN domain name registrants who are Chinese nationals, and to
provide copies of those documents to CNNIC. We were advised that domain
names of registrants who did not register as required would no longer
resolve. In other words, their domain names would no longer work.
We were immediately concerned about the motives behind the
increased level of registrant verification being required by CNNIC. It
did not make sense to us that the identification procedures that had
been in place since 2005 were apparently no longer sufficient from
China's standpoint, and no convincing rationale for the increase in
documentation was offered. We were also concerned by the ex post facto
nature of the new requirement--in other words, at the time the affected
Chinese nationals registered their domain names, they were not required
to provide photo identification and the other documentation now being
required by the CNNIC. The new documentation requirement was to be
retroactively applied to registrants who had previously registered
their websites, in some cases years before. The intent of the new
procedures appeared, to us, to be based on a desire by the Chinese
authorities to exercise increased control over the subject matter of
domain name registrations by Chinese nationals.
Approximately 1,200 unique Go Daddy customers were affected by
CNNIC's ex post facto application of the requirement for additional
identification documentation. This represented a much larger number of
domain names, of course, because many registrants have multiple domain
names under their control. We contacted our affected customers advising
of this new requirement, and advised them that, if they wished to
provide us with the required documentation, we would provide it to
CNNIC in accordance with CNNIC's directive. Ultimately, only about 20
percent of the affected customers submitted the required documentation
and agreed to allow us to submit it to the CNNIC. The domain names of
the remaining 900 or so customers remain at risk of cancellation. That
means thousands of websites the Chinese authorities may successfully
disable because of retroactive application of this new set of rules.
Go Daddy has been registering domain names since 2000. We currently
serve as an authorized registrar for dozens of domain name extensions.
This is the first time a registry has asked us to retroactively obtain
additional verification and documentation of individuals who have
registered a domain name through our company. We are concerned for the
security of the individuals affected by CNNIC's new requirements, as
well as for the chilling effect we believe the requirements will have
on new .CN domain name registrations. For these reasons, we have
decided to discontinue offering new .CN domain names at this time. We
continue to manage the .CN domain names of our existing customers.
increasing ddos attacks originating in china
Another China-related issue we have seen recently is an increase in
the number of distributed denial of service (also known as ``DDoS'')
attacks on the systems that host our customer websites. In Go Daddy's
case, a DDoS attack is typically an attempt to make websites that we
host unavailable to their intended users for some period of time. We
also combat many attacks that are more systematic, such as hackers
attempting to insert malicious code into the pages of our customers'
hosted websites. An example of this type of attack would be the
installation of spyware on the computers of all visitors to a website
we host. The spyware then logs keystrokes to harvest passwords to email
accounts, which can then be infiltrated and monitored without the
knowledge of the account owner.
Go Daddy operates data centers, and has invested hundreds of
millions of dollars in those centers, including building and operating
state-of-the-art security measures that monitor and fight external
attacks on our systems 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. In the first
three months of this year, we have repelled dozens of extremely serious
DDoS attacks that appear to have originated in China, based on the IP
addresses from which the attacks derived. Had our security systems not
countered these attacks, the result would have been a widespread take-
down of our customers' hosted websites.
spam
Unlike many other Internet companies of our size, Go Daddy operates
a large 24/7 Abuse Department whose mission it is to identify and help
stop illegal and malicious activity on the Internet. We work very
closely with local, federal and international law enforcement agencies
to stop all types of Internet abuse, including child pornographers,
unauthorized online pharmacies, spammers, phishers, and sellers of
counterfeit merchandise.
In monitoring spam activities, we have found that an overwhelming
majority of websites promoted through spam are hosted in China, often
at service providers that choose to ignore complaints of spam and other
types of illegal activity. When Go Daddy and other legitimate hosting
companies receive complaints that spam is being sent from websites
hosted by their company, the sites are typically taken offline.
However, many companies in China offer so-called bulletproof hosting,
where websites are allowed to stay online and spam operations can
continue unabated, even after receipt of a complaint.
China is also the location of choice for buying and selling lists
of spam ``zombies''--personal computers deliberately infected with
spam-enabling viruses and operated by ordinary, usually oblivious,
computer users around the world. Our
research indicates that China dominates the market for buying and
selling lists of zombie PCs, which are peddled by virus writers on
Internet forums found on Chinese servers. Lists can currently be had
for about $2,000-$3,000 per 20,000 compromised computers.
Another reason so much spam appears to originate in China is the
spam industry's growing sophistication. The modern spam industry is
populated by technically advanced programmers and organized crime
rings. Spammers create complex phishing scams to lure individuals to
fake websites where they are conned into divulging bank account, social
security and credit card details. Organized spam groups tend to avoid
operating in jurisdictions where authorities are hostile and penalties
potentially severe. To date, China has not enforced significant
penalties against spammers and others who utilize the Internet to
engage in criminal activities; thus, it has become a sort of safe
harbor for such criminals.
China is also an attractive locale from which spammers operate
because of its low costs. A domain name can be bought for as little as
$0.15 in China, which allows scammers to acquire lots of domain names
inexpensively. Domain names cost much more in the United States, where
some of the money goes to fighting abuse and spam. But the low revenue
stream in China is likely hampering the creation of programs to stop
abuse.
China today is basically the only major market where spammers can
do just about anything they want. Go Daddy's efforts to persuade
authorities there to investigate or prosecute spammers have been
ineffective, as have our efforts to work with Chinese-based hosting
companies to shut down compromised websites. Official pronouncements by
the Chinese government usually appear to be aimed at getting
Chinese spam servers removed from foreign blacklists rather than
actually preventing spam.
payment fraud
In addition to our Abuse department, Go Daddy also has a full time
Fraud department that is continually monitoring and guarding against
payment fraud issues affecting our customers. The payment fraud trends
associated with China-based users include the widespread use of
compromised U.S. or UK credit cards to purchase items. In one
particularly egregious case, an individual or group operating from
China is utilizing compromised credit cards from a wide variety of
banks to purchase one year domain name registrations. The registrant
then attempts to use the domain names to perform a variety of illegal
activities. Since January, our Fraud team has managed to close 134 new
shopper accounts associated with this repeat Chinese fraudster.
Go Daddy has also been successful in combating Chinese spammers by
closing customer accounts through our payment fraud process. Most
recently, our Abuse department identified a Chinese-based spammer with
175 separate shopper accounts with Go Daddy. Although each of the
accounts was opened using a valid PayPal account, we were able to halt
the spammer's activities by placing a payment fraud lock on the
accounts.
In addition to the challenges presented by China-based criminals,
societal and cultural norms in China can make it difficult to identify
and resolve payment fraud issues affecting legitimate Chinese
customers. For instance, a problem we frequently encounter is the
provision of invalid shopper/billing information by Chinese shoppers.
Where invalid information is provided, contacting the customer to
verify order activity is usually impossible.
Credit card use is not prevalent in China, and most Chinese
shoppers do not possess their own credit card. When credit cards are
issued, they are often shared by numerous individuals. It is therefore
very common for accounts owned by Chinese shoppers to have multiple
unrelated names and addresses on file. This too makes identifying
payment fraud more difficult.
Despite these payment fraud challenges, Go Daddy is focused on
continuing to serve and expand upon its Chinese customer base. In
furtherance of this goal, in December 2009, we began to offer the
Alipay payment processing system to our customers. Alipay is China's
leading independent third-party online payment platform, with more than
270 million registered users. What sets Alipay apart from other online
payment platforms is that it holds funds in escrow until the product is
received. Chinese customers can fund their Alipay accounts using direct
bank payments or debit cards, both of which are more common forms of
payment in China than credit cards. Alipay is a popular and trusted
option for Chinese consumers, and we have experienced a large increase
in our volume of sales to Chinese customers since we implemented it as
a payment option. We have also found use of the Alipay system to be
very helpful in combating China-related payment fraud. In fact, our new
shopper payment fraud rates associated with Chinese accounts has been
reduced by approximately 50 percent since we introduced Alipay in
December of 2009.
what the u.s. government can do to help
Go Daddy's primary mission is to promote secure, easy, equal access
to the Internet to people around the world. We are also committed to
ending illegal or nefarious uses of the Internet, including for the
invasion of personal privacy or to limit freedom of expression. We
believe that many of the current abuses of the Internet originating in
China are due to a lack of enforcement against criminal activities by
the Chinese government. Our experience has been that China is focused
on using the Internet to monitor and control the legitimate activities
of its citizens, rather than penalizing those who commit Internet-
related crimes.
We believe that countries or individuals that engage in cyber
attacks or other types of Internet crimes should face serious
consequences and international condemnation. We hope that the U.S.
government can use its influence with authorities in China to increase
Chinese enforcement activities relating to Internet abuse, while
encouraging the free exchange of ideas, information, and trade. This
would include the retraction of China's recent policies relating to the
registration of .CN domain names, which will act as a barrier to
Internet access by Chinese nationals.
______
Prepared Statement of Sharon Hom
march 24, 2010
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting Human Rights in China (HRIC)
to testify at this important and timely hearing. As a Chinese human
rights NGO, HRIC appreciates this opportunity to share our experience
and some modest recommendations. In light of the events of the past
week, the topic for today is a story still in progress.
The loss of annual MFN review leverage in 2000 and a decade of
delinking of human rights from trade has contributed to the lack of
systematic and sustainable human rights progress, and an unstable,
unpredictable climate for foreign business in China. In recent months,
there have also been disturbing reports about a series of cyber-
attacks, including the one publicized by Google in January of this
year, emanating from China, targeting foreign governments, private
businesses, and human rights advocates both in the United States and
around the world. These cyber-attacks present serious cross-border
human rights, diplomatic, and business challenges for China and the
world.\1\
As the comprehensive CECC Annual Report for 2009, the State
Department Country report for China, and recent United Nations human
rights reviews of China's record demonstrate, human rights violations
in China--a country vital to U.S. security, trade, and human rights
policy interests--remain serious, systematic, and widespread.\2\ On top
of the economic, political, and increasing soft power leverage of
China, China exerts control over expression on the Internet through its
state-of-the arts technology, state secrets and state security system,
police and security
apparatus, and resulting self-censorship.\3\ By doing so, the Chinese
government's policy and practices on information control implicate two
universally recognized and mutually reinforcing human rights--the right
to freedom of expression and opinion and the right to privacy.\4\
The experiences of HRIC's own staff also illustrate that the
Chinese authorities' repressive tactics at home extend to Chinese
nationals and human rights defenders abroad. Such tactics include
blacklisting, surveillance, and even inhumane denials of permission to
return to China for family funerals. Additionally, the Chinese
authorities have succeeded in preventing independent human rights NGO
dedicated to China from succeeding in applying for ECOSOC status or UN
conferences' accreditation--thereby undermining independent Chinese NGO
voices.
role of technology
The rapid pace of technology developments globally and in China,
including in mobile and connective technologies, has provided tools for
increased social control and human rights violations in China,
especially regarding freedom of expression and privacy. However,
China's Great Fire Wall is impressive, but clearly not impregnable, as
technology developments also provide tools for advancing fundamental
rights and democracy in China. With over 384 million citizens online,
600 million mobile phone users, and between 26,000 to 30,000 Tweeters,
all despite China's censorship regime, China is a prime target country
for developing empowering potential uses for new technology, which will
also have significant implications for the region and for the future
security and viability of the Internet worldwide.
For more than two decades now, HRIC has focused on supporting
Chinese lawyers, activists, journalists, writers, and other rights
defenders in China. From our China office in Hong Kong, and our U.S.
office in New York, and with a committed staff with Chinese and
international law, technology, and media expertise, we have also been
developing and deploying a range of technology approaches and tools to
promote uncensored information flow into and out of China. Using
Internet technology that bypasses China's censorship mechanism, HRIC
has provided and
continues to provide an uncensored platform for Chinese voices and
disseminates independent news, discussion, and rights-related
electronic publications through stable mass e-mail delivery to over
200,000 subscribers in every province and autonomous region in China.
HRIC's electronic publications provide access to proxy servers and
six interrelated websites offering online Chinese publications, tools
for activists, and online advocacy resources. Analysis of e-mail
delivery rates indicate that since a new electronic biweekly was
launched in June 2009, an average of 74 percent of biweekly e-
newsletters reached the first Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP)
server in mainland China. This program has enabled individuals in
China, through the use of proxy technology and other circumvention
tools, to have uncensored access to human rights information on the
Internet and a space for debate and discussion. HRIC
incorporated YouTube and Twitter into its advocacy strategy last year
as well, launching an HRIC YouTube channel and regularly tweeting the
latest human rights developments.
the case of liu xiaobo: who's afraid of the internet?
There is perhaps no better example of the Chinese government's
anxiety underlying the official crackdown on freedom of expression on
the Internet than the case of Liu Xiaobo, a prominent independent
intellectual in China, long-time advocate of political reform and human
rights in China, and outspoken critic of the Chinese communist regime.
On Christmas Day, 2009, a court in Beijing convicted Liu Xiaobo of
``inciting subversion of state power'' and sentenced him to 11 years in
prison and two years of deprivation of political rights. The verdict
cited as evidence passages from six essays Liu published online between
2005 and 2007 and his role in drafting Charter 08, an online petition
for democratic reform issued on December 9, 2008, which has since
garnered more than 10,000 signatures, predominantly from Chinese in
China. On February 9, 2010, a higher court rejected Liu's appeal and
upheld the verdict.\5\
Liu Xiaobo's case elucidates one of the most crucial challenges
facing the emerging Chinese civil society: the clash of visions between
Chinese pressing for a democratic China governed by genuine rule of
law, and the Chinese authorities, who demonstrate time and again their
intolerance for diverse views and their need to maintain control at all
cost. The outcome of Liu's case has made clear the authorities'
willingness to trample on a fundamental human right protected in the
Chinese Constitution and enshrined in international human rights law.
It also raises serious concerns about the prospects for the rule of
law, human rights, and democracy in China.
Liu's six essays cited in the verdict were the following:
The CPC's Dictatorial Patriotism (posted on
Epochtimes.com and 5 links): Liu debunks the notion
successfully purveyed by the CPC that the ruling party is the
Chinese nation itself, a fallacious concept that has enabled it
to maintain absolute rule over the people.
The Many Aspects of CPC Dictatorship (512 clicks;
posted on observechina.net; secretchina.com): Liu describes the
post-Mao regime--unlike that during the era of ``Maoist
totalitarianism''--as more skillful in using ``pragmatic,
.exible control methods'' to maintain stability. Liu warns that
``[t]he loyalty bought by the promise of a comfortable life has
a soul that is rotten to the core,'' and that the system is
ultimately unsustainable.
Can It be that the Chinese People Deserve Only
``Party-Led Democracy? '' (402 clicks; posted on
epochtimes.com; observechina.net): Liu points out that the
Chinese people--having been conditioned historically to view
any benevolent policy as mercy granted by their ruler--are in
fact complicit in their own oppression. Rather than waiting for
the arrival of a ``virtuous master,'' they must, Liu maintains,
place their hope in the ``continuous expansion of the ?`new
power' among the people.''
Changing the Regime by Changing Society (748 clicks;
posted on epochtimes.com; observechina.net): Liu explores how a
continuously growing civil society is the key to China's
gradual, bottom-up transformation into a free society.
The Negative Effects of the Rise of Dictatorship on
World Democratization (57 clicks; posted on observechina.net;
secretchina.com): Liu discusses China's use of ``money
diplomacy'' to degrade world civilization, and the necessity of
helping the world's largest dictatorship transform into a free
and democratic country with direct consequences for global
democratization.
Further Questions About Child Slavery in China's
Kilns (488 clicks; posted on minzhuzhongguo.org;
renyurenquan.org): Liu examines the extreme government
corruption and lack of accountability that have enabled
thousands of children to be kidnapped and used as slaves in
kiln factories.
The verdict also cited Charter 08 (5154 clicks; posted on
chinesepen.org, boxun.org, minzhuzhongguo.org).
Liu Xiaobo was a principal drafter of Charter 08, an appeal for
fundamental political transformation and for the implementation of key
foundational principles--
freedom, human rights, and equality, among others. The document also
lists 19
essential features of a new, democratic government, including
legislative democracy, judicial independence, urban-rural equality,
freedom of association, assembly, expression and religion, social
security, and transitional justice.
In their argument at trial, Liu's defense lawyers pointed out that
the articles and Charter 08 were posted on websites based outside
China, not accessible by people inside China. However, the court's
verdict provided the total number of clicks, as of December 23, 2009,
on the articles and Charter 08 as 7,361 (with the clicks on specific
items ranging from a low of 57 to a high of 5,154). Even if all the
clicks were made by Chinese citizens inside China, and even if each
click represents a different visitor, the total number of people is an
infinitesimally small portion of China's population of 1.3 billion.
If 7,361 people reading these documents can, in the view of the
Chinese authorities, pose such a grave threat, whatever that reveals
about the sense of security among those in power, Liu Xiaobo's case is
also a testament to the power and necessity of freedom of expression.
In addition to the high-profile case of Liu Xiaobo, there are
countless other examples of China's use of the crime of ``incitement to
subvert state power'' to punish expression on the Internet. Scholars,
journalists, artists, lawyers, and rights activists have all found
themselves prosecuted for ``incitement to subvert state power,'' for
doing nothing more than exercising their rights to freedom of
expression and opinion online. As a consequence of using the Internet
as a platform to speak out on such important issues as democratic
reform, laborers' rights, state confiscation of lands, earthquake
victims' rights, and government corruption, these individuals have been
sentenced to draconian prison terms, some lasting more than a decade.
In 2009, HRIC issued press releases on at least 12 individuals who had
come under official scrutiny for their activities on the Internet.\6\
looking ahead and recommendations
In the fall of 2012, the Communist Party of China (CPC) will hold
the 18th National People's Congress. Due to term restrictions, Hu
Jintao, the current President of the People's Republic of China, will
be required to step down as the party's General Secretary at that time.
The 18th National People's Congress will therefore be the first time in
the CPC's history that a meeting to redistribute power will be held
without a political strongman casting his shadow over it. It will
decide on the dominant power in China's politics for the following five
to ten years.\7\
The political contest surrounding the 18th National People's
Congress is already having a clear effect on the current political
situation in China. The pattern in the past has been that during the
process of power transition within the CPC, various factions exhibit
exceptional toughness in order to demonstrate their ideological
orthodoxy and thus gain the upper hand in the power struggle. The
comprehensive tightening of social controls by Chinese authorities
since last year and their recent tough attitude in dealing with a
series of both domestic and foreign events is a manifestation of this
effect. One should not expect there to be any relaxation of this
posture before the 18th National People's Congress convenes in 2012.
While the political climate for the next few years may not be
encouraging, there are still concrete actions that the U.S. government
and the private sector can take.
Individual cases: In line with the U.S. government's
renewed engagement with the UN Human Rights Council, the United
States can press for releases of individuals as part of China's
compliance with decisions of independent UN human rights
mechanisms such as the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,
which has issued decisions on cases such as those of Shi Tao
and Jin Haike.\8\
Promoting empowering uses of technology: The past
decades of rapid-paced technology developments in China
demonstrate that there is no one silver bullet for a
sustainable solution to protect freedom of expression and
advance open, safe, and secure access to information, both of
which are critical to development of a democratic and open
society and a rule of law. Effective technology solutions must
be informed by human needs and deployed using approaches that
are sensitive to local culture, politics, and human rights
history and traumas.
Some specific areas in which the CECC could encourage greater
support and development through various existing and expanded U.S.
government programs and initiatives include:
--Expanding support for uncensored multimedia platforms
for Chinese voices and independent news, discussion,
and rights-related information, including through
creative use of social networking tools and YouTube.
--Development and safe dissemination of circumvention
tools beyond the small group of sophisticated netizens
already able to use these tools.
--Capacity-building initiatives that more effectively
use interactive web-based conference tools to allow a
greater range of targeted participants that avoid the
expense, travel restrictions, and other political
limitations of on-site events.
Promote diverse, concrete solutions and approaches
for doing business responsibly in China,\9\ including multi-
stakeholder initiatives, e.g., encouraging companies to join
and help develop the Global Network Initiative. The February
2010 letter from Senator Richard Durbin to 30 technology
companies asking them to join the Global Network Initiative and
seeking more information about their business practices in
China is one welcome step. In light of the global nature of the
challenges, the U.S. should also explore joint initiatives with
other governments.
The Google decision announced this week also illustrates the
possibility of moving strategically beyond an either/or mentality of
stay-and-censor or leave-the-country. By making its most recent move to
redirect users from Google.cn to Google.com.hk, and by creating an
additional website clearly and regularly updating the status of the
Chinese government's interference, Google has contributed to increasing
the transparency of and possible accountability for Chinese censorship.
Although it's not clear whether this one-country, two systems move will
evade the censorship system, at the very least, Google has taken a
stand that it will no longer be complicit in Chinese government
violation of human rights.
The human rights and business issues and challenges are complex,
and as Google co-founder Sergey Brin stated, ``The story's not over
yet.''
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
----------------
\1\ For more detailed discussion on cyber-espionage, see Ron
Deibert and Rafal Rohozinski, ``Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a
Cyber Espionage Network,'' Information Warfare Monitor, Munk Centre,
JR02-2009, March 29, 2009, http://www.scribd.com/doc/13731776/Tracking-
GhostNet-Investigating-a-Cyber-Espionage-Network.
\2\ See U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2009
Annual Report, available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/
annualRpt09/CECCannRpt2009.pdf; U.S. Department of State, 2009 Human
Rights Report: China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), available
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eap/135989.htm; United
Nations Committee Against Torture, ``Concluding observations of the
Committee against Torture: China,'' UN Doc. CAT/C/CHN/CO/4, December
12, 2008, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/
cats41.htm; United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, ``Concluding Observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination: China,'' UN Doc. CERD/C/CHN/CO/
10-13, August 28, 2009, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/cerd/cerds75.htm. See also HRIC's recent parallel reports to UN
bodies: Human Rights in China, Implementation of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in the People's
Republic of China: A Parallel NGO Report by Human Rights in China, June
2009, http://www.hrichina.org/public/PDFs/Reports/2009-CERD--
Report.pdf; Human Rights in China, Implementation of the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment in the People's Republic of China: A Parallel NGO Report by
Human Rights in China, October 2008, http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/
Submissions/HRIC-CAT-2008-FINAL.pdf; Human Rights in China,
Implementation and Protection of Human Rights in the People's Republic
of China: A Parallel NGO Report by Human Rights in China, September
2008, http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/Submissions/2008--HRIC--UPR--
Report.pdf (submitted to the UN Human Rights Council in advance of
China's 2009 Universal Periodic Review).
\3\ For more detailed discussion on the Chinese government's tools
for suppressing information access and exchange, see Ronald Deibert,
China's Cyberspace Control Strategy: An Overview and Consideration of
Issues for Canadian Policy, February 2010, available at http://
www.canadianinternationalcouncil.org; James Fallows, ``The Connection
Has Been Reset,'' The Atlantic Monthly, March 2008, http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/-ldquothe-connection-has-
been-reset-rdquo/6650/; Andrew Lih, ``In Brief: Google's China Move,''
Andrew Lih Blog, posted on March 23, 2010, http://www.andrewlih.com/
blog/2010/03/23/in-brief-googles-china-move/; and Rebecca MacKinnon,
``China, the Internet and Google,'' Rconversation Blog, posted on March
23, 2010, http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2010/03/china-
the-internet-and-google.html.
\4\ For instance, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) states that ``[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers,'' while under
Article 12, ``[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon
his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks.'' UDHR, G.A. res. 217A
(III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).
\5\ Complete English translations of the criminal verdict of the
Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court and the decision of the
Beijing Municipal High People's Court against Liu Xiaobo have been made
available by HRIC in its quarterly publication China Rights Forum,
2010, no. 1, and will soon be made available at http://
www.hrichina.org/public/contents/category?cid=1043. In addition,
English translations of the six articles by Liu Xiaobo that formed the
basis of his criminal conviction have been made available by HRIC in
the same issue of China Rights Forum; a complete English translation of
Charter 08 has been made available by HRIC at http://www.hrichina.org/
public/contents/85717.
\6\ For more information on these and other individuals, see HRIC's
press releases and statements at http://www.hrichina.org/public/
contents/category?cid=1052.
\7\ Presently, two factions within the party, known as the
Princeling Faction and the Youth League Faction, are engaged in an
intense power struggle. The Princeling Faction has currently seized
favorable geopolitical and socioeconomic conditions to gain the upper
hand. Their representative, Xi Jinping, is preparing to take over the
duties of General Secretary of the CPC from Hu Jintao. Meanwhile, Li
Keqiang, the representative of the Youth League Faction, is preparing
to take over from Wen Jiabao as the Premier of the State Council.
However, much can happen between today and the fall of 2012, and what
will happen in the end is still uncertain.
\8\ Since May 2002, HRIC has submitted 60 individual cases to the
WGAD with 17 opinions issued by the WGAD. The conclusion of each and
every one of these opinions is that the detention in question is
arbitrary, meaning that individuals were being detained for exercising
fundamental freedoms or that the circumstances of their detentions
violated international standards and norms. The U.S. government should
urge action on the part of the Chinese government in these and other
cases of arbitrary detention of courageous activists and individuals.
By releasing these individuals, China will demonstrate its respect for
international human rights and its compliance with the decisions of
international human bodies.
\9\ See Human Rights in China, ``Human Rights: Everyone's
Business,'' China Rights Forum, 2008, no. 1, http://www.hrichina.org/
public/contents/category?cid=164873.
______
Prepared Statement of Edward Black
march 24, 2010
Good afternoon. We appreciate the efforts of this Commission and
especially Chairmen Dorgan and Levin to address the issue of Internet
freedom, and I thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is an
issue that will impact the shape of the world we will live in,
especially with regard to trade, privacy and human rights. For too long
the U.S. business community has had insufficient support from the U.S.
Government in responding to other nations' efforts to censor or spy on
their citizens, and to interfere with the reasonable flow of services,
products, and information. Companies are on the front lines in the
battle for Internet freedom, but when they are confronted with foreign
government demands, the governments that represent these companies must
lead in the defense of Internet freedom and free trade principles.
While I now represent a wide variety of technology and
communication companies, I was honored to served in the State and
Commerce Departments under five Secretaries in the 1970's, and early
80's, where I worked on East-West trade and was actively involved in
the approval of the first U.S./China trade agreement. I later chaired
and still serve on the State Department's Advisory Committee on
International Communication and Information Policy. The interconnection
between trade and human rights, including freedom of expression, is an
issue I have seen from various vantage points and have cared deeply
about throughout my career.
Our nation founded the Internet. Since that time, our government,
and those who are committed to freedom and democracy, should have been
out there creating and promoting visionary multilateral understandings
designed to maximize freedom on the Internet. We are still at an
historic crossroads, and we need to seize the opportunity to ensure the
Internet lives up to its potential to spread knowledge, awareness, and
expand human potential. If we do not lead, we can expect other
governments to stifle or distort that potential.
Over the past decade the Internet has grown into the most efficient
tool to communicate, exchange information, spark innovation and extend
opportunity to many millions around the world. The Internet platform
provides a level playing field for anyone to access information, and it
gives disadvantaged people and underrepresented and oppressed groups
around the world new opportunities to participate in economic, social,
cultural and political activity.
Access to the Internet--and the ability to fully use it for
communication, commerce, and exchanging information--is more than just
a First Amendment issue in this country. The United Nations recognizes
freedom of expression as a right. Internet freedom is nothing less than
freedom of expression in the 21st century. It must become a top-tier
human rights, foreign policy and trade issue.
Freedom and openness are the essence of the Internet, which is what
makes it such a powerful communications tool. Totalitarian regimes have
depended on tightly controlling the flow of information, both
domestically and from the outside world, and they have been
increasingly restricting the Internet to maintain their control of
information. It is a natural temptation for any government to want to
achieve its goals by all means possible. This makes the Internet a
tempting target to turn into a tool of state control. But we must
protect Internet openness not just from those who want to use it for
repression, but also from the many seemingly noble, well-meaning
efforts to control specific content or monitor Internet traffic.
Direct challenges to the openness and freedom of the Internet are
serious and dangerous. In the long run, though, we may find an equally
great threat to Internet freedom will come not from direct attacks,
which strike a fatal blow, but from a chipping away of openness--a
death by a thousand cuts. This happens as every seemingly well-
intentioned effort to remedy a societal problem wins an exception to
openness. Repressive regimes use that same technology, and rationale,
to filter the Internet or spy for reasons our nation does not support.
Our best response to this is for countries who support freedom of
expression, non-governmental organizations and consortia like the
Global Network Initiative (GNI) to work together to adopt a common
ethic of principles for Internet freedom, and to build on that support
in whatever form and by whatever means are possible.
My testimony explains that: (a) Internet censorship is a human
rights issue and a trade issue; and (b) Internet freedom is a principle
that countries purporting to espouse democracy and the welfare of their
citizens should practice and protect. Internet freedom must be advanced
through leading by example here at home and using negotiations, human
rights reports and trade agreements to build international support for
Internet freedom principles so as to make outliers of countries that
seek to isolate their citizens and use the Internet for censorship,
spying and repression.
censorship is a human rights issue
The Internet can be the greatest tool in history for people to
gather information, communicate and provide a more open, transparent
relationship between government and its citizens. Or, the Internet can
be among the greatest tools for political repression--depending on how
it is used. If we fail to take action, others may pervert the Internet
and finally bring about the Orwellian future we thought we had avoided,
one in which governments perpetually spy, surveil, censor and control--
and say they are doing it for our own good.
We fail the citizens of China, Vietnam, Iran and many other
Internet-Restricting Countries when we fail to note their governments'
censorship\1\ and website blocking in human rights reports. For
example, in the 2007 Country Reports on Human Rights issued by the
State Department, China was upgraded on its human rights issues--
despite the apparent increase that year in censorship and surveillance
on the Internet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ While the policy discussion around Internet-restricting
countries often refers to "censorship", there are in fact a variety of
practices at issue. When we casually refer to Internet censorship, we
must recognize that this includes restrictions such as filtering,
blocking, and delaying; state-imposed penalties for posting
``wrongthink'' online; as well as the self-censorship induced by
perpetual state surveillance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To respond to government crackdowns on protesters while looking
away when a government cracks down on access to the open Internet sends
a signal that we are not serious about Internet freedom. The U.S.
Government must consistently treat Internet freedom as a human rights
issue in its dealings and communications with foreign governments.
The need for countries that support freedom of expression to use
trade and diplomatic means to exert pressure on Internet censorship is
only increasing. Every week we fail to take strong action seems to be
viewed as a green light by Internet Restricting Countries like China to
further curtail Internet freedom. Last month, China announced new trial
restrictions on Internet websites. According to the Associated Press,
anyone wanting to start a website in China must now submit identity
cards, photos of themselves and meet with Chinese regulators and
service provides before they can register their website. The Chinese
government claims this will reduce pornography, but it will clearly
also crack down on anyone disagreeing with the government online.
We're here today partly because of the high profile battle of a
major technology company in China. But the number of companies and
countries impacted are far greater. There are few easy answers for
companies as they try to bring their technology services and
communications tools into nations that have different rules about free
speech and freedom of expression. Without the backing of their own
government, companies often are faced with the unappealing decision to
follow local laws or else exit the market. Staying and engaging can in
some cases offer choices to citizens in a repressive country that they
wouldn't otherwise have. What companies face varies from country to
country. The involvement of the federal government, pushing for a
common ethic, can help ease the complexity companies are forced to
handle in negotiating operating deals. But the complexity and diversity
of situations faced by companies means that rigid statutory solutions
may cause unexpected problems and even be counterproductive.
Ultimately countries--not companies--must battle countries on human
rights issues. But companies are working alongside government and human
rights groups to support Internet freedom. The Global Network
Initiative (GNI) is a collaborative project begun in 2008 in which a
handful of American companies, including Microsoft, Google and Yahoo!,
participate with international human rights organizations and academics
to find productive pathways forward in the quest for Internet freedom
and unimpeded commercial market access, being careful not to jeopardize
employees or other citizens in Internet Restricting Countries. Key
Members of Congress, including Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Rep.
Chris Smith (R-NJ), have expressed strong support for GNI and Secretary
Clinton did so as well in a major policy address in January. Congress
and the Administration should encourage broader participation in the
GNI by a wider range of U.S. companies, foreign nations and foreign and
multinational corporations.
I have seen China make extraordinary strides through economic
engagement with the outside world to the point where it is now one of
the most influential economies in the world. However, while a policy of
engagement may be a necessary condition for increased freedom, it is
not in and of itself sufficient to create freedom. As U.S. companies
face pressure from the Chinese government in the course of their
business activities in China, support from their own government is
needed to ensure that they are not taken advantage of, and that China
understands that access to its markets is not a coin that enables them
to buy their way out of respecting human rights and freedom. Countries
that have supported China's growth as a world player in the belief that
its economic growth would lead to its becoming a ``responsible
stakeholder'' need to take a stand when China's unreasonable demands on
issues like Internet censorship prove inconsistent with such
responsibility.
censorship is a trade issue
The United States is an information economy, and U.S. companies are
leading vendors of information products and services. In this context,
information discrimination by other countries fundamentally undermines
U.S. economic interests, including the interests of U.S. companies
seeking to access foreign markets, including those engaged in
electronic commerce. Filtering American content and services has the
effect of filtering American competition, and combating it should top
our trade agenda.
The development of the Internet has led to a revolution in the way
we conduct international commerce and trade. The success of e-commerce
depends on users feeling comfortable and secure enough to utilize the
services our industry provides. That comfort and security can only
exist in an environment of Internet freedom. When a foreign government
stifles online freedom or otherwise restricts the Internet, it creates
a hostile market environment by preventing its consumers from fully
using new products, applications and services offered by or through
U.S. tech companies.
Government restrictions on the Internet affect trade in a variety
of ways, including as follows:
Information discrimination represents a classic
``non-tariff trade barrier'' (NTB) that U.S. trade policy
should dismantle. By attempting to co-opt U.S. businesses into
content filtering, offenders create barriers to market entry
that would not otherwise exist.
Information discrimination constitutes an unfair
``rule of origin'' by filtering out (through a nontransparent
process) U.S.-originating content such as certain U.S. domains
deemed to be ``subversive.''
Information discrimination also violates the
fundamental free trade principle of ``national treatment'' to
U.S. services and service providers. This provides a leg up to
foreign competitors of U.S. companies, thus allowing U.S.
companies to be perceived as being coerced into lowering their
corporate moral standards and leading to negative public
reaction and even penalties at home.
The WTO requires transparency and access to judicial
or administrative review for measures affecting trade in
services. Foreign governments, however, regularly restrict the
Internet without transparency and accountability.
When a country blocks access to a U.S. search engine
or website, the advertising on those sites is also being
blocked, and trade in the products and services advertised are
interfered with. This could particularly impact small
businesses that rely on U.S. websites to reach international
markets.
If foreign governments push U.S. tech companies out of their
domestic market, small businesses that rely on these sites to advertise
or directly sell goods would be forced to do business instead with
those nations' domestic companies that offer similar services that
compete with U.S. companies. Indeed, the unreasonable demands the
Chinese government has continuously placed on U.S. companies--from
censorship coercion to Green Dam to Indigenous Innovation--all seem to
have the added objective of clearing the competitive deck of foreign
companies.
A special note with respect to China: the Chinese government has
been pursuing various ``indigenous innovation'' policies aimed at
controlling technology development and promoting local technology
companies. These technology policies extend to the Internet space as
well, where Chinese government has been making it difficult for foreign
companies to compete and favoring local companies. China's Indigenous
Innovation procurement requirement requires Chinese government agencies
to purchase only products for which intellectual property was developed
and owned in China. Both Indigenous Innovation and Internet censorship
are policies that set the price of access to the Chinese market at an
unacceptable level of submissiveness.
The European Union was laudably quick to take the first step to
recognize and respond to the issue of Internet freedom as a trade
issue. In 2007, the European Parliament overwhelmingly passed a
proposal to treat Internet censorship as a trade barrier by a vote of
571-38. Hopefully, the European Commission will soon take the necessary
further action to implement this policy.
first steps to promote internet freedom
Having neglected to devote appropriate attention to foreign
governments' restrictions of Internet content and services, we now have
considerable work before us. This is where we should begin:
The U.S. Government should investigate cases of
Internet censorship and
The United States Trade Representative (USTR), the
State Department and Commerce Department should raise issues of
Internet restrictions and combat them using the means of their
respective offices. Secretary Clinton's major policy speech is
an especially noteworthy and commendable beginning. We
appreciate actions like the letter the USTR issued in June
after China announced all personal computers sold as of July 1
must have the Green Dam Internet filtering software. But our
nation has historically missed opportunities to use our
existing trade agreements or even reports as leverage in
constraining Internet restrictions, censorship, and
surveillance.
USTR should highlight Internet censorship policies in
trade reports. In 2006, the USTR issued a report that was
billed as a top to bottom review of U.S.-China trade relations.
The report discussed simple infringement of intellectual
property, yet did not even mention Internet censorship
policies. In U.S. Government trade reports, more attention
needs to be paid to Internet restrictions taken in the name of
censorship. Every year, the USTR conducts the Special 301
review, in which we assess our trade relationships with an eye
toward intellectual property protection. Do principles of free
expression deserve any less protection? If we are willing to
make adequate protection for copyrighted movies a litmus test
for our trade relations, how can Internet freedom be worthy of
any less?
In its annual reports on trade barriers, the USTR
should review foreign
government restrictions on the Internet--taken in the name of
censorship or otherwise--and take appropriate action. If it is
found that censorship and surveillance impairs U.S. business
interests, we should reassess and adjust our trade
relationships accordingly.
Ultimately, the U.S. Government should negotiate
provisions that promote Internet commerce, openness and freedom
in trade and other agreements.
The U.S. Government should use existing trade
agreements wherever appropriate to address Internet
restrictions.
The State Department should actively support GNI. It
already lends financial support to censorship technology
circumvention projects in Internet Restricting Countries. By
encouraging broader American corporate responsibility and
participation in GNI, and by seeking the participation of our
allies abroad such as the European Union, Congress and the
State Department could boost GNI's visibility and effectiveness
worldwide.
The potential effectiveness of treating and
contesting Internet censorship as a trade barrier lies in the
fact that there is a global rules-based system on trade that
nations are obligated to follow. A multilateral rules-based
approach may create the necessary leverage to make Internet
Restricting Countries respect the economic significance of
restricting Internet freedom.
internet freedom begins at home
In addition to using existing trade agreements and human rights
monitoring to combat Internet censorship and spying, the United States
must lead by example when in comes to Internet freedom and openness by
being a model:
We should look at policies enacted by Congress or various
government agencies to see if they grow Internet access and increase
competition among Internet Access Providers. The competition will help
when dealing with another threat to the open Internet--legal or policy
changes that allow network level discrimination among end users and
messages on the Internet.
We should discourage censorship and surveillance ourselves,
restrict intrusive practices such as deep packet inspection and think
twice before attempting to block content perceived to be unsavory. Once
openness erodes, it's hard to get it back.
We must lead by example. While it is tempting to assume warrantless
monitoring of telephone calls, burdensome search engine subpoenas, and
regulatory power grabs are not to be equated with the systematic
oppression in authoritarian states, these distinctions are hard to make
to the rest of the world. To say that our government coerces Internet
companies for noble causes while others do so to repress is missing the
point: quibbling about the order of magnitude of civilian monitoring
will undermine the bold leadership that is necessary to backstop U.S.
Internet companies when they are facing down the Thought Police around
the world. If our government leads the fight for Internet freedom--by
example at home and by negotiations around the world--it will provide
invaluable political support to U.S. companies trying to honestly and
ethically compete in challenging markets.
conclusion
If the U.S. Government and others who value liberty, do not push
Internet freedom to the top of the priority list now, they will be
failing the future. We are now faced with a ``dangerous opportunity.''
China's policy of coerced censorship has now become a matter of global
public concern. The U.S. Government should take advantage of this
moment by pushing for substantive policies that would not only support
U.S. businesses resisting Internet oppression, but would also ensure
that no company is left to combat a foreign government's Internet
repression on its own. If the U.S. Government does not take meaningful
action, foreign governments will conclude that they are free to pick
off individual companies and intimidate them into submission.
Nations that support human freedom, dignity, and democracy should
ensure Internet freedom starts at home and set standards by adopting
policies that support a free open Internet. If the Internet is to
fulfill its potential as the printing press of the Digital Age, neither
a government nor an Internet access provider should act as a
gatekeeper, quashing access and content at their whim. At the end of
the day, companies can't fight repressive regimes alone on Internet
freedom. They need government to lead.
Oppressive foreign governments may not easily change their ways but
they need to be made to understand the depth of U.S. and international
commitment to Internet openness and freedom. We need to elevate this
issue to the top of our diplomatic and trade agenda. Finally, we must
be consistent with our own Internet freedom policies and fight for
Internet freedom as a common principle so that other nations understand
our commitment to curbing censorship of the Internet and threats to
Internet freedom in whatever form they manifest.
______
Prepared Statement of Mark Palmer
march 24, 2010
As the father of modern China, Sun Yat-sen once noted: ``Worldwide
trends are enormous and powerful; those who follow them prosper, and
those who resist them perish.'' The Internet is the most powerful force
for progress in our lifetimes. The fact that more than 400 million
Chinese already are online testifies to its enormous importance for
China.
At a time when Freedom House, the State Department and others have
documented increasing censorship of the Internet, and an overall
decline of human rights in China and across the globe, it is easy to
become pessimistic about the Internet's prospects. But I believe we
need to look more deeply at recent history, at what the Chinese people
themselves want, at what we can do to respond to their aspirations and
at what the State Department for three years has refused to do.
The single most strategic failure of our best minds in the
intelligence, journalist and academic communities over the past half
century has been their failure to anticipate, indeed even allow for,
peaceful democratic revolution. And yet some 60 such revolutions have
occurred in countries as divergent as Indonesia, the Philippines, South
Africa, Chile, and Ukraine.
We have neither understood what is going on in the minds of elites
beneath the closed surface of dictatorships nor the power of students,
women and others once they organize. We now know from his secretly
tape-recorded, recently published memoir, that Zhao Ziyang, the General
Secretary of the Communist Party of China, ultimately concluded that
for China's economic success to continue it must be accompanied by a
modern political system with a free press, multiple party elections and
an independent judiciary. His predecessor as General Secretary of the
Communist Party Hu Yaobang was sacked for heading in the same
direction.
Over 11,000 of the most influential thinkers in China have signed
in their own names Charter 08 which explicitly calls for all human
rights to be respected and an ``end to the practice of viewing words as
crimes.''
I emphasize elite thinking because of my own experience over 40
years of living in and working on European communist countries. While
we caught glimpses of their views and debates when they were still in
power, I participated in President Reagan's first meetings with General
Secretary Gorbachev and was close to the last communist leaders of
Hungary, we now understand from numerous documents and interviews how
deeply troubled senior and mid-level party officials were with their
situations and how often just one man at the top or a small group of
elders or security officials held back democratic openings. And I have
seen with my own eyes the Iron Curtain coming down across Europe--
something conventional wisdom thought was impossible.
Beyond elites, in China today it is quite extraordinary how many
public protests take place every day and across the country, some
90,000 a year according to official statistics. The support for
Google's splendid determination to resist censorship of the Internet
speaks volumes about the desire of hundreds of millions to enjoy the
same access and rights as their colleagues in Taiwan and across the
developed world.
While Hu Jintao boasts about his own use of the Internet, he also
has called for it to be ``purified'' and said ``Whether we can cope
with the Internet is a matter that affects . . . the stability of the
state.'' By which he means the stability of the one-party state. He is
keenly aware that both elite and popular opinion, if allowed free rein
on the Internet, will bring about the fall of communist dictatorship.
This fear of the Internet, of his own people and elites, has led Hu
Jintao to unleash a truly massive program to control and censor the
Internet. What can we do to ensure that the Chinese people circumvent
these controls, to bring the Great Firewall down and not only in China
but Iran and other increasingly repressive countries as well?
Some of the students who were present on Tiananmen Square during
the 1989 massacre came to the United States and earned doctoral degrees
in computer sciences from leading American universities. They realized
the enormous popularity and potential of the Internet in China and were
urged by Chinese still in China to find ways to use their computer
engineering skills to combat growing censorship and growing overall
violations of human rights.
Beginning in 2000 they have developed a system of software and
servers, which over the past decade has grown to be the world's largest
circumvention system, providing for roughly 90 percent of anti-
censorship traffic in China and worldwide. About a million Chinese and
hundreds of thousands of Iranians are frequent users of this system. It
works through the distribution of encrypted, secure, free software and
by constantly switching IP addresses, up to 10,000 times per hour, on
dedicated servers located across the world. They have built and staffed
this system with volunteer labor and virtually no financial support
from others.
The major limitation on this Global Internet Freedom Consortium's
(GIF) ability to serve even much larger numbers of users and to bring
down the Firewall altogether is money. They have had to make hard
choices between serving a surge in Iranian users last summer and fall
and reducing their availability to Chinese users as their servers were
crashing. GIF needs to buy many more servers and finally to support
full-time staff. Competing with and staying ahead of over 50,000
heavily financed engineers and censors in China requires a dedicated
and properly financed team. We spend $800 million annually on ``old
media'' like VOA and RFA and an additional $1.7 billion on democracy
support. Surely we can and should spend $50 to $100 million per year on
a system or systems to circumvent Internet censorship and bring down
this firewall.
Realizing the enormous success of this Global Internet Freedom
Consortium and its potential, a bipartisan group of Senators and
Congressmen appropriated $15
million in 2008 to begin to scale up this system and any others which
could demonstrate proven ability to circumvent Internet censorship in
China, Iran and elsewhere. And in 2010 another $30 million was
appropriated.
In my 26 years within the State Department and 20 years outside
working on democracy and human rights, I have never been more convinced
of the power of any innovation to help those still living in one of the
world's 43 remaining dictatorships, half of them Chinese, to liberate
themselves.
I also have never been more appalled at the State Department's
refusal to do what is so clearly in the national interest of the United
States. In flagrant and now repeated violation of Congressional
legislation, the State Department has refused to use the appropriated
funds to scale up an existing, successful circumvention system. State
Department staff-level officials have made a mockery first of Secretary
Rice's and now Secretary Clinton's frequently voiced and sincere
commitments to help ensure freedom of the Internet.
Let us take just one dimension of American national interest. There
is a profoundly false understanding of the Google-China issue--as if
Google must lose its China market because it no longer accepts
Google.cn censorship. If the United States acts in the manner we seek,
and people in China can access Google.com, sell Baidu stock short. And
watch Google pick up support from Iran, Syria, and elsewhere. Google's
in a fight and a martyred defeat will not help the cause. It too should
be pressing the State Department and working with GIF. If it does so,
its franchise throughout the world will be enhanced by orders of
magnitude for being not merely a wounded victim but the provider of
enhanced closed society access to the Internet.
Fortunately key members of Congress are determined that the State
Department finally does the right thing. Senators Brownback, Casey,
Kaufman, Kyl, and Specter, three Democrats and two Republicans, wrote
to Secretary Clinton on January 20, 2010. After expressing concern that
the State Department's use of the FY08 funds ``did not materially
enhance Internet access,'' they stressed that ``the FY10 Consolidated
Appropriations Act requires as a matter of law that the Internet
Freedom funds be awarded applicants who currently and demonstrably are
able to expand Internet access to large numbers of users living in
closed societies that have acutely hostile Internet environments. The
intent of this language is clear: funds should facilitate immediate and
order-of-magnitude scale-ups of proven, field-tested protocols that
facilitate access to the Internet by pro-democracy demonstrators in
Iran, China, and elsewhere.''
To get the State Department's attention, two weeks ago Senator
Brownback put a hold on the confirmation of four ambassadorial and
assistant secretary nominations. At a press conference on March 18, the
Senator citing renewed State Department interest removed these holds.
But he stressed ``the objective is clear, and delay is the chief
ingredient of the problem. The funds must be rapidly dispersed to
groups that possess the current capability of immediately opening
access to the Internet for millions of new users. One such group is the
Global Internet Freedom Consortium, which operates the Freegate
circumvention system relied upon by millions around the world. If there
are others that can fulfill these criteria, then the State Department
should come forward with clear and convincing evidence and we should
support those groups as well.''
Senator Brownback continued ``But we must act now. If we do not
achieve a breakthrough in the next week, I will not hesitate to place
holds on future State Department nominations for as long as it takes to
move the Department away from policies that will keep the firewalls in
business for years.'' Senator Kyl also spoke at the March 18 press
conference, affirmed that he shared Senator Brownback's assessment and
will join in future holds.
We strongly urge the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
also to press the State Department to move promptly to work out an
agreed strategy with concerned Members of Congress.
We all agree that it is profoundly in our interest for the Chinese
people to have direct and uncensored access to the Internet, that the
censorship be circumvented and ultimately defeated. We have it in our
power to achieve this goal. Further delay will be an act of moral
cowardice and a failure of strategic vision.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Byron Dorgan, a U.S. Senator From North
Dakota; Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China
march 24, 2010
The Commission convenes this hearing today to examine China's
censorship of the Internet and the challenges it poses both to
advocates of free expression and to U.S. companies doing business in
China. The recent controversy over Google's operations makes clear that
the Chinese government's regulation of the Internet is both a human
rights and trade issue.
In the spring of 2000, Congress debated whether to support PNTR for
China. Supporters argued that opening China's markets would improve
human rights and level the playing field for U.S. companies. The
Internet was expected to lead the way, and it has brought some
important changes. Today, China has 400 million Internet users, the
most in the world. Chinese citizens now have opportunities to shop
online, and communicate with one another and the outside world. And,
the Chinese government, to its credit, has invested heavily in Internet
infrastructure and sought to bridge the digital divide between rich and
poor.
Yet, the larger hopes for genuine openness and freedom have gone
unrealized. China's Internet users remain subject to the arbitrary
dictates of state censorship. More than a dozen agencies are involved
in implementing a host of laws, regulations, and other tools to try to
keep information and ideas from the Chinese people.
As Rebecca MacKinnon, a leading expert on media and information
technology policy in China, has noted:
China is pioneering a new kind of Internet-age
authoritarianism. It is demonstrating how a non-democratic
government can stay in power while simultaneously expanding
domestic Internet and mobile phone use. . . . Yet on the other
hand, as this Commission's 2009 Annual Report clearly outlined,
Communist Party control over the bureaucracy and courts has
strengthened over the past decade, while the regime's
institutional commitments to protect the universal rights and
freedoms of all its citizens have weakened.
The government also continues to strengthen controls over the
Internet and to harshly punish citizens such as Liu Xiaobo, who use the
Internet to advocate for human rights and political reform. I have a
list here of political prisoners in China punished in recent years for
Internet activities. It was drawn from the Commission's publicly
accessible, Political Prisoner Database. I ask that this list be
included in the hearing record.
As this list vividly shows, China's censorship practices and
control of the Internet have had a terrible impact on human rights
advocates. These include ordinary people who promote political freedoms
or try to organize on line, or ethnic groups such as Tibetans
attempting to share information about ongoing government repression. We
also are learning that Internet censorship and regulation in China has
serious economic implications for U.S. companies like Go Daddy and many
others. China's Internet regulations often run against basic
international trade principles of nondiscrimination and maintaining a
level playing field.
Testifying before the Commission today is a representative from
Google, perhaps the most potent Internet company in the world. In mid-
December, Google announced that it had ``detected a highly
sophisticated and targeted attack on its corporate infrastructure
originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual
property from Google.'' And just this week Google announced that it
will stop censoring its Chinese search engine, by rerouting its China
searches to its Hong Kong site. The company also said it would also
monitor and publicize any attempts at censorship of its Hong Kong site
by the Chinese government.
Google's decision is a strong step in favor of freedom of
expression and information. It is also a powerful indictment of the
Chinese government's insistence on censorship of the Internet.
We asked the Chinese Embassy if they would like to send a
representative to appear before us today, and they declined. They did,
however, send a statement, and I move now to have that statement
included in the hearing record.
The Commission is dedicated to understanding the connections
between trade and human rights in China today. For that reason, we have
called on five prominent human rights experts and American business
leaders to discuss the impact of Internet censorship in China today. I
look forward to hearing from the witnesses about possible ways for the
U.S. Government, policy makers and businesses to respond to China's
regulation of the Internet from both a human rights and trade
perspective.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sander Levin, a U.S. Representative From
Michigan; Cochairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China
march 24, 2010
The purpose of this hearing today is to examine the challenges and
hazards that the Chinese government's control of the Internet poses
both to advocates for free expression and to American companies doing
business in China.
Nearly one year ago, in April 2009, the Chinese government
published its first National Human Rights Action Plan. In this Action
Plan, the Chinese government made specific commitments to the role of
the Internet in promoting human rights.
As issued by the Information Office of the State Council, the
Action Plan states,
In the period 2009-2010, along with the dissemination of
knowledge of the law among the general public, the state will
actively rely on . . . the media, including . . . the Internet,
to carry out education in human rights in various forms in a
planned way, popularizing and spreading knowledge of the law
and human rights. . . .
The Action Plan further states the Chinese government's commitment
during 2009-2010 to:
(m)aking good use of the media, including . . . the Internet,
to disseminate the knowledge of human rights among the general
public and to making good use of new media, including the
Internet, to spread knowledge of human rights . . . .
Finally, and very importantly, according to the Action Plan:
The state will take effective measures to develop the press and
publications industry and ensure that all channels are
unblocked to guarantee citizens' right to be heard.
These words could not have been clearer. Human rights and the
Internet were linked before the Google controversy, and the Chinese
government itself linked them. This only underlines the importance of
this hearing, and means that there is considerable and appropriate
ground to cover today.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that all people
have the right ``to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.'' And yet, under Chinese
policies, laws and regulations, private Internet companies are required
to censor or filter content that the Chinese government deems
politically unacceptable. These requirements impose limits on
internationally recognized rights to free expression.
The Internet can be a great tool for free speech and democratic
participation. However, just in the last few months, as this Commission
has documented, Chinese authorities have detained, imprisoned or
affirmed the sentences of numerous individuals for non-violent
expression over the Internet. In so doing, the Chinese government has
shown that the Internet may be exploited by authorities as a tool to
repress speech and to maintain a closed society.
I would like to call attention to one case in particular, involving
the writer and professor Liu Xiaobo. On Christmas Day 2009, a Beijing
court sentenced Mr. Liu to 11 years in prison for six essays he
published online and for his e-mailing Charter 08, a public document
calling for political reform and human rights signed by thousands of
Chinese citizens. The court in announcing its decision emphasized Mr.
Liu's use of the Internet. Even though Mr. Liu did not advocate
violence, the court said he had committed the crime of ``inciting
subversion.'' Mr. Liu appealed his case, and on February 11, 2010, his
appeal was denied. The facts are unambiguous: Mr. Liu has been
detained, tried and punished for exercising internationally recognized
rights to free expression and association. China does not wish to be
labeled a gross violator of human rights, yet the Chinese government
makes its determination to eliminate dissent painfully clear to the
world. The trial of Mr. Liu shows us that China once again is at an
important crossroads, but seems to be turning in the wrong direction.
The Internet provides new forums for the exchange of ideas. People
who use the Internet to access information, to exercise internationally
recognized rights to free expression, or to engage in non-violent
political speech, must be protected. In its National Human Rights
Action Plan, the Chinese government itself threw a spotlight on the
relationship between human rights and the Internet. Other nations,
including ours, have both the responsibility and a legitimate interest
in looking closely at that relationship, as this Commission, with the
help of our distinguished panel, does today.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher H. Smith, a U.S. Representative
From New Jersey; Ranking Member, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China
march 24, 2010
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and good afternoon to everybody.
And thank you for calling this hearing on Internet freedom.
Reporters Without Borders documents that in China alone, at least 72
people are known to be imprisoned for Internet postings. But the
victims of the Chinese government's assault on Internet freedom include
the entire Chinese people, denied their right to free expression,
denied access to information, and often self-censoring out of fear.
Even beyond this, the Chinese government's victims include other
peoples, tyrannized by governments with which the Chinese government
sells or gives its advice on technologies and techniques of Internet
repression--reportedly these include Cuba, Vietnam, Burma, Belarus, and
Sri Lanka.
Yet we have seen some positive developments. We have seen that some
U.S. IT companies really want to do the right thing. Yahoo! has
established much stricter policies governing its interactions with
repressive governments, working to keep personally identifying
information out of their hands.
Google's transformation has been even more impressive. In 2006, I
chaired an eight-hour hearing on The Internet in China: A Tool for
Freedom or Suppression? The hearing responded to Yahoo!'s cooperation
with Chinese Internet police's tracking down of journalist Shi Tao--who
is still serving a 10-year prison term for disclosing state secrets,
that is, e-mailing to the United States Chinese government orders not
to report on the 15th anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre. Google,
Yahoo! and Microsoft, among others, testified at that hearing, which
broke the ground on the issue of Internet freedom.
Since 2006 I have been meeting with Google executives, and they've
known for some time that the theory that their mere presence in the
Chinese market would liberalize China, or at least justify their
willingness to censor searches had proven mistaken, and that China was
growing more repressive.
Two days ago Google fulfilled its January commitment to stop
censoring results on its Chinese search engine. This is a remarkable,
and welcomed action, and an important boost of encouragement for
millions of Chinese human rights activists and political and religious
dissidents. Google's recent actions are a blow against the cynical
silence of so many when it comes to the Chinese government's human
rights abuses--a blast of honesty and courage and a good example of
responsible and principled corporate policy.
Today Go Daddy, the world's largest domain name registrar,
announces in its submitted testimony that it has ``decided to
discontinue offering new .CN domain names at this time'' out concern
``for the security of the individuals affected by'' the Chinese
government's new requirements for domain registration.
Go Daddy is the first company to publicly follow Google's example
in responding to the Chinese government's censorship of the Internet by
partially retreating from the Chinese market. Google fired a shot heard
'round the world, and now a second American company has answered the
call to defend the rights of the Chinese people. Go Daddy deserves to
be praised for this decision. It is a powerful sign that American IT
companies want to do the right thing in repressive countries.
But Go Daddy and Google deserve more than praise for doing the
right thing in China--they deserve our government's support. We want to
see American IT companies doing the right thing--but we don't want to
see them forced to leave China for doing so. Now we see that, however
well-intentioned, American IT companies are not powerful enough to
stand up to repressive governments. Without U.S. Government support,
which my bill, the Global Online Freedom Act would provide, they are
inevitably forced to play a role in the repressive government's
censorship and surveillance.
The Global Online Freedom Act, the legislation I crafted in 2006
and re-introduced in this Congress, would give American IT companies
the U.S.-Government backup they need to negotiate with repressive
governments.
Let me describe the bill's key provisions. The bill would establish
an Office of Global Internet Freedom in the State Department, which
would annually designate ``Internet restricting countries''--countries
that substantially restrict Internet freedom relating to the peaceful
expression of political, religious, or ideological opinion or belief.
U.S. IT companies would have to report to the State Department any
requirement by a repressive government for filtering or censoring
search terms--and the State Department would make the terms and
parameters of filtering public knowledge, thus ``naming and shaming''
the repressive countries.
U.S. IT companies would also have to store personally identifying
information outside of Internet-restricting countries, so that the
repressive governments wouldn't be able to get their hands on it to
track dissidents. U.S. IT companies would have to notify the Attorney
General whenever they received a request for personally identifying
information from a repressive country--and the Attorney General would
have the authority to order the IT companies not to comply, if there
was reason to believe the repressive government seeks the information
for other than legitimate law-enforcement purposes.
In short: the Global Online Freedom Act would give the IT companies
the backup of the U.S. Government. If the Chinese or Iranian government
tells them to filter a search term, they can point to the Global Online
Freedom Act and say that U.S. law doesn't permit it. If the
government's Internet police intercept a human rights activist's e-
mail, and demand the company turn over personally identifying
information on the account, the company will notify the AG, who can
then bring the weight of the U.S. Government into the matter.
I would like to thank Google for re-iterating its support for the
Global Online Freedom Act; which it recently did in a support letter
which we have here today. And I also want to thank the human rights
NGOs which have agreed to issue a joint letter of support for the bill:
Reporters Without Borders, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
Freedom House, Laogai Research Foundation, Wei Jingsheng Foundation,
International Campaign for Tibet, China Aid Association, Uyghur-
American Association, Committee to Protect Journalists.
The ability of Google and such highly regarded human rights groups
to agree in supporting the Global Online Freedom Act is a strong sign
that we should all be able to get behind this bill--the bill has even
been introduced, with only slight changes, in the European Parliament.
Submissions for the Record
Prepared Statement of Rebecca MacKinnon, Visiting Fellow, Center for
Information Technology Policy, Princeton University
march 24, 2010
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony for the
record. I am Rebecca MacKinnon, a visiting fellow at Princeton
University's Center for Technology Policy. From 1992-2001, for more
than nine years, I worked as a journalist for CNN in China. For the
last six years while based at several different academic institutions I
have researched Chinese Internet censorship alongside global censorship
trends, examining in particular how the private sector assists
government efforts to silence or manipulate citizen speech. I am a
founding member of the Global Network Initiative, a non-governmental
multi-stakeholder initiative that aims to help Internet and
telecommunications companies uphold the principles of free expression
and privacy around the world. I am also co-founder of an international
bloggers' network called Global Voices Online. Several of our
contributors regularly summarize and translate conversations from the
Chinese blogosphere, and report on developments related to online free
expression in China. My testimony today is informed by my experience as
a journalist who has lived under Chinese censorship and surveillance;
as a researcher of Chinese Internet censorship; as a practitioner of
new media and participant in Chinese-language online communities; and
as an advocate for free expression and human rights on the Internet.
On January 12 Google stunned the world with its dramatic
announcement that it was reconsidering its business in China in the
wake of debilitating cyber-attacks, and furthermore that the company
was no longer willing to continue operating a censored search engine in
China, Google.cn, launched in January 2006.\1\ On March 22, Google
redirected Google.cn to the Hong Kong-based search engine
Google.com.hk, where it now provides uncensored search results in the
simplified character set used by people in Mainland China.\2\ In my
testimony, I will briefly describe the context of the Google decision.
I will then outline some of the different tactics used by the Chinese
government to censor and control online speech, including tactics used
against Google. I will describe what some Chinese citizens are doing in
order to evade and oppose these tactics. Finally, I will offer some
specific policy suggestions for how the United States can help to
improve Internet freedom in China.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A new approach to China, by David Drummond,The Official Google
Blog, Jan. 12, 2010, at: http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-
approach-to-china.html.
\2\ A new approach to China: an update, by David Drummond, The
Official Google Blog, March 22, 2010 at: http://
googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-china-update.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the context of google's china announcement
American Internet company executives have long argued that more
connectivity will bring more freedom -even in repressive regimes where
the Internet is under heavy censorship and surveillance. Statements to
that effect were a common theme in Congressional testimony given by
Google and Yahoo executives at the February 2006 hearing convened by
the late Rep. Tom Lantos.\3\ Since then, Chinese Internet usage has
nearly quadrupled. Stories abound of how Internet users in China have
helped expose corruption, bring justice to innocent victims of official
malfeasance, and even change some laws and regulations. But this has
not changed the regime's repressive attitude toward dissent. According
to a recent report by the Dui Hua Foundation, in 2008 arrests and
indictments on charges of ``endangering state security''--the most
common charge used in cases of political, religious, or ethnic
dissent--more than doubled for the second time in three years.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Testimony of Google Inc. before the Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific, and the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and
International Operations, Committee on International Relations, United
States House of Representatives, February 15, 2006, by Elliot Schrage,
Vice President, Global Communications and Public Affairs, Google Inc.,
at: http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/testimony-internet-in-
china.html; and Testimony of Michael Callahan, Senior Vice President
and General Counsel, Yahoo! Inc., Before the Subcommittees on Africa,
Global Human Rights and International Operations, and Asia and the
Pacific, February 15, 2006, at: http://yhoo.client.shareholder.com/
press/ReleaseDetail.cfm?ReleaseID=187725
\4\ ``Chinese State Security Arrests, Indictments Doubled in
2008,'' Dui Hua Human Rights Journal, March 25, 2009, at: http://
www.duihua.org/hrjournal/2009/03/chinese-state-security-arrests.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
China is pioneering a new kind of Internet-age authoritarianism. It
is demonstrating how a non-democratic government can stay in power
while simultaneously expanding domestic Internet and mobile phone use.
In China today there is a lot more give-and-take between government and
citizens than in the pre-Internet age, and this helps bolster the
regime's legitimacy with many Chinese Internet users who feel that they
have a new channel for public discourse. Yet on the other hand, as this
Commission's 2009 Annual Report clearly outlined, Communist Party
control over the bureaucracy and courts has strengthened over the past
decade, while the regime's institutional commitments to protect the
universal rights and freedoms of all its citizens have weakened.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 2009 Annual Report, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China, at: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt09/
CECCannRpt2009.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Google's public complaint about Chinese cyber-attacks and
censorship occurred against this backdrop. It reflects a recognition
that China's status quo--at least when it comes to censorship,
regulation, and manipulation of the Internet--is unlikely to improve
any time soon, and may in fact continue to get worse.
overview of chinese internet controls
Chinese government attempts to control online speech began in the
late 1990's with a focus on the filtering or ``blocking'' of Internet
content. Today, the government deploys an expanding repertoire of
tactics. They include: deletion or removal of content at the source,
device and local-level controls, domain name controls, localized
disconnection or restriction, self-censorship due to surveillance,
cyber-attacks, government ``astro-turfing,'' local government
``outreach,'' and targeted police intimidation.
Filtering or ``blocking:'' This is the original and
best understood form of Internet censorship. Internet users on
a particular network are blocked from accessing specific
websites. The technical term for this kind of censorship is
``filtering.'' Some congressional proceedings and legislation
have also referred to this kind of censorship as ``Internet
jamming.'' Filtering can range in scope from a home network, a
school network, university network, corporate network, the
entire service of a particular commercial Internet Service
Provider (ISP), or all Internet connections within a specific
country. It is called ``filtering'' because a network
administrator uses special software or hardware to block access
to specified web pages by banning access to certain designated
domain names, Internet addresses, or any page containing
specified keywords or phrases. A wide range of commercial
filtering products are developed and marketed here in the
United States by U.S. companies for filtering by parents,
schools, government departments, businesses, and anybody else
who wants to control how their networks are used. All Internet
routers--including those manufactured by the U.S. company Cisco
Systems--come with the ability to filter because it is
necessary for basic cyber-security and blocking universally
reviled content like child pornography. However, the same
technology can just as easily be used to block political
content. According to the Open Net Initiative (ONI), an
academic consortium that has been following global Internet
filtering since 2002, more than 40 countries now practice
Internet filtering to some extent at the national level.
However China's Internet filtering system--known to many as
``the Great Firewall of China''--is the most sophisticated and
extensive in the world.\6\ In its 2009 report on Chinese
Internet censorship, the ONI described increasingly pervasive
and sophisticated filtering tactics. ``In fine-tuning this
system,'' the report concluded, ``China is also adopting
subtler and more fluid controls.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet
Filtering by Diebert, et.al. (MIT Press, 2008). Updates and new country
reports are posted regularly at the Open Net Initiative website at:
http://opennet.net
\7\ ``China'' research profile by Stephanie Wang, Open Net
Initiative, published on June 15, 2009 at: http://opennet.net/research/
profiles/china
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deletion and removal of content: Filtering is the
primary means of censoring content over which the Chinese
government has no jurisdiction. When it comes to websites and
Internet services over which Chinese authorities do have legal
jurisdiction--usually because at least some of the company's
operations and computer servers are located in-country--why
merely block or filter content when you can delete it from the
Internet entirely? In Anglo-European legal parlance, the legal
mechanism used to implement such a system is called
``intermediary liability.'' The Chinese government calls it
``self-discipline,'' but it amounts to the same thing, and it
is precisely the legal mechanism through which Google's Chinese
search engine, Google.cn, was required to censor its search
results.\8\ All Internet companies operating within Chinese
jurisdiction--domestic or foreign--are held liable for
everything appearing on their search engines, blogging
platforms, and social networking services. They are also
legally responsible for everything their users discuss or
organize through chat clients and messaging services. In this
way, much of the censorship and surveillance work is delegated
and outsourced by the government to the private sector--who, if
they fail to censor and monitor their users to the government's
satisfaction, will lose their business license and be forced to
shut down. It is also the mechanism through which China-based
companies must monitor and censor the
conversations of more than 50 million Chinese bloggers.
Politically sensitive postings are deleted or blocked from ever
being published. Bloggers who get too influential in the wrong
ways can have their accounts shut down and their entire blogs
erased. That work is done primarily not by ``Internet police''
but by employees of Internet companies.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See Race To the Bottom: Corporate Complicity in Chinese
Internet Censorship by Human Rights Watch (August 2006), at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/. Also ``Search Monitor Project:
Toward a Measure of Transparency,'' by Nart Villeneuve, Citizen Lab
Occasional Paper, No.1, University of Toronto (June 2008) at http://
www.citizenlab.org/papers/searchmonitor.pdf
\9\ For more details see ``China's Censorship 2.0: How companies
censor bloggers,'' by Rebecca MacKinnon, First Monday (February 2006)
at: http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/
view/2378/2089; and ``The Chinese Censorship Foreigners Don't See,'' by
Rebecca MacKinnon, The Wall Street Journal Asia, August 14, 2008, at:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121865176983837575.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cyber-attacks: The sophisticated, military-grade
cyber-attacks launched against Google were targeted
specifically at GMail accounts of human rights activists who
are either from China or work on China-related issues. This
serves as an important reminder that governments and
corporations are not the only victims of cyber-warfare and
cyber-espionage. Human rights activists, whistleblowers and
dissidents around the world, most of whom lack training or
resources to protect themselves, have over the past few years
been victim of
increasingly aggressive cyber attacks.\10\ The effect in some
cases is either to bring down overseas dissident websites at
critical political moments, or causing frequent outages,
putting great strain on the site's operators just to keep it
running. Websites run by Chinese exiles, dissidents, and human
rights defenders have seen increasingly aggressive attacks over
the past few years.\11\ In other cases the effect is to
compromise activists' internal computer networks and e-mail
accounts to the point that it becomes too risky to use the
Internet at all for certain kinds of organizing and
communications, because the dissidents don't feel confident
that any of their digital communications are secure.
Journalists who report on human rights issues and academics
whose research includes human rights problems have also found
themselves under aggressive
attack in places like China, exposing their sources and making
it much more risky to work on politically sensitive topics.
Like the activists, these groups are unprepared and unequipped
to deal with cyber-attacks.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See Tracking Ghostnet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage
Network, by Information War Monitor (March 2009) at http://
www.nartv.org/mirror/ghostnet.pdf
\11\ ``Chinese human rights sites hit by DDoS attack,'' by Owen
Fletcher, ComputerWorld, January 26, 2010, at: http://
www.computerworld.in/articles/chinese-human-rights-sites-hit-ddos-
attack
\12\ ``National Day triggers censorship, cyber attacks in China,''
Committee to Protect Journalists, September 22, 2009 at: http://
cpj.org/2009/09/national-day-triggers-censorship-cyber-attacks-in.php
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Device-level and local controls: In late spring of
2009 the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT)
mandated that by July 1 of that year all computers sold in
China must be pre-installed with a specific software product
called ``Green Dam--Youth Escort.'' \13\ While the purpose of
``Green Dam'' was ostensibly for child protection, researchers
inside and outside of China quickly uncovered the fact that it
not only censored additional political and religious content,
it also logged user activity and sent this information back to
a central computer server belonging to the software developer's
company.\14\ The software had other problems which made it easy
for U.S. industry to oppose: It contained serious programming
flaws which increased the user's vulnerability to cyber-attack.
It also violated the intellectual property rights of a U.S.
company's filtering product. Faced with uniform opposition from
the U.S. computer industry and strong protests from the U.S.
government, the MIIT backed down on the eve of its deadline,
making the installation of Green Dam voluntary instead of
mandatory.\15\ The defeat of Green Dam, however, did not
diminish other efforts to control and track Internet user
behavior at more localized levels within the national ``Great
Firewall'' system--for instance at the level of a school,
university, or apartment block as well as at the level of a
city-wide Internet Service Provider (ISP). It was reported in
September last year that local governments were mandating the
use of censoring and surveillance products with names like
``Blue Shield'' and ``Huadun.'' The function and purpose of
these products appeared similar to Green Dam, though they had
the benefit of involving neither the end user nor foreign
companies.\16\ The implementation of these systems has received
little attention outside of China.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ ``China Squeezes PC Makers,'' by Loretta Chao, The Wall Street
Journal, June 8, 2009, at: http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB124440211524192081.html
\14\ China's Green Dam: The Implications of Government Control
Encroaching on the Home PC, Open Net Initiative bulletin (June, 2009)
at: http://opennet.net/chinas-green-dam-the-implications-government-
control-encroaching-home-pc; Analysis of the Green Dam Censorware
System, by Scott Wolchok, Randy Yao, and J. Alex Halderman, Computer
Science and Engineering Division, The University of Michigan, June 11,
2009, at: http://www.cse.umich.edu/%7Ejhalderm/pub/gd/.
\15\ ``After the Green Dam Victory,'' by Rebecca MacKinnon, CSIS
Freeman Report, June/July 2009, at: http://csis.org/files/publication/
fr09n0607.pdf
\16\ ``China Clamps Down on Internet Ahead of 60th Anniversary,''
by Owen Fletcher, IDG News Service, September 25, 2009 at: http://
www.pcworld.com/article/172627/china--clamps--down--on--internet--
ahead--of--60th--annive rsary.html ; and ``China: Blue Dam activated,''
by Oiwan Lam, Global Voices Advocacy, September 13, 2009 at: http://
advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2009/09/13/china-blue-dam-activated/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Domain name controls: In December, the government-
affiliated China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC)
announced that it would no longer allow individuals to register
Internet domain names ending in .cn. Only companies or
organizations would be able to use the .cn domain.\17\ While
authorities explained that this measure was aimed at cleaning
up pornography, fraud, and spam, a group of Chinese webmasters
protested that it also violated individual rights.\18\
Authorities announced that more than 130,000 websites had shut
down in the cleanup. In January a Chinese newspaper reported
that self-employed individuals and freelancers conducting
online business had been badly hurt by the measure.\19\ Later
in February, CNNIC backtracked somewhat, announcing that
individuals will once again be allowed to register .cn domains,
but all applicants must appear in person to confirm their
registration, show a government ID, and submit a photo of
themselves with their application.\20\ This eliminates the
possibility of anonymous domain name registration under .cn and
makes it easier for authorities to warn or intimidate website
operators when ``objectionable'' content appears.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ``China tightens control on domain name registration,'' by
Zhao Chunzhe, China Daily, December 14, 2009, at: http://
www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-12/14/content--9174767.htm
\18\ ``China: Online protest against CNNIC,'' by Oiwan Lam, Global
Voices Advocacy, December 22, 2009 at: http://
advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2009/12/22/china-online-protest-
against-cnnic/
\19\ ``China: More than 100 thousand websites shut down,'' by Oiwan
Lam, Global Voices Advocacy, February 3, 2010, at: http://
advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2010/02/03/china-more-than-100-
thousand-websites-shut-down/
\20\ ``China Further Tightens Rules for Domain Name Owners,'' by
Owen Fletcher, PCWorld, February 23, 2010, at: http://www.pcworld.com/
article/190013/china--further--tightens--rules--for--domain--name--
owners.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Localized disconnection and restriction: In times of
crisis when the government wants to ensure that people cannot
use the Internet or mobile phones to organize protests,
connections are shut down entirely or heavily restricted in
specific locations. There have been anecdotal reports of
Internet connections going down or text-messaging services
suddenly not working in counties or towns immediately after
local disturbances broke out. The most extreme case however is
Xinjiang province, a traditionally Muslim region bordering
Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan in China's far Northwest.
After ethnic riots took place in July of last year, the
Internet was cut off in the entire province for six months,
along with most mobile text messaging and international phone
service. Nobody in Xinjiang could send e-mail or access any
website--domestic or foreign. Businesspeople had to travel to
the bordering province of Gansu just to communicate with
customers.\21\ Internet access and phone service have now been
restored, but with severe limitations on the number of text
messages people can send on their mobile phones per day, no
access to overseas websites, and even very limited access to
domestic Chinese websites. Xinjiang-based Internet users can
only access specially watered-down versions of official Chinese
news and information sites, with many of the functions such as
blogging or comments disabled.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ ``What Internet? China region cut off 6 months now,'' by Cara
Anna, Associated Press via Yahoo! News, January 19, 2010, at: http://
news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100119/ap--on--bi--ge/as--china--internet--
blackout
\22\ ``Blogger describes Xinjiang as an `internet prison,' '' Josh
Karamay, BBC News, February 3, 2010, at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
asia-pacific/8492224.stm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Self-censorship due to surveillance: Surveillance of
Internet and mobile users is conducted in a variety of ways,
contributing to an atmosphere of self-censorship. Surveillance
enables authorities to warn and harass Internet users either
via electronic communications or in person when individuals are
deemed to be taking their online activities too far. Occasional
detention, arrest, or imprisonment of select individuals serves
as an effective warning to others that they are being watched.
Surveillance techniques include:
``Classic'' monitoring: While Chinese
surveillance measures are explained by the government
to the public as anti-terrorism measures, they are also
broadly used to identify, then harass or imprison
peaceful critics of the regime. Cybercafes--the cheaper
and more popular option for students and less affluent
people--are required to monitor users in multiple ways
including ID registration upon entry to the cafe or
upon login, surveillance cameras, and monitoring
software installed on computers. Surveillance in
Chinese cybercafes is known to be so extensive that
people who are likely to engage in political
conversations online avoid doing so in such facilities.
``Law enforcement compliance:'' In a country
like China where ``crime'' is defined broadly to
include political dissent, companies with in-country
operations and user data stored locally can easily find
themselves complicit in the surveillance and jailing of
political dissidents. The most notorious example of law
enforcement compliance gone badly wrong was when
Yahoo's local Beijing staff gave Chinese police account
information of journalist Shi Tao, activist Wang
Xiaoning, and at least two others engaged in political
dissent.\23\ There are other examples of how law
enforcement compliance by foreign companies has
compromised activists. In 2006, Skype partnered with a
Chinese company to provide a localized version of its
service, then found itself being used by Chinese
authorities to track and log politically sensitive chat
sessions by users inside China.\24\ This happened
because Skype delegated law enforcement compliance to
its local partner without sufficient attention to how
the compliance was being carried out. China's more
sophisticated and politically aware Internet users have
long assumed that Chinese-branded e-mail and chat
services monitor their communications and share them
readily with authorities. As news about these incidents
involving foreign-branded products spread among Chinese
Internet users, however, many no longer feel that they
can trust foreign brands either. They feel they have no
choice but to minimize the extent to which they use any
Internet or mobile service for politically sensitive
conversations for fear that anything and everything
might be compromised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ For detailed analysis of the Yahoo! China case see ``Shi Tao,
Yahoo!, and the lessons for corporate social responsibility,'' working
paper presented at presented December 2007 at the International
Conference on Information Technology and Social Responsibility, Chinese
University, Hong Kong, at: http://rconversation.blogs.com/
YahooShiTaoLessons.pdf
\24\ Breaching Trust, by Nart Villeneuve, Information Warfare
Monitor and ONI Asia Joint Report (October 2008), at: http://
www.nartv.org/mirror/breachingtrust.pdf
Pro-active measures: ``astro-turfing'' and outreach:
The government increasingly combines censorship and
surveillance measures with pro-active efforts to steer online
conversations in the direction it prefers. In 2008 the Hong
Kong-based researcher David Bandurski determined that at least
280,000 people had been hired at various levels of government
to work as ``online commentators.'' Known derisively as the
``50-cent party,'' these people are paid to write postings that
show their employers in a favorable light in online chat rooms,
social networking services, blogs, and comments sections of
news websites.\25\ Many more people do similar work as
volunteers--recruited from among the ranks of retired officials
as well as college students in the Communist Youth League who
aspire to become Party members. This approach is similar to a
tactic known as ``astro-turfing'' in American parlance, now
commonly used by commercial advertising firms, public relations
companies, and election campaigns around the world.\26\ In many
provinces it is now also standard practice for government
officials--particularly at the city and county level--to work
to co-opt and influence independent online writers by throwing
special conferences for local bloggers, or inviting them to
special press events or news conferences about issues of local
concern.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ ``China's Guerilla War for the Web,'' by David Bandurski, Far
Eastern Economic Review, July 2008, at: http://www.feer.com/essays/
2008/august/chinas-guerrilla-war-for-the-web
\26\ ``Astroturfing describes the posting of supposedly independent
messages on Internet boards by interested companies and individuals In
American politics, the term is used to describe formal public relations
projects which deliberately give the impression that they are
spontaneous and populist reactions. The term comes from AstroTurf--the
fake grass used in many indoor American football stadiums. The contrast
between truly spontaneous or ``grassroots'' efforts and an orchestrated
public relations campaign, is much like the distinction between real
grass and AstroTurf.'' From http://www.answers.com/topic/astroturfing
\27\ ``How China polices the internet,'' by Kathrin Hille,
Financial Times, July 17, 2009 at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/e716cfc6-
71a1-11de-a821-00144feabdc0.html
All of these measures are implemented in the context of the Chinese
government's broader policies on information and news control. In
December the Committee to Protect Journalists listed China as the
world's top jailer of journalists.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ ``2009 Prison Census,'' Committee to Protect Journalists, (as
of December 1, 2009) at: http://cpj.org/imprisoned/2009.php
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
citizen pushback
Despite the government's formidable array of control tactics,
China's determined, creative, and opinionated Internet users have
managed to make the Chinese Internet a lively, fun, and often
contentious place.\29\ Over the past six years I have been involved
with a number of Chinese blogger groups, mailing lists, and social
networks. Chinese ``netizens''--as they call themselves--are doing a
range of things to oppose Internet controls:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ For an excellent portrayal of Chinese Internet culture and its
contentious, playful nature see The Power of the Internet in China:
Citizen Activism Online by Guobin Yang, (Columbia University Press,
2009).
Informal anti-censorship support networks: I have
attended gatherings of bloggers and journalists in China--with
varying degrees of organization or spontaneousness--where
participants devoted significant amounts of time to teaching
one another how to use circumvention tools to access blocked
websites. Informal ``teach-ins'' on how to access Twitter are
especially popular among people who want access to an
uncensored, international community of conversation. Certain
bloggers are known to post information about how to circumvent
censorship and welcome their friends to copy and re-post their
work as widely as possible. I have seen numerous Powerpoints
presentations and PDF documents containing instruction manuals
on how to use various tools, circulated by e-mail or through
peer-to-peer instant messaging clients.
Distributed web-hosting assistance networks: I am
aware of people who have strong English language and technical
skills, as well as overseas credit cards, who are helping
friends and acquaintances in China to purchase inexpensive
space on overseas web hosting services, then set up independent
blogs using free open-source software. The objective is to help
people who don't have the technical skills to run a website on
their own to avoid (a) being victim of content removal if they
use domestic services, or (b) being blocked if they use popular
international blogging platforms like Blogspot, Typepad,
Livejournal, or Wordpress.com, all of which are blocked in
China. Sometimes the people doing this largely volunteer work
also help bloggers to switch domain names and IP addresses when
the blog gains attention and gets blocked by the ``great
firewall.''
Crowdsourced ``opposition research:'' With the
Chinese government's Green Dam censorware edict last year, we
have seen the emergence of loosely organized ``opposition
research'' networks. Last June a group of Chinese computer
programmers and bloggers collectively wrote a report exposing
Green Dam's political and religious censorship, along with many
of its security flaws. They posted the document at
Wikileaks.\30\ Another anonymous group of Chinese netizens have
collected a list of companies and organizations--domestic and
foreign--who have helped build China's Internet censorship
system.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ ``A technical analysis of the Chinese ``Green Dam Youth
Escort'' censorship software,'' posted June 2009 on Wikileaks.org at:
http://wikileaks.org/wiki/A--technical--analysis--of--the--Chinese--
%27Green--Dam--Youth-Escort%27--censorship--software (At time of
writing the page cannot be reached due to bandwith and funding problems
at Wikileaks.org)
\32\ ``A Dirty Pun Tweaks China's Online Censors,'' by Michael
Wines, The New York Times, March 11, 2009, at: http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/03/12/world/asia/12beast.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Preservation and relay of censored content: I have
noticed a number of people around the Chinese blogosphere and
in chatrooms who make a regular habit of immediately
downloading interesting articles, pictures, and videos which
they think have a chance of being blocked or removed. They then
re-post these materials in a variety of places, and relay them
to friends through social networks and e-mail lists.
Humorous ``viral'' protests: In 2009, Internet
censorship tightened considerably. Many lively blogging
platforms and social networks where heated political
discussions were known to take place were shut down under the
guise of an anti-porn crackdown. In response, an anonymous
Shanghai-based jokester created an online music video called
``Ode to the Grass Mud Horse''--whose technically innocent
lyrics, sung by a children's chorus over video of alpaca sheep,
contained a string of highly obscene homonyms. The video
spawned an entire genre of anti-censorship jokes and videos
involving mythical animals whose names sound similar to
official slogans and obscenities of various kinds.\32\ This
viral pranksterism created an outlet for people to vent about
censorship, poke fun at the government, and raise awareness
among many people who are not comfortable discussing such
matters in a direct way.
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\31\ ``GFW Engineering Team Name List,'' posted to Google
Documents in January 2010 at: http://docs.google.com/
View?docid=0Ae8NBXfKeGvqZGR0am1yeGRfMWhyZDljcWY4
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Public persuasion efforts: A number of prominent
liberal Chinese intellectuals and journalists occasionally
write essays on personal blogs in which they criticize the
government's censorship and information control policies as
counterproductive: censorship, they argue, stifles the Chinese
people's innovation and creativity, contributes to corruption
and economic inefficiency, and generally prevents the nation
from fulfilling its real potential. Such arguments have failed
to influence government policies in any kind of meaningful way,
although individual officials and business leaders sometimes do
echo these sentiments in public fora.\33\ It remains unclear
when or whether this line of argument will eventually convince
China's leadership to relax information controls. The good
news, however, is that in China today it is at least possible
to make this argument.
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\33\ ``Charles Zhang: Without Reform There is No Way Out'' by Xiao
Qiang, China Digital Times, February 4, 2010, at: http://
chinadigitaltimes.net/2010/02/charles-zhang-
%E5%BC%A0%E6%9C%9D%E9%98%B3%EF%BC%9Awithout-reform-there-is-no-way-out/
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recommendations
Because the Chinese government deploys an expanding range of
tactics to control online speech, efforts to promote Internet freedom
in China should be similarly multi-pronged and multi-faceted. China's
Internet users are pushing back against the controls in a range of
ways, as I have described. It is thus important to support, encourage,
and enable a range of efforts aimed at tackling different parts of the
problem. Finally, corporate social responsibility is essential: It will
be much more difficult for Chinese Internet users to fight for their
rights if the international business community assists the Chinese
government in finding more effective means to muzzle them.
Anti-censorship tools: Congress is to be commended
for giving both moral and financial support to programmers who
are working hard to develop anti-censorship technologies. In
spite of this, I have never ceased to be amazed by the number
of university students, academics, journalists, and other
white-collar professionals I've encountered on frequent trips
to China over the past few years who profess little or no
knowledge of circumvention tools and techniques. While no
survey data exists to shed light on what percentage of Chinese
Internet users know how to circumvent censorship--or are
interested in doing so even if they know how--the anecdotal
evidence I have gathered leads me to concluded that the
percentage must be relatively small, and concentrated among
elite groups of tech-savvy people who work in the Internet
industry, followers of banned religious groups, and politically
active people. The broader Internet-using public in China
appears to be largely in the dark about how to access blocked
websites. Funding for software development, therefore, needs to
be accompanied by equally robust support for education and
outreach among broader segments of Chinese society beyond the
obvious communities.
Anonymity and security tools: In my interactions with
Chinese journalists, human rights, lawyers, bloggers, and
academics, I've found that most of them are shockingly
uneducated about how to evade online surveillance, how to
secure their e-mail, how to detect and eliminate spyware on
their computers, and how to guard against even the most
elementary cyber-attacks. Chinese-language, culturally
appropriate technologies, accompanied by robust education and
training, is badly needed. The recent attacks against Chinese
GMail users only highlights the urgency.
Capture, preservation, and distribution of censored
content: As I mentioned earlier, a lot of Chinese Internet
users are downloading and preserving content before it gets
censored, but in an ad-hoc and unorganized way. A searchable,
accessible, and secure repository of such materials would be
invaluable if somebody had the time, funds, and technical
support to create one.
Support for ``opposition research'': To date, ad-hoc
groups conducting research aimed at exposing details of Chinese
censorship policies rely primarily on two platforms to publish
their findings: Google Documents and Wikileaks.org. It is
unclear whether Google Documents will remain accessible in
China if Google shuts down Google.cn and reduces or closes its
China operations. Wikileaks.org faces bandwith problems and
financial difficulties resulting in frequent inaccessibility.
Chinese opposition researchers could use help in finding
secure, reliable, and accessible platforms through which their
work can be disseminated.
Corporate responsibility: To ensure that American
Internet businesses in China assume the appropriate level of
responsibility for the human rights of their users and
customers, I support a voluntary component backed up by
legislation if necessary.
Global Network Initiative: In 2008 Google,
Yahoo, and Microsoft took the important step of joining
the Global Network Initiative (GNI), a code of conduct
for free expression and privacy for companies in the
Information & Communications Technologies (ICT)
sector.\34\ The GNI can help companies uphold a shared
commitment to the values of free expression and privacy
while recognizing that no market is without political
difficulties or ethical dilemmas. Just as companies
have a social responsibility not to pollute the
environment or exploit twelve-year-olds, American
companies have a responsibility not to collaborate with
the suppression of peaceful speech. The GNI's
philosophy is grounded in the belief that people in all
markets stand to benefit from Internet and mobile
technologies. In most cases companies can still do a
lot of good by being engaged in countries whose
governments practice at least one of the forms of
Internet controls I have described above--as long as
they are aware of the human rights implications of
their business and technical decisions. It is
reasonable to expect all Internet and
telecommunications companies to include human rights
risk assessments in their decisions about market entry
and product development, just as they and other
companies consider environmental risks and labor
concerns. With a multi-stakeholder membership including
human rights groups, socially responsible investors and
academics like myself, GNI's goal is to help companies
do the right thing while bringing expanded Internet
communications and mobile access to the people who
stand to benefit from this connectivity the most.
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\34\ See http://globalnetworkinitiative.org
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The principles' implementation guidelines and
accountability framework can be adapted to a range of
business models, including hardware companies and
Internet service providers if these companies choose to
engage with the GNI. As this Commission is aware,
Senator Dick Durbin has written to 30 companies urging
them to join the GNI and we look forward to working
with them so that it will be possible for them to join
in the near future. While GNI is presently most
relevant to Yahoo, Google and Microsoft because those
were the three companies that launched the initiative,
it is also apparent that the 30 companies contacted by
Senator Durbin share varying degrees of human rights
risk, even as their business models, technologies, and
geographies vary widely. They have an obligation to at
least consider joining the GNI and if they choose not
to, to find other appropriate policy and operational
responses to address the inescapable human rights
implications of their products or services.
Legislation: While recognizing that no
connectivity at all is even worse than censored
connectivity, and also recognizing that many
information communications technologies have ``dual
use'' capabilities that can be used for security and
legitimate law enforcement as well as repression, it
should nonetheless be made more difficult for U.S.
companies to provide censorship and surveillance
capabilities to Chinese government entities and their
corporate affiliates, given the regime's clear track
record of using those technologies to suppress peaceful
political dissent. It is important, however, that
legislation be flexible enough to accommodate the
rapidly changing nature of information communications
technology, as well as the complex and highly diverse
nature of ICT businesses--including many small
startups, as well as innovations that are difficult to
define, categorize, or predict in advance. It is also
important that any law concerning the human rights
implications of ICTs be truly global in scope,
recognizing that ICT companies can face human rights
dilemmas in almost every market, whether the government
involved is technically categorized as ``democratic''
or ``authoritarian.''
Legal support for victims: Companies will have a
further disincentive to collaborate with repressive
surveillance and censorship if victims or corporate
collaboration in human rights abuses can more easily
sue them in a United States court of law.
Incentives for socially responsible innovation:
Companies should be encouraged to develop technologies
and service features that enhance users' ability to
evade censorship and surveillance, and to help users
better understand what personal information is being
stored and how it is used.
conclusion
Many of China's nearly 400 million Internet users are engaged in
passionate debates about their communities' problems, public policy
concerns, and their nation's future. Unfortunately these public
discussions are skewed, blinkered, and manipulated--thanks to political
censorship and surveillance. The Chinese people are proud of their
nation's achievements and generally reject critiques by outsiders even
if they agree with some of them. A democratic alternative to China's
Internet-age authoritarianism will only be viable if it is conceived
and built by the Chinese people from within. In helping Chinese
``netizens'' conduct an un-manipulated and un-censored discourse about
their future, the United States will not imposing its will on the
Chinese people, but rather helping the Chinese people to take ownership
over their own future.
______
Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
response from christine jones to a question from representative david
wu
Question. What are one, two, or three things the Federal Government
can do to assist you in your capacity?
Answer. To date, China has not enforced significant penalties
against spammers and others who utilize the Internet to engage in
criminal activities; thus, it has become a sort of safe harbor for such
criminals.
Go Daddy's efforts to persuade authorities there to investigate or
prosecute spammers have been ineffective, as have our efforts to work
with Chinese-based hosting companies to shut down compromised websites.
We hope that the U.S. Government can use its influence with
authorities in China to increase Chinese enforcement activities
relating to Internet abuse, while encouraging the free exchange of
ideas, information, and trade. Specifically, U.S. diplomacy with China
should include efforts to effect the retraction of China's recent
policies relating to the registration of .CN domain names, which will
act as a barrier to Internet access by Chinese nationals.
response from christine jones to a question from representative michael
honda
Question. How does the Chinese government perceive the role or
purpose of the Internet? Is it a resource for information or economic
benefit? One of the government's main driving forces is stability
through economic growth. How do we help Chinese officials to understand
the economic benefits through Internet freedom--so that they are
encouraged to change their philosophy on censorship and lift their
filters? Are there confidence-building steps that our government can
make with Chinese officials to instill trust.
Answer. There appears to be a recent increase in China's
surveillance and monitoring of the Internet activities of its citizens.
In particular, limitations on Chinese nationals ability to register
domain names through non-Chinese registrars, and new reporting and
verification requirements for .CN registrations appear, to us, to be
based on a desire by the Chinese authorities to exercise increased
control over the subject matter of domain name registrations by Chinese
nationals. In addition, China has not taken adequate steps to prevent
spam, cyber-crimes, and other malicious online activity.
By limiting the ability of its citizens to fully engage in the
Internet and the free flow of information and the economic productivity
it enables, the Chinese government is limiting the economic growth
potential of its population. In its trade and diplomatic meetings with
the Chinese government, the United States should encourage the
enforcement of internationally recognized norms on law enforcement
related to malicious online activity nd seek to have China lift its
implicit and explicit limits on domain registrations.
response from sharon hom to a question from representatives christopher
smith and michael honda
Question. As a member of the United Nations' Human Rights Council,
should the United States government call for a hearing in the Human
Rights Council on China's human rights practices and censorship of the
Internet?
Answer. The U.S. Government needs to demonstrate stronger
leadership and more active participation in existing human rights
bodies and processes, including the Human Rights Council. There have
already been a number of assessments of China's human rights record by
various UN human rights bodies that raise concerns regarding Internet
censorship, access to information, and protection of freedom of
expression and privacy rights. Unfortunately, during the Human Rights
Council's Universal Periodic Review of China's overall human rights
record in February 2009, the U.S. Government--an observer state--
remained completely silent.\1\
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\1\ For more information on the Human Rights Council's Universal
Periodic Review of China in 2009, including a summary of all
recommendations made by observer states to the Chinese government for
greater human rights protections, see Human Rights in China's press
releases, including ``China's UN Human Rights Review: New Process, Old
Politics, Weak Implementation Prospects,'' February 9, 2009, http://
www.hrichina.org/public/contents/127014 and ``China Rejects UN
Recommendations for Substantive Reform to Advance Human Rights,''
February 11, 2009, http://www.hrichina.org/public/contents/128130.
Recommendations from the U.S. Government are notably absent from the
international community's calls for greater human rights reform.
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Other UN human rights mechanisms available are limited by their
specific relevant mandates and are often further weakened by the
council's politicized process. Nonetheless, the U.S. Government can
still do much more to strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of
the work of the Human Rights Council.
The U.S. Government should also actively promote greater
protections for online freedom of expression and protection of privacy
through greater participation in other international forums, and
strategic cooperation with European and other bilateral partners to
integrate human rights issues and concerns throughout its trade, human
rights, and security policy approaches.
response from sharon hom to a question from representative david wu
Question. What are one, two, or three things the Federal Government
can do to assist you in your capacity?
Answer. U.S. leadership on global norm building: In fulfilling its
commitment to development of and respect for international law, the
U.S. Government must actively participate in the process of developing
a global consensus on defining and promoting Internet rights and
freedoms within an international human rights framework.
Support for and consultation with civil society: The U.S.
Government can also support civil society groups, both in the United
States and abroad, including those engaged in important Internet
advocacy in restrictive regimes like China. This should include regular
consultations with human rights groups, technology developers,
information and communications technology (ICT) companies, socially
responsible investors, policy think tanks, and academic communities.
Encourage pro-active private sector initiatives: The U.S.
Government should continue to encourage individual companies, and
business and trade associations, to address and promote more effective
approaches to advancing human rights, including freedom of expression
and privacy rights. This encouragement should include support for and
pressure on ICT companies to participate in multi-stakeholder
initiatives, such as the Global Network Initiative.\2\
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\2\ The Global Network Initiative (GNI) is a multi-stakeholder
group of companies, civil society organizations (including human rights
and press freedom groups), investors and academics committed to
developing a collaborative approach to protect and advance freedom of
expression and privacy in the ICT sector. For more information, see
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org.
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responses from sharon hom to questions from representative michael
honda
Question 1. How does the Chinese government perceive the role or
purpose of the Internet? Is it a resource for information or economic
benefit? One of the government's main driving forces is stability
through economic growth. How do we help Chinese officials to understand
the economic benefits through Internet freedom--so that they are
encouraged to change their philosophy on censorship and lift their
filters? Are there confidence-building steps that our government can
make with Chinese officials to instill trust?
Answer. The Chinese government's perception of the role and purpose
of the Internet has changed over the past decade. As part of its
efforts to modernize and deploy high technology, China built its
Internet infrastructure via the so-called ``Golden Shield Project'' to
enhance and increase its information control and surveillance
capability--largely with the help of foreign ICT companies.\3\
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\3\ Multinational corporations deeply involved in creating China's
Internet infrastructure include Nortel Networks, Sun Microsystems, and
Cisco. See Greg Walton, China's Golden Shield (Montreal: International
Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, 2001), available at
http://www.ichrdd.ca/site/--PDF/publications/globalization/CGS--
ENG.PDF.
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However, the current evolution and rapid growth of the Internet has
exceeded the Chinese leadership's initial understanding of its
capability to control it. They did not foresee that one day the
Internet might provide direct online platforms for public opinion,
debate, and broadcast beyond official media for now over 384 million
netizens, including 233 million mobile Internet users, and over 50
million bloggers.\4\
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\4\ See China Internet Network Information Center, 25th Statistical
Survey Report on Internet Development in China (Beijing: China Internet
Network Information Center, 2010), available at http://www.cnnic.cn/
uploadfiles/pdf/2010/3/15/142705.pdf.
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The Chinese government also understands very well the economic
benefits of the Internet, but the number one policy imperative is to
maintain social and political control through Chinese law, a pervasive
police and security apparatus, and state-of-the art surveillance and
monitoring technology, all of which contribute to self-censorship.
Despite this powerful censorship and surveillance capacity, the Chinese
government perceives the Internet to pose serious risks to one-party
rule.
Therefore, the key challenge is not building confidence, because
the Chinese authorities can never be reassured about their greatest
fear: loss of power. To ask the Chinese authorities to ``change its
philosophy on censorship and lift their filters'' is like asking a
tiger for its skin. However, there are reform forces within Chinese
society that desperately need support, encouragement, and confidence-
building measures to enhance their own efforts to advance a more open
and democratic society in China.
Question 2. Over the years, we have seen Chinese regulations and
laws adopted that improve human rights and rule of law standards.
However, transparency and enforcement of these have been questionable
and lacking. Much of that is due to the lack of oversight on local
officials to enforce these rules. In this case, Internet censorship is
more of a centralized effort and governance. As Ambassador Palmer
stated, one person or small group at the top of the leadership can hold
back reforms. I see Internet censorship as a perfect case in point. Do
you see the new and upcoming party leaders as more receptive to
Internet policy reforms?
Answer. Although there is a widely recognized gap between Chinese
law as written on the books and as actually enforced, the one key
policy obstacle to greater rights protection is the Chinese
leadership's emphasis on ``yifazhiguo''--to rule the country by law.
That is, the key role of Chinese law is to uphold the authoritarian
regime. This role is not to be confused with an independent rule of
law, or ``fazhi.''
After the 18th National People's Congress in 2012, there will be
new faces within the Chinese leadership. Clearly, some are already
lining up in the wings. However, no matter who the new leaders are,
they will always act in furtherance of the Communist Party of China's
special interests. Although they may be receptive to some Internet
policy reforms, they will not support any reforms that undermine their
hold on power.
Question 3. There are over 400,000 Chinese Internet users. What is
the general Chinese public's opinion of the Internet? We have seen a
tremendous increase in the number of protests in China, such as ones
against poor work conditions and local government corruption. Internet
censorship, however, is less visible and tangible. Can we expect a
larger popular protest on Internet censorship in China?
Answer. The Internet has become an integral part of the daily life
of a certain demographic of Chinese people--typically educated,
professional, high-income males under the age of 30.\5\ However,
together with the rapid expansion of mobile technology, social
networking tools like Twitter, QQ, and Skype, and the explosive growth
of multimedia applications, the Internet has also provided the platform
for immediate broadcast of protest footage, documentation of security
and police actions, and social mobilization. This empowering role of
technology has the further effect of encouraging other citizens to use
these tools--all deployed with great spirit and even satirical humor.
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\5\ Ibid.
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