[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE BP OIL SPILL: ACCOUNTING FOR THE SPILLED OIL AND ENSURING THE
SAFETY OF SEAFOOD FROM THE GULF
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
AUGUST 19, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-152
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
_____
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan JOE BARTON, Texas
Chairman Emeritus Ranking Member
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia FRED UPTON, Michigan
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
BART GORDON, Tennessee NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
ANNA G. ESHOO, California JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
BART STUPAK, Michigan JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York ROY BLUNT, Missouri
GENE GREEN, Texas STEVE BUYER, Indiana
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
Vice Chairman JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
LOIS CAPPS, California MARY BONO MACK, California
MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania GREG WALDEN, Oregon
JANE HARMAN, California LEE TERRY, Nebraska
TOM ALLEN, Maine MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
JAY INSLEE, Washington TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
JIM MATHESON, Utah STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina PARKER GRIFFITH, Alabama
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
JOHN BARROW, Georgia
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
DORIS O. MATSUI, California
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin
Islands
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio
JERRY McNERNEY, California
BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
PETER WELCH, Vermont
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania RALPH M. HALL, Texas
JAY INSLEE, Washington FRED UPTON, Michigan
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
BARON P. HILL, Indiana JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
DORIS O. MATSUI, California STEVE BUYER, Indiana
JERRY McNERNEY, California GREG WALDEN, Oregon
PETER WELCH, Vermont SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
ELIOT ENGEL, New York
GENE GREEN, Texas
LOIS CAPPS, California
JANE HARMAN, California
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
JIM MATHESON, Utah
JOHN BARROW, Georgia
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Massachussetts, opening statement.............. 1
Witnesses
Bill Lehr, Senior Scientist, Office of Response and Restoration,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration................ 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Donald Kraemer, Acting Deputy Director, Center for Food Safety
and Applied Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration;
Accompanied by Vicki Seyfert-Margolis, Senior Advisor to the
Chief Scientist, FDA's Office of the Commissioner.............. 15
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Paul Anastas, Assistant Administrator, Office of Research and
Development, Environmental Protection Agency................... 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Ian MacDonald, Professor, Department of Oceanography, Florida
State University............................................... 66
Prepared statement........................................... 68
Dean Blanchard, President, Dean Blanchard Seafood, Inc........... 75
Prepared statement........................................... 77
Acy Cooper, Jr., Vice President, Louisiana Seafood Association... 78
Prepared statement........................................... 80
Mike Voisin, Chief Executive Officer, Motivatit Seafood, LLC..... 82
Prepared statement........................................... 85
Lisa Suatoni, Senior Scientist, Oceans Program, Natural Resources
Defense Council................................................ 88
Prepared statement........................................... 91
THE BP OIL SPILL: ACCOUNTING FOR THE SPILLED OIL AND ENSURING THE
SAFETY OF SEAFOOD FROM THE GULF
THURSDAY, AUGUST 19, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:39 a.m., in
Room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward
Markey [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Member present: Representative Markey.
Staff present: Bruce Wolpe, Senior Advisor; Melissa
Cheatham, Professional Staff Member; Caitlin Haberman, Special
Assistant; Lindsay Vidal, Special Assistant; Jen Berenholz,
Deputy Clerk; Andrea Spring, Minority Professional Staff; Mary
Neumayr, Minority Counsel; Garrett Golding, Minority
Legislative Analyst; and Lyn Walker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Mr. Markey. Welcome to the Subcommittee on Energy and
Environment.
For anyone who has been diagnosed with a life-threatening
illness, one of the best words you can hear is ``remission,''
whether it is cancer, HIV or some other illness. A battery of
modern cures can reduce the disease to lower, perhaps even to
undetectable levels. Yet even in remission, there is often
unease that the disease could return and the pestering
inevitable scientific and metaphysical questions arise: Where
did it go? Could it come back?
Right now, we are in a similar state in this environmental
disaster. After many trials and several false starts, BP
finally created a system to cap and seal the well. Oil has not
come from the Macondo well for about a month. We are no longer
at the bleeding stage. A tourniquet has been applied to the
well, and now we are told we may need to wait for the final
procedure, the relief well, until September.
And so just like a patient in remission, we have reached a
more stable stage of health with this bill. To say the well is
capped is tantamount to a cure would be false confidence. Like
unseen internal bleeding in a trauma patient, the veiled oil
persisting in the Gulf poses continued risks. Today, we are
here to ask the same questions about this spill as a patient or
a doctor would of a disease: Where did it go, and could it come
back?
According to the most recent estimates, 4.9 million barrels
of oil spewed from BP's well over the course of this 100-day
gusher. Of that oil, some was captured, some was dispersed and
some evaporated or naturally dispersed. Yet, at least 1.3
million barrels still remain unaccounted for in the waters and
marshes of the Gulf, an amount five times larger than was
spilled during the entire Exxon Valdez disaster.
Just as we are worried about rogue weapons sold on the
black market harming the public, we must be vigilant about
rogue oil from this disaster harming the public, putting a
black mark on Gulf seafood or Gulf tourism.
In addition to all the oil, millions of gallons of
dispersant chemicals have been used in unprecedented ways. Just
a few weeks ago, FDA told me that they had determined that
dispersants have a low potential to accumulate in seafood and
do not pose a significant public health risk through human
consumption. While this news is welcome, it addresses only the
issue of short-term toxicity. The FDA knows little about the
long-term impacts that these compounds will have on marine
life, nor do they know how the presence of oil and dispersants
may influence the concentration of other toxic compounds in
seafood species.
We have yet to see the full picture of hazards posed by
this spill. The work done by the FDA, NOAA and EPA will be
critical in ensuring that fish and shellfish from the Gulf is
safe to eat for years to come.
And so we will ask today: where do we go from here? Where
should monitoring and cleanup efforts be focused in this new
chapter of recovery and restoration? Are the clouds of oil
suspended below the ocean's surface still a concern? What about
the plumes of methane gas? Where have these plumes gone and
will microbes consuming methane use up oxygen in the water,
potentially asphyxiating areas of the Gulf? What impact will
all the oil, methane and the chemical dispersants have on
marine life in the Gulf and on Gulf seafood supply in the years
ahead? Is seafood from the Gulf safe to eat today? Will it be
safe to eat in the future? American families want the only oil
in their seafood to be cooking oil.
Ending BP's gusher in the Gulf does not, by itself, cure
the harm that has been done. The treatment of the region from
this disaster has only just begun.
To have a successful, continued response to this spill, we
need to do three things going forward: One: monitor the health
of the waters, wetlands, wildlife and people of the Gulf. Two:
maintain the pressure on BP and others to continue the recovery
and restoration process. And three: muster the attention of our
entire country on solving the economic and environmental
challenges from our continued dependence on oil, especially
foreign oil.
We have an extremely distinguished group of witnesses
appearing before us today. We appreciate the fact that it is
the middle of the summer. We know that many people have gone
away. However, the oil has not gone away, and it is important
for the Gulf of Mexico residents to know that the attention on
this issue has not gone away. That is why we are having this
hearing today.
So let us turn to our first witness, Dr. Bill Lehr. He is a
Senior Scientist in the Emergency Response Division of NOAA,
where he leads the spill response group. He has been active in
spill research and response for more than 15 years. We thank
you, Dr. Lehr, for being here. Whenever you feel comfortable,
please begin.
STATEMENTS OF BILL LEHR, SENIOR SCIENTIST, OFFICE OF RESPONSE
AND RESTORATION, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION; DONALD KRAEMER, ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTER
FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY VICKI SEYFERT-MARGOLIS, SENIOR
ADVISOR TO THE CHIEF SCIENTIST, FDA'S OFFICE OF THE
COMMISSIONER; AND PAUL ANASTAS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE
OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
STATEMENT OF BILL LEHR
Mr. Lehr. Thank you, Chairman Markey and members of the
subcommittee for this----
Mr. Markey. Could you turn on your mic?
Mr. Lehr. It should be on. There we go.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Mr. Lehr. Thank you again, Chairman Markey and members of
the subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify here for the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's role in the
recent Deepwater Horizon oil spill response. I would like to
discuss the critical roles that NOAA services during oil spills
and their importance to their contributions to protect and
restore natural resources, communities and economies affected
by this recent terrible event in the Gulf of Mexico.
NOAA's scientific experts have been assisting with response
from the first day both on scene and through our headquarters
and regional offices. NOAA's support has included daily
trajectories of the spilled oil, weather data for short- and
long-term forecasts, special forecasts for cleanup operations
such as the in situ burning. NOAA experts analyze the satellite
imagery and also perform real-time observations to help verify
the spill location and movement. In addition, NOAA scientists
are providing expertise and assistance regarding sea turtles,
marine mammals and other protected resources such as corals.
NOAA is also coordinating with the federal and States co-
trustees and responsible parties to conduct natural resource
damage assessment which is a process that quantifies the total
losses and develops restoration projects that compensate the
public for their losses.
NOAA has also participated in a number of interagency
expert teams. These include the Flow Rate Technical Group that
estimated the size of the spill that you referred to, and also
a joint effort with NOAA, the Department of Interior, the Coast
Guard, the National Institute of Standards and Technology and
other outside experts to develop an oil budget calculator to
estimate for response purposes the fate of the spilled oil.
Now, there has been a lot of discussion on this budget, so
let me get into a little detail on it. Basically, according to
what our experts were able to determine, the oil that was
spilled could be divided up into four basic categories. About
one-quarter of it was either recovered directly, was burned in
situ or was skimmed on the surface. Another quarter either
evaporated or dissolved into the water column, and another
quarter, as you mentioned before several times, the size of the
Exxon Valdez remains out there for cleanup purposes, and then
another quarter was dispersed into the water column.
Now, part of that was through natural dispersion and other
was through the use of dispersants. Dispersants for the
Deepwater Horizon spill were only used where oil was present on
the surface or they were applied at the wellhead on the sea
floor. A total of 1.8 million gallons of dispersants were used.
The effects of the dispersants are being monitored by NOAA,
also the dispersed oil. There are over 2,000 water samples that
have been collected in the deep waters of the Gulf. As well as
analyzing for oil, they have also analyzed for components of
the dispersants and thus far only one dispersant component,
propylene glycol, was detected in a sample that was close to
the wellhead.
In addition, EPA is monitoring surface water samples for
the presence of dispersant components near the shoreline, and
my colleague from EPA can discuss that.
Finally, to ensure the safety of fishermen and consumers,
NOAA prohibited commercial and recreational fishing in certain
areas of the Gulf of Mexico because of the spill. Now that the
wellhead is capped and new oil is no longer flowing in the
Gulf, NOAA scientists are going back into the spill area taking
seafood samples to determine which areas are safe for fishing.
An area is only reopened to fishing if visible oil is no longer
present in the area and only after the seafood passes rigorous
sensory and chemical testing. To date, every seafood sample
from reopened waters or outside the closed area has passed
sensory and chemical testing for contamination of oil
dispersant. No unsafe levels of contamination of the seafood
have been found. NOAA has begun to reopen portions of the
closed area but only after being assured that the fish products
within the closed area meet the Food and Drug Administration's
standards for public health and wholesomeness.
To conclude, the attention at this point is focused on
evaluating fisheries for reopening, shoreline cleanup,
monitoring of subsurface oil both near shore and in deepwater,
and conducting natural resource damage assessments with our co-
trustees.
Thank you for allowing me to testify today, and I am happy
to answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lehr follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Markey. Thank you very much.
Our next witness is Mr. Donald Kraemer. He is the Deputy
Director of the Office of Food Safety at the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, where he is responsible for the administration
of the FDA's seafood policy. He has been with the FDA since
1977. You may proceed, Mr. Kraemer.
STATEMENT OF DONALD KRAEMER
Mr. Kraemer. Good afternoon, Chairman Markey and members of
the subcommittee. I am Donald Kraemer, Acting Deputy Director
of the Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition at the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration. With me is Dr. Vicki Seyfert-
Margolis, Senior Advisor to the Chief Scientist at FDA's Office
of the Commissioner. We appreciate the opportunity to discuss
FDA's role in ensuring the safety of seafood harvested from the
Gulf of Mexico in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
FDA is an active and integral part of the federal
government's comprehensive, coordinated, multi-agency program
to ensure that seafood from the Gulf of Mexico is free from
contamination as a result of the oil spill. This program is
important not only for consumers who need to know that food is
safe but also for the fisheries industry, which needs to be
able to sell its product with confidence. FDA is working
closely with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, other
federal agencies and state authorities in the Gulf region. I
would like to note the high level of cooperation that FDA has
experienced among these agencies both at the leadership and
among the technical and scientific staffs that carry out the
research, testing and analysis needed to fulfill our respective
missions.
The federal government is taking a multi-pronged approach
to ensure that marketed seafood from the Gulf of Mexico is not
contaminated as a result of the oil spill. These measures
include the precautionary closure of fisheries, the
surveillance and testing of seafood products and a heightened
emphasis on FDA's Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point,
or HACCP, regulations. Beyond our ongoing work to ensure that
currently marketed seafood is safe, FDA in conjunction with
NOAA and the Gulf States have developed a strict protocol for
reopening closed fisheries in a manner that will ensure the
safety of seafood from these previously closed areas. We are
also planning for additional research into potential hazards to
the food supply presented by crude oil and dispersant
chemicals.
The primary preventative controls for protecting the public
from potentially contaminated seafood is the closure of fishing
areas that have been or are likely to be affected by the oil
spill. Immediately after the oil spill, FDA worked with NOAA
and the States to ensure that the appropriate closures were put
in place. These closures are enforced by federal and State
wildlife officials as well as the U.S. Coast Guard.
The second element of our approach is a heightened emphasis
on FDA's longstanding HACCP program for seafood in which
processors are obligated to identify hazards that are
reasonably likely to occur and institute preventive controls to
address them. The framework of our seafood HACCP program is
proving its value in the context of this extraordinary public
health challenge. Over the past several weeks, FDA has
conducted more than 300 inspections of seafood processors in
the Gulf region to verify that they are implementing controls
to ensure that they receive fish harvested only from waters in
which fishing is permitted.
The third element is a verification that the other controls
are working properly. This is the analysis of a variety of
seafood samples that have been commercially harvested from Gulf
waters. We are testing for polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, or
PAH, the primary contaminants of concern in oil. FDA has so far
tested for PAH in about 500 animals comprising a variety of
seafood including shrimp, crab and oysters from open State
waters. The results of all samples have shown PAH levels well
below the levels of concern, usually by a factor of 100 to
1,000, essentially the same levels as were seen before the oil
spill.
With respect to the reopening of closed waters, FDA, NOAA
and EPA worked in close cooperation with agencies in the five
Gulf States to establish a single agreed-upon protocol for
reopening to ensure the safety of seafood harvested from these
waters. Under the protocol, waters impacted by oil will not
reopen until, one, all oil from the spill is no longer present
in quantities or forms that could contaminate seafood; two, a
scientifically valid sampling plan is agreed upon; and three,
all samples from the area successfully pass both sensory and
chemical analysis to ensure that they contain no harmful oil
residues.
In our sensory analyses, expert examiners check the odor
and appearance of raw seafood and the taste and odor of cooked
seafood. Samples that pass sensory testing are sent for
chemical analysis for oil which allows scientists to
conclusively determine whether PAH contaminants are present in
the fish or shellfish tissue that could be consumed. To date,
all samples have passed sensory testing for oil or dispersants
and the results of all chemical analyses have shown PAH levels
to be well below the levels of concern, again by a factor of
100 to 1,000. To date, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida and
Mississippi have reopened some portions of their coastal waters
to recreational and commercial fishing with concurrence from
FDA that the criteria under the joint reopening protocol have
been met. Additional reopenings are likely in the coming weeks.
Finally, with respect to the impact of dispersants used in
the Gulf on seafood safety, the current science indicates a low
risk that these dispersants will bioconcentrate in seafood and
they are therefore unlikely to present a food safety concern.
Further, NOAA and EPA data confirm that dispersants are not
present at detectable levels in the overwhelming number of
water samples taken. However, out of an abundance of caution
and in order to gather additional information, NOAA and FDA are
conducting additional studies to reaffirm that dispersants do
not accumulate in tissues of fish and shellfish. FDA will
continue to study the long-term impacts of chemical dispersants
on seafood safety and we will take any new relevant information
into account and adjust our protocols accordingly.
I see that I have exceeded my time, so I will forego my
concluding comments.
Mr. Markey. You may continue, sir.
Mr. Kraemer. Thank you.
Then to conclude, Mr. Chairman, the safety of consumers is
FDA's highest priority and a responsibility we take very
seriously. In close coordination with federal and State
agencies, we have been proactive in monitoring this disaster,
planning for its impacts and mobilizing our personnel and
facilities to take the steps needed to ensure safe food supply.
The protocols and approaches we have implemented are protecting
American consumers while minimizing the negative impact on Gulf
seafood processors.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these important
issues, and I look forward to answering your questions. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kraemer follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Kraemer, very much.
Our next witness is Dr. Paul Anastas. Dr. Anastas is the
Assistant Administrator for EPA's Office of Research and
Development and the EPA Science Advisory. He has conducted
groundbreaking research on the design, manufacture and use of
environmentally friendly chemicals. We welcome you, Doctor.
Whenever you feel comfortable, please begin.
STATEMENT OF PAUL ANASTAS
Mr. Anastas. Thank you, Chairman Markey. I appreciate the
opportunity here to testify on the important issue of
dispersants and their use in the BP Deepwater Horizon crisis.
We have now passed day 120 of the BP oil spill tragedy, a
tragedy that resulted in loss of life, livelihoods, and put the
Gulf Coast ecosystem in peril. We are relieved that the well is
currently sealed and that dispersant use has been reduced to
zero. We hope and expect that this will continue to be the
case.
As the President has said, this tragedy does not end with
the sealing of the well. The President and EPA are committed to
the long-term recovery and the restoration of the Gulf Coast,
one of our most precious ecosystems. In addition to its other
responsibilities with oil spill response, EPA continues to
rigorously monitor the air, water and sediments for the
presence of dispersants and crude oil components that could
have an impact on health or the environment. These data are
posted on EPA's Web site and are publicly available.
EPA has a role in the use of dispersants, which are
chemicals that are applied to the oil to break it down into
small particles. The dispersed oil mixes with the water column
and is diluted and degraded by bacteria and other microscopic
bacteria. Specifically, EPA is responsible for managing the
product schedule of dispersants available in the oil spill
response.
The decision to use dispersants as part of a larger oil
spill response is not one that EPA took lightly. When
considering dispersant use, we are faced with environmental
tradeoffs. The potential long-term effects on aquatic life are
still largely unknown, and BP has used over 1.8 million gallons
of dispersant in a volume never before used in the United
States, but because of our aggressive and constant monitoring,
what we do know right now is this: our monitoring data
overwhelmingly confirm modeling results that dispersants are
not present at levels of detection per our method. For the rare
anomaly, we investigate to either confirm or disprove the
validity of a detection. To put this in context, of the more
than 2,000 NOAA-generated samples and the nearly 1,000 EPA-
generated samples, there have been only two detections above
the method detection limit. These were immediately
investigated, and our monitoring continues. Our monitoring
results also show that oxygen in the water is not being
depleted to dangerous levels.
Now, given the unprecedented nature of the spill, the EPA
directed BP to identify less-toxic alternative dispersants.
When the company failed to provide this information, EPA
decided to conduct this testing independently in a rigorous,
peer-reviewed manner. Specifically, EPA conducted acute
toxicity tests to determine lethal concentrations of eight
available dispersants. First, we tested each of the eight
dispersants alone. Then we tested the Louisiana sweet crude oil
alone. And finally, we tested mixtures of the oil with each of
these eight dispersants. These standard tests screen species
called mysid shrimp and silverside fish to determine the
relative hazard of each of the dispersants. These two species
are widely considered to be representative of those found in
the Gulf and were tested during a juvenile life stage when
organisms are most sensitive to pollutant stress. The tests
were conducted over a range of concentrations including those
much greater than what aquatic life is generally expected to
encounter in the Gulf.
EPA's testing delivered three important results. One, all
of the eight dispersants when tested alone could be categorized
as slightly toxic to practically nontoxic. Two, the oil alone
was generally moderately toxic. Three, mixtures of oil and each
of the eight dispersants were no more toxic than the oil alone
in these tests. All of these results indicate that the eight
dispersants tested possess roughly the similar acute
toxicities.
While these data are important, I want to emphasize that
continued monitoring is absolutely necessary. EPA has directed
BP to monitor for indicators of environmental stress like
decreased oxygen levels and increased toxicity to small
organisms called rotifers. To date, we have not seen dissolved
oxygen levels approach levels of concern to aquatic life. We
have also seen no excessive mortality in rotifers. While more
work needs to be done, we see that the dispersants have worked
to help keep oil off of our precious shorelines and away from
sensitive coastal ecosystems.
The crisis has made it evident, that additional research is
needed. Congress has recently appropriated EPA $2 million to
begin a long-term study on the impacts of dispersants. These
funds will support research on the short- and long-term
environmental and human health impacts associated with the oil
spill and dispersant use. We will also further our research
efforts to include innovative approaches to spill remediation
and to address the mechanisms of environmental fate, transport
and effects of the dispersants. EPA will continue to take
science-based approaches to dispersant use. We will continue
monitoring, identifying and responding to public health and
environmental concerns. In coordination with our federal, State
and local partners, EPA is committed to protecting Gulf Coast
communities from the adverse environmental effects of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
In conclusion, we will persist in asking the hard questions
until we more fully understand the long-term effects of the BP
oil spill and conduct the investigations required to enable the
Gulf's long-term recovery. EPA is fully committed to working
with the people of the Gulf, our federal partners, the
scientific community and NGOs toward the recovery of the Gulf
of Mexico and the restoration of its precious ecosystem.
At this time I welcome any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Anastas follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Dr. Anastas, very much.
The Chair will now recognize himself for a period of asking
questions.
Dr. Lehr, intended or not, I think the reaction to the oil
budget report that was released last week is one of relief.
People want to believe that everything is OK, and I think this
report and the way it is being discussed is giving many people
a false sense of confidence regarding the state of the Gulf.
Overconfidence breeds complacency and complacency is what got
us into this situation in the first place. Dr. Lehr, how much
oil was actually discharged into the Gulf?
Mr. Lehr. By the best estimates of the combined efforts of
the FRTG plus the Department of Energy National Laboratories,
the best estimate to date would be 4.1 million barrels plus or
minus 10 percent.
Mr. Markey. So it would be 4.1 million barrels discharged?
Mr. Lehr. That were actually discharged into the
environment. There was 800,000 barrels that was released from
the wellhead but was captured directly and pumped up above.
Mr. Markey. So is the 800,000 included in the oil budget
baseline?
Mr. Lehr. The oil budget baseline follows closely the form
that is established by the Incident Command System Situation
Unit for preparing categories of where to record the oil, and
for the purpose of response, that would be the standard
procedure, so we follow the standard procedure, and yes, that
is included in that budget for response.
Mr. Markey. But that oil went directly into ships on the--
--
Mr. Lehr. That is correct.
Mr. Markey [continuing]. Surface and never was in the water
at all. Is that correct?
Mr. Lehr. That is correct.
Mr. Markey. The 800,000 barrels. So there were 4.1 million
barrels that were actually discharged into the water?
Mr. Lehr. That is correct.
Mr. Markey. Now, out of the 4.1 million barrels discharged,
how many barrels are still in the Gulf or on its shores in some
form?
Mr. Lehr. Probably about three-fourths would still be,
roughly, I would say. To go through the calculations that we
have, the only oil that you would say that is actually removed
from the environment would be that 800,000 plus the amount that
was burned. The stuff that evaporated into the atmosphere is
still in the environment, the stuff that is dissolved into the
water column, the amount that dispersed into the water column
as droplets plus the amount that was on the sheen on the
surface or in small tar balls, so in that case, I would say
most of that is still in the environment. It is not available
for response, which was the purpose of the oil budget numbers.
You cannot do any recovery operation on oil that is evaporated
or is dissolved into the water column.
Mr. Markey. So even according to the calculations of the
oil budget, the report that was released last week, between 60
and 90 percent of the discharged oil, that is, the oil that
actually went into the ocean, remains in the Gulf of Mexico,
and that would be between 2.45 and 3.675 million barrels. Is
that accurate?
Mr. Lehr. I would have to do the calculations here in my
head, but when you were including your numbers there, I mean,
the oil that evaporated, which was a substantial amount,
whether it is still in the Gulf of Mexico, I don't know. You
would have to look at how it was transported by the wind. So I
think you would want to stick with just the amount that would
be in the water column or on the shoreline, and that would be
the amount that we estimated as being naturally dispersed or
chemically dispersed, and the amounts that are on the
shoreline. Now, some of that has been recovered on the
shoreline as well and the amount that has been dispersed is
biodegrading. We still are working to determine the rate. So
again, the numbers that we put in the budget calculator for
response purposes, to answer the question about what is the
fate of it in the long term, that is a different question. That
is for the damage assessment.
Mr. Markey. Dr. Lehr, I am interested in understanding how
BP has performed in terms of removing spilled oil from the Gulf
before it hits land. What percentage of the oil that was
spilled into the Gulf was actually removed from the ocean? I am
talking about burning and skimming and actually removing the
oil from the ecosystem. That is, of the----
Mr. Lehr. Of course, you want----
Mr. Markey. Let me say it. Of the 4.1 million barrels of
oil that actually went into the ocean, what percent was removed
by BP?
Mr. Lehr. I would have to redo these calculations since
these were based on the 4.9 million as opposed to----
Mr. Markey. But----
Mr. Lehr. Are you talking about----
Mr. Markey. Actually the only issue I think that the
American people are concerned about is the 4.1 million barrels
that actually went into the ocean, so it is important for us to
discuss that issue and separate it from the oil that just went
directly into the ships and never was in the ocean at all,
because that is where the concern is, and people should have a
very good understanding of what percentage of that oil has been
removed thus far. So do you have a number or----
Mr. Lehr. You would have to take the ratio of 4.9 divided
by 4.1 and then multiply that by these fractions that we have
down here for----
Mr. Markey. So if you could use your own chart, Dr. Lehr,
and break that down in a way that could help us to understand
of the 4.1 million barrels, how much BP did----
Mr. Lehr. So if you take the 5 percent that was burned and
multiply that by the ratio of 4.9 to 4.1, and I must admit, in
the era of pocket calculators, I can't do that math in my head.
And then if you take the amount that was skimmed, 3 percent,
and multiply that by 4.9, by 4.1----
Mr. Markey. Now, are you using 4.9 or 4.1 as you are doing
this?
Mr. Lehr. No, you asked me to use it with the new ratio.
Mr. Markey. OK, 4.1.
Mr. Lehr. Then I have to multiply those numbers by that
ratio. I could get a calculator and see what that ratio is.
Mr. Markey. Do you have assistants here with you? Has
anyone accompanied you here this morning, Dr. Lehr? Could one
of your assistants do that?
Mr. Lehr. I have got a calculator here. I need to multiply
by 1.2 times each of those percentages, so roughly the burn
would then roughly be 6 percent, and the skimmed would be 4
percent, roughly.
Mr. Markey. So between the skimming and the burning, 10
percent of the 4.1 million barrels would have been removed from
the ocean, leaving 90 percent unaccounted for?
Mr. Lehr. Well, there would also be whatever was recovered
on the shoreline, which we didn't----
Mr. Markey. No, that is what I am saying. In the arithmetic
we are doing right now, so the burning is 6 percent, the
skimming is 4 percent?
Mr. Lehr. Right.
Mr. Markey. So let us continue then with the arithmetic.
What else----
Mr. Lehr. OK. So then you had whatever was captured in the
residual, and we have not quantified that quantity and how much
of that as they do the beach recovery and so on. So I can't
give you the numbers on that. We were again looking at it for
response purposes.
Mr. Markey. So again, let us recapitulate here for a
second. Six percent was burned, 4 percent skimmed, and an
unknown amount was collected on the beaches. Is that correct?
Mr. Lehr. Right.
Mr. Markey. And can you tell us the reason that has not
been calculated yet?
Mr. Lehr. It was mixed in with--you know, you don't pick up
just oil on the beaches. You pick up oil and debris and there
is a question of trying to separate that out. It is not a
simple process.
Mr. Markey. Has there been even a range that has been put
together in terms of some estimate of how much oil that might
represent?
Mr. Lehr. There may have been. I am not aware. But I could
get back to you and get that answer to you.
Mr. Markey. Well, in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill in
1989, both the Government Accountability Office and the Office
of Technology Assessment published reports looking at the
capacity to recover oil after a major spill. They found that
given technologies available at that time, we could really only
recover 10 to 15 percent of the spilled oil. So it seems to me
that BP's oil recovery effort comes in on the low effort of
what was achievable 21 years ago. You seem to have come in at
the number of approximately 10 percent plus whatever was on the
beaches, but still within that range of 10 to 15 percent that
was determined to be recoverable after the Exxon Valdez spill.
Would you agree with that?
Mr. Lehr. Yes. I mean, in terms of the actual oil on those
categories. Now, there was of course in this case the unusual
event of a large amount of natural dispersion and the addition
of large amounts, a record amount, as far as I'm aware, of
chemical dispersants, and that is considered a type of
response. So one would have to say, how do you weigh that, so--
--
Mr. Markey. I understand, but I am just----
Mr. Lehr. In terms of the standard mechanical and, you
know, burn operations, beach recovery, I would say yes, this
was about average for what we have seen from major spills.
Mr. Markey. I am just trying, if I could, Doctor, I am just
trying to divide the question so that the public can understand
what it is that we are talking about. So in terms of just
recoverable oil, it is somewhere in the range of 10 percent?
Mr. Lehr. And in my mind, that is not a passing grade, only
10 percent of 4.1 million barrels actually having been
recovered. I think we all saw this coming, and with all of BP's
talk about using golf balls, nylons and hair to clean up the
spilled oil, I think it is important that even using a 21-year-
old grading system that BP has done a very poor job in cleaning
up the Gulf.
So Dr. Lehr, throughout the entire BP saga, I have pushed
for BP and the Unified Command to make this process as
transparent as possible. The way I see it, the more people we
have independently analyzing and verifying the data and
information associated with the spill, the better and more
informed our response decisions will be.
With regard to the oil budget, is this something NOAA does
as part of the operational response to a major oil spill?
Mr. Lehr. The oil budget is a traditional part of a
response. As I mentioned before, there's a special form that's
filled out as part of the situation unit in the Incident
Command System. The standard procedures for that use, amongst
other things, a model that was developed by NOAA but also they
used some other techniques such as observers estimating the
size of the spill. In the case of this spill, because it was so
large, because it went on for so long and in particular because
it was occurring at a mile underneath the water surface, it was
necessary to develop the special tool, which is what we did
with the budget calculator. Now, I have noticed in the press
that this is called the NOAA budget calculator. I would like to
receive credit for that but one thing in science that you have
to do is to recognize the contributions of other, and so this
really was a joint effort of both government agencies and the
outside experts in the field to develop this tool.
Mr. Markey. Now, Doctor, is there an established
methodology for making the oil budget calculations?
Mr. Lehr. There is a standard form that you would calculate
to divide the budget into, but in terms--and there is a normal
procedure that we had to modify because of the circumstances
for the spill.
Mr. Markey. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon spill, how
long has NOAA been calculating an oil budget to guide the
response efforts from the Unified Command?
Mr. Lehr. In terms of the Incident Command, we started
working I believe in either June, starting to work on the
development of the tool, and were providing guidance for some
time in July for the Incident Command.
Mr. Markey. So has NOAA been using the established
methodology for calculating an oil budget in this case?
Mr. Lehr. I am going to have to ask for clarification, what
you mean by--we did use the standard procedures for estimating
oil for each of the techniques based on methods that had been
used in the past but were modified. Let me give you an example.
In calculating dispersion, natural dispersion, this is based on
looking at something called the energy dissipation rate that is
due to breaking waves. Now, we of course obviously in the case
here, we had a plume that was subsurface. We didn't have
breaking waves but we did have an energy dissipation rate and
we had to then employ some of the experts that worked on the
FRTG to help us calculate that energy dissipation rate so we
could get a new estimate for natural dispersion.
In the case of evaporation, we have some standard models
for estimating the evaporation of Louisiana sweet crude. It is
in our oil library database. But that is for spills that happen
at the surface, and the spills that are coming from a mile
deep, there is dissolution that occurs before it gets to the
surface. Many of the same molecules that would evaporate on the
surface become dissolved in the water so we had to modify that
to handle those cases. So it was the standard procedures, and
to the extent that we had to modify them for the specific
instances that happened in this spill.
Mr. Markey. Can I ask, has NOAA made available the
background data and formulas that were used to reach
conclusions on what happened to the spilled oil?
Mr. Lehr. In terms of the--one component in terms of the
flow rate, there have been reports on that. In terms of the oil
budget calculator, which is what I assume that you are
referring to, this was an oil spill emergency, not an oil spill
experiment. When we put together the team, our priority was to
get an answer as quickly as possible to the Incident Command.
Now, the technical documentation is being written and will be
peer reviewed. It will be long. It will be boring. It will be
filled with graphs and charts and all the references and the
passive voices that are typical of such reports, and I assure
you, it will bore everybody except for those handful of us who
actually like to do oil spill science, but I noticed that some
of our academic friends have asked us for this.
For our younger friends, I would suggest that patience in
this case is a virtue. In an emergency, you first get the
answer. You do not tell Admiral Allen that he has to wait 3
months while your report goes through peer review, but that
will come. We welcome people's comments on it. I would
encourage the new people who are coming into the field from
nontraditional areas of this to stay interested in it. We like
to welcome the new blood, but you are going to have to wait a
little bit for that report to get out.
Mr. Markey. Well, I appreciate the desire to complete a
full peer review, Doctor, but you have already issued four
pages of findings and a 10-page supplement that explains some
of the calculations in greater detail. If much of this oil
budget is standard procedure for NOAA in response to an oil
spill, why can't that information be made available sooner,
especially given the historic issues that many independent
scientists have voiced regarding the conclusions of this
report?
Mr. Lehr. Well, I would say this. I would prefer, and I
think all the scientists would prefer that because the
questions now are on a different time frame and we move from
the response to damage assessment, that it is better to take
the time to do it right. Now, yes, some of the methods are
standard but some of them had to be modified, as I mentioned in
my testimony, in terms of the evaporations calculations and the
natural dispersion. We are doing a thorough literature survey
because again our understanding is, this report is going to be
looked at not only by oil spill scientists who have been doing
this for 20 years, in many cases are contributing to the
report, but by other scientists who are coming to this, this is
their first major spill event, so we wanted to provide a
complete document here that will answer all their questions.
Mr. Markey. Let me ask this. Will NOAA agree to make
available to the public the citations of the scientific
literature, formulas or actual algorithms that would allow
independent scientists to evaluate the report's findings?
Mr. Lehr. Of course.
Mr. Markey. Will you release that now?
Mr. Lehr. It is still being compiled.
Mr. Markey. You have already released a report last week.
Could you give us for the public consumption the citations of
the scientific literature, formulas or actual algorithms that
you used in creating your oil budget?
Mr. Lehr. All that--first of all, and again, I am going to
come back to this. This is not a NOAA product, this is a
product of a joint effort, and the----
Mr. Markey. What we are trying to do, Doctor, is to get at
the methodology so that we understand what was used in order to
produce your initial oil budget. You are saying that it has to
be reviewed for some time in order to determine whether or not
you got it right and so in order, I think, to ensure that we
have this done in a time frame that provides the information to
the residents of the Gulf of Mexico, that you release these
algorithms, you release the scientific literature that you
relied upon so that there can be independent eyes, independent
judgments that are also allowed in real time to be able to make
judgments as to whether or not the formula which was used was
the correct one to be used, given the consequences to the
public if that formula was not constructed accurately. In other
words, would you support making that information available to
the public, speaking for NOAA?
Mr. Lehr. For NOAA--and I would assume that all the experts
that contributed will also be releasing this information.
That's what the purpose of the report is. Representative
Markey, what we are doing in this case is going through the
standard procedure which is done for a scientific report. We
get the experts. They all contribute to the report. We send it
back to them for them to look at to make sure that we have got
their comments and their opinions and their assessments correct
and then we send it out, as you say, to independent scientists.
That is what a peer review is. We sent it out to people, and we
will welcome recommendations for peer review.
Mr. Markey. But when will that happen, Doctor?
Mr. Lehr. Excuse me?
Mr. Markey. What is the time frame for that to happen?
Mr. Lehr. Well, it has been delayed by a week, because I am
having to come here, but we are hoping to get it out within 2
months.
Mr. Markey. Two months? That is not timely enough, Doctor.
That is the problem. That is what we are trying to get at right
here. We are trying to telescope the time frame that it will
take in order to get that information into the hands of
independent scientists.
So you don't want to make all of the data and models
available but you have given us conclusions that result from
these models of the data. You then say you don't want to make
the models and data available to outside scientists because you
are still having everything peer reviewed post release of your
budget report. That is to me unacceptable. We need to have that
information. The report that you released last week received
international attention. There are many people who are making
decisions based upon that report. So it is important right now,
Dr. Lehr, for that information then to be made public so that
not only is it being peer reviewed in the regular process but
because of the real-life consequences for the lives of the
people in the Gulf of Mexico and outside of the Gulf of Mexico,
because of the toxic nature of the material in the Gulf, that
that information be made public. There is too long of a gap
that is going to elapse under the process that you have
adopted.
The real issue here is that the public has a right to know
right now what is going on in the Gulf of Mexico, and your
report should be analyzed by others right now so that we are
sure we got it right, because if your numbers are wrong, 2
months from now could be too late in terms of the remedial
recommendations which are made to the public, to the fishing
industry, to the consuming public in terms of the consequences
for their families. So I ask again for you to release that
information, that data.
The flow rate team estimated that 4.9 million barrels of
oil flowed from the Deepwater Horizon well. The uncertainty of
this estimate is plus or minus 10 percent, as you said. Does
NOAA have certainty with regard to the figures for the
estimates of what happened to all 4.9 million barrels? What is
the best and worst case estimate for the residual oil that
remains in the Gulf?
Mr. Lehr. We have--we do, as part of the calculator, do
have the estimates of uncertainty for each of the various
processes, so, for example, in terms of the burn, there are
some ASTM standards for the burn rate that were applied to the
spill. It gives us a high degree of confidence. We have very
low uncertainty for the estimates for that. For evaporation and
dissolution, again, we have taken samples and matched them up
with models from both NOAA, from Environment Canada and from a
large research organization in the European Union, and those
results match closely so we are fairly confident on those
values.
Now, when we get into the dispersed oil, the uncertainty
becomes larger, particularly for the use of the chemical
dispersants subsurface, which is a new experience to us, and we
were very conservative there. Now, we employed the expertise of
the National Institute of Standards and Technology, who has
brought in some very excellent statisticians to calculate the
net uncertainties on it. That is given in those extra pages
that I believe you were given there, but that will also be in
the final report, and Representative Markey, I will commit
today to do whatever I can to speed up the report. I appreciate
the concern on it. I hope that you and the public and the other
academics appreciate that because of the importance, because of
the points that you just stressed, we want to make sure that it
is done right, and that is why I am making sure that we brought
in the experts and----
Mr. Markey. Here is the thing, Doctor. You shouldn't have
released it until you knew it was right because so much is
going to depend upon that release, and if you are not confident
that it is right, then it should not have been released because
it basically sent a signal with regard to how much of the
problem remains, and that is really something that is obviously
of great concern to people who live in the Gulf. They don't
want to be forgotten. They don't want this to be downplayed or
lowballed, which is in some quarters what has happened since
that report was released. So I think it is important, since it
has been released, to be examined right now so that we can be
sure that those numbers were accurate and independent
scientists can quickly look at the formulas and corroborate or
question, but it should not be something that is done in a
boring academic setting over a prolonged period of time. It is
something that has to be done in a dynamic setting in real time
because of the resources that may need to be dedicated to this
problem to ensure that it is remediated in a shorter period of
time than otherwise if your estimates are inaccurate, so that
is critical, and from a political perspective, the longer the
time that elapses is the lower the political pressure and the
public attention will be there to ensure that the resources are
brought to the problem. And so we have to make sure that we do
this in a timely fashion so that unlike the Exxon Valdez spill,
we actually do something in real time so that everything that
can be learned about it is learned about it, and you agree,
Doctor, that the amount of oil which is still in the Gulf of
Mexico and unaccounted for is at least five times the size of
the Exxon Valdez spill? You do agree with that?
Mr. Lehr. Well, I agree that this is--and I also note that
NOAA is taking a lead role in monitoring the oil that is out
there. We will continue to do that. I don't think the report
should be interpreted as saying that somehow this spill is over
with.
Mr. Markey. No, it is not that it is over with, but there
was an optimistic spin in some quarters that was placed upon
that report, and since that is happening in real time, then the
independent evaluation of that report must happen in real time
because if it is wrong, then many opportunities for a
calibrated response to the defects in the report will have been
lost and so that is why it is important for you to surrender
this information now to independent scientists.
So according to NOAA's oil budget, 408,792 barrels of oil
were chemically dispersed out of a total of 4.1 million
barrels, approximately 9 percent of the total oil in the Gulf
of Mexico. This means that 43,900 barrels of dispersant were
needed to get rid of 408,792 barrels of oil. This means that
one barrel of dispersant dispersed just over nine barrels of
oil, yet according to your budget documentation, a dispersant-
to-oil ratio of one to 20 is considered successful. Dr. Lehr,
it seems to me that the ratio used in this disaster of one to
nine would not be successful by NOAA's own definition. Would
you agree with that?
Mr. Lehr. What we did for--and this is an area that we had
the hardest time calculating, was the effectiveness of the
chemical dispersant. The dispersant that was applied
subsurface, what we called ideal conditions. We made sure--I
mean, the dispersant was being injected into the oil so it was
making direct contact. It was a very turbulent flow regime
there. So this would be the ideal conditions for dispersant
operations. We asked the people who make a living applying
dispersants what they thought would be the effectiveness and
they had numbers as high as 30 or 40 to one ratio. We looked at
the literature, and the oil industry literature suggested that
a successful operation was 20 to one, so we decided to be
conservative and say we will go with the 20 to one. We may very
well have underestimated the effectiveness of that subsurface
dispersant.
Now, at the surface where a lot of the dispersant was
applied, they were applying on oil which had partially
weathered and had partially emulsified. The viscosity was high,
and according to past spills, dispersants would have been not
as effective, but there was a study that was done by SINTEF, a
research group out of Norway, with this emulsified oil using
these dispersants that said that it was showing some
effectiveness, plus there were some observations on scene by
NOAA personnel and Coast Guard personnel that suggested that
the surface operations were being at least partially effective.
So what we did was to scale down what we would estimate would
be the effectiveness of the surface operation. I believe we
estimated it would be like four or five barrels per amount of
dispersant sprayed and that would take into account that some
of the dispersant did not interact with the oil. You don't
always hit the oil. And secondly, the fact that the oil had
emulsified to such an extent that it was more difficult to
disperse and to form the small droplets that are necessary for
the oil to disperse in the water column.
Mr. Markey. So Dr. Anastas, according to the budget
documentation of dispersant-to-oil ratio, one to 20 is
considered successful but this was a ratio which was one to
nine. Do you believe that that constitutes a successful
application of dispersant?
Mr. Anastas. I think my colleague, Dr. Lehr, noted the
significant uncertainty in the estimates of dispersion. All of
the evidence, all of the monitoring that was conducted in an
ongoing way that was required by EPA during the application,
especially the subsurface application of the dispersant, showed
effectiveness. We ensured through fluorescent spectrophotometry
that particles were being formed. This was a high-energy
system. We have reason to believe and evidence shows that it
was an effective and relatively efficient----
Mr. Markey. So given your own numbers and your own
analysis, how successful would you say that it was?
Mr. Anastas. Well, I don't think that there is a way to
measure the ratio between chemically dispersed and biologically
dispersed oil, so I don't think we can have precise numbers. I
do think the estimates, as Dr. Lehr noted, whether it is 20, 30
or 40 to one in terms of a ratio would be more potentially in
the ballpark.
Mr. Markey. Well, dispersed doesn't mean exactly the same
thing as gone, does it?
Mr. Anastas. No, it does not.
Mr. Markey. For example, if I put a spoonful of sugar in my
iced tea and stir it, the sugar is dispersed. You can't see it.
But if I then drink the iced tea, it still tastes sweet because
the sugar is still there. The sugar is dispersed but it is
present. Isn't that somewhat analogous to the situation we face
in the Gulf with this dispersed oil as well?
Mr. Anastas. Not exactly. The sugar dissolves in solution.
Dispersant means that it is being broken up into small
particles, the whole purpose of which is to make them more
ingestible and digestible by the microbes because the only time
that oil actually goes away is when it is degraded. Now, that
degradation can happen through biological processes. It can
happen through physical processes. Physical processes, when it
is broken down by the water itself, is called hydrolysis. When
it is broken down by temperature, it is called thermolysis.
When it is broken down by light, it is called photolysis. These
degradation processes all combine and the whole purpose of the
dispersant is to make it more accessible to these degradation
processes.
Mr. Markey. What is the time frame for that process to take
place? How do you measure that in terms of the actual amount of
oil that is as a result more subject to being consumed because
the dispersant has been released? How can you measure that over
such a vast area?
Mr. Anastas. There have been studies done even by the EPA
and its partners, and part of the rationale for applying
dispersants is because we have seen rates of degradation
increase by as much as 50 percent with the use of dispersants.
Mr. Markey. Did you say 15 or 50?
Mr. Anastas. Five zero, 50 percent, over those untreated.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Dr. Lehr, government scientists have now estimated that 4.9
million barrels of oil escaped from the BP Macondo well but
that number does not include the methane that also came out of
the well, much of which entered the Gulf of Mexico. Although
the impacts of methane are not well understood as that of oil
is understood, we know that it has the potential to cause harm
when released at such significant levels above the natural
seepage of methane in the Gulf. As part of the natural
resources damage assessment and associated restoration plan,
will NOAA be looking at the impact of the release of methane
from the BP well?
Mr. Lehr. In terms of the effect, I would believe the NOAA
folks would take that into consideration for sure. Now, I am
not part of the damage assessment team. We have a different
group that does that. And the oil budget calculator did not
take it into account because it was an oil budget calculator.
There is no response to dissolved gases that you can't put
skimmers out and so on. So that is why it wasn't in the report
that you saw. But in terms of the damage assessment, certainly
you would take into account all the hydrocarbons that were
released and what effects they would have on the environment.
Mr. Markey. Just a few weeks ago in response to a letter I
wrote, FDA explained that while it does not presently monitor
for dispersant chemicals in the issue of seafood, the agency is
working closely with NOAA to conduct further studies to
determine if dispersant chemicals or their metabolites can
bioconcentrate in the flesh of seafood species. Mr. Kraemer,
what is the status of these studies?
Mr. Kraemer. Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer this
question to Dr. Margolis.
Mr. Markey. Could you identify yourself for the record,
Doctor?
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. Dr. Vicki Seyfert-Margolis.
Mr. Markey. And what is your title, please?
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. I am the Senior Advisor for Science
Innovation and Policy in the Office of the Commissioner of Food
and Drug Administration.
We have been working with NOAA on developing chemical
methodologies for the detection of one of the major components
of dispersant, which is dioctyl sulfosuccinate sodium salt, or
DOSS. This component is about 20 percent of the total Corexit
dispersant which was applied in the Gulf. Essentially what we
have done is two series of studies where we are exposing crabs
and fish in tanks in controlled settings to DOSS at 100 parts
per million, which is an effective concentration of 20 parts
per million of the DOSS. We then do exposure 24 hours with
subsequent washouts in clean saltwater for 24, 48 and 72 hours
and then assess the concentration of DOSS in the hepatopancreas
or liver as well as the muscle tissue. We have preliminary data
to date suggesting that there is not any bioconcentration of
DOSS in the hepatopancreas or in the muscle tissue of crabs.
Mr. Markey. Could you explain what DOSS is so that the
public who is watching can understand what that is?
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. Sure. DOSS is a detergent,
essentially a detergent-like compound that is actually found in
a variety of products including a number of over-the-counter
products. It is used to help disperse the oil but it is
generally an inert nontoxic substance, and there have been
significant studies on toxicity of DOSS demonstrating a lack of
toxicity of this particular component of Corexit.
Mr. Markey. Please continue.
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. So essentially we conducted these
tank studies and we found no evidence to date of
bioconcentration of DOSS in the crabs and some shrimp that have
been tested so far. We are still actively assessing these
samples in the controlled setting, and additionally we are able
to go back to all of the retrospective samples which were
collected because this particular component is present in the
fraction or extract that we made for monitoring PAH for the
reopenings.
Mr. Markey. What about the other components of Corexit in
addition to DOSS? Have you done the analysis of the other
components of Corexit, this chemical that was shot into the
ocean in order to determine the toxicity of those components?
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. We have not. We have started with
this as a marker for DOSS because it is one of the principal
components of the Corexit and therefore will be very readily
detectable so it essentially serves as a marker for the
dispersant.
Mr. Markey. What is the time frame that you are going to
use in order to do an analysis of the other components in
Corexit to determine whether or not there is a toxicity, there
is a danger that could attach to it if human beings consumed
that chemical?
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. Some of the other components that are
present in Corexit such as the petroleum distillates would be
found in our PAH analysis as well, so it would be difficult to
distinguish those from petroleum distillates in the oil itself.
We are not currently looking at any of the other components of
Corexit.
Mr. Markey. You are--can you repeat that?
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. We are not currently doing tests on
the other components of Corexit right now because we wanted to
establish the methodologies using the principal, one of the
principal components which we felt we could detect readily as a
first step.
Mr. Markey. How long will it take you before you actually
conduct experiments on the other components?
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. I can't speak to that because it is
not clear whether or not we have the methodologies in hand to
detect all those at the present time.
Mr. Markey. So if you find DOSS in your seafood samples,
then what?
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. Then we would consider that as
something that we would need to go back and reevaluate the
samples for a possible presence of dispersant.
Mr. Markey. Are there potentially other components in
Corexit that are known to be toxic?
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. There are a number of components of
Corexit. I think the EPA could probably speak better to
toxicity studies that have been done on the various components
of Corexit.
Mr. Markey. Dr. Anastas, are there other components in
Corexit that have been known to be very toxic?
Mr. Anastas. I guess I would first start off by saying that
the testing that we conducted, that the Administrator ordered
conducted, was on Corexit itself. So of course when you are
looking at the entire formulation, all of the components and
their contributions to toxicity would be considered, and it is
important to look at the formulation as a whole. So the
toxicity results that I reported in my opening statement----
Mr. Markey. So are you saying that as a result, that there
is no point in even bothering to examine the other components
in Corexit because you have already studied Corexit?
Mr. Anastas. No, I am saying that when you do toxicity
studies on the Corexit as a whole, you are in essence doing
toxicity studies on the components.
Mr. Markey. And what I am asking, as a result, if I can go
back to the FDA, does that mean that there is no reason to do
any further studies of these materials, even though some of
them are known to be toxic?
Mr. Kraemer. Mr. Chairman, FDA, first of all, is fully
aware of what are the components of Corexit, and we have looked
at each one of these for toxicity, and as you are aware, in our
response to your letter to the agency, each of these components
are low toxicity to humans. I think we have to separate here
the distinction between toxicity to marine animals as I think
was the concern that EPA was suggesting from toxicity to humans
if it is present in the flesh of the fish, so of course FDA's
concern is the latter toxicity to humans if it in the flesh of
the fish. We have looked at each of these components of Corexit
and they are all very common household constituents so they are
in things such as lip gloss and toothpaste and a variety of
over-the-counter drugs, so they have been approved for use for
consumption by people. These are components that FDA reviews
for food additive purposes, also reviews----
Mr. Markey. You have yet to put in place, though, a test in
order to determine whether or not any of these components are
in the fish. Is that correct? You have only done a study so far
on the DOSS as a marker but not on these other chemicals. So as
you are sitting here as the FDA and representing the public's
interest in determining whether or not these fish are safe to
eat, it is without having completed the study in terms of these
actual component chemicals inside of the fish. Is that correct?
Mr. Kraemer. I would to, if you don't mind, put that
question in the context of what we have done, and I do intend
to answer your question specifically, but the first question
that FDA wanted to answer with respect to dispersants is
whether the constituents of or the components of the Corexit,
what do we know about those and what do we know about whether,
one, they can get into the flesh of the fish, and two, if they
were in there, what would be the risk to humans. The answer to
all of these is that they have a very low potential to get into
the flesh of fish. That doesn't mean they won't get in at any
level, it means that they have a low likelihood of getting into
the fish and are highly unlikely to accumulate at levels above
what is in the environment, which we believe is comforting.
The second question as I mentioned is, do the components,
are they toxic in and of themselves, and as I said, we are
aware of all of these components and they have common uses in
products that either intentionally consumed, or as in the case
of lip gloss, do get consumed as a matter of course because of
the way they are used, and these components have approval
levels in each of those uses, and those levels are much higher
than the levels that under any circumstance you could imagine
would end up in the flesh of the fish. So it is true that we
have decided that in the case of DOSS in particular, at least
as a starting place, we are looking to see whether--we want to
confirm in a definitive study what we already believe we know
the answer to, and that is, that is unlikely to bioconcentrate,
and as Dr. Margolis put forward a minute ago, the studies,
although just underway at the current way, but the preliminary
information is very suggestive that they will not
bioconcentrate, so again confirming what we believe we already
knew. It is a reasonable question to ask if we can look at the
other components. I think that is something that we ought to
do.
Mr. Markey. Just so I can understand, Doctor, so right now
in the parts of the Gulf that have been reopened for fishing,
you have okayed the consumption of that food, those fish, even
though you haven't completed testing on the component parts of
Corexit but with the belief that it does not accumulate in fish
at a level that would pose a danger to the public as they
consume that fish. Is that correct?
Mr. Kraemer. It is correct to an extent, but what I would
like to clarify is that we are doing some analysis of the fish.
This is through the sensory testing that I mentioned earlier.
And to give you an understanding there, these are experts who
are trained. I think there is a misunderstanding by many about
the nature of this test. Quite frankly, these are folks who go
through significant training. Not every one of them can get
through that training and demonstrate the skill to be able to
pick up different odors, but the panels that we have in place
on the Gulf Coast now, these are both NOAA and FDA people
working together, are truly expert, and they have been
calibrated against the standard of seawater, oil and dispersant
that was collected at the well site so they can detect that
combined odor. They were also calibrated specifically against
the odor of dispersant, which has a much milder odor but still
detectable, and so all of the samples that we are using for
reopening of waters have been run through this analysis. We
recognize that there is more comfort in having a chemical test,
and that is the reason that we have engaged with NOAA in the
development of the chemical test for the DOSS component. We
believe it is highly unlikely that dispersant will be present
by itself but there is certainly the possibility that it could,
so that is the purpose for the develop of that test capability.
But again, I don't want to suggest that we lightly came to
the conclusion that the components of Corexit are unlikely to
accumulate and if they did are nontoxic. There is an extensive
body of science around all of these components which FDA has
looked into. So as we have said and made public statements, we
are confident that based on the current science, the likelihood
for bioconcentration in fish is very low, and should it occur,
the toxicity of those components would be very low. The studies
that we are talking about are really there because of the
unprecedented nature of this spill. We want to be able to
assure the public that we have a test but we don't believe
there is any risk to the fish that is caused as a result of the
fish that are already on the market.
Mr. Markey. In the same letter, FDA stated that it defers
to EPA to determine if dispersant and oil residues can
accumulate in aquatic plants and eggs. Dr. Anastas, can oil and
dispersant bioconcentrate in fish eggs?
Mr. Anastas. The properties of oil and the degree to which
it dissolves in fat can allow oil to in principle enter into
fat tissues and potentially enter those biological systems. All
of the models that we have done on the dispersants would
certainly suggest that we would not see the dispersants
entering into and bioaccumulating and biomagnifying in the way
that oil may.
Mr. Markey. Is it possible that a fish may be caught and
test clean in the adult tissues but contain eggs that have high
levels of these toxic chemicals?
Mr. Anastas. I am not aware of a mechanism by which that
could occur.
Mr. Markey. You believe that it could occur?
Mr. Anastas. No, I am not aware----
Mr. Markey. You are not aware?
Mr. Anastas [continuing]. Of a mechanism by which that
could occur.
Mr. Markey. Do you believe that further testing on eggs
meant for human consumption be performed to ensure that all
fish products on the market are safe?
Mr. Anastas. I am sorry. If you could repeat that, please?
Mr. Markey. Should further testing on eggs meant for human
consumption be performed to ensure that all fish products on
the market are safe?
Mr. Anastas. I would defer to my FDA colleagues on that. I
would have to say that the more data that we have, the more
sampling we have to verify this is always good, that we need to
rely on the data and the data needs to drive us.
Mr. Markey. Dr. Lehr, how do FDA and NOAA ensure that fish
that were located in oiled waters and were contaminated with
toxic chemicals from the oil have not been swimming to areas
that have been cleared for fishing?
Mr. Lehr. I mean, the presumption here is that when you
take it, the fish is guilty until proven innocent, so to speak.
So when they do their sampling, the fish has to--you don't
assume that it is cleared. You assume that it has to pass the
tasting test, and then only then if it passes those does it
then go to the laboratories of NOAA for the testing for the
PAHs. So I would say that in the case here that we have that
that we would take that into account. However, to be on the
safe side, there is a five-mile buffer between the area where
the places would be open or have not been closed in the first
place and where oil has appeared so----
Mr. Markey. Are you----
Mr. Lehr. You would have to be an athletic fish.
Mr. Markey. Are you right now engaging in intensive testing
where the oil is still present in large quantities? Are you
doing testing there?
Mr. Lehr. The testing for the fish is being done in areas
where the oil is no longer present on the surface.
Mr. Markey. Where the oil is----
Mr. Lehr. It is in the areas where either oil was never
present or in areas where it hasn't been present for some time.
Then they do the sampling. And then of course, every sample has
turned out to be negative. They never detected any PAHs in the
fish.
Mr. Markey. And I am just going to use a hypothetical, and
I don't know how accurate this is but let us just use it as a
hypothetical, that the bluefin tuna, which is ultimately caught
off of Georges Bank off of New England does spawn down in the
Gulf of Mexico. Let us say just for the sake of the discussion
and only for the sake of the discussion that some of that
spawning is going on right now inside of the much more oiled
area of the Gulf. We know that those fish are ultimately going
to migrate up off the coast of New England. What is the testing
for that fish or other fish that is going on inside of the
oiled area that will ensure that it is safe when it finally
reaches the part of the ocean where that fish or any fish is
caught?
Mr. Lehr. I think I am going to defer that question to
experts that can answer that better than I can right now.
Mr. Markey. Is there someone here who can do that for us?
Can you move up to the microphone, please, and identify
yourself?
Mr. Gray. Chairman Markey, I am John Gray. I am the
legislative affairs person. We don't have a person from the
fisheries service here. We had one witness and it was going to
be Mr. Lehr, so we can get those answers to you but we don't
have that person here.
Mr. Markey. I think that is an important issue to be
resolved in people's minds because it just seems, I think, to
someone that thinks about the fishing industry that these are
not stationary or territorial entities in many instances. We
are seeing sharks all up and down the coastline of New England
and they don't seem to limit themselves just to a 5-mile radius
right now, and just to say don't worry about it a few miles
further away, that the sharks only stay within a 5-mile radius
doesn't seem as though that would be the kind of warning that
the public would think was sufficient in order to guarantee the
safety of their families. So I think this is important
information for us to have and the more that it can be put in
very simple terms for the public, I think the better it will be
for the fishing industry and for the consuming public.
Mr. Kraemer, you are seeking recognition?
Mr. Kraemer. Yes. I would just like to respond a bit on
that. I think there are several answers to that question or
several pieces of the answer to that question. The NOAA testing
has included testing outside of the closed areas, and the
purpose of that testing was to look for whether or not--first
of all, to determine whether or not the closures were
sufficiently protective, so this 5-nautical-mile buffer zone
that was put around it we believe is sufficiently protective.
The question, though comes, was it sufficiently protective. So
testing was performed outside the area in which the closures
were. Beyond that, both NOAA and FDA have done market sampling,
so this is fish that were commercially harvested certainly in
open waters so samples were collected there, and we believe we
would have picked up any indication that there were fish that
had higher than expected levels. And then finally, especially
true for finfish, they clear the PAHs very rapidly from their
body, usually within a matter of days. So a scenario of a fish
that contaminated in the Gulf making it up to New England I
think is highly improbable and we don't believe that that would
be something that consumers should be worried about.
Mr. Markey. Are you actually testing for that, though,
given the unprecedented underwater experiment----
Mr. Kraemer. We are testing Gulf product, that is, product
that has been commercially harvested in the Gulf and that is
currently being marketed, so we are testing that product, and
again, it is not showing levels of PAHs above the background
levels that were there before the spill occurred. So we believe
that the fish coming out of the Gulf do not have levels that
are of concern.
Mr. Markey. Mr. Kraemer, is the FDA monitoring seafood
recovered from the Gulf for the presence of heavy metals
present in crude oil?
Mr. Kraemer. We are not, no, but there is a NOAA program,
the Mussel Watch program, that it is a bit of a misnomer in the
Gulf in that it is not mussels that are being tested, it is
oysters, but these are what we would call a sentinel species in
that they are the species that is most likely to absorb
contaminants including heavy metals, the most likely to hang
onto that within their flesh and also the species most likely
to bioconcentrate, that is, have it at levels above what would
be in the environment. So this program has been in place for
decades in the Gulf so we have a very solid--well, in fact,
nationwide--so we have a very solid background level. We know
what the levels of these contaminants are. It includes any of
the heavy metals, for example, that you would be concerned
about.
Mr. Markey. But are you monitoring for it right now?
Mr. Kraemer. I would defer to NOAA to answer what has been
done on this but I wanted to mention that FDA has not but the
NOAA program we believe is a good sentinel program.
Mr. Markey. Let me go to NOAA then because it is my
understanding that compounds like mercury, arsenic and other
heavy metals that are present in crude oil have the ability to
accumulate in the tissues of fish in levels that may cause harm
particularly to pregnant women and children. Has the FDA or
NOAA here examined seafood for the presence of heavy metals?
Dr. Lehr.
Mr. Lehr. There is some monitoring that is being done as
part of the Mussel Watch program in the area. Again, I am going
to defer to my colleagues to answer that correctly, and we will
get back to you with an answer to that.
Mr. Markey. So Mr. Kraemer, back over here at FDA, you
don't screen for heavy metals. You think that NOAA may but the
witness today does not know the answer to that question.
Mr. Kraemer. I hate to speak for NOAA in this regard but it
is our understanding that NOAA has collected a sampling run, if
you will, from one end of the Gulf to the other where they
would normally collect for the Mussel Watch but that the
results are not yet back, so we don't have analyses of them. We
do not expect to see an increase based on this spill but
certainly those results will be confirmatory of that.
Mr. Markey. Well, Mr. Kraemer, I wrote a letter to the FDA
on this issue of heavy metals 6 weeks ago and I have yet to
receive an answer from the FDA.
Mr. Kraemer. And I apologize for that, Mr. Chairman. I
would be happy to respond to those questions at this time.
Mr. Markey. I would not have asked the question if I did
not believe that it was important. I mean, heavy metals
obviously have a danger that attaches to them and to have this
kind of regulatory black hole be created here today between the
FDA and NOAA in terms of knowing what the response is to
testing for heavy metals in this fish which we know can
accumulate in fish is something that obviously should have been
identified within the last 6 weeks since I wrote the letter.
When can I expect that response from the FDA?
Mr. Kraemer. In a matter of days.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Kraemer, very much.
Dr. Lehr, how does FDA and NOAA ensure that fish that were
located in oiled waters and were contaminated with toxic
chemicals from the oil are not then swimming to other areas? I
am sorry. I have already asked that question.
Let me move on to the FDA and NOAA. You have agreed on a
protocol to examine when closed federal harvest waters can be
reopened. That protocol relies heavily on surveillance tests
and sampling that generate data about the concentration of
particular contaminants found in seafood. It is my
understanding that there have been fishery reopenings in State
waters within 3 miles of the coastline of Louisiana and
Mississippi. Does NOAA and FDA have access to the data that is
used to drive the reopening decisions in State waters within 3
miles of the coastline of Mississippi and Louisiana? Mr.
Kraemer.
Mr. Kraemer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The answer is yes.
The protocol that was developed jointly by FDA, NOAA and EPA
along with the five Gulf Coast States calls for the States to
provide that data to FDA and NOAA. I should say that for
reopening purposes, the States are acting under their own
authority, as I think you know.
Mr. Markey. What role does the FDA and NOAA have in the
opening and closing of State waters?
Mr. Kraemer. When the State has made a decision that they
would like to reopen a portion of their waters for a particular
fishery, for example, for finfish or for shrimp, they develop a
sampling protocol or plan, and that identifies how many of each
of the species and where they are going to be located that they
intend to collect. FDA and NOAA review that proposal and either
concur with it or make recommendations for changes, and at that
point the State then goes out and collects those samples and
submits them to the NOAA laboratory in Pascagoula, Mississippi,
which is where the sensory testing that I described a minute
ago is performed. If a sample passes the sensory testing, then
it is submitted to a chemical laboratory, and this is where the
samples split. If it is federal waters, which isn't the
question you raised, the sample would go to a NOAA laboratory.
If it is a State waters, then the sample is handled by FDA or
one of the State laboratories that we have under contract, and
that is where we perform the analysis for PAH. The sensory
analysis, as I mentioned, is for odors indicative of oil as
well as odors that are indicative of oil contamination--I am
sorry, of dispersant contamination.
Mr. Markey. So can the FDA and NOAA state unequivocally
that fish caught in the State waters are safe to eat? Can you
state that unequivocally?
Mr. Kraemer. FDA has expressed confidence in the fish that
are commercially marketed from the Gulf Coast, and as I said,
we--I didn't mention that the sample results then come back to
FDA and NOAA for review and FDA then provides its concurrence
to the State before the State reopens. So we are aware of the
state of the oiling in that area and we are aware of the levels
of the results of the analytical tests before the water is
reopened by the State. So yes, we are able to vouch for the
safety of those fish with respect to the contamination from the
spill.
Mr. Markey. Dr. Lehr, do you agree with that? Do you agree
that the federal government is able to vouch unequivocally that
the fish caught in State waters are safe to eat as well as
federal waters?
Mr. Lehr. I would say that the fish caught is meeting all
the standards that were developed by FDA and NOAA.
Mr. Markey. And what about noncommercial fishing?
Recreational fishing is a major tourism sector in the Gulf. Can
we be sure that those fish are safe to eat as well? Mr.
Kraemer.
Mr. Kraemer. FDA is directly responsible for recreational
catch but I can tell you that again the States again exercise
that control except in federal waters where NOAA exercises that
control. But the States have implemented closures for
recreational catch that mirror the closures that they have for
commercial catch. So the safety of the recreational catch
should be at the same level as commercial.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Kraemer.
Dr. Anastas, with regard to the use of dispersants, Dr.
Suatoni of the Natural Resources Defense Council says in her
testimony that ``it would be unwise to draw conclusions about
the safety of this unprecedented application of chemical
dispersants from two laboratory experiments and field
observations.'' Do you agree or disagree with that statement?
Mr. Anastas. I think it is important to follow the data.
Mr. Markey. Excuse me?
Mr. Anastas. I think it is important to follow the data,
and what that means is that we look at the data and what that
data tells us but never remain satisfied. That is why we have
ongoing monitoring programs. That is why we will always
continue to ask the tough questions. That is why we are looking
to have an ongoing long-term research plan so we do understand
not only the current situation but the long-term effects.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Mr. Kraemer, polyaromatic hydrocarbons, PAHs, are one of
the most concerning compounds present in oil because of their
significant health impacts. However, these compounds are also
very quickly metabolized in aquatic species, particularly in
certain types of fish. It is my understanding that polyaromatic
hydrocarbons are often metabolized into products that are
retained in the flesh and can be more toxic than the parent
compounds. In the market surveillance, is the FDA examining the
metabolites of PAHs in the analytical sampling tests?
Mr. Kraemer. It is my understanding that what we are
looking for is specific PAHs and not any metabolites of those
PAHs. So I think the short answer is no.
Mr. Markey. Dr. Seyfert.
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. I think there is two points of
clarification I would like to add, Chairman Markey, to go back
to your question on heavy metals, which I would like to get to.
To clarify on the metabolite issue, we have been engaging some
experts in academia to discuss just this. I have had several
conversations with Dr. Overton at LSU about their experiences
with PAHs and metabolites that may be derived from those but we
are not currently testing for those, but I do want to add that
to date we haven't found any level. In fact, almost every test
that we have conducted on the fish and shrimp that have been
collected to date and other seafood has been completely
negative, below our limit of detection for the PAHs themselves,
if not very, very low levels as Mr. Kraemer stated, a thousand
times below what would one----
Mr. Markey. Have you been looking at fish that are right
now inside the oiled areas?
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. No.
Mr. Markey. I think that that is important for people, and
I would recommend to you that you do some testing there. I
think it is important for the public to know that inside the
oiled area you are also doing testing because people will be
concerned that there could be some migration outside of that
oiled area subsequently, especially if the fish then move to
areas where they are traditionally caught that might not be
there in that area and that might not be this month or next
month or the month after but some point in the future I think
it would be very helpful if you would do some of that testing
as well just so that we can see what happens in the most
concentrated area as opposed to where you are now testing, and
I think that is important information. I actually think it is
important information going forward long term. We should know
what happens to fish where the oil is most dense at this time.
Doctor.
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. Just one more point of clarification
on I think this point which is very well taken and your points
on heavy metals. We are also engaging with NIH and other
scientists to develop long-term toxicity studies. I think those
are incredibly important in terms of looking at potential for
accumulation of heavy metals and toxicities that may derive
from that. And again, I would add that we do think that the
surveillance through the Mussel Watch program is an incredibly
important first line of defense but that there are active
discussions about long-term toxicity studies and we will be
engaging in these studies for years to come.
Mr. Markey. Again, I would think that it would be important
to begin those studies right now by going to the most
potentially toxic areas and finding the samples now that are
then used as your baseline, and I think that is long term going
to be something that a lot of people wished was there in
significant quantities in order to match off about what is then
found at the periphery, so I would recommend to you that you do
that.
And again, let me ask the question again. Do you plan to
test for metabolites?
Ms. Seyfert-Margolis. I think this is part of our ongoing
discussions with NIH. In fact, there is a meeting happening
right now with several of the agencies and long-term toxicity
studies and the design of those is one of the points under
discussion.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Mr. Kraemer, there has been much criticism of the seafood
sampling plan, particularly about the method of risk
assessment. It is my understanding that the level of
contamination with PAHs that is considered safe does not take
into account vulnerable populations such as pregnant women and
children, and this is because the assumptions made in the plan
calculate safe levels based on an average adult male body
weight of 176 pounds. Has the FDA produced guidelines to ensure
that children and pregnant women are adequately protected from
contaminants that may be present in seafood?
Mr. Kraemer. I think the short response to that is that we
believe that the levels of concern that we established for the
reopening protocol are quite conservative and will be
sufficiently protective for all populations but we also
acknowledge that these are valuable comments and we are
committed to looking again at the calculation of the levels of
concern to make any judgments about whether we need to modify
the levels that we have established for the reopening. I would
like to point out, though, that again as we mentioned before,
the levels that we are finding in fish flesh are essentially at
levels that they would have been at before the spill. So
whether or not the values would change, we are not seeing
levels that should be of concern for children or pregnant
women.
Mr. Markey. And I appreciate the conclusion which you
reach, but as you know, for 100 years, almost all medical
research was done on the prototypical 176-pound male and only
in the 1990s under pressure from the women's movement that
independent research that dealt with the unique nature of women
and children begin to be introduced. So the very fact that the
classic 176-pound male is still used here is something that I
think you should reexamine in terms of whether or not that is
sufficient to deal with the more vulnerable population which
are women and children in this particular instance. The
extrapolation of all of these lessons over to women and
children I think is something is probably not outdated and this
may be one of the last remaining models that continues to stay
on the books as the exclusive means by which such a measurement
is in fact made of the risk to human beings.
Mr. Kraemer, if an analytical test conducted by NOAA
indicates that contaminated seafood has been found that was
harvested from open waters, how does NOAA communicate this to
FDA and what is the feedback method to stop others from fishing
in the same place?
Mr. Kraemer. Well, we have communications with NOAA at a
number of levels so we communicate at the senior leadership
level, we communicate through the National Incident Command
process and we also communicate on multiple daily calls between
all three agencies at the staff, scientific and technical
levels, so any one of those routes could be used to move that
information. Fortunately, we haven't had to deal with that
information yet, but if it were to occur, we would immediately
investigate, and that investigation would be to look at the
analytical results, confirm that they in fact show that the
product is what FDA would call adulterated and if we found in
fact that it did reach that level of concern, either we or the
State would act through our authorities to remove that product
from the market, and also to reevaluate the adequacy of the
closure that is in place.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Dr. Lehr, last Friday Admiral Allen issued a directive for
a coordinated integrated system of ocean monitoring involving
federal, State and academic monitoring efforts to detect
remaining submerged oil in the Gulf. Can you tell us more about
this effort and why this directive was necessary at this time?
Was this coordination not occurring over the past 4 months?
Mr. Lehr. Coordination in terms of tracking the subsurface
oil has been happening since the beginning of the spill. In
fact, early on in the spill, we went out and made arrangements
with the experts who are experts in, for example, well blowouts
from the Carson University, provided us their information of
how the oil would act. We also made arrangements with SINTEF,
which has a subsurface model that we could track the oil and
now we have brought in our own models that are tracking it as
well, tied in with all the detailed sampling that is being
done. Now, I think the directive now of course other groups and
other agencies have been doing it and the idea is to now bring
them all together as a coordinated approach. I think that is a
good idea.
Mr. Markey. Are you saying that this is nothing more than a
continuation of what has been going on all along?
Mr. Kraemer. I would say this----
Mr. Markey. And I guess I would ask, why was a new
directive necessary if this was something that is nothing more
than a continuing effort?
Mr. Kraemer. I think what the admiral is stressing is that
we are focusing now on the subsurface oil with the surface
problem being removed and bring in extra resources to do that.
Many of the folks at NOAA that I know of who are doing the
surface trajectory have now been transferred to working on the
subsurface trajectory collection, so I think to say it is a
redirection as the problem has evolved and leave it at that.
Mr. Markey. Thank you. What do we know about the dispersed
oil and dispersant that is on the ocean floor? What species are
affected there and how does that impact the food chain? Dr.
Anastas.
Mr. Anastas. I think you are asking an extremely important
question. There are issues that we are looking to in real time
develop research plans in the immediate and the longer term to
fully understand what the oil is doing. I do refer back to the
opening statements about we are not detecting dispersants in
any concentrations to the limits of our methods of detection,
so we are not seeing the presence of those substances.
Mr. Markey. So are you saying you are not seeing
dispersants and oil collecting on the ocean floor at this time?
Mr. Anastas. In the thousands of samples that have been
run, we are not detecting dispersants, the dispersant
constituents on the ocean floor at this time. We have not seen
a hit of dispersants at this time. We have the one hit that was
referred to in NOAA, the one hit that was referred to at EPA in
EPA testing. But the question that you asked about the oil on
the ocean floor, we have seen some reports in the media that
have talked about the oil on the ocean floor. This is something
that as we look to ensure we understand the long-term effects,
that this is exactly one of the questions that we need to
investigate and find out, either confirm or disprove the
presence of this oil and also to understand the impacts of this
oil.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Why don't we do this? Why don't we hear from each one of
you in reverse order of your opening testimony so that you can
tell us what it is that you want the American public to
understand about the state of the Gulf of Mexico at this
particular point in time? We will begin with you, Dr. Anastas.
Mr. Anastas. Thank you very much. I think the single
message that Administrator Jackson has sent is that we need to
be vigilant on understanding what the nature of the problems
are, the immediate term and the long term, and that monitoring
is crucial, that this crisis is not over, that the monitoring
will continue, the work will continue, the research will
continue into the long term, and getting that understanding not
only to inform our decisions but to make sure that we get it to
the American public as quickly as possible is one of our
primary goals in accomplishing our mission of protecting human
health and the environment.
Mr. Markey. Great. Thank you, Dr. Anastas, and thank you
for your work on this issue.
Mr. Kraemer.
Mr. Kraemer. Thank you. The question that we are very often
asked in FDA is, what should a consumer do to make sure that
their next meal of Gulf seafood is safe, and the answer I like
to give to that and I would like to respond here is that they
needn't do anything. That is FDA's job. And we take that job
very seriously. We are confident that the program that FDA has
put together along with our colleagues in the federal and State
governments is sufficiently protective and that they need not
take any steps to protect themselves from the seafood, that it
is essentially at the same level of safety as it was before the
spill. Having said that, we recognize that this is an
unprecedented event, and our looking at the long-term safety of
this source of food is something that we can't overlook, and I
think we have mentioned here a few ideas of things that we do
need to look at into long-term studies, the development of
methods that can detect contaminants that we presently can't
detect, and we think those are positive steps to providing
further assurance to the public.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Kraemer, very much.
And Dr. Lehr.
Mr. Lehr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I get to my
closing, I want to correct one thing. I am a good scientist but
perhaps a bad impromptu speaker, and so one of the things that
you brought up was to suggest that this calculator was not
involving independent scientists. The independent scientists
contributed to the development of the calculator and
independent scientists, very qualified scientists, will be the
ones who are doing the reviewing of it. The field of oil spill
science I like to say is so small that we could have a meeting
in a ballroom and still have plenty of room to dance, and we
have been able to tap many of the biggest names in that field
for both the review and for the development. So I would like to
stress that, particularly since there are other folks who this
is their first big spill and they are coming in and perhaps
don't have the background in this area.
Now, for my other comment, as my colleagues have said, this
is a continuing operation. The spill is far from over. We are
beginning in a new phase, and NOAA and all the other agencies
will be involved in this, and for those of us who are spill
experts, we get paid for doing this but what I would like to
think and people don't get enough credit to, when we went to
develop our tools both in terms of the flow rate calculations
and in terms of this budget calculation, we went out to many of
the independent academics and other experts, and in many cases
they were not being paid any compensation. I have not yet had a
single instance where any of those folks have refused to work
on any of the projects and the requests that we have done. So
if there is a silver lining in the terrible event of the spill,
it is the extent to which the American people are willing to
volunteer their efforts at both the highest expertise levels
down to the fellows who are volunteering to come out and clean
up the beaches. Such tragedies do bring out the best in our
country and I think that that is something that should be more
brought forward perhaps.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Dr. Lehr, and again, thank all of
you for your work.
The point that I was making earlier was that in terms of
the study that was released last week, first you gave the
answer and now you are going to be showing your work, but in a
peer-reviewed way, and that is the opposite of the way in which
a study of that magnitude would be released, and all I am
saying is that given the way that this has unfolded, that it is
important that everyone including independent scientists who
may not have participated in your creation of these models can
see the assumptions upon which they were based now, given the
fact that the peer review is going on right now but the science
experiment in the Gulf of Mexico is occurring in real time so
that there can be a real capacity to have all questions asked
and answered not months from now as part of a boring academic
exercise sometime next year but right now when concern is at
its highest.
So again, I restate my request to you that you provide that
information to independent scientists who are not part of your
study so that there can be a fresh set of eyes and minds that
are applied to it because the consequences are great if you are
wrong. If you are wrong, the consequences could be great. So
let us just err on the side of safety. Let us have that
information be given to the rest of the scientific community
given the way in which that record was put together.
So we thank you, Dr. Lehr, and again, in no way do we want
to say anything other than we thank you for the work which you
have done thus far. It is an exceedingly difficult working
environment. It is unprecedented what has occurred in the Gulf
of Mexico. We have this hearing principally because the public
has a right to know, that there should not be a 6-week period,
a month-and-a-half period where Congress has not been working
on this issue, given the fact that it is our responsibility to
make sure that the public interest in all aspects is protected.
So we thank you, and we ask you perhaps to make yourself
available to return again to answer additional questions
because this is something that obviously is going to affect the
Gulf of Mexico for months and years to come. With the thanks of
the committee, we appreciate your contribution.
Before we hear from our next set of witnesses, for the
record, the subcommittee invited the Louisiana Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries to participate in this hearing. The
Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries makes the
decisions regarding opening or closing of fisheries in State
waters affected by the spill and has been working in
consultation with the FDA regarding opening and closing of
fisheries. Although nobody from the department was able to
attend, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
submitted a statement for the record which I ask unanimous
consent to move into the record at this time. Without
objection, so ordered.
[The information was unavailable at the time of printing.]
Mr. Markey. I would also like to move into the record a
statement from the Center for Science in the Public Interest.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information was unavailable at the time of printing.]
Mr. Markey. We will now move to hear from our witnesses,
and we ask those witnesses to please move up to the witness
table.
Welcome back to the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment.
Let me begin by making a unanimous consent request that all
members be allowed to submit statements for the record and any
questions which they would like to submit to the witnesses who
are testifying here today. Without objection, so ordered.
Our next witness is Dr. Ian MacDonald. Dr. MacDonald is a
Professor of Biological Oceanography at Florida State
University. His research uses satellite imaging to locate
natural oil releases on the ocean surface. We thank you for
coming, Dr. MacDonald. Whenever you feel comfortable, please
begin.
STATEMENTS OF IAN MACDONALD, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF
OCEANOGRAPHY, FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY; DEAN BLANCHARD,
PRESIDENT, DEAN BLANCHARD SEAFOOD, INC.; ACY COOPER, JR., VICE
PRESIDENT, LOUISIANA SEAFOOD ASSOCIATION; MIKE VOISIN, CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, MOTIVATIT SEAFOOD, LLC; AND LISA SUATONI,
SENIOR SCIENTIST, OCEANS PROGRAM, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL
STATEMENT OF IAN MACDONALD
Mr. MacDonald. Well, I am a Professor of Oceanography at
Florida State University. Today, however, I am speaking solely
on my own findings, and I wanted to say before I embark on
technical discussions that I have 30 years of professional and
private experience traveling around, cruising on, diving to the
bottom of the Gulf of Mexico, and I deeply and fiercely love
this ocean and its people and I thank you for your exemplary
service during this catastrophe.
I would like to comment briefly with a critique on the NOAA
oil budget report which we discussed earlier. I feel that this
report was misleading, and although it presents science, it was
done by very competent scientists without any citation to the
scientific literature. Without the algorithms, without the
formulas and the actual budget that are referred to, it is
impossible for someone reading this report to check the numbers
that are there, and we have concern about those numbers.
So as I think you very ably demonstrated in your
examination, we really can only account for 10 percent of the
oil that was discharged, that 4.1 million barrels that was
discharged through burning and skimming. The balance of the oil
remained in the environment. There may have been some 10
percent that evaporated into the atmosphere that is gone from
the ocean but the balance is still in the ocean. The question
is, how is it partitioned between the water column and the
floating material that will have sunk to the bottom or become
buried on the beaches, and this partitioning which was done or
this separation into categories which was done by the oil
budget is really pretty theoretical at this point. We need to
check on that. There are findings that are coming out that I
think will cause this into question.
But let us just take this 26 percent, this 1.3 million
barrels. As you say, this is five times the Exxon Valdez
release. This oil has already degraded, has already evaporated
and emulsified. It is going to be very resistant to further
biodegradation. This oil is going to be in the environment for
a long time. I think that the imprint of the BP release, the
discharge, will be detectable in the Gulf of Mexico environment
for the rest of my life, and for the record, I am 58 years old,
so there is a lot of oil. It is not gone and it is not going
away quickly.
I would also like to comment on an aspect of the spill that
hasn't received a lot of attention and that is the methane gas.
All of the numbers about the release, the discharge have been
presented in volumes of oil, barrels of oil. If, however, we
calculate, we know that the Macondo field well was very rich in
gas and we have good numbers on that from the Flow Rate
Technical Group. If we take those numbers and we present all
the discharge in terms of units of mass equivalents or barrel
of oil equivalents, it turns out that the oil plus the gas is
equal to 1.5 times the oil alone. In other words, if we
conclude that there are 4.1 million barrels of oil released,
the actual discharge in barrel of oil equivalents is in excess
of 6 million barrels. Because this oil, this material was
released at the bottom of the ocean, it transited the ocean.
Some of it, much of it perhaps still remains in the ocean so I
would contend that for the purposes of the Oil Pollution Act,
this was a discharge and this total pollutant load should be
included in our assessment of how far this spill went down.
I would also like to comment on the so-called resilience of
the Gulf of Mexico. Now, a fair reading of the report indicates
that this 90 percent, this huge volume of oil represents a
massive dose of hydrocarbons in the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem.
There has been some talk about the resilience of the Gulf of
Mexico. My concern, my first concern is not for a whole-scale
die-off but for a depression, some decrease, 10 percent, 15
percent of the productivity and the biodiversity of the Gulf of
Mexico ecosystem. Now, this might be--if we had a 10 percent
decrease, this might be very difficult to demonstrate
scientifically. It might be even harder to prove in a court of
law. Nonetheless, if we sustain this impact over many years, it
would be a severe affect.
My greatest concern, however, is that some of the damage
will be so severe that we may have tipping point effects that
will overwhelm the resilience of the ecosystem, and this
unfortunately has been the case, has been the scientific result
looking at Prince William Sound in the wake of the Exxon Valdez
spill. We need to hope that this won't happen. We need to do
more than hope. We need to watch very carefully, and I have
drafted as part of my submission here a list of species that I
think we should be watching closely. These include some of the
big species, the shrimp, the tuna and so forth, but they also
include more humble members of the ecosystem such as fiddler
crabs, the Coquina clams that are so abundant on the beaches.
We need to be watching these populations through time, not just
next year but for years to come, because it may take several
years to notice the impact. A healthy environment has to
support the species that depend on the healthy environment. If
we watch those species, we will know they go. Is my time up?
OK.
[The prepared statement of Mr. MacDonald follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Markey. Yes, it is, but you will have time during the
question-and-answer period to elaborate.
Our next witness is Mr. Dean Blanchard. He is the President
and sole owner of Dean Blanchard Seafood located in Grand Isle,
Louisiana. Dean Blanchard Seafood is the largest dockside
shrimp broker in the United States and the third largest in the
world. Thank you for coming, Mr. Blanchard. Whenever you feel
ready, please begin.
STATEMENT OF DEAN BLANCHARD
Mr. Blanchard. Yes. Thank you for having us, Chairman.
I want to say, we visit your State regularly, and gosh, it
reminds me of Grand Isle.
We are here today to talk about seafood safety, and we have
a few concerns, and basically I have taken a moment to outline
a few of my major concerns as an independent seafood business
owner of Grand Isle regarding the effects of the BP oil spill.
If a seafood product is put onto the market and is later
determined to have made the consumer ill because of oil and/or
dispersant contamination, who will be determined to be the
responsible party? That is one of our major concerns right now
because we are having trouble getting product liability
insurance. I have been responsible for moving, it is just a
guess, but I believe in my lifetime about 300 million pounds of
shrimp, and I have never seen anyone get sick. You know, we are
born in this business. Pretty much everyone in the seafood
business is born and raised in it. You don't just decide one
day I am going to be a seafood business guy. So we have good
people in our business and we know the shrimp, you know, and I
am hoping that will keep the public safe. We are testing our
shrimp. We are checking it. I won't put nothing on the market
that I won't eat myself. I stayed about 2 weeks without eating
shrimp, and I felt like I was going to die and I decided I was
going to start eating it again because it was so good. But that
is one of our major concerns is, who is going to be
responsible. I have a feeling that if I get sued I am going to
be the one paying the bill.
Another concern we got, our commercial shrimpers and
fishermen are hesitant to fuel up their boats, buy ice and oil
and salt because they believe that the open waters will be
closed once more, or that they will find oil-contaminated
seafood which they know I will not buy and they are going to
have to dispose of it. It is difficult for an out-of-work
fisherman to pay for these expenses without the confidence in
the government, who dictates the openings and closures, and
without the confidence in BP's press releases which state that
virtually all of the recoverable oil has been recovered.
You know, if you go out shrimping right now and you watch
to catch oil, they can go catch oil. But if you want to catch
good shrimp, you can catch good shrimp also. So, you know, I
told every fisherman, you know, when you bring me the product,
it is going to be scrutinized 10 times more than it has ever
been before, so if you think anything is wrong, don't bring it
to me. I will not buy it. I will not take the chance of getting
sued or getting someone sick. You know, the last thing I ever
want is for somebody to say I got them sick or a pregnant
woman, you know, that would be hard to live with, so we are
taking extra precautions to make sure that doesn't happen.
You know, we are having, like I said, a difficult time
locating insurance companies who will sell us insurance, and
that is--you know, what I am scared of is not somebody actually
getting sick, I am scared of someone trying to make money off
of this, you know. That is the scary part, you know.
Basically in summary, we in the seafood industry have very
little trust in the government, you know. When I try to sell
seafood, I tell them, I say well, the government said they did
thousands of tests and everything is all right, and they say is
that the same government that said only 1,000 barrels a day was
leaking out the well, and I say well, it is the same government
but it is a different branch.
So that is some of the problems we are having and we
appreciate with the help of people like you that maybe we will
get down to the bottom of it, but I firmly believe that all the
seafood I have seen so far is safe. I eat seafood probably six,
seven times a week. I haven't had any problems with the
seafood. So we are hoping that the government is doing the
right job and making sure everybody is safe and maybe we can
all get through this one day. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blanchard follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Blanchard, very much, and thank
you for being here today.
Our next witness is Mr. Acy Cooper, Jr. He is a fisherman
from Plaquemines Parish and the Vice President of the Louisiana
Shrimpers Association. He is the owner of the commercial shrimp
boat the Lacy K, and we thank you for coming, Mr. Cooper.
Whenever you are ready, please begin.
STATEMENT OF ACY COOPER, JR.
Mr. Cooper. I would just like to talk a little bit about
the damages done to our community.
This oil spill, we have oil on the bottom of our waterways.
We have reports of numerous fish kills. We know the oil is
there. NOAA keeps saying that the oil is not there. Everybody
said it is not there. We know it is there. I worked in one part
of this particular bay for 2 months and we wear hazmat suits,
we wear gloves, we taped up. They said oil is not there. When
they got rid of me the last day I was working for BP, I found
oil is on the bottom. I reported it to the Coast Guard,
reported it to BP, brought them up there, showed them it was
there.
This has catastrophic effects on our community, our
industry, our way of life. We do not need to let this lay
because BP is going to step out of here and they are trying to
get out of here now. We need to make sure we stop on top of
things because if we let them leave now, we are going to be in
deep trouble. Everybody says it is over with. They want to
paint a picture that in a perfect world it would be. Right now,
as you have seen this morning, 90 percent of the oil is still
there, and that is one thing we are definitely scared of. The
places that we do have that is clean, we know it is clean, like
they were just stating. We are worried about when it comes in
tomorrow or the day after tomorrow that we can't fish there
anymore.
The main thing is that we monitor the fish areas that are
clean. Let us work in the fish areas that are clean. Where it
is not clean, we can just stay away from it. Our fishermen are
not going to come in and sell anything that is bad. We want to
make sure what we put on the market is good. That is one of the
main things that we discussed. We have meetings on our own and
we do discuss this.
Now, we need to make sure that BP stays in place for as
long as it needs to be because we see right now that they are
trying to move out and they are trying to go. We don't need to
let them leave now. Finish the job they started. They did it.
They need to clean it up. Like Dean said, if we get somebody
sick, it is going to come back on us. The process of having a
dockside waiver saying that we caught them in open areas in the
marsh, they are making us sign waivers that we caught them in
open marsh. Now, who are we going to make responsible for that?
Is BP going to step up and be responsible for what we have to
do? I signed it for Dean. He signed it for the processors. Who
signs for us? So we are going to wind up with the burden of
having to take the brunt of this. We can't make any money.
It opened on August 16, the season. I went out. Normally I
would catch a couple thousand pounds to 10,000 pounds. I caught
500 pounds of shrimp at $1.25. Those same shrimp last season
was around $2, $2.25. They went down $1. Now, if I can't get
the price for my shrimp and I can't catch them, how am I going
to survive? I have been doing this for 35 years. My father is
74 years old. He still does it. My sons do it. Hopefully their
sons will do it, hopefully. I don't see any future in it. With
the prices and everything that is going on now, we may not have
a future. Who is going to be liable for that? BP needs to step
up and make sure they pay us for what they have done, keep this
industry going. Our docks can't afford to keep going. What
happens if they go out? One link is broken in this chain and we
lose our industry. This is something we have been doing all our
lives. Who do we go to then?
I just want to make sure they understand that we are not
happy with what is going on right now. They said the oil is
gone. It is not gone. It is on the bottom. We can take you and
show you. I brought the Coast Guard, I brought BP and showed
them. You stir the bottom up and oil comes up. So whoever said
it is gone, as you heard today, they said 75 percent was gone
before, 90 percent is still there and it is going to come into
our shores eventually somewhere, if not in Louisiana, somewhere
else. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Cooper. And just so you know,
the reason that we are having this hearing is that BP knows
that we are not going away. We are going to stay on them until
they do the job. We know that BP did not stand for Be Prepared.
Right from the very first day when they said there was 1,000
barrels per day all the way until today, they never had a plan
put in place to deal with something like this, and we just
can't allow them to believe that the coast is clear, that they
can retreat without having to pay for everything that they are
responsible for.
Mr. Cooper. Let me say one more thing. You heard them
talking earlier about 5-mile bumpers. Where I found the oil,
the season was open in that area this last--the 16th. It was
open where I found the oil at. And they are talking about
giving a tradeoff, a tradeoff for the dispersants, and the only
tradeoff that we feel they gave to is our industry because when
you sink it like that, we can't see it coming in. Our shrimp
and fish, they are all bottom feeders. That is where it went,
to the bottom. So it is deeply concerning for us where it is
out there coming in on our bottoms.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.
Now we will hear from Mr. Mike Voisin. He is the Chief
Executive Officer of Motivatit Seafood, and oyster processing
plant in Houma, Louisiana, a family-owned business. The Voisin
family has been involved in the seafood industry since 1770.
Mr. Voisin also serves on the Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries
Commission, the Louisiana Oyster Dealers Association and the
Louisiana Oyster Taskforce. We welcome you, Mr. Voisin.
STATEMENT OF MIKE VOISIN
Mr. Voisin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon.
The opportunity to come before you is a pleasure today, and
thank you for this opportunity.
Mr. Markey. And may I also say that in Congress there are
two places that everyone thinks has a very funny accent, and
one of them is Louisiana and the other one is from Boston, so
this is a gathering of those. The other 48 States, they all
think they speak plain English but we know that our accents are
the authentic ones, so welcome.
Mr. Voisin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our company has an oyster farm in south Louisiana that
comprises about 10,000 acres of water bottoms. We produce
anywhere from 45 to 75 million oysters annually, and on the
bottom we always have 2- to 3-year classes of oysters or 135 to
225 million oysters on the water bottom at any time.
In addition to running my family business, you mentioned my
relationship with the Wildlife and Fisheries Commission of
Louisiana as a member. I am also past chairman of the National
Fisheries Institute.
Louisiana is second only to Alaska in total seafood
landings. In 2008, our commercial fishermen harvested 1\1/4\
billion pounds of seafood, which represented nearly $660
million in dockside value. Meanwhile, 3.2 million recreational
fishermen along our shoes took to the water, completing a total
of 24 million fishing trips.
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill is clearly an ecological
and human tragedy that will surely affect not only the fragile
habitats where fish and shellfish are harvested, but the very
core of the community that brings these iconic delicacies from
the waters of the Gulf to the tables of America. That culture
and those Americans need your support during these challenging
times.
The seafood community has been actively engaged with both
state and federal officials as they closely monitor the Gulf
waters and only now begin to reopen those waters. We have
worked closely with NOAA, the Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries, Department of Health and Hospitals and other groups
including the Environmental Protection Agency as well.
We strongly supported the precautionary closures at the
outset of this tragic event in order to ensure consumers
continue to have access to seafood maintained with the level of
quality and safety expected in the Gulf of Mexico. And now, as
we did then, we support regulators as they reopen those same
waters and continue their ongoing efforts to protect consumers.
We agree that closing harvest waters which could be exposed
to oil was the best way to protect the public because this
prevented potentially contaminated seafood from entering the
marketplace. Closures made with the intent to ensure seafood
was as safe as possible were balanced with not closing any
fishing areas unnecessarily. And as a testament to that system,
we know now that no contaminated product has made its way into
the market.
Waters are reopened only when oil from the spill is no
longer present and the seafood samples from the area
successfully pass chemical testing. Sensory analysis testing is
a heavily established, verifiable and highly scientific way to
detect contamination. That testing continues aggressively as
well. In fact, FDA has collected 5,658 specimens, as well as
NOAA, that all of these samples have been 100 to 1,000 times
below the threshold levels for any margin of safety relating to
any human health concern.
The Gulf seafood community applauds the Administration for
taking the lead on the coordination of a comprehensive multi-
government agency response and we appreciate the collaborative
efforts of NOAA, FDA, EPA and the State authorities including
the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. We are
pleased that the State agencies are working closely with the
federal government and we are thoroughly confident that every
necessary step is being taken to ensure the continued safety of
seafood sourced from the Gulf. After thousands of tests, the
public should not be concerned about the safety of Gulf
seafood. We have all seen media reports raising questions about
that same seafood, which stand in contrast to all the federal
and State testing we have seen. It is absolutely critical to
the Gulf seafood community that a consistent and precise
message continues to be delivered to the consumers who may
unnecessarily shy away from this otherwise very healthy
product.
The Gulf of Mexico has 600 square surface miles of water,
and during the 100 days or so of this event, the Mississippi
River carried 1,600,000,000 plus gallons of water into that
Gulf of Mexico. We know it is 5,000 feet deep, probably more
like 10,000 to 13,000 feet deep. There is a lot of water out
there. We have corresponded with doctors, MDs, and we have
spoken to scientists. We have educated ourselves and understand
that the demonstrable risk from dispersants is negligible and
we hope further studies will be able to help consumers better
understand that challenge.
I would like to thank you and the Administration for all
the efforts that are you are putting forth to make sure that we
continue to do the right things relating to this seafood
concern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Voisin follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Voisin, very much, and we thank
the members from the Louisiana delegation, Mr. Melancon and Mr.
Scalise, for their work in helping to make sure that we keep BP
accountable and the government accountable to ensure that the
innocent victims of this continue to be protected.
Our next witness is Dr. Lisa Suatoni. She is the Senior
Scientist in the Oceans Program at the Natural Resources
Defense Council. She earned her PhD in ecology and
environmental evolutionary biology from Yale University. We
welcome you, Dr. Suatoni.
STATEMENT OF LISA SUATONI
Ms. Suatoni. Thank you. Thank you for this opportunity to
testify.
Mr. Chairman, recent communications by the federal
government on the oil spill have been optimistic. We are
hearing that pieces of the puzzle are falling together, that
the picture looks better than many of us had feared and that we
have turned the corner. However, previous experience from other
oil spills tells us that we are only at the beginning stages of
this event from an ecological perspective, that the story is
necessarily complex and many unanswered questions remain.
In my testimony today, I will focus on three recent actions
from the federal government that have raised concerns. First,
the concerns, the tradeoffs associated with the use of
dispersants. As we heard from Dr. Anastas today, the EPA
conducted recent toxicological studies on the dispersants
Corexit and we heard that Corexit had equal toxicity to other
dispersants, that Corexit had much lower toxicity than the oil
itself and that the Corexit-oil mixture had about equal
toxicity to the oil, at least to two test species. However,
with the release of these findings, the federal government
concluded that the picture is becoming clearer, that the use of
Corexit was an important tool in this response. Well, it may be
tempting to conclude that use of dispersants was a wise
decision in this oil spill, we think that conclusion is
premature. As you already mentioned today, we think it is
unwise to form that conclusion on the basis of two
toxicological studies and observations in the field that
Corexit is at exceedingly low concentrations. As you pointed
out, you raised many important additional questions today and
there are additional ones too.
For example, what proportion of the oil that would
otherwise have ended up on the coast didn't because of the use
of dispersants? Where is the chemically dispersed oil? Is it
encountering vulnerable benthic ecosystems on the shallow shelf
or in deep ocean canyons? Is the chemically dispersed oil more
able to get into the food chain than the oil alone? Is it
getting into the food chain? Is it possible for the dispersant
to biomagnify in the food chain? These are all outstanding
questions. It is clear that the use of chemical dispersants is
a tradeoff but it is not at all clear that we understand what
tradeoff we have made.
On the remaining oil in the environment, we have already
heard a critique from Dr. MacDonald about the federal oil
budget, and NRDC agrees with him, the assertion that 75 percent
of the oil is no longer in the environment is an
overinterpretation of the data and misleading. Because of the
uncertainty associated with the rate of biodegradation of the
oil, we really don't know how much oil remains in the
environment. This needs to be directly measured. If you do a
more direct interpretation of the federal oil budget, it
reveals that 50 percent of the oil may remain in the
environment. That is over 100 million gallons, or nine times
the Exxon Valdez spill. That is a lot of oil.
In addition, the federal oil budget appears to be a
preliminary budget that was perhaps prematurely released. It
was released before peer review. It was released without any
discussion of the precision associated with those estimates. It
is a partial tally of the hydrocarbons in the environment.
Again, as we have heard today, it didn't contain methane, which
scientists believe comprised half of the total hydrocarbons
that went into the environment. And it was a partial analysis
of the fate of the oil. For example, it didn't provide
estimates of how much oil went into an oil slick or what
proportion of the oil made it to the coast or what proportion
of the oil is now on the sea floor. As presented, the federal
oil budget was a partial snapshot of the oil in time. It
doesn't directly address where the oil was, where it is going
and how long it will remain in the environment, and it of
course didn't address the ecological impacts. To fully
understand the risk of the remaining oil or the impacts to the
environment, this picture needs to be filled out and the oil
budget needs to be refined.
Relating to the safety of seafood, recent statements from
the federal government made today in fact assure Americans that
the open fishing grounds and the seafood in the market have no
oil in them and present no health hazard whatsoever. Again,
many important questions remain. My colleague, Dr. Gina
Solomon, who is in the health program at NRDC, highlights three
primary concerns that we have.
First, much of the data in the contamination of the Gulf
seafood are not publicly available so scientists cannot
independently review the findings. NOAA has released data on
fewer than 100 of the samples out of thousands that they say
they have, and only on finfish, not on shrimp. Data from the
State waters has not yet been released. Second, the seafood
monitoring that is currently being done may not be adequate in
terms of sample size and in terms of failure to monitor heavy
metals, which you discussed today, and the dispersants. Third,
assumptions using the FDA risk assessment fail to adequately
account for exposure to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons to
vulnerable populations, mainly developing fetuses, young
children, and subsistence fishing communities, and that is
largely because of the assumptions you already raised about the
weight of adult males.
In conclusion, the Gulf oil disaster represents the largest
oil spill in U.S. history. We understand that the government
wants to turn the corner and wants to signal that the Gulf is
on its way to recovery. However, the facts simply do not bear
that out. This is still a huge amount of oil in the
environment. No matter how you interpret the federal oil
budget, everyone agrees with that. It does a disserve to the
Gulf region and to the public at large to diminish the problem
that this oil presents to the health of Americans and the
ecosystems of the Gulf of Mexico. The government needs to take
the time to do a careful study to assess the fate and the
effects of this spill and greater transparency is warranted. In
the end, we believe that this follow-through is the only thing
that will keep this catastrophe from being such a big disaster.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Suatoni follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Doctor, very much.
Now we will turn to questions from the committee, and I
will begin with you, Dr. MacDonald.
I think that there is a lot of concern about how far the
oil and methane from the spill has spread in the Gulf, how long
it will remain and what harm it could cause. I know that these
questions are areas of active research for you and for the
broader academic community. Can you give us a brief overview of
what academic scientists are finding in that regard?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, this week and today in fact we have
seen the release of a number of careful studies, one by the
University of South Florida reporting on results from a recent
research cruise with the research ship Weather Bird, a careful
study of the oil budget by a scientist at the University of
Georgia in Athens, and today the release of a major paper
published in Science by Richard Camilli and colleagues. These
reports collectively show different aspects of the spread of
the oil and its related compounds that raise major concerns.
The Camilli report documents the--and this is the best science
that I have seen yet out of this process. The Camilli report
documents the spread of compounds called BTEX, and these are
the polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and the ones of greatest
concerns, these are benzenes, xylene, toluene and so forth.
These are the most toxic components of the oil, and they track
a very large plume of this material spreading to the south and
the southwest of the spill.
Now, I will note that in that report, they document that
some 6 to 7 percent--I believe those numbers are correct--of
the BTEX released from the well, the total discharge was
included in that plume. This plume is at 1,100 meters. If that
BTEX is a tracer on the total amount of oil released and
entrained into these deepwater layers, that suggests that we
don't know very well what happened to the balance, and in fact,
the upper layers of the ocean including the surface of the
ocean may have received a bigger dose of oil than we are
presently worried about.
We do know from my work and other work that has been done
that the oil spread over an area of many thousands of square
kilometers, and as it degraded, as it emulsified and sank, it
rained down particles of oil, and this oil became more
concentrated as it reached the coast so we now have a very
widespread amount of oil that is scattered in layers, and this
is what the findings from the Weather Bird documented. They
took core samples going towards Panama City and they found oil
on the bottom everywhere. Now, just sampling with a core, that
suggests that either you are very unlucky or there is a lot of
oil on the bottom, and the Georgia study confirmed many of the
points that have been made in this hearing.
Mr. Markey. OK. Great. Thank you.
While this hearing was ongoing, the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute released a study, and it is a snapshot
from the middle of June, and what they found was a plume of oil
from the well at least 22 miles long, 1.2 miles wide and 650
feet high at a depth of 3,000 feet below the surface in the
Gulf, and contrary to government oil budget report that said
dispersed oil is biodegrading quickly, Woods Hole scientists
found that microbes are degrading the plume relatively slowly,
in the words of Woods Hole. That means that the oil is
persisting for longer periods than expected. They don't know
how toxic it is or if it poses a threat, and unlike some other
researchers, they did not find areas of severe oxygen
depletion, that is dead zones. They explained this discrepancy
because of their use of an older lab-based technique rather
than the use of modern sensors which can give oxygen readings
that are too low when the sensors are coated with oil. So I
just wanted to put that on the record.
Mr. Cooper, how many years have you been shrimping?
Mr. Cooper. Thirty-five years myself.
Mr. Markey. Now, have you been out shrimping recently?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, sir, on the 16th of August it opened up
and I went that day.
Mr. Markey. Now, did you see anything different or unusual
in terms of the waters or the shrimp?
Mr. Cooper. Not in the area I went, which we didn't have a
whole lot of concentration of oil come in, it was a clean area,
so no, at that point I didn't. I just didn't have enough
shrimp. It wasn't there.
Mr. Markey. Dr. Suatoni, would you like to comment on that
in terms of the long-term impact?
Ms. Suatoni. Well, we are concerned primarily with regard
to the shrimp and the presence of the subsurface oil, and that,
as Mr. Cooper said, oil is present in open grounds and that
there may be more exposure. The marine invertebrates do not
process polycystic aromatic hydrocarbons as quickly as food
fish so we think there needs to be special care taken with the
sampling of invertebrates.
Mr. Markey. Dr. MacDonald, would you like to comment?
Mr. MacDonald. Well, I think that the survival of the Gulf
seafood industry requires the survival of seafood, and we have
to be concerned. I mean, this is anecdotal. This is one fishing
trip and I am sure you have gone out before, Mr. Cooper, and
not caught as many fish as you wanted to.
Mr. Cooper. Correct.
Mr. MacDonald. So this one event doesn't tell us the whole
story. But the fishermen, however healthy the seafood is, if
they can't catch it because there has been a lot of some year
classes, then all of the protection and the vigilance of the
FDA is not going to sustain the Gulf seafood industry because
it won't be there. So that is my concern.
Mr. Markey. Mr. Cooper, are you going to go out shrimping
again soon?
Mr. Cooper. Yes, sir.
Mr. Markey. What is your plan right now?
Mr. Cooper. When I get back home, I will be back in the
water.
Mr. Markey. OK. Great. Now, Mr. Cooper, are you convinced
that there is no oil in the areas open to shrimping?
Mr. Cooper. Like I told you earlier, one spot where I did
find the oil was, they say a 5-mile bumper zone. It wasn't 5
miles that one of the bays I did find oil in.
Mr. Markey. Now, in your opinion, is there any way that
NOAA or the FDA can be sure that there is no oil in the water
where shrimping is taking place?
Mr. Cooper. I found it the last day when I was working with
BP over 2 months in the same area, and it just so happened, one
of my last days that I worked, we found it. I called the Coast
Guard and BP and had them come out there and I had to bring it
to their attention. The Coast Guard wouldn't come. Finally, I
caught one that was in the bay and brought him over there and
showed him, so I went to a town hall meeting and I brought it
before them and invited them all to come see what I found, and
they did come, the commander of the Coast Guard and BP came
with me and I did show them in this bay, disturb the bottom and
the oil comes to the top, and they say it is unrecoverable oil
but still yet this opened this bay up for trawling.
Mr. Markey. Now, Mr. Blanchard, some have suggested that
people raising concerns about the quality of seafood simply
want to continue to collect checks from BP. Can you deal with
that issue for us just so we can understand what is going on
down in the Gulf in terms of the relationship between this
program to pay the fishermen who need to be paid and again an
incentive to get back out there as soon as you can, everything
is OK. So how should we be viewing this tension?
Mr. Blanchard. Well, I told BP from the very beginning that
they was going about it the wrong way. What we asked them to do
was to help the fishermen and give them an incentive to go back
fishing. If they would have left the fishermen fish, even
though they had to go further away from their home, even though
they would have to go to different fishing grounds, well, pay
them for that. Give them an incentive to go out. Then it would
have kept the market going, you know. But BP took the approach
that they were going to do a PR program and put all the
shrimpers to work for them, but in my opinion, BP never tried
to pick up the oil. They have never tried to pick up the oil. I
have talked to hundreds of boats that said they found oil,
contacted BP and BP told them not to try to pick it up and go
the other way, and this has been going on for a hundred and
some days. I have lived through this.
Mr. Markey. Why do you think that is the attitude of BP?
Mr. Blanchard. It was cheaper to sink it. Out of sight, out
of mind and out of here. That is the approach BP took, you
know.
But as far as going back to seafood testing, all the
seafood right now is probably being tested more than any other
product in the world, you know. I don't believe beef or pork or
any seafood in the world--we get seafood from foreign countries
that personally wouldn't eat. It's probably being grown in a
sewer, and the FDA checks 1 to 2 percent out of it, and out of
the 1 to 2 percent they check, 40 percent to 60 percent is no
good, it is rejected. So, you know, that is one thing I wanted
to bring up. All the seafood right now is being tested probably
more than any product in the world, so hopefully they are doing
their job and they are doing it right.
What I would like to see is for one time before I die is
somebody that works for the government be held accountable for
something. Whoever is testing it, whatever agency is testing
it, they ought to come out and give us a paper and say we
guarantee this product is good, and if something goes wrong,
they will be held accountable, not us.
Mr. Markey. Well, you know that is why we are having this
hearing. You know that is what is happening here today. We are
sending a very strong signal to those who are responsible
that----
Mr. Blanchard. Well, that is what I would like to see.
Mr. Markey [continuing]. They are representing to the
American people that this is safe.
Mr. Blanchard. I think if they would be held accountable,
people would have more trust in the government agencies. But,
you know, there are certain government agencies that are
responsible for this oil spill when nobody is being held
accountable.
Mr. Markey. Well, you know, we are going along beginning
with the Minerals Management Service----
Mr. Blanchard. That is what I would start with.
Mr. Markey [continuing]. And there are a lot of people
there who are going to be made accountable, and we are going to
move through this entire process. We are not going away. We are
going to make sure that all of the lessons that can be
extracted from what happened are learned and implemented in
order to protect the public.
Mr. Cooper, in your testimony, you indicated that BP
required you to wear a hazmat suit when you went out into the
waters. How long ago was that?
Mr. Cooper. Oh, 2 weeks ago.
Mr. Markey. Now you are being told to head back out into
the same waters without any additional protection. Is that
correct?
Mr. Cooper. And that is very troubling, yes, it is.
Mr. Markey. Do you think that you are being asked to work
in an unsafe environment?
Mr. Cooper. Not necessarily. Some of the areas, they didn't
have the oil, so I don't see in those areas that it is unsafe,
but in some of the areas, yes, it is unsafe. If they are going
to make us wear hazmat suits and tape up and take hazmat
training, how can you send fishermen back out again? But some
of the areas, yes, the oil never came, no, it is not there.
Some of these guys had to take these jobs instead of fishing,
and I know there is a big controversy in Louisiana right now. A
bunch of people wants the fishermen to go back to work. We only
have limited areas to fish. They want to put them back into the
waters and make them go to work but then they are paying us
lower prices, with high fuel prices. The price is not there. We
don't have the area to work. So these guys have to do it. But
the opening and closing of the seasons with wildlife and
fisheries, they pretty much had to do what they had to do, and
if it means going out there and working for BP to make a
living, well, so be it. That is what they had to do.
Mr. Markey. Now, in your testimony, you indicated a smaller
than normal size catch this week. Have you noticed any other
changes to the shrimp or to the fish, the color, the size, the
spots, the smells?
Mr. Cooper. Not in this area, no, sir. This area was a
clean area.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Mr. Voisin, would you like to inject your thoughts at this
point?
Mr. Voisin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say
that there are two small areas in south Louisiana that have
been oiled, and that is the Barataria system where Mr. Cooper
actually harvests and Mr. Blanchard has his dock, and then out
at the mouth of the river, Pasalutra. We have 7,500 miles of
shoreline in south Louisiana if you go in and out every bayou
and every bay and lake. Only about 400 miles of those were
oiled. It happens to significantly be where Mr. Blanchard and
Mr. Cooper are located. Seafood from throughout Louisiana is
safe. It is wholesome. And while there can be questions
raised----
Mr. Markey. You are saying that the seafood which is being
sold is safe but there are many areas where if it was caught
and sold it would not be safe. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Voisin. No, the seafood----
Mr. Markey. You are saying all seafood caught anywhere off
of the coastline of Louisiana is now safe? Is that what you are
saying?
Mr. Voisin. All the seafood caught off the coastline of
Louisiana is now safe and that is put into the commercial
market. Yes, sir. Eighty-seven percent of our State is
currently open to the harvest of seafood. That occurred last
week as a result of the intensive testing and protocols. And I
know we have talked a lot about protocols today and about the
dispersant testing and oil testing. Looking at the risk
assessment based on the protocol, Mr. Chairman, I took a look
at it, and in terms of oysters, oysters are consumed at about a
quarter a pound per capita consumption. In the risk assessment,
they used a number between 9 and 10 pounds per capita
consumption on an annual basis, and they figured that exposure
at 5 years, so they are exceeding the per capita consumption by
40 times and they exposure by 5 years, and they are looking at
the risk of illness at one in 10,000, which is traditionally
looked at as one in either 100,000 or one in a million, so that
is being magnified significantly, and we are meeting by 100 to
1,000 fold all of the criteria in the reopening protocols.
Mr. Markey. So I just wanted to again clarify. You are not
represented that in the areas, the federal waters that are now
closed, that it is safe to eat the fish that is caught in those
areas. You are not saying that?
Mr. Voisin. I did not say that, sir. In the open waters
where fish are being harvested and commercially sold, I would
feed it to my kids, my wife, and we do eat it often, yes, sir.
Mr. Markey. But in those other areas, you would not feed
that fish to your family, in the waters are now closed?
Mr. Voisin. In the waters that are closed, we can't. I
mean, we can't harvest from those----
Mr. Markey. That is what I am saying.
Mr. Voisin. So the bottom line is, that as they do the
reopening and go through the protocol, absolutely I would feed
that to my family.
Mr. Markey. Let me get back to you, Mr. Cooper. Can you
give us a comment? And then you, Mr. Blanchard.
Mr. Cooper. Would I eat the shrimp? We have been eating
them. I have been eating them. Not in the areas that are
closed, no, I haven't eaten them, but the ones I caught, I did
eat. I will eat them.
Mr. Markey. Mr. Blanchard.
Mr. Blanchard. I definitely eat them. I don't think there
is any difference on what is open and what is closed.
Mr. Markey. OK. Great. Thank you.
Dr. MacDonald, could you comment here, and divide the
question here first in terms of what you believe is safe and
what is not safe and how the American people should be viewing
this.
Mr. MacDonald. Well, I would certainly eat them too, and
perhaps I can have the occasion sometime. I will say that my
concern remains the productivity, not the safety. I think that
we have to have a productive Gulf, and the 350-mile statistic
is heartening, that it could have been worse. But as you move
offshore, you get a lot of areas that have got oil on the
bottom, you know, further out, and as you go to the east, we
see a lot of oil off Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, my
State. In those areas when people go offshore and take samples,
they are finding this buried oil and they are finding this
buried oil in the beaches and they are finding this oil in the
marshes, and that 350 miles did get a lot, and the edges of
these marshes where the marsh grasses were oiled, my concern is
that, you know, if it dies back 10 percent or 5 percent, that
opens up, that dilates these channels. It makes them wider.
That means the flow of water through is greater. That means the
loss of wetland is greater. We have a tremendous amount of work
to do to restore the Gulf of Mexico. We had a lot to do before
all this and now we have a whole bunch more.
So my concern is the ecosystem and the productivity. I
believe in the fishermen and the FDA and protecting our safety.
Mr. Markey. Dr. Suatoni, you have heard the comments on
this question. Can you add yours as well?
Ms. Suatoni. I would like to emphasize, build on what Dr.
MacDonald said, but emphasize that long-term monitoring is
imperative. What we learned from the Exxon Valdez spill was
that oil that gets into the coast and into low-oxygen zone
stays toxic in its kind of full toxic form for decades, and any
time it gets disturbed or it rains, it can seep into the
environment, and these near-coastal fisheries, I think it is
important that they continue to monitor for the exposure to
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons and metals over the long term.
Mr. Markey. Can I ask this, Dr. Suatoni? Was there anything
that was of concern to you that you heard on the opening panel
from the government officials? What is it that stuck out that
you think needs more attention?
Ms. Suatoni. A few things stuck out. One was that they are
only now developing tests to examine whether or not dispersants
bioaccumulate. That seems to be something that we should have
known since dispersants are a common tool in oil spill
response. Another thing that you know we are concerned about is
that the risk assessment used by the FDA is not adequately
conservative for specific vulnerable populations. It was
reassuring to hear that they are open to reconsidering that
margin of safety. And I would say with regards to seafood,
those were the two primary concerns.
Mr. Markey. Was there anything of concern, Mr. Voisin, that
you heard in the opening testimony that you would like us to
continue to focus on?
Mr. Voisin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would say that I
stated earlier in response to Dr. Suatoni that I feel that the
risk assessment that deals with the protocol for reopening
basically are much more conservative than there should be any
concern related to. I think they have gone way beyond what
would be conservative to the nth degree, and I described that a
moment ago in my answer to you.
Mr. Markey. Even though you heard concerns about heavy
metals and other issues, that is not of concern to you?
Mr. Voisin. Having spent countless hours talking to PhDs as
well as doctors relating to this and the metabolization of all
of these things through finfish and shellfish, I personally
think that there is no concern relating to those, although
there is a concern and we should be concerned----
Mr. Markey. Even though there have never been any studies
on this subject, you still have no concern?
Mr. Voisin. I personally do not, no, sir, given the----
Mr. Markey. Do you have concerns, Mr. MacDonald?
Mr. MacDonald. Regarding the government report?
Mr. Markey. About any aspect of this including the testing
for heavy metals and the other issues that seem to still be
unresolved.
Mr. MacDonald. Yes. My concern is for the coastal and
marine ecosystem of the Gulf of Mexico. I am concerned that I
have not yet heard from NOAA their plan for monitoring the
continued health of this ecosystem and I think that when we
look at the oil spill budget, it is unmistakable that an
enormous dose of oil was given and really putting it simply,
Mother Nature is being made to clean up our big mess, and I
think Mother Nature suffers for it. I think that we need to
endow a permanent fund for the restoration, the understanding
and the sustenance of the Gulf of Mexico coastal and marine
ecosystem in perpetuity, and I don't hear that coming from NOAA
and I would like to hear that.
Mr. Markey. Great.
Mr. Blanchard, Mr. Cooper, Mr. Voisin, everyone wants the
Gulf seafood industry to rebound from the BP disaster. Your
industry did not cause this mess. Your industry, your business
and livelihoods were harmed by the spill. What would each of
you ask the federal government to do to help establish the
safety of Gulf seafood and to help reassure the consuming
public about the safety of Gulf seafood? You heard the
questions that I posed to the government panel that appeared
here earlier about the need for additional tests to be done to
help address some of the issues that have not yet been
definitely addressed such as the metabolites of the oil, the
effect of dispersants, heavy metals and long-term impacts that
this disaster could have on the quality and productivity of
seafood in the Gulf. Do you agree that those should be
priorities and what other issues would you like the government
to address?
Mr. Blanchard. Well, what I didn't like what I heard about
the government, it looked like they were just checking the open
places. If it would be me, I would go to the worst place and
check that first and then see what I am looking at, you know.
It looked like every time you listened to the government, they
would say we just checked the open places. Well, why don't we
check the closed place and see why it is closed, you know?
Nobody seems to be checking that. And, you know, we have been
severely harmed by this. I call them bad people, BP. You know,
since this happened in this 100-some days, I got my secretary
to look at the bills we paid. We paid $488,000 in bills, and I
received $165,000 in payments from BP, and, you know, it
reminds me, I heard the President said that he wasn't going to
let our cash flow be interrupted, but if I don't have $323,000
to pay my bills, I am out of business. You know, why is nobody
holding BP accountable to come in and make it right what they
have done to us?
Mr. Markey. Well, I will tell you one thing. This committee
wants to work with you, Mr. Blanchard. We want to make sure
that BP stands for ``bills paid.''
Mr. Blanchard. Yes, that sounds better.
Mr. Markey. And that includes your bills. So let us work
together on that and make sure your bills are paid but other
people's bills as well. Thank you.
Mr. Blanchard. Thank you very much.
Mr. Markey. Mr. Cooper?
Mr. Cooper. Just to make sure they keep long-term testing
and they just don't forget about it, and one other issue as far
as what is going on in the Gulf now with the Vessel of
Opportunity. They are trying to take the money that we made
working with BP off our claims, and that is not fair for the
fishermen that went out there and did the job. We were cleaning
their mess, and now they are going to hold us, our claims
towards that money, and that is not fair for what we just did.
We went out there. We put our lives on the line. We cleaned
their mess up and now they are going to take it against our
claims, and that is totally wrong. For BP to even think about
doing something like this is uncalled for because we did a job
and we expect to get paid for the job that we did.
Mr. Markey. Mr. Voisin.
Mr. Voisin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that long-
term testing is critical to the Gulf and the survival of the
Gulf. I believe that the State of Louisiana--I know that the
State of Louisiana has requested $457 million from BP for a 20-
year testing program. We have not approved it yet but it is
needed to continue to monitor the health of our species, the
viability of its reproductive cycles.
But more importantly, one of our great challenges is the
brand of the Gulf of Mexico. The brand of Gulf seafood has
taken the greatest hit in the history of my seven generations
of family that have plied the waters of south Louisiana. People
need to understand there may be questions but there are no
questions about what is in the market today, that there may be
questions about fishing areas that are closed, and we should
ask those questions, but that product that is in the market
today is wholesome and safe based on tremendously conservative
science and we need to convince those American people.
Customers at restaurants are now instead of ordering oysters on
the half shell, very close to my heart, shrimp cocktails, they
are saying instead of having that as an appetizer, I will have
chicken wings, and instead of having that grouper as my main
course, I will have a steak. We need to overcome that. A
hundred-plus days of oil gushing in the bottom right-hand
corner of the TV screen has branded us as something other than
we are. We have a challenge. We will meet that challenge.
However, the challenge is in a very small part of the whole
Gulf of Mexico. We need to look at the whole. It is 200 million
gallons of oil that has escaped from this situation. We need to
deal with it. We are blessed in the Gulf of Mexico with having
the microbes that will eat oil. That was not the case in
relationship to the Valdez incident where they don't have the
warm water. We are cursed with that warm water and that warm
water as well.
Mr. Markey. Would you like to see more testing in the areas
that have the heaviest concentration of oil right now? Would
you like to see that implemented now so that we will have that
information in the long term going forward, Mr. Voisin?
Mr. Voisin. I think it is happening, Representative Markey.
I believe that that is happening. Could more--more is better. I
think NOAA----
Mr. Markey. We heard on the opening panel that there was no
intensive program to do that right now. You would like to see
that kind of intensive program right now?
Mr. Voisin. I would support that, and I have been on
conference calls with NOAA where they have reported they are
doing testing in the closed areas. I have been on conference
calls with the FDA as well. Now, that is what they have
indicated on those conference calls, that they have done
testing of seafood products in those areas. They have done oil
plume testing and they have indicated that they are continuing
to do that. Today, I forget the guy from NOAA----
Mr. Markey. So you want them right now to be testing the
fish inside of the closed areas? You want that to happen?
Mr. Voisin. I believe, Mr. Markey, they are. Yes, I do want
it.
Mr. Markey. But if they are not doing it right now, you
believe it is important for them to test the fish inside of the
most oiled areas right now?
Mr. Voisin. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Mr. Markey. Absolutely?
Mr. Voisin. Absolutely.
Mr. Markey. OK. Great. That helps us a lot.
So let us do this. Why don't we ask each one of you to give
us your closing thoughts in reverse order of the opening
statements so that we have a sense of what it is that you want
us to retain, to focus on, as we are going forward in the
Congressional oversight of this greatest of all environmental
calamities. So we will begin with you, Dr. Suatoni.
Ms. Suatoni. Thank you. NRDC is concerned with the recent
tone of the communications and analyses coming out of the
federal government. There is a desire to rush to judgment, to
turn the corner and accelerate the analysis of the impacts the
oil has had on the ecosystem, and it is of great concern.
According to the Oil Pollution Act, the federal government is
required to fully and fairly assess the impacts of the oil
spill, and we hope that they take the time and do the necessary
comprehensive study that is required to get that done.
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
Mr. Voisin.
Mr. Voisin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Gulf of Mexico
States, the State of Louisiana that I live in, have been
challenged in the last 5 years by five major events, this spill
being the most recent significant event. We will be scarred but
we will not be broken as a result of this. The seafood
community is a viable community. My family left France under
exile orders in the 1770s, went to Canada and was kicked out of
Canada. So far we have not been kicked out of Louisiana and
hopefully that won't occur. We will be resilient.
You know, people aren't really interested necessarily in
the rough seas that you have but whether or not you bring the
ship in, and we are going to be about, and I hope the federal
government continues its effort and doubles if appropriate and
needed to bring that ship in and that is safe seafood of clean
and healthy Gulf Coast. We will have scars from this just like
I do from different accidents and challenges in my life but I
am viable. The Gulf is a viable place to live. The seafood is
wholesome and safe. It is harvested from the Gulf of Mexico and
we want Americans to know that.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Voisin.
Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Long-term testing on the oil, testing on the
Corexit and also testing on our harvest and whether it is has
been depleted or not, a stock assessment to see what is
happening to our fisheries because the last season that just
opened, it really opened your eyes and said what is going to
happen, so that is some of the things that we would like to
see, testing on the Corexit for sure, no doubt, and the oil for
long term.
Mr. Markey. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Blanchard.
Mr. Blanchard. Yes. Thank you. Well, basically for 28 years
of my life I have had a product that has always been known as
the best because it was the best, and I would just like the
perception of the American public to know it is the best again,
you know. You know, in our business, we don't work 9 to 5, we
work 5 to 9, you know. We work 7 days a week. It is my life. I
guess I will say it like Tony Hayward: I pretty much want my
life back. You know, I want my life back. They took everything
that I worked for all these years and one company doesn't know
what they are doing or cut too many corners and put me out of
business, I mean, just ruined my whole life, and nobody is
being held responsible but me, and I didn't do anything wrong.
I mean, I am just so confused. I go to work like I always do. I
walk around in circles, don't know what to do. I mean, until it
happens to you, you know, until you live through what we are
living through, you know, it just--I don't know what is going
to happen, you know. Every night I go to sleep, I can't sleep.
I lay down in my bed. I know how many squares I got on the
ceiling, you know.
You know, I just hope that the government makes BP clean
everything up and everything returns back to normal and the
American public has confidence that the seafood that we are
going to buy, we are not going to sell them anything I wouldn't
eat myself, and the last thing we want to do is get anybody
sick and we will do the best that we can and make sure
everything is all right. Thank you.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Blanchard.
And to you and Mr. Cooper, we thank you for coming here
today. We know that you are individuals who have a tremendous
amount at stake here, and just so you know, if at any point
tomorrow, next week, next month, that you can just dial our
number here on the committee to help you personally with your
own family situations as you are going forward, and we will
give you the number to call as soon as this hearing is done
just so that you know that there is someone who will be behind
you.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you very much.
Mr. Markey. It takes a lot of courage for you guys to be
here today and we appreciate that.
Dr. MacDonald.
Mr. MacDonald. BP is going to have to pay a fine, Mr.
Chairman, a big fine, and my concern is that that fine will be
dedicated to restoring the Gulf of Mexico, not disappear into a
treasury somewhere, and I hope that the houses of Congress can
work together and the parties can work together to guarantee
that the money that is paid here goes into permanent
restoration projects. I am talking about restoring marshes. I
am talking about marine protected areas where they are needed.
I am talking about better enforcement of coastal runoff. Those
are all things that have to happen to make our Gulf whole
again. That is what we all want. If you all will do that, you
will have massive support from the people of the Gulf of
Mexico. Thank you very much.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Dr. MacDonald, very much. And I
would also like to add, Dr. MacDonald, that the House of
Representatives just 3 weeks ago did adopt one of your
recommendations to the oil spill response bill that we passed
on the House Floor to create a new trust fund for oceans so
that funds raised from drilling in our oceans will also go
towards protecting and improving our oceans. The Senate has
said that they will take up the legislation when they return in
September. That is always problematic, dealing with the Senate,
but we did in the House of Representatives take your
recommendation and implement it, and hopefully the same will be
true in the Senate so that it can go to President Obama's desk.
What we have learned today is that the oil is not gone. The
oil remaining in the Gulf waters or washed up on the floor is
equivalent to 10 Exxon Valdez-size spills and could be much
more. Most of the Gulf has been reopened to fishing but the
industry is not in the clear. Long-term impacts on stocks
remain unknown. If one contaminated catch makes it to market
and makes people sick, then the reputation and the credibility
of one of America's most important fisheries will be in
jeopardy.
So we must engage this issue with continued caution and
vigilance is necessary. We have seen some premature
celebration. Dispersed oil is not the same as oil which has
disappeared. Data, formulas, algorithms need to be made public
so that independent scientists can verify the conclusions that
are now shaping the debate on what to do now. We need to test
the fishing stocks in the closed fishing areas now so that we
understand what is going on now. That will help us in the
future to protect the fishermen, to protect the consumers of
fish in our country, but we must spend the money now so that in
the future there are no questions that are unexamined, that we
ensure that the compensation is given to those who will need it
for as long as possible until we make everything as safe as is
possible. All of that is in my opinion going to be something
that this committee and the American people will need to be
vigilant to ensure is put in place so that the people in the
Gulf of Mexico at the end of the day are made completely whole.
BP in my opinion will try to walk away as fast as they can.
BP lowballed the size of the spill in the first week saying it
was 1,000 barrels. Then they said it was 5,000 barrels. They
knew in the first week that it was a huge spill. It turns out
to be between 53,000 and 63,000 barrels per day. That is not
1,000 barrels. That challenged the level of response in those
first weeks, in those first months because of the misleading
information. People were less vigilant than they would have
been. The response was less intense than it would have been if
we understood the magnitude. We must continue that level of
vigilance. We must assume that we need to use all of our
resources to understand what is going on right now so that in
the future there can be the proper protections which are put in
place and that the proper compensation is given to all of those
whose lives have been adversely affected by what has happened.
So while BP might be spending tens of millions of dollars
on their television commercials saying that they are on the
job, even today we identified many questions which have yet to
be answered in a satisfactory fashion and we need to make sure
that they are for the long-term wellbeing of the residents of
the Gulf.
We thank you all for being here today and we hope to be
able to stay in close contact with you. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]