[House Hearing, 111 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] TOYOTA GAS PEDALS: IS THE PUBLIC AT RISK? ======================================================================= HEARING before the COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 24, 2010 __________ Serial No. 111-75 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/ index.html http://www.house.gov/reform TOYOTA GAS PEDALS: IS THE PUBLIC AT RISK? TOYOTA GAS PEDALS: IS THE PUBLIC AT RISK? ======================================================================= HEARING before the COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ FEBRUARY 24, 2010 __________ Serial No. 111-75 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/ index.html http://www.house.gov/reform U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 58-346 WASHINGTON : 2010 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DARRELL E. ISSA, California CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN L. MICA, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio DIANE E. WATSON, California LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina JIM COOPER, Tennessee BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JIM JORDAN, Ohio MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois JEFF FLAKE, Arizona MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah Columbia AARON SCHOCK, Illinois PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois ANH ``JOSPEH'' CAO, Loiuisiana CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland HENRY CUELLAR, Texas PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut PETER WELCH, Vermont BILL FOSTER, Illinois JACKIE SPEIER, California STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio JUDY CHU, California Ron Stroman, Staff Director Michael McCarthy, Deputy Staff Director Carla Hultberg, Chief Clerk Larry Brady, Minority Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on February 24, 2010................................ 1 Statement of: LaHood, Raymond H., Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation............................................. 11 Lastrella, Fe Niosco, lost family members in a car accident involving a Toyota vehicle; Kevin Haggerty, experienced sudden unintended acceleration in a Toyota vehicle; Joan Claybrook, president emeritus of Public Citizen and former Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration; and Clarence M. Ditlow, executive director, Center for Auto Safety..................................... 126 Claybrook, Joan.......................................... 135 Ditlow, Clarence M....................................... 145 Haggerty, Kevin.......................................... 131 Lastrella, Fe Niosco..................................... 126 Toyoda, Akio, president and CEO, Toyota Motor Corp.; and Yoshimi Inaba, president and CEO, Toyota Motor North America, Inc............................................... 73 Inaba, Yoshimi........................................... 79 Toyoda, Akio............................................. 73 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Claybrook, Joan, president emeritus of Public Citizen and former Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, prepared statement of...................... 138 Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, prepared statement of............... 174 Ditlow, Clarence M., executive director, Center for Auto Safety, prepared statement of.............................. 147 Haggerty, Kevin, experienced sudden unintended acceleration in a Toyota vehicle, prepared statement of................. 133 Hodes, Hon. Paul W., a Representative in Congress from the State of New Hampshire, prepared statement of.............. 166 Inaba, Yoshimi, president and CEO, Toyota Motor North America, Inc., prepared statement of....................... 81 Issa, Hon. Darrell E., a Representative in Congress from the State of California: Prepared statement of.................................... 9 Prepared statement of Mr. Saylor......................... 153 Kaptur, Hon. Marcy, a Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, various materials........................... 121 LaHood, Raymond H., Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation, prepared statement of...................... 14 Lastrella, Fe Niosco, lost family members in a car accident involving a Toyota vehicle, prepared statement of.......... 129 Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the State of Florida: Memo dated March 17, 2008................................ 33 Number of FTE vacancies in NHTSA......................... 31 Quigley, Hon. Mike, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, prepared statement of................... 172 Towns, Hon. Edolphus, a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, prepared statement of................... 4 Toyoda, Akio, president and CEO, Toyota Motor Corp., prepared statement of............................................... 76 TOYOTA GAS PEDALS: IS THE PUBLIC AT RISK? ---------- WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2010 House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 a.m., in room 2154 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edolphus Towns (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Representatives Towns, Kanjorski, Maloney, Cummings, Kucinich, Tierney, Clay, Watson, Lynch, Cooper, Connolly, Quigley, Kaptur, Norton, Davis, Van Hollen, Cuellar, Hodes, Murphy, Welch, Foster, Speier, Driehaus, Chu, Issa, Burton, Mica, Souder, Duncan, Turner, McHenry, Bilbray, Jordan, Flake, Fortenberry, Chaffetz, Schock, Luetkemeyer, and Cao. Also present: Representative Davis of Kentucky. Staff present: John Arlington, chief counsel, investigations; Kevin Barstow, investigative counsel; Peter Fise, staff assistant; Linda Good, deputy chief clerk; Jean Gosa, clerk; Velginy Hernandez, press assistant; Adam Hodge, deputy press secretary; Carla Hultberg, chief clerk; Marc Johnson and Ophelia Rivas, assistant clerks; Chris Knauer, senior investigator/professional staff member; Phyllis Love and Christopher Sanders, professional staff members; Mike McCarthy, deputy staff director; Steven Rangel, senior counsel; Jenny Rosenberg, director of communications; Leneal Scott, IT specialist; Shrita Sterlin, deputy director of communications; Ron Stroman, staff director; Gerri Willis, special assistant; Lawrence Brady, minority staff director; John Cuaderes, minority deputy staff director; Rob Borden, minority general counsel; Jennifer Safavian, minority chief counsel for oversight and investigations; Frederick Hill, minority director of communications; Adam Fromm, minority chief clerk and Member liaison; Kurt Bardella, minority press secretary; Seamus Kraft and Benjamin Cole, minority deputy press secretaries; Tom Alexander and Kristina Moore, minority senior counsels; Marvin Kaplan, minority counsel; and Jonathan Skladany, minority chief counsel. Chairman Towns. Good morning. And thank you all for being here. It is hard to imagine the horror of the event that took the lives of an entire family near San Diego, CA on August 28, 2009. California's Highway Patrolman Mark Saylor, his wife, their 13-year-old daughter, and Mrs. Saylor's brother, Chris, were driving in a Toyota Lexus, a loaner car that the Toyota dealer provided while their car was being repaired. As they drove along the highway, suddenly the car accelerated rapidly. He stood on the brakes, but nothing happened. No matter what he did, he could not stop the car from flying down the road faster and faster. As this car reached top speed in just a few seconds, it was all he could do to keep it under control. In a frantic call to 911, his brother-in-law, Chris, reported the gas pedal was stuck, the brakes did not work, and they were barreling down on an intersection. He yelled over the phone, ``Hold on. Hold on. Hold on. Hold on, and pray. Pray.'' And those were his last words. We now know that the terrifying death of this family was not caused by a freak accident. It turns out that people from all over the country had been complaining about sudden acceleration in Toyota vehicles. And what people are wondering is, ``Will I be next?'' Our investigation found that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [NHTSA] has received nearly 2,500 driver complaints about sudden acceleration in Toyota vehicles. We have discovered that since 2000, one insurance company, State Farm, has reported to NHTSA over 900 cases of sudden acceleration in Toyotas. We have also learned that NHTSA did very little about it; and, when it did do something, its actions were very limited. Similarly, Toyota either ignored or minimized reports of sudden acceleration. Toyota first blamed the problem on improper installation of floor mats, never mind that many reports of sudden acceleration involved vehicles that did not even have a floor mat. Now they blame it on sticky gas pedals. While I remain skeptical that these are the sole causes, the way that these complaints were handled indicates problems at both NHTSA and Toyota. Since 2003, NHTSA has undertaken a multitude of investigations into sudden unintended acceleration. But there is a serious question of whether NHTSA used all of its regulatory tools to thoroughly investigate this issue. When I read press accounts about how former NHTSA officials were hired by Toyota and then helped to negotiate the scope of regulatory increase, I have my own doubts. In the case of Toyota, there is striking evidence that the company was at times more concerned with profit than customer safety. Toyota's own internal documents indicate that a premium was placed on delaying or closing NHTSA investigations, delaying new safety rules, and blocking the discovery of safety defects. In fact, Toyota officials bragged about saving $100 million by preventing NHTSA from finding a defect related to sudden acceleration. The recent Prius recall represents yet another troubling pattern of delay when it comes to revealing safety information. A few weeks ago, Toyota announced it would recall certain Prius models because of a software problem related to the braking system. Drivers began complaining to NHTSA about Prius brake problems last year. Toyota knew about this problem and was already addressing it for new cars on the assembly line. But at the same time, Toyota withheld that information from both NHTSA and current Prius drivers until months later. If the spotlight had not already been shining brightly on Toyota, would the public have ever been told? That is a question that needs to be answered. NHTSA failed the taxpayers. Toyota failed their customers. Thousands of complaints, multiple investigations, and serial recalls are bad enough, but we now have 39 deaths attributed to sudden acceleration in Toyotas. To give that horrifying number some perspective, there were 27 deaths attributed to the famous Pinto exploding gas tank of the 1970's. In short, if the Camry and the Prius were airplanes, they would be grounded. These facts raise several important questions. Is it safe to drive these cars? Is Toyota now serious about solving the problem? Can NHTSA say the cause of the problem has been identified and fixed? What can we do to prevent this kind of thing from happening again? Can the American people trust NHTSA to ensure vehicle safety? Hopefully, we will find some answers to these and many other questions today. On that note, I yield to the gentleman, the ranking member from California, Congressman Darrell Issa, for his opening statement. [The prepared statement of Hon. Edolphus Towns follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.003 Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A little housekeeping. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent Mr. Jeff Davis of the Commonwealth of Kentucky be allowed to participate in the hearing as a dais member, recognizing that it will be unlikely that there will be any time for him to ask questions. Chairman Towns. Without objection, he will be accepted. Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, it is the obligation of yourself primarily, and then myself, to set the tone for hearings, to tee up, if you will, through our opening statements how we view what we are going to accomplish here today. And I would like to commend you for the work you have done in your opening statement and add just a little bit more to it. I would first like to put up a slide of the recalls, From Recall to Recovery. This slide shows a little of the history that the chairman alluded to. The 1978 recall of Ford Pintos. The 1981 GM recalls for steering problems, 5.8 million vehicles. The very sad but great loss of life, 1982 Tylenol recalls of 31 million bottles of Tylenol pills, which of course led to the tamper-proof bottles we all take for granted today. The 1996 Ford recalls of 8 million vehicles for fires. And, of course, the well- publicized GM recall after their pickup trucks would spontaneously explode if hit from the rear. Mr. Chairman, this is an example of companies, both auto and non-auto, who over the years have faced clear challenges. In the case of the auto companies, we expect to see them again. We judge them not by whether or not they from time to time have unseen and developed problems in their vehicles; but, how quickly they respond and how they in fact react after scrutiny, from either within their own company or from without, brings these to their attention. I will not call any of these five a success except for Tylenol. Tylenol was a victim of other people, in all likelihood, poisoning their product; and yet, they took a step that has changed safety of the medicines we take for granted today. Recently, Mr. Toyoda's company, Toyota Motor Cars, began airing a television commercial, and I will take the liberty of using his words today. In it, they said that, ``In fact, good companies fix the mistakes they have made, but great companies learn from them.'' Today, we will be asking Mr. Toyoda and Mr. Inaba those very questions as to whether or not they are a good company or a great company. My second slide, I think, depicts one of the challenges of why, prior to today, we cannot say that Toyoda was a great company, perhaps not even a good company, when in 2007 what we know for a fact is that floor mat problems or gas pedal entrapment problems were discovered in similar vehicles in both the United States and Japan. In the United States, working with NHTSA, a negotiated fix related to the carpets occurred. In Japan, the gas pedal, like the one seen here today, was shortened. In 2009, nearly 2 years later, we had the sad and fatal loss of life in what in all likelihood, and has been at least documented, reported, and not formally contested, to be a carpet entrapment problem of an automobile loaned by Bob Baker, a local dealer in my city, that led to this loss of life. Today, in 2010, gas pedals are being shortened at dealers around the country. It is very clear that at least at Toyota, a possible solution, now seen as superior, was available, contemplated, and executed, but not for the very car that ultimately--the S350 that led to this loss of life. So today we will be asking two questions: How could NHTSA, in this modern age in which I can Google Secretary LaHood's name, get pictures from all over the world of the Secretary to get information and bio and almost anything from data bases around the globe--how is it that NHTSA does not formally have a system to know about every report, whether it is a sticky accelerator in Great Britain, whether it is a troubled system in Canada, whether it is a different but similar vehicle in Japan, NHTSA is not prepared to proactively act. Some would say that we should in fact add to our body of laws. I believe that both NHTSA and Secretary LaHood will tell us that our body of law is sufficient and yet modernization is required. I am delighted to have my friend and former colleague, Secretary LaHood, here today, because it will be on his watch that either the Department of Transportation will be a good organization dealing with these specific problems, or a great organization learning from the mistakes of the past. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing. I look forward to our witnesses, and I yield back. Chairman Towns. I thank the ranking member for his statement. [The prepared statement of Hon. Darrell E. Issa follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.004 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.005 Chairman Towns. At this time, we would like to introduce our first witness, the Honorable Raymond H. LaHood, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation. Mr. Secretary, it is a longstanding tradition that we swear all of our witnesses in. If you would stand and raise your right hand. [Witness sworn.] Secretary LaHood. It gives them a chance to take more pictures, also. Chairman Towns. Let the record reflect that the witness answered in the affirmative. You may be seated. And you may begin. STATEMENT OF RAYMOND H. LaHOOD, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Secretary LaHood. Thank you Chairman Towns and Ranking Member Issa, and the members of the committee, for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the important issue of Toyota's recent safety recalls. Ever since I was sworn in as Secretary of Transportation 13 months ago, I said that safety is the Department's No. 1 priority. I would like to think that we have demonstrated that commitment time and time and time again. When the terrible crash of the Washington Metro system claimed nine lives and injured dozens of others last summer, we quickly introduced legislation, which I would encourage all of you to cosponsor, to give us Federal safety oversight over transit, something we currently don't have. As a matter of fact, we are prohibited from having that kind of responsibility. When Colgan Air Flight 3407 crashed in Buffalo, we learned right away what many of the problems were and we did not wait 1 year for the NTSB to conclude its investigation. We began working with the aviation industry immediately to enhance airline safety and pilot training, holding 12 safety summits around the country. This spring, the FAA will issue a new rule to combat pilot fatigue, and it has already begun to overhaul pilot certification qualifications. One of the hallmarks of my time as Transportation Secretary has been our work on distracted driving. For all of you with cell phones and BlackBerries and other electronic devices, I want you to know that I am on a rampage about people talking and texting while driving a bus, plane, or train, and an automobile. It is a menace to society, and we recently exercised our authority to ban truck drivers from texting while driving. Now, for Toyota. The Toyota recall situation is extremely serious and we are treating it extremely seriously. The three recalls involving Toyota are among the largest in automobile history, affecting more than 6 million people in the country. And I would like to say a word to consumers. If you notice your gas pedal or your brake is not responding as it normally would, contact your Toyota dealer now. The recent recalls involve three issues: One, accelerator, pedal entrapment by floor mats, which can lead to uncontrolled acceleration at very high speeds. It is important to take your floor mats out of the driver's side of the vehicle until your car has been repaired for this problem by an authentic Toyota dealer. Second, accelerator pedals sticking or returning slowly after being depressed. If the pedal is harder to depress or slower to return after releasing it, this could be the precursor to what is known as a sticky pedal. If your pedal has these symptoms, contact your Toyota dealer immediately. If your gas pedal becomes stuck for any reason, steadily apply the brake, put the car in neutral, bring it to a stop in a safe place, and call your dealer. Finally, with the Toyota Prius for model year 2010 and the Lexus HS250, if you experience a change in your car's braking performance, contact your Toyota dealer. Now, I want everyone to know that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration has the most effective defect investigation program in the world. Known as NHTSA, its job is to investigate complaints and to look for defects. NHTSA receives more than 30,000 complaints from consumers every year, and we take every one seriously. We look at every one, we don't set any of them aside, and we review them quickly to make sure that if there is a serious issue, we will look at it and ultimately investigate it. Over just the last 3 years, NHTSA's defect and compliance investigation have resulted in 524 recalls involving 23 million vehicles. We haven't been sitting around on our hands. When people complain, we investigate. When there needs to be a recall, we do it. Of the 100 investigations NHTSA opens in an average year, there are currently 44 open defect investigations, 5 of which involved Toyota. Every step of the way, NHTSA officials have pushed Toyota to take corrective action so that consumers would be safe. Unhappy with Toyota's responsiveness to our safety concerns, the Acting Administrator of NHTSA, Ron Medford, and two associates flew to Japan in December 2009 to clarify for Toyota management what the company's legal obligations are to find and remedy safety defects in vehicles sold here in America. In January, our new Administrator of NHTSA, David Strickland, and Ron Medford, now our Deputy Administrator, told the president of Toyota North America in no uncertain terms that we expect prompt action following the disclosure of the sticky pedal problem. Toyota publicly announced that recall 2 days later. I have been on the phone with Mr. Toyoda from here to Japan, and I am so pleased that he accepted the invitation to appear before this committee. With potential fatal defects on the road, NHTSA has pressed hard to expedite these safety fixes. If NHTSA had opened a formal investigation and Toyota had resisted a recall, that would have consumed an enormous amount of time and resources, in effect extending the period in which owners of affected vehicles are at risk. By engaging Toyota directly and persuading the company to take action, the agency avoided a lengthy investigation that would have delayed fixes for a year or more. Last week, I announced that we are investigating whether Toyota acted quickly enough in reporting these safety defects to NHTSA as well as whether they took all appropriate action to protect consumers. We have asked Toyota to turn over a wide range of the documents that will show us when and how they learned about these safety problems. NHTSA will continue to make sure Toyota is doing all it promised to make its vehicles safe, and we will continue to investigate all possible causes of unintended acceleration. While the recalls are important steps in that direction, we don't maintain that they answer every question. Some people believe that electromagnetic interference has a dangerous effect on these vehicles. Although we are not aware of any incidents proven to cause such interference, NHTSA is doing a thorough review. We will get in the weeds on this. We will do everything we can to find out if electronics are a part of the problem. And if we find the problem, we will make sure it is resolved. I have been assured by Mr. Toyoda that he takes U.S. safety concerns very seriously, and its safety is the company's top priority. And we will hold him to that. Finally, I want to remind everyone that there is a reason that we investigate safety defects and there is a reason that we push automakers to do the right thing. I listened to the 911 tape of the Saylor family's harrowing last moments. Mark Saylor, a California Highway Patrolman, died last year, along with his wife and daughter and brother-in-law, when the accelerator got stuck and the Lexus they were driving crashed at more than 120 miles per hour. Last evening, after I finished my testimony before the Energy and Commerce Committee, I met with the Saylor family to offer our sympathy and to offer any assistance we could give to them. It was a horrible tragedy and I hope that no other family has to endure that. Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying this. I was sworn in on January 23, 2009. I have traveled to 36 States and 80 cities. Everywhere that I have gone, I have talked about safety. That has to be our No. 1 priority, whether it is in trains, planes, or automobiles. You look at any statement I have ever made, any speech I have ever given, there is always something about safety in it. We will not sleep at DOT and we will work 24/7 at NHTSA to make sure that every Toyota is safe to drive, and we will continue to make safety our No. 1 priority at DOT and at NHTSA. I look forward to your questions. Chairman Towns. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I really appreciate your commitment to safety. I think that is so important. [The prepared statement of Secretary LaHood follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.006 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.009 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.012 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.013 Chairman Towns. Let me just raise a couple of questions with you very quickly. The committee has reviewed thousands of complaints sent to NHTSA regarding the sudden acceleration of Toyota vehicles. Before the crash that killed members of the Saylor family in August 2009, there were almost 2,000 complaints at the time of Toyota's floor mat recall in 2007. The agency had already received more than 1,300 complaints. My question is: Why did it take NHTSA so long to act? Secretary LaHood. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would say this. I have been in this job a little more than a year; and prior to my time, which would have been prior to January 23, 2009, if there are issues that I can't answer, I will get back to you for the record. But I am going to tell you this: 40,000 complaints come to NHTSA every year, and we look at every one of them. We think every one is important. Some come from people who are driving cars, some come from the industry. We look at what is going on from stakeholders, people who are in the automobile business. Sometimes they file complaints with us. And then, when we see a pattern, we will do an investigation or we will look at it. And if our investigation shows there needs to be a recall, it will be done. That has been the work of NHTSA. With respect to your specific question during that time period, what I would like to do, Mr. Chairman, is put it on the record after I really can get the facts for you. Chairman Towns. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Again, I know you, as all of us, recognize how important safety is. So let me ask you this: Do you think it is safe to drive a Toyota today? Secretary LaHood. Pardon me? Chairman Towns. Do you think it is safe to drive a Toyota today? Secretary LaHood. I will say this. I will say that if people check our Web site, DOT.gov, we have listed every Toyota that is up for recall. I want anybody that has one of those cars to take it to their dealer and to make sure that it gets fixed. And, again, we are going to work 24/7, and we are going to continue until every Toyota is safe for their customers to drive. Chairman Towns. Thank you for your commitment and your dedication in this regard. I now yield to the ranking member, Mr. Issa. Secretary LaHood. This mic is on, Mr. Issa. But---- Mr. Issa. It just dropped off all of a sudden. It has nothing to do with you, I am sure. Chairman Towns. Switch to the other mic. In fact, you can use two. Secretary LaHood. This one works. OK, I will use two. Mr. Issa. It is very Presidential. Mr. Secretary, I will pick up where the chairman left off. Some companies, including Toyota, I am told, you can go to their Web site and you punch in a VIN, which is the one piece of information that anyone who is in possession of the car can see. At your Web site, you have to put in make and model. So you kind of have to know your trim level, etc. Can you commit to us that in the foreseeable future the Department of Transportation could and, if you agree, should have for every automobile sold in America a VIN number on file, so if somebody punches in the VIN number they can see every recall and every piece of safety information that you know of that needs to be applied to that vehicle? Secretary LaHood. Given the right amount of time, I will commit to you that--we should make that information available in the simplest possible way, for even people who maybe don't have access to a computer or whatever, we should make it available to people. Mr. Issa. I appreciate that. And a lot of my questions from my opening remarks are about what do we do proactively for the future. And I appreciate that we will all have questions both for you and for NHTSA and followup questions about the past. But let me go on to another one. Currently, NHTSA, as I understand it, has 41, 42--49 in the high year--thousand inquiries or complaints. And, of course, the auto companies also have theirs. If an auto company reaches a certain threshold, they have a requirement to send that in, in the United States. If an auto company has a recall in another country, they have an obligation to inform NHTSA, I understand, through that system. Now, you and I served in our past lives on the Select Intelligence Committee, so you are very familiar what our open- source system is. Can you tell me today that there is any technological reason or commonsense reason that in fact we should not--we, the U.S. Government and NHTSA, should not be able to transparently see all claims from all of our First World partners--obviously to be arranged--and all the collateral material from all the people who want to sell vehicles in this country? Meaning, is there any reason you have to wait until there has been a recall to get information? As you know, Great Britain, they didn't actually have a recall but they had a similar sticky pedal that they didn't see as significant because they thought it only happened there on right-hand drive cars. And yet, when we were getting a relatively small amount of sticky pedals, had we had that information, like any open-source bringing together of information, an agency of the government would have fairly easily been able to have an alert that could have been sent to the auto company for their attention and response. Do you see any reason that is not something that should be part of a great organization rather than a good one? Secretary LaHood. I agree that it should be part of it. We believe in transparency. I personally think information can be very powerful. And the more, the better. Mr. Issa. Now, I know that you can't answer everything about NHTSA, but I think you are familiar with the Toyota Blade sold in Japan, the one that had a pedal similar to this, even though it was not an automobile sold in the United States, in which they shortened the pedal because of entrapment. Are you familiar with that? Secretary LaHood. I am not intimately familiar with that, Mr. Issa. Mr. Issa. Well, I would appreciate it if you would respond for the record of how, in the future, a similar automobile in another country that does have a change can have a change consistent in the United States. As I said in my opening remarks, we took a shortcut, with NHTSA's acquiescence and awareness, we took a shortcut on the mats in 2007 here, while in Japan they reduced--they increased the clearance on the pedal. The difference is the difference in San Diego of that family still being alive. So that is probably the most important question I have for you, is between open-source information and consistency of similar or even sometimes dissimilar parts around the world, can you commit to me that it is within your vision and authority with existing law to bring about a real change so that this will not happen again? Secretary LaHood. I take your point on this. It is a good point, and you have my commitment. Mr. Issa. I appreciate that. And if you would do us one favor, and that is if at some time in the future you do see a potential need for more authority or more specific legislation, that you would also come back to us. Secretary LaHood. Absolutely. Mr. Issa. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you again. I yield back. Chairman Towns. I thank the gentleman from California. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Congressman Kanjorski. Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Mr. Kanjorski. From arriving at this meeting today, I assume this is one of the more uplifting sessions that you have had since in office. I think this is probably the greatest attendance I have seen in the hallways of the press. Secretary LaHood. I would agree. Mr. Kanjorski. Obviously, we have struck a nerve, this committee and the occurrence that happened in California. I wanted to take a moment, Mr. Secretary, to congratulate you. I think--I have been observing you for the last week or two, and I think you courageously exercised the authorizations of your office, exactly what this committee and the Congress expect you to do. Earlier today, I was watching the ranking member, Mr. Issa, on CNBC, and he made an interesting proposal, partially what he has discussed with you today. And maybe if that proposal could be encapsulated into legislation with greater authority, but even above and beyond the auto industry, that we find a way, since we are in a global marketplace, to find this information, readily assembled for deposit, and then for availability to not only citizens of the United States but citizens of the world. And it is something we should have. I commented to my staff after I saw Mr. Issa, I love Portuguese sardines. But I have to be honest with you. If somebody died from botulism as a result of eating sardines, I would have no way in the world of knowing where to go, where to find out, or who to inform. And it is time now that we think about the fact that we are not in a city market, a State market, or regional market, or just a national market; we are in a world market. And if anything productive could come out of this hearing, and highlight it is the fact that we take this positive action. So I make an open offer to the ranking member. I will join you in the sponsorship of authorization of not only the auto industry, but all international industries, to get this type of repository information made available, and utilize the intelligence networking and information of this country to commercialize it, if you will. And to you, Mr. Secretary, I want to make the offer that this has been a tragic experience, I think, for Toyota. I am sure that if I were a stockholder of that company, or if I were Japanese, with the pride they have with that company and their 50 years of experience, this is something no one wanted to see happen. And what we have to do is handle this situation with a form of class, if you will. I hope we don't utilize this as some effort to beat up either on a foreign manufacturer or to overemphasize or exacerbate the feelings that may occur between the two nations. Secretary LaHood. We certainly haven't done that. And I know that all of you feel this way. We have done it under the umbrella of safety for people who own Toyotas. Mr. Kanjorski. That is a good message, if we can put that message out there. What we want to derive from this hearing and from this fact is the best purposes in the world, to accomplish things in the future so this can't happen or won't happen again. But on the other hand, we don't want to excoriate our friends and exaggerate situations that go beyond reasonableness. So I thank you for your testimony. I thank you for your attendance to this. And I pledge to you, together with the ranking member, that we will take such action as possible to see a positive result. Secretary LaHood. We will work with you on that. Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. I now recognize the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, former chair of this committee. Mr. Burton. Let me preface my remarks by welcoming you, Mr. Secretary. We have been friends for a long, long time, and I know you to be a very honorable man. So the questions I am going to ask have nothing to do with questioning your integrity; I want you to know that. There was an invitation made to Mr. Strickland to testify, and there was an article in the Los Angeles Times today that indicated that, because of your request, Mr. Strickland was asked not to testify today. Is there some reason for that? Secretary LaHood. Well, look, Mr. Burton; Mr. Strickland has been on the job 40 days. I have been on the job about 13 months. I am not going to have our NHTSA administrator, who has been on the job 40 days, appear. And, look it, I am taking responsibility for this. As I said in my testimony, safety is No. 1. And I am going to be accountable. If somebody wants to criticize NHTSA or the Department, I will be responsible for that, not somebody else. That is my job. I am not going to duck it. And I am not going to give it to somebody who has only been on the job 40 days. And when I talked to Mr. Towns and Mr. Issa, it was always clear to me they wanted me to come and I wanted to come, when we originally talked. So I don't know how that confusion occurred, but that is the reason for it. Mr. Burton. Now, don't get mad at me, Ray. That was the Los Angeles Times. Secretary LaHood. Well, just because I raised a little decible in my voice doesn't mean I am mad, Mr. Burton. Mr. Burton. Mr. Secretary, I have known you for 20 years. Don't give me that stuff. You know, there is a question about whether or not there might be some kind of a sweetheart arrangement with some of the people that preceded you working at NHTSA; and there are a number of people, I think at least two NHTSA employees, who now work for Toyota. They are on the Toyota payroll, and I have their names here. Are you familiar with that at all, sir? Secretary LaHood. I have read the reports of that and we have looked into it. And what the law requires is that if you have been an employee at DOT and you go to work for a company that does work with DOT, you cannot communicate or participate in the work that you did with this company. So if you go to work for a company, if you go to work for Toyota, you cannot communicate on issues that you dealt with at DOT. So, for example, if those employees worked at NHTSA, which they did, they can't come back and be talking about these things. They could talk about a highway project or something like that, I suppose. But--and here's my pledge to all of you. If anybody here knows that there's violations, let me know, and I will refer it to the IG and there will be an investigation. There has been no more higher standard set for ethics than this administration. At the first Cabinet meeting, the President made it clear: I don't want any ethical problems with anybody. Mr. Burton. This preceded you anyhow, Mr. Secretary. Secretary LaHood. Right. Mr. Burton. But this Mr. Christopher Santucci, now Toyota's assistant manager of technical and regulatory affairs, did work for the agency. And according to General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, they don't have anybody that's formerly worked for NHTSA that's working for them in those capacities. But you're saying that these gentlemen, that---- Secretary LaHood. They can work for Toyota. But they cannot come back and talk about issues that they worked on. They can't do that. They could talk to people in other modes, FAA or some other mode, but they cannot come back and talk to our folks about issues that they---- Mr. Burton. The one thing that I would suggest is that the appearance is one of the things that right now I think the public is very concerned about. And a couple of people that worked at NHTSA that go to work and they're in a public relations position, they could talk to people at NHTSA, and the appearance may be that they are influencing some decisionmaking that is going on. Secretary LaHood. Look, I agree with you on this, Mr. Burton, and I think this law probably should be tightened up, I really do. Because I agree with you, perception is reality. Anybody that's been in politics knows that. And I take your point on this. Mr. Burton. Well, thank you very much. And I still love you, Ray. Chairman Towns. Does the gentleman yield back? I now recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Representative Cummings. Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And to Mr. LaHood, Secretary LaHood, it is good to have you here. One of the things that--we find ourselves in quite a dilemma here. On the one hand, as Mr. Kanjorski has said, we want to be very careful about what we are doing here, because we do have a No. 1--one of our main trading partners, Japan, involved. On the other hand, though, we have the safety of citizens, many of our constituents who spend thousands upon thousands of dollars to buy an automobile, and they have a right to expect to be safe. And to that end, yesterday there was some very telling testimony before the Commerce Committee, and I know you were there and heard about it, where the president of Toyota Sales USA, when asked about the mat issue, whether it was a sticky pedal or the mat problem, whether recalls in regard to those issues would solve the problem, he was not sure. Are you familiar? Secretary LaHood. Yes, sir. I was there, and I heard his testimony. Mr. Cummings. And as I sat here and I listened to you when you talked about--you said go to the Web site. And you said if people were having certain problems, they should go to the dealership. And then I heard you--in answer to the chairman's question, I don't think you ever really answered the question, because he asked you whether or not you considered a Toyota to be safe. You are our safety guy, just as you just said. You said it, I didn't. And I believe that. I believe you are concerned about safety. The question still becomes, for our constituents, you as our safety guy. Secretary LaHood. Well, let me answer you very directly, Mr. Cummings. Mr. Cummings. Thank you. Secretary LaHood. For those cars that are listed on our Web site, DOT.gov, for recall to go back, those are not safe. We have determined they are not safe. Mr. Cummings. All right. Secretary LaHood. We believe that we need to look at the electronics in these cars, because people have told us they believe there's an issue. And we are going to do that. We are going to have a complete review on the electronics. But for now, any car that is on the Web site needs to go back to the dealer to be fixed. Mr. Cummings. Now. Secretary LaHood. We have determined that those are not safe because of a floor mat problem, because of a sticky pedal. And---- Mr. Cummings. It's the ``and'' that I am wondering about right there. In other words, you just said you didn't consider those safe. But, again, we had Lentz saying yesterday--and I am not trying to attack you, I just want to make sure we are clear. Secretary LaHood. Look, I am not offended by any this of this. Come on. I am not. Mr. Cummings. But we need to be clear. We have people driving these cars every day. And I am just wondering, do you believe that--and it sounds like you do--that there's something beyond just those two things, as Mr. Lentz of Toyota USA testified to yesterday? And one more question. If those automobiles--if there are automobiles that are not on the recall list, because that is what I am beginning to wonder about, what are they supposed to do? Secretary LaHood. There are people who believe that there are electronics problems with Toyota, and that is the reason we are going to do a review. Mr. Cummings. OK. Secretary LaHood. And for now, we don't have evidence right now to say conclusively that there are these electronics problems. We are going to get into it, we are going to get in the weeds. There were people at that committee yesterday that had some studies that showed that there were electronics problems on at least one that was tested. We want that information. For now, the only thing I will say to Toyota drivers: If your car is listed, take it to the dealer and get it fixed. And please know that we are going to look at some other issues because we've had complaints about the electronics. Mr. Cummings. Now, do we have enough personnel to do that? Secretary LaHood. Yes, sir. And I will tell you this. The President in his budget proposed 66 new employees for NHTSA. We have 125 engineers, and we do have electrical engineers also. The answer is the President has proposed in our budget 66 new employees for NHTSA. Mr. Cummings. And when you look at NHTSA and you talk about looking at problems, and you said when you see a pattern, can you tell us what a pattern is? In other words, you say if you see a pattern, then you take the next step. Secretary LaHood. I would say, you know, if we get--I don't know; say we get 50 complaints on an automobile, say we get 10 complaints, we look at those seriously. And if those 10 complaints appear to be serious, we will begin to look into it. Mr. Cummings. Thank you. I see my time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Towns. I thank the gentleman from Maryland. I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Congressman Mica. Mr. Mica. Mr. Chairman, when I received the notice for today's hearing--in fact this, I guess, is from the committee-- it says the panel of witnesses would include David Strickland, the administrator of NHTSA. I know he has only been on the job for a limited number of days, but I think it is important that he testify. I would ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to testify and be sworn in as a witness. Chairman Towns. As it was explained earlier, that the Secretary indicated the fact that the decision was made that he had been on the job 40 days, and that is the reason that he is not here. But the Secretary also assured us that the decision, in terms of the final decision, was his, and that he is prepared to assume that responsibility. So once he said that, I became very comfortable with it. Because if he is going to assume the responsibility, then of course when we discussed it with the ranking member we accepted that. And, of course, I think that we should just move on. Mr. Mica. Well, I do understand that he is here and he is available. I've never met him before, but I read his resume. And it said--this is from the Department Web site. It said that his work included the--he was with the Senate committee, I guess, and advising the Commerce Committee members led to his inclusion of several significant vehicle safety measures, including the electronic stability control mandate for every passenger vehicle. So he does have a certain amount of expertise. If we are going to look at the safety of equipment, I think it appears he not only is knowledgeable but has also had experience in passing legislation or influencing regulations in that regard. So I can withdraw my request. But, again, I am disappointed that he is not a witness, and I was led to believe, again, that he was on the witness list. Mr. Issa. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. Mica. Well, I will yield. Mr. Issa. Just very briefly on this point. Mr. Chairman, we are anticipating having another panel in a week or two. Would you agree to work with us on the possible inclusion of Mr. Strickland? Because, of course, we are going to be calling probably Bush administration people, and we can see the potential of that at the end of this hearing. Chairman Towns. I don't have a problem with that at all, because, let's face it, what we are talking about happened on the other watch. And of course we need to recognize that. So the point is that I think that is where our emphasis should be in terms of trying to make certain we talk to them. But I don't have a problem in terms of at some point asking Mr. Strickland to come forward. But the point is I think we should just move forward today. We have the Secretary with us. And I think---- Mr. Mica. I will withdraw my motion if it's acceptable, and will work with you. But then, if I am now recognized. Chairman Towns. I now recognize the gentleman for 5 minutes. Mr. Mica. NHTSA is the primary national safety transportation, surface safety transportation agency of the United States and the Department of Commerce; right, Mr. LaHood? Secretary LaHood. That is correct. Mr. Mica. Every account I have heard to date says that NHTSA failed and Toyota failed. The chairman said it in his opening statements yesterday. We heard that. I am sorry I can't talk to the NHTSA administrator today, but we will get an opportunity to hear from him. You opened your commentary, rightfully so, with safety being the primary responsibility of the Department of Transportation. Correct? Secretary LaHood. That is correct. Mr. Mica. And you now set the policy, and you have been there for a number of months. So I am somewhat baffled by the budget request of the administration from 2010 to 2011, the budget request that came out a few days ago, with the smallest request for increase in budget for our primary safety agency. It was only $5 million. And yesterday I said in the Transportation Committee that my dad used to say, It is not how much you spend but how you spend it, if you spend it wisely. But I think you know the concern Mr. Oberstar and I have had about safety and making that a priority, particularly in transportation and in NHTSA in particular. But it is a relatively modest amount. In fact, it is one of the lowest increases requested. Any reason for that? Secretary LaHood. We think that adding 66 new people at NHTSA probably gets us where we need to be in terms of really staying on top of our safety issues. Mr. Mica. You have 632 current positions. How many vacancies do you currently have? Secretary LaHood. I'll have to get back to you on the record for that. Mr. Mica. Does Mr. Strickland know? Maybe if Mr. Strickland or staff happen to know. Secretary LaHood. I will be happy to get back to you for the record. Mr. Mica. OK. And I would like, Mr. Chairman, to ask unanimous consent that, the number of FTE vacancies in NHTSA, be included in the record. Chairman Towns. Without objection. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.014 Mr. Mica. The issue of the revolving door of people going from NHTSA to the industry, it was stated that there's no communications that what you stated allowed between them. I have a copy of an e-mail in 2008 between Scott Yon of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the former NHTSA employee who works for Toyota. Are you aware that these types of communications went back and forth? Secretary LaHood. I saw that e-mail. Mr. Mica. Well, you did admit that we should tighten things up. I think that was your term. Secretary LaHood. Absolutely. Mr. Mica. Is there now a 2-year ban or a 1-year ban? Are you familiar with the restrictions on the revolving door? Secretary LaHood. Two-year ban. Mr. Mica. So I would be glad to hear your recommendation and support your recommendation to tighten this. Secretary LaHood. I will be happy to work with you on it. Mr. Mica. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit this document to the record to show that in fact there has been communications, and that we do need to close the revolving door. If it's just limited to Toyota---- Chairman Towns. Without objection. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.016 Mr. Mica [continuing]. It doesn't matter. I do have disappointment. Again, I don't want to get into all the specifics of where those bodies are directed or requested. It's not my intention to try to embarrass the Department. It's my intention to make certain that you have the resources to do the job that you need to do to ensure safety. Is there anything else you could recommend to either our Transportation Committee or Government Reform in the way of additional authority, personnel, or resources that would allow---- Secretary LaHood. Regarding safety? Mr. Mica. Yes. Secretary LaHood. I would love for every member of this committee to cosponsor the transit safety bill that Mr. Oberstar introduced. That's a good way to give us the opportunity to have oversight over transit systems, including WMATA, which had a terrible crash that sparked our interest in really getting into the safety business. And I would encourage every member of this committee to look at that bill. It is a good bill, and it gives us the authority, which we are prohibited from doing, to get into the safety business with respect to transit organizations. Mr. Mica. Well, and transit is one thing. Again, the Federal agency has say over Amtrak and freight rails, which have probably the worst safety record. But if you took all the fatalities in public transit over the years and compared it to the incidents that have been cited today in this one automobile part, I think we have a problem. Secretary LaHood. Mr. Mica, I don't minimize any fatality. I think one fatality is too many fatalities. And when eight people are killed here in Washington, DC, on America's Metro system, somebody needs to be looking out for safety. We want to do that. And I hope we can have your support to do it. Mr. Mica. Finally, I would venture to say, and there's an article in today's Post that if we had--we do have equipment that could provide that safety. Rather than spending on a bunch of people wandering around the tracks, our money would best be expended---- Secretary LaHood. You will be happy to know the President has proposed $150 million in the 2011 budget for WMATA for equipment. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Mica. And $5 million for the NHTSA budget, the lowest amount that I have in recent history. Thank you. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. I now yield to the gentleman from Ohio. But let me just say, before we do that, we have three votes; and, of course, we are going to continue through the votes, I just want to assure you of that. So as soon as you vote, you need to come right back, because we are going to continue. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized. Mr. Kucinich. I thank the chairman. Welcome, Secretary LaHood. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Mr. Kucinich. CBS had an exclusive where they were able to gain some internal documents that showed that Toyota redesigned software in 2005 in response to complaints that cars were accelerating unexpectedly. Are you familiar with those documents? Secretary LaHood. No, sir, I'm not. Mr. Kucinich. Is this the kind of issue that NHTSA has the ability to be able to get into? Secretary LaHood. Yes, sir. Mr. Kucinich. So are you interested in that kind of report? Secretary LaHood. Yes, sir. Mr. Kucinich. One of the suggestions made in that report is that the--by an electrical engineer--is that there may be a problem with systems design with respect to Toyota and, I would assume by reference, to their electronic throttle control. Does your Department have the technical ability to be able to analyze systems, design, engineering, mechanical, software, hardware, and all the elements that would be necessary to be able to come to a conclusion as to what the nature of unintended acceleration would be? Secretary LaHood. Yes, sir, we do. And we take our responsibility seriously. We have 125 engineers. We have electrical engineers. We are going to get into the weeds in a very thorough, comprehensive review on the electronics, because that issue has been raised enough that we need to do that. It's been raised by people who drive Toyotas, it's been raised by Members of Congress, and we are going to do it. Mr. Kucinich. The distance between Washington and Japan is well established. But the question is: What kind of ability do you have to send those who have the technical skills to analyze documents to Japan to get Toyota's cooperation in being able to review records of research from, let's say, 2004, 2005, on these models, internal documents that would tend to show whether or not Toyota was aware of any of these problems? Have you sent people specifically to do that? And if you haven't, do you intend to as part of your findings and your investigations? Secretary LaHood. We have asked for a voluminous amount of information from Toyota which we will review. If we need to go to Japan and meet with their engineers and get more information, that will be a part of our review. Mr. Kucinich. But you no doubt are aware that as an established and respected automobile manufacturer, that Toyota would have research documents within their control that would show the function of various components of their system. Secretary LaHood. Yes. Of course. Mr. Kucinich. And I think this is important, Madam Chair, that we hear from the Secretary on this, because his Department does have the ability to be able to get into this. And while we, as Members, get these documents, we can analyze them, we have help in being able to understand. Now, in the time that I have remaining, for the instruction of the membership and the public, could you walk us through how complaints are investigated? You know, who does the investigation? Can you enable us to learn, is this all in- house? Do you outsource any of your investigations? Secretary LaHood. Almost all of our investigations are done in-house by our experts. People file complaints with us, and we take them seriously. We look into them. When we decide that this is serious enough, we interview people; we look at all the possible written material from the automobile manufacturer, from people themselves, from--we gather the most comprehensive amount of information through interviews and research, and then make a judgment if a car needs to be recalled. Mr. Kucinich. Well, thank you, Mr. LaHood. I just want to make sure that you put on your agenda the issue of the redesign of software by Toyota engineers in 2005, because we want to see if Toyota's claim that electronics were not to blame--we want to see how that squares with the software redesign that occurred apparently in response to some kind of electronic problem. Secretary LaHood. It's on our radar. Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, very much, Mr. Secretary, and thank you for your service to our country. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Ms. Norton. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Secretary, I want you to know that the chairman has not morphed into a lady in red. He has gone to vote, and I am here pending the vote of the Congress to give the residents of the District of Columbia the same vote that your constituents had when you were here making trouble and doing good. Secretary LaHood. As a former Member, I supported your opportunity to do that, Ms. Norton. Ms. Norton. And we certainly will miss your vote when the bill comes up. We thank you. The Members will reappear. I call on, next, the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Souder, for 5 minutes. Mr. Souder. Thank you very much. Mr. Secretary, I want to say I always appreciated your your intelligence and your feistiness. It is how we arrive at truth, and it is the only way we get at truth. I appreciate that. First, let me say, so nothing is misunderstood, I don't represent a Toyota district. I represent a GM district. Fort Wayne is the proud manufacturer of the Silverado and the Sierra. My manufacturers supply all auto companies, but mostly the Big Three. But this whole ruckus about Toyota has bothered me personally in watching this process--100 percent risk free is your goal--because it is not really achievable. It is not achievable in bicycles or ice skating or horseback riding or anything. You try to get that. But we have kind of held them up to an artificial standard here. I am concerned that by dragging Mr. Toyoda through this, or asking questions like, ``Are you completely, 100 percent safe in a Toyota?'' What are you supposed to say? It leads me to ask a couple of questions, and you may not be able to answer all of these today, but I would really appreciate you looking at this because this needs a thorough looking at and a fair looking at, and not acting like it is just one car company. One thing is no vehicle is 100 percent safe; isn't that true? Secretary LaHood. Our goal is to make sure that vehicles are 100 percent safe, Mr. Souder. Mr. Souder. But no vehicle is 100 percent safe? Secretary LaHood. Our goal will continue to be to make sure that cars are 100 percent safe. Mr. Souder. Second, you said that all Toyotas that are on a safety recall, and you are even less confident of their safety if they are on a recall. Wouldn't you encourage people, if they have a safety recall on any of the car companies, of which you said this is one of the largest, but not the largest, any car company that has a safety---- Secretary LaHood. Of course. Absolutely. In the last 3 years, 23 million cars have been recalled and the vast majority of them have not been Toyotas. So anytime there is a recall, people should take their car in and get it fixed. Of course. Mr. Souder. Yes, and that is very logical. Right now, the whole world media is focused on one of the companies. I just want to make sure that---- Secretary LaHood. I can give you a whole list of cars that are on recall, Mr. Souder, and I would be happy to do that for the record. Mr. Souder. I would appreciate that. One of the challenges here is, and I know from my district, almost every supplier supplies all of the Big Three. We don't have enough suppliers anymore to be unique in the United States, and most of them supply some of Honda and Toyota. And one of the things that strikes me here is that you should find out, not just looking at Toyota, but where is a common supplier, and if that supplier was supplying just to Toyota, as opposed to other suppliers, if it is supplying other companies and it isn't occurring there, what would be the unique thing that is happening in Toyota? And I don't have confidence right now that is occurring, but I would think it is kind of a basic research question right now. You did represent an industrial district, too, that had companies, and I think that is a fair thing. Now, we also have a question of the difference between-- first, let me ask you, you agree with this, right, that some is sudden acceleration and some is slow return? Secretary LaHood. Yes. Mr. Souder. And that the deaths--which have dramatically increased since all the publicity, the allegations, but the proven number was 14, then it went up to 39 that are now in question, and more coming--were all related to the sudden acceleration and not the slow return? The slow return, I think you correctly said, is a potential danger, but the sudden acceleration, every single one of the deaths related to that? Secretary LaHood. That's correct. Mr. Souder. CTS is one of the suppliers. They are not in my district, they are in Joe Donnelly's, but a lot of the people work in my district. And in visiting them, they had the slow return and they were first fingered by Toyota. But in fact, none of the parts on the sudden acceleration were actually made in the United States, they were all Japanese suppliers. I think we need to look comprehensively by model and start to look at this unique supplier question because, for example, CTS supplies several different companies, whether those Japanese suppliers in fact supply other companies as well in this supply system. Another thing I would appreciate more detail on is one of the things that I am worried about happening in the regulation is, as was just stated a number of times, was that Toyota was looking at this and they were researching this and Europe had different standards so they started to do that. One of the dangers here with the lawsuits, and particularly watching what is happening with Toyota sales right now, is around the world they are getting basically, in my opinion, smeared. Possibly justly. I don't know all of the details yet. But they are getting attacked before all of the evidence is in, as I just suggested, with the suppliers. Part of the question here is, will we in fact have a discouraging impact on companies doing--checking out every concern if it is going to be drug into the public eye, that documents are going to be released--and I am not accusing you, but this committee may be responsible for that--before all of the evidence is in? One of the challenges here, we ran into this with the trailer controversy in FEMA, which clearly now has not been established, but had this big bubble. We said zero toxins, and then we find out that this room had more toxins in it than the trailers. We are finding this in orthopedic devices. We are finding this in all kinds of things that we kind of react, and then the companies are afraid even to do the research. The bureaucrats and the organizations require more and more paperwork. We drive prices up because all vehicles and all parts are a combination of what is convenience, what is price, what is the tolerance when you go to 99.9 versus 99.7. There's cost to the consumers. If we all drove 20 miles an hour, we would have fewer deaths. In this process, are you at all concerned that we are going to silence research by the manufacturers and increase risks or increase costs or other types of things? Secretary LaHood. Not at all. I think what we will do is sensitize manufacturers to the idea that safety has to be their No. 1 priority, and until they get to that point, they should manufacture cars where they can tell the driving public they are going to be safe. Mr. Souder. Won't lowering the speed limit to 30 save a lot more lives? Secretary LaHood. Well, the research doesn't show that. Look it, on an interstate highway, we have minimum speed limits. Look, Mr. Souder, that is not a very good illustration. Lowering the speed limit on an interstate highway to 30 would make it very dangerous. Mr. Souder. The reason you have a minimum is because you have a maximum. If you lowered the maximum to 30, you wouldn't need a minimum. The point being you can save lives with other types of things. Secretary LaHood. I don't buy your argument, Mr. Souder. Mr. Souder. The question is: What is the tradeoff of lives, convenience, and so on. We have seen this in horseback riding and we have seen it in skateboarding. You have a difficult job. Your goal is 100 percent. But we have to have some balance here between risk, cost, and benefit. Secretary LaHood. Madam Chair, our job is not for people who ride horses or skateboards. Our job is for people who ride cars. And our goal is that when people get in a car, they want to make sure that it is 100 percent safe. We are not going to sleep until that happens with Toyota. Ms. Norton. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. Secretary, I recognize that this problem started perhaps as early as 2000. You've only been in office less than a year. My question really goes to going forward. You've I think been a stand-up Secretary. You haven't cast blame to those who came before you. I'm interested in the capacity of the agency, and I use the word ``capacity.'' We have talked about 66 new people. That sounds good to all of us, particularly in this climate. It sounds responsive. More troubling to me was news that Toyota's engineers and technology experts were simply not there, that NHTSA didn't even have people capable of doing the technical work that would have been necessary to look closely at what Toyota was doing. So when you look at these 66 people going forward, are we going to have experts in the agency that can go toe to toe with Toyota and anybody else? How are you dividing up these new people so we know we have people with the technical capacity to do the job, as apparently was not the case, because you have engineers from Toyota saying to the press, ``I didn't know how to do the work that was necessary in electronics?'' Secretary LaHood. We will find--the climate we are in today with the economy, I have no doubt we are going to find the very best experts that we can to fill these positions. And we will resource them in areas where we need them, as quickly as the Congress passes our budget. Ms. Norton. And in division of labor, as experts versus other kinds of people, there were missing experts, were there not, at NHTSA during the last few years? Secretary LaHood. Yes. Yes. Ms. Norton. So in filling the gaps, are you focusing on these technological experts, these engineers? Secretary LaHood. Yes. We will fill the positions with people when we see the direction where our investigations are going and what we see as the way forward for looking at complaints. Ms. Norton. Mr. Secretary, I have to ask you about the notorious culture of secrecy that even is admitted in Japan and whether or not issues of competence and candor came together encapsulated in a culture which apparently was not as open as some would have it. Have you had difficulty penetrating the Toyota culture which teaches that these are things that should not be aired in public? Secretary LaHood. Yes. Ms. Norton. How are you penetrating that? Secretary LaHood. Well, we have had some issues, and that's the reason when the acting administrator, Ron Medford, came to me and said, ``I need to go to Japan and talk to these people directly,'' I said, ``Get on a plane tonight.'' And he went and he talked directly to the people in Japan. And I picked up the phone and I talked personally to Mr. Toyoda, and I told him these are serious matters and they need to be taken seriously. As I said earlier, I am pleased that he accepted the invitation of this committee to appear here. I think that begins to build the kind of communication and opportunity for people to really talk to one another about how we solve these problems in the future. Ms. Norton. Well, let's take the sticky pedal issue. We now know that Toyota--because Toyota said that it knew of this issue as early as 2008, but it didn't decide to make those changes in the United States until over a year later, is it accurate that they knew about it and, over a year, delayed in making the necessary changes, and how do they justify that to your agency? Secretary LaHood. Madam Chair, I would rather just give you the details for the record, if I could, rather than getting into the specifics. Ms. Norton. Say that again. Secretary LaHood. I would like to put that on the record so I can be very specific about the chronology of it and how it took place. Ms. Norton. Mr. Secretary, that really is going to be necessary. It is that lag that makes everybody driving a Toyota today wonder whether or not a few months from now they will hear about another recall that they should have heard about prior to that. It is very important to get that on the record as soon as you can. I understand the necessity to do so in the spirit of accuracy. Secretary LaHood. We will do it very quickly. Ms. Norton. In meeting with the committee staff, officials from your agency said Toyota had been dragging its feet--that's in quotes, that's from the staff--when it comes to working with your agency to solve the issues. Do you believe that Toyota has been slow to respond to safety concerns raised by the Department and by NHTSA? Secretary LaHood. Yes, I do. That's the reason we went to Japan. That's the reason I talked to Mr. Toyoda directly. That's the reason we've had these discussions. Ms. Norton. Do you believe now that the candor and the rapid response that you are demanding you are receiving? In other words, this notion that if you take your time, that was apparently a part of the culture of Toyota, these things will work out? When it comes to these cars, that will not be tolerated? That somehow what they say to you, you now can trust? Secretary LaHood. I said yesterday at the other hearing, Madam Chair, that I think the business model for Toyota where they have some very, very good people in North America, very good people--their issues may not have always been communicated or heard in Japan. But I do think that the fact that Mr. Toyoda is here, that he is testifying, that he is willing to answer questions, things have changed. His visit here has been a game changer. Ms. Norton. It is very important for Toyota owners to hear that the game is really different now, Mr. Secretary. However, I am looking at a big ream of paper, and I must congratulate your new administrator because it was sent apparently on February 16th. He has not been in office very long, as you indicated. They contain over 100 questions as of now, seeking information about this crisis. It would lead us to believe that even now you are somewhat skeptical about what you are hearing from Toyota because you have had to send a whole ream of entirely new questions to Toyota about what appears to be this whole set of issues, even though you have penetrated very deeply already and gotten countless recalls and countless information anew from Toyota. What is the meaning of having to send so big a pile? These are three separate letters from different parts of NHTSA. How are we to interpret at this date the necessity to get this much new information from Toyota? Or is it new information? Secretary LaHood. Some of it will be new information. I made a judgment and a decision that we would do the most comprehensive review, going back as far as we possibly could, to get information so we can make a judgment about whether they were forthright, whether we had the information, whether we were making judgment calls based on everything we had. We need to see all of that so we can determine if Toyota was forthright, because we have the ability to issue penalties if they weren't. But before we decide that, we want to make sure that they give it all to us, and did we get it all to begin with. Ms. Norton. Now, how common is it to have to send such a big pile of letters so late in a controversy to get the information that is necessary? You've had recalls. What's new about this is recurrent, almost rolling recalls. Secretary LaHood. We felt it was necessary to do--really do the total comprehensive review of this to make sure we got it right. Ms. Norton. Let me ask you about what you believe happened to a company that stole the thunder from other companies--and most especially companies in the United States--based, it would seem initially, almost primarily on the safety and quality of its product, built a reputation of products that were so thoroughly, and done with such high quality, were so trustworthy on the road. That rising star was Toyota. And we have automobile companies in the United States in receivership essentially, owned by the United States. One of the things that is very hard for Toyota owners to understand is how that stellar reputation so quickly--or was it quickly--got lost so that you would now perhaps rank Toyotas among the worst of automobile companies in terms of safety and reliability? What did they do wrong that got them to this low point in what had been a very lofty and well-regarded history of operation? Secretary LaHood. Madam Chair, some of what I would say would be conjecture. But certainly on the safety side, I think Toyota became a little bit safety deaf. Ms. Norton. Was it because they were so big? Secretary LaHood. Well, look, I don't want to conjecture on these things because it would just be my opinion. But on the safety part of it, which I think is something we know about at DOT, I do believe that they were safety deaf. I also believe their business model for communicating between North America and Japan needs some change. Ms. Norton. Meaning that Japan calls the shots even in North America? Secretary LaHood. Just that they need to listen to one another and hear what one another are saying. Ms. Norton. Let's take the override systems. When we talk about quality and the type of quality that one would expect from Toyota, even if one didn't expect it from other companies, apparently when it came to brakes, other companies did have override systems in their vehicles that would have allowed them to be easily stopped. Why, and I am sure you have asked Toyota, wasn't override, which apparently was common enough to be in other makes of cars, why did they not do override in the Toyota? Secretary LaHood. Mr. Lentz, the CEO of Toyota, announced yesterday that they are putting this override capability in a number of cars. Ms. Norton. You betcha, after loss of life. But this was not something they had to discover. What would have led a company of such reputation not to include that override when it was already included in other makes of cars? Secretary LaHood. Well, I would just be conjecturing on that. I think Mr. Toyoda may be able to answer that. Ms. Norton. Maybe we need to ask him. But Mr. Secretary, unless we can discover why Toyota decided to throw overboard the kinds of safeguards we understand would have been in early Toyotas, we won't be able to make sure that they are not doing it. In other words, ultimately brake overrides, we will have to say whether everybody should have brake overrides. And we will have to know whether those kinds of things get left out of cars because people are trying to save money or because people are trying to keep up with the competition. We have to know why. That is not a small thing, and it is a matter of some genuine, I think, skepticism and curiosity on the part of all of us. Now, one auto consultant said in a recent report, ``Regardless of the causes of sudden acceleration in Toyota and Lexus vehicles, it is apparent that the automaker's first step should be measures aimed at protecting the public. The implementation of a brake to idle override feature across all model lines and years may be a significant step in that direction.'' Do you think that such features should now be in all automobiles, Mr. Secretary? Secretary LaHood. You know, I would rather base that kind of a judgment on good research and a number of things. I'm not going to--we need to really look at that, Madam Chair. I can't render a judgment on that at the moment. Ms. Norton. Mr. Secretary, I wish you would take a look at it, because I think now everybody is going to want to know what is the minimum safety equipment that should be in every automobile sold in the United States. Let me go on to another series of questions. The committee has an e-mail between NHTSA investigators and Toyota from January of this year. There is a reference to an accident that occurred in Texas and NHTSA's request to download data from the event recorder in that vehicle. From reading this e-mail, it would appear that NHTSA is unable to download this data on its own without Toyota's presence. Is that correct? Secretary LaHood. We have over 7,600 EDR files in our crash data. The commercial available tool only reads GM, Ford, Chrysler. Toyota has a proprietary EDR which is the system that only they can read. Ms. Norton. Why is it proprietary? Why can they only read it? It is not proprietary for the others. This is what I mean by the culture of secrecy. It is ours, even though these kinds of things are made known by other automakers, we're not going to do it. Would your agency allow that kind of secrecy on that kind of important matter to continue? Secretary LaHood. No. Ms. Norton. I'm pleased to hear that. Should there be a Federal standard there, do you think? Secretary LaHood. Let me get back to you on that. Ms. Norton. It is very important. We need to know what the standards are. Secretary LaHood. Right. Ms. Norton. What the new standards are. And you recognize, Mr. Secretary, all of these questions are, yes, based on what has happened, but based on going forward, because that was on their watch, now you're on your watch? Secretary LaHood. Right. Ms. Norton. Do you believe that Toyota should make the black box data more easily available to law enforcement and NHTSA? Secretary LaHood. Yes. Ms. Norton. Thank you. According to testimony that we are going to get later, I understand NHTSA has a standard that allows companies to choose whether to install black boxes in cars, and requires that any installed recorder track certain types of information. Some experts have suggested that we need a Federal safety standard, and I would like to know your opinion on this matter. Secretary LaHood. That's something we are looking at. Ms. Norton. Could I ask you, Mr. Secretary, how long you think it will take to come up with a basic safety standard for all automobiles? We are asking you some questions which you certainly cannot answer until the Toyota investigation at the very least is over. I am now, I think, speaking for people who are driving Lexuses and Toyotas, about whether they can expect that the agency, doing its due diligence, will come up with something that means I've been driving an unsafe automobile. That's why the time factor turns out to be important on this. How long do you think that it will take us to know, or NHTSA to know? Secretary LaHood. Rather than giving you a time, Madam Chair, I would rather get back to you so we can figure this out. Ms. Norton. I wish you would give us an understanding just how difficult that is. When I look at this ream of new material, I'm not asking you not to go through it, but I am thinking about how many nervous folks are out there wondering if they would be next. Secretary LaHood. Would you mind if we take a brief recess? Maybe the only advantage of you not having a vote is you can continue asking me questions, but I wouldn't mind taking a break, if you don't mind. Ms. Norton. Mr. Secretary, in light of your great patience in being here while I sat alone asking you questions, I could hardly refuse you. Ten minute break. [Recess.] Ms. Norton. We will reconvene with Mr. Duncan of Tennessee recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Secretary, I don't see how anybody could have done a better job during this first year. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Mr. Duncan. Rampage, as you describe it, about texting and other electronic devices while driving. I hope you will keep pushing that just as much as you can. Let me ask you, is there anything that Toyota should be doing now, that the Department feels that Toyota should be doing now, that they are not doing? Are you satisfied with their response? Secretary LaHood. Well, we have sent them a request for a lot of information. I believe they will comply. We want to look back and look at a lot of documents to determine what went wrong earlier on, if anything went wrong earlier on. So that request is pending. We know they will be doing their--gathering the information that we have asked for. We want their cooperation as we look in depth at this electronics issue because we are going into the weeds on this. People have asked us to do this. We think that it is important to do it. Some people believe that electronics are a part of the problem and it is our responsibility to really check that out. So we are going to do that. We need their cooperation on that. I don't know that they won't cooperate. There have been some studies done by some people that they hired, but also by a fellow at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale. We want to look at that information. We want to know if they have any information independent of the people that they have hired. We will continue to look into that aspect of their automobiles. Mr. Duncan. Let me ask you a couple of other things. I seem to recall that I read that NHTSA has approximately 700 employees; is that correct? Secretary LaHood. Round numbers, that is pretty accurate. Mr. Duncan. There was some mention of this occurring, some of the bad things happening on somebody else's watch, but most of those employees are civil service employees, I assume. And most of those employees are still there today that were there. Secretary LaHood. Some of them are, and they are all career people. Mr. Duncan. Right. Judging from your earlier testimony, you are pretty satisfied with the response that they made at the time, or the investigations that were made at the time, and what has been done since you came on board? Secretary LaHood. One of the reasons that we made this huge request to Toyota, we want to make sure when our people put eyes on paperwork prior to this, that we had everything. But I tell you this, we have some of the most professional career people. They take their jobs very seriously when it comes to safety because they know the work they do could save lives and save inuries. But we want to make sure that they had all of the information. Mr. Duncan. All right. I have heard on the news, and I don't know what the details are, but there apparently was some braggadocio, or at least happiness, by some Toyota engineers or Toyota employees for getting NHTSA to reduce an earlier recall or hold it down to a very small number, and they have claimed that they saved Toyota $100 million or some huge amount of money. Do you know about that? Secretary LaHood. No, I saw the press reports where Toyota was talking about that. But I will tell you this, Mr. Dunning: We are not going to compromise when it comes to safety, not on my watch. We are going to hold Toyota's feet to the fire. We are going to get all of this information. We are going to make sure that what we looked at before was correct. If there is new information, then we will put it out there. So Toyota made some statements about saving some money but from my point of view it will not be at the expense of safety. Mr. Duncan. These earlier reports about NHTSA not having electrical engineers or software engineers, you said that was untrue and you have plenty of electrical and software engineers. Secretary LaHood. We have electrical engineers. We have over 200 engineers, total about 230, and we have electrical engineers. Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much. Chairman Towns. The time of the gentleman has expired. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois, Congressman Quigley. Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. My colleague, Ms. Norton, raised the issues and, again, discussing the black box issue at some point. Is it true that NHTSA issued a voluntary standard as it relates to black boxes, asking that they be included, that they be used in cars? Secretary LaHood. Voluntary to have it, mandatory if you do have it. For reporting. Mr. Quigley. In light of what we have learned so far, and perhaps in light of what we don't know because you mentioned yourself, we are not sure it's the electronics, or someone is not sure it's electronics, does it make sense now, given the fact that this information lag is dangerous, that we require it? Secretary LaHood. That is something that we are looking into. Mr. Quigley. Is it because of cost? Secretary LaHood. The answer, Mr. Quigley, is that we will find out if they should be mandatory or not. We are looking into it. Mr. Quigley. Back to the issue of electronics, then, and whether or not that is an issue, do you or do the folks who work with you, are they aware that the electronics that are used in Toyotas are being--it is the same type of software that is being used in all makes of relatively new cars? And if that's the case, to act proactively, shouldn't we be looking at the sum and substance of that software to see if it can't be an issue with all makes as well? Secretary LaHood. Of course, and that's what we are going to do. I said earlier in my testimony and in response to other questions, we are going to do a comprehensive, complete review on the electronics because people think that it has caused some of these accidents. Members of Congress think that. It is our obligation to check it out, whether it is in Toyota or any other car. Mr. Quigley. Well, have we started talking to other automakers about their electronics and the issues they may or may not have had? Secretary LaHood. We are going to do a comprehensive review. Mr. Quigley. I know what you're going to do, so I'm just asking, have we done that---- Secretary LaHood. We're starting it. Have we done it before? Is that what you're asking me? Mr. Quigley. Yes. Secretary LaHood. We are just starting, because of all of the complaints we have heard. Mr. Quigley. We have heard these complaints for how long? Secretary LaHood. On the electronics, since really the issue of the floor mat. We really started hearing about the electronics when we identified what we thought the problem was and then we issued the three recalls. So we have made a decision to look at the electronics now. Mr. Quigley. What would you suggest your timeframe would be either to get back to us or to the public in terms of your recommendations on the electronics, dealing with other makers and the issue of whether or not to make the black boxes mandatory? Secretary LaHood. I will get back to you. I don't know how long this is going to take. It's going to be a complete review. And as you've indicated, it should be on other makes of automobiles that use the same kind of electronics. It's going to be a comprehensive study. I'll get back to you for the record when our results will be available. Mr. Quigley. Given your answers, I will close with the following. It seems like we are flying blind. The makers and yourself seem to be saying that we don't know enough. So that information lag would seem to at first beg the question that we have the black boxes in all these new cars so we don't have to go back and say what happened. We know as it happens, immediately. So I know you want to review it and think about it, but it seems the key missing ingredient here is what happened and why. If we had the black boxes, perhaps we would have a better answer already and we would be acting quicker to solve these problems. So it just makes sense to me to start moving quickly. You made it mandatory, why not make it mandatory now so we go forward with more information? Secretary LaHood. I take your point. Mr. Quigley. I yield back the balance of my time. Chairman Towns. I thank the gentleman from Illinois. Thank you very much for your comments. The gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, does the government treat Toyota the same as it does all of the other automakers? Secretary LaHood. In the last 3 years, we have had 23 million recalls. The vast majority have not been Toyota. The answer is absolutely correct. Yes. Mr. Chaffetz. My understanding is the GM Cobalt, which I happen to own--I was surprised after learning this information. In February NHTSA opened an investigation into the steering mechanism in the GM Cobalt based on 1,157 complaints. My understanding is that based on 84 complaints, the model year 2009 Corollas were also opened up. Two questions: Why did it take NHTSA so long, when we are talking about model year 2005 and 2006 Cobalts, to jump into this fray? And why is there such an apparent discrepancy between the number of Cobalts versus the number of Corollas? Secretary LaHood. You mean the number of complaints? Mr. Chaffetz. Yes. Secretary LaHood. There are 30,000 complaints a year. Every one is taken seriously. We look at every one. We review every one, and we make a judgment call about when to start an investigation. Mr. Chaffetz. Why did it take so long? A thousand complaints. Secretary LaHood. I will have to get back to you. I don't know the specifics on that. But I want you to know this---- Mr. Chaffetz. Well, 1 out of every 30 complaints is about this Cobalt, according to your stats. Why did it take so long? Secretary LaHood. I will get back to you for the record. Mr. Chaffetz. And what is the current status of this? Secretary LaHood. It is under investigation. Mr. Chaffetz. Do you honestly believe that Toyota is being held to exactly the same standard as General Motors and everybody else? Secretary LaHood. Absolutely, 100 percent. Mr. Chaffetz. Is there any sort of interaction with the United Auto Workers on any part of this whatsoever? Secretary LaHood. Absolutely not. Mr. Chaffetz. What is the so-called negotiation? I don't understand why a regulatory body involved in safety and security has to enter into a negotiation with a company. I'm not understanding that term and what that really means. Secretary LaHood. Well, we want to talk to them. We need to get information from them. We need to talk to them about what our investigation is about and what we are looking at, what kinds of information we need in order to do the good investigation that needs to be done. Mr. Chaffetz. My understanding is there is a February 5, 2010, report entitled, ``Toyota's Sudden Unintendend Acceleration'' which claimed that NHTSA's incomplete investigative findings are ``certainly the result of insufficient resources.'' Do you believe it is common for NHTSA to not be able to go as fully into these problems and challenges because of insufficient resources? Or is it some other reason? Secretary LaHood. We have resources. As I said, we have about 125 engineers. We have electrical engineers. I believe we have the resources in the President's budget proposed for 2011; 66 additional slots would come to NHTSA if that budget were approved by Congress. Mr. Chaffetz. My understanding is that it is common, standard language for NHTSA to say, if a defect petition is denied by NHTSA, to use the language, ``In view of the need to allocate and prioritize NHTSA's limited resources to best accomplish the agency's safety mission, the petition is denied.'' Is there a reason that language is routinely used? If you are saying that you do have sufficient resources and you are using the statement on a regular basis, they seem to contradict each other. Secretary LaHood. You know, I will have to get back to you on that. I don't know the reference that you are making on that. Mr. Chaffetz. There have been some anecdotal allegations--I don't know if they are true, that is why I am asking the question--that there seems to be an increase in the number of attorneys that are going into NHTSA and a decrease in the number of engineers. Can you give me a sense of what is really happening in terms of the balance of the employees? Secretary LaHood. I will put it on the record, how many attorneys versus how many engineers. Mr. Chaffetz. I'm sorry, you don't know? Secretary LaHood. I want to be accurate because I am under oath. If you want to know the exact number of lawyers versus the exact number of engineers, I will put it on the record for you. Mr. Chaffetz. That would be great. Are there any other failures that we see within the system, or complaints or concerns by citizens, that have been given to NHTSA, that are above and beyond the number that we saw with Toyota, that have not gone into this category of being recalled or gone into some other---- Secretary LaHood. I would say the one thing that I have already talked about is the electronics, and that is something, as I said, we are going to review because people have come to us, both Toyota drivers and owners and Members of Congress, who believe that the electronics are a problem. And we are going to look into that. Mr. Chaffetz. Do you believe there is too cozy of a relationship between NHTSA and the industry? And the second part of that question---- Secretary LaHood. No, absolutely not. Mr. Chaffetz. Why would Toyota not hire former NHTSA employees if not to just engender a more cozy relationship? Secretary LaHood. You'll have to ask the employees. There is not a ``cozy relationship.'' In the last 3 years, we have recalled 23 million cars. Chairman Towns [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Towns. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper. Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. You have been on both sides of these congressional hearings, so you know what it is like. Way back in 2007, an enterprising TV journalist in Nashville, TN, for the NBC affiliate, Jeremy Finley, reported on a story about the Toyota Tacoma, an unfortunate accident in our area, unexplained circumstances. But unlike most reporters, he dug deeper. He found 20 cases all over America. He went from Phoenix to Boston. He interviewed former NHTSA head, Joan Claybrook, who said, ``I think what you've encountered here is a safety defect of significant proportions.'' He interviewed other experts. In 2008, apparently NHTSA took a quick look but rapidly closed its investigation, telling folks that ``In view of the need to allocate and prioritize NHTSA's limited resources to best accomplish the agency's safety mission, the petition is denied.'' NHTSA didn't say there wasn't a problem. They basically said they had other, more important things to look at. Now, we all know that we want to get to the truth here. I would urge you and NHTSA to make sure that you are asking Congress for whatever resources you need, that you are prioritizing appropriately, and if you could give us assurances that you are looking into all models. I know that you are a good person. You inherited a lot of responsibilities, but the public is demanding answers. Secretary LaHood. May I just read something here, Mr. Cooper: The Tacoma 2005 through 2010 is subject to the pedal entrapment recall announced in October 2009. The Tacoma is not subject to the sticky pedal recall because it applies only to vehicles that have a certain pedal manufactured by CTS. And the Tacoma was not subject to the floor mat recall in 2007 because the evidence available did not indicate the floor mat was a problem. We have identified 33 relevant complaints and, as I indicated, those model years are under a recall. Mr. Cooper. You know as well as I do that families who own a vehicle may not be expert as to whether it is a pedal entrapment problem or a floor mat problem or a sticky pedal problem. They just want a safe ride for themselves and their families. So we need to be getting about the business of offering safe rides to folks. Secretary LaHood. I agree with that. Mr. Cooper. My concern is this. We need a strong safety agency so that they can catch safety problems promptly and save lives. We also need a safety agency that is not captured or beholdened to industry, so it has the credibility that once safety problems have been resolved, that people feel comfortable riding in the vehicles again, because there are a lot of innocent victims at the front-end when lives are lost and at the back-end when livelihoods are lost. So I am hopeful we can restore Toyota's credibility, get to the bottom of this rapidly, and start encouraging commerce again and safe rides all over this country. I appreciate your service not only in this body but also in the executive branch, and just make sure that you ask us for whatever you need to get the job done. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Mr. Cooper. I yield back. Chairman Towns. Thank you. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake. Mr. Flake. I thank the chairman. Welcome back, Mr. Secretary. It is good to see you. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Mr. Flake. I just want to follow along the lines Mr. Chaffetz did, talking about whether all car companies, domestic and foreign, will be treated equally. And I know you emphatically stated, yes, they are and will be. But he seemed to present some statistics that show that at least--and I know a body like this shouldn't just accept an emphatic statement, ``yes, we will,'' you ought to look at the complaints and statistics and wonder if that is the case or will be the case. This recall is likely to cost Toyota untold billions of dollars. A similar recall of a GM product, for example, would be similar. That cost, because of our investment of taxpayer dollars into this bailout, would reflect on the taxpayers as well. So I don't think it is out of line to question and at least caution that the Department of Transportation and NHTSA be extremely careful in how they accept and deal with complaints that come in, to ensure that government isn't taking sides in an area where we have a big investment. I was just a little bit disturbed by the emphatic statement, ``Believe me when I say yes,'' rather than ``Well, if there are statistics that may appear to reflect some kind of favoritism, we will look into that.'' Do we have a commitment that is the case and not just saying, yes, they will be treated fairly and you should trust us, but we will look into the statistics on complaints and how they are dealt with by NHTSA? Secretary LaHood. Well, Mr. Flake, let me stipulate, when it comes to safety, there will be no compromises. There will be no cozy relationships. There will be no sweetheart deals. You have my commitment on that. Not under my watch. And as I said earlier, if you look at any speech I gave last year, it was on safety. Whether it was on planes, trains, or automobiles, it was on safety. That is our obligation to the public. I don't buy this argument that because the government owns 60 percent of GM that we are going to turn a blind eye to that. That is nonsense. We would never do that. It will never happen under my watch. I guarantee you that. Look, Mr. Flake, you and I have worked on a lot of issues together. Mr. Flake. We have. And I understand your commitment. A lot of this was prior to your entrance there. But I guess what I'm looking for is a recognition that hey, on the outside, one could question whether or not government, the Federal Government, with a substantial investment of taxpayer dollars into a couple of domestic automakers might be under a pretty high standard here, and we ought to look at complaints and make sure that we are treating them fairly rather than just saying yes, we will treat them fairly, trust me. I trust you. I may not trust everybody that I don't know, that I haven't seen. It goes a lot further, I think, with a lot of us to hear yes, that is something that we need to guard against. That is something that we need to be absolutely sure of. I can tell you in other areas government does favor areas, individuals, and others with whom investments are made. That's just the bottom line, that is how governments work, and that is human nature. I am asking for a little recognition that that is something we ought to be concerned about, and we are. Secretary LaHood. I recognize that. Mr. Flake. Thank you. Mr. Issa. Would the gentleman yield? Mr. Flake. I would yield. Mr. Issa. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, you earlier noted the investigation of the Cobalt, that it has been open. In your opening remarks, first set of remarks, you talked about the members of NHTSA who went to Japan and shortcutted an investigation by saving time and money and getting a voluntary cooperation early on, based on the end of a 2009 trip to Tokyo; is that right? Secretary LaHood. Yes. Mr. Issa. So we own 60 percent of General Motors. The Cobalt has had far more complaints on a reminiscently similar problem to where you have a recall on the Corolla. Are we doing this investigation in the slow road because General Motors is not willing to do what Toyota was willing to do when your people went to them last year? Secretary LaHood. Repeat the question. Mr. Issa. Wouldn't it save us money if General Motors would do what Toyota did and not make you go through the long investigation process on a car that has had far greater complaints and should be under the same scrutiny? Secretary LaHood. Our job is to do an investigation. If we can get cooperation, we get it. If we can't, we use every tool in our tool box to get to the bottom line, which is the safety of these cars. Mr. Issa. How about our majority interest in General Motors? We own 60 percent of them. Secretary LaHood. Ask me a question about it. Mr. Issa. Are you willing to ask General Motors to cooperate as fully as Toyota did with the Corolla on a car which has had more complaints for a longer period of time? Secretary LaHood. Yes. Mr. Issa. Thank you. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois, Congressman Davis. Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you and it is good to see you in this role. I want to commend you on the stellar job you have been doing since having been appointed and confirmed. Let me ask you, some believe that the uncontrollable sudden acceleration problems are not being caused by pedal entrapment or sticky pedals but by an electrical malfunction, either a software problem or electrical interference with some component of Toyota's computer systems. It is my understanding that the Department of Transportation has now launched an investigation into possible electrical interference as a possible cause; is that correct? Secretary LaHood. I would call it more of a very comprehensive review, and at some point we may get into an investigation. But we are going to do a thorough review and look at everything. And by that, I mean we know now as a result of testimony given yesterday, there is a fellow at Southern Illinois University who did a study, and we want to look at that and we want to look at what Toyota has done and look at all of the facts and then determine if, in fact, there is a problem. Mr. Davis. Can I ask you what precipitated or caused you to look at this particular area? Secretary LaHood. Complaints by people who own these cars and also Members of Congress who believe there is an electronics problem. Mr. Davis. It is my understanding that both Toyota and NHTSA have examined this issue before. What would be different now about the examination? Secretary LaHood. I think testimony that was given yesterday before the Commerce Committee, where a gentleman from SIU has done a study and he found that there were some problems. If there is fresh information, new information, we know Toyota hired some people to do a study, we want to look at that. We want our own engineers to look back. Look it, if people think there is a problem, we should look at that. That is our job to look at it. Mr. Davis. So you are not relying on past examinations and past experiences. You are really starting now? Secretary LaHood. Yes. We want to put eyes on the fresh information, the new information. Mr. Davis. Thank you very much. That gives me some assurance that we are going to do a thorough investigation. I commend you again for the work that you have done. Thank you. Secretary LaHood. Thank you, sir. Chairman Towns. I thank the gentleman from Illinois. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Luetkemeyer. Mr. Luetkemeyer. Mr. Secretary, thank you for the frankness of your answers today. Compared to some of the recent witnesses we have had, it is very refreshing. Thank you. I am kind of curious. To me the question here is the protocol or process that you have in place with regard to reviewing 30,000 complaints a year and what raises it to a level that you would start to investigate the floor mat problem, for instance. Can you give me a little overview of your process or protocol that you have in place with regard to how many complaints do you have to have, how serious they have to be, before they are raised to the level of requesting a recall from the manufacturer, and kind of walk us through the process? Secretary LaHood. I can't give you a number where you say, you know, once you get 25 complaints, that's it. That's the benchmark. It depends. The gentleman from Utah was questioning why it took 1,300 one place and a lesser number in another place. It is the seriousness of the complaint. It is our people who are experts really looking at these, driving, looking at the research, talking to the people who owned the automobile, talking to the car manufacturer, and really trying to discover if there is a serious flaw or defect or something wrong. It's a judgment call. Mr. Luetkemeyer. It is more individualized based on the particular incident that you are investigating. Secretary LaHood. That's right. And if there is a commonality. If there are 100 complaints and they are all about the same thing, obviously that is probably an issue that we need to look at. Mr. Luetkemeyer. I know a couple of Members were talking about trying to bring into the investigation information from other parts of the world. Have you done that at all with any recent investigation? Secretary LaHood. We do that. We try and get information from the foreign car manufacturers and other places in the world. We get, try to get, we look at it and see what it says. Mr. Luetkemeyer. I know that you mentioned that you are looking to try and get some more engineers on your watch here. And one of the things that the folks at Toyota have made a comment about is that they believe and the comment was ``the new team has less understanding of engineering issues and are more focused on primary legal issues.'' Do you think that is a fair statement? Is that the necessity for more engineers? Secretary LaHood. Is the statement that engineers are working on legal issues? Is that what that said? Mr. Luetkemeyer. What they are trying to say is that your focus is more on the legal part of it versus the actual engineering part where the problem really is. Secretary LaHood. I don't buy that argument. But, you know, if you want me to get you some statistics on it, I can do that for the record. Mr. Luetkemeyer. They are actually making the argument for more engineers for you. Secretary LaHood. Well, the President put in our budget 66 new positions, and we think that will be a good resource for us. Mr. Luetkemeyer. I think, quite frankly, a point needs to be made as well that, a lot of the problems we are dealing with today is their engineering versus the quality of the vehicle itself. I think that the manufacturing and the quality of the parts on the vehicle are not in question here; it is the engineering of these parts that cause some of the problems to happen. So I guess one more question I have with regards to all of this when you are starting to investigate, do you bring in outside experts as well to try and work on these issues? In other words, if you have an issue you are not--your engineers are not capable of doing, or actuarially you are not sure? Secretary LaHood. Absolutely. Mr. Luetkemeyer. Where do you go to get that information? What experts do you go to? Secretary LaHood. We go to people on the outside who are expert, electrical engineers, or mechanical engineers. We find--look at, there are a lot of good people around America who can provide expertise. And we are not bashful about doing that if we don't think we have it in-house. Mr. Luetkemeyer. Do you make recommendations to manufacturers on how to rectify a situation? Or do you leave it up to them? Secretary LaHood. We leave it up to them and we don't sign off on it. They come to us and say: We think this is the fix. But we don't put our stamp on it, but we make sure that they really believe this is the fix. Mr. Luetkemeyer. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your comments today. I yield back the balance of my time. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Chairman Towns. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia, Congressman Connolly. Mr. Connolly. With the consent of the chairman and the committee, I would like to yield my time to Mr. Lynch who has a pressing engagement, and reclaim my time at the appropriate point. Chairman Towns. Without objection. Mr. Lynch. I thank Congressman Connolly. I appreciate the courtesy. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Good to see you. We have the advantage in Congress of being able to look at things forensically after they happen, and you have the unfortunate disability that you have to make decisions as they occur. And I understand that difficulty. But I do want to say that, looking at this forensically, first, we had Toyota come out with the recall regarding the floor mats. All right. So I just think that is a red herring, and I am not sure that all of these problems are from somebody's floor mat. I think it is easily understood; it is somewhat user controlled. The second excuse was this very simplistic sounding ``sticky gas pedal,'' trying to make it sound very innocent. And now we have electronic interference, somewhat external, I guess, as the nature of the problem. And it just sounds like the problems are getting--or at least the solutions are getting more complicated as we go forward, more expensive, more pernicious. And I happened to read something by Steve Wozniak, the co-founder of Apple and he has a bunch of Priuses, but his most recent one is not one of the ones that was subject to any of the recalls. And he says, ``I have many models of the Prius that got recalled, but I have a new model that didn't get recalled.'' And this is a fellow who says a lot of things don't bother him in life except for computers that don't work and don't work right. And he says, ``This new model has an accelerator that goes wild, but only under certain conditions of cruise control. And I can repeat this over and over again safely.'' He said, ``This is software. It is not a bad accelerator pedal. It is very scary, but luckily for me'' he says, ``I can hit the brakes.'' Now, here is my problem, Mr. Secretary. My dealers are working night and day right now, my Toyota dealers, to fix the mats, the floor mats, the sticky pedal. They are going through these fixes. One of my dealers I talked to yesterday doing 175 fixes per day. He has all of his people working. And I appreciate that there is a real effort. But I am one of these Members of Congress who thinks that this is a software problem. And if we are bringing people in and fixing their sticky pedal, or fixing their floor mat and sending them back out on the road with the assurance that their car is fixed, we are sort of creating a moral hazard here, a situation that we are telling people that they have the reassurance now, because we have ``fixed it.'' But if this is still a problem that you are investigating and beginning to investigate, then we are making the problem more dangerous. And I am just concerned that is the phenomenon we have here, that this is at root, a software problem, something much more complex, something much more pernicious, something much tougher to get rid of. And we are playing with this by telling people, well, we are going to change your floor mat or we are going to oil your sticky pedal here and you will be OK. So how do we get at that? Secretary LaHood. Well, as you can imagine, Mr. Lynch, I mean, we have to base our judgments on research and on good data and making sure we know what we are talking about. When we say something, people listen to us. Mr. Lynch. Hopefully. Secretary LaHood. And until we do the complete review, the comprehensive review, look at all these things, we are not about to say something where it is just not accurate, you know, just for the point of---- Mr. Lynch. Well, you might be doing that already, is what I am getting at. If you are telling people there's a problem with the floor mat and it is not, or if you are telling people it's a sticky pedal and it's not. Secretary LaHood. Look, I don't agree with you. I mean, we wouldn't have told people to change out these floor mats if we didn't think our research showed that was a problem. We can prove that. We can prove the sticky pedal was a problem. We can prove it. Now, so, to say that is not accurate belies all the facts that we have. And we wouldn't be saying these things if it weren't true. Mr. Lynch. Well, I just think that we have to consider the fact that there very well could be a serious software problem here. And, again, I think we are in a very awkward position if we are telling people that changing out your floor mat is going to fix this or the sticky pedal solution is going to fix this, and yet we are sending people out in dangerous automobiles. I am just saying you have to weigh that in with the course of your investigation and the urgency with which you're investigating these more complicated or complex problems. Secretary LaHood. I take your point. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry. Mr. Fortenberry. Mr. Secretary, welcome. It is always my hope that congressional hearings have some sort of constructive outcome. And in that regard, it was discussed earlier, I believe, by Mr. Issa that a more transparent international marketplace for safety data sharing would be appropriate. In that regard as well, given that today's hearing is about Toyota's safety problems, and particularly this unintended acceleration problem which you have committed to continuing to research and work through, this has happened, though, across other car manufacturers, two other car manufacturers, from the data that I see. Has there been any discussion about developing some type of consortium and perhaps in partnership with NHTSA that would actually work toward a comprehensive evaluation of this so that there could be even broader safety outcomes for the public? Secretary LaHood. Well, we try and do these things based on the complaints that we hear from people. We do conduct these investigations. Mr. Fortenberry. This is out of our box, though. This is a policy consideration. Secretary LaHood. Pardon me? Mr. Fortenberry. This is a policy consideration. A potential change in policy. Secretary LaHood. I will be willing to look at it. But, I mean, it doesn't fit into what we are doing now. Mr. Fortenberry. Should it? Secretary LaHood. I think it is something we can look at. Look, I get lots of good ideas from coming to these hearings, and it is something that I would be happy to visit with you about and see. I mean, I am not going to sit here and tell you that it is something we are going to do because I don't know enough about what you are trying to purport here. But I'm willing to talk to you about it. Mr. Fortenberry. Again, what I said in the beginning, looking for constructive outcomes. That is the purity of my intention is to maybe think creatively about this, because right now, our attention has shifted to Toyota, and appropriately, trying to get to the bottom of these safety issues. But, again, given that this has happened across the industry, is there an opportunity to think more creatively policywise about a common fix using resources that we have or creating some type of consortium, again, that could look at this in partnership with the government to again improve or make the safety outcomes of this hearing and what you are doing even broader applicably. Secretary LaHood. Sure. I got you. Mr. Fortenberry. That is just a policy idea I put out to you. Secretary LaHood. Got you. Mr. Fortenberry. I yield the additional time that I have to Mr. Issa. Mr. Issa. I will be quick, and then Mr. Burton would like to ask a quick question. Mr. Secretary, you said that it depends on when you evaluate something how significant it is. But under the current system, the manufacturer doesn't give you every single complaint that occurs; so you are evaluating some and missing others. If there's a sticky pedal like this one in Great Britain and there's some reports, unless there is a recall you don't see it at all. Do you think that should change? Secretary LaHood. Look, when we go to the manufacturer and we ask them for information about complaints they have had about their vehicles, we hope they are going to be forthright with this. I mean, part of the process---- Mr. Issa. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. But the current law, they only have to tell you if there is a recall. Do you believe that it should change to where all information on like models worldwide be available? Secretary LaHood. I think the more information, the better. Mr. Issa. Do you have the authority to ask for that and receive it from the manufacturers, or do you need authority from Congress? Secretary LaHood. We ask the manufacturers when we get complaints about certain aspects, mechanical aspects, and we assume they are being forthright with us. Mr. Issa. Thank you. Mr. Fortenberry. Mr. Chairman, I will yield the remaining time to Mr. Burton. Mr. Burton. Let me just--Mr. Secretary, this floor mechanism was made in Japan and there hasn't been any problem with it. And this one was made in the United States. They both work on the same car. And this one is the one that they have had all the problems with, and they had to put a shim in so that there was proper clearance so it wouldn't stick. And my question is, why is it in the same car you have two different mechanisms, and one is causing the problem and one isn't? It seems to me that Toyota evidently knew that there was a problem maybe with one and not the other. And this one was used in Japan and Europe and this one was used in the United States, and this is the one that has caused the problem? Now, he just asked you a question about whether you have the authority. It seems, if there is a problem any place in the world, your agency ought to be able to get that information or demand that information so that you can look at a recall here in the United States even if it happened over in Europe someplace. And I would like for you maybe to ask--and I'm going to ask the president of Toyota about this today--why they have this difference. Mr. Souder. Would the gentleman yield? Chairman Towns. Mr. Fortenberry controls the time. Mr. Souder. Will the gentleman yield? Mr. Fortenberry. I yield the remaining time to Mr. Souder. Chairman Towns. Actually, the gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Souder. Point of order. The gentleman made a somewhat factual misstatement about a manufacturer in Indiana, and I think it is important to clarify the record because we went through this once earlier. The sticky pedal, which you said correctly, the one that had a slow return. But the Secretary testified that the slow return didn't have any of the deaths with it. It was the Japanese part that had the deaths. They did have to put that thing in. But there are two distinct things that happen with that pedal, and it's important that the record show that the American part, as we already established, did not cause the deaths. Chairman Towns. Let the gentleman know that Mr. Toyoda will be testifying later on. So I think that is an appropriate question that can be raised with him. Now I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Congressman Cuellar. Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Secretary, it is good seeing you again. I think the last time we saw each other was in San Antonio. It is a pleasure. I have an overhead that I would ask the staff to put on and I am going to ask your thoughts on this particular. It has to do with the percentage of vehicles affected by safety recalls from 2001 to 2010. I would ask you to take a look at that, Mr. Secretary, and just give me your thoughts on that, once they make it big enough so you can go ahead and look at that. Mr. Secretary--and I guess what I am looking at, I do have around my area, I do have the San Antonio plant there where 2,600 employees depend on the work that you do with the enforcement and regulator, and of course, what Toyota is going to do. That doesn't even include the onsite hires where you add another amount and it adds about 5,500 local jobs in our area. It doesn't include the dealer, it doesn't include that. So there's a lot of folks there depending on what we're doing, what you all are doing, and of course, jobs and of course, making sure that the drivers are safe. And if you can look at that, I think you see Toyota--if you can read that, Mr. Secretary, about 11 percent. And my question is, and I know you just got in a little over a year ago. But from the understanding over the past decade, what are we doing to respond to the recalls of other car makers in this particular graph? I mean, anything different than we are doing now? Secretary LaHood. When we believe that there needs to be a recall, we notify the manufacturer and then the recall takes place. And, as I said, over the last 3 years, 23 million cars have been recalled and the vast majority of them have not been Toyota. I can't read that chart, Mr. Cuellar, but if you want to---- Mr. Cuellar. Well, there is a company at 32 percent. This is from percentage of vehicles affected by safety recalls from 2001 to 2010, the last 10 years. Secretary LaHood. OK. Mr. Cuellar. You have one company at 32 percent, another company at 17 percent, another company at 15 percent, and then you have others, a combination of other companies. And then you have Toyota at 11 percent. Secretary LaHood. OK. Mr. Cuellar. This is, again, using NHTSA's recall data base from you all. Secretary LaHood. Right. Mr. Cuellar. I say that, Members, just so we can look at the overall picture of what we are looking at, No. 1. No. 2, I'm looking at your budget, Mr. Secretary, the fiscal year 2011. And you have been a legislator, and I guess I am asking your thoughts. Anything you think we ought to do in the budget to improve--I know it's your budget. I think I know what your answer is going to be. And, of course, any legislative responses that we ought to look at? And if you say budgets should stay that amount, no legislative changes, then what should we do differently to make sure that we protect our drivers and make sure we provide that safety and to make sure that car companies, in this case, Toyota, make sure that they respond as quickly as possible? Secretary LaHood. Well, I think some of the things that Mr. Issa mentioned as far as information, we may want to work with all of you on our ability to get information worldwide. And, you know, we may have some thoughts on that. With respect to our budget, we are grateful to the President for including 66 new positions. We can use those human resources and experts to help us do our work. Mr. Cuellar. Now, let me ask you this, Mr. Secretary. I understand that NHTSA took a trip to Japan to meet with top officials to press the seriousness of the safety issues. You noted that it was because of that trip that the actions were made because of the recalls. And I guess I have two questions. What measures did you take before NHTSA made the trip to Japan to discuss the seriousness of these issues? No. 1. And then I have a followup question. Secretary LaHood. We had several meetings with North America Toyota. And I want to stipulate that these are very professional, good people who take their jobs very seriously. And we met with them and talked with them several times about the issues that we felt were causing their vehicles to malfunction. Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Secretary, why travel to Japan? I mean, I know that there's a different hierarchy in the company, I understand that. But talking to Toyota USA, wouldn't that be sufficient? Or was there a necessity? Apparently it looked like there was a necessity to travel to Japan. Secretary LaHood. Mr. Lentz, the CEO of Toyota North America, stipulated yesterday at the hearing that he testified at that a lot of decisions are made in Japan. And when we determined that we needed to go to the people who were making the decisions so they understood that these are serious safety concerns and that we were going to take some pretty significant action, we wanted to go to the people that were making the decisions. Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. The gentleman yields back. Mr. Jordan of Ohio. Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you for joining us today. I think there's three quick questions. Let me go first to this concern, I think, was raised earlier by my colleagues from Utah and Arizona about this idea that government majority owner in General Motors and Chrysler and yet also the regulator, the competitors of those two companies, are there or have you or has NHTSA put any specific safeguards, any specific protocols in place, again, just to ensure impartial treatment when you are evaluating recalls and complaints you receive from any car manufacturer? Do you know of, like, specific things you have done, specific protocols, specific safeguards that have been enacted? Secretary LaHood. Have we put any safeguards in our relationship with companies other than Toyota? Is that what you are asking me? Mr. Jordan. I am just saying, just this perception that here we have the taxpayers, the majority owner of General Motors and--the government, the majority owner. Secretary LaHood. So you are asking me just about those two companies then, any safeguards, GM or Chrysler. Right? Mr. Jordan. Exactly. Secretary LaHood. We put no safeguards in. We don't have to. Safety is our No. 1 priority. When safety is our No. 1 priority, it's not going to be compromised by any kind of relationship we have with anybody. Never has been, never will be. Mr. Jordan. OK. Let me ask you along those same lines. In regarding specifically the Toyota recall situation, has anyone from General Motors contacted you about the Toyota recall situation? Secretary LaHood. You know, I will have to check, but not that I know of. But, you know, since I am--I want to be accurate on these things and I know this information is important to you, and I will personally let you know. But I don't think so. Mr. Jordan. How about anyone from Chrysler? Secretary LaHood. Not that I know of. Mr. Jordan. Anyone from the United Auto Workers? Secretary LaHood. No, sir. Mr. Jordan. Has anyone, specifically Ron Bloom or anyone else from the Auto Task Force, contacted you regarding the Toyota recall situation? Secretary LaHood. No, sir. Mr. Jordan. Last question then, Mr. Chairman. Earlier you said, Mr. Secretary, every Toyota car listed on the NHTSA recall Web site is unsafe. Is that just--is that statement accurate only about Toyota? Or does that mean any car listed from any company on a recall Web site list? Secretary LaHood. Any car, any company on our Web site that is listed for recall should be taken to the dealer so it can be made safe. Mr. Jordan. OK. Let me go back, if I could, Mr. Chairman. Back to any contact. Do you know of anyone--I asked you if you have been contacted. Do you know if anyone from NHTSA has been contacted by General Motors, Chrysler? Secretary LaHood. You know what, I'll have to get back to you for the record. We have lots of employees at NHTSA. There's no way I'd know that, but I will check it out and I will let you know. Mr. Jordan. I yield the remaining time to Mr. Issa. Mr. Issa. Mr. Secretary, this is within your scope even though it clearly is not something that anyone is going to say you could have taken care of immediately. But are you aware of any studies that show us, out of these 23 million recalls during that decade, how many cars got fixed? How many cars---- Secretary LaHood. I'll have to put that on the record for you. The 23 million is the last 3 years, not the decade. Mr. Issa. Of these 23 million, if you have or can get or can have a study done to let this committee know, out of 23 million cars that are unsafe--as Ralph Nader said, unsafe at any speed. But unsafe on the highway, there are 23 million cars. If, let's say, only 20 percent of them had their recalls applied--I don't think that's going to happen with Toyota, but it may happen with other less publicized recalls--then we have 90 percent of those 23 million unsafe and on the highway. Would you commit to us to find out how effective recalls are, what percentage actually get applied, and, as a result, how many cars are unsafe, in your opinion, my opinion, I suspect the chairman's opinion, so that we can evaluate whether or not better advertising or better compliance needs to occur? Secretary LaHood. Of course we will get you the information, Mr. Issa. But we are a little bit busy right now, too, so I hope you are not going to stipulate we do it within the next 24 or 48 hours. Mr. Issa. Of course not, Mr. Secretary. Although, if you need more resources, just ask. Secretary LaHood. Our people are very busy. But of course, we will provide you the information. Mr. Issa. And, Mr. Chairman, just one piece of patience. I am presuming that all it takes to get this information would be to contact the top 11 manufacturers and ask them to provide it, since they have it and you said they give you what you ask for. With that, I yield back to the gentleman. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize the gentlewoman from California, Congresswoman Chu. Ms. Chu. Secretary LaHood, congratulations on being confirmed as Secretary---- Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Ms. Chu [continuing]. Of Transportation. I have a question about the pattern of behavior at NHTSA that may have occurred before you got there, and it leads one to wonder, NHTSA is supposed to be a watchdog, but has it instead become a lap dog. And, in fact, some people believe that NHTSA has become too dependent on the manufacturers that it regulates to cooperate with the agency and volunteer information about what might be going wrong with a particular vehicle. While NHTSA sends letters asking for this information, it rarely uses a subpoena, which would be far superior in that it would require a full and complete response under threat of criminal penalties. Do you believe that NHTSA is aggressive enough in seeking information that it needs to keep the public safe? Secretary LaHood. I believe that we have been very aggressive. And if we need to use subpoena, we will use it, but we have lots of enforcement mechanisms. And I would also stipulate that on my watch, we have been a lapdog for nobody. We have been a lapdog for the people who drive cars and want to do them safely. That's who we have been a lapdog for. Safety is our No. 1 priority. I have been in this job since January 23, 2009. I am not a lapdog for anybody and none of our employees are, either. But we have good enforcement mechanisms, and we use them. And if we can't get the information, we have the opportunity to subpoena. Ms. Chu. If I could followup. According to the testimony that is going to be provided later by former NHTSA administrator, the Agency imposed no penalties from 2004 to 2008, and the largest penalty that the agency has ever imposed is $1 million. The TREAD Act of 2000 now authorizes much higher penalties. What would explain the lack of penalties that NHTSA has imposed in the last several years? Secretary LaHood. I will have to get back to you for the record on that. That was prior to my stewardship of this agency. But I will put that on the record for you. Ms. Chu. Thank you. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Chairman Towns. Does the gentlewoman yield back? Ms. Chu. Yes. I yield back. Chairman Towns. I now recognize the gentleman from California for 5 minutes, Congressman Bilbray. Mr. Bilbray. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, first of all, congratulations. I am glad to see a fellow classmate serving the Nation in a different set. But I can't think of a better choice that the President could have made, and so I am glad to see you there. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Mr. Bilbray. I happen to drive one of these vehicles, hopefully, safely, and will correct whatever we need to. But in San Diego, we ended up having this incident where a Highway Patrolman driving his wife, his child, and his brother-in-law ended up basically dying because of the mat issue. When I look down those lists, I am wondering, though, from an observation from a distance, that could have the reputation of Toyota actually been a contributing factor in how this process was handled? Some may not know, but Toyota is ranked absolute top, second only maybe to Mercedes and Porsche, for satisfaction for reputation. And I guess if you drive a Porsche you had darned well be happy for the vehicle if you paid for it. But is it possible that in this process the great reputation of dependability and safety that Toyota has created over the last 30 years created an inadvertent prejudice against more strict review because everybody always assumed in the last 20 years--and let me just stop and say 10 years from now--10 years ago, if you and I would have said we would be here talking about Toyota, most of us would have said you are crazy. Yugo maybe. You might have been talking about General Motors. But never would have thought talking about Toyota. Couldn't that inherent institutional prejudice--and I am not saying to the agency but to society as a whole. Could have we created a situation where maybe there wasn't as critical review up front on Toyota that might have been done if it was a Yugo or if it was General Motors? Secretary LaHood. Well, not in my opinion, Mr. Bilbray. I have been in this job 13 months. I have worked with the people at NHTSA. They are a lot, almost all of them are career people. They take their jobs very seriously because it does involve safety. And I don't think that is the case. Mr. Bilbray. I appreciate that. In 2007, there was an investigation conducted about the mats. It appeared that investigation or the outcome of that investigation didn't reflect what we now believe should have been the proper observation. It wasn't until the deaths in my county and Darrell Issa's county that it really raised it, the concern last year when we had the crash, again, with the all--with the mats again showing up. How do we have this investigation in 2007, review all of these models, pull back on a lot of models, and then still end up with a situation where, by 2009, people are dying on the streets of San Diego County? Secretary LaHood. Well, it's obvious to us that, when that crash occurred, that highlighted again the floor mat problem that was determined to be what caused the accident and that was the issue. And we also looking back realize that people really weren't taking their cars in that had floor mat problems, and so we reengaged Toyota to ask for another mailing to their customers so that they could bring them in and have the floor mats replaced. And then that led to the investigation of the sticky pedal and the result of the determination that needed to be fixed also. Mr. Bilbray. In all fairness, Mr. Secretary, when we talk about the format issue, we're talking about the all-weather mat and we are talking about in this case, in San Diego's deaths, it was not an owner who didn't bring it in. This was actually a dealership vehicle that still had the mats in place. And so there seems to be a big disconnect between what we said we wanted done and what was actually done in the field. And I think, in all fairness, this one shows that it wasn't just the fact that those of us who drive Toyotas didn't take the recall notice seriously. Frankly, it wasn't even--I wasn't even aware as a consumer that the all-weather was specifically targeted here until I as a member of this committee know that. Doesn't that tell you that we have a major gap between the way the system ought to work and the way it is actually working? Secretary LaHood. I would admit that there is a disconnect sometimes between whether people get the information and whether they take it seriously and how it's disseminated. I think that is an issue. I agree with that. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize the gentlewoman from California, Congresswoman Watson. Ms. Watson. Secretary LaHood, congratulations. I have enjoyed your straightforward responses. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Ms. Watson. And that's a serious commendation. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Ms. Watson. In response to consumer complaints that have come in as early as 2003, NHTSA launched the first of eight separate investigations into sudden unintended acceleration, and three of these investigations concluded that it was the floor mat. And I had the people from Toyota in my office yesterday and they showed me the floor mats and so on and so forth. Easy to fix, just shorten the floor mat and so on. What I am hearing through the media, it's really in the computer system. Can you tell me what you have learned that might be helpful to us that we can relate to our constituents who have Toyotas? Secretary LaHood. We are going to do a complete review of the electronics to determine if that is part of the reason that some of these vehicles accelerated or decelerated. We have heard from enough Members of Congress about this and we have heard from enough drivers of these vehicles that they think it's an issue, and we are going to look into it. And we are going to look at information that was provided yesterday to the Energy and Commerce Committee by people who have done some studies. We are going to look at some studies that Toyota has done and we are going to talk to experts about this. Ms. Watson. Thank you so much for that response, because I do think it bears looking into and I shared that with the Toyota people when they came. I said, you have to clarify this particular flaw that seems to be very prevalent. I have read that, in Mrs. Claybrook's prepared testimony, she stated that NHTSA statute should be changed to add criminal penalties for complaints--for companies who knowingly and willfully refuse to initiate a recall to correct safety defects. Do you agree with that? Secretary LaHood. Ms. Watson, I really haven't thought enough about that to render an opinion. I have seen what Joan Claybrook has said about that and I'd rather not really venture a guess on that at the moment--or an opinion. Excuse me. Ms. Watson. So if we find it's necessary, would you work on a provision to---- Secretary LaHood. The information that we have requested from Toyota, which is voluminous, is a part of what we are trying to determine whether there should be some civil penalties. Ms. Watson. Thank you. And in your testimony, you described a lengthy process that must be undertaken for your agency to order recalls. As a result, consumers are offered protection and the fastest when manufacturers voluntarily initiate recalls. While some of the experiences with Toyota have fortunately been voluntary recalls because of the pressure applied by NHTSA, do you think the process for NHTSA to order recalls could be made more efficient? And I heard you say that if you had the employees, the money was there. So do you want to elaborate on that? Secretary LaHood. I think we should always look at efficiencies. I think if there's a better way to do these things, I'm not opposed to doing that. And if people around here think that there's a better way to do it, we are willing to listen to them. But the system as it exists now I think has worked pretty well, but I am not opposed to doing something more efficiently. Ms. Watson. It's been reported that there has been some negotiations between Toyota and, I guess, NHTSA on whether or not the recall, the numbers of recalls should be capped and so on. Can you give us more information? Secretary LaHood. Not on my watch, Ms. Watson. We have taken this work very seriously, and we do what we think is the best interest of the people that own these automobiles, particularly as it relates to safety. Ms. Watson. Well, I wish you well. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Ms. Watson. This is a turbulent time for your agency. I understand that. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Congressman Connolly. Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I know it's been a long day, Mr. Secretary. And I didn't have the privilege of serving with you here in the House, but I am so glad you are where you are. And I want to thank you for one of the first things you did as our new Secretary of Transportation was sign the full funding grant agreement for rail to Dulles. A very important project. Thank you so much for your leadership and your support on that. I am going to ask you a series of questions that are in the category of what do we know and when did we know it. And I understand that most of those answers are probably going to precede your tenure, so I am asking you to the best of your knowledge, given your current position, what do we know and when did we know it. To the best of your knowledge, Mr. Secretary, when did we first learn--we, the Federal Government, your agency NHTSA-- first learn there was a problem that merited further examination with respect to the acceleration of those Toyota vehicles? Secretary LaHood. Well, I will get you the exact year but it was a few years ago. For the record, I am going to--I want to be accurate about these things. You know, I just don't want to speculate. I could pour over my papers here and get you the answer, but I don't want to waste your time. It's better for me to just do it for the record. Mr. Connolly. That's fine. Mr. Secretary, do you know how many lawsuits have been filed with respect to the accelerator problem? Secretary LaHood. I do not. But I will find out. Mr. Connolly. And when they were first filed. That would be very helpful. Secretary LaHood. OK. Mr. Connolly. In the predecessor administration, NHTSA officials flew to Tokyo to meet with Toyota about this problem. Is that not correct? Secretary LaHood. That was under my watch. Mr. Connolly. It was under your watch? Secretary LaHood. Yes, it was. That occurred last year. Mr. Connolly. And can you describe for us the nature of those conversations? Secretary LaHood. It was a very, very frank conversation about safety matters that we felt they needed to address, and they began to address them after that meeting occurred. I also had a telephone conversation personally with Mr. Toyoda and talked to him about the seriousness of the matter that we were addressing. Mr. Connolly. And could you characterize a little bit Toyoda's reaction to the seriousness? Secretary LaHood. I think they realized that it was a serious situation, and that we were not going to countenance any kind of delay in really addressing it. Mr. Connolly. And do you feel that the company, from your perch, has, in fact, responded in a timely and effective---- Secretary LaHood. After our visit to Japan and after my phone call with Mr. Toyoda, yes. Mr. Connolly. One of the criticisms one has heard from consumers was that they were, in fact, lodging complaints with the company and were kind of being dismissed. And, in retrospect, do you believe Toyota could have or should have maybe taken those early warning consumer complaints more seriously? And, part two, might it have made a difference in terms of where we are today? Secretary LaHood. I would really only be speculating on that. I just--I can only tell you about our involvement. And I think that maybe that is a better question for Mr. Toyoda. Mr. Connolly. NHTSA falls in your domain? Secretary LaHood. Yes. Mr. Connolly. And as you have said multiple times in this hearing, safety is our No. 1 priority? Secretary LaHood. Yes. Mr. Connolly. Presumably, the SOPs, the standard operating procedures, for NHTSA are that alarm bells go off when we learn about, even anecdotally, the acceleration--the involuntary acceleration of a vehicle, let alone anecdotal information that would suggest people have actually lost their lives because of it. We have to certainly, at least, look into it. Secretary LaHood. Absolutely. Mr. Connolly. What grades would you give NHTSA in the past in responding with alacrity to those anecdotal reports, and what have we learned moving forward in the future to improve our performance? Secretary LaHood. Under my watch, we have taken all of these things very seriously. We really have. This is no nonsense. Mr. Connolly. And the previous watch? Secretary LaHood. Pardon me? Mr. Connolly. And the previous watch. Secretary LaHood. Well, I mean, I will get back to you on the record on that. I mean, look, some things have taken place that maybe should have been done more expeditiously. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Connolly. I thank the Chair and I thank the Secretary. Chairman Towns. I now yield to the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Cao. Mr. Cao. Mr. Secretary, actually I don't have any questions; I just have a statement. Secretary LaHood. OK. Mr. Cao. And just to sincerely thank you for everything that you have done for Louisiana, especially for the Second District. I know that you have worked very hard in your capacity as the Secretary to address all of the transportation issues of the country. But on behalf of my constituents, I just want to thank you for your visit and thank you for everything that you have done for us. That is all I have. I appreciate that you have been under hours of questioning already. Secretary LaHood. Thank you very much. Chairman Towns. Mr. Secretary, you don't get that too much around here. Secretary LaHood. I appreciate it. Chairman Towns. Want you to know. Secretary LaHood. I appreciate it when I hear it, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Towns. I now yield to the gentlewoman from New York, Congresswoman Maloney. Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first would like to welcome my colleague and very good friend, and thank him for his public service in the House of Representatives and now. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Mrs. Maloney. Now at Transportation. I would like to ask a broad question: How did we get to this place? Toyota had a good reputation. Your department has a good reputation. Yet, the field technical reports from the company in Europe show that they knew about this problem and were reporting that there were problems a year ago. Why didn't they bring this to your attention? I am just saying I am reading from the field report. This is an internal document from Toyota. This brings the number of reported cases in the FTR to 38. The customer has stated about this sticky deal and the problem with the acceleration. And so they knew about it in Europe, and yet why is it the communication did not work to get to you that this was a problem, to get to American dealers that this was a problem? Can you give an overall assessment of what went wrong and, therefore, give us a guide to what we need to do in the future for the safety of American citizens and all citizens? Secretary LaHood. My assessment of this, Mrs. Maloney, is this: Two things, really. I think the business model that Toyota has used where they have some really, really good professional, capable people in North America running the company without the kind of opportunity for decisionmaking, so then decisions are made in Japan. And I think the second part of it is--well, first of all, I don't know if that business model--I think it's failed them in this instance. And I think the other part of it is some people in Toyota--and I have said this before, this is not anything new--became a little safety deaf. Mrs. Maloney. And specifically how did the business model fail? They weren't communicating? Secretary LaHood. No, it's not that they--the information was being passed, but then the decisions that I think and the outcomes that people wanted in North America weren't always complied with. Mrs. Maloney. Well, getting back to the sudden acceleration events. You testified that consumers, if they feel they have a problem, they go to their dealer and they correct it. And how do you know that it's been corrected? And how do you know that was the problem? Did you do any independent analysis or did anyone do any independent analysis of the problem and how to fix it? And how does a consumer know, once it has gone back to the company to be corrected, that it is, in fact, corrected? Secretary LaHood. Well, we, as a part of our investigations, we asked the companies to fix the problem and present that information to us. And, again, we don't sign on the dotted line and say we agree or disagree. But if they believe, based on all the information we have presented them that they think this is the fix, then that process gets carried over to the customer. And in, I think, many instances, the fix has worked. Mrs. Maloney. Well, later on there will be a witness who was a former employee of your department or of Transportation, and she testifies that--from reading her testimony--that the NHTSA administrators did not accurately investigate the many problems. Now, this was before you took the helm. So the staff has literally shown us in preparing for this hearing that there were literally thousands of complaints of sudden unintended acceleration. Yet, it doesn't appear that any meaningful action was taken until the Saylor family crashed. And my question is, why did it take so long? Again, we are talking about complaints that, by some reports, started coming in in 2004. Secretary LaHood. Well, we did work with Toyota on a fix on the floor mat and they put out a recall so that those floor mats could be removed. There's a recall on the sticky pedal, and those are up on the Web site. And if people take their cars in, Toyota will fix those. And so, you know, people have to be made aware of it either by notice or looking on the Web site or by concern or media reports or whatever. And not everyone has taken their car back, but we encourage people, if you are having a problem with your car, take it to your Toyota dealer. Mrs. Maloney. And since safety is our No. 1 concern, as you so properly stated, from your agency, have you considered asking your inspector general to audit or examine the prior investigations to determine if they were sufficiently robust? The staff reported to us that many of the investigations were very short, they weren't detailed, it wasn't a thorough investigation. Secretary LaHood. I have not asked the inspector general to do that. He has been asked by Members of Congress to do some investigations, but not specifically on that issue. Mrs. Maloney. Well, my time has expired. Thank you very much for your testimony and your service. Secretary LaHood. Thank you. Chairman Towns. Thank the gentlewoman from New York. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio, Ms. Kaptur. Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Secretary. You certainly have gotten into a lot of issues in your 1-year tenure thus far. Let me ask you, can you speak to the level of cooperation between Japan's counterpart of NHTSA and NHTSA? Is their safety agency open and forthcoming, in your opinion, or does it suffer from the same kind of cloaked and opaque character of that country's ministry of trade? Are they working with you and sharing data on this recall issue? Secretary LaHood. I think, in some instances, yes. Ms. Kaptur. So you are saying they have been cooperative, in your tenure? Secretary LaHood. Oh, during my tenure they have been cooperative. In some instances they have. Ms. Kaptur. But information regarding this acceleration pattern obviously wasn't shared by their ministry if they knew about it in Japan versus our country. Our country, according to the data we have gotten from the Energy and Commerce Committee, first got a time line in March 2004 that on the Camry, Solara, and Lexus 300 models, that NHTSA found no pattern. And then there seems to be a gap between 2004 and 2007 in our country, but in March 2007, NHTSA opened an investigation on the Lexus ES350 in which NHTSA then found entrapment of the accelerator pedal by floor mat as the sole cause of what happened. And then through 2007, 2008, there were more and more Toyota vehicles, until the point in January when Toyota suspended sales of eight different models. And my question is, when all this was occurring in our country, was Japan's ministry sharing information with you about recalls prior to your tenure? Secretary LaHood. I will have to check, Ms. Kaptur, and put it on the record and get back to you on that. I don't know the answer to that. Ms. Kaptur. One of the pieces of data I would like to place up on the boards here is the trade deficit the United States has amassed with Japan over the last 24 years in the area of automotive manufacturing, autos and auto parts. And one of the reasons that Toyota and some of the other companies have been able to gain a beachhead in global auto markets is that it operates from a very tightly protected home market even while it is the second largest marketplace in the world. There's a chart that shows the trade deficits our country has amassed with Japan, totaling over $1 trillion, which translates into lost jobs in this country. Less than 3 percent of Japan's marketplace is open to cars from anywhere else in the world. They didn't even take Yugos and they certainly don't take our auto parts in any appreciable numbers. Yet, we have welcomed their cars here. Our dealers sell their cars, and that doesn't occur in that country. Imagine, the second largest marketplace in the world having less than 3 percent of their cars from anyplace else other than Japan, while our market over half the cars come from elsewhere or from transplants here. And one of my questions of Mr. Toyoda, and I have a hunch he is listening, is, does this sort of predicament that the company now faces result from a rather attitude of market superiority resulting from the false confidence of a closed home market? In other words, you can afford to ignore some of what has happening because of this false confidence that comes from that kind of a very imbalanced situation? And I am quite concerned about this. I have been for a long, long time. And my question to you, and I would appreciate for the record going back and seeing what kind of cooperation Japan's counterpart agency actually had with NHTSA? Were there sudden acceleration difficulties inside of Japan, to your knowledge, during this period? Secretary LaHood. I will get you that for the record. Ms. Kaptur. Because I think that's really important, whether it's Canada, United States, what is happening inside Japan's market versus what is happening inside our marketplace, the European marketplace. This is a very, very unlevel playing field, and I am quite concerned about the fact--oh, and I wanted to ask you for one other piece of information for the record. Inside of NHTSA, how many people from March 2004, which appears to be the first year in which some of these complaints started to come to NHTSA, how many people actually were involved in the assessment of what was happening inside of NHTSA? A staff of 10, 20, 50? What were their backgrounds? How long had they worked for NHTSA? And whom had they worked for before coming to NHTSA? Are you able to provide that information for the record? Secretary LaHood. We will do the best we can. Ms. Kaptur. From your sense, how many people? Is there anybody from NHTSA there now that can tell us how large was the unit that assessed these recalls? How many people are we talking about? Secretary LaHood. We want to be accurate about our information. We will get it for the record. Chairman Towns. We will hold the record open for that information. The gentlewoman's time has expired. Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Towns. I now recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Congressman Clay. Mr. Clay. Mr. Chairman, my staff has advised me that all of the questions that I wanted to ask have been asked, we have exhausted this issue with this witness, and I have no questions. Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. According to the record, I think that everyone--has everyone had an opportunity? Mr. Tierney. I would just yield to Mr. Cummings for one question. Chairman Towns. Sure. Mr. Cummings. Just one thing. You said something that really--I am so glad I had a chance to ask this. Who was safety deaf? You said somebody was ``safety deaf.'' Secretary LaHood. Toyota. Mr. Cummings. Toyota was safety deaf. And then you said there was some kind of disconnect. Secretary LaHood. Let me go back and tell you what I said. Mr. Cummings. Yeah, because I want to be clear about that; because when Mr. Toyoda--I'm going to ask him about what you are saying. Secretary LaHood. Mrs. Maloney asked me to assess what I think went wrong here. And, two things: Toyota has an organization called North America Toyota. They have some great people there. They are very professional. They are good people. We work with them. They make recommendations to Japan. The decisions are made in Japan. The reason that our acting administrator went to Japan was because he didn't think his message was getting to Japan, so he flew over there and met with the Toyota people and said, ``look at, this is serious.'' ``Lives are being lost.'' Mr. Cummings. And when was that? Secretary LaHood. November, December last year. Mr. Cummings. OK. Secretary LaHood. And right after that, they started taking action. So then I get on the phone with Mr. Toyoda and I said, this is a serious matter. This involves safety, it involves lives. So my point is this: Their business model is they have a lot of good people in North America Toyota, but the decisions are made in Japan. Mr. Cummings. Got you. All right. Thank you. Secretary LaHood. Is that it, Mr. Chairman? I was going to say what a joy. No. The gentlelady from California. Of course. Chairman Towns. The gentlewoman from California, Congresswoman Speier. Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here these many hours. I am going to try and be quick and to the point. I want to talk about the black boxes. If 80 percent of the cars already have black boxes and they help piece together what happens during the last 5 seconds of an accident, why not make them mandatory in all cars? Secretary LaHood. It's a good point and it has been raised here earlier, and we are going to look at that. We really are. It's a good point. And if it is a way for us to really measure what happens, it's something we are going to look at. Ms. Speier. Now, as I understand it, you can read the black boxes from some of our domestic manufacturers. Secretary LaHood. That is correct. Ms. Speier. But you cannot read the black boxes from Toyota because they are encrypted. Secretary LaHood. That is correct. Ms. Speier. So shouldn't we require that all black boxes be readable by NHTSA? Secretary LaHood. Yes. Ms. Speier. In order to--so you would support that? Secretary LaHood. Yes. Ms. Speier. All right. Have you had a chance to look at Joan Claybrook's EDL recommendations? And, if so, would you provide written responses? Secretary LaHood. You mean her testimony here? Ms. Speier. Yes. Secretary LaHood. I have not read her testimony. Ms. Speier. She also suggested your office needs about $100 million more in terms of support. Would you support that recommendation? Secretary LaHood. We are very grateful that the President included 66 new positions in our budget for 2011. Ms. Speier. How many software engineers do you have working within the Department? Secretary LaHood. Software engineers? I would have to get-- we have like--we have between 125, 130 engineers. I will get you the figure on the software. Ms. Speier. And you will provide it to the committee? Secretary LaHood. Of course. Ms. Speier. Because what I have been told is while you do have many engineers, you don't have software engineers. Secretary LaHood. We have electrical engineers. I know that was a point that people were a little confused about. Ms. Speier. And if this has already been asked, I apologize. But it appears that the chip you need in the computer system in these vehicles to have a brake override is really the solution. Do you concur? Secretary LaHood. Mr. Lentz said yesterday at the Energy and Commerce Committee that they were installing brake override in many of their vehicles. Ms. Speier. I guess my question to you is, irrespective of what Toyota is doing, would you look at it to determine whether or not the requirement that the brake override be actually implemented and installed in more vehicles than Toyota? Secretary LaHood. We will be happy to look at it. Ms. Speier. And you will let the committee know as well? Secretary LaHood. Yes. Ms. Speier. Thank you. And I will yield back. Chairman Towns. Thank you. And let me thank the Secretary for his time. Secretary LaHood. What a joy, Mr. Chairman. Great to be back. Chairman Towns. Thank you. We are now going to have a 10-minute recess, and then come back for the second panel. [Recess.] Chairman Towns. I would like to introduce our second panel. Testifying on this panel is Mr. Akio Toyoda, president and CEO of Toyota Motor Corp.; and Mr. Yoshimi Inaba, president and CEO of Toyota Motor North America. Gentlemen, it is the committee's longstanding policy that all witnesses are sworn in. Please stand and raise your right hands as I administer the oath. [Witnesses sworn.] Chairman Towns. Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. You may be seated. Let me begin by first welcoming you. And I really appreciate the fact that you have come to testify and that, Mr. Toyoda, you actually volunteered to come and to testify. I want you to know we are very impressed by that. That shows your commitment, and of course to safety, as well. And we want you to know we appreciate the fact that you volunteered to come. Mr. Inaba, we welcome you here, as well. And we have had conversations with you, you know, over the past few weeks and months. So, at this time, we would ask you to--actually, we will give you additional time. We generally give 5 minutes, but, you know, being he is all the way from Japan, we will give him more time. So, Mr. Toyoda, you may begin. STATEMENTS OF AKIO TOYODA, PRESIDENT AND CEO, TOYOTA MOTOR CORP.; AND YOSHIMI INABA, PRESIDENT AND CEO, TOYOTA MOTOR NORTH AMERICA, INC. STATEMENT OF AKIO TOYODA Mr. Toyoda. Thank you, Chairman Towns. I am Akio Toyoda of Toyota Motor Corp. I would first like to state that I love cars as much as anyone, and I love Toyota as much as anyone. I am here with my Toyota family of dealers, proud team members, and friends. I take the utmost pleasure in offering vehicles that our customers love, and I know that Toyota's 200,000 team members, dealers, and suppliers across America feel the same way. However, in the past few months, our customers have started to feel uncertain about the safety of Toyota's vehicles, and I take full responsibility for that. Today, I would like to explain to the American people, as well as our customers in the United States and around the world, how seriously Toyota takes the quality and safety of its vehicles. I would like to express my appreciation to Chairman Towns and Ranking Member Issa, as well as the members of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, for giving me this opportunity to express my thoughts today. I would like to focus my comments on three topics: Toyota's basic philosophy regarding quality control, the cause of the recalls, and how we will manage quality control going forward. First, I want to discuss the philosophy of Toyota's quality control. I, myself, as well as Toyota, am not perfect. At times, we do find defects. But in such situations, we always stop, strive to understand the problem, and make changes to improve further. In the name of the company, its longstanding tradition and pride, we never run away from our problems or pretend we don't notice them. By making continuous improvements, we aim to continue offering even better products for society. That is the core value we have kept closest to our hearts since the founding days of the company. At Toyota, we believe the key to making quality products is to develop quality people. Each employee thinks about what he or she should do, continuously making improvements, and by doing so, makes even better cars. We have been actively engaged in developing people who share and can execute on this core value. It has been over 50 years since we began selling in this great country and over 25 years since we started production here. And in the process, we have been able to share this core value with the 200,000 people at Toyota operations, dealers, and suppliers in this country. That is what I am most proud of. Second, I would like to discuss what caused the recall issues we are facing now. Toyota has, for the past few years, been expanding its business rapidly. Quite frankly, I fear the pace at which we have grown may have been too quick. I would like to point out here that Toyota's priorities have traditionally been the following: first, safety; second, quality; third, volume. These priorities became confused. And we were not able to stop, think, and make improvements as much as we were able to before, and our basic stance to listen to our customers' voices to make better products has weakened somewhat. We pursued growth over the speed at which we were able to develop our people and our organization, and we should sincerely be mindful of that. I regret that this has resulted in the safety issues described in the recalls we face today, and I am deeply sorry for any accidents that Toyota drivers have experienced. Especially, I would like to extend my condolences to the members of the Saylor family for the accident in San Diego. I would like to send my prayers again, and I will do everything in my power to ensure that such a tragedy never happens again. Since last June, when I first took office, I have personally placed the highest priority on improving quality over quantity, and I have shared that direction with our stakeholders. As you well know, I am the grandson of the founder, and all the Toyota vehicles bear my name. For me, when the cars are damaged, it is as though I am, as well. I, more than anyone, wish for Toyota's cars to be safe and for our customers to feel safe when they use our vehicles. Under my leadership, I would like to reaffirm our values of placing safety and quality the highest on our list of priorities, which we have held to firmly from the time we were founded. I will also strive to devise a system in which we can surely execute what we value. Third, I would like to discuss how we plan to manage quality control as we go forward. Up to now, any decisions on conducting recalls have been made by the Customer Quality Engineering Division at Toyota Motor Corp. in Japan. This division confirms whether there are technical problems and makes a decision on the necessity of a recall. However, reflecting on the issues today, what we lacked was the customer perspective. To make improvements on this, we will make the following changes to the recall decisionmaking process. When recall decisions are made, a step will be added in the process to ensure that management will make a responsible decision from the perspective of ``customer safety first.'' To do that, we will devise a system in which customers' voices around the world will reach our management in a timely manner and also a system in which each region will be able to make a decision as necessary. Further, we will form a quality advisory group composed of respected outside experts from North America and around the world to ensure that we do not make a misguided decision. Finally, we will invest heavily in quality in the United States through the establishment of an automotive center of quality excellence; the introduction of a new position, product safety executive; and the sharing of more information and responsibility within the company for product quality decisions, including defects and recalls. Even more importantly, I will ensure that members of the management team actually drive the cars and that they check for themselves where the problem lies, as well as its severity. I, myself, am a trained test driver. As a professional, I am able to check a problem in a car and can then understand how severe the safety concern is in a car. I drove the vehicles in the accelerator pedal recall as well as the Prius, comparing the vehicles before and after the remedy in various environmental settings. I believe that only by examining the problems onsite can one make decisions from the customer perspective. One cannot rely on reports or data in a meeting room. Through the measures I have just discussed and with whatever results we obtain from the investigation we are conducting in cooperation with NHTSA, I intend to further improve on the quality of Toyota vehicles and fulfill our principle of putting the customer first. My name is on every car. You have my personal commitment that Toyota will work vigorously and unceasingly to restore the trust of our customers. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Toyoda follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.019 Chairman Towns. Thank you very much, Mr. Toyoda. Mr. Inaba. STATEMENT OF YOSHIMI INABA Mr. Inaba. Chairman Towns, Ranking Member Issa, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. My name is Yoshimi Inaba, and I am the president and COO of Toyota Motor North America and chairman and CEO of Toyota Motor Sales USA. As you heard today from the Toyota president, Akio Toyoda, and as the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations heard yesterday from Jim Lentz, president and chief operating officer of Toyota Motor Sales USA, Toyota is taking decisive steps to restore the trust of the tens of millions of Americans who purchase and drive our vehicles. Our 172,000 team members and dealers across America are making extraordinary efforts to complete our current recalls as quickly and conveniently as possible. We have rigorously tested our solutions and are confident that, with these repairs, Toyota vehicles will remain among the safest on the road today. We are also going further, by installing advanced brake override systems in all of our new North American vehicles before the end of 2010 and in an expanded range of existing models as a customer confidence measure, and taking comprehensive steps to ensure strict quality control and increased responsiveness to our customers and regulators in the future. As you have heard, Mr. Toyoda is leading a top-to-bottom review of our global quality control processes and will seek input from independent safety experts to ensure that our processes meet or exceed industry standards. As head of Toyota's North American operations, I will be closely involved in this review. Working with our new chief quality officer for North America, I also will take responsibility for ensuring that we improve our dialog with U.S. safety regulators and that we take prompt action on any issues we identify to ensure the safety of American drivers. In inviting me to testify today, the committee asked me to address several issues with regard to our recent recalls. Let me summarize my answers here: Our recent recalls address five separate issues that we have identified with certain Toyota vehicles. In total, some 5.3 million vehicles across 14 models are affected by one or more of these recalls in the United States. The biggest recalls are for solutions our engineers have developed with regard to two specific mechanical causes of unintended acceleration. One involves all-weather or inappropriate accessory floor mats that, when loose or improperly fitted, can entrap the accelerator pedal. The other concerns accelerator pedals that can, over time, grow sticky with wear in rare instances. The solutions we have developed for both of these issues are effective and durable. With respect to possible accelerator pedal entrapment by the floor mats, Toyota recently designed a vehicle-based change that directly addresses the problem and announced the solution to the public in November 2009 as part of the safety campaign announced on September 29, 2009. Owners of affected vehicles can, in the meantime, drive safely by ensuring that they use only properly secured, appropriate floor mats. With respect to sticking accelerator pedals, Toyota announced a safety recall in the United States in January to address this issue. The sticking condition does not occur suddenly, and if it does, the vehicle can be controlled with firm and steady application of the brakes. We are confident that vehicles whose drivers are not experiencing any issues with their accelerator pedal are safe to drive, and Toyota dealers are rapidly completing the repairs on our customers' vehicles. In both these cases, Toyota thoroughly and carefully evaluated the technical aspect of these issues. However, we now understand that we must think more from a customer-first perspective rather than a technical perspective in investigating complaints and that we must communicate faster, better, and more effectively with our customers and our regulators. Our recent, smaller, voluntary recalls of certain 2010 Prius and Lexus HS hybrids for a software update to the braking system, certain 2010 Camry cars to inspect a power-steering hose, and certain 2010 Tacoma trucks to inspect the front drive shaft all illustrate this new approach. Chairman Towns, Ranking Member Issa, and members of the committee, I assure you that nothing matters more to Toyota than the safety and reliability of the vehicles our customers drive. We are committed not only to fixing vehicles on the road and ensuring they are safe, but to making our new vehicles better and even more reliable through a redoubled focus on putting our customers first. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Inaba follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.021 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.022 Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. And let me thank both of you for your testimony. Let me begin by saying, have you told NHTSA everything you know about sudden acceleration problems? Have you told NHTSA? [Note.--Mr. Toyoda's replies were delivered through an interpreter.] Mr. Toyoda. According to my understanding, we fully shared the information we have with the authorities. Mr. Inaba. Our Washington office has been always in touch with NHTSA, and we are fully cooperating with NHTSA in any information they require. Chairman Towns. Has Toyota disclosed all information about other potential safety defects with your vehicles to the regulators? Have you done that? Mr. Toyoda. I do not know the specifics. However, as I mentioned earlier, I do understand that all the information we have are shared with the authorities. Chairman Towns. Let me ask this question. Today, Attorney General Andrew Cuomo of New York announced an agreement with Toyota, and this agreement provides that if a customer might be afraid to drive his or her car subject to a recall, the dealer will pick up their cars, fix them, and return them to the customers. Now, the customer will then be reimbursed for any taxi or rental car expenses that they might incur. Will you commit to doing this for customers nationwide? If you want me to repeat it, I would be delighted to do so. Mr. Inaba. Mr. Chairman, let me address that question because I am local here. Chairman Towns. I would be delighted. Mr. Inaba. Yes. I heard a number of instances that when this recall news came out, I think a number of customers were very afraid. And our dealers are fully behind it, and dealers took care of customers very well. In many instances, dealers went to pick up their cars and then also gave them a Toyota rental car for the time they were out. And this recall process is rigorously going on. I think there is a good understanding now on the part of the customers that the cars are being fixed well, and they are confident about that. Chairman Towns. But I guess my question is, are you just doing this in New York, or is this something that you are going to do nationwide? Mr. Inaba. No, this is happening all over the world--I mean, all over the Nation, nationwide, yes. Chairman Towns. OK. So I just wanted to make certain, you know, we have that understanding, because I understand it is going on in New York. And the last question that I have for you is, Mr. Toyoda, you have offered a brake override feature for some recalled vehicles. Why haven't you offered that feature for all Toyota vehicles? Mr. Toyoda. Allow me to explain the situation a little bit. The factors contributing to the unexpected acceleration I believe can be roughly classified into four categories: first, problem with electronic throttle system; second, the way in which a car is used or misusage of the car; third, the structural aspect of the vehicle; and fourth, the structural aspect of the parts used in the vehicle. So these, I understand, are four major factors contributing to unexpected acceleration. And of that, the electronic throttle control system is designed based upon the concept of safety first. And, therefore, whenever there is any abnormality or anomaly there in the system, the fuel supply to the system is cutoff. And even under very rigorous testing conducted internally or by NHTSA, no problem and malfunction was identified. And, therefore, I am absolutely confident that there is no problem with the design of the ETC system. However, placing emphasis upon the fact that customers do have concern as to the possibility of unexpected acceleration which may result from the remaining three reasons, in order to offer extra measure of confidence, as the chairman has just mentioned, we decided to add the brake override system. Chairman Towns. Is that a yes or no? I mean, that is what I am trying to get to. Is it a yes or a no? Because I am on Congressman Issa's time. I yield to Congressman Issa, but I am trying to find out, is that a yes or a no? Mr. Inaba. Let me address in a different perspective. Just for the record, we are putting a brake override system on all the models for North America coming off the line by the end of this year. And now probably your question is retroactively, what about the existing models? We have already announced Camry, Avalon, and then ES 300, and then IS; those are already included as an additional measure when we do recalls. And now we have recently announced Tacoma, which has a very high complaint rate, and then added to Venza and Sequoia. This covers probably, if my recollection is correct, 72 percent of the recall population. And any older one, technically it is not possible. And, therefore, we think we have covered. But we do not, you know, stop it there. We carefully monitor the situation. By the next year, with this new model, with BOS coming in, with these retroactive actions, I think we will be quite sure that it will be very much lower than the industry average. Chairman Towns. I yield to the gentleman from California. Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And the chairman has proven that he can ask a question so complex as to even be difficult for people of your great knowledge, and it doesn't surprise me. Let me ask in a different way the same question, so that we all on the dais have clarity. And, Mr. Inaba, I will put this one to you. Isn't it true, in order to use an advanced brake override system like this, your cars depend on electronic systems? They depend on microprocessors, and they depend on engine control modules that can actually simultaneously reduce fuel when sensing through the data bus that the brake has been pushed. Isn't that correct? Mr. Inaba. You are much better technically savvy than I am. I believe so. Mr. Issa. So I think, for all of us here who are concerned, of course, about fail safe and acceleration caused by electronics, I think--I am asking you, isn't it fair to say that, although electronics could at times be a problem--and your people have not eliminated that--the solution is, in fact, electronics, in this case, and that is what is going to give the higher level of safety? Mr. Inaba. Well, I can only say that this is an added measure to customer confidence. And, of course, I do not mean to say it solves all the problems. Mr. Issa. Yes. And I understand that in the earlier testimony there were some discrepancies, perhaps, between how Secretary LaHood would explain certain technical occurrences and how you would. Is that correct, that you would like to be able to correct the record on some areas of Secretary LaHood's testimony? Mr. Inaba. I am not quite understanding what specific comments you are referring to. Mr. Issa. Well, I guess I would welcome that, if you would like to, we would offer you the opportunity to submit for the record any technical corrections in what Secretary LaHood's questions and answers were during the earlier testimony. Mr. Inaba. Well, we would be glad to for the record. Mr. Issa. Thank you. And then I would ask that we put up the unintended acceleration exhibit that I showed earlier. And I put this up for both of you because, in your current advertisement on TV, you said something which I thought was extremely profound and a high goal. You said that good companies fix their mistakes and great companies learn from them. In the case of the unintended acceleration, in 2007 there was a problem in the United States for which the floor mats were changed. There was a problem in Japan with a different model but similar in floor pedal in which the Toyota pedal itself was shortened. And now, in the case of all of these models, there is an electronic upgrade, additionally, to prevent an accident like we had in 2009. Would that be the outcome today, the outcome of the recall, including the electronics upgrade to advanced brake override, is that the type of ``learn from your mistake'' that we can expect in the future on any problem that develops? Mr. Toyoda. I do not know this situation you refer to about 2007. But, generally speaking, whenever a problem occurs, Toyota addresses those problems in the most sincere manner and attitude. Mr. Inaba. May I make a comment? Mr. Issa. Yes, please. Mr. Inaba. I came to know Japan's problem, to be shameful, only in the previous hearing you mentioned. And that was the very first time I ever heard. And, therefore, let me look into that, if it is correct or not. But at the same time, I think we are the company that we learn great lessons, for me, from this instance, and we try to do more. So, you know, we are committed that we try to remain a great company, not just a good company. So I think we have a full commitment of our president, and then he has just said-- and we have many, many measures already taking place. I don't want to go---- Mr. Issa. No, I appreciate that. And I have a copy of the documents that you have provided to us concerning the Toyota Blade, which is the Japanese-only vehicle. And we will deliver that to you for your further update. My second and only other question: Secretary LaHood talked about wanting to but not necessarily having the transparency of worldwide sales and problems. Will you agree, Mr. Toyoda, to be the company that leads by providing the U.S. NHTSA with full transparency of your worldwide observations and help set a model for all the major companies here in the United States? Mr. Toyoda. To that question, I clearly say yes. In the past cases of recall or problem solutions, in making decisions we based our decision on two issues: the technical consideration and, also, whether or not the regulations and statutes in different parts of the world are complied with. And, in that sense, going forward, we intend to exchange and share information more timely throughout the world. And we are now setting up the system for that purpose. And for that specific purpose, we are going to establish the special committee on global quality, which I personally will be heading. And the very first meeting of that will be held on March 30th. And, for that purpose, we are now setting up the structure where the United States and other parts of the world will be represented in the meeting on that special committee for global quality. And we are now introducing this system so that we really face up to this problem openly and transparently. Mr. Issa. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence. Chairman Towns. I recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Kanjorski. Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome to the United States. I have to compliment you, Mr. Toyoda, for deciding to come here and testify. Actually, it is quite a unique experience, in terms of you will be able to brag about the fact that you withstood the interrogation of a congressional committee. That is a badge of courage in the United States. But if you had heard any of the examiner's questions of the Secretary, and I think now of yourselves, we are a little disturbed about some things, and I am too, although I am very sympathetic to the fact that we want to encourage international business and we want to certainly open our markets to your manufacturing from Japan or your ownership of manufacturing facilities in the United States. But I thought I heard this morning the Secretary say that you had a problem in Japan that was detected in 2007, and then subsequently the same problem was detected in Europe, but there was no communication of that problem or the prospect of that problem being contained in American-manufactured automobiles or your products being sold in the American market. If that impression that I have is true, that is very troubling to me. I would like you, as best you can--and I understand the difference in language--to explain whether or not you are giving the American automobile purchaser, your customer, and the American market the same level of attention that you give to the Japanese market or the European market. And if you didn't in the past, what are you going to do to make sure that difference doesn't occur in the future? We can't afford to have a lag of a year or 2 years of finding out something that is defective in an automobile. I suspect the stock price is reflecting that to you, that it can be very costly. I hope it doesn't destroy a great deal of the equity of your company, and I hope you can move on and move beyond this question. But I want to hear in my own mind that there hasn't been this difference between the home market and the American market or the home market and the European market or your experiences in the home market and the European market and the ignoring of the American market and the American customer, if I may. Mr. Toyoda. We provide the same services with the same degree of care to the customers not only in the United States but customers the world over. However, as the Congressman has just pointed out, our speed of expansion outpaced our development and training of our people working for us. And right now I am fully aware of that. In July last year I became president, and since then I appointed executive vice presidents responsible for each region of the world. And by doing so, we established a system where information on different regions can come into the head office and be captured in a more timely manner. And, on top of that, specifically about this quality issue that we are faced with at the moment, with respect to concerns of the customers or customers' voices before they are expressed in terms of a complaint, we are going to capture those, so that information be conveyed to the head office in a timely manner. And we are putting in place a system to enable us to do that. Mr. Inaba. Let me address, if I may, specific issues of defect information sharing, which was also Ranking Member Issa's question. I think we should have done a better job in sharing those cross-regional defect information---- Mr. Kanjorski. What have you determined was the cause that you didn't? Was it a culture? Is it psychology? Was it something that happened in the communications breakdown? It just seems absolutely---- Mr. Inaba. When you go into a certain data base, you can find it. But it is not--I must say, I don't know very well, but positively shared. Now, going forward, what we are going to do is, one of the things I would like to report to you is we are making now one American, we call, product safety executive. It is a part of recall decisionmaking as part of the global committee headed by one Japanese, one American, and maybe later added from other regions like Europe and China. And then, in that, all the information is shared there so we can evaluate and know what is going on in other parts of the world in more transparent ways. So this is the change that we are making, you know, now. Mr. Kanjorski. Let me ask you just a side question. Does Japan have a tort system similar to the United States, where a suit can be brought for damages by these injuries and loss of life? Mr. Toyoda. I believe we do. Mr. Kanjorski. All right. We have a little bit of a contest, sometimes, going on in the United States; we call it tort reform. And it is an argument that my friends on the other side very often use in the medical argument field. If you had tort reform and you just allowed some people to die or get severely injured without recovery, that would correct things. I think you are making the best argument in the world that I have ever heard of why we should have the present tort system. And I hope you recognize what kind of payment for the injuries and the damages suffered by innocent American citizens who, like myself, have grown up in an atmosphere that we had a great deal of faith in something that was stamped ``Made in Japan,'' that it was of the highest reliability. And you have injured that thought process in the American public. And you will be called upon, under our system, to pay compensation for that. I yield back. Chairman Towns. I now yield to the gentleman from Indiana on that note. Mr. Burton. Let me just preface my remarks by saying we really need tort reform. Mr. Kanjorski. We should just forgive these companies and let them kill our people, right? Mr. Burton. Never mind. We just have a difference of opinion. First of all, let me thank you both for being here. I think it is very good that you came. It shows real concern on the part of Toyota. And I also want to compliment Toyota dealers around the country. I went to a couple of Toyota dealers this last week to take a look at what is going on. And they are working day and night to correct these mistakes. And so, to your Toyota dealers, I want to say thank you for working so hard to correct these problems. Now, having said that, first of all, I have a case here that took place in 1997. I don't want to go into all the details on it, but a woman was injured in an automobile accident involving a Toyota. She lost both legs. And I would like for you to review that, and if you wouldn't mind giving me a response. Would you do that for me? Mr. Inaba. Yes, sir. Mr. Burton. OK. I will have my staff give this to you so that we can talk about that. The second thing I want to do is--I don't understand this. I went to the Toyota dealer, and this is the floor pedal mechanism that is used in Japan and in some cars here in America. This is one that is manufactured by CTS here in the United States, and they have done a good job on this. This pedal here has been involved in the accidents, I believe, that have caused the fatalities. This one here, there has been sticking and they have been putting a shim in there, a little metal piece in, to correct that. And my question is, why the difference? These are going in the same model car, and why do they have different specifications? Because this one here has caused the problems that has created the deaths, and this one here has some sticking problems which have been corrected, but it is different. And so, when you are manufacturing the same car, why is it that they don't meet the same exact specifications? It seems to me that would be easier to correct than having one that is made one way and one that is made another way. Mr. Toyoda. As the Congressman already knows, a car consists of some 20,000 to 30,000 parts. And I would like you to, first of all, know that we work together with the suppliers in designing those parts. Mr. Burton. If I might interrupt, I understand that you work with the suppliers, but the designs are different. This one here has a different mechanism here on the bottom than this one. And I am just wondering why, if it is the same model car, there is a difference? Mr. Toyoda. Some parts are designed by our suppliers, with Toyota approving that. And, in other cases, Toyota's own engineers design those parts. So there are two approaches used. In the case of this specific pedal, the suppliers designed the pedal and Toyota approved that. And, in both cases, we were able to identify two excellent suppliers whose parts were worthy of us to use in the United States and Japan. And, therefore, those two parts designed by our suppliers were used in this pedal. And, on top of that, it is our philosophy to grow together with our suppliers. And, in that sense, rather than placing orders with one single supplier, we source the same parts from multiple suppliers. That is to say, when there are suppliers that can supply parts that perform the same function, we do that. And this is another point I would appreciate your understanding. Mr. Burton. No, if I might real quickly just say I understand, but when there is a problem of this magnitude, where people have been killed because of a part, and there is another part that didn't result in fatalities but there was a sticking, it seems to me it would be easier to correct the problem if there was more consistency in the two parts. Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. And the gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Congressman Cummings. Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of you for being with us this afternoon. And to Mr. Toyoda, I have read your testimony and I have listened to it, and I can appreciate you saying and meaning that you are sorry. The problem is that it is one thing to say you are sorry; it is another thing when it seems as if, time after time, there are pronouncements that problems are being addressed and, over and over again, they seem like they are not being addressed: 2007, a fatal crash involving a Camry because, allegedly, of floor mats, a person was killed. And we can't get away from these facts. September 2007, you then--55,000 cars were recalled. And I know this was before your presidency. August 2009, California fatal crash, four people were killed, the Saylor family. September 2009, 4.2 million cars recalled. And we can go on and on. And then just yesterday, Mr. James Lentz III said something that was very interesting. And basically what he said was that, even with the sticky pedal and the floor mat problem, that this may not account for all of the problems. And he implied that maybe there were some electronic problems taking place. The question becomes, at what point do--and I know also you want to regain the trust of your customer base, but that trust is hard to establish, or re-establish, when they see over and over again these kinds of situations, and they say, ``Well, why should we believe that things are going to get better?'' And I know that there have been Members on this dais who have said that they have some good things that Toyota has done, but I have people in my district who, by the way, are saying that they call and they have to wait to get their cars repaired, but at the same time they have to take the children to the babysitter, they have to go and do their marketing. I mean, these are just practical things that are happening. So I am just asking you, how do you say to your customers, the people who take their hard-earned dollars in a tough economic time and spend them on a Toyota vehicle, how do you say to them that we can trust you now, when--and I say this most respectfully--when it seems as if there is no end to this series of promises, promises that seem to come short of reaching the goal of safety? Mr. Toyoda. I sincerely regret that some people actually encountered accidents in Toyota vehicles. As I mentioned earlier, with respect to the electronic throttle control system, the system itself has been designed based upon the philosophy of safety first. And, therefore, whenever any abnormality or anomaly is detected, fuel supply is instantly cutoff. That notwithstanding, accidents actually happened. And, therefore, I instructed that every effort be made thoroughly to reproduce and duplicate the accidents. And up until yesterday, those duplication tests have been repeated and conducted. However, no malfunction or problems were identified based upon the tests conducted internally within Toyota. And, therefore, based upon such thorough examination and testing conducted within Toyota, I have been saying that I have no question with respect to the integrity of our ETC system. And, therefore, in cooperation with the authorities' consent, we already announced that we are going to thoroughly examine and investigate the outcome and data, recording event, data recorder. And the findings will be made public and disclosed in a prompt and timely manner, and changes will be made in a very transparent manner so that be assured going forward. Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. And I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica. Mr. Mica. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I would like to request unanimous consent to include in the record the specific information on the administration's proposed 2011 budget request which cut National Highway Transportation Safety Administration's Vehicle Research Program and also further reduced the amount for vehicle safety research in the budget. I didn't have this further. If that could be inserted also in-- the budget information in the record appropriate to my previous questioning of the Secretary. Without objection? Chairman Towns. I will review it, and we will reserve the right to reject. Mr. Mica. Again. OK. I will proceed. This is indeed a very embarrassing day for the U.S. National Highway Safety Transportation Administration. It is equally a very embarrassing day for Toyota, to have the son of the founder of Toyota here as the chief officer to come before the U.S. Congress. I am embarrassed for you, sir. I am embarrassed for my dealers that I have talked to. I am embarrassed for thousands of people, hardworking Americans who work in I guess over 10 plants across the United States. I thought, actually, I thought we were doing pretty good because Toyota was taking quite a hit. And I will put in the record later on your safety record and some of the things you have done positively, information that I got, until I was shaving the other day and heard the news of the memo that was prepared by a gentleman, whom I didn't even know his name, bring over a copy of the July 6th Inaba memo. I hadn't read this actually, the details of it today. Mr. Inaba, this is one of the most embarrassing documents I have ever seen. In your preparation of this, you embarrassed all the people I represent, those hardworking people across this country. This is absolutely appalling, sir, that you would identify--and I know you were on the job only a few days--but key safety issues, and identify as one of them, on page 14 of the document you prepared, you identified the problem of the safety issue with regard to these pedals. Then, on page 16, ``Wins for Toyota Safety Group?'' How could you possibly put in writing this and list as wins for Toyota? Particularly under the defects entry, and negotiated equipment recall on Camry ES, SA saved a hundred million with no defects found? I think you have done a great injustice, sir, in this. I don't know if it was--it is not a rookie mistake. Obviously you have been with the company. But to prepare this document, to undermine the good working people and the reputation. Toyota has an outstanding reputation and actually has had a great safety record. But this discredits everyone. How would you respond, sir? Mr. Inaba. Yes, sir. First, let me get the facts straight. This is the only few days after my arrival to the company. And then---- Mr. Mica. Had you been with Toyota before? Mr. Inaba. Yes, sir. Mr. Mica. How long? Mr. Inaba. Forty years in total, sir. But this is after 3 years away from Toyota. I also first became the president of Toyota Motor North America, and then I visited one of a few days to Washington office. I had no idea what the company was. And that's why our staff wanted to give me an orientation material. Mr. Mica. I was stunned to find your name on the front page. Mr. Inaba. Addressed to me. Mr. Mica. I did not know that until today. Mr. Inaba. And the point is that I was in the middle of orientation tour. Yes. I didn't make it really clear. My name is on it. It is presented to me; not me made it. That is all I want---- Mr. Mica. But you were aware of this. Again, this is information you had and your company prepared. If, in the future, any company prepared a document like this and presented it to anyone in the company, to me, it would be one of the most dangerous things that you could do to anyone's reputation. I know it says on the side ``confidential'' and all of that. But do you realize the people that have been let down, me, the people in my district who go to work every day in those Toyota operations, the sales? And already, the reputation has been severely damaged by what has been done here. Mr. Inaba. I honestly, with my honesty, I do not recall the meeting in any depth. But, at the same time, now I see that. I think I must say to you that it is so inconsistent with the guiding principles of Toyota, and my feeling is and therefore-- -- Mr. Mica. It is just to me unbelievable. Mr. Inaba. I feel the same. Mr. Mica. Mr. Toyoda, you are in charge of the company and have that responsibility. Can you assure the committee that this is not the approach, this will not be the approach of Toyota now or in the future? Mr. Inaba. Because now I am getting more familiar. I am the president of that company. I am going to rectify that. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. Let me just make an announcement before we move any further. There is a vote on the floor, actually there are three votes. We plan to continue with the gentlewoman from Washington, DC, assuming the Chair. But, I also want to let the gentleman from Florida know that his time has long expired. Mr. Mica. Yes, sir. And if Mr. Toyoda could just answer. Mr. Toyoda. I do not know about that specific document you referred to, and I do not know the comment. However, generally speaking, when a new person takes office as president, it is customarily done in any division to make presentations on various contents or substances going on in the company. However, generally speaking, the substance and contents of such documents does not affect the entire company in no way to cause drifting of the company itself. Ms. Norton [presiding]. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Kucinich, has 5 minutes. Mr. Kucinich. Madam Speaker, I am going to vote, and I would like to ask the questions when I come back. Ms. Norton. You can. I am calling on people who are left. Mr. Kucinich. I will---- Ms. Norton. I am going to go to Mr. Connolly then. Mr. Kucinich. We are coming back? Ms. Norton. We are. Mr. Connolly, you have 5 minutes. Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Toyoda, welcome to the committee. When did it first come to your attention that there was a problem with acceleration of your vehicles? Mr. Toyoda. I was appointed president in July. And there is a major difference between the sort of information I had received prior to assuming the position of president and the information I get to receive after becoming president. And, therefore, there may be some difference between the information that company may have had as a company and the information I personally had as president. However, I will clearly state whatever I know, and even in those cases where I do not know or I do not have any notice of, I will look into the matter and supply the report to you. So, responding specifically to your question of when, I would say sometime toward the end of last year. Mr. Connolly. Toward the end of 2009? Mr. Toyoda. That is correct. Mr. Connolly. OK. Were you aware of the fact that there had been complaints by consumers long prior to that time? Mr. Toyoda. Right now, I am aware of that. However, did I have that sort of information before I became president? I didn't have that sort of information with the same degree of accuracy that I do now. Mr. Connolly. But you had some awareness. We just heard from Secretary LaHood prior to your testimony, and he talked about the fact that NHTSA sent a team to Tokyo to meet with the top leadership of Toyota to bring to their attention as forcefully as they could the fact that there was a problem and that it needed to be attended to. That meeting was prior to your testimony just now that you only learned about this problem in December of last year. Were you not aware of the fact that NHTSA had sent a team to Tokyo headquarters? Mr. Toyoda. On that specific point, that was a matter handled by the division in charge of quality assurance. And certain person in that division I understand received the visit from NHTSA representatives and had discussions with them. I know that. However, I do not know the specific content of the discussion nor the timing of that meeting. Mr. Connolly. Well, there seems to be some discrepancy. Again, we are trying to get at what did we know and when did we know it to sort of gauge the company's--the quality of the company's response to the serious problem on behalf of its customers. And obviously, we have an interest as American Congressmen and women to protect our constituents who are your customers. And we know that the company certainly was made aware by U.S. officials through NHTSA who flew to Tokyo for this express purpose, and you are telling us in your testimony you didn't know about it. You were aware of that trip and that meeting, but you weren't aware of the fact that there was a serious acceleration problem with your vehicles until just a few months ago, December 2009. Is that correct? Because if it is correct, given your position in the company and your family's association with the company, that would constitute extraordinary compartmentalization. Mr. Toyoda. I personally know that there was a meeting with NHTSA representatives, but I do not know the content of that meeting. Mr. Connolly. OK. I am just going to ask one more question, and that is of Mr. Inaba. I am looking at this confidential document that was made available to this committee that my colleague was just referring to. Mr. Inaba. Yes. Mr. Connolly. And on one of the pages, it has just a series of ticks like this. And the bottom tick in your briefing, if I understand what you said, it says, ``Secured safety rulemaking favorable to Toyota.'' And I am going to run out of time, but could you at least answer, what was your understanding of what that meant? Mr. Inaba. As I said, I don't recall the meeting in any depth, and I had no idea about this recall process back then. Therefore, I have very little knowledge about it. And funny enough that I only recall quiet cars in that whole list of that. Of course, now I am made aware of this, there was an execution of that. But I don't recall it. Mr. Connolly. Madam Chair, I know my time is up. Ms. Norton. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Connolly. But I would just note for the record that this document is dated July 6, 2009. Ms. Norton. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Davis. Mr. Davis of Kentucky. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I would like to thank you and also Ranking Member Issa and members of the committee for allowing me to join from my position on the Ways and Means Committee on this Oversight hearing on Toyota's recall. I have the honor of representing Toyota's North American headquarters in Erlanger, KY, and wanted to voice some perspective from our region. Toyota directly employs more than 172,000 in plants and dealerships in the United States, and Toyota has an integral part in our economy in Kentucky and investment in the United States of America. They maintained operations and a world-class level of quality in the Commonwealth for nearly 25 years. The Georgetown facility now manufactures engines in addition to automobiles, all part of a $5.4 billion investment in our State. Toyota has been an exceptional corporate citizen in Kentucky. They have given more than $37 million to local charitable groups with missions ranging from education to social services. And not only has Toyota supported local charitable needs, but Toyota has also been one of the Commonwealth's strongest job creators. Toyota North American headquarters in Erlanger, KY, in the Hebron's Park Center, supplies distributors across the continent in my hometown of Hebron, KY. In all, more than 8,000 Kentuckians work for Toyota, and almost 1,500 are in Kentucky's Fourth Congressional District. Additionally, 90 Toyota suppliers are located in Kentucky, creating more than 10,000 additional jobs. Toyota's decade-long reputation for quality, safety, and service is based on their high standards of quality and innovation, and based on their corporate ethic of discipline, honor, and humility. They have had a positive and transformational effect on virtually every aspect of American manufacturing, and I can speak to this as one of the few manufacturing professionals who serves in the Congress. Toyota is--as Congress conducts these hearings related to Toyota's recall, we need to keep in mind Toyota's willingness to do something unusual in American business politics in the Congress, and that is to actually take responsibility and ownership for the problem and continue their longstanding commitment to quality and, more importantly, for the well being of their customers. Careless words and unfounded allegations by those who may have other agendas can do irreparable harm to job creation in Kentucky and in the United States. At a time when quality jobs are in short supply and unemployment in Kentucky and the Ohio Valley remains above 10 percent, the jobs created by Toyota are more important than ever. Echoing the concerns voiced by Kentucky Governor Steve Beshear and other Governors across the United States in a recent letter to Congress, I urge the members of this committee and my other colleagues to be thorough in their investigations of these issues and to arrive at conclusions based on evidence that is uncovered, rather than circumstantial speculation or sensationalism. Let's focus on the facts, rather than giving way to the temptation to engage in political theater. Congress must exercise appropriate oversight in determining its National Highway Transportation Safety Administration is able to effectively identify and comprehensively investigate automobile safety issues facing Americans. And, moreover, America needs clear and consistent automotive safety standards applied to all manufacturers in this country, not simply one, to ensure the safety of the entire American public. I appreciate your willingness to come and participate in this today, and the contribution of your business to our country's economic strength and wealth. And with that, Madam Chair, I thank you. And I yield back. Mr. Inaba. Thank you for your comment. Ms. Norton. The gentleman's time has expired. Mrs. Maloney of New York. Mrs. Maloney. Thank you. And thank you for coming to testify today. Earlier in response to the chairman's question, you said the dealers in America are responding to any of the problems and making the customer whole, assuming all costs for repair, and trying to subsidize for their time and so forth. My question is, what about the American families or individuals who died or were injured? Since the company knew about the problem, will you assume their medical costs, their funeral costs? Mr. Toyoda. Truly speaking, truly I feel very sorry for the members of the Saylor family who ended their life with Toyota vehicle, and I extend the condolences from the deepest part of my heart. Working closely together with engineers, Toyota team members, and suppliers in making maximum efforts so that such a tragedy be never, ever again repeated. Mrs. Maloney. But you did not answer my question of whether or not you would assume the cost of the hospital, repair of the body, the expenses of the individuals. Mr. Inaba. Well, many of those cases are pending legal issues, and so we will leave it to our legal counsel for its information. Mrs. Maloney. Earlier, when this came forward, you had this report examination done. And I would like to know if you think this report on the problems and the solutions was sufficient. Earlier, Commissioner LaHood testified he was depending on the research of Toyota. So I am asking whether you feel that this is sufficient. And, second, I would like to go back to a field technical report that came in from Europe. And in it, the mechanics are really very clearly stating that there is a problem. And I want to know why this information was not gotten out to people, to America, to the dealers, to everyone immediately. And, specifically, how many complaints trigger an investigation? Is there a standard? When someone complains and says there is a problem, what happens? How many complaints have to come in before you start reaching out? Mr. Inaba. First of all, let me address this cross-regional information sharing. As I stated before, we could have done a much better job, and we are now taking steps to improve it, as I said before. And to the specific question of how many, the number of reports do you need to initiate that investigation, I think for the UA issues, unintended acceleration issues, that we are committed to take actions in investigating those issues one by one. In other words, once we get the complaints of reports of that UA issue going forward, we will--the goal is to start the investigation within 24 hours of the information that we receive. And we are creating many, many SWAT teams to really go into that area. Mrs. Maloney. I have been called for a vote, but I would like to get on the record, if I could, your response, Mr. Toyoda. What have you learned from this personally, and what lessons has the company taken from the events leading to today's hearing? And how will you change Toyota in the future to protect people and to provide an excellent product? And I am going to go vote. If you can answer. Ms. Norton. You may answer, Mr. Inaba or Mr. Toyoda, what you learned, etc. Mr. Toyoda. With respect to the recall, thus far, we have been too much focused on two perspectives: One is technical perspective, and the other is compliance with laws and regulations. The most important lesson that I learned from this experience relates to the following. With respect to customer- first philosophy, we have been placing the highest priority on the safety thus far, and we will continue doing so. But on top of that, from the perspective of customer-first, we will place greater emphasis upon the customer's viewpoint and perspectives. So that is the first lesson that I would like to mention here. In addition to that, we will make sure that we get information from various regions of the world in a more timely manner so that the time lag be minimized between different parts of the world and the global head office in Japan. We will make efforts in that direction. Ms. Norton. Thank you. If I may say so, the reason that you have seen such emphasis on what you call the technical matters and the law is precisely that customers did in fact apparently over and over again complain about these issues, but had no way to know the cause, and expected Toyota to in fact look at the technical details. The technical details are beyond a family that reports unintended acceleration. And the family expects that, having reported that, there will be an immediate remedy. The matter of law goes to transparency itself. The law requires automobile operators in this country to--manufacturers in this country to operate in a certain way. Therefore, the first thing we do is to look and see if they are operating according to law. And law here meant of course the regulatory agency. I don't know if you want to respond, but I do want to make it clear, and I was pleased to hear that apparently the route from customer complaint to those who can do something about it is one of the reforms you have suggested in your testimony already. Apparently, these went astray because they didn't get straight up to the fix-it person. And, as I understand it, one of the most important reforms is not that the customer complaint you listened to--I suppose you heard them--but the right people in the structure did not hear these complaints. Is that so? At the right level, the level to bring an immediate remedy. Those people didn't hear it soon enough, and so the customers weren't heard soon enough. Is that correct? Mr. Toyoda. It is not that customers were not heard, in my view. Whenever complaints were reported, we try very hard to reproduce and duplicate those complaints to identify what it was that was actually taking place which led to the complaints coming from the customers. We investigated them very hard. And, at the same time, whether the similar phenomenon is likely to continue into the future, how much possibility there is for the same phenomenon to spread to other areas or other cars is another aspect that is investigated. So I will say that I will accelerate that process of following these three steps further into the future. But with respect to the reproducing--reproducibility or duplication of those phenomenon, we have been working very hard, being Toyota, to do exactly that. But even with the best efforts made, there are cases that cannot be or that have not been reproduced. So, going forward, we will enhance the transparency of the process of us working very hard to reproduce and try to identify those causes, sometimes seeking cooperation from the authorities concerned. And we intend to lead our efforts in this area in a manner that our efforts itself will lead to the improvement of the vehicles of the entire industry. Ms. Norton. I am going to go on with my questions. I just want to make sure you are not blaming the victims. The customers reported. The customers reported. Let's not say they didn't want to hear our customers. The fault does not lie with the customers. You can bet your bottom dollar that the first time there was unintended acceleration, that is about everybody's horror. You can bet your bottom dollar that customer reported that. Your answer, which goes to we will see if this is duplicated, is in some ways very troublesome, because that is such a serious problem that once it is reported one time, it seems to me you have a huge problem on your hands. And you seem to be saying, well, if we hear it enough, then we will know we ought to do something about it. That is very troublesome. Mr. Inaba. Well, what we said in our testimony and have many other times, customer first is the thing that we have been doing. But we would have to make more focus on the customer concerns and complaints. And, for that matter, I think we also work closer with the NHTSA so that when we receive the customer complaints, we would like to know more about it. And then, also, some of the information has been or will be sort of open to us, including VIN numbers, so that we can trace back each one of the customers. As I said, this SWAT team could do that. So we are trying very hard to really put that word, customer first. Ms. Norton. First, let me say to you, I am going to ask you a question that I think every American who has a Toyota would want me to ask. And I can ask this because it is personal as well as congressional. I drive a Camry Hybrid. I switched to Toyota very reluctantly, because I wanted to buy an American car, and the Americans were not making hybrids almost at all or were so few that I went straight away to Toyota. Why? I didn't ask how much it cost. I was relying on this extraordinary reputation for quality and safety that had been built over generations. So I ask you, Mr. Toyoda, is there any chance that the Camry Hybrid will be recalled for any reason? Mr. Inaba. First of all, let me step in. First of all, Madam Chair, you are driving an American car. It is produced in America. Ms. Norton. It has Mr. Toyoda's name on it. You don't want to claim it anymore? You are disclaiming the car? Mr. Inaba. No, no. Ms. Norton. It was the Americans' fault? Mr. Inaba. No, no. Please. First of all, and also, now Camry Hybrid is not on the recall list. Ms. Norton. No, and I just want to find out if you expect it ever to be on the recall list for any reason. Mr. Inaba. I think you will be very safe driving the car. So that is all I wanted just before Mr. Toyoda. Ms. Norton. You stand behind the Camry Hybrid, Mr. Toyoda? Mr. Toyoda. Right now, it is completely safe. And every day, as customers continue to use those vehicles, they may come up with the new findings, but as I said, it is 100 percent safe at the moment. And for the customers to be able to feel safe in the car and so that ourselves be able to sincerely receive any voices of the customers anywhere in the world, we are now putting in place the structure worldwide to capture customers' voices wherever in the world. And we will listen to those customers' voices very humbly and modestly so that they will continue to be safe in our vehicles. Ms. Norton. Thank you. Mr. Inaba. Madam Chair, can I have one more? Because it was, I am afraid, misunderstanding. The Camry Hybrid is produced here, and a vast majority of the parts are coming from the United States. So that is what I meant as an American car. Ms. Norton. I just don't know what difference that makes. You need to explain that to me. Were the cars that have been recalled produced elsewhere, and that is the problem? Mine is safer because American workers did it and produced it? I don't understand the distinction. The cars that have the problem were from Japan? Mr. Inaba. No. The reason why I said why Camry Hybrid is an American car, because you did--bought an American car. That is what I meant, which is produced here, supplied here. And then so that is all I wanted to say. Ms. Norton. Many Toyotas are produced here and supplied here. Aren't they? We are pleased to have you produced and supplied here. But the worldwide reputation begins in Japan and stands behind wherever they were produced. Sometimes produced in Europe. Mr. Toyoda, I was impressed with your opening remarks. In fact, I am impressed with your being here, and I am impressed with some of what you have said you intend to do, because we are really going forward. I am trying in my own questions to get some sense of where we need to have confidence in Toyota and where there is still some questions. But in your testimony, you say, I would like to point out here, this is page 1 of your testimony--that Toyota's priority has traditionally been the following: ``First, safety; second, quality; and third, volume.'' Now, I am going to ask you a question about what seems to be a fourth priority that is, for me, the most troubling aspect of this controversy, and that fourth quality is secrecy. To get to the heart of my concern about secrecy and the culture of secrecy, I would go to the data recorder, otherwise known as black box. Now, people in the United States are very familiar with airline black boxes because they know that in that black box is critical information. And if you get to it, get to it fast; you can find the cause. You can put--you cannot only respond to those who have been hurt, but you can put to rest some of the concerns as people begin to speculate what indeed caused this and they come up with sometimes wild conclusions. But that black box is critical. Now, other manufacturers, understanding just how important it is to get to the cause of the accident for all concerned, make the black box data available to download. I have had a hard time understanding, therefore, given the fact that your competitors make this data downloadable easily, I have had difficulty understanding Toyota invoking proprietary technology that allows only you, Toyota, on the spot to download. Why should we respect your proprietary technology any more than we respect the proprietary technology of other automakers, particularly given the safety aspects of this matter and the fact that an accident has already occurred? Why do you not want to clear the air as quickly as possible? On what basis do you invoke some proprietary technology interest when your competitors do not in the downloading area? Mr. Inaba. Let me respond to that question first that, yes, we know that the three manufacturers have this information, and then the reader is commercially available. Toyota is also making this---- Ms. Norton. Wait a minute. What is commercially available and when? Mr. Inaba. The three. General Motors, Ford, Chrysler have this commercially available reader that is what you---- Ms. Norton. Why don't you have such a reader? Mr. Inaba. We are in the process of making it available, commercially available, by probably the middle of next year, which is ahead of the law requirement, A; B, that this year, by April, in 2 months time, in less than 2 months time, we are going to make hundreds of units of readers available at any region, any area. The point is that, with the authority, also in the past request, we made it always open. Now, this is the information, the ETR information is the owner's information that, with their consent, we can make that information available. Ms. Norton. It was available if you were on the spot. Mr. Inaba. We did not hide it at the request of authorities, like police request or NHTSA request, or some other government and authorities request. We have made it openly. Ms. Norton. One, you came as if there was something that was so secret that even you had to be there in order for law enforcement and regulators to read it. I just don't understand the difference. Indeed, let me make sure I understand what your testimony is. Are you saying that the company is redesigning the black box so that it can be readable by law enforcement, by safety investigators, and consumers? Mr. Inaba. And owners of that. It is not--it should not be made available to anybody else unless there is a consent, to my knowledge, of the owners of the vehicle. Ms. Norton. You would not have to be--Toyota would not have to be present in order for the black box to be read. Is that true? Just like other manufacturers, you don't have to come to unlock the black box personally? Mr. Inaba. I don't know that technical detail to answer. Ms. Norton. Well, that is the whole point, sir. Mr. Chaffetz from Utah, you have 5 minutes. Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. Mr. Toyoda, Mr. Inaba, thank you for being here. I very much appreciate it. Mr. Toyoda, do you believe you are being treated the same as other manufacturers in the United States of America? Mr. Toyoda. Yes, I believe so. Mr. Chaffetz. Do you have any reason to believe that other automakers are treated any differently by NHTSA? Mr. Toyoda. No, I don't think so. Mr. Chaffetz. If you could hand the document, please, to them. There is a document dated July 6, 2009. If you could take a look at this, please. This is an internal Toyota document dated July 6, 2009. Mr. Inaba, it has your name on it. My apologies if I pronounced it wrong. On page 7, which should be the second page, it says under the first bullet point: Changing political environment. Massive government support for Detroit automakers. Is that concerning? Why was that brought up? Mr. Inaba. This is one of--I explained already once part of it. This is one of my orientation, because I was a few days into this position, and this is prepared by Washington office to give me sort of a first look of it. I do not honestly recall all these notions. The only thing I said, also, recall, is the quiet car regulation, which struck me with a very strange feeling. But that was the only thing. But looking at all these papers, this suddenly does not represent the Toyota's overall guiding principle or belief. Mr. Chaffetz. On the second page, it is under key safety issues, and the first point it says: U.S. DOT NHTSA under Obama administration not industry friendly. Is that a compliment, or is that a criticism? Mr. Inaba. I can't comment on that. Mr. Chaffetz. What does it mean to you? Let me go to the last point, Mr.--perhaps both of you could take this. ``The new team has less understanding of engineering issues and are primarily focused on legal issues.'' Can you explain what Toyota meant by that? Mr. Inaba. I still don't understand what the big difference between the two, engineer, legal. Both are involved anyhow. Mr. Chaffetz. Both what? Mr. Inaba. Both sides have been--will be involved in a discussion anyhow. Mr. Chaffetz. This is an internal Toyota document. Mr. Toyoda, how would you read this? Mr. Toyoda. I can't understand it. Mr. Chaffetz. My understanding is that both Toyota and NHTSA knew about this problem back as early as 2007, and yet it took so long to get it taken care of. Is there a regulatory component here that was slowing this down? Mr. Toyoda. Today I came to understand that this particular document was prepared as a part of the presentation material addressed to the new president. However, I do not know the background of this writing nor do I know how this document was prepared. And, therefore, I apologize, but I simply do not know the answer to your question. Mr. Chaffetz. Do you believe it is true? Do you stand by it, or do you want to distance yourself from it? Mr. Toyoda. Well, I need to understand this further. That is to say, I cannot understand the English written here. Mr. Inaba. Now 8 months into this position, I am beginning to learn myself and form my own opinion. So that is not consistent, or I am learning this does not represent my feeling today. And of course, I will learn more. I would like to build a very good relationship with NHTSA, and so that we can work together very good. Mr. Chaffetz. Do you--explain to me the negotiation that happens between an auto manufacturer and NHTSA. Often the word ``negotiation'' is used. How does that work? What is negotiated in your---- Mr. Inaba. I have met NHTSA officials twice. So I am not able to explain what the negotiation means. So it is still a little bit too premature for me to say anything. But, I don't know. Certainly negotiation doesn't sound like a good word. There is a discussion, yes. But also exchange of information, yes. And we oftentimes get the good guidance from NHTSA, from an official. We listen to it. We respect him. They ask us information. We provide them. So this is sort of like the nature of the relationship, as I understand. Whether it falls into negotiate or not, I can't--I don't know. Mr. Chaffetz. Do you believe, Mr. Toyoda, that American unions have an undue influence in this process? Mr. Toyoda. Since I haven't understood the content of this, I do not know how I should answer that question. I apologize for that. Mr. Chaffetz. Toyota hired some former NHTSA employees. Why would it be appealing to hire former NHTSA employees? Mr. Inaba. Well, first of all, those two gentlemen who came from NHTSA I know personally. So, of course, having---- Mr. Chaffetz. How did you know them? Mr. Inaba. I just started meeting him more often because I am a president of that company and meet them. Mr. Chaffetz. Did you know them before they were hired? Mr. Inaba. No, I did not. So I am beginning to know their personality so their professional standard. So I have a very high respect for both gentlemen's professionalism and also ethical standard. So it doesn't matter whether they are coming from NHTSA or not. To me, it does not. Mr. Chaffetz. Do you believe that the relationship between NHTSA and Toyota or other manufacturers is too close, too cozy? Mr. Inaba. I don't believe so. Ms. Norton. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Kucinich of Ohio, 5 minutes. Mr. Kucinich. I thank the gentlelady. We have heard Mr. Toyoda say that Toyota grew too fast. It is interesting that is being told to us as we are investigating cars that are accelerating out of control. It is ironic, but I would submit perhaps a misleading parallel, because the problem is not that you were moving too fast but that you were moving too slow, too slow to recognize the material defects that put people's lives at risk, and too slow to have some internal questioning about the effectiveness of your own value innovation program, which in the mid-decade began slashing production costs so that you could reach a 10 percent operating profit. And then, when China came on into full competition and began dropping their price for parts, you began to cut your costs even more. And this committee hasn't really looked at the economic backdrop of the change--what appears to be a change in Toyota's culture but which may be, in fact, a kind of a cut-throat, corporate, competitive environment which caused Toyota to drive its costs down. And, as we know, everywhere, when costs are driven down, safety is also put at risk. There are 180 different parts that you look at where you cut the cost by at least 30 percent, according to all industry reports. Now, Mr. Toyoda, to your knowledge, were there ever any discussions at Toyota that certain design or engineering flaws would create system failures that would result in unintended acceleration? Mr. Toyoda. You pointed out that, before I became president, the speed of growth may have been too fast. And I was referring to the fact that the growth may have outpaced our ability to develop and train human resources. And you also pointed out that the company may have become a finance-driven manufacturing company. And---- Mr. Kucinich. You know, I understand your answer, but it is not responsive to the question that I am asking. Now, I want to be polite, but I also hope that you will answer the question that I asked, which is: Were there ever any discussions at Toyota that certain design or engineering flaws would create system failures that would result in unintended acceleration? That was my question, and I would appreciate the courtesy of a direct response. Mr. Toyoda. Whenever those issues of recall came about within Toyota, we had very serious discussion as to at which stage so-called unintended acceleration takes place. Mr. Kucinich. Well, let me ask a followup question, Mr. Toyoda. Have you ever been advised by your attorneys or business associates not to discuss any defects in the electronic throttle control system because such an admission would create such liability which would be financially devastating to Toyota? Mr. Toyoda. That has never happened. Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Inaba. Mr. Inaba. Never happened. Mr. Kucinich. You have had no discussions with your attorneys about matters of material defect in your products? Mr. Inaba. Nothing costs Toyota more than the loss of a customer's trust in our vehicles. From that perspective, we are as eager as anybody else to know if there is any problem on our ETC system. Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Towns. The gentlemen from Indiana, Mr. Souder. Mr. Souder. I would like to make a couple of comments at the very beginning. First, I want to thank Mr. Inaba for visiting Warsaw, IN, to the new Toyota dealership there. That was a big thing for a small town. Dave Illingworth is running that, and that is in my district. And people were very excited to have you in. Second, I have some concerns about the way the hearing has been conducted. To some degree, it seems like we are having a hanging before the trial. Now, I am not saying that you are not guilty; I am just saying it seems by hauling you in here and the way we have handled this and by going through a lot of internal memos, there is a lot yet to be decided. And I am trying to get to the truth. I represent an auto area. We make parts through my whole district. Fort Wayne, IN, is the proud home of the Silverado and Sierra, who is in competition with you every day. So my goal is to sell GM products and Ford and Chrysler, but also I have suppliers to you. One in this district is CTS. It is right at the edge of my district. These two pedals have distinctly different problems. This longer one was having a slightly slow release, which means that, when you take your foot off, it comes up just a fraction of a second too slow. And it also, because it was longer, was sticking in floor mats. But nobody was killed from that. That was a standard recall problem where you say, OK, we are going to fix the part. This one, however, for whatever, whether it is electronic or whatever, the one from Densol, had acceleration. In other words, it wasn't that when you let go it went up; it was actually causing the car to go faster. And all of the death cases came from the Densol model, not the CTS. Because when you go through the models--and this is important for several things. Like Mr. Kanjorski, one of our concerns as American Congressmen is that you treat America like the rest of the world. And we are very concerned about memos that suggest you were addressing the problem in Europe and Japan before in the United States. The other thing is, in part suppliers, what is amazing in this story is that the American part supplier was actually delivering the safer model and that your subsidiary--and I don't know whether you are aware. A little after 3 o'clock, the FBI raided three Toyota suppliers, and one is this one that made the pedal that is causing it. And there is clearly going to be an investigation as to that. I also want to thank you, if you are going to be an American company, for working with our parts suppliers. I understand that you need multiple suppliers. And it is good to have the competition; that is how we get better things. I understand even why, as a corporation, you need to have legal protection, although you need to be honest about what is happening here. And partly, when we have hearings like this, more people file lawsuits, and you have to protect yourself and your stockholders, and I understand that. But in looking for safety, I encourage you to continue to look at the American suppliers, because, in this case, I don't know whether it was because you were trying to do cost controls internally on your historic system, but what I see happening-- and it is interesting when you match up these two models. What happened is, it isn't true that the American company was supplying your American-made vehicles, that you have been transitioning over, and where the problems were occurring were in the Densol model, and that you have moved 50 percent over to Camry starting in 2007, but the problems were pre-2007. You have now been moving Lexus over. And I am praising you, I am not criticizing you, for moving over. But it is more or less an acknowledgment that, while you had problems in this one, they weren't as great as this one. And I would encourage you, like others have, to look at whether there was some interaction in the type of pedal, whether it was the cruise control that did it or the electronic, or whether there is something inside here. Because you are addressing the snap-back. That is just a fraction, unless you catch your mat, which is partly--we have people sticking carpet under. You know, you can have any kind of pencil get under that affects that. But that is still different than this sudden acceleration. And I encourage you to continue. You have multiple manufacturing plants in the State of Indiana, which aren't in my area. Like I say, we are more the big three. I also want to encourage you, in addition to not treating us differently compared to Europe and Japan in safety questions and continuing to use American suppliers and doing your standards--I mean, the companies in my district are saying, when you come in, you are very aggressive in making sure that they have good standards, but to continue to do that. And I also encourage you--I am very discouraged that, a number of years ago, you said your goal was to be the No. 1 auto supplier to Iran. Now, we have rules in the United States about supplying Iran, and I hope Toyota also reverses that position, because, as Americans, we are very concerned about that. I would welcome any comments. Mr. Inaba. Thank you for all of the suggestions and the advice. I must only say that we do not treat American customers any differently from Europe or Japan. And just a matter of timing, that there may be a difference in acting and reacting or resolving the problem. But there is no way that we can differentiate any American drivers from the rest. Chairman Towns. All right. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman from Illinois, Congressman Quigley. Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My colleague from Ohio stressed that he raised a point to get a more specific answer, and I will briefly try to do the same thing as it relates to black boxes. Clearly, other manufacturers make this black box data available to download. At this point, Toyota has proprietary technology that allows only Toyota to download this data. Now, beyond adding more, the specific question is: Will your company redesign the black box so they can be readable by law enforcement, safety investigators, and consumers? Mr. Inaba. It is true that we have one dealer in the United States which can read EDR. And we have made a decision that we will have a hundred units of them made available by the end of April. Mr. Quigley. How will they be made available? To whom? Mr. Inaba. This is made by our supplier, so it is a Toyota technology. But let me carry on. By the middle of 2011, prior to the law requirement, we will make this reader commercially available in this market. So there are steps that we have to take, maybe because of technical reasons, but we are making it. Because for us, also, it is very important to know the reasons of any accident and, you know, getting into more technical detail of that. And, of course, we have been always open with all information to the authority's requests. Mr. Quigley. But the other manufacturers don't make these entities hurdle to get this. It is not proprietary, I mean, so they can do it themselves. You are still making it difficult, even if you add more readers. As you say, information is so important. And, as we talked about before, one of our big concerns here is we don't know exactly what is happening. Mr. Lentz yesterday said he is not certain that a recall would fully solve the safety problem. So, again, we are flying blind. And, with respect, I don't see that what you are talking about is a dramatic leap forward to improve how much information we are getting with these incidents as they take place. Mr. Inaba. The other manufacturers you are referring to is, to my understanding, to the best of my knowledge, it is only General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, and no other makes are ready yet, I don't think. So I think we are still among earliest wave of that information available. Mr. Quigley. With respect, I think that it would behoove you and everyone who drives your vehicles, including my family, if you rethought that and advanced the efforts to make this information available far more quickly than it allows and even in the redress attempts that you are talking about now. Mr. Inaba. Yes, we are trying to, sir. Mr. Quigley. Getting to the main point that was made by Mr. Lentz, that he wasn't certain that a recall would solve these problems, it came down to the issue of electronics, and there is still a question there. What is your level of certainty as to whether electronics is a main cause of this problem? Mr. Inaba. Well, let me try my way. Mr. Quigley. OK. Mr. Inaba. My level of confidence is 100 percent. I think I have full trust in Toyota's engineers. Over 50 years, I think they have done a great job to bring the Toyota name up to here, and I have no doubt they are still doing it. So, of course, all the exhaustive testing done at Toyota, it is exhaustive, you know, in their mind. That is why we went outside. And if that is not enough, we are willing to stand--we are just in the process, just very close to announce what Mr. Toyoda referred to as an outside advisory board. This is going to be two very prominent--I can't name it as of now, maybe in a couple of days--two prominent safety experts leading the panel to investigate this ETCS of Toyota, you know, whether it is any problem or it is robust. And they can choose any outside laboratory to test it. So we are now hoping that we can answer fully so that you would understand. But we are willing to take that, sort of, test through this advisory. And they can also be an advisory board to our overall quality improvement. So this is what I wanted to say. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Quigley. Thank you. Chairman Towns. Congressman Fortenberry from Nebraska. Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for coming today. Frankly, it is refreshing to see corporate executives show remorse in what is a very serious issue and to try to unpack the way to move forward to resolve safety concerns with your product. With that said, I would like to ask one question and then perhaps propose a creative opportunity for you to consider. Is your corporate culture in America different than your corporate culture in Japan, so that the corporate culture in America is impeded from responding more quickly to safety concerns? Mr. Inaba. If I understand your question correctly, is corporate America culture different from Japan at Toyota; is that the question? Mr. Fortenberry. It would be helpful to have an understanding if your corporate culture in America is fully free and independent to be able to respond quickly to the safety problems that are presented to them here? Mr. Inaba. Well, of course, there is a difference because our corporate culture in America is very much composed of so many Americans. The vast majority is of Americans, so there may be a difference. But at the same time, it is amazing that we see a lot of camaraderie. I personally see a lot of camaraderie because I have worked in this country for 9 years. So I have seen many of the Toyota associates here, including our leaders, and the corporate culture is very, very similar to my surprise to that of Toyota in Japan. But there is also a difference in communication, I have to admit. And there is sometimes a lack of communication because of the language differences, because of the cultural differences, too. So here I am being a head of this North American operation. I am called half American, half Japanese, so I think I can bridge that gap very easily so our corporate culture of customer first, and then honest and transparency should be kept intact. Mr. Fortenberry. So there is nothing in the American Toyota corporate system that is not free or is impeded by the dominant corporate culture in Japan to quickly address safety issues? Mr. Inaba. It would be fair to say that there are none, but there are always differences. I think my job is to sort of even it. Mr. Fortenberry. One of the significant issues here is the unintended sudden acceleration. Your executive yesterday suggested what you are doing may not totally fix the problem. Now, in that regard, unintended acceleration has affected other car manufacturers, so I would suggest to you that you have a potential opportunity here as the dominant player in worldwide manufacturing, certainly one of them, to perhaps lead on a new way of thinking about this safety problem, working perhaps in a consortium with other manufacturers, your very competitors, working with the U.S. Government, to think more creatively and perhaps do the research and collaboration that shows that it is this mechanical problem that we were demonstrating earlier; or is there some electrical issue that has not been discovered yet that more collective minds working together could actually discover and broaden the impact of the safety changes for the entire car industry? Mr. Toyoda. As the Congressman has just pointed out, throughout the world, Toyota has been deploying business and pursuing business in the world. I believe the corporate culture for things that we treasure very much are commonly shared anywhere in the world. However, different regions do have its own culture, its own customs, and local people of a specific country work for a company, and we deliver our products to customers in the local markets. In that sense, I have been thinking since April that we will give greater initiative to different regions of the world, for example, by emphasizing more the culture of the United States or the customs here. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. I recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Congressman Davis. Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you gentlemen for appearing before the committee. Mr. Toyoda, for years, there have been complaints pouring into your company about unintended acceleration problems in your vehicles. Your own field technicians in Europe were alerting you that something in the accelerator pedal was causing cars to speed up uncontrollably more than a year ago. When did Toyota first learn it had a problem with sudden unintended acceleration? And why did it take you almost a year to bring this to the attention of regulators and even more time to tell the public about the problem? Is there some policy in your company that prevents you from alerting regulators as quickly as possible about a problem or the public so that we all become aware? Mr. Toyoda. In the name of our company's tradition and pride, I can clearly say that whenever a problem arises, Toyota pursues the facts thoroughly and rigorously and looks into those matters in great deal. In doing so, our fundamental approach and stance is to give the highest priority to customers' safety and convenience. And in relation to that, once that is accomplished, we provide and create products that also satisfies the mandate of the times, for example, in conserving environment or existing in harmony with nature. Now, with respect to your specific question of when we learned of this problem, I do not know when we learned of this problem, but I do hope that you would understand the basic stance and attitude of the company which I described. Mr. Davis of Illinois. Reports were actually surfacing several years ago, and yet it appears there was no significant effort to deal with it until the accident in California. Do you feel that your company acted quickly enough to begin to address the issue in a way that regulators and the public would know that you were doing so? Mr. Toyoda. As it turned out in this particular case, the response, according to information, was not quick enough. However, going forward, we will establish the framework very firmly and diligently so that we will not betray your expectations in that regard. I will personally take leadership in putting in place the structure that will enable us to capture information from the local areas concerned in a more timely manner. Mr. Davis of Illinois. Media reports suggest that your company knew for at least a year about the sticking pedals before you shared that information or until you communicated that information to the regulators. Do you think that was perhaps a lengthy bit of time to tell regulators if the company knew? Mr. Inaba. Now I know this sticky pedal situation is in question. And yes, we knew that probably a year ago in Europe. And I say that had not been shared enough well on this side. So we did not hide it, but it was not properly shared. We need to do a much better job in sharing. Whatever is happening in Europe should be known in the United States so we are all alert. See if there is any danger to American consumers and drivers. The other issue is the first information we get to know in Europe was all right-hand drive cars, and also different models, much smaller models than those models sold here. That is why initial judgment, which was wrong, turned out to be wrong, but it was limited to a right-hand drive and it was much smaller cars. So there is a lack of you may call it sensitivity, but there is no deliberate sort of delay in the process. Mr. Davis of Illinois. Well, let me just say that I appreciate your answers, and I thank you for indicating that you expect to do a better job. I am always reminded of my mother, who told us when I was a kid growing up that what you do speaks so loudly until it is hard for me to hear what you say. So I hope your actions will be forthcoming, and I thank you for your answers. Chairman Towns. I thank the gentleman from Illinois. Now I call on the gentleman from California, Congressman Bilbray. Mr. Bilbray. Mr. Inaba, you made a comment that kind of was startling to me, and I apologize that you have to testify in a second language and in a setting that may not be as comfortable for you as you prefer, but you stated that you had 100 percent, you were 100 percent sure that the difficulties with the pedals, with the acceleration, was not electronic, that it was not going to be involved with the data systems, that it was a physical problem. Do you stand by that statement? Mr. Inaba. Sir, may I clarify what I meant because the question I thought was, are you personally, what is my confidence level about ETCS, the Electronic Throttle Control System. So my feeling is, since I have a trust in our engineers, even though it has not been extensively tested by outsiders, which I added, but my personal confidence level is 100 percent. But I am only referring to the ETC system, sir. Mr. Bilbray. Because it does concern me when anybody can say anything to 100 percent. It is one thing to stand behind their vehicles; it is another thing to ask the American people to stand in front of them, especially with their children; 100 percent is a very strong statement. It is fine to say it here in these hearings, but out in the real world, we have had some terrible tragedies. I just want to make sure, being a Representative in San Diego, where the tragedy that finally opened up this book caused not only Toyota but the American community to be willing to ask the tough questions that I don't think have been made. Mr. Toyoda, your family has spent decades creating a reputation that is second to none, probably only compatible with the inventor of the automobile themselves. The big question is, do you think there is a possibility that reputation being so good might have made those of us who were regulators not ask the tough questions that we might have asked from General Motors or some other automaker, or that same reputation and feeling of success and confidence might have left Toyota not to ask the tough questions of yourself? In other words, your success created the problem or created the atmosphere and the environment that allowed this problem to go on from 2007 until just recently? Mr. Toyoda. I personally do not believe that we didn't ask tough questions because we had very high reputations. Since I became president in July, I have been saying internally within the company that we need to heed customers, dealers, and we need to become a good listener. But because of the inadequacy on my part probably, that ability itself may not have spread widely within the company. But for the past 70 years, we have been supported by customers and by our partners because Toyota has been a company that listens to those opinions of outsiders very modestly and sincerely. You have my commitment that we will continue doing so going forward. Mr. Bilbray. Look, the damage done to the Toyota name will do more--will impact Toyota more than anything this Congress can do. The consumer and the market will demand a very high price from Toyota for these mistakes. The question is, how do we prevent it in the future for Toyota and everybody else? Do you agree that the Federal Government of the United States should require all manufacturers, including Toyota, to report all incidents of malfunctions no matter where in the world those occur, not just here in the United States? Mr. Toyoda. I personally believe that realistically there are limitations to the current engineering capability. However, Toyota has a challenging spirit to make things better or to correct inadequacies or troubles wherever that may happen. In going forward, we will continue to strive to minimize those troubles as close as possible to zero by examining each individual reported cases, putting them under scrutiny, and making public any findings in that process. And we would like to work together in this industry. Mr. Bilbray. Mr. Chairman, in all fairness, I would just like a yes or no. Should the Federal Government of the United States require Toyota and every other manufacturer to report total malfunctions, not just those within the jurisdiction of the United States; yes or no? Should we require all information, or shouldn't we? What is the position of Mr. Toyoda? Mr. Toyoda. We would like to extend full cooperation. Mr. Bilbray. So we will take that as a ``yes.'' Mr. Toyoda. Yes. Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas, Congressman Cuellar. Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I represent the San Antonio area down to the valley where we have a Toyota plant. Currently, right now, there's about 2,600 hardworking Americans in the San Antonio area plant where they are jobs and family livelihood. I see Jay here, which I visited, and a couple of other folks here. We are asking you to put Toyota back on track so American jobs are not put in jeopardy. And American drivers that are at risk we have to address. It is my hope that you move swiftly and safely to repair the safety problems, rebuild the reputation and restore the Toyota legacy which employs Americans here at home. American drivers and American workers are watching and waiting. Toyota has a glowing legacy in this country for decades. For the sake of safety and for the sake of jobs, you all need to get that back. In this country we have American-made Toyotas made by American workers with American drivers behind the wheel. The responsibility Toyota has to Americans runs wide and runs deep, and this is about safety, and this is about jobs. As I mentioned, in my area, 2,600 local jobs, doesn't include the onsite local suppliers, which is about 6,500 when you put everybody. It doesn't include the Toyota dealers. So millions of Americans also drive your vehicles. As I mentioned, I met with Jay. I met with a couple of other folks, one of your Toyota forklift operators in San Antonio, and she said, even in this type of recession, Toyota has not laid anybody off. They have spared the employees that are still working. And we appreciate that. But without a doubt, your ability to repair your reputation in this country will affect American workers and drivers who depend on Toyota. One of the things that I want you to look at, because in fairness to all, when you look at the NHTSA numbers, you see--I don't want to go, but you can see there, you know, one company was at 32 percent. And I have handed this chart out, Mr. Chairman. Another one was at 17 percent, and another one was 15, and other, which means combined one, and then Toyota was at 11 percent. In the past, you were doing well, very well. But, again, we now have to look at, what lessons have we learned? So my question, Mr. Toyoda, what lesson has your company learned as a result of this recall? Mr. Toyoda. This past data clearly places high evaluation to our track record. However, currently we are having a series of recalls. The brake system or accelerator pedal has caused concerns. But we are examining those matters, pursuing the true cause of those problems, identifying countermeasures. And going forward, we will make sure that we get information more swiftly. Therefore, I will clearly say that, going forward, we will regain the good reputation as represented here in this track record. That's exactly what we are doing at the moment. Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Toyoda, in your major editorial that you wrote recently, you said that Toyota, paraphrasing your words, has not lived up to the high standards it set for itself. How has your company not lived up to those high standards? Mr. Toyoda. First, above anything else, we will make double commitment with new vigor to have safety and customer first permeate through every business and through every process within Toyota. That I believe would be the best way for us to win back the trust that we enjoyed in the past. On top of that, as we deploy business globally, we will make every effort to enhance the transparency of our business in various parts of the world. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. I call on the gentleman from Tennessee, Congressman Duncan. Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Yesterday a woman named Rhonda Smith testified at the Energy and Commerce Committee. She is from east Tennessee, from just outside my district, which is based around Knoxville. She was driving into Knoxville in her Lexus automobile on October 12, 2006, 3\1/2\ years ago, and she experienced one of these sudden acceleration events and that her automobile reached 100 miles an hour. And she said that she thought it was her time to die, and she said she called her husband and tried to put the car in reverse but the computer apparently didn't recognize it. She feels that Toyota's response to her complaints was a farce because Toyota apparently told her there was nothing wrong with her car. Our investigators for the Energy and Commerce Committee and this committee found that complaints started coming in about these events in 2001, and NHTSA started an investigation apparently in 2004 aimed at Toyota. Now 2004, you know, I don't know, that is 6 years ago if the investigation started early in the year; maybe 5\1/2\ years ago if it started late in the year. But Mr. Toyoda has said several times today that he just became president last summer, as if that excuses him. Mr. Inaba, though, became head, as I understand it, 9 years ago of the U.S. Toyota operation. Now one of my sons had a Toyota 4Runner several years ago, and my wife drove a small Lexus until about 2 years ago, and both of those were very good automobiles. And I think you have a very good company and put out almost entirely good automobiles. I have a good impression of your company. But having said that, I don't believe I have heard a good answer today, and I have been in and out some, but I don't believe that I have heard a good answer or a complete answer as to why it took your company so long to respond to these complaints, because apparently there were many complaints. I have seen it described as several hundred. I have seen it described as a few thousand. I don't know which it is, but there were many, many complaints. And I appreciate the fact that you have expressed remorse and that you say that you are going to do better. Why was there not a response before now when you had all of these complaints? Mr. Toyoda. I listened to the testimony by Ms. Smith yesterday, and I feel very sorry and regret for the fact that, while she was driving a car, such a huge anxiety was caused to her. And at the same time, I apologize for the response by the dealer, which is not really up to our standards. Now as to why it took us so long, well, in order to accelerate our response going forward, I have established the Special Committee for Global Quality, and we are now setting up the framework so that the first meeting can take place on March 30th. We have deeply reflected on what has happened thus far. We learned a very important lesson from what has happened, and to take actions for improvement as quickly as possible I think is the job that I really have to attend to at the moment. Mr. Duncan. Well, let me just say this. I understand there are no Americans in the top leadership of Toyota in Japan. You can say there are many Americans in the top leadership here, but it might be a good idea to put a couple of Americans in the top leadership in Japan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize Congresswoman Speier from California. Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My question is to both the president and the CEO in the States. Have you turned over every document to NHTSA that relates to the sticky pedal and the sudden unintended acceleration? Mr. Toyoda. I believe so. That's my understanding. Ms. Speier. So there is not going to be any suppressed document or secret document that we are going to hear about a year from now? Mr. Toyoda. That won't happen. Ms. Speier. Now the people of Japan are very hospitable. I know that for a fact. This is the No. 2 most important market for Toyota in the world. When a U.S. regulator flies to Japan to meet with your leadership, I find it hard to believe that, one, you didn't know about the meeting; and, two, you never had a report about the meeting. Can you respond to that? Mr. Toyoda. That's a fact, and I regret that the response in that matter was not good. Of course, there are things that we reflect upon, but I believe that the people in the quality division responded to that very adequately. That is my understanding, and I hope your understanding. Ms. Speier. I would like to ask you to turn over to the committee any documentation, any memos that arose out of that meeting by the regulators in the United States coming to Japan. Mr. Toyoda. I will do that. Ms. Speier. Now, I want to read to you an e-mail that I received from a constituent who owns a Toyota Tacoma truck that they purchased in 2008: ``Soon after we bought the truck, we began to notice that the engine would surge when we were stopped and had our foot on the brake. We took the truck into the dealer as soon as we started to notice these problems. We returned at least three more times with the same problem. They had a service person test drive it. They told us they were unable to duplicate the problem. My wife finally asked to speak to the head of the service department, and he told her that the truck needed to get used to her driving style and to give it a few months to make the adjustment.'' In exasperation, they went to the Internet. They found similar complaints. ``We told the service people at the agency about what we found on the Internet, and they said that they had contacted Toyota, and Toyota told them that they had never had a complaint of that nature we described. They continued to blame the problem on my wife.'' Now, I would like for you to review this particular complaint and report back to me. But more importantly, I hope that, moving forward, you never again use the excuse that it was driver error. Mr. Toyoda. I didn't know about this Tacoma case, but we would like to give due explanation on that through documents or other means. And as CEO of the company, I will make sure that we will never, ever blame the customers going forward. Ms. Speier. Thank you. One last question. You said, safety first, Mr. Toyoda. We know that the electronic throttle control may be problematic. You have already decided to put the override, the brake override chip into models moving forward. You are going to do it for some models retroactively. Would you be willing for a customer who came into your dealership to offer that chip to anyone who had concerns about the safety of their vehicle? Mr. Toyoda. I do not know the technical details, but if it is technically and engineeringly possible, or if we can find a good method, we will do that. But other than that, I do not know a good answer to that. Ms. Speier. All right, thank you. Chairman Towns. I now call on the gentlewoman from Ohio-- I'm sorry, California--Congressman Watson. Ms. Watson. Thank you so much. May I say to you, kunnichiwa and aligato for your testimony. Mine is more a comment. And, Mr. Chairman, I'm going to concede my time because we do have another panel and there's another committee waiting for this room. But currently, about 8 million Toyota vehicles have been recalled in this country due to the sudden, unintended acceleration events and braking concerns. I hope that the interest shown here in America will be taken back so that you can fix whatever is causing this. And we hear it's computer- driven, these causes. So I would hope--and there is a saying that Kaiser Permanente uses--I hope we all thrive. I hope you thrive. But we are concerned about the victims that are going to be the next panel up. And I was hoping that we could get both panels together so they can explain what happened to them and you can comment. But a word to the wise. And that is, listen closely, make a commitment to go back and make the decisions at the top so that your particular product will be, again, No. 1. With that, I will say [speaking in Japanese.] I will yield back my time. Chairman Towns. I thank the gentlewoman from California for yielding back her time. I recognize now the gentlewoman from Ohio. Ms. Kaptur. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Toyoda and your associates, thank you for coming today. Mr. Toyoda, I am not satisfied with your testimony. I'm being very forthcoming. I do not feel it reflects sufficient remorse for those who have died, and I do not think you have accurately reflected the large number of complaints that have been filed with Toyota for nearly a decade. So I, as one member, am disappointed. I dedicate my testimony in memory of Mrs. Guadalupe Alberto, age 76, from Flint, MI, who died when her 2005 Toyota Camry sped out of control and crashed into a tree. Business Week reports: She blew past an intersection. Witnesses saw her with both hands on the wheel. She appeared to be standing on the brake while steering. Where is the remorse? As far back as 2002, NHTSA--and our government is at fault, too--records that two Toyota executives, Christopher Tinto and Christopher Santucci, both of whom were former NHTSA employees, hired by your company, worked with their former coworkers, Scott Yon and Jeffrey Quandt, at NHTSA when it decided it wouldn't investigate what they termed ``longer duration incidents'' involving uncontrollable acceleration, I call it ``sudden death'' acceleration, where brake pedal applications allegedly had no effect. NHTSA limited its investigation to those situations where it was a second, or under a second. That was a major decision that affected lives all through the decade. So I am disappointed. This book, ``The Toyota Way,'' is used in business schools across this country. And the author talks about your company's principles. Principle No. 5 reads: Build a culture of stopping to fix problems to get quality right the first time. The first time. Mr. Toyoda, how did Toyota lose its way? You say in your testimony your company grew too fast. Some smart lawyers gave you those words. I think what happened was your company went from emphasizing long-term quality values and corporate responsibilities to fighting against safety regulations; against insider influence inside this city and your own capital in Japan; and environmental regulations; and, indeed, worker rights and car checks inside your company. So is it the Toyota way to use insider dealing to change decisions and is it the Toyota way to push a deregulation agenda that works against the interest of the people of our country and other countries? Do you know how many people in Japan died because of what your company did? Mr. Toyoda. Not just limiting to those individuals you specifically mentioned, I feel deeply sorry for those people who lost their lives or who were injured by traffic accidents, especially those in our own cars. And I extend my sincerest condolences to them from the bottom of my heart. I came from Japan to appear at this hearing, but at the same time I have been trying to convey my sincere feelings, my own true beliefs to the people throughout the world, but the fact that you said that was not adequate is something that I will seriously reflect upon. As we pointed out, the devotement of people, human resources at Toyota, may not have kept pace with expansion. I will observe that and look at that fact very sincerely. And going forward to bring about and effect changes to become a better car maker and to become a more transparent car maker, I think, is a real admission of myself as president. However, some customers of Toyota, as a matter of fact, many customers of Toyota around me say that they are willing to continue buying Toyota vehicles going forward. And as long is there are such customers, feeling and accepting the gravity of those victims of traffic accidents, I think it is my responsibility to care for those customers and create cars for those customers, and I believe that I'm the only person who can display the leadership to transform Toyota in that direction. Chairman Towns. The gentlewoman's time has expired. I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri, Congressman Clay. Mr. Clay. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for being here. Mr. Toyoda, yesterday David Gilbert, associate professor of automative technology at Southern Illinois University, testified that Toyota has an electronic problem, a conclusion he derived from testing that only took him 3\1/2\ hours. I'd note that his credentials are significant. He is very qualified to do this testing. Toyota has announced that to help solve this problem, Toyota will begin to install brake override systems on your cars. Isn't it true that if what Dr. Gilbert testified to, that Toyota has an electronics problem, you cannot be certain that a brake override system would even kick in and work when your electronics malfunction? Mr. Toyoda. With respect to this problem of electronic throttle control system, I gave instruction to conduct thorough duplication and reproduction tests. We have conducted, actually, numerous reproduction and duplication tests on a 24- hour basis, but thus far we have not identified any problem with our ETC system. I know of this testimony given by Professor Gilbert yesterday, and I personally do not know the details of what sort of testing he conducted. But just the confrontation between Toyota and Professor Gilbert will not clarify which side is correct, and this means that there are problems that have not been resolved for the entire industry. And therefore in the open forum, to validate the situation, we are willing to conduct testing together so that our customers will be able to feel safe in the vehicles as quickly as possible. And Toyota is ready to extend cooperation in that regard. Mr. Clay. Thank you. Yes, sir. Mr. Inaba. Please allow me. I have a little more information about that. I will be glad to meet with him or have him meet with our engineers and then explain his method, test method. And if there's any input that he may have, we are willing to listen to any input he has for the UA issue. But we have some concerns. As far as we know, and our engineers gave us some concerns about it, because he cut into a circuitry and then manipulated the system in a way that is very unrealistic. And, also, in the meantime, with a very short time, we have conducted if some other manufacturers' cars would perform the same. We have done three cars done already with a very low UA rate. In other words, they are considered to be a very safe car. It replicated the same way. So in my very amateur term it is not unintended acceleration, it is an intended manipulation. Mr. Clay. So you have determined it's not electronic. But I would hope you would get with Professor Gilbert. Mr. Inaba. Absolutely. Mr. Clay. And compare your notes, compare your testing, to make a determination on whether it is or isn't. Mr. Inaba. Yes, sir. Mr. Clay. Thank you. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. Now calling on the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Driehaus. Mr. Driehaus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our witnesses for their time today and for coming in and testifying before the committee. Mr. Inaba, I'm concerned about some of what you say in your testimony relative to what we have learned about Toyota employees and former NHTSA employees. As has been explored by multiple Members here today, there seems to be a conflict or there certainly seems to be an effort on the part of former NHTSA employees, now employed by Toyota or formally employed by Toyota, to put a halt to some of these investigations. And I will just refer to the Business Week article on February 12th. It said: In one example of Toyota aides' role, Mr. Santucci testified in a Michigan lawsuit that the company and NHTSA discussed limiting an examination of unintended acceleration complaints to incidents lasting less than a second. That is what Representative Kaptur was referring to. It goes on to say that: All four of the probes the Toyota aides helped end were into complaints that the unintended acceleration was caused by flaws in the vehicle's electronic throttle systems. Do you believe that had these efforts not been made to limit these investigations, that Toyota as a company would have reacted more quickly and NHTSA would have reacted earlier to some of the problems that we are now addressing today in terms of the number of accidents and the severity of these accidents? Mr. Inaba. Well, I don't know any of the specific incidents or occurrence that you have mentioned. But, as I said, I think I believe in two of our associates' very high ethic standard, and also their integrity. So I have all good reasons to believe in that, rather than just hinting that they may have some relationship and favor us. I think they have done--and also the NHTSA part. They are very, very professional team of people. Mr. Driehaus. Just to followup. So you're suggesting that they didn't engage in this behavior to try to limit the investigations? Is that what you're saying? Mr. Inaba. All I'm saying is that whatever they have done is within the very good ethical sort of code. Mr. Driehaus. My question, though, is if the investigations had not been limited, if the investigations had not been limited, would we have addressed the situation earlier than we are today? Mr. Inaba. I think it is a very issue that, you know, since I don't know the conversation or event, I would not make any more comment on that. Mr. Driehaus. Also, Mr. Inaba, in your testimony earlier you suggested that the information in Europe with regard to some of these challenges wasn't shared with folks in the United States. I personally find that hard to believe; that Toyota here in the United States was unfamiliar with what was going on in terms of recalls and addressing sudden acceleration problems in Europe. So I just want to make sure that I have this right. So you are saying that Toyota America was not aware of the efforts by Toyota to address the sudden acceleration issues in Europe when that was going on? Mr. Inaba. Well, I must say that it is, we call in our term, sticky pedal issues. I think the truth is that Toyota American site was not aware of that or was not informed of that. That is true. That is all I know. Mr. Driehaus. So when that was going on, when those complaints were being addressed, when solutions were being created and a recall was taking place in Europe, you were unaware of that here in the United States? Mr. Inaba. I personally got to know that fact in January this year. Mr. Driehaus. I will just conclude with a case. And I'm encouraged by the fact that my folks in Cincinnati, when I went to the Toyota dealership and I went to the service department, said they hadn't seen any of these complaints. But then when I went back and looked at the NHTSA record, it was pretty clear there were multiple complaints about sudden acceleration. I will just reflect upon this one that I saw, and it's a complaint from 2009. The gentleman says: I bought my 2005 Tacoma about 2 months ago. I've experienced this problem three times now, the last time being tonight after picking up my daughter at work. The truck was accelerating and I was literally standing on the brake and the engine was racing and would not stop. I threw it into neutral and it sounded like it was going to explode. I have no rugs in the vehicle. It did not come with any, and I was going to get all the weather mats but have not bought them yet. The cruise control was not engaged. I do not consider myself to be an inexperienced driver. I used to race, actually. And he goes on. But, clearly, this isn't a mat problem, this isn't a sticky pedal problem. This is a problem with an experienced driver experiencing sudden acceleration. And this is in a 2005 Tacoma. I think we certainly as a Congress want to know, and I think the American people want to know, if their vehicles are safe, and if you can stand here today and tell us that they don't risk--because of a computer issue or an electronic issue-- sudden acceleration in Toyotas that are on the street today. Mr. Toyoda. I do not know of the Tacoma case of 2005 or 2009, and therefore without knowing those specifics, I cannot give you any specific answer. But if I might just refer to electronic throttle control system. To the extent that we have conducted various tests thus far to date, we have not encountered the same phenomenon as a result of that test and therefore I believe the vehicle is safe. However, going forward we are willing to work together in an open forum with the industry partners to validate the situation, introducing opinions of other people, including Professor Gilbert, for that matter. Chairman Towns. The gentleman's time has expired. Let me say that, first of all, I really, really appreciate your coming to testify. We really appreciate that. We look forward to your followup on the safety issue because, as I indicated to you, this is what this is all about. It's about safety, making certain that people get in their cars, that they are safe. I hope that you continue to work on that. Let me say to you, Mr. Toyoda, I want you to know that I'm impressed with the fact that you came voluntarily before the committee to testify. I want you to know that, to me, that indicates your commitment, indicates your dedication, and that you're serious about making certain that these autos are safe. So I want to thank you for that. I also want to thank you, Mr. Inaba, for your being in touch and understanding the fact that this is a serious issue that must be addressed. Anything else? Mr. Issa. Mr. Chairman, if I could just echo your words and say a great many promises were made here today, commitment for change. We look forward to seeing that. As somebody who has worked with the Society of Automotive Engineers for many years, I look forward to that change being spread throughout the design industry in QS9000 and other standards, because I believe that what we have begun here today is going to be critical for all automobile manufacturers, particularly as we put more electronic systems in the car. I, again, thank you for your great distance and your patience through this long day. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that both of our booklets of inclusions be put into the record at this time. Chairman Towns. Without objection. I recognize the gentlewoman from Ohio. Ms. Kaptur. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just ask unanimous consent to include materials in the record attendant to my questioning. Chairman Towns. Without objection. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.023 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.024 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.025 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.027 Chairman Towns. So thank you very, very much for coming. Now we go to our third panel. The committee will come to order. I would now like to introduce our third panel of witnesses. Mrs. Lastrella, welcome to the committee. Mrs. Lastrella lost family members in a car accident involving a Toyota vehicle. I want you to know you have our deepest sympathy. I know how tough it is when you lose a loved one. So thank you so much for coming. Mr. Haggerty experienced a sudden unintended acceleration in a Toyota vehicle. I can imagine what that's like. So I want to thank you, too, for coming today. I imagine that experience of all of a sudden your car takes off. I can imagine. Mrs. Claybrook, a former Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and president emeritus of the Public Citizen. Welcome. We're so delighted to have you and your experience that you could share with us. Mr. Ditlow, the executive director of the Center for Auto Safety. We are delighted to have you with us as well. So what we will do is just start with you, Mrs. Lastrella, and just come right down the line. You have 5 minutes. Of course, when you start out, the light is on green, and then it turns to yellow, and then of course it becomes red. Red everywhere means stop. So we will stop with that. Mrs. Lastrella, you start first. I have to swear you in, too. [Witnesses sworn]. Chairman Towns. Let the record reflect that all the witnesses answered in the affirmative. STATEMENTS OF FE NIOSCO LASTRELLA, LOST FAMILY MEMBERS IN A CAR ACCIDENT INVOLVING A TOYOTA VEHICLE; KEVIN HAGGERTY, EXPERIENCED SUDDEN UNINTENDED ACCELERATION IN A TOYOTA VEHICLE; JOAN CLAYBROOK, PRESIDENT EMERITUS OF PUBLIC CITIZEN AND FORMER ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION; AND CLARENCE M. DITLOW, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY STATEMENT OF FE NIOSCO LASTRELLA Mrs. Lastrella. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Issa, and the members of the congressional committee, thank you for inviting me here and giving me the opportunity to speak for my four siblings, to testify for the Toyota recall as they relate to my beloved family who were taken prematurely away from us. I would not discuss or talk about the accident, as we have heard enough. We have heard so much from the media anywhere throughout the world. I'm here to speak for my four children and for the safety of the consumers throughout the world. I braved this time myself. I would like to introduce myself. I am Fe Lastrella. I am a school teacher by profession and I ventured into the real estate business when we moved to Vallejo. Nobody knows probably where Vallejo is. That is a suburb of San Francisco, CA. We moved in 1977 to Vallejo, but we were in Alameda for quite a while before coming to California. My husband was stationed in Midway Island. So I was married to Cleto Lastrella for 46 years. He was a retired Command Master Chief, U.S. Navy, for 30 years, and worked for the Federal Government for another 10 years. We have five children. The oldest one was Cleofe Lastrella Saylor. Chris Lastrella, the middle of the five, who was with them, who called and dared to call 911. As I mentioned earlier, I will not discuss the accident. So let me start with Cleofe. Cleofe, when she graduated from the University of California, Davis, she worked for her immediate boss for a year in the research department. Then she worked for Calgene, in which she has--and I went through her experiment. I know I only have 5 minutes, but I'd like to mention this because she had that experiment in which we didn't mention the cotton. It was presented by the president of Calgene on TV. And then she worked for various pharmaceutical and technological companies, and the last one was AMBRX in LaJolla, CA, in which she received an achievement award for significant technological innovations awarded to her in October 2009. Mark Wesley Saylor, her husband, was a highway patrol officer, who loved her dearly. He was respected. A very respectful person and very caring. He was a person of honor and integrity. He was a very religious man, a devout father and husband. He gained respect from his colleagues and friends. Mark dedicated his time in life to his family and to his job. In 1997, he responded to a traffic collision on Interstate 5. He saved the life of a man who was strapped in his car, burning car, and he was awarded for that, too, for his effort and for his superior act. This is ironic; he saved someone, but he was not able to save his family from the crash. Mahala Manda Saylor, that is my 13-year old granddaughter, she was a promising athlete. Her love for soccer made her a team captain. Mahala was blessed for a parent like Mark and Cleofe. After working hours, her parents would attend to her games, to her practice, to school, and to church. The week of the tragedy, my daughter Cleofe took off for a week to prepare her daughter entering ninth grade at Mater Dei Catholic School in Chula Vista. Mahala missed the invitation and the opportunity to travel, as she was invited by the Sports Ambassador People to People Soccer Cup in Vienna, Austria. Knowing Mark and Cleofe, they will make an investment on their child's future. That is Mahala. Chris Lastrella's passion was basketball. He graduated at St. Vincent-St. Patrick High School. He worked for the United Parcel Service as loading supervisor. After his graduation in college at the University of East Bay--it was University of California, Hayward--he went into the financial mortgage business, also as we encouraged, because it goes hand-in-hand with the real estate business. So he ventured into that. While doing that, he worked for Wells Fargo Mortgage Co. While doing that, he went to school for voice acting in San Francisco in Sausalito. Chris' voice was heard over because of his practice, and he was so composed when he said--he was the one that called for 911. And everybody heard it. I have not heard it. I stayed away from it. I don't want to hear the rest of it. And the message was strong. He asked the operator to hold on and pray, pray, pray. That was very great of him, the courage that he had. I know it was the four of them were on the verge of their deathbed and he was able to call 911. And I thank him for that. August 28th was the tragic date that triggered this all. But we didn't hear about it until the following morning when the law enforcement officer came to our door with a note to contact the coroner's office. And I said, ``Oh, no.'' How could you imagine coroner's office, and what does that tell you? So, was it only my daughter? Because I know my daughter always checks her cell, her experiments on weekends to see how they are doing. That's how dedicated she was. So when we heard from the cop that there were three of them, I said, How about another person? And I was so glad that there's another person somewhere that was not with them. But then when we called the coroner's office, there were four. Could you imagine? It's unimaginable to lose four people in your siblings. So I brave this moment so hopefully, Mr. Chairman, and the committee, and the different organizations, the Department of Transportation and NHTSA would do something for the safety of the world. We don't want another person, another family, to suffer like we are suffering. We have--at the time we have a 7-month old baby. His name is Connor Toyooka. Toyooka. My Japanese son-in-law. We were talking to him. I know he is bubbly all the time. But he would not even smile. That is how the impact of the tragedy was felt in my household. It had a big impact on my friends and family and the whole community in San Francisco area, in the San Diego area. Thank you so much for listening to me. And I know I didn't come here to cry on someone else's shoulder. But as I mentioned earlier, it is for the safety of the world. Thank you. Chairman Towns. Thank you very much, Mrs. Lastrella, for your very moving testimony. [The prepared statement of Mrs. Lastrella follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.029 Chairman Towns. Mr. Haggerty. STATEMENT OF KEVIN HAGGERTY Mr. Haggerty. My name is Kevin Haggerty, and I owned a 2007 Toyota Avalon. For the past 6 months I have experienced five events where my car accelerated on its own. The first few times I experienced the car accelerating without my foot on the gas pedal, I was driving through town. The car would go back to its normal RPMs after driving a few miles or after the car was stopped, turned off, and restarted. After experiencing the sudden acceleration a third time, I took my vehicle to be checked by my local auto body shop--or auto shop. They could not find anything wrong with my vehicle. After two more incidents, I brought my car to a Toyota dealership on November 11, 2009, to be checked. After keeping my car for 2 days, they found no unintended acceleration problems and confirmed that the factory mats were installed properly. Then on December 28, 2009, I was driving to work on Route 78 in New Jersey. The car began to accelerate without my foot on the gas pedal. As I pushed on the brake, the car continued to accelerate. I was not able to stop by pressing on the brake pedal. The only way I was able to slow the car down was to put the car into neutral. I got off at the next exit, which was the exit for the dealership. Determined to get the car to the dealership, I showed them firsthand that--I wanted to get it to the dealership to show them firsthand that this was happening. I drove approximately five miles by alternating from neutral to drive and pressing very firmly on the brakes. On my way there, I called them and asked for the service manager to meet me outside. As I pulled into the front of the dealership, I put the car into neutral and exited the car. With the brakes smoking from the excessive braking and the car's RPMs racing, the manager entered my car. He confirmed that the gas pedal was not obstructed, the mats were properly in place, and the RPMs were very high. They contacted a Toyota tech to come to the dealership and look at my car. He arrived within a few hours. The dealership had my car for 1\1/2\ weeks. When I was told the car was ready to picked up, I asked what problem they had found. I was told by the service manager that, per Toyota, they replaced the throttle body and accelerator assembly, including one or two of the sensors. Since they cannot tell me exactly what problem they found with these parts and why they were replaced, I started doing some research about Toyotas online. I came across Sean Kane's name in multiple articles I read, and decided to contact him. When I reached him, I explained my situation and expressed my fear of driving this car in light of what just happened. I no longer felt safe in it, since nobody could explain why the acceleration problem occurred. Sean did not have an answer for the cause and was surprised that the dealership replaced parts and witnessed it firsthand. I was then contacted by ABC News and they were interested in doing a followup story on accelerator problems. ABC also confirmed with Toyota that the parts taken out of my car were sent to Toyota's corporate offices to be evaluated. I agreed to an interview, mainly because I wanted to help people understand how to safely stop a car by putting it into neutral. I continued driving my car out of necessity, but refused to put my children in it. About 3 weeks ago a local dealership owner, after hearing about my story, made me a generous offer on a new vehicle as well as offered to pay off the balance of the loan on my Avalon. For my safety, as well as the safety of my family, I took him up on this offer. I just want to confirm one thing on this, my statement. I explained the first couple of times it happened I was able to apply the brake and slow down the car, but I was going at a slower pace. I was going 15, 20 miles an hour through town. On December 28th, when I was driving at a faster rate, 60-65 miles an hour, I was not able to stop the car just by applying the brakes. The only way to stop it was by putting it into neutral. Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. Thank you very much for your testimony. Mr. Haggerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Haggerty follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.031 Chairman Towns. Ms. Claybrook. STATEMENT OF JOAN CLAYBROOK Ms. Claybrook. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here. I'd like my whole statement in the record because I'm not going to have time to read it. Chairman Towns. Without objection. Ms. Claybrook. I just want to highlight a few things and try not to be repetitive of other things that have been said today. The first thing I'd like to mention is that I do believe that Toyota has harmed its trust and confidence of the American people, and particularly with the document that has been mentioned at this hearing. One of the things that concerns me enormously is that there are no criminal penalties in the NHTSA statute. And I'm concerned about that because the Consumer Product Safety Commission has them, the Food and Drug Administration has them, the FCC has them. In an article in the New York Times recently on foreign bribes and misleading, a company paid $400 million in penalties and has the threat of going to jail. So the penalties at this agency, which total $16.4 million maximum at this point, are way understated for the size of the companies that this agency is regulating. And so I hope that this will be something that will be taken up by the committee as a recommendation. I know you're not doing the legislative part. I'd like to say for the people who have been victims of this--and Marcy Kaptur was very articulate about it; really, the only remedy they have, other than getting a new car and trying to forget the horrible experiences and loss of family and friends, is a lawsuit. That is really their only remedy. That is the only way that they can individually punish Toyota. Even that really isn't a punishment because it's just a financial penalty. But it's not really a penalty for the people who made the decisions. That's the reason that I'm interested in criminal penalties. I would like to mention something about NHTSA and the revolving door. There are 28 former top officials of this agency that have gone to work for the auto companies in one capacity or another in the last 25 years. A former NHTSA administrator, several of them former chief counsels, former deputy administers, top engineers, and lawyers of this agency, have become the face and voice of auto manufacturers after they have left the agency. And they have left it way before---- Chairman Towns. Not just Toyota, but different companies. Ms. Claybrook. Not Toyota, but all these companies. Toyota has had several. But I'm talking about all of the companies. So it's not a small issue when people raise it. I just wanted to make sure that you saw the scope of that issue. There's been a discussion of Toyota's secrecy, and I just want to say that I think this has less to do with their culture in Japan than it has to do with the fact that they are an auto company. All the auto companies are secretive. So it's an issue that is really crucial. And so is NHTSA. NHTSA is very secretive. Clarence Ditlow has filed probably more Freedom of Information Act requests to NHTSA. And Public Citizen, while I was the president, has litigated more than you can possibly imagine, for no good reason. I do think that is something that this committee may want to take a closer look at, is how secretive this agency has been. One of the things that really got my goat was when I read in the October 5th filing by Toyota on the floor mat recall, October 5, 2009, is that they claimed they were doing this, but it wasn't a safety-related defect. Please. Sudden acceleration isn't safety-related? I mean it was so arrogant, what they did, and it was so unbecoming of a company that should have much more sensitivity than that. The other action that they took, which I found very disappointing, was that they hired a litigation expert company to supposedly evaluate whether or not they have a problem with the electronics, and in fact the whole purpose of this company is to defend manufacturers. In terms of NHTSA, I would just like to ask you to get more details about the financial information, because here is their budget document filed by the agency in this Congress, and what it shows is that, of their total budget, only 15 percent is for motor vehicles. Only 15 percent. The vast majority of it, 71 percent, is for grant and aid to the States, and another 13 percent is for highway safety research. And only 15 percent is for vehicle safety of the total budget of this agency. And so when they say they can have 66 new positions coming up or that they are going to ask for more money, where are they going to ask for this money? Where is it going to be? So I hope that there will be a question asked about that. The last sort of major point--and, by the way, this agency is the poor step-sister in DOT, because 95 percent of the deaths in Transportation occur on the highway, and they have 1 percent of DOT's budget. So it is a very grossly underfunded agency. It has been for far too long. A lot has been mentioned about the event data recorders. I will hope that you followup on that. I don't know whether or not Toyota has looked at the event data recorders for the crashes that you've been hearing about. Have they looked at what the event data recorder said for the crash we just heard about or for the other 38 deaths and all those injuries? They haven't made it available easily in the United States. I will bet that NHTSA doesn't have that data. And that would help to elaborate what actually happened in those crashes and it wouldn't be ``he said, she said,'', it would be factual data. The last thing is that when the Firestone-Ford Explorer debacle happened 10 years ago, Congress passed a new law called TREAD, and in there it required early warning systems to be established by the agency, which it did do. But it keeps it all secret. NHTSA is not transparent either. All of the information is kept secret. So if you have a problem and you go to see whether or not a company has given information to the agency about that particular make and model of vehicle and what the problem is, that is all you can find. But you can't get the number of consumer complaints, you can't get the number of warranty claims, you can't get the information about their field activities. And they don't even have the number of lawsuits filed in that particular case. So you're really disabled. And I hope that this transparency issue will become a key concern of this committee. Last, I'd just like to say that some new safety standards do need to be issued. I've got them in my statement. Mr. Cummings [presiding]. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Ms. Claybook follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.032 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.038 Mr. Cummings. Mr. Ditlow. STATEMENT OF CLARENCE M. DITLOW Mr. Ditlow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sudden unintended acceleration has always been recognized as a serious safety hazard. In 1971, General Motors recalled 6.7 million Chevrolets for defective engine mounts that caused sudden acceleration. That is the fourth largest recall ever. But the early sudden acceleration recalls, they were mechanical in nature. Easy to detect, easy to fix. With the advent of electronic ignition and cruise controls systems in the late seventies and the early eighties, we began to see complaints that didn't happen of a mechanical nature. They were hard to find. In January 1989--and this is a fundamental problem with NHTSA's logic--the Department of Transportation's Transportation Systems Center did a major study into sudden acceleration and concluded that absent finding a defect that could cause the throttle to open, such as a failed cruise control, it must have been driver error. And in investigation after investigation after investigation after 1990, the agency took the position that they would close the investigation without a defect determination or recall if they couldn't find a mechanical problem that caused the throttle to open. Beginning in 2001, though, the game changed with the introduction of electronic throttle controls. Complaints at the Center for Auto Safety, NHTSA, and Toyota went up fourfold. After that, NHTSA received five defect petitions, they opened three preliminary evaluation investigations, and two engineering analyses. But none of these investigations resulted in a single vehicle safety recall. What happened, the investigations as a whole, though, show significant weaknesses in NHTSA's enforcement program, which Toyota exploited to avoid recalls until the tragic crash in San Diego that took the lives of Mrs. Lastrella's family. In the defect petitions, most consumer complaints were excluded because they were long duration events or where the driver said the brakes could not bring the vehicle to a stop. Not a single defect petition resulted in any recall. In the most crucial investigation, which was engineering analysis 07010, NHTSA commissioned a technical study and test at their vehicle research test center in Ohio to determine whether it was electronic controls or floor mats that caused it. We FOIA-ed NHTSA for the results of that test, because their conclusion was it's only floor mats; there's no EMI interference, there's no electronic control problem. NHTSA responded to that FOIA by saying they don't know how they did the test, they don't know what they measured, and they had no test data. In other words, they had nothing other than a conclusion. Now as an engineer, which I am, you keep lab books, you enter the data, you enter the test procedure. NHTSA had nothing. Yet that report was what enabled NHTSA to do an equipment recall of the Lexus. But look at that equipment recall. It resulted in 55,000 vehicles on floor mats. It was designed to fail. The completion rate in the recall, as Representative Issa was interested in earlier, was 40 percent; 60 percent of the mats still had never been replaced. The only other investigation that resulted in anything was a safety improvement campaign. What's that? That's not even a safety recall. It's just something where the manufacturer says, There's no safety defect; we're not going to even comply with-- be subject to the part 573 in the Safety Act requirements. And so when we look at all this from 2001 to the October 2009 floor mat recall, which was generated by the San Diego crash--not by an investigation, not by anything else. All they got was an equipment recall, which Toyota told in its internal memo that it saved the country $100 million. The other thing that we filed a FOIA for is the early warning system. After TREAD, as Joan indicated, Congress established an early warning system. It was supposed to prevent more tragedies, like Ford-Firestone. It didn't. We have been told there are hundreds of investigations under early warning. The agency won't even give us a list of the investigations. Now, we have a number of recommendations for moving forward to improve this process. Here's what needs to be done. For NHTSA, it needs to require all responses investigations to be sworn. Just simply say the information in here, is truthful under penalty of perjury. Not a subpoena, just a statement or affidavit that it's true. Make the early warning investigations public, make the minutes public, revamp and revise their NAS systems so we have more crash investigations to find out what happens in crashes. Finally, they need to do a comprehensive evaluation of electronic controls and adopt safety standards, including the requirement that every vehicle have brake override. For Toyota, we just have a few recommendations. First of all, install the brake override in all the vehicles. Open up the public record in these investigations so we can see. Finally, for every consumer who files a complaint, and there's only been 2,500, give that consumer a report and evaluation on what happened in their car and tell them what they did to fix it. Thank you. Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Ditlow follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.042 Mr. Cummings. Let me just start off the questions. Ms. Claybrook, you told the committee staff that all of this seems to represent a failure of regulation. What's been wrong with NHTSA's approach to the issue of sudden unintended acceleration? Ms. Claybrook. I think they lack leadership. I don't think there was an enforcement mentality. This agency is a cop, it's a policeman. It should act like a cop. If it's not popular, that is just too bad. They should be a cop. I think that there has been great improvement since Secretary LaHood took over, and David Strickland, but for the past decade there were one investigation after another closed. No real explanations. The agency is grossly underfunded. It never used any of its subpoena power. It rarely hired an outside consultant to help it. It didn't put out public alerts. Thirty thousand complaints that Secretary LaHood talked about. When I was there, there were 200,000. Why were there? Because I put out consumer alerts all the time. I asked the public to come in and tell us about things. We had 23,000 complaints on one Ford defect. We valued those consumer complaints because that's the richest, freest information you'll ever get on what's happening in the highway. This agency has just been--I don't know whether its been beaten down or just didn't care or whether it didn't have any enthusiasm, but it certainly didn't have any leadership. There was no caring by the top staff of that agency that says, Tell me what's going on with these. Give me a weekly report. I want to know every case that's happened. I want to know the number of deaths, I want to know the number of industries. And let's put out some consumer alerts to alert the public. And on the early warning issue, the fact that Public Citizen had to sue the agency twice in the mid-2000's in order to even get just the vehicle, the make and model of the vehicle, and the problem put in the public record. It's ridiculous. This whole program was meant to be public. And if the public knows what's going on, they're going to tell you. As you've heard today, they're going to give you information that is rich. And the agency should do its job. Mr. Cummings. I'm sure you heard the testimony of Secretary LaHood. He said that they were trying to bring on 66 new employees, I assume to do the followup on some of these complaints. From what you know, do you think that is a sufficient number of folks to bring in to do what they need to do? Ms. Claybrook. Well, no. The agency has always been understaffed and underfunded. When I was---- Mr. Cummings. When were you Administrator? Ms. Claybrook. In the Carter administration. And when I was the administrator, we had 119 employees in the entire Enforcement Office. Today, there are about 30 less than that. That is for standard enforcement as well as for defect enforcement. So there are only 18 investigators in the Defects Office for the whole country and all automobile defects. And there's only 57 employees just in the Defects Office. So it is not enough. But the key issue to me is how is it going to be allocated. Because, as I mentioned to you, 71 percent of the money this agency gets now goes in grants to the States. Only 15 percent of that money, which is $132 million a year, that is the total budget for the entire Motor Vehicle program at the Department of Transportation to do research, to set standards, to do litigation cases that they have that come up, to investigate defects, to investigate safety standards. So I say it needs another hundred million dollars, minimally, right now. I also think that it needs to be able to impose penalties against companies in that range as well, because $16.4 million is chump change to Toyota. Mr. Cummings. Mr. Ditlow, you said that NHTSA has relied on an outdated sudden acceleration study; is that right? Mr. Ditlow. Yes. Mr. Cummings. How do you think that's affected them? So they are not up to date with regard to that issue? Mr. Ditlow. I'm sorry? No, they are definitely not up to date on sudden acceleration. They did more in studies in 1975 and 1976 than they have since then. The only study they did was one that was aimed at showing that it was driver error that was causing sudden acceleration, not electronics. There are twice as many vehicles on the road today and the vehicles are five times as complex. The job is enormous, and their staffing and resources are down. Mr. Cummings. I see. If there's a message that you want to deliver, Mr. Haggerty, what would that be to NHTSA? And you, Mrs. Lastrella, what would be your message? Mrs. Lastrella. I beg your pardon? Mr. Cummings. If there was a message that you want to deliver to NHTSA, what would that be? Mrs. Lastrella. Full capacity of investigation by NHTSA. Mr. Cummings. Mr. Haggerty. Mr. Haggerty. I think they need to take the investigations more seriously. I was contacted by NHTSA from Scott Yon. He seemed very interested in my case. He also copied several other people in his agency. He also mentioned they may be interested in taking a look at my car to see if there was anything else that may be contributing to the acceleration problems, with the electronics, and they wanted to dig into it. And they seemed very interested. And I never heard from them after the one conversation we had. I sent him an e-mail telling him I was planning on selling my car. If you're interested in taking the car and taking a look at, please let me know. I never heard anything back. I just wish they would take some of the complaints very seriously, from the dealership on up, once they get a complaint from the dealership, to contact Toyota and take it seriously and really dig into it and find out how the problem is and how to correct it. Mr. Cummings. Mr. Issa. Mr. Issa. I'd ask unanimous consent that the prepared written statement of John Saylor, the deceased father, be placed into the record. Mr. Cummings. Without objection. [The prepared statement of Mr. Saylor follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.044 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8346.046 Mr. Issa. Mrs. Lastrella, once again, our condolences. I had an opportunity also to be asked to pass on again deep regret from Bob Baker, the elderly 50-year car dealer, who simply was the unfortunate owner of the dealership that provided the loaner car to your daughter and son-in-law. There are many victims that we are dealing with in this tragedy, in this group of tragedies, but none touches us in San Diego more closely than the loss of your family. We are here today I think trying to get to the bottom of an agency's failures. And, Ms. Claybrook, I am deeply concerned that the agency that you administered back in the 1970's has become complacent. And I would like to be fair to them and I would like to run just a line of questioning and then talk about some of the things that should be done to revitalize it. In 1975, a study was done just before you became the administrator that estimated that about 50 percent of all auto accidents were alcohol related; 93 percent of all crashes were directly or indirectly related to the individual drivers; and approximately 13 percent were mechanical or vehicle related. And in those days, as you and I recall, a lot of cars were driving without automatic self-adjusting brakes and most had drums. So no surprise that vehicles were more a part of it. And there were 51,000 deaths in 1980, the last year of your administration, and that was 3.35 per thousand. Now, the good news. Today, about one-third of all fatalities are estimated to be alcohol related. In 2008, there were 37,261 fatalities, even though our population has grown greatly, and that is about 1 per, 1.27, I should say, per thousand. Or actually so call it. And about 2 percent of automobile fatalities are estimated to be directly related to the vehicle failures, meaning we have gone from 13 percent where the car is at fault to 2 percent. Ms. Claybrook, I believe that probably a lot of what NHTSA is dealing with is the fact that cars are simply a lot better and less likely to fail. And, what Mr. Ditlow has said is, they are also harder to find those failures when they occur. You heard Secretary LaHood earlier today answering questions about transparency of the agency, looking around the world so that this problem or problems that had been detected and changed differently in Japan, detected and dealt with in Great Britain sooner than in this country. And had they been done, no doubt in my mind, your family would still be alive. Do you believe, first of all, that the Secretary is going to be able to make those changes within the budget and the present constraints, if you will, of the law; and, if not, what we need to do to help him make those changes? Ms. Claybrook. Thank you so much for your question, Mr. Issa. There is a lot of information in what you said. Mr. Issa. I don't want to mislead people. Cars are safer, but they are not as safe as, obviously, they could be if the agency you once shepherded was doing a better job. Ms. Claybrook. And there's also different things. For example, there's 10,000 rollover deaths a year that virtually didn't exist when I was the administrator because we didn't have SUVs. Mr. Issa. And we had long gas lines then, too. Ms. Claybrook. Well, I issued the toughest fuel economy standards you'll ever see, and Lee Iacocca can tell you that. But, yes, there has been a reduction in deaths and injuries, and it is actually a little bit lower right now because of the recession. If you look at the economy and deaths on the highway, they sort of track each other. But I think that the vehicle safety standards that we have, particularly air bags and safety seat belts, now that are used by the vast, vast majority of public have made a huge difference in the safety, and the campaigns that have been launched and the laws that have been passed on drunk driving have made a huge difference in that area. And those are big, big issues. I still think that there are a lot of issues that haven't been addressed in terms of safety standards. And then we have, in the defects area, for example, in the Ford Firestone case, there were over 200 deaths. And I believe that the 34, 39 deaths we know about now in the Toyota case is probably going to triple by the time all the information comes in, because it--a lot of people don't tell you that it happened. In terms of big changes, I think that the agency needs a lot more money. It has, I think, a meager budget for the work it is required to do, and as I said I think it needs $100 million more. And I know that's maybe pie in the sky, but I think that ought to be the goal fairly soon. Second, the agency collects data in a very old-fashioned way. It collects data by doing accident investigations, SWAT teams as Mr. Toyoda said. But they were supposed to collect huge numbers of crash data, maybe 20,000 crashes a year. They are now only under the funding able to collect 4,000. The reason I focus so hard on the data recorder, the black box, is because the black box could be not only the liberator of information about what happened in particular crashes; it could become the data source for the agency and very inexpensively, because it is quite accurate. And so it should be mandatory. It should collect a lot more data. And that data should automatically go to the agency. And if it did, then they could take that $20 million they now spend on crash investigations and do analyses and fill in, in little gaps. So there's some very special things that this agency should do right now, and I believe that my testimony also elaborates on that. Mr. Issa. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, I would ask just to be able to ask a question for the record very briefly. Secretary LaHood was, let's just say, not completely prepared to answer the questions related to, when we do a recall, how few actually in the ordinary course get implemented versus people get the letters, they don't see the significance, and they get lost. Would you answer for the record your view of obviously, then, now, and how we could change that? Ms. Claybrook. Well, it's about 75 percent, 74 percent. That is the best. We never have 100 percent. The newer the car, the cheaper the fix, the more likely there is to be a recall and the higher the returns are, except in examples like this, which are so unusual where people are scared to death, so they bring the car in to get it fixed. The agency does get quarterly reports--I mean, quarterly reports for six quarters after a recall is announced, so it knows what the progress is of the company in getting these cars fixed. And it can extend that. It can also require the company to send out a second letter. It can also require them to do advertisements and other things like that to publicize it if it is particularly needed. I think that one of the key issues is how the letter is written to the consumer. When I was administrator, I reviewed all those letters and they had to say ``alert,'' ``safety.'' You know, now they are sort of smudged down so that they don't, as some people say, they don't scare the consumer. I want to scare the consumer. I want them to bring that car in to get it fixed. And it is also how the dealer reacts to it. Sometimes the dealers are underpaid, and when they are underpaid, then they make that the last thing that they do. Sometimes the manufacturers don't make the parts on time, so the letter goes out, and you can't get your car fixed for 6 months or 4 months, and so people then don't do it. So there are a lot of factors. And I think that there was an investigation by the Inspector General of DOT in 2004, I would commend that to you to look at, in which he talked about this process, the early warning system and getting the defects office activated. And I think that maybe another IG report on what NHTSAis doing and could do to enhance the repairs of these vehicles would be very worthwhile. Mr. Issa. Thank you. Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. And let me also again thank you so much for your testimony. Let me begin by asking you, Ms. Claybrook, and also Mr. Ditlow, NHTSA missed many warning signs regarding sudden unintended acceleration. Further, it appears that the agency was caught completely by surprise when Toyota began a series of recalls. I thought these problems were solved after the Ford Firestone fiasco, but clearly they were not, according to this. What specific changes must be made at NHTSA so we don't see this again? Is it a resource issue, or is it a lack of commitment? Or it is they just hope that things will just sort of go away and they won't have to deal with it? Ms. Claybrook. I think there is a wonderful phrase that you can lead a horse to water, but you can't make them drink. And I think there are some changes that could be made. But I think it is a leadership issue. I think it is whether or not there is an interest by the administrator and the Secretary, and an insistence that this part of the agency be well-funded and that there be weekly reports on exactly what is going on with all the defect cases they have, so that the administrator knows that some cases have been pending for 2 or 3years, or they have been closed without a really good explanation for why they were closed. So I think that part of it is administrative. Part of it is transparency. If this stuff was all up on the Internet, if it was easy to find--their Web page is disastrously difficult to use. The early warning system doesn't even summarize things for you, so you have to spend hours digging through it to try to find anything out. If the agency helped with the transparency so that a person, like Mr. Haggerty, who has a problem could go easily to their Web page and find out if other people had that problem, and then there would be the ability of the citizens to push harder as well. And also the Congress would know. You know, your staff could check it every week: What is the progress of this agency in doing its job? So I think transparency is a huge issue. I think criminal penalties are a big issue, because that puts an incentive to the manufacturer not to get caught and have to go to jail. And when executives know there are criminal penalties in the statutes, they behave differently. And I think there needs to be a heavier penalty, and there needs to be better funding. Mr. Ditlow. In addition, the agency used to publish monthly press releases on all the pending investigations that went out to the media with a summary of each one. They need to redo that again. The agency used to make public the names and addresses of consumers so you could contact them and get information like, are the--were the floor mats in your car? There os a check box on a complaint form for the manufacturer to get a complaint, but there's no check box on that form for the consumer to make the entire complaint public. Ms. Claybrook. Make that clear, this is a form filled out by the consumer. So they would say, yes, it's OK for you to make my name public. They now say it's OK to send it to the manufacturer, but here they would have to say it's OK to make it public. And then, as Clarence says, we could have called Mr. Haggerty or whatever and found out. Mr. Ditlow. There's case after case in the early days where we got expanded recalls by going to the consumer and rebutting the information that the manufacturer had put in. And the other way to do that is to talk to the consumer. But if you can't get to the consumer, you can't do it. There needs to be a restoration of that check function of the outside public to look at what the agency is doing. The agency wants to operate behind closed doors. And one other thing is minutes. They have minutes of meetings of the manufacturers where the only thing you see are the list of the attendees. They should be required to have detailed minutes of what went on behind closed doors with the manufacturer and investigations. Chairman Towns. Let me ask you this. In response to a letter I sent to Toyota regarding the possible causes of sudden unintended acceleration, Toyota cited a report, of course, as to why it did not believe that an electronic malfunction is to blame for sudden acceleration. Is this a serious study? And do you think its methodology proves that the sudden acceleration problem is not caused by an electrical malfunction? Ms. Claybrook. Is this the Exponent's report? Chairman Towns. That's correct. Ms. Claybrook. Right. Well, I don't think that it's a serious study, and Toyota has now said that it's an ongoing study. This is not a company that I would go to if I were seriously interested in trying to find out the answer to a problem. This is a company that Toyota went to, to justify what it did, and that is the purpose of this company. That's what it does. Chairman Towns. Why wouldn't you go to them? Ms. Claybrook. I don't know why they did it. I guess they were in a defensive mode. And normally what this company does is it protects companies that are sued in product liability litigation. That's the purpose of this company and--or, a large part of it. And so that's what it was attempting to secure was justification for what it had done. If it was really seriously interested in a fresh approach and a fresh look, I think it could have gone to a lot of other people in the United States, including Mr. Gilbert who testified yesterday. Mr. Ditlow. General Motors once hired the same firm to do an analysis of fuel tank fires in GM vehicles. And they did such a misleading analysis that the president of General Motors had to make an apology for the fact that the study was misleading, that they didn't intend to mislead the agency, but in fact, they did. Chairman Towns. And then I can understand your response, Ms. Claybrook. But let me just say to you two, Mr. Haggerty, and to you, Mrs. Lastrella, when I hear the situation that occurred, this is the reason why it is just so important that we really continue to push to make certain that this is corrected. Because listening to you in terms of losing family members, and you in terms of, Mr. Haggerty, that must have been some experience when you have a car accelerate on you like that. And then you receiving that phone call, Mrs. Lastrella, I can imagine how you felt in that time. But so we want to let you know that we are going to stay on this and continue to see what we can do to try and get to the bottom of it. And thank you again---- Mr. Haggerty. If I can make a comment. Chairman Towns. Go ahead. Mr. Haggerty. Regarding the acceleration and as far as the sticky pedal, I just want to make a note that the first or second time that happened, I was able to slow down the car, and I stopped it. I turned off the engine and turned it on again to reset itself. And when I brought it to the dealership after that day driving to work, you know, when I was driving to work when it was accelerating and the only way to stop it was putting it into neutral, they really didn't know what the problem was, and they never determined that it was a sticky pedal, or it was a defective pedal. I probably would have been OK with that. Here's the problem. We found it. It is defective; we fixed it. But that's how it happened. They put an accelerator pedal in, a throttle body, and replaced the sensors and sent it out to be tested. And I don't think they even knew themselves, and they had the car for a week and a half. They brought specialists in. And I just really in my heart don't feel they knew exactly what the problem was. And if it was a sticky pedal or if it was stuck in any way, I believe--and you would have to talk to the mechanic, but I believe he had spoke to some other people, that he turned the car off and then it reset itself. So just by knowing that information, I just hope they look into that as well, for my car particularly. I hope they look into that and make sure that may be--just take a look at that seriously. Chairman Towns. Thank you. Congressman Chaffetz, recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a brief question. There was some discussion about Exponent, the company. They were evidently the organization used to investigate the Columbia crash, the space shuttle. Do you care to comment on that? Are you suggesting that they had that same type of reputation and that investigation was flawed? Ms. Claybrook. I don't know anything about that, so I can't answer that question. I can only say that, in the automobile area, where I do know something about them---- Mr. Chaffetz. I mean, you just kind of tore a company and their reputation apart. And yet you are willing to give them a deference on the space shuttle? Ms. Claybrook. I will take your criticism and limit my comments to automobiles. Mr. Ditlow. In the automotive area, they have done a half a dozen major defects where they've come in and found there's no defect, even though there's been a recall in many of the cases. Mr. Chaffetz. Is there any reason to think that they are any different on space shuttles versus aircraft? Ms. Claybrook. They probably have different people working on them, and they may be different if they're working for---- Mr. Chaffetz. How big a company? I just don't know. How big a company is this? Ms. Claybrook. It's a pretty big company. And it may have a different mode of operation when it's working for the government than when it's working for manufacturers. Mr. Chaffetz. So you would question what their motivation was kind of behind the scenes. Are you suggesting that we should go back and reconsider the work that they did in other areas? Or---- Ms. Claybrook. Well, I don't know that you would want to do that, but---- Mr. Chaffetz. I mean, that's a pretty serious allegation, and it's a pretty big disaster in the history of our country. Ms. Claybrook. I have no idea, as I said to you, about the space program. I have no idea at all. Mr. Chaffetz. And so going back to what you do know, is that from your own firsthand experience? Ms. Claybrook. Well, that is from my reading and understanding and talking to lots of different people and knowing a lot about what the agency has done and what they have said about these defects and looking at cases. Mr. Chaffetz. Would you be willing to share with the committee the people that you have garnered this information from so that we can further investigate why we would be so--why we should question their integrity? Ms. Claybrook. You probably don't know, but I just retired as the head of Public Citizen, and I sent 450 boxes to George Washington University of every file that I ever had on auto safety to start a new library there, so and they are piled up in some room out near Dulles Airport. So I don't know that I could supply you with much of anything. Maybe Clarence, however, who is still working in his job and has files. Mr. Chaffetz. You just bring a wealth of information and perspective that many of us don't have since we are brand new to this. Ms. Claybrook. Well, maybe we could do it together, and Clarence could pull from his files. I have nothing. Mr. Ditlow. I would be glad to submit for the record a book by a retired professor from Yale, Leon Robertson, who looked into a number of different cases where that failure analysis was involved in. And I think that's much broader than just the automotive area. But I, personally, have looked at their reports on Firestone Tires, their reports on GM fuel tanks and several other automotive investigations, and I would be happy to provide information on those. Mr. Chaffetz. I think this committee would appreciate your helpful input. I mean, you are two very credible witnesses giving us a perspective and calling into question the very core of the integrity of people who we have relied upon for some of the biggest disasters in our country. So to the extent that you can further help the committee with your insight and perspective, at least guiding us and giving us direction or documents that you may be aware of. You know, when you have a company that borders--has questionable conduct and integrity, I don't know that you necessarily draw that, well, they are really good on space shuttles. So we appreciate your testimony and perspective, and I guess that's why we bring it up, is it's a serious charge, and we would like to explore that further, and I think we would be negligent if we didn't. So thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Towns. Thank you very much. The gentleman yields back his time. And I now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You know, I had a representative of Toyota visit with me in my office to deliver this Exponent report. I noted a couple things when I looked at it. One is that it was, Exponent was retained in December 2009 to look into these reports and claims of unintended acceleration. December 2009. Now, they looked at over a period of--looks like they focused on 3 years and looked at three different kinds of models from 3 years. Ms. Claybrook. It was a very small sample. Mr. Kucinich. I just wanted to point out the sample they took was very small. It would be interesting to pair that sample up with the complaints that came in to see if there's any similarity. And, you know, none of us are interested in smearing anybody here. But if a company has a reputation, according to LATimes.com, the California engineering firm is known for helping big corporations weather messy disputes. OK. Well, Toyota has more than a messy dispute. I want to submit this L.A. Times article for the record. Chairman Towns. Without objection. Mr. Kucinich. And---- Chairman Towns. So ordered. Mr. Kucinich. I am more interested in, you know, this issue I raised before about, why did Toyota order a software design in 2005? Now, Mr. Ditlow, I read your testimony, and you heard the presentation that Toyota made. Is Toyota's representations that it's unlikely that it could have been an electronic throttle control, is that credible based on the information that you have seen and that you have studied at the Auto Safety Center? Mr. Ditlow. No. What we have done is we've examined the complaints that have come in. Mr. Kucinich. Could you sit closer to the mic? Mr. Ditlow. We have examined the complaints that have come in. And when you have a complaint that comes in and there's no floor mats in the vehicle, there's no sticking gas pedal, and the driver clearly has his foot on the brake to the extent that the brake system is scorched from trying to stop the vehicle, what else is there other than electronics? Mr. Kucinich. That's the thing. Mr. Haggerty, in your prepared testimony, when you brought your vehicle in and it was still running to the max, you had it in neutral. They checked it out. It wasn't a floor mat. It wasn't the pedal. And then they determined that it was the electronic throttle. Mr. Haggerty. They are not sure. They don't know. They replaced a bunch of parts. They never got back to me and said, we know what the problem was. All they kept coming back with is, per Toyota, they told us to replace these parts. They don't know. And that's why I didn't feel comfortable. Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, this whole hearing, which has been a very important hearing, I feel like we are trying to-- we're still at the point of trying to grasp smoke here. Ms. Claybrook. Well, not only that---- Mr. Kucinich. Hold on, Ms. Claybrook. Because I don't think Toyota has been forthcoming. I think that they have made a--it's good that Mr. Toyoda was here. That was remarkable. But I don't think they have been forthcoming. They seem to have blinders on about this issue of electronic throttle control for whatever reason. It could be liability, could be that there's a link to a coverup. I don't know. But there's-- the thing doesn't fit here. If you have a missing piece when you are doing an investigation, you have to keep asking questions. So, Mr. Chairman, despite the fact that this committee has put in a very long day here, I am thinking that there's going to need to be a followup where we will sift through the testimony, look at all the evidence that we have gathered so far. And we may have to take one more crack at this, because the testimony by Toyota officials doesn't square with evidence that has been produced to this committee and doesn't square with evidence that is available to experts in the automotive industry. Now, Ms. Claybrook, you wanted to make a comment. Ms. Claybrook. Well, I just wanted to add to your collection there, which is that they are also putting in this electronic brake override in the vehicles. Mr. Kucinich. Speak closer to the mic. Ms. Claybrook. They are also putting the electronic brake override in the floor mat recall vehicles. There's two recalls. The one with the sticking pedal is low impact, low speed generally. But the floor mat recall, which most people don't believe is a floor mat because it just doesn't make a lot of sense; there, in most of those vehicles, they are putting the brake override. And they are putting the brake override--it's an electronic brake override to override the accelerator throttle, and that's an electronic software change that they are making. And so you are still going to have the problem, perhaps, of having an accelerator that slams to the floor, but you are going to have a brake override which will stop it. Now, normally, if it was a floor map problem, you fix the floor mat. Why are they putting the brake override in addition? They say they're doing it for the comfort of the people. Mr. Kucinich. My time has expired, but I just want to say thank you for your diligence in pursuing this, Chairman Towns. I also want to finally express my condolences to Mrs. Lastrella and your family for the suffering that they have endured. And to all those who are watching and trying to determine, will their families be safe, our job is a very serious one to pursue this. And I want to thank each and every one of the witnesses for their presence here. Thank you. Chairman Towns. Let me also thank all the witnesses. And really appreciate your being here, and to say to you that safety is the issue that we're really pursuing here. And thank you for helping us to do that. Thank you very much. This committee is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 6:48 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] [The prepared statements of Hon. Paul W. Hodes, Hon. Mike Quigley, and Hon. Gerald E. 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