    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                                          ?

            DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2011

    _______________________________________________________________________

                                    HEARINGS

                                    BEFORE A

                               SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

                           COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                             HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
                                  FIRST SESSION
                                    ________
                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                    DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina, Chairman
    CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas                   HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
    C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland  JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
    ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia         JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas
    NITA M. LOWEY, New York                 MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois
    LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California       KEN CALVERT, California
    SAM FARR, California
    STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
    MARION BERRY, Arkansas

     NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full
    Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
    Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
                    Stephanie Gupta, Jeff Ashford, Jim Holm,
                  Karyn Kendall, Will Painter, and Mike Birsic,
                                Staff Assistants
                                    ________

                                     PART 3

                         DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
                                                                       Page
     CBP--Balancing Security With Legitimate Trade and Travel.........    1
     FY 2011 Budget Hearing for United States Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement.......................................................  223
     CIS--FY 2011 Budget Hearing......................................  691
     Update on Southwest Border: The Challenges That DHS Continues to
    Face..............................................................  837
     DHS Air and Marine Operations and Investments: Customs and Border
    Protection and Coast Guard........................................  967
                                    ________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

        PART 3--DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2011

                                                                          ?

            DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2011

    _______________________________________________________________________

                                    HEARINGS

                                    BEFORE A

                               SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

                           COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                             HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
                                  FIRST SESSION
                                    ________
                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                    DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina, Chairman
    CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas                   HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
    C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland  JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
    ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia         JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas
    NITA M. LOWEY, New York                 MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois
    LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California       KEN CALVERT, California
    SAM FARR, California
    STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
    MARION BERRY, Arkansas

     NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full
    Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
    Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
                    Stephanie Gupta, Jeff Ashford, Jim Holm,
                  Karyn Kendall, Will Painter, and Mike Birsic,
                                Staff Assistants
                                    ________

                                     PART 3

                         DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
                                                                       Page
     CBP--Balancing Security With Legitimate Trade and Travel.........    1
     FY 2011 Budget Hearing for United States Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement.......................................................  223
     CIS--FY 2011 Budget Hearing......................................  691
     Update on Southwest Border: The Challenges That DHS Continues to
    Face..............................................................  837
     DHS Air and Marine Operations and Investments: Customs and Border
    Protection and Coast Guard........................................  967

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
                                    ________

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
     61-840                     WASHINGTON : 2010

                                      COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                       DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman

     NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington               JERRY LEWIS, California
     ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia           C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida
     MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio                        HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky
     PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana               FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia
     NITA M. LOWEY, New York                   JACK KINGSTON, Georgia
     JOSE E. SERRANO, New York                 RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN,
     ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut               New Jersey
     JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia                  TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
     JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts              ZACH WAMP, Tennessee
     ED PASTOR, Arizona                        TOM LATHAM, Iowa
     DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina            ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
     CHET EDWARDS, Texas                       JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri
     PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island          KAY GRANGER, Texas
     MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York              MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho
     LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California         JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas
     SAM FARR, California                      MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois
     JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois           ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida
     CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan           DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana
     ALLEN BOYD, Florida                       JOHN R. CARTER, Texas
     CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania                RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana
     STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey             KEN CALVERT, California
     SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia           JO BONNER, Alabama
     MARION BERRY, Arkansas                    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
     BARBARA LEE, California                   TOM COLE, Oklahoma
     ADAM SCHIFF, California
     MICHAEL HONDA, California
     BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
     STEVE ISRAEL, New York
     TIM RYAN, Ohio
     C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
     BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
     DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
     CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas
     LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee
     JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado
     PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania

                     Beverly Pheto, Clerk and Staff Director

                                      (ii)

            DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2011

                                  ----------

                                             Wednesday, March 24, 2010.

            CBP--BALANCING SECURITY WITH LEGITIMATE TRADE AND TRAVEL

                                    WITNESS

    DAVID AGUILAR, ACTING DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
        PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

                   Opening Statement of Chairman David Price

        Mr. Price. The Subcommittee will come to order. Good
    morning.
        We are happy today to welcome David Aguilar, the Acting
    Deputy Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, as
    we focus on how CBP polices our borders while at the same time
    expediting legitimate travel and commerce. We also would like
    an update on SBInet in light of the Secretary's plan to
    reallocate Recovery Act funding, but I will say we will have a
    chance to get into that in more detail during our Southwest
    border hearing scheduled for April 14th.
        Trade and travel are essential to our economy and to the
    economy's recovery. There is broad, bipartisan agreement on the
    need to insulate trade and travel from disruption, either from
    attack or ineffective and costly security measures. That is not
    to say that everyone agrees on exactly how to do this. It is
    simple to endorse a strategy that is risk-based and that
    emphasizes defense in depth but then to gloss over the devilish
    details, which can be hard to measure and implement, especially
    when one must rely on the cooperation of the private sector and
    often work with foreign governments.
        Secretary Napolitano testified that CBP will not be able to
    implement the 9/11 Act mandate to scan 100 percent of U.S.-
    bound cargo by 2012, which has been characterized as
    unrealistic and unaffordable. She says that the Department will
    rely instead on other ``risk-reduction'' measures for screening
    cargo originating in foreign ports and headed for the U.S. Now,
    I am sympathetic to taking a realistic approach to scanning
    cargo overseas. I have said that repeatedly. But we do need the
    Department's strategy and we have not yet received the
    Department's strategy to achieve meaningful and effective cargo
    and supply chain security as required by the fiscal 2010
    Appropriations Act.
        The 2010 budget proposal dramatically cuts the Secure
    Freight and Container Security Initiatives, it replaces CBP's
    overseas presence with a virtual one in many cases, and it
    reduces the C-TPAT trusted shipper program by 15 percent.
        Commissioner, we visited seaports. We know that
    implementing cargo security is complicated. But the Department
    simply must spell out its vision with a plan to achieve it if
    we are to understand how these cuts affect U.S. security and
    trade objectives.
        Another critical element to trade and security is CBP
    personnel, whether at or between ports of entry. As we all
    know, this Subcommittee has led efforts to support the
    recruitment and retention of CBP's critical workforce, most
    recently by authorizing and funding law enforcement officer
    retirement benefits for CBP officers. And I want to commend the
    Department for funding its journeyman pay initiative in the
    fiscal 2011 budget, although I am disappointed to learn that
    budget pressures have forced CBP to postpone implementing that
    initiative this year and that postponement has reportedly
    damaged morale considerably.
        Beyond the journeyman pay issue are fundamental staffing
    budget challenges for CBP. I am concerned we may lack the CBP
    Officers and agriculture specialists we need. While we doubled
    the number of Border Patrol agents since 2002, the number of
    CBP Officers has not grown accordingly and is projected to
    decrease by about 500 positions this year, despite increased
    appropriations. Yet ports of entry are where most narcotics and
    other contraband enter. Seizures are rising there where most
    travelers, legitimate or otherwise, cross; and we continue to
    hear of long wait times at land ports of entry.
        Your request includes $70 million to address what you call
    ``systemic salary shortfalls'' and $45 million for 389 CBP
    officers to ``maintain staffing for critical positions''. These
    have the appearance of stopgap actions. The problem is, user
    fee collections, which fund over a third of CBP officers, are
    falling.
        Clearly, CBP has big structural budgetary dilemmas. Minor
    economies like cutting foreign language incentive pay or
    management efficiencies are not real solutions. They may, in
    some instances, be counterproductive. So we need to focus on
    CBP's strategy to fix these problems in a more sustained way.
        In addition to personnel, technology has been a cornerstone
    of CBP efforts to detect radioactive and nuclear material,
    drugs, weapons, and other dangerous contraband, with over $1
    billion appropriated over the past 5 years. Yet there remain
    significant challenges. For example, the next generation of
    radiation portal monitors has yet to be certified, and cargo
    scanning at seaports remains consistent, particularly those
    served only by rail. We would like to hear about CBP plans to
    do more operational testing of possible technologies.
        We also want to hear CBP's overall strategy for modernizing
    nonintrusive inspection systems to streamline the inspection
    process. Targeting, screening, and inspecting international
    travelers is, of course, a CBP mission, with tools such as the
    Electronic System for Travel Authorization, the Western
    Hemisphere Travel Initiative, and the traditional screening of
    inbound and now outbound travelers. In light of the December
    25th incident of last year, how is CBP improving its capacity
    to target, screen, and process travelers, to document arrivals
    and departures, and to enhance security while expediting low-
    risk travelers?
        So, Commissioner, this is a full plate. We look forward to
    a lively dialogue on these issues.
        We, as is our custom, will put your full written statement
    into the record and ask you to limit your oral remarks to a 5-
    minute presentation so we can get on with an exchange with you.
        Before we recognize you, I want to turn to our
    distinguished ranking member, Hal Rogers, for his comments.
        [The information follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

               Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers

        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Welcome back, Chief Aguilar.
        With all due respect to you, Chief, I find it very
    disappointing that we are here today, nearly 14 months after
    the administration was sworn in, and an agency as vital as CBP
    is still without confirmed leadership. CBP is the critical
    filter in our homeland security arsenal, allowing legitimate
    travel and trade in and doing all it can to keep terrorists,
    criminals, and contraband out. So, given the fact that our
    witness is a career Border Patrol agent with more than 31 years
    of service, I find it regrettable that he is being asked to
    defend the administration's curious and potentially harmful
    decision to substantially cut border and cargo security.
        But considering last week's seemingly haphazard
    announcement on SBInet, I think we need to at least clarify a
    few questions that are long overdue for answers, like when are
    we going to secure the border, how are we going to do it, and
    how much is it going to cost? This Subcommittee has been asking
    these questions since its inception. And since the launch of
    the Secure Border Initiative in November of 2005, I have been
    asking what is to stop S-B-I from being just another three-
    letter acronym for failure?
        So, as troubled as I am about the funding and direction of
    SBInet, I am far more concerned about achieving and sustaining
    meaningful control of our borders. In the midst of an
    escalating and murderous drug war, now is certainly not the
    time to retreat from our strategic goals and blink in the face
    of the cartels' senseless violence there.
        So, today, I want to learn how CBP is getting its mission
    right. I want to learn where the administration is headed with
    cargo security while proposing what amounts to a 37.7 percent
    cut in the Container Security Initiative and an 18.4 percent
    cut in C-TPAT for fiscal 2011. I want to understand why, in the
    wake of the Christmas Day terrorist attack, the fiscal year
    2011 budget proposes no enhancements to CBP's overseas presence
    to screen U.S.-bound foreign travelers. And, perhaps most
    importantly, I want to get straightforward answers on our
    border security efforts, especially when the fiscal 2011 budget
    is proposing to slash funding for the fencing, infrastructure,
    and technology appropriation by $225 million, 28 percent below
    the current year.
        Chief, I know you understand the need for robust security
    along our border and our ports. We have watched your career
    over many years now. I also know that you are being put in an
    unfortunate situation in having to carry the administration's
    water on what appears to be significantly detrimental
    reductions to many of our most vital security programs,
    programs we have spent years building up. So I appreciate you
    being with us today. Thank you in advance for your candor in
    helping us understand CBP's budget request for fiscal 2011.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Commissioner, please proceed.
        [The information follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                        Statement of Chief David Aguilar

        Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, and good morning. Chairman Price,
    Ranking Member Rogers and members of the Subcommittee, good
    morning. It is an honor to be today to discuss the work of
    Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
        Let me begin by expressing my gratitude to the Committee
    for the strong, continued support that you have provided since
    the creation of Homeland Security.
        CBP relies on a balanced mix of professional enforcement
    personnel, advanced technologies and modernized facilities and
    infrastructure both at and between the ports of entry. Over the
    years, this Committee has made significant investments in all
    of these areas, and every investment you have made has helped
    to protect this country against historical and evolving threats
    and vulnerabilities.
        CBP, as you know, is the largest uniformed federal law
    enforcement agency in the country. Our purview spans more than
    5,000 miles of border with Canada and more than 1,900 miles of
    border with Mexico. We now have more than 20,000 Border Patrol
    agents operating between the ports of entry and more than
    20,000 CBP officers at the ports of entry. These forces are
    supplemented with more than 1,100 air and marine agents and
    more than 2,300 agricultural specialists and other
    professionals.
        In Fiscal Year 2009 alone, CBP processed more than 360
    million pedestrians and passengers and 109 million conveyances,
    apprehended more than 556,000 illegal aliens crossing between
    the ports of entry, encountered more than 224,000 inadmissible
    aliens at the ports of entry and seized more than 5.2 million
    pounds of narcotics. Every day, CBP processes more than 1
    million travelers seeking to enter the United States by land,
    air or sea.
        While considering the successes in our day-to-day
    activities, we must continually strive to improve our
    capabilities, capacities and abilities to keep terrorists from
    doing harm to our Nation and its commercial supply chains,
    basically, to our way of life.
        Through our efforts and this Committee's support, I believe
    our Nation is safer and more prepared today than ever before to
    face the threats and challenges that impact our Nation's
    borders. However, the attempted attack on Northwest Flight 253
    on December 25th was a very powerful reminder that terrorists
    will go to great lengths to defeat the security measures that
    have been put in place since September 11, 2001.
        As Secretary Napolitano has testified in recent hearings
    regarding the attempted attack, this Administration is
    determined to thwart terrorist plots and disrupt, dismantle and
    defeat terrorist networks. This is an effort that involves not
    just CBP but, very importantly, components across the
    Department of Homeland Security, as well as other federal,
    state, local, tribal and private sector and international
    partners--the entire Homeland Security enterprise.
        Working with our partners, our strategy is to secure the
    Nation's border by employing and enhancing our layers of
    defense throughout the continuum that impacts our borders,
    starting at the point of origination, transit, arrival, entry,
    egress into the country and final destination within the
    country. This strategy relies upon increased intelligence and
    risk management strategies regarding both the movement and flow
    of travelers, trade and means of transportation.
        Our organization, our agents and officers recognize we can
    never become complacent. We must continually reevaluate and
    improve the effectiveness of every layer of our strategy to
    adapt to an ever-changing threat environment.
        CBP remains committed to being progressively proactive, not
    just reactive. When it comes to the security of our borders and
    the safeguarding of our way of life, this is absolutely
    critical.
        Over the past few years, we have seen an escalation of
    drug-trafficking-related violence in Mexico. We are responding
    to the challenges and threats this poses to our Nation. As part
    of the Southwest Border Initiative announced by Secretary
    Napolitano in March 2009, CBP launched new initiatives and
    strengthened existing strategies to address this concern.
        We are continuing to enhance and build on our robust
    partnerships with our Western Hemisphere neighbors, Mexico and
    Canada. We have built successful programs to facilitate
    legitimate trade and travel, and we will continue to build upon
    those efforts.
        For instance, we successfully implemented the Western
    Hemisphere Travel Initiative on June 1st for land and sea
    travel. The Global Entry Trusted Traveler Pilot Program, which
    began at three airports in 2008, now operates in 20 airports,
    with more than 40,000 members enrolled. And, finally, we will
    utilize advanced targeting, screening and intelligence
    capabilities to quickly identify persons or cargo that warrant
    additional scrutiny without unduly impeding the traveling
    public or commerce.
        This budget recognizes that our people remain our greatest
    asset. It funds the journeyman-level increase for its front-
    line CBP officers, Border Patrol agents and agricultural
    specialists from the GS-11 to the GS-12 level. The jobs of our
    front-line personnel have become more complex since 9/11, and
    this upgrade reflects the increase in those responsibilities.
        Over the past 5 years, CBP has experienced substantial
    growth in its resources and capabilities and was supported by a
    near doubling of our annual budget during that time span.
    However, our Nation is still experiencing the effects of a deep
    and lasting recession, which has had some direct impact on our
    budget. As a result of this tough economic reality, our agency
    has seen a decrease of approximately 8 percent in user fees.
    However, this does not translate to a corresponding decrease in
    inspection requirements or workload in the enforcement area.
        Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to be here this
    morning and for your continued support of CBP. We are
    continuing to make real strides in the balance between
    effective and secure border management and streamlined and
    efficient trade policy. Thank you, and I look forward to any
    questions that you might have of me, sir.
        [The information follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                        SCANNING U.S. BOUND CARGO WAIVER

        Mr. Price. Thank you. We appreciate your testimony, and we
    will proceed to those questions.
        I want to focus on the scanning issue, the scanning of
    cargo headed for U.S. shores in overseas ports, both the Secure
    Freight Initiative and the Container Security Initiative, and
    whatever other approaches or plans that the administration will
    be developing.
        The Secretary has said she will likely waive the 9/11 Act
    requirements to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo by 2012,
    although we understand that DHS will consider the impact of any
    significant changes such as improved scanning technology before
    finalizing that waiver and sending it to Congress. For a long
    time now I, and I think this subcommittee, have expressed some
    understanding of the difficulties involved in that
    authorization requirement and have urged on the Department
    candor, straightforwardness in working with us to figure out
    what is realistic but also for the long run what is desirable,
    what is the optimal solution here.
        Let me first, though, focus on the waiver at hand--or the
    likely waiver at hand. To what extent is this decision one
    caused by inadequate technology, and how much of it is due to
    other aspects, perhaps aspects not as easily fixed--although
    technology is difficult enough--burdens of diplomacy, of
    logistics, of cost, of administration? How would you assess the
    likely waiver and the reasons behind it? And, of course, this
    isn't the first time we have dealt with this.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir. And thank you for that question
    because it gives us an opportunity, in the interest of candor,
    to basically describe the situation that we are facing.
        It is a very complex situation that we are facing. You
    touched on some of the most important points. Technology,
    obviously, is going to be critical in order to accomplish that
    100 percent scanning at any given location. But, in addition to
    that, Mr. Chairman, we also have the situation of logistics--
    the host country being able to host us, wanting to host us,
    having the desire to host us at that host country.
        In addition to that, we have the layout, the schematic, if
    you will, of the existing ports of entry. A new term that I
    learned, for example, is a gateway port, where it is much
    easier to deploy technology because, basically, the
    containerized cargo goes through one gateway into the port.
    There are other layouts that basically are transitional ports,
    where there are a multitude of avenues into the ports and a
    multitude of requirements in order to get us to that kind of a
    situation.
        In addition to that, there are the financial costs and
    burdens that they play, not necessarily on the country but on
    the trade, the industry and so forth.
        So it is a combination of all of those things that make the
    waiver a very real situation. Needless to say, though, we are
    not going to continue in the outyears to look at the potential
    and that possibility.

                         CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE

        Mr. Price. Well, let me go a little further with this.
        The 2010 appropriations bill directed CBP to report on its
    strategy to, quote, achieve meaningful and effective cargo and
    supply chain security. Now, we don't have that report. We can
    infer probably some elements of your strategy, though, from the
    budget; and that is what I want to ask you to help us do here
    this morning.
        One striking aspect at the outset is a cut of $16.5 million
    from the Secure Freight Initiative. Now, the Secure Freight
    Initiative is the pilot project which attempts to establish
    comprehensive scanning, 100 percent scanning, of cargo at a
    foreign port before that cargo heads to our shores. Now, the
    plan, as I understand it, is to sustain the SFI project through
    remote operations only at the ports of Qasim in Pakistan and
    Salalah in Oman. Other sites, including the port of Hong Kong,
    would remain part of the Security Initiative, which we will
    come to in a moment. That Container Security Initiative does
    use CBP officers at foreign ports in partnership with host
    nation authorities, and it seeks to identify high-risk cargo to
    be screened and cleared before loaded onto U.S.-bound ships.
        Now, your budget says you will establish an SFI port in
    Karachi, but you request no new funding for that. So let me ask
    you, as a practical matter, are we really looking at the end of
    the Secure Freight Initiative? Is the 100 percent global
    scanning requirement feasible in any reasonable timeframe? And,
    if not, what will scanning and screening look like at foreign
    ports?
        As I said, we will later talk about the CSI as one possible
    model. There are no doubt others under consideration. Are we
    talking about really questioning or maybe eliminating the
    chance for widespread overseas scanning? There is certainly not
    going to be any momentum or incentive for foreign government or
    private sector implementation without U.S. leadership.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir. Fair questions, Mr. Chairman.
        First of all, we are undertaking a full assessment of just
    how we bring security to the supply chain, including a
    combination of scanning, screening by way of physical and
    virtual presence and bringing all of those together.
        Let me begin with the Container Security Initiative (CSI)
    portion of this. Our intent is to continue taking a look at
    very strategic locations where the physical presence will
    benefit our interest in continuing to secure the supply chain.
    That will continue.
        You mentioned----
        Mr. Price. Excuse me. Could you just for the record
    indicate how many CSI ports are there at this moment?
        Mr. Aguilar. We are operating in 32 countries, 58 ports,
    through which more than 80 percent of cargo that either
    originates at, or transits through, comes into the United
    States.
        Mr. Price. All right. So the CSI approach is actually quite
    widespread?
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Price. Please proceed.
        Mr. Aguilar. In addition to that, we talk about securing
    the supply chain. It is through a transformation of both
    physical scanning and screening.
        One of the things that I think we should be very proud of
    is the fact that, through a combination of CSI, the Secured
    Flight Initiative (SFI) and the virtual capabilities that we
    have through our national targeting center that resides
    domestically, we literally screen and target by way of risk
    management more than 98 percent of all containerized cargo
    leaving foreign parts coming toward the United States.
        Now, again, the way that we take a look at the supply chain
    is in the following fashion: What can we do at the point of
    origin, point of transit, point of arrival, point of entry and
    even continuing beyond that?
        So, at the point of origin, we have the CSI, SFI, virtual
    capabilities. We have the 10+2 rule that has now engaged and,
    thus, gives us an even higher degree of scanning and targeting,
    locating exactly where the cargo has been stuffed into the
    actual ships, things of this nature. Upon transit, we continue
    doing that risk-based analysis. Upon arrival at the ports of
    entry in the United States, we now are, in fact, scanning
    approximately 96 to 98 percent of all containers before they
    leave those ports of entry.
        Mr. Price. Whether or not they have received attention
    overseas?
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir. And we certainly take that into
    consideration.
        Now--and, again, you did mention that we are going to be
    keeping Salalah and a couple of the other ports open. And
    again, very importantly, it is going to be the strategical
    approach that we take into the future at applying our either
    virtual or physical presence under CSI.
        And, of course, very importantly, sir, something I didn't
    mention, but I think it is critical to mention, is our Customs
    and Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program, which
    is our voluntary industry program that has had a tremendous
    amount of support from the industry. We right now have more
    than 9,700 member companies of that program, which basically at
    the point of origin and throughout the transit chain also
    ensures that the companies are doing everything that they can
    to ensure the security of trade, industry and containers moving
    toward the United States.
        Mr. Price. All right. This is helpful, but it does, you
    probably would agree, raise about as many questions as it
    answers in terms of the Department's long-term plans. I am
    going to go on to the next round to raise questions about the
    future of CSI in this budget. Because, as you know, the budget
    raises questions about whether that is the preferred approach
    going forward.
        But let me at this point turn to Mr. Culberson.
        Mr. Culberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chief Aguilar, we really appreciate the service that you
    and your officers put your lives on the line for us every day
    and genuinely appreciate your dedication and admire you guys
    immensely. I have had the privilege of working with you and
    your sector chiefs and visiting many, many parts of the border.
    You and your officers exhibit extraordinary bravery and we are
    really proud of you guys.
        Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, sir.

                            SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE

        Mr. Culberson. I want to ask, if I could, Chief, in this
    first round about the Secure Border Initiative, which, as you
    know, was kicked off about 5 years ago with an estimated cost
    of about $8 billion to $10 billion; and we have as a Nation so
    far I believe spent over $1 billion in the program. The SBInet
    program is a combination of technology, of course, using part
    pedestrian and fencing and vehicular fencing and technology. It
    was supposed to be like a virtual fence in more remote areas.
        Last week, Secretary Napolitano announced that the
    Department of Homeland Security would redeploy $50 million of
    money that had been provided to the Department under the
    stimulus bill and that it would be used for SBInet, as she
    said, for the purchase of, quote, commercially available
    security technology along the Southwest border. Now, she also
    announced that DHS would be freezing all SBInet funding beyond
    the block one initial deployment to the Tucson and Ajo sectors
    until the assessment she ordered in January was completed.
        Now, the stimulus plan required a detailed expenditure plan
    for all funds that were provided. So far, the plan has not been
    provided to the Congress to demonstrate exactly what
    commercially available security technology she was referring to
    and that has been purchased, and we don't have a timeline or
    scope of SBI.
        So far, about $6 billion--$6,000 million--has been
    appropriated for fencing, infrastructure, and technology,
    Chief. And, as I say, there has been $1 billion invested so far
    specifically in the virtual fence, about $1 billion in CBP's
    air and marine resources. Looking at the numbers, I see the
    Border Patrol has estimated that in October of 2005 you had 241
    miles of our 2,000 mile long border, southern border, under
    effective control. And the most recent numbers that I have been
    able to get access to show that about 697 miles are under
    effective control as of March of 2009. That is about 35 percent
    of the southern border.
        I wanted to ask, Chief, if you could, to talk to us about
    when, in your opinion, we will have the southern border under
    effective control and how we will do it and how much it is
    going to cost.
        Mr. Aguilar. Tough questions. Sir, I will begin there.
    Tough questions, because I am not sure that anybody could give
    you an answer to that, but I will attempt to take you through
    where we are going.
        First, let me begin with the SBInet situation that we are
    facing. There is nobody that is more frustrated with the
    situation that we have faced with SBInet since it began than
    those of us who have actually patrolled and worked that border
    because we identified a requirement that basically has, to
    date, not necessarily been met. We are making headway. But
    because of the situation that we find ourselves in, $50 million
    has been pulled of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
    (ARRA) funding toward SBInet.
        In addition to that--this is the best way I can explain
    where we find ourselves now; Tucson 1, 23 miles of capability,
    Ajo 1, 30 miles of capability, for a total of 53 miles, are
    basically going forth. They will be in the hands of the Border
    Patrol for operational testing and evaluation by the end of
    this calendar year.
        Mr. Culberson. How many miles in Ajo?
        Mr. Aguilar. Ajo is 30; 23 in Tucson 1, sir. What we are
    seeing so far, Tucson 1 is now operationally being tested and
    is showing good signs. It is giving us a capability that
    basically we have never had before. But that is why we are
    taking a measured and judicious approach to make sure that any
    further investments that are made under SBInet gets the agents
    on the ground which is exactly what we need.
        What we need is to have situational awareness. People call
    it a virtual fence. Actually, what it gives us is situational
    awareness of what is happening along our Nation's borders, not
    with a single focus but for an environmental landscape focus,
    if you will.
        Mr. Culberson. I want to stress it is the safety of your
    officers, too. This is, above all, first and foremost, for you
    and the senior command the safety of your men and women in the
    field is at risk.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir. And that is the criticality of it,
    yes, sir. And that is why we are taking this approach.
        I agree with this approach to do an assessment, to take a
    step back. That is not to say that we are going to slow down by
    any means at all. The redirection of the ARRA funding, for
    example, is going to give us capabilities, not system
    capabilities, but it will give us technological force enhancer
    capabilities that we, frankly, don't have right now. One of the
    systems we are looking forward to getting additional units of
    is going to be the Mobile Surveillance System (MSS).
        Mr. Culberson. Out of the $50 million?

                           MOBILE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM

        Mr. Aguilar. Out of the $50 million, yes, sir. About $32
    million of that is what we are looking at directing toward that
    MSS capability. Each one of those systems basically has the
    capability to give us an environmental look, landscape look, of
    anywhere from between 8 to 12 miles of the border.
        Mr. Culberson. If you would describe the Mobile
    Surveillance System.
        Mr. Aguilar. It is a combination of ground surveillance
    radar, Doppler radar, infrared day/night capability and
    targeting and tracking capability all in one package that
    covers an area of anywhere from 8 to 12 miles. We have used it.
    We own about 40 to 42 of those right now. That capability has
    worked tremendously. So we are going to continue to add on it.
        Mr. Culberson. Thirty-two of the 50. And what about the
    other remaining?
        Mr. Aguilar. It is spread out, sir, over capabilities for
    some of our air assets, some of our pedestrian capabilities (we
    are looking for our foot officers to basically carry night
    vision capability), things of that nature. So it is spread out
    over capability requirements our officers have identified.
        Mr. Culberson. So you have got a good idea, you have
    already got the equipment lined up, and you know how the $50
    million is going to be spent.

                                EXPENDITURE PLAN

        Mr. Aguilar. We have an expenditure plan, yes, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. If I could, that is required by law to be
    provided to Congress. What happened? And when are we going to
    have it? We probably ought to get that right away.
        Mr. Aguilar. The only thing I can tell you, sir, is it is
    going through the review process right now.
        Mr. Culberson. You have done your part. Border Patrol has
    submitted it.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. That is something we heard yesterday, Mr.
    Chairman. It seems like we have got a real choke-point
    somewhere in the bureaucracy up there. It would be nice to make
    a requirement that somebody doesn't get anymore money for
    whatever office they are running if they don't provide
    statutorily required reports, would be good.
        If you could, Chief, the Tucson sector I want to ask about
    is a continuing problem. The latest numbers we have show that
    in the Tucson sector, the estimates we have heard is--and I
    want you to confirm this--that you all are apprehending about
    one in ten people that cross the border in the Tucson sector.
    Does that sound about right?

                        TUCSON SECTOR APPREHENSION RATE

        Mr. Aguilar. No, sir. No, it doesn't, but I am afraid we
    can't give you an exact number of apprehensions.
        Mr. Culberson. Your best estimate.
        Mr. Aguilar. I wouldn't want to guess now. And the reason
    is that in those areas where we now have the capability to have
    good, solid knowledge of what is happening, for example, in
    Tucson 1, we are operating for about 16 hours per day. That
    gives us an exact footprint of what is happening. And basically
    we get pretty close to telling you how many are crossing and
    how many of those we are catching. We can give you an
    approximate there. I don't have that number there. I can get it
    for you. More than 16 hours.
        For the remainder of the sector, where we don't have that
    kind of capability but are trying to build it, it is a best
    guess.
        Mr. Culberson. Let's say for that 16 miles, what do you
    estimate you are catching; two out of ten, three out of ten for
    that sector?
        Mr. Aguilar. It would be higher than that, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. Okay. I will ask some follow-up questions.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mrs. Lowey.

                       SCREENING INTERNATIONAL PASSENGERS

        Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and welcome.
        Frankly, I brought this subject up quite a few times, and
    it is astonishing to me that we can't get this changed now. It
    was outrageous. And I am sure we would all agree that
    Abdulmutallab was a known threat, should have been stopped from
    boarding, the plane had CBP, had more time to review the
    passenger list.
        Now, during a hearing last March with CBP Commissioner
    Ahern, I asked him whether airlines should provide passenger
    lists 24 hours in advance of international flights arriving in
    the United States, as incoming sea vessels are required to do.
    He replied, absolutely not.
        Further, when Secretary Napolitano testified here last
    month, she said DHS was in the process of evaluating all of its
    rules and procedures.
        It is so obvious to me that 30 minutes is not enough time
    for CBP officers to screen hundreds of passengers. Twenty-four
    hours should be the new standard.
        In the months since Secretary Napolitano appeared before
    this Subcommittee, has the status of the DHS review of
    screening international passengers changed and is it still the
    position of CBP that 30 minutes is plenty of time to get the
    visas, review the history, make a decision as to whether that
    person shouldn't be aboard the plane? Can you respond?
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, ma'am, I will be glad to.
        December 25th changed the way that we take a look at every
    one of our programs, and we are currently in a reassessment
    mode for everything.
        Mrs. Lowey. How long do you have to reassess? I know you
    are reassessing.
        Mr. Aguilar. Well, it takes into account what the new known
    threat is. The threat that we faced with Mr. Abdulmutallab was
    an unknown threat, and now we are looking at what gaps existed
    then so that we can close those gaps.
        Mrs. Lowey. Can you tell me if you can do this in 30
    minutes?
        Mr. Aguilar. Given the--well----
        Mrs. Lowey. Can you review the visas, check any background?
    In 30 minutes you can make a determination that someone can get
    aboard a flight and we don't have to worry about them?
        Mr. Aguilar. If we have the known information to match it
    up to, yes, ma'am.
        But the real problem that we have is not against the known;
    it is against the unknown. And if you would allow me, please,
    because Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) is not the
    sole dependency that we have for checking against our watch
    lists. We start out with Passenger Name Record (PNR). That
    starts coming at us at 72 hours before, at 24 hours again, at 8
    hours and 1 hour before boarding.
        In addition to that----
        Mrs. Lowey. May I just ask, the 72 hours, do you have their
    visa information as well?
        Mr. Aguilar. No, we do not have the visa information, nor
    do we have it with the 30 minutes before APIS checking. We have
    names, we have biographical information that we then take and
    match up against the known watchlists, the Terrorist Screening
    Databases that we have.
        Now, we are working toward revetting against visas as we
    speak. This is one of these gaps that we are looking to close.
    That is being worked on basically almost as we speak here.
        Mrs. Lowey. May I ask you, you said that this is a gap that
    you know you should close.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes ma'am.
        Mrs. Lowey. I have been talking about this for probably
    more than a year. What is taking so long to make that decision?
    What is so difficult?
        Mr. Aguilar. Well, it is not any one agency that does all
    of this.
        First of all, let me take you to PNR. PNR is information
    that is given to us by the industry based on requirements that
    they have, not requirements that we have. We are taking an
    existing amount of data set in a certain way that we are
    basically getting from them.
        Mrs. Lowey. From the airlines.
        Mr. Aguilar. From the airlines. The data set will include
    the name, might include the date of birth, might include the
    way that the ticket was purchased, might include traveling
    partners, but it is inconsistent throughout. Now, we are
    working very closely with the industry to bring some
    consistency to the elements that we need under PNR.
        Mrs. Lowey. May I just follow up, because I know my time is
    limited. Is it very difficult for you, just you, to make a
    determination as to whether you should get the visa, you should
    get this additional information? What is so difficult about
    this process and this decision making?
        Mr. Aguilar. Well, you asked two questions, ma'am.
    Identifying the requirements, absolutely not. We have the
    requirements. As officers, as the boots on the ground that our
    people are, we understand; we know the requirements. The
    difficulty is how we reach that. Again, we are working with the
    industry right now. If that industry effort does not work out,
    we may very well be coming to you and saying we need help here.
        Mrs. Lowey. Look, I am a New Yorker. I was down at the
    World Trade Center. I have been out with our distinguished
    Chairman to JFK. We met with the police. The threat is still
    there.
        Mr. Aguilar. Absolutely.
        Mrs. Lowey. I don't know why it is taking you so long to
    make this decision, and I would like to have an answer in
    writing as to why you can't determine that at least 24 hours--
    you say you get the name 72 hours. Why can't you get the visa
    and all background information? I mean, to me this is
    astonishing.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: Air carriers must transmit Advance Passenger Information
    System (APIS) data no later than 30 minutes prior to securing the
    aircraft doors for a batch transmission of passenger data or up to the
    time of securing the aircraft doors for interactive Automated Quick
    Query (AQQ) submissions of individual passenger data. CBP does require
    commercial air carriers to provide access to available Passenger Name
    Record (PNR) data starting at 72 hours before departure.
        Many reservations contain incomplete information which limits CBP's
    ability to conduct terrorist watchlist screening, however; this will
    change with the implementation of the Transportation Security
    Administration's (TSA's) Secure Flight program. Under Secure Flight,
    carriers will be required to collect and provide passenger information
    including full name, date of birth and gender to TSA for security
    screening starting at 72 hours prior to departure. CBP will also
    receive this more complete passenger information through the PNR data
    requirement resulting in enhanced screening capabilities for CBP.
    Secure Flight is expected to be fully deployed for international air
    carriers by December 31, 2010.
        Requiring additional passenger information and additional time for
    screening, beyond current APIS and PNR requirements, would necessitate
    changes to existing processes. Requiring travelers to formalize plans
    to travel to or from the United States at least 24 hours before
    departure would also preclude all last-minute travel.

        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard.

                                ILLICIT SHIPPING

        Ms. Roybal-Allard. Welcome Mr. Aguilar.
        Last December, I was joined by Mr. Farr and several of my
    colleagues from California in sending your predecessor a letter
    urging the crackdown on Chinese shippers that intentionally
    mislabeled consignments of steel tubing to avoid paying import
    duties. Without these duties, the Chinese tubing is
    significantly less expensive than its American counterpart.
    This illicit shipping, as you well know, robs our Treasury of
    essential revenue; and, more importantly, it puts American
    businesses at a competitive disadvantage resulting in the loss
    of American manufacturing jobs.
        Now, while I understand that some aspects of your current
    efforts are in fact confidential, can you please describe CBP's
    overall strategy for preventing Chinese steel tubing and other
    imports from illegally entering the U.S. market?
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes ma'am. I will speak to the degree that I
    am knowledgeable now about things such as countervailing and
    anti-dumping efforts that are ongoing.
        Just this past week, I was in Los Angeles with our district
    officers relating to import specialties and things of this
    nature, and, basically, that is one of the challenges that we
    are facing--continuing to staff up to the point where thorough
    review audits can continue to be done and then taking the
    appropriate tariff tax and duty actions against these
    individuals. We are dealing, as an example--and for obvious
    reasons I can't go into names right now--but we are dealing
    with several instances of like situations, not steel, but other
    products that have basically been skirting our duties.
        But I can assure you that CBP and DHS are taking very
    aggressive actions, both from the staffing technological
    standpoint and the focus standpoint, to ensure that we take the
    appropriate actions against these individual companies that are
    trying to skirt these duties that create an unfair competition
    field for our own domestic products.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. So I can look forward to--or at least
    the companies that are in my district that are suffering from
    this, we can look forward to the fact that that is in fact
    going to change?
        Mr. Aguilar. We are taking, yes, very aggressive actions on
    that. I am not familiar with the company that you are referring
    to, ma'am, but if you can give us specific information, we will
    give you whatever we can on it, yes, ma'am.

                         CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE

        Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
        Last year, I asked your predecessor, Mr. Ahern, about CBP's
    relationship with its foreign counterparts through the
    Container Security Initiative; and it was really disturbing to
    learn that several of our largest trading partners, including
    China, do not allow U.S. Customs officials stationed overseas
    to actually witness the inspections of suspicious shipments
    bound for the United States. Does that practice continue today,
    and what is being done to ensure that these inspections are
    being conducted properly, and if there is still a problem that
    it, in fact, is being reported?
        Mr. Aguilar. We, in fact, are working very aggressively
    with places and locations such as China, the one that you
    described, to ensure that the validation process as we deem
    necessary and appropriate gets carried out by our officers.
    Without having to go into much detail, I think all of us
    recognize the challenges that we have with China. But that does
    not mean that we are letting up. We, in fact, are continuing to
    work it. I just sat down with the new ambassador to China from
    the United States about a month and a half ago, and this was
    one of our main topics.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. So at this point U.S. inspectors are
    still prevented from observing?
        Mr. Aguilar. We have our challenges, yes ma'am. To what
    degree we are being prevented, I don't have the exact count. I
    can get some of that for you, if you would like.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. I would appreciate it.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes ma'am.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: The CSI program currently has CBP officers stationed in
    Shanghai and Shenzhen. High risk shipments are referred to China
    Customs for examination. China Customs will perform examination using
    non-intrusive inspection technology comparable to that which is used in
    the U.S. In FY 09, China Customs conducted examination on 19.9% of U.S.
    requests. By comparison, CSI requests for examination are conducted 93%
    of the time program wide. China Customs performs the lowest level of
    requested examinations in the CSI program.
        Over the past year CSI has requested assistance from the CBP
    Attache at the embassy in Beijing and the consulate in Shanghai. China
    Customs says that by the time they get the referrals for exams by CSI,
    the containers are already laden on the vessel. Formal letters were
    written and meetings held with China Customs requesting that China
    Customs Officers be available to perform exams on weekends and after
    hours and China Customs indicated the Declaration of Principles signed
    with CSI does not stipulate that they are required to work after hours
    or weekends.
        CSI and the CBP Attache in Beijing continue to engage China Customs
    to resolve the low exam rate.

                                 C-TPAT PROGRAM

        Ms. Roybal-Allard. And, finally, as you know, through the
    Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program, shippers
    agree to implement stronger security measures in return for
    less scrutiny from Customs officials at major ports of entry.
    According to recent news reports, Mexican drug cartels have
    begun to take advantage of this arrangement, targeting the
    trucks and containers of C-TPAT-certified companies and using
    them to smuggle narcotics into the United States. These stories
    are made especially troubling by the fact that more than half
    of all U.S. imports now come from shippers enrolled in that
    program. What steps are being taken to prevent the cartels from
    exploiting a C-TPAT, how successful have your efforts been, and
    what challenges still remain?
        Mr. Aguilar. The C-TPAT program, ma'am--first of all, let
    me begin here--is one of our great success stories because of
    the fact that it brings in industry as a critically important
    partner to help us secure the supply chain from an enterprise
    perspective. More than 9,700 companies are now members of C-
    TPAT.
        The reason I mention that is because just last Thursday, I
    gave a keynote address to more than 1,200 C-TPAT members in Los
    Angeles, CA. One of the main focuses of my address and of the
    classes that were being given and the training that was being
    given was just what you speak to: the vulnerabilities that
    exist, the things that we must recognize in this partnership
    and the things that we must do to overcome them. One is
    increasing the security, the vigilance of the companies
    themselves, the validation process that we take them through.
    And then, critical to understand, because they are members of
    C-TPAT does not mean that they have a free ride. There is still
    ongoing samplings taken of these companies.
        But I am elated to tell you that, from the perspective--I
    met Chief Executive Officers or vice presidents from Shell
    company and Swift and other companies, General Motors, that
    were there, and the level of interest in protecting and
    ensuring the security of the supply chain is very, very high.
        I also had the opportunity to meet with one of the under
    secretaries for Mexico on the same issue. They are working
    jointly with us right now toward a C-TPAT-like program, and we
    are offering capacity building and lessons learned to them also
    to strengthen that supply chain.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. And once they enter the program is there
    a continuous review? Or do they enter and then they are just
    sort of forgotten?
        Mr. Aguilar. No ma'am. There is an ongoing, continuous
    review.
        And the validation process--I will share with you that,
    when I first heard about it, I was pleasantly surprised. The
    revalidation process can take anywhere from a month to a year,
    depending on what our import specialists find. So it is a very,
    very strong program, I believe.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you. My time is up.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mr. Rodriguez.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you.

                           INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRAINTS

        Chief, thank you very much for your leadership. And I want
    to personally thank you for your hard work in defending our
    country. I know that you have been--in terms of boots on the
    ground, you have been there. So I want to thank you for your
    direct knowledge of the things that are needed out there.
        I wanted to ask you--and I know we have beefed up on border
    patrol. We are now close to 20,000. One of the areas that we
    continue to get reports, not only from the Border Coalition but
    from other groups, about the need for Customs on the bridges
    and the problems that we continue to have with commerce there,
    as well as security. And no one knows that better than you,
    that you can secure the areas--and they are being well secured
    in most areas between the bridges--but if you don't have the
    personnel on the bridge it is going to either bottle up or we
    are going to have some problems there. Your budget recommends
    about 380 additional people when all indications are that there
    is a need for some 5,000. From your perspective, where are we
    at on that and when are we going to come to grips with that
    issue?
        Mr. Aguilar. Well, first of all, thank you for asking that
    question because it gives us an opportunity to speak to
    something that too often we don't get an opportunity to speak
    to.
        The concerns, the frustrations, are in fact very real when
    those bottlenecks occur, when that stymieing, if you will, of
    trade occurs. The officers, the Customs and Border Protection
    officers and the ag specialists are absolutely critical to
    maintaining the efficiency and the effectiveness. But they are
    constrained, also--and we must recognize this--they are
    constrained by the infrastructure that exists at these ports of
    entry.
        Congressman, one of the things that we have taken into
    consideration and we must take into consideration and we do
    look at very closely is whether it is a good thing to put more
    officers into a port of entry that, regardless of how many
    officers you put in there, because of the infrastructure
    constraints, can't bring any more capacity?
        Personal experience. Nuevo, Laredo, the infrastructure from
    an ingress into the port of entry from Mexico, is a bottleneck
    way before it gets to the port of entry.
        Mr. Rodriguez. And I understand that problem. But other
    situations, and you have seen it yourself, where we go to
    communities and we have opened up additional lanes, but they
    are closed because they don't have the personnel. Especially
    during times when staff want to take off, like Christmas,
    Easter, you know, and that is when you need them the most.
        So I understand in terms of infrastructure. And no one got
    more upset than when the stimulus money came out and it all
    went to Arizona, and Texas got nothing, than me.

                              PERSONAL CONSTRAINTS

        But, having said that, I know that we need to beef up, but
    we also need to beef up on personnel. So, based on the 380, it
    is not going to get us there in terms of--you know, we just
    opened up another bridge Ansandua. Those 380 were probably just
    going to go there, yet we are still looking at other
    possibilities.
        So I would hope that we start looking at how we beef up on
    Customs. If nothing else, there has got to be a program there
    with the number of border patrols that we have that at some
    point in time--I know that it might be difficult--but for them
    to also be able to have a transition where some of them go on
    the actual ports of entry and help out. So give that some
    thought during especially those heavy times when we need them.
        I can tell you communities of San Marcos in Texas where 40
    percent of their sales is to Mexicans coming over purchasing
    stuff. And if they don't show up, my God, we are going to be in
    trouble. Others, it is 80 percent of their sales. But ensuring
    the security. And I agree with you in terms of the
    infrastructure, because that is another issue.

                           BIG BEND BORDER CROSSINGS

        The Secretary of the Interior was with me, Secretary
    Salazar, in the Big Bend. We had an opportunity to visit that
    area. We talked about the possibility of the dialogue that has
    taken place since the 1930s and 1940s about an international
    park and the importance of that.
        There is three crossings that were closed in the Big Bend,
    and the possibilities of opening those crosses in especially
    like Boquillas, which it just makes more sense for us to have
    direct contact, a little more in terms of what is happening on
    the other side versus bringing closure completely and then not
    have any contact whatsoever with a community. I would ask in
    terms of where are we at on looking at--because I had more than
    three closures of bridges after 9/11--and so to seeing how we
    might, if nothing else, for tourist purposes of those three
    crosses. Can I get your comments on that?
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir. I believe the ports of entry that
    you are talking about, or what used to be ports of entry class
    B, which were done away with in 1986, are La Linda and
    Boquillas. And we did, in fact decide, because of the field
    commander's determination right after 2001, that those needed
    to be closed because of the situation we were facing. We are in
    the process of reassessing, taking a look at what the situation
    is currently, to see what it is that can be done. But, of
    course, with that comes additional resource requirements.
        Mr. Chairman and Congressman, just one other thing. Because
    of the criticality of the importance as to how we look at our
    ports of entry, the congestion and things of that nature--
    again, I am going to repeat--the CBP officers are absolutely
    critical. But we are looking at not only that but also other
    things that we can do (bringing other capabilities to those
    ports of entry that will help us segment, sort, target and
    triage, expedite the flow through)--things such as our Trusted
    Traveller Programs that will help us segment and sort the
    people that we trust and the WHTI effort that we have
    undertaken, again another tremendous success story that has
    taken real hold.

                   WESTERN HEMISPHERE TRAVEL INITIATIVE (WHTI)

        WHTI right now, of those that are actually queried on the
    southern border, approximately more than 94 percent of them
    hold a card that is one of a minimal amount that can be used,
    as opposed to more than 8,000 that could be used before. So
    that facilitates, that expedites.
        So, again, I would just repeat that officers are key, but
    the other actions that we have actually put in place are
    absolutely critical also.
        Mr. Rodriguez. If you can help me with Del Rio and Eagle
    Pass, on those passages, they have to go all the way to Laredo
    to get that card, and not only does it cost them $150 or so but
    also, in addition to the travel, those individuals, we need to
    get them in some of those other communities. They have been
    asking me. There are thousands of them. That would also help
    expedite for the people in Acuna and the people in Piedras
    Negras also that would have to travel all the way down there.
        One additional question?

                            C-TPAT BUDGET REDUCTION

        Mr. Price. If you don't mind, wait until the next round.
    Your time has expired.
        I do want to follow up on Ms. Roybal-Allard's line of
    questioning. An important program, C-TPAT, and we appreciate
    basically your positive assessment of that program and its
    future. I would like to ask you, though, to put a little finer
    point on that, and you can do this for the record if you
    prefer. But there is a $12 million cut of this program in this
    budget, and that does raise obvious questions, doesn't it,
    about the number of current C-TPAT participants who can be
    revalidated, and also the capacity to add new participants. It
    just seems to me that is a basic question that this Committee
    needs to address, and you need to help us do so.
        Mr. Aguilar. I will do that, and I will address a short
    portion of it and take the rest of it, which I think will
    demand more detail as an insert for the record (IFR).
        But the reduction, if you will, does not necessarily mean
    the reduction in capacity of the program, especially as it
    relates to realignment of the revalidation inspectors and
    things of that nature. I believe, at the present time, we have
    about 200 of those import specialists that actually perform
    those revalidations.
        I spoke to the group from Miami last week, and I asked them
    specifically, how many companies do you each carry in your
    portfolio? It varies. I asked them if we were basically at the
    peak, and they said no, but we will be getting there pretty
    fast. So expansion capabilities are still inherent within the
    program by way of realignment.
        Now, we will take a look specifically at the import
    specialists as to what it is we need to carry out that very
    important part of C-TPAT. The rest I will take for IFR.
        Mr. Price. If you can assure us those basic capacities are
    not compromised in that budget request, then please tell us
    where those cuts do occur; what would account for the savings
    that you think can be absorbed?
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: The current funding profile for the C-TPAT program was
    developed during the start up and expansion phase. The program is now
    mature, and $12 million can be eliminated from its budget with no
    impact on operations. Based on projected workload, as well as on
    program efficiencies, the operational capability cut will not impact
    CBP's supply chain security mission. The program has aggressively
    worked to identify and successfully implement travel and validation
    procedures aimed at maximizing program resources.
        C-TPAT will reduce the number of contractors (software programmers
    and testers) assigned to the Office of Information Technology to
    develop the program's Automated Web-Based Portal System from 8 to 2
    programmers in equal increments from FY 2010-2012. The Portal is the
    primary interface with the C-TPAT trade members and has approximately
    20,000 designed users. It warehouses information pertinent to the
    validation process and is critical to effective and efficient
    administration of the program. A phased down approach will give the
    program the opportunity to make needed functional enhancements over an
    extended time period.
        The reduction to funds supporting the Automated Web-Based Portal
    System will have minimal impacts because CBP will use a phased approach
    in which necessary enhancements will still be made, over an extended
    time period. The reduction to support funds, including equipment,
    services and supplies, will not impact the program's ability to meet
    current mission goals. The C-TPAT program will meet all timelines as
    mandated by the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006
    (SAFE Port Act), Public Law 109-347.

                         CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE

        Let me return to overseas scanning and screening and the
    Cargo Security Initiative, which, as you said, is a much more
    widespread initiative at overseas ports to examine as much
    cargo as possible headed for the U.S. before it reaches our
    shores.
        Fifty-eight ports around the world now implement CSI,
    covering, as you said, 80 percent of the shipments headed to
    the U.S. In answering my question about the 100 percent
    screening and about the future of the Secure Freight
    Initiative, which is a pilot designed to determine the
    feasibility of 100 percent screening, and I think it is fair to
    say, from what you said and what we know, that that pilot has
    not been terribly reassuring. There have been some good
    operations set up, some good cooperation, but still it is a
    formidable goal and one that we are asking you to be candid
    about in terms of its feasibility.
        Now, CSI is a more targeted approach. There have been
    implications in past discussions that maybe this was the model
    for overseas screening. Yet your budget cuts this by $50
    million. And as I read your budget presentation, you are going
    to reduce the physical CBP presence to four ports, relying a
    great deal more on what you call virtual inspection, targeting,
    and possible reciprocal inspection agreements with foreign
    governments.
        Mr. Aguilar. That is right.
        Mr. Price. Now, that really raises a great many questions,
    I think, especially in light of the quite understandable
    reservations you have raised about the 100 percent goal. Why
    have you decided to pull back from the overseas-based CSI?
        The fundamental question about the pulling back that
    occurs, can domestic operations equal or surpass CBP's capacity
    to gather information and screen overseas shipments that is
    currently made possible by having a physical presence at these
    overseas ports?
        Your budget calls for reliance on domestic-based targeting
    and analysis. Where is that going to be? How is that going to
    work? You don't propose increased staffing or capacity at the
    National Targeting Center, and CBP officer staffing levels are
    declining. So within the terms of your own budget, we don't
    understand where this capacity is going to come from.
        But as you can tell, I have a more fundamental question
    about how this is going to work, scaling back the actual
    presence of your officers overseas in the way this budget
    anticipates. And I guess the question I started with, then,
    looms over all of this: Is CSI the model of the future in terms
    of overseas scanning, or are we really talking about pulling
    back on that whole endeavor and simply adopting another less
    ambitious model, or maybe pulling back on the goal of doing
    much of this work overseas altogether?
        Mr. Aguilar. Let me begin with the following, Mr. Chairman,
    because I think it is critical that we do a couple of things.
        One is that we recognize that doing as much as we can
    before--the pre-departure, before these containers are coming
    at us--is absolutely critical. I think all of us are in
    agreement on that.
        Two is that we revisit where we started CSI in 2002. It
    started because of a vulnerability that was quickly recognized
    after 9/11. At that point, the only way, the only means we had
    to start this initiative was to actually have the physical
    presence of CBP officers on foreign ground doing the screening,
    doing the targeting, the risk assessment and any needed
    assessment. That was the only way we could do it.
        Since then, in the effort of transforming what we do, we
    have now gained tremendous capabilities, thanks to this group
    right here, on building up our technological, our virtual
    capabilities. The National Targeting Center--Cargo began in
    partnership with our National Partnership Center--Passenger. It
    has now been split out. We have our own component, which
    specifically targets cargo.

                      CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE CONT.

        Before 9/11, we had no advanced automatic targeting. We
    have it today. We had limited personnel overseas. We now have
    about 27 reps, attaches, throughout these locations. We have
    much better-established international relationships. We also
    have the 1,400 Radiation Portal Monitors deployed. We have
    something that is very critical--the do not load authority--
    which did not exist before.
        So it is a combination of the virtual capability to screen,
    of which we are doing close to 100 percent, and the do not load
    authority that we have. It is the transformation of--again I
    would remind us that it is not just the CSI, but it is CSI, C-
    TPAT, SFI, 10 + 2, 24 Hour Rule, all coming together in this
    transformational interest to ensure that we push at our borders
    as much as possible. Then at the end, domestically, we have
    more than 98 percent scanning capability of those containers
    once they are in country.
        So it is that combination, it is that comprehensive
    approach, it is not any one silver bullet that is going to get
    us to where I think we need to get. Managing the risk,
    assessing, targeting, segmenting, sorting, triaging as far away
    from our border as we can, is exactly the intent that we have.
        One hundred percent scanning foreign is a very real
    challenge for some of the reasons we spoke about earlier, some
    within our control, others that we have no control over. How
    were the ports designed many, many years ago? Is the host
    country willing to accept our desires and sometimes demands? So
    it is all of these things that we take into consideration, sir.

                               VIRTUAL SCREENING

        Mr. Price. Well, the virtual screening, the capacity you
    are talking about to do a lot of this stateside and to not have
    that physical presence, where in this budget should we expect
    to see that enhanced capacity reflected?
        Mr. Aguilar. One of the things occurring right now--and I
    believe it is three. Right now, I can only remember one
    location. But in New Zealand and Israel, for example, we are
    working with them, and they actually do the scanning at our
    request, virtually send us the image. Our officers here
    domestically review the imaging, and depending on what they
    find----
        Mr. Price. Where are those officers located?
        Mr. Aguilar. Here domestically, sir. We will provide that
    information to you.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: The officers are located at the National Targeting
    Center--Cargo, in Herndon, Virginia.

        Mr. Price. Is there going to be a lot more of that going
    on?
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes.
        Mr. Price. Then the question is, what kind of enhanced
    capacity is it going to require stateside?
        Mr. Aguilar. Again, this is what we are assessing right
    now. This is basically a pilot program that is ongoing right
    now for that, virtual imaging, and the budgets will reflect
    what our needs are going to be, taking into consideration that
    it is that plus everything else we are doing, sir.
        Mr. Price. I want to turn to Mr. Culberson. I must say that
    the impression one gets on visiting these ports, and I remember
    very well a visit to an SFI port, Salalah, and a CSI port,
    Alexandria, Egypt, the impression one gets is that the presence
    of our people on the ground is quite important. In fact, we
    were struck by the almost diplomatic quality of the job they
    were required to do, the daily interactions with people on the
    ground in those ports and just making certain that the promised
    examination was taking place. I have to confess, it is hard for
    me to envision pulling all that back and not having that
    physical presence in these ports.
        But you are saying CSI, as it has been developed, can
    operate under the conditions projected in this budget?
        Mr. Aguilar. CSI, plus everything else that supports it.
        Mr. Price. CSI, as enhanced by C-TPAT and other programs.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes.
        Mr. Price. That is going to require some very careful
    scrutiny.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Price. Mr. Culberson.

                              OPERATION STREAMLINE

        Mr. Culberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say for
    the record, while my good friend Ciro Rodriguez is here, how
    much I have enjoyed working with Ciro. We were elected together
    in 1986 to the Texas House, have been good friends ever since.
    Our daughters--your daughter is a little older than mine, but
    we were roommates in that first session.
        And we have with great success, Chief, worked, as you know,
    in the Del Rio sector; Ciro, in the Laredo sector. You guys
    have done a magnificent job with the help of the local
    prosecutors, the judges, the marshals, the sheriffs, in
    implementing the zero tolerance program, Operation Streamline,
    with the support of the local community.
        I note that the crime rate has just plummeted, Ciro, and
    Del Rio is much safer. Public safety is enhanced in Del Rio and
    in Laredo.
        I wanted to ask you, I know you are continuing to work on
    rolling that out down to Brownsville. I wanted to make sure
    Operation Streamline is secure. It has got the full support of
    headquarters and your office; is that right, sir?
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes.
        Mr. Culberson. And you are working to expand it down to the
    Rio Grande Valley sector and get it further expanded in Laredo?
        Mr. Aguilar. Let me qualify the answer I am going to give
    because what we want to ensure is that every chief on the
    ground has Streamline as a tool in his or her tool box to apply
    at the appropriate time, in the fashion that they feel is
    right. That is what we are working toward. The expansion is
    actually up to the chiefs on the ground, sir. It is important
    that we give them that capability, yes.
        Mr. Culberson. They have the capability, for example, in
    the rest of the Laredo sector, that ability is there, and in
    the Brownsville sector?
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes. Yes. Working with their partners.
        Mr. Culberson. We can work on that, Ciro, with our good
    friends, with Solomon. Henry has, I think, the Laredo sector;
    Solomon--and who else has got the piece of Brownsville?
        Mr. Aguilar. Mr. Hinojosa.
        Mr. Culberson. Yes. It is working beautifully. We look
    forward to helping you with that. In my opinion, there may be
    some areas you need a fence, maybe in urban areas. You want to
    make sure the local community has some input on that.
        But the best solution, Mr. Chairman, we have seen, Ciro and
    I have seen it and the Chief has proven it, is boots on the
    ground; effective law enforcement by officers, using their
    heads and their hearts and their good judgment with the support
    of local prosecutors. In fact, Chief, I understand that the Val
    Verde County Jail, Ciro, even has vacancies. It is working so
    well, the illegal crossings in Del Rio have plummeted, and you
    have been leasing beds from the Del Rio County Jail, and there
    is even room for more customers.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. There is room at the inn. This system works
    beautifully, and we are going to work together to get that
    implemented in the rest of the Rio Grande Valley and in Laredo.

                            SECURE BORDER INITIATIVE

        Let me ask you about SBI. It is scheduled to be tested and,
    I think, undergo system acceptance testing by as late as
    September.
        Mr. Aguilar. September of this year; yes, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. How long will that testing take and what
    criteria are you using to either accept or reject SBI?
        Mr. Aguilar. The criteria I won't go into because I am not
    that familiar with it. I am dependent on our executive
    director, Mr. Mark Borkowski, to carry that out. And I have to
    say I have full faith and confidence that he is trying to get
    us what we need.
        Mr. Culberson. What is the time frame?
        Mr. Aguilar. Well, it will begin sometime in September;
    that is what we are being told at the present time. I can't
    give you an exact time. It will probably be 30 to 45 days, and
    then it is going into what is known as operational testing and
    evaluation. That is when it gets into the hands of the Border
    Patrol in a quasi-formal fashion to actually jerk it around,
    throw it down, get it dirty, utilize it as Border Patrol agents
    will. And then it will go to acceptance, full acceptance.
        Mr. Culberson. Your officers will do that review?
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir. In fact, our officers are working
    with the system right now, Tucson-1, for about 14-16 hours per
    day to kind of begin that testing process.
        Mr. Culberson. Would you be sure and ask, from your end and
    we push from our end, to get headquarters to release the
    spending plan on that $50 million? You have done that part. It
    sounds like you guys have done your job.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir; we will find out where it is.

                       COST TO SECURE THE SOUTHERN BORDER

        Mr. Culberson. And push to get it to us.
        I want to follow on with a very important question that I
    know all Americans are concerned about, is when will the--
    particularly the southern border--the northern border is a
    problem, but we have a full-scale war going on across the
    border in Mexico--when will the southern border be secure and
    how long is it going to take?
        It looks like about 697 miles are currently secure,
    according to your own reports. Your report that you have
    effective control is the term I was looking for of 697 miles. I
    know that there is a different level of operational control.
    But in terms of effective control, I ran the math, and if the
    southern border is 2,000 miles and you had 241 miles of
    effective control in October 2005, 697 miles in March 2009, it
    looks like you were securing about 11 miles a month; and with
    1,300 miles left, that means we got about 10 years at that pace
    to get effective control of the southern border. And we have
    already spent, just doing the math, $6 billion over 5 years on
    fencing and infrastructure, $1 billion for air and marina sets,
    and about $5 billion--$3 billion a year for CBP, so $15 billion
    over 5 years.
        So, doing the math, $22 billion over 5 years, and we have
    697 miles of effective control, it looks like 10 years and $40
    billion before the entire southern border would be under
    effective control. Does that sound about right?
        Mr. Aguilar. No, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. Let's hope it is a lot sooner and less
    expensive.
        Mr. Aguilar. I have to qualify that I can't give you a
    figure, and I won't give you a time for the following reasons.
        Mr. Culberson. Just ballpark.
        Mr. Aguilar. Let me put it in this fashion first because I
    think it is foundational. The effective control miles are a
    means by which we, the Border Patrol, measure a certain level
    of control along the southwest border. There is effective
    control, there is monitored control, there is less monitored
    control and then there is an unknown. The unknown is the
    smallest group. Each one of those varies in the levels of
    control. The most critical sections of our border, especially
    as it relates to the southern border, are the ones that are
    under operational control right now.
        What that translates to is the following, and this is
    critically important: that there are places like El Paso, which
    is the third safest large city in the Nation, third largest
    safest city in the Nation. You go to San Diego, crime has
    plummeted; Laredo, crime has plummeted; the Rio Grande Valley,
    plummeted; Del Rio, vacancies in the Val Verde County Jail.
    These are things we hadn't seen before. So it is those critical
    areas where our strategy has worked.
        That is not to say we are ignoring the other areas. In
    those other border areas where we have a different level of
    control, we are monitoring it so that at the most appropriate
    time, we can start over, we can shift, we can request.
        But having said that, the Border Patrol has doubled in size
    over the last 7-8 years. We are going through a very good
    maturation period. We now have six unmanned aircraft systems
    (UASs) that we are flying. We didn't have those in the past. We
    are getting a more mature program. We now have more than 280
    aerial platforms. As recently as 2003, the Border Patrol only
    owned about 90-95 platforms. We have 500 pilots right now.
    Things we never had in the past.
        Then, because I think you hit on something that is
    absolutely critical, we have a real homeland security
    enterprise approach to the border. We have operations such as
    the Alliance to Combat Transnational Crime in Arizona that have
    taken hold where more than 65 different agencies are supporting
    the Border Patrol. We have Operation Stonegarden.
        So it is all of these things that are maturing that should
    not cost us the same that it costs us to put them in place.
        Mr. Culberson. You know how strongly this Subcommittee and
    the Congress supports your work and admires what you do. What I
    am driving at is just trying to give us, because it is so
    critical for our planning purposes in funding and looking into
    the future--for you to give us even a ballpark estimate, it is
    just critical, of when and how much is it going to cost to
    secure the southern border.
        Mr. Aguilar. I can't give you that answer, sir. I can tell
    you that we have a commitment to move forward as quickly as
    possible. I can tell you that every dollar that is being
    appropriated is working toward that. A lot of actions that are
    being looked at by this body, for example, will have an impact
    on what happens in Mexico, things of this nature.
        Mr. Culberson. Maybe what I could suggest, Mr. Chairman,
    and thank you for being gracious with the time. Sam just got
    here.
        Let me say what we found, Mr. Chairman, to be really
    tremendously effective, is Ciro and Henry and I, just literally
    just going down and visiting with your sector chiefs, talking
    to the judges, the marshals, firsthand-- what are your
    problems, what do you need--the sheriffs.
        Each of us individually, Mr. Chairman, can have a
    tremendous impact on helping these good men and women do their
    job, because the officers are risking their lives and doing
    what they need to do. But it is a team effort. We have to make
    sure the marshals and prosecutors are there.
        So I would encourage each one of us to get involved, Sam,
    in the California sector. It is astonishing what we can
    individually do as a member of the Appropriations Committee and
    this Subcommittee just by being here and seeing and hearing
    what you need. We can move mountains. That was really how we
    got Streamline done in Texas, wasn't it? A team effort and your
    local Congressmen getting down there and getting involved.
        Mr. Aguilar. Mr. Chairman, I would just add the following,
    if you would allow me, please. It is critical to understand
    that we need to do more. I am not saying we are finished or
    anywhere close to it. We are moving in that direction. But we
    also need to recognize that the tragic situation of border
    violence is on the south side. It is not spilling over to any
    great degree.
        We are seeing some spillover. If fact, one of the areas is
    against our officers. We have about a 45 percent increase in
    violent assaults against our officers just this year, more than
    300 assaults. But we are stemming it. We are keeping it south,
    and, at the same time, working with our partners in Mexico to
    do everything we can to reduce it even on that side. So, again,
    I just want to put that in context.
        Mr. Culberson. I have a few more in the next round.
        Mr. Price. Mr. Rodriguez.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Let me follow up on the--I had six bridges,
    or six points, not bridges, points of entry that were closed, a
    lot of them during 9/11. I asked to see if you can do an
    assessment for us, especially the three within the big bend
    area, and see in terms of what it would cost to look at the
    possibility of reopening. Because I think it would be even more
    cost-effective for us from a security perspective to have that
    communication back and forth and to see what it would cost,
    number one.

                                 DRUG KINGPINS

        Number two, there was some dialogue regarding the efforts
    being done in terms of going after the drug kingpins and the
    cartels. And I was wondering if you have any knowledge, or you
    engage in, after someone is captured. I know on the Federal
    side, on this side, you get caught, your property is taken away
    and all that. I know that there is a push now to look at people
    on the Mexican side that are related that might have visas, how
    many of those visas have we confiscated, do you know?
        Mr. Aguilar. What you are referring to, sir, is a new
    program we have undertaken probably within the last 4 or 5
    months. I don't have the exact number with me right now. I can
    get that for the record.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Number one, I want to congratulate you on
    that program. I think if anyone gets caught with drugs, their
    visas need to be confiscated and we need to do whatever we can
    there to follow through on that. If you can get us a report
    later on, on that, I would also appreciate it.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: CBP officers do not confiscate visas. An individual's
    visa may be canceled because the individual was deemed inadmissible by
    the CBP officer. The critical function of the CBP officer is to
    determine admission. Our records are designed to capture and preserve
    the inadmissibility determination for future reference not to record
    the status of a document.

                                 BUSINESS VISAS

        Mr. Rodriguez. The other thing I wanted to hear is the
    number of visas that have come in in terms of businesses.
    Because I know we have had, based on commerce, you know, we
    have had some difficulty on the border there with Customs and
    commerce. I know you are involved with the security, but you
    are also involved in making sure those packages come through
    that are appropriate.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rodriguez. We have also a good number of people that
    are starting businesses on this side. Do you have those
    numbers?
        Mr. Aguilar. I can get them for you, sir.
        Mr. Rodriguez. I would appreciate that, because I know we
    have had a huge number in Del Rio, Eagle Pass, San Antonio,
    Austin, El Paso, and we welcome that investment. I just want to
    get a feel in terms of the number that is coming across.
        [The information follows:]

        REPONSE: CBP does not compile, mantain, or report on foreign-based
    or foreign-owned businesses located in the United States.

        Mr. Rodriguez. Some of them, there is no doubt, are fleeing
    the cartels.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rodriguez. And so then at a later time, I want to see
    if we might be able to follow up on, maybe with the appropriate
    people. I am not sure, I apologize, Chief, whether you are the
    best one for those visas to get a good grip in terms of what is
    occurring. Okay.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rodriguez. So you will get back with me on the possible
    cost on the Customs?
        Mr. Aguilar. On the visas, yes, sir; and any kind of costs
    associated with it, yes, sir.
        Mr. Rodriguez. I still go back to we haven't beefed up on
    Customs. We have beefed up on Border Patrol, but we really
    haven't beefed up on Customs.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rodriguez. There is a real need to kind of look at
    that. Those are the ones right on the border.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.

                       TACTICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN ARIZONA

        Mr. Rodriguez. My friend had talks about effective control.
    You are doing a pretty effective job in our area. Arizona, let
    me know, isn't it all fenced in already, all of Arizona?
        Mr. Aguilar. All the fence that we--all the tactical
    infrastructure that we needed to put in place in Arizona is
    just about done, with very few pieces that are lacking.

                             PRESIDIO REPROCESSING

        Mr. Rodriguez. In spite of that, that is where the majority
    are coming in. You had a program where they came in, you
    started it before Christmas, and you were taking them to
    Presidio in my district and unloading a couple of busloads a
    day.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Do we know how many we did like that?
        Mr. Aguilar. I will get you the exact number, sir, but I
    believe it was about 98, 95 to 98 per day. I don't know the
    exact count. It was very successful.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: In FY 2010 to date, 3,314 aliens were repatriated through
    the Presidio OE under ATEP.

        Mr. Rodriguez. You ran it for about 2 or 3 months. You
    stopped it and you started it again; is that correct?
        Mr. Aguilar. The program is ongoing. We are not going into
    Presidio at the present time because we are still working with
    the Government of Mexico.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Are you going into any other city in my
    district?
        Mr. Aguilar. I don't know at this point. I will get that
    answer for you because we are alternating.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Please let me know. That is a good idea.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: Aside from Presidio, there are no other cities or towns
    in TX-23 congressional district where ATEP is being run.

        Mr. Culberson. If the gentleman would yield, Ciro, if I
    could, Mr. Chairman, just to clarify. They are bringing them
    from Arizona to release them in your district?
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rodriguez. No, not in my district. Across the border.
        Mr. Aguilar. Not in his district. In Mexico.
        Mr. Culberson. I wanted to make sure I understood.
        Mr. Rodriguez. But I want you to know, I asked for the
    statistics. Based on the statistics, none of them return back,
    with the exception of one that came in through Laredo. And none
    of them came in, and this is the beauty of it, none of them
    came through our area. They went back to Arizona, the majority
    of them, and a few went to Brownsville. But none of them came
    through our sector.
        Mr. Culberson. Because of Streamline.
        Mr. Aguilar. The recidivism rate, Mr. Chairman, and this is
    an important point here, of those people that were put in the
    Alien Transfer And Exit Program was very, very low. I think it
    was like 3 or 4 percent, compared to a regular recidivism rate
    of up to 28-30 percent. So it was a very successful program.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mr. Farr.

                   ELECTRONIC SYSTEM FOR TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

        Mr. Farr. Thank you very much for being here. I enjoyed the
    evening we had in Tucson when the Chairman led a codel. We did
    actually travel, frankly, all the way from Tucson to San Diego,
    the entire border, and stopping along the way. We couldn't have
    done it without helicopter support. But I learned more about
    that border than I ever imagined.
        I want to shift a moment, because one of my sidebar things
    here is chair of the Travel and Tourism Caucus. You have got a
    tough job. You have the busiest border in the world. You have
    got the border with the contrast of the richest and the poorest
    in the world. You have the most movement of people
    legitimately, commerce of legitimate human beings and
    legitimate traffic commerce. And also probably the biggest
    pressures for illegitimate trafficking of both goods and
    persons. It is a tough job.
        Part of the things we are trying to do is to make America a
    nice place to come to. Obama just signed the Travel Promotion
    Act. It established a $10 fee by incoming, and directed the
    Department to establish a $10 fee for use of Electronic System
    for Travel Authorization, ESTA, in order to fund the travel
    promotion program. And everybody in the industry is interested
    in gearing this up.
        I was wondering, the collection of this fee is going to be
    fundamental to its success because we can't do the promotion
    without the money. I understand that CBP is responsible for
    implementing ESTA. I wondered how long it is going to take to
    get that up and running, and do you foresee hurdles in
    completing this responsibility?
        Mr. Aguilar. We are looking at getting it up and running as
    quickly as possible, sir. I will take that for the record, if
    you don't mind, because I just do not--it is brand new, as you
    know, so I am not that up to speed.
        Mr. Farr. If you are not the one, I am keen on seeing how
    fast we can get that implemented.
        Mr. Aguilar. It will be my responsibility to get it to you
    from my folks, from my experts.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: Any change to the ESTA regulations to require a fee
    collection as mandated under the Travel Promotion Act (P.L. 111-145)
    requires that CBP follow the rulemaking process. CBP is currently
    reviewing the statute and drafting the rulemaking package. The
    rulemaking package must be approved by OMB and published in the Federal
    Register. The timeline for fee collection has not yet been established.

                              GLOBAL ENTRY PROGRAM

        Mr. Farr. Thank you. I also--I really appreciate in your
    testimony that you highlighted the Global Entry program. I
    think this is a great example of another success that you had.
        Mr. Aguilar. Thank you.
        Mr. Farr. The Global Entry program is running at the top 20
    airports dealing with inbound international travelers, and it
    has reduced the wait times for participants. It currently has
    around 40,000 participants.
        I wonder, how can we make it even a bigger success? How
    does the Global Entry enrollment numbers compare to other
    programs like Nexus and Sentry?
        Mr. Aguilar. Unfortunately, the growth rate is not as
    robust as some of the others. But one of the things that is
    absolutely critical is our outreach, our outreach to that pool,
    if you will, of international partners. We are working very
    closely with some of the major international traveling
    locations, if you will. Japan. Canada, of course, have very,
    very high records on that. But in my visit to Los Angeles
    airport last week, I asked that very same question because of
    the obvious benefits to efficiency. And it is the outreach.
        Mr. Farr. Can we grow that program outside of the airports
    themselves? Outside the airport environment, so they can grow
    the enrollment?
        Mr. Aguilar. The actual enrollment process, that is exactly
    one of the questions I asked. In fact, there are some pilot
    tests going on right now specific to that. For example, the
    question that I asked last week was if we could go to a company
    that has 200, 300, 400 international travelers instead of
    expecting them to come to us? And the answer is, we are
    actually testing some of those efforts.
        Mr. Farr. Good. I appreciate that. I would like to know
    about that.
        Mr. Aguilar. We recognize it as something that is critical
    to making more efficient use of our limited resources at our
    ports of entry.

                                IMMIGRATION LAWS

        Mr. Farr. Let me just ask you sort of the big question
    here. In September 2009, Secretary Napolitano said, Over the
    past 10 months we have worked to improve immigration
    enforcement and border security within the current legal
    framework. But the more work we do, the more it becomes clear
    that the laws themselves need to be reformed.
        How true is this statement for the CBP and what changes in
    our immigration laws do you need in order to do your job as
    effectively as possible?
        We are starting to deal with immigration reform. If that
    immigration reform, if we don't deal with it, I guess, the
    other question is how will that impact on your Agency's ability
    to do its job? When we did that border visit, it was very clear
    by the officers who are trying to enforce this law and just
    saying, You know, we need law changes. We cannot do this.
        We cannot just continue--of course, the economy was very
    high and the interest in coming over was just at an all-time
    high. That has changed with the slump. But I think it is very
    incumbent for us facing this is to get from the officers on the
    ground how important it is for us to make our laws right.
        Mr. Aguilar. Laws play an absolutely critical part in our
    ability and capabilities to bring security to the border, both
    at the ports and between the ports and actually from foreign
    locations also. Having said that, there is limited input that I
    can give because of my position. I am a career officer.

                             RECIDIVISM PERCENTAGE

        Mr. Farr. How about what is the percentage of people that
    are coming back who have come to the United States, are living
    here, working illegally, but working. I live in Salinas Valley
    in Monterey County. We probably have the largest number of
    undocumented workers in the United States. You couldn't get a
    salad in this country without those workers. Agriculture is
    trying--they are paying them good wages. It isn't like that
    because they are undocumented that they are getting treated
    poorly. They actually get a lot of benefits as they work. Some
    of these families have been around for decades. They came over
    in the old Bracero program. They are really keen on finding
    legitimacy.
        So how much do you think of the traffic coming over is
    people returning back to their families, going home for
    Navidad, for the Christmas season, coming back? Because you
    talked about the recidivism. That is the ones you catch. Has
    anybody looked at the percentage of just people living in the
    United States who are trying to get back to the United States?
        Mr. Aguilar. I don't have that number, sir. I don't know if
    anybody has actually taken a look at it. But you asked a very
    specific question that I can give you an anecdotal answer to.
        I have been in the Border Patrol now for going on 32 years.
    It used to be a cyclical return to Mexico because they could.
    And because they could, they would cause--the chaotic situation
    of the inflow would be such that criminal organizations would
    take advantage of that and exploit the flow, the chaotic
    situation, in smuggling people, narcotics, and other bad things
    into this country.
        Because of what this body has done (given us the resources
    and given us the capabilities and capacities), that no longer
    happens. People are no longer going back for Christmas or
    Easter because they can't come back.
        Mr. Farr. They won't go back for funerals or for anything.
        Mr. Aguilar. Funerals, I would think they are going to try
    more than for Christmas. But it is no longer easy to get back
    in this country illegally, whether it is at the ports or
    between the ports of entry.
        In 1999, my first year as a Chief in Tucson, AZ, we
    apprehended more than 600,000 people crossing illegally at the
    ports of entry, most of which occurred within about a 12-to-18-
    mile area. Last year, in its entirety, along the 2,000 miles of
    the border with Mexico, the U.S. Border Patrol apprehended
    565,000. The drop has been dramatic.
        Now, the good news is that apprehension of narcotics is
    going up because we are now able to pay attention to the other
    illegal activity going on--that chaotic flow of people coming
    into the country. So it is no longer easy for people crossing
    illegally between the ports of entry or at the ports of entry.
    We have, in fact, increased the security of our borders.
        Now, that has not come without anticipated costs. As we
    speak, we are seeing the boats going up on the Pacific Coast,
    going as far north toward Los Angeles, 40-45 miles, because
    they can no longer go between the ports of entry. But we are
    working with the Coast Guard on that. We are catching people.
    We are apprehending narcotics. We are apprehending smuggled
    goods. So that cycle has been broken.
        Mr. Price. The time of the gentleman has expired. Thank
    you.
        We will undertake a brief final round, Mr. Commissioner, if
    that is all right.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.

                           SECURE FREIGHT INITIATIVE

        Mr. Price. I want to shift topics in terms of my own
    questioning, except I do want to say that on this extended
    discussion we have had over international cargo screening, I
    hope the message is clear. We have, for certainly a number of
    years, encouraged on the part of the Department a
    straightforward, candid, approach with us about the
    authorization mandate you face and the extent to which that is
    feasible at any reasonable cost. That is, of course, related to
    the judgments you have made and that are reflected in your
    budget about the Secure Freight Initiative pilots overseas. We
    continue to encourage that candor and that kind of realistic
    long-term projection of the approach that you propose that the
    country take.
        At the same time, we do need to have a long-term plan that
    addresses the security needs and that mirrors the commitment
    you have articulated here again this morning to do as much of
    this work overseas as we feasibly can do, understanding fully
    the benefits of that.
        Frankly, the justification we have of the CSI plans and the
    cuts that are included there doesn't fill the bill in terms of
    giving us that longer-term perspective and, of course, we need
    that report. We need the report mandated by the fiscal 2010
    appropriations bill, which presumably will do this, and more,
    in terms of giving us some basis on which to see where we are
    headed and to make these budget decisions for the next fiscal
    year.
        So I hope that all aspects of this message are clear coming
    out of this hearing today.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.

                        CBP OFFICERS FUNDED BY USER FEES

        Mr. Price. Let me turn to the staffing issues and your
    declining fee revenues. That is a matter, I know, of
    considerable importance. CBP officer and agricultural
    specialist staffing, of course, is critical to enforcement of
    our laws at the ports of entry to detecting and stopping the
    smuggling of people, weapons or contraband, to ensuring that
    commerce is free of dangerous or unhealthy threats, and
    efficiently collecting tariffs and duties. In all these
    functions, the staffing is critical.
        On the positive side, good, adequate, professional staffing
    is key to speeding goods and people through our ports. And we
    get a lot of reports that think CBP is still shorthanded. You
    are hearing this from Mr. Rodriguez and lots of other sources.
        Nonetheless, you are going to experience a net reduction of
    500 CBP officers this year. The personnel levels are down 300
    from last September. That is a result of budget austerity and
    declining fee collections. Almost 10,000 CBP employees and a
    third of CBP officers are funded by user fees. That is the nub
    of the problem. That is what we want to get at here. I
    understand that.
        In fiscal 2000, CBP expected a 3 percent increase in fees,
    but they declined instead. And this looks to be a trend for
    this year and next, unless you can give us some information to
    the contrary.
        Mr. Aguilar. I wish I could.
        Mr. Price. Hence, my questions. What impact are declining
    fee collections going to have on staffing in fiscal year 2011?
    Assuming that is an adverse impact, how are you going to deal
    with it? How are you going to reverse it; to what degree are
    you going to propose to reverse it?
        Secondly, will your realignment of funds and your
    restoration of CBP officer positions be able to prevent
    reduction in CBP officers at the ports? Even in the short-term,
    what are you going to be able to do?
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir. And, again, I thank you for asking
    that question because, as you stated, Mr. Chairman, the way
    that 37 percent of our CBP officers and agriculture specialists
    are funded is a real concern. Funding from that perspective
    does not lend itself to a Homeland Security way of doing
    business. We cannot be dependent on economic fluctuations to
    drive our ability to pay our people. So I state that for the
    record because it is a real concern as to how that portion of
    our workforce is funded.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: From FY 2008 to FY 2009 there was a decrease of $105
    million in user fee collections and continued global economic weakness
    could result in a further decrease of $20-$50M from FY 2009 to FY 2010.
    This creates a total from FY 2008 to FY 2010 of $125-$155 million. In
    FY 2010, the user fees were planned to support 9,684 positions. The
    decline of $125-$155 million would equate to about 870 to 1080 of those
    positions, as well as related non-salary support costs.
        While Users Fees are impacted by the economy, enforcement
    activities are not. A decline in the numbers of inspections performed
    does not correlate with the number of enforcement activities performed
    at ports of entry, These enforcement activities are seizures,
    penalties, and arrests related to trade compliance in addition to
    secondary inspections of non-compliant passengers. In many cases, CBP
    enforcement activities have grown, not declined. Across the wide
    variety of enforcement activities, CBP has experienced a nearly 7%
    increase in enforcement activities from FY 2008 to FY 2009.
    Approximately 37% of the CBP officer's salaries have been historically
    funded from user fees, and with this decline in user fee collections,
    CBP has reduced travel, training, other operational support, and
    enhancements to existing capabilities in enforcement, travel, and trade
    facilitation.

        Last year we fell by 8 percent on the user fee account.
    That translates to about $100 million. In Fiscal Year 2011, we
    are going to take about $46 million of appropriated funds and
    apply it toward CBP officers, which translates to about 318-320
    full-time equivalents. So that will occur.
        In addition to that, we have looked at the situation on
    exemption for Canada, Mexico and most of the Caribbean. If that
    exemption went away, that would actually add another $100
    million to $125 million per year into user fee, if we continue
    with user fee. So those are all of these things we are looking
    at.
        So will it be a full reversal? Probably not. But taking the
    appropriated funds that we can afford to take and applying them
    toward this is going to be one of the actions that we take.
        The realignment costs, I am not going to try to fool
    anybody, they are going to have to come from somewhere. It is
    going to cost somewhere else. Those are some of the things we
    are looking at now. As to just exactly what it is, we have been
    very careful and very measured in realigning those costs to
    ensure that the impacts would be minimal. But the real problem
    here is the way that we fund 37 percent of our workforce, sir.
        Mr. Price. Well, I appreciate the straightforwardness of
    that statement. It is a problem we share.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Price. But we are going to have to deal with this near-
    term decrease in fees and the kind of implications they have
    for the budget. We have got it right. So to the extent you wish
    to furnish further updates or elaborate on the answer you have
    just given me, we will----
        Mr. Aguilar. I would welcome that opportunity.
        Mr. Price. Mr. Culberson.

                       CUTS TO AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS

        Mr. Culberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chief, you correctly pointed out the effectiveness of the
    work that you are doing, your officers, the infrastructure, the
    money Congress has sent you, the work you are doing. In many
    areas of the border, you have got effective control, you are
    seeing a drop in crossings and pushing people into other
    sectors.
        I wanted to ask you, if I could, to comment and tell us in
    your opinion the effect of the proposed cuts to the Coast Guard
    and to CBP's Air and Marine operations. We see the budget for
    fiscal year 2011 proposes cutting Border Patrol's Air and
    Marine personnel by 3.6 percent. It looks like that would
    result in the loss of, we estimate, 68 pilots. You would lose
    20 marine interdiction agents, 56 support personnel. These are
    positions that were actually requested by the administration in
    the last budget.
        This year's budget proposed by the White House would cut
    operational personnel of the Coast Guard by more than 1,100,
    which is a real concern, and deactivate 19 operational
    components. They propose to cut funding for your Air and Marine
    procurement by 3.2 percent. They are trying to give you a $2.6
    million cut in logistics and maintenance; cutting Coast Guard
    acquisitions by 10 percent, more than 10 percent; and yet
    increase information technology positions by 950 in the Coast
    Guard civilian workforce by 349.
        How would those funding and personnel reductions impact the
    work that you do, and what sort of effect would you see along
    the borders as a result of what the budget proposes?
        Mr. Aguilar. Well, let me begin by stating that I would not
    feel comfortable nor would I propose to answer for Commandant
    Thad Allen on the Coast Guard issues. I would say, with the
    Coast Guard, we have a very, very positive working
    relationship. Everywhere that we can work together, we do,
    whether it is on the Canadian border, eastern coast, western
    coast, San Diego, Rio Grande Valley, in all of these areas, we
    work very, very closely.
        Mr. Culberson. Well, what effect would cuts like those
    have, in your opinion?
        Mr. Aguilar. I don't know because I don't know what those
    cuts translate to or where they translate to, sir. But I will
    say on the issue of Air and Marine, I want--I am sorry?
        Mr. Culberson. If you have fewer assets out there, the
    concern is, of course, you are going to see an increase in drug
    smuggling, because you are pushing them out to sea. And the
    Coast Guard, they propose to cut Coast Guard. That logically
    means you are going to see an increase in smuggling in Coast
    Guard jurisdictions.
        Mr. Aguilar. In Coast Guard jurisdictions, we will see an
    uptick, as we are already seeing. That does not translate to us
    not working closer with Coast Guard.
        Mr. Culberson. Certainly. You guys do a great job with
    that. That is not the issue.
        Mr. Aguilar. And the Coast Guard engaging, for example--
    and, again, I don't want to speak for the Commandant, he is a
    good personal friend, but I don't think he would appreciate
    that.
        Mr. Culberson. That causes some problems.
        Mr. Aguilar. Well, he is working with SEMAR (The Mexican
    Navy), and things of this nature. We are working very closely
    with port authorities, with maritime authorities and things of
    that nature to get us what we need. But, again, I don't want to
    go into that realm because I just don't have enough information
    on it.
        Mr. Culberson. And you won't be able to fly as many
    surveillance hours. You are going to have to cut your
    surveillance hours.
        Mr. Aguilar. Let me address that because I spoke to General
    Kostelnik this morning before I came over here, and this is the
    way he described it. And I would agree with him.
        In the area of the Air environment, more is always going to
    be good, more capability. Now, capability does not necessarily
    translate to either just pilots, UAS pilots or aerial
    platforms. It is the right mix. And then having said that, I
    asked him, ``Are we actually going to take cuts?'' And he said
    it is not actually cuts; it is a cut to the anticipated
    enhancements. So the assets that are on the ground right now
    are not going to be cut.
        Mr. Culberson. You can't do all that you had planned to do.
        Mr. Aguilar. Well, with the enhancements we expected, yes.

                          IMPACT OF DECLARING AMNESTY

        Mr. Culberson. We will do all we can to help you with that.
    I know we are in the final round, but I wanted to ask, it is a
    fact we have seen throughout history, whenever there is a
    discussion in Congress that there may be an amnesty, we are
    going to legalize illegals, there is a surge in crossings. If
    you can again ballpark anecdotally, quantify what type of
    percentage increase do you typically see in the number of
    crossings? How big has that surge historically been when there
    is a discussion of amnesty?
        Mr. Aguilar. I would not even venture a guess, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. You have seen a surge. Every time there is a
    big discussion, lots of press about there is going to be
    amnesty, you have seen a surge.
        Mr. Aguilar. There is activity on both sides of the border.
        Mr. Culberson. You have seen an increase as a result the
    discussion and the debate?
        Mr. Aguilar. There is activity; yes, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. As a result of the debate.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes.

                             ARRESTS IN EACH SECTOR

        Mr. Culberson. And if I could also, Mr. Chairman, Chief, I
    would be very grateful if your staff could provide Jeff in my
    office with the number--what I am looking for is to try to get
    a handle on the current state of affairs, the number of arrests
    in each sector, and, in that sector, if you are arresting one
    out of three, one out of four, one out of five, best estimate.
        And then, of those arrested, Chief, the third thing I would
    really like to get a handle on is what percentage of those
    folks that are apprehended are actually being prosecuted in
    each sector. And then work with your office to try to help you
    identify what the problem is.
        Because again, I keep going back to Tucson, because it is
    so awful. Again, it looks like the most recent numbers we have,
    Mr. Chairman, are fiscal year 2008. Chief, is it still your
    understanding if you are arrested in the Tucson sector carrying
    less than 500 pounds of dope, the U.S. attorney will not
    prosecute? What is the threshold?
        Mr. Aguilar. I do not believe that there is actually a
    hard-and-fast threshold.
        Mr. Culberson. A couple of years ago it was 500.
        Mr. Aguilar. There was one. There was one.
        Mr. Culberson. There is no hard-and-fast today?
        Mr. Aguilar. That I know of, no. I will check, but I do not
    believe there is a hard-and-fast threshold. If I might, sir, a
    very quick story.
        Dennis Burke, the sitting United States Attorney, was out
    in the field with us at one of our remote locations, working.
    To his credit, he was out there; he wanted to see how we
    operated. He was on horseback, and he was out there, I believe,
    for about 6 to 8 hours, to track down, along with one of our
    officers, a load of dope, 250 pounds more or less, give or take
    a few pounds. When he recognized that under existing
    thresholds, that amount of work would not be prosecuted, that
    is when he really started taking a look at that situation.
        Mr. Culberson. I am so glad to hear that, and I am so sorry
    I couldn't go with you, Sam, and Mr. Chairman, to go to Tucson.
    It was just impossible for my schedule. Because it has got real
    problems and it is a team effort in there. But I would be
    grateful if you could provide me with those numbers.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: CBP does not control the threshold for narcotics
    prosecution. CBP reports all suspect loads that have the potential to
    be part of an investigative operation to U.S. Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement (ICE). ICE presents the information to the Assistant U.S.
    Attorney, who decides if it will be accepted for prosecution.

                               MERIDA INITIATIVE

        Mr. Culberson. If I could ask, could you let us know what
    happened to the Merida Initiative that Bush was pushing? I
    think it wound up being, the money or equipment we provided to
    the Mexican Government on Merida, I think it was $1.3 billion
    worth of equipment. What happened? Where did it go? What kind
    of equipment did they get and where did it go?
        Mr. Aguilar. That is under the auspices of the Department
    of State, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. All of it went through the Department of
    State?
        Mr. Aguilar. As a funding mechanism; yes, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. We will have some other questions for the
    record, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank you very much.

                        COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION POLICE

        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        I turn to Mr. Farr to close out. I too recollect that visit
    very acutely. We did learn a lot. I appreciate, Mr.
    Commissioner, that you are not in a position to answer the
    broad policy questions about immigration reform necessarily.
        But I do remember from that visit remarking that we never
    met a Border Patrol agent that said this was about enforcement
    alone, that in fact you learn just the opposite; that unless
    and until there is a more comprehensive fix, a more
    comprehensive balancing of our official policy and what it
    permits and our labor market needs, that all the fences and all
    the enforcement in the world aren't going to represent a
    complete solution. I know I heard that many times on that
    visit, and I have heard it many times since. So we understand
    here on this committee that we are dealing with only a piece of
    this issue.
        I hope we have dealt with it responsibly and well. We take
    enforcement very seriously.
        Mr. Aguilar. Absolutely.
        Mr. Price. But I for one have never had the slightest
    delusion that this was all that we needed to do in this
    Congress and in this country.
        Mr. Farr. Mr. Culberson, the answer to your question is in
    today's paper. Secretary Clinton is in Mexico today, and the
    complaint from Mexico is, ``We never got the money,'' and the
    response was, ``We are going to get it to you ASAP.''
        Mr. Culberson. Thank you.
        Mr. Farr. Also I wanted to correct something. I think you
    led the witness a little bit on this surge issue on when there
    is discussion of immigration reform. As you recall, in order to
    apply for sort of temporary status, because you have to go
    through background checks, you have to prove that you have had
    a history of being here. You do not grandfather in anybody who
    got here yesterday. They couldn't qualify for the old amnesty
    program. You had to have proof of work and residence prior to
    the law, in fact, months before the law was ever adopted.
        The issue on prosecution, it is the same at home. It is
    threshold value. It is what is the value? We saw in the
    marijuana locker all these backpacks that were seized, and the
    issue for the U.S. attorney was that the value of that backpack
    didn't meet a threshold level to go in and prosecute.
        You find that in your domestic courts as well as your
    border issues. Our prosecutors don't prosecute misdemeanors or
    small crimes, because they have got so much work to do with
    large crimes.
        I am interested in this. I think if you are going to grow
    the border, it first has to start with getting our own house in
    order. We have been very interested in integrating with other
    entities like AFT on the arms going south and working with
    Border Patrol and then working in a collaborative way so we
    could stop this. You know, our side of the smuggling out or
    smuggling into Mexico, those arms are being bought on our side
    of the border. I think in order to have credibility in this
    border issue of smuggling from Mexico, we also have to be
    honest that, one, the demand side is on this side of the
    border; the money is on this side of the border; and the guns
    are on this side of the border. Those are things that are
    getting back--that money is getting into the system because of
    our use of drugs.
        Hopefully this health care bill, it might be very
    interesting. We allow for the treatment of drug addiction. It
    has to be in every insurance policy now. It is automatic. So
    one of the difficulties we have had is getting people access to
    treatment. Now there is going to be a huge market for
    treatment, so there is going to be a lot of growth in treatment
    programs. I think that is one of the real benefits of the
    health care bill we signed.
        What do you have to pay to come across to the coyotes now?
    What is the going price?

                            COST FOR BEING SMUGGLED

        Mr. Aguilar. For being smuggled?
        Mr. Farr. Yes.
        Mr. Aguilar. It all depends on where you are. In Tucson it
    could be--for an illegal person from Mexico wanting to get to
    Phoenix, it would be $1,500 to $2,000. If you are talking about
    a Korean, you are talking about as much as $60,000 into the
    interior of the United States. If you are talking about a
    special interest country alien, it could be higher.
        Mr. Farr. So how many do you say you think made it across,
    or you seized? What percentage of those getting across are
    seized?
        Mr. Aguilar. I am sorry, sir. I don't understand the
    question.
        Mr. Farr. You mentioned how many are detained.
        Mr. Aguilar. Five hundred and fifty-six thousand, last
    year.
        Mr. Farr. Five hundred and fifty-six thousand. And what
    percentage of that is--of the whole total?
        Mr. Aguilar. I didn't give an answer to that because we
    haven't found anybody to include the major universities in this
    country to approximate.
        Mr. Farr. So we don't know whether it is two-thirds, 90
    percent, 80 percent.
        Mr. Aguilar. Or if it is 2 percent. We don't know.
        Mr. Farr. But if it is half a million people paying $2,000
    each, averaged out that is a lot of money.
        Mr. Aguilar. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Farr. In fact, I remember on that trip we were told
    that there is more money being made in smuggling people across
    the border than drugs.
        Mr. Aguilar. I wouldn't doubt that.

                      POTENTIAL CORRUPTION OF CBP OFFICERS

        Mr. Farr. So if there is that much money in people and they
    are getting through, there is some question of what about you
    know, what is going on? Are any of our cops being bought off?
    Are they being paid? And the question goes to the Office of
    Internal Affairs.
        Because, as I understand, the President's budget is cutting
    that funding by $250,000. Meanwhile, we have doubled the Border
    Patrol size in the last 5 years. You are struggling to
    adequately train the new officers. I mean, there is a lot
    coming in. It is pressure on the system. I understand there is
    a very low ratio of supervisors to the novice new agents, and
    Internal Affairs mission to oversee the integrity of this is
    critical and is strapped. Do you know what the budget is for
    that and how many staff investigative complaints and concerns
    are they being able to deal with?
        Mr. Aguilar. I don't know the exact numbers, up-to-date
    numbers.
        I can tell you this, sir, a couple of things I think are
    critical. The Internal Affairs Office of CBP is absolutely
    critical to our operations. We recognize that we operate under
    one of the most vulnerable environments there is to operate in
    from a law enforcement perspective: Customs. You are guarding a
    border. Sometimes you are working remotely and things of this
    nature.
        But it is also important to note that what we do--and I am
    talking now from the approach of the law enforcement community.
    As we approach corruption from the point of being reactive,
    which is absolutely critical, we need to do that, and we need
    to do more of that. One of the focuses that we are trying to
    bring to CBP is that we be as preemptive as possible, we be as
    proactive in keeping corruption to the lowest level possible
    and be more reactive and sustain a culture of intolerance to
    corruption. So it is a full court press across.
        The other thing that I think is critical to note is that it
    is not just Internal Affairs that has responsibility for
    corruption or ethical oversight, integrity oversight. It is
    Internal Affairs. It is the IG. It is FBI Corruption Task
    Forces. It is ISO PR. It is everybody else that--it is the
    local task forces, also.
        So, yes, we have gone down if the number is--I believe you
    are correct--250,000, but we are also augmenting by other
    means, such as training, than just being reactive. We are
    concentrating on training our people on the value of
    intolerance for corruption. So it is that comprehensive
    approach that we have to take a look at.
        Mr. Farr. Enough resources in that area? Do you have
    enough?
        Mr. Aguilar. Same answer I gave Mr. Culberson. More is
    always better. We are doing everything we can in looking for
    more effective ways to do what we are doing today with the
    capacity that we have.
        Mr. Farr. Do I have any more time, Mr. Chairman? I have one
    question.
        Mr. Price. One minute.

                            JOINT POWERS AGREEMENTS

        Mr. Farr. The other thing I am very interested in, I talked
    to Mr. Culberson. I come from local government. What we have
    done in local government and what we are trying to deal with in
    region and we have got all different kinds, we create these
    joint powers agreements. And my instinct on being on the border
    was why don't we create these joint powers agreements between
    border cities. I mean, it is infrastructure on both sides.
        And, as you pointed out, I mean, ideally, if Mexico had the
    economy that we had and the middle class that we have, there
    wouldn't be any desire to cross this border. I mean, Europe has
    open borders all over Europe; and you have got southern Europe,
    where there is still a lot of poverty. That doesn't mean they
    have to put up a fence between Italy and Switzerland and
    Austria and so on. Those are open borders.
        It would be remarkable if Canada, the United States, and
    Mexico were just a uniform common market and could compete with
    the rest of the world, but we are not there. But little by
    little it seems to me if we are just repairing one side of the
    river, so to speak, one side of the border, and the other is
    left in poverty and doesn't have water and doesn't have sewer
    and doesn't have the kinds of things that lead to quality of
    life and to investment.
        Maybe we ought to be building joint powers agreements. I
    think California did that with Tijuana. It is their sewage, but
    it came through our--their pipes came through our State. We
    ended up building a treatment plant for their sewage, even
    though it was on the other side of the border.
        Those are the kinds of projects it seems to me along the
    border that we ought to be more engaged in in trying to develop
    an infrastructure that works for both sides, and I wonder if
    you have any feelings about that.
        Mr. Aguilar. Let me comment. I don't have an answer, but
    let me comment.
        Mr. Farr. But you have some law enforcement interactions,
    don't you? You have joint meetings with law enforcement on the
    other side?

                                   TERRORISM

        Mr. Aguilar. Absolutely. Yes, sir. Anything that our
    country, the municipalities, that the border region population
    can do to reduce the exploitation possibilities of our border
    is going to increase the security of our Nation.
        One thing that we haven't talked about here, which I find
    kind of ironic at times, and it is not anybody's fault, is that
    we have spent a lot of time on immigration, on narcotics, on
    prosecutions of those. What is very critically important is the
    security of our Nation from the standpoint that people who are
    looking to harm our country do not exploit that flow, that
    chaotic information, those criminal enterprises that now
    operate to get into this country.
        So I just want to point that out. It is about all threats.
    It is not just about immigration. It is not just about
    narcotics. Those two are critically important, but it is about
    securing our Nation from all threats. And reducing to the
    degree possible the flow of illegal people, the flow of illegal
    narcotics and any other illegal commodity increases multi-fold
    our capabilities to bring greater security to this Nation.
        And it doesn't begin and doesn't end at the border. It
    begins pre-departure, points of origin, transit, at arrival,
    and it continues into our final destination.
        So Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to make that
    statement because I think it is critical and too often it just
    gets lost.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mr. Culberson. Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. May I join with you on that? Just a quick
    follow-up that I think you and Sam will find very interesting
    and worthwhile, very quickly, if I may.
        Mr. Price. Yes.
        Mr. Culberson. Thank you so much.
        Chief, you bring up a great point that I needed to ask you
    about, but I had to get at some of the other fiscal issues.
        To follow up on Sam's question, CBP reported the GAO
    released a report in August, 2009, that said that the Border
    Patrol had reported that in fiscal year 2008 there were three
    individuals encountered by the Border Patrol at Southwest
    border checkpoints--this is a direct quote--who are identified
    as persons linked to terrorism. Who were they and what links
    did they have to what terrorist organizations?
        Mr. Aguilar. I think that goes to closed session, if you
    don't mind, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. That would be I think helpful, Mr. Chairman,
    if we could at some point.
        Mr. Price. We will get that information out in a different
    setting.
        Mr. Culberson. Thank you.
        Mr. Price. Let me thank all our members and thank you,
    Commissioner, for your appearance here today, your service,
    your continuing service. We look forward to working with you as
    we formulate our 2011 budget.
        Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Price. The Subcommittee is adjourned.

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                                              Thursday, March 18, 2010.

        FY2011 BUDGET HEARING FOR UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
                                  ENFORCEMENT

                                    WITNESS

    JOHN MORTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
        ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

                   Opening Statement of Chairman David Price

        Mr. Price. The Subcommittee will come to order. Good
    afternoon. Welcome to this once-postponed, once-delayed
    hearing. We are finally underway here, and we are very glad to
    welcome today Assistant Secretary John Morton from the U.S.
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE, to discuss his
    agency's $5.5 billion request for fiscal year 2011.
        Overall, the ICE discretionary budget grows by $87 million,
    or 1.6 percent, in 2011 with proposals that would expand the
    successful Border Enforcement Security Task Force, or BEST
    program; invest in improved ICE information technology systems;
    grow ICE's Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Center; and
    hire additional investigatory support personnel.
        Other key programs, such as Secure Communities and
    alternatives to detention, have no real budgetary increase.
        Three years ago when I became Chairman of this
    Subcommittee, I challenged ICE to prioritize the identification
    and removal from our country of illegal immigrants who have
    been convicted of serious crimes. Astonishingly, at that time,
    and I will never forget that initial hearing, the Director of
    ICE was unable to give this Subcommittee even an estimate of
    the number of illegal immigrants that might be in penal
    custody, let alone guarantee that all of those convicted of
    violent crimes would be deported at the end of their sentence.
        While this problem is still not solved, the Subcommittee
    has provided the resources for ICE to make significant progress
    finding aliens in penal custody, and removing them at the
    completion of their criminal sentences.
        ICE's performance statistics bear this out. Between 2002
    and 2007, ICE increased criminal alien removals by only 7
    percent per year, even as non-criminal deportations surged 22
    percent annually. In contrast, criminal alien removals
    increased 12 percent in 2008, another 19 percent in 2009.
    Furthermore, the 2011 budget estimates that after full rollout
    of the Secure Communities program, 80 percent of ICE detention
    capacity will be dedicated to criminals awaiting removal from
    this country. These are real results that show ICE's commitment
    to target its resources based on threats to our society. And I
    would note these changes have been made while maintaining the
    Department's catch-and-return policy, the key element of
    maintaining control of our nation's Southwest border.
        Another key ICE success over the last year has been a
    strengthened presence along our nation's Southwest border, and
    the expansion of joint operations with Mexican law enforcement.
    These efforts have been critical to containing the drug
    violence that continues to plague our southern neighbor.
        In April we will hold a hearing specifically focused on
    Southwest border activities, so I will reserve further
    questions about ICE's anti-smuggling, counter-drug, and gang-
    destruction investigation until that time.
        During our hearings last year, the Subcommittee heard about
    improvements ICE planned for its detention facilities,
    particularly in detainee medical care. I had hoped that in this
    hearing we would be applauding the significant progress made
    since then. Unfortunately, many of the promised solutions to
    this issue, such as a new electronic medical records system,
    are still years away from implementation.
        A study of ICE medical services that this Subcommittee
    funded in fiscal year 2008 has yet to be completed. Other
    system reforms advocated, by Dr. Dora Schriro's comprehensive
    analysis of ICE's detention facilities are being challenged by
    ICE field office directors as unworkable or inappropriate.
        So, Mr. Secretary, we want to know more about how you plan
    to accelerate progress in this area, and when we will begin to
    see meaningful reform of the ICE detention system.
        Another area requiring Subcommittee attention is ICE's
    international operations, particularly the Agency's Visa
    Security Unit, or VSU, program. In last year's House Bill and
    in the final Appropriations Act, Congress increased funding for
    VSUs so that ICE could expand its presence overseas, and review
    more visa applications from high-risk countries. Although ICE
    has identified 46 countries it considers at high risk for
    terrorist travel or other visa fraud, it has established units
    in only 12 countries, and has just received State Department
    approval to expand to three more in 2010. The 2011 budget
    proposes no additional Visa Security Units.
        Assistant Secretary Morton, we will need to discuss this
    further, both to understand the pace at which ICE is expanding
    this program, and what is delaying the establishment of VSUs in
    more countries.
        Finally, Mr. Secretary, we would like to discuss your plans
    for the Alternatives to Detention Program, with which ICE keeps
    track of individuals whose cases are working their way through
    the Immigration Court removals process but who pose no risk to
    society. It is a successful program. It has an appearance rate
    of over 90 percent at final hearings. Also important for this
    Subcommittee is the fact that it costs much less per day to
    monitor individuals through this program than to keep them in
    detention.
        Every year that I have been Chairman of this Subcommittee
    we have seen to it that the budget for Alternatives to
    Detention has increased over the request level, both because
    the program is cost-effective, and because it is more humane
    than locking up everyone who appeals their status in
    Immigration Court. In the last two Appropriations Acts,
    Congress has required ICE to submit a plan for nationwide
    deployment of the Alternatives to Detention program. A draft
    report was delivered to Subcommittee staff last month, but we
    have yet to receive an official submission from the Department.
    Given projections that the majority of immigration detention
    space will soon be filled with criminal aliens, I am concerned
    about what appears to be resistance to expanding this important
    program. So Mr. Secretary, we hope you can clarify ICE's plans
    for Alternatives to Detention.
        Mr. Morton, we look forward to reviewing these details of
    your budget, and undoubtedly there will be a wide range of
    questions about ICE operations. As you are fully aware, the
    policy area that you are in charge of elicits strong opinions
    from many corners of American society. But despite the concerns
    I have raised, I am grateful for the leadership you have
    brought to the Agency. Like the tough, seasoned prosecutor that
    you are, you have set clear priorities for ICE, starting with
    the imperative to keep the American people safe. We look
    forward to continuing to work with you to help your Agency
    fulfill its mission.
        I am going to ask you to summarize your statement with a
    five-minute oral presentation. We will enter your full written
    testimony into the hearing record.
        Before we begin, let me ask our distinguished Ranking
    Member from Kentucky, Mr. Rogers, for his opening remarks.
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               Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers

        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, Secretary
    Morton. It is good to have you here with us, your first blush
    at this, I think.
        It looked like we were afraid to have you because we
    postponed, and then we delayed today. But I assure you, we are
    happy to be here.
        As I reviewed ICE's body of work over the past year, as
    well as the Agency's budget request for 2011, I see a rather
    disturbing trend. On the one hand, ICE has laudably stepped up
    its efforts on criminal aliens, illicit trade, Southwest border
    enforcement.
        But on the other hand, ICE has noticeably curtailed its
    enforcement actions on illegal immigration, under the guise of
    prioritizing criminal aliens. What the Administration calls its
    smart-tough enforcement policy.
        So the way I see it, it looks as though you are an enforcer
    trapped in a poorly veiled administrative effort at so-called
    immigration reform. But last I checked, our immigration laws
    have not changed. Minding our borders and the people who enter
    our nation very much matters to our homeland security.
        First and foremost, ICE's principal mission is to target
    the people, money, and materials that support terrorism. Look
    no further than the 9/11 hijackers, none of which would have
    been categorized as criminal aliens. Rather, all of the 9/11
    terrorists exploited the legal immigration system, and several
    were here illegally.
        And then just this past year, we have seen three serious
    terrorism cases that involved individuals who could not be
    categorized as criminal aliens, who all exploited the legal
    immigration system, as well. The Zazi case in Denver, and the
    Smadi case in Dallas, and the Christmas Day attack over
    Detroit.
        In fact, the Smadi case in Dallas involved a Jordanian who
    had overstayed his tourist visa, and was therefore here
    illegally. So we cannot allow a preoccupation with criminal
    aliens to obscure other critical ICE missions; namely, those
    missions pertaining to what should be an unrelenting effort to
    disrupt and interdict terrorists.
        Secondly, immigration matters to our economy. At a time of
    painfully high unemployment, how can we allow illegal
    immigrants to take jobs away from Americans who need them?
    Stats do not lie; from 2008 to 2009, ICE's non-criminal
    administrative arrests during work-site enforcement operations
    declined by more than 68 percent. It trickled down to just 24
    arrests this past January. Hardly any.
        Furthermore, current detention bed space capacity is not
    being fully utilized. Out of the 33,400 detention beds ICE is
    currently able to use, only 29,192 beds are filled. What these
    facts tell me is that ICE is not vigorously enforcing our
    immigration laws, or fully using all the tools at its disposal
    to deter illegal aliens.
        Finally, immigration matters to the disruption of criminal
    activity. In our hearing on Southwest border enforcement last
    fall, our witness testified that ICE needs to use its
    administrative authorities to apprehend and deport dangerous
    individuals affiliated with criminal gangs and illicit trade,
    but individuals who may not be criminal aliens, by the
    Administration's definition, but are extremely dangerous
    individuals nonetheless.
        In summary, when I look at the shift in ICE's focus over
    the last year, I am deeply concerned. At best, it appears as
    though immigration enforcement is being shelved, and the
    Administration is attempting to enact some sort of selective
    amnesty, under the cover of prioritization.
        At worst, however, the Administration's apathy towards
    robust immigration enforcement is perhaps making it easier for
    terrorists and hardened criminals to embed themselves in our
    communities. Either way, I will not stand for it.
        Secretary Morton, I know you have a tough job. I think it
    is getting made tougher by the Department's lack of planning on
    SBINet, and proposed cuts to the Coast Guard's drug
    interdiction capabilities, two things that will now only put
    more pressure on the border.
        So what we need to know here today is that ICE is using
    every tool at its disposal to fulfill its mandates and improve
    our homeland security, because far too much is at stake.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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                            Statement of John Morton

        Mr. Price. Thank you. Mr. Morton, please proceed.
        Mr. Morton. Thank you very much, Chairman Price. Thank you,
    Member Rogers, and the distinguished members of the
    Subcommittee.
        In light of the overall budget challenges, U.S. Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement's (ICE's) request this year is
    primarily designed to sustain our existing criminal and civil
    enforcement activities. As the Chairman noted, we have some
    enhancements that are proposed, primarily to improve our
    detainee medical care, to expand our border enforcement efforts
    and to strengthen our intellectual property efforts,
    particularly the financial intellectual property rights
    coordination center.
        Before I go any further, though, let me thank the
    Subcommittee for its steady and bipartisan support of ICE. To
    Mr. Rogers, it is a challenging job, and we have received
    modest support. And I have to tell you, in spite of the many
    challenges that we face, in my view, the Agency's future has
    never been brighter.
        We are rapidly becoming a premiere federal criminal
    investigative agency and a critical player in the war on
    transnational organized crime and national security. We are
    also taking long-needed steps to identify and remove criminal
    aliens in a uniform and concerted manner, steps that were
    strongly encouraged by this Subcommittee. We removed a record
    number of criminal aliens from the United States last year
    (136,000)--that number, I expect to report to you in a few
    months will increase yet again quite substantially this year.
        Indeed, for the first time in the Agency's history, I think
    we have programs underway to answer the questions that, the
    Chairman noted, we could not answer a few years ago. And it is
    a major reform and a major step when it comes to criminal
    offenders. I think we are just a few years away from being able
    to accurately identify all alien criminal offenders in the
    United States and have a rational way to remove from the United
    States those that are subject to removal.
        Please also know that I want to have the best relationship
    I possibly can with this Subcommittee. I value oversight; I
    think it is a hallmark of our democratic system. And I commit
    to candor and transparency as Assistant Secretary.
        Let me just start out with a little candor and
    transparency. The Chairman has noted reports that, for a
    variety of reasons, are not here to the Subcommittee on a
    timely basis. All I have to say to that is it is not
    acceptable. They should have been here, and it is my
    responsibility as Assistant Secretary ultimately to make sure
    that they are. I do not make any excuses. We are going to do
    better. We will get to it on those two reports, get them here,
    and we will do better in the future.
        Let me briefly comment on a few priority areas. I will
    start with one that Mr. Rogers touched upon, and I will start
    with that, which is preventing terrorism and enhancing
    security. I agree with Mr. Rogers; this is a critical area for
    us. We have to focus on it very, very strongly.
        With this budget, were it enacted, we would continue our
    very strong presence on the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).
    We are the second-largest federal contributor to the JTTF
    outside of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Most
    people do not realize that. With the Deputy of the National
    JTTF, we are at 100 out of 106 JTTFs. I expect we will be at
    106, whether or not we receive these particular enhancements
    requested in the budget.
        We are going to continue our leading role when it comes to
    export control. We investigate more cases than any other
    federal agency when it comes to the efforts to obtain our
    sensitive technology illegally, whether it is weaponry or dual-
    use technology.
        We will talk shortly about visa security, I am sure. I am
    committed to it. Just know that I am in the midst of
    discussions with the State Department to see how we can come up
    with a much more aggressive, comprehensive expansion of the
    program.
        There are some other initiatives that I think I should come
    and brief the Subcommittee on, that address some of Mr.
    Rogers's concerns in the national security area. I would rather
    not do that in public, however.
        Next, turning to our efforts to secure the border, we are
    placing a major emphasis on intellectual property enforcement
    (mainly because there are real job issues), also it fuels
    transnational crime and with this budget we would be able to do
    that.
        We also want to continue the great work of the Border
    Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST). We have 17 BESTs; with
    this budget we would be able to go to 20. We would also make
    permanent the generous increases to Southwest border
    enforcement that the committee made last year. And that is very
    important to us.
        Turning to the nation's immigration laws. With this budget,
    we would continue to have a heavy emphasis, at the
    Subcommittee's encouraging direction, on criminal offenders. I
    think we would see record numbers, and not just in terms of a 2
    percent or 3 percent increase. We will do so without ending
    catch-and-return. I am committed to it. Hear it straight from
    me: We will provide the necessary detention space and resources
    to maintain that policy. I think it is important.
        I agree with Mr. Rogers 100 percent that we cannot have an
    immigration enforcement system that is marked solely by
    attention on criminal offenders. They are an important
    priority, but if the system is going to have integrity and
    credibility, the border has to be attended to, and we have to
    pay attention to fugitives, people who knowingly ignore final
    orders.
        And we are going to continue to address the question of
    illegal employment. It is a challenge. There are a number of
    statutory provisions that I would be happy to talk to the
    Committee about, and I have some ideas on how we might be able
    to improve them.
        For example, we do not use the two most direct provisions,
    as an investigative agency, given their difficulty in actually
    employing. One is a Class B misdemeanor. The other requires us
    to demonstrate that an offender had actual knowledge that, not
    only were the people being employed in an unauthorized manner,
    but they crossed the border unlawfully. We have to demonstrate
    that in a case. Very, very difficult for us to do. We are going
    to have a record year in terms of I-9 enforcement. And I think
    you will see the results shortly.
        Secure Communities, we are continuing to deploy that. As
    the Chairman noted, it works well. And that is going to pose a
    very large challenge for us down the road, as we are faced with
    an ever-increasing number of serious criminal offenders that we
    need to remove.
        Just to give you some flavor of how it is working. Secure
    Communities just had its best week ever. More than 600 level 1
    aliens identified in a single week. Level 1. Put aside levels 2
    and 3. Level 1, drug traffickers, murderers, rapists, violent
    offenders. In a single week. And we have just begun, and we
    will continue to grow. It is going to pose a necessary but
    significant law enforcement challenge.
        On bed cost, here is the challenge. We absolutely intend to
    meet the Committee's direction when it comes to the funding of
    33,400 beds. The big challenge for us is that estimate is based
    on the $99-a-bed figure. In reality, the cost, in Fiscal Year
    2010, is closer to $122. So it is not a question of will, it is
    a question of how. I am committed to a robust use of our
    detention resources, the resources provided here. And I can
    assure you that they are not being diverted to anything other
    than custody operations.
        Let me just finally note, Mr. Chairman, that we are working
    very hard on the question of detention reform. I would be happy
    to discuss that further. I know it may appear from the outside
    that the progress is slower than would be liked; it is a
    signature issue for me personally. We spend an enormous amount
    of time on it.
        I just got back from Mr. Carter's district, looking at the
    Hutto facility. I go to a lot of detention facilities. I am
    very, very focused on bringing the reform that I think the
    committee seeks. My foot is on the path, and I am going to
    continue down that road.
        [The information follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Price. Thank you very much. Let me start with Secure
    Communities.

                               SECURE COMMUNITIES

        As you know, Mr. Secretary, this Subcommittee regards
    itself as the instigator, co-initiator you might say, of such
    Secure Communities. So we follow this very carefully. So I do
    welcome your up-front acknowledgement that we have got to have
    better compliance with the deadlines for the various reports
    that are due. And that almost certainly would include the
    quarterly reports that we receive on Secure Communities. They
    are required by law to be delivered 45 days after the close of
    each quarter. They have been consistently late. So we take your
    pledge at face value, and that means the second quarter report
    for fiscal year 2010 will be delivered on May 15 of this year.
    And we will look forward to receiving that, and to having that
    at hand as we proceed with our business.
        I want to focus on Secure Communities. Through the work of
    this Subcommittee, ICE has received $550 million for the Secure
    Communities program. It is designed to identify and deport all
    aliens convicted of crimes, sentenced to imprisonment, and
    judged deportable by the United States.
        The key part of Secure Communities is ICE's support of the
    so-called inter-operability solution, which links crime
    databases with immigration databases. So that when criminals
    are fingerprinted, both their criminal history and their
    immigration status can be immediately determined.
        In 2009, almost 826,000 inquiries were processed through
    inter-operability, from only 88 jurisdictions. Twenty
    jurisdictions ran it in the first quarter of 2010. During that
    time about 515,000 more inquiries were submitted to inter-
    operability.
        Now, the current plan, as we understand it, is to deploy
    inter-operability to 270 locations in 2010, which is estimated
    to cover more than 80 percent of the foreign-born jail
    population. However, ICE was only able to reach 20 additional
    facilities in the first quarter of 2010.
        So we would like to know what you are doing to make sure
    you reach your deployment goals for the remainder of 2010, and
    are those goals, in fact, on track? And then how much more
    coverage do you anticipate achieving with the 2011
    appropriation?
        We assume, as you have said, the eventual goal is for ICE
    to have inter-operability implemented in 100 percent of the
    country's jails and prisons. And assuming that is true, what is
    the timeline for that to happen?
        Mr. Morton. Mr. Chairman, first of all, you are absolutely
    right in the figures you recite. And we are in 119 facilities
    now. We have reached about 30 of the ones that we want to do
    this year. And that means there is a big number between now and
    the end of the year, the last 6 months.
        I have been asking the same questions that you have been
    asking. I am told that we are going to get there. And I am
    committed to it.
        So I can tell you, I am not aware of a reason why we are
    not going to get there. I am focused on doing it. We need, and
    then we have got another big chunk to go next year, big
    challenge. But it is working. It is the wave of the future. The
    truth of the matter is the Committee prodded the Agency quite
    strongly to get to where we are now. And I am not defensive
    about that at all. It was the right thing to do, and here we
    are.
        The big challenge for us is that it does work. It works
    well. It was the right thing to do. We need, as an agency, to
    make sure we deliver on our implementation. I intend to see it
    through to 2013, to where we are with everyone.
        But, as you have noted, we are front-loading. We are going
    first and foremost to those places that our mapping suggests we
    will have the biggest bang for the buck. And those last out-
    years, while they are large in actual number of implementation,
    we will reach jurisdictions with ever-decreasing percentages of
    criminal offenders. Because we focused on, for example, going
    into Cook County. We started in Harris County, Texas. All
    places where our modeling has suggested there are a large
    number of deportable criminal offenders, and, in fact, that has
    turned out to be right. I expect it will continue.
        So I will say I hear your concern. There is no part of me
    that is not fully committed to Secure Communities. Frankly, I
    think it is the future of criminal alien enforcement.
        Mr. Price. Now, I want to make sure what I think I heard
    you just say. That the target date, the expected completion
    date for the 100 percent coverage of the country's jails and
    prisons is 2013, for 100 percent coverage.
        Mr. Morton. Correct.
        Mr. Price. You are also saying that the 2010 goal of 270
    locations, 80 percent of the foreign-born jail population is on
    track.
        What I did not hear you say is what this 2011 appropriation
    will buy us. What kind of, what kind of coverage are we going
    to have at the end of the fiscal year, for which we will be
    appropriating this spring?
        Mr. Morton. Yes, to be clear, you are right on everything I
    just said. When you say ``on track,'' I think for this year
    what I would respond is: ``It will be on track at the end of
    the year.''
        We have 30 of 190 this year and is in addition to what we
    had last year and gets us to the 280. For next year, our
    intention is to deploy to another 870 locations. So we have a
    big increase next year, and we have clearly got to do a lot. We
    have got to get to 190 this year, and then we have really got
    to turn it on the following year to go to 870. In Fiscal Year
    2012, that number increases even more, to 1,550.
        Mr. Price. There you are talking about, ordinarily, very
    small facilities.
        Mr. Morton. Correct, very small.
        Mr. Price. Or facilities with a very small number of----
        Mr. Morton. And with a diminishing return, in terms of the
    overall response. But the goal is 100 percent coverage. I want
    to get to a place where we can answer the Committee's
    questions: How many criminal offenders are in the United
    States? And, are you doing everything you can to identify and
    remove them?
        And to do that, we need to be in every jail and prison in
    the United States, whether or not it is at the Federal level,
    the State level or the local level. The big challenge, of
    course, is the local level because there are so many. There are
    more than 3,000 jails and prisons at the local level. We are in
    every Federal and every State jail and penitentiary as we speak
    now. It is the local level where the big challenge is.
        Mr. Price. Thank you. Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, I salute you for the criminal alien work.
    We all agree on that, and it should be a top priority, as it
    is. So I salute you for that.

                   DECREASE IN WORK-SITE ENFORCEMENT ARRESTS

        However, you have all but stopped apprehending and
    detaining non-criminal illegal aliens. As I said in the opening
    statement, a major, major decline. Administrative arrests, that
    is non-criminal arrests, down 68 percent. And in January this
    past year, you only arrested 24 people. Twenty-four.
        Criminal arrests, criminal arrests during work-site
    enforcement operations, went down 60 percent. And in January,
    20 arrests. Twenty. Indictments filed during work-site
    enforcement operations, down 58 percent. In January, 10
    indictments. Ten. Convictions through work-site enforcement
    operations, down 63 percent. In January, 13 convictions
    nationwide.
        However, I-9 audits of employers increased 187 percent. And
    I do not see how you can have that many employers arrested, and
    ignore, apparently ignore apprehending the illegal aliens
    working at those employers' places. Can you explain that?
        Mr. Morton. A few things. First of all, let me be clear on
    our efforts when it comes to non-criminals.
        You are right, Mr. Rogers, that our numbers, in the context
    of work-site enforcement operations, have dropped. But that
    cannot be extrapolated to the larger effort.
        On the contrary, in Fiscal Year 2009, this Assistant
    Secretary presided over the largest removal of non-criminal
    offenders in the Agency's history, in the country's history.
    Fiscal Year 2009 saw the largest number of non-criminal
    offenders removed from the United States.
        The challenge for me is obviously when it comes to our
    priorities, where do the non-criminal offenders that we
    identify and remove come from. And for me, the challenge has
    been, first and foremost, we have a priority when it comes to
    criminal offenders.
        Second, the border. DHS has to maintain security along the
    border. We cannot return to catch-and-release.
        And finally, for me, we need to have an emphasis on
    fugitives, people who knowingly flout their final order.
        Now, I do not mean to suggest that is a full explanation
    for the numbers on work-site enforcement. But I will tell you
    that you are right; a number of the categories that you
    identified are down from the previous year. It is of concern to
    me. I have been talking about it the last few weeks, and we are
    going to do better.
        Mr. Rogers. It is not down, it has plummeted. As I said,
    administrative arrests went from 5,184 to 1,644. That is 68
    percent. And as I say, in January, this past, there were only
    24 arrests. And yet you audited, your I-9 audits went from 503
    to 1,444, 187 percent increase; and yet, you practically had no
    administrative arrests of illegals. Apparently, at those
    employers' places. That is not going down, that is plummeting,
    practically to zero.
        Mr. Morton. We have 387 administrative arrests, to date. We
    have----
        Mr. Rogers. For what, for the year?
        Mr. Morton. For the year. For 6 months, to date, in the
    fiscal year. And that is a substantial reduction from the year
    before.
        We have a reduced number of criminal cases, to date, as you
    have noted. I am very focused on getting that up. But, again,
    just in fairness, it is not a question that we have in any way
    given up on non-criminal immigration enforcement. On the
    contrary, we set a record for employer fines and penalties.
        I routinely receive a number of letters noting the record,
    and not particularly in a positive light, from the perspective
    of the person writing the letter.

                            DETENTION BED RESOURCES

        Mr. Rogers. Well, you have got almost 4,000 beds, detention
    bed space, unused this year. I mean, for all of those years we
    were building and acquiring detention bed space like crazy,
    every year getting bigger and bigger and bigger, and we could
    not keep up with it then.
        Now, all of a sudden it has gone the other way. We have got
    33,400 beds, and 3,900 of them are being unused this year.
    Which tells me something. It tells me you are not apprehending
    people and processing them on the way back home.
        Mr. Morton. The 29,000 figure, and you are correct,
    reflects the fact that of the 33,400 number in the budget, we
    cannot afford year-long detention because the estimates that
    went into what it takes to fund 33,400 beds were not right. And
    we, as an agency, bear most of the responsibility on that. Let
    me be clear about this. I am not suggesting that the Committee
    has responsibility for that; that is largely the Agency's
    responsibility in past years, and very, very poor cost
    modeling.
        Mr. Rogers. I am just saying that the unused beds are an
    indication that you are not apprehending and deporting the
    numbers that you are talking about. Otherwise you would not,
    you would use every bed you could. We have done it for decades.
        Mr. Morton. Just to be clear, Mr. Rogers, we are going to
    use every bed. I have been planning to use every bed. It is a
    question of given how much money is in the budget, how many
    beds can we actually buy.
        And on April 1, you are going to see us move to something
    very close to 33,400 and run it for the rest of the year. I can
    assure you, coming straight from the top, there is no intention
    whatsoever to divert detention bed resources to something else.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, on average, on average for the year,
    there are 3,900 beds that you are not using. And maybe once in
    a month or two you may use the max, but the average number
    should be the max. It always has been.
        Mr. Price. Mr. Carter.
        Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one particular
    question, and then I want to get back to some of the stuff, see
    if I have time after Mr. Rogers on the next round.

               CONTRACTORS VS. ICE EMPLOYEES--DETENTION OVERSIGHT

        As of April 12 of 2010, current contract for private
    contractors that oversee ICE's compliance with the national
    detention centers will expire. ICE will begin to replace these
    highly qualified contractors, that have at least 10 years'
    experience, with new government employees that have little or
    no experience at overseeing compliance with NDS.
        This also will become a conflict-of-interest, whereas ICE's
    own folks will do compliance, not private-sector contracts.
        In addition, it is another needless expansion of Federal
    government to create full-time positions which are not fiscally
    flexible, like in the private sector. You currently have a
    contractor performing the on-site monitoring of ICE detention
    facilities. Is this contract funded, and for how long? Is ICE
    planning next month to remove the independent contractors, with
    a minimum of 10 years' correctional experience--and in the case
    of the current contractor, they have 26 years' average
    experience--with government employees who have minimal or no
    experience?
        Mr. Morton. We do have independent contractors providing
    oversight. And we are reviewing whether to eliminate or not
    eliminate some of those contractors. And we do intend to have
    Federal employees. Let me just address it directly.
        We got to a point over the last couple of years where,
    literally, no ICE employee was involved in the basic detention
    operations of the Agency, even though we are responsible, all
    the way to me, for the detention of more than 400,000 people
    per year. And we reached a level of dependence on contractors
    that came to literally 100 percent. In my view, we need some
    direct ICE responsibility and oversight of the detention
    function.
        It is our statutory obligation. We are responsible for it.
    You hold me accountable for its good use and exercise. And we
    have had a number of instances in the past few years where our
    stewardship of detention space has been questioned, and
    questioned quite strongly.
        Let me be clear. We are going to continue to use
    contractors to carry out large portions of our detention
    function. This is not about replacing contractors with Federal
    employees. It is a reflection that, right now, we are 100 to
    zero. And that, when it comes to our responsibility as an
    agency, we ought to at least have one person on site at the
    major detention facilities--which are all carried out in our
    name, with taxpayer dollars provided by this Committee--who is
    there to make sure that the job is being done well and is being
    done in a way that is efficient to the taxpayer.
        We are very cognizant of the need to have people with
    experience. That is a requirement for the folks that we are
    looking for. We have a number of people on our staff who have
    Bureau of Prisons experience. My view is we need to have direct
    ICE involvement so that, you know, the buck really stops with
    me and with us as an agency. And we are not in a situation
    where we basically contracted out--lock, stock and barrel--the
    statutory responsibility that was given to us by the Congress.
        Mr. Carter. And maybe we are talking about different
    things, but I am not arguing with you that ICE ought to have
    some participation in overseeing the operations of the
    contractors who operate a facility. This is a question of
    making sure that national detention standards are met.
        I have only the experience of national jail standards,
    which are very similar. And at least when I was overseeing the
    operation of a fairly good-sized jail, on the standpoint of
    oversight as a judge, we had serious compliance officers
    breathing down our throat every day. And they did not work for
    the people who operated the jail. They worked, they were
    independent people who operated outside it. Now, in our case it
    was a state agency, independent completely from the operation
    of our jails.
        I am not talking about that, operations. I am talking about
    the oversight, make sure you are in compliance with national
    standards which are required.
        And the other question I have is, my understanding is right
    now, you are contracting that with some very experienced
    compliance officers. And I would assume at least some of those
    compliance officers should be independent from the operation of
    it. Maybe they are not, and that might be a problem. I am not
    going to argue with that problem.
        But if they are independent from the operation contractors,
    they are doing oversight or compliance. And with the kind of
    experience, I do not understand why. And there is a flexibility
    on contractors. You do not hire them for life like you do
    federal employees, with some exceptions.
        And so you are sitting there now replacing an inexperienced
    compliance officer, an experienced with an inexperienced, to
    create government jobs. And I want to know why that is better
    and more efficient. I do not understand how it is.
        Mr. Morton. One, I do not think we are going to replace
    them with inexperienced people. I completely agree with the
    idea that there needs to be various levels of oversight, not
    all of which is within the Agency. But I am a strong believer
    that integrity starts at home. And you know, the Assistant
    Secretary ought to be on the hook for making sure that----
        Mr. Carter. So is what you are telling me, you are not
    completely substituting government employees for all compliance
    officers.
        Mr. Morton. Well, we are going to move forward with 40
    positions. I would need to get back to you about whether or not
    that is going to replace all of the present independent
    contracts that we have doing some of it. And I am more than
    happy to talk to you about, even if we have a person on site
    that does our immediate things, how do we have the necessary
    independent oversight to make sure that we are doing what we
    are supposed to do.
        Mr. Carter. Yes, I would like to know about that.
        Mr. Morton. Okay.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: Yes, beginning in FY 2010, 39 ICE positions were
    dedicated to approximate the coverage provided by 54 contract
    field positions and contract management oversight to ensure
    compliance with ICE's national detention standards. To provide
    the same level of coverage and oversight as the contract, an
    additional 25 full-time employees are being requested to
    complete the baseline activation of the program. This is part
    of the on-site Detention Compliance Oversight Program
    initiative to improve efficiencies and enhance oversight and
    care of detainees in custody. The 39 positions are responsible
    for monitoring facilities housing approximately 23,000
    detainees which, on any given day, accounts for 70-80 percent
    of ICE's total detained population.

        Mr. Price. Thank you. Mr. Morton, let us pursue this topic
    of detention, detention space, detention reform a bit further.
        As I understand it, ICE's detained population is, in fact,
    projected to change quite dramatically in the coming year.
    Before ICE initiated the Secure Communities program, a majority
    of ICE's detained population was non-criminal. The budget
    justification states that by the end of 2011, 80 percent of
    ICE's detention capacity will be used for criminals.

                       ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION PROGRAM

        Now, such a shift could complicate ICE's approach to
    detention reform. It may also heighten the importance of the
    Alternatives to Detention program and the integrity of our
    immigration system.
        If ICE's detention space is going to be used primarily for
    criminal aliens, there will need to be a practical, robust
    approach to deal with non-criminal immigration violators. As I
    mentioned in the opening statement, you do not seem to have
    made a great deal of progress in expanding the Alternatives to
    Detention program, even though this Committee has increased
    funding for that program, and requested, for the last two
    years, a report outlining ICE's strategy for a nationwide
    rollout of the program.
        Well, let me just ask you a few questions about this. What
    is holding up the nationwide rollout? As more criminals are
    held in ICE detention, what is going to be done with the non-
    criminal immigration violators?
        Last fall you awarded a new contract for Alternatives to
    Detention. Under that contract, ICE projected 16,750
    participants in the 30 cities where alternatives are currently
    available.
        However, recent ICE data show that only 11,353 participants
    are enrolled. That is 32 percent under the projected program
    capacity. Why are you not using that full capacity in the
    Alternatives program?
        And then finally, the contract solicitation for
    Alternatives to Detention proposed expanding the program from
    that 30-city base to up to 134 more locations within two months
    of the contract award. Why has that not been initiated when you
    anticipated it when the contract was awarded?
        Mr. Morton. I understand that we had a one-time blip when
    it came to the conversion of the contract, and we went with the
    unified contract for the Alternatives to Detention (ATD)
    program, which brought the cost down. That made it appear that
    we were not using the full number of spaces allotted, but was
    really a conversion issue, and we are back up much closer to
    15,000, 16,000 slots now. I am happy to look into that, though.
    I do not want to speak out of turn. And if your numbers are
    right as of today, then we clearly have a problem that I am not
    aware of.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: The Aternatives to Detention (ATD) program
    currently manages 11,767 participants in the full-service
    program and 4,116 participants in the technology-assisted
    program. In FY 2010, ICE consolidated two full-service
    contracts and enrolled 3,000 new participants for both full-
    service and technology-assisted programs. Total participation
    in ATD program components is 15,883 and represents full
    capacity.

        Mr. Price. Well, maybe we do need to clear it up. I just do
    not understand what you mean, though, by conversion issue. What
    do you mean?
        Mr. Morton. Well, we went from using three different
    contractors for Alternatives to Detention (ATD), to one. And we
    have moved to a single contractor to implement the program
    nationwide. That is not only going to bring some uniformity to
    what we are doing, it is going to reduce costs. So we can use
    the same money to have more slots. So overall, from our
    perspective, it is a necessary reform.
        But let me address the sort of heart of your questions
    directly, which is, I am not at all reluctant to use ATD. My
    only caveats are it needs to work, and it needs to be cost
    effective for the taxpayer.
        Now, in immediate terms, on a daily basis, it seems like a
    no-brainer. It is $8.80 per day, compared to $122 per day. But
    that $8 per day only works out in the long run if the hearing
    time for that case is a short one. And right now, it is not.
        A non-detained docket takes a long time. And so we are
    actually occasionally in perverse situations, where it actually
    costs more money to put somebody on an ATD, because it just
    takes so much longer to get their case heard, than someone in
    detention, because the detention docket is expedited. It is
    really a question of Department of Justice (DOJ) resources and
    the ability for DOJ to move ICE cases. So it is a challenge
    that we face.
        We are trying to deal with that directly, with the
    Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). We are running
    two pilots, Mr. Chairman, one in Baltimore and one in Miami,
    where EOIR is devoting the resources so that we can see if we
    have an expedited ATD docket. You know, can we achieve the
    promising vision of ATD? And I think we can. But just to let
    you know, there are some real-world impediments to making it
    work.
        And the second, I would just caution, the figure of 90
    percent, which is often used, is for the final hearing. For us,
    however, the law enforcement agency, it needs to work through
    removal. That is what we are ultimately judged on. And if, you
    know, lots of people are willing to show up to hear whether or
    not they were granted relief. The real question is when they
    are informed that they lost their case and they need to leave
    the United States, will they show up? That is the number that
    we need to work on and make sure it works for ATD.
        If ATD can ensure that people who are not a risk to the
    community show up for their removal, then it makes sense. If it
    is 90 percent up to their final hearing, but then only 10
    percent show up for their actual removal, it is a challenge for
    us.
        Mr. Price. Your last point about needing to know about the
    percentage rate for actual removal, as well as the showing up
    for the hearing, is the basis. But I understand that figure is
    around 70 percent. Is that about right?
        Mr. Morton. The initial reports are, anecdotally, that it
    is not as high, but that it can be significant, depending on
    which one they are using. Bracelets tend to work the very best.
    Now, a lot of people do not like that because of the intensive
    supervision.
        I do not know that there is enough real data in from our
    pilots for me to answer that directly. I do not want to lead
    you astray or to get myself into territory that I do not know.
    But I do know that that figure is one we need to know and
    answer well, to be able to tell you that it is a good-use
    alternate.
        I think it will be. We just have to recognize that that is
    a challenge for us because people do tend to show up for their
    hearings at a greater rate than they do for removal. That is
    why we have such a large fugitive backlog.
        Mr. Price. All right. I would appreciate your furnishing,
    for the record, the best figures you have on that. And of
    course, also, comparisons to the removal rate for people
    released on their own recognizance. That is a very, very low
    number.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: Thus far in FY 2010, the participants in the
    program have a 98 percent appearance rate (3,607 attended 3,620
    scheduled hearings). Of the participants that have received
    either a final order of removal or the benefit of voluntary
    departure (452), over 78 percent (354) have departed the United
    States.
        The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)
    maintains the appearance rates for non-detained aliens through
    its Statistical Yearbook. EOIR statistics indicate the failure
    to appear rate for FY 2009 among non-detained aliens is 27%
    (thus, a 63% appearance rate).
        The removal rate for non-detained, non-ATD population is
    2.17%. The reason this number is so low is that many of these
    individuals represent a low priority for ICE and tend to have
    cases that go through various appeal processes (e.g. a student
    requesting an extension of time in the U.S. to complete studies
    or a VISA overstay requesting an extension).

                               SECURE COMMUNITIES

        Mr. Morton. Could I briefly comment on your observation on
    criminal aliens?
        Just to note, that is a function, that is--the way Secure
    Communities has mapped this out, and the way the numbers are
    unfolding, that 80 percent is a result of mandatory detention
    provisions in the law.
        So what we are saying is, Secure Communities is working
    well. As we go into all sorts of jails and prisons that we have
    never been in before as an agency and take it to 100 percent
    over the next few years, the good news is it works; the
    challenge is we are going to identify a huge number of serious
    criminal offenders who are mandatory detention, from the
    perspective of the law, that the Agency was not previously
    identifying.
        Mr. Price. Well, and of course, it is obviously a big
    difference, if you will be using 80 percent of your detention
    capacity for such people.
        What kind of implications is that going to have for
    detention practices themselves? For conventional detention?
    Does it imply a need for heightened levels of security, for
    example? I mean, will there be budget implications for having a
    different population mix in detention?
        Mr. Morton. I think you are right on the money. There are
    going to be serious questions, both regarding the kinds of
    facilities that we need to have and the budget implications.
    Because obviously, the Level 1 offenders, who are largely the
    mandatory detention offenders, need more restrictive centers.
    Let us be frank; these are criminals coming out of the criminal
    justice system, and they need to be detained in something that
    looks a lot like a jail.
        The expedited removal cases, they are mandatory detention,
    but those are typically non-criminals. A significant portion of
    those not need to be detained in something that looks like a
    jail.
        The real challenge for us is, as we look forward, how do we
    address the fact that we are detaining an ever-increasing
    number of serious criminal offenders, who, everybody would
    agree, need to be detained and need to be removed. How do we do
    that in a way that does not get to the Ranking Member's point,
    which is there are other parts of the immigration enforcement
    docket that are important, and need a certain level of
    detention to maintain credibility in the system?
        We can do that, some through ATD. But there are, you know,
    a significant number of people for whom that is not
    appropriate. There is just such a high risk of flight, or they
    are a danger to the community. We are either going to have to
    look at future appropriations or decrease the amount of time it
    takes for us to turn cases over.
        If I can reduce the amount of time that people stay in
    detention, it is a way of increasing our detention capacity
    without a further appropriation. I am very focused on that.
    Each couple of days that I can shave off the amount of time it
    takes to turn a case over is the same: the net effect of you
    giving me more money to go out and buy more beds.
        Mr. Price. Thank you. Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. I want to get to the violence on the border in
    a minute, but I cannot leave this one. Briefly.

                  WORK-SITE ENFORCEMENT POLICY--LEAK TO MEDIA

        The Administration's first raid on a work site I think was
    the Bellingham, Washington matter, where I think it was 24
    illegals, who admittedly got their job through false
    documentation, were arrested on that raid. And then I think all
    of them were then released from custody. And more importantly,
    were given a permit to go to work, which was an absolutely new
    policy, and what I called at the time virtual amnesty. Because
    I think the message to illegals coming into the country was
    work for a company, even though you admittedly are illegal
    there, and we will not touch you. If you get arrested, we are
    going to give you a permit to go to work, and you have got a
    license. You are legal now. Which is unheard of.
        And then, to top it off, the IG, DHS IG issued a report in
    December of 2009, I think just--well, I am not sure when it
    was, related to Bellingham. Anyway, issued its new policy on
    work site enforcement to the New York Times. Not to Congress,
    not to the ICE field offices; to the New York Times. We read
    about it in the newspaper. A whole new policy on immigration
    enforcement in the country, one of the hottest issues going.
        And the Congress, your funding authority and authorization,
    overseers, read about it in the New York Times. Last I heard,
    the Times is not the approval of authority for ICE workshop
    enforcement policy. Or am I wrong?
        Mr. Morton. Well, you are obviously right to be----
        Mr. Rogers. Was there any disciplinary action ever taken
    about that? Who was responsible for leaking this policy before
    it was allowed to be reviewed by the Congress? Has anybody ever
    been disciplined because of that?
        Mr. Morton. A couple of points. First, Bellingham was
    before my time as Assistant Secretary. What I understand is
    that, at the time, there were work authorizations given, but it
    was for the purpose of witnesses for the criminal case.
        Mr. Rogers. Oh, we have heard that before. We have heard
    all of that. Was anybody disciplined on letting this go to the
    press before the Congress approved it?
        Mr. Morton. The answer, I believe, is no. I think the
    Inspector General did not find any disciplinary misconduct.
        Mr. Rogers. It is not the IG's job to find disciplinary
    conduct; it is the Department's job. The IG reports on what he
    found. Did the Department take any disciplinary action against
    anybody for leaking this new work site enforcement policy to
    the New York Times before Congress could look at it?
        Mr. Morton. I believe the answer is no.
        Mr. Rogers. Can you tell me why not?
        Mr. Morton. I think the answer is that the Inspector
    General, in his review, found that there was no misconduct that
    would warrant discipline. But I will take a look at the report,
    and I will see if I am incorrect about this.
        Mr. Rogers. I want you to file with this Committee the name
    of the person that leaked the information out, and why he or
    she was not disciplined for that. If we are going to have
    government in the press, then let us just go ahead and do it,
    and disband Congress.
        So will you file that information with the Committee?
        Mr. Morton. Let me take a look at the report, Mr. Rogers.
    Let me educate myself on this, and I will get back to you and
    the Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. The question is, will you file that information
    with the Committee?
        Mr. Morton. I will let you know if anybody was disciplined.
    Absolutely.
        Mr. Rogers. I want to know who leaked the information, and
    whether he or she was disciplined. Will you file that
    information with this Committee?
        Mr. Morton. To the extent that it is, one, that somebody
    leaked the----
        Mr. Rogers. Answer the question. Yes or no.
        Mr. Morton. I will, to the extent that somebody leaked the
    information, and there is no statutory prohibition on me
    disclosing something, of course. Again, as I said at the
    beginning, I want to have a relationship that is marked by
    transparency and candor, even when it is something that you
    disagree with me on as a policy.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, file the information. And I do not know,
    Mr. Chairman, there ought to be some sort of a time limit on
    this, to be sure we get it.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: On December 3, 2009, the Department of Homeland
    Security's Office of Inspector General released a report
    regarding the review of the potential leak of the WSE strategy
    to the New York Times. The report concluded that while the
    release of the strategy deviated from DHS and ICE practices, no
    Law Enforcement Sensitive information was released. No person
    has been identified as having provided the information to the
    New York Times and as such, no disciplinary action has been
    taken.

        Mr. Price. Let me say to the Ranking Member, I appreciate
    his request. It does seem to me, and I am not in possession of
    all the details about this case, it seems to me that there is
    probably a prior question about whether a change in policy, in
    fact, was involved here. And therefore, whether there is any
    departmental employee that could have leaked the information
    about a change in policy.
        I do think that what Mr. Morton is offering, which is an
    accounting of this incident and of the IG's finding, is a
    reasonable response. And then at that point we can determine if
    we want to request further information.
        Mr. Rogers. I would inform the Chairman that the Department
    IG issued this report, in December of 2009, on the new policy
    on work site enforcement. There is a new policy, and it was
    released last spring, labeled law enforcement-sensitive.
        And then, in response to that report, I issued a statement
    back then. I can quote it, I will not take the time to do it,
    but, talking about how concerned I was that, complaining that
    the policy was issued publicly to the newspapers before we had
    a chance to even see it, much less comment on it. I think that
    is a gross violation of the relationship between the Department
    and the Congress, particularly Appropriations.
        Mr. Price. We want to be informed of any change in policy.
    However, it does seem to me appropriate for us to have a
    response from Mr. Morton answering your question to what extent
    there was, in fact, a change in policy implemented at that
    time. And therefore, the extent to which there was a news item
    to be leaked in the first place.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, he knows what I want, and he knows I will
    not rest until I get it. So the sooner the better, Mr. Morton.
        Mr. Morton. What I can add to some of the things that we
    could give, is an accounting of where things actually ended up
    in Bellingham. Because I think at the end of the day, and I am
    just looking at some notes here, there were 28 individuals in
    question; 15 of them are now pending their removal proceedings,
    and seven already have gone through and have a voluntary
    departure order or have left. And one absconded, and one left
    right away.
        So again, I was not there at the time. But the end result
    is enforcement against all but one person, who absconded.

                BORDER VIOLENCE--DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS

        Mr. Rogers. Let me move quickly to violence on the border
    and trends that may be going on. We all know about the drug
    cartels and the violence that is taking place inside Mexico. A
    lot of us complain that the cartels are all over this country,
    as well, in our larger cities, including this one. So the
    cartels' operations have spilled over the border, and that is
    to put it mildly.
        And as the judge can better tell us, the cartels are
    getting more emboldened. We read of the tragic murder of the
    boys on the Consulate, and another, the woman, pregnant and
    with a child in the back seat.
        But at least 18,000 people have been killed in Mexico since
    December of 2006. And the pace escalates, most notably in
    Juarez, 500 murders so far this year. The average number of
    murders per month approaches 200. That is 10 a day. Well, not
    quite.
        What have we learned over the last year about the cartels'
    tactics, especially related to border crossings, how they get
    the drugs across and where, and how that operates?
        Mr. Morton. Let me say a few things. I am going to be
    careful how I answer your question. And let me offer to come
    and tell you a little bit about what we have got going on, in a
    bit more sensitive environment.
        But listen, Mr. Rogers, the cartels, as you have noted on
    many occasions, are just brutal, vicious, you know, organized
    criminal gangs. And they are operating on a grand scale with
    great consequences for all of us.
        You mentioned something in your opening that I think bears
    repeating, which is ICE has some fairly unique authorities that
    can be brought to bear in that regard. And that is, not only do
    we exercise aggressive and broad criminal investigative powers
    but we have our civil immigration authority. And that should be
    put to work, side by side with those criminal investigative
    authorities, on the border.
        We have done a number of recent operations. As a matter of
    fact, I remember meeting with you at the very beginning, and we
    talked about this a little bit. And I am glad to report that we
    have started to do some of these exact kind of operations,
    where we are not just saying that we are going to do gang
    enforcement operations, but we started targeting those efforts
    against those gangs that support the drug cartels.
        We have done an operation called Cross-Check now in Los
    Angeles, and we just did it in Texas, and we are going to be
    doing it in a few other states, where we specifically target
    criminal offenders on the streets for removal. We need to be
    more aggressive as a law enforcement agency in using our civil
    powers to support and carry out some of the important criminal
    investigative work we do.
        So I am very interested in looking at our civil immigration
    enforcement efforts against gang members and criminals and
    using our powers in a way that furthers a broader objective of
    attacking the drug-trafficking organizations.
        If a particular gang is known on our side of the border to
    be supporting, even at a low level, drug distribution that
    furthers a drug-trafficking organization, then why do we not
    pick that group as this month's focus for immigration and
    customs enforcement? And that is the kind of targeted effort;
    we need to do everything we can to push back on the drug-
    trafficking organizations.
        But let me----

                          BORDER INSPECTIONS--WEAPONS

        Mr. Rogers. I know we talked about, I guess it was last
    year some time, we were talking about the inspections at the
    ports of entry, and looking for drugs coming in and weapons
    going south. And one of the things that we wanted to try to do
    was to check the rail traffic going into Mexico for weapons.
    And I think we have been doing that. My information is that
    they found no weapons in that fashion. Do you know, is that
    accurate?
        Mr. Morton. I would not say no, and I would really want
    U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), who has been doing
    most of the inspections, to answer for you.
        We have not found a large number of firearms. And
    obviously, the question is, is that a reflection of they are
    not going in at the level that we think they are, or are we not
    finding them?
        I will say, obviously the Mexican Army and Mexican law
    enforcement finds very large caches of weapons all the time in
    Mexico. That is an open question about where those come from.
    They could come from many places in addition to the United
    States.
        So I think on that one, I would need to double-check with
    CBP, and let you know exactly what the results are. But CBP has
    been upping its inspections, not only at the ports of entry,
    but also at the rail crossings and with the Border Patrol.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, if we are not finding weapons in that
    fashion, should we not move those personnel to more productive
    places?
        Mr. Morton. Assuming, I know they just started it. And so
    the real question is, without me commenting much further let me
    find out what they are doing. I do not want to misspeak. They
    may be finding far more weapons than I appreciate.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: Although ICE works with U.S. Customs and Border
    Protection (CBP) to curtail illegal weapons trade between the
    United States and Mexico, CBP maintains exclusive jurisdiction
    over border searches, including those involving transnational
    rail.
        CBP is conducting 100 percent scanning of all outbound rail
    cars destined to Mexico. CBP deployed high-energy systems along
    all eight (8) Southwest Border railroad crossings to conduct
    non-intrusive inspections (NII) of southbound trains for the
    presence of contraband to include illicit currency and smuggled
    firearms.
        Notification protocols have been developed with Mexican
    Customs for the inspection of suspect rail cars, since the cars
    themselves are on Mexican soil immediately after the U.S. NII
    scan.
        From March 1, 2009, to February 28, 2010, there were
    approximately 7,378 southbound train movements. While
    conducting 100 percent scanning, CBP has completed non-
    intrusive inspections of over 368,000 full and over 160,000
    empty southbound railcars and referred 72 railcars to our
    Mexican counterparts. To date, all referrals have been
    negative.

        Mr. Price. Mr. Carter.
        Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start off by
    saying I am a fan of your agents on the Texas border. They do a
    good job, as far as I know, those that I have gotten to know. I
    am pleased to call them fellow Texans.

                               SECURE COMMUNITIES

        The question I have--I have a lot of questions, I do not
    know where to start. I want to go back to the Secure
    Communities program. And I want to make sure I have got the
    right idea.
        You are setting this up to take people out of prison that
    have committed serious felony crimes, is that right? Or are you
    taking everybody who has committed any crime?
        Mr. Morton. Well, the ultimate goal of Secure Communities
    is to identify anybody who has committed a crime, that Congress
    has provided for as deportable based on that crime. And
    obviously, we are going to start, first and foremost, with
    those who have committed a serious offense.
        But you know, my view is, if you are here unlawfully and
    you are committing crimes, Congress has said that is two
    reasons that you should----
        Mr. Carter. And I am also making the assumption that these
    people have finished meeting their obligation to the State or
    the county that has arrested them and convicted them.
        Mr. Morton. That is right. Now, one minor caveat. It is
    within most State's power to release people to us early. But
    our preferred approach is for the State to go through with the
    criminal process, for there to be a conviction and for the
    person to serve their time; then, we take them and remove them.
        We will accept, and the law provides for, some early
    release, but that is at the discretion of the State.
        Mr. Carter. So, what I call serious people, and that is
    people who do aggravated sexual assault, murder, major crimes,
    drug dealers, gang cartel members and those types of people;
    they are the first round that is taken up, right?
        Mr. Morton. Absolutely. Our Level 1 offenders, any crime of
    violence, any serious drug-trafficking organization. Now, of
    course----
        Mr. Carter. Some of those people are going into detention
    centers. And you just visited mine, which used to be a prison,
    but it is not any more. And now the question, are not you going
    to have security problems there? And I would argue you are.
        I mean, if you are housing those kind of people, you need,
    you have got a different situation than what we have been
    trying to deal with on detention for the last five years.
        Mr. Morton. It depends on the facility. The Hutto facility,
    for example, in your district, would not be appropriate for
    those kinds----
        Mr. Carter. It would have when it first opened, but it is
    not now.
        Mr. Morton. Right, it is now. Now it is appropriate, yes.
        Mr. Carter. We spent a lot of time changing that.
        Mr. Morton. And you can see that when you are there; it was
    an old prison, and it is now something else. It is entirely
    appropriate for the non-criminal female, females that we detain
    and remove there. And we need a facility like that because we
    have a lot of women.
        But for your basic point of----

                           ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION

        Mr. Carter. Now, and your alternative for the non-criminal
    offenders is to do intensive supervision, or electronic
    monitoring, right?
        Mr. Morton. Or something like Hutto. Hutto works perfectly.
        Mr. Carter. Or Hutto. Detention.
        Mr. Morton. Yes.
        Mr. Carter. But when you are trying to relieve the
    detention population, you use electronic monitoring, or you use
    intensive supervision.
        Mr. Morton. Or bonds, we also use bonds. And then in some
    instances----
        Mr. Carter. Now, under the bond program, I mean, our
    history on bond programs, with ICE and with this immigration
    program, is horrible. I mean, the people who show up for their
    hearings, they are in the 5 percent to 8 percent range, is what
    usually happens, at least used to historically.
        Now, I happen to have done a whole lot of electronic
    monitoring, and I have also done a whole lot of intensive
    supervision. And intensive supervision, if done right, is
    intense. Which means somebody is calling in all the time, and
    that means that a case worker can only handle X number of
    intensive supervisions. So that means you, with the numbers
    that you are talking about, you are talking about a tremendous
    number of case workers, which I doubt if you have got enough
    people out there that can do the job.
        Because if you have got 100 people on intensive
    supervision, you have got an insane case worker, okay? Cannot
    do it.
        Now, on electronic monitoring, are you treating that as
    house arrest? In other words, do they, does that monitor tell
    you when they leave home and when they come back to home, and
    they are given rules that they have to live under? Or does it
    just tell you where they are?
        Mr. Morton. I do not know the answer to that. Let me get it
    to you. But we have both intensive supervision or electronic
    monitoring, and in some instances we have both. You go on
    intensive supervision, and you have a monitor. And it works
    well.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: A participant in an ATD program is first served
    with an Order of Recognizance (OREC), for those still in
    immigration proceedings, or an Order of Supervision (OSUP), for
    those who have completed their immigration proceedings and have
    a final order of removal. The OREC and OSUP documents detail
    the rules of their release and specify what they may and may
    not do while out of custody. Once in the program they will
    either be required to report telephonically (TR) through a
    voice verification program or be assigned a global positioning
    system (GPS) ankle bracelet. ICE determines on a case-by-case
    basis the proper reporting mechanism to assign to a participant
    based on factors such as the procedural posture of the
    participant's immigration case, criminal history, demonstrated
    program compliance, and flight risk.
        A participant that is assigned TR is required to schedule a
    recurring interval during which the participant receives a
    telephone call from the voice verification program instructing
    the participant to call back within three minutes. When the
    participant calls back, the participant's voice is verified
    using voice recognition technology. After the call is completed
    successfully, the next pre-set call interval is determined.
        If the participant is assigned a GPS unit, the unit sends
    out signals to track the participant's location in 15-minute
    intervals (passively) or 1-minute intervals (actively).
    Although the device tracks the participant's whereabouts
    generally, the device does not affirmatively alert ICE. Unless
    otherwise pre-determined, the participant is not prevented from
    participating in routine activities. The participant's
    movements are not typically restricted; however, additional
    controls may be required in a specific case. In some instances,
    participants are also informed of areas they may or may not be
    permitted to enter. The GPS units track and record where the
    participant goes and the information is typically used to
    verify participant compliance in the program.

        For me, I want to get to, as you describe it, that program
    that works well. I want to see a high rate of compliance, where
    you are not just at your hearing but at your removal. And I
    will do whatever it takes to get that.
        Mr. Carter. Is there a punishment for taking the bracelet
    off? In other words, do you have procedures set up that if they
    remove the ankle bracelet, then they are automatically going to
    detention?
        Mr. Morton. We are going to detain you. If you do that, if
    you take it off, we are going to detain you.
        Now, it is an interesting question as to whether or not
    that would fit under some of the obstruction of justice
    criminal provisions in the Code that can be applied on the
    criminal side, if you do not do what the Court ordered you to
    do. I would need to take a look at that. Absolutely.
        Mr. Carter. So you might have charges, additional charges
    you could file.
        Mr. Morton. We might.
        Mr. Carter. Absolutely.
        Mr. Morton. As a minimum, we would go to your house and
    pick you up, find you, pick you up, and put you in detention if
    you do not comply.
        Mr. Carter. If they do not show up for their hearing, then,
    in other words, if they are monitored but they do not show up
    for the hearing, then----
        Mr. Morton. Then they are a fugitive.
        Mr. Carter. They are fugitives at that point in time.
        Mr. Morton. Absolutely. And when we go through the ATOs, we
    are very clear with people.
        Mr. Carter. And you will find out whether they are under
    house arrest. I mean, when we have people on monitors, we say
    okay, we are putting you out on a monitor. You are free to
    travel to work. But there is an argument about your monitor,
    that if you keep everybody on a monitor, and they keep doing
    what they were already doing when we picked them up in the
    first place, they are pretty happy. I guarantee that monitor is
    not that burdensome. But I will not go into that argument.
        The question I have is, are you saying you are not free to
    go to the beer joint, you are not free to go out on Saturday
    night and stay out until 3:00 in the morning. You are policing
    these people up, and saying you are going to be model citizens
    if you are going to get this privilege. We treat it as a
    privilege.
        Mr. Morton. Absolutely. Let me find out for you, and we
    will get back to you.
        Mr. Carter. Thank you.
        Mr. Price. Thank you, Mr. Morton. All right. We will go and
    have a final round here.
        Mr. Morton. Of course.

                           VISA SECURITY UNIT PROGRAM

        Mr. Price. And move right ahead. And I have a question
    about visa security units, as I indicated in my opening
    statement.
        We appropriated $30.7 million to the ICE Visa Security
    Unit, or VSU program, in 2010. The Agency has not requested an
    increase for 2011, even though by the end of the year there
    will be VSUs in only 15 of 46 high-risk countries.
        And by the way, those 46 countries are an interesting mix
    of countries with, in sensitive regions of the world, but also
    with a population mix that makes them of special interest.
        This program requires coordination with the Department of
    State. But I heard a disconcerting remark from the last
    Ambassador to London, who apparently told ICE that DHS already
    had, quote, ``too many people at the embassy'' to justify a VSU
    there.
        Well, what do you say about the level of deployment of
    these units? Are you concerned that ICE Visa Security Units are
    at less than one third of the countries your own agency has
    labeled is at risk? What are you doing to work with the State
    Department to accelerate the establishment of VSUs in all high-
    risk countries?
        And the obvious question. Why does the 2011 budget request
    not include more funding for VSUs, when there is a known
    deficiency in the coverage we are achieving?
        Mr. Morton. I am concerned. I am attending to the matter
    with the State Department. I do want to get to a place that is
    more comprehensive than we are now.
        The Secretary wants to do the same thing. She has asked me
    to meet with the State Department. I have already met with the
    Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs. I am going to meet
    with the head of Diplomatic Security, also an assistant
    secretary, next week. And we are going to have some good
    conversations about how we can get to full coverage at the 57
    posts that we have identified, together, as the institutions
    that we should have posts in.
        I will say, on London, some good news. I went to London
    personally and spoke to the Deputy Chief of Mission, and we
    have approval to go to London. We will be going to London, and
    we will use the resources the Committee provided for us to do
    that.
        We will also go to one more country, or one more post in a
    country, in 2011, using what we have. I would rather just tell
    you that separately and not here publicly.
        So I have my work to do with the State Department. We have
    had occasional challenges, largely due to space issues, what
    the State Department refers to as right-sizing. And all I can
    tell you is I try to work through them on every one, but I do
    not want to suggest to you that I think we are exactly where we
    need to be. I am focused on it, and I would be happy to let you
    and the Ranking Member know where we intend to head well before
    our next hearing on something like this.
        Mr. Price. Well, we will appreciate that information. This
    is not the first time the Subcommittee has been in the position
    of questioning the requested amount, and trying to nudge this
    program forward.
        If you are concluding that the original projections maybe
    are beyond what really has priority, or in some other way are
    reconsidering this, we need to know it. But it is not the way
    we want to operate, to have a stated goal in place, and an
    apparent rationale for that goal; and yet, it does not match up
    with the budget request. And there is surely not a good
    explanation for that.
        So we need, between now and bill-writing time, we need to
    come to a better understanding, I think, of what your goals are
    here, and what kind of priorities you have in your own mind as
    to where we go next. And for that matter, how far this rather
    modest appropriation request will take us.
        Mr. Morton. Understood, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. Thank you. Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Let me ask you about the Visa Security Units.
    To me, it is sort of a muddled picture. We have never, in my
    judgment, got this right. It is not your fault.
        In issuing visas and who has control of what, both Homeland
    and State Department of course have a goal in visa policy.
    State responsible for visa applications, processing, and
    denial; DHS responsible for visa policy. And then specifically,
    Homeland is responsible for the approval of all immigrant and
    non-immigrant petitions, the authorization of permission to
    work in the U.S., the issuance of extensions of stay, and
    change or adjustment to an applicant's status while he is in
    the, he or she is in the U.S. DHS, within DHS, the CIS
    administers policy, ICE conducts enforcement of fraud and
    compliance.
        To me, that is really muddled. Do you feel muddled?
        Mr. Morton. I do not feel muddled today, at least not on
    this particular issue.
        You are right, we have the investigative responsibility.
    The CIS has the responsibility for the approval of the
    extensions and the various employment-based applications.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, I have always had the belief if two
    people are in charge, nobody is in charge. Because both of them
    can blame the other one when something goes wrong.
        I really like a clean target. And I know this is above both
    of our pay grades, but it has always been confusing, ever since
    I have been around this place. And it ought to be straightened
    out, but it has not been.
        But back to the main point. These Visa Security Units that
    you run I think play a vital role in enforcement and counter-
    terrorism. In 2009, these units screened 900,000-plus
    applicants. You determined that 301,000 required further
    review, and you recommended over 1,000 for refusal, to the
    State Department, for the issuance of a visa.
        And then in 2009, you also generated 30 watchlist names, or
    nominations. And you have units in Sana'a, Yemen, Tel Aviv,
    Israel, London, and Jerusalem. Is that correct?
        Mr. Morton. Coming. That is this year's expansion.
        Mr. Rogers. Applications to place them. You have existing
    units in Frankfurt, Amman, and I think those are pending, are
    they not?
        Mr. Morton. Yes.
        Mr. Rogers. And it is especially important to have those
    units, because I think it was London, was it not--where was the
    Christmas Day bomber----
        Mr. Morton. London.
        Mr. Rogers. It was in London. If we had had a VSU there at
    that time, would that have made a difference?
        Mr. Morton. It is really hard to do Monday-morning
    quarterbacking on that one. And I am not trying to avoid the
    question in any way, Mr. Rogers.
        The trick with Abdul Mutallab was the information that
    ultimately came to light after his visa was issued. And that is
    one of the challenges that we face with visa security and one
    of the issues that I want to focus on with the State
    Department. Also, when I referred to some sensitive things that
    I would rather brief you on in private, there is a gap; we can
    look at you once when you get your visa issued, but we cannot
    stop there.
        Many times, and Abdul Mutallab is a key example, you get
    your visa, and it is valid for multiple entries. And then you
    do some things that then come to our attention and ought to
    lead to either a revocation of the visa or refusal, putting you
    on the various watchlists.
        And I am very interested in that gap because I am
    responsible right now for the initial security screening at the
    time of the issuance of the visa. Because of the role that we
    play in JTTF, and as you have noted the critical importance of
    this from a national security perspective, I want to work on
    that gap, as well, and make sure that between us, CBP, the
    Transportation Security Administration, all the key players,
    that if something comes up after you get your visa, we have got
    a way to either revoke that visa or prevent entry.
        Mr. Rogers. When will you set up these new VSUs?
        Mr. Morton. Well, the four, we are doing it right now as we
    speak, this year, with the resources provided for by the
    committee.
        Mr. Rogers. Who opposed the application? Who decides this?
        Mr. Morton. It is a two-step process.
        Mr. Rogers. Make it quick.
        Mr. Morton. The first step is me and the Department. Then
    ultimately, the Department of State, we have to get the
    Ambassador's approval at the end of the day for us to show up
    because they have to get a space.
        Mr. Rogers. And you have got to have the money to do it,
    right?
        Mr. Morton. And then we have got to have the money to do
    it.
        Mr. Rogers. It is your personnel, right?
        Mr. Morton. That is right. It is our personnel; we pay for
    it.
        Mr. Price. Will the gentleman yield just for a question?
        Mr. Rogers. Yes.
        Mr. Price. Did I hear you right? You have to secure the
    approval of the individual Ambassador?
        Mr. Morton. We do.
        Mr. Price. Of the country concerned? There is not a State
    Department authority that you are working with?
        Mr. Morton. Well, we have a general approval from the State
    Department, and we have an agreed list--the 46 high-risk
    countries that we have already done. But with regard to each
    actual placement, we must receive the approval from the
    Ambassador.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, that is not unusual. As a courtesy, I
    think, the local Ambassador has the approval of even FBI being
    there.
        Mr. Morton. That is right.
        Mr. Rogers. And other agencies, including the Marine Corps.
        Mr. Morton. The Chief of Mission authority extends to every
    single employee.
        Mr. Rogers. That is a formality only. It is really the
    State Department that decides, right?
        Mr. Morton. A number of Ambassadors have raised concerns
    about whether or not there is space, room at the inn. And so
    there are times when an Ambassador will raise some question.
        Mr. Rogers. Is that the case in London?
        Mr. Morton. No. In London now, thankfully, we have
    approval, and we are going forward this year.
        Mr. Rogers. Does State have any investment, dollar-wise, in
    these units?
        Mr. Morton. No, we pay for the entire cost.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, these are critical, in especially these
    locations that we have mentioned. It seems to me like we ought
    to move expeditiously. When do you think we can expect them to
    be in place?
        Mr. Morton. I think by the end of the year, we should have
    everybody in place for the four new ones, and there is another
    one that I can tell you about afterward.

                                 ILLICIT TRADE

        Mr. Rogers. Let me ask you briefly about illicit trade
    investigations. It is part of your chore to enforce illicit
    trade questions, an often overlooked mission, especially on the
    companies doing business in violation of our Iran embargo. What
    can you tell us about it?
        Mr. Morton. Well, I can tell you, first, Ranking Member
    Rogers, I appreciate you even noticing that it is a major
    issue, and it is something that we spend a lot of time on,
    because we do. We spend a tremendous amount of time, and it is
    a critically important part of our national security mission.
        This is a national security mission. We are not talking
    about mom-and-pop violations; we are talking about orchestrated
    attempts on behalf of foreign powers to obtain sensitive
    information. We do a lot of it.
        Mr. Rogers. Tell us about Mr. Artibelli.
        Mr. Morton. Mr. Artibelli was working on behalf of various
    international arms dealers to obtain sensitive U.S. weaponry
    for Iran. And there are a number of other cases just like his.
        We do more than 70 percent of these cases, and they involve
    a wide variety of countries trying to obtain our technology, in
    violation of the law, or our weaponry. And it is a serious
    problem. We are very focused on it.
        It takes a tremendous amount of sophisticated investigation
    and effort to do these. These people do not want to be caught;
    they do not want to come to the United States. They know what
    they are doing is wrong.
        I very much appreciate the support that we get from the
    committee in this. We could not do it without it.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, he pled guilty, did he not?
        Mr. Morton. He did, and he alternately cooperated.
        Mr. Rogers. He was, he acknowledged procuring electronic
    chips used in military aircraft? Phase shifters, state-of-the-
    art devices that help guide missiles to their targets?
        Mr. Morton. Absolutely.
        Mr. Rogers. And various other things. That is pretty
    sensitive stuff.
        Mr. Morton. Very sensitive. This typically involves
    attempts, in the case of Iran, to obtain items to rehabilitate
    weaponry that they obtained from us many years ago, F-94s and
    F-5s, or radar installations. Nuclear materials is a constant
    concern for us. Sensitive metallurgy. There are a whole range
    of very, very sophisticated either material or technology that
    is produced here in the United States that people want to get
    for cheap and in violation of the law.
        Mr. Rogers. So these were your agents?
        Mr. Morton. Absolutely, yes, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. DOJ was with you, I am sure.
        Mr. Morton. In some instances, we will partner with the
    Federal Bureau of Investigations. In many instances, we do them
    by ourselves. And we also work with the Department of Commerce.
    We are the lead in about 70 percent of the cases. And we run
    the National Export Enforcement Coordination Center.
        Mr. Rogers. Let me ask you about this. On March 6 past, the
    New York Times reported that the federal government has awarded
    more than $107 billion in contract payments and other benefits
    over the past decade, to foreign and multinational American
    companies, American companies, while they were doing business
    in Iran. Including nearly $15 billion paid to companies that
    defied American sanctions, by making large investments that
    helped Iran develop its vast oil and gas reserves.
        What are we doing about that? These are tax dollars.
        Mr. Morton. I do not know the answer to that question. I am
    unfamiliar with that report. I need to get familiar with it.
    And so----
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: ICE is the primary agency authorized and
    responsible for conducting investigations involving illegal
    transactions with Iran. The Counter-Proliferation
    Investigations (CPI) Unit at ICE Headquarters is tasked with
    coordinating and supporting investigations into violations of
    the Iranian Transactions Regulations (that implement the
    sanctions against Iran), the International Emergency Economic
    Powers Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and the Export
    Administration Act.
        If ICE learns that a United States multinational company is
    conducting business or facilitating the movement of money by
    means of Iran, ICE contacts the U.S. Department of Treasury,
    Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), to query whether that
    company has obtained a license to conduct business with Iran.
    If ICE learns that a United States multinational company is
    doing business with Iran and that company has not received
    approval from OFAC, ICE initiates a criminal investigation into
    that company and all individuals involved in the transaction.
    This includes investigating the movement of money in support of
    any non-authorized transaction.
        ICE is familar with the New York times article ``Profiting
    From Iran, and the U.S.'' published March 12, 2010, wherein it
    was alleged that United States multinational companies are
    involved in illegal exports to Iran. The CPI unit at ICE
    headquarters has notified field offices of the allegations made
    in the New York Times article as well as the specific companies
    that were identified.
        ICE has a long history of successful investigations and
    prosecutions of individuals and companies that violate United
    States export laws, to include Iranian embargo violations. To
    combat the threat, ICE uses a multi-layered approach to include
    industry outreach visits to manufacturers, brokers, and sellers
    of sensitive and controlled United States technology and
    commodities. ICE's Project Shield America is an effective
    mechanism in which to solicit industry cooperation and support
    in protecting the United States from illicit procurement
    attempts by Iran. ICE has a very successful undercover
    operations program wherein agents communicate and meet with
    targets of investigation that are predisposed to violate United
    States export laws. CPI agents also work closely with other ICE
    agents stationed overseas to coordinate enforcement actions and
    share intelligence with foreign law enforcement partners. ICE's
    various investigative techniques combined with its unique
    border search authority have resulted in disrupting and
    dismantling numerous illicit proliferation networks
    asymmetrically from the potentially illicit United States
    source companies to the prohibited end user in Iran.

        Mr. Rogers. Well, it seems to me like it would be ICE's
    chore to stop our own government from awarding contracts to
    U.S. businesses in violation of the trade restrictions with
    Iran. Do you agree?
        Mr. Morton. If there is a violation of the law, absolutely.
        Mr. Rogers. I would like to know what you are doing about
    that. That is the March 6, 2010 edition of the New York Times.
    I have got a copy, would you not know.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Morton.
        Mr. Morton. Thank you, Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Price. With that, we will bring this hearing to a
    conclusion, with thanks for your appearance and your testimony,
    and in anticipation of working with you as we write the 2011
    bill.
        Mr. Morton. Mr. Chairman, if I just may note, on a closing
    note, I very much appreciate these hearings. I offer again that
    I am more than willing to come and meet with any member of the
    Committee, including the leadership, on any of these issues.
    And please do not hesitate to call. I will personally come and
    brief you on what we are doing. And even if it is a concern you
    think we are not doing something right, well, tell us because I
    need to know that and work on it.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
        Mr. Price. The Subcommittee is adjourned.

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                                             Tuesday, March 16, 2010.

                           CIS--FY2011 BUDGET HEARING

                                    WITNESS

    ALEJANDRO ``ALI'' MAYORKAS, DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
        SERVICES

                   Opening Statement of Chairman David Price

        Mr. Price. The subcommittee will come to order.
        Good afternoon, everyone. This afternoon we are happy to
    welcome Director Ali Mayorkas to discuss the 2011 budget
    request for the United States Citizenship and Immigration
    Services, or CIS, in his first appearance before our
    Subcommittee. The Administration is requesting $386 million in
    discretionary appropriations for CIS, an increase of 72 percent
    over the 2010 enacted level. This large increase stands in
    contrast to many other programs at DHS, the budgets for which
    have been held virtually flat or even reduced in 2011.
        CIS operations are funded through a mix of discretionary
    appropriations and nonappropriated collections. The vast
    majority of CIS's resources come from the application fees
    collected when someone applies for an immigration benefit,
    which covers the cost of adjudicating the application and
    processing all of the necessary paperwork. While we expect CIS
    will continue to be largely fee-funded, if appears that ongoing
    fee shortfalls have contributed to policy decisions that shift
    more operational costs to the taxpayers and away from fees. We
    will need to discuss this approach in detail and, as we move
    toward marking up our bill, review the longer-term impacts of
    this proposal carefully.
        The most significant shift is a $207 million discretionary
    request for CIS to process asylum claims and refugee
    applications, an increase of $157 million over the 2010
    appropriation. Currently the cost of processing refugee and
    asylum applications is borne by other immigration applicants.
    The 2011 budget proposes fully shifting this cost to general
    revenue. While Congress started this transition in the 2010
    Appropriations Act by funding 3 months of taxpayer-financed
    processing, CIS has yet to discontinue the surcharge it imposes
    on other immigration applicants. So, Mr. Director, the
    conference report made it clear that CIS would not be allowed
    to double-dip and to charge immigration applicants and
    taxpayers for asylum and refugee processing. We want an update
    today on when the regulations will be published to discontinue
    the application surcharge.
        The 2011 budget also proposes a new discretionary
    appropriation of $34 million to fund Systematic Alien
    Verification for Entitlements, or SAVE. This program
    complements E-Verify and is used by State and local governments
    to validate people's immigration status when they apply for
    various State-administered benefits, such as driver's licenses,
    Medicaid enrollment, and food stamps or other welfare benefits.
        Currently the SAVE program is also financed through CIS's
    fee collections. Your proposal would shift the cost, again, to
    general revenues. There are going to be arguments on both sides
    of this proposal, so we are eager to understand in more detail
    the reasons you proposed a change such as this at this time.
        Discretionary funding for E-Verify itself is decreased in
    the 2011 budget. As explained in the budget justification, the
    higher-than-requested appropriation for E-Verify in 2010 as
    well as some nonrecurring investments planned in the current
    year will permit CIS to continue expanding E-Verify enrollment
    in 2011 with a lower level of funding.
        I am concerned, however, by the findings of a recent Westat
    study that revealed an inadequate level of compliance auditing
    and analysis designed to prevent fraudulent uses of E-Verify.
    In this Committee's report accompanying the fiscal year 2010
    House bill, we supported CIS plans to expand the monitoring and
    compliance staff to ensure E-verify is not used for employment
    discrimination or other prohibited purposes. Mr. Director, we
    will be interested to know where that initiative stands and how
    the 2011 request will adequately address these concerns.
        In 2011, CIS projects a decrease in expenditures from fee-
    based revenue of $209 million, largely because of one-time
    expenditures and an anticipated decrease in applications. Even
    though application fees were raised substantially in July of
    2007, a surge of applications were filed just before the higher
    fees took effect. Since then CIS has seen its filing volumes
    drop and has spent down its sizable cash balances that were
    accumulated by virtue of that surge.
        The recent 2010 reprogramming that this Subcommittee
    approved does not leave the agency much of a financial cushion
    if lower filing volumes persist. Given the Federal budget
    deficit, it also seems unlikely Congress will be in a position
    to provide discretionary appropriations for CIS operations if
    processing times begin to lag.
        Although the most recent production report show the CIS
    application backlog all but eliminated, I am concerned that it
    might come back. So, Mr. Director, we need to talk frankly
    about the longer-term implications of lower fee projections and
    your outlook for CIS finances in 2011. I look forward to
    hearing your plans for avoiding any financial crisis that might
    threaten your agency.
        Given this wide range of topics we need to discuss, we will
    ask you to limit your introductory statement to 5 minutes. We
    will gladly put the full statement in the record.
        [The information follows:]

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        Mr. Price. Before we hear from you, I recognize my friend
    and Ranking Member Hal Rogers for his opening remarks.

               Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers

        Mr. Rogers. Welcome to Director Mayorkas in what marks your
    first appearance before the Subcommittee. While I know we are
    primarily here, Mr. Chairman, to discuss the fiscal 2011 budget
    request, I have to say this witness' personal story is perhaps
    one of the most compelling we have heard for someone
    responsible for overseeing our Nation's immigration service:
    the son of Cuban immigrants who fled Castro's Communist regime,
    an individual who worked his way up to become one of our
    Nation's youngest U.S. Attorneys, and a dedicated prosecutor
    who sought to uphold the law by aggressively tackling the most
    challenging cases on discrimination and violent crime. This
    story is a truly American one, and embodies what our
    immigration system ought to be about, integrity and
    opportunity.
        In fact, CIS's mission statement echoes this sentiment
    through the use of phrases like ``lawful immigration,'' ``legal
    right to work,'' ``civic integration,'' ``lawful presence in
    the U.S.,'' and ``strengthening the security and integrity of
    the immigration system.'' These are not just mere words. These
    are bedrock principles for the agency that facilitates the
    rights, responsibilities, privileges and obligations of
    citizenship and visitation to the U.S.
        I am quite sure that you, Director Mayorkas, subscribe to
    these principles because of your background and your legal
    experience, but as I look at how the Administration is
    approaching immigration, I am increasingly concerned.
        First, immigration enforcement appears to be grinding to a
    halt, and while this is an issue that is most appropriate to
    discuss with ICE, it speaks to larger concerns on how DHS is
    ensuring the integrity of our immigration system, as well as
    lawful employment.
        Secondly, at a time when revenue is barely meeting CIS's
    operating costs, the agency has yet to properly adjust its fees
    and is expanding the use of so-called reform in a claim of
    fairness to shift what have traditionally been fee-funded
    activities to activities supported by direct appropriations.
    What this means in real terms is that the Administration is
    shifting the cost of some immigration programs and benefits
    from applicants to the U.S. taxpayer.
        Third, recent reports have raised questions about E-
    Verify's effectiveness, a program that Congress has robustly
    funded, and one that is absolutely vital to ensuring lawful
    employment and protecting American jobs.
        Finally, the pace of CIS's transformation initiative
    continues to be a concern. This Subcommittee has appropriated
    funds for aspects of transformation since 2004, but it is
    unclear exactly when CIS will reap some savings and
    efficiencies from moving to operations that are more automated
    and less dependent upon manpower and paper.
        These concerns are not trivial. Immigration is absolutely
    central to our Nation's security as well as to our economy.
    Look no further than the al Qaeda-led terrorist plots that
    occurred within the U.S. this past year. Both the Christmas Day
    attack and the Zazi plot involved individuals who exploited our
    legal immigration system to gain entry into our country in
    order to carry out their various plans.
        So as I have said many times before, a viable immigration
    system based upon legitimacy and the rule of law very much
    matters to our homeland security. Without enforcing our
    immigration processes and laws, the true contribution and value
    that immigrants bring to America cannot be fully realized.
        Director Mayorkas, I know you have a difficult job, but
    given your commendable journey from Cuba and your current seat,
    I am confident you share my interests in getting our
    immigration system right.
        So, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the
    discussions.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        [The information follows:]

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        Mr. Price. Director Mayorkas, please proceed.

                        Statement of Alejandro Mayorkas

        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Chairman Price,
    Congressman Rogers, and other Members of the Subcommittee.
    Thank you very much for inviting me to appear before you today
    to testify about our budget request for fiscal year 2011 and
    several critical issues of interest to the Subcommittee and to
    our agency, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.
        If I may, Congressman Rogers, thank you very much for your
    remarks about my personal history. I attribute whatever success
    I have achieved to the parenting I received. Regrettably,
    whatever shortcomings I have are my own responsibility.
        It is a privilege for me to be here today. On behalf our
    entire agency, thank you for your support of CIS and its
    programs. Increased funding this year will enable us to make
    further improvements to E-Verify, an important tool in ensuring
    a lawful workplace. A significant increase in immigrant
    integration funding will assist us as we build capacity across
    the Nation, integrate immigrants into our communities and build
    a stronger civic fabric.
        Providing funds to eliminate the asylum and refugee
    surcharge will help us strengthen the alignment between our
    fees and the costs of these applications and petitions. These
    are just a few examples of program improvements that your
    continued support make possible.
        While our budget request for fiscal year 2011 is consistent
    with your recent past actions on our funding, I appreciate and
    understand the constraints you are facing in this difficult
    budget environment.
        Our agency faces several operational and management
    challenges. Our challenges, however, present opportunities. To
    enhance our national security and the integrity of our
    immigration system, we have established a new directorate
    devoted exclusively to fraud detection and national security,
    and to develop improved safeguards and security measures in our
    operations.
        A decline in revenue underscores the importance of
    developing new and greater efficiencies. This is acutely
    significant for us as an agency funded primarily by applicant
    and petitioner fees. Inherent challenges in our immigration
    system have led us to improve operational transparency, begin
    initiatives to create consistency and predictability in agency
    actions, strengthen community outreach and improve customer
    service functions.
        Our outdated information technology infrastructure has led
    us to reassess how we operate so that we can move more quickly
    from a paper-based workplace to one that is account-centric and
    more reliant on electronic information.
        Challenges indeed present opportunities, and these
    opportunities in the hands of the men and women of the U.S.
    Citizenship and Immigration Services will mean a stronger and
    brighter future for our agency and for the public we serve.
    There can be no stronger recent example of this than the
    dedication and skill our personnel exhibited in the tragic wake
    of the January 12th earthquake in Haiti. Working tirelessly and
    selflessly day and night, our workforce brought hundreds of
    Haitian orphans to safety and humanitarian relief to thousands
    of Haitian nationals in our country who could not return safely
    to their homeland. What we have done since January 12th and
    what we continue to do is a shining example of our abilities
    and our potential.
        Each and every day around this great Nation, our agency
    celebrates the naturalization of immigrants who have come to
    this country with the hope of a better life, and who have
    earned the gift of citizenship, just as I did in 1973. We host
    these ceremonies on workdays and on special days such as those
    commemorating our Nation's independence. Gaining the rights and
    assuming the responsibilities of United States citizenship is a
    privilege that we are proud to administer.
        We are thankful and proud of your support. Your demands and
    expectations help define our goals and aspirations. I am
    privileged to be before you today, and I look forward to
    working with you and to answering your questions as best I can.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        [The information follows:]

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                          ASYLUM AND REFUGEE FEE RULE

        Mr. Price. We will now begin with some questions. I will
    begin with a question with several parts about CIS financing,
    some of the concerns I telegraphed in my opening statement.
        We have not yet heard from your agency about how or when
    the application surcharges for asylum and refugee processing
    will be discontinued. There is widespread agreement that they
    should be discontinued. We appropriated $50 million for this
    activity in 2010, but it remains unavailable for expenditure
    until a regulatory update is published. The 2011 request
    assumed that the surcharge will be discontinued since the
    budget includes $200 million for a full year's worth of asylum
    and refugee application processing.
        So as we look toward 2011 and the kind of money that is
    going to be required, we need to know when you plan to publish
    the regulatory update to discontinue the refugee and asylum
    processing surcharge. And given the fact that we are nearly
    halfway through the fiscal year, we wonder, are you sure you
    can do this? Are you concerned you may not be able to spend the
    entire $50 million appropriated in 2010 that was designed for 3
    months of asylum and refugee processing? In other words, the
    2010 appropriation assumed that the new regulations would be in
    place for the last quarter of the current fiscal year.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We are
    grateful for the $50 million that was allocated in the Fiscal
    Year 2010 budget.
        Our draft fee rule, is indeed in the clearance process. We
    are very mindful of the timing requirement to make those funds
    available this year, both in terms of their availability and
    our ability to spend the resources that this Committee
    appropriated to us. So that fee rule is in the clearance
    process, and we anticipate our successful deployment of it
    within the time frame that this committee set for us.
        The request for a greater appropriated amount to fully
    cover the fees imposed on other fee-paying applicants and
    beneficiaries for the costs of servicing asylee and refugee
    applications is something that we believe allows us to better
    align the fee-for-services model that our agency's financial
    condition is premised upon.
        We do believe it is incumbent upon us to serve that model
    by relieving paying applicants and petitioners of the burden of
    paying for services that they do not receive.
        Mr. Price. Mainly the services rendered asylees and
    refugees?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes, who are the most ill-equipped to pay,
    given their circumstances.
        Mr. Price. So the idea is to eliminate that surcharge which
    other immigrants have paid.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. And to make their fees commensurate with the
    actual services they themselves are actually receiving.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes, to truly align the fee-for-services
    model.
        Mr. Price. Your projection is you will be able to implement
    this system in the last quarter of the current fiscal year?
        Mr. Mayorkas. It is, Chairman.

                USING GENERAL REVENUE TO FINANCE CIS OPERATIONS

        Mr. Price. Good. Well, we will await that eventuality,
    because we hope it will be done this year, and therefore we
    will be in a position next year to implement this fully.
        I would also like to hear your thoughts about how much of
    the CIS budget should eventually be funded by tax revenues.
    Under current law you receive most of your operations by
    charging fees to immigration applicants. The 2010 Appropriation
    Act started shifting the cost burden for asylum and refugee
    processing to taxpayers, as we have been discussing. The 2011
    budget proposes another proposal to fund another CIS program
    through appropriations, namely the Systematic Alien
    Verification for Entitlements program, or the SAVE program.
        To determine benefits applicants' immigration status, State
    and local agencies currently pay fees that fund the cost to
    administer the SAVE program. Although these fees don't cover
    the full cost of SAVE, if users no longer have to pay to use
    SAVE, should we expect an increase in usage? Does this budget
    account for this potential outcome by investing in a greater
    capacity for SAVE?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, the amounts that we requested
    from this committee by way of appropriation (most notably that
    one that you already have referenced, the effort to relieve
    fee-paying applicants and beneficiaries of the surcharge for
    refugees and asylees, and now the second one, the effort to
    relieve fee-paying applicants and beneficiaries of the cost of
    the SAVE program) do not reflect an administration effort to
    move from the fee-for-services model but rather to align our
    agency's budget with the principles of that fee-for-services
    model, which is that the fee-paying applicant or beneficiary
    pays a fee commensurate with the cost to our agency of
    providing the service to that individual petitioner or
    beneficiary.
        So the cost of the SAVE program, what we are seeking to do
    with the appropriation, is, in fact, to relieve the fee-paying
    petitioner and beneficiary of supplementing the funding for
    that service when they do not necessarily receive the benefit
    of it.
        Mr. Price. Let me make sure I understand this. The State
    and local agencies that are using this service do currently pay
    a fee.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes, they do.
        Mr. Price. But the fee doesn't cover the cost totally of
    the SAVE program.
        Mr. Mayorkas. That is correct.
        Mr. Price. All right. And so the rest of the cost is picked
    up how?
        Mr. Mayorkas. The rest of the cost is picked up by the fees
    paid by applicants and beneficiaries who do not avail
    themselves of the SAVE program. Therefore, we are seeking to
    relieve them of essentially that surcharge and to better align
    that fee that individuals pay with the services that they
    directly receive.
        Mr. Price. And what will the situation of the direct users
    of the SAVE program be? Will they still pay a fee that
    partially covers the cost?
        Mr. Mayorkas. No, Mr. Chairman. The appropriation that we
    have requested would relieve state, local and municipality
    organizations from paying the fee. Currently they cover, I
    think, approximately 25 percent of the cost of the SAVE
    program.
        Mr. Price. That is what I thought. That is why I asked, do
    you anticipate this would discourage use?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Actually our desire is to promote use, and it
    is intended to be an obligatory use of the SAVE program for the
    obvious security and antifraud benefits that participants
    realize.
        Mr. Price. So you expect a possible increase in use by the
    virtue of the absence of any fee whatsoever?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes, Chairman.
        Mr. Price. What about the broader question? How much of the
    CIS operating budget do you think ought to be funded by fees?
    You have articulated a general principle here, although the
    conclusion you have reached with respect to SAVE doesn't seem
    totally consistent with that in that you are removing any fees
    whatsoever from the users of that program.
        Mr. Mayorkas. From the federal, state, local and municipal
    organizations, yes, we are. Chairman, I am 7 months into my
    tenure. I have focused primarily on the operational issues and
    challenges that our agency confronts. I have not spent a great
    deal of time trying to determine whether reformulation of our
    funding model is appropriate or not. That is something that I
    have given some thought and have begun to study.
        But my focus has been, to date, on seeking the funds that
    our agency needs and ensuring that our fraud detection and
    national security functions are operational, that our customer
    service obligations and responsibilities are met fully for the
    benefit of the public that we serve and that our critical
    current responsibilities are met. Refashioning the way we as an
    agency are funded is something that I have not yet focused
    upon.
        Mr. Price. Mr. Rogers.

                                    E-VERIFY

        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me talk to you about E-Verify. At last year's hearing,
    we discussed how the inaccuracy claims against E-Verify were
    simply unfounded. But then the Wall Street Journal came out
    with an article about a month ago that said that E-Verify might
    be failing to detect one out of two illegal workers whose
    employment authorizations are screened, outside consultants
    have told the agency. Tens of thousands of companies--I am
    quoting from the story--participate in E-Verify, either
    voluntarily or as a condition of doing business with the
    government.
        The Department hired Westat, a consulting firm, to study
    the program and tell us whether or not the information that E-
    Verify has is accurate or not, and the report came back in
    essence saying that E-Verify is only as good as the data
    entered into it. In other words, E-Verify is, in fact, accurate
    at confirming the data it is presented, but it can't confirm
    whether that data belongs to the worker who is submitting it.
        Is that an accurate statement that I made?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Congressman, if I can address the E-Verify
    topic as a whole.
        The past criticism lodged against E-Verify was that E-
    Verify failed to authorize immediately potential employees who,
    in fact, were authorized to work in the United States. The
    Westat report, based on data in 2008, concluded that for
    authorized employees, E-Verify's accuracy rate is more than 99
    percent. So, no longer is E-Verify the subject of criticism in
    that realm.
        Westat then turned to a different community of potential
    employees, and that was the community of individuals who are,
    unauthorized. Putting aside for a moment the standard deviation
    and the potential shortcomings in the statistical model, Westat
    concluded that approximately 6.2 percent of the employees
    running through the E-Verify system were, in fact, unauthorized
    to work in the United States.
        I think one thing is very important to note about that. E-
    Verify, the use of E-Verify by the employer serves as a
    tremendous deterrent to the unauthorized worker seeking to gain
    employment for which that unauthorized worker is not entitled.
    6.2 percent is a small percentage of the entire potential
    workforce that runs through E-Verify. And what the Westat
    report concluded is that, of that 6.2 percent, E-Verify failed
    to identify 54 percent of the workers who were unauthorized.
        So, 54 percent of a 6.2 percent subset of employees or
    potential employees runs through E-Verify, and, therefore, a
    much, much smaller number than the article or the Westat study,
    out of context, would imply. The 54 percent is only the
    numerator in the number. The denominator is 6.2 percent of the
    entire workforce.
        We are very proud of the fact that E-Verify continues to
    improve and has, in fact, implemented a series of improvements
    since the Westat data were collected in 2008. We have
    implemented the use of a photo tool to use the DHS photo
    database to better detect identity fraud. We will be accessing
    the Department of State's portfolio of photographs to further
    supplement that effort. We intend to deploy 11,000 compliance
    actions in our enhanced monitoring and compliance efforts to
    detect employers who are misusing the system.
        We have a number of improvements already in place and
    planned, so we are actually very proud of the success of E-
    Verify. I will tell you that as a federal prosecutor who
    prosecuted identity fraud cases, they are sometimes very
    difficult to detect before the offense is committed. E-Verify
    is but one tool in our portfolio of measures to address
    identity fraud.
        Mr. Rogers. So when this newspaper story says, ``An
    evaluation of E-Verify carried out for DHS by research group
    Westat found the program couldn't confirm whether information
    workers were presenting was their own, and as a result many
    unauthorized employees obtained employment by committing
    identity fraud that cannot be detected by E-Verify,'' that
    allegation in the story is incorrect?
        Mr. Mayorkas. I think that the story accurately
    communicates the fact that the E-Verify program is, indeed, not
    100 percent able to detect identity fraud and that it does
    detect identity fraud slightly less than half the time.
        We have, as I mentioned, Congressman, implemented measures
    to improve that ratio of success. We have additional measures
    planned to further improve it, and other tools are at the
    government's disposal to address the offense when E-Verify
    falls short.
        Mr. Rogers. I am glad to hear that. It is a terribly
    important tool, because if we have a reasonably accurate
    database where prospective employers can screen an applicant
    for a job to find out whether or not they are authorized to
    work in the U.S., that then clears the way--if the employer, in
    fact, hires an illegal alien, it clears the way for us to
    prosecute the employer. So it is a terribly important program,
    one that I feel strongly about and support fully.
        We gave you $25 million, an additional $25 million, this
    year for E-Verify to enhance the system and to ensure it is
    capable to process the Federal contractor requirement, among
    others. Do you need more money, or is that enough?
        Mr. Mayorkas. We have sought an appropriation for Fiscal
    Year 2011, Congressman, that is less than the amount that we
    sought for the Fiscal Year 2010 appropriation. The 2010
    appropriation provided 2-year money. We have some carryover
    money. We are very proud of the improvements we already have
    implemented, and we have future plans for improvement of E-
    Verify.
        Mr. Rogers. Tell us how many participants you have now,
    employers.
        Mr. Mayorkas. I have those data, if I may have a moment.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, the newspaper story says close to 30,000.
    Is that reasonably accurate?
        Mr. Mayorkas. I am sorry, Congressman?
        Mr. Rogers. Close to 30,000.
        Mr. Mayorkas. We have, I believe, more than that,
    Congressman. I have that information.
        Ms. Ratliff. We have the most recent information from this
    morning, if I may hand it to him, the most recent statistics.
        Mr. Mayorkas. We have 700,000 work sites that currently
    employ the E-Verify system or benefit from it.
        Mr. Rogers. Seven hundred thousand work sites. Do you know
    the number of employers, or is that the number?
        Mr. Mayorkas. One hundred ninety-two thousand one hundred
    eight is the most recent figure.
        Mr. Rogers. The number of employers. That is a rapid
    growth; is it not?
        Mr. Mayorkas. The employers, yes. We continue to receive
    approximately 1,400 new participating employers per week in the
    E-Verify system.
        Mr. Calvert. Would the gentleman yield for a second on that
    point?
        I thought you were growing the system by approximately
    1,000 employees a month. You are saying you are growing the
    system by 1,000 employers a month. You are right. So how many
    employees does that equate to?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Congressman, we are actually increasing the
    program by more than 1,000 employers.
        Mr. Calvert. Thanks for that clarification; 1,000 employers
    per week.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Per week.
        Mr. Calvert. And how many employees does that equate to?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Approximately 6 million so far this year.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. Mr. Farr.
        Mr. Farr. Just a follow-up question on that. Your testimony
    indicates you are about 96 percent accuracy with E-Verify?
        Mr. Mayorkas. The Westat report reported an accuracy rate
    of 96 percent.
        Mr. Farr. What does 4 percent represent in total number of
    people? You say you have about 6 million?
        Mr. Mayorkas. We have run through approximately 6 million
    thus far this year.
        Mr. Farr. The point is even 4 percent, that is a lot of
    people, if it is screwing up on one thing or another.
        Mr. Mayorkas. If I divide that number a little more
    surgically, Congressman, I think your question is a fair one.
    The accuracy rate of E-Verify is 96 percent overall. That
    speaks to both the authorized workforce and the unauthorized
    workforce as identified numerically by Westat.
        With respect to the authorized workforce, E-Verify's
    accuracy rate is just more than 99 percent, which means that E-
    Verify accurately identifies a potential employee as work-
    authorized when, in fact, that potential employee is work-
    authorized more than 99 percent of the time.
        The success rate is reduced slightly when one takes into
    consideration the unauthorized workforce and E-Verify's ability
    to detect, because of identity fraud, the unauthorized
    workforce. And as Congressman Rogers correctly noted, the
    success rate of E-Verify in that arena is not as high.

                          APPLICATION PROCESSING TIMES

        Mr. Farr. By the way, I want to thank you for what you all
    have done in Haiti. I think it is remarkable, and I appreciate
    it. That was great. Please pass our compliments to all of your
    staffers that worked so hard.
        My staff brings up processing times. We get a lot of
    casework, and it is processing, and you have made some great
    improvements. What are those standards? You indicate you have
    greatly improved on the standards and the times. What are the
    present standards for processing?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Well, we had goals that we set for ourselves
    as an agency, Congressman, and I think the best example of our
    success in meeting those goals is with respect to the critical
    N-400 application, which is the application for naturalization.
        Mr. Farr. It takes how long?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Our processing times used to be more than 10
    months for an application, and it is currently just more than 4
    months. So we are very proud of that improvement, and I think
    that improvement is characteristic of the progress we have made
    in our processing times across the board.
        Mr. Farr. There was a cabdriver the other day coming in
    from Dulles airport that said he just sent his old immigration
    card to get the new one. They screwed up on his name, and it
    was not his fault because his name was on the application. So
    they are waiving the fee, just told him they put it in the
    mail. But they told him it would take I don't know how many
    months just to get his name corrected and get the card back to
    him. Is that typical, due to an error like that?
        Mr. Mayorkas. No, it isn't, and I, of course, can't speak
    to that particular case, Congressman. But I think it is fair to
    compliment our agency with respect to our agency's work in
    Haiti. I think, knowing what I know from the brief 7 months
    that I have been here, I would like to expand that compliment
    to all the work that the men and women in our agency perform.
    That is not to say that, from time to time, we don't make
    mistakes. Lord knows I outnumber anyone in our agency with
    respect to that. But the improvement in the processing times we
    have achieved, I think, is a hallmark.

                          OFFICE OF PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT

        Mr. Farr. It has certainly gotten a lot better, there is no
    doubt about it. But if you are one of those individuals that
    gets caught up where it doesn't go fast, it is still
    problematic.
        You have a new Office of Public Engagement. How is that
    outreach? Who do you outreach to? Who are considered your
    external partners? You mentioned in your testimony, but I don't
    know what external partners are. Are those contractors, or what
    are they? Are they Congress or our staffs? Who are they?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Congressman, we stood up the Office of Public
    Engagement on the following very basic principles: That we are
    a public service agency and that we deal with the fundamental
    rights of individuals who seek a place in this country.
        Mr. Farr. I know that. But the question is who are your
    external partners, as you used that word in your testimony?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Our external partners or stakeholders,
    Congressman, are the general public, the advocacy community
    that represents the immigrants who come before us, the law
    enforcement community that is concerned about the integrity of
    our system, individuals who have an interest in the proper
    functioning of the immigration system regardless of the views
    that they might hold with respect to that system. Our external
    stakeholders include the applicants and beneficiaries,
    individuals that represent them, and the broader public, of
    course.
        Mr. Price. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Calvert.

                             E-VERIFY IMPROVEMENTS

        Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Going back to E-Verify just for a moment, I am the original
    author of the legislation from back in 1996, and I know
    significant improvements have taken place over the years. But
    getting back to this issue of identity fraud, can you verify
    exactly what you are doing to allow employees to lock in their
    Social Security numbers; in other words, where we prevent or
    certainly cut down on the number of times that people can
    continually, repeatedly use the same Social Security number?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes, Congressman. Thank you very much. That
    is a very important tool that we are utilizing to help ensure
    that a Social Security number is not misused. An employee has
    the ability to, once that employee begins the term of
    employment, lock in the Social Security number, so that anyone
    else who seeks to use that Social Security number again in a
    case of attempted identity fraud would be prevented from doing
    so.
        Our work, the E-Verify program, is a collaborative effort
    between U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and our
    partner, the Social Security Administration.
        Mr. Calvert. How is that coming along?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Very successfully. We are always looking for
    further improvements, given, I think, what Congressman Rogers
    has correctly identified as the threat to the integrity of the
    system, and that is those who seek to fraudulently use a false
    identity to gain employment.
        Mr. Calvert. As you know, there have been a number of
    critics over the years that claim that people authorized to
    work in the United States are being denied jobs. Has anyone
    ever sued the Department for losing a job over E-Verify?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Not that we are aware of, Congressman.
        Mr. Calvert. Can you kind of review what the process is for
    individuals who receive a tentative nonconfirmation?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Congressman, what happens is if an individual
    receives a tentative nonconfirmation (and that is after they
    have begun the period of employment), they have 10 federal
    business days within which to obtain the records necessary to
    establish their authorization.
        It is interesting that if E-Verify issues a tentative
    nonconfirmation and, at the end of the 10 federal business day
    period, the employee is able to establish work authorization,
    that is determined to be an error on the part of the E-Verify
    system. And I think that terminology is actually misplaced
    because the tentative nonconfirmation may, in fact, be
    predicated upon the Social Security Administration records that
    are in place with respect to that potential employee.
        So, for example, a wife who has recently married and who
    has not updated her Social Security record may receive a
    tentative nonconfirmation, may utilize the 10-day period within
    which to correct the Social Security number.
        Mr. Calvert. Wouldn't you agree it would be better for
    individuals to be notified of an inaccuracy of their
    information sooner rather than later? It needs to get
    straightened out at some point.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes, and we are actually working on a program
    to equip the potential employee with the ability to determine
    the accuracy of the Social Security records before seeking
    employment.
        Mr. Calvert. By the way, back to tentative nonconfirmation,
    what is the most common reason for someone to receive a
    tentative nonconfirmation?
        Mr. Mayorkas. A marriage, Congressman.

                      ALIGNING CIS FEES WITH BENEFICIARIES

        Mr. Calvert. Let me see. One other issue that the Chairman
    brought up, these processing fees for visas and green cards.
    Just to clarify that, there is apparently some interest in
    increasing appropriation to cover the increased costs. But
    don't you think that is improper, to shift that cost to the
    U.S. taxpayer? Shouldn't we just increase the fees relative to
    the actual administrative costs of these processing fees?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Congressman, are you referring to the refugee
    and asylee population?
        Mr. Calvert. I am talking about fees for visas, for green
    cards, the normal processing fees that are going on at the
    present time. I understand that you are only collecting a
    portion of those costs, actual costs and fees, and that there
    is some discussion about increasing the appropriation to cover
    the differential.
        Mr. Mayorkas. The three things, Congressman, in our budget
    request for Fiscal Year 2011 for which we are seeking a greater
    appropriation--actually, I am sorry, efforts to better align
    the requested fees with the costs of providing the service to
    the individual paying the fee are to relieve the fee-paying
    petitioners' and surcharge applicants' relief from the cost of
    the adjudication and processing of asylum and refugee
    applications; the SAVE program, to which the Chairman referred;
    and the funding for the Office of Citizenship and the Immigrant
    Integration Program. I am very happy to comment that, if you so
    wish.
        Mr. Calvert. Are you saying there is not cost shifting
    going on as far as the difference between the actual fee and
    the appropriation?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Not beyond those that I identified, unless I
    am in error.
        Mr. Calvert. So if someone applies for a green card, for
    instance, and the fee is X, that is the actual cost to the
    Department for processing that green card?
        Mr. Mayorkas. That is the way our cost model works.
        Mr. Mayorkas. If I may, keeping in mind that currently
    there is a surcharge for asylees and refugees of which we are
    trying to relieve that fee-paying applicant or beneficiary.
        Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard.

                                 CIS FEE MODEL

        Ms. Roybal-Allard. Welcome, Mr. Mayorkas. I want to go back
    to the question of fees, not the appropriated fees for the
    refugees, because it is my understanding that the fees that are
    paid by immigrants for green cards and visas cover far more
    than just the cost of processing their application; that, in
    fact, your agency's entire infrastructure, including this new
    electronic system, is supported by these revenues. Is that
    correct? Because my understanding is that what happens is that
    that is one of the reasons that the fees continue to rise, and,
    unfortunately, in some cases they rise to the point where
    residents can't--a legal permanent resident can't afford the
    fees and often have to forgo their dream of American
    citizenship.
        So I want to differentiate between what I am talking about
    and what I think the question had to do with, with the
    appropriated money for the refugees and the asylum seekers. So
    could you explain that difference? And also what are the
    challenges? If, in fact, your fees that are charged to
    immigrants actually cover more than the costs, and your
    operation depends on those fees, what are the challenges that
    you face as you have to respond to the changing workloads and
    the unpredictability of your budget?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Congresswoman.
        If I can preliminarily comment on, in the course of our
    public engagement, something to which Congressman Farr
    referred, we have heard loud and clear from the community we
    serve a concern that, if indeed the price of naturalization
    would increase, in this economy, the ability to become a
    citizen might be rendered inaccessible. We have heard that from
    stakeholders with whom we have spoken in our engagement
    process.
        When we talk about a fee-for-services model and a
    particular petitioner or applicant having to pay a fee for the
    cost of processing that individual petitioner's or applicant's
    benefit request, we take into account the overhead of the
    agency--the cost to us of operating as an agency. That is part
    of the costs that figure into the fee-for-services model that
    substantiate the fee rules that we publish and for which we
    seek appropriations.
        So, it is not just the individual cost of taking in that
    particular application by a single person. It is the cost of
    taking in that application; paying the person, of course, pro
    rata but paying what it costs us to employ the person who takes
    the application; keeping the lights on; keeping the facility
    open and the like. It is all of the costs of running our
    organization, and we deploy a formula when trying to determine
    how much each particular benefit costs us to administer, taking
    into account all of our operational costs.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. What challenges do you face when there
    is a fluctuation in the number of applicants, particularly when
    you have less applicants than anticipated? I am trying to
    understand the challenges that you face as a result of not
    having a certain appropriated amount of money for your
    operating costs, in addition to just the cost of processing the
    application.
        Mr. Mayorkas. It is the very challenge that we are
    confronting now. We have considerable fixed costs. We have 86
    field offices throughout the country, for example, not
    including our four very large service centers across the
    Nation, not to mention our international footprint. We have
    very significant fixed costs.
        Perhaps as a function of the downturn in the economy, but
    for the past 2 years (Fiscal Year 2009 and now in Fiscal Year
    2010), the number of applications that we are receiving from
    fee-paying customers has been persistently below forecasts of 2
    years ago. Therefore, on the basis of our fee-for-services
    model, we do not have the revenue sufficient to continue our
    operations as they existed prior to the decline. We have to
    make adjustments as a result.
        One of the things we have done, and as I think fiscal
    responsibility would dictate, was to turn internally within our
    agency and try to develop greater efficiencies and make cuts
    wherever they can be made so that we essentially right-size, if
    you will, to the extent we can, taking into consideration our
    fixed costs. And we have already in place $160 million in cuts.
    But it leaves us in a very difficult position when the number
    of applications drop. Our ability to fund our operations is
    challenged.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. Then if they suddenly increase in a
    certain year, how long then does it take you to gear up to
    address this influx? In other words, we are here asking how
    efficient are you operating; are you doing what needs to be
    done in terms of E-Verify and all of your programs? And what I
    am hearing, or as I understand, given the way that you receive,
    the model under which you operate, really jeopardizes your
    ability to plan ahead, to keep that same level of efficiency
    going, because it is dependent on how many people are applying
    in any given year.
        Mr. Mayorkas. I think if I may, Congresswoman, there are
    two questions there. One is: Can we be as efficient as we
    should be in a time of economic challenge? And that we can be.
    Can we be prepared for any future increases in application
    numbers? Of course. It depends on quantities and degrees. But
    if, for example, we were to see in the coming months a
    tremendous increase in volume, we would want to develop a
    greater infrastructure capacity, we would want to achieve a
    greater level of hiring and we would not have the funds at our
    ready disposal. So the funds would have to precede our ability
    to intake and process.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. If you had actually an appropriated
    amount for your overall operation that you could depend on.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Well, appropriations----
        Mr. Price. Go ahead. Please finish.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Well, appropriated amounts are not
    necessarily inflexible or lacking fluidity. So----
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. I am just trying to help you out.
        Mr. Mayorkas. I know. It is something we are studying.

               EFFECT OF FLUCTUATING FILING VOLUMES ON OPERATIONS

        Mr. Price. Our colleague surely has a good point, though,
    that your agency is faced with considerable fluctuations in
    workload by virtue of how applications wax and wane, but in
    your case, the inflow of cash is also determined by that same
    waxing and waning. And as much as our appropriations sometimes
    fluctuate from year to year, this is a particularly variable
    source of income, and that phenomenon lies behind a lot of the
    questions I was raising earlier as well.
        When the fee increases were announced in 2007, you had this
    surge, kind of an artificial surge, if you will, of
    applications. At the start of fiscal 2009, you had a cash
    balance of approximately $900 million. At the start of 2010,
    your cash balance was $700 million. Based on estimates from
    2010, that balance may be down to $400 million by the start of
    2011. And you have applications in 2009 12 percent below
    projected receipt levels. So while your workload is going down
    some, your cash balance is going down even faster.
        You have given Ms. Roybal-Allard a partial answer here
    about your expectations for the future. I wonder if you expect
    to continue to see lower-than-projected application filing
    volumes this year and next. Then, of course, there is the
    question that she raised with you, if the application volumes
    and the associated fees fail to materialize at projected
    levels, what do you do about it? What plans do you have for
    maintaining CIS operations at the performance levels you
    promised?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. By answering your
    question, I am going to sneak in a supplement, if I may, to
    Congresswoman Roybal-Allard's question.
        The model in place now certainly doesn't leave us as a very
    nimble agency to address the fluidity in the volume of
    applications that we receive and especially to prepare for
    anticipated increases. But we are not forecasting an upswing
    right now in the number of applications. Our efficiency review,
    our spending plans, the way we are looking to make cuts, as
    needed, are in anticipation of the trend continuing as it has
    over the past 12 months or so.
        As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, we have in place already $160
    million in cuts. We have not filled vacancies and full-time
    equivalents. We have ended quite a number of contractor
    positions. And that fiscal responsibility, that internal
    review, is an ongoing one. We are very mindful of the fact that
    we are trying to make whatever cuts are prudent and of our
    responsibility to incur the cuts without adversely impacting
    the service we provide to our customers.
        We are very proud of the reduction in processing times we
    have achieved over the past 2 years, and we intend to continue
    that high level of service while gaining greater efficiencies.
        Mr. Price. Well, I am well aware, as we all are, that were
    we to move away from a fee-based system with your agency, the
    price to pay in regular appropriations could be substantial. So
    the principle that you articulated early on in this hearing,
    that of the fees levied should basically cover the costs of
    services rendered, seems like a sound principle, and it
    certainly helps us deal with the refugee and the asylee case. I
    don't think you have applied it precisely to the SAVE case, but
    we see what you are getting at.
        I do think Ms. Roybal-Allard has raised a set of
    interesting questions, though, about just how much overhead are
    you including in that, and what does it mean for a fee to cover
    the cost of processing and application, and just how widely do
    you range in counting those cost, in figuring what contributes
    to those costs?
        Thank you. This does help clarify the situation you may
    face with respect to the waxing and waning of revenues and the
    kind of contingency plans that might be necessary.
        Mr. Rogers.

                        BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION PROGRAM

        Mr. Rogers. Since 2004, we appropriated about $153 million
    for IT modernization and your transformation effort, which is
    intended to transform the agency from a manpower and
    papercentric operation to a digital enterprise, and in
    addition, $585 million was given since 2004 for employment
    verification systems, including E-Verify, which are fundamental
    to your mission.
        But then last year the Department's Acquisition Review
    Board required you to stop work on that transformation contract
    with IBM to facilitate a modification and resequencing of the
    contract. And that action, as I understand it, put in place
    then short-term milestones which are intended to prevent major
    cost and schedule overruns since each term is based upon
    accomplishment of previous milestones.
        Did I say that right? And where are you on the
    transformation?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Congressman, your focus on transformation is
    very important to us. That is an initiative that speaks to the
    future of this agency and the effort to move this agency into
    an account-centric electronic environment for the benefit of
    those who file petitions and applications, as well as the
    benefit of our Nation's security and the integrity of the
    immigration system that we administer.
        Indeed, the Department did impose a benchmark process. I
    should note that I am getting further and further personally
    involved in the transformation effort, given its importance to
    our agency as well as its cost. What we are doing now,
    Congressman, is we are essentially laying out a blueprint for
    the implementation or the rollout of the transformation effort.
        We have studied the transformative efforts of other Federal
    agencies. We have taken a lessons-learned approach. We are
    sharing data with other government agencies, both within the
    Department of Homeland Security and in other departments, to
    ensure that the transformed environment, if you will, is an
    integrated one across the government and our systems are
    compatible and to understand the needs and our demands of the
    agencies with which we do business on a regular basis.
        We are engaged in extensive outreach in the community, and
    I say that in the broadest sense, the broadest definition of
    community, to understand what our external partners require and
    what they need from us. We are developing a plan, and we hope
    to implement our first rollout in the resequenced environment
    in 2011.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, I have seen the acres of files, and there
    are literally acres. One file on one person might be that
    thick. And there is some inquiry from some agency, and somebody
    has to flip through that entire file, maybe it takes 30 minutes
    or an hour or more, whereas if it were digitized, it would be
    available instantaneously. So it is very important with the
    kind of paperwork that you are having to deal with that that
    transformation take place expeditiously.
        I wonder, is this new sequencing, or whatever you call it,
    milestone accomplished process, is that going to drag out the
    completion of the transformation process all told?
        Mr. Mayorkas. No, it won't, Congressman. It actually
    accelerates the rollout. Our goal is to implement the
    electronic environment for the nonimmigrant class in 2011, and
    our goal remains the same, that by 2013 our agency will have
    been transformed.
        Mr. Rogers. 2013.
        Mr. Mayorkas. 2013.
        Mr. Rogers. Any way to speed that up?
        Mr. Mayorkas. I have asked that very same question. It is a
    question that not only I ask, but we ask ourselves on a daily
    basis. Given the inefficiency to which you refer, or I should
    say the system that is currently in place, that is certainly
    not optimal. The digitized environment and the ability to
    access electronic records and share information and access
    information is of critical importance to our agency and to our
    improvement.
        Mr. Rogers. I know you have asked yourself, and I ask you,
    too. You may have answered yourself; you didn't answer me. Is
    there a way to speed it up?
        Mr. Mayorkas. We want to get it right.
        Mr. Rogers. Is there a way to speed it up?
        Mr. Mayorkas. We are doing everything possible.
        Mr. Rogers. Is there a way to speed it up?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Not that I am aware of yet, Congressman.
        Mr. Price. Mr. Farr.
        Mr. Farr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am excited that you are putting a lot of this on your Web
    site. The question is what happens to those people who don't
    have computers in their house?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Congressman, we have not as an agency made
    the decision to move to a purely mandatory electronic
    environment. As a matter of fact, the question of the
    community's ability to access services in an electronic
    environment is a question that we posed to the community last
    week as part of our public engagement.
        Mr. Farr. Can you just give me a short answer? If you don't
    have a Web site or have access to a computer, do you use the
    existing system? They still have to call in or visit or come to
    the congressional offices?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Assuming lack of access to a computer or to a
    Web site, we have in-person means or telephonic means of
    obtaining information from our agency.
        Mr. Farr. But you are reaching out with this Office of
    Public Engagement to try to figure out how to get people more
    information so they don't spend a lot of time just trying to
    find out where their application is and things like that?
        Mr. Mayorkas. That is correct. We have also redesigned our
    Web site.

                           NATURALIZATION CEREMONIES

        Mr. Farr. I know. My staff uses it and recommends it to
    people all the time. You and I chatted about this Proud to be
    an American Act, which was a process the Congress adopted to
    encourage swearing-in ceremonies around the Fourth of July and
    take them out of the centers where you normally process these
    swearing-ins. I know the Department has done a lot of that
    yourselves.
        I am very curious about how we can work with your Members
    of Congress who want to do that this coming Fourth of July. Who
    in your office should they be working with and talking to?
        Mr. Mayorkas. The individual who leads our Office of
    Citizenship, Congressman Farr, is Rebecca Carson.
        Mr. Farr. So if Members ask me--because a lot of them know
    I have been doing it with great success. It is the nicest thing
    I do all year, I think. We treat them like a big graduation
    ceremony. The whole town comes, and, in fact, we move it around
    to a different town in the district all the time. I am
    interested in making sure that you use that, because I think it
    is good public relations for both sides, for Congress and for
    the community, to understand how proud we are to have new
    citizens in America.

                              CONTRACTOR WORKFORCE

        One of the things that we heard from Secretary Napolitano
    is that you are looking at a Department of Homeland Security-
    wide, districtwide or systemwide reduction in contractor
    positions. How many contractors does CIS have?
        Mr. Mayorkas. I believe we have just under 8,000,
    Congressman.
        Mr. Farr. Eight thousand contractors?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Just under, yes, I believe, approximately.
        Mr. Farr. What are their capacities? What are they doing
    for you?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Their capacities range widely. Some assist in
    the intake of applications. Some conduct site visits in our
    effort to make sure the integrity of those who seek particular
    benefits. Really they run almost the gamut of our activities
    that are not inherently federal.
        Mr. Farr. Who do you have supervising them? As the
    Secretary said, you are trying to reduce the contractors and
    make, wherever possible, these jobs Federal employees?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes, Congressman. I am sorry, was your
    question----
        Mr. Farr. How long would it take? That is a lot, 8,000.
        Mr. Mayorkas. It is. Our entire workforce is approximately
    18,000. As part of the realignment of our agency, we created a
    Management Directorate that has focused on the efficient
    administration of our agency. It is within the Management
    Directorate's purview to review the federal employment versus
    contractor ratio and to achieve the greater efficiencies to
    which Secretary Napolitano was referring.
        Mr. Farr. You are at almost 50 percent.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Almost.
        Mr. Farr. Do you have a plan how long it is going to take?
        Mr. Mayorkas. I would have to get back to you, Congressman,
    on what exactly is the execution plan for the review of our
    contractor versus federal workforce. But I can tell you the
    efforts are under way to move from the ratio that we currently
    have.
        Mr. Farr. All right. You have somebody in your Department
    that is supervising all of that?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes, Congressman. We have a number of people
    dedicated to that efficiency effort.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: USCIS is implementing a plan to in-source a
    portion of our contractor workforce consistent with guidance
    and standards being utilized across the Department. We expect
    the processes for in-sourcing the positions will continue at
    least through FY2011.

        Mr. Farr. Has my time expired?
        Mr. Price. At this very moment it has.
        Mr. Farr. I had one more question.
        Mr. Price. We will have a brief final round.
        Mr. Calvert.
        Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Just for the record, what is the fee for someone to apply
    to become a legal permanent resident right now?

                                    E-VERIFY

        Mr. Mayorkas. $1,010.
        Mr. Calvert. One thousand ten dollars.
        Going back to E-Verify, now that Federal contractors are
    required to use E-Verify, have you seen an increase in the
    number of employers signing up since that rule went into
    effect?
        Mr. Mayorkas. We have, Congressman, yes.
        Mr. Calvert. That is significant.
        Now, can you clarify what that means, say, to a Federal
    contractor? If a business is hired by the Federal Government to
    get a product or a service, they must go through E-Verify;
    isn't that correct?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes, Congressman.
        Mr. Calvert. Say that the government buys something from
    Walmart Corporation as a contractee. Are they required to go
    through E-Verify?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Congressman, I think it depends on the nature
    of the contract. If it is a pure procurement, I don't know that
    the E-Verify requirement would be triggered. That would depend
    on the contractual relationship between the government and the
    private entity.
        Mr. Calvert. Is there a definition of what you perceive a
    contractor to be that we can take a look at?
        Mr. Mayorkas. I would be glad to provide your office with
    that information, Congressman.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: Executive Order 12989, as amended, instructs the
    Federal Acquisition Regulation to be amended to include the FAR
    E-Verify clause in certain federal contracts. The Executive
    Order uses the definition of contractor found in the Federal
    Acquisition Regulation (FAR) at subpart 9.4. Under the FAR,
    ``contractor'' means any individual or other legal entity that:
        1. Directly or indirectly (e.g., through an affiliate),
    submits offers for or is awarded, or reasonably may be expected
    to submit offers for or be awarded, a government contract,
    including a contract for carriage under government or
    commercial bills of lading, or a subcontract under a government
    contract; or
        2. Conducts business, or reasonably may be expected to
    conduct business, with the government as an agent or
    representative of another contractor.
        In addition, the preamble to the FAR E-Verify final rule
    states that ``[w]hoever signs a contract is the contractor.
    Only the legal entity that signs the contract and is bound by
    the performance obligations of the contract is covered by this
    E-Verify term. If ambiguity remains, this issue will have to be
    handled on a case-by-case basis consistent with traditional FAR
    principle.'' 73 Fed. Reg. 67,651, 67,669 (2008).
        The E-Verify Federal Acquisition Regulation thus requires
    contracting officers to insert a clause into covered Federal
    contracts committing Government contractors to use the USCIS E-
    Verify System to verify that all of the contractors' new hires
    and all employees (existing and new) directly performing work
    under the respective Federal contracts, are authorized to work
    in the United States. The government contracting official, not
    the E-Verify program, determines whether the Federal contract
    will include the FAR E-Verify clause.
        The Rule only affects Federal contractors who are awarded a
    new contract on or after the effective date of the rule,
    September 8, 2009, that includes the FAR E-Verify clause (73 FR
    67704). Some existing Federal contracts may also be bilaterally
    modified to include the FAR E-Verify clause. In summary,
    consistent with the requirements first set forth in the
    proposed rule, the final rule:
        1. Exempts contracts that are only for commercially
    available off-the-shelf (COTS) items and items that would be
    COTS items but for minor modifications; contracts of less than
    the simplified acquisition threshold ($100,000); contracts with
    a period of performance of less than 120 days; and contracts
    where all work is performed outside the United States.
        2. Requires inclusion of the clause in subcontracts that
    flow from the prime contract for services or for construction
    with a value over $3,000.
        3. Requires contractors and subcontractors to use E-Verify
    to confirm the employment eligibility of all new hires and all
    existing employees who are directly performing work under the
    covered contract. Certain Federal contractors need only use E-
    Verify to verify the employment authorization of employees
    assigned to a covered Federal contract. These include state and
    local governments, governments of federally recognized Native
    American tribes, institutions of higher education, and sureties
    performing under a takeover agreement entered into with a
    Federal agency pursuant to a performance bond.
        4. Applies to solicitations issued and contracts awarded
    after the effective date of the final rule in accordance with
    FAR 1.108(d).
        5. In exceptional circumstances, allows a head of the
    contracting activity to waive the requirement to include the
    clause.

        Mr. Calvert. Okay. When there are articles in the newspaper
    like there was in the Wall Street Journal--it was repeated, by
    the way, by the Los Angeles Times about E-Verify and the 50
    percent inaccuracy rate, which is 50 percent of the 6 percent,
    which is obviously perceived to be something different than
    what it was--are you proactive in addressing those
    misrepresentations and trying to get a correction?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Congressman, we are very proactive in
    publishing the success of E-Verify, as well as its challenges.
    I hope I made clear at the outset that the complaints that were
    lodged at E-Verify initially were its inability or perceived
    inability to accurately capture work-authorized individuals as
    work-authorized. That success rate now seems to have caused a
    shift in concern about E-Verify to its ability to address the
    unauthorized workforce and recognize that.
        As you correctly underscored, the Westat report, which is
    based on data that are now a bit dated, speaks of a percentage
    success rate that we believe we have improved upon.
        Mr. Calvert. I read the Westat report, and relative to the
    newspaper articles, the articles obviously were quite negative.
    But you read the Westat report. It is relatively positive. So
    it was just an interpretation of the statistics within that
    study, which ultimately ended up with the stories that ran
    nationally.
        Are you asking for the newspaper to give information to
    those newspapers and other publications--it got picked up
    obviously by the broadcast industry and the rest--to deal with
    that?
        Mr. Mayorkas. We have been very active in ensuring that the
    public is aware of the success of E-Verify. We have reached out
    to quite a number of community members, the business group, the
    labor group and other important constituents, that are impacted
    by the E-Verify program, to ensure that they are aware of the
    success of the program and the improvements that we are making
    to address whatever weaknesses might exist.
        Mr. Calvert. If there is a significant increase in the
    number of employers that want to go in the system, do you feel
    confident that you are able to take that on and be able to
    process them in a relatively quick fashion?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Most certainly. E-Verify is built to a
    capacity far greater than it currently administers.
        Mr. Calvert. What is the capacity it is built to?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Approximately 200 million employees per year.
    It currently has the capacity to run approximately that many
    through its system.
        Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard.

                                FRAUD PREVENTION

        Ms. Roybal-Allard. According to law enforcement officials,
    there is a growing number of unscrupulous individuals in our
    country who call themselves ``immigration specialists'' or
    ``notarios,'' hold themselves up as attorneys that are
    qualified to practice immigration law. As you know, they enter
    into fraudulent contracts and promise permanent legal status
    and charge exorbitant fees, even when they know very well that
    sometimes the person that they are asking to represent has no
    chance of legalization. In other cases, beyond the loss of
    money, these fraudulent services often jeopardize a victim's
    ability to legalize their status, even though they were
    qualified prior to becoming a victim of fraud.
        Could you highlight a little bit of what kinds of things
    that you are doing to educate the public about these fraudulent
    practices by these people to let them know that they do, in
    fact, exist and will jeopardize their status?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. That is a
    question that goes to the very heart of a very significant
    initiative we already have underway.
        Earlier this year, we led a very robust engagement with
    community members about the unauthorized practice of law and
    notario fraud, and we are developing a strategic plan to fight
    immigration practitioner fraud and protect the consumer. We
    understand that public education, building a stakeholder
    capacity and deterrence are three very important foundations
    for a successful program.
        We currently have available on our Web site a number of
    informational pieces that we hope serve the community while we
    are developing a more comprehensive and fulsome nationwide
    strategic plan.
        For example, we list the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
    and BIA-recognized organizations that serve the immigrant
    community. We list free or low-cost service providers. We have
    a link to the National Association of Attorneys General that
    identifies individuals who have been prosecuted for the
    unauthorized practice of law or notario fraud, to mention just
    a few of the tools we are using.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. Going back to Mr. Farr's point, not
    everyone has access to a computer, and that is certainly true
    of many in my district. So you are not depending on that alone.
    You mention you also do outreach to community-based
    organizations and other groups to get that information out; is
    that correct?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Yes, we do. And, Congresswoman, we not only
    touch the community-based organizations that represent
    individuals who might not have access to computer facilities,
    but we touch the individuals themselves through our extensive
    outreach efforts.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. You said you were developing a strategic
    plan. When can we expect that?
        Mr. Mayorkas. We hope to unveil that in the next 30 days.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
        And just one last point, going back to the model under
    which you operate. If and when we pass comprehensive
    immigration reform, the processing of thousands of background
    checks and applications for naturalization will be your
    responsibility. I am wondering if there is anything that you
    are doing now in anticipation of that, given the model that you
    are now working under?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Congresswoman, we are building efficiencies
    so that we are fully prepared to address whatever increase in
    applications we receive. Our experience with the January 12th
    tragic earthquake in Haiti demonstrated our capacity to meet an
    unanticipated increase in volume. So if comprehensive
    immigration reform would pass, we would be prepared to
    administer the program.
        Our ability to administer a program of an exponentially
    greater volume of people would depend on our receipt of funds
    to build the infrastructure capacity. But in terms of the
    systems, the operational design, we have that.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.

                            BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION

        Mr. Director, we will have a very rapid final round here,
    just to tie up a few loose ends. I will start with the subject
    our Ranking Member discussed, the business transformation plan
    and our concerns about the delays of implementation, and our
    desire for good information going forward, and, if at all
    possible, an acceleration of the timeline that you have
    projected.
        We do want to get it right. Of course, you are correct
    about that. But when you consider the savings, the
    efficiencies, the greater accuracy, the gains are going to be
    substantial, and it is highly desirable to realize them as soon
    as possible. I want to make sure that I understand the stages
    in which this system is going to be put in place.
        As I understand what you said and what we have heard from
    you otherwise, under the current project plan, CIS is first
    going to implement transformed application processing for
    nonimmigrant benefits, for student visas, work visas, that sort
    of thing.
        I wonder if you have an interim cost estimate as to how
    much you are going to save with on-line processing for
    nonimmigrant applicants?
        Then what you were talking about with Mr. Rogers, the 2013
    date, the second phase of CIS's business transformation will
    put the green card and citizenship processes on line,
    incorporating the entire immigration process into a digital
    system. That is what you have given us the 2013 estimate on,
    and I wonder if you have figures with estimated savings and
    efficiencies from the completed transformation?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, we did resequence. Originally,
    the agency had planned to first transform the citizenship
    application process, but we thought it most economically and
    systemically prudent to actually follow the cycle of the
    immigration benefit process. We resequenced, therefore, to
    first transform the nonimmigrant benefit process.

        RESPONSE: USCIS does not have a cost estimate associated
    with savings that may be realized from the transformation of
    non-immigrant benefit processing, or for the complete
    transformation effort as a whole. Long term cost savings is a
    goal of transformation. USCIS will strive to realize cost
    savings and factor them into future fee levels. Savings are one
    of several important goals that also include the modernization
    of outdated technology and processes, improvements in customer
    service and security, and more effective adjudication
    operations overall. USCIS will assess the cost savings over the
    long term as transformational operations, systems, and
    processes begin to be implemented.
        With respect to what savings we intend to realize, if I
    may, Chairman, this committee, I would like to get back to you
    with that. I do not have that information at the ready, and I
    do not know whether we have actually undertaken that modeling.
        I well understand and appreciate, from the questions that
    you have posed, the frustration that you have with respect to
    the initial pace of the transformation effort, as well as my
    estimated 2013 time frame and my clearly unsatisfactory answer
    that we are not in a position to accelerate that time frame
    now. What I would respectfully propose is that I make it a
    point to personally update this committee on a regular basis
    with respect to the transformation program, both substantively
    in terms of the improvements and progression of the effort, as
    well as the costs associated therewith.
        Mr. Rogers. Will the gentleman yield on that point?
        Mr. Price. Yes.
        Mr. Rogers. If you could include in that estimate if more
    money would accelerate the process?
        Mr. Price. I would second that request. That is clearly a
    relevant aspect.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: Transformation within USCIS is a gradual process
    that will require careful planning and a comprehensive change
    management strategy that will take several years to fully
    implement. USCIS will continue to explore options for moving
    Transformation forward at a faster pace.

                           HAITI AND THE TPS PROGRAM

        Mr. Price. Let me wrap up with reference to Haiti. I want
    to echo Mr. Farr's expression of gratitude to you. I should
    have done this at the outset. We are well aware of the
    contribution CIS has made in responding to the Haitian tragedy
    and being one of several Homeland Security agencies that has
    been working on this very hard, along with the Coast Guard,
    with FEMA, with ICE. We are grateful for your efforts.
        I want to ask you about one aspect of this, though, that I
    think may raise some broader questions about your method for
    projecting the impact of various programs, the demand for
    various programs. On January 21, you issued a public notice
    that you would accept applications for temporary protected
    status for Haitians who were illegally present in the United
    States before the earthquake that had destroyed, of course, so
    much of that country and the prospects for anyone returning and
    earning a livelihood.
        Based on the latest data, CIS has processed about 30,000
    applications for temporary protected status. That is much
    lower, considerably lower, than the 200,000 individuals you
    projected might apply for that benefit.
        So, Mr. Director, I wonder how you would account for that?
    Do you believe that the TPS announcement may have overstated
    the number of Haitians that might apply for TPS? What would
    account for receiving so many fewer applications than
    projected?
        Then it does lead me to a broader question. There have been
    some other shortfalls in application filings versus CIS
    projections, such as the overall lower level of applications
    received in 2009. Does this lead you to reflect on CIS's method
    for projecting its workload and changes, improvements that
    might be indicated by some of these missed projections, missed
    targets?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Chairman. Let me, if I
    can, answer the questions in the order in which you posed them.
        First with respect to the Temporary Protected Status (TPS)
    program for Haiti, specifically, we at the outset estimated
    100,000 to 200,000 potential applicants for TPS, for that
    humanitarian relief. Indeed, we thus far have received
    approximately 30,000 applications. The pace is a bit slower
    than we anticipated. We are, of course, only 2 months into a 6-
    month registration period, so it is unclear what volume we will
    see at the close of the period. So it is, I think, a bit early
    to assume that our projections were off.
        I should say also that we projected the 100,000 to 200,000
    number on the basis of our best understanding from the
    community of the anticipated volume and to ensure that we as an
    agency were ready should that volume materialize, rather than
    underestimate and plan on the basis of an underestimation. I
    think that would be far more dangerous to our ability to
    administer the relief that the government extended to this
    population in need.
        So that number of 100,000 to 200,000 was our best
    understanding at the time based on our interaction with the
    community and the data that we had available. We geared up for
    it operationally. We are, I think, approximately 2 or so months
    into a 6-month registration window, and we will see where the
    numbers shake out.
        With respect to the projections prior to Fiscal Year 2009,
    I don't know if the drop in applications is directly linked to
    the economic conditions that befell this country, and, frankly,
    the world, in 2009. I don't know if anyone anticipated the
    degree of the financial challenges that our economy would face
    and perhaps the consequent drop in applications. But our
    ability to project numbers, because of the significance of the
    projections on our operations and on our efficiency modeling,
    is something that we are constantly reviewing and scrubbing.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. No further questions.
        Mr. Price. Mr. Farr.

                         IMMIGRATION INTEGRATION GRANTS

        Mr. Farr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to follow up on this. You have requested $8 million
    in competitive grants to organizations preparing immigrants for
    citizenship and helping these individuals gain knowledge that
    is necessary to become successful citizens. You talk about
    expanding the capacity of volunteers to prepare immigrants for
    citizenship and so on. That is what in a way a lot of
    congressional offices do by referring people to the support
    groups.
        What I would suggest in this is that you include in this
    outreach notifying Members of Congress of these grants and
    being able to put them together in their communities.
        One of the reasons to do this, Mr. Chairman, is that it
    just becomes sort of a routine if you are doing it all the time
    in Federal courthouses and Federal office buildings. But if you
    take this outside of the normal area to do it, it just creates
    a whole pageantry of interest by local press that interview
    these people. They interview these people, the oldest person
    being sworn in, the number of countries they are coming from,
    the incredible background stories that need to be told all the
    time. This is what the great, great melting pot of America is.
        I know I do it and other Members do it, but it has always
    been sort of ad hoc, and it seems to me if we are going to put
    this money out there for community outreach, that we ought to
    get better connected. You can figure out the math here. If
    community organizations and local people wanted to put together
    one at $5,000, we have never had one that expensive, but $5,000
    for a swearing-in ceremony for all of them, you give them food
    and drink, and we do birthday cakes, a big celebration for
    America. We do it around the Fourth of July. We get flags all
    up, school groups, all sorts of things. But if you did that for
    every Member of Congress, you are talking about $2.1 million. I
    think that the sense of the importance of immigration, if every
    Member wanted to participate in it, would really help the image
    of our country, both internally and abroad, from the countries
    that these people come from.
        So it is just a suggestion. I would like to work with you
    on that and include in that outreach and in those community
    organizations sort of the ability if you would like to have a
    swearing-in ceremony in your own community, that one could put
    together the ``ask'' for a grant to do that.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you, Congressman.
        Mr. Farr. Are you interested in helping on that?
        Mr. Mayorkas. Congressman, if I can address the question,
    we receive an appropriated amount to fund immigrants' ability
    to prepare for the naturalization test, to be able to provide
    to them educational tools that they might not otherwise have
    access to so that they can be equipped to pass the
    naturalization test and become U.S. citizens.
        Once they achieve that citizenship, we, through the funding
    that this Committee has appropriated, have increased
    exponentially the capacity of community-based organizations and
    our office to assist immigrants who have been naturalized to
    integrate into the community and become part of the national
    fabric.
        We currently, without special appropriation, conduct
    naturalization ceremonies throughout the country, almost one
    every day. I think we naturalize 600,000 or 700,000 new
    citizens per year. Given the tremendous fiscal challenges that
    we face, given the critical need to use the appropriated funds
    for our Office of Citizenship to enable people to become
    naturalized and then, once naturalized, to integrate into
    society, given the fact that we receive donations from the
    facilities that want to lend themselves to our effort to
    conduct naturalization ceremonies across the country, in cities
    far and wide, on ordinary days and on special days, it is very
    difficult for us as an agency to come before this Committee and
    seek an appropriation to fund ceremonies themselves when we
    conduct them already across the country without the
    appropriated amounts.
        Mr. Farr. I certainly would like to know what you spend on
    those and where you do them, because certainly no one has ever
    been doing them in our area until I initiated it. As I said, it
    is all the service clubs and schools and everybody is involved.
    No one ever did it outside of our asking. So I would like to
    see how many of these you do, how much you move around, and
    what the cost is to the agency to put on one of these, because
    I think we can do it cheaper with the service clubs.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you, Congressman. I will provide you
    with that information.
        Mr. Price. We will look for that information for the
    record.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: As indicted within the Congressional
    Justification of the FY 2010 budget request, USCIS estimated
    that naturalization and oath of allegiance ceremonies cost
    approximately $26.3 million in FY 2010. The level for FY 2011
    is estimated to be $27.1
        USCIS holds hundreds of naturalization ceremonies across
    the country and overseas every month. Among these are
    ``special'' naturalization ceremonies held at historical
    landmarks and uniquely American setting across the nation in an
    effort to highlight the importance of citizenship. Such events
    are held on holidays and national days of observance such as
    Independence Day, Veterans Day, Citizenship Day, and
    Constitution Week. USCIS would be happy to provide information
    upon request for specific categories of naturalization
    ceremonies of interest and/or ceremonies provided on specific
    days of a particular year.

        Mr. Price. Director, thank you. Congratulations on your
    appointment and your service thus far. Thank you for that
    service and for your presence here today. We will look forward
    to working with you as we assemble your budget for next year.
        Mr. Mayorkas. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Price. With that, the Subcommittee is adjourned.

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                                             Wednesday, April 14, 2010.

     UPDATE ON SOUTHWEST BORDER: THE CHALLENGES THAT DHS CONTINUES TO FACE

                                   WITNESSES

    ALAN BERSIN, COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
    JOHN MORTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
        ENFORCEMENT

                   Opening Statement of Chairman David Price

        Mr. Price. The Subcommittee will come to order. This
    morning we will be focusing on the southwest border and the
    challenges that the Department of Homeland Security continues
    to face in that part of our country.
        Our southwestern border region possesses a rich history, a
    shared culture interwoven over the centuries, and lands of
    unsurpassed natural beauty. It is not a faraway, alien place,
    but an inextricable part of our homeland with millions of
    hardworking families and a vital and diverse economy. Cross-
    border trade is an important part of the picture. Eighty
    percent of Mexico's exports and half of its imports are with
    the United States, and 10 percent of our country's overall
    trade is with Mexico.
        However, these trade statistics exclude illicit drugs. Over
    90 percent of the cocaine entering our country is estimated to
    pass through Mexico, which is also our country's largest
    supplier of marijuana and methamphetamines. The U.S. appetite
    for drugs has nurtured powerful and corrupting cartels with
    tens of billions of dollars in criminal proceeds. These
    international criminal organizations routinely violate our
    borders to traffic drugs and weapons and money and to smuggle
    undocumented aliens. But it is the violence of these cartels
    and the fear and disruption they sow that now dominate the
    news.
        Over 18,000 people, including 79 Americans, have died in
    Mexico since President Calderon confronted the cartels. The
    brutality, the wanton disregard for bystanders, including women
    and children, and the apparent impunity with which the cartels
    have operated is appalling.
        The questions we raised in prior hearings and we will
    explore today are whether and to what degree are we making
    progress against the cartels, making our borders harder to
    exploit, and reducing the risk that violence will spread.
        I believe there is not much point in debating to what
    extent cartel violence has spilled over into the United States.
    Our close relationship with Mexico means we cannot ignore the
    violence there regardless of when and whether it crosses the
    line physically. The deaths in March of three persons in Ciudad
    Juarez associated with the U.S. consulate, intensified assaults
    against Border Patrol agents including the murder of two, the
    kidnapping and murders of U.S. residents in Texas, and the
    recent homicide of an Arizona rancher all remind us of the
    threats of narcoviolence. The truth is the cartels are engaged
    in criminal activities every day in cities and communities on
    both sides of the border and not just along the border. We need
    to focus on meaningful ways to deal with cartels and their
    violence on the border and beyond.
        This hearing falls on the first anniversary of the
    administration's announcements of its Southwest Border
    Initiative. Secretary Napolitano noted during her recent visit
    to Mexico that CBP and ICE's enhanced efforts have resulted in
    record seizures of drugs, firearms and smuggled illicit cash.
    She also cited unprecedented cooperation with Mexico on
    information sharing, joint training, cross-border
    communications and trade.
        Today from our witnesses we will want an assessment of how
    successful DHS efforts are or can become, and we will pose such
    questions as: how would you grade efforts to prosecute drug and
    trafficking cases in Mexico given that Mexico has its own
    immigration issues? Will our cooperation help U.S. security
    against attempts by non-Mexicans to enter the U.S. through
    Mexico? Does the fiscal year 2011 budget enable CBP and ICE to
    sustain a long-term effort to counter the cartels? How
    effective are joint efforts with Federal, State and local
    agencies, including backing them up when they are seriously
    outmanned or outgunned?
        We also want to understand how investments that we have
    made to date are complicating life for the cartels. These
    include the Secure Border Initiative, the Border Enforcement
    Security Task Forces, the deployment of air and marine assets,
    tunnel detection, and the establishment of forward-operating
    locations or checkpoints.
        Our Subcommittee is pleased to welcome this morning
    Commissioner Alan Bersin of U.S. Customs and Border Protection
    and Assistant Secretary John Morton, the Director of U.S.
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to bring us up to date on
    the status of this initiative in light of expanded staffing,
    equipment and other resources that Congress has provided to
    enable your agencies to work with Federal, State and local
    partners as well as with the Government of Mexico to overcome
    the cartels. Assistant Secretary Morton appeared here last
    November on this topic, but this is Commissioner Bersin's first
    time before the Committee.
        Commissioner, we welcome you. We expect that your initial
    year at the DHS, along with your unique law enforcement and
    personal experience has given you a realistic perspective on
    what can be accomplished on the border.
        We look forward to hearing from both of you today. We will
    insert your complete statements in the hearing record, so we
    will ask you to summarize your presentation in a 5-minute oral
    presentation. We will begin with Commissioner Bersin followed
    by Assistant Secretary Morton. But we first want to turn to our
    distinguished ranking member Mr. Rogers for his comments.
        [The information follows:]

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               Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers

        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this
    hearing, because there is no more important topic for American
    security than the southwest border.
        Commissioner Bersin, as the chairman says, this marks your
    first appearance before the Subcommittee. Given your extensive
    experience working in southern California and your service as
    this administration's border czar over the past year, I look
    forward to finally hearing your views on border security.
        And a welcome back to Assistant Secretary Morton. We meet
    again. I appreciate your being here and look forward to hearing
    your strong views on border enforcement as well.
        As the chairman noted, it has been just over a year since
    this administration launched its Southwest Border Security
    Initiative, an effort that has surged resources to further
    enhance our border security and support the courageous actions
    of the Mexican Government against the cartels. While this
    initiative has resulted in some noteworthy seizures of drugs
    and bulk cash and modest interdiction of weapons, the murder
    rate continues to soar, the purity of marijuana and
    methamphetamine remains stubbornly high, and Mexico appears
    years away from sufficiently reforming its customs and
    immigration services as well as sustaining resilient local law
    enforcement. In fact, the cartels appear emboldened as ever,
    demonstrated by the continued escalation of violence and the
    recent assertion of a well-known Mexican drug lord to the media
    that ``Mexico's war on the drug trade is futile, even if cartel
    bosses are caught or killed.'' Sobering.
        According to several published reports, mounting drug
    violence in Mexico has killed more than 19,500 people since
    President Calderon launched his effort against the cartels in
    2006. Furthermore, the pace of homicides continues to escalate,
    most notably in Juarez, as the chairman said, where the average
    number of murders a month approaches 200, more than 6 murders a
    day on average in 1 city on the border in Mexico.
        But just as this drug war seem to be reaching a tipping
    point, I fear as though our political resolve to adequately
    sustain this fight is on the verge of slipping. The President's
    fiscal 2011 budget not only curbs CBP's operational resources
    and reduces funding for border security technology and
    infrastructure, it also severely cuts the Coast Guard and its
    drug interdiction capabilities to the point where the amount of
    cocaine seized will decline by an estimated 11.3 percent.
    Explain that.
        Such reductions to operations will undoubtedly empower the
    cartels and put more pressure upon the border. In the midst of
    this drug war, with our border under siege, how can we possibly
    support a budget that is knowingly letting our guard down and
    allowing more drugs, more illegals, and contraband to flow
    across that border into this country? How can we justify this?
        And apart from DHS's flawed fiscal 2011 budget request,
    there are other pressing questions. How can we accept the
    administration's recent pronouncements on the troubled SBInet
    program when we have yet to receive the legislatively required
    expenditure plan for that program for the next fiscal year--for
    fiscal 2010, the current fiscal year? And why does the
    administration repeatedly assert that ``violence is not
    spilling over'' when, one, our own Justice Department admits
    the cartels' networks reach all across this country into every
    city and now almost every village, direct cartel organizations
    all across this land, not just on the border; two, assaults
    against the Border Patrol continue to increase, and an agent
    was murdered in cold blood last year, another with his face
    caved in a few days ago, a well-known Arizona rancher murdered
    last month on his own property, U.S. consulate personnel
    murdered, another consulate bombed just this past weekend? And
    as the Washington Post reported on April 4, the cartels'
    contract killers are operating with near impunity on both sides
    of the border, but including the U.S. contract killers, hired
    by a foreign cartel, murdering Americans. What are you going to
    do about that?
        And beyond the surge efforts of the past year and
    escalating violence, what are the next steps that need to be
    taken against this threat? If there is one thing I am certain
    of from my experience as a State prosecutor in Kentucky for 11
    years, a DA, and my years here in this body, is that drugs pose
    a grave and unrelenting threat to the health, safety and
    security of the United States; therefore, we must do all we can
    to secure that border, thwart these cartels, and put a stop to
    their savage criminality and their murderous ways.
        So the challenge being presented to DHS by this drug war is
    clear. My question, which is the same one I posed during our
    hearing on border violence last November, is whether or not we
    are up to the challenge. And when I pose this question, I am
    not wondering whether we have the proper resources in place to
    simply disrupt this organized cross-border crime. I am
    wondering, just as I did last November, whether we have the
    will to actually break its back.
        Now, I realize that is a mighty tough chore. I am quite
    certain it is a worthy fight, and surely this country has the
    capability to protect our border from organized criminal
    ventures spreading its tentacles across every inch of America.
    This is a serious, serious problem.
        Securing our border is not a mere luxury. Securing our
    border is a worthy fight that we must win. So today, Mr.
    Chairman, I am not only interested in assessing our progress in
    this fight with the cartels, I am interested in learning what
    more we can do to combat this clear and present threat to the
    United States and its citizens. Thank you.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
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                            Statement of Alan Bersin

        Mr. Price. We will now begin with the Commissioner,
    Commissioner Bersin.
        Mr. Bersin. Good morning, Chairman Price, Ranking Member
    Rogers, members of the Subcommittee and staff. I appreciate
    this opportunity to provide an update on our efforts to combat
    the threat of violence along the southwest border and to
    discuss my vision for the southern border as U.S. Customs and
    Border Protection's (CBP's) new Commissioner.
        The Committee has been extremely supportive of CBP over the
    years in meeting our difficult mission, and we are grateful for
    your support and your continued guidance. The significant
    investments that you have made in CBP helps protect our country
    from a variety of evolving threats, including those generated
    by organized criminal organizations operating transnationally
    in Mexico.
        Before serving as CBP Commissioner, I worked for many years
    as a prosecutor on the border and in other positions with the
    Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice.
    During that time, I worked closely with U.S. law enforcement
    colleagues at all levels--state, local, county, federal and
    tribal--as well as with our counterparts in Mexico. The level
    of cooperation that we see today between the United States and
    Mexico under President Felipe Calderon is unprecedented and
    provides us with a historic opportunity. President Calderon's
    willingness to address the growing problems of drug cartels is
    nothing short of heroic. It presents a unique opportunity to
    expand and deepen coordinated law enforcement operations
    between our countries. We recognize that this is a journey that
    will not be accomplished overnight, but the important point is
    that it is a journey in which the first steps have been taken.
        Having worked and lived most of my life in border
    communities, I recognize the concerns of our citizens regarding
    drug-related violence that has taken place on both sides of the
    border. It has been and continues to be a deeply serious
    threat. Most recently, the tragic murder of Robert Krentz, an
    Arizona rancher and a leader in his community, is an outrage
    and a tragedy. It points to the continuing problem. Secretary
    Napolitano has committed significant resources to bring this
    killer or killers to justice.
        Immediately after the shooting, CBP provided air and marine
    assets and trackers to find signs of the suspects. Furthermore,
    CBP dispatched additional mobile surveillance systems,
    supplemented regular aerial surveillance and transferred and
    deployed 64 additional Border Patrol agents into the area.
        Although individual incidents of violence are not a new
    phenomenon along the border, we are determined to prevent the
    kind of widespread violence that continues to take place every
    day in northern Mexico from crossing the border into the United
    States in the form in which it appears in Mexico.
        In March 2009, Secretary Napolitano announced the
    comprehensive Southwest Border Strategy aimed at preventing
    spillover violence and at helping the Government of Mexico
    crack down on drug cartels in that country. During the past
    year, CBP has supported that initiative by adopting the
    doctrine of co-responsibility, acknowledging that drugs coming
    north is part and parcel of a cycle of violence that involves
    bulk cash and weapons going south.
        To deal with national security issues for both countries,
    CBP has increased its cooperation with Mexico to coordinate
    border inspections and law enforcement operations. We have
    enhanced our information sharing and continue to build on
    intelligence cooperation. We have developed joint strategic
    approaches to our common problems, and we have continued to
    increase our capacity building at ports of entry.
        Just last month, CBP opened the Operations and Intelligence
    Coordination Center in Tucson, AZ. This new facility serves as
    a centralized location for gathering and disseminating real-
    time data (actionable information to help increase security
    along the southwest border) and then putting information into
    the hands of CBP agents on the ground.
        Since last November when Acting Commissioner Jayson Ahern
    testified before this Subcommittee, CBP has continued its
    enhanced efforts on outbound operations to prevent weapons and
    currency that, in fact, fuel drug-related violence that
    continues in Mexico.
        As part of the strategy, we have expanded our License Plate
    Reader (LPR) program, we have invested in nonintrusive
    technology and we have deployed additional Border Patrol agents
    on the scene. We have also deployed mobile response teams,
    canine teams and other resources to increase pulse and surge
    operations, looking at what is leaving our country as we
    concentrate on what is coming into our country.
        These outbound efforts have been successful. They are an
    important step in the right direction. Since the Southwest
    Border Initiative was launched last year, CBP has seized more
    than $30 million in illicit southbound cash along the southwest
    border. Together with our cooperative efforts with U.S.
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the numbers are
    greater and growing.
        Let me take a concluding moment to address our future
    strategy. In addition to keeping America's border safe and
    secure, CBP recognizes that we must promote economic
    competitiveness throughout North America. Security and trade
    and commerce go hand in hand. Security comes first, but we can
    be economically competitive as we enhance our security.
        We will adopt strategies that simultaneously improve
    security and expedite legitimate trade and travel. Smarter
    targeting and risk segmentation allow law enforcement
    authorities like CBP to focus their energy on the relatively
    small amount of illegitimate cargo and crossings that pose a
    threat to our public safety as well as to our economic
    prosperity. We can have enhanced security while reducing the
    cost and inconvenience to legitimate goods and lawful
    travelers.
        CBP has made tremendous strides in this area by
    implementing trusted traveler programs such as the Free and
    Secure Trade (FAST) program and the Secure Electronic Network
    for Travelers (SENTRI) program on the southern border. These
    programs complement the Global Entry program at our airports
    and the NEXUS program on our northern border. They expedite
    entry for low-risk travelers and cargo, while allowing our
    officers to focus on more high-risk individuals and shipments.
        Working with our public, private and international
    partners, we believe that we can continue to have greater
    security and greater prosperity.
        Finally, let me thank you again for this opportunity to
    appear here and deliver my first testimony as CBP's new
    Commissioner. I am honored to be able to share with you the
    good work the men and women of CBP do each day to safeguard our
    Nation's security. Thank you.
        Mr. Price. Thank you, Commissioner.
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                            Statement of John Morton

        Mr. Price. Mr. Morton.
        Mr. Morton. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rogers, members of the
    Committee, thanks once again for inviting me to appear before
    you to testify on this subject. Let me also take a moment to
    welcome my new colleague, Commissioner Bersin, to his post.
    Alan has great insight and experience when it comes to the
    border and to Mexico, and I look forward to working with him as
    we train ICE and CBP, making the border a much more secure and
    safe place.
        Since I last testified before you on the same subject, we
    have, as both the chairman and Mr. Rogers noted, witnessed
    several acts of violence against U.S. citizens, and, in
    particular, we have seen the outrageous killing of three
    individuals associated with the U.S. consulate in Ciudad
    Juarez, Mexico, and the cowardly murder of Mr. Krentz, the
    Arizona rancher in Cochise County near the Mexico border.
        First, on behalf of ICE, I extend my heartfelt sympathy to
    the families of Lesley Enriquez, her husband Arthur Redelfs, as
    well as to the families of Jorge Alberto Salcido Ceniceros and
    Mr. Krentz.
        Although I can't get into the specifics of the open and
    ongoing investigations into these cases, I can assure you of
    one thing: Both ICE and CBP acted very swiftly and aggressively
    in response to the killings. We are working with our partners
    in Mexico and the United States as we speak to try to solve
    these murders and to bring the killers to justice.
        In the Krentz case, for example, ICE is the lead federal
    agency assisting the Cochise County Sheriff's Office with the
    investigation. We have assigned special agents full time to the
    case, we have devoted the full resources of our office in
    Mexico to it and we have offered a reward to bring the killers
    to justice.
        My message today to you is simple. ICE shares the concerns
    of many over the presence of organized crime in Mexico and
    along our border. We are committed to vigilance and to a
    sustained attack on the criminal networks that seek to smuggle
    drugs, guns, money and people to and from Mexico.
        This commitment is more than rhetorical. Thanks to the
    increased appropriations we have received from this
    Subcommittee during the past 2 years, there has never been, in
    the history of our agency, more ICE agents and deportation
    officers devoted to the southwest border, and the results are
    promising.
        Let me start with our staffing. Approximately a quarter of
    our special agents are devoted to our five Special Agent in
    Charge (SAC) offices in the four border states. The same is
    true for our detention and removal officers, a quarter of our
    entire staffing.
        We now have 10 of our 17 Border Enforcement Security Task
    Forces (BESTs) on the southwest border: two in California, two
    in New Mexico, three in Arizona and three in Texas. The 11th is
    being formed in Mexico City itself. By the end of the year, we
    will have 40 ICE agents in Mexico, both in Mexico City and in
    border cities along the border--again, the largest presence we
    have ever had in any country in our history. We have six
    special assistant U.S. attorneys devoted to prosecuting border
    cases in border U.S. attorney offices. I am personally
    committed to significantly increasing that number, and we are
    in the process of working with the Deputy Attorney General to
    do just that.
        To give you some flavor of the results over the past year,
    in our Houston office, we have seen a 64 percent increase in
    drug seizures; in San Antonio, a 23 percent increase in drug
    seizures and, in San Diego, a 40 percent increase in currency
    seizures; in Phoenix, a 15 percent increase in criminal
    convictions; and, overall, an 11 percent increase in
    administrative arrests of criminal offenders along the
    southwest border.
        As welcome as these successes are, we intend to do more.
    The drug-trafficking cartels remain a very serious threat to
    both Mexico and the United States, fueling unacceptably high
    levels of violence in Juarez and elsewhere in Mexico. This is a
    fight. It is a very real and a very nasty fight, and it is one
    that will take deep resolve and deep commitment to win, but we
    have to win it. There is no rational alternative.
        ICE is aggressively going after the cartels and other
    organized criminals in Mexico in many ways. First, we are
    pursuing initiatives along the southwest border to stop all
    cash smuggling, drug trafficking and firearms trafficking. We
    are also attacking the alien-smuggling industry and
    transnational gangs that operate on both sides of the border,
    and, in this respect, we are increasingly doing it hand in hand
    with our other federal law enforcement partners, namely the
    Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol,
    Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation.
        Second, we are going to continue to match our powers of
    investigation, seizure and deportation with CBP's impressive
    powers of inspection and interdiction. Between the two of us,
    working closely, we can make the border and the transit zones
    on the Mexican side and the U.S. side hostile places for
    criminal networks.
        Third, we are going to increase our joint efforts with
    Mexican law enforcement to investigate cases, share
    intelligence and improve professionalism through training. I
    really want to focus on the concrete here: real cases, real
    criminals, real jail time.
        Fourth, we need to develop much better intelligence sharing
    among all of the federal and local law enforcement agencies
    involved.
        Finally, I want to harness the full power of our local law
    enforcement partners, our intelligence officers in our 10
    southwest border BESTs. All of these are described in more
    detail in my submitted written remarks, but they just reflect
    the absolute commitment we have to trying to get this right.
        Since my last testimony here, we have also stepped up our
    specific efforts in and around Juarez and El Paso, TX. This has
    involved taking such extraordinary steps as stopping all
    removals of criminals and noncriminals through Juarez. We are
    expanding the Illegal Drug Program in which we, with the
    Mexican Government, prosecute individuals in Mexico for
    offenses that occurred in the United States, and we are working
    with the Mexican equivalent of the BEST called the UNITO.
        Let me close by just saying we have begun to see real
    results from our efforts. I can assure everyone here that we
    are mindful of the seriousness of this problem. We spend an
    enormous amount of time trying to think about getting it right,
    doing things differently, being more innovative. It is a very,
    very serious challenge to us. Alan and I have talked about it a
    lot. We are both sort of sober individuals. We are not
    pretending in any way that this isn't a challenge that
    confronts our Nation. We have a long, long history in federal
    law enforcement, and ultimately I think that it is going to be
    an important combination of the power of the Federal
    Government, cooperation with state and Local law enforcement
    and a much better and improved relationship with Mexico that
    will lead to success in the end. Thank you.
        [The information follows:]

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                 BILATERAL ENFORCEMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH MEXICO

        Mr. Price. Thank you, and thanks to both of you for your
    testimony.
        I want to focus initial questions on something you both
    referenced extensively; namely, the cooperative efforts
    underway with the Mexican Government and to get you to
    elaborate a bit on the results that agreement has produced, and
    what you expect from it, because we all know that cooperation
    is absolutely essential.
        Secretary Napolitano, along with her counterparts at State
    and Defense, met with their Mexican counterparts in February
    and March. They signed new agreements on intelligence sharing,
    border and air security cooperation. We would be interested in
    your take on the significance of those agreements, and what
    difference they will make in your work, and what kind of
    results you would anticipate. But let me be a little more
    specific. I would like first, Commissioner Bersin, to ask you
    about efforts on the Mexican side to greatly beef up military
    and law enforcement presence in the northern part of the
    country.
        When President Calderon took over in 2006, he put the
    Mexican military in charge of security and policing for Juarez
    and other northern Mexican areas, and it was reported at the
    time the local police were demoralized, there were corruption
    problems, they were overwhelmed by the cartels. Now there has
    been a replacement of those military forces, or at least a
    number of them, with Federal police who have now arrived in
    Juarez as of April 8. What can you tell us about that? What do
    we conclude from that? Is that good news in the sense of
    signaling an enhanced capacity from the police? What kind of
    mix of forces are we looking at here, and what would be your
    assessment of the way on the Mexican side these forces have
    been deployed?
        Mr. Bersin. Mr. Chairman, of all the remarkable changes
    that have taken place in Mexico and in the bilateral
    relationship with regard to confronting organized crime, one of
    the most extraordinary was the recognition and the public
    acceptance by President Calderon that much of Mexico's law
    enforcement machinery and much, if not all, of its judiciary
    was subject to corruption and that corruption and the tentacles
    and the influence of organized crime had tainted law
    enforcement and the judiciary at all levels of Mexican society.
        Since 2006, they have begun, under President Calderon's
    leadership, the transformation of law enforcement into a
    reliable instrument of public policy, focusing for the most
    part on the federal police and the federal enforcement
    authorities: the Secretary of Public Safety, or Seguridad
    Publica (SSP); ingeniero--engineer--Garcia Luna, I think, is a
    very positive step and one that will, over time, begin to
    produce dividends.
        Secretary Napolitano as well as Secretary Morton and myself
    have been to the headquarters in Mexico City, which just in an
    equipment and technological sense is impressive and indicates
    the commitment that has been made fiscally to build up a
    federal law enforcement presence.
        The plan is to move toward 20,000 federal police. What we
    have seen recently in Juarez was the decision that recognized
    that although the military, because of the lack of local law
    enforcement, will continue to have a role to play in dealing
    with organized crime, the long-term solution was to substitute
    a military presence with a law enforcement presence. That is
    beginning to happen in Juarez, where the primary enforcement
    duties are being transitioned to Secretary Garcia Luna, with
    the military remaining, but in a protective stance. And I
    believe that is the way ahead, one that will show significant
    improvement in the near term as well as over the longer term.
        Mr. Price. So your assessment is that that is, number one,
    a mark of increased capacity, greatly improved capacity on the
    part of the police; and secondly, that that is the optimal
    long-term pattern, that the military would remain in that
    supportive role perhaps, but would not be the primary force?
        Mr. Bersin. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I believe that is the
    strategy, and that it is a sound one.
        Mr. Price. Let me turn to the Controlled Substance Pilot
    Project that is an agreement between the Mexican Attorney
    General, ICE and CBP, that enables them, the Mexicans, to
    prosecute drug-smuggling cases when for whatever reasons those
    cases are declined by the U.S. Attorney's Office. There is a
    similar program for alien smuggler prosecutions known as the
    OASIS's program.
        So, Assistant Secretary Morton, your testimony refers to
    the first two convictions from this new drug prosecution
    cooperative program. You don't make any reference to
    prosecutions for alien smuggling. What can you tell us about
    the impact underway or the impact you anticipate from these two
    cooperative programs? Is there reason to believe the Mexican
    authorities are able and willing to accelerate prosecutions?
    What kind of specific report can you give us?
        Mr. Morton. I can tell you that the initial results are
    very promising here. In less than a year, we have gone from
    having no pilot programs addressing drug prosecutions on the
    Mexican side to having two programs, and we are in active
    discussions with the federal prosecutor's office about
    expanding. The basic idea is simply: We have a number of drug
    offenses that occur on our side of the border, particularly at
    ports of entry, that, for a variety of reasons, ICE is able to
    investigate with assistance from CBP, but that are not accepted
    for prosecution. Mexican federal law provides fairly
    significant penalties for that conduct, reaches that conduct
    assuming Mexicans were involved, and the Mexican standards of
    proof are different and allow prosecution in certain instances
    where we can't do it. So it makes a lot of sense. And so far so
    good. And we have done the same thing with smuggling offenses
    for quite some time now through OASIS.

         OPERATION AGAINST SMUGGLERS INITIATIVE ON SAFETY AND SECURITY

        I am cautiously optimistic that we are going to stop
    considering these as pilots and move to a broad-based
    prosecution program hand in hand with the Mexicans for low-
    level offenses involving Mexicans on their side. And as we have
    seen, they are starting to convict people and send them to
    jail.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Well, by every account, public and private, the threat on
    that border is increasing. The violence is increasing. The
    audacity and the bravado of the criminal cartels is growing by
    the minute. According to the Department of Justice's most
    recent National Drug Threat Assessment released in February of
    this year, the cartels are not only ``the single greatest
    trafficking threat to the United States,'' they also have
    operations in every region of the U.S. and are expanding into
    more rural and suburban areas, according to the CNN reports.
    And the cartels, according to that report, have partnered with
    U.S. street gangs and prison gangs for drug distribution to
    such an extent that ``Mexican drug trafficking organizations
    control most of the wholesale cocaine, heroin and
    methamphetamine distribution in the United States as well as
    much of the marijuana distribution.''
        Do you agree with that? Commissioner.
        Mr. Bersin. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. The report also says that greater levels of
    heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine are flowing across the
    border than ever before, and projects availability of such
    drugs to increase.
        Have I understated the threat that is there on the border?
        Mr. Bersin. I think not, Mr. Rogers.

                   CUTS TO BORDER PATROL MONEY AND PERSONNEL

        Mr. Rogers. Then how can you justify coming here to this
    Congress and asking us to decrease the amount of money and
    personnel in Border Patrol faced with this ever-growing threat
    to our security? How can you justify that?
        Mr. Bersin. Congressman, with regard to the Fiscal Year
    2011 request and the level of Border Patrol agents, we have
    seen remarkable growth thanks to this Committee, and that
    growth will continue to increase. Although we saw a slight
    decrease from 2009 to 2010, from 21,294 CBP officers, (and
    20,019 Border Patrol agents), we will maintain a level of
    20,163 in 2011. So, in fact, with regard to the Border Patrol,
    the budget calls for maintenance of the unprecedented levels
    that this Committee has been instrumental in providing us on
    the southern border.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, you are still cutting air and marine
    operations, right, and Coast Guard?
        Mr. Bersin. The cut in air interdiction agents, but not a
    diminution in the assets, yes, is from 891 to 839 under the
    budget that has been called for.
        Mr. Rogers. And when you furnished us the first iteration
    of your budget request for 2011, you would have cut 1,100
    Border Patrol agents--I am sorry, 1,100 Coast Guard personnel.
    And then when you heard the noise up here against that kind of
    a cut, you came back with a budget request that restored some
    of that personnel, but you are still cutting the air and marine
    operations and other aspects. And I just wonder how in the
    dickens you can justify that, given the threat that we are
    facing there by all accounts including your own.
        Mr. Morton, you have been silent there a while. What do you
    say?
        Mr. Morton. ICE's budget has a modest 2 percent increase.
    Our budget for this year annualizes the enhancement that we
    received in Fiscal Year 2010, so I am quite confident that the
    President's budget is going to sustain us at our highest levels
    ever, and we will have a modest increase.

                       COMBATTING DRUGS AND GANG VIOLENCE

        Mr. Rogers. You know, Mr. Chairman, the old-fashioned idea
    of what Border Patrol and ICE is supposed to do is to protect
    us against the traditional threat along the border, illegal
    aliens particularly. But the problem on the border has evolved
    into huge changes and into a huge danger, and that is
    criminality, drugs, and contraband and that sort of thing,
    which is really a law enforcement problem. And I have been long
    critical of the administration, of the previous one and this
    one, for not recognizing that the border is more of a criminal
    problem now than it is anything else, and yet we do not have
    enough of the Nation's law enforcement manpower on that border.
    I am talking FBI, DEA and those agencies that fight drugs and
    criminality. And this thing is getting out of hand down there.
    And I wonder what either of you see that we could be doing that
    we have not thought about or not planned for yet. Are we doing
    all that we can do? Commissioner?
        Mr. Bersin. There are always, Congressman, improvements
    that can be made, but in terms of the strategy and the
    resourcing that has taken place over the last decade, indeed
    over the last 5 years, I think what we do is continue to get
    better and improve the mix and the alignment of the resources
    that have been provided; 21,000, 20,000 Border Patrol agents
    compares favorably to what existed when I first met you 15
    years ago by a factor of almost 6.
        We have seen dramatic increases, and we need to now develop
    the capacity of these wonderful men and women who now will have
    the opportunity to become journeyman Border Patrol agents.
        We need to build on intelligence sharing. We need to build
    on technology that is available. We need to coordinate with our
    sister agencies like ICE in a more effective way.
        All of this is always a work in progress. So I wouldn't,
    for a moment, suggest that the work is done or the challenges
    aren't supreme. They are. But, in fact, we stand better
    resourced than we have been. And we need to develop and see
    that the resources that have been given to us are deployed most
    effectively and aligned with our technical equipment capacities
    that also are, frankly, unparalleled from what existed in the
    past.
        Mr. Rogers. Mr. Morton.
        Mr. Morton. Two quick things, Mr. Rogers. One, on your
    point about the border facing a level of criminality that needs
    to be reflected in a change in strategy and approach, I think
    that is one of the great promises that ICE holds. As you
    alluded to, traditionally we are often thought of in the
    context of civil immigration enforcement, yet, at the same
    time, we are the second largest criminal investigative agency,
    with nearly 7,000 special agents (1811s) whose sole job is to
    investigate crime. And we need to harness both of those powers
    in a very focused way on the border to address the problems
    that have arisen.
        And, in terms of what can we do better, one of the things
    you mentioned earlier on that same report from the Department
    of Justice that pointed out the relationship between the
    cartels and gang members and street-level distribution, we did
    something differently this year. It was the first time we ever
    did it, and we need to do more of it. And that is ICE does a
    lot of transnational gang removal. We have typically done it in
    terms of--Look at MS 13. Look at this gang. Are they here
    unlawfully? Let us remove the gang members from the community
    from just a general safety perspective.
        For the first time, we took the very report you were
    talking about, and we said, ``Well, this time let us focus on
    those gangs that also have a direct connection to the cartels
    and the distribution of narcotics.'' We did it nationwide, and
    we ended up with nearly 800 people. That is the kind of thing
    where we need to match our civil powers with our criminal
    powers in a coordinated way so that we are not just removing
    gang members, but we are removing gang members who are
    furthering the efforts of specific cartels. And we are going to
    do more of it.
        Mr. Rogers. My time has expired. Could I ask just one brief
    question?
        Mr. Price. Certainly.
        Mr. Rogers. It relates to the gangs, the contract killers
    that the cartels are now engaging, have contracted with, that
    are apparently responsible for thousands of murders on both
    sides of the border. What can you tell us, either of you, about
    what we are doing to try to break that cycle of hiring gang
    killers?
        Mr. Morton. I am not familiar with the level of contract
    killings that particular report refers to. I will say this, and
    I prefer to say more about it in private rather than in public:
    The relationship between ICE and the Drug Enforcement
    Administration is the closest it has ever been in our country's
    history. And I don't want to suggest that it is perfect. We can
    always work to make it better. But there is a lot going on in
    that regard that I think is promising. We need to do the same
    with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). ICE's role from
    a border security perspective with the FBI has been good but
    not particularly strategic, so I need to work some more in that
    area. It might be a fruitful one.
        Mr. Rogers. The Washington Post of April 4 carried the
    story about the heavily tattooed Barrio Azteca gang long
    operating across the border in El Paso, dealing drugs, stealing
    cars, but in Juarez that organization, according to this
    report, now specializes in contract killing for the Juarez drug
    cartel. And according to U.S. law enforcement, it may have been
    involved in as many as half of the 2,600 murders in the city in
    the past year alone, and that is just 1 town, 1 city. Can you
    follow up on that and give us a report?
        Mr. Morton. Be happy to.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: ICE will provide a classified briefing on this
    subject on Wednesday, June 16, at 9:30 a.m.

        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mr. Rodriguez.

                                BORDER CROSSINGS

        Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you very much. And let me thank you
    for being here today and what you do for all of us throughout
    the country and keeping us safe.
        Commissioner and Mr. Secretary, as you well know, I
    represent one of the largest districts in the Nation. I have
    785 miles along the border. I have 17 border stations. I have
    seven ports of entry and crossings. I have three Border Patrol
    sectors. And I want to take this opportunity to invite both of
    you to come to my district, if I can. I have had Secretary
    Salazar from Interior come by and visit. I have two beautiful--
    I have a good number, but two beautiful national parks right on
    the border, the Amistad, which is the best bass fishing in
    North America, as well as the Big Bend area, which is a
    beautiful area that has 340,000 people visit it every single
    year. And I have 1.7 million people visit the Amistad, and
    thank God we have never had any serious incidents there.
        But we do have a very beautiful relationship in those
    communities working with the Border Patrol as well as the Park
    Rangers, and working together in housing and working on that.
    But I wanted to follow up, and I have been told that we are
    safer when we communicate with the other side and have lines of
    communication.
        There was a numerous number of crossings that were closed
    in that sector. From Del Rio to Presidio is some 400 miles, and
    there are communities there that no longer have legal crossings
    anymore. And so do you see any value with having border
    crossings within the Big Bend or at least looking at the
    feasibility of reopening some of the old crossings?
        Mr. Bersin. Congressman Rodriguez, I thank you for that
    invitation. I have been to your district and share your
    assessment of Amistad and the Big Bend National Park. And, as
    you point out, in those vast expanses of the Big Bend country
    in Texas (across from Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas and Coahuila in
    Mexico), there is a border that we need to protect but also a
    border that serves as the community, a cross-border community,
    of families, of friends as well as of commercial partners.
        In the wake of security threats (and security being
    paramount) there have been, as you noted, closings of a number
    of the so-called informal crossings in which people crossed
    back and forth across Rio Bravo/Rio Grande for generations.
        As a result of your inquiries and your requests, and
    without sacrificing security, which we understand needs to be
    one of the primary requirements, we are in the process of
    reviewing the feasibility of opening up one or more of those
    crossings but doing it in a controlled way. I think it is
    beyond the point in American and border history where we can
    have unmonitored and uncontrolled crossings, but the point you
    make about facilitating cross-border community life is one that
    we understand and will work to assess with your office.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you very much.
        And I just want to highlight a very positive thing that is
    occurring in Big Bend with the ones we called the Diablos. And
    it is about 38 or so Mexicans that legally--and I say legally--
    every year during our emergency periods of time when we have
    fires in our national parks, that have been trained to help us,
    and they come every year in those specific areas where we have
    serious fires occurring, where we can't get other people there
    as quickly as possible, and it is beautiful the way they go out
    there. Right now they just go out on the border and yell out,
    and these farmers and ranchers on the Mexican side come in
    riding their horses and get into their gear to fight the fires
    on our side.
        And so there are some beautiful stories to tell about that.
    So I want to thank you for that. And we want to continue to
    enhance that beautiful trade that occurs there, not to mention
    the tourism with the national parks of those figures that I
    mentioned.
        Secondly, if I can real quickly, I know that throughout our
    history we have used the military on the border, and they have
    played a very significant role in certain specific areas. The
    National Guard, for example, performed non-law law enforcement
    duties and allow for more of our trained Border Patrol and CBP
    officers to be able to do some of the things that they can do
    and get out of behind the desk.

                                BORDER VIOLENCE

        The military on the border has been also a serious source
    of contention along the border. As you well know, in 1997 an
    incident with a young man, a kid actually, a high school kid in
    my district, at Redford who got killed, and I wanted to just
    get some assurance from you--I know the Governor has talked
    about sending the troops to the border, and, by the way, I
    don't have any problem if that is what we need to do--I want
    some assurance that before any type of action in this manner is
    taken, that there will be appropriate outreach information to
    my communities, the ranchers out there and the people in that
    area, and be notified if that is the case.
        Mr. Bersin. Congressman, in dealing with the violence (real
    and threatened), the administration is determined to take all
    necessary actions to protect border communities and our
    national borders. In that inquiry, all options have been on the
    table and will be on the table in terms of law enforcement, and
    any action that is taken will involve the kind of outreach with
    local communities and with state authorities, as you suggest.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you.
        If I can just add, I have my ranchers who also enjoy
    hunting and that kind of thing, and I don't want them in any
    way endangered by our own troops when they go through, so that
    communication is essential. So thank you.
        Mr. Price. Mr. Calvert.
        Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    gentlemen, for attending today.
        And as Mr. Rogers pointed out, the level of violence has
    continued to escalate. I live in southern California, and we
    see evidence of that every day in our communities in
    California, and I am sure throughout the Southwest United
    States.
        And obviously, the violence in Mexico is extreme. I would
    say it is not a fight, it is a war. Almost 23,000 people have
    been killed just since 2006 alone in Mexico. And I certainly
    congratulate President Calderon and the courage he has taken to
    take this adversary on, and it is an adversary. And, as has
    been pointed out, the violence is escalating on both sides of
    the border, not just the media when they point out what
    happened to this rancher in Arizona, but the drug activity
    throughout the United States, especially methamphetamine, which
    is being distributed through these gangs right here in Virginia
    and Maryland. It is not just in California and the Southwest;
    it has spread throughout the United States.
        And because of this level, I want to kind of go over with
    the gentleman from Texas, as you know, we had an operation
    called Operation Jump Start. I was along the border back in
    2006, and they give the assistance to the Border Patrol as they
    were increasing their numbers to protect that border. But
    obviously since then violence has increased significantly on
    the Mexican side and on the American side of the border.
        So I am going to ask you, do you think that if that is
    occurring, do you see any value in another deployment of
    National Guard along the borders to support your mission until
    we can stabilize this, especially in areas next to Juarez or
    Laredo and other areas where we seem to see real extreme
    problems along that area?
        Mr. Bersin. Congressman, as we confront the violence on our
    side of the border, and particularly, as you point out, the
    extreme levels of violence taking place in Northern Mexico, in
    Juarez, but also increasingly in the Northeast, in Nuevo Laredo
    and in the Tamaulipas area, as I said, the administration is
    committed to considering all options and the mix of options in
    order to deal with this threat and to contain it, so that the
    kind of extreme violence that is being experienced in Mexico in
    single incidents does not come into the United States and
    affect our communities on the border.
        What I would say is that, as I said to Congressman
    Rodriguez, all options are on the table and in the process of
    being considered and will be determined in terms of law
    enforcement--National Guard deployment, if any--in the near
    future.

                            CRIMINAL REMOVAL PROCESS

        Mr. Calvert. The reason I point that out, if, in fact, the
    reports I have read in other areas that the President of Mexico
    is going to escalate here rapidly his battle--it seems that he
    has been doing that, but I understand he is going to do
    significant escalation here soon going after these individuals
    throughout Mexico--that this probably will have an effect on
    the United States, especially in the border communities, and
    whether we should be prepared for that if, in fact, that
    occurs.
        And, Mr. Morton, on your comment about deporting these
    criminal aliens that are in the United States, I would hope as
    rapidly as possible identifying these individuals, especially
    the ones that are involved in distribution of drugs throughout
    the United States, identifying, finding them and deporting them
    as quickly as possible, and I would hope that is a top priority
    in your Department.
        Mr. Morton. Absolutely. And actually the chairman referred
    in his opening remarks to whether or not our relationship with
    Mexico has improved, and that is one area where it actually has
    improved quite dramatically. The Commissioner and I went with
    the Secretaries to Mexico, and one of the agreements we signed
    was to provide information sharing between ICE and Mexican law
    enforcement officials on all of the criminals that we are
    removing, with an eye to streamlining that process. We are
    working with them on having more centralized removal procedures
    for criminals, maybe flying them to central places. We don't
    just take them to the border communities anymore. It is a top
    priority.

                                      AMOC

        Mr. Calvert. And I would hope if they are incarcerated,
    they stay incarcerated. I don't have a lot of confidence
    sometimes in the penal system in Mexico.
        But nevertheless, one other issue before my time expires.
    AMOC is in my congressional district in southern California,
    and, as you know, they have been very successful and very
    integral in protecting our country from attack not just from
    drug activity, but any potential terrorist problem and the
    rest. Could you provide an update on how AMOC in Riverside,
    California, is utilized specifically in their interdiction,
    security and coordination roles as the environment on and
    across the border has changed over the last year?
        And I certainly share Mr. Rogers' perspective on this is--
    if any time, this is more important than ever to keep this type
    of program rolling. So----
        Mr. Bersin. Mr. Calvert, I share your enthusiasm for the
    Air and Marine Operations Center (AMDC) in Riverside, CA. Tony
    Crowder and his colleagues at the operations center have built
    a very critical capacity to monitor aviation movements in the
    country and across the border in a way that significantly
    enhances our situational awareness with regard to aviation
    efforts, in particular efforts to bring dangerous things and
    potentially dangerous people into our country.
        There is a continued reliance on the integration of AMOC
    into our national military and civilian agencies coordination
    between DoD and the Federal Aviation Administration, operating
    with AMOC, is an asset valued, recognized and supported by
    Secretary Napolitano significantly.
        Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mr. Farr.

                        ILLEGAL FLOW OF GUNS SOUTHBOUND

        Mr. Farr. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        This is interesting testimony on the border because you led
    our Committee on a CODEL once from Tucson to San Diego, and I
    was thinking as we are listening to a lot of this, perhaps we
    ought to do it before it gets too hot, one long weekend here do
    a CODEL from El Paso, Juarez to the whatever that city is----
        Mr. Bersin. San Diego.
        Mr. Farr. No the other way; go east, go the rest of Texas.
    Brownsville.
        But I am struck here as I listen to this because it seems
    to me that we have got to think a little bit outside the box. A
    lot of testimony in other committees is, what are we doing in
    Iraq and Afghanistan? If you think about it, we are trying to
    stabilize an area, we are trying to put a lot of foreign aid
    into that so we can stop the violence that is caused by the
    Taliban. And we have the same situation on the border, we just
    have different names for it. Instead of the military, we put
    ICE, Border Patrol. And I am not sure we have even focused on
    what we ought to be doing about infrastructure development,
    particularly foreign aid, to build the Mexican side of the
    border up so that we don't--all the pain isn't on our side,
    because I think just like the military said that we can't win
    the war in Afghanistan militarily, I don't think we can arrest
    our way out of our border issues.
        And I say that because I represent Salinas, California,
    which is not on the border, but it is halfway between northern
    California and southern California, and we have a border war
    going on in Salinas between the Nortenos and Sortenos, and last
    year they killed 29 kids. Kids killed kids; 29 in a small town.
    Just think what that would be. And it has everybody absolutely
    freaked. Two weeks ago a kid got up in the middle of the night
    to go out to get a drink of water, and he got killed by a
    bullet. It was a stray bullet. He wasn't intended, it was just
    the wrong place at the wrong time. Five years old, could have
    been anybody's child. And it has brought this city to our
    knees, so we really need to have more of a collaborative.
        I want to ask some questions of Secretary Morton, and by
    the way, Commissioner, I am really pleased with your background
    in both San Diego, knowing the border issues, but your
    background in education, because I think what we need to start
    looking at in education, they know that you can't put all of
    the resources in the schools and expect them to have kids not
    drop out unless you have what they call wraparound, all those
    other social services in a community. You know that from an
    airport district in San Diego, it wasn't an island within the
    city, it had to have collaboratives with everything. I think
    you are building those collaboratives, but I don't think we are
    building them enough.
        And I wanted to ask Secretary Morton, we have had this
    testimony before this Committee about the cooperation with
    Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, ATF, but it is obvious that
    there is still a massive number of guns and other weapons
    recovered by raids by Mexican authorities as well as ongoing
    levels of violence that U.S. has still not successfully reduced
    in the southbound flow of arms, and my understanding is that
    some of ICE's resources have been redirected to assist in
    reducing the flow of guns. And one of the questions I have is
    what role does ICE play in reducing the southbound flow? What
    do you see as the central challenge to eliminating illegal flow
    of arms? What problems is ICE facing? And if you were given the
    authority and the responsibility, how would you execute a
    program to eliminate the southbound flow of guns?
        And the reason I ask that is when I went with the President
    to the Summit of Americas, we stopped at Mexico City. And it
    was your folks in your Department that were asking these
    questions of me about they are not seeing the kind of
    collaboration that they wanted to see with ATF. So perhaps you
    could answer that question.
        Mr. Morton. Well, here is what we do now. As your question
    suggested, we do not have----
        Mr. Farr. It is not what you are doing now, it is what you
    can do--but what you can do to reduce, what is not--and what
    you are not doing that you should be doing or would like to be
    doing.
        Mr. Morton. By statute, we have no authority----
        Mr. Farr. I know that. But you have collaboration.
        Mr. Morton. That is right. So the support that we can bring
    is to ATF. In the support role, we also have independent
    authority to investigate smuggling of firearms in violation of
    law, but we have no authority to oversee or go to Federal
    Firearms Licenses (FFLs). Then we work very closely with CBP to
    target specific shipments. Often a CBP interdiction at the
    border is, in fact, based on ICE intelligence that we developed
    through an investigation, and then we refer it to CBP for
    actual arrest and interdiction at the border. We are doing
    everything we can to play the most significant support role we
    can to ATF and to CBP.
        And where we have evidence of smuggling and an actual
    smuggling network, we will do that independently, but we are
    quite limited in our legal authority to do more.
        Mr. Farr. I know you are limited in your legal authority,
    and that is what my question really went to is if you were
    given authority, sole authority, because I have even been told
    that there is restrictions on what ATF can do, very restrictive
    as to what they can do in gun stores and so on. If we were
    rewriting all this, what would you like to see?
        Mr. Morton. I think one of the big challenges that we face
    right now is the southbound inspection process, harnessing more
    and more of that, as CBP does more and more southbound
    inspection; taking our intelligence, matching it up with CBP's
    powers to inspect; and doing a more aggressive approach on
    searches along the border, and not just in a random way but in
    ways that we have developed using intelligence from our office
    in Mexico and our offices along the border--looking in that
    car, looking in that container.
        We are in our infancy on that, but that is what we are
    doing, and the more--. We have a very broad informant network.
    We have a lot of undercover cases. We have a lot of
    cooperators. Again within our limitations of the law, we have
    the power to direct more seizures.
        And the other piece is working much more closely with the
    Mexicans because they seize quite a large number of firearms on
    their side of the border, far more than we interdict right now
    going across the border.
        Mr. Farr. Does the power--the agricultural inspections from
    the Mexican side greater for CBP than the firearms power on our
    side? You can go to do more inspections of where it is coming
    from, sources of----
        Mr. Morton. CBP's powers of inspection are quite broad and
    expansive on the border. The question is more about the
    infrastructure and how it was originally designed and put
    together. In the beginning, the structure was mainly on inbound
    inspection, and here we are talking about outbound inspection
    and just the challenge, literally the infrastructure
    challenges, for CBP of doing outbound inspections in a facility
    that was designed with all the lanes and the inspection booths
    for the inbound. CBP has been working on that, and we have been
    lending a lot of our--. We do surge operations, hand in hand
    primarily through our Border Enforcement Security Task (BEST)
    task forces with CBP, where we literally go into the outbound
    lanes, search, and start checking on individual trunks. It is
    not so much that CBP doesn't have the power, it is building up
    that southbound inspection capacity.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mr. Carter.
        Mr. Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I thank both of you for being willing to take on this
    tough job. And it is a tough one. I personally am very
    frustrated with this whole operation.

                                  DRUG CARTELS

        I have been involved in looking at the southwest border as
    a Member of Congress and on a Committee that can do something
    about it since 2004. We have dumped tons of resources into the
    border. I see nothing but failure. I see, A, we have gone from
    cartels in Colombia to now cartels within 250 miles of my home.
    I woke up Saturday and Sunday finding out that 23 houses in
    Austin, Texas, were cartel-owned drug-distribution houses. The
    good news is we raided them, I think made 17 arrests. But the
    point is, now it is no longer 250 miles from my house; now it
    is 5 miles from my house, okay.
        And as far as I am concerned, and as far as the people of
    Texas are concerned, this is an expanding, potentially violent
    situation that is moving into our State. If there are 23 houses
    in Austin, Texas, there are 50 in San Antonio, and how many in
    San Diego nobody knows. So the question is this cancer is
    spreading it is not stopping.
        Meanwhile I talked to Border Patrol agents who were fired
    upon regularly from the Mexican side with no authority to
    return fire.
        We have got to at some time recognize that we have to
    actually get in the business of fighting these people and not
    just talking about fighting the people.
        And I want to know how much assurance do you have that AKs
    are not going to be firing in the capital city of Texas,
    because we now know the drug cartels are purchasing property in
    Austin, Texas.
        So this looks like to me we are failing at that level. We
    have now seen this violence moved up to within 5 miles of my
    home. I want you to give me an answer on what do you see that
    we can do to start fighting rather than talking about fighting
    now for all the time that I have been in this committee? Any
    answer. I will take any answer.
        Mr. Bersin. To say that, in part, thanks to this committee,
    there are increased resources and that, in fact, the potential
    for progress exists is not to deny the gravity of the threat.
    In fact, as you suggest, when you deal with an issue in law
    enforcement, and in particular in one area, it moves and pops
    up in another area. So, in fact, we did see the movement of
    cartel power. Once the Medellin and Cali cartels were reduced
    in significance, we saw the growth of Mexican cartels. and we
    have seen the movement into the interior of the United States
    of drug-distribution gangs that are geared and based in
    organized crime in Mexico.
        Having recognized that threat, in fact, we build the
    capacity to deal with it. And we separate out, in fact, the
    need to prevent the kind of mass violence that we have seen in
    places like Juarez and increasingly in Nuevo Leon and
    Tamaulipas from coming over in that form with that degree of
    shootouts in public places that Mexico has experienced. We
    haven't seen that in the United States, and we need to do
    everything and intend to do everything to prevent that.
        That is not to deny, as you say, that there are drug-
    distribution rings in every medium- and large-sized city in the
    United States, and those cause and have violent repercussions.
    That means that we need to continue to do the investigation,
    the prosecution and the interdiction that takes place at
    greater levels than in the past, but is challenged by
    significant threats.
        So I take your point, Mr. Carter, but I don't see this as
    unmitigated failure. I see it as a continuing challenge and the
    need to continue to ramp up our capacity as well as our
    willingness to stay the course on this.
        Mr. Carter. I was in the business of putting people in
    prison for this for 20 years, okay? I know there is always
    going to be and always have been drug-distribution points. My
    point is it is organized crime, Mexican cartels that are out
    there buying homes and putting people in them. It means that
    they have got the resources and they have got the expansion to
    come as far as into Austin, Texas, which makes it mighty close
    to home for me.
        And I think that at some point in time, we have got to
    recognize we got them out of Colombia, why can't we get them
    out of Mexico? What did we do in Colombia that pushed them out
    of Colombia? I think the Colombian Government got severely
    involved, and we, under the Bush administration, forced them
    and pushed them and cajoled them and financed them to get those
    people shoved out of Colombia, but they shoved them right into
    Mexico. And now we need somehow to get together--and I have the
    greatest respect for the Mexican Government. I went to school
    in Mexico. I believe they are a first-class country with first-
    class resources, and we can assist those resources. But this is
    a fight. We can't just sit around and talk about it.
        I think if somebody fires upon an American who is doing his
    job on our side of the border from the other side of the
    border, we should talk to Mexico about shooting back, and if we
    don't shoot back, all the Border Patrol can do is duck and
    cover.
        Mr. Bersin. Border Patrol agents have the right to engage
    in self-defense, and what we have that is different from what
    has ever been the case is we have the potential and, in Arizona
    and Sonora, the reality of actually having federal police
    officers who coordinate with our Border Patrol to actually deal
    with this.
        So, for example, in the Tucson/Sonora corridor where the
    Secretariat of Public Security has deployed 200 federal police
    officers who are in regular contact with our Border Patrol, we
    have seen a decrease in the rocking incidents and a response, a
    real-time response. In that respect, I see great potential in
    terms of the coordination.
        But your point in terms of protecting our Border Patrol
    agents, I take that point completely.
        Mr. Carter. These incidents took place in the district at
    Laredo across the border, across the river.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. All right. Thank you.
        Let us see. Ms. Roybal-Allard.

                                 BORDER FENCING

        Ms. Roybal-Allard. Mr. Bersin, in the rush to build the
    border wall, there was a failure to address some of the very
    legitimate concerns of affected landowners, and the wall
    continues to negatively impact border communities by limiting
    the ability of first responders to reach isolated areas, and by
    adversely affecting farms and other businesses. These
    stakeholders play a critical role in border security, and their
    views should be incorporated into CBP's planning process moving
    forward.
        Can you please tell us what steps is your agency taking to
    develop constructive relationships with local landowners to
    mitigate the effects of fencing and other security measures on
    border communities?
        And also, given the fact that in some areas--I believe that
    El Paso is probably one of the best examples--public
    information offices have been established in certain sectors of
    the border to perform community outreach, and they have proven
    to be a very effective means of facilitating dialogue and
    addressing local concerns before they become major problems,
    are you also considering expanding those programs?
        Mr. Bersin. Congresswoman, I believe, with regard to each
    of our Border Patrol sectors, we have a public outreach, a
    public affairs capacity locally. And one important improvement
    that has been made--as I return after a hiatus of 10 years to
    see the Border Patrol and the way in which it has grown--is
    that it has developed a significant and a sophisticated
    outreach capacity in terms of real communications communities
    and the development of relationships with community groups,
    civic groups and business groups in a way that simply was not
    the case. And you correctly point out that community outreach
    is absolutely essential in areas such as the building of the
    border fence that has taken place over the last number of
    years.
        Secretary Napolitano made clear when she came in--and as
    someone who has lived on the border for a very long time and
    been a political leader as well as a prosecutor, Governor in
    Arizona--that there would be this kind of outreach, and I think
    we can continue to see it, for example, in the area of
    environmental mitigation in which $50 million has been
    committed by CBP to the Department of the Interior. There is
    regular communication with the Department with regard to
    environmental mitigation and, in fact, regular communication
    with local communities. There has been, I think, considerable
    improvement, recognizing that we can always be better in terms
    of public outreach and public communication. But I believe the
    extensiveness of CBP contact, particularly the Border Patrol
    contact, having to do with the fence is actually a fact and a
    very positive fact.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. I raise this because there was a letter
    sent to Congressmen from an association of landowners who feel
    that a lot more needs to be done, so I am glad that you are
    paying attention to this issue. But I think you need to look
    into it to make sure that there is more progress made in that
    particular area.

                   TREATMENT OF UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN

        I also very quickly want to bring to your attention an
    issue that I have been concerned about for some time, and that
    is the reports that I continue to hear about the mistreatment
    of immigrants, especially unaccompanied children, at Border
    Patrol stations. And according to the human rights groups,
    these children sometimes go without beds or blankets, they fail
    to receive adequate nutrition, and in some cases have endured
    physical and emotional abuse.
        Can you please explain what steps that you are going to be
    taking to ensure that every individual in custody is treated
    humanely, and also to provide this committee with the policies
    and procedures governing their care, as well as if you could
    describe what oversight mechanisms exist to prevent the abuse
    of detained immigrants at Border Patrol facilities?
        I have asked this question before. I have gotten responses.
    I am told that changes are being made; however, I continue to
    hear from advocacy groups that go into these facilities and
    hear complaints from immigrants about their treatment. So
    again, this is an area that needs attention immediately, and
    there is a lot more that needs to be done especially in light
    of the fact that we are talking about young children here.
        Mr. Bersin. The commitment to humane and lawful treatment
    of all people taken into custody is a paramount one and one
    that CBP takes seriously. As you know, for many years, the
    treatment of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) has been
    governed by the Reno v. Flores settlement, and, in fact, that
    sets the standard and the protocols that are required in this
    case.
        We have--and I have looked into this--with regard to so-
    called UAC, there are very established procedures that are
    followed and supervised to see to it that these minors are
    handled with extreme concern and care and watched very
    carefully as they are turned over to ICE for then, I think,
    subsequent transfer to the Department of Health and Human
    Services. So there is a very established, long established,
    procedure for handling UAC. I am satisfied our people
    understand the absolute importance of observing it and, to my
    knowledge, are observing it.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. Could you please submit whatever those
    procedures are.
        [The information follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Roybal-Allard. And also I just want you to know that in
    private meetings with some Border Patrol, there does seem to be
    some confusion about what they can and can't do and how to go
    about it.
        Mr. Bersin. Before turning it over to Mr. Morton, let me
    say that, when you receive complaints in this area, or any
    other for that matter, please forward the specific facts, and
    they will be looked into. And, yes, we will provide you with
    the procedures that are required by Reno v. Flores.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. As well as the oversight procedures that
    you have.
        Mr. Morton. Just very quickly, Border Patrol's detention
    authority is quite limited, and it typically doesn't extend
    much past a few hours to 12.
        Ms. Roybal-Allard. That is what I am talking about, that
    72-hour period.
        Mr. Morton. And, in most instances, if there is going to be
    any prolonged detention, UACS are transferred to Immigration
    and Customs authority. And, as you know, we have a very
    pronounced overhaul of our immigration detention practices
    underway. But, with regard to minors, there is quite a detailed
    set of procedures. They come to us, but only very briefly,
    because we, in turn, turn them over to Child Protection
    Services in most instances or advocacy groups with contracts
    with the state.
        Mr. Price. Mr. Culberson.
        Mr. Culberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                              OPERATION STREAMLINE

        Commissioner Bersin, can I ask your help, please, in
    providing me with some information that my office has been
    trying to get from you for some time? It is very simple and
    straightforward. We are looking for the numbers of individuals
    that have been apprehended, this by sector, sector by sector,
    on the southern border, and northern border, too, for that
    matter--we are not neglecting it, but obviously the problem,
    the most severe problem, is on the southern border--but sector
    by sector the number of individuals apprehended, and then the
    number of individuals actually prosecuted, by sector, over the
    last several fiscal years. Could you provide that to me by the
    end of the week? You have got the data. It is real simple.
        Mr. Bersin. I was going to say I would be happy to provide
    the data. My understanding is we have apprehension statistics,
    and we have the prosecutions, particularly with regard to
    Operation Streamline. We will get it to you as expeditiously as
    we can.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: This response has been designated as ``Law
    Enforcement Sensitive--For Official Use Only'' and, as a
    result, cannot be placed in the record or released to the
    public. DHS has provided this response to the Committee
    separately.

        Mr. Culberson. Thank you. Thank you. I really appreciate
    it. We and all of us in this Committee have a keen interest in
    making sure the border is secure. Those of us from Texas in
    particular, this is near and dear to us.
        My good friend Ciro Rodriguez--we were elected together in
    1986, and known each other, been good friends ever since--have
    worked together very successfully with Henry Cuellar, who also
    was elected with us to the Texas House in 1986, to implement
    Operation Streamline. Works beautifully. This is not
    complicated. You enforce existing law with existing resources
    by law enforcement officers who are using their good judgment
    and their good hearts to prosecute everybody who crosses with
    the obvious exception of women and children, who are handled a
    little differently. The officers are using their good judgment
    and their good hearts.
        But I was wondering if you could--just if you could
    reaffirm your support for Operation Streamline and our efforts
    to get it expanded up and down the southern border. You are in
    support of Streamline and want to see it expanded?
        Mr. Bersin. Yes. As a former prosecutor, I understand the
    importance of consequence delivery. As you understand, no
    series of crime, save the most heinous, actually are prosecuted
    at a 100 percent rate. But the importance of the deterrent
    effect in the application of Operation Streamline has a very
    important place in consequence delivery, in the deterrence of
    illegal immigration among other violations.
        Mr. Culberson. And you have seen the dramatic declines in
    the crime rate in the Del Rio and Laredo sector. It is just a
    terrific program.
        And also I think it is important, as Mr. Carter has said,
    that I think we quit--the country recognize that in a real
    sense there is an undeclared war on the southern border. Mexico
    is as violent today, Northern Mexico, as it was 100 years ago.
    I am going to go back and look at the level of violence 100
    years ago during the Mexican Revolution in Northern Mexico and
    compare it to today, and I suspect we will discover that the
    level of violence today was even more severe than it was 100
    years ago when President Wilson sent General Pershing to the
    southern border to deal with the violence that had crossed over
    into the United States.
        The Mexican Army itself--I understand the Department of
    Defense estimates that the Mexican Army has about 130,000
    troops, but that the cartels, just the two biggest cartels
    together, have about 100,000 foot soldiers. So in a very real
    sense the level of violence, the spillover, the shootings
    across the border, the helicopter crossings, just the chaos and
    the violence that we see in Northern Mexico certainly meets--
    you know, Webster's dictionary defines a state of war as a
    state of hostility, conflict or antagonism between opposing
    forces for a particular end. And I certainly think what we are
    seeing in Mexico today qualifies as a state of war, which we
    need to quit--we need to--as Mr. Carter says, there is a lot of
    talk, and we don't see enough action.
        So I appreciate your commitment to expanding Operation
    Streamline. It is vitally important. It works beautifully. This
    is, from our perspective on the U.S. side, a law enforcement
    operation. We need to stay focused on that. The role that the
    National Guard played in the Bush administration was one of
    support and support of the Border Patrol, and I think that is
    important, but they were very successful where they were
    deployed and sincerely appreciate the dedication of your
    officers, the work that you are doing. I understand the
    frustrations and challenges you face. I know this Committee
    supports you in a bipartisan way.
        I would like you to, if you could, look into what Mr.
    Carter has identified in the Laredo sector, several instances,
    and I am also aware of shootings, people from the Mexico side
    shooting at our law enforcement officers, and our law
    enforcement officers are unable to return fire. They are under
    orders not to return fire, and that just doesn't make any
    sense. They can certainly shoot in self-defense. But I hope
    that you can correct that situation.
        Mr. Bersin. Mr. Culberson, we will get back to you with the
    incidents that have occurred over the last 3 years and the
    facts attendant to each of them because the protection of our
    Border Patrol agents on the front line is very much uppermost
    in my mind.
        Mr. Culberson. Also I want to ask, Mr. Chairman, I
    appreciate the time, the Border Patrol in fiscal year 2008, Mr.
    Bersin reported that there were three individuals--and this is
    from the GAO report in August--that the Border Patrol reported
    in fiscal year 2008 there were three individuals encountered by
    the Border Patrol at southwest border checkpoints who were
    identified as persons linked to terrorism. Who were they, and
    to what terrorist organizations were they linked?
        Mr. Bersin. I prefer to get that back to you in response to
    that issue. I can't identify those persons for you at this
    moment.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: This response has been designated as ``Law
    Enforcement Sensitive--For Official Use Only'' and, as a
    result, cannot be placed in the record or released to the
    public. DHS has provided this response to the Committee
    separately.

        Mr. Culberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mr. Rothman.
        Mr. Rothman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Commissioner Bersin, Secretary Morton, thank you for being
    here.

                                 BORDER FENCING

        I come from a non-Mexican border State, the State of New
    Jersey, but there are consequences to the flow of criminal
    activity across the Mexican border into the United States that
    are felt in New Jersey in terms of gang violence and drugs, of
    course. In many of my town hall meetings, the subject of
    illegal immigration comes up, especially that immigration
    originating across the Mexican border.
        The issue of a fence, some people say just build a fence
    all the way across the border. I notice in the budget we now
    have, in the testimony with Commissioner Bersin, 646 miles of
    fencing to go up to 655 miles of fencing. Do you consider that
    amount to be sufficient? Should the entire border be--should a
    fence be put up through the whole border? Would that be the
    best use of U.S. taxpayer dollars to stop the flow of illegal
    activity across the border?
        Mr. Bersin. The building of more than 600 miles of fencing
    in the original directions of the Congress--Secretary
    Napolitano indicated when she took office more than a year ago
    that she committed to completing what Congress had mandated,
    and, except for several miles that are still being discussed,
    that commitment has been met.
        The Secretary has also indicated that she will continue to
    be advised by professionals on the border (Border Patrol
    agents, our field officers, our air and marine officers, as
    well as ICE agents and others who live and work on the border)
    about whether or not any additional infrastructure would be
    necessary.
        Mr. Rothman. Mr. Commissioner, excuse me, I have a limited
    amount of time, so I want to follow up on your answer. So would
    it be a fair characterization of your testimony that today and
    in the fiscal year 2011 budget request of your agency, the
    amount of fencing that you want to build is being funded?
        Mr. Bersin. To this date, yes, sir.
        Mr. Rothman. Next. There is a general sense--and this is a
    softball, this is one right over the middle for you gentleman
    to address--but there is some chatter out there from various
    sources saying that the border between Mexico and the U.S. is
    porous, it is practically open, there are criminal gangs just
    flowing unimpeded into the United States, drugs are coming in
    willy-nilly. Now, of course your written testimony belies that,
    but for the record, and this is being televised, are those
    statements true, illegal immigrants coming in, terrorists
    practically able to walk in without any problem?
        Mr. Morton. Those statements aren't true as your question
    suggests.
        Mr. Rothman. They are true that all these things are
    happening easily without any impediments?
        Mr. Morton. No. I think that both Commissioner Bersin and I
    would note for everyone here, and I think most of the
    individuals on the panel have seen it as well, that while the
    challenge remains very significant (and I don't pretend that it
    is not a very real and significant challenge) the resources and
    enforcement dedicated to our southwest border has never been
    greater. And the change has been profound in the 16, 17 years I
    have been in the enforcement business.
        Mr. Rothman. But sir, Mr. Secretary, is it enough? I
    appreciate the fact that there are more resources than ever,
    the threats are real, and you are addressing them with greater
    and greater success. Is your budget enough? Should we give you
    more money to do more things?
        Mr. Morton. You know, that is a question that the
    administration officials always have to dance a little bit on,
    and so I will say that I am always happy to do everything I can
    with the good money that the Appropriations Committee gives me.
        Mr. Rothman. Are we gaining ground or losing ground in
    these areas?
        Mr. Morton. I think we are gaining ground, but, again, I
    don't want to be heard as saying that I think we have by any
    means solved the problem or that some of the points that Mr.
    Carter has made. I think the greater point is that we are in a
    long-term struggle with organized criminals, and they are
    trying to stay a step ahead of us. They are willing to go to
    lengths that we haven't seen in the past, they are willing to
    go to a level of violence and brutality we haven't seen in the
    past, and our job is to stay a step ahead of them.
        Mr. Rothman. And your budget reflects the resources to
    address that, you feel, this year?
        Mr. Morton. I feel that this year for ICE, in particular,
    we are going to have the----
        Mr. Rothman. One fast question.
        Mr. Price. The gentleman's time has expired. We will have a
    quick second round, but let me turn to Mr. Mollohan.
        Mr. Mollohan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                           DRUG SMUGGLING VIA TRUCKS

        Mr. Bersin, there was an ABC World News Tonight report a
    year ago now which suggested that--the title was ``Cocaine
    Highways Post-NAFTA: Most Drugs Cross U.S. Border in Trucks.''
    I don't know if you are familiar with that report or not. But
    let me read the introductory paragraph.
        It says, Most of the drug shipments smuggled into the
    United States by the Mexican cartels are hidden in trucks that
    drive across U.S. border checkpoints in plain sight with little
    fear of inspection, U.S. law enforcement officials told ABC
    News. Only about 5 percent of the trucks coming into the
    country from Mexico are inspected, according to U.S. officials,
    and that is out of 3 million loaded container trailers crossing
    the border checkpoints last year, which would have been 2008.
        And a Juan Zarate is quoted in this piece as saying, quote,
    It is just--Mr. Zarate dealt with these trafficking issues in
    George--in President Bush's White House. Mr. Zarate was the
    Deputy National Security Director under President Bush, and he
    is quoted in this article as saying, It is just too costly and
    too slow, given the volume of trucks, to actually try to stop
    and inspect each and every truck. And he goes on and says that
    any attempt to inspect all trucks crossing the border, quote,
    would have a hugely negative impact in terms of commercial
    traffic and trade between the United States and Mexico.
        Is this accurate? Is this an accurate depiction of----
        Mr. Bersin. I am not familiar with that particular article.
    I would not say----
        Mr. Mollohan. Do the facts resonate with you?
        Mr. Bersin [continuing]. That article, as you have
    described it adequately or accurately in all respects,
    characterizes the situation at the southern border.
        Mr. Mollohan. Are you saying it does or it doesn't?
        Mr. Bersin. It does not because, in fact, there are
    sophisticated methods we use to determine which trucks or
    vehicles that are coming across the border need to be
    inspected, subjected to the kind of X-ray equipment that is
    unprecedented, in part, because of the resources provided by
    this Committee.
        In fact, more than 5 percent are inspected, but it is not
    just a--sometimes it is done on a random basis, but, in fact,
    there is a sophisticated targeting system based on advance
    information that we require of trucks coming to the border, in
    terms of the use of intelligence systems that we have, so that,
    in fact, it is much more organized, much more systematic and
    much more effective than that article suggests, sir.
        Mr. Mollohan. It sounds like you are dealing with a tough
    problem. Statistics can't be too far--are there 3 million
    trucks that come across the border inbound to the United States
    every year?
        Mr. Bersin. I know that CBP handles 60,000 containers that
    come across every day via air, sea, and land. We don't have--I
    will get you the specific number of trucks from that number.
        [The information follows:]

        Rep. Mollohan: How many Mexican trucks travel inbound into the
    United States each year?
        RESPONSE: Please see the chart below for vehicles crossing from
    Mexico for Fiscal Years (FY) 2007-2009, and FY 2010 year-to-date ending
    in March.

            SOUTHWEST BORDER COMMERCIAL VEHICLE CROSSINGS FROM MEXICO
               (Past Three Fiscal Years (FY 07-09) + YTD FY 2010)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    4,818,936           4,967,514.......  4,275,977.......  2,286,277
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Mollohan. It sounds like a huge number of trucks coming
    across the border, and it sounds like a small percentage,
    relatively small. Your response to that is it may be relatively
    small, 5 percent might not be the right number, but it might be
    relatively small, but we deal with that by a sophisticated
    selection process.
        Mr. Bersin. There are a variety of programs that help us
    distinguish between those cargoes about which we know something
    and those about which we know nothing.
        Mr. Mollohan. Would you for the record submit kind of a
    discussion of this? You are not going to have time to respond
    in my time, and I really think it is an important question. How
    do we deal with that? If it is true, once they get across the
    border, my goodness, what a transportation vehicle for drugs
    across the country. And this article goes on to say that there
    is a--they have hubs across the Nation, and it references
    Atlanta as doing it.
        For the record would you please elaborate on this answer
    and get us some accurate statistics and then how you are
    dealing with it, please? Would you submit to my office that
    copy, too?
        Mr. Bersin. Yes, we will do that.
        [The information follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Mollohan. Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. Thank you very much.

                                 MEXICAN GANGS

        We are trying to honor Mr. Bersin's schedule for an airline
    that is not going to wait, but we do have time, and I think we
    do have some further questions. So we will proceed with a brief
    second round here, if that is all right with you gentlemen. And
    I will begin by referencing Mr. Rogers' comments about these
    gangs that have specialized in assassinations. The Aztecas, I
    think, was the case he quoted, responsible for something like
    2,660 murders in 2009, just an incredibly and, of course,
    highly alarming figure.
        In that context I would like to ask you specifically about
    press reports that follow the March 13 killings of U.S.
    consulate workers and their family. The DEA led a multiagency
    gang sweep called Operation Knock Down to apprehend dangerous
    Azteca gangs members after that. Soon after there was a warning
    that came out of DHS. That is what I wanted to ask you about, a
    warning that said the Azteca had been given a green light to
    conduct retaliatory killings of U.S. law enforcement officers.
    What can you tell us about that? It sounds like an ominous
    escalation; looks like a type of direct confrontation that
    could mark a new level of engagement with these Mexican gangs.
        Mr. Morton. To be candid with you, Mr. Chairman, I would
    prefer to answer that question off the record with you. But
    what I can say more generally is that we have-- We are working
    very closely with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and
    the Federal Bureau of Investigations not only in Operation
    Knock Down, but to identify the killers in that case and to
    focus the full weight and resources of the Federal Government
    on the Barrio Aztecas. We get a lot of information through
    investigation. So far, we have not seen that the particular
    information that you refer to, in fact, reflects actual
    intentions.
        Mr. Price. Of course, I would welcome the information you
    have in whatever setting you need to use. This was a public
    pronouncement though, a green light on retaliatory killings of
    U.S. law enforcement officers, and that is why I bring it up in
    this setting, a very, very ominous kind of escalation of this.

                                     BESTS

        All right. Let me turn to the Southwest, the Border
    Enforcement Task Force teams. You have referenced those a
    number of times today. I want to ask you more specifically
    about what value added they represent, and what kind of
    evidence you have of their performance, and also why this isn't
    more explicitly reflected in the budget request for 2011.
        We provided 100 million last spring to respond to the drug
    violence in Mexico. ICE received 55 million of this, largely
    for these new so-called BEST teams, as well as more border
    intelligence officers, expanded investigatory resources, and so
    on.
        Do you have any measure of success, Secretary Morton? What
    kind of difference are these units making? What is their value
    added? What is your measure system? What do you anticipate?
        We know that the 2011 budget request continues the base
    budget for ICE southwest border initiatives like BEST. There is
    no specific funding proposed for expansion of this effort, and
    so it just raises the question, is a flat budget adequate for
    what appears to be a problem that is not going away and, we
    hope, an initiative that is making some headway?
        Mr. Morton. A few things, Mr. Chairman. First, I think our
    budget does, in fact, request a modest increase for the BESTs,
    including three new ones. They would not be along the southwest
    border. Two would be at seaports, and one would be along the
    northern border.
        Mr. Price. Excuse me. Could you clarify that? There is some
    BEST team expansion, but not on the southwest border.
        Mr. Morton. Not on the southwest border. But more
    generally, and I think that is a reflection, Mr. Chairman, of
    the very tight budget environment, that our modest increase
    would, in fact, focus how much importance we give to these task
    forces.
        Very quickly, the whole task force concept for BEST was in
    response to the violence in Laredo in 2005, very similar to the
    conversation that we have had today. That worked so well that
    we immediately adopted the basic concept elsewhere, and it has
    grown very rapidly. We use task forces for all sorts of things,
    from criminal investigation to surge operations that we do with
    CBP. CBP is our biggest partner on the task forces, and we have
    begun to work very closely with the marshals. We are hunting
    down fugitives. We returned a number of wanted murderers using
    the task forces. We go out and we find them, and we return them
    to Mexico.
        What do we need to do a better job on? Were Congress to
    appropriate the 2011 budget, we would move to 20. I have
    directed that we create an office here in headquarters to
    better coordinate what we are doing, to make sure that the task
    forces are working in tandem in their respective spheres and
    that we have articulable measurements for success, so that you,
    the Committee, can evaluate how value added that we think they
    are and why we think they have been so successful.
        They have worked really well in the seaport context. We are
    thinking about having our very first one in a major
    international airport. It just has worked well. We are bringing
    not only our federal law enforcement partners, but our local
    law enforcement partners.
        One little trick that we may want to talk to you about in
    terms of making the program a full success is that our ability
    to reimburse some of our state and local law enforcement
    partners is quite limited. CBP has much broader authority, and
    we can reimburse some overtime, some equipment purchases, but
    our authority is quite narrow; it is not really a question of
    money, but just authority for it. And I think that would
    greatly help the overall effectiveness of the BESTs.
        Mr. Price. Have you, in fact, requested that formally?
        Mr. Morton. No, and we need to talk to you about it. It is
    really just getting the legalities down in terms of our
    authorities. I don't think it is a heavy lift. It is something
    that we need to come and brief you about.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mr. Rogers.

                                     JIATFS

        Mr. Rogers. How many BESTs are on the southwest border?
        Mr. Morton. Ten, Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. The last time you were here, we talked about
    the advisability of creating a joint interagency task force for
    the whole southwest border, where all of the agencies that
    might be involved in some fashion would be headquartered under
    one roof to coordinate the defense of that border, much the
    same as the JIATF task force in Florida manages the Caribbean
    antidrug war very, very successfully. Are you giving some
    thought to that?
        Mr. Morton. A lot of thought. I think most people would
    agree with your general assessment that Joint Interagency Task
    Force (JIATF) South has worked quite well, that something akin
    to JIATF South, from an intelligence perspective, makes a lot
    of sense along the southwest border.
        Mr. Bersin and I have talked about this subject at great
    length, and the question is do we model something like JIATF
    South for the southwest border in a place like the El Paso
    Intelligence Center (EPIC), which is right now very sort of
    Department of Justice (DOJ)- and DEA-centric (although CBP has
    quite a presence and ICE has quite a presence), or do we have
    an outright JIATF structure that is independent of EPIC along
    the border? But I think few people would argue with your basic
    premise that JIATF South or something like that would be quite
    useful along the border. It think we think it does.
        Mr. Rogers. We talked about this last year. Have you moved
    at all since then?
        Mr. Morton. Yes, we have talked about it a lot in the
    interdiction committee that both Mr. Bersin will now sit on and
    that I sit on presently. There are many moving parts. Obviously
    to do this right, you have to get a lot of different federal
    agencies to come together under one roof and to coordinate. CBP
    and ICE, fortunately we are within the same Department, and we
    are already moving a lot of our intelligence operations closer
    and closer together.
        I think the momentum, though, is very much in favor of the
    general concept that you outlined, and it is just a matter of
    time.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, we are facing problems on that border as
    we have talked about this morning that are enormous and growing
    and very dangerous to the security of the whole country, both
    us and Mexico. And it seems to me that we need a single place
    where all of the agencies, military and civilian, are
    headquartered, much like JIATF South on the antidrug war in the
    Caribbean, so that you can call instantly on any asset of any
    of these agencies that may or may not be needed and get an
    instant response, and where you coordinate both Justice
    Department activities as well as DHS and any military agencies.
    And when can we expect a decision about doing this?
        Mr. Morton. I can't promise you any timetable on a decision
    because it obviously involves many more players than me. What I
    can tell you is I actually spoke to Michele Leonhart, who is
    the Acting Administrator of DEA, on this very issue, this exact
    conversation, on the way back from the trip to Mexico, and we
    agreed that I would go down. We are waiting for Commissioner
    Bersin to come on board and go down and take a hard look at
    EPIC and what we are doing there. We just need to have that
    kind of assessment in conversation among the key players. And
    now that Alan is here, that is very much one of the key
    players, and we will move from there.
        Mr. Rogers. Could we get an update on your progress, say,
    within 30 days? Is that a reasonable time, or should it be
    longer or shorter?
        Mr. Bersin. We could certainly give you an update on where
    the discussions on EPIC and the coordination among agencies is,
    but I think realistically because--as you recognize--this would
    be a major structural transformation, 90 or 120 days would give
    you more substance than not.
        Mr. Rogers. What could we expect in 90 days?
        Mr. Bersin. I think what we could report back to you is
    where the federal agencies across DHS and DOJ, and the
    Department of Defense for that matter, would be in terms of the
    willingness to entertain in serious detail, not in rhetorical
    flourish, of the notion of a unified command, a joint command
    or a variety of other command mechanisms that are available.
        Mr. Rogers. Mr. Chairman, to try to further this process
    along, I would hope that we could informally request of the
    gentlemen a report on how we are doing in 90 days. Would that
    be a reasonable request?
        Mr. Morton. Fine. From the two of us.
        Mr. Price. Let us just agree at this point that we will
    make that informal request and look forward to it.
        Mr. Rogers. That would be a big step forward. I think the
    time has come for a headquarters operation like this to manage
    that whole aspect of the southwest border.

                              BULK CASH SMUGGLING

        Quickly switching gears, last time I guess it was you were
    here, Secretary Morton, we talked about the flow of drugs
    across the border this way, and possibly the money and guns and
    stuff going the other way. What can you tell us about those
    subjects?
        First off, do we have an estimate, a rough estimate, of the
    amount of money that the drug sales in this country are netting
    the cartels in Mexico?
        Mr. Morton. Yes. There are broad ranges of anywhere from
    $18 billion to north of 30----
        Mr. Rogers. Eighteen to $30 billion per year?
        Mr. Morton. Per year.
        Mr. Rogers. And that is money going from the U.S. to the
    cartels across the border, the southwest border?
        Mr. Morton. Yes. And then, in certain instances, to places
    like Colombia and other countries.
        Mr. Rogers. How can that amount of money, say, $30 billion,
    how that can that amount of money cross that border without us
    knowing about it? Just the bulk of that is something; is it
    not?
        Mr. Morton. It is.
        If you were to ask me where is the area where we need to
    devote more time and attention to developing intelligence, it
    is in this exact area that the--although CBP and ICE's
    seizures--and we typically do these together because a lot of
    CBP's seizures are based on ICE leads--are at an all-time high,
    the truth of the matter is we are seizing a fraction of those
    estimates if that is right.
        Mr. Rogers. How much money have we seized going south?
        Mr. Morton. This has been a particularly good year. We
    typically, between the two agencies, are north of $200 million
    per year. This particular year we had one of the largest
    seizures in ICE's history of $40 million in some shipping
    containers going between Mexico and Colombia. We found the
    containers in the space of about 10 days. They were packaged
    inside very large ammonium nitrate shipments.
        Mr. Rogers. You recovered roughly $200 million out of $30
    billion?
        Mr. Morton. Yes. And then DEA and the other partners at
    Justice seized a similar amount, but, again, it is by no means
    the majority of the money. We are not seizing most that is
    going south if those estimates are right.
        Mr. Rogers. That is a miniscule percentage, a very
    miniscule percentage.
        Commissioner Bersin, do you have any information you can
    share with us on this?
        Mr. Bersin. Congressman, although much of the money goes
    down in bulk cash, as Secretary Morton indicated, and CBP and
    ICE are working to intercept it, not all of it is bulk cash,
    but rather is transferred through banking channels and through
    trade arrangements. And, as Mr. Morton suggested, we need a lot
    more intelligence about the way in which money is laundered,
    and we need to be able to identify with much more precision
    about what the proportion is in cash as opposed to other kinds
    of transfers. And frankly, we need to get a better range,
    simply $18 million up to $30 billion, so that we can be much
    more responsive in our efforts.
        Mr. Rogers. It seems like this is a very fertile field for
    getting at the problem, and that is tracking the cash that is
    flowing across that border in rivers. Quickly----
        Mr. Morton. If I could add one thing on that, Mr. Rogers,
    there are many things that we are doing to try to address that
    exact point. We are working with the DEA, ICE, CBP and the
    Mexicans to study the flow of money from the United States to
    Mexico. And we are also working with the World Customs
    Organization (WCO) to try to broaden our efforts. We are doing
    these for the first time, international bulk cash smuggling
    surges, where we get-- Last year we had more than 80 countries
    pick a week, and we hit every airport, we hit every crossing,
    and we just went looking for trouble. And it has been quite
    successful. We want to do more of those under the umbrella of
    the WCO, and we have seized a lot of cash.
        And this phenomenon is by no means limited to the drug
    cartels. All large criminal organizations need to move money
    back and forth, and they do it through bulk cash smuggling or
    through sophisticated money laundering.

                                FIREARM SEIZURES

        Mr. Rogers. At this Committee some time back there was a
    lot of noise made about weapons of the cartels coming from the
    U.S. across that border. Have you determined how much weaponry
    is going north to south?
        Mr. Morton. I have not, and as alluded to earlier, we have
    some--we have very limited authority in the firearms area.
    Typically we look to ATF for the estimates and analysis of what
    is coming and going across the border because they have the
    tracing authority. We do not.
        Mr. Rogers. Mr. Commissioner, do you have information for
    us?
        Mr. Bersin. Not to add to that.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, I can tell you this: According to CBP, no
    weapons have been seized by way of rail into Mexico from the
    U.S. Only 72 weapons have been seized heading outbound at
    points of entry, including one submachine gun, 15 shotguns, 28
    rifles and 28 handguns. Considering the weaponry that the
    cartels have in Mexico, these are popguns that we are talking
    about here. There is hardly any weaponry that has been seized
    going south across that border. Is that generally true?
        Mr. Morton. I know that our seizures are roughly in the
    neighborhood of about 1,500 per year. So most of the seizures
    that I am aware of occurred in Mexico and obviously could have
    come from a variety of sources, including the southern border
    of Mexico and elsewhere.
        Mr. Rogers. No. I mean outbound weapons at points of entry.
        Mr. Morton. I would have to defer to the Commissioner.
        Mr. Price. Let me say to the gentleman we did receive, in
    response to inquiries in our last hearing, specific information
    about weapons seized at outbound points of entry. What we don't
    have is a fuller account of the assessment of the weapons
    seized in the country, in Mexico and the country of origin of
    those weapons.
        Mr. Bersin. That is an area of continued inquiry in terms
    of the population of weapons you look at. But the Congressman
    is right. In Fiscal Year 2009, 109 firearms were seized by CBP,
    and thus far to this point in this fiscal year, 72 firearms
    have been seized at outbound checks.
        Mr. Rogers. And those were the numbers that I quoted to
    you. But the question the chairman was talking about of the
    origin of weapons that have been found in Mexico, what can you
    tell us about those?
        Mr. Morton. That is where ATF comes in with the tracing.
        Mr. Price. That is the information we still need to get
    from ATF.
        Mr. Morton. ICE does have FFL authority under the law.
        Mr. Price. We will pursue that energetically because we do
    need to fill out the picture more fully.
        All right. Moving right along. Mr. Rodriguez.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you very much. And let me say in that
    particular specific area, I know we put in about 15-17 million
    to do that, which is not sufficient in all honesty, and the
    little reports that I got when I was in Mexico was that a good
    a number, they felt, came from the U.S., but they weren't sure.
    What they did know was that a lot of the guns did come from the
    wars that we have had in Central America and elsewhere,
    especially some of the big arms. But we do need additional
    data.

                                 DRUG SEIZURES

        I also feel what the Congressman, Minority Leader, just
    talked about in terms of following the money, we haven't done a
    good job there. And I know there is some stuff out there in the
    Caribbean, and there are some other people doing some things.
    But please let us know in terms of what else we might be able
    to do there, because if it is $30 billion, and that amount
    remains stagnant, and we have done a lot more capture of a lot
    more drugs, and assuming that our appetite for drugs in this
    country has remained the same, then we made some inroads. If
    our appetite has increased, then we haven't, we are not there
    yet.
        But let me also just add I had an opportunity to visit 13
    of my 20 counties. One of them was at Fort Hancock, which is
    Hudspeth County, and there is a genuine--of all my counties, I
    think that is where there is a genuine fear there that is
    occurring and a concern in terms of what is happening on the
    other side. I met with the sheriff's staff on this side. I met
    with the Border Patrol. And by the way, they are doing a
    tremendous job. All the numbers are dropping in my three
    sectors, and they are doing good work and haven't heard too
    many complaints or too many concerns except in that specific
    area, and that fear is from other communities not wanting to
    send their kids to play ball there, to do other things like
    that. And I know that part of it is just what they hear in
    terms of what is occurring across the border and what is
    happening in terms of the ones that are coming across. There
    are increases locally in terms of they were telling me they got
    about 1,100 seizures of the local authorities there.
        And having said that, I wanted to reemphasize how important
    it is for us to continue work with our sheriffs and the county
    officials as well as the cities. And I mentioned the city of
    Presidio because they have, I think, one deputy working there
    for the whole city; they can't afford any more.
        So that Stonegarden project that the chairman has been
    really helpful on has been really a good program that has been
    extremely positive, and ironically Hudspeth County is not one
    of the ones that has received those resources. But it has been
    helpful.
        So whatever we can do to beef up on local authorities and
    somehow look at the language, and also look at the school
    districts, because I know I have a couple of school districts
    where there has been talk about people coming over, and the
    kids that are dropping out, where there is dialogue about
    picking up some of those kids who do the drugs now from the
    cartels. I don't have any evidence, but I know we have had a
    lot of talk in some areas in the border where it might be
    happening in Brownsville. Whatever we might do in terms of
    those political subdivisions such as school districts, cities
    and counties and continue to support that, I would appreciate
    it.
        I know the administration, did they wipe out that sector,
    the $60 million that we put in there, Mr. Chairman? It is in
    the budget?
        I know I will be asking the chairman to see if we can up
    those numbers a little bit in not only helping the northern
    border, but the southern border. So I wanted to stop with that
    and seeing how else we might be able to work with those
    communities.
        One of the other is just communication. Along that border
    there, my God, you get lost. They are still unable to
    communicate among themselves. Having that interoperable
    communication capability is essential, and every year we put a
    little bit, a little bit. In some areas we are almost there, in
    other areas we are not quite there yet, where the local sheriff
    and the local police can dialogue with not only EMS, but also
    Border Patrol and other people. That is important. And so thank
    you very much. If either of you want to comment on that.
        Mr. Price. Why don't we ask Mr. Mollohan to close us out,
    if that is all right, because our time is really drug to a
    close.
        Mr. Mollohan.
        Mr. Mollohan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

                      EPIC AS PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE CENTER

        Gentlemen, Drug Enforcement Agency's 2011 request includes
    $40 million to dramatically expand the El Paso Intelligence
    Center. Part of the justification for that is the anticipation
    that ICE is going to be using that. Following up on the ranking
    minority Member's questions, does ICE intend to choose EPIC as
    its primary intelligence center for southwest border needs?
        Mr. Morton. I was unaware that that request was based in
    any formal way on a decision by ICE because that decision
    hasn't been reached. What I have agreed to do is to take a hard
    look at the resources we have at EPIC. I think we need to have
    much more coordinated intelligence gathering----
        Mr. Mollohan. When are you going to make these decisions?
    Because these funding decisions are going to be made very
    quickly, and it is a large amount of money. So the question is,
    does ICE support using EPIC as the primary intelligence center?
    And that is the question that really needs to be answered for
    us to respond to these requests from these law enforcement
    agencies.
        Mr. Morton. I think, as we have noted, that is an ongoing
    discussion and will be part of what we get back in the 90 days
    that we have agreed to here.
        Mr. Mollohan. Ninety days. I agree with the ranking member,
    90 days is a long time, because we are going to be making these
    funding decisions much more quickly than 90 days.
        Mr. Morton. One thing I need to do is to look at DEA's
    request for $40 million and to the extent that it refers to
    ICE, which is news to me, and then talk to Michele about it.
    But I am not prepared at this time to say that we have decided
    that, in fact, EPIC is the place to be. It is obviously one of
    the prime contenders.
        Mr. Mollohan. What would be the alternative to using EPIC
    for that purpose?
        Mr. Morton. One of the other centers or the creation of a
    new center along the southwest border.
        Mr. Mollohan. Who would stand the new center up?
        Mr. Morton. Well, it could be the Department of Homeland
    Security. CBP and ICE already are, in practical terms, the
    principal players along the border. CBP and ICE share
    intelligence regularly. We are already moving many of our
    operations. We do them in the same place. And then, of course,
    the military is a key player. JIATF South, to start with, has a
    very strong military support and structure to it.
        Mr. Mollohan. Would you include my office, please, in the
    updates that Mr. Rogers has asked for this purpose?
        Mr. Morton. Absolutely, sir.
        Mr. Mollohan. We are making these decisions real time.
        Mr. Rogers. Would the gentleman yield on that briefly?
        Mr. Mollohan. I don't have very much time here. May I yield
    after I am finished, please? Because if I can get one more
    question here, I am going to feel lucky, one more question in.

                                WEAPONS SEIZURES

        That is a paltry number of weapons to seize going out of
    the country. Is that because you are not checking, you are not
    screening for traffic going out of the country? Why wouldn't
    you catch or--did you say 18 weapons going across the border
    into Mexico?
        Mr. Bersin. One hundred nine in the last fiscal year, but,
    in fact, we have not seized any weapons in rail, and yet every
    rail shipment in and out of the United States is subject to an
    X-ray examination.
        Mr. Mollohan. My statistics--and I am sorry to be so quick
    here and cut you off, I understand that is rude, and I don't
    want to do that, but I have to get the essence of my question.
    I understand that 90 percent of the firearms found in Mexico
    come from the United States. Did you agree or disagree with
    that statistic?
        Mr. Bersin. I disagree with that. That is a statement that
    has been broadly publicized but does not reflect the reality.
    The most that could be said is that 90 percent of the weapons
    that have been traced may originate in the United States, but
    we don't know what the larger population of weapons are.
        Mr. Mollohan. Can you give us a statistic of what
    percentage of the weapons being illegally used in Mexico come
    from the United States?
        Mr. Bersin. As Mr. Morton indicated, that is information--
    we haven't dodged questions--that is information that is more
    readily available from ATF.
        Mr. Price. To answer your question, I am sure both of our
    Committees have made this request, and we need to get a better
    answer.
        Mr. Mollohan. It sounds to me, Mr. Chairman, we are not
    doing enough screening or focusing on effective screening of
    weapons traveling south. We screen a lot coming north, but not
    having enough time to--I won't make a judgment on that, not
    having enough time to follow up on the question.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. Mr. Rodriguez, I guess you have a quick request
    for the record?

                                      EPIC

        Mr. Rodriguez. Just really quickly, I know that the State
    Department had also been looking in terms of the money
    expenditures that were going into Mexico, doing something, as
    was discussed here, about some collaborative effort together in
    some area that includes the State Department in our efforts
    with Mexico, at one point a little bit over $1 billion, and
    hopefully maybe we can dialogue, move that dialogue further
    into some reality in forming some center that will respond to
    that and address all those issues beyond not only security, but
    what is also occurring in Mexico in the training of the judges
    and all that other stuff. Thank you.
        Mr. Price. Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Briefly, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Mollohan, of
    course, will be important if we do a JIATF-like organization on
    the southwest border because he appropriates the funds for the
    Justice Department. And I hear him saying that 90 days, if we
    delay the decision 90 days, it is going to be too late for the
    action of these Subcommittees to write into the budget next
    year's money for such a center.
        Mr. Bersin.
        Mr. Bersin. If I may say respectfully, I think that what we
    are talking about is such a remarkable institutional
    transformation that, in fact, would not be a matter for this
    budget year, in any case. And although I agree that the issue
    on EPIC is improving its service to ICE and CBP as border
    agencies, we have made a huge investment in EPIC over the
    years, and I don't think in the next 90 days we will be in a
    position to make a radical departure.
        But I take your point that we should be in a position to
    report in 90 days where the status of the discussion is, and,
    if it is going further, then, in fact, it has real budgetary
    implications.
        Mr. Rogers. Just be advised that the Subcommittees may
    override you and do this anyway.
        Mr. Morton. Yes.
        Mr. Rogers. Whether you like it or not or whether you are
    prepared for it or not.
        Mr. Bersin. I understand. But if you ask for my
    recommendation, I would not make a radical change in course in
    the period of time that we have to consider this in this budget
    cycle.
        Mr. Rogers. With the severity of the problem on the border,
    a radical change may be in order.
        Mr. Price. In any case, the request stands for the 90-day
    report, as full as you can make it, of the state of your
    present thinking and interagency discussions.

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        With that, we really have run out of time, and we will
    adjourn the hearing with thanks to both of you for your good
    work and for your testimony today.
        Mr. Morton. Thank you.

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                                               Tuesday, March 23, 2010.

       DHS AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS AND INVESTMENTS: CUSTOMS AND BORDER
                           PROTECTION AND COAST GUARD

                                   WITNESSES

    REAR ADMIRAL VINCE ATKINS, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR CAPABILITY, U.S.
        COAST GUARD
    MAJOR GENERAL MICHAEL KOSTELNIK (RET.), ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR THE
        OFFICE OF AIR AND MARINE, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION

                   Opening Statement of Chairman David Price

        Mr. Price. Good morning.
        The Subcommittee will come to order. We are going to be
    examining this morning the respective roles and coordination
    between the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection in
    carrying out their air and marine missions.
        This is a somewhat different way of configuring a hearing.
    But we think it will let us get at some issues that wouldn't be
    raised in exactly the same way in separate discussions with the
    Coast Guard and CBP.
        So we appreciate you both being here.
        The Department of Homeland Security is analogous to a
    police force in some ways, with the Coast Guard and the CBP
    walking the same beat, watching for smugglers and working to
    thwart their efforts. Their aircraft and vessels patrol our
    borders and coasts and interdict migrants and illegal drugs.
    Their illustrious histories originated in the first acts of the
    U.S. Congress to collect revenue, counter smuggling, and
    protect life and property along the coast. And their range is
    vast: 7,500 miles of land border, and 95,000 miles of
    coastline.
        This hearing is the first opportunity for this subcommittee
    to examine how these essential programs work in tandem to
    support a wide range of law enforcement, national security, and
    humanitarian missions.
        We welcome Admiral Vince Atkins, assistant commandant for
    capability for the U.S. Coast Guard; and Michael Kostelnik,
    assistant commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine, U.S.
    Customs and Border Protection for a frank discussion of this
    topic.
        Admiral Atkins is a leading member of the DHS senior
    guidance team on matters related to the Department's maritime,
    air and surface capabilities and is Coast Guard's lead
    executive for the Predator B partnership, one area of focus for
    today's hearing. Before his current assignment, Admiral Atkins
    served as deputy director of response policy, overseeing
    development of policy guidance for the Coast Guard's statutory
    missions and helping friend the foundation for cross-agency
    partnerships that we will examine today.
        Assistant Commissioner Kostelnik directs the world's
    largest civilian aviation and maritime agency. Before coming to
    CBP, the Commissioner had a distinguished U.S. Air Force
    career, retiring as major general. He then ran NASA's manned
    space and international space station programs. For his 5 years
    with CBP, he has helped transform Air and Marine into a
    national enterprise, a long way from its origins as a loose
    confederation of field operations.
        Cooperation between these agencies has been very successful
    in places like Puerto Rico, where shared resources have slowed
    undocumented immigration through the Mona Pass and intercepted
    illegal drugs headed for American shores. On the drug front,
    their joint efforts are combined with DOD and DEA under the
    Joint Inter-Agency Task Force South, which coordinates efforts
    in the western hemisphere to detect, monitor and interdict drug
    smuggling by sea and air.
        Both agencies are long conducted aerial surveillance along
    our coasts. The Coast Guard has its C-130 and C-144 aircraft,
    and CBP has its P-3 and Dash-8. All are used to identify and
    track smugglers moving drugs from South Africa to the Caribbean
    and Gulf Coast. Both agencies operate helicopters for
    interdiction, law enforcement support, and humanitarian
    assistance.
        CBP and the Coast Guard are jointly developing a maritime
    variant of the Predator B unmanned aircraft system to extend
    their surveillance abilities. This maritime variant, named the
    Guardian, was first flown in 2008, and it is undergoing
    additional operational testing. Another is requested by CBP in
    the 2011 budget. The Guardian represents a new level of
    collaboration on this critical mission, and we look forward to
    learning more details about this program today.
        Coordination between these two agencies also extends to
    managing and sharing assets. Over the past 2 years, Coast Guard
    has transferred 73 small vessels, including 55 SAFE boats, to
    CBP for refurbishment and marine deployment. Both agencies
    participate in DHS councils to review aircraft and vessel
    procurement planning and decisions. And they have benefited
    from access to each other's contracts. In light of such
    cooperation, we hope to hear today how the two agencies manage
    their overlapping jurisdictions, how they coordinate their
    missions, and how they share intelligence.
        Despite many positive elements, we have concerns about the
    sustainability of these programs. First, the lack of trained
    operators and support staff could reduce DHS capacity to carry
    out aerial surveillance missions. For example, their request
    for 2011 cuts 120 CBP pilots and other positions funded last
    year to support the UAS program. This seems inconsistent, at
    least on the face of it, with plans to deploy the Predator.
        In addition, while both Coast Guard and CBP are acquiring
    new marine and air assets, they are burdened with aging fleets
    which are increasingly expensive and dangerous to operate. The
    need for Coast Guard recapitalization is well known, and CBP's
    air assets are over 33 years old on average. We expect to
    explore today whether CBP can sustain its operating tempo while
    delaying replacements, as anticipated in the budget. And
    turning an eye toward the long-term situation of these assets,
    this Subcommittee needs updated and overdue strategic
    recapitalization plans for CBP and the Coast Guard. I suppose I
    am starting to sound like a broken record on that issue. But I
    have to say again, without this information, we cannot assess
    how the Department will modernize these aging fleets. And
    therefore, it is very difficult to put our 2011 budget
    decisions in perspective.
        Admiral Atkins and Commissioner Kostelnik, we anticipate an
    informative discussion today. Your full written statements will
    be placed in the record. So we are going to ask you to limit
    your remarks to a 5-minute oral presentation. And before you
    begin, I want to turn to our distinguished ranking member, Hal
    Rogers, for his comments.
        [The information follows:]

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               Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers

        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General and Mr. Commandant, thank you for being here.
    Welcome to the Committee. It is good to see you and to be seen
    with you.
        Each of you, of course, has a very tough job, you are the
    ones caught between the bean counters here in Washington and
    the bureaucrats at DHS headquarters, and the brave men and
    women in the field, who put their lives on the line every day
    to keep us safe and secure.
        And you are the ones apparently getting squeezed,
    shortchanged by the fiscal year 2011 budget, a budget that
    proposes to substantially increase the Department's
    headquarters' staff and put $200 million of its money toward
    security costs of terrorist trials, needlessly I might add;
    while also cutting funding for CBP's air and marine personnel
    by 3.6 percent, cutting Coast Guard operational personnel by
    more than 1,110 military billets and decommissioning or
    deactivating 19 operational components; cutting funding for
    CBP's air and marine procurement and maintenance by 3.2 percent
    and cutting funding for Coast Guard acquisitions by more than
    10 percent.
        So to put it mildly, your tough jobs are getting made
    tougher by an administration that is increasing bureaucracy at
    the expense of operations, a prioritization that I find simply
    indefensible. We all know the threat. We all know your aging
    assets are in dire need of recapitalization. The challenge
    before you now is how to meet your mission requirements with
    fewer dollars. This is certainly no small chore since the boats
    and aircraft our frontline operators need are expensive, and
    the systems to make those assets work together are inherently
    complex.
        So we are counting on both of you and the men and women
    that you command to find a way to collectively use the talent
    and experience at CBP and the Coast Guard to link funding to
    real results and do this in a fiscally responsible way.
        While the joint program offices that you have established
    are noteworthy, it is collaboration at the technical level in
    the field that I find far much more significant. In fact, the
    need for teamwork during operations was probably best summed up
    by the Coast Guard sector commander in San Juan, then Captain
    Jim Tunstall, who simply remarked when CBP isn't flying, I
    cannot see anything. What Captain Tunstall was specifically
    referring to was the Mona Pass, as the chairman indicated, a
    heavily trafficked stretch of water where CBP provides aerial
    surveillance, since the Coast Guard has no maritime patrol
    aircraft in Puerto Rico.
        That teamwork exhibited by CBP and the Coast Guard in
    Puerto Rico exemplified what I believe is the most critical
    asset in our entire Homeland Security arsenal, sheer will, the
    will to put turf battles aside and seek any and all means to
    further the broader Homeland Security mission, which is exactly
    what was envisioned when DHS was established. And it is exactly
    what the American people expect of our security professionals
    today.
        So that brings us to today's hearing, what I hope will be a
    thoughtful discussion of how CBP and the Coast Guard are
    working together to further the protection of our borders and
    shores.
        Gentlemen, please know that we and the American people are
    very appreciative of the work that you are doing, very grateful
    for all of the sacrifices made by those in the field, whom you
    represent here today. We thank you for being here. We look
    forward to hearing your views.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Whatever order you prefer to proceed. But please go ahead.
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                  Statement of Major General Michael Kostelnik

        General Kostelnik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is a pleasure to be here, Ranking Member Rogers,
    Congressman Calvert.
        First, let me begin by thanking this Committee for your
    outstanding support over the five years that I have been
    associated with the program. And as the chairman properly
    noted, Air and Marine, although our roots with U.S. Customs go
    back to the beginning of the Customs service more than 200
    years, the current configuration of Air and Marine is only five
    years old.
        And, of course, our recapitalization efforts was a
    significant issue going back to the legacy Border Patrol air
    fleet that was in poor condition and the legacy Customs fleet
    of aircraft and maritime vessels in support. And back in 2005,
    at the beginning of the merger, there were insubstantial funds
    for any serious recapitalization effort.
        Now five years later, with the support of this Committee,
    we have done a lot of things. You all have provided more than a
    billion dollars for an aircraft recapitalization program which
    we think we have invested wisely. We still operate some of the
    oldest aircraft in the inventory, but don't confuse age with
    capability.
        Going back to the P-3 program, in front of our larger
    sister service, the United States Navy, we made a decision in
    2005 to restore the P-3 fleet, with your support, create a
    service life extension program. We have done that. In 2006,
    recall, all those aircraft were grounded through 2007 and 2008.
    And we tried to fly the mission with three or four aircraft.
        And today, I am pleased to tell you, 11 of those 16
    aircraft are operational. Three are still permanently grounded
    until rewinging, but we have completed the acquisition process
    in 2011 for 10 wing sets. We have the first aircraft to be
    rewinged in advance of the Navy fleet that rolls out this
    spring and will enter operational service; the second aircraft
    later this year. And we will complete the rewinging of all 10
    aircraft as early as 2015.
        We have taken due diligence on some of the oldest aircraft
    we have. We still operate more than 50 percent of our fleet
    with aircraft that are 33 years, on average, old. Some of those
    are a concern. We have managed those very closely. The worst
    ones we have started to de-assess. In fact, this year we lost
    our confidence in our MB-600 fleet, grounded those nine
    helicopters.
        The P-3s have been restored. We are updating the A model
    Black Hawks to L model configuration. With your support, we
    purchased new M model Black Hawks. So while we keep the old
    aircraft solid and maintain them on duty and upgrade them with
    sensors and new capabilities and upgrades to keep them safe, we
    are also recapitalizing the middle parts of our fleet that,
    while still functional and not safety or flight issues, have
    been short in the areas of performance.
        A lot of that has been with your help, most importantly
    last year with the plus-up of our maritime program. Clearly,
    with the things happening in Somalia and off the coast of the
    Horn of Africa with pirating and so forth, clearly small boats
    and the approaches to the country are an increasingly important
    part of our Nation's defense. While we focus on the land
    borders, we have not forgotten about the water borders. And
    with your support, the 11 new marine branches are in place now.
    The boats are in place. And with the help of the Coast Guard
    and others, we have made tremendous investments there.
        At the end, while we continue to manage aged aircraft and
    support them to make them safe and modernize them for continued
    service for the long term, we have been, over the last several
    years, working at the front end of technology and particularly
    with our UAV program. From one single aircraft, which was lost
    in a pilot error in 2006, we have grown our UAV force to be the
    most capable force in this hemisphere.
        The DOD is much larger, has many more assets, most of which
    are deployed. But in the country, in this hemisphere, the
    Office of Air and Marine with the six aircraft we currently
    have in service can do things in this hemisphere today that the
    larger DOD could not do in the same capability. And I think
    that speaks well for the investment towards the future.
        We have land-based Predators that flew last night on the
    Southwest border. We have northern-based Predators that are
    flying the floods at the request of Governor Hoeven and the
    political leadership in North Dakota, doing before and after
    difference analysis using our synthetic aperture radar,
    streaming a live feeding video to not only our own people but
    to state and local to give unprecedented situational awareness
    to what is happening on the ground, practiced with the floods
    we flew in North Dakota last year and the hurricanes the year
    before.
        So while we create this national capability to support our
    homeland security, the fallout is unprecedented support for
    local humanitarian and contingency response.
        And finally I will leave my comments with the creation of
    the Guardian. I will be happy to answer your questions and
    explore possibilities, a unique partnership with the U.S. Coast
    Guard, but only one of many. You mentioned the number of boats.
    Those 73 boats that the Coast Guard de-assessed, we re-engined,
    refurbished and put into service, that was a cost avoidance for
    Air and Marine of more than $14 million.
        That has made an unprecedented difference for us to be able
    to grow our marine force. In 1995, we had 85 MIAs on active
    service. Today we have more than 350 MIAs, Marine Interdiction
    Agents, in service and more than 253 boats operational. A good
    part of that was not only the support from this Committee, but
    the support we have had from our partners with the United
    States Coast Guard.
        And in the areas of the UAVs, while the Coast Guard look at
    their opportunities and requirements, we have formed a Joint
    Program Office, training Coast Guard crews, providing CBP
    aircraft assets and folding these things into where I think you
    all mentioned you were most concerned with joint operations.
        Not only is Puerto Rico and the CBP operation a great role
    model, you will find similar relationships in many other places
    around the country: In the Great Lakes, where we are both at
    Selfridge Air Force Base; in San Diego, where there is a joint
    operation there; in the San Juans in upstate Washington; and
    most importantly, in the transit zone, a unique partnership in
    JIATF South in the Inter-Agency-DEA, United States Navy, U.S.
    Coast Guard, CBP-all oriented to a tremendous effort in
    limiting narcotics from coming out south.
        So I would offer to you that while we continue to maintain
    the old things we have with your support, we do it in a
    measured safe way. We update the equipment we have, and we are
    planning on the leading edge for perhaps contingencies we have
    not seen. And we are doing this in a very coherent and in a
    very amenable partnership with our larger sister service, the
    Coast Guard. I look forward to your questions.
        Thank you.
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                        Statement of RDML Vincent Atkins

        Mr. Price. Thank you, General.
        Admiral.
        Admiral Atkins. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rogers,
    distinguished members. As the Coast Guard Assistant Commandant
    For Capabilities, I am honored to appear before you today to
    talk about the Coast Guard's critical role in maritime security
    and safety and how our cooperative efforts with sister agencies
    move those capabilities along and further our efforts in air
    and marine operations. At a time when whole of government
    operations and approaches are critical to achieving national
    objectives, the Coast Guard's military multi-mission and
    maritime assets provide highly adaptive operational
    capabilities that serve the Nation's interests well, whether
    those interests are in the heartland, in our ports of entry
    along the coastlines, in exclusive economic zones or anywhere
    around the globe.
        The Coast Guard's unique combination of civil and military
    authorities and capabilities makes our service ideally situated
    to serve as the principal agency for maritime law enforcement
    and lead federal agency for the maritime component of homeland
    security.
        The Coast Guard's law enforcement authority, codified in
    Title 14 of the U.S. Code, is the foundation of our maritime
    security mission. This authority underpins our ability to
    interdict illegal drugs, illegal cargos and illegal people and
    other more potentially dangerous threats to the homeland.
        When coupled with our Title 10 military responsibilities
    and authorities, the Coast Guard truly is a unique service
    provider to the Nation. The Coast Guard's ability to contribute
    to any whole of government operation is predicated on our broad
    authorities, our core competencies, our organizational ethos
    and our fleet of assets. In terms of those assets, we remain
    committed to recapitalizing our aging surface and air fleets.
    We continue to make progress in the delivery of new major
    cutters, such as Berthoff and Waesche, our first two national
    security cutters. We are operating new fixed-wing assets, the
    C-130J and to HC-144. And we are realizing tremendous return on
    investment from the modernization of our helicopter fleet, both
    the H-65 and H-60s. The Rescue 21 Command and Control System is
    on watch from Maine to Texas, and it is increasing our ability
    to conduct search-and-rescue and to save lives.
        Sirs, the recapitalization program that you are supporting
    is making a difference. And our men and women on the frontline
    want to thank you for your continued support of that
    recapitalization effort.
        The Coast Guard has strengthened its ability to protect our
    Nation's ports, waterways and coastal borders by partnering
    with federal, state and local agencies, tribal nations, the
    marine industry and international stakeholders. Nowhere are
    these effective partnerships more apparent than between the
    Coast Guard and other agencies within DHS.
        For instance, our efforts with US-VISIT highlight the
    success of our joint biometric proof of concept in reducing
    illegal migrant flow into Puerto Rico. Our cooperative efforts
    with Customs and Border Protection are spearheaded by a
    strategic guidance team that brings together senior agency
    leaders to drive interagency effectiveness and efficiency.
        Examples of our interagency cooperation occur every day
    throughout the United States and at sea. And they are a source
    of pride for our service and a sense of accomplishment for the
    Department. From Joint Operation Centers, joint targeting,
    synchronized detection and monitoring to effective endgame
    prosecution, the Coast Guard and CBP are working smarter and
    more effectively along the northern, the southern and coastal
    borders, the maritime ports of entry and throughout the elicit
    drug transit zone en route to North America.
        Beyond our operational efforts, we are working to leverage
    each other's strengths in acquisition, training and
    maintenance. Our joint efforts are illustrated by the
    successful DHS Small Boat Commodity Council and Joint Coast
    Guard CBP program office for unmanned aircraft systems.
        Sir, the Coast Guard is proud to stand the watch. We
    recognize that where there is overlap in areas of operation,
    authority and capability, the American taxpayer is best
    protected and best served by unity of effort that results in
    coordinated and effective operations. To this end, the Coast
    Guard strives to expand its collaboration to consistently and
    effectively execute our mission as America's maritime guardian.
        Sir, thank you again for this opportunity to come and have
    this discussion with you all today. I am happy to answer any
    questions you might have.
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                         CONFLICTING MISSION PRIORITIES

        Mr. Price. Thank you, Admiral.
        And let me start with you, because you do give a very
    positive rendition of the planning process in particular that
    your agencies are engaged in. You describe a very smooth
    process for sharing assets, a process that goes on from the top
    down from the very beginning of planning to execution.
        Surely sometimes mission conflicts arise. I wonder if one
    of the downsides of what we are discussing in a positive vein
    here today might be that unshared missions could get the short
    straw when it comes to planning. Can you give us a little
    better feeling for this planning process and some of the
    conflicts that you have to overcome in this process from time
    to time?
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir. I would say the planning process
    is absolutely essential, and it begins with the unified command
    perspective. And as the general indicated, across the Nation at
    various ports of entry, we are working very closely together at
    the tactical level so that our tactical forces are best arrayed
    against the threat for that particular vector and sector. So,
    for instance, in Florida, where there is a Southeast border
    interagency group that is looking to coordinate, what they have
    done is they have looked for where are the various agency
    partners flying their aircraft on any given day? And how do you
    deconflict those aircraft and those times and those areas of
    patrol to maximize the effect that we are trying to bring to?
        And now it is not just aircraft in the air, but it is
    surface units on the water, because while you might be able to
    detect and monitor, the absolute essential here is to get an
    effective endgame on the water so whomever you are
    interdicting, you are boarding and you are finding out what you
    need to find out. So it is this idea of prior planning to
    understand where the other blue forces are, where the other
    interagency forces are, how do you deconflict those and how do
    you aim them to get the best result, sir?

                              GUARDIAN DEPLOYMENT

        Mr. Price. Let me ask both of you to turn to a specific
    innovation in border and maritime surveillance--the Predator
    unmanned aircraft system. By October of this year, as we
    understand CBP will have seven Predator Bs operating on the
    Southwest border, the Northern border, Florida, the coast, the
    Gulf and possibly the Caribbean transit zone.
        One of these, the Guardian maritime variant, is being
    tested in a joint program with the Coast Guard. Preliminary
    results indicate the Guardian could fill air surveillance gaps
    for vulnerable areas in the southeast coastal region
    particularly since it can operate longer and with a smaller
    crew than manned surveillance aircraft. The CBP budget proposes
    a Florida UAS base in fiscal year 2011 or 2012. Commissioner
    Kostelnik and Admiral Atkins as well, what is the current
    Guardian deployment plan and how does it fit into the Deepwater
    and CBP 5-year recapitalization plans? And, of course, I have
    to say, again, these are plans currently under review and due
    to this Subcommittee.
        General Kostelnik. Let me start and take you back to the
    history of the maritime variant, and it goes back to, I think,
    what the Admiral was talking about, about the rich relationship
    we have at the tactical level. Going into the source and
    transit zone were differentiated by our missions by the kind of
    equipment we have. So, clearly, on the water, you need the
    bigger ships that we don't have. So U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard
    with U.S. Coast Guard boarding crews were out of the Eastern
    Pacific. And then you have maritime aircraft overhead; used to
    be some foreign aircraft involved; now they have gone. There is
    Navy P-3s. There are Coast Guard C-130Js. There is our P-3. But
    it is never enough. Similar to the Mona Pass issue, we just
    don't have enough maritime capabilities.
        So going back a couple of years ago, we thought it would be
    prudent, given the good success we were having with the land-
    based variant, to do a development of a Guardian-type aircraft
    with a maritime radar. To give you a sense for the genesis, the
    Coast Guard was coming off some of the Deepwater experience
    with the VTOL UAV. And I will leave the Admiral to talk about
    the long-term requirements consistent with the deepwater
    approach. But in that time period, there was some interest by
    the Coast Guard with the land-based variant from maritime ops,
    given the close connectivity we had in all these areas around
    the environment in the littoral area where an aircraft could be
    useful.
        The Coast Guard, to their credit, put a fair amount of
    money, as did we, and we borrowed the Air Force prototype of
    the Mariner, a very early variant of the Predator with an ELTA
    CV radar that was never developed. And we did an extensive and
    exhaustive test in the Gulf of Mexico jointly working with
    Coast Guard cutters, Coast Guard aircraft, our aircraft to
    determine if there would be a need. And it turned out, there
    was great promise. And the Guardian program was what evolved
    from that.
        Now, with the Guardian program currently in test, it has
    completed DT&E very early because it is an aircraft we know. It
    is a radar system we already operate on our Dash-8 and our P-3,
    very low risk. And we are getting very good results. We should
    finish the operational testing and evaluation of this aircraft
    in the next month or so.
        And then we have options. And we are looking at those
    options coherently with the Coast Guard to see where would be
    the first operational mission deployment. There is clearly
    requirements pull in the Caribbean supporting DEA and Coast
    Guard missions and JIATF South missions. We could get into Mona
    Pass with this aircraft. So clearly that part of the Southeast
    region is in play.
        The second Mariner aircraft, CBP-159, should arrive later
    in the summer. We should get the radar on it in the September/
    October time frame. We are looking to deploy that aircraft in
    Corpus Christi. That gives us two maritime basing locations
    where, from those fixed locations, we can support the Caribbean
    and Southeast region. We can also turn those aircraft north and
    support the Eastern seaboard and also the metro areas of D.C.
    and New York State, should there be issues up here. And then
    with the Corpus bird, we can cover the Gulf. We can cover south
    Texas. We can cover the Texas border if we need to.
        We can then, with both of those assets, make both of those
    aircraft available for deployments into the Gulf, deep Central
    America or the Eastern Pacific in concert with the JIATF South
    mission.
        So at this time, we are focused on basing in Florida,
    although that could be moved to other bases in the Florida
    region. We would do that in concert with the U.S. Coast Guard,
    depending on where we can best support these missions. The
    second base at NAS Corpus Christi, we already have a large P-3
    presence there, and we do qualify our P-3 crews to fly this
    asset as well. And there is a Coast Guard presence there.
        So the ultimate way ahead with deployment will be
    determining condition by how this first aircraft performs. And
    coherently, we are in the planning process with the operational
    part of the Coast Guard to determine where the first deployment
    would be. Those two experiences will help the condition, the
    overarching strategy.
        It is important to note that while these are primarily
    oriented towards the maritime environment, the belly pod, which
    carries the CV radar will accommodate all the radars that the
    Air and Marine and the Coast Guard operate, so we can put
    different sea-search radars in that configuration. And we can
    also drop that belly pod, put the synthetic aperture radar back
    in and operate the maritime-based variances--marine variances
    as well.

                             UAS FLEET REQUIREMENTS

        Mr. Price. General, before turning to the Admiral, let me
    just ask you specifically how many flight hours the UAS fleet
    is going to make in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. And of course,
    you understand the reason I am asking you that question. Will
    you have pilot and other support crew to support the 14-hour
    mission average previously projected for the Predators? As you
    well know, there are multiple challenges that developed,
    producing an alarmingly low utilization for the first half of
    fiscal year 2009, falling far short of projections. So with
    that background on both of our minds, I wonder if you could
    fill us in on the kind of flight hour projections you are
    dealing with now.
        General Kostelnik. I appreciate the opportunity to comment
    on that, because even though these aircraft are old, they are
    unmanned; it is kind of a misdirection in a way because you
    would think they are less manpower-intensive. The reality is,
    given as you correctly point out, the extended length of
    flight, in fact, the land-based variants we demonstrated 20-
    hour mission capability with the configuration we carry. And
    the first long-duration flight of the Mariner looks like it is
    going to have about 20 hours duration as well. So it actually
    takes more pilots and crew to fly one of these things, and of
    course, that is the downside.
        On the plus side, it allows you to bring in other
    capabilities. You can bring in intel specialists. You can bring
    in legal specialists. And, of course, in our business, that is
    an important factor in real-time consideration. So you
    basically bring in a flight team.
        So if you will look at our utilization rate to date, I
    mean, the observation that I would offer is that, again, going
    back to this program, it is just a little over four years old.
    And having said that, we are still growing this force. But with
    the capabilities we have today and in only four years, we have
    grown the second largest operational fleet of Predator Bs on
    the world stage. We have capabilities no other country in the
    world has. And in this hemisphere, we have experiences in
    Homeland Security that even the DOD doesn't have, even though
    they have much larger assets.
        So we are still very much in the building part of our
    process, trying to grow pilots, trying to train analysts,
    trying to acquire the equipment at the same time we are doing
    due diligence, flying a fairly high ops tempo. We try to fly
    every night on the Southwest border. When the weather is good
    on the Northern border, we try to fly every day or night up
    there. But we are actively training many of our crews.
        And oddly enough, it isn't really the aircraft that is the
    discriminant. It is either the ground control stations, which
    are always more problematic, late to need, and we are short of
    those and, most importantly, having enough training pilots to
    fly that.
        The partnership with the Coast Guard is a good one for us
    and them because it will start to grow and train Coast Guard
    pilots to fly these aircraft. In fact, we already have three
    that are fully qualified on the Predator, and they will be
    assisting with the Guardian mission. So we typically look like,
    for a single aircraft, with the crews and control sets, we
    could fly those aircraft typically three times a week. Probably
    not 20 hours, because there are other limitations: Mission
    need; in some cases, the code; the certificate of
    authorization; or issues associated with the tower's operating
    availability. So while the flight rate to date has been perhaps
    less than what people might have expected given the aircraft,
    you are going to see, as we bring on the Coast Guard pilots--
    and with your support we hired and dedicated 24 UAV pilots last
    year, but again those are still in training and coming up to
    speed and then to offset the shortage of pilots because the
    bulk of our aviation fleet and numbers has not changed. Even
    though we increased the number of pilots over time, we are
    dual-qualifying our pilots. So the same pilots that fly P-3
    missions in the transit zone will be flying Guardian missions
    on rotation. So I think you are going to see a dramatic
    increase in the flight hours for these assets over time.
        Mr. Price. And you are telling me in other words that we
    can expect to approach that 14-hour mission average that was
    previously projected? Or is there some reason to alter that
    projection?
        General Kostelnik. It is not so much the 14 hours because
    typically out--Sierra Vista today, given the limitations on
    crews primarily, we fly typically 10-hour missions. So the
    aircraft will go out in the afternoon, and it will land
    sometime around midnight. And oddly enough, that is in concert
    with when the bulk of the activity is. Those aircraft are
    dealing a lot with low-level drugs, a lot of smuggling across
    the border. And typically the activity is occurring 10:00 to
    midnight, and then people travelling out in the desert bed down
    at night. So it just turns out that that mission suits our
    needs.
        In the East-Pac area, if there is a mission requirement
    pull and need for the aircraft to be out longer because the
    assets are out there, we can fly those aircraft longer. It is
    not an issue that we don't have the spare parts. It is not an
    issue we don't have the gas. The reality is, when you go to 20-
    hour mission sets, you have got to have two full crews of
    mission pilots in addition to the launch-and-recovery pilots
    that you have at the remote site.
        What I am saying is, over time, we are still aggressively
    building our training program, and each month, as the time goes
    by, we have more pilots available to fly. Right now, it is the
    pilots that are the limits and the duration, not the GSEs, not
    the Coast, not the aircraft. But what it does offer--and a good
    way to think about these things--while these are reasonable
    missions, while they are still building this force today, both
    in border security in the Southwest border and the Northern
    border, but also in contingency ops, if floods happen. Two
    years ago we had no capability to do that when we had the
    floods in Iowa. Today, in North Dakota and Minnesota or any
    place else in the country where you have a humanitarian need
    for these assets, we can put an aircraft overhead the same day.
        We flew the hurricanes, three hurricanes two years ago. We
    have never done that before. But now having done that, that
    capability is available. So this summer, we get into hurricane
    season again. If there is a need, we will be there.
        And all these activities, both the day-to-day work and the
    border security, as limited as it is right now because we are
    still training, give you the ability to respond not only to
    these humanitarian events, but if we were to have a serious
    event in this country today, one perhaps like 9/11 or something
    short, but something significant today, any place else in the
    continental United States, we could put a Predator overhead,
    streaming live video, having COCOM, having a laser ranger
    designator providing unprecedented situational awareness to
    leaders across federal, state and local government. And I think
    that puts us in a very good position.
        But, again, I would leave you with the part that you would
    have to look at this program. It is just four years old. In
    many cases, in many organizations, trying to build a
    capability, you would just be getting the aircraft now or maybe
    it would just be at the end stages of operational test and
    evaluation. We are not only growing at a fast rate and have
    been doing missions 24/7 for the last three years while
    building this force, we are not only creating new opportunities
    by laying in the back game with intel, but creating this new
    maritime variant. So, from our perspective, where we sit, we
    think we have been leaning forward strongly in the saddle and
    providing a great capability for the country.

                                 UAS STAFF CUTS

        Mr. Price. General, I am sure we will return to this
    question throughout the morning. I do want to turn to other
    members.
        But, finally, your answer to me does underscore the
    question of personnel. And it is in that respect that I must
    say, this 2011 budget does raise some serious questions,
    particularly in light of the kind of program you have just
    outlined. Last year you estimated you need 79 crew members,
    mission support and trainers, to fully deploy the UAS. You
    sought and received fiscal year 2010 funding to add 18 more UAS
    pilots.
        But that is where this 2011 budget comes in. Your 2011
    budget is proposing funding cuts for 13 of these people. What
    is the rationale for that? Have personnel needs somehow
    changed? Again, what is your operational deployment plan for
    the UAS in relation to the staffing cuts? That is really what I
    am trying to get at. Are these staffing cuts going to constrain
    your ability to use the UAS effectively and indeed carry out
    the program you just described?
        General Kostelnik. As you know, I know you have been
    familiar with our operations for a long time. We are a very
    small force. If you look at Customs and Border Protection, the
    Office of Field Operations, it is about 26,000 agents. Border
    Patrol is about 23,000 agents. Air and Marine is 1,800 total.
    We have always been a very small force, and we work very hard
    with what we have had.
        I am sure you are aware that 2011 is a tough budget year,
    and obviously, we are subject to constraints like others. We
    make our case, we submit our inputs and we get what we get as
    part of the process. Directly to your question, we would have
    hired more pilots in 2010 were those to be supported in our
    2011 request. We do get supported to the tune of about 24 of
    those original 144 requests, of which we are certainly going to
    use wisely, but it is not necessarily just for the pilot.
        And in the short term, the direct answer is, no, there
    would be no impact to our short-term program because of the
    innovations we have used having dual qualifications for our
    pilots that fly the P-3s. They understand the mission, the
    transit zone. We have both pilots and back seat detection,
    specialists. And our plan is to use the pilots to fly the
    aircraft and detection specialists to run the sensors.
        The partnership with the Coast Guard: We love the Coast
    Guard, would like to bring them along. We really don't compete
    at the tactical level and have a lot of great synergism. But
    the truth of the matter, while we are providing hardware and
    UAV expertise, we are getting manpower from the Coast Guard
    that we just don't have and that helps us. We would be limited
    without the Coast Guard support of their aviation pilots
    associated with the program. That is how we work that.
        We have a solid plan for the manpower we are going to hire
    this year; some pilots, some associated support both at the Air
    and Marine Operation Center and our various program and
    engineering staff to make sure we can support those things. We
    are aggressively training the pilots, and long term, having
    more pilots would be better. And depending on the
    representation of the Guardian and the transit zone mission and
    out-year budget, we would expect to have some further
    investments both in aircraft and support equipment, but also in
    pilots downstream.
        But in the short term, while we are still building this
    force and training, actually the shortage of pilots in the 2011
    request will not have a serious impact on that activity. In
    fact, if you look back into 2005, at the beginning of our
    recapitalization, Air and Marine only had a little over 500
    pilots, agent pilots at that time. Thanks to your support, we
    now have over 800 agent pilots and more than 350 Mariners.
        But if you look at the aircraft side of that picture,
    despite the investment from this committee--in 1965, we had 264
    aircraft. Today we only have 284 aircraft in service, despite
    the investment. So as you can see, we actually do have some
    excess capacity in our rated force, and using that excess
    capacity to dual qualify on the Predator makes good sense. And
    if you have watched the issues that the Air Force was having
    with the unpopularity of manned fighter pilots having to fly
    unmanned things, it is actually a benefit for our agents
    because all of our agents are certified FAA pilots, and all of
    our agents who fly the Predator also fly a manned aircraft,
    either a Black Hawk or a Cessna 550 or, in the case of the
    Guardian, the P-3. So we think this synergism and the
    partnership with the Coast Guard will put us in good shape for
    2011.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, to follow up on that line of question the
    chairman had for you, I didn't follow you. I mean, you are
    going to be, your budget proposal would cut personnel by about
    3.6 percent, and as I understand it would, you would have to
    actually lose 68 pilots because of that, 20 marine interdiction
    agents and 56 support personnel, positions that were actually
    requested by the administration in fiscal year 2010. Right or
    wrong?
        General Kostelnik. Those numbers are--those make up the
    composition of the 144 that we would have hired in 2010. Those
    were added to the force we currently have in place. And
    because, during the budget deliberations internal to the
    administration, it was clear that we were not going to have
    those allocations in 2011 supported, we did not bring those
    added people on board. So those are not in fact cuts from
    agents or officers that we currently have on board. Those are
    new hires that we did not hire in 2010 that we would have
    hired.
        Mr. Rogers. Which means that, in fiscal year 2010, you
    obviously saw the need for the additional pilots and personnel,
    right?
        General Kostelnik. You can always have more, sir, always.
        Mr. Rogers. And you were denied, apparently denied your
    request by the administration; is that correct?
        General Kostelnik. Well, as part of the ongoing
    prioritization within CBP and DHS, that is true.
        Mr. Rogers. And it is indefensible to me that, at a point
    in time when we are besieged by the cocaine traffic out of
    South America--and I hold here a description, depiction of the
    traffic patterns of cocaine from South America through the
    Eastern Pacific and Caribbean to Mexico, thus to the U.S. That
    is not abating, is it, Admiral?
        Admiral Atkins. Sir, what we are going to be doing, as the
    general indicated, is we are going to be maximizing our MPAs as
    best as we possibly can. And what we want to do is we want to
    put into effect a concerted effort to the JIATF South
    structure, a plan for detecting and monitoring and then
    affecting an endgame. And really the issue here is, how can we
    best fuse our information and get acute intel to the assets
    that we do have.
        Mr. Rogers. Sure. Duh. What I am saying is the problem is
    not decreasing. It is increasing every day, is it not?
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir, it is.
        Mr. Rogers. And your interdiction efforts are being more
    successful every day, are they not, Admiral?
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir.
        General Kostelnik. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. It is not the time, from my judgment, to deny
    you the personnel and equipment and assets that you need to
    continue to battle this problem, which is killing Americans.
    And for the administration to deny you on the front lines of
    this battle the personnel and equipment that you, as recently
    as last year, said we must have, you have told us, and we gave
    you, and now the bureaucrats are saying, we are not going to
    give you what you need to fight this battle; and I find that
    reprehensible as well as indefensible. All in the name of
    increasing headquarters personnel in Washington, D.C., by
    almost 1,000 people, which is reprehensible and indefensible to
    deny you on the front this commitment and manpower.

                         OFFSHORE INTERDICTION EFFORTS

        Tell us about this fight that is going on here. Here are
    the terrific patterns out of South America through the Eastern
    Pacific and the western Caribbean and the eastern Caribbean and
    primarily into Mexico, thus into the U.S. How is it going,
    General?
        General Kostelnik. I think it is going exceptionally well.
    In fact, we just had a meeting of the Source and Transit Zone
    Interdiction Committee that the Commandant of the Coast Guard
    shares. And we had Admiral Dan Lloyd, who, as you know, is the
    JIATF South commander. He directs our assets in the Eastern
    Pacific, which is really the largest area of that activity
    where, again, we have U.S. Navy destroyers and frigates. We
    have Coast Guard cutters. We have Coast Guard boarding crews on
    both ships, Navy P-3s, CBP P-3s, 11 of which we now have back
    in service, which is a benefit. But we have also put the CV
    radar on the long-range tracker aircraft. That has increased
    their effectiveness in the maritime role as well as the Coast
    Guard aircraft.
        And it was reported that in 2009, JIATF South was
    responsible for interdicting more than 234 metric tons of
    cocaine just in the East-Pac area. These are primarily the
    self-propelled, semi-submersibles you have heard so much about.
    I think nine or ten of those were detected last year. Large
    numbers of go-fast. And if you think about that much narcotics
    in bulk quantity not getting to our shores, that is more
    narcotics of all kinds from all agencies, from all sources
    coming into the country. I would say that is a big deal.
        Now, they say what is the worry about what they are
    missing, based on projection or intel or so, you know,
    techniques, but the way I look at that and you look at those
    type of activities, it has been extraordinarily successful and
    I think more than justifies our interest and our investment in
    the Source and Transit Zone Mission.
        Mr. Rogers. Admiral.
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir, I would agree with that. And I
    think that the issue is, again, the underlying reasons for
    success is this unity of command and unity of effort that is
    brought under JIATF South's hat. And it is this idea that you
    have somebody in charge and you bring complementary
    capabilities to the fore and to bear against good intel, and
    then you affect endgame. So those would be the same qualities
    and characteristics of what makes this a success.
        And so in terms of the operational success down in East-
    Pac, in particular, from the Coast Guard perspective, our C-
    130s have been outfitted with new Selex radars, which are
    highly effective. We have been able to use our retooled MH-65s,
    which are armored up and, with airborne use of force, have been
    able to make a real effective impact against go-fast runners.
        Mr. Rogers. I understand the budget is cutting five of
    those helicopters; is that right?
        Admiral Atkins. Sir, there are five H-65s which are to be
    cut in the fiscal year 2011 budget, but those are not
    associated with the deployers that go down to East-Pac. Those
    are in the Great Lakes regions associated with search and
    rescue.
        Mr. Rogers. I share your enthusiasm and admiration of JIATF
    South. I went there years ago and was greatly impressed with
    the way that we are bringing together not just the units that
    you represent, but the FBI and the Justice Department and the
    Navy and Army and all the other agencies, DEA and so on. A
    great operation. In fact, I was so impressed, this is before we
    had the Department of Homeland Security. I brought that entire
    crew up here to brief then Homeland Security Advisor Governor
    Ridge to try to impress him and the then President that this
    was really the way we ought to be fighting terrorism
    nationally, through this kind of an operation that JIATF South
    represented.
        So it is a great, great facility and capability. What I am
    saying to you is I don't understand the recommendations to cut
    personnel and manpower both in Coast Guard and in CBP, Air and
    Marine personnel. In the face of an ever-growing problem that
    is killing Americans. I just don't fathom that. And even given
    the terrific cooperation that your agencies have and the
    terrific work in JIATF South and that the other agencies are
    bringing to the fight, we are disarming in my judgment. Coast
    Guard acquisitions are being cut by 10 percent. CBP's Air and
    Marine procurement and maintenance: Maintenance is being cut
    3.2 percent, including $2.6 million cut to logistics and
    maintenance system upgrades, and no funds for procurement of
    new multiple-role enforcement aircraft. The Coast Guard is
    going to have to cut 1,110 military billets and decommission,
    take out of service, deactivate, withdraw from the battle 19
    operational components. How can you justify that?
        Admiral.
        Admiral Atkins. Sir, as Admiral Allen testified just a
    couple of days ago, he had to make some very tough choices
    between recapitalizing the Coast Guard's aging fleet and
    decommissioning those assets and staying within an overall
    budget in terms of operational priorities. He had to make some
    very tough decisions relative to which assets to let go and
    which assets to recapitalize. And, sir, that is the answer.
        Mr. Rogers. In other words, it was a budget crunch.
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir. We are absolutely making
    operational priorities based on available dollars.
        Mr. Rogers. And you are not getting all of the money that
    you actually need to do your chores, are you?
        Admiral Atkins. Sir, we are living within the
    Administration's priorities, and we are trying to work as best
    we can to weigh operational risk and to use our collective
    operational experience as best we can, given the resources we
    get.

                           NORTHERN BORDER OPERATIONS

        Mr. Rogers. That was a good answer. You are good.
        Well, now, tell me about the operations on the northern
    border. You are planning a new fusion center, are you not,
    general?
        General Kostelnik. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. Tell us about that.
        General Kostelnik. Well, this is part of--while the
    southwest border obviously has gotten a lot of attention over
    the last several years, as you all know, we have put a lot of
    Air and Marine infrastructure across the northern border, not
    only five new Air and Marine branches that were directed
    before, but also a new UAV branch up in North Dakota. And I
    think this concept of a fusion center is tied to our northern
    border strategy and our northern border technology
    demonstration of taking some of the key and essential elements
    that have worked well in the SBI program, some of the MSS
    equipment and some of the connectivity associated with that,
    and taking some of the intelligence-based function out of our
    Joint Interagency, not only with us and the Coast Guard but
    also the Canadian friends up in the north, capitalizing on
    preexisting things and creating in essence a DHS campus at
    Selfridge Air Force Base. The Coast Guard has been there for a
    number of years. We opened up one of our large air branches
    there a couple years ago, a great facility, Border Patrols on
    the same facility.
        So what you are starting, IC and the fusion center coming
    together, is in essence an air and maritime operational center
    not unlike the command and control AOCs that the DOD operates
    or the facility down at JIATF South to focus on the northern
    border and particularly the Great Lakes, which is a combination
    of Coast Guard, larger vessels and some small vessels, and our
    small vessels associated with the ports of entry tying into the
    air capabilities we have up there.
        And of course fundamental to that, you may recall that last
    year we had a very early deployment of our Predator system out
    of North Dakota to Upstate New York. We were hosted by the 10th
    Mountain Army Rangers at Fort Drum in partnership with the men
    and women of Syracuse Air National Guard to apply Predators for
    the U.S. Air Force to start to create the beginnings of an
    umbrella of Predator support for the northern border, with
    assets in North Dakota and a potential deployment site to
    Upstate New York and Fort Drum, and from those assets over time
    as we worked the issues--the rifle issues with the FAA about,
    you know, flying in congested airspace over the Great Lakes
    proper, we are starting to create, you know, an air picture.
        So part of the fusion center activity will be to work the
    connectivity from taking Predator imagery feeds from fleer
    radars. We could have Guardians up there at the Great Lakes at
    some point in the future, depending on what the risk or issues
    would be.
        So the fusion center is an early technology push in an
    integrated fashion to create, I think, the benefit of what you
    see in the JIATF South.
        Mr. Rogers. What can you tell us about the threats that you
    are seeing in the Great Lakes and that border that would
    require such a center?
        General Kostelnik. The risk? Well, I will leave it to the
    Admiral to talk about some things in the Great Lakes proper.
    You know, clearly, we have had all types of unknown people show
    up at a marina, coming across the Great Lakes uninterdicted. We
    clearly have had a lot of activity through the ports of entry.
        If you look at the things that we see across--all across
    the northern border, there is a fair amount of traffic in
    methamphetamines. They are coming north, coming south. There is
    a fair amount of traffic in BC Bud, some of these hidden in
    devices coming through the ports of entry, some airdrops off
    small Canadian helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. And these
    are the things that we know. There is cocaine going north.
    There are probably guns going north. And there is cash in bulk
    quantities going, you know, both ways and these are the
    things----
        Mr. Rogers. Is this not going to stretch your budget even
    worse by building this center there? It is a $40 million item,
    is it not?
        General Kostelnik. It is, sir. And it is funded, thanks to
    your help.
        Mr. Rogers. But isn't taking that money for that purpose
    going to wreak other problems on you with your budget cuts that
    are being proposed?
        General Kostelnik. I really don't see those as detrimental
    to the effort. I mean, we have the people and the
    infrastructure in place, as I am sure the Coast Guard does as
    well. I would look on that--while we have the hardware and we
    have some of the software elements and we have the people and
    the infrastructure, I think the real issue on the northern
    border is the connectivity, you know, tying in NORTHCOM and the
    air picture, tying in the maritime picture on the Great Lakes.
    I look on that $40 million investment as a good piece of
    connectivity to help create a common operating picture, because
    I talked about the threats that we know, and we see those
    probably in spades, but it is not the threats you know that get
    you in trouble, it is the ones that you don't know.
        And added connectivity, tying in the sensor aircraft and
    the new class of boats--we are putting up 38-foot SAFE boats,
    very capable boats, on the Great Lakes in partnership with the
    Coast Guard, 33 feet for them, as well as the cutters and other
    ships that are out in the Great Lakes proper--tying all that
    information and fusing the information from the sensor aircraft
    and boats, tying those into the intelligence of the interagency
    should make us stronger in the northern border.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, it makes a lot of sense. I just worry
    about whether or not you are going to have the personnel to
    operate that center once you get going because of these cuts
    that are being forced upon you.
        General Kostelnik. Well, fortunately, a lot of that is in
    Intel-based centers; so actually a lot--some of those won't be
    Air and Marine personnel. A fair percentage for us will be
    actually Intel people that we have hired and do have in place
    to do that work.
        Mr. Rogers. Admiral, do you want to add anything?
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir. I would just like to add to the
    General's comments in that this is the beginning of a JIATF
    flight structure on the northern border in the sense of you
    begin to bring everybody together and you begin to share
    information. Sir, at this point we don't have a way to
    deconflict where our own internal operations are happening, and
    so this tool provides us--this fusion center provides us that
    capability. So it is an opportunity to sort of model those
    other excellent examples that you see down in Puerto Rico, down
    in Florida, and San Diego.
        Mr. Rogers. This center will be funded out of your SBI
    accounts, will it not?
        General Kostelnik. Yes, sir, I believe that is the case.
        Mr. Rogers. In closing--I know others need to be on
    schedule here--Admiral, you were once the first executive
    officer aboard the cutter DECISIVE and then later, the
    RESOLUTE; is that correct?
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir, it is.
        Mr. Rogers. Do you recognize in the room anyone who served
    under you on either one of those missions?
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, I do. And I believe he owes me a
    morale report.
        Mr. Rogers. You are talking about the staffer, Ben, here
    who served with you.
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir. Mr. Nicholson was a fine Coast
    Guard officer, and I am proud to see him continue in service to
    his country.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Mr. Calvert.

                        AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS CENTER

        Mr. Calvert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is good to see you again, General. I remember you back
    in the days when I chaired the Space Aeronautics Committee. We
    don't have a human space program anymore, but those were the
    good old days.
        I want to talk a little bit about the Air and Marine
    Operations Center, AMOC. As you know, the Air and Marine
    Operations Center is in Riverside, in my congressional
    district. And the AMOC team does a great job of critical work
    serving our Nation's general aviation and interdiction security
    operations. So I was disappointed you didn't mention it in your
    testimony. I understand the CBP still owes the Committee a
    report on the role and the operations of AMOC, and so I was
    wondering when can we expect that report?
        General Kostelnik. The report should be forthcoming pretty
    soon. AMOC, as you know, it is the crown jewel of the
    Department of Homeland Security. When I signed on, when I left
    NASA in 2005, I saw a lot of things that I didn't like, I mean
    an aging force, we had low morale, questions on the way ahead.
    But the Air and Marine Operation Centers, even in 2005, was a
    crown jewel that few could want to have. I mean, it was kind of
    put together over years with--you know, on the side with some
    contractor support and some government intervention. But at the
    end of the day, even in 2005, it could do things in the
    Homeland Security mission that other things could not do.
        Over the last four years, you know, we have continued to
    plus it up. We have added infrastructure. We have added the GCS
    control sets. We have added more DEOs. We have hired some intel
    specialists to start to work there. We are still growing that
    capability and, as you know, in the way ahead it is still
    early, but still in the long-range planning of what further
    investments we need to make. That work is still unfinished. But
    with the money that was provided for AMOC in this calendar
    year, we are using that to set the stage----
        Mr. Calvert. And that was a question I was going to ask.
    Could you provide us a breakdown of how that $6 million we
    provided in fiscal year 2010 to AMOC for technology expansion
    was allocated to the Office of Air and Marine? Was the money
    spent on the core mission of AMOC, that function there?
        General Kostelnik. It was, in fact, and actually making
    that mission stronger. Part of that, we are going to strengthen
    our UAV capability. Today we have a GCS and a KU-band antenna
    there. We have actually used that to fly missions. But in the
    way ahead, we are looking to add the endgame of that, which we
    really don't have in place anything else, and this is the piece
    that the DOD has. In fact, I think there was an article today
    in the paper on the amount of information that is potentially
    available from the unmanned systems. And this is the part of
    the problem we are having. When we flew the hurricanes and
    floods, we could gather the information. We could provide, you
    know, unique FLIR imagery static synthetic aperture radar, but
    we really didn't have the people to analyze what those things
    meant.
        So part of that investment is we are adding an intel cell
    very similar to exactly the same kind of intel cells that the
    DOD proper uses in their missions in the AMOC to tie the
    intelligence part of it to the operational feeds on the UAVS.
    So that is a future investment.
        We are also working coherently as we have grown our
    capability through this big pipe technique. The big pipe is a
    technology where we feed the streaming FLIR imagery not only
    from the UAVs anywhere in the free world, but from the P-3s as
    well. In fact, if we were flying up in North Dakota today with
    the Predator, we could easily put the streaming video from that
    asset on your personal computer here or at home. Those kinds of
    connectivity investments are part of that.
        And then, finally, a lot of that--some of the money is
    still planning money to put the ducks in a row, working on what
    the real investment for the long-term growth of the AMOC ought
    to be.

                              PREDATOR OPERATIONS

        Mr. Calvert. One last comment on the Predators and,
    obviously, the Predator B. I am very familiar where the
    aircraft is built in Southern California. I have been to the
    plant a number of times, and of course moving to the Predator
    C. But the confliction in operating in airspace, in domestic
    airspace operations--is there any work with the FAA to remove
    those conflicts where you can operate more freely within the
    airspace of the United States and certainly along the Canadian
    border, the Mexican border, where you can operate that aircraft
    more efficiently?
        General Kostelnik. There is certainly a lot going on in
    that regard. Flight----
        Mr. Calvert. Furthermore, do you think there ever is going
    to be a point in the near future--and not in the long future--
    where we can actually take off and land within, say, March Air
    Force Base, for instance, or Coronado?
        General Kostelnik. It is a tough debate, and I am
    sympathetic in a way for the FAA because it is their job to
    keep the national airspace safe. It is our job, you know, to
    apply technologies we have, and, with some risk, to keep the
    country safe. So there obviously is a potential conflict. And
    of course with the tremendous growth of UAVs, or RPAs, as the
    Air Force is now calling them, there is a wide variety of
    unmanned things, small handheld things that are like, you know,
    RC model years from years ago, to the Global Hawk flying 60,000
    feet, you know, very large aircraft and everything in between.
    And there is a different risk posture for each one of those.
        But you, like all of us, would want the national airspace
    to be safe. So in areas where there is a lot of commercial
    manned traffic, if we are going to put unmanned things into
    those scenarios, we need to assure the traveling public that we
    can do that safely. And while the Predator is a tremendous
    airplane--more than a million operational hours is why we chose
    that aircraft for our fleet--it is still not without its risks.
    We still get surprised, and the Predator C will be no different
    because it is a manmade thing, a manmade program.
        So what we have tried to do in Homeland Security--because
    unlike the DOD, who has a training mission in this country,
    ours is Homeland Security. Ours is different. You know, we need
    to apply these technologies to protect ourselves today. So we
    have offered the FAA, and have over four years of discourse, a
    very simple theme about why we should be flying and what we are
    doing. One is what we fly--four W's--what we fly. The system,
    it is the safest system out there, but not perfectly safe. We
    have lost an airplane. We have crashed a couple of them in
    landing accidents. And every once in a while, we get surprised
    by a software error or, like anything else, one of our pilots
    will make a mistake.
        The second risk reduction is when we fly. We fly typically
    at night, because that is when the bad guys are up to work.
        To your point about North Island, it is where we fly. We
    are not flying downtown D.C. We are not flying over New York
    City. We are flying on the borders. You are familiar with the
    California border. There is not much out there. There is not a
    lot of risk. And that in itself is a risk reduction.
        And, finally, the last W is why we are flying. We are not
    flying to make a point. We are not flying to push a policy. We
    are not flying to make money for commercial reasons. We are
    flying to protect the country.
        So in our approach in Air and Marine, why I think we have
    been successful and why--we have issues with the FAA. We argue
    with them all the time. We fly by certificates of
    authorizations. They are difficult. But that is not the
    constraint. We are flying the floods. We flew the hurricanes.
    If we were to have a national event, we will be there for that,
    and we will continue to work with them because they are right
    to be concerned about the risk.
        There will come a time and you--back in our time in the
    space business, you know, the space business is mostly
    unmanned. We have pilots and astronauts and so forth there, but
    many of those activities are already done remotely. So the
    technology is coming, and there will be a time when there will
    be unmanned things in the normal traffic pattern. In fact,
    overseas in the operational bases, it is not uncommon to find
    fighters and C-130s and Army helicopters and Predator A's or
    B's all in a pattern; so in a combat scenario, it will work.
    But they are in a combat environment with collateral damage
    associated and risk associated with the combat environment. I
    don't think we are quite there yet. So I think that debate will
    continue.
        But I know there has been an interest from this Committee.
    We are working very closely with the DOD to find a measured way
    to open the doors. And I would offer to you, based on where we
    were in 2005 and where Air and Marine and the Coast Guard will
    be with the Guardian this year, we have gone remarkable ways in
    our ability to fly in the national airspace when needed, and I
    think that meets our needs.
        Mr. Calvert. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        General, let me pick up just briefly on the report in the
    Washington Post this morning which you referenced, which has to
    do with the heavy use of Predator drones over Afghanistan and
    other countries, that is resulting in an overload of the
    satellite networks used to control and retrieve data. We will
    ask for a classified response as well, but to the extent you
    can discuss this, will you elaborate a bit? How much of an
    issue is bandwidth as we deploy and use more of these assets,
    and what kind of an analysis has been done of the Department's
    bandwidth needs?
        General Kostelnik. That is not really my technical area of
    expertise in exactly kind of where we are. It is less of an
    issue for us today in our business. I mean we fly our aircraft
    much like the DOD does, through the satellite infrastructure.
    So bandwidth is critical not only for command and control but
    even more so for the data feeds. And as you acquire more
    systems that produce even more data--in fact, a very specific
    system, Gorgon Stare, which is talked about in that DOD
    article, is going to generate a lot of information. And
    ultimately that information, with compression techniques and so
    forth, is going to require a lot of bandwidth.
        So really bandwidth is going to be an issue in the long
    term, because listening to Secretary Gates and seeing where
    unmanned things are going into the Department of Defense,
    watching the interest across the globe in the commercial use of
    unmanned things, clearly there is going to be, over the next
    several years, tremendous growth in the need and, therefore,
    constraint in the area of bandwidth. And obviously there are
    some technical things in terms of how data is manipulated and
    compressed that will help to offset that.
        There will still be growth in technology that will cut into
    those issues. But in the long term, bandwidth is going to be
    another one of those resource limitations that is problematic.
    For our mission specifically in the Continental United States,
    in Homeland Security, that is not going to be an issue in the
    near term.

                              GUARDIAN DEPLOYMENT

        Mr. Price. Thank you. Before we leave the Predator
    question, Admiral, I want to give you a chance to comment on
    the question that the General explored in the first round;
    namely, the current Guardian deployment plan and how it fits in
    with the Coast Guard's larger plans, the recapitalization plans
    in particular. Anything you want to add on that before we move
    on to other issues?
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, I would, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        The Coast Guard is really excited to be working with CBP on
    the Joint Program Office. Related to that, we are also working
    with the U.S. Navy on a Fire Scout Joint Program Office in
    terms of rotor wing ship-based launch UAV technology.
        At this point, the Coast Guard is in the needs
    identification phase, and we are trying to understand and we
    are trying to leverage the lessons learned by more experienced
    agencies; in this regard, CBP relative to the Predator and the
    Navy relative to the Fire Scout. And through those lessons
    learned, when we are ready to ramp up our own acquisition
    programs, sir, we will be better situated to do so.

                                 MARINE VESSELS

        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        Let me turn to Marine vessels. CBP currently has 253 Marine
    vessels in service in coastal and riverine areas enforcing the
    laws, with an end state of 358 planned, as we understand. This
    year it will complete setting up 11 new Marine units funded in
    fiscal 2008, integrate SAFE boats transferred from the Coast
    Guard, explore acquisition of a multirole enforcement vessel,
    and test a new Marine interceptor vessel.
        The Coast Guard has almost 300 boats that range from 33-
    foot special-purpose law enforcement craft to 110-foot patrol
    boats that operate in the same coastal waters on joint
    missions. Between the two components, 2,643 people crew these
    boats and hundreds more support them in port and at the
    strategic level.
        Now, CBP is recapitalizing its interceptor fleet and
    building up its riverine and coastal enforcement capability.
    Although the Coast Guard is quickly recapitalizing its small
    boat fleet, the 87-foot and 110-foot patrol boats are rapidly
    aging, and we are just beginning to build the fast response
    cutters needed to replace them. Four will be built with the
    $243 million we provided in the current fiscal year, and the
    2011 budget provides a similar amount for four more of these
    vessels.
        Now, given the constraints on the budget, which have been
    referred to repeatedly this morning, and the significant
    capital costs involved in these projects, it is critical to
    direct this investment properly. So I ask you both to explore
    this. How is the Department planning, across components, on
    asset acquisition and workforce planning to make sure we have
    the right mix of boats for crews and crews for boats, as well
    as the right mix of assets to secure our maritime border? Has
    the Coast Guard in particular been involved in the development
    and testing of the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator, or
    will this be a specialized CBP asset? What does it do that
    existing vessels in the joint mix cannot?

                    ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATOR

        General Kostelnik. Let me address the Advanced Concept
    Technology Demonstrator. This was in a similar fashion to the
    air investment piece. While we continue to operate a lot of
    outmoded vessels that are reaching the end of their service
    life, and good vessels that are just getting, you know, worn
    out, the Midnight Express, a year ago we created a technology
    investment program to build a one-of-a-kind boat. This is the
    Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator. It is oriented as a
    requirements demonstrator and a technology push tool to give
    our mariners a sense for what the requirements ought to be to
    replace the Midnights. This is our primary 39-foot interceptor.
    This is in a class of boats that is really different from the
    Coast Guard utilization, not one that would be, you know,
    consistent for their mission set, but it is our primary
    interdiction tool out in the Caribbean and all the coastal
    environments.
        That boat is 39-foot, has four 225 engines, conventional
    seats, and some type of law enforcement capability, but not
    anything substantial. The Advanced Concept Technology
    Demonstrator is a one-of-a-kind boat, 43-foot developmental
    hull, four 350 horsepower developmental Mercury Verado, the
    largest developmental racing engine made. We mounted 2,762
    machine guns with the help of the U.S. Coast Guard, state-of-
    the-art FLIR, state-of-the-art integrated flat-blade displays,
    state-of-the-art seats, shock-absorbing seats--the biggest
    investment in our human capital force that are like, you know,
    nothing else--and put all of these things in one integrated
    boat, this boat can do things that nothing else in its class
    can do, 75 miles an hour in the open water.
        There are pictures of it. Everything is out of the water
    except for the prop underway with a full-man crew 600-gallon
    tank. We are not going to buy--we bought that one-of-a-kind
    boat, but that allowed us to take that boat to all of our
    mariners, let them have a look, refine their requirements. And
    this year, this summer, we are going out for an RFP based on
    what we learned from that one-of-a-kind boat to replace our
    Midnight fleet.
        The first part of that has already been funded by this
    Committee. In fact, with the added six boats that we will get
    in the funding in 2011, we will have money in hand for 23 of
    these new vessels, and there will be nothing like that. That is
    about half of our operational interceptor fleet, which is
    really a good start on that effort.
        In the other parts in regards to the Coast Guard's
    recapitalization, those 73 boats they gave us, those were in
    superb condition. We reengined those craft. We refurbished
    those. We put those boats right into service in rough duty. And
    of course, I think you all know we procure the SAFE boats for
    the U.S. Coast Guard and we buy the engines and maintain those
    boats. We have a perfect partnership in those class of boats
    where we have overlapping mission requirements.
        That relationship in terms of training, in terms of
    resourcing and sustainment and acquisition could not be any
    stronger. As you get to the larger craft, out of class, you
    know, a different mission set and clearly a different kind of
    process.
        So I believe on the Marine side, now similar to the air
    picture and the recapitalizations we have done, thanks to your
    input and the improvements that we got last year, of which most
    are in place, added our facilities a little bit late in some of
    these new marine branches we have put up, but they all have
    boats and they all have mariners, and that speaks well for that
    part of our program.
        Mr. Price. Admiral.

                          SMALL BOAT COMMODITY COUNCIL

        Admiral Atkins. Sir, I would add to that the ``how'' part
    of your question, which was how does the Department deal with
    that? And really it is this DHS Small Boat Commodity Council
    that has brought CBP and Coast Guard and others together where
    we discuss our requirements. And as the General points out, it
    really is a missions-generated sort of discussion.
        So if there is an opportunity for synergy, we seek it out
    and it has really brought some terrific synergies relative to
    the boats that we buy, the maintenance that we share. The Coast
    Guard is able to take advantage of CBP maintenance contracts,
    and we are also able to bring together, in terms of training,
    those techniques and practices that align our actual tactical
    operations on the water. So it is through this DHS Small Boat
    Commodity Council that delivers the ``how'' to the departmental
    ability to bring synergies in effectiveness and efficiency.

                            SEMI-SUBMERSIBLE VESSELS

        Mr. Price. Let me, before I turn to Mr. Rogers, ask you
    about one particular threat, which Admiral Allen has
    highlighted. He has described the growing threat of SPSS, or
    Self-Propelled Semi-Submersible vessels, noting that their use
    has grown significantly and that they account for maybe a third
    now of all the maritime cocaine flow.
        Needless to say, this goes way beyond initial expectations
    and projections of the importance of these vessels.
        Admiral, I wonder if you could estimate for us the number
    of these vessels being used by traffickers, the number we are
    able to detect and stop in relation to that overall number.
        And to both of you, what assets are Coast Guard and CBP
    bringing to bear against these vessels? Are they enough? And
    then how do you target your efforts? Are you mainly relying on
    surveillance? Are you getting other types of good intelligence
    to target these traffickers, and what do you need to get better
    intelligence?
        Admiral Atkins. Sir, in terms of--you cite the numbers; in
    the last year, approximately 11, 10 to 11 SPSS were
    interdicted. I can get you for the record a more exact number
    relative to the projections associated with that from JIATF
    South.
        In terms of what tools we are bringing to bear, really
    JIATF South, again through their unified command, we are able
    to bring from the Coast Guard our maritime patrol aircraft, the
    C-130s, from the CBP the P-3s, and in the future we hope the
    UAVs. It is this idea of providing that domain awareness, and
    now couple that with JIATF South intel and information, how can
    we better cue the surface assets that the Coast Guard and the
    Navy--Navy-carrying Coast Guard LEDETs is able then to execute
    the endgame?
        So, sir, I will tell you that we--as we discussed earlier--
    are being more effective through that cued information from
    JIATF South, and they are able to bring to bear a national
    asset and sound intelligence, human intelligence. We have had
    some fantastic opportunities working through the Department of
    Justice, DEA, on how to bring to bear all the national assets
    against this threat vector.
        In terms of our aviation use of force through our HITRON
    Squadron where we put up armed helicopters to bring a stopping
    function so that our vessels on the waters can then interdict
    and board these vessels, that really is part of the picture,
    too, to our fantastic success rate down there.
        Mr. Price. Do you have a rough estimate you can give us of
    the number of these vessels that are now out there being
    utilized and the interdiction numbers?
        Admiral Atkins. Sir, I would like to get back to you on
    that for the record.
        Mr. Price. All right. Please do that.
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: In fiscal year 2009, according to the
    Consolidated Counterdrug Database, Joint Interagency Task Force
    South (JIATF-S) assets detected 13 or 60 documented Self-
    Propelled Semi-Submersible (SPSS) deployments. Coast Guard
    assets, initially under JIATF-S tactical control, interdicted
    11 of the 13 SPSS detected and removed over 64.6 metric tons of
    cocaine. Projections for FY 2010 indicate Drug Trafficking
    Organizations will continue to utilize SPSSs at a rate similar
    to those in FY 2009.

                         SEMI-SUBMERSIBLE VESSELS CONT.

        Mr. Price. General.
        General Kostelnik. Of course, the projections are really
    estimates. These boats are one-way ships, so they either make
    it or they don't. The last time I was in JIATF South, they talk
    as many as 20 to 30 of these things at any one time being under
    construction in the jungles along the riverine environment,
    although we can get their current assessment.
        And I would just reinforce the kind of things that the
    Admiral said, and that is that we have made a lot of
    improvement in our support in that area. Recovering the P-3 has
    been the first-order effect because back in 2006, we only had
    two of the airplanes flying. In 2007, three of the airplanes.
    Today we have 11 airplanes. So, one, there is a lot more air
    time being provided into the maritime role. In fact, last year
    in 2009, more than 58 percent of the total air picture was
    provided by CBP P-3s.
        If you look at our P-3 aircraft, not only have we provided
    the aircraft and returned them to operational service, but we
    have two different kinds of P-3s in play. We have the domed
    aircraft which has the radar. That is the primary aircraft used
    for searching out the boats.
        And the second aircraft, called the long-range tracker--and
    these aircraft are typically deployed in pairs--traditionally
    has the forward-looking infrared and an F-16 radar. It does the
    air intercept and provides the endgame picture for the radar.
        So you need two things for the maritime endgame. You need
    radar to detect the vessel and then a FLIR to work with the
    surface vessels for the endgame.
        Two years ago we put the sea-view radar on the long-range
    tracker P-3 and on the first operational deployment, the same
    radar that we are putting on the Guardian with the same amount
    of OT&E on the first operational deployment of that long-range
    tracker P-3 into EASTPAC last year, around the first of
    January. In 13 days that one aircraft with the developmental
    radar got three of four Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles.
        So, one, we are almost doubling the fleet by putting the
    seavue radar, which we plan to do on all of our slick long-
    range tracker aircraft. We are also going back and looking at
    putting a FLIR on the domed aircraft. So now that is going to
    ultimately double the capability, where each aircraft now can
    fly the mission stand-alone, rather than requiring two
    aircraft.
        Specifically in regards to the SPSS, not only are we going
    after those, but you might recall that a year ago Science and
    Technology in the Department of Homeland Security built a
    surrogate target. We have several of these submarines that the
    Coast Guard was successful in acquiring, and one or more of
    those at JIATF South. But we built a developmental target
    vessel that we are actually going to use that target vessel in
    our Guardian test to see how the Guardian radar, with the same
    capability that the P-3 has, does against the SPSSs. So we are
    enhancing our maritime capability with very long duration.
        The P-3's typical mission is about 12 hours. We can fly the
    Guardian about 20 hours in EASTPAC with a combined crew. The
    aircraft would be launched and recovered from Central America
    somewhere, or one of our remote sites, but flown from a
    combined fly team--it could be Florida, could be Miami, could
    be Fort Huachuca, Riverside, could be any of our
    infrastructures around the country.
        So, one, not only have we recovered our P-3 fleet, which
    gives you more time on station, but we are adding new
    capabilities.
        And, finally, Admiral Atkins mentioned the HITRON
    capability, which is another great example of partnership,
    Customs has had that same entitlement. We shoot out the engines
    on boats on the water to stop craft when we can run them down,
    but often we are out--don't have enough boats or can't get to
    an endgame, and aircraft would bring the capability.
        So this past year, not reinventing the wheel, we procured
    the same Barrett weapon that the Coast Guard uses in HITRON,
    capitalized on their expertise and their training, and this
    year we are adding that capability to our Black Hawk fleet.
    Now, we don't fly Black Hawks out, you know, in the EASTPAC
    because these aircraft are mounted on ships. But from land-
    based facilities in the SeaBig area of operation, and the Mona
    Pass and the Caribbean and other approaches, starting this year
    we will have that capability deployed on our Black Hawk.
        So if you look at the overall picture, there is a lot going
    on behind the scenes to deal with this mission. And I would
    echo what Admiral Atkins said earlier. It is a great
    partnership and a great process to have Admiral Dan Lloyd down
    there sitting in a chair, focused entirely on this effort,
    managing not only the interagency but the international,
    getting the intelligence right, getting us focused--which is
    the key--and then focus the resource assets we have on the
    ships as they actually sortie.
        I don't know what we are missing, but I can tell you when
    you get 234 metric tonnes in one year that doesn't get to the
    States, that is a big deal. That has to hurt somebody.
        Mr. Price. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rogers.

                             RECAPITALIZATION PLANS

        Mr. Rogers. Do you want to know how you can help yourselves
    secure the funds that you need for your programs? Tell us about
    it. That is our chore. We have to decide how to allocate the
    funds for your agencies, and we are having a tough time with it
    because we don't have your recapitalization plans, which, in
    the case of the Coast Guard, is required by law. It is in the
    appropriations bill of 2010 and the report language for the
    CBP, and yet we don't have it. It is way overdue.
        What is the problem? Admiral.
        Admiral Atkins. Sir, we are working on that report. It is
    now at the Department, and we are working with them so that
    they can understand the Coast Guard's position relative to our
    needs.
        Mr. Rogers. General.
        General Kostelnik. Well, the reports are clearly late, the
    need. In the case of Air and Marine looking towards 2011, we
    were late in doing our due diligence and putting our activity
    together. You know, given the limited resources we have and the
    investment strategy, we try to optimize those as carefully as
    we can. And on the leading edge in terms of our UAS program, we
    are very much conditioned about the emerging threats in the
    real world around us. So some of that delay I would have to
    take in our agency. I know you are all aware it is a difficult
    process going through the Administration to get it formally
    approved, not only with the Department but with OMB and others,
    and that does take some time. I think you are going to get our
    report very soon. I don't think you will see a lot of
    surprises. We try to work closely throughout the year with----
        Mr. Rogers. I understand the difficulty of getting it
    through OMB and the Department and everybody else. That is a
    common problem we hear time and again, on all these agencies,
    is we can't get OMB to clear our report that is due 6 months
    ago under the law.
        I don't know why, Mr. Chairman, we don't just have the OMB
    up here and grill them for about a week on every one of these
    departments.
        I mean it is not just you, but for goodness sakes, how can
    we intelligently lay out a spending plan for you if we don't
    know what it is you want to do?
        So I am frustrated, and I know probably you are too, but it
    is an impossible situation. We are trying to help you sort
    through the funding for the CASA aircraft and the Marine patrol
    aircraft that you want and the sensing pallets and all of those
    things that are Greek to a lot of us. But we are depending on
    you for expert advice.
        We love you to come here and testify, but we really need in
    writing the plans. I am a great believer in planning your work
    and working your plan. And you are working a plan, but I don't
    think the plan is written out.
        Well, we hear constantly from everybody that there are not
    enough flight hours, but all of the equipment that each of you,
    both of you have--and that also bears back on the desire that
    we have to help you fulfill your mission.

                         MULTIROLE ENFORCEMENT AIRCRAFT

        Now, in the CBP's 2011 budget, you have no funding for
    sustaining the procurement of the new multirole enforcement
    aircraft. Coast Guard's budget only includes funding for one
    Marine patrol aircraft, the 15--the HC 144-A. No spare part
    moneys. CBP has contracted for 30 of the multirole enforcement
    aircraft, but only funds five through the end of the current
    year and only enough funding for one P-3 service life
    extension.
        And given the growing need for flight hours, how can we
    hope to realize the increased flight hours with this stinginess
    on acquiring and maintaining the aircraft that you have? Any
    thoughts?
        General Kostelnik. Sir, I would just offer that the--flying
    our program, obviously, is fully funded for this year and I
    believe it is fully funded in 2011. Now, getting those aircraft
    in service would certainly be a benefit in regards to the five
    MEAs and it will take us some time to get those aircraft in
    service. In fact, we do have those first five aircraft on
    contract. The first aircraft is actually coming down the
    assembly line at Beech, and should be out and delivered to the
    contractor for its law enforcement modifications this spring.
    But it will still be late in 2011 before we even get the first
    one of those aircraft, and of course those aircraft will have
    to go into tests.
        Our contract for 30 gives us options to add those things as
    resources are available. And, of course, you hope to have
    continuity in those investment lines. But the MEA program is
    really out on the leading edge, again, and in pretty good
    shape. And in some cases, giving us a little time to make sure
    we get the right aircraft, make sure the sensors work properly,
    and test is not a bad thing.
        On the P-3 investment, that is actually the addition of
    another wing set. That will be our tenth wing set. But those
    things--we already have enough wing sets in place; so those
    really aren't going to affect the rewinging of the P-3s.
        So in fact, over the foreseeable future, with two aircraft
    down each year being rewinged, in addition to the airplanes we
    currently have grounded, our plan shows that we will have 11
    operational aircraft flying the mission, and only in the
    transit zone, meeting the 7,200 hours expected by JIATF South,
    but also being able to bring the aircraft into other roles and
    missions along the southwest border or along the northwest.
        Mr. Rogers. One of the big reasons that we want to see your
    recapitalization plan is that we have got to try to plan the
    expenditures over a period of time, multiyears in fact. And it
    only stands to reason the Coast Guard is only budgeting for one
    aircraft in 2011 and will likely end up paying around $2-5
    million more per aircraft in that fashion by piecemealing it
    out one or two at a time.
        CBP has only received funding for five of the 30 multirole
    aircraft that you are planning to buy; no funding to sustain
    the procurement in 2011. That will drive up the cost per plane,
    possibly elongate the delivery schedule. So we will wind up
    paying millions and millions of dollars more for the
    procurement program if it is stretched out piecemeal over the
    years. And if we went ahead and paid for them now, we could get
    them at a unit cost millions of dollars cheaper than if you
    piecemeal it out. Is that right or wrong, Admiral?
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir. A consistent funded line would--
    as you maintain that line open, it would be cheaper in the long
    run.
        Sir, if I could return to one of your earlier questions
    about how do we seek to maintain the hours? For the C-144s in
    particular, they are replacing aircraft that are supposed to
    bring 800 program flight hours per asset, whereas the 144s are
    supposed to be bringing us 1,200 program flight hours per
    asset.
        And so this year, working with our Aviation Training
    Command, and as we go forward into our first operational unit
    at Miami, we are on schedule to hit that target of 1,200
    program flight hours. So it is this idea, that through new
    assets with better service life, with better maintenance, that
    don't have the issues of reliability and maintainability and
    operational overhead associated with older aircraft, we are
    going to be able to maintain those op hours, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. There is no funding for spare parts that you
    request.
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir, that is correct.
        Mr. Rogers. How come?
        Admiral Atkins. Sir, again, we are living within the
    constraints and we are making priorities. And in order to move
    forward on surface recapitalization, that was the priority for
    that year, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. Does the procurement plan--the capitalization
    plan that you have submitted to the Department and to OMB, does
    that plan anticipate the need to procure these items not one at
    a time, but in wholesale lots? Either one of you.
        Admiral Atkins. Sir, I am not sure I understand your
    question relative to wholesale lots.
        Mr. Rogers. Do you have in your mind at least, and probably
    on paper--you know what you want to do. You have got a
    recapitalization plan, do you not, each of you in your own
    world?
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. And you have submitted that recapitalization
    plan to the higher-ups, have you not, to the Department?
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Rogers. And to the OMB?
        Admiral Atkins. The report that we discussed earlier, sir,
    is at review with our Department right now.
        Mr. Rogers. Is what? I am sorry. What did you say?
        Admiral Atkins. The Deepwater report, sir. Our plan going
    forward is with the Department, and we are working with them
    right now to understand the puts and takes.
        Mr. Rogers. General?
        General Kostelnik. The MEA program, as we contracted out
    with lot option buys, we really don't pay more in the long run
    if we don't put the risk of the aircraft on right away. The
    commercial market has the basic aircraft available more
    frequently. So in the near term, there really isn't any impact
    to this because it takes us so long to build the aircraft and
    to get the pieces on.
        There will be a time at some point, if we don't add to the
    option and procure the aircraft, where there could be the kind
    of issues that you are referring to, including suboptimization.
    But right now, I would characterize that that program is well
    on track.

                               FLIGHT OPERATIONS

        And in regards to flying hours, recall these are going to
    be additive aircraft to our fleet. These are aircraft that are
    going to replace the existing C-12s that we are still
    continuing to maintain and fly out the end of their service
    life. So as these aircraft come onboard, we will be retiring
    other aircraft at the end of our area.
        And also for us, the biggest part of our flight operation
    is the rotary wing. So we do have, obviously, fixed wing. We
    talked about the P-3s and the MEA. But a big part of our force
    is the rotary wing program, and that program is very important
    because it is a very tight helicopter market on the kind of
    aircraft that we buy, and to the support that we have had from
    this Committee, that program is well established. We acquire
    another eight aircraft in 2011, and we continue to keep that
    line open. We are well along in that particular program.
        We would see the kind of issues you talked about if we had
    a break in our procurement or the numbers, and to the credit of
    this Committee and the Administration, we continue to get those
    aircraft in at one per month. In fact, by the end of 2011, we
    will have acquired 39 of the new AStar 350-3B aircraft with
    FLIRS and a full law enforcement package.
        This is the mainline part of our small rotary-wing fleet
    that we will take a lot of the aircraft--the 086, the MD-500s,
    the MD-600s--out of service. So in a much bigger part of our
    program, I think you would see the coherency and the continued
    logical investment that you would expect in these other
    programs.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, the recapitalization plan is long
    overdue. We got the budget request of the OMB before us, and I
    guess that answers most of the questions that have been raised
    here about what they will do about the recapitalization plan
    that you have submitted.
        The budget is the plan, I guess, and that is proposing all
    these horrendous cuts in your equipment and personnel. I don't
    understand, though, now why we can't get the recapitalization
    plan under the budget that has been submitted to us from OMB.
    Right?
        General Kostelnik. It is certainly a worthy expectation and
    they should both be forthcoming very soon.
        Mr. Rogers. I have heard that before, Mr. Chairman.
        Well, there are others wanting to ask questions, but let me
    ask you this one finally.
        Well, I will yield to the next round, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Price. Mr. Culberson.

                             RECAPITALIZATION PLANS

        Mr. Culberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral and General, we really appreciate your service. The
    people of Texas are very proud of you and appreciate what you
    and the men and women that you command do for our country to
    protect us.
        To follow up on Mr. Rogers' questions, who had--apparently
    you all have obviously done your part of producing your
    capitalization plans, fulfilling your requirements under the
    law to tell the Committee what we need to do to help you. Who
    has those reports? Where are they now? It sounds like they are
    at OMB; is that right, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Rogers?
        General Kostelnik. I can't speak for the Coast Guard, but
    in terms of our report, OMB actually took the least amount of
    time. So actually the OMB crowd is actually a pretty quick read
    on our reports, and ours have gone back and forth. Some of that
    is our fault at Air and Marine for not having the proper things
    in here and making changes and submitting into the process kind
    of late. So a big part of our particular problem was our own
    fault.
        Our report is in the final stages of review at DHS and
    should be forthcoming in the very near future. I mean, the work
    is done and virtually approved, so you should----
        Mr. Culberson. Who at DHS? It would be very helpful, I
    know, for Mr. Rogers and the Chairman and the staff to identify
    who has it so we can go find them and get it.
        General Kostelnik. I don't think I know the individual at
    DHS. It is a large infrastructure and----
        Mr. Culberson. Would you find--have your staff, please,
    tell the Chairman and Mr. Rogers who has it? Admiral, can you
    tell us the same thing? It sounds like you have done your due
    diligence. Where is it?
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: The report was transmitted to Congress on April
    8th, 2010.

        Admiral Atkins. We do share that responsibility. We just
    finished it up ourselves here in the Coast Guard, and we passed
    it to the Department, and we are now in that give-and-take
    stage with the Department to understand the puts and takes of
    the report. And so the Coast Guard shares responsibility for
    this tardiness, and we are working with the Department to move
    it as quickly as we possibly can.
        Mr. Culberson. You all are very gracious about this. I
    understand. But, please, what we are looking for is tell Mr.
    Rogers and the Chairman who in the Department of Homeland
    Security has your capitalization report and the other
    information that the Committee needs, so we can bust it loose.
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir. We are working with a number of
    offices within the Department including the Under Secretary of
    Management's Office.
        Mr. Culberson. Under Secretary of Management.
        Admiral Atkins. Yes, sir. But a whole bunch of folks
    relative to what is in the report and how do we move it
    forward.
        Mr. Rogers. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Culberson. Yes, please, Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. And while you are at it, convey to them that
    this Subcommittee is not in the business of writing blank
    checks. We want to know what we are buying, and we don't know
    that without that report.
        Mr. Culberson. And we are really serious about it. We
    really want to help you. We admire you. We revere you guys and
    want to help. And you are being very gracious and diplomatic
    about it publicly. Tell us who, and we will go find it.

                          OFFSHORE DRILLING PLATFORMS

        Let me, if I could, also ask, General--I represent Houston,
    which is to the energy industry what Silicon Valley is to the
    computer industry. And the Committee may not be aware, Mr.
    Chairman and Mr. Rogers, that Homeland Security actually came
    out with a rule, a tentative rule, last year that we found out
    about at the last minute because there was no notice that the--
    all the offshore drilling, if you are an offshore drilling
    platform or rig in the Gulf of Mexico or anywhere in the United
    States, could no longer use foreign-flagged vessels; is that
    right?
        Out of the blue, Homeland Security comes out with this rule
    that says no foreign flag vessel can support or bring supplies
    to any offshore drilling rig. Well, you can imagine what a
    catastrophe that would be. We were fortunate. I objected and
    others objected, and that rule was withdrawn. And obviously you
    want to make sure we are protecting that strategic asset. But
    it has never been a problem, and there are virtually no
    American foreign-flagged supply vessels that supply these
    offshore rigs.
        Can you tell us, General, the status of that rule?
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: The Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is
    currently in the review process. The rulemaking package must be
    approved by OMB and published in the Federal Register.

        We understand--I have been told by Oceaneering, the folks
    that do the underwater exploration, they do the blowout
    preventers, that they understand this rule is about to be
    resubmitted. I certainly hope not, and you need to make sure
    that you are including the industry. If you are thinking about
    a similar rule, it has to include input from the industry, and
    we need to know about it in advance.
        Could you tell us what is the status of that? Is there
    going to be another such rule proposed? And, Admiral, maybe
    you--I am not sure--it really is CBP, Admiral.
        General Kostelnik. I am not aware of that law or that
    approach. That could be something with the Office of Field
    Operations, but it really is beyond my area of expertise. I am
    really not familiar with it.
        Mr. Culberson. Would you have somebody on your staff--would
    somebody run that down for us? That is a big one.
        General Kostelnik. If it is from CBP, we will take a look
    at that.
        Mr. Culberson. Shutting down all offshore oil and gas
    production is a pretty big deal, which would be the effect of
    that rule. It would just kill us.

                               OPERATION PREDATOR

        Another question I want to ask, General, is the Predators
    are extraordinarily important. One thing I discovered on
    touring the border, up and down the southern border, is you
    have got wildly different levels in enforcement. In sectors of
    Texas, the Border Patrol's policy is essentially zero
    tolerance. They call it Operation Streamline. And it works
    beautifully. The local community supports it. The local
    community is 96 percent Hispanic on the Texas border. In Del
    Rio and Laredo, the crime rate has plummeted. The Border Patrol
    is enforcing existing law.
        We have supplied you with additional resources in order to
    keep up with the prosecution rate. But the illegal crossings
    have essentially disappeared in those sectors where the law is
    being enforced.
        However, in Tucson we visited--what was the name of that
    air base? We visited Fort Huachuca, Mr. Chairman and Mr.
    Rogers, and saw some of the extraordinary assets you have got
    there with the Predators. And we were shown a CD, Mr. Chairman,
    where the Predator had actually spotted--how big was that load?
    It was like a caravan of vehicles, wasn't it, Joe? You could
    actually see this caravan of smugglers coming over the southern
    border, Mr. Chairman, with the Predator. And at night, in the
    dead of night, your Border Patrol agents--I mean the brave
    souls, God bless them, go out there in the dead of night in
    that desert to intercept these heavily armed smugglers. And
    they were carrying thousands of pounds. It was a huge load, a
    huge load of dope.

                        PREDATOR OPERATION PROSECUTIONS

        Mr. Culberson. And the Predator set the whole thing up. You
    see the whole thing on videotape, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Rogers,
    and then we discover the prosecutor in Tucson would not
    prosecute. And apparently, it happens all the time, that you
    guys risk your lives, make these arrests. And as far as we can
    tell, it is still the case in Tucson that if you are arrested
    in the Tucson sector crossing the border illegally, carrying
    less than 500 pounds of dope, you have a 99.6 percent chance of
    never going to jail. And all the smuggler is out is about 3
    hours and the load.
        Now, that is still apparently the case. Are you familiar
    with this problem in Tucson, and are you continuing to have
    difficulty getting the U.S. Attorney to prosecute intercepts
    and arrests that your agents make using your Predators?
        General Kostelnik. It is really not limited to the Predator
    part of the mission.
        Mr. Culberson. It is. It is bigger than that.
        General Kostelnik. We are a part of the air picture for the
    Border Patrol field commanders, who actually run the mission
    kind of on the ground.
        But I would offer that I am familiar with the issue on the
    prosecutors and which cases they choose to take. And it is
    frustrating when you find people, obviously, that are involved
    in the criminal enterprise, large or small, that are not
    prosecuted.
        But my guess is that the capacity is limited. They have to
    choose the cases wisely. I don't think the cases they choose
    have anything to do with whether it is Predator-related or not.
        Mr. Culberson. Yes, sir, that is the area of your expertise
    and knowledge, though.
        General Kostelnik. I know there are limits on how much or
    what kind of narcotics----
        Mr. Culberson. That is what they tell us.
        General Kostelnik. And certain kind of things they choose
    not to prosecute.
        Mr. Culberson. The point is--could I have someone on your
    staff--could you please go back and look and tell us the level
    of arrests versus prosecution? I mean, the people that you all
    arrest in those different sectors, what percentage are
    prosecuted in those different sectors up and down the border?
        [The information follows:]

        RESPONSE: This response has been designated as ``Law
    Enforcement Sensitive--For Official Use Only'' and as a result,
    cannot be placed in the record or released to the public. DHS
    has provided this response to the Committee separately.

        General Kostelnik. We could probably give you some sense of
    that.
        Mr. Culberson. In Tucson, you are aware of the 99 percent
    plus release rate that they don't prosecute?
        General Kostelnik. I couldn't confirm or deny the actual
    percentages, but I know that there are a lot.
        Mr. Culberson. They turn almost all of them loose.
        General Kostelnik. A lot of it is humanitarian, those are
    turned back. Certain levels of narcotics, they are interdicted,
    and they are offered up for prosecution. If the prosecution is
    not accepted, then they are repatriated.
        Mr. Culberson. Yes, sir. Regardless of the prosecutor's
    excuse, you are aware of--and I just wanted you to confirm for
    the Committee--that in the Tucson sector, virtually everyone
    that is arrested is released?
        General Kostelnik. I don't think that I could confirm that.
    I would say that there is a large number, a fair percentage.
        Mr. Culberson. An extraordinarily high percentage.
        General Kostelnik. That would probably be a fair
    characterization.
        Mr. Culberson. Is that fair?
        General Kostelnik. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Culberson. It is important for you all to know that,
    Mr. Chairman.
        We are working on it and continuing to try to shine some
    sunlight on it, find some additional resources for the
    Marshals. We have worked with the judges there and found a
    way--the Border Patrol, actually, Mr. Chairman, provided an
    administrative facility. There is a building in Tucson that you
    all own. I think the Border Patrol owns--it is an
    administrative building.
        And I will wrap up here, Mr. Chairman. But I wanted to be
    sure while I had you here to remind the Committee, our good
    chairman and ranking member that this continues to be a
    terrible problem where the Tucson sector is essentially wide
    open, as is Southern California, yet the Yuma sector and large
    sectors along the Texas border, the law is being enforced very
    successfully, with great support from the local community. Is
    that an accurate statement?
        General Kostelnik. I am not familiar with the details on
    the other, but----
        Mr. Culberson. In Tucson, you have a bad problem.
        General Kostelnik. It is a focus area, as you know, for the
    Border Patrol. There is a lot of activity of all kinds. It may
    be a supply and demand issue with the attorneys.
        Mr. Culberson. Thank you very much.
        I really appreciate what you guys do.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for going back through that. It is
    just important for the Committee and the staff to know how
    serious a problem we have got in the Tucson sector. Thank you
    very much.
        Mr. Price. Thank you.
        And with that, we will thank both of you for your service
    and for your testimony here this morning. This interagency
    focus on air and marine assets is one that we need to take
    under consideration as we write the budget, obviously,
    understanding that the operations of both of your agencies are
    related to each other and need to be assessed in a coordinated
    fashion.
        So you helped us greatly in doing that, and we are
    appreciative.
        Mr. Rogers, do you have any final thoughts?
        Mr. Rogers. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman, except to say
    thank you to these gentlemen and their staff who are with them
    and to thank them for their service to the country. We
    appreciate it.
        Mr. Price. With that, the Subcommittee stands adjourned.

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                               W I T N E S S E S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Aguilar, David...................................................     1
    Atkins, Rear Admiral Vince.......................................   967
    Bersin, Alan.....................................................   837
    Kostelnik, Major General Michael (Ret.)..........................   967
    Mayorkas, Alejandro ``Ali''......................................   691
    Morton, John.....................................................   223
    Morton, John.....................................................   837

                                   I N D E X

                                  ----------                              --
    --------

            CBP-BALANCING SECURITY WITH LEGITIMATE TRADE AND TRAVEL

                                                                       Page
    Opening Statement of Chairman David Price........................     1
    Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers................     7
    Statement of Chief David Aguilar, Acting Deputy Commissioner, CBP    11
    Arrests in Each Sector...........................................    51
    Automated Modernization: COPPS...................................   204
    Automated Targeting System (ATS).................................   191
    Big Ben Border Crossings.........................................    33
    Bonuses..........................................................   166
    Border Patrol Tactical Communications Program....................   221
    Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology (BSFIT)..   195
    Business Visas...................................................    42
    CBP Construction.................................................   205
    CBP Officers Funded by User Fees.................................    48
    CBP Operations in the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas
      Islands (CNMI).................................................   204
    CBP Readiness and Mass Migrations/Evacuations....................   213
    Comprehensive Immigration Police.................................    52
    Container Security Initiative...........................22, 30, 35, 179
    Contracts........................................................    74
    Cost For Being Smuggled..........................................    53
    Cost To Secure the Southern Border...............................    40
    Cross-Border Travel and Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
      (WHTI).........................................................   194
    Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorist (C-TPAT).............   183
    C-TPAT Program...................................................    31
    C-TPAT Budget Reduction..........................................    34
    Cuts to Air and Marine Operations................................    49
    Cyber Security Initiatives.......................................   191
    Drug Kingpins....................................................    42
    Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA)...............44, 206
    Expenditure Plan.................................................    26
    Fee Funded Operations............................................   188
    Fiscal Responsibility............................................   218
    Global Entry Program.............................................    45
    Hiring...........................................................    67
    Illicit Shipping.................................................    30
    Immigration Laws................................................45, 210
    Impact of Declaring Amnesty......................................    51
    In-Bond Shipments................................................   184
    Infrastructure Constraints.......................................    32
    Inspection and Detection/Nonintrusive Inspection Technology......   177
    Integrity Programs...............................................   188
    Jones Act Regulation Changes.....................................   221
    Joint Powers Agreement...........................................    55
    Merida Initiative................................................    52
    Mobile Surveillance System.......................................    26
    National Targeting Center (NTC)..................................   183
    NEXUS/SENTRI/FAST................................................   184
    Northern Border BSFIT Investments................................   202
    Operation Streamline.............................................    38
    Oversight and Accountability.....................................   216
    Personal Constraints.............................................    33
    Ports of Entry...................................................   190
    Potential Corruption of CBP Officers.............................    54
    Presidio Reprocessing............................................    43
    Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price.......    60
    Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable John
      Culberson......................................................   221
    Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Sam Farr.....   207
    Reception and Representation.....................................    64
    Recidivism Percentage............................................    46
    Recovery.........................................................   185
    Revenue Collection...............................................   192
    Scanning U.S. Bound Cargo Waiver.................................    22
    Screening International Passengers...............................    27
    Secure Border Initiative.........................................25, 39
    Secure Freight Initiative.......................................47, 182
    Security in the Border Region....................................   211
    Statistics and Data..............................................    60
    Tactical Infrastructure in Arizona...............................    43
    Terrorism........................................................    56
    Textile Transshipment Program....................................   186
    Training of CBP Agents...........................................   214
    Travel...........................................................   174
    Travel and Tourism...............................................   207
    Tucson Sector Apprehension Rate..................................    27
    Unobligated Balances.............................................   176
    Virtual Screening................................................    37
    Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI)......................    34

        FY2011 BUDGET HEARING FOR UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
                                  ENFORCEMENT

    Opening Statement of Chairman David Price........................   223
    Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers................   229
    Statement of John Morton, Assistant Secretary, ICE...............   235
    287(g)...........................................................   682
    287(g) and State and Local Immigration Support...................   499
    Alternatives to Detention (ATD)...........................270, 494, 683
    Alternatives to Detention Program................................   262
    Ballistic Forensics/NIBIN........................................   607
    BEST Team Program................................................   680
    Bonuses..........................................................   668
    Border Inspections--Weapons......................................   268
    Border Violence--Drug Trafficking Organizations..................   267
    Contractors vs. ICE Employees--Detention Oversight...............   260
    Contracts........................................................   609
    Decrease in Work-Site Enforcement Arrests........................   258
    Detainee Medical Services........................................   514
    Detainee Transfers...............................................   682
    Detention and Removal............................................   687
    Detention Bed Resources..........................................   259
    Detention Reform.................................................   281
    Family Separation................................................   683
    Hiring...........................................................   607
    Illicit Trade....................................................   276
    ICE Field Office Consolidation...................................   538
    ICE Investigations...............................................   540
    ICE Overseas Investigations......................................   576
    Operation Angel Watch............................................   681
    Operation Community Shield.......................................   606
    Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price.......   281
    Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Alan Mollohan   680
    Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Lucille
      Roybal-Allard..................................................   682
    Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Sam Farr.....   685
    Reception and Representation.....................................   650
    Secure Communities.................................256, 264, 269, 684-5
    Secure Communities/Criminal Aliens...............................   576
    Southwest Border.................................................   687
    Travel...........................................................   675
    Unobligated Balances.............................................   675
    Visa Security Unit Program.......................................   272
    Worksite Enforcement.............................................   686
    Work-Site Enforcement Policy--Leak to Media......................   265

                           CIS--FY2011 BUDGET HEARING

    Opening Statement of Chairman David Price........................   691
    Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers................   695
    Statement of Alejandro Mayorkas, Director, CIS...................   701
    Aligning CIS Fees with Beneficiaries.............................   724
    Application Processing Times.....................................   722
    Application Volumes..............................................   794
    Asylum and Refugee Fee Rule......................................   717
    Bonuses..........................................................   778
    Business Transformation........................................735, 828
    Business Transformation Program..................................   728
    CIS Fee Model....................................................   725
    Contractors......................................................   832
    Contractor Workforce.............................................   730
    Contracts........................................................   745
    Effect of Fluctuating Filing Volumes on Operations...............   727
    E-Verify..................................................719, 731, 833
    E-Verify Improvements............................................   723
    Fee Rule Updates for Asylum and Refugee Surcharge................   829
    Fraud Prevention.................................................   734
    Haiti and the TPS Program........................................   736
    Hiring...........................................................   742
    Immigration Application..........................................   833
    Immigrant Integration............................................   827
    Immigration Integration Grants...................................   737
    Naturalization Ceremonies........................................   730
    Office of Public Engagement......................................   723
    Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price.......   742
    Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Sam Farr.....   831
    Reception and Representation.....................................   778
    SEVIS-II.........................................................   827
    Stateless Persons................................................   829
    TPS Status for Haitians..........................................   829
    Travel...........................................................   791
    Unobligated Balances.............................................   793
    Using General Revenue to Finance CIS Operations..................   718
    Website..........................................................   831

     UPDATE ON SOUTHWEST BORDER: THE CHALLENGES THAT DHS CONTINUES TO FACE

    Opening Statement of Chairman David Price........................   837
    Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers................   842
    Statement of Alan Bersin, Commissioner, CBP......................   848
    Statement of John Morton, Assistant Secretary, ICE...............   863
    Follow Up Statement of Alan bersin, Commissioner, CBP and John
      Morton, Assistant Secretary, ICE...............................   921
    AMOC.............................................................   893
    Benchmarks of Success............................................   958
    BESTs............................................................   911
    Bilateral Enforcement Relationship with Mexico...................   885
    Border Crossings.................................................   890
    Border Deaths....................................................   939
    Border Fencing.................................................898, 905
    Border Violence..................................................   891
    Bulk Cash Smuggling..............................................   914
    Cargo Security and Narcotics Smuggling Through the SW Border
      Ports of Entry.................................................   929
    CBP--Background Investigations...................................   948
    CBP--Inspection Protocol for Commercial Trucks Originating in
      Mexico.........................................................   951
    CBP--Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) Equipment....................   947
    CBP--Ports of Entry (POE)........................................   944
    CBP--SBInet Review...............................................   943
    CBP--SBInet System Acceptance Testing............................   944
    CBP--Tactical Communications.....................................   946
    Combatting Drugs and Gang Violence...............................   888
    Corruption.......................................................   963
    Criminal Removal Process.........................................   892
    Cuts to Border Patrol Money and Personnel........................   887
    DHS--JIATF-like Entity for Southwest Border Enforcement..........   943
    Drug Cartels.....................................................   896
    Drug Smuggling Via Trucks........................................   907
    Drug Seizures....................................................   917
    The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).........................919, 956
    EPIC as Primary Intelligence Center..............................   918
    Firearm Seizures.................................................   915
    Firearms Trafficking at the Southwest Border.....................   950
    Homeland Security Advisory Council Recommendations...............   931
    ICE Overseas Investigations......................................   928
    Illegal Flow of Guns Southbound..................................   893
    Intelligence Coordination........................................   935
    JIATFS...........................................................   913
    Mexican Drug Cartels and Commercial Trucks Originating in Mexico.   952
    Mexican Gangs....................................................   911
    Multi-Agency Cooperation at the Border...........................   957
    Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security....   886
    Operation Arizona Denial.........................................   942
    Operation Streamline...........................................903, 938
    Oversight and Accountability.....................................   940
    Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price.......   928
    Questions for the Record Submitted by Ranking Member Harold
      Rogers.........................................................   943
    Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Alan Molloh950, 954
    Questions for the Record Submitted by the Honorable Sam Farr.....   957
    Recent ICE/ATF and ICE/DEA Memos of Understanding................   954
    Sharing Border Crossing Information..............................   930
    Short-term Custody...............................................   936
    Special Assistant US Attorneys...................................   956
    ``Spillover'' Border Violence....................................   933
    Training of CBP and BP Agents....................................   941
    Travel...........................................................   930
    Treatment of Unaccompanied Alien Children........................   899
    Weapons Seizures.................................................   919
    Weapons Seizures and Ballistics Tracing..........................   936
    Weapons Smuggling and Forensic Analysis..........................   929

       DHS AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS AND INVESTMENTS: CUSTOMS AND BORDER
                           PROTECTION AND COAST GUARD

    Opening Statement of Chairman David Price........................   967
    Opening Statement of Ranking Member Harold Rogers................   973
    Statement of Major General Michael Kostelnik, Assistant
      Commissioner, CBP..............................................   979
    Statement of RDML Vincent Adkins, Assistant Commandant, USCG.....   995
    Adequacy of Shared Resources: Counternarcotics Efforts.......1046, 1057
    Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator.........................  1021
    Aging Aircraft Program......................................10148, 1057
    Air and Marine Operations Center.............................1016, 1048
    CBP Office of Air and Marine Budget and Operations...............  1036
    Coast Guard--Cutter-based UAS....................................  1060
    Coast Guard--HH-65C Deactivation.................................  1060
    Conflicting Mission Priorities...................................  1005
    Flight Operations................................................  1028
    General Aviation.............................................1050, 1057
    Guardian Deployment..........................................1005, 1020
    Joint Training and Maintenance...................................  1052
    Marine Vessels...................................................  1020
    Multirole Enforcement Aircraft...................................  1026
    Northern Border Air and Marine Branches..........................  1051
    Northern Border Operations.......................................  1014
    Offshore Drilling Platforms......................................  1030
    Offshore Interdiction Efforts....................................  1012
    Operation HALCON.................................................  1049
    Operation Predator...............................................  1031
    Predator Operation Prosecutions..................................  1031
    Predator Operations..............................................  1017
    Questions for the Record Submitted by Chairman David Price...1036, 1056
    Questions for the Record Submitted by Ranking Member Harold
      Rogers.........................................................  1060
    Recapitalization Plans.......................................1025, 1028
    Semi-Submersible Vessels.........................................  1022
    Sharing Resources............................................1045, 1056
    Small Boat Commodity Council.....................................  1022
    Small Vessels....................................................  1055
    Southwest Border Mexican Military Incursion......................  1050
    UAS Fleet Requirements...........................................  1007
    UAS Staff Cuts...................................................  1009
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)..................................  1053
    Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Certificates of Authorization  1058
    Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs)..........................1055, 1058