[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CRISIS IN KYRGYZSTAN: FUEL, CONTRACTS, AND REVOLUTION ALONG THE AFGHAN
SUPPLY CHAIN
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 22, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-150
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
http://www.house.gov/reform
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65-551 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011
______________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected].
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DARRELL E. ISSA, California
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
DIANE E. WATSON, California LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
JIM COOPER, Tennessee BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JIM JORDAN, Ohio
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
Columbia AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
PETER WELCH, Vermont
BILL FOSTER, Illinois
JACKIE SPEIER, California
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio
JUDY CHU, California
Ron Stroman, Staff Director
Michael McCarthy, Deputy Staff Director
Carla Hultberg, Chief Clerk
Larry Brady, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island DAN BURTON, Indiana
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland JOHN L. MICA, Florida
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
PETER WELCH, Vermont LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
BILL FOSTER, Illinois PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio JIM JORDAN, Ohio
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri
JUDY CHU, California
Andrew Wright, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 22, 2010................................... 1
Statement of:
Huskey, Eugene, professor, Stetson University; Ambassador
Baktybek Abdrisaev, lecturer, Utah Valley University, and
former Kyrgyz Ambassador to the United States 1996-2005;
Alexander Cooley, professor, Barnard College at Columbia
University; Scott Horton, professor, Columbia Law School,
and Contributing Editor, Harper's Weekly; and Sam Patten,
senior program manager, Eurasia, Freedom House............. 7
Abdrisaev, Ambassador Baktybek........................... 19
Cooley, Alexander........................................ 32
Horton, Scott............................................ 43
Huskey, Eugene........................................... 7
Patten, Sam.............................................. 56
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Abdrisaev, Ambassador Baktybek, lecturer, Utah Valley
University, and former Kyrgyz Ambassador to the United
States 1996-2005, prepared statement of.................... 21
Cooley, Alexander, professor, Barnard College at Columbia
University, prepared statement of.......................... 34
Horton, Scott, professor, Columbia Law School, and
Contributing Editor, Harper's Weekly, prepared statement of 45
Huskey, Eugene, professor, Stetson University, prepared
statement of............................................... 9
Patten, Sam, senior program manager, Eurasia, Freedom House,
prepared statement of...................................... 58
CRISIS IN KYRGYZSTAN: FUEL, CONTRACTS, AND REVOLUTION ALONG THE AFGHAN
SUPPLY CHAIN
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Tierney, Welch, Driehaus, Quigley,
Flake, Duncan, Turner, and Fortenberry.
Staff present: Andy Wright, staff director; Boris Maguire,
clerk; Scott Lindsay, counsel; LaToya King, fellow; Aaron
Blacksberg and Bronwen De Sena, interns; Adam Hodge, deputy CD;
Laura Kieler, legislative correspondent for Representative
Tierney; Adam Fromm, minority chief clerk and Member liaison,
Stephanie Genco, minority press secretary and communication
liaison; Tom Alexander, minority senior counsel; and
Christopher Bright, minority senior professional staff member.
Mr. Tierney. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
National Security and Foreign Affairs, the hearing entitled,
``Crisis in Kyrgyzstan: Fuel, Contracts, and Revolution Along
the Afghan Supply Chain,'' will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking
member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening
statements. Without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept
open for 5 business days so that all members of the
subcommittee be allowed to submit a written statement for the
record. Without objection, that too is so ordered.
So good morning, everybody, and particularly our witnesses.
I want to thank you again for being here today and helping to
enlighten us on a region of the world that many Americans have
not had an opportunity to study in depth.
Today's hearing will explore the recent revolution in
Kyrgyzstan, the causes of the political turmoil there, and
Kyrgyzstan's critical role in the supply chain for the United
States and NATO's war effort in Afghanistan, although,
Ambassador, you make the good point that cannot be the only and
the sole focus of our relationship.
In addition, we will examine the political and geopolitical
significance of allegations of corruption in connection with
U.S. fuel contracts at the Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan. That
is, of course, a critical transit and re-supply hub for
Operation Enduring Freedom.
Last Monday, the subcommittee announced a wide-ranging
investigation into allegations that the contractors who supply
fuel to the Manas Air Base had significant financial dealings
with the family of deposed President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. I
understand from press reports that the interim government in
Kyrgyzstan has announced its own investigation into allegations
of corruption in the Bakiyev regime, including the Manas fuel
contracts.
Of course, allegations of corrupt practices among Kyrgyz
public officials are an internal Kyrgyz matter. However, some
of the present allegations raise serious questions about the
Department of Defense's management and oversight of contractors
along the Afghan supply chain. Today's hearing will not answer
the who, what, and where of the contractual dealings at Manas.
It will also not test the veracity of allegations that are
swirling in Central Asia. These questions will be answered in
due course by the subcommittee's ongoing investigation.
Rather, the purpose of today's hearing is to look more
broadly at the recent revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz-
American relations, the history of the U.S. presence at Manas,
and the significance of the allegations of corruption at the
base as a driver of the revolution.
Since 2001, Kyrgyzstan has been a critical ally of the
United States in support of our ongoing military efforts in
Afghanistan. The Manas Air Base is a crucial hub for U.S.
troops going in and out of Afghanistan, as well as a refueling
station for the United States and NATO aircraft operating in
the region. Not unexpectedly, Kyrgyzstan's willingness to host
a U.S. air base on former Soviet soil has generated some
domestic controversy in Bishkek, and even more controversy in
Russia, which looks suspiciously at the United States'
influence in Central Asia.
As the United States has increased its presence in
Afghanistan, our dependence on the Manas Air Base and the
Northern Distribution Network--that, of course, is the supply
chain to Afghanistan through Central Asia--has also increased.
U.S. dependence is particularly acute at Manas; in March 2010
alone, 50,000 U.S. troops transited in and out of Afghanistan
through this base.
So let's be honest. At many times throughout our history,
the United States has closely dealt with unsavory regimes in
order to achieve more pressing policy or strategic objectives.
That is realism in a nutshell. But the United States also
prides itself on a more enlightened view of our role in the
world and our long-term interests in universal respect for
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.
Some suggest that the United States has allowed strategic
and logistical expedience in Kyrgyzstan to become a lasting
embrace of two corrupt and authoritarian regimes. Regardless of
U.S. intent, we are left with the fact that both President
Akayev and President Bakiyev were forcefully ousted from office
amid widespread public perceptions that the United States had
supported the regimes' repression and fueled--I say that
without any pun intended--their corrosive corruption.
Meanwhile, the leaders of Kyrgyzstan's political
opposition, the men and women who bravely confronted President
Bakiyev for his corruption and oppression, were left in the
lurch. Today, many of those opposition leaders are in power
and, I expect, the United States will have to work hard to
restore our credibility in their eyes, beginning with
transparency regarding U.S. fuel contracts at Manas. I wish
them the good judgment to transform the art of Kyrgyz
governance in a manner deserving of the Kyrgyz people.
Ultimately, it is my belief that only transparency will
help Kyrgyz-American relations move forward on a new page. And
toward that end, I look forward to our witnesses' thoughts on
the future of this important alliance.
With that, I would like to yield to Mr. Flake for his
opening remarks.
Mr. Flake. I thank the chairman and thank the witnesses for
coming.
Kyrgyzstan is at a turning point, it seems. I think we are
all hopeful that political stability will come. We have a
vested interest, as the chairman mentioned, certainly with the
air base as a supply hub for our operations in Afghanistan. The
existence of a U.S. base in a former Soviet territory has been
troublesome for Russia and, to make matters worse, there are
longstanding allegations that former leadership benefited
illegally from Department of Defense fuel contracts, as has
been mentioned.
So there is no easy solution here, particularly given the
air base and the situation we have there, but I look forward to
any light that can be shed on the situation and what we can do
as Members of Congress to make sure that we have a secure
situation for our war efforts in Afghanistan and also to help
lend stability to the situation there.
I yield back.
Mr. Tierney. Well, thank you, Mr. Flake.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Turner for a unanimous consent
request.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
request unanimous consent to make an opening statement.
Mr. Tierney. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
you and the ranking member for holding this hearing on what is
a very important issue, and I would like to pause for a moment
to recognize in the back of the room we have Dr. Conroy and her
AP Government class from Georgetown Visitation. They are all
seniors who are here today participating in the hearing, and
they include my daughter, Jessica Turner. So thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for allowing me to recognize them.
Mr. Tierney. The committee welcomes all members of that
class, as well as their faculty. We hope you enjoy your stay in
Washington and appreciate, Jessica, your dad's good work on
this committee. He does really in-depth work and has been a
leader here, and we appreciate that.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For the last 9 years, Kyrgyzstan has continued to assist
the United States with our efforts in Afghanistan. Successive
governments in Bishkek have resisted tremendous pressure from
some other governments who would prefer the U.S. military bases
be evicted from Central Asia. As a member of the House Armed
Services Committee, I am frequently reminded of the critical
contribution the Manas Transit Center makes to supplying the
United States and NATO troops in Afghanistan.
I was further reminded of Kyrgyzstan's strategic location
during my visit there several years ago. Manas also plays a
vital role in providing security and military assistance to the
Afghan people. By doing so, this facility and U.S. presence
there helps the Kyrgyz security. We are grateful for Madam
Otunbayeva's recent statements that the lease for use of the
transit center will continue for another year. This assurance
comes at a critical time in the buildup of United States and
allied counterinsurgency forces in Afghanistan.
Furthermore, Manas creates other opportunities for the
Kyrgyz public, including economic benefits such as jobs,
salaries, and good services procured, as well as humanitarian
assistance provided by the military personnel base there. For
example, the U.S. service members have assisted a local
orphanage by donating their time and money.
However, our relationship with Kyrgyzstan and with Central
Asia as a whole should not be seen exclusively through the
prism of U.S. bases there or as an adjunct of our Afghan
policy. Currently, the Defense and State Departments groups
Central Asia in the same bureaus and divisions as Afghanistan
and Pakistan. This organizational structure may act as an
enabling factor for administration officials to pigeonhole
Central Asian countries as simply a corridor to get to
Afghanistan.
We should have in place policies and strategies that look
at Central Asian states as countries that have their own unique
cultures, challenges, and possibilities. One of these
possibilities is helping and encouraging the Kyrgyz people to
create economic opportunity. Kyrgyzstan has little economic
means today. The Kyrgyz people need economic opportunities and
jobs to achieve long-term stability.
Stability is in America's and NATO's military interest.
Economic development would help perpetuate stability.
Prosperity and stability in Kyrgyzstan is also in America's and
Europe's economic interest.
Most of the highways already exist for transportation.
There is required investment that should assist the better
border management and supporting infrastructure, and border
control would also help stem narcotics flow out of Afghanistan,
an issue that I am concerned about.
To help the Kyrgyz invite more investment, its democratic
friends around the world, including the United States, must
help its government to increase transparency. I hope that the
administration and nongovernmental organizations, some of which
are represented at this hearing, will assist the Kyrgyz
Republic in creating ways that provide transparency for
commercial transactions. This includes working with the new
interim authorities to determine a way forward that eliminates
any suspicion of wrongdoing by any party to remove lingering
doubts that the U.S. directly or indirectly condones
corruption.
In the near future, I hope we will also be able to hear
from administration officials to outline and describe U.S.
strategies in the region. We need to ensure that we have a
strategy not only to help Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors, but a
strategy which continues to buildupon and cultivate U.S.
relationships in the region.
Again, I want to thank the chairman for holding this
hearing.
Mr. Tierney. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Turner.
Is there any other Member who would like to ask for
unanimous consent for an opening statement? Otherwise, we have
the opportunity to place them on the record, of course, as
usual.
The subcommittee will now receive testimony from the panel
that is before us today. A brief introduction of each of them
to begin, starting with Dr. Eugene Huskey. He is the William R.
Keenan, Jr. Chair of Political Science at Stetson University in
Florida. He also serves as an associate editor for the Russian
Review and is a member of the Editorial Board for the Journal
of Communist Studies and Transition Politics.
Dr. Huskey's work focuses primarily on transition politics
and legal affairs in the former Soviet Union and its successive
states of Russia and Kyrgyzstan. He is the author of several
books and has published dozens of articles about the political
affairs of Kyrgyzstan and other former Soviet states. He has
been asked to speak before the CIA, the Department of State,
and numerous universities in Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Europe, and
the United States. Dr. Huskey received a B.A. from Vanderbilt
University, an M.A. from the University of Essex, and a Ph.D.
in politics from the London School of Economics and Politics.
Ambassador Baktybek Abdrisaev is a distinguished visiting
professor of history and political science at Utah Valley State
College. From 1996 until 2005, he served as the Kyrgyz
Ambassador to the United States and Canada, and from 1995 to
2000 he was a member of the Kyrgyz Parliament. Prior to that,
Ambassador Abdrisaev was appointed director of Kyrgyzstan's
International Affairs Department under former President Askar
Akayev.
Ambassador Abdrisaev specializes in international
relations, diplomacy, and Central Asian comparative politics.
He has published dozens of scholarly articles and op-eds on
Kyrgyz politics, is the author of Kyrgyzstan's Voice in
Washington, Reflections of the Kyrgyz Ambassador on Bilateral
Relations During the Transition Year. Ambassador Abdrisaev
holds a B.S. from the Bishkek Polytechnical Institute, a Ph.D.
from the Institute of Electronics Academy of Sciences at
Belarus, and a honorary professorship of the International
University of Kyrgyzstan.
Ambassador, I want to express the committee's sympathies. I
know you had personal losses during this latest uprising over
there, lost three close members of your family and friends,
amongst others, so we extend our sympathy to you. We know this
is difficult testimony for you today and a difficult period of
your life, and we thank you for taking time out to share with
us your experience and your knowledge of this area, because it
was in fact you that first negotiated the agreement with
respect to Manas, so you have particular insight for us on
that. Thank you.
Dr. Alexander Cooley is an associate professor of
international relations at Barnard College at Columbia
University and is currently a global fellow with the Open
Society Institute. His areas of expertise are the political
transformation of post-Soviet Eurasia, the politics of the
United States overseas basing, and theories of contracting and
organization. Dr. Cooley has written two books, including Base
Politics: Democratic Change in the U.S. Military Abroad, which
examines the political impact of the U.S. military bases in
overseas host countries, including Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
He obtained his B.A. from Swarthmore College, a Masters in
philosophy from Columbia University, and a Ph.D. from Columbia
University.
Scott Horton is an attorney, a lecturer at Columbia Law
School, and a contributing editor for Harper's Weekly. Mr.
Horton is known for his work in emerging markets in
international law, especially human rights law and the law of
armed conflict. He is a lifelong human rights advocate and co-
founder of the American University in Central Asia, where he
currently serves as a trustee.
Mr. Horton is also a member of the Board of the National
Institute of Military Justice and a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations. Mr. Horton holds a B.A. from the University
of Maryland and obtained a J.D. from the University of Texas
following studies at the University of Munich and Mainz in
Germany as a Fulbright scholar.
Sam Patten is the senior program manager for Eurasia at
Freedom House. From 2008 to 2009, Mr. Patten served as a senior
advisor for the Democracy Promotion at the Department of State.
Prior to that, he headed the International Republican
Institute's Moscow Office and directed its political
programming in Baghdad from 2004 to 2005. Mr. Patten has also
helped manage democratically focused campaigns in Ukraine,
Georgia, Romania, Albania, and Northern Iraq. Prior to his
international career, Mr. Patten served as an advisor to
Senator Susan Collins and a speech writer to Senator Olympia
Snow. Mr. Patten obtained his B.A. from Georgetown University.
So we have a lot of fire power here today. We expect to
really learn a lot and, again, we want to thank you for being
here, sharing your expansive expertise.
It is, of course, the policy of the committee to swear in
witnesses before they testify, so I ask you to please stand and
raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. The record will please reflect that
all of the witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Again, I remind you that your full written statement will
be put into the written record, and I appreciate, as do the
members of the committee, how extensive those written remarks
were and how helpful they are in getting our background
together. We allot about 5 minutes for opening remarks. The
light will turn green, with a minute to go it will turn to
amber, and when the 5-minutes are up it will turn to red and
the floor drops and out you go. [Laughter.]
But basically we won't do that. We are appreciative of your
being here. We will have some latitude, but we do want to get
to a point where we can have some questions and answered
exchange back from the committee members to the panel.
So, Dr. Huskey, would you please start?
STATEMENTS OF EUGENE HUSKEY, PROFESSOR, STETSON UNIVERSITY;
AMBASSADOR BAKTYBEK ABDRISAEV, LECTURER, UTAH VALLEY
UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER KYRGYZ AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
1996-2005; ALEXANDER COOLEY, PROFESSOR, BARNARD COLLEGE AT
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY; SCOTT HORTON, PROFESSOR, COLUMBIA LAW
SCHOOL, AND CONTRIBUTING EDITOR, HARPER'S WEEKLY; AND SAM
PATTEN, SENIOR PROGRAM MANAGER, EURASIA, FREEDOM HOUSE
STATEMENT OF EUGENE HUSKEY
Mr. Huskey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Flake,
and subcommittee members, for giving me the opportunity to
speak about U.S.-Kyrgyz ties and about the country of
Kyrgyzstan, which I have been studying for the last two
decades. Much of my testimony today is based on interviews that
I conducted with three dozen members of the Kyrgyz opposition
during the last 2 years. Many of those interviewees have now
assumed prominent posts in the new government and five of them
make up the new collective leadership of the country.
We are here today because the United States tried to please
a dictator. We all understand that difficult decisions have to
be made in wartime, but our embrace of the Bakiyev regime in
Kyrgyzstan was far tighter than it needed to be in order to
retain our basing rights in that country.
This became clear to me when I began interviewing
opposition leaders in July 2008. They complained that for the
first time in the post-communist era they were shunned by the
U.S. Embassy in Bishkek. In late April 2009, the opposition
candidate for president, Almaz Atambaev, told me that neither
he nor other opposition politicians had been able to meet with
the new U.S. Ambassador, even though she had been in her post
for more than 6 months.
Atambaev was by no means a radical politician; he was a
former prime minister and a successful businessman. He is now
in fact the first deputy leader of the interim government, the
No. 2 man in the country.
I heard the same refrain of isolation from the heads of
NGO's in Bishkek. They had become untouchables in the eyes of
the U.S. Government. These NGO leaders were smart, energetic,
and anxious to take their country in a liberalizing direction.
With the U.S. Embassy out of the picture, the Russian
Embassy in Bishkek stepped into the breach and, for the first
time, Russian diplomats started to cultivate contacts in the
western-oriented NGO community. This was the opening gambit in
what would become a more balanced Russian policy toward
government and society in Kyrgyzstan.
In spite of our numerous concessions to the Bakiyev regime,
including the granting of lucrative contracts that is the
subject of today's hearing, I would argue that the recently
vented anger of Kyrgyz leaders and ordinary citizens over the
air base does not reflect an inherently anti-American sentiment
in the country. It derives instead from a sense that the United
States betrayed its own principles and the forces of change in
Kyrgyzstan in order to curry favor with a despotic ruler who
held the key to the air base.
It also, I should add, reflects popular frustration with a
decade-long history of Kyrgyz presidents selling or leasing
pieces of the country's territory to the highest foreign
bidder. These bidders have included Russia, Kazakhstan, China,
Uzbekistan, and the United States.
Let me turn finally to a few of the issues that will shape
the future of the air base and U.S.-Kyrgyz relations more
broadly. First, it is vital that the interim government in
Bishkek consolidate its authority throughout the country. The
air base cannot function properly against the backdrop of
sporadic civil unrest, never mind a civil war. The country is
deeply divided along north-south lines and pockets of
resistance to the revolution remain in the south.
Because the revolution was made in the north by
northerners, and because the deposed president was from the
south, there is great concern in the south that the interest of
this historically disadvantaged region will not be fully
represented in Bishkek. The interim government has made a good
start by including two leaders from the south in its senior
ranks, but there is still much work to do.
Second, who rules Kyrgyzstan and how will be determined in
the next 6 months by the introduction of a new constitution and
the holding of new elections. The new constitution is likely to
strip the presidency of much of its power and strengthen the
parliament. This should make politics more competitive, but it
may also complicate future negotiations over the air base. The
U.S. administration may need to gain the support of a coalition
of parties instead of a single individual, as in the past.
As elections grow closer, the tensions within the
collective leadership will increase because the focus of the
rulers will shift from governing to campaigning for their party
or for the presidency. It is at this point that the system is
likely to be at its most fragile and there will be the greatest
temptation for Kyrgyz politicians to use the air base at Manas
as a whipping boy in order to advance their own electoral
prospects.
It is in the interest of the United States, then, to have a
thorough and early airing of our misdeeds with regard to the
base and the Bakiyev regime. We do not want the next elections
in Kyrgyzstan to be swayed by an October surprise that could
reveal embarrassing details of our earlier policy toward the
country. I welcome, therefore, your efforts to investigate our
policies toward the Bakiyev regime. I also welcome the early
signs from the administration that we will be pursuing a new
strategy of engagement with governments and societies in
Central Asia.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Huskey follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Doctor. We appreciate your remarks.
Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR BAKTYBEK ABDRISAEV
Mr. Abdrisaev. Dear Mr. Chairman, dear Ranking Member
Flake, dear members of the subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen.
First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude for
inviting me to testify before your committee on the recent
change of government in Kyrgyzstan and its impact for U.S.-
Kyrgyz relations.
When the upheaval of April 6th and 7th happened in
Kyrgyzstan, I was teaching my students in Utah at Utah Valley
University. This time, in comparison with the events 5 years
before, a regime of the deposed President Bakiyev, as he
promised, used live ammunition against protesters, and soon,
like many others in Kyrgyzstan, I felt a great pain from this.
Among those who fell, struck by the two bullets in the head
was my nephew, 35 years old, Rustan Shambetov, and one of my
wife's cousins, Mirlanbek Turdaliev, 29 years old, who was
raised as an orphan in Jalalabad, the same city from which the
deposed President Bakiyev also came. Then one more person,
Joldoshbek Kudaybergenov, 36 years old, journalist, who was
just witnessing the process and tried to await some news about
that. He was struck by a bullet.
So this is also the proof that there were so many people
there involved, not just the crowd and mob, but just many
people who are sincerely, genuinely trying to witness the
changes that was going on.
So the upheaval caused 85 people so far and hundreds and
hundreds still are there in hospitals. And now the Kyrgyz
people there want, first of all, accountability for the
government which was undermined by corruption and nepotism, and
also a government which authorized the use of lethal force
against protester citizens. But they also want a new
government, and they have high expectations from the people who
are now in the interim government who would restore democratic
freedoms, ensure free access to the market, and the system of
corruption and patronage.
They also are asking questions. Most important, is America
truly our friend? And if so, then, first, America should
demonstrate its commitment to democracy and the values of an
open society with more than just words. Second, America should
also remember that Kyrgyz society, despite the questions quite
sharp and not pleasant about the procurement contracts, etc.,
still continues to view America as a model worth emulating.
Third, America should remember that its support, for
example, for education in Kyrgyzstan has had a far more
positive impact on our country than the Transit Center. U.S.-
founded American University in Central Asia is now among the
most prestigious universities in Central Asia and the region,
and America can show it cares about our country by continuing
such generous support for education that is shaping our
country's future.
And as far as the air base, Manas, is concerned, I would
like to remind you, first, that its major aim was, and still
continues to be, to support U.S. military operations in the war
in Afghanistan and, as a result of that, to maintain security
for the Kyrgyz public against external threats that originate
in that country.
Therefore, from the beginning, the air base operation, the
issue of payment was never our primary concern. The Kyrgyz
government was focused on the threat of its own population
originating from Afghanistan starting from 1999 when, for the
first time, we experienced incursions of al Qaeda on our soil
and, as a result, 3 years before 9/11 we experienced such
attacks and we lost 55 lives of our people in uniform and
citizens.
So, therefore, when the United States came with such a
proposal, we welcomed it and said, as President Akayev
mentioned in 2002 during his visit to Washington, DC, at CSIS,
that Kyrgyzstan will make its own contribution to fight with
this great evil terrorism. We are not asking for the money
because this is our own fight for the triumph of democracy and
the right to enjoy its fruits, to live in peace and prosperity.
I am really grateful to you for, again, having this
hearing. So many of you talk why and how the issues from such
kind of strategic importance now shifted to the issue about the
so-called corrupted practices from both sides, and I know that
my colleagues have a lot to offer.
But my main message is that we have to restore our
cooperation on a wide-range of issues, and the issue of the
base is extremely important to us, to continue to keep its
presence as a strategic asset for us against a strike from
Afghanistan and, at the same time, to pay attention to other
areas--education, political, and economic reforms--which could
help the country continue to advance itself in Central Asia,
which deserves its own right and place in the international
community.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Abdrisaev follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
Dr. Cooley.
STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER COOLEY
Mr. Cooley. Thank you very much, Chairman Tierney, Ranking
Member Flake, distinguished members of the subcommittee, for
this privilege of addressing you today. I am a political
scientist who has studied the Manas Air Base since its
establishment in 2001 and studied in a comparative context,
viewing developments related to the base in comparison to other
bases that we have in places like East Asia, Southern Europe,
and other post-communist states.
Regrettably, it is not surprising that the U.S. military
presence has become intertwined with allegations that the U.S.
supported of the repressive and corrupt regime of President
Kurmanbeck Bakiyev. At the same time, I do believe we have the
opportunity now, if we act I think with some foresight and we
act aggressively, to salvage the base.
I think it is important at the outset to understand that
the base has come to mean different things for Kyrgyzstan and
the United States. For us it is, naturally, this important,
vital hub to support the mission in Afghanistan. And for the
Kyrgyz, when it was first established, this was also the
security purpose.
However, the base's role within Kyrgyzstan has evolved
since its establishment, and during the Bakiyev regime and, I
would argue, the latter stages of the Akayev regime, the base
became viewed primarily as a domestic source of rents, income,
and patronage. So this is why the United States has to pay quid
pro quo to establish its presence in Kyrgyzstan. It otherwise
lacks the authority, just from of this vital international
mission, to keep the base.
Now, this quid pro quo has been official, in the form of
rental payments that have gone from $2 million to $17 million
to the current $60 million, but some of the quid pro quo is
also tacit; and this is when we get into the business of base-
related service contracts and fuel contracts. Unfortunately,
both these official and these tacit payments have tended to
accrue to Kyrgyz elites and have not benefited Kyrgyzstan and
Kyrgyz's development as a whole. So the base means very
different things to each side.
As you mentioned in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, the
base also became a symbol of the U.S.'s indifference to
regressions in Kyrgyzstan's human rights and democracy. Also,
the base itself was viewed not only as a symbol, but as an
actual site of Bakiyev's greed and cronyism. It functioned as a
daily reminder of what this regime had become.
The point I want to make in my remarks to you is that we
learned actually the wrong lessons about the relationship
between political authoritarianism, stability, and basing
rights. Many DOD and State Department officials I talked to
pointed to the example of Uzbekistan as a cautionary tale of
what can go wrong; where, in 2005, after the crackdown of Uzbek
security services against demonstrators in the eastern city of
Andijon, there was a wave of international criticism, including
from the U.S. State Department.
The Uzbek government became very concerned about our
political commitment to them. This was also in the middle of
the colored revolutions. And this led to a series of events
that resulted in the eviction of the U.S. military from the
Karshi Khanabad K2 facility in the summer of 2005.
So the lesson seems to have been learned: don't push
Central Asian governments on human rights and democracy;
otherwise, you will jeopardize the base. But the fact of the
matter is that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have very different
political cultures. Kyrgyzstan is considerably more open; has a
better civil society; and its security services are not as
repressive and never have commanded the loyalty of the regime
as they have in Uzbekistan.
And you saw that; in both 2005 and 2010, the security
services did not go to the mat for the Kyrgyz regime. So that
is one thing, that we sort of thought there was this one
Central Asian political culture that fits all.
A second point I would make is that we started viewing
Bakiyev's authoritarianism as, in and of itself, evidence of
political stability, when in fact it was popular protest
against electricity rate hikes and against the greed and
corruption of the regime that led to its destabilization.
So I would just make those two points.
Recommendations going forward. We do have to mend fences
with the Kyrgyz government, and quickly. I think we can offer
financial support for very specific goals that we can agree
with, for example, helping them finance this upcoming
Presidential election that will be so open.
Second, I think U.S. officials should publicly declare
their willingness to cooperate with any Kyrgyz investigation to
Bakiyev-era base-related business practices and open these
transactions to public scrutiny. I realize these are going to
inconvenience certain parties, but the symbolism is important.
This has to be treated as a political crisis, not as a legal
matter. And one suggestion I would have is look at ways in
which base-related contracts can accrue into the Kyrgyz
national budget, as opposed to private entities with offshore
registrations.
Finally, I think both the President and the Congress should
recommit to supporting Kyrgyzstan's democratization and support
the appropriate programs.
My final point, yes, the base was extended for a year, and
we are all grateful for that, but we are entering a campaign
cycle now where this will become a political pinata for
populous politicians to really link the base to U.S. support of
an unpopular dictator. So as Professor Huskey mentioned, it is
imperative that we take these actions now, and not in October
when the campaign is in full swing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooley follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much, Dr. Cooley.
Mr. Horton.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT HORTON
Mr. Horton. Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Flake, and
distinguished Members, it is a great honor for me to appear
before you today and talk about the situation in Kyrgyzstan.
I want to start by noting my colleague, Alex Cooley's
comment. He says we need to look at this as a political matter,
rather than a legal matter, and I will submit we have to look
at it both ways. I submit that principally because I am a
lawyer and it is my duty here to look at the legal issues; and
that is what I have done. But I also feel that is a fundamental
aspect of the political controversy in Kyrgyzstan today.
This revolution, reduced to one word, was about corruption.
Now, all the political leaders that I have talked with agree,
and in the wake of the revolution there is a great deal of talk
about the rule of law and transparency. And the question I hear
thrown at me as an American, when I talk with them, over and
over again is what is your commitment to the rule of law and
transparency? You talk about this all the time and we don't see
it in your conduct in our country.
And I am ashamed to say I think they have a valid point. So
I looked with some care at the publicly available information
concerning the fuel contracts that were written relating to
Manas, and I note in my remarks that we don't have the quality
of information that a prosecutor could use to bring a case, but
I think we can draw some conclusions from this information.
And the first is that there are numerous red flags of the
sort traditionally used by our Department of Justice when
looking at bribery cases relating to public contracts, which
suggests strongly that we may be looking at a violation of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other anti-bribery statutes.
And certainly there are sufficient red flags to merit the
opening of a formal and detailed inquiry into what transpired.
The second thing is looking at the structure of these
contracts and looking particularly at Red Star and Mina Corp.,
the two entities which received in excess of $1 billion in fuel
supply contracts. They are very disturbing questions concerning
these companies. They appear to have come out of nowhere with
no prior track record of involvement in this sector; the
individuals involved with them have copious connections to the
U.S. Government, but not really very much to the fuel supply
industry; and the contracting relationships themselves are, in
a word, extraordinary, not consistent with traditional
contracting rule and approaches.
In fact, yesterday, in an article by Aaron Roston, he
secured and released and published a Memorandum of Agreement
between the Department of Defense and Red Stas, which I
examined, and I have to say I was just shocked by it. It is
nothing like a traditional contracting document.
All this together shows the absence of an arm's length
relationship between Red Star and the Department of Defense,
and I think that is quite troubling because, of course, it is
Red Star and Mina Corp. that historically did do contracts with
President Akayev's family--I think that information is really
quite well established--and are accused of having concluded
similar contractual arrangements with entities controlled by
President Bakiyev. In any event, that accusation is out there,
presented very sharply by the Kyrgyz government, and it is
incumbent upon us to operate transparently, get to the bottom
of the facts, and admit we made a mistake if in fact we did.
I also am concerned about the role the U.S. Department of
Justice has played in this, because after the 2005 revolution,
the Justice Department did come in, did conduct an
investigation, and appears to have given a wink and a nod to
these arrangements involving Red Star and Mina Corp., and I
think that raises serious questions in my mind about their
understanding of this contract corruption issue, particularly
because this occurs at a time when our Justice Department is
telling us that procurement contract fraud is a priority for
the Department of Justice. Indeed, they say it is a national
security issue. And I don't see how we can reconcile the way
they have behaved in this case with those sorts of statements.
In the end, how our Defense Department contracts for
services at Manas makes a statement about how we view
Kyrgyzstan. Is this a fellow democracy that shares our values
and the rule of law and transparency, or do we view this
country as congenitally corrupt and governed by competing bands
of kleptocrats, where we have to use walking-around money to
accomplish goals and we define the relationship only in short-
term ways, because we are really not looking for a long-term
relationship?
The simple truth is that Kyrgyzstan is not a well
established, stable democracy, but it is also is not some sort
of Hobbesian nightmare. The people in Kyrgyzstan have very,
very high aspirations. And the question is what is the path
forward? How are we going to proceed? Are we going to work with
the Kyrgyz and support their aspirations for a modern democracy
that lives up to the values that we both articulate, or are we
going to continue dealing with them in a way that shores up
corruption in the country and autocratic rule? And I think the
approach of the last few years is not worthy of the United
States and is not worthy of Kyrgyzstan.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Horton follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Horton.
Mr. Patten.
STATEMENT OF SAM PATTEN
Mr. Patten. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Tierney,
Congressman Flake, and other Members, for the opportunity to
speak on behalf of Freedom House to this subcommittee.
In his novel The Last Tycoon, Scott Fitzgerald wrote that
there are no second acts in American lives.
In view of recent events, a fitting question for this
hearing, and for those who are concerned about Kyrgyzstan's
future, is whether there is indeed a second act in store for
Kyrgyzstan, the far-distant mountainous Soviet state that is
little known to the American people.
I would argue that there is if we learn the correct lessons
from the recent experience. Those lessons would be the first
application of such lessons in the former Soviet Union. In no
instance since the color revolutions between 2003 and 2005 have
any of the former dictators been brought to account for their
crimes against their people.
Unfortunately, Mr. Bakiyev's exit from Kyrgyzstan denies
the Kyrgyz people the opportunity to hold him and his regime to
account for the crimes that he committed. However, hopefully
the full investigation that other witnesses have talked about
and alluded to will be conducted and there will be an
opportunity to bring the Bakiyev family to account for the
crimes that no other former Soviet leader has to date been
called to account for.
Freedom House is probably best known for the rankings that
we produce each year of Freedom in the World, Nations in
Transit, taking a look at all of the countries of the former
Soviet Union and indeed the world. This year, for the first
time, we downgraded Kyrgyzstan to not free in January for a
variety of reasons having to do with the Bakiyev government's
relationship with the media, its increasing censorship, the
violence with which it dealt with journalists, and its
increasing political repression.
In the spirit of fairness, I took our report to the then
Kyrgyz Ambassador in Washington, Zamira Sydykova, who is a
relatively thoughtful woman and a former journalist, much in
the same spirit as the interim leader, Rosa Otunbayeva, to have
a conversation and to explain to her why Freedom House
downgraded Kyrgyzstan to not free.
She listened to the reasons that I laid forth and that were
in our reports, and at the end of our discussion she asked,
``why is it that the State Department no longer talks to us
about democracy? It used to be that every sentence the State
Department would say to us would include the word democracy;
now they only talk to us about trade. If your State Department
does not care about democracy, why should we?''
I was stunned by her reaction to the report and, indeed,
there is an important responsibility. Much blame has been put
on the Department of Defense for the recent events that have
happened in Kyrgyzstan. I think it is important to look at the
role in a whole government approach that the State Department
also needs to play.
We have seen in the New York Times the fairly apocryphal
account of an opposition leader, which has been mentioned here
today, visiting the U.S. Embassy and saying that the revolution
begins on Wednesday, and the diplomat with whom he spoke said,
``oh, yeah?'' Other opposition figures, as we have heard, were
not received at the U.S. Embassy and, in fact, Congress passed
the Advanced Democratic Values Act in 2006. There is a law on
the books requiring senior U.S. diplomats to actively outreach
and engage opposition figures, human rights activists, and
others in all countries where the United States conducts
diplomatic relations. Kyrgyzstan should be no exception; the
other countries of the former Soviet space should be no
exception.
The recent incident in Kyrgyzstan and the ongoing tumult
that comes from the events of the last 2 weeks puts the
regional situation, particularly with Kazakhstan, as the
chairman of the OSCE, in a unique perspective. Kazakhstan's
becoming the first chairman of the OSCE east of Vienna is a
historic precedent.
The events of the last 2 weeks presented the first
opportunity in Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the OSCE to
actively engage in a constructive way to diffuse violence, to
put monitors on the ground, and work in the process of healing
the country of Kyrgyzstan. They failed. They failed to deploy
ODIHR, which had the monitors and the resources necessary to
engage, and, instead, reverted to old-style former Soviet
diplomacy, in effect whisking Bakiyev off through Kazakhstan to
Belarus, where he safely sits today.
I think that is an important lesson looking forward about
just the role of multilateral institutions in the OSCE in
particular and how it was intended to be used in situations
like this and how, perhaps in the balance of Kazakhstan's
chairmanship, it can do a better job.
Looking also in the regional perspective, there are lessons
to be learned here with respect to Uzbekistan in particular.
And the case was raised that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are not
similar in many circumstances; however, the lessons are the
same. The lesson that we have learned in Kyrgyzstan is that
backing up a single dictator does not put us in a very good
position when a revolution happens.
The question with Uzbekistan is not if the revolution will
happen, but when it will happen, and do we want to be in the
same position sitting here at this table, wondering what
happened, when things do change in Uzbekistan, as we are today.
A careful look and review of the situation and how Kyrgyzstan
got to where it is hopefully will put us in a better position
when that comes.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Patten follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Patten.
Thank all of our witnesses for your testimony, both written
and oral; it has been informative on that. We are going into a
question and answer period here, about 5 minutes per Member,
and we will go around more than one cycle if that is amenable
to all the witnesses and the Members desire it.
Mr. Patten, it is not unusual for the United States, if we
go back in our history, unfortunately, and find out how often
diplomatically we have chosen to support somebody who was
authoritarian in nature or convenient to moving our priorities
forward, as opposed to keeping those open contacts with
opposition leaders as well, and playing a different role.
Pakistan comes to mind, General Musharraf, as a more recent
thing, but it goes on and on.
Let me ask first, though, to all the witnesses here. I am
hearing that it is a good idea to do this investigation, it is
a good idea to do it early on, it is a good idea to be as
inclusive and thorough as we can be. Yet, on the other hand, I
am hearing that doing that may give fodder to sort of a pinata
sort of situation in the elections coming up in that country.
So can you weigh or balance for me the pros and cons of that?
In any order people want to speak up.
Dr. Cooley, you have been nodding away. Do you want to
speak first?
Mr. Cooley. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think the base is going to
be a pinata whether we have the investigation or not. I think
candidates are positioning themselves. They have all the fodder
that they need to make these connections. And, again, this
operates in Kyrgyz political space. This is regardless of what
the intentions may or may not have been on the part of the
State or DOD. The base will be an issue. That is why having an
investigation, being contrite about some of the arrangements,
all of this is important to give domestic political support to
those factions, to those candidates that want to maintain the
base and have good relations with the United States.
Mr. Tierney. Sure, Mr. Horton, go ahead.
Mr. Horton. I would just add that I think investigations
are occurring because the Kyrgyz side is conducting an
investigation. And while we talk about transparency, actually,
I think all of us who have tried to look into the issues
surrounding these contracts have discovered very quickly we can
get much more detailed information much more quickly in Bishkek
than we can get it in Washington.
There are prosecutors out there right now doing detailed
investigations. Information is circulating about the pricing of
the fuel contracts right now. Copies of the documents are
circulating. It is out there. And, frankly, it would behoove us
to conduct our own investigation and be out there with
conclusions ahead of them. We have to view it in that context.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Horton, as long as you are on that, I take
note of your comment that there are U.S. individuals connected
with some of these companies, like Red Star and Mina. So tell
me a little bit about that, why we should be cautious of that
and what you know so far.
Mr. Horton. Well, again, I viewed this from a perspective
of traditional analysis of the FCPA as it will be applied in a
commercial setting and I said, if we viewed this as a
commercial contract----
Mr. Tierney. The FCPA being the Federal Corrupt----
Mr. Horton. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. And one thing
the prosecutors do applying this is they look to these sorts of
contract and subcontracting relationships and test is there
really an arm's length relationship between the original
company and the first tier contractor.
In applying those tests, we come to a conclusion very
quickly there is no such arm's length relationship, and that
using the traditional factors--who are the officers, who are
the people who are working in the company, what is its
tradition, what is its business history, has it operated in
this sort of business in the past, what volume of business did
it have before, how are the contracts concluded, was there open
bidding for it--you apply all these tests and it flunks every
single test, which means, using the traditional Department of
Justice analysis, not arm's length.
Mr. Tierney. Ambassador, what do you say about the Akayev
regime when it was in power? Do you believe it was corrupt as
well as the Bakiyev? Do you take no position on that or what
information do you want to share?
Mr. Abdrisaev. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, first of
all, about the previous question, I think that such an
investigation will be quite important for a fellow democracy,
an emerging democracy, to learn lessons from the leading
democracy in the world. It will demonstrate how some of the
problems must be resolved in a legal framework. It would be
really great.
Second, about the corrupt practices, I think this is an
issue where we have to now admit that during Akayev's regime,
when I was an ambassador, in 2003 I was at--University and I
was grilled on the same issue 7 years ago, and I admitted that
probably, yes, because the president's family is involved in
that business.
But how do we have to regulate it? What kind of legislation
and framework do we need, because it is an issue that our
country has to admit and then resolve. And probably this
investigation will help for us to not to allow for the rulers
to do something, which people view as against their benefits
and for their wealth.
But second, also, it would help for us to understand how
the base changed its status from being of strategic
importantance for protection from external threats to now
becoming such a source of controversy. Because we have another
example in Kyrgyzstan of the famous company Kumptor Gold
Mining. It experienced the same kind of problems during 2 or 3
years, and we have just couple of such projects. Why are we in
such a bottleneck when people now view the U.S. base as just a
source of money? And it is quite an important question which I
think this investigation also would help to resolve.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much.
Mr. Huskey. Mr. Chairman, could I speak to the comparison
of President Akayev and Bakiyev on this point?
Mr. Tierney. There being no objection, sure, go right
ahead.
Mr. Huskey. It is true that both were corrupt, both regimes
were corrupt, but the degree of corruption in the most recent
regime of Bakiyev was far greater, bringing his son right into
the central core of the executive branch. The other difference,
however, didn't have to do with corruption, but it had to do
with the level of repression. In Akayev it was still possible
to have a relatively vibrant civil society. That was being
destroyed since 2007.
We had a criminalization of the state in Kyrgyzstan, where
law enforcement authorities were intermingled with criminal
groups, where the former chief of staff of the president was
incinerated in his car because he dared to flirt with the
opposition, we had journalists and opposition politicians being
killed, members of the parliament being killed. This kind of
thing didn't happen under Akayev. So I think there was a
qualitative difference between the Akayev and the Bakiyev eras.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. Thank you for that.
Mr. Flake, you are recognized.
Mr. Flake. We have spoken about the air base, Dr. Cooley,
the air base being used politically.
Dr. Huskey, if you could elaborate how will this be used in
a political campaign? Is there popular support in the
population for the air base? Does the population simply want
the revenue to trickle down a little more freely? Or what kind
of politics are going to be used with the air base? If you
could elaborate.
Mr. Huskey. Again, as I was suggesting, the air base has to
be seen as a part of a decade-long history of Kyrgyzstan either
selling or auctioning its territory. It began at the end of the
1990's with the Chinese border delimitation, where Kyrgyzstan
lost 250,000 acres to China. There are lots of rumors about the
president at the time taking money and other members of the
cabinet. Kazakhstan was given territory; Uzbekistan was on the
verge of getting a very sweet deal.
Unfortunately, Manas is a part of that tradition, and I
don't think we can say that in the Kyrgyz population the base
is terribly popular. They, I think, have forgotten what
happened in 2001; it is almost a decade beyond that point. And,
as Ambassador Abdrisaev was saying, the incursion of people
from Afghanistan through southwestern Kyrgyzstan at the end of
the 1990's, alarmed the population and the government. But now
I think the base is not a terribly popular idea.
The only thing I would say is that it is possible that some
of the parties that are now separate will come together before
the election. If they do, one could imagine a moderate stance
on this, an accommodational stance. The danger would be that
kind of fused party would be outflanked by a party willing to,
again, hit the pinata, as Professor Cooley says, with the air
base issue.
Mr. Flake. Dr. Cooley.
Mr. Cooley. The base will certainly be an issue in the
campaign, but it is not going to be the only issue, and I would
argue it wouldn't be the prime issue. What drove the events of
the last 2 weeks were anger about, as was stated, the increase
in electricity and gas tariffs, which is a result of corruption
and the accelerating pace of corruption, which has been pointed
out that in the Bakiyev government, the level of corruption,
the depth of corruption intensified tremendously.
Really, by focusing on corruption and coming up with
concrete ways of being more transparent in the way in which
funds are provided for rent and other aspects of the base, the
United States can best represent itself and put the base issue
to rest and address the focus on the real issue in Kyrgyzstan,
which is corruption and its affect on government, which is
entirely corrosive.
Mr. Flake. Did you have something to add there?
Mr. Cooley. Just very quickly. The base faces a very
negative media environment, and always has, in Kyrgyzstan from
the Russian language press, and a lot of the stories that they
run are untrue; they are rumors, they are meant to delegitimize
it, accuse the base of doing all sorts of things that they are
not doing. So the media terrain is very difficult and issues
like this just keep stacking up on top.
Now, the transit center does have a Web site; it is much
more proactive than it was a year ago, and I would commend the
base for taking some good PR steps. But a lot of the images in
the Kyrgyzs' mind about the base have been set.
I think our best case scenario, a pro-base politician, if
we want to use that word, I think will only be able to run on
the promise that they will keep the base, but renegotiate some
of its legal provisions. I think that is the political space. I
think the sort of time for business as usual, no one is going
to get behind that.
Mr. Flake. Mr. Ambassador, first, I am glad to see you at
UVU. My kids are at BYU next door. I am wondering, there was as
much as $8 million a month, it was thought that might have been
skimmed off these fuel contracts. Is there any effort or was
this money seized somewhere in these campaigns that will come
out? Are politicians claiming that they can recoup some of this
money and is that a way that they can, through transparency and
whatnot, legitimize the existence of the base, at least? Is
there an effort to seize the money that has been skimmed? Or is
that money just gone now?
Mr. Abdrisaev. I think it requires a serious investigation
from the Kyrgyz side and U.S. side as well. But, first of all,
hearings and transparency in this process I think would help us
maybe to recover part of that money. But the difference with
the previous regime, now people would at least know how that
money would be spent with the current ones for a couple more
years. I think there is no feeling with the new people there
will be such problems like before because now we have a
plurality.
So many people with different opinions, they will liberate
some decisions which benefit society in a more positive way
than the previous regime. The previous regime, everything was
so clouded and secret and, therefore, as a result, of course,
such problems. But now I think it is worth to do it.
And, by the way, my guess is if you would do that, we would
ask also the economic conditions and question the presence of
another base which exists and also a Russian one. And, by the
way, when we signed the agreement with both the United States
and Russia in 2001, the reasons were the same, and it is quite
important for us to see how, in this case, society would
benefit politically, strategically, economically from both
cases. So don't be afraid.
Mr. Flake. Thank you.
Mr. Horton. [Remarks made off mic.]
Mr. Flake. If that is OK with the chairman; I am out of
time.
Mr. Tierney. Sure. Go ahead.
Mr. Horton. [Remarks made off mic.]
Mr. Flake. Can you put the mic on?
Mr. Horton. I am sorry. So $200 million they say has been
transferred out. They are trying to trace that money and freeze
it right now. So there is an ongoing effort to specifically
identify the counter-parties and freeze and secure the funds,
just hold it while they then deal with the question of
liability and whether it can be recovered.
Mr. Flake. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Driehaus, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Driehaus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for holding this hearing.
Dr. Huskey, you had talked about the actions of the U.S.
Embassy and our treatment of opposition leaders leading up to
the change in government, and I am curious as to your opinion
as to whether or not, structurally, at the embassy, folks have
recognized the failure of their actions and what we have done
to address that.
Or are the same people in place? We talk a lot about this
investigation and looking at the air base, but I am wondering
if we are also looking internally at the decisionmaking process
at the embassy and whether or not we have learned anything from
that and are outwardly expressing signs that, yes, we recognize
what we failed to do and we are adjusting for that.
Mr. Huskey. Last week I spoke to people in the State
Department and the administration. I think there is a
recognition that changes have to be made in the embassy. The
previous Ambassador who left--it would have been right about
when I arrived in July 2008, had had a fairly active agenda
with opposition members, and the new Ambassador, Ambassador
Gefeller, adopted a very different policy.
I understand, again, simply from secondhand accounts, that
there was some disagreement with that policy in the embassy
itself, and I am afraid you will have to go elsewhere to find
more detail about this, but obviously an ambassador would not,
it seems to me, on her own be able to make such an important
decision as to stand aside from the opposition of the
democratic change-oriented forces in a country. That would have
had to have been something known and approved in Washington.
Mr. Driehaus. So it is your understanding that the policies
that were being pursued were being instructed or driven by the
State Department in Washington, not necessarily driven by the
Ambassador?
Mr. Huskey. I would so assume.
Mr. Driehaus. Have there been outward signs at the embassy
to the government? There has been mention of the way in which
we could help fund education, how we could pay for the
elections. We talk about the path forward, as Mr. Horton
suggested. The investigation is important, but are there other
things that the embassy could be doing to show that we have
learned our lessons, to show that, in fact, we are working
cooperatively with the government, we are rooting out some of
the corruption that has been identified and we are on a new
path? Have there been outward signs to that effect from the
embassy?
Mr. Huskey. The embassy has certainly been talking to the
interim government, and very actively. It is probably early
days to re-engage with NGO's, but I would assume they would do
that and they would do that, again, very actively. There are a
number of projects that the United States probably ought to get
involved in in that region, some of them infrastructural
projects that would assist them in hydroelectric production.
Russia has gotten involved in a very big way with a kind of
demonstration project, a huge scale project that is now
somewhat uncertain as to when it is going to be finished. But
there are a lot of small scale hydroelectric things that we
could do in the United States that I think would bring terrific
economic and political benefits to both sides.
Mr. Driehaus. Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Abdrisaev. I would like just to add maybe the view of
the outsider, because for 5 years I was out of the
decisionmaking in Bishkek, also dealing with the U.S. Embassy.
I think it will be difficult to blame just the Ambassador for
such changes in policy. My guess is that the opinion of
[indiscernible] is quite important. The United States probably
already decided not to treat our country as a fellow democracy,
but just a regular case of a corrupted and failed state.
And we could see so many opinions not only among the State
Department people, but also among the [indiscernible] experts.
In 2005, I was surprised by the fact that President Nazarbayev
used the case of Kyrgyzstan as mocking in order to be reelected
for the next time, and it was surprising that neither the
United States or experts in the west, they just looked at that
case as something which is indifferent for them.
Our country was used as a case of, again, a violent one and
failed one, and here we already started to lose its connections
based with respect to the values and shared values as well. And
Bakiyev we have to also take into account, he did all of the
efforts in order to cut ties with the United States. He never
ever expressed his desire to come to Washington, DC. During his
time, four diplomats were expelled from Kyrgyzstan. It is
unimaginable. It is unimaginable to expel for almost nothing.
And I can understand the Ambassador, when she came to her
new position, there was already a whole trend. Now it is
necessary to change, again, to restore our attention based on
the multidimensional cooperation--educational, people's
diplomacy exchanges and other things that could restore the
credibility and will be a different attitude.
Mr. Driehaus. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Turner, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Patten, you had mentioned that perhaps they weren't
hearing the word democracy enough from us, so my question is
about democracy. I would like each of you, if you would, to
give us your thoughts on what does the transition look like. Is
it possible for them to transition to democracy? And what can
we do to help?
Mr. Patten. Of all the----
Mr. Turner. I am sorry, Mr. Patten, before you begin,
because I have a feeling that may take up most of my time for
you to each give your thoughts on democracy.
I want to ask unanimous consent from the chairman. I have
an article that is ``Regardless of Who Is in Power, We Have an
Ally in Need,'' by Eric Stewart, former U.S. Department of
Commerce Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europe and Eurasia,
which just sounds many of the themes that I know you are going
to be telling us.
Mr. Tierney. Without objection, that will be put in the
record.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Patten.
Mr. Patten. Thank you, Congressman. Kyrgyzstan has, for
some time, been seen among all the Central Asian states as the
most pluralistic, with the most opportunities for citizen
participation. And certainly during the Akayev period that was
seen to a far greater extent than in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan
or obviously Turkmenistan.
The repressions increased over the Bakiyev term, but there
is an experience in Kyrgyzstan of civic entitlement that does
not exist elsewhere in Central Asia, and for that reason there
is an opportunity, particularly in this next 6 months and the
3-months leading up to the constitutional referendum, and then
in the fall elections.
The key issue is really going to be the legitimacy of the
interim government. This is an unelected government, whereas
Bakiyev was elected, albeit by a rigged election. So the best
way that they can approach that from a standpoint of democracy
is to engage civil society, which is reasonably strong in
Kyrgyzstan relative to other Central Asian countries.
There is an independent public council of strong civil
society groups that has played a very constructive role in the
last 2 weeks. They have engaged in an effort to try and ease
tensions between Bakiyev, before he left the country, and the
interim government, and they have offered draft legislation
already to be considered, issues such as freedom of the media
and reform of police and law enforcement.
So encouraging and supporting civil society is probably the
best thing we can do in the next 3 to 6 months.
Mr. Horton. Well, I agree with Sam Patten on every single
point he made; they are exactly right up and down the list. And
I think acting decisively, vocally, and with funds to support
these elections, to support the constitution process is
extremely important. Enabling civil society, ensuring that it
plays a vibrant role, as I am sure it can, in this process is
critical.
And I think Kyrgyzstan is a standout in this entire region;
it is a country where there are, in fact, millions of people
who deeply care about democracy and civil liberties. They are
willing to take to the streets for it, to stand up and die for
it. They have overturned two governments over this. It is a
unique opportunity and it is something that forms the basis for
a bond with the United States that can be lasting and it can
serve our mutual security interests.
Mr. Cooley. Yes, I would just underscore that I think the
focus should be on encouraging political pluralism, be it in
media or civil society. Yes, the technical stuff is important
in terms of democracy, but it is really creating spaces for the
rich political pluralism and diversity of viewpoints and
external affiliations that the Kyrgyz have. I think that should
be the focus.
Mr. Abdrisaev. I would like also to mention here, as an
addition, that now it is time to work with the political
parties, and during my couple of years last time with the
opposition, I could see a couple of really great hopes with
several parties. So that is why if we would embolden them, help
them, especially not only with creating the party structures,
but also some of the bodies which help them to develop
programs, analytical research, etc., and they will quite
quickly adjust to that, it will develop quite a sound, long-
lasting programs and would have an impact.
One such party I would say [indiscernible]. I was
impressed. He is the person during the 2-years was trying to
push the process of engaging the people, using his grassroots
level support and with quite impressive developments.
Mr. Huskey. Just quickly. I think we have heard about two
preconditions that are in place for democracy, one is culture
and one is leadership with Tekebaev, the Ambassador just
mentioned Atambayev Suriev.
But I think the other issue is institutions and what kinds
of rules are going to be established in the constitution
drafting. It is my feeling that a parliamentary republic for
Kyrgyzstan will be preferable. It will prevent the
concentration of power; it will be less likely that we will
have a winner take all type election with the presidency. And
we see already in the draft that Mr. Tekebaeu has put forward,
he has the idea of the legitimacy of the opposition, which we
take for granted in this country, but which we only developed
in the early 19th century in the United States.
And Kyrgyzstan and many other countries in the world are
trying to do that. He is trying to institutionalize this by
actually giving the opposition the chairmanships of the two key
committees in the next parliament; that would be the budget
committees and the defense committees. Frankly, I am not sure
that will work, but at least there is the idea of creating
institutions that are going to prevent a concentration of
power.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you. You can pretty much bet that
wouldn't work around here. [Laughter.]
Mr. Welch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Welch. Thank you.
I really appreciate your testimony, but I want to ask the
question about what appears to me to be an unresolvable
conflict, and get your thoughts on that. On the one hand, the
necessity for the American military is to have a secure supply
line, and that obviously is to protect our troops. And that
need suggests, to accomplish it, a partner that they can deal
with, corrupt or not, and that urgency of supplying our troops
is going to take precedence, I would think, over any other
goals.
What you have been describing are, in effect, pro-democracy
goals that I certainly support, but in the real world,
particularly with the pressure that is on our troops, is going
to be considered a luxury. So how do you do both, or do we have
to face the fact that we can't do both?
I will start with you, Dr. Huskey.
Mr. Huskey. It is going to be very difficult to do both,
but the reality is that if they elect a government that isn't
willing to extend the air base lease, there is not much we can
do about it except offer a lot more money. And I think money
will speak in a country that has a very small GDP, struggling
budget, economic crisis. I think there are ways, therefore,
that even if we have a very negative outcome in the fall, that
we may be able to counterbalance that, but I think it is going
to be a very heavy price we would have to pay.
Mr. Welch. Ambassador.
Mr. Abdrisaev. Thank you for asking such a question. I
think now we have more hopes with this second upheaval that
society and political structures which we are creating would be
more receptive to the variety of opinions, and I think that no
one need here to be afraid that if the ruling party will make
such a decision. Now we have more voices in order to oppose.
You can see, for example, I have an opinion. This is a base
which has a strategically important meaningful [indiscernible].
I know several opposition leaders, hardliners who are saying
the base is necessary to keep there. Why? Because we already
sacrificed 55 lives and the situation now in Afghanistan is
worse than it was in 1999. Therefore, it is something where
will be no decision like Bakiyev; money in pocket and that is
it.
Mr. Welch. Thank you. Let me keep going. Thank you very
much, Ambassador.
Dr. Cooley.
Mr. Cooley. No, I mean, I think this is the dilemma. I
would make two points. One is because of the different things
that the base meant to us and to the Kyrgyz, I think threats
that the Kyrgyz should somehow evict the United States were not
credible. In other words, I think we had considerable more
leeway for maneuver on the political issues than we thought at
the time, No. 1. No. 2, planning for political change,
especially in an important overseas base host, that has to be
part of the strategic planning effort.
Hedging our bets, reaching out to potential future
political leaders, it is not an all or nothing proposition,
because we have a lot of historical cases here. The
Philippines, we didn't manage the opposition well there;
Thailand; Spain; Greece; Turkey; Okinawa; even the backlash in
Korea that you see. All of these have to do with sort of
democratizing forces coming in and reexamining basing
relationships because somehow they were linked to sort of the
past. So I would make that strategic planning part of the way
we think about the base in an everyday sense.
Mr. Welch. Thank you.
Mr. Horton.
Mr. Horton. I would say I think we have to start by
recognizing there will be situations where imperative concerns
of national security will justify a departure from normal
procurement rules. I will put that mildly. But I am not sure,
in fact, I believe that Kyrgyzstan was not such a case, and
where the appropriate effort to do it the right way needed to
be made and wasn't made.
And I think there is also another really fundamental point
that I think Alex just made, but I will put it in slightly
different terms. It is a question of whether we are focused on
the short-term or a long-term relationship. If it is a short-
term, well, corners will be cut and we don't care.
If we want to have a long-term relationship with this
country, we want to have a facility there for the long term--
and that is a politically very hot issue, of course--then we
have to modulate our behavior accordingly, and we have to
respect them and show respect for their institutions, their
aspirations for rule of law and democracy. We haven't done
that. That, I think, was a serious error in Kyrgyzstan. And now
it is up to us to draw conclusions about it and try and
straighten the situation up.
Mr. Patten. Congressman, your question is really central in
terms of whether or not we can do both, and I believe we can do
both on the basis of accumulated experience and looking at
where we have been successful and where we haven't been
successful. As Ambassador Abdrisaev mentioned in his opening
remarks, having served the Kyrgyz government at the time the
base was initially opened, it is in the Kyrgyz national
security interest to have an American presence there. The tide
seems to have shifted in Central Asia where, in the 1990's,
when the Americans first showed up in Central Asia, all of the
states understood that there was a strategic value in having
the United States present.
Now that we are in the position of appearing to be
blackmailed by a dictator, other dictators are looking at that
and seeing possible opportunities. We have to shift back to the
strategic questions while applying the lessons learned.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Welch.
So, Mr. Horton, at this juncture is there any information
that you are aware of that suggests that the Department of
Defense purposely designed the fuel service contracts to enrich
the first families?
Mr. Horton. It seems to me that the Department of Defense
absolutely accepted that might be the most expedient way to
proceed.
Mr. Tierney. You should have been a diplomat.
Mr. Horton. That is the perception, the very broad
perception inside Kyrgyzstan. We see that charge being made
dramatically by the chief of staff, Edil Baisalov, a number of
other people. I, frankly, looking at the details of how these
contracts were structured, who was involved with them, I find
it very difficult to refute that.
I think it is likely that we are going to see the Defense
Department say, well, at the end of the day, we got the fuel,
we got it on time, and we got it for a reasonable price, so who
cares. And the answer to that has to be, two governments fell
in part because of this, so it really does make a big
difference and it really has disturbed our relationship with
this country, which at one point was clearly the most pro-
American country in Central Asia and today may no longer be
that.
Mr. Tierney. So it begs the question or the answer, I
guess, that certainly they could have taken steps to steer
those contracts away from the private interested companies and
to another government type of entity or something a little more
national in nature on that, how would that have looked?
Mr. Horton. I think they could have gone through a
transparent public bidding process for the contracts, and they
should have--what you would have seen, probably, was an effort
by Kyrgyz authorities to rig the process so that only one
company would be available as a possible provider or bidder.
But I think the United States would have come out of this
much better if it went through a public process and
procurement, set it up for bids, and awarded it. At the end of
the day, if it wound up going to a company that was controlled
by the president, if that happened as a result of an open
public process because that was the only company that was
capable of fulfilling the contracts, we would be a lot better
off.
Mr. Tierney. Well, I think we already have evidence that
was not the case.
Ambassador, let me ask you. For a country the size of
Kyrgyzstan, and now the $64 million lease number people bandy
around, what would that money have meant to Kyrgyzstan if it
had not been dissipated into other corrupt bodies? What would
it do for a country like Kyrgyzstan to have the use of that
money?
Mr. Abdrisaev. I think it is this question of the
government, and probably they would be in the process of open
bidding, they will see how, through the taxes, it will be
redistributed to different needs for the people, and they could
explain it. But with the government of the Bakiyev, probably
this was not the case; they were interested in different
things.
You mean not about additional to the oil? I think, again,
through the budget they could show the true use for the paying
of the salaries and sustain some of the other projects. But my
guess here is base issue is not--the problem that now we have a
bottleneck in Kyrgyzstan and the base is becoming just one of
the few projects, and we need here more diversity. Still, the
problem will continue further in the future, and we have to
work on that issue as well.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Dr. Huskey, how does that number relate to the overall GDP
of Kyrgyzstan?
Mr. Huskey. I think it is something like 3 percent. I mean,
this is not high. It is a significant amount of money and it
clearly could have been put to very good use for the Kyrgyz
people if this money had not been syphoned off. It is a trick,
because even if you have open tender, you need to have a
competitive bidding process.
It is possible in a Bakiyev-like environment for people
surrounding the family, after the fact, to come in and horn
their way into these legitimate businesses. This has happened
one time after another in Kyrgyzstan and other parts of the
post-communist world. But at least the original bidding should
be competitive and above-board.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Driehaus, would you care to ask any more questions?
Mr. Driehaus. I would just like to ask one final question,
if we could run through the panel. Clearly, the United States
has suffered a blow in terms of its legitimacy in Kyrgyzstan
with respect to the long-term interests of the United States in
the region and the country, and I think we have discussed some
of this, but what are your one or two things that you believe
we should be focusing on that would support the long-term
interests not just of Kyrgyzstan, but also of the United
States--which I believe would also benefit us in the short-
term--with regard to the base?
Dr. Huskey.
Mr. Huskey. Well, I think something that hasn't been talked
about is the role of Russia in this. Russia has been a very
important player in bringing about the revolution, in trying to
expel the United States in the first place, so this is not just
a U.S.-Kyrgyz issue.
There is a triangular aspect to this, so I think we have to
frame it in that way. Russia is trying to expand its sphere of
influence, understandably, after the difficult decades for them
of the 1990's, and why it wanted to expel the United States.
Was that simply a sphere of influence issue? Was it trying to
have a bargaining chip with the United States on other perhaps
larger issues of bilateral matters between the two countries?
Let me just stop there and I will let my colleagues add.
Mr. Abdrisaev. I think it is an issue about investments,
which were already mentioned, quite an important one, and I
planned at the beginning not to raise that issue, but probably
it is time. Kyrgyzstan, from 1998, is the only country from the
WTO in the region, and from that time during all of the 12
years, it is the only WTO member in the whole region, and China
just during 2000.
So you could imagine that 12 years ago 200 percent of
[indiscernible] against all our goods, and this is a factor
that has contributed to the poverty, unemployment, and
desperation. So we need more investments. And the people would
be happy. And Kazakhstan, who is teaching us about many things,
they are also contributing to our poverty as well.
Why? Two hundred percent. I would like to say, like
President Reagan said in a famous speech, Mr. Gorbachev,
please, tear that wall down. And then it will be a miracle. Our
people know how to handle it.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Cooley. I think one lesson here is that we need to get
out of the sort of competitive mind-set that our competition
with Russia, some type of great game, that zero sum for
influence in Central Asia. I think this is potentially quite
destructive because it also leads the Russians to behave in
that kind of way, where they think any kind of blow that they
can strike against our presence there is a gain for them.
So I think part of it has to be recalibrating the mind-set,
being very clear as to what our goals are in Central Asia. Are
they access to the base? That is not the same thing as
undermining Russia, and working, I think, in a more
consultative way with Moscow would behoove us.
I see three-way competition in Central Asia between Russia,
the United States and China. China did more trade with Central
Asia in 2009 than Russia. So in this relationship Central Asia
is not our backyard; Afghanistan's backyard. We need to have a
distinct brand. What do we stand for that China doesn't stand
for and that Russia doesn't stand for.
So this is why we get back to the importance of things like
transparency and investment, engaging on a range of sort of
social democracy issues. Things that the two other regional
powers don't do, I think that will be part of our brand in
Central Asia moving forward.
Mr. Horton. I think the path to our retention of our
position with this base starts with our demonstration that this
relationship is not just about the base; that there is a
broader foundation for it, that we care about democracy, we
care about human rights, but especially that we care about
education.
When you press Kyrgyz when they say you really don't care
about anything in the base and you press them, is that really
true, frequently they will sort of grudgingly say, oh, well, of
course we recognize you did do all these things in the
education sector; there is the American University that was set
up, there was support for secondary education, there was
English language training, there were scholarships.
Frankly, the best invested money we put into Kyrgyzstan
easily has been in the education sector, and it has been the
basis for popular support in Kyrgyzstan for the broader
security relationship. It is students from Kyrgyzstan who go to
high schools in the United States, who go to colleges, who get
masters degrees. Those are the people who say this isn't a bad
idea; we need to sustain that relationship. We need to learn
that lesson and we need to continue that investment.
Mr. Patten. I would put forth that Kyrgyzstan is the only
country in the region where there has been regime change since
independence. You could argue that in Turkmenistan,
Turkmenbashi died and he was succeeded by his doctor, but it is
essentially the same thing. There have now been two rounds of
regime change in Kyrgyzstan, and the second round has been more
violent than the first.
So I think our strategic interest is in institutionalizing
a way for regime change according to a democratic procedure in
Central Asia that will serve as a model for the other
countries, because this is the looming question for Uzbekistan,
for Kazakhstan, for the other countries: how does succession
happen, and I think Kyrgyzstan presents an excellent
opportunity to look at better models for succession, and that
could really be America's legacy in the region. As Dr. Cooley
said, it is really a question of having the American brand be
one of values, and that is what the people of Central Asia are
looking toward.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you very much.
Mr. Fortenberry, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
for coming today. I am sorry I have missed the balance of your
testimony, and I apologize if some of this is a bit repetitive.
I think, Mr. Ambassador, you may be best suited to answer
this first question. Culturally speaking, what is the
disposition of the people of Kyrgyzstan toward the United
States as we look toward some of what was just discussed here,
longer-term relationships, empowering governance capacities,
particularly in terms of peaceful transfers of power and long-
term stability in the country for the well-being of the people,
but also clearly to secure interests that we have, such as our
own base?
Mr. Abdrisaev. According to the poll which was made public
last year by the IRA, in Kyrgyzstan we have quite a negative
trend toward the United States. Feelings are not good, and
probably because of some of the promises which were not
fulfilled. But partly also this process was inflamed by the
transfer of the Russian Federation into the policies from the
regime, which was now changed.
In general, if we would implement suggestions which my
colleague just made--education, grassroots level education and
support more to those forces, which we have already there,
civil society, NGO's, media--they could start flourish, then we
will change the tide dramatically and, parallel also, the base
would continue to exist. It is my opinion that people could
understand how to balance that together. It is time for us just
to very, very [indiscernible] and people of Kyrgyzstan would
understand that clearly.
I agree also with the opinion of my colleague from Freedom
House that it is the second change of regime in Kyrgyzstan.
Unfortunately, we lost the time during 5 years in order to do
that in an orderly way, and now it is time to show how it is
possible to do in Central Asia something which, by the way,
happened quite successfully in Mongolia. Same thing; country,
small size, but five, six times changes of the regime, and now
it is a full-fledged democracy. Something we have to look at
the lessons and to try to work quite actively.
Mr. Fortenberry. Mongolia, by the way, is a partner country
with the House Democracy Partnership Commission on which I
serve, one of the early recipients of this opportunity to be in
dialog with us on an ongoing basis as to how we build their
technical capacity in their parliament, their legislature. So
you are right, that is a good example in the region there.
Does Russia actively connive at fomenting this anti-
American spirit, or is it just part of the broader organic
movement in the area at this point in time?
Mr. Abdrisaev. Russia now is trying to regain its influence
in the region and in Kyrgyzstan as well, and we have to admit
that Russia has a legitimate right to be there in that
territory, and pro-Russian sentiments are quite great.
I think it is time also for us to see how to work together
with Russia, and even if Russia was involved in the change of
the regime, probably it is also a sign that Russia has quite
high stakes in promoting the regimes which are not so looking
toward feudalism like previous government or Bakiyev tried to
create. I have plenty of examples which before Russia and
United States tried to implement in Central Asia to the
benefits of the Kyrgyz Republic, so it is time also to find the
common goals.
Mr. Fortenberry. Well, somebody made the point that to
convict the people that it is not necessary to pick a side
here, but to actively engage in their own well-being by active
engagement, constructive engagement with the United States,
constructive engagement with Russia is a potential outcome that
is beneficial to them particularly, but would also help
stabilize our relationship, I assume.
Dr. Cooley, did you want to----
Mr. Cooley. No, I would just also make the point that ever
since the apparent double-cross of Bakiyev against Putin last
year, when Russia offered a $2 billion package of investments
and assistance to close down the base, the base closure was
announced and then was walked back, relations between Moscow
and Bishkek really deteriorated to an all-time low and Russia
really launched an all-out soft power blitz in the media that
really undermined the Bakiyev regime, calling him corrupt and
nepotistic, drawing attention to these aspects of his rule.
It was an onslaught and it put us in an embarrassing
position where it was the Kremlin, for its very own cynical
political purposes, that was drawing attention to these
governance issues that we were relatively silent on. So Russia,
through its soft power, through these cultural influences, also
through the fact that Kyrgyz workers live and work in Russia
and send home remittances which comprise anywhere from 30 to 40
percent of Kyrgyz GDP, for all these reasons Kyrgyzstan's
connections with Russia are quite close, and we need to take
that into account.
Mr. Fortenberry. There is a certain irony in what you just
said, though.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Fortenberry.
Let me thank all of the witnesses for giving up your time
today and sharing your expertise. You can't get rid of us very
easily, so I am hoping that you all are available for us to
call on at some point in the future if we want to take
advantage of your knowledge and your understanding and your
expertise.
So I will take those little nods of your head as assent to
that, and I appreciate it. You have been a tremendous help to
us in setting the table for what I think are going to be some
pretty extensive hearings, and I think you have let us have
some context to where we ought to go.
So I want to thank all of you. Ambassador, thank you
especially through your difficult times that you are
experiencing. It is our hope that this investigation does serve
the purpose of lending some transparency and accountability to
the situation for the United States and for people in
Kyrgyzstan, and that we just find out what happened, who the
players were, what they did, and we can then determine whether
it was good, bad, or indifferent and act accordingly from there
to make sure that we build a stronger relationship and take a
good path forward.
I do want to just say that I note one thing that is a
common thread on this, that we can't always have just a
military priority solely and lead with the military, put that
as our foremost priority, treat it as if it is the only one or
whatever. We have to have a more whole-of-government approach,
as somebody mentioned earlier, and reach out diplomatically, as
well. Rule of law issues, democracy, all those things are
important, and in that context I think that we may get more
cooperation out of friends and allies if we show a deeper
interest and a longer-range interest in their well-being, and
then that should encompass some of our mutual priorities as
well.
So thank you all for being here and for all that you have
done for this committee. We appreciate it. I thank the members
of the panel as well.
Meeting adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]