[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PIPELINE SAFETY OVERSIGHT AND LEGISLATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-159
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
_____
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
78-136 WASHINGTON : 2013
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan JOE BARTON, Texas
Chairman Emeritus Ranking Member
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia FRED UPTON, Michigan
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
BART GORDON, Tennessee NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
ANNA G. ESHOO, California JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
BART STUPAK, Michigan JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York ROY BLUNT, Missouri
GENE GREEN, Texas STEVE BUYER, Indiana
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
Vice Chairman JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
LOIS CAPPS, California MARY BONO MACK, California
MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania GREG WALDEN, Oregon
JANE HARMAN, California LEE TERRY, Nebraska
TOM ALLEN, Maine MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
JAY INSLEE, Washington TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
JIM MATHESON, Utah STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
JOHN BARROW, Georgia
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
DORIS O. MATSUI, California
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin
Islands
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio
JERRY McNERNEY, California
BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
PETER WELCH, Vermont
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania RALPH M. HALL, Texas
JAY INSLEE, Washington FRED UPTON, Michigan
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
BARON P. HILL, Indiana JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
DORIS O. MATSUI, California STEVE BUYER, Indiana
JERRY McNERNEY, California GREG WALDEN, Oregon
PETER WELCH, Vermont SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
ELIOT ENGEL, New York
GENE GREEN, Texas
LOIS CAPPS, California
JANE HARMAN, California
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
JIM MATHESON, Utah
JOHN BARROW, Georgia
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Massachussetts, opening statement.............. 1
Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, opening statement.................................... 3
Hon. Jay Inslee, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Washington, opening statement.................................. 4
Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, opening statement.............................. 4
Hon. G.K. Butterfield, a Representative in Congress from the
State of North Carolina, opening statement..................... 5
Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, opening statement................ 6
Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Michigan, opening statement................................. 6
Hon. Doris O. Matsui, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, opening statement............................... 8
Hon. Cliff Stearns, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Florida, opening statement.................................. 9
Hon. Jerry McNerney, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, opening statement............................... 9
Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas, prepared statement...................................... 11
Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas, opening statement....................................... 13
Hon. Steve Scalise, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Louisiana, opening statement................................ 13
Hon. Jim Matheson, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Utah, opening statement........................................ 14
Hon. Mary Bono Mack, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, prepared statement.............................. 131
Witnesses
Mark Schauer, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan....................................................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration................................ 23
Prepared statement........................................... 25
Answers to submitted questions............................... 157
Christopher A. Hart, Vice Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board................................................... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Answers to submitted questions............................... 161
Stephen Wuori, Executive Vice President, Liquids Pipelines,
Enbridge Inc................................................... 49
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Rick Kessler, Vice President, Pipeline Safety Trust.............. 60
Prepared statement........................................... 63
Answers to submitted questions............................... 164
Donald F. Santa, Jr., President, Interstate Natural Gas
Association of America......................................... 79
Prepared statement........................................... 81
Andrew Black, President, Association of Oil Pipe Lines........... 93
Prepared statement........................................... 96
Lori Traweek, Senior Vice President and Chief Operative Officer,
American Gas Association....................................... 109
Prepared statement........................................... 111
Answers to submitted questions............................... 168
Submitted Material
Letter of December, 2009, from a consortium of Texas mayors,
submitted by Mr. Burgess....................................... 132
Statement of the American Public Gas Association, submitted by
Mr. Markey..................................................... 139
Letter of September 22, 2010, from the Sierra Club, et al.,
submitted by Mr. Markey........................................ 154
PIPELINE SAFETY OVERSIGHT AND LEGISLATION
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in
Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward J. Markey
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Markey, Inslee, Butterfield,
Matsui, McNerney, Dingell, Green, Harman, Matheson, Barrow,
Upton, Stearns, Shimkus, Pitts, Burgess, Scalise, and Barton
(ex officio).
Staff Present: Greg Dotson, Chief Counsel, Energy and
Environment; John Jimison, Senior Counsel; Jeff Baran, Counsel;
Joel Beauvais, Counsel; Melissa Cheatham, Professional Staff
Member; Caitlin Haberman, Special Assistant; Lindsay Vidal,
Deputy Press Secretary; Mitchell Smiley, Special Assistant;
Aaron Cutler, Minority Counsel; Andrea Spring, Minority
Professional Staff; Peter Spencer, Minority Professional Staff;
and Garrett Golding, Minority Legislative Analyst.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Mr. Markey. Welcome, ladies and gentlemen, to the
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment and this very important
hearing on pipeline safety oversight and legislation.
This week marks the end of a summer of fossil fiascos for
the U.S. oil and gas industry. From April to August the country
watched with horror as the BP disaster unfolded, leaving 11
workers dead and spilling nearly 5 million barrels of oil into
the Gulf of Mexico.
What has gone less noticed by many is a wave of major
accidents during the same period on the country's aging oil and
pipeline system.
In June, a Chevron pipeline burst near Salt Lake City,
spilling over 20,000 gallons of crude into a creek that feeds
the Great Salt Lake.
On July 26th, a pipeline owned by Enbridge ruptured near
Marshall, Michigan, spewing nearly 1 million gallons of crude
oil into Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. The oil
ultimately was contained just 80 river miles from Lake
Michigan, but only after doing massive damage to local
communities and the environment.
Earlier this month a PG&E natural gas pipeline exploded in
the San Francisco suburb of San Bruno, leaving seven people
dead or missing, destroying several dozen homes and damaging
over 100 others.
The very same day yet another Enbridge oil pipeline burst
near Chicago, spilling over 250,000 gallons of crude.
There are over 2.5 million miles of oil and natural gas
pipelines in this country, many of them laid a half a century
or more ago. Some of these pipes appear nearly as fossilized as
the fuel they transport. This summer's tragic accidents
underscore the potential danger they present if not properly
maintained.
Here, as with the BP disaster, it is critical that we
unearth the causes of these accidents and hold the responsible
parties fully accountable. Just as important, we must reexamine
and strengthen our laws to ensure that accidents like these do
not happen again. Now is the time for that discussion, as the
Federal pipeline safety law is due for renewal this year, a
duty that this committee and subcommittee shares with the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. That is what
today's hearing is about.
We are grateful to have before us Congressman Mark Schauer
in whose district the Marshall spill occurred. He has been
heavily involved in response to the Marshall spill. He is also
the lead sponsor of H.R. 6008, the Corporate Liability and
Emergency Accident Notification, or CLEAN Act, a bipartisan
pipeline safety bill cosponsored by our ranking member, Fred
Upton from the State of Michigan, and others that the House
will vote upon today.
We will hear from the head of the Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, the Federal agency in charge
of pipeline safety regulation, about the recent accidents and
the Obama administration's proposal to strengthen the Federal
pipeline safety law.
We also welcome the Vice Chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board, which is responsible for
investigating the recent accidents in Michigan, California, and
elsewhere.
We will hear from Steve Wuori, the man in charge of
Enbridge's pipeline operations and its response to the Marshall
and Romeoville spills. In addition to these two accidents
Enbridge has had over 160 pipeline incidents since 2002.
Enbridge has had over 200--over 160 pipeline incidents since
2002 and was recently fined $2.4 million for a 2007 accidents
in which two workers were killed. I trust that the subcommittee
will have many questions for Mr. Wuori.
Finally, we will hear from the Pipeline Safety Trust, which
seeks to improve pipeline safety and from the three major trade
associations representing pipeline owners.
I look forward to the testimony of our distinguished
witnesses. I thank all of the members for their participation.
I now turn to recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee,
the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Upton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate having
this hearing today, which perhaps will be the last of this
Congress, so we will see.
Pipeline safety is an issue that is certainly important to
every community in our country. The U.S. currently has over
200,000 miles of oil pipelines and 260,000 miles of natural gas
pipelines, an often unseen underground labyrinth that allows
our communities to function and prosper. The safety security
and integrity of this infrastructure is of the highest
importance to our Nation and certainly worthy of this
committee's oversight. Unfortunately, as southwest Michigan
recently found out firsthand, communities cannot fully
appreciate the importance of pipeline safety until something
goes wrong, and in our case it was an 800,000-gallon pipeline
leak.
We are still waiting on answers. It is vital that we
receive the answers promptly from the Department of
Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration, as well as Enbridge, regarding the Michigan
spill. We must continue to work aggressively to ensure that
there are no delays at the Federal level.
Thankfully, the emergency response was swift and decisive.
Our local emergency responders and volunteers certainly stepped
up to the plate, and I commend them on the wonderful job that
they continue to do.
Pipelines are the arteries of our Nation's energy
infrastructure. Through our hundreds of thousands of miles of
pipelines we transport the energy that fuels our economy, heats
our homes, and powers our daily lives. Unfortunately, recent
accidents have thrust this vital infrastructure into the
headlines for the wrong reasons and perhaps highlighted the
need for safety reassessments.
Given the vast size of our pipeline system and the limited
resources at our disposal, it is imperative that safety
inspections and regulations are as efficient and as productive
as possible.
While today's hearing is rightly focused on oversight
issues, attention should also be given to allocating these
finite resources in a more cost effective and efficient manner
to assure that we maximize our safety efforts.
Legislation has to be sensible and improve safety rather
than impose arbitrary mandates that sometimes increase costs
and only creates the appearance of safety.
As we are not too long away from adjournment, I hope an
issue as important as PHMSA reauthorization goes through the
regular and proper order rather than being jammed through a
lame duck session which may only be a day or two.
This committee does have a vital role to play in the
legislative process. This issue is certainly worthy of more
than just one hearing. Just ask the folks in southwest
Michigan. They will tell to you get the job done right to
protect our communities.
Again, pipeline safety is an important bipartisan issue,
and I look forward to hearing from or witnesses today on the
issues. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Markey. I thank the gentleman very much. We recognize
the gentleman from Washington State, Mr. Inslee, for an opening
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAY INSLEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
Mr. Inslee. Thank you. One of the great painful things is
to see these tragedies repeated. We had a horrendous incident
in Bellingham, Washington on June 10, 1999, where a pipeline
explosion killed three young men, and I got to know the
families quite well and they were courageous people who helped
Congress fashion at least one approach to try to improve
pipeline safety. So to continue to see other families suffer
from the failure of the industry to adequately inspect and
maintain the lines is deeply painful.
I think the frequency of these events clearly call on us to
review additional action. I will just mention two things that I
think we ought to at least listen to people about, and that is
the rate and type of inspections in non-dense, non-urban areas,
which still can be dangerous; second, whether there are
additional types of testing that we ought to be talking about.
During our original debate in 2000 and later than that we
talked about the benefits of hydrostatic testing, to actually
exposing pipelines to pressure with water in them that can be a
built-in suspenders approach. I think this is something we have
to consider.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Markey. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Burgess.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
having the hearing today. It is certainly an important one for
this committee to hold.
For several months we have actually watched as other
committees held hearing after hearing on pipeline safety,
chipping away at the jurisdiction that rightfully belongs in
this committee. Pipeline safety is a matter of energy policy,
and it is crucial to what we do here.
The events in Michigan and California have been tragic
reminders that safely maintaining our Nation's energy
infrastructure is an ongoing process and we must be diligent in
protecting the lives in and around those pipelines.
It is true in many areas of the country, including my
backyard in north Texas, civilization is encroaching on
pipelines just as pipelines are encroaching on civilization.
Homes are being built closer and closer to the infrastructure
that was laid decades ago in what used to be rural areas. Now
the population has increased and urban density is forcing
people to move further and further into the country, and
pipelines that were once miles from anywhere are suddenly right
beneath residents' backyards.
More and more people require natural gas. It is one of the
cleaner fuels on the market. And more pipelines and
infrastructure will be needed to meet that demand. What is not
clear how to best move forward with regulating this increased
infrastructure.
Some on this committee are calling for new Federal
regulations as we revise and reauthorize the existing pipeline
statute. Certainly that might be required, but investigations
into the pipeline explosions are still months from being
completed, and perhaps they will have some useful data to share
with us at some point and perhaps we should look at that.
We see this time and again with this committee. We never
let a crisis go to waste, but not all regulations need to be at
the Federal level. A consortium of mayors in my district
collaborated on a pipeline best practices guideline. Mr.
Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to insert into the
record--
Mr. Markey. Without objection, it will be so included.
Mr. Burgess. --the pipeline best practices developed by the
mayors of Denton and Dish, Texas, Argyle and Bartonville.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Burgess. We don't want to be continuing to study a
problem when another crisis occurs. But we are also obligated
to get the correct regulations.
So, Mr. Chairman, I am glad we are here today. We need to
be looking into what is causing these explosions. Is it just a
coincidence that the incidents have occurred within a short
span of each other or is there a fundamental flaw in how we
monitor and design our pipelines? We need firm answers to
questions like these in order to best know how to move forward
with balancing our need for increased clean energy with the
health and lives of those who live so close to the energy
infrastructure.
I thank you for the courtesy and I will yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time is expired. The chair
recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Butterfield.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. G.K. BUTTERFIELD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
Mr. Butterfield. Thank you. I too want to thank you for
convening this very important hearing and thank the witnesses
for their testimony today.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to talk as quickly as I can. We
just got notice that we may be having votes in just a few
minutes.
Let me extend my sympathies to the families of those who
lost their lives in San Bruno in the pipeline explosion. It was
a terrible tragedy by any estimation. Hopefully it will focus
our discussion and make us more exact in the pursuit of good
policy.
In addition to the San Bruno PG&E explosion, the two
Enbridge spills this year certainly demands this body's
attention. This is an issue that effects nearly every Member of
this body as the millions of miles of pipeline in this country
are literally in our constituents' backyards. We have a
responsibility to guarantee that the rules that these companies
operate under are sufficiently crafted to maintain the
integrity and safety of the pipelines and to protect our
communities from environmental disaster or even death.
I am particularly interested in the testimony of the
Administrator. The latest incident suggests the pipeline safety
program is in need of serious attention. I look forward to her
suggestions on how to improve this program.
I yield back.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair
recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Pitts.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Mr. Pitts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this important hearing on pipeline safety oversight and related
legislation.
Like all of us, I believe that it is critical to ensure the
safety and security of our Nation's pipelines. The tragic
events in San Bruno, California, and the Enbridge incident
highlight the high stakes and potential consequences of the
faulty lines.
In my congressional district there are several natural gas
pipelines that run through beautiful countryside and in close
proximity to neighborhoods. It is of the utmost importance to
me that these pipelines are functioning safely and effectively.
The safety of the 2\1/2\ million miles of natural gas and
hazardous liquids pipelines in the United States is overseen by
the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. The
pipeline safety statute, which is generally reauthorized every
4 years, is up for consideration this year. Clearly ensuring
the safety of our pipelines is a bipartisan issue, and I want
to work with my colleagues on the other side of the aisle on
prudent regulations. We need clear regulations and robust
safety standards.
Before we legislate I think it is important to first learn
the facts about what happened in California and Michigan so we
know what steps to take. We want to ensure that we are
prudently legislating and addressing issues that will
contribute to reliable and secure pipelines which deliver their
products to American households and businesses every day.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and
thank you and yield back.
Mr. Markey. We thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes
the chairman emeritus of the Energy and Commerce Committee, the
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Dingell.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesy and
thank you for holding this hearing today.
Pipeline safety is a most serious issue, and I commend you
for your attention to this matter. This has been a matter of
concern to this committee for a long time. For years pipeline
safety was largely disregarded by the executive branch no
matter who happened to control that particular part of our
government, and it was only after this committee interested
itself very vigorously in these matters that the matter began
to be set aright.
If my colleagues will remember, we had a number of years of
difficulty during which this committee had a vigorous duel with
the industry to see to it that we finally came to something
that would in fact assure the necessary protections to the
American public.
Pipeline failure can take many forms. It can be an
explosion that comes close to reminding one of an atom bomb, or
it can be a slow leak, or it can be something which pollutes
and contaminates our waters and our lands. It can have an
enormously destructive effect to humans, wildlife, the
environment, and indeed to all the things that we care about.
I am particularly pleased that our good friend and
colleague, Mr. Schauer, is here before us today. He is an
extremely valuable member of the Michigan delegation and serves
Michigan Seventh Congressional District just to the west of the
district that I have the honor to serve. He serves his district
with distinction and honor and has particular concern about the
events associated with pipeline failure because of the enormous
consequences that a recent failure has had in his district.
I also would like to welcome an old friend of mine, former
member of the staff of this committee, our good friend Rick
Kessler, who, as many will remember, used to staff this
committee on these very issues.
In late July, Enbridge's pipeline known as 6B ruptured just
south of Marshall, Michigan. The end result of the rupture was
the release of nearly a million gallons of crude oil, which
flowed into the Kalamazoo River, a tributary of Lake Michigan.
Again, on September 9th Enbridge reported a second pipeline
spill, this time in Illinois. This time 256,000 gallons of oil
were released before the pipeline was shut down. On the same
day a natural gas pipeline operator by PG&E exploded in San
Bruno, California. Like far too many pipeline explosions over
the years, this one saw the tragic loss of life.
I have spent much time over the years on this issue of
pipeline safety. We, and I mean this committee, have made
tremendous improvements, and we have been able to do so in a
bipartisan manner. I am pleased to be a cosponsor of Mr.
Schauer's bill, which is scheduled for floor consideration on
the suspension calendar today. This legislation moves the ball
forward some more.
The common sense legislation does three simple and
necessary things: One, a company must report a leak within an
hour of discovery; two, increases fines for failure to report;
three, requires DOT to maintain a searchable database of all
reportable accidents and incidents involving hazardous liquids.
I think we should strongly support this legislation, but I want
to make it clear it is no replacement for reauthorization and
reform of the Pipeline Safety Act.
I am still concerned about the historically lax enforcement
by the Pipeline and Hazardous Safety Material Administration. I
look forward to hearing from PHMSA about their actions with
regard to the aforementioned incidents.
The Department recently released a draft proposal for
reauthorization. It is quite possible this is a good starting
point, but it is also something which must be carefully
scrutinized to see whether it meets the needs of the country.
As currently goes on, only about 7 percent of natural gas
pipelines are subject to integrity management programs that
this committee put in place in 2002, clearly insufficient. The
administration draft does nothing to address this matter. The
granting of waivers remains all too real a possibility. The
draft lacks sufficient improvements to the matter of
inspections and repairs. It does nothing to address the issues
that we should have dealt with years ago, including remote
shut-off valves for natural gas and making pipelines more able
to accommodate smart pigs, which is still the best technology
for addressing the question of pipeline safety.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, Mr.
Chairman, and I look forward to working with you and my
colleagues on the committee for reauthorization that will make
further needed and significant improvements to the law. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Markey. We thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes
the gentlelady from California, Ms. Matsui.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DORIS O. MATSUI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Ms. Matsui. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling
today's hearing, and I would also like to thank the witnesses
for appearing before us today.
The recent explosion that devastated the San Bruno
neighborhood captured the Nation's attention. It was hardly the
first tragedy involving a PG&E natural gas pipeline in northern
California. I want to express my sympathy to the families of
those who lost their lives, their homes, and the many who were
injured.
I will never forget being alerted on Christmas Eve 2008
about another natural gas pipeline leak that caused an
explosion and a fire in Rancho Cordova, California that killed
one of my constituents Wilbert Pena and hospitalized five
others.
As the NTSB and the California Public Utilities Commission
continue their investigations into the cause of the San Bruno
incident, it is critical that we ensure that the pipeline
safety program protects consumers and meets the needs of our
Nation's energy requirements. Failure to take the necessary
steps to do so will significantly endanger our public health
and our economy.
As oversight of pipeline safety and security continues, we
should question the manner in which safety corresponds with
ongoing efforts to secure the nearly half a million miles of
oil and natural gas transmission pipeline nationwide and other
infrastructure. It is also important that we examine the
effectiveness of existing regulatory authorities and the
current pipeline safety regulations and enforcement mechanisms.
This committee is well positioned to scrutinize these
matters and has already received a proposal from the
administration suggesting ways in which we might address them.
I look forward to hearing from the panelists today and
working with the committee's stakeholders on these important
endeavors. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. Markey. Thank you. We thank the gentlelady. The chair
recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. I will waive for questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Markey. The chair recognizes the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Stearns.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CLIFF STEARNS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Mr. Stearns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank Ranking
Member Upton for calling this important hearing, examining the
recent oil and gas pipeline accidents in Michigan an California
as well as the pipeline safety legislation that is being
proposed by the Obama administration.
The development and distribution of our oil and natural gas
resources is vital to our economy, and transporting these fuels
through pipelines remains the safest means of distribution to
families and businesses throughout this country. However,
recent pipeline failures have highlighted a catastrophic effect
a release can have on a community and the environment.
In July, Enbridge reported the rupture of a 30-inch
pipeline resulting in the release of 800,000 to 1 million
gallons of oil that contaminated nearby creeks and rivers
before being contained.
Enbridge also reported a second incident on September 9th,
which they estimated released over 256,000 gallons of oil
before the pipeline was shut down. On the same day a 30-inch
natural gas pipeline operated by PG&E exploded in San Bruno,
California, resulting in a fire that took the lives of at least
seven people and injured dozens more.
In all three cases the National Transportation Safety Board
has instigated a safety investigation to determine what went
wrong. The investigators have stated it could take up to 18
months for a full report to be released. So I believe we owe it
to the families and those killed in the explosions and those
affected by the Enbridge leaks to fully understand what caused
the leaks and how best to mitigate the risk of another
disaster. Proceeding with legislation without all the facts
will only serve to give a false sense of security to anyone who
lives near an oil or natural gas pipeline without addressing
the actual causes of these disasters.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing. I
look forward to the testimony from the witnesses.
Mr. Markey. We thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes
the gentleman from California, Mr. McNerney.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JERRY MCNERNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. McNerney. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening
today's hearing.
Everyone from California was shocked and saddened by the
tragedies at San Bruno, and our thoughts and prayers are with
the victims and their families. I am closely monitoring the
ongoing response efforts and will hold all parties accountable
for any actions or omissions that contributed to this horrible
accident.
Today's hearing is an important opportunity to investigate
the causes of this and similar disasters and how we can prevent
this kind of occurrence from happening again. I am grateful for
the opportunity to hear from today's witnesses and evaluate
legislative proposals that could improve the safety of
pipelines.
I commend Representative Schauer for working across party
lines to develop the CLEAN Act, and I also thank Ranking Member
Upton for his commitment to a bipartisan process on this
matter.
I also hope to hear from today's witnesses about the
evaluation, about their evaluation of the administration's
proposal to reauthorize pipeline safety regulation legislation.
We should closely analyze this proposal and continue working in
a bipartisan fashion to achieve a high quality reauthorization
bill.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Markey. I thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes the
ranking member of the full committee, the gentleman from Texas,
Mr. Barton.
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Chairman. I am going to put my
statement in the record and just say that we appreciate you
holding this hearing. It is very important.
We have historically operated in a bipartisan fashion on
the reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act, and I hope that
this is not an exception.
I want to give special recognition to one of our witnesses,
Andy Black, who used to work for the committee, and before that
worked for me on my personal staff. He is one of our witnesses
this afternoon and we welcome the hearing and welcome hopefully
a bipartisan effort to reauthorize a very important piece of
legislation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barton follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Markey. We thank the gentleman very much, and one of my
former staffers, William Meyer, is out in the audience. I would
like to recognize him. And any of the other members that want
to recognize anyone who used to work for them out in the
audience, I think you should be able to do that as well.
Let me turn now and recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Green.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE GREEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no former
staffers in the audience as I can tell. I want to thank you for
holding the hearing today and I welcome our three panels. I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss this important issue, in
particular Congressman Schauer's H.R. 6008, the Corporate
Liability Emergency Accident Notification Act, and the
administration's legislative proposal for reauthorization of
the pipeline safety statute that was presented to Congress last
week.
The recent leaks in Michigan, Illinois, and then the tragic
explosion in San Bruno, California, remind us of the importance
of maintaining a safe pipeline system, and my thoughts and
prayers go out to the families and friends of those tragically
lost in San Bruno.
As we consider these proposals, I ask we keep in mind that
transporting our fuels through pipelines is the safest, most
reliable, economically and environmentally friendly way to
transport fuels. Our job and Nation's job, industry's job is to
ensure that this transport is as safe as it can be, and we all
agree that one leak is one leak too many.
I am concerned that it has taken three accidents for
Congress and the administration to look at this important
issue, even with the current law up for the reauthorization. As
such, we are now in a situation where we are moving to deal
with very serious legislation such a few short legislative
weeks, all the while investigation results on three leaks are
still coming in.
I appreciate the comments from our panelists on both these
proposals and then their take on the status of our pipeline
infrastructure at large.
I come from an area where I have lived along pipeline
easements literally my whole life, and it is part of our life
in my area, and so we take pipeline safety very seriously in
our community.
Again thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the
testimony of our witnesses.
Mr. Markey. We thank the gentleman. The chair recognizes
the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Scalise.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE SCALISE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Mr. Scalise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to also extend my deepest condolences
to the families and friends of those who lost their lives in
California as a result of the explosion in San Bruno.
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the important issue
of pipeline safety today. I look forward to hearing the panel
and welcome our colleague from Michigan.
In my home State of Louisiana, tens of thousands of miles
of pipeline crisscross throughout the State and provide
critical energy resources, not just to Louisianians but also to
the rest of the country.
While transport by pipe is still the safest way to get our
energy supplies from one place to another, it is imperative
that we continuously review and improve our inspection systems
and work with industry officials at all levels of government to
keep our communities safe from accidents.
I am committed to working with my colleagues to ensure that
strong inspection and enforcement laws are on the books as we
consider the reauthorization of our pipeline safety laws.
However, as we consider reauthorization and as we continue to
investigate the causes of both the San Bruno explosion and
Enbridge incident in Michigan, we must be very deliberate to
make sure that any changes we make to current laws actually
improve safety, and we must avoid acting hastily on changes
that may leave us more vulnerable to accidents and disasters.
Of course, in my home State of Louisiana we are
experiencing this directly. As a supposed answer to the BP oil
explosion in the Gulf of Mexico, the President came and put an
arbitrary ban on all Outer Continental Shelf drilling, which
actually, according to the President's own scientists, reduces
safety of drilling in the Gulf and actually leaves us more
vulnerable to oil leaks because 70 percent of all the leaks of
oil come from oil that is imported on tankers. And so that was
a bad policy, that was a wrong reaction to the tragic disaster
in our State, and hopefully as we move forward we do it in a
much smarter way that actually addresses the problem.
So thank you. I look forward to hearing from the panel, and
I yield back.
Mr. Markey. We thank the gentleman. Our final opening
statement is from the congressman from Utah, Mr. Matheson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM MATHESON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF UTAH
Mr. Matheson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I
know we have votes coming up on the floor.
The tragedy in the Gulf and these recent series of oil and
natural gas pipeline accidents are unfortunate reminders that
we always need to be vigilant in oversight of our energy
infrastructure in this country and we should always be
evaluating the effectiveness of our current safety laws and
regulations.
The incident in Utah when a Chevron pipeline burst in Salt
Lake City ultimately leaked 33,000 gallons of oil into Red
Butte Creek, which runs through downtown Salt Lake and
eventually empties in the Great Salt Lake. In this case
fortunately no lives were lost and the oil was basically
contained before it get to the Great Salt Lake. But it raises
similar questions to a number of these recent accidents
referred to in the hearing that need to be addressed.
Right now the cause of the Salt Lake leak that has been
reported in the press is that a tree branch fell during a heavy
windstorm, hit a power line, which created an electric arc,
which hit a metal fence post, and that fence post happened to
be driven into the ground just inches away from the oil
pipeline. The electrical arc burned a small hole in the pipe
through which the oil leaked. So this raised an important
question, why was a fence post within inches of the pipeline?
In addition, it appeared that the monitoring equipment on
the pipeline failed to indicate there was a leak for several
hours after the leak started, and the first time Chevron was
aware of the leak was when the Salt Lake City Fire Department
called them the next day. This raises an important question
about how effective pipeline monitoring equipment is.
Now the final report on the cause of the Salt Lake leak has
yet to be completed by PHMSA, so I won't press for those
details, but do I hope the Administrator can speak later in
this hearing to the general investigation process and whether
questions related to over pipeline integrity, adequacy of
current pipeline inspections and how thorough industry is being
in their pipeline integrity plans will be addressed in the
report and reports on the accidents in Michigan, Illinois, and
California, if it turns out some of the factors contributing to
the leaks are poor pipeline integrity management plans,
inadequate pipeline patrol and inspections, particularly in
high population areas, and faulty leak detection equipment, and
I look forward to working with my colleagues to ensure the
steps are taken to resolve these issues through pipeline safety
reauthorization.
Mr. Chairman, with that I will yield back.
Mr. Markey. We thank the gentleman very much. That
completes all time for opening statements of members.
Now, Congressman Schauer, you are our opening witness, but
there are only 5 minutes left to go before the roll call is on
the floor. We give you the option. You can give us your
condensed kind of 3-minute summary or you can come back and do
the more extended version. I leave it up to you.
We recognize then Congressman Mark Schauer, within whose
district the Enbridge spill occurred. Since July he has been a
leader on the legislation, along with Mr. Upton, to deal with
that catastrophe. We yield to you 3 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. MARK SCHAUER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Schauer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Upton,
all members of the subcommittee.
Enbridge Energy Partners is the largest oil pipeline
company in North America; 286 miles of its lakehead system
flows through Michigan through Line 6B.
On July 15th, 2010, 10 days before this incident occurred
in Marshall, Michigan, their Vice President told the
Transportation and Infrastructure Pipelines and Hazardous
Materials Subcommittee that their response time for release in
incidents can be almost instantaneous, and our large leaks are
typically detected by our control center personnel.
You will hear from the NTSB, they will walk you through
timeline. Thirteen hours of alarms were occurring in Edmonton,
Alberta, at their control center. Their leak detection system
failed. Finally, after 911 calls in the local community on the
gas odor, 11:00 a.m. The next morning another local utility
company informed Enbridge that heavy crude oil was leaking into
Talmadge Creek. Soon after Enbridge began lowering boom in
Talmadge Creek, but it took almost 2 hours later before the
National Response Center was called.
Every second counts in an incident like this, and nearly 1
million gallons of heavy crude oil was spilled into the
Kalamazoo River.
My good friend and colleague, your ranking member knows
full well and can explain the fear of this oil heading to a
lake which is an EPA Superfund site with PCBs. The cause of
this spill, a 6-1/2 foot tear in a 41-year old carbon steel
pipe, 30 inches in diameter.
This incident should never have occurred. Since 2007
Enbridge has been aware of 390 anomalies; 329 went unfixed.
That is unacceptable. That is what regulation will hopefully
fix.
In the remaining time let me touch on the CLEAN Act. This
bill would clarify the congressional intent of the term
``immediately'' in the reporting requirements of a spill
incident to the National Response Center. The CLEAN Act will
define ``immediately'' as no more than 1 hour after the
discovery of an incident. The CLEAN Act will also increase
current fines if a spill is not reported immediately to the
National Response Center.
Additionally, my bill seeks to increase transparency by
directing the U.S. Department of Transportation to create a
searchable public database of all reportable hazardous liquid
incidents.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Upton and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for holding this hearing. It is my
sincere hope that with proper standards and oversight for
pipeline inspections and repairs, leak detection and spill
reporting, we can work toward preventing such devastating
spills and protect the safety of our communities and our
environment.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schauer follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Congressman Schauer, for your
historic work. You and Congressman Upton have demonstrated
bipartisanship at its highest level in the production of this
legislation. We thank you for your testimony.
We are going to stand in recess while we cast these 5 votes
on the House floor and then we will come back to hear from our
witnesses. The subcommittee stands in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Markey. Welcome back to the Subcommittee on Energy and
Environment.
Our next witness is Cynthia Quarterman. Ms. Quarterman is
the Administrator for the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration, also known as PHMSA. Got that, everybody
listening? You are going to hear PHMSA for the next hour or so.
So that is the Administrator for Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration, PHMSA.
Prior to her nomination, Ms. Quarterman was a partner in
the law firm of Steptoe & Johnson and a member of the Obama
administration transition team at the Department of Energy. We
welcome you, Administrator Quarterman. Whenever you feel ready,
please begin.
STATEMENTS OF THE HON. CYNTHIA L. QUARTERMAN, ADMINISTRATOR,
PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION; AND THE
HON. CHRISTOPHER A. HART, VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
STATEMENT OF THE HON. CYNTHIA L. QUARTERMAN
Ms. Quarterman. Thank you. Chairman Markey, Ranking Member
Upton and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today and discuss the oversight
responsibilities of the United States Department of
Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration and the Obama administration's legislative
proposal for the Department's pipeline safety program.
Before I discuss these topics, I would like to extend my
sincere condolences to the families of all of those whose lives
were forever changed by the September 9th Pacific Gas &
Electric pipeline failure in San Bruno, California.
Last week I joined PHMSA investigators on the scene in San
Bruno, supporting the efforts of the NTSB and the California
Public Utility Commission. I saw firsthand the devastating
impact this incident is having on that community. Incidents
such as this and the recent oil pipeline failure in Marshall,
Michigan, must not happen.
As the sole Federal agency with regulatory oversight for
the safety of pipelines, we must do our part to keep
communities free of risk and exposure to pipeline failures and
enhance public confidence in the safety of the Nation's energy
pipelines. To ensure safety is not only the Department's top
priority, but also the top priority of those we regulate.
Secretary LaHood unveiled a legislative proposal last week
that would strengthen the Department's regulatory oversight
capabilities for pipelines. The proposal is designed to hold
all operators accountable for operating their pipelines in a
safe and environmentally sound manner.
Among other things, the proposal would ways the maximum
penalty for the most serious violations from $1 million to $2.5
million. It would authorize 40 additional Federal inspection
enforcement experts over the next 4 years. The legislative
proposal will also complement additional regulatory initiatives
under development to continue to improve pipeline safety.
Specifically, PHMSA is considering identifying additional
areas along pipelines that should receive extra protection;
establishing minimum requirements for point-to-point leak
detection systems for all pipelines; and requiring the
installation of emergency flow restricting devices that would
isolate leaking pipeline sections, minimizing the amount of
product released, among other initiatives.
Mr. Chairman, ensuring the safety and reliability of the
Nation's hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline network is
an enormous task. The recent pipeline failures in California
and Michigan show that prompt passage of this legislation is
more important than ever.
The Department and PHMSA look forward to working closely
with you and the other members of the subcommittee to ensure
the Nation's pipeline network is safe, reliable, and subject to
the most stringent oversight feasible.
Thank you. I will be pleased to answer any questions you
might have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Quarterman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Markey. Thank you very much.
Our next witness is Christopher Hart, who is the Vice
Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, which
will be known henceforth as the NTSB, not to be confused with
PHMSA, for those who are watching on C-SPAN.
He served as Deputy Administrator of the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, Deputy Director for Air Traffic
Safety Oversight at the FAA and has had a very distinguished
career.
Mr. Hart, we welcome you. Whenever you feel comfortable,
please begin.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER A. HART
Mr. Hart. Thank you. Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Upton,
members of the subcommittee, I join in also thanking you for
the opportunity to address you today on the reauthorization of
the United States Department of Transportation's Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, or PHMSA.
I would start, on behalf of NTSB, to express our
condolences as well to the friends and families of those who
suffered in these incidents we will be speaking about.
As you know, the National Transportation Safety Board
investigates accidents to determine the probable cause and
makes recommendations to prevent recurrences, and some of those
recommendations go to regulatory agencies such as PHMSA. So
thank you for inviting us today to talk about our
recommendation history with PHMSA.
PHMSA has made significant improvements in the past 5
years, many of which have been guided by the Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2002 and the PIPES Act of 2006. In addition,
they have been fairly responsive to the Safety Board's
recommendations. In particular, since 2002 we have issued 24
recommendations to PHMSA, and only nine of those remain open
and only one from prior to 2002.
Their more notable accomplishments in recent years include
Integrity Management Program regulations for various types of
pipelines, regulations for improved education among regional
emergency response agencies and the public, and implementation
of the 811 One-Call System for excavation.
We do have some remaining concerns, however; for example,
regulation of low stress pipelines. Our bottom line is that
regulations should be based primarily upon the level of risk
that the pipeline poses to the public and to the environment.
PHMSA has made some good progress in recent rulemakings in that
direction, but there are still many types of pipelines that are
not addressed and not regulated that pose risk that are
comparable to pipelines that are regulated.
In addition, the integrity management programs, there
already are integrity management programs for transmission
lines, but the PIPES Act expands that to include distributions
lines, and that requires some different techniques and we are
looking at some of those different techniques. Also, one of the
things that is important to that is excess flow valves. We had
an example in nearby South Riding, Virginia in 1998 regarding a
gas pipeline explosion in a residence due to not having any
excess flow valve. So the PIPES mandates excess flow valves for
single family residences, but we recommend that it also apply
to apartments, other multifamily dwellings, and commercial
properties.
And last but not least, the oversight of integrity
management programs, we think it is very good that operators
have flexibility and responsibility to develop their own
integrity management programs because one size doesn't
necessarily fit all, but what that does is it creates an
enormous responsibility for the operator to scrutinize whether
the program is effective, identify areas where it is not
sufficiently effective and needs improvement, and implement
corrections.
PHMSA, on the other hand, must determine that operators are
implementing and correcting the programs as needed. So it is a
good system, but it imposes huge responsibilities on both the
operators and PHMSA, and we have examples where that process
broke down.
In Kingman, Kansas, it broke down because the operator
didn't include the leak history in prioritizing which pipelines
to inspect. We have other examples in Carmichael, Mississippi,
in 2007 and in Palm City, Florida, in 2009 where the process
broke down. So that is very important as to keep that process
going.
Since June, the Safety Board has been involved in
investigating four pipeline accidents, and you have already
heard reference to all of them. Two weeks ago, the 30-inch
natural gas transmission pipeline exploded in San Bruno,
California, killing at least seven and destroying many of the
surrounding homes. I accompanied our investigators to San Bruno
as the Board member on the scene.
The 28-foot section of pipe that you see in this picture
was thrown 100 feet from where it was buried in the ground. We
have transported that section here to D.C. where it will be
tested in the metallurgy labs. The other picture you see is the
pipe underground from which that pipe was blown.
Also in this month, a crude oil pipeline operated by
Enbridge ruptured in Romeoville, Illinois, and we have begun to
investigate that event. And the previous event in July, the
reason it got as much attention as it did was because of the
previous event in July of the same company, a 30-inch diameter
crude oil pipeline also operated by Enbridge that ruptured in
Marshall, Michigan, that we are hearing about much today that
spilled as much as 1 million gallons of oil into the Talmadge
Creek and the Kalamazoo River. So pipe sections from both of
those are also transported to D.C.
So while our investigations are still underway we expect
that they may focus on several areas that we will look at, the
control of the pipeline, the pipeline operators, the
notification after the emergency, the response, a number of
areas that we will be looking at.
So we have had a good relationship, working relationship
with PHMSA. They are generally responsive to our
recommendations. We look forward to working with them in
addressing these areas of concern that I have mentioned.
Thank you, and I would be pleased to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Hart, very much. I ask unanimous
consent to include in the record a statement from the American
Public Gas Association and a letter from the Sierra Club and
other environmental organizations. Without objection, so
ordered. And I ask unanimous consent that all members have 5
days to include in the record their opening statements which
they might not have had an opportunity to make this afternoon.
[The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
Mr. Markey. The chair now recognizes himself for a round of
questions.
Vice Chairman Hart, is the NTSB investigating whether there
were any alarms or other indications of a problem in Enbridge's
Line 6B prior to 5:58 p.m. on July 25?
Mr. Hart. Yes, we are looking in great detail at the
timeline because that is an important aspect of our
investigations, how quickly did the operator become aware of
the problem and how quickly did they respond to the problem.
That one is perhaps partially complicated by the fact that the
pipeline was in the course of a scheduled shutdown at the time,
and that may complicate the detection and response. But we are
looking at that issue in great detail.
Mr. Markey. Vice Chairman Hart, it has been reported that
PG&E's gas line that ruptured in San Bruno, California, was
unusual in that it had a longitudinal seam and numerous wells,
indicating that it was made from multiple smaller sections of
pipe.
What is the potential significance of this fact, and what
do we know about how common this type of pipe may be in PG&E
and other pipe systems?
Mr. Hart. The piece of pipe that was shipped back to D.C.
is a piece of pipe that contains those multiple sections you
are talking about. It appears that there were multiple sections
because the pipe was negotiating a curve at that point and the
multiple sections are the slightly slanted sections that were
welded together to negotiate that curve. So that is one of the
things we will be looking at in the metallurgy lab is to look
to see whether those wells were compromised in the course of
this event.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Administrator Quarterman, some industry groups are lobbying
against H.R. 6008, the bipartisan CLEAN Act sponsored by
Representative Schauer and Ranking Member Upton. They say that
the bill would require pipeline operators to report a spill
based on just the rumor of a spill, but the bill only requires
reporting within 1 hour of the discovery of the spill.
Aren't they misleading Members of Congress about what this
bill does?
Ms. Quarterman. Mr. Chairman, in the body of my written
testimony, you will see that the administration is supporting
the CLEAN Act and it is consistent with our current
requirements that we be notified about an incident or the NRC
be notified within an hour or two of the discovery of an
incident.
Mr. Markey. Administrator Quarterman, in the case of the
Marshall spill, nearly 20 hours went by between the time when
Enbridge received the first alarm on its system and when it
discovered and reported the leak. I recognize that you can't
speak to the Enbridge spill specifically. But isn't it clear
that we need to establish mandatory standards to improve leak
detection now? Will you commit to promulgating such standards
within the next year?
Ms. Quarterman. Mr. Chairman, I mentioned in my opening
statement that the administration in complement to the piece of
legislation that was offered is working on a regulatory
proposal, an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, which we
hope to have out within the next few days that addresses
several questions to leak detection issues.
I think one question that we will be asking is whether we
should put in place a particular standard that all companies
have to meet across the Board. Currently, it is subject to the
discretion of the individual companies to determine what the
appropriate leak detection system is. We want to put in place a
hard standard.
Mr. Markey. Administrator Quarterman, it seems to me like
simple common sense that your agency should retain and make
public the oil spill response plans that pipeline operators are
required to prepare. Why doesn't the agency do that now? And
are you going to commit to changing that as soon as possible?
Ms. Quarterman. We do retain copies of the oil spill
response plans. They have not been made public for no
particular reason. I think they have probably not been made
public because there hasn't been much of a request for it. We
certainly have no problems with providing those publicly.
Mr. Markey. And they will be retained?
Ms. Quarterman. And they will be retained, yes.
Mr. Markey. The industry groups testifying today have
argued against extending integrity management requirements
beyond high consequence areas limited to population centers and
ecological reserves.
Isn't it true that spills outside of high consequence areas
can and do have serious impacts on human health and the
environment?
Ms. Quarterman. Of course they do. In our legislative
proposal, there is a provision that we should do a report about
what the next steps should be with respect to the integrity
management rule and in specific how it is dealt with with
respect to high consequence areas. In addition to that, in our
regulatory initiative, we will be asking questions about
whether the definition of a high consequence area is adequate,
and as well as whether or not the repair criteria that are in
place for the high consequence area should be extended to all
areas that have been subject to an inspection.
Mr. Markey. And finally, the industry groups testifying
today have argued against the administration's proposal to
eliminate the blanket regulatory exemption for gathering lines.
Can you expand on why you are seeking to gain authority, to
regulate at least some subset of gathering lines?
Ms. Quarterman. Well, I think it is important for the
public to know that all pipelines, hazardous liquid pipelines
that exist in this country are subject to someone's regulatory
authority. Right now there are primarily two exceptions or
exemptions in the law. One is for production-related facilities
or refinery facilities. And those are being regulated by
different entities.
With respect to gathering lines, some of them may be
regulated. Some of them may not. We want to ensure that we know
that those lines are subject to somebody's authority.
Mr. Markey. Okay. Thank you. And what percentage of
pipeline incidents caused by excavation are caused by State or
local agencies or railroads that are exempt from ``call before
you dig'' requirements?
Ms. Quarterman. That number I will have to get for you. I
don't know it off the top of my head.
Mr. Markey. We would appreciate that. The chair's time has
expired. I will turn and recognize the ranking member, Mr.
Upton.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
testifying. And although we didn't get to ask our colleague Mr.
Schauer questions, it was certainly an issue that he and I
worked on, shoulder to shoulder on, both in July and August to
try to do all that we could to minimize the damage. As I said
in my opening statement, we had a great response by our local
people and they really did work together. There was a true fear
that this would spill into a man-made lake and disturb a large
PCB-filled lake and, even worse, get into Lake Michigan. So
every minute really did count. I know that a little bit later
this afternoon his bill was going to be on the House floor.
So just really, really quickly, you support the bill that
is going to be on the House floor this afternoon. Do you think
that it is feasible that, in fact, when there is a spill within
an hour that they can in fact make that notification?
Ms. Quarterman. Yes. The administration does support the
bill. We believe that they should be able to make it within an
hour or provide some rational justification for why they were
unable to do so.
As I mentioned earlier, we do require, subject to the
safety advisory, that they respond within an hour or two.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Hart, do you accept that? I mean, do you
believe that they--companies within an hour should be able to
make that call?
Mr. Hart. We look at that question with respect to each
specific event and determine what appears to be appropriate
with respect to each event, and we are doing that in these
events.
Mr. Upton. The last question that I have is that back in
the early nineties, the Congress took up major oil spill
legislation as it related to responses. I was actually then a
member of the Transportation Committee. As part of the effort,
I was put on the conference committee and fought successfully
to have an oil spill response team for the Great Lakes. At the
time we had a major oil spill on a tanker over in Bay City, Jim
Barcia, a former colleague, it was in his district, and a
tanker pulled off the moorings and there was a major spill on
that side of the State.
As we look at this spill, you know, anything that involves
particularly a waterway, do you feel that because of the
legislation not only for the Great Lakes but around the country
that, in fact, there are the appropriate amounts of boom and
other material to address situations like this in the future,
if in fact they happen? As we did this particular scene, I was
in touch with the Coast Guard and with EPA, and they were
terrific in terms of getting the right sized boom and
everything there that they thought everything--but what is your
sense as it relates to the rest of the country in terms of the
inventory of boom in case something happens, period?
Ms. Quarterman. PHMSA is not responsible for----
Mr. Upton. I know EPA is.
Ms. Quarterman. EPA is, yes. And I don't have a survey of
the amount of boom across the country.
Mr. Upton. Might we be able to get that? Would you be able
to get that and then give it to us for the record?
Ms. Quarterman. I am certain that we can follow up on that
issue. If we know the answer ourselves, we can follow up with
our sister agencies.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair
recognizes the gentleman from Vermont.
Mr. Welch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Markey. Well, with the thanks of the committee, we will
be submitting additional questions to the two of you and your
agencies, and we would very much appreciate prompt responses.
We thank you for your service.
Mr. Hart. Thank you.
Mr. Markey. This panel is completed. So let's turn to the
next panel, if we may. And that is a panel that will begin with
Mr. Stephen Wuori, who is the Executive Vice President of
Liquids Pipelines at Enbridge Incorporated.
Enbridge operates the longest pipeline system in the world.
Mr. Wuori is responsible for all of Enbridge's crude oil and
liquids pipeline operations in North America. He has over 27
years of experience with Enbridge, including 20 years in the
liquids pipeline business.
Mr. Wuori, whenever you feel comfortable, please begin.
STATEMENTS OF STEPHEN WUORI, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, LIQUIDS
PIPELINES, ENBRIDGE INC.; RICK KESSLER, VICE PRESIDENT,
PIPELINE SAFETY TRUST; DONALD F. SANTA, JR., PRESIDENT,
INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA; ANDREW BLACK,
PRESIDENT, ASSOCIATION OF OIL PIPE LINES; AND LORI TRAWEEK,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OPERATIVE OFFICER, AMERICAN GAS
ASSOCIATION
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN WUORI
Mr. Wuori. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Upton, and members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
Enbridge's approach to pipeline safety.
Mr. Chairman, I want to be absolutely clear, no spill is
acceptable to Enbridge. Enbridge operates the largest and most
complex liquids pipeline system in the world, and we are
committed to upholding the highest standards for pipeline
safety and integrity. For that reason, we invest heavily in
pipeline integrity and safety management.
Our central mission is to assure that our pipeline networks
have the strength and operating fitness to perform safely,
reliably, and in an environmentally responsible manner.
I am proud to say that we have approximately 2,200
employees in the United States, and we deliver about 12 percent
of the total daily imports of crude oil into the U.S.,
delivering more crude each day than any other country or
jurisdiction, including Venezuela and Saudi Arabia.
Even though we built our business in the transportation of
oil and gas, we are also investing heavily in green energy,
including seven wind farms, a hybrid fuel cell system, and
North America's largest photovoltaic solar facility. Through
our neutral footprint initiative, we are seeking to grow our
business without increasing our impact on the environment; and
therefore, we intend to plant a tree for every tree we remove,
conserve an acre of land for every acre we permanently impact,
and produce a kilowatt of green energy for each kilowatt of
energy that we use to power our operations.
With respect to Line 6B in Michigan, we have taken full
responsibility for cleaning up the spill and addressing all
impacts on the environment, on the individuals and on the
businesses in the Marshall, Battle Creek, and surrounding area.
Congressman Upton, we recognize that this incident has been
a very high priority for you. You earlier reflected on the
cooperation with the local agencies, and we have experienced
tremendous cooperation with our company, and I want to take
this opportunity to extend my thanks to all of those agencies
for the cooperation that we have received. Thanks to the
dedication of all personnel involved in the response, including
the 500 Michigan residents we put to work, the spill was
quickly contained and we are now well on our way to remediating
it. As a native of Michigan myself, I understand the importance
of the affected waterways.
Upon first notification of the release of oil on July 26,
the pipeline was isolated. Crews began installing containment
boom that is stored in Marshall, and response teams from our
regional offices throughout North America arrived that day. Our
CEO, Pat Daniel, and I arrived that evening, and we have been
based in Marshall since that time.
We mobilized as quickly as we could so that anyone affected
would have housing and medical care at our expense. We provided
direct assistance for prepaid hotel stays, equipment and
services, and we reimbursed individuals for cost of living and
other expenses. We also established a home purchase program to
help assure affected homeowners that their property values will
not go down as a result of the spill.
Mr. Chairman, our intention from day one has been to assure
that the people and businesses impacted by the incident are
made whole. We acted in good faith to establish a claims
settlement process that is simple, fast, and fair. But when
questions were raised, we engaged former Michigan Supreme Court
Justice Dennis Archer to examine our process and make
recommendations for improvements, if needed. Justice Archer's
review is underway.
With respect to the cleanup in Marshall and Battle Creek,
effective August 10, the Environmental Protection Agency
announced that the emergency phase of the incident was over,
and by next week we will have completed the bulk of the
cleanup. We received PHMSA approval for our restart plan last
evening, and we now anticipate that we will meet the restart
plan requirements and return Line 6B to service on Monday
morning, September 27, subject to receipt of final PHMSA
approval.
With respect to Line 6A in Romeoville, Illinois, we focused
on rapid cleanup of the spill and addressing the needs of
affected residents and businesses. The pipeline was shut down
immediately after Enbridge was notified on September 9. Repairs
were completed and the line was safely returned to normal
service on September 17. The NTSB is investigating, as you have
heard, the cause of the leak and also a separate rupture of a
water main directly underneath our pipeline. NTSB has reported
that both pipes had been punctured.
Mr. Chairman and Mr. Upton, I want to reiterate that for
Enbridge, no spill is acceptable. We understand that we must
hold ourselves accountable and to the highest standards of
openness and care in all the communities where we operate. We
have been serving America's energy needs for 60 years, and we
intend to continue to be a good neighbor for many decades to
come.
Thank you again for providing us this opportunity to share
our perspective.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wuori follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Welch [presiding]. Thank you very much.
And our next witness is Rick Kessler, Vice President of the
Pipeline Safety Trust, a nonprofit organization well known to
the committee. Mr. Kessler is well known to the committee,
having served as Chief of Staff to Chairman Emeritus Dingell.
Sorry he is not here, but that is quite a recommendation around
here.
He currently serves as President of Dow Lohnes Government
Strategies. And welcome, Mr. Kessler. We look forward to your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF RICK KESSLER
Mr. Kessler. Thank you, Mr. Welch, and thank you, Ranking
Member Upton. As you have just heard, I am Rick Kessler, and I
am here in my purely voluntary and uncompensated role as the
Vice President of the Pipeline Safety Trust.
My experience with pipeline safety stems from my years as a
staff of this committee on such issues, starting in 1994 after
a natural gas explosion in Edison, New Jersey, all too similar
to what just occurred in California. It destroyed the whole
apartment complex, left one person dead and many people
homeless.
The events of the last 2 months, the Enbridge pipeline
environmental catastrophe in Michigan that made houses
uninhabitable and, more recently, the devastation and tragedy
brought about by the PG&E explosion in San Bruno, drive home
the need for significant comprehensive changes to our pipeline
safety laws as part of any reauthorization.
Transporting fuels through pipelines is without a doubt the
safest way to move these highly dangerous substances, but the
question isn't whether pipelines are a safe mode of
transportation. It is whether they are as safe as they could
and should be and whether they are being regulated in a manner
that is efficient, effective, and protective. Unfortunately,
the answer to both questions is no.
You have asked the Trust to comment on two legislative
proposals currently before the committee, H.R. 6008, the CLEAN
Act, and the reauthorization proposal released last week by the
Obama administration.
It is our understanding that Mr. Schauer, Ranking Member
Upton, and others introduced H.R. 6008 in response to the
Enbridge pipeline accident that affected both their districts.
The bill's main provisions require pipeline owners and
operators to notify the Secretary and the National Response
Center within 1 hour of discovering a hazardous liquid or
natural gas leak. It would not expand the category of leak
required to be reported nor require a leaking line be shut
down, as some have erroneously asserted. Rather, it merely
directs releases that are required to be reported today be
reported more quickly in the future, no more than an hour from
when they are first discovered by the pipeline operator.
The second major provision in the bill raises the cap on
civil penalties, and we applaud the increase but caution that
it is not a panacea.
The CLEAN Act's third major provision requires the
Secretary to establish a database of all reportable incidents.
While PHMSA already makes incident data of this sort available
for download, we think this provision would be a step forward
if the intent is that PHMSA makes such information available in
a more user-friendly format on their Web site.
Of course, the CLEAN Act isn't intended to be a vehicle for
full scale reauthorization. It is a narrowly crafted but useful
step forward to address a number of issues raised by the recent
accidents, and we support it as such. We hope, however, the
bill is amended to require enhanced leak detection on pipelines
and urge you to include such a reasonable provision in the bill
or in any reauthorization package.
Last week, the Obama administration released a draft
pipeline safety reauthorization proposal. Had this 12-page bill
been unveiled a year ago, it might have been a nice first step
on the long road to reauthorization. However, coming as it has
on the heels of major catastrophic accidents and with only a
short time left to reauthorize the act, the only way to
characterize it is too little, too late.
Certainly there are positive provisions in the bill,
including increased staffing and funding for PHMSA. The bill
also takes baby steps towards regulating gathering lines by
removing the provision in the law that prohibits PHMSA from
acting in this area. However, even this is flawed because it
requires no further regulatory action.
Also, the bill would merely study expansion of integrity
management in high consequence areas, but doesn't expand
inspections beyond the 7 percent of natural gas transmission
lines covered by the 2002 act, nor does it address the quality
of those inspections or the repairs made in their wake. One
generally positive development is the administration's proposed
changes to the overly broad provisions of the existing law
dealing with waivers.
The last time I appeared here, I stated the Trust's support
for the sensible use of waivers so long as certain commonsense
standards were put into place to protect public health and the
environment. Section 10 of the administration proposal
addresses some of our concerns by imposing higher standards for
waiver applicants, time limiting the duration of a waiver,
explicitly requiring PHMSA to recover processing costs, and
directly authorizing the Secretary to revoke waiver for cause.
Ultimately, as I indicated earlier, the problem of this
proposal has little to do with what is in it but rather what is
not in it. For instance, there is little or nothing to do in
the proposal that would address issues raised by the Michigan
and California incidents or the many other accidents that have
occurred during the same period.
The good news is that with significant additions, this
proposal could be part of the kind of bipartisan, proactive
reauthorization package that emerged from this committee in
both 2002 and 2006. Such a package must address, in addition to
the things I previously mentioned, expanding the miles of
pipelines that fall under integrity management, making more
pipeline safety information publicly available, requiring a
remote or automatic shutoff valves for gas transmission, and
emergency flow restrictions devices on hazardous liquid
pipelines, enhanced requirements for accommodating internal
inspection devices, or smart pigs, and a number of other
equally important issues raised in my written testimony.
I see I am running out of time. I just want to thank you
again for this opportunity to testify and note that over the
last decade this committee has proven to be a bipartisan
bastion of common sense in the realm of protecting the public
and the environment from unsafe pipelines. We urge the
committee to continue its leadership role on the issue and look
forward to working with you in the future.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kessler follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Welch. Thank you, Mr. Kessler.
Our next witness, Mr. Santa, President of Interstate
Natural Gas Association of America. Previously I understand you
served as Commissioner at the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission and have also served as Majority Counsel to the U.S.
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. We around
here think that is a little bit of a demotion compared to Mr.
Kessler. But thank you for joining us. When you are ready,
please begin.
STATEMENT OF DONALD F. SANTA, JR.
Mr. Santa. Thank you, Mr. Welch and Ranking Member Upton,
for the opportunity to appear here today on behalf of the
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, or INGAA. INGAA
represents the interstate natural gas pipeline industry, and it
also is INGAA's members that operate the natural gas
transmission pipelines, the interstate pipelines that are
subject to the Pipeline Safety Act and direct regulation by
PHMSA. There also are interstate--intrastate, excuse me,
natural gas transmission lines that are subject to the Pipeline
Safety Act but are typically regulated by State agencies.
On behalf of INGAA and its members, we would like to
express our condolences to those who have suffered a loss as a
result of the tragic San Bruno accident. Clearly we need to
discover the facts and the causes of that accident, and we
pledge to work on effective solutions as a result of those
lessons to improve pipeline safety.
The first point that I would like to make to the
subcommittee is that transmission pipelines are very safe
compared to other modes of transportation and energy delivery.
This is borne out by the Department of Transportation Bureau of
Transportation Statistics Figures. Interstate pipelines
typically are buried and in remote locations. Fatalities and
injuries to the general public from pipeline accidents are
rare, as is damage to public property. Still, protection of the
public in highly populated areas is and always has been a high
priority in the pipeline safety programs. Over the past 10
complete years--that is 2000 through 2009--excavation damage is
the leading cause of serious pipeline accidents; that is, the
accidents that cause a fatality or an injury.
Detailed statistics from PHMSA are included in INGAA's
written testimony, and I would note that these statistics do
not include the 2010 accidents. Those are the two excavation
accidents on intrastate pipelines in Texas and the San Bruno
accident.
The second point I would like to emphasize is that the
Integrity Management Program, or IMP, has made the natural gas
transmission pipeline network safety. Protection of the public
from the risk of pipeline accidents has always been a priority,
and the IMP program was preceded by the class location system
that required an extra measure of safety in urban areas.
The IMP program, mandated by the Congress in the Pipeline
Safety Improvement Act of 2002, is modeled on industry best
practices that preceded that standardized program. This program
has produced significant results. IMP requires integrity
management inspections of natural gas transmission pipelines
located in close proximity to population centers. These are
referred to as high consequence areas, or HCAs. All HCAs must
be inspected in 10 years by the end of 2012 and all must be
reinspected within 7 years of that baseline assessment. We are
now over three-quarters of the way through those baseline
assessments and over 19,000 miles of pipelines within HCAs have
been inspected. As a result of those inspections, over 3,000
repairs have been performed to address actionable anomalies.
Pipelines are now beginning the reinspection of segments
that were inspected early in the program. It is noteworthy that
the rate of actionable anomalies being discovered in these
reinspections is far lower than what was discovered during the
baseline assessments. I would also note that over 90 percent of
the assessments being performed by INGAA members are being done
using inline inspection devices. That is smart pigs.
Still, it is a cause for concern that the San Bruno
accident occurred in a high consequence area that is covered by
the IMP program. We need to understand the root cause of that
accident, what it tells us about the effectiveness of the IMP
program in that case, and what lessons should we apply to other
similarly situated pipelines.
Finally, with regard to the IMP program, many recent
stories have emphasized the point that only 7 percent of the
transmission pipeline mileage in the U.S. is being inspected.
Let me respond.
First, the industry and the regulator are doing exactly
what the Congress directed. The emphasis of the program is to
focus on highly populated areas where the consequences to the
public from a pipeline accident would be the greatest.
Second, IMP is but one layer of a multifaceted pipeline
safety program that covers everything from pipeline design and
construction to pipeline operation and maintenance to control
room operators. And in addition, integrity management is just
one kind of inspection.
Third, as a practical consequence of the logistics and
economics of operating inline inspection tools, much greater
mileage has been inspected with these tools than just the
mileage in HCAs. Compared to the mileage inspected within HCAs
under the program, seven times more mileage has been inspected
outside of HCAs during the same period and this has been
reported to PHMSA, and any actionable anomalies discovered in
these non-HCA pipelines have been repaired.
Mr. Chairman, I see that I am running out of time here. My
written statement includes INGAA's positions on both the
administration's draft reauthorization bill and the CLEAN Act,
and in the interest of time I will conclude my remarks now and
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Santa follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Welch. Thank you very much. Our next witness is Andrew
Black, President of the Association of Oil Pipelines. Like Mr.
Kessler, Mr. Black is also known to the committee, having
served as the Republican Deputy Staff Director of Policy for
the committee. Welcome. And Mr. Black has also served as the
Director of the Office of External Affairs for the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission and Director of Federal Government
Relations for the El Paso Corporation.
Mr. Black, welcome.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW BLACK
Mr. Black. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Upton, it
is good to be back. I am Andy Black, President and CEO of the
Association of Oil Pipe Lines. I appreciate the opportunity to
appear on behalf of AOPL and API. I will discuss the oil
pipeline industry's commitment to safety, our improved safety
record, and the importance of improving damage prevention
programs in pipeline safety reauthorization legislation.
Pipelines are the safest way to move crude oil and refined
petroleum products, such as gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel,
home heating oil, and propane. A reminder of the strong safety
record of pipelines may seem discordant in the aftermath of a
pipeline accident, but it must be kept in perspective.
Pipelines are also the most reliable, economical, and
environmentally favorable way to move these fuels. Pipeline
operators have every incentive to invest in safety. Most
important is the potential for injury to members of the public,
employees, contractors. Operators could also incur costly
repairs, cleanups, litigation and fines in the event of
accidents. And the pipeline may not be able to accommodate
customers, losing the business use of the pipeline asset if the
facility needs to be shut down.
Operators face a rigorous set of Federal Government
requirements for construction, operation, and maintenance of a
pipeline. Regulations also cover public awareness, reporting,
design standards, operational controls, pressure testing,
maintenance standards, qualification of personnel, emergency
response and more. While we do not know the cause of the major
recent pipeline accidents, it is important to note that laws
and regulations already address the leading causes of pipeline
failures, including corrosion, excavation damage, materials and
equipment failure, and operations.
This industry had a wakeup call after a fatal incident in
1999 that Mr. Inslee described earlier. Congress and the Office
of Pipeline Safety asked more of pipelines, and pipelines
answered the call. As a result of new laws and regulations and
vigorous industry efforts, liquid pipeline spills along rights-
of-way have decreased over the past decade in terms of both the
number of spills and the volume of product released. Each of
the major causes of pipeline accidents also showed decreases
during this time period, reflecting the successes of multiple
different strategies to manage risk. We are proud of this
improved record, but we are not content. We still strive for
zero accidents.
Operators invest millions of dollars annually to maintain
their pipelines and comply with Federal pipeline safety laws
and regulations. In one recent survey, liquid pipeline
operators representing three-fourths of U.S. mileage reported
spending approximately $2.7 billion on integrity management
activities in the past 6 years. These costs will only increase
as integrity management tools become more expensive, more
sophisticated, and more effective at identifying issues for
pipeline operators to address.
Operators work hard to learn lessons from pipeline
incidents and share ideas for improvement and best practices
throughout the industry. The industry has standing teams and
workshops to discuss integrity management issues, review
incidents, analyze data, and make recommendations to
executives. The industry invests in research and development at
the company and consortium level to develop new technologies
and practices to confront pipeline challenges.
As attention turns to reauthorization of the pipeline
safety laws, we ask for the help of Congress to protect
pipelines from excavation damage. Third party damage is less
frequent today but still accounts for 31 percent of all
significant liquid pipeline accidents, the leading cause.
In some States, State laws requiring the use of the 811
``call before you dig'' number do not exist, are weak or
inadequate, or are not adequately enforced. Some State
agencies, municipalities, and other local entities are exempted
from requirements to use the One-Call System. These exemptions
create a gap in enforcement and in safety because the threat of
pipeline damage is the same, regardless of who the excavator
is. The Office of Pipeline safety can close the gap by
exercising One-Call civil enforcement authority granted by
Congress in 2006. They can conduct enforcement proceedings for
a One-Call violation within the boundaries of a State if the
Secretary has determined that a State's enforcement is
inadequate to protect safety.
We urge OPS to complete their rulemaking to implement this
authority, and we encourage Congress or OPS to require
termination of these exemptions by the States or risk Federal
enforcement and loss of grant funds.
We continue to study the recent pipeline safety proposal by
the administration. Although there is much we do not oppose, I
note significant concerns with two provisions. First, we oppose
the proposal to create a fee for OPS inspections of pipeline
construction. OPS has long had construction-related authority
and their activities had long been paid for by pipeline user
fees for decades. We see no reason for the new fee, which will
ultimately increase costs passed on to consumers.
Secondly, we oppose a proposal to transfer a regulation of
certain gathering lines from States and other Federal agencies
to the OPS. Gathering lines gather crude to be sent to
processing facilities. They are small pipelines in areas where
crude oil is produced. They are often not large enough to
accommodate smart pigs. They are local, with local effects and
not transportation lines. This regulatory framework has not
failed under the oversight of EPA or other Federal agencies and
the States.
Moving to H.R. 6008, pipeline operators certainly support
prompt notification to the National Response Center of a
pipeline release. We support the intent of the bill. We do not
oppose the bill and are not lobbying against it in its current
form. We recommend additions to the bill that would eliminate a
rigid volume reporting rule that can cause a pipeline to
hesitate before notifying the government of a release. We will
also stand on guard against changes that might mistakenly
increase the potential for false alarm notifications just to
comply with an arbitrary deadline.
Congress has provided OPS with a thorough set of tools to
regulate pipeline safety. They are an aggressive regulator
conducting rigorous inspections and vigorously enforcing
compliance. We lament the recent accidents and have sent
condolences to those who are affected but see no reason to
greatly expand the pipeline safety program.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Black follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Welch. Thank you very much. And our final witness is
Lori Traweek, Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer
at the American Gas Association. Ms. Traweek's experience
includes work as an offshore and onshore engineer for ARCO Oil
and Gas Company in Texas and Louisiana.
Welcome. We look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF LORI TRAWEEK
Ms. Traweek. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The
advantage of going last is that I will be able to reiterate
much of what you have heard this afternoon.
My name is Lori Traweek, Senior Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer at the American Gas Association. We represent
195 energy utilities that distribute natural gas throughout the
country.
Our hearts also go out to those who are suffering, who lost
loved ones, homes as a result of the tragic San Bruno accident.
No incident is acceptable. Every incident is one incident
too many. As I speak, senior executives and safety leaders from
around the country working at natural gas utilities are now in
Boston at the fourth annual AGA Executive Safety Leadership
Summit. They are there to discuss employee safety, public
safety, contractor safety, and customer safety. Not
surprisingly, this year, San Bruno and the tragedy there is a
focus of those conversations.
We hold these best practices forums and exchange because
first and foremost, the industry's goal is safely reliably and
efficiently delivering natural gas to the more than 70 million
customers in the United States who rely on this fuel for their
energy needs. When there is a tragic incident like this,
similar to Congress, the regulators, the public, we too want to
determine what could have been done to prevent the incident and
then take appropriate actions to prevent a recurrence.
Until the NTSB has concluded its investigation, however, it
is best we not speculate about the causes of the accident and
possible solutions. Any speculation could result in ineffective
or unnecessary reactions. While the cause of the incident is
being determined, we encourage all who are interested in
learning about the safe delivery of natural gas to visit our
Web site. Also, it is equally important that all citizens are
aware of the industry's One-Call safety program, 811 ``call
before you dig.''
The natural gas industry spends an estimated $7 billion
each year in safety-related activities. The design,
construction, operation, inspection, and maintenance of all
operating natural gas pipelines are subject to rigorous
oversight by Federal and State regulators. This includes the
promulgation of the transmission integrity management rule that
adds a layer of protection for pipelines in high consequence
areas in addition to the multitude of periodic inspections/
maintenance performed on all pipelines throughout the system.
In 2006, Congress passed the PIPES Act, which included four
core provisions key to enhancing the safety of pipelines
operated by utilities: First, excavation damage, the single
greatest threat to distribution system safety and reliability.
Our combined efforts of regulators, stakeholders, and natural
gas operators have been successful. Improvements have been
made. But as you have heard from Mr. Black, more can be done.
Second, the DOT has promulgated an Integrity Management
Program for distribution pipelines. Operators have been and
continue to aggressively write and implement integrity
management programs to meet the August 2011 implementation
date. 1,450 operators, 2.1 million miles of pipe, and 70
million customers will be positively impacted by this rule.
Third, DOT now requires distribution gas utilities to
install an excess flow valve on new and replacement service
lines for single family residences. Millions of EFVs have been
installed by operators.
And fourth, DOT has promulgated a regulation for control
room management which natural gas pipeline operators are
implementing on an accelerated schedule.
Finally, on a personal note, gas transmission pipelines run
through my neighborhood. Therefore, my husband, two children
and I live in a high consequence area. I can say without
hesitation that because of the safety--the record of this
industry and because of the regulations that are in place, I do
not feel compelled to move because of the tragic incident in
San Bruno. I do, however, want to know what happened. We all
want to know what happened so we can consider what appropriate
actions can be taken to avoid a similar occurrence in
neighborhoods across the country.
That is why AGA is committed to working with Congress and
Federal and State regulators to ensure that natural gas
distribution and transmission systems continue to be the safest
and most reliable method, delivering a clean and reliable
energy source.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Traweek follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Welch. Thank you very much for your testimony. We
appreciate the testimony of all the members of the panel. The
chair will recognize himself for 5 minutes for a few questions.
Mr. Wuori, on July 15, 10 days before the spill, near
Marshall, Michigan, an Enbridge executive testified before the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee that the company's
response time for release incidents can be almost
instantaneous. It turned out that not only did Enbridge not
discover the spill, but we understand Enbridge also did not
report the spill to the National Response Center for nearly 2
hours after confirming the existence of the leak, nearly 20
hours after the first pressure alarm, after 10 separate alarms,
and over 16 hours after people began calling 911 to report oil
or gas odors.
So the obvious question is this: How is it possible that it
took this long for Enbridge to discover and report what was a
very massive leak?
Mr. Wuori. Mr. Chairman, the systems that were described by
Rich Adams in his testimony are the systems that we have
installed in the company both with regard to the pipeline
operation and leak detection in the company, and for years we
have been striving to improve upon those.
Mr. Welch. The question is, why not the report? The
discovery in the report. The systems apparently worked to send
a signal that something was wrong. So the question was, what
took so long?
Mr. Wuori. As you know, we are a participating party in the
NTSB investigation. We have our own investigation underway, and
all of the timeline events are part of that investigation. And
I really can't speculate, and it wouldn't be fruitful for me to
try to draw conclusions too early based on the early data.
Mr. Welch. So you don't know or you won't say?
Mr. Wuori. I do not know at this time. We haven't finished
our investigation. And when we do, we will draw the right
conclusions, and then we will apply those learnings to the
system.
Mr. Welch. Let me ask you this: Were there any alarms or
other anomalies detected by Enbridge or its employees with
regard to Line 6B prior to 5:58 Eastern Daylight Time on July
25, 2010?
Mr. Wuori. What we do know is that we have an internal
inspection tool, an inline inspection tool that is in the line.
And that was in the process of being run prior to the Sunday
evening. But yet there is nothing that I can speculate on in
terms of that time frame. We had a lot of communication going
on between the field and the control center during that period.
Mr. Welch. The question is simple. 5:58 was the event. Were
there any alarms or other anomalies that were detected prior to
5:58? I mean, that is a known answer. There were or there
weren't, right?
Mr. Wuori. Yes. I think we heard earlier though from Vice
Chairman Hart that that is part of the investigation and
therefore I can't draw conclusions on that either.
Mr. Welch. That is the point of the question. I am not
asking you for a conclusion. I am asking you for just a factual
report as to whether there was an anomaly or an alarm that
occurred before 5:58.
Mr. Wuori. I am not aware, Chairman, of any alarms or
anomalies prior to that time.
Mr. Welch. And you would know?
Mr. Wuori. I would not necessarily know every single alarm
from where I sit, no.
Mr. Welch. Okay. The chairman yields to the ranking member.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
testimony, all of you. Mr. Black and Ms. Traweek, I appreciated
your comments as it related to the One-Call. And certainly I
think those are very good ideas that as we look at the
reauthorization to take into account, I just wonder, Mr. Black,
if you might be able to provide our subcommittee with
information as it relates to municipalities, State agencies, if
you can identify those which are exempt in some number or State
so that we can have that as we work with our Members from those
States to make sure that they can be onboard to really have a
uniform system that works and so that folks in any community
will have some sense of order if that call is made. I don't
know if you can prepare that for us in the next couple of weeks
or whatever as we look to do this, whether it be in this
Congress or the next.
Mr. Black. Last time we looked, 41 States had some kind of
exemptions from One-Call laws. We got that information from
NAPSR, National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives,
State regulators. Congress has given the DOT the authority to
eliminate those to determine that exemptions do not meet the
minimum standard of what an adequate State damage prevention
plan is. We encourage Congress, when you are considering
reauthorization, to direct DOT or encourage and persuade them
to continue on the road that they already appear on, which is
really pushing the States to eliminate those. If they can't
successfully get the States to eliminate those, we think DOT,
with Congress' direction, should weigh in and should do Federal
damage prevention enforcement in the States, which you have
already given that authority to do.
Mr. Upton. Ms. Traweek, do you agree? If any of you have
information that might be useful for us, I think that would be
helpful.
Mr. Wuori, we are all aware of the Department of
Transportation release, and I am looking at one here. I will
put it in the record if you haven't seen it, which calls for
the gradual--the is the headline--gradual restart plan for
Enbridge Line 6B in Michigan, approved by PHMSA under strict
oversight. As I understand it, it is expected that this line
will open on Monday next week. Is that still your assessment?
Mr. Wuori. That is our current assessment, Congressman. We
do need final PHMSA approval on the steps that we are now
taking between last night's approval of the plan and the final
approval to restart. So we will require their final approval
before we restart. We have projected Monday the 27th.
Mr. Upton. Do you know if it is early Monday, late Monday?
Mr. Wuori. Typically on a line restart, we would do it in
daylight hours, so it would likely be Monday morning.
Mr. Upton. The last question that I have, you all are aware
of the legislation that we are going to be debating yet this
evening, a bill that I have cosponsored with other Members on
both sides of the aisle that calls for--the main element of it
is the requirement that within an hour of knowledge of a mishap
that that call be made. I would like to know from each of you
if you support that idea, do you think that it is workable? Yes
or no is sufficient.
Mr. Wuori.
Mr. Wuori. I think the only tradeoff in the 1 hour is the
accuracy of the volume estimate. When you call the National
Response Center, you are asked to give a volume estimate for
good reasons. And typically our policy has been it is a two-
hour time frame in which to develop the volume estimate of any
spill and also any other conditions that should be reported.
Shortening it to 1 hour would then require an understanding
that the volume estimate process may not be as accurate.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Kessler.
Mr. Kessler. We do support it, and we understand the
concerns about the volume estimate reporting and think those
can be worked through. They are reasonable concerns, but they
in no way diminish or impact the need or the reasonableness of
your legislation.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Santa.
Mr. Santa. Yes, Mr. Upton, in our comments INGAA noted that
we would recommend that the time be modified to 2 hours rather
than 1 hour in order to provide pipeline operators with an
opportunity to discover whether the alarm is accurate, to
discover where the release, if it is occurring, is occurring,
and also note the tradeoff that--there is a cost if it is a
false alarm and the operator----
Mr. Upton. That is always good news if it was false. Sorry,
right?
Mr. Santa. Well, I would just note that you would be
notifying first responders and things of that nature. But we
are not opposing it, but we are recommending that the time
period be extended to 2 hours.
Mr. Black. We are not opposing the bill. We want to help it
get better; and if it does get better, we can support it. The
volume reporting process, which is very rigid right now,
creates a hesitancy for a pipeline. If we can eliminate that--
and I think that we can--then 1 hour works perfectly. As long
as that 1 hour is applied from the pipelines operator's
discovery of a release, not a time a pipeline operator should
have known, we think that issue is going to get resolved well
either in the legislation or at DOT by a rulemaking.
Mr. Upton. Ms. Traweek.
Ms. Traweek. We also are not opposing the legislation. We
would prefer the 2 hours. But most importantly, we think that
it is necessary to be able to verify that it is actually an
incident before that reporting is made. I know it is good news
to be able to say that it was a false alarm. But there can be
thousands of calls made that, once checked out, turn out not to
be an incident at all. And as Mr. Santa suggested, the thought
of having to bring emergency responders out or to trigger the
type of responses that you get from that kind of false alarm I
think would be more negative results of that than positives.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Mr. Welch. I want to thank all the witnesses. And on behalf
of----
Mr. Markey. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Welch. On behalf of Mr. Markey, I want to say welcome
back.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I be recognized?
Mr. Welch. Mr. Upton? Want to vote? Yeah, we vote
unanimously. We will recognize the chairman.
Mr. Markey. I thank the gentleman very much.
Mr. Wuori, in 2007 and 2009, Enbridge inspections on Line
6B identified nearly 400 corrosion defects that required repair
under Federal regulations. Both of these inspections also
identified metal loss in the area of the rupture in Michigan
but, according to Enbridge, did not have to be repaired under
Federal regulations.
How is it that there could be nearly 400 corrosion defects
on this line that required repair under Federal regulations but
the defect in the area where the spill occurred did not meet
the repair criteria?
Mr. Wuori. Congressman, that is part of our investigation
and part of the NTSB's investigation in looking at exactly the
area of the spill and exactly the condition of the pipe there.
I would add that the indications that you note are the
result of inline inspection tools that run through the
pipeline. If you ran a tool through a brand-new pipeline, you
would get a number of indications. And then those are
prioritized into a dig program. But the specific indication at
the site of the spill is part of the investigation as to what
happened.
Mr. Markey. Well, you can imagine why observers would be
suspicious, and I just hope that your answers are good answers
that you give because it doesn't make any sense on its face.
Mr. Wuori, Enbridge's Line 6B was constructed in 1969, and
the pipe was coated in the field using then commonly used
polyethylene tape. In a May 21, 2009 pipeline integrity
assessment conducted by Enbridge on its 6B line, it states
that, quote, The external corrosion pattern may be attributed
to the tinting of the PE coating.
Can PE tape lead to corrosion by allowing water to get
under it.
Mr. Wuori. Congressman, polyethylene tape was used commonly
in the 1960s, 1970s and into the early 1980s. One of the issues
with polyethylene tape-coated pipelines is exactly what you
describe, and that is tinting of the coating and then the entry
of water underneath that coating which makes it more difficult
for the cathodic protection systems to work. As part of the
pipeline integrity management plan that our company has--and I
am sure that other companies have also--to run inline
inspection tools to look for areas where that has had any
effect.
Mr. Markey. Was the Enbridge 6A line also coated in PE
tape?
Mr. Wuori. Yes. The Line 6A is a polyethylene-coated line.
Mr. Markey. What percentage of Enbridge's pipelines are
coated with this tape?
Mr. Wuori. I don't know that offhand, Congressman. I would
have to get that number for you.
Mr. Markey. Mr. Kessler, do you want to comment on this and
the preexisting knowledge that they have with regard to this
corrosion pattern that is attributable to the tinting of PE
tape on pipes?
Mr. Kessler. I think you have actually stated it quite well
in terms of its ability to hold water, and it appears to
promote corrosion in these instances. So I think you are on a
good track asking these questions at this time.
Mr. Markey. Do any of the rest of you wish to comment on
this? Is this sufficient warning that there is a problem and
that it should be attended to on a systematic basis to ensure
that this risk is not posed to other pipes across the system?
Mr. Kessler. I do want to raise--just reiterate the issue
you raised about the lack of standard over the repairs. I think
that is an important point, the question of how things can go
unrepaired or how they actually are repaired and the need for
clarification and set standards and practices for these things
under law.
Mr. Markey. Thank you. Mr. Wuori--and I want to just follow
up briefly on a question that Mr. Welch asked earlier--don't
you think that for 20 hours to elapse from the first alarm that
something might be wrong to the spill actually being reported
is just too long?
Mr. Wuori. That is part of the investigation that is
underway by ourselves and also by the NTSB and other agencies.
And that timeline, I assure you, is being looked at very
carefully. We don't want to draw--and I certainly can't draw
any conclusions this soon into that investigation.
Mr. Markey. Mr. Kessler, what do you think? Is 20 hours too
long?
Mr. Kessler. If that is correct, it is about 19 hours too
long. And I think Mr. Upton and Mr. Schauer agree with that. It
raises a real question about standards for leak detection on
liquid lines and whether they are adequate, whether we should
be moving to a more modern standard, maybe based--we have
talked about basing it on the Alaska standard. But something
that is technologically and economically feasible, but a
standard. So----
Mr. Markey. Mr. Santa, do you think 20 hours is too long to
respond? Is there a circumstance where 20 hours could be an
acceptable time to elapse?
Mr. Santa. Mr. Chairman, I am not familiar with the exact
circumstances of the accident and the reasons that may have
caused that and really don't feel that I am in a position to
comment about it for the record.
Mr. Markey. Mr. Black, do you want to comment on that? Is
20 hours too long.
Mr. Black. I don't know the details of their incident. I
know leaks are difficult to detect in certain situations, like
small leaks.
Mr. Markey. Ms. Traweek, you represent the American Gas
Association.
Ms. Traweek. Yes.
Mr. Markey. From the perspective of the American Gas
Association, do you think that 20 hours is an acceptable amount
of time that can elapse?
Ms. Traweek. I think it is critically important to
understand what the circumstances were, and once those
circumstances are understood if the response time was
inadequate, then absolutely they should be held accountable.
Mr. Markey. The report was 16 hours after the 911 calls
about odors. It was 4 hours after an Enbridge employee went to
the pump station three-quarters of a mile from the spill.
Ultimately Consumers Energy, not Enbridge, did cover this leak.
As you hear those facts, do you believe that there is any
excuse for a 20-hour time period to elapse before there is an
actual, you know, response from Enbridge?
Mr. Wuori.
Mr. Wuori. Congressman, nobody wants to know the answers to
those questions more than we do, and that is why we are
investigating and the TSB is investigating all of those
circumstances, including 911 calls prior to.
Mr. Markey. Well, I am very concerned that this is
something that, if it is a pattern, is going to lead to
catastrophic conditions, and if the American Gas Association,
you know, ultimately accepts this, if there is no credible
explanation, then it is a cause for concern, that families
across the country should understand that they could be at
risk. And I just think that since time is of the essence in
these responses that the families are there, believing that
there are protocols in place that ultimately lead to rapid
responses and they actually don't exist, then that detrimental
reliance is ultimately going to lead to catastrophic
conditions, ultimately rumbling through these families lives
and sending them up on trajectories that will change an entire
generation of those families, and I just think it is just not
an acceptable standard and it must be changed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Mr. Welch. I will yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts
for any closing comments.
Mr. Markey. I am fine. Thank you.
Mr. Welch. Well, thank you very much, the panelists. We
look forward to working with you.
[Whereupon, at 5:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]