    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                        NHTSA OVERSIGHT: THE ROAD AHEAD

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, TRADE,
                            AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

                                     OF THE

                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 11, 2010

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 111-104

          Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

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                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                     HENRY A. WAXMAN, California, Chairman
    JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan            JOE BARTON, Texas
      Chairman Emeritus                    Ranking Member
    EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RALPH M. HALL, Texas
    RICK BOUCHER, Virginia               FRED UPTON, Michigan
    FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey       CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
    BART GORDON, Tennessee               NATHAN DEAL, Georgia
    BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois              ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
    ANNA G. ESHOO, California            JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
    BART STUPAK, Michigan                JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
    ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York             ROY BLUNT, Missouri
    GENE GREEN, Texas                    STEVE BUYER, Indiana
    DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado              GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
      Vice Chairman                      JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
    LOIS CAPPS, California               MARY BONO MACK, California
    MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania       GREG WALDEN, Oregon
    JANE HARMAN, California              LEE TERRY, Nebraska
    TOM ALLEN, Maine                     MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
    JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois       SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
    CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas           JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
    JAY INSLEE, Washington               TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
    TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin             MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
    MIKE ROSS, Arkansas                  MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York          PHIL GINGREY, Georgia
    JIM MATHESON, Utah                   STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
    G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
    CHARLIE MELANCON, Louisiana
    JOHN BARROW, Georgia
    BARON P. HILL, Indiana
    DORIS O. MATSUI, California
    DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin
        Islands
    KATHY CASTOR, Florida
    JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
    CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
    ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio
    JERRY McNERNEY, California
    BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
    BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
    PETER WELCH, Vermont
            Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection

                            BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
                                      Chairman
    JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois       CLIFF STEARNS, Florida
        Vice Chair                            Ranking Member
    JOHN SARBANES, Maryland              RALPH M. HALL, Texas
    BETTY SUTTON, Ohio                   ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky
    FRANK PALLONE, New Jersey            GEORGE RADANOVICH, California
    BART GORDON, Tennessee               JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
    BART STUPAK, Michigan                MARY BONO MACK, California
    GENE GREEN, Texas                    LEE TERRY, Nebraska
    CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas           MIKE ROGERS, Michigan
    ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York          SUE WILKINS MYRICK, North Carolina
    JIM MATHESON, Utah                   MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
    G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
    JOHN BARROW, Georgia
    DORIS O. MATSUI, California
    KATHY CASTOR, Florida
    ZACHARY T. SPACE, Ohio
    BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
    DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
    JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan (ex
        officio)

                                 C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hon. Bobby L. Rush, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Illinois, opening statement.................................     1
    Hon. Ed Whitfield, a Representative in Congress from the
      Commonwealth of Kentucky, opening statement....................     2
        Prepared statement...........................................     4
    Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Illinois, opening statement...........................     7
    Hon. Bruce L. Braley, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Iowa, opening statement.....................................     8
    Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Michigan, opening statement.................................     9
    Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of California, prepared statement..............................    81
    Hon. Kathy Castor, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Florida, prepared statement....................................    85
    Hon. Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Texas, prepared statement......................................    88

                                   Witnesses

    David L. Strickland, Administrator, National Highway Traffic
      Safety Administration..........................................    10
        Prepared statement...........................................    13
        Answers to submitted questions...............................    91
    Joan Claybrook, Former Administrator, National Highway Traffic
      Safety Administration..........................................    33
        Prepared statement...........................................    37
    Ami V. Gadhia, Safety Policy Counsel, Consumers Union............    46
        Prepared statement...........................................    48
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   119
    Dave McCurdy, President and CEO, the Alliance of Automobile
      Manufacturers..................................................    59
        Prepared statement...........................................    62
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   127

                        NHTSA OVERSIGHT: THE ROAD AHEAD

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010

                  House of Representatives,
               Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade,
                               and Consumer Protection,
                              Committee on Energy and Commerce,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:48 p.m., in
    Room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bobby L.
    Rush (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
        Members present: Representatives Rush, Schakowsky, Sutton,
    Barrow, Braley, Dingell, Markey, Stearns and Whitfield.
        Staff present: Michelle Ash, Chief Counsel; Anna Laitin,
    Professional Staff; Will Cusey, Special Assistant; Bruce Wolpe,
    Senior Advisor; Danny Hekier, Intern; Jeff Wease, Deputy
    Information Officer; Elizabeth Letter, Special Assistant;
    Lindsay Vidal, Deputy Press Secretary; Shannon Weinberg,
    Minority Counsel; Brian McCullough, Minority Senior
    Professional Staff; Sam Costello, Minority Legislative Analyst;
    Robert Frisby, Minority FTC Detailee; Sarah Kelly, Press
    Intern; and Kevin Kohl, Minority Professional Staff.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOBBY L. RUSH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

        Mr. Rush. The subcommittee will now come to order.
        Let me just say something in regards to those people who
    have been waiting since 10 a.m. this morning. I sincerely
    apologize, but as you know, the duties of the House are varied
    and we did have to postpone this meeting for a series of votes
    and other matters, so again, please accept my sincere apologies
    for the delay. We are very cognizant of your time and we value
    your time, so please accept our humble apology. We will now
    proceed with this hearing.
        This hearing today is a hearing of the Subcommittee on
    Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, and the subject
    matter is NHTSA: The Road Ahead. The Chair recognizes himself
    for 5 minutes for the purposes of an opening statement.
        The Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
    Protection again welcomes our participants here at this
    meeting. Our main purpose for coming together today is to
    assess NHTSA's functionality and its effectiveness. Last month,
    I promised America's motorists, passengers, and pedestrians
    that as this subcommittee takes up its jurisdictional
    responsibility to reauthorize NHTSA, we would help NHTSA regain
    the public's confidence.
        This is our first occasion to welcome NHTSA's newest
    administrator, Mr. David Strickland, to this hearing and to
    this subcommittee and to this committee. Although Administrator
    Strickland's first several months at NHTSA's helm have been
    rocky and filled with difficult challenges, I know him to be a
    highly intelligent, thoughtful and capable professional. I
    expect that he will ``shoot straight'' with us as we begin
    crafting reauthorization legislation that the members of this
    subcommittee can quickly support and move through this
    subcommittee and through the full committee and take it to the
    floor of the House.
        I look forward to listening to both witness panels and
    hearing their views on what NHTSA is currently doing through
    its crash data analysis, its research and its rulemakings to
    promote vehicular safety.
        Although I am typically not very stringent about enforcing
    time restrictions on member statements and questioning, this is
    a different day. We are starting late, and because of the
    timeliness, I will not hesitate to drop the gavel today to keep
    us on point, and I might say, on the right path, as much as
    possible. The right road may be more appropriate. We have a lot
    of ground to cover and we expect a number of members to
    participate. I would ask my colleagues for their understanding
    and to be as cooperative as possible as it relates to the time
    considerations.
        Before I yield my time, I would like to say a few words
    about the scope of today's hearing. Let me be clear, this is
    not a hearing about Toyota's recalls or its practices. Please
    try to restrain yourselves from veering too far away from our
    purpose of examining NHTSA and NHTSA's configuration, NHTSA's
    organization, and NHTSA's performance in the areas of defects
    investigation, safety standards and enforcement.
        Again, I want to thank all of our witnesses for taking the
    time out of your very important schedules in order to advise
    this subcommittee. Again, I want to say we are more than
    thankful to you for your patience. Let us work collaboratively
    and constructively to ensure that NHTSA has on hand the
    necessary resources and capacity to fulfill its stated mission
    of saving lives, preventing injuries and reducing economic
    costs due to road traffic crashes through education, research,
    safety standards and enforcement activity. You are all great
    Americans and you are becoming greater Americans if you help us
    improve NHTSA. Thanking you again. I yield back the balance of
    my time.
        And now I recognize the ranking member for 5 minutes, my
    friend from Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ED WHITFIELD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
               CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

        Mr. Whitfield. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want
    to thank you all for your patience, and we welcome the
    witnesses on both panels.
        I would like to start out first of all this afternoon by
    simply congratulating the National Highway Traffic Safety
    Administration. I notice that today's vehicles are safer than
    ever. In 2009, there were 33,963 highway fatalities, which is
    too many, but the fewest since 1954. The rate of fatalities in
    2009 was 1.6 deaths per 100 million vehicle miles, and when
    this record was first recorded back in 1979, there were 3.34
    fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles. I think that should
    make the public feel more comfortable, even though one death is
    one death too many.
        As a result of all the focus on Toyota, some commentators
    have opined that the system is broken and needs to be fixed.
    Those opinions are wide ranging and point to many different
    issues ranging from NHTSA's authority to the way in which it
    has utilized its authority. Mr. Sean Kane, who is president of
    the Safety Research and Strategies Company, which does a lot of
    consulting work for plaintiff trial lawyers, testified during
    the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee hearing last month
    when he was asked the question, does NHTSA need more tools,
    more authority. He simply said that ``I think the number of
    errors were made in the process of these investigations, not so
    much that the tools were not available as much as the tools
    were not employed.'' So I think it is important that we
    consider all of those things as we move forward.
        As far as unintended acceleration, this is a problem that
    has cut across 3 decades and multiple Administrations without
    successful resolution. Similar to NHTSA's finding in the late
    1980s and early 1990s when it commissioned an independent
    examination of unintended acceleration or the more recent
    review conducted between 1999 and 2000, the current
    investigation has not answered all questions and may never do
    so to everyone's satisfaction.
        Regarding NHTSA's action, it is also not clear what more
    they could have done than what they have already done and
    whether the outcome would be any different. Administrator
    Strickland testified last week that there simply wasn't a
    strong enough case to force the issue of a mandatory recall,
    even if that had been decision NHTSA's decision, and if a
    problem cannot be clearly identified, a proposed fix most
    likely will not have a meaningful benefit.
        I might also say that to date the Office of Inspector
    General within the Department of Transportation announced the
    initiation of an audit of NHTSA's Office of Defects
    Investigation to conclude an examination of its handling of
    Toyota as well as the broader issue of the process that ODI
    employs to examine and investigate safety defects. The Office
    of Inspector General's objectives are similar to those of this
    hearing and that is simply to determine whether NHTSA has the
    tools and information available to investigate safety defects
    and identify possible improvements to its current procedures,
    and I think that is what this hearing is all about as we move
    forward with NHTSA, and I would yield back the balance of my
    time.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Whitfield follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6016A.001

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6016A.002

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6016A.003

        Mr. Rush. The Chair recognizes the vice chair of the
    subcommittee, Ms. Schakowsky of Illinois, for 5 minutes for the
    purpose of opening statements.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, A
         REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

        Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am so happy that
    we are having this hearing today.
        Without a doubt, the National Highway Traffic Safety
    Administration's profile has risen dramatically as a result of
    its role in responding to the dangerous problems with Toyota
    vehicles, probably a little higher profile than perhaps you had
    wanted or anticipated.
        This hearing will give us the opportunity to explore
    whether NHTSA has the resources, expertise and authority
    necessary to sufficiently investigate reports of safety
    problems and enforce existing safety rules.
        I want to welcome Mr. Strickland and congratulate him on
    his new position and welcome him to this committee. I know that
    you really are an advocate for consumers and it was really a
    pleasure to be able to work with you earlier on the Consumer
    Product Safety Improvement Act when we worked together when you
    were in the Senate. So I know of your commitment to consumers
    and consumer safety.
        My guess is, though, that right now we will find some gaps
    that need to be filled, and I look forward to working with
    Chairman Rush and the subcommittee and with NHTSA in crafting
    legislation to address those gaps.
        Mr. Strickland, in addition to discussing issues
    surrounding NHTSA's oversight and enforcement activities, I am
    looking forward to begin a dialog with you about children's
    safety in and around cars and other proactive safety measures.
    I appreciate that we had a moment before this 10:00 hearing to
    discuss this a bit. In past year, Congress has enacted
    legislation requiring NHTSA to issue specific safety
    regulations. Dear to my heart has been the Cameron Gulbransen
    Kids Transportation Safety Act signed into law in 2008,
    requiring rulemaking on a rear visibility standard and a power
    window standard, and I know that you are working on both of
    these issues as we speak and it is my hope that both standards
    will be very strong in order to protect children.
        I have to tell you that I think the hardest thing that I
    have done in this Congress, I am in my 12th year now, is having
    parents come with pictures of their children who are no longer
    with us, sometimes because they themselves inadvertently, and
    we know in large part due to design problems actually were
    responsible for those children's deaths. It is just the most
    unbearable thing to think about, that these were preventable,
    and yet these parents have turned this tragedy into a crusade
    to make automobiles safer, not just in traffic but not in
    traffic. And so I am looking forward to working with you to
    create standards that actually do prevent those accidents from
    happening.
        My concern is that in the past that Congress was forced to
    take action because NHTSA was not initiating badly needed
    rulemaking on its own and so I look forward to working with you
    to make sure that NHTSA has all the tools it needs and that it
    uses its tools to protect consumers. I look forward to that
    very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Iowa,
    Mr. Braley, for 5 minutes.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRUCE L. BRALEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                    CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF IOWA

        Mr. Braley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to applaud you
    and the ranking member for holding this important hearing.
        It is really an honor to have you here today, Mr.
    Strickland. We haven't met before. You have an important
    responsibility that is too often kept on the back pages of most
    newspapers and magazines, and it is only when something
    dramatic like these Toyota recall hearings comes up that the
    public starts to understand the critical role that your agency
    plays. You look to me like you are a young man, so I don't know
    if you know where you were on December 2, 1994, but I know
    where I was. I was not sitting in that chair, even though I was
    supposed to be sitting in that chair, because I was supposed to
    be testifying that day at a recall hearing on side-saddle fuel
    tank explosions involving CK General Motors pickup trucks, and
    I did not get the opportunity to testify because a settlement
    was reached that day between your agency and the Secretary of
    Transportation and General Motors whereby $51 million was paid
    for supposed consumer safety programs so that the recall
    hearing would not go forward where people like me would have an
    opportunity to talk about the impact on human lives of defects
    that do not get solved, and I was going to testify that day
    about a client of mine, a young woman in Iowa, who had the
    right side of her face burned off when the pickup truck she was
    riding in was involved in a collision and the pickup rolled
    over on its side, and because of the placement of those fuel
    tanks outside the frame rails, the flames went up the side of
    that pickup truck and engulfed her face in flames, and her
    husband, who was driving the pickup truck, pulled her young
    son, who was seated between them, through the broken windshield
    and got him to safety, and when he went back to try to rescue
    his wife, he reached into grab her and pulled out big chunks of
    her hair that had burned off in the fire. And he went back to
    his son and told him Mommy is in heaven now, but miraculously,
    this brave woman survived and went through months and years of
    grueling, painful skin grafts, hair transplants and incredible
    disfigurement because of that defect.
        When we gather for these hearings, we spend a lot of time
    talking in very arcane, technical language about sudden,
    unanticipated acceleration and electronic control safety
    devices, but we rarely talk about the human impact of the
    failure to act, and so when you think about the important
    responsibilities your agency has, it is important not just to
    think about where we are today and where you are going to take
    that agency going forward, it is important to look backwards at
    the legacy of this agency and why there are some people who
    feel it is not fulfilled its responsibility to keep the
    American public safe.
        So I look forward to the opportunity to have a meaningful,
    long-term conversation with you about the important
    responsibilities you have, and I look forward to hearing your
    testimony today as we work together to get to the bottom of
    this unexplained problem, and I yield back.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes the chairman emeritus of
    the full committee, my friend from the State of Michigan, Mr.
    Dingell, for 5 minutes.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

        Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your kindness
    and courtesy. I commend you for this hearing, which is very
    important, and I also commend you for your fine leadership of
    this subcommittee which you have done a splendid job.
        I want to observe that NHTSA's response to the safety
    defects implicated in these recalls has been sluggish.
    Likewise, NHTSA's decisions to terminate several internal
    analyses related to the defective Toyota vehicles since 2003
    due to a purported lack of resources leave one with the
    impression that the agency lacks the appropriate level of
    personnel and appropriations with which to fill its mandate. We
    want to find out if that is the case today because if that be
    so, then the safety of the American public is of course in
    question.
        As was the case with its sister agency, the Consumer
    Products Safety commission, NHTSA has suffered years of
    stagnation in funding and in many cases has endured a reduction
    in personnel levels, most notably in its important Office of
    Defects Investigation, ODI. Nevertheless, the agency possesses
    a number of powerful enforcement tools, many of which were
    augmented under the Transportation Recall Enhancement
    Accountability and Documentation, or the TREAD Act, of 2000. In
    addition to being able to compel manufacturers to recall
    defective vehicles, NHTSA may impose civil penalties for
    noncompliance and criminal penalties for falsification or
    withholding of information. This in mind, we must ask ourselves
    today why these authorities were not used in the case of recent
    Toyota recalls. Put another way, are the problems with NHTSA's
    response to the recalls better traced to a lack of authority or
    rather to ineptitude and lack of resources. At present, it
    appears that the latter is more persuasive. Although I will not
    discount the possibility that improvement can be made in the
    statutes of conferring NHTSA its authority.
        Our discussion of NHTSA's authorities and resources must
    not lose sight of what I believe to be malfeasance on the part
    of Toyota improperly addressing the problems that led to the
    recall of over 8 million vehicles. To reauthorize NHTSA without
    a view towards compelling better behavior by automobile
    manufacturers would be a self-defeating exercise.
        Two weeks ago, my questioning of Mr. James Lentz, Toyota
    head of sales for North America, indicated that all of Toyota's
    decisions relating to recalls are made in Tokyo. More
    disquieting is the fact that U.S. officials, the Secretary of
    Transportation, and the then-head of NHTSA had to fly to Japan
    to persuade Toyota to initiate recalls in the United States. In
    brief, we must examine how best to oblige automobile
    manufacturers selling vehicles in the United States to comply
    quickly and fully with our regulations and law.
        In closing, I suggest my colleagues bear these comments in
    mind as we begin what must be the first of many conversations
    about improving federal oversight of transportation safety. I
    further ask that these discussions and their resultant
    legislation will be bipartisan, collegial and subject to the
    regular order for these are the hallmarks of this committee's
    best work over the years.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your kindness. I thank our
    witnesses for appearing before us and I yield back the 58
    seconds remaining to me.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the gentleman for his
    extraordinary kindness.
        It is the normal practice of this committee to swear in the
    witnesses, so would you stand and raise your right hand?
        [Witness sworn.]
        Mr. Rush. Let the record reflect that the witness has
    responded in the affirmative.
        The Chair recognizes himself now for 5 minutes for
    questioning the witness. Oh, I am sorry. The Chair is getting
    ahead of himself. The Chair wants to recognize now the
    administrator, because he has certainly some opening
    statements, so the Chair recognizes the administrator for 5
    minutes for the purposes of opening statement.

    TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID L. STRICKLAND, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
                 HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To be perfectly
    honest with you, my statement is not as important as the
    committee's questions, so I can understand you wanting to hurry
    up and get to business.
        Mr. Rush. A great beginning.
        Mr. Strickland. Thank you so much for your kind words, all
    of you, and before I begin my formal remarks, I want to just
    take a second to acknowledge Mr. Braley and Ms. Schakowsky's
    note about the human toll. We have a tremendous amount of death
    on today's highways, and I am very happy to report some very
    good news, but 33,000 people is a tremendous amount of people
    to die, and one person is too many, and the personal toll that
    it takes on a family is absolutely catastrophic, and in my time
    that I served as a staffer on the Senate Commerce Committee, I
    have had the opportunity to spend time with countless victims
    including mothers and fathers who have killed their children in
    unfortunate back-over accidents and folks that have been
    disfigured and burned because of traffic accidents, because of
    defects, and you can never properly capture what this means to
    people, so I am fully aware of the responsibility that I have
    and that every day this agency has one goal. That is to keep
    people alive and safe on the road, and we can never do that job
    well enough. We just simply can't. But that doesn't mean that
    we can't try, and we will continue to put forward maximum
    effort as we have to make sure that we accomplish the goals.
    But thank you so much for your observations and they are taken
    well to heart.
        Chairman Rush, Ranking Member Whitfield and members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today to discuss the Department of Transportation's vision for
    the future of the National Highway Traffic Safety
    Administration and its important safety programs.
    Transportation safety is the Department's highest priority.
    NHTSA's safety programs are an integral part of addressing that
    priority. Even before I was sworn in as administrator on
    January 4th, I knew NHTSA's programs worked and they work well.
    We just released numbers that show a continuing dramatic
    reduction in the overall number of highway deaths. The
    Secretary this morning released a report that projects that
    traffic fatalities have declined for the 15th consecutive
    quarter and will be 33,963 in 2009, the lowest annual level
    since 1954, but we must do more. The loss of more than 33,000
    people represents a serious public health problem to our
    Nation. We will not rest until that number is zero.
        So how do we get there? Highway safety is a complex
    problem, and NHTSA has built a broad spectrum of programs that
    address both behavioral and vehicle-related causes of highway
    deaths. The linchpin of all of our programs is good data, good
    science and careful engineering.
        When I was sworn in 2 months ago, I felt it was important
    to look at whether there was a need to improve NHTSA's
    effectiveness in this era of the global marketplace and rapidly
    changing technologies. One of my first decisions was to
    question whether NHTSA is being well served by the four vehicle
    statutory authorities on which it relies to regulate. The
    reality is, is that while current authority does work and
    various constituencies have learned to work with them, they
    were written in the 1960s and the 1970s when the world and the
    automobile market were profoundly different. The question I
    pose and the questions I want to have is whether NHTSA's
    statutory authorities accommodate the modern automobile, the
    modern competitive marketplace even. More importantly, do they
    allow us to regulate in a way that allows the industry to build
    and sell safe products that the consumer wants to drive? Do
    they allow us to promote safety, innovation and fuel efficiency
    while providing effective regulatory and enforcement oversight?
    I have asked our legal and program staff to take a look at our
    existing authorities to answer these questions and to make
    their best recommendations.
        I believe this self-assessment is critical and supports the
    President's goals for transparency and accountability in
    government, and while we are taking a hard look at our
    authorities, I also commit to look at the current ethics rules.
    I believe the ethics standards set by this Administration are
    the highest ever established by any Administration, and I fully
    support Secretary LaHood's desire to tighten and enforce these
    rules across the Department of Transportation. If there is any
    evidence of any violations of these rules, swift and
    appropriate action will be taken.
        The next question I ask of NHTSA is, do we have the
    programmatic expertise that we need to support our programs?
    NHTSA has a diverse and experienced workforce and we will take
    full advantage of their skills, talent and expertise. If as we
    go forward we find that we need to shore up our workforce in
    certain areas, we will recruit aggressively. We are currently
    requesting the authority to hire 66 more people next year and
    will target these positions to meet our program needs.
        Well, at this point it appears that I am out of time and I
    will cut my remarks here, and I thank the committee for their
    time and their patience and I stand ready for questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Strickland follows:]

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        Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the administrator, and the Chair
    recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
        As has been stated, Mr. Administrator, our goal, the goal
    of this subcommittee as it relates to NHTSA is to look forward
    and to determine for ourselves what is the best way that we can
    assist NHTSA in its primary goal of protecting American
    citizens and American drivers. As I looked at this scenario of
    this Toyota incident as a framework, I wonder about the safety,
    the quality or the safety of the automobiles on America's
    highways in general. The question I have is, what reason can
    you give the subcommittee that we should not think that the
    recent Toyota recall that it would not replay itself for any
    other automobile dealer that manufactures automobiles for
    America's highways? Can you assure us that this Toyota recall
    is really just something that is an aberration as it relates to
    automobile safety?
        Mr. Strickland. I will say this, Mr. Chairman, that the
    Toyota recall, while wide ranging, is I think indicative of how
    NHTSA uses its authority in a way to get to the bottom of
    something. When the Secretary of Transportation took office,
    and at the time it was Acting Administrator Medford, they were
    observing certain issues with Toyota and they felt so strong
    about it that Mr. Medford went to Japan to inform Toyota that
    they did not feel that Toyota was holding up its obligations to
    inform and interact with NHTSA in a way to address safety
    concerns and recall concerns. That was the beginning. That
    effort began actually on December 15th. It was the day of my
    confirmation hearing, which is a good reason why the entire
    senior staff regarding defects was actually in Japan and not at
    my hearing. But better that they be there in Japan explaining
    to Toyota what they were doing wrong than sitting in a hearing
    room here in Washington, D.C. When I took office on January
    4th, I was updated about these issues, and Toyota was at that
    point beginning to get the message. I again met with them
    personally for the first time on January 19th, and I learned
    about the sticky pedal situation, and they actually executed
    their stop sale on January 21st. That effort was because of the
    analysis of the NHTSA, the fast action of the career staff and
    the leadership of the Secretary of Transportation. So I don't
    see Toyota as an indicative example of failure, I see it as
    NHTSA doing its job, and when our professionals use the data,
    make the case and go forward, we get the results that we need.
    So I think that Toyota in the wide-ranging recall that it
    executed, that is the type of response that frankly I would
    want as administrator and I think that this agency is
    expecting, and I would hope that in the future that other
    automakers would do the same in the same set of facts.
        Mr. Rush. Can you give the subcommittee any assurances that
    the automobiles right now as far as NHTSA is concerned have a
    level of safety that is greater than what we have experienced
    with Toyota?
        Mr. Strickland. There are two parts of that answer. First,
    I will go back to the success that we just had regarding the
    current data. We have the lowest number of deaths we have had
    since we have been recording this data since 1954. NHTSA is
    succeeding in its mission.
        The second part of your question, do I feel that vehicles
    are generally safe or will be safe and we won't have any other
    issue like Toyota, it is the automakers' responsibility to
    warrant that their vehicles comply with the federal motor
    vehicle safety standards. That is their responsibility. We are
    not branding these cars safe. It is our job to enforce and to
    police the marketplace, which we will do. So as far as I am
    concerned, the automakers have to uphold their obligation to
    not only comply with our standards but basically the state of
    the art. It is my job to make sure that they hold to those
    standards and this agency will hold that line.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair's time is up.
        The Chair recognizes Mr. Whitfield for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Whitfield. Well, Mr. Strickland, thank you again for
    joining us this afternoon. As I said in my opening statement, I
    do think that the agency should be commended because the
    highways really are safer today than they have ever been from a
    statistical standpoint. You would agree with that, I am
    assuming?
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Whitfield. Now, we have heard a lot--there have been a
    lot of articles written, a lot of testimony recently that NHTSA
    has not fulfilled its responsibility, NHTSA is a lapdog for the
    industry, not a watchdog for the industry, and so there has
    been a lot of criticism out there about the agency. And as the
    administrator, how would you respond to that in just a general
    way? Do you think that criticism is valid or not valid?
        Mr. Strickland. No, sir, it is not valid at all. We have
    been a very active agency since I have taken office. The agency
    has been very active since Secretary LaHood has taken office.
    And from my review of the work done, if we are talking about
    Toyota specifically, this agency opened eight separate
    investigations over the time period when there were complaints
    about sudden acceleration. A lapdog doesn't open eight
    investigations. Now, the goal is for us and our statutory, you
    know, order is to find any vehicle safety defect that presents
    an unreasonable risk. Any time a complaint or any data or any
    anomaly in the number of complaints or what we see from the
    early warning system, our folks take a look at it, they go
    forward and they investigate. If we cannot find the defect, we
    cannot under the statute and force a mandatory recall, but that
    doesn't mean that we think that vehicle is safe per se. At that
    point we cannot make the statutory case but we will keep
    looking, and as we have, we keep looking, and when we find a
    defect such as in the instance of the floor mat entrapment or
    the instance of sticky pedal or in the instance of the 2010
    Prius brakes, we act and we act quickly. I don't think that the
    history of our action in this area before I took office or in
    the 10-year period that a lot of people are looking at, I think
    that this agency has been quite active.
        Mr. Whitfield. Now, if you find a defect, then you can
    require a mandatory recall. Is that correct?
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir, we can.
        Mr. Whitfield. And I have heard a lot of discussion about
    subpoena power, and it is my understanding that you can issue
    information requests.
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Whitfield. And do the manufacturers have to respond to
    that request? Is it----
        Mr. Strickland. There is a difference between a subpoena
    and an information request. I know a lot of people talk about
    we have subpoena power and yes, we can compel a subpoena for
    documents. We say we want every document you have on a
    question, and yes, they have to give that to us. Information
    requests, they also have to respond, but it has actually a
    better purpose. We not only get documents, we actually ask
    direct questions that they give us answers to. It is a much
    sharper tool and the agency uses that quite frequently. In
    fact, we sent three queries to Toyota, three large queries,
    regarding the timeliness of their submission of information to
    us regarding the floor mats and the sticky pedal, and we sent a
    large recall query asking Toyota for all their information and
    answer questions about all of sudden-acceleration incidents,
    which will be a large amount of documents and data for us to
    review. If we find in the review of those documents that there
    is a violation, we will move forward accordingly.
        Mr. Whitfield. Now, have you found the lack of subpoena
    power a hindrance to the agency doing its job effectively?
        Mr. Strickland. In my review of the work on Toyota, they
    have been able to--while Toyota has been slow in years past, I
    will say that they have not been as responsive as my career
    staff feel they should have been in responses. Since I have
    been in office, they have been very responsive, and I would
    hope that that would continue in the future. But in terms of
    our subpoena, our ability to get information requests issued
    and responded to, I have gotten no evidence that that has been
    a problem in terms of getting a response.
        Mr. Whitfield. Now, I know most of your budget money goes
    to the States for grants and then the rest is spent basically
    between behavioral safety and vehicle safety. Is that correct?
        Mr. Strickland. That is correct, sir.
        Mr. Whitfield. And I know in 2005, Congress directed NHTSA
    to conduct a national motor vehicle crash causation survey, and
    at that time they came back and they said that 95 percent of
    crashes were due primarily to driver fault or negligence. Are
    you familiar with that study or do you have any thoughts on
    that?
        Mr. Strickland. I am tangentially familiar with it. I can't
    give you song, chapter and verse about the study but I can talk
    sort of in more specifics about behavior. That is the largest
    component of risk on the highway, which is the reason why the
    NHTSA budget is designed to attack the highest risk. Impaired
    driving, not wearing belts, driving distracted, those are all
    the hugest risks for everyone on the road today. Vehicle
    defects are important. We have to address them. They are
    significant. But in terms of the overall risk profile for
    highway safety, the behavioral side of the house, so to speak,
    comprises the largest risk and that is the reason why our
    program for safety is designed the way it is.
        Mr. Whitfield. Thank you.
        Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Whitfield.
        Mr. Rush. The chairman emeritus is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I thank for your courtesy.
        My questions in view of the time shortage have to require
    yes or no answers.
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, Mr. Dingell
        Mr. Dingell. Mr. Administrator, do you believe that the
    NHTSA made mistakes in its response to the recent Toyota
    recalls?
        Mr. Strickland. No, sir, I do not.
        Mr. Dingell. Should NHTSA have pushed Toyota to initiate
    recalls earlier than it did?
        Mr. Strickland. Sir, we pushed the recalls when we had the
    evidence of an unreasonable risk defect.
        Mr. Dingell. But yes or no?
        Mr. Strickland. The answer is yes, we responded
    appropriately.
        Mr. Dingell. OK. Thank you. What authorities does NHTSA
    lack whether under TREAD Act or otherwise with which to address
    defects in automobiles deemed hazardous to public safety?
    Please submit that answer for the record.
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Dingell. Now, yes or no, does NHTSA have in place a
    ranking system for determining the priority of defects
    investigations, yes or no?
        Mr. Strickland. The answer is no, but we rank risk by
    profile internally. There isn't a one through ten.
        Mr. Dingell. Thank you. Now, there seems to be broad
    agreement about the need to increase resources available to
    NHTSA to carry out its mission. Do you need additional
    resources, yes or no?
        Mr. Strickland. The President's budget gives us more
    resources, so----
        Mr. Dingell. Do you need more?
        Mr. Strickland [continuing]. When the President's budget is
    passed, we will have the resources we need.
        Mr. Dingell. Please submit to us for the record how much
    more resources you need in what area.
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Dingell. I want that submitted directly to the
    committee and not through OMB.
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Dingell. Now, in my questioning of James Lentz,
    Toyota's chief of sales for North America, he revealed
    decisions to recall Toyota vehicles sold in North America are
    made in Japan. Do any other manufacturers require that your
    information for details or decisions made relative to recalls
    are made in any country outside this United States? Is Toyota
    unique in that, yes or no?
        Mr. Strickland. It appears Toyota is unique, yes, sir.
        Mr. Dingell. All right. It strikes me that this is a bad
    situation insofar as safety of the American people. Am I
    correct or wrong?
        Mr. Strickland. The system that Toyota uses could be much
    more efficient.
        Mr. Dingell. By requiring them to have a response to be
    made in the United States by somebody empowered to comply with
    our laws. Is that right?
        Mr. Strickland. I would feel that if they had somebody in
    America to respond directly, we could act more quickly.
        Mr. Dingell. Now, I would appreciate it if you would submit
    to us for the record how this would be corrected.
        Now, is there a quantitative difference in response times
    between domestic and foreign automobile manufacturers to
    NHTSA's data inquiries, yes or no?
        Mr. Strickland. The domestic manufacturers tend to respond
    faster than the foreign, yes, sir.
        Mr. Dingell. What is the cause for this?
        Mr. Strickland. There are several reasons in terms of
    design of leadership, as you mentioned, and other factors.
        Mr. Dingell. In the case of Toyota, it is because the
    information has to be procured from Toyota instead of receiving
    it directly from here. Is that right?
        Mr. Strickland. That has been identified by Toyota itself
    as a problem.
        Mr. Dingell. This is also true with regard to the question
    of recall?
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Dingell. The decision is made in Tokyo?
        Mr. Strickland. That is correct.
        Mr. Dingell. Now, is there a qualitative or quantitative
    difference in the data provided to NHTSA by domestic and
    foreign automobile manufacturers?
        Mr. Strickland. The quality is--because they are
    statutorily required, the quality of data is very similar
    between foreign and domestic.
        Mr. Dingell. Similar?
        Mr. Strickland. Similar.
        Mr. Dingell. That doesn't it is the same.
        Mr. Strickland. They have different data sets because of
    their manufacturing and information processes. They comply to
    our system so they are similar.
        Mr. Dingell. All right. Now, why was it that the Secretary
    of Transportation and the acting head of NHTSA had to go to
    Tokyo to get cooperation of Toyota on recalls and production of
    information?
        Mr. Strickland. They were responding to NHTSA and the
    acting administrator and the Secretary too slowly.
        Mr. Dingell. But they had to go over there. Why did they
    have to go over there?
        Mr. Strickland. Because at the time, the Secretary and the
    acting administrator felt they needed to go directly to convey
    that message.
        Mr. Dingell. So they had to convey that message because the
    message was to urge Toyota to comply more expeditiously with
    the safety concerns of the Department of Transportation?
        Mr. Strickland. That is correct.
        Mr. Dingell. So they had to do it to get more expeditious
    cooperation from Toyota?
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir, that is correct.
        Mr. Dingell. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Schakowsky for 5
    minutes for questioning.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        On September 1, 2009, proposed rules were put out dealing
    with the automatic reverse system in windows. Let me quote:
    ``NHTSA proposes requiring automatic reversal systems, ARS, in
    those windows equipped with one-touch closing or express up
    operation.'' In a letter March 10, 2010, sent to you, Mr.
    Strickland, Henry Waxman, Chairman Rush and myself point out
    that such windows generally already have auto reverse
    technology and are usually found in the driver's window where
    children don't sit, and the intention of the legislation of
    course was to protect children. But here is really the point I
    want to make that I find stunning is that you have a chart.
    This was alternative one of five alternatives that were
    proposed at that time. This is before your tenure. Alternative
    one is the one I described, and when it says on this chart cost
    per window for this remedy supposedly, it says zero dollars,
    total incremental cost near zero dollars, annual fatality
    benefits zero, annual injury benefits near zero. So the
    preferred alternative to protect children was a no-cost, no-
    benefit solution. I would have thought it embarrassing actually
    not only to put that in writing but to choose that as the
    preferred option. I would hope that nothing like that happens
    again.
        Let me describe alternative two, requiring auto reverse
    windows at all power side windows to meet ECE 21, which is
    European standards. The cost per window, $6, which I think most
    people would find reasonable, the total incremental cost,
    $149.4 million. Annual fatality benefits, two, annual injury
    benefits, 850. So two deaths and 850 injuries, which I think is
    a pretty modest projection, pretty conservative, could be
    saved. That was at 6 bucks a window. Again, I want to go back
    to those families that came talking about children who were
    choked by these windows. It has got to be maddening to them
    that this is something that could have been corrected for $6
    and that that is the European Union standard, why isn't it the
    standard here. So really my request is that we reject this
    alternative one, but how does that happen? Can we expect that
    it will not happen any more, that a no-cost, no-benefit
    solution will not be proposed?
        Mr. Strickland. As you know, Representative Schakowsky, I
    can't engage in a discussion about a rule that is currently
    being worked on by NHTSA, but I understand that we have
    received new data from a lot of constituencies including the
    folks that have worked very closely with you and other members
    on the Cameron Gulbransen Act and the agency is taking a very
    hard look at that data, and when the rule is finally
    promulgated, we hope that we will be-- I know for a fact it
    will be based on sound data and sound science that will be the
    most efficacious of safety. So that is the one thing I can tell
    you.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Well, let me make a very strong
    recommendation that you don't propose rules that have
    absolutely no effect when the Congress stated very clearly that
    we want to protect children, and I am sure you will agree with
    that, so I thank you very much, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Representative.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Iowa, Mr.
    Braley, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Braley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Strickland, in your opening statement that we received,
    the written statement, on page 1, third paragraph, you wrote,
    ``One of the first questions I asked when I became the
    administrator of NHTSA is whether or our current statutory
    authority drafted largely in the 1960s and 1970s is sufficient
    to address the modern automobile and global automotive
    marketplace.'' Have you answered that question?
        Mr. Strickland. That question is still being worked on by
    the staff. I have a great deal of experience in looking at
    consumer product safety statutes from my prior employ, and you
    have to be very careful in examining these things. We have to
    make sure that there is a lot in those statutes that are very
    functional and works well, and we want to look to improve upon
    a strong authority, and both my legal staff and my programmatic
    staff are undertaking that work right now. When we have
    completed that work, we will be happy and excited to share our
    thoughts with the committee and looking forward to working with
    you on a going forward basis.
        Mr. Braley. And I look forward to having that conversation,
    and let me get back to one of my earlier points about the
    legacy of the agency that you now head, because in your
    statement, you noted correctly that safety is the Department of
    Transportation's highest priority, and you stand by that
    statement today?
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir, absolutely.
        Mr. Braley. And we know that the Office of Defect
    Investigation, often referred to by its acronym, ODI, is on the
    front line of defect investigation and prevention as part of
    the Department of Transportation.
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir, that is correct.
        Mr. Braley. And Mr. Whitfield asked you a very appropriate
    question when he said you have mandatory recall power and you
    answered yes. Do you remember that?
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Braley. Can you explain to all of us then why your
    agency, NHTSA, has not initiated a recall since 1979?
        Mr. Strickland. Because you can often influence a recall by
    going through the initial stages of the process. Most times an
    automaker will not want to go through the full formal process.
    It takes approximately a year. It is a public process, and a
    lot of automakers, realizing they are facing public scrutiny of
    fighting a vehicle safety defect, and when they know that the
    agency can prove it, they will go forward and effectuate a
    voluntary recall. The universe is that most recalls are
    voluntary--all recalls since that period of time are voluntary
    but there is a huge number that are influenced by this agency
    and that is the actual we want you to look at, and we influence
    well over half of the recalls that happen ever year. So that is
    the real number, Mr. Braley. I think that is indicative of the
    power of ODI. We don't have to get to a point where the
    administrator after a year of public hearings and show-cause
    hearings has to sign an order. Automakers will go forward and
    take care of that recall voluntarily from ODI's work.
        Mr. Braley. Well, count me as skeptical that in a 31-year
    period there has not been an instance where automakers acted
    responsibly in every particular case responding to demand for
    recall of a product defect in a 31-year period.
        One of the things that I also want to talk to you about is
    how you described the agency's mission has changed in response
    to changes in the automotive industry. Do you remember that in
    your opening remarks?
        Mr. Strickland. I don't think I will change it a change in
    mission but it is a change in how we have to approach the job
    because of the change in the marketplace. There was a time when
    America was the world's leader in automotive manufacturing. We
    are no longer that leader.
        Mr. Braley. Well, I am talking about something different so
    I want to make sure you understand.
        Mr. Strickland. I apologize, Mr. Braley.
        Mr. Braley. When I was growing up, it was during the muscle
    car era where you could tear apart a Chevy large block engine
    in your basement and put it back together having a basic
    knowledge of the internal combustion engine. You cannot do that
    anymore. Would you concede that?
        Mr. Strickland. I agree, yes, sir.
        Mr. Braley. And one of the things that came out during our
    earlier hearing was this concept of black-box technology that
    has crash data in it that is driven by complex computer codes,
    sometimes which the manufacturer is willing to share with your
    agency and sometimes manufacturers have been very reluctant to
    share that data or to provide an ability for your own employees
    to have the keys to the kingdom so that they can download and
    interpret that information independently. You would agree with
    that?
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, sir, I agree.
        Mr. Braley. So one of the things that I am concerned about
    is our own internal committee report for this hearing suggests
    that your agency's budget dedicated to vehicle safety has
    remained stagnant relatively over the past 10 years and that
    your resources are far below the resources that were available
    for this type of investigation than when the agency was at its
    height, and my concern is, based upon some of the testimony at
    the previous hearing, when you have a demand for computer
    engineers and electrical engineers and people who are not based
    on mechanical backgrounds, I am concerned that the level of
    funding and the staffing of personnel within your agency may
    not be adequate to meet the incredible demands of the changing
    technology of this automobile industry. Have you done an
    independent review since assuming responsibility to make your
    own independent judgment on whether or not that is a critical
    case we need to address?
        Mr. Strickland. I have a couple of responses to that, Mr.
    Braley. The work of ODI and the automotive engineers that do
    the work, they are some of the finest in the business in this
    country, and as the technology evolves, the experience of our
    investigators and our engineers also evolves. I can give you
    the quantum number of folks that we have on deck to do the job.
    We have 125 engineers in NHTSA. We have five electrical
    engineers. We have a software engineer. We have engineers that
    are based in our East Liberty, Ohio, facility. We have
    resources for consultants when we need additional expertise. My
    understanding from what I know from when I have taken office,
    there is not a notion that we don't have the proper expertise
    to handle today's automobiles. I don't think that is the case
    at all.
        However, recognizing that you can always buttress what you
    have, the President has provided us resources to hire 66 new
    people, which we will use to leverage our resources and to
    buttress and strengthen those folks, in addition to we will be
    looking at ways how we can do longitudinal studies and long-
    range studies on these complex systems, as the Secretary spoke
    about in the prior hearings. Is my confidence that we can
    handle the current marketplace with our expertise? Yes, we can.
    Can we be stronger in that area? Of course we can.
        Mr. Braley. Of the 62 employees you have identified that
    are in the President's budget request, how many of those do you
    propose to allocate to ODI?
        Mr. Strickland. That is part of the process I am working
    with the career staff and with the Office of the Secretary to
    figure out what our resource needs will be in that area. I will
    be happy to come forward with that information when a decision
    is made.
        Mr. Braley. Can you also provide the committee with a
    breakdown of the people working at ODI with engineering degrees
    by their names, their job titles and what their particular
    expertise in terms of being a professional engineer is?
        Mr. Strickland. I would be happy to do that, Mr. Braley.
        Mr. Braley. Thank you. I appreciate that, and I yield back.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair recognizes now the gentlelady from
    Michigan, Ms. Sutton, for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Sutton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rush. Ohio. I am sorry.
        Ms. Sutton. I am close to Michigan but I am from Ohio.
        Mr. Rush. I apologize.
        Ms. Sutton. That is OK.
        Administrator Strickland, thank you for being here. I have
    a number of questions and they touch on different areas, so
    bear with me as we shift around.
        Beginning with the question of the black-box technology, we
    have heard a lot about when Secretary LaHood was here he
    indicated difficulty getting the information that is in those
    black boxes, that we don't have the capacity, whether it is, as
    my colleague, Mr. Braley, described, that we don't have keys to
    the kingdom, which is that information. But when I heard you
    answer Representative Dingell about having access to data, you
    said we have access to data in a similar way whether it is
    Toyota, who keeps information in Japan, and our domestic auto
    industry. But I was under the impression based on the last
    hearing that we actually could access information from our
    domestic auto manufacturers in a way that we can't get from
    Toyota. So could you clarify for me?
        Mr. Strickland. I would be happy to clarify. I took from
    Mr. Dingell's question about early warning reporting data,
    which is the quarterly data we receive from all automakers,
    which is a set template of data that we receive. There are some
    differences in how they collate and present it but we can
    understand all of that. That is what I thought he meant.
        In terms of event data recorders, you are absolutely right,
    Representative Sutton. Toyota has a proprietary system that up
    until I guess a week or so ago there was only one tool in the
    country that could be used to read it and we did not have that
    tool. So if we ever wanted to get information from an event
    data recorder on a Toyota vehicle, it was very difficult. It is
    my understanding that Toyota has provided my ODI staff three of
    these tools to read their event data recorders. I am not sure
    of the status of whether we have received them all yet but that
    is my understanding, that Toyota has promised to us that they
    will provide those tools. So in terms of Mr. Dingell's
    question, in terms of the set data that comes in to us
    quarterly from all automakers, yes, it is similar. On your
    question on event data recorders, yes, there is a difference
    between the Detroit automakers, which all use a commercially
    available tool and we have the ability to read it, versus
    Toyota, where we could not up until a week ago.
        Ms. Sutton. And now that you have this equipment, that was
    the only hindrance to having access to the black boxes? You can
    get them? You can always get access?
        Mr. Strickland. We can access it, Representative, but we
    still need a Toyota representative to help decode the data. It
    isn't fully transparent, even when we download the box. So I
    still believe that we need Toyota representation to assist us
    in decoding what happened 5 seconds pre crash and 1 second post
    crash I believe is the data that is being included in those
    boxes.
        Ms. Sutton. And is that something that they are required in
    any way to do or is that just a voluntary offer on their part?
        Mr. Strickland. At this point we are undergoing rule. By
    2012, if an automaker chooses to have an EDR on board, it has
    to comport with certain readability and data standards but they
    don't have to have an electronic data recorder on board. It is
    not mandated.
        Ms. Sutton. Well, that is interesting. We will have to
    follow that and see what the consequences intended and others
    are of that rulemaking.
        OK. With respect to what we have been reading, we have been
    reading in the Washington Post about the relationship between
    some of those who used to work at NHTSA and going over to work
    for some of the car companies, and in this moment, Toyota is in
    the headlines, and so the Post article mentioned that two
    former NHTSA defects investigators left the agency and
    immediately took jobs at Toyota managing federal defect
    investigations. Do you think that there is an apparent conflict
    of interest here? You know, we are charged, as Members of
    Congress, with ensuring that the public interest is always the
    key, and you can understand that people are more than a little
    concerned when they see sort of that cozy, quick turnover
    revolving door. Could you comment on that?
        Mr. Strickland. Certainly. I have two responses to that,
    Representative. No ethics laws were broken. You know, Mr.
    Santucci and Mr. Tinto, who are former employees of NHTSA, when
    they left their post employment, they were of the level of
    employee--everything that they did was fully compliant with the
    current federal laws regarding post-employment limitations. So
    no laws were broken.
        But I am not going to quibble with you on appearance.
    Perception is reality. And the Secretary was very clear in his
    statement to this committee and to Oversight and Government
    Reform and to the Senate Commerce Committee on this issue. He
    is committed to strengthening the ethics requirements in the
    Department of Transportation. I fully support his efforts, and
    as far as I am concerned, I am going to hold every employee in
    NHTSA to the highest ethical standard as the Secretary holds
    everybody in DOT to the highest standard and frankly the Obama
    Administration has made it a focal point that this will be the
    most ethical Administration in history. So we are looking
    forward to working with you on a going forward basis in dealing
    and handling this issue of appearance and arms-length distance
    for employees of NHTSA and when they move into a post-
    employment situation.
        Ms. Sutton. I appreciate that answer because the public
    trust is critically important in making sure that things are
    working as they should, and, Mr. Chairman, if I could just
    indulge in one last question.
        During the hearings that we have had in the past with
    representatives of Toyota and Secretary LaHood, we heard
    information about how recalls of vehicles had happened in other
    countries, and these recalls, you know, stemming from what
    appear to be problems that arose here in this country and led
    to eventual recalls after much tragedy had occurred. Is there
    anything that requires auto manufacturers to report to NHTSA
    problems beyond our borders with vehicles that are sold in this
    country?
        Mr. Strickland. Yes, there are a couple of requirements
    actually. They have to report to us foreign recalls that
    involve components used in United States vehicles and they have
    to also report foreign service campaigns in the vehicles. Now,
    the question is whether they did this timely. We definitely
    will investigate those issues. But we receive a lot of data
    from the early warning system and other obligations from the
    TREAD Act and we are definitely looking at other ways and other
    types of information that could be helpful to us in that
    mission and we are looking forward to working with the Congress
    and finding ways that we can buttress those abilities.
        Mr. Rush. We see that Mr. Markey has joined the
    subcommittee. He is not a member of the committee, so the Chair
    seeks unanimous consent that Mr. Markey be allowed to ask
    questions of the witness, and hearing no objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Markey, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
    hospitality.
        As you know, the early warning system that I helped to
    create during the 2000 TREAD Act was intended to provide the
    Department of Transportation and the public with early
    information that auto manufacturers receive about safety-
    related complaints. But the Bush Administration issued a
    regulation that deemed almost all of the information automakers
    to be confidential business information. As a result, as far as
    the public is concerned about my provision back in 2000, the
    early warning system has become an early warning secret. I have
    a summary here of the public information contained in all of
    the early warnings submitted by Toyota in the last quarter of
    2008. It tells you that there were seven reports of deaths or
    serious injuries due to speed control but that is all the
    information you get. The public can't learn whether those
    reports relate to sudden unintended acceleration. They can't
    learn what happened and they can't learn whether any consumers
    made complaints about similar problems that didn't result in a
    serious injury or death.
        Do you agree that the public versions of early warning
    system data don't really tell the public anything specific or
    useful about potential automobile safety problems?
        Mr. Strickland. Mr. Markey, the one thing I would like to
    start off with saying is that the NHTSA databases and the
    information we provide are some of the most transparent in
    government, and we have been noted by the federal government
    about our data sources that we provide.
        In terms of the early warning system, as far as the Obama
    Administration is concerned, as far as I am concerned as
    administrator, the more transparency we have, the better. I
    definitely would like to have a dialog with you about the early
    warning reporting system and your thoughts on how we can
    improve transparency going forward.
        Mr. Markey. Now, consumers can report safety complaints to
    NHTSA as well and these reports are made public. Does it make
    sense to you that when a consumer reports a safety problem
    directly to NHTSA, it goes into a publicly searchable database,
    but when a consumer not knowing that they could complain to
    NHTSA instead reports the safety problem to a car company, that
    it becomes confidential business information without a
    requirement that the public learn about it? Do you think that
    is right or do you think that that information should as well
    have to be made public because it is given to NHTSA as part of
    a public report?
        Mr. Strickland. I clearly see that inconsistency. This
    Administration believes in transparency. I would happily talk
    to you on a going forward basis how we can make our databases
    more transparent.
        Mr. Markey. Do you think that information should be
    information that the public, me as an owner of a Toyota Camry,
    should I have had that information?
        Mr. Strickland. That information should not be hidden, in
    my personal opinion. However, there are other things that
    should come into play and I would be happy to talk to you on a
    going forward basis.
        Mr. Markey. When President Clinton signed the Act into law,
    he directed the Department of Transportation to implement the
    early warning system in a manner that ensures maximum public
    availability of information. That clearly hasn't happened. So
    my goal is to work with you, sir, in order to accomplish that
    goal. We thank you for taking this job, by the way.
        Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Markey.
        Mr. Markey. And we have enjoyed working with you over all
    the years, especially on the fuel economy standards and your
    work in the Senate.
        Let me ask if I may one final question. Although NHTSA can
    undertake a mandatory recall, doing so takes a great deal of
    time and can require you to go to court to prove the existence
    of a safety defect. There are times, however, when taking that
    long costs lives. As you know, since you were the lead staffer
    in the Senate 2 years ago, Congress gave the Consumer Product
    Safety Commission the authority to quickly inform the public of
    an imminent product safety hazard, even though the formal
    recall process was complete. Do you think that sort of
    authority could help NHTSA more effectively protect and inform
    the public of serious safety problems, and will you work with
    us to develop such a provision?
        Mr. Strickland. The imminent-hazard authority, Mr. Markey,
    is in several of our sister consumer safety agencies. The
    Federal Rail Administration, for example, has this authority
    and it has proven to be very helpful to them. I look forward to
    working with you and having a further discussion on this
    authority. It has proven very successful in other areas in
    consumer protection and it may bear fruit for NHTSA as well.
        Mr. Markey. Thank you, and our country is very fortunate
    that you were willing to accept this position.
        Mr. Strickland. Thank you, Mr. Markey. That is very kind.
        Mr. Markey. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair will ask the indulgence of the witness
    just for a few more minutes. The Chair will authorize a second
    series of questioning, and the Chair recognizes himself for 2
    minutes.
        NHTSA's budget for vehicle safety programs has been
    stagnant, as was mentioned earlier, for the past 10 years. From
    my perspective, this year's budget request is down a few
    million dollars from the year before. ODI, which focuses its
    enforcement activities on new cars sold within the last 5
    years, has a budget of less than $10 million to police a fleet
    of 80 million vehicles, and according to the Chicago Public
    News, adds up to about 10 cents a car. The budget for
    rulemaking has suffered as well. It has delayed major
    rulemaking efforts to the point that Congress has been
    compelled to legislate mandates for rollover standards and for
    child safety. I know that there is an increase of about 66 new
    personnel but if you get more resources for your safety
    programs, where would you focus those increased resources?
        Mr. Strickland. Well, Mr. Chairman, you know, the safety
    mission is not simply in the ODI or the vehicle safety office.
    It is actually our entire mission. It is the behavioral side as
    well. And the President's budget provides resources for us to
    accomplish our mission with the new resources for those
    personnel. We will take a hard look at those 66 personnel and
    deploy them at the places where we need not only to improve and
    strengthen the Office of Defects Investigation but in other
    places where we can also help further our safety mission in the
    most efficient way.
        In terms of resources overall, we have accomplished our
    mission with the resources we have had. The President has given
    us a budget that gives us more resources to do more and we will
    use that for the safety mission.
        Mr. Rush. This Congress has to prepare a budget. The
    Congress has to approve a budget. Would you have any objections
    if we gave you more than a budget for 66 employees?
        Mr. Strickland. Mr. Rush, the President's budget helps us
    accomplish our mission. If the decision of the Congress is to
    provide us more resources, we will use them judiciously for the
    purposes of improving safety.
        Mr. Rush. Sounds like a good answer to me.
        Mr. Whitfield for 2 minutes.
        Mr. Whitfield. I would just say, I don't know how much more
    we have to give you, but thank you.
        Mr. Rush. With that said, and seeing no more members
    seeking recognition, Mr. Administrator, you have done an
    excellent job. We thank you very much. And again, please
    forgive us but our duties have taken us away and so we weren't
    able to be as prompt as we wanted to be beginning this hearing,
    so thank you for your patience.
        Mr. Strickland. No, thank you, Mr. Rush. It has been an
    honor. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Rush. Thank you.
        Mr. Strickland. Mr. Whitfield, thank you.
        Mr. Rush. The second panel will please be seated at the
    desk. The Chair thanks the second panel for your patience, and
    again, we want to reemphasize our apologies to you for our
    scheduling. It has been fairly horrendous and it has taken us
    away from our scheduled duties. And so please accept our
    sincere apologies.
        The Chair wants to introduce the witnesses now that
    comprise the second panel. On my left is Ms. Joan Claybrook.
    She is the former administrator for the National Highway
    Traffic Safety Administration, and Ms. Claybrook, we want to
    welcome you here once again. Seated next to Ms. Claybrook is
    Ms. Ami Gadhia, and Ms. Gadhia is the safety policy counsel for
    the Consumers Union, and Ms. Gadhia, we want to welcome you
    also to this hearing. And lastly we want to not just recognize
    but we want to also say hello to our former colleague, who was
    a member of this House, a very able Member representing the
    State of Oklahoma for many years, a very bright and intelligent
    human being, the Hon. David McCurdy, who is the president and
    the CEO of the Alliance for Automobile Manufacturers. Dave, it
    is good seeing you again and we welcome you again to this
    subcommittee hearing.
        Now we want to recognize for 5 minutes for the purposes of
    an opening statement the illustrious Ms. Joan Claybrook.

     STATEMENTS OF JOAN CLAYBROOK, FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
     HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION; AMI V. GADHIA, SAFETY
     POLICY COUNSEL, CONSUMERS UNION; AND DAVE McCURDY, PRESIDENT
           AND CEO, THE ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS

                      STATEMENT OF JOAN CLAYBROOK

        Ms. Claybrook. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
        I am the last person to have required an auto company to do
    a recall, and that was 31 years ago, and I would like to say
    that when you do find a defect, the auto companies will often
    do a recall and you do not have to go to court. But sometimes
    you do have to go to court, and I think that there has been,
    and the Toyota case, I think, elaborates on this. I think there
    has been a misconception on what a defect is, and in the last
    case that was litigated by the Department of Transportation on
    this issue, the federal Court of Appeals made several important
    comments which I would just like to mention to you. This is not
    in my testimony. I hope my whole testimony will be in the
    record. But I think that this is a very important issue. It has
    come up now several times in recent days.
        What the court said was, to find a defect within the
    meaning of the Act, the NHTSA must show that the vehicle itself
    is defective whether the defect manifests itself in
    performance, construction, components or materials of the
    automobile. In other words, it can be a performance defect and
    they do not have to show that there are five or 500 or 10,000
    consumer complaints that have arisen, and often in fact those
    complaints are not allowed in court as evidence. So if the
    agency relies on it, then it is not going to have them find a
    successful result.
        Judge Leventhal, who was a Court of Appeals judge in a
    different case, said that a determination of a defect does not
    require any predicate of identifying engineering, metallurgical
    or manufacturing failures. A determination of a defect may be
    based exclusively on the performance record of a vehicle or
    component.
        Now, I think that this changes if you look at the Toyota
    case, and I know this is not just about Toyota but it is about
    the agency. It changes the way the agency should approach these
    defect investigations, and I do think that the agency has
    fallen into a trap, if you would, with the Toyota case and
    others, where it seems to be accepting the burden of having to
    define what the defect is in terms of the failure of
    performance. That is the responsibility of the manufacturer.
    The manufacturer put that vehicle together. They did the design
    drawings. They make the profit from it. And how this happens is
    their responsibility. If it has a failure in performance, the
    agency can find a defect and the company has to fix it and the
    company has to figure out what that fix is. That is what the
    courts have said, and I think it is very important to make that
    clear.
        My testimony that I submitted has seven points that I would
    like to just mention very briefly. One is that there has been a
    low priority on enforcement in the agency, a lack of resources,
    which you all have discussed, but there is another key issue
    which is that a court of appeals in the mid-1980s found that
    consumers did not have authority under the existing statute to
    sue if a defect was not found by the agency. In other words, if
    a case is closed, there is no authority of consumers to go to
    court. There is authority for consumers to go to court if a
    rulemaking decision is made that we don't think is proper, and
    we in fact have gone to court at Public Citizen on many, many
    occasions and helped to make the statute work better because of
    the cases that we have brought. We have brought them on uniform
    tire quality grading, the tire monitoring system for the amount
    of inflation in the tire, on the early warning system, which
    was kept secret, totally secret. We at least got part of it
    revealed in two different lawsuits. So we can sue when there is
    a rulemaking issue. We cannot sue when there is a defect
    disclosed, and I think that changes the balance of thinking by
    the administrator. There is no fear that if they close a case
    that it is finished, and what the court there said in the court
    of appeals in the mid-1980s was that the agency had the
    discretion to figure it out according to their resources and so
    in every case that NHTSA closes, it says it closes it on the
    basis of resources. They just are mimicking the words of the
    court decision. But the fact is that we should have that
    authority because we are not going to bring cases we don't
    think we can win because that is a waste of our time and
    energy, and I think there ought to be a better balance of power
    because if the agency finds a defect, then the company gets a
    change to get its words and say what it thinks, and if we bring
    a case, they can intervene.
        Secondly, the agency has been engaged in excessive secrecy.
    The early warning system, which Mr. Markey talked about, is a
    good example, and as I said, we had to sue to make it
    available. We don't even know how many times Toyota in the
    recent cases filed an early warning report to the agency and
    what it said and how many consumer complaints it had and how
    many warranty claims it had and how many field reports it had.
    All of that is secret. And if that were more open, then the
    public would have access to it and they could help the agency
    by letting them know when they had a problem, but their web
    page in addition is a mess, so if you went to the web page to
    try and figure out whether there have been early warning
    reports on the particular vehicle that you are driving that is
    not working right, you wouldn't be able to figure it out. I
    wouldn't be able to figure it out.
        The third point is that I think the penalties that the
    agency has authority to impose are insufficient. First, they
    should have the criminal authority for knowing and willful
    violation of the Act, which you put in the CPSC law most
    recently a year ago. It is in the FDA law. It is many of the
    sister agency laws. I think the same should be available for
    NHTSA. And in addition, the penalty for the civil penalty is
    $16.2 million, which is a flyspeck for companies like Toyota.
    They spend that much in half a day on their communications
    activities and staff. So we think that it ought to be $100
    million because that is something that they would pay attention
    to.
        Fourth, the agency is drastically underfunded. The total
    budget for the motor vehicle program for the whole United
    States is $132 million in this agency. That is it. And it is
    not much above what it was when I was there just individual
    dollars, and in terms of inflation, it is way below. It has
    been drastically cut. By the way, those 66 new FTEs that were
    being discussed, it is actually only 33 full-time ones. So that
    is not really 66. And in addition, they have allocated them.
    Twenty-three are for operations and research, eight for
    rulemaking, four of them for enforcement. So that is the
    tentative allocation. Now, they may be changing that and
    reconsidering it but that is what was in the budget. So the
    agency cannot handle the programs, the rulemaking programs
    which are critically important, as important certainly as the
    defect enforcement because of lack of capacity.
        Information gathering and the data systems are totally
    insufficient. They should have been funded at four or five
    times what they are now, given the design of these systems back
    when they were first created in the 1970s. I think that a key
    issue that has come up at this hearing to some extent is the
    black box. It is a voluntary standard. Voluntary standards
    don't work as evidenced by the fact that Toyota, you know, its
    system is not even being made available and the deadline for
    compliance was supposed to be 2010. It was extended to 2012, so
    it is delayed. It is a 5-year lead-in for a voluntary standard,
    which is ridiculous. We think that the black box ought to be
    mandatory and that the data, have a standardized downloading
    for the data so that the police don't have to have seven
    different computers depending on if it is a General Motors car
    or Toyota or Nissan or Mercedes. They ought to have one
    standardized downloading system. And I think that a way that
    the agency could be drastically enhanced, it is very exciting,
    would be to have that black-box data when it is downloaded when
    a crash occurs, a serious crash, a tow-away crash or an airbag
    crash, to have that data go to NHTSA, have NHTSA set up a data
    system to receive it so that that can be the basis for their
    evaluation of defects and evaluation of safety standards, and
    the data would be voluminous and it would be fabulous and far
    more than what they have today, and it would be much less
    expensive. So I hope that the committee will consider that
    issue as well.
        The new safety standards should come out of some of the
    work that goes in the defects area. For example, for years
    NHTSA has tested cars and seat backs have failed when they hit
    them in the rear at 30 miles an hour and yet they have never
    issued a standard to upgrade that seat back. The very dangerous
    circumstance of seat back fails, you can't control the car, and
    also many people become quadriplegic and paraplegic as a
    result. But in the Toyota case, I think a brake override
    standard and a new accelerator standard which was issued in
    1973, it is not even electronic that is completely irrelevant
    to the current model should be done.
        And then finally, I believe that conflict-of-interest rules
    need to be strengthened as we have mentioned and I would
    mention that NHTSA has a test facility in Ohio but it is owned
    by Honda Motor Company. I created this back in the 1970s when
    it was owned by the State of Ohio. Now it is owned by Honda
    because they bought it. And I think that that should be
    changed. They should change their facility and there are some
    opportunities for doing that.
        Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have several
    submissions for the record. I am sorry that I am slightly over
    on my time.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Claybrook follows:]

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        Mr. Rush. The Chair by unanimous consent will accept the
    extraneous material and your full statement into the record.
        Ms. Claybrook. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Rush. Ms. Gadhia, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

                       STATEMENT OF AMI V. GADHIA

        Ms. Gadhia. Thank you. Chairman Rush, Ranking Member
    Whitfield and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to testify on the road ahead for NHTSA. I am Ami
    Gadhia, policy counsel with Consumers Union, the nonprofit
    publisher of Consumer Reports.
        The recent Toyota recalls involving sudden, unintended
    acceleration have focused national attention on safety
    problems. Consumers Union believes that addressing this
    formidable challenge demands a coordinated effort by the
    government, automakers, the public and independent consumer
    groups such as our own. We recommend the following government
    actions to improve our auto safety net.
        Consumers Union believes government regulators could have
    moved more aggressively to pursue sudden, unintended
    acceleration and to protect consumer safety. Various news
    reports and our own analysis of documents from the investment
    point to a pattern of missed opportunities. NHTSA and Toyota
    were aware of unintended-acceleration complaints involving
    Toyota models as early as 2003 when the agency received a
    petition to investigate the problem. We are pleased that NHTSA
    is now looking into potential electronics issues behind the
    events involving Toyotas and we eagerly await the agency's
    findings. However, we believe that NHTSA can take actions now
    to improve safety.
        First, we would like to see improved public access to
    safety information. NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigations
    collects complaints and data about autos from the public and
    manufacturers in two separate databases: the consumer
    complaints database and the agency's early warning reporting
    system. They both have limitations, and the data they provide
    are not integrated, making it more difficult for investigators
    to spot issues and for consumers to find information. Consumers
    shouldn't have to visit different sites to see all of this
    information or be forced to search it using tools that are less
    than user-friendly. All complaint information should be visible
    by a single easy-to-use consumer-facing site. NHTSA should also
    initiate a program to raise public awareness and invite more
    drivers to participate in data gathering. The more public
    complaints there are to analyze, the greater the change that
    problems such as unintended acceleration will be identified at
    an early stage.
        Second, NHTSA should promulgate certain safety regulations
    to prevent unintended acceleration in all automobiles. They
    should require that cars be able to stop within a reasonable
    distance with a sustained press on the brake pedal even when
    the throttle is fully open. One method to reduce stopping
    distances is smart throttle technology that allows the brakes
    to override the throttle. Other methods may also become
    available. To us, the most important safety feature is to
    ensure that a vehicle can stop within a reasonable and safe
    distance. NHTSA should require simple standard controls that
    can easily turn off the engine in an emergency. In many current
    Toyota vehicles, when the car is moving, it requires a
    sustained 3-second push of the button to turn off the engine.
    Though that is a safety precaution to prevent accidental engine
    shutoff, it is an action many owners may not be able to do in a
    panic situation. Ignition controls should be easy to operate,
    especially in an emergency.
        NHTSA should require intuitive, clearly labeled
    transmission shifters in all cars. If your car is accelerating
    out of control, hitting the brakes and shifting into neutral is
    your best strategy but you want to know where neutral is when
    you are panicking. There should be consistency for shifters
    across all vehicles. NHTSA should also require a minimum
    distance between the gas pedal and the floorboard. Floor mats
    that entrap pedals have been a major focus in recent recalls
    but people frequently use thick mats or ill-fitting mats or
    stack the mats on top of each other. NHTSA should ensure that
    there is sufficient clearance between the pedal and the floor
    mat.
        We also think that NHTSA's cap on civil penalties should be
    lifted to act as a deterrent against future violations and that
    NHTSA could improve the recall compliance process. The average
    consumer response rate to vehicles is 74.1 percent. Currently,
    manufacturers notify dealers about recalls and the dealers in
    turn notify car manufacturers once the cars are repaired in
    response to a safety recall. Consumers Union suggests that
    going forward car manufacturers submit such data to NHTSA. This
    information, which manufacturers already have, should include
    individual vehicle identification numbers, or VINs, of cars
    that are subject to a particular recall as well as when the
    recall repairs were performed on the vehicles. NHTSA would then
    be able to match up safety recalls with the manufacturer-
    provided VIN in a consumer-friend searchable database. We would
    further encourage States to consider linking safety recall
    compliance with the ability to obtain a vehicle registration
    similar to the way consumers must show proof of insurance to
    register their cars now. This would help people who purchase
    used cars to know whether recall repairs have been made.
        We also recommend that Congress take a look at the reports
    of a revolving door at NHTSA and whether this may have impacted
    safety decisions. We are pleased to hear today the
    administrator's comment that NHTSA will be looking into this
    particular issue.
        Finally, we urge Congress to adequately fund NHTSA. In
    2007, motor vehicle crashes accounted for 99 percent of all
    transportation-related injuries and fatalities yet NHTSA's
    budget currently amounts to just over 1 percent of the overall
    DOT budget. The agency's budgeting and staffing for auto safety
    and consumer protection functions should be commensurate with
    the realities of traffic safety.
        Consumers Union thanks the committee for the opportunity to
    present its recommendations as you move forward.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Gadhia follows:]

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        Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the witness.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. McCurdy for 5 minutes for the
    purposes of an opening statement.

                       STATEMENT OF DAVE McCURDY

        Mr. McCurdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
    Whitfield for the opportunity to appear and speak on behalf of
    the industry as a whole. I must admit as you made your
    introduction, there was some chagrin on my personal part when I
    looked at the membership of this subcommittee in that I
    actually served with the fathers of three of the members, so it
    is a homecoming of sorts but I hadn't thought I had been gone
    that long. It is good to be back with you.
        As you and your colleagues consider the road ahead of
    National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, it is important
    to remember three key points. The administrator, who we are all
    delighted that David Strickland is now the administrator of
    NHTSA, as he pointed out in the Department of Transportation
    highlighted today and actually I have a chart that is displayed
    here that motor vehicle crash fatalities and injuries are at
    historic lows. It is a very, very important point because that
    is the mission of the organization. Secondly, autos have never
    been safer and they are still getting safer every day because
    of innovative safety technologies including advanced
    electronics. And third, we need to be careful not to inhibit
    the innovation or the speedy identification and remedy of
    defects.
        On the first point, as the chart indicates, sometimes when
    you see a chart like that it is confusing for folks but to put
    it in perspective, this figure reports fatality per 100 million
    vehicle miles traveled, so there are 1.16 fatalities per 100
    million miles traveled. That is down from in excess of two. Put
    that in terms of human lives, and again, we all know that this
    is far too many, that is a significant reduction from what Joan
    Claybrook would indicate back in the 1970s when it was at a
    high of 51,000. Now that is a decrease of 17,000. So I think
    that is a very important point that there is a significant and
    steady reduction despite increased ownership and increased
    vehicle miles traveled. So I think this is a goal that we share
    and we want to continue to work to support.
        As far as the safety of vehicles, by every single measure,
    these vehicles are dramatically safer than years ago, and in
    the last 15 years we have seen a revolutionary expansion of
    advanced vehicle safety technologies including increased number
    of electronic components and features. Mr. Braley mentioned
    being able to take apart a carburetor and engine in the
    basement. It is indeed impossible to do that today. But a lot
    of the technologies that we see to meet fuel economy
    requirements, to meet emission controls, to provide safety are
    because of these advanced electronics. Also, Ms. Claybrook said
    that voluntary standards don't work but in fact many of the
    incredible safety innovations were voluntary and were brought
    out before the agency ever considered regulating it. Electronic
    stability control--electronic stability control saves anywhere
    from 5,000 to 9,000 lives annually. Lane departure warning,
    over 2,700 lives. Safety belt reminders and safety belt
    interlock, again significant. Side airbags, forward collision
    warning, emergency brake assist, adaptive headlights, blind
    spot information systems, all of these are innovations that the
    industry introduced ahead of regulation.
        Secondly, it is really important to recognize that
    electronic systems are often far more reliable over time than
    mechanical systems. I used to represent the electronics
    industry and I will tell you that the advancements in solid-
    state technology provide increased performance. It enables
    vehicles to not only sense, diagnose and also to have failsafe
    modes that are not possible with traditional historic
    mechanical systems. So this is a very significant technology
    which is helping us to meet our goals of sustainable mobility.
        And third, as I indicated, I think we are going to have to
    be careful not to inhibit this cycle of innovation because this
    industry innovates more rapidly and gets into the marketplace
    technologies for consumers and so we need to maintain a policy
    framework that embraces technology-based solutions ahead of
    regulation, and I don't think the public would be well served
    if automakers were forced to wait for the government to catch
    up with industry's innovation.
        And it also important, we have talked a lot about recalls,
    but the vast majority of recalls are voluntary, and I have a
    chart here talking about detecting and correcting the defects
    sooner. In fact, the number of recalls is up. Some may say
    well, isn't that a sign of problems. In fact, that is a good
    point because the number of vehicles affecting is coming down
    so automakers are using the recall system based on data it
    receives not only from the consumer directly but also from the
    agencies to initiate these actions, to identify the defects and
    get them remedied and get the vehicles back into the
    marketplace.
        And then just in closing, I want to make a couple points
    about some suggestions for this committee, and I appreciate--I
    know how this chairman works and I know how this committee
    works, and you want to build a consensus on a bipartisan basis
    to address significant concerns. We would respectfully submit
    that Congress really does need to ensure that NHTSA has the
    resources to do its job and we would support this committee in
    its efforts. We have long advocated additional resources to
    fund the National Automobile Sampling System, the NASS system,
    which we believe is underfunded. We also support a number of
    other legislative elements that we hope would be included in
    this reauthorization such as State inducements, in other words,
    working to encourage States to adopt primary enforcement safety
    belt laws. I know that Chairman Oberstar is looking at this in
    his reauthorization. Our industry spent hundreds of millions of
    dollars in campaigns to try to pass primary seat belt
    enforcement laws across the country, and we have made real
    progress. We had three States this year alone.
        We also believe there should be a first offense with an
    ignition interlock requirement for impaired driving, drunk
    driving. The statistic that is not reported up there, the
    33,000 deaths, unfortunately, 30 percent of those or more are
    the result of less than 1 percent, one-half of 1 percent of the
    drivers and those that are impaired drunk driving. We have to
    get those people off the road.
        And then lastly, the graduated license laws for teens based
    on best practices, the STANDUP Act, we support that, and then
    there are other things that can really work to fund support
    high-visibility enforcement efforts such as Click It or Ticket
    and other limit under arrest or over the limit under arrest
    provisions. And again, there is an opportunity to support a
    driver alcohol interlock device research program called the
    ROADS SAFE Act, which puts money to try to develop research to
    prevent drunk drivers getting access to vehicles or starting
    vehicles.
        We appreciate very much your work. I understand how
    challenging it is. And we look forward to working with you to
    help develop commonsense solutions to some of these challenges.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McCurdy follows:]

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        Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks all the witnesses and the Chair
    thanks Mr. McCurdy for your statement. The Chair recognizes
    himself for 5 minutes for questioning.
        Mr. McCurdy, there has been a lot of testimony at this
    hearing and in past hearings, and some of it has centered on
    the black box as a technological solution or a recording device
    that would help in gathering data and also determining the
    causes for accidents. What is the industry's response to this
    phenomenon of the black box?
        Mr. McCurdy. We believe the information from event data
    recorders is important for NHTSA to do its job. They do have a
    rule that has standardized or recommended standards for the
    type of data that would be acquired. I think the industry is
    moving rapidly towards deployment of that system. Over 60
    percent of all vehicles today, modern vehicles, have that
    capability. The only caution I would give, and again, having
    come from the intelligence and defense world, when we talk
    about black boxes or we come from the world of aerospace where
    some people think that in an aircraft there is this black box
    that they recover after an accident. Actually these data
    systems are embedded throughout vehicles and so it is not just
    one solitary device. But is important that there are
    commercially available tools to access that. So I think the
    agency is going to be addressing this and we look forward to
    working with them. I think this is something that can be
    addressed.
        Mr. Rush. Ms. Claybrook, you indicated that you think that
    NHTSA's current budget is inadequate and that the President's
    budget for this year, or next year, rather, is inadequate. What
    do you think as a former administrator in today's dollars, how
    much do you think NHTSA's budget should be and what do you
    think should be the categories that we should look at
    increasing personnel and other resources for NHTSA?
        Ms. Claybrook. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that the
    budget should be doubled. It is $132 million, which is a
    pittance by any measure in the federal government, and it
    should probably double the year after that. This agency is
    starving to death. It can't do the research it should. It can't
    collect the data that it should. It doesn't have the expertise
    that it should. It doesn't have the enforcement personnel that
    it should. And all of us suffer from that because of deaths in
    the highway, and I think that Mr. Strickland is going to be a
    good leader for this agency. I am looking forward to see his
    work, I think he needs the resources to do it, and I have
    already been talking to him and the Secretary a little bit
    about this, and I think his answer was very appropriate that
    they would use very wisely the resources that the Congress
    decided that they would give the agency. He didn't say we
    didn't want them or that they couldn't use them. He said that
    they would use them wisely, and I think that is as far as he is
    allowed to go under the President's rules and I am very pleased
    to see that he said that.
        Mr. Rush. You have given us seven----
        Ms. Claybrook. I would add one other thing, Mr. Chairman,
    which is that issues have been raised today about the reduction
    in death and injury on the highway, which is magnificent, but I
    would also point out that after the oil crisis of 1973, there
    was a reduction of 9,000 deaths a year because the economy was
    in the sink, and I think that if you look at the documents that
    were prepared by the agency itself, for example, here is there
    list that they put out today of their crash stats, you will see
    that every time there is a downturn in the economy, there is
    less discretionary driving and there is a downturn in death and
    injury, but it comes right back up again, and so should anyone
    suggest that this is a permanent fix for the agency, it is not.
    I think that you are still going to need those resources, new
    safety standards, and there are many others that I didn't
    mention today which I will submit a list of for the record of
    other safety standards that the agency is woefully behind in
    issuing.
        Mr. McCurdy. Mr. Chairman, may I inject one point on that,
    just clarification? I think the administrator said that it
    actually had decreased and decline for 15 and a half straight
    quarters. That is more than the current recession, so I think
    this is a long-term trend. It is because of the regulatory
    efforts and it is because of the work of the industry
    cooperatively with that agency and also the work of Congress.
        Ms. Claybrook. Well, I wouldn't say that. The acting
    administrator, the one who went to Japan, Mr. Medford, he gave
    a presentation which I will also submit for the record in which
    he said that safety technologies had between 1960 and 2000
    saved 328,551 lives, and so I do agree, I agree with Mr.
    McCurdy that cars are safer today. I am disappointed that the
    industry often opposes some of those improvements but they also
    do take initiatives on their own, which he has mentioned, and
    these safety features can make a huge difference. They have
    made a difference in the number of lives saved and the number
    of deaths on the highway today would be far, far greater were
    not this agency doing its work, but there is much more that can
    be done and we will see more deaths and injuries when the
    economy improves.
        Mr. Rush. My time is expired. The Chair recognizes Mr.
    Whitfield for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Whitfield. Thank you. This has been quite an
    interesting hearing, and of course, any time we talk about
    death on the highway, and all of us have known people who have
    been killed in car accidents or have had loved ones that have
    been disfigured, and there is no way not to be emotional about
    individual deaths on the highway. But I am walking away from
    this hearing feeling a little bit better really about things,
    understanding that the Toyota issue is out there but when you
    have this kind of a reduction in the deaths per 100 million
    miles from in the middle 1970s 3.34 fatalities per 100 million
    vehicle miles down to last year 1.16 per 100 million miles, and
    it doesn't really make any difference what the economy is or is
    not, we are talking about 100 million vehicle miles. So I think
    that is something we really should celebrate to see that the
    fact that this fatality rate is coming down.
        Now, when we talk about the budget of NHTSA, I think the
    total budget is somewhere in the neighborhood of $900 million
    but a lot of that goes to State grants, and you all may be more
    familiar with those State grants than I am and I know that Ms.
    Claybrook is right as far as vehicle safety. There is about
    $132 million a year for vehicle safety. But I referred earlier,
    for example, to this Congressionally mandated study in 2005
    about the causes of vehicle accidents, and it said that 95
    percent were due to the driver, primarily driver mistakes, and
    2 percent, by the way, were related to vehicle or equipment
    defect but about 40 percent or 50 percent of that related to
    tires. So I am just wondering if maybe we should look at this
    in a different way and try to start focusing more money on
    educating drivers, better educational programs for drivers. And
    every State sets their own laws for how old you have to be and
    what kind of program you have to go through to drive. Because
    of the fact that 95 percent of all accidents are caused
    primarily because of driver neglect or whatever, should we be
    focusing on more programs to provide better educational
    opportunities for drivers to make them better prepared? And I
    would just ask each one of you that question and see how you
    would respond to that.
        Ms. Claybrook. Well, first of all, Mr. Whitfield, thank you
    so much for putting this out, and I appreciate your question.
    First of all, I would like to submit for the record the
    problems that we see with this causation study. It is quite
    complicated and I don't want to take the time today, but there
    are a lot of deficiencies in it. But even assuming, which I
    don't, that 95 percent of the crashes occur because of driver
    error, what you have to look at is what causes the death and
    injury, and Dr. William Haddon, who was the first NHTSA
    administrator, put together what he called the Haddon Matrix
    and it had pre crash, crash and post crash, and what you are
    talking about is the pre-crash issue, which is drunk driving,
    falling asleep, brakes don't work, whatever it may be in the
    pre-crash field.
        Mr. Whitfield. Ms. Claybrook, there is only about a minute
    left, so I am just going to say that you disagree with what I
    was saying, I am assuming, that----
        Ms. Claybrook. Well, no, not necessarily. I will submit for
    the record the information on that. But what you want to do is
    to protect the driver and the occupants, and the way you do
    that is making sure the car is safe regardless of what causes
    the crash, and on driver education, NHTSA itself has done lots
    of work on this and shown that driver education really doesn't
    do much in terms of the long-term driving capability of most
    people.
        Mr. Whitfield. What about you, Miss Gadhia?
        Ms. Claybrook. I like driver education. I mean, it----
        Mr. Whitfield. What about you, Ms. Gadhia? Do you have any
    comments on that?
        Ms. Gadhia. In our testimony that we submitted for the
    record, we took a look at the question that the committee is
    asking in light of all the recalls that we have seen in recent
    weeks, are there areas that we see for improvement, and so we
    have made our recommendations accordingly. We are pleased,
    though, that the agency and Secretary LaHood have put a great
    focus on distracted driving. That is something that has been
    obviously a big problem. So we do see a value in that
    particular kind of focus.
        Mr. Whitfield. Mr. McCurdy?
        Mr. McCurdy. Thank you, Mr. Whitfield. In fact, in addition
    to driver behavior and performance, there is the driving
    environment, so the condition of roads, the lack of safety
    features there, weather, et cetera is a fact in 2 percent and
    then in the other instances, about 2 percent can be attributed
    to the vehicle. But I will tell you, since we had a reference
    to older vehicles, I will provide for the record a copy of our
    playbook. It has an interesting photograph of a 50th
    anniversary event at the National Institute of Highway Safety,
    the Insurance Institute, and they did a 40-mile-an-hour head-on
    crash of two vehicles. One was a 1959 Chevrolet Belair. We are
    not picking on Chevy. It is actually a good story here. As you
    know, in 1959--well, some of you probably weren't around then
    but most of us who were know there is a lot of metal there--a
    40-mile-an-hour head-on crash with a 2009 Chevy Malibu, which
    is a smaller car, and the results are dramatic. The cage, the
    front seat, the passenger area of the 1959, those passenger
    would have been killed. There is no doubt. I mean, severely
    injured, tremendous impact, crushing that compartment. In the
    new model, the cage is intact. It also has front airbags, side
    airbags, side curtains and also has other features that improve
    the likelihood of survival in a head-in crash regardless of the
    cause, whether it is someone swerving.
        The last point I would make in this, a comment made about
    the 3-second stop. I drive a vehicle that has push-button on
    stop. That is one of the features that many, many consumers are
    moving towards. Are we saying that consumers today, it is in
    the manual, it is in the instructions and all the rest, can't
    take 3 seconds to push a button? I know that we panic, I know
    there are instances, but there is a need for education. There
    is a need. And maybe one of the positive aspects of all this
    investigation, all the reporting is maybe consumers are having
    to pay attention to actually the vehicles that they are
    driving, what are those shifters, where is neutral. My son-in-
    law drives a Camry. When this came up, the ones in the recall,
    he asked what do you do. I said you put it in neutral, OK. You
    don't want to turn it off at first, and those buttons are there
    and that 3-second delay is there for a reason because you don't
    want inadvertent shutting off the engine because then you could
    lose power. That affects steering and other conditions.
        So I think there is a commonsense approach we need to take.
    Let us find out what it is. Let us work together. And I think
    that is what NHTSA and the industry should be discussing. So
    there is not one solution, but I think there is a genuine
    concern about it to try to develop some solutions.
        Ms. Gadhia. Mr. Chairman, may I briefly respond to the
    comment about the push button?
        Mr. Rush. Certainly.
        Ms. Gadhia. I would like to note that our recommendations
    have to do with when the consumer is in an emergency situation
    since we have been talking about sudden unintended
    acceleration, and I will note also that given what has
    happened, it is my understanding that Toyota is working on
    reconfiguring their push-button ignition so it can be turned
    off in an emergency situation with multiple quick presses in a
    short period of time. So that is what we are talking about.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Illinois
    for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    apologize to the witnesses for not being here for your
    testimony, though I have looked at it. I want to also just take
    this moment to say what a tremendous resource we have in Joan
    Claybrook, who did serve as head of NHTSA, and I hope that not
    only our subcommittee but that NHTSA right now will take
    advantage of all of the years of experience she has had not
    only as an administrator but as an advocate. I thank Ms. Gadhia
    and also Mr. McCurdy for the work that you are doing, but I
    wanted to particularly just thank Joan for decades, I won't say
    how many, of being an advocate for consumers.
        In looking at the priorities that you laid out for
    legislative and administrative--I mean, there are a couple
    things that are clearly legislative. If you think that
    penalties need to be enhanced, I think that is legislative on
    our part. But what are those things that you think the
    committee in particular has to deal with that really can't be
    done administratively to meet the goals that you have set out
    or the problems that you have identified?
        Ms. Claybrook. Well, I would say certainly in the penalty
    area that that is a legislative issue, and in the funding, that
    is a legislative issue. The President's budget is what it is
    and it is totally insufficient, and so it is not this
    committee's responsibility, although you do authorize, of
    course. I think that in the area of transparency, there have
    been some decisions made by the agency that this committee
    could change. In the early warning act, while there was a lot
    of discussion about the information being open, in fact, the
    way that it was written was interpreted as not being open. So I
    think that it would helpful clarification on transparency with
    the early warning system because right now it is not available
    to any of us.
        Ms. Schakowsky. And that would require a change or a
    clarification or----
        Ms. Claybrook. I think it would be--yes, I think it would
    be very helpful to have a clarification of that.
        In terms of consumers being able to bring a lawsuit when a
    case is closed in the enforcement area, we definitely need to
    have legislation there because of the court of appeals
    decision, and then I think it would be very helpful to have
    some legislative support for improving the black block. This is
    something that could be done administratively by the agency. I
    think it would be really helpful because if the black box is
    mandatory, if it gathers a lot of really good data, if it can
    be downloaded easily, all of that data can come into NHTSA's
    data system and it would vastly enhance, excitingly enhance the
    capacity of the agency to analyze problems, to find out what is
    going on in the highway because this would be rich information
    from our crashes that occur right then on the highway, and this
    information is totally lacking in the agency now, and gathering
    it through the NASS system, which is this National Accident
    Sampling System, which is after the fact investigations, there
    was intended to be 20,000 of them a year, it is now 4,000
    because of the cost, and this I think will never get to the
    20,000. So why not take advantage of this data that is going to
    be collected anyway in black boxes under what I think has to be
    a mandate for the black box itself and use that data for the
    operation for the agency as well as particular crashes.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. McCurdy, you seem to be nodding at
    that. Did you want to comment on this?
        Mr. McCurdy. Thank you, ma'am. Actually I did want to
    comment. We asked for additional resources for NASS. We think
    that data needs to be collected, and this committee has
    oversight of NHTSA and the data is there but we need to make
    sure that the agency has the tools and resources to gather it.
    My only caveat on that, and I think this is something that we
    need to work on, is I don't believe that the wholesale release
    of raw and unverified data would further objective of quickly
    identifying and correcting defects. If anything, it may lead to
    more litigation, and I don't believe that is the answer.
        Ms. Claybrook. Well, I should say, Mr. McCurdy----
        Mr. McCurdy. I actually have the mic, Mr. Chairman. You
    know, I don't believe it would in fact do that. I would hope
    before the gentlelady leaves or we at least have another round
    actually talk about one of the principle issues that you are
    the key sponsor of which we supported, the Cameron Gulbransen
    Act, and the role that we actually played because this is one
    of our priorities and it shows where we can actually work
    together to address significant problems, and those are some of
    the most tragic instances that we know.
        Ms. Schakowsky. They are.
        Mr. McCurdy. I worked with Senator Sununu and Senator
    Clinton at the time as well as your staff and the staff of the
    committee to make that happen, and the industry fully supported
    that. So I want to make sure that is on the record.
        Ms. Schakowsky. And I appreciate that.
        Ms. Claybrook. Could I----
        Ms. Schakowsky. Is there any way, Mr. Chairman, that Ms.
    Claybrook can respond back to that, or do you want----
        Ms. Claybrook. It is privacy information. I just want to
    make clear that I don't think that this data should be public
    as to individual crashes. It would be for statistical purposes.
    That is all I wanted to say.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
        Mr. Rush. The gentlelady's time has expired. The Chair
    recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Stearns.
        Mr. Stearns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Claybrook, let me just follow up what Ms. Schakowsky
    talked about. In these boxes, isn't the box on a person's car,
    that box would belong to that person, wouldn't it?
        Ms. Claybrook. Yes.
        Mr. Stearns. So wouldn't they have the right to opt out if
    they wanted to? Could they flick a switch so that if they
    didn't want this to occur, they could do it, or do you think
    that should not be----
        Ms. Claybrook. I don't think there ought to be an on/off
    switch.
        Mr. Stearns. So you think there should be no opt-out?
        Ms. Claybrook. I do not think there should be an opt-out.
        Mr. Stearns. OK. Secondly, the information they collect is
    obviously speed, perhaps location. Is it going to go beyond
    that in terms of weight in the car or driving habits? What, in
    your opinion----
        Ms. Claybrook. On the black box?
        Mr. Stearns. In the black box. It sounds like you want to
    expand it, and I think many people are concerned about how the
    federal government will handle this data. Say I can't opt out
    of the box under your persuasion, then if it goes to the
    federal government, is this going to be public on the Internet?
    Should private citizens be able to go and see that about their
    neighbors who are driving? I mean, there are some privacy
    implications I think that I am concerned about.
        Ms. Claybrook. I really appreciate you asking the question
    because I certainly didn't mean to suggest that every crash
    that occurs should be publicly exposed on the Internet with the
    name of the person and their car and all the rest of it. The
    black box generally collects data 20 to 5 seconds before a
    crash and 5 to 10 seconds----
        Mr. Stearns. So it doesn't come on all during the whole
    time?
        Ms. Claybrook. No.
        Mr. Stearns. And so it is very, very limited time frame,
    and what it records is whether your foot was on the
    accelerator, whether it was on the brake, a lot of aspects of
    the engine itself, the speed of the vehicle and so on, and that
    data, what I am talking about having to go to the federal
    government, it would be only statistical data. All privacy
    information would be erased, so the federal government wouldn't
    even have it. It would just be statistical data. It would just
    be that a crash occurred and what the circumstances were so
    that you can then accumulate that data and say these are the
    kind of crashes that are occurring and these are the kind of
    remedies that we need to think about applying because of that.
    I do think it needs to be mandatory. I think it should be on
    every vehicle. Actually, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler
    readily reveal the contents of their black boxes in litigation
    because they think it is advantageous for them.
        Mr. Stearns. Well, I guess this committee would be
    concerned about the privacy. Let me move on. I have another
    question.
        Mr. McCurdy, welcome to the committee. It is nice to see
    you. Eddie Towns and I dropped a bill on January 28, 2009,
    which would direct the Department of Transportation to issue
    regulations which would mitigate the safety hazard caused by
    near-silent hybrid and electric cars. I was in a parking lot
    going into the grocery store and I was just walking along with
    my BlackBerry and this car came up that was a hybrid and I
    didn't hear it, and it practically hit me, and so my question
    is, I think both General Motors and NHTSA have come up and
    proposed methods to address this, and I guess the concern of
    the ever-increasing desire now to have these cars that are
    hybrid and silent and you can't hear them. Winston Churchill
    almost got killed when he came to the United States and got off
    the wrong side of the road, and certainly if these cars are
    silent, he might not have been alive and so concerned with
    ever-increasing danger and sort of the inconsistency of the
    industry response so far. Do you think NHTSA needs to take
    further action to ensure an industry-wide solution, perhaps
    something like Congressman Towns and I, the bill we introduced
    which is called the Pedestrian Safety Enhancement Act of 2009.
    It has 210 cosponsors. It is H.R. 734.
        Mr. McCurdy. I know the bill well, and it is good to see
    you, Mr. Stearns. Actually we refer to this as the quiet car
    legislation, and concern. Actually I think we ought to
    recognize--I don't know if John is still here--John Pare from
    the National Federation of the Blind. We at the Alliance have
    been working closely with NFB. Our member companies have been
    conducting acoustic testing. There are some challenges. You
    know, it is ironic, unintended consequences, but we have been
    pushed for years by some that say we have to reduce noise. We
    have been pushed by others to say we have to eliminate the
    internal combustion----
        Mr. Stearns. No one is ever happy.
        Mr. McCurdy. So we are moving, you know, rapidly to hybrid
    and electric technology and they are quiet, if not silent. I
    can't resist the point, though, when you say that you are
    walking along with your BlackBerry and don't hear it. It is a
    little bit of distracted walking, and we are mixing issues
    here, but we talk about distracted driving too. The point
    that----
        Mr. Stearns. But I am a pedestrian and I had the right-of-
    way with the hybrid.
        Mr. McCurdy. Actually I spoke to the NFB convention earlier
    in the year when they were in Detroit. I think they will tell
    you that we have reached out to them. We have worked closely
    with them. What we are trying to do is understand the
    challenges here, to really understand what the acoustic----
        Mr. Stearns. Is there a timeline? Can you give me a
    timeline?
        Mr. McCurdy. Well, we have been doing the research now. I
    think there are questions of length of implementation but I
    think we are not far from finding a solution.
        Mr. Stearns. A year, 2 years?
        Mr. McCurdy. It depends on front end and back. I think we
    are actually making real progress, and again, we want NHTSA to
    engage with us as well. So I think there is an opportunity for
    real stakeholder conversation here, and it is not
    confrontational at all. I think this is a question of really
    understanding the problem and bringing to bear the right
    science and engineering. But I think there will be a solution
    and I think it can be----
        Mr. Stearns. And you think NHTSA should have an industry-
    wide solution?
        Mr. McCurdy. It should be industry-wide. I think it is
    actually going to be global. I am involved internationally and
    I think Japan is----
        Mr. Stearns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. McCurdy [continuing]. Actively engaged and others will
    as well.
        Mr. Rush. I recognize Mr. Braley for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Braley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Stearns, there is a great episode on the TV show The
    Office where one of the characters engages in a low-speed chase
    with a Prius and sneaks up on one of the other characters,
    which demonstrates the importance of this legislation.
        Mr. McCurdy, voluntary can be a relative thing, and you
    talked earlier about some of the voluntary changes the industry
    has made to respond to safety concerns but a lot of those
    changes that were made were also things that the industry
    initially resisted, and one of the great things about the
    country we live in, we have a system that allows people from
    all different walks of life to work together both in a public
    setting like through NHTSA and through our private enforcement
    methods to try to hold people accountable and work together to
    improve the technology in automobiles. You mentioned that you
    had concerns about the use of electronic data recorder
    information and suggested it could lead to more litigation. I
    would challenge that statement because I believe if you had a
    system with standards for accessing and downloading that
    information and a clear understanding of what it represented,
    you could actually reduce litigation because right now much of
    the expense in a lot of these crash cases is people trying to
    understand how an accident occurred, how the occupant
    compartment was compromised and potentially contributed to the
    fatality or the severity of the crash. So one of the things
    that I am interested in hearing from you is, we have been
    talking about the standards for electronic data recorders and
    there has already been some proposals both by the Institute for
    Electric Engineers and also proposed regulations that NHTSA is
    considering, and it has been my impression that some members of
    your alliance have been objecting to the enactment of those
    regulations. Are you able to make a statement here at the
    hearing today on behalf of the Alliance that it supports the
    enactment of standardized regulations by NHTSA that govern the
    use of electronic data recorder information?
        Mr. McCurdy. I believe we are moving in that direction. I
    will put it that way. I think the industry, there is well over
    64 percent I think is the most recent number of 2005 models
    that have EDRs. I may have been confused on all the
    information. I think some of the early warning information is
    where we have some concerns. The type of information in the EDR
    is probably less of concern. But again, I think there can be
    movement on this, and again, I think the stakeholders and
    working with NHTSA have an opportunity. My hesitation was
    because of my experience in the electronic field is that again
    some people have a very simplistic idea of what that is. It is
    not quite as simple as just saying everyone is going to have a
    black box, but I think we are moving in that direction.
        Mr. Braley. And Ms. Gadhia, I want to talk to you about
    that because in your written statement you said the EDR
    information must also be standardized and expanded, and Mr.
    Stearns began his question by asking Ms. Claybrook about the
    ownership of that data and assumed that it belonged to the
    owner of the vehicle, and yet during the early years of EDR
    data availability, the manufacturers frequently took the
    position that was proprietary information that belonged to
    them, not the person who paid for the automobile. So how do we
    move forward from this point to try to come up with a system
    that makes easily available and downloadable information that
    achieves the privacy concerns we are worried about but provides
    us with better data that helps us solve the underlying problems
    that lead to occupant injury?
        Ms. Gadhia. As we noted in our written testimony that the
    NHTSA regulation is going to require EDRs to collect--the cars
    that do have EDRs to collect certain standardized amounts of
    data from 2013 model year cars. We would like to see that
    happen sooner. We think there is a utility to the information
    that they collect. But there are some privacy concerns about
    ownership of the data, as you mentioned, Representative Braley,
    and in the past Consumers Union has submitted comments to NHTSA
    as they were considering the regulation that the final rule
    that they put forward in 2006 and I would be happy to share
    that with your office.
        Mr. Braley. Please do. That would be much appreciated.
        Ms. Claybrook, I want to finish with you. One of the things
    that we know from the medical field, there is a process called
    differential diagnosis, and that is when a physician is
    presented with a sick patient, they come with the hierarchy of
    the possible causes of their illness beginning with the most
    likely and descending to the least likely, and then the
    physician goes through a process of testing and evaluation to
    try to rule out what could be causing the illness to be able to
    reach a final diagnosis and a plan of treatment. And one of the
    concerns I have with the response we have seen to some of the
    problems with the Toyota recall is that the differential
    diagnosis that Toyota engaged in was limited, it appeared to
    many of us, to a mechanical failure, and they have now
    participated in massive recalls to address sticky accelerator
    pedals and problems with floor mats. And yet we still see
    reports of sudden unintended acceleration in vehicles where
    those retrofits have been made. So can you comment based on
    your experience as a former NHTSA administrator and as somebody
    involved in a long period of public safety advocacy on what you
    think needs to be done to get to the underlying cause?
        Ms. Claybrook. Well, Toyota is the only company, the only
    entity that can do that. They designed the vehicle, they
    created the software, they have software engineers who did it.
    The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration should not
    design the remedy. It never has in any case ever. And it
    doesn't have the capacity to do the kind of evaluation that is
    necessary to figure out what the underlying cause is. A lot of
    people have said that figuring out a software glitch is almost
    impossible in some cases, particularly if no marker is left
    that this glitch even occurred, a marker left in the computer.
    And so that is why a lot of people have talked about the brake
    override as the only possible solution because we just don't--
    at least we don't know, maybe Toyota does but we don't know
    what the problem is. I think it is very interesting that Toyota
    has said it is a floor mat recall of 5 million cars and yet the
    remedy that they are putting in most of those cars is not only
    to remove or fix the pedal and the floor mat but to put in a
    brake override system, which is an electronic fix. Why did they
    put an electronic fix in if it is the floor mat or the pedal?
    They say it is for customer, you know, so they will feel safe.
    I think it is because it is a software problem, and if the
    vehicles have been fixed with the floor mat and the pedal and
    the pedal and they still run away, then there is obviously
    another problem, and I think there are also vehicles that are
    not covered by the recall that may have these problems. They
    may not be identical. They may use different software so they
    are not identical problems. But there is no question in my mind
    that this is an electronic issue, and I think the company took
    the position early on that it wasn't because that hurts their
    sales with consumers. Consumers don't like software glitches
    they can't understand, and they couldn't change. Now if they
    change their mind, they are going to be subject to 18 U.S.C.
    1001 lying to the government and going to jail. So they are in
    a very difficult position. Why would they do that now that they
    have taken this position in the hardcore way that they have.
        I was at a Senate hearing the other day and there were 21
    people representing Toyota sitting in front of me, and I said
    to them, gee, you have a lot of lobbyists, and they said oh,
    no, no, these are all communications people. I think that they
    are looking at this as a communications fix as opposed to a
    real fix.
        Mr. Braley. I want to thank all the witnesses for your
    impressive testimony and look forward to working with all of
    you as we move forward on these important issues, and I yield
    back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rush. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and the Chair
    himself also thanks all the witnesses again for your patience
    and for your time that you have contributed to us. Your
    testimony has been invaluable as we proceed down this path for
    reauthorizing NHTSA, and the Chair thanks you and wants you to
    know that you have done a great service to the American people,
    the driving public, today.
        Thank you very much. The subcommittee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
        [Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

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