    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

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     THE CRISIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: IMPLICATIONS FOR
                             U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

       SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                               NOVEMBER 30, 2010

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       SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

                    LORETTA SANCHEZ, California, Chairwoman
    ADAM SMITH, Washington               JEFF MILLER, Florida
    MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina        FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
    ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey           JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
    JIM MARSHALL, Georgia                MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
    BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana              CHARLES K. DJOU, Hawaii
    BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
    SCOTT MURPHY, New York
                    Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member
                   Alex Kugajevsky, Professional Staff Member
                          Jeff Cullen, Staff Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2010

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Tuesday, November 30, 2010, The Crisis in the Democratic Republic
      of the Congo: Implications for U.S. National Security..........     1

    Appendix:

    Tuesday, November 30, 2010.......................................    29
                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2010
     THE CRISIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: IMPLICATIONS FOR
                             U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California,
      Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats
      and Capabilities...............................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Dagne, Ted, Specialist in African Affairs, Congressional Research
      Service........................................................     3
    Komorowski, Adam, Regional Head of Operations, Africa Mines
      Advisory Group (MAG) International.............................     7
    Prendergast, John, Former Director of African Affairs, National
      Security Council...............................................     5

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Dagne, Ted...................................................    38
        Komorowski, Adam.............................................    54
        Miller, Hon. Jeff............................................    34
        Prendergast, John............................................    44
        Sanchez, Hon. Loretta........................................    33

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]

     THE CRISIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: IMPLICATIONS FOR
                             U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                      Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional
                                      Threats and Capabilities,
                            Washington, DC, Tuesday, November 30, 2010.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Loretta Sanchez
    (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE
        FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
                UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

        Ms. Sanchez. The subcommittee will now come to order.
        Good afternoon. We meet today to discuss the ongoing crisis
    in the Democratic Republic of Congo and examine the related
    implications for U.S. national security.
        Within Africa the Democratic Republic of Congo has always
    held strategic importance, due to its large size and central
    location, as well, of course, all its natural resources. For
    decades the Congo has experienced varying degrees of political
    instability and violence, and it is estimated that more than 5
    million people have died there due to preventable disease and
    war-related causes. The violence is additionally troubling
    because of the high degree of gender-based and sexual violence,
    which appears to have become frighteningly commonplace there.
        In the midst of this violence the Congo has been the site
    of one of the largest and most expensive United Nations [U.N.]
    peacekeeping missions in the world. Changes in this U.N.
    mission are on the horizon, and the Congolese government
    recently asked for a gradual withdrawal of the U.N.
    peacekeeping force that is there.
        Nearly 1,500 U.N. peacekeeping troops have been withdrawn
    since May of this year. And since the Congo will also host
    presidential and legislative elections in November of 2011, I
    think that the time is right for the U.S. and others to
    consider how these changes would impact security and stability
    in the region and to prepare accordingly.
        With its porous borders, its weak institutions and its
    close proximity to East African countries, such as Uganda and
    Sudan, transnational terrorist threats should not be ruled out
    when we seek to understand U.S. national security concerns
    associated with the Congo and with the Great Lakes region. This
    point is critical to our subcommittee, which deals with
    terrorism, unconventional threats and capabilities. And
    although few transnational terrorist threats have been directly
    linked to the Congo, Al Qaeda and affiliated groups have had a
    presence in neighboring East Africa for almost 20 years. And
    the recent attacks in Kampala, Uganda, this past July remind us
    of how linked these issues have become.
        The Department of Defense [DOD] has been active in Africa
    and within the Congo and neighboring countries. Through our
    U.S. Africa Command [AFRICOM], the United States has worked to
    improve the capacity of the Congolese military, and it has
    sought to develop an army that is accountable to the Congolese
    people. More specifically, our Special Operations Forces have
    been focused on training, teaching and mentoring the Congolese
    army and have worked to create a model battalion that can in
    turn train and professionalize the rest of the Congolese Army.
        So I am pleased that one of the major goals and components
    of U.S. training and assistance has been to improve the human
    rights practices of that Congolese army. And with this in mind,
    I am really thrilled about the hearing today.
        Unfortunately, I won't be able to stay the entire time. I
    have asked Mr. Smith when I leave to take over, and I know this
    is a topic that he is incredibly interested in also.
        So I thank the witnesses for being before us.
        And Mr. Conaway, from the Republican side, hello.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the
    Appendix on page 33.]
        Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        And the ranking member has an outstanding opening statement
    to put in the record. I would, rather than prove to you that my
    third grade teacher taught me to read aloud, I will ask
    unanimous consent to introduce it into the record and get right
    to the witnesses.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Miller can be found in the
    Appendix on page 34.]
        Ms. Sanchez. So be it. Great.
        So we will move forward. And today we have three witnesses
    before us.
        Let me make sure that I have your names correct, gentlemen.
        We are fortunate to have a panel of three experts. First,
    we will hear from Mr. Ted Dagne, an expert in African Affairs
    at the Congressional Research Service. Then we will hear from
    John Prendergast, the former director of African affairs at the
    National Security Council and co-founder of the non-
    governmental organization The Enough Project that seeks to
    raise awareness and develop policy solutions that prevent
    genocide and crimes against humanity in the Congo and in the
    region. And, lastly, we are joined by Adam Komorowski of the
    Mines Advisory Group [MAG], an international NGO [Non-
    Governmental Organization] that works to limit the spread of
    illicit weapons used by illegally armed groups in the region.
        Thank you for appearing before the subcommittee and
    discussing this critically important topic. And I believe we
    will adhere to the 5-minute rule, which means you can tell us
    whatever you want, summarize your statements within 5 minutes
    apiece, and then we will go to questions. And we will be under
    the 5-minute rule for the members of the committee also.
        So we will start with Mr. Dagne, please.

        STATEMENT OF TED DAGNE, SPECIALIST IN AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
                     CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

        Mr. Dagne. Chairwoman Sanchez, members of the subcommittee,
    thank you for the opportunity to testify before your committee.
        I have a longer statement for the record. I will simply
    summarize my statement focused on the rebel groups and their
    activities and if there are any linkages to international or
    original terrorist organizations.
        But to give you an overview briefly of the Congo, the Congo
    has been in political humanitarian turmoil for the past, not
    decade, for the past at least four decades. This is in large
    part due I think to neglect and to the government's inability,
    successive governments' inability to govern in a democratic
    way.
        When I talk about neglect, it is basically the main source,
    the root cause of the problem. For many Congolese governments
    over the years and political leaders Kinshasa was for them the
    country, not Goma, not Kisangani, no other places. But the
    other important thing to point out is that the government in
    power often provides the benefits to those who are close to
    them and not to the people.
        To give you an example, back in the mid 1990s, 1996, I went
    to Goma, the place where the two major wars started, with a
    congressional delegation. That was the first liberated town in
    1996. And I met Laurent Kabila, who would become president a
    year later. And I asked him, he was in a mansion, lush green
    lawns, gold-plated sofas, you name it. Outside, no electricity,
    not a single paved road, and people dependent on food aid.
        I asked him, I said, ``aren't you concerned that you live
    in this mansion while your people outside are still
    suffering?''
        His response was, ``I am their leader; when I become
    president, things will change.'' Things did not change. There
    was more war, poverty and suffering for the Congolese people.
        I don't want to give you, you know, this picture of a Congo
    in a total chaos. I think you find, over the past at least
    seven, eight years, some relative stability in other parts of
    Congo, and the political conditions have improved
    significantly, but not for eastern Congo.
        You had an agreement in 2003 whereby the major rebel groups
    were incorporated into the political process. You had elections
    that were held in 2006, and the next one is expected in 2011, a
    year from now.
        But I think what is important to point out is that the
    Congo crisis wasn't simply a crisis for the Congolese, but it
    was for the entire region. In fact, in the 90s, we used to
    refer to it as Africa's Third World War because you had over
    half a dozen African countries involved in the Congolese
    conflict on one side or the other.
        Over the past several years, things have changed and
    relationships between the Congolese government and that of
    their neighbors. Rwanda, once considered enemy number one by
    Congo, they are now allies. And in fact, in 2009, they
    conducted a joint military offensive against some of the rebel
    groups internally.
        But the most important thing to point out is that the
    Congolese problem is tied to the existence of rebel groups, or
    we call them negative groups, who do not really have a
    political agenda, but some of them basically embrace the idea
    of terrorizing the civilian population. The main targets have
    been civilian population. I will go through some of them, some
    of the main groups.
        The first one I would say is the Democratic Forces for the
    Liberation of Rwanda [FDLR]. It is a Rwandese rebel group. The
    leadership of the FDLR consist of those who belong to what we
    used to refer to as the Interahamwe militia, the militia that
    carried out the genocide in 1994, and the former Rwandese army
    leadership. They have been in operation in eastern Congo for
    over a decade and a half. Their main objective is to terrorize
    the civilian population, particularly the Tutsi, and also to
    hopefully overthrow the government of Rwanda, their main
    operation from Congo.
        The other group is the National Congress for the Defense of
    the People [CNDP]. This is a Congolese group with some Rwandese
    involved. This group has also been operational in eastern Congo
    for several years. Their main objective, they claim, was to
    defend the Tutsi against the FDLR. In 2009, the joint offensive
    by the Rwandese and Congolese government was targeting the FDLR
    and the CNDP.
        The leader of the CNDP, Laurent Nkunda, was once an ally of
    the Rwandese government. Shortly after the military offensive
    began, he ran to the border with Rwanda expecting that he would
    be welcomed, and instead, he was arrested, and he still is
    under house arrest in Rwanda.
        The CNDP no longer exists as a cohesive group. A number of
    their fighters have been integrated into the Congolese army and
    a number of others have basically functioned independently of
    the organization.
        The other group is the Allied Democratic Forces, ADF. That
    is a Ugandan Muslim group operational near the border with
    Uganda. They don't have a lot of military power, but one must
    point out that the ADF had been engaged in terrorist activities
    as early as the mid-1990s in Uganda. They have carried out a
    number of bombings in Kampala and other places in 1998.
        ADF is also the one organization that has a link now with
    al-Shabaab, the Somali group that carried out the attack in
    Kampala. In June, the Congolese forces launched an offensive
    against the ADF, and they were able to obtain documentation and
    equipment that linked them directly to al-Shabaab. That
    relationship still exists, and a number of ADF operatives are
    currently in custody suspected of the attack, the Kampala
    attack, in July of this year.
        The other group is the Mai Mai militia. It is a loosely
    grouped set of militia. No political objectives, basically
    carrying out attacks against civilian U.N. peacekeepers or
    anyone they think that they can get money, food or whatever
    benefits that they can get out of it.
        The Lord's Resistance Army, another Rwandan group, is also
    operational in Congo. But the LRA [Lord's Resistance Army] is
    also very much operational in the Central African Republic and
    in parts of South Sudan. It has been weakened over the past 5
    years but remains a threat to the civilian population. No
    linkage with international terrorist organizations at this
    point.
        Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Dagne, you are about 3 minutes over.
        Mr. Dagne. I am done. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Dagne can be found in the
    Appendix on page 38.]
        Ms. Sanchez. Okay. I am sure we can come back to your
    report and ask you specific questions with respect to it.
        Our next speaker, Mr. Prendergast, please.

       STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, FORMER DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN
                   AFFAIRS, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

        Mr. Prendergast. Thanks very much, Chairwoman Sanchez, and
    the members of the subcommittee.
        Like Mr. Dagne, I will submit my written testimony for the
    record and make an oral statement.
        I just returned from the Congo, from the eastern Congo, 48
    hours ago. My team and I interviewed a number of women and
    girls who recounted their tales of horror involving mass rape
    and other terrible atrocities. Mass rape has become the
    signature crime against humanity in this war. It is a war that
    is driven primarily by the exploitation of minerals, as you
    said in your opening statement, and they are minerals that
    power our cell phones and our laptops that we all use every
    day.
        Now, unlike most of the conflicts that I have worked on for
    the last 25 years in Africa, this one we have a direct
    connection, a direct responsibility, because of our demand for
    these minerals in the products that we use every day. So,
    because of that direct link, we therefore have a potential
    influence and a potential opportunity to help bring that war to
    an end if we change that relationship between consumers and
    producers on the ground there.
        I don't want to give you a laundry list of things that the
    United States should do. This isn't Afghanistan. This isn't
    Iraq. We have very limited resources at this juncture in our
    history.
        So I want to focus on two things that I think, with U.S.
    leadership and a small investment, that we could actually help
    catalyze real change on the ground in the Congo and bring an
    end to some of the most horrific violence that we have ever
    seen on the face of the earth against women and girls.
        These two things are mineral certification and Security
    Sector Reform, SSR. Let's start with the latter one, with SSR.
        The Congolese army, and Ted, Mr. Dagne, was talking a bit
    about that, the Congolese army is the biggest--one of the
    biggest sources of instability on the ground in human rights
    violations in the country. So if we try to work around the army
    in whatever we do as a government in our investments, we will
    have no impact. We need to take the challenge of reforming that
    army head-on.
        And we should start with a major investment in
    professionalization and training of the army in coordination
    with other governments. In particular, we have this incredible
    comparative advantage, I think, in military justice, and
    AFRICOM could play a credible role in building that military
    justice system. We have got to bring this state of impunity
    that soldiers have on the ground in Congo to an end in some
    way, shape or form. And you can begin to do that through the
    infusion of resources and support and training for the justice
    system within the army.
        Until the army, I think, gets reformed, we are going to see
    this violence, particularly sexual violence, remain at epidemic
    levels.
        Now, this isn't a novel idea. We have tried little bits and
    pieces of army reform over the last decade. So what's
    different? The critical difference, I think, is that we are
    finally making efforts internationally to expose and undermine
    the mafia networks that control the mineral smuggling
    industries that end up exporting these minerals into the
    products that we use.
        Now, the military in the Congo is knee-deep in these mafia
    networks, and until we address, therefore, until we address the
    economic roots of the conflict, of violence, of state
    dysfunction, we have no chance of building legitimate
    government institutions, like a reformed military and police.
        Now, the good news is that the U.S. Congress has taken the
    lead in addressing these economic roots. For the first time in
    Congo's history, we actually have efforts under way to try to
    address that relationship of how we extract Congo's rich
    natural resource base.
        Section 1502 of the Wall Street Reform Bill Act deals--
    dealt directly with the link between the violence in the Congo
    and our electronics products and other things we use every day.
    The next steps, now that that bill has passed and President
    Obama has signed it, are to ensure that the SEC [Securities and
    Exchange Commission] regulations that are implement--that will
    demonstrate or that will modify how that bill is implemented,
    those SEC regulations have to be strong. And Members of
    Congress have a great role to play in ensuring that that is the
    case.
        And for the U.S., particularly led by Secretary Clinton,
    who visited Congo and has repeatedly talked about the
    importance of it to her as an issue for her, for her
    leadership, is for the U.S. to take the lead in creating an
    internationally negotiated certification, mineral
    certification, scheme, which will involve the industry, involve
    governments and civil society organizations, just like the
    blood diamonds.
        You know, ten years ago, when governments internationally
    worked together with the diamond industry and created a system
    to weed out blood diamonds, that gave people in Sierra Leone a
    chance and Liberia and Angola a chance, those wars were over in
    two years, all three of them.
        This is the same thing. If we deal with those economic
    roots, we have a chance then to work on all the kinds of things
    that this committee has a direct role to play and,
    particularly, army reform.
        So these are the two keys: Deal with the economic roots of
    violence and build a legitimate security sector in Congo, so
    that the army becomes a protector, not a predator, to the
    people in the Congo. If the U.S. does these two things, I would
    argue, the odds for peace in the Congo increase dramatically.
    It is not an exaggeration to say that millions of Congolese
    lives hang in the balance in terms of what we do or don't do in
    the Congo.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Prendergast can be found in
    the Appendix on page 44.]
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Prendergast.
        I am going to turn this over now to my very able colleague,
    Mr. Smith.
        But I have just a quick question. Mr. Prendergast, when you
    mentioned mafia network, were you using mafia as an adjective
    or as a noun?
        Mr. Prendergast. That is a great question. I think it is
    more of an adjective describing the nature of the illicit
    violent extractive networks that are part and parcel of getting
    those minerals out through the region into the international
    marketplace.
        Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Great. That is what I thought. But I
    just wanted to make sure you weren't going after the Sicilians.
        Mr. Prendergast. Thank you. Thanks for that clarification.
        Mr. Smith. Sorry, Mr. Komorowski. You may proceed.

      STATEMENT OF ADAM KOMOROWSKI, REGIONAL HEAD OF OPERATIONS,
            AFRICA MINES ADVISORY GROUP (MAG) INTERNATIONAL

        Mr. Komorowski. Thank you very much.
        As per the previous speakers, I will provide you with a
    brief summary of my submitted written testimony.
        Thank you very much for inviting me to address the
    subcommittee on behalf of the Mines Advisory Group on issues
    relating to the conflict landscape of the Democratic Republic
    of Congo.
        In the testimony, I am going to cover a number of
    operational issues and draw on the six years of experience and
    learning that we have gathered from our work on the ground.
        As mentioned before, DRC [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
    has expansive porous borders. To put that into context, it
    shares a total of 10,730 kilometers of border with nine
    countries, many of which are experiencing or have experienced
    significant instability.
        Across the country and in the east of Congo in particular,
    ongoing conflicts and tribal allegiances mean that official
    political borders with other countries can become very blurred.
    Conflicts regularly flare up in border areas, with easy access
    to arms exacerbating and, in many cases, fueling violence.
        Armed groups, as, again, already referenced, from
    neighboring countries, such as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda
    continue to operate out to the largely ungoverned spaces in
    eastern Congo. The trafficking and easy availability of small
    arms and light weapons substantially contributes to the
    continued instability and the armament of these groups.
        Furthermore, a recent UNDP [United Nations Development
    Program] report estimates that there are approximately 300,000
    weapons in civilian hands in eastern Congo. However, the
    quantity of arms currently in the hands of armed rebel groups
    operating in this region is unknown. Both the U.N. Group of
    Experts on Congo and UNDP found that a significant number of
    these weapons originally came from military stockpiles due to
    thefts and seizures by armed groups, diversion of arms by
    military officers, and desertion and demobilization of military
    personnel.
        Since 2007, with the support of donors, including the
    Department of State's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement,
    MAG has been involved in extensive weapons and ammunition
    destruction activities. Over this period, we have destroyed 718
    tons of ammunition and more than 107,000 small arms and light
    weapons.
        We believe that a cautious and pragmatic approach to
    working with the army is absolutely essential to making
    progress on the critical issues of weapons management and
    disposal. MAG works in close collaboration with the FARDC
    [Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo], taking
    a consistent line of pragmatic engagements. And this strategic
    decision has paid dividends to date in terms of the success of
    our conventional weapons management and disposal program.
        We coordinate with the military in several ways; at a
    strategic level, through national norm setting and training,
    cooperation in regards to the safe management of ammunition and
    arms depots, coordination of ammunition and arms destruction,
    and support to security sector reform.
        The military is acutely aware that it does not have the
    capacity to adequately manage its ammunition and arms
    stockpiles. They understand the risk that poorly managed
    stockpiles can pose to their own security, as well as to the
    security of the civilian population. In recent years, the
    military has experienced several explosive incidents in their
    ammunition stockpiles which has resulted in hundreds of
    casualties.
        MAG also coordinates closely with the relevant Department
    of Defense actors in the Congo, including relevant U.S. Embassy
    personnel and AFRICOM, and we are currently exploring
    opportunities to work further in conjunction with U.S.
    deployments in regard to explosive ordnance disposal training
    of military personnel.
        We facilitate and support the Department of Defense's
    Defense Threat Reduction Agency missions wherever possible
    across all of our programs. And we believe that the long-term
    presence we have established and the strong relations with
    local, national and regional bodies and authorities provides us
    with often unique access and opportunities for constructive and
    collaborative work.
        The example of Camp Ngashi in northwest Congo is a good
    example of the threat posed by poorly managed stockpiles. In
    June 2007, a military ammunitions stockpile exploded. The
    initial explosion caused a huge fire which burned intensely for
    at least six hours, setting off numerous subsequent large
    explosions. The facility housed large- and small-scale weapons,
    small-arms ammunition, different caliber mortars and rockets up
    to high explosive aerial bombs. Ammunition was also ejected up
    to three and a half kilometers outside of the camp. As a
    consequence, three people were killed, around 100 injured, and
    over 200 families displaced. Unexploded ordnance scattered
    across the densely populated town, seriously damaging schools,
    government and military facilities. MAG emergency response
    teams were then dispatched to the area and tasked with
    unexploded ordnance clearance, which took many further months.
        Now, whilst the movement of arms across borders remains a
    critical concern, there is substantial research concluding that
    the majority of arms used by armed groups come from military
    stockpiles. A recent report concluded that unless the Congolese
    security forces significantly improve the effectiveness of
    their stockpile management, the extent to which the current
    arms embargo, which places no restrictions on arms acquisitions
    by the FARDC, can maintain peace and stability in the region
    will be limited. As such, securing and marking existing FARDC
    armed stockpiles is as critical as is securing borders.
        Based on our current operations, MAG is convinced that the
    destruction of surplus arms, building a successful arms
    management capacity and the necessary infrastructure in
    armories, and the marking of operational arms with a unique
    country code are central to curbing the illicit sale and
    trafficking of weapons in the Congo.
        In closing, I would like to thank the committee for its
    time and the opportunity to present on our range of activities
    and approaches to dealing with the unique challenges that this
    vast and unstable country presents. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Komorowski can be found in
    the Appendix on page 54.]
        Mr. Smith. Thank you.
        Thank you all for your testimony.
        I appreciate it, and I appreciate this committee and the
    chairwoman agreeing to have this hearing.
        I think one of the biggest issues that we are trying to
    address here is to draw attention to the situation in the
    eastern Congo. It does not get the publicity that some others
    do. But as you gentlemen have very ably explained, it is a
    huge, huge problem. It is probably the largest humanitarian
    crisis in the world, given the suffering that has happened
    there and continues to happen there. And yet it is not
    something that is regularly discussed in Congress, much less in
    the United States.
        So what we are trying to do in the subcommittee in part is
    draw attention to the problem and then find ways that we in
    Congress and we in the U.S. can help to alleviate it. And I
    think that is sort of the--it is sort of a bad news/good news.
    Certainly you look at what has happened there in the last, you
    know, four decades, you look at the violence in the area--I led
    a delegation that stopped in Goma last year, and the violence
    against women is I think the thing that stands out as the most
    appalling, the rapes that are just accepted as a matter of
    course. It is an overwhelmingly devastating thing to witness
    and to see. But beyond that, you have all the violent gangs
    roaming around, as Mr. Dagne explained. And it is a situation
    that cries out for attention.
        The good news is there are a lot of people over there who
    are making a positive difference. I met with Heal Africa as one
    of the NGOs that is working specifically on changing the
    culture of rape. And that is really what it is. It is beyond
    just the fact that there are some, you know, gangs roaming
    around doing this. It is far too accepted by the general
    population. And trying to change that and give the support to
    the women necessary to change that culture is a very positive
    thing.
        And there are a lot of other NGOs that are actively
    involved there. I have done work with the Eastern Congo
    Initiative [ECI], which is focusing specifically on this region
    and has laid out some pretty clear goals, two of which Mr.
    Prendergast focused on. One is the conflict minerals issue;
    second, being helped with security and governance but then also
    continuing to provide our support for the elections that are
    coming up to make sure they are done in a stable way and, you
    know, make sure that we stay active in that region and get
    involved by making sure that we maintain a regular envoy from
    our State Department to the region, is the fourth goal that
    they state. I think if we stay involved in that, we can truly
    make a difference here. We can save lives, and we can turn this
    region around.
        Because the other thing that really struck me about this
    region, it is a beautiful place. It is rich in natural
    resources. Certainly the minerals you mentioned, but also
    agriculture, the Great Lakes region is there. This is an area
    that has massive potential for a very, very positive outcome
    for the people of that region and for the world if we can just
    help them realize it.
        And then I do believe we have an interest beyond just the
    humanitarian crisis. Certainly, the conflict minerals issue,
    given the fact that we do purchase those items. But this
    subcommittee's particular jurisdiction is on counterterrorism.
    And the instability in a region opens the door for radical
    extremist groups. And as Ms. Sanchez mentioned in her opening
    statement, they are certainly recruiting in that area, even if
    they have not been that active.
        If this region explodes into instability, it is bad for
    global stability and bad for United States national security
    interests. So that is why we are trying to pay attention to the
    region.
        I want to ask specifically, Mr. Komorowski, to follow up on
    the issue of the unsecured ammo dumps, what is being done and
    what should be being done to help turn that situation around
    and get better security on ammunitions?
        Mr. Komorowski. Okay. Thank you for the question.
        We as an organization have our efforts, and we are very
    grateful for the support of the Office of Weapons Movement and
    Abatement to do that. Fundamentally it is about engaging at
    different levels. The perspective that I like to present and
    that is key to our organization is an operational one. So we
    work directly in Kinshasa with the FARDC, with a number of
    high-ranking representatives, both to look at the depots that
    they have there, and we also have teams that then work across
    the provinces, both doing destruction and also doing essential
    armory reconstruction work, as well as basic training----
        Mr. Smith. Can I ask--sorry to interrupt, is this a problem
    where you have got depots that have just wound up being, you
    know, abandoned, neglected, or is this a situation where they
    are ones that the Congo is trying to maintain, they just don't
    have sufficient security around it, or it sounds like both?
    But.
        Mr. Komorowski. Exactly, it is a mixture of both. The
    definition sometimes of an armory or a cache or a stockpile,
    sometimes it is literally four walls, no roof, and then full to
    the brim of various kinds of ammunition; mortars, rockets,
    grenades, occasionally, and we do discover them, MANPADS [Man-
    portable Air-defense Systems] as well.
        Mr. Smith. Just left there by the government or, in some
    cases, left there by rebel groups?
        Mr. Komorowski. Frequently by rebel groups. And actually
    they are often resupply points. And as mentioned, a number of
    the groups, earlier today, such as the LRA, we have come across
    a number of what we are told by the community--we work very
    closely with the community to try and get a good insight into
    the legacy, into the history, of what we are finding there. And
    often they are our greatest source of information, directing us
    to where we can find these sources of ammunition, unsecured
    weapons, and so forth.
        But there is also, and it is recognized a lot within the
    reporting, not just that which we provide as an organization,
    by a lot of advocacy groups that are active on the ground, that
    the insecurity of existing military stockpiles is a key problem
    as well. Small Arms Survey recognized in their yearbook, not
    for 2010 but 2009, the diversion from stocks, from official
    stocks, often police, often army, is one of the key providers,
    some of the fuel to the ongoing fire. So the nature of them is
    very diverse. We work in our own way as an organization with
    the resources we have.
        To come back to another point of the question, what should
    be done? I think it is, as Mr. Prendergast mentioned, security
    sector reform. This is a component of that. So it is about the
    wider modalities of that as well. What we are doing is a part
    of the puzzle. Obviously, we believe that it should be done
    with greater coordination and with greater breadth. But it is
    only a part of the picture. It does require the broader
    elements of security sector reform if it is going to have a
    long and lasting successful legacy.
        Mr. Smith. I am out of time. I have more questions, but I
    will come back to them after we get to the other members.
        Mr. Conaway.
        Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning--this
    afternoon.
        Mr. Prendergast, can you give me some sense of the scope of
    minerals production? In other words, it would probably be a
    different percentage for each of the discrete minerals, but how
    big a part of the world's supply of these minerals is the
    Congo, and just to help me understand the scope of what they
    are doing?
        Mr. Prendergast. Thank you for asking.
        There are four particular minerals that come from eastern
    Congo that bleed into the world supply that end up in all these
    electronics products we are talking about. Gold is one of them.
    And then there are what we call the three Ts: tin, tantalum,
    and tungsten. Tin, my guess is around 10 or 15 percent of the
    world supply, Congo. Tantalum is the big one. Because Australia
    withdrew its exports from the market last year, began to stop
    exporting, because they could not compete with the slave wages
    and this kind of criminal network that produces the tantalum,
    that exports the tantalum from Congo, the share of global, the
    Congo's share of global supply skyrocketed somewhere in the
    neighborhood of well over 50 percent. And then in terms of
    Tungsten, it is probably another 10 or 15 percent.
        So, in other words, there are lots of other suppliers, but
    Congo, because it is so cheap, remains a favorite for the
    refiners in Asia for buying these things.
        Mr. Conaway. Any sense for what the gross revenues for the
    bad guys represent?
        Mr. Prendergast. It is so opaque. We have done some
    assessments and started to look. I mean, the Congolese senate,
    for example, did a significant report. They estimated it $2
    billion a year. I think that is an overstatement. Hundreds of
    millions of dollars accruing to the armed groups is a safe
    estimate, but it is a wild guess, because there really is
    almost no trade that goes on in the legitimate market.
        Mr. Conaway. Ted, maybe you have got a sense of this. The
    culture of rape or the weapon of choice of rape must result in
    conceptions. What is the experience of those children once they
    are born? Are they readily accepted into the mothers' families
    or what--you know, we are going to be--you know, those started
    15, 20 years ago. They are going to be reaching young adulthood
    and that kind of thing. What has been the experience of the
    children that result from those rapes? Or is it a big number?
        Mr. Dagne. In the case of Congo, it is really very
    difficult at this juncture to give you really an accurate
    assessment of, you know, this generation of kids, you know,
    growing up; are they accepted or rejected? But I can tell you,
    in the region, and some of whom have carried out this rape and
    attack, some of them came from Rwanda. During the genocide, a
    number of the Tutsi were raped deliberately by the Hutus. And
    there were tens and thousands of kids born. And I met a number
    of them. And what is amazing is that--not only that society
    accepted them, but senior government officials themselves
    adopted deliberately those kids.
        Mr. Conaway. OK.
        Mr. Dagne. So, culturally, it is not like, you know, you
    are born because of rape, and therefore, you are not accepted.
    I haven't seen that.
        Mr. Conaway. Good. OK.
        In 2008, AFRICOM helped plan and lead Operation Lightning
    Thunder, which was a multi-country attack on, I guess, the
    Lord's Resistance Army. Can you give me some sense of did that
    work? Did it help, Mr. Prendergast, to professionalize in some
    small way the Congolese military as they work alongside
    AFRICOM's folks? And could it be expanded, or should it be
    expanded to go after some of these other targeted groups?
        Mr. Prendergast. It did not work. There was clearly some
    advance notice. Joseph Kony got out in time. The leadership of
    the LRA remains untouched since then.
        President Obama has just released his plan, as a result of
    the congressional bill that was passed this year on the Lord's
    Resistance Army. The bill is insufficient. It is inadequate to
    deal with the serious security threat that LRA poses to people
    of Southern Sudan, Central African Republic and the Congo.
        And so our view is that there needs to be, as we look at
    this plan that the President has put forward, and particularly
    as Congress in its oversight capacity looks at it, particularly
    this committee looks at it, we need to really take a very hard
    look at how it is implemented so that resources are provided to
    give a fighting chance to the militaries in the region that are
    on the front lines of trying to contain this significant
    threat, because up until now, what we have provided has been
    grossly insufficient and incommensurate to the damage done to
    civilian populations.
        Mr. Conaway. Okay.
        I have a second round as well, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Cooper.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I appreciate your holding this hearing.
        A couple of years ago, the National Geographic had on its
    cover a picture of poached and murdered gorillas. And
    incidentally, in the article, they mentioned that 5 million
    human beings had been killed in the Congo. That was not the
    cover story. And I am all for gorillas, but, you know, for
    Americans not to understand that this has been the bloodiest
    conflict on earth is horrifying. Because as Samantha Power
    pointed out in her book, you know, genocides happen more
    frequently than we like to admit.
        I think the frustration that I feel is, what can you do to
    solve it? If you read a book like Dambisa Moyo's ``Dead Aid,''
    she pretty much condemns pretty much all government-to-
    government aid. And maybe she is wrong. Maybe she has an overly
    pessimistic viewpoint, but we have seen a lot of the
    kleptocracy. And I think Mr. Dagne points out his visit with
    Kabila in 1996, the gold-plated sofas and Jacuzzis, and you
    know, little of that help trickles down to the average people.
    Unfortunate. With Mr. Smith, I have been to Goma. It is
    unimaginable the conditions that must exist out in the jungle.
        So I think what we are searching for here are constructive
    paths to take. You know, this humanitarian operation by MONUSCO
    [United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the
    Democratic Republic of the Congo] may have done more to harm
    the U.N.'s reputation than any other undertaking it has ever
    involved in. This is their largest single commitment, and you
    know, it is problems galore. So how do we solve this problem?
        How do we even know simple things like who we are talking
    to? You know, recently in Afghanistan, we thought we were
    apparently dealing with the top-ranking member of the Taliban.
    It turned out to be an imposter. How do we even know elemental
    things like that?
        And when it comes to identifying and shutting off or
    appropriately regulating coltan or these other minerals it is--
    are the Chinese better at figuring out how to secure supplies,
    because the last time we were there, I think we heard that they
    had engaged in some sort of long-term contract arrangement and
    promised to build a road. You know, what is going on here? What
    could guide us as policymakers to make a constructive
    difference? The ball is in your court. Anybody?
        Mr. Prendergast.
        Mr. Prendergast. I think there is a huge opportunity here
    now. I mean, if--we could throw billions of dollars at this
    problem, we could throw tens of thousands of peacekeeping
    troops, it wouldn't make a difference in a place as large as
    Congo with the history of the crisis there.
        What has to be done is to change the incentive structure
    that exists there now. The current incentive is for violent,
    illegal extraction of minerals. If you have the biggest guns
    and you are willing to use terrible atrocities as your primary
    military tactic, you can secure either access to mining or the
    smuggling routes and tax the smuggling routes along the way and
    smuggle these minerals out of there; that is how you make money
    in the Congo today. That is what fuels the war. And the end
    markets are us. So that is the inescapable conclusion.
        So what has to happen if anything is really going to change
    there is you have got to flip the incentive structure. If the
    world demand for these minerals says, okay, we are only going
    to buy minerals that are peacefully and legally mined, then it
    creates a different incentive structure for the people on the
    ground. I don't see how else we can alter that physical
    dynamic, because we simply don't have the resources or the
    troops internationally to make the kind of security--to change
    the security equation on the ground in the same way that our
    ability to affect how people make money, how that gravy train
    gets serviced, as we can if we push for these SEC regulations
    to be strong and we push for a real certification scheme like
    we did with the blood diamonds.
        Mr. Cooper. How long do we wait before we know whether that
    has had an effect or not?
        Mr. Prendergast. It is in our hands really. I mean, the SEC
    is going to promulgate its regulations in the next couple of
    months. It has already shaken up the industry. It has shaken up
    the armed groups. People are trying to figure out--I mean, I
    just literally came from there. Everyone is affected by it.
    They are trying to figure out what the SEC is going to do.
    Every minerals trader, every military official that I talk to
    knows exactly what is going on in Washington.
        In 150 years, go back to King Leopold, go back to Mobutu
    Sese Seko. Nobody ever tried to deal with how the world was
    relating to Congo in terms of our extraction of one of the
    richest natural resource bases in the world. And we wonder why
    this country is completely and totally in crisis for the last
    century and a half. It is because of the relationship.
        Now Congress has made this first step. We have got to back
    it up; the executive branch has to back it up with real
    leadership internationally.
        Mr. Cooper. So this is a celebratory hearing because we
    solved the problem if we have proper enforcement?
        Mr. Prendergast. We have identified the problem for the
    first time, and Congress has taken the first step in moving
    towards what could be possibly a catalytic approach to
    addressing the solution. I really actually think, in 25 years
    of visiting, working and living in the Congo, I think this is
    the first time anyone has taken it seriously, and I applaud
    this Congress for doing so.
        Mr. Cooper. Do the other witnesses agree with this
    optimistic assessment?
        Mr. Dagne. I have a slightly different approach to this.
    Yes, it may contribute to a certain degree to bring about an
    end to the resources that some of the rebels or the commanders
    use.
        But, at the same time, you have to remember that what is
    killing Congolese, is raping Congolese, is not the AK-47, is
    not the conflict mineral resources; it is the culture. It is
    the ideology that is doing it.
        If you take away all the AK-47s, all the ammunitions, they
    would still rape people. They would still use the machetes.
    They would still have instability.
        We have to start to think out of the box and say, how is it
    that we can help? At the same time, we can't be the solution to
    the problem in the region. The region itself, the country
    itself, must work to find a solution. We can help, but we
    cannot solve.
        Mr. Smith. I think, if I could, I want to get to Mr.
    Murphy, but I think my comment would be here, no there is no
    one solution here.
        But I do think that going after the money that funds the
    rebel groups will make an enormous difference. And as you
    mentioned, when we went after the, you know, blood diamonds,
    conflict diamonds, that had a distinct impact in the region
    where that was put in place. You know, the purpose of this
    hearing isn't to say that we have the idea and it is going to
    automatically solve the problem. We are looking to make
    progress. This is one big area where we can make progress.
        The bigger area that has been mentioned is reliable
    security and governance. And that is where the efforts of many
    of the NGOs that are working with the local population, this
    has been ungoverned space for a long time in which various
    criminal elements and rebel groups have filled the vacuum. So
    getting decent security and governance is also a critical step.
        But this is not an insignificant move to take some of the
    money out of the equation if we do it successfully.
        With that, I will turn it over to Mr. Murphy.
        Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I actually was hoping to dig in a little bit more, Mr.
    Prendergast, on some of the parallels with what we saw with the
    blood diamonds and some of the differences, whether they are
    cultural differences, that we may see in eastern Congo versus
    what we saw in Sierra Leone or Liberia or Angola or other
    places.
        Can you give just us a little more color in terms of what
    we need to be doing? What we can do at this point--you talked
    about us weighing in the with the SEC, but what should we be
    thinking about as that is going on?
        And then, Mr. Dagne, if you will comment on maybe some of
    the cultural differences that you see between some of the
    places where we have seen some success with restricting access
    to mineral wealth and conflict and what might be different as
    we try to think of solutions in this instance.
        Mr. Prendergast. Thanks, Congressman.
        I think, you know, that the solution, and I want to second
    Congressman Smith's point--I mean, this is just--this is a
    catalytic element of an overall set of recommendations. You
    mentioned the ECI initiative. There are all kinds of issues
    that we have to address in Congo. This is, we think, just one
    of the crucial ones that, as a prerequisite, helps to build a
    momentum towards helping to solve a lot of the problem.
        The key, I think, Congressman Murphy, is certification. And
    that is, you look at and try to draw the analogy with the West
    African issues related to blood diamonds. When there was a
    decision that we would no longer purchase the diamonds that
    were actually helping to fuel the terrible violence in Angola,
    Sierra Leone, and Liberia, then there was a long process. It
    didn't just overnight. We had the United States, Britain and
    many other countries work with regional countries and the
    companies, particularly De Beers, and civil society groups that
    have a vested interest in working on the publicity around the
    terrible atrocities recurring, they came up with a
    certification scheme that eventually created a way for you to
    weed out the bad from the good. And that has now, 10 years
    later, led to three countries that are at peace that have, you
    know, fairly well-functioning diamond markets that help
    contribute to development.
        Mr. Murphy. Do we have a partner in eastern Congo who could
    be the kind of certifiable producer of any of these minerals,
    or is it all so much chaos that you don't even have anybody
    that could meet a certification process?
        Mr. Prendergast. That is the good news, is that the region
    has begun to brace itself for the fact that major change has to
    occur. So a regionally led initiative, and I will defer--I bow
    to Mr. Dagne's point about you got to defer--because at the end
    of the day, if the region isn't buying in, forget it, is this
    international certification effort that has begun with the
    Great Lake states. So the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, a number of
    states have begun a process. The acronym is ICGLR
    [International Conference on the Great Lakes Region]. And they
    have put together the bare bones, the essentials, of a
    certification scheme in principle. Now they need a dance
    partner. Now they need the United States and other countries
    that are end users of these minerals to come in very strongly
    and work with the governments in constructing as airtight a
    system as possibly can be created in this very difficult
    environment, get the industry to buy in, everyone from Apple to
    Hewlett Packard to Dell. All these companies suddenly realize
    that they can't continue with business as usual because of the
    bill, because of the Wall Street reform bill and the section on
    this thing. They want to be involved in this.
        So it just requires somebody to take the lead. And we think
    that the United States could play that critical role because we
    are the biggest, in gross dollar terms, consumers of the end
    user--end users of the product--of the minerals that are being
    produced there.
        Mr. Murphy. Mr. Dagne, in terms of some of the parallels we
    are talking about with the blood diamonds, are the cultural
    issues parallel, and are there some lessons from what we saw
    that maybe worked in some of the other places? Or are the
    culture issues very different and not very useful in terms of
    things to learn about the approach here?
        Mr. Dagne. I think what I meant by cultural is not to
    suggest that this is strictly a Congolese or Rwandese cultural
    issue. I am talking about the culture of violence, the ideology
    of violence, which is something new that we are dealing with.
    In comparison to the other regions, definitely you had a
    cultural violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia and Angola. But
    if one goes back and looks at, you know, how did we end those
    wars, is it because of the blood diamond, ending the blood? No.
    We have to be practical and say, those bloody wars dragged
    sometimes for over 20 years, and at the end, it was a
    negotiated settlement, whether it is with the MPLA [Movimento
    Popular de Libertacao de Angola] and UNITA [Uniao Nacional para
    a Independencia Total de Angola] in Angola or Sierra Leone or
    for Liberia.
        I think, when I suggested, you know, that the conflict
    mineral legislation and certification process would help, but I
    think if we put our hope in that, you know, we are going to be
    disappointed because before the diamonds, before the gold, you
    had violence there; even in their absence, you would have
    violence.
        The other thing also we need to take into consideration is
    that the certification process only applies to American
    companies. Who is going to prevent China or any other company
    from doing business? That will continue.
        The other important thing to remember is also, what are the
    impacts on the locals, not the rebels, not the, you know,
    corrupt commanders, but the millions of Congolese who depend on
    these resources for centuries? Do we have an alternative
    mechanism for them when the decision that we take could affect
    their livelihood, you know? Is there a mechanism in place to
    say, okay, here are the alternatives, this is what we are going
    to do?
        I think the important thing to think about is, you know,
    the countries in the region itself, they have been doing a
    number of things. We need to be able to coordinate those
    activities in order to have a maximum impact. Look at the
    decision of Rwanda and Congo just a year and a half ago to
    jointly move against the negative forces. They were able to
    reduce their, you know, effectiveness significantly and
    dislodge them from a number of areas.
        Now, if you have a more coordinated effort like this, you
    take away all these negative forces, some of whom can be
    integrated into society; over 20,000 civilians returned just in
    1 year because they were being held hostage by those negative
    forces. Then you need to have an infrastructure in place to
    govern so that the basic necessities for the people can be
    provided, including security.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you.
        And I think we would certainly agree that there needs to be
    a more comprehensive solution.
        I do think the money drives a fair amount of it. And I
    guess what you would try to do is you would try to set up,
    through the certification process, a way for legitimate people
    to get access to that. It is not the entire issue, but I think
    money drives a lot of this. Well, it certainly drives the
    criminal activity. But I think also it gives the resources to
    the rebel groups out there to sustain them. They have to find
    resources.
        I mean, this is true of any insurgency. Cutting off the
    source of that money is at least a critical first step.
        But I totally agree with Mr. Dagne that it is not
    sufficient in and of itself.
        Mr. Conaway.
        Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You mentioned that the--we caught the head of the CNDP and
    tried to get back into Rwanda, and since then, that
    organization has ceased to be a functioning organization. It
    may have splintered. And this committee is terrorism and
    unconventional threats. We have got some experience with
    cutting the heads off of snakes. Should that be a focus as
    well, to go after the leadership of these other negative
    groups, as you called them?
        Mr. Dagne. I think it is important because of the
    leadership of some of these rebel groups, and I think I would
    describe them also as terrorist groups. Now, they are not being
    described as terrorist groups because they are active in
    Africa, but the act that they carry out, according to any legal
    definition, is terror against the civilians. And some of the
    leadership are here in the United States.
        Mr. Conaway. So the same kind of a--well, let me ask this,
    Mr. Prendergast or others. If we, as we should, deal with the
    certification of minerals, what is next? Where do these
    negative groups, rebel groups, terrorists, which I agree with
    you, Mr. Dagne, what do they do next? I mean, is it--they never
    just lay down, because it is far easier to hold a gun on
    somebody and make them work for you than it is to work
    yourself. And so, if we were able to effectively control that
    avenue, is there something else they pivot to that we then have
    to start Whack-A-Mole there?
        Mr. Prendergast. I think that, you know, the three main
    groups that Ted talked about in his testimony, the FDLR, the
    ADF and the LRA, the three main sort of foreign insurgent
    groups inside on Congolese territory, these three need to be
    subject to intensified counterinsurgency operations involving
    the governments in the region, involving the peacekeeping
    forces in the region.
        The efforts so far, again, we have already talked about the
    LRA, led by the Ugandan government, has eroded the LRA's
    capacities. In other words, they used to be a fairly large, in
    the thousands, tens of thousands, over 10,000 fighters; now
    they are a band, a criminal band of a few hundred. They still
    do terrible damage in the places that they operate, but they
    have been eroded significantly by counterinsurgency operations.
    Now is the time to finish them off, to really cut that head of
    Joseph Kony and to find him and take him out the theater in
    some way or another.
        With the FDLR, which is the Rwandan militia that came
    across the border, as Ted talked about in the history, during
    1994, during the genocide, the core capacity has been eroded
    dramatically. I mean, in 1994, there were 80,000 to 100,000
    armed elements from the Rwandan--who committed--who perpetrated
    the Rwandan genocide, were running around the eastern Congo.
    Now there's probably 4,000, maybe less. I mean, the numbers are
    wild estimates, 3,500 to 4,000.
        And their capacity has been eroded dramatically because of
    counterinsurgency operations, largely driven by the Rwandan
    government, though the humanitarian implications of these
    operations has been dramatically negative for the people of the
    Congo. Now that there are those 3,000 or 4,000 left, we need to
    target those operations, go after the international support
    that they have, as Ted said, and really find and hone the
    elements of the regional militaries and the peacekeeping forces
    to go after those elements to try to bring them down.
        Mr. Conaway. Yeah, one of the tools that we use on the
    existing terrorist groups is we go after their banking
    relationships and those things. These organizations are
    sophisticated enough they are using the banking systems to
    facilitate cash-flow funds, or would that be an effective tack
    as well?
        Mr. Prendergast. It is very different I think because of
    the mineral smuggling. Because the FDLR has been----
        Mr. Conaway. So they are cash basis?
        Mr. Prendergast [continuing]. Ensconced in these areas and
    they are able to smuggle, particularly gold, through Uganda. I
    think that, we just need to figure out how we can get at that
    source, because as Congressman Smith said, if we don't arrest
    the money issue, you know, we are just going to be whistling
    Dixie.
        Mr. Conaway. Give me a sense of what--you said Americans
    are the bulk of the end users. But as China and India's
    economies grow, they will surpass us at some point. Give me a
    sense of what the percentage is of manufacturers based in
    China, India, and the United States. Can we get a sense of
    where that split comes? Because I agree that getting China--
    India maybe less so--but getting China to agree to these kind
    of sanctions may be a little more difficult.
        Mr. Prendergast. A terribly important question. And I just
    want to correct something that Ted said; the legislation that
    Congress passed was not just for American companies. It was
    anybody who wants to import into the United States. Now,
    because in the electronics arena, we have the highest end
    products in terms of consumers, China is not going to say, Hey,
    because we want to maintain some supplier who supplies 10
    percent of the tin from Congo, we are not going to export to
    the United States anymore? That is not going to happen. They
    are already complying. They are trying to figure out how the
    smelters based in China and other countries can comply.
        So I think as long as we are affecting through the
    legislation and implementation, those people that want to
    import into the United States and work with our European allies
    to create similar legislative frameworks so that we are talking
    about a fairly large consumer base that is rejecting the
    purchase of minerals that come from violent and illegally
    extracted sources, I think we are going to have a chance of
    altering the entire marketplace, including India and China.
        Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Smith. Can you talk a little bit about the U.N. mission
    there? It is not well thought of by the local population in
    terms of its efficacy because they don't have a lot of
    authority, so their presence there is not thought of as having
    been that helpful, based on the people that I talked to when I
    was there. On the other hand, you know, there is concern, you
    know, if you simply pull them out, again, you are leaving a
    vacuum.
        How effective has the U.N. been? And, more importantly,
    going forward, what is the best course of action in terms of
    maintaining the mission or changing it or getting rid of it?
        And whoever. Mr. Komorowski, you haven't spoken in a while.
    First crack there.
        Mr. Komorowski. Thank you. Yeah, it takes more than a
    rebranding from MONUC [United Nations Organization Mission in
    the Democratic Republic of the Congo] to MONUSCO [United
    Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo] to solve the problem. I absolutely
    endorse many of the points you made there.
        I think there are a couple of points. There is no doubt
    that, to date, the perception--and it is a bit more than
    perception--the reality on the ground is that this force varies
    in size, but as has already been mentioned, one of the largest,
    if not the largest, standing U.N. force in the world to date.
        That is still not adequate for the kind of scale of--the
    physical geographical sale that we are talking about. But maybe
    there is a slightly different problem. It is not so much the
    numbers, but it is the focus. It is the targeting and also,
    bluntly, the terms of engagement.
        Mr. Smith. At the most basic level, what do they do? They
    are there. What is their mission? What do they do?
        Mr. Komorowski. They are there to provide security for the
    civilian population, with varying degrees of success. I will
    happily say one point for the record, the many times I have
    been there, I have met with many different members of the U.N.
    on the ground and of MONUSCO. Often, there is a real issue with
    the quality of the composition of the forces on the ground.
    They are not coming from some of the nations with the finest
    militaries that can provide them, and often so, you are not
    looking at individuals on the ground who are particularly
    thrilled at their mission status.
        We talked earlier about incentives and incentivizing,
    whether it be through the mineral supply chain or whether it be
    through security sector reform. We haven't touched on DDR
    [Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration]. The same
    exists, I think, for that force on the ground. They are not
    properly equipped to do the job, but I also think it is about
    their tasking. And oftentimes, they are not in the right areas,
    and frequently as well, their terms of engagement and when they
    are going to go. The times where they are most needed, their
    remit does not allow them to get sufficiently engaged. I think
    that is probably as directly as I would put it.
        Mr. Smith. And when does that mission complete? It is for a
    set amount of time. When is it up where it would have to either
    be renewed or end? Do you happen to know that?
        Mr. Komorowski. Not off the top of my head, no.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Dagne.
        Mr. Dagne. It was just renewed it in May, so it would have
    to be renewed again next year in June.
        Mr. Smith. Okay. Mr. Prendergast, Mr. Dagne, just quickly,
    do you think it should be renewed? What role should the U.N.
    play, going forward?
        Mr. Dagne. Just to go back to answer your question about
    the effectiveness and whether they should be renewed or not, I
    think the record has been mixed. It is one of the largest U.N.
    peacekeeping missions in the world. Currently, you have over
    19,000 armed, uniformed personnel. I think they have done a
    number of good things. Their presence provided at least some
    relative stability and allow humanitarian delivery, and
    provided some protection to the civilians. In their absence, it
    would have been worse.
        Mr. Smith. OK.
        Mr. Dagne. At the same time, they could have done better.
    The security sector training that you are talking about is
    provided by the U.N. and so forth. I think it is important as
    you move forward, you know, is there a need to have such a
    large peacekeeping force just to be there or can the mandate be
    changed in order to accommodate, I think, the needs on the
    ground. I think, in my view, perhaps a review of that is
    necessary, and the security council in May significantly
    restructured the mandate, and I am pretty sure, I think, come
    next year, you know, it has to be reviewed once again.
        Mr. Smith. OK. Mr. Prendergast.
        Mr. Prendergast. From what I have seen on the ground, you
    know, one of the things that is positive is that they help keep
    the roads open and for commercial traffic in some places
    through their patrolling. That is a positive. It is sort of a
    byproduct of their existence and their presence on the ground.
    That's not saying much.
        I think in individual areas, at the behest of particular
    commanders of units that are deployed into different places,
    they have done targeted capacity building for the FARDC for the
    Congolese army. That is a very helpful thing, and more of that
    could happen in terms of professionalization and respect for
    human rights of the Congolese army.
        Making decisions on the ground, operational decisions to
    protect civilians in localized areas, has made a difference.
    Most units don't. And therefore, they are spectators for
    terrible human rights atrocities. So it is strengthening their
    mandate in New York so that you can strengthen the hands of
    commanders on the ground who want to do that kind of stuff is
    really important.
        And then, finally, something that has been missing all
    along is some kind of special forces capacity to actually
    undertake targeted military operations against both foreign-
    armed groups and Congolese-armed groups that are the spoilers
    for continuing violence and instability.
        So looking in the course of the next year for re-upping the
    MONUSCO mandate and looking at whether we can recruit a nation
    to contribute that kind of capacity, that would actually make,
    potentially make a difference in the overall scheme.
        Mr. Smith. That is something our committee works on a great
    deal. We work with the Special Operations Command here in the
    U.S., and also internationally and NATO and other places, and
    it is a very specialized skill that not a lot of militaries
    possess and is very much in demand at the moment in many, many
    places. But certainly, I can see where that would be helpful.
        Mr. Cooper.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        How do I know, or how does the manufacturer know whether
    the tantalum in this phone is clean or not? Is it Australian,
    is it Congolese, is it clean Congolese? Each diamond is unique,
    but a fungible commodity like tantalum or tin or even refined
    tantalum or tin, how do you know? You just have to trust the
    supplier?
        Mr. Smith. Well, I don't. If I could interrupt there, I
    don't think technically each diamond is unique, but if you
    happen to have a diamond ring right now and were to look at, I
    think you would have the same basic problematic question of
    telling by looking at it, where it came from. I don't think it
    is unique in that sense. I think it is a matter of, you know,
    regulating the supply chain aggressively. So correct me if I am
    wrong in that, but I don't think there would be any difference
    in terms of the difficulties of making sure that this is
    adhered to for diamonds than it would be for basic minerals. I
    could be wrong on that.
        Mr. Prendergast. Already, the industry associations that a
    year ago were saying precisely what you were saying,
    Congressman, now are working very aggressively to try to comply
    with these regulations and talking directly to many of the
    groups, many of the companies' senior executives and the people
    on the ground who are taking trips to Congo trying to figure
    out how to do it. There is much more clarity now, based on the
    United Nation's panel of experts' work, based on a lot of
    different organizations that have exposed how these supply
    chains work. It is not a big mystery. It might be a mystery to
    us sitting in Washington, but it is not a mystery to those that
    actually take the time to study these supply chain networks.
        So we can figure out where stuff comes from. And there are
    ways to do that. You just have to set up monitoring,
    observation, and tracing mechanisms that the industry can
    comply with that will allow us to certify where this stuff
    comes, whether it is coming from a mine that does damage to
    civilian populations or not.
        This is all doable. And the more that it is studied, the
    more light that is shined on it, particularly by the U.N. panel
    of experts that released yet another report yesterday exposing
    in great detail how this supply chain works, we are learning
    more and more about how to do this, and the industry groups
    are, have shifted from a very unhelpful position to now trying
    to figure out how to comply and how to figure out how you would
    know what is in any particular electronics component that ends
    up in the United States.
        Mr. Cooper. Shift to people for a second. How do we know
    who the war criminals are? Who was, in fact, a member of the
    LRA or the Mai Mai; or who may have been a member but not
    committed an atrocity; who is not a member of anything but
    committed an atrocity. How do you know?
        Mr. Dagne. I think with the LRA, FDLR, and CNDP we do have
    good knowledge of who the leaders are, who the commanders are.
    And I will be happy to provide those names and the command
    structure if you are interested.
        Mr. Cooper. But so many of the atrocities are committed by
    low-level troops, right?
        Mr. Dagne. Of course, you have the rank and file who commit
    the atrocity, but who gives the order, who gives the command,
    is primarily responsible for it.
        Mr. Prendergast. Yeah. I think it is really important to
    understand that these aren't just, you know, troops that are
    completely out of control, running around raping, pillaging,
    and looting. There are very specific war strategies being
    pursued by the various armed groups in Congo, whether it is the
    government army, whether it is the foreign-armed groups, or
    whether it is some of the Congolese militias. There are
    particular interests being pursued. And when you give a green
    light to your rank and file that you now, as a strategy, as a
    tool of war, we are encouraging you to rape in the context of
    our attacks on particular civilian populations, that is a war
    crime or crime against humanity.
        And finally we are getting the ICC to investigate these
    linkages. We are seeing now indictments of particular
    individuals in Congo where related to the recruitment of child
    soldiers forcibly and sexual violence as a war crime. And as
    the evidence accumulates, it is going to be harder and harder
    for people to argue that this is, you know, a violent, out-of-
    control situation. There are command and control issues that
    one hopes will be exposed by these indictments and that some of
    these people will actually end up spending the rest of their
    lives in jail for it.
        Mr. Cooper. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Conaway.
        Mr. Conaway. No questions, just a quick comment.
        Mr. Dagne, you said earlier that you believe the Congolese
    have to come up with their own solutions. And I couldn't agree
    more with you. I think the folks in Odessa, Texas, are better
    at solving the problems in Odessa, Texas, than anybody in D.C.
    It is heartening to hear someone as informed as you are about
    these issues make that statement, that we really do have to
    look to the Congolese themselves and then help them do it.
        In that vein, is there leadership in Congo that can provide
    the ideas that we can then help with as opposed to coming up
    with our own ideas and trying to put them over--implement them
    in the Congo? Are there folks there that we can work with?
        Mr. Dagne. There is a government in Congo, was elected,
    President Joseph Kabila, and they have position groups, a
    functioning parliament, and we have been working with that
    government for the past decade. Is it ideal? Is it purely
    democratic? No. There is a lot more work that needs to be done.
    The point I am making is that in order for us to have an impact
    on the ground, we need to work with them, not come with a
    solution and say, This is what is best.
        Mr. Conaway. Exactly. Where is their list of solutions they
    have come up with themselves and said, Here are the things that
    we are going to make happen; can you help us with these, as
    opposed to us coming with that list and saying, Here's some
    good ideas. What do you all think?
        I mean, is there that list and does it include this
    minerals management programming and everything else, or is
    there something else on that list that they themselves believe
    is the right way to go at this?
        Mr. Dagne. Yeah. I can give you some examples on the
    security sector for the Congolese themselves have been asking
    in order even to control their own commanders. Not long ago, I
    think about 5, 6 months ago, the president himself ordered the
    arrest of a senior general because of abuses that his units had
    carried out. Even on the conflict diamond issue, the minister
    of mining himself came and asked how we can help him. Use of
    satellites, for example, to identify bad areas and good areas.
        So they do come up and ask from time to time for help. And
    I think what is important, like when I said the region, they
    had come up, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, and established a
    structure in order to ensure transparency on the conflict
    mineral issue. And that can be strengthened and coordinated.
    There have been other activities. For example, a European-based
    group that had been taking, you know, satellite photographs of
    some of these mines, and basically pushing that into a database
    identifying who controls it.
        For us to be able to have an effective result, we need to
    know on the ground. We don't have that kind of presence. You
    know, who is mining it? Who is the rebel commander there? Is it
    clean? Is it possible that----
        Mr. Conaway. Isn't that something that the Congolese should
    be doing for themselves?
        Mr. Dagne. Yes. Precisely. That is what I am talking about,
    the coordination with the Congolese.
        Mr. Conaway. Alright. Let me ask one other thing, and any
    of you can answer. The post-conflict diamond era in Sierra
    Leone and Liberia and Angola, the rank-and-file human beings
    there, is their quality of life any better today or have they
    just swapped one set of miseries for a new set of miseries?
        Mr. Dagne. I think it is very difficult to say, you know,
    that their lives have improved. I can give you a number of
    examples from Angola. I was there.
        Mr. Smith. If I may, not to interrupt you, but certainly it
    has got to help that there aren't armed gangs running around
    shooting people. Who, I mean, that is not to say that their
    economy has taken off. But I find it hard to believe that if
    you--if a civil war is going on in your neighborhood, and then
    a civil war is not going on in your neighborhood, I just got to
    believe that is a better situation.
        Mr. Conaway. Well, maybe the civil war is still going on.
        Mr. Dagne. The question that I thought was asked was if
    their livelihood has improved, not the security on the ground.
        Mr. Conaway. Right. Just one set of miseries for a new set
    of miseries.
        Mr. Dagne. The day-to-day life of the individual once they
    are demobilized.
        Mr. Smith. Right. Day-to-day life. And I am sorry to keep
    arguing.
        Mr. Conaway. Reclaiming my time.
        Mr. Smith. But the livelihood, certainly I get that. Well,
    I have made my statement. Go ahead.
        Mr. Dagne. To answer your question, the day-to-day life,
    once they are demobilized, for a number of them, they are
    either integrated into the regular forces. But have they been
    given training ----
        Mr. Conaway. I am not talking about the demobilized. I am
    just talking about the rank-and-file citizen who is out there
    who is the victim of both sides of the civil war that was going
    on, that is not now going on, are their lives any better today,
    post-conflict diamond controls, than they were before? Or are
    they just as miserable now, they just got different miseries?
        Mr. Dagne. No, no. I think when you look at the overall
    picture, definitely.
        Mr. Conaway. They are better off.
        Mr. Dagne. For example, just Sudan. Five years ago, they
    signed an agreement. For me, when I look at the registration
    for primary school for girls, it had tripled. And that's
    progress. When I look at, you know, people, you know, going to
    school and having access to medical care, that is progress
    which they didn't have before. The same thing can be said about
    the end of the war in Angola. You know, you see a lot of
    construction taking place, schools being built.
        Mr. Conaway. So their lives are better?
        Mr. Dagne. Yes, their lives are better.
        Mr. Conaway. You said first that they weren't, but now you
    are saying they are better.
        Mr. Dagne. No, I thought you asked about--maybe I heard it
    wrong--I thought you asked about those who are demobilized once
    they are.
        Mr. Conaway. No. No. Just the overall folks who are the
    victims of whatever set of atrocities are going on, whether it
    is from machetes or AK-47s, are they better? What I am hearing
    you say is yes, life in Angola today is better than it was when
    diamonds were being mined by the negative groups and sold.
        Mr. Dagne. Yeah. Definitely, in every case you end the war,
    the focus becomes on reconstruction and development. And that
    improves the lives of people.
        Mr. Prendergast. There really is no comparison. I mean,
    three countries that had some of the highest rates of
    displacement in the world; people were living, moving from
    place to place escaping these terrible atrocities. And today,
    they are largely secure. Yeah, their economic growth rates
    aren't off the charts, but it is an extraordinary difference to
    not be living in an internally displaced camp or a refugee camp
    to be able to go home and try to eke out a living.
        Okay, they are a long way from being a roaring economy, but
    to have the chance to rebuild your communities and your lives,
    that is what is happening in Liberia and Sierra Leone and
    Angola today. And those people, and just your point is
    reinforced. It is to let's give those countries a chance and
    the people themselves to do it themselves. You take away that
    layer of conflict and people get on with their lives.
        Mr. Komorowski. I think I would echo the two former
    speakers. On the subject of Angola, which is another country in
    which MAG works, we have worked through a period of time
    immediately post-conflict through a resurgence of the conflicts
    and to the current day as well. And, certainly, the point Mr.
    Prendergast made about the displaced peoples and supporting
    initially all of the work with UNHCR [United Nations High
    Commissioner for Refugees] repatriation, et cetera, the ability
    now, I think the key word that is important here is the ability
    for communities and authorities at local regional and national
    levels to actually do some planning; to actually start looking
    at not just the stabilization of the communities, but planning
    reconstruction efforts, which we are seeing in the provinces in
    which we are working in Angola.
        It is a marked difference. And I would pose comparison to
    Sudan, DRC, et cetera; other countries which we are working
    where the threat and the regional threat and the insecurities
    such that those processes are a long way down the line. And
    that is a significant difference. And you genuinely see it in
    the face of people with whom you are working. You know that
    they are aware that they are not living under the imminent
    threat of the barrel of a gun as opposed to some of the other
    communities we have been mentioning in the likes of Eastern
    Congo.
        Mr. Smith. Thanks. I just have two final questions, both
    for Mr. Komorowski, but you can comment as well. The Department
    of Defense, AFRICOM, is not terribly involved in the Eastern
    Congo, is my understanding. But in your work in that area, what
    sort of relationship do you have with our DOD? And then the
    second question is about the Congolese army. We have talked
    around it a little bit. They are a significant part of the
    problem, both in terms of not being able to provide security in
    their country, but then also many members of the Congolese army
    actually do occasionally wind up preying on the population and
    becoming some of those rebel groups.
        Could you walk us through are we making progress on making
    the Congolese army better? At least, we do see the number of
    times they turn on the population making them better. And then,
    like I said at the outset, the question about you, the
    involvement of our Department of Defense in terms of helping
    with some of the issues we have talked about today.
        Mr. Komorowski. Okay. So to take the two points separately.
    First of all, the engagement of my organization, Mines Advisory
    Group with the Department of Defense and its various agents and
    operators. We have a body here also in Washington so we
    coordinate very closely with the Office of WRA, Weapons Removal
    and Abatement, and so we are made aware when there are going to
    be DTRA [Defense Threat Reduction Agency] or AFRICOM missions
    and personnel deploying.
        So one of the key things we are providing is intelligence,
    is a clear understanding from our staff and our operations on
    the ground of the picture that is emerging there on a day-to-
    day basis. So that is one of the very practical ways in which
    we are engaged in working with the DTRA as well. We have, on
    occasion, actually been tasked to deliver operations as a
    follow-up to assessments that they have made. For example, in
    Burundi there was a DTRA assessment, and it became apparent
    that there were a number of MANPADS, numbering more than 300--
    --
        Mr. Smith. I should say, by the way, Defense Threat
    Reduction Agency is DTRA, for the uninitiated.
        Go ahead.
        Mr. Komorowski. Apologies. Yes, thank you. So on the basis
    of that Defense Threat Reduction Agency assessment, there was
    in excess of 300 MANPADS--man-portable air-defense systems--
    that were located. And as a result of MAG's cooperation with
    that assessment, we were able to carry out the destruction with
    U.S. support as well. So that is one very practical example.
    But across the piece, we are essentially tied in and working
    with AFRICOM as and when there is a presence on the ground,
    mainly through briefings. I don't know if that adequately
    answers----
        Mr. Smith. It does. That is enormously helpful.
        Mr. Komorowski. So to take the second question about
    working with the Congolese military, I think it is very
    important to make clear from the outset that MAG's engagement
    with the military is very much, as I mentioned, within the
    province of weapons----
        Mr. Smith. If I may, I am not actually talking about your
    particular engagement, just as you engage with them, your
    assessment of their capabilities. And, as I said, two big
    problems: Number one, they are not providing security; number
    two, in many instances, they are part of the problem, the
    individual members in the Congolese military.
        How would you assess those two statements that I have made,
    and is getting better? Is it getting worse? Where is that
    headed? And that would be for all three of you.
        Mr. Komorowski. Sure. I think one of the key problems that
    we deal with is the rotation or the movement, the change, the
    instability in terms of the structures with which we are
    working. So I mentioned in my submission that the building
    relationships of trust and an understanding of the role that we
    as an organization and other entities bring in is really key.
        When those are built and when those individuals are then
    moving on, and we see that frequently, it takes the process
    back. So building long-term reform with regard to the military
    capacity for justice building, et cetera, that is slightly out
    of our province. But I think that that turnover is unhelpful in
    that respect.
        I think the second point, as regards the Congolese military
    being part of the problem, again, I think it was mentioned
    earlier about at one point, Kinshasa was the perception of
    Congo. What we find as well is that the further away you get,
    the looser the chain of command. And I think that is one of the
    key issues as well in terms of how things are operating the
    further away that operations are from central command.
        It is not a particularly joined-up strategy or structure we
    see on the ground. And that is an issue in terms of how the
    tasking works.
        Mr. Smith. Gentlemen, do you want to offer your thoughts?
        Mr. Prendergast. Only one quick point, which is that for
    SSR to have a chance of working, it has got to be a multiyear,
    multidonor effort. And we need higher level engagement, because
    the kind of basic things, building blocks of army reform in the
    Congo, the kind of things you would want to do, reforming just
    how people are being paid and ensuring that they are paid;
    constructing barracks. When I used to work for an International
    Crisis Group, we went around and did a survey of all these
    barracks and talked to the soldiers and their families and
    stuff and it was worse than a refugee camp. You know, these
    guys. And then we are, like, wondering why so much looting goes
    on in the vicinity of these camps you know, and its direct.
    Their commanding officers are just pillaging these guys. They
    are taking everything that comes down the chain.
        So there is basic reforms of how people are paid and how
    they are trained and how they are then held accountable as
    soldiers for their activities.
        Mr. Smith. Is it getting any better or, in recent years or
    is it just about where it's at? OK. Let the record reflect he
    shook his head no.
        Mr. Dagne.
        Mr. Dagne. I don't think it has improved. I think it has
    been terrible over the past 5 years. Even, I think, with the
    ongoing security sector reform, I don't expect improvement to
    come any time soon as long as those who are carrying these, you
    know, attacks are not held accountable. Accountability is just
    as important, and we haven't seen much of that.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. I have no further questions.
        Mr. Conaway?
        Well, thank you. That was very, very informative. I really
    appreciate the testimony from all three of you, and we will
    continue to work on this issue and in that area, and look
    forward to working with you. Thank you.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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