[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
NHTSA OVERSIGHT: THE ROAD AHEAD
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE,
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 11, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-104
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan JOE BARTON, Texas
Chairman Emeritus Ranking Member
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia FRED UPTON, Michigan
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
BART GORDON, Tennessee NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
ANNA G. ESHOO, California JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
BART STUPAK, Michigan JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York ROY BLUNT, Missouri
GENE GREEN, Texas STEVE BUYER, Indiana
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
Vice Chairman JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
LOIS CAPPS, California MARY BONO MACK, California
MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania GREG WALDEN, Oregon
JANE HARMAN, California LEE TERRY, Nebraska
TOM ALLEN, Maine MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
JAY INSLEE, Washington TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
JIM MATHESON, Utah STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
JOHN BARROW, Georgia
BARON P. HILL, Indiana
DORIS O. MATSUI, California
DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin
Islands
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio
JERRY McNERNEY, California
BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
PETER WELCH, Vermont
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
Chairman
JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
Vice Chair Ranking Member
JOHN SARBANES, Maryland RALPH M. HALL, Texas
BETTY SUTTON, Ohio ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
FRANK PALLONE, New Jersey GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
BART GORDON, Tennessee JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
BART STUPAK, Michigan MARY BONO MACK, California
GENE GREEN, Texas LEE TERRY, Nebraska
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
JIM MATHESON, Utah MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
JOHN BARROW, Georgia
DORIS O. MATSUI, California
KATHY CASTOR, Florida
ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio
BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex
officio)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. Bobby L. Rush, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Illinois, opening statement................................. 1
Hon. Ed Whitfield, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, opening statement.................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Illinois, opening statement........................... 7
Hon. Bruce L. Braley, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Iowa, opening statement..................................... 8
Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Michigan, opening statement................................. 9
Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, prepared statement.............................. 81
Hon. Kathy Castor, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Florida, prepared statement.................................... 85
Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Texas, prepared statement...................................... 88
Witnesses
David L. Strickland, Administrator, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration.......................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Answers to submitted questions............................... 91
Joan Claybrook, Former Administrator, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration.......................................... 33
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Ami V. Gadhia, Safety Policy Counsel, Consumers Union............ 46
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Answers to submitted questions............................... 119
Dave McCurdy, President and CEO, the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers.................................................. 59
Prepared statement........................................... 62
Answers to submitted questions............................... 127
NHTSA OVERSIGHT: THE ROAD AHEAD
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THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Protection,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:48 p.m., in
Room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bobby L.
Rush (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Rush, Schakowsky, Sutton,
Barrow, Braley, Dingell, Markey, Stearns and Whitfield.
Staff present: Michelle Ash, Chief Counsel; Anna Laitin,
Professional Staff; Will Cusey, Special Assistant; Bruce Wolpe,
Senior Advisor; Danny Hekier, Intern; Jeff Wease, Deputy
Information Officer; Elizabeth Letter, Special Assistant;
Lindsay Vidal, Deputy Press Secretary; Shannon Weinberg,
Minority Counsel; Brian McCullough, Minority Senior
Professional Staff; Sam Costello, Minority Legislative Analyst;
Robert Frisby, Minority FTC Detailee; Sarah Kelly, Press
Intern; and Kevin Kohl, Minority Professional Staff.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Mr. Rush. The subcommittee will now come to order.
Let me just say something in regards to those people who
have been waiting since 10 a.m. this morning. I sincerely
apologize, but as you know, the duties of the House are varied
and we did have to postpone this meeting for a series of votes
and other matters, so again, please accept my sincere apologies
for the delay. We are very cognizant of your time and we value
your time, so please accept our humble apology. We will now
proceed with this hearing.
This hearing today is a hearing of the Subcommittee on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, and the subject
matter is NHTSA: The Road Ahead. The Chair recognizes himself
for 5 minutes for the purposes of an opening statement.
The Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection again welcomes our participants here at this
meeting. Our main purpose for coming together today is to
assess NHTSA's functionality and its effectiveness. Last month,
I promised America's motorists, passengers, and pedestrians
that as this subcommittee takes up its jurisdictional
responsibility to reauthorize NHTSA, we would help NHTSA regain
the public's confidence.
This is our first occasion to welcome NHTSA's newest
administrator, Mr. David Strickland, to this hearing and to
this subcommittee and to this committee. Although Administrator
Strickland's first several months at NHTSA's helm have been
rocky and filled with difficult challenges, I know him to be a
highly intelligent, thoughtful and capable professional. I
expect that he will ``shoot straight'' with us as we begin
crafting reauthorization legislation that the members of this
subcommittee can quickly support and move through this
subcommittee and through the full committee and take it to the
floor of the House.
I look forward to listening to both witness panels and
hearing their views on what NHTSA is currently doing through
its crash data analysis, its research and its rulemakings to
promote vehicular safety.
Although I am typically not very stringent about enforcing
time restrictions on member statements and questioning, this is
a different day. We are starting late, and because of the
timeliness, I will not hesitate to drop the gavel today to keep
us on point, and I might say, on the right path, as much as
possible. The right road may be more appropriate. We have a lot
of ground to cover and we expect a number of members to
participate. I would ask my colleagues for their understanding
and to be as cooperative as possible as it relates to the time
considerations.
Before I yield my time, I would like to say a few words
about the scope of today's hearing. Let me be clear, this is
not a hearing about Toyota's recalls or its practices. Please
try to restrain yourselves from veering too far away from our
purpose of examining NHTSA and NHTSA's configuration, NHTSA's
organization, and NHTSA's performance in the areas of defects
investigation, safety standards and enforcement.
Again, I want to thank all of our witnesses for taking the
time out of your very important schedules in order to advise
this subcommittee. Again, I want to say we are more than
thankful to you for your patience. Let us work collaboratively
and constructively to ensure that NHTSA has on hand the
necessary resources and capacity to fulfill its stated mission
of saving lives, preventing injuries and reducing economic
costs due to road traffic crashes through education, research,
safety standards and enforcement activity. You are all great
Americans and you are becoming greater Americans if you help us
improve NHTSA. Thanking you again. I yield back the balance of
my time.
And now I recognize the ranking member for 5 minutes, my
friend from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ED WHITFIELD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Mr. Whitfield. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want
to thank you all for your patience, and we welcome the
witnesses on both panels.
I would like to start out first of all this afternoon by
simply congratulating the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. I notice that today's vehicles are safer than
ever. In 2009, there were 33,963 highway fatalities, which is
too many, but the fewest since 1954. The rate of fatalities in
2009 was 1.6 deaths per 100 million vehicle miles, and when
this record was first recorded back in 1979, there were 3.34
fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles. I think that should
make the public feel more comfortable, even though one death is
one death too many.
As a result of all the focus on Toyota, some commentators
have opined that the system is broken and needs to be fixed.
Those opinions are wide ranging and point to many different
issues ranging from NHTSA's authority to the way in which it
has utilized its authority. Mr. Sean Kane, who is president of
the Safety Research and Strategies Company, which does a lot of
consulting work for plaintiff trial lawyers, testified during
the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee hearing last month
when he was asked the question, does NHTSA need more tools,
more authority. He simply said that ``I think the number of
errors were made in the process of these investigations, not so
much that the tools were not available as much as the tools
were not employed.'' So I think it is important that we
consider all of those things as we move forward.
As far as unintended acceleration, this is a problem that
has cut across 3 decades and multiple Administrations without
successful resolution. Similar to NHTSA's finding in the late
1980s and early 1990s when it commissioned an independent
examination of unintended acceleration or the more recent
review conducted between 1999 and 2000, the current
investigation has not answered all questions and may never do
so to everyone's satisfaction.
Regarding NHTSA's action, it is also not clear what more
they could have done than what they have already done and
whether the outcome would be any different. Administrator
Strickland testified last week that there simply wasn't a
strong enough case to force the issue of a mandatory recall,
even if that had been decision NHTSA's decision, and if a
problem cannot be clearly identified, a proposed fix most
likely will not have a meaningful benefit.
I might also say that to date the Office of Inspector
General within the Department of Transportation announced the
initiation of an audit of NHTSA's Office of Defects
Investigation to conclude an examination of its handling of
Toyota as well as the broader issue of the process that ODI
employs to examine and investigate safety defects. The Office
of Inspector General's objectives are similar to those of this
hearing and that is simply to determine whether NHTSA has the
tools and information available to investigate safety defects
and identify possible improvements to its current procedures,
and I think that is what this hearing is all about as we move
forward with NHTSA, and I would yield back the balance of my
time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Whitfield follows:]
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6016A.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6016A.003
Mr. Rush. The Chair recognizes the vice chair of the
subcommittee, Ms. Schakowsky of Illinois, for 5 minutes for the
purpose of opening statements.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am so happy that
we are having this hearing today.
Without a doubt, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration's profile has risen dramatically as a result of
its role in responding to the dangerous problems with Toyota
vehicles, probably a little higher profile than perhaps you had
wanted or anticipated.
This hearing will give us the opportunity to explore
whether NHTSA has the resources, expertise and authority
necessary to sufficiently investigate reports of safety
problems and enforce existing safety rules.
I want to welcome Mr. Strickland and congratulate him on
his new position and welcome him to this committee. I know that
you really are an advocate for consumers and it was really a
pleasure to be able to work with you earlier on the Consumer
Product Safety Improvement Act when we worked together when you
were in the Senate. So I know of your commitment to consumers
and consumer safety.
My guess is, though, that right now we will find some gaps
that need to be filled, and I look forward to working with
Chairman Rush and the subcommittee and with NHTSA in crafting
legislation to address those gaps.
Mr. Strickland, in addition to discussing issues
surrounding NHTSA's oversight and enforcement activities, I am
looking forward to begin a dialog with you about children's
safety in and around cars and other proactive safety measures.
I appreciate that we had a moment before this 10:00 hearing to
discuss this a bit. In past year, Congress has enacted
legislation requiring NHTSA to issue specific safety
regulations. Dear to my heart has been the Cameron Gulbransen
Kids Transportation Safety Act signed into law in 2008,
requiring rulemaking on a rear visibility standard and a power
window standard, and I know that you are working on both of
these issues as we speak and it is my hope that both standards
will be very strong in order to protect children.
I have to tell you that I think the hardest thing that I
have done in this Congress, I am in my 12th year now, is having
parents come with pictures of their children who are no longer
with us, sometimes because they themselves inadvertently, and
we know in large part due to design problems actually were
responsible for those children's deaths. It is just the most
unbearable thing to think about, that these were preventable,
and yet these parents have turned this tragedy into a crusade
to make automobiles safer, not just in traffic but not in
traffic. And so I am looking forward to working with you to
create standards that actually do prevent those accidents from
happening.
My concern is that in the past that Congress was forced to
take action because NHTSA was not initiating badly needed
rulemaking on its own and so I look forward to working with you
to make sure that NHTSA has all the tools it needs and that it
uses its tools to protect consumers. I look forward to that
very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Iowa,
Mr. Braley, for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRUCE L. BRALEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA
Mr. Braley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to applaud you
and the ranking member for holding this important hearing.
It is really an honor to have you here today, Mr.
Strickland. We haven't met before. You have an important
responsibility that is too often kept on the back pages of most
newspapers and magazines, and it is only when something
dramatic like these Toyota recall hearings comes up that the
public starts to understand the critical role that your agency
plays. You look to me like you are a young man, so I don't know
if you know where you were on December 2, 1994, but I know
where I was. I was not sitting in that chair, even though I was
supposed to be sitting in that chair, because I was supposed to
be testifying that day at a recall hearing on side-saddle fuel
tank explosions involving CK General Motors pickup trucks, and
I did not get the opportunity to testify because a settlement
was reached that day between your agency and the Secretary of
Transportation and General Motors whereby $51 million was paid
for supposed consumer safety programs so that the recall
hearing would not go forward where people like me would have an
opportunity to talk about the impact on human lives of defects
that do not get solved, and I was going to testify that day
about a client of mine, a young woman in Iowa, who had the
right side of her face burned off when the pickup truck she was
riding in was involved in a collision and the pickup rolled
over on its side, and because of the placement of those fuel
tanks outside the frame rails, the flames went up the side of
that pickup truck and engulfed her face in flames, and her
husband, who was driving the pickup truck, pulled her young
son, who was seated between them, through the broken windshield
and got him to safety, and when he went back to try to rescue
his wife, he reached into grab her and pulled out big chunks of
her hair that had burned off in the fire. And he went back to
his son and told him Mommy is in heaven now, but miraculously,
this brave woman survived and went through months and years of
grueling, painful skin grafts, hair transplants and incredible
disfigurement because of that defect.
When we gather for these hearings, we spend a lot of time
talking in very arcane, technical language about sudden,
unanticipated acceleration and electronic control safety
devices, but we rarely talk about the human impact of the
failure to act, and so when you think about the important
responsibilities your agency has, it is important not just to
think about where we are today and where you are going to take
that agency going forward, it is important to look backwards at
the legacy of this agency and why there are some people who
feel it is not fulfilled its responsibility to keep the
American public safe.
So I look forward to the opportunity to have a meaningful,
long-term conversation with you about the important
responsibilities you have, and I look forward to hearing your
testimony today as we work together to get to the bottom of
this unexplained problem, and I yield back.
Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes the chairman emeritus of
the full committee, my friend from the State of Michigan, Mr.
Dingell, for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your kindness
and courtesy. I commend you for this hearing, which is very
important, and I also commend you for your fine leadership of
this subcommittee which you have done a splendid job.
I want to observe that NHTSA's response to the safety
defects implicated in these recalls has been sluggish.
Likewise, NHTSA's decisions to terminate several internal
analyses related to the defective Toyota vehicles since 2003
due to a purported lack of resources leave one with the
impression that the agency lacks the appropriate level of
personnel and appropriations with which to fill its mandate. We
want to find out if that is the case today because if that be
so, then the safety of the American public is of course in
question.
As was the case with its sister agency, the Consumer
Products Safety commission, NHTSA has suffered years of
stagnation in funding and in many cases has endured a reduction
in personnel levels, most notably in its important Office of
Defects Investigation, ODI. Nevertheless, the agency possesses
a number of powerful enforcement tools, many of which were
augmented under the Transportation Recall Enhancement
Accountability and Documentation, or the TREAD Act, of 2000. In
addition to being able to compel manufacturers to recall
defective vehicles, NHTSA may impose civil penalties for
noncompliance and criminal penalties for falsification or
withholding of information. This in mind, we must ask ourselves
today why these authorities were not used in the case of recent
Toyota recalls. Put another way, are the problems with NHTSA's
response to the recalls better traced to a lack of authority or
rather to ineptitude and lack of resources. At present, it
appears that the latter is more persuasive. Although I will not
discount the possibility that improvement can be made in the
statutes of conferring NHTSA its authority.
Our discussion of NHTSA's authorities and resources must
not lose sight of what I believe to be malfeasance on the part
of Toyota improperly addressing the problems that led to the
recall of over 8 million vehicles. To reauthorize NHTSA without
a view towards compelling better behavior by automobile
manufacturers would be a self-defeating exercise.
Two weeks ago, my questioning of Mr. James Lentz, Toyota
head of sales for North America, indicated that all of Toyota's
decisions relating to recalls are made in Tokyo. More
disquieting is the fact that U.S. officials, the Secretary of
Transportation, and the then-head of NHTSA had to fly to Japan
to persuade Toyota to initiate recalls in the United States. In
brief, we must examine how best to oblige automobile
manufacturers selling vehicles in the United States to comply
quickly and fully with our regulations and law.
In closing, I suggest my colleagues bear these comments in
mind as we begin what must be the first of many conversations
about improving federal oversight of transportation safety. I
further ask that these discussions and their resultant
legislation will be bipartisan, collegial and subject to the
regular order for these are the hallmarks of this committee's
best work over the years.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your kindness. I thank our
witnesses for appearing before us and I yield back the 58
seconds remaining to me.
Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the gentleman for his
extraordinary kindness.
It is the normal practice of this committee to swear in the
witnesses, so would you stand and raise your right hand?
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Rush. Let the record reflect that the witness has
responded in the affirmative.
The Chair recognizes himself now for 5 minutes for
questioning the witness. Oh, I am sorry. The Chair is getting
ahead of himself. The Chair wants to recognize now the
administrator, because he has certainly some opening
statements, so the Chair recognizes the administrator for 5
minutes for the purposes of opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID L. STRICKLAND, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To be perfectly
honest with you, my statement is not as important as the
committee's questions, so I can understand you wanting to hurry
up and get to business.
Mr. Rush. A great beginning.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you so much for your kind words, all
of you, and before I begin my formal remarks, I want to just
take a second to acknowledge Mr. Braley and Ms. Schakowsky's
note about the human toll. We have a tremendous amount of death
on today's highways, and I am very happy to report some very
good news, but 33,000 people is a tremendous amount of people
to die, and one person is too many, and the personal toll that
it takes on a family is absolutely catastrophic, and in my time
that I served as a staffer on the Senate Commerce Committee, I
have had the opportunity to spend time with countless victims
including mothers and fathers who have killed their children in
unfortunate back-over accidents and folks that have been
disfigured and burned because of traffic accidents, because of
defects, and you can never properly capture what this means to
people, so I am fully aware of the responsibility that I have
and that every day this agency has one goal. That is to keep
people alive and safe on the road, and we can never do that job
well enough. We just simply can't. But that doesn't mean that
we can't try, and we will continue to put forward maximum
effort as we have to make sure that we accomplish the goals.
But thank you so much for your observations and they are taken
well to heart.
Chairman Rush, Ranking Member Whitfield and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the Department of Transportation's vision for
the future of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration and its important safety programs.
Transportation safety is the Department's highest priority.
NHTSA's safety programs are an integral part of addressing that
priority. Even before I was sworn in as administrator on
January 4th, I knew NHTSA's programs worked and they work well.
We just released numbers that show a continuing dramatic
reduction in the overall number of highway deaths. The
Secretary this morning released a report that projects that
traffic fatalities have declined for the 15th consecutive
quarter and will be 33,963 in 2009, the lowest annual level
since 1954, but we must do more. The loss of more than 33,000
people represents a serious public health problem to our
Nation. We will not rest until that number is zero.
So how do we get there? Highway safety is a complex
problem, and NHTSA has built a broad spectrum of programs that
address both behavioral and vehicle-related causes of highway
deaths. The linchpin of all of our programs is good data, good
science and careful engineering.
When I was sworn in 2 months ago, I felt it was important
to look at whether there was a need to improve NHTSA's
effectiveness in this era of the global marketplace and rapidly
changing technologies. One of my first decisions was to
question whether NHTSA is being well served by the four vehicle
statutory authorities on which it relies to regulate. The
reality is, is that while current authority does work and
various constituencies have learned to work with them, they
were written in the 1960s and the 1970s when the world and the
automobile market were profoundly different. The question I
pose and the questions I want to have is whether NHTSA's
statutory authorities accommodate the modern automobile, the
modern competitive marketplace even. More importantly, do they
allow us to regulate in a way that allows the industry to build
and sell safe products that the consumer wants to drive? Do
they allow us to promote safety, innovation and fuel efficiency
while providing effective regulatory and enforcement oversight?
I have asked our legal and program staff to take a look at our
existing authorities to answer these questions and to make
their best recommendations.
I believe this self-assessment is critical and supports the
President's goals for transparency and accountability in
government, and while we are taking a hard look at our
authorities, I also commit to look at the current ethics rules.
I believe the ethics standards set by this Administration are
the highest ever established by any Administration, and I fully
support Secretary LaHood's desire to tighten and enforce these
rules across the Department of Transportation. If there is any
evidence of any violations of these rules, swift and
appropriate action will be taken.
The next question I ask of NHTSA is, do we have the
programmatic expertise that we need to support our programs?
NHTSA has a diverse and experienced workforce and we will take
full advantage of their skills, talent and expertise. If as we
go forward we find that we need to shore up our workforce in
certain areas, we will recruit aggressively. We are currently
requesting the authority to hire 66 more people next year and
will target these positions to meet our program needs.
Well, at this point it appears that I am out of time and I
will cut my remarks here, and I thank the committee for their
time and their patience and I stand ready for questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Strickland follows:]
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Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the administrator, and the Chair
recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
As has been stated, Mr. Administrator, our goal, the goal
of this subcommittee as it relates to NHTSA is to look forward
and to determine for ourselves what is the best way that we can
assist NHTSA in its primary goal of protecting American
citizens and American drivers. As I looked at this scenario of
this Toyota incident as a framework, I wonder about the safety,
the quality or the safety of the automobiles on America's
highways in general. The question I have is, what reason can
you give the subcommittee that we should not think that the
recent Toyota recall that it would not replay itself for any
other automobile dealer that manufactures automobiles for
America's highways? Can you assure us that this Toyota recall
is really just something that is an aberration as it relates to
automobile safety?
Mr. Strickland. I will say this, Mr. Chairman, that the
Toyota recall, while wide ranging, is I think indicative of how
NHTSA uses its authority in a way to get to the bottom of
something. When the Secretary of Transportation took office,
and at the time it was Acting Administrator Medford, they were
observing certain issues with Toyota and they felt so strong
about it that Mr. Medford went to Japan to inform Toyota that
they did not feel that Toyota was holding up its obligations to
inform and interact with NHTSA in a way to address safety
concerns and recall concerns. That was the beginning. That
effort began actually on December 15th. It was the day of my
confirmation hearing, which is a good reason why the entire
senior staff regarding defects was actually in Japan and not at
my hearing. But better that they be there in Japan explaining
to Toyota what they were doing wrong than sitting in a hearing
room here in Washington, D.C. When I took office on January
4th, I was updated about these issues, and Toyota was at that
point beginning to get the message. I again met with them
personally for the first time on January 19th, and I learned
about the sticky pedal situation, and they actually executed
their stop sale on January 21st. That effort was because of the
analysis of the NHTSA, the fast action of the career staff and
the leadership of the Secretary of Transportation. So I don't
see Toyota as an indicative example of failure, I see it as
NHTSA doing its job, and when our professionals use the data,
make the case and go forward, we get the results that we need.
So I think that Toyota in the wide-ranging recall that it
executed, that is the type of response that frankly I would
want as administrator and I think that this agency is
expecting, and I would hope that in the future that other
automakers would do the same in the same set of facts.
Mr. Rush. Can you give the subcommittee any assurances that
the automobiles right now as far as NHTSA is concerned have a
level of safety that is greater than what we have experienced
with Toyota?
Mr. Strickland. There are two parts of that answer. First,
I will go back to the success that we just had regarding the
current data. We have the lowest number of deaths we have had
since we have been recording this data since 1954. NHTSA is
succeeding in its mission.
The second part of your question, do I feel that vehicles
are generally safe or will be safe and we won't have any other
issue like Toyota, it is the automakers' responsibility to
warrant that their vehicles comply with the federal motor
vehicle safety standards. That is their responsibility. We are
not branding these cars safe. It is our job to enforce and to
police the marketplace, which we will do. So as far as I am
concerned, the automakers have to uphold their obligation to
not only comply with our standards but basically the state of
the art. It is my job to make sure that they hold to those
standards and this agency will hold that line.
Mr. Rush. The Chair's time is up.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Whitfield for 5 minutes.
Mr. Whitfield. Well, Mr. Strickland, thank you again for
joining us this afternoon. As I said in my opening statement, I
do think that the agency should be commended because the
highways really are safer today than they have ever been from a
statistical standpoint. You would agree with that, I am
assuming?
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
Mr. Whitfield. Now, we have heard a lot--there have been a
lot of articles written, a lot of testimony recently that NHTSA
has not fulfilled its responsibility, NHTSA is a lapdog for the
industry, not a watchdog for the industry, and so there has
been a lot of criticism out there about the agency. And as the
administrator, how would you respond to that in just a general
way? Do you think that criticism is valid or not valid?
Mr. Strickland. No, sir, it is not valid at all. We have
been a very active agency since I have taken office. The agency
has been very active since Secretary LaHood has taken office.
And from my review of the work done, if we are talking about
Toyota specifically, this agency opened eight separate
investigations over the time period when there were complaints
about sudden acceleration. A lapdog doesn't open eight
investigations. Now, the goal is for us and our statutory, you
know, order is to find any vehicle safety defect that presents
an unreasonable risk. Any time a complaint or any data or any
anomaly in the number of complaints or what we see from the
early warning system, our folks take a look at it, they go
forward and they investigate. If we cannot find the defect, we
cannot under the statute and force a mandatory recall, but that
doesn't mean that we think that vehicle is safe per se. At that
point we cannot make the statutory case but we will keep
looking, and as we have, we keep looking, and when we find a
defect such as in the instance of the floor mat entrapment or
the instance of sticky pedal or in the instance of the 2010
Prius brakes, we act and we act quickly. I don't think that the
history of our action in this area before I took office or in
the 10-year period that a lot of people are looking at, I think
that this agency has been quite active.
Mr. Whitfield. Now, if you find a defect, then you can
require a mandatory recall. Is that correct?
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir, we can.
Mr. Whitfield. And I have heard a lot of discussion about
subpoena power, and it is my understanding that you can issue
information requests.
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
Mr. Whitfield. And do the manufacturers have to respond to
that request? Is it----
Mr. Strickland. There is a difference between a subpoena
and an information request. I know a lot of people talk about
we have subpoena power and yes, we can compel a subpoena for
documents. We say we want every document you have on a
question, and yes, they have to give that to us. Information
requests, they also have to respond, but it has actually a
better purpose. We not only get documents, we actually ask
direct questions that they give us answers to. It is a much
sharper tool and the agency uses that quite frequently. In
fact, we sent three queries to Toyota, three large queries,
regarding the timeliness of their submission of information to
us regarding the floor mats and the sticky pedal, and we sent a
large recall query asking Toyota for all their information and
answer questions about all of sudden-acceleration incidents,
which will be a large amount of documents and data for us to
review. If we find in the review of those documents that there
is a violation, we will move forward accordingly.
Mr. Whitfield. Now, have you found the lack of subpoena
power a hindrance to the agency doing its job effectively?
Mr. Strickland. In my review of the work on Toyota, they
have been able to--while Toyota has been slow in years past, I
will say that they have not been as responsive as my career
staff feel they should have been in responses. Since I have
been in office, they have been very responsive, and I would
hope that that would continue in the future. But in terms of
our subpoena, our ability to get information requests issued
and responded to, I have gotten no evidence that that has been
a problem in terms of getting a response.
Mr. Whitfield. Now, I know most of your budget money goes
to the States for grants and then the rest is spent basically
between behavioral safety and vehicle safety. Is that correct?
Mr. Strickland. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Whitfield. And I know in 2005, Congress directed NHTSA
to conduct a national motor vehicle crash causation survey, and
at that time they came back and they said that 95 percent of
crashes were due primarily to driver fault or negligence. Are
you familiar with that study or do you have any thoughts on
that?
Mr. Strickland. I am tangentially familiar with it. I can't
give you song, chapter and verse about the study but I can talk
sort of in more specifics about behavior. That is the largest
component of risk on the highway, which is the reason why the
NHTSA budget is designed to attack the highest risk. Impaired
driving, not wearing belts, driving distracted, those are all
the hugest risks for everyone on the road today. Vehicle
defects are important. We have to address them. They are
significant. But in terms of the overall risk profile for
highway safety, the behavioral side of the house, so to speak,
comprises the largest risk and that is the reason why our
program for safety is designed the way it is.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Whitfield.
Mr. Rush. The chairman emeritus is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I thank for your courtesy.
My questions in view of the time shortage have to require
yes or no answers.
Mr. Strickland. Yes, Mr. Dingell
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Administrator, do you believe that the
NHTSA made mistakes in its response to the recent Toyota
recalls?
Mr. Strickland. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Dingell. Should NHTSA have pushed Toyota to initiate
recalls earlier than it did?
Mr. Strickland. Sir, we pushed the recalls when we had the
evidence of an unreasonable risk defect.
Mr. Dingell. But yes or no?
Mr. Strickland. The answer is yes, we responded
appropriately.
Mr. Dingell. OK. Thank you. What authorities does NHTSA
lack whether under TREAD Act or otherwise with which to address
defects in automobiles deemed hazardous to public safety?
Please submit that answer for the record.
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Now, yes or no, does NHTSA have in place a
ranking system for determining the priority of defects
investigations, yes or no?
Mr. Strickland. The answer is no, but we rank risk by
profile internally. There isn't a one through ten.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you. Now, there seems to be broad
agreement about the need to increase resources available to
NHTSA to carry out its mission. Do you need additional
resources, yes or no?
Mr. Strickland. The President's budget gives us more
resources, so----
Mr. Dingell. Do you need more?
Mr. Strickland [continuing]. When the President's budget is
passed, we will have the resources we need.
Mr. Dingell. Please submit to us for the record how much
more resources you need in what area.
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. I want that submitted directly to the
committee and not through OMB.
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. Now, in my questioning of James Lentz,
Toyota's chief of sales for North America, he revealed
decisions to recall Toyota vehicles sold in North America are
made in Japan. Do any other manufacturers require that your
information for details or decisions made relative to recalls
are made in any country outside this United States? Is Toyota
unique in that, yes or no?
Mr. Strickland. It appears Toyota is unique, yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. All right. It strikes me that this is a bad
situation insofar as safety of the American people. Am I
correct or wrong?
Mr. Strickland. The system that Toyota uses could be much
more efficient.
Mr. Dingell. By requiring them to have a response to be
made in the United States by somebody empowered to comply with
our laws. Is that right?
Mr. Strickland. I would feel that if they had somebody in
America to respond directly, we could act more quickly.
Mr. Dingell. Now, I would appreciate it if you would submit
to us for the record how this would be corrected.
Now, is there a quantitative difference in response times
between domestic and foreign automobile manufacturers to
NHTSA's data inquiries, yes or no?
Mr. Strickland. The domestic manufacturers tend to respond
faster than the foreign, yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. What is the cause for this?
Mr. Strickland. There are several reasons in terms of
design of leadership, as you mentioned, and other factors.
Mr. Dingell. In the case of Toyota, it is because the
information has to be procured from Toyota instead of receiving
it directly from here. Is that right?
Mr. Strickland. That has been identified by Toyota itself
as a problem.
Mr. Dingell. This is also true with regard to the question
of recall?
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dingell. The decision is made in Tokyo?
Mr. Strickland. That is correct.
Mr. Dingell. Now, is there a qualitative or quantitative
difference in the data provided to NHTSA by domestic and
foreign automobile manufacturers?
Mr. Strickland. The quality is--because they are
statutorily required, the quality of data is very similar
between foreign and domestic.
Mr. Dingell. Similar?
Mr. Strickland. Similar.
Mr. Dingell. That doesn't it is the same.
Mr. Strickland. They have different data sets because of
their manufacturing and information processes. They comply to
our system so they are similar.
Mr. Dingell. All right. Now, why was it that the Secretary
of Transportation and the acting head of NHTSA had to go to
Tokyo to get cooperation of Toyota on recalls and production of
information?
Mr. Strickland. They were responding to NHTSA and the
acting administrator and the Secretary too slowly.
Mr. Dingell. But they had to go over there. Why did they
have to go over there?
Mr. Strickland. Because at the time, the Secretary and the
acting administrator felt they needed to go directly to convey
that message.
Mr. Dingell. So they had to convey that message because the
message was to urge Toyota to comply more expeditiously with
the safety concerns of the Department of Transportation?
Mr. Strickland. That is correct.
Mr. Dingell. So they had to do it to get more expeditious
cooperation from Toyota?
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy.
Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Schakowsky for 5
minutes for questioning.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On September 1, 2009, proposed rules were put out dealing
with the automatic reverse system in windows. Let me quote:
``NHTSA proposes requiring automatic reversal systems, ARS, in
those windows equipped with one-touch closing or express up
operation.'' In a letter March 10, 2010, sent to you, Mr.
Strickland, Henry Waxman, Chairman Rush and myself point out
that such windows generally already have auto reverse
technology and are usually found in the driver's window where
children don't sit, and the intention of the legislation of
course was to protect children. But here is really the point I
want to make that I find stunning is that you have a chart.
This was alternative one of five alternatives that were
proposed at that time. This is before your tenure. Alternative
one is the one I described, and when it says on this chart cost
per window for this remedy supposedly, it says zero dollars,
total incremental cost near zero dollars, annual fatality
benefits zero, annual injury benefits near zero. So the
preferred alternative to protect children was a no-cost, no-
benefit solution. I would have thought it embarrassing actually
not only to put that in writing but to choose that as the
preferred option. I would hope that nothing like that happens
again.
Let me describe alternative two, requiring auto reverse
windows at all power side windows to meet ECE 21, which is
European standards. The cost per window, $6, which I think most
people would find reasonable, the total incremental cost,
$149.4 million. Annual fatality benefits, two, annual injury
benefits, 850. So two deaths and 850 injuries, which I think is
a pretty modest projection, pretty conservative, could be
saved. That was at 6 bucks a window. Again, I want to go back
to those families that came talking about children who were
choked by these windows. It has got to be maddening to them
that this is something that could have been corrected for $6
and that that is the European Union standard, why isn't it the
standard here. So really my request is that we reject this
alternative one, but how does that happen? Can we expect that
it will not happen any more, that a no-cost, no-benefit
solution will not be proposed?
Mr. Strickland. As you know, Representative Schakowsky, I
can't engage in a discussion about a rule that is currently
being worked on by NHTSA, but I understand that we have
received new data from a lot of constituencies including the
folks that have worked very closely with you and other members
on the Cameron Gulbransen Act and the agency is taking a very
hard look at that data, and when the rule is finally
promulgated, we hope that we will be-- I know for a fact it
will be based on sound data and sound science that will be the
most efficacious of safety. So that is the one thing I can tell
you.
Ms. Schakowsky. Well, let me make a very strong
recommendation that you don't propose rules that have
absolutely no effect when the Congress stated very clearly that
we want to protect children, and I am sure you will agree with
that, so I thank you very much, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Representative.
Mr. Rush. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr.
Braley, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Braley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Strickland, in your opening statement that we received,
the written statement, on page 1, third paragraph, you wrote,
``One of the first questions I asked when I became the
administrator of NHTSA is whether or our current statutory
authority drafted largely in the 1960s and 1970s is sufficient
to address the modern automobile and global automotive
marketplace.'' Have you answered that question?
Mr. Strickland. That question is still being worked on by
the staff. I have a great deal of experience in looking at
consumer product safety statutes from my prior employ, and you
have to be very careful in examining these things. We have to
make sure that there is a lot in those statutes that are very
functional and works well, and we want to look to improve upon
a strong authority, and both my legal staff and my programmatic
staff are undertaking that work right now. When we have
completed that work, we will be happy and excited to share our
thoughts with the committee and looking forward to working with
you on a going forward basis.
Mr. Braley. And I look forward to having that conversation,
and let me get back to one of my earlier points about the
legacy of the agency that you now head, because in your
statement, you noted correctly that safety is the Department of
Transportation's highest priority, and you stand by that
statement today?
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir, absolutely.
Mr. Braley. And we know that the Office of Defect
Investigation, often referred to by its acronym, ODI, is on the
front line of defect investigation and prevention as part of
the Department of Transportation.
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Braley. And Mr. Whitfield asked you a very appropriate
question when he said you have mandatory recall power and you
answered yes. Do you remember that?
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
Mr. Braley. Can you explain to all of us then why your
agency, NHTSA, has not initiated a recall since 1979?
Mr. Strickland. Because you can often influence a recall by
going through the initial stages of the process. Most times an
automaker will not want to go through the full formal process.
It takes approximately a year. It is a public process, and a
lot of automakers, realizing they are facing public scrutiny of
fighting a vehicle safety defect, and when they know that the
agency can prove it, they will go forward and effectuate a
voluntary recall. The universe is that most recalls are
voluntary--all recalls since that period of time are voluntary
but there is a huge number that are influenced by this agency
and that is the actual we want you to look at, and we influence
well over half of the recalls that happen ever year. So that is
the real number, Mr. Braley. I think that is indicative of the
power of ODI. We don't have to get to a point where the
administrator after a year of public hearings and show-cause
hearings has to sign an order. Automakers will go forward and
take care of that recall voluntarily from ODI's work.
Mr. Braley. Well, count me as skeptical that in a 31-year
period there has not been an instance where automakers acted
responsibly in every particular case responding to demand for
recall of a product defect in a 31-year period.
One of the things that I also want to talk to you about is
how you described the agency's mission has changed in response
to changes in the automotive industry. Do you remember that in
your opening remarks?
Mr. Strickland. I don't think I will change it a change in
mission but it is a change in how we have to approach the job
because of the change in the marketplace. There was a time when
America was the world's leader in automotive manufacturing. We
are no longer that leader.
Mr. Braley. Well, I am talking about something different so
I want to make sure you understand.
Mr. Strickland. I apologize, Mr. Braley.
Mr. Braley. When I was growing up, it was during the muscle
car era where you could tear apart a Chevy large block engine
in your basement and put it back together having a basic
knowledge of the internal combustion engine. You cannot do that
anymore. Would you concede that?
Mr. Strickland. I agree, yes, sir.
Mr. Braley. And one of the things that came out during our
earlier hearing was this concept of black-box technology that
has crash data in it that is driven by complex computer codes,
sometimes which the manufacturer is willing to share with your
agency and sometimes manufacturers have been very reluctant to
share that data or to provide an ability for your own employees
to have the keys to the kingdom so that they can download and
interpret that information independently. You would agree with
that?
Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir, I agree.
Mr. Braley. So one of the things that I am concerned about
is our own internal committee report for this hearing suggests
that your agency's budget dedicated to vehicle safety has
remained stagnant relatively over the past 10 years and that
your resources are far below the resources that were available
for this type of investigation than when the agency was at its
height, and my concern is, based upon some of the testimony at
the previous hearing, when you have a demand for computer
engineers and electrical engineers and people who are not based
on mechanical backgrounds, I am concerned that the level of
funding and the staffing of personnel within your agency may
not be adequate to meet the incredible demands of the changing
technology of this automobile industry. Have you done an
independent review since assuming responsibility to make your
own independent judgment on whether or not that is a critical
case we need to address?
Mr. Strickland. I have a couple of responses to that, Mr.
Braley. The work of ODI and the automotive engineers that do
the work, they are some of the finest in the business in this
country, and as the technology evolves, the experience of our
investigators and our engineers also evolves. I can give you
the quantum number of folks that we have on deck to do the job.
We have 125 engineers in NHTSA. We have five electrical
engineers. We have a software engineer. We have engineers that
are based in our East Liberty, Ohio, facility. We have
resources for consultants when we need additional expertise. My
understanding from what I know from when I have taken office,
there is not a notion that we don't have the proper expertise
to handle today's automobiles. I don't think that is the case
at all.
However, recognizing that you can always buttress what you
have, the President has provided us resources to hire 66 new
people, which we will use to leverage our resources and to
buttress and strengthen those folks, in addition to we will be
looking at ways how we can do longitudinal studies and long-
range studies on these complex systems, as the Secretary spoke
about in the prior hearings. Is my confidence that we can
handle the current marketplace with our expertise? Yes, we can.
Can we be stronger in that area? Of course we can.
Mr. Braley. Of the 62 employees you have identified that
are in the President's budget request, how many of those do you
propose to allocate to ODI?
Mr. Strickland. That is part of the process I am working
with the career staff and with the Office of the Secretary to
figure out what our resource needs will be in that area. I will
be happy to come forward with that information when a decision
is made.
Mr. Braley. Can you also provide the committee with a
breakdown of the people working at ODI with engineering degrees
by their names, their job titles and what their particular
expertise in terms of being a professional engineer is?
Mr. Strickland. I would be happy to do that, Mr. Braley.
Mr. Braley. Thank you. I appreciate that, and I yield back.
Mr. Rush. The Chair recognizes now the gentlelady from
Michigan, Ms. Sutton, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sutton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rush. Ohio. I am sorry.
Ms. Sutton. I am close to Michigan but I am from Ohio.
Mr. Rush. I apologize.
Ms. Sutton. That is OK.
Administrator Strickland, thank you for being here. I have
a number of questions and they touch on different areas, so
bear with me as we shift around.
Beginning with the question of the black-box technology, we
have heard a lot about when Secretary LaHood was here he
indicated difficulty getting the information that is in those
black boxes, that we don't have the capacity, whether it is, as
my colleague, Mr. Braley, described, that we don't have keys to
the kingdom, which is that information. But when I heard you
answer Representative Dingell about having access to data, you
said we have access to data in a similar way whether it is
Toyota, who keeps information in Japan, and our domestic auto
industry. But I was under the impression based on the last
hearing that we actually could access information from our
domestic auto manufacturers in a way that we can't get from
Toyota. So could you clarify for me?
Mr. Strickland. I would be happy to clarify. I took from
Mr. Dingell's question about early warning reporting data,
which is the quarterly data we receive from all automakers,
which is a set template of data that we receive. There are some
differences in how they collate and present it but we can
understand all of that. That is what I thought he meant.
In terms of event data recorders, you are absolutely right,
Representative Sutton. Toyota has a proprietary system that up
until I guess a week or so ago there was only one tool in the
country that could be used to read it and we did not have that
tool. So if we ever wanted to get information from an event
data recorder on a Toyota vehicle, it was very difficult. It is
my understanding that Toyota has provided my ODI staff three of
these tools to read their event data recorders. I am not sure
of the status of whether we have received them all yet but that
is my understanding, that Toyota has promised to us that they
will provide those tools. So in terms of Mr. Dingell's
question, in terms of the set data that comes in to us
quarterly from all automakers, yes, it is similar. On your
question on event data recorders, yes, there is a difference
between the Detroit automakers, which all use a commercially
available tool and we have the ability to read it, versus
Toyota, where we could not up until a week ago.
Ms. Sutton. And now that you have this equipment, that was
the only hindrance to having access to the black boxes? You can
get them? You can always get access?
Mr. Strickland. We can access it, Representative, but we
still need a Toyota representative to help decode the data. It
isn't fully transparent, even when we download the box. So I
still believe that we need Toyota representation to assist us
in decoding what happened 5 seconds pre crash and 1 second post
crash I believe is the data that is being included in those
boxes.
Ms. Sutton. And is that something that they are required in
any way to do or is that just a voluntary offer on their part?
Mr. Strickland. At this point we are undergoing rule. By
2012, if an automaker chooses to have an EDR on board, it has
to comport with certain readability and data standards but they
don't have to have an electronic data recorder on board. It is
not mandated.
Ms. Sutton. Well, that is interesting. We will have to
follow that and see what the consequences intended and others
are of that rulemaking.
OK. With respect to what we have been reading, we have been
reading in the Washington Post about the relationship between
some of those who used to work at NHTSA and going over to work
for some of the car companies, and in this moment, Toyota is in
the headlines, and so the Post article mentioned that two
former NHTSA defects investigators left the agency and
immediately took jobs at Toyota managing federal defect
investigations. Do you think that there is an apparent conflict
of interest here? You know, we are charged, as Members of
Congress, with ensuring that the public interest is always the
key, and you can understand that people are more than a little
concerned when they see sort of that cozy, quick turnover
revolving door. Could you comment on that?
Mr. Strickland. Certainly. I have two responses to that,
Representative. No ethics laws were broken. You know, Mr.
Santucci and Mr. Tinto, who are former employees of NHTSA, when
they left their post employment, they were of the level of
employee--everything that they did was fully compliant with the
current federal laws regarding post-employment limitations. So
no laws were broken.
But I am not going to quibble with you on appearance.
Perception is reality. And the Secretary was very clear in his
statement to this committee and to Oversight and Government
Reform and to the Senate Commerce Committee on this issue. He
is committed to strengthening the ethics requirements in the
Department of Transportation. I fully support his efforts, and
as far as I am concerned, I am going to hold every employee in
NHTSA to the highest ethical standard as the Secretary holds
everybody in DOT to the highest standard and frankly the Obama
Administration has made it a focal point that this will be the
most ethical Administration in history. So we are looking
forward to working with you on a going forward basis in dealing
and handling this issue of appearance and arms-length distance
for employees of NHTSA and when they move into a post-
employment situation.
Ms. Sutton. I appreciate that answer because the public
trust is critically important in making sure that things are
working as they should, and, Mr. Chairman, if I could just
indulge in one last question.
During the hearings that we have had in the past with
representatives of Toyota and Secretary LaHood, we heard
information about how recalls of vehicles had happened in other
countries, and these recalls, you know, stemming from what
appear to be problems that arose here in this country and led
to eventual recalls after much tragedy had occurred. Is there
anything that requires auto manufacturers to report to NHTSA
problems beyond our borders with vehicles that are sold in this
country?
Mr. Strickland. Yes, there are a couple of requirements
actually. They have to report to us foreign recalls that
involve components used in United States vehicles and they have
to also report foreign service campaigns in the vehicles. Now,
the question is whether they did this timely. We definitely
will investigate those issues. But we receive a lot of data
from the early warning system and other obligations from the
TREAD Act and we are definitely looking at other ways and other
types of information that could be helpful to us in that
mission and we are looking forward to working with the Congress
and finding ways that we can buttress those abilities.
Mr. Rush. We see that Mr. Markey has joined the
subcommittee. He is not a member of the committee, so the Chair
seeks unanimous consent that Mr. Markey be allowed to ask
questions of the witness, and hearing no objection, so ordered.
Mr. Markey, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
hospitality.
As you know, the early warning system that I helped to
create during the 2000 TREAD Act was intended to provide the
Department of Transportation and the public with early
information that auto manufacturers receive about safety-
related complaints. But the Bush Administration issued a
regulation that deemed almost all of the information automakers
to be confidential business information. As a result, as far as
the public is concerned about my provision back in 2000, the
early warning system has become an early warning secret. I have
a summary here of the public information contained in all of
the early warnings submitted by Toyota in the last quarter of
2008. It tells you that there were seven reports of deaths or
serious injuries due to speed control but that is all the
information you get. The public can't learn whether those
reports relate to sudden unintended acceleration. They can't
learn what happened and they can't learn whether any consumers
made complaints about similar problems that didn't result in a
serious injury or death.
Do you agree that the public versions of early warning
system data don't really tell the public anything specific or
useful about potential automobile safety problems?
Mr. Strickland. Mr. Markey, the one thing I would like to
start off with saying is that the NHTSA databases and the
information we provide are some of the most transparent in
government, and we have been noted by the federal government
about our data sources that we provide.
In terms of the early warning system, as far as the Obama
Administration is concerned, as far as I am concerned as
administrator, the more transparency we have, the better. I
definitely would like to have a dialog with you about the early
warning reporting system and your thoughts on how we can
improve transparency going forward.
Mr. Markey. Now, consumers can report safety complaints to
NHTSA as well and these reports are made public. Does it make
sense to you that when a consumer reports a safety problem
directly to NHTSA, it goes into a publicly searchable database,
but when a consumer not knowing that they could complain to
NHTSA instead reports the safety problem to a car company, that
it becomes confidential business information without a
requirement that the public learn about it? Do you think that
is right or do you think that that information should as well
have to be made public because it is given to NHTSA as part of
a public report?
Mr. Strickland. I clearly see that inconsistency. This
Administration believes in transparency. I would happily talk
to you on a going forward basis how we can make our databases
more transparent.
Mr. Markey. Do you think that information should be
information that the public, me as an owner of a Toyota Camry,
should I have had that information?
Mr. Strickland. That information should not be hidden, in
my personal opinion. However, there are other things that
should come into play and I would be happy to talk to you on a
going forward basis.
Mr. Markey. When President Clinton signed the Act into law,
he directed the Department of Transportation to implement the
early warning system in a manner that ensures maximum public
availability of information. That clearly hasn't happened. So
my goal is to work with you, sir, in order to accomplish that
goal. We thank you for taking this job, by the way.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Markey.
Mr. Markey. And we have enjoyed working with you over all
the years, especially on the fuel economy standards and your
work in the Senate.
Let me ask if I may one final question. Although NHTSA can
undertake a mandatory recall, doing so takes a great deal of
time and can require you to go to court to prove the existence
of a safety defect. There are times, however, when taking that
long costs lives. As you know, since you were the lead staffer
in the Senate 2 years ago, Congress gave the Consumer Product
Safety Commission the authority to quickly inform the public of
an imminent product safety hazard, even though the formal
recall process was complete. Do you think that sort of
authority could help NHTSA more effectively protect and inform
the public of serious safety problems, and will you work with
us to develop such a provision?
Mr. Strickland. The imminent-hazard authority, Mr. Markey,
is in several of our sister consumer safety agencies. The
Federal Rail Administration, for example, has this authority
and it has proven to be very helpful to them. I look forward to
working with you and having a further discussion on this
authority. It has proven very successful in other areas in
consumer protection and it may bear fruit for NHTSA as well.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, and our country is very fortunate
that you were willing to accept this position.
Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Markey. That is very kind.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rush. The Chair will ask the indulgence of the witness
just for a few more minutes. The Chair will authorize a second
series of questioning, and the Chair recognizes himself for 2
minutes.
NHTSA's budget for vehicle safety programs has been
stagnant, as was mentioned earlier, for the past 10 years. From
my perspective, this year's budget request is down a few
million dollars from the year before. ODI, which focuses its
enforcement activities on new cars sold within the last 5
years, has a budget of less than $10 million to police a fleet
of 80 million vehicles, and according to the Chicago Public
News, adds up to about 10 cents a car. The budget for
rulemaking has suffered as well. It has delayed major
rulemaking efforts to the point that Congress has been
compelled to legislate mandates for rollover standards and for
child safety. I know that there is an increase of about 66 new
personnel but if you get more resources for your safety
programs, where would you focus those increased resources?
Mr. Strickland. Well, Mr. Chairman, you know, the safety
mission is not simply in the ODI or the vehicle safety office.
It is actually our entire mission. It is the behavioral side as
well. And the President's budget provides resources for us to
accomplish our mission with the new resources for those
personnel. We will take a hard look at those 66 personnel and
deploy them at the places where we need not only to improve and
strengthen the Office of Defects Investigation but in other
places where we can also help further our safety mission in the
most efficient way.
In terms of resources overall, we have accomplished our
mission with the resources we have had. The President has given
us a budget that gives us more resources to do more and we will
use that for the safety mission.
Mr. Rush. This Congress has to prepare a budget. The
Congress has to approve a budget. Would you have any objections
if we gave you more than a budget for 66 employees?
Mr. Strickland. Mr. Rush, the President's budget helps us
accomplish our mission. If the decision of the Congress is to
provide us more resources, we will use them judiciously for the
purposes of improving safety.
Mr. Rush. Sounds like a good answer to me.
Mr. Whitfield for 2 minutes.
Mr. Whitfield. I would just say, I don't know how much more
we have to give you, but thank you.
Mr. Rush. With that said, and seeing no more members
seeking recognition, Mr. Administrator, you have done an
excellent job. We thank you very much. And again, please
forgive us but our duties have taken us away and so we weren't
able to be as prompt as we wanted to be beginning this hearing,
so thank you for your patience.
Mr. Strickland. No, thank you, Mr. Rush. It has been an
honor. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rush. Thank you.
Mr. Strickland. Mr. Whitfield, thank you.
Mr. Rush. The second panel will please be seated at the
desk. The Chair thanks the second panel for your patience, and
again, we want to reemphasize our apologies to you for our
scheduling. It has been fairly horrendous and it has taken us
away from our scheduled duties. And so please accept our
sincere apologies.
The Chair wants to introduce the witnesses now that
comprise the second panel. On my left is Ms. Joan Claybrook.
She is the former administrator for the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, and Ms. Claybrook, we want to
welcome you here once again. Seated next to Ms. Claybrook is
Ms. Ami Gadhia, and Ms. Gadhia is the safety policy counsel for
the Consumers Union, and Ms. Gadhia, we want to welcome you
also to this hearing. And lastly we want to not just recognize
but we want to also say hello to our former colleague, who was
a member of this House, a very able Member representing the
State of Oklahoma for many years, a very bright and intelligent
human being, the Hon. David McCurdy, who is the president and
the CEO of the Alliance for Automobile Manufacturers. Dave, it
is good seeing you again and we welcome you again to this
subcommittee hearing.
Now we want to recognize for 5 minutes for the purposes of
an opening statement the illustrious Ms. Joan Claybrook.
STATEMENTS OF JOAN CLAYBROOK, FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION; AMI V. GADHIA, SAFETY
POLICY COUNSEL, CONSUMERS UNION; AND DAVE McCURDY, PRESIDENT
AND CEO, THE ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS
STATEMENT OF JOAN CLAYBROOK
Ms. Claybrook. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
I am the last person to have required an auto company to do
a recall, and that was 31 years ago, and I would like to say
that when you do find a defect, the auto companies will often
do a recall and you do not have to go to court. But sometimes
you do have to go to court, and I think that there has been,
and the Toyota case, I think, elaborates on this. I think there
has been a misconception on what a defect is, and in the last
case that was litigated by the Department of Transportation on
this issue, the federal Court of Appeals made several important
comments which I would just like to mention to you. This is not
in my testimony. I hope my whole testimony will be in the
record. But I think that this is a very important issue. It has
come up now several times in recent days.
What the court said was, to find a defect within the
meaning of the Act, the NHTSA must show that the vehicle itself
is defective whether the defect manifests itself in
performance, construction, components or materials of the
automobile. In other words, it can be a performance defect and
they do not have to show that there are five or 500 or 10,000
consumer complaints that have arisen, and often in fact those
complaints are not allowed in court as evidence. So if the
agency relies on it, then it is not going to have them find a
successful result.
Judge Leventhal, who was a Court of Appeals judge in a
different case, said that a determination of a defect does not
require any predicate of identifying engineering, metallurgical
or manufacturing failures. A determination of a defect may be
based exclusively on the performance record of a vehicle or
component.
Now, I think that this changes if you look at the Toyota
case, and I know this is not just about Toyota but it is about
the agency. It changes the way the agency should approach these
defect investigations, and I do think that the agency has
fallen into a trap, if you would, with the Toyota case and
others, where it seems to be accepting the burden of having to
define what the defect is in terms of the failure of
performance. That is the responsibility of the manufacturer.
The manufacturer put that vehicle together. They did the design
drawings. They make the profit from it. And how this happens is
their responsibility. If it has a failure in performance, the
agency can find a defect and the company has to fix it and the
company has to figure out what that fix is. That is what the
courts have said, and I think it is very important to make that
clear.
My testimony that I submitted has seven points that I would
like to just mention very briefly. One is that there has been a
low priority on enforcement in the agency, a lack of resources,
which you all have discussed, but there is another key issue
which is that a court of appeals in the mid-1980s found that
consumers did not have authority under the existing statute to
sue if a defect was not found by the agency. In other words, if
a case is closed, there is no authority of consumers to go to
court. There is authority for consumers to go to court if a
rulemaking decision is made that we don't think is proper, and
we in fact have gone to court at Public Citizen on many, many
occasions and helped to make the statute work better because of
the cases that we have brought. We have brought them on uniform
tire quality grading, the tire monitoring system for the amount
of inflation in the tire, on the early warning system, which
was kept secret, totally secret. We at least got part of it
revealed in two different lawsuits. So we can sue when there is
a rulemaking issue. We cannot sue when there is a defect
disclosed, and I think that changes the balance of thinking by
the administrator. There is no fear that if they close a case
that it is finished, and what the court there said in the court
of appeals in the mid-1980s was that the agency had the
discretion to figure it out according to their resources and so
in every case that NHTSA closes, it says it closes it on the
basis of resources. They just are mimicking the words of the
court decision. But the fact is that we should have that
authority because we are not going to bring cases we don't
think we can win because that is a waste of our time and
energy, and I think there ought to be a better balance of power
because if the agency finds a defect, then the company gets a
change to get its words and say what it thinks, and if we bring
a case, they can intervene.
Secondly, the agency has been engaged in excessive secrecy.
The early warning system, which Mr. Markey talked about, is a
good example, and as I said, we had to sue to make it
available. We don't even know how many times Toyota in the
recent cases filed an early warning report to the agency and
what it said and how many consumer complaints it had and how
many warranty claims it had and how many field reports it had.
All of that is secret. And if that were more open, then the
public would have access to it and they could help the agency
by letting them know when they had a problem, but their web
page in addition is a mess, so if you went to the web page to
try and figure out whether there have been early warning
reports on the particular vehicle that you are driving that is
not working right, you wouldn't be able to figure it out. I
wouldn't be able to figure it out.
The third point is that I think the penalties that the
agency has authority to impose are insufficient. First, they
should have the criminal authority for knowing and willful
violation of the Act, which you put in the CPSC law most
recently a year ago. It is in the FDA law. It is many of the
sister agency laws. I think the same should be available for
NHTSA. And in addition, the penalty for the civil penalty is
$16.2 million, which is a flyspeck for companies like Toyota.
They spend that much in half a day on their communications
activities and staff. So we think that it ought to be $100
million because that is something that they would pay attention
to.
Fourth, the agency is drastically underfunded. The total
budget for the motor vehicle program for the whole United
States is $132 million in this agency. That is it. And it is
not much above what it was when I was there just individual
dollars, and in terms of inflation, it is way below. It has
been drastically cut. By the way, those 66 new FTEs that were
being discussed, it is actually only 33 full-time ones. So that
is not really 66. And in addition, they have allocated them.
Twenty-three are for operations and research, eight for
rulemaking, four of them for enforcement. So that is the
tentative allocation. Now, they may be changing that and
reconsidering it but that is what was in the budget. So the
agency cannot handle the programs, the rulemaking programs
which are critically important, as important certainly as the
defect enforcement because of lack of capacity.
Information gathering and the data systems are totally
insufficient. They should have been funded at four or five
times what they are now, given the design of these systems back
when they were first created in the 1970s. I think that a key
issue that has come up at this hearing to some extent is the
black box. It is a voluntary standard. Voluntary standards
don't work as evidenced by the fact that Toyota, you know, its
system is not even being made available and the deadline for
compliance was supposed to be 2010. It was extended to 2012, so
it is delayed. It is a 5-year lead-in for a voluntary standard,
which is ridiculous. We think that the black box ought to be
mandatory and that the data, have a standardized downloading
for the data so that the police don't have to have seven
different computers depending on if it is a General Motors car
or Toyota or Nissan or Mercedes. They ought to have one
standardized downloading system. And I think that a way that
the agency could be drastically enhanced, it is very exciting,
would be to have that black-box data when it is downloaded when
a crash occurs, a serious crash, a tow-away crash or an airbag
crash, to have that data go to NHTSA, have NHTSA set up a data
system to receive it so that that can be the basis for their
evaluation of defects and evaluation of safety standards, and
the data would be voluminous and it would be fabulous and far
more than what they have today, and it would be much less
expensive. So I hope that the committee will consider that
issue as well.
The new safety standards should come out of some of the
work that goes in the defects area. For example, for years
NHTSA has tested cars and seat backs have failed when they hit
them in the rear at 30 miles an hour and yet they have never
issued a standard to upgrade that seat back. The very dangerous
circumstance of seat back fails, you can't control the car, and
also many people become quadriplegic and paraplegic as a
result. But in the Toyota case, I think a brake override
standard and a new accelerator standard which was issued in
1973, it is not even electronic that is completely irrelevant
to the current model should be done.
And then finally, I believe that conflict-of-interest rules
need to be strengthened as we have mentioned and I would
mention that NHTSA has a test facility in Ohio but it is owned
by Honda Motor Company. I created this back in the 1970s when
it was owned by the State of Ohio. Now it is owned by Honda
because they bought it. And I think that that should be
changed. They should change their facility and there are some
opportunities for doing that.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have several
submissions for the record. I am sorry that I am slightly over
on my time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Claybrook follows:]
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Mr. Rush. The Chair by unanimous consent will accept the
extraneous material and your full statement into the record.
Ms. Claybrook. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rush. Ms. Gadhia, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF AMI V. GADHIA
Ms. Gadhia. Thank you. Chairman Rush, Ranking Member
Whitfield and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the road ahead for NHTSA. I am Ami
Gadhia, policy counsel with Consumers Union, the nonprofit
publisher of Consumer Reports.
The recent Toyota recalls involving sudden, unintended
acceleration have focused national attention on safety
problems. Consumers Union believes that addressing this
formidable challenge demands a coordinated effort by the
government, automakers, the public and independent consumer
groups such as our own. We recommend the following government
actions to improve our auto safety net.
Consumers Union believes government regulators could have
moved more aggressively to pursue sudden, unintended
acceleration and to protect consumer safety. Various news
reports and our own analysis of documents from the investment
point to a pattern of missed opportunities. NHTSA and Toyota
were aware of unintended-acceleration complaints involving
Toyota models as early as 2003 when the agency received a
petition to investigate the problem. We are pleased that NHTSA
is now looking into potential electronics issues behind the
events involving Toyotas and we eagerly await the agency's
findings. However, we believe that NHTSA can take actions now
to improve safety.
First, we would like to see improved public access to
safety information. NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigations
collects complaints and data about autos from the public and
manufacturers in two separate databases: the consumer
complaints database and the agency's early warning reporting
system. They both have limitations, and the data they provide
are not integrated, making it more difficult for investigators
to spot issues and for consumers to find information. Consumers
shouldn't have to visit different sites to see all of this
information or be forced to search it using tools that are less
than user-friendly. All complaint information should be visible
by a single easy-to-use consumer-facing site. NHTSA should also
initiate a program to raise public awareness and invite more
drivers to participate in data gathering. The more public
complaints there are to analyze, the greater the change that
problems such as unintended acceleration will be identified at
an early stage.
Second, NHTSA should promulgate certain safety regulations
to prevent unintended acceleration in all automobiles. They
should require that cars be able to stop within a reasonable
distance with a sustained press on the brake pedal even when
the throttle is fully open. One method to reduce stopping
distances is smart throttle technology that allows the brakes
to override the throttle. Other methods may also become
available. To us, the most important safety feature is to
ensure that a vehicle can stop within a reasonable and safe
distance. NHTSA should require simple standard controls that
can easily turn off the engine in an emergency. In many current
Toyota vehicles, when the car is moving, it requires a
sustained 3-second push of the button to turn off the engine.
Though that is a safety precaution to prevent accidental engine
shutoff, it is an action many owners may not be able to do in a
panic situation. Ignition controls should be easy to operate,
especially in an emergency.
NHTSA should require intuitive, clearly labeled
transmission shifters in all cars. If your car is accelerating
out of control, hitting the brakes and shifting into neutral is
your best strategy but you want to know where neutral is when
you are panicking. There should be consistency for shifters
across all vehicles. NHTSA should also require a minimum
distance between the gas pedal and the floorboard. Floor mats
that entrap pedals have been a major focus in recent recalls
but people frequently use thick mats or ill-fitting mats or
stack the mats on top of each other. NHTSA should ensure that
there is sufficient clearance between the pedal and the floor
mat.
We also think that NHTSA's cap on civil penalties should be
lifted to act as a deterrent against future violations and that
NHTSA could improve the recall compliance process. The average
consumer response rate to vehicles is 74.1 percent. Currently,
manufacturers notify dealers about recalls and the dealers in
turn notify car manufacturers once the cars are repaired in
response to a safety recall. Consumers Union suggests that
going forward car manufacturers submit such data to NHTSA. This
information, which manufacturers already have, should include
individual vehicle identification numbers, or VINs, of cars
that are subject to a particular recall as well as when the
recall repairs were performed on the vehicles. NHTSA would then
be able to match up safety recalls with the manufacturer-
provided VIN in a consumer-friend searchable database. We would
further encourage States to consider linking safety recall
compliance with the ability to obtain a vehicle registration
similar to the way consumers must show proof of insurance to
register their cars now. This would help people who purchase
used cars to know whether recall repairs have been made.
We also recommend that Congress take a look at the reports
of a revolving door at NHTSA and whether this may have impacted
safety decisions. We are pleased to hear today the
administrator's comment that NHTSA will be looking into this
particular issue.
Finally, we urge Congress to adequately fund NHTSA. In
2007, motor vehicle crashes accounted for 99 percent of all
transportation-related injuries and fatalities yet NHTSA's
budget currently amounts to just over 1 percent of the overall
DOT budget. The agency's budgeting and staffing for auto safety
and consumer protection functions should be commensurate with
the realities of traffic safety.
Consumers Union thanks the committee for the opportunity to
present its recommendations as you move forward.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gadhia follows:]
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Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the witness.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. McCurdy for 5 minutes for the
purposes of an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DAVE McCURDY
Mr. McCurdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Whitfield for the opportunity to appear and speak on behalf of
the industry as a whole. I must admit as you made your
introduction, there was some chagrin on my personal part when I
looked at the membership of this subcommittee in that I
actually served with the fathers of three of the members, so it
is a homecoming of sorts but I hadn't thought I had been gone
that long. It is good to be back with you.
As you and your colleagues consider the road ahead of
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, it is important
to remember three key points. The administrator, who we are all
delighted that David Strickland is now the administrator of
NHTSA, as he pointed out in the Department of Transportation
highlighted today and actually I have a chart that is displayed
here that motor vehicle crash fatalities and injuries are at
historic lows. It is a very, very important point because that
is the mission of the organization. Secondly, autos have never
been safer and they are still getting safer every day because
of innovative safety technologies including advanced
electronics. And third, we need to be careful not to inhibit
the innovation or the speedy identification and remedy of
defects.
On the first point, as the chart indicates, sometimes when
you see a chart like that it is confusing for folks but to put
it in perspective, this figure reports fatality per 100 million
vehicle miles traveled, so there are 1.16 fatalities per 100
million miles traveled. That is down from in excess of two. Put
that in terms of human lives, and again, we all know that this
is far too many, that is a significant reduction from what Joan
Claybrook would indicate back in the 1970s when it was at a
high of 51,000. Now that is a decrease of 17,000. So I think
that is a very important point that there is a significant and
steady reduction despite increased ownership and increased
vehicle miles traveled. So I think this is a goal that we share
and we want to continue to work to support.
As far as the safety of vehicles, by every single measure,
these vehicles are dramatically safer than years ago, and in
the last 15 years we have seen a revolutionary expansion of
advanced vehicle safety technologies including increased number
of electronic components and features. Mr. Braley mentioned
being able to take apart a carburetor and engine in the
basement. It is indeed impossible to do that today. But a lot
of the technologies that we see to meet fuel economy
requirements, to meet emission controls, to provide safety are
because of these advanced electronics. Also, Ms. Claybrook said
that voluntary standards don't work but in fact many of the
incredible safety innovations were voluntary and were brought
out before the agency ever considered regulating it. Electronic
stability control--electronic stability control saves anywhere
from 5,000 to 9,000 lives annually. Lane departure warning,
over 2,700 lives. Safety belt reminders and safety belt
interlock, again significant. Side airbags, forward collision
warning, emergency brake assist, adaptive headlights, blind
spot information systems, all of these are innovations that the
industry introduced ahead of regulation.
Secondly, it is really important to recognize that
electronic systems are often far more reliable over time than
mechanical systems. I used to represent the electronics
industry and I will tell you that the advancements in solid-
state technology provide increased performance. It enables
vehicles to not only sense, diagnose and also to have failsafe
modes that are not possible with traditional historic
mechanical systems. So this is a very significant technology
which is helping us to meet our goals of sustainable mobility.
And third, as I indicated, I think we are going to have to
be careful not to inhibit this cycle of innovation because this
industry innovates more rapidly and gets into the marketplace
technologies for consumers and so we need to maintain a policy
framework that embraces technology-based solutions ahead of
regulation, and I don't think the public would be well served
if automakers were forced to wait for the government to catch
up with industry's innovation.
And it also important, we have talked a lot about recalls,
but the vast majority of recalls are voluntary, and I have a
chart here talking about detecting and correcting the defects
sooner. In fact, the number of recalls is up. Some may say
well, isn't that a sign of problems. In fact, that is a good
point because the number of vehicles affecting is coming down
so automakers are using the recall system based on data it
receives not only from the consumer directly but also from the
agencies to initiate these actions, to identify the defects and
get them remedied and get the vehicles back into the
marketplace.
And then just in closing, I want to make a couple points
about some suggestions for this committee, and I appreciate--I
know how this chairman works and I know how this committee
works, and you want to build a consensus on a bipartisan basis
to address significant concerns. We would respectfully submit
that Congress really does need to ensure that NHTSA has the
resources to do its job and we would support this committee in
its efforts. We have long advocated additional resources to
fund the National Automobile Sampling System, the NASS system,
which we believe is underfunded. We also support a number of
other legislative elements that we hope would be included in
this reauthorization such as State inducements, in other words,
working to encourage States to adopt primary enforcement safety
belt laws. I know that Chairman Oberstar is looking at this in
his reauthorization. Our industry spent hundreds of millions of
dollars in campaigns to try to pass primary seat belt
enforcement laws across the country, and we have made real
progress. We had three States this year alone.
We also believe there should be a first offense with an
ignition interlock requirement for impaired driving, drunk
driving. The statistic that is not reported up there, the
33,000 deaths, unfortunately, 30 percent of those or more are
the result of less than 1 percent, one-half of 1 percent of the
drivers and those that are impaired drunk driving. We have to
get those people off the road.
And then lastly, the graduated license laws for teens based
on best practices, the STANDUP Act, we support that, and then
there are other things that can really work to fund support
high-visibility enforcement efforts such as Click It or Ticket
and other limit under arrest or over the limit under arrest
provisions. And again, there is an opportunity to support a
driver alcohol interlock device research program called the
ROADS SAFE Act, which puts money to try to develop research to
prevent drunk drivers getting access to vehicles or starting
vehicles.
We appreciate very much your work. I understand how
challenging it is. And we look forward to working with you to
help develop commonsense solutions to some of these challenges.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McCurdy follows:]
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Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks all the witnesses and the Chair
thanks Mr. McCurdy for your statement. The Chair recognizes
himself for 5 minutes for questioning.
Mr. McCurdy, there has been a lot of testimony at this
hearing and in past hearings, and some of it has centered on
the black box as a technological solution or a recording device
that would help in gathering data and also determining the
causes for accidents. What is the industry's response to this
phenomenon of the black box?
Mr. McCurdy. We believe the information from event data
recorders is important for NHTSA to do its job. They do have a
rule that has standardized or recommended standards for the
type of data that would be acquired. I think the industry is
moving rapidly towards deployment of that system. Over 60
percent of all vehicles today, modern vehicles, have that
capability. The only caution I would give, and again, having
come from the intelligence and defense world, when we talk
about black boxes or we come from the world of aerospace where
some people think that in an aircraft there is this black box
that they recover after an accident. Actually these data
systems are embedded throughout vehicles and so it is not just
one solitary device. But is important that there are
commercially available tools to access that. So I think the
agency is going to be addressing this and we look forward to
working with them. I think this is something that can be
addressed.
Mr. Rush. Ms. Claybrook, you indicated that you think that
NHTSA's current budget is inadequate and that the President's
budget for this year, or next year, rather, is inadequate. What
do you think as a former administrator in today's dollars, how
much do you think NHTSA's budget should be and what do you
think should be the categories that we should look at
increasing personnel and other resources for NHTSA?
Ms. Claybrook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that the
budget should be doubled. It is $132 million, which is a
pittance by any measure in the federal government, and it
should probably double the year after that. This agency is
starving to death. It can't do the research it should. It can't
collect the data that it should. It doesn't have the expertise
that it should. It doesn't have the enforcement personnel that
it should. And all of us suffer from that because of deaths in
the highway, and I think that Mr. Strickland is going to be a
good leader for this agency. I am looking forward to see his
work, I think he needs the resources to do it, and I have
already been talking to him and the Secretary a little bit
about this, and I think his answer was very appropriate that
they would use very wisely the resources that the Congress
decided that they would give the agency. He didn't say we
didn't want them or that they couldn't use them. He said that
they would use them wisely, and I think that is as far as he is
allowed to go under the President's rules and I am very pleased
to see that he said that.
Mr. Rush. You have given us seven----
Ms. Claybrook. I would add one other thing, Mr. Chairman,
which is that issues have been raised today about the reduction
in death and injury on the highway, which is magnificent, but I
would also point out that after the oil crisis of 1973, there
was a reduction of 9,000 deaths a year because the economy was
in the sink, and I think that if you look at the documents that
were prepared by the agency itself, for example, here is there
list that they put out today of their crash stats, you will see
that every time there is a downturn in the economy, there is
less discretionary driving and there is a downturn in death and
injury, but it comes right back up again, and so should anyone
suggest that this is a permanent fix for the agency, it is not.
I think that you are still going to need those resources, new
safety standards, and there are many others that I didn't
mention today which I will submit a list of for the record of
other safety standards that the agency is woefully behind in
issuing.
Mr. McCurdy. Mr. Chairman, may I inject one point on that,
just clarification? I think the administrator said that it
actually had decreased and decline for 15 and a half straight
quarters. That is more than the current recession, so I think
this is a long-term trend. It is because of the regulatory
efforts and it is because of the work of the industry
cooperatively with that agency and also the work of Congress.
Ms. Claybrook. Well, I wouldn't say that. The acting
administrator, the one who went to Japan, Mr. Medford, he gave
a presentation which I will also submit for the record in which
he said that safety technologies had between 1960 and 2000
saved 328,551 lives, and so I do agree, I agree with Mr.
McCurdy that cars are safer today. I am disappointed that the
industry often opposes some of those improvements but they also
do take initiatives on their own, which he has mentioned, and
these safety features can make a huge difference. They have
made a difference in the number of lives saved and the number
of deaths on the highway today would be far, far greater were
not this agency doing its work, but there is much more that can
be done and we will see more deaths and injuries when the
economy improves.
Mr. Rush. My time is expired. The Chair recognizes Mr.
Whitfield for 5 minutes.
Mr. Whitfield. Thank you. This has been quite an
interesting hearing, and of course, any time we talk about
death on the highway, and all of us have known people who have
been killed in car accidents or have had loved ones that have
been disfigured, and there is no way not to be emotional about
individual deaths on the highway. But I am walking away from
this hearing feeling a little bit better really about things,
understanding that the Toyota issue is out there but when you
have this kind of a reduction in the deaths per 100 million
miles from in the middle 1970s 3.34 fatalities per 100 million
vehicle miles down to last year 1.16 per 100 million miles, and
it doesn't really make any difference what the economy is or is
not, we are talking about 100 million vehicle miles. So I think
that is something we really should celebrate to see that the
fact that this fatality rate is coming down.
Now, when we talk about the budget of NHTSA, I think the
total budget is somewhere in the neighborhood of $900 million
but a lot of that goes to State grants, and you all may be more
familiar with those State grants than I am and I know that Ms.
Claybrook is right as far as vehicle safety. There is about
$132 million a year for vehicle safety. But I referred earlier,
for example, to this Congressionally mandated study in 2005
about the causes of vehicle accidents, and it said that 95
percent were due to the driver, primarily driver mistakes, and
2 percent, by the way, were related to vehicle or equipment
defect but about 40 percent or 50 percent of that related to
tires. So I am just wondering if maybe we should look at this
in a different way and try to start focusing more money on
educating drivers, better educational programs for drivers. And
every State sets their own laws for how old you have to be and
what kind of program you have to go through to drive. Because
of the fact that 95 percent of all accidents are caused
primarily because of driver neglect or whatever, should we be
focusing on more programs to provide better educational
opportunities for drivers to make them better prepared? And I
would just ask each one of you that question and see how you
would respond to that.
Ms. Claybrook. Well, first of all, Mr. Whitfield, thank you
so much for putting this out, and I appreciate your question.
First of all, I would like to submit for the record the
problems that we see with this causation study. It is quite
complicated and I don't want to take the time today, but there
are a lot of deficiencies in it. But even assuming, which I
don't, that 95 percent of the crashes occur because of driver
error, what you have to look at is what causes the death and
injury, and Dr. William Haddon, who was the first NHTSA
administrator, put together what he called the Haddon Matrix
and it had pre crash, crash and post crash, and what you are
talking about is the pre-crash issue, which is drunk driving,
falling asleep, brakes don't work, whatever it may be in the
pre-crash field.
Mr. Whitfield. Ms. Claybrook, there is only about a minute
left, so I am just going to say that you disagree with what I
was saying, I am assuming, that----
Ms. Claybrook. Well, no, not necessarily. I will submit for
the record the information on that. But what you want to do is
to protect the driver and the occupants, and the way you do
that is making sure the car is safe regardless of what causes
the crash, and on driver education, NHTSA itself has done lots
of work on this and shown that driver education really doesn't
do much in terms of the long-term driving capability of most
people.
Mr. Whitfield. What about you, Miss Gadhia?
Ms. Claybrook. I like driver education. I mean, it----
Mr. Whitfield. What about you, Ms. Gadhia? Do you have any
comments on that?
Ms. Gadhia. In our testimony that we submitted for the
record, we took a look at the question that the committee is
asking in light of all the recalls that we have seen in recent
weeks, are there areas that we see for improvement, and so we
have made our recommendations accordingly. We are pleased,
though, that the agency and Secretary LaHood have put a great
focus on distracted driving. That is something that has been
obviously a big problem. So we do see a value in that
particular kind of focus.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. McCurdy?
Mr. McCurdy. Thank you, Mr. Whitfield. In fact, in addition
to driver behavior and performance, there is the driving
environment, so the condition of roads, the lack of safety
features there, weather, et cetera is a fact in 2 percent and
then in the other instances, about 2 percent can be attributed
to the vehicle. But I will tell you, since we had a reference
to older vehicles, I will provide for the record a copy of our
playbook. It has an interesting photograph of a 50th
anniversary event at the National Institute of Highway Safety,
the Insurance Institute, and they did a 40-mile-an-hour head-on
crash of two vehicles. One was a 1959 Chevrolet Belair. We are
not picking on Chevy. It is actually a good story here. As you
know, in 1959--well, some of you probably weren't around then
but most of us who were know there is a lot of metal there--a
40-mile-an-hour head-on crash with a 2009 Chevy Malibu, which
is a smaller car, and the results are dramatic. The cage, the
front seat, the passenger area of the 1959, those passenger
would have been killed. There is no doubt. I mean, severely
injured, tremendous impact, crushing that compartment. In the
new model, the cage is intact. It also has front airbags, side
airbags, side curtains and also has other features that improve
the likelihood of survival in a head-in crash regardless of the
cause, whether it is someone swerving.
The last point I would make in this, a comment made about
the 3-second stop. I drive a vehicle that has push-button on
stop. That is one of the features that many, many consumers are
moving towards. Are we saying that consumers today, it is in
the manual, it is in the instructions and all the rest, can't
take 3 seconds to push a button? I know that we panic, I know
there are instances, but there is a need for education. There
is a need. And maybe one of the positive aspects of all this
investigation, all the reporting is maybe consumers are having
to pay attention to actually the vehicles that they are
driving, what are those shifters, where is neutral. My son-in-
law drives a Camry. When this came up, the ones in the recall,
he asked what do you do. I said you put it in neutral, OK. You
don't want to turn it off at first, and those buttons are there
and that 3-second delay is there for a reason because you don't
want inadvertent shutting off the engine because then you could
lose power. That affects steering and other conditions.
So I think there is a commonsense approach we need to take.
Let us find out what it is. Let us work together. And I think
that is what NHTSA and the industry should be discussing. So
there is not one solution, but I think there is a genuine
concern about it to try to develop some solutions.
Ms. Gadhia. Mr. Chairman, may I briefly respond to the
comment about the push button?
Mr. Rush. Certainly.
Ms. Gadhia. I would like to note that our recommendations
have to do with when the consumer is in an emergency situation
since we have been talking about sudden unintended
acceleration, and I will note also that given what has
happened, it is my understanding that Toyota is working on
reconfiguring their push-button ignition so it can be turned
off in an emergency situation with multiple quick presses in a
short period of time. So that is what we are talking about.
Mr. Rush. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Illinois
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
apologize to the witnesses for not being here for your
testimony, though I have looked at it. I want to also just take
this moment to say what a tremendous resource we have in Joan
Claybrook, who did serve as head of NHTSA, and I hope that not
only our subcommittee but that NHTSA right now will take
advantage of all of the years of experience she has had not
only as an administrator but as an advocate. I thank Ms. Gadhia
and also Mr. McCurdy for the work that you are doing, but I
wanted to particularly just thank Joan for decades, I won't say
how many, of being an advocate for consumers.
In looking at the priorities that you laid out for
legislative and administrative--I mean, there are a couple
things that are clearly legislative. If you think that
penalties need to be enhanced, I think that is legislative on
our part. But what are those things that you think the
committee in particular has to deal with that really can't be
done administratively to meet the goals that you have set out
or the problems that you have identified?
Ms. Claybrook. Well, I would say certainly in the penalty
area that that is a legislative issue, and in the funding, that
is a legislative issue. The President's budget is what it is
and it is totally insufficient, and so it is not this
committee's responsibility, although you do authorize, of
course. I think that in the area of transparency, there have
been some decisions made by the agency that this committee
could change. In the early warning act, while there was a lot
of discussion about the information being open, in fact, the
way that it was written was interpreted as not being open. So I
think that it would helpful clarification on transparency with
the early warning system because right now it is not available
to any of us.
Ms. Schakowsky. And that would require a change or a
clarification or----
Ms. Claybrook. I think it would be--yes, I think it would
be very helpful to have a clarification of that.
In terms of consumers being able to bring a lawsuit when a
case is closed in the enforcement area, we definitely need to
have legislation there because of the court of appeals
decision, and then I think it would be very helpful to have
some legislative support for improving the black block. This is
something that could be done administratively by the agency. I
think it would be really helpful because if the black box is
mandatory, if it gathers a lot of really good data, if it can
be downloaded easily, all of that data can come into NHTSA's
data system and it would vastly enhance, excitingly enhance the
capacity of the agency to analyze problems, to find out what is
going on in the highway because this would be rich information
from our crashes that occur right then on the highway, and this
information is totally lacking in the agency now, and gathering
it through the NASS system, which is this National Accident
Sampling System, which is after the fact investigations, there
was intended to be 20,000 of them a year, it is now 4,000
because of the cost, and this I think will never get to the
20,000. So why not take advantage of this data that is going to
be collected anyway in black boxes under what I think has to be
a mandate for the black box itself and use that data for the
operation for the agency as well as particular crashes.
Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. McCurdy, you seem to be nodding at
that. Did you want to comment on this?
Mr. McCurdy. Thank you, ma'am. Actually I did want to
comment. We asked for additional resources for NASS. We think
that data needs to be collected, and this committee has
oversight of NHTSA and the data is there but we need to make
sure that the agency has the tools and resources to gather it.
My only caveat on that, and I think this is something that we
need to work on, is I don't believe that the wholesale release
of raw and unverified data would further objective of quickly
identifying and correcting defects. If anything, it may lead to
more litigation, and I don't believe that is the answer.
Ms. Claybrook. Well, I should say, Mr. McCurdy----
Mr. McCurdy. I actually have the mic, Mr. Chairman. You
know, I don't believe it would in fact do that. I would hope
before the gentlelady leaves or we at least have another round
actually talk about one of the principle issues that you are
the key sponsor of which we supported, the Cameron Gulbransen
Act, and the role that we actually played because this is one
of our priorities and it shows where we can actually work
together to address significant problems, and those are some of
the most tragic instances that we know.
Ms. Schakowsky. They are.
Mr. McCurdy. I worked with Senator Sununu and Senator
Clinton at the time as well as your staff and the staff of the
committee to make that happen, and the industry fully supported
that. So I want to make sure that is on the record.
Ms. Schakowsky. And I appreciate that.
Ms. Claybrook. Could I----
Ms. Schakowsky. Is there any way, Mr. Chairman, that Ms.
Claybrook can respond back to that, or do you want----
Ms. Claybrook. It is privacy information. I just want to
make clear that I don't think that this data should be public
as to individual crashes. It would be for statistical purposes.
That is all I wanted to say.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
Mr. Rush. The gentlelady's time has expired. The Chair
recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Stearns.
Mr. Stearns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Claybrook, let me just follow up what Ms. Schakowsky
talked about. In these boxes, isn't the box on a person's car,
that box would belong to that person, wouldn't it?
Ms. Claybrook. Yes.
Mr. Stearns. So wouldn't they have the right to opt out if
they wanted to? Could they flick a switch so that if they
didn't want this to occur, they could do it, or do you think
that should not be----
Ms. Claybrook. I don't think there ought to be an on/off
switch.
Mr. Stearns. So you think there should be no opt-out?
Ms. Claybrook. I do not think there should be an opt-out.
Mr. Stearns. OK. Secondly, the information they collect is
obviously speed, perhaps location. Is it going to go beyond
that in terms of weight in the car or driving habits? What, in
your opinion----
Ms. Claybrook. On the black box?
Mr. Stearns. In the black box. It sounds like you want to
expand it, and I think many people are concerned about how the
federal government will handle this data. Say I can't opt out
of the box under your persuasion, then if it goes to the
federal government, is this going to be public on the Internet?
Should private citizens be able to go and see that about their
neighbors who are driving? I mean, there are some privacy
implications I think that I am concerned about.
Ms. Claybrook. I really appreciate you asking the question
because I certainly didn't mean to suggest that every crash
that occurs should be publicly exposed on the Internet with the
name of the person and their car and all the rest of it. The
black box generally collects data 20 to 5 seconds before a
crash and 5 to 10 seconds----
Mr. Stearns. So it doesn't come on all during the whole
time?
Ms. Claybrook. No.
Mr. Stearns. And so it is very, very limited time frame,
and what it records is whether your foot was on the
accelerator, whether it was on the brake, a lot of aspects of
the engine itself, the speed of the vehicle and so on, and that
data, what I am talking about having to go to the federal
government, it would be only statistical data. All privacy
information would be erased, so the federal government wouldn't
even have it. It would just be statistical data. It would just
be that a crash occurred and what the circumstances were so
that you can then accumulate that data and say these are the
kind of crashes that are occurring and these are the kind of
remedies that we need to think about applying because of that.
I do think it needs to be mandatory. I think it should be on
every vehicle. Actually, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler
readily reveal the contents of their black boxes in litigation
because they think it is advantageous for them.
Mr. Stearns. Well, I guess this committee would be
concerned about the privacy. Let me move on. I have another
question.
Mr. McCurdy, welcome to the committee. It is nice to see
you. Eddie Towns and I dropped a bill on January 28, 2009,
which would direct the Department of Transportation to issue
regulations which would mitigate the safety hazard caused by
near-silent hybrid and electric cars. I was in a parking lot
going into the grocery store and I was just walking along with
my BlackBerry and this car came up that was a hybrid and I
didn't hear it, and it practically hit me, and so my question
is, I think both General Motors and NHTSA have come up and
proposed methods to address this, and I guess the concern of
the ever-increasing desire now to have these cars that are
hybrid and silent and you can't hear them. Winston Churchill
almost got killed when he came to the United States and got off
the wrong side of the road, and certainly if these cars are
silent, he might not have been alive and so concerned with
ever-increasing danger and sort of the inconsistency of the
industry response so far. Do you think NHTSA needs to take
further action to ensure an industry-wide solution, perhaps
something like Congressman Towns and I, the bill we introduced
which is called the Pedestrian Safety Enhancement Act of 2009.
It has 210 cosponsors. It is H.R. 734.
Mr. McCurdy. I know the bill well, and it is good to see
you, Mr. Stearns. Actually we refer to this as the quiet car
legislation, and concern. Actually I think we ought to
recognize--I don't know if John is still here--John Pare from
the National Federation of the Blind. We at the Alliance have
been working closely with NFB. Our member companies have been
conducting acoustic testing. There are some challenges. You
know, it is ironic, unintended consequences, but we have been
pushed for years by some that say we have to reduce noise. We
have been pushed by others to say we have to eliminate the
internal combustion----
Mr. Stearns. No one is ever happy.
Mr. McCurdy. So we are moving, you know, rapidly to hybrid
and electric technology and they are quiet, if not silent. I
can't resist the point, though, when you say that you are
walking along with your BlackBerry and don't hear it. It is a
little bit of distracted walking, and we are mixing issues
here, but we talk about distracted driving too. The point
that----
Mr. Stearns. But I am a pedestrian and I had the right-of-
way with the hybrid.
Mr. McCurdy. Actually I spoke to the NFB convention earlier
in the year when they were in Detroit. I think they will tell
you that we have reached out to them. We have worked closely
with them. What we are trying to do is understand the
challenges here, to really understand what the acoustic----
Mr. Stearns. Is there a timeline? Can you give me a
timeline?
Mr. McCurdy. Well, we have been doing the research now. I
think there are questions of length of implementation but I
think we are not far from finding a solution.
Mr. Stearns. A year, 2 years?
Mr. McCurdy. It depends on front end and back. I think we
are actually making real progress, and again, we want NHTSA to
engage with us as well. So I think there is an opportunity for
real stakeholder conversation here, and it is not
confrontational at all. I think this is a question of really
understanding the problem and bringing to bear the right
science and engineering. But I think there will be a solution
and I think it can be----
Mr. Stearns. And you think NHTSA should have an industry-
wide solution?
Mr. McCurdy. It should be industry-wide. I think it is
actually going to be global. I am involved internationally and
I think Japan is----
Mr. Stearns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCurdy [continuing]. Actively engaged and others will
as well.
Mr. Rush. I recognize Mr. Braley for 5 minutes.
Mr. Braley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stearns, there is a great episode on the TV show The
Office where one of the characters engages in a low-speed chase
with a Prius and sneaks up on one of the other characters,
which demonstrates the importance of this legislation.
Mr. McCurdy, voluntary can be a relative thing, and you
talked earlier about some of the voluntary changes the industry
has made to respond to safety concerns but a lot of those
changes that were made were also things that the industry
initially resisted, and one of the great things about the
country we live in, we have a system that allows people from
all different walks of life to work together both in a public
setting like through NHTSA and through our private enforcement
methods to try to hold people accountable and work together to
improve the technology in automobiles. You mentioned that you
had concerns about the use of electronic data recorder
information and suggested it could lead to more litigation. I
would challenge that statement because I believe if you had a
system with standards for accessing and downloading that
information and a clear understanding of what it represented,
you could actually reduce litigation because right now much of
the expense in a lot of these crash cases is people trying to
understand how an accident occurred, how the occupant
compartment was compromised and potentially contributed to the
fatality or the severity of the crash. So one of the things
that I am interested in hearing from you is, we have been
talking about the standards for electronic data recorders and
there has already been some proposals both by the Institute for
Electric Engineers and also proposed regulations that NHTSA is
considering, and it has been my impression that some members of
your alliance have been objecting to the enactment of those
regulations. Are you able to make a statement here at the
hearing today on behalf of the Alliance that it supports the
enactment of standardized regulations by NHTSA that govern the
use of electronic data recorder information?
Mr. McCurdy. I believe we are moving in that direction. I
will put it that way. I think the industry, there is well over
64 percent I think is the most recent number of 2005 models
that have EDRs. I may have been confused on all the
information. I think some of the early warning information is
where we have some concerns. The type of information in the EDR
is probably less of concern. But again, I think there can be
movement on this, and again, I think the stakeholders and
working with NHTSA have an opportunity. My hesitation was
because of my experience in the electronic field is that again
some people have a very simplistic idea of what that is. It is
not quite as simple as just saying everyone is going to have a
black box, but I think we are moving in that direction.
Mr. Braley. And Ms. Gadhia, I want to talk to you about
that because in your written statement you said the EDR
information must also be standardized and expanded, and Mr.
Stearns began his question by asking Ms. Claybrook about the
ownership of that data and assumed that it belonged to the
owner of the vehicle, and yet during the early years of EDR
data availability, the manufacturers frequently took the
position that was proprietary information that belonged to
them, not the person who paid for the automobile. So how do we
move forward from this point to try to come up with a system
that makes easily available and downloadable information that
achieves the privacy concerns we are worried about but provides
us with better data that helps us solve the underlying problems
that lead to occupant injury?
Ms. Gadhia. As we noted in our written testimony that the
NHTSA regulation is going to require EDRs to collect--the cars
that do have EDRs to collect certain standardized amounts of
data from 2013 model year cars. We would like to see that
happen sooner. We think there is a utility to the information
that they collect. But there are some privacy concerns about
ownership of the data, as you mentioned, Representative Braley,
and in the past Consumers Union has submitted comments to NHTSA
as they were considering the regulation that the final rule
that they put forward in 2006 and I would be happy to share
that with your office.
Mr. Braley. Please do. That would be much appreciated.
Ms. Claybrook, I want to finish with you. One of the things
that we know from the medical field, there is a process called
differential diagnosis, and that is when a physician is
presented with a sick patient, they come with the hierarchy of
the possible causes of their illness beginning with the most
likely and descending to the least likely, and then the
physician goes through a process of testing and evaluation to
try to rule out what could be causing the illness to be able to
reach a final diagnosis and a plan of treatment. And one of the
concerns I have with the response we have seen to some of the
problems with the Toyota recall is that the differential
diagnosis that Toyota engaged in was limited, it appeared to
many of us, to a mechanical failure, and they have now
participated in massive recalls to address sticky accelerator
pedals and problems with floor mats. And yet we still see
reports of sudden unintended acceleration in vehicles where
those retrofits have been made. So can you comment based on
your experience as a former NHTSA administrator and as somebody
involved in a long period of public safety advocacy on what you
think needs to be done to get to the underlying cause?
Ms. Claybrook. Well, Toyota is the only company, the only
entity that can do that. They designed the vehicle, they
created the software, they have software engineers who did it.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration should not
design the remedy. It never has in any case ever. And it
doesn't have the capacity to do the kind of evaluation that is
necessary to figure out what the underlying cause is. A lot of
people have said that figuring out a software glitch is almost
impossible in some cases, particularly if no marker is left
that this glitch even occurred, a marker left in the computer.
And so that is why a lot of people have talked about the brake
override as the only possible solution because we just don't--
at least we don't know, maybe Toyota does but we don't know
what the problem is. I think it is very interesting that Toyota
has said it is a floor mat recall of 5 million cars and yet the
remedy that they are putting in most of those cars is not only
to remove or fix the pedal and the floor mat but to put in a
brake override system, which is an electronic fix. Why did they
put an electronic fix in if it is the floor mat or the pedal?
They say it is for customer, you know, so they will feel safe.
I think it is because it is a software problem, and if the
vehicles have been fixed with the floor mat and the pedal and
the pedal and they still run away, then there is obviously
another problem, and I think there are also vehicles that are
not covered by the recall that may have these problems. They
may not be identical. They may use different software so they
are not identical problems. But there is no question in my mind
that this is an electronic issue, and I think the company took
the position early on that it wasn't because that hurts their
sales with consumers. Consumers don't like software glitches
they can't understand, and they couldn't change. Now if they
change their mind, they are going to be subject to 18 U.S.C.
1001 lying to the government and going to jail. So they are in
a very difficult position. Why would they do that now that they
have taken this position in the hardcore way that they have.
I was at a Senate hearing the other day and there were 21
people representing Toyota sitting in front of me, and I said
to them, gee, you have a lot of lobbyists, and they said oh,
no, no, these are all communications people. I think that they
are looking at this as a communications fix as opposed to a
real fix.
Mr. Braley. I want to thank all the witnesses for your
impressive testimony and look forward to working with all of
you as we move forward on these important issues, and I yield
back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and the Chair
himself also thanks all the witnesses again for your patience
and for your time that you have contributed to us. Your
testimony has been invaluable as we proceed down this path for
reauthorizing NHTSA, and the Chair thanks you and wants you to
know that you have done a great service to the American people,
the driving public, today.
Thank you very much. The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
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