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HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S.
EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA
COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT
FORCES COMMAND**

HEARING HELD
MARCH 10, 2010



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FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 10, 2010.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. I want to welcome our witnesses today. And this is, as you know, the posture hearing for the fiscal year 2011 budget for the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. African Command (AFRICOM), and the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).

Before I introduce our witnesses, I wish to make note that our staff director, Erin Conaton, will be witnessing her last hearing in the role of staff director. To say that she has done yeoman's work is an understatement. I am immensely proud of the leadership—she supported—her ability, her tireless energy, her good judgment, and in steering this committee so very, very well.

And we wish her well as the new Under Secretary of the Air Force, and she will be joining that team in just a few days. But this is her very last hearing.

Mr. McKeon.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to second everything that you have said, plus I would like to add that, you know, I am fairly new at this job, and Erin has made it so enjoyable. You know, as we went through the conference the day after I was named the ranking member, we had our markup. And so it was like drinking out of a fire hose for the next several months.

And we got down to the final four. Many of those meetings that we held—and I want to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, because for what else is happening in this Congress, this committee has been bipartisan due to your leadership. And everything that we did, Erin made it bipartisan.

She made sure that we know everything that is going on and all of the decisions. We didn't agree on everything. We probably agreed on more than we did with the Senate. But, I mean, through the process, she has been a true professional and done an outstanding job. And she will be missed, but the Air Force is gaining a great new member.

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McKeon, thank you very much.

Erin, we wish you well.

[Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. We have announced her replacement, Paul Arcangeli, standing by the door by Erin, and as the deputy, Debra Wada, who all of us know so well through the years. Welcome aboard.

[Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Appearing before us today, Admiral James G. Stavridis, United States Navy; General William E. “Kip” Ward, United States Army; General James N. Mattis, United States Marine Corps. We appreciate your being with us today, and we welcome you.

It has been the practice over several years, a very compressed hearing calendar causes us to consider your testimony as a group but, really, each of you deserve to have—because of your position as commander of your important commands—deserve your own separate hearing, but we were unable to do that this year. And I hope you understand that.

First, European Command. Admiral, Europe remains critical to our national security, and we should remember that. Long trans-Atlantic ties have endured difficult times over the years. Challenges in those relationships present themselves today. We tend to think of our European friends and allies solely as partners for operations outside of that theater, but we should not so quickly put aside what the Russian incursion into Georgia two summers ago reminded us; real regional challenges do exist in Europe.

Many of our allies rely on us to guarantee security and stability in Europe. One shining example of our commitment to security is in the Balkans where, after nearly 15 years, the American presence in Bosnia Herzegovina is down to a handful, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Kosovo has brought us genuine stability.

We are all watching the NATO mission in Afghanistan closely. Many of our allies are making considerable contributions to that effort and, sadly, suffering casualties to prove it. Somehow, however, are not able to perform all missions where this is a matter of concern regarding capability and not national will.

I encourage you to continue to find ways to build their capacity and would like to hear your ideas along those lines.

Next, General, U.S. Africa Command. After a beginning of fits and starts, it looks to me like AFRICOM has gotten its feet underneath it. You worked very hard to bring together parts of three other combatant commands, and until President Obama laid out a clear vision of United States national policy toward Africa last July, you had been operating under somewhat vague policy guidance.

Now, it seems like things are finally coming together in your shop, none too soon. From Al Qaeda in East Africa to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Al Shabab in Somalia, we see that violent extremism on the continent is on the rise. AFRICOM has done some impressive things while working with its African partners to

promote African stability and security. And that is, of course, a worthy effort.

The effect the United States Navy and its African partnership station has had on developing African maritime security is a great example. So we feel like we should pat our Navy on the back for having done so well.

I have thought for some time, General Ward, that when it comes to your command's activities that are not clearly counterterrorism, your challenge has been to describe them in terms of a clear linkage to U.S. national security interests. I hope you will emphasize that point in your testimony today, sir.

Last but of course not least, United States Joint Forces Command, JFCOM, perhaps one of the most opaque commands for an outsider because so much of what you do, General Mattis, is conceptual. Sometimes, it feels like one has to be an experienced practitioner of the art of war to understand it. Still, that intellectual space is exact the where the next war is going to be won before we even know who we will be fighting against.

At last month's hearing in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), I observed that the QDR did not pay enough attention to the operational needs of our money boot warriors. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan made it very clear that the superiority of individuals in small units engaged in close combat is essential if the United States is going to win these sorts of wars.

These are our most effective weapons, and I understand the Joint Forces Command is making great strides in developing innovative tools to make sure our small units are fully and realistically trained. I think we are a ground-combat team. It is the same sort of preparation in terms of stimulus and other training tools that we give our pilots, for instance, and I hope, General Mattis, you will talk about that today.

We welcome you. We look forward to your testimony. This should be a very, very interesting hearing.

The ranking member and the gentleman from California, my friend, Buck McKeon.

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Today, we begin our series of posture hearings with the commanders of U.S. EUCOM, U.S. AFRICOM, and U.S. Joint Forces Command. I would like to welcome Admiral Stavridis, General Ward, and General Mattis and thank each of you for your leadership and your service to our Nation as well as all of those people that are here with you in uniform. Thank you.

Your appearance also reminds us of our extraordinary military men and women serving around the globe to protect American national interests. Please pass along my sincere gratitude to all of our service members and their families serving under your command.

Admiral Stavridis, unfortunately, we do not have time to cover all of the challenges facing EUCOM and NATO, but I would like to highlight a few areas that I hope that you will address today.

The first is the administration's Russia reset policy. While your written statement correctly highlights the complexities of engaging with Russia, we need to ensure that the reset policy does not risk the viability of the security architecture that has kept the European continent peaceful for nearly 60 years.

In other words, reset needs to be balanced with U.S. reassurance to our allies. This is why many of us support a NATO-first policy which would make clear to our NATO allies that U.S. bilateral engagement with Russia will not foster collected insecurity amongst our allies.

I am pleased that your prepared statement addresses the need to strengthen trans-Atlantic security, assure allies, and dissuade adversaries. Important to assuring allies is a U.S. force presence in Europe. Your prepared statement states that force posture is key to achieving our national objective in EUCOM's area of responsibility and offers context by highlighting how U.S. personnel in Europe has decreased from 300,000 during the Cold War to less than 80,000 today.

While some have called for even less force presence, you state that—and I quote—“without four brigade combat teams in Europe, deterrence and reassurance are at increased risk. Given Russia's military modernization efforts, its behavior in Georgia, and its revised nuclear doctrine, this is not a risk we can afford to assume.”

A key development in your area of responsibility (AOR) since last year is missile defense. While I understand the missile defense costs and capability are not EUCOM issues, addressing our allies' concerns about the Iranian threat is a major EUCOM equity. With respect to defense of Israel, EUCOM should build on its October 2009 Juniper Cobra exercise which successfully exercised the active missile-defense capabilities of both U.S. and Israeli Armed Forces. I do have concerns about the administration's phased adaptive approach, however.

In my view, it is critical that the administration deliver on its promise on missile defense in Europe. We have learned little about this plan since the September 2009 announcement. Does EUCOM have a detailed plan in place to execute this policy?

Finally, absent from your comprehensive testimony is discussion of NATO as a nuclear alliance. While you highlight that Article 5—and collective defense is a cornerstone of the alliance—you do not address whether the U.S. should continue to have a nuclear presence in Europe.

In my view, our forward-deployed nuclear forces strengthen trans-Atlantic security and are critical to the credibility of our collective defense commitment. I take to heart the view that our nuclear forces work for us every day by providing assurance to allies and deterrence to our adversaries.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that my entire statement be included for the record where I address policies facing the other combatant command testifying today.

Once again, I thank you, gentlemen, for being here, and I look forward to your testimonies.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman, and the statement will be spread upon the record without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Stavridis, welcome.

**STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN,
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND**

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee. Thank you so much for taking time to have a dialogue with each of us and to hear our views and to learn of yours.

I want to also commend Erin Conaton who has been a terrific liaison and, sir, has represented this committee in an extraordinary fashion. I was also pleased to see you use a nautical metaphor to commend her doing “yeoman’s work” which we like that expression in the Navy. And she has been a good friend to the Navy and, indeed, to all the services and I believe will be an extraordinary addition to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon.

I am very blessed to be here today with two outstanding shipmates who are on my flanks and are both good friends. And as I mentioned yesterday, I feel very safe in the company of two combat-serious infantry-type officers from the Army and the Marine Corps.

Mr. Chairman, I will be extremely brief. I want to, as always, thank this committee for all of the support to all of our men and women. Your visits matter. Your support through the committee matters deeply. It is the fuel in the machine, and we thank you for it. And we thank you for your informed engagement with us that helps guide us.

I will talk—and I look forward to taking your questions on Afghanistan. My role there, of course, is in my Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) NATO hat. I am cautiously optimistic about progress in Afghanistan. Secretary Gates is down south in the Helmand yesterday and said he sees bits of pieces of progress. I think we have a long way to go and a tough year ahead, but I am encouraged by what I have seen over the course of the last year in terms of strategy, resources, and leadership in Afghanistan.

The Balkans, Mr. Chairman, thank you for mentioning the Balkans. It really is a success story. I look forward to a continued reduction of our forces there. The key in the Balkans is to ensure we don’t fall backward.

As you pointed out, 10 years ago, we had almost 30,000 troops all over the Balkans. Today, we have less than 1,200. Our allies are there. The allies have almost 15,000 troops there. So they are pulling hard, and I think, overall together, the Balkans are an example of trans-Atlantic security working at its best.

A couple of other issues that I think are key I would like to touch on at some point today are cyber. I am concerned about that both in the context of U.S. European Command and, also, on my NATO side. I am very concerned about Iran.

Thank you, Ranking Member McKeon, for mentioning the missile defense threat. I think that Iran is what poses that threat, and we need to be responsive to that.

And Russia, I take your point entirely, Ranking Member McKeon, that it is a balance between these polls of reset and reassurance, as you correctly point out.

In terms of how we are approaching business as U.S. European Command, as I did at U.S. Southern Command, we are working very hard to have an international, an interagency orientation in the work we do. We are trying to have effective strategic communications and explain what we are doing. And above all, we depend on the brave men and women, almost 80,000 of them in Europe today, who are defending our Nation forward.

I thank you for your time today, and I look forward to your questions, sir.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found in the Appendix on page 46.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you very much.
General Ward, please.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. WILLIAM E. "KIP" WARD, USA,
COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND**

General WARD. Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, thank you for this opportunity to be here, distinguished members of the committee. We appreciate all that you do in support of our command as we work to pursue our interests in the continent of Africa.

I would also be remiss if I didn't acknowledge Erin. She has been such an instrumental and supportive part of all that we have done these past now two and a half years in standing up our Nation's newest combatant command.

And, Erin, thank you for your support and how you were able to help us along in so many ways and wish you all the best in your new assignment. And we look forward to working with, also, with Paul and Debra as they continue to work with us as we move forward for our Nation.

I am honored to appear here today with my friends and distinguished colleagues, Admiral Jim Stavridis and General Jim Mattis.

What we do in AFRICOM to protect American lives and promote interests is our mission, and we do that by supporting security and stability programs in Africa and its island nations. We concentrate our strategy and our efforts on helping African states build their capacity to field professional and capable militaries that respect human rights, adhere to the rule of law, promote professionally dedicated militaries and, also, effectively contribute to stability in Africa.

We are assisting our African partners in building capacity to counter transnational threats from violent extremist organizations, to stem illicit trafficking, to support peacekeeping operations, and to address the consequences of human disasters, whether they be manmade or natural.

Supporting the development of professional and capable militaries contributes to increased security and stability in Africa, allowing African nations and regional organizations to promote good governance, expand development, and promote their common defense to better serve their people and to help protect the lives of Americans, be they abroad or here at home.

The Africa partnership station—and, Chairman, thank you for mentioning that—which includes our European and African partners as member of the staff, is now on its fifth deployment and has expanded from the initial focus in the Gulf of Guinea to other African coastal regions as well.

Africa Endeavor, a continental-wide command-and-control exercise, has seen a steady increase in participation with over 30 nations projected to participate this year. Exercise National Fire was acclaimed by all as a tremendously successful exercise bringing together five Eastern African nations to address their response in a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief scenario.

Mr. Chairman, in my written statement, I highlight these and other programs and activities all designed to help build our partner security capacity, and I ask that it be made a part of this record.

These programs reflect the willingness of our partners to work with us and with each other to address common threats that have the ability to impact us here at home and reflect that our programs and our activities are, indeed, producing tangible results. And I will provide some examples of that later on.

My focus is on activities, programs, and communications that support our national interests and also reinforce the success that we have established in ways that will assure progress in the long term for our African partners to be more capable of providing for their own security and, thus, helping to guarantee our security here as well.

We closely harmonize our activities with our colleagues at State, at United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and other agencies of our government. Our service components continue to mature. Our offices of security cooperation, defense attachés, and network of forward-operating sites and cooperative security locations, including Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, are tremendously valuable as we pursue U.S. security interests.

It is my honor to serve with the uniformed men and women as well as those civilians who comprise the United States Africa Command. We are making a difference in this vitally significant and strategically important area of our global society. Their dedicated efforts exemplify the spirit and determination of the American people, and I would be pleased, with your permission, to introduce someone here with me today representing those men and women, the command senior enlisted leader, Command Sergeant Major Mark Ripka, who is here.

What we do is important. We recognize the contributions of this committee. We thank you for your support, and I look forward to taking any additional questions to provide you any additional information that I can with respect to our command.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Ward can be found in the Appendix on page 107.]

The CHAIRMAN. General Ward, thank you.

General Mattis, welcome, sir.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER,
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND**

General MATTIS. Thank you, Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify. And, sir, I request my written statement be placed into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the written statements of each of the witnesses will be placed in the record.

General MATTIS. Thank you, sir. And I wish to echo my shipmates' respect of Erin's service and quiet support of our military forces over many, many years.

You will be missed. You have been magnificent, Erin.

Over the course of the past year, Joint Forces Command has continued to provide combat-ready forces to the combatant commanders to support active military operations. We have continued to prepare for future conflict by thinking ahead so, if surprised, we have the fewest regrets. And after a historic change of command in NATO in which I handed over supreme command of allied command transformation, we continue to ensure Joint Forces Command remains closely linked with our allied partners in NATO.

The character of this current conflict remains different or, better said, irregular. We have continued to adapt our forces in stride to become increasingly competent in irregular warfare. Across the board, the joint forces significantly adapted to this new environment, but our watch board must be balanced.

The chairman and Secretary of Defense have stated we must not lose our nuclear deterrence, our conventional superiority in the process of adapting to irregular warfare. Even as we continue to prepare and deploy forces into the irregular fights of Iraq and Afghanistan, we cannot permit the dormancy of our conventional capabilities.

Our forces will continue to achieve balance as dwell times build. Through effective training and education across the force, we can strike the appropriate balance while ensuring our current and future combat readiness. Based on the reality of current active operations and future trends outlined in our recent assessment of the joint operating environment, Joint Forces Command's top priority continues to reflect balance between support for the current fight and our constant assessment of the future to ensure we remain the most capable military in the world.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of General Mattis can be found in the Appendix on page 157.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, General.

Let me ask a few questions, if I may.

Admiral, I made reference to Russia as well as the ranking member did. Would you discuss for us what you see in Russia? Is it a rising Russia? Is it going back to its earlier status? What is your opinion of that country and where it is headed?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Mr. Chairman, as I look at Russia and the way the impact of Russia is felt in the European landscape, the view is varied. The view varies from the Baltics and the Eastern European states who remain concerned about Russian activities that range from Zapad exercises to the residual effect of the activi-

ties involving Georgia. All of that raises a certain level of concern in that part of Europe.

On the other hand, in Western Europe, there is a very strong attempt to try and find zones of cooperation with Russia. And so the view of Russia varies across the European theater.

My own view—and I think the Secretary General of NATO has expressed this well—is that we need to find areas of cooperation with Russia wherever we can. And they can vary from arms control in a bilateral sense to counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, cooperation in Afghanistan is possible.

We can have discussions about military reform. As you know, the Russians are in the process of doing a fair amount of military reform, including a significant reduction in their officer corps and raising the professionalism of their non-commissioned officers (NCOs).

On the other hand, we need to find and demonstrate to our allies in the Baltics and in Eastern Europe reassurance; show them that we have contingency plans; that we have the ability to back up Article 5 of the NATO treaty.

So I would conclude by saying it is really all about balance in approaching Russia. And we must maintain a sense of both reassurance with our allies but also find zones of cooperation as we move forward.

The CHAIRMAN. What military-to-military operations do we have?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. In terms of operations at this point, we are not engaged in anything that I would describe as an actual operation, Mr. Chairman. But we are engaged in active dialogue with Russian counterparts. For example, I held meetings in Brussels recently with General Nikolai Makarov, the Chief of Defense (CHOD) of Russia. We are in a dialogue with them about exchanging non-commissioned officers and having a sense of showing them our training program and understanding what they are trying to do.

We are also talking to them in general terms about their experiences in Afghanistan; trying to learn some lessons from all that. And, also, we are operating with them—and this is probably the closest we would come to an actual operation. There are Russian ships that are involved in counter-piracy operations alongside our ships, both on the U.S. side and on the NATO side, of the Horn of Africa. So that is a quick summary of where we are.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Ward in your capacity, you, of course, have the service component commands working with you and for you. Is that correct?

General WARD. That is correct, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, in particular, tell us what the Navy has been doing in the maritime security arena. And that has been of help in working with our African partners—the United States Navy?

General WARD. Mr. Chairman, approximately two and a half years ago, in October of 2006, we conducted a maritime conference in Cotonou, Benin. It was—at that time, I was still the Deputy Commander at EUCOM, and we had the Commander of Naval Forces Europe with me. And we worked with the Chief of Defense there to find out from them what they needed to help them be in

a better posture to protect their territorial waters from all the illicit trafficking things that had been going on.

As a result of that conference, we have expanded into what we now call the Africa Partnership Station. It is a program. It is not the platform. It is a program. It is a training program that brings together the various nations of the littoral there in the continent of Africa. It started in the western part of the continent. As I have mentioned, it has expanded around to the entire continent now. But it includes our U.S. Marine Corps, Navy, other European partners, the Dutch, the Germans, the British, French, as staff members of this training platform. It also includes members from the African nations where this platform, as it circumnavigates the continent, will touch for two to three week periods of time, training these African nations on things that they see for themselves as important to increase their capacity to improve their security.

It includes such things as small boat maintenance and repair. If you have a problem in your territorial waters, you have to have assets to deal with that. And so as simple a thing as keeping your boat motors operating, as keeping your electrical systems running are the sorts of things that we do with this platform.

It includes professionalization of the noncommissioned officer corps. It includes other professionalism discipline sorts of drills that increase the capacity of these nations to bring their own security capacity to bear as they seek to protect their territory waters.

It also includes how they work together in a linked way with respect to how they monitor and surveil their maritime areas. And so how they bring their surveillance systems into play is part of that dynamic.

Training, in some cases, providing the equipment, that program is being led by the United States Navy, and it is under the auspices of my command, my component command, Naval Forces Africa, who now leads that program but with the involvement of the players of Europe, as I mentioned, the continental players, as I mentioned, but also other parts of the interagency in that attempt to help these countries increase their maritime safety and security.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Mattis, let us talk about professional military education for a moment. Our colleague from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder, in his role as Chairman of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, has delved into the professional military education at great length in a series of hearings.

And I have a concern that—well, it is reflected pretty well in an article that retired General Bob Scales wrote entitled, “Too Busy to Learn.” And he compared what we are going through today, about putting off education for some people and some not even getting it, to what the British went through prior to the First World War.

How do we correct that? You know, there is only so much time in a person’s career. How do we do that? The promotion timelines are so tight that it is just hard it fit it all in. But if we are to be successful in the future years, it is important that we educate our officers at all levels.

Do you have thoughts on that, General?

General MATTIS. I do. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The only thing worse in a war than obsolete weapons is obsolete thinking. And you can get obsolete by thinking that the war you are fighting is what all wars are going to look like. There can be no doubt about the operational effectiveness of the U.S. military today. It is unmatched in the world.

The problem is we are not worried about today in terms of your question. We are worried about tomorrow. I think that you point to a very specific problem of arithmetic. There is no more years in a career right now, so you have to squeeze it all in.

And when you look at the service competency upon which officers create their own self-image, they test themselves, they develop their confidence based on their service capability, whether it be an infantryman in the Army or a ship driver in the Navy or a pilot, they have got to get good at their basic skills, their basic military skills.

Then what do we do? I believe that we are going to eventually, in light of the better health of the force today where we don't drink or smoke like we once did, this sort of thing, that we need to look at extending officer careers. There should be certain restrictions on this. There should be continuation boards so we don't end up keeping the wrong people around.

But you simply can't put in the amount of education and everything else that needs to be into an officer's career if we continue with the current 20- and 30-year expectations.

I believe that the danger is real, and we are going to have to address it in more than just the manner in which we have in the past. In other words, distance learning, we are going to have to reward the kind of behavior that we want to keep. Institutions get the behavior they reward, yet we do not have sufficient rewards right now for those who, on their own, commit to an active learning throughout their career.

So I think you need to change some of the reward systems. We are talking personnel policies here. And we also need to consider extending, as appropriate, not in all cases, the normal career to 30 and 40 years versus 20 and 30.

I hope that addresses your question, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.

Mr. McKeon.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, while the current policy seeks to reset relations with Russia, I think we ought to take steps to reassure our allies and friends, as I said in my opening statement. And your posture statement notes that, without four brigade combat teams in Europe, deterrence and reassurance are at an increased risk.

I talked about moving from 300 down to 80,000 and then if we took 2 brigade combat teams out, it would cut it in half again.

Can you explain how reducing our force presence in Europe puts deterrence and reassurance at risk?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. I think you have outlined the top two aspects of it very well, which are the physical presence of our troops is extremely reassuring on the one hand to the allies and friends about whom we spoke earlier. And I think there is a deterrent value in it.

And so with that as backdrop, I would add three other things that I think are important to this four brigade combat team level presence in Europe.

One is one we don't always focus on, but it is logistics. It is having that capability to move rapidly globally and, let us face it, our current set of missions are on the other side of Europe. And so that footprint in Europe is well supported. And those four brigade combat teams are all cycling forward into the fight in Afghanistan and Iraq.

So I would add logistics. I would also add training. There is an extremely important training element in the building of partnership capacity with our allies. And with four brigade combat teams, the level, the complexity, the depth of training that can be conducted with allies is twice as good as with two brigade combat teams.

So I think that is a second element I would add to the two you mentioned. And then thirdly, I would say there is really a leadership component for the United States. For us to maintain a leadership role, I think, that level of 80,000 troops in Europe is roughly about right, particularly, when you look at the steep decline it has gone through, as you pointed out earlier, sir.

So I would sort of say reassurance, deterrence, logistics, leadership, and training as the five reasons that I would put forward the military advice to remain at the level of four brigade combat teams.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you.

There seems to be a debate brewing over U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. Your statement was notably silent on this issue. Do you think keeping these forces in Europe strengthens the alliance? Is our nuclear presence important to Article 5, the common defense provision?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I have not taken a public stance on this because, as you can appreciate, it is very much in the political venue. I mean, this is an international dialogue that has to be conducted among the members of the alliance. I will say that the shared responsibility of these nuclear weapons creates a military-to-military level of trust and confidence that is extremely helpful, in my view, in maintaining the military-to-military aspects of NATO.

I would also say that I would hope that any decisions that are taken are made multilaterally and that we do this as an alliance, not responding to this nation or that nation having a particular political issue, but rather we look at the whole question of nuclear weapons in the alliance as a whole.

And I believe that is where Secretary General Rasmussen wants to take this dialogue.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you.

I understand that the recent Juniper Cobra exercise with Israel was a success. Given the growing crisis over Iran's nuclear program, what additional steps is EUCOM taking to ensure the defense of Israel and its stability in your AOR?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, thank you, sir, for mentioning Juniper Cobra. We are extremely proud of that exercise. We had over 2,000 U.S. and allied forces involved in that. It was a very complex missile defense exercise that married up the Israeli systems, the Arrow

and the Iron Dome system, with our own AEGIS sea-based system as well as some of our land-based systems.

Very complex to bring all that together. Very effective. I would say that we need to build on that exercise and continue to have that level of dialogue and engagement and actual operational activities with our Israeli friends. And I believe that we can learn from them and we can learn from their technical systems just as they can marry up and learn from ours.

So I would say build on that missile defense. I would say continue information and intelligence sharing. And I would say—I would support, obviously, the continued very strong military-to-military cooperation across the board that we enjoy with Israel today.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you.

I am concerned about the reset policy, particularly, the impact on our NATO allies. What are you hearing from our NATO allies on U.S.-Russian engagement? And what is the military, particularly EUCOM, doing to prepare in the event of another Russia-Georgia or similar conflict?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. From all of the allies, there is a real understanding that we have a need to train and be prepared for any kind of contingency in Europe. And so we are constantly, actively reviewing all of our contingency plans both on the NATO side and on the U.S. European Command side to be prepared for any security eventuality in Europe.

That is an active dialogue, and it is sort of step-one planning. Step two is a very robust series of exercises both on the NATO side and on the U.S. European Command side. Example, this summer, we have what are called BALTOPS, Baltic Operations, which will bring both Marines afloat as well as ships at sea as well as Army operators ashore and special operators ashore to practice and exercise with our Baltic partners.

We are going to do a special operations series of exercises this summer in the—in Eastern Europe as well. So exercises, I would say, are number two and equally important.

And then third and finally, it is the sharing of information and training—the kind of international military education and training (IMET) program where we bring our partners here to the United States to train. We send our folks to train and be educated in their institutions. To the Chairman's point about education, that also creates a real bond among the allies at the officer-to-officer level and at the senior NCO level which is extremely, extremely helpful in maintaining the sense of reassurance amongst all of the allies.

So I did put those three things at the top—planning, exercises, and shared education and training.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from California. We are under the five minute rule.

Mr. Ortiz, please.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I would like to thank all three of you for appearing before our committee today, and thank you for your service.

General Ward, I just have a few questions for you. In light of the horrific recent tragedies in Nigeria, does AFRICOM have enough troops to conduct training? And I know you have had some training exercises with countries that have requested support.

And can you also speak to the training of African troops by AFRICOM? And I know that, in the beginning, you know, when we set the command, there were some questions about being accepted in the area where we had troops. How well are the African troops faring in actual operations? Can we conduct the performance reviews on the African training programs?

And I know that all of this comes into play with the complex humanitarian emergencies that come about, but maybe you can give us a little input as to what is going on and the training and whether you have enough personnel to do something that does justice to them.

General WARD. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz.

First, you are correct. We have no assigned forces. We get our forces through the global force management process administered by the Department of Defense (DOD) here in D.C. as well as my friend, Jim Mattis' Joint Forces Command. And we submit, through a request-of-forces process, our requirements for forces.

We are being—that requirement is being satisfied at about the 80 to 85 percent rate which is commensurate with what happens at the other combatant commands. It does affect us a bit because we don't have any assigned forces to complement that. But at the current time, we are looking at ways and the Department of Defense is also looking at ways to reestablish the global employment of the force priority structure such that the requirement for building partner capacity that you have addressed here is achieved—receives a higher priority in this whole process.

But right now, that is how we do it. And for me, having assigned force is not necessarily the issue. What is important is that, when I have a demand for forces, those forces can be provided. Owning them is not important, but having them available is something that I think is very, very important.

As we work with the African nations with our various exercises, we provided training support, logistics support, and they have participated in peacekeeping operations. We see that level of training and support being very, very instrumental to their level of performance.

As a recent example of a training iteration that we conducted in Mali as we were working with the Malian armed forces as they conducted their counter-terror training. You may recall that, last summer, the Malians suffered some pretty substantial defeats on the part of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Part of the outcome of this most recent training happened in January from one of the members who participated who said, had I had that training prior to or had those who encountered that incident last July, had they had this training, the outcome would have been different.

We think we are making a difference. The performance of these African nations indicates that our presence, our training with them makes a difference. And we certainly look to continue that because that is how we help safeguard our own populations. With their having increased capacities to do those things, to provide for their

own security, it has a direct impact on the safety and security of our citizens and Africa but also in the transnational nature of today's threat environment also helping them do their part to counter those transnational threats.

Mr. ORTIZ. And I know that we do have some health threats, pandemics in the area. How are we addressing some of the health problems, the pandemics that we have in the area? Are we working jointly with them? Are we having doctors that help out as well?

General WARD. Our efforts are part of the entire Department of Defense health assurance program. We work our pandemic plans with the African nations as well as, obviously, our European friends because we see the global connectivity of all of those things. We do work with them in their planning, their response.

A part of my staff—my surgeon staff, my medical staff—are going and doing their engagement—our medical engagement, also, to help them address their own individual unique requirements and how they counter these threats from pandemics.

The H1N1, they didn't have a problem with it. It was kind of in reverse how they tried to assure people that that didn't have an effect on them. And, obviously, the health threat that would emanate from the continent and would spread, likewise, keeping those in check.

But other things as well from HIV-AIDS, malaria, robust program with all those issues of health are also security related if they are left unchecked.

Mr. ORTIZ. Again, thank you so much for your service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. During the last break, I and 12 other members of Congress, both the House and Senate, spent the better part of a week with several Russians in Madrid talking about U.S.-Russian relations.

It was pretty obvious from the perspective of those Russians present that there are two major impediments to better relationships between the United States and Russia. One is NATO, and the other is our placement of anti-ballistic missile defenses.

Sometimes, it helps to put yourself in the other guy's place. Suppose that the Cold War had gone differently and we had lost and NATO was gone and the Warsaw Pact was alive and growing, and the next two countries that were coming into the Warsaw Pact are Canada and Mexico. How would we feel?

That is kind of the way that the Russians feel, I think, when the Baltic countries and the Ukraine might be coming into NATO. If we need a good will—European good will society, it probably ought to be called something other than NATO or Russia ought to be invited into NATO. One of those two solutions, I think, would be very preferable to what we are now doing.

The other major impediment to better relations was our placement of the missile sites. I don't think there is any country that is going to launch over the pole except Russia, and our meager defenses there would be immediately swamped by Russia. They have thousands of weapons.

These other people may be evil. They are not idiots. They are not going to launch from their soil. Are they going to launch from the ocean? They know if they launch from their soil, they will be almost immediately vaporized. They are not going to do that.

If, in fact, you think we need these sites in the Arctic, why not put them in Russia? Russia has a lot of Arctic territory.

As far as protecting Europe is concerned, we were going to place them in Poland and Czechoslovakia. If you look at the map, that leaves about half of Europe totally unprotected. You really need these missile sites to protect Europe from Iran, and Iran is not going to launch weapons from their soil.

But if we really think you need that, what is wrong with the most extreme southwestern part of Russia? If you look at that site as a far better place to put missiles to protect Europe than where we are now planning to put them?

Would you agree that these are the two major impediments to better relations with Russia?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would say that I have heard both of those discussions from my Russian interlocutors, and that Russia, as you know, sir, just recently issued a new strategic doctrine in which they talk about NATO expansion as a—they call it a danger to Russia. So I think it is absolutely correct to say that, from a Russian perspective, NATO expansion is of concern.

Mr. BARTLETT. Then, sir, why do we continue with this if we want better working relations with Russia?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, NATO is an open organization. And if you look at Article 9 of the NATO treaty, sir, it says very simply that membership in NATO is open to any nation by a unanimous-consent vote of all the current nations in NATO.

Mr. BARTLETT. Have we invited Russia in?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. We, the United States, have not invited Russia into NATO, no, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. Why would we not want Russia to be a part of NATO if we want better working relationships with them and better security on the continent?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, I think that that question really is better posed to NATO rather than to the commander of U.S. European Command. But I know that the Secretary General of NATO, Secretary General Rasmussen, recently had a visit in Moscow and had a very wide-ranging discussion about all of these topics and is working very hard, along the lines of what you suggest, to place himself and to place the alliance in a position to look through the eyes of Russia so that we can find these kinds of zones of cooperation.

So I think our hand is out from a NATO perspective. I have heard the secretary general say repeatedly our hand is out in cooperation. I think whether there is a follow-on along the lines you are discussing is something that all 28 NATO nations would have to discuss.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Before I call on Mr. Taylor, General Ward, you formerly were the deputy at European Command. Is that correct?

General WARD. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank was four-star. Is that correct?

General WARD. Correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have a four-star deputy in your command. Is that correct?

General WARD. None of the combatant commands have four-star deputies.

The CHAIRMAN. That answers the question. Thank you very much.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield to Mr. Kissell and take his place at the appropriate time.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Mr. Taylor. The last time, Mr. Taylor was nice enough to yield to me like this, I said I would be glad to take his time if he would also yield some questions to me because Mr. Taylor asks some of the best questions that are ever asked on this panel.

I welcome you gentlemen here today and thank you for your service and thank you for being here today.

Admiral, we have talked quite a bit about the importance of NATO and our relationship with NATO. What is the mindset of NATO towards the organization—the European mindset. How committed are they? What do they see as the future for NATO? How do they view this alliance?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I believe that broadly—and here I speak from polling data conducted in Europe—about 60 percent of most Europeans in Western Europe feel extremely positively toward the NATO alliance. And those numbers go up as you move toward the east. So that in the eastern part of Europe, we see numbers very high, as high as 70 percent, if you will, approval ratings for NATO.

So from a public perception, I have that, broadly speaking, there is acceptance of NATO as a fundamental construct in the trans-Atlantic bridge.

My own experiences talking to heads of state, ministers of defense, ministers of foreign affairs, chiefs of defense, the equivalent of our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, certainly support that. I feel there is strong support for NATO, even as we are today engaged in a wide variety of activities. We have almost 90,000 NATO troops engaged on three different continents in operations all around the world. There are losses, but, overall, I believe there is a strong sense of support for NATO as an alliance moving forward.

Mr. KISSELL. Just curious in a specific country, Turkey. Reading last week about conflicts between a less secular part of Turkey versus the military. What do you see is the role of Turkey and how it might play out there?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I believe Turkey is an extremely important state geopolitically. It is a hinge state between Europe and the Levant and South Asia and, indeed, the entire arc of the Islamic world. So the presence of Turkey in NATO is extremely important and I think is very helpful in maintaining an orientation of Turkey toward and with the West.

Mr. KISSELL. Okay. General Ward, we have had hearings recently about our relationship with China. What is the influence of

China into the continent of Africa? How is that playing out? Pros and cons about what is taking place there?

General WARD. Thank you, sir. China is pursuing its interest in Africa like other nations. It is working with many nations of the continent pursuing economic and developmental interests. Their—from what I can see, their military relations are not very robust. From time to time, you will note some engineering sorts of things going on with infrastructure development.

It is the type of thing that, from my perspective, we clearly see how these sovereign nations reach out to other sovereign nations to help them achieve various national objectives that they may have. China is one of the countries that they reach out to. China responds in ways that satisfies requirements.

What impact that will ultimately have, I am not prepared to address. The work that we do is work that we hope that, where there are opportunities to cooperate from the standpoint of promoting security and stability, that that would clearly be an objective, also, of the Chinese and any other nation that is engaging on the continent with the sovereign nations of Africa as they move ahead and pursue those common objectives.

That is how I see the current situation as it moves ahead there on the continent, sir.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir.

And General Mattis, you had talked about, in your opening statement, about the thoughts in trying to envision the next war. And looking at that now and our mindset—where we are with the conflicts we have and the challenges we have—what would be an area—or what is the area that most concerns you that we are missing the most as we do move forward? What potentials are we missing?

General MATTIS. Sir, that is really the \$64,000 question in my line of work, knowing that we will not get it exactly right, we just don't want to get it completely wrong. We look at what happened in our current operations. We look at South Lebanon in the second Lebanon war, and we look at Russia-Georgia, and we put together what we believe is a hybrid nature of threat that is coming at us, where it will not be all conventional or all irregular; it will be more of a blurred hybrid threat that we have to confront because the differences between types of warfare seem to be blurring.

The enemy has found our weak area, and they are moving against us in those areas. They are a very learning, adaptive enemy.

So the most important point we can make is that we not adopt a single preclusive view of war and we stay attuned to what Secretary Gates has called for with this balance because we could inadvertently actually incite an enemy to try us in an area that we decide to abrogate because we don't think it is very likely. It makes for a very difficult effort, but it is one that is primarily addressed through education and training that creates the kind of adroit officer that can move from one type threat to another without being caught flat-footed, sir.

That is about the best answer I can give you with just a couple moments here.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Taylor.

And, thank you, Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes, the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And gentlemen, let me echo what my colleagues have been saying in terms of our appreciation for your service and all that you do.

And General Mattis, if I could follow up on some of your previous comments that you just made in response to Mr. Kissell's questions.

As you know, our forces face an adversary that does tend to avoid our strengths and exploit our weaknesses and remains quickly adaptable to the changing engagement environment. To train our soldiers in our conventional manner is expensive and time consuming.

I am just wondering if you could share with the committee how we can use modeling and simulation to help train our forces. And what do you believe the resulting benefits would be?

General MATTIS. Thank you, Mr. Forbes. This is an area of some great focus to me. And if we would go back to the Chairman's opening remarks about the need for superior individual and small-unit capabilities being the most critical, most effective weapons today, we are going to have to have the ground forces adopt an aviation and a maritime view with the use of modeling and simulation.

The aviators and the maritime forces have used them from the Idaho desert where they have the reactors for the Navy to the simulators on every single airbase for our aviators. We just had signed 48 hours ago by the Deputy Secretary of Defense a decision to create a line of funding that will permit us to take advantage of the gaming industry's advances, and we will try to put our young troops, our infantry, the ones who take—over 80 percent of our casualties since 1945 have been infantrymen—we are going to try to bring to them a level of simulation and modeled training that will put them through as many technical and ethical challenges as we can before they go into their first firefight and during every dwell time after that.

This is, to me, a fundamental area. It is both a military effectiveness area of opportunity, and it is an ethical burden that we need to take on right now.

Mr. FORBES. And, General, I have heard you speak before, but I was just wondering if you could elaborate on your thoughts about how that kind of modeling and simulation training could actually save the lives of some of our infantrymen. And where do you see JFCOM in this role, and how are they positioned to, perhaps, assist or help with this?

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. JFCOM has a role because, today, we find jointness where the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, coalition forces are working together at increasingly lower levels. Where, at one time, you might have an Army division alongside a Marine division alongside an allied division. Today, we have Marine infantrymen with Army intelligence specialists serving alongside them inside an Army brigade with Air Force and Navy close-air support alongside a NATO ally that is closely off an enemy line of retreat.

This means we can no longer leave simply to the services without support the ability to train the joint and coalition warfare at levels now that may involve NCOs receiving the same kind of training that you and I have characterized in the past for junior officers.

So the Joint Forces Command role is one to bring this joint piece down to the lowest tactical level so joint intelligence capabilities are understood and used there, joint fires are used to mitigate danger, carry out the mission.

Mr. FORBES. And specifically as it relates to casualties for our infantrymen, what role can modeling and simulation play in helping to ratchet up their experience level and, perhaps, reduce these casualties?

General MATTIS. Mr. Forbes, I have been in a lot of fights, and this isn't scientific, but I would say half the people—I am an infantry officer—half the casualties I have seen on our side were for silly, stupid reasons. And if we can put people through simulation—it is not so they know one way to take down an enemy stronghold but so they know five different ways to do it and they have already been through it so many times they know how not to make the mistake that can be made on a simulator. We will still have to do live-fire training.

It won't give us a risk-free environment. But I am convinced, both ethically and casualties wise, we can reduce the missteps that we are taking on the battlefield and reduce them significantly.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. We appreciate your many, many years of service to our country.

Admiral Stavridis, Mr. Kissell asked about Turkey. In the Arkansas River, we have the USS *Razorback*, which was a World War II era submarine. It is actually one of the submarines that you see in the row in Tokyo Harbor in 1945 at the surrender. It saw some action at the end of the war and then did some Cold War tours, but at some point, was donated to Turkey as part of our U.S.-Turkey alliance. It served the Turkish navy for quite a few years.

And a few years ago, they donated it back to the city of North Little Rock as part of a museum. And so we actually have a submarine sitting in the Arkansas River. We had to lift it a little bit between some barges to get it up there.

But it sits there. I think it is a symbol of the very, very strong relationship between Turkey and the United States. Would you amplify, please, on how important Turkey has been or is currently to our activities in both Iraq and Afghanistan?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. I will be glad to.

As the—first of all, as the only Islamic nation in NATO, Turkey has been extremely helpful in assisting all of the other nations in understanding the cultural morays that are so important as we go into these kinds of complex situations that General Mattis is talking about.

Secondly, Turkey is a big, muscular country with a strong-standing army and a very capable military. We have learned a great

deal and have drawn on their active support, for example, the Turks today have 1,800 troops in Afghanistan doing exceptionally good work really across a wide spectrum of missions in the country.

Thirdly, they are an absolutely vital link in the overall Article 5 defense of the alliance. They are a border state of NATO. The Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), the air-control station in the southeastern portion of the alliance is located in Ismir, Turkey. They link up with us extremely well.

We have forward aircraft there. At every dimension, Turkey has been an extremely strong NATO partner. In terms of the U.S. aspects of this, the bilateral relationship, equally so. They have been very supportive. We are working with them on intelligence and information sharing along their borders working across that border with Iraq.

My good friend, General Ray Odierno, has been very engaged in this. I count the chief of defense of Turkey, General Ikler Basbug, a close friend and interlocutor who gives me good advice on how we should be approaching and working in the Islamic world.

So overall, an extremely important partner both to NATO and to the United States.

Dr. SNYDER. There also is a very strong relationship between Armenia and the people of Armenia and the American people. And as you know, on August 31st of last year, Turkey—the leadership of Turkey and Armenia signed two protocols that they intend to be a pathway to normalization. And the protocols, as you know, are awaiting legislative approval in both countries.

And we, as a Nation, certainly understand agreements, whether they are trade agreements or other agreements, awaiting approval by legislative bodies.

Should both countries approve those protocols, how important a step do you think that will be forward for Europe?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it would be an extremely important step. There are several of these so-called frozen conflicts in Europe. And this is one of them. And a step forward between those two nations, I think, would also serve as a very good example as other types of these issues are worked through, for example, in the Balkans.

My grandparents were born in Turkey. They were of Greek descent and immigrated here to the United States. It is an extremely complex region of the world.

And whenever these nations can find common ground and move beyond the disputes and the anger and the warfare of the past, that is an extremely salutary step, really, for all of Europe but certainly nations involved.

Dr. SNYDER. And we wish both nations well as they grapple with that issue.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Dr. SNYDER. General Mattis, you specifically mentioned in your opening statement in response to the Chairman's question talked about PME. I was at Quantico a week ago or so, and we wanted to have a discussion about enlisted PME. And one of the topics that was brought up there by the leadership there was the fact that, at the enlisted level—while we do a lot in the Marine Corps and the military for enlisted PME—when you take a 30-year enlisted per-

son and look at their career, how much time they have been given during their career to actually go to college, it is dramatically lower than the officers.

And the feeling was that is something that we need to look at. I just have a few seconds left, but if any of you had any comment about that issue of should we be revisiting the issue of enlisted people and where time off to go to college. Because a lot of them go to college, but it is on their own time at night.

Any comments?

General MATTIS. As you know, sir, the Congress has given us money to defray the tuition costs for our NCOs going. And they have taken great advantage. We have a quality of enlisted force today that is eager to learn very broadly and, of course, their own skills.

A point I would make is one of the great strengths of the American forces is its NCOs—noncommissioned officers—and petty officers. Much of what we call “sergeant’s work” or “chief’s work” cannot really be taught in a college or university.

So we need to make sure that we separate out the natural quest of almost all of these young Americans to improve themselves and educate further versus the military requirement which may require more extended military schooling at a level that we usually associate with junior officers vice putting them through college which may or may not actually make them better NCOs.

But the need for the education is absolute. It is just making certain we do it in a focused way so we stay at the top of our game, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for being here.

Just a quick comment, General Mattis. I was very pleased to hear your comments about modeling simulation response to Mr. Forbes’ questions on the one hand. On the other hand, it is almost appalling that we have reached this 2010 and we are not further along. I know the services—and certainly the Marine Corps because I was involved in it going back 16 years or more ago—was recognizing that need for modeling simulation.

So I hope we will move out aggressively to take advantage of that technology.

General Ward, it is always great to see you. I sometimes flash back those many years ago when we were colonels and commanding soldiers and Marines in Somalia. And I want to get to that country in just a second.

But I was looking at some headlines here in the last week from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and others: Hundreds dead in Nigeria attack; Mauritania vows no negotiations or prisoner exchanges with Al Qaeda; tear gas fired at Togo protestors; Sudan army says it now controls strategic Darfur plateau; twin blasts hit Rwanda’s capital; Canada lists Somalia Shabab as a terrorist group; France claims biggest haul of pirates off Somalia; Libya calls in U.S. oil firms over Gathafi jibe; and so forth.

You have got a mess and very few forces. Let us go to Somalia, if we can, to help me and us understand how AFRICOM works to

address these issues. If you look at Somalia—and you know well what a mess it was 17 years or so ago when you and I were there. And you look at Al Shabab and you look at the headline that I just read. And today, in the New York Times, it says as much as half the food aid sent to Somalia is diverted from needy people to a web of corrupt contractors, radical Islamist militants, and local United Nations staff members.

We could have read the same thing 16, 17 years ago. In fact, that is why you and I were there because food wasn't getting where it would supposed to go.

So we have AFRICOM. And somehow, you have got to work with the interagency, with Special Operations Command, with African forces. Who is in charge? And how do you do that?

I know that is a big question, but I know that we have been grappling since the standup of your command. How does that work? Is Special Operations Command in charge? Are you in charge? You know, is the ambassador in charge? Is there nobody in charge?

Use Somalia as the example or pick any one you want to kind of tell us how that works.

General WARD. Well, thank you for that, Mr. Kline. And, obviously, as you pointed out, that is a complex environment, and things have not changed.

If you take the case of Somalia, obviously, with where we are and the transition federal government that is there and the fact that the African Union—which wasn't the case when we were there 17 years ago—there is a continent-wide organization that has said that we will do our best to help bring this transition federal government into a place where it can begin to exert some control over that vast territory.

The problem in Somalia is the lack of a government. It is the lack of effective governance. But there are things being done to address that. Is it truly an international effort. It requires the support of the global community. And the response that the United States has in that endeavor is—and the things that we are doing to try to reinforce the work of this transition government, to reinforce the work of the African Union, its mission in Somalia, Amazon, as they have fielded peacekeeping forces, African peacekeeping forces who have familiarity, have understanding.

Our training support, our logistical support, our support to the transition federal government forces to cause them to be in a better state to help deal with this lack of governance are the sorts of things that we are doing in support of this, I think, international effort to address the problems of lack of governance in Somalia. And doing what we do through our interagency process, coordinating our activities with the Department of State and where there are things that need—

Mr. KLINE. If I could interrupt, I am about to run out of time here, and I do really want to be respectful of that. But I am just struck again that this New York Times story is talking about a web of corrupt contractors, radical Islamic militants, and local United Nations staff members.

And if the United Nations is, frankly, is as inept now as it was when you and I arrived there those many years ago where they

were all holed up in a little corner of the Mogadishu Airport, I guess I would like to have the confidence—or I would like to have a feeling that, somehow, AFRICOM, now that you are in existence, is going to be able to exert, perhaps, more influence to help clear that up.

And I have run out of time, and I know it was too big a subject. But it is worrisome to us that we don't—you don't have, perhaps, the organizational ability to step in there.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just a couple of areas to follow up on some of what my colleagues had asked about and some from your opening statements.

Admiral Stavridis, if you could talk to us a little bit about our NATO partners in Afghanistan now that we have been into our new strategy for a few months, making progress in some areas, obviously, long-term continued support across Europe is going to be critical and it is hard to come by.

Certainly, the population has considerable concerns and the leadership is grappling with that. If you could just walk us through how you think that is going as someone who is got to perspective. Where are our European allies at in terms of their cooperation short term and long term on our plan in Afghanistan?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I would be glad to. Big picture, U.S. has about—we are moving toward about 100,000 troops in Afghanistan. Our allies are about 40,000 troops. We have taken just over a thousand casualties. Our allies have taken about 750 casualties.

They are very much in the fight with us. I think it is worth mentioning as a passing aside, if you will, 75 percent of the casualties in Afghanistan are actually taken by Afghan security forces. But of that 25 percent, our allies are very much in this fight with us.

In fact, the nation who has taken the most casualties on a per capita basis may surprise you. It is Estonia. Estonia, Great Britain, Canada, the Dutch, many of these nations have taken a great deal—have given a great deal of blood as well as treasure.

At the moment, we are seeking to fill up to about a total of 10,000 allied troops coming in alongside the 30,000 that President Obama just sent forward. We have got about 9,500 of them committed, but we are concerned about the fact that the Dutch government, as you mentioned, appears to be taking their forces out of Afghanistan by the end of this year. So that is of concern.

Mr. SMITH. And what—how many troops do they have there now?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. They have about 1,700 troops there now. So that would set us back from filling up that goal of a total of 10,000. My particular focus at the moment is on trainers because the success strategy in Afghanistan will be training the Afghan security forces, and that is really where we have made significant progress and where our allies have been very, very helpful over the last seven or eight months.

I need about 700 more NATO trainers, and we are working very hard going country by country to get that and to fill it up. So over-

all, we have a significant contribution from the allies. I would like to get a little bit more. We are working very hard to achieve that.

The war is, in various places in Europe, it is less popular than the United States. And in other places, it is—I don't want to say more popular—but it enjoys a higher level of support even than it does here.

So it really varies across the European continent. I would say, overall, the allies are very much in this with us. I think they are—they will be with us through the short term, and I would say as long as the U.S. is engaged, as long as NATO is engaged, I am confident, overall, they will stay with us.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

General Ward, I don't have a lot of time left here, but I would want to ask quickly about the situation in North Africa, Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in particular. You know, we are looking at, you know, future places that could be sort of the next Yemen, if you will, in terms of a place that rises up and becomes more of a problem than perhaps we expected, though I will say the DOD expected Yemen for some time. It is a bit of a misconception that we didn't see that coming.

But in North Africa, in Mali and Mauritania, Al Qaeda (AQ) is very active and we simply don't have the resources there, certainly, than we have in Iraq and Afghanistan but even than we have watching Yemen and Somalia. What is your assessment of where that threat is at and what more we can do to be aware of what is happening? Because my great fear is there is a lot of, you know, vast open space out there that we know AQ is active. We don't have the type of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) coverage or intelligence that we would like to know what is going on there.

Could you give me your quick assessment of that region and what more we should be doing?

General WARD. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

That region that you are describing is the size of the continental United States. It is a vast region, and what we are doing, working with those nations—those are sovereign nations there. So our effort is focused on trying to give them additional capacity to help, in fact, have better control over those vast spaces.

So we will work with Malians, Algerians, Burkina Faso, Niger, other nations in the Sahel so that they have increased capacity. The intel piece is a very great piece of that, sir. And so how we are able to have additional information that helps them understand better what the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is doing will also be a part of their ability to then deal with that threat.

Mr. SMITH. Can you say a quick word about Mauritania? I know we have the—their critical there in the middle of this. We had the problem—they had the coup a few years back, broke off relations to a certain extent.

What are we trying to do to deal with Mauritania's role in all of that?

General WARD. Thankfully, in Mauritania, we are past the coup, and we are looking to increase our cooperation with the Mauritians to work with them as well as other international

players working with the Mauritians to give them increased capacity to deal with the threat as well.

And we are opening that again.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. It is an area of particular interest to me and would like to be supportive as I can of your efforts there.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Before I call Mr. Coffman, Admiral, earlier, you mentioned a concern regarding the cyber world. Would you explain that, please?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. As I look at a world today in which 1 billion devices are connecting to the Internet and I look at all of our vulnerabilities in U.S. European Command and also look at it from the perspective of a NATO commander with 28 nations all of whom are very dependent on this cyber world, this cyber sea in which we sail, I am concerned that we are vulnerable from a military perspective; that we do not have the level of international cooperation that would create the norms, the systems of maintaining together how we navigate this cyber sea.

And so I am an advocate of an international and an interagency approach, and I think the cyber world really needs to be a whole-of-government, whole-of-society approach. And so as I look at our vulnerabilities, I am seeking to improve those by working with interagency partners as well as international partners in the NATO context particularly with the NATO cyber center that we have established in Estonia as one example of that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the admiral.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, General Mattis, I first want to commend you in taking a look at going beyond this 20-year career path and looking at a longer career path. Having served as an infantry officer, too, only having one year as a rifle platoon commander in my first assignment, I mean, I think that we need to look at individuals being able to serve more time at different develops in their career path. And I think we are pushing people through faster than we ought to.

But one question—first, a statement that I disagree with using nation building as a principle tool for achieving our foreign policy objectives, but I understand that is beyond the pay grade of—or beyond the Department of Defense to make that decision.

But one question I have of you is, number one, has using our conventional forces and a heavy footprint for counterinsurgency purposes—how has that degraded our war fighting capability from a conventional standpoint? And prospectively, are there plans to use our—rely more heavily on special operations forces (SOF) to counter irregular threats, asymmetric threats and utilize our conventional forces to counter conventional threats going forward?

Could you address that, please?

General MATTIS. Thank you, Mr. Coffman.

On using our SOF more, we are using them right now to the absolute limit of capacity in a number of areas, not just the ones that make the newspapers every day. So between General Casey, General Conway, Admiral Olson who commands Special Operations Command, between the Army, Marine Corps, SOF, and Joint

Forces Command, we are looking at those engagement efforts, counterinsurgent efforts, that require SOF only. We are building relationships and this sort of thing.

If it is just teaching troops how to fight small-unit tactics, how to march, how to shoot, how to do first aid, those are things the general-purpose force can take off of the special forces so they are free to do only the things that they are best tuned for.

So there is going to continue to be a need for our general-purpose forces to be able to fight across the spectrum of combat. We cannot have forces that we basically put on the shelf and say we only use them in this kind of a fight. We try to bring all of them together. And I recognize there is some degradation right now, but we believe that, with the congressional build-up of the Army and the Marines that they have funded, and with the drawdown of about 10,000 fewer troops in the Central Command (CENTCOM) AOR in September of this year compared to September of a year ago, you will see dwell times extending. And that will allow the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, to get back to some of the more conventional aspects of war, which we have put on the back burner right now.

We have Marines who have not been on board ship, although they have been in the Marine Corps for eight years. We have Army troops who have not coordinated large artillery fires in support of brigade maneuver. Dwell time will give us the chance to do that, sir, without segregating the general-purpose force out of irregular warfare.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, General Mattis.

Admiral, I think you have four brigade combat teams organic to NATO or positioned in Europe. But my first assignment was in the United States Army mechanized infantry in Europe, and we did Reforger exercises every year—I don't know if those are still ongoing—where forces from continental United States (CONUS) would then go to Europe and we would kind of simulate being able to utilize them for a counterattack against, at that time, Warsaw Pact forces.

Since we have that capability, can't we preposition those forces within the United States without compromising our commitment to NATO and simply utilize those forces on an ongoing operational basis by deploying them into Europe on a very temporary basis and then pulling them back but basing them inside the United States?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. You could examine a construct like that, and I recognize that any decision like this has political and economic elements that need to be worked out. There is a business case that is involved with all this, and I would refer that aspect of it to the Department of the Army which looks very closely at all this.

My job is to provide my military advice as to what I think is best for the security and defense of the United States in Europe, and I have look at this very closely. And from my perspective, because of the things we talked about earlier—the reassurance, deterrence, leadership, logistics, training—I think four brigade combat teams in Europe is a good investment for the United States, sir.

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, in reverse alphabetical order, if you don't mind, we will start with you, General Ward, in a minute and a half, what keeps you awake at night, if anything?

General WARD. Sir, I am concerned about the potential that American lives will be lost because of what might generate and emanate from the continent of Africa. That is why our focus on the security capacity of those nations to secure their territorial borders, to secure their territorial waters is so important. Those threats could affect us wherever we may be in this globalized society.

What goes on in Somalia, Sudan, Nigeria, what goes on in East Africa with respect to Al Qaeda, what goes on in Maghreb with respect to Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb—our programs are all designed to address those threats that are faced by Americans who live on the continent and also could have an effect on us here at home.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

Admiral.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I will be very brief. Afghanistan, through my NATO hat, is of extreme concern, and we are working that. And I would put that at the top of my list of things I worry about.

I am concerned, also, about the Balkans, making sure we don't fall back into the situation we saw in the 1900s. As I mentioned to the chairman, I worry about cyber. I don't think we spend enough time looking and thinking at that.

And then, lastly, I worry about Iran, about the growing threat of ballistic missiles, about the possibility of them acquiring a nuclear weapon, about state-sponsored terrorism.

So those four things, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. General Mattis.

General MATTIS. Sir, mine are a mix of current and future concerns. First of all, the loss of precision dominance by our forces means that no longer do we have the ability to hit the enemy in ways they cannot reply in kind. Just think of Israel. Instead of under attack by ballistic-launched rockets, think if each one had a GPS transmitter or receiver on the front that can guide them precisely onto locations and what are we doing to make certain, if we deploy forces, they can protect themselves.

Second is counter-improvised explosive device (IED). We need to get away from defensive measures and create technologically sustainable offensive ways to turn the IED on the enemy so we are no longer putting more armor or more jammers on ours.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, can I interrupt? Do you see that technology anywhere? And is Congress missing the boat on acquiring it?

General MATTIS. Sir, it is not the Congress. There is enough money that you have given to Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIJEDDO) and others. What we have is a technologically challenging effort, as a physicist put it to me, General, you are asking us to do something harder than going to the moon. That took us 10 years. You have been at war eight. We should be getting pretty close then.

We have the money, sir. We need to organize the effort. But this one very much concerns me. This weapon is coming to a city near us very soon.

A couple other things that keep me awake at night, sir, the quality of the troops joining the U.S. Army. The Army continues to do most of the fighting and most of the bleeding for this country. It is okay right now, but we all saw a concern about this a few years ago. And the all-volunteer force is unmatched, but we must maintain the quality of this force.

I am also concerned in the long run about the financially unsustainable path that our national budget is on and whether or not we will be able to maintain the military forces when the only discretionary money you may have to play with, to address, to allocate, is at the Department of Defense. And what are the long-term implications of that?

And last is the one that was just mentioned by my comrade here, and that is the cyber vulnerability.

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral, while I still have you, going back to your days in Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), are there any surface combatant missions off the coast of South and Latin America that cannot be handled by a Guided Missile Frigate (FFG) or a SLEP'd [Service Life Extension Program] FFG?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Day-to-day, no. Everything can be handled by a frigate-sized vessel. I would only point out the Haiti experience that you and I remember both from the hurricanes and most recently from the earthquake, hospital ship, big-deck amphib for those extremely discreet individual high-end events.

But other than that, those frigates do us very well down there, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. General Ward, on the counter-piracy mission off of Somalia, is there anything that could not be handled by a frigate?

General WARD. To my best understanding, Congressman, there is not.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. Thank you very much. And, again, thank you, all of you, for your tremendous service to our Nation. Thank you for being here today.

Mr. TAYLOR [presiding]. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for five minutes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Generals and Admiral, I want to join with you. I agree with you about Erin Conaton, who has been confirmed to be the Under Secretary of the Air Force. Ms. Conaton has just been a—I have seen firsthand a devoted person for our military and, of course, she was trained by Chairman Ike Skelton. So we know that she will be an excellent resource and supporter of our military. So I am grateful for that.

And General Ward, of course, each year, I like to welcome you. I like to remind you that Charleston, my birthplace, would love to have you and AFRICOM to locate there. The Chamber of Commerce in Charleston has an open invitation for AFRICOM.

And with that, I understand that Secretary Gates has stated that a move of AFRICOM's headquarters will not be considered until 2012. When this decision is made, what are the primary issues that are going to be considered? Particularly, I am interested in the quality of life for dependents, access to schools, medical facilities, transportation access, jobs.

How would that be weighed in the decision?

General WARD. Thank you, Mr. Wilson, and thank you for your invitation, again, as well, sir.

The decision, when it is considered in 2012, has not been outlined at this point in time. However, to be sure, in any environment, the quality of line, the well-being of the serving members, be they uniformed or civilian, their family members will be a part of that dynamic, I am sure. To what degree it will take, again, I am—we are not at that point just yet.

As you are aware, those are factors in determining where the headquarters are currently located from the standpoint of the enduring location that Stuttgart offers, the availability of those facilities. So I am sure they will be considered in that same light when this decision is revisited in a few years.

Mr. WILSON. Well, anytime I see you, whether in the hallway, anywhere, do understand, we would love for you to relocate to Charleston, South Carolina. [Laughter.]

And, Admiral, DOD-sponsored programs for spouses and dependents of service members are very important. What are you doing to ensure the dependents of members stationed within EUCOM are receiving the same benefits as those stationed within the continental United States? In particular, are education standards for schools-age children meeting these of their counterparts in the United States?

What are the employment opportunities for spouses? And what measures are being taken to increase awareness of those?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, sir.

I do want to mention that my sister lives in Charleston and she lives in Mount Pleasant. She is a schoolteacher there. And she loves Charleston which brings me to teaching children and the quality of that over in Europe.

And I am very pleased to report that the budget coming forward for which we are seeking the support of the Congress does, in fact, allocate a significant upgrade in the schools for our DOD children which I would argue is at the very top of the quality-of-life programs. Every parent—we all know this—every parent, the first thing we ask as military members when we are moving, the very first thing is how are the schools.

So we have gotten a good level of support in the budget in front of you, and we would sure ask for your support on that.

We also, to your question of how do we focus on this, we hold a lot of conferences. In fact, right now, my senior enlisted is not with me because he is back in Europe spearheading my annual quality-of-life conference which I know all of the combatant commanders do. We really value that direct feedback from the families.

That is our kind of input loop. And I must say, this Congress has been terrifically supportive of our dependents in Europe and, of course, Kip is actually my next-door neighbor in Europe. His headquarters, as you know, is currently there.

We are very happy with the overall level of support, and we ask for the continuance of that from the Congress, sir.

Mr. WILSON. And we appreciate your efforts.

And, General Mattis, I want to thank you for raising the threat and danger of the budget irresponsibility that is going on here in

Washington. I am also concerned, though, about the joint training events. Are they sufficient for our troops to be trained?

General MATTIS. Sir, I just want to correct one thing. I did not say anything about budget irresponsibility. I just—I am concerned about the sustainability of the budget.

Mr. WILSON. Right.

General MATTIS. But as far as the training, sir, we have the dollars, and we have the means to train. Where we are challenged right now is primarily for chief of staff of the Army, Special Operations Command coming out of the Marine Corps is the dwell time. That is improving, as you know, but it is mostly a time constraint, not a physical plant or a dollar constraint.

Thanks, I might add, to the support of this committee.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. TAYLOR. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, for five minutes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With the ice melting in the North Pole due to global warming which does open up new lanes for commercial activity, shipping in particular, and given the fact that abundant natural resources lie in that area—natural gas, coal, even oil—and given the fact that Russia has planted its flag on a disputed region of the intercontinental shelf, I would like to know what we are doing from a security standpoint to protect our commercial interests in that area.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you for the question, sir. It is an extremely interesting part of the world, as you allude to. There are actually three combatant commanders who have contiguous responsibility, and I am one of them. U.S. European Command, also, U.S. Northern Command from the northern part of Canada and then U.S. Pacific Command.

So the three of us, together, look at these security issues in that region. Today, there are five nations that surround that North Pole where you are correct, there are shipping lanes that, I think, over the next decade will begin to open up. U.S., Russia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway are the five nations.

There are two others, Sweden and Finland, who are also associate members of a group called the Arctic Council. This Arctic Council, sir, is the forum in which all of these issues—and it is really security but also navigation. It is the environment. It is scientific research. It is hydrocarbon recovery, as you mentioned. All of those issues come together in this Arctic Council which provides a forum for discussion.

I think that is probably the right place for this discussion to be occurring. It is a cooperative, an active body. And that is the center of the security discussion at this time.

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Well, let me ask you this question and follow up. There is a need for vessels that can accommodate the conditions—icy conditions—in that area. Do we have—are we properly equipped navally to be able to address any concerns that would occur up there?

And, also, I wanted to know about the relationship, military-to-military, between China and Russia. And not just military-to-military, but even other ways that they may cooperate with each other.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. In terms of the ability of U.S. ships to operate in high-north conditions, I think we are reasonably capable in that regard. In terms of more specifics, I would be happy to take the question for the record and go to the commandant of the Coast Guard because we should remember a great deal of this ice-breaking capability is resident in the Coast Guard and to the Chief of Naval Operations who, I think, are better suited than I to address—and I will get you that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 181.]

Mr. JOHNSON. How many working seaworthy ice breakers do we have in this country?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I don't know the answer to that. It is not in my purview or my remit as commander of U.S. European Command.

Mr. JOHNSON. I appreciate you—

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I will be glad to find that data out for you and provide it for the record, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 181.]

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. And with respect to the rest of the questions.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. To China—excuse me—China and Russia. As I survey the relationship between those two, I look at it, of course, from a Russian perspective because Russia is part of U.S. European Command's area of focus. I would say it is a relationship that has commercial, demographic, limited military-to-military cooperation, although they are both cooperating in the counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa.

So I would say it is a relationship of both of the nations watching each other. They share one of the longest land borders in the world. But at this time, they are not in an extremely active geostrategic dialogue.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

And last question. How are AFRICOM and the U.S. military efforts in Africa perceived by Africans and by other foreign nations, General Ward?

General WARD. The perception is increasingly favorable. It has been rising over the last two years, and they are continuing to increase in a most favorable way. Positive perceptions.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. Thank you, all three of you, for your work. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And General Mattis, I want to thank you. I read your article in Marine Times, March 1, 2010, "Better Officer Training." And you called for an overhaul. I found that article very interesting, and I would hope that some of my colleagues would have a chance, maybe, to read the article and your recommendations. Thank you very much for that.

Admiral, I want to ask you a question. I have got most of my questions for General Ward. But if you would, give me kind of a short answer.

I remember back in 2003, 2004 many Generals—and I don't mean this disrespectfully—I mean, respectful. They would get questions about the Afghan security force, and they would say, well, the training is going well, we, you know, have got a lot to do, we have got years ahead, but it is going well.

You know, the American people are frustrated, many in the military, particularly wives and some children are very frustrated. Do you see—I know this might be very difficult to project the future. That, I fully understand.

But you know, I know the President said we are there another year and a half, but many of us are concerned that, as we get closer to that year and a half and another Presidential election, that some advisers—not necessarily military—might say, well, I don't think right now you need to pull down the troops in Afghanistan; we need—you know, we have got an election coming up. We have got to make sure that the people understand, you know, this and that.

If you would, this is 2010, and I don't know who will be here—maybe I am running the gambit—maybe I will, maybe I won't.

But two or three years down the road, if there is an admiral or a general that says that the training of the Afghan security force is going pretty well, how long should we say to the American people it is pretty well before we get to a point that we are financially broke as a country, we have worn out our military, we have worn out the equipment? I am not asking you for a timeline, but truthfully, do you see that maybe, in the short term, whatever the short term might be, that the Afghans can pick up it and take the responsibility?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I will be very brief. I can talk for an hour and a half on that.

Mr. JONES. I am sure.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The short answer is, in the seven months that I have been in command and the eight months that Stan McChrystal has been in command, I think both of us would sit here and tell you honestly we have seen progress. And in January, February, and March of this year, we have seen everything from Afghans piloting MI-17 helicopters going on commando raids to them repulsing serious attacks inside the capital to the current operation in Marjah which is being conducted in a one-to-one ratio.

So I can't speak to the four, five, six years ago, sir, but I can say that I think we are on a positive trajectory now. We have an outstanding three-star general who has unified command of all training for the first time, Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell. I would love to take you to Afghanistan and show you what is going on.

It is hard. It is very challenging. There is great risk ahead. But I am seeing progress. And that is as short as I can be about it.

Mr. JONES. Admiral, thank you. And maybe at some point in time in the future, I could ask you to come to my office and give me a briefing for an hour and a half if you want to.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I would love to. I will do it.

Mr. JONES. Really would appreciate that.

General Ward, I want to pick up very briefly because time goes so quickly with five minutes. But the issue of China. You made a statement—and I accept your statement—that the Chinese are, as it results to their military, they are not very robust but in other ways, they are being very aggressive, I would assume.

My concern is that—in your discussions with African leaders and other countries, do you feel that, at the present time, that the Chinese are trying to buy the hearts and souls of leaders by being able to be in a position of spending money, making investments in the infrastructure of certain countries? Do you feel that this is something that policy makers in Washington, not necessarily military people but policy makers need to be concerned about?

General WARD. Thank you, Mr. Jones. I don't know if I am in a position to characterize Chinese actions in that way. I think what I would say is, as I see Chinese activities, as they attempt to secure the sorts of things that will help fuel their economic development, they are pursuing multiple lines and multiple channels to secure resources to have the type of impact in Africa that would be in keeping with them achieving whatever their national interests from the Chinese perspective may be.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I see my time is over. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Sestak, please.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning—good afternoon.

Admiral, the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy, is this a good thing we are doing to repeal it? And I have a couple of questions, so I am just going to try to get to them rapidly.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman have come forward and spoken to this, and they have put in place a process—

Mr. SESTAK. As an operational commander, do you agree with it?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I agree with their process that they are undertaking.

Mr. SESTAK. Good. There was a program called the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) Group where we focused with Norway and Russia on the SSBNs that were rotting away up there in—we have stepped away from that but never did the SSNs up there as at reactors are rocking away.

Do you believe we should reengage on that effort? We stopped this about two, three years ago. What is your proposal?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I will have to get back to you on that one. I don't have a set response for that.

Mr. SESTAK. It was called AMEC.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes. We are looking at that type of issue, sir, in the Arctic Council which I spoke about a few moments ago.

Mr. SESTAK. Right.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. And that is—that, I think, is the right forum to address that, and I will get back to you with a more detailed answer.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 181.]

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.

Sir, I heard your response on AFRICOM. My understanding is, when we established this, we kind of pushed it a little harshly, potentially, without being a bit more ingratiating with South Africa. Is that an unfair statement after having sat down with them a bit and talked?

General WARD. I am not aware of not being fair with South Africa, Mr. Sestak. That doesn't resonate with me. The South Africans had concerns, as did a few of the other nations, that it was being established to bring large military formations to militarize the continent. As we have seen, that didn't happen. The South Africans' response has been, certainly, less strident against the command.

Mr. SESTAK. We have a good bilateral Defense Department relationship with South Africa, particularly, in the environmental area. Is that part of your charge, also, as AFRICOM as part of this engagement that you are doing down there?

General WARD. Not directly. Our engagement, military-to-military, that is very robust. It is growing. Our naval relationships, our land relationships, our air relationships, the work between the component commanders of my command and their South African counterparts—

Mr. SESTAK. Mainly military-to-military?

General WARD. Mainly military-to-military.

Mr. SESTAK. Wasn't your staff supposed to be two-thirds civilian, and so you were supposed to be a broader engagement than just military-to-military?

General WARD. The staff is about half civilian. Of that half, a percentage of that is from the interagency. Not from the standpoint of doing the work of the interagency, from the standpoint of how the interagency work is more and better supported by what we do so we have a better understanding—

Mr. SESTAK. I understand now.

General WARD. Correct.

Mr. SESTAK. General, the Commandant of the Marine Corps testified to a question a week or two ago that it would take us, because of our involvement in Iraq and now Afghanistan, upwards of 10 years before we get the U.S. Marine Corps back to where it is able to respond to the war plans.

My question to him had been that for the last four years, we have done no training except—nothing on combined arms—just on counterinsurgency—and that the Army can't respond to any other war plan around this nation; was that the same for the Marine Corps?

In your joint training area, would you say that is a correct assessment that our military is—in order to get back to the pre-Iraq days of readiness to respond to that is about 10 years?

General MATTIS. Sir, I did not see the Commandant's—the context of how he was—

Mr. SESTAK. His exact words were “about a decade.”

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. We have lost some of our edge that I believe that, thanks to the increased numbers of troops that you have authorized us and the drawdown in CENTCOM, is going to allow a graduated return to some of the things that have atrophied.

Mr. SESTAK. Would you think the time—

General MATTIS. I don't believe it will take 10 years—

Mr. SESTAK. All right.

General MATTIS. But I can't—I would have to study it a little bit and actually look at dwell times and training—

Mr. SESTAK. If you are able to with our commitment in Afghanistan, it would be great because I think that is one of—you know, the national fabric of national security got changed by Iraq. I am not arguing good or bad right now, although I would argue bad.

But I would be curious if you did.

Admiral, one last question. And, first, for all three of you, thanks for your service.

Advanced Electronic Guidance and Instrumentation System (AEGIS)—we have taken and plucked out from the Czech Republic and Poland what some would say was a stick in the eye of the bear and placed the same missile defense capability at sea in a way that protects us, some would argue, where we couldn't do before—Turkey and Israel more immediately but also can give us something in 2017 to more effectively defend our Nation here. Right step?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes.

Mr. SESTAK. He always cuts me off because I am a sophomore. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Finish your question.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think the question was finished, and I agree. I think we need to—we need to move forward, and I have confidence in the AEGIS—

Mr. SESTAK. In terms of, also, of negotiating with Russia and—

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it is—

Mr. SESTAK [continuing]. Helping them pivot to Iran?

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Franks, wrap it up.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you for your lifetime commitment to freedom. We never are grateful enough to you.

If it is okay, I wanted to take off on a point that Mr. Taylor makes often about what keeps you up at night.

I have to suggest to you, even though my perspective is not nearly as relevant as your own, that what keeps me up at night is the potential of Iran gaining a nuclear capability. I know that has been talked about and touched on significantly here.

But I think that we, perhaps, made an error—and I am sure that there will be disagreement on the panel here—relating to the European missile defense site. Most of you know that the phased adaptive approach—and when we were in the Bush Administration, these were things that were planned in general already. These are already kind of on the planning schedule.

But I am concerned about the timing. You know, one of critiques of the former missile defense plan was that it was only expected to cover about 75 percent of our European allies by 2013. But how does the phased adaptive approach compare coverage wise by percentage of allies supported by that timeline? And what can we look to in the future?

And, Admiral Stavridis, I will talk to you first about that.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sure. First of all, the answer to that is a technical one, and I would have to really direct you to the Missile Defense Agency. They are the people that kind of come with that, and they can give you a very detailed briefing on it.

But as I mentioned to Representative Sestak a moment ago, I am confident in the ability to begin by using a sea-based system off of our AEGIS ships, and it will provide some initial coverage. And then the plan, without going into classified details, is to use some of those systems ashore.

And I am confident that we will be able to transition that technology. As to the precise degree of coverage and when it walks in, there is a classified briefing that can take you through that in detail.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Admiral Stavridis, I appreciate your perspective. I will just suggest to you that there is at least a conclusion on the part of a lot of us that, even though no one supports the AEGIS system more than I do—I think it is a magnificent testimony of American technology and capability—it is the timing.

My concern is that Iran, in all of their calculus of moving forward a nuclear weapons program, I think part of their concern is what would be the response of the Western world. I am not sure that they are really too shook up about our response at this point. I am thinking they are more concerned about Israel's response.

But if we had had that capability to defend most of Europe in the timeframe that could have at least beat them to the punch, I think it might have played in their calculus. At this point, I don't think that we are going to be able to have much of a deterrence within the timeframe here.

And I guess I illustrate that by—it seems that we have made a buy of eight SM-3 Block 1-B interceptors for this year, and how does that affect the timeline in the phased adaptive approach? I mean, what happens if the industrial base that is currently set to produce 48 interceptors cannot make up the difference after 2 years without any real substantive orders from the Department of Defense? I mean, you understand we are behind the eight ball here.

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Well, again, sir, I am not the right person to address the slip stream of missile moving forward, but I will take that question to the Missile Defense Agency, and I will make sure they come and give you a brief in-depth about that.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. FRANKS. Okay. I certainly don't mean to badger you because I think you are doing your job in a magnificent way.

General Mattis, I appreciate your soldier statesman diplomacy in clarifying that you were saying "sustainability" instead of "irresponsibility." That is a word left to people like myself, and I think I would probably—if I were to use "irresponsibility," I would berate myself for understatement because I do think that the budget irresponsibility this administration has some pretty profound implications for our military readiness in the future.

So with that in mind, if there were some area that you feel like we are maybe missing the boat on making sure that we are going to be ready for whatever contingencies come in the future, what

area of the budget—and it is not fair to ask you, but I am sure your statesmanship will be in tact here too.

What area of the budget would you be concerned about the most?

General MATTIS. Representative, looking at my crystal ball, which is about as good as anyone else's, we are facing an increasingly difficult problem gaining access around the world. And that access is being denied technologically, as we see a profusion of precision weaponry being passed around the world. We see it going to potential adversaries. It is political. All politics being local, there are places where large footprints of our troops ashore are not welcome.

I think we are going to have to see an increased naval aspect to how we reassure our friends and temper potential adversaries' plans using our asymmetric strengths of sea control.

Thank you.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. McKeon, any further questions?

If not, the hearing comes to a close. We thank each one of you for being with us, for your excellent testimony. In a word, you make us proud.

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 10, 2010

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 10, 2010

McKeon Opening Statement for Hearing on the Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Requests for EUCOM, AFRICOM & JFCOM

March 10, 2010

Washington, D.C.—U.S. Rep. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon (R-CA), the top Republican on the Armed Services Committee, released the following opening statement for the committee’s hearing on the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2011 budget request for the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM):

“Today, we begin our series of posture hearings with the commanders from EUCOM, AFRICOM, and Joint Forces Command. I would like to welcome Admiral Stavridis, General Ward and General Mattis and thank each of you for your leadership and service to our nation. Your testimony this morning gives our Members an opportunity to understand the posture of your commands and better appreciate the ongoing and evolving security challenges in your respective areas of responsibility (AOR) as we head into our annual process of making national security policy and budgetary decisions.

“Your appearance also reminds us of our extraordinary military men and women serving around the globe to protect American national interests. Please pass along my sincere gratitude to all of our service members and their families serving under your commands.

“Admiral Stavridis, unfortunately we do not have time to cover all the challenges facing EUCOM and NATO, but I would like to highlight a few areas that I hope you will address today.

“The first is the Administration’s Russia reset policy. While your written statement correctly highlights the complexities of engaging Russia, we need to ensure that the reset policy does not risk the viability of the security architecture that has kept the European continent peaceful for nearly 60 years. In other words, reset needs to be balanced with U.S. reassurance of our Allies.

“This is why many of us support a NATO First policy, which would make clear to our NATO allies that U.S. bilateral engagement with Russia will not foster collective insecurity amongst our allies. I’m pleased that your prepared statement addresses the need to strengthen transatlantic security, assure allies and dissuade adversaries.

“Important to assuring Allies is U.S. force presence in Europe. Your prepared statement states that force posture is key to achieving our national objectives in EUCOM’s area of responsibility, and offers context by highlighting how U.S. personnel in Europe has decreased from 300,000 during the Cold War to less than 80,000 today.

“While some have called for even less force presence, you state that: ‘without four Brigade Combat Teams in Europe, European Command assumes risk in its capability to conduct steady-state security cooperation, shaping, and contingency missions. Deterrence and reassurance are at increased risk.’ Given Russia’s military modernization efforts, its behavior in Georgia and its revised nuclear doctrine this is not a risk we can afford to assume. That is why we need to increase our building partnership capacity efforts, particularly efforts to assist our Eastern European Allies, and welcome initiatives like the EUCOM Building Partnership Capacity Center.

“A key development in your AOR since last year is missile defense. While I understand that missile defense costs and capability are not EUCOM issues, addressing our allies’ concerns about the Iranian threat is a major EUCOM equity. With respect to defense of Israel, EUCOM should build on its October 2009 Juniper Cobra Exercise which successfully exercised the active missile-defense capabilities of both U.S. and Israeli armed forces.

“I do have concerns about the Administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach, however. In my view, it is critical the Administration deliver on its promise on missile defense in Europe—we have learned little about this plan since the September 2009 announcement. Does EUCOM have a detailed plan in place to execute this policy?

“Finally, absent from your comprehensive testimony is discussion of NATO as a nuclear alliance. While you highlight that Article 5 and collective defense is the cornerstone of the Alliance, you do not address whether the U.S. should continue to have a nuclear presence in Europe. In my view, our forward deployed nuclear forces strengthen trans-Atlantic security and are critical to the credibility of our collective defense commitment. I take to heart the view that our nuclear forces work for us every day by providing assurance to Allies and deterrence to adversaries.

“General Mattis, as the Joint Force Provider, you have had the unenviable task of fulfilling the combatant commander’s manpower requirements at a time when our

Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are stretched thin. It is not easy to do what we have asked you to do. Thank you for your continued commitment to this Nation and your willingness to sit in the gap as bridges are being built.

“I also want to applaud your personal effort in defining the roles and responsibilities of JFCOM. I’ll be the first to admit that I have no idea what is implied when people in the Department talk of ‘enterprises’ and ‘federations’. Since you took the helm at JFCOM I’ve heard less related to an old episode of Star Trek and more about effective and efficient use of our finite joint force capacity. Thank you for the clarity of your leadership and I look forward to our discussion today.

“Let me conclude my statement by briefly addressing AFRICOM. General Ward you and I have spoken several times since I became Ranking Member. Let me say publically, that you have accomplished the daunting task of establishing a command in one of the most complex and evolving regions in the world. I commend you for your efforts. From terrorism to drug trafficking to piracy to enduring conflicts—Africa presents a demanding strategic environment.

“As you know, this problem set—like many—requires an interagency and international partnered approach. AFRICOM is intended to be the tip of the spear for the Department of Defense when it comes to supporting the implementation of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. I would like to hear you assessment of AFRICOM’s efforts to integrate different U.S. departments and agencies while continuing to meet its military objectives. Also, I would welcome some examples of what you are doing in the areas of security cooperation and building partnership capacity.

“Thank you for being here, I look forward to your testimonies.”

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HOUSE AND SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES

HOUSE AND SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES

TESTIMONY OF

ADMIRAL JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, UNITED STATES NAVY

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

BEFORE THE 111TH CONGRESS 2010



Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McKeon, and distinguished Members of the Committee

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to share with you the challenges and successes achieved by the men and women of both European Command and Allied Command Operations. Although I have only been at the helm of these Commands for less than a year, I am happy to report we are making great progress and we are moving assertively toward stronger partnerships for our shared security. Truly, the most important activities we have undertaken in the past year have been those in which we worked together with our Allies and partners to build their capacity, as well as our own, to ensure security in the European theater and defend our homeland forward. These kinds of activities demonstrate the three essential pillars I believe are necessary for success.

First, we must understand the military is but one link in the chain anchoring our national security. Those of us in uniform are well trained and capable of performing a wide range of duties, but many of the dangers posed to our national security elicit more than just a military response. Instead, they call for a “whole of government” approach that requires partnering with other agencies such as the Department of State (DoS) leading diplomacy, U.S. Agency for International Development leading development, Department of the Treasury, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, and other departments and agencies of our government to ensure we use all the means available to ensure our national security. Several U.S. Departments and Agencies either have representatives at our headquarters in Stuttgart or will have them in place this fiscal year. More than a tool or a method, “Interagency Partnering” is an expanding paradigm at EUCOM and we are intent on serving as a model of interagency cooperation.

Second, not only must we work with our interagency partners, we must also cooperate closely with our international partners as well. Our aim is to undertake international security cooperation in a way that recognizes and leverages the histories, cultures, and languages of our Allies and partners, and enhances our collective capability.

Finally, it is important that we employ effective strategic communication in everything we do. Our deeds and words should communicate clearly and credibly our values and priorities to Allies, partners, friends, and even enemies.

Our partnerships in Europe are strong. We share a great deal of history and culture based on democratic values. Our own democracy was born of the great European thinkers from Plato to Voltaire, and great works that shaped our own Constitution, like the Magna Carta. Waves of immigrants from Europe have helped build our country, and many of the families of those immigrants still have strong ties to societies on the European continent. These strong personal transatlantic ties unite us in common goals and enduring partnerships.

EUROPEAN COMMAND Mission: U.S. European Command conducts military operations and builds partner capacity to enhance transatlantic security and defend the homeland forward.

EUROPEAN COMMAND Vision: An agile security organization with a “whole of government” approach seeking to support enduring stability and peace in Europe and Eurasia.

EUROPEAN COMMAND Themes:

- Ready forces provide regional security.
- Mutual security challenges require cooperative solutions.
- EUROPEAN COMMAND is committed to enduring partnerships.

EUROPEAN COMMAND Motto: “Stronger Together”

During the past year, European Command's 80,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians have executed many programs, side-by-side with our Allies and partners, which have truly made us "*Stronger Together*." Let me summarize some key European Command accomplishments and initiatives:

- Provided pre-deployment training to thousands of Europe-based U.S. forces and over 100 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams slated for deployment in Afghanistan
- Provided forces and critical support for the movement of equipment and personnel between the Continental United States and the Central Command Region in support of overseas contingency operations
- Provided a world class medical center, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, used as the primary trauma facility supporting U.S. forces in Europe and the Middle East
- Executed 38 major exercises involving nearly 50,000 U.S., Allied, and partner nation personnel and 45 partner nations
- Conducted 151 security assistance projects in 19 countries
- Re-organized to better engage and collaborate with NATO, the interagency, academia, the private sector, think tanks, and international and non-governmental organizations

PROGRESS

Think of U.S. European Command as part of a bridge: one that spans the broad North Atlantic. Our fundamental purpose is to defend the United States of America. To do so, we must keep that trans-Atlantic bridge strong.

In a dynamic region, European Command continues achieving success by partnering with allies to increase their capacity and ours to contribute to international security-enhancing solutions. Below are some examples highlighting this approach:

Joint Multi-National Readiness Center. The Joint Multi-National Readiness Center supports European Command and Central Command operations by providing pre-deployment training to Europe-based U.S. forces and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams slated for deployment to Afghanistan. Currently, the Center provides enduring Observer/Controller support to the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) Israel to train the Palestinian National Security Forces. Joint Multi-National Readiness Center observer/controllers were also instrumental in the successful pre-deployment training of the Jordanian 2nd Ranger Battalion for operations in support of Afghanistan's national elections. We have trained almost 4,000 soldiers thus far. Through these training efforts, EUCOM enabled partner nations in making contributions to the effort in Afghanistan. However, we require expanded long-term authorities and funding to enhance and continue these efforts.

Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force. Marine Forces Europe directly supports the Republic of Georgia's two-year program to deploy Georgian forces alongside Marine Forces to Afghanistan. The Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force will deploy four rotations of a Georgian battalion with a Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Brigade to Afghanistan. As capabilities improve, Georgian forces are

expected to be able to operate independently. By using Georgian shadow instructors Marine Forces Europe will create a Georgian training group that will largely take over the Partnership Training Program by their fourth rotation.

The National Guard State Partnership Program. The National Guard State Partnership Program links individual state National Guard organizations with a particular European nation. The National Guard of Illinois, for example, partners with Poland. The State Partnership Program makes large multi-faceted contributions to security both within and outside Europe. The twenty-one European State Partnerships undertake a broad range of projects, including a capacity-building program generating four enduring European Command State Partnership Program Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams conducting combat operations in Afghanistan. This program has the additional benefit of building critical long-term personal and professional relationships between the states and European nations because many of the same personnel return year after year to train with their counterparts.

Support to NATO Response Force. We are providing personnel to support multiple 2009 training and certification events through U.S. European Command. This effort enhanced the training and certification of the Land Component Command and assisted the NATO Response Force's Joint Logistics Support Group in reaching advanced operational capability. This high level of operational acumen is key to ensuring the Force maintains the deployment capability required to execute its core mission.

Support to OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN, Kosovo. The United States' continuing support to NATO's Kosovo Force OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN helps maintain stability in Kosovo and advances security progress alongside our NATO and European Union partners. European Command supports Kosovo Force through our land component, US Army Europe, and

leverages National Guard Bureau forces to source Task Force Falcon (Multi-national Task Force-East), Regional Mentoring and Liaison Teams, NATO Training Teams, elements of the Kosovo Force Headquarters, as well as augmenting the Kosovo Force Military-Civilian Advisory Division by providing mentors and advisors. In June of last year, the North Atlantic Council approved the plan to begin a drawdown from Focused Engagement (current force structure) to a Deterrent Presence. Accomplishment of Deterrent Presence, which will reduce NATO force presence from approximately 14,000 to 2,500, began in January 2010 and, based on a coordinated review of political and security conditions on the ground may occur in three phases. Today Kosovo remains stable and secure – a real allied success, but NATO’s North Atlantic Council will continue to evaluate further drawdown.

Reduction of U.S. presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. European Command has played a significant role in Bosnia's progress since the 1995 implementation of the Dayton Accords. At the height of OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR in 1996, more than 20,000 U.S. service members served in Bosnia. The September 2009 deactivation of Task Force Dayton, the last U.S. entity operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina, marked a significant milestone for U.S. European Command. Less than twenty U.S. personnel now remain in Bosnia assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo and the United States Balkans National Support Element. European Command continues building partnership capacity with Bosnia through focused security cooperation initiatives to include International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing, Joint Contact Team Program familiarizations, and the State Partnership Program with Maryland’s Army National Guard. In a show of its increasing capacity, Bosnia assumed a key leadership role during European Command’s 2009 COMBINED ENDEAVOR exercise involving 39 countries and 1200 personnel. European Command is also developing a bilateral

exercise program to further focus on defense reform, Euro-Atlantic integration, support to Overseas Contingency Operations, and capacity building. Because of the progress in Bosnia, the nation contributed consistently to the coalition effort in Iraq between 2005 and 2008 and will deploy personnel to Afghanistan in the near future.

Multi-National Joint and Interagency Exercises: The most intensive form of peacetime interaction with our Allies and partners occurs in the conduct of joint exercises. European Command maintained a robust bilateral and multilateral exercise program last year, executing 38 major exercises involving nearly 50,000 U.S., allied, and partner nation personnel and 45 partner nations. The exercises focused on preparing partner nations for ongoing coalition operations to include International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, NATO interoperability, and improving our military capability and interoperability with Israel.

In support of NATO, European Command provided forces for 12 NATO and NATO Partnership for Peace events in the Baltics. U.S. Naval Forces Europe also executed Exercise BALTIC OPERATIONS, a long-standing multinational maritime exercise including 14 nations focused on maritime and amphibious interoperability. In the Balkans, two major exercises, MEDICAL CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE EXERCISE '09 and COMBINED ENDEAVOR, discussed above, bolstered partner capabilities and eased regional tensions. MEDICAL CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE EXERCISE '09, U.S. European Command's first large scale exercise in Serbia, included 14 nations and focused on medical readiness and disaster response. This exercise also supported the U.S. Agency for International Development's Preparedness, Planning and Economic Security program that has been making Serbian municipalities more resilient to crises and disasters.

Of particular note, European Command conducted a theater-wide Exercise, JACKAL STONE, a Special Operations Headquarters and Field Training Exercise executed in Croatia and distributed locations throughout the theater involving more than 10 nations and 1500 partner nation Special Operation Forces personnel. This event, along with other special operations exercises and Joint Combined Exchange Training events in over 30 countries, directly supported U.S. and partner Special Operations Forces readiness and contributions to International Security Assistance Force and other endeavors.

European Command continues a high level of engagement with Israel, conducting 500+ theater security cooperation events annually and chairing four bi-lateral, biennial conferences spanning planning, logistics, exercises, and interoperability. The US-Israel exercise portfolio also includes eight major reoccurring exercises. European Command leadership and staff maintain uniquely strong, recurring, personal and direct interactions with counterparts on the Israel Defense Force. These regular and direct relationships have paid dividends as the placement of the AN/TPY-2 radar in Israel resulted in a dramatic uptick in both senior level and operator level interaction. European Command Headquarters executed AUSTERE CHALLENGE 09, the premier joint force headquarters exercise in the European Command Theater, with a crisis action planning phase in January 2009 and an operations phase in May 2009.

Building on the success from Southern Command's exercise BLUE ADVANCE 08, European Command benefitted from the participation of an Integration Planning Cell with representatives from the US Department of Agriculture, the Department of Justice, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization led the Integration Planning Cell, which also featured the first-

time participation of the newly formed Advance Civilian Team, which was co-located with EUCOM's Joint Task Force headquarters. Together, the Integration Planning Cell and Advance Civilian Team comprised the largest interagency involvement to date in any Combatant Command exercise. The benefits of this structure are clear: most real-world challenges require an inter-agency approach to solve and our robust exercise program reflects this understanding.

AUSTERE CHALLENGE 2010 will feature multiple event-driven scenarios requiring multiple joint task forces and will involve a Combined Joint Air Coordination Center led for the first time by the French Air Force. On a smaller scale, FLEXIBLE LEADER is a Command Post Exercise, focusing on Foreign Consequence Management and Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief planning and operations, and strengthening our "whole of government" approach through engagement with various U.S. agencies as well as partner nations and non-governmental organizations.

None of these events would be possible without Commander Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation Funding. The support from Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center is also a keystone to this Command's capability to plan, manage, and execute these challenging joint exercises.

In addition to the extensive engagement European Command has with partner nations, there are additional major projects.

Logistical Support to Contingency Operations from Spain. In support of ongoing overseas contingency operations, European Command continues providing critical coordination and support for the movement of key U.S. equipment and personnel between the Continental United States and the Central Command region.

Exercising Nuclear Command and Control. In May 2009, the Joint Staff conducted a Staff Assessment Visit on the European Command Joint Operations Center and Joint Nuclear Operations Center, and the Joint Staff inspectors rated both centers' performance as "excellent," a repeat from last year's positive assessment.

Assistance to Turkey. Increased intelligence sharing with the Turkish General Staff has increased the effectiveness of Turkish cross-border counter-terrorism operations in Northern Iraq, leading to more precise Turkish action that reduces potential collateral damage and increases stability in the region.

Humanitarian Assistance Programs. European Command's Humanitarian Assistance programs directly benefit the nations where they are executed and consist of the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program, the Humanitarian Assistance-Other Program, and Humanitarian Assistance Program-Excess Property.

Projects funded through these resources complement United States Agency for International Development efforts, enhance regional security cooperation, and advance U.S. interests throughout the region. They also bolster a country's own capability to respond to disasters, thereby diminishing the need for future U.S. involvement, and provide an example of the value of a military during times of peace. While the European Command Humanitarian Assistance budget is relatively small, it has a disproportionately high and positive impact. Last year, the command executed over \$9 million in Humanitarian Assistance Project funding for 151 security assistance related projects in 19 countries.

Whole of Government/Whole of Society Approach. Our nation's success in developing conventional combat power has driven our adversaries to other forms of warfare, necessitating a

whole of government/whole of society approach. Interagency and international military partnering is the “heart of the enterprise” for this Command.

Embassy Country Teams, a perfect example of interagency partnering themselves, are our primary engagement entities for the 51 countries in our region. At the theater or regional level, however, the Geographic Combatant Commands can serve as a platform for hosting interagency partners wishing to coordinate their activities with the U.S. military. European Command presently hosts interagency representatives from the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Agency for International Development, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Global Center for Security Cooperation; we will soon add representatives from Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Energy, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. This cooperation helps us interact with Allied and partner militaries who perform many non-traditional military activities: patrolling borders; responding to natural disasters; providing coastal security; and performing civilian air traffic control.

We recently changed the organizational structure of European Command to better facilitate integration of our interagency partners. Starting at the top, we established a civilian deputy, an office now filled by Ambassador Kate Canavan, who in addition serves as European Command’s Political Advisor. Additionally, European Command’s newly formed J9 Interagency Directorate engages and collaborates with international and Non-Governmental Organizations, academia, the private sector, think tanks, and military organizations. We gain many advantages by leveraging the knowledge and fresh thinking of academics and business professionals, and international organizations and non-governmental organizations have capabilities, access, and credibility in areas where the military does not.

For example, we are in the very early stages of pursuing a whole of government/whole of society approach in addressing regional narcotics and terrorism threats in Europe and Eurasia, similar to the interagency effort led by Joint Interagency Task Force-South in Key West. This would synchronize multiple combatant commands (European Command, Central Command, Africa Command) and the multitude of agencies working border control, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism and trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, creating synergies that would add considerable capability and trust for our international partners while defending our Homeland forward.

European Command Service Components

United States Army Europe, United States Marine Corps Forces Europe, United States Naval Forces Europe, United States Air Forces in Europe, as well as European Command's functional subordinate unified command for special operations, Special Operations Command Europe, are responsible for supporting our Theater Campaign Plan and implementing our Theater Security Cooperation programs across the region. The Service Components provide the capabilities necessary to build military capacity among our partners and Allies, conduct military operations, and promote vital national security interests. Reductions in their forces imposed by budget constraints necessarily diminish what they can accomplish.

United States Army Europe

In 2009, United States Army Europe supported European Command's essential security objectives through Building Partner Capacity by promoting the transformation of European ground forces into effective expeditionary partners through military to military engagement activities, exercises, and personnel exchanges. It was a force provider to Operation Iraqi Freedom and International Security Assistance Force, and supported both through its own organizations as well.

With over 69,000 active-duty, reserve and civilian employees operating in ten main Army communities, United States Army Europe leads and supports eleven brigades postured in geographically-separated locations throughout Central Europe, from Mons, Belgium to Livorno, Italy. United States Army Europe provides key tactical and operational forces to include full spectrum combat units and strategic enablers for European Command, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and the International Security Assistance Force. The command currently has 25% of its Soldiers operationally deployed but still continues to lead daily to build partner capacity and execute Theater Security Cooperation in support of USEUCOM's strategy of active security and global requirements. U.S. Army Europe directly participates in cooperative efforts with over 80% of the countries that have forces actively serving in partnership with the U.S. in Overseas Contingency Operations.

Activities with Allies and Partners: United States Army Europe's Joint Multinational Training Command in Germany is pivotal to the Building Partner Capacity mission. Joint Multinational Training Command builds expeditionary competencies and increased interoperability between partner nations' militaries through collective multinational training and

through certifying U.S. and coalition forces for deployments to International Security Assistance Force, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Kosovo Force missions. Additionally, Joint Multinational Training Command has qualified over 500 soldiers from 21 nations in Counter-Improvised Explosive Device training and conducted mission rehearsal exercises for International Security Assistance Force North, South, and Central Regional Commands.

United States Army Europe leads Task Force-East as a European Command vehicle for fulfillment of the Theater Security Cooperation mission requirements set forth by the Defense Department and to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to our Black Sea Allies. The Command continuously maintains Task Force-East facilities and support services, and can quickly transition the facilities to support an increased posture for all European Command components and partners. Task Force-East provides important training opportunities not only for the U.S. military, but also to new Allies close to their forces' home station. U.S. Army Europe's forward presence in Romania and Bulgaria continues to facilitate NATO efforts to build and maintain an Alliance for the 21st Century.

This year, United States Army Europe participated in 26 major exercises in 22 different countries with 34 participating nations, of which six were in direct support to U.S. Africa Command. These exercises enabled United States Army Europe to meet European Command's priority of sustaining the relevance of, and U.S. leadership within, NATO; assisting NATO countries with the capability to conduct out-of-area operations and ensuring a successful transition of U.S. Africa Command into a fully operational combatant command. United States Army Europe also acted as the lead organization in AUSTERE CHALLENGE 09, a comprehensive command post exercise involving over 3,400 European Command forces, which certified European Command's Combined Joint Task Force.

United States Army Europe continues supporting Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. In 2009, over half of United States Army Europe's units trained and deployed to or returned from these operations. Currently, the 1st Armored Division Headquarters, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, and 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment are deployed in support of Overseas Contingency Operations. V Corps inactivation was delayed in order to deploy to Afghanistan, where it currently forms the core of International Security Assistance Force's 3-Star level command and control headquarters. United States Army Europe also continues contributing significant operational support and sustainment forces in support of Overseas Contingency Operations in the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command region. Additionally, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment provided rotational forces for Task Force East in Romania and Bulgaria while at the same time supporting Denmark in their train-up for NATO Response Force-14. The 172nd Brigade Combat Team and 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, which recently reflagged as the 170th Brigade Combat Team, redeployed from Iraq and are preparing for possible future rotations while completing their reset and dwell.

Activities Conducted Unilaterally: United States Army Europe continues executing its Title 10 responsibilities through transformation planning initiatives in support of modernization and efficient basing. This past year, United States Army Europe transformed into a Theater Army functional staff configuration. This restructuring will result in European Command losing one of its Full Spectrum Joint Task Force/Joint Forces Land Component Command capable headquarters. This loss, combined with significant force requirements in support of Overseas Contingency Operations outside the European Command region, makes retaining one Tactical Intermediate Headquarters and four Brigade Combat Teams critical to United States Army Europe's and European Command's mission. Without the four Brigade Combat Teams and one

tactical intermediate headquarters capability, European Command assumes risk in its capability to conduct steady-state security cooperation, shaping, and contingency missions. Deterrence and reassurance are at increased risk.

While United States Army Europe is transforming, it is also optimizing its footprint and gaining basing efficiencies by consolidating across six Main Operating Bases in Germany and Italy by 2015. In support of this initiative, this past year United States Army Europe returned eight sites to host nation control. United States Army Europe projects a decrease in 1,400 Soldiers this year as it continues to consolidate forces.

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe

In 2009, Marine Forces Europe focused on individual training programs, building partner capacity through combined activities utilizing expeditionary forces to contribute to conventional deterrence, and supporting operations in Afghanistan.

With only a small service component headquarters, Marine Forces Europe very effectively leverages the capabilities of the Marine Corps in support of European Command objectives. Marine Forces Europe's engagement in the region follows three lines of operation: (1) building partner capacity, particularly through combined exercises; (2) utilizing expeditionary forces to contribute to conventional deterrence; and (3) supporting operations in Afghanistan. The primary focus of Marine Forces Europe Theater Security Cooperation activities is defense sector reform and professionalization of partner nations' militaries in the Caucasus. The primary focus of Marine Forces Europe Theater Security Cooperation activities is defense sector reform and professionalization of partner nations' militaries in the Caucasus.

Collective Training Programs:

Engagements in Task Force East, Bulgaria and Volos, Greece: Marine Forces Europe, in coordination with U.S. Naval Forces Europe, employed over 2,000 Marines and Sailors of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit between May and June 2009 on a scale not seen since OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.

Maritime Prepositioning Force exercise, LOYAL MIDAS: LOYAL MIDAS improved prepositioning equipment in support of expeditionary operations; a core competency. LOYAL MIDAS experimented with procedures for tracking offloaded cargo from a prepositioning ship using new wireless technologies, and significantly improved European Command's ability to rapidly deploy and assemble expeditionary forces in the region.

Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway: Using this program, the Marine Corps worked with the Norwegian Defense Staff and Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, and the European Command staff to develop a plan that enhances access to prepositioned equipment ashore. Participants analyzed joint U.S.-Norwegian agreements, and initiated a long-range plan for instituting an operating concept for the prepositioning facility.

Georgia Deployment Program – International Security Assistance Force: This program supports the sustained deployment of a Georgian infantry battalion to Afghanistan to operate as part of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade for two years. The initial deployment occurs this coming spring.

Coalition Embarkation Support: Personnel from the Marine Forces Europe Strategic Mobility section used this European Command-led International Security Assistance Force effort to familiarize partner nations with U.S. embarkation procedures. Partner nation self-deployment to Afghanistan or other regional contingencies is the overall goal of the program.

Marine Forces Europe is planning for a company-sized rotational force to deploy to Task Force East this summer. This force, which is a proof of concept for the Marine Corps' Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force, plans to accomplish in only 90 days what previously required a full year of Theater Security Cooperation activity by forward-deploying and utilizing the forward operating site in Romania.

Force Posture: Despite these successes, the lack of a sustained Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit in the European Command region curtails engagement opportunity with Allies and partners and detracts from active deterrence. Resuming a sustained presence in the European Command region would deter adversaries and assure Allies and partners of our commitment to stability in Europe.

United States Naval Forces Europe

In 2009, United States Naval Forces Europe conducted numerous activities to build partnership capacity, improve ballistic missile defense, strengthen anti-submarine warfare capability, respond to piracy, and assist with explosive ordnance disposal on land.

With more than 8,000 active-duty, reserve, and civilian employees operating from five main installations supporting rotational surface, air, submarine and expeditionary forces, United States Naval Forces Europe conducts the full range of maritime operations and Theater Security Cooperation in concert with coalition, joint, interagency and other partners to advance security and stability in Europe. NAVFLEX continues to strengthen relationships with enduring Allies and emerging partners while maintaining naval leadership and combat readiness. United States Naval Forces Europe leverages its maritime expertise to support and improve regional maritime

safety and security. Through ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, expeditionary force engagement, a continuing surface presence, and other activities, United States Naval Forces Europe enhanced maritime safety, security and cooperation throughout the European Command region in 2009.

Theater Security Cooperation and other Activities with Allies and Partners: Through military-to-military activities demonstrating our naval commitment, United States Naval Forces Europe promotes maritime domain awareness, maritime security operations, security assistance, NATO interoperability, and information sharing.

Taken together, United States Naval Forces Europe's anti-submarine warfare program, Ballistic Missile Defense initiatives, and partner capacity building efforts are improving maritime stability and ensuring U.S. and partner access to the maritime domain. Theater Security Cooperation highlights include:

Afloat Ballistic Missile Defense: A survivable sea-based ballistic missile defense system is an important component of the phased adaptive approach to defend the Homeland, as well as Allies and partners in Europe and Eurasia. United States Naval Forces Europe is developing the necessary ballistic missile defense command and control architecture while mitigating vulnerabilities to the sea-based ballistic missile defense network with air and undersea capabilities. A United States Naval Forces Europe Flag Officer commanded JUNIPER COBRA 2010, a joint missile defense exercise with Israel, incorporating all aspects of both land and sea-based missile defense and stands as a hallmark of the future of our ballistic missile defense program.

Enhanced Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare Capability: In partnership with our Allies, United States Naval Forces Europe continues upgrading procedures, training and qualifications to enhance theater anti-submarine warfare capability through Commander, Task Force 69.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal: Naval Forces Europe's Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit Eight provides extensive military-to-military training programs with the partner nations' expeditionary forces and provides explosive ordnance disposal support to International Security Assistance Force contributors. In addition to supporting U.S. and NATO exercises throughout the region, the unit provided real-world explosive ordnance disposal to several European nations.

Response to Piracy: Maritime Expeditionary Security Detachment provides shipboard security teams to U.S. military support vessels, participates in exercises and contributes to theater security cooperation engagements.

Construction Support: Naval Construction Forces (Seabees) completed a diverse array of construction projects emphasizing humanitarian civil assistance and military-to-military engagements as well as construction support to exercises BALTIC OPERATIONS, MEDICAL TRAINING EXERCISE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, SEABREEZE and JACKAL STONE. The Seabees completed construction of operation centers, training infrastructure, and quality of life projects, including a Military Operation Urban Terrain facility used for Close Quarters Combat training in Zadar, Croatia and renovation of the Padarevo Kindergarten facility in Padarevo, Bulgaria.

Maritime Domain Awareness: U.S. NAVAL Forces Europe -Sixth Fleet continues actively developing and validating advanced maritime domain awareness procedures. Several maritime domain awareness exercises, including AUTUMN BLITZ 2009, were conducted with

NATO's Maritime Component Command-Naples to advance the interoperability and information processing necessary for effective planning and conduct of maritime operations, such as NATO's Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, between NATO and U.S. commands.

Eurasia Partnership Capstone: In 2009, United States Naval Forces Europe's primary Black Sea-Eurasia region engagement vehicle took place at Souda Bay, Crete. Personnel from 11 nations participated.

Port Visits: Ship visits demonstrate United States Naval Forces Europe's commitment to improving maritime safety and security and strengthen partner relationships through training activities with host nation militaries. For example, following JOINT WARRIOR 2009, the three participating U.S. ships conducted Theater Security Cooperation port visits in six countries.

Exercises with Allies and Partners: United States Naval Forces Europe participated in 19 exercises with 25 Allies and partners covering the full range of maritime activity. Highlights include:

Exercise BALTIC OPERATIONS 2009: United States Naval Forces Europe -Sixth Fleet sponsored and executed the 37th annual BALTIC OPERATIONS with 43 ships from 12 participating nations. This European Command-directed multinational exercise enhanced maritime safety and security in the Baltic Sea by increasing interoperability and cooperation among regional Allies.

PHOENIX EXPRESS 2009: Members of the United States Naval Forces Europe -Sixth Fleet Staff, USS MOUNT WHITNEY and USS ROBERT G. BRADLEY along with several European and North African navies conducted the two-week Exercise PHOENIX EXPRESS 2009, leveraging the capability of European and African partnerships in order to enhance stability in the Mediterranean region through increased interoperability and cooperation.

Exercise FRUKUS 2009: United States Naval Forces Europe -Sixth Fleet staff and USS KLAKRING participated in Exercise FRUKUS 2009 (France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States). This confidence-building exercise focused on resuming the maritime partnership between NATO's major Navies and the Russian Federation Navy.

RELIANT MERMAID 2009: USS STOUT and members of the United States Naval Forces Europe -Sixth Fleet staff participated in the tri-lateral maritime search and rescue exercise RELIANT MERMAID 2009 with maritime forces from Turkey and Israel. This annual exercise contributed to overall joint readiness in response to possible humanitarian assistance efforts or maritime search and rescue operations in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and helped improve engagement between Turkey and Israel, key U.S. allies and partners in the region.

Way ahead: Our efforts will remain focused on the Black Sea-Eurasia and eastern Mediterranean regions and follow European Command Country Campaign Plans. United States Naval Forces Europe is also embarking on an effort to establish a Mediterranean Sea Fleet Commanders Forum to enhance interoperability among capable Allies and partners and increase efficiencies in the international military partnership realm.

UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

In 2009, United States Air Forces in Europe provided forces and capabilities that supported and participated in theater and global operations, while working daily with allies and partners to increase their aerospace capability.

With more than 42,000 active-duty, guard, reserve, and civilian employees operating from seven main installations supporting nine wings and 80 geographically separated locations, United States Air Forces, Europe is a key force provider of tactical combat air forces, tanker, and

airlift assets for European Command, Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), and the International Security Assistance Force. Crucially, it also provides a large number of forces for building partnership capacity on a daily basis, with approximately 740 annual events that promote enduring relationships and increase security within and beyond Europe.

Additionally, United States Air Forces in Europe provides full-spectrum air, space, and cyberspace capabilities promoting regional stability through focused theater engagement and supporting combat operations, humanitarian assistance, and Ballistic Missile Defense. United States Air Forces in Europe is also European Command's lead agent for personnel recovery, theater air mobility, and aeromedical evacuation. They execute the EUCOM mission with forward-based air power to provide forces for global operations, ensure strategic access, assure allies, deter aggression, and, key to our approach overall, build partnerships.

Provide Forces for Global Operations: United States Air Forces in Europe's top priority is to partner with the Joint and Combined team to win today's fight. They do this by providing expeditionary forces as well as a war-fighting headquarters that can plan, deploy, command, control and coordinate air, space and cyberspace capabilities across the full range of military operations.

Ensure Strategic Access: Forward basing of air assets and the establishment of mobility hubs in the European theater ensure strategic access for operations in Europe as well as to the US Central Command and US Africa Command regions. United States Air Forces in Europe maintains robust support for US Transportation Command's en-route locations, enabling global operations by permitting the full spectrum of passenger and cargo movement through bases

throughout Europe. In addition, the command has enhanced strategic flexibility by opening up new access points through engagement with new NATO partners.

The activation of the Strategic Airlift Consortium at Papa Air Base, Hungary exemplified this, with NATO members Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the U.S., as well as Partnership for Peace nations Finland and Sweden. The result was the creation of a 12-member Heavy Airlift Wing consisting of three C-17 Globemaster IIIs. The Strategic Airlift Consortium is a watershed event in international military cooperation.

Assure Allies and Deter Aggression: United States Air Forces in Europe continues building and sustaining a credible capability to dissuade aggressors. Its interoperability with Alliance partners through exercises and operations remains crucial for ensuring primacy of the Alliance and the US leadership role.

United States Air Forces in Europe is EUCOM's lead agent for Integrated Air and Missile Defense. It operates a Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communication suite to provide the commander with Ballistic Missile Defense situational awareness, early warning, and possible defensive counter-measures. The suite is designed to be interoperable with NATO systems in order to support the Presidential decision to employ a Phased Adaptive Approach to the Ballistic Missile Defense of Europe.

NATO remains the primary security institution in Europe. Forward US presence and interoperability with Alliance partners is crucial for ensuring primacy of the Alliance and a US leadership role. The planned basing of new systems such as Global Hawk, 5th generation fighter capabilities on schedule with our allies, and the potential for a future Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance aircraft capability in theater will provide opportunities for the US to display its

commitment and resolve, provide critical tools for engagement, and enhance Allied and partner contributions to global operations. In accordance with NATO's strategic concept, the United States Air Forces in Europe fulfills the U.S. commitment to allied extended nuclear deterrence with Dual Capable Aircraft, and personnel who ensure the custody, safety and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.

Build Partnerships: In a program with long-term benefit, United States Air Forces in Europe's efforts build partner capabilities, increase their ability to counter terrorism, protect homelands and common interests, and counter emerging threats. Their "Building Partnerships" program contributes to the building of key relationships, promoting U.S. strategic interests, providing for essential peacetime and contingency access and en-route infrastructure, and improving information exchange and intelligence sharing. Within the past twelve months, the command conducted approximately 740 building partnership events with 51 partners and Allies, including theater security cooperation events, exercises, aerial events, and military-to-military engagements. In addition to partner engagement, they actively engage, in accordance with European Command direction, to advance regional stability.

Exercises with Allies and Partners. United States Air Forces, Europe develops increased Alliance capability to support Overseas Contingency Operations through participation and leadership in 20 combined exercises and operations, including UNIFIED ENGAGEMENT, MEDICAL TRAINING EXERCISE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, COMBINED ENDEAVOR, AUSTERE CHALLENGE, JUNIPER COBRA, and the BALTIC REGION TRAINING EXERCISES, as well as the Tactical Leadership Program. Key cross-border programs include:

Baltic States Air Capability Development. United States Air Forces, Europe led a series of 4-nation symposia with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to develop the basis for establishing fundamental air combat capabilities leading to ministerial-level buy-in of a concept of operations and a long-term strategy for aviation excellence and eventual self-reliance.

Enhancing Nordic States interoperability with NATO. In 2009, United States Air Forces in Europe led and fostered efforts to enable the Swedish and Finnish Air Forces to participate in NATO and coalition air operations.

Developing capability of “near-4th generation fighter” nations. United States Air Forces, Europe placed strong emphasis on helping these partner nations transition smoothly to 4th-generation operations. To support Poland’s new force of 48 F-16s, a very successful sister-wing relationship between the 52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem AB, Germany and the Polish AF was established. It is now instrumental in spreading lessons-learned and best practices, as the Polish AF strives toward its goal of expeditionary F-16 operations. Additionally, deployments to Bulgaria and Romania fostered those countries’ efforts to adopt NATO-interoperable tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Build/Sustain Joint Terminal Attack Controllers capability. Working to increase the number of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers available to deploy to International Security Assistance Force, U.S. Air Forces in Europe trained 25 new partner nation Controllers in 2009 and estimates training 30 more in 2010. Work with Poland will provide an organic regional Air Ground Operations School training capability. Continuing training relationships with French pilots enable them to train with native English speakers prior to deploying into Afghanistan.

United States Air Forces in Europe’s forward-based forces provide the nation a three-for-one efficiency by providing forces for global operations, promoting regional stability (with

capabilities to deter aggressors and assure Allies), and building partnerships. Unfortunately, the reduction of twenty-four fighter aircraft will significantly limit the resources available for these activities. As we move forward, we must ensure that our forward-based posture is adequate to support our nation's strategic objectives.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, EUROPE

2009, Special Operations Command Europe focus:

- (1) Generating increased Special Operations Force capacity in support of overseas contingency operations
- (2) Contributing to U.S., allied, and partner nation efforts to defend against transnational threats
- (3) Preparing for unforeseen contingency operations

These initiatives directly supported U.S. objectives of building partnerships to enhance security and support global security efforts, assisting in NATO's transformation, supporting operations in Afghanistan, and countering transnational threats.

Special Operations Command, Europe, comprised of more than 1,600 active-duty, reserve, and civilian employees operating from two main locations, remains the preeminent U.S. Special Operations Force provider to the International Security Assistance Force; provides such forces for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF); contributes significantly to the development of Allied and partner special operations forces; and stands, prepared and ready, to defend against transnational threats and rapidly respond to unforeseen contingencies within the EUCOM Area of Responsibility.

Special Operations Command, Europe's capacity building efforts relies on three elements: the Partner Development Program, support to the NATO Special Operations Forces

Coordination Center—now evolving into the NATO Special Operations Headquarters—and deployments in support of NATO International Security Assistance Force operations. Special Operations Command, Europe remained heavily engaged throughout 2009, conducting 29 Joint Combined Exchange Training events, eight bilateral training activities, nine military-to-military engagements, and six counter-narcoterrorism missions in 18 countries. Along with these activities, the Command conducted numerous staff and key leader engagements. These events focused on developing more capable and professional American and Allied Special Operations Forces, while building the relationships required to increase the support and commitment of European political and military leadership.

Activities and Exercises with Allies and Partners:

Partner Development Program: Partner Development Program allows Special Operations Command, Europe to link disparate programs and training venues to build partner Special Operations Forces capacity. It focuses on those Allies and partners that demonstrate willingness to deploy Special Operations Forces in support of NATO operations in Afghanistan and the capability over time to sustain their increased Special Operations Forces capacity. Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Lithuania are a few of the countries that have participated in this program and have deployed Special Operations Forces for the benefit of the Alliance.

The Command's exercise program exemplifies Partner Development Program's utility. The annual Special Operations Command, Europe capstone exercise, JACKAL STONE 2009, brought together approximately 1,500 Special Operations Forces service members from 10 countries—nine out of ten currently contribute Special Operations Forces to International Security Assistance Force operations, or have indicated a willingness to do so in the future.

Special Operations Command, Europe Support to the NATO Special Operations

Headquarters. The second critical element of American Special Operations Forces capacity building objectives in Europe is Special Operations Command, Europe support to the NATO Special Operations Headquarters. The NATO Special Operations Headquarters, now being established from the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Center, is already making significant contributions to Special Operations Command, Europe and Allied efforts by developing common NATO Special Operations Forces standards and encouraging allied integration.

Special Operations Command, Europe Support to International Security Assistance

Force. Since 2007, Special Operations Command, Europe has maintained a Special Operations Task Group (one U.S. Special Operations Company and associated staff officers) under NATO command in Afghanistan, separate from Operation Enduring Freedom. Special Operations Command, Europe deployments to International Security Assistance Force also showcase “best practices” to our Special Operations Forces partners and encourage equally capable Special Operations Forces Allies to mentor other developing partners.

As a direct result of Partner Development Program and NATO Special Operations Headquarters initiatives, European national Special Operations Forces contributions to International Security Assistance Force have steadily increased providing strategic relief for already committed U.S. and allied Special Operations Forces. Special Operations Command, Europe, through European Command, Special Operations Command, and the Department of Defense, continues to work with the Department of State and Congress to develop the mechanisms necessary to advance to the next stage of partnership cooperation.

Defense Against Transnational Threats. Special Operations Command, Europe contributes to American, Allied, and partner nation efforts to defend against transnational threats through sharing information, building capacity, reinforcing strategic communications messages, and, if required, conducting or supporting kinetic special operations. For example, throughout 2009, Special Operations Command, Europe sponsored a weekly video teleconference, allowing Department of Defense and other government agencies from around the globe to share intelligence and evidentiary information that closed intergovernmental and international seams and synergized law enforcement and military operations against complex non-state global networks.

Preparation for Contingency Operations. Though the European continent is relatively stable, it has numerous potential flashpoints from the Balkans to the Caucasus. In 2010, the Command plans to increase regional security through 36 different engagement events with 30 countries. The Partner Development Program will begin to focus on filling collective rotary wing aviation gaps, combining efforts with Department of State to take a lead role in the development of interoperable Special Operations Forces aviation capacity.

Challenges

Afghanistan: Of the 43 nations contributing forces to the International Security Assistance Force besides the U.S., 80% of them (36 nations) come from the European Theater and those 36 nations represent approximately 42% of the Coalition's personnel. Many nations are making particularly large contributions of forces and have suffered high casualty rates relative to their populations. Our partners understand the importance of this mission and they are willing to send their sons and daughters in harm's way alongside our own to bring peace,

security, and prosperity to the people of Afghanistan. Many of these nations wish to contribute more capability and other nations have the will to join the International Security Assistance Force but lack the capacity to do so. Within the European Theater itself, European Command's primary focus is to lend whatever support it can to these other nations as they seek to contribute to security and stability efforts in Afghanistan. Within the framework of contributing to international efforts in Afghanistan, and within the boundaries and authorities set by law and regulation and by international agreements, this support involves providing training, equipment, logistical assistance, and personnel augmentation to nations that desire to contribute to the International Security Assistance Force.

Terrorism in Europe: Our role in the fight against trans-national terrorism in the region is primarily one of engagement and intelligence sharing. Terrorist networks use Europe principally to recruit fighters, garner financial and logistic support, and provide sanctuary. They cooperate closely with criminal networks and engage in numerous illegal activities as fund raising mechanisms. Well-established and commendable European civil liberties and the loosening of border controls provide opportunities for terrorist support and logistic activities. Nonetheless, Europe is not immune to Al-Qaida affiliated terror attacks or the threat of them. Al-Qaida has consistently and recently stated a desire to strike directly against our European Allies. The reverse flow of foreign fighters out of Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with the bona fides and experience these fighters will have gained there may increase the terror threat in Europe in the future.

The possibility of a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction adds another dimension. Al-Qaida has consistently striven to incorporate weapons of mass destruction into their attacks and the majority of the world's nuclear weapons are within the European

Command's area of responsibility. The security of these weapons and weapons material is a significant aspect of European Command's efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction.

The biggest impact we can have on terror networks in Europe is through enabling and partnering with our friends and Allies. A good example of this is our intelligence sharing with Turkey regarding Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorists. In addition to partnering with other nations in Europe, we are also closely partnering with other arms of the U.S. government, where appropriate, to ensure all the levers of our national power are applied against these networks in a coordinated fashion.

Potential Regional Conflicts: In spite of European integration, European Command continues to face an environment in fluid transition, and we are coping with the insecurity associated with 21st century challenges and unsolved 20th century security problems. The outbreak of conflict between Georgia and Russia served as a reminder that war has not disappeared from the European Command Theater.

Secessionist pressures, unresolved or suspended conflicts, and ethnic and religious tensions make European Command's Black Sea and Eurasia regions the most conflict-plagued area along the Euro-Atlantic perimeter. Russia's North Caucasus remains an area of persistent conflict. Armenia and Azerbaijan are at a stalemate over Nagorno-Karabakh. The South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia are a continuing source of tension between Georgia and Russia, the more so given the Russian military presence in those regions and Russian recognition of their independence from Georgia. Little progress has been made toward a settlement of the Transnistrian conflict, which divides Moldova and hinders solely needed economic development. Conflict persists between Israel and Palestinian groups. The sources, complexities, and

significant tertiary effects of these regional conflicts require an integrated interagency approach in concert with our European partners and security organizations.

Russia: The complexities of managing a military-to-military relationship with Russia are high. On one hand, there are many areas of potential cooperation and partnership, including Afghanistan, arms control, counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, counter-narcotics, and eventually missile defense. On the other hand, many of our allies and friends in the region remain concerned about Russian actions, including the conflict with Georgia in the summer of 2008, exercises on their borders like the Zapad series in 2009, and Russia's continuing suspension of implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

Working with Russia is about balance and seeking to find the potential for cooperation, while maintaining an honest and open dialogue about all aspects of our relationship, including where we disagree. While a great deal of engagement with Russia is handled either by State Department in the diplomatic realm or directly by the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense, we at European Command are ready to pursue military-to-military communication, engagement, and even training and operations with Russia where and when appropriate.

Energy Security: A massive amount of energy is produced in or transits through European Command's region. Russia, Azerbaijan, Norway, and other countries produce large amounts of hydrocarbons. Approximately 3 million barrels of oil transit the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles each day.

European Command is and must be a major participant in the interagency efforts to ensure the security of energy flows to, from, and through our region. The Command already has several interagency representatives on staff to better synchronize our efforts. We are already working to promote integrated planning and exercises and build up the capabilities of our

European partners through technical assistance, the Partnership for Peace program, and other train and equip efforts. The Command is also collaborating with other U.S. government partners and like-minded NATO allies to develop a framework to develop common solutions for major energy security issues. Finally, we view Russia as a key partner in these efforts and will work with Moscow in areas of common interest. However, where our interests do not intersect, we will work with other European partners to develop solutions for all of Europe.

The Arctic: Changes in the Arctic create both challenges and opportunities. Climate changes may result in open shipping routes, which link Asia to Europe, cutting the distance on these routes by up to 40 percent and transit time by 10 days.

The Arctic is emerging as a complex but potentially productive region for oil, gas and new industrial activity. Unresolved issues will become more pressing as economic activities expand. For example, there are eight bilateral boundary issues involving all states in the region, and the northernmost extension of the continental shelves in the Arctic is unresolved.


States, particularly the traditional great powers, will play a key role in determining patterns of cooperation and tension within the Arctic. Russia's activities in the Arctic include producing and modernizing icebreakers, resuming submarine and long-range aviation patrols, stationing more researchers throughout the region, and asserting extensive territorial claims. Russia's latest Arctic policy paper states that the Arctic must become Russia's top strategic resource base by 2020. It further states that they must complete geological studies to prove their claim to Arctic resources and create a new group of forces to ensure military security under various political-military circumstances.

As the Arctic emerges as a region of economic significance and we develop our relationship with Russia, there may be opportunities for increased military activities with Russia

to directly support U.S. policy initiatives. We see the Arctic as not an area of confrontational challenges but one of shared opportunities for cooperation and partnership that will benefit all states of the region. Early investment in an open and meaningful interagency dialog with Russia in the very near future, could avoid potential conflict in the more distant future.

Force Posture: The interrelationship of U.S. forces, their footprint, and our relationships with other nations, is key to achieving national objectives in the European Command Theater.


The presence of U.S. forces – air, land, and sea – in Europe fosters relationships and deepens partnerships in multiple ways, including the shared use of training facilities and other building partner capacity and international military partnering events.



The nations within the European Command region are of significant importance to U.S. global strategic interests as evidenced by the overwhelming number of ISAF troop contributing nations from the EUCOM AOR. Our ability to develop coalitions and the capabilities of European coalition partners are central to advancing our national security priorities. Building partnerships and building partnership capacity is therefore job number one for European Command.

The forces stationed in Europe today are a key element of America’s strength and they promote our values, protect our interests, and are tangible reminders to friends and foes alike of

our dedicated commitment to a strong trans-Atlantic relationship based on cooperation and adherence to fundamental ideals. As the post-Cold War security environment changed, the size of our forces required to maintain our leadership role also changed. The number of U.S.



personnel in Europe has gone from 300,000 during the Cold War to less than 80,000 today. European Command forces assure our Allies and deter and dissuade our adversaries, and are the most visible indication of the ongoing U.S. commitment to the NATO Alliance.

European Command's footprint is pivotal to U.S. global operations. Sites and installations in Europe provide superb power projection facilities for the support of coalition operations and overseas contingency operations. Installations in the European Command region coupled with long-standing and emerging relationships contribute to assured access and strategic reach to and from Europe.

Force posture initiatives for European Command support building the capability and capacity of partner nations in Europe, increased expeditionary capability from Europe, and achieve basing efficiencies. Our posture initiatives support two major categories: operational capability development and improvements for basing efficiencies in sustainment and Quality of Life. Operational capability development initiatives include assessments for stationing of forces anticipated to deploy to the European theater and a new prepositioning strategy that transforms

portions of European Command prepositioning equipment to support soft power employment for missions such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response.

Other force posture initiatives focus on achieving basing efficiencies through coordinated review of infrastructure capacity as well as supporting service component efforts to optimize resources supporting of European Command forces. Sustainment initiatives include the continuous review of Quality of Life requirements such as education and housing services for European Command personnel and their families.

European Command has aligned its posture planning processes to support the Department's efforts in addressing global force posture. The European Command staff coordinates strategic assessment, implementation feasibility, and theater prioritization of force posture issues through a posture forum that maximizes outreach and integration in posture development among Combatant Commands, our European Command Service Component Commands, and our interagency partners. Our posture planning necessarily involves coordination across the whole of government, as we integrate Defense Department posture overseas with State Department representatives and ultimately our relationships with European hosts.

Opportunities

Many of our challenges also present opportunities for international military partnering that bring benefit to today's issues such as Afghanistan but also for those that we will face tomorrow.

Afghanistan. Supporting the International Security Assistance Force has given European Command the opportunity to deepen its relationship with our Allies and partners using our

expertise and experience to inculcate an expeditionary mindset and train deploying partnered-country forces in irregular warfare. The contributions and sacrifice of Eurasian and European nations in Afghanistan have demonstrated the credibility, legitimacy, and effectiveness of international military cooperation. The scale of Allied and partner force contributions to the International Security Assistance Force has allowed the hand-over of significant responsibility for regional operations to coalition partners. NATO's Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams program directly supports the development of the Afghanistan National Army and the Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams program supports the expansion of the Afghan National Police. Under these programs, European Allies and partners are currently providing approximately 50% of the number of teams required to train Afghanistan's security forces. Right now, U.S. Forces assigned to European Command are deployed to Afghanistan and make vital contributions on a daily basis. However, within the European theater itself, European Command's primary focus is to lend whatever support it can to other nations as they seek to contribute to the security and stability efforts in Afghanistan.

Engagement with Russia. In 2009, European Command authored a framework document to resume military-to-military cooperation with Russia in an equal, pragmatic, transparent, and mutually beneficial manner. This framework not only addresses crisis response operations, but also seeks to promote interaction and ensure mutual support in conducting counter-terrorism and counter-piracy operations; peacekeeping; missile, space, and ballistic missile-defense; as well as search and rescue. This framework document was signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Russian Chief of Defense during the July 2009 Presidential Summit in Moscow. This framework begins to rebuild a structure for our bilateral defense relationship with Russia that allows wide-ranging and candid engagement on all issues of concern.

In rebuilding the bilateral relationship with Russia, however, European Command will work with NATO and partners to develop an integrated and inclusive security cooperation architecture beneficial to all participants that does not come at the expense of Allies and partners.

European Missile Defense. European Command looks forward to operationalizing the recently announced Phased Adaptive Approach, a complete revision of how the U.S. manages ballistic missile defense of Europe. The phased implementation of the proposed network of sensors, interceptors and associated Command and Control structures will provide a regional capability that is flexible, scalable, and responsive. The architecture aims to provide the right level of capability, at the right time, in the right location based on the emerging threat. The new approach provides increased opportunity for interagency and international military partnering. European Command is actively cooperating with the Department of State, Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, and others as the United States builds the plan for international engagement in the region. The capabilities delivered with the new phased, adaptive approach will serve as a catalyst to develop a cooperative solution with our allies and partners in the region.

Balkans: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo: Today, almost 15 years after the Dayton Peace Accords and 10 years after the NATO military campaign to end atrocities in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo still evince the problems present throughout this volatile region: endemic corruption, organized crime, deep-rooted ethnic divisions, decrepit infrastructures, and weak economies with little foreign direct investment. Such an environment invites organized criminals and limits the capabilities of governments to effectively provide essential services. Despite these challenges, the United States remains committed to bringing lasting stability to the Balkans, and we have been making steady progress in the region, as

exemplified by the April 2009 admission of Croatia and Albania into NATO and recent democratic elections in Kosovo.

In this region, European Command focuses on enhancing transatlantic security through 1) defense modernization and reform efforts; 2) defense institution building activities to improve the organic capacity of countries to recruit, train, and sustain their own military forces; 3) humanitarian assistance operations; and 4) demilitarization of unexploded ordnance to eliminate the threat to lives, property, and government stability.

Significant political and cultural divisions remain in both Bosnia and Kosovo. In Bosnia, uncompromising, ethnic-based rhetoric continues to stall reform efforts. While the “Butmir Talks” last fall were a step in the right direction, Bosnia will need to progress politically toward stability. Although many problems in Kosovo are simply growing pains of a new state, the institutions in Kosovo face stark challenges to strengthen weak government institutions, combat corruption and illicit trafficking, and improve provision of essential services. Most of our military-to-military engagement is at a basic level, such as training the Kosovo Security Force and the provision of personal equipment like boots and uniforms. The programmed reduction of NATO and European Union forces in the Balkans may induce additional risk and requires continued monitoring to guard against others in the region from exploiting weaknesses.

Despite these challenges, there are solid prospects for success given that we are prepared to devote the necessary attention and resources to the region. Bosnia and Kosovo, like their Balkan neighbors, generally hold the United States in high regard. To be effective, we must continue to coordinate our efforts with our European Allies and partners. We must expand our efforts to persuade NATO and European Union partners to persevere in these efforts.

Maintaining stability at the southeastern corner of Europe remains an important transatlantic interest.

Cyberspace. Cyberspace enables and supports all of the efforts, challenges, and opportunities above. The cyberspace domain and the ability to operate freely in Cyberspace are of great importance to European Command. The 21st Century and many events of the 20th Century will be defined or re-defined by the development, movement, and consumption of information in a holistic and collaborative environment. Our ability to freely operate and shape that environment has significant implications on both our leadership and partnerships in Europe.

European Command is already building that advantage and defining that success. Access to reliable cyberspace has become imperative to our national security, economics, and way of life. We must gain greater visibility of disruptive activities, determine how and to what extent these actions increase the risk to security and stability, and build the ability to maintain freedom of maneuver in the cyber domain for ourselves, our friends, and the voices of truth. We have established a Network Warfare Center to provide a fused cyber operations, intelligence and defense capability. We have also reached out to NATO and other partners to establish cyber information sharing agreements. These agreements provide great value by enhancing awareness, building common understanding and developing operational trust. Finally, European Command continues to see the need for continued investment and development of both Joint and Multi-National cyber capabilities. These capabilities must be integrated, layered, responsive, and assured. U.S. European Command sees great promise in the continued development and use of cyberspace in Europe both as a mission enabler and as a common interest area with European allies and partners.

Innovation Cell. Because innovation is so important to maintaining effectiveness, we have established a small, dedicated innovation cell. In the first six months, this team closed a gap in US-foreign partner security cooperation. As a result, it uncovered an interesting human detection technology in the Slovak Republic, accelerated a project with the French Armaments Agency to put a wireless internet router in space, and connected over a dozen different organizations together to demonstrate innovative ways to build partner nation and public-private partnerships to counter piracy.

Building Partner Capacity Center. Building Partner Capacity is at the heart of EUCOM's mission and the key to strengthening stability in our region and the regions to which we project military forces. It requires, however, complex and astute interactions with our Allies and partners, and the application of lessons learned in many different regions. For those reasons, we are investigating the establishment of a Building Partner Capacity Center that will bring together subject matter experts in a way that makes their knowledge accessible to all and facilitates an in-depth examination of the issues.

Counter Narcotics Task Force. In another very critical area, EUCOM and its naval component have conducted a full mission analysis for a Counter Narcotics Task Force and have begun establishing one. United States Naval Forces Europe is initially staffing the Task Force from its intelligence directorate. The Task Force has initiated preliminary outreach to the Maritime Analysis and Operations Center-Narcotics in Lisbon and with the Center for Combating Smuggling in the Mediterranean (CeCLAD) in Toulon. To accelerate establishment, Naval Forces Europe will resource the task force with its own personnel and funding and has set aside additional funding for FY10 as start-up money.

Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction: In the last decade, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, and Ukraine have experienced accidental explosions of their aging conventional munitions, destroying infrastructure and causing military and civilian casualties. The amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO), excess, and unstable munitions in our theater is great and of serious concern. We are working with the Department of State, the federal lead for weapons removal and abatement, to enhance their recent stockpile reduction initiative and address with a greater sense of urgency these stockpiles that are aging, destabilizing, and exploding unintentionally. Together we want to preclude another incident that would threaten lives and decrease stability.

Taking Care of EUROPEAN COMMAND Personnel

Quality of Life: European Command is committed to support and maintain a quality of life for our assigned personnel commensurate to the nation we serve and defend. We also recognize that forward deployed forces are better able to focus on the mission when their families are properly cared for through quality living quarters, educational opportunities for their children, and medical care.

Deployment, Behavioral Health and Compassion Fatigue Support: Protracted combat operations, multiple deployments, insufficient dwell time and casualties have critically increased the immediate and future demand for Behavioral Health Specialists for our service members and their families. Multiple studies, for example the Department of Defense Mental Health Task Force, have identified the need for increased behavioral health support to military and family

members. Component commanders have identified the need for additional behavioral health providers and technicians for European Command military and family members.

As we continue to maintain mission readiness, our warriors and families require access to these vital programs and services without stovepipes in a stigma-free environment. A 360-degree review of programs and the connection between at-risk indicators and catalysts is needed to eliminate gaps in support. The goal is alignment of focused care-giver teams with corresponding indicator data systems to ensure the health of our force and family.

European Command community caregivers providing warfighter and family support continue to show signs of stress, burnout and compassion fatigue. European Command, with funding from European Regional Medical Command, contracted to develop and deliver a comprehensive compassion fatigue program titled Providing Outreach While Enhancing Readiness – Caring for the Caregiver, which focuses on providing caregivers with tools and strategies to prevent the risk of burnout, stress and compassion fatigue.

Dependent Education: The quality of the President's school system, managed by the Department of Defense Education Activity, is a major contributor to the Quality of Life of European Command members. European Command's system is a benchmark for other school systems and we need your continued support and funding to ensure we maintain high educational standards.

We continue to work collaboratively with the Department of Defense Education Activity to ensure funding for programs such as The Virtual School for our approximately 2,000 students in the European Command region located in areas with no school. Because funding for educational support in remote areas has not kept pace with new mission requirements, we need your support for this leading edge educational system for our youth. We are now just beginning

to see the effect of nearly \$100M to replace our schools, many of which are 1950s barracks. We must continue funding this endeavor in future years.

We look forward to sustaining the recent accomplishments in Quality of Life and base infrastructure. Taking care of people enhances readiness. In the short term, this includes ensuring the capability of the community support base to deploy Service members and support their families. In the long term, it enables the military services to attract and retain the high quality force our mission demands.

European Command Infrastructure and Logistics

As a large organization with responsibilities spanning Europe, European Command has major infrastructure and logistics responsibilities.

Theater Infrastructure: At enduring locations, we must continue to sustain and recapitalize our infrastructure through responsible use of both the Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization program and the Military Construction program. At non-enduring locations, we must optimize use of all available resources to ensure these installations remain fully mission effective until the installations are removed from the inventory.

Thanks to strong Congressional support, previous annual Military Construction authorizations and appropriations have enabled European Command to address a balanced mix of our most pressing mission, mission support, quality of life, and housing requirements. The Kaiserslautern Military Community Housing project is nearing completion and is one of several showcase examples of the impact that Military Construction program support has for our community. Continued support of these investments will enable us to eliminate inadequate housing and this will pay dividends as we divest non-enduring bases and consolidate our forces into more efficient communities. European Command's future requirements will appear in our

Theater Posture Plan and military construction requests.

Strategic Mobility and Maneuver. Because facilities and forces must be effectively linked, dependable and available sealift, strategic and tactical airlift, and ground transportation systems are essential elements of European Command's strategy. The fielding of the Joint High Speed Vessel and its assignment to the region will significantly enhance our capability to deploy and transport forces along sea lines of communication. The ability of the Joint High Speed Vessel rapidly to transport large volumes of material will provide a critical engagement platform to support Military Partnership activities and improve our ability to respond to potential contingencies such as non-combatant evacuation operations.

European Command's fleet of C-130s is currently undergoing an important upgrade from 17 older C-130E aircraft to 14 new, more capable C-130Js. The payload, capacity, and range constraints of even these aircraft limit European Command's ability rapidly to deliver forces or materiel across our theater.

Strategic airlift is also an important force enabled in the region. We applaud the stand-up of the Strategic Airlift Consortium - Heavy Airlift Wing that commenced operations July of 2009 at Papa Air Base, Hungary. The wing operates three C-17 aircraft, shared by a consortium of ten NATO and two Partnership for Peace nations, and is the product of a groundbreaking building partner capacity initiative that provides European Command with access to robust theater-based strategic lift capability. European Command will continue to pursue increased organic lift capability to enable the full range of engagement and contingency activities.

European Command's principal contribution to global logistics throughput in support of ongoing operations is to the Central Command region. For example, lines of communication and

distribution routing for logistics support through the European region should be able to support all of the International Security Assistance Force logistics requirements in the event other routes are unable to maintain the required capacity. European Command continually coordinates logistics planning with Transportation Command and the Defense Logistics Agency as well as Central Command to ensure global air, sea and land lines of communication are identified and maintained to support global operations.

Pre-Positioned Equipment: Pre-positioned equipment reduces demands on the transportation system and appreciably shortens crisis response time by providing a scalable capability and enabling the assembly of deploying forces with equipment already staged in the European Command's region. Continued support of the Services' Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel programs also demonstrates commitment through presence and preserves a broad spectrum of response options, from that of traditional crisis response through support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. As we transition to a more expeditionary posture, there is a heightened need for Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel equipment configured to support both kinetic and non-kinetic operations, positioned in strategically flexible locations, and enablers such as the Joint High Speed Vessel. Exercising prepositioned stocks also builds military partner capacity with Allies and provides ready assets for units arriving in theater for training/engagement and security cooperation missions.

All four Services maintain Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel in the European Command's region, either on land or afloat. United States Air Forces, Europe maintains Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel at main operating bases within the theater, with centrally managed storage sites in Norway and Luxembourg. U.S. Marine Forces Europe maintains Marine Corps Pre-positioning Program-Norway and assets afloat in the Mediterranean via

Maritime Pre-positioned Force ships. United States Army Europe maintains propositioned stocks via the Department of the Army's Heavy Brigade Combat Team pre-positioned set at Camp Darby near Livorno, Italy.

Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel currently requires upgrade. Over two-thirds of the Marine Corps's Pre-positioning Program-Norway stocks were withdrawn in direct support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Army preposition stocks at Camp Darby have also been reduced to support these operations as well as the International Security Assistance Force. We do not expect this equipment to reset until at least 2015.

European Command is actively involved in Defense Department-led studies examining the global disposition of Pre-positioned War Reserve Materiel and is working to ensure that these studies incorporate our strategic direction and operational requirements.

NATO/SHAPE

"NATO continues to be the essential transatlantic forum for security consultations among Allies. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and collective defense, based on the indivisibility of Allied security, are, and will remain, the cornerstone of our Alliance."

-- Declaration on Alliance Security, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / Kehl on 4 April 2009

NATO has been the anchor of Trans-Atlantic security for more than 60 years ensuring the security of its members, enhancing peace and stability throughout Europe, and countering threats across the globe. It is inescapable in any alliance that differences will emerge, consensus becomes difficult, and perpetual challenge makes members weary; thus making NATO's success that much more impressive, though not surprising. The Alliance endures because the principles it defends are timeless and the determination to safeguard freedom is boundless.

In the relative comfort of this success, set against an extraordinary amount of post-Cold War challenges, it would be tempting to address European security as a less pressing matter. U.S. commitment, distinguished by force levels in Europe and leadership positions throughout the NATO command structure, will remain a critical piece in Trans-Atlantic security in the 21st century.

“...NATO’s most important days and most significant contributions
still lie ahead...”

- Gen James Jones, 2006

The NATO Secretary General began a multi-faceted review of NATO’s Strategic Concept with an eye to the future—the results of which will ensure NATO continues being relevant and responsive to future security needs and clearly acknowledges that its most significant contributions still lie ahead. Thanks to the efforts of former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the 12-member Group of Experts, who at the request of the Secretary General are leading an exercise of reflection and consultation among Allies, partner nations, NGOs and others interested in the future of NATO, careful examination of threat perceptions, future challenges to our security, and NATO’s role in meeting them is underway.

Whatever the Alliance’s level of ambition, we need to align policy and resourcing in the same timeframe. NATO does not maintain a permanent set of forces; as such, our ability to carry out operations is defined by the armed forces the member nations develop and maintain. Regardless of the willingness of members to contribute, the burden of deployed operations is, and will be, borne by those nations whose armed forces are structured for expeditionary warfare.

NATO needs to be capable of making decisions that may defuse a crisis. There are an infinite number of challenges we may face in the next decade and we must be ready to respond

with appropriate capability across the full spectrum. This does not mean we should be looking first for military solutions; instead, we will require creative work, unparalleled cooperation and active partnerships. Whatever the final solutions, there is no substitute for clear objectives and an honest commitment to achieve them.

“The alliance is part of a broader system working on problems of peace, justice, development and humanitarian response. Accordingly, we should draw a distinction between what NATO must do and what others can do – and between situations where the alliance must act on its own and where a team approach is preferable.”

- Madeleine K. Albright at the 1st seminar on NATO's Strategic Concept

Comprehensive Approach. Since the Riga Summit in 2006, NATO has become increasingly committed to implementing a Comprehensive Approach towards crisis management. The mission in Afghanistan, in particular, has emphasised the necessity to align security, governance and development activities to achieve holistic benefit. Governance, development and security are inextricably linked and cannot succeed without complementing each other through the collaboration between military and civilian agencies and organisations. However, while the aspiration for a Comprehensive Approach is noteworthy and the principle agreed universally, it is somewhat more difficult to realize.

The principle of cooperation is universally accepted, however, without enlightened and firm leadership, will not be realized and optimal progress enjoyed. As the most accepted and legitimate organization, the United Nations must be encouraged to take a greater and more robust lead in a truly Comprehensive Approach. While there is cooperation on the ground between NATO, Security, Governance and Development organizations and agencies at national, regional

and global levels, senior United Nations leadership must act with determined resolve. I would encourage our government to advocate for a High Commissioner who is willing to embrace the leadership necessary to see this critical mission through.

NATO-EU Relations. The European Union is another potential partner for NATO in its Comprehensive Approach. However, differences¹ continue to hamper greater collaboration. There is a genuine need to enhance NATO-EU cooperation, whether within or beyond the 2003 'Berlin Plus' framework. Currently, NATO and the European Union may conduct parallel military and civilian operations with no established or formalized mechanisms for coordination and cooperation. Field commanders then resort to informal but pragmatic ad hoc arrangements to harmonize their missions. Although these arrangements are a means to an end, they cannot fully harness the true potential effects of NATO-European Union collaboration during all phases of crisis management. NATO and the European Union may offer capabilities that are complementary for addressing a given situation. The challenge is to find an appropriate mechanism for achieving unity of effort without unnecessary duplication.

From a military perspective, we do our very best to collaborate both in terms of planning and execution. However, we will not be able to deliver a complementary, holistic effect without high level political agreement between NATO and the European Union. While I am confident that NATO's Secretary General and his European Union counterpart are doing their utmost to resolve the matter, it will take time and patience before we reach a meaningful and efficient level of cooperation.

While paving the way to the future, NATO must balance the urgent with the important and commanding forces is my highest priority. Since its first military intervention in 1995,

¹ Principally emanating between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and linked to EU membership.

NATO has been engaged in an increasingly diverse array of operations. Today roughly 100,000 military personnel are engaged in NATO missions around the world, successfully managing complex ground, air and naval operations in all types of environments.

Kosovo: Today, approximately 10,000 troops from NATO's Kosovo Force are deployed in Kosovo to help maintain a safe and secure environment, preserving the peace that was imposed by NATO nearly a decade earlier. Following Kosovo's declaration of independence on 17 February 2008, the Alliance reaffirmed that KOSOVO FORCE shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. NATO and KOSOVO FORCE will continue to work with the authorities and will cooperate with and assist the UN, the EU, in particular EULEX, the EU Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the further development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo.

NATO and Iraq: At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Allies agreed to be part of the international effort to help Iraq establish effective and accountable security forces. The outcome was the creation of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I), which to date has trained over 14,000 Iraqi security sector personnel. NTM-I is involved in police training, establishing and mentoring Iraq's military academies, and facilitating substantial equipment donations and regular out-of-country training hosted by NATO Allies. All NATO Allies contribute to the training effort through deployment of trainers, provision of equipment, or NATO's financial contribution. The Government of Iraq regularly praises NTM-I, and continues to request its continuation and expansion.

ACTIVE ENDEAVOR: Under Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, NATO ships are patrolling the Mediterranean and monitoring shipping to help detect, deter and protect against

terrorist activity. The operation evolved out of NATO's immediate response to the terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September 2001 and, in view of its success, is continuing. As the Alliance has refined its counter-terrorism role in the intervening years, the experience that NATO has accrued in Active Endeavour has given the Alliance unparalleled expertise in the deterrence of maritime terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea. NATO forces have hailed over 100,000 merchant vessels and boarded 155 suspect ships.

By conducting these maritime operations against terrorist activity, NATO's presence in these waters has benefited all shipping traveling through the Straits. Moreover, this operation is also enabling NATO to strengthen its relations with partner countries, especially those participating in the Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue.

Supporting the African Union: Well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, the Alliance continues to support the African Union (AU) in its peacekeeping missions on the African continent. Since June 2007, NATO has assisted the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support for African Union peacekeepers. Following renewed African Union requests, the North Atlantic Council has agreed to extend its support by periods of six months on several occasions. NATO also continues to work with the African Union in identifying further areas where NATO could support the African Standby Force. NATO's continuing support to the African Union is a testament to the Alliance's commitment to building partnerships and supporting peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.

Operation OCEAN SHIELD: Building on previous counter-piracy missions conducted by NATO beginning in 2008 to protect World Food Program deliveries, Operation OCEAN SHIELD is focusing on at-sea counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Approved on 17

August 2009 by the North Atlantic Council, the current operation continues to contribute to international efforts to combat piracy in the area. It is also offering, to regional states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy activities.

NATO Special Operations Forces: The U.S.-led NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Centre has continued to serve as a dynamic engine of transformation within the Alliance. As a result, in September 2009, the North Atlantic Council approved its reorganization into the NATO Special Operations Headquarters. The NATO Special Operations Headquarters, projected to be fully operational in 2012, will continue to provide coordination, support, training, and enabling functions for NATO SOF, but will also fill a void in the Alliance's crisis response options, establishing an assured, rapidly deployable SOF command and control capability, by providing the core elements of a deployed special operations headquarters. Evolving to a headquarters will better enable the synchronization of SOF across the Alliance, enhance NATO SOF unity of effort, and provide Allied SOF with a multinational out of area command and control capability.

The NSHQ's SOF Communications Network underpins Allied and Partner SOF collaboration by providing an unprecedented vehicle for command, control, communications, and intelligence sharing for networked operations. The NSHQ's Special Operations Forces Fusion Cell (SOFFC) in Kabul, Afghanistan is demonstrative of the operational impact among Allied and Partner SOF. This stakeholder run enterprise, manned by some 40 personnel from 11 nations and several agencies, focuses on garnering information from a multitude of Allied and Partner sources, fusing that information with operational requirements to produce and

disseminate actionable intelligence to ISAF SOF Special Operations Task Groups (SOTGs) and our Afghan partners.

The NSHQ is building enduring operational capabilities, collaborative policies and procedures, and networked command, control, and communications mechanisms among NATO SOF. Collaborative training and exercises reinforce this framework to ensure Allied and Partner SOF are interoperable in order to operate more effectively in designated combined operations well into the future.

Afghanistan:

NATO's operation in Afghanistan currently constitutes the Alliance's most significant operational commitment to date. America's Allies in NATO have shared the risks, costs and burdens of this mission from the beginning. They have contributed to International Security Assistance Force and the Afghan National Security Forces, as well as significant non-military contributions.

The situation in Afghanistan today is complicated and challenging. As the President has stated, Afghanistan is the epicenter of the violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. For this reason, I strongly support the President's new strategy for Afghanistan and I will continue to work with our Allies as we all contribute to this challenge. Our Allies have already contributed a great deal to this war, fighting, bleeding, and dying side-by-side with our own troops.

"This is not just America's war, this is an Alliance mission..."

-- NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen

And many have committed further contributions following President Obama's announcement, strengthening their resolve and partnership.

I believe there are four areas in which we must succeed in order to win in Afghanistan. First, we must strike the right balance between our civilian and military efforts. Success cannot be achieved solely by the military. In addition to strong military and police forces to ensure security, Afghanistan needs a credible government taking active, visible steps to show that it is stamping out corruption, improving efficiency and delivering necessary services to its people effectively. This is where concentrated civilian efforts are needed the most, for it is they who have the expertise and credibility on topics such as rule of law, economics, and agriculture – three areas that are critical to Afghanistan's reconstruction and development.

Second, if Afghanistan is to become a secure and stable nation, the Afghans themselves must be at the center of this effort. Our Allies must partner with Afghan security forces and civilian personnel to mentor and develop their own capabilities to conduct these critical activities on their own. The Afghan people must assume responsibility for the well-being of their country and they must feel confident in their own government's ability to provide basic security and services absent of corruption and tribal favoritism.

Third, strategic communication will be a key method of ensuring that the Afghans, as well as our enemies, understand the United States and our Allies are committed to a secure and stable Afghanistan.

Finally, the most important role that the military can play in this strategy is to increase the size and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), through training and mentoring, to be able to take the lead responsibility for securing their country.

Again, the challenges facing Afghanistan today are serious and complex. However, I am confident that the Afghan people will prevail. We have the right strategy and resources in place to partner successfully with the Afghans to develop their capacity to self-secure.

A recent survey conducted in Afghanistan by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research underscores how our strategy is indeed bringing us closer to our goals in Afghanistan. That survey revealed that nearly three out of four Afghans interviewed expect things to be either somewhat better or much better in a year. That sentiment reflected a 51% improvement over the year prior and is indicative of a spreading feeling of hope, not hopelessness.

The survey also revealed that 85% of Afghans interviewed rate the work of Afghanistan present government as either fair, good, or excellent, and nearly 90% also rated their provincial governments as fair, good or excellent. Both the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army received an 89% approval rating, indicative that our investments in training these security forces are paying off. 90% of Afghans interviewed also said they would rather have Afghanistan's current government in place than the Taliban or another government and 69% said they considered the Taliban the biggest danger to Afghanistan.

These are all good news indicators that validate our effort to put the Afghan people at the center of the equation in Afghanistan. We need to continue giving the Afghan people hope that they are not destined to live under the yoke of tyranny and offering them every opportunity to live in an Afghanistan with a future worthy of their sacrifices.

Conclusion

The Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Civilians at European Command and Allied Command Operations contribute to our national security everyday with their professional engagements with our Allies and partners in the European theater. As we look forward to continued success, I ask for your continued support of these men and women and their families to ensure they receive the care and benefits they deserve.

Operationally, we must continuously strive to find flexible authorities and funding mechanisms to build the capacity of those partner nations willing to fight side-by-side with us. This has become increasingly important because of the recent surge in activities in Afghanistan and the need to get our Allies and partners more involved. Your continued support and expansion of authorities like NDAA Section 1206, particularly allowing their use for partner nation forces deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, has been absolutely pivotal in enabling our strategic efforts in the European theater. With these programs, we are able to provide our Allies and partners with the training and equipment necessary to achieve interoperability with our own forces engaged in on-going overseas contingency operations. They will be able to arrive in theater better prepared to assume the responsibilities they have committed their forces to undertake, further reducing the risk of injury and loss of life.

Furthermore, our efforts to fulfill this short-term task of building enduring capability are vital to ensuring the long-term stability and security of Europe. In addition to increasing the contributions of our allies and partners to operations outside Europe, building partner capacity allows us to make significant progress toward achieving strategic objectives within the AOR. For example, we have been able to conduct security sector reform assessments in Albania, an inter-agency effort critical to integrating Balkan countries in the European community. We also

have numerous programs targeted at countering the proliferation of WMD throughout the theater such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. But we cannot stop there. With greater flexibility, these authorities can achieve greater strategic goals in support of our theater and national objectives.

European Command and Allied Command Operations serve as important links between the United States and our friends in Europe, effectively “bridging” the Atlantic. We are building and strengthening relations with our European partners that will help us ensure the security of the United States at home and abroad. We are all STRONGER TOGETHER.

Admiral James G. Stavridis

Commander, U.S. European Command and NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Admiral James Stavridis assumed duties as Commander of the United States European Command and as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in early summer 2009.

Stavridis is a 1976 distinguished graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a native of South Florida.

A Surface Warfare Officer, he commanded the Destroyer USS Barry (DDG-52) from 1993-1995, completing UN/NATO deployments to Haiti, Bosnia, and the Arabian Gulf. Barry won the Battenberg Cup as the top ship in the Atlantic Fleet under his command.

In 1998, he commanded Destroyer Squadron 21 and deployed to the Arabian Gulf, winning the Navy League's John Paul Jones Award for Inspirational Leadership.


From 2002-2004, he commanded Enterprise Carrier Strike Group, conducting combat operations in the Arabian Gulf in support of both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

From 2006-2009, he commanded U.S. Southern Command in Miami, focused on Latin America and the Caribbean.

Ashore, he served as a strategic and long range planner on the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has also served as the Executive Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

Stavridis earned a PhD and MALD from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in International Relations in 1984, where he won the Gullion Prize as outstanding student. He is also a distinguished graduate of both the Naval and National War Colleges.

He holds various decorations and awards, including the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal and five awards of the Legion of Merit. He is author or co-author of several books on naval shiphandling and leadership, including *Command at Sea* and *Destroyer Captain*.



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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL WILLIAM E. WARD, USA
COMMANDER



UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

10 March 2010

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

UNCLASSIFIED

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE - WRITTEN STATEMENT
OUTLINE**

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INTRODUCTION

It is my privilege as Commander of United States Africa Command to present to Congress our Posture Statement for 2010. U.S. Africa Command's operations and programs protect American lives and interests, in Africa and in the homeland, by supporting security and stability in Africa and its island states. We concentrate our strategy and efforts on helping African states build capable and professional militaries that are subordinate to civilian authority, respect human rights, and adhere to the rule of law. We are assisting our African partners in building capacities to counter transnational threats from violent extremist organizations; to stem illicit trafficking in humans, narcotics, and weapons; to support peacekeeping operations; and to address the consequences of humanitarian disasters—whether man-made or natural—that cause loss of life and displace populations.

Supporting the development of professional and capable militaries contributes to increasing security and stability in Africa—allowing African states and regional organizations to promote democracy, to expand development, to provide for their common defense, and to better serve their people.

In his address in Ghana last July, President Obama reaffirmed Africa's strategic importance to the United States and our national interests. He identified four priorities for the U.S. government's engagement efforts:

- Supporting strong and sustainable democracies and good governance
- Fostering sustained economic growth and development
- Increasing access to quality health and education
- Helping to prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflict

Through sustained security engagement with African militaries, U.S. Africa Command is supporting U.S. national interests and both the President's priorities and our African partners' objectives—now and in the long-term.

In this report, I provide an overview of the strategic environment in Africa, explain our strategic approach, and show how our security cooperation efforts, designed and executed in close coordination with our interagency partners, are promoting stability in Africa in support of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The challenges and opportunities in U.S. Africa Command's Area of Responsibility (AOR) are complex and dynamic. The application of only military means is insufficient to help our partners address them. U.S. Africa Command seeks to be part of a coordinated effort that integrates all tools available to our international and interagency partners.

Our discussion of the strategic environment in Africa begins with the key Defense Department concerns noted by the President: the potential for conflict, transnational threats, and other threats to peace and security. It is followed by an overview of the important issues faced by our African partner militaries as they seek to confront these threats.

Nature of the Environment

Africa is a large and diverse continent whose land mass is about three and a half times the size of the continental United States. The distance from Africa's northernmost tip to its

southernmost tip is roughly equal to the distance from New York to Moscow. Its 53 countries each have unique histories.

Africa is home to one billion people, divided among 800 ethnicities and speaking about 1000 different languages. Ethnic ties are strong, and ethnic dynamics often influence national politics. Africa's population growth rate is the highest in the world. Of the 40 countries worldwide with the highest rates of growth, 34 are African.

While an increasing number of African states are conducting elections, many of the requirements of enduring liberal democracies, such as the rule of law, protection of individual rights, and a vibrant civil society, are nascent or non-existent. Additionally, in some countries previously demonstrating liberalization and democratization, increasing examples of authoritarianism are emerging.

Areas of Potential Conflict and Impacts on Peace and Security

Africa is still dealing with the effects of widespread conflict that engulfed the continent following the independence movements of the last half of the last century, with some still ongoing today.

The effects of armed conflict in Africa are severe. The African Union (AU) estimates that Africa has the world's largest number of forcibly displaced individuals, with close to three million refugees and approximately 11.6 million internally displaced persons in 19 countries across the continent. According to a 2007 study by Oxfam International on the economic impact of armed conflict, 23 African countries lost an estimated 284 billion dollars in revenue between 1990 and 2005 as a result of armed conflict. Oxfam estimated that an armed conflict in Africa

contracts a country's economy on average by 15 percent. Conflict is a major obstacle to development and the delivery of basic services, such as health and education.

Today, 8 of the 17 ongoing peacekeeping operations or political missions administered by the United Nations (UN) are on the African continent. The 8 missions in Africa account for approximately 75 percent of the UNs' military, police, and civilian peacekeepers deployed world-wide. The number and scale of peacekeeping missions increasingly strain donor states and regional organizations. Therefore, it is in our interests to help our African partners improve their capabilities and broaden their capacities.

While the number of violent conflicts in Africa has decreased over the past 10 years, significant potential for new and continued conflict remains.

- In Sudan, Darfur remains insecure, violence has increased in Southern Sudan, and tensions continue in border areas.
- Somalia remains a country in armed conflict, as its Transitional Federal Government (TFG) battles violent Islamic extremists.
- Despite pressure by the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF), scattered elements of the Lord's Resistance Army continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian populations in the Central African Republic, northern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Southern Sudan.
- In the DRC, independent local militias, the insurgent Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, and some ill-disciplined Congolese armed forces remain destabilizing forces in the country's eastern region.

Transnational Challenges

Threats to stability do not necessarily manifest themselves in conflict, but can nevertheless have a corrosive influence on the development of good governance, viable market economies, and effective security sectors. Weakly governed spaces provide favorable operating

environments for violent extremism, piracy, and trafficking of humans, weapons, and drugs, posing direct threats to the U.S. homeland and our interests abroad.

Violent Extremism

Violent extremism by transnational terrorist organizations is a major source of regional instability. In the last year, al-Qaeda and terrorist groups in Africa appear to have strengthened their collaboration. Al-Qaeda operatives are active in East Africa, while al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operates across the trans-Saharan region of Northern and Western Africa. The leaders of Somalia-based Al-Shabaab have publicly aligned themselves with al-Qaeda, having issued public statements praising Osama Bin Ladin and linking Somalia to al-Qaeda's global operations. Al-Shabaab also announced its support to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) at the same time that AQAP activities increased in Yemen, separated from Somalia by the 20-mile wide Bab-el-Mandab Strait. Al-Shabaab continues to operate multiple terrorist training camps in Somalia with al-Qaeda participation.

Al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda affiliates also target the United States and our European and African partners across North Africa and the Sahel. Terrorist activities, kidnapping, illicit trafficking of all types (humans, weapons, drugs), and the existence of under-governed spaces in the Sahel contribute to the region's vulnerability and make it susceptible to extremist influences.

Countries of the Maghreb, like Algeria and Morocco, partner with the United States to respond to terrorism and check the western extension of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Yet, enhancing security depends upon regional cooperation and the development of stable and growing economies to undercut the recruiting activities of violent extremist organizations.

Illicit Trafficking

Narcotics trafficking is a growing concern in Africa. West Africa is a node for Latin American drugs transiting to their primary destination in European markets. In addition, drugs originating in Asia are transported through South and East Africa on their way to Europe. The destabilizing and corrupting influence of narcotics trafficking threatens to turn Guinea-Bissau into a narco-state and helps to expand the Latin American cartel's network and influence throughout the region. Many African countries lack the capability to interdict the flow of narcotics—on land, air, or sea. While not as directly impacted by narcotics flows through Africa as our European allies, the United States has a vested interest in countering the destabilizing impacts of drug trafficking on security, stability, and development in Africa.

Many Africans also remain vulnerable to human trafficking in the forms of forced labor, child labor, child soldiers, and slavery. While some countries are making strides to counter trafficking in persons, many lack the law enforcement capacity to address this problem.

Piracy

Incidents of piracy in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden have continued to receive international attention. In 2009, pirate attacks continued to escalate in frequency and expanded their geographic range in the western Indian Ocean out to 1,000 nautical miles from the African coast. U.S. Africa Command continues to support counter-piracy operations through the employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Maritime Patrol Aircraft temporarily based in the Seychelles.

Public Health, Economic Development, and Democratization

Public health, economic development, and democratization challenges continue to significantly impact the security environment in Africa.

Public Health Sector

African populations remain at great risk to a host of infectious diseases, including 2009 H1N1 Influenza. The Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), tuberculosis, and malaria are the leading causes of adult mortality in Africa. Most African countries lack adequate capacity and capability to contain or mitigate the threat of pandemic diseases.

Pandemic disease is not only a human security issue, but also a military readiness challenge. For example, some of our African partners have professional and capable militaries that contribute thousands of soldiers to UN and AU missions in Somalia, Sudan, DRC, and elsewhere. However, they would have even greater peacekeeping capacities if it were not for the high rates of HIV/AIDS incidence found in their military forces.

Economic Development

Until the global economic crisis of late 2008, Africa as a whole experienced a 10-year trend of sustained economic growth, averaging over 5 percent growth in gross domestic product per year. High oil prices enabled some African oil-producing countries to achieve economic growth that rivaled the world's highest rates. However, countries solely dependent on oil and extractive commodities revenue were vulnerable to falling prices. In many cases, undiversified economies, high unemployment, and corruption, have prevented the wealth generated by Africa's natural resources from finding its way to the neediest segments of African societies.

The UN identified Africa as the world's most impoverished continent, containing 25 of the world's poorest countries.

Democratization

Over the past 20 years, many African countries have moved toward democratic processes, good governance, and the rule of law. In January 2009, Ghanaian voters conducted their fourth free and fair presidential election in 15 years. For the second time, the ruling party was peacefully replaced by the opposition. In April 2009, over 13 million South Africans went to the polls and elected Jacob Zuma, the country's fourth president since the end of apartheid, and Botswana, in October 2009, held its tenth democratic presidential election since independence—the most of any post-colonial sub-Saharan African country. Since the 1990s, many African states have also moved from dictatorship toward democracy.

The African Security Sector

Although African countries have consistently expressed a strong desire to provide for their security and address these various challenges themselves, many lack sufficient means to do so without foreign assistance. The challenges they face can be broadly described as:

- Militaries have frequently been used as tools of authoritarian regimes to protect their leaders and suppress the opposition. This has led to corruption and distrust by the populace.
- Increased professionalization of many African militaries remains a work in progress. Traditionally, the development of maritime and air components has lagged that of land components in most African militaries.
- The legacy of Cold War politics flooded Africa with competing streams of military equipment, tactics, and doctrine. Much of what remains is poorly functioning and ill-suited for confronting today's challenges.

- Although regional cooperation has improved tremendously, combined efforts to confront transnational challenges are limited. Domestic politics can inhibit a government's willingness to take strong action against a violent extremist organization or other direct threats.
- The AU's African Standby Force and its five Brigades have shown continued development, but are not yet fully mission capable. They lack sufficient enablers to become self-sustaining as a peacekeeping and crisis response force. National peacekeeping capabilities are similarly lacking, although some countries have made regular and substantial contributions to international peacekeeping missions.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND's APPROACH

Our approach is founded in our overall national security interests on the continent as outlined by the President and Secretaries of State and Defense. The United States and our African partners have strong mutual interests in promoting security and stability on the continent of Africa, its island states, and maritime zones. Advancing these interests requires a unified approach that integrates our efforts with those of other U.S. government (USG) departments, agencies, and our African and other international partners.

Our programs and activities support U.S. national interests as well as pursue four defense-oriented goals expressed by our African partners:

First, that they have capable and accountable military forces that perform professionally and with integrity;

Second, that their forces are supported and sustained by effective, legitimate, and professional security institutions;

Third, that they have the capability to exercise the means nationally and regionally to dissuade, deter, and defeat transnational threats;

Fourth, that they have the capacity to increase their support to international peacekeeping efforts.

Fostering stability supports the pursuit of these goals, and allows further opportunities to reinforce success.

Our approach is subordinate to overall USG policy goals. We work in concert with our interagency partners, such as the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to ensure our plans and activities directly support U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Africa's challenges require a holistic view of security that includes defense, law enforcement, and customs and border security. Addressing defense-related challenges must be pursued in concert with other USG and partner security-related endeavors to sustain unity of effort.

Our activities must provide immediate benefits and help our partners progress toward their long-term goals. Our mission is "sustained security engagement"; providing programs and activities that build for the future and reinforce success.

Regional cooperation is critical, whether it be neighboring countries working together against mutual threats, or region-wide efforts to establish common security networks, such as the AU's cooperative security architecture. Our approach focuses on mutual interests, fostering interoperability and common situational awareness, regionally-oriented capacity building, and enhancing relationships built on trust and cooperation. The more the countries of Africa work together, the greater the likelihood that the continent will achieve lasting stability.

These goals support our national security interests. Increasing African partner capability to identify and interdict threats emanating from the continent enhances the security of the U.S.

homeland. Enhancing the capacity of African forces to respond to threats to peace and stability on the continent allows the United States to use its forces for other operations. The development of capable and professional military forces can support efforts to consolidate democratic principles and good governance by fostering transparency and accountability in the military, which historically has been one of the most important institutions in modern African societies.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

U.S. Africa Command's programs and activities support the development of capable, professional partner military forces, and are integrated and coordinated with the DOS, U.S. Chiefs of Mission, and our international partners. Africa Command conducts several categories of activities to support our four primary goals and address current security challenges that threaten stability. The primary purposes of our activities can be categorized as follows:

- Building the capacity of partner conventional forces
- Supporting capacity building of partner security forces
- Building the capacity of partner enabling forces
- Fostering strong strategic relationships
- Conducting defense sector reform
- Fostering regional cooperation, situational awareness, and interoperability
- Countering transnational and extremist threats
- Contributing to stability in current zones of conflict
- Addressing conditions that contribute to instability

Building Capacity of Partner Conventional Forces

U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines are terrific trainers and exemplary examples of military professionalism and our core national values. The training and exercises they conduct encourage the development of partner security capabilities and the instilling of professional ethos among African military elements. Moreover, most of these activities can be performed with small numbers of U.S. forces. Some examples of our recent activities include:

NATURAL FIRE, Uganda

In October 2009, U.S. Africa Command, with U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) as the lead component, brought together more than 1,200 soldiers and civilians from six countries for Exercise NATURAL FIRE 10 in Uganda. The exercise improved inter-operability and helped build African partner capacity to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies. The region jointly exercised contingency plans designed to address a global health threat of pandemic influenza. Approximately 550 U.S. personnel and 650 soldiers from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda participated.

Africa Partnership Station

Africa Partnership Station (APS) is U.S. Africa Command's primary maritime security engagement initiative and is now a program of record. In cooperation with partner states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), APS builds maritime security capabilities in our Africa partners using sea-based training platforms to provide predictable regional presence with a minimal footprint ashore. Our training and assistance focuses on strengthening four pillars of maritime sector development: a competent and professional maritime security force; secure infrastructure to sustain maritime operations; maritime domain awareness; and maritime

response capability. Our African partners view APS as a successful maritime initiative and are enthusiastic participants.

From January through May 2009, the Command employed the USS NASHVILLE to support APS. With representatives from 9 European allies, 10 African countries, and Brazil, APS doubled the number of partners participating in the planning and execution compared to previous engagements. APS conducted 10 engagements in 7 countries—Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Sao Tome and Principe, and Gabon. U.S. Marines and their counterparts from Spain and Portugal conducted security cooperation events with over 800 African military professionals in Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon. Over 1,750 African professionals were engaged in 64 workshops and seminars.

The success and effectiveness of our engagements was demonstrated when the Benin Navy boarded and freed a pirated tanker without loss of life. APS in Benin was a principal enabler for that mission. Benin's Navy participated in APS instruction focused on Visit, Board, Search and Seizure, small boat operations, Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection, and use of the Automated Information System (AIS), which was installed during their training. The Benin Navy used maritime domain awareness tools provided by APS to guide one of its ships to assist the tanker, allowing its Navy to take action against a threat affecting the interests of Benin, the United States, and the international community.

U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF), is building on the success of the APS in West Africa by conducting similar activities in East Africa. APS-East will work to build our African partners' capabilities in small boat operations. Our partners include Kenya, Mozambique, the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Tanzania. The activities of the USS BRADLEY and the USS ARLEIGH BURKE in 2009 served as a pilot deployment for APS-East and made great inroads

in South and East Africa. In addition, the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) established a maritime center of excellence in Mombasa, Kenya, to provide maritime training to African states. Both DOS and DOD approved a Section 1206 (Fiscal Year 06 National Defense Authorization Act, as amended) program to provide small boats, AIS, and surface search radars to Djibouti, Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Comoros. The latter effort will establish a basic surveillance capability along the entire East African coast. We plan to sustain and supplement this project through Foreign Military Financing (FMF).

AFRICAN LION, Morocco

AFRICAN LION is an annual exercise with Morocco, a key regional ally and active contributor to international peacekeeping operations. U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) is U.S. Africa Command's lead component for the exercise, which focuses on U.S.-Morocco interoperability, air and ground combined arms training, staff training, Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) training, medical and disaster response training, public affairs training, and humanitarian civic assistance operations. Last year, during AFRICAN LION 09, medical teams conducted humanitarian civic assistance in 5 villages, treating over 17,000 Moroccans and over 9,500 livestock. Numerous Fiscal Year (FY) 2010-2011 Exercise Related Construction projects are scheduled to improve training ranges, strategic access, and delivery of logistics support in support of AFRICAN LION. U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA) will spearhead its participation in AFRICAN LION through the State Partnership Program, with the Utah Air National Guard providing KC-135 tankers and personnel.

Building effective non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps

Several African countries have under-developed NCO corps, which in some cases are vulnerable to corruptive influences. Our African partners recognize that effective NCO corps are essential to developing capable and sustainable units, which will contribute to overall stability and security. They have turned to us for assistance. By helping partners develop their NCO corps, we have an opportunity to instill the qualities and character that will allow them to train and guide their own development in this area.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

A particular challenge many of our partners face is the lack of serviceable equipment—from individual military gear to vehicles to other major systems. FMF and FMS are two programs we are leveraging to help address these shortfalls. U.S. Africa Command is working with U.S. country teams to develop and implement FMF programs to procure systems that increase interoperability among African partners, international allies, and the United States. U.S. Africa Command is employing the Excess Defense Articles program under FMS to supply trucks, personal soldier equipment, and uniforms to support the deployment of peacekeeping battalions to Darfur, Somalia, and Liberia.

Supporting Capacity Building of Partner Security Forces

Achieving security and stability in Africa requires more than the contributions of the military alone. Security is a holistic function that includes non-military elements such as law enforcement, border patrol, customs, and judiciary. U.S. Africa Command works closely with USG departments and agencies to ensure that we plan and conduct our efforts as seamlessly as possible.

African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP)

AMLEP is a cooperative maritime law enforcement program with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard and host nation Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET) embark on U.S. and host nation ships and law enforcement vessels to provide the vessel with the necessary authorities and capabilities to conduct boardings, search, seizure, and arrests within the participating African country's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

AMLEP operations were conducted with Senegal, Morocco, Sierra Leone, and Cape Verde, with the support of DOS, French Maritime Air Forces, and the U.S. Coast Guard. Collectively, our operations accomplished the following: Maritime Law Enforcement and small boat training for LEDET personnel; the integration of French Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability; and vessel boardings led by the respective country's LEDET team.

The highlight of our engagements occurred in August when the Republic of Sierra Leone's Armed Forces Maritime Wing detained the 750-ton Taiwan F/V YU FENG 102 for fishing illegally in the Sierra Leone EEZ. The YU FENG's 11 crewmembers were deported to Taiwan and the Feng was impounded by the government of Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leone forces again demonstrated their resolve and capability by seizing four vessels for violation of Sierra Leonean law during December AMLEP operations.

Security Sector Assessments

An integrated and harmonized assessment of a partner nations' requirements is helpful in developing effective and coordinated activities. This past year, U.S. Africa Command participated in DOS-led Security Sector Assessments in Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cape Verde, and Mozambique. The resulting interagency plans will

ensure our military engagements with these countries are consistent with policy objectives and mutually reinforce the activities of other USG departments and agencies.

Building Capacity of Partner Enabling Forces

Enablers such as logistics, intelligence, communications, and de-mining capabilities play vital roles in the U.S. military, and facilitate our ability to sustain operations independently. Developing similar enablers or enabling capabilities among African countries can help reduce their dependence on foreign assistance when conducting military operations. Many of our capacity building activities in this area add tremendous value while requiring only a minimal commitment of U.S. personnel.

Logistics Capacity Building

Our African partners recognize the importance of logistics and have benefitted from several U.S. Africa Command training events and symposia in this area. For example, experts from U.S. MARFORAF provided vital logistics support and guidance to assist the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces in packaging and loading a UN ship in preparation for their first United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) deployment.

The *Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team (ADAPT)* develops African military logistics capacities to enable them to manage and support peacekeeping operations. ADAPT training provided by U.S. Africa Command's Army and Air Force components enabled the Rwandan Defense Force to load and deploy vehicles, equipment, and supplies to support UNAMID. ADAPT also allowed the Ugandan People's Defense Force to certify Ugandan soldiers to load equipment on U.S. military aircraft (C-130 and C-17), strengthening their ability to support peacekeeping operations and disaster response operations employing U.S. or UN

cargo aircraft. These soldiers will also serve as co-trainers for future ADAPT activities.

ADAPT activities are planned in Nigeria and Tanzania in 2010.

In 2009, U.S. Africa Command conducted the first *Partnership for Integrated Logistics, Operations, and Tactics (PILOT)* symposium with 25 African participants. PILOT is an operational-level seminar jointly designed and funded through partnership with the Canadian Ministry of Defense, Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Center. PILOT focuses on familiarization with the legal and ethical aspects of peacekeeping; the roles, missions, and functions of the AU and the UN in peacekeeping; planning logistics staff estimates for PKO; planning Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration operations; planning Force Deployment Planning and Execution; and an overview of the Joint Operational Planning Process.

Intelligence Capacity Building

Military intelligence is an essential capability for all professional militaries. The ability to collect, analyze, and synthesize information is key to developing effective military plans.

U.S. Africa Command's *Intelligence Security Cooperation and Engagement (ISCE)* Program seeks to build sustainable military intelligence capacity in designated partner nations and regional organizations. ISCE develops and implements common military intelligence doctrine and procedures. It emphasizes the rule of law, respect for human rights, and civil authority in order to reverse the historical stigma associated with many African intelligence and security services. Program activities include familiarization seminars; senior intelligence officer visits; Director of Military Intelligence conferences; intelligence exchanges and analyst roundtables; and a series of officer and non-commissioned officer intelligence training courses.

The *Military Intelligence Basic Officer Course-Africa (MIBOC-A)* is a course offered to junior military intelligence officers, primarily from north and west Africa. In addition to

teaching professional intelligence skills, it promotes relationships among the intelligence communities that encourage greater cooperation in the future. U.S. Africa Command conducted two MIBOC-A courses in FY09 and one so far in FY10.

Communications Systems Development

One way to foster regional cooperation is to establish means by which partner militaries can reliably and effectively communicate with each other. However, because African communications infrastructure is underdeveloped, U.S. Africa Command is developing programs that improve the communications architecture among African military leaders.

The AU Command, Control, Communications, and Information Systems initiative is an effort to enable the AU's command and control of its Standby Force. This initiative achieved its first milestone with the recent ribbon-cutting of the new AU Peace Support Operations Center, and will continue by establishing similar command and control nodes at the regional Standby Brigade Headquarters, planning cells, and logistics cells. This initiative is also pursuing connectivity with the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

We are also supporting two other regional initiatives. The Economic Community of Western African States' (ECOWAS) Regional Information Exchange System provides workstations, internet access, and telephone services to senior defense leaders in 11 ECOWAS countries, and this will soon expand to 13. Meanwhile, the Multinational Information Sharing Initiative has just begun, and it will provide similar mobile capabilities to the Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) countries over the next three years.

De-Mining Capacity Building

U.S. Africa Command conducts "Train-the-Trainer" *Humanitarian Mine Action* missions to build our partners' anti-mine capacities and support broader U.S. and international efforts to

eliminate landmines and other explosive remnants of war. We initiated programs in Kenya, Burundi, Mozambique, and Namibia in 2009, and will expand mine action programs to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, and Chad in 2010. We are also working with Uganda to develop anti-mine capabilities in support of Ugandan peacekeeping deployments to AMISOM.

Special Staff Programs

Efforts to establish capable and accountable forces involve mechanisms that allow the partner military leadership to establish and enforce standards of conduct and readiness. These mechanisms should be transparent to ensure equal treatment, fairness, and common expectations. Through mentoring and information exchanges, our inspector general, chaplain, legal counsel, surgeon, public affairs, and other special staff elements work closely with partner countries to build capacity in these areas in support of improving the military's standing with its government and people.

Fostering Strong Strategic Relationships

Strong strategic relationships are important enablers for sustaining the positive gains of our capacity building activities. They encourage our partners to assume greater ownership of their newfound capabilities. They provide ready opportunities to reinforce success through follow-on activities and open communication links that facilitate new or evolving requirements. They also encourage dialogue with other partners.

The National Guard State Partnership Program

The State Partnership Program is a superb tool that fosters a variety of military-to-military, military-to-civilian, and civilian-to-civilian engagements using National Guard and U.S. states' capabilities. Eight African countries currently partner with U.S. states through this program: Tunisia-Wyoming; Morocco-Utah; Ghana-North Dakota; South Africa-New York; Nigeria-California; Senegal-Vermont; Liberia-Michigan; and Botswana-North Carolina.

The benefits of this program from the past year are many and impressive. For example, in Tunisia, the Wyoming Guard is helping the Tunisian Government integrate Ground Surveillance Radar into border patrol operations. In West Africa, U.S. Africa Command's Air Force Component, U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA), partnered with the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, the Tennessee Air National Guard, and the Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center to coordinate military-to-military efforts to rebuild the first of four Nigerian C-130s. In Botswana, the North Carolina Air Guard demonstrated its Modular Airborne Firefighting System capability; an event of key importance to Botswana due to the annual range fires that destroy grazing land and the habitat for one of Botswana's most important national resources—its wildlife.

The State Partnership Program delivers programs and activities that build broad capabilities with our African partners. The habitual relationships this builds adds tremendous value to our efforts. This program is very valuable to U.S. Africa Command, and we look forward to expanding it as our African partners request greater participation. I urge your continued support.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded IMET (E-IMET)

Professionalizing militaries and reinforcing the democratic value of elected civilian authority are among the benefits of the DOS-led IMET and E-IMET programs. These comprise the most widely-used military assistance programs in U.S. Africa Command's area of responsibility. Approximately 900 military and civilian students from 44 African countries received education and training in the United States or their own countries valued at \$19.8 million. Many officers and enlisted IMET graduates go on to fill key positions in our African partners' militaries and governments, and the relationships built in the academic environment directly contribute to stronger bi-lateral military relationships between the United States and partner countries.

IMET funded regional seminars with a Defense Institute for International Legal Studies Military Education Teams (MET) for Chad, Cameroon, DRC, Mauritius and Sierra Leone, and also supported a Center for Civil Military Relations MET for Cameroon, Comoros, DRC, Mauritius, and Guinea Bissau. Sustained support for robust IMET and E-IMET programs is an investment in our future, and directly supports long-term U.S. interests and relationships in Africa. It is one our most desired and productive programs.

Military-to-Military Engagement Programs

U.S. Africa Command uses military-to-military (mil-to-mil) programs to strengthen key relationships and familiarize partners with U.S. military techniques, tactics, and procedures they can employ to address a broad range of security challenges, including conducting peacekeeping operations and countering terrorism. Mil-to-mil also assists partners in improving deployment procedures, logistics systems, maintenance operations, force protection, and the conduct of their own training. In FY04, the initial year of the program, less than \$500K was spent in Africa for mil-to-mil programs. Today the mil-to-mil program is the cornerstone of U.S. Africa

Command's engagement activities, with \$6.3 million allocated and 431 events planned in 40 countries in FY10. This is a relatively small investment with substantial dividends.

Conducting Defense Sector Reform

U.S. Africa Command is a key contributor to the long-term development of professional defense forces as part of broader security sector reform efforts led by the Department of State.

Liberia

To solidify gains made under the DOS' Security Sector Reform program, U.S. Africa Command commenced a five-year mentorship program with the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) Headquarters Staff and Liberia's 23rd Brigade. We have 56 military mentors in Liberia to continue the professional development of the AFL. ONWARD LIBERTY is one of three lines of effort in our over-arching Defense Sector Reform program in Liberia. We are also working with the U.S. Coast Guard to help the AFL re-establish a Coast Guard-like capability, and with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to mentor the Liberian Ministry of Defense.

Democratic Republic of Congo

At the request of the Department of State and DRC, U.S. Africa Command is training and equipping a battalion of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) in support of USG objectives and priorities established by Secretary of State Clinton during her visit to the DRC in August 2009. We will help the FARDC to: 1) improve its capacity to lead, manage, and sustain its force; 2) enhance its ability to investigate and prosecute its personnel accused of human rights violations and other crimes; and 3) reduce sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) by the military.

The third objective, mitigating SGBV, is important to helping heal the wounds of past conflicts in DRC. We are working closely with the country team and USAID to identify opportunities to provide support to survivors of SGBV. We are pursuing funding for the completion of a maternity hospital in the capital city of Kinshasa that will also provide counseling for SGBV survivors and perform fistula repairs. In South Kivu Province, we are seeking to secure funding for two projects: the construction of a primary school, whose pupils will consist of HIV orphans or survivors and children of SGBV; and a Reference Hospital in Wolungu serving a large, rural population that includes SGBV survivors.

Fostering Regional Cooperation, Situational Awareness, and Interoperability

The spirit of cooperation is growing very strong among African states. Over the past two years, participation by African countries has increased steadily in many of our regional activities. All of our activities seek to capitalize on this spirit by bringing partners together to develop collaborative solutions to shared security challenges. The following activities are noteworthy in their emphasis on interoperability.

Exercise AFRICA ENDEAVOR

AFRICA ENDEAVOR is our premier communications interoperability exercise that involves the greatest number of partner countries, and it continues to grow. Exercise AFRICA ENDEAVOR 09 in Gabon brought together 25 countries and 3 regional organizations (the AU, ECOWAS, and the Economic Community of Central African States). Focusing on information sharing among African states via communication networks, the exercise developed communications links with the United States, NATO, and other countries with common stability,

security, and sustainment goals for the region. Participation in this summer's AFRICA ENDEAVOR 10 exercise in Ghana is expected to expand to 30 African states.

Exercise PHOENIX EXPRESS, North Africa

PHOENIX EXPRESS is a multinational maritime security exercise led by U.S. NAVAF and focused on maritime interdiction, communications, and information sharing. Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia increased their participation in the exercise this past year.

Working With Partners to Counter Transnational and Extremist Threats

Transnational challenges in Africa are a threat to the United States, our partners, and our allies. Transnational threats exacerbate difficult circumstances for local populations and complicate efforts to create a secure and stable environment conducive to development. We conduct operations and capacity building programs and activities to address the threat of terrorism, piracy, narcotics and other illicit trafficking.

Counter-terrorism Efforts in North Africa and the Sahel--Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-TRANS SAHARA (OEF-TS)

Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA) conducts OEF-TS to counter the terrorism threat in North and West Africa. OEF-TS supports the DOS-led Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) by increasing our partners' capabilities to deny safe havens to terrorists, improving border security, promoting democratic governance, and reinforcing regional as well as bilateral military ties. OEF-TS activities are designed to defeat violent extremist organizations throughout the region.

U.S. Africa Command works closely with the DOS and U.S. embassies to ensure we provide the military support needed to meet the objectives of TSCTP, including the following major elements: information operations; train, advise and assist activities; intelligence capacity building; coalition development; military exercise programs; and development and establishment of a regional computer-based information network. All OEF-TS activities are closely coordinated with the State Department and our U.S. embassy country teams.

SOCAFRICA remained very active last year with OEF-TS. Military Information Support Teams assisted DOS public diplomacy efforts in countering extremist ideology in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Nigeria. OEF-TS created High Frequency-Radio Tactical Communications Interoperability between Algeria and Niger, and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) trained new Counter-Terrorism (CT) light infantry companies in Mali. The MTTs also trained existing CT units in Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Senegal. OEF-TS Military Intelligence courses trained students from 7 OEF-TS countries, and the Trans-Sahara Security Symposium civil-military course trained nearly 100 students from 4 OEF-TS partner countries. Additionally, OEF-TS Civil-Military Support Elements have completed or are planning 79 humanitarian assistance projects.

In the last year, political conditions have allowed us to resume engagement with Mauritania, to include our efforts to build a CT company. Mauritanian security forces lack the capability to logistically sustain themselves during operations. Helping Mauritania develop a logistics capacity will provide Mauritanian security forces with the capability to push supplies and personnel to its forward-deployed CT companies, which operate hundreds of miles away in extremely austere territory. Through U.S. assistance, Mauritania will be able to sustain CT operations within its borders and in partnership with other regional forces.

In West Africa, we are building on efforts in Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Burkina Faso. Our activities range from training and equipping specialized CT units to increasing intelligence capabilities and information sharing to supporting efforts that counter extremist ideology in the region. We are working with Mali to develop an intermediate level maintenance and vehicle repair capability, and to improve its air mobility, intelligence, and reconnaissance capabilities. These two programs will bolster the ability of Malian security forces to take direct action against AQIM.

Counter-terrorism Efforts in East Africa

In East Africa, U.S. Africa Command's CJTF-HOA conducts operations to counter violent extremists throughout the region to protect U.S. and coalition interests. In cooperation with other USG departments and agencies, CJTF-HOA focuses its operations on building regional security capacity to combat terrorism, deny safe havens, and reduce support to violent extremist organizations. It accomplishes these objectives through the use of Civil Affairs Teams, Seabee construction teams, military advisors, and by importing security courses of instruction.

U.S. Africa Command has focused the majority of its CT capacity building activities in East Africa on Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, which—aside from Somalia—are the countries directly threatened by terrorists. For example, in Kenya, the Command is assisting in establishing a Ranger Strike Force and a Special Boat Unit, which will become the country's primary CT and border security forces. SOCAFRICA completed training two companies of the Kenyan Ranger Strike Force, and our Special Operations Forces (SOF) maritime efforts have created a nascent Kenyan Special Boat Unit capability to enhance Kenyan maritime security.

When completed, Kenya will have a significantly improved capacity to counter the terrorist threat emanating from Somalia.

In Djibouti, U.S. Africa Command is assisting with training of the Djiboutian counter-terrorism unit, the Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale. We are helping with the repair and transfer of 12 vehicles from the AU to Djibouti. The vehicles are specifically for counter-terrorism and border security operations.

The Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) is one of the region's most professional militaries. It is a reliable partner in combating terrorism and, in collaboration with regional partners, is leading operations against the Lord's Resistance Army. Uganda's peacekeeping force in Somalia has played a critical role in providing the TFG an opportunity to establish itself. U.S. Africa Command and CJTF-HOA continue to work with the UPDF to enhance peacekeeping and CT capabilities through Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), IMET, and PKO funded training.

Counter-Narcotics Programs

Our Counter-Narcotics programs train, equip, and support partner nation law enforcement, paramilitary, and military units that have a counter-narcotics and narco-terrorism mission. They build partner capacity to conduct the full range of counter-drug activities, such as sharing information, detecting threats, and interdicting and seizing vessels.

One success from the past year was the construction of a multi-national and interagency fusion center in Cape Verde, funded by our Counter-narcotics Division. The center incorporates U.S. law enforcement, International Police, and Cape Verde law enforcement agencies and maritime forces, and U.S. FMS projects will provide vessels. Our naval component, along with the U.S. Coast Guard, is providing maritime interdiction training and familiarization. The U.S.

Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Justice, and Department of State are also significant contributors. The goal is to develop a Cape Verde maritime force capable of detecting and interdicting illicit traffickers, and sharing critical law enforcement information with the United States and the international community.

Operation OBJECTIVE VOICE (OOV)

OOV is U.S. Africa Command's information operations effort to counter violent extremism by leveraging media capabilities in ways that encourage the public to repudiate extremist ideologies. OOV is closely coordinated with U.S. embassies, DOS, and USAID, and employs a variety of messaging platforms, such as the African Web Initiative, to challenge the views of terrorist groups and provide a forum for the expression of alternative points of view. OOV also supports local outreach efforts to foster peace, tolerance, and understanding. Examples included a 'youth peace games' in Mali and a film project in northern Nigeria. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the enhanced dialogue has had a positive impact. We are currently collecting baseline data and developing assessments to quantify the overall effects.

Contributing to Stability in Current Zones of Conflict

Long-term efforts to build security capacity can only succeed in an environment of sufficient stability. The United States is supporting African efforts to stabilize current and potential zones of conflict through peacekeeping missions and the growth of robust peacekeeping capacity that includes the AU's African Standby Force.

Sudan

U.S. Africa Command is closely working with USG stakeholders to support implementation of the comprehensive U.S. Strategy for Sudan. In Southern Sudan, the Command supports professional military education and non-commissioned officer development programs, HIV/AIDS courses and seminars, as well as familiarization events across professional military skills and functional areas. Additionally, we are examining ways in which our assets and resources can strengthen the UN missions operating in the country, and how we can continue to provide support to DOS-led Security Sector Reform efforts.

Somalia

The lack of an effective central governing authority in Somalia for nearly two decades has created a multitude of de-stabilizing conditions. It has left the country vulnerable to terrorist exploitation, and fosters a permissive environment for piracy and other illicit activities. It also exacerbates a severe humanitarian crisis. AMISOM, the multilateral AU Mission in Somalia, is severely under-resourced, but is essential to securing key TFG locations. The USG's support to AMISOM includes training, equipping, and logistical support for Ugandan and Burundian forces. Additionally, U.S. Africa Command provides military mentors to ACOTA pre-deployment training for AMISOM forces. Before deploying, each battalion receives staff training and soldier skills training tailored to PKO and the operational environment in Somalia.

We also provide support to U.S. Central Command operations to address the increase of piracy in the western Indian Ocean. Counter-piracy training is also a part of our maritime capacity building efforts in east and southern Africa, such as Africa Partnership Station-East.

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)

GPOI is a DOS program that builds peacekeeping capacity in targeted partners and organizations. The GPOI-funded ACOTA program is regularly supported by U.S. Africa Command with officers and non-commissioned officers that serve as trainers and mentors. ACOTA has trained and provided equipment for Ugandan and Burundian forces for AMISOM, and trained Rwandan, South African, Zambian, and Tanzanian Forces for UNAMID.

For FY10, U.S. Africa Command has requested GPOI funding to support training programs to enhance the capabilities of the AU peacekeeping staff, the Economic Community of West African States, the Economic Community of Central African States, and the Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade Headquarters. We have also sought funding for designated member states' tactical units pledged to the respective Regional Standby Brigades.

Addressing Conditions that Contribute to Instability

The U.S. military has a number of civil-military programs that promote good civil-military relations, provide military training benefits, and help develop the humanitarian capacity of African countries. They complement civilian development efforts and are closely coordinated with U.S. embassy country teams.

Exercise MEDFLAG

In August 2009, MEDFLAG 09 was conducted with the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force as a joint Medical/Dental/Veterinary Capabilities Exercise. U.S. Army Africa and U.S. Air Forces Africa designed a mass casualty scenario that exercised the Defense Force's response capabilities and its interoperability with civilian first-responders. The exercise assisted the Swazi ministries of Health and Defense in jointly examining their emergency response plans and

procedures. MEDFLAG 09 helped improve Swaziland's capacity to support future regional AU or UN PKO missions, while highlighting our support for this region of the continent.

Pandemic Response Program

Because infectious disease outbreaks have the potential to rapidly become global crises, U.S. Africa Command works with African partner countries, the interagency, international organizations, and NGOs to build partner military capacity to mitigate the effects of a pandemic. Our efforts are reinforced with three years of funding from USAID, which cooperates with the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and other partner organizations in African countries.

Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) Program

U.S. Africa Command's military HIV/AIDS program is aimed at mitigating the impacts of the disease on African military readiness. The program includes activities that help prevent the escalation of HIV/AIDS infection rates within African security forces, and provide care and treatment for the service members and families infected or affected by the disease. DOD activities that support African militaries' fight against HIV/AIDS now reach 39 African countries. During the first half of FY09, U.S. Africa Command's programs reached over 117,000 African troops and family members with prevention messages, and provided counseling and testing services for 114,430 service members and their families. In addition, 111 senior military leaders have been trained on HIV/AIDS policies, and 2,396 peer educators and 517 health care workers have received HIV/AIDS training. Over 19,000 individuals are on antiretroviral treatment as a result of these collaborative efforts. The fight against HIV/AIDS in Africa is having an impact. Recently, a leader of a southern African country remarked that, three years

ago, he was conducting burials everyday for an HIV related death; however, today he conducts one burial every eight to ten days.

SHARED ACCORD, Benin

When possible, we integrate civil-military operations into our exercises. SHARED ACCORD is one example. Conducted by U.S. MARFORAF, SHARED ACCORD's primary purpose is to train for peacekeeping and peace support operations, and the exercise successfully integrated two Beninese Infantry Companies with two Marine Corps Infantry Companies. An additional component of the exercise was a Medical/Dental Civic Action Program, which treated 7,370 patients during visits to three villages over an 8 day period. A separate Veterinary Civic Action Program treated 92,410 animals while visiting seven villages over the same period. An exercise-related construction project to increase the Beninese capacity to conduct peacekeeper training at the Bembereke Peace Keeping Training Center was also completed.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND COMPONENT AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

U.S. Africa Command has four component commands, one sub-unified command, and the Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa. Our components are newly established and have inherited legacy efforts that they must mold to fit the Command's strategy. U.S. Africa Command's components and subordinate commands are the primary implementers of our programs and activities on the continent. Since our components have no assigned forces, we rely on the DOD Request for Forces process for the resources necessary to support our engagements in Africa.

U.S. Army Africa (USARAF)

On 1 October 2009, the Secretary of the Army designated U.S. Army Africa as the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) to U.S. Africa Command. USARAF will be fully operational capable (FOC) as an ASCC in FY12, and has doubled in size during the last 15 months. USARAF is heavily involved in the professional development of African land forces, which remain the dominant military force in most African states. USARAF's goal is to help transform our partners' land forces into contributors to peace and stability, with the capabilities and capacities required to accomplish their missions in support of legitimate authority.

USARAF continues to forge cooperative relationships and enduring partnerships that contribute to self-sustaining African security capacity. Key to USARAF's success is collaborating with both military and non-military partners. USARAF is fostering new partnerships and enhancing existing ones, to include partnerships with other USG agencies.

USARAF sponsored NATURAL FIRE, the largest exercise on the continent last year. It brought together U.S. forces from Europe and the United States to join with forces from five African states in a Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief exercise in Uganda.

U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF)

NAVAF's primary mission is to improve the maritime security capability and capacity of our African partners. Beyond APS, law enforcement operations, and Theater Security Cooperation activities, NAVAF is working to enhance maritime security by focusing on the development of maritime domain awareness, trained professionals, maritime infrastructure, response capabilities, regional integration, and a comprehensive approach for planning and execution. These capabilities will improve maritime security and contribute to development and

stability by allowing our partners to take advantage of the resources in their exclusive economic zones.

NAVAF, located in Naples, Italy, supports the creation of an environment where all African countries take a proactive interest in their own maritime security and in the overall security of the region. NAVAF utilizes maritime engagement activities to build trust, mutual cooperation, and respect in order to protect U.S. interests, reduce demand for U.S. resources, and ensure reliable and open access to ports, territorial waters, and other resources required for conducting sustained maritime operations.

U.S. Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA/17AF)

The 17th Air Force is the Air Force component to U.S. Africa Command. AFAFRICA continues its growth in capacity to command and control air forces in Africa for the purpose of conducting security engagement and operations, and to promote development, air safety, and security.

AFAFRICA is organized into an Air Force Forces (AFFOR) staff and the 617th Air and Space Operations Center (AOC). AFAFRICA's AFFOR staff reached FOC on 1 October 2009. The 617th AOC is expected to achieve FOC on 1 June 2010. The AOC provides continuous air command and control capability for all theater security cooperation exercise and engagement activities and crisis response operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance and non-combatant evacuation operations. Eventually, the AOC will provide a common operating picture of all air and space missions over the continent. Located at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, the 300-person command is administratively assigned to the United States Air Forces Europe for

DOD funding support. AFAFRICA answers directly to U.S. Africa Command for operational assignments and joint support.

One of AFAFRICA's key programs is the Air Domain Safety and Security (ADSS) program, which is a long-term Air Force program of record with FY10 funding of \$2.6 million. Funding is projected to grow to \$3.1 million in Fiscal Year 2011. AFAFRICA will expand ADSS significantly in 2010, by utilizing general purpose air forces and working together with USG departments and agencies and other partners to develop African capacity to provide regional air safety and security solutions to the civil and military air domains. Discussions with Rwanda, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana are underway, and will lay the foundation for a common regional air picture.

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF)

MARFORAF, located in Stuttgart, Germany, conducts operations, exercises, training, and security cooperation activities throughout the AOR. In 2009, MARFORAF participated in 15 ACOTA missions aimed at improving partners' capabilities to provide logistical support, employ military police, and exercise command and control over deployed forces. As the executive agent for the Non-Lethal Weapons program, MARFORAF conducted a very successful capabilities exercise attended by eleven African countries. This exercise highlighted a wide range of weapons that can limit the escalation of force and increase a tactical commander's ability to control a situation short of lethal force.

MARFORAF conducted mil-to-mil events in 2009 designed to familiarize our African partners with nearly every facet of military operations and procedures, including use of unmanned aerial vehicles, tactics, and medical skills. MARFORAF, as the lead component,

continues to conduct Exercise AFRICAN LION in Morocco--the largest annual Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) exercise on the African continent--as well as Exercise SHARED ACCORD 10, which will be the first CJCS exercise conducted in Mozambique.

U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA)

On 1 October 2008, SOCAFRICA was formed as a Special Operations Forces (SOF) Functional Sub-Unified Command for U.S. Africa Command. SOCAFRICA is co-located with U.S. Africa Command at Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany.

Also on 1 October 2008, SOCAFRICA assumed responsibility for the Special Operations Command and Control Element - Horn of Africa, and on 15 May 2009, SOCAFRICA assumed responsibility for Joint Special Operations Task Force Trans-Sahara (JSOTF-TS)—the SOF component of Operation Enduring Freedom - Trans-Sahara.

SOCAFRICA's objectives are to build operational capacity, strengthen regional security and capacity initiatives, implement effective communication strategies in support of strategic objectives, and eradicate violent extremist organizations and their supporting networks. SOCAFRICA forces work closely with both U.S. Embassy country teams and African partners, maintaining a small but sustained presence throughout Africa, predominantly in the OEF-TS and CJTF-HOA regions. SOCAFRICA's persistent SOF presence provides an invaluable resource that furthers USG efforts to combat violent extremist groups and builds partner nation CT capacity.

Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)

In East and Central Africa, CJTF-HOA is critical to U.S. Africa Command's efforts to build partner capacity to counter violent extremists and address other regional security challenges. Its mission to counter violent extremism and its location at Camp Lemonnier remain of utmost importance given the rising regional threat from al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab in Somalia and al-Qaeda in Yemen. To counter extremist influences, CJTF-HOA works along several lines of effort:

Fostering Regional Security Cooperation: CJTF-HOA works in close coordination with coalition members, African partners, other USG departments and agencies, and NGOs operating in the Joint Operations Area. CJTF-HOA fosters regional security cooperation through support to the East African Standby Force, the International Peace Support Training Center, the Humanitarian Peace Support School, ACOTA, the East African Community, and the East African regional disaster preparedness exercises NATURAL FIRE and GOLDEN SPEAR.

Strengthening Partner Nation Security Capacity: Civil-military Operations, activities, and development programs offer U.S Africa Command various pathways to strengthen partner security capacity. Civil Affairs (CA) teams help our partners promote the legitimacy of their governments and military forces. Coordinated with USAID and DOS, civil affairs activities help mitigate the underlying stresses that can contribute to regional instability. CJTF-HOA also strengthens partner security capacity by supporting APS; providing opportunities for our African partners' militaries to work closely with our CA Teams; developing Maritime Safety and Security/Counter-Piracy capability and capacity; and by providing opportunities for African military liaison officers to serve on the CJTF-HOA staff.

CJTF-HOA's support for Djibouti's efforts to train Somali TFG soldiers and support to the East African Standby Force Field Training Exercise has improved Djibouti's capacity to assume a larger role in promoting peace in the Horn of Africa.

COMMAND ENABLERS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The breadth and scope of U.S. Africa Command's programs and activities in Africa are significant and growing. Our ability to sustain forward progress toward our long-term goals in Africa is dependent on several factors that enable our efforts. Some, such as limits on authorities, present us with challenges where we seek assistance. Others, such as interagency integration, present opportunities for growth and development of new or improved programs and activities that we wish to sustain.

Authorities

Sustaining our long-term security cooperation programs and activities in Africa requires flexible, multi-year authorities. Existing authorities are designed to support the conduct of individual short-term activities or long-term programs, but do not support the transition from the former to the latter. They are also insufficiently responsive to changing conditions, such as when train and equip efforts initiated in response to emergent threats highlight the need for long-term capacity building.

The authorities and programs we currently use for building partner capacity are essential, and I ask for your continued support in the following areas:

- Full support of the President's budget request for the global train and equip program.
- Support of the Department of State's request for programs in Africa.

- Support of the Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund, with increased flexibility for foreign military education and training activities.

We encourage dialogue on ways to streamline or modify legislative authorities to enable sustained security engagement with our African partners, ranging from train and equip programs that respond quickly to changing conditions to long-term partner capacity-building, especially in countering violent extremism.

Theater Infrastructure and Posture Requirements

U.S. Africa Command's theater posture was inherited from the three previous commands that formerly had DOD responsibility for Africa. U.S. Africa Command, in close cooperation with DOS, is evaluating and refining its access needs based on our theater-wide requirements. This centers primarily on gaining and maintaining the access and freedom of movement necessary to conduct both day-to-day security cooperation activities and, if required, crisis response operations. We are working with our components, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and DOS to identify the network of Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) and supporting agreements required to enable the Command to carry out these activities. Currently, 10 CSLs have been identified, 8 of which were previously established by U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command. The Command's posture plan and facilities master plan are designed to address our emerging support requirements.

Forward Operating Sites (FOS) and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) in U.S. Africa Command's AOR

Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) is an enduring location essential to U.S. security interests in East Africa and the greater Indian Ocean basin. This facility supports efforts in the

Gulf of Aden as well as U.S. Central Command's objectives for Yemen. Co-location with Djibouti Airport and proximity to Djibouti's seaport make CLDJ an ideal site for supporting U.S. Africa Command operations throughout the region, and of equal importance is the Camp's ability to support DOD's global transportation infrastructure network as a key node. Camp Lemonnier also supports our international partners as we work together to counter piracy in the region.

We are transitioning CLDJ from its previous contingency footing to an enduring presence through the construction of permanent facilities funded through a military construction program of record. The first series of projects will improve security and safety. Subsequent projects will improve the capacity to sustain operations.

The second of our two FOSs, Ascension Island, is also critical to the strategic transportation network supporting U.S. Africa Command—extending our operational reach to the west and south Africa. U.S. Africa Command is working with U.S. Transportation Command to develop the infrastructure of this FOS so that it can provide broader support to the Command's mission.

En-Route Infrastructure outside U.S. Africa Command's AOR

In addition to the transportation infrastructure inside our AOR, U.S. Africa Command continues to depend on adjacent command infrastructure and main operating bases in Rota (Spain), Sigonella (Italy), Aruba (Lesser Antilles), Souda Bay (Greece), and Ramstein (Germany) for logistical support. Although these sites are located in other geographic combatant command AOR, they are critical intermediate nodes that support operations in Africa.

Command, Control, Communications, and Computer System (C4S) Infrastructure

All the above leads to a requirement for significant investment in the development of its C4S capabilities for our enduring locations—Camp Lemonnier, FOSs, CSLs, and en-route locations. The expanse of the African Continent and U.S. Africa Command’s limited forces necessitate a steady-state C4S requirement met by limited commercial capability or deployed tactical networks. The migration and improvement of legacy C4S, as well as tactical networks, to a robust and sustainable infrastructure will continue to be an investment priority for U.S. Africa Command.

Resources

The level of funding for programs under the authority of DOS that are available to Africa has increased since the creation of U.S. Africa Command, and we request continued funding to allow us to fully pursue the defense aspects of the President’s stated priorities. The countries in our AOR are among the poorest in the world. Many of their militaries are inappropriately trained, equipped, and prepared for their primary missions—the defense of their state or participation in peacekeeping operations. Movement of U.S. and African military personnel and equipment to meet emergent threats, conduct capacity building activities, and respond to crises, is heavily dependent on U.S. military air and sealift.

Fully funding DOS-led programs is necessary to assist our partners in maintaining stability that fosters development, while helping them transform their security sectors. The greatest needs include the following.

Funding for the FMF Program

FY 2011 FMF request totals for Africa are approximately \$38 million, of which \$14 million is allocated to Tunisia and Morocco. If we are to achieve our strategic objectives and avoid undesirable long-term consequences, we must fully fund our requested FMF commitment to the African continent. FMF is critical to accomplishing the United States' mission in Africa and constitutes a long-term investment in critical relationships. Inadequate funding of our FMF request or inconsistent year-to-year distribution can compromise our efforts, turn our partners towards other sources, and inhibit peacekeeping operations. FMF is fundamental to our strategy of preventative rather than reactive response.

Funding for Exercises

A key component of our capacity building is our Joint and Combined Exercise program. This program is conducted under the auspices of the CJCS exercise program, and is dependent upon funding from the Combatant Commander's Exercise and Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program. As the command continues to mature and our exercise program expands to meet the readiness needs of U.S. forces and partner militaries, U.S. Africa Command will place increasing demands for limited CE2T2 funds. We ask for your continued support of the Department's request for the Combatant Commander's Exercise and Engagement and Training Transformation Program.

Funding for Counternarcotics Efforts

Revenue from the sale of illegal narcotics trans-shipped through Africa directly benefits the same drug cartels who resolutely distribute narcotics on the streets of the United States. The influence of drug money in developing states breeds corruption and instability, which may

threaten the availability of African natural resources critical to the U.S. and global economy. Countering the flow of narcotics through Africa has direct relevance to U.S. national security, and we urge you to consider giving this program your full support.

Interagency Integration and Contribution

The construct of U.S. Africa Command is based on the premise that interagency partner integration leads to better planning and greater unity of effort by all USG stakeholders. As mentioned in this statement, our national interests have benefited from U.S. Africa Command's interagency collaboration. Our collective efforts have produced significant positive results in the areas of security sector reform, military professionalization, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster preparedness, pandemic response programs, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.

U.S. Africa Command is working to improve and expand its interagency partner integration. Currently U.S. Africa Command has memoranda of agreement with 11 departments and agencies. Opportunities are expanding with the recent addition of the U.S. Geological Survey, the Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Department of the Interior, and the Transportation Security Administration.

Challenges of successfully embedding interagency personnel in the Command have been identified recently through a comprehensive internal survey. As a result, initiatives are being implemented to address training issues, collaborative exercise planning, and the education of DOD personnel concerning interagency capabilities. We understand that other USG agencies have different obligations and objectives, and that interagency cooperation is a two-way street. In all we do, we seek to ensure that the programs and actions of this Command support overall

U.S. policy in Africa. We continue to work diligently to ensure that interagency participation with U.S. Africa Command is beneficial to all participants and, particularly, to our national interests.

Increases in funding for defense-related programs must be accompanied by adequate resourcing of parallel efforts in diplomacy and development programs. Adequate TSCTP funding enables civilian agency efforts to help our partners develop and sustain conditions to counter violent extremism. We encourage Congress to support USG efforts in their entirety when it comes to diplomacy, development, and defense.

Well-Being Programs

Our Quality of Life (QoL) Office promotes accessibility, equity, and an increased quality of life through services and programs for the U.S. Africa Command family. To help us identify QoL focus areas, Africa Command Families on the African Continent conferences are held to address challenges faced by families living in Africa. To assist our team members and their families in solving problems resulting from deployments and other family changes, we have implemented the Military and Family Life Consultant Program. Concerning education, our partnership with the Department of Defense Education Activity and the Department of Defense Dependent Schools, Europe, ensures educational support to all U.S. Africa Command members. U.S. Africa Command will continue to support and expand these initiatives in FY11.

The Command will continuously assess the theater-wide environment in order to identify emerging and unusually sensitive QoL challenges. We will strengthen our strategic partnerships to leverage best business practices and collaborate on solutions to mitigate or resolve quality of


life issues. We continue to focus our efforts on our members and their families, both on and off the African continent, to ensure their quality of life remains a priority and is funded properly.

CONCLUSION

United States Africa Command's priority is to conduct effective and sustained security cooperation programs and military operations to advance and protect U.S. interests in Africa. Our programs are helping our African partners assume an ever-increasing role in addressing the security concerns of the continent and its island states. By focusing on long-term capacity building, we are implementing a preventative strategy that serves the interests of the United States, our African partners, and our allies.

The United States achieves its greatest effect when all USG agencies work collaboratively in applying the tools of diplomacy, development, and defense to meet our national security objectives. Congress can modernize our nation's approach to emergent challenges made evident in the first decade of this new century by supporting funding and further development of the other USG departments and agencies with whom we partner and support. Revising security assistance authorities will allow all agencies that contribute to our foreign policy and national security effort to improve our unity of effort, and thus ensure we outpace transnational threats that know no lawful limits.

I am grateful for the outstanding Congressional support to U.S. Africa Command. Your continued devotion to the men and women from DOD and other USG departments and agencies assigned to the Command will allow their good work to protect and advance the interests of the United States. I am proud to serve on the U.S. Africa Command team with these dedicated Americans.



General William E. "Kip" Ward

Commander, United States Africa Command

General William E. (Kip) Ward became the first commander of US Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany, on October 1, 2007. US Africa Command is one of six unified geographic commands within the Department of Defense unified command structure.

General Ward was commissioned into the Infantry in June 1971. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced courses, US Army Command and General Staff College, and US Army War College. He holds a Masters of Arts Degree in Political Science from Pennsylvania State University and a Bachelors of Art Degree in Political Science from Morgan State University. His military service has included overseas tours in Korea, Egypt, Somalia, Bosnia, Israel, two tours in Germany, and a wide variety of assignments in the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii.

His command and troop assignments include: Platoon Leader, 3d Battalion (Airborne), 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Rifle Company Commander, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 17th Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, Camp Howze, Korea; S-4 (Logistics), 210th Field Artillery Brigade, VII Corps, US Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany; Executive Officer, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 7th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, US Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany; Commander, 5th Battalion, 9th Infantry, 2d Brigade, later G-4 (Logistics), 6th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Wainwright, Alaska; Commander, 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York and Operation Restore Hope, Mogadishu, Somalia; Assistant Division Commander (Support), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Commanding General 25th Infantry Division (Light) and US Army, Hawaii, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and Commander, Stabilization Force, Operation Joint Forge, Sarajevo, Bosnia.

His staff assignments include: Executive Officer, US Army Military Community Activity -- Aschaffenburg, US Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany; Staff Officer (Logistics), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, US Army, Washington, DC; Executive Officer to the Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, Washington, DC; Deputy Director for Operations, J-3, National Military Command Center, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC; Chief, Office of Military Cooperation, Egypt, American Embassy, Egypt; and Vice Director for Operations, J-3, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.

Prior to assuming his current position, Ward was Deputy Commander, Headquarters US European Command, Stuttgart, Germany. He previously served as the Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, US Army Europe and Seventh Army. While in this capacity he was selected by the Secretary of State to serve as the United States Security Coordinator, Israel - Palestinian Authority where he served from March through December 2005.

General Ward's awards and badges include: the Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster); the Distinguished Service Medal; the Defense Superior Service Medal (with two

Oak Leaf Clusters); the Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters); the Defense Meritorious Service Medal; the Meritorious Service Medal (with six Oak Leaf Clusters); the Joint Service Commendation Medal; the Army Commendation Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters); the Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster); the Expert Infantryman's Badge; the Combat Infantryman's Badge; and the Master Parachutist Badge.

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STATEMENT OF
GENERAL JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

MARCH 10, 2010

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Statement of

**General James N. Mattis, USMC
Commander, United States Joint Forces Command**

Before the House Armed Services Committee

March 10, 2010

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to report on Joint Forces Command. Joint Forces Command is comprised of 1.16 million Active Duty, National Guard and Reserve Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines. Our command provides combat-ready forces to our nation's geographic combatant commanders around the globe in support of today's fight, while we simultaneously prepare the joint force for future conflicts. Successful accomplishment of our mission ensures we field the most capable and ready joint force the world has ever known. At the same time we keep a weather eye on the future to ensure our nation has the fewest regrets when future surprises occur, as they surely will if history is a guide.

Joint Operating Environment (JOE) and Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)

Our thinking about how to prepare our forces for the future must be informed by the past. No one has a crystal ball to accurately predict the threats and challenges we could face. But if we're to reduce the potential for being caught flat-footed, we must explore the strategic and operational depths of the future to provide the most reasoned mental framework within which will come the challenges that our political and military leaders will confront in the future. Developed at Joint Forces Command for defense planners and decision makers, *The Joint*

Operating Environment (JOE) provides a framework of trends, contexts, and strategic implications as a basis for thinking about the world over the next quarter century. Its purpose is not to predict, but to suggest ways leaders might think about the future.

First published in 2008, the *JOE* was updated and will be re-released later this month. This new edition of the *JOE* continues to be historically informed and forward looking, and this year the *JOE* includes a new section that looks at the world's tenuous financial stability, a growing U.S. national debt, and what this all might mean for future national security and defense planning. By considering how global trends will drive change, we draw general conclusions about the military implications. Those implications set the framework for our concept development.

If the *JOE* is the "problem statement" for the future joint force, then the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)* is the "solution." The *CCJO* is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's statement for how the joint force will operate in the future threat environment described in the *JOE*. As the Capstone Concept, it was drafted with active engagement of the Joint Chiefs and Combatant Commanders under the guidance of the Chairman. This past summer a series of war games tested the *CCJO* and found it conceptually sufficient. The games also highlighted several key areas that require focus and improvement for the joint force and informed the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Throughout history every military organization that has successfully adapted has done so by clearly articulating the problem as we have in the *JOE*, and then resolving the problem as the

Chairman has outlined in the *CCJO*. With the *QDR*, *JOE* and the *CCJO* providing our backdrop, Joint Forces Command remains focused this year on prevailing in the current conflict, preparing for a wide range of future contingencies, and preserving and enhancing the joint force, including its ability to work harmoniously with other elements of the U.S. Government and allies.

Prevail in Today's Conflicts

Supporting the current active operations overseas commands much of our effort. We are engaged in training and deploying forces, analyzing and applying lessons learned, and overseeing the development of joint capabilities in response to our warfighting commanders needs. These activities demand a sense of urgency. It is imperative that we adapt and evolve the force to confound our enemies, keeping our forces at their top effectiveness.

As the joint force provider, Joint Forces Command is responsible for providing trained and ready forces to combatant commanders in support of current operations and global contingencies. This mission area has the most immediate and visible impact on current joint operations. During the past year, we responded to more than 390 rotational and emergent requests for forces from combatant commanders resulting in the sourcing of more than 398,000 personnel supporting numerous global missions. Key among these is the troop increase in Afghanistan, while continuing to satisfy requirements in Iraq and other regions.

In reserve, as a shock absorber for unpredictable events like the surprises outlined in the *JOE*, Joint Forces Command maintains the Global Response Force ready to respond to unforeseen crises at home or abroad. This force, most recently deployed in support of Haiti,

provides the Commander-in-Chief with flexible options to respond to a variety of crises while we simultaneously fulfill our commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere around the world.

The character of ongoing operations has resulted in unusual stress on “high-demand, low density” assets and requires accelerated force structure changes. In some cases the demand requires new capabilities be developed. The work associated with the QDR resulted in considerable gains in identifying shortfalls and validating the need to balance the force. Although the Services are continuing to increase these capabilities, persistent shortfalls exist in electronic warfare, civil affairs, engineering, military intelligence, military police, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

While we cannot accurately predict the type warfare in which we must be ready to engage in the future, we recognize that we cannot adopt a single, preclusive view of war. Balance is key. Our forces must be tailored to provide the maximum flexibility to deal with a wide range of conflicts and contingencies, because today's strategic and operational environment is characterized by the constants of rapid change and complexity. Today, we recognize that the force must be balanced to effectively meet various challenges to U.S. interests and an irregular threat, without compromising our nuclear deterrent or conventional capabilities and at a time when the distinctions between types of warfare are blurring. Our military leaders and our forces will need to be the most versatile in our nation's history.

In support of this line of thinking, in March of 2009 Joint Forces Command published a vision for Irregular Warfare (IW) and established a set of goals and objectives to advance counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability operations capabilities as a core competency within the General Purpose Forces. Our Joint Irregular Warfare Center (JIWC) is the command's catalyst and driving force behind establishing IW as a core competency for the joint force. This team is building bridges across the Services, Service labs, industry, academia, civilian partners, and with allies to harvest the best ideas on how to address this challenging form of warfare and steal a march on our enemy.

As you know, the non-state, insurgent and terrorist adversaries we face today in the Middle East and elsewhere have chosen approaches to warfare that avoids our conventional strengths. We have adapted to these changing approaches to war and will continue to do so across the joint force. The asymmetric approach of our enemy has in some cases negated our technologically superior, iconic weapon systems, putting the preponderance of enemy engagements in the hands of our ground troops in close quarters combat. In this unforgiving environment, our ground units are employed every day, and this is where over 80% of our casualties occur, often in the initial firefights.

Across all warfighting communities, training advances have been significant, yet the use of advanced simulation technology has not yet achieved for infantry training what we take as routine for aviation, armor or maritime simulation training. While there are a host of reasons, and the different combat training regimes pose notably different simulation challenges, dramatic advances in immersive simulation, artificial intelligence, and gaming technology must now be

harnessed to bring state-of-the-art simulation to small infantry units. Though the rudimentary simulation designed for close combat currently affords units some level of challenge, it does not yet approach the level of sophistication deemed essential in other disciplines.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has directed funding to the Services and Joint Forces Command to support the urgent development of infantry immersive training simulators as part of a broader national effort for small unit excellence. As our troops are engaged around the world and assigned a variety of missions confronting insurgents on the ground, the development of a close combat/infantry immersive training simulator is a national priority in terms of creating top-performing small units able to take advantage of joint surveillance and fire support. Our immediate task is to create prototype immersive training simulators as a means to enhance warfighter survivability, amplify exposure to joint and combined assets, improve the employment of our joint-asymmetric capabilities, and increase the overall effectiveness of our close combat/infantry small unit performance to defeat the enemy while protecting the innocent intentionally jeopardized by our enemies' tactics.

Focusing efforts to enable small units to combine initiative, critical thinking, and joint warfighting experience will allow for brilliance in combat skill basics and agile responses to the enemies we face. Casualty reduction, fewer ethical missteps, psychological resilience and enhanced mission success rates are the goals. We will remain responsive and innovative to confront the challenges our close combat and small infantry units encounter today and tomorrow. Other communities have demonstrated that simulator training is an effective tool to increase

operational effectiveness. America's close combat/infantry forces will get our best effort to provide them every advantage and prepare them fully to achieve success in battle.

In addition to improved simulation training capabilities, Joint Forces Command continues its efforts to enhance small unit effectiveness. We have brought together the trainers, coaches, educators, social and human scientists, academia, and technical and cognitive assessment experts to form a community of interest that will improve the combat effectiveness of our small units. Paramount to this effort is the development of leaders who are capable of operating against a broad spectrum of threats, while retaining and enhancing their ability to lead in a more conventional environment. The complex and dynamic security environment demands that we have small units and leaders that are able to take advantage of fleeting opportunities on the battlefield. These small units and leaders must be able to operate independently, possessing the full knowledge and ability to employ joint and combined capabilities, and subsequently be empowered to make critical decisions under stressful conditions - the same attributes we anticipate will be required on future battlefields, conventional or otherwise.

Working with the Services, Joint Forces Command has developed a Concept for Joint Distributed Operations in support of experimentation to be conducted this summer. This concept describes how joint enabling capabilities can be made more effectively and efficiently available to smaller distributed units and that these joint capabilities can be pushed to lower echelons. Current operations demonstrate that distributed operations are becoming more the norm, and this experiment will draw on lessons learned and best practices from recent experience to determine what solutions should be incorporated into future joint force capabilities.

In Afghanistan, U.S. airpower represents one of our joint force's greatest asymmetric advantages over the enemy. The employment of air-based joint fires, used properly, will wreak havoc on enemy forces. In the fluid environment of a counter-insurgency fight, the decision to employ these joint air-based fires will come from leaders who understand that to be effective these fires must be employed rapidly and precisely against the enemy while avoiding civilian casualties. Effective employment often requires persistent observation, integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and shortened approval procedures. Our airpower is unmatched in the world, however today's approach of loitering multi-million dollar aircraft and using a system-of-systems procedure for the approval and employment of airpower is not the most effective use of aviation fires in this irregular fight. A Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft capability has the potential to shift air support from a reactive threat response, to a more proactive approach that reduces sensor-to-shooter timelines, with immediate and accurate fires, providing surveillance and reconnaissance throughout a mission, while providing communication and navigation support to troops on the ground. Additionally, a LAAR capability can provide a means to build partner capacity with effective, relevant air support. This year Joint Forces Command will closely follow a project called Imminent Fury where the Navy and Air Force will employ a LAAR capability to reinforce our asymmetric advantage over the enemy.

Presently, one of the enemy's most effective weapons is the Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Joint Forces Command is collaborating closely with the Joint IED Defeat Organization to defeat this enemy capability, sharing lessons learned and adapting our operating

concept and training efforts. Joint Forces Command continues to prepare the joint force to conduct operations in urban environments to defeat adversaries who are embedded and diffused within a population without causing catastrophic damage to the functioning society. In collaboration with the Services and international partners, we will strive to leverage relevant efforts that address gaps in our ability to effectively operate within cities and complex terrain.

The joint force has learned and adapted to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and required stability operations conducted in a complex environment. Recently, the Services and Joint Forces Command completed an initial assessment of U.S. General Purpose Forces (GPF) readiness and proficiency for irregular warfare. This first effort provides a primarily qualitative assessment of proficiency and readiness, and will serve as a baseline for future work. As we incorporate IW - relevant tasks, skills, and experiences into our tracking mechanisms and further institutionalize the enduring lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, subsequent assessments will provide a more quantitative and focused picture of the GPF's proficiency and readiness for IW.

The complex series of coincident challenges continues to demand highly educated warriors and leaders. Joint Forces Command continues to provide a robust Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) program to support the training of deploying headquarters elements to Afghanistan. These have included the 101st Airborne Division and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force Forward. These exercises are continually improved to stress cultural awareness and the decision making skills required in the irregular warfare environment, including interagency, coalition and Afghan Security Force representatives in attendance. During 2009, the exercise support to

Central Command's Combined Transition Command-Afghanistan helped prepare that staff to assist the Afghan National Army to assume national responsibilities. The exercises remained tightly linked to our joint and NATO lessons learned processes, and feedback from the field continues to shape the scenarios and operational problems within which we train and evaluate deploying commanders and their staffs.

Through Joint Knowledge Development & Delivery Capability (JKDDC) and Joint Knowledge Online (JKO), Joint Forces Command continues to provide virtual classroom training to cover a wide array of training topics. The JKO Portal hosts more than 330 courses, including many developed by coalition partner nations to build partner capacity through sharing information and security related training. The portal also offers basic language training and tailored pre-deployment training for Individual Augmentees (IAs) and coalition partners participating in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many resources found on the JKO Portal also are available to interagency, international and non-governmental organizations. To date, JKO reports over 100,000 registered users and 230,000 course completions. In 2009 JKDDC invested in research and development for advanced technology capabilities that targeted specific training gaps. These fielded and available applications include the Virtual Cultural Awareness Trainer (VCAT) and the Small Group Scenario Trainer (SGST), specifically addressing operations, tailored cultural awareness training, and small group training capability needs. These applications provide some rudimentary capabilities to satisfy basic warfighter training needs.

Coalition Efforts

The U.S. will seldom choose to go it alone. Allies and coalition partners play a key role across the full range of military operations today and those anticipated in the future. The presence of allies and partners will likely exert a major influence on the military balance in future operations. Our friends can and do provide critical support. We must continue to broaden and deepen relationships with capable security partners. Joint Forces Command continues to strengthen partnerships through engagement with DoD and NATO, via Allied Command Transformation (ACT), and representatives from other nations assigned to the command. The command remains actively linked to ACT, not only because of its proximity, but also because of the productive working relationships fostered between the headquarters' staffs. As of December 2009, Joint Forces Command routinely collaborates bi-laterally with representatives from 48 nations. These relationships are critical to building the trust and interoperability necessary to build and sustain strong alliances and coalitions.

The Joint Forces Command led Multi-National Experiment (MNE) 6 is a two-year, multinational and interagency effort to improve coalition capabilities against enemies employing a mix of irregular operational methods, adaptive technologies, and hybrid approaches to warfare through a whole-of-government approach. Participants include military and civilian sectors of 18 NATO and non-NATO nations, NATO's Allied Command Transformation, and U.S. Special Operations Command. MNE 6 produced draft products on the assessment of operational progress and cross-cultural awareness in the first year. The remainder of the experiment is focused on developing and implementing at national and international levels solutions for coordination of partner efforts to solve a crisis, assess campaign progress with valid metrics, and develop a strategy for information sharing and situational understanding.

A common, often daunting task for the geographic combatant commander is strengthening indigenous security forces. As articulated in the QDR report, Security Force Assistance (SFA) is a cornerstone for establishing regional security. Effective indigenous security forces can preclude or minimize conflict and thereby strengthen the collective security against threats and security challenges, reducing the potential demand for U.S. forces. While Security Force Assistance expertise traditionally resides within special operations forces (SOF), some aspects of SFA are well suited to general purpose forces (GPF). Transitioning portions of these responsibilities will relieve pressure on our over-extended SOF. The GPF possesses robust capability that can be used more effectively to provide full spectrum SFA support. For example, a maritime SFA possesses the expertise to support everything from low-end opportunities such as small boat engine maintenance, to ballistic missile defense, one of the most complex aspects of modern warfare.

Presently, the joint force is not optimally trained and organized to advise and assist with building partnerships, although real progress has been demonstrated. As the provider of the majority of the GPF to the combatant commanders, we remain fully engaged with Special Operations Command to expand these capabilities, particularly the emerging role of SFA. We envision selected SFA executed by GPF in small units, task organized for the mission, operating in a distributed manner and building partner security capability in support of theater campaign plans. This vision includes SFA support within the ground, air and maritime domains. Our maritime forces are uniquely positioned to support this mission, by providing SFA from the sea, thereby sustaining U.S. influence while minimizing the U.S. footprint ashore, and maintaining

the security of the global commons. To support this vision of an expanded GPF role, we have adapted the global force management process to account for SFA, and are addressing this capability in joint concept development and experimentation like the Joint Distributed Operations experiment, ensuring the Services have a model for these operations and highlighting Service strengths, such as our asymmetric naval capabilities.

Prepare

Where deterrence fails and enemies threaten our national interests, the joint force must have the capacity and capability to apply force. It must be prepared to operate with success in a wide range of contingencies. Preparing the joint force for these future contingencies is the focus of Joint Forces Command's effort supporting the development of fully interoperable joint warfighting capabilities and concepts.

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is the means to develop our future leaders for the complexity of the threat environment in which those leaders will find themselves. Viewed broadly, JPME is a strategic asset for our nation that shapes the understanding of not just American officers, but also for preparing and building personal relationships and trust with our allied or partner nations whose officers also attend our schools. Today, JPME is essential to understanding the multiplicity of state and non-state actors, the nature of warfare, and building partner capacity to operate in an era of persistent engagement. The complexities of today's complex security environment demand the most innovative and versatile leaders to execute a strategy that demands melding military, civil and cultural factors. A trained warfighter must perform acceptably against a range of threats and in dynamic security environments, which demand highly-educated warriors who can adapt opportunistically in order to prevail. A critical

thinker/warrior will know how to acquire knowledge, process information from multiple sources, and make timely, accurate decisions in complex, ethically challenging and ever-changing environments. We now place greater emphasis on the study of history, culture and language beyond their broad incorporation into training and exercise scenarios, including efforts employing the latest modeling and simulation technology.

We are taking concrete steps to translate battlefield adaptations into rapid institutional change. Our maturing relationship with the National Defense University (NDU) is one effort to improve JPME and ensure it is aligned properly with the current realities and future challenges that we pick up in lessons learned, mission rehearsal exercises, and concept development. Results from the ongoing House Armed Services Committee Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, National Defense University, and Service school evaluations of the entire JPME program can provide insights to transform JPME, making it more effective and relevant to meet the demands of both the present and future operating environments. In conjunction with Special Operations Command and NDU, we will stand-up an Irregular Warfare Academic Center of Excellence to provide a capability which harnesses the work of the many academic institutions studying counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, stability operations, unconventional operational methods, and hybrid approaches to warfare and to make their lessons relevant and available to the joint force. I strongly urge your continued support of our efforts to expand allied and partner access to our educational institutions to further build trust and interoperability among our forces, while broadly sharing our ethical grounding. We are also swiftly incorporating battlefield lessons learned into rehearsal exercises and senior leader education programs like the Pinnacle, Capstone and Keystone courses. Participants' surveys consistently note the relevance of both

lessons learned and interaction with senior level warfighters who bring a wealth of experience to bear.

As a means to promote the necessary cognitive approaches, the application of ‘operational design’ will help leaders understand the problem, understand the environment, design an approach to solve the problem, and reframe the problem when circumstances change. Joint Forces Command has initiated a program to move operational design forward at the tactical, operational and strategic levels; focused on a cognitive approach vice procedural approach; built with the best of breed; developed in a joint context; and in collaboration with all the Services, while leveraging the Army’s mature work along these lines.

During the past year, Joint Forces Command examined the adequacy of the joint force to execute the precepts outlined in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. Through wargaming activity, and drawing on the extensive experience and broad perspective of participants who included seven ambassadors; four former combatant commanders; active flag and general officers from the United States, United Kingdom and Australia; subject matter experts from all services and combatant commands; and representatives from relevant U.S. Government departments and the National Security Council, this examination identified risk areas where the joint force’s ability to achieve its mission are most vulnerable, and evaluated potential mitigating actions.

The CCJO wargame identified force development implications in order to address the changing nuclear landscape, gaining and maintaining access around the globe, interagency

integration, situational understanding, and overcoming digital dependence. Detailed insights and recommendations from the experiment were provided to joint and Service policy and decision makers and helped inform the QDR. The CCJO and related experimentation are also shaping the development of supporting concepts focused on combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction, which in turn will update our guiding doctrine.

We have no sense of complacency. The enemy doesn't rest, nor will we as we move to check his capabilities. With the proliferation of inexpensive and capable technology, our enemies are gaining precision capability, and this is no longer an exclusive advantage of U.S./NATO forces. This precision capability will allow modestly funded states or non-state actors to acquire long-range precision munitions, project power from farther out, and with greater accuracy. We are just now scratching the surface on how best to defend against and defeat this threat and overcome the anti-access threat they constitute.

During the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, Hezbollah employed unmanned aerial vehicles on several occasions. This use of low cost, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles demonstrated that sophistication is not the sole realm of developed states. Again, the proliferation of relatively cheap and capable technology is creating threats we must be prepared to reckon with. Presently, our Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Center of Excellence, in conjunction with the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Office, is developing a concept of operations to address challenges and evaluate capabilities associated with countering adversary unmanned aerial systems.

With almost a decade of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is inevitable that some currently unused capabilities may atrophy. In many cases, there are now joint warfighters who have never assaulted a beach or hit a drop-zone by parachute. Because of this, we are seeing a decline in our ability to conduct forcible entry operations, operations that can reassure our friends and temper our adversaries' designs. Additionally, the continued development and proliferation of longer range, precision guided munitions challenge our ability to perform these operations in the contested littorals around the globe. The battle for access may prove not only the most important, but the most difficult, requiring forcible entry capabilities and sustainment capabilities. Couple this readiness issue with aging ships, aerial tankers and strategic bombers, and our ability to gain access and influence actions over strategic distances needs to receive increased attention. Seabasing is a highly relevant supporting effort as we look toward our asymmetric strengths to create cost-imposing dilemmas on future enemies.

Joint force commanders require robust Command & Control (C2) capabilities that enable agile decision-making and information flow from the operational to tactical level across today's global domain. This domain encompasses cyberspace, all wired and wireless communications, and fixed and mobile warfighting customers, to include the networks that support them down to the tactical edge. Robust C2 implies a degree of reliability, redundancy, and agility necessary to effectively operate, both independently and with our coalition partners and allies, in degraded and/or austere conditions. Developing enhanced, robust C2 capabilities in the near-term requires adoption of an integrated C2 triad network approach; specifically the blending of surface (including maritime), air and space systems into a resilient network. We are working to develop an operational context for objective joint analysis, assessment and training, and common standards to verify operational effectiveness of information exchanges and interoperability.

As the Command and Control capability portfolio manager, Joint Forces Command is responsible for leading a number of efforts across the C2 Joint Capability Area which directly supports the establishment of an integrated C2 triad network. These integration efforts will enhance our wired and wireless cyberspace capabilities, while leveraging and creating cyberspace opportunities. To better enable our small units operating at the wireless tactical edge in austere and/or hostile environments, we are working in coordination with Special Operations Command, Strategic Command, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration to develop C2 On-the-Move (C2OTM) and Joint Aerial Layer Network (JALN) capabilities. Central to this effort is the stand-up of the Joint Systems Integration and Interoperability Lab (JSIIL) to conduct full-spectrum C2 capability analyses and up-front Joint Systems Engineering (JSE) to improve joint interoperability and integration. Finally, we continue to advocate on behalf of the warfighter ensuring the sustainment and synchronization of our C2 legacy systems as we migrate to objective joint C2 capabilities, including an Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) capability that strives to reduce the time required for warfighter plan development to under a year, and accelerate plan execution to near real time.

In Iraq and Afghanistan our opponents have displayed considerable capacity to learn and adapt in both the political and tactical arenas. We anticipate we will see more of this in the future; more sophisticated opponents of U.S. military forces will certainly attack perceived American vulnerabilities. It is highly likely that attacks on our computers, space and communications systems will severely degrade command and control of U.S. forces. Thus, those

forces must possess the ability to operate effectively against denial operations and in degraded conditions.

For this reason our leaders must understand that, first and foremost, C2 is a human endeavor. C2 must be leader-centric and network-enabled to facilitate initiative and decision-making at the lowest level possible. While materiel solutions, processes, and engineering can enable decision making, command and control is not synonymous with network operations nor the employment of advanced technology. The joint force must have the flexibility to exploit both. Commanders must be skilled at crafting and articulating their intent, enabling junior leaders to exercise initiative and take advantage of fleeting opportunities in the decentralized operations we anticipate, vice centralizing decision-making at high levels. This is vital in both conventional force-on-force warfare and decentralized operations that we observe in the combat zone.

Preserve /Conclusion

We must continue to seek ways to ensure the vitality and the quality of the all-volunteer force. As the joint force provider, I have a vested interest in the vitality and quality of the force. Our number one priority remains supporting the warfighters around the globe to prevail in today's wars. Essential to this effort is sustaining the all-volunteer force to maintain the combat effectiveness of our warfighting formations.

Our guiding principle is balance as we craft our approach to countering any specific threat or scenario while protecting against the surprises that are sure to come. Our force must be

designed with the aim of having the fewest regrets when surprises strike. From applying lessons learned to our current efforts, to guiding sound concept development and experimentation to build future combat power, with your support, Joint Forces Command will continue to press ahead in our efforts.

On behalf of the men and women of U.S. Joint Forces Command, I thank you for the opportunity to report. I look forward to working with you to ensure the continued security of America.



Gen. James N. Mattis
United States Marine Corps
Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command

Gen. Mattis serves as commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), located in Norfolk, Va.

The command focuses on supporting current operations while shaping U.S. forces for the future.

Gen. Mattis has commanded at multiple levels. As a lieutenant, he served as a rifle and weapons platoon commander in the 3rd Marine Division. As a captain, he commanded a rifle company and a weapons company in the 1st Marine Brigade.

As a major, he commanded Recruiting Station Portland. As a lieutenant colonel, he commanded 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, one of Task Force Ripper's assault battalions in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As a colonel, he commanded 7th Marines (Reinforced).

Upon becoming a brigadier general, he commanded first the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade and then Task Force 58, during Operation Enduring Freedom in southern Afghanistan. As a major general, he commanded the 1st Marine Division during the initial attack and subsequent stability operations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In his first tour as a lieutenant general, he commanded the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and served as the deputy commandant for combat development.

Most recently, he commanded the I Marine Expeditionary Force and served as the commander of U.S. Marine Forces Central Command.

From 2007-09, he served as both NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and commander, USJFCOM.

Gen. Mattis, a native of the Pacific Northwest, graduated from Central Washington State University in 1972. He is also a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the National War College.

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

MARCH 10, 2010

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SESTAK

Admiral STAVRIDIS. BLUF: Re-engagement thru the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) program would be prudent for the long term cooperation and protection of the Arctic. The more venues in which we can encourage dialogue and cooperation amongst the Arctic nations the better opportunities we have to develop peaceful and meaningful solutions to our challenges.

Background:

The AMEC program began as a Norwegian initiative to combine the efforts of the U.S., Norway, and Russia to address environmental problems in the arctic region associated with Russian nuclear submarine decommissioning. In a 1999 program plan to the Congress, DOD stated that AMEC projects would support the goals of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. However in GAO-04-924 the GAO found that “only one of eight AMEC projects designed to support CTR’s objective of dismantling Russia’s ballistic missile nuclear submarines” had done so. “Despite AMEC’s limited contribution to the CTR, DOD officials, including CTR representatives, said that most of the projects can be used to support dismantlement of other types of Russian nuclear submarines”

Jerry Havens, Distinguished Professor of chemical engineering and director of the Chemical Hazards Research Center and reviewer for the Technical Guidance Group of the AMEC program stated in 2004 that “nuclear submarines pose a transnational-boundary environmental threat primarily because of the highly radioactive spent fuel that remains in their nuclear reactors” and that “It is critical that the United States participate in the efforts to prevent further damage to the environment. It’s not just Norway’s problem or Russia’s problem . . . eventually the pollutants released into the Barents Sea will wash up onto our own shores.” [See page 34.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Last year, Admiral Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations, began studying the implications of climate change for the Naval services. That research is ongoing as there are many factors that must be analyzed. The U.S. Navy has no ice-hardened surface ships and all of its icebreakers were transferred to the Coast Guard in 1965. As such, the Coast Guard is the federal agency charged with operating the Nation’s icebreaking fleet. Polar-capable icebreakers are unique national assets and the only USCG surface assets capable of projecting and fulfilling national objectives in the Arctic region year round. Therefore, I feel it prudent that the USCG maintain its current icebreakers in operational condition until such time as the Nation can determine the best mix of assets needed to meet national requirements. [See page 32.]

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Currently the Coast Guard has three polar-capable icebreakers, although the USCGC POLAR STAR (WAGB-10) and USCGC POLAR SEA (WAGB-11) are the only two built to handle heavy ice. Both Polar-Class icebreakers are near the end of their service life. The third icebreaker, HEALY is a multi-mission, medium icebreaker that primarily supports Arctic science research; however, HEALY is not nearly as capable at breaking thick ice as our two Polar-class breakers. HEALY and POLAR SEA are operational. The Coast Guard is reactivating POLAR STAR from a caretaker status and it should be operational by the end of 2012. [See page 32.]

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