    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                           COMBATING THE BP OIL SPILL

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

                                     OF THE

                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 27, 2010

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 111-128

          Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

                            energycommerce.house.gov

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                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                     HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
    JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan            JOE BARTON, Texas
      Chairman Emeritus                    Ranking Member
    EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RALPH M. HALL, Texas
    RICK BOUCHER, Virginia               FRED UPTON, Michigan
    FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey       CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
    BART GORDON, Tennessee               NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
    BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois              ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
    ANNA G. ESHOO, California            JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
    BART STUPAK, Michigan                JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
    ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York             ROY BLUNT, Missouri
    GENE GREEN, Texas                    STEVE BUYER, Indiana
    DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado              GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
      Vice Chairman                      JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
    LOIS CAPPS, California               MARY BONO MACK, California
    MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania       GREG WALDEN, Oregon
    JANE HARMAN, California              LEE TERRY, Nebraska
    TOM ALLEN, Maine                     MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
    JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois       SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
    CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas           JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
    JAY INSLEE, Washington               TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
    TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
    MIKE ROSS, Arkansas                  MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York          PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
    JIM MATHESON, Utah                   STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
    G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
    CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
    JOHN BARROW, Georgia
    BARON P. HILL, Indiana
    DORIS O. MATSUI, California
    DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin
        Islands
    KATHY CASTOR, Florida
    JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
    CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
    ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio
    JERRY McNERNEY, California
    BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
    BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
    PETER WELCH, Vermont
                     Subcommittee on Energy and Environment

                   EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
    MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania       RALPH M. HALL, Texas
    JAY INSLEE, Washington               FRED UPTON, Michigan
    G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina     ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
    CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana          JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
    BARON HILL, Indiana                  JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
    DORIS O. MATSUI, California          STEVE BUYER, Indiana
    JERRY McNERNEY, California           GREG WALDEN, Oregon
    PETER WELCH, Vermont                 SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
    JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan            JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
    RICK BOUCHER, Virginia               MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
    FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
    ELIOT ENGEL, New York
    GENE GREEN, Texas
    LOIS CAPPS, California
    JANE HARMAN, California
    CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
    TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
    MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
    JIM MATHESON, Utah
    JOHN BARROW, Georgia

                                 C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hon. Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress from the
      Commonwealth of Massachusetts, opening statement...............     1
    Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Michigan, opening statement....................................     3
    Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of California, opening statement...............................     4
    Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Texas, opening statement.......................................     5
        Prepared statement...........................................     7
    Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Michigan, opening statement.................................    13
    Hon. Cliff Stearns, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Florida, opening statement..................................    14
    Hon. Jay Inslee, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Washington, opening statement..................................    15
    Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Illinois, opening statement....................................    16
    Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Texas, opening statement.......................................    16
    Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from the
      Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, opening statement................    17
    Hon. Lois Capps, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      California, opening statement..................................    18
    Hon. Mary Bono Mack, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of California, opening statement...............................    19
    Hon. Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      California, opening statement..................................    19
    Hon. Michael C. Burgess, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Texas, opening statement..............................    20
    Hon. Tammy Baldwin, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Wisconsin, opening statement................................    21
    Hon. Steve Scalise, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Louisiana, opening statement................................    22
    Hon. Charlie Melancon, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Louisiana, opening statement..........................    30

                                   Witnesses

    Jo-Ellen Darcy, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works);
      accompanied by Terrence ``Rock'' Salt, Principal Deputy
      Assistant Secretary of the Army................................    23
        Prepared statement...........................................    26
    Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency..    33
        Prepared statement...........................................    36
    Larry Robinson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
      Atmosphere, NOAA...............................................    46
        Prepared statement...........................................    49
    David J. Hayes, Deputy Secretary, Department of the Interior.....    67
        Prepared statement...........................................    59
    Rear Admiral James Watson, Deputy, Unified Area Command, United
      States Coast Guard.............................................    68
        Prepared statement...........................................    71
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   151

                               Submitted Material

    BP interim report, dated May 24, 2010............................   101
    Letter of May 24, 2010, from Mr. Burgess to United States Army
      Corps of Engineers.............................................   149
    Letter of May 26, 2010, from Mr. Burgess to the White House......   150

                           COMBATING THE BP OIL SPILL

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 27, 2010

                      House of Representatives,
                Subcommittee on Energy and Environment,
                              Committee on Energy and Commerce,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:09 p.m., in
    Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward J. Markey
    [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
        Present: Representatives Markey, Inslee, Butterfield,
    Melancon, McNerney, Dingell, Green, Capps, Harman, Baldwin,
    Matheson, Barrow, Waxman (ex officio), Upton, Stearns, Shimkus,
    Blunt, Pitts, Bono Mack, Sullivan, Burgess, Scalisle, Griffith,
    and Barton.
        Also Present: Representative Castor.
        Staff Present: Phil Barnett, Staff Director; Bruce Wolpe,
    Senior Advisor; Greg Dotson, Chief Counsel, Energy and
    Environment; Joel Beauvais, Counsel; Michal Freedhoff, Counsel;
    Melissa Cheatham, Professional Staff Member; Caitlin Haberman,
    Special Assistant; Meredith Fuchs, Chief Investigative Counsel;
    Karen Lightfoot, Communications Director, Senior Policy
    Advisor; Elizabeth Letter, Special Assistant; Jen Berenholz,
    Deputy Clerk; Mitchell Smiley, Special Assistant; Mary Neumayr,
    Minority Counsel; Aaron Cutler, Minority Counsel; Peter
    Spencer, Minority Professional Staff Member; Andrea Spring,
    Minority Professional Staff Member; and Garrett Golding,
    Minority Legislative Analyst.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
            CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

        Mr. Markey. Good afternoon. It is day 38 of the BP oil
    spill disaster. Over these 38 days, BP has misled the public on
    the amount of oil spewing into the ocean. They waited until day
    23 to release a 30-second clip of the oil spill. They waited
    until day 31 to release a live feed of the spill. They
    continued to use dispersants that EPA has directed them to
    replace. And while we all hope that the top kill is successful,
    it is one of several untested strategies to address oil leaks
    at this depth, signaling BP's utter lack of preparedness.
        Through BP's obfuscation of the truth, the Federal
    Government has been working to determine the impacts of the
    spill and to mitigate the damage done to our environment,
    economy, and coastal communities. This is BP's spill, but it is
    America's ocean.
        After the initial explosion of the oil rig on April 20, the
    Coast Guard was first on the scene for a search and rescue
    operation that saved the lives of 115 workers. The
    administration immediately established a command center.
        A day after the explosion, the Coast Guard, EPA, and the
    Departments of Interior, Commerce, and Homeland Security joined
    State and local groups to coordinate resources and oversee BP's
    response.
        Within a week, Secretary Napolitano and Secretary Salazar
    signed on to an order for a joint investigation to determine
    the causes of this disaster.
        Homeland Security designated this event as a spill of
    national significance to fully leverage resources for the
    Federal Government's response.
        The Department of Commerce declared a fishery disaster in
    the Gulf to mobilize assistance to fishermen and fishing
    communities.
        NOAA has taken a lead role in evaluating the impacts of oil
    on marine resources and advising cleanup efforts.
        EPA has been monitoring air quality and has directed BP to
    use less toxic and more effective dispersants.
        However, in addition to the spill under the sea surface, we
    are also confronting the spillover from the Bush
    administration. This culture was established during the Bush
    administration when it compromised the Minerals Management
    Service, or MMS, responsible for offshore drilling oversight.
        On Tuesday, the Department of Interior released a report
    detailing how during the Bush administration MMS personnel
    routinely accepted expensive gifts from the very people they
    were supposed to be regulating. The Obama administration has
    responded with a plan to fundamentally restructure the MMS into
    separate entities for leasing, safety, and revenue collection,
    with independent missions to strengthen oversight of offshore
    energy operations. Any changes in MMS personnel will not change
    their dedication to effective oversight of our energy
    resources.
        Congress has also been working to determine the causes and
    consequences of this disaster, holding the companies involved
    accountable. BP, Halliburton, and Transocean have been
    questioned about the events leading to the accident. Chairman
    Waxman and Chairman Stupak are leading that investigation, and
    they will get to the bottom of what efforts were actually taken
    to stop the leak and attempts to clean up the mess.
        Ocean experts have testified to the effects of the oil on
    marine ecosystems. I sought and succeeded in making BP's live
    feed from the ocean floor available to the public, working with
    members of this committee.
        For years, the oil industry told us an oil spill was
    impossible. Then they said stopping the leak is mission
    impossible. It is clear that BP was unprepared for this.
        America is looking to the administration to provide
    oversight and to prevent this from ever happening again. There
    has been an impressive Federal response. To date, the Federal
    Government has deployed 1,300 vessels, over 1.85 million feet
    of containment boom, and directed 22,000 Federal employees to
    work on the BP oil spill.
        As this work continues, we must realize that we cannot
    drill our way to energy independence. We have 2 percent of the
    world's oil reserves, 5 percent of the world's population, and
    we consume 25 percent of the world's oil on a daily basis. The
    BP oil disaster is another reminder that we must move to a
    clean energy future, buoyed by increased fuel economy, wind,
    solar, hydropower, and efficiency and other technologies that
    can help us in the long run to avoid this ever happening again.
        Let me turn now and recognize the ranking member of the
    subcommittee, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Upton.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

        Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate you
    calling this hearing today.
        We are all outraged and saddened by the disastrous oil
    spill in the Gulf that left 11 dead and has spread untold
    barrels of oil into the sea. It is a very, very tragic event
    for our country. I would hope to see more hearings from this
    committee so that we can get answers and the companies
    involved--from both the administration as well as the companies
    involved about what happened, how we can fix it, and how we can
    ensure that a disaster like this cannot and does not happen
    again.
        It is not time for knee-jerk policy reactions but for
    answers. We must first determine what caused the accident and
    how we can prevent similar accidents from happening in the
    future.
        Second, we need to make sure, crystal clear to all
    involved, that the polluter will pay. The American taxpayers
    should not be on the hook for a dime for the cost of this
    accident.
        I was a member of the Conference Committee for the Oil
    Pollution Act of 1990. There is no doubt in my mind that the
    President and his administration have both the authority and
    the obligation to take control of the crisis. Clearly, from
    where we stand today, it has not happened.
        The spill from the Deepwater Horizon rig a month ago is the
    first major spill since enactment of the 1990 law. The Oil
    Pollution Act gives the President the authority to oversee the
    cleanup managed by the responsible party or federalize the
    efforts. It is the obligation of this committee and the
    Congress to scrutinize what procedures were taken by BP and the
    Obama administration and how these actions or inactions led to
    the mess that we see today. Hindsight is 20/20, but lessons can
    be learned and applied in the future.
        The Coast Guard has been charged with a Herculean task.
    However, I am concerned that the delays of the administration
    have set them up for failure. For example, it was 9 days after
    the accident before the administration tapped the Department of
    Defense to assist by deploying needed equipment to combat the
    spill site a mile underneath the water surface.
        I am also particularly interested in the Coast Guard's
    delay of initiating the controlled burn of the surface oil
    immediately after the spill occurred. It appears that there
    could have been a delay in using that tactic because of air
    pollution concerns.
        Was EPA involved in that decision or the delay? Did
    CO2 or climate change concerns play a role in that
    decision?
        Additionally, why were chemical dispersants that make oil
    less harmful to the environment not fully used from the onset?
    Again, was this due to environmental concerns that may not have
    been warranted in that instance?
        Unfortunately, this is not the first safety or
    environmental problem that we have seen from BP. Clearly, they
    were not prepared to deal with a leak 5,000 feet below the sea.
    There is plenty of blame to go around, but as The Washington
    Post indicated this week, you cannot plug a well with
    regulation, speeches, or paper.
        There has not ever been a disaster like this in the 30
    years that they have been drilling in the deep water or the
    Gulf. After such a stellar safety record, you would start to
    think that things like this could not happen.
        While we can't turn our back on offshore drilling, we need
    to do a much better job and be prepared for the future. We need
    to do what we can to prevent this from ever happening again
    and, at the same time, be prepared for the worst. I look
    forward to the testimony and interaction.
        I yield back my time.
        Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair recognizes the gentleman from full committee, the
    gentleman from California, Mr. Waxman.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                 CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

        Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman, it is now 5 weeks since the
    Deepwater Horizon disaster; and each day brings more
    discouraging news of the devastating impact this oil spill is
    causing to the economy, to the environment, and the people of
    the Gulf Coast region. Each day we are learning more about the
    cascade of mistakes and misjudgments that caused this
    catastrophe.
        On Tuesday, May 25, committee staff received a briefing
    from BP officials, including the Group Vice President For
    Safety and Operations and the leader of BP's internal
    investigation. BP shared with the committee a 48-page document
    summarizing the company's interim incident investigation, and I
    ask that this document be made part of the hearing record.
        Mr. Markey. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
        Mr. Waxman. We learned a great deal from that presentation
    about BP's preliminary observations of possible causes of the
    blowout and explosion at the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig in
    the Gulf of Mexico. We summarized this in a memorandum that
    Chairman Stupak and I released on Tuesday.
        What we are now learning is that BP's investigation appears
    to omit key issues. There have been several reports today
    concerning questionable well design choices made by BP,
    including the decisions to use a type of casing that could
    allow gas to flow up the annular space to the wellhead to limit
    the number of spacers centering the casing, despite objections
    by Halliburton, and to curtail the length of time that drilling
    fluids were circulating to clean gas out of the well. Yet none
    of these issues were mentioned by BP when they briefed our
    staff. That raises the possibility that BP's internal
    investigation is not examining the consequences of BP's own
    decisions and conduct.
        Our investigation is examining all potential causes of the
    blowout, including the responsibility of BP. That is why we are
    sending a letter to BP today seeking more information on these
    issues.
        I want to thank Chairmen Markey and Stupak for their
    leadership in this investigation. The committee's first hearing
    was held by the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee on
    May 12 where Chairman Stupak revealed new information about
    problems with the blowout preventer. Chairman Markey has led
    the way in Congress in investigating the amount of oil coming
    from the well and providing video feeds of the leak.
        Our next hearing will be a field hearing by the Oversight
    and Investigations Subcommittee in Chalmette, Louisiana, on
    Monday, June 7, 2010, at 10:00 a.m., where we will explore some
    of the impacts of this oil spill. We will continue a broad and
    aggressive investigation throughout the month of June.
        I pray that the efforts today will seal up this well and
    stop the damage that is being done. But that can't be the end
    of it. We have got to make sure that this kind of disaster
    never happens again and we know what went wrong so we can hold
    the proper parties responsible.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair recognizes the ranking member of the full
    committee, Mr. Barton from Texas.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE BARTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                    CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

        Mr. Barton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I thank you and
    Chairman Waxman for asking our witnesses to come today and
    holding this hearing at this important time.
        As we speak, it is unclear whether the so-called top kill
    procedure has been successful, but it does appear that it has
    been at least partially successful, and hopefully we will know
    by the end of the day that it has been totally successful.
        No one can bring back the 11 individuals who lost their
    lives on the drilling rig back in April. We can't put the oil
    that has been spilled back into the reservoir, but perhaps, if
    we work together, we can find out what caused the problem, what
    can be done to fix the problem right now, and what can be done
    to prevent it in the future.
        I am disappointed with the President's decision today to
    stop drilling in the deep Gulf and in Alaska. I think putting
    our drilling programs in those areas in a deep freeze is
    exactly the wrong approach. All we are going to do is cause
    unemployment and cause the price of oil to go up, which is
    going to hurt our economy even more, and we are already hurting
    with almost 10 percent unemployment. So I think that the
    President has made a decision that will come back to hurt this
    country.
        I want to make one thing perfectly clear, Mr. Chairman.
    Under current law, the President is in charge of this cleanup.
    This accident occurred in the Federal waters in the Gulf of
    Mexico outside the State limits. We have a law that makes the
    President in charge from day one.
        I do think the President made the right decision to put
    British Petroleum in charge of day-to-day decision making under
    the supervision of the Coast Guard, the EPA, the MMS, and other
    Federal agencies. It is BP's responsibility. They are the
    primary owners of the well, and I don't second-guess that
    decision at all.
        But, make no mistake, there has not been one decision that
    I am aware of, unless some of the panelists tell us so today,
    that BP or Halliburton, Transocean or Cameron has made that
    wasn't acknowledged by Federal officials and wasn't approved by
    Federal officials.
        And, again, it is real easy to sit up here on the podium,
    Mr. Chairman, and second-guess. I went down to Louisiana with
    you and others of this committee and went to the command site
    and then went out and overflew the accident site. It is tough
    to be there and have to make decisions on what to do when there
    is no easy, obvious answer. So I don't think it is fair to
    second-guess some of the decisions that have been made.
        But I think it is fair, if you are going to try to pin the
    blame on somebody, as President Truman said, ``The buck stops
    here.'' And under current Federal law, the President of the
    United States is ultimately in charge.
        It is not BP that has not given the OK to build the berms
    down in the State of Louisiana that the Corps of Engineers
    until today had been sitting on for a month. That was not a BP
    decision.
        It is not a BP decision to be using one dispersant and then
    be told by the EPA to use another and then be told again to go
    back and use the other dispersant. In fact, while it was a BP
    recommendation to use dispersants to try to keep the oil under
    the surface, that in itself I understand could be a
    controversial decision. That was a decision that was ultimately
    approved by the Environmental Protection Agency.
        I think, Mr. Chairman, that this committee, under the
    leadership of Mr. Stupak and yourself and Mr. Waxman, with the
    help from Dr. Burgess and Mr. Upton and myself, have conducted
    a fair investigation.
        My position on this is pretty straightforward. Let's stop
    the spill, and hopefully today we will accomplish that. Let's
    soon clean up the damage. And I know everybody is trying to do
    that. Let's conduct a fair, fact-based investigation and, based
    on that, decide what policies need to be changed, what best
    practice procedures need to be changed to prevent a situation
    like this from happening in the future.
        If we do that, Mr. Chairman, while this, again, is a tragic
    accident, 11 people have lost their lives, hundreds of
    thousands of barrels of oil have been spilled into the Gulf,
    our ecology has been impacted, our economy has been impacted,
    if we learn from this, though, we can hopefully prevent it from
    happening in the future.
        And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Barton follows:]

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        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 76583A.003

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 76583A.004

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 76583A.005

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 76583A.006

        Mr. Butterfield [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Barton.
        At this time, the chair recognizes the chairman emeritus of
    the committee, Mr. Dingell.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

        Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, thank you; and thank you for
    holding this important hearing today.
        The Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee held a
    hearing a couple of weeks ago where we heard from BP,
    Transocean, Halliburton, and Cameron. Today, we have the
    administration officials. Mr. Chairman, I commend you for
    having the administration officials here today. Their testimony
    and their answers to questions are equally critical in terms of
    finding out what went wrong and why and what to do about it.
        To our witnesses, thank you for being here today.
        Mr. Chairman, as I have mentioned in previous hearings, I
    have been a supporter of offshore oil and drilling; and I must
    say that the oil companies are making this support increasingly
    difficult. I have tried to support this when it was right and
    in compliance with our environmental laws and hoped that it was
    for many years.
        I come from Michigan, and we are a manufacturing State, and
    domestic manufacturers need domestic energy sources. Domestic
    oil and gas drilling is as much a part of a comprehensive
    energy policy as anything else and can reduce our dependence on
    foreign energy sources and increase our manufacturing
    competitiveness.
        On the other side of that, Mr. Chairman, I am an avid
    conservationist. I wrote many of our cornerstone environmental
    laws. That includes the National Environmental Policy Act, the
    Endangered Species Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act.
    These laws are a little like my children. I protected them for
    years and intend to do so as long as I am able. I have observed
    that they do not appear to have been properly enforced by the
    administration, nor do I see that they have been properly
    carried out by the oil companies.
        Balancing these views is challenging. Today, I am forced to
    come to a difficult conclusion. We need to establish a complete
    moratorium on all leasing and all drilling activities until it
    is established that all of it is done and is being done in full
    compliance with the environmental laws and with full attention
    to safety and to avoiding the kind of disastrous spills that we
    are seeing going down in the Gulf. And so full compliance with
    the environmental laws has to be the responsibility of the oil
    companies but also of the administration; and I refer very
    specifically to NEPA, which appears to have been significantly
    disregarded, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act.
        I don't believe that new regulation is necessary at this
    time. Quite frankly, because we have our current environmental
    laws in place for a long time, it is my belief that if they had
    been properly followed we would probably not be in the mess in
    which we currently now find ourselves.
        And the fact is that NEPA and the Marine Mammal Protection
    Act are good laws that work when properly enforced, but they
    were set aside for BP Deepwater Horizon in behavior that is
    unacceptable by our government.
        I am extremely dismayed, disappointed, and just plain angry
    about the process or lack thereof used by the Minerals
    Management Service. Drilling at any cost seems to be the modus
    operandi. Cash bonuses have been handed out for meeting
    deadlines for offshore leasing. Broad exemptions from
    environmental laws have been made, including in the case of
    Deepwater Horizon, and scientists have been ignored.
        After everything we have learned over the years about BP, I
    might expect this kind of behavior from them but not from the
    Federal Government. I would note we have from time to time seen
    BP before this committee and its investigative committees to
    talk about the failure in terms of wells on pipelines, major
    spills and explosions; and always we were promised that BP
    would do better. They have not.
        I do appreciate and do commend the administration's efforts
    to reform the way we do oil and gas leasing, but I am not sure
    that is enough. Very frankly, we need a timeout. We need to be
    taking stock of what is wrong with the system, what we are not
    doing right, what we can do better, how we didn't comply with
    the laws, and how we are going to make sure that our laws are
    being complied with. The stakes are too high to do otherwise.
        I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. Butterfield. I thank the gentleman.
        The chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
    Stearns.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CLIFF STEARNS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                   CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

        Mr. Stearns. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        I regret that Mr. Markey, the chairman of the subcommittee,
    is not here. I would like to answer his opening statement where
    he said the Bush administration is at fault for this. I think
    that is, obviously, a stretch.
        If you read any of the air pollution act, which I am going
    to read to you, the Clean Water Act section 311(c)(1)(A), the
    President shall ensure effective and immediate removal of a
    discharge and mitigation or prevention of a substantial threat
    of discharge of oil or a hazardous substance.
        So the President is involved here. He is responsible. If
    there is any problem, it is he and the U.S. Coast Guard who
    report to him.
        Now, Mr. Markey went on to say there was an impressive
    Federal response. Well, it is not enough. And, in fact, even as
    we speak here this afternoon, officials in Louisiana are still
    waiting--still waiting for the Federal Government to provide
    millions of feet in boom to approve an emergency permit to
    fully--not partially--implement their plan to dredge and build
    a new barrier island to prevent even more oil from reaching
    their marshes and wetlands.
        Mr. Chairman, Saudi Arabia had an oil spill in the Gulf. It
    was many, many times this; and they used their ships and barges
    to vacuum up the spill. In fact, there are many countries
    around the world who have volunteered with the State
    Department, including Canada, France, Germany, and others, the
    United Kingdom, to help with the idea of providing technical
    expertise, booms, chemical dispersants, oil pumps, skimmers,
    and wildlife treatment; and none of that has been accepted by
    this administration. The vast majority of assistance has not
    been utilized.
        The blunt fact is, the administration is on the watch. It
    is their responsibility. Everybody knew that the Minerals
    Management Service was not effective. There were so many
    inspectors' reports about this. It should have been reformed,
    and it should have been done on the President's watch, and
    certainly he has responsibility for this.
        Mr. Butterfield. Thank you.
        At this time, the chair will recognize the gentleman from
    the State of Washington, Mr. Inslee.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAY INSLEE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                 CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

        Mr. Inslee. Thank you.
        Well, I am shocked that the Republicans are blaming this
    disaster on Barack Obama. It is shocking to me that that could
    happen. And I guess maybe I shouldn't be shocked, but I am.
        It is sort of like H. Rap Brown, who I think coined the
    phrase ``burn baby burn.'' He didn't blame the government for
    the arson; and those who pushed the ``drill baby drill''
    positions as the solution to our energy woes, it seems to me,
    ought not to be blaming the government for this particular
    tragedy.
        There are legitimate issues about everyone's performance,
    and it is appropriate to look at everyone's performance. But it
    wasn't Barack Obama's decision not to use 20 centralizers on
    the rig which, in fact, the BP people thought should be used
    and only used six. So that they didn't have any centralizers.
    Centralizers are the things that keep the pipe centered in the
    well board so you don't get voids in the cement. And the BP
    staff said, well, you should use 20. Well, somebody delivered
    the wrong ones to them, so they only used six, and they didn't
    have any in the cement area above the hydrocarbon area. That
    wasn't Barack Obama's decision.
        It wasn't Barack Obama's decision to use a casing system
    that created higher risks of a blowout in order to save some
    dollars. That was British Petroleum's decision.
        It wasn't Barack Obama's decision to have a dead battery in
    the blowout provider. It was someone, either BP or one of the
    other subcontractors, had and didn't tighten up the valve so
    you had a hydraulic leak.
        So I think we are going to find we need to have, yes,
    greater oversight over this industry. But I will tell you,
    Lamar McKay, who was just down at our Natural Resources
    Committee, looked a little sheepish trying to explain why
    British Petroleum didn't use the centralizers that they thought
    they should use. And he wasn't blaming it on Barack Obama.
        So I think it would be helpful to really focus on what
    really happened here, and I look forward to the testimony.
        And, by the way, just one comment. Administrator Jackson,
    we are not going to let people take away your authority to
    prevent all the invisible oil spills that are going on from
    carbon dioxide making our oceans acidic either. We are going to
    keep that authority.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Butterfield. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Shimkus from Illinois.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

        Mr. Shimkus. Now, Mr. Inslee, I was telling Administrator
    Jackson how nice I was going to be today; and you go rile me
    up. Because we could go into the climate debate, which I don't
    want to do. But I do want to talk about the impending issues.
    So we are pleased to have you all here.
        I will direct some questions on the dispersant issue and
    just getting clarification. A lot of us have been informed now.
    We are trying to gather information. And I will talk about the
    type being used, how it is certified, questions made that it is
    not good and then the need for it. And I will go in that
    direction.
        I think there is some valid concern about, when we have an
    emergency--responding in an emergency situation, the marshes
    are being polluted, we do have some delay from the locals who
    want to protect their marshes by the permitting process. I
    think we should be able to expedite that.
        And I think there will be some emotions on all sides. These
    locals want to do all they can, and there is some delay on the
    local elected officials and their ability to do everything they
    want to do.
        But we are all in this together. This is a huge
    undertaking. No one is happy about it.
        I am a ``drill baby drill,'' and I still believe that is
    important to our national energy security. Three thousand
    drilling operations in the Gulf. Katrina went by, no effect. We
    just can't be Pollyannish about our energy needs. I am one that
    will also continue to talk about our energy security and
    national security needs.
        Thank you all for coming. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Butterfield. Thank you Mr. Shimkus.
        The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE GREEN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                    CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

        Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the
    hearing.
        The Gulf of Mexico is in the midst of an incident that is a
    tragedy we have never seen, and my thoughts and prayers go out
    to the families and communities affected by this terrible
    incident.
        I appreciate the administration being here to answer our
    questions. I know your colleagues are diligently working to
    stop that leak.
        While I agree that we should look at how effective our
    government response has been, certainly look at the adequacy of
    BP's response plans, I believe that our efforts should focus at
    this time mainly on plugging the well instead of casting blame.
        We are certain to continue hearings on this issue for
    months to come. There is no doubt the eventual lessons learned
    from Deepwater Horizon spill will impact on how our offshore
    resources are obtained. The industry should provide an accurate
    response plan for every rig; and, conversely, MMS should have
    adequate oversight to ensure that these response plans are
    adequate.
        Having said that, I want to caution my colleagues against
    rushing through any legislative proposal that adversely affects
    our ability to develop domestic resources, for example,
    automatically raising the liability cap to $10 billion when
    maybe a BP or a major company could afford that, but so much of
    the Gulf of Mexico is produced by independents who don't have
    the capitalization of the majors.
        These proposals should be thoroughly vetted by the
    committees of jurisdiction. Our energy resources are vital to
    our national security, economic growth of our country; and our
    country requires a safe and effective and steady development of
    its offshore oil and gas resources.
        I have been on this committee since 1997, and I remember
    about 3 years ago we were all lamenting $4 a gallon gas. If we
    continue the prohibition against deep water or even shallow
    water production, you can guarantee it that we will be back to
    $4 a gallon gas, and we won't be able to blame Saudi Arabia for
    it.
        Thank you for the work you are doing, Mr. Chairman. I yield
    back my time.
        Mr. Butterfield. Thank you, Mr. Green.
        The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Pitts.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
             CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

        Ms. Pitts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
    this hearing.
        I want to begin my comments today also by expressing my
    deepest regrets to the family members and friends who have lost
    their loved ones.
        This is a tragic event. Not only have lives been lost but
    an unknown amount of oil has been leaked into the ocean,
    causing great damage and horrible effects, some of which we
    know now and some of which will take years to discover.
        In the wake of this event, questions regarding the cause of
    the explosion and leak have naturally arisen, along with
    questions on the appropriateness of the response from BP and
    the administration. Particularly, I am eager to hear from our
    witnesses today regarding whether or not sufficient response
    plans were put to work in order before the incident occurred
    and, if they were, whether or not they are currently working.
        It seems to me that the Federal response has been not only
    disjointed but confusing and frustrating for those on the
    ground trying to bring relief. A prime example would be the
    EPA's convoluted instructions regarding the use of dispersants.
        In addition, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal said on Monday
    that, quote, we have been frustrated with the disjointed effort
    to date that has too often meant too little, too late for the
    oil hitting our coast, end quote. This is incredibly
    disappointing.
        As I have said, this is a tragic event. We need to make
    sure due diligence is done in investigating the causes and the
    appropriateness of the response in the aftermath. However, we
    need to make sure the response of this body and the
    administration is prudent, one that still encourages our
    country's energy security and independence.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Butterfield. I thank the gentleman.
        The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Capps.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LOIS CAPPS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                 CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

        Mrs. Capps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our
    witnesses. Thank you for your testimonies in advance.
        Thirty-eight days after BP's Deepwater Horizon rig exploded
    and killed 11 workers, 15 to 40 million gallons of toxic crude
    oil have spilled into the Gulf of Mexico. The oil from the
    slick now equals the size of South Carolina, has soiled more
    than 100 miles of Louisiana's coastline. Fishermen working on
    the cleanup have become ill after working long hours near
    waters fouled with oil and dispersants, reporting nausea,
    dizziness, headaches, and chest pains. It has gotten so bad
    that yesterday the unified command recalled the vessels
    operating in Breton Sound after crew members reported health
    problems.
        Today I, along with Health Subcommittee Chairman Pallone,
    wrote to BP, urging the company to take the necessary steps
    that it apparently is not now doing to ensure the health and
    safety of the workers and volunteers who are cleaning up this
    giant mess.
        Quite frankly, it is an outrage that this company, which
    made $16 billion in profits last year, has such a terrible
    record on safety for the drilling itself and for the workers
    who are trying to clean up the mess; and that is why it is so
    important that the Federal Government is bringing every
    resource necessary to put a stop to this catastrophe.
        Last week, the President established an independent
    commission which was modeled on legislation I introduced with
    Chairman Markey to investigate the cause, the response, and the
    impact of BP's spill. Earlier today, he announced tougher
    safety requirements for offshore drilling and a stronger
    inspections regime; and he took steps to ban new deep water
    wells for 6 months, cancelled exploratory drilling in Alaska,
    and cancelled a proposed lease sale off of Virginia's coast.
        Mr. Chairman, this whole tragedy brings into stark relief
    what many of us have been saying for years and which the
    chairman, in his opening remarks, said as well. We need to end
    our addiction to fossil fuels. My only hope now is that perhaps
    there is some measure of good that can come out of the
    sickening sights of toxic sludge in Louisiana's wetlands, the
    oil slick on the open ocean, the underwater toxic plumes that
    continue to kill marine life, wildlife, and birds at an
    alarming clip. Finally freeing ourselves from this costly
    addiction would be a fitting tribute to the terrible tragedy
    being borne by the people of Louisiana and the Gulf.
        I yield back my time.
        Mr. Butterfield. Thank you, Mrs. Capps.
        The chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, Mrs.
    Bono Mack.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARY BONO MACK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                 CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

        Mrs. Bono Mack. Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by also
    sending my condolences to the families of the 11 brave men who
    lost their lives as a result of this tragic accident.
        I also appreciate very much the time of our witnesses to be
    here with us today to discuss the issues related to the massive
    spill off of Louisiana's coast.
        I know that today's hearing will delve into the details of
    who knew what and when they knew it, which we must examine, yet
    we seem to be spending so much time pointing fingers and
    playing politics, which is exactly what has the American people
    frustrated beyond belief.
        What we have in front of us is a disaster that has extreme
    environmental and economic effects. Millions of Gulf Coast
    residents wake up every morning knowing that they are providing
    the food on our plates and the gasoline to power our vehicles.
    Yet I am extremely frustrated to see both BP and politicians,
    plus, truthfully, this entire town, continue to point fingers
    and play a game of gotcha instead of collaboratively and
    aggressively seeking solutions and taking action.
        We cannot afford more bureaucratic barriers to addressing
    the need to cap the well as well as lessen the spill's effects.
    The excuses have been many, and the press excuses even more
    numerous. But today we need to get clear answers about the
    levels of preparation for the deep water drilling taking place
    in this region and the clear path forward for cleanup
    operations of this epic disaster. The fact is, wasting time,
    playing politics, and placing blame on past actions when
    confronted with this national emergency is, frankly, insulting
    to the hardworking people of the Gulf region.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, again, I thank our witnesses; and
    I yield back the balance of my time. I look forward to the
    testimony out of our panel. Thank you.
        Mr. Butterfield. I thank the gentlelady.
        We will now recognize another gentlelady from California,
    the third in a row, Ms. Harman.
        Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We plan to take this
    committee over very soon.
        Mr. Butterfield. Please don't ask unanimous consent for
    that.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JANE HARMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                 CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

        Ms. Harman. No, I was just stating our intention.
        As Chairman Markey said in his opening remarks, quote, this
    is BP's spill, but it is America's ocean.
        That ocean touches my district, which hugs almost 20 miles
    of California coastline. I have always opposed drilling off the
    coast of California and have cast 20 votes--more than 20 votes
    against offshore drilling over my eight terms in Congress,
    including a vote against the 2006 Deep Ocean Energy Resources
    Act.
        Further, I am an original cosponsor of the Garamendi bill
    that seeks to ban all drilling off the entire west coast.
        The events of the last month have only reinforced my
    opposition. Like millions of Americans, I have watched the days
    mount and the strategies fail. The crude oil gushing from BP's
    blown well is now threatening Florida's Atlantic coast and when
    it gets into the Gulf stream could potentially spread thousands
    of miles.
        There is a Washington lesson and a national lesson here.
    For the Washington lesson, we have to dramatically ramp up
    government oversight of drilling activities and end the
    sweetheart relationship between MMS and industry. President
    Obama was right to force the resignation earlier today of the
    MMS director, who obviously is not before us now. And he and
    Secretary Salazar and everyone on today's panel all must do
    more, as we must.
        The national lesson is that America's insatiable thirst for
    oil must be stemmed. It is dirty, poses major environmental
    risks, and when we buy it from abroad, it enriches our enemies.
    We must seize this moment to end our crippling dependence on
    oil. Enough is more than enough.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Butterfield. Thank you.
        I believe Dr. Burgess is next.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, A REPRESENTATIVE
                  IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

        Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We have heard a number of things today. We are going to
    hear a number of things from our witnesses, and I am anxious to
    do so.
        Again, I will just reiterate some of the questions that
    came up in earlier hearings that we have had. Particularly I am
    glad we do have a representative from the Minerals Management
    Service.
        The application that was submitted for the Deepwater
    Horizon drilling permit in March of 2009 raises some serious
    issues.
        A section 2.7 blowout scenario, a scenario for a potential
    blowout of the well from which BP would expect to have the
    highest volume of liquid hydrocarbons, is not required for the
    operations proposed in this exploration plan.
        Section 2.3, BP Exploration Production, Inc. does not
    propose to utilize new techniques or unusual technologies for
    these operations or drilling in 5,000 feet of water, going down
    18,000 feet. That does sound new and unusual to me.
        Section 14.2, in the event of an unanticipated blowout
    resulting in an oil spill, it is unlikely to have an impact
    based on industry-wide standards for using proven equipment and
    technology for such responses.
        Implementation of BP's regional oil spill response plan,
    which address available equipment and personnel techniques and
    recovery and removal of the oil spill.
        Why was this application--I mean, shame on BP, shame on BP
    for submitting an application that was so scant on details. But
    why was an application like this ever accepted in the first
    place?
        And we have heard other people in their opening statements
    make comments about folks around the country that are concerned
    about this and want to help. I did two town halls on Saturday,
    town halls in north Texas. A fellow brought in this contraption
    and showed it to me. That is basically a coke bottle that has
    been cut in half. He has got this thing filled with what looked
    like sawdust, but it was some sort of polypropylene material
    that he has. And, apparently, it has another Federal use, so it
    is something that has already been approved by the EPA.
        He poured a bottle of gunk like Ed Markey had in here the
    other day, poured the bottle of gunk in the top, and you could
    see down in the bottom of the mayonnaise jar--his equipment was
    not very sophisticated--it looks like clear water is coming
    out.
        This individual had been trying to get some recognition of
    his technique. There are people like this all over the country
    that are willing to help. They want to help clean up their
    coastline. Governor Jindal wants to help the coastline, and he
    has been prevented by the Corps of Engineers and the
    Environmental Protection Agency. It is time to relax those
    standards and give him the authority that he needs to do what
    needs to be done.
        I will yield back.
        Mr. Butterfield. I thank the gentleman.
        At this time, the chair recognizes the gentlelady from
    Wisconsin, Ms. Baldwin.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TAMMY BALDWIN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN

        Ms. Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just came from a hearing at the Judiciary Committee on
    the BP oil spill and liability issues where we heard from Keith
    Jones, the father of one of the men who lost his life. We also
    heard from two survivors from the explosion. And I daresay
    there wasn't a dry eye in the audience as the three of them
    testified.
        Like so many of my colleagues and my fellow Wisconsinites
    and all Americans, I am really angry about the oil spill in the
    Gulf of Mexico and sad and angry about the loss of life. I am
    horrified by the negligence and the conflicts of interest that
    have been revealed and exhibited leading up to this tragedy,
    and I am furious that for over a month oil has been spewing
    into the Gulf of Mexico, endangering lives and livelihoods and
    our precious ecosystem with no end in sight.
        There are several aspects of this crisis that are
    particularly troublesome: the conflicts of interests at the
    Minerals Management Service, which allowed the agency to
    oversee the safety of offshore drilling while simultaneously
    collecting royalties from the companies they were overseeing,
    and this is unacceptable. We have heard the reports of staff
    members of the agency repeatedly accepting tickets to events
    and lunches and other gifts from industry.
        Equally disturbing is that BP has used unprecedented
    volumes of chemical dispersants to break up the oil offshore
    that we now learn could further imperil the mammals and fish
    and birds and turtles that inhabit the Gulf region. And despite
    EPA belatedly telling BP to limit use of this product, the
    company has continued to do so.
        The situation in the Gulf appears to be one of a company
    continuously believing that it is above the law, ignoring
    warning signs, shortcutting proper procedure, failing to
    properly plan for a disaster, and putting profits over other
    considerations.
        Mr. Chairman, this spill is a tragic reminder that we must
    rethink our Nation's energy policy and move toward a post-
    petroleum economy.
        I thank our witnesses, and I yield back the balance of my
    time.
        Mr. Butterfield. I thank the gentlelady.
        The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Scalise.
        Mr. Scalise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit this into
    the record. It is a statement from the U.S. Travel Association
    about combating the BP oil spill.
        Mr. Butterfield. Without objection.
        [The information was unavailable at the time of printing.]

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE SCALISE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

        Mr. Scalise. Thank you.
        Yesterday, we paid respects to the 11 men who lost their
    lives in the explosion of the rig, and our prayers go out to
    them and their families. And I know some of the families are
    here today. I hope to have the opportunity to meet with them.
        I hope the top kill is successful today, and we may not
    know that for a few days, but we can't forget that more than a
    month's worth of oil has already spilled into the Gulf and is
    moving its way into our marshes, and that is something we are
    going to have to be working for a long time to clean up that
    mess.
        But today the President held a press conference where he
    said that he has been in charge from day one, and I have just
    got to disagree. If this has been his top priority, if he has
    been in charge from day one, then why is it that it took more
    than 16 days to get an answer from our Governor and our local
    officials who submitted a plan to protect the marsh from the
    oil?
        They submitted this plan more than 2 weeks ago before any
    oil was in the marsh. It sat on bureaucratic desks, didn't go
    anywhere. If all hands were on deck, the President would have
    rolled up his sleeves day one when the Governor submitted that
    plan and say, we are going to figure out a way to get this done
    and to give you the Federal permit, so y'all can go and protect
    your marsh.
        It didn't happen. It didn't happen for over 2 weeks, and
    now we are hearing from the Governor's office that the plan
    that might have been approved today only covers about 2 percent
    of the Governor's plan. That is just not acceptable. We are
    trying to protect our marsh right now; and if the President has
    got a better plan, put it on the table. But we haven't seen
    them come up with any plan to protect our marsh. We have put
    one on the table for over 2 weeks, and nothing from the
    President. That is inexcusable.
        If all hands were on deck, then why is it that on Sunday--
    on Sunday as oil was coming into our marsh in Grand Isle I
    heard reports from officials who said the boom-laying beats
    were sitting at the dock. They weren't putting out boom. They
    were sitting at the dock instead of putting out the boom as oil
    is coming into our marsh.
        That is not all hands on deck. That is not a top priority
    of the President. If he is in charge, as the law says that he
    should be under the Oil Pollution Act, that should have never
    happened.
        So I am glad that today he acknowledged that some mistakes
    were made, but we don't have time for the mistakes and the
    excuses. We need action. And when he comes down tomorrow--and I
    know he won't share with our delegation where he is going or
    what he is doing, but I hope he meets with those local
    officials, and I hope he finally solves these problems instead
    of all of the red tape and all of the excuses that we are
    getting.
        Thank you, and I yield back.
        Mr. Butterfield. Thank you, Mr. Scalise.
        Before proceeding, it has come to my attention that one of
    our scheduled witnesses, Ms. Jo-Ellen Darcy, is going to have
    to leave at 1500, 3:00 this afternoon. So we are going to allow
    you to be excused in just a moment. But thank you very much for
    your willingness to come.
        I am told that your deputy, Mr. Terrence ``Rock'' Salt,
    will be available to answer any questions. But we thank you for
    your service. We thank you for your willingness to come today.
        I will say for the record that Ms. Darcy is the Assistant
    Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, a position that
    supervises the Army Corps of Engineers' Civil Works Program.
    The Army Corps of Engineers is an environmental preservation
    and restoration agency that regulates activities in the
    Nation's wetlands. That is a very honorable position, and we
    thank you for all that you do.
        All right. Without objection, we might go ahead and
    recognize you for your 5 minutes. I am told that that may be in
    order. Let me consult with the ranking member just a moment.
        Mr. Upton. I just wanted to ask, too, for all members, we
    ask unanimous consent that their opening statements might be
    put into the record at this point, too.
        Mr. Butterfield. Without objection.
        Do you consent to the witnesses' testimony being given at
    this time?
        The witness is recognized for 5 minutes.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JO-ELLEN DARCY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
      OF THE ARMY (CIVIL WORKS), ACCOMPANIED BY TERRENCE ``ROCK''
         SALT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

        Ms. Darcy. Thank you Congressman Butterfield, and I want to
    thank all members of the subcommittee for inviting me here
    today.
        My name is Jo-Ellen Darcy. I am the Assistant Secretary of
    the Army for Civil Works; and I am joined by ``Rock'' Salt who
    is my Principal Deputy, who will come up here when I finish
    delivering this testimony.
        And I ask that my written statement be submitted for the
    record in full, because I will summarize here for you.
        In the midst of the response to the tragic Deepwater
    Horizon oil spill, the Corps of Engineers continues to provide
    reliable navigation on the river systems and waterways along
    the Gulf Coast as it maintains vigilant monitoring and
    assessment of the oil impacts.
        In addition, the Corps has provided modeling support for
    river discharges and is offering emergency review under section
    404 and section 10 authorities of a proposed barrier plan
    developed at the local level intended to prevent the oil from
    reaching the coastal wetlands.
        The Corps has also reviewed and provided input to an
    interim EPA region six oil solidifier policy and supports its
    implementation.
        Currently, the oil spill is not affecting dredging
    operations or navigation in any rivers or waterways along the
    Gulf. There have been no incidents of deep draft vessels
    getting oil on their hulls as they approach the southwest pass
    on the Mississippi River.
        The U.S. Coast Guard, working with navigation interests,
    has established cleaning stations in the lower Mississippi
    River to clean those vessels before they proceed up the river
    to the New Orleans district as well as similarly this was done
    after the 2009 Mississippi River oil spill.
        The Corps continues daily monitoring of any impacts to
    navigation and dredging operations as a result of the oil spill
    and maintains continued coordination with navigation interests
    and appropriate agencies.
        The Corps has analyzed a number of water management
    conditions and possible actions to determine whether we could
    modify river flows to keep oil away from the mouth of the
    Mississippi River and wetlands on either side of the river.
    This analysis included possible deviations from the statutory
    70/30 split at the Old River Control Structure between the
    Mississippi River and the Atchafalaya Basin. Numerical modeling
    analysis has shown that diverting water from the Atchafalaya
    Basin to the Mississippi River at the Old River Control
    Structure would have minimal influence on the movement of the
    oil in the Mississippi River Delta.
        Due to the extreme flooding on the Tennessee and the
    Cumberland Basins earlier this month, Mississippi River
    discharges below New Orleans will nearly double. Even with
    these forecasted increases in discharge, we do not anticipate
    increased flows that would allow opening the Bonnet Carre
    Spillway to reduce the oil from entering the Mississippi Sound
    area.
        With respect to the smaller freshwater diversion
    structures, those are currently operating near design capacity,
    and the modeling again suggests that this may help slow the
    movement of the oil into the project marshes from the marsh and
    the open water boundaries in the immediate vicinity of these
    structures. Our team continues to evaluate other water
    management scenarios to determine if they will help address the
    oil spill issues.
        The Corps' Engineering Research and Development Center is
    also working with the United States Geological Survey program
    to collect and analyze baseline sediment samples in the
    wetlands and the navigation areas. These pre-oil spill samples
    will provide critical comparisons to post-emergency sediments
    that will be required for efforts to continue with Louisiana
    coastal restoration through the beneficial uses of dredged
    material.
        I would like to update my written testimony based on
    actions taken today.
        The Corps of Engineers has proffered a permit to the State
    of Louisiana which grants partial approval for Louisiana's
    barrier island project proposal, covering the State's original
    request and includes six different areas. Once this permit is
    finalized, the State would be authorized to construct the
    barrier islands as long as this construction meets the terms
    and the conditions established in the Corps permit. The
    conditions in the permit respond to all issues and concerns
    raised by the other Federal agencies.
        Additionally, the Corps has issued a total of 12 permits
    using our emergency authorities throughout the Gulf. There are
    seven additional permits that are still pending.
        Seven people have been deployed from our research lab to
    support the Fish and Wildlife Service natural resource damage
    assessment activities. Activities include but are not limited
    to providing expert NRDA strategy development, development of
    bird injury study plans, global positioning systems collection
    and integration of field data, primary GIS and mapping support.
        Our research lab stands ready to assist in the development
    of a common operating plan for the multi-agency oil spill
    response. As the Department of Army lead for environmental
    restoration research and development, our research lab is
    prepared to assist in formulating and implementing strategies
    for long-term monitoring and remediation of wetlands and
    barrier islands areas affected by the oil spill. Our research
    lab is also prepared to provide analysis for the eventual
    remediation of contaminated barrier sediment and material
    removal and ecological restoration.
        That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman; and, again,
    thank you for having us. I apologize for having to leave, but
    Mr. Salt will be here.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Darcy follows:]
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        Mr. Markey [presiding]. We very much appreciate your
    ability to be here, and we also appreciate the responsibilities
    which you are discharging simultaneously in the Gulf. So we
    thank you for being here. And when your assistant sits at that
    table, then we will I think still be able to get the expert
    advice from your agency. Thank you.
        The chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
    Barrow, for an opening statement.
        Mr. Barrow. I thank the chair.
        I am more interested in hearing from the witnesses than I
    am from hearing from me, so I will waive an opening.
        Mr. Markey. The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Melancon.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLIE MELANCON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

        Mr. Melancon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
    having the hearing today. I thank the witnesses for attending.
        First, I would like to say to those that want a political
    posture, having been through Katrina, Rita, Gustav, Ike, and
    now the oil spill, I am sick of it. I would appreciate it if
    y'all would respect the people and the people of the State of
    Louisiana, the people that died in this accident.
        It has not been fun for 5 years in south Louisiana. The
    press reported today that even using the most conservative
    estimates that the new flow rate estimates on the leak have
    grown to nearly 19 million gallons over the past 5 weeks,
    surpassing the size of the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster in
    Alaska.
        Having flown over this disaster this past week, I can tell
    you personally that the scale and the scope of this disaster is
    greater than one can ever imagine. My constituents in St.
    Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, Terrebonne, and Lafourche and
    those that have not yet been impacted are watching this slow-
    motion tragedy unfold in front of them; and, as of today, there
    is still no absolute assurance that this leak will be brought
    under control in the near future.
        I am heartened to hear initial reports that the top kill
    effort appears to temporarily have stopped the flow of oil and
    gas into the Gulf, and I hope and pray that these efforts as
    they continue lead to a permanent solution.
        The response to this leak has consumed a tremendous number
    of resources and much manpower since the rig first sank weeks
    ago. I have been in constant contact with the administration
    and first responders on the ground. I have also reached out to
    local officials in my district to take inventory of their
    response needs, booms, vessels, whatever, and work towards
    providing these resources as best I can.
        And while I know this hearing today is to discuss the
    current response to the leak, I would like to remind my
    colleagues and the distinguished panel of witnesses today that
    the recovery phase is just as critical as the response phase.
    Our culture is threatened, our coastal economy is threatened,
    and everything that I know and love is at risk. Even though
    this marsh lies along coastal Louisiana, these are America's
    wetlands.
        I just wish to submit the rest of my statement for the
    record. Thank you.
        Mr. Markey. We thank the gentleman.
        Every member of our committee and every American is praying
    for the people of Louisiana and the people of the Gulf. It is
    just an unimaginable tragedy.
        The chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr.
    Griffith.
        Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I appreciate
    Congressman Melancon's feelings and deep emotion.
        I grew up in south Louisiana, on Big and Little Alabama,
    Atchafalaya Basin, the wetlands and spent a lot of my youth in
    the canals down there. And I can tell you that it is
    heartbreaking, heartbreaking to lose the lives of the young men
    from that area whose culture was working on the rigs. And if
    there is blame to go around, I think it will be many, many
    people who will accept responsibility ultimately.
        I would like to thank the chairman and ranking member for
    calling this important hearing today and the witnesses for
    taking the time to come.
        I was upset, however, to hear the announcement this morning
    that the administration has chosen to cancel the western Gulf
    and Virginia lease sales.
        The American Petroleum Institute estimates that from the
    time a lease is sold, it is 3.5 years before drilling begins;
    and if successful, it is 6 years before any production takes
    plays.
        As we learn from these tragedies, these cancellations do
    not reflect the stated President's view that we must have oil
    and gas production in our energy portfolio that we can produce
    safely. Canceling these leases does not protect us, and it
    actually is nondiscriminating in that we are punishing
    companies that have an exemplary safety record. We must
    remember, too, that the Deep Horizon oil--Deepwater Horizon rig
    had drilled over 70 successful wells.
        As we learn the outcome of the many investigations that are
    taking place, it is vital that we learn lessons from this
    incident so that we can keep our workers and environment safe
    to produce our valuable oil and gas.
        We must also question the effectiveness of the response on
    the Federal side as the reports come out stating that this may
    be the Nation's biggest oil spill. Has the bureaucracy been
    unable to facilitate a quick response? Reports from the ground
    say it is not clear who is in charge, which leads to chaos. As
    we see changes in drilling plans and officials suddenly
    resigning, it seems that there are unknown facts surrounding
    the oversight of this project both before and after the
    explosion.
        And thank you both, and all, for coming. Thank you.
        Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
    Butterfield.
        Mr. Butterfield. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
    convening this very important hearing.
        I thank the witnesses for their testimony today.
        I think I am sort of like Mr. Barrow, Mr. Chairman, I am
    eagerly looking forward to the testimony of the witnesses.
        One thing for sure, there is so much we don't know about
    this tragedy. And what complicates the tragedy is that we are
    not getting much help from BP or Halliburton or from
    Transocean. And perhaps the witnesses' testimony today will be
    enlightening on this very important subject.
        In time, though, we will find out what happened, or the
    courts will find the facts and will report them to the American
    people. It is absolutely clear that more should have been done
    to prevent this disaster.
        Over the past 30 years, the oil industry has used some of
    the most advanced technologies to drill in increasingly deeper
    waters. The rapid ingenuity that allows us to drill miles under
    the ocean floor may have outpaced the commitment to safety. We
    really don't know the extent of this still. I am looking
    forward to discovering the true facts of this matter and to
    report them to the American people.
        And so the President is right. I happen to agree with the
    President. He made a very wise decision today, and I support
    the President entirely.
        Thank you, witnesses, for your testimony. I yield back.
        Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
    Sullivan.
        Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Chairman Markey.
        Thank you for holding this hearing today on combating the
    BP oil spill and examining the Federal response to the
    disaster.
        I am interested in learning from our witnesses their
    thoughts on what went wrong and their ideas moving forward to
    prevent this from ever happening again.
        I am disappointed that no one from the Mineral Management
    Services is here to testify on their role in response to this
    effort. Given their integral role of the Federal oversight in
    offshore drilling operations, it is critically important to
    hear the MMS's point of view directly and to get their take on
    what safety lapses occurred and if any regulatory breakdowns
    happened that may have contributed to this terrible accident.
        We still have work to do to uncover exactly what went
    wrong. There are many questions that will be asked today on
    ongoing efforts to contain the leak, whether the Federal
    response plans were in place prior to the incident and whether
    those response plans had been inadequate in light of the
    ecological disaster.
        I commend the brave men and women who are working day and
    night to stop the leak and to protect the shoreline in the Gulf
    region. This is a challenge of epic proportions, and it is the
    job of this committee to conduct a fact-based investigation
    into the disaster to find out what went wrong and how we can
    prevent it from ever happening again. I look forward to getting
    to the bottom of this tragedy and finding solutions to it.
        I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
    McNerney.
        Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        This disaster and tragedy has been a sobering lesson.
    Technology exists to bring great benefit but also, if not
    properly overseen, can cause great damage.
        Our responsibility now in this body is to provide all the
    resources at our disposal to stop the leakage and to help the
    people that are impacted.
        But next, we need to expose the facts about the causes of
    the leak and implement whatever is necessary to prevent this
    from happening again.
        I intend to pursue those responsibilities with vigor. But
    beyond that, this morning, along with Chairman Markey, Anna
    Eshoo, Judy Biggert, and myself, we introduced the Electric
    Drive Vehicle Deployment Act of 2010. We need to move
    aggressively to make our vehicles more efficient so we can
    reduce this country's overwhelming demand for oil. I invite all
    my colleagues to support this initiative. I thank the panel for
    your participation in this effort.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri, Mr.
    Blunt.
        Mr. Blunt. Mr. Chairman, I have no opening statement.
        Mr. Markey. The chair does not see any other members who
    are looking for recognition at this time.

      STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE LISA P. JACKSON, ADMINISTRATOR,
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; THE HONORABLE LARRY ROBINSON,
      ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE,
         NOAA; THE HONORABLE DAVID J. HAYES, DEPUTY SECRETARY,
      DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR; AND REAR ADMIRAL JAMES WATSON,
        DEPUTY, UNIFIED AREA COMMAND, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

        Mr. Markey. So we will turn to our first witness, who is
    Lisa Jackson, the administrator of the Environmental Protection
    Agency.
        Before becoming the EPA administrator, she served as the
    commissioner of the State Department of Environmental
    Protection in New Jersey. She is a former New Orleans resident
    who graduated summa cum laude from Tulane University and earned
    a masters degree in chemical engineering from Princeton
    University.
        We welcome you, Administrator Jackson. Whenever you are
    ready, please begin.

               STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LISA P. JACKSON

        Ms. Jackson. Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Upton,
    Chairman Emeritus Dingell, and members of the committee, thank
    you for inviting me to testify about EPA's role in responding
    to the BP Deepwater Horizon rig explosion. First, let me join
    you all in expressing my condolences to the families of those
    who have lost their lives in the explosion. We owe them our
    very best.
        As we all know, efforts to stop the oil release continue.
    While the environmental disaster that the Gulf of Mexico is
    facing right now certainly has no easy answers, EPA is
    committed to doing its job: Protecting communities, the natural
    environment, and human health from the spill itself, as well as
    any concerns resulting from the response to the spill.
        Since the crisis began, EPA has had nearly 200 staff
    working on the emergency response, from scientists, engineers,
    contractors, and others, in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and
    Mississippi. We are performing rigorous testing and monitoring
    of air and water quality, and we are sharing that data with the
    public every day. I have personally traveled to the region, the
    region I grew up in and still consider my home, several times
    over the past week.
        For nearly a month, EPA has been monitoring the air and
    water for pollutants which could pose a health risk to
    communities. This monitoring is essential to ensure that
    communities are protected as we respond to the BP spill. All of
    this information is being made public at EPA.gov/BPspill, as
    quickly as we can compile it.
        One of our top priorities is the safe application of
    chemical dispersants. Oil spill dispersants are chemicals
    applied to the spilled oil to break down the oil into small
    drops below the surface. Ideally, the dispersed oil mixes into
    the water column and is rapidly diluted and degraded by
    bacteria and other microscopic organisms.
        We know that dispersants are generally less toxic than oil.
    They decrease the risk to the shoreline and to organisms at the
    surface, and they biodegrade over weeks, not years, as oil
    would. But in the use of dispersants, we are faced with
    environmental tradeoffs. The long-term effects on aquatic life
    are still unknown, and we must make sure that the dispersants
    that are used are as nontoxic as possible. To date, BP has used
    850,000 gallons of dispersant, a volume never used before in
    this country.
        Since this crisis began, EPA has not only demanded, but has
    ordered, with the full force of law, that dispersants must be
    limited in use, in volume, and toxicity.
        EPA was first asked by BP on April 30 to authorize
    unlimited use of dispersants in a novel manner, underwater, at
    the source of the leak. The goal of their approach was to break
    up and degrade the oil before it reached the water's surface
    and came closer to our shorelines, our estuaries, and our
    nurseries. EPA demanded scientific data from the company to
    prove that such use of the dispersants was indeed effective.
    After that data showed that this approach was effective, EPA
    required the implementation of a rigorous monitoring system to
    ensure that underwater application would continue to be
    effective and would also track measurable environmental
    impacts, if any.
        Two weeks later, on May 14th, after the system was in
    place, EPA conditionally granted authorization for use after it
    was made clear to the company and to the public that EPA
    reserved to use the right to halt the use of subsurface
    dispersant if we concluded that at any time the impact to the
    environment outweighed the benefit of disbursing the oil. EPA
    will also continue to push BP to switch to less toxic
    alternatives due to the volumes of dispersant being used and
    the lengthening period of this crisis.
        Mr. Chairman, we are not satisfied that BP has done an
    extensive enough analysis of other dispersant options, and it
    appears that BP seems more interested in defending their
    initial decisions than analyzing possible better options. That
    is why, on May 21, EPA, along with the Coast Guard, ordered BP
    to evaluate alternative dispersants. We continue to hold BP to
    this requirement, and I have further committed EPA's best
    scientists to independently evaluate alternative dispersants as
    well as verifying BP's science.
        And this week, on May 26, along with the Coast Guard, we
    have instructed BP to significantly scale back the subsurface
    use of dispersants to only what is needed to be effective. And
    we have ordered BP to halt use of surface dispersants unless
    they get prior approval from the Federal on-scene coordinator.
        That order has yielded results: Four days ago, the total
    use of dispersants on a daily basis was 70,000 gallons;
    yesterday, it was less than 12,000 gallons.
        Mr. Chairman, we are in a position with no perfect
    solution. As we emerge from this response, I commit to
    revisiting the regulations surrounding EPA's response,
    particularly regarding dispersant registration under the
    National Contingency Plan. I also commit to sharing the results
    with this committee and working with you to tighten the
    underlying laws, as necessary. As a New Orleans native, I know
    firsthand the importance of the natural environment to the
    economy, the health, and the culture of the Gulf Coast.
        As I mentioned, this month since the accident, I have been
    to the region three times. I have listened to people in
    numerous town halls from Venice, Louisiana, to Waveland,
    Mississippi, and other communities in between. I have learned
    in those meetings that the people of the Gulf Coast are eager
    to be part of this response. They want to be informed and,
    where possible, empowered to improve their own situation on
    their own.
        We have a great deal of rebuilding to do both in material
    terms and in terms of restoring this community's trust that
    government can and will protect them in a time of need. This is
    one of those times. I urge that we do everything within our
    power to ensure a strong recovery and future for the Gulf
    Coast. And, of course, I welcome any questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson follows:]
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        Mr. Markey. Thank you, Administrator Jackson.
        Our next witness is Dr. Larry Robinson.
        He is the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
    Atmosphere at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
    Administration. Dr. Robinson guides policy and program
    direction for NOAA's conservation protection and resource
    management priorities.
        Upon being confirmed for the position on May 7, 2010, Dr.
    Robinson went to the Gulf Coast to help coordinate NOAA's
    scientific resources throughout the region. Prior to his
    appointment, Dr. Robinson was the vice president for research
    and a professor at Florida A&M University.
        Whenever you are ready, Mr. Robinson.

               STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LARRY ROBINSON

        Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Upton, and members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to
    testify on the Department of Commerce's National Oceanic and
    Atmospheric Administration's role in response to the BP Deep
    Horizon oil spill.
        I wish to begin by letting the families of the 11 people
    who lost their lives in the explosion and sinking of the Deep
    Horizon know that we think of them every day. The 12,800
    employees of NOAA working in the Gulf of Mexico and those
    around the country send our deepest condolences.
        Because you already have my written testimony, I would like
    to simply summarize NOAA's role in the oil spill response and
    then provide a short update on NOAA's latest efforts.
        NOAA's mission is to understand and predict changes in the
    earth's environment, and conserve and manage coastal and marine
    resources to meet our Nation's economic, social, and
    environmental needs. NOAA is also a natural resource trustee,
    and is one of the Federal agencies responsible for protecting
    and restoring the coastal natural resources when they are
    affected by oil spills. As such, the entire agency is deeply
    concerned about the immediate and long-term environmental,
    economic, and social impacts of the Gulf Coast and the Nation
    as a whole as a result of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
        NOAA is the Nation's scientific resource for the unified
    command and is responsible for coordinated scientific, weather,
    and biological response services. NOAA's experts have been
    assisting with the response from the very beginning of this
    spill. Offices throughout the agency have been mobilized, and
    hundreds of NOAA personnel are dedicating themselves to assist.
        Over the past few weeks, NOAA has provided 24/7 scientific
    support to the U.S. Coast Guard in its role as Federal on-scene
    coordinator both on scene and through our Seattle operation
    center. This NOAA-wide effort support includes data of the
    trajectories of the oil spill, information management,
    overflight observations, and management, weather and river flow
    forecast, shoreline, and resource risk assessment, and
    oceanographic modeling support.
        Now, a few specifics on seven activities of which NOAA has
    responsibility. NOAA's oceanographers continue to release
    updated oil spill trajectory maps showing the predicted
    trajectory of the oil spill. These maps help inform shoreline
    operations, placement of booms, and oil recovery efforts at the
    surface.
        NOAA's current forecast show offshore winds through
    Saturday morning with magnitudes of 6 to 12 knots. Yesterday's
    overflights observed significant amounts of oil offshore around
    the Mississippi Delta and near the Southern Chandeleur Islands.
    Although offshore winds may eventually lead to a reprieve in
    new shoreline impacts, the Mississippi Delta west of Timberlier
    Bay, Breton Sound, and the Chandeleur Islands continue to be
    threatened by shoreline contacts during NOAA's current forecast
    period of 72 hours.
        The loop current. We continue to track the small amounts of
    oil that was detrained in the loop current late last week. Most
    of that surface oil is now caught in a counterclockwise eddy on
    the northern side of the loop current. And because the top of
    the loop current has now pinched off, any oil that was in the
    loop current will most likely be retained in the Gulf and not
    routed to the Florida strait or the Gulf current.
        Flow rate. NOAA's scientists are part of the National
    Incident Command's flow rate technical group, which is designed
    to support the response and inform the public by providing
    scientifically validated information about the amount of oil
    flowing from the leaking well, while ensuring the vital efforts
    to cap the leak are not impeded.
        Fisheries disaster declaration. On May 24, Commerce
    Secretary Gary Locke determined that there has been a fishery
    disaster in the Gulf of Mexico due to the economic impact on
    commercial and recreational fisheries from the ongoing Deep
    Horizon oil spill. The affected area includes the State of
    Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Secretary Locke made the
    determination under section 312(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
    The declaration was made in response to requests from Louisiana
    and Mississippi based on the loss of access to many commercial
    fisheries and the existing and anticipated environmental damage
    from this unprecedented event.
        Fisheries closure and seafood safety. This past Tuesday,
    NOAA's National Marine Fishery Service modified the boundaries
    of the fisheries closed areas based upon the latest oil spill
    trajectories. The modified area increased the closed area to
    54,096 square miles. This represents 22.4 percent of the Gulf
    of Mexico's exclusive economic zone. NOAA is sampling seafood
    inside and outside of the closed areas and working with the FDA
    to ensure that seafood is not contaminated and to guide
    decisions about when closed areas can be reopened.
        Natural resource damage assessment. NOAA is coordinating
    the natural resource damage assessment effort with the
    Department of the Interior as a Federal co-trustee, as well as
    co-trustees in five States and representatives of at least one
    responsible party, British Petroleum. The focus currently is to
    assemble existing data on resources and their habitat, and
    collect baseline or pre-spill impact data. Data on all
    resources and habitat are also being collected.
        Number seven. Social and environmental impact. NOAA is
    aggressively working with other agencies and non-Federal
    scientists to understand where oil is on the surface and below
    the surface and to evaluate the environmental impacts of both
    the spill and any associated mitigation efforts.
        To close, I would like to assure you that we will not
    relent in our efforts to protect the livelihoods of Gulf Coast
    residents and mitigate the environmental impact of this spill.
        Thank you for allowing me to testify on NOAA's response
    efforts. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]
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        Mr. Markey. Thank you, Dr. Robinson.
        Our next witness is Mr. David Hayes. He is the Deputy
    Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior. Mr. Hayes
    served as counselor to Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt and
    Deputy Secretary of the Interior during the Clinton
    administration.
        I understand that you will have to leave at 4:00 to attend
    to spill response matters, Mr. Hayes. So please begin your
    testimony.

               STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID J. HAYES

        Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, also Ranking Member
    Upton, and members of the subcommittee. I will give a few oral
    remarks to accompany the written testimony from the Department.
        [The information follows:]
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        Mr. Hayes. We have been, as you would imagine,
    extraordinarily busy here on this matter since day one. The
    morning after the accident, I went down to the Gulf and was the
    first administration person working with Admiral Landry on
    setting up the command center. We have been working every day
    since then virtually 24/7 with several streams of work,
    obviously working to plug the leak.
        Secretary Salazar has been in Houston four times. Dr.
    Marcia McNutt, the director of the U.S. Geological Survey, has
    been in Houston for most of the last three weeks working with
    Secretary Chu and the directors of the National Labs to provide
    Federal oversight and direction in connection with those high-
    tech activities.
        Thirdly, we have been very active on the response effort
    side. The Department of the Interior has more than 600
    personnel mobilized in the four command centers in the Gulf
    region, including some of our highest-ranking folks. Jon
    Jarvis, the director of the National Park Service, is our lead
    in the Mobile, Alabama, office, by way of example.
        We have significant assets in the area. We have 40 National
    Park units and/or National Wildlife Refuge units in the area.
    And we are leading a lot of the natural response efforts on the
    natural resource damage response efforts.
        We also have been doing some special science projects. As
    Dr. Robinson referred to, there has been a Flow Rate Task Force
    established, and Dr. Marcia McNutt has led that task force, our
    director of USGS. And she provided a briefing earlier today
    that updated and provided independent governmental estimates of
    the flow rate coming out of the leaks.
        More broadly, I will just mention a couple of other
    important aspects of what we have been doing. Obviously,
    because of our jurisdiction over the Minerals Management
    Service, we have been deeply involved in addressing the safety
    issues that have arisen in connection with this disaster. We
    have started our own investigation, working with the United
    States Coast Guard. Secretary Salazar also commissioned an
    independent investigation by the National Academy of
    Engineering, which is under way.
        Today, we submitted to the President a 30-day safety report
    that he requested, suggesting interim additional measures to
    increase the safety for offshore drilling. And, as you know,
    the President accepted that report and took a number of steps
    to ensure that we would not have additional problems until we
    could fully implement those safety requirements and also get
    the benefit of the input of the Presidential commission that he
    established and which is now under way.
        We also, of course, have been undertaking broader reform
    efforts at the MMS. As you know, we have taken reform efforts
    with the Royalty-in-Kind Program and, most recently, have
    reorganized the MMS to separate out the enforcement function
    from the permitting function, and also to separate out the
    revenue function, which collects an average of $13 billion per
    year.
        I will leave it with that, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to
    questions.
        Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Hayes, very much.
        Our next witness, Mr. Salt, is the principal deputy
    secretary of the Army. He provides policy for the Army Corps of
    Engineers. Assistant Secretary Darcy delivered the Army Corps
    prepared testimony, so Mr. Salt will be there to answer
    questions moving forward.
        Our next witness is Rear Admiral James Watson.
        Rear Admiral Watson assumed duties as deputy commander of
    the United States Coast Guard Atlantic Area Command in April of
    2010. Prior to that, he served as the Atlantic area's first
    director of operations.
        Rear Admiral Watson graduated from the Coast Guard Academy
    in 1978 with a degree in marine engineering, and he
    additionally has masters degrees in mechanical engineering,
    naval architecture, and strategic studies.
        When you are ready, Admiral, please begin.

                 STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JAMES WATSON

        Admiral Watson. Good afternoon, Chairman Markey,
    Representative Upton, distinguished members of the committee.
        First, I want to say that this is an incident that is a
    tragic incident for the people of South Louisiana, Mississippi,
    Alabama, and even parts of Florida.
        I have been down there, and we are terrifically sensitive
    to the impacts that this has on them, and particularly also the
    people who have lost their loved ones on the Deepwater Horizon.
        Since the night of the explosion, Federal, State, and local
    authorities and the responsible parties, BP and Transocean,
    have been working around the clock to secure the leak and
    mitigate environmental damages. My role as the deputy Federal
    on-scene coordinator is to support Rear Admiral Mary Landry,
    the Eighth Coast Guard District Commander. We will carry out
    our national policy and direction, and have oversight of all
    response operations as directed by the National Contingency
    Plan.
        The Deepwater Horizon explosion on the night of April 20
    set off an unfortunate chain of events. The event began as a
    search-and-rescue case, and within the first few hours of the
    explosion, 115 of the 126 crew members were safely recovered.
    After 3 days of continuous searching, the Coast Guard suspended
    the search for the 11 missing crew members. My deepest
    sympathies are for the families and friends of the Deepwater
    Horizon crew who lost their lives in the line of duty.
        A massive oil spill response followed the sinking of the
    Deepwater Horizon, unprecedented in its scope, complexity, and
    indeterminate nature, the spill has required an extraordinary
    unified response across all levels of government, industry, and
    the communities of the five Gulf Coast States.
        A federally-led incident command was quickly established to
    coordinate this massive operation. Employing lessons learned
    from the Exxon Valdez, the Cosco Busan, spill of national
    significant exercises, and through the implementation of the
    Oil Pollution Act of 1990, the response community galvanized
    their efforts under a common framework provided by the National
    Contingency Plan.
        This framework, developed over the last two decades,
    enables us to respond to these catastrophes in a way that
    leverages the strengths of private industry under the
    leadership of a Federal on-scene coordinator. In accordance
    with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, we integrate the best of
    Federal, State, and local resources alongside the best and
    brightest of industry, academia, and the public in a unity of
    effort to protect our natural resources, livelihoods, and the
    security of the Nation.
        From the President down, the Federal Government has taken
    an ``all hands on deck'' approach from the moment the explosion
    occurred, including the designation as a ``spill of national
    significance,'' with Admiral Thad Allen as the national
    incident commander.
        From the start, our objectives have remained constant and
    clear: Stop the leak, fight the spill offshore, protect
    environmentally sensitive areas, and mitigate the effects on
    the environment, the economy, and the local communities.
        Despite several aggressive measures, including the top hat
    and the riser insertion tube, engineers have been unable to
    stop the flow of oil. Today, we eagerly await the outcome of
    the top kill. We continue to monitor the progress in operation,
    which is expected to take 3 to 4 days.
        In parallel, BP is drilling relief wells from two
    additional rigs. I meet personally with BP's chief of
    operations officer, and I know their drilling contractors are
    working around the clock to secure the source of the oil.
        While we are working permanently to secure the leak, we are
    attacking the spill as far offshore as possible. As the oil
    moves from one large slick to multiple ribbons of oil, we
    continue to deploy traditional removal methods. These include
    in situ burning, skimming, and pre-approved surface
    dispersants.
        The magnitude of this spill has required us to look at
    nontraditional mitigation strategies. Subsurface dispersants
    and satellite imagery are just a few of the innovative
    technologies responders are using offshore. Near shore, almost
    2 million feet of hard boom has been deployed, according to
    environmentally and economically sensitive areas, as outlined
    in local area contingency plans. This includes different types
    of booms and other nonconventional barriers methods, including
    National Guard deployment of Hesco barriers in Mississippi and
    sandbags in Louisiana.
        As oil reaches the shoreline, we will continue to be
    aggressive in monitoring BP's contractors and launching
    coordinated Federal and State actions. We require BP to obtain
    and deploy whatever resources are necessary, including new
    technologies, to ensure we are doing everything we can to
    protect the shoreline environmental sensitive areas in the Gulf
    region.
        Mitigating the effects of this spill extend beyond
    environmental impacts and include damages to surrounding
    communities who depend so heavily on the Gulf of Mexico for
    their livelihood. The fishermen and small business owners are
    anxious to do whatever they can. Recognizing the desire of so
    many to help and support the local economies, the unified
    command has established a volunteer and vessel of opportunity
    program to maximize the opportunities available to the local
    communities to support response and cleanup operations.
        Although the incident remains under investigation by a
    joint Minerals Management Service and Coast Guard Marine Board
    of Investigation, it may be months before we fully understand
    what caused the explosion. However, the spill has heightened
    the need for building resiliency into our Nation's critical
    infrastructure so we are better prepared to respond to system
    failures and prevent spills of national significance from
    occurring in the future.
        Our response to this historic spill is far from over, but I
    want to reassure you, the entire responsive community is fully
    committed and will continue to aggressively pursue all
    available options to mitigate the environmental and economic
    impacts of the spill.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Watson follows:]
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        Mr. Markey. Thank you, Admiral Watson, very much.
        The chair will now recognize himself for a round of
    questions.
        Deputy Secretary Hayes and Admiral Watson, this is BP's oil
    spill. BP hired Transocean to drill the well. BP hired
    Halliburton to cement the wellbore. BP owns the equipment
    necessary to stop the oil leak and has sole responsibility to
    stop the leak and pay for the cleanup cost. But BP gave
    deflated estimates about the flow rate, how much oil was
    actually going out into the ocean on a daily basis, couldn't
    provide a live feed of its efforts to the public for over a
    month after the explosion, and has not yet stopped the leak.
        What oversight authorities of the Federal Government have
    been engaged to ensure BP gets the job done?
        Admiral Watson.
        Admiral Watson. Sir, as soon as the oil spill response
    started, we have had a designated Federal on-scene coordinator
    who is responsible for that oversight. BP was given a letter
    that made that very clear, and the organization was
    established. All of the activities involving the response have
    been under the oversight and direction of the Federal on-scene
    coordinator.
        As the incident grew larger and larger, we expanded that
    organization from a local incident command to an area command,
    and finally to a national incident command with the commandant
    of the Coast Guard, Admiral Thad Allen, in charge.
        Mr. Markey. Thank you.
        Administrator Jackson and Rear Admiral Watson, yesterday
    the Coast Guard ordered all ships participating in the BP oil
    spill cleanup to cease operations after crew members on three
    boats reported health problems. Since the start of this spill,
    EPA has been stating that the oil spewing under the sea is
    harmful to human and animal health.
        Such illness is nothing new. Following the Exxon Valdez
    spill in 1989, Exxon reported 6,722 cases of upper respiratory
    infection from workers participating in the cleanup. Yet, BP
    spokesman Graham McEwen said this past Tuesday that he was
    unaware of any health complaints amongst cleanup workers. And
    fishermen working on cleanup are saying they weren't provided
    with protective equipment.
        Did BP consult with the EPA or the Coast Guard on the
    health effects of deploying volunteers?
        Admiral Watson. We have at each of our incident command
    posts and at the area a safety officer. And our plans, our
    daily plans are updated according to the changing conditions of
    which these workers are exposed.
        One of our highest concerns has been for the workers
    actually over the well, which caused the explosion in the first
    place, from the volatile organic compounds. As we hire
    contractors, we ensure that they are in compliance with the
    OSHA standards for working in these conditions, and volunteers
    are given specific training and equipment for the conditions
    that they would be volunteering to participate in.
        For the fishing vessels, there is one set of training
    requirements; for the shore-side people, there is another. And
    then there is the wildlife people.
        Mr. Markey. Do you think that these reported symptoms
    experienced by people involved in the cleanup efforts could be
    a result of exposure to the chemical dispersants?
        Admiral Watson. Sir, I can't comment on that specifically.
    But I know that the unified command is responding to those and
    making changes when we determine what it actually is that is
    being reported.
        Mr. Markey. How is the EPA going to evaluate the long-term
    public health concerns associated with the use of dispersants,
    including the ingestion of contaminated seafood?
        Ms. Jackson. Chairman, we will first rely on data. That
    data is a collected now. Primarily along the shoreline, air
    data is being collected along the shoreline in conjunction with
    the States, and also with two roving labs. We call them our
    TAGA vehicles, and also by the ASPECT aircraft, which is able
    to take air samples, especially during surface burning
    operations.
        EPA is monitoring for particulate matter, volatile organic
    compounds, specifically compounds that would tend to cause odor
    from oil, BTX, benzene toluene, xylene. And we have added those
    components that are most volatile in the dispersant. We are
    just getting that data in. We haven't seen any dispersant
    chemicals, but we have seen elevated levels of some of those
    volatile organic compounds. We have also seen occasionally
    elevated levels of hydrogen sulfites, which we are monitoring
    for.
        There is more and more data added every day, and I think it
    is EPA's job to assess both any short-term impacts--we haven't
    seen numbers that give us concern. We did have one volatile
    spike in the last few days and a hydrogen sulfite spike at one
    location--and then interpret for the people of the Gulf Coast
    what that means.
        Right now, if you go on our Web site, it says that what you
    smell probably can make you nauseous, give you a headache,
    irritate you. So the first thing to do is if you are not
    participating in the cleanup or response is to remove yourself,
    because some people are quite susceptible to that. When I was
    there, it didn't bother me, but I am notorious for not being
    able to smell.
        If you are a worker, then we refer--whether we are getting
    those complaints from the workers themselves or NGOs--those
    complaints to OSHA, which is part of the unified command,
    because worker protection and safety is their responsibility.
    We are not doing as much monitoring out over the wellhead
    itself.
        Mr. Markey. Thank you.
        The chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
    Upton.
        Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like each of you to give me what your estimate is
    of your cost thus far to the agency and what you might think it
    will be for the foreseeable future. Obviously, a ballpark
    figure is sufficient.
        Ms. Jackson. I will go. To date, EPA has spent
    approximately $6.7 million. Of that, we spent about $5.2
    million in the regions in reimbursable funds and approximately
    $1.5 million in headquarters.
        Mr. Upton. And what do you anticipate for the next 30 to 60
    days or so?
        Ms. Jackson. Double it. You know.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Robinson?
        Mr. Robinson. Thank you. NOAA has expended $4.6 million on
    Deepwater to date. This includes $2.9 million in reimbursable
    funds from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund and $1.7 million
    in recurring activities. I don't have the benefit of an
    estimate of what those expenses might be within the next 30
    days. We will make that calculation and get back to you.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Hayes?
        Mr. Hayes. Mr. Upton, our estimate to date is about $8
    million. That is fresh from a House Appropriations hearing this
    morning. About 60 percent of that we believe will be directly
    reimbursable under agreement with the Coast Guard from BP. Some
    of the balance of that will not be. So that is our estimate at
    this point. And like Dr. Robinson, we can try to project
    forward, but that is pretty speculative.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Salt, you get the added importance, I guess,
    of if we go ahead with these permits that have been approved,
    you all may be doing some extensive work there as well. So what
    are your estimated costs?
        Mr. Salt. Sir, I don't have a good answer to that. The
    Corps' work so far has been on providing certain technical
    analysis, particularly the hydrologic analysis, as Secretary
    Darcy testified, with respect to options managing the
    Mississippi River. And then with respect to our regulatory
    effort the bulk of our future efforts will be in the monitoring
    part of that. It is not expected that we would do any of the
    work. At this time, it is not expected that we would do any of
    the work with respect to those permits.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Watson?
        Admiral Watson. My estimate is about $19 million at this
    time.
        I have to say, though, that one of the things that I am
    responsible for in my position as the deputy Federal on-scene
    coordinator is management of the ceiling of the emergency fund
    under the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. It is a portion of
    the overall trust fund that we use for responding to
    emergencies. And we provide funding to other Federal agencies,
    State agencies. We use that fund to hire contractors directly.
    It is not used for damage costs or claims.
        That fund, when I was down there just a couple days ago,
    was up to $85 million total. And that is--when you are in a
    Federal response, that is the number that you are managing. As
    opposed to----
        Mr. Upton. My clock is running here fast. I want to get in
    a couple more questions. So as you all look at your costs thus
    far and going ahead, I would imagine that all of you will be
    seeking full reimbursement from BP.
        Is there any argument to that statement?
        Good. All five are unanimous.
        Ms. Jackson, you indicated that you have done rigorous
    testing, sharing the data, particularly of the subsurface
    disbursements. Did they work? Are they working? Is that the
    reason why it has been reduced from 70,000 gallons to 12,000
    gallons, because they are working? Because, based on what I
    have seen, there is not a lot that is working.
        So tell me how they are working if in fact you are reducing
    the flow by a considerable amount.
        Ms. Jackson. Thank you, Mr. Upton.
        One of the reasons that BP first requested the ability to
    use the dispersants in the subseas, something that has never
    been done as far as we can tell, anywhere in the world, is that
    they claim they can use much less dispersant and still be much
    more effective. And that is exactly what we are seeing right
    now. They use about--of the amount I told you, the 12,000, they
    used 11,110 gallons in the subsurface; they used 1,029 at the
    surface. The day before that, they used 200 at the surface.
        Mr. Upton. 200,000 or 200 gallons?
        Ms. Jackson. 200 gallons. The Coast Guard would rather, at
    the surface, use surface burning whenever possible. Surface
    burning obviously depends on the wind, and of course skimming
    and other collection operations.
        You asked about the monitoring that we do in the
    subsurface. There are three basic pieces of data that are
    reviewed every night by a team of Federal scientists. The first
    is particle size. The smaller particle size is a measure of
    dispersion, if you will. The second is dissolved oxygen. There
    has been lots of concern that there would be too little oxygen
    in the system. And when that happens, the system becomes
    hypoxic and creatures die, to put it mildly. And the third is a
    toxicity test, which is done on a critter called rotifer. And
    those tests were agreed to by a panel of scientists because we
    can get them back quickly. And right now, we are seeing usually
    above 90 percent survivability when we expose this creature to
    the oil dispersant water mixture. I think we have had one or
    two samples maybe in the high 80 percent survivability.
        Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair recognizes the chairman emeritus of the
    committee, Mr. Dingell.
        Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        This question for the witness from the Coast Guard and from
    the Army.
        Louisiana has proposed building a chain of sand barriers
    along the Louisiana coast to prevent oil from the coastal
    wetlands. The plan has not yet been approved. Why, and when?
        Admiral Watson. There is a consideration that the Federal
    on-scene coordinator uses in a proposal like this, and it is
    primarily: How effective is it going to be? Is it the most
    effective thing in the tradeoffs?
        Mr. Dingell. By the time you decide that, I have a notion
    that the oil will be well into the wetlands. How long is it
    going to take to come to this decision?
        Admiral Watson. First of all, we have to get a reading from
    the Corps and the other agencies as to whether it is going to
    be more hazardous to the environment than it would be if you
    didn't do it. Then, secondly, we have to make a determination
    if it is going to be effective stopping the oil.
        Mr. Dingell. Now, which agency down there has
    responsibility for the environmental impact? It is the
    Department of the Interior, is it not?
        Mr. Hayes. That is correct.
        Mr. Dingell. Now, you did not require the environmental
    impact for the particular--impact statement for the particular
    well that we are talking about in the spill. Is that correct?
        Mr. Hayes. That is correct. There is a legal restraint.
        Mr. Dingell. Let me continue, please, because I only have a
    certain amount of time.
        Why did you not have an environmental impact statement?
    Each drilling undertaking is different, and each part of that
    of the tract on which you had the general environmental impact
    statement is different, and the equipment is all different. Why
    was there not an environmental impact statement on that?
        Mr. Hayes. The administration has asked the Congress to
    change the law under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The
    Department is required to process an exploration plan and
    permit within 30 days.
        Mr. Dingell. Let me ask you about 30 days; I want to hear
    about that later. But the environment, the National
    Environmental Policy Act is still in force. It requires you,
    wherever there is going to be a significant environmental
    impact, to file one of these environmental impact statements.
    Why was that not filed here?
        Mr. Hayes. CEQ has a categorical exclusion for this
    activity that they----
        Mr. Dingell. Why did that do that?
        Mr. Hayes. They did that in 1986. The chair has started to
    review that----
        Mr. Dingell. What year did they do it in?
        Mr. Hayes. 1986.
        Mr. Dingell. OK. Now, explain to me, if you please, why I
    am hearing about the risks of drilling or failure to drill
    properly and I am not hearing anything about the steps that the
    agencies have taken to ensure that good drilling practices are
    followed?
        Mr. Hayes. Congressman, the Minerals Management Service
    spends about $30 million a year on an inspection program, has
    66 full-time inspectors. We are doing a stem-to-stern
    evaluation, however, of whether that enforcement mechanism
    where they check against the prescriptive requirements and the
    regulations is adequate or not. And that is going to be an
    important outcome, I think, of the investigation that has
    started and the Presidential commission that has been
    established.
        Mr. Dingell. Now, you tell me that you are required to come
    to a decision within 30 days on these permits. Is that in the
    statute?
        Mr. Hayes. It is in the statute.
        Mr. Dingell. Do you have any authority to waive or to
    extend that?
        Mr. Hayes. No authority, unfortunately. It is a shell. And
    legal counsel, since this law was passed in 1978, have said
    there is no authority to extend it.
        Mr. Dingell. All right. Now, MMS has granted 27 categorical
    exemptions to oil and gas companies. Would you submit to the
    committee the list of the categorical exemptions that you have
    given and why those categorical exemptions have been given in
    each instance, please.
        Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the record stay
    open so that can be received.
        Mr. Markey. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Dingell. Now, I note that you have given categorical
    exemptions to a well at 4,000 feet deep. Here, you gave one at
    5,000 feet. And you now have one that I note is given to
    Anadarko Petroleum for a plan that will be for a drilling
    undertaking that will be more than 9,000 feet. Why are these
    given? And explain why they are a, quote, category of actions
    which do not individually and cumulatively have a significant
    effect on the human environment and for which, therefore,
    neither an environmental impact assessment nor an environmental
    impact statement is required.
        And I am quoting from the actions of the agency. Please
    explain that.
        Mr. Hayes. Congressman, I would have to look at those
    specific examples. They have been--those are preceded by two
    environmental impact statements, one in connection with a 5-
    year plan under which those leases were granted, and then a
    second environmental statement was prepared for each specific
    lease sale under the 5-year plan.
        You raised a very important point, though. And Chairman
    Sutley and Secretary Salazar 10 days ago suggested a top-to-
    bottom review of the NEPA approach taken by the Minerals
    Management Service.
        Mr. Dingell. Can you make a bald statement that every
    action that was taken by the drillers in each of these cases
    conformed in full to the environmental impact statement and to
    the permit?
        Mr. Hayes. I personally cannot.
        Mr. Dingell. Would you submit for the record a statement
    that you can or cannot; and, if so, why?
        Mr. Hayes. Certainly.
        Mr. Dingell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The chair recognizes the ranking member of the full
    committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Barton.
        Mr. Barton. Thank you, Chairman Markey.
        The first thing I want to establish is chain of command.
        Admiral Watson, when I was in Louisiana with Chairman
    Markey several weeks ago, the top Federal official on site was
    an admiral named Mary Landry. Is she still the top Federal
    official on site?
        Admiral Watson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Barton. Who does she report to?
        Admiral Watson. She reports to Admiral Thad Allen.
        Mr. Barton. And who does he report to?
        Admiral Watson. He reports to Secretary Napolitano.
        Mr. Barton. And who does she report to?
        Admiral Watson. The President.
        Mr. Barton. So that is the chain of command?
        Admiral Watson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Barton. The President, Napolitano, Admiral Allen, and
    the Admiral Landry?
        Admiral Watson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Barton. Is there any private representative on site
    that doesn't have to report to Admiral Landry?
        Admiral Watson. There is a requirement under the Oil
    Pollution Act of 1990 that we have a unified command and that
    the Federal on-scene coordinator is the person with the 51
    percent vote.
        Now, we do have a unified command in which we have a State
    on-scene coordinator, so the States are well represented, as
    well as a coordinator from the responsible party.
        Mr. Barton. The point that I am trying to get across, the
    British Petroleum representatives, the Halliburton
    representatives, the Cameron representatives, the Transocean
    representatives, any other contractor that works for a private
    company, they have an independent chain of command through
    their companies, but they have to work with Admiral Landry or
    her designee; they cannot act independently. Is that not
    correct?
        Admiral Watson. That is correct. The COO of BP is in our
    command center. He is right next to Mary Landry.
        Mr. Barton. Now, I want to go to Administrator Jackson.
        We have talked quite a bit, and you mentioned in your
    testimony the dispersant issue. And I want to say right off the
    front, that I think that is a judgment call, and I think EPA
    has made the right judgment. I think it is the right judgment
    to try to use these dispersants to try to keep the oil under
    water as opposed to letting it get on the top of the water
    where it would wash onshore and could foul up the beaches and
    the marshlands.
        So I am not negative at all about the decision to use
    dispersants. And I understand some of your testimony about the
    qualitative differences on how much to use. I think the least
    you can use, the better. I am not second-guessing that.
        My question is, as the administrator of EPA, has British
    Petroleum received approval before using dispersant? And have
    they ever used dispersants in a way that EPA specifically
    disapproved of?
        Ms. Jackson. The answer to your first question is they have
    been--they were approved, pre-approved through the Federal on-
    scene coordinator's regional response plan that use of
    dispersants at the surface, as long as it was on the EPA
    product schedule, was allowable for surface applications. So
    that is yes. I believe you said, were they approved? Yes,
    throughout the--by the FOSC ultimately, but in conjunction with
    the ROT.
        They specifically requested approval to use it in the
    subsurface and received that, I believe it was, May 14. The
    date is in my testimony, my oral and written testimony.
        And then you asked if at any time their application of
    dispersants has been in violation of an order. I would say the
    closest that we got to that was Sunday night when my concern
    was that we had already approved use of subsea dispersants. All
    the testing and science was showing that it was working, and
    yet the amount of spraying at the surface kept going up. And
    the conversation that I had with Admiral Landry, and then she
    brought in Mr.--I am sorry, I don't remember his name. His
    first name is David. I am sorry--was that we wanted to see that
    go down. Their initial response was that they didn't understand
    that. But they did come around. And we have seen the amounts go
    down, as I mentioned in my testimony.
        Mr. Barton. Again, there can be honest differences of
    opinion about just the fact that you use dispersant or not,
    about the qualitative differences. But in terms of the policy,
    they have gotten approval before beginning and they have--while
    they have had differences of opinion, they have not continued
    to do something that EPA or the on-site Federal official
    Admiral Landry didn't approve of. That's a true statement.
        Ms. Jackson. It is. The one piece of color I add to that,
    sir, is just that we--at this point I do not feel like I have
    the science to say with certainty that they are using the least
    toxic dispersant out there. So we are getting that science. It
    will take time.
        Mr. Barton. I understand that.
        Know my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
        I have two more questions. One is for the representatives
    of the Corps of Engineers.
        I want to know why in God's name Louisiana hasn't gotten
    approval to begin to build these berms. They have been waiting
    for over a month. Why would you not assign responsibility to
    the Governor of Louisiana, and tell them to do what they can to
    protect their marshland?
        Mr. Salt. Sir, we actually received the permit request on
    May 11. We quickly coordinated that request, went back to the
    State. They agreed that they needed to modify the request based
    on some issues that were developed. We took their modified
    request, and we have been working with that.
        One of the main issues is the time it would take to do it.
    The State's request, you can think of it as 19 increments of
    berm. We just coordinated an analysis of how long it would take
    to construct the shortest, and it was 5 months. Part of the
    analysis then is, how much of this is it reasonable to permit
    under the emergency provisions? The Jacksonville district
    commander proffered that to the Governor.
        Mr. Barton. So basically you have sat on your bottom for a
    month, and nothing--and I think you got some permitted today.
    Isn't that correct? Six sections got permitted. And in the
    meantime, the oil is in the marshland. Even if it didn't work--
    --
        Mr. Salt. Sir, my math is 13 days. But, yes, in that
    process of trying to sort--I mean, the question really is, is
    it more harm than good to throw up a berm for over 100 miles
    along the coast?
        Mr. Barton. And so the Corps' judgment is it is more harm.
        Mr. Salt. There is a part of that proposal that is
    beneficial. That is the part that it worked through with the
    State and others. I am not sure that--the State hasn't accepted
    the offer yet, but that was offered.
        Mr. Barton. If the Corps had given approval immediately,
    could not some of the oil that had gotten in, has been able to
    infiltrate into the marshland, would it not have been prevented
    from getting into the marshland?
        Mr. Salt. Sir, I honestly don't think so. We are talking
    about large berms. And to achieve some of the benefits you are
    talking about, like I said, to complete the shortest of the
    berms, the Corps' estimate was 5 months.
        Mr. Barton. Well, maybe if Louisianans did it, it might not
    take 5 months.
        Mr. Salt. Even if we accept those kinds of proficiencies,
    sir, I think--the Corps was trying and is trying and is
    committed to try----
        Mr. Barton. I encourage you to try to harder.
        I thank the chair's discretion.
        Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired.
        And, Mr. Hayes, we know that you have an important meeting.
    Obviously, because of your responsibilities, you have to go
    there right now. So we thank you for coming here today.
        Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to
    respond to any further questions for the record.
        Mr. Stearns. Point of information, Mr. Chairman, is it
    possible that someone from MMS could be here as his
    replacement? Since we do have a hearing and we are in Congress,
    we would like to have somebody here; and many of us still want
    to ask him questions.
        Mr. Markey. I don't know that there is anyone designated by
    the Secretary to replace Mr. Hayes.
        Mr. Hayes. We do not have anyone else here.
        Mr. Stearns. Can he possibly wait for one series of
    questions?
        Mr. Markey. Again, I know that they are part of the spill
    response team, and Mr. Hayes is responsible for it, and I just
    don't want our hearing to interfere with his ability to
    participate in the important decisions which are being made
    right now.
        Mr. Hayes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Hayes.
        The chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms.
    Capps.
        Mrs. Capps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank each of our
    panelists. It has been a very arduous process, both down in the
    Gulf and here answering questions.
        Workers and volunteers and local residents are at risk as
    we speak here for a host of negative health affects. Just
    yesterday, the unified command recalled fishing vessels working
    on the spill due to workers' experience of nausea, dizziness,
    headaches, and chest pain. Previous spills have shown that more
    serious health problems may arise over time.
        Administrator Jackson, according to an L.A. Times interview
    with some fishermen working on the results of the spill
    yesterday--or the interview was yesterday--while they were told
    not to touch the oil in their training, they weren't provided
    with any protective equipment by BP. Instead, they wore leather
    boots, regular clothes on the boat to work the spill.
        When asked what BP told them, the fishermen responded that
    they--meaning the BP officials--told us if we ran into oil it
    wasn't supposed to bother us.
        Do you think that BP has done enough to protect the health
    of the oil spill responders in the Gulf Coast communities?
        Ms. Jackson. Based on that story, no, ma'am.
        Mrs. Capps. Just for the record, I was at a hearing earlier
    today with the CEO of BP, and I asked the same question, and I
    didn't get any response. So it seems to me that, while BP does
    have some technical expertise and experience in drilling, when
    it comes to public and worker health there is no reason that we
    should assume that BP has the expertise, the willingness to use
    its resources or incentives to really address the issues that
    are involved here.
        Now EPA is already taking steps to protect the health of
    workers in communities, as you mentioned in your opening
    remarks. You are collecting data, you are doing monitoring and
    surveillance, but are there some other ways that EPA is
    communicating about health risks to the public?
        Ms. Jackson. The primary means that we use are for those
    who have Internet access we put up information to help
    communities. It is a right to know. A basic tenet of
    environmental protection is that people have the right to know.
    We do that in conjunction with our partners and with the
    command.
        We also have put up a translation in Vietnamese. So that
    there is access to not everything but some information,
    particularly that related to human health.
        We continue to get data. We have had a series of public
    meetings, and we have been fortunate enough to be joined with
    our partners. Often, the Coast Guard, NOAA, Department of
    Interior, Fish and Wildlife are there to answer questions.
        Just as your particular issue we would normally refer that
    to OSHA. Dr. David Michaels I believe has been very adamant
    about the need for OSHA to stand up and be very available
    through the unified command for any questions related to work,
    specifically to worker health.
        Mrs. Capps. Thank you.
        I am assuming EPA is also translating--while you are
    translating literally to other languages, but as data is being
    collected, as this ongoing process occurs, you will use this.
    Do you use any other methods as well to keep the local
    communities and workers and volunteers apprised of new data as
    it comes along?
        Ms. Jackson. Oh, absolutely. We are trying everything we
    know to help the communities understand what we do. Just the
    other day when I was out there, we had NGOs who were
    particularly concerned about odor complaints ride along in our
    mobile lab so they can understand and tell us where they might
    want us to go to focus on information.
        It is a continual process, and it is one that we do under
    the direction of the Coast Guard. They have been very
    supportive of any efforts EPA makes to bring in and inform the
    local community.
        Of course, since I am from Louisiana at least and the Gulf
    Coast region for sure, that I think nothing could be more
    important.
        Mrs. Capps. And, also, to follow up even more, you
    mentioned OSHA and you talked about collaboration with the
    Coast Guard. Are there other agencies as well that should be
    involving in some of these public health responses.
        Ms. Jackson. Certainly when it comes to seafood safety, it
    is the Food and Drug Administration, along with any partnership
    with NOAA, because NOAA is collecting so much data out there.
        I believe either today or yesterday EPA was asked by NOAA
    to join some of their deep sea cruises. We generally don't do a
    lot of sampling out in the deep sea. That is NOAA's
    responsibility. But there is good cooperation there. And we are
    working very closely with our Federal partners to ensure that
    all data is getting up on the Web. EPA has a bit of experience
    in that regard as well.
        Mrs. Capps. You know, earlier this week, this full
    Committee on Energy and Commerce, we held a markup for a bill
    that will provide necessary health care to 9/11 responders--if
    you can believe this many years after that--who continue to
    face negative health consequences when their heroic work after
    the Twin Towers fell.
        Responders to this oil spill, including local shrimpers and
    fishermen and volunteers and community residents, shouldn't be
    choosing to save the life of the Gulf region, which they
    definitely want to participate in doing, while having the
    choice then to put their own health and lives at risk. And this
    time I hope we can, as I am encouraging to continue doing what
    you are doing and even expand it, all of these agencies here,
    that we don't find ourselves in the same position 10 years from
    now that we did before.
        Ms. Jackson. I thank you.
        I just want to acknowledge the Coast Guard's very strong
    precautionary action yesterday when there was the first sign of
    complaint. It is very warm down there. That oil is light crude,
    sweet light crude. It does volatilize, and it can have effects
    on folks, even folks in the Gulf. We think we are pretty tough
    as it is. And so I could not emphasize more strongly, although
    it is out of my lane per se, that proper protective equipment,
    erring on the side of precaution is extremely important for
    anybody down there.
        Mrs. Capps. I know that I have run out of time. If there
    were more time or maybe you can submit for the written record,
    Admiral Watson or any others that wish to submit some
    statements about this fact.
        Admiral Watson. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
        I just want to emphasize that safety is the first thing
    that we discuss at every one of our meetings; and, of course,
    we are reactive immediately if we find there is a concern. I
    have been in personal discussions with Dr. Michaels, and OSHA
    is a very much a part of our team.
        Mrs. Capps. Thank you very much. I yield back.
        Mr. McNerney [presiding]. At this point, the chair
    recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Shimkus.
        Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Chairman, I think Mr. Stearns. The order
    we had when we started with the opening statements is when the
    gavel drops by seniority, and he was here when the gavel
    dropped.
        Mr. McNerney. The chair recognizes Mr. Stearns.
        Mr. Stearns. And I thank the gentleman, Mr. Shimkus.
        Admiral Watson, recently, the press secretary for the
    President, Robert Gibbs, indicated, ``There's nothing that we
    think can and should be done that isn't being done, nothing.''
    He was pretty emphatic about that. And I guess the question for
    you is, in your present position, do you think absolutely
    everything is being done that possibly could be done to clean
    up this oil spill?
        Admiral Watson. Sir, I was sent down there to do everything
    that could be done. My assignment was to be----
        Mr. Stearns. Oh, I understand your assignment, Admiral.
        Admiral Watson. I really feel like I have done my duty.
        Mr. Stearns. Have you done everything possible that could
    be done to clean this oil spill, in your best opinion?
        Admiral Watson. Personally and from my perspective inside
    the organization, yes, sir.
        Mr. Stearns. Now, ABC ran a news story yesterday in which
    they interviewed a lot of the small fishermen. They say, we
    have boats. We are ready to go out and skim off the oil to help
    out. Why aren't all those unemployed fishermen--why aren't you
    using a lot of their boats to help out?
        Admiral Watson. Sir, I think we have over 500 fishing
    vessels. I think the number is closer to 600. They are----
        Mr. Stearns. They showed boats after boats on ABC, and they
    interviewed these individuals.
        Admiral Watson. Well, I just know that we have accepted
    vessels of opportunity from all the fishing vessel communities.
    We have given them the training, the equipment, and we have
    deployed them, and they are being used to recover.
        Mr. Stearns. Well, you heard Ranking Member Barton indicate
    that Governor Jindal has asked for approval to put these oil
    spill booms out and hasn't got it. And he has also got partial
    approval for building the berms. Why wasn't that done earlier
    if you think everything has been done that has been done? Why
    haven't you given the approval for the Governor on the oil
    spill booms?
        Admiral Watson. Sir, on the berms, that is a tactic that
    hasn't been used before. We need to know----
        Mr. Stearns. No, let's take the first one, the booms. He
    has been asking that for some time.
        Admiral Watson. Oh, booms. There is 1.8 million feet of
    booms out. We have put booms down to the maximum level of
    effort possible, and there is----
        Mr. Stearns. He has indicated in a press conference
    yesterday, the Federal Government--he wants them to approve
    millions of feet of boom, and he is waiting for their approval,
    and he hasn't got it. This is the Governor. So you are saying
    you have approved everything and you are not going to approve
    more?
        Admiral Watson. We are still flowing booms in as fast as we
    can into the State of Louisiana.
        Mr. Stearns. OK, well, I am just telling you what the
    Governor says.
        Now it is also reported there are lots of countries who
    want to help out. They want to send their ships over here. They
    want to provide research, technical expertise, oil pumps,
    skimmers, wildlife treatment. All these countries have listed,
    and yet it doesn't appear to be--I mean, you have had Mexico,
    maybe one other country. Why haven't you accepted help and
    support and assistance from all these other countries? I think
    there were 15 countries that were cited.
        Admiral Watson. Yes, sir. I can't address each one of
    those, but we do have State Department in our organization, and
    we are using the presence of BP around the world to access
    those resources. We are flying Canadian aircraft. We are using
    booms from the Middle East and from Europe.
        Mr. Stearns. It was also reported that Holland has a ship
    and a mechanism to take up 80 percent of the oil by skimming
    it. Did you know about that?
        Admiral Watson. We do have----
        Mr. Stearns. Have you contacted Holland to see what the
    process is they have in place?
        Admiral Watson. We have a dedicated group of engineers that
    are working with proposals like that, sir. I can't speak to
    that specifically.
        Mr. Stearns. OK, it has been 5 weeks. It seems like from
    day 1 if you would had boats out there to take off the skim and
    oil pumps and skimmers, this expertise would have delayed
    hitting the shores of Louisiana. Don't you agree with that,
    that you should have had on day 1 somebody out there doing
    that?
        Admiral Watson. Sir, we responded on day 1 with everything
    that we had. This equipment takes time to flow in, and these
    novel things need to be evaluated before----
        Mr. Stearns. Well, how about day 21? Day 21, you did
    nothing. There was no skimmer boats out there. There was
    nothing being done. And I don't see any foreign countries out
    there that you have approved coming in. And, you know, the
    Governor now has for 2 weeks been asking for you to give
    waivers. Why didn't you do it earlier for the oil spill booms?
        Admiral Watson. We have a total of 1,500 vessels, sir. I am
    not sure which ones you are referring to that we don't have
    working.
        Mr. Stearns. Well, the first couple weeks you weren't out
    skimming the oil at the site. You weren't trying to contain the
    oil. The oil was--I was out there. I saw it. I was on a Coast
    Guard aircraft. It was flowing everywhere. And you could see it
    come up. It was emulsified orange. Everywhere you looked, you
    saw it. And there was--nobody was skimming it up, nothing. This
    was about 3 weeks ago.
        So for you to sit here and tell me, Admiral, that you have
    done everything possible and let this thing hit the Louisiana
    shore, you have to take some culpability here; and you have to
    stand up and say, we could have done more. You can't go with
    the administration that keeps saying, oh, yes, we have done
    everything possible. Because it is clear you haven't.
        Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Stearns.
        At this point, the chair recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
        First of all, I would like to ask if there are any known
    methods out there--maybe Mr. Salt can answer this or
    Administrator Jackson could answer this--that would be
    effective in protecting the marshes. Are building dirt walls
    effective or putting human hair booms? Is there anything out
    there that would be effective?
        Mr. Salt. Sir, I believe we are trying everything we know
    to try.
        Mr. McNerney. Well, I mean, is there any method that is
    known that would be effective, whether or not you are using it,
    whether or not you are deploying it? Getting oil, to prevent
    oil from coming ashore, is there anything out there that can
    prevent that?
        I know that the oil is dispersed in the water. It is not
    just on the surface. So it is a difficult problem. Is there any
    known technique or method that would be effective in this, in
    this situation?
        Mr. Salt. Sir, beyond what is being tried right now, no,
    sir, I don't know anything more.
        Mr. McNerney. Ms. Jackson.
        Ms. Jackson. Sir, as we heard the Admiral say, we are using
    all the methods that are typically used. I have almost every
    day someone who e-mails me with an idea of some sort. There
    have been so many that there was a technical group put together
    under the leadership of the command to try to evaluate them. It
    is very, very difficult, sir, to do science on the fly right
    when you are in the middle of something of this magnitude and
    not do harm. One of the concerns is that in our rush to want to
    do something we want to make sure we are not making the bad
    situation worse in the long term.
        Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
        Rear Admiral, looking in the mirror a little bit now, is
    there anything that the United States government could have
    done that would have been more effective, taking control of the
    administration of this, or any administrative or technical
    thing that we could have done that the United States government
    could have done that would have been more effective?
        Admiral Watson. My personal feeling is that once this
    manifests itself with all of that oil coming up onto the
    surface--we did have weather conditions that did provide--that
    did force us to retreat on occasion. I think that from what we
    could have done differently it could have been in the time
    since drilling has moved outward we could have changed our
    readiness and increased our planning factors for this kind of a
    spill. We have contingency plans. They are really based on
    worse-case scenarios that aren't as worse as this one is, and
    that would have potentially changed our resources that were
    available when the event occurred.
        Mr. McNerney. In your opinion, would it have been hurtful
    or more effective to take control of this from BP? In other
    words, my understanding is that BP is running the show with
    oversight of the Federal Government. Would it have been more
    effective for the Federal Government to take control and to
    give direction to the various players?
        Admiral Watson. Well, let me just explain the type of
    control that we have over BP.
        First of all, they are required to have a contingency plan.
    They are required to have oil spill response contractors and
    other contractors to respond to the type of incident that they
    might have. And then when the incident occurs, they have to
    become a part of the organization. If we find that they are
    nonresponsive, then we would begin to give them more direct
    orders. But in this particular case we have been working this
    response as a unified command, and we found that the resources
    that BP has been able to bring have been valuable, and there
    have been no circumstances that I have observed where they have
    not complied with the plan of the day for the oil spill
    response.
        Mr. McNerney. Thank you.
        I am going to yield my time back and recognize--is it your
    turn--the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Shimkus.
        Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not trying to
    manage time, but I appreciate that.
        Obviously, thank you all for coming. Again, we wouldn't
    wish this on anybody. This is what we have, and I know there is
    a lot of frustration. I think part of the frustration is we are
    the representatives of the people. I know the folks in
    Louisiana are frustrated. The whole country is really
    frustrated.
        With new technology today, we see every ``gee whiz dang''
    solution that can save this thing, from putting straw on the
    thing and soaking it up--that was one that went around last
    week. And, you know, Kevin Costner is going down there to get
    his little whirlybird thing down there to help. People want to
    help. They see all these things.
        I think the other part of the frustration--you know, if I
    was Governor of Louisiana, I would just do it. I would just do
    it and suffer the consequences. The court of public opinion he
    wins by trying to save his marshes. I wouldn't wait for the
    Federal Government. But I am not the Governor of Louisiana, so
    I guess I don't have to make that call.
        Administrator Jackson, I said I would be very kind, and I
    am going to be. What is the name of dispersant that we are
    talking about?
        Ms. Jackson. COREXIT. There are two different formulations,
    COREXIT 9527A and 9500A.
        Mr. Shimkus. Are they both being used, or is one over the
    other?
        Ms. Jackson. Yes, they both have been used. I think the
    only one that is currently being used is 9500A.
        Mr. Shimkus. You mentioned some type of list. Can you
    explain for me that list? And the 9500, is that on that list?
        Ms. Jackson. 9500 is on the product schedule which is
    authorized and listed in the national contingency plan.
        Mr. Shimkus. So this 9500 is what is being used. The only
    kind of different thing about this is there has been approval
    for it to be dispersed deep, right at the spill.
        Ms. Jackson. Yes, the novel application is this injection
    right as the spill was coming up. That stopped yesterday,
    actually, as they initiated the top kill operation. I don't
    think it is happening right now.
        The other novel thing is the volume use. It is usually used
    over a shorter period of time. So there are certainly U.S.
    record volumes used here.
        Mr. Shimkus. And so then on this--so it is usually
    dispersed on surface, and this is new. And so could part of
    this--I give credit to Chairman Markey. This whole debate of
    how much is being spilled is very important. I sat through
    people taking pictures and trying to do the flow diagrams, and
    I had some thermal fluids at my military school that I
    attended.
        If we had a lower projection of what was being released and
    then this dispersant was being used volumetrically in
    proportion to what we thought it was, would that not make the
    case that that is why we have probably some more surface
    appearance versus, you know--could that have been a reason, you
    think?
        Ms. Jackson. I am not sure I understand the question.
        Certainly when you use a dispersant as I understand it at
    the surface you have to set your nozzles to a certain rate of
    application. And one of the important things is making sure you
    are not wasting it, if you will, accidentally spraying it or
    having it drift over open water. It is not going to do any
    good. And one of the big lessons that we will learn, frankly,
    on the fly here with this subsea application is maybe we found
    a tool that could be used in future, God forbid, accidents.
        Mr. Shimkus. Could be used positively.
        Ms. Jackson. Yes. If we continue to believe that this is a
    much more effective way to get at the problem, this means you
    can use less of the chemical. And we are seeing issues. Now the
    one thing that people are pointing out is that there is no data
    on the long-term fate of this material, this dispersed
    material, so we are going to----
        Mr. Shimkus. So we don't know if it is biodegradable or
    stuff.
        Ms. Jackson. It is biodegradable.
        Mr. Shimkus. Is there a time line for that?
        Ms. Jackson. There is a French study and some other work
    that has been done that says within a month it biodegrades.
    What is a little unusual is that is assuming surface
    application, and we are in 5,000 feet of water here.
        Mr. Shimkus. And you mentioned France. I guess the French
    use this or other countries use of this, especially use the
    9500 one. I mean, is that commonly used around the world?
        Ms. Jackson. Let me get the answer back to you on the
    record on that. There has been some back and forth about a
    British ban. The British don't use COREXIT in their rocky--in
    their shallower water, and they are testing it in deeper water.
        Mr. Shimkus. Again, thank you for all you do, all hands on
    deck. We have got to get this solved. Hopefully, we were
    successful today.
        I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Shimkus.
        The chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.
        Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for having
    to run in and out, but we also have other committees and
    issues. I appreciate our panel being here.
        I represent a very urban district in Houston. We have the
    Houston ship channel, and so we wouldn't be there without the
    Coast Guard. And needing dispersant--just recently, we had two
    ships collide in the upper channel, and we had the booms, and
    nothing on comparison of what is going on now. So our
    experience is in much smaller spills, and we are literally
    finding out what we can do on these huge spills, and we never
    had one before.
        In fact, a lot of the technology we have today--I was a
    State legislator in 1979 when the well exploded in the Bay of
    Campeche, and we saw oil on the Texas coast, and it was much
    more tragic than what we are seeing now. But, again, I don't
    want to see that or this or anything.
        I appreciate the panel being here. I know the Department of
    Interior left, and I had some concern about the--and I know the
    President just announced the expansion or the 6 months on
    drilling in deep water or floating rigs; and there are a lot of
    Members, including on this committee, who have some concern
    about the shallow water which is a thousand foot or less. So I
    have some concern to make sure that can continue. Because,
    actually, we need the natural gas safely produced.
        Let me talk about dispersants. Because, Madam
    Administrator, again, we are making history. We have never had
    to disperse this much, and we have never had the underwater
    plumes that are so deep, I guess. Because, again, a ship
    channel, even where it was at, it wasn't 45 foot. So it was
    very small compared to what we are experiencing.
        Correct? It is--from what I understand, it biodegrades
    rapidly and does not bioaccumulate. And does it not include any
    known carcinogens or endocrine disrupters? Ms. Jackson, is that
    information that you can share with us?
        Ms. Jackson. There is testing that I have asked my
    scientists to do. It will take about a week to look
    specifically at endocrine disrupters.
        Listen, it is a chemical, sir, so it has a toxicity to it.
    It is less toxic than oil, but it is--it has toxicity.
        Mr. Green. I can understand your response to Congressman
    Shimkus. You see the planes flying over and, you know, it is
    kind of like trying to put out a forest fire. Once you put the
    dispersant out, it is going in open water as well as water that
    has the plume or the oil on the surface.
        Are there any other alternatives other than COREXIT and the
    secondary one that can be used and what are the availability of
    alternatives other than that?
        Ms. Jackson. Sir, I believe there are 14 or 15 different
    dispersants listed on the national contingency plan product
    schedule. The way the area response plan reads, potentially any
    of them could have been used.
        The concern became that, as this thing has become a longer-
    term release, whether or not the original decision to use
    COREXIT might not be looked at again, whether there was
    something less toxic out there. BP has not identified anything
    less toxic. My belief is that there is more science needed on
    that, and so we are going to do it.
        Mr. Green. Our concern is the secondary, you know, but is
    that particular dispersant--has it improved the situation of
    the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico?
        Ms. Jackson. Sir, it is a tough tradeoff, but I believe it
    has been a useful tool. Again, as I understand it from the
    Coast Guard, the FOSC would rather use burning and booming.
    Surface dispersant application is really her last choice,
    because it is inefficient.
        The subsurface method certainly bears further study for
    potential options in the future. But I think we owe it to
    everyone--especially when I go down there and I talk to
    shrimpers and others, there is a lot of concern. And, right
    now, I can't give them all the answers they would like about
    whether or not this dispersant is in the water. So we are
    taking the samples. We have gotten some very, very limited
    water samples back; and so far we don't see any of the
    constituents from the dispersant in the water. But we will get
    another 60, 70 samples back in the next few days.
        Mr. Green. Any other panelist on the dispersants?
        Admiral Watson. Congressman, I would just add dispersants
    have been in our inventory to respond to oil spills for a long
    time, 20 years. We have never used this much, but over those
    years I think we have found them effective, and they have been
    effective in this particular spill particularly.
        Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. McNerney. Thank you, Mr. Green.
        The votes have been called. There is about 12 minutes left,
    so I ask the remaining members to be mindful that there are
    three members that wish to speak.
        At this point, the chair recognizes the gentleman from
    Texas.
        Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        They will hold votes for us. This is important.
        Administrator Jackson, oil, is it biodegradable?
        Ms. Jackson. Yes, sir, oil does biodegrade. It takes a
    while.
        Mr. Burgess. By what action does it do that? Does it
    oxidize, does sunlight change it, or do bacteria digest it?
        Ms. Jackson. Bacteria under aerobic conditions digests oil,
    sir.
        Mr. Burgess. What research has been undertaken by EPA to
    investigate the ability to use normal occurring bacteria to
    deal with an oil spill?
        Ms. Jackson. There are products listed on the national
    contingency plan schedule that are--I forget the name for them,
    but they are considered to be aids to biodegradation. That is
    different than dispersants. So there is some work authorized
    under the NCP for the EPA to evaluate and potentially list them
    as tools that can be used in response.
        Mr. Burgess. Exxon Valdez, some people felt that some of
    the mitigation efforts were actually as harmful or more harmful
    to the shoreline than was the oil itself. Given that
    information, has EPA been actively engaged in any research with
    any university or academic arrangement to try to develop these
    bacterial digesters?
        Ms. Jackson. Well, EPA wouldn't necessarily develop them.
    That is the innovation and ingenuity of the American people,
    sir. But EPA does have a lab. I believe we partner with
    Environment Canada up in Nova Scotia to look at----
        Mr. Burgess. How many of these are you evaluating?
        Ms. Jackson. Sir, I don't have an answer for you on what we
    are evaluating right this second.
        What I mean to say, as part of our regulatory
    responsibilities, we would have to list these----
        Mr. Burgess. We have to go fast, because he has a quick
    gavel.
        We have been very fortunate since Exxon Valdez--and Mr.
    Green mentioned the Gulf of Campeche. We have been very
    fortunate with oil spills, but we have got a lot of activity in
    the Gulf. We have driven our exploration out to deeper and
    deeper levels because we put so many areas off limits and yet
    we still demanded the energy. So, with that in mind, would it
    have not been prudent for the Environmental Protection Agency
    to have opened this up, request for proposals, to have people
    bring in their products and understand better how to deal with
    these problems up front.
        Ms. Jackson. Well, I think EPA relied on the oil industry
    and, in this case, specifically BP, who said that this would
    not happen. So that is why we are----
        Mr. Burgess. That is a real troubling aspect. I realize we
    lost our Department of Interior person, and we fired the MMS
    person, but this application is--I mean, it is a scandal in and
    of itself, and it is not just EPA but from a regulatory
    standpoint. Yes, shame on BP for turning this in.
        A scenario for potential blowup of the well, which BP would
    expect to have the highest volume of liquid hydrocarbons, is
    not required for the operations proposed in this exploration
    plan. Well, that is bad judgment on BP's part, but the agency
    in charge of regulating and approving, it is really bad
    judgment on their part.
        It seems like the EPA really should be more forward leaning
    in this regard. We do have a lot of activity going on in the
    Gulf of Mexico. The President did outline a plan for other
    areas to be open for exploration. We have been very lucky not
    to have spills, but spills are going to happen. Maybe not of
    this magnitude again in our lifetimes, but spills are going to
    happen. And it does seem to be prudent that the EPA would take
    a forward-leaning role in this regard. The industry to be sure.
        Now the injection of this dispersant at 5,000 feet under
    water, whose idea was that?
        Ms. Jackson. The request to do the injection came from BP.
        And, sir, I just want to make sure--I know you know this,
    but many in the room may not realize that EPA does not review
    drilling applications. So I think you should get a response
    from them.
        Mr. Burgess. I would love it if they were here, but we were
    denied that opportunity, as you saw. They left before those of
    us on the lower ends of the dais got a chance to question, and
    they fired the other lady this morning. So that was unfortunate
    for us.
        It just seems like after all this time--we have heard it in
    this committee, and we have heard it on television, on Rachel
    Maddow last night, the anxiety of people because we have not
    developed these contingencies. And maybe it is not EPA's place
    to do that, but it seems like EPA would have an ongoing,
    forward-looking strategy to deal with spills as they occur.
        Let me ask you a question. Are we going to--is this going
    to eliminate deep water drilling in the Gulf? We have got a 6-
    month moratorium the President proposed today. Is deep water
    drilling in the Gulf over?
        Ms. Jackson. Oh, I don't have a crystal ball, sir.
        Mr. Burgess. Is this the Three Mile Island for deep water
    drilling in the Gulf? No deep water drilling, no nuclear, with
    hydrologic fracturing prohibitions that are being--we heard in
    this committee just yesterday, are we going to have anything
    left as far as producing energy for the American people that is
    of an American origin? Are we going to lock everything off?
        Ms. Jackson. Sir, I don't have a crystal ball, but I would
    refer to what the President said today, which is that until he
    can assure this can be done safely--first, let's remember 11
    people died here and then that it can be done safely so that
    the States around the Gulf Coast, all of whom use it for
    varying purposes, including energy production, can feel certain
    that their interests are protected. I think he said he believes
    we need to have more time to make sure we understand exactly
    what happened here.
        Mr. Burgess. I don't disagree with that. If it is to be
    done safely, though, the applications must be followed to the
    letter.
        Mr. Markey [presiding]. We have to go back to Mr. Scalise.
    I give you 3 minutes, Mr. Scalise.
        Mr. Scalise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to get in
    as much as we can.
        I know Mr. Barton talked about the chain of command. I have
    got a real interest in what that command chain of command
    really was. Because when I read the Oil Pollution Act it is
    very clear the President is the one who is directly responsible
    for ensuring effective and immediate removal of the discharge.
        For too long, especially in the first few weeks but even
    still today, our local officials are still being sent through
    BP to get approval for various things that they are trying to
    do to protect the marsh and the coast. And so I will throw it
    out to whoever will answer this question--I guess the Coast
    Guard, since technically we were told the Coast Guard is in
    charge. Why is BP still in charge of certain recovery
    operations? I can understand if they are dealing with the well,
    but why are they dealing with things that have nothing to do
    with the well?
        Admiral Watson. The Coast Guard Federal On-Scene
    Coordinator is responsible for the response, sir. And if there
    is any other activities that go on outside of that organization
    under the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, those things can be
    done; and the recourse for compensation for those is back to
    the responsible party. So I think we may be seeing some of
    those independent activities and when----
        Mr. Scalise. Well, let me be specific, because my time is
    short.
        What about boom, the boats that are supposed to lay out
    boom? We were told our local fishermen were going to be hired
    to go do that. Many fishermen say they have not gotten any
    involvement in this.
        This is what really irritated me. On Sunday in Jefferson
    Parish, the parish where I live, the Homeland Security chief
    told me that they actually went out and found 50 boats sitting
    idle at the dock that were contracted out to be laying boom.
    This is a day that oil is permeating into our marsh, and yet
    the boats that were employed to go put out boom were sitting
    idle at the dock. They went and commandeered a few of
    themselves to go put out the boom on their own. Why did you all
    let this happen?
        Admiral Watson. I can't explain that particular situation.
        Mr. Scalise. Who was in charge of that situation?
        Admiral Watson. We have a staging director.
        Mr. Scalise. Coast Guard? BP?
        Admiral Watson. This is a unified command, specifically----
        Mr. Scalise. Somebody is in charge. The President said
    today that he is in charge. Is the President in charge of boom?
        Admiral Watson. The President has put Admiral Allen in
    charge. Admiral Allen has Admiral Mary Landry report to him on
    a daily basis, twice daily.
        Mr. Scalise. So who signs the contract? I am trying to get
    an answer. I have got 30 seconds left. You are running my clock
    out.
        I want to know who was in charge of putting out the boom
    and who let those boats sit idle at the dock on Sunday of this
    past week when you had oil coming into our marsh? Who did it?
    Can you tell me?
        Admiral Watson. I can't tell you the specific person----
        Mr. Scalise. Nobody wants to accept the responsibility for
    this. You know why we are frustrated right now? We are seeing
    the passing of the buck. Who did it? Who let that happen?
        Admiral Watson. The person on the ground who was
    responsible for that----
        Mr. Scalise. Who is going to be held accountable? Give me a
    name. Give me a name.
        Admiral Watson. I don't know.
        Mr. Scalise. Who can give me that?
        Admiral Watson. Well, I can get back to you, sir, if I know
    the location.
        Mr. Scalise. Inexcusable.
        Let me move on then, because, again, that is inexcusable as
    an answer. That should not have happened. If the President was
    all hands on deck, that wouldn't have happened.
        Let's talk about the Governor's plan, and I will ask the
    Corps of Engineers, Mr. Salt. We are being told that what was
    approved that the President announced today was only 2 percent
    of Governor's plan that he submitted. And in fact if it was
    done 2 weeks ago they would have laid out already 10 miles of
    protected barrier in front of the marsh that is now inundated
    with oil. Why didn't the President get everybody in a room or
    did he get everybody in a room and say we are rolling up our
    sleeves and we are not leaving until this problem is solved 2
    weeks ago when this was submitted?
        Mr. Salt. Sir, we wouldn't agree with those numbers.
        Mr. Scalise. Was everybody brought in the room by the
    President to say let's solve the problem or did they let 2
    weeks go by where people went around--I have reports from the
    Corps and others where they are talking about doing an
    environmental study on this while the environment is being
    destroyed. That is ludicrous.
        Mr. Salt. Sir, all of this is under emergency protocols. I
    would be happy to talk to you more after the hearing, if you
    would like.
        Mr. Scalise. I want answers on this. Because this is going
    on right now. We are not talking about let's study this after
    the fact. This is happening right now. Sunday, the boats were
    sitting at the dock while oil was coming into the marsh. There
    is no excuse for that.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Markey. The gentleman's time has expired, and the
    gentleman did have 5 minutes.
        The gentlelady from Florida, I can just recognize her very
    briefly; and I apologize.
        Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Pictures of the oil from the BP disaster washing up in
    Louisiana are horrendous, but I am very concerned about the
    pollution that we cannot see. In Gulf waters, in places where
    marine life has been abundant, marine scientists are reporting
    today that they have detected a wide area of elevated levels of
    dissolved hydrocarbons throughout the water column. This
    follows on what the LSU pelican found a couple of weeks ago.
        The highest concentrations are in the recesses of the Gulf
    of Mexico about 35 kilometers northeast of the disaster site
    south of Mobile, Alabama. Part of this area is known as the De
    Soto Canyon, which a deep valley that cuts through the
    Continental Shelf south of the Florida panhandle. It is an
    upwelling of very nutrient-rich Gulf waters, where marine life
    is abundant and plentiful, our fisheries interact and produce
    enormous amounts of marine life. This pollution can't be seen
    from the surface, but it is a severe threat to habitat and
    marine life, nonetheless. It is going to get into the food web,
    our marine scientists say.
        I am very concerned that NOAA doesn't have the tools to do
    the monitoring. I think what I have heard from scientists is
    over the past decade are data gathering and monitoring
    capabilities have been severely degraded, and I know NOAA is
    relying on a lot of the university and academic research
    institutions.
        What are your plans to build back the capability to do this
    long-term data analysis that we are going to need? Do you
    understand the impact of this disaster? What is your plan for
    being able to monitor and survey the subsurface oils and
    impacts of the toxic nature of this disaster?
        Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Ms. Castor.
        As you know, we have been looking at both surface and
    subsurface oil. In fact, as you know, we are utilizing academic
    as well as our own resources in this effort, in particular the
    Weatherbird from the University of South Florida. We have seen
    from some of that data--from some of those monitoring data that
    indicate that part per million levels of oil are at the
    subsurface.
        Mr. Markey. To the gentlelady--and I apologize to her.
    There is no time left on the roll call on the House floor, and
    I apologize to you, but----
        Ms. Castor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will look forward to
    visiting with NOAA and EPA.
        Mr. Markey. And I do apologize to her for that.
        I have members who sent a request that a statement from
    U.S. Travel Associates be included in the record.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Burgess. Mr. Chairman, I would also ask unanimous
    consent that letters from Steve Scalise and myself to
    Lieutenant General Robert Antwerpen and to Barack Obama
    regarding allowing the Governor of Louisiana to build the sand
    berms be included in the record.
        I ask the record be held open for 5 days for written
    questions.
        Mr. Markey. Without objection, it will be included in the
    record.
        [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
        Mr. Markey. We thank all of you for being here. We know
    that you are very busy and thank you for your service to our
    country and the work you are doing in this very difficult
    circumstance. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 4:52 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
        [Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
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