[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE RISING STAKES OF REFUGEE ISSUES IN CHINA
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ROUNDTABLE
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 1, 2009
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening statement of Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Staff Director,
Congressional-Executive Commission on China.................... 1
Reid, Toy, Senior Research Associate, Congressional-Executive
Commission on China............................................ 1
Charny, Joel, Vice President for Policy, Refugees International.. 3
Scholte, Suzanne, North Korean Refugee expert; President, Defense
Forum Foundation; Chairman, North Korean Freedom Coalition..... 5
Markey, Mary Beth, Tibetan Refugee expert; Vice President for
Advocacy and Communications, International Campaign for Tibet.. 7
Roberts, Sean R., Uyghur Refugee expert; Associate Professor of
the Practice of International Affairs, The George Washington
University..................................................... 10
THE RISING STAKES OF REFUGEE ISSUES IN CHINA
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FRIDAY, MAY 1, 2009
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 10:27
a.m., in room 628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Charlotte
Oldham-Moore, Staff Director, presiding.
Also present: Toy Reid, Senior Research Associate; Steve
Marshall, Senior Advisor; and Kara Abramson, Advocacy Director.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHARLOTTE OLDHAM-MOORE, STAFF DIRECTOR,
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Good morning. My name is Charlotte
Oldham-Moore. I am the Staff Director for the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China. It is terrific to have all of
you here today.
For those of you who are not familiar with the Commission,
please visit our Web site. We are at www.cecc.gov. We post
daily analysis on rule of law and human rights developments, as
well as an annual review on human rights and rule of law
developments in China, plus transcripts of roundtables and
hearings.
Today's roundtable is ``The Rising Stakes of Refugee Issues
in China,'' a little-explored issue and a very important one,
so I am delighted that we are doing this today.
Douglas Grob, my colleague who usually hosts these with me,
is at a conference, so we are very pleased to have our Senior
Research Associate, Toy Reid, and he will take it from here.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF TOY REID, SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE,
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Mr. Reid. Thank you, Charlotte. And thanks to all of you
for joining us here today.
The focus of today's roundtable is an important one, not
only because the issue of refugees is so often overlooked in
conversations about China's growing role in the international
system, but also because it provides a useful test case. What,
if anything, does China's record with regard to fulfilling its
obligations to refugees tell us about its general willingness
to comply with international laws and norms?
China has reaped substantial benefits from its integration
into the international system and its power and influence
within the system continue to rise. But questions remain
regarding the strength and depth of China's commitment to key
aspects of the international system and whether it will seek to
reshape the system in ways that might modify or dilute
longstanding norms and practices.
For these and other reasons, the Commission is drawn to
consider the question of whether China has made progress toward
fulfilling its obligations to refugees under international law.
Within this discussion, North Korea looms large. North Korea's
neighbors such as China, and other interested nations such as
our own, struggle to respond effectively to North Korea's
unparalleled human rights abuses and chronic humanitarian
crises, ranging from persistent hunger and periodic starvation
caused by the use of food distribution as a political tool, to
the extreme punishments that the regime metes out to those whom
it perceives as disloyal to it, especially repatriated
refugees. The Commission found, in its 2008 Annual Report, that
the Chinese authorities have stepped up efforts to locate and
forcibly repatriate North Korean refugees who have fled to
China.
Moving in the opposite direction, each year Tibetans leave
China and risk the dangerous crossing over Himalayan passes to
seek asylum in India and elsewhere. If Chinese authorities
intercept them en route to the border they may face detention,
and sometimes torture.
Those who successfully cross into Nepal often face forcible
repatriation back to China. Uyghurs fleeing government
repression in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region also face
similar risks and barriers to asylum, often under the sway of
Chinese Government pressure on neighboring countries to refuse
refugee status, to impede access to local asylum proceedings,
and to forcibly refoul them.
Our distinguished panelists will now offer their thoughts
and observations on these, and other issues.
To my left, Joel Charny. Mr. Charny is Vice President for
Policy at Refugees International, where he oversees the
organization's Policy & Advocacy Program. Mr. Charny has
conducted humanitarian assessment missions to various troubled
regions around the world, including the Chinese border with
North Korea. He is the author of ``Acts of Betrayal: The
Challenge of Protecting North Koreans in China,'' and a host of
other articles on humanitarian issues published in outlets such
as the New York Times, The Economist, and the Asian Wall Street
Journal.
Also to my left is Suzanne Scholte. Ms. Scholte is the
President of the Defense Forum Foundation, a nonprofit
organization that sponsors educational programs on foreign
affairs, national security, and human rights issues. She was
the recipient of the 2008 Seoul Peace Prize for her work on
North Korean human rights issues and her work with Western
Sahara refugees. She also serves as the chairman of the North
Korea Freedom Coalition and the vice chairman of the Committee
for Human Rights in North Korea.
To my right is Mary Beth Markey. She is the Vice President
for International Advocacy at the International Campaign for
Tibet [ICT]. She has worked at ICT since 1996, where she
coordinates its international government advocacy and field
research in Nepal and India. She is the recent recipient of a
Human Rights Press Award from the Far Eastern Economic Review
and the Hong Kong Foreign Correspondents Club for her article,
``Tibetans' Uncertain Future in Nepal.''
And, finally, to my right is Dr. Sean Roberts. Dr. Roberts
is the director of the International Development Studies
Program and an Associate Professor at the George Washington
University's Elliot School for International Affairs. He has
spent significant time conducting research in Uyghur
communities in both China and central Asia, and is the author
of numerous articles and a documentary film on the Uyghurs
along the Pakistan-China borderland. He earned his doctorate in
Social Anthropology at the University of Southern California.
So, thank you to all of you for coming, and we will start
with Joel.
STATEMENT OF JOEL CHARNY, VICE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY, REFUGEES
INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Charny. So, good morning. Welcome. It is good to see--I
gather there are many North Koreans here, so that is very good.
I want to thank Charlotte and the staff of the Commission
for inviting me to be a part of this session. I am afraid I
made a presentation on North Korean refugees in China to the
Commission in 2005 and I wish I could say that the situation
has improved, but I think basically when it comes to China we
are facing the same problems and obstacles that we faced then.
Now, my role this morning is to place China's response to
refugees within the overall context of its international legal
obligations and put its response to North Koreans in particular
within the context of China's approach to other refugees and
asylum-seekers. So, Suzanne is going to be the one to really
focus on conditions for North Koreans, and I am going to try to
put that more in context.
China is a signatory of the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, acceding to both in
September 1982. This, in and of itself, is positive and must be
seen in the context of other major Asian countries that have
refused to become a states party to the convention, including
India, Thailand, and Malaysia. China is also a member of the
Executive Committee of the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees [UNHCR], again reflecting what you were referring
to about China's increasing status in the world and their
ability to use that status within international institutions.
The largest refugee flow faced by China was that of
Vietnamese of Chinese ethnicity who fled Vietnam in 1979 at the
time of China's border war with Vietnam. Vietnamese fled across
the border to southwest China, as well as by boat to Hong Kong,
then a British colony. About 260,000 Vietnamese received asylum
in China. The community now numbers 300,000. They are fully
integrated into China and exercise many of the rights of
citizens, but they do not have formal citizenship.
In 2006, the High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio
Guterres, visited the Vietnamese refugee communities--I am
going to mangle the pronunciation--in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
Region and judged them one of the best examples of successful
integration anywhere in the world. So the point is, China has
shown, in the case of Vietnamese refugees, that they can abide
by their international obligations. In their dialogue with the
Office of the High Commissioner, they often point to that
example and they have been working with UNHCR also on improving
and doing training on Chinese refugee law.
So this positive example makes that of China's treatment of
North Koreans even more egregious. The Chinese know full well
and firsthand the horrible human rights and humanitarian
situation prevailing in North Korea. They know that North
Koreans are severely punished upon deportation. Nonetheless,
China is adamant that North Koreans fleeing into northeast
China are illegal economic migrants. They frequently arrest and
deport individual asylum-seekers with no regard for breaking up
families and separating children from their parents.
The Chinese authorities categorically refuse to allow UNHCR
to visit the region where North Korean refugees are present.
They harass and detain institutions that attempt to provide
protection and assistance to the asylum-seekers, especially
Christian missionaries and individuals who attempt to
facilitate the access of North Koreans to South Korea through
broker networks.
Now, I worked on this issue for four years on behalf of
Refugees International. I made one visit and a colleague made
another, so we made two assessment missions to the border
region, but we were never able to pursue a dialogue with the
Chinese authorities on this matter.
Now, at the local level where Chinese of Korean ethnicity
are in the majority, officials did allow a few support
organizations to operate legally and the deportation orders
usually came from the center, reflecting overall geopolitical
interests. They did not tend to come from local officials. We
struggled in terms of the awareness raising, which I think begs
the question that presumably we are all going to address, which
is what works?
What strategy with China is going to work? The more
confrontational strategies of having high-profile movement of
North Koreans into consulates in Beijing, some of the other
global campaigning work, it raised consciousness about this
issue but it also forced the hand of the Chinese; it forced
them to respond, it embarrassed them. As we know, the Chinese
tend not to respond very well to being embarrassed.
I still have the same recommendations on China that I had
four years ago. I do not see any reason to change them. The
Chinese need to stop deportations, they need to grant temporary
humanitarian status to North Koreans and allow their children
to attend school, they need to grant citizenship to North
Koreans with Chinese spouses and their children, they need to
crack down on the trafficking of North Korean women, and they
need to allow UNHCR to assess the situation and make
recommendations to the Chinese Government as to how to proceed.
I think the problem fundamentally is finding the right
people to engage with in China to pursue this very modest
agenda. There should be a way to put this in the framework of
China's international legal obligations, but to my knowledge,
as with many human rights issues related to China, a meaningful
and sustained dialogue has never taken place. Thank you.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you, Joel.
Suzanne, please.
STATEMENT OF SUZANNE SCHOLTE, NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE EXPERT;
PRESIDENT, DEFENSE FORUM FOUNDATION; CHAIRMAN, NORTH KOREA
FREEDOM COALITION
Ms. Scholte. I am deeply grateful to Charlotte and Toy for
organizing this roundtable as part of North Korea Freedom Week
and to give me the opportunity to talk about the North Korean
refugees in China. I also want to express my appreciation to
the fact that they have always taken the time to meet with
witnesses that we have brought to Washington over the years.
As Joel has pointed out, under international law China is
obligated not to repatriate North Korean refugees because every
North Korean who is forced back to North Korea by China is
tortured and imprisoned. Those who are found to have crossed
more than once or have been in contact with Christians can be
publicly executed.
China established a policy even to fine and jail their own
citizens, as well as humanitarian workers who provide food and
shelter to the refugees. In fact, here today at this hearing we
have Steve Kim. If you could stand, Steve, just for a minute.
Steve Kim of Huntington, NY. He was jailed for four years
because he was caught rescuing North Koreans.
By refusing to abide by its international agreements and in
jailing humanitarians who try to help North Korean refugees,
China is directly responsible for creating a horrific human
rights crisis. Over 80 percent of North Korean females have
been victims of trafficking, while men are treated as slave
laborers. The shortage of women in China has created a demand
for North Korean females and human traffickers are luring them
into China to sell them.
I have with me two women who are examples of what thousands
of North Korean women are facing and I am just going to ask
Mrs. Kim Young-Ae if she could just stand for a moment. This is
Mrs. Kim Young-Ae. Her husband died in an accident when she,
her son, and her parents were already at the brink of
starvation. Lured to China by a trafficker who promised her a
job as a nanny, she crossed the Yalu River, only to be met on
the other side by a trafficker who took her to Liaoning
Province to be sold to a mentally unstable Chinese pig farmer
for $733.
According to Mrs. Kim, ``I had to live a life of hell, for
he threatened that he would hand me over to the Chinese police
if I said or did anything that displeased him.'' Mrs. Kim gave
birth to a daughter, which gave her the only comfort she knew
as she worked as a slave laborer by day and was beaten and
abused at night by her so-called husband, who kicked her so
hard he damaged her teeth. One day, her daughter, while under
the care of her mother-in-law, drowned in a stream in front of
the house. Her daughter had not yet even learned how to walk.
Mrs. Kim, filled with guilt, fled in the night, only to be
caught again by a human trafficking gang who sold her to a
farmer in a rural village in Henan Province. The farmer told
Mrs. Kim he had bought her for $1,100. Unable to speak the
language or adjust to the food, she suffered serious medical
problems and she ended up begging the trafficker who had sold
her to take her away. Of course he was glad to do this, and he
sold her again to a handicapped man. She finally escaped to
South Korea in 2007.
Mrs. Bang Mi-Sun is another witness. If you could just
stand. Ms. Bang Mi-Sun's husband starved to death during the
famine. Afraid that the rest of her family might starve, she
and her son and daughter crossed the Tuman River in June 2002.
She said, ``I thought I would be able to feed my children once
I got to China, but what was really waiting for us was the
possibility of arrest and forced return to North Korea by the
Chinese police. Just as I was ready to do anything that would
guarantee my children's safety, a Chinese trafficker appeared
and began to threaten me, using my children's vulnerability. In
the end, I was sold for $586 and taken to a place called
Heilong. The Chinese brokers called us North Korean women
`pigs.' ''
There were many North Korean women with Mrs. Bang and she
was sold first as the ``best pig.'' The person who bought her
then sold her to his relative in Shangdong Province. Her new
husband was 15 years her senior and treated her as a beast of
burden, constantly stressing how he had bought her for an
enormous sum of $1,025. While the man who bought her was out of
the house, a group of people stormed in and took her to be sold
again. In addition to the traffickers, there are also vicious
brokers who steal North Korean women only to resell them.
This time she was sold to a man over 10 years younger than
she; he was 34 and she was 48. He demanded that she bear him a
child. When he found out that she had a contraceptive device,
he brought in an obstetrician and had the members of his family
hold her down while the obstetrician brutally tore the
contraceptive device out of her body. This caused her to be
bedridden for a month.
She fled the house, but soon was arrested by the Chinese
police and forced back to North Korea to a labor camp in Musan,
where she was forced to do intensive physical activity. When
she fell in exhaustion, the North Korean guards beat her with a
bludgeon on her leg, permanently disabling her.
After the labor camp, she was sent to a detention facility
where she witnessed the guards force a pregnant repatriated
North Korean to lose her baby by putting a plank on her belly
and forcing the other inmates to stand on it. Then Mrs. Bang
was sent to a political prison camp where she witnessed the
terrible suffering of other North Koreans; all of this because
they both wanted to feed their children.
The stories of these two women are typical of what is
happening right now in China, and right now North Koreans are
facing a tragedy that seems to never end: starvation in North
Korea, leading them to flee to China; abuse and inhumane
treatment in China, and then punishment and torture when China
forces them back to North Korea.
How can Hu Jintao continue to placate Kim Jong Il with this
repatriation policy? Kim Jong Il has shown his racist contempt
for the Chinese people because he has ordered his border guards
to force North Korean women to abort their babies because they
are half Chinese.
The Chinese Government, and even U.S. policymakers, have an
unfounded fear that if China showed compassion to the refugees,
China would be flooded with refugees, which would lead to the
collapse of the North Korea regime. This fear is not only
unfounded, but it is prolonging the suffering.
To end this crisis, China should allow them safe passage
because, unlike any refugee crisis in the world today, North
Koreans have a place to go as they have automatic citizenship
under the South Korean Constitution. Second, they should let
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees do their job. Third, they
should work with the humanitarian community rather than jailing
them. The United States and other countries in the region
should establish a First Asylum policy for North Korean
refugees, as was done to save the Vietnamese boat people.
In February, I met a woman named Mrs. Ko Mae Hwa, who fled
to China with her 16-year-old daughter. While they were
separated, her daughter was caught by Chinese police and forced
back to North Korea, where she was beaten to death by North
Korean border guards. It is hard to imagine that people could
beat a 16-year-old girl to death who was simply trying to find
her mother.
As Mrs. Bang has said, ``I realized that there was a world
where human beings were bought and sold and that people could
show such cruel shamelessness. If someone does not wipe their
tears, heal their wounds, and help them regain their human
dignity, female refugees will continue to be sold like pigs in
China. They will never know life's happiness. How long can we
let this barbaric situation continue, especially when all the
solutions are right at hand? ''
I thank you for the opportunity to address this issue.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Now to Mary Beth Markey, who is going to
explore the challenges facing Tibetan refugees who seek to
leave China.
STATEMENT OF MARY BETH MARKEY, TIBETAN REFUGEE EXPERT; VICE
PRESIDENT FOR ADVOCACY AND COMMUNICATIONS, INTERNATIONAL
CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET
Ms. Markey. Thank you, Charlotte.
I first want to express my deep sympathy to the Korean
women who were referred to in the testimony this morning. My
heart goes out to you, and I hope you are able to find some
peace in your life now.
It occurs to me, before I start my testimony, that China's
strong resistance to cooperating on the Korean refugee issue or
to provide refuge, even temporary refuge to the Korean
refugees, should be considered also in relation to their policy
concerning Tibetan refugees. I hope my testimony will help
illuminate why that may be the case.
The measures that China has in place to deal with Tibetan
asylum-seekers are primarily internal, but the Chinese
Government has increasingly sought to contain its Tibetan
refugee problem through its engagement with Nepal, making the
Tibet issue the defining element of its bilateral relations.
The reasons that Tibetans flee are predictably similar.
Parents send their children for an education, monks and nuns
seek religious freedom, and nomads separated from their
traditional livelihoods hope to find a future and an
affirmation of their Tibetan identity in exile. Virtually all
Tibetans say they wish to be near His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
Somewhere between 2,500 and 3,500 Tibetans are registered
each year by the UNHCR as Persons of Concern and provided
assistance at the Tibetan Refugee Reception Center in
Kathmandu. There have been unusual spikes in those numbers and
we are now seeing a major decrease. Only 652 Tibetans arrived
safely at the Kathmandu Reception Center last year.
Depending on their point of origin, it can take months or
weeks to make the journey out of Tibet, and the journey becomes
more perilous in the approach to the Tibet-Nepal border where
shelter, food, and water become scarce and frostbite, snow-
blindness, and other injuries are common. In this final leg,
most Tibetan refugees pass through the glaciated Nagpa Mountain
Pass, which rises nearly 19,000 feet above sea level west of
Mt. Everest.
Chinese border security is intense. Just six years ago, the
main People's Armed Police Border Patrol station was some 25
kilometers northwest of Nagpa Pass, but in 2003 the Chinese
Government completed construction of a motorable road to a
point just 6 kilometers north of Nagpa La. The Chinese
Government also began to draw attention to its efforts to
tighten border security. It made quite a show of commending
border security for intercepting people attempting to flee the
country while maintaining ``revolutionary spirit in a place
with insufficient oxygen.''
Further inside Tibet, a prison near Shigatse houses
Tibetans caught en route. Former inmates report that there have
been as many as 500 prisoners there at any time, nearly all
caught at Nagpa La or near the Chinese-Nepal Friendship Bridge
border crossing at Dram, which is the main commercial crossing
at the Tibet-Nepal border.
Most Tibetans serve from three to five months, during which
time they receive beatings and are tortured regularly. They
must perform hard labor, usually road building in and around
Shigatse, and must sign, ultimately, a document that they will
never again attempt to leave the People's Republic of China to
go to India. According to Article 322 of the Chinese Criminal
Law, such Tibetans are subject to imprisonment for ``secretly
crossing the national boundary.''
Chinese border police aggressively pursue Tibetans,
including into Nepalese territory. In 2002 and 2005, border
security fired on Tibetan refugees while they were attempting
to cross over Nagpa La. In September 2006, a young Tibetan nun,
Kelsang Namtso, was shot dead by Chinese border police on the
Nagpa Pass. It was the first time that such an incident had
been captured on video by international witnesses, climbers on
near Mount Cho Oyu. The Chinese Government described the
incident as ``normal border management.''
Nepalese authorities stepped up border security
dramatically following the protests in Tibet that began last
spring and in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics last summer.
Indeed, the border was virtually closed. Tibetans living near
the border reported being harassed by Chinese security and
photographed by Nepalese informers during this period. TAR
Chairman Jumpa Punsok made a rare trip to the Tibet-Nepal
border to congratulate security stationed there for their work
in preventing ``splitism.''
Responding to China's plans for its climbers to carry the
Olympic Torch to the summit of Mt. Everest, Nepalese officials
agreed to close down access for the 2008 spring climbing season
and allegedly received a cash sum in the millions of dollars to
compensate for the loss of revenue associated with such a
massive disruption of the climbing season.
Throughout the 1990s, Nepal authorities generally permitted
Tibetans to enter Nepal and have assisted or directed them to
the refugee center in Kathmandu, typically after they have been
detained by border police and handed over to Nepal immigration
officials. Nonetheless, incidents of forced repatriation at the
border, and even from Kathmandu, have occurred periodically and
often in exchange for even minor enticements from the Chinese.
In 2003, Nepalese police were photographed carrying back cases
of beer from the Tibetan side of the border following the
refoulement of 18 Tibetan refugees.
As pressure from the Chinese Government intensifies,
Nepal's attitude regarding Tibetans entering or transiting its
territory becomes markedly less welcoming. China quickly
registered its Tibet position with the new Maoist-led
government in Nepal, and Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal,
a.k.a. Prachanda, reiterated his intention to support China on
the Tibet issue and readily affirmed that Nepal would not be
used by Tibetan separatists for any anti-Chinese activities.
The new government in Nepal has also allowed Chinese diplomats
extraordinary and extrajudicial influence in dealing with
Tibetan issues in Nepal.
Prachanda supported the Chinese Government's harsh
suppression of Tibetans following the 2008 demonstrations, and
in Nepal ruled out allowing the Tibetan Refugee Welfare Office
and the
office of the representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to
reopen, both of which had operated in Kathmandu since the
1960s. The two offices had been ordered closed in 2005 by King
Gyanendra in an apparent quid pro quo for China's support when
Gyanendra dismissed the democratic government in Nepal, fired
the entire parliament, and assumed absolute control.
Nepalese authorities adopted a zero tolerance approach to
Tibetan protesters last year, and Nepalese police, on occasion,
employed excessive force against the protesters, using canes to
beat them. Chinese Embassy personnel were witnessed and
photographed working behind police lines, guiding the handling
of protests and arrests of demonstrators, even going so far as
to direct the positioning of Nepalese police officers.
In August, Nepal's Home Ministry announced that Tibetans
residing in Nepal without legal documentation would face
deportation, a response to Chinese pressure to put an end to
Tibetan protesters demonstrating in front of the Chinese
Embassy. Foreign embassies cautioned Prachanda that his
inaugural appearance at the UN Security Council meeting in New
York the next month might not go well if his government had
just deported a large number of Tibetans to China. At the end
of the year, China announced a substantial military assistance
package to Nepal, at which time the Chinese deputy chief of
staff said that his meeting with Nepal's Defense Minister had
focused on border management and the One China policy.
Last fall, small numbers of Tibetans began to attempt the
crossing again. The repressive aftermath of the spring
demonstrations and security crackdown, while checking movement
across the Tibetan plateau, also means that more Tibetans will
likely see no other alternative but to seek to escape Tibet.
International Campaign for Tibet [ICT] offers the following
recommendations for attention by the Congress and
administration:
First, China has proposed a friendship treaty to Nepal.
Nepal, distracted with internal problems, has yet to respond,
but there is talk that if the treaty does not move then Beijing
will seek a narrower extradition treaty as a first step. There
is concern that the China draft will seek to legitimize their
position that the Tibetans in Nepal are illegal economic
migrants, not refugees, and if adopted would undermine any
protection that the Tibetan refugees currently have.
The U.S. Government and its partners should take a clear
position with the Nepal Government against any extradition
treaty that would codify the PRC position, and at the stroke of
a pen turn Tibetan refugees in Nepal into criminal illegal
aliens and could lead to their extradition to China where they
would face a credible fear of persecution.
Second, the Tibetan Refugee Reception Center in Kathmandu
is an essential lifeline for the refugees coming across the
border and transiting through Nepal onward to India. It is also
supported by U.S. Government funds. The center is likely to be
the next target of Chinese pressure on Nepal. The U.S.
Government and its partners must work to keep the reception
center open. Closure would frustrate the ability of the UNHCR
to offer protection and expose Tibetans fleeing through Nepal
to exploitation and refoulement.
Thank you.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you, Mary Beth.
Sean Roberts, to speak on the challenges facing Uyghur
refugees who leave Xinjiang.
STATEMENT OF SEAN R. ROBERTS, UYGHUR REFUGEE EXPERT; ASSOCIATE
PROFESSOR OF THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE GEORGE
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Mr. Roberts. Thank you. I think perhaps the audience is
less knowledgeable about the situation of Uyghurs than some of
the other situations of others who have been discussed thus
far, so I am going to talk both about why many Uyghurs seek
political asylum and about the challenges that they face in
doing so.
To understand why so many Uyghurs seek political asylum
outside of China, one must first understand the position of
Uyghurs in their homeland within the Chinese state. For those
unfamiliar with the Uyghurs, they are a Muslim minority who
live primarily in China's northwest and speak a Turkic language
closely related to the Uzbek language in the former Soviet
Union.
Much like the better-known Tibetans, Uyghurs are a minority
within the Chinese state and have a distinct homeland located
within the borders of the People's Republic of China [PRC].
Many, if not most, Uyghurs believe this homeland, which is
presently called the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of
China, should be an independent state, or at the very least
should have greater autonomy within the PRC. Much like Tibet,
the Chinese state refutes these ideas.
I would argue, however, that historically China has viewed
Xinjiang as a buffer zone for their relations with neighbors to
the west, and therefore this issue has not been as pronounced
as it has become recently. Since the economic reforms of the
1980s in China, Xinjiang has increasingly gained in importance
to the PRC. For the first time, China has begun to seriously
develop the region and to successfully convince Han Chinese
migrants to move to the northwest voluntarily for economic
opportunity. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Xinjiang has
also become a trade gateway to the west for China, and in the
context of China's growing economy, both a source of oil and a
route through which to bring oil and gas from central Asia. All
of these developments have suddenly made the Chinese state view
Uyghur aspirations for sovereignty as a bigger threat to
national security than at any time since the Sino-Soviet split
of the 1960s.
Since the early 1990s, therefore, Uyghurs have come under
increasingly greater scrutiny from authorities for their
political behavior and unsanctioned religious activity.
Successive ``Strike Hard'' campaigns launched by authorities
have targeted Uyghurs as suspected political criminals, guilty
of aspirations to split China or to worship Islam through
unofficial channels. As a result, thousands of Uyghurs have
been imprisoned and tortured for their political and religious
beliefs in the last 15 years, with scores of those being
executed.
These campaigns aimed at eradicating Uyghurs' desire to
establish an independent state intensified after the September
11 terrorist attacks on the United States, which has allowed
the Chinese Government to now frame Uyghur political dissent as
a terrorist threat. Even more troubling, in the aftermath of
September 11 both the United States and the United Nations
officially recognized a little-known Uyghur organization called
the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement as a terrorist group in
2002, despite the fact that there is no conclusive evidence of
any organized terrorist acts perpetrated by Uyghurs inside or
outside of China.
As a result of this international recognition, which many
believe was undertaken for political reasons to gain China's
support in the war on terror, the Chinese state has felt that
it now has an international mandate to crack down on Uyghur
dissent without regard for human rights because Uyghurs have
been recognized among the common enemies in the global war on
terror.
Inside China, this has made Uyghurs more vulnerable to
political and religious repression than anytime in recent
history. It does not mean that all Uyghurs are targeted by the
state as terrorists, but it does mean that virtually any Uyghur
is at risk of being deemed such, particularly if they publicly
voice their political opinions or worship Islam outside state-
sanctioned mosques.
This situation offers an obvious impetus for Uyghurs to
seek political asylum outside of China and makes it difficult
to distinguish who is and who is not deserving of refugee
status, as international law stipulates, ``owing to fear of
persecution on account of their political or religious
beliefs.'' Furthermore, a Uyghur who has applied for political
asylum but is denied is likely to be targeted by state organs
on return to China, making such a denial a potentially lethal
sentence for those who receive it.
Unfortunately, these ethical issues regarding Uyghur
refugee cases are not the only quandary the international
community faces with regards to asylum-seekers. Uyghur refugee
issues are further complicated by the overwhelming strength of
China's so-called ``soft power'' around the world. China's
growing leverage globally as the world's fastest-growing
economy has allowed it to unduly influence the positions of
other states. This phenomenon has received particular attention
over the last several years as China has sought increasing
influence in the developing world where it desires better
access to energy sources and other raw materials needed to fuel
its growing economy.
But the decision of the United States to recognize a Uyghur
terrorist group despite a lack of conclusive evidence suggests
China may also be capable of influencing more developed
countries, especially on an issue like the Uyghurs, which does
not have any bearing on other countries' direct interests.
China has continually used its soft power in this instance
to
influence other states to avoid taking Uyghur refugees. Perhaps
the most visible example of this problem is the difficulty that
the United States has had in finding countries to host Uyghur
refugees who have been held in the Guantanamo detention
facilities but have been cleared of any wrongdoing.
But there are numerous other examples to draw from. In
recent years, China has especially engaged countries that would
naturally be sympathetic to the Uyghur cause, including Turkey,
the Arab states, the central Asian states, and Pakistan,
seeking to dissuade them of taking Uyghur refugees or allowing
Uyghurs already living in these countries from advocating the
Uyghur cause internationally.
Furthermore, China's soft-power influence has not only been
employed to discourage countries from taking asylum-seekers; it
has also been used to make countries one might think would be
sympathetic to the plight of the Uyghurs willingly extradite
those who might qualify for political asylum back to China to
face prison terms and/or execution. The most recent example of
such extradition comes from Pakistan, which only this month
extradited nine Uyghurs who are accused of being terrorists by
the Chinese Government.
But there are similar cases from the central Asian states,
going back to the later 1990s. In fact, China initiated the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the mid-1990s, at that
time called the Shanghai Five Group, explicitly to influence
the central Asian states not to harbor Uyghurs who advocated
political views contrary to the positions of the Chinese state.
The most troubling example from central Asia involves
Hussein Jalil, a Uyghur with Canadian citizenship who was
extradited to China by Uzbek authorities while he was visiting
family in Uzbekistan in March 2006. He is presently serving a
15-year prison term for his alleged involvement in terrorism.
While the Canadian authorities have complained about this case
to the Chinese Government, they have not been able to secure
his release.
In most of these cases of extradition, the country involved
does not undertake any legal deliberation of the validity of
the accusations against those they are returning to China; they
merely take the word of the Chinese Government as valid in
itself. Furthermore, in several cases of this kind I witnessed
in Kazakhstan in the last decade, the UNHCR did little to
prevent the extraditions. As one UNHCR official told me in the
1990s, he felt extensive pressure from his home office on this
issue, since the UNHCR was worried that spending its political
capital on issues related to Uyghurs might jeopardize more
important endeavors in which it was involved in China.
In conclusion, therefore, I would like to advocate for more
international recognition of this problem, and at the very
least, more recognition of the problem within the U.S.
Government. As China takes a more visible position in the
international community, the problem is only likely to become
larger and will continue to rear its head in countries
throughout the world.
Uyghur refugee cases must be considered consistently on
their legal merits and not be subjected to political
manipulation. Furthermore, the UNHCR, as a neutral
international body, must take a more active role in advocating
for objectivity and due process with regard to Uyghur refugee
cases.
Thank you.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you, Sean.
Now we turn to the question and answer portion of this
morning's roundtable. For those of you who are new to the CECC,
I want to just give you a quick background on how we handle
this. There will be an official congressional transcript
created from this event. Members of the audience are encouraged
to ask questions. If you do not want your name used in the
transcript, to be printed in the transcript, just let us know
and it will not be. We will just have ``audience participant.''
Another challenge we have had is voices. People are
sometimes too shy for my taste. So when you get up to ask your
question, please project. Judy Wright of our staff will also
have a little, not a microphone, a little device that will help
our transcriber hear your question.
The first question for the panelists: As we see in the
United States, rarely is a state's response, a government's
response to
refugees' challenges monolithic. Certainly in our country, in
response to the Haitians and other refugee populations, we have
had segments of our government respond differently or have
different impulses.
Joel commented that China had made positive developments,
including being a signatory to the refugee convention, and
joining the Executive Committee of the UNHCR. I was curious
whether any of the other panelists in their areas of expertise
also saw notable trends or developments from the government?
Ms. Markey. No. No.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. No split between the local and the
central as Joel commented on the North Korean refugees. No?
Ms. Markey. No. No. Nothing from the Chinese Government. In
fact, I would be very--my judgment, based on the Tibetan
refugee experience, on China's presence on the Executive
Committee of the UNHCR, and even its signing of the
International Refugee Covenant, is that signing a document has
little to do with implementation. China is very eager to wield
its influence in international fora, and I would say its
involvement in these fora reflects its own strategic self-
interests. So, I am sorry, that is my perspective.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Sean, anything in terms of the Uyghur
perspective?
Mr. Roberts. Well, I guess since the refugee problem is
part and parcel of the general state of relations with the
Uyghur people, I would say that the one glimmer of hope you see
is that the Chinese state is not only using a ``stick'' in
terms of its control of Xinjiang, it is trying to establish
various ``carrots'' to integrate the Uyghur population more
into society.
Unfortunately, I think that there is not enough input from
the Uyghur population in terms of, what types of ``carrots''
they might like to be given. The Chinese state, for example, is
providing more education to Uyghurs, but it is more education
in Mandarin language and not more education in Uyghur. So, that
can also be a divisive issue.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Okay. Thank you.
Joel, anything? Suzanne?
Mr. Charny. This is where I gather, at one point, Michel
Gabaudan from UNHCR was going to be a respondent or part of the
panel. I have talked to Michel privately about this. He was the
UNHCR representative in Beijing, I think, for four or five
years. From what he said, UNHCR is trying to pursue a sustained
dialogue and advocate with the Chinese Government on these
issues, and at various times they might get a commitment from
an official that they are going to relax their policy or not
arrest and deport people. But my feeling is, we just have not
seen results.
I mean, in the case of North Koreans, if anything--again, I
haven't been to the border region now for a long time. But my
understanding is, if anything, the policy is harsher now in the
sense that they have really made an arrangement, they have cut
a deal with the North Korean border guards and the military on
the other side of the border to really limit the flow. I mean,
that's their strategy right now. So given the continued
deprivation in North Korea, that in effect is blocking asylum-
seekers. Then at the same time, as Suzanne said, they are
continuing the harassment of the networks of people trying to
assist, and so on.
So I think it would be a reach at this point to see
anything positive. This, again, begs the question of how, how
do we pursue
collectively the issues that we are raising with the Chinese
Government in a way that is going to make any difference
whatsoever? I would be very interested if anyone has any bright
ideas on that score.
Ms. Scholte. I do not know if I have a bright idea, but I
was going to say, just to echo what Joel was talking about, and
I think everyone on this panel would agree, the irony of the
Olympics was Beijing won the Olympics with a promise that China
was going to improve on human rights. The irony of that was,
the situation got worse for all the groups that we are
concerned about.
The Chinese Government actually told the UNHCR that the
group of North Korean defectors that had gotten asylum and were
being protected by the UNHCR before the Olympics, that they
will not let these North Koreans go to South Korea unless the
UNHCR promised that it will not bring in any more North Koreans
until after the Olympics, and putting the UNHCR in a terrible
position, because that is their whole job, to take care of
refugees. We were able to get this out and get some Members of
Congress to write letters, and that group eventually got out.
In fact, three of them came to the United States. But after
that, we had two families that were ready to seek asylum with
the UNHCR and we waited until after the Olympics because we
thought maybe things will get better. The UNHCR actually told
us it was actually worse after the Olympics. It was horrible
before the Olympics. So, I see no improvement. This continues
to be a terribly difficult situation.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Okay. Thank you.
We are going to turn to the audience. If you would like to
ask a question, please raise your hand and I will call on you.
Anybody interested? Patricia Kim, our intern, please.
Ms. Kim. I've heard that North Korean refugees also cross
the border into Mongolia, but I haven't heard too much
information on that route. Is the Mongolian route to South
Korea just as popular as the Chinese route? Could you explain
what the situation is like at the Mongolian border.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Patricia Kim just asked whether North
Koreans go into Mongolia as a preferred route and whether that
is a good route or not.
Ms. Scholte. Yes. That was a good route for a time. But
what happened is, it was actually a year and a half ago, the
Chinese tried to shut that route down. The reason why you do
not hear a lot about the refugees getting out of Mongolia is
because the Mongolian Government has a very good relationship
with North Korea and they don't want to rock the boat. But as
long as the refugees get there, I don't know of any case where
the Mongolians have forced them back. But they like to do it
very quietly because they want to keep good relations with
North Korea.
But I want to say, if anybody has not seen this movie,
you've got to see the movie ``Crossing'' because it's based on
true stories. It's an incredible movie. Actually, the escape
route they used in that movie was Mongolia, but it's a very
dangerous route getting out. Actually, the southern routes are
actually safer, but all of them are dangerous.
Mr. Charny. It should just be stressed for those of you who
are not up on your northeast Asia geography, there is no direct
access from North Korea to Mongolia, so, you still have to go
through China. Even if Mongolia is the destination, you are
subject to the risk of arrest and deportation simply by
traveling through China to get to Mongolia.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Steve Marshall?
Mr. Marshall. I'm Steve Marshall. I work for the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China and I cover the
Tibet issue. I thank all of you for your testimony today, and I
have a question for Mary Beth Markey.
This is a very basic question but I think it goes right to
the heart of the matter: why are all these Tibetans traveling
illegally across the border? The question is, do they have an
option to travel legally? My understanding would be that they
would need possibly four documents to travel legally to, say,
get to India for personal, religious, cultural purposes: (1) a
Chinese passport; (2) permission to use that passport for exit
and reentry; (3) visas to travel through Nepal, and (4) to
enter India. What options do they have to do this legally and
acquire these documents? Thank you.
Ms. Markey. It is possible for Tibetans to get Chinese
passports and to travel on Chinese passports. It is not
possible across the board and in every circumstance and,
especially since the spring 2008 demonstrations began, it is
nearly impossible for Tibetans to get passports to travel
abroad.
Those Tibetans that have been able to attain passports
usually use them to enter Nepal and leave them there. Any
indication on a Chinese passport that you, as a Tibetan, have
been to India will be treated with tremendous suspicion on
return to China. So, in fact, we do know that there are many
cases where Tibetans may have passports, but they certainly
leave them behind in Nepal. Did I answer your question, Steve?
Mr. Marshall. [Off microphone].
Ms. Markey. Well, actually I don't know. Generally Tibetans
do not use any legal means, any legal documentation from Tibet
for the entire route through Nepal and onward to India. When
they arrive in Kathmandu they present themselves to the UNCHR
as having no documents. They certainly, again, would not use a
document to go to India.
There is a specific population, a very small part of the
Tibetans walking out of Tibet over the Himalayas, who,
understandably, would have an interest in going back that way.
These Tibetans come out, for example, to get a blessing from
His Holiness the Dalai Lama or to receive a special teaching,
or perhaps to bring their children to the Tibetan refugee
schools in India and then leave their children there and go
back.
Mr. Marshall. [Off microphone].
Ms. Markey. They would not have good prospects for getting
travel documents now because of the intense security across
Tibet, neither would they want to use those documents if they
provided evidence that they had gone to India and the come back
to Tibet, because then they would expose themselves to
harassment.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Kara Abramson, and then the gentleman in
the back.
Ms. Abramson. I'm Kara Abramson with the Congressional-
Executive Commission on China. I'd like to ask Ms. Markey and
Dr. Roberts to please discuss conditions for family members of
people who leave China and seek asylum elsewhere. Do these
family members who remain inside China face any repercussions,
and are they able to apply for derivative refugee status and
eventually leave China to join their relatives who have already
left?
Ms. Oldham-Moore. A quick repeat on the question for those
in the back. Ms. Abramson asked about the status of families
left behind in terms of Uyghurs and Tibetans who leave, and
whether those family members who stayed behind face any
negative repercussions, and also did they get any derivative
refugee status later, can they obtain it.
Mr. Roberts. I guess the answer is that it is not a very
good situation. The most visible case of this concerning
Uyghurs involves Rabiya Khadeer, who is a refugee in the United
States. Several of her family members have been arrested, not
overtly on charges that she had left the country as a political
refugee, but I think it's fair to say that that certainly
contributed to their arrests.
In general, it's my impression that once you've become a
refugee it's very difficult to establish contact, direct
contact, with family members. The only possible way might be if
they were to meet in a third country. Unfortunately for
Uyghurs, while it used to be fairly easy to get legal travel
documents to go from Xinjiang to central Asia, which was a
place where people could meet, now that has become much more
difficult.
As the case I mentioned about the Canadian citizen who was
extradited while visiting Uzbekistan points out, it is not even
a safe option necessarily for refugees to go to central Asian
states. Many of the Uyghur refugees who are in the United
States, in Europe, and other countries, the Chinese have cases
out against them, politically motivated criminal cases. So if
they land in a country that is practicing this type of
extradition, they could be in serious problems.
Ms. Markey. Generally families are placed under suspicion
and can be harassed if the authorities know that other family
members have left Tibet to go to India. It has been common
practice for Tibetans to send their children to schools run by
the Central Tibetan Administration, the Tibetan government in
exile, in India. Tibetan cadres have been required to withdraw
their children from Tibetan schools in India or face
termination if they work for the government.
Most Tibetans who live in India or Nepal, long-staying
Tibetan refugees who arrived before 1989, have resident status.
In Nepal, it is no longer possible for new arrivals from Tibet
to get resident status. In India, it is possible to even get
citizenship, but it is a long and cumbersome process and I have
heard accounts from some Tibetans that it is even impossible to
get. In Nepal, some things are possible in the margins, but
Tibetans are generally in a vulnerable position and resident
status does not even convey basic rights.
Tibetans have been able to get visas to come to the United
States. Some apply for political asylum and there are family
reunification possibilities in the United States. But again,
these days it is very difficult for Tibetans to come out of
Tibet. If their families were in India or even Nepal, family
reunification would be much easier. I don't know of any
circumstances of family reunification from Tibet. I could
imagine that if somebody got asylum in the United States and
their family was in Tibet, their family members may try to
leave Tibet to go to India and then try for family
reunification from there.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you.
Yes, sir?
Mr. Rendler. Thank you. I'm Jack Rendler from Amnesty
International. I'd like to take a crack at Joel's question
about how to encourage the Chinese to accept more North Korean
refugees and not to turn them back.
Wouldn't you think, Joel, that you, Joel Charny, could
convince the Chinese that stability on the Korean peninsula
would be enhanced by allowing more people to leave North Korea?
Wouldn't the Chinese have an interest in people who are either
starving to death or dissident, to not be in North Korea, to
leave? I could picture tactically, say, you write an article
that makes that case, and then we, Amnesty International, would
take it around to Chinese Embassies and consulates around the
world and say, what do you think about this, doesn't this make
sense?
The other thing I wondered about is the issue of
trafficking. It would seem to me that of all the issues on
human rights abuses that come up in discussions around North
Korean refugees, that trafficking might be the issue that the
Chinese would be most sensitive to. Wouldn't it be in their
interest to give some kind of status to women who are coming
out of North Korea into China so that they wouldn't be so
susceptible to trafficking?
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Did you have those questions? Yes. Great.
Mr. Charny. So Jack tried to basically respond to my
challenge about, how can we move the Chinese on this issue, the
suggestion being to argue that it is in China's security
interests because it would lead to a more stable North Korea to
allow people who are suffering and people who are politically
persecuted to move into China, thereby relieving pressure on
the North Korea state.
I don't know. I mean, I think it would be--whether the
Chinese would respond to that argument, I'm really not sure. We
had a good discussion yesterday at the Heritage Foundation, and
I think a good point that was made there was, first of all,
China has a longstanding security relationship with North Korea
that they are fundamentally trying to maintain, and furthermore
they need, and want, North Korea as kind of a buffer between
any encroachment from the south and the China border.
So would the Chinese buy the argument of more people moving
into China increasing the stability of North Korea? I'm not
sure that they would. I think the Chinese also are, as Suzanne
referred to, either genuinely, or they just use it as an
excuse, afraid of kind of a massive outflow into China that
would change the demographics in that part of the country. So,
I don't know. I need to mull that over. Maybe there is
something there.
I should have mentioned the trafficking angle. I actually
think that is one of--I would like to think that that's
potentially a promising way to approach this. I think a refugee
rights approach is
basically not going to work, but many countries in the world,
including totalitarian ones, are nominally on side on this
whole question of trying to limit the trafficking of women.
Trafficking of women, I think, has managed to emerge in the
international dialogue as something that everyone should be
against. So that is our big advantage in this case.
Now, I don't know. Being a refugee expert and not a
trafficking expert, I don't know the international institutions
that would be best to take this up with the Chinese, but I
would like to believe that that would be a promising angle,
that you would go to the
Chinese and say, look, you have got a big problem with illegal
trafficking of women, this is both wrong and damaging your
international reputation, can we start discussions about how to
limit that, they might be open to that.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Let me just comment. CECC's last report
has a big section on trafficking and China's response, and the
government has done many positive steps in terms of
enforcement, offering victims' services. So I don't think in
that regard that there's an all-negative story there, so that
might be a good angle.
Ms. Scholte. I just wanted to make a comment, too, about
the argument about--I think I mentioned that China has an
unfounded fear that if it did show compassion to the refugees,
that they may be flooded with refugees. I wanted to speak to
that.
First of all, if refugee flows out of North Korea would
have had that effect--I think they fear that it would cause the
regime to collapse in North Korea. We have to remember that
during the famine, at least half a million people crossed the
border and 3 million people died, and it didn't affect Kim Jong
Il at all. So this idea that this would collapse the regime if
more refugees tried to flee is unfounded, but I think China has
that mind-set.
The other thing that people have to remember is the
refugees who are leaving North Korea don't want to leave North
Korea. I've been working on this issue since 1996. I have never
met a North Korean that didn't want to go back to North Korea.
They left Kim Jong Il, they left that regime. So what China is
doing is prolonging this problem because if it did show some
compassion for the refugees it would actually create subtle
pressure on the regime to reform and to open up if they did
show some compassion.
But also in the long term it would be an economic benefit
to China for North Korea to open up because that area of China
is depressed, that border region. There is going to be so much
that North Korea needs to build that country. I mean, they
don't even have electricity or roads, or very poor roads, in
most of North Korea. They need all kinds of things, all kinds
of infrastructure that China could actually help with.
So I think we need to do what we can to make China realize
that it would be--as Jack was saying, to make them realize that
it would actually be a long-term benefit to China. We know this
regime is going to go down eventually and the Chinese ought to
be looking toward the future.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you.
Any folks from the audience? Yes, ma'am. Please.
Audience Participant. I would actually prefer that my name
not be on the record. But first and foremost, I just wanted to
thank the panel, as well as all the North Koreans and the
advocates in this room, because I think that really your
presence and your stories and your bravery--it's really one of
the primary lights of hope, I think, regarding this issue.
[Statement made in foreign language].
Second, I wanted to respond to the Amnesty International
point. I think that one issue that isn't really discussed
explicitly is that China has a very long-term policy and their
vision, I think, is not only an unfounded fear of the refugees
coming across, but also an unfounded fear--or perhaps a founded
fear--of reunification in the Korean peninsula and the power
dynamics that will result because of that. I think that is
something that is just not really addressed.
I have two questions. The first, is whether or not
international organizations and the UN have tried to focus
recommendations to China, not sort of on the broad proactive
measures that should be taken, but on sort of the passive
measure that should be taken just to allow the UNHCR to move to
that northern frontierland or the borderland. I think that just
focusing on that specific issue might be perhaps a little bit
more compelling because it makes an easier decisionmaking
process for the government.
The second question is what the U.S. public and the public
around the world can do to try and create more awareness about
this issue. I know that with regard to a lot of other crises in
the world in recent years, the Web has provided incredible
public awareness and action. I just wonder whether or not there
are certain things that the U.S. public should take into mind,
and if you have any suggestions.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you.
Joel? Suzanne?
Mr. Charny. Well, on the--I think there have been sustained
efforts to try and get the Chinese to change their mind about
allowing UNHCR access, but the Chinese just continue to rebuff
them. One idea that we had--and I don't know enough about how
UNHCR actually functions internally, and this is probably----
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Oh. Yes, you do.
Mr. Charny [continuing]. This is probably, again,
completely infeasible, or even naive, but it seems to me--for
China, it's a privilege. I mean, one of the--this extends
across the board, I think. I mean, China has been brilliant, as
part of this soft power, of insinuating itself into mainstream
international institutions without, in many ways, fundamentally
improving their practice on issues that we care about.
So one of the points I made three or four years ago was,
how does China get to be on the UNHCR Executive Committee if
they're not allowing UNHCR to perform their fundamental
obligation with North Korean refugees? I mean, shouldn't that
be just a basic contradiction? Everyone's nodding. It's
obvious. Okay. Well, given that basic contradiction, is there
any way to work that within the UNHCR Executive Committee? But
again, this is where I get discouraged, because China just has
so much leverage right now.
The United States is simply not going to stand up in Geneva
at the UNHCR Executive Committee and ask China tough questions
about the treatment of North Korean refugees. Why? Because we
are on the hook for, I don't know, how many trillion in terms
of the Chinese buying our treasury bonds, and so on? There's an
interlocking economic dependence at this point that I think
really weakens the United States in terms of its overall
leverage with China and getting them to change their behavior.
So then--and Suzanne will remember this. One thing I used
to get a little bit annoyed about, was everyone was kind of
blaming UNHCR for the fact that they couldn't get up to the
northeast. No. Let's blame the member states of the United
Nations for not backing UNHCR in their drive to get up there.
You can't ask UNHCR to perform political miracles. So again,
I'm sorry to be kind of depressing, but it's kind of, this
issue has been stuck.
Efforts have been made, and unfortunately they haven't
really gotten anywhere. Suzanne, I think, is the expert on
mobilizing. But overall, I think there is just so much more
information now about the situation, both inside North Korea
and at the border. I think what we haven't found is the spark
to really make this a public international issue. It's much
more known than it was 10 years ago, but as we discussed
yesterday at Heritage, it is hardly the Darfur of Asia in terms
of public awareness.
So, any ideas that people have to make this a true
international global cause--it's nowhere near as recognized as
Tibet, for example. I think if we were ranking the causes,
Tibet would be number one by far. I think that relates
primarily to the visibility of the Dalai Lama. North Korea is
then way, way, way down on the scale, and I think the Uyghur
situation is virtually unknown.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. I agree with that assessment.
Mary Beth?
Ms. Markey. I would like to make one comment, a couple of
comments, actually. First of all, I think that you were
absolutely right, Joel, when you said that the problem is with
the refugee issue itself. This is where I was trying to suggest
commonality between the Korean refugee issue and the Tibetan
refugee issue. China has a problem with the very definition of
refugees. They do not want people to believe that Tibetans are
fleeing because they have a credible fear of persecution, that
their own homeland is inhospitable to them because of China's
Tibet policy. The Chinese are working very hard to turn that
perception around and belittle the humanitarian and human
rights issues that compel people to leave. China would like the
world to believe that all these refugees are simply economic
migrants who are illegally sneaking around looking for
opportunity.
I think they see this as a problem for Korea, too, which is
an ally of theirs. So, it is the political issue for them
linked to failed policies and oppression. The refugee issue is
much harder for China to acknowledge as a legitimate
international concern than the issue of trafficking would be. I
agree that engaging China on trafficking would be a very good
inroad to providing help to the Koreans, to Korean refugees, in
fact.
In response to the comment about the attention that Tibet
is getting, I have been following this issue for a very long
time, and I can tell you that it's getting a great deal of
attention primarily because China is putting a great deal of
attention on Tibet right now. It used to be that Chinese
diplomats would run around capitals screeching about Taiwan.
That has gone down a great deal, primarily because of more
accommodating politics in Taiwan as a result of the success of
the KMT in the last elections.
Now Chinese diplomats are going around the Hill and call on
the administration, and they raise their problem with Tibet.
They are unhappy with U.S. policy on Tibet, and on, and on, and
on. I assume they don't come and harangue President Obama about
their Korean refugee problem. So I think there's a priority
there within China's own internal thinking. Obviously they
think that they can handle this Korean refugee problem.
Advocates on behalf of Korean refugees need to make it
clear that China is not handling it in the right way, and I
agree that an approach through the trafficking issue may be the
right way to go.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Suzanne? Thank you, Mary Beth.
Ms. Scholte. I want to make a couple of points to that
question. It's been very frustrating for all of us in the North
Korean human rights movement to get more attention to this
because we do think it's the worst human rights tragedy going
on by far, because we're talking about 3 million people who
died just from the famine alone, and all of those were needless
deaths when you look at the humanitarian assistance that could
have been provided to them; 200,000 people in political
prisoner camps, anywhere from 30,000 to 200,000 to 300,000
refugees in China.
But I want to respond. One of the difficulties that we have
had is that we don't have a high-profile person. There's no
movie stars, no Richard Gere or Mia Farrow--and God bless them
for what they're doing to help raise the cause of the Darfur
and the Tibet issue. And one of the things we face is the lack
of access. We know there are political prison camps, but all we
have is eyewitnesses to tell us about it and satellite photos.
To demonstrate the difficulty of reporting on the refugee
and the trafficking issue--Laura Ling and Anna Lee--where are
they right now, the two reporters that were trying to cover
this issue in China? This just shows the collusion between
North Korea and China. The North Korea border guards went into
China, took those two women at gunpoint, and they are in
Pyongyang now facing trial for espionage because they were
trying to report on the trafficking of North Korean women. So
that is one of the other problems, the lack of access.
But as far as what we could do to create awareness, what
are you doing tomorrow? Noon, the Chinese Embassy, we are
having a protest on behalf of the North Korean refugees. Now,
I'm not a diplomat, I'm an NGO person, so I can talk about
these things. But we're having a protest against the
repatriation because ``Hu Jintao and Kim Jong Il are side by
side in genocide.'' That's the theme for tomorrow.
But I also want to mention very significant--how many of
you have heard of Charter 08?
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Hopefully many of them.
Ms. Scholte. Okay.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. We have a lot of analysis on our Web site
on Charter 08. But, please.
Ms. Scholte. I was going to say, Charter 08. This is an
incredible thing, 303 Chinese intellectuals, lawyers. They put
their lives on the line to sign Charter 08, this document that
lays out a path for China, calling for an end to the Communist
Party. And God bless them, because these same people signed a
letter back before the Olympics, basically opposing the
Olympics as Chinese citizens, and they mentioned all our
causes. They even mentioned the North Korean refugees.
So, we need to do more to support the signers of Charter 08
and work together. I know many of us--I see Alim from the
Uyghurs. Many of us have tried to put together a coalition of
all our groups where the source of all our problems is Hu
Jintao, and we need to all band together to do more together
about this China issue, in solidarity with the Chinese citizens
that are putting their lives on the line, because they are with
us.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you.
Toy, do you want to ask a question?
Mr. Reid. I have a question for the panelists. Feel free to
chime in as you like. Starting with North Korea, I know China
has occasionally appealed to a bilateral border agreement that
it has with the North Koreans, and said essentially, we can't
do anything about these refugees because this bilateral
agreement says we will send them back if they come here. Now,
the issue then becomes, there's a clear conflict between this
bilateral agreement and the 1951 Convention on Refugees that
China has signed.
So, Joel, if you could speak to that particular issue and
whether you think there is genuine concern on China's part in
wanting to show respect for this particular bilateral
agreement, or whether it is just used as a convenient
justification for their repatriation policy.
Likewise, in the case of the Tibetans and the Uyghurs, Mary
Beth mentioned a bilateral agreement that is in the works
between China and Nepal. Could you please talk a little more
about that? And with regard to the central Asian states that
border China, Sean, do you see a pattern that is similar? Are
there bilateral agreements in place? Are they being drafted?
Do such agreements contain provisions that the Chinese
Government, or the Kazakhstan Government, or the Nepali
Government, may appeal to as taking precedence over
international law? Thanks.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Great.
We only have time for one other question after this, so
let's do a lightening round, as they say on ``Meet the Press.''
Mr. Charny. Well, I'll be brief: I think it's bogus. I
think to hide behind an agreement with the state that's
violated the human rights of its citizens to the degree that
North Korea has--and again, I insist that the Chinese know
every detail of the horrors that the North Korean people go
through--to say, oh, we cannot honor our international
obligations because of this agreement, I mean, it's
preposterous, and I think the Chinese know it is preposterous.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Mary Beth? There's a lot to say on this,
I know.
Ms. Markey. We have seen China, over the years, pulling
Nepal closer and closer into its orbit through various
enticements, and we know that China is very serious about
stopping the Tibetan refugee flow. It is an embarrassment. And,
as I said at the outset, as far as international treaties go,
China will implement those agreements or laws that it is so
inclined to implement, and it will ignore those that it is not.
I don't know in the pecking order which supersedes which, but I
think that if there's an extradition treaty in place, then, in
this case, China will readily point to it and say, ``it's the
law.''
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Sean?
Mr. Roberts. Well, it's been my impression that China has
historically deliberately left a lot of disputed borders for
various reasons, they can use politically. In central Asia,
that was really the major ``carrot'' that got everybody into
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in the mid-1990s. The
Chinese were very interested in the central Asian states
limiting Uyghur political activity on their territories, and
the central Asian states wanted these disputed borders resolved
because they saw them as something that the Chinese could use
to encroach on their territory eventually and they just wanted
it resolved. So, in fact, in central Asia, most of those
borders have now been resolved, but to the detriment of the
situation of Uyghurs in those countries.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you.
One last question from the audience. Anybody? Yes, sir.
Mr. Marshall. [Off microphone].
Ms. Markey. It is complicated. I think your question
encapsulates all of the variables that come together. Yes,
there is
enhanced security across Tibet, making movement around the
Tibetan plateau much more difficult. We had anticipated, in
fact, that there would be a rise in the numbers of Tibetans who
would want to come out because they were implicated in the
demonstrations and so on. So the fact that there has not been
this rise is disturbing. It means that the crackdown is very
effective. It also suggests that people are postponing their
flight until the situation is determined to be less heated.
I think one element we haven't talked about is the guides.
Most Tibetans come out of Tibet in large groups led by a guide.
It's dangerous for those guides if they're caught. They
sometimes are caught and they're treated very harshly. If
they're going to take the risk to bring over 20 people when
they're used to taking a risk to bring over 200, then the
guides will also hold back. So a lot of these elements are
coming together, but it is alarming and I think we should be
looking at it.
Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you.
I just want to thank our panelists. These are very
complicated and difficult topics we have looked at today. We
will have a transcript of this proceeding up on our Web site in
a few weeks.
I want to thank Joel Charny, Suzanne Scholte, Mary Beth
Markey, and Sean Roberts, and also Ms. Bang and Ms. Kim, for
your courage and presence here today, and Mr. Steve Kim. Thank
you so much.
Please come back. We're going to have, again, May 22, in
this room, a roundtable on democracy, the concept of democracy
in China. Then June 4, we're having a Commission hearing on
Tiananmen's 20th anniversary.
Thank you so much for being here today. I appreciate it.
[Applause.]
[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m. the roundtable was adjourned.]