SBINET: DOES IT PASS THE BORDER SECURITY TEST? PARTS I AND II

JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM
WITH THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
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MARCH 18, 2010

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SBINET: DOES IT PASS THE BORDER SECURITY TEST? PART I

Thursday, March 18, 2010

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM,
JOINT WITH
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OVERSIGHT,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Henry Cuellar [Chairman of the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism] presiding.

Present from the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism: Representatives Cuellar, Thompson, Pascrell, Kirkpatrick, Bilirakis, and McCaul.

Present from the Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight: Representatives Carney, Thompson, Pascrell, Kilroy, and Bilirakis.

Mr. CUERRALL [presiding]. The subcommittees will come to order. The Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism and the Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight are called to meeting today to receive testimony on “SBInet: Does It Pass the Border Security Test?”

Today the subcommittees are meeting to examine SBInet, the Department of Homeland Security’s latest effort to secure our Nation’s borders using technology.

As a Member of Congress, I represent a district along the U.S.-Mexico border, and I have been interested in this program since its inception 4.5—or 4.5 years ago. I believe strongly that technology does play a vital role in securing our border, Americans’ border.

Unfortunately, as you all know, I think we all agree, that SBInet has had some technological problems and deployment delays from the start.

Bottom line is that this hasn’t had a good return on the investment—when you look at SBInet. In fact, to date only 28 miles of SBInet technology has actually been deployed along the border. Even those miles known as Project 28, it is of limited operational value.

The slow pace of deployment has frustrated many of us, especially in the face of the escalating drug trafficking and violence just across the southern border.
At the rate of 28 miles every 4.5 years, we did a little calculation. Twenty-eight miles every 4.5 years, it would take us 320 years, or until the year 2030, to deploy the SBInet technology across the Southwest border, using the pace we have been going. If you look at the amount of dollars, I think it is somewhere between $600 million, $700 million, you can do the calculation also if you want to cover the whole Southwest border.

I know that Secretary Napolitano understands what the stakes are. As a former border Governor, she understands what we are dealing with. We had an opportunity yesterday, Mr. Chairman, as we flew down to the Federal training center in Georgia and got to spend a little time in talking to her about this particular issue.

We all agree we have to deploy security swiftly but effectively. That is why I am pleased to have a witness from the Government Accountability Office before us. Mr. Hite will discuss the results of the latest in a series of Security Border Initiative engagements the GAO has conducted at the request of the Committee on Homeland Security.

We want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Thompson.

I am concerned about the GAO’s finding that the number of new defects identified in the SBInet is generally increasing faster than the numbers are being fixed, meaning we are taking one step forward, yet two steps back. Certainly interested in the testimony that will be given by all the witnesses on this particular point.

I am also troubled by the GAO’s finding that changes made to certain tests and procedures appeared to be designed to “pass the test, instead of being designed to qualify the system.”

If tests are being rigged, how do we know that the Border Patrol won’t ultimately be stuck with technology deserves a failing grade.

Over the years GAO has conducted about 17 reviews, and I emphasize 17 reviews, of DHS border security technology deployment. While the DHS generally concurs with the GAO’s recommendations, DHS hasn’t always followed the recommendations. I know there is different stages that we are, but I think the last ones were about eight recommendations about 18 months ago, and we still believe DHS is still working on them.

I hope that the Department will take this recommendation seriously in the future on all the findings, now that we have heard from Secretary Napolitano’s recent announcement on the SBInet, and certainly I support using the $50 million in stimulus funds to purchase proven border security technology on the border. I agree that we should be completing the on-going deployments before deciding on or whether to proceed with SBInet.

At the same time, I am concerned with the announcement that this is a signal that SBInet is about to follow suit of its two failed predecessor programs, the—and the American Shield Initiative. I hope the Department is working on a Plan B, if that is the case, because those along the border have waited long enough for security—for a security solution that works on the border.

Looking forward, I hope that Secretary Napolitano will continue to look at other technology. For example, the UAV that I know Michael McCaul and other folks—Texas have been working on, requesting the UAVs along the Texas border, because that covers about 1,200 miles of the whole U.S.-Mexico border.
As part of this—technology we ought to look at all this technology, and I certainly feel that UAVs will be a way to fill some of the gaps that the SBInet might not cover, something to consider for the future, and of course, you know, especially with this recent violence that we have had across the river, escalated violence we have.

In closing, I would like to express my appreciation to Chairman Thompson, who has provided the leadership to this committee and on this particular issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman Thompson.

Chairman Carney, who does the oversight and management, has done an excellent job, and certainly we look forward working with him.

Also the former subcommittee Chairwoman, Loretta Sanchez, for her longstanding efforts on this important issue. I certainly want to thank her for all the foundation work that she has done.

Again, I want to thank all the witnesses for joining us here today, and I look forward to the testimony.

The Chair now recognizes—we don’t have the Ranking Member, Mr. Souder, so if it is okay with Michael McCaul, we will now recognize the Chairman of the Management, Investigations, Oversight Subcommittee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, for an opening statement.

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank you and your subcommittee for agreeing to work with my subcommittee on this very important issue.

Today we are here to examine efforts to secure the Nation’s borders through the Secure Border Initiative, or SBInet. The Management, Investigations, and Oversight Subcommittee that I chair has held multiple hearings and briefings on this issue, including two joint subcommittee hearings in the 110th Congress.

I continue to be greatly concerned that the SBInet will continue to cost U.S. taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars while not providing the services we were sold at the inception of the program.

I am also concerned that deadlines continue to be set for the program, only to be extended later.

I would like to commend Secretary Napolitano for ordering a reassessment of SBInet. I also agree with her decision to redirect the $50 million Recovery Act funding originally located for SBInet instead of funding other tested, commercially available security technology along the border.

It is my hope that the Department will work quickly on this reassessment and soon deliver a solution that once and for all will secure our borders in a timely and a cost-effective manner.

I would have to echo the sentiments of my colleague, Mr. Cuellar, on the use of UAVs. I think that is a technology that could be put to great use at a very effective cost, to be quite honest.

I am extremely interested in discussing with our witnesses the GAO’s latest SBInet report entitled “Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance Limitations that Place Key Technology Programs at Risk.”

In this report, the GAO was asked to determine whether SBInet testing has been effectively managed, planned, and executed. GAO was also asked to analyze the test results.
Some of the major findings of the report are as follows.

One, DHS has not effectively managed key aspects of SBI testing.

Two, there is key evidence to suggest that changes made to system qualification tests and procedures were designed to pass the test instead of being designed to qualify the system.

From March 2008 to July 2009, about 1,300 SBI defects were found, with the number of new defects outpacing those being fixed. This is a signal that the system is worsening.

Given that key test events have yet to occur and other problems will likely surface, it is important for DHS to improve its procedures to address these problems. If it does not, it is unlikely that SBInet will meet the Border Patrol's needs and expectations, and it will continue to erode its support in this Congress.

SBInet has been plagued with a number of technology and systems integration issues, and therefore has so far failed to live up to its billing by the Department and by Boeing. SBInet's continued failure to meet expectations brings to mind the Department's previous failed attempts at border security technology programs. The Obama administration must assess the system it inherited and determine whether to continue to move forward with SBInet or to pursue other technology solutions as part of its border security strategy.

Over $1.1 billion have been spent on the Secure Border Initiative, and over $800 million has been spent on SBI alone. I have to ask: Does it make sense for us to keep throwing money at a program with so many problems? Maybe an even better question is: Do we get a refund?

I thank the witnesses for their participation, and I look forward to their testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CUELLAR. Yes, thank you, Mr. Carney.

At this time, the Chair will recognize the Chairman of the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an opening statement.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank both of you for holding this very important hearing.

I am pleased that while the Department is undergoing its analysis of the SBInet program, we are also conducting very rigorous oversight and holding hearings regarding the viability of this costly effort. This committee has conducted 11 hearings on SBI-related issues in an effort to ensure that taxpayers' funds are being properly utilized for the execution of this program.

Earlier this week, Secretary Napolitano announced that the Department of Homeland Security is freezing all SBInet funding until a full and comprehensive assessment of the program has been conducted. It is vitally important to the security of this country that we continue to utilize technology at our borders.

However, based on the reasons given by the Secretary for reaching her decision, continued and repeated delays of SBInet and its exorbitant costs, I agree with the Secretary's decision to take a closer look at SBInet to determine whether it is a viable option for securing our borders.
Approximately 4 years ago, DHS awarded a contract to Boeing to help secure our Nation’s borders by using technology to create a virtual fence. Four-and-a-half years and over $800 million later, we are still without an effective technological tool to secure our borders. Even more troubling, we are now faced with the question of whether this program should even proceed.

The Government Accountability Office has pointed out time and time again the reasons the taxpayers have not seen a true return on their investment. From poor planning and testing to inadequate oversight and user input, we could go on and on about what this administration inherited. Today, GAO is releasing yet another report on the program. This report, which focuses on the testing of SBInet systems, once again reveals that SBInet has more problems than solutions.

For example, according to the report, from March 2008 to July 2009, over 1,300 defects were found in the SBInet system. During that same time, the number of new defects uncovered grew at a faster rate than the ability to fix those that had already been found. Moreover, more than 70 percent of the testing procedures were rewritten as they were being executed because the procedures that had been approved were not adequate. This type of on-the-fly management lacks the quality and assurance that is needed to assure effective testing and calls into question whether the results would have been worse had these changes not been made.

Furthermore, Border Patrol operators, the ultimate user of SBInet, found among other things that the radar systems were inadequate, many of the cameras were operationally insufficient, and the quality of the video feed was blurry and inconsistent. As a result, further delays on top of the delays the program has already experienced are expected.

There is a saying that goes “how you practice is how you perform.” If the test results are an indication of how SBInet will perform, we will be exactly where we are 4 years ago—that is, without an effective technological solution for identifying, deterring, and responding to illegal breaches between border ports of entry.

Let me also note that I am extremely displeased with the fact that $833 million has been spent on SBInet without the full utilization of small businesses. Both the number of small businesses and small disadvantaged businesses that were used were below target. Moreover, women-owned small businesses in addition to service-connected disabled veterans-owned small businesses were significantly below the target rate. This is unacceptable. I am especially interested in hearing from Boeing on this issue.

I thank the witnesses for being here today. I look forward to your testimony. Again, I thank both chairmen for conducting this joint hearing.

I yield back.

Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

At this time, I will recognize Mr. McCaul, the gentleman from Texas. He had a statement. Okay. He had a statement for Mr. Souder.

So at this time, I will recognize Mr. Bilirakis for an opening statement.
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. I would like to submit Mr. Souder's statement for the record, if that is okay.

Mr. CUellar. Without objection.

[The statement of Mr. Souder follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER MARK E. SOUDER

MARCH 18, 2010

The Secure Border Initiative Network was announced in 2005 and promised the capability to secure our borders, at least our southern border, by 2013. Over the past 5 years, we have had close to a dozen hearings on SBInet and border security. I have to say that this is the first time that I've actually felt concern about the commitment from the Department to find a solution to secure the borders.

During the hearing with Secretary Napolitano 3 weeks ago on the DHS fiscal year 2011 budget request, I highlighted the flat-lining of progress for gaining control of the border. According to CBP, we have just over 900 miles under control and the goal is just to maintain that through 2011. Now, with the announcement by the Secretary on Tuesday to scale back and halt SBInet, I'm concerned that there is a chance we could actually lose ground and have fewer miles under control.

I can't say whether SBInet should be continued or expanded or halted. What I do know is that this Department has announced cutbacks and has not provided any other plans or vision for enhancing security.

I appreciate that the Secretary included a plan in her Tuesday announcement to redirect $50 million in Stimulus funds from SBInet to purchase other technologies for use on the border. However, spending funds on uncoordinated purchases that don't fit into a larger strategy are not significantly better than where we are today.

I'm greatly concerned that we are not keeping the big picture in mind. Securing the border matters. Gaining operational control is critical.

Border violence is still a concern and we've all been reminded of that with the tragic murders of three people with ties to the U.S. Consulate last weekend. Drugs are coming across the border every day. And we have a report that in the past year at least 270 Somalis have illegally crossed the southwest border.

Where is the urgency?

My main questions for this hearing are:

• What is the strategy for securing the border?
• How long will it take?
• And, is this timeline acceptable?

Who would have ever thought that building hundreds of miles of actual fence would be easier and faster than deploying a camera and radar system? The issue of fencing is something we need to take another look at if we are no longer going to have a virtual fence.

Mr. Chairman, I know that you are as committed to finding a solution for securing the border. It seems that a lot is in flux at DHS right now regarding how to move forward. I would like to request that we look into holding a hearing on how all of these different pieces—fencing, SBInet, alternative technologies, etc.—fit together into a cohesive plan.

Thank you. I yield back my time.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, thank you.

Thank you, Chairman Cuellar and Chairman Carney, and of course our overall Chair, our general Chair. I am pleased the subcommittees are meeting today to continue our oversight of the SBInet program. Nearly 5 years since the first announcement of the program, we have little to show for the more than $1 billion we have spent to install detection and surveillance technology along the border.

This program has experienced unacceptable cost overruns and delays and is in desperate need of better management by the Department and performance by the contractor. It is unacceptable that we do not have better control over our borders. At the end of fiscal year 2009, the Department reported that it has effective control over only 936 miles of the more than 6,000 miles of the U.S. border.
While the Border Patrol intends to maintain control of these miles in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, they do not intend to add any additional miles of effective control. Frankly, I think we can do much better.

Secretary Napolitano stated earlier this week, and I quote—“Not only do we have an obligation to secure our borders, we have a responsibility to do so in the most effective way possible,” and as a result, has frozen all SBInet funding beyond the Block 1 deployment and redeployed Recovery Act funding originally designated for SBInet to other border security technologies.

I share Secretary Napolitano’s desire to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars as we work to secure our borders. However, I hope that this announcement is not an indication that the Department is scaling back its commitment to secure the entire border. We need to ensure that we have a comprehensive and coordinated strategy to secure our borders.

I am particularly interested in hearing from Mr. Borkowski about the status of the SBInet review mandated by the Secretary and where the alternative technologies procured with the Recovery Act funds, such as the mobile surveillance systems and the remote video surveillance systems, will be deployed. I would also like to hear from Chief Fisher about how the Secretary’s recent announcement impacts the Border Patrol operations.

Mr. Chairman, we cannot declare defeat in our efforts to strengthen border security. We must use the lessons learned from our prior investments in SBInet. We must leverage these capabilities to develop a coordinated border security strategy that will allow us to achieve effective control of as much of the border as we can as soon as possible, and of course, in the most cost-effective manner.

Thank you, Mr Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. Cuéllar. Thank you. I thank the gentleman from Florida for his opening statement.

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that under the committee rules, opening statements may be submitted for the record.

At this time, I welcome our panel of witnesses. Thank you very much for being here with us.

Our first witness is Chief Michael Fisher, who was named acting chief of the Border Patrol on January 3 of this year, 2010. Congratulations and welcome, Mr. Fisher. Prior to this appointment, he served as the chief of Border Patrol at the San Diego sector.

Chief Fisher started his duty along the southwest border in 1987 in Douglas, Arizona. After completion of the selection process for the Border Patrol’s tactical unit in 1990, he was selected as the field operations supervisor for the tactical unit assigned to El Paso. Chief Fisher has also served in Detroit, Tucson, and at the Border Patrol headquarters.

Again, congratulations on your appointment and welcome here.

Our second witness is Mr. Mark Borkowski, that was named executive director of the Secure Border Initiative program in October, 2008. Again, welcome. Mr. Borkowski oversees the SBI implementation at Customs and Border Protection.
Previously, he served as the executive director for mission support at the Border Patrol headquarters. Before joining CBP, you were also a program executive for the robotics lunar exploration program at NASA headquarters.

Again, thank you for the work that you have done.

Our third witness is Mr. Randolph Hite, who is the director of information technology architecture and systems issues at GAO, where he is responsible for the GAO's work on IT issues across Government, concerning architecture and systems acquisitions, development, operations, and maintenance.

During his 30-year career with GAO, Mr. Hite has directed the reviews of major Federal IT investments, including DHS border security modernization programs.

Again, Mr. Hite, thank you and welcome.

Our fourth witness is Mr. Roger Krone, who is the president of network and space systems for Boeing Company. Again, welcome.

Before the formation of the network and space systems, Mr. Krone was vice president and general manager of Boeing’s Army Systems Division.

He has held several other business management and finance positions in Boeing’s U.S. Army programs and military rotorcraft and Boeing’s military aircraft and missile systems.

Again, Mr. Krone, thank you very much for being here and welcome.

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted in the record. I now ask the witnesses to summarize their statements for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Borkowski, who will provide testimony for himself and for Chief Fisher.

So, Mr. Borkowski, thank you again, and you are welcome to start.


Mr. BORKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Cuellar, Chairman Carney, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member Souder and Ranking Member Bilirakis, distinguished Members of the committee, we appreciate very much the opportunity to come here and talk to you today about the status of SBInet.

With me is Acting Chief Michael Fisher of the United States Border Patrol. As you indicated, I will give a quick summary of our joint statement here.

First, I want to talk about the assessment. As you suggested, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary has announced an extensive Department-wide assessment of the program. She did this based on what she has seen over the last several months. As you know, she is a former Governor of Arizona, and she was familiar with the promise and the potential of SBInet, but she was also familiar with the fact that it has not performed to that promise to this point.
As a result of that, she has worked with CBP, and in particular the past acting commissioner, Mr. Hearn, to understand and to assess the path forward. Based on that assessment and based on what she has learned over those months, in January she directed a full Departmental-wide assessment of the SBInet program.

In doing that, she had two major considerations. One, which we have spoken about here already in your opening statements, is the fact that the program has been delayed significantly. Those delays raise significant questions about the viability and the ultimate availability of this system to support the very critical mission of border security.

The second concern, which, frankly, probably would have existed even if SBInet had performed flawlessly, gets to the question of the cost of the system and the basis on which we would conclude that we would spend this money on this system when there are alternative technologies that are less costly and maybe ought to be traded off.

So those two things led to this assessment. The first, get a status of the program and a prediction or an assessment of whether or not it is really viable. But secondly, is it really cost-effective?

The assessment will have two phases, a near-term and I think, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the diversion of SBInet funds to near-term technology immediately is part of that near-term. Obviously, there is an urgent need for technology. The Secretary understands that and has directed us to meet that urgent need through the diversion of those funds.

The long-term assessment is the broader question about whether or not SBInet as it stands is an effective option and is cost-effective. The Secretary has directed that that will be a science-based assessment, up to the normal industry standards for these kinds of assessments, for these kinds of investments.

She has indicated very clearly that it does not make sense to make investments of that magnitude that can’t be defended and supported by a science-based assessment.

Now, SBInet, if it proves to be viable, will be a candidate and may continue; but if SBInet is not viable and is not cost-effective, obviously, SBInet will not continue. That is why she has frozen funds. She has directed us to continue Tucson-1 and Ajo-1, which we will talk about, but not to spend any more money until she has decided whether that is the right place to spend it or it should be diverted to other technology.

I would emphasize that this is not a cancellation of technology. The Secretary has been very clear in saying that we must have technology. The question is, what technology should that be?

With that, let me go briefly to SBInet Block 1, which is the development, the relatively expensive system, and it is designed to go across all of Arizona.

We are currently building the first two increments of that, into areas called Tucson-1 and Ajo-1. Block 1 continues past that into the rest of Arizona, but those are the funds that are frozen, the ones past Tucson-1 and Ajo-1.

Tucson-1 is built and constructed. We had intended to have it completely tested by now, and we do not, and we will welcome questions about and attempt to explain where that is.
However, we have worked hard over the last year to improve the system, and it is fairly solid. So starting February 6, we actually turned it over to the Border Patrol for night operations, and it has been—the feedback from the Border Patrol has been very positive.

So we think that is a very encouraging turn of events, but of course it is not the end of the story until we complete testing, and I know Chief Fisher will look forward to answering your questions about the results with Tucson-1.

Ajo-1, which is the second deployment, has started construction. Part of the point of Ajo-1 is to build that in what is a very critical area of the border, but also to see if the recurring costs, the repeated costs, the costs for the next deployment, will or will not mimic the kind of cost experience that we have seen in the past that both Chairman Carney and Chairman Cuellar reflected.

So that is the current status of the program. We look forward to answering your questions. We recognize that the program has been seriously delayed. We look forward to the assessment of the Secretary. The Secretary obviously shares your concern and we look forward to your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The joint statement of Mr. Borkowski and Mr. Fisher follows:]

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK BORKOWSKI AND MICHAEL FISHER

MARCH 18, 2010

Chairman Cuellar, Chairman Carney, Ranking Member Souder, Ranking Member Bilirakis, and distinguished Members of the committee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss SBInet. I am Mark Borkowski, Executive Director of the Secure Border Initiative, and with me today is Acting Chief of the United States Border Patrol, Michael Fisher.

DEPARTMENTAL-WIDE ASSESSMENT

Before I begin to discuss where we are with SBInet development, I want to briefly discuss the Department-wide reassessment that was ordered by the Secretary back in January. As the Governor of Arizona, Secretary Napolitano became uniquely aware of the promises that were made about SBInet and the shortfalls it has faced. When she came into the Department, she took a hard look at our progress with SBInet. She gave my team at CBP a fair chance to prove that we were on the right track. She asked hard questions about the future of the program and the feasibility of where we were headed and directed then-Acting Commissioner Jayson Ahern to provide his assessment of the path forward for SBInet. Based upon the results of that review, she ordered a Department-wide reassessment of the program to determine if there are alternatives that may more efficiently, effectively, and economically meet our Nation’s border security needs.

The Department-wide review is motivated by two major considerations. The first is that the continued and repeated delays in SBInet raise fundamental questions about SBInet’s viability and availability to meet the need for technology along the border. The second is that the high cost of SBInet obligates this administration to conduct a full and comprehensive analysis of alternative options to ensure we are maximizing the impact and effectiveness of the substantial taxpayer resources we are devoting to border security technology. Quite frankly, this type of investment can only be justified if you know exactly what you are going to get, and this type of comprehensive analysis of alternatives should have been undertaken years ago. Secretary Napolitano recognized the need for such due diligence, which is why we will conduct such an analysis under the review she ordered.

The assessment has an immediate and a long-term phase. This week, the Department announced that it will be redeploying $50 million in Recovery Act funds that were scheduled to be spent on SBInet to alternative currently available, stand-alone technology, such as remote-controlled camera systems called Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSSs), truck-mounted systems with cameras and radar called Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSSs), thermal imaging devices, ultra-light detection,
backscatter units, mobile radios, and cameras and laptops for pursuit vehicles, that
will immediately improve our ability to secure the U.S.-Mexico border.

In the long-term phase, we will conduct a comprehensive, science-based assess-
ment of alternatives to SBInet to ensure that we are utilizing the most efficient and
effective technological and operational solutions in all of our border security efforts.
If this analysis suggests that the SBInet capabilities are worth the cost, this admin-
istration will extend deployment of these capabilities. If this analysis suggests that
alternative technology options represent the best balance of capability and cost-eff-
ectiveness, this administration will immediately begin redirecting resources cur-
rently allocated for border security efforts to these stronger options.

ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

It has often been said that technology is one of three “pillars” that contribute to
effective border security, with tactical infrastructure, such as physical fencing, and
personnel being the other two. Physical fencing provides “persistent impedance”—
that is, it delays the progress of people who attempt to cross our borders between
the ports of entry. These delays, in turn, provide more opportunity for our Border
Patrol agents to respond to and interdict those attempts. From 2006 through 2008,
the bulk of our funding within SBI focused on completion of the physical fence along
areas of the southwest border where Border Patrol determined it was operationally
necessary. Since then, as that fence has largely been completed, we have shifted our
funding focus more towards technology.

Technology is primarily used to provide continual monitoring and surveillance of
a particular area, enhancing situational awareness for Border Patrol agents, detect-
ing activity between the ports of entry and providing information about the type of
activity (i.e. human or animal, vehicle or pedestrian, transporting contraband or not
transporting contraband, etc.). This knowledge assists our Border Patrol agents in
responding to and interdicting criminal activity, and enhances their safety by giving
them information about the relative threat of any group or individual and about
how best to approach the threat.

CBP has already deployed technology to several specific areas of the border. As
mentioned above, we have deployed Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSSs),
which allow personnel to keep an eye on selected areas by displaying pictures at
a central dispatch location. We have also deployed Mobile Surveillance Systems
(MSSs), which transmit radar and camera images to a terminal in the cab of the
truck where they are monitored by an operator. Finally, we have deployed Unat-
tended Ground Sensors (UGS), which can detect movement in their vicinity. All of
these systems provide important information to the Border Patrol about activity in
a particular area.

The goal of SBInet was to network a set of sensors that cover a wide area into
a Common Operating Picture, or COP—in contrast to the individual, stand-alone
systems described above, which are very useful and relatively inexpensive, but also
labor-intensive and limited in coverage. By depicting a large amount of information
in a small space, SBInet was designed to allow fewer personnel to monitor and di-
rect operations across a larger area. Border Patrol agents would be able to observe,
manage, and respond to multiple events more effectively.

SBINET BLOCK 1

With respect to the development progress of SBInet, it is clear to all who are pay-
ing attention that progress has been slower than anticipated. Recent testing results
suggests that SBInet Block 1 has demonstrated some progress, but the time it has
taken us to get to this point is extremely discouraging and frustrating. As a partial
mitigation to the delays, we worked with Boeing to make a change in our plans so
that the Border Patrol could use parts of the system that are not yet fully complete
“as is” while engineering work continued. The Border Patrol has been using these
parts of the system in this capacity since February 6 and the feedback has been
positive from agents on the frontlines. The next steps involve completing our engi-
neering work and conducting formal testing. We expect to conduct System Accept-
ance Testing through August, and then to turn the system over to the Border Patrol
for formal Operational Testing and Evaluation starting in September.

Construction on a second part of the system, known as Ajo–1, started on January
25. Ajo–1 was delayed for several reasons, including technical concerns and environ-
mental considerations—Ajo–1 is located in an environmentally sensitive area, so we
have worked very closely with the Department of the Interior to ensure that we pro-
tected it appropriately. Much of the Ajo–1 AoR should be constructed by this spring.

By August, we expect to complete construction of Ajo–1. We will then conduct ac-
ceptance and operational testing of Ajo–1 through the end of this calendar year.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, we recognize that the SBInet program has been a frustration. This committee and the entire Congress has been supportive and patient with us as we have worked through issues and delays encountered by the program. The comprehensive review ordered by Secretary Napolitano demonstrates that she shares your concern. Technology along the border is of critical importance to our National security and the safety and effectiveness of our Border Patrol agents working in the field. We need to ensure that we provide them with proven, cost-effective tools that will help them do their jobs and keep our Nation safe—whether that means large-scale networks like SBInet or the inexpensive, stand-alone technology I mentioned above. One thing is clear: The Secretary’s review will require all of us to go back and take a hard look at the assumptions that were made in the past, and it will ensure that we proceed in a manner that both bolsters the security of our Nation’s borders while making the most out of the resources that have been devoted to technology solutions to our border security challenges. We look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Mr. Hite, you have got 5 minutes to summarize your statement.

STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH C. HITE, DIRECTOR, IT ARCHITECTURE & SYSTEMS ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. Hite. Thank you, Chairman Cuellar, Chairman Carney, Chairman Thompson. Let me begin by commending you for holding this hearing today on SBInet testing. Today we are releasing our January 2010 report on SBInet, which one could say really details the good, the bad, and the ugly about how Block 1 has been tested, how it has been planned, executed, and what the results show.

Given that DHS is in the process of positioning itself to begin the next major phase of testing, which is acceptance testing, the timing and focus of this hearing could not be better.

Before I summarize my written statement, let me first provide two contextual remarks about testing.

First, testing is not a one-time event. It is a series of incrementally expansive test events that build upon each other and complement previous test events. This is, each test event in the series can be viewed as a link in a chain, and thus each link must be well-planned and executed for testing to accomplish its intended purpose.

This brings me to my second contextual point, which is that the purpose of testing is not to demonstrate the absence of problems, it is to find problems restated, it is a given that testing will result in the discovery of defects that will need to be resolved, and it is vitally important that they be resolved on the basis of assigned priorities and that their resolution be tracked.

In so doing, meaningful understanding of the system’s maturity and readiness for further testing and operational use can be gained.

Now, with that as a backdrop, my bottom-line message today is that key aspects of the most recent SBInet test events, which include nine component qualification tests and one system qualification test, as well as the associated regression testing, have not been effectively managed.

Specifically, while the plans for these 10 test events define, for example, roles and responsibilities of those involved and the items to be tested—and that is good—none sufficiently described the
risks associated with completing the test and only one described the test schedule to be followed.

This is important because such omissions have contributed to some test events not proceeding as expected and resources not being available when needed.

Further, while most of the test cases associated with these 10 events describe test objectives, expected outputs and the procedures to be followed—that is good—few describe either test inputs, dependencies among test cases, or the facilities and personnel needed to execute the test cases.

This is important because such omissions have precipitated the need for additional time and effort to rerun test cases.

In addition, even though test procedures, as I just noted, were largely defined for each of the test cases, the procedures for about 70 percent of these test cases were not followed as written, but instead were changed on the fly during test execution.

Moreover, these changes were not subjected to written quality assurance checks, and in some cases the changes were extensive.

For example, some procedures were completely crossed out and replaced with handwritten steps, while for others the system requirement that the procedure was to demonstrate was changed.

To make matters worse, some of the changes were characterized as being made merely to pass the test case, rather than to demonstrate that the system could function as intended.

In my view, the volume and the nature of the changes made to test procedures cast doubt on the sufficiency of the testing performed, which in turn increases the likelihood that system problems remain undiscovered.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the test events nevertheless did identify a large number of defects. The latest data available to us showed that over 1,300 problems were discovered during a 17-month period when these tests were under way in some form or another.

What is more of a concern, however, is not the total number, but rather the fact that during this 17-month period the number of new problems that were being discovered were outpacing the number that were being closed.

The result is a trend in the number of unresolved defects that is not indicative of a maturing system.

Exacerbating this 17-month trend are three factors.

First, some of the problems have proven to be significant in that they caused lengthy delays to the program.

Second, additional problems were reported at the end of this 17-month period based on an early assessment of the system by the Border Patrol.

Third, the full magnitude of this upward trend is not clear, because most of the 1,300-plus defects were not assigned priorities based on their severity, thus limiting an understanding of the system's maturity.

Now, having said all this, let me close on a positive note by saying that our report and testimony contains recommendations aimed at addressing these test-management and problem-resolution limitations, and so the next phase of testing would not suffer from the same ones.
To the Department’s credit, they have told us that actions are under way and planned to address them.

This concludes my statement. I am happy to answer any questions.

[The statement of Mr. Hite follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH C. HITE

MARCH 18, 2010

GAO–10–511T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittees: Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on the technology component of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI). My statement today is based on our report Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk, which is being released at this hearing.1

As you know, SBI is intended to help secure the 6,000 miles of international borders that the contiguous United States shares with Canada and Mexico. The program, which began in November 2005, seeks to enhance border security and reduce illegal immigration by improving surveillance technologies, raising staffing levels, increasing domestic enforcement of immigration laws, and improving physical infrastructure along the nation’s borders. Within SBI, the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) is a multibillion dollar program that includes the acquisition, development, integration, deployment, and operation of surveillance technologies—such as unattended ground sensors and radar and cameras mounted on fixed and mobile towers—to create a “virtual fence” along the border. In addition, command, control, communications, and intelligence software and hardware are to use the information gathered by the surveillance technologies to create a common operating picture (COP) of activities within specific areas along the border and transmit the information to command centers and vehicles.

In September 2008, we reported to you that important aspects of SBInet were ambiguous and in a continuous state of flux, making it unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities were to be delivered when. In addition, the program did not have an approved integrated master schedule to guide the program’s execution, and key milestones continued to slip. This schedule-related risk was exacerbated by the continuous change in and the absence of a clear definition of the approach used to define, develop, acquire, test, and deploy SBInet. Furthermore, different levels of SBInet requirements were not properly aligned, and all requirements had not been properly defined and validated. Also, the program office had not tested the individual system components to be deployed to initial locations, even though the contractor had initiated integration testing of these components with other system components and subsystems, and its test management strategy did not contain, among other things, a clear definition of testing roles and responsibilities; or sufficient detail to effectively guide planning for specific test events, such as milestones and metrics. Accordingly, we made recommendations to address these weaknesses which DHS largely agreed to implement.2

In light of SBInet’s important mission, high cost, and risks, you asked us to conduct a series of four SBInet reviews. This statement and report being released today provide the results for the first of these reviews.3 Specifically, they address: (1) The extent to which SBInet testing has been effectively managed, including identifying the types of tests performed and whether they were well planned and executed; (2) what the results of testing show; and (3) what processes are being used to test and incorporate maturing technologies into SBInet.

In summary, SBInet testing has not been adequately managed, as illustrated by poorly defined test plans and numerous and extensive last-minute changes to test procedures. Further, testing that has been performed identified a growing number

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1 GAO–10–158 (Washington, DC: Jan. 29, 2010). Both the report and this statement are based on work performed in accordance with generally accepted Government standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained during the course of this review does provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.


3 See attachment 1 for the objectives and status of the other three reviews.
of system performance and quality problems—a trend that is not indicative of a maturing system that is ready for deployment anytime soon. Further, while some of these problems have been significant, the collective magnitude of the problems is not clear because they have not been prioritized, user reactions to the system continue to raise concerns, and key test events remain to be conducted. Collectively, these limitations increase the risk that the system will ultimately not perform as expected and will take longer and cost more than necessary to implement. For DHS to increase its chances of delivering a version of SBInet for operational use, we are recommending that DHS improve the planning and execution of future test events and the resolution and disclosure of system problems. DHS agreed with our recommendations.

BACKGROUND

Managed by DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), SBInet is to strengthen CBP's ability to detect, identify, classify, track, and respond to illegal breaches at and between ports of entry. CBP's SBI Program Office is responsible for managing key acquisition functions associated with SBInet, including tracking and overseeing the prime contractor.

In September 2006, CBP awarded a 3-year contract to the Boeing Company for SBInet, with three additional 1-year options. As the prime contractor, Boeing is responsible for designing, producing, testing, deploying, and sustaining the system. In September 2009, CBP extended its contract with Boeing for the first option year. CBP is acquiring SBInet incrementally in a series of discrete units of capabilities, referred to as “blocks.” Each block is to deliver one or more system capabilities from a subset of the total system requirements.

In August 2008, the DHS Acquisition Review Board decided to delay the initial deployment of Block 1 of SBInet so that fiscal year 2008 funding could be reallocated to complete physical infrastructure projects. In addition, the board directed the SBInet System Program Office (SPO) to deliver a range of program documentation, including an updated Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP), detailed test plans, and a detailed schedule for deploying Block 1 to two initial sites in the Tucson Sector of the southwest border. This resulted in a revised timeline for deploying Block 1, first to the Tucson Border Patrol Station (TUS–1) in April 2009, and then to the Ajo Border Patrol Station (AJO–1) in June 2009. Together, these two deployments are to cover 53 miles of the 1,989-mile-long southern border. However, the SBI Executive Director told us in December 2009 that these and other SBInet scheduled milestones were being reevaluated. As of January 2010, the TUS–1 system is scheduled for Government acceptance in September 2010, with AJO–1 acceptance in November 2010. However, this schedule has yet to be approved by CBP.

DHS HAS NOT EFFECTIVELY MANAGED SBINET TESTING

Testing is essential to knowing whether the system meets defined requirements and performs as intended. Effective test management involves, among other things, developing well-defined test plans and procedures to guide test execution. It is intended to identify and resolve system quality and performance problems as early as possible in the system development life cycle.

DHS has not effectively managed key aspects of SBInet testing, which has in turn increased the risk that the system will not perform as expected and will take longer and cost more than necessary. While the Department’s testing approach appropriately consists of a series of progressively expansive test events, some of which have yet to be completed, test plans and test cases for recently executed test events were not defined in accordance with relevant guidance. For example, none of the plans for tests of system components addressed testing risks and mitigation strategies.

Further, SBInet test procedures were generally not executed as written. Specifically, about 70 percent of the procedures for key test events were rewritten extemporaneously during execution because persons conducting the tests determined that the approved procedures were not sufficient or accurate. Moreover, changes to these procedures were not made according to a documented quality assurance process but were instead made based on an undocumented understanding that program officials said they established with the contractor. While some of these changes were relatively minor, others were significant, such as adding requirements or completely rewriting verification steps. The volume and nature of the changes made to the test

4The TEMP defines the program's integrated test and evaluation approach, including the scope of testing and the staff, resources (equipment and facilities), and funding requirements associated with testing.
procedures, in conjunction with the lack of a documented quality assurance process, increases the risk that system problems may not be discovered until later in the sequence of testing. This concern is underscored by a program office letter to the prime contractor stating that changes made to system qualification test procedures appeared to be designed to pass the test instead of being designed to qualify the system.

These limitations are due, among other things, to a lack of detailed guidance in the TEMP, the program’s aggressive milestones, schedule, and ambiguities in requirements. Collectively, these limitations increase the likelihood that testing will not discover system issues or demonstrate the system’s ability to perform as intended.

SBINET TESTING RESULTS HAVE IDENTIFIED A GROWING NUMBER OF SYSTEM PERFORMANCE AND QUALITY PROBLEMS

The number of new SBInet defects that have been discovered during testing has increased faster than the number that has been fixed. (See figure 1 for the trend in the number of open defects from March 2008 to July 2009.) As we previously reported\(^5\) such an upward trend is indicative of an immature system.

![SBinet Testing Results](image)

Some of the defects found during testing have been significant, prompting the DHS Acquisition Review Board in February 2009 to postpone deployment of Block 1 capabilities to TUS–1 and AJO–1. These defects included the radar circuit breaker frequently tripping when the radar dish rotated beyond its intended limits, COP workstations crashing, and blurry camera images, among others.

While program officials have characterized the defects and problems found during development and testing as not being “show stoppers,” they have nevertheless caused delays, extended testing, and required time and effort to fix. Moreover, the SPO and its contractor have continued to find problems that further impact the program’s schedule. For example, the radar problems mentioned previously were addressed by installing a workaround that included a remote ability to reactivate the circuit breaker via software, which alleviated the need to send maintenance workers out to the tower to manually reset the circuit. However, this workaround did not fully resolve the problem, and program officials said that root cause analysis continues on related radar power spikes and unintended acceleration of the radar dish that occasionally render the system inoperable. One factor that has contributed to the time and resources needed to resolve this radar problem, and potentially other problems, is the ability of the prime contractor to effectively determine root causes for defects. According to program officials, including the SBI Executive Director, the contractor’s initial efforts to isolate the cause of the radar problems were flawed and inadequate. Program officials added, however, that they have seen improvements in the contractor’s efforts to resolve technical issues.

Along with defects revealed by system testing, Border Patrol operators participating in an April 2009 user assessment identified a number of concerns. During the assessment, operators compared the performance of Block 1 capabilities to those of existing technologies. While Border Patrol agents noted that Block 1 offered functionality above existing technologies, it was not adequate for optimal effective-
ness in detecting items of interest along the border. Users also raised concerns about the accuracy of Block 1’s radar, the range of its cameras, and the quality of its video. Officials attributed some of the identified problems to users’ insufficient familiarity with Block 1; however, Border Patrol officials reported that the participating agents had experience with the existing technologies and had received 2 days of training prior to the assessment. The Border Patrol thus maintained that the concerns generated should be considered operationally relevant.

Effectively managing identified defects requires a defined process for, among other things, assigning priorities to each defect and ensuring that more severe ones are given priority attention. However, the SPO does not have such a documented approach but instead relies on the prime contractor for doing so. Under this approach, defects were not consistently assigned priorities. Specifically, about 60 percent (or 801 of 1,333) of Block 1 defects identified from March 2008 to July 2009 were not assigned a priority. This is partly attributable to the SPO’s lack of a defined process for prioritizing and managing defects. Officials acknowledge this and stated that they intend to have the contractor prioritize all defects in advance of future test readiness reviews. Until defects are managed on a priority basis, the program office cannot fully understand Block 1’s maturity or its exposure to related risks, nor can it make informed decisions about allocating limited resources to address defects.

DHS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE TESTING PROCESS IS BEING USED TO LEVERAGE MATURING TECHNOLOGIES FOR SBINET

The SPO does not have its own process for testing the relevance to SBInet of technologies that are maturing or otherwise available from industry or other government entities. Instead, it relies on DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), whose mission is to provide technology solutions that assist DHS programs in achieving their missions. To leverage S&T, CBP signed a multiyear Interagency Agreement with the directorate in August 2007. According to this agreement, S&T is to research, develop, assess, test, and report on available and emerging technologies that could be incorporated into the SBInet system. To date, S&T has focused on potential technologies to fill known performance gaps or improve upon already-made technology choices, such as gaps in the radar system’s ability to distinguish true radar hits from false alarms. S&T officials told us that they interact with Department of Defense (DOD) components and research entities to identify DOD systems for SBInet to leverage. In this regard, SPO officials stated that the current SBInet system makes use of DOD technologies, such as common operating picture software and radar systems. Nevertheless, S&T officials added that defense-related technologies are not always a good fit with SBInet, due to operational differences.

GAO IS MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE SBINET TEST MANAGEMENT AND PROBLEM RESOLUTION

To improve the planning and execution of future test events and the resolution and disclosure of system problems, we are making the following four recommendations to DHS:

- Revise the SBInet Test and Evaluation Master Plan to include explicit criteria for assessing the quality of test documentation and for analyzing, prioritizing, and resolving defects.
- Ensure that test schedules, plans, cases, and procedures are adequately reviewed and approved consistent with the Test and Evaluation Master Plan.
- Ensure that sufficient time is provided for reviewing and approving test documentation prior to beginning a given test event.
- Triage the full inventory of unresolved problems, including identified user concerns, and periodically report the status of the highest priority defects to Customs and Border Protection and Department of Homeland Security leadership.

In written comments on a draft of our report, DHS stated that the report was factually sound, and it agreed with our last three recommendations and agreed with all but one aspect of the first one. DHS also described actions under way or planned to address the recommendations.

In closing, I would like to stress how integral effective testing and problem resolution are to successfully acquiring and deploying a large-scale, complex system, like SBInet Block 1. As such, it is important that each phase of Block 1 testing be managed with rigor and discipline. To do less increases the risk that a deployed version of the system will not perform as intended, and will ultimately require costly and time-consuming rework to fix problems found later rather than sooner. Compounding this risk is the unfavorable trend in the number of unresolved system problems, and the lack of visibility into the true magnitude of these problems’ severity. Given that major test events remain to be planned and conducted, which in turn
are likely to identify additional system problems, it is important to correct these testing and problem resolution weaknesses.

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the subcommittees may have.

ATTACHMENT 1—SUMMARY OF GAO’S ON-GOING SBInet WORK FOR THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

SBInet’s Commitment, Progress, and Acquisition Management. Our objectives are to determine the extent to which DHS has: (1) Defined the scope of its proposed system solution, (2) developed a reliable schedule for delivering this solution, (3) demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of this solution, (4) acquired this solution in accordance with key life cycle management processes, and (5) addressed our recent recommendations. We plan to report our results in April 2010.

SBInet’s Contractor Management and Oversight. Our objectives are to determine the extent to which DHS: (1) Has established and implemented effective controls for managing and overseeing the SBInet prime contractor and (2) is effectively monitoring the prime contractor’s progress in meeting cost and schedule expectations. We plan to report our results during the summer of 2010.

Security Border Initiative Financial Management Controls Over Contractor Oversight. Our objectives are to determine the extent to which DHS has: (1) Developed internal control procedures over SBInet contractor invoice processing and contractor compliance with selected key contract terms and conditions and (2) implemented internal control procedures to ensure payments to SBInet’s prime contractor are proper and in compliance with selected key contract terms and conditions. We plan to report our results during the summer of 2010.

Mr. Cuellar, Sir, I thank you very much for your testimony. At this time I recognize Mr. Krone for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF ROGER A. KRONE, PRESIDENT, NETWORK AND SPACE SYSTEMS, BOEING DEFENSE, SPACE & SECURITY, THE BOEING COMPANY

Mr. Krone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairmen Cuellar, Carney, Thompson, Ranking Members.

It has been 6 months since we last appeared here to discuss SBInet. In that time, the Government and industry team has made significant progress on the deployment of the SBInet Block 1 system, and we are now seeing real-world results and actual Border Patrol operations in the Tucson sector.

In addition, we have started a second Block 1 deployment in Ajo, and on the northern border we have delivered the Buffalo Project, and we are within weeks of delivering the Detroit Project.

Testing is a critical function of all developmental programs. Its purpose is to understand system’s performance, ensure system’s functionality, and demonstrate that the design meets system’s requirements.

In any test, we expect to find problems.

In many cases, we push the system to failure to understand its detailed functionality and durability.

When issues are identified, we have a process in place to capture them, prioritize them and address them. We utilize a closed-loop, root-cause corrective action process to ensure we fully understand each problem and have implemented a corrective action that is both comprehensive and complete.

Late last fall, our systems qualification test revealed several hardware and software changes that needed to be made. In addition, analysis of the Playas test bed and the Tucson-1 production configuration identified differences in some components which ne-
cessitated a limited set of assessments on the Tucson-1 configuration to ensure traceability of and verification of artifacts and to reduce risk.

At the same time, working closely with CBT and conscious of GAO’s concerns, we revised our systems acceptance test plan to include an expanded set of routes and more precise success criteria for the key performance parameters. These tests will involve day and night operations along 60 or more Border Patrol-identified trafficking routes. These factors drove the schedule adjustment, which now has Tucson-1 acceptance testing starting in late summer, concluding in early fall.

As you know, schedule delays drive costs. We are aggressively pursuing opportunities to reclaim schedule and reduce the cost of Tucson-1 and Ajo-1 deployments. However, in terms of performance on the program, progress is evident. We are not seeing any system-wide issues. We have plans in place for remaining lower-level issues, and we are confident the revised system acceptance test plan is robust and its success criteria are well-understood.

This assessment is supported by the feedback we are getting from early operations. Early operations began, as Mark said, on February 6 and has provided the Border Patrol with the opportunity to use the Tucson-1 system during swing and midnight shifts, times that our engineers are not able to work on the system for safety and security reasons. To date, about 4 dozen Border Patrol agents have taken the formal classroom training program. The system has performed reliably and effectively 7 days a week.

I would like to relay to the committee my personal observations from a visit I made to Tucson sector less than 2 weeks ago. I spent an evening in the command-and-control center at Tucson sector headquarters observing agents at three consoles of the Block 1 system, and I spent the following day visiting tower sites. I was struck by the speed with which agents are adapting to the system both at the consoles and in the field, and the skill they are displaying even at this early stage.

Also apparent is the increased tactical advantage agents now have because of the significantly improved situational awareness the system provides them. The sensor information SBI collection relays to the agent in the field really does give him or her greater ability to deal with each encounter effectively and safely.

So does SBInet pass the Border Security test? Based upon all the activities of the recent days, I would say there are three questions. Are we testing the system adequately? Does the system work? Does it provide value, best value to the Border Patrol?

On testing, yes, the majority of the delay in our testing program is to bring the configuration of the system up to its production level and to conduct more rigorous testing, and we are seeing signs of a maturing system out in the field.

Second question: Does it work? Definitely yes, it works today. I would ask you to direct your questions to Mark and to Chief Fisher, and it will get better as we finish the development and construction of the system. But more importantly, value—is this good value for money? Our job at Boeing is to design, develop, and deploy the system. Value is really a Customs and Border Patrol decision, but based upon my experience, the Tucson-1 system gives the
agent in the field a significant tactical advantage, an increase in situation awareness, especially in night operations.

So I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you today. I look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.

[The statement of Mr. Krone follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER A. KRONE
MARCH 18, 2010

Good morning.

It has been 6 months since we last appeared to discuss SBInet. In that time, the Boeing Team has made significant progress on the deployment of the SBInet Block 1 System, and we are seeing real-world results in actual Border Patrol operations in the Tucson Sector. In addition, we have started a second Block 1 deployment in the Ajo area. On the northern border, we have delivered the Buffalo project and are within weeks of delivering the Detroit project.

This progress has been achieved through application of a disciplined engineering approach and lessons learned along the way. As we have discussed previously, there is inherent complexity associated with integrating multiple commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components into a complex system.

Testing is a critical function of all developmental programs. Its purpose is to ensure system functionality and that the design meets system requirements. In any test, we expect to find problems, and in many cases, we push the system to failure to understand its detailed functionality and durability. When issues are identified, we have a process in place to capture them, prioritize them, and address them. We utilize a closed-loop Root Cause Corrective Action (RCCA) process to ensure we fully understand each problem and have implemented a corrective action that is both comprehensive and complete.

SCHEDULE

Late last fall, our System Qualification Test (SQT) revealed several hardware and software changes that needed to be made in the system before entering into System Acceptance Test (SAT). In addition, subsequent analysis of the Playas test bed and Tucson 1 (TUS1) configurations identified differences in some of the COTS hardware and software components, which necessitated we conduct a limited set of assessments on the TUS1 configuration to ensure traceability of our verification artifacts and reduce risk to a successful System Acceptance Test and Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E).

At the same time, working closely with CBP, we revised our SAT plan to include an expanded set of routes and a more precise set of success criteria for the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). These tests will involve daytime and nighttime operations along more than 60 Border Patrol-identified trafficking routes. To ensure that the tests are statistically valid, multi-kilometer segments along each route will be walked multiple times by various group sizes. In addition to pedestrians, vehicles will also be evaluated. This is a time-consuming and labor-intensive process necessary to ensure the accuracy of the testing. These factors are the reason for delaying the start and extending the duration of SAT. TUS1 acceptance testing is now expected to start in late summer and conclude in early fall.

COST

The cost growth we have experienced on the program has been driven by the schedule delays. We are aggressively pursuing opportunities to reduce the cost of the TUS1 and AJO1 deployments. Our team has identified a number of opportunities in our TUS1 schedule to accelerate milestones and realize cost reductions as a result. In consideration for these delays, Boeing has committed to apply the fee that we receive for the TUS1 Deployment toward system enhancements that will be identified by the Border Patrol. In addition, Boeing has also committed company resources to establish a senior technical team to independently evaluate the readiness of the Block 1 System and to make recommendations on key areas that will enhance the system performance and availability.

Based on where we are today in the program, the progress is evident. We are not seeing any system-wide issues; we have plans in place for the remaining lower-level issues and we are confident we have a robust SAT plan with well-understood success criteria. We are on the way to deliver a system with the capabilities and means to become a reliable force multiplier for the Border Patrol and one from which CBP
and the Border Patrol can develop Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) to meet our Nation’s evolving border security needs.

EARLY OPERATIONS

Our current view of the system is supported by the feedback we are getting from Early Operations. Early Operations began on Feb. 6, 2010, and has provided the Border Patrol with the opportunity to use the TUS1 System during swing and midnight shifts, times that our engineers are not able to work on the system for safety and security reasons. To date, about four dozen Border Patrol Agents have taken the formal classroom training program at the Production Support Facility in Tucson. After the 3-day training session, the agents are able to use the TUS1 System to support Border Patrol operations in the Sasabe Port of Entry area. During Early Operations, Boeing engineers work side-by-side with the agents to provide technical support as required. The feedback that we have received to date from the agents has been very positive and complimentary of the improvement over Project 28 and the impact on mission performance. To date, the system has performed reliably and effectively, 7 days per week.

I'd like to relay to the committee my personal observations from a visit to the Tucson Sector less than 2 weeks ago. I spent an evening in the Command and Control Center at the Tucson Sector Headquarters observing three agents at the consoles of the Block 1 System and the following day visiting tower sites. I was struck by the speed with which the agents are adapting to the system—both at the consoles and in the field—and the skill they are displaying even at this early stage. Also very apparent is the increased tactical advantage agents now have because of the significantly improved situational awareness the system provides. The information the system relays to the agent in the field really does give him or her greater ability to deal with each encounter effectively and safely.

As Early Operations progresses, we will work closely with the SBInet Program Office to capture issues and feedback. A formal system is in place to disposition issues as they arise, either in the form of corrections that need to be made prior to acceptance or as potential enhancements to be made after OT&E.

AJO1

In late January, we began the second deployment of Block 1 technology, called AJO1, near the Lukeville Port of Entry in an environmentally sensitive area of the Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument. The 6-month delay to the start of the AJO1 Deployment was driven primarily by environmental and land management assessments and permits that were required before construction could begin. Since late January, we have erected five towers and our teams are actively at work at all the remaining sites where we have permission to work. The Ajo Station Command and Control Center was recently completed, and the full system will be ready for Operational Test & Evaluation late this calendar year. The speed at which AJO1 is erected, tested, and accepted by the CBP will demonstrate the increased maturity of the Block 1 System.

NORTHERN BORDER PROJECTS

We also have significant progress to report on our northern border projects where we are installing the Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) to enhance agent surveillance capabilities in the river environments near Buffalo and Detroit. The Buffalo deployment was completed and accepted by CBP on Feb. 26, 2010, and is now part of operations of the Border Patrol. The completion of the Detroit deployment has been delayed by an issue with a Government vendor, but is expected to be delivered to CBP early next month. The delivery of both of these projects is in accord with the schedule outlined in the hearing last September.

MOBILE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS

In addition, Boeing has been providing logistics sustainment for the Border Patrol’s Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS) since April 2009. These highly modified vehicles provide mobile radar and camera surveillance capability. When Boeing began this effort, the availability of the 41 MSS was less than 50 percent. Today, through close collaboration with CBP, the availability of the MSS is greater than 90 percent.

CONCLUSION

While SBInet has been a difficult and challenging program, we believe the original concept of providing timely and actionable situational awareness to Border Pa-
trol Agents remains a sound one. With the support of CBP, we now have a version of the Block 1 System in use today by the Border Patrol—providing value to their operations. To date, we are more than three-quarters complete with the first two deployments and are within months of starting formal acceptance testing for the TUS1 system.

So, does SBInet pass the border security test? Based on the capabilities developed, the engineering rigor, and the positive mission impact of Early Operations, the answer is "yes."

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Krone, for your testimony.

At this time, I remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to question the witnesses.

I now recognize myself for questions.

Mr. Borkowski, let me ask you this. The way I see this is we have GAO that goes and looks at your systems, and I think they have done it about 17 times. I understand you just came in just recently. I understand that.

But one of the things I would like to see is the agency, if you agree with the recommendations, and my understanding is pretty much all have agreed to the recommendations. The last set of recommendations I think were about 18 months ago, Mr. Hite, is that correct?

But then after you all get the recommendations, then you all talk about that. I haven’t seen the improvement or the completion of those recommendations. You know, and the reason I say this, because you all should be looking at this cooperative, instead of adversarial, and I almost feel like, you know, you all feel, the Department feels that GAO is out to get you, but I see it more as an improvement.

Where are we with those recommendations and when are we going to finish them? I know your background. You are new, but somebody has to answer those questions.

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Right. Absolutely. First of all, we concur with the GAO recommendations largely because we agree that they reflect best practices in the way that you manage a program of this complexity. We agree that the program did not have those practices in place.

I just want to comment on a couple of things, though. One is, yes, we are working toward that kind of structure and discipline, but you don’t undo 2 and 3 years in, you know, 15 minutes. So that is a work in progress. It is going to take some time to close all of those.

The second thing, though, that I would point out is that the GAO report we are talking about today is based on analysis of things that essentially were looked at last spring. So for example, when you talk about test procedures being adjusted, if you go into the report—and by the way, I have a draft report; we haven’t seen the final, but I assume the draft is close—if you go in and you look at that, you will see that the GAO acknowledges that in April 2009, it was the program office that said to Boeing, “It looks like you did this.” So the point I am trying to make is that I think we are on it.

The other thing is that between then and now, we have focused on a lot of the things that GAO also identified. We saw the same things. So that is a work in progress. I can’t promise you, Mr. Chairman, that it will be done overnight. I can promise to you that
we are very committed to increasing that discipline. I do think that
the kind of things we are seeing in the initial ops, the fact that the
system is not crashing when we turn it over to the Border Patrol,
is in some measure due to the imposition of what discipline we
have been able to achieve by this point.

But you are absolutely right. This will go on for longer than
today, tomorrow, and the next several months.

Mr. Cuellar. Okay. If you can just keep the committee informed
as to the progress itself.

The other question is dealing with the $50 million that the Sec-
retary just redeployed. Sensitivity—I am not asking you to give me
details as to what equipment you are going to buy, but just gen-
erally what are we looking at? How does that improve value to the
border security? How is Mr. Fisher, Border Patrol, included in buy-
ing that equipment? We had this conversation yesterday, but for
the record.

Mr. Borkowski. We actually asked. SBI did not make a deter-
mination of what equipment we should buy. We actually asked not
only the Border Patrol, but the Office of Field Operations, the Of-
fice of Air and Marine, the Office of Intelligence for their priorities.
We worked in kind of an integrated way to come up with those pri-
orities.

But the types of things we are looking at are the mobile surveil-
lance systems, the remote video surveillance systems which are in
use today. There are scope trucks that give night vision that the
Border Patrol is very interested in. There are some additional sen-
sors on aircraft. There are radars to detect low-flying aircraft.
There are cameras and laptops for pursuit vehicles for the Office
of Field Operations. There is equipment to support field operations,
southbound operations. So we have a whole list of things that we
collected from the agents and officers themselves and that is what
we will use to build that $50 million plant.

Mr. Cuellar. Okay. You heard my statement at the beginning.
At the current rate of 28 miles every 4.5 years, it would take us
320 years to complete, which would be the year 2330 at that rate.

If we look at—how much have we spent so far—$600 million,
$700 million, including R&D and all that?

Mr. Borkowski. Right, right. It is in the $700 million—about
$615 million to Boeing has been spent, and then another $100 mil-
lon, $200 million on other costs related to that that were not Boe-
ing.

Mr. Cuellar. Okay. You do understand what our concerns are
on costs and time, especially with the violence escalating across the
river. CBP Air Marine—are the ones that operate the UAVs. I
know they have to work out the cost, the certificates of authoriza-
tion with the FAA. How is that coordinated—how is that coordi-
nated with the SBI? UAVs or technology is technology, and one of
the letters that I sent is I wanted to ask what is the long plan for
the CAVs for the northern border, for the southern border, and my
understanding is that Coast Guard working with CBP is working
on the UAVs for the coastal areas.

Mr. Borkowski. Well, I know you are aware that we have plans
to buy UAVs, and I think you are right—that needs to be inte-
grated. That is one of the reasons, I think, that the Secretary has
directed this assessment is because UAVs should be part of the tradeoff against things like SBInet, against things like other technology. That evaluation should include a sense of how they work together.

So part of, I think, the Secretary's intention in dealing with this assessment is also to get to that question.

Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Krone, I think it was earlier this week or last week, I saw—I think you had a tape of how your project has worked, the new one, and to me it looked pretty clear. I am not Border Patrol, and we will ask Mr. Fisher. But I saw there was some good things from what I saw, but at the same time, it is mixed, as Mr. Hite has mentioned. But what I saw was some good things coming in. It was clear, and my understanding is Border Patrol, and I will ask Mr. Fisher to add to this, but was they can play with a couple of screens, where they can get a couple of screens at one time that makes it, I think, more useful to look at different things at one time.

My understanding also, and Mr. Fisher, I am asking I guess both of you all, was—it is easier, friendly for the agents to use this, or time for it to be trained? If you can just address that, and Mr. Fisher, tell us how you all see what is being done right now. Because again, look, for the record, Mr. Krone, if we are going to be paying this much money, I want Boeing to succeed, okay? I want you all to succeed. But I hope you all understand that we have got concerns about time and cost and some of the issues that have been brought up by GAO, Mr. Hite.

Mr. Krone. Right. I will make a few comments and then clearly we all want to hear from the chief.

So, again, I had the opportunity to go out to the Tucson command and control center. If you can imagine with me what the layout looks like, in the front row we have three consoles for Tucson-1, and each console controls three towers.

Immediately behind that, we have the old P28 system. So you can literally stand there and watch the P28 Border Patrol operators operating the old P28 system and the new system.

For the Members and those of us who have been involved in this program for a long time, know that we redesigned the interface software, which we call the common operating picture, when we moved from P28 to Tucson-1, and we did that in a very collaborative process with Border Patrol agents and actually brought them into the design early, a criticism that we had in P28, with the intent to make it extremely user-friendly and to reduce the training time that it would take agents to learn the new system.

Just my observation being out in the command and control center is we provide 3 days' worth of training to the agents and then they are allowed to use the system—these early operations.

I am extremely impressed at how significantly they have been able to use the Tucson-1 system, vice the P28 even at this early stage. So I think we have got what I believe is a pretty good success in the user interface and the ability for the agents to adapt quickly to the system and, frankly, to use it effectively in engagements.

But I would also like to hear from Chief Fisher.
Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Fisher, if you can summarize. My time is up. But if you can just tell us your perspective on the system.

Mr. FISHER. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thank you for the opportunity to be here this morning.

I will tell you first, I haven’t seen firsthand the new developments that we are talking about personally, although I will have an opportunity at the end of the month to do so. But I have worked in Tucson over the years. I have seen the early developments when the system and the common operational system was being put together, and I will tell you, I think later there is a film, a short clip perhaps, that is going to show the capabilities.

One of the things that impressed me when I first saw this the other day was certainly, as you have mentioned, sir, the clarity of the picture and everything.

But what really impressed me from an operator’s perspective was the sense of how protected the Border Patrol agents in the field are going to be because of this. Again, I am not projecting, you know, long-term this is going to be—certainly this is not the silver bullet.

But what impressed me was the fact that an operator, a Border Patrol agent, back away from these smugglers, was able to provide in advance information to the Border Patrol agents on the field, relaying that information to them in real time, providing back-up perhaps of getting other agents to be able to move into position, and providing the interdiction, cover, and concealment if you will, and oversight that historically we just didn’t have in the Border Patrol before.

It does look promising. I am going to hold judgment until the actual testing and when the Border Patrol actually looks at it beyond what we have done so far in interim steps. But I will tell you that it has given us a general sense of better situational awareness just beyond some of the clarity with respect to some of the other detection capabilities that we have implemented along the southwest border over the years, sir.

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. Thank you.

Chair now will recognize other Members for questions they may wish to ask of the witnesses. According to—committee rules and practice, I will recognize Members who were here present at the beginning based on seniority of the subcommittee, alternating between Majority and Minority.

Those Members coming in at a later time will be recognized in the order of arrival.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Carney, for 5 minutes. Thank you.

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Once again, I appreciate the joint hearing.

I am not sure where to start on this.

So, Mr. Borkowski, I guess you are first on this one. As we all know, we have experienced significant delays with SBInet in Tucson-1 and Ajo-1. In fact, every time Congress was given a date for their completion, the date has come and gone.

For example, in December 2008 we were told that Tucson-1 and Ajo-1 would be completed in September 2009 and December 2009, respectively. Then, in February 2009, those dates were pushed back to November 2009 and mid-2010.
In April 2009, further delays caused the dates to be moved from—or to December 2009 and June 2010. Once again, in January—once January 2010 rolled around, we were told not to expect a timely completion because the system would not be finished until later in the year.

Now, tests show that the date is moved further into the future than originally expected. I am afraid to ask, but, you know, we are here, I am going to ask, when do you expect full deployment of Tucson-1 and Ajo-1?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. We expect Tucson-1 and Ajo-1 to be completely in the hands of the Border Patrol by the end of this calendar year or very early next calendar year. That is the short answer to your question.

Now, turning it to the hands of the Border Patrol, the Border Patrol has options of doing some operational tests during that period for as long as they care to do it. But both of those we anticipate will be in the hands of the Border Patrol for operations toward the end of the year.

Mr. CARNEY. That gives you a bit of wiggle room, doesn’t it?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, I can give you the precise dates.

Mr. CARNEY. Yes, yes, that would be great.

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Okay. We expect to have Tucson-1 completed through its system acceptance testing by September 15, and at September 15 we would turn it over to the Border Patrol for their operational test and evaluation.

Mr. CARNEY. Okay.

Mr. BORKOWSKI. In the case of Ajo-1, Ajo-1 is going through construction. Some of the delay there, by the way, was environmental. That is a highly sensitive environmental area. So some of the construction was delayed due to that.

We are constructing it as we speak. There will be a kind of shutdown for a couple months for Sonora and prong-horn fawning season in the spring going into the summer, but that should be all constructed by the middle of August.

Then the system acceptance testing for Ajo-1 will go on into about till November of this year, and after, again, system acceptance testing it would be turned over to the Border Patrol.

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Okay. Thank you. Appreciate that.

Mr. Krone, I got to tell you, I have to commend you for your ability to spin this situation. It was truly an inspired—an inspired performance.

One question I have. How many miles of either Ajo-1 or Tucson-1 are actually under control using your technology?

Mr. KRONE. Well, all of Tucson-1 is under control with P28. P28 is up and operational. Then at night we double down, we have both P28 and the Block-1 system. But on Ajo we are in tower construction. So there is none of Ajo today and all of Tucson-1, essentially with two systems.

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Now, is that what was originally sold? Is that what you originally told us?

Mr. KRONE. Was that a schedule question?

Mr. CARNEY. Yes.

Mr. KRONE. Clearly not. You know, whether we want to go and pick a particular date or a particular point in time.
So it is a developmental program, Congressman Carney. We have made a decision to move from a schedule-based program to an event-based program.

Now, what do I mean by that?

Mr. CARNEY. No, I understand what you mean by that.

Mr. KRONE. Okay.

Mr. CARNEY. I got it.

Mr. Hite, I was really fascinated with your testimony here. I liked the good, the bad, the ugly part. Not so much the bad and the ugly.

Are there proven technologies, other proven technologies out there that would accomplish the same thing, that they are already in existence?

Mr. Hite. The short answer would be yes. I think that is the purpose of the assessment that the Secretary wants. There is a recognition that there are other technologies, that there is not necessarily one panacea that is going to satisfy the Border Patrol's needs across the entire border. They want to look at what are the options out there, and then what is the best allocation of those options across the border.

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. Where might these technologies be in use right now, the other ones?

Mr. Hite. Where they are actually in use, sir? I couldn't give you an answer——

Mr. CARNEY. Are they in use—so you don't know if they are in use in Iraq or in Israel or places like that?

Mr. Hite. Unfortunately, I can't give you the answer to that. I don't know for certain.

Mr. CARNEY. Okay. If you could look and let us know——

Mr. Hite. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARNEY [continuing]. That would be great.

Finally, Mr. Hite, you mentioned that 70 percent or so of the testing was changed on the fly. Who approved those changes? Who makes the decision to, in the middle of the test, change the test?

Mr. Hite. Yes, sir. That was 70 percent of the procedures within—I am sorry, 70 percent of the test cases the procedures were changed to varying degrees, some of which were minor changes, some of which were more significant.

The rules governing those changes were not laid out in a document at quality assurance process. Rather it was an informal agreement between the parties within the program office and Boeing. They described to us what that process was, and we in fact validated that that unwritten set of procedures was, in fact, followed, and that there were quality assurance sign-off on those changes at the time.

Mr. CARNEY. You know, I got to tell you, it doesn't pass the smell test. I used to be a professor. You don't change a test in the middle of the test. I don't care who signs off on it.

Mr. Hite. I would agree with you, particularly the volume of the changes that were made and how extensive they were.

What it is indicative of is that, well, we didn't have the test procedures right to begin with, so we are going to try and fix them to try and get them right here at the last minute.
Now, you run a risk of trying to do something like that on the fly, you know, at the last minute.

Mr. Carney. So, hold on, if the test—if the test wasn’t right, we are not even far enough along on the project to know what questions to ask?

Mr. Hite. Well, what we were dealing, when you design a test, you are designing it to a requirement. Part of the problem here was the requirement in some cases was not well-defined. If you are trying to write a test to execute a requirement that is not well-defined, you are going to run into difficulty in doing that.

So what contributed to this situation relative to changes in test procedures were a number of things that didn’t occur earlier on in the system development, because making sure that a system like this is successful and involves doing many things over many years means you got to have a lot of stars to align to form this constellation.

All those early stars that were out there weren’t aligned very well.

Mr. Carney. I agree.

Okay. I am way over my time. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the next round.

Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentleman from Pennsylvania.

At this time, I recognize the gentleman from the State of Florida, Mr. Bilirakis.

Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very much.

Mr. Borkowski, in your statement you discuss the SBInet review required by Secretary Napolitano. Who is responsible for conducting the review? What is the status now? When will the results be available?

Mr. Borkowski. Well, the review is run by the Department. It is managed by the Secretary’s office. There is a facilitator who is the chief of staff to the under secretary of management. We have met over the last couple of months to lay out structure and timelines and such.

The Secretary’s office is still working those, though, because on the one hand, the Secretary is very committed. She wants the technology now, as you can imagine. On the other hand, she does not want to go back to the earlier mistakes of not having done an analysis to justify significant investments. So the exact timelines are in review with the Secretary’s office as we speak.

Mr. Bilirakis. So are we talking about maybe getting something by the summer?

Mr. Borkowski. My understanding is that the Secretary would like to have results to advise future budget decisions. That is about as much as I can say at this point about the timeline.

Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Chairman, I would request a review, maybe the office can brief us on the results, if that is possible.

Mr. Borkowski. Yes, we will do that.

Mr. Bilirakis. Okay.

Okay, Mr. Krone, I understand that CBC has requested you consider alternative locations for the tower Ajo-1 due to issues with GSA. If you identify a viable alternative location, what steps must
be taken to begin construction of the tower? What impact will that have on the completion of Ajo-1?

Mr. Krone. I actually think we are—I think we are past that. I think all of the towers at Ajo-1 have been approved and the environmental impact assessments have been complete. What is holding us up on Ajo-1 really is this antelope fawning season, and our inability to move heavy construction equipment into the area to complete construction of those towers.

But all of the tower sites in Ajo-1, I think the environmentalist assessment has been complete and we are really—go ahead, Mark.

Mr. Borkowski. If I might. As you suggest, there is an issue with a communications tower at the Lukeville port of entry, which is a site that we have located and intended to use. We have been asked about relocating that tower to deal with some other CBP needs. So we are in the process of figuring out what the right way to handle that is. I don’t think Mr. Krone is aware of that just yet, but we are in the process of—

Mr. Bilirakis. Have you identified a location?

Mr. Borkowski. No, not yet. We are looking at candidate locations. We haven’t also identified that we have to move our tower just yet, but we are in the process of doing that.

Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Will you keep us informed?

Mr. Borkowski. Absolutely. I think that will be a very significant effort, yes.

Mr. Bilirakis. Okay.

Mr. Borkowski, what impact will the Secretary’s announcement to redeploy $50 million of recovery funds, funding originally located for Block 1, have on the Block 1 deployment? Will this further delay the completion of Block 1? Will the technology procured with the redirected Recovery Act funding be deployed? Will these technologies provide Border Patrol agents with a common operating picture?

Mr. Borkowski. The intent of our SBInet stimulus funds was to buy what we call long-lead cameras, radars, equipment to build towers so that we would be spring-loaded to go build those once we were done with Tucson-1 and Ajo-1. So the effect of diverting the funds on the one hand, on SBInet, might have an impact on our ability to speedily, if we decide it makes sense—which again, the assessment hasn’t yet concluded it does—to speedily continue deployment of Block 1.

But on the other hand, the immediate diversion of those funds likely gives us quicker some technology that meets the needs of the Border Patrol than we would have gotten with SBInet. So there is a little trade-off here. There may be an impact on our ability to get SBInet if we decide to build more, but certainly it should result in quicker other technologies to the border to meet the needs of the agents and officers there.

Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.

A question for Mr. Fisher. What impact have the delays in SBInet deployment had on the Border Patrol operations?

Mr. Fisher. Well, sir, when you look at our capabilities and what we currently have, and the deployment and the evolution of our strategy under a border security context. Now what we are seeing in the deployment in Tucson, specifically with SBInet, is an on-
going effort to provide beyond what our current detection capabilities are.

We are going to continue—as a matter of fact, I had this discussion with the staff here and the field commanders when I first came up in January. I said we are going to continue. We are going to have objectives. We are going to continue to have objectives as it relates to our ability to, one, reduce the likelihood that dangerous people and dangerous things get into this country, and at the tactical level, make sure that we are able to gain, maintain, and expand operational control.

We are going to have the ability to use personnel, technology, and infrastructure as part of our existing strategy. We also have to be cognizant of the fact that we are dealing with a threat that is ever-evolving and changing. So as we look at that, it is not a one-term solution as it relates to that right combination.

Now, with respect to SBInet in Tucson, what we are seeing, although it has taken a lot longer than perhaps the operators would have liked, we are doing it right. I think at the end of the day, what we want to be able to do is use that, not to replace all of our detection capability, but add that to a suite of other things and other capabilities that the Border Patrol agents will have today and will have in the future to maintain that operational control.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much.

Last question for Mr. Krone. What is Boeing doing to prioritize and resolve defects identified during the testing?

Mr. KRONE. Yes, we have got to discipline both software and hardware defect management. It is a best practice. By the way, we will get together with Mr. Hite so we understand the 1,300 issues that he has identified in his report. We have had trouble tracking to that number, but we have what we call a joint software review board with Customs and Border Patrol. We also have the change configuration board where we deal with hardware and software.

We essentially put these defects and issues into five levels and prioritize them. Then we work cooperatively with Mark and his team to prioritize which ones get fixed immediately, which ones get rolled into the next block, and which ones, if you will, have no impact into systems operation and it is not a best value decision to go correct them.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Okay, thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate it. Yield back the balance.

Mr. CUellar. Yes, thank you.

The gentleman from Florida, thank you very much.

At this time, I recognize the gentleman from Mississippi, Chairman Thompson, for 5 minutes.

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask the clerk to display a slide for the committee, please.

[The information follows:]
Mr. T HOMPSON. What you have displayed is a capsule of what Congress and this committee was promised when we started the SBInet program. We were promised completion by 2008. We were told that somehow the costs would be less than $2 billion, and that the coverage would be the entire southwest border, some 1,933 miles.

Based on what we have heard today, we are a long ways from completion, somewhere around $833 million, and—am I correct?—around maybe 20 miles of control. So we have a long ways to go.

Mr. HITE. A couple of thoughts on that. When you critique something, or critique oneself, you do it against some type of baseline. The baselines that you have put up on the screen here talk about the timing of when that was going to get done, at what cost.

If you look at what was promised from the outset on this program in terms of where we are right now, promises were made relative to deployment over a large geographic area—the entire southwest border—that we are about 8 years off of. Promises were made relative to sectors that we are probably about 3 years off of. Then when you get down to specific locations, like Tucson-1 and Ajo-1, promises were made that we are probably somewhere between 12 and 15 months off of.

So to evaluate performance and, you know, Mr. Krone was talking about where the system is right now, and he was talking about,
you know, it is working; we have worked off these defects; it is being used by the Border Patrol; they like it.

I am not going to take issue with precisely where the system is right now, but if you are going to measure yourself, measure yourself against some type of baseline.

Mr. Thompson. Thank you.

Mr. Borkowski, you talked about the $50 million purchase of equipment. How much operational control will we have of the border with the purchase of that equipment?

Mr. Borkowski. Well, the equipment by itself doesn’t get you operational control of the border. SBInet by itself doesn’t get you operational control of the border. It is a combination of the personnel, the infrastructure—for example, fence—and the technology.

So I can’t really answer that question. I can tell you that we have asked the Border Patrol. We have asked the Office of Field Operations. We have asked the Office of Air and Marine where they would like us to put priority in putting this equipment. Then it will be up to them to apply the equipment with the other elements, the other three pillars of the stool, to determine how far they can get with operational control.

I don’t know—perhaps Chief Fisher might be better postured.

Mr. Fisher. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think, you know, a point worth making is the fact that not a piece of tower or one technology solution, not 10 or 15 Border Patrol agents in a particular zone, nor an access road or primary fence or secondary fence in and of themselves is going to, in our tactical operational definition, achieve operational control.

So in areas where we do have effective operational control, which means our field commanders over a period of time have deployed or redeployed resources, took out a lot of factors to make a determination that those sections of the border were either at what we called the controlled or managed level. They have made an assessment, more so on the conditions as opposed to attributing specifically whether it was the Border Patrol agents or whether it was the fence or whether it was the technology that caused that area to be under effective control.

Mr. Thompson. Well, let me ask it another way. Did you ask the Border Patrol, Mr. Borkowski, “What do you need to do your job?”, or did you say, “We have $50 million, go spend it”?

Mr. Borkowski. We have done both. In fact, we have completely restructured the way we design what we do for technology, what we need. So we have done both.

As part of that process, the $50 million is in fact kind of the highest priority, most obvious kind of opportunities.

Obviously, as we make future investments—and, for example, the Secretary has frozen the other SBInet so that it is available, if appropriate, to divert to other technologies—as we make other investments and as those dollars become increasingly significant, we will want to do more detailed cost-effectiveness analysis.

But right now, yes, we have gone to the Border Patrol and ask that question.

Mr. Thompson. Yes. What I guess I am trying to figure out is, now that we are spending $50 million because of shortcomings with
SBInet, are you saying we just get a better operational control of certain areas? Is that 10 miles? Is that 20 miles? Is it 50 miles?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Mr. Chairman, I don't have that number handy. We would have to go and work with the Border Patrol on where they want to deploy it.

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, I think you need to get it to us, because we are just throwing up a $50 million figure, and you can't provide the committee any information as to what we get for it other than some redundancy and some other things within existing systems, and that is fine.

Mr. Krone, there is some question about Boeing's utilization of small service-connected disabled veterans within the different tracks. Can you provide the committee with the current statistical data within a week?

Mr. KRONE. Yes, sir, we would be happy to provide the committee with the information. Let me just give you a couple summary numbers today.

As you know, we have a small-business goal on the program of 40 percent content. Right now on the program when you include the steel and the fence construction, we are at 33, about 34 percent small business.

We were actually over our goal before we signed up to manage the steel supply chain as part of the construction of the physical fence. If we removed the purchase of the steel from our numbers, we would actually exceed the goal of 40 percent. We would be at 48 percent.

But we have the details, and we would be pleased to provide them to your office.

Mr. THOMPSON. If you will not only provide the percentages, but the name of the companies, so we can make sure they do fit the criteria——

Mr. KRONE. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMPSON [continuing]. Of small and service connected——

Mr. KRONE. We would be pleased to do that.

Mr. THOMPSON [continuing]. And other things.

Mr. Borkowski, at what point can we receive copies of the requested assessment that the Secretary indicated was under way?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. I will have to check with the Department because that is actually in the control of the Secretary's office. But we will ask the Department to answer that question.

Mr. THOMPSON. Well, we were told it would take 5 weeks. I think we are in week 6 or 7 right now. So if you can provide that, we are anxiously awaiting the results of the assessment that the Secretary indicated would be forthcoming.

I beg the indulgence.

Mr. Hite, the question of testing came into some of the testimony now. When you test the systems and found the thing, who was present? What staff was involved? Who was around?

Mr. HITE. We did not actually test the system. We——

Mr. THOMPSON. Who provided the information?

Mr. HITE. The Department of Homeland Security, the SBInet program office provided us the information.

Mr. THOMPSON. So you were provided information indicating that tests had failed. Am I correct?
Mr. HITE. We were provided the information surrounding the plans that were prepared for testing. The actual test cases, we could analyze them to see how complete they were. We were provided the results of testing. We actually went through the test cases, went through the results.

So we didn't actually conduct the tests ourselves, we analyzed what was done.

Mr. THOMPSON. In your estimation, that was incomplete?

Mr. HITE. Yes, sir. For tests to be well-planned, they needed to have certain characteristics, contain certain information, and that information was missing.

So that made it, in our view, not adequate, and there were consequences associated with those omissions.

Mr. THOMPSON. Last question, Mr. Chair.

Mr. BORKOWSKI, what was the official position of the Department on this GAO review?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. The GAO, the Department largely concurred. We took some exception, a partial exception to a discussion about a particular kind of document, called a test and evaluation master plan, which is one of the many types of documents. But in general we concurred with the GAO report.

Mr. THOMPSON. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

At this time I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for 5 minutes.

Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The recent killings in Juarez of U.S. Consulate officials I think demonstrate the dire situation down at the U.S.-Mexico border, across from El Paso, my home State of Texas.

Last year in Mexico over 6,000 people were murdered at the hands of the drug cartels, many in very horrific execution-style slayings.

There is a war going on, and the president of Mexico calls that—calls it a war, because it is. We can't afford to delay and delay and wait. We met with Secretary Napolitano this morning, and she said, “You know, I want to take a time-out and review this situation and assess SBInet.” That is fine, I respect her opinion on that.

But we can't afford any more time-outs. I mean, 2008, then 2013. Then we were told that the earliest this could be completed would be 2016.

Meanwhile, there is a war going on. There are people being killed. It is going to spill over into this country. It is a threat—security threat—not only to Mexico, but a National security threat to the United States. People in our State see it up close and personal.

I have the video clip I want to show. There is an operation going on at SBInet Block 1 in the Tucson sector that began on February 6 where about four dozen Border Patrol agents, even though it is being tested, are making it operational, even though it hasn't had final approval.

Chief Fisher, I would like for you to go ahead, if you may, and narrate what we are seeing on this video.

Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir, I would be happy to.

This happened last month in the Tucson area of responsibility. What you are seeing here in the middle of the screen are six back-
packers coming in from Mexico. They were detected and are being tracked now. You can see carrying marijuana, what turned out to be almost 200 pounds of marijuana.

Now, as the screen switches and you see the white hot, you see in the upper corner, you will see a Border Patrol agent lying in wait. His partner is up ahead of the group, waiting to do the interdiction.

What is also happening, as you can see as it pans out, is the Border Patrol agent that is operating the system at the command and control is taking a look at their surrounding area to provide security for those two Border Patrol agents who are about to do the interdiction. At the same time, command and control will be calling out to other Border Patrol agents to start moving into the area to provide cover.

Now, the other thing of note I would like you to see is when the interdiction is made and the Border Patrol agent in front starts challenging the group, identifies himself or herself as a Border Patrol agent, the group starts to run, except for the person that is first in line with the dopers.

What happens a lot of times is this person is the guide, person who knows where they are going. In some cases in this particular area that person may be armed.

What is happening here is we have a better sense of situational awareness, we have a better sense of identifying the particular threat. That information would be relayed to the Border Patrol agents prior to that interdiction being made.

Mr. McCaul. Well, I want to thank CBP for sharing this video with us, with the committee, with myself. I viewed this video a couple days ago and it seems to be working pretty effectively. I know that there is even more technology where they can put a laser on the dopers crossing to better guide the Border Patrol agents to where they are.

Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCaul. So it works.

Mr. Borkowski, why is this going to take so much longer to finally get approved and get ready? Because, you know, our State, home State of Texas has zero, we have nothing on our border. The Texas-Mexico border has nothing down there. That is where a lot of the killings are taking place.

Mr. Borkowski. Yes, it does work, but what you see there is a system which has some patches. We are finalizing—we want the final version of the software, for example. So you have got beta versions of software, for example.

It has to go through something called certification and accreditation. So, for example, on your home computer, occasionally, you know, Windows sends you a note says there is a security patch you need to download. Because we were working on the software we didn’t download any of those. We have held them all in abeyance. We have got to get those in. That takes some time.

Some of the issue is making sure we do have a good test plan for the final measurement because we are going to use that to make a decision about spending potentially a lot of money on more of these.
So it is important, I think, that we do this right (a), and that at the end of the day this looks very, very promising, but we make sure we have really tested it, much in line with what Mr. Hite has said.

Mr. McCaul. I can appreciate that.

What is your time frame—because we saw a successful apprehension—what is your time frame for getting this approved?

Mr. Borkowski. As we said, the plan that we have right now is to get all of this—these clean-up activities done. The system acceptance test should run basically through August and we should be ready to turn it over to the Border Patrol for their operational tests. They get a chance to say, notwithstanding the engineering, they like it, they don't like it, very formally. So that should happen in September.

Mr. Borkowski. We are building Ajo, and one of the reasons we are building Ajo is to start to demonstrate, if we decided we want more, how quickly they can go up and what they will actually cost.

So Ajo is very important. I think, to your consideration, Congressman, because that will give us evidence of whether or not it can go up quickly, how long it would take, where it would make sense.

Mr. McCaul. If all goes well and it is approved in short order, how soon can be—because 2016 is a very long time out in the future. As I mentioned earlier, I don't think we have time. We are running out of time here. What can we do to expedite this?

Mr. Borkowski. Again, I think the thing to do to expedite this is to divert funds immediately to other technologies which are perhaps not quite this effective, but still very effective, to those critical areas based on Border Patrol priorities. We have started that. We have started diverting funds. The Secretary has said this is urgent. There are areas where we need something today and if that means this existing technology, we are going to do that.

If it turns out that SBInet Block 1 should be done more broadly, then we will have to have a discussion with the Congress about the pace and the funding and the budgets required for that, but we are just not there yet. In the mean time, the Secretary has said technology is urgent; divert some funds for some of these other technologies to plug those holes.

Mr. McCaul. Well, this issue has been largely ignored, in my view, by the Congress. I think we need to prioritize this issue. There is nothing more important, I think, to a lot of my constituents.

Last question, the Chairman mentioned the UAVs. I have been a big proponent of that. I had an amendment on the floor that was unfortunately defeated, to provide more UAVs down there. There are some. I think it has been very successful in terms of surveillance. The Governor from the State of Texas has requested additional UAVs to add more resources down to the border.

Would anybody on the panel care to comment on that?

Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I am working with the assistant commissioner for CBP's Air and Marine, General Kostelnik, and one of the things we are looking at is trying to expand that capability across the southwest border. We are continuing to work with FAA.
I think it was mentioned earlier that the certificates of authorization in trying to get us airspace to be able to, you know, deploy those UASs beyond our current capability right now. That is going to help our ability to achieve operational control even beyond some of those areas where we can fly those UASs. We are looking at that, sir.

Mr. McCaul. The Secretary didn’t mention the airspace issue. Is there anything that I can do to help you? I am here to help, so thank you very much.

I yield back.

Mr. Cuellar. I want to thank the gentleman from Texas.

Let me just add one point. I did meet with CBP Air and Marine on the UAVs, and they said they were waiting for FAA to give them the CAOs for the State of Texas based there in Corpus Christi and to cover Corpus—and all the way up. So I called the FAA administrator, Mr. Babbitt, and he told me he has not officially gotten the request from CBP.

I know there has been communication and maybe they have a different opinion what a official request is, but I would ask you all to contact Mr. Babbitt because I was trying to help you all to move this along, because I know we can't fly if we don’t get those COAs. But I just want to let you know what Mr. Babbitt officially told me was that he has not received the official request from CBP to get that UAV.

So whatever that means, I would appreciate an answer as soon as you can.

At this, I would like to——

Mr. McCaul. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cuellar. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCaul. If I might for one moment.

Just to continue briefly on this vein of UAV use. We know that a Predator A with a full sensor sweep, very robust sensor sweep, day-night, you know—is about $8 million a copy, something like that. You know, you could buy several of those for the money that Secretary Napolitano set aside and still have money left for other things.

So, you know, as a proponent of this particular system, I think, you know, you really ought to consider it. But in any event, I yield. Thank you.

Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much.

At this time, I want to thank again the gentleman from Texas.

But at this time, I would like to recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell, for 5 minutes.

Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The aerial border operation that we had working in 2006, 2007, it was discontinued to address what the gentleman from Texas was talking about. Has that been continued? Mr. Borkowski.

Mr. Borkowski. I am not familiar with that. I am sorry, Congressman.

Chief, are you aware of——

Mr. Pascrell. Acting Director Fisher.

Mr. Fisher. I am sorry, sir. Could you repeat that, please?

Mr. Pascrell. Yes, we had an aerial operation which was very effective, and both governments said it was very effective—Mexico
and the United States. I want to know whether we have decided to renew that capability again or have we not?
Mr. FISHER. I am not specifically sure which operation you are referencing, but I will find out and let you know, sir.
Mr. PASCRELL. Which brings me to the question of accountability. I listened very carefully. In fact, I read your testimony, Mr. Hite. The GAO found a lot of inadequacies in terms of not only the testing, but the management. I mean, somebody is in charge from Homeland Security to review whether the testing is proper and going on.
I think, and any time I ask questions about Homeland Security, I want to know who is accountable, because we know what happens. The bigger the bureaucracy, the less ability you have in any manner, shape, or form, to find out who is accountable. Who is accountable, Mr. Borkowski?
Mr. BORKOWSKI. Ultimately, I am. I am accountable.
Mr. PASCRELL. Well, during this period of testing, you had a management team, did you not?
Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes, I did.
Mr. PASCRELL. Who was the management? I don’t want to know names, but you appointed them? How did they get their jobs? I mean, we have a serious charge of 70 percent of the testing was doctored. That is pretty serious.
Mr. BORKOWSKI. Congressman, 70 percent of the testing was not doctored.
Mr. PASCRELL. Well, let’s use another word—changed.
Mr. BORKOWSKI. Right.
Mr. PASCRELL. At the last moment. How is that? How does that term suit you?
Mr. BORKOWSKI. That is true. That is fine.
Mr. PASCRELL. Okay. Go ahead, tell me.
Mr. BORKOWSKI. A certain amount of that typically goes on, but I agree with Mr. Hite—70 percent is too much. I would also point out that——
Mr. PASCRELL. But you don’t disagree with the figure, the percentage?
Mr. BORKOWSKI. No.
Mr. PASCRELL. Okay. Okay.
Mr. BORKOWSKI. I would point out that a good deal of that is what my team caught and is what my team has been dealing with.
Mr. PASCRELL. Okay, then, who was held accountable for that? What did you do to the contractor? What did you do to the folks who perhaps let it slip by?
Mr. BORKOWSKI. The folks that I have who, by the way, have worked very hard, Mr. Pascrell, and I do need to defend them. The folks that I have have tried very hard to handle this program, and I do not believe that they felt they had the support from the people at my level. I believe they feel that now and we are improving this.
Mr. PASCRELL. Every problem we address, whether it is this subcommittee or the other subcommittees, we really never get to the fundamental problems of who pushed Jake. We say that the problem is too complex. The operation is too complex. We are still out there testing, but no one is ever held accountable. We are talking about people’s lives here.
The fact that we have tried to implement a very intricate technical system is in direct contrast to what we are doing on the northern border, which is twice as big, whether it is Detroit—regardless of where it is. In fact, in the northern border, the construction of cameras, let’s say in the Buffalo region, is complete. They are much more simplistic. They don’t include radar capabilities. Why not?

Mr. Borkowski. Because the idea on the—and again, talking with the northern border, and we also were using the money that had been earmarked by this Congress. We looked at the best use of that money. What they needed was some of the systems that are currently available on the southwest border, but had not been on the northern border. That is their down payment, frankly, and it is a reasonable down payment, and it is one that the operators there thought would be very effective.

Mr. Pascrell. Do you know what percentage of the northern border is unprotected?

Mr. Borkowski. Perhaps the chief can talk to that. I would not.

Mr. Fisher. Sir, just for clarification, I am not quite sure when you say “unprotected.” We have deployment of—agents. We have a little bit of infrastructure, not much, and some technology that Mr. Borkowski talked about. Some areas, in the Buffalo area and Detroit as well, having additional——

Mr. Pascrell. You have very little infrastructure in the north, and when you look at the number of patrols that you have patrol—border patrolmen that you have along the border, do you know the small percentage that exist per mile in that area?

Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir. I do.

Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Fisher, I know you recently took over as the head of the Border Patrol.

Mr. Fisher. In acting capacity——

Mr. Pascrell. Yes, I wish you well.

Mr. Fisher. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Pascrell. I know you have considerable experience in the field, especially along the southwest border. Considering that experience, I want to ask you, and I want you to give me a straight answer, as you usually do, what you feel is the most effective way to secure the border. To be clear, are we creating an over-reliance on technology instead of hiring more border agents, more physical barriers, et cetera, and using more traditional methods to patrol the border?

Finally, isn’t this especially true since the technology we have spent so much money on and will continue to spend money on doesn’t seem to be ready for prime time? I think that is a fair question.

Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir. I would agree. I think generally my response to that would be our ability to achieve operational control and protect the American people is always fundamentally, again in my opinion, going to come down to the brave men and women that put on this uniform every day and recognize that this threat, at least in my lifetime, is not going to go away.

Now, to the extent that we can get additional technology, and a lot of different ways, shapes, or forms—I mean, one of the things that we look at when we talk about the implementation of the
strategy, and it is not necessarily so simplistic. I am not suggesting that anybody on this particular committee. You understand the challenges that we face in an air and marine and land threat environment.

When you take into consideration the environments in which we have worked, in the urban, the rural, the remote areas, and the fact that the northern border is different from the southern border, and the fact that, yes, over the last few years we are looking at a workforce now that over 45 percent has less than 2.5 years experience, we get that.

I can tell you, sir, with certainty, what I can guarantee you, that each and every day when I put on this uniform and I talk with those men and women, is we are going to commit to achieving this objective.

If it means there is going to be an SBI tower in a particular area, perhaps in south Texas, if that is what the field commanders are telling me that is what they need to be able to increase probability of detection and apprehension, we are going to do that, sir. If it also means that we are going to increase our ability to respond—I apologize, I am new at this, sir—we are going to continue to do that as well.

But I will also tell you that the implementation of the strategy, how we do this, is always going to come down to the training, the recruiting and Border Patrol agents, both men and women, who fundamentally understand this threat and are committed.

When they take that oath of office, and when they say that they are going to swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic, there is no technology that can guarantee that, sir. That is something that I am charged with, to maintain that this culture that we are developing will continue to develop in the Border Patrol is—continues to be impressed upon the organization.

Yes, the technology is going to help us do that, sir, and it may be a tower, it may be a—surveillance system, may be some additional UASes down the road. But fundamentally it is that one Border Patrol agent who this afternoon is going to go out there and may not have the technology right now, but understands that it is not going to happen on their watch.

So thank you, sir, for that question. I hope that answered it.

Mr. PASCRELL. Thank you, Acting Chief Fisher. I hope you become the chief.

Mr. FISHER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. CUellar. Want to thank the gentleman from New Jersey for his line of questioning.

At this time I would like to recognize the gentlewoman from Ohio, Ms. Kilroy.

Ms. Kilroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to the panelists for your time here this morning.

Mr. Borkowski, I would like to ask, you indicated that the next steps would be completing the engineering and to taking a look at what tools are proven and effective. I would like to understand, can you tell us what you are doing to strengthen the capacity for systems engineering at the program office level?
Mr. BORKOWSKI. Certainly. I thank you for the question because that is very critical to how we got here in the first place.

We have actually within the Secure Border Initiative itself reorganized the office in recognition of the fact that there are some critical capabilities that a Government program office has to have in order to effectively manage a contractor.

One of those things is to build an office that is focused on developing a Government competency for system engineering that can be applied not only to this program, but to other technology programs as they evolve.

In addition to that, the Department itself has put a great deal of focus on this. The Department, in its chief procurement officer, its Acquisition Program Management Division, has also established a function to develop a core competency in system engineering.

That is a critical function, and it is often—the lack of that function is often the cause of the kinds of problems we have seen in the last several years on this program.

So we are building that. It will take some time. We have to hire people. We have to train people. But we recognize the significance of it.

Ms. KILROY. So we had that core competency in place, could we have avoided some of the issues like the last minute changes in the testing procedures?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Absolutely. Much of the kinds of things that Mr. Hite is telling you about are tied to a failure to have established a core competency in things like systems engineering, yes.

Ms. KILROY. Mr. Hite, what do you see that we need to do to go forward to improve systems, to address maybe a lack of rigor or lack of cooperation or lack of competency? Or are there other issues that you see that would be able to improve these processes for SBInet or others that we are engaged in?

Mr. HITE. Yes, ma’am. What you see that has transpired with this program over the years in many ways is a microcosm of the Department. I would say that the Department has been challenged since its inception in being able to manage large-scale acquisitions like SBInet.

There is a number of factors that have contributed to that. Just like in performing any type of operation, you accomplish things, so you effectively manage a program like this by bringing to bear three things. You bring people with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute these critical functions. You define them in a way that is clear and transparent and so that they can be consistently applied. Then you provide them with the tools they need in order to execute these functions.

In the case of SBInet in particular, from the outset I think this program was underestimated in terms of its size and complexity. I think it was driven by the need to meet a pre-defined schedule as opposed to what is it going to take to put this kind of system in place. For the sake of schedule, you were willing to bypass some of the discipline that comes with defined processes executed by adequately staffed and knowledgeable people.

I see that changing now. I have the utmost respect for Mr. Borkowski. He is a very competent individual. He came into a situation where you had a train moving down a track and you needed
to change it while it was moving. You just can't stop—you just couldn't stop it and say, "Let me build the capacity to do this thing right while this train is moving, I have got to do these things simultaneously." That is not an easy thing to do, it is not going to happen overnight. Progress is being made in that direction.

Ms. Kilroy. Thank you. I appreciate the need for competency in all of these areas, starting from writing the specs for the contracts and writing the contracts themselves, all the way—all the way through to managing the projects, holding vendors accountable.

But I would also say that there is responsibilities on the part of the vendor as well to live up to things and to bring problems to attention in a timely manner.

So, Mr. Krone, is this, the experiences that you are having with this particular contract, is that in any way different or atypical from other Federal contracts that Boeing has acquired?

Mr. Krone. Thank you for that question. We have been involved in the SBInet program, ma'am, as you know, for 4 or 5 years. There are clearly different types of contracts under what we call the IDIQ umbrella. So there were fixed-price elements of this and there are cost-plus and cost-plus incentive—award fee.

Boeing has executed development programs under all those types of contract structure, and just as we have across our portfolio of programs, delivered some on cost and on schedule, some early, and some late. If we look at the task orders under the IDIQ umbrella, under SBInet, you would find that there are parts of the program that we delivered on cost and on schedule, in fact some ahead of schedule; there are some that we have delivered on time; but we are here today because on the Arizona deployment task order we are over cost and behind schedule, and we regret that.

But if you look at the totality of the SBInet program, from P28, northern border, to the fence fabrication, the steel, we have a fence lab that we constructed, I think overall the Government has gotten good value for their money.

Ms. Kilroy. What steps would you recommend to prevent more delays in the future?

Mr. Krone. I think most of recommendations that we might have, have already been implemented, and I would like to second Mr. Hite's comment about the addition of Mark Borkowski to the SBInet team.

Since Mark has taken over as program manager of the SBInet program, frankly, ma'am, everything has been working much, much better. We have done more system engineering, we have slowed down when we have needed to. We have had the latitude of doing appropriate analysis ahead of moving systems in the field.

We feel as good about this program as we have in the last 4 years and really looking forward to SAT, the systems acceptance testing, and turning the system over in OT&E in both Tucson and Ajo.

Ms. Kilroy. One last question, directed to Chief Fisher or to Mr. Borkowski.

As Custom and Border Patrol officers have begun using the Block 1 technology, are you seeing an increase in effectiveness? Are they preventing or deterring more illegal crossings, covering more territory out of one station?
Mr. Fisher. Although it hasn’t been going on too long, what we are seeing is, it is increasing our capacity in a variety of ways.

One, it is helping us understand what is actually occurring on the ground there. Two, I think it is teaching the Border Patrol agents who are at the command-and-control station how to think a little bit differently about approaching this particular threat.

So early indications are it is helping us achieve our overarching objective, and it is teaching the Border Patrol agents—who, by the way, aren’t just going to stay their whole career looking at the cameras at the command-and-control, they are going to go back down into the field to have to work these groups, and it is going to give them a better perspective when they do that.

So it is helping, yes, ma’am.

Mr. Borkowski. Again, I think Chief Fisher is authoritative on it. I think it is just interesting to pass on some of the feedback that we have gotten, which is one of the things that this system provides—and, again, it is very costly—but one of the things that this system provides that nothing else we have seen or have done is the ability for an agent to observe the entire area and everything that is going on in that area at the same time.

Other systems are kind-of localized, so an agent here will know this is going on and an agent there will know that is going on. But to be able to see four or five or six groups all at the same time and to be able to deploy resources to deal with each of those, and in fact to see the kinds of things that at least the agents have told us about where a group perhaps of drug smugglers will lay up and wait for another group to move so that the Border Patrol will divert to that group and then these drug smugglers can come in behind, now the Border Patrol sees all of that and can stop that.

Now, we still need time to see how that evolves. As Chief Fisher properly notes, it is very, very early. But that opportunity to see the whole area at once in one place and to be able to allocate resources to deal with four or five groups at a time from a central location looks like it could be very significant.

Ms. Kilroy. Thank you all.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. Cuellar. Thank you. I thank the gentlewoman from Ohio for her lines of questioning.

A couple of things, and we will go down one more round quickly, but I just have a couple of questions.

Mr. Fisher, back on February 16 of this year I sent the acting deputy commissioner, Mr. Aguilar—the letter was asking him about the UAVs. What are the plans for the northern border coverage? I know there is some in parts of it and I know there is parts in the southwest also. What is planned for for the northern border, for the southern border, or the time table, including the coastal area where the Coast Guard, along with the Air and Marine are working together on some of the testing.

I would like to have a request, and I know you have got your Congressional folks here, but will you remind Mr. Aguilar that it has been 30 days plus 2 days, and that I will ask that—and I will ask—work with the committee that 5 working days from today that I expect to see that letter. I think that is more than sufficient time so he can give us an idea of what his plans are on that, No. 1.
No. 2, we also have a testing coming up I believe in April—I believe in April for the DIA. I talked to Boeing, talked to Mr. Borkowski also and so did Mr. Fisher. They are doing a testing. As you know, DIA, they do use taxpayers’ dollars and they have done a lot of research and development also. They have used a lot of this equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan, and if it is tested and it works for the military, I have no idea what we can use some of that equipment. Because I assume we are not going to use one patch for the whole border. I think we are going to use different areas.

So I want to ask you, and Mr. Borkowski I know we have talked about this and we talked about it again yesterday, is, one, for you all to sit down with the DIA and see what ideas. You know, it might be that maybe the equipment is not sufficient, but at least let’s sit down with them. I certainly want to invite you and the committee Members to Laredo, and the committee will give us the exact date for that testing. They are doing that testing there. They have done it in the south. They have gone to the north. So I certainly want to invite all the witnesses to join us at that time.

I have no further questions. At this time, I will recognize Mr. McCaul, the gentleman from Texas, for his lines of questions.

Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me echo your sentiments. The Department of Defense is testing this type of capability. Certainly, with the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, we have some serious—I mean that is a serious border issue as well. There is no reason why you couldn’t apply the same technology they are advancing there on our—on our U.S.-Mexico border.

I know the Chairman I think is planning a CODEL I think down to look at this facility in Texas, and I hope to join you on that.

When I was down in El Paso, and chief, you do have some great men and women working for you. I was down there in El Paso last time when they were killing police officers in Juarez. I said, “What do you perceive to be the biggest threat still?” He said, “It is the terrorist threat. It is the human trafficking. It is the terrorist threat.”

This situation actually kind of reminds me a lot of where we were in the Iraq war where there was loss of confidence on the part of Congress in the operation. Then we had Secretary Gates and General Petraeus came in and they restored confidence on the part of the Congress and on the mission itself.

I am hopeful that Mr. Borkowski and Chief Fisher, you all are going to be able to play that role here, to restore faith in the Congress that this can be done. But like Gates and Petraeus, they came forward and basically were very honest with us. They weren’t trying to spin anything. They got the confidence of the Congress by being sincere and honest and admitting where we made mistakes.

But they also came up with a game plan—you know, a surge, the Sunni awakening, the de-Baathification. You know, a lot of things that at the end of the day worked—counterinsurgency plans. I see a lot of analogies in what happened there to this. I think what we are really asking for is for you all to come up with a game plan. You know, be honest with us. Come up with some metrics that actually are realistic, some quantifiable numbers, so that we can be assured, you know, that we are back on track here.
You know, tell us that you know what, here are the problems, but we are looking at adding in terms of the virtual fence, if you will, you know, 200 miles a year or whatever it is. But you know, this is—it is so unquantifiable right now, it is hard to get a handle on where we are.

I think as representatives of the American people, I really think that is where the American people are with this. They just want to know, you know, when is this going to get done. Be honest with us and realistic in your assessment. Then I think you are going to find if you do that, like in Iraq and that situation, you are going to have a lot more support on the part of the Congress.

I think Mr. Borkowski and Chief Fisher, you have a unique opportunity coming in sort of as a fresh face to this to turn this thing around and put it in the right direction. I don't know if there are any comments to that. If there are, I would be happy to hear that.

Mr. Fisher. Sir, you have my commitment that I will always be forthright with this committee and all committees, and I will do my level best to make sure that our border security mission, that we achieve those objectives and we are able to articulate the extent to which we are able to do that during my command. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Borkowski. I would just add, I think you make a very good point, sir. I think we are getting to the point where we better understand where we are, but I think what is missing is the: "What is the game plan forward?". I believe that is a large part of the Secretary's intent in going through this assessment is to require us to present a game plan forward.

Mr. McCaul. Because you have, you know, you have good technology here. I know Boeing has been working hard on this. I know you all have as well. But I know the Secretary has taken a deep breath and is looking at all this. But I would, you know, that is just my advice to you.

With that, I yield back.

Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. Again, I agree and I certainly want to echo the statement by my friend from the State of Texas. I think following up on that point, I think the fact that the Secretary sat back and is looking at the big picture, I think that is good for all of us, and certainly we want to be team players with you on this endeavor.

I understand it is a very difficult situation. I know technology is only a component. You know, the men and women that are out there, I know a lot of them. They live in my neighborhood there in Laredo and I am sure we have got them all over the southern-northern border. We appreciate the work.

Technology is one part of it. It is one component, but it is an important component to this.

So I want to thank all of you. I know this is a very difficult situation, but it is one that we have to win. We just have to win this one.

So I want to thank all the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. Members may have additional questions for the witnesses and we will ask you to respond to those questions in writing as soon as possible.
Hearing no further business, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.]
SBINET: DOES IT PASS THE BORDER SECURITY TEST? PART II

Thursday, June 17, 2010

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND
OVERSIGHT,
JOINT WITH
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER, MARITIME, AND GLOBAL
COUNTERTERRORISM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Christopher P. Carney [Chairman of the Management, Investigations, and Oversight subcommittee] presiding.

Present from the Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight: Representatives Carney, Green, and Bilirakis.

Present from the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism: Representatives Cuellar, Sanchez, Kirkpatrick, Miller, McCaul, Rogers, and Smith.

Mr. CARNEY [presiding]. The subcommittees will come to order. The Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism are meeting today to receive testimony on “SBInet: Does it Pass the Border Security Test? Part Two.”

Good morning, and I would like to take a second to thank Chairman Cuellar and his subcommittee for continuing to work with my subcommittee on this issue, so thank you, Henry.

Today we are here to receive testimony on the Department of Homeland Security’s efforts to secure the Nation’s borders through the Secure Border Initiative technology or SBI, also known as SBInet.

According to the GAO report released today entitled “Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program,” poorly defined requirements and limitations in the capabilities of commercially available system components have led the Department to downgrade its expectations for SBInet.

The result will be a deployed and operational system that, like Project 28, may not live up to expectations and provide less mission support than was originally envisioned. As Boeing developed the system, it became clear it would not meet the requirements established by the Department.
As opposed to ensuring that the requirements were satisfied, the number of component-level requirements was reduced from 1,286 to 880, or by about 32 percent.

Some examples of requirements that received waivers or deviations include, unattended ground sensors that could not differentiate between human, vehicle, and animal targets. Since they were only able to identify potential vehicles, not humans and animals, this requirement was changed.

The daytime cameras to identify humans were judged to be operationally ineffective over 5 kilometers, while the requirement indicated that the cameras should be effective to 10 kilometers.

The laser range finder was determined to have an effective range of less than 2 kilometers, while the requirement for the effective range was again 10 kilometers.

The geographic locations that will deploy SBInet capabilities have also been reduced. As of September 2008, the initial Block 1 deployment was to span three Border Patrol sectors—Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso—for a total of 655 miles. Deployment to these three areas was the priority of the Border Patrol, due to the high threat levels.

At present, the only areas expected to be covered by SBInet technology on the southwest border are Tucson and Ajo–1. Together, these two deployments cover a mere 53 miles of the 1,989-mile southern border.

The Department has not yet estimated a reliable life-cycle cost of deploying Block 1, in violation of OMB regulations. The cost estimate should include all Government and contractor costs over the program’s full life-cycle, from program inception, through design, development, deployment, operation, and maintenance all the way to retirement.

According to the GAO, the cost estimate calculated by the Department does not include all relevant costs, such as support contractor costs, costs associated with system and software design, development, and all testing activities.

Furthermore, the cost estimate has not been updated to reflect program changes that have occurred since its development.

In response to GAO’s findings, Department officials indicated that the DHS Cost Analysis Division was unable to prepare an accurate cost estimate due to a shortage in the personnel and the tools needed to do so.

It also has indicated that as of July 2009, there were only eight cost estimators, six in headquarters and two in program offices, for the entire Department of Homeland Security.

SBInet has been plagued with a number of technology and systems integration issues, as highlighted by GAO. Over $1.1 billion has been spent on a Secure Border Initiative, and over $800 million has been spent on SBInet alone. Fifty-three miles at a cost of $1.1 billion is unacceptable.

At our last hearing on SBInet in March, I asked if we could get a refund, and I believe the taxpayers would still like one. Now perhaps some good has come from this program, but not nearly enough to justify the funding and the time that has been spent on this program. I urge the Department to continue to explore alter-
native means to secure the border in a timely and effective manner.

I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony. I look forward to hearing from them.

[The statement of Chairman Carney follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CHRISTOPHER P. CARNEY

JUNE 17, 2010

Today we are here to receive testimony on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to secure the Nation’s borders through the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) technology component known as SBInet. According to the GAO report released today entitled “Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program,” poorly defined requirements and limitations in the capabilities of commercially available system components have led the Department to downgra...
Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome the
witnesses. The Committee on Homeland Security and its sub-
committees have held no less than eight hearings on the Secure
Border Initiative and its technology piece, SBInet, since 109th Con-
gress. Unfortunately the news has not gotten better over time.
I am extremely concerned with GAO's conclusion in its most re-
cent SBInet review that DHS has yet to demonstrate that its pro-
posed SBInet solution is cost-effective—is the cost-effective course
of action, and thus whether the considerable time and money being
invested to acquire and deploy it is a wise and prudent use of lim-
ited resources.
As I noted at our last hearing on SBInet in March, it is simply
unacceptable that our borders are not secure. I, along with many
of my colleagues, am anxiously awaiting the results of the Sec-
retary's assessment of SBInet and her strategy for securing the
border going forward.
I am interested in hearing from our witnesses about when we
can anticipate the completion of this assessment. What is the sta-
tus of the plan to redeploy $50 million in Recovery Act funds origi-
nally intended for Block 1 to other commercially available border
security technologies. When? Where and when will this technology
be deployed?
I am also supportive of deploying National Guard troops to the
border, but once again, the requirement has not provided this com-
mittee with the details of its plan. This piecemeal approach and
consistent lack of details makes me question whether the Secretary
has a comprehensive strategy for securing our borders.
I am also troubled by the themes that run through many of the
Department's large-scale procurements. Many of the GAO findings
related to SBInet also apply to other large-scale DHS procure-
ments.
The GAO finding that the Department lacks the basis to deter-
mine whether the proposed SBInet system will work and is cost-
effective is similar to the GAO findings on procurements such as
a transformation and systems consolidation, the Department's fi-
nancial management consolidation effort.
In both procurements, there is an inability to reliably estimate
the overall cost of the projects. Mr. Chairman, we on this—the
management subcommittee, must work to ensure that the Depart-
ment has the resources and staffing it needs to develop the vital
acquisition management capabilities such as cost estimation.
Until we can mature these functions at the headquarters level,
I fear that we will continue to see problems in these large-scale
procurements. With that, I would like to welcome our witnesses,
again. I look forward to your testimony. Securing our borders is es-
sential to homeland security, and we have to get it right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CARNEY. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the Border, Maritime,
and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee, the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Cuellar, for an opening statement.
Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Carney. I appreci-
ate that both of our committees are working together, so I want
to thank you and your Members on that.
Today, the subcommittees come together to continue our examination of the SBInet to discuss the finding of a new report from the Government Accountability Office. Almost 3 months ago, we heard from this same panel of witnesses on the Department’s ongoing efforts to deploy technology at our Nation’s ports.

As you all know, there has been some good spots and there has been some other areas that we need to improve. I know Mr. Borkowski you have been down to the border and I appreciate your effort. Hopefully we will spend some time with the new chief also on that.

But we really appreciate, you know, the good efforts that are being made. But there is still some issues, as we all know, about SBInet. A number of problems the SBInet was growing faster than the numbers being fixed.

There has been some questions as to whether the testing procedures have been modified to help the system pass the test instead of ensuring that the system delivered as promised.

This is not what we envisioned back in 2006 when this got started. At that time, DHS called SBInet a “strategic partnership” that would allow the Department to “exploit the private sector ingenuity and expertise to quickly secure our Nation’s borders.”

Unfortunately, as you know, there has been issues about planning, missed deadlines, technology issues and questions about oversight. Again, we talked about this and we will spend a little bit more time talking about that.

Again, I am one of those that I like to recognize the good parts because there are some improvements. But we still have got to look at some of the efforts.

As you know, I do represent a border district and I have been following SBInet’s development and progress and working with our former Chair Loretta Sanchez. We have been working on the SBInet along with our Chairman on this particular issue.

We, you know, of course we are going to talk about and certainly want to see the responses to the GAO’s findings, you know, that promises made at the start of the program still remain unfulfilled as the expected scope and capabilities of SBInet have continued to shrink over the last few years.

For example, the initial SBInet deployment was supposed to cover 655 miles and three Border Patrol sectors, Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso. However, the initial deployment at now best covers only 387 miles and includes only Tucson and the Yuma sectors.

Over the last 15 months, the number of system requirements has dropped from 1,286 to 880 or 32 percent. Again, those are things that we have to look at. SBInet was created to strengthen the ability to detect, identify, and respond to unauthorized entries, and certainly some of the performance capabilities have been relaxed.

I am one of those I feel that using, in my personal opinion, using a fence is a 14th century solution to a 21st century problem that we have. This is why the right mixture of technology, personnel, the overall procedures that Border Patrol and the other folks use are so important.

But again, you know, these are issues that we need to look at very carefully. One of my concerns is trying to get the border cov-
er as soon as possible. If you look at it, for the last 4 years I think we spent about $1.3 billion.

If you look at the page, you know, if you just work with me on the addition, the covered amounts that we have covered so far cover the—almost 2,000 miles. It will take us roughly to the year 2034—2034.

Then if you multiply $1.3 billion every 4 years and get to 2034, that will give you a large number. I know we can do better and I know we can do this quicker than the year 2034 to secure 2,000 miles of border.

So certainly, Mr. Borkowski and your folks, Mr. Fisher, we appreciate the work and I certainly commend Secretary Napolitano for taking the reviews so we can step back, take a breath, see what works. You know, how do we make this thing work as soon as possible?

So certainly I appreciate all the good work that you all are doing, but we do have some issues that we need to address. I think by working together, by addressing these issues, we will be able to address it.

At this time I want to thank the witnesses for being here. Keep in mind that we are not here to try and catch anybody. We are trying to see how do we make things work so it is not us versus you? It is not us versus you. It is all of us working together to find that security.

[The statement of Hon. Cuellar follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN HENRY CUELLAR

JUNE 17, 2010

Today, the subcommittees have come together to continue our examination of SBInet and discuss the findings of a new report from the Government Accountability Office. Almost 3 months ago, we heard from this same panel of witnesses on the Department’s on-going effort to deploy integrated technology at our Nation’s borders. The testimony was worrisome: The number of problems with SBInet was growing faster than the number being fixed. Testing procedures appeared to have been modified to help the system “pass the test” instead of ensuring the system delivered as promised.

The state of this program is not what was envisioned when it was initiated in 2006. At that time, DHS called SBInet a “strategic partnership” that would allow the Department “to exploit private sector ingenuity and expertise to quickly secure our Nation’s borders.”

Unfortunately, in the years since, SBInet has been plagued by poor planning, missed deadlines, technology issues, and inadequate oversight. I have the privilege of representing a district along the southern border and, as a result, I have been closely following SBInet’s development and progress.

People along the southern border have been eagerly awaiting the additional support promised by SBInet in the face of growing violence. However, as the GAO’s findings indicate, the promises made at the start of the program remain unfulfilled as the expected scope and capabilities of SBInet have continued to shrink over the last few years.

For example, the initial SBInet deployment was supposed to cover 655 miles and three border patrol sectors: Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso. However, the initial deployment will now, at best, cover only 387 miles and include only Tucson and Yuma sectors. Over the last 15 months, the number of system requirements has dropped from 1286 to 880 or 32 percent.

The reductions to SBInet do not end there.

SBInet was created to strengthen the ability to detect, identify, and respond to unauthorized entries. However, its performance capability has been relaxed. Under new thresholds, SBInet performance is acceptable if it identifies a mere 49 percent of items of interest. As even my two daughters know, 49 percent is not even close to a passing grade.

After numerous hearings and GAO reports since the inception of the program, it is my sincere hope that DHS can take the lessons learned and apply them in a meaningful way. After more than 4 years and approximately $1.3 billion, we need to get on the same page about what a technology solution at the border looks like.

I am curious to learn more about the status of the Department’s on-going assessment of SBInet and what it means for the future of the program. I commend Secretary Napolitano for undertaking this review.

Most importantly, I want to hear a commitment to doing more to secure our borders sooner rather than later, whether through additional personnel or proven technologies. Border communities, like those I represent, have waited long enough.

Mr. CUELLAR. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism Subcommittee, the gentlewoman from Michigan, for an opening statement. Mrs. Miller.

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you both holding this joint hearing today; interested listening to the comments about SBInet and the experience that our Nation has had on the southern border.

I would like to make a couple of comments about our experience with SBInet on the northern border. We have a modified version of SBInet, mainly involving camera towers and mobile surveillance equipment that has been deployed in two primary locations, both in Buffalo and Detroit.

In the Detroit sector, which actually runs through my Congressional district, so I am very familiar with it, we have 10 of the 11 towers that have been proposed already installed. They cover approximately 37 miles along the St. Clair River, which is an international river between Michigan and Canada.

If you think of the map of Michigan, St. Clair River is running sort of along from the tip of the thumb here—oh, excuse me, not quite the tip of the thumb, but right from about this knuckle down the St. Clair River there.

According to the reports from the Detroit sector chief, who has worked very, very diligently I might say, on the roll-out and the community outreach related to this initiative, and I would like to recognize Mr. Borkowski who was there when we had our community roll-out which went very, very well.

The towers and the cameras have been installed. They are operating with minor delays, and the CBP actually accepted the program, the system in April of this year. In fact, the “Detroit News” is going to be writing a very large article about SBInet on the northern border this weekend.

I think it is important that the current review of SBInet under way in the Department also includes a review of what is happening on the northern border sites. I think about how we might expand these programs.

Operational control of the border must be a top and urgent priority, and I understand what is happening on the southern border. I understand the problems there. Believe me, I am sensitive to them.

I still think it is important to point out there is a lot we don’t know about illegal activity happening on the northern border be-
cause we lack sufficient Border Patrol resources and technology. In fact, there are only 32 miles considered to be under effective control on the northern border, which is a 4,000-mile long border.

I think when we have our first big “get,” if we could call it that, with the SBInet on the northern border, I think people’s eyes will pop out when they see what is coming across the northern border as well.

I think one of the things that concerns me is the sort of matter-of-fact way that canceling the SBInet is being discussed. We have invested nearly $1 billion in this technology, and so we don't want to let it go to waste.

I think as the Department moves ahead either with SBInet or another system, I think we obviously all have to think about, as has already been mentioned, we need to be good stewards of the taxpayer money and make use of the investments that we have made in SBInet thus far.

I am also a bit concerned by the Department’s backtracking on the end goal of providing essential detection and identification capability for the Border Patrol.

I would say one of the things that concerns me most about the efforts to secure the border is the lack of a cohesive or a coherent plan from the Department on how to move forward. We find that nearly every month either the Department or particularly the White House announces a new initiative or assessment. But then we don’t see any results or progress.

I would just mention in January, Secretary Napolitano announced the review of SBInet plus an assessment of alternatives to see what other technology could be used on the border. That has been 6 months, and I don’t think we are any closer to knowing how we are going to proceed. Hopefully today’s hearing will shed a bit of light on that.

As has also been mentioned, last month the Obama administration took the first step in acknowledging that we need more to be done on the southwest border and by requesting $500 million in emergency spending up to 1,200 additional National Guard troops, I think everybody welcomed this change.

But again, it has been 23 days since that announcement has been made. Incredibly no additional information has been provided on how the money would be spent, how many additional Border Patrol agents could be added, when and how the National Guard will operate.

It seems as though the administration perhaps made this announcement in a vacuum without even—I know the DHS can't comment on this, but it seems as though they were not consulted on this prior to the announcement.

I would just close by mentioning one other issue that has been in the news this week. That is that this week ICE announced significant changes for illegal aliens in their detention standards. This may not be the place to talk about that, but I will mention this because it had a lot of interest around the Nation.

Apparently moving forward a number of the facilities will now be offering bingo and dance classes, 12-hour visitation rights and a snack bar. I raise that because I think this shows a disconnect between the priorities of this administration and of the majority of
the American people about the will that we have as a Nation for securing our borders.

I think we certainly need to see a sense of urgency from the administration to develop a very clear strategy for gaining control of the border.

With that I would yield back my time. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mrs. Miller.

Other Members of the subcommittees are reminded that under committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the record.

[The statement of Chairman Thompson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JUNE 17, 2010

In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security announced its plan to install technology along the southwest border that would serve as a virtual fence and provide Border Patrol with the information it needs to secure the border.

Four years and $1 billion later, we are still without the plan that was originally envisioned.

To make matters worse, this was not our first opportunity to get this right. Two former border technology programs—the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS) and the American Shield Initiative (ASI)—were eliminated due to mismanagement and equipment failure.

The third time, as they say, was supposed to be a charm.

This committee's oversight, along with the report that GAO will release at today's hearing, indicates otherwise.

Regrettably, the partnership between DHS and Boeing has produced more missed deadlines and excuses than results.

When Boeing was awarded the SBInet contract in 2006, we were told that SBInet technology would be deployed along 655 miles of the southwest border in Tucson, El Paso, and Yuma by the end of 2008, to help the Border Patrol gain operational control of the southwest border.

Four years later, and 2 years beyond the original deadline, SBInet technology is only being deployed along 23 miles in what is called Tucson–1 and 30 miles along what is referred to as Ajo–1 totaling a mere 53 miles; which is a far cry from 655. According to my calculations, that equals nearly $20 million per mile.

Furthermore, the capability of what is being deployed along those 53 miles is far less than what was originally expected.

The original plan was to approve equipment that met a threshold of 95 percent for detecting and identifying items of interest that crossed the border.

When it was determined that the system in place would not meet that standard, instead of attempting to improve what we had, Boeing and the Department lowered the standard to 70 percent.

As a result, I have little to no confidence in the usability of this system, despite its exorbitant cost.

I am convinced that DHS and Boeing grossly underestimated the task of standing up SBInet.

I am pleased that the Secretary is conducting an evaluation of SBInet's future, including Boeing's performance under its contractual obligations.

I would urge the Department to continue to look to the innovation of this great country for border security technology, as opposed to continuing to use taxpayer dollars on a system that does not live up to our expectations.

Mr. Carney. I would like to welcome our panel of witnesses today. Our first witness is Mr. Randolph Hite. He is director of information technology architecture and systems issues at GAO, where he is responsible for GAO's work on IT issues across the Government concerning architecture and systems acquisition, development, operations, and maintenance.
During his 30-year career with GAO, Mr. Hite has directed reviews of major Federal IT investments, including DHS' border security modernization programs.

Our second witness is Mr. Mark Borkowski. Mr. Borkowski was named executive director of the Secure Border Initiative Program Executive Office in October 2008. Mr. Borkowski oversees SBI implementation at Customs and Border Protection.

Previously, Mr. Borkowski served as the executive director for mission support at Border Patrol headquarters. Before joining CBP, Mr. Borkowski was a program executive for the robotic lunar exploration program at NASA headquarters.

Our third witness, Chief Michael J. Fisher, was named chief of the Border Patrol on May 7, 2010. In that role, Chief Fisher serves as the Nation’s highest-ranking Border Patrol agent and directs the enforcement efforts of more than 20,000 Border Patrol agents responsible for patrolling our Nation’s borders between the official ports of entry.

From January 3, 2010 until his May appointment, Chief Fisher served as the acting chief. Prior to that appointment he served as chief of Border Patrol’s San Diego sector. Chief Fisher started his duty along the southwest border in 1987 in Douglas, Arizona.

After completion of the selection process for the Border Patrol Tactical Unit in 1990, he was selected as a field operations supervisor for the tactical unit assigned to El Paso. Chief Fisher has also served in Detroit and Tucson at the Border Patrol headquarters.

Our fourth witness, Mr. Roger Krone, is president of Network and Space Systems for the Boeing Company. Before the formation of Network and Space Systems, Mr. Krone was vice president and general manager of Boeing’s Army Systems Division.

He has held several other business management and financial positions at Boeing’s U.S. Army programs in military rotorcraft and Boeing Military Aircraft and Missile Systems.

Without objection, the witnesses’ full statements will be inserted into the record. I now ask the witnesses to summarize their statements for 5 minutes, beginning with Mr. Hite.

STATEMENT OF RANDOLPH C. HITE, DIRECTOR, IT ARCHITECTURE AND SYSTEMS ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. HITE. Thank you, Chairman Carney, Chairman Cuellar. Before I begin, let me first commend each of you for your oversight, the oversight by you and your staffs on SBInet.

In my opinion you have made a difference in bringing attention to a program that from the outset has been troubled. Despite the addition of some new and qualified program leadership, it has struggled to right itself over the last 18 months.

Today we are releasing the latest in a series of reports that we have done on SBInet. This report was issued to you on May 5 of this year. Like the prior report in this series, we continue to sound the alarm about program uncertainties, management weaknesses, performance shortfalls, and risks.

In particular, we reported early on that DHS was investing heavily in a system solution without committing to what system capa-
abilities would be delivered by when and at what cost and without linking capabilities to measurable mission outcomes or benefits.

We also reported that the manner in which the program was being executed was extremely wanting, to the point that it was unlikely that the delivery system would meet mission needs and perform as intended.

We further reported that changes to the program milestones were all too frequent, and the program's exposure to risk because of the uncertainties, the shortfalls and the weaknesses, was not being adequately disclosed and mitigated.

More recently we reported what I described in this hearing room 3 months ago as “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly,” about how SBInet was being tested, as well as a disconcerting trend in the number of unresolved system problems that was not indicative of a maturing system.

Our latest report continues to raise serious concerns about the program's commitments and its execution. I will summarize the report's message by making four points.

Point No. 1, while DHS is finally committed to what capabilities the first increment of SBInet is to include, these capabilities have continued to shrink in terms of what the system is to do and how well and where it is to do it.

One example of that deals with the geographic footprint that many of you have already described. Another deals with the system performance of the system that has been relaxed to the point that it will be deemed accessible if but 49 percent of the items of interest across the border can be identified.

Point No. 2, the schedule being used to execute the program that was available at the time of our review did not adequately capture when and in what order the work needed to deliver the system would occur.

At the same time milestones for the program have continued to be pushed out into the future. As a result, we do not have any confidence that the most recent set of program milestones associated with accepting the system will be met.

Point No. 3, DHS has yet to demonstrate, and many of you have made this point as well, that SBInet will not produce mission benefits that are commensurate with the system's December 2008 estimated cost of $1.3 billion.

In particular, this estimate is not reliable for a litany of reasons, and measurable benefits expected from the system will not be known, according to DHS, until the system has been deployed and can be operationally evaluated.

In effect, DHS is saying that it will have to invest more than a billion dollars in SBInet before it will know whether doing so is economically justified and cost-effective vis-a-vis other technology alternatives.

Point No. 4, DHS has continued to fall short in its application of acquisition management discipline and rigor associated with, for example, requirements definition and management. Such discipline is absolutely necessary to reasonably ensure the capability, benefit, cost, and schedule commitments on a program like SBInet can be met.
Not surprisingly, DHS has established a pattern of not living up to SBInet commitments. Simply put, the answers to the two most basic questions associated with successfully acquiring a system like SBInet, namely: “Are we doing the right thing? Are we doing it the right way?”

Right now, the answers would be, “We don’t know,” and “No, we are not.” As many of you mentioned, after having invested almost a billion dollars in 5 years, the answers to these questions should be, “Yes.”

In closing, let me end on a positive note by saying that DHS has agreed with many of our recommendations and has already taken action aimed at addressing them. For example, the program office has taken steps to improve its risk management efforts.

Also, the DHS Secretary has ordered an assessment of SBInet vis-à-vis alternative system solutions and has decided to limit further investment in the initial increment until this assessment is completed.

Both actions are consistent with the key recommendations in our report. I should add, however—excuse me—I should add, however, that such an assessment, frankly, should have been done years ago.

With that I will conclude my statement and be happy to answer any questions that you may have.

[The statement of Mr. Hite follows:]
when.\(^2\) In addition, the program still lacked an approved schedule to guide its execution, and key milestones continued to slip. This schedule-related risk was exacerbated by the absence of a clearly defined approach used for developing and deploying SBInet. Furthermore, different levels of SBInet requirements were not properly aligned, and not all requirements had been properly defined and validated. Also, the program office was not effectively managing early test events. We thus emphasized at that time that the program was not on a path for success and that change was needed. In March 2010, we reported that recently completed test events were not adequate, as illustrated by poorly defined test plans and numerous and extensive last-minute changes to test procedures, and we reported on a growing number of system performance and quality problems, which we said was not indicative of a maturing system.\(^3\) We have also reported multiple times on the impact that SBInet performance limitations have had on Border Patrol operations. In particular, we reported that the instability of the cameras, mechanical problems with the tower-mounted radar, and the sensitivity of the radar have limited system reliability and contributed to significant delays in system deployment along the southwest border.

As a result, Border Patrol agents have been forced to rely on existing technologies that have their own limitations, such as cameras mounted on towers that intermittently lose signals.\(^4\)

My statement today summarizes our most recent report on SBInet, which is being released publicly at this hearing. In summary, the report provided a timely and compelling case for DHS to rethink the plans it had in place at the beginning of this year for investing in SBInet. In this regard, we showed that the scope of the initial system’s capabilities and areas of deployment have continued to shrink, thus making it unclear what capabilities are to be delivered when. Moreover, DHS had yet to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of the proposed SBInet solution, and thus whether the considerable time and money being invested represented a prudent use of limited resources. Further, DHS had not employed the kind of acquisition management rigor and discipline needed to reasonably ensure that the proposed system capabilities would be delivered on time and within budget. Collectively, we concluded that these limitations increased the risk that the proposed solution would not meet the Department’s stated border security and immigration management goals. To minimize the program’s exposure to risk, we recommended that DHS determine whether its proposed SBInet solution satisfied the Department’s border security needs in the most cost-effective manner and that the Department improve several key life-cycle management areas. DHS largely agreed with our recommendations. More importantly, since receiving these recommendations in a draft of our report in March 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security has taken action to limit the Department’s near-term investment in SBInet pending its completion of an analysis of alternative investment options. This and other planned actions are consistent with the intent of our recommendations.

**BACKGROUND**

Managed by DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP), SBInet is intended to strengthen CBP’s ability to detect, identify, classify, track, and respond to illegal breaches at and between ports of entry. The SBI Program Executive Office, which is organizationally within CBP, is responsible for managing key acquisition functions associated with SBInet, such as requirements management and risk management. Within the Executive Office, the SBInet System Program Office (SPO) is responsible for managing the day-to-day development and deployment of SBInet.

In September 2006, CBP awarded a 3-year contract to the Boeing Company for SBI, with three additional 1-year options. As the prime contractor, Boeing is responsible for designing, producing, testing, deploying, and sustaining the system. In September 2009, CBP extended its contract with Boeing for the first option year. CBP is acquiring SBInet incrementally in a series of discrete units of capabilities, referred to as “blocks.” Each block is to deliver one or more system capabilities from a subset of the total system requirements. The first block, known as Block 1, is to include a mix of surveillance technologies (e.g., cameras, radars, and sensors) and C3I technologies that are to produce a common operating picture—a uniform presentation of activities within specific areas along the border. Block 1 is to be initially deployed within the Tucson Sector to the Tucson Border Patrol Station (TUS–1) and

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\(^4\) See, for example, GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-651T (Washington, DC: May 4, 2010).
to the Ajo Border Patrol Station (AJO–1). As of May 2010, the TUS–1 system is scheduled for Government acceptance in September 2010, with AJO–1 acceptance in November 2010.\(^5\)

In January 2010, the DHS Secretary ordered a Department-wide reassessment of the program to include a comprehensive assessment of alternatives to SBInet to ensure that the Department utilizes the most efficient and effective technological and operational solutions to secure the border. Pending the results of the assessment, the Secretary also froze all Block 1 expenditures beyond those needed to complete the implementation of the initial SBInet deployments to TUS–1 and AJO–1. Further, in March 2010, the Department announced its plans to redeploy $50 million from its American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 funding to purchase currently available, stand-alone technology, such as remote-controlled camera systems called Remote Video Surveillance Systems, and truck-mounted systems with cameras and radar, called Mobile Surveillance Systems, to meet near-term operational needs.

**BLOCK 1 CAPABILITIES, GEOGRAPHIC COVERAGE, AND PERFORMANCE STANDARDS HAVE CONTINUED TO DECREASE**

In order to measure system acquisition progress and promote accountability for results, organizations need to establish clear commitments around what system capabilities will be delivered, and when and where they will be delivered. In September 2008, we reported that the scope of SBInet was becoming more limited without becoming more specific, thus making it unclear and uncertain what system capabilities would be delivered when and to what locations.\(^6\) Accordingly, we recommended that DHS establish and baseline the specific program commitments, including the specific system functional and performance capabilities that are to be deployed to the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso Sectors, and establish when these capabilities are to be deployed and are to be operational.

To its credit, the SPO subsequently defined the scope of the first incremental block of SBInet capabilities that it intended to deploy and make operational; however, these capabilities and the number of geographic locations to which they are to be deployed have continued to shrink. For example, the number of component-level requirements\(^7\) to be deployed to the TUS–1 and AJO–1 locations has decreased by about 32 percent since October 2008 (see fig. 1).

![Figure 1: Illustration of Reduction in Block 1 Requirements from October 2008 through September 2009](image_url)

In addition, the number of sectors that the system is to be deployed to was reduced from three border sectors spanning about 655 miles to two sectors spanning about 387 miles. Further, the stringency of the performance measures was relaxed, to the point that system performance is now deemed acceptable if it identifies less than 50 percent of items of interest that cross the border. According to program officials, the decreases are due to poorly defined requirements and limitations in the capabilities of commercially available system components. The result will be a deployed and operational system that does not live up to user expectations and provides less mission support than was envisioned.

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\(^5\) This schedule has yet to be approved by CBP.

\(^6\) GAO–08–1086.

\(^7\) Component-level requirements describe required features of various surveillance components (e.g., cameras and radars) and infrastructure (e.g., communications).
A RELIABLE SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETING BLOCK 1 HAS NOT BEEN DEVELOPED

The success of a large-scale system acquisition program, like SBInet, depends in part on having a reliable schedule of when the program’s set of work activities and milestone events will occur, how long they will take, and how they are related to one another. Among other things, a reliable schedule provides a road map for systematic execution of a program and the means by which to gauge progress, identify and address potential problems, and promote accountability. In September 2008, we reported that the program did not have an approved master schedule that could be used to guide the development of SBInet. Accordingly, we recommended that the SPO finalize and approve an integrated master schedule that reflects the timing and sequencing of SBInet tasks.

However, DHS has yet to develop a reliable integrated master schedule for delivering the first block of SBInet. Specifically, the August 2009 SBInet integrated master schedule, which was the most current version available at the time of our review, did not sufficiently comply with seven of nine schedule estimating practices that relevant guidance states are important to having a reliable schedule. For example, the schedule did not adequately capture all necessary activities to be performed, including those to be performed by the Government, such as obtaining environmental permits in order to construct towers. Further, the schedule did not include a valid critical path, which represents the chain of dependent activities with the longest total duration in the schedule, and it does not reflect a schedule risk analysis, which would allow the program to better understand the schedule’s vulnerability to slippages in the completion of tasks.

These limitations are due, in part, to the program’s use of the prime contractor to develop and maintain the integrated master schedule, whose processes and tools do not allow it to include in the schedule work that it does not have under contract to perform, as well as the constantly changing nature of the work to be performed. Without having a reliable schedule, it is unclear when the first block will be completed, and schedule delays are likely to continue.

COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF BLOCK 1 HAS NOT BEEN DEMONSTRATED

The decision to invest in any system, or major system increment, should be based on reliable estimates of costs and meaningful forecasts of quantifiable and qualitative benefits over the system’s useful life. However, DHS has not demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of Block 1. In particular, it has not reliably estimated the costs of this block over its entire life cycle. To do so requires DHS to ensure that the estimate meets key practices that relevant guidance states are important to having an estimate that is comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. However, DHS’s cost estimate for Block 1, which is about $1.3 billion, does not sufficiently possess any of these characteristics.

Further, DHS has yet to identify expected quantifiable or qualitative benefits from this block and analyze them relative to costs. According to program officials, it is premature to project such benefits given the uncertainties surrounding the role that Block 1 will ultimately play in overall border control operations, and that operational experience with Block 1 is first needed in order to estimate such benefits. While we recognize the value of operationally evaluating an early, prototypical version of a system in order to better inform investment decisions, we question the basis for spending in excess of a billion dollars to gain this operational experience. Without a meaningful understanding of SBInet costs and benefits, DHS lacks an adequate basis for knowing whether the initial system solution is cost-effective.

BLOCK 1 HAS NOT BEEN MANAGED IN ACCORDANCE WITH KEY LIFE CYCLE MANAGEMENT PROCESSES

Successful management of large information technology programs, like SBInet, depends in large part on having clearly defined and consistently applied life cycle management processes. In September 2008, we reported that the SBInet life cycle management approach had not been clearly defined. Accordingly, we recommended that the SPO revise, approve, and implement its life cycle management approach,
including implementing key requirements development and management practices, to reflect relevant Federal guidance and leading practices. To the SPO's credit, it has defined key life-cycle management processes that are largely consistent with relevant guidance and associated best practices. However, it has not effectively implemented these processes. In particular:

The SPO revised its Systems Engineering Plan, which documents its life-cycle management approach for SBInet definition, development, testing, deployment, and sustainment, in November 2008, and this plan is largely consistent with DHS and other relevant guidance. For example, it defines a number of key life-cycle milestone or “gate” reviews that are important in managing the program, such as initial planning reviews, requirements reviews, system design reviews, and test reviews. The plan also requires most key artifacts and program documents that DHS guidance identified as important to each gate review, such as a risk management plan and requirements documentation. However, the SPO has not consistently implemented these life-cycle management activities for Block 1. For example, the SPO did not review or consider key artifacts, including plans for testing and evaluating the performance of the system, as well as assessing the robustness of the system’s security capabilities, during its Critical Design Review, which is the point when, according to the plan, verification and testing plans are to be in place.

The SBInet Requirements Development and Management Plan states that: (1) A baseline set of requirements should be established by the time of the Critical Design Review; (2) requirements should be achievable, verifiable, unambiguous, and complete; and (3) requirements should be bi-directionally traceable from high-level operational requirements through detailed low-level requirements to test plans. Further, the plan states that ensuring traceability of requirements from lower-level requirements to higher-level requirements is an integral part of ensuring that testing is properly planned and conducted. However, not all Block 1 component requirements were sufficiently defined at the time that they were baselined at the Critical Design Review. Further, operational requirements continue to be unclear and unverifiable, which has contributed to testing challenges, including the need to extemporaneously rewrite test cases during test execution. In addition, while requirements are now largely traceable backwards to operational requirements and forward to design requirements and verification methods, this traceability has not been used until recently to verify that higher-level requirements have been satisfied.

In 2008, the SPO documented a risk management approach that largely complies with relevant guidance. However, it has not effectively implemented this approach for all risks. Moreover, available documentation does not demonstrate that significant risks were disclosed to DHS and Congressional decision-makers in a timely fashion as we previously recommended, and, while risk disclosure to DHS leadership has recently improved, not all risks have been formally captured and thus shared. For example, some of the risks that have not been formally captured include the lack of well-defined acquisition management processes, staff with the appropriate acquisition expertise, and agreement on key system performance parameters. However, the SPO recently established a risk management process for capturing SBI enterprise-wide risks, including the lack of well-defined acquisition management processes and staff expertise.

Reasons cited by program officials for not implementing these processes include their decision to rely on task order requirements that were developed prior to the Systems Engineering Plan and competing SPO priorities, including meeting an aggressive deployment schedule. Until the SPO consistently implements these processes, it will remain challenged in its ability to successfully deliver SBInet.

DHS HAS AGREED TO IMPLEMENT GAO RECOMMENDATIONS AIMED AT ADDRESSING SBINET LONG-STANDING UNCERTAINITIES AND RISKS

To address the program’s risks, uncertainties, and acquisition management weaknesses, our report being released today provides 12 recommendations.

In summary, we recommended that DHS limit future investment in SBInet to work that is either already under contract and supports the completion of Block 1 activities for deployment to TUS–1 and AJO–1 and/or provides a basis for a Departmental decision on what, if any, expanded investment in SBInet is justifiable as a prudent use of DHS’s resources for carrying out its border security and immigration management mission. As part of this recommendation, we reiterated prior recommendations pertaining to program management challenges and recommended that DHS address weaknesses identified in our report by, for example, ensuring that
the SBInet integrated master schedule, Block 1 requirements, and the Systems Engineering Plan, among other program elements, are consistent with best practices.

We also recommended that the program undertake a detailed cost-benefit analysis of any incremental block of SBInet capabilities beyond Block 1 and report the results of such analyses to CBP and DHS leadership. Further, we recommended that DHS decide whether proceeding with expanded investment in SBInet represents a prudent use of the Department’s resources, and report the decision, and the basis for it, to the Department’s authorization and appropriations committees.

To DHS’s credit, it has initiated actions to address our recommendations. In particular, and as previously mentioned, the Department froze all funding beyond the initial TUS-1 and AJO-1 deployments until it completes a comprehensive reassessment of the program that includes an analysis of the cost and projected benefits of additional SBInet deployments, as well as the cost and mission effectiveness of alternative technologies.

Further, in written comments on a draft of our report, DHS described steps it is taking to incorporate best practices into its management of the program. For example, DHS stated that, in response to our previous recommendations, it has instituted more rigorous oversight of SBInet, requiring the program to report to the Department’s Acquisition Review Board at specified milestones and receive approval before proceeding with the next deployment increment. With respect to our new recommendations, DHS stated that it is, among other things, taking steps to bring the Block 1 schedule into alignment with best practices, verifying requirements and validating performance parameters, updating its Systems Engineering Plan, and improving its risk management process.

In closing, let me emphasize our long-held position that SBInet is a risky program. To minimize the program’s exposure to risk, it is imperative for DHS to follow through on its stated commitment to ensure that SBInet, as proposed, is the right course of action for meeting its stated border security and immigration management goals and outcomes, and once this is established, for it to ensure that the program is executed in accordance with proven acquisition management best practices. To do less will perpetuate a program that has for too long been oversold and under-delivered.

This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or other Members of the subcommittees may have.

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Hite.

I now recognize Mr. Borkowski for 5 minutes.


Mr. BORKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Carney, Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Miller, distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you again for this opportunity to describe what we are trying to do to deal with the issues you have described.

This is a continuation of the hearing from March, and our written testimony is pretty much that testimony, but I will try to recap a little bit and give an update as to where we are compared to what we said in March.

As we discussed then, the Secretary has ordered a reassessment of the program, and in fact has frozen funds beyond those required to complete what is already started. Those are the two areas of SBInet Block 1 deployment known as Tucson-1 and Ajo-1, those areas that you described.

That is driven by the same concerns the Secretary has come to—the same conclusions that the committee has already identified, as has the GAO—which is that we suffer from two fundamental flaws.
One is we need to become convinced that the program we have designed is actually even viable.

The second is that we need to become convinced that even if it is viable that it is the right way to spend money, that we are getting value for that money. So that is the purpose of the Secretary’s assessment is to answer those two questions before we invest more money in SBInet Block 1.

Now, I would like to be clear about what we mean by SBInet Block 1, because we often use SBI and SBInet and technology interchangeably. SBInet Block 1 is a certain kind of technology. It is a technology which we don’t yet have but which we have endeavored to develop. It includes fixed towers that have radars and cameras.

It includes the computer software and the communication network that allows all of that information from all of those towers to be combined in one place so it can be acted on by the Border Patrol. So it is that technology configuration, and it is that technology configuration that is designed to work at the beginning in Arizona. We call that SBInet Block 1.

There is other technology that SBI provides, for example, the northern border technology that Congresswoman Miller talked about or mobile surveillance systems. So we do have alternatives and we do have options.

But SBInet Block 1 is the development of something that we hoped would give us a step function increase in capability by allowing us to network a depiction of what is going on in one area.

We have, frankly, failed in delivering what was promised at the beginning, so we would not argue with your characterization, Chairman Carney. So the question for us has been what do we do now?

So we are looking at this system, and we are looking at this, the cost-effectiveness of it. There are two fundamental questions, as I said, that the Secretary’s assessment is designed to get at. One is: Is the system viable?

The way that we intend to assess that is by completing Tucson-1 and Ajo-1, going through the testing that is required to characterize it and then using that as a quantitative measure of what this system does.

We will also, of course, know what it costs at that point, not just what it cost to develop but what it costs to produce in a recurring way. So that will give us insight into the viability. As I told you in March, we expected to have the engineering test results for Tucson-1 by September, and we are still on schedule for that.

We expected to have engineering test results for Ajo-1 by the end of the calendar year, and we are still on schedule for that.

The other part of the assessment is the question of whether or not it is—even if it works is it worth it? There are other technologies so I can have less capability at less dollars, more capability at more dollars. The question is do I get value for those more dollars?

That is the quantitative science-based assessment the Secretary has talked about, and we are doing that in some phases because it is a deliberative effort. The first of those we should have data by the end of June. That data will be focused on an analysis of Ari-
zona and then based on that we can extend that analysis to other parts of the border.

But what that is designed to do is to compare SBInet Block 1 to other technology options in a very quantitative science-based way so we can make more intelligent decisions about where it makes sense to spend money on this system.

That quantitative analysis, depending on how that looks, will continue into other areas of the border before we make any commitments to those areas of the border.

I also wanted to mention that we also talked about a near-term assessment where we would look at the $50 million of stimulus funds that had been originally designed for SBInet Block 1. In fact, we had to find another way to divert those to other technology, including many more mobile surveillance systems, sensors for our aircraft, backscatter radars for Border Patrol checkpoints and even pursuit cameras for our office of field operations, Customs and Border Protection officers at the ports.

So we are in the process of acquiring those, and we expect to start to see delivery of those within a matter of some months here. That is the quick and dirty summary and recap of where we are, what we said we would be doing last March and how we are doing on it. I will look forward to your questions going forward.

[The joint statement of Mr. Borkowski and Mr. Fisher follows:]

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK BORKOWSKI AND MICHAEL FISHER

JUNE 17, 2010

Chairman Carney, Chairman Cuellar, Ranking Member Bilirakis, Ranking Member Miller, and distinguished Members of the committee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to discuss SBInet. I am Mark Borkowski, Executive Director of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), and with me today is the Chief of the United States Border Patrol, Michael Fisher.

DEPARTMENTAL-WIDE ASSESSMENT

Before I begin to discuss where we are with SBInet development, I want to briefly discuss the Department-wide reassessment that was ordered by the Secretary back in January. As the Governor of Arizona, Secretary Napolitano became uniquely aware of the promises that were made about SBInet and the shortfalls it has faced. When she came into the Department, she took a hard look at our progress with SBInet. She gave my team at CBP a fair chance to prove that we were on the right track. She asked hard questions about the future of the program and the feasibility of where we were headed and directed then-Acting Commissioner Jayson Ahern to provide his assessment of the path forward for SBInet. Based upon the results of that review, she ordered a Department-wide reassessment of the program to determine if there are alternatives that may more efficiently, effectively, and economically meet our Nation’s border security needs. Secretary Napolitano also ordered a freeze on all SBInet funding beyond SBInet Block 1’s initial deployment to the Tucson and Ajo regions until the assessment is completed.

The Department-wide review is motivated by two major considerations. The first is that the continued and repeated delays in SBInet raise fundamental questions about SBInet’s viability and availability to meet the need for technology along the border. The second is that the high cost of SBInet obligates this administration to conduct a full and comprehensive analysis of alternative options to ensure we are maximizing the impact and effectiveness of the substantial taxpayer resources we are devoting to border security technology. Quite frankly, this type of investment can only be justified if you know exactly what you are going to get, and this type of comprehensive analysis of alternatives should have been undertaken years ago. Secretary Napolitano recognized the need for such due diligence, which is why we will conduct such an analysis under the review she ordered.

The assessment has an immediate and a long-term phase. In March, the Department announced it was redeploying $50 million in Recovery Act funds that were
scheduled to be spent on SBInet to alternatives currently available, stand-alone technology, such as remote-controlled camera systems called Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSSs), truck-mounted systems with cameras and radar called Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSSs), thermal imaging devices, ultra-light detection, backscatter units, mobile radios, and cameras and laptops for pursuit vehicles, that will immediately improve our ability to secure the U.S.-Mexico border.

In the long-term phase, we will conduct a comprehensive, science-based assessment of alternatives to SBInet to ensure that we are utilizing the most efficient and effective technological and operational solutions in all of our border security efforts. If this analysis suggests that the SBInet capabilities are worth the cost, this administration will extend deployment of these capabilities. If this analysis suggests that alternative technology options represent the best balance of capability and cost-effectiveness, this administration will assess options for redirecting resources to these stronger border technology options.

ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

It has often been said that technology is one of three “pillars” that contribute to effective border security, with tactical infrastructure, such as physical fencing, and personnel being the other two. Physical fencing provides “persistent impedance”—that is, it delays the progress of people who attempt to cross our borders between the ports of entry. These delays, in turn, provide more opportunity for our Border Patrol agents to respond to and interdict those attempts. From 2006 through 2008, the bulk of our funding within SBI focused on completion of the physical fence along areas of the southwest border where Border Patrol determined it was operationally necessary. Since then, as that fence has largely been completed, we have shifted our funding focus more towards technology.

Technology is primarily used to provide continual monitoring and surveillance of a particular area, enhancing situational awareness for Border Patrol agents, detecting activity between the ports of entry and providing information about the type of activity (i.e. human or animal, vehicle or pedestrian, transporting contraband or not transporting contraband, etc.). This knowledge assists our Border Patrol agents in responding to and interdicting criminal activity, and enhances their safety by giving them information about the relative threat of any group or individual and about how best to approach the threat.

CBP has already deployed technology to several specific areas of the border. As mentioned above, we have deployed Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSSs), which allow personnel to keep an eye on selected areas by displaying pictures at a central dispatch location. We have also deployed Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSSs), which use truck-mounted radar and camera to provide greater situational awareness to operators in the field. Finally, we have deployed Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), which can detect movement in their vicinity. All of these systems provide important information to the Border Patrol about activity in a particular area.

The goal of SBInet was to network a set of sensors that cover a wide area into a Common Operating Picture, or COP—in contrast to the individual, stand-alone systems described above, which are very useful and relatively inexpensive, but also labor-intensive and limited in coverage. By depicting a large amount of information in a small space, SBInet was designed to allow fewer personnel to monitor and direct operations across a larger area. Border Patrol agents would be able to observe, manage, and respond to multiple events more effectively.

SBINET BLOCK 1

With respect to the development of SBInet, it is clear that progress has been slower than anticipated. Recent testing suggests that SBInet Block 1 has demonstrated some progress, but the time it has taken us to get to this point is extremely discouraging and frustrating. As a partial mitigation to the delays, we worked with Boeing to make a change in our plans so that the Border Patrol could use parts of the system that are not yet fully complete “as is” while engineering work continued. The Border Patrol has been using these parts of the system in this capacity since February 6 and the feedback has been positive from agents on the front lines. The next steps involve completing our engineering work and conducting formal testing. We expect to conduct System Acceptance Testing through August, and then to turn the system over to the Border Patrol for formal Operational Testing and Evaluation starting in September.

Construction on a second part of the system, known as Ajo-1, was delayed for several reasons, including technical concerns and environmental considerations. Ajo-1 is located in an environmentally sensitive area, so we have worked very closely with
the Department of the Interior to ensure that we protected it appropriately. Much of the Ajo-1 Area of Responsibility (AoR) has been constructed, and most of the system will be completed by August. We will then conduct acceptance and operational testing of Ajo-1 through the end of this calendar year.

**SBI EFFORTS ON THE NORTHERN BORDER**

In addition to our activities on the southwest border, CBP has continued to make investments in technology on the northern border to enhance situational awareness and capabilities of the Border Patrol.

As a part of SBI’s Northern Border Project, CBP has deployed proven surveillance systems, including Remote Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) and Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS), to the Buffalo, Detroit, and Swanton Border Patrol Sectors. Two MSSs were deployed to the Swanton Sector in 2009. The Buffalo Sector deployment, completed in February 2010, consists of 5 RVSS sites along the upper Niagara River, expanding upon an earlier deployment of 4 remote video surveillance cameras in 2003. The Detroit Sector deployment consists of 1 MSS and 11 RVSS sites along the St. Clair River, covering approximately 35 miles from Lake Huron to Lake St. Clair. Ten of the sites are completed and operational, with the eleventh scheduled for completion by the end of the year.

These technology deployments provide an immediate capability to help Border Patrol agents expand their ability to detect, identify, classify, respond to, and resolve illegal cross-border activity, while providing lessons learned that will enable CBP to design better-tailored, longer-term technology options for the northern border. CBP chose the Buffalo, Detroit, and Swanton Sectors based on the needs of the Border Patrol and the unique operational area, which includes coastal maritime, river, urban, and rural environments.

In the fiscal year 2009 Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act (Pub. L. 110–329), Congress directed $40 million within the Border Security, Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology account towards a “Northern border security technology investment.” CBP is using these funds to conduct a demonstration of capabilities in the Detroit area that will attempt to integrate sensors and data from a variety of sources. The goals of the pilot project are to improve operational integration of border security efforts in the Detroit area, improve detection capabilities in the vicinity of the St. Clair River area, and enhance situational awareness for CBP and their mission partners in the region.

To that end, construction is currently underway for the establishment of an Operational Integration Center (OIC). The OIC will provide a collaborative work area and communications capabilities for representatives of CBP, U.S. Coast Guard, other DHS components, Federal law enforcement agencies, State and local law enforcement, and Canadian officials. This facility will serve as a laboratory for border security agencies to explore and evaluate enhanced border security capabilities. Additionally, the OIC is intended to enhance situational awareness by providing multiple information feeds within one single location. Initial operations at the OIC are scheduled to begin October 2010.

**CONCLUSION**

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, we recognize that the SBInet program has been a frustration. This committee and the entire Congress has been supportive and patient with us as we have worked through issues and delays encountered by the program. The comprehensive review ordered by Secretary Napolitano demonstrates that she shares your concern. Technology along the border is of critical importance to our National security and the safety and effectiveness of our Border Patrol agents working in the field. We need to ensure that we provide them with proven, cost-effective tools that will help them do their jobs and keep our Nation safe—whether that means large-scale networks like SBInet or stand-alone technology I mentioned above. One thing is clear: the Secretary’s review will require all of us to go back and take a hard look at the assumptions that were made in the past, and it will require that we proceed in a manner that both bolsters the security of our Nation’s borders while making the most out of the resources that have been devoted to technology solutions to our border security challenges. We look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Borkowski.

I understand Chief Fisher was a joint statement, so Mr. Krone for 5 minutes, please.
STATEMENT OF ROGER A. KRONE, PRESIDENT, NETWORK AND SPACE SYSTEMS, BOEING DEFENSE, SPACE & SECURITY, THE BOEING COMPANY

Mr. Krone. Oh, excuse me. Thank you, Chairman Carney, Chairman Cuellar and Members of the committee. It has been 3 months since we last appeared here to discuss the SBInet program, and I am pleased to be able to report good performance by our team and excellent progress in meeting the milestones of all the projects we are working on.

The two northern border projects have been accepted by the Customs and Border Patrol, and the two southern projects are on track for completion on the schedules we discussed in March. Early operations of the Tucson-1 system continues to be very successful, and we plan to extend early operations to our second deployment, Ajo-1, in August.

With continued good performance we expect to have both of the systems permanently in the hands of the Border Patrol by the end of the year.

This program was transferred to my business unit in August 2007. I would like to provide a little background that might put some perspective on the comments from the Government Accountability Office that we are discussing here today.

The original concept of SBInet was to create a spiral development program utilizing to the maximum degree commercial off-the-shelf equipment in order to get a capability to the southwest border as quickly as possible.

As such, many of the 12 best practice program management recommendations by the GAO in today's report were not proposed, bid, nor implemented in the original SBInet program.

However, since the program transitioned from what I would call the P28 phase to the Block 1 phase, many of the suggested scheduling, systems engineering, requirements, and baseline management and risk management processes have been implemented. Today, the program is run in a manner very similar to a Department of Defense ACAT I or ACAT II program.

The GAO questions whether the SBInet is "a cost-effective course of action." Although the value question is best addressed by the Customs and Border Patrol relative to other means of securing the border, I would like to clarify where the Government's money has been spent on the program to date.

The GAO states, "SBInet is being acquired and deployed in incremental blocks of capability with the first block to cost about $1.3 billion." This representation is not entirely accurate and bears some clarification.

First, of the $1.3 billion, $441 million has been spent to construct 32 miles of physical fence and purchase 140,000 tons of steel mesh for other fence construction. Utilizing the numbers in Table One of the GAO report, updated for current cost performance, we can see the remaining $828 million has been spent in the following way.

Four hundred eighty-four million dollars has been spent for non-recurring design development, supplier, and program management and the construction of the Systems Integration Lab in Playas, New Mexico for the Block 1 system. Construction of a network op-
eration center and systems operation center in Springfield, Virginia.
Most of this investment will not be repeated if we complete additional deployments beyond those under contract. Eighty million dollars was spent for design and development of the command and control software to drive the Block 1 system, referred to as the common operating environment, also a non-recurring investment.
Seventy-one million dollars has been spent for contractor logistics support of P28 Block 1 and other border surveillance systems. So of the $1.3 billion, only $195 million has been spent on actual deployments of technology solutions to the border under the SBInet program.
Of that, $20 million has been spent on the Buffalo and Detroit northern border towers, $20 million has been spent for P28 that covers 28 miles of Arizona border and $155 million, which is our current estimated complete, what we call the Arizona Deployment Task Order, more commonly known as Tucson-1 and Ajo-1, which will cover 25 and 30 miles of the border respectively, a total of 55 miles.
We know today that we have a system that the Border Patrol agents helped design and are using in real operations along the Arizona-Mexico border. In September we expect to have successfully accomplished system acceptance test for Tucson-1 and to complete system acceptance testing of Ajo-1 by the end of the year.
The Government has almost finished its investment in the development of the Block 1 system. Deployments beyond Tucson-1 and Ajo-1 will be done on a fixed-price basis at prices significantly lower than those of the Arizona Deployment Task Order, with reliable schedules based upon demonstrated performance.
The GAO recommends that the Government answer the question as to the value of the SBInet program. At Boeing we are hopeful that such assessments will lead to a positive outcome, and we can get restarted on further deployments and help our customer secure the border.
Thank you very much, and I am prepared to answer any questions you might have.

[The statement of Mr. Krone follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER A. KRONE
JUNE 17, 2010

Thank you, Mr. Chairman
It’s been 3 months since we last appeared here to discuss the SBInet Program. At that time, I described the status of our two southern and two northern border deployments, the work remaining on SBInet Block 1 technology to achieve System Acceptance from the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) customer, and our positive experience with Early Operations, an initiative that allows the Border Patrol to use the Tucson-1 (TUS1) System during the swing and night shifts when our contractor team must clear the operational area where the towers are located.
On all these projects, I am able to report strong performance by our team and excellent progress in meeting the milestones of the program.

NORTHERN BORDER
On the northern border, we have completed the Detroit and Buffalo Projects, both of which included installing cameras along the St. Clair and Upper Niagara Rivers, respectively. Both projects have been accepted by CBP and are now part of daily operations for the agents there.
In March, I discussed the remaining developmental issues for the first deployment of the SBInet Block 1 technology known as Tucson-1 (TUS1). The TUS1 deployment, covering approximately 24 linear miles of border and 1,000 square miles around the Sasabe Port of Entry, has incorporated expanded testing into the program plan to validate system success and acceptance by the customer. We have now incorporated the hardware fixes identified by earlier testing and updated the software to address critical program change requests (PCR).

Our progress over the past 3 months puts the program into position to start the preliminary readiness activities and tests that lead into System Acceptance Test (SAT). We will complete the Preliminary Test Readiness Review (PTRR) this month and will then begin conducting dry run tests of the routes used during SAT. With satisfactory completion of the dry runs, we will proceed to the Test Readiness Review (TRR) then to System Acceptance Test runs for record in July. All of this progress is the result of hard work and dedication by the Boeing, CBP, and Border Patrol teams. We are adhering to the Integrated Master Schedule that was developed in February 2010, and have focused on critical path management and risk management. Challenges remain, but we are tracking to a mid-September delivery to CBP.

The second deployment, Ajo-1 (AJO1), covering approximately 30 linear miles of border and 1,500 square miles around the Lukeville Port of Entry in an environmentally sensitive area, is progressing well. Seven of the 10 towers have been erected as we speak, and most have the sensors packages installed. We have begun the tower characterization step, which will provide the initial check-out of each completed tower. System Acceptance Test for AJO1 is scheduled to begin early this fall with final delivery to CBP around the end of the calendar year. Similar to TUS1, the CBP and Boeing team has been focused on managing the critical path to schedule completion. Improvement in risk management, including bi-weekly Risk Management Board meetings and increased discipline in risk and issue identification and resolution have helped to ensure that the schedule is realistic and manageable.

Throughout the development and deployment of TUS1 and AJO1, Boeing has maintained a detailed cost database and developed an in-depth life-cycle cost model that we continue to refine. We are sharing this information with CBP and are committed to identify potential cost savings that will be reflected in future deployments.

The user assessment conducted in Playas, New Mexico, in 2009 identified deficiencies in performance in the ground surveillance radar, the electro-optical camera and the laser range finder. Playas is the representational testbed we established to test and validate the system, and I can tell you today that the issues identified there during the user assessment have been addressed. Boeing worked directly with the radar component’s original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to develop software changes that improved the performance of the radar and provide the user with more controls. Working closely with the CBP and the camera OEM, settings were adjusted in the daylight, electro-optical cameras, resulting in significant performance improvement. Regarding the laser range finder, Border Patrol agents are using it today in TUS1 Early Operations to enhance the accuracy of coordinates when appropriate. Probably more significant is the overall performance of the Block 1 technology in the Tucson area of responsibility. Observations from Early Operations and feedback from the end-users tell us those component-level issues are not present in TUS1. Moreover, we are seeing improved performance of the total system through interaction and integration with other border security systems and personnel resources.

In March, we also discussed Early Operations of the TUS1 system. At that time, the Border Patrol had been using the TUS1 system for nightly operations for about 5 weeks. At the request of Rep. McCaul, a video of an encounter using the system was shown and narrated by Chief Fisher. As he said then, the system gives agents “a better sense of situational awareness, we have a better sense of identifying the particular threat.”
Today, we have more than 4 months of Early Operations experience totaling nearly 5,000 agent-hours on the system. Availability has been excellent despite interruptions due to our planned developmental work, and we continue to get very positive feedback from the agents. The high utilization rate of the system, in my opinion, is evidence that the agents want to use the TUS1 capabilities whenever possible. While we have a considerable amount of testing left to accomplish before Government acceptance of the system later this summer, the fact that the system has been in the hands of the operators, being used in actual operations for thousands of hours, makes a strong statement about its maturity and its suitability for use along the southern border.

SAT will provide the official measurement of whether the system meets the requirements set out for it in the contract. We are on schedule to complete that by mid-September.

NEXT STEPS

We know today that we have a system that Border Patrol agents helped design and are using in real operations along the Arizona-Mexico Border. In September, we expect to have successfully accomplished SAT for TUS1 and to complete AJO1 by the end of the calendar year. This brings us to the questions of, where do we deploy the Block 1 System next; how long will it take to build; and, how much will it cost?

These are questions for the Government to answer, but it has always been our position that once the technology is proven, we could embark on serial deployments of the system that would be rapid, efficient, and cost-effective.

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. I would like to thank all the witnesses for their testimony.

I will remind each Member that he or she will have 5 minutes to question the witnesses, and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. Begin with you, Mr. Hite, as you know the Secretary suspended future spending on SBInet until the analysis is done on its viability. Frankly, do you think the project can be saved or is it time to move to other options?

Mr. HITE. See, I hesitate to give you a definitive answer on that. You know, making those kind of tough decisions requires access to data that I haven’t seen. It certainly is a legitimate question to pose at this point in time, but if I was in a position to make that decision now based on what I know, I would be asking for more information to inform my decision.

Mr. CARNEY. Certainly the original project as contracted and envisioned it is far and away a lot greater than we have in reality today with the project.

Mr. HITE. Absolutely.

Mr. CARNEY. Why? What has happened to see sort of a shrinkage of capability?

Mr. HITE. A lot of things in combination have contributed to that, not the least of which is an underestimation and over-optimism about what could be delivered, what it would take in order to accomplish that, optimism surrounding what is available in the commercial marketplace. Underestimating what it is going to take to integrate those components.

As the witness mentioned, the program originally set out under a spiral development approach, which my personal opinion is a risky approach to take. It evolved over time and so the definition and the implementation of the kind of acquisition of rigor that my experience has shown can contribute to a successful program wasn’t there from the outset.

I don’t think the program had the people it needed to run it successfully from the outset. So I mean this, as I mentioned in my oral
statement is this program was in trouble months after it was started. It was spiraling downhill after that.

So, you know, I, as I mentioned, despite here in the last 18 to 24 months bringing in more capability, trying to address some of these limitations, it is hard to, you know, redirect an iceberg once it has started moving in one direction. That is, you know, what we have been faced with.

Mr. CARNEY. At least icebergs can block something. Why have the thresholds been so constrained? I mean the parameters have changed. It is, you know, I am struck by the fact that cameras only work at five clicks rather than 10, that the laser only works to two rather than 10.

Mr. Borkowski or Mr. Krone, can you answer that question?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, first of all I think we have improved the cameras. But having said that, what we did is we selected commercially available off-the-shelf hardware. We tried to do that in a way at the time, and this in hindsight may have been a mistake so I am not trying to make excuses for it.

But at the time when we had a very ambitious schedule, what we did is we compromised on performance of some of the hardware in order to get it in time to meet the then-anticipated schedule.

Now, in hindsight that turned out not to be wise because we both failed to meet that schedule and ended up with cameras that were probably less than optimal. Now, having said that, we have made some improvements to the cameras, and I don’t want people to think we haven’t.

But those two things sort of conspired, the interest in commercially available, quickly available to support a schedule and to support a cost ended up causing us to make compromises in specific components.

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Krone.

Mr. KRONE. See, I would concur with that. I would also, I think, mention that we, in tweaking with the cameras and working on their performance in many scenarios today, they actually exceed the 10 kilometer range.

But the range in which they work is certainly dependent upon the environment, the atmospheric conditions, and there are some conditions where they don’t have the 10 kilometer range. But in other places we have actually seen them in operations, in early operations, where they have exceeded the range.

The initial deployment of the COTS hardware didn’t meet spec or our expectations, and we have been working hard with the Customs and Border Patrol to improve their performance.

Mr. CARNEY. Okay, thank you. I imagine we will have a couple of rounds of questions.

I now recognize the Ranking Member from Florida for 5 minutes.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

Again, just before the subcommittee’s last hearing on SBInet, the Secretary announced her intention to use, as I said during my statement and I know you said, the $50 million in the recovery funds.

I am aware that there is promising DOD technology, Mr. Borkowski, being used on the border. Will the redeployed Recovery Act funding be used to leverage this technology?
Mr. BORKOWSKI. The specific DOD technology, no, not with the stimulus funding. However, as we go forward and make decisions about what is the right technology we have talked to the DOD. In fact, many elements of DOD as well as, by the way, many, many vendors, probably well over hundreds of conversations I have had both with DOD and vendors.

We will use all of that as candidates for the appropriate technology. So we have talked to DOD but it is not in this initial $50 million.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you.

Mr. Fisher, I have long been concerned about the impact of the border violence on CBPOs and the Border Patrol agents. I understand in fiscal year 2009 there were nearly 1,100 assaults on Border Patrol agents.

Based on CBP statistics recently provided to the committee, through May 31 there have been nearly 800 assaults on Border Patrol agents this fiscal year, with more than 100 assaults alone in May.

What is the reason for this escalation of violence against the Border Patrol agents? What resources do CBPOs and Border Patrol agents have in terms of protective equipment and training to ensure their safety and the protection of lawful travelers as well?

Mr. FISHER. Congressman, with respect to your first question as it relates to the cause of the violence across the southwest border at—in between the ports of entry, I will just offer a general statement because there is a lot of different reasons depending upon the area. Depending upon which transnational criminal organization happens to own that area in which we are operating.

But in general terms, what we have seen over the years and consistent with what we are seeing so far this year, is that there is generally a cause and effect of what we do with respect to our enforcement posture at the ports of entry and between the ports of entry.

By the way, I should mention those aren’t being done independently. Those are being done collectively within the field leadership because we recognize that the criminal organizations historically have tried to exploit at the ports and in between the ports.

So what we are doing in our joint planning, joint enforcement posture, is we are making a difference in the criminal organizations to operate in these particular areas where historically they have operated with impunity.

Where we are making a difference, the criminal organizations are adjusting their tactics. Some of those tactics do include aggressive assaults against Border Patrol agents, again CBP officers, in the hopes that we will pull further away from the border and allow them to again operate within some of those same areas.

So that is a general statement we have seen that over time and certainly we are seeing that as well this year.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. How about the protective equipment? Can you answer that as well?

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir, I can. Again, throughout the year as we start seeing the evolution, if you will, of that threat, as an operator we take that into consideration in planning and making sure that
the agents and officers are trained properly, they have the equipment.

What we have instituted over the years we are currently deploying today, are forms of less lethal capabilities. That would take the form of FN 303s, pepper ball systems, riot gear.

We also had specially trained CBP officers and Border Patrol agents that when we know we need to go into a particular area and the threat assessment indicates that the propensity of violence may be high, we go ahead and deploy those troops in advance with extra equipment, extra training.

To make sure that when we do go in and enforce those areas that we do have the appropriate agents that are trained and equipped to handle the commensurate threat.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. Mr. Krone, in your testimony you stated that should DHS decide to continue to deploy SBInet technology beyond Block 1 it could be deployed rapidly, efficiently, and cost-effectively. How much would it cost and how long would it take to deploy this technology to additional Border Patrol sectors?

Mr. KRONE. At the time that we were put on stop work, we had three additional deployments that we had done some initial planning, what we call the Tohono O’odham Nation 60-mile sector, the Nogales 30-mile sector and the Sonoita 30-mile sector.

At that time we had rough order of magnitude estimates at complete, again, these are not contractual numbers, and when we are put on contract I am sure we will have a negotiation with Mark on the actual numbers. But for the TON deployment, which is about 60 miles, that is in the order of $100 million to $110 million.

For Nogales about 30 miles in the $50 million to $60 million range and Sonoita would be about the same, 30 miles at about the $50 million to $60 million, or at a cost per mile around $2 million per mile of border.

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Chairman Cuellar for 5 minutes.

Mr. CUELLAR. All right. One of the things when we talk about securing the border is we have got—and we are using taxpayers’ dollars—is we want to know is the—what we are trying to do, is it efficient? Is it effective? Is it accountable to the taxpayers?

But the other thing is that we ought to ask for, is it worthwhile on that? That is where I am coming from on this particular issue.

So let us go back to my basic question. If you have somebody in Brownsville, Texas, for example, or similar in another part of the four States that border Mexico, when can we tell the taxpayers that we can secure our border using this technology?

I understand that we can use different technology. There is not going to be a cookie-cutter situation. It depends, you know, in west Texas you might use something else and in Arizona you might use something else. You can make an argument that in Texas you have a Rio Grande that provides a natural boundary so you use something else.

In Arizona you might use a fence because you can step from one side to the other side, so I understand all that. My question to all
of you all is when can we say to the taxpayer that we can secure the border? How much would it cost?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Chairman Cuellar, and I apologize in advance for this, but we can’t secure the border with just technology, okay?

Mr. CUellar. No, no, I understand.

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Okay.

Mr. CUellar. A mixture of technology, a mixture of personnel——

Mr. BORKOWSKI. All right.

Mr. CUellar [continuing]. A mixture of the operation strategy.

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Right.

Mr. CUellar. I understand that. When can we say that we have sufficient technology to address that? Because I mean there is areas that certainly I would like to see those towers and fences and cameras and—up and down the border.

But I mean just for example, Mike McCaul and ourselves, we got in one of those civil air patrol planes the other day, actually last year, and we just very low flying we flew up from Laredo, followed the river all the way for a couple hours down all the way to Brownsville.

Of course, I was making my argument on how do you put a fence all around there, but nevertheless how do you secure that area? That is only one part from Laredo down to Brownsville. So how do we address this issue?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well——

Mr. CUellar. How much would it cost us, time and money?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Okay. Probably the worst case, the worst case would be if we decided to take SBInet Block 1 or whatever is up—the appropriate iteration, put that all along the southwest border with some ambitious but potentially realistic funding assumptions. We have talked about those numbers before. We talked about $8 billion. We have talked about 2016, 2017.

Mr. CUellar. Yes.

Mr. BORKOWSKI. That is probably worst case, and by the way, probably very unlikely because I doubt that we would conclude that SBInet is the right answer for the entire border.

Mr. CUellar. Okay.

Mr. BORKOWSKI. But that is a worst-case assessment. So the challenge for the Secretary’s assessment, the Department now is saying, okay, now we have got that worst-case assessment. It has very ambitious funding assumptions because obviously it would slip based on funding.

But is that the right answer? Can we get some things more quickly if we go to other technology, less expensively if we go to other technology? We expect the Secretary’s assessment to advise that.

So worst case, very ambitious funding assumptions, and by very ambitious I am talking like a billion dollars a year into technology, okay, 2016, 2017 if you used SBInet Block 1.

We are hopeful that through this assessment process we can identify and better tailor technology so that we can accelerate that with the appropriate technology at lower cost compared to that kind of worst-case SBInet baseline. But we haven’t built that yet and won’t build that until we have completed the assessment.
Mr. Cuellar. So roughly 2016, 2017 for the 2,000 miles, at least in the southern border, and we are not even talking about the northern border——
Mr. Borkowski. Right.
Mr. Cuellar [continuing]. But let us say the southern border, 2016, 2017.
Mr. Borkowski. In order to have technology SBInet Block 1 with some ambitious budgeting. Again, we hope we can do better after we go through the assessment, but that is kind of the way the baseline was laid out. Don’t expect to execute that baseline. I want to be very clear of that, but in order to size the problem that is probably the best place to start.
Mr. Cuellar. Money-wise?
Mr. Borkowski. Well, the estimate for SBInet across the southwest border was $8 billion. Now again, to be fair, that estimate suffers from some of the deficiencies that Mr. Hite has described, but that is the estimate that we have had up to this point.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. So I am sorry—so how much again for 2016, 2017 in U.S. dollars?
Mr. Borkowski. 2016, 2017 about $8 billion if we put in SBInet Block 1. Again, I want to reemphasize, I don’t expect us to do that. That is a worst case, I believe.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. So worst-case scenario might be $8 billion up to 2016, but if you use different type of technology it might be faster. That is the worst-case scenario. Give me the best-case scenario.
Mr. Borkowski. I guess I am hesitant to do that because I would be speculating at this point, Chairman Cuellar. That would be pretty dangerous for me. So if I could defer I would——
Mr. Cuellar. Finally, the last question I have for all of you all, do you talk to GAO besides the time that we are here in a committee? Because I mean GAO comes up with term findings and I know you are not going to agree with. That includes also Mr. Krone, all of you all. I mean do you all talk, seriously? I know you are going to say yes, but do you really talk to each other before we come to the committee?
I mean, the way I see it is GAO is not doing a catch you—hey, we have got you here. I mean to me it is I look at the findings. You work with them, fix them, the ones that you agree with. The ones you don’t agree with then debate them on that.
But do you all talk, seriously? I know you are going to say yes, but do you really talk to each other before you come to this committee hearing?
Mr. Borkowski. First of all, Chairman Cuellar, I do agree with most of the GAO findings. What I look for in the GAO is whether they found something I didn’t already know, okay? So I agree with the findings. I might disagree with some of the technical or packaging of it, but I agree wholeheartedly with the findings. The GAO has identified weaknesses in this program.
Yes, we do talk. Now, we don’t get together before the day of the hearing and compare notes. But the GAO is with us all the time. We have many exchanges of data. They interview us for their findings. They come in and they tell us what they are seeing and ask us, are we aware of it? Have we seen it?
Mr. Hite and I are not, you know, drinking friends, but he does come into the office from time to time——
Mr. CUÉLLAR. Maybe you should be drinking friends.
Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, maybe we should.
[Laughter.]
Mr. BORKOWSKI. In fact, that is not a bad idea. But he does come in and share his ideas on—not on every an every week basis but probably every couple of months. So yes, we do compare notes.
Mr. CUÉLLAR. Okay. Let me just give you, again, my personal opinion. I appreciate your attitude because we have had other folks in the past, and I am not talking about your program, but other folks that are very defensive when it comes to the GAO.
I like your attitude as, you know, whether it improves, doesn’t improve, you know, I like that attitude. So I just, Mr. Borkowski, I appreciate that type, and I thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul for 5 minutes.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for being here today, and I think I felt like we just did this a few weeks ago. But I don’t really need to tell you all about the threats that exist at the border. There is a war going on.
We have U.S. officials targeted in Nuevo Laredo, Juarez. We had a deputy sheriff in Arizona shot. We just had a shooting in the El Paso, Juarez border. Every day we hear a news story about some violent killing. More people died in Mexico at the hand of the drug cartels than the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan combined.
So my constituents and the American people, they get frustrated and they want this to happen now. When they hear 2016, 2017 and I know all of you understand this, that to them that is not acceptable. I don’t think it is either. I think we can do better.
I think Mr. Borkowski, you and Mr. Fisher have a—being new to the scene have a great opportunity to get this done right. There are some good technologies out there. I think, you know, I showed a video of Block 1 last hearing and it seems to be working relatively well. The agents seem to like.
As I understand your testimony, by the end of June, Mr. Borkowski you will have an assessment on that?
Mr. BORKOWSKI. Not of that. By the end of June what we will have done is this so-called quantitative science-based assessment to say with SBInet we expect it to do, compared to what other technology could do, what SBInet would cost to do it, what other technology would cost to do it. What is the best trade-off in cost and benefit for Arizona? That is the end of June.
In terms of taking the experience of the agents, and which has been very encouraging, but it is not quantitative. It is subjective. So to put that in other words what the agents are seeing and doing they like. What we don’t know is, are we seeing and doing all the things that we are supposed to be seeing and doing?
That is the system acceptance testing we talked about that would be completed for Tucson-1 in September. So we will combine that. That will be measurable. We will have some measures. We will
combine that with the qualitative assessments of the agents and we will characterize the system.

Mr. McCaul. Okay, so by the end of September you will have a better idea——

Mr. Borkowski. Yes.

Mr. McCaul [continuing]. On it? I appreciate your comprehensive approach. I think there are a lot of good technologies out there. I think as Congressman Cuellar and I talked about we have seen—well, you and I took a trip down to the border and saw technologies that we are using in Afghanistan on the Pakistan borders that the taxpayers already paid for.

It seems to me we ought to be using that. Not duplicate efforts and use that same technology on the southwest border where it is needed. I think you agree with that, got good sensor technologies, surveillance technology.

We saw an operation the other day that uses radio frequency to shut down vehicles, boats. I mean think about the applications that that would have. So I think you are smart to look at all the menu of technologies out there and to using best for the taxpayer.

UAVs, do you—and Mr. Fisher and Borkowski, do you value the use of UAVs down there?

Mr. Fisher. Yes, Congressman, we do.

Mr. McCaul. I would like to see more of them down there. Would that be helpful to your mission?

Mr. Fisher. Yes, Congressman, it would.

Mr. McCaul. We just, you know, we have several in Arizona but not enough in Texas in my view where I come from.

I know my time is limited, but I wanted to follow up on something, Mr. Borkowski, you said, and that is we can't secure the border with just technology. I think technology is an important piece. The fence is by and large finished except for those parts litigated. Can you explain what other—what else you were talking about?

Mr. Borkowski. Well, what we are talking about here is technology, tactical infrastructure which includes fence but also things like roads and lights and then personnel. So technology, what we use technology primarily for is to give us an awareness of what is going on.

Technology can't respond to that awareness. By the way, people can give us that awareness. So there is a trade-off there between what can I have technology do, what I have people do, for example.

Mr. McCaul. I agree, but the President’s budget basically proposed a decrease in SBInet down to $574 million from the previous year funding of $800 million, and cuts to Border Patrol agent staffing. I don't think that is the right direction.

Now, I know that the President just came out recently and I commend him for it, that $500 million emergency spending and 1,200 National Guard. Did the President talk to you, Mr. Fisher, about this proposal?

Mr. Fisher. No, sir. The President did not speak to me about that.

Mr. McCaul. No. You are the chief of the Border Patrol, right?

Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. Okay. Don’t you think it would be good to get your input in terms of how many National Guard are needed on the southwest border?

Mr. Fisher. Well, I can tell you, sir, that my requirements, operational requirements that I get from the field, the chiefs in the field, my collective staff here in headquarters, gets packaged with all of CBP’s requirements for border security efforts. It gets funneled through the Secretary, so ostensibly my requirements are being heard. I am just not doing it personally.

Mr. McCaul. Do you think 1,200 is sufficient?

Mr. Fisher. Twelve hundred, sir of the——

Mr. McCaul. Additional National Guard?

Mr. Fisher. Up to 1,200 National Guard will help us and in those priority areas to achieve higher levels of what we tactically define as operational effective control of the border.

Mr. McCaul. The Governor of my State has requested a thousand just on the Texas and Mexico border. My constituents are very frustrated about the use of the National Guard. They don’t understand why they can’t do what they are trained to do down there. That they are basically assigned to desks and they push paper as opposed to providing security on the border.

I share in that frustration. I know there are some legal obstacles to that, but what do you see as the use of the National Guard on the border?

Mr. Fisher. Well, sir, and certainly I wouldn’t argue with your constituents’ perception with respect to what the Guard may or may not be able to do. I will tell you that they add value.

What we have seen in using the Guard over the years, we use them in many cases to perform services such as auto mechanics, surveillance operators for some of the camera systems Mr. Borkowski has mentioned.

Because what that does, that allows a Border Patrol agent who is currently doing that to then free them up to go and do the patrols that have and those agents have the arrest authority where the National Guard does not.

They also provide in terms of entry identification teams. What that means is we have National Guard members who, along with Border Patrol agents, get up to a high point where perhaps we don’t have the technology solution yet. They perform a valuable function detecting that which we can’t see otherwise so that Border Patrol agents can then respond.

It increases our capacity to not only have some situational awareness that reduces those vulnerabilities with those additional force multipliers on the ground. So they do add value to our operations in my opinion.

Mr. McCaul. Well, I hope you can fully utilize their experience because they have tremendous experience. They could be, you know, brought to bear on the border.

I look forward to working with the two of you more in the future. You are, again, you are new to this so we are not going to blame the new guy. But I think we have a good opportunity as well in terms of fixing this problem.

With that I yield back.

Mr. Carney. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the other gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for appearing today. I especially thank you, Mr. Fisher, because you are a part of the front line. I don't think you get enough of indications, if you will, that you have a tough job and you are trying to do it as best you can.

So I appreciate what you are trying to do under exceedingly difficult circumstances, and you are to be commended. Thank you.

I would like to start with the basic premise from which securing the border has to emanate. That premise is this, a definition of secure. When we say we want to secure the border, the public hears "prevent people from entering." That is what the public hears.

What have we codified as the definition of securing the border? Who is best suited to do this? If you want to raise a hand I will recognize you or you will just start talking?

Mr. FISHER. I will start that, sir, and thank you for the comments and thank you for your continued support on our mission. I, too, have been thinking over the years and more recently over the last few months about securing the border, and hearing also both, you know, within the organization as we look at our strategy and what that means.

We do have tactical definitions by which we measure that because each and every day the field chiefs along with their field commanders assess to what extent are they achieving the objectives? We start there from an operational perspective.

What that tells us is when we look at prevention, we look at identification and classification and responding and all the things we try to measure how well we are doing against that, the ultimate objective and what we are trying to accomplish ultimately, is to be able to reduce the likelihood that dangerous people and dangerous capabilities enter between the ports of entry.

Now, what you didn't hear when—also is thrown in to secure the border, is sealing the border. What is interesting when you look at as measures and what is it that we are trying to accomplish and be measured with? There is an expectation certainly, and then there are areas, for instance, where we have detection capability, and we have infrastructure.

We have the vast majority of Border Patrol agents, and we have those areas we have gained effective operational control. Again, the highest operational and tactical definition which tells us levels of activity in terms of how many people are coming in and how many people are we arresting?

Even in some of those areas, the vulnerabilities exist when they tunnel underneath us, when they use ultralights to go over top. So all of a sudden we start, again, adjusting and trying to anticipate what that threat is going to do because it is a dynamic threat environment in which we are faced.

So when you say securing the border, I can put it in terms of the Arizona Corridor, for instance, where when I was a Border Patrol agent last there, just a short 10 years ago, there was over 420 arrests in a particular area.

Then you compare that with today, and I am not suggesting that 240 apprehensions last year was good. I am just saying the com-
parative that would suggest that we are doing something in reducing the likelihood.

Because what we are seeing also as we reduce the likelihood that those dangerous people and dangerous capabilities can come in, we also are able to move some of that threat and put them out into some areas where we do have time. Try to get them out of those urban areas where historically they have operated.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, sir. I have one additional question and I would like for Mr. Hite and Mr. Krone to respond to this question. If the plan is 100 percent effective, what percentage of people will we prevent from entering the country?

We will start with you, Mr. Krone, if you would please.

Mr. KRONE. Let us see, it is a great question. I can tell you on a given day what the radar will do, what the camera will do. I can tell you the performance that we have observed. I can talk about probabilities of detect and probabilities to I.D. that individual once we detect them. Those are all parameters of the system, right, that Boeing has been asked to design.

But I don't, as the contractor, have the ability to answer the whole question. When you combine tactical infrastructure, the Border Patrol agents and the technology of what that overall number would be, that is really a composite view of the border which I think is best addressed by the Customs and Border Patrol.

But I would be happy to go——

Mr. GREEN. How likely is——

Mr. KRONE [continuing]. Through the specifications of the operating——

Mr. GREEN. No, no, no, no.

Mr. KRONE [continuing]. But that doesn't address your question.

Mr. GREEN. I understand. My time is very limited. Now, I am already over, but let us move to Mr. Hite and perhaps Mr. Fisher, but Mr. Hite, 100 percent effective. Do you have some guesstimation, estimation, prognostication as to what percentage of persons will be prevented from entering?

Mr. HITE. No, sir.

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Fisher.

Mr. FISHER. Sir, I will tell this committee and quite honestly that I cannot guarantee with any amount of technology, personnel, or infrastructure that nobody will ever penetrate the borders between the ports of entry either underneath, over, or by the air.

What I can guarantee is our continuous efforts, again, in working with that right combination, working with the intelligence community and identifying that threat. In cases where we do have somebody that comes across the border that we will have the capacity and the capability to respond and mitigate any potential impact against that threat.

Mr. GREEN. Well, the reason I ask is because it would seem to me that if we are going to spend billions of dollars we ought to have some goal, some idea as to what we will ultimately accomplish after spending billions of dollars.

So let us give Mr. Borkowski a chance to—an opportunity. Can you shed some light? Will we prevent 75 percent, 85 percent?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. I can't——
Mr. Green. Ten percent? What percentage of persons will we prevent from coming into the country if our plan is 100 percent effective?

Mr. Borkowski. A couple things, Congressman. By the way, I can't give you a specific number. I can say this. Border enforcement at the border is not enough in and of itself, okay? So we are talking about securing the borders themselves, but there are other factors that impact preventing people from coming across there, which is why there is an—and I am not commenting on the policy, but I have to emphasize there is interior enforcement. There are immigration reform issues with this.

So we are talking about border security. The goal of border security at the border is to know what is going on to some high level of confidence across that whole border, and to have the opportunity to respond to that knowledge as we see fit when we see fit. So that is what our technology is designed to give us, knowledge of what is going on.

Mr. Green. Sir, may I just indulge for one additional person, please? Mr. Hite, did you respond?

Mr. Hite. Yes, sir.

Mr. Green. Your opinion is again?

Mr. Hite. That I didn't have the answer to your question.

Mr. Green. Do you as a person who works with this closely, do you believe that we should have an answer to that question? That we should have some goal?

Mr. Hite. Well, I believe that we should have a goal. I think a goal in the terms that you were asking about with that level of precision is—would be very, very difficult if not impossible to have. It is a very complicated equation.

Mr. Green. All right, thank you very much. Thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Carney. Thank you.

The Chair now recognizes my friend from Alabama, Mr. Rogers for 5 minutes.

Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chief, back in 2005 when we—or 2006, when we authorized the ramping up of your forces from 12,000 to 18-3 or -5, I can't remember what it was, I said then I didn't believe that was enough. That I believed that we needed to be in the—below the mid-20s? Do you believe you are adequately staffed for the mission?

Mr. Fisher. Given where we are now with about 20,000 Border Patrol agents, at this point with the increase of the technology as we are seeing over time and the right deployments, currently that is what we are assessing as well.

I can also tell you, sir, and this is a point that is worth mentioning is of those additional 6,000 Border Patrol agents back then, or 6,000 Border Patrol agents, a lot of those agents now are having levels of maturity—

Mr. Rogers. Right.

Mr. Fisher [continuing]. Post-training so their value in the force-multiplying capability is going to be enhanced over the next few years. So that is why I am measured because it is not just the numbers. It is what we are seeing as it relates to the training, the
maturity level, the additional technology, and then what we are seeing as those benefits.

So for right now as we look at, you know, personnel, technology, and infrastructure, as everybody has mentioned here, you know, the other critical piece for our organization is a new way of thinking which suggests that not just those three things are going to get us operational control, however that is defined.

It is that we look at our strategy. We take a look at the difference between gaining that control as well as sustaining that. Where is the emphasis with the personnel and technology within a sustainment strategy in comparison to the way we have applied it over the years to be able to gain control in some of these areas, so——

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I want to talk about strategy in a minute. In answering the question from Mr. McCaul a few minutes ago about UAVs, I am curious, do you all use air ships at all along the border that could meander and loiter for weeks at a time?

I am not talking about the aerostats that are tethered. I am talking about what I call a blimp but the military uses them like in Afghanistan, eyes in the sky? Do you all use that platform?

Mr. FISHER. I don't believe we do, sir.

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Borkowski.

Mr. BORKOWSKI. We don't, although we have spoken to folks representing that to kind of put into our menu of options. But we don't currently use them.

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, you know, early on we saw the inherent problems with the cameras on poles. I know you all have a fancier name for them, but that is what they are. It just seems like that this is an asset that we ought to be incorporating because it does allow you to see over into Mexico and see what is gathering and have a pretty good view from our side as well.

So I would be interested in your thoughts about that at some other time. I may have you come by and visit with me.

I also heard Mr. McCaul talk about the fact that the 700 miles of fencing that was authorized and appropriated, which only half of it is pedestrian fencing, has been pretty much completed. Is that accurate?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. ROGERS. How much more do you need of pedestrian fencing? How much more fencing do you need now that you—now that we have used up what we have appropriated and authorized? What would be the next ask?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, Congressman, we are in the process of assessing that right now, matter of fact. Going back to some of the evaluations and what my staff is currently doing at my request is taking a look at requirements based on what we know with the projections for SBI.

Going back and revisiting the personnel, technology, and infrastructure piece because one of the things I want to be able to do is we have basically one operational, almost two operational cycles, if you were, 2 years to see what that pedestrian fence, what that vehicle barrier has done with respect to our ability to achieve those levels of operational control.

Where have the traffic gone, and in some of those areas——
Mr. ROGERS. When do you expect to have that assessment?
Mr. BORKOWSKI. Probably within the next few months, sir.
Mr. ROGERS. By the end of this calendar year?
Mr. BORKOWSKI. By the end of the calendar year into the next year when we are talking about our operational planning cycle, yes, sir.
Mr. ROGERS. You will be able to talk about not only what you need as far as fencing but staffing?
Mr. BORKOWSKI. Yes, sir.
Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. I wanted to visit strategy before my time is up. I noticed in January Secretary Napolitano announced a DHS-wide review of SBInet and its alternatives. In February of this year the budget request, it included a $225 million cut for border technology.
Then the following month, in March, Secretary Napolitano froze SBInet funds and transferred $50 million to other technology. In May, President Obama announced a request of $500 million in emergency funds to boost the border security and deployment of National Guard.
This is for Chief Fisher. Did they talk with you about any of these before they made these decisions? Was this part of a strategy is what I am after?
Mr. FISHER. I have been in discussions with both the CBP leadership and the Department leadership about requirements, about, you know, strategy and what we are doing with respect to the threat. I don't know how much of that was part of those specific items that you had mentioned, sir.
Mr. ROGERS. Well, and I understand the idea of a strategy——
Mr. FISHER. Yes.
Mr. ROGERS. A little while ago my colleague from Texas asked Mr. Borkowski a question about, you know, best-case scenario, and you said you didn’t have one. It just really seems to me that as a part of your plan that you kind of ought to have an idea of when you are going to achieve certain milestones and objectives, best-case and worst-case.
I mean, I just think it is fundamental. So I was kind of maybe uncomfortable to hear you don't have a best-case scenario. For what that is worth I hope that you all will work toward that goal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I yield back.
Mr. CARNEY. Thank you, Mr. Rogers.
Interesting testimony so far, but I am not surprised by anything I don’t think, but Mr. Borkowski, what is going to happen to equipment that has already deployed if the Secretary finds we are not going to continue with SBInet? What is the plan for that?
Mr. BORKOWSKI. Well, under the nature of a contract like this the hardware that is already built because it is a cost-reimbursable contract, if we shut everything down we own it. Then the question for us is do we continue to operate it or not?
Now, in Tucson-1 where we have turned this over since February to the Border Patrol while we are waiting to do the testing, we are getting value out of it. So my anticipation would be we would operate it to whatever level it is effective.
The question, as I suggested earlier is how effective is it? But it is somewhat effective. So I don’t think, although we haven’t con-
cluded, I don’t think it is likely we just rip it all apart and not use it. I suspect we would use what we have got but we wouldn’t build any more. That would be the issue.

Mr. CARNEY. Would you then integrate it with other technologies that you are assessing now or what are you assessing now actually?

Mr. BORKOWSKI. All right. The immediate question for the assessment is do we need to rethink the basic technology strategy, which was let us deploy SBInet in some incarnation along the whole border? That will be the meat of our technology investment.

The question is, is that really the right technology in the right places? Or are there better mixes and matches, including things like UAVs, which really weren’t in that trade. So the assessment is do—should we rethink that baseline?

Was that really the right way to define the technology contribution to border security? Or can we come up with something that is a little bit more rational that is tailored to each area of the border?

Some of those might be things like SBInet, but some of them might be a couple of mobile surveillance systems, a camera tower, a UAV, you know, a blimp. Okay? So that is the plan.

Now, that is going to take a little while to frame that for the whole border, which is why I think we are all frustrated because you would like me to have that today and, frankly, I can’t tell you I do. So that is what we are talking about assessing.

My expectation is that we would not end up with SBInet all along the border. Already that doesn’t look like a wise thing to do. It may make some sense. We don’t know yet. It may make some sense in some places. So that is the plan.

In terms of integrating, that is a longer-term question because if I have UAVs and mobile surveillance systems and so forth, the question would be is there utility in taking all of that information, sending it to one place and doing something called—like data fusing it? It is very expensive, but it has benefit.

So that would be a vision for the future. The first question is get technology there in the first place. The second question is can I do something to enhance the utility of that technology through things like integration and fusion?

Mr. CARNEY. Well, the future is now. I think we understand that. Chief Fisher, you know, you are supposed to have about 655 miles or so under surveillance with this technology by now, and it is—we are down to 53—or we are at 53 miles roughly. That leaves a big gap. I mean, some of that the technology was supposed to account for fewer Border Patrol agents, right?

I mean they were supposed to do the work that more agents on the ground should do. What have you done to fill in that gap to compensate for that shortage of folks on the ground?

Mr. FISHER. Well, we would deploy Border Patrol agents in there to do the detection capability and/or mobile surveillance systems, mobile war scopes. We would commonly deploy and redeploy those resources within an area of operation on a daily basis anyway.

So the fact that a particular SBInet system isn’t doing that, we are compensating because a threat may still be there and we have to reduce that vulnerability in other ways.
Mr. CARNEY. No, I understand that you are compensating, but do you have adequate forces? I mean—I am kind of re-asking Mr. Rogers’ question here. Do you have enough folks on the ground to fill the gap that should have been filled by SBInet?

Mr. FISHER. We are currently assessing that as well, Mr. Chairman, matter of fact, and one of the things we are looking at as part of the strategy is defining corridors of operation. Then identifying and prioritizing those corridors to be able to match the adequate resources against a particular threat in a prioritized fashion.

So to suggest that we have that all across my answer would be no, we don’t. But then again, going back with what Chairman Cuellar had mentioned is we have the finite resources and with respect to the taxpayers’ dollars.

How do we then deploy those resources in the appropriate way to be able to achieve the stated objectives at the most cost-effective way of doing that? That is what I am charged with, sir, and that is what we are assessing right now.

Mr. CARNEY. We cannot wait for your answer, frankly. How much input do you have as Border Patrol into what Boeing is doing now?

Mr. FISHER. I don’t work directly with Boeing personally myself. I do——

Mr. CARNEY. But the CBP does?

Mr. FISHER. Oh, absolutely. Matter of fact, I meet frequently with Mr. Borkowski. There are Border Patrol agents assigned to his staff. He is clear as far as what my operational requirements are as it has being communicated to me from our field leadership. He constantly checks my thinking just to make sure that what he is hearing is consistent with what the discussions that he and I have had.

Mr. CARNEY. Okay, thank you.

I will recognize Mr. Cuellar for 5 minutes.

Mr. CUELLAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, just a quick observation, if we want to do something—I think that if the private sector wanted to do something or Government wanted to do something, I think the first thing we would do looking at the big picture is do the assessment as to what we want to do, what we want to cover, what technology will be used in different areas, and then you get to work.

In this case, and I know you are new, Mr. Borkowski. I appreciate it. I really—because like I said I really like your attitude. I really do—is it looked like we got into the project and started working on it and then when Mr. Rogers or myself or other folks ask you well, you know, what do we need for the rest? Oh, we haven’t gotten to that assessment yet because we are trying to work on this.

Quite honestly I don’t think we gave Boeing the right directions, you know? You know, I want Boeing to succeed on this, and I know there have been some issues, but did we do the assessment for the whole border and following Ms. Miller it is not only the southern border but the northern border, but right now we are focusing on the priority which the southern border is.

Did we do the overall assessment because everything I have been hearing so far is well, I can’t give you a short-term. I can give you
the worst-case scenario but I can’t give you the best-case scenario. We haven’t gotten to the assessment. We are still looking at that.

I mean I would ask you all to really step back, do the long-term assessment, see what works in south Texas, what works in California, what works in New Mexico, what works in that area?

Work with our new chief and do that. I know you all have been doing that, but we have been asking you, and the responses we have been getting back is well, we haven’t gotten to that assessment on that.

I think that would be more fair to Boeing or any other company that you are working with to say this is the overall assessment. This is what we need. Go ahead and give us the best product or service in this case.

I would ask you all to really work together on that assessment because otherwise Mr. Rogers and myself, Mr. Chairman and other folks, we ask you for that assessment but you are telling us well, we haven’t got to that.

I know you are new. But I would ask you to look at that and work with us on the committee so we can help you do that overall assessment. That is it. No answer requirements, just hopefully saying, “Yes, I will. We will work on it.” Thank you.

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Chief, I want to follow up on that a little bit. I serve on the Armed Services Committee as well, and one of the things I found in the years I have been there is you are never going to get a general to tell you he needs something separate from what the President’s budget says or what the Secretary of Defense is saying.

I don’t appreciate that. It is unfair to the Congress to not be able to get a fair answer from a commanding general as to what they need in wartime so that we can provide it.

I offer that back up to say this. We need to know if you need more agents. No matter what the Secretary wants or what the President wants, if you feel like you need more agents, you need to tell the people on this committee so we can get them for you.

So I ask, when you say you haven’t got your assessments yet, do you just not want to tell us? Or do you really not know if you need more people or not?

Mr. FISHER. I can tell you, sir, my response to your earlier question about identifying the requirements to—under our operational definition is to achieve effective operational control. It is not a numerical equivalent of 19,000 or 25,000.

Not—and even if the threat remained the same, which it doesn’t by the way, and all things were being equal with respect to the terrain along the southwest border, which it isn’t, and the northern border, is trying to figure out what is that right combination?

I mean and sometimes I even get frustrated with my staff when they say well, chief, it depends. It depends, you know, that right combination of personnel——

Mr. ROGERS. Right.

Mr. FISHER [continuing]. Technology and infrastructure. What is interesting is now that we started over the last few years receiving that, we are starting to see the benefits of that. So I think we are
in a better position over this next year and the following year to assess what that combination is.

That is why I was mentioning earlier in some of those areas where we have achieved by our tactical definition effective operational control. Now the question is: Okay, what is it going to take to sustain that? Because the thought is within our strategy, it is going to take more resources in that combination to gain control than it is to sustain it.

So when we look at those areas and we start developing a sustainment strategy and what that entails, what I am expecting is that we will be able to redeploy some of those resources into other areas where we are gaining control.

So that is why the number may at some point be okay, but we are using it in a lot more flexible manner. We are being a lot more mobile with our response capabilities because now we do have the situational awareness and the detection with the technology piece.

We have the persistent impedance that the infrastructure gives us. So now we are using our personnel smarter. We are using our air assets smarter. So we are coming up with a force that we are a lot more flexible against those threats.

Mr. Rogers. Well, you know that on its face what is happening right now with the National Guard being sent back down there it gives us the impression that you need more staffing, maybe in support capacities. May not have to be agents, but you see my point?

Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rogers. I would like to know do you have a problem after you complete your assessment giving us your unvarnished opinion notwithstanding how the President or the Secretary would feel about it?

Mr. Fisher. No, Congressman, I wouldn’t have any—I told this committee in my first testimony that any questions that you pose to me I will give my honest answer and assessment to that. I mean, if there are certain circumstances in my tenure as the chief that I can’t answer a question I will tell you that as well, sir.

Mr. Rogers. But you do understand how we would have concerns when we see the National Guard having to be mobilized to come out and help you all, that maybe you need more of your own people and not having to have the National Guard?

Mr. Fisher. Oh, I understand those concerns——

Mr. Rogers. Okay.

Mr. Fisher [continuing]. Sir, yes.

Mr. Rogers. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Carney. Thank you, Mr. Rogers.

Mr. Krone, every deadline that has been set for SBInet has been missed. What do you account for the failure of the system to meet the deadlines and what methodologies do you use to actually calculate those time frames that you are trying to do something?

Mr. Krone. Thank you, Chairman. First, let me point out that the schedule that we discussed 3 months ago relative to completion of systems acceptance testing for both Tucson and Ajo, we have held those schedules. Although we are not celebrating, there actually have been some milestones over the last 4 or 5 months that we have beat. Not by a lot but by some.
I think that is the cumulative result of applying sound management practices to the program, some of which were pointed out by the GAO and a lot of rigor that has been brought to the program by Mr. Borkowski.

As I said before, I have been associated with the program for about 3 years now. We went on this spiral development journey to do something that had not been done before.

That is net together a series of sensor towers with a common operating software and put Border Patrol agents in the loop to work interactively with the system and fielded Border Patrol agents, integrating commercial off-the-shelf into a relatively harsh environment in the southwest border.

We learned a lot along the way about how individual components, which were well-characterized in and of themselves, when combined together in this operational scenario would perform. In many areas we were disappointed—I know the committee was—in the performance of this total end-to-end system.

So collectively in partnership with our customer we made decisions about do we deploy the system as is, if you will, out of the box, strung together? Or do we spend some time to try to improve the performance of the system and therefore delay its systems acceptance testing and eventual hand-over?

So these were, if you will, deliberate decisions that we made collectively with our customer to get the system right before we turned it over to the Border Patrol for their use.

Mr. CARNEY. Understood. So we decided to take more time and change the goals a little bit, or to a certain degree change the parameters, which it was not how it was originally sold. We, you know, we have had this discussion before——

Mr. KRON. Yes, sir.

Mr. CARNEY [continuing]. And which becomes an issue that we are, you know, the guardians of the taxpayers' money and, you know, we said yes to this. Somebody said yes to this and we want it as sold.

Mr. Borkowski, going back to alternatives, how—are you seriously considering expanding, say, the Predator fleet or things like Shadows, you know, smaller UAVs, UAS' to get more—you are not going to control ground with vision, but you can certainly point folks in the direction to do that?

Mr. Borkowski. Yes. In fact, we are seriously considering it, although those decisions are actually going to be made by folks like Chief Fisher. Somebody asked earlier about, you know, do we have a dialogue? He is actually the boss.

Mr. CARNEY. Right.

Mr. Borkowski. He sets what we need and how we use it. But yes, we have had the small UAVs, certainly, and I know you have probably talked with General Castellaw and you know his view and the importance of UAS and UAVs. So yes, we are seriously considering those.

Mr. CARNEY. Okay, very good. Now, a number of my colleagues asked questions, and I will end with this because we have actually got to go vote. On the time table for your assessments, you know, we ask questions that have—you probably should have anticipated
a while ago actually. In the—you haven’t done the assessments for us.

So we would like, the next 30 days, assessments on, for example, you know, best- and worst-case scenarios of deployment. Because we, you know, we actually have—when are we going to be able to control the border? Because coming up some time in the foreseeable future we are going to have to vote on things like immigration reform.

We can’t do that until we have operational control of the border, until we understand that. I know maybe they go hand-in-hand. Maybe they are part and parcel of one another, but you are in a position to provide us with information and we would love that.

We would also love your schedule on your testing coming up. You know, what is going to happen? When are the dates of the testing? What are your parameters for testing? You know, so we have something to also have a metric to assess by. Okay?

You know, hopefully this is as frustrating for you as it is for us here. We have got to get this right. You know, we have a long less-than-secured border, and I am not going to say completely unsecured because I think what CBP is doing is remarkable, to be honest. I mean, my hat is off to you guys all the time.

But in the end we have to be the stewards of the taxpayers’ dollars, of the resources that we have available and protect this Nation. The threats are increasing rather than decreasing. Until we do that we cannot consider this homeland secure.

That ends this hearing for this morning. We will have other questions and we will submit them in writing, and I am—please encourage you to give us a prompt response. We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the subcommittees were adjourned and the hearings were concluded.]