[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TRANSITION IN IRAQ: IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT PREPARED TO TAKE THE LEAD?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-103
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-138 WASHINGTON : 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DARRELL E. ISSA, California
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN L. MICA, Florida
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
DIANE E. WATSON, California PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
JIM COOPER, Tennessee JIM JORDAN, Ohio
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
Columbia BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island ANH ``JOSEPH'' CAO, Louisiana
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
PETER WELCH, Vermont
BILL FOSTER, Illinois
JACKIE SPEIER, California
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio
JUDY CHU, California
Ron Stroman, Staff Director
Michael McCarthy, Deputy Staff Director
Carla Hultberg, Chief Clerk
Larry Brady, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 23, 2010............................... 1
Statement of:
Bowen, Stuart W., Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction............................................. 46
Thibault, Michael J., co-chairman, Commission on Wartime
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, accompanied by Grant
S. Green, Commissioner, Commission on Wartime Contracting
in Iraq and Afghanistan.................................... 10
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Bowen, Stuart W., Jr., Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction, prepared statement of...................... 49
Issa, Hon. Darrell E., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 8
Thibault, Michael J., co-chairman, Commission on Wartime
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Grant S. Green,
Commissioner, Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and
Afghanistan, prepared statement of......................... 13
Towns, Chairman Edolphus, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York, prepared statement of............... 3
TRANSITION IN IRAQ: IS THE STATE DEPARTMENT PREPARED TO TAKE THE LEAD?
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2010
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in
room 210, House Visitor Center, Hon. Edolphus Towns (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Towns, Maloney, Cummings,
Kucinich, Tierney, Clay, Watson, Connolly, Quigley, Norton,
Cuellar, Speier, Driehaus, Issa, Duncan, McHenry, and
Luetkemeyer.
Staff present: John Arlington, chief counsel--
investigations; Kwame Canty, senior advisor; Craig Fischer,
professional staff member; Linda Good, deputy chief clerk;
Katherine Graham, investigator; Carla Hultberg, chief clerk;
Marc Johnson and Ophelia Rivas, assistant clerks; James Latoff,
counsel; Amy Miller and Gerri Willis, special assistants; Brian
Quinn, investigative counsel; Jenny Rosenberg, director of
communications; Leneal Scott, IT specialist; Ron Stroman, staff
director; Larry Brady, minority staff director; John Cuaderes,
minority deputy staff director; Rob Borden, minority general
counsel; Adam Fromm, minority chief clerk and Member liaison;
Moly Boyl and Mark Marin, minority professional staff members;
Justin Lorranco, minority press assistant and clerk; Ryan
Little, minority legislative assistant; Ashely Callen, minority
counsel; Tom Alexander, minority senior counsel; Jon Skladary,
minority chief counsel; and Jennifer Safavian, minority chief
counsel for oversight and investigations.
Chairman Towns. The committee will come to order.
Good morning and thank you all for being here.
For the past 7 years, the military has led the charge in
Iraq. In addition to providing security, the military has
trained and equipped Iraq's security forces and has overseen
billions of dollars of reconstruction projects. The military
has also provided vital support to the other U.S. agencies
operating in Iraq: food, housing, transportation, and medical
evaluation services have all been managed or carried out by the
Defense Department.
All that is about to change. Under President Bush's
agreements with the government of Iraq, U.S. military forces
are to complete their exit from Iraq by December 31, 2011. As a
result, we have reached a new phase in Iraq, a phase that
places less reliance on our troops and more on our civilian
agencies. This new phase has been called, ``Operation New
Dawn,'' but from where I am sitting it should have been called,
``Operation New Challenges.''
As we reduce the number of troops in Iraq, many duties now
performed by the military will be transferred to the State
Department. The size and complexity of State's new role in Iraq
is unprecedented. Numerous important issues appear to be
unresolved. The State Department will take over many functions
that are inherently military, for which State has little or no
expertise.
This raises important practical questions. Who will provide
security for State Department employees? Who will recover
personnel who are wounded or killed? Who will provide convoy
security? Who will provide counter-fire in rocket artillery and
other mortar attacks? Who will recover damaged vehicles and
downed aircraft? Who will provide explosives disposal? Even
basic questions of what military equipment will be transferred
to the State Department and who will apply rules for the use of
force have still not been settled.
Without the State Department having the expertise or the
staff to carry out these functions, State will be forced to
turn to contractors to fill this gap. For example, the Wartime
Contracting Commission estimates that State will need more than
double the number of security contractors it currently has in
Iraq, to as many as 7,000.
The State Department must also grapple with how it intends
to provide basic life support services. Despite poor past
performance by KBR, the Army recently made the highly
controversial decision to extend KBR's sole source contract
under LOGCAP 3 instead of competing it under LOGCAP 4. The
implications of this Army decision are unclear.
With the huge increase in the number of contractors and
contracting costs, the State Department will need to closely
monitor these contracts. Unfortunately, providing effective
contract oversight has not been the State Department's
strongest suit.
The State Department Inspector General, the Special
Inspector General of Iraq Reconstruction, and GAO have all
found significant weaknesses in the State Department's contract
management in Iraq. Even the State Department's Assistant
Secretary of Management has acknowledged a lack of contract
experience and expertise within the agency.
Six months ago Ambassador Patrick Kennedy wrote to the
Defense Department outlining these issues and requesting help.
Defense has still not fully responded. This apparent lack of
cooperation is unacceptable.
These issues cannot be ignored. We cannot sit on the
sidelines and hope these problems take care of themselves. The
risks are too high to botch the transition and we cannot turn a
blind eye to reckless contractors. We cannot afford to lose the
gains our service men and women have fought so hard for over
these years.
I look forward to hearing testimony from the Commission on
Wartime Contracting, as well as the Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction. Both the Commission and the IG have
completed important work in these areas and continue to be an
important asset to the Congress.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Edolphus Towns
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.003
Chairman Towns. At this point I would like to yield 5
minutes to the ranking member of the committee and say to him
that these digs over here are just temporary. We will be moving
back to our regular quarters after the completion.
Mr. Issa. Mr. Chairman, on so many things we find common
ground. We find the ability to come together and to agree.
Today's hearing is an example, leaving these digs is not.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Chairman, today's hearing is important and it is
bipartisan. Now, we use the words bipartisan, nonpartisan, all
these other things, pretty often around here. It is pretty
clear that the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, although supported
for the troops, have not always been equally supported on both
sides.
But as we are nearly 2 years into a new administration and
America's vital national interests have fully transitioned from
one President and one administration to another, and persistent
problems remain, as the Commission on Wartime Contracting
issues its report, the Special Inspector General's reports have
been keenly looked at by this committee, it is pretty clear
that 7, 8 years of one President in war and 2 years of another
President at war look a lot the same.
We are going to hear today about a number of needs in the
transition. These are not new needs. Certainly, this committee
has staked out a great deal of jurisdiction over the question
of outsourcing of inherently governmental activities. In fact,
no committee owns more of the responsibility to get it right in
the future than this.
The Diplomatic Security Service is woefully understaffed.
Now, 9 years ago when that was the case, nobody was surprised.
First one and then another war in which diplomats in great
numbers were deployed while we were still at war and/or in an
occupation created a unique need. We never intended our
diplomatic services to need attack helicopters, overhead eye in
the sky, predator drones, and the like, but they did.
Now, nearly a decade later and two Presidents into two
wars, we realize that there is an ongoing elevated need for a
level of security to be provided for our diplomats that is not
appropriate to provide by uniformed services. It is not that
the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force haven't done a great job. They
have. But they are not, in fact, the appropriate people to
stand by a diplomat as he goes in saying, this is about peace.
Our Marines, and I represent Camp Pendleton, have for
virtually our entire time as a country guarded embassies. But
as the diplomats go out, they need to go out in civilian
clothes with, to the greatest extent possible, a peacetime
look. This is not currently possible through Government
employees. And the contracting system has been controversial.
One, because it costs a great deal to employ somebody in these
areas, and because it has been viewed as temporary, and as a
result the high cost and the lack of a systematic approach for
what the rules of engagement will be have caused us diplomatic
problems time and time again. This committee has held hearings
on many of those diplomatic problems.
Although this committee often looks at waste, fraud, and
abuse through the eyes of dollars, and the projected costs and
overruns that we will discuss today are huge and need to be
addressed, I think this committee has an obligation to bring
light today on the fact that, after 7 years in Iraq and a
declared mission accomplished twice, we have to make sure that
the powers that remain remain with the assets they need and
appropriately, when inherently governmental, use governmental
assets.
Over the years I have met with contractors who provide
security services. Of course, they do it for compensation, but
time and time again they have said, this is not our company's
core requirement. This is not what we do. These companies very
rightfully would give that up in a transition, and that
transition is long overdue.
So as we talk to two panels of learned experts, I hope that
we will focus on what we don't have today but should have had
several years ago, a transition that in many cases has not
really begun, and how we go forward from here on a bipartisan
basis.
Mr. Chairman, I know we can do this together. I know that
the cost overruns and the sins of the past are just that, but
we now have it on our watch and I look forward to working
together on this.
I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Darrell E. Issa follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.005
Chairman Towns. I thank the gentleman for his statement. I
look forward to working with him.
At this time I would like to ask the witnesses to please
stand and raise your right hands. We swear all of our witnesses
in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Towns. Let the record reflect that both witnesses
answered in the affirmative.
Mr. Michael Thibault is co-chair of the Commission on
Wartime Contracting. Before being appointed to the Commission,
Mr. Thibault spent his career in public service at the Defense
Contracting Audit Agency. From 1994 until his retirement from
DCAA, Mr. Thibault served as the Deputy Director for the
Agency. Mr. Thibault is also a decorated Vietnam veteran,
serving in the U.S. Army from 1965 to 1968.
We welcome you this morning.
Mr. Grant Green is one of the six Commissioners who served
with the two chairs of the Commission on Wartime Contracting.
Highlights from Mr. Green's career include appointment as Under
Secretary of State for Management and Assistant Secretary of
Defense. Mr. Green also spent 22 years in the U.S. Army and is
currently the chairman of a business consulting firm.
We welcome you.
At this time I ask the witnesses to deliver their 5-minute
testimony. I understand that you, Mr. Thibault, will be
delivering testimony on behalf of the Commission. Let me just
say that, even in our new digs, I understand that when you
start out the light is on green, and then all of the sudden it
moves to yellow, caution, which means that you have 1 minute to
summarize from that point. And, as everywhere in the United
States of America, red means stop. Of course, when the red
light comes on, that means stop, which will, of course, allow
us an opportunity to raise questions with you.
Let me thank both of you for being here this morning. Of
course, at this time, Mr. Thibault, you have 5 minutes to give
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. THIBAULT, CO-CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON
WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, ACCOMPANIED BY
GRANT S. GREEN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING
IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN
Mr. Thibault. Thank you, Chairman Towns, Ranking Member
Issa, and other members of the committee. I am Michael
Thibault, co-chair of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Beside me is Commissioner Grant Green.
Thank you for inviting us to testify today.
I will briefly summarize our joint statement and request
the full statement be entered into the record.
Chairman Towns. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Thibault. Thank you.
First, I would like to state that my co-chair, Chris Shays,
who has worked with me extensively, as well as with this
committee in his past, very graciously asked Commissioner
Green, because of the background that you recognized, that he
sit in and provide testimony. I am not sure I could have done
that, but he did. Commissioner Shays is, as you mentioned,
bipartisan and absolutely in synch with our efforts today.
Chairman Towns. We were looking forward to seeing him
because he served on this committee for a number of years. I am
happy to know that he didn't feel it was a conflict of
interest.
Mr. Issa. We had a few questions for him from his time here
that we are still hoping to ask.
Mr. Thibault. Thank you.
Chairman Towns. And we wanted to show him our new digs.
Mr. Thibault. The future of the new Iraq is unsettled. This
past Sunday, as the Washington Post reported, six car bombings
in Baghdad and a suicide bombing in Fallujah killed 37 people
and wounded more than 100. Iraq remains a dangerous place. The
combination of a military withdrawal, a persistent security
threat, and a return to customary intra-governmental relations
brings us to our concerns for this hearing.
The U.S. Embassy will remain after U.S. troops withdraw
from Iraq. These circumstances combine to create what may be a
unique situation in American history: a diplomatic presence re-
established and expanding in a country that appears unable to
provide normal host country security and services, while the
U.S. military withdraws.
The scheduled withdrawal of the U.S. military forces leaves
State very little time to arrange for the alternative provision
of functions. One example best highlights the many challenges
facing the State Department. When insurgents attack U.S. bases,
they often include rocket and other indirect fire as part of
that attack.
Presently, the U.S. Army has a sophisticated and highly
effective system to provide immediate warning for these rocket
attacks. This system is called the counter-rocket and mortar
system. Within seconds of an enemy rocket or mortar launch,
there is a warning for all base occupants. This system has
saved countless lives.
Also included is a counter-battery system where military
indirect fire experts locate and return fire onto enemy
insurgents. This counter-battery effort takes 6 to 8 seconds
and is critical. As a result, enemy insurgents seldom fire more
than one rocket, as they know they will be targeted.
The State Department recently received an unsolicited
contractor proposal and now has identified a commercial variant
to replace the current system. They are presently evaluating
how this system can be acquired.
Even more troubling in this example, State Department
executives informed us this week that the counter-battery
effort will be terminated. Enemy insurgents will be delighted
when they learn and experience that they will not be
immediately targeted and brought under fire by the military.
Where our enemies work very hard to launch a single rocket,
there will be little reason to not launch entire batteries of
rockets. There will be no military consequences for them.
Commission concerns were recently validated by a June 21,
2010 Capitol Hill hearing. Among the troubling testimony we
heard that day was what you have previously mentioned, Mr.
Chairman, the Department of State estimates that without U.S.
military support it will need to raise its private security
force from 2,700 to almost 7,000.
Under Secretary of State Patrick Kennedy wrote to the
Department of Defense almost 6 months ago to request a
substantial amount of military information plus continued
access to the Army's LOGCAP logistics contract and continued
food and fuel supply through the Defense Logistics Agency, and
we found that DOD's joint staff at that time had not forwarded
that request with a recommendation to the Office of the
Secretary. We have been informed informally that they have, but
we attempted to reach confirmation on that and we were unable.
In summary, State Department program leaders have been
dealt a hand that includes unknown contract and program support
from the Department of Defense, funding limitations likely to
impact their mission capability, and the need to contract for
and perform functions that have never been done by their
Department. We believe that the State Department has been
placed in an unfair position as they work to deliver on
critical mission requirements in the continuing effort to
stabilize and reconstruct Iraq.
That concludes our joint statement, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member Issa. We thank the committee for its attention
and welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thibault and Mr. Green
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.016
Chairman Towns. Thank you very much for your testimony. We
will now start the questioning period. Each Member, of course,
will have 5 minutes. I will begin.
Your July report highlights very significant problems with
transition planning for the Defense Department handoff to the
State Department. Are we facing a potential disaster at this
point?
Mr. Thibault. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure if I would refer
to it as a potential disaster. We certainly are facing the
potential for significant contract cost overruns,
inefficiencies, and potential fraud, waste, and abuse if this
transition occurs in the form of what might be called a pick-up
game.
Chairman Towns. What do we need to do to fix this problem?
Mr. Thibault. Well, in our statement senior executive
leadership needs to address this. Our recommendation is at the
Secretarial level. There has been some coordination in theater
now as a result of our concerns and concerns raised by others,
but it is at the middle management level. This needs to be
pushed up to the highest levels within State and Defense,
because it is that important.
Chairman Towns. Right. Your report lists 14 security-
related tasks currently performed by DOD that will soon be
transferred to State. Functions such as recovering killed and
wounded soldiers will become a State Department responsibility.
Who will be performing these functions?
Mr. Green. Mr. Chairman, some of those 14 functions will
probably fall off the table. It will not be necessary to do
them, but the majority of them will. In most cases there will
be contractors performing those functions. There is a lot of
coordination currently being done now between the State
Department and the Defense Department on what equipment can be
left behind, for example, medical support. There is a dialog
ongoing now to see what medical support could be left behind by
DOD to support the State Department.
But some of these missions, for example, route clearance,
which had heretofore been done by the Department of Defense,
will fall principally to either contractors, and they plan on
using UAVs to perform that mission.
The main question and the answer is that these functions
will essentially be done by contractors. I think that obviously
creates difficulties. You mentioned them in your opening
remarks, inherently governmental functions. There is great
concern here in this Body and across America, in some cases,
about personal security contractors, but we forget about all
these other things that are military or quasi-military that
will now be done by contractors.
One of the most extreme examples that I can think of is the
State Department has asked for MRAPS. The Defense Department
has, at least verbally, indicated they will provide those
vehicles. They will be driven by contractors, and if there are
occasions when they go into high-threat areas and they have
weapons mounted, those weapons will, as it stands right now, be
manned by contractors.
Chairman Towns. I am thinking about all these security
contractors. One of the problems that we face, in terms of the
Department, is managing all of these security contracts. I
mean, it seems to me that you are going to probably double or
even maybe triple the amount that is in there now.
Mr. Thibault. Right. Mr. Chairman, the management of
security contractors for the Department of Defense and the
Department of State has been a challenge. There have been
numerous instances that we have reported where they are not
providing the kinds of quality and background investigation
that many of the security officials or contractors should have.
In the case of the State Department, they are going to be
challenged with potentially tripling the size of their security
force. It is unprecedented. They acknowledge it is
unprecedented.
The other item I think that is important that Commissioner
Green brought up is many of these inherently governmental items
that are being transitioned to State from the military
represent items where this Commission feels that the U.S.
military is the superior performer, and many of them relate to
security. With no disrespect for contractors, those items that
are inherently governmental, where professional military best
performs it, should and could remain with the military.
Chairman Towns. Let me be very basic. What can we do to
make this transition work?
Mr. Green. I think two things come to mind, and that is the
increased, expanded, and continuing dialog and coordination
between the State Department and the Defense Department. As
Chairman Thibault mentioned in his opening remarks, there has
been a dialog. It has mostly been at the middle management
level. They have certainly progressed from the time that I was
in-country the end of May and spent a week with the State
Department talking about the transition. U.S. forces Iraq has
been very forthcoming in providing liaison people and advisors
to the Embassy, but that has to continue.
Where I see a void is, and I go back to my time in the
State Department when I was responsible on the State side for
the transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority,
Ambassador Bremmer, to the new embassy. I had a counterpart
from the Defense Department, a retired Army lieutenant general
that worked directly for the Secretary. He was that ``belly
button,'' and he came over there with a gaggle of colonels and
helped us through that process. That process was nothing
compared to what we are facing today.
Where I see a hole is that we don't have or I don't know of
a person, we don't have a single person from the Defense
Department that can run interference and make things happen.
We mentioned the LOGCAP contract and the request for
equipment and support for LOGCAP DLA that went to the Defense
Department in April. As far as we know, it is still sitting
there. We need somebody that can walk into the Deputy's office
or even the Secretary's office and say, sir, we have to move
this. We have to make a decision. If it is yes, great. If it is
no, let's make a decision. Because much of the planning that
State has to do today in-country cannot be done until they know
the status of LOGCAP, as an example.
Chairman Towns. OK. My time is up.
Mr. Thibault. And, Mr. Chairman, one simple add-on to that
is anything that this committee can do to compel the Department
of Defense to provide support to the Department of State where
it is needed and where they have that kind of expertise and can
influence the criteria for providing that support is needed.
Chairman Towns. OK.
Mr. Green. I only answered part of your question, because
you said, Mr. Chairman, what else can we do.
Chairman Towns. Right.
Mr. Green. I think the other key element here is a stable
and reliable funding stream to State. I can tell you from my 4
years there, budget is always a problem. Today it is more of a
problem. We have already seen some decrements in the
supplemental for Iraq's support to both State and Defense. I am
concerned that when the spotlight is off this transition and it
is forgotten about and State is doing their thing and they have
taped this thing together. And I am confident it will happen.
It will work. But a lot can fall through the cracks.
We have to have stable funding when no longer is this the
top priority after Afghanistan.
Chairman Towns. And it seems to be a big crack.
Mr. Green. It is a big crack.
Mr. Thibault. That is right.
Mr. Green. It is a big crack.
Chairman Towns. And I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
California, the ranking member of the committee.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to stay right
along your line of questioning.
Let me start off by reminding all of us on this side and
informing you, a while back we did a good and important hearing
that sort of was sad, and that was on how the Coast Guard
decided it was going to create its fleet of blue water naval
ships, if you will, and they didn't know how to do it. The end
result is we have ships that are going to break in half sooner
than they normally do. It boils down to less life because they
didn't have the right designers. And they were designing a ship
that was substantially similar to ones that were designed by
the Navy successfully for years.
That taught all of us something, which is that procurement
doesn't belong just to the agency doing it; it belongs to this
committee to find and ensure that, if the skills exist in one
part under one stovepipe of Congress and one stovepipe of the
administration and the need is in another, we have an
obligation to either assist or de-conflict. I think we have
that here today. I think we can all agree on that.
Let me start by asking a question for the record, which is:
does State Department have the acquisition skills, by any
stretch of the imagination, to acquire 7,000 people and
commensurate hard assets to do the type of security,
protection, and missions in Iraq that we see for at least the
next year?
Mr. Thibault. I would answer that, Mr. Congressman Issa,
that they do have acquisition skill sets to award contracts.
Mr. Issa. That is not my question, though.
Mr. Thibault. I think the contract oversight and the
management of that is absolutely strained to the max now. They
have been providing some additional support for contract
oversight based on need. If you triple the force, for example,
of private security contractors, the inference is clear: if you
want to have boots on the ground to take a look and make sure
that they are complying with use of force criteria, you have to
have the people to do the oversight. That is going to be a
challenge.
Mr. Issa. OK, but let us break it down a little
differently. Do they know how to buy predator aircraft, to
figure out which one?
Mr. Thibault. No. Not presently.
Mr. Issa. Do they know how to buy armored vehicles?
Mr. Thibault. They do not have experience.
Mr. Issa. OK. They do not know how to buy anti-mortar or
anti-missile systems?
Mr. Thibault. They are going to have to learn how.
Mr. Issa. Do they?
Mr. Thibault. No. They do not have that experience.
Mr. Issa. Mr. Green, if they don't have that experience and
if 100 percent of the skills exist in the U.S. military, both
for acquisition and among our uniformed men and women, and they
have historically done a big part of the job, as distasteful as
it is to say we are going to break with long tradition of
having military not standing next to Ambassadors as they go in
to heads of state and so on, aren't we just arguing over the
uniform?
And let me just give you a hypothetical, because it is
beyond the jurisdiction of this committee, but not beyond our
imagination.
If we look at our 50,000 men and women already there and we
segment or ask the administration to consider segmenting this
role on a seconded basis to where they would assume those
additional duties as they have in the past, if we do that,
don't we save money, save trying to train, and, in the case of
men and women in uniform who have been doing much of this job,
save using private contractors who ultimately, as patriotic as
they might be, are, in fact, more alien to the process of
protecting our Diplomatic Service than the military itself is?
Mr. Green. State would be thrilled to have that support
and, in fact, will need it and have asked for it.
Just go back to LOGCAP as an example. If DOD in their
wisdom says, OK, we will support you with LOGCAP for the next
one, two, or whatever years, and we will provide also that
oversight and management, that mechanism that is in place today
to oversee those contracts, they also would want, and you
mentioned, UAVs and CRAM. They also will need help and will ask
for help and have asked for help as they begin to develop those
requirements.
Mr. Issa. So, to put it short, this is a gaping hole which
we are deeply concerned about and the time is ticking down to
zero, and yet it is, by definition, a self-inflicted wound if
it is not necessary to move it, but rather a decision for the
military to shed something, for whatever reason, when, in fact,
the most capable, most cost-effective support might, in fact,
already exist with our military and have no justification for
the long run for most of the rest of the world for our men and
women in the Diplomatic Service?
Mr. Green. Believe me, State Department knows where their
weaknesses are and has reached out and I hope will continue to
reach out to the Defense Department in those areas where
Defense obviously has the expertise.
Mr. Issa. Well, as we continue to look at it, I am going to
close with one question. I know we are talking and your
specific expertise is in Iraq, but we have Iraq and
Afghanistan. We also have the Horn of Africa, and we have other
areas around the world that are hot, can become super-hot, and
could fit the same model. Don't we have an obligation to have
an answer that isn't simply, go look for recently departed from
the military personnel to bring in contractors, but rather have
an in-sourced, in-Government group of people who can meet those
responses which could escalate as quickly, I shouldn't say as
they de-escalate, because they don't seem to de-escalate
quickly, but they do escalate quickly. Isn't that true?
Mr. Thibault. Mr. Congressman Issa, we would absolutely
agree with that. The fact that the U.S. Army now has a core
capability, they have more than 200 individuals on a team in
Iraq right now doing LOGCAP, for example. There are no State
employees doing LOGCAP. The only alternative is contractor or
our contractor employees.
Your reference to other theaters is spot on. There is an
absolute need to be able to respond quickly and effectively.
Mr. Issa. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope we have a
second round. I think this is a good line of questioning, and I
appreciate your time and yield back.
Chairman Towns. Right.
I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio,
Congressman Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Thibault.
Going over your testimony which you read and didn't read
that is in your prepared statement, and I see phrases like: no
clear guiding policy; a pick-up game; lack of transparency,
visibility, and basic data; transition limbo; State required to
undertake a very large, hurried, expensive, and unprecedented
exercise in contracting; functions falling off the table;
diplomatic presence re-established and expanding in a country
that appears unable to provide normal host country security and
services.
There is another way to caption this: fiasco. I mean, this
is not about fault; it is a fiasco. That is what you have
described.
Now, I think when you hear about this discussion about
Department of Defense and State it is like we are talking about
two different countries here. This is within the same
government, so what is really going on here? I think this is a
teachable moment, Mr. Chairman.
Let us look at the Washington Post's account yesterday, Bob
Woodward's new book. Here's a quote. I want everyone to think
about this. Woodward quotes General Petraeus as saying, ``You
have to recognize also, I don't think you win this war. I think
you keep fighting. It is a little bit like Iraq, actually.''
He's talking about Afghanistan, but then he says, ``Yes, there
has been enormous progress in Iraq but there are still horrific
attacks in Iraq. You have to stay vigilant. You have to stay
after it. This is the kind of fight we are in for the rest of
our lives and probably our kids' lives.''
The Washington Post, same Washington Post article, also
tells of a real struggle inside the administration where
President Obama kept asking for an exit plan to go along with
any further troop commitment and is growing increasingly
frustrated with the military hierarchy for not providing one.
So I think what is going on here, based on what this
testimony is, is that the Department of Defense isn't getting
its way. The top military commanders like Petraeus want to stay
in Iraq, and so it is OK with them if the State Department's
mission collapses, because then that opens the door for them to
come in and to stay. This is so clear to see, and this
testimony has to be put in the context of a desire of certain
top military commanders to thwart, frustrate, delay, and
otherwise impede an exit strategy from Iraq.
I mean, this Woodward book is an important book that is
coming out, but you have to look at the struggle that has been
going on within the administration to try to end the war. They
might be good soldiers, they might be fine individuals, but
they should not be making the policy for the United States of
America. That is up to the President of the United States.
We see this report. It is a very disturbing report and
Woodward's book. And when you hear this testimony today and you
put it together with this emerging view of what is going on,
there is just no question that the Department of Defense will
do anything it can at this point to thwart the mission of the
State Department to try to achieve a peaceful transition. Very
clear that is what is really going on here.
It is just so clear I am amazed, but you can't say it, Mr.
Thibault, but you have said it in so many words or less. I have
numerous questions to ask you, but after I read your report and
I am thinking about what I read yesterday, Mr. Chairman, what
we really ought to be doing is calling the Secretary of Defense
in front of this committee and General Petraeus and get them to
explain why they are not cooperating with the State Department.
That is what we really need to do. The State Department has
been given a mission impossible, given the fact that the
Department of Defense is not cooperating. And we know why: they
don't want to leave. Why don't they want to leave? That is a
subject for another hearing.
I don't have anything more to say.
Chairman Towns. I thank the gentleman for his statement.
I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri, Mr.
Luetkemeyer.
Mr. Luetkemeyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The title of the hearing today is Transition in Iraq: is
the State Department prepared to take the lead? And in your
summary, Mr. Thibault, you list a list of concerns here:
unknown contract and program support from DOD, funding
limitations likely to impact mission capability, need to
contract for and perform functions that have never been done by
the Department, and feel the Department has been placed in an
unfair position to be able to deliver on their mission.
I guess my question is: you sort of prefaced in your
summary here the reason for failure of the State Department to
be able to lead and/or its concerns about leading, and I wish
you would elaborate on that because I would like to know, is
the State Department prepared to lead on this?
Mr. Thibault. Our assessment, my assessment, is they are
prepared to lead if they must. Their preference is to do as has
been discussed here earlier, which is those organizations that
can best provide support would provide them the support. That
is the request. And the point is the request has been out there
almost 6 months, and so they are going with a dual approach of
planning, which doesn't make a lot of sense to us.
Their approach is: if the Department of Defense gives us
support, here is what we can do, but if they don't give us
support--and they have begun solicitation planning to use
contractors for the many items introduced in our statement and
in our prior report simply because they may not have a choice.
And the points that have been made here, what we are trying to
force out is a decision and then a debate on that decision, and
the decision just is not forthcoming.
Mr. Luetkemeyer. OK. So you delineated the concerns and the
problems, and obviously there is some give and take here on
what is going on. Let me back up a little bit to a couple
things. During your testimony you raised some questions. One of
the things you talked about is the MRAPS are going to be
allowed to be used by the contractors. How much equipment are
we going to be leaving behind or reassigning to the
contractors? Do we give up ownership of this as the United
States, or is it going to be ours and going to be utilized by
the contractors? How does that work?
Mr. Thibault. Right. This would be still be government-
owned equipment. The State Department provided a page-long,
very detailed request for various equipment items, to include
MRAPS and aviation transport and other types of critical
equipment. That is also part of the request that is out there
that hasn't been forthcoming. But the government would own it.
But I think the example of Commissioner Green, MRAPS go
where there are security issues.
Mr. Luetkemeyer. Right.
Mr. Thibault. Everyone here knows that there is a gunner on
top of an MRAP, and the gunner's job is to provide safety. And
we can say it is defensive, but it is really offensive. It is
to take down insurgents. That is the great example of
government-owned equipment that is going to be operated by
contractors unless this coordination process evolves into
something more meaningful.
Mr. Luetkemeyer. What do you believe the mission to be for
the transition here over to the State Department? Do you
believe it to be a military operation yet, or is it turned
completely into a political operation, or is it a combination
of both?
Mr. Thibault. Well, I would say their mission that they
would see is a diplomatic mission in an environment that is
absolutely not secure. So by default, if they are providing all
services, it has to be a combination of both.
Mr. Luetkemeyer. OK. Well, during your testimony you also
made a comment, something about the military was unable to
respond to an attack under the new guidelines here, or did I
misunderstand that?
Mr. Thibault. No, sir.
Mr. Luetkemeyer. OK. Can you elaborate on that just a
little bit?
Mr. Thibault. I am drawing a blank on the military unable.
Oh, what I would elaborate on in my testimony was that now,
within 6 to 8 seconds, the military puts indirect fire on top
of insurgents who mount rockets or mortars and the like. The
State Department has said, well, we would have difficulty
obtaining that service from contractors, and therefore we don't
have any plans to replace them.
The difficulty becomes, if you are one of the bad guys and
there is no one raining fire down on your head immediately, you
are liable to, rather than take one rocket and run, which is
bad enough, you are liable to take many rockets and fire them
all off into the area. And rockets are very random and the
potential for security risks are amplified.
Mr. Luetkemeyer. The contractors don't have the ability to
respond?
Mr. Thibault. The contractors don't run indirect fire
mortars.
Mr. Luetkemeyer. OK. So our mission there then is it
transitions over to the State Department, would be less
military then?
Mr. Thibault. It would have to be the use of contractors if
the military was not available to do counter-battery. The only
other option would be the Iraqi forces providing that support,
but to date that is not considered an option.
Mr. Luetkemeyer. OK. I see my time is up. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Towns. I recognize the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Congressman Tierney, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen.
When I wrote this bill that formed your Commission on
Wartime Contracting in the House with my colleague Jim Leach,
Republican, and then Jim Webb took it up in the Senate, it was
our intention to give you the authority to go in and look at
just these types of matters, and I want to thank you for doing
that. I wish we had gotten the bill as a bipartisan bill
through the House earlier so you could have gotten an earlier
start.
But the important aspect of that was, in fact, identifying
exactly what is an inherently governmental function and then
giving us a course of how to remedy the current situation. So I
am assuming that your report, either an interim report or a
final report, is going to give us a path of recommendation as
to what are the inherently governmental functions, how we ought
to get to the point where government does them. And then if the
correct government agency can't do it immediately, then how are
we going to arrange for a proper government agency to do it in
the interim, and then have a path of training people and
bringing people on board for the right government agency to
eventually do those functions?
And in the interim, if, perchance, some of it has to be
done by contractors, and hopefully not, how they are going to
get right management and oversight personnel and the right
number of them in place to carry out those activities with
insight not just into the subcontract but the sub-subcontracts.
That kind of insight has been terribly missing, like our
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs cited in
Warlord, Inc. Report, for just one example on that.
Am I right about this expectation for your report?
Mr. Thibault. You are absolutely correct, Congressman.
Mr. Tierney. OK. Then I think we have here a real issue
about funding on that, and the State has been hollowed out. I
think you point that out very well on that. We have had a
number of hearings in our subcommittee, as well.
Now, Secretary Gates has indicated in the past that he
thinks he is going to save about $100 billion in his cuts in
Department of Defense with things that are redundant or ought
not to be continued on. The problem as I see it is he has made
some rhetoric in the past about thinking that the State
Department ought to be beefed up.
I would hope that your recommendations go to how some of
those savings for our national security interests would be
transferred into the Secretary of State's agency to allow us to
have a better national security posture by beefing up the
Secretary of State. I don't know if you are going to go there
or not, but I would recommend that you take a look at that.
It is all under the national security umbrella. It is not
just a situation we have to stay in silos any more. If we are
going to have a good national security posture, then it has to
be one that puts the right people out front in the right places
and it all has to be perceived as national security. It really
shouldn't matter where the money comes from on that.
I think, you can correct me if I am wrong, that this is
something we can look at not just in Afghanistan and Iraq, but
in all of the places where Mr. Issa indicated that we may be
posturing in the future, whether it be Yemin, Somalia, Sudan,
or whatever, is to look at the right mix of people, what is
inherently governmental there, and how we get those personnel
in place.
Are you going to have time to do all of that by the time
your report needs to be issued?
Mr. Thibault. Well, we are challenged and we are putting
out a report this December with our legislative proposals so
that they can be considered, or very early January, so they can
be considered by the Congress.
In answer to your point, which is accurate, and
Commissioner Green may want to amplify, if the State Department
doesn't receive the kinds of funds that they are not receiving
now, no matter what their capability is they are not going to
get the job done, because they are not going to have the staff,
the people, the resources to award and oversee contracts.
If part of that mechanism is to utilize funds that have
been saved in Defense or have Defense provide certain functions
that they already do, that will greatly contribute to the
State's objectives.
Mr. Tierney. I would think that is basically accounting.
If, in fact, you take the money that is saved in Department of
Defense and it goes to Secretary of State and temporarily they
can't do it themselves, then just subcontracting back to the
Department of Defense. Maybe they have to work some major
memorandum of agreement or something where the resources are at
least put in the right place.
Mr. Thibault. Right.
Mr. Tierney. And then temporarily spent back on that basis
to cover it, because I know there is a lot of maneuvering
between the Secretaries here who is going to pay for what, what
budget this comes out of.
But the fact of the matter is we somehow, Mr. Chairman,
have to transcend that and say, look, if you can save X amount
of dollars, it ought to be in the Secretary of State's
division, and if temporarily DOD has to fulfill it, then let
them do a subcontract or something on that basis, but at least
set up the mechanism where we are transitioning on a long-range
plan, we have a plan to get where we eventually need to be.
Because we cannot have the number of private contractors out
there doing inherently governmental functions, because it is
not the right message to send, because there is no check on
liability, there is no accountability, and, frankly, it is rife
for fraud and abuse and over-spending and inefficiency.
It is a big challenge that you have. It is one that we put
in the legislation for you to do. I thank you for starting off
on that way. We will support you any way we can, I suspect.
Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Towns. Let me thank the gentleman from
Massachusetts, and also to thank him for his work in this area.
Of course, we still have a long way to go, but I want him to
know he has really got us going, and I think the serious
questions are being raised, which is why I think this hearing
is so important.
I now yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Congressman
Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, gentlemen. If I may, let me pick up where Mr.
Tierney just left off. I find that sometimes the definition of
inherently governmental is deceptively simple. Let me ask you
both, for example, is the provision of security, ongoing
security for U.S. personnel in Iraq, an inherently governmental
function, in your view?
Mr. Thibault. Well, the simple answer, and I do not mean to
be vague, is our perspective, and we have not come down
formally on this because it is that important, is to recognize
the different types of security, because you have convoy
security, you have distinguished visitors security, and you
have static or base security. There haven't been substantial
issues or country concerns about base security. There have been
issues about convoy security, very significant issues about the
use of private security contractors and the like.
Mr. Connolly. Well, your answer certainly comports with my
own view that, again I repeat, deceptively simple. The answer
is: it depends.
Mr. Thibault. That is correct.
Mr. Connolly. There are some security functions that it may
be perfectly proper for the Government to take over. There may
be others we want to continue to contract out for various and
sundry reasons. It depends.
Mr. Thibault. That is accurate.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Green, you would concur?
Mr. Green. I would concur. I think the difficulty here--and
we haven't talked much about this--is we are really in a box.
We have until December 2011 to get all troops out of country,
and there really is no alternative, if that is the way we are
going. There is no alternative to contractors, whether they are
doing inherently governmental things or they are running a mess
hall. Until when and if that decision is modified, we are going
to do it with contractors.
Mr. Connolly. Let me ask on contracting, one estimate of
the number of security folks we are going to need, the State
Department is going to need in taking over new responsibilities
is they probably need somewhere in the vicinity of 6,000 or
7,000 contractors.
Mr. Thibault. Correct.
Mr. Green. Correct.
Mr. Connolly. You would agree with that number?
Mr. Green. Yes.
Mr. Thibault. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. And how are they coming along in securing
contracts to secure 6,000 to 7,000 private contractors for
security?
Mr. Green. I don't know.
Mr. Thibault. I think I can assist with that. They have
several solicitations that are in the works because of the
growth, and the solicitations generally go toward existent
companies with a proven record, contractors, because they have
confidence in working with them, and in a very short turn-
around you tend to go with those organizations. They try to
utilize competition, but it is not as broad a base as might be
desirable simply because of the expedient nature of the
mission.
Mr. Connolly. Are we confident that there won't be any
holes in the security apparatus because of contracting
mechanisms, or delays in the signing of contracts and the
execution thereof?
Mr. Thibault. Well, the execution is interesting, because
the way they are aligning is right now, using Iraq, it could
fit Afghanistan I guess, but there are about 50 military bases,
forward bases and military bases. That will go to maybe 14 or
15, counting those that are there for the Department of Defense
for foreign military sales.
By necessity, what they have done is cut back their
diplomatic capability to travel throughout the country, so one
of the implications and outcomes----
Mr. Connolly. They being our State Department?
Mr. Thibault. State Department.
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
Mr. Thibault. They will not do the diplomatic mission to
the extent they would like to because, even with 7,000, they
have cut back dramatically. For example, the number of what
they call PRTs, or the provincial teams that build diplomacy
and build relationships and provide assistance, that has been
totally pulled back to their four existing bases because of
security. That is with 7,000 additional security individuals.
If they tried to keep it the way that they had it, I have
no idea what that number would be, but it would be
substantially more, maybe double.
Mr. Connolly. At least speaking for this Member, Mr.
Thibault, what you just said is stunning.
Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Towns. I thank the gentleman for yielding back.
I now recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Congressman
Quigley.
Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I suppose this is as good a time as any and as good an
issue and location as any to say that I have a hard time
disagreeing with my colleague, the gentleman from Ohio, about
this issue. It is extraordinarily frustrating. And we should
care about the issue, wherever it is in the United States, the
fundamental issue of that which makes our country safer. And
the fact is this transition has to work, and the Department of
Defense has to help, because we are forgetting the issue closer
to home here.
If I might indulge, we have heard of threats everywhere and
would-be bombers. Well, the most recent one was in Chicago, and
the would-be bomber placed the bomb a block from my house, so I
can't help notice that the work that really matters first and
foremost is taking place right here in this country. The
success that has taken place in stopping this is good police
work right here in this country. So you will have to forgive me
if I am frustrated that the Department of Defense seems to have
the mindset that staying in Iraq for a lifetime is going to
somehow make us safer.
This has to work. The current strategy of stalling and
making this difficult is counterproductive and in the long run
makes us less safe.
But to the extent you gentlemen are willing to chime in, in
the end, even if this transition works to the extent that you
are talking about, do you really think the dynamics inside Iraq
are going to be different 5 years from now or 10 years from now
so that someone else from the outside won't have to play a big
role?
Mr. Green. That is certainly a question that intellectually
I am sure all of us have thought about. It is not within our
charter, certainly. One of the great frustrations that State
feels and that Defense feels, the chairman has remarked to it,
as well as Secretary Gates and folks within the State
Department, is the unsettled nature of the Iraqi government.
There are many, many decisions that cannot be made until there
is a government.
I can speculate until the cows come home when that might
happen and the difficulties in achieving that, but the fact
remains until that government is settled there are many, many
decisions that cannot be made between State and the Defense
Department.
I don't want to leave the impression that Defense is being
uncooperative. We talked the one issue, the LOGCAP memo, I will
call it. We do not understand why that has taken so long, but
in other areas there has been significant cooperation. In fact,
I briefed General Austin about 3 days before he left here to
take over command in Iraq, and I told him, I said, ``You know,
if this fails it is not State failing, it is the country
failing,'' and that is what it is.
So we have to work together. State, Defense, USAID, and any
other departments and agencies that have a stake in this have
to lean forward in the foxhole and make sure it happens the way
our country has set up for it to happen.
Mr. Thibault. And I might add that, as part of your
question, I think it is reflective today of the environment
related to security as we pull out, which is in some cases
increased, given the fact that we are at fewer locations. There
is no indication that is going to cease when we turn simply to
a diplomatic approach in 2011. We would all like that.
I think everyone would like that, but there is no
indication; therefore, the State Department, as a good steward
of safety, contracting, and the like. If you look at the
numbers now on their four permanent locations they are building
out right now, and they are building it out somewhere between
two-thirds and 75 percent of each one of those locations are
security people. The number of diplomats in two of them,
because they had to cut them in half because of budget, you
can't cut the security, are 20. So you have at embassy branch
offices or consulates 20 people doing what State Department
would like to do, and several hundred individuals doing
security. That is, I think, reflective of your concern.
Mr. Quigley. I agree.
Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Towns. Thank you very much.
I now recognize the gentlewoman from California,
Congresswoman Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. I am somewhat
dumbfounded by what you have presented to us today. In some
respects, we are just rearranging deck chairs, it would appear,
and substituting a group of contractors to do what our military
has been doing, and the contractors will be overseen by a State
Department that doesn't have the oversight authority or
capacity to do the job. Is that a fair analysis?
Mr. Thibault. Well, I think the State Department would say
they are working very hard to try to build that capability, but
I think that would be a concern that they have that, because
historically, to call it just like it is, they have been slow
to provide the kinds of contract oversight. They have been very
responsive, but it has been a situation where their staff
limitations have created challenges, and to pry out four or
five additional contracting officer representatives to do the
kind of work they do, which is to make sure a security company
is satisfying their contract requirements, has been a
challenge. So it will continue to be a challenge.
Ms. Speier. Has the State Department ever had similar
responsibilities in any other country?
Mr. Green. No. Not like this. I mentioned early on that I
participated in the transition from the Coalition Provisional
Authority to the new embassy in 2004. And obviously when the
Soviet Union went down and the State Department created a
number of new embassies, those were big jobs, but they have
never in my estimation, and I think others would support this,
they have never faced this kind of a task in such a hostile or
I will say non-benign environment. So you are in a high-threat
area.
We do not know what is going to happen in December 2011
with the insurgency. What are they going to do? We have already
seen periodic upticks in threats. In fact, the embassy compound
took some rockets not long ago, and I was told that one of them
clipped the DCM's residence. So it is a high-threat environment
complicated by the fact that they are going to have to take
over many, many, many missions which they have no experience
doing.
Ms. Speier. No core competency. That is not their job.
Mr. Green. Well, it is not their job.
Mr. Thibault. It is not their job.
Mr. Green. No.
Ms. Speier. We are giving State Department a job which they
don't have core competency in, that they don't have the
experience or expertise, and we are telling them to go out and
do the, and, by the way, you are going to have 6,000 or 7,000
contractors under the auspices of the United States operating
in country.
Mr. Thibault. And you have to add to that, because we are
talking security contractors. If they are left holding the
logistical support bag, they don't have a present capability in
theater. They have no experience. They have relied on the Army.
Right now, because in advance of this I pulled down the
number, there are 36,300 KBR employees that are providing
logistical support in Iraq.
Ms. Speier. Excuse me one moment. Let me interrupt you. I
apologize. That is a sole source contract at KB.
Mr. Thibault. Exactly.
Ms. Speier. So no competitive bidding?
Mr. Thibault. Exactly. But there are 36,300. That number
will come down from 50 bases to maybe 14 locations. But if you
do the math, 30 percent times 40,000, I could come up with
another 10,000 that they would have to manage if, in fact, the
Army doesn't provide that support. And the Army has become,
from a management perspective, not necessarily a contracting
but from a management perspective they are much better than
they were, but to take it away from them and have State
Department start all over just doesn't make sense.
Mr. Green. And, in fairness----
Ms. Speier. I am sorry. My time is about up. Let me just
ask one more question.
Mr. Green. OK.
Ms. Speier. Is this going to cost the taxpayers of this
country more money per----
Mr. Thibault. Absolutely.
Ms. Speier. How much more money?
Mr. Thibault. It is really indeterminable, but very
substantial amounts of money, because there is going to have to
be some kind of a transition, especially if competition results
in a different contractor. You might save some money in
competition, but you are going to be introducing the need for
the transition.
Our position is that, starting in 2011, they should use
LOGCAP 4. They should award a solicitation, bring competition
in. If KBR wins it, great. If DynCorp or Fluor wins it, great.
But there is a mechanism. But the longer we draw this out, just
like the continuation of LOGCAP 3, the longer you draw it out,
the more likely you are going to get a letter from the
Department of Defense or from State saying we don't have time
to use competition, let us extend the sole source contract.
That is the risk.
Mr. Green. And we had better get this right, because we are
going to be doing it in Afghanistan in the not too distant
future.
Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. The gentlewoman's time
has expired.
I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina,
Congressman McHenry.
Mr. McHenry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At this time I would
like to yield the balance of my time to the ranking member, Mr.
Issa.
Mr. Issa. I thank the gentleman.
I want to followup on something because I think it wasn't
intended, I am sure, to be part of this hearing, but it now is.
The gentleman from Ohio I believe implied that he needed to
get General Petraeus and the Secretary of Defense in here, if I
understood correctly, because the military doesn't want to
leave and they want the State Department to fail.
Mr. Green, you have been on both sides of this. Do you see
any malice or any legitimacy to the thought that either DOD or
State wants the other to fail?
Mr. Green. No. I do not. And somebody maybe can find it,
but I see no evidence that the military wants to stay in Iraq.
I just served two tours in Vietnam, and I was happy to leave.
Mr. Issa. There is a reason you count down those days,
isn't there?
Mr. Green. That is right. But I think that there is
cooperation. Why LOGCAP, why this one request has been held up,
I don't think we need to build everything, the whole
relationship around whether that one request was held up or
not. Yes, it is a major one, but there has been a lot of other
cooperation at the working level between State and the
commands, and certainly in-country. So the simple answer is no.
Mr. Issa. Yes. And you would say no also, I am sure?
Mr. Thibault. I would say no also. No, no. I agree with
that statement. There is no indication at all that the U.S.
Army wants to remain. In fact, they are pulling troops out in a
manner which we might say pause in terms of some of the support
requirement that the State Department needs.
But in my mind and maybe others' minds I think there is a
question about does the Army really want to provide the kind of
support that State needs. That I think is the stovepipe
situation that you have already talked about.
Mr. Issa. And the gentleman from Massachusetts alluded to
the question, and some of this seems to be funding fight and
the question of nobody wanting to spend their resources unless
they are fully funded, and so on. Let me just put it in a
context.
You know, we have all been to other host countries. I will
just use Japan as a good example. In Japan we have a large
military presence, and that large military presence, they are
not just our host but they are our financial host. And so when
we view our military support there, we view it as fully funded
by the host country.
In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, because you are
absolutely right, we are going down that road, should this
committee look into that the funding should be, even if it is
U.S. dollars, should be hosted there, so regardless of who goes
there they must go there to get the money. In other words, if
the Army were looking at cycling through people, or the Air
Force or anybody else, or State, the money is there. They tap
that money in host country. If they don't provide the support,
if it goes to a contractor or it goes to a State Department
employee, they use those funds. Would that movement of dollars
to be independent of who does it allow for all the agencies to
maybe play better in the sandbox?
Mr. Thibault. If such a thing was remotely possible that
they could fund it, I know in Afghanistan if you look at the
moneys we are spending now, the country has no ability to fund
it.
Mr. Issa. And I am not suggesting for a moment that we
expect that the money would come from the host country.
Mr. Thibault. Right.
Mr. Issa. But when it comes from the host country, the
Army, Navy, Air Force, everybody sort of competes for, OK, can
I get a slot in there? Is that slot meaningful? And I know I am
going to be paid for it.
If we move it, because we have an appropriations system, it
is stovepipe, for the most part, by committees. But if we
looked at Iraq and we had Iraq funding as a stand-alone and we
made it independent of whether the Army or the State Department
or the Department of Interior got the money initially but the
money was there and we did an authorization for that. Now, it
is basically still State Department money, but it wouldn't be
State Department money in the large barrel, it would be Iraq
funding for State activities. If we did that, wouldn't that
eliminate some of this problem of people being reticent to pay
for something unless they are going to get paid back because
they see it as taking from other mission?
Mr. Green. I think, if I understand your premise, I think
something like that was recommended by Secretary Gates to
Secretary Clinton, and, as I understand the proposal, and I
don't understand it terribly well, that each would put money in
a pot commensurate with their responsibilities to do certain
things.
As you know better than I, State's budget is minuscule
compared to DOD. DOD rounds off more at the end of the year
than State has to spend, other than in foreign assistance,
which can't be touched for this.
I haven't given it a lot of thought, but if there were an
appropriation, a pot of money, and the State Department didn't
have to contribute to that, because that is where I think they
have a difficulty, but if there were a pot of money I think it
would eliminate some of this back-and-forth, because, as
someone mentioned before, you know, Gates is going to save $100
million but he is going to let the services keep that to apply
it to new weapons systems and personnel increases. So unless
somebody says, no, he can't do that, that is what his plan is.
Chairman Towns. The gentleman from North Carolina's time
has expired.
Mr. Issa. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the witnesses
expand on that in writing, and that perhaps we flesh out some
of the possibilities together to recommend to the President.
Chairman Towns. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
Chairman Towns. I now recognize the gentlewoman from
California, Congresswoman Watson.
Ms. Watson. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I am sitting
here very, very frustrated because we got into a war that was
not declared by Congress. The Secretary of State said if you
break it, you own it. And there is no way, and I want this for
the record, there is no way that we are going to win a war of a
particular cultural and traditional quality with guns and
bullets. Now we are discussing the State Department, whose
mission is completely different. The mission of the State
Department is to work on the foreign policy of our Government
and the post we are in, the Nation we are in, diplomatically.
So I think the responsibility, and I am saying this to the
Commission to deliver to your members and to the President, we
need to have the military and this committee needs to do the
oversight, provide for the military security and the security
of our missions as long as we are there.
We have not won a war. We are trying to have a sovereign
nation use a diplomatic system with their experimenting with,
but we do not need to take on that burden through the State
Department.
So what I am asking is: will you recommend strongly again
in your next report that the military take over securing with
the number of forces that are needed as long as we are there?
And, my friends, we are going to be there forever. It is a
completely different part of the world with different goals and
different ways of running their own nations. We have to
understand that.
So my question to you is: can we put forth a contingency
plan for the State Department to be able to have the kind of
security and to fulfill their mission that will be funded
through the resources of DOD?
Mr. Thibault. Under the current budgetary and fiscal
guidelines, you know, you are asking can we. That is not doable
because there is----
Ms. Watson. What is not doable?
Mr. Thibault. Separate streams of funds and the like. This
committee or an organization----
Ms. Watson. What are we asking the State Department to do?
We are asking the State Department to take over the
responsibilities of the military, correct?
Mr. Thibault. In many cases that is absolutely correct.
Ms. Watson. Yes. I ran a mission. It was a tiny mission
over in Micronesia. We contracted out our security. We hired a
former Marine who headed up a security company, and because of
the size of the mission it worked. But we are in a war zone, as
determined by the last administration, and we still have troops
there. So can we, using that kind of line of thinking, ask the
Department of Defense to increase the budget for securing that
mission that we are still involved in?
Mr. Thibault. We would support, and it is stated in our
testimony, a requirement that the Department of Defense more
timely and effectively sit with the State Department, go
through those functions that they ought to be doing----
Ms. Watson. Exactly.
Mr. Thibault [continuing]. And that there be a requirement
that they do those functions. From a budgetary viewpoint, the
question then remaining is who funds it.
Ms. Watson. OK. Let me take that off the table and ask the
chairman of this committee if we can develop a letter stating
just what has been mentioned, and send it to the President,
Commander in Chief, and to DOD, and to the State Department,
because the State Department does not have the skill sets to
provide the kind of security. They contract it out usually. So
the subject matter of this whole hearing is the oversight
responsibility that we have, and I think we ought to send a
letter saying let DOD do what it is assigned to do so the State
Department can carry out its mission and provide the funding.
Chairman Towns. I understand the lady's request. When we do
hear from the second panel we will make a decision as to how we
move from here.
Ms. Watson. Thank you.
Mr. Thibault. Thank you.
Chairman Towns. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Congressman
Duncan, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Duncan. Well, Mr. Chairman, because I was in other
meetings I wasn't able to get here in time, and so I am going
to yield my questioning period to Mr. Issa.
Chairman Towns. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Issa. I thank the gentleman from Tennessee.
I believe this is so important. Our staff has worked hard
on more questions than we will ever ask, and I would ask if
both of the gentlemen would be willing to answer some
additional ones in writing.
Mr. Thibault. Absolutely.
Mr. Green. Certainly.
Mr. Issa. They will probably be the ones less of interest
to some people, but more of interest to the staff that, in
detail, would like to produce a report afterwards.
I am on leave of absence from the Foreign Affairs
Committee, so I have to know my limitations and I have to
remember the jurisdiction of that committee, but we have 1,600
people in six major facilities in Iraq in the current plan
roughly, is that right? That is the number that I have in front
of me for the embassy and branches or consulates.
Mr. Green. The diplomatic side?
Mr. Issa. The diplomatic side, yes.
Mr. Green. That is probably pretty close.
Mr. Issa. So part of the need for a total of 7,700 people,
or roughly 6,100 contractors if the fit doesn't hit the shan in
the weeks after military begins pulling out, is because of the
size of our mission, the largest mission anywhere in the world;
is that right?
Mr. Green. It is both the static security of the embassy
and the four other posts, plus the personal security details
that would be there and available to escort and protect the
diplomatic staff.
Mr. Issa. Now, in my time going around nation world in the
Foreign Affairs Committee, one of the things that I observed
regularly was that USAID typically only goes if it is safe
enough, and in the Horn of Africa and a number of other areas
it usually begins phasing over to the military to do AID
projects if it is an insecure situation. Iraq has fit that.
Afghanistan fits that. This is a place in which the military
contributes far more to the construction projects and so on
than the State Department.
Am I to understand that this plan envisions USAID taking
over construction and activities of that sort, development, and
the democracy movement, and doing so with this size force, as
it does not do in most other areas?
Mr. Green. I think that certainly the AID mission when it
comes to reconstruction and stability operations will increase
because, to the degree that we would do SERP-like projects----
Mr. Issa. Right.
Mr. Green [continuing]. They won't be SERP, but AID would
take over those to the degree they have the capability and that
their implementing partners have the capability you are
absolutely right. The AID staff, if there are unsecured areas,
they don't tend to go out, but they count on their implementing
partners.
Very frankly, most of the implementing partners don't want
that linkage with the Defense Department. They don't want a
flag out there, because they believe it attracts the wrong kind
of attention.
Mr. Issa. Sure. I understand that. That is always
controversial of whose sign goes up and who gets credit.
Mr. Green. Yes.
Mr. Issa. There is always some sheik who would prefer the
credit over anybody else.
Actually, I remember in the latter days of Jimmy Carter
when we sent free wheat to Russia, to the Soviet Union, and
they proceed to paint over anything that said United States and
put good made in Russia on it so that their people would think
they were being fed by themselves. I guess things never change.
The question I have goes back to that self-inflicted wound.
We have missions of various size, Marines and seconded military
personnel, military attaches. Egypt, for example, has a large
amount of our military people that work in and for the
Ambassador. Is there any inherent reason that Iraq is
preventing military assets from being, I use the word seconded,
but assigned to the Ambassador for purposes of many of these
duties? Is there anything that has absolutely been negotiated
away so that would be impossible?
Mr. Green. Not that I am aware of. In fact, plans are well
underway to form the Office of Security Cooperation, and they
are going to have several sites around the country and they
will facilitate, through both active military and technical
staff, facilitate sales to the country.
Mr. Issa. So the idea that there are 50,000 troops and the
2011 deadline is actually a not-quite-true deadline because we
are going to have a large amount of military personnel present
for activities other than war fighting?
Mr. Green. Well, a large amount. Right now the number of
military----
Mr. Issa. Compared to Micronesia.
Mr. Green. Micronesia? Probably.
Mr. Thibault. There are going to be five locations for
sure, and they are thinking an additional four to accomplish
those duties. The military footprint between 400 and 500, but
if someone is thinking the military is all gone, that is not
the case.
Mr. Issa. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Towns. The gentleman from Maryland is recognized
for 5 minutes, Congressman Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask you this. Are the Departments of Defense and
State considering re-negotiating the Status of Forces Agreement
to allow the military task force to provide security and re-
establish the lost functions that are critical for security and
mission success?
Mr. Green. I think that the ball is really in the court of
the Iraqi government such as it is, and once that new
government is formed and solidified they will make the decision
whether they want to request that the Status of Forces
Agreement be modified. As I am sure you know, there have been
calls by various folks in the Iraqi government, the vice
president, the head of the military, the former vice president,
to say, hey, troops need to stay longer. But that then will be
a decision, a recommendation that will have to be considered by
this administration, whose current position is that troops are
out of there by December 2011.
Mr. Cummings. Well, that leads me to my next question. Are
the Department of State and Defense meeting regularly to
develop strategies and contingencies in case Iraq does not form
a government soon?
Mr. Thibault. Well, I think the point we try to make is at
the middle management level, and by that I mean the
coordination of colonels and senior State Department officials,
is greatly improved in the last 4 or 5 months. It is somewhat
robust. So are they developing a plan? I can't say that for
sure, but they are discussing the alternatives that are there.
But there is no guiding policy.
We would say that many of the areas that we are suggesting
remain and are inherently Governmental, that those areas would
probably require a change in the SOFA in order to effect that
after 2011.
Mr. Cummings. So if a government is not formed, then what
happens?
Mr. Thibault. That is a problem.
Mr. Cummings. You have to tell me more than that.
Mr. Thibault. Well, under the current policy and Statement
of Forces Agreement we are out of there at the end of 2011. The
military planning is we are out of there at the end of 2011.
Mr. Cummings. No matter what?
Mr. Thibault. They lock step and salute when situations
like that occur, and that may be part of this issue about them
wanting to support the State Department. Hey, we are leaving.
Now, we don't think that is a good idea.
Mr. Cummings. Yes. Yes. Well, what is the Department of
State's grand strategy for Iraq, and how do we define success?
Mr. Thibault. Well, I think their grand strategy they would
tell you, and I can't speak totally for them, but they gave us
a list of about a dozen diplomatic objectives and
responsibilities. I think there would be to build a more
effective, safer government environment and accomplish those
areas consistent with the United States' policy.
Mr. Cummings. So that is the document that you are talking
about that I guess you are looking for right now. It is OK, you
can look while I talk. So I take it that document is the
measuring tool; is that right?
Mr. Thibault. Well, it certainly would be the objectives
that are laid out there, and I thank you for giving me the
time, but they are talking about areas. They would be
successful if they mitigate and mediate Arab, Kurd, Suni,
Shiian, Provincial, Baghdad tensions, so there isn't a
sectarian war.
Mr. Cummings. Right.
Mr. Thibault. I am going to call it like it is.
Strengthening the capacity of provisional, the provinces'
institutions at key flashpoint locations, in other words, where
there is potential unrest, strengthen government, or whatever
is needed. Those are the criteria under which they would be
judged, not military criteria.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Green, I have 32 seconds. I want to hear
what you have to say.
Mr. Green. Well, I can just run through a couple of the
others here: balancing foreign interference, encouraging
foreign investment and economic development, promoting the safe
return and resettlement of displaced persons, providing limited
services to American citizens, presenting American policy and
promoting mutual understanding and respect for American values.
That is kind of the laundry list of what they hope to achieve
through the embassy and through these four other posts that
they are planning to establish.
Mr. Cummings. I see my time is up. Thank you very much.
Mr. Green. Thank you.
Chairman Towns. I would like to thank the gentleman from
Maryland.
If there are no further questions, at this time I would
like----
Mr. Clay. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Towns. I am sorry, the Congressman from Missouri,
Mr. Clay.
Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be as brief as
possible. Let me thank both witnesses for being here. You both
paint me a very troubling picture of Iraq's security realities
and of the State Department's ability to handle this
transition.
The State Department has requested over $4 billion to fund
its plans for a large civilian presence in Iraq during and
after the draw-down of U.S. forces. Concerns have been raised
that the State's budget request may not reflect the actual cost
of its future civilian presence. Do you believe that the State
Department is capturing the full cost of what it is going to
take to fund this transition?
Mr. Thibault. I think that might be two parts in that
answer. I think they are trying to capture the cost, but what
they are doing is they are moving costs now under a plan to the
right. In other words, the permanent construction of these new
sites, it is an unfair word, but they are coddling together
available resources to build T-walls and things they are
bringing from a distance rather than building new sites, and
they are moving that to the right.
There are several examples where fiscal management is
requiring that they meet these challenges by delaying the
application of the funds, because it is a zero sum gain and
they don't have enough funds.
Mr. Clay. Well, with the hiring of private contractors and
civilian presence, are there enough safeguards to ensure that
is transparent, that there is accountability? Mr. Green, you
can try that.
Mr. Green. I believe it does. I think that there has been
so much planning that has occurred relative to security that I
think, under the current circumstances, that the DP believes
they have the bases covered.
To answer your question about the $4.7 billion or $4
billion that they requested in the 2010 supplemental and the
2011 budget, is that enough? I don't know because it is like
painting a moving train. As I mentioned in an earlier comment,
until the Iraqi government is stood up and is able to make some
of the decisions that they have to make, for example, the
transfer of property. We can't get a final OK on the four sites
for the consulates and the other two sites for the embassy
offices. We can't get final approval on those until the Iraqi
government gives a green light.
There have been discussions. The chief of staff to the
Prime Minister and the DCM at the embassy have had detailed
discussions. They get a wink and a nod. But until we know that
real estate, as an example, is there for the State Department
we don't know all of the costs associated with it.
Mr. Clay. This is my final question. On the issue of
transfer of power, is DOD dragging their feet because they
don't support the change of policy in Iraq and the hand-over to
the State Department?
Mr. Green. I would say no. I would say that DOD is probably
the reverse: giving up when they shouldn't give up certain
responsibilities that have been brought up here previously that
they should be performing.
So maybe it is the opposite of it, to an extent. They have
been told to get out, and they are in a hurry to get out. I
mean, they know the date is December 2011 and they have saluted
and they are making plans to turn over these responsibilities
to the State Department, move equipment out, transfer equipment
where appropriate.
Mr. Clay. And you are comfortable with that?
Mr. Green. No.
Mr. Clay. No, you are not?
Mr. Thibault. No, we are not. No, sir.
Mr. Clay. OK. All right. I thank you both for your
testimony and your answers.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. Let me just say to the
gentleman from Missouri, that is why we are having this
hearing. We want to make certain that these questions are
answered. I want to thank you for your questions.
Let me thank the witnesses for their work. Of course, we
look forward to continuing our dialog. There will be some
questions that we will submit to you in writing, hoping to get
answers to them, as well.
Please convey our best to Congressman Shays.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Thibault. We will, and thank you, sir.
Mr. Green. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Towns. Thank you.
Let me just say to the Members that just before the vote
coming up very shortly what I would like to do, there are five
bills I think we can quickly pass, and then call up the second
panel. Why don't we do that. If staff would make the
transition, then we will go to the second panel immediately
after that.
[Recess.]
Chairman Towns. Now we have a second panel that we would
like to call up.
The second panel, Mr. Stuart Bowen, Jr., has served as the
Special Inspector General of Iraq Reconstruction since 2004,
and before becoming the Inspector General Bowen served
President George W. Bush at the White House in roles including
Deputy Assistant and Deputy Staff Secretary. Mr. Bowen also
served on Governor George Bush's staff, and as an assistant
attorney general of Texas Mr. Bowen spent 4 years on active
duty intelligence U.S. Air Force.
As we do with all of our witnesses, we swear you in. Raise
your right hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Chairman Towns. Let the record reflect that he answered in
the affirmative.
Of course, I am sure you know the rules, that you have 5
minutes. Of course, as you know, after 4 minutes the yellow
light comes on, and then after that minute the red light comes
on. Of course, the yellow light means sum up, red light means
stop, which will allow us an opportunity to raise some
questions.
You may begin.
STATEMENT OF STUART W. BOWEN, JR., SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION
Mr. Bowen. Thank you, Chairman Towns, Ranking Member Issa,
members of the committee, for this opportunity to appear before
you today on the critical issue facing our country in Iraq
right now.
The title of the hearing captures it well: Transition in
Iraq: Is the State Department ready to take the lead? Defining
``ready'' is a difficult task, as we heard from the first
panel. There are structural challenges, funding challenges,
core competency challenges inherent in analyzing this question.
But let me put it in context by identifying three ongoing
evolutions in Iraq affecting our program.
First, the U.S. effort is evolving from a large-scale
contingency relief and reconstruction program to a more regular
order and more regularized foreign aid package. That is not to
say that this isn't still a huge funding initiative, a huge
rebuilding effort still ongoing, one of the largest in the
world today. Indeed, combining the supplemental and the fiscal
year request, the State Department is seeking $6.3 billion to
spend in Iraq over the next year. Significant. One of the
largest foreign aid packages operative today.
Second evolution is the departure of DOD down to 50,000
this past September, down to zero active troops on the ground
by the end of next year. It means that the security environment
is fundamentally changing. The backdrop that DOD provided in
movement across the country is disappearing, and as a result
the State Department is requesting hundreds of millions, in
fact, billions of dollars to fund continuing security. Without
that security, doing the job of foreign assistance, foreign
support, foreign aid will become virtually impossible.
And the third evolution is the changing nature of U.S. aid
in the country. As was mentioned in the earlier panels, the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams are going away, enduring
presence posts will replace them, from 15 PRTs down to 4
enduring presence posts. The nature of our effort is also
moving rapidly away from hard reconstruction. But we still
continue to spend significant sums in the training of police
and the training of Iraq's military.
This work raises several concerns about the readiness
question regarding the State Department's operations in Iraq.
We have conducted four audits of their police training program,
the largest contract in State Department history, $1.2 billion,
managed by INL, not managed well. As our audits have shown, the
need for strengthening oversight for better contract management
for actual increased personnel, ensuring that the program goals
are met, is essential to accomplish that critical task,
bringing security to Iraq through its re-energized police
forces.
Second, our audits have raised concerns about grants and
contracts that the State Department manages, identifying
specifically that the contracting practices are weak, the
grants management practices have been weak. This year we have
issued two audits, the third one coming out shortly, on the
management of grants by NDI and IRI through DRL, Democracy
Human Rights Office in the State Department, and we found
excessive costs and inefficient management or oversight of the
goals that were sought to be achieved through that program.
The other piece that is a huge part of the pending
supplemental and the pending funding is providing life support
and security. The supplement has already provided $725 million
for security, and Secretary Lute said that is only a quarter of
the needs, so significant additional funding necessary for
security.
Finally, the State Department is going to need to address
an issue that our office has repeatedly highlighted, and that
is the oversight of asset transfer, the transfer of projects
completed by the United States and transferred to Iraq, and the
sustainment of those projects. Real waste, in fact, may
continue to occur in Iraq if those assets aren't effectively
managed through a coordinated asset transfer program, and if
they are not sustained.
The truth is that over the last couple of years hundreds
and hundreds of projects that the United States has funded and
built have been transferred unilaterally to the government of
Iraq. That is no way to run a rebuilding program.
Ultimately I think that the considerations that we
recommend in our report, which echo those that I sent in a
letter a year ago to the Ambassador and the commanding general
in Iraq, need to be applied to the continuing State Department
program; namely, strengthening contract, program, and grant
management controls, and continuing to invest or resource the
State Department's capacity to carry out those missions.
It is a fact that their overall contract effort has been
identified as weak by the State Department IG, by the GAO, and
by our reports. I think it is time for reform in that area, but
there is a larger reform. Let me close with that point that I
think was expressed by the first panel and I think is evident
as a lesson learned, the hardest lesson learned from Iraq and,
frankly, from Afghanistan, and that is the lack of an
integrated system for managing contingency relief and
reconstruction operations overseas.
This is not a new issue. We experienced it in the Balkans,
Panama, Somalia, but Afghanistan and Iraq are the biggest ever
in history, of course. Combined, over $100 billion spent.
Combined, tens of billions wasted. That is not acceptable,
notwithstanding the security challenges in both countries. And
the path to reform, one of the mandates of this committee,
Oversight and Government Reform, is reforming the U.S. approach
to structuring, executing, and being held accountable for
contingency relief and reconstruction operations.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bowen follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.023
Chairman Towns. Thank you very much, Mr. Bowen.
Let me just announce before I start my questioning that the
business meeting will reconvene at 2 p.m., so staff, make
certain that the Members are aware of the fact that we will
have the final meeting at 2 p.m.
Thank you very much, Mr. Bowen, for your statement.
Where do you see the major areas of fraud, waste, and
abuse? Where do you see these?
Mr. Bowen. Well, we have identified egregious examples of
fraud through the course of our work over the last 6 years, 34
convictions to date, 50-plus indictments. The latest phase of
our work has involved a forensic review of all the money that
is being used in Iraq, using a variety of electronic tools. I
can't go into the details, but I can tell you that because of
the excessive emphasis and use of cash on the ground to pay
contractors, which still occurs in Iraq, especially through the
Commander's Emergency Response Program, there has been those
that have taken advantage of that situation and stolen the
money through various means. We are catching some of them,
holding them accountable, and the DOJ is prosecuting them.
On the waste front, much more significant problem. We have
estimated $5 billion that has been wasted in the overall Iraq
reconstruction enterprise. That is symptomatic of a variety of
factors. One, the security challenges that force delays in
projects and programs; two, the changing policies that changed
emphases in those projects and programs; three, the use of
inappropriate contracting vehicles at the outset, namely very,
very large cost-plus programs that paid for failure, frankly,
for too long until we moved away from cost-plus to fixed price
contracts, partly through our lessons learned report and our
identification of that unwise contracting vehicle.
Chairman Towns. Could you go into detail in terms of some
of the things you found, specific kinds of things that you
found?
Mr. Bowen. Sure. The prison 60 miles north of Baghdad, $40
million U.S. taxpayer money spent, will never hold a prisoner.
It is less than half built. The subcontractor was not properly
overseen, repeatedly failed in accomplishing goals set, and
finally the contract was terminated with the prime contractor
and finally all the subcontracts were terminated because it was
a failure.
This is emblematic, or perhaps the poster child of poor
planning in Iraq, in that the Deputy Minister of Justice told
us when we interviewed him on this inspection that the Iraqis
never wanted that prison up in Diyala Province anyway and it
should never have been started.
So a failure in planning, a failure in contract management,
a failure in program oversight, and ultimately $40 million
wasted.
Chairman Towns. Right. What do we need to do to fix some of
these problems?
Mr. Bowen. Well, I think first and foremost is developing a
system within our government that is capable, has that core
competency for executing contingency relief and reconstruction
operations. We heard from the first panel that these matters
are diffused among a number of agencies, most pointedly
Department of Defense and Department of State. We heard about
silos mentioned. People are operating in silos.
Departmental lines, departmental funding differentials,
weak core competencies that aren't suited to the missions that
we are asking those departments to execute, indeed, the very
question of today's hearing, is the State Department ready,
implies a competency question, because it is happening, as Mr.
Thibault articulated, but are they capable. As Ambassador
Watson pointed out, this addresses a core competency issue
within the State Department. State Department, as the
Ambassador identified, is in the mission of diplomacy, not
relief and reconstruction operations. This is a new
development.
The DOD has also expanded its capacity over the last 5
years. It is my view, and we articulated it in a report of this
past January or February, that the United States needs to
develop an integrated entity that brings together the
capacities at State, Defense, AID, Treasury, AG, Justice, all
who play a role in these operations, into something called the
U.S. Office for Contingency Operations that actually is in
charge of relief and reconstruction operations.
There is no focused responsibility, and thus you don't have
people to call and hold accountable here at this table for
outcomes in the contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
There is no one person involved.
The Commission identified that when it called
representatives from DOD, State, and AID and said, who is
running the reconstruction program in Afghanistan, and they
were not able to get a clear answer. It is frustrating for
them, frustrating for you all, I know, and frustrating for the
taxpayer, most significantly, in that it results in waste.
Chairman Towns. What more do we need to do, I am talking
about now Members of Congress, to make certain that this waste,
fraud, and abuse and stupidity is eliminated?
Mr. Bowen. Well, I think there is the larger reform issue
that is still hanging out there and needs to be addressed,
something that achieves integration in planning and execution,
and that is an important long-term solution that could make a
difference in Afghanistan today. We are going up to $70 billion
in Afghanistan next year, the largest contingency operation in
history.
But I think in the short term in Iraq, which is what this
hearing is about, I think bringing to the table not so much the
secretaries but the managers, the chief financial officers, the
Director of Acquisition Management, State Department, the
Director of Diplomatic Security, I mean, $725 million has
already been approved by the Congress for security in Iraq. I
think it is an important question, how is that going to be
managed? They will have 7,000 new contractors. You have raised
concerns in your first panel about whether they have capacity
to manage that. Well, those are tough questions to ask those
who are going to manage that money.
The second question is we have identified largest contract
in State Department history, most important continuing issue,
police training in Iraq. Largest single chunk of funding that
they are going to be spending over the next year. Are there
enough in-country contracting officers on the ground to oversee
the execution of that program? Our audits speak for themselves.
The answer in the past has been no. The Director of INL in-
country assured me that there would be. I think it is a fair
question for you to ask is there.
Chairman Towns. I yield to the gentleman from California
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bowen, I want to thank you for your service, for your
many trips to a very dangerous place in the world, and for your
diligence in bringing one after another failures to our
attention. I also want to thank you for the many times you have
brought some potential sanity and solutions to the process.
I would like to dwell into sort of mixing that first panel
and the problems that we focused on, mostly the transition and
the absence of certain expertise at State, and your concerns
today.
Some years ago, before my time. Goldwater Nichols was
passed, but I was a soldier before and I have seen the military
after. The military today plays better in the sandbox. They
have officers who have gone to each other's war colleges and
senior staff officers. They have had assignments in each
other's back yards whenever possible. As a result, my
observation has been if we have to do joint activities we have
people who have comfort and experience in doing that.
Would you say, from your time of watching State and DOD and
the various people contracted to do various functions in Iraq,
that we need to look at exactly that? We need to look at
building up an interoperable culture between different agencies
and in situations like Iraq and Afghanistan have to work
together?
Mr. Bowen. Absolutely. As a matter of fact, the reform
proposal that I have discussed we termed ``Beyond Goldwater
Nichols.'' This is a civilian version of it. It is a rough
analogy, but it seeks the same outcome, jointness, because
integration, not coordination--there are coordinative meetings
all the time in Iraq, but coordination lasts usually as long as
the meeting does.
You go out, you go down the hall, you go out into the
field, it is difficult to operate on agreements. You need to
have it trained. You need to have it authorized. You need to
have it appropriated and overseen--in other words, driven by
this Congress shaping an administration structure that can
achieve our national security goals. This is about protecting
our national security interests in a very unique setting,
something new that is not Defense, not development, not
diplomacy. The Fourth D is what we call it.
Mr. Issa. Earlier on in the first panel--and the chairwoman
here brought it up as a former Ambassador--we sort of begged
those questions of do we need a new entity with direct
authority, do we need direct funding, do we need to make sure
that what is asked for is then delegated or assigned to the
most efficient source, not simply each one trying to get the
money but not spend it to do the job because that is inherent
when you have other issues.
Would you comment on how you view us doing that, recognized
Iraq is, to a certain extent, yesterday's story, but
Afghanistan is still today's story, and likely tomorrow's.
Mr. Bowen. You began to address that with Mr. Green about
the joint funding mechanism that Secretary Clinton and
Secretary Gates are coming to agreement upon. Secretary Gates
proposed it last December. It is a dual key approval process,
and it is a step in the right direction toward this integration
in management, in execution, but it is only funding and funding
is only a piece of it. You just can't pour more money into the
State Department or into the coordinator for reconstruction and
stabilization or into the security pool, it is really a funding
pool, and expect it to get executed and integrated.
The other pieces of the puzzle have to be put in place to
ensure that you get the performance you expect. Funding is a
good step. It is what the United Kingdom has done through their
conflict pools, but they have also taken steps further that
have sought to bring personnel, IT, contracting, oversight,
planning into one executory system, which is what we are
proposing, so that there is accountability, there is
responsibility, so that planning is done ahead of time.
Mr. Issa. When you envision this within the U.S. system,
the Ambassador in Baghdad is Presidentially nominated, Senate
confirmed. The commander on the ground is Presidentially
selected, Senate confirmed. Do you envision that in these
situations, special but not unique, as we see them appear
around the world, that we should consider having positions in
which funding coming from multiple agencies goes to a
designated person, whether it is directly appointed by the
President or agreed on by the Cabinet officers, who then goes
for confirmation and controls those funds and personnel based
on, if you will, a congressional mandate?
Mr. Bowen. Yes. That is exactly what we proposed in our
latest report, that there ought to be someone who has been
confirmed by the Congress, who is responsible for specific
funds appropriated by the Congress for a specific mission, the
contingency relief and reconstruction of Iraq, Afghanistan, or
wherever, and that creates within our system, and that is how
accountability happens.
You are able to identify clearly through authorization who
is responsible, through appropriations responsible for what,
and ultimately through oversight did you do it. That is a
system that doesn't work well in this unique, relatively modern
evolution in protecting our national security interests abroad.
Instead, we have a massive expansion of coin and
stabilization opposite the Department of Defense filling a
space, as General Petraeus has said, that wasn't being filled.
And then you have the creation of new personnel centers over at
State Department, SCRS, but not with program funds or with
authorized missions that enable them to get out and execute
that program or enough authority to operate in interagency
fashion.
Mr. Issa. I thank the gentleman and thank the gentlelady
and yield back.
Ms. Watson [presiding]. OK. Ms. Norton, you have 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. I thank you very much, Mr. Bower. What you had
to say was, particularly after the last panel, disturbing but
perhaps expected.
Besides the State Department, how is the consultation that
you describe, with no central entity responsible, how is that
consultation happening? Surely as they get together they
understand that somebody has to be responsible for being in
touch with the others, or are they all operating separately and
independently? These various agencies, I think you have named
them, are they operating independently without coordination,
without consultation?
Mr. Bowen. There is a NSC directive, the interagency
management system, adopted in 2007 that created the integration
planning cell. That does bring representatives from State and
AID and other civilian entities together under the NSC's aegis
to plan. However, the actual operations are less integrated,
are less coordinated, and as a result less effective on the
ground.
Ms. Norton. They are operating now?
Mr. Bowen. Yes.
Ms. Norton. But the State Department isn't in charge now? I
mean, you know, the Defense Department is still there and on
the ground. Is the State Department considered the lead or the
Armed Forces? Are they really giving the direction at this
point?
Mr. Bowen. Well, it is trifurcated, frankly, the oversight,
and we are still operating under a Presidential directive, NSPD
36, which put the State Department in charge of overseeing
civilians who are participating in the reconstruction program
but left it to the Defense Department to manage police training
and training of the Army.
The program has evolved beyond the framework and the ad hoc
measures put in place back in 2004, but there is no governing
law, so to speak, which is what I am proposing, that to provide
clarity through specific authorization that identifies those
duties outside the context of a particular situation, and it
thus allows appropriations to be effectively executed and
someone to be held accountable, ultimately, for their outcomes.
That system is not current in place.
Ms. Norton. Now, you believe this has to be statutory
authority?
Mr. Bowen. Yes, for it to endure and not be an ad hoc
solution.
Ms. Norton. Have you seen any indication that the
administration agrees that there needs to be statutory
authority?
Mr. Bowen. They agreed with our identification of the
problems that I have been articulating, but they have not
endorsed the statutory solution.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much.
Ms. Watson. Thank you.
We appreciate your being here today. There are many more
questions we would like to ask, but there is a vote on the
floor. Since Members are leaving to take part in the vote, we
are going now to say that, without objection, the record shall
be left open for 7 days so that Members may submit their
questions for the record, and so there might be questions
coming to you for written response.
We certainly appreciate you being here.
Mr. Bowen. Thank you.
Ms. Watson. So without objection I will enter the binder of
the hearing documents into the committee record and the
committee shall now stand adjourned.
Thank you so much.
Mr. Bowen. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[Additional information submitted for the hearing record
follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 63138.047