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[H.A.S.C. No. 111–147]

HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

HEARING HELD
MARCH 25, 2010

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

58–295 WASHINGTON : 2010

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FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 25, 2010.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Today, our committee will continue its posture hearings.

Admiral Robert Willard, Commander of the United States Pacific Command [PACOM]; General "Skip" Sharp, Commander of United States Forces in Korea [USFK].

At the outset, let me welcome both of you back to our committee and thank you for your excellent leadership. We are downright proud of you. We all thank the troops that you lead along with their families and the incredible service and personal sacrifice that they have.

There is an ever-present danger that we in Washington are so focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan and Iraq that security challenges elsewhere in the world don't get the attention that they merit. More concretely, as a result of the last nine years of operations, the readiness posture of all the combatant commands outside of the Middle East has suffered, creating a high strategic risk. There are clear examples of these problems in the Asia-Pacific, and I believe that we ignore them to our peril.

Let me review just a few of the daunting challenges ahead in the Asia-Pacific area. The rebasing of United States Marines from Okinawa to Guam is one of the largest movements of military assets in decades, estimated to cost over $10 billion. The challenges are there.

Changes planned as part of the move not only affect our bilateral relationship with Japan, they will shape our strategic posture through the critical Asia-Pacific region for at least 50 years, yet the path forward remains unclear.

Japan is reassessing the agreement to move troops from Okinawa to Guam. It does not appear that the budget includes sufficient funds to accomplish the agreement. And the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] has identified problems with the rebasing plans' environmental projects.

We must get this right, and I assure you that this committee will work to make sure that we do.

Last year, North Korea launched a Taepodong–2 missile over Japan, conducted a second nuclear test, kicked out inspectors, pulled out of the Six-Party Talks, and restarted its nuclear facilities. All this occurred in the context of an uncertain leadership and succession environment that may have fed some of these very concerning events.

At the same time, our presence in South Korea is transforming. We are undertaking tour normalizations in Korea and substantially relocating our forces in an effort we will hear about today.

There are also questions about how the new U.S. and South Korean command relationship started in 2012 will work. And I am interested in an update on those issues.

Never to be forgotten in this entire region, of course, is China, which recently suspended high-level military and other contracts with our country in response to a U.S. arms sale to Taiwan. While China announced a defense budget increase for this year, it is less than it has been in the past. Their budget is still growing rapidly, and the linkage between their stated strategic intentions and their actions remain unclear in certain areas.

China conducted an unexpected midcourse missile interception test earlier this year, and reports of cyber attacks from China against Google and other large U.S. companies continue to be troubling. We must be proactively engaged in the Asia-Pacific region on multiple fronts. We must realize that our own actions may well influence the choices and actions of others.

We must be able to pursue opportunities for security cooperation with regional allies and partners. And that is very important. At the same time, we must ensure that our force posture allows us to deter or to confront any security challenge that might emerge in that part of the world.

We have difficult work to do. I am pleased that the Department of Defense [DOD] and this Administration have already taken a number of positive steps in this direction.

I now turn to my Ranking Member, my friend, Buck McKeon, the gentleman from California, for any statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Today, we conclude our series of posture hearings with the Commanders from U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea. I would like to welcome back Admiral Willard and General Sharp, both of whom have traveled great distances to be with us this morning.

I am glad we were able to spend the whole week here so we wouldn't have to ask you to come back again.

Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership and service to our Nation, and please pass on my gratitude to our extraordinary military

men and women who are serving in the Asia-Pacific region to protect Americans' national interests.

Gentlemen, you are no strangers to this committee. Admiral Willard, when you were here a couple of months ago, we had an opportunity to examine the Administration's policy toward China and how such a policy is aligned with our overall approach to the region.

Let me begin with where our discussion left off in January—with my speculation, or rather my fear, that the China threat would be downgraded to justify last year's and future cuts to key defense programs. According to open-source reports, the White House National Security Council [NSC] directed U.S. intelligence agencies to lower the priority placed on intelligence collection for China.

If true, I am interested in hearing what impact, if any, this would have on PACOM's ability to understand China's military modernization. You can provide this information in a classified format if you prefer.

Now, turning to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR], when we last met, Congress was weeks away from receiving the final draft of the QDR. What we know now is that, unlike the 2006 QDR, which explicitly called out China as having the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States, the most recent QDR understates the requirements required to deter and defeat challenges from state actors, and it overestimates the capabilities of the force the Department would build.

While the QDR did an excellent job of delineating the threat posed by those with anti-access capabilities, notably China, it does little to address the risk resulting from the gaps in funding, capability, and force structure. This is where I would like to focus our discussion.

Admiral Willard, how would the U.S. assess China's intentions and capacity to develop and field disruptive technologies, including those for anti-access and area denial as well as for nuclear, space, and cyberspace? As you know, it is vital for our national security interests that it maintain an upper hand when it comes to America's capabilities to project power in China's neighborhood and reassure our allies in the region.

From the PACOM perspective, do we have the right range of capabilities to counter China's anti-access/area-denial capabilities? How is PACOM adjusting in its scenario planning to ensure we maintain access to the global commons and proximity to Taiwan?

Are we making the necessary investments in updating our scenario planning to take into account advances in these anti-access capabilities in the mid- to long-term?

I think it is critical this committee ensures that we maintain our military superiority in undersea warfare and in environments where there is advanced anti-aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, and cyber and space threats. China is not the only nation of concern, but it is one that requires our immediate attention.

I would like to emphasize that this is not an over-the-horizon problem, but it is a gap that we face today.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you in this regard.

Now, turning to a nuclear-armed, missile-ready, and unstable North Korea. Since last year's posture hearing, North Korea con-

ducted a nuclear test, and we have seen considerable developments in its short-, mid-, and longer-range missile programs.

We know that North Korea has a history of cooperating and proliferating with such nations as Syria and Iran.

Admiral Willard and General Sharp, I hope that you will address the following questions. First, how do we define the outlook of North Korea as both a regional and global threat? How is the United States working with our key allies in the region to expand our defensive capabilities?

Also, as we hear more about increasing demands for missile defense in Europe and the Middle East, I would like to learn what that means for the Asia-Pacific AOR [area of responsibility] and if assets will be taken away from PACOM.

Again, I look forward to an informative and candid discussion, and I thank you for being here.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my entire statement be included for the record where I address other issues facing PACOM and USFK.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the statement will be submitted for the record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 40.]

The CHAIRMAN. Before I ask each of you to testify, we wish to welcome the Admiral's wife, Mrs. Donna Willard, and thank you very much for being with us today.

Admiral, welcome.

STATEMENT OF ADM. ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, so that we can get to the committee's questions sooner, I will keep my remarks brief. But I ask that my full statement be included for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Admiral WILLARD. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the United States Pacific Command and the Asia-Pacific region. Seated behind me, as you have already acknowledged, sir, is my wife, Donna, who has been at my side for 36 years. She is an outstanding ambassador of our Nation and a tireless advocate for the men and women of our military and especially their families.

I also would like to thank you for your interest in our area of responsibility. I have either met many of you en route to the region, or I have followed your travels in the region with great interest. Your presence and interest sends a strong message, and I invite all of you to stop by Hawaii either on your way into the region so my staff and I can brief you on the security environment or on your return trip in order that I may hear your insights from the engagements that you encounter.

Today is my first posture hearing as the Commander of United States Pacific Command. Since taking command last October, I have had the chance to meet with many of my counterparts, travel throughout the region, and exercise several of our contingency plans.

When combined with my previous years of experience in the Asia-Pacific, this has led me to the following conclusions, which I hope that we can expand on during today's hearing.

The Asia-Pacific region is quickly becoming the strategic nexus of the globe as a consequence of its economic expansion and potential. Key to our commitment in the region is our forward-deployed and postured forces. We face constraints in building partner capacity from shortfalls that exist in our security assistance programs.

The United States remains the preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific though China's rising influence is changing regional power dynamics in ways that create both challenges and, I think, opportunities.

Advancing our relationships with our allies and strategic partners is vital to maintaining security in the region. China continues to progress in the rapid, comprehensive transformation of its armed forces, elements of which appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region.

And, finally, India's strategic location, shared democratic values, growing economy, and evolution as a regional power combine to make them a partner with whom we need to work much more closely.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the Asia-Pacific region is a region of great potential and is vital to the interests of the United States. Every day, the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and civilians of Pacific Command are working with our allies, partners, and friends to help maintain this region's security. Our success has been enabled by this committee's long-standing support. You have provided us with the most technically advanced systems in the world and with military quality of life worthy of the contributions of all of this volunteer force.

On behalf of the more than 300,000 men and women of the United States Pacific Command, thank you for your support and for this opportunity to testify on the defense posture of this critical region of the world.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard can be found in the Appendix on page 44.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you.

This is not, by any means, the first appearance of our friend, General Sharp, and I want to welcome you back, and we would love to receive your testimony.

STATEMENT OF GEN. WALTER L. "SKIP" SHARP, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES KOREA

General SHARP. Chairman Skelton and Congressman McKeon and distinguished members of this committee, I do appreciate this opportunity, and I am honored to report to you today on the state of United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces Korea.

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the Korean War. Since 1950, Congress and the American people have made an enormous investment in blood and treasure to first defeat and then deter North Korea aggression. The alliance continues to reap the returns of that investment.

The Republic of Korea bears the majority of the burden of defending itself, and in 2012, wartime operational control transitions from Combined Forces Command to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff [ROK JCS]. Beyond its borders, the Republic of Korea has become an important part of the international efforts to keep peace and respond to disasters. With significant forces deployed to Lebanon, Haiti, the Horn of Africa, and other missions, the Republic of Korea is fast becoming a global strategic ally envisioned by the 2009 Joint Vision Statement signed by Presidents Lee and Obama.

With our long-term commitment of 28,500 troops, we continue to deter aggression and maintain peace not only in the Korean Peninsula but throughout Northeast Asia. Last year, I spoke about three command priorities. And thanks to your support and funding, I am able to share with you the progress that we have made since then.

First, the United States Forces Korea, in the Republic of Korea–U.S. alliance, is prepared to fight and win. I flew here directly from our annual Key Resolve/Foal Eagle combined exercise. This exercise demonstrated that the United States and the Republic of Korea Forces and staffs are trained and ready to fight tonight on the Korean Peninsula.

Second, the Republic of Korea–U.S. alliance continues to grow and strengthen. Militarily, we will be prepared to transition wartime operational control to the ROK JCS on 17 April 2012. In last year's Ulchi–Freedom Guardian exercise, we successfully stood up and tested many of the post-OPCON [operational control] transition command and control structures and organizations.

Through our strategic transition plan, future Ulchi–Freedom Guardian exercises and the final certification exercise will ensure the readiness of the ROK JCS to accept wartime operational control in April of 2012 and the ability of the U.S. Korea Command to become the supporting command.

The Republic of Korea is also deferring a significant portion of U.S. Forces Korea costs. Under the five-year Special Measures Agreement, Korea will provide U.S. Forces Korea with approximately $700 million per year of cost-sharing funds.

My third priority is improving quality of life for the command personnel. We are making substantial progress here, and with Congress' support, we will achieve all of our goals. We are improving the quality of life through two key initiatives. The first is the relocation of U.S. forces.

By consolidating U.S. forces from 105 facilities maintained in 2002 to 48 sites in two hubs, we will make better use of limited resources and be better postured to support our service members and families.

The second initiative toward normalization goes hand in hand with the relocation. As we consolidate bases, we are building world-class facilities in housing that are transforming U.S. Forces Korea from a command where one-year tours are the norm to one where single service members serve for two years, and those with families stay for three.

In the last 2 years since June of 2008, the number of families on the peninsula have increased from about 1,600 to, today, over 3,900 families. By keeping trained military personnel in Korea for normal tour lengths, we retain institutional knowledge and create a more

capable force and are better able to support the alliance and deter aggression and, also, demonstrate our commitment to Northeast Asia.

At the same time, we are eliminating unneeded, unaccompanied tours and building the strong families that are key to retention and the effectiveness in this time of ongoing conflict.

To close, the Republic of Korea–U.S. alliance has never been stronger. The alliance has successfully deterred aggression on the Korean Peninsula for 57 years. In doing so, it has helped to make Northeast Asia a remarkably peaceful and prosperous place.

With the Republic of Korea contributing a substantial portion of the alliance costs, we are maintaining combat readiness and improving the quality of life of our military personnel and their families.

I thank you for supporting the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and DOD civilians and their families serving our great Nation in the Republic of Korea. And I look forward to the questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Sharp can be found in the Appendix on page 83.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.

Admiral, bring us to date on the proposed plan of moving 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam. How is it today? What are the major challenges that you see?

Admiral WILLARD. Mr. Chairman, the Defense Posture Review Initiative, the DPRI, the realignment arrangement with the Government of Japan, has been ongoing for some time, and contains many moving parts, to include the movement of air forces and consolidation from urban areas on the main island of Honshu to other attendant smaller moves throughout Japan.

And as you suggest, one of the main thrusts of this is the relocation of 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam.

Currently in discussions with the Government of Japan is one element of the Marine Corps move that has to do with an airfield relocation at Futenma, which is the rotary-wing Marine Corps lift that is attendant to our Marine Air-Ground Task Force in Okinawa. And this—the new Government of Japan has chosen to relook at the Futenma replacement facility issue, and we are looking forward to their response back, which Prime Minister Hatoyama has contended will be by next month or—excuse me—by the month of May.

So we are looking forward to hearing back from the Japanese on this review.

In our assessment, across Okinawa, having discussed this with the Japanese for about the last 17 years, we believe that the current plan for the Futenma replacement facility is the best plan on the island of Okinawa.

Other issues with regard to the movement of 8,000 Marines to Guam pertains to Guam itself. And as has already been suggested in opening statements, there is an ongoing draft environmental impact study, and we are presently in negotiations with the Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] on criticisms of the EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] thus far which I would be happy to explain in greater detail if you would like. But the EIS is scheduled

right now to be concluded with a Record of Decision by late summer. And we are aggressively pursuing the corrective actions that may come with the discussions with EPA.

But to answer the issues pertaining to the EIS in time, to then execute the budget for Guam that has been established thus far, so we have, you know, the discussion is ongoing with Japan and issues with Guam's infrastructure and others, our EIS process, and the combination of the two and the timing of that, I think, will establish our ability to move forward with DPRI.

The last point that I would make, sir, is that this is a very complex series of moves associated with DPRI. Many moving parts. And in order to achieve it against the timeline and within the budget that has been prescribed, will require the commitments of both the United States Government and the Government of Japan across many departments, in our case, and across multiple ministries in the case of Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you.

General Sharp, you explained the length of tours and the fact that families will be increasing accompanying the troops to South Korea. But would you please tell the committee and bring our committee up to date on the moves within South Korea, what is being built up and from where are they being moved?

General SHARP. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

As you know, several years ago, the Republic of Korea came to the United States and said we would like you to move the forces that you have in Yongsan, where my headquarters is, from Yongsan down to another location further south near Osan Air Force Base.

That was a program called the Yongsan Relocation Program, and we agreed to that. And the Republic of Korea is burdening all of the cost to construct all the facilities, to replace what we have on Yongsan today.

At about the same time, we said we would also like to consolidate forces up north of Seoul, primarily 2nd Infantry Division, and consolidate them also down to what is now becoming called U.S. Army Garrison-Humphreys.

That progress, in order to be able to build up Camp Humphreys—U.S. Army Garrison-Humphreys—is progressing very well. The Republic of Korea has already purchased the land that is needed in order to be able to expand Camp Humphreys. It will expand three times from what it originally was. It will go from a population of about 6,000 military and dependents to over 49,000.

We are on track over the next five or six years to complete all of the construction down there. We will actually start moving down there in 2012 and then phase that in over the next several years following that.

As with the move to Guam, this is very complicated because I have to not only make sure all the facilities are in place but make sure I have unit integrity so that we could fight tonight if we had to. So we are working through, with the Republic of Korea, on a very detailed plan in order to be able to have all of that move complete.

Once consolidated down there, thanks to your support and really the support of the Republic of Korea, U.S. Army Garrison-Hum-

phreys will be an outstanding Army installation. And it should be if you can build it from the ground up, which we are going to be able to do.

So we are on track, and I can report good progress, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. What date do you anticipate it will all be finished?

General SHARP. Sir, again, the goal is within the next five or six years, and I know that is not a definitive date. We are trying to do it as quickly as possible to be able to return this land to the Republic of Korea and to consolidate our forces to improve the quality of life for our service members.

What we are doing now is taking the very detailed engineer work to be able to get all of those moving pieces in place and seeing where we can shorten the time by—I mean, such simple things as creating another access road into Camp Humphreys greatly reduces the amount of time it takes to construct.

I mean, one example is, in 2012 alone, there will be $2 billion worth of construction going into Camp Humphreys. And the number of trucks that are coming in and out of the gates and the number of folks that we have to card to make sure that they have access in is what we are trying to reduce and minimize as much as possible.

But, again, to specifically answer your question, I am very comfortable to say within the next five or six years, it will be complete. But we will have moved a lot of people down there, soldiers down there, well before that as the land and the construction is complete.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

My friend, Buck McKeon.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you for taking us there last year and giving us a chance to see some of that dirt being moved and this air site in Okinawa. That was a good, worthwhile trip to get a hands-on of what was happening in the area.

As I stated earlier, the QDR did a good job of delineating the threat posed by those with anti-access capabilities, most notably China, but it did little to address the risk resulting in gaps in funding, capability, and force structure.

Admiral Willard, from PACOM's perspective, how would you assess China's intentions and capacity to develop and field disruptive technologies, including those for anti-access and area denial? Specifically, can you comment on China's anti-ship ballistic missile capability and how it is evolving?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Congressman McKeon. I can. And thanks for the question.

The China military capacity has been growing, by and large, unabated for the past 10 to 20 years. The past 10 years have been pretty dramatic. And as you suggest, this has included investments in what has broadly been termed anti-access capabilities. Area-denial capabilities is another way to think about it.

And these range from the investments in submarine capabilities to investments in integrated air and missile defense capabilities to, as you suggest, anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities at extended ranges from the mainland of China as well as cyber capabilities

and anti-space capabilities, all of which we have been monitoring very closely for some years.

In terms of China's intentions, one of your questions—it is truly the question that we would endeavor to see answered—the uncertainty that comes with investments of this type generates concern not just for the United States military that has patrolled this region and maintained security in this region, by and large, for the last 150 years, but for the regional allies and partners that we have in the region as well whose own navies, air forces might be challenged by these same capabilities.

So this is a challenge that we are attempting to address with the Chinese that is broader than just the U.S. military and the Western Pacific, but I would offer, the entire Asia-Pacific is interested in understanding what the long-term plans are for capabilities such as you described.

We have worked hard to identify the gaps that you suggest and the insufficiencies that are required to deal with area-denial capabilities such as this, and we continue to. And they range from the way in which we develop our concepts of operations to actual technologies that the program produces.

And Pacific Command continues to provide its input both individually and through its service components to identify the concerns with regard to gaps and insufficiencies as we proceed.

Mr. MCKEON. I think the concerns I have are if we feel like or if it is perceived that we are being pushed back, then neighbors, allies in the area start taking different positions to make sure they have more options. And I think this sets us on a path that we don't want to be on.

What is PACOM doing to ensure that the United States will maintain its current access within the global commons and its proximity to Taiwan?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, sir. And related to the final statement that you made to the China question, we are not being pushed back. I maintain the same forces forward that we have enjoyed, again, for decades in both the sea space and air space.

These are commons that we have maintained a presence in to guard sea lanes of communication that carry over a trillion dollars in commerce per year that not only supports the economy of the United States but the economies of our close allies and partners in the region and China as well.

So our presence is being sustained in the region. And as you suggest, it is very much an assurance to our allies that we are here to stay. And we will continue to work with China over time to attempt to ascertain what their long-term intentions are but, also, to see them emerge in the Asia-Pacific region as a constructive partner, which is truly, I think, all of our desire and all of our intent.

But at the same time, it is very important that it, through our presence, through the application of extended deterrence, and through the partnering and capacity building that we do in the region, that we assure our allies and partners in the region and try to suppress the urge to proliferate weapons and build up armies as a consequence of the concerns that are being generated by this changing dynamic in the Asian area.

Mr. MCKEON. That is very important because we—the question what are their intents, we don't know. And we can never know another person's full intentions or another country's, so it really behooves us to always be prepared.

I am reminded of President Reagan's comments about all the wars in his lifetime never came because we were too strong. So I think it is important that we always maintain that area of strength.

Admiral Willard, General Sharp, I am deeply concerned about North Korea's provocative behavior during the last year. In your judgment, will North Korea return to the Six-Party Talks? If not, beyond our tools of diplomacy and sanctions, what are we doing to expand our defensive capabilities?

And, also, as we hear about increasing demands for missile defense in Europe and the Middle East, what does that mean for the Asia-Pacific AOR? Is it your understanding that assets will be taken away from PACOM?

General SHARP. I will start first with the Six-Party Talks. We highly encouraged Kim Jong-il to come back to the Six-Party Talks. It is the way that I think that he has the opportunity to be able to stop the downward spiral that has happened in North Korea over the last several years.

I do believe that the UN [United Nations] Security Council resolutions have made a difference in North Korea and, again, we hope that Kim Jong-il takes this opportunity.

What we have done specifically on the Korean Peninsula in order to make sure that we are prepared for any contingency from North Korea is along several lines. First, we continue to develop our plans to make sure that we do have the full range of plans to deal with all possible scenarios.

Secondly, we have worked very closely between the ROK JCS and Combined Forces Command in between the U.S. Embassy, led by Ambassador Stevens, and MOFAT [Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade] in order to be able to make sure that we, in South Korea, and we, as the U.S. alliance, along all elements of power, are saying one thing to North Korea. And we work very hard to make sure that that single voice comes out.

I also do believe that, as we move towards OPCON transition, that is strengthening our force and it is clearly demonstrating to North Korea the strength of the Republic of Korea military that they will be ready to take the lead in 2012.

And, again, I am confident along all those lines that we were prepared for North Korea.

Mr. MCKEON. Okay.

Admiral WILLARD. As the United States and the other party members of the Six-Party Talks all encourage and are attempting to bring North Korea back into the talks forum, I would offer that our actions, as General Sharp has already described, the deterrence that is represented by the ROK–U.S. alliance, is a cornerstone of our response to potential aggression from North Korea and has been for 60 years.

I would also offer that our strong alliance with Japan is equally a deterrent and that Japan and Russia and China, the United States and the Republic of Korea, together, as Six-Party members,

offer both the impetus to North Korea to return to talks and, in our teaming, a deterrent value in itself.

And then lastly, we have other issues with North Korea than just on the peninsula. The potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction [WMD] or the proliferation of the delivery systems represented by United Nations Security Council Resolution [UNSCR] 1784 are an example of concerns that we have that North Korea has in the past, and may continue to be, a proliferator.

And then the provocations that we encountered through the sequence of missile tests that occurred last year are another example of the actions that we take in this ballistic missile defense [BMD] area to deal with North Korea and the instability that this regime represents.

On the subject of European ballistic missile defense, I am an advocate of the way ahead in Europe. I think that what the maritime BMD dimension brings to our missile defense capability is very powerful and very flexible. At the same time, as we develop that maritime capability into the future—so this is the number of Aegis ships that we transition to be BMD-capable—and as we develop the missiles themselves that provide our BMD capability and, especially, the follow-on missiles that will greatly expand the envelope and reduce the requirement for as many ships on scene as currently exist—those are the capability developments that I think all of the COCOMs [Combatant Commands] are watching with great interest, very interested to see progress on a timeline.

Thus far, as we have shared ballistic missile assets between Pacific Command, European Command [EUCOM], and Central Command [CENTCOM], this has been manageable. But I would offer that we still are producing the weapons, and we are still producing—you know, transitioning our ships at a pace that must be managed very carefully in order to provide that capability into the future as quickly as we need it.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, General, thank you so much for joining. It is good to see both of you again. And thank you for your service.

Admiral Willard, I wanted to discuss with you the Marine Corps move from Okinawa to Guam. And as you may be aware, this realignment of forces has been a great concern for this committee.

In the end, this committee is dedicated to ensuring that we realign the forces correctly and that it does not adversely impact the residents of Guam. I have been briefed that the Department believes an additional 80,000 military, civilians, construction workers, and their dependents beyond the 180,000 current residents are expected on the island of Guam by the year 2014.

The EPA has reviewed the Department's plans and has expressed great concern that the Department will adversely affect the residents of Guam because of insufficient utility infrastructure. There are additional concerns regarding workforce's housing, medical care, and other community infrastructure.

And of course, I am a great believer in us having a forward presence. Just a couple of questions. With the 80,000 additional resi-

dents in 2014, including 20,000 construction workers and their dependents, do you believe that Guam will be adversely impacted by the Marine Corps relocation? And what steps would you recommend that the Government of Guam take to better prepare for this relocation?

And, finally, what steps should the Federal government be taking to support the Marine Corps relocation? I think that this is a very important move. I think that—I am a great believer in having forward presence with what we see in that area. And maybe you can give us some insight or enlighten us on this move.

Admiral.

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Congressman.

The move is a very important one to me as well. The forward presence of our Marines in Okinawa currently provide great flexibility to General Sharp in terms of responses to the Korean Peninsula, in our obligations in accordance with our alliance and defense agreement with Japan.

These same Marines are knowledgeable of the area of responsibility of the Asia-Pacific region, and they are constantly engaged in capacity building with our partners. They are my first-to-respond forces for non-combatant evacuation operations [NEOs] or for humanitarian assistance and disaster response.

So the III Marine Expeditionary Force, very, very vital as a forward-postured force in the Western Pacific.

The move to Guam of 8,000 of those Marines and their families, in order to maintain that forward posture, very, very important to Pacific Command and, I think, important to the Nation that, as the chairman commented in his opening remarks, that we get it right.

There is no question that the construction pressures on Guam through a port that, thus far, is inadequately suited to handle the shipping and amount of work that is likely to come with the construction efforts in Guam, and that the pressures on infrastructure in Guam will be challenging.

I don't think anyone in the course of our environmental impact study and in the course of the deliberations over the challenges and issues expressed by the Environmental Protection Agency—I think it is acknowledged that Guam infrastructure is suffering from inadequacies now given the population on Guam and that any additions to the population are likely to pressurize its water systems, power systems, waste disposal systems, sewage systems, and the like.

In order to get it right, we are working with the Environmental Protection Agency, but, just this past week, I sent my senior representatives to Guam with Ms. Sutley, the President's environmental adviser, in order that they could see first-hand and listen first-hand to the concerns regarding the outside-the-fence requirements on Guam, the infrastructure concerns that Guam has.

And it is our intention to work closely with the EPA, closely with Ms. Sutley, closely with the Government of Guam, in order to identify where the inadequacies are and then to work across the departments in this Government in order to determine the best solution for the corrective actions that need to be taken as a consequence of this relocation effort.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. The people of Guam are great people, and I don't want them to feel that we are taking them for granted. I

am glad that you are coordinating all these other agencies to support and build a good infrastructure and, like the Chairman said, to do it right.

Thank you so much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentleman from Virginia, Randy Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Willard, thank you for being here.

General Sharp, we thank you for your service.

And, Admiral Willard, let me just begin with you. We received a breakdown of a list of unfunded requirements that the Navy needed. Did you have any part at all in helping to create that list of unfunded requirements for the Navy?

Admiral WILLARD. The impact that our combatant command would have in the Navy's determining a list of unfunded requirements would be based on the IPL, the integrated priority list that I provide into the Joint Staff process, and it is exposed to the Navy, so they will know what Pacific Command's particular requirements and concerns are and, as a consequence, where it has a maritime dimension to it—and the naval staff concurs with that—they will normally include that in their unfunded requirements list if it is not already being attended to in other ways.

Mr. FORBES. By definition, I take it, if it is a requirement, it would be something you need to fulfill your mission, or is there another definition for that requirement?

Admiral WILLARD. I think when we discuss requirements in the Pentagon or as combatant commanders in our regions, we are talking about the needs to fulfill our mission. That said, across the globe, not all of our requirements are necessarily ever being met to the maximum. And as a consequence, we mitigate to the requirements where shortfalls exist or gaps exist.

Mr. FORBES. General Sharp, would you concur? Do you have any role at all in participating in the unfunded requirements that the Army would have? And would you agree with Admiral Willard that they were requirements needed to fulfill the mission?

General SHARP. Yes, sir. I go through the same process. I submit my requirements in order to be able to execute my plans through Admiral Willard who then consolidates them, as he said, and submits them to the Joint Staff.

Mr. FORBES. One of the things that I would ask you both—not today because I don't expect you to have that information now—we are in the business of making sure you have what you need to do your jobs, and when we get that list of unfunded requirements, we assume that they are requirements and we want to try to see how we can get them.

One of my worries is always our ability to assess the risk factors we have of not getting those requirements. I would just ask each of you if you would be kind enough to submit for the record, at some point in time, which of those requirements would impact you and some assessment as to the risk we run if we do not fulfill those requirements.

Could you provide that for us at some later date? Again, don't expect you to have that information——

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, Congressman. I will provide you that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 111.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you very much.

Admiral, the last thing I would like to ask you, one of the things that we always worry and hear about is when we see that spiraling curve of ships that the Chinese are creating and we see a downward move in the ships that we have, how do we have a mechanism that adequately deals with the risk factor of those two curves changing?

And you and I had the ability to talk about this before. And I would just wonder if you could tell us today, one, at what point does quantity start mattering? You know, sometimes we always love to say, well, the quantity is different, but we are looking at capabilities. But at some time, quantity has a role to play there.

Secondly, how comfortable do you feel with our risk assessment mechanisms? I mean, are there weaknesses there? And thirdly, what is the role that modeling and simulation might be able to play in cutting that down?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, sir. Those are excellent questions, all three.

And I think the answer to the first is that quantity has its own quality now. So those of us that have regional responsibilities, and especially the Asia-Pacific which relies so heavily on forward presence and posture and time-distance factors that are profound in this region of the world that encompasses half the globe, that the ability to be present in all of the places that we are required to be demands that certain quantities of force structure be made available to this particular region.

I think the 60–40 split that has been decided upon in terms of submarine force structure and aircraft carrier force structure are examples of the bias toward meeting the quantity demands of Pacific Command.

But, again, to your question, quantity is important to all of us now, I think.

In terms of our ability to, you know, view or quantify our forces into the future, I think the—it will be very important for us to ensure that we identify where the forces must be present, how they must be present, and to describe that back to our, both down to our, service components and back to our leadership in the Pentagon.

And so, once again, I think the ability to gauge risk associated with quantity shortfalls, the importance of being able to characterize the risk that might be attendant to our contingency plans or the risk that might be attendant to our ability to meet our peacetime requirements, are important elements to quantify. And when we account for risk at the unit level and walk it up to a strategic level, there is a compound risk factor that I think needs to be accounted for as well.

And these things are not entirely objective. Sometimes some subjective and difficult, as you have suggested, to understand, to quantify, and to discuss in an apples-to-apples way. I think that modeling and simulation is a mechanism that would assist us in accomplishing that.

So this is the idea that, in a modeling and simulation approach, that risk factors could be incorporated into that quantitative or, in the case of modeling and simulation that occurs in a qualitative way, qualitative fashion.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank both of you gentlemen not only for your service to your country but for making a very long trip back to Washington to testify before the committee.

Admiral, you know, our Nation has got a lot of challenges. I am told that this year, the Social Security Trust Fund starts paying out more than it collects in taxes. Same for Medicare. A trillion dollar annual operating deficit and it just doesn't get any easier when you look at replacement of the *Ohio* class, the Joint Strike Fighter coming on board, et cetera, et cetera.

With regard to the *Ohio* class, the early estimates are is that ship is going to cost in that neighborhood of $7 billion. And unfortunately, my experience here is, if someone tells me it is going to cost $7 billion, it means it is $9 billion by the time it is actually delivered or more.

The primary reason for the *Ohio* replacement is to carrier the D5 missile which travels approximately 5,000 miles. So my question to you as the person with the toughest job in the Navy: Should we be building a sub that fits the D5 missile? Or should we consider—and I want to just use the word "consider"—building a missile that will fit the *Virginia*-class submarine which has proven to be a very good acquisitions programs, and I am told by those who operate those vessels, a fine submarine?

If you are uncomfortable talking about that in public, I would welcome your thoughts in private, but it is a decision that is going to affect shipbuilding budgets starting about the year 2019 in a very significant way. And in the purest terms, in 2019, we can buy a carrier and a sub a year, and there is no money for anything else. And I know that is unacceptable.

Secondly, to Mr. Forbes' comment about—Mr. Forbes, I can assure you today, you are going to have an opportunity to cast a vote to grow the Navy. I am going to put that on the table and give you that opportunity. Okay? We only want to go one way on this committee, and that is for a bigger fleet.

And lastly, General Sharp, I wanted to say this. I like Koreans. I take tae kwon do from a Korean guy. They are smart, diligent, hard-working people. I took the opportunity to visit four of the most phenomenal shipyards in the world. They are all in Korea. It was a humbling experience as a guy who represents shipbuilders to see the money that they have invested in those yards. It is a beautiful modern country.

I mean, most Americans, including myself, have this image from the show "M*A*S*H" of Korea in the 1950s. It looks nothing like the nation now.

Having said all of that, at what point could we declare a victory and bring those 28,000 Americans home? Because, again, that is a

very modern, well-financed country with sharp, hardworking, diligent people and, again, a phenomenal manufacturing base.

So at what point do we still need to be there, in your opinion?

Admiral WILLARD. Congressman, I will begin with your question regarding *Ohio* class, the *Virginia*-class option with regard to replacement for our SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines].

Fundamentally, the missions differ greatly between our fast-attack submarine [SSN] force and our ballistic missile submarine force.

Mr. TAYLOR. I understand that, sir.

Admiral WILLARD. I think that alone calls for a recapitalization of our SSBN force when the time comes. And I take your point that submarines are very expensive——

Mr. TAYLOR. I guess, to my point, do you need a 5,000-mile missile? What is the magic number, if there is such a thing, for the distance that that missile should need to travel in order to fulfill your needs?

Admiral WILLARD. Senator, I think we ought to—I think we ought to——

Mr. TAYLOR. I think that is the question.

Admiral WILLARD. Okay. That is probably a subject more appropriately taken in closed committee.

Mr. TAYLOR. Would you, at some point, get me that answer.

Admiral WILLARD. I will.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Thank you.

General Sharp, to my second question?

General SHARP. Sir, first off, as you just pointed out, the Republic of Korea has greatly advanced since the end of the Korean War. Their military has, likewise, greatly advanced.

And they are taking more and more responsibilities not only for the defense of their own country, as evidenced by the move towards OPCON transition, also evidenced by, since 1994 when the ROK JCS has been responsible for and in charge of OPCON of their forces during armistice, but also what they are doing globally in order to be able to, as I said in my opening statement, to help build peace and security around the world with all the different peacekeeping missions that they are in. They are about ready to go back into Afghanistan.

Having said that, I really do think that presence makes a big difference in any part of the world. And I think that our presence and our teaming with the Republic of Korea for the foreseeable future, just as it has for the last 57 years, will ensure peace and stability in Northeast Asia for the foreseeable future.

So I think our investment of 28,500 troops, which our President and Secretary Gates have said is the force level that we will maintain for the foreseeable future, is a great investment in order to be able to help build the ROK military, as I think we have helped greatly along those lines so that they can globally engage, and to be able to have peace and security remain in Northeast Asia.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank both of you gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen.

The gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for your service.

And to Mrs. Willard, you look much better off than your husband does after those 38 years. You have held up great.

But my question is, going with—being a Marine spouse or a Navy spouse can, at times, be lonely, fulfilling, exhilarating, and just not fun sometimes. So thank you for your service as well.

Tying into Ranking Member McKeon's question, when it comes to access—and I am talking forcible access. Just really quickly, what would you rate our forcible access capability on an A through F grade when it comes to the Pacific?

Admiral WILLARD. We believe that, in our contingency plans, that we can achieve the access required to win those plans.

Mr. HUNTER. So it would be an A-plus then? You can be anywhere that you needed to?

Admiral WILLARD. I would offer that, to be quantitative—I mean, to describe this in the way that you desire, my preference would be to do this in a closed hearing.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Okay. We can do that. That was my question. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen, please.

Mr. LARSEN. Can I have the rest of Mr. Hunter's time? [Laughter.]

Just kidding.

Gentlemen, thanks for coming and helping us out. I want to start with General Sharp. I have to tell you, there is no better advocate for tour normalization in Korea than a spouse from my district. And so when you matched her up with my wife and me—or your predecessor did when we were there last—I heard about it on the way back, so, no better advocate. And I want to ask a question about that with regards to tour normalization.

So we are headed to this, and it is a great idea, but what are the resources that you need, and how are you planning for those resources to accommodate the, you know, two-year and three-year tours?

General SHARP. We are approaching tour normalization in a process to make sure that, as I tell the folks in my command, I don't get ahead of my own headlights because we have got to make sure we have got the right infrastructure from schools, from housing, from medical in order to be able to do the right thing for these families.

So the phases that the Department is going through right now is we are in, if you will, right now the first phase of tour normalization, which is to get the number of families there that I can accommodate with the infrastructure that I have in place, basically, right now.

And that number is about 4,900 families. And, again, we are at about 3,900 right now. The goal is to get to that 4,900 and the services, mainly the Air Force and the Army, are committed to that by the end of, really, next summer. And, again, I am confident that we can get there. We are increasing about 100 families a month in Korea right now.

The next phase is really what we are working through right now with the POM '12–'17 [Program Objective Memorandum 2012–

2017] work that is going on right now in the Department and how quickly we are going to be able to get there. It is also—we have also got to link it to the move down to Camp Humphreys and the completion of Camp Humphreys because, again, that will be the place where we have the majority of Army service members and families. There will be many still down at Daegu, but the big hub is going to be at Camp Humphreys.

So there is going to be some time in there where we are concentrating on moves and concentrating on building that Camp Humphreys infrastructure. And then, again, it gets down to, you know, the resources in order to be able to move forward to get all the facilities needed.

And, again, you will see that, well really, next January when the Department submits the '12–'17 POM.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Thanks.

Admiral Willard, two questions for you. In your testimony, on page 12—as I am leafing through this—on page 12, I think you really wrap up the issue with China—China's interest a peaceful, stable environment that will support the country's developmental goals is difficult to reconcile with the evolving military capabilities that appear designed to challenge the U.S. freedom of action in the region. That is sort of this conundrum that we are in with this relationship with China.

On page three, you talk about the growing presence and influence in the region create both challenges and opportunities. And we have been through some of these—you have talked through some of these challenges. Anti-access, we have talked about the ASAT [anti-satellite] tests, the military modernization.

But I was wondering if you can talk about, you know, what kind of opportunities line up against that. And the final question I would have for you, if you would include separately, is you say we face challenges in building partner capacity in the current patchwork of authorities and programs designed to support our security assistance efforts.

Can you briefly wrap up your answer by talking about what does that patchwork look like and what does it need to look like to be cohesive for it to work for you?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you very much, Congressman Larsen.

In terms of opportunities with China, when you consider the capacity building that has been ongoing, particularly as it relates to the PLA [People's Liberation Army] Navy, the potential for China to contribute constructively to security of the region and to contribute to ongoing prosperity in the region, the protection of commerce and the like is excellent—terrific.

To date, we haven't seen them dedicate their assets to that goal. Although, were they to emerge as a constructive partner, I think the region would be better for it. And when we look across the capabilities that they have produced, their ability to demonstrate a contribution to counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden, their ability to contribute into Haiti, and what that could look like in an ability to contribute into the Asia-Pacific region in our every-eight-week disaster response on average or through the soft areas of humanitarian assistance, I think China has great potential in all of that.

Mr. LARSEN. And, Mr. Chairman, could we get for the record the answer to the third question about security assistance and the patchwork and some of the changes Admiral Willard would like to see happen to make that work better for him?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. If the Admiral would furnish that, please?

Admiral WILLARD. I would be happy to furnish that, sir.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you.

[The information referred to can be found on pages 30 through 31.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thanks, Chairman.

General Sharp, Admiral Willard, thank you so much for your service to our country.

General Sharp, you mentioned the movement of our troops from the northern part I guess towards the demilitarized zone [DMZ] of South Korea down to Camp Humphreys. And I understand that the South Korean Government is paying for those costs.

General SHARP. Sir, they are paying for the cost of rebuilding the facilities that I have at Yongsan where my headquarters is now in Seoul. The cost to consolidate and to move the 2nd Infantry Division, which are in the camps and stations north of Seoul to Camp Humphreys is a shared burden between the United States and the Republic of Korea.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. And the policy change from an unaccompanied tour to a longer accompanied tour where the families of U.S. military service personnel are now going to South Korea, I understand probably now for, instead of a year assignment, now the personnel will stay on station for three years.

But is that the U.S. cost—is that a cost to the U.S. taxpayers to build those schools, to build that infrastructure?

General SHARP. Primarily, yes. And we are looking, again, at how to best do that to partner through many different mechanisms in order to be able to have that to be the most reduced cost. There is savings in and of itself where you don't have to, you know, send somebody every year. Just the cost of moving people around, I think, is a cost that you are going to save by longer tours over there.

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure.

General SHARP. The other thing is the tour normalization, as we call it, really bring us is, of course, a much more capable force. If I don't have to train a new service member every year but I have got them for two or three years, that really greatly increases just our overall capability.

Secondly, is it really does reduce stress. Why have an unaccompanied tour anywhere in the world if you don't have to? And, finally, it really does, I think, show our commitment to Northeast Asia, which is critical.

Mr. COFFMAN. I think that is my question, about showing our commitment. And I would raise the point, can't we demonstrate commitment by having, say, annual scheduled military exercises—as we do currently, is my understanding—where we bring forces from the United States, when available, but to have annual exercises with the South Korean military where we—instead of having our forces permanently there, that we bring them there?

And we will certainly know that, when the situation would dictate, that intelligence or say the political environment and the military environment, the security environment in South Korea is such that it is coming to a boiling point, then we deploy our forces there.

So is it necessary in this day and time to permanently have—if I understand the numbers right—28,000 U.S. military personnel in South Korea?

General SHARP. Sir, first off, as you said, we do do exercises throughout the year, several very big ones. But I guess I personally believe that presence consistently around there in order to be able to develop the relationships, in order to be able to help work together military-to-military, is a requirement and gives us huge benefits to be able to do that.

So I think, again, that presence is a requirement in an important part of the world like Northeast Asia.

Secondly, to your point on being prepared and being able to have forces come, you know. As you know, North Korea has the great majority of their forces currently stationed very close to the DMZ. And the ability for them to be able to attack with little notice is there. And that is why we have to be prepared, shared with, you know, with the Republic of Korea who really has the forces along the DMZ to be prepared for that short contingency and to be able to get—our family members out of there—the other American citizens out there and then to be able to receive other forces that come in.

So, again, and the number, sir, is 28,500. I do believe it is a great investment and has proven itself for 57 years in order to be able to maintain stability in not only Korea but Northeast Asia.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Thank you.

Admiral Willard, it would seem like, with China, that they could be participating in the Six-Party Talks a lot more than they are; that they certainly have the capacity to put pressure on North Korea that they are not putting on North Korea. It would seem to me that they feel that they benefit by having an uncertain security situation in North Korea and by forcing us to provide our assets in that direction.

Could you comment on that?

Admiral WILLARD. Congressman, I think we are convinced that the Chinese are committed to the denuclearization of North Korea as we are. And they have made efforts, increasing efforts, I think, over the past year to exert their influence over North Korea. At the end of the day, the choice to reenter into Six-Party or not has been a North Korean refusal.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Kissell.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for your service and testifying today.

Admiral, in looking at—we talked about our forward presence in relation to China and looking at it on a routine basis where there is not heightened tensions between the two nations. As we move forward, and if we—and not looking at a specific that we have a mission there to carry out where we insert to do certain things. But as we move forward, if there was a time of say, heightened tensions, could we maintain that, with what we anticipate the Chinese

to do, could we maintain that forward presence and still have safety in our fleet?

Admiral WILLARD. If I understand your question correctly, Congressman, I think the answer is yes.

We maintain a forward presence in the region for many, many purposes, and, again, the safety of the maritime domain, the safety of the sea lines of communication, and the international air space is a main reason why we are there.

We respond to heightened tension and have, in my experience, on a fairly regular basis, last year's provocations out of North Korea being a perfect example.

And I am very confident in my ability to consolidate forces where I need them when I need them should a contingency arise.

Mr. KISSELL. And we have talked about China and its relation with the United States and Japan and Korea. What about in the other parts of Southeast Asia, the other countries? As we see the presence of China grow and that influence change, do you see any response in those countries in how they might be in relation to us, the Chinese, and how that might be changing?

Admiral WILLARD. Well, I think that China's influence is very wide-ranging throughout the Asia-Pacific region, and I would offer farther than that. I mean, we have all read and understand China's influence in Africa, China's influence in South America and so forth. I mean, this is a greatly expanding economy, and they are very influential.

Likewise, their military-to-military contacts are also expanding throughout the region such that, wherever I go, whether I am speaking to military leadership or civilian leadership, we often have a discussion with regard to China, their influence in the region, their expanding military capacity, and what our views on it are.

I think there will be comparisons drawn regarding the presence and influence of the United States military and the growing influence of China, you know, for a long time. And now, those comparisons are drawn and often written about or commented on throughout the region.

Mr. KISSELL. At this point in time, there is changing relationships in the recognition of China and its objectives. Is there anything exceptionally negative there towards our relations with other nations that are taking place?

Admiral WILLARD. I think on the contrary. The other nations are very receptive to U.S. presence, so this has been mostly a discussion regarding our staying power in the region and their desire for our continued influence in the region.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you. And, General, the move in Korea to Camp Humphreys, is that more strategic? More political? A combination? What for? What are the things that went into that thinking?

General SHARP. First off, I think we are going to get a lot more efficient because we are able to consolidate. We are going down from over 105—approximately 107 camps and stations that were basically there at the end of the Korean War down to about 45 camps and stations and consolidating many of those forces going into Camp Humphreys.

So just the efficiency that comes with that consolidation, I think, is very important.

Secondly, again, it is able to be able to give back to the Republic of Korea some of the land that is very valuable, and I think that strengthens as far as the strategic alliance in order to be able to do that.

Mr. KISSELL. And one last question. The expansion of the time—the rotation. We have been through all the reasons why. I am assuming this is popular with the service and their families?

General SHARP. Sir, thank you for that question. It really is. And it is popular for a couple of reasons.

Number one is, of course, we have many unaccompanied tours for service members that are going to Iraq and Afghanistan and other places, and there is no need to have an additional one in Korea.

And secondly, the Republic of Korea is a great place to live. It is a great place to serve. The training that we are able to give our service members because of the ranges, because of the joint environment that we do with other services and the combined that we do with the Republic of Korea military. It is a great place to train our military.

It is extremely safe. The people in Korea understand the importance of U.S. forces there. A recent State Department poll gave us 87 percent of the people in Korea say it is important for us to be there. So it is a great place to serve.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson, please.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Admiral and General, thank you very much for your service.

I had such a great opportunity last year to go with a delegation the chairman led to Hawaii and to the very beautiful island of Guam, to Iwo Jima, Okinawa, to Korea. And everywhere, the American troops would just make you so proud.

And what you have achieved—one of the longest periods of lack of conflict in the Pacific in history, and it is because of your good work and the good work of our troops. I am particularly grateful because my dad served in India and China during World War II. And I learned firsthand growing up the business spirit of the people of those two countries. And it has been exciting as the past co-chair of the India Caucus, the largest country caucus here in Congress, reflecting the new partnership between India and the United States.

And so, Admiral Willard, how is the Pacific Command engaging with India to help address terrorism concerns and strengthen the U.S.-India security partnership?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you very much for that question.

We regard India as a particular area of focus for growing the strategic partnership that India and the United States currently enjoy. And the military-to-military relationship is a very important part of that. In the five months that I have been at Pacific Command, I have traveled to India twice and had, you know, very encouraging and good discussions with my counterparts there.

I think that the India-U.S. relationship right now is stronger than I have ever enjoyed. As you know, because of our history, we have only been truly engaging with India mil-to-mil [military-to-military] for about the last half a dozen years. And yet it has been pretty profound how far that has come.

We are engaged with India now with regard to their counterterrorism challenges, particularly as it relates to Lashkar-e-Taiba, the terrorist groups that emanates from Pakistan and attacked into Mumbai, and what we believe to be their presence in areas surrounding India. And PACOM has a responsibility to develop the contingency plans to deal with that in support of our Indian friends.

So I think, from foreign military sales [FMS] to other means of security assistance, to high-level strategic talks and the counterterrorism concerns that we both have, the Indian-U.S. relationship is terrific.

Mr. WILSON. And as you said, it is exciting. This has only been a recent phenomenon. And the world's largest democracy, India, with the oldest democracy, the United States, and to see us working together. I want to thank you.

Another success story, obviously, is Korea, General. And I had the opportunity to meet with Korean troops in Afghanistan at a provincial reconstruction team site. What an example Korea is of recovery, success after a war. And so with that, I know our relationship now is going to evolve into a Joint Vision Statement.

Can you tell how that will work?

General SHARP. As I said, both President Lee and President Obama signed a Joint Vision Statement in June that really takes a look at how can the Republic of Korea–U.S. alliance engage globally through all elements of power in order to be able to help security and stability, to be able to help economically around the world.

I think President Lee's vision is to be able to—because of the great prosperity and the great progress that the Republic of Korea has made since the end of the Korean War, to be able to give back some of that to the rest of the world. I mean, he is doing it—I will speak on the military side—very well with the different places that they are in UN peacekeeping missions around the world.

And I think any sort of mechanism that increases that alliance between the Republic of Korea and the U.S., whether it is militarily or economically, really strengthens us in Northeast Asia and, really, globally.

Mr. WILSON. And I can remember, as we were studying to go, that Korea had a per capita income back in 1960 of like a hundred dollars, today—which is equivalent to Afghanistan, but, today, one of the wealthiest countries on Earth. And so we can't anticipate that for Afghanistan, but we can sure try to create the environment.

A final question, Admiral, we do have international terrorism in that region. What is our success, particularly the Philippines?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, sir.

The Philippines is now a longstanding engagement in support of the armed forces of the Philippines counterterrorism efforts. It has been very successful and particularly so in about the last 24

months where significant accomplishments against the Abu Sayyaf group have occurred.

As you suggest, in our region, we have concerns in Indonesia. The Indonesian Government has been successful there, and we are now engaging the issues in and around India that I just described.

So we have our own counterterrorism responsibilities that we are accomplishing through the great efforts of our forces every day.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis, please.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Thank you so much for your service, both of you, and for joining us today.

General Sharp, I actually am very pleased that many of my colleagues have asked about the normalization in South Korea, and I appreciate that as a spouse who was there in Japan many years ago during the Vietnam War.

I actually have been wanting to kind of go and see with my own eyes. One of the concerns that I understand that may be changing some points of view for families are the high cost of housing, and I want to ask you quickly about that.

Is it that we are not raising the bar sufficiently? We don't have, I would assume, enough housing on any of the bases to accommodate those families.

General SHARP. We, of course, go through recurring looks at how much cost of housing for those that are not on-post, are not on one of our bases, and we adjust in order to be able to accommodate that, so I believe that we are paying the amount that we need in order for families to get to standard housing off-post.

Mrs. DAVIS. And of those families that you—when you see them coming on, you mentioned about a hundred a month—what percentage are on-post? What percentage are on the economy?

General SHARP. It depends upon where they are going. All of them up north of Seoul are on the economy because we are moving out of those locations, and we are not going to build housing up in that area.

I had to make the decision can we bring families to what we call Area 1, 2nd Infantry Division, or not have any families there until the move to Camp Humphreys. I talked to a lot of people, and people understand that, when they come command-sponsored up there, the facilities that they are going to get, but it is a family choice to be able to do that.

And, again, they get housing allowance to get into true standard quarters off-post in Yongpyong—and the other places up north. Down where we are in Seoul, the great majority are on-post as is down in Osan on the Air Force base down there.

That is kind of why I am capping at 4,900 until we make the move so that we can balance what we have both on-post and off-post. And let me just be a little more specific in Seoul. It is either on-post or Government-leased quarters which we have some around Seoul as to where the families are living. They are allowed to live on the economy, but that is what we have available at Seoul.

Mrs. DAVIS. And on the economy, it has to be three years even for the economy—or can it be two years accompanied as well?

General SHARP. Right now, it can be two years or three years. The service member gets to make that choice. And the Department decided to start at that so that, as someone mentioned earlier, there is still a vision within a lot of our families, of "M*A*S*H" in Korea. And until we get the word out that, no, Korea is a modern country and it is a great place to live, the service members are being given choice. You can either come for two years and bring your family, or you can come for three years.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

I wanted to ask about public opinion in both of the AORs and the extent to which I guess, in Korea, that the fact that you do have more families on the economy, what impact that has at all.

But, also, speaking to Japan, you mentioned, Admiral Willard, the need to keep that relationship strong. I am wondering, also, about the messages that Members of Congress can send on any visits they make to Japan or even in your AOR. I mean, how important is that? Is that something that you would encourage more of?

We know that members do travel, a lot, you know, certainly, to the war theater. But as well, we probably need to be making some of those contacts as well. We certainly do some of that, but perhaps it could and should increase.

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you. I don't think there is any place in the world where the U.S. message is regarded as so important and so valued as in the Asia-Pacific. You know, we are polling and trying to understand the extent to which we are understood and the extent to which we are supported in the region.

I would offer that, in recent surveys in Japan, the alliance is very, very highly regarded by the Japanese people, and I think that the recent statements by the Japanese Government as well have reinforced that.

But I think Congress' messages, whether they are delivered here in Washington or whether it is during your travels into the Asia-Pacific, that have to do with our commitment to the region, the importance that our presence in the region, in your views, shares. I think these messages are invaluable. So thank you for delivering them and look forward to hosting you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no questions.

Well, on second thought, I will ask about——

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. I will ask about Guam. The water facilities, the facilities, the infrastructure to deliver water, electrical generation facilities, landfills or some way of doing away with trash and garbage, sewage capacity, those kinds of things on the island as it is now would be—are already—those systems are termed as being inadequate. Is that correct?

Admiral WILLARD. Congressman, I think that there are different levels of adequacy and insufficiencies associated with Guam infrastructure. It is important to remember that, by and large, this is infrastructure that was created after World War II and probably into about the 1970s, and they do have, you know, many concerns, challenges that they face.

In the area of water, they have an aquifer in the north and a reservoir in the south actually on Navy property. And the sufficiency of the aquifer is, right now, a concern of scientists in evaluating Guam's ability to absorb more.

So as you suggest, there are waivers and other challenges associated with Guam infrastructure, by and large, across the board of the items that you discussed.

Mr. JOHNSON. I mean, what would we do with trash and other waste products for 80,000 people at peak construction? How would we handle that? Is there a plan in place right now?

Admiral WILLARD. Well, Guam is in the process of developing another solid-waste disposal area on the island.

Mr. JOHNSON. A landfill?

Admiral WILLARD. They are expanding their landfill capacity now. But I think the answer to your question is, one, that, you know, the private enterprise could assist with and that we have to think broadly about how Guam fulfills its needs for its people through this, you know, peak capacity of new construction and with the additional 8,000 Marines and their families that, ultimately, would settle there.

So there is analysis to be done to the extent that it hasn't to ensure that we know and that the Government of Guam settles on what capacities and corrective actions need to be taken.

Mr. JOHNSON. This is an island that, at its widest level is, what, 12 miles from shore to shore? And at its smallest level or smallest location, it is 7 miles between one shore and the other. Is that correct?

Admiral WILLARD. I don't have the exact dimensions, but to your point, sir, I think Guam is a small island.

Mr. JOHNSON. A very small island and about 24 miles, if I recall, long. So 24 miles long, about 7 miles wide at the least widest place on the island and about 12 miles wide on the widest part of the island.

And I don't know how many square miles that is. Do you happen to know?

Admiral WILLARD. I don't have that figure with me, sir. I can certainly supply it to you if you would like.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. My fear is that the whole island will become so overly populated that it will tip over and capsize.

Admiral WILLARD. We don't anticipate that. The Guam population, I think, currently about 175,000 and, again, with 8,000 Marines and their families, it is an addition of about 25,000 more into the population.

Mr. JOHNSON. And, also, things like the environment, the sensitive areas of the environment—coral reefs and those kinds of things. And I know that, you know, lots of people don't like to think about that, but you know, we didn't think about global warming either.

Now, we do have to think about it. And so I am concerned from an environmental standpoint whether or not Guam is the best place to do this relocation, but it is actually the only place. Is that correct?

Admiral WILLARD. This is the best place. This is the farthest west U.S. territory that we own. And, you know, this is part of our

Nation. And in readdressing the forward presence and posture importance to Pacific Command, Guam is vital to this decision.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Dr. Snyder, please.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Willard, the comment was made earlier today that in order to justify cutting our defense budget, the somehow perceived threat from China was decreased in order to justify defense cuts. Do you have any reason to think that that is accurate?

Admiral WILLARD. I think that the Quadrennial Defense Review, in characterizing the capabilities that have been part of what we have discussed here in terms of China's advances, I think the QDR report accurately—it captures the concerns that I have regarding China.

I think, likewise, the Secretary's recent report to Congress on China capabilities accurately captures the concerns that we have with regard to China as well as we have already discussed some of the opportunities.

So I do believe we understand the issues that we face out there. I spend a great deal of time and focus ensuring that I know these things and in communicating those to my counterparts and to my boss back in the Pentagon.

Dr. SNYDER. This is my 14th year here, and through the years I have occasionally asked this question, and I will ask you because I don't think you and I have talked about it before.

At the highest ranks of Navy leadership, when you look at what the Chinese military is doing as their economy has grown over the last 2 or 3 decades, as they modernize their military, as they look to widen their military capability to extend out into the Pacific, how do you evaluate, if you were a Chinese Navy admiral, how do you evaluate, from your perspective, what is appropriate modernization consistent with their stature as a country with a growing economy versus behavior that we would think is not appropriate for a nation? Or does it matter from your perspective as U.S. Navy——

Admiral WILLARD. I think it does matter, and I think, sir, you are capturing the dilemma that we have with them. So this is China's global strategy and regional approach. The stated intentions versus the actions that we actually see and the type of capabilities and so on that they develop, so to the extent the stated strategy is a peaceful contribution to a harmonious existence throughout the region and across the globe and what is developed are area-denial weapons and capabilities and power projection capabilities. The incongruence in that is what we are endeavoring to both understand and to answer.

And in our engagement with China, while we seek to cooperate in areas of common interest, we want to have frank dialogues on exactly what you have suggested is the question.

Dr. SNYDER. All right. Thank you for your service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony today and your service to our Nation.

I would just like to turn to a couple of areas, both cyber issues and missile defense, if I could.

If I could, could you tell me what PACOM is doing in terms of defending our cyber assets if you are thinking of how PACOM has responded to recent reports of cyber attacks originating from China against Google. Clearly, this is—modern warfare has probably changed, and our cyber systems are at risk, and we can't move quick enough as far as I am concerned to protect those assets.

I also wondered, if you could, respond to China's missile defense—China's midcourse interception test earlier this year and how has PACOM factored that into the work that it does. And could you also give me an update on where we are on the Navy's role in missile defense, particularly in your AOR?

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, sir. I will.

As you suggest, cyber is a concern that I think is manifested in our Nation, let alone, in our military. Certainly, a concern in Pacific Command. We have been contending with intrusions, some of which are likely emanating from the People's Republic of China [PRC] for years at this point. And I think you have seen the culmination of some of that as some of those intrusions have reached into our corporate communities most recently.

The actions that we have taken in Pacific Command to contend with this range from passive defense actions to more active defense actions where we are endeavoring to understand all of the cyber domain as it relates to our command and control capabilities and information sharing capabilities and exactly how to defend them.

And this is a combination of organizational adjustments, process adjustments, and technological additions to our systems that will help protect it as well as the mitigating actions when we do come under attack and how we deal with it.

So we take many actions day to day. We have plans for contingency, and we are working very closely with Strategic Command [STRATCOM], the newly formed Cyber Command, and the Pentagon to ensure that our requirements in Pacific Command are understood and met. We think we are pretty central to the problem out there, and we are exercising to it as well in our large-scale exercises.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are you factoring in resilience and redundancies so that, should the system go down as a result of the cyber attack, that you will be able to respond, bounce back quickly?

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, sir. As I mentioned, in passive defenses, that is hardening. That is the resilience and redundancy as well as our ability in, under attack, to come back with a secondary plan, a branch plan in order to continue to command and control.

So this is a very multidimensional approach and, again, we are advancing in this, and I think we, as a Nation, have a long way to go to be assured that we are protecting our cyber domain. I think, inevitably, this will be a global challenge that will be discussed internationally and, ultimately, solved internationally.

On your question of China's missile defenses, the question arises as to whether or not the most recent exercise by China that had to do with a missile intercept was an anti-satellite test or a missile

defense test. And we are monitoring China's capabilities in this area very closely, particularly concerned with their approaches to counter space.

Mr. LANGEVIN. And status on your role in integrating responsibilities in missile defense?

Admiral WILLARD. In my previous assignment as the Pacific Fleet Commander, I was immersed in missile defense capabilities on the maritime side, the use of our Aegis platforms, and the naval dimension of missile defense but also its integration into our theater missile defense plans, regional missile defense plans, and national missile defense plans which now incorporate ground-based interceptors, THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] missile systems, Patriot, and the like.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen. It appears no one else has a question. Let me end with one question.

Admiral, China has recently suspended the military-to-military contacts since American arms sales to Taiwan. What is the status of that now? And is China continuing to cooperate with us on maritime security issues?

Admiral WILLARD. As you suggest, after the last announcement of Taiwan arms sales, China, once again, suspended military-to-military relations with the United States. If I were to look across all the forms of engagement across the departments of the U.S. with China, our military-to-military engagement is probably lagging all other forms of engagement as a consequence of both lack of substance at times in the engagement as well as the suspensions that routinely characterize it.

We are seeking to reengage with China at multiple levels, and we look forward to the opportunity to reengage mil-to-mil both in terms of visitation and in terms of a variety of forms of contact with them.

I think the broader issue is China's appreciation for the value of mil-to-mil on a continuum, which we believe very strongly contributes to not just the military-to-military understanding and dialogue between the two countries but our ability to prevent misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and sometimes miscalculation.

So we are encouraging our Chinese counterparts to consider mil-to-mil differently than they have in the past.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen has an additional question.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And this will save staff time on the question for the record. It gets back to the security assistance and the patchwork of programs that you have, and just a quick comment for context.

A lot of discussion, obviously, on China, on Korea, and Japan, but showing our commitment to a lot of the smaller countries in terms of population and maybe they don't get in the news a lot. These programs that we have that can help with our outreach on the military side of some of these countries is very important.

What changes to the patchwork of programs would be necessary to help with the security assistance that will, you know, underscore that message of engagement that we are trying to have with these other countries in the region?

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Congressman Larsen.

The importance of this, as you suggest, in capacity building and capability growth among our partners in the region, critically important. I think if you were to poll them and say, "What in security assistance is lacking in your relationship with the United States military?", it is often our ability to deliver to their needs with speed.

And so this gets into the processes associated with our foreign military support—FMS—our ability to execute foreign military sales and even some of the vehicles that we go to for other means of security assistance to fund to their immediate needs.

So in lieu of years of effort in order to achieve a sale to one of these countries or an offer of excess capability to one of these countries, they are seeking assistance, often, in weeks and months. And our aged systems, processes, don't support that.

So I very much endorse Secretary Gates' initiatives to try and streamline, particularly FMF [Foreign Military Financing], FMS processes—foreign military sales processes—in order to meet some of the speed demands that I perceive in the region.

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Taylor has an additional question.

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral, I am very much in support of the President's decision to move our national missile defense on ships. I was an early convert to Admiral Roughead's decision to truncate the 1,000 [DDG–1000 *Zumwalt*-Class Destroyer] and go back to building 51s [DDG–51 *Arleigh Burke*-Class Destroyers].

But given the complexity and the added dimension of another nation's anti-ship missile that is now a factor, do you feel like we are doing everything we need to have a fleet that can defend itself while it is providing our Nation's missile defense while it is obviously engaged in other actions around the world? Or is there something that we need to be doing additionally that, because of the new requirement for missile defense, has that changed the things you need? And are we getting you the things that you need?

Admiral WILLARD. I think there are a couple ways to answer that. One is, in missile defense itself, there is the point defense requirements that our units need in order to be protected, so there are layered defenses that come down to a very internalized defense that each ship needs to be capable of.

And I think we understand what those are, but our ability to contend, as you suggest, in an area-denial environment where we are relying on our ships for missile defense but also for four or five other mission areas in their multimission assignment, very important that they have the capabilities both in layering to defend themselves and as individual units to defend themselves.

As I have viewed into the programs that are in work, both in areas that are kinetic and in areas that are non-kinetic, we are addressing these issues. I have advocated for many years for a better anti-ship capability within our fleet, and I think that, in the areas of development, we are seeking to understand what those requirements are.

So to your point, yes, our units need to defend themselves. And it becomes increasingly important as we rely on them in this new and very critical mission area. I think we are addressing these

areas. I think they are vitally important that we pay attention to what those programs are and ensure that they are followed through.

Mr. TAYLOR. I guess the simple question is: With that additional mission, are 313 ships enough? Or does that number have to go up again, keeping in mind that they not only have to defend us from missiles, but they have to defend themselves or else they are no good to us in the first instance?

And that has got to have changed—plus the threat of that missile that everyone knows is out there.

Admiral WILLARD. Some of the ballistic missile defense developments on the weapons side—so this is SM–3 developments—and the theater-level missile terminal capabilities that are under discussion and in development—I think these are the areas that will allow us to continue to incorporate these as multimission platforms across broader areas.

I think that CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], right now, characterizes 313 as a floor, and I agree with that. I think that our shipbuilding, ship numbers, quantity of fleet are very important to United States Pacific Command, and I would expect that all the combatant commanders feel the same.

So there is an importance in our continuing our shipbuilding efforts. I think that the answer with regard to this particular mission area across the multimissions of these units is a more multifaceted answer than simply numbers. It is the follow-on weapon developments as well.

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral, you know my concerns. You are in town. I would welcome the opportunity to talk to you off the record.

Admiral WILLARD. I would be happy to do that, sir. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen.

General Sharp, thank you so much for being with us again. It is good to see you.

And, Admiral Willard, we hope to see you many times in this role, so with that, we thank you for your service and the service of those you represent. The hearing is closed.

[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

March 25, 2010

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 25, 2010

Opening Statement of Chairman Ike Skelton

Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests from the U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea

March 25, 2010

Today the committee will continue its posture hearings with Admiral Robert Willard, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, and General "Skip" Sharp, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea. At the outset, I want to welcome you both back to the committee, and thank you for your excellent leadership. I also want to thank the troops that you lead, along with their families, for their incredible service and personal sacrifice.

There is an ever-present danger that we in Washington are so focused on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq that security challenges elsewhere in the world will not get the attention they merit. More concretely, as a result of the last nine years of operations, the readiness posture of all the combatant commands outside the Middle East has suffered, creating heightened strategic risk. There are clear examples of these problems in the Asia-Pacific, and I believe that we ignore them at our peril.

Let me review just a few of the daunting challenges ahead in the Asia-Pacific. The rebasing of U.S. Marines from Japan to Guam is one of the largest movements of military assets in decades, estimated to cost over ten billion dollars. The changes being planned as part of that move will not only affect our bilateral relationship with Japan; they will shape our strategic posture throughout the critical Asia-Pacific region for 50 years or more.

Yet the path forward remains unclear. Japan is reassessing the agreement to move troops from Okinawa to Guam. It does not appear that the budget includes sufficient funds to accomplish the agreement—and the Environmental Protection Agency has identified problems with the rebasing plan's environmental impacts. We must get this right, and I assure you that this committee will work to ensure that we do.

Last year North Korea launched a Taepo-Dong-2 missile over Japan; conducted a second nuclear test; kicked out inspectors; pulled out of the Six Party Talks; and restarted its nuclear facilities. All of this occurred in the context of an uncertain leadership and succession environment that may have fed some of these very concerning events.

At the same time, our presence in South Korea is transforming. We are undertaking tour normalizations in Korea and substantially relocating our forces, an effort we will hear today has now been postponed for several years. There are also questions about how the new U.S.-South Korea command relationship, starting in 2012, will work. I am most interested in an update on these issues during today's discussion.

Never to be forgotten in this region, of course, is China. China recently suspended high-level military and other contacts with the U.S. in response to a U.S. arms sale to Taiwan. While China's announced defense budget increase for this year is less than it has been in the past, their budget is still growing rapidly and the linkage between their stated strategic intentions and their actions remains unclear in certain areas. China conducted an unexpected mid-course missile interception test earlier this

year—and reports of cyber-attacks from China against Google and other large U.S. companies continue to be troubling.

We must be proactively engaged in the Asia-Pacific region on multiple fronts, and realize that our own actions may well influence the choices and actions of others. We must be able to pursue opportunities for security cooperation with regional allies and partners. At the same time, we must ensure that our force posture allows us to deter or to confront any security challenge that might emerge in this part of the world. We have difficult work to do to get there. I am pleased that the Department of Defense and Obama administration have already taken a number of positive steps in this direction and I hope to see more as we move forward.

Opening Statement of Ranking Member Howard P. "Buck" McKeon

Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests from the U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea

March 25, 2010

Today, we conclude our series of posture hearings with the commanders from U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea. I would like to welcome back Admiral Willard and General Sharp, both of whom have traveled great distances to be with us this morning. Gentlemen, your testimony gives our Members an opportunity to understand the posture of your commands and better appreciate the ongoing and evolving security challenges in your respective areas of responsibility (AOR) as we head into our annual process of making national security policy and budgetary decisions.

Let me also take a brief moment to thank each of you for your leadership and service to our nation. Your appearance also reminds us that our extraordinary military men and women who are serving in the Asia-Pacific region to protect American national interests. Please pass along my sincere gratitude to all our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines and their families serving under your commands.

Gentlemen, you are no strangers to this Committee. Admiral Willard, when you were here a couple of months ago, we had an opportunity to examine the Administration's policy toward China and how such a policy is aligned with our overall approach to the region. We also discussed China's military buildup and activities in the region and around the globe—and the impact they have on the

strategic posture of the United States. That conversation is one I would like to continue today.

Let me begin with where our discussion left off in January—with my speculation, or rather my fear, that the China threat would be downgraded to justify last year's and future cuts to key defense programs. According to open source reports, the White House National Security Council directed U.S. intelligence agencies to lower the priority placed on intelligence collection for China. If true, I am interested in hearing what impact—if any—this would have on PACOM's ability to understand China's military modernization. You can provide this information in a classified format if you prefer.

Now turning to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). When we last met, Congress was weeks away from receiving the final draft of the QDR. What we know now is that unlike the 2006 QDR which explicitly called out China as having the "greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States," the most recent QDR understates the requirements required to deter and defeat challenges from state actors and it overestimates the capabilities of the force the Department would build. While the QDR did an excellent job of delineating the threat posed by those with anti-access capabilities—notably China—it does little to address the risk resulting from the gaps in funding, capability and force structure.

This is where I would like to focus our discussion. Admiral Willard, how would you assess China's intentions and capacity to develop and field disruptive technologies, including those for anti-access and area denial, as well as for nuclear, space, and cyber warfare? As you know, it is vital for our national security interests to maintain an upper hand when it comes to America's capabilities to project power in China's neighborhood and reassure our allies in the region.

From the PACOM perspective, do we have the "right" range of capabilities to counter China's anti-access/area denial capabilities? How is PACOM adjusting in its scenario planning to ensure we maintain access to the global commons and proximity to Taiwan? Are we making the necessary investments and updating our scenario planning to take into account advances in these anti-access capabilities in the mid- to long-term? I think it is critical that this Committee ensures that we maintain our military's superiority in undersea warfare and in environments where there are advanced antiaircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, and cyber and space threats. China is not the only nation of concern, but it is one that requires our immediate attention. I would like to emphasize that this is not an "over-the-horizon" problem, but is a gap we face today. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you in this regard.

Now turning to a nuclear-armed, missile-ready, and unstable North Korea. Since last year's posture hearing, North Korea conducted a nuclear test and we've seen considerable developments in its short-, mid- and longer-range missile programs. We know that North Korea has a history of cooperating and proliferating with such nations as Syria and Iran. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, I hope that you will address the following questions: first, how do you define the outlook of the North Korea as both a regional and global threat? How is the United States working with our key allies in the region to expand our defensive capabilities? Also, as we hear more about increasing demands for missile defense in Europe and the Middle East, I would like to learn what that means for the Asia-Pacific AOR and if assets will be taken away from PACOM.

In closing, I think it is important to address our allies and partners in the region. I commend you both for addressing the significance of these relationships in your prepared testimonies. After the President's November trip to Asia, I was

deeply concerned with the message we sent to our partners in the region. From Australia to India, the trip raised some questions. At a time when we should be focused on reaffirming our commitment, we left many doubting the depth and breadth of American power and influence.

Last week, the President canceled a long-planned trip to Australia and Indonesia in order to work on his domestic agenda. While it's hard to fault him for his decision, the President risks sending a confusing message to our partners. As Ranking Member, I am committed to doing my part so that the United States remains the "partner of choice"—and commend you for your work with our regional treaty allies—Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. Today is an opportunity for you to provide concrete examples of your efforts.

As we know, these relationships do not come without some tribulations. But in view of the complexity and evolving challenges we face in PACOM's AOR, it is important that we have a forward deployed, trained, and ready Marine expeditionary force in the PACOM AOR. While we have agreed to reduce our Marine presence in Okinawa, it now appears the Japanese may back away from our mutual accord. Whatever happens with regard to Japan, it is clear that the United States must maintain a strong Marine presence in the Western Pacific.

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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL ROBERT F. WILLARD, U.S. NAVY

COMMANDER

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE

MARCH 25, 2010

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Introduction

Chairman Skelton, Representative McKeon and Members of the Committee,

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the United States Pacific Command and our area of responsibility (AOR) in the Asia-Pacific. I am pleased to report that 2009 was a very productive year for us and, through your continued support, we anticipate 2010 to be the same. I also would like to thank you for your interest in the AOR. I have either met many of you en route to the region or followed your travels with great interest. Your presence and interest send a strong message, and I invite all of you to stop by Hawaii either on your way into the region so my staff and I may brief you on the security environment or on the return trip to share your impressions from your engagements.

Today is my first posture hearing as the Pacific Command Commander. Since taking command last October, I have had the chance to meet with many of my counterparts, travel throughout the region and exercise a few of our contingency plans. Based on that experience, I would hope that we could expand our discussion on the following areas during my testimony:

- The Asia-Pacific region is vital to our nation; it is quickly becoming the strategic nexus of the globe due to its economic expansion and potential.
- Key to our commitment to the region is our forward-deployed/postured forces.
- We face challenges in building partner capacity under the current patchwork of authorities and programs designed to support our Security Assistant efforts.
- The United States remains the preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific. Modernizing and expanding our relationships with our allies and security partners is vital to maintaining stability and enhancing security in the region.

- China's growing presence and influence in the region create both challenges and opportunities for the United States and regional countries.
- China's rapid and comprehensive transformation of its armed forces is affecting regional military balances and holds implications beyond the Asia-Pacific region. Of particular concern is that elements of China's military modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region.
- India's strategic location, shared democratic values, growing economy and evolution as a regional power combine to make them a partner with whom we need to work much more closely.

For over 60 years U.S. Pacific Command has helped provide a secure environment within the AOR that has allowed the regional countries to focus on developing their economies and building strong government institutions. Today we see the benefits of these efforts as the global economic center of gravity shifts into the region in alignment with our own nation's interests. Consider the following achievements over the past year:

- On a combined basis, the nations in the AOR had an estimated GDP (on an exchange rate basis) of $15.1 trillion; compared to total U.S. GDP of $14.3 trillion.
- U.S. two-way trade in goods and services with countries in the AOR totaled nearly $1.3 trillion.
- In 2009, China surpassed Germany as the world's third largest economy behind the United States and Japan.
- Five of our "Top Ten" trading partners are now Asia-Pacific countries.
- The Strait of Malacca remains one of the world's most strategic waterways with over 60,000 ships transiting annually, carrying half of the world's oil and 90% of the oil imported by China, Japan and South Korea – our second, fourth and seventh largest trading partners, respectively. Due to the cooperative efforts of the nations bordering this waterway, piracy has dropped from a high of 38 incidents a year in 2004 to just two in 2009.

In my travels and discussions with leaders in the region both as the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet and now as the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, I have found that our continuous regional presence is not only welcomed, but strongly desired. Maintaining such a posture is not a simple task given size and diversity of our AOR. For example, sitting in my headquarters in Honolulu, I am closer to New York City than Sydney, Australia. A soldier at Fort Lewis in Washington State is closer to Kuwait City than he is to Bangkok, Thailand. These vast distances make our forward-deployed and forward-stationed forces all the more important if we desire to remain a highly effective influence in the region. The abilities of the more than 140,000 men and women - who represent our forward-stationed/deployed joint forces - to project credible combat power serves as an effective deterrent to those who would disrupt the Asia-Pacific security environment or threaten our friends and allies. In no other region of the world is the requirement for a properly postured, ready force with dominant high-end capabilities more vital than in the Asia-Pacific. The forward forces are the strongest statement of U.S. commitment to the region and any reduction in their posture, readiness or capability is regarded as waning interest and diminished U.S. influence.

The military and government leaders that I have spoken with have also made it clear that we should not take our level of influence within the region for granted. Many countries, most notably China, see the same strategic opportunities that we do and are seeking to increase their level of access and influence throughout the Asia-Pacific by building and expanding economic, diplomatic and security relationships. While we remain the current *"partner of choice,"* leaders consistently tell me it's growing more

difficult to be a U.S. partner given the "constraints," such as limitations of our security assistance programs that often accompany that partnership.

Among our most powerful programs for the region are the security assistance programs that focus on building partner capacity in security-related areas. These programs expose future leaders of other countries to our values and culture through education and training; present opportunities for nations to purchase U.S. military equipment that enables greater interoperability in our combined operations; and provide engagement opportunities for our best ambassadors, our young servicemen and women, to develop relationships with the region's military personnel and general populations. Unfortunately these programs have not evolved much since the end of the Cold War. As reported by the QDR, these security assistance programs are constrained by a "patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in the resources, unwieldy processes and a limited ability to sustain such undertakings beyond a short period of time." I agree with this description and fully support the Administration's efforts to reform and enhance these important programs as essential to maintaining, and, in some cases, regaining our competitive edge. I hope you will support the Administration efforts in this regard.

I would like to discuss in detail some of my priorities for the region which include: allies and partners, China, India, North Korea, and transnational threats.

Allies and Partners

Five of our nation's seven mutual defense treaties are with nations in the Asia-Pacific region. We continue to work closely with these regional treaty allies – Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of the Philippines and Thailand – to strengthen and leverage our relationships to enhance security within the region.

Australia. Australia remains a steadfast ally that is firmly committed to enhancing global and regional security and to providing institutional assistance throughout the Pacific. Australia is particularly active leading the International Stabilization Force in Timor-Leste and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. Their contributions to global security are evident by their recently increased force presence in Afghanistan. As the largest non-NATO force provider, Australia has committed to contribute to our effort to stabilize Afghanistan.

Australia highly values advancing interoperability and enhanced defense cooperation with the U.S., particularly through training events and acquisition programs. Last year, TALISMAN SABER 2009, a large scale biennial, bilateral combined arms exercise that focuses on strengthening the U.S.-Australian military-to-military relationship, enjoyed unprecedented participation (of 24,000 U.S. and Australian military personnel). The exercise enhanced interoperability and our collective ability to provide security in the region by focusing heavily on combined command and control, amphibious operations, close combat and combined arms, and joint and coalition logistics. The U.S. and Australian militaries also collaborate extensively in many other areas including Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR).

Japan. Our alliance with Japan is the cornerstone of our security strategy in Northeast Asia. Despite some recent challenges related to U.S. basing in Japan, the military relationship, as well as the overall alliance, remain strong, as evidenced by Prime Minister Hatoyama's recent pledge of support. That being said, we must make every effort – particularly as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the alliance – to remind the citizens of

both the U.S. and Japan of the importance of our alliance to enduring regional security and prosperity.

U.S. Pacific Command remains committed to the implementation of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). Initiated by the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense with their Japanese counterparts in 2002, progress on Alliance Transformation and Realignment through the execution of the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment are critical next steps. Major elements of the Realignment Roadmap with Japan include: relocating a Marine Corps Air Station and a portion of a carrier airwing from urbanized to rural areas; co-locating U.S. and Japanese command and control capabilities; deploying U.S. missile defense capabilities to Japan in conjunction with their own deployments; improving operational coordination between U.S. and Japanese forces; and adjusting the burden-sharing arrangement through the relocation of ground forces.

The rebasing of 8,000 Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam remains a key element of the Realignment Roadmap. Guam-based Marines, in addition to those Marine Forces that remain in Okinawa, will sustain the advantages of having forward-based ground forces in the Pacific Command AOR. Currently the Government of Japan (GOJ) is reviewing one of the realignment elements that addresses the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and related movement of Marines Corps aviation assets in Okinawa; an action which is directly linked to the relocation of Marines to Guam and a plan to return significant land area to Japan. The GOJ has indicated it expects to complete its review by May of this year. The U.S. remains committed to the 2006 DPRI Roadmap as agreed to by both countries.

The Japan Self Defense Force is advancing its regional and global influence. In the spring and early summer of 2009, Japan deployed two JMSDF ships and two patrol aircraft to the Gulf of Aden region for counter-piracy operations. Although their Indian Ocean-based refueling mission recently ended, Japan remains engaged in the region by providing civil and financial support for reconstruction and humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the foreseeable future.

Although the Japanese defense budget has decreased each year since 2002, the Japan Self Defense Forces continue their regular bilateral interactions with the U.S., and in some multi-lateral engagements with the U.S. and our other allies, such as the Republic of Korea and Australia. Last year witnessed the completion of several successful milestones in our bilateral relationship, including the completion of a year-long study of contingency command and control relationships and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) testing of a third Japan Maritime Self Defense Force Aegis destroyer. Japan continues to maintain over $4 billion in annual Host Nation Support (HNS) to our Japan-based force. Japan HNS contribution remains a vital strategic pillar of respective U.S. and Japanese alliance commitments.

Republic of Korea (ROK). The U.S.–ROK alliance remains strong and critical to our regional strategy in Northeast Asia. General Sharp and I are aligned in our efforts to do what is right for the United States and the ROK as this alliance undergoes a major transformation. I will defer to General Sharp's testimony to provide the details of our relationship on the Peninsula, but note that General Sharp's progress in handling the transition of wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the ROK military has been exceptional as has his leadership of U.S. Forces Korea.

The transformation of the U.S.–ROK alliance will ultimately assist the ROK to better meet security challenges both on and off the peninsula. The ROK currently maintains a warship in the Gulf of Aden in support of counter-piracy and maritime security operations, and has provided direct assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom, including demonstrating strong leadership in its decision to deploy a Provincial Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan this year. Of particular note is the evolving trilateral security cooperation between the U.S., ROK, and Japan. Although there are still policy issues to be addressed in realizing its full potential, the shared values, financial resources, logistical capability, and the planning ability to address complex contingencies throughout the region make this tri-lateral partnership a goal worth pursuing.

Republic of the Philippines (RP). The RP is simultaneously conducting a force-wide defense reform, transforming internal security operations, and developing a maritime security capability. These efforts in turn support important U.S. regional initiatives and contribute to a stronger Philippine government capable of assuming a greater role in providing for its own regional security.

In close partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), U.S. Pacific Command continues to support Philippine Defense Reform (PDR). Most significantly, the Philippines is actively working to transition their forces from a focus on internal security operations to territorial defense by 2016.

Lastly, USPACOM continues to support the AFP in their counter-insurgency and counter-terror efforts in the south. 2009 marked some notable AFP successes and we have seen that its momentum has carried over to 2010.

Thailand. Thailand remains a critical Southeast Asian ally and engagement partner. In addition, we appreciate Thailand's important global security contributions to overseas contingency operations, counter-narcotics efforts, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations (such as their upcoming deployment to Darfur).

In Thailand, U.S. PACOM forces enjoy unmatched access and support. We recently completed the 29th Exercise COBRA GOLD which we co-host with/and in Thailand. COBRA GOLD remains the premier U.S. Pacific Command multilateral exercise which this year had six participants and observers from more than 15 nations.

The U.S. and Thailand share important mutual goals on democracy, regional stability, counter-terrorism, and counter-proliferation. Thailand is a positive contributor to the regional security environment and I am committed to strengthening and broadening our alliance even further.

Partnerships

Successfully managing the many security challenges in the region depends upon a collaborative approach between like-minded nations who appreciate the fundamental relationship between security and enduring prosperity. U.S. Pacific Command expends significant time and resources developing relationships with non-ally nations who understand the role common cause partnerships play in the establishment of regional security. While these relationships often begin or focus on narrow or specific areas of shared interest, as trust grows and common values are realigned, broader regional security contributions often result. U.S. Pacific Command appreciates that strong bilateral relationships advance in complexity and effectiveness on the basis of individual engagements and according to capacities, capabilities, and a partner-nation's desire and

national interest. That being said, there is regional security benefit provided by all of the partnerships we enjoy among the 36 Asia-Pacific nations.

An example of such a partnership – one that has matured significantly in the past several years and one that contributes in many ways to enhanced regional security – is the one we share with Singapore. Initially a relationship focused on trade, maritime security, and a modest U.S. logistics presence, it has since expanded into other areas. In 2005, the relationship was formalized with the signing of a security agreement which identified Singapore and the U.S. as "Major Security Cooperation Partners." Today Singapore is one of our strongest security partners in the region, hosting many of our transiting ships and deploying personnel, working with U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and commanding the multi-national, counter-piracy, Combined Task Force in the Gulf of Aden.

Our rapidly developing relationship with Indonesia – the largest Muslim-majority democracy in the world - provides another excellent example of a partnership of great importance to enduring regional security. After years of limited engagement with the Indonesian armed forces (TNI), the significant level of transparency and extent of institutional reforms initiated by President Yudhoyono has provided impetus to renew and advance our military relationship. Based on a desire to contribute more to the regional security effort, the TNI now plays a larger leading role in multilateral events and exercises that focus on capabilities such as HA/DR and peace keeping. We are looking forward to supporting Indonesia's developing security role in the region, particularly as the Administration builds towards a new "comprehensive partnership".

China.

One cannot engage within the region without having a discussion about the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Beijing's national strategy remains primarily focused on economic development which emphasizes domestic stability and maintaining an international security environment conducive to continued economic growth. This new found economic wealth is funding a military modernization program that has raised concerns in the region over the lack of transparency into Beijing's emerging military capabilities and the intentions that motivate them – a concern shared by the United States. China's interest in a peaceful and stable environment that will support the country's developmental goals is difficult to reconcile with the evolving military capabilities that appear designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region or exercise aggression or coercion of its neighbors, including U.S. treaty allies and partners. Reconciling the apparent gap between the PRC's statements and its observed military capabilities serves to underscore the importance of maintaining open channels of communication and of building toward a continuous dialogue with China's armed forces based on open and substantive discussion of strategic issues. However, that type of frank and candid discussion requires a stable and reliable U.S.-China military-to-military relationship– a relationship that does not yet exist with the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA).

People's Liberation Army (PLA) Modernization. China has continued a rapid, comprehensive program of military modernization with supporting doctrine and a professionalization of the officer and enlisted ranks. This program of modernization has been supported by a military budget that has grown annually by double digits over the last decade. Beijing publicly asserts that China's military modernization is "purely defensive

in nature," and aimed solely at protecting China's security and interests. Over the past several years, China has begun a new phase of military development by beginning to articulate roles and missions for the PLA that go beyond China's immediate territorial concerns, but has left unclear to the international community the purposes and objectives of the PLA's evolving doctrine and capabilities.

The PLA has placed increasing emphasis on attracting and retaining a professional cadre of officers and non-commissioned officers. Incentives include advanced training and education, as well as housing and post-service employment preferences that should lead to a more motivated, better trained and professional military capable of a broader range of combined arms missions.

China continues to develop weapons systems, technologies and concepts of operation that support anti-access and area denial strategies in the Western Pacific by holding air and maritime forces at risk at extended distances from the PRC coastline. The PLA Navy is continuing to develop a "Blue Water" capability that includes the ability to surge surface combatants and submarines at extended distances from the PRC mainland. Modernization programs have included development of sophisticated shipboard air defense systems as well as supersonic sea-skimming anti-ship cruise missiles.

China's leaders are pursuing an aircraft carrier capability. In 1998 China purchased an incomplete former Soviet *KUZNETSOV* class aircraft carrier, which began renovations in 2002 at its shipyard in Dalian. I expect this carrier to become operational around 2012 and likely be used to develop basic carrier skills.

China continues to field the largest conventional submarine force in the world totaling more than 60 boats; while the quality of China's submarine fleet is mixed the

percentage of modern, quiet submarines in the fleet is growing. This fleet also includes a number of nuclear powered fast attack and ballistic missile submarines. China is also developing a new submarine launched nuclear ballistic missile, the JL-2, capable of ranging the western United States.

China fields a growing number of sophisticated multi-role fighter aircraft, including the SU-27 and SU-30 purchased from Russia and indigenously produced 4th generation aircraft. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and Naval air forces have continued to focus on improving pilot and controller proficiencies in complex, multi-plane combat scenarios, including operations over water. The PLA has focused considerable effort on building up its integrated air defense capabilities and has deployed an increasing number of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU 2 long range surface-to-air missile systems along the Taiwan Strait. China is also developing and testing a conventional anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21/CSS-5 MRBM designed specifically to target aircraft carriers.

Until recently, "jointness" in the PLA meant that different services operated toward a common goal in a joint or combined campaign with operations separated by time and distance. However, years of observing U.S. military operations and modern warfare campaigns have convinced PLA leadership of the need for greater integration between services to include enhanced joint operations at the tactical level. The PLA has adopted the concept of "Integrated Joint Operations" as a goal for the Chinese military to allow it to conduct integrated operations on a campaign level. Additionally, the PLA has placed increased emphasis on training in more demanding conditions, such as complex electromagnetic environments.

China's Strategic Capabilities. China maintains a nuclear force capable of ranging most of the world, including the continental United States. This capability has been enhanced through the development of increasingly sophisticated road mobile delivery systems as well as the development of the Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (JIN-class SSBN). Despite assertions that China opposes the "weaponization" of space, the PLA is developing a multi-dimensional program to deny potential adversaries the use of space, an element of which was demonstrated in January 2007 when China intentionally destroyed one of its own weather satellites with a direct ascent anti-satellite weapon.

U.S. military and government networks and computer systems continue to be the target of intrusions that appear to have originated from within the PRC. Although most intrusions focus on exfiltrating data, the skills being demonstrated would also apply to network attacks.

China's Ongoing "Sovereignty" Campaigns. Beijing remains committed to eventual unification with Taiwan, and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve that goal. The PLA's continued military advancements sustain a trend of shifting the cross-Strait military balance in Beijing's favor. The Taiwan Relations Act provides that it is U.S. policy "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan." At the U.S. Pacific Command, we fulfill these obligations on a daily basis.

Motivated by a need for indigenous natural resources and consolidation of self-proclaimed sovereignty limits, the PRC has re-asserted its claims to most of the South

China Sea and reinforced its position in the region, including the contested Spratly and Paracel Islands. The PLA Navy has increased its patrols throughout the region and has shown an increased willingness to confront regional nations on the high seas and within the contested island chains. Additionally, China lays claim to the Senkakus, administered by Japan, and contests areas on its border with India.

As an integral part of its strategy, the PRC has interpreted certain international laws in ways contrary to international norms, such as the UN Convention for Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and has passed domestic laws that further reinforce its sovereignty claims.

U.S./China Military Relationship and Security Cooperation. U.S. Pacific Command is committed to the development of a stable and reliable military-to-military relationship with the PRC, which is critical to avoiding misperception and miscalculation and, ultimately, building the type of partnership that leaders in both countries aspire to. Although we are currently in a period of reduced engagement activity due to the PRC's reaction to the notification of arms sales to Taiwan, last year's military-to-military activities were highlighted by exchange visits by senior leaders from both sides. During his visit to Washington, D.C. in November 2009, General XU Caihou, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, agreed with Defense Secretary Gates to further develop the military aspect of the U.S. – People's Republic of China (PRC) relationship. U.S. Pacific Command looks forward to working with the PLA on concrete and practical measures to strengthen our military relationship in order to improve the security interests of both the United States and China. These measures include senior leader visits, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise observer exchanges, a naval passing exercise, and a military medical exchange. The PLA leadership has also shown a

willingness to expand military engagement to areas such as counterterrorism, counter-piracy, maritime safety, and non-proliferation.

As the Executive Agent for the U.S. – PRC Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), U.S. Pacific Command co-led senior leader bilateral MMCA discussions last summer in Beijing. The MMCA forum was initiated in 1998 and is intended to improve safety for airmen and sailors when our nations' vessels and aircraft operate in proximity to one another. During the December 2009 Defense Policy Coordination Talks held in Honolulu, both sides agreed to reinvigorate the MMCA as a viable diplomatic mechanism through which we can manage issues related to maritime and air safety.

India

The complexity, unique significance, and growing importance of the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership warrant considering this nation apart from the broader Allies and Partners focus previously discussed. Our nation's partnership with India is especially important to long term South and Central Asia regional security and to U.S. national interests in this vital sub-region. India's leadership as the largest democracy, its rising economic power, and its influence across South Asia as well as its global influence attest to its pivotal role in shaping the regional security environment. We must continue to strengthen this relationship and, while our near-term challenges in Central Command are of great strategic importance, we must ensure the U.S.-India relationship remains rooted in our extensive common interests of which the Afghanistan-Pakistan issue is only one. U.S. Pacific Command is working hard to develop bonds that are trust-based, leverage our shared values, and endure beyond current conflicts. Such an approach is critical to taking

advantage of the full potential of our relationship; and to effectively collaborating on the wide range opportunities available in an area of the world that is not only home to some of the most contentious geo-political and transnational challenges, but also to some of the most vital sea, air, and land lines of communication.

Our relationship has grown significantly over the past five years as both countries work to overcome apprehensions formed during the Cold War era, particularly with respect to defense cooperation. Resolution of the long-standing End User Monitoring (EUM) issue removed a major obstacle to a more robust and sophisticated defense sales program. To date, for example, the Government of India has purchased Lockheed Martin C-130Js and Boeing P-8I aircraft; expressed their interest to acquire C-17s; and conducted flight tests of F-16s and F/A-18s (under consideration in the medium multi-mission role combat aircraft competition). The recent increase in defense sales, which exceeded $2 billion in 2009, not only enhances U.S. access to one of the largest defense markets in the world, but more importantly enables greater cooperation between our armed forces.

The complexity of our exercises and training events is increasing and we are expanding our cooperation in the Indian Ocean and beyond. We currently engage together combating piracy in Gulf of Aden, countering terrorism, enhancing maritime security, expanding POW/MIA recovery missions, and conducting HA/DR events. One of our most notable accomplishments was last year's bi-lateral Exercise YUDH ABHYAS. Located in India, it included the largest deployment of U.S. Stryker vehicles outside of the Middle East. Such events offer unique training opportunities, allow for increased personal and professional interaction and relationship building, and improve our ability to work together across a sophisticated range of operations.

We continue to search for new areas to cooperate as our relationship develops. One area that has been prominently mentioned in the QDR is managing the global commons. Threats in the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains will be of increasing concern to both our nations; and we see many opportunities for U.S.-India cooperation to address broad threats to the region's and the world's common areas.

As our relationship develops, U.S. Pacific Command remains mindful of the significance of India-Pakistan tensions, particularly as they relate to the broader security discussion and the management of geo-political challenges that span Combatant Commands (Pakistan resides within Central Command's AOR and India resides in the Pacific AOR). We are keenly aware of the importance of a peaceful co-existence between these two nuclear-armed nations and stand ready to assist with this goal in conjunction with interagency partners.

North Korea

As President Obama has said, "the path for North Korea to realize its future is clear: a return to the Six-Party Talks; upholding previous commitments, including a return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." We remain convinced that our strong bilateral alliances with Japan and the ROK, as well as our growing trilateral cooperation, are critical to deterring the DPRK and to achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We continue to work with our interagency partners to ensure military involvement in relevant areas such as PSI, operations to enforce UNSC resolutions, and multilateral non-proliferation exercises are synchronized with diplomatic approaches and that they contribute to the transmission of a clear and consistent message to the DPRK.

Transnational Threats

Counter Terrorism: U.S. Pacific Command has long employed a strategy of working "by, with and through" regional partners to combat terrorism in the region. Our main effort, the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P), operates in support of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in Southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago Region. The work of U.S. forces - advising, training, exercising, and informing - in conjunction with the resolute commitment and impressive abilities of AFP personnel, has resulted in great success. Over the past year the AFP has captured or killed more than a dozen Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) leaders. Perhaps more importantly, the effort has resulted in enhanced quality of life and denial of safe haven to extremists in the area.

Leveraging the lessons learned in Southeast Asia, and in concert with our interagency and regional partners, we are developing plans to combat extremism in South Asia. Our efforts there will undoubtedly require a whole-of-government approach and a coordinated multi-national effort given the extent of the problem and the variety of regional CT organizations, responsibilities, authorities, and policies.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Our main effort to counter the spread of WMD is through support for the State Department's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Fifteen nations in the AOR have endorsed the PSI. Of particular note is the success by Thailand to enforce U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 last December when they intercepted 35 tons of illicit weaponry that had originated from North Korea.

In October 2009, Singapore hosted the 38th PSI Exercise, DEEP SABRE II, in which U.S. Navy and Coast Guard personnel participated – with the armed forces of 18

other nations - in maritime interdiction exercises designed to enhance the capabilities and improve the coordination of participating nations. We are looking forward to supporting future regional PSI Exercises. Additionally, and in support of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, we conducted Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Defense and Consequence Management bilateral working groups with Japan and the Republic of Korea with the intent of improving interoperability and growing regional capability and capacity.

Northeast Asia

Mongolia. A strong partner, Mongolia continues to demonstrate support for U.S. regional and global policy objectives, while managing positive relations with its two neighbors, China and Russia. The Mongolia Defense Reform (MDR) assists the Mongolian Armed Forces with their transformation into a self-sustaining, international peacekeeping force capable of contributing to UN, international, and coalition missions. In support of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which serves as the Executive Agent for MDR, U.S. Pacific Command implements bilaterally agreed-to initiatives and priorities further the defense relationship between the U.S. and Mongolia.

Members of the Mongolia Armed Forces regularly participate in bilateral and multilateral for a such as the Pacific Army Management Seminar, Pacific Rim Air Chiefs Conference, Chief of Defense Conference, and NCO subject matter expert exchanges.

Mongolia continues to support peacekeeping and coalition operations and, with assistance from the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), continues to develop the Five Hills Training Center into a national, and eventually, a regional peacekeeping training center which hosts UN-certified training and component-level peacekeeping exercises for

regional participants. Every year, the Mongolian Armed Forces partner with either U.S. Army Pacific or U.S. Marine Forces Pacific to host KHAAN QUEST. Following two years as the GPOI capstone peacekeeping exercise in 2006 and 2007, KHAAN QUEST remains an important multi-lateral peacekeeping exercise.

Finally, I would like to add that Mongolia committed to deploying 800 personnel to Chad in late-2009 in support of the UN, while continuing to support the UN in Sierra Leone and other UN missions in Africa. A strong supporter in U.S. overseas contingency operations, in the fall of 2009, Mongolia deployed 200 troops in Afghanistan, with a security company and a mobile training team under Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and a 40 soldier security detachment under the Germans as part of the International Security Assistance Force.

Russia. U.S. Pacific Command coordinates all Russian security cooperation activities with U.S. European Command to ensure the efforts of both geographic combatant commands are mutually supportive. We seek engagement with Russia in areas of mutual interest such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and search-and-rescue operations. U.S. Pacific Command contacts were re-established in 2009 when the USS COWPENS and USS STETHEM conducted port visits to Vladivostok. These port visits were symbolic of the historic and positive relationship that has existed in recent years between U.S. Pacific Command and Russia's Far East Command, particularly between our two navies. We plan to build on the success of these port visits by continuing to engage Russia in areas of mutual interest in accordance with the Military Cooperation Work Plan.

Southeast Asia

Malaysia. Our military-to-military ties with Malaysia remain solid amidst a warming bilateral political relationship and enhanced ties between the U.S. and ASEAN nations. In 2009, U.S. Pacific Command developed closer ties to the Malaysian Joint Forces Command by participating in major command post exercises and by supporting their forces to enhance their capacity in maritime security operations. Malaysia maintains a strong leadership role in the region by being tough on terrorism, serious about maritime security, and committed to global peace and stability. We will continue to expand our cooperation with Malaysia and address our common security challenges.

Cambodia is emerging as a strong supporter of U.S. policy in the region. The Cambodia Ministry of National Defense and Royal Cambodian Armed Forces are seeking U.S. engagement opportunities. In 2009, U.S. Pacific Command supported Cambodia's major initiatives of counter-terrorism, maritime security, defense reform, HA/DR, and peacekeeping operations. In 2010, we will continue to assist Cambodia on its Defense Reform initiative; augment its counter-terrorism efforts with 1206 funding; and, together with Australia and Japan, work with their defense establishment and interagency to achieve their maritime security goals.

Laos. With the U.S. Defense Attaché now in place, U.S.–Laos military-to-military engagement is expanding. The Joint Task Force Full Accounting recovery mission, led by the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), continues to be an important focus in developing U.S.–Laos military relations. Laos has placed a priority on English language training to enable greater training opportunities and participation in bilateral or multilateral operations. In our bilateral defense discussions with the Ministry of National Defense, both sides agreed to explore greater engagement opportunities

associated with military medical cooperation, civil military operations, training and education, and counter-narcotics cooperation.

Vietnam. As we prepare to mark the 15th anniversary of the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam relations, our military-to-military relationship with Vietnam continues to improve. Vietnam hosted several ship visits this year including the Seventh Fleet Flag Ship, the USS BLUE RIDGE, and its escort, the USS LASSEN, whose commanding officer was born in Vietnam. In support of JPAC, USNS BRUCE HEEZEN, with embarked Vietnamese scientists and personnel, conducted the first combined hydrographic survey in Vietnamese waters, successfully identifying potential crash sites. During his visit to Pacific Command last December, Vietnam's Minister of Defense indicated a desire for activities that foster greater understanding and cooperation in various areas such as disaster management, conflict resolution, trafficking in persons, and improving relations with its neighbors. We look forward to Vietnam's chairmanship of ASEAN this year and its desire to take a more responsible role in promoting peace and security in the region.

Timor-Leste. U.S. Pacific Command remains optimistic about the future of this young democracy. The government of Timor-Leste managed to maintain control of the country and return home more than 10 percent of its population who were living in IDP camps. Timor-Leste is working with several other countries to begin critical institutional development which includes the Timor-Leste Defense Force (F-FDTL). Although its soldiers lack many basic capabilities, the F-FDTL leadership is developing a recruiting and training program to establish a legitimate, professional military.

U.S. Pacific Command's interaction with Timor-Leste increased significantly in 2009, highlighted by our first military-to-military bilateral discussions. The F-FDTL

participated in the Marine Exercise MAREX 09, a multilateral exercise with Timorese and Australian Defense Forces that concentrated on basic infantry skills and medical and dental readiness. Although current engagement with Timor-Leste is mostly in the form of medical and dental readiness exercises and engineer assistance by U.S. Navy SEABEEs, we are hopeful that engagements such as MAREX 09 will form the basis of our relationship as the F-FDTL develops into a professional military.

Burma. Beyond the significant issues associated with their human rights record, Burma presents challenges to regional stability in a number of other areas, including a maritime border dispute with Bangladesh, narcotics trafficking, trafficking-in-persons, and potential for rapid spread of pandemic disease. The recently completed U.S. government policy review and subsequent high level visits to Burma by senior-level members of the U.S. Government have not altered our military engagement with Burma. It remains essentially non-existent as a matter of policy and public law. That said, U.S. Pacific Command is prepared to re-engage in a military-to-military dialogue with the Burmese whenever U.S. policy allows.

South Asia

Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. The conclusion of the Government of Sri Lanka's war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) terrorist group in May 2009 brought about an uneasy peace to Sri Lanka. Concerns over the welfare of nearly 300,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) initially caused the international community to pressure the Government of Sri Lanka to better provide for the IDPs while expediting the return to their homes. To its credit, the Government of Sri Lanka has taken steps to lower the number of IDPs in camps to a current estimate of around 100,000.

As a consequence of allegations of human rights violations, all U.S. military-to-military engagement with Sri Lanka was halted in August 2009, with the exception of humanitarian assistance. In the meantime, we await development of a USG strategy that may include enhanced mil-to-mil.

Republic of Maldives. Since President Nasheed took office in November 2008, we have seen a marked increase with Maldives' desire to interact with U.S. Pacific Command. Maldives strategic location astride key shipping lanes in addition to its archipelagic geography make it a key region for maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Maldives requested U.S. assistance in helping the Maldives National Defense Force transform itself into a force more capable of defending against the threats of terrorism, piracy, and illegal drug trafficking. In response to the Government of Maldives' concerns that international terrorist organizations were actively recruiting Maldivian citizens, we provided assistance in development of a national intelligence capability enabling quicker responses across various agencies of their government.

Nepal. The resignation by the Maoist government in May 2009 resulted in a political stalemate that continues to cast serious doubts as to whether Nepal's Constituent Assembly can ratify a constitution by the May 2010 deadline. The Maoists, who still control a plurality of seats in the Assembly, have staged numerous walkouts and demonstrations, effectively impeding the Constituent Assembly and the constitution drafting process.

Due to the potential for the current peace to unravel, U.S. Pacific Command's focus is on humanitarian assistance and efforts to support the peaceful integration of members of the Maoist People's Liberation Army into the Nepalese security forces. Senior level

dialogue and defense sector reform events are the primary means to assist this change. Additionally, U.S. Pacific Command continues to assist Nepal in the development of its peacekeeping operations and training capabilities through GPOI. While PACOM is focused on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping activities, we are also noting an increase in violence in the southern Terai region. These poorly governed areas are susceptible to exploitation by terrorist groups in South Asia. PACOM will continue to closely monitor this issue and stands ready to assist Nepal in building its CT capacity.

People's Republic of Bangladesh. The return to democracy in Bangladesh, while a positive step, has also resulted in occasional civilian-military tension that could potentially destabilize this moderate nation of 150 million people. U.S. Pacific Command has initiated several programs and events to assist in promoting civilian-military trust, transparency and cooperation.

Despite their political issues, Bangladesh continues to be a strong partner who works closely with the U.S. to enhance regional security. The establishment of a naval counter-terrorism force and their hosting of a regional forum to counter violent extremist organizations are examples of Bangladesh's commitment to improve their counter-terrorism capacity. We also continue to work closely with Bangladesh to expand and improve their peacekeeping, HA/DR and maritime security capabilities.

Oceania

New Zealand. New Zealand shares many U.S. security concerns such as terrorism, maritime security, transnational crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. New Zealand is supportive of our overseas contingency operations, deployed for the fourth round its Special Air Service (SAS) special operations troops to Afghanistan

and has extended their commitment to lead the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyan Province, Afghanistan until September 2010.

While the New Zealand nuclear-free zone legislation and resultant U.S. defense policy guidelines constrain some bilateral military-to-military engagement, the New Zealand Defense Force participates in many multilateral events that advance our common security interests. In 2010, New Zealand will be an observer in "Rim of the Pacific" (RIMPAC) – the Pacific AOR premier multinational naval exercise. Our Marines continue to assist in New Zealand's efforts to integrate their multi-role maritime patrol vessel into regional HA/DR operations.

New Zealand remains active in global security initiatives, from stabilization efforts in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, to operations in Korea, Sudan, and throughout the Middle East. Additionally, the New Zealand Defense Force supports our National Science Foundation efforts in Antarctica by serving as the primary staging area for the multinational Operation DEEP FREEZE.

Compact Nations. U.S. Pacific Command values our partnership with the three Compact Nations – the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau. We meet our defense obligations to these nations under the Compacts of Free Association through implementation of our Homeland Defense planning and preparation. Additionally, we commend the professional Pacific Patrol Boat crews and fully support each nation's initiatives to expand operations to protect their valuable EEZ resources. We also recognize the significant contributions of the proud citizens of these nations as they serve in the U.S. Armed Forces and Coast Guard in Operations such as IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM.

Guam. As a U.S. Territory in a strategically important location, Guam is host to a variety of U.S. joint forces, critically important Navy and Air Force installations and the headquarters for Commander U.S. Forces Marianas. Efforts are ongoing to simultaneously prepare for increased Marine Corps presence on Guam, improve Navy and Air Force infrastructure, and improve the quality of life for service members and their families stationed there.

U.S. Pacific Command Organizations

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). While APCSS is not subordinate to U.S. Pacific Command, it is a Department of Defense academic institute that supports U.S. Pacific Command by developing professional and personal ties among national security establishments throughout the region. The Center's focus is on multilateral approaches to security cooperation and capacity-building through its three academic components: executive education, conferences, and research and publications. In FY09, 628 students joined the more than 4,000 fellows from nations in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The success of APCSS programs is regularly demonstrated through the courses and seminars that the center offers, and its extensive networking efforts (there are currently 45 alumni associations in as many nations). APCSS builds its programs to address areas of mutual interest and concern held by the U.S. and the countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC). JPAC has the important mission of achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing from our nation's conflicts. Last year, JPAC successfully completed 69 missions globally and, in cooperation with 16 nations on 4 continents, identified 93 Americans missing from the

Vietnam War, Korean War, and World Wars I & II. We expect another successful year in 2010 and are projected to execute 75 missions. Of note, engagement with North Korea remains suspended, but we are prepared to resume discussions and operations as soon as conditions permit.

Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF-West). JIATF-West's mission is to conduct activities to detect, disrupt, and dismantle drug-related transnational threats in Asia and the Pacific by providing interagency intelligence fusion, supporting U.S. law enforcement, and developing partner nation capacity. The command was essential to several significant victories this past year that included JIATF-West Tactical Analysis Team support to law enforcement operations which dismantled several transnational criminal organizations. JIATF-West also worked directly with the Drug Enforcement Agency in the multi-ton seizure operation of Asian precursor chemicals destined to methamphetamine laboratories in Mexico and Guatemala.

With respect to capacity building successes in 2009, JIATF-West supported the establishment of Vehicle Control Checkpoint (VCC) facilities in Sikhiu and Chumphon, Thailand. These VCCs were specifically set up to enhance border security and interdiction capacity in a region known for illicit trafficking. Also this year, JIATF-West executed 17 counter-narco-terrorism training missions which trained 1,578 partner nation law enforcement officials from Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam in ground and maritime interdiction skills.

Although JIATF-West's authorities allow us to act against transnational criminal organizations, *inclusion of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines under 1033 authority would allow us to better support U.S. and partner-nation Law Enforcement*

Agencies. This authority would allow JIATF-West to provide tools and training to maintain operational maritime assets, and automated data processing and information technology networking equipment for JIATF West –constructed interagency fusion centers.

Programs

Security Assistance. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET), executed in partnership with the Department of State and our embassy country teams, are powerful engagement tools for building security partnerships with developing countries. FMF – the program for financing the acquisition of U.S. military articles, service, and training that support U.S. regional stability goals - continues to demonstrate its worth. It has been particularly important to supporting partners engaged in combating violent extremism, especially the Philippines and Indonesia. The IMET program – which provides education and training to students from allied and friendly nations - also continued to provide lasting value to all participants. The program is a modest but highly effective investment that yields the professional and personal relationships that are so important to regional security.

Science and Technology (S&T). The U.S. Pacific Command S&T Advisor actively engages with Service and Defense S&T organizations to identify potential solutions to operational problems that have a critical impact on combat readiness. This advisor is also responsible for executing the S&T Strategy in support of the lines of operation in our Theater Campaign Plan. That strategy focuses on improving partnership opportunities throughout the AOR and encourages cooperative S&T efforts through the extensive use of OSD's Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) and Coalition

Warfare Program (CWP).

Pacific Partnership. One of the U.S. Navy's newest cargo ships, USNS RICHARD E. BYRD (T-AKE 4), successfully deployed to Oceania on a five-country, three-month humanitarian and civic assistance mission from June to September 2009. The mission travelled, for the first time to Samoa, Tonga, and Kiribati and returned for a second visit to Solomon Islands and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. This annual deployment is designed to build partner capacity and multilateral capability in medical, dental, veterinary and engineering disciplines to enhance regional security and better prepare participating organizations to respond to regional crises. It is a remarkable multinational and multi-organizational evolution that, this year, involved personnel from 14 nations and countless international and host-nation Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). In all, the mission treated more than 22,000 medical and dental patients, conducted 116 community relations projects, and completed 17 engineering and infrastructure projects. This summer Pacific Partnership will return to the region aboard USNS MERCY, the Navy's West Coast hospital ship, to deliver help and hope to the people of Indonesia, Timor Leste, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Pacific Angel. Pacific Angel employs the exceptional capabilities of the Pacific Air Forces International Health Services to conduct humanitarian assistance and public diplomacy in less accessible areas of South East Asia. This unique C-17, C-130, and KC-135-based operation is designed to increase public health capacity as well as cooperation and understanding among the armed forces, NGOs, regional partners, and peoples of Vietnam, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and the United States. Assisted by partner-nation and NGO medical personnel, PACIFIC ANGEL conducted six Medical Civic Action

programs, cared for 14,978 medical and 1,010 dental patients, and completed six engineering civic-actions projects.

NDAA Section 1206. Congressional 1206 authority is the only partner capability/capacity building tool that we have to address urgent or emergent needs in the region. Last year U.S. Pacific Command contributed more than $31 million to the maritime security capabilities of Bangladesh and the Philippines. In FY10, we intend to build upon the initiatives funded in 2009 and to expand counter-terrorism capability/capacity in South and Southeast Asia. Given the success of these efforts to date, we very much support the President's request.

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA). In the Asia-Pacific, we respond to natural disasters about every 60 days. OHDACA funds enable Pacific Command forces to respond quickly to those in need when these inevitable disasters occur. Additionally, OHDACA-supported activities promote interoperability and coalition-building with foreign military and civilian counterparts, and improve basic living conditions for populations in countries and regions that are particularly susceptible to violent extremism. OHDACA projects offer a significant and sometimes unique opportunity in the region; and have been particularly helpful to decreasing the operating space of terrorists and violent extremists. OHDACA is a critical element in PACOM's comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in South Asia; specifically in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). GPOI is rooted in a G-8 commitment to addresses major gaps in peace operations around the world. The global initiative aims to build and maintain the capability, capacity, effectiveness of professional

peacekeeping forces. Within the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. Pacific Command's GPOI program leverages existing host-nation programs, institutions, policies, and exercises. We encourage long-term sustainment of qualified forces through a "train-the-trainer" approach, which enables standardization and interoperability, and works within the framework of United Nations guidelines. The GPOI program has been fully implemented by U.S. Pacific Command in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Thailand, and Tonga; and this year we will begin implementation in the Philippines. Also in 2010, U.S. Pacific Command will co-host with Cambodia the largest multinational peacekeeping capstone exercise conducted in the Asia-Pacific region. We expect participation in this exercise, Angkor Sentinel, more than 20 of our regional GPOI partners.

Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT). The MPAT program is a cooperative, multi-national effort to facilitate the rapid and effective establishment of a multinational headquarters in response to an HA/DR event in the Asia-Pacific region. The vision of the program is to develop a cadre of multinational military planners from regional nations. The MPAT effort – which currently involves more than 30 nations – works to provide coalition and combined expertise in crisis action planning and seeks to develop procedures that promote multinational partnerships and cooperation in response to military operations other than war and small scale contingencies. Recent MPAT events have focused on building capacity for response to humanitarian crises and on developing standardized operating procedures.

Challenges

Multi-National Information Sharing (MNIS). The ability to exchange information among DoD Components, all levels of U.S. Government, coalition partners, and the private sector is becoming increasingly important to regional operations; and increasingly dependent on MNIS efforts such as the Combined Enterprise Regional Informational Exchange (CENTRIX) Cross Enclave Requirement Program and the Improved Connectivity Initiative.

Joint Information Environment (JIE). Within DoD, Services IT architectures are often redundant or incompatible. In an attempt to address this issue, U.S. Pacific Command is partnering with the DoD Chief Information Officer, the Joint Staff, all Services, and Industry to develop a JIE that moves to a unified and integrated net-centric environment. When realized, this environment will eliminate the need for Joint Force Commanders to integrate networks; further, it will enable personnel access to the information with a single log-on from anywhere on a DoD network.

Cyberspace. U.S. Pacific Command faces increasingly active and sophisticated threats to our information and computer infrastructure. These threats challenge our ability to operate freely in the cyber commons, which in turn challenges our ability to conduct operations during peacetime and in times of crisis. U.S. Pacific Command, in conjunction with the newly established U.S. Cyber Command and other Service and Agencies, is working on solutions to detecting these attacks on our networks and to responding to them in near real-time.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). Given the size and nature of the Asia-Pacific region, effective ISR is essential to obtaining critical insights into the

plans, capabilities, and intent of our current and potential adversaries. We continue to work with the National Intelligence Community, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, and the Joint Staff to effectively address our intelligence collection priorities, capability gaps, deployments of assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination of information to maximize situational awareness and warning.

Missile Defense. To defend U.S. forces, interests, allies and friends from short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles, U.S. Pacific Command seeks a forward-deployed, layered, and integrated air and missile defense system capable of intercepting threat missiles throughout their entire time of flight. Additionally, we are coordinating with the Government of Japan to leverage the newest Japanese systems – such as PATRIOT PAC-3, AEGIS SM-3 capable ships and their associated radars.

Piracy. The U.S. Pacific Command continues to facilitate multilateral efforts to improve regional and global maritime security, especially in the Strait of Malacca, the archipelagic regions of South East Asia, and in the Gulf of Aden. In Southeast Asia, U.S. Pacific Fleet conducted the annual Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism (SEACAT) exercise, which is designed to highlight the value of information sharing and multi-national coordination (participants included Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand; Indonesia participated this past year as an observer). Also of note is the cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and most recently, Thailand, to patrol the Malacca Straits, an effort which has contributed significantly to reduced incidents of piracy in that vital choke point. Lastly, in the tri-border area where Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia share common maritime boundaries, terrorist

freedom of action has been curtailed as a consequence of improved maritime surveillance and response capabilities procured using 1206 authorities.

Pandemic Influenza (PI). U.S. Pacific Command maintains a robust pandemic influenza response plan that supports force health protection, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Advise and Assess (AA) teams are available to provide assistance and to coordinate additional support for U.S. States and Territories. Additionally, we are postured to deploy teams to advise U.S. Country Teams and partner nations on PI response and to assess infectious disease control and surveillance programs, laboratories and response team capabilities.

This past year, we conducted more than a dozen PI-related events that included bi- and multi-lateral exercises and subject matter exchanges within our Area of Responsibility (AOR). Highlights from the past year include the Joint Task Force – Homeland Defense exercise LIGHTNING RESCUE 2009, which tested the State of Hawaii's PI response and validated domestic relationships and linkages to the U.S. Pacific Command PI plan.

Closing

U.S. Pacific Command must be recognized as both an extension of U.S. military power as well as a committed and trusted partner in the Asia-Pacific. Our every endeavor must promote a region whose nations are secure and prosperous. Throughout the AOR, we are fortunate to have allies, partners and friends who willingly and effectively contribute to regional security and who seek to advance their partnerships with the U.S. on behalf of the 36 nations and 3.4 billion people who reside in the Asia-Pacific region.

In closing, I would like to express my appreciation to the Committee for the long-standing support you have provided our military. Your efforts have provided our members

with the most technically advanced systems and with a quality of life that recognizes the contributions our young men and women make to our nation every day. On behalf of the more than 300,000 men and women of the Pacific Command, thank you for your support and for this opportunity to testify on the defense posture in the U.S. Pacific Command.

Robert F. Willard, USN
Commander, U.S. Pacific Command

Adm. Robert F. Willard is the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii.

Admiral Robert F. Willard is a Los Angeles native and a 1973 graduate of the United States Naval Academy. He has a Master's Degree in Engineering Management from Old Dominion University and is an MIT Seminar XXI alumnus.

An F-14 aviator, Willard served in a variety of west coast fighter squadrons; VF-24, VF-124, VF-2, and VF-51 aboard the aircraft carriers USS Constellation, USS Ranger, USS Kitty Hawk and USS Carl Vinson. He was Operations Officer and Executive Officer of Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) and aerial coordinator for the movie. He later commanded the "Screaming Eagles" of Fighter Squadron 51.

Following nuclear-power training, Willard served as Executive Officer of USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), commanded the amphibious flagship USS Tripoli (LPH 10) in the Persian Gulf during "Operation Vigilant Warrior" for which Tripoli received a Navy Unit Commendation and commanded the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72).

As a Flag Officer, Willard twice served on the Joint Staff, was Deputy and Chief of Staff for U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawai'i, commanded Carrier Group Five aboard USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) and commanded the U.S. Seventh Fleet in Yokosuka, Japan. In March 2005, Willard became the 34th Vice Chief of Naval Operations; in May 2007, he assumed command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet; and on October 19, 2009, he became the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawai'i.

Admiral Willard's decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit and various other awards.

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL WALTER L. SHARP

COMMANDER, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND;

COMMANDER, REPUBLIC OF KOREA-UNITED STATES

COMBINED FORCES COMMAND;

AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

25 MARCH 2010

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I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to provide my statement to you. As the Commander, United Nations Command (UNC); Commander, Republic of Korea – United States (U.S.) Combined Forces Command (CFC); and Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK), it is a privilege to represent the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Department of Defense (DoD) Civilians, and their families who serve our great nation in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On behalf of these outstanding men and women, thank you for your support of American forces stationed in the ROK and your commitment to improving the quality of life for Command personnel and their families. Your sustained support allows us to deter aggression against the ROK and promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, which in turn promotes peace and stability in the region of Northeast Asia and helps protect the national interests we share with regional partners. I appreciate this opportunity to report on the state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula, my Command priorities, the plans in place for organizational transformation of the commands I lead, and how this change will strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

This year we mark the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, a three-year conflict that resulted in millions of military and civilian casualties and has yet to be concluded by a formal peace agreement. This year my commands will support a host of ROK led events to honor those who played a role in repelling North Korea's aggression of six decades ago. Also this year we recognize the 57th anniversary of signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Serving as a cornerstone for the broader ROK-U.S. Alliance, mutual commitments under the

treaty have allowed the Alliance to deter aggression against the ROK and promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

The Korean Peninsula sits at the center of Northeast Asia – a dynamic region that has significant national interests for the U.S.[1] Northeast Asia is home to four of the world's six largest militaries in terms of personnel and two nuclear powers (China and Russia).[2] The region contains 25% of the world's population and is an economic powerhouse.[3] In 2009, Northeast Asia housed five of the world's 19 largest economies that collectively accounted for 24.8% of global gross domestic product during that year.[4] Countries in the region also accounted for 25.8% of U.S. trade in goods during 2009.[5] At the end of 2008, the U.S. direct investment position in Northeast Asia was valued at $220.7 billion.[6]

While Northeast Asia has grown into a major economic region, it is also characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change. Historical animosities, territorial disputes, competition over access to resources, and struggles for regional hegemony have combined to pose difficult and long-term security challenges not only for regional states but also for the

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[1] The region of Northeast Asia is defined to include the following countries and special administrative regions: China, North Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, ROK, Russia, and Taiwan.

[2] In terms of number of personnel in the armed forces, the world's six largest militaries during the year 2009 were: China (2.1 million personnel); U.S. (1.54 million); India (1.28 million); North Korea (1.2 million); Russia (1.02 million); and the ROK (687,000). Personnel data obtained from *The Military Balance 2009*, produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

[3] Population percentage calculated with data obtained from the *CIA World Fact Book*. Percentage is as of July 2009.

[4] Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at purchasing power parity in the year 2009 for the economies of Northeast Asia were: China-$8.7 trillion; Japan-$4.1 trillion; Russia-$2.1 trillion; ROK-$1.3 trillion; Taiwan-$693 billion; Hong Kong-$301 billion; North Korea-$40 billion (2008); Macau-$18 billion; and Mongolia-$10 billion. GDP data obtained from the *CIA World Fact Book*.

[5] U.S. trade in goods during 2009 was valued at $366 billion with China, $147 billion with Japan, $67 billion with the ROK, $46 billion with Taiwan, $23 billion with Russia, $55 million with Mongolia, $24 billion with Hong Kong, $446 million with Macau, and $900,000 with North Korea. Trade data was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.

[6] The direct investment figure is on a historical cost basis and was obtained from data published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Countries/special administrative region included in the valuation are China, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and the ROK.

international community. U.S. force presence in the ROK is a long-term investment in regional peace and stability and both maintains security commitments to the ROK established under the Mutual Defense Treaty and reinforces American engagement with actors throughout Northeast Asia. U.S. force presence in the ROK also helps set the conditions for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and eventual reunification of the two Koreas in a peaceful manner. A strong ROK-U.S. Alliance, with a meaningful U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula, is essential to meet the security challenges posed in the dynamic and economically growing region of Northeast Asia. As observed in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, achieving core missions of American armed forces requires strong security relationships with allies and partners that are best enabled and maintained through long-term presence and sustained interaction.

II. STATE OF AFFAIRS IN KOREA

ASSESSMENT OF THE ROK

Last month ROK President Lee Myung-bak marked the start of the third year of his five-year term in office.[7] President Lee Myung-bak has committed the ROK to taking on a more global orientation in its policies and to assume a greater role in the international community. Indeed, President Lee has made the development of a "Global Korea" one of five national goals for the ROK.[8] Later this year the city of Seoul will host a Group of 20 (G20) summit and at the end of 2009 the ROK officially joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee, pledging to nearly triple its current level of

[7] In the ROK, Presidents serve a single, five-year term of office without the possibility of re-election.
[8] The other four national goals are to develop a government serving the people, a lively market economy, active welfare, and a country rich in talent. See the ROK Office of the President (Blue House) web-site.

official development assistance to a value that will equal 0.25% of gross national income in the year 2015. The ROK's commitment to assume a greater role in the international community is evidenced by its participation in about a dozen peacekeeping operations around the world, its plans to form a 3,000 person military unit that can be rapidly deployed in support of such operations, and a general willingness to support international stability and reconstruction operations such as in Haiti and Afghanistan (where in Afghanistan the ROK will deploy a Provincial Reconstruction Team later this year).[9]

In June 2009 the ROK government released a revision to its National Defense Reform 2020 plan. First written in 2005, the defense reform plan aims to modernize and restructure the ROK military through 2020 so that it is ready to address the future security environment and challenges. The revised plan focuses on developing capabilities to address North Korea's asymmetric threats (identified as its nuclear and missile programs), successful transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK military, enhancing jointness, developing network centric warfare capabilities, increasing managerial efficiencies to include the extensive use of civil resources, enhancing the ability to participate in operations sponsored by the international community, and contributing to development of the national economy. The objective is to develop an information and technology-intensive military force that can cope well with a comprehensive set of security threats. As stated by President Lee during his 1 October 2009 Armed Forces Day speech, the ROK military must transform into a highly efficient multi-purpose professional elite force that can support Korea's bid to carry out roles commensurate

[9] Peacekeeping operations include UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNOMIL (Liberia), UNAMA (Afghanistan), UNMIS (Sudan), UNAMID (Darfur), UNMIN (Nepal), UNOCI (Ivory Coast), MINURSO (Western Sahara), UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan), Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan.

with its growing international stature. Through 2020 the ROK plans on spending an accumulative 599.3 trillion won ($466 billion) on defense to include expenditures on this reform initiative. I fully support the ROK's Defense Reform 2020 initiative and hope the plan is fully resourced throughout the life of the program.

ASSESSMENT OF NORTH KOREA

North Korea continues to be a threat to regional as well as global security and prosperity. Over the past year, Pyongyang's foreign policy alternated from provocative actions to a willingness to engage in some forms of dialogue. North Korea tested its nuclear and missile capabilities and continued attempts to proliferate conventional arms and other materials in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. Pyongyang has also maintained its aging but massive forward deployed conventional military force. North Korea will remain a serious security threat in the region and a significant concern for the U.S and the international community for the foreseeable future.

Strategy, Goals, and Internal Dynamics

Kim Jong-il's strategic goal is the survival and continuance of his regime. North Korea's efforts to build a nuclear arms program have become the key component of its strategy to guarantee regime survival. This program is now assessed to have enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons. Nearly sixteen years after the signing of the 1994 Agreed Framework, Pyongyang continues to try to develop nuclear capabilities. In 2009, it announced a second nuclear test, made public statements about its plutonium reprocessing and weaponization activities, and announced progress in uranium enrichment. These efforts, along with the

sustained development of a complementary missile delivery system, will likely continue into the foreseeable future. North Korea appears to desire international recognition as a nuclear weapons state, which the U.S., the ROK, and many members of the international community (including five members of the Six-Party Talks) have made clear is unacceptable.

On the domestic front, Kim Jong-il appears to have recovered from an apparent stroke in the summer of 2008 and remains in full control of North Korea. Over the past year Kim has systematically introduced his third and youngest son – Kim Jong-eun – as the heir apparent. Meanwhile, North Korea's ruling elite, whose privileged position apparently rests upon continuance of the status quo, appears unwavering in its loyalty to Kim Jong-il. The role of the military in Pyongyang's decision-making apparatus appears to be more prominent, as highlighted by last year's expansion of the National Defense Commission authorities. North Korea's conventional and asymmetric military forces remain the guarantor of Kim's power. The regime manufactures the perception of an external threat – primarily from the U.S. – to maintain internal control and justify its "military first" policy.

A Year of Pyongyang Provocations and Posturing

Last year, North Korea initiated a series of provocative actions against the ROK, including announcing its unilateral nullification of the 1991 South-North Basic Agreement, restrictions of ROK activity at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), and threats against ROK naval forces off the western coast of the Peninsula. Pyongyang in April launched a Taepo Dong-2 and in May announced that it conducted a second nuclear test in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions. North Korea also launched multiple shorter range missiles

off its eastern coast, reversed disablement procedures at its Yongbyon nuclear facility, announced the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to obtain additional fissile material, announced its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, and stated its intent not to abide by the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

In August, Pyongyang released two detained American journalists, a detained South Korean KIC employee, and four detained ROK fisherman. Pyongyang also lifted its earlier imposed KIC border restrictions and allowed inter-Korean family reunions at Mount Kumgang. But in October, North Korea launched more missiles, announced that its uranium enrichment development program was in its final stages and that all plutonium had been harvested and would be weaponized, and provoked an inter-Korean naval skirmish.

North Korea's provocations during the first half of 2009 may have been intended to test the resolve of the new administration in Washington, create tension in ROK domestic politics, or set conditions internally for the introduction of a regime successor. Of North Korea's true intentions, we know little. But what is clear is that these actions resulted in the North's further isolation – highlighted by unanimous passage of additional United Nations Security Council sanctions – and pressure to return to denuclearization talks from all five parties, including China and Russia. After these events, North Korea launched a "charm offensive" in the second half of 2009, inviting foreign visitors and business interests to visit the country. This has not yet led to any measurable progress towards the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea.

Last year, North Korea's annual domestic food production remained dismal, with the country dependent upon international assistance to meet its basic subsistence requirements.

Despite its serious economic problems, Pyongyang reportedly continued to divert precious national resources to its conventional and asymmetric military forces. At year's end, North Korea announced a currency redenomination which appears to have confiscated what little wealth might have been accumulated by private farmers and traders and which many now regard as a failure.

Though aging and technologically inferior, North Korea's massive army and vast artillery forces continue to represent a substantial threat capable of initiating limited offensives against the ROK that could potentially cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars in damage. North Korea also continued to develop its missile forces by attempting a multi-stage space launch vehicle, as well as multiple theater ballistic missile launches. Pyongyang continued to focus resources on its conventional and asymmetric military forces despite food shortages and a faltering economy. North Korea's missile capabilities remain a significant regional and global threat.

North Korea Threat Outlook

My number one concern will remain Pyongyang's continuing attempts to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities. The full potential of these capabilities would threaten the U.S., our regional allies, and the international community. We must also be mindful of the potential for instability in North Korea. Combined with the country's disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector, insufficient agricultural base, malnourished military and populace, and developing nuclear programs, the possibility of a sudden leadership change in the North could be destabilizing and unpredictable.

In the future, Pyongyang may continue its strategy of periodically heightening tensions. We must never be complacent about the possibility that North Korea might take additional provocative steps or even launch an attack on the ROK. To address this threat, UNC/CFC/USFK must maintain the highest level of readiness.

III. COMMAND PRIORITIES

I have established three priorities for the commands. These priorities have remained constant and serve as the guiding principles for all key initiatives pursued. The three priorities are: 1) be prepared to fight and win; 2) strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance; and 3) improve the quality of life for all service members, DoD civilians, and their families. I will address each of these priorities and the key initiatives within each below.

PREPARED TO FIGHT AND WIN

My first priority as Commander of UNC, CFC, and USFK is to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined combined and joint commands that are prepared to fight and win. This has been the focus of U.S. forces stationed in Korea for more than 50 years and for the CFC since it was established in 1978. Maintaining "fight tonight" readiness is the primary reason U.S. forces are stationed in the ROK, supporting the alliance between the American and Korean people in defense of the ROK. The Alliance stands ready to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge with little warning on the Korean Peninsula. This spectrum of conflict ranges from major combat operations under conditions of general war or provocation, to multiple possibilities of destabilizing conditions on the Peninsula, to humanitarian assistance operations, and even the

elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Given these varied potential security challenges, it is imperative that our forces maintain the highest possible level of training and readiness.

In order to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge on the Korean Peninsula, the Command has developed and constantly refines plans to deter aggression against the ROK, defeat aggression should deterrence fail, and respond to other destabilizing conditions that could affect the ROK. U.S. and ROK military personnel develop and maintain their warfighting skills through tough, realistic training to include theater-level exercises that leverage a variety of facilities and ranges located in the ROK.

The Command conducts two annual exercises: Key Resolve/Foal Eagle and Ulchi Freedom Guardian. Key Resolve, a Command Post Exercise focused on crisis management, trains and sharpens skills on how we will fight today using existing organizational structures where CFC executes command and control over the combined force. Foal Eagle is a large-scale combined field training exercise that includes the strategic deployment of American forces from bases in the U.S. as well as the participation of thousands of ROK troops. Key Resolve and Foal Eagle ensure that CFC remains ready today to decisively defeat any aggression that is directed against the ROK. The second annual exercise – Ulchi Freedom Guardian – is a computer-simulated warfighting exercise that focuses on the development of Alliance command and control structures that will exist after the transition of wartime OPCON of ROK forces in April 2012.

Maintaining "fight tonight" readiness can only occur when training is conducted that prepares forces to address the full spectrum of operations that characterizes today's complex

operational environment. It is vital that Command training facilities and events support the full transformation of U.S. military forces stationed in the ROK. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps possess adequate training resources in the ROK to maintain unit combat readiness to include the rehearsal of robust amphibious operations. But USFK still faces challenges with respect to the training of air forces located in the ROK. We have made progress with our ROK hosts in scheduling and maximizing use of limited ranges. However, there is still insufficient training range capability and capacity. A continued shortfall in electronic warfare training capability and restrictions placed on precision guided munitions training pose deficiencies that must be addressed. Deployments of U.S. air forces to training events outside the Korean Peninsula mitigate current training shortfalls and ensure the same standard of training and readiness as American combat air forces not located in the ROK. This is not a long-term solution, however, and I continue to work with the ROK government to find a solution to this key training and readiness issue.

STRENGTHEN THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE

My second priority is to strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance. This supports the June 2009 ROK-U.S. Joint Vision statement that commits both nations to build an Alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world as a whole.

The most significant Alliance strengthening initiative is the transition to ROK-led defense on the Korean Peninsula. That is, the transition of wartime OPCON. Following the transition of peacetime OPCON in 1994, this initiative to transition wartime OPCON resumed in

October 2005, when the ROK President stated that the time had come for Seoul to be responsible for its own defense. In early 2007, it was determined that the ROK would assume wartime OPCON of its forces by April 2012. Under OPCON transition, the ROK and U.S. will disestablish CFC and stand up separate, but complementary, national commands consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty to focus on combined defense of the ROK. After OPCON transition the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) will become the supported – or lead – command and the newly created U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be the supporting command. OPCON transition will not result in independent OPCON nor require independent, self-reliant ROK forces. It also will not lead to a reduction in USFK forces or weaken the U.S. commitment to provide reinforcement to the Korean Peninsula. Rather, the Alliance will continue close strategic coordination and consultation to ensure the appropriate capabilities are in place to meet future threats. The U.S. will have the same commitment to the Alliance after OPCON transition that it does now – to include the provision of extended deterrence using the full range of military capabilities.

The combined roadmap toward OPCON transition is laid out in the Strategic Transition Plan (STP). The STP summarizes 20 high level tasks and associated sub-tasks and milestones needed to develop appropriate ROK and U.S. organizations, plans, processes, and systems for the future Alliance military structure. It is a methodical approach that ensures the new command and control relationship between ROK and U.S. forces will be even more effective than the current CFC construct. To ensure that all tasks are completed to standard, a detailed certification process has been established. Both American and Korean external senior observers are being used to help evaluate the new commands. These advisors use a detailed checklist to report to the

ROK JCS Chairman and U.S. KORCOM commander as well as to the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense during the annual Security Consultative Meeting.

Additional evaluation and further development is conducted through the Command theater exercise program. The Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) computer simulated warfighting exercise is the Command's preeminent combined exercise to test, develop, and refine post-OPCON transition command and control arrangements. Two UFG exercises have already been conducted and two more will be held prior to a final OPCON transition certification exercise in 2012. These exercises help ensure that the new combined command structure will be trained and ready to fight and win on the day of OPCON transition. The STP is on track as planned and we are working hard to ensure that all conditions will be met for a smooth OPCON transition on 17 April 2012.

The rationale for OPCON transition emanates from the tremendous changes that have occurred in the ROK since the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1953. The ROK today is a secure democracy and a global economic leader. By assuming the lead for its own defense, the ROK will send a strong message not only to North Korea but to the rest of the world that it has a strong, competent, and capable military that can take the lead role in securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. South Korean leaders have proven their ability to lead forces in a changing regional and global environment. They are members of a combined task force and are participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Officers of the ROK military, who have grown up in the Korean culture and are well versed with relevant operations plans while also being familiar with the Korean Peninsula's terrain, are best equipped to protect the Korean people. After OPCON transition occurs, the ROK military will be fully capable of leading the

combined warfight in defense of its people and the U.S. will remain committed to ROK defense through its supporting role.

Another key Alliance strengthening initiative was the conclusion of a five-year (2009-2013) cost sharing agreement in January 2009. Known as the Special Measures Agreement (SMA), this cost sharing arrangement has the ROK provide USFK with valuable labor and logistics services as well as the design (paid for in cash) and in-kind construction of facilities and infrastructure needed for daily operation of the Command. Under the SMA, ROK support for the maintenance of USFK ensures that the Command maintains its "fight tonight" readiness, a factor that helps deter aggression against the ROK and preserves peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. SMA contributions also help build the infrastructure needed for a long-term U.S. force presence in the ROK. SMA funds help stimulate the ROK economy through the payment of Korean national employee wages, Korean service contracts, and Korean construction contracts, serving as a source of economic growth for communities that host USFK facilities. During calendar year 2010 the ROK will provide USFK with 790.4 billion won ($664 million) in cost sharing support.[10] Future increases in the ROK cost sharing contribution through the year 2013 are tied to changes in the ROK consumer price index.

Finally, the Command's *Good Neighbor Program* continues to make great progress in strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance. The purpose of the program is to conduct community outreach events that engage and connect the Command with the Korean community. Good Neighbor Program events educate, inform, and familiarize Koreans with the mission and purpose of USFK. This direct engagement allows Americans and Koreans to develop mutual

[10] U.S. dollar figure calculated by using a forecasted average 2010 won-$U.S. exchange rate of 1,191. This forecasted exchange rate was obtained from the U.S. DoD.

understanding of one another's cultures, customs, and lifestyles, often leading to the formation of lifelong friendships between members of the two communities. Examples of events conducted by the Good Neighbor Program include English-language camps, speaking engagements by U.S. military personnel, and tours of the Joint Security Area/Demilitarized Zone and USFK installations. The program promotes two-way exchange between USFK personnel and people of our host country. The program helps foster exchange, understanding, and cooperation between members of my Command and the Korean communities that exist alongside USFK facilities. In 2009 alone, 2,043 events were conducted with the participation of over 139,000 local nationals. The ROK Ministry of National Defense operates similar programs called *Friends Forever* and the *Experience Korean Culture Program*. Under these two programs, USFK personnel are given the opportunity to experience Korean culture by participating in various host-nation sponsored events and tours. These programs strengthen the Alliance at both the professional and personal levels.

IMPROVE QUALITY OF LIFE FOR COMMAND PERSONNEL

Improving the quality of life for service members, DoD civilians, and their families is my third priority. My overall objective is to establish the infrastructure and operational climate that makes Korea the assignment of choice for DoD personnel. In order to achieve this objective and support this priority, the Command is currently implementing two key initiatives: the relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and tour normalization.

Relocation of U.S. Forces in the ROK

The Command is implementing two separate relocation plans. Once completed, American forces will be stationed in the ROK on two primary "hubs" of five enduring sites.[11] The first plan – named the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) – will move forces currently stationed in and around the capital city of Seoul to U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys, which is located near the city of Pyeongtaek some 40 miles south of Seoul. The majority of costs associated with this relocation plan will be paid by the ROK. The second plan, called the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), moves the 2nd Infantry Division from locations north of Seoul to areas south of the Han River and expands infrastructure at Osan Air Base and Camp Mujuk. Costs associated with the LPP will be shared between the ROK and U.S. While the YRP and LPP programs are being executed, actions will be taken to maintain our current facilities at an acceptable standard in order to support current operations.

The relocation of U.S. forces in Korea will occur in two distinct phases: consolidation and relocation. Phase I – consolidation – is currently underway. The current U.S. troop level of 28,500 personnel will remain on the Peninsula. The Command has returned 37 installations to the ROK so far, in the process giving thousands of acres of land back to the Korean people. In turn, the ROK has purchased land that is needed to accommodate USFK relocation. The ROK government has granted land at USAG Humphreys, an action that has enabled the ROK-U.S. Alliance to begin designing, planning, and construction of what will become one of the best Army installations in the world. The major facilities that will be constructed include medical

[11] The two primary hubs are centered on Osan Air Base/United States Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys and USAG Daegu. The five enduring sites are Osan Air Base, USAG Humphreys, USAG Daegu, Chinhae Naval Base, and Kunsan Air Base.

facilities, headquarters buildings, family housing, schools, a communications center, and other operational and support infrastructure needed to accommodate the relocation of 2nd Infantry Division.

Phase II of USFK relocation will involve the movement of Army forces to one of the two enduring hubs that will be located south of Seoul. Once this phase is completed, USFK forces will utilize 48 separate sites, well below the 104 facilities USFK maintained in 2002. The success of the relocation initiative will sustain USFK's "fight tonight" readiness. Unit moves in the relocation plan will be packaged and executed in manageable components, which will allow units to maintain their full spectrum of operational and support capabilities. Completion of the relocation initiative will be a great boon for the ROK-U.S. Alliance because it improves readiness and soldier quality of life, realizes stationing efficiencies, signals continued U.S. commitment to the region, improves the combined capability to deter and defend against aggression directed at the ROK, and optimizes use of Korean land by creating a less intrusive military footprint, thus enhancing force protection for USFK.

Tour Normalization

DoD approved plans to normalize the tours of all service members in the ROK on December 1, 2008.[12] As noted in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD's long-term goal is to phase out all unaccompanied tours in Korea. This goal will mean all service members stationed in the ROK will be on 36-month accompanied or 24-month unaccompanied tours. Single troops will serve 24-months. Prior to this policy change, the majority of U.S. military

[12] It should be noted that in August 2009 the standard length of tour for USFK civilian personnel was increased from 24-months to 36-months.

personnel serving in the ROK were on one-year unaccompanied assignments. For military personnel with dependents, tour normalization means that they can be accompanied by their family members while serving our nation in the ROK, something that has been done in Europe for decades. Once complete, there will be approximately 14,500 families in Korea.

Phase I is currently under way and will run through Fiscal Year (FY) 2011. During this phase, the number of command sponsored families in the ROK will almost triple from the start of this phase, to 4,932. The length of accompanied tours offered in five locations – Seoul, Osan, Pyeongtaek, Daegu, and Chinhae – are now 36 months and for areas north of Seoul (Dongducheon and Uijeongbu, referred to as Area I) are 24 months. Single soldiers serve a 12-month tour.

The tour normalization process will synchronize increases in the number of command sponsored (accompanied tour) service members and their families with the expansion of necessary infrastructure such as housing, schools, medical facilities, and other infrastructure needed to accommodate this growth. Throughout the phased tour normalization process, the funding for needed infrastructure could come from three key sources: public and private ventures, appropriated military construction funds, and ROK cost sharing contributions where appropriate.

The tour normalization initiative benefits the Command, DoD personnel serving in the ROK, military families, the ROK-U.S. Alliance, and U.S. national interests. Full implementation of this initiative improves force readiness and combat capability by keeping trained military personnel in place for longer periods of time, thus enhancing continuity, stability, and the retention of institutional, regional, and cultural knowledge. It will also reduce the stress placed

on troops and units by frequent rotations and supports the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review's "preserve and enhance" objective by establishing a sustainable rotation rate that helps protect the force's long-term health. Quality of life for our service members will be greatly improved through the elimination of needless separation from their families and the use of modern DoD standard design facilities. The ROK-U.S. Alliance will be enhanced by the more meaningful and deeper interaction between Americans and Koreans that can occur during a tour of longer duration. Finally, U.S. national interests are supported through the signal tour normalization sends on U.S. commitment to the long-term security and stability of the ROK as well as Northeast Asia as a whole.

IV. FUTURE OF THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE

A key part of U.S. security policy in Asia is the construction of a comprehensive strategic alliance with the ROK as specified in the June 2009 Joint Vision statement. This comprehensive strategic alliance will be bilateral, regional, and global in scope and will be based on common values and mutual trust. We will maintain a robust defense posture backed by allied capabilities which support both nations' security interests. Just as today, in the future the ROK-U.S. Alliance will remain vital to securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. The U.S. will maintain its commitment to the defense of the ROK through the employment of capabilities postured both on and off the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, the U.S. welcomes recent moves by the ROK to expand its role in the international community at a level that is commensurate with its growing international stature. The U.S. will continue to provide extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities

to include the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities. As the ROK-U.S. Alliance evolves in the future, we will cooperate on a wide-ranging set of global security challenges that are of mutual interest to include peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.

Over the next decade or so the security component of the Alliance will experience some of the most profound changes since the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1953. Three of these key changes are the transition of wartime OPCON, relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK onto two enduring hubs, and tour normalization. These transformational changes will strengthen the Alliance and enhance its stabilizing role on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider area of Northeast Asia. The process of change will also be supported by implementation of the ROK Defense Reform 2020 initiative. As the Alliance transforms, United Nations Command will continue to provide a coalition of 15 nations ready to provide support for defense of the ROK as well as conduct its armistice maintenance functions through the Military Armistice Commission.

Through Alliance transformation we seek to build a better future for Koreans and Americans by establishing a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and setting the conditions for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. As Alliance partners, the ROK and U.S. will work together toward achieving complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In the Asia-Pacific region the Alliance will work jointly with regional institutions and partners to foster prosperity, maintain peace, and improve the daily lives of people. To enhance security in the Asia-Pacific area the ROK and U.S.

governments will advocate for – and take part in – effective cooperative regional efforts to promote mutual understanding, confidence, and transparency regarding security issues among nations of this region. The two governments will also work closely to address the global challenges of the North Korean threat, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and piracy. The ROK and U.S. will also enhance coordination on peacekeeping operations and post-conflict stabilization and development assistance. In the end, the two countries will work toward achieving Alliance goals through strategic cooperation at every level.

V. SUMMARY

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. Thanks to the sacrifice and selfless service of a countless number of Koreans, Americans, and people of other nationalities, North Korea's aggression was repelled. This year also marks the 57th anniversary of signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Thanks to the peace and stability created by the Alliance structures that emanated from this mutual defense pact, the ROK has been able to develop into a democratic industrialized state with a high standard of living and a growing role in the international community. By promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK-U.S. Alliance has not only set the conditions for successful development of the ROK over the last six decades, but also promoted peace and stability in the broader region of Northeast Asia – a region of key national interest to the U.S.

The ROK-U.S. Joint Vision statement of June 2009 looks to the future and sets out a path for taking the next step in Alliance development – building a comprehensive strategic alliance. My three command priorities of being prepared to fight and win, strengthening the Alliance, and

improving the quality of life for Command personnel support this next step in Alliance evolution. In particular, the transition of wartime OPCON recognizes the substantial growth and development that has occurred in the ROK over the last 60 years, and rightly places the ROK in the lead position for its own defense. The relocation of U.S. forces in the ROK improves readiness and soldier quality of life. Finally, tour normalization greatly increases our capability and demonstrates long-term U.S. commitment to the Alliance, an Alliance that has served the Korean and American people so well for over half a century.

I am extremely proud of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, DoD Civilians, and their families serving our great nation in the ROK. Their selfless service promotes peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as well as in the broader region of Northeast Asia. Your support for them and the ROK-U.S. Alliance is greatly appreciated. I am certain you will agree that our men and women in uniform deserve the very best working, living, and training environment that can be provided, and that we should do everything in our power to provide it. Thank you.

Commander UNC/CFC/USFK
General Walter (Skip) Sharp

General Walter (Skip) Sharp was born in Morgantown, West Virginia while his father was fighting in the Korean War. As a child he moved among many cavalry posts until he went to the United States Military Academy in 1970. General Sharp graduated from West Point in 1974 and was commissioned an Armor officer. He has earned a Master of Science degree in Operations Research and System Analysis from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; and is a graduate of the Armor Basic Course, the Field Artillery Advanced Course, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College.

General Sharp's command positions include armor Company Commander 1st Battalion, 67th Armor, 2nd Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Squadron Commander 1st Squadron, 7th U.S. Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood Texas; Regimental Commander 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, Louisiana; Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver 2nd Infantry Division, Camp Red Cloud, South Korea; and Division Commander, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia. He commanded troops in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and SFOR's Multinational Division (North) in Bosnia.

General Sharp has served in the Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Knox, Kentucky, the Armor/Anti-Armor Special Task Force, and the Armored System Modernization Office at the Pentagon. He has had four assignments at the Pentagon on the Joint Staff. He was the Deputy Director, J5 for Western Hemisphere/Global Transnational Issues; the Vice Director, J8 for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment; the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J5; and the Director of the Joint Staff.

His awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Bronze Star, and Legion of Merit.

General Sharp is married to the former Joanne R. Caporaso of Brooklyn, New York. The Sharps have three children; Elizabeth, married to Major Paul Weyrauch, stationed at Hohenfels, Germany, Steven, working as an HR specialist in Rosslyn, Virginia; and Kevin, a graduate student studying climatology at the University of Colorado and two grandchildren: Emma Rose and Hartley Virginia.

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

MARCH 25, 2010

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Admiral WILLARD. The United States Pacific Command develops the Integrated Priority List (IPL) as part of the Comprehensive Joint Assessment response to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The IPL is my top ten capability gaps derived from analysis and assessment of the Pacific theater operational and contingency plans. The IPL becomes the "war fighter's voice" within the Pentagon and exists to provide a transition from planning to programming. I rely upon the Services and defense agencies to use the IPL too as a foundational element as they develop their individual Program Objective Memoranda (POM). When the Services are unable to fund all the needs within their POM, they use the unfunded requirements mechanism to identify additional resources for emergent and growing operational needs.

Navy's FY11 unfunded list for Aviation Spares, Ship Depot Maintenance, and Aviation Depot Maintenance are all key to sustaining crucial operational capabilities in the Pacific.

I cannot stress enough the importance of sustaining and maintaining the fleet. I depend upon the Navy and the Commander of the Pacific Fleet to provide prompt, capable, forward naval presence to continue our engagement strategy across the region. Our allies and regional partners depend on our naval aviation and maritime capabilities to assure and deter. I strongly endorse the Navy's effort to sustain war fighting capabilities they seek in their FY11 unfunded list to mitigate risk to the Pacific Command. [See page 15.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 25, 2010

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, the 4 phases of the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) provide some direction on the development of missile defense in Europe, but it does not address the PACOM region specifically. How do you see the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) applying to PACOM? What are the milestone dates to gain a capability in PACOM? What specific systems and inventory levels will be required to support a PAA in PACOM? What sites are likely candidates for land-based SM–3s and what is the status of host nation agreements for those sites?

Admiral WILLARD and General SHARP. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, please discuss the threat that North Korean ballistic missiles pose in the region. How do you assess the current threat and the near-term threat over the next five years? I am especially concerned about the progress the North Koreans made in longer-range ballistic missiles last year and I would like to hear your assessment of where we stand today and in the future.

Admiral WILLARD. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

General SHARP. North Korea continues to develop its ballistic missile forces in order to threaten not only the Republic of Korea, USFK, and all of Japan but increasingly U.S. bases and territory in the western Pacific and beyond. Already possessing hundreds of theater ballistic missiles capable of doing significant damage to the South Korean and Japanese economies, we believe North Korea is now focused on improving the range, accuracy, and overall quality of its missiles. Recently, Pyongyang fielded a long-range theater ballistic missile, probably capable of threatening U.S. bases on Guam and the Aleutian Islands.

North Korea's announced intention on 29 April 2009 to conduct an "intercontinental ballistic missile" (ICBM) test launch—coming shortly after the 5 April 2009 Taepo Dong–2 (TD–2) apparent satellite launch attempt—suggests a separate line of long-range missile development that could bring Hawaii, Alaska, and the U.S. mainland under threat of attack. Moreover, Pyongyang is likely interested in eventually developing a more survivable mobile ICBM—a natural evolutionary step given its goal of maintaining a credible deterrent and considering all other mature North Korean ballistic missile systems are mobile. If North Korea pursues robust research & development and testing, it is certainly possible for it to have an operational ICBM-range missile in five years' time.

With the 2009 launches of the multistage TD–2 Space Launch Vehicle and multiple-theater ballistic missiles, North Korea probably gained valuable testing experience, furthering the development of long-range missiles. Future TD–2 Space launch attempts may also serve as a test bed for other long-range missiles in development and the TD–2 itself could probably be used as a backup or alternate ICBM. Considering North Korea's steady pursuit of both longer-range missiles and nuclear weapons, we believe the Kim Jong-il regime seeks to hold U.S. territory throughout the Pacific and the continental U.S. at risk of nuclear missile attack.

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, the Administration's shift to the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) in missile defense last Fall drives many force structure changes. As AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable ships are allocated to the Middle East and European missile defense to meet PAA milestones, does PACOM retain enough AEGIS-based missile defense capability to meet its needs against the growing threats in the region? What is the specific PACOM requirement for BMD-capable ships today? What do you project as the requirement in 5, 10 or 15 years?

Admiral WILLARD and General SHARP. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. LAMBORN. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, Admiral, the cyber attack against Google in China highlights an existing vulnerability for the United States. Our technological edge is a double-edged sword. There have been many initial steps taken to respond to the very real, and growing cyber threat. What has PACOM done

specifically to respond to the threat and how do you assess the cyber threat to your operations?

Admiral WILLARD. PACOM has increased its cyber security posture as well as its vigilance regarding cyber threats to thwart any adversary's intrusions on PACOM networks. Specifically, we have created a Cyber Fusion Center to coordinate directorate responses to network intrusions and to prevent network intrusions when possible. Through the Cyber Fusion Center, we have recently published theater Tailored Response Options and an Information Assurance situational awareness report to increase the theater's and headquarters' situational awareness regarding PACOM's cyber threat. We assess the current cyber threat to our operations as high.

General SHARP. I will address this question from the perspective of United States Forces Korea (USFK). We agree that there is a persistent and evolving cyber threat against USFK. We assess the current risk to USFK operations as low due to our ability to implement countermeasures.

Historically, we have implemented a layered computer network security defense structure termed Defense-in-Depth that has successfully mitigated the risk of cyber threat Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE). A Red Team assessment that simulated cyber threat activities during March 2010 validated our secure and strong defensive posture. However, cyber threat actors have discovered new ways to circumvent our Defense-in-Depth structure with varying degrees of success. As such, in order for USFK to maintain confidence in the protection of our networks, we must continue to identify and resource new technologies that defend against the evolving threats. The discussion below outlines the mitigation steps USFK implements on a daily basis to respond to cyber threats.

USFK employs various layers of Defense-In-Depth countermeasures to thwart off attacks similar to the Google Aurora cyber threat; to include four different commercial vendors of network layer Intrusion Detection System (IDS) used at the network layer which identify network traffic at the source and destination. We also use web cache engines that screen malicious content, and reverse proxy servers for public-facing web servers. Secure external remote access to our networks is achieved through Virtual Private Network (VPN) concentrators and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for authentication.

USFK has implemented additional host security tools. These products defend against known, unknown zero-day exploits, and malware. We utilize four different vendors for remediating and identifying vulnerabilities in our Defense-In-Depth architecture. Units in Korea are given the Army Gold Masters (AGM) software image for ensuring a secure baseline is being maintained; this software baseline is also validated daily with the Host Based Security System (HBSS) tool. There are three different antivirus vendors that are used to ensure the malware is detected, stopped, and eradicated from the Email servers. The Common Access Card (CAC) utilizes PKI for identity management. These combined technologies provide user confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation when using information systems. USFK users are required to sign an Acceptable Use Policy, and receive annual security awareness training to reinforce security focused usage on government networks. PKI has been detrimental in email phishing attempts like those used in the Google Aurora cyber threat.

Note—USFK was used as the test bed for DOD's deployment of HBSS, Hercules, and Retina Enterprise Manager (REM). Since we were one of the first enterprises to successfully deploy HBSS, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and McAfee have modeled their BBPs off of our deployment methods.

In the past 6 months, DISA performed two Command Cyber Readiness Inspections (CCRI) on the Korean Peninsula. Both Kunsan Air Base and Joint Command Information Systems Activity (JCISA) inspections resulted in monitor compliance and excellent marks, respectively. The 1st Signal Brigade Korea–Theater Network Operations and Security Center (K–TNOSC) is scheduled for their CCRI in June.

Microsoft released a patch for this zero-day vulnerability on the 21st of January 2010; one week after the initial US–CERT notice. Before this patch was made available, USFK IA/CND informed their community of the vulnerability and available countermeasures recommended in JTF–GNO, US–CERT, and other civilian reports. USFK maintains a robust Information Assurance Vulnerability Management (IAVM) program. As of 31 March 2010, USFK is currently 99.40% compliant for this particular Information Assurance Vulnerability Alert (IAVA).

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