    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

      THE TRANSITION TO A CIVILIAN-LED U.S. PRESENCE IN IRAQ: ISSUES AND
                                   CHALLENGES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               NOVEMBER 18, 2010

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 111-135

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

     Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

                                   ----------
                             U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

    62-399 PDF                       WASHINGTON : 2010

    For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
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    Washington, DC 20402-0001

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
    GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York           ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
    ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American      CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
        Samoa                            DAN BURTON, Indiana
    DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey          ELTON GALLEGLY, California
    BRAD SHERMAN, California             DANA ROHRABACHER, California
    ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York             DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
    BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts         EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
    GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York           RON PAUL, Texas
    DIANE E. WATSON, California          JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
    RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri              MIKE PENCE, Indiana
    ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey              JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
    MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York         J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
    THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida          CONNIE MACK, Florida
    JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee            JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
    GENE GREEN, Texas                    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
    LYNN WOOLSEY, California             TED POE, Texas
    SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas            BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
    BARBARA LEE, California              GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
    SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
    JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
    MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
    BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
    DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
    JIM COSTA, California
    KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
    GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
    RON KLEIN, Florida
                       Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
                    Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
      Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State (Former United
      States Ambassador to Lebanon)..................................     8
    Colin Kahl, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the
      Middle East, U.S. Department of Defense........................    19

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign
      Affairs: Prepared statement....................................     4
    The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman: Prepared statement.............    11
    Colin Kahl, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............................    23

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    44
    Hearing minutes..................................................    45
    The Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Indiana: Prepared statement...........................    46
    The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of New York: Prepared statement......................    48
    The Honorable Joe Wilson, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of South Carolina: Prepared statement....................    50
    The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of Missouri: Prepared statement......................    51
    Responses from the Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman to questions
      submitted for the record by the Honorable Russ Carnahan........    53
    Questions for the record submitted by the Honorable Russ Carnahan
      to Colin Kahl, Ph.D. (responses not received prior to printing)    64
    Questions for the record submitted by the Honorable Barbara Lee,
      a Representative in Congress from the State of California, to
      the Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman and Colin Kahl, Ph.D.
      (responses not received prior to printing).....................    65

      THE TRANSITION TO A CIVILIAN-LED U.S. PRESENCE IN IRAQ: ISSUES AND
                                   CHALLENGES

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2010

                      House of Representatives,
                                  Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:24 p.m. in room
    2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Chairman Berman. The committee will come to order. Of
    course, for the third day our Caucus is meeting, although I
    think it is about to end. So I hope we will be joined by some
    other members of the Caucus soon, although we are fortunate to
    have Mr. Klein.
        In a moment I will recognize myself and the ranking member
    for up to 7 minutes for purposes of making an opening
    statement. I will recognize the chairman and ranking member of
    the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee for 3 minutes for
    opening remarks, and then all other members will have an
    opportunity to make 1-minute opening statements, if they wish
    to do so. Members may also place written statements in the
    record.
        Before I begin the opening statement, I would just like to
    say a few words relevant to the committee. We are coming to the
    end of this Congress. I hope, I expect, I intend for there to
    be one other hearing during this session, hopefully the first
    week of December, a hearing on the implementation of Iran
    sanctions. It is our intention to have such a hearing. That
    legislation is one of the things I think we can rightfully be
    proud of accomplishing in this past Congress. There are other
    issues as well, but I am not going to belabor all of that at
    this particular moment.
        I do want to say to my ranking member that I do think we
    have accomplished a number of things together, and while we
    haven't agreed on absolutely every single issue, you have been
    a very good partner, a spirited partner. I don't want to be
    presumptuous, because I know these decisions haven't been made,
    but, were such a decision to be made, I would look forward to
    working with you for 2 years in your new capacity and my new
    capacity, if I can afford to be presumptuous about my own
    situation.
        So we have a number of colleagues on the committee who will
    not be here again because we have a Caucus, and who will not be
    here in the next Congress. I would like to mention them, but
    since they are not here I am just going to mention one of my
    dear friends and, I think, a great member of the committee who
    will not be with us in the next Congress, Congressman Klein,
    who made a tremendous contribution to the product of this
    committee and to the Congress.
        I think all of us, and I know this is true of the ranking
    member from our earlier conversations over the years, shares
    the feeling. We will miss having you here very much,
    Congressman Klein.
        [Applause.]
        Chairman Berman. I will now begin the opening statement.
    This hearing will delve into a subject, and I apologize to the
    witnesses for the delay, a subject that, not too long ago, was
    at the very top of our foreign policy agenda: Iraq and the U.S.
    role there.
        U.S. military forces currently face a December 31, 2011,
    deadline for a complete withdrawal, in accordance with the 2008
    agreement with the Iraqis. As a result, the primarily Defense
    Department-led military campaign is being transformed into a
    diplomacy, assistance, and advisory effort led by the State
    Department and USAID. This transition is unprecedented in terms
    of its sheer complexity, the resources required to do it right,
    and the likely consequences of failure.
        As part of this transition, the State Department will be
    expected to manage a number of specialized security-related
    tasks--often with the use of contractors--that in the past were
    handled exclusively by U.S. military forces. These include
    operating early-warning radar systems that alert our personnel
    to incoming rocket fire, handling unexploded munitions that
    land inside of U.S. compounds, running unmanned aerial
    surveillance; and recovering downed vehicles.
        The State Department's largest program in Iraq is now--and
    will continue to be--police training, but the challenges facing
    the department in this area will become even greater with the
    launch of a new advanced police training and reform program and
    with the handoff of some training responsibilities from DoD.
        In order to monitor political, economic, and security
    developments in Iraq; identify potential threats to U.S.
    interests before they emerge; and effectively engage with key
    political players, the State Department also plans a
    significant expansion of the U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq.
    In addition to our Embassy in Baghdad--which is already by far
    the largest staff of any U.S. Embassy in the world--State is
    planning to open four other diplomatic posts: Consulates-
    general in Basra and Erbil and temporary posts, called
    ``embassy branch offices'' in Mosul and Kirkuk.
        The U.S. transition is proceeding in a difficult and
    dangerous setting. Iraq's failure to form a workable governing
    coalition promptly after the elections has complicated, and, at
    times, worsened the security environment in which State is
    assuming the responsibilities once held by Defense.
        Our diplomats and development professionals in Iraq
    continue to face significant perils, with insurgent rocket fire
    sometimes targeting the Embassy compound. Movements of U.S.
    officials outside their facilities often require security
    details of up to 20 or 25 people. And with the host country
    currently unable to provide the security and services routinely
    offered in most nations, the security environment may become
    even more treacherous after the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
        The transition from Defense to State in Iraq is a massive
    undertaking, and it won't come cheap. But by any calculation,
    the costs associated with an increased State Department
    presence pale in comparison to the resources we have expended
    in Iraq through so many years of war and terrorism. If funding
    this transition will help preserve the hard-won progress in
    Iraq and provide a solid foundation from which the United
    States can support Iraq's internal stability and foster a
    peaceful Iraqi role in a strategically critical region, then it
    is likely to be worth paying the price--even in these difficult
    economic times.
        I have a number of questions about the transition. How have
    Iraqi political problems been affecting transition plans and
    the security situation of our personnel on the ground? How
    often and under what circumstances will our diplomats be able
    to move around the country? What do they expect to accomplish
    after the U.S. military departs Iraq?
        How will our diplomats, civilian professionals,
    contractors, and facilities be protected if U.S. troops are not
    at hand? What can we expect from the Government of Iraq in
    terms of protection of our diplomatic establishments? How is
    State responding to concerns over shortcomings in past
    management and oversight of its programs in Iraq--as raised,
    for example, by the Special Inspector-General for Iraq
    Reconstruction--particularly as State plans to ramp up use of
    private contractors to provide both security and life-support
    services?
        And finally, the big question that I hope our witnesses
    from State and Defense will address head on: What are the
    consequences for U.S. national security if we shortchange the
    transition effort? In a world where Congress is going to have
    to make very, very difficult budgetary choices, why should
    funding the transition be a high priority? How will a robust
    civilian presence in Iraq after 2011 serve the larger national
    interest? What is the administration's long-term vision for
    U.S.-Iraq relations?
        Regardless of how one feels about the origins of the Iraq
    war and U.S. policy in the last decade, these complicated
    issues challenge all of us to look ahead, in a bipartisan,
    manner at the kind of strengthened U.S. civilian presence in
    Iraq that can advance our interests and enable us to stand with
    the Iraqis who are fighting extremism and trying to develop
    their country.
        In a moment I will introduce our witnesses, but first to
    the ranking member and presumptive chair of the next Congress,
    Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, for any opening remarks that she might
    have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Berman follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and I
    also would like to begin my statement by thanking three
    departing members from our side from our committee, Senator
    elect Boozman of Arkansas and two gentlemen from South
    Carolina, Mr. Barrett and Mr. Inglis. We will miss them, and we
    thank them for the great service to our committee.
        And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this timely
    hearing today. The U.S. mission in Iraq is in a time of
    transition. Embassy leadership has rotated twice since the
    committee last received testimony from both the Department of
    State and the Department of Defense. A more fundamental
    transition is now underway as the U.S. combat mission in Iraq
    ended in August 2010 and the U.S. role shifts further.
        As a result, while I respect and admire and thank our
    witnesses for their record of service to our nation, it is
    difficult to understand, Mr. Chairman, why the administration
    declined to send higher ranking officials from the State
    Department and the Defense Department to a full committee
    hearing on a matter as important as Iraq and future U.S.
    policy.
        I am concerned that such a decision reflects a broader
    strategic ambivalence in the policy and our approach to Iraq.
    We owe it to our troops who have sacrificed so much in the
    course of their mission in Iraq to ensure that a strategic
    defeat does not spring from their hard-fought, tactical
    victory.
        Unfortunately, for most of the last 2 years much of the
    focus has been on dealing with short-term considerations such
    as drawing down troop levels quickly without sufficient focus
    on the emergence of Iran as the key power broker in the country
    or the long-term security applications and situations or the
    nature and the extent of the future U.S.-Iraqi relationship.
        We do have a strategic framework agreement with Iraq, but
    what is the administration's strategy for moving this effort
    forward? We must be both proactive and prospective. Iraq can
    play a critical role in limiting the Iranian influence, which,
    as all of us know, has been destabilizing in the region, and
    Iran's ability to threaten and intimidate its Gulf neighbors is
    well documented.
        So a stable, secure and friendly Iraq can help separate
    Iran and Syria, can provide Turkey with a key alternative to
    economic involvement with Iran, can demonstrate to the Gulf
    states that Iran cannot dominate the northern Gulf, nor can it
    expand to the south, and, finally, a friendly Iraq can help our
    key allies in the region.
        I would ask that our witnesses address this question: If
    they agree that greater U.S. leverage in Iraq can play a
    critical role in limiting Iran's influence and Iran's ability
    to threaten and intimidate its neighbors, and what specifically
    is the United States' near and also far reaching and long-term
    strategy for addressing the Iranian threat in Iraq? Would you
    agree that a stable, sovereign and secure Iraq will show that
    Sunni and Shiite Muslims can cooperate and can diffuse the
    threat of Sunni extremism, as well as the kind of Shiite
    extremism backed by Iran?
        And going one step further, we have to recognize that
    Iran's activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan are components
    of a broader threat that it poses to U.S. interests and allies
    in the Middle East and beyond. The need for a sound,
    comprehensive strategy has never been more vital as we
    transition our presence to an overwhelmingly diplomatic one and
    as Iran seeks to exploit that transition period to draw the
    recently formed Iraqi Government under its thumb. We may still
    be able to achieve a lasting, grand strategic victory, but not
    if we treat Iraq as if they were some sort of end state rather
    than the need for a continuing strategic focus.
        And finally, Mr. Chairman, given the need for full
    oversight of our Iraq policy, I am concerned about news that
    the State Department has failed to comply with repeated
    requests by the Special Inspector General for Iraq
    Reconstruction for contract data on the Iraqi police training
    program. Given the troubled history of our police training
    efforts there, the need for oversight of this program is
    particularly important so that we do not repeat past mistakes.
        I share the concerns that were raised by Senators Grassley
    and Coburn in their October 6 letter to the Secretary of State
    about the continued failure of the Bureau to take immediate
    steps to address the lack of cooperation with the Special
    Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
        What guidance has been given employees of the Department of
    State in regards to responding to requests made by SIGIR to
    ensure that the unanswered request for information does not
    continue? What has been done by both State and DoD to implement
    the recommendations set forth by SIGIR?
        And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to express concern
    regarding the plight of the residents of Camp Ashraf. Mr.
    Chairman, last year you and I issued a joint statement urging
    the Iraqi Government to live up to its commitment to ensure the
    continued well-being of all who live in Camp Ashraf. However,
    reports indicate that denied medical care, including vital
    treatment for cancer patients, are still being denied to the
    residents of Ashraf.
        Secretary Feltman, I would urge the Department of State to
    please intervene more proactively to ensure that the
    humanitarian protections to which Ashraf residents are entitled
    and were promised are going to be upheld.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank the witnesses for their time and look
    forward to hearing from them about the administration's plans
    going forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time.
        Chairman Berman. Well, thank you very much, Ms. Ros-
    Lehtinen.
        We are now--I hate to tell you--going to have a series of
    five votes. As soon as the fifth vote is cast I will come back
    here. Talk among yourselves or whatever.
        I just have one thing, though, since the ranking member
    raised it. I want to reaffirm the notion that the commitments
    on Camp Ashraf that were made by the Iraqi Government and all
    that, I share the concern that those are kept and that we not
    forget about that issue.
        With that, the committee will recess until we have finished
    the votes on the House Floor. Thank you.
        [Recess.]
        Chairman Berman. I see neither the chair nor the ranking
    member of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee and so
    does any member wish to--the gentleman from California, Mr.
    Rohrabacher, is recognized for 1 minute.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. I won't be able to
    attend the whole hearing because of a speech on the Floor of
    the House that I am working on about 1 hour from now, but, Mr.
    Chairman, I just would like to note that as we go into this
    phase where American troops are withdrawing we cannot throw
    those people who are our friends, throw them out as if they
    meant nothing to us.
        Those people who are currently allied with us in the war
    against radical Islam, especially the mullah regime in Iran,
    should not be taken for granted and should not be put in a very
    dangerous situation. I talk specifically about Camp Ashraf.
    These are protected persons by our own definition. We should
    not try to placate or let the Iraqis build some sort of cordial
    relationship with the mullah dictatorship in Iran by the
    sacrifice of these freedom loving people.
        Second of all, I would hope that the people in Iraq
    understand that we see it when churches are bombed. We feel it
    badly when, yes, Muslims are killing Muslims, but when Muslims
    there in Iraq start killing Christians it raises even greater
    alarm here in the United States. Just last week, 50 Christians
    were killed in a Syrian church as it was bombed by radical
    Muslims.
        We have got to make sure that the Government of Iraq knows
    that is unacceptable, all of the factions in Iraq know that is
    unacceptable. We need to have a consulate in Erbil to give the
    Kurds a little bit of protection so they will know that they
    aren't going to be so victimized, and perhaps the Christians,
    the Syrian Christians, need a province of their own in Iraq
    that will give them some sort of safety in that type of
    environment.
        Those are issues that I think need to be put in the record,
    Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of this hearing. Thank you very
    much for giving me the opportunity to register those areas of
    concern.
        Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. And
    now I think we should hear the testimony of our witnesses.
        Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman serves as the Assistant
    Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. Previously he
    served as a U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon. He was also head of the
    Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) Office in the Erbil
    Province of Iraq and simultaneously served as Deputy Regional
    Coordinator for the CPA's Northern Area. Ambassador Feltman has
    been a career member of the Foreign Service since 1986, and I
    think he is uniquely and specially qualified to testify on this
    subject.
        Dr. Colin Kahl is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
    for the Middle East. Prior to joining the department he was a
    Council on Foreign Relations Fellow, working at the department
    on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability
    operations. Dr. Kahl has also served as coordinator for the
    Obama campaign's Iraq--Obama campaign? Was it the Obama
    campaign? The Obama campaign's Iraq Policy Expert Group. Oh, I
    get it. Okay. It was. Well, it is good they have an expert
    group. And was a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American
    Security, a Washington-based think tank.
        Gentlemen, we are very pleased you could be with us, and we
    look forward to your testimony. Your entire statements will be
    included in the record. If you choose to summarize, that will
    be good. Assistant Secretary Feltman?

       STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFFREY D. FELTMAN, ASSISTANT
     SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
           STATE (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO LEBANON)

        Ambassador Feltman. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-
    Lehtinen, honorable members of the committee, thank you for
    holding this hearing and for inviting Dr. Kahl and me to appear
    before you today. Thank you for agreeing to enter my entire
    statement into the record.
        The next few years will be critical for our relationship
    with Iraq, for Iraq's relationship with its neighbors and for
    the relationship between the people of Iraq and their own
    government. In each of these relationships, the United States
    has a tremendous amount at stake. With Iraq situated
    strategically in the Middle East, it is profoundly in our
    national interest that Iraq emerge as a strategic partner to
    the United States, a sovereign, stable, self-reliant nation and
    a positive force for moderation and stability in the region.
        For most of the past 40 years, Iraq has played a negative,
    a destabilizing role in the region, often allied with our
    adversaries and posing a threat to U.S. interests and those of
    our friends and allies. In the year ahead, as the military
    continues its drawdown in accordance with our security
    agreement with Iraq, our mission is clear. We must secure the
    gains our nation and our military have made at great cost and
    great sacrifice, and we must help Iraqis move forward in a
    long-term partnership with us.
        Even a few years ago, we might not have been able to
    anticipate having the strategic opportunity that we have today.
    My written statement describes a number of the challenges
    Iraqis are facing, including the need to establish and rebuild
    functioning social, economic and governing institutions.
        Iraqis have made significant strides, particularly in the
    security area. Iraq has substantial natural resources, a rich
    cultural history and resilient, diverse population, but Iraq is
    not yet in a position to resolve its challenges and make
    strategic progress on its own without continued assistance from
    us. Left unresolved, the problems Iraq faces have the potential
    to seriously affect our country's national security as a weak
    and an unstable Iraq could provide sanctuary for international
    terrorists, become a tool of Iraq's aggressive neighbors and
    destabilize the Gulf.
        Last week's agreement on the framework to form an inclusive
    representative government was a real milestone, but none of us
    should be under the illusion that success is a foregone
    conclusion or that there won't be significant challenges ahead.
    It is in our interest that we remain engaged and be a leading
    partner of Iraq through this transition and beyond.
        As you know and as my colleague here can further
    illuminate, the United States is drawing down its military
    presence in Iraq. That presence has already been reduced to
    below 50,000 troops and is slated to draw all the way down by
    the end of 2011. But we need a long-term and sustainable
    partnership with Iraq, and Iraq's leaders have made it clear
    that they want a close, an enduring and a civilian-led
    partnership with the United States.
        The State Department, working intensively with our
    colleagues in the Defense Department, the White House and
    agencies all across the government, is determined to secure
    that long-term partnership and to get this transition right. I
    would like to thank Dr. Kahl and his colleagues at the
    Department of Defense in particular for their close
    coordination with us at State on this effort.
        What we have done is identify the areas where Iraq most
    needs our continued assistance over the next 3-5 years in order
    to become more stable and self-reliant. We have identified the
    programs that will have the biggest impact and the most
    critical areas, and we are implementing those programs with our
    Iraqi partners, building off the progress they and our Embassy
    and military colleagues have made over the last few years.
        One of the most important examples of work the State
    Department will be assuming is the police development program.
    Over the past 7 years, the United States has helped Iraq's
    Ministry of Interior to expand its security forces up to
    approximately 600,000 people and train them in counterterrorism
    and basic police skills.
        But now we must ensure that these forces also have the
    management, leadership and technical tools and capabilities to
    provide for internal security, protect Iraq's vulnerable
    minorities that we have heard already talked about and uphold
    the rule of law. This is a basic element of civil society, of
    more reliant economic growth and of respect for human rights.
        Likewise, as our military presence continues to draw down,
    we will continue robust security cooperation with Iraq through
    an Office of Security Cooperation. We are also implementing
    assistance programs aimed at ensuring that Iraq's economy will
    be able to stand on its own feet and be truly self-reliant.
    Iraq isn't there yet. Despite having vast oil wealth in the
    ground, Iraq lacks more basic infrastructure and will not be
    able to fully benefit from these resources for at least 5 more
    years.
        Our programs help Iraq to establish banking and regulatory
    frameworks and put in place policies for economic growth and
    diversification which will also help secure the investments of
    U.S. companies in Iraq.
        Outside of Baghdad, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, we plan
    to open two consulates general in Basra and Erbil and two
    temporary embassy branch offices in Kirkuk and Mosul. Our
    officers there in these offices will engage directly with
    Iraqis at the regional and local levels, helping to diffuse
    tensions and build institution and other capacities. Tensions
    between Iraq's communities are still significant, and we have
    an important role to play in helping Iraq's leaders resolve
    these sources of friction.
        Turning to how we are transitioning from a military to
    civilian lead, let me say first that we have, as you all know,
    the finest military in the world, and they have done heroic
    work in Iraq. The State Department will now assume some of
    these roles and activities previously carried out by the
    military; some of these the State Department has never done
    before. Dr. Kahl may talk more about the excellent support that
    DoD is providing to us as we move forward.
        Within the State Department there are seven operational
    areas we focus on when we talk about transition: Property,
    facilities, security, life support, medical, aviation and
    contractor oversight. In each of these cases, we are engaged in
    very robust planning and pursuing our interests in partnership
    with the Iraqis.
        In summation, securing Iraq's future as a sovereign,
    stable, self-reliant nation, a positive force in the region and
    a strategic partner to the United States is a massive
    undertaking. I see the transition from a military-led presence
    in Iraq to a civilian-led presence to be a defining test of the
    Foreign Service and of the nation's diplomatic corps that I am
    proud to serve in.
        Our civilian effort in Iraq is a prime example of Secretary
    Clinton's strong desire to create a more expeditionary
    workforce that can rise to meet the challenges of the twenty-
    first century. It is imperative that we succeed and that we are
    able to seize the opportunity and make good on the enormous
    investments and sacrifices made by Americans and Iraqis over
    the last 7 years.
        I look forward to answering any questions the committee may
    have, and I look forward to working with this committee on
    achieving these goals.
        [The prepared statement of Ambassador Feltman follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Berman. Thank you very much, Assistant Secretary
    Feltman.
        And now Secretary Kahl?

     STATEMENT OF COLIN KAHL, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
        DEFENSE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Kahl. Chairman Berman, Representative Ros-Lehtinen and
    distinguished committee members, I appreciate the opportunity
    to appear before you today alongside my colleague and friend,
    Assistant Secretary Jeff Feltman, to discuss the issues and
    challenges associated with the United States' transition from a
    predominantly military to a civilian-led presence in Iraq.
        This transition includes four key components. The first is
    ensuring that the Iraqi Security Forces reach what we are DoD
    call minimum essential capabilities or MEC. The second is
    developing a State-led police development program. Third is
    expanding the diplomatic presence, and fourth is establishing
    an Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq or what we call OSC-
    I.
        These programs, implemented under the Strategic Framework
    Agreement, are the foundation for building our continued
    strategic partnership with the government and people of Iraq.
    This is a partnership that includes robust diplomatic,
    political, economic and security cooperation.
        Assistant Secretary Feltman has discussed the overall U.S.
    policy and the specific programs for our post 2011 presence, so
    I want to focus my remarks on the security situation in Iraq,
    which is enabling our responsible drawdown to continue as the
    Iraqis step forward and assume primary responsibility, as well
    as the support the Department of Defense is providing to the
    State Department to help the transition process that Assistant
    Secretary Feltman alluded to.
        The first thing I want to talk about is the security
    environment. I know members have concerns about the readiness
    of the Iraqi Government to provide security in Iraq as U.S.
    forces draw down between now and December of next year,
    particularly as extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda in Iraq,
    continue to wage high profile attacks against innocent Iraqi
    civilians.
        Indeed, we continue to see evidence that extremist groups
    are capable of horrific attacks. Recent examples include the
    October 31 attack on Christian church members, the bombings in
    Shia neighborhoods of Baghdad, followed by attacks on pilgrims
    in Karbala and Najaf in the first week of November, attacks on
    Christians in Baghdad on November 9 and 10 and recent
    coordinated attacks on Iraqi Security Forces in Diyala and
    Kirkuk.
        Nevertheless, it is crucial to keep in mind that these
    attacks have repeatedly failed to accomplish al-Qaeda in Iraq's
    number one strategic objective, and that is to spark a return
    to widespread insurgency and communal civil war. Moreover,
    despite the often exaggerated media narrative that depicts an
    Iraq that is teetering on the brink of failure or just on the
    verge of unraveling, the underlying security situation as
    assessed by our commanders on the ground remains strong.
        Overall levels of attacks and Iraqi civilian casualties
    have remained relatively constant at their lowest levels of the
    post 2003 period for more than 2 years. This consistently low
    level of violence is even more remarkable considering that it
    has been maintained as the Iraqi Security Forces have assumed
    primary responsibility for security throughout the country and
    as our force levels have declined from roughly 144,000 troops
    on the ground when we took office in January 2009 to roughly
    50,000 today, while those troops have simultaneously shifted
    their mission from helping to lead combat counterinsurgency
    operations to a predominantly supporting, advise and assist
    role.
        Since January 1, 2009, the Iraqi Security Forces have been
    in the lead on security operations, a role that they have more
    capably embraced with each passing month. On September 1 of
    this year, we made the official transition to Operation New
    Dawn and drew down to below 50,000 U.S. troops, fulfilling the
    President's commitment made at Camp Lejeune in February 2009
    and further cementing the Iraqis' status as in the lead in the
    security role.
        While the United States continues to provide vital support
    to the Iraq Security Forces, including training, equipping,
    mentoring, advising and providing certain critical technical
    enablers, the Iraqis are very much in charge, and they simply
    no longer need such large numbers of U.S. forces to keep the
    violence in check. The ISF have also remained professional and
    independent of political pressure, despite the prolonged period
    of uncertainty associated with Iraq's Government formation
    period.
        Beyond the increased capability of the ISF, the primary
    factor underlying the improved security situation is a viable
    political process that now exists as the enduring framework in
    which key disputes and questions related to the distribution of
    power and resources can be resolved.
        The vast majority of Iraq's major parties, factions and
    communal groups, including many former militants, are now
    heavily invested in the political system. In the 6 months it
    took to form a government in Iraq in 2006 following the
    December 2005 elections, extremists exploited a security vacuum
    to plunge Iraq into civil war.
        In 2010, no such vacuum emerged, despite 8 months of
    sometimes raucous government formation negotiations, largely
    due to the activities of the ISF and a functioning caretaker
    government. That is progress. Last week, after months of heated
    negotiations, Iraqi leaders took a major step forward with the
    formation of a government coalition, including all the major
    Iraqi political blocs, as well as agreement on a set of
    political reforms addressing a series of divisive issues.
        As Vice President Joe Biden often remarks, ``politics has
    broken out'' in Iraq. As we all know, it is often messy, as it
    is even in the most developed democracies, but the Iraqi
    commitment to the political process is real. As we have
    witnessed in recent weeks, violence will continue to challenge
    this process, but as long as the Iraqis stay committed to
    resolving their differences through the force of words rather
    than the force of arms, we believe Iraq is unlikely to sink
    back into widespread violence.
        Iraq will continue to suffer terrorist attacks, both over
    the next year and after U.S. forces complete their drawdown,
    but the level of U.S. support required to assist the Iraq
    Security Forces in keeping violence at low levels and below a
    threshold that we judge would threaten the viability of the
    Iraqi state is a small fraction of previous years. Moreover, it
    is our judgment that the current military footprint on the
    ground is currently so modest compared to what it used to be in
    the past that the remaining drawdown over the next year is
    unlikely to trigger a dramatic surge in violence.
        I want to say a few words about what DoD is doing to help
    the State Department in the transition that is ongoing. As
    Assistant Secretary Feltman stated, the Department of State,
    the Department of Defense and other agencies and offices have
    undertaken unprecedented levels of coordination and planning
    for the transition in Iraq. DoD has an excellent working
    relationship with the State Department, and we are working
    together at all levels to achieve a successful transition.
        As one would expect with a transition of this scope and
    complexity, challenges exist. DoD is doing everything it can to
    help set up the State Department for success during this
    process. After a comprehensive review process, USF-I, that is
    U.S. Forces in Iraq, identified 1,127 essential activities that
    DoD performs in Iraq. The tasks were binned into 24 different
    categories, examples of which include intelligence,
    telecommunications and reconciliation efforts.
        In close coordination with Embassy Baghdad, USF-I completed
    the process of canvassing, categorizing and defining handover
    plans for these activities and functions, determining what
    would be turned over to the Iraqis, what would be turned over
    to U.S. civilian agencies or multilateral or private
    institutions or terminated altogether.
        The Embassy has already taken the lead on 150 of these
    tasks and will assume control of another 310 as USF-I complete
    its drawdown over the next year. Eighty-two will be transferred
    to U.S. Central Command and 36 to the Iraqi Government. Five
    hundred and thirty have been completed, and 22 were identified
    as nonessential and therefore will be phased out.
        In addition, we are leaning forward to provide the State
    Department with excess equipment and other forms of support.
    Recently, for example, the Army has identified 60 excess MRAPS
    and nine fuel trucks for transfer to the State Department for
    use beyond 2011. An OSD and Joint Staff team is also working
    with State to plan for the receipt and maintenance of this
    equipment. We are working with the State Department to help
    them define other requirements for additional equipment and
    support. We have established a State-DoD Senior Ad Hoc Working
    Group that meets on a weekly basis to work through State's
    requests, as well as other emerging requirements.
        On September 27, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved
    providing life support after 2011 to the State Department on a
    reimbursable basis, so-called LOGCAP support. Embassy Baghdad
    is receiving substantial technical support from USF-I, the Army
    Materiel Command and OSD staff. This is a good start, but in
    the coming year DoD will likely have to do even more to assist
    the State Department to ensure a successful transition, and we
    will.
        In conclusion, our continued engagement in Iraq remains
    vital. We are now at the point where the strategic dividends of
    our enormous sacrifice are within reach, as long we take the
    proper steps to consolidate our hard-fought gains. Building a
    long-term strategic partnership with Iraq, based on mutual
    interests and mutual respect, presents many advantages for the
    United States.
        Continued U.S. support for the Iraqi Security Forces,
    including joint training exercises and military exchanges, will
    also help to ensure steady improvements in Iraqi capabilities
    even beyond 2011 and over time improved interoperability that
    will facilitate Iraq's long-term cooperation with the United
    States and other regional states to address common challenges.
        Continued security assistance and cooperation through the
    Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq that we are in the
    process of standing up will assist in addressing concerns we
    share with Iraq, such as counterterrorism,
    counterproliferation, maritime security and air defense.
        In this context, however, reduced funding is a challenge
    for the transition. Security costs are high, and planners must
    base costs on the conditions today, not on best case
    assumptions of what they may be in 2012. As the U.S. draws down
    its military presence, the Iraqi Government must feel that it
    has the foundational capabilities to defend against external
    threats both objectively and subjectively.
        Our country has sacrificed a great deal in Iraq, and fully
    resourcing the mission to its completion is vital to ensuring
    that this enormous national investment produces enduring
    results. We are 10 yards from the goal line and need one final
    push.
        With that I look forward to your questions. Thank you very
    much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Kahl follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman Berman. Well, thank both of you very much, and I
    will now yield myself 5 minutes to begin the questioning.
        Secretary Kahl, in the forthcoming Brookings study on Iraq
    that is about to be released, the authors say the U.S.' top
    priority in Iraq should be to prevent the outbreak of another
    civil war. This is a quote from the draft:

            ``By far, the most important U.S. military mission now
            is to support Iraq's internal stability by continuing
            to perform peace keeping functions, especially, but not
            exclusively, in Kirkuk and other territories disputed
            by Arabs and Kurds in northern Iraq.''

        The authors say that the U.S. troops can be a crucial
    substitute until trust is reestablished between contending
    Iraqi groups. Do you agree with that view? Do you foresee U.S.
    troops playing that role on an ongoing basis? What will the
    consequences be if they don't?
        Mr. Kahl. Well, I have not read the draft Brookings report,
    although I am familiar with the arguments made by many of its
    authors and its general conclusions.
        I think the judgment of the Department of Defense, as well
    as other agencies and departments, to include the State
    Department, is that a return to the dark days of 2006 and 2007
    where there was an all-out communal civil war is unlikely under
    most foreseeable circumstances, and I think it is our general
    assessment that the drawdown is completely compatible with
    consolidating the security gains that we have seen over the
    last 2 years.
        I think it is worth noting that we have pulled out almost
    100,000 forces since January 2009, and yet those security
    trends have stayed relatively positive. That included us
    leaving the cities in June 2009, handing over formal security
    responsibility to the Iraqis for the first time and then of
    course drawing down and changing our mission this past
    September.
        So I think we have actually seen some evidence for the fact
    that the Iraqi Security Forces, which now number more than
    660,000, are capable of beating back the extremists and
    preventing the kind of back sliding that that report mentions.
        I will say, though, that in the next year and beyond we
    will continue to work with the Iraqi Security Forces to
    professionalize them, modernize them, and the State Department
    will be actively engaged precisely on some of those Arab-Kurd
    fault line areas that were mentioned in the report.
        I would defer to Assistant Secretary Feltman, but keep in
    mind that two of the embassy branch offices are in Kirkuk and
    Mosul for precisely the kind of conflict resolution and
    engagement efforts that will continue to be important in the
    coming years.
        Chairman Berman. Just to add that while there are a number
    of things for the State Department that are new in terms of
    security operations, they are still not going to be involved in
    peacekeeping operations in those areas.
        Secretary Feltman, real quickly. Sadr. He seems to have
    been a critical part of Maliki's ability to apparently become
    the next prime minister or continue in that job. He started out
    after the election vigorously opposed to Maliki. What do you
    think convinced Sadr to throw his support to Maliki? To what
    extent will the Sadrists exert influence in the government that
    is being formed, and to what extent is the Sadrist faction a
    threat to U.S. interests in Iraq? A minute and 25 seconds.
        Ambassador Feltman. Mr. Chairman, I think the question is
    even related to what you asked my colleague and friend, Colin,
    just a second ago because I think what the Iraqis have done is
    they have built an inclusive government. The Iraqis themselves
    have said they want everybody inside because they want the
    differences among them to be fought out on political grounds,
    through political means, through the constitutional organs, not
    on the street.
        And so, yes, the Sadrists are part of this equation, but
    the Sadrists are only one part of the equation. Everybody is
    inside. I think the little theatrics, the melodrama we saw in
    the Parliament on November 11, showed, as Vice President Biden
    said and as Colin quoted, ``Politics has broken out in Iraq.''
        And so I think it is actually positive that everybody is
    inside. It may not be the most efficient way to do things,
    but----
        Chairman Berman. Let me just interject only because of the
    time. Taking your line, is Alawi, as a key part of the
    government, part of that sort of getting everybody inside and
    in the political process?
        Ambassador Feltman. Alawi himself played a critical role in
    bringing all of Iraqiya in. Alawi right now seems to be in a
    little bit of a huff off in London, but all of his Sunni
    leaders that are part of Iraqiya that are so important to
    Iraq's stability, to the regional integration, have agreed that
    they are part of the government.
        Chairman Berman. My time has expired. I recognize the
    gentlelady, the ranking member, for 5 minutes and ask
    Ambassador Watson if she would just take the chair for a moment
    while I have a quick meeting. I will be back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Feltman, Chairman Berman and I had asked about or had
    related to you our concerns about Camp Ashraf residents, their
    humanitarian problems, lack of protection. If you could
    elaborate on that? That is number one.
        Number two, I wanted to ask you about the reports that we
    have been hearing about hundreds of former Sunni sectarian
    fighters who had joined the Awakening or the Sons of Iraq,
    reconciled with the government, many of whom have gained
    extensive knowledge about the U.S. military, and they appear to
    have rejoined al-Qaeda.
        Reports indicate that many of these Awakening fighters are
    still on the Iraqi Government's payroll and are covertly aiding
    the insurgency. If you could verify that and what vetting
    mechanisms we have in place to prevent covert assistance to the
    insurgency by Awakening fighters?
        And then lastly, sirs, what is the administration's
    strategy to address concerns surrounding the development fund
    for Iraq and the outstanding United Nations Security Council
    resolution that Iraq is still technically subjected to? Do you
    believe that we can utilize this leverage with the Iraqi
    Government as a means to hedge against the growing Iranian
    influence in the government?
        So if I could ask you, any of you, those three questions?
    Thank you.
        Ambassador Feltman. Thank you, Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen.
    First of all, I think I speak for all of us that are working on
    this Iraq file. We agree with you and the chairman 100 percent
    that the Iraqi Government needs to live up to its commitments
    to protect the human rights of the residents of Camp Ashraf. We
    agree 100 percent.
        It is something that we are watching and monitoring
    extremely closely. It is not only us, there is international
    effort as well. The U.N. and others are also involved in
    encouraging the Iraqi Government to live up to its commitments.
    Basic food, basic medical supplies and basic fuel are getting
    in to the residents of Camp Ashraf.
        There are a lot of mutual provocations between the Iraqis
    and the residents that aren't particularly helpful. We have
    told everyone to lower the rhetoric because this could quickly
    lead to a miscalculation and get out of control. When there
    have been incidents reported to us, we have engaged with the
    committee of the Iraqi Government that is in charge of this
    portfolio.
        I think that our engagement has had some success and
    reminded the Iraqis of their obligations under international
    humanitarian law to provide for the human rights of the
    residents of Camp Ashraf. So we agree with you and we need to
    keep watching this. We are glad that we have international
    partners that are involved.
        In terms of the Sons of Iraq, in general I would say that
    this has been a success story. By the time of the Iraqi
    elections in March, about 43 percent of the roughly 95,000
    people who are part of the Sons of Iraq had been incorporated
    into security, or for the most part civilian positions inside
    the government. This was all put on hold during the elections
    and government formation, but the Iraqis have formed a Sons of
    Iraq Coordination Center in the Ministry of Defense to continue
    the programs. They are continuing the payments.
        In terms of allegations of individual members I will ask
    Dr. Kahl if he can comment, but in general this has been a
    success story. I think that the overall numbers tell us this.
    If you look at 2007, there were about 3,800 violent incidents a
    month in Iraq. Thirty-eight hundred. And now today there are
    some horrible incidents happening, but it is roughly 250 to 300
    a month. A big difference from 3,800 a couple of years ago.
        On DFI, Iraq, as you know, was subject to a number of
    Chapter 7 obligations under the Security Council, mostly
    stemming from the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Iraq has made some
    progress in moving to get out from under these Chapter 7
    obligations. We want to see Iraq get out from under these
    Chapter 7 obligations as they meet the benchmarks that are
    there. They have met the requirements, for example, to get out
    from under the WMD-related Chapter 7 obligations and they are
    working to complete the Oil for Food.
        But some of these are actually things I think that even the
    Iraqis would agree are helpful. Resolution 1483 had a Chapter 7
    obligation on all of us to return----
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you. I am sorry. My time
    is up.
        Ambassador Feltman. Oh, I am sorry.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. But thank you. Good answers. Thank you,
    Madam Ambassador.
        I would ask Mr. Fortenberry to take over for me. I have a
    few more appointments.
        Ms. Watson [presiding]. Yes. I was just going to go to Mr.
    Fortenberry for questions. In the meantime, I will recognize
    myself for the next 5 minutes while he is taking the ranking
    member's place.
        I address this to both of you. The Commission on Wartime
    Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan has been expressing concern
    that the transition has, at least in the past, proceeded too
    slowly and suffered from inadequate coordination between the
    State and DoD.
        What are some of the specific steps both Departments have
    been taking to improve the collaboration and clarify what needs
    to be done as military forces leave and the State inherits some
    of their responsibilities, along with what is being done in
    your various Departments to make certain that transition
    decisions can be made quickly and at high levels in order to
    avoid a bureaucratic backlog that may halt a successful
    transition?
        I will start with you, Mr. Feltman, or Mr. Kahl?
        Ambassador Feltman. Thank you. There are a number of
    reports that we have that help us, to guide us, that show us
    some of the challenges of working in these environments so I am
    glad you brought this up. We certainly have a lot of lessons
    learned.
        I think the coordination right now, echoing what Dr. Kahl
    said earlier, is excellent. I will use one example, what we
    call LOGCAP. LOGCAP is Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, it
    means life support. It is the DoD contracting mechanism that
    provides the life support for people working in Iraq. We in the
    State Department have never had anything quite this complicated
    to deal with, and DoD has generously said that they will
    continue the LOGCAP contracting for us on a reimbursable basis.
        It is the type of example of coordination that we are doing
    now where DoD knows how to do this life supporting contracting,
    they know how to monitor it; they know how to make sure that
    there is proper oversight built in. They know all it takes, we
    are learning. So they have agreed to renew the LOGCAP on a
    reimbursable basis to make sure we get it right. That is one
    example.
        Police training is another one, a very key one. We will
    have our police training program in place by July 1 next year,
    but not actually taking responsibility for the program until
    October 1 next year.
        Ms. Watson. Let me just ask. Is your police training
    separate from the training of their forces to be able to defend
    their own country? Is it a separate type of training?
        Ambassador Feltman. It is a separate type of training, but
    we have built in a 3-month overlap so that the transition is
    smooth.
        What DoD has done is they have done force generation, built
    up the Iraqi forces, built up the Iraqi security services.
    There were 58,000 police in 2003, there are now over 600,000
    people that work in the security field. That is force
    generation. There has been focus on basic training and
    counterterrorism operations.
        What the State Department will do is move to everything you
    need for a criminal justice and security system to work. You
    want honest cops on the----
        Ms. Watson. Yes. Do they have courts? Do they have people--
    --
        Ambassador Feltman. Yes. Our program will be integrated
    into a criminal justice program that includes Department of
    Justice, Department of Homeland Security, all----
        Ms. Watson. That is us. Do they have theirs up and running?
        Ambassador Feltman. Theirs are there, but there is a lot of
    work that needs to be done to have an integrated system of
    policemen on the streets, pretrial detention, court systems for
    criminal cases and then rehabilitation and jail sentence
    afterwards.
        So we are doing a whole government approach that goes from
    the honest cop on the street to the fair judge in the
    courtroom.
        Ms. Watson. You know, what is really frustrating me, and I
    asked this way, way back when the word came to our committee.
    It looks like we are in nation building, and it looks like we
    are going to have a long-term commitment if we still have
    establishment of a judiciary to do.
        You know, every time there is development of a new program
    in the process it is costing us a lot. Can we see an end in
    sight in terms of the judiciary? I mean, we are building a
    nation, and we are paying the cost of it. What confounds me is
    why is it taking the Iraqis so long to see their own people
    trained to fight crime and then to protect their own borders?
    What is wrong?
        Ambassador Feltman. I am sorry. I left out a key difference
    between the DoD force generation security program and what we
    are doing now. We are working much more on train the trainers
    so that they themselves are doing the work.
        Ms. Watson. That is what I wanted to hear. Train the
    trainers so we can get our people out of there in a reasonable
    amount of time.
        Ambassador Feltman. Yes, we are talking about a
    transitional program and not doing things that the Iraqis
    themselves need to be responsible for. We are talking about how
    to unleash the Iraqi capacity so they can do it themselves.
        Ms. Watson. Absolutely. We have been there what, 8 years
    now?
        Ambassador Feltman. Yes, about 7, 8 years.
        Ms. Watson. Yes. Slow learners I guess. You know, what did
    they do before? Did they depend on Saddam Hussein? Yes, sir?
    Mr. Kahl?
        Mr. Kahl. I would just say one of the challenges of course
    is it has been a little bit like building an airplane in
    flight.
        We have been generating a lot of these institutions,
    helping them build back institutions that were flattened or
    that were left to degrade under Saddam Hussein's dictatorship
    and then 20 years of war and sanctions and other things, as
    well as obviously the strife that inflicted the country in the
    aftermath of the 2003 invasion. So we are building institutions
    in an incredibly challenging environment.
        There are institutions for the rule of law. They continue
    to be a work in progress, but in fact one of the things, I
    think one just anecdote, one of the things that actually
    catalyzed the government formation coalition that we saw over
    the last couple weeks was a ruling by the Iraqi Constitutional
    Court that time was up and that the Iraqis had to go on with
    forming their government.
        The fact that the court made that ruling and that the Iraqi
    politicians complied I think is evidence of an evolving rule of
    law.
        Ms. Watson. Yes. My time is up now, but I will just say
    this last thing before I go to Mr. Fortenberry.
        I see a long-term commitment. I mean, we have had this
    conversation in this committee a couple of years ago. It is
    still going on. I am wondering. It appears to me that they
    would like us to leave their country, and maybe we ought to
    compromise and leave sooner. If we have been training the
    trainers in the last few years, they are slow learners if they
    don't have it now.
        And with that I will go on to Congressman Fortenberry.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. Gentlemen, I
    appreciate your willingness to come out today. I believe
    primarily my discussion will be with you, Mr. Secretary
    Feltman. A pleasure to see you again.
        As you know, I am from Nebraska. Now, when you think about
    Nebraska, you might think of corn, cattle, football, something
    like that, but it is also home to a diverse set of communities
    that are a diversity of communities of refugees, many of whom
    are Iraqis who have sought asylum and a peaceful environment
    out on the prairie.
        I want to also commend your deputy, Mr. Corbin, for coming
    out to Nebraska. We actually had a very productive town hall
    meeting, as I have shared privately with you before, with the
    Iraqi community and learned that there is a good continuity
    there, even in Nebraska, among people who perhaps in their
    former homeland didn't necessarily have the type of interaction
    that you would expect in America, so that was a pleasant
    surprise.
        With that said, I think the extent to which we can judge
    our efforts in Iraq as a success is also dependent upon a very
    important question. To the degree that we have to help protect
    ethnic and religious minorities and help them fully integrate
    into the economic and political life of the emerging new
    country, there is a quiet diaspora going on in Iraq, and that
    has become heightened of late with the bombing of the Catholic
    church. Many people perhaps don't realize that Iraq had as many
    as 2 million Christians at one time. The number may now be as
    low as 400,000.
        This problem that is going on not only in Iraq, but in
    other places in the Middle East, robs people of their ancient
    homeland. It is a grave injustice. It is becoming incumbent
    upon countries such as the United States to help absorb
    populations who have a right to remain in peace and security
    and again their ancient homeland.
        So again, the bombing of the church several weeks ago
    highlights the vulnerability here of that particular religious
    minority, but there are others. In my town of Lincoln we have a
    fairly well established Yezidi community as well, another
    ancient religion who has traditionally enjoyed some degree of
    insulation within the borders of Iraq. So it is my
    understanding that the Prime Minister visited the church that
    was bombed. I think that was an important signal. It is my
    understanding that they have committed to rebuild the church
    with Iraq's funds.
        What else can we do to work in tandem particularly with the
    international community, as well as strengthen the political
    culture, to demand, to cajole, to admonish that the religious
    minority populations are an essential part of Iraqi's important
    cultural history in the Middle East and provide a leavening
    presence in that country? Their loss would be devastating I
    think to the future of their country.
        Ambassador Feltman. Congressman, thank you. We share your
    horror over the church bombings and other attacks that these
    vulnerable minorities have suffered. It is atrocious,
    reprehensible.
        I would say that we in the government spend more time
    thinking and talking about the Iraqi minorities than we do the
    larger groups in Iraq, and that is because they are more
    vulnerable. They deserve to have more attention, more thought
    put toward how we might be of assistance.
        As you know from the anecdote that you described, our
    minorities coordinator, Michael Corbin, is doing a really good
    job of reaching out to the minority communities in the United
    States to hear from them, to get an idea from them of what
    their people back home most need, where we might most be of
    service.
        After that church bombing it was not only that the Prime
    Minister visited the church and vowed to use government funds
    to rebuild it--and we will hold him to that, by the way--you
    had condemnation from across the spectrum, including the Grand
    Ayatollah Sistani from Najah. I think all of the Iraqis were--
    --
        Mr. Fortenberry. Does this shock the sensibilities of all
    of Iraq?
        Ambassador Feltman. Yes. Words like shock were used in
    these condemnations, and I think they were sincere.
        Now, in terms of what is the United States doing, first of
    all, whenever there is an attack like this our forces, our
    military people, go to the Iraqis and say hey, how can we help?
    How can we follow up? How can we help you get to the bottom of
    this? We are not in the cities anymore, but we can help provide
    background. Our political leaders from Washington, as well as
    Ambassador Jeffrey, go to the political leadership and make
    similar pleas.
        When we designed our strategy for Iraq for the transition
    period ahead, we picked out those places for embassy branch
    offices partially because of the minorities being there, so
    that we would be able to engage with the minorities on the
    ground, the Christian communities in Ninawa Province, continue
    the assistance programs that we are providing that have both
    short-term emergency humanitarian aspects and long-term job
    creation aspects.
        We need to work in partnership with the Iraqis to have a
    viable future for these communities in Iraq. We agree. The fact
    that there is now an inclusive government coming together that
    is proud to represent all of Iraq's groups, I think we have a
    good partner for this.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Ms. Watson. I would like now to call on Mr. Costa from
    California for questions.
        Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Madam Chairperson.
    Secretary Kahl, you talked about the drawdown dates. What do
    you believe the military's presence in Iraq will look like 5
    years from now?
        Mr. Kahl. Congressman, that is a good question. We have an
    agreement with the Iraqis. It was negotiated by the Bush
    administration in November 2008. At the time it was referred to
    as the Status of Forces Agreement.
        Mr. Costa. Right.
        Mr. Kahl. We call it the Security Agreement. It calls for
    remaining forces to be out of Iraq by 2011. The President has
    been clear that we are going to comply with the terms of the
    Security Agreement.
        We will have a robust Office of Security Cooperation that
    lingers beyond that, which falls under the Chief of Mission
    authority. That will be----
        Mr. Costa. But at the end of the day, it really is going to
    depend upon the Iraqis' ability to stand on their own and what
    presence they want us to play?
        Mr. Kahl. Well, it is not completely condition dependent
    because we have an agreement. So the only conditions in which--
    --
        Mr. Costa. I am talking beyond the agreement.
        Mr. Kahl. I understand, sir. It would require the Iraqis to
    request----
        Mr. Costa. Right.
        Mr. Kahl [continuing]. An additional stay and for us to----
        Mr. Costa. Agree to it.
        Mr. Kahl [continuing]. Agree to that.
        Mr. Costa. Yes. In terms of the transition between you and
    the State Department, I think there is concern--there always
    has been--in terms of American personnel, Embassy people,
    USAID, to ensure security is there in the outlying provinces.
        Do you feel confident that that is going to be able to
    protect those American men and women and others who are
    assisting in getting the government's feet and its economy back
    on track?
        Mr. Kahl. I feel confident that the State Department is
    planning against the security conditions as they are now, and
    since we expect the security conditions to continue to improve
    I think that the State Department will be well positioned
    beyond 2011 to continue to operate and contribute to Iraq's
    progress beyond that point.
        If circumstances were to deteriorate substantially then we
    would have to re-evaluate, but we don't anticipate that
    circumstances are going to deteriorate substantially.
        Mr. Costa. Secretary Feltman, I am concerned about the
    overall ability of this government to try to institute these
    institutions of democracy and what still seems to me in that
    part of the world to be a situation in which corruption, if not
    a way of life, is endemic.
        I told that to Prime Minister Maliki when I first met him 4
    years ago, and I am not so sure how much progress we have made
    there. Could you give us an assessment, notwithstanding the
    institutions' performances so far, as to that level of
    corruption?
        Ambassador Feltman. Congressman Costa, corruption is a
    problem. You put your finger on it when you talked to Prime
    Minister Maliki. It is one of the many problems that Iraq has
    to deal with, but it is a significant one.
        There is an Iraqi Commission that has been established and
    we are supporting it; they have had some successes. In 2009,
    they prosecuted and convicted the Deputy Minister of
    Transportation. They have prosecuted collaborators of the
    Minister of Trade and these people are in prison. So there has
    been some success.
        We also have rule of law advisors who are working in the
    provinces with provincial leaders against this. We are
    supporting OIGs in various ministries, but it needs to be more
    institutionalized. This is a real challenge.
        We ourselves have a coordinator against anticorruption
    measures in the Embassy, so we have a part of the Embassy that
    is working full-time on the very issue you have recognized
    because the Iraqi people have to see that the government is
    accountable. Accountability is part of having a responsible
    democratic government.
        Mr. Costa. And how would you grade the ability of the
    government this far to demonstrate some level of credibility
    that it is just not a way of life as I described it to the
    Prime Minister and that they are making changes, that there is
    some people that are viewed or believed to be on the up and up?
        Ambassador Feltman. A couple thing. Maybe even partially in
    response to your meeting, Prime Minister Maliki did announce,
    and with our support, an anticorruption campaign that he
    himself has put his name and office behind so that there was a
    high level push. Again, we are supporting this in terms of
    institution and financing as well to give it some heft.
        These prosecutions that took place were high profile
    prosecutions so people can see that there is stuff taking
    place. A lot more needs to be done.
        Mr. Costa. Yes, obviously. I want to switch tracks quickly
    before my time runs out.
        On my last visit there we went out to Anbar Province and we
    started doing some exchanges. Not only do they have a
    tremendous amount of oil resources, but it used to be the bread
    basket of the Middle East. There is tremendous agricultural
    opportunities with the Tigris and Euphrates.
        What efforts have taken place to get the agricultural
    economy going again? We have done some exchanges with some of
    our universities, with Fresno State in California and Anbar
    University. Is there more of that going on?
        Ambassador Feltman. Well, a couple things. USDA in June
    took out a delegation with representatives from 17 U.S.
    agribusiness firms to try to find partnerships and
    opportunities with Iraqis. They met with over 200 Iraqi
    agribusiness representatives. So we are trying to promote some
    U.S. business exchanges in line with what you are doing on the
    academic side.
        Also, AID is stepping up work in the agricultural sector,
    because it is not only that that used to be a bread basket, it
    is a real potential for employment generation. Iraq needs jobs
    that are in the non oil sector, and this is a real potential.
        Mr. Costa. Thank you.
        Ms. Watson. Thank you. I now yield 5 minutes to the
    gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you both for
    being here.
        I want to zero in on first Camp Ashraf and the situation as
    it is today and what is taking place there. I personally am
    concerned about the residents of Camp Ashraf, the 4,000 people
    that are in there. I have received information from the
    residents about several things that are taking place. Here are
    some photographs taken by residents of Camp Ashraf, and I will
    have to let these get closer to you all.
        Their concern is about the 112 loudspeakers that are posted
    around the entire camp that are blaring in to Camp Ashraf at
    all times of the day and night apparently comments such as we
    are going to set Ashraf on fire; Ahmadinejad is a great
    President, all of you should follow him; you will soon see how
    the Iraqis are going to attack and destroy this camp; and we
    will hang every one of you.
        It seems to me to be some type of psychological torture,
    torment, whatever you want to call it, to the residents of Camp
    Ashraf. First of all, I am not sure who is doing this. Is it
    Iranians with the permission of the Iraqis? Is it Iraqis? Is it
    both? Do either one of you know about this? Secretary Feltman?
        Ambassador Feltman. The residents of Camp Ashraf and their
    family and family members here have certainly told us about
    this. We are aware of this, yes.
        Mr. Poe. And what is your opinion of it? Do you think that
    is the way we ought to be treating folks in Camp Ashraf?
        Ambassador Feltman. Congressman, Camp Ashraf is under Iraqi
    sovereignty. That is just a fact. We have to accept the fact
    that it is under Iraqi sovereignty.
        Mr. Poe. I understand that, but do you think these are
    Iranians or Iraqis that are blaring these loud speakers?
        Ambassador Feltman. I don't know who is blaring it in, but
    the commitment that we have from the Iraqis that they must live
    up to, that we will be working to make sure they live up to, is
    that they do not deport them to a country where they could be
    tortured for their political beliefs, where they could be
    arrested and detained for their political beliefs.
        That is a commitment that the Iraqis have given us. It is
    part of an international understanding that is with the Iraqis
    now.
        Mr. Poe. Excuse me. I am just limited on time. Do you think
    that that is a commitment that they are going to live up to or
    we just hope they are going to live up to?
        Ambassador Feltman. We are watching this all the time. The
    Camp Ashraf residents are not popular in Iraq. They were part
    of the whole----
        Mr. Poe. I know where they came from. I know they are
    Iranians.
        Ambassador Feltman. So this is a political issue in Iraq,
    and both sides around that camp in our view have engaged in
    needless and dangerous provocations basically.
        Mr. Poe. Well, do you think that setting up 112
    loudspeakers that are going off all day and night saying all
    kinds of propaganda things against the Camp Ashraf residents is
    something that should be a concern to the United States, or we
    should just forget this because now it is not our problem?
        Ambassador Feltman. No. I think all of these basically
    dangerous versions of name calling, provocations, et cetera,
    should all be stopped because you don't know when things are
    going to get out of control. You don't know when someone is
    going to cross a line that leads to violence.
        Mr. Poe. I agree.
        Ambassador Feltman. It has happened before.
        Mr. Poe. So what are we doing about this, these
    loudspeakers?
        Ambassador Feltman. We are in constant touch with the
    Iraqis on this. The U.N. is in constant touch with the Iraqis
    on this. There have been some incidents that have taken place
    lately that we have played a facilitating role in calming
    things down.
        Mr. Poe. Are we trying to get these loudspeakers down, or
    are we just talking about it?
        Ambassador Feltman. We are telling people you need to lower
    the temperature on both sides.
        Mr. Poe. So if they don't, what do we do? I am just
    concerned about when we are finally gone what happens to these
    residents in Camp Ashraf?
        Ambassador Feltman. We support an international solution
    for this whole problem. We need to have an international
    resolution for the whole problem of the residents of Camp
    Ashraf. You can't predict when there might be one of these
    provocations that crosses the line and leads to violence.
        Mr. Poe. Exactly. Are you concerned as a representative of
    the United States about the Iranian influence in not only Camp
    Ashraf, but Iraq as well?
        Ambassador Feltman. Yes, of course. We are concerned about
    Iranian influence across the region. I am the Assistant
    Secretary for NEA. We see Iran's bad behavior in a lot of
    different places, but what we see happening----
        Mr. Poe. Has it stabilized? Is it getting worse? Is it
    about the same? Is it getting better? I mean, kind of give me a
    thermometer of what your opinion is of the Iranian influence in
    Iraq.
        Ambassador Feltman. It is there, but I think that the
    Iraqis have shown time and time again that they are making
    decisions based on Iraqi considerations.
        You know, whether that is talking about government
    formation, how to conduct elections, how to do their alliances,
    whether to go against the Iranian backed Shia militias, time
    and time again the Iraqis have acted like Iraqis.
        Mr. Poe. One more question if I may. The Christians that
    have been murdered in Iraq. Our position as a nation. Who is
    responsible for that? Al-Qaeda claims responsibility. Do you
    agree that al-Qaeda is responsible for that or somebody else?
        Ambassador Feltman. Yes, and specifically a group called
    the Islamic State of Iraq, which is an al-Qaeda affiliate, has
    taken credit. We think it is credible.
        I think it shows how awful these people are that they are
    doing this sort of thing, but it also shows their desperation,
    that they are having to go after these vulnerable minorities
    because they have failed to reignite the Sunni-Shia clashes
    that I think they had hoped to ignite.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Ms. Watson. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from
    Texas, Sheila Jackson Lee.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chair, it is a pleasure to have the
    opportunity to be yielded by such a distinguished diplomat as
    yourself. Let me thank Congresswoman Watson for her own service
    in the cause of diplomacy and peace and human rights. I thank
    Chairman Berman for yielding the chair to the congresswoman and
    thank the chairman for this hearing.
        If I have had a moment of pleasure on this committee, it is
    because of the very fine staff and diplomats of the United
    States Department of State, so I want to take this opportunity
    to personally thank you and the Secretary of State and the
    numbers of individuals that I have engaged with in a number of
    opportunities to represent the United States in faraway places.
        We, I believe, have the moral compass of right. This is not
    a hearing about Haiti, but am I outraged about the failing
    government in Haiti, the suffering people with cholera? I am.
    Am I concerned about the Sudanese and the elections coming up?
    I am. And the hot spot that Pakistan has become, Burma and
    others? Yes, I am.
        And I raise those particular countries because at one point
    or another we have stuck our nose in there, rightly so. I hope
    we will be sticking our nose back in Haiti because I believe
    that we are in a complete collapse there, but this is not a
    hearing on Haiti.
        But we have taken up the cause of human rights, and I want
    Mr. Feltman and your esteemed colleague here to comment on Iraq
    from this perspective. Let me give my bias. We went into Iraq
    looking for weapons of mass destruction, and all we did is
    destroy and make worse to a certain extent. I am not a fan of
    the present government. I am not a fan of Maliki, a Shiite, and
    al-Alawi, who is a Sunni, whose name I may not have pronounced
    correctly, but I know him when I see him.
        It is a constant, continuous contact sport of who can have
    the upper hand, who can fill their pockets even more. So we
    have less troops there, but I don't think the United States can
    abandon its responsibility concerning human rights.
        So let me pointedly ask a question about the people in Camp
    Ashraf. Not only do they have loud noises and torture and
    afraid for their life and the people in this country, Iranian-
    Americans whose families were left behind or whose families
    went to be able to save the lives of other family members
    living in utter fear.
        Can you tell me what humanitarian act is it to let sick and
    dying people die because they have no access to medical care?
    Elham, Mehdi, both suffering massively from cancer, being
    denied the opportunity, one with thyroid cancer, one with acute
    kidney cancer in a critical state, already lost one of their
    kidneys, and they need to undergo an operation and they can't
    seem to get into a hospital.
        Where is our stance on human rights? We are continuing to
    plow investment into Iraq. Let me be very clear. I hope we have
    a pathway of economic opportunity. I hope there is a pathway
    for businesses in the United States. After all, look at the
    enormous measure of blood that we shed in that place. And what
    do we have to show for it?
        I believe if we do not leave behind a civilized society
    that in their own way--they don't have to follow the American
    way. They don't have to have the Harris County Public Health
    System. But in their own way cannot treat people in a
    humanitarian way. If they cannot form a government in less than
    100 years, which it appears to be, that still is not stable and
    still we have not agreed to then we have failed.
        If we keep continuing to say they are a sovereign nation,
    sovereign about what? They are not a sovereign nation. They are
    a collapsed government. There is nothing positive going on
    there other than the massive new embassy that we have and the
    hard working State Department employees that ground out their
    lives there every single day. Thank them for their service.
        Mr. Feltman, I can't let you leave this room without
    telling me what are you going to do in our State Department
    about the conditions in Camp Ashraf? I come here every time
    there is a hearing and say the same thing. What we understand
    is the Iraqi soldiers are the ones that are intimidating these
    people. Now, if you can prove that they are spies then it is
    something else.
        May I yield 1 additional minute? Let me yield for him to
    answer the question, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Berman [presiding]. Yes. Unanimous consent to 1
    additional minute to answer.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. If they are spies, Mr. Feltman,
    let us know that because that is a sovereign issue, but I want
    the State Department to act. Thank you.
        Ambassador Feltman. We will have to look into the
    individual cases you raise. I as Jeff Feltman am not familiar
    with the individual cases you raise. I will tell you that every
    time I have gone to Iraq, and I was going to Iraq on a fairly
    regular basis--a week a month--for a long time I go to see the
    Minister of Human Rights. I go to see the Minister of Human
    Rights because I care about the same values that you have
    described and because it is part of our policy to be promoting
    universal standards and adherence to human rights, and so it is
    an important part of our dialogue to keep in touch with the
    Minister of Human Rights.
        Yes, we talk about Camp Ashraf with the Minister of Human
    Rights. We talk about the prisons. Iraq has a long way to go.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. What are we going to do? We need to go to
    Camp Ashraf. We can't listen to the human rights director. He
    is not telling the truth. What can we do, the U.S.?
        Ambassador Feltman. I think that she, the Human Rights
    Minister, who is a woman, has actually been very effective in
    working with us on some of the issues dealing with Camp Ashraf,
    and I think she has also been a very good advocate for the very
    values that you are describing. She is working in extremely
    difficult circumstances.
        Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. I need a report in writing because
    my time is up. A report in writing not on these cases, but the
    conditions in Camp Ashraf and what the United States and she,
    the director, the Secretary of Human Rights, is actually doing
    regarding the ceasing of torture of these people in Camp
    Ashraf. She is doing nothing.
        And I yield back. Thank you.
        Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
        I thank both of you. I apologize for the delayed start, the
    45 minute intermission. I appreciate very much your being here,
    and with that this committee hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
        Ambassador Feltman. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

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                                   Minutes

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