[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
MOVING FORWARD AFTER THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD REPORT:
MAKING METRO A SAFETY LEADER
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE,
POSTAL SERVICE, AND THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-123
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
http://www.house.gov/reform
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DARRELL E. ISSA, California
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
DIANE E. WATSON, California PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JIM JORDAN, Ohio
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
Columbia BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
PETER WELCH, Vermont
BILL FOSTER, Illinois
JACKIE SPEIER, California
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio
JUDY CHU, California
Ron Stroman, Staff Director
Michael McCarthy, Deputy Staff Director
Carla Hultberg, Chief Clerk
Larry Brady, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of
Columbia
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts, Chairman
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
Columbia BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland ------ ------
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
William Miles, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 23, 2010............................... 1
Statement of:
Hersman, Deborah A.P., chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board; Catherine Hudgins, Board of Directors, first
vice chairman, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority; Richard Sarles, interim general manager,
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Matthew
Bassett, Chair, Tri-State Oversight Committee; Anthony W.
Garland, recording secretary/Local 689 safety officer,
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 689; and Francis
DeBernardo, Chair, Riders' Advisory Council................ 11
Bassett, Matthew......................................... 50
DeBernardo, Francis...................................... 61
Garland, Anthony W....................................... 57
Hersman, Deborah A.P..................................... 11
Hudgins, Catherine....................................... 19
Sarles, Richard.......................................... 29
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Bassett, Matthew, Chair, Tri-State Oversight Committee,
prepared statement of...................................... 52
Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, prepared statement of............... 86
DeBernardo, Francis, Chair, Riders' Advisory Council,
prepared statement of...................................... 63
Garland, Anthony W., recording secretary/Local 689 safety
officer, Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 689, prepared
statement of............................................... 58
Hersman, Deborah A.P., chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board, prepared statement of........................ 14
Hudgins, Catherine, Board of Directors, first vice chairman,
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, prepared
statement of............................................... 21
Lynch, Hon. Stephen F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Massachusetts, prepared statement of.............. 3
Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, a Delegate in Congress from the
District of Columbia, prepared statement of................ 6
Sarles, Richard, interim general manager, Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, prepared statement of. 31
MOVING FORWARD AFTER THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD REPORT:
MAKING METRO A SAFETY LEADER
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service,
and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:25 p.m. in
room 2203, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Lynch, Norton, and Bilbray.
Staff present: Aisha Elkheshin, clerk/legislative
assistant; William Miles, staff director; and Dan Zeidman,
deputy clerk/legislative assistant.
Mr. Lynch. I would like to call this hearing to order. The
Subcommittee on the Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the
District of Columbia's hearing will now come to order. I would
like to welcome those Members in attendance.
I know that Mr. Chaffetz was just with us at the earlier
hearing, so he is in transit right now. And I would like to
thank all of our witnesses and those in attendance this
afternoon.
The purpose of today's hearing is to explore the steps the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority has taken to
address the safety findings and recommendations contained in
the recent National Transportation Board's issued Railroad
Accident Report on June 22, 2009, Metro rail collision. The
Chair, the ranking member, and the subcommittee members will
each have 5 minutes to make an opening statement, and all
Members will have 3 days to submit statements for the record.
Hearing no objections, so ordered.
As stated earlier today, our hearing has been called in
order for the subcommittee to once again receive an update on
the steps the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority is
taking to ensure that the Metro rail, bus, and para-transit
services are operating at the highest possible levels of safety
and reliability.
Today's hearing, which marks the third subcommittee hearing
held on the Washington Metro in the 111th Congress, will also
entail a full discussion on the findings and recommendations
contained in the National Transportation Safety Board's
recently issued Railroad Accident Report on the June 22, 2009,
Red Line collision, and the Washington Metro's efforts to
address the NTSB's conclusions in that report.
The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority is the
national capital area primary public transportation agency and
provides service to a population of over 3\1/2\ million people
within a 1,500 square mile area. Considering the estimated 40
percent of the Federal employees who utilize the Washington
Metro on a daily basis and the hundreds of thousands of D.C.
area residents and tourists who rely on the system to navigate
the Nation's Capital, it is critical that America's transit
system, so-called, be at the highest level of dependability and
safety.
Since the June 22, 2009, Red Line collision which left 9
people dead and 76 injured, serious questions have been raised
by the Federal Transit Administration, the Tri-State Oversight
Committee, and most recently the National Transportation Safety
Board regarding deficiencies in the Washington Metro safety
culture. Notably, the National Transportation Safety Board
concludes that shortcomings in the Washington Metro's internal
communications, in its recognition of hazards, its assessment
of risk from those hazards, and its implementation of
corrective actions are all evidence of an ineffective safety
culture within the organization.
In light of these concerns, I am particularly interested in
hearing about the specific actions that the Washington Metro
has pursued over the last several months to elevate and improve
the organization's safety record and performance.
I also look forward to discussing ongoing efforts to
strengthen and empower the Tri-State Oversight Committee, which
serves as the Washington Metro safety oversight agency in
accordance with FTA regulations. I understand that the
Washington Metro is currently navigating a complex transition
period, and while today's hearing is aimed at addressing the
the transit system safety and reliability challenges, we cannot
ignore Washington Metro's financial challenges which, whether
we like it or not, impact the organization's ability to achieve
certain standards of safety.
Additionally, I would like to note that the Federal
Government has a role to play in promoting the safety and
service of the Washington Metro, and I welcome the opportunity
to hear more about what we here in Congress can do to help the
Washington Metro at this time.
Again, I would like to thank each of you for your
willingness to be with us and to help the committee with its
work, and I look forward to your participation in today's
important hearing.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen F. Lynch follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. In light of my colleague and friend, Mr.
Chaffetz s, absence, and it is understandable. We were in two
competing hearings. I ran a little faster than he did to get
over here, and he will be along directly. He is very diligent
about that.
I would like to recognize Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton,
Congresswoman from the District of Columbia, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank
you above all, as we come to the end of this session, for the
way that you have pressed this subcommittee and the leadership
on Metro matters. You indicated we have had three hearings. We
even had a hearing before the collision. But, Mr. Chairman, you
have taken the leadership in making sure that there was direct
and timely and constant oversight from the Congress. I
particularly appreciate that you are holding this hearing on
the NTSB recommendations before Congress adjourns so that work
can begin on them beyond what I am sure is already taking
place.
I want to emphasize again, Mr. Chairman, that beyond the
obvious interest of members of the committee who are from this
region, there is a strong Federal interest in what happens to
Metro since, indeed, almost of half of the riders on weekdays
are Federal employees, which is why we subsidize them to get to
work. Anyone who doubts that need only think of the snow storms
of the past winter, when it became clear that if Metro shuts
down, so must the Government shut down.
So we have an interest in Metro beyond even the private
sector here, and particularly in the fact that it has for
decades been plagued by a series of safety issues. The NTSB, of
course, has been on top of these issues throughout, and this
subcommittee has been at pains to see that others with
oversight are also as diligent.
Mr. Chairman, the most disturbing part of what we have
known from briefings from the NTSB is that this tragedy was
preventable. There was no signal that there was a train on the
track, and yet there were systems in the hands of Metro which
could have, indeed, been in use. That has led the subcommittee
to focus on safety, and the NTSB's recommendations on safety
culture is the recommendation that it be, in my view, at least,
it has focused most of my attention.
I hope this won't be seen as a reflection on the workers,
because, as I questioned Ms. Hersman and others at NTSB, I
learned that NTSB was almost alone in not having a non-punitive
safety culture. Apparently, other common carriers understand
that the safety culture has to be non-punitive, so that if you
report, that report won't result in punishment. Why would
anybody report then against their own personal interest? Yet,
it appears that is the way in which Metro has operated. That is
not the way in which, according to NTSB, trains operate or
airlines operate. They have long had non-punitive cultures. I
am sure if we had such a culture at Metro much of the rest
would take care of itself.
Mr. Chairman, I note that, even as we are in session, the
subcommittee, the NTSB Reauthorization Act is going to be on
the floor today, and I am pleased to note that. I have a
section of that bill that is far less important than the
reauthorization, itself, but it would clarify that NTSB can
make interim safety recommendations.
NTSB was on point in making all of the recommendations that
should have been followed. At the same time, we could hardly
blame Metro, which only got the first $150 million, this year
it is going to get another $150 million, for not having
replaced the trains and the tracks and the rest, although I do
believe the track matter did not require that the overhaul of
the system that we now know must take place, and Metro is
certainly to be held accountable for that.
I regret that only after the tragedy did the first $150
million come, but now they seem to be coming in regular order,
and I will be very, very interested to hear what progress Metro
has made on these recommendations, most of which they were
aware of simply by virtue of the trauma they have gone through
even before the NTSB has given them a virtual track record to
follow. If they go down that list, do what the NTSB says, I
think all of us will feel safer.
Thank you very much again, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Lynch. I thank you.
I am going to fully recognize my Republican colleagues when
they do arrive, but in the interest of time what I would like
to do is, first of all, ask all of our witnesses, it is the
custom before this committee that anyone who is offering
testimony must be sworn, so may I please ask you to rise. Raise
your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Lynch. Let the record show that each of the witnesses
has answered in the affirmative.
I know that a few of you have been here before this
committee and you understand the lighting system we have here.
That little box in the middle of the table will flash green
when you are to begin your testimony, and then after it turns
yellow you are to wrap up your testimony, and then the red
light indicates that your time has expired.
What I would like to do is to first offer some brief
introductions of our panelists.
First of all, Deborah A.P. Hersman was sworn in as the 12th
chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board on July
28, 2009, following her nomination to the post by President
Barack Obama and confirmation by the U.S. Senate. Chairman
Hersman is also serving a second 5-year term as a board member
on the National Transportation Safety Board.
While I think initially we had a conflict for time, I think
we have resolved that, which is important, and I appreciate
your diligence in being here in the important role that you
have played not only in identifying the causes of this
accident, but also in the recommendations that you have made to
make necessary corrections, so I am very happy that you will be
able to join us for the full hearing.
Ms. Catherine Hudgins is the first vice chairman of the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Board of
Directors. Ms. Hudgins joined the Metro board in January 2004
as an alternate director. She was appointed as principal
director in 2008, representing Fairfax County, Virginia. Ms.
Hudgins also was elected to the Fairfax County Board of
Supervisors in November 1999 and is currently serving her third
term.
Richard Sarles was appointed interim general manager of the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority by the Metro
Board of Directors effective April 3, 2010. Notably, Mr. Sarles
has more than 40 years of experience in the transit industry
with New Jersey Transit, Amtrak, and the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey. He most recently retired from New Jersey
Transit, where he served as Executive Director.
Matthew Bassett serves as chairman of the Tri-State
Oversight Committee, the joint organization that oversees Metro
rail safety and security programs. Mr. Bassett works for the
Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation. Prior to
joining the Department of Rail and Public Transportation, he
worked for the Maryland Department of Transportation's Rail
Safety Oversight Programs.
Anthony W. Garland is the recording secretary for the
Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 689. Mr. Garland, originally a
Metro bus operator, has more than 25 years experience with
Local 689. Prior to being elected recording secretary, Mr.
Garland served as a shop steward, executive board member, and
assistant business agent of Local 689.
Welcome, Mr. Garland.
Francis DeBernardo is the Chair of the Riders' Advisory
Council for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,
which provides the Washington Metro Board with the riders'
perspective on issues affecting Metro bus, Metro rail, and
Metro access. Mr. DeBernardo is also the Executive Director of
the New Ways Ministry located in Mount Ranier, Maryland.
Welcome all.
What I would like to do then is to ask, Ms. Hersman, if you
would like to begin by offering your opening statement for 5
minutes. Thank you.
STATEMENTS OF DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD; CATHERINE HUDGINS, BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, FIRST VICE CHAIRMAN, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY; RICHARD SARLES, INTERIM GENERAL MANAGER,
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY; MATTHEW
BASSETT, CHAIR, TRI-STATE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE; ANTHONY W.
GARLAND, RECORDING SECRETARY/LOCAL 689 SAFETY OFFICER,
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 689; AND FRANCIS DEBERNARDO,
CHAIR, RIDERS' ADVISORY COUNCIL
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH A.P. HERSMAN
Ms. Hersman. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Lynch,
Delegate Norton, members of the committee. The Safety Board is
pleased to return to brief you on the findings and the
recommendations from our report on the June 22, 2009, collision
that occurred near Fort Totten. It resulted in 9 fatalities and
52 injuries.
About a month after the accident, actually, a couple weeks,
July 13th, we issued two early recommendations. We testified
before your committee the day after that on July 14th. On
September 22nd we issued nine additional recommendations. We
held a public hearing on February 23rd through 25th. We held
our Board meeting, where we adopted the final report and 23
more recommendations on July 27, 2010. And on August 9th our
Board, the five members of the National Transportation Safety
Board, met with the Metro Board, all the members of their
Board, to discuss our findings.
We determined the probable cause of the accident was the
failure of the track circuit modules to cause the automatic
train control system to lose detection of the train, and thus
transmit speed commands to the trailing train up to the point
of impact. WMATA's failure to ensure that enhanced track
circuit verification test was institutionalized and used
system-wide, which would have identified the faulty track
circuit before the accident; the lack of a safety culture
within WMATA; WMATA's failure to maintain and monitor the
performance of its automatic train control system; GRS and
Alstom Signal Inc.'s failure to provide a maintenance plan to
detect spurious signals that could cause its track modules to
malfunction; ineffective oversight by the Metro Board; TOC's
ineffective oversight and lack of oversight authority; and
FTA's lack of statutory authority.
With your permission, I would like to show a short
animation of the accident sequence for the committee. The
motion of the struck train, Train No. 214, was derived from
data retrieved from event recorders. The striking train, No.
112, did not have event recorders; consequently, its motion is
derived by simulation of speed commands that were transmitted
from the train control system and the train performance
characteristics.
The animation is going to show two views of the train in
real time. The top of the screen shows an overhead view of both
trains as they travel inbound on the red line. The striking
train is indicated by the blue arrow, and the struck train,
214, is shown by the orange arrow. The yellow dots on the track
delineate each segment of the track, each circuit.
WMATA's automatic train control system is designed to issue
speed commands to trains to ensure that at least one unoccupied
track circuit separates the trains. The middle section of the
screen shows the time of day, speed commands issued by the
train control system, and the actual speeds of each train.
Finally, the bottom of the screen shows a view riding along
with the striking train up to the point of the collision.
[Video shown.]
Ms. Hersman. The animation begins with Train 112's
departure from Tacoma Station about 2\1/2\ minutes before the
collision. Train 112 is being operated in the automatic mode,
where the train responds automatically to the speed commands
from the train control system.
At this time, Train 214 is approaching Fort Totten and is
about eight-tenths of a mile ahead of train 112. Train 214 is
being operated in the manual mode, where the operator controls
the motion of the train according to the speed commands from
the train control system. Notice that the speed command for
Train 112 varies with the position of the train ahead. Its
actual speed lags behind the speed command.
At this point the system has brought the speed command for
Train 112 to zero due to the presence of Train 214 ahead, and
Train 112 automatically begins to slow to a stop.
The lead train, 214, is on a faulty track circuit. The
speed command displays zero, and the operator of 214 begins to
manually slow the train to a stop. Because the train control
system cannot detect Train 214, it responds as if the track
ahead is clear and transmits an errant speed command of 55
miles per hour. Train 112 automatically begins accelerating to
55 miles per hour, with Train 214 stopped and undetected just
ahead.
According to sight distance testing, at 470 feet apart the
operator of Train 112 had a full view of Train 214.
Approximately 3 seconds after the Train 112 operator had the
full view of the stopped train, she applies emergency braking.
Braking action was normal, but there was only enough time to
slow the train a few miles per hour.
[Video concludes.]
Ms. Hersman. Thank you for inviting me to testify and
allowing me to show the animation. I am ready to answer any
questions when it is time.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hersman follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Lynch. I know that they have just called for a vote, so
that is why the other Members are delayed, but I am going to
ask the gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Eleanor
Holmes Norton, to please take over the hearing, and I will run
over and vote and come right back.
Thank you.
Ms. Norton [presiding]. Thank you very much, Ms. Hersman.
Ms. Hudgins.
STATEMENT OF CATHERINE HUDGINS
Ms. Hudgins. Thank you, Chairman Norton. Madam Chairman and
members of the subcommittee, my name is Catherine Hudgins and I
am honored to appear here before you today as the first vice
chairman of the Board of Directors of the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Metro.
I would like to speak first about improving safety, the top
priority of Metro Board, and how we are currently addressing
the NTSB recommendations. I would also like to address our
current significant financial challenges, which relates
directly to enhancing our state of good repair and operational
reliability.
Above everything else, Metro must provide safe and reliable
service. To this end, we have focused on three goals: build a
new safety culture throughout the organization, from the Board
to the general manager to the bus and rail operators,
mechanics, and track walkers; two, invest in the equipment,
facilities, and personnel needed to enhance safety; and, three,
create the policies and procedures that enhance system safety.
In doing so, we will restore public confidence in the safety
and quality of our service and build trust among policymakers,
legislators, and our stakeholders.
I know that these goals will not be achieved overnight. We
are doing everything that we can to move Metro toward these
goals.
On safety, safety is the top priority of Metro, for the
Board, for Metro management, for all our staff from top to
bottom. The Board intends to ensure that, to the best of our
ability, each and every NTSB recommendation to Metro associated
with its review of the June 22, 2009, accident is implemented.
Following the NTSB's July 27th recommendations, the Metro
Board convened a special Board meeting in August, during which
we heard directly from the NTSB about what we could do, both as
a Board and Metro as a whole, to cultivate a safety culture. I
greatly appreciate the thoroughness of the information that
NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman and her colleagues shared with us
that day. Our Board heard what needs to be done, and has
started taking specific actions to respond.
One week ago Metro Board's Customer Service Operations and
Safety Committee voted to approve a change to our Board
governance to establish a distinct Safety and Security
Committee. The committee will be chaired by Mort Downey, who
was appointed to our Board earlier this year by Federal
Government as a voting member. The Customer Service,
Operations, and Safety Committee also moved a new mission
statement that clearly places safety at the forefront of the
transit agency. The statement reads: Metro operates and
maintains a safe, reliable, and effective transit system that
enhances mobility, improves the quality of life, and stimulates
economic development in the metropolitan area.
Both actions taken in the committee last week must go to
our full Board for adoption on September 30th. I assure this
committee that my fellow Board members are wholeheartedly
endorsing these changes.
In addition to these actions, the Metro Board has taken
other steps to address NTSB recommendations. We have begun by
dedicating $30 million from our capital budget to assist in
responding to NTSB's recommendations. On July 22nd the Metro
Board approved Metro's revised whistleblower protection policy
to encourage employees to raise safety-related concerns. And,
finally, in July the Board approved a contract to replace the
1000 series cars, which are the oldest rail cars in the fleet,
with the new generation 7000 series rail cars.
On Metro s financial situation, Metro faces the same
financial issues which practically every other major transit
system in the United States faces. In this period of economic
decline, many of our revenue sources, such as advertising and
fares, have decreased, and the funds available for our
subsidies have declined. Transit becomes one of a number of
vital services competing for funding with fewer resources
available.
We are exceptionally pleased that our State and local
partners have demonstrated a long history of strong financial
support for this system. That strong support is continuing even
in these tough economic times, as our jurisdictional partners
have provided over half a billion dollars to support Metro
operations in fiscal year 2011, an increase of 5 percent over
fiscal year 2010, while many other local services are taking
cuts.
I would like to wrap up and say that we are committed as a
Board, and that as a Metro Board member, Madam Chairwoman, I
would like to conclude and want to make sure that you
understand that we are committed to moving people safely and
reliably and comfortably. It is our mission, and it is the
proud history of Metro.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hudgins follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Ms. Hudgins.
Mr. Sarles.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD SARLES
Mr. Sarles. Madam Chair, I thank you for the opportunity to
testify before you today. I am Richard Sarles, general manager
of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
In Metro there is no higher value than safety. I want this
subcommittee and our riders to know that we recognize that our
long-term success depends on our ability to build a safety
culture that is dedicated to prevention and continual
improvement.
What is being done?
First, as outlined during my testimony on April 21st to the
Oversight and Government Reform Committee, I have developed and
we have made significant progress in implementing a 6-month
action plan to move Metro forward in addressing our greatest
challenges, which I see as safety, service, reliability, and
financial stability.
These are the fundamental areas that Metro has focused on
for the past 5 months. A full update on each of them is in my
written testimony, but I want to take the time today to
highlight our progress to improve safety and our safety
culture.
We have strengthened our safety department with a team that
has more than 230 years of experience. Chief Safety Officer
James Dougherty leads the team and reports directly to me, as
well as provides monthly updates to the Board of Directors on
our safety progress.
Metro has worked closely with the Tri-State Oversight
Committee to develop corrective action plans in response to
findings from both external and internal audits and
investigations. We have closed 223 CAPs since 2004, currently
33 CAPs remain open. I have communicated to Metro staff that
continuing to close CAPs is a top priority.
To give our employees the safety skills they need on the
job, we have expanded safety training throughout the
organization.
Our commitment to a new safety culture cannot be
accomplished without a financial commitment. The WMATA Board
anticipated this by including $6.9 million in Metro's operating
budget to address audit FTA recommendations. The Board also
established a $5 billion 6-year capital plan, the largest
capital budget since the completion of the rail system, to
ensure that we can make needed equipment and infrastructure
safety and state of good repair improvements.
While we work on reinforcing our safety culture, we have
taken action to comply with NTSB recommendations.
Now I would like to turn to the work we are doing to
respond to each of the recommendations associated with the June
22nd accident.
First, parasitic oscillation. We have already replaced
track circuit modules, at 34 of the 103 locations, and are
developing plans to replace the remaining track circuit
modules. We are increasing the frequency of our inspections,
and the loss of shunt review will continue twice daily until
the testing is completed on the real-time alert system.
Next, improving internal communications. We initiated a
cross-functional committee to develop procedures for clear
communication and to document receipt of all technical
bulletins and other safety-related information.
Next, wayside communications. We are identifying all
locations throughout the rail system where unnecessary wayside
communication equipment exists, and are developing a plan to
disable and/or remove it.
Next, safety analysis. We have retained an independent firm
to perform a rigorous safety analysis of the automatic train
control system and provide recommendations. Once the analysis
is complete, we will address the recommendations.
Next, cable installation resistance testing. Test
procedures and standards are in development and should be read
in November 2010.
Next, Federal Transit Administration final report. All FTA
findings related to Metro were addressed and the FTA has
reviewed and accepted the proposed actions. now we will
complete those actions.
Next, operational data on onboard recorders. The review of
operational data from onboard event recorders will be
incorporated into monthly senior staff meetings. Local 689
Union representatives will be invited to participate.
Next, non-punitive safety reporting program. We established
an anonymous hotline, reinforced our whistleblower policy, and
we have started discussions with Local 689 on a non-punitive
near-miss reporting program.
Next, hazard identification, hazard management. Metro's
Executive Safety Committee has started reviewing safety audits
and open corrective action plans. Removal of 1000 series cars--
on July 26th, we awarded a contract to replace the 1000 series
cars.
Installation and maintenance of on-board event recorders. A
plan has been developed to equip and maintain the 4000 and 1000
series cars with onboard event recorders.
In conclusion, Madam Chair, at Metro there is no higher
value than safety. We want riders to know that we recognize our
long-term success depends on our ability to change our safety
culture to one dedicated to prevention and continuing
improvement. Establishing a new safety culture in this
fundamental way will require enduring consistent commitment,
from the top all the way through the organization. The change
will take years to become ingrained, but we have begun putting
the foundation in place.
In the last year, Metro has faced a number of challenges,
and there are more to come, but we have also forged better
partnerships with the agencies that provide safety oversight,
and with their help and the leadership of our Board, we are on
a path to continuing improvement of safety and service
reliability.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sarles follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Sarles.
Mr. Bassett.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW BASSETT
Mr. Bassett. Good afternoon, Chairman Norton. On behalf of
the Tri-State Oversight Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the ongoing challenges and recent
improvements to the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority's rail safety efforts.
Since our committee last testified on April 21st, both
WMATA and the TOC have made significant progress in addressing
safety shortcomings noted by Congress, the National
Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Transit
Administration, and the riding public. These entities have been
steadfast partners in making the system safer.
This May, the Governors of Maryland and Virginia and the
mayor of the District of Columbia committed to increasing TOC
funding, providing full-time staffing, and ensuring access for
TOC members to immediately raise safety concerns to State
transportation leaders. This led to the creation of the TOC
Executive Committee, a working group which meets regularly to
provide guidance and policy direction for the TOC.
In July, Maryland hired a full-time TOC member, Mr. James
Benton, who brings with him more than two decades of experience
in rail car maintenance and rail operations from the Maryland
Transit Administration. The District of Columbia is also in the
hiring process for a full-time TOC member.
On July 27th, TOC received NTSB's recommendation in
response to the June 22, 2009, Fort Totten collision to fully
address the Federal Transit Administration's March 2010 audit
findings. We are committed to doing so and continue to work
with FTA on this task, as well as WMATA.
This summer TOC completed our triennial safety and security
review of WMATA's rail operations. TOC members and consultants
spent 3 weeks working with WMATA staff inspecting facilities
and equipment, interviewing workers, and conducting an
exhaustive document review. We planned to publish this document
on our recently revamped Web site, [Web page here] by October
9th.
On September 13th the TOC Executive Committee revised the
TOC memorandum of understanding, which provides our authority
and operating framework. The revised MOU responds to concerns
identified by FTA, the NTSB, and Congress by providing
additional authority to the TOC chair and allowing the
Executive Committee to take any action permitted by law,
including suspending State capital funding, in the unlikely
event that all options to resolve TOC safety concerns have been
exhausted.
Since the arrival of WMATA interim general manager, Richard
Sarles, the TOC has been pleased to note that safety has been
placed not just at the forefront of WMATA's rhetoric, but of
their efforts, as well. His regular presence at TOC meetings,
safety performance metrics, and long overdue restructuring of
the WMATA Executive Safety Committee have guided a
comprehensive response to the system's safety challenges. He
has also hired several safety experts, including James
Dougherty as chief safety officer.
The Safety Department is investing in new systems and
processes to streamline their investigations, resolve open
corrective actions, and improve their auditing capacity. A good
example of this new approach is the recent completion of
WMATA's roadway worker protection [RWP] Manual, which
leadership recently signed into effect. By bringing together
safety, operations, labor, and management employees, as well as
soliciting input from outside agencies and experts, WMATA has
created a comprehensive document that will improve safety on
the tracks.
WMATA also recently revised their rule book, complying with
longstanding TOC and NTSB recommendations, and acknowledged the
need to develop a non-punitive safety reporting system,
although this essential step remains a work in progress.
Yet, despite advances, WMATA's organizational culture must
become willing to show their work. A recent example came July
4th weekend, when WMATA removed all 4000 series rail cars after
technicians discovered a potential fault that could allow train
doors to open during movement. There is no question that
WMATA's immediate response was the safest course of action, but
our attempts to learn more were delayed.
On July 6th we asked for more information about this
decision and for any procedure for the door repairs, and
received conflicting answers. Twenty days later we received a
copy of the full procedure, learning it had been in effect
since 3 days after our original request. Our request for
information about the reasoning behind this decision took even
longer.
Our difficulty in obtaining information during the process
just demonstrates that our need for timely and accurate
information must become a high priority.
WMATA faces real challenges to the goal of becoming
America's rail transit safety leader; however, they can promote
transparency, empower the safety department, hold managers
accountable for safety goals, and improve hazard communication,
as has begun. It will grow safer, smarter, and stronger as an
agency.
Continued engagement on the part of the Congress, the FTA,
the NTSB, and the riding public, as well as the TOC in our
State safety oversight role, will be crucial to their success
in sustaining their progress.
Thank you for your time. I look forward to answering any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bassett follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Bassett.
Mr. Garland.
STATEMENT OF ANTHONY W. GARLAND
Mr. Garland. Good afternoon, Congresswoman Norton, members
of the committee, and others. Thank you, Congresswoman Norton,
for inviting ATU Local 689, the largest transit workers' union
in the Nation's Capital, and the third largest transit union in
the Nation, to testify before you.
I am here today to speak on behalf of the Union's
president, Jackie Jeter, and our members. Over the past several
years, we have made several recommendations to WMATA that we
expect will improve management, employees' preparedness,
riders' and workers' safety, and the safety of the public.
Please allow me to explain some of the most important. We
believe that these are consistent with the proposed Federal
leg.
One, development of comprehensive safety plans that mirror
the proposed national plan. The WMATA plan should result from a
collaborative effort between WMATA and the Union and require
all parties to adhere to it.
Two, Union representatives should be members of the WMATA
Board of Directors and the Safety Inspection Team.
Three, retraining plans must be developed and implemented
for the entire work force, and likewise certification and
recertification of safety personnel should become routine and
ongoing throughout the workers' career.
Four, equipment upgrades must meet safety performance
criteria and conform to minimum safety performance standards
consistent with national standards or set at a higher level by
our jurisdictions, then those standards should be maintained.
Five, deferred maintenance must be given priority in a
timely set for completion.
Six, specific items, replacement parts or new mechanisms,
new procedures within the systems, must be addressed within a
specified timeframe, then tested and evaluated immediately.
Adjustments and revisions must be completed within a specified
period, and retest completed prior to any implementation.
Seven, the result of any equipment or process failure
should be made public promptly, and the report should be
disseminated to affected divisions and personnel within the
WMATA and the Union work force.
Eight, we support the inclusion of oversight from external
entities with enforcement powers.
Nine, we believe that noncompliance should be sanctioned
and that improvements should be funded by the Federal
Government and the three jurisdictions provided mass transit
for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority going
forward, with greater emphasis placed on awareness, disbursal
of information, and willingness to work collaboratively with
the Union on behalf of its employees.
Thank you for your time and attention this afternoon. I
look forward to answering any of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Garland follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Garland.
Mr. DeBernardo.
STATEMENT OF FRANCIS DEBERNARDO
Mr. DeBernardo. Good afternoon, Chairman Norton. Thank you
for inviting me to testify today. My name is Francis
DeBernardo, and I serve as the 2010 Chair of the WMATA Riders'
Advisory Council.
The Riders' Advisory Council serves as the riders' voice
within Metro. The Council provides feedback to the Board and
customer input to Metro staff. Members use Metro's transit
services, Metro bus, Metro rail, and Metro access, and
represent a diverse mix of ages, backgrounds, and ways in which
they use the system.
Your invitation letter noted that this hearing would focus
on the NTSB's railroad accident report on the June 22, 2009,
Metro rail collision and the shortcomings in Metro's internal
communications and its ineffective safety culture. Since the
Riders' Advisory Council is specifically composed of non-Metro
employees, it will be difficult for me to comment on Metro's
internal workings. Instead, I would like to focus my testimony
today on how Metro's communications with its external
stakeholders, namely its riders, affect safety and how, as it
rebuilds its safety culture, Metro must include riders in that
effort.
As the NTSB's report noted, several factors, human and
mechanical, contributed to the 2009 collision. The Council is
confident that, under the leadership of the interim general
manager, Mr. Sarles, Metro has been identifying and addressing
the mechanical factors that contributed to last year's
collision. However, in addressing safety, Metro cannot only
look inward for solutions. It must also look to its 1.2 million
daily customers about how to address safety.
In the wake of last year's crash, the focus has been on the
safety of the train control system and the safety of employees
working within Metro's right-of-way. I would also suggest that
other aspects of the rider experience are critical to create a
safe Metro system.
Working to reduce crowding and improving service
reliability, along with ensuring clear and direct timely
communications with riders will all greatly improve safety.
Crowded platforms, crumbling tiles, and broken elevators and
escalators pose threats to customer safety that, while not as
dramatic as last year's crash, are just as dangerous because of
their ubiquity.
We are encouraged that Metro is taking steps to improve
communications with riders in terms of safety and security.
Earlier this month Metro unveiled signage that preeminently
featured the telephone number for the Metro Transit Police to
help riders report problems or safety concerns. This example of
a rider-suggested change will directly improve safety for
Metro's customers.
As it rebuilds its safety culture, Metro also needs to
rebuild its culture of customer service. Employees, especially
those actively engaged with customers, will be better able to
recognize and correct potentially dangerous situations earlier.
In addition, an organization that listens to customers,
addresses their concerns, makes it more likely that those
customers will identify and report safety concerns.
Metro's 1.2 million daily riders represent 1.2 million
pairs of eyes and ears on the system every day. This is a
resource that cannot be taken for granted if Metro truly wants
to become safer.
The Council is also encouraged by Metro's recent efforts in
tracking and reporting service and safety. The new monthly
vital signs report provides a clear, timely snapshot of Metro's
performance. Metro must make this available to all its
stakeholders if they want to improve performance.
Ensuring sufficient capital funding for Metro is necessary
to improve safety. The Council appreciates Congress' support of
the $150 million annual Federal capital funding and hopes
Congress will continue to provide these funds, especially as
they will be directed toward safety.
We are also encouraged by the Metro Board's approving a $5
billion, 6-year capital funding agreement.
I thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony and
will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. DeBernardo follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. DeBernardo.
Could I ask a question of the entire panel? Since the June
22, 2009, tragedy, in your view is Metro safer than it was? I
am not asking for absolutes here, but is it safer than it was?
And I would like you to describe briefly, if you think it is
safer, why; and if you think it is not safer, why.
Ms. Hersman.
Ms. Hersman. Yes, ma'am. I think clearly Metro is in a much
safer position today than it was in June 2009. The reason I
would say that is because I think they are aware of many of the
deficiencies that exist on the system, whether it is track
circuits or challenges that they have within their operation,
communication, making sure that maintenance procedures are
clear. They have done a lot of learning in the last year-plus,
and I think that always every organization is going to go
through a difficult time after an accident.
The question is how you react to that accident and what
changes you make, and I believe that the Metro Board was very
willing to listen to the Safety Board after our report was
concluded, and they have taken many of those lessons to heart,
and I think that they are beginning to make many improvements
that have been long overdue.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Ms. Hersman.
Ms. Hudgins.
Ms. Hudgins. Ms Norton, yes, I believe that we are, as an
Agency as well as our Board, a safer environment for our
customers. I think we most specifically have to talk about the
fact that immediately after the accident that there has been a
constant attention to the testing that needs to be done for the
trains to ensure that the accident should not happen again.
But, more importantly, I think the Board has been focused.
As I noted in my opening point, we have already changed our
committee so that we can make sure that safety and security are
foremost in the work that we are looking at, and that we can
get the kind of information that was brought out in the NTSB
report that we need to hear, as well as the whistleblower piece
that allows our workers to be willing to report information
freely without punishment.
I think those are very important pieces to start us on what
I think is rebuilding the culture that is needed for safety in
our organization, throughout the Board, and with our customers.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Sarles.
Mr. Sarles. I believe we are a safer organization, but we
have a long way to go. Some of the things that have been done
include, with regard to the specific incident, monitoring our
system much better than we did. We have started more training.
We have improved communication. We have taken some actions such
as ordering new cars.
One of the important actions, which I mentioned in my
testimony, was the appointment of a chief safety officer with
much experience and bringing other people into this
organization that have many, many years of experience in rail
operations and safety, and that person reports directly to me
and has a lot more independence and strength than occurred in
the past in this organization.
Those are some of the things, but I emphasize it is a
start; it is not an end.
Mr. Bassett. Speaking on behalf of the oversight agency, I
would believe that yes, they have made significant progress.
They are a safer organization than they were on June 21st.
I think it is worth noting that the Metro is unequivocally
the safest way to get around the national capital region and
has been for a very long time, but I think they have made
notable progress, in particular in the areas of switching their
focus from what I would characterize as occupational safety,
where they were primarily concerned with number such as slips,
trips, and falls, workers compensation injuries which, while
important, do not reflect an approach to analyzing systemic,
high-consequence threats to the system such as June 22nd.
The addition of the expertise that Mr. Sarles mentioned has
really permitted them to bring their safety office up to a very
high level of technical proficiency in the matters, in
particular with rail safety, that will help them analyze such
hazards in the future and prevent them before they ever pose a
risk to passengers.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Bassett.
Mr. Garland.
Mr. Garland. I would have to answer that two-fold. I think
in a worker's capacity, which is what I was hired as a bus
operator, the Agency is safer because of the awareness that the
system gets in the media or incidents that happen on a daily
basis. But I would say that, as far as the workers are
concerned, the ones who do the work, there is this element of
the workers not being confident in the Agency as far as being
able to protect their safety and their health.
The underlying issue is, when they are doing their daily
operations in the system, there is that element of always
looking over your shoulder as to what else is out there. So in
that sense you are working under pressure as a worker.
I know the train system is in a manual mode and the train
operators basically run the system through the manual mode, but
there is that element out there, what's out there? That is a
safety issue.
So until we address the work force and reconnect with the
work force as to training, as to recertifying, building the
morale of the work force and reconnecting with the work force,
that element is always going to be there.
We always talk about the funding of the system, but there
is that element of the human beings who do the work, and until
that is addressed the money portion really is like opening a
window and pouring it out of the window. If you have
complacency with your work force, you must get reconnected with
the work force and re-instill in them what they are doing on a
daily basis. So I would say it is unsafe in that sense.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Garland.
Mr. DeBernardo.
Mr. DeBernardo. Yes, the Riders' Advisory Council believes
that the Agency is safer in practice, in policy, and, most
importantly, because of their willingness to be accountable and
transparent.
Ms. Norton. Metro is faced with a very difficult issue. in
testimony from one of you, or perhaps this is just what I
remember, there is something like $11 billion in funds that are
needed in your capital program.
Now, the Congress has authorized only $1\1/2\ billion over
10 years, and, as I understand it, the region would put in
another $1\1/2\ billion. So let me begin at the micro level.
You now have from the region $600 million last year and $600
million, we believe, this year.
How should that money be spent? Anyone can answer that who
feels that they can, but we would like an answer to that
because somebody has to figure out, given the enormity of the
need, I almost assure you are faced with a deficit in a
recession, not much hope that the Congress would pony up more
money. We are aware of your own difficulties, certainly not of
your making but there they are, and so you are not going to get
more from the rider public than you are already getting. Mr.
DeBernardo will probably be the first to tell you.
So in a climate of extreme scarcity and great need,
somebody has to figure out where these scarce resources go. Is
anybody figuring it out? One way to do so, since you have money
in hand, is to say where is that money going to go.
Ms. Hudgins. Congresswoman Norton, I think when we look at
our approved capital budget and we look out over the 6-years
that we have, we have tried to focus those resources in many of
the areas that were raised by the NTSB.
If you recall, over 6 years ago the Metro Board developed a
Metro matters, and it was funded really from the jurisdictions,
the Metro Compact members. What we are acknowledging is that
$1\1/2\ billion over the 10-years is, indeed, a very important
piece of what we are doing.
We just have to admit that it is still not enough, and it
is uncomfortable to say that when we recognize how much we need
to do.
Ms. Norton. Yes, and we don't want to hear that because we
don't want to raise hopes here, so we need to know how you are
going to spend that money. Have you budgeted the first 2 years
of money or the first year of money? Have you spent the first
year of money?
Ms. Hudgins. We have budgeted, and Mr. Sarles can go over
the estimates that are part of the NTSB recommendations that I
think are very critical in addressing this problem.
Ms. Norton. We recognize that you are dealing not only with
funds from Congress.
Ms. Hudgins. Yes.
Ms. Norton. I am asking about our funds. The appropriators
will want to know, for example, as we struggle--and it is a
struggle each year to get each $150 million out. Well, they are
going to ask for an accounting on their funds as if their funds
were the only funds in the whole world, when, as your own needs
indicate, they are a fairly small part of the funds you receive
and need.
Mr. Sarles, if the appropriator were here he would say: how
did you use the first $300 million and how will you use the
$300 million for this year?
Mr. Sarles. All of it is devoted to safety and state of
good repair projects. An example of where a good chunk of money
is going is to purchase the cars to replace the 1000-series
cars, which is our top priority and, of course, an NTSB
recommendation of longstanding time period. So that is where it
is going, safety, state of good repair. In fact, if you look at
our entire 6-year, $5 billion capital program, it is all
devoted to safety and state of good repair.
Now, we do have the NTSB recommendations. I outlined before
that we are going to move ahead on all of them. We know already
that there is roughly $150 million that wasn't accounted for in
our budget, because obviously we didn't know exactly what the
recommendations were. We are going to have to deal with that
and reprogram because we are going to do it.
Ms. Norton. I'm sorry. What was not accounted for in your
budget?
Mr. Sarles. About $150 million that will have to be spent
as a result of the NTSB recommendations.
Ms. Norton. Above and beyond?
Mr. Sarles. What we had budgeted.
Ms. Norton. For this year? For which years?
Mr. Sarles. Over the next 3 years or so. The entire program
is 6 years, but it is really things that we want to accomplish
in the next 2 or 3 years.
So we are going to have to look at reprogramming that, and
then obviously if there are other funds that come available,
that would be very helpful.
Beyond that, there are certain recommendations that we are
following through on, such as the systems safety testing and
analysis that, as a result of that, we may have other
conclusions that come out and other findings that say we have
to spend additional money, but that we will not yet be able to
determine until we have completed those analyses.
Ms. Norton. Ms. Hersman, your report is truly excellent and
it is the kind of road map that I believe will probably be used
by other systems, as well, particularly since you cautioned
other systems early on, and we certainly thank you for your
early discovery and your announcement that other systems which
had similar tracking systems need be very cautious. That is
very important national announcement that you made.
What it, of course, indicates to the subcommittee is that
you have the kind of knowledge of these systems around the
country that none of the rest of us, including, I am sure, many
at Metro, have. I would like to know, you have to forgive me, I
still am a professor at Georgetown and always mark on a curve,
so I don't want to compare my own students to the perfect. I
look across the board and I say, compared to what? It is the
only fair way to judge, even though we want people to reach
beyond where the best are.
I would like to ask you today, with the improvements that
have been made as of now, how Metro would rank compared to the
systems that we are most familiar with, like Chicago, New York,
Boston, the kinds of systems. How would you rank our Metro
system today, given improvements that they have made,
consciousness they have, with these systems far older and
apparently haven't had the same issues?
Ms. Hersman. You are kind of asking me to pick amongst my
children a little bit. Certainly Metro is a system that I and
many of our employees use every day to get to work, and so it
is one that we are very familiar with. But I will say we
investigate accidents in transit properties all across the
country, and so we do find failures and lapses. We find
deteriorating equipment and challenges in those systems.
It is very simple things sometimes, like distractions, like
a train operator that might be texting while they are operating
a train and they hit another train. Those are not always things
that cost a lot of money or have anything to do with the age of
the system, but they involve the human beings that are
involved, so it is having good procedures and good systems.
I will say that there are many other transit properties
that are learning a lot from this investigation on Metro.
Ms. Norton. Ms. Hersman, would you make us understand.
Perhaps we just don't know. This was so dramatic and
inflammatory. Why haven't we had such crashes in New York and
in Boston? Is it because they have a safety culture that we do
not have?
Ms. Hersman. I think it is hard to say, but they have not
had certainly the overall number of accidents that Metro has
had. Certainly the June accident in 2009 was very spectacular,
but Metro had three other events after that.
Ms. Norton. Your report noted and we are talking about one
spectacular event, but how many events did you note over the
year?
Ms. Hersman. Well, over the year since the accident there
were four incidents that were investigated.
Ms. Norton. Even since the accident?
Ms. Hersman. Yes.
Ms. Norton. Even since the accident?
Ms. Hersman. Three additional that we investigated on Metro
property.
Ms. Norton. And before the accident there were about how
many?
Ms. Hersman. We investigated two track worker fatality
events, one on the yellow line, one on the red line. We also
had the Woodley Park accident where we had the train roll back.
Fortunately, there were no fatalities on that. But the number
of accidents that Metro has had is unusual compared to the
other properties around the country.
Ms. Norton. Are you satisfied with what you know that Metro
is spending the first of its funds in the right places?
Ms. Hersman. I think it is really up to Metro to prioritize
what they are ready to roll out.
Ms. Norton. In terms of safety?
Ms. Hersman. Yes, in terms of safety. I think Mr. Sarles
and his team are in the best position to know what projects are
ready to go and what things are ready to roll out.
One of the things that doesn't cost any money, and that is
what the Metro Board is moving forward with, is beginning to
change that safety culture from the top down, and I think this
goes to Mr. Garland's comments. You have to involve the whole
organization in this process. You have to bring the employees
to the table for this to be effective.
Those are things that may not be very expensive, but they
are going to take a lot of work. I really did appreciate what
Mr. Sarles said, that they have a lot of work yet to do, and I
think that is exactly the right attitude.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Sarles, how will the workers be involved,
more involved with Metro, not as adversaries, apparently there
has been some adversarial feeling. Mr. Garland says that there
should be a member of the Board. Is there any system that you
know where workers are represented on the Board, not on the
Board? How would you make sure that workers have a buy-in into
the system?
Mr. Sarles. I think there are a number of things that can
be done and, in fact, we have started on a number of them.
One is what we call safety conversations, where we are
strongly encouraging workers among themselves, as well as
between supervisors and workers, to talk about safety issues
when they arise.
I will give you a for instance of what that is. I was out
one night looking at construction work and I happened to step
over some tools, and one of the folks came up to me and said,
You shouldn't have done that because you could have stepped on
the shovel and smacked yourself in the face. That is a safety
conversation. It is that kind of thing that we have to
encourage.
In addition, at our facilities there are meetings that go
on between the supervisors and the workers, there are safety
committees that discuss what issues are coming up. Now, it is
important not just to have the conversations and talk about
what the issues are, but then to act on those issues and to
give that kind of feedback to the workers. That is the
direction we are moving in. I wouldn't say it happens all the
time every place the way it should, but that is the direction
we are moving in.
We have established superintendent report-out committees,
where I go and listen once a month to what the issues are, and
this reflects the conversations that are going on in the safety
committees as to where the trends are, where there are issues,
and where there are successes.
I think importantly, which I have some experience with at
my last job at New Jersey Transit, we were the first commuter
railroad to introduce the non-punitive reporting system. We did
that last year and we signed up that agreement with----
Ms. Norton. Who did that? I am sorry.
Mr. Sarles. New Jersey Transit. First commuter railroad in
the United States to do that. We have discussed that we the
leadership at ATU Local 689. In fact, I shared with them that
agreement, and that is the kind of thing I would like to see
happen, myself.
Ms. Norton. This is what I would like to get to the bottom
of. We don't think that there is a non-punitive culture at
Metro now, and the words are thrown around, and I am not sure
what they meant. In fact, the only understanding I have is what
you, Ms. Hersman, indicated. The way she gave me to understand
it was not simply talking in generalities about culture, but by
describing other forms of transportation.
I wish, Ms. Hersman, for the record you would tell us about
non-punitive systems in other modes of transportation. I do not
think the public understands it any more than I did before I
heard what I regarded as a very clear statement from you. I
have not heard any here today. It would elucidate our record to
know by way of example what a non-punitive culture is by
reference to other forms of transportation that have such
systems in place. How do they operate?
Ms. Hersman. Thank you for that question. I would be happy
to explain because we think that they have been very successful
in other modes of transportation. The Close Call Reporting
System is being used in the rail industry, in the freight rail
industry. Certainly Mr. Sarles has some experience with a
commuter rail industry.
Ms. Norton. Now, close call would mean, for example, if I
am Mr. Garland and I had a close call, and who knows it is Mr.
Garland and maybe the other driver, they would just come
forward and say, I had a close call?
Ms. Hersman. Absolutely. Well, you need to set up a
structure where the employees feel comfortable reporting this.
I can give you a couple of examples in the aviation industry
because we also have a very mature non-punitive reporting
system for pilots. We have one in existence also for air
traffic controllers. But when we talk about pilots, the
important thing is sometimes there are things that go on that
no one else might know besides the people who are in that
cockpit. Sometimes there are things that other people know
about. But what you need is you need more information really to
understand what happened and why it happened.
So it is not about letting people off. It is not about
avoiding discipline. But it is really about the organization
being able to learn about mistakes or failures or systemic
procedures that don't work or aren't being applied.
So we can look at two aviation accidents and look at how
they might have been treated differently based on the
circumstances. One involves two pilots who overflew their
destination, Northwest 188. These are real events. Last October
they overflew Minneapolis by about 100 miles. They did not
respond to air traffic control hails for over an hour and they
didn't realize that they had overflown until they got a call
from the flight attendant saying, Should we begin preparing the
cabin, and they realized we have overflown.
They had taken their laptops out and they were talking
about new scheduling procedures and they had gotten distracted
from the task at hand.
Around the same time, we had another airplane coming in
from South America on an overnight flight. They had a senior
pilot, a third pilot in the cockpit with them who got ill, had
to leave the cockpit. They were coming down to land in Atlanta
Hartsfield about 6 a.m. They had been flying all night. They
got a change of assignment and runway, some information as they
were coming in. They landed on a taxiway at Atlanta Hartsfield
Airport, our Nation's busiest airport, not on the runway but on
a taxiway. They were very fortunate that they didn't have a
major accident.
Those pilots, they made a mistake. They did not want to
land on that taxiway. What was really important about that
event is that we learned about why. Was the lighting good on
the runway, on the taxiway? What were their instructions? Were
they unclear? How did they line up?
Ms. Norton. But what about the first one? As I recall, the
first pilots were not candid about having their laptops out.
Ms. Hersman. They actually were. They were forthcoming with
the Safety Board investigators, but they did end up getting
their licenses suspended by the FAA.
Ms. Norton. Yes. That is pretty severe.
Ms. Hersman. That was because they knowingly violated
procedures. They had a prohibition in the flight deck by the
company, You can't do this. So this would be like a bus driver
texting and hitting someone. That is a violation of procedures,
a knowing violation. You don't want to protect people who are
violating rules.
But on the other situation with the pilots coming in to
Atlanta, you want to understand why that happened because they
didn't mean to get in that situation. That report was accepted
into the system. They talked to the pilots, they counseled
them, they learned from that event.
So we say, how does this apply to a transit system? How
would this work in a transit environment? I visited some other
operators around the country, and I asked a system in another
city how would you use this system or how have you used this
system, and they said, we had a problem. We had some escalators
that we had an issue with, and one of them slipped and someone
got hurt, and we said, wow, this has never happened to us
before. And a bunch of their maintenance technicians said, yes,
it actually has. It happens a lot. We see it happen all the
time. And the management team said, what do you mean you have
seen it all the time? And the employee said, ``well, we have
this form for reporting if we get hurt, we have this form if we
are reporting if a passenger gets hurt,'' but they didn't
really know how to put that information up the chain that an
escalator had slipped but nothing bad had happened. So the
operator said, ``wow, we really need to be able to get this
information. We need to be able to pull this information in
before something bad happens.''
That is exactly the kind of system that they need to have
on Metro, so if they have an escalator that is slipping at
Woodley Park they need to get employees who are calling up
Management and saying, we are having this problem and you need
to help us figure out how to address it. Let's sit down and
talk about this.
Ms. Norton. Instead of feeling that the escalator slipped
and the first thing you are going to be asked is who did it.
Ms. Hersman. Well, and we actually saw that in our
investigation of the Metro accident. What we saw is that there
was a sense that there was a punitive culture if mistakes were
made.
We talked to the train operator of the standing train, the
one that was struck, and he shared with us the reason why he
was operating in manual mode. He should have been in automatic
mode, but the reason why he was operating in manual mode is
because in the past he had been operating in automatic mode and
the train overran the place where it was supposed to go in the
station and he was disciplined for it when the train was
running in automatic. That made him not trust the system, not
trust the train, and he wanted to be in control and make sure
that it didn't overrun so he wouldn't get into trouble.
Ms. Norton. That is a direct example.
Ms. Hersman. He was violating procedures because he was
concerned about the discipline.
Ms. Norton. Yes.
Ms. Hersman. Rather than the company understanding we have
a problem with these overruns and we need to fix it.
Ms. Norton. That certainly helped to cause the accident if
he was in manual mode.
Ms. Hersman. Well, it didn't necessarily cause the
accident. He happened to be stopped on that track circuit that
didn't detect him.
Ms. Norton. Yes.
Ms. Hersman. That was what caused the accident.
Ms. Norton. Yes.
Ms. Hersman. But it was a symptom of not addressing
problems and employees feeling uncomfortable talking about
them.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Sarles, did you look at what other modes of
transportation have done? You say you were the first system to
have----
Mr. Sarles. First commuter rail system to have close call
where we----
Ms. Norton. Right.
Mr. Sarles. This involved an agreement between the
operating unions, the FRA, and ourselves that people could
identify and report something that could be a hazard or could
lead to an accident in the future but hadn't occurred in that
particular incident, and by doing it in a way that protected
the employees so that the information was provided without them
being subject to any retaliation. It is way to get that
information out that the Chair of the NTSB just pointed out,
and it is the way we should go, and that is the way I would
like to go.
Ms. Norton. Have you initiated such discussions with the
transit union here?
Mr. Sarles. Yes, we have. We meet monthly, and that is one
of the things we are talking about.
Ms. Norton. Ms. Hudgins, I am interested in you and Mr.
Sarles that you have looked outside of the Agency. Any time, I
think that is always among the best practices, to assume that
there may be others who can be helpful.
I believe in your testimony you describe an external safety
panel that Metro has formed. I must say I was impressed with
the composition. You formed it with help from the DOT, and I
hope Metro will recognize that DOT is right here with lots of
expertise that can be useful to Metro, but they apparently
helped Metro form this panel, and it has an impressive, across-
the-board membership--AFL-CIO, American Public Transportation
Association--to develop strategies for creating this safety
culture.
Can you give us some information about what this panel is,
how this panel is advising you, and whether they have, in fact,
been able to move you toward a safety culture? And if so, when?
Ms. Hudgins. Ms. Norton, the panel is working now and has
been working with our Metro staff and working in looking at our
organization, and they are to come back to our Board.
Ms. Norton. When are they due back?
Ms. Hudgins. I am not sure I have the final date back, but
by the end of the year we need to have that back, because there
are two aspects of this. We really were looking for outside
help in order to evaluate what we should set as the standard
for our organization, and that starts with the general manager,
and looking at a general manager for the future we want to make
sure that this Board understands----
Ms. Norton. Where are you on the general manager of the
future?
Ms. Hudgins. The general manager?
Ms. Norton. And when is the future coming?
Ms. Hudgins. Well, let me first say that we have a general
manager in place, and Mr. Sarles has been outstanding in the
work that he has done, but he has indicated he is not a
permanent candidate for this job so we are working toward the
end of the year of moving forward on a general manager.
Ms. Norton. So you believe that by January 1st we will have
a new general manager for the Metro system?
Ms. Hudgins. We hope that within that timeframe we are able
to do so. But the information that we are gathering is very
critical in trying to set some priorities for the organization
about safety, and that is what that group is doing in helping
the Authority and the general manager and his employees, but we
are looking for expertise. We are looking for information from
this task force that will set forth some guidelines for us.
Ms. Norton. I believe Mr. Sarles' testimony, or it comes
from really the audit of March 2010 when 25 percent of the
positions in Metro's safety department were vacant, and you
have testified about James Dougherty, the new chief safety
officer, and an actual increase of 12 positions. So we would
like to know how many positions remain vacant?
Mr. Sarles. None.
Ms. Norton. And how has that new safety operation been
restructured? In what way is it different?
Mr. Sarles. There are no vacancies left. All those vacant
positions that were talked about were filled, including people
who have worked on other railroads and have extensive
experience in the regulated environment.
In addition, as part of the FTA findings and
recommendations, we were to do a self-assessment of the safety
organization. What we have completed thus far is looking at the
experience of all the people in the organization, what we need
in that organization, and the additional training that has to
be done so that everyone is fully qualified in all their
positions. There has been a lot of experience; now we are just
adjusting it to the Washington Metro organization.
Importantly, as I mentioned before, that organization,
which had sort of moved around, safety organization had moved
around different places in the organization, not always
reporting to the general manager, reports directly to the
general manager, as well as giving monthly reports to the
Board.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Bassett, I appreciate the work that you
have done, particularly given the obvious handicaps under which
you labor. How many funded positions does TOC have?
Mr. Bassett. We currently have two members who are assigned
full time, myself and Mr. Benton. The White Paper, as issued in
April, identifies the commitment from the three jurisdictions
to allocate one full-time person, as well as one person who
will provide 50 percent of a full-time equivalent, per
jurisdiction. So once the hiring process is complete for the
District of Columbia, we will have three full-time TOC members.
Ms. Norton. Now, Mr. Bassett, you are having to struggle
while we in the Congress are trying to create an entirely new
system where the local jurisdictions would have to have a fully
funded oversight organization or depend upon the Federal
Government, and we are giving that option in our legislation,
at least, to the local jurisdictions. You can do it yourself,
according to regulations which will be at some level national,
or the Federal Government can help the local jurisdictions.
That is just very rough notion of the statute.
You are going to have to hobble along until we get this
bill out. Actually, I think it is today it is on the floor, or
tomorrow it is on the floor. I am going to go to speak to that
bill. We hope to get the bill out of the Senate.
So we are very concerned about the issues you have had. Why
did they have issues, after there have been hearings that Mr.
Basset reported, Mr. Sarles?
Mr. Sarles. I think, as Mr. Bassett said, there has been a
lot of improvement. As I said, we are just at the start.
The one issue that Mr. Bassett brought up with regard to
the 4000-series cars, there are two pieces to it.
Ms. Norton. This was the 4000-series cars that were all
taken off line?
Mr. Sarles. Right.
Ms. Norton. Which would lead any oversight body to want to
know why, and they got two or three different answers, and we
are left to believe that there were not real written
procedures, correct me if I am wrong, because the document you
got was dated 3 days ahead of when you got it, or some such. It
indicates they kept getting answers one way or the other, which
tended to show that the procedures within Metro themselves were
in disarray, and only because Mr. Bassett asked for a really
common-sense explanation did it become clear that the problem
was not so much just tell us what the answer is; it was that
the procedures of Metro did not provide for staff to do the
appropriate documentation in order to render an answer to Mr.
Bassett or anybody else, so they had to quickly get themselves
together and get an answer to Mr. Bassett.
Mr. Sarles. Let me clarify something. Immediately upon the
determination that there was a problem the TOC was notified.
Immediately, they were invited in to see what the problem was
and to show what the solution was in the field, invited to the
shops, I believe, and reviewed it and did not see an issue with
what we were doing.
Where we could have done a better job is that once we
determined what the fix was and how to do it, which we shared
with the TOC, in terms of documenting that. In other words, you
decide how you are going to fix it, and then you have to write
down how you are going to fix it, as we were proceeding with
the repairs.
So the focus of our folks was on identifying it,
identifying the corrective action, getting the corrective
action moving so we get the cars back in service. What took
more time than it should have and could have been more clearly
communicated was documenting what had been done and what we
were doing.
So we recognize that and we will take steps to improve upon
that.
Mr. Bassett. I think Mr. Sarles has accurately outlined the
sequence of events. Our concern was never that they did the
wrong thing or that their procedures for actually correcting
the problem were inadequate.
Ms. Norton. So they acted quickly. When that door didn't
open, they knew to take those cars out?
Mr. Bassett. Actually, I believe the concern was the door
was opening when it shouldn't have.
Ms. Norton. Yes. Just the opposite.
Mr. Bassett. But the important thing to note is that, as
Mr. Sarles mentioned, they were on the phone with us at nine
o'clock on a Friday night on a holiday weekend. They were
bringing our contract engineer in in the immediate response,
and that went very well.
The issue was the followup.
Ms. Norton. Well, that is a vast improvement if the first
thing you do is to notify TOC.
Mr. Bassett. Yes. And I unfortunately was pressed for time
putting together oral testimony, trying to get a whole bunch of
stuff into 5 minutes, but I believe the written testimony
reflects that their immediate reaction of notifying us and
bringing our personnel in was praiseworthy. But the concern is
the followup.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Bassett, I really have to ask you about our
concern. We don't know when this bill will get out. Let's
assume our bill gets out of the House and the Senate. It will
take considerable time for regulations to be drawn and the
rest.
The subcommittee was very concerned the way TOC is funded.
Bad enough for it not to be independent in the usual sense of
the word, but are you not funded through the transportation
departments of the various jurisdictions?
Mr. Bassett. We are, and in the White Paper they made the
commitment to almost double the funding from the three
jurisdictions on an annual basis.
Ms. Norton. What was mystifying to us was, since all the
money comes from the legislatures in the first place, why use
the transportation departments, who could be implicated, who
knows, in issues TOC finds? Why use them as a pass-through if
the point is not to in some ways control TOC? Why not at least
make TOC independent enough so that its funds come directly
from the legislature or the county legislature, or in the
District it would be the City Council? They could appropriate
it in their funds. We don't understand why you give the money
to DOT and say, will you give it, because we see that third
party intermediary as either unnecessary or if not actually
having a role. So we would like to know is it?
Mr. Bassett. The membership of the TOC, as well as the
funding, does come from the three State jurisdiction level
transportation.
Ms. Norton. We are well aware of that. Yes.
Mr. Bassett. And I think the only real additional comment I
can share on that is that this was an approach that was
approved by the Federal Transit Administration and, in terms of
having State level agencies doing the State safety oversight
for a major rail transit system, it is fairly common to use
this approach nationally.
Ms. Norton. Well, what role does the Department of
Transportation of the various agencies play other than pass
through? Do they consult you? Do they advise you? Is their
expertise necessary?
Mr. Bassett. They are our employers. We are part of the
team. I think probably the most noteworthy thing, especially
recently, is that with the creation of the TOC Executive
Committee, thanks to the leadership of the two Governors and
the mayor, we now have access on a regular basis to the
secretaries of transportation for Maryland and Virginia and to
the director of transportation for the District of Columbia.
So our being a part of these transportation agencies has,
especially since the White Paper, permitted us access to senior
transportation leaders who previously might not have been
available to us as quickly.
Ms. Norton. So you don't perceive any interference from
them with respect to your independence or duties?
Mr. Bassett. They are an integral part of our leadership,
and I would say their role is to help us perform our duties.
Ms. Norton. They give you advice and counsel and technical
expertise and the like? Is that what they do?
Mr. Bassett. We have access to those things from both our
leaders and other personnel within our agencies. So yes.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Garland, we have heard testimony here
without much detail about the new whistleblower protection
policy. The Federal Government has an awful record on
protecting whistleblowers except it might not be as vital if
you are a functionary in the Department of Education, but if
you are a common carrier, it would seem to me that
whistleblower protection would be of the highest order, which
would mean that the worker could blow the whistle on issues
without facing punitive measures.
Have you any view on the new whistleblower protection
policy and the so-called safety hotline, I think that is the
name that was used, that has been initiated?
Mr. Garland. I am familiar with the Safety Hotline. The
Safety Hotline has always been there for the employees to
report safety issues and things of that sort. I think what we
are dealing with is a culture of workers that, over the years,
were basically working in a work force where the solution to
everything was to increase discipline on the work force, so
they are more so reluctant to come forward with information as
far as, my coworker may be doing something, or if I am doing
something and I want to come out and share that information
with other workers so that no one has to go through what I went
through, and things of that sort. So to get this workforce to
buy into a new safety culture, it is going to take more than
just throwing that term out there.
There is a real disconnect in the Agency with the work
force and management, and it really has to be addressed before
we can move forward. Like I said before, we can throw the money
at the infrastructure and the safety mechanisms in WMATA, but
there is a human element as to workers wanting to do their job
and to feel good about what they are doing, and more so being
their brother's keeper, and that is their coworkers and things.
Ms. Norton. You seem to indicate that besides the safety
culture there is a whole workers culture or worker/management
culture that Metro needs to work on.
I would like to know from Mr. Sarles and Ms. Hersman in
particular how a non-punitive safety culture fits in with the
whistleblower and the hotline notion. I mean, do you need
whistleblowers as much if you have a non-punitive safety
culture of the kind, for example, that they have in the
airlines and rail? Or would whistleblowers and hotlines be just
as necessary if this non-punitive safety culture were to evolve
in Metro? How do the two fit?
Ms. Hersman. Well, I think it depends on how robust and
positive the culture is, and so my question would be how many
calls do they get in to that hotline, and are they calls that
effect change. Do they use those calls to change what is going
on?
I know that everyone throws around the term of safety
culture, and it is sometimes a little bit ambiguous to
understand what the point of a safety culture is, and if you
don't have trust within an organization, if you don't have
confidence that things are going to be acted on, it does create
problems.
One of the things that we talk about with respect to a
safety culture, some of the things that we saw at Metro about
their ineffective safety culture was that they were focused on
operations, that they didn't have adequate information about
critical safety issues within the organization; their
organizational structure didn't effectively communicate.
One of the things we knew after those two close calls in
Rosslyn, where we had the same problem occur but it wasn't
identified, we had a train stop under the river, we had another
train approach in automatic, and the operator saw that they
were getting too close. They applied the emergency brakes. Very
close call. They moved forward. It happened again with another
train.
I think the learning lesson there was that they tried to
identify what the problem was, they couldn't quite figure it
out, and so they really wanted to get back into service
quickly, so they just replaced everything and moved on.
The engineering department did go further. They did take a
look at what happened, and they developed this test to make
sure that a track circuit worked, so you have the engineering
department that has identified the problem, but here is the
maintenance department, and they don't take this new procedure,
throw it over the wall, and apply it for the maintenance
people. So when we went onsite and we interviewed the
maintenance personnel that had done some of the work right
there at Fort Totten in the days before the accident, they
weren't familiar with this procedure, this procedure that
existed for a long time.
Metro had requirements that employees had to sign and
initial procedures when they came out, but if you have multiple
employees who don't understand a procedure and it is not being
effectively implemented, that is a breakdown. That is a
breakdown in the people that are here supervising how do the
engineering and maintenance folks work together, and what do
the maintenance people do and what do they know every day.
So you have to be able to take those issues and break them
down and say what happened? What failed there? You want to have
an informed culture so the people who are operating and
managing the system have knowledge about the factors that are
affecting the system. You want to have a reporting culture, and
this is what we are talking about when we talk about non-
punitive reporting. People can report safety concerns. They can
report errors that they have made and near misses in a just
culture so people are encouraged and rewarded for providing
safety information without fear or blame.
If you have an effective safety culture, it is flexible. It
can change. It can adapt. A learning culture. So you have to be
able to have the willingness and the competence to get those
lessons learned, to draw them, to change things.
It is not something that is going to happen overnight, and
there is going to have to be a lot of confidence-building
measures to take place with the employee work force so they are
full participants in this culture, so that they feel like they
own it and they feel like they are a partner. That is why our
recommendations both to the Federal Transit Administration to
establish this system-wide across the country and to Metro talk
about all of the pieces that really need to be involved to make
this a success.
If you are not getting a lot of calls on your safety
hotline, people don't have confidence in it and they are not
using it. When we look at an airline with a robust reporting
culture for pilots, they get 10,000 reports a year. I wonder
how many calls they get on the safety hotline?
Ms. Norton. Mr. Sarles may want to answer that. He also may
want to respond to Ms. Hersman's notion of what sounds like a
classic stovepipe culture where the maintenance did not know
about the issue she described. Has that been remedied?
Mr. Sarles. Certainly there are a lot of silos in Metro. As
I said before, we have started on the path to remedying those
things. I will not sit here at this point and say it has all
been remedied. We have a long way to go.
I will agree that when that safety culture is in place and
when there is a trust that is referred to before, there will be
actually, in my view, less need for a safety hotline because if
there is truly a trust between the workers and the managers and
the feeling that information can be shared without retribution,
then people will not have to be a whistleblower and they will
not have to use the safety line. But it is going to take a long
time to get there. In the meantime, with those tools available,
at least if someone feels there is going to be retribution they
have a channel to do it, and if they call the safety hotline
the call is treated anonymously.
Ms. Norton. Mr. DeBernardo, I have a question for you, but
I think I am going to defer to Mr. Bilbray now, who hasn't had
the opportunity to ask any questions.
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Madam Chair.
What is the headways during the rush hour?
Mr. Sarles. It is around 3 minutes. Depends.
Mr. Bilbray. Three minutes. Is every heavy rail in the
country operating with an automated system with a manual
override?
Mr. Sarles. Generally most systems in this country are
manual. They do not have Automatic Train Operation. WMATA was
more advanced than that.
Mr. Bilbray. Well, let me answer that and come back,
because I know that BART, when I was involved in the transit
system, I ran into BART and a couple others that really
questioned the automated system for a safety reason, mostly
because of the relationship between humans, the attention span
of humans, and when they go down.
Are you saying that the majority of heavy rail operators in
this country are operating with a manual operation and then--
let me just say this and allow you to sort of counter it--I was
told that the safer system would have been a manual operation
with electronic override, because the fact is the human, when
they are not engaged, will not have the attention span to
engage. When you need them, they are not going to be there, was
basically the argument.
I want to open that up. I know this is an issue that all of
us in transit bounce back and forth, but I would love to hear
your argument on the counterside on that issue.
Mr. Sarles. Well, my experience has always been with a
manual system, so it is a little hard to argue since I have
only been here for a few months.
The obvious advantage of an Automatic Train Operation is
that you can probably get a little bit more capacity and more
reliability.
Mr. Bilbray. In theory your headway is going to be smaller?
Mr. Sarles. A little bit. But, more importantly, just like
when you are driving a car down a highway, if one person slows
down a little bit more than the other, just for whatever
reason, you will tend to slow the rest of the traffic. The same
thing can be when you are in manual operation. One operator
will operate just slightly differently than the others, maybe
slow down in one area that another one would not, so that will
tend to reduce your capacity.
However, especially in my view here in regard to WMATA,
before you can return to an automatic train operation you have
to do that complete system safety analysis that the NTSB has
recommended and carefully review the results of that, and then
the Board at that time, with the expertise that we provide to
it, will have to make a decision on that.
Mr. Bilbray. You remember in the 1970's the big argument,
the engineer said the human didn't even have to be on the car.
The lines I got while we were designing our systems was that
you are going to have to have them in the cars anyway, and if
they are sitting there doing nothing you not only loose
attention, you end up having to pay them more for doing
nothing, because the stress, basically the fatigue, is higher
for doing nothing than actually engaging.
Do you have any experience in the relationship between that
automated system?
Let me just say this up front: I have to believe with
modern technology that there is a way to integrate these two
components and get the advantage of the human being in there
and tap more into the advantage of the human, but still being
able to utilize technology.
A good example is this configuration of how close the cars
operate, or whatever. I think there are ways that technology,
especially with the new high-tech stuff going on, that we can
really take advantage of increasing efficiency still more, but
having more safety, and really tapping into the safety of
having a human in the cab. The oversight people at all even
consider looking at that in this report?
Ms. Hersman. The Safety Board has looked at automation in
all modes of transportation, and you raise an excellent point,
because one of key issues is that you have to get the human in
the loop, and so, with respect to human-centered automation,
the Safety Board sees technology and automation as being a very
powerful tool to provide a safety redundancy to human beings in
the event that they have lapses, errors, failures, mistakes.
It is very important to keep the human in the loop when you
are designing a system. In fact, we made a recommendation to
Metro coming out of our 1996 investigation of a Shady Grove
accident. At the time Metro was operating in automatic all the
time--it occurred on icy rails where there wasn't good traction
for the wheels--the train over-sped, and the operator was not
able to stop as it came in at the end of the line and it hit
another train.
We actually made a recommendation to Metro that they needed
to train their employees to operate in manual and not rely on
automatic all the time, and to recognize that you can't always
rely on the technology to operate the train.
So, based on that recommendation, Metro did change how they
operated their trains, and they operated them in automatic
during rush periods but in manual during other periods, and
that was significant, because after this accident they went to
all manual on all lines all the time. They had a work force
that was experienced operating in manual that might not have
otherwise been if they hadn't changed the mix.
So we have found that automation can be a problem, whether
it is in aviation in the cockpit, on the trains. We do see
technology as a backup or redundant system for human failure.
Mr. Bilbray. OK. Thank you.
I apologize, Madam Chair, but these things really are big
questions. I know that it was openly debated in the 1970's. I
am old enough to remember that. But there are still schools of
thought here. I just think there is a whole lot of difference
between having technology back up human and a human backing up
technology, because technology traditionally does not fatigue,
does not text, does not get distracted, and that can't be said
about human beings. I know this seems like nit picking, but I
think it can be a major critical issue, and as soon as I saw
this accident, as somebody who comes from a transit background,
that was the first question I had.
I appreciate the chance to be able to dialog here and I
appreciate the open and frank discussion on this.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Bilbray.
Final question for Mr. DeBernardo. Mr. DeBernardo, we have
spent this time exclusively discussing Metro rail because of
the NTSB report and the spectacular nature of that tragedy, not
to mention the other accidents where workers, for example, were
killed, but I believe the riding public that you represent, in
terms of the record of this hearing, would also want the
riders' perspective on safety challenges confronting Metro bus
and Metro access riders. I say that not in the abstract. We
have had serious accidents here involving Metro buses at the
same time there were Metro rail accidents. Could you comment on
that for us?
Mr. DeBernardo. I think the concern in those areas in terms
of Metro access and in terms of Metro bus have to do not with
technology but with human error, with problems with lack of
attention.
Ms. Norton. Traffic.
Mr. DeBernardo. Traffic, and not mechanical failure. And
then with Metro Access, in particular, the problems that we
have seen in the news with not transportation issues but the
sexual assaults that have occurred due to subcontracting out
and not sufficient oversight of employees in those areas
because of subcontracting.
Ms. Norton. Those have been very concerning to us all. We
don't want to get off into another subject at this hearing, but
we want to note those matters for the record.
The chairman had indicated that he would make every effort
to be back. He has now sent word that it has become impossible
for him to come back and has asked me to thank all the
witnesses and Members who attended this hearing today.
There may be questions submitted to you in written form.
Members will have 10 legislative days to do so.
The subcommittee and full committee look forward to
continuing this very important beginning dialog following the
NTSB report.
Could I just say, with respect to the quality of testimony
that we have heard here today has been superb and invaluable,
and we thank you very much for your testimony.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statement of Hon. Gerald E. Connolly
follows:]
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