HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S.
SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND
HEARING HELD
MARCH 18, 2010
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### THURSDAY, MARCH 18, 2010

#### FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Morning. Committee will come to order. And today's hearing is part of our annual series of posture hearings with combatant commanders. I am pleased to welcome General Renuart of the Northern Command [NORTHCOM] and the North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD], and General Doug Fraser of the U.S. Southern Command [SOUTHCOM].

We welcome you both. Let me express my gratitude and appreciation to all the service men and women whom you each command. They provide an invaluable service to our country, and we are certainly in their debt. We are fortunate to have the Northern Command and the Southern Command represented here today. In many respects these two commands share more than a common boundary.

They take on many similar types of intractable challenges and work closely with our partners to provide our regions' security and stability. Recent events including the earthquake that devastated parts of Haiti, and drug cartel-related violence near our border in Mexico remind us of the many important varied missions of these commands.

At today's hearing we will look forward to our witnesses' testimony on these missions, and issues that they face. Starting in the Northern Command area of responsibility we would like to hear from the general about what progress we are making in helping our Mexican neighbors combat narcosyndicates and border violence.

I also look forward to hearing about how NORTHCOM is continuing to work to improve coordination with local, state, and federal authorities. We would also like to hear about how the recent quadrennial defense review recommendations will impact NORTHCOM. In particular please address recommendations for faster and more flexible consequent management forces and improved awareness in the Arctic region.
Turning to the Southern Command, we would like to commend General Fraser and all those men and women in SOUTHCOM for their tremendous effort in Haiti in conjunction with Operation Unified Response. Under the command of SOUTHCOM, American military forces quickly responded to the urgent needs of the Haitian people and allowed them to immediately start the relief and recovery process after the devastating earthquake that struck their capital city at Port-au-Prince.

SOUTHCOM played a critical role in the inter-agency effort in Haiti. I am very proud of all those involved. I am also interested to hear the General's thoughts on the future of Haiti and what SOUTHCOM's role and the requirements will be there.

I continue to be very concerned about the flow of illegal narcotics from the South and Central America into our country as well as reports of increase in trafficking to Europe and the Middle East. We welcome any comments the General might have on those issues.

In addition we would like to hear a frank assessment of the status of our relationship with militaries and governments in the SOUTHCOM region. That is important that we know that. Please address how the current state of our relationship impacts our ability to conduct counternarcotics and other operations in that area.

More broadly speaking we would like to hear from both our witnesses today on ideas that you may have for improving your commands' ability to execute its missions. Once again we thank our witnesses for being here. We are proud of what you do. We look forward to hearing your comments today on answering our questions.

Now I turn to my good friend, the Ranking Member, gentleman from California, Buck McKeon.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Today we conclude our series of posture hearings with the commanders from U.S. Northern Command—NORTHCOM, and U.S. Southern Command—SOUTHCOM. I would like to welcome General Renuart and General Fraser. Gentlemen, you represent the best America has to offer and I thank you indeed for your service. And all of those behind you in uniform that are here with you.

General Renuart, you have the dual responsibility of overseeing two commands, NORTHCOM and the North American Space Defense Command—NORAD. There are several issues within your AOR I hope that will be addressed today. But I would like to take this opportunity to focus on one of the most eminent national security challenges on our nation's doorstep—the narcocriminal enterprise operating in Mexico.

As both the ranking member of this committee as well as a representative of Southern California, I am deeply concerned with the scourge of violence fueled by the ongoing battles among powerful cartels. The recent killings in Ciudad Juarez illustrate the danger and reach of the escalating drug war. Soon after he took office,
President Obama honed in on this issue endorsing the Merida Initiative which was passed by Congress in 2008. But that interest seems to be flagging even though the violence is not.

Mexico cannot win this war without America’s help, and we cannot afford for Mexico to lose. From your perspective where and how should we build upon the momentum initiated by Merida and translate that effort into a lasting partnership? What role do you see NORTHCOM playing in terms of building the capacity of the Mexican military to counter the threats it faces?

Turning to SOUTHCOM, General Fraser, first I must commend SOUTHCOM for its efforts to assist Haiti in its time of need. The success of Operation Unified Response speaks to the professionalism of your forces and to the command’s efforts to enhance its inter-agency relationships. Your forces brought comfort and hope to a devastated people, and have helped to put Haiti back on a road to recovery.

While our engagement in Latin America is often focused on disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, we must not forget that the region faces many pressures that make it vulnerable. Narco-trafficking continues to undermine regional stability and bring violence to the countries it touches. Authoritarian regimes seek to reduce U.S. influence and engagement in the region while other outside influences from terrorist financing groups to Iran seek to make further inroads.

Given our commitments in other areas of the world, most notably the CENTCOM [United States Central Command] AOR [area of responsibility], I am concerned that we may not have the resources needed or the focus to appropriately engage our Latin American partners on a military level. And that security and stability in the region will suffer. How is SOUTHCOM addressing the region’s many challenges, and where do you need our assistance?

In closing let me take a moment to comment on the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. One issue related to the work of the joint task force that concerns me is how it manages the interaction between Gitmo detainees and their habeas lawyers. My understanding is that lawyers are prohibited from giving detainees information relating to military operations, intelligence, arrests, political news, and the names of U.S. government personnel. There have been reports in the press recently that some habeas lawyers have violated and continue to violate DOD procedures and possibly the law. I think these issues merit serious attention.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that my entire statement be included for the record where I address other issues facing the combatant commands testifying here today. Once again I thank you for being here this morning, and I will look forward to your testimony.

Yield back, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 40.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And without objection your prepared testimony will be placed in the record.

We thank you gentlemen for being with us. General Renuart, you are on.
STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND

GENERAL RENUART. Well thank you, Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, members of the committee. Great to be with you this morning. I say that with a true smile on my face in that I am approaching 39 years of service to our nation, and my wife has said, "It is time to do something different."

And so we will be retiring after I change command in this office here later this spring—early summer. And I must say I want to express my thanks while I may not have the opportunity to come before you again. I want to express my thanks to the committee for all the support you have provided to our two commands over the previous three years of my command. And certainly as we have grown and developed over the last few years.

The safety of the nation is our paramount concern. And you share that with us every day. And we appreciate that quite a bit. It is good to have the opportunity to talk about the successes that our two commands have achieved over the past few years, and to talk about some of the challenges you mentioned today. Certainly the difficulty in Mexico. The integration with our state and federal partners as we look at events that may occur in the homeland. Discussing the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] and ballistic missile defense [BMD] and other issues. The Arctic and clearly how we and SOUTHCOM collaborate in combating narcocriminalism in this hemisphere.

So these are all topics that I look forward to having a good discussion with you today. As I start it is important for me also to extend my thanks to the men and women who wear the cloth of our nation each day. They defend our homeland certainly in the battlefields far away from the United States. But they also defend our homeland every day here as a combined team of active Guard and Reserve military members ensuring that our families and our communities are safe and secure.

In particular I would like to recognize the service of our enlisted personnel of each of our services, and recognize them through our senior enlisted leader at U.S. Northern Command and NORAD today.

I am pleased to have Chief Master Sergeant Allen Usury here with me today. He is my senior enlisted leader. And of note, Chief Usury is the first National Guard senior enlisted leader selected for duty at U.S. Northern Command. And I looked at all of the competitors, and Allen clearly was head and shoulders above active Guard and Reservists who competed. So I am pleased to have him with me.

Also great to share the table with my friend Doug Fraser. Over the past months our commands have partnered substantially across a broad spectrum of interest areas to our nation.

First, in the fight against narcoterrorism and the drug trafficking organizations in our hemisphere. We have partnered substantially in a broad variety of areas. And whether that is sharing of intelligence information, combined operations in the Caribbean and in the Pacific, or collaborating with Mexico in order to make them more capable of countering the challenges that they have in their
nation, SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM truly have stood as partners. And so, it is a treat to be able to sit here and have the discussion today with Doug.

We have also partnered to ensure that the U.S. efforts to support the victims in Haiti have been successful. And I am pleased to have been able to assist and partner with Doug’s team in terms of planners and air operators and a number of other skill sets that we have provided in order to assist in that effort.

Chairman, as you mentioned, our missions are twofold. One, the NORAD mission, a bi-command mission to ensure the air and space sovereignty and security, and the maritime sovereignty and security of our two nations is maintained.

In our NORTHCOM role, to provide for U.S. forces to defend the homeland from a variety of external threats, as well as to support law enforcement as we defend ourselves against security concerns inside the borders of our country.

We are careful to keep a line between both. We understand the Constitutional limitations of use of the military in the homeland. We also understand how the military can support our law enforcement and other federal partners in the homeland.

Across a broad spectrum of missions, from air sovereignty, to maritime domain awareness, to homeland defense, to ballistic missile defense, to support to law enforcement, our team—and that is a team of over 60 agencies with this government—works every day hand in hand to ensure we can be successful.

From warning to consequence management, that broad spectrum is in our job jar every day. And I will be pleased to answer the questions—those questions—with you as we get further into today’s session.

We work hard with each of those teammates. We have worked hard to develop and integrate planning system that does in fact incorporate state and local and federal agencies in a coherent process.

And I think the examples of Hurricane Gustav and Ike, last year’s floods in North Dakota, all give good examples of ways that we have been helpful and successful with, and at the same time, understanding the unique nature of each of the federal partners that we participate in any operation with.

We have two great partners in our international portfolio and we are growing a third. Canada has the best and most capable partnership with the U.S. Navy of any nation in the world. They stand shoulder to shoulder with us in the battlefields of Afghanistan.

But they also sail with us, fly with us, and stand with us in disaster response here in the northern hemisphere. The success of the Winter Olympics is a testament to certainly the Canadian approach to a great world event, but also underline that support of NORAD and support of NORTHCOM to our Canadian partners was a real model of bi-national cooperation.

With Mexico, we continue to help grow their capacity. We will talk about that in some more detail, but I would tell you that our relationship with the government of Mexico and the military of Mexico is as good as it has ever been in history. We still have work to do, as do they, and we are continuing to work on that aggressively each day.
Finally, as we grow our newest partners in the Bahamas, we are assisting in operations in the Bahamas and Turks and Caicos that have focused primarily on criminalism and countering drug trafficking. We work closely with NORTHCOM in that area as well, in addition to the team at JIATF–South [Joint Interagency Task Force South] and our Coast Guard.

So across our area of focus we are engaged, we are continuing to improve, and we look forward to telling you that story today.

Finally, I would like to close as I opened a little bit with 39 years-plus of service, I want to say thank you on the—for the record—to my wife Jil and our sons Brian and Andrew, who have quietly, mostly, supported our career, the many moves.

We will move out of our 28th household here at the end of this tenure. And I will tell you that truly I would not have been able to succeed without her great support. And so, I would like to publicly say thanks to her and to the military families of all of our servicemen around the world. They pay a price that is often untold, and we do appreciate that.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering your questions here this morning. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Renuart can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you. And as your career draws to an end, we can say in a good old-fashioned Missouri, ya done good, General. So thank you.

General RENUART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. But we know you will run hard to the finish line.

General Fraser, please.

STATEMENT OF GEN. DOUGLAS FRASER, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

General Fraser. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, and the distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to have this opportunity to appear before you today and provide my assessment of the United States Southern Command.

It is also my great privilege to share this table with my good friend and mentor, General Gene Renuart. Our appearance together, as Gene mentioned, represents the close coordination, alignment, and relationship between our two commands. And I also want to congratulate him on almost 39 years of distinguished service to our Air Force and to our nation.

Finally, I want to thank the members of this committee for your continued strong support of United States Southern Command, and of your outstanding soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilian personnel it has been my privilege to lead and represent.

I have personally seen these outstanding men and women in action during the United States response to the earthquake in Haiti. The devastation was tremendous. The U.S. response was swift, coordinated, and aggressive. Within 24 hours, elements of United States Southern Command, the United States Air Force, the United States Navy, the United States Army, as well as the United States Coast Guard were supporting relief efforts.
Air Force and Army elements began surveying the international airport. A Navy P–3 aircraft conducted aerial reconnaissance, and an aircraft carrier and an amphibious group were ordered to make best possible speed to Haiti.

Over the next 3 weeks, the military response to the relief effort grew to a peak of just over 22,000 personnel, supported by all of the combatant commands, including U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and every branch of our armed forces.

Our forces dramatically expanded the Air Force capacity and opened the seaport to enable the vital flow of supplies. They distributed water, food, medical supplies, and provided critical medical care. They worked diligently to meet the immediate needs of the Haitian people.

As relief capabilities of the government of Haiti, USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], the United Nations, and NGOs [non-governmental organizations] have increased, and as relief needs of the people of Haiti have been met, we are transitioning many of our functions to these capable partners, and are conducting a deliberate conditions-based drawdown of our forces.

I think it is important though, Mr. Chairman, to state that we will stay very involved with Haiti in supporting U.S. government efforts, international efforts, to support for a long time. So this is a transition of forces to those forces that will be needed in the future as we continue to support the effort in Haiti.

Less than 2 months after the catastrophe in Haiti, tragedy struck once again in the region, when an 8.8 magnitude earthquake shook Chile. Within a day of the earthquake we distributed imagery of the affected areas to the Chileans, and sent satellite phone. Additionally, we supplied Chile with transport aircraft, a field hospital, and a port survey team. We stand ready to provide further assistance if additional support is required.

Beyond these two disasters, Southern Command continues to address other challenges in our area of responsibility. Illicit trafficking, narcoterrorism, gangs, and the potential for the spread of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] are the principle security threats within the region. The region remains very dynamic.

Brazil continues its rapid emergence as a regional leader with global influence. Competing ideologies within the region are stressing democratic and human rights advances, and the increasing engagement of external players, such as China, Iran, and Russia, continue to broaden regional outlooks and positions.

Addressing the challenges of our region requires a truly whole-of-government approach in which United States Southern Command plays a supporting role. To that end, we work not only to strengthen partner military capacity, but also to build important relationships throughout the region, foreign and domestic, military and civilian, public and private.

One of the institutions providing critical support to our mission is the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation. I want to thank this committee for your continued strong support of WHINSEC [Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation]. I also want to acknowledge my fellow board members, or
board visitor members, some who sit on this committee, for your active involvement in overseeing WHINSEC’s activities.

As a customer of WHINSEC, I can attest that it is critical role to our security cooperation efforts, especially its focus on human rights, is essential. It is one more reason why our military-to-military relations throughout the region remain strong.

Let me close by saying the tragedy in Haiti reminds us of the challenges we face in this region. The cooperation we have developed with our partners over the years, relationships built through enduring and consistent engagement, have paid big dividends in Haiti during Operation United Response.

Thank you for your continued interest and your continued support in Southern Command.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in the Appendix on page 82.]

The CHAIRMAN. General Fraser, thank you very much.

General Renuart, Mexico. Has the violence increased in the last year? What is the answer to the horrific violence and murders in Mexico, General?

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, the short answer is yes, the violence has increased. We see increased competition among drug trafficking organizations for—in my terms—market share, distribution network, and profit margin.

And they have used violent means to attempt to achieve that. At the same time they use those same types of measures to intimidate local law enforcement and government officials.

The government of Mexico is keenly aware of that increase, and in fact, has taken a series of steps to attempt to stop and then reduce that violence. Sadly, we saw here in just the last week three individuals killed in Mexico, in Juarez, three U.S. citizens associated with the American consulate there. And I think it continues to remind us that the drug trafficking organizations will be violent and we need to continue to do all that we can for Mexico to assist them.

To your second question about is there a way forward, and I would mention a number of issues where the U.S. government is continuing to assist Mexico to grow capacity, as you may know, Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates will lead a large delegation to Mexico next week. This will be the central point of discussions for them.

But in the near term and over the last six months, U.S. Northern Command has been working very aggressively with the Mexican military and with the Mexican Federal Police to help them vet new candidates and to increase capacity by providing focused training to Mexican special forces units, who, in fact, are given the mission of going out and conducting some of the operations against drug trafficking organizations. A lot of work to do. There is not a fast solution in this process because in many ways Mexico has to rebuild the law enforcement and justice infrastructure in order to take on these organizations.

And I think the important element here is persistent partnership. We need to continue to show the Mexicans that we are part of their team, that we support their efforts and that we will con-
continue to assist them whether it is in equipment or training or in many cases teaching, allowing them to learn the lessons of our integrated operations in other parts of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. General Fraser, first, we compliment you and your team on your efforts in Haiti. It was very apparent from watching the news and also from briefings we have had. So thank you and be sure to thank all the——

General, in your area of responsibility, are we gaining or losing influence as a country?

General FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I think we are gaining and it is a relationship that I think we need to continue to pay a lot of attention to. And because I focus on that region, I obviously have a very specific interest in it. My concern is we look to it as—with the era of globalization, there are a lot of other factors that are now starting to come in and influence.

And so the way that we have approached the region in the past I think needs to change as we look out into the future. And we need to continue to engage very robustly within the region to continue to build those partnerships. There was a Latino barometer survey done. It is a Chilean organization that shows the regard for the United States leadership. The United States has grown from 58 percent to 71 percent. That to me is a very good indicator of the engagement and the continued engagement and the representation that we have within our region.

The CHAIRMAN. How are our relations with the country of Colombia progressing?

General FRASER. Mr. Chairman, our relations with Colombia are very good and they continue to grow on a continual basis. There has been over the last 8 years since 2002 roughly $5.0 billion of United States money invested in the fight to help and support Colombia in their fight against the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] as well as illicit trafficking. That continues to grow.

The Colombians have a very successful effort continuing. They have been able to kill or detain 12 mid-level to senior FARC members this year. They have a very comprehensive consolidation plan to go out and continue to take over and solidify control within various regions and remove the illicit trafficking capability from their country. And more than that, they are starting to reach out. And working with the United States Northern Command, they have agreed to train some Mexican helicopter pilots in their facilities within Colombia.

Within Haiti, we had great relations with the supplies that they have sent, with a field of medical capability that they sent and integrated very easily within our operation there. So overall, I see our relations with Colombia strong and I see them continuing to grow.

The CHAIRMAN. Buck McKeon.

Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Renuart, congratulations on your 39 years. As we visited the other day, we got a chance to talk about some of this and—very interesting, but when you mentioned this morning that you had had 28 residences, I started counting up the number we have had in our 47 years of marriage and we came to exactly half of that. And I know what the
strain that put on my wife and I commend Jill for putting up with it, for being such a great support to you.

As I stated earlier, I am deeply concerned with the levels and reach of the violence generated by the narcocriminals. I think the threat on our border requires a plan of strategic cooperation of finding areas where we can help Mexico fight back. Being from Southern California, we see some of the spillover. We have had it in my community. And so it is something that we are really concerned about.

Last weekend, as it has been mentioned, two American citizens, an employee and an employee of the U.S. Consulate in Mexico were murdered. How do you see the threat of the narcocriminals in Mexico changing? And in addition to Merida, how does the NORTHCOM use 1206 to train and equip and 1000 for counter-narcotics funding to build the capacity of our Mexican military partners?

Congressman McKeon, we share that concern and as you know, that violence, while it may sporadically spill directly across the border, it certainly permeates our country in a number of cities as we see the increase in drug-related gang violence in cities across our country. So that distribution network is really the focus of these drug trafficking organizations. And they will be violent to try to expand their market share, if you will.

Having said that, along the border, you are exactly correct. We do need to have an integrated process among all the partners and players. And as you know in Southern California, the Customs and Border Patrol host the Air and Maritime Operations Command and Control Center. We participate in that through our Joint Task Force North. We share a common air picture with them to continue to expand the information sharing that we have with the Mexicans and we are looking to continue to grow that.

On the ground, in fact, in a week, I will host a meeting at our headquarters with the leaders of Customs and Border Patrol with the drug enforcement agencies, with the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and many others to talk about a more integrated strategy along our southwest border to both support—in other words, for DOD to provide support to law enforcement on the north side and coordinate that with the DOD support we provide to the Mexican military on the southern side.

You may be aware we have twice yearly border commanders conference and in that conference, the Mexican district military commanders and our U.S. military commanders get together to help share common tactics, techniques and procedures and increasingly, now, to share intelligence. That effort will continue and continue aggressively.

With respect to direct support to military in Mexico via a variety of different funding streams, certainly Merida and 1206, the counternarcotics money, all provide us valuable resources. One of my concerns is, as you know, Merida was a term limited, if you will, set of money. We need to continue that effort beyond the terms of Merida. Both Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton are very supportive of that. We would request the help of Congress obviously as we move forward, but these things provide invaluable tools to Mexico.
Their challenge is the fusion of intelligence and the agility to move highly qualified teams from one target, if you will, to another to be able to exploit the vulnerabilities that they may find with good fused intelligence. And so we have expanded our efforts in terms of training their special military teams, in terms of training on the integration of law enforcement and military in an operation much like we have done in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Those avenues that provide funding that allow us to do that are critically important to us. And so is 1206, the CN money, sort of whatever the son of Merida may be in the coming years, because this really is an eight to ten year problem. It is not a one year solution that we can come up with. And while we regret the casualties, we have to continue to stay persistent in our partnership with Mexico.

Mr. McKeon. Thank you very much. General Fraser, is the increased narcotrafficking violence in Mexico a direct result of positive gains in counterterror—counternarcotics efforts in Central and South America? What can SOUTHCOM do to assist Mexico and NORTHCOM's efforts especially given that many countries in your AOR are restricted from different types of assistance?

General Fraser. Congressman McKeon, I think there is a result of the drug trafficking and that has influenced the concerns within Mexico. I see it as a much larger regional issue and I see it as a regional what we are terming an illicit trafficking enterprise. An illicit trafficking enterprise to include not only drugs, but trafficking and weapons and fund both cash as well as humans and other articles.

And that network extends throughout Latin America and Central America. In through Mexico, the primary avenue right now of especially cocaine entering the United States is through the isthmus of Central America into Mexico and then into the United States. So there is a direct relationship out of there and we see some of the drug trafficking organizations, especially the Mexican drug trafficking organizations, now moving into the northern part of Central America. So that causes me concern also.

You asked what we can do about it. We continue to engage with Colombia. We continue to support the efforts in Mexico with General Renuart. Our Joint Interagency Task Force South responsible for coordinating the detection and monitoring and the maritime domain is supporting that effort. It supports not only Southern Command, but Northern Command to Mexico on both coasts, the Caribbean and the Pacific. So that is a very integrated effort and works very well with all the nations in the region, if you will.

We continue to support along with 1206 funding as General Renuart talked about to support capabilities in the maritime environments and continue to work with them on counternarcotics [CN]. And that is with each nation along the way. We are looking at how we build a broader strategy if you can that doesn't just look at it just nation by nation, but looks at us and how we can integrate our collective efforts to address the illicit trafficking issue.

Mr. McKeon. Thank you. General Fraser, can you describe the procedures that JTF GITMO [Joint Task Force Guantanamo] has in place to manage the interaction between the habeas counsel and the GITMO detainees? Are you aware of instances where lawyers
have given detainees information relating to military operations, intelligence, arrests, political news, and the names of U.S. government personnel? Is this still happening? And of yet what steps has the JTF GITMO taken to prevent this from happening?

General Fraser. Thank you, congressman. The process for directing and the engagement between habeas counsel and detainees was prescribed under a protective order that was issued by the United States court—federal court here in the District of Columbia. They are the ones who have jurisdiction. And so it prescribes very specifically how we do that. We have a very specific procedure that I would like to put into the record to—to give you that more specifically on how that works. But let me describe briefly how that works.

There was a protective—or a privilege team set up that is U.S.—or contractors who work for the federal court here in District of Columbia. They provide, and they monitor both the incoming and outgoing mail associated with habeas counselors, and their interaction with detainees.

If a counselor wants to visit a detainee in Guantanamo, there is a very specific location where they meet. They are able to meet there. We monitor it visually either with someone watching, or someone watching on a videotape. But no audio associated with that. And that is primarily for security that we continue to watch visually. And so that is controlled under that means.

Any messages that are—or letters, or correspondence that is left with a detainee is reviewed by that privilege team before it is sent to Haiti. And so that remains there. If a counselor wants to talk with a detainee, but not visit, then that is conducted first over a secure means if we can do that so that they can connect directly. If there is an insecure means there, then someone from that privilege team monitors that conversation.

No one at JTF Guantanamo monitors any of the conversations between counsel and the detainees. And so briefly that is the way the process works.

Mr. McKeon. When was that put into place?

General Fraser. Congressman, I will have to get back to you with a specific date.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 127.]

Mr. McKeon. Okay. Thank you.

General Fraser. But I have heard of a couple of instances of—where information was passed primarily on potential movement of detainees in the future. But that is the only—between habeas counsel and—and the detainees, that is the only instances of concern that I am aware of. Any instance that the people at Guantanamo may be concerned about, they raise that up to DOD [Department of Defense], and we, in turn, turn that over to the Department of Justice [DOJ].

Mr. McKeon. Thank you very much.

Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. McKeon. That is the first time we have had two fighter pilots sitting here together.

The Chairman. And they do well.
Mr. McKeon. They sure work together well. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. McKeon.

Mr. Taylor yields to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to say good morning to you, gentlemen.

General Renuart, or Renuart, you have served admirably for—may as well just go on and say 40 years. And you are to be congratulated for the achievements, and—the personal achievements as well as the job that you have done for America and its citizens.

General Renuart. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Johnson. And we appreciate it. And you are leaving us with General Fraser who you have mentored throughout the time that you all have been together. I think that is such a special relationship to have. And I know that General Fraser will make sure that you do not forget him. He will be calling upon you from time to time perhaps.

But I do want to ask this question, General Renuart. As far as the Arctic region, if there was a let’s say a military vehicle that got stuck and the ice shifted, and it got stuck, and this happened tonight, how would we go about extracting our people and the equipment from the Arctic region?

General Renuart. Congressman, that is actually a very good example of the kind of activity that we need to continue our momentum on within the Arctic region. All the scientific evidence tells us that there is increasing navigable water in the Arctic. But that can change literally overnight. We saw just in the last few months over 100 vessels stuck in the Baltic Sea where they were caught by a very rapid freeze.

So this is a real concern in the Arctic region. Today if that had—

If that occurred, I—the answer is we and the Coast Guard would partner with a rescue force. But today that rescue force would be primarily the ability to go in and extract the crew from that vessel, because we do not have the capabilities necessary for major ice breaking operations in the Arctic, nor do we have the vessels positioned in the Arctic that could provide a rescue vehicle for—with ice hardened hulls.

And in fact, at the time Admiral Keating and I—he was the Pacific Command Commander—have written both to the secretary supporting the Coast Guard’s desire to grow additional ice breaking equipment. And since then, other combatant commanders have added their support to that. That is a capability that is vitally important to the nation. So that you can in fact have the capacity to go in with a large vessel and in fact rescue or break free a ship that is caught in the ice.

Last year there were a number of cruise ships that actually took advantage of the navigable portion of the year to transit in the Arctic. And clearly at some point one of those will encounter a difficulty whether it is stuck in ice, or a maintenance problem, or the like. And we have got to grow a capacity to conduct rescue of those kinds of forces in that very harsh region.

So the Arctic is an area that has great promise, but it also is an area with great—that has great difficulty in day-to-day operations.
We partner both with our NORAD and our NORTHCOM teams with Canada on collective search and rescue. The other point I would make is that Canadians also have an ability to help in a rescue like that as well. And they will always come to our assistance should that be required.

But the bottom line, sir, is we have got to grow capacity in the Arctic whether it is navigation, communication, or in fact rescue.

Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you, sir.

And General Fraser, you mentioned Colombia—you mentioned FARC, a left-wing group, a terrorist group. There is also proof that there are right-wing terrorist groups that—the death squads. What kind of progress has been made in reigning in those organizations?

General Fraser. Congressman, Colombia has actually made quite a bit of strides in reducing that. They have had an ability to—I can't think of the right word, but to bring those folks in and bring them—make them part of the society. And so they have actually been able to repatriate about 30,000 of those types of individuals as they have worked over many years to do that. And those efforts continue.

Mr. Johnson. Including the right-wing militias?

General Fraser. Yes, sir. That is where the focus has been. In militias. It also has been on the FARC. And so that is an effort that continues. One of the negative sides of what is happening is some of those individuals have chosen to take on criminal activity if you will and become parts of criminal gangs focused on illicit trafficking. So there is one area where they are transferring, and they haven't been successful in that effort.

Mr. Johnson. Thank you both. And enjoy your retirement, General.

The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Before I call on Mr. Bartlett, let me ask. To your knowledge is help, aid, and assistance from Venezuela coming to the FARC in Colombia?

General Fraser. Chairman, we do see a—or Chairman, we do see a long-term relationship that exists between the Government of Venezuela, and the FARC. That has been evidenced if we go back and look at the computer records that came out of the Rafael Reyes detention—or capture of that computer. That continues on. There is safe haven. There is financial logistic support. There is safe haven for the FARC provided.

And that—all the evidence I have says that continues. The evidence I have doesn't say that it—that I can explicitly say it is continuing. But I can't say it is explicitly not continuing. So based on the evidence up to date, I would say that that support still continues.

The Chairman. Is the FARC getting smaller or larger?

General Fraser. Congressmen, we do see a—or Chairman, we do see a long-term relationship that exists between the Government of Venezuela, and the FARC. That has been evidenced if we go back and look at the computer records that came out of the Rafael Reyes detention—or capture of that computer. That continues on. There is safe haven. There is financial logistic support. There is safe haven for the FARC provided.

And that—all the evidence I have says that continues. The evidence I have doesn't say that it—that I can explicitly say it is continuing. But I can't say it is explicitly not continuing. So based on the evidence up to date, I would say that that support still continues.
level that they were when Colombia relief focused their effort. Right now we estimate about 8,500 FARC members. So the fight is still very much there. The FARC has been pushed to a defensive role. They are changing their tactics, but they are still very active.

Colombia had to take on a very active role in making sure they were not able to disrupt the recent congressional elections held. And the armed forces and the national police did a very good job of doing that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. General Renuart, before Rumsfeld was the Secretary of Defense he chaired a commission study of the emerging ballistic missile threat. That study concluded the threat was real, was growing, and was far more imminent than we had anticipated. Our response to that has been a very aggressive development and deployment of anti-ballistic missiles. A major focus of that has been in the Arctic.

I hope that that will never be used, because I think the only country that will ever launch over the pole today may be China tomorrow. But the only country ever to launch over the pole today will be Russia. And our meager defenses there would be almost immediately swamped by the sheer numbers of the weapons that they could release.

Other adversary—potential adversaries like Iran and North Korea may be evil. They are not idiots. And I think that there is a very small probability that they would ever launch from their homeland, because that launch would be detected. And they know that they would be almost immediately vaporized. And so if they attack us, sir, it is not going to be from their homeland. So we don’t need to wait until they have a missile which will reach us.

If they attack us, it is going to be from the sea. And so I have two questions. One is what is our capability of defending our coast from ship launched missiles? And by the way, with any trans steamer and a scud launcher which they can buy for about $100,000 and a crude nuclear weapon, they can attack us. That attack will almost certainly be where we are most vulnerable, which would be an EMP [electromagnetic pulse] attack. And if they miss their target by 100 miles, it is as good as hitting it dead on.

Iran had a missile test which we said failed, because the thing was detonated in space. That is exactly how you would produce an EMP attack. So my second question is how much of your fighting capability would remain after the EMP attack, and what would be the situation in our country?

General RENUART. Congressman Bartlett, let me take the second question first. You and I have had a discussion about two years ago actually as—with respect to Cheyenne Mountain on EMP issues. And I promised you at the time that we would continue to work this very aggressively. And I am pleased that we have been able to continue a very aggressive funding line to ensure not just the systems in Cheyenne Mountain, but the systems in our headquarters every day have the appropriate EMP protection against just this kind of event.

Mr. BARTLETT. Can you tell us, sir, at what level you are protecting? Is it 30, 50, or 100 kilovolts per meter?
General Renuart, Congressman, I think I expressed ignorance back then of the specific number. And I am afraid if I gave you one I might not be telling you the truth. So let me—but I will get you the number back——

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. Bartlett. Appreciate that. Thank you.

General Renuart [continuing]. If I could after the hearing for the record. But your point is very well taken. The threat is not the traditional threat that we saw during certainly those cold war days. And even today certainly the Russians and the Chinese maintain a substantial intercontinental range system that our missile defense system was not designed to protect us against. But rather those rogue nations.

And I would say that that system is working very well against that very limited threat. But enemies that we have today don’t necessarily follow the normal rule book. And so as you mentioned, one of my very real concerns is the ability of a nation state, or non-nation state actor to gain access to a lower tech missile that could be launched from somewhere off our shore.

We have been working a number of programs to give us better situational awareness that that may occur. Not—in the areas of maritime domain awareness we partner with the Navy and the Coast Guard as well as our science and technology laboratories to create a better maritime domain awareness picture. So that today we have fielded a system that allows us to monitor the commercial shipping traffic as well as the military shipping around the world as it approaches our shores. And we could be made aware of a vessel well off our coast—hundreds of miles if not 1,000 miles off our coast.

The next piece is what do you do about it? And there I have a concern in that our ability to detect what I will call cruise missiles or crude cruise missiles is limited to the existing radar systems that we have today.

We are investing in numbers of follow-on technologies through a program called, “Command and Control Gap Filler,” which would combine certainly some fixed sites as well as over the horizon technologies which have proven relatively effective in certain areas against a cruise missile-sized target. To give us the sufficient warning that we could then take advantage of existing alert sites or others to try to provide us some defense.

But this is an area we have concern, and we are continuing to work within the department to expand.

Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.

Gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes.

Mr. Reyes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And generals, thank you for your service and your leadership at a very pivotal time in our nation’s history.

General Renuart, the governor of Texas recently stated that he is concerned about imminent border violence spillover into the U.S. border. Yesterday, the two senators from Texas urged President Obama to act on spillover border violence. From your perspective as NORTHCOM commander, do you believe that there is an immi-
General RENUART. Congressman, I think we need to ensure that we are prepared if something like that were to occur. As the governor mentioned, there has been evidence of spillover violence, and that does occur, and I would say episodically. It is not a consistent series of events across all of the border. But it has happened some in California. Certainly some in Arizona, and as we have seen most recently in Juarez. But also along the south Texas border as well.

Mr. REYES. But, General, one of the things that concerns me, and I represent El Paso, which is the second safest city in the nation, right across from Juarez. I think we have to be very careful what we characterize as spillover violence. For instance, when you mentioned Arizona, some months ago they were reporting the kidnappings as a direct result of the ongoing violence in Mexico. It turned out to be that these were alien smuggling organizations.

General RENUART. Yes.

Mr. REYES [continuing]. Smuggling organizations.

General RENUART. Yes, sir.

Mr. REYES. Nothing to do with the cartels or the Mexican government’s efforts. Part of the problem that we are seeing today is that perception becomes reality. When in effect what happened in Juarez this past weekend, which now is—we are being told may be a case of mistaken identity that those acts were taken in Juarez.

But when the governor talks about his concern for imminent spillover, and he talks about activating some secret plan that he has to bring additional resources, that naturally raises the angst in people that live along the border that are very concerned. Even in the second safest city in the country people are calling my office wanting to know what is the governor’s plan? Why is he activating it? And what is it that he knows that they don’t know. And that I think is a disservice to border communities, because it tends to affect not just the people, but also the business community, the commerce, and the trade.

So we need to be careful. And that is why I ask you that question. And secondly you—are you aware of the secret plan that Governor Perry has? And have you been briefed, because we haven’t?

General RENUART. Yes. Congressman, and you said it in much more eloquent terms than I would have. But the point I did want to make is we do have to be extremely careful about how we characterize actions south of the border, which in many cases are cartel on cartel violence, or intimidation tactics. And obviously to emphasize, and El Paso is a great example the very safe environment that we have in most of our cities.

So I too am very careful in how we characterize anything that is described as spillover violence. Because I think the preponderance of evidence is that the violence is certainly there south of the border. But that actually our border security folks are doing a very good job of keeping that—and our law enforcement on the north side are working that as well, I think. And secondly, I am not aware of a secret plan. And so I have no idea what that may be referring to. Certainly the governor can use law enforcement National Guard to be involved in counternarcotics operations. But I
know of no plan that would be sort of kept in a drawer that he might use.

Mr. Reyes. But on the flip side Customs and Border Protection—the Northern Command—we all have contingency plans in case something happens, correct?

General Renuart. Absolutely, sir. And in fact, most of those plans center around growing capacity with the Mexicans to help them deal with the problems on the south side of the border. And in fact we have a senior leader meeting on this topic in about two weeks’ time at my headquarters.

Mr. Reyes. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.

Gentleman from California, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service, and for being here. I want to touch on WHINSEC for a minute. It is the Western Hemisphere Institution for Security Cooperation. As you all know, they use WHINSEC to train folks from other countries, and go back to those countries, and then help those countries deal with whether it is narcotics or narcoterrorism or other things.

During the past couple of years an amendment has been offered to the House Defense Bill which would authorize publication of personal information of WHINSEC students. From your perspective, what would be the impact of releasing that information of those students that we have trained here to the international public?

General Fraser. Congressman Hunter, let me take the first try at that. As you know, the Senate Armed Services Committee asked the Department of Defense to do an assessment of the release of names. That assessment is still working its way through the system.

That said, while we are waiting for that, and I don’t know the specifics of the response yet, but I don’t support the release of names. We have a great relationship with WHINSEC with the partners there. It is not only partners with the U.S. and our partner nations, but with one another. And so, they return and they continue to engage with one another throughout the region.

So my concerns are that we continue to have this capability available. That we continue to not only respect the rights and desires of the nations who provide those people, men and women, to those facilities, but we also look to make sure from a privacy standpoint we protect the U.S. citizens also, who are the instructors and the people who man that at WHINSEC.

General Renuart. Congressman, if I could just add a couple points? First, we too are avid users of the WHINSEC capabilities and are very supportive, and I echo General Fraser’s comments about the importance of maintaining the security of the individuals attending, as well as the faculty.

And let me give you an example of what can happen when information is in fact released. You may recall recently the Mexican military, the navy in particular, was successful in the raid on Arturo Beltran Leyva.

One of the naval individuals that was part of that raid was killed. And you might recall later that as his identity was made
public—and this was not WHINSEC-related—just made that information public, his mother and wife and children were killed.

We cannot afford to have the information that is held in WHINSEC released because it will have that kind of effect potentially for the individuals who are extremely valuable to us.

And so, I echo Doug’s comments that we need to be very careful about the release of that information, and we would oppose that.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, gentlemen. I concur with both of you. Lastly, just in the last minute and 30 seconds here, is there anything that we can do to enhance the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency], the Coast Guard, you all, DOD, CBP [Customs and Border Protections], everybody working together, because I know in San Diego, for instance, we have the border fence there.

It pushes stuff west, whether it is smugglers, criminals, gang members, terrorists, coming across the border. The ocean is now being used more than anything—excuse me—the Coast Guard talks about wanting more UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]. And you know, being DOD, you are the experts on it, they aren’t.

So, is there anything that we can do here to make everything work more seamlessly together between all the different agencies?

General FRASER. I think, Congressman, that the Joint Interagency Task Force South provides us with a good model for how to do that. They are operating today with all the agencies that you mentioned, from DEA to CBP, as well as our partner nations. They have liaisons from 17 different partner nations who are also working this.

So it is a great collaborative effort, who everyone understands their capabilities and their authorities and they work seamlessly to make sure they focus and continue on the mission.

As we look more broadly than that, through the interdiction committee, and I think there is an opportunity that we expand that capability on a broadly, more national basis, if you will, to further integrate that capacity, not only at a tactical level, but at an operational level.

General RENUAR T. And just very quickly, I know we are out of that time. I think supporting the existing budgets is certainly critical to that. And then finally, this concept of this national task force focused on integrating all of those efforts is an area with great merit, and we are working at both our commands, as well as each of the agencies you have described, through the interdiction committee. And I think that will be more ready for prime time in the coming months.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. Really appreciate it. Congratulations on your retirement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for being here and for your extraordinary service. We appreciate it.

General Renuart, I know that there has been discussion about Mexico and the violence spilling over. I wonder if in your work with the Mexican government that there has been any concern as well that some of the civilian—you know,—that there is—will be a
counterreaction I guess to overreach on the behalf of the Mexican Army?

Is there any concern that human rights abuses or other abuses might impact the ability of the services? And how are we working on what is a very sensitive issue?

General Renuart. This is actually a very real concern that the Mexican government has. They understand that the challenge that they placed their military in by using them in effect to replace law enforcement in the cities.

General Galván, their secretary of defense for the Army and Air Force, and I have had a specific discussion. He has asked us for our assistance in providing unique training on the integration of real operations and law enforcement and justice and human rights.

And in fact, to Mr. Hunter's question a moment ago, WHINSEC is helping us create this team that we will then take to Mexico and provide very unique training to not just the schools, but to the units in the field on how they best integrate their operations with the rule of law and human rights.

So I am very pleased at that progress. We will begin working that in earnest in the coming months. Having said that, it is very difficult for the Mexican military to be put in that law enforcement role for an extended period.

And General Galván has been working aggressively as the federal police has been essentially all removed and now rehired and vetted and trained. He is working aggressively to help them build capacity so that they can take on the appropriate roles in the cities.

And in fact, in Juarez that transition has recently occurred and the federal police is taking more of a leadership role. So I think they are very sensitive to this issue. I think President Calderón clearly knows he has a limited type capability to affect things and he is using all the best way he can.

Mrs. Davis. Thank you.

General Fraser, and I am going to ask you a question we had an opportunity to speak about this briefly the other day, but on the dwell time for our men and women in uniform we know that they performed tremendously in Haiti and yet for some of them, that did take away some of their dwell time.

So I am just wondering what we can do to really ensure those men and women have enough time at home before they go back on deployment. Is there anything that we should be doing or looking at in terms of helping them out, I guess not unlike we have done in other cases?

General Fraser. Congresswoman, thank you for that question. And our men and women did a marvelous job and they responded very, very quickly. A lot of them who were not scheduled to sail, not scheduled to participate, to include the comfort that, and they sortied in very quick fashion to go help the people of Haiti.

It has made it so that there are some of those individuals who will probably not get the full dwell time between, because they are—some of them more in prep for future transition or movement to ongoing efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some of them had just come back.

So the Department of Defense throughout the operation in Haiti has put a considerable focus on making sure we understand the
limitations of that. And in all reality, there has been some impact to it, but it has been fairly minor impact, relatively minor, in all of that.

What can we do to help? I think it is your continued focus on helping our men and women and supporting them. We will go back and look at specifically what you are looking at, because it could impact on us in other parts and other operations within Department of Defense. So let me take that back and we will get back to you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 127.]

Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I appreciate that. What you are saying is that in fact there may be relatively few people affected, but that there may be other programs in which we are not able to open up some of these issues for them as well? Is that basically the concern that if you do it for this group, you might—you would run into a problem in other ways?

General Fraser. No, ma'am. I think it is an issue that we are talking on worldwide. And there is a very concerted effort whenever this happens to make sure that we focus on the families of our deployed men and women.

Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you both for your service.

And General Renuart, I trust that you will retire in the state of Colorado and remain there as a good citizen of our state. Can I get your commitment on that? Okay, very good.

My first question is, General Renuart, you said—talked about sharing intelligence with officials from the Mexican government. Is there a concern, and I have heard it expressed before, that some of that intelligence is being leaked to some of the cartels, and that is compromising our capability?

General Renuart. Congressman, I think I am not so concerned that direct information is being leaked to the cartels. I think that one of the challenges of any kind of an operation that would target a high value individual or an organization, has the potential for some of that information to be leaked in the execution.

In other words, operational security of that information, once you begin to act on it, becomes a challenge. And this is one of the areas that we are working very closely with our Mexican partners to share with them the lessons we have learned about operation security once you actually begin to find and fix a target to be able to take action.

We have worked very hard in the broader intelligence-sharing arena with both the Mexican Navy and the Army and Air Force to secure information in a way that it can be protected. So is there a risk? Absolutely. Have we seen instances? Yes, sir, we have. We have also seen the trend where the Mexican military understands the importance of operation security and has continued to work on that.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General. And a follow-up question, the Merida Program, are you—is there a concern that some of the
weapons—military weapons that we are giving to the Mexican military, Mexican security forces in general, that some of those soldiers or some of the police officers are walking with those weapons and join in the cartels?

General Renuart. Sir, I would say no.

Mr. Coffman. Okay.

General Renuart. I have no concern with that.

Mr. Coffman. Okay. Very well. To both of you, is there any evidence in—of some in the past to say Hezbollah has been engaged in the drug trafficking business to raise money for some of its operations in the Middle East? Are any of you—either of you aware of that or any reports to that effect?

General Fraser. Congressman, there have been within the Southern Command region. There had been some reports of Hezbollah is starting to get engaged within the illegal trafficking area. So I have that indication. We are looking for beyond that, but it is primarily right now a focus on logistics support, financial support to their apparent organizations in the Mideast.

Mr. Coffman. Okay. And, General Fraser, to you as well, there have been media reports about Iran being involved in Nicaragua, I think, building a mosque or something, but sponsored by the Iranian government. Are you aware of that and to what extent is that a concern to you, if it is true?

General Fraser. Congressman, Iran has been engaging on a political and a commercial level throughout much of Latin America. Over the last 3 to 4 years, they have increased the number of their embassies from seven to 11 going to another one this year. They have engaged very directly with Venezuela. They are also engaging consistently with Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, as you mentioned. Also with Brazil. So they are actually working across the region to engage in both a political and a commercial endeavor.

Our concerns aren’t just watching to understand what those—the relationships are and I don’t see any evidence that they are beyond that right now, but we are very skeptical and watching very closely.

Mr. Coffman. Very well. I think both of you to some degree—General Fraser mentioned the issue of Venezuela. How would you assess Venezuela right now as a destabilizing force in the region?

General Fraser. Congressman, they continue to have a very anti-U.S. stance and look to try and restrict U.S. activity wherever they have the opportunity to do that. They are continuing to engage with the region, if you will, and continuing to pursue their socialism agenda. So that continues to be a concern. They remain a destabilizing force in the region.

Mr. Coffman. Okay. General Renuart, in looking at our southern border with Mexico, is there any evidence that those other than seeking the status of being a laborer in this country, i.e., any Al Qaeda elements, any terrorist elements, is there any evidence that any of those folks are crossing our border?

General Renuart. Congressman, right now, there is no evidence that they are crossing the border. In fact, it is something we work very closely with the Mexicans about to try to keep track of that. And so far, I would say not seeing any successful attempts.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Larsen of Washington.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today. I will start with General Renuart regarding page 16 of your testimony on the Olympics.

I actually got to go to the hockey game that we won. A great time up there. But that week I was home, I also visited the Olympics Coordination Center in Bellingham, Washington, where for the—possibly for the first time brought together most, if not all, of federal, state and local and international agencies necessary to sort of take care of security on our side of the border. And you referenced that in your testimony with regards to some of the work you do with Canada.

Can you though—can you give us perhaps maybe the top three lessons or the top three takeaways from that experience for NORTHCOM that are perhaps different than what you had going into this experience?

General RENUART. Congressman, I would be happy to. And the biggest failure was the final game.

Mr. LARSEN. Absolutely. Absolutely.

General RENUART. I predicted it terribly wrong and we came up on the other side.

Mr. LARSEN. I know. And there is nothing we could have done at NORTHCOM to fix that. And so——

General RENUART. We tried.

Mr. LARSEN. I know.

General RENUART. Congressman, I think—and very quickly, first, it was a success story beyond, I think, even what the planners had hoped. You mentioned the great interagency cooperation at the operation center there in Bellingham and that really did go from local all the way to federal and everybody that had a part to play. The same was true in Vancouver with the Vancouver Olympic Committee and the Integrated Security Unit, our partnership, NORAD and NORTHCOM, with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Organizing Committee and the others were extraordinary. I think there were—there was a very positive result in that we found a way to integrate air and maritime operating pictures in a better fashion than we had been using thus far. And so we are going to adapt that model or adopt that model in our current operations for NORAD and NORTHCOM. And the key with that is it got the picture down to the local authorities at the same time we saw at the federal. So that was a very positive element. Second, the collaboration between the Navy and the Coast Guard in the Straits and the approaching areas was also a real model for success for the future. In terms of things we would like to do better, I believe the final piece would be we clearly were in a position to provide support to Canada should it have been required in a crisis.

I think the procedural process of that, for example, moving quickly across the border, we have got to still work closer with our friends on both sides to ensure access in a crisis. And we are working a couple of projects with Canada Command, our NORTHCOM equivalent, to rapidly integrate the militaries of either country to support in a civil event or a disaster event is really the right way to describe it that occurred, but those are—frankly, that is in the noise level. That really was a successful event.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. Yes. In my visits to the Coordination Center, I spoke with some of our Washington State National Guard folks and asked them what experience they were having. They actually ended up—it is kind of funny when you think about it because they actually ended up finding the phone number of the people at NSA or NGA to get the maps that they believed existed, but didn't know existed and it took this Coordination Center for them to connect with folks to find the people to call to get that stuff.

I mean, as simple as that which now our National Guard will start utilizing that tool much more aggressively in the future for any number of things that they are doing. Also in your testimony—in your written testimony, you talk about seeing the counter-narcotics side of things as well in reference to northern border. And I appreciate that. I appreciate the increase of attention.

There is a lot of tension in the southwest border for obvious reasons, but Interstate 5 is not only a great pipeline for travel, for tourism, for trade, economic growth, it is also the number one pipeline for drugs that come out of Canada, sometimes originated in Canada, sometimes originated elsewhere and coming through Canada. And that partnership that we need with our Canadian partners is extremely important and I think there are lessons from the—on the CN side of things.

Can you talk about that, the counter-narcotics side of things on the border, northern border?

General Renuart. Congressman, let me provide you some very specifics, but we have conducted two good exercises in Washington State, collaboration with both our U.S. law enforcement and Canadian law enforcement to help identify transit points and allow information so they can be interdicted.

There is a great deal more to that. We are going to conduct that exercise again this year. In the interest of time, let me pass that to you and I will put that in the record as well, but I will get that back to you specifically for some opportunities that we had this year.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. Larsen. I appreciate that. And Mr. Chairman, just quickly, these drugs wouldn't be coming into the U.S. from Canada if there was not a demand in the U.S. So I don't want to put this on our Canadian friends. There is a demand in the U.S. that we also need to take care of.

General Renuart. Well, important to say that the flows are coming in from the sea into Canada as well. So this is not just a north to south issue.

The Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. Franks.

Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank—and thank both of you for being here. Thank you for your service. General Renuart, I will especially thank you for your lifetime of service on behalf of my children, you know? People like you have held the line and you have given your whole life to the cause and thank you very, very much.

General Renuart. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Franks, General Renuart, I want to take off on a question that Mr. Bartlett posed earlier related to the potential homeland attack, EMP attack. I think that all of these challenges, of course, point to a very critical need to have the most robust layered missile defense capability that we can have. And NORTHCOM, I understand—you understand better than anyone—is trying to develop the global force management plan to address the Phased, Adaptive Approach.

And, you know, we are certainly very hopeful that that will be successful. I guess my question is one of timing. I know that our offensive capabilities has not dissuaded people like North Korea or Iran from moving forward with their program, but I am hoping that that indicates to us that they value these programs so greatly that they are willing to take a great deal of risks in order to obtain them. And if our defensive capability were such that it would nullify or devalue their system that it might play into their calculus. That is the idea. So I guess my concern here about the approach is the timing. And so I guess my question to you is what is the timeline for the development of the global force management plan that addresses the Phased, Adaptive Approach not only to protect us against things that Mr. Bartlett mentioned, but I guess the host of other threats?

General Renuart. Mr. Franks, I know you had General Chilton and Mr. Miller in front of the committee just in the last day or two. I saw their comments, and I guess I would say in terms of timeline the unknown here is the speed at which a country like Iran may be accelerating its efforts. Certainly what we know is through the entirety of the Phased, Adaptive Approach we would expect to have that fully capable in—potentially in the year 2018.

In the meantime, the existing ground basement course systems that we have I think provide us reasonable capability against any developing threat that may occur between now and then. I think importantly in all of this is that we continue to focus on an integrated air and missile defense capability for the nation. And that is an integration of sensors, many of which General Chilton owns, and shooters, many of which I own. And we are working aggressively to pull all of that.

So we don't just think about homeland defense in terms of a missile, or an airplane, or a UAV, or a cruise missile, but rather we create the architecture that allows us to address all of that. And we are making good progress on that. And that is the area where the Congress always helps. Is that we continue the support for those programs and the funding lines that we see through the Secretary's budget so that we can remain on track.

Mr. Franks. Well, I guess that—you know, that makes a lot of sense. But it brings me to the question as far as the upgraded sensors, and the real time discrimination capability that I think is essentially included in your answer. What do you think the timing is on being able to implement those kinds of improvements that will—

General Renuart. Sir, I think the sensor situational awareness is actually moving faster than some of the elements of the shooters.
In the Phased, Adaptive Approach, the SM–3, Blocks 2–A/2–B are out in a few years showing great capability and potential. But still in development. Our sensor network is actually growing.

As you may know, we will launch our first geosynchronous SBIRS vehicle this year. It had been delayed, but now the program is going on track. That will continue the investment in a very robust sensor package. C–2 BMC, which is the command and control system that allows us to integrate those sensors into coherent decision quality information is also now moving along nicely.

So I am actually comfortable that the sensor piece is working. I am still focused on the cruise missile part of that sensor. And we are continuing to work with the department. And I think we have a way ahead, and I am not uncomfortable with the direction.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you. I guess I will leave this last question up to either one of you. I know that, you know, being a general it is going to be in your mind about the potentiality of a nuclear Iran. What if there is one thing that you could suggest would be critical to this country from your point of view—from the warfighter's point of view of preventing Iran from gaining that nuclear capability, what are we doing right? What are we doing wrong?

General RENUART. Could I say we have three seconds left, and I will have to talk fast. Sir, I think the key is the aggregate pressure that we are putting on Iran through diplomatic, through military strength, through the partner nations that we have in the region, has to be continued. And that will hopefully dissuade Iran. Because I think they have got to change their strategic intentions. And I think that effort is really the focal point for us.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Ms. Bordallo, the gentlelady from Guam.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I realize this is a little bit out of my jurisdiction. But I am assisting my colleague from Puerto Rico in asking this question.

I have hopefully a simple and quick question for either General Renuart or General Fraser. As you know, a fiscal year 2006 budget action by the Air Force programmed for the retirement of all 8 C–130s that are currently stationed at San Juan—Luis Muñoz International Airport with the Puerto Rico Air National Guard.

Now I understand that Puerto Rico is technically in Northern Command area of responsibility, but in many cases military units stationed in Puerto Rico assist with missions, humanitarian and otherwise, in Southern Command’s area of responsibility. So I think we need to hear from both of you. First I would like to understand what type of operational impact the retirement of the C–130s in Puerto Rico will have to respond to humanitarian, natural disaster, or other matters in the Caribbean, Central and South American region?

General FRASER. Ma’am, thank you for that question. We have along with the Puerto Rican National Guard—the C–130s. There is a set of four other C–130s—we call them “Coronet Oak,” that are provided as a ready capability to respond for an immediate need within the Southern Command region. And so those are the aircraft that we have on immediate recall basis if you will to respond to those issues.
So those are being supplied broadly from the Air Force capability. So right now that is where we have. And so Puerto Rico's ability to contribute to that I think is really what will make a difference for Southern Command.

Ms. Bordallo. And General.

General Renuart. Congresswoman, I would like to just first say that the Puerto Rican Air National Guard did certainly provide great support during Haiti and flew a number of missions within the overall transportation system of—that is operated by U.S. TRANSCOM [Transportation Command].

In terms of the specific Puerto Rican Air National Guard units, I think the chief of staff of the Air Force has made some necessary decisions as we recapitalize our units. And I think that for me and my AOR, and as you say Puerto Rico is in my area of responsibility, it is important that we maintain a capacity to move material around the region.

But I have to defer to the Air Force to make decisions on specifically which units do that. I continue to maintain a requirement to provide some of that lift for a variety of reasons. So we will work closely both with the territory as well as the Air Force——

Ms. Bordallo. Right.

General Renuart [continuing]. On the in state there.

Ms. Bordallo. I have a further part of that question. Now I have seen the proposed bed down of C–130s across the U.S. for fiscal year 2012. And without C–130s or some sort of air lift out of Puerto Rico I fear we have a dangerous capability gap in the Caribbean region. So I fear this will send the wrong signal to our partners in the Caribbean and Central and South American nations.

Could you address the strategic importance of Puerto Rico in terms of our operational plans and capabilities for that region? And how important is Puerto Rico to your commands, and having the right assets to conduct missions?

General Renuart. Ma’am, I would say Puerto Rico is actually a very strategic location for us. In fact if you look at the flow of illicit trafficking from south to north. As we put pressure in one particular area, the traffickers move to another. And certainly that area in the eastern Caribbean has been a flow route in varying volumes for quite some time. So in terms of its strategic importance, Puerto Rico offers a unique location. And in fact we have taken advantage of that to put surveillance radars and some other things that assist law enforcement in conducting those operations in that region.

So for me it is a very important area.

Ms. Bordallo. General Fraser.

General Fraser. Ma’am, I agree. It is a very important area. Especially also because it is a partner within the Caribbean——

Ms. Bordallo. All right.

General Fraser [continuing]. Confines. And so it makes a big difference in our ability to interact with the Caribbean neighbors as well as our Latin American neighbors.

Ms. Bordallo. Well I will pass this message over to the representative from Puerto Rico, Mr. Pierluisi.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I have—Mr. Wilson, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Lamborn have not asked questions yet. And I believe the scheduled votes for 11:30 have been rescheduled for 12:30. So I think we are in pretty good shape to finish. Before I call Mr. Wilson, let me ask General Renuart concerning the wind turbines that are being erected in various places—and I think there is a field in the state of Missouri on that is being considered as well. Do you have a concern about the impact of wind turbines on radar in your AOR?

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. Absolutely. I have real concerns. Having said that, I also recognize the real importance and value of alternate energy sources to our nation. And so we have begun a collaborative effort with the FAA, certainly the Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, Department of Interior, to provide assessment tools that developers may use to determine if their particular radar siting may have an affect.

The science in this is that the turbines themselves have a very real effect on the radars. They distort the radars. In many cases block the picture, and put at risk the air safety—the traffic safety of our—in our national airspace system, as well as create risk for the defense of our U.S.

There are a number of sites around the country that have repositioned the physical siting in order to minimize the affect on our radars. There are some sites today that we have concern over. And we are working with those developers to try to mitigate the effects of these radars. But this is a very real concern.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Generals, thank you very much for your service. And I want to thank both of you and your troops for what a difference—what was made for the people of Haiti. It was extraordinary. The American military was so successful in helping the people there. And I know I have a lot of constituents who have done volunteer work over the years in that country. And they just were so proud of the American military coming immediately to the rescue of the people of Haiti.

So thank you so much. Additionally, General Fraser, I have a keen interest in the country of Colombia. I serve as the Honorary Chairman of the Partners of the Americas program. We are associated with the country of Colombia. And we have hosted students from Colombia at our home in high school. And then two of my sons have gone to high school in Colombia. A great ally and friend of the United States.

Can you review further the current state of FARC in Colombia. And also is there current evidence between FARC and the government of Venezuela?

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman Wilson. Having grown up in Colombia, I also have an interest there as well. That said, Colombia and the support and their efforts to fight the FARC are continuing to be successful. This year, they have been able to kill or capture 12 mid-level, high-level, leaders within the FARC.
They have a continuing effort to reduce the illicit trafficking and their consolidation plan is continuing to grow and foster. And that consolidation plan enables them to have the military go in, secure an area, then bring in other parts of the government to change the capacity there so the illicit trafficking and the FARC cannot reside there.

I think the FARC is on the defensive. We are starting to see a change in the tactics, but they are still at about half the size and the level that they were previously. And so, the fight continues so I ask for your continued support of our efforts to support the Colombians as they continue that fight. It is an important fight.

Mr. WILSON. And that is part of the success story of Plan Colombia. Can you bring us up to date further in regard to the counter-narcotics efforts in addressing the production and transport of illegal narcotics in your AOR? And your plans for addressing illegal narcotics in the future?

General RENUART. Yes, sir. Thank you, Congressman Wilson.

Colombia has been successful in reducing the numbers. Especially in 2008, there was a 14 percent reduction in the amount of cocaine produced within Colombia. Those efforts continue. They have done and worked on manual eradication. They are also—and those efforts, although smaller this last year just because of budgets and capability, they have still remained successful, also.

So that has—if you want to look at it on a regional basis—starting to have an impact more broadly. The traffickers, because there is resistance to the growing of cocaine within Colombia, are starting to look for other places. And they are starting to look at other places in Colombia, headed toward the northwest part of Colombia, but also into Peru and Bolivia.

So we see the traffickers adjusting to successes that we are seeing within Colombia. I think we will that same as Mexico continues to pursue their efforts, and so the traffickers will adjust. We are working to build awareness across the region of that illicit trafficking enterprise, so that we can understand it better, and understand how to coordinate our efforts, government-to-government, military-to-military, law enforcement-to-law enforcement, to really put a pressure across the board on the illicit trafficking enterprise.

Mr. WILSON. General Renuart, in 2008 your area of responsibility now includes some extraordinarily beautiful areas of the Caribbean. But as General Fraser was mentioning, narcoterrorism, trafficking, now is a threat in that area, too. So what is being done in your area?

General RENUART. Congressman Wilson, this is a growth industry for us. As you mentioned, the Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, became part of our area of focus as well in that 2008 timeframe.

And candidly, I am also considering moving my headquarters there, because——

Mr. WILSON. I would. BVI comes to mind.

General RENUART. I am sorry, Congressman Lamborn, I am not going to do that, but we may have an alternate headquarters.

I think that area is also a key transit area and we are continuing the efforts that NORTHCOM had been involved in, and expanding to include some modernization of facilities, expansion of the Royal Bahamian Defense Force capabilities, to allow them to address this
in their region as well. They are a valued partner and we are growing that relationship.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both of you gentlemen.

General Fraser, I guess three questions. Number one, when Morales was elected the president of Bolivia, it is my understanding that his political party was actually called the Cocaleros, that a significant part of his platform would be reduced emphasis of coca in Bolivia. So I guess the follow-up to Mr. Wilson’s question is, is it safe to assume that as cocaine production went down in Colombia, it increased dramatically in Bolivia? As it went down in Colombia?

General FRASER. Congressman, I can’t make a direct linkage. I do know that cocaine production has grown within Bolivia. It is now the third largest cocaine producer within Latin America, within South America. And that President Morales has expanded the legal amount of land available for the legal amount of growth of cocaine within Bolivia for indigenous use and their own internal use. So it has grown within Bolivia.

Mr. TAYLOR. At some point could you have someone give me a follow-up on that? I know I am catching you cold on this. I should have given you some warning.

General FRASER. Yes, sir, Congressman. I would be happy to do that.

Mr. TAYLOR. Are there any missions, surface combatant missions, off in your AOR that the frigates in the fleet we have today cannot perform?

General FRASER. Congressman, they are performing all those missions. In fact, we rely very heavily on not only the U.S. Navy, but the U.S. Coast Guard to provide us with that capacity. And so, it varies on a routine basis on what we are doing. We are working with the Navy to expand some of the capabilities to help us further that.

The other thing that we are working with the Navy on is one of the things that will help us get more station time for the ships is to have oilers available. So it is not a capacity on the ships itself, it is the capacity of keeping those ships on station.

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, my follow-up is I was looking at a study yesterday that because of the delay in the LCS [littoral combat ship] program, and because of the scheduled retirement of the frigates, that we are looking by 2015 at having something in the neighborhood of over a dozen fewer small service combatants than we have today.

What does that do to your mission? And presumably most of the small service combatants are in your AOR, so what does that do? What gets done now that won’t get done then?

General FRASER. Congressman, our demand for surface capability runs at about 14 ships at a time. And that is to reach the goal of denying 40 percent of the traffic, if you will, cocaine, in the maritime domain. On a normal basis, we get eight of those ships. So it is a 14 to 8.
So it will depend, as other demands on the Navy equate, how they resource us with those ships. Actually, the LCS ship, as you know, the USS Freedom, is in the SOUTHCOM region right now, and it has been doing very well. It has already had two successful interdictions of trafficking.

Mr. Taylor. Again, the question was just looking at the numbers, if we don’t extend the life of the frigates, then they go away, the LCS is way behind schedule, there is always the possibility that the loser in this competition protested, so we end up with a tanker-type situation, where years from now the LCS’s are finally getting delivered.

So again, given that scenario, the lack of those surface combatants, what do you lose in your AOR if they are not there?

General Fraser. Congressman, I will lose some presence, as we have talked about. The number of ships that are available to conduct the mission. But depending on the need, that can be adjusted based on the needs of the Navy. And I use not only frigates, but there are Coast Guard ships who provide that capability, as well as destroyers. So it is a mix of capacity that we use to provide the mission assets.

Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The Chairman. Thank the gentleman from Mississippi.

I have Mr. Lamborn and Mr. Johnson, and then we can wrap it up.

Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank both of you for your years of service, and Mr. Renuart, to you in particular I want to say I agree with Mike Coffman. I hope that you stay in Colorado after you retire. You will be missed.

And most of all, I hope that you will continue to somehow lend your experience and your expertise to some kind of assistance as we go forward with our nation’s defense. I am hoping those opportunities are available to you and I look forward to that as well.

General Renuart. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Lamborn. Let me bring up a topic, before I talk about missile defense, to something that we have had this conversation on before, and that is building two in Peterson. And as you know, there is strong local concern, and even some on this committee, about making sure that building two is sufficiently fortified and strengthened and hardened against any kind of incident or threat.

Can you update us on where we stand with building two, and what has been done, and what may still need to be done?

General Renuart. Yes, sir. Thanks. As you know, we have had a series of projects put in place over the last three years to grow that security capacity as we havetransitioned some of the routine operations from Cheyenne Mountain into building two.

That funding is all in place. The projects are ongoing. We have continued to grow additional physical, additional electronic barriers. We are in the process of completing a physical security modification to our building that will provide for biometrics as well as for physical security by armed security forces.

Standoff to the building exceeds the standards that we would have for any high priority building, and I am very comfortable that
as we complete these projects—in the next year and a half is about the timeline—that we will have a world-class facility that does have all of the security issues addressed that we have talked about in a variety of formats.

I will just make one other point. And that is that in addition to making that particular building more secure, we are also discovering that—our mission growth and other things has—is allowing us the opportunity to reassess additional facilities.

And so, we are in the process of a long-term study and investment study that will look at expanding the headquarters campus in a way that will allow us to absorb all of the missions that we have in a single area.

And that is a more long-term issue, but I think that too will incorporate certainly all the security issues that we have discussed in previous meetings.

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, thank you very much. I look forward to continuing to work with you, and I know the committee does as well, and your successor, on these important issues.

On missile defense, last year the administration made a decision to reduce the number of ground-based interceptors in Alaska and California from 44 projected to 30 because it concluded that the long-range threat was not materializing as rapidly as was once thought. However, since then we have seen an acceleration in developments and threats from North Korea and Iran that were not evident at the time.

At what point, General, do you think that the department needs to reevaluate its previous reductions specifically from 44 to 30 ground-based interceptors in light of changing threats?

General RENUART. Congressman, you are correct. The day-to-day operational deployed number of missiles was reduced down to 30. I concurred with that based on the intelligence that we saw and the progress of some nations to develop a threat to the U.S. But I also asked the Secretary to hedge a bit if we saw increased growth or more rapid growth and he has done that in that we have an additional small number, but additional number of missiles, 10 that will be designed for tests and four that will be, what I will call operational reserve, that we could bring into the operational capabilities.

And as you know, we are, in fact, continuing with the construction of Missile Field 2 up at Greely that will allow us to house those missiles should we need to do that. And I think that provides us a good hedge with potential acceleration in a particular threat and, of course, we also see the Phased, Adaptive Approach developing and hopefully the two will continue to show the progress and potential that they seem to have.

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, General, on testing, do you think that we have scheduled enough testing? Because I think that we were only planning two intercept tests of the two staged GBI over the next couple of years. Do we have enough tests scheduled and resources for testing including missiles?

General RENUART. Yes, sir. I think the test program is rigorous and a good one. I think we do need to maintain flexibility to adjust the tests so that if we see an emerging threat we can accelerate
some of those should that be required. We work very closely with the Missile Defense Agency on that particular issue.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen. We have Mr. Johnson, Mr. Coffman with additional questions. Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes. Under the radar obstruction—well, with respect to that issue, radar systems are interfered with by wind turbines, General Renuart, as noted in the written materials. Private wind farm development could interfere with Department of Defense or NORAD surveillance networks or the network, if you will, and there is not anyway currently to know about a private development of wind turbine farms. And I know that some measures are being taken to kind of get out on—in front on that issue.

Are there any federal—is there a federal permitting process that has to be followed by these wind farm developers or state or local regulations?

General RENUART. Congressman Johnson, I think there is a federal program to cite these kinds of activities and there is a planning tool that is made available actually through the FAA where a developer can go onto that—into that planning tool, it is a Web-based tool, and essentially put their proposal into the tool and it will tell them whether there is risk or not of their citing affecting either the FAA or defense-related facilities.

The challenge has been that the—it is not widely known by some that they need to go into that tool and start this process.

Mr. JOHNSON. So it is not a mandatory rule?

General RENUART. In fact, it is a recommendation from the National Wind Generation Association. That is not the correct term, but their industry association—to advise them that they should go into these. In some cases, developers have and, in fact, we have worked closely with some to reposition those sites, but I would hasten to say also that it is not just wind farms. In fact, we have had a couple of instances where the construction of a new resort hotel has impacted the field of view of one of our radars.

And so this is an area that Secretary Lynn was asked in some testimony in front of the Senate a few days ago and he has directed the formation of an executive group within the Defense Department to partner with the FAA and the industry so that we can ensure that anyone who might be undertaking one of these projects knows how to go to get this information before they enter into contracts or expend money that might be put at risk.

Mr. JOHNSON. Should it be mandatory that they do certain things, developers in general?

General RENUART. Congressman, it makes sense to me to do that, but not being a legal expert on this, I am not sure what is in place for certain today and what might need to be amended. So I think I would have to defer an expert answer on that.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Johnson asked the questions that I was going to ask. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen. If there is no further questioning, we wish to thank each of you for your excellent testimony, for your wonderful service. And General Renuart, we wish
you well to the finish line. And General Fraser, we shall meet
again.

General RENUART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We are now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 18, 2010
Opening Statement of Chairman Ike Skelton

The Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests from the U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command

March 18, 2010

The committee will come to order. Today’s hearing is part of our annual series of posture hearings with Combatant Commanders. I am very pleased to welcome General Gene Renuart of the U.S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command and General Doug Fraser of the U.S. Southern Command. General Renuart and General Fraser, welcome.

I want to express my gratitude and appreciation to all the servicemen and women whom you each command. They provide an invaluable service to our country, and we are in their debt.

We are fortunate to have the U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command represented here today. In many respects, these two commands share more than a common boundary. They take on many similar types of intractable challenges and work closely with their partners to provide for our region’s security and stability.

Recent events, including the earthquake that devastated parts of Haiti and the drug cartel-related violence near our border in Mexico, remind us of the many important and varied missions of these commands.

In today’s hearing, I look forward to our witnesses’ testimony on these missions and the issues that they face.

Starting in the NORTHCOM area of responsibility, I would like to hear from General Renuart about what progress we are making in helping our Mexican neighbors combat narco-syndicates and border violence. I also look forward to hearing about how NORTHCOM is continuing to work to improve coordination with local, state and federal authorities.

In addition, I would like to hear about how the recent Quadrennial Defense Review recommendations will impact NORTHCOM. In particular, please address the recommendations for faster, more flexible consequence management forces and improved awareness in the Arctic region.
Opening Statement of Howard P. “Buck” McKeon

The Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget Requests from the U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command

March 18, 2010

Today, we conclude our series of posture hearings with the commanders from U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Southern Command. This hearing, like those that preceded it, are critical to this committee’s analysis of the Administration’s budget request and our oversight responsibilities as we work to ensure that our troops have the critical tools, resources, and support they need to succeed in their various missions around the globe.

I would like to welcome General Renuart and General Fraser. Gentlemen, you represent the best America has to offer. I want to personally thank each of you for your leadership and service. General Renuart, a special thank you for the thirty-nine years you have given to the Air Force. I wish you and your family all the best in your future endeavors.

Combined, your commands cover the Western Hemisphere—including the United States and our northern and southern ‘neighbors’. Your testimony this morning gives our Members an opportunity to understand your priorities and better appreciate the ongoing and evolving security challenges in your respective areas of responsibility (AOR) as we head into our annual process of making national security policy and budgetary decisions.

Your appearance also reminds us of our extraordinary military men and women serving around the globe to protect American interests. Please pass along my sincere gratitude to all of our service members and their families serving under your commands as well as their interagency civilian partners.

General Renuart, you have the dual responsibility of overseeing two commands—NORTHCOM and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Both organizations have important roles in protecting American citizens, defending our homeland and supporting our immediate neighbors to the north and south.

There are several issues within your AOR that I hope will be addressed today.

Let me begin with one of the most imminent national security challenges on our nation’s doorstep: the narco-criminal enterprise operating in Mexico. As both the Ranking Member of this Committee, as well as a representative of southern California, I am deeply concerned with the scourge of violence fueled by the ongoing battles among powerful cartels. The recent killings in Ciudad Juarez illustrate the danger and reach of the escalating drug war. Soon after he took office, President Obama honored in on this issue, endorsing the Merida Initiative, which was passed by Congress in 2008. But that interest seems to be flagging, even though the violence is not. In 2009, narco-related violence reached all-time highs with nearly 8,000 drug-related murders in Mexico. According to some, violence this year is expected to be even higher.
Mexico cannot win its war without America’s help and we cannot afford for Mexico to lose. From your perspective, where and how should we build upon the momentum initiated by Merida and translate that effort into a lasting partnership? What role do you see NORTHCOM playing in terms of building the capacity of the Mexican military to counter the threats it faces?

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) emphasized homeland defense and identified several high priority capabilities for the Defense Department in order to provide support to civil authorities, including faster and more flexible consequence management response forces and enhancing domestic counter-IED capabilities. I am interested in hearing what steps the command is taking to reorganize Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive Weapons (CBRNE) response forces and what NORTHCOM’s role will be in assisting civil authorities with counter-IED tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Finally, turning to the important mission of NORAD. NORTHCOM also plays an important role in directing missile defense operations to protect the homeland. Given the nuclear and ballistic missile ambitions of nations such as Iran and North Korea, I hope your testimony will provide an assessment of NORTHCOM’s capabilities and force structure to defend the United States from a ballistic missile attack.

General Fraser, first I must commend SOUTHCOM for its efforts to assist Haiti in its time of need. The success of Operation Unified Response speaks to the professionalism of your forces and the command’s efforts to enhance its interagency relationships. Your forces brought comfort and hope to a devastated people, and have helped to put Haiti back on a road to recovery.

While our engagement in Latin America is often focused on disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, we must not forget that the region faces many pressures that make it vulnerable. Democracy is threatened on several fronts—most notably in Venezuela. Narcotrafficking continues to undermine regional stability and bring violence to the countries it touches. Poverty and development shortfalls create an increasingly disenfranchised population. Authoritarian regimes seek to reduce U.S. influence and engagement in the region while other outside influences—from terrorist financing groups to Iran—seek to make further inroads.

All of this highlights the need to remain engaged in Latin America. While we must ensure we can meet the region’s humanitarian assistance and disaster relief needs, we must not shy away from the other challenges. Yet, given our commitments in other areas of the world, most notably the CENTCOM AOR, I am concerned that we may not have the resources needed or the focus to appropriately engage our Latin American partners on a military level and that security and stability in the region will suffer. So, I think it will be very important for the members of this committee to hear what SOUTHCOM is doing now, what resources you are able to bring to bear to meet the region’s many challenges, and where you need our assistance.

In closing, let me take a moment to comment on the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Amidst the political swirl over the President’s stated goal of closing the detention facility, the men and women supporting the Joint Task Force continue to perform their duties
with extraordinary professionalism. Please pass on my gratitude to them for their exemplary service.

One issue related to the work of the Joint Task Force that concerns me is how it manages the interaction between GTMO detainees and their Habeas lawyers. My understanding is that lawyers are prohibited from giving detainees information relating to military operations, intelligence, arrests, political news and the names of U.S. government personnel. There have been reports in the press recently that some Habeas lawyers have violated—and continue to violate—Department of Defense procedures and possibly the law. I think these issues merit serious attention.
STATEMENT OF
GENERAL VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND
AND
NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
18 MARCH 2010
Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to report on the posture, challenges, and future direction of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). Every day, the Commands’ Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, National Guardsmen, Reservists and civilians defend the United States and Canada from external threats and aggression—protecting our citizens, national power, and freedom of action. Due to their efforts, North America enjoys continued security and freedom.

**HOMELAND DEFENSE IS OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY**

NORAD and USNORTHCOM are inextricably linked Commands that have complementary missions and work closely together to protect our homelands. Incorporating an integrated headquarters staff, our Commands have forged an indispensable partnership operating within a common security environment, and together are dedicated to defending the United States and Canada. The synergies that exist between these two Commands enable us to conduct our missions with a sense of urgency in the face of very real threats.

USNORTHCOM is responsible for homeland defense, sustaining continuous situational awareness and readiness to protect the United States against a range of symmetric and asymmetric threats in all domains. USNORTHCOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) includes air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Saint Pierre & Miquelon (French Territory off the northeast coast of Canada), The Bahamas, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and three British Overseas Territories: Bermuda, Turks and Caicos Islands, and British Virgin Islands, as well as the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles, the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. USNORTHCOM is also responsible
for leading the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts for theater security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and Caribbean nations within the USNORTHCOM AOR.

Day to day, we are focused on deterring, preventing, and defeating attacks against the United States. We also stand ready to support primary agencies, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef), in responding quickly to natural and man-made disasters. To accomplish our civil support mission, we stay close to our Federal partners to anticipate and plan for how and when the DOD can assist in preventing and minimizing loss of life, suffering, and property damage. We continually assess threats to our security, improve our homeland defense and civil support plans and capabilities, and strengthen relationships with our mission partners. We work diligently to ensure our nation’s military is ready and immediately accessible to support our fellow citizens when called upon.

NORAD is the bi-national U.S. and Canadian command charged with the missions of aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America. Aerospace warning includes the detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America—by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles—through mutual support arrangements with other commands. Aerospace control includes ensuring air sovereignty and air defense of the airspace of the United States and Canada. The renewal of the NORAD Agreement in May 2006 added the maritime warning mission, which entails a shared awareness and understanding of the activities conducted in U.S. and Canadian maritime approaches, maritime areas, and internal waterways.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

To perform our missions, we rely on the sharing of intelligence among Federal, State, and local agencies. USNORTHCOM’s Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC-North)
coordinates the acquisition, analysis, and fusion of intelligence, counterintelligence, and appropriate DOD-related law enforcement information for the USNORTHCOM AOR, and shares that information with organizations at the national, State, and local levels. JIOC-North maintains a dual focus on monitoring both non-state and nation-state threats to North America.

In countering transnational terrorism, we continue to rely on our established connections within the intelligence and Federal law enforcement communities, seeking as much legally appropriate information as possible. USNORTHCOM maintains liaison officers with the National Counterterrorism Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Beginning in 2009, DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis placed a liaison officer with JIOC-North. In the wake of the Fort Hood shootings in November 2009, we established a daily terrorism and force protection information sharing group to improve the manner in which potential threats are identified, assessed, and acted upon. We perform our intelligence activities with a focus on safeguarding the civil rights and civil liberties of U.S. citizens and adhering to appropriate statutes and DOD regulations.

HOMELAND DEFENSE OPERATIONS—PROTECTING WHAT AMERICANS VALUE MOST

USNORTHCOM may be known best for leading the DOD response to disasters in our AOR; however, we remain vigilant in our number one responsibility, homeland defense, as we monitor an average of 12-20 potentially dangerous events each day. Through our operational missile defense program and our maritime and air defense activities, USNORTHCOM maintains a high state of readiness to respond as necessary against man-made threats.
Ballistic Missile Defense. USNORTHCOM is responsible for ballistic missile defense operations within our AOR and other areas as directed to protect the homeland, allies, friends, and other national interests from potentially hostile acts. Our ability to carry out this mission continues to mature. The Ballistic Missile Defense System has been in nearly continuous operations since 2006 against potential threats to the defended area. Although it is a Missile Defense Agency (MDA) asset, the Sea-Based X-Band radar capability has also been included in our operational baseline during heightened threat periods since 2008.

Our missile defense crews are trained and our procedures are continuously validated and exercised, so that we can meet the high standards required to defend the nation. Furthermore, USNORTHCOM is active in the ground and flight testing programs to ensure the tests are more operationally realistic. Our immediate challenge is balancing a real-time defensive capability with requirements of MDA’s Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation activities.

USNORTHCOM is working closely with the other Combatant Commands to develop a Global Force Management Plan to address the Phased Adaptive Approach and improved capabilities to defend the homeland. This effort will assess operational planning, force structure, and budgetary implications to better meet global ballistic missile defense requirements. We are working with MDA to ensure that the Phased Adaptive Approach includes upgraded sensor systems with real-time discrimination capability; improved deployable and fixed-site interceptors; enhanced command and control systems that provide a common operating picture across the strategic, operational and tactical levels; and an additional Fire Control node at Fort Greely, AK. MDA’s Concurrent Test, Training, and Operations and Simultaneous Test and Operations, with the additional Fort Greely equipment, will bridge the gap between operational capability and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation activities.
Operation NOBLE EAGLE. Operation NOBLE EAGLE began immediately after the 9/11 attacks and continues today to protect and defend the United States and Canada with airspace surveillance, ready alert forces, and the U.S. National Capital Region (NCR) Integrated Air Defense System. Air National Guardsmen and Air Force Reservists have flown more than 80% of the more than 55,000 Operation NOBLE EAGLE missions.

The security and defense of the NCR against terrorist air threats is one of our highest priorities. NORAD works closely with DHS, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to ensure the skies over the NCR are protected. We are prepared to provide a rapid, reliable response as incidents unfold. As part of the NCR Integrated Air Defense System, NORAD and the USCG provide air patrol and alert aircraft to counter fast- and slow-moving air threats that may penetrate the NCR Air Defense Identification Zone.

NORAD also provides tailored air defense for National Special Security Events (NSSE) in the United States and similar events in Canada.

We are implementing a “risk assessment” model as recommended in the GAO-09-184 report “Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace.” This risk assessment will enhance NORAD’s ability to determine and apply appropriate requested levels and types of units, personnel, and aircraft.

Northern Sovereignty Operations. During 2009, NORAD launched fighter aircraft on 14 occasions in response to TU-95 Bear and TU-160 Blackjack aircraft not on international flight plans that penetrated North America’s Air Defense Identification Zone. Because these flights did not violate U.S. or Canadian airspace, they were not considered threats to national sovereignty. The response was a means of identifying unknown aircraft operating in relative proximity to U.S. and Canadian sovereign airspace. In 2009, for the first time, a NORAD representative was
included at the annual U.S.-Russia Prevention of Incidents over the High Seas staff talks. We anticipate continued NORAD and Russian Long Range Aviation dialog in 2010 to reduce the ambiguity of Russian military flights near our borders and promote safe flight operations within international airspace. NORAD operations in Alaska will remain a key avenue for positive interaction with Russian military counterparts during the reset of relationships between our nations; continued support for military-to-military engagement opportunities is essential to maintain this professional dialog.

**Maritime Domain Awareness.** Maritime Domain Awareness is the comprehensive understanding of the global maritime domain as it relates to the security, safety, economy, and environment of the homeland.

In the fall of 2008, a Russian Surface Action Group, led by a KIROV class cruiser, transited the USNORTHCOM AOR en route to participate in a naval exercise with Venezuela and a port visit in Cuba. Additionally, in the summer of 2009, we were involved with monitoring the activity of a Russian support ship and a pair of nuclear-powered Russian submarines patrolling covertly off our Eastern seaboard. Although these vessels were not considered a threat to our homeland, their presence off the coast of the United States cannot be ignored and requires naval assets to be in a readiness posture to respond in any way necessary to defend the homeland, if required.

USNORTHCOM has aggressively pursued interagency and partner-nation cooperation for Maritime Domain Awareness. USNORTHCOM has partnered with Mexico to better integrate regional efforts by initiating the development of an automated identification system architecture, which will contribute to increased information exchange and Maritime Domain Awareness. This will have a positive impact on our combined capability to combat illicit traffic.
USNORTHCOM is the Operational Manager for two Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations, which transitioned to Programs of Record in 2009. These complementary programs—Maritime Automated Super Track Enhanced Reporting and Comprehensive Maritime Awareness—automatically fuse maritime-related intelligence to allow joint and interagency analysts to provide decision-makers, planners, and operators the capability to rapidly evaluate and respond to potential maritime threats. These programs are fully operational and are employed in the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center, as well as the Navy’s maritime operations centers.

As the Arctic emerges as an area of increased activity, USNORTHCOM has taken steps to evaluate DOD’s ability to maintain Maritime Domain Awareness in the region. To establish this foundation, USNORTHCOM has commissioned a surveillance study with the intent of identifying current capabilities to determine where gaps exist. The study will be completed in the fall of 2010.

**NORAD Maritime Warning.** The NORAD maritime warning mission continues to evolve as NORAD planners work in close coordination with Canadian and interagency partners. Collaboration on several planning documents with these many organizations established and reaffirmed formal and informal relationships required for bi-national and bilateral maritime operations.

The past year’s accomplishments and ongoing efforts have resulted in enhanced bi-national information sharing and comprehensive understanding of the maritime domain among our mission partners. We worked aggressively to address gaps and seams documented in an internal Information Sharing Architecture study that identified barriers to achieving full mission capability status. The study further identified critical steps and processes necessary to
close these gaps within the NORAD maritime warning mission. We have also moved forward in the development of a shared bi-national common operating picture of the maritime domain. We continue to be challenged in a constrained environment to match the Canadian manpower commitment to this important mission area.

**Maritime Homeland Defense.** Commander, USNORTHCOM (CDRUSNORTHCOM) is the operational commander responsible for Maritime Homeland Defense within the AOR. Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command is under the operational control of CDRUSNORTHCOM for Maritime Homeland Defense. Maritime threats, particularly asymmetric maritime threats in close proximity to the homeland, require defensive capabilities ready to respond on extremely short notice. USNORTHCOM is developing a short-notice maritime response concept of operations that will provide an anti-ship defeat capability for short-range emergent threats leveraging U.S. interagency and partner-nation capabilities.

USNORTHCOM faces a wide spectrum of maritime vulnerabilities that warrant a comprehensive analytic study of “Short-Notice Maritime Response” to identify Maritime Homeland Defense capability gaps from a whole-of-government perspective. The nation's ability to respond to a maritime threat in the USNORTHCOM AOR requires the full integration of DOD maritime operations with those of interagency partners and, where appropriate, international partners, anchored on the principle of unity of effort. To respond to a maritime threat within the USNORTHCOM AOR, the nation depends on synchronized security efforts at the operational level along the approaches to and within the United States. The capability to intercept vessels of interest beyond their ability to impact population centers, critical infrastructure, and key resources, and the ability to respond quickly to maritime indications and warning are essential to protecting the United States from external threats and aggression. In sum, a whole-of-government approach
is required to leverage USNORTHCOM maritime partner capabilities and resources.

**Mine Countermeasure Contingency Operations.** The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan outlines roles and responsibilities that enable the U.S. Government to respond quickly and decisively to threats against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain. In accordance with the MOTR Plan, USNORTHCOM is responsible for Mine Countermeasure (MCM) operations in U.S. waters. In 2009, in order to consolidate logistics and maintenance infrastructure, the Navy completed the homeport shift of all surface MCM forces (minesweeping vessels) to San Diego, CA, and all Aviation MCM forces (mine sweeping helicopter squadrons) to Norfolk, VA. In May 2009, an experiment conducted in the port of Corpus Christi, TX confirmed that surveys and port folders completed prior to a mining incident can significantly reduce the time required to mitigate the mining threat and restore port operations.

**Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection (AT/FP).** USNORTHCOM protects DOD assets in our AOR by executing a comprehensive all-hazards approach to the AT/FP mission that provides DOD personnel (active duty, reservists, civilians, and family members), assets, facilities, installations and infrastructure protection from the full spectrum of threats in order to ensure mission accomplishment. USNORTHCOM has established theater policy, standards, and training, and verifies program execution and compliance through an exercise program and AT Program Reviews. We also integrate operational protection efforts with DHS to create a synchronized defense strategy for the AOR.

USNORTHCOM supports new processes and technologies that sustain the force protection mission. During the past year, we participated in a pilot program, with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, to identify a suspicious activity reporting and sharing capability for the DOD. The unclassified FBI
eGuardian system is anticipated to be the DOD suspicious activity reporting system when designated by the Deputy SecDef. The eGuardian system will share potential terrorist threats, terrorist events, and suspicious activity information with State, Local, Tribal, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, State Fusion Centers and the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The eGuardian system will provide a continuous law enforcement force protection threat information sharing environment to identify emerging threats to DOD.

**Critical Infrastructure Protection/Critical Resource Protection.** The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating the national effort to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) in the United States. The DHS Secretary serves as the Principal Federal Official to lead, integrate, and coordinate implementation of CI/KR protection efforts among Federal departments and agencies, State and local governments, and private sector. USNORTHCOM continues outreach with DHS and infrastructure sector partners to ensure effective critical infrastructure information sharing for the execution of its missions.

As assigned by the SecDef, Combatant Commands act to prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation of DOD-owned critical assets within their AOR. For non-DOD owned critical assets, Combatant Commands act to prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation only at the direction of the SecDef, with the exception of responding to a time-critical event that requires specific actions by military forces to prevent significant damage to mission-critical infrastructure.

USNORTHCOM retains DOD Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) focus in three areas: 1) Area of Responsibility or those DOD assets that are owned, leased or managed by DOD; 2) Area of Influence to include the Defense Industrial Base; and 3) Area of Interest that is non-DOD assets that are critical to sustaining U.S. military operations.
CIVIL SUPPORT—HELPING THOSE IN NEED

When directed by the President or SecDef, USNORTHCOM supports the primary agency, typically DHS, in responding to natural and man-made disasters by conducting operations to save lives, reduce suffering, and protect the infrastructure of our homeland. The Department of State may request DOD support in response to requests from other countries within and outside the USNORTHCOM AOR. DOD is prepared to support primary agencies with military-unique capabilities such as fixed- and rotary-wing airlift, search and rescue teams, mobile medical facilities, communications infrastructure, and catastrophic planning expertise.

A key component of USNORTHCOM’s support is Incident Awareness and Assessment to provide critical imagery for local responders. Military aircraft over disaster sites provide Full Motion Video and still imagery to give responders on the ground their first look at affected areas. At the request of the primary agency, USNORTHCOM is prepared to provide a variety of aircraft and satellites to gather photos and video that allow Federal, State, and local response assets to quickly respond to situations. We conduct these Incident Awareness and Assessment activities while simultaneously safeguarding the civil liberties of American citizens and adhering to appropriate statutes and DOD regulations.

CBRNE Consequence Management. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents pose a great and foreseeable challenge to the security of the American people. A terrorist attack on U.S. soil or an accidental CBRNE incident could create catastrophic results that would likely exceed the response capabilities of civil authorities. As a result, DOD established a requirement for CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) to be trained and ready to respond to requests from civil authorities to save lives, help mitigate pain and suffering, and reduce property damage.
A CCMRF is a brigade-sized task force that operates under the authority of Title 10 of the United States Code. CCMRFs are self-sustaining and may be tailored to any CBRNE event. A CCMRF is composed of Army, Air Force, Marine and Navy units with unique CBRNE training and equipment, as well as general purpose units trained to operate in a CBRNE environment. CCMRF capabilities include event assessment, robust command and control, comprehensive decontamination of personnel and equipment, hazardous material handling and disposal, medical support, air and land transportation, aerial evacuation, mortuary affairs, and general logistical support for extended operations. The CCMRF augments the consequence management efforts of State and local first responders, National Guard forces, and Federal agencies by providing complementary and unique capabilities when the effects of a CBRNE event exceed their capabilities.

In November 2009, USNORTHCOM and Army North (ARNORTH), USNORTHCOM’s Army Component Command, conducted the VIBRANT RESPONSE 10.1 Field Training Exercise (VR 10.1 FTX), the first full-scale, full-deployment exercise for a CCMRF, confirming the CCMRF’s capability to deploy to and support a catastrophic CBRNE Consequence Management event from a standing alert status. VR 10.1 FTX involved a simulated Improvised Nuclear Device detonation at Muscatatuck Center for Complex Operations near Camp Atterbury, IN. This challenging scenario is one of the 15 National Planning Scenarios established as a common interagency baseline, and the exercise set the stage for CCMRF 10.1 to fulfill its assignment through the remainder of FY10.

Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS), a USNORTHCOM subordinate command, plans and integrates DOD support to the designated primary agency for domestic CBRNE consequence management operations. When approved by the SecDef and directed by CDRUSNORTHCOM,
JTF-CS deploys to the incident site and executes timely and effective command and control of designated DOD forces, providing support to civil authorities to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support. Some typical JTF-CS tasks include incident site support, casualty medical assistance and treatment, displaced populace support, mortuary affairs support, logistics support, and air operations.

The FY08 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 1082, as amended by the FY10 NDAA, Section 1034, directed DOD to establish an advisory panel to carry out an assessment of the capabilities of DOD to provide support to U.S. civil authorities in the event of a CBRNE incident. This advisory panel was sworn in on 15 September 2009 and will submit their report with recommendations to Congress within 12 months. USNORTHCOM hosted the Advisory Panel’s second meeting at our Headquarters on 23 November 2009 in closed session for classified command mission briefings and discussions. The Command will continue to engage with the Advisory Panel throughout its efforts and we look forward to assisting them in additional research and insight into the Department’s CBRNE consequence management mission sets.

Response to Haiti Earthquake. USNORTHCOM is supporting U.S. Southern Command’s (USSOUTHCOM) response and support for Haiti Earthquake relief efforts. USNORTHCOM and our components contributed more than 170 people. Air operations experts from Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH), assisted USSOUTHCOM by transforming the 601st Air Mobility Division’s Regional Air Movement Control Center into the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center to control the smooth flow of aircraft into Port-au-Prince Airport. AFNORTH’s Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, Air Force Reserve officers assigned to respond to natural and man-made disasters in the United States, were onsite at facilities set up in the Southeast Region to support Haitian earthquake relief efforts. ARNORTH’s Defense
Coordinating Officer/Element worked closely with Federal, State, tribal and local officials to determine which DOD capabilities can assist in mitigating the effects of the Haiti disaster.

**Cyber Operations.** NORAD and USNORTHCOM continue to rely on data systems, the Internet, and networked commercial and military infrastructure to accomplish our missions. Cyber threats to these infrastructures include nation-state actors, terrorists, and criminal organizations, and are increasing in sophistication and occurrence. These cyber threats pose potentially grave damage to the ability of NORAD and USNORTHCOM to conduct aerospace, maritime, and homeland defense, as well as DSCA missions. Our dependence on critical information systems leaves us vulnerable to potentially pervasive and sustained cyber attacks from global actors.

The Commands partner with U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), the military Services, DOD Agencies, DHS, and other Federal agencies to share cyber threat and related information, reduce cyberspace vulnerabilities, and defend against information infrastructure attacks. Efforts such as the U.S. Government’s plans to increase information sharing with the private sector, and its migration to trusted Internet connections for the government and military networks, will help promote situational awareness and reduce vulnerabilities.

In 2009, USNORTHCOM, along with DHS, USSTRATCOM, and other mission partners, developed a plan tailored to provide rapid assistance to DHS and other Federal agencies for cyber-related events. This DOD cyber support would fall under our DSCA mission area and be provided in a similar fashion as hurricane relief, wildfire support, and responses to other national disasters. USNORTHCOM is also conducting an analysis of providing a cyber response under our homeland defense responsibilities.
H1N1 Operations. USNORTHCOM is executing Phase 1 of our Pandemic Influenza response plan. As part of our response, we identified five Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) Headquarters. The RJTFs, along with USNORTHCOM subordinate commands, continue to prepare to assist the primary agency. To date, USNORTHCOM has not received any requests from the primary agency for DOD capabilities.

In addition, USNORTHCOM is the DOD lead for globally synchronizing military efforts to minimize contamination and prevent further spread of pandemic influenza. The DOD Global Synchronization Plan for Pandemic Influenza provides guidance to all the Geographic Combatant Commands, Functional Combatant Commands, Services and DOD Agencies to assist in development of regional plans addressing operations in a pandemic influenza environment. Our efforts are focused on ensuring our military remains combat ready while taking care of interagency actions to keep military families safe at home.

Support to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics. The 2010 Winter Olympics began on 12 February 2010 in Vancouver, British Columbia. The Canadian Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness was charged with overall security for the Games and delegated the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) as the lead agency for this task. At the same time, the Minister formally requested Canadian Department of National Defence assistance for the RCMP. As a result of this request, the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, General Walter Natynczyk, tasked CDRNORAD with the aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for this event.

Inland Search and Rescue (SAR) Coordinator. In addition to defending our freedom, our lives, and our territory, SAR is a priority mission for USNORTHCOM. On 4 November 2009, the SecDef designated CDRUSNORTHCOM as the U.S. Inland SAR Coordinator, which made USNORTHCOM responsible for civil SAR involving the inland portion of the 48 contiguous states.
USNORTHCOM stands ready to coordinate the full spectrum of SAR, from normal SAR, such as searching for a lost hiker, to responding to catastrophic incidents, such as a large-scale earthquake, through our Rescue Coordination Center (RCC). The RCC is our key node for inland SAR and is under the purview of USNORTHCOM’s Service Component Command, AFNORTH. In addition, our Joint Personnel Recovery Center at Tyndall AFB, FL, allows us to have experts in place for routine SAR missions and to have those same experts at AFNORTH lead the way for a catastrophic incident SAR mission. The FY11 President’s Budget request for recapitalization of the Air Force’s current rotary-wing SAR capability supports the continued viability of our SAR mission. Full funding of this FY11 request keeps us on a path to continue providing SAR support to American citizens in those critical early hours of a crisis when aerial life support is a no-fail mission.

**SUPPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES**

**JTF-North Operations.** Joint Task Force North (JTF-North), a USNORTHCOM subordinate command, provides military support to Federal law enforcement agencies to assist in the identification and interdiction of transnational threats within and along the approaches to the United States. During FY09, JTF-North coordinated 61 missions in support of Federal law enforcement agencies. In accordance with DOD policy for supporting law enforcement counterdrug efforts, JTF-North employed joint air, ground, and maritime sensors along the nation’s Southern and Northern borders and coasts; conducted detection and monitoring of suspected trafficking threats; provided for information and intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies; supported Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) request for enhanced tactical infrastructure along the Southwest border; assisted with building planning capability within CBP; and provided Federal law enforcement with other support such as transportation,
tunnel detection capabilities, and basic military skills training.

At the request of DHS Assistant Secretary Alan Bersin, JTF-North provided support to the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats, a multi-agency operation, in the State of Arizona. JTF-North facilitated intelligence and operational planning, and provided sensor capabilities during execution of this intelligence-driven operation.

Through JTF-North’s missions and activities, USNORTHCOM continues to sustain important relationships with Federal law enforcement agencies in securing our nation’s borders against drug traffickers and their associated activities. Robust collaboration exists today between JTF-North and operational-level leaders in CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the FBI.

**Counternarcotics (CN) Programs.** USNORTHCOM’s CN Program is an integral part of the defense and security of our nation. We continue to build USNORTHCOM’s capabilities and establish coordinated efforts supporting our partner agencies and partner nations to address the illicit narcotics trafficking threat to the homeland.

USNORTHCOM’s CN efforts support Law Enforcement Agencies through information collection, analysis, fusion, and sharing, as well as theater security cooperation and partnership programs. These efforts are closely coordinated among the USNORTHCOM staff and subordinate commands.

In addition to our Southwest border, there are ongoing efforts with our Canadian partners along our 5,000 mile long Northern border. This U.S.-Canadian cooperation has uncovered and is addressing widespread illicit narcotics trafficking in our shared land, air, and sea domains that does not currently exhibit the level of violence as on our border with Mexico, but nevertheless remains a serious transnational threat to the United States. Illicit trafficking also poses a threat to
The Bahamas, Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, which are now in the USNORTHCOM AOR. Accordingly, we are exploring how to better coordinate CN efforts with USSOUTHCOM in this region.

USNORTHCOM has also made tremendous strides in supporting national CN efforts by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the Interdiction Committee (TIC) as part of their coordination with DOD. TIC membership consists of 17 agencies and commands led by a chairman appointed by the ONDCP Director. TIC provides advice to ONDCP on activities and threats posed by all illicit drug trafficking that threatens the United States and its interests in the Western Hemisphere. USNORTHCOM is now represented quarterly as a TIC participant with JTF-North.

**Counter-Tunnel Initiative.** USNORTHCOM is working with DHS, other Combatant Commands, and coalition partners to explore, map, and characterize illicit subterranean structures. Among these enhanced capabilities are seismic-acoustic and linear fiber-optic sensors, robotics, and other technologies. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research and Development Center, is the technical lead for this initiative and continues to work in support of multiple Combatant Commands to solve this difficult problem. Within the past year, DOD support has resulted in the preemptive interdiction of two unfinished tunnels on the Southwest border. The Southwest border is a perfect test-bed for this capability. Results of this initiative benefit all Combatant Commands and help our interagency partners in their border security mission.

**THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES—OUR PARTNERS**

National Guard and Reserve forces are critical to USNORTHCOM’s ability to carry out our
assigned homeland defense and civil support missions. As such, USNORTHCOM advocates for National Guard and Reserve capabilities in support of the Command’s mission. In each of our annual Integrated Priority List and Program Objective Memorandum submissions to the DOD, we advocate for and support resolution of National Guard and Reserve capability concerns. We further advocate for changes to DOD policies that allow for more collaborative planning to ensure proper resourcing for National Guard and Reserve units’ equipment, personnel and training for civil support operations. We also advocate for and support key issues such as equipment modernization in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams.

We recognize the National Guard as a fundamental partner in the Total Force and essential to the security and defense of our nation. The Air National Guard provides the bulk of NORAD’s operational force for Air Sovereignty Alert missions, and is developing additional capabilities in support of domestic requirements. The Army National Guard provides all of the manning at our Ground-Based Interceptor sites in support of missile defense requirements. Additionally, the Army National Guard provides the bulk of personnel for ground-based air defense capabilities protecting the National Capital Region.

The National Guard has made a significant investment in personnel assigned to USNORTHCOM. In fact, USNORTHCOM has the largest concentration of Title 10 National Guard officers in a joint organization outside of the National Guard Bureau. There are over 50 full-time National Guard authorizations in USNORTHCOM HQ; however, only 39 of those positions are filled. In addition, Guard general officers serve in nominative positions as my USNORTHCOM Deputy Commander, Director of Operations, and one Deputy Director of Plans and Policy. Our ongoing partnerships with the National Guard have increased our ability to coordinate and integrate joint and interagency operations. While we still have work to do, I am
pleased to report our collaboration with the National Guard has never been better, and the experience gained by Guard members serving throughout USNORTHCOM ensures we have a strong foundation for enhancing this relationship as these servicemembers progress through their careers.

**PLANS—THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR SUCCESS**

USNORTHCOM’s homeland defense and civil support plans are vital to our Nation’s ability to deter, detect and defeat threats to our security, and assist civil authorities when called upon by the President or SecDef. Our plans are modified as threats, observations, and lessons learned from exercises and real-world operations dictate.

On 2 November 2009, the SecDef established a Civil Support Plan category of DOD plans that may be shared with State, local, tribal, and other Federal authorities that play a mission-critical role in the development, review or execution of the plans. This Civil Support plan category of DOD plans contains seven USNORTHCOM plans.

The USNORTHCOM Theater Campaign Plan provides the framework for all of our planning efforts and is the primary means by which we synchronize day-to-day operations for homeland defense, civil support, and theater security cooperation activities. The operations and activities outlined in the campaign plan place strong emphasis on anticipating threats, improving our homeland defense and civil support capabilities, and strengthening relationships with our mission partners, at home and in the North American region. We continually assess the campaign plan to evaluate our progress toward achieving the long-term goals and objectives outlined in national and DOD strategies.
THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION

Our top theater security cooperation priority is to build the capacity of allies and partners to help create an environment in North America that is inhospitable to terrorism. USNORTHCOM’s long-range vision focuses on establishing a comprehensive defense architecture where the United States works with its international partners to deter, prevent, and if necessary, defeat mutual threats. To achieve this, we plan, execute, and assess theater security cooperation programs, events, and activities with The Bahamas, Canada, and Mexico to support national and Command goals and objectives. This requires us to direct theater security cooperation activities toward improving partner-nation defense capacities, using a capacities-based planning approach, to promote regional cooperation and enhanced interoperability.

The focus for our efforts is on building partner capacities with The Bahamas and Mexico and on enhancing coordination and interoperability with Canada. Our goal is to strengthen homeland defense through mutually beneficial partnerships in the AOR that counter terrorism, trafficking of WMD and illicit narcotics and other transnational and irregular threats and their consequences, while contributing to national security objectives.

We have worked over the past year with the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Geological Survey, FEMA and the Environmental Protection Agency to strengthen those relationships to further North American security and prosperity. Recent, ongoing, and planned initiatives include building relationships and capabilities and creating enduring partnerships that result in enhanced safety and security along our common borders and within the region. Activities have focused on developing and improving procedures to prepare for and respond to potentially catastrophic events such as pandemic influenza outbreak,
mass exposure to dangerous chemicals and/or materials, and natural and/or man-made disasters.

**Canada.** The relationship among NORAD, USNORTHCOM and Canada Command is a tremendous example of the strong and mutually beneficial military-to-military ties between our nations. I reported last year that we had signed the Canada-United States Civil Assistance Plan, which is the framework for forces from one nation providing support to forces of the other nation for timely, effective, and efficient support to their respective civil authorities. We used the Civil Assistance Plan in our deliberate planning process, as the U.S. Government responded to requests from the Government of Canada for USNORTHCOM support to Canada Command when they supported Royal Canadian Mounted Police security efforts for the 2010 Olympic Games in Vancouver.

NORAD and USNORTHCOM continue to develop our relationships with Canada Command. This past year, we concluded a comprehensive Tri Command Study that examined future roles, missions and relationships to increase North American defense and security while enhancing the valued relationship between Canada and the United States. The Tri Command Study identified several initiatives to further integrate and synchronize our operations and created a Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation among NORAD, USNORTHCOM, and Canada Command that highlights fundamental relationships and underscores individual command responsibilities for mutual support and cooperation.

**Mexico.** USNORTHCOM leads Theater Security Cooperation and Building Partnership activities with Mexico to promote specific U.S. security interests and support the development of Mexican military capabilities for self-defense and coordinated operations. Our military-to-military relationship with Mexico is growing stronger, with full respect for Mexican sovereignty and a shared responsibility for countering the transnational illicit trafficking activity
affecting our nations.

As one essential element of the U.S. whole-of-government approach, USNORTHCOM’s most significant contribution is in strengthening the operational capacity of the Mexican Army, Air Force, and Navy. Our engagement goes beyond providing hardware and the associated training; it also focuses on developing the ability to analyze and share the information that will allow the Mexican military to conduct operations against the drug trafficking organizations to systematically dismantle them. We are committed to a long-term military partnership with Mexico that is beneficial to both nations.

USNORTHCOM works in partnership with the Mexican military to support its efforts to increase capacities and execute its current strategy to counter Mexico’s security threats. The level of communication, interchange, cooperation, and training exchanges between U.S. and Mexican armed forces has increased dramatically over the last two years and represents a historic opportunity for long-term strategic improvement of the U.S.-Mexico security partnership.

Through our Theater Security Cooperation Plan and activities, USNORTHCOM plays a significant role in supporting the Mexican military and improving the security situation in Mexico through the execution of the following programs:

- The Mérida Initiative: $415.5 million appropriated in FY08 and FY09 Foreign Military Financing funds to purchase aircraft (up to eight Bell 412 helicopters, up to five Sikorsky UH-60M helicopters and up to four CASA aircraft) to improve the Mexican military’s ability to deploy rapid-reaction forces quickly in support of police operations against drug cartels, and to conduct maritime surveillance in an effort to deny the use of the eastern Pacific and western Caribbean to transnational criminal organizations, including drug traffickers and potential terrorists. In addition, funding will procure ion scanners to help detect illicit drugs.
USNORTHCOM’s actions are in coordination with efforts to build up the capabilities of Mexico’s civilian law enforcement entities by the U.S. Department of State and other agencies.

- **Section 1206 assistance**: $14.0 million for equipment such as Night Vision Goggles, Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boats, personal protective equipment, digital media forensics, tactical communications equipment, and specialized training.

- **Section 1004 counterdrug support**: $18.0 million for pilot training, specialized skills training, and intelligence training.

- **Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid**: $3.0 million in FYs 08-10 for hazardous materials response, flood early warning and emergency management training.

- **Facilitated training support in the areas of Night Vision Goggle maintenance, Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Hazardous Material team training, and Aviation Training**. Additionally, our service components are actively engaged with their Mexican counterparts in subject matter exchanges and sharing lessons learned from our experiences in the areas of civil-military relations and urban operations.

I have engaged with senior officers in the Mexican armed forces over the past few months who have expressed an interest in more detailed discussion and training in the areas of military justice and operational law (and inherent human rights issues) and administrative law. As a result, we are developing Subject Matter Expert Exchange and Mobile Training Team events (in conjunction with the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies) in order to enhance respect for the rule of law and human rights within the Mexican armed forces. For example, USNORTHCOM attorneys and attorneys from the Mexican armed forces have already participated in conferences designed to develop curricula for the professional development of military attorneys. Additionally, senior attorneys from the Mexican armed forces have visited
various U.S. military entities to get a first-hand view of how the U.S. military is organized and trained for the administration of military justice and for conducting operations in compliance with domestic and international law.

USNORTHCOM continues to support the Department of State’s “Beyond Mérida Initiative.” USNORTHCOM has partnered with the Mexican military in support of disrupting the capacity of organized crime to operate and institutionalizing capacity to sustain the rule of law, thus helping to build strong and resilient communities on both sides of the border.

We will continue to work proactively with our mission partners and with the Mexican military to achieve the joint goals of the United States and the Government of Mexico. It is important to recognize that while we are currently working with Mexico to develop and strengthen its military’s capability to defeat the drug trafficking organizations, our long-term goal is to establish an enduring relationship—built upon trust and confidence—so that we can cooperate in the future on other mutual security issues.

**The Bahamas.** On 17 December 2008, Theater Security Cooperation responsibility for The Bahamas was transferred from USOUTHCOM to USNORTHCOM. This UnifiedCommand Plan transfer enhances our homeland defense mission through our partnership with the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF), and strengthens our civil support missions with Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. This past year, my staff coordinated closely with USOUTHCOM and RBDF staffs to ensure smooth planning and execution of this shift in mission and responsibilities. We have developed a comprehensive Bahamas engagement plan as part of our Theater Campaign Plan that will enhance the U.S.–Bahamian relationship and integrate The Bahamas as a participant in the President’s Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). USNORTHCOM representatives participated in the WHINSEC Board of Visitors in June and December of 2009. We worked closely with the WHINSEC staff to ensure their curriculum is fully compliant with U.S. Code and supportive of human rights. I have tasked WHINSEC to provide human rights training to the Mexican armed forces in the upcoming months; however, I continue to believe that open disclosure of the names of all WHINSEC graduates intrudes upon students’ privacy and, more importantly, would assist drug trafficking organizations or terrorist groups to target the best and the brightest graduates from Latin America.

INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS

For mission success, our communications activities are focused on ensuring DOD interoperability with our DHS, State and local partners to rapidly and effectively share information to ensure a prompt, coordinated response in the aftermath of a disaster.

In partnership with the Defense Information Systems Agency, each year we sponsor the VITAL CONNECTION Communications Exercise (VCCE), which provides a realistic, controlled environment for DOD and its partners to train and collaborate on communications systems and capabilities that facilitate effective and efficient interoperability.

In 2009, there were four venues where DOD, State, and local first responders developed and refined their techniques and procedures to improve interoperability in the event of a natural disaster or national emergency.

USNORTHCOM continues to partner with FEMA and the National Guard in the employment of Deployable Cellular-Based Suites, which include cellular towers, satellite communications connectivity, Land Mobile Radio interfaces, and ancillary devices to improve
interoperability and service to emergency responders. USNORTHCOM procured four additional Incident Awareness and Assessment/Full Motion Video communications suites through the Combatant Commander Initiative Program that are positioned within AFNORTH Headquarters and Air Combat Command Communication Squadrons to provide enhanced Incident Awareness and Assessment/Full Motion Video capabilities to incident commanders. These suites provide additional capability to enhance situational awareness during disasters and emergency events for both incident on-scene commanders and our national leadership.

EXERCISES, TRAINING AND EDUCATION

NORAD and USNORTHCOM continue to derive exceptional training value from our participation in the National Exercise Program (NEP). In 2009, we participated in each of the Tier I and Tier II NEP exercises, including the National Level Exercise in July that represented the capstone event for the first-ever New Administration Transition Training program.

Our own two major exercises, ARDENT SENTRY 09 (AS 09) in June 2009 and VIGILANT SHIELD 10 (VS 10) in November 2009, represented extraordinary training opportunities with scores of Federal, State, local, tribal, non-government organizations, private sector, and multi-national partners.

In AS 09, we ran agro-terror and other asymmetric exercise incidents in Iowa and three surrounding States, a Deployable Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense scenario off the coast of Oregon, and a nuclear weapon accident/incident vignette in Wyoming, all while simulating loss of the use of our primary operations facility and having to move to an alternate location.

In VS 10, we linked to the main Canadian exercises supporting preparation for the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics (including how we would provide civil support if requested), and
simultaneously conducted an earthquake exercise in upstate New York. Each of these major exercises was linked to a VIGILANT GUARD exercise, the series we conduct in support of State National Guard Headquarters and Joint Task Forces.

In 2010, we will again participate in the National Level Exercise, and ARDENT SENTRY 10 will further exercise our civil support mission. We will also practice our homeland defense missions in VIGILANT SHIELD 11, linked to USSTRATCOM’s exercise GLOBAL THUNDER 11. We are also continuing a series of Pandemic Influenza exercises in preparation for future DOD-wide and U.S. Government-wide Pandemic Influenza exercises.

All in all, we annually conduct or participate in approximately 50 exercises of varying type, length, and complexity, to maintain our readiness across diverse NORAD and USNORTHCOM mission sets detailed in over ten Concept Plans. We engage our training partners at every level of Federal, State, tribal, and local government to employ the most comprehensive and realistic scenarios.

The newest complement of our civil support series of training courses is our DSCA Senior Executive Seminar. Hosted in our Headquarters, this two-day seminar provides a great opportunity for me to meet with State Governors and The Adjutants General (TAGs) (ranging from one to five at a time), for them to receive capabilities briefs from various staff Directorates regarding DSCA operations, and orient themselves to USNORTHCOM’s missions.

PARTNERSHIPS

Working with our mission partners is essential to ensuring the American people receive assistance during times of need, whether at the international, interagency, or State and local level. Our nation’s Governors take very seriously their role as Commanders in Chief of their State and
we respect that authority. Our job is to support our nation’s Governors in responding to emergency situations and threats in their States.

**States and Territories.** In an effort to understand each State’s risks and capabilities and in order to anticipate the best response for DOD requested assets, I participated in the initial meeting of the congressionally-directed Council of Governors and have also separately engaged with Governors, Lieutenant Governors, various state Directors of Emergency Management and the TAGs. Since taking command, I have met with a total of 27 State Governors and/or Lieutenant Governors. I have also met individually with 37 different States’ TAGs and have addressed all 54 TAGs at various National Guard senior leader conferences. The most recent conference was the 2010 National Guard Bureau/USNORTHCOM Hurricane Planning Workshop, 18-22 January 2010, in Tampa, FL, where several hundred representatives from 30 States and for the first time senior officials from DHS and FEMA addressed hurricane emergency response preparedness. Next year, we plan to expand the scope of the planning conference to include all hazards. These engagements strengthen the relationships between the State and DOD, improve mutual understanding of the critical balance each State must maintain between its requirements and resources to ensure support of the State’s civil authorities during a major disaster, crisis, or NSSE; enhance sharing of information and lessons learned from previous responses to disasters and events; and support the State’s understanding of NORAD and USNORTHCOM and our missions.

NORAD and USNORTHCOM provide a training and exercise program that actively engages the States and Territories. The VIGILANT GUARD Joint Regional Exercise Program is sponsored by USNORTHCOM and executed in conjunction with the NGB. Four VIGILANT GUARD (VG) exercises are conducted each year, and when feasible, two are linked to NORAD
and USNORTHCOM-sponsored exercises (VG Iowa with ARDENT SENTRY 09 and VG New York with VIGILANT SHIELD 10). All VG exercises include some degree of local/county government participation.

**Interagency Community.** NORAD and USNORTHCOM have strong relationships with many non-DOD Federal Agencies and Departments. Agency representatives and USNORTHCOM liaison officers provide an established reach-back capability to their parent organizations. These relationships provide the essential interagency context during operations planning and execution, while also providing the DOD’s perspective to external agencies.

**Private Sector.** Our Private Sector Engagement Team has worked closely with DHS, particularly FEMA, to support a comprehensive outreach program to non-profit and non-governmental organizations (NGO), businesses, academia, faith-based organizations, and public-private partnerships throughout the country. The tremendous capabilities, resources, and willingness of the private sector and NGO community are essential to successful disaster response. Achieving unity of effort is our goal.

**CHALLENGES**

We are aggressively tackling impediments to our efforts to improve air and maritime domain awareness, interagency information sharing, and consequence management operations. As we move forward with these efforts and others this year, we solicit and appreciate your continued support.

**Aircraft Recapitalization.** Legacy fighters, tankers, and airborne early warning aircraft in use today adequately meet all aspects of the Air Sovereignty Alert mission; however, recapitalization of these legacy aircraft is critical to the future success of the NORAD mission set.
Legacy fighters are aging and will be stressed to maintain reliability and capability as we move into the 2015-2030 timeframe. Recapitalizing the fighter, tanker, and airborne early warning aircraft will remain a challenge, given the DOD’s post-9/11 long-term mission requirements. NORAD’s mission readiness will be affected if Air Sovereignty Alert aircraft are not recapitalized in accordance with the FY11 President’s Budget Request.

**Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace.** USNORTHCOM is fully engaged with the UAS community through our membership on the Joint UAS Center of Excellence Advisory Council; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics-led UAS Task Force; and our participation on the Policy Board for the Federal Aviation UAS Subgroup. USNORTHCOM is also an advisory member to the newly formed UAS Executive Committee, co-chaired by the FAA and DOD, which is addressing the numerous national airspace access issues for public users. We are eager to team with our partners in the interagency community as they expand their UAS operations to achieve synergy in our homeland defense and civil support efforts. We continue to work with the FAA on finding the best way forward on employing UAS in the National Airspace outside restricted airspace.

**Deployable-Integrated Air Defense System.** One of the greatest challenges facing the Commands is the lack of an integrated air and cruise missile defense capability to counter threats from low-flying aircraft, UAS, and cruise missiles. As these threats grow, it becomes increasingly important to develop an integrated air and cruise missile defense system-of-systems to defend the homeland. In the past year, NORAD and USNORTHCOM worked closely with the Joint Air Defense Operations–Homeland Joint Test Team as the operational sponsor in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for a Deployable-Integrated Air Defense System capability, which could be employed to protect a particular venue or city which may be threatened or at risk.
National Security Implications of Arctic Change. The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is a seminal agreement of the extensive international legal framework that applies to the Arctic Ocean. Global interest in the Arctic region shows no hint of ebbing, evidenced by the summer 2009 transit of two German-owned cargo vessels through the Northern Sea Route, westbound from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. Increased activity necessitates that the United States become party to the Convention in order to protect and advance national interests in the Arctic by enhancing our national security (including the maritime mobility of our Armed Forces), securing U.S. sovereignty rights over extensive marine areas (including the valuable natural resources they contain), and giving the U.S. a seat at the table when rights vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.

To bolster our efforts for the Arctic region, I support the stated desires of our respective U.S. and Canadian civilian defense leadership to reinvigorate the Permanent Joint Board on Defense as highlighted by Secretary of Defense Gates’ and Minister McKay’s November 2009 Halifax Security Talks.

FUTURE CAPABILITIES

As we investigate existing technologies and capabilities for innovative uses, we are also focusing on emerging technologies to meet our requirements. We urge Congress to support the following initiatives.

Air Domain Awareness. In March 2007, the National Strategy for Aviation Security (NSAS) was published to enhance public safety and economic growth by promoting global aviation security through reducing vulnerabilities. The NSAS states: “Together, the Strategy and seven supporting plans present a comprehensive national effort to prevent hostile or illegal
acts within the air domain, promote global economic stability, and protect legitimate aviation activities."

To achieve the objectives of the NSAS, the whole-of-government must be committed to the guidance provided within the NSAS and supporting plans to achieve global air domain awareness (ADA). ADA crosses many Departments and Agencies within the government, thus requiring a coordinated approach. Historically, the operational synergism and cost efficiencies associated with the principle of unity of effort have not been completely realized for ADA because neither an interagency governance mechanism nor an information sharing infrastructure has yet been established.

To meet this challenge, NORAD and USNORTHCOM have teamed with DHS and other organizations across the U.S. Government to collaboratively develop solutions and lay the foundation for ADA. The desired end-state is development and implementation of a work plan leading to a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational ADA governance mechanism, interdepartmental capabilities and resourcing roadmap, and information sharing infrastructure to synchronize the disparate efforts of ADA mission partners.

DHS, NORAD, and USNORTHCOM hosted an Interagency ADA Summit on 13-14 January 2010 bringing together senior leaders from numerous federal agencies. The summit leadership provided guidance to three working groups facilitating development of processes for governance, information sharing, and capabilities and resources. Additional summits are planned at six-month intervals and will bring in participation from industry, State, local, tribal, and international partners.

**NORAD and USNORTHCOM Defense Surveillance Gap Filler Strategy.** Wide-area surveillance is a key component of Air Domain Awareness and is critical to air and missile defense
of the homeland; however, NORAD and USNORTHCOM lack adequate real-time, persistent, multi-domain surveillance. The NORAD and USNORTHCOM Surveillance Gap Filler Strategy proposes to rectify this problem by providing the Commands with a foundation to develop a family of systems permitting persistent wide-area air and maritime surveillance to enhance defense against threats in the interior of and in the approaches to North America.

The C2 Gap Filler Joint Capability Technology Demonstration will demonstrate a capability that enables efficient, secure, timely and trusted exchange of information resulting in enhanced C2 capabilities for NORAD and USNORTHCOM.

A second effort is the Next Generation Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTH) Technical Risk Reduction Initiative (TRRI) Phase I project. TRRI was developed to minimize the technical risks of building a next generation OTHR prototype while simultaneously raising technical readiness levels of advanced radar technologies. Over-the-horizon radars are proven, wide-area surveillance systems with the ability to detect and track thousands of air and maritime targets at ranges exceeding 1,500 miles from the radar site. When completed, these initiatives will improve wide-area surveillance around North America.

**Radar Interference.** Comprehensive Air Domain Awareness will not be attained unless we can resolve the growing issue of radar interference. As such, NORAD and USNORTHCOM support the establishment of an interagency process to allow the accurate assessment of existing and future plans for obstructions that potentially disrupt various radars within our area of operations. A formal vetting process is required with the necessary authorities to prevent projects from interfering with the defense of North America, while supporting the expansion of alternative energy sources, such as wind farms. To that end, NORAD has taken the initiative to form a radar obstruction evaluation team to quantify the impacts of proposed wind energy projects in close
proximity to our radars.

**Long-Range Radar Sustainment and Future Plans.** DHS, NORAD and USNORTHCOM use long-range radars to detect and monitor non-cooperative targets. Many of these radars are 1950s vintage technology and in some cases are well beyond their life expectancy. To help with the maintenance of these radars, the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) was approved, has been funded since FY06, and again requested in the FY11 President’s Budget. Upgrades to the radars are currently being completed. The goal is to sustain the existing systems another 15-20 years and use modern technology to play an integral part in the SLEP.

**FINAL THOUGHTS**

NORAD and USNORTHCOM have demonstrated our ability to meet emerging threats to the homeland and support civil authorities in times of crisis. We are committed to remaining strong and reliable partners, working together to protect and defend our nations, people, and way of life.

Our Commands’ success depends on the dedication, professionalism and sacrifice of our servicemen and women. We appreciate what the Members of this Committee have done to ensure the men and women of NORAD and USNORTHCOM have the best possible resources to maintain world-class capabilities.
GENERAL VICTOR E. RENUART JR.

Retiring.


The general entered the Air Force in 1971 following graduation from Indiana University. He was commissioned through the Officer Training School in 1972. He has commanded a NATO support group and two fighter wings. He served as Commander of the 76th Fighter Squadron during operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and supported Operation Deny Flight as Director of Plans for the NATO Combined Air Operations Center at Headquarters 5th Allied Tactical Air Force. In addition, he commanded Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Southwest Asia, responsible for control of Operation Southern Watch. The general has served as the U.S. Central Command Director of Operations, wherein he oversaw the planning and execution of all joint and allied combat, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction operations for operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. He also served as Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces, where he was responsible for Air Force and Air Component Command activities for the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. The general has flown combat missions in operations Desert Storm, Deny Flight, Northern Watch and Southern Watch.

Prior to assuming his current position, General Renuart was the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. He served as the principal immediate office adviser to the Secretary in all matters pertaining to the department.

EDUCATION
1971 Bachelor of Science degree in production and industrial management, Indiana University, Bloomington
1975 Master of Arts degree in psychology, Troy State University, Troy, Ala.
1977 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1979 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1992 Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
1997 Senior Officers in National Security Program, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.

ASSIGNMENTS
3. July 1976 - September 1979, assistant professor of aerospace studies, University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Ind.
6. June 1982 - July 1984, operations officer, Detachment 2, 81st Tactical Fighter Wing, Detachment 2, Leitheim Air Base, West Germany
12. March 1993 - October 1994, Commander, Headquarters Support Group, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, NATO, Ramstein AB, Germany
15. April 1996 - June 1998, Commander, 52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem AB, Germany
17. April 2000 - May 2001, Commander, Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and Commander, 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Southwest Asia, U.S. Central Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Northern Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating: Command pilot
Flight hours: More than 3,800, including 60 combat missions
Aircraft flown: T-37, AT-38, A-10, F-16, F-15, C-130 and HH-60

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters
Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Aerial Achievement Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant Jan. 12, 1972
First Lieutenant Jan. 12, 1974
Captain Jan. 12, 1976
Major Dec. 1, 1983
Lieutenant Colonel May 1, 1987
Colonel Nov. 1, 1992
Brigadier General Aug. 1, 1997
Major General Aug. 1, 2000
Lieutenant General Jan. 1, 2004
General March 23, 2007

(Current as of April 2007)
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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

POSTURE STATEMENT OF
GENERAL DOUGLAS M. FRASER, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

BEFORE THE 111TH CONGRESS

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

March 18, 2010

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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
Introduction

Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, and distinguished Members of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the United States Southern Command and our area of responsibility in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is my privilege to report to you on the successes and accomplishments of our men and women over the past year, and to share our appreciation for the outstanding support Congress has shown us. The devastating earthquake in Haiti has shown how suddenly the strategic environment can change; but it has also shown how your investments in U.S. Southern Command through the years enable us to respond to such challenges. With your continued support, we will build upon this foundation and strengthen the bonds of security cooperation throughout this region.

The nations of the Americas are strongly linked together in ways beyond physical and sociological proximity: our hemisphere is linked demographically, economically, socially, politically, culturally, linguistically and militarily. These shared qualities and beliefs connect us and provide the basis for addressing the common challenges that affect the security and stability of all nations in the region, today. These common traits also enable strong partnerships and serve as the foundation for the enduring relationships we will need as we face the future together.

As globalization trends continue, our security will depend upon expanding cooperative engagement with multinational, multi-agency and public-private partners in our hemisphere. We will be better able to meet complex challenges of the 21st Century security environment by building robust, enduring partnerships now. Together we are stronger and more effective than working as a single organization or nation operating individually. Our vision embodies this belief.

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The Region—Enduring and Evolving

U.S. Southern Command is responsible for conducting military operations and promoting security cooperation in Central America, the Caribbean and South America in order to achieve US strategic objectives. Successfully accomplishing this mission enhances the security and stability in the Western Hemisphere and ensures the forward defense of the United States.

The Americas, a home we share, is a strategically vital, culturally rich, and widely diverse and vibrant region. Since taking command nine months ago, I have traveled extensively throughout the region and have witnessed the challenges facing regional leaders and their people. I have also learned that many of these challenges are shared by all of us. Although our nations may at times disagree on political and economic matters, we are united by a common view that we can settle our problems through negotiated agreements. This view provides the key for security for our citizens and requires a steadfast dedication to protecting our fundamental liberties and defending our common commitment to maintaining democracy and the rule of law.

International commerce and trade between the U.S. and Latin American and Caribbean countries is strong, and experts forecast this growth to continue. The Western Hemisphere is the United States’ largest market with nearly 38 percent of US trade travelling north and south, equating to $1.5 trillion.\(^1\) We obtain more crude oil imports—52 percent—from this region than from the Persian Gulf, which only provides 13 percent.\(^2\) The Panama Canal is paramount in strategic and economic importance as nearly two-thirds of ships transiting the Canal are going to or coming from a US port, carrying 16 percent of US trade; expansion of the Canal is expected to

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1 Economic Interdependence 2008 Trade Figures (www.census.gov/foreign-trade). ~38 percent to Western Hemisphere versus ~31 percent to PACRIM and ~21 percent to Europe.
2 Energy Information Administration (www.eia.gov) Aug 2009 Figures: More than 52 percent from Western Hemisphere (incl CAN and MEX), 30 percent from LATAM (incl MEX), 19 percent from AOR, versus 13 percent from Persian Gulf.
almost double the capacity to approximately 600 million tons a year. The Commerce Department reports the overall sum of US foreign direct investment in the hemisphere (minus Canada) is 17.8 percent of our total foreign direct investment worldwide. Further, ten of the 17 US Free Trade Agreements are with countries in the Americas. In terms of percentage, our total foreign direct investment in the hemisphere (including Canada) equals our direct investment in Asia, the Middle East and Africa, combined. Additionally, Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) studies estimate $42.3 billion in remittances flowed from the U.S. to the region in 2009, slightly more than two-thirds of the IADB’s estimated world-wide total of remittances. Economic partnerships are strong today, and according to Commerce Department and World Trade Organization data, by 2011, US trade with Latin America is expected to exceed trade with Europe and Japan.

In addition to demographic and economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean, we share social and political views rooted in a common commitment to democracy, freedom, justice and respect for human rights. Compared to three decades ago when the form of government in the majority of these countries was non-democratic, most nations in the region now subscribe to democracy and agree that free governments should be accountable to their people in order to govern effectively.

We are fortunate to share similar main languages and interwoven cultures. Although there are many different dialects, people of the region use four primary languages: English, Spanish, Portuguese and French. While the U.S. is thought of as a primarily English-speaking nation, we are also the fifth largest Spanish speaking country in the world. Our significant

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3 Panama Canal Authority (www.panocanal.com) 5 percent of world trade transits the canal / 16 percent of U.S. trade transits the canal, 3/4s ships transiting Panama Canal are going to/from US ports
cultural ties will grow stronger in the decades ahead, as by 2050, the number of people in the United States citing Hispanic heritage will comprise approximately 30 percent of the total US population\(^3\).

Despite the constant ebb and flow of political tides in this hemisphere, U.S. Southern Command has been fortunate to maintain strong professional relationships with our military and security force counterparts in almost every nation in the region. We engage with these nations continuously during peacetime through numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises, conferences, and other training engagements designed to prepare for the host of challenges that may confront us. Regional partnerships with and among our partner forces directly enhance hemispheric security and stability, as evidenced by the outstanding professional teamwork and unity of effort displayed by the region’s militaries as part of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE.

In addition to our more than 20 large-scale joint and combined exercises annually, we host and sponsor hundreds of unit and individual exchanges, and assist with arrangements for approximately 5,000 students from Latin America and the Caribbean who attend US military schools and training sessions throughout the region. Future senior military leaders interact with US military personnel at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Inter-American Defense College, and the Inter-American Air Forces Academy. The camaraderie developed and the schools’ strong emphasis on democratic values and respect for human rights contribute to the professionalization of military establishments who are subordinate to civilian control and capable of effective combined operations.

Despite the number of enduring linkages we share with our neighbors in the region, we are also in a period of profound strategic change. Globalization has enabled nations, non-state actors, multilateral institutions and non-governmental organizations to affect—both positively and negatively—the condition of millions throughout our region and across the globe. Our world is shrinking. The Atlantic and Pacific oceans are not the borders or barriers they once were. There are multiple approaches in several domains—including, increasingly, cyberspace—by which adversaries can enter the United States. At U.S. Southern Command, we remain committed to helping achieve hemispheric security by developing and maintaining strong partnerships to meet the dynamic and uncertain future.

Challenges

The nations within our area of responsibility are largely at peace with one another and have formally foresworn the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Military spending on a per capita basis remains lower in Latin America and the Caribbean than anywhere else in the world. The likelihood of conventional 20th Century military threats also remains low for the foreseeable future. However, we do face non-traditional challenges that threaten security and stability throughout the hemisphere.

These challenges are multiple and complex and include a broad and growing spectrum of public security threats, the possibility of natural and man-made disasters, and an emerging class of issues, such as those relating to the environment. More specifically, illicit trafficking, transnational terrorism, crime, gangs and the potential spread of WMD pose the principal security challenges within the region, none of which fall to DoD to take the lead in confronting. Most of these issues, in turn, are fueled by the endemic and underlying conditions of poverty,
income inequality and corruption. Thus, our primary focus is on doing what we can to support other agencies of our government and our partner nations as they confront these problems and try to prevent them from becoming issues that require the military to address.

**Poverty and Income Inequality.** Perhaps the single factor contributing most to unrest, insecurity and instability in our region is the pervasive nature of poverty. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in 2009, the number of people living in poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean—defined as living on less than $2 a day—rose for the first time in six years, increasing by 1.1 percent over the previous year, from 180 million to 189 million people, or just over 34 percent of the population. The number of truly destitute—those living in extreme poverty, defined as living on less than $1 a day—increased from 71 to 76 million. That is an additional **9 million** people living in poverty and **5 million** living in extreme poverty. These figures illustrate in very real terms the enormous challenges faced by our partner nations and neighbors in the region. Coupled with this poverty is a disparity in income levels that is, according to the World Bank, the most unequal sub-region in the world. The richest ten percent of the Latin American population earns 48 percent of the region’s income, 30 times the percentage of the poorest ten percent, which earns 1.6 percent.

Areas with lower levels of economic investment, development and growth can provide a breeding ground for illicit trafficking, other related criminal activities, and the full range of terrorism. Impoverished citizens, with little trust in their governments or hope for a better life, are easy prey for illicit traffickers, terrorist organizations and political demagogues. They provide fertile soil in which international criminals and terrorists can recruit, take root, and flourish, thus directly undermining state sovereignty, threatening public safety and contributing to rising regional instability.
Illicit trafficking: The confluence of money, power and the ability to breach the integrity of national borders makes the illicit trafficking problem a significant security challenge for nations throughout the Americas. Border insecurity, increased violence, public fear, corruption, weakening support for democratic institutions, and heavily burdened local, county and state agencies are the by-products of this illegitimate and criminal activity, which is estimated to cost legitimate economies more than $245 billion annually. Furthermore, the same routes and networks by which illicit traffickers smuggle 1,250-1,500 metric tons of cocaine per year around the region, could be used unwittingly or unwillingly to smuggle weapons, cash, fissile material or terrorists. As a threat to our homeland and the long-term stability of the region, illicit trafficking is of critical concern as it provides a possible nexus for transnational terrorism and the potential proliferation of WMD.

Internal and cross-border—via air, land and/or sea—trafficking in drugs, weapons, human beings, money and terrorists poses a threat to every nation’s security and stability. Revenue from illicit trafficking has weakened state structures throughout the region, subverted the rule of law, and ripped apart the fabric of social order. I am particularly troubled by the progressively negative impact of these activities on the Caribbean and Central America regions. As progress in Colombia continues, air and maritime interdiction efforts are increasingly effective, and the Government of Mexico continues to apply pressure to drug trafficking organizations, these traffickers are being progressively squeezed out of their previous operating locations. This resultant “balloon effect” causes the trafficking organizations to seek safe havens in “undergoverned spaces” like the Petén in Guatemala, the Miskito Coast in Honduras and Nicaragua, and the Darién regions in Panama. Similarly, our Caribbean neighbors are also seeing an increase and return of illicit trafficking organization presence in their territories,
particularly the island of Hispaniola. The governments and institutions in these countries contend with the onslaught of violence, instability and insecurity associated with illicit trafficking as best they can, but they do not yet possess the capability or capacity to do so without help.

Underlying all this is the illegal narcotics industry. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, 31,000 deaths in the United States each year are attributed directly to drug-induced causes. The demand for drugs in the U.S. remains strong and creates incentives for illegal activities. The Andean Ridge produces nearly all of the world’s cocaine and it and Central America are increasingly providers of heroin consumed in the U.S. Of the approximately 1200 metric tons of export quality cocaine that shipped from source countries in South America in 2009, approximately 60 percent of that was headed north, destined for the United States; in addition, we are seeing a growing amount (approximately 30 percent) heading to new and expanding markets in Europe and the Middle East, as evidenced by Spain becoming the world’s largest per capita drug user.

This is not simply an issue of supply and demand for illegal narcotics, however. Traffic is bidirectional and equally congested in both lanes with contraband. As traffickers exchange drugs for arms and services in the transit zones, transit nations become drug consumers as well. Brazil provides an illustration of how such an evolution can occur, as it is now the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world behind the U.S. While drugs and people tend to go out from the region, increasingly, we are seeing money, arms and technology/know-how (from communications gear to gangland tactics) flowing back into the region. This cycle has expanded to become more than a localized or even regional issue—it has become a global enterprise and thus requires a global strategy to countermand it. While partner nations are willing to work with
us to develop regional approaches to counter the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics, effective and sustainable counter illicit trafficking operations severely test the capabilities and capacity of their thinly stretched forces. I see the illicit trafficking threat as a multi-faceted equation—demand, production, transit and finances—all supporting micro-markets of instability and violence.

The Drug Enforcement Administration estimates the illegal worldwide trafficking industry to be a $394 billion per year industry. In addition to illegal narcotics, illicit human trafficking nets approximately $32 billion per year; illegal arms smuggling nets roughly $10 billion per year, and the exotic wildlife industry nets a surprising $80 billion a year. Traffickers are constantly developing new means of preventing interference with their illegal activities. As we modify our tactics, drug producers and traffickers find innovative methods to develop the drugs as well as alternative trafficking routes to transport them. The traffickers of yesterday have become much more lethal today, and this trend is expected to continue.

**Terrorism:** The blurring of the lines that used to separate terrorists from narcotics traffickers can be seen in groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru. These entities define a category of "narco-terrorists" and they derive a majority of their funding and power from their involvement in the illicit drugs industry. These organizations and a number of extremely violent gangs have driven up the rates of homicide and kidnappings throughout the region and do not operate within traditional nation-state boundaries—they live among and terrorize the populace, and take advantage of ungoverned and undergoverned spaces without any regard or respect for national sovereignty.

As these two threat vectors merge into one new hybrid, so must our efforts to counter it. We thank the Congress for providing the dedicated resources necessary for this mission and for
working with us in the specific case of Colombia to authorize flexible funding sources that allow us to adapt and stay ahead with a blending of counterterrorism (CT) and counternarcotics (CN). This expanded authority and flexibility is essential to helping us rapidly address emerging capability gaps with our partners as the strategic situation continues to evolve. We now need to ensure that we have this authority in other areas as appropriate where we see this nexus potentially occurring, such as Peru.

**Crime and gangs:** A close corollary of the spread of illegal trafficking is the alarming growth of criminal violence in the region. Rising crime, coupled with corruption, exacerbates the conditions of poverty and inequality, hampering development efforts and reducing an already fragile economic growth environment. One out of every three homicides in the world takes place in our region, as does one out of every two kidnappings. According to United Nations data, Latin America and the Caribbean’s annual homicide rate is one of the highest in the world, with more than 27 homicides per 100,000 people—murder now ranks as one of the five main causes of death in several Central American countries. Central America is the region with the highest levels of non-political crime worldwide, with an average murder rate of 33 per 100,000 inhabitants last year, three times greater than the global average, according to the UN Development Program (UNDP) Report on Human Development in Central America 2009-2010. These reports all emphasize the toll—both human and economic—of insecurity, violence and crime on the day-to-day decisions of the population, making insecurity a clear impediment to development and a destabilizing element for many nations in the Western Hemisphere. For example, in recent surveys of the region, delinquency and lack of personal security rank as the top social ill for the majority of countries.⁶

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⁶ Latinobarómetro.
The growing presence and influence of gangs contributes to rising crime rates and severely challenges personal security in many areas. In Central America, Jamaica, and major cities in Brazil, gangs are infecting society’s ability to provide basic functions and necessities, and are thus becoming a significant security priority. The overall gang population is estimated to reach into the hundreds of thousands, primarily filling their ranks with disenfranchised youth.

According to a comprehensive study conducted by the National Public Security Council in El Salvador in 2008, violent crime cost the five countries examined a combined $6.5 billion, equivalent to 7.7 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The GDP losses to crime came at the expense of government investment in social services like spending on development, infrastructure, public safety and education. Increasingly, the threat posed by gangs reaches beyond Latin America and the Caribbean—the more sophisticated groups operate regionally and even globally with deep reach back into the United States from California to Washington, DC, and increasingly into Europe.

The compounded effects of urban violence and transnational gangs are an undeniable threat to our national security and to the larger long-term security and stability of the region. The Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and USAID each have programs that fit together to augment the efforts of the nations’ most affected by youth violence. In each case, U.S. Southern Command closely coordinates with and supports the lead federal agency and the U.S. Ambassador; at the same time, we continue working arm-in-arm with partner nation

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7 Los Costos Económicos de la Violencia en Centroamérica (The Economic Cost of Violence in Central America), El Salvador, 2008, pp.13-14. In 2008, the National Public Security Council of the Salvadoran presidency’s office commissioned a study compiling the excess direct spending and losses caused by violence in five Central American countries in four areas, namely: increased health care; increased government spending for crime prevention, law enforcement and justice; spending on private security; and, material losses from crime. This landmark analysis found that in 2006, violent crime cost the combined states $6.5 billion—equivalent to 7.7 percent of GDP. Though all nations suffered significant losses, the total cost of violence varied between countries: $2.9 billion in Guatemala (7.7 percent GDP), $2.01 billion in El Salvador (10.8 percent GDP), $885 million in Honduras (9.6 percent GDP); $790 million in Costa Rica (3.6 percent GDP); and, $529 million in Nicaragua (10.0 percent GDP).
military and security forces in the region to build the necessary capabilities to enable them to provide their own national security and be able to provide responsible support to civilian authorities when required.

*Competitive Marketplace:* Because of globalization and its inherent empowerment of new actors, the U.S. can no longer take for granted that our way of life is the sole ideology of choice in this region. We must now actively compete to ensure our message is accurately transmitted and received by the appropriate audience. Populism, socialism and democracy are *all now* prevalent ideas within the region. Money, trade, and other interaction from expanding players like China, Russia and Iran exist in Latin America and the Caribbean. We are also beginning to see a renewed polarization in the region. All of these factors combine to form a competitive marketplace of ideas, within which non-traditional actors have become very adept at operating.

To compete in this venue, we engage proactively and counter anti-U.S. messaging with persistent demonstrations of our goodwill, competence and professionalism. We convey the strength of our ideas in both words and deeds by training and working with our regional partners to improve security, provide humanitarian assistance, and respond to disasters. We remain engaged in this marketplace through dialogue and open discussion with partners within the region as well as players external to our AOR.

China’s evolving relationship with Latin America through a growing number of linkages and longer-term investments is impacting the strategic landscape in the region and further emphasizes the interconnectedness of the 21st Century. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), total bilateral trade between China (excluding Hong Kong) and Latin America has risen from $39.3 billion in 2004 to almost $147 billion in 2008. China is already the second
largest user of the Panama Canal. The rapid growth of China’s trade with Latin America and the Caribbean shows the likelihood China could become an enduring part of the economic landscape of the Americas.

We have also noticed a marked increase in military-to-military and technology-based relations between China, Russia, Iran and the region. China is conducting more military training and educational exchanges, entering into a larger number of technology transfers agreements, and selling sophisticated defensive military items such as air surveillance radars and military aircraft. China is also finding new areas for cooperation in the commercial space sector as seen in the China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite (CBERS) program. Russia has followed suit, with arms sales and a naval tour of the Caribbean. Russia has publicly stated that improving relations with Latin America is a top priority, focused primarily on Cuba and then Venezuela. They have also increased their outreach to other countries in the region as evidenced by signing a military and scientific bilateral agreement with Peru, offering increased support to Bolivia’s counter-narcotics operations, and seeking a Free Trade Agreement with Chile.

Iran, too, is strengthening its ties to the region, focusing primarily on Venezuela, while developing relationships with other nations, as evidenced by opening 11 new embassies with a 12th expected to open in the Caribbean later this year. Iran’s trade activities have thus far focused on infrastructure development, medical exchanges, agriculture, mining and the oil industry. Finally, a Trade Memoranda of Understanding between Iran, Cuba and Venezuela since 2005 has now surpassed $7 billion.

As we face this complex, dynamic and continually evolving security environment at Southern Command, we are constantly reminded that achieving our desired end state of secure stable, democratic and prosperous states throughout the Americas requires a wide variety of tool
sets beyond pure military activity. We continue to look for creative ways to approach partnerships throughout the region. We seek innovative ways to organize, plan, train and operate; to adapt new technology to ever-changing challenges; and to communicate, including how we describe and frame our challenges both with our partners and with the public in general.

Strategic Framework: Initiatives, Exercises and Operations

Our strategic approach is balanced and prioritized — confronting the most pressing and probable threats to the Nation today, while at the same time, posturing the joint, combined and multinational force to prevent, and if necessary, defeat the most consequential threats to tomorrow. We take a regional, global and long-term view of our strategic environment, our objectives, and the implications for strategic risk. It is imperative we remain capable of executing our plans, while still engaging throughout the region at the appropriate levels: building, complementing or enhancing, as appropriate, partner capability and capacity; improving international and interagency cooperation; and, fostering both security and stability.

As we confront the considerable range of challenges before us in our AOR, we continually ensure coordination across multiple levels in more than one agency and in more than one nation. This is a prerequisite for any project, exercise, initiative or operation within our region: each issue needs to be assessed as part of an interconnected and unified strategy. For example, the illicit trafficking issue cannot be adequately addressed in isolation from issues of illegal narcotics, migration, arms trafficking, money-laundering, and radical ideological terrorists. Furthermore, our strategic approach is based on the affirmation of common values held throughout the hemisphere: democracy, liberty and human rights.
In terms of military-to-military contact, Latin America and the Caribbean represent many opportunities of US engagement. We have witnessed numerous positive results from non-traditional approaches to partnering that integrate talents and capabilities from foreign and domestic, military and civilian, public and private sector entities. These efforts may be relatively low visibility, but they have a huge impact on US military and partner nation military and security force readiness, particularly when they are accomplished in a consistent and enduring manner. We pursue a host of programs in support of other lead agencies and government entities to include numerous training exercises, educational programs, technology sharing, intelligence sharing, security procurement assistance, humanitarian aid, among others. Our evolving engagement strategy commits us to build or enhance the security capability of our military counterparts and to expand the capacity for all of us to work together. Joint, international, interagency, and public-private is the essence of everything we do.

**Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South):** At the tactical and operational level within U.S. Southern Command, a model for this regional engagement and international and interagency coordination is JIATF-South located in Key West, Florida. JIATF-South exists to spearhead the effort to fight one of the most pressing challenges facing the region—illicit trafficking—with an acknowledged potential nexus with narco-terrorism. This interagency task force, which celebrated twenty years of excellence last year, is led by a U.S. Coast Guard Rear Admiral and is comprised of truly amazing individuals from all four branches of the military, 14 different agencies and 13 partner nations. This group, beyond doubt, is a team: a joint, interagency, international, combined and allied team—a creative and innovative body that defines “synergy”, the blending of experience, professionalism and knowledge being greater than the sum of its individual parts.
JIATF-South continues to make incredible headway, producing extraordinary results every year. For example: JIATF-South’s joint operating area (JOA) covers nearly 42 million square miles, almost 21 percent of the earth’s surface; in the 20 years it has been conducting operations in this region, 2500 metric tons of cocaine have been seized, 705,000 pounds of marijuana interdicted, 4600 traffickers arrested, 1100 vessels captured, and a grand total of approximately $195 billion taken out of the pockets of the drug cartels. They have accomplished these results while possessing zero assets of their own—every aircraft and vessel involved with detection, monitoring, interdiction and apprehension is allocated through the Department of Defense Global Force Management process, Department of Homeland Security Statement of Intent, and International contributions that place the assets under tactical control (TACON) of JIATF-South, which can be recalled by their service provider or operational control (OPCON) authority if unexpected circumstances warrant, such as Haiti relief efforts, search and rescue (SAR), or other national interests. In 2009, JIATF-South had TACON of USCG, USN, and international ships for a total of 2915 on-station days, equating to an approximately 8.0 surface asset laydown on any given day within the JIATF-South JOA. Similarly, JIATF-South had TACON of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), USCG, DOD and international long range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) for a total of 9446 on-station hours, equating to an approximately 3.0 air asset laydown on any given day within the JIATF-South JOA. Based on JIATF-South’s analysis, a 14.0 surface asset laydown and a 5.0 air asset laydown are required to meet the National Interdiction goal of 40 percent.

In addition to the need for organic surface and air assets, additional challenges that restrict JIATF-South from realizing their full effectiveness include: policy limitations on the amount and degree of intelligence and other data that can be shared with partner agencies and
nations; structural and technological hurdles in situational awareness, particularly Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA); and, an unequal level of “end game” capabilities present in the military and security forces in the AOR. Still, in 2009, JIATF-South was responsible for greater than 61 percent of all global transit zone seizures and disruptions, and 45 percent of all cocaine seizures in the world; additionally, they were responsible for the interdiction of 226 metric tons of cocaine, equivalent to a net $4.5 billion loss for the cartels and traffickers. While doing all this, JIATF-South set the benchmark for workplace quality in a recent organizational study.\(^5\) This kind of success demands total commitment from the entire organization—inspirational leadership, complete integration, collaboration and partnership which exists at every level throughout the command. JIATF-South is the standard for integrating and synchronizing “whole of government”, “whole of nation”, and “whole of many nations” solutions in confronting challenges to our national and shared regional security.

**Exercises:** Southern Command is committed to being a good partner—more to the point, we want to be the enduring partner of choice throughout the region. Day in and day out, year after year, we dedicate the majority of our resources toward strengthening the security capabilities of our partners, while working to encourage an environment of cooperation among all the nations in the region. We conduct frequent and wide-ranging multinational exercises and international exchanges with our partners, send thousands of partner military and civilian experts to various leading academic institutions, and provide other critical security assistance to our friends in the region. All these activities focus on strengthening regional bonds and enhancing collective capabilities we believe are integral to US national security and stability in the Western Hemisphere as a whole. These exercises focus on confronting regional threats such as maritime

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\(^5\) 2009 Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) Organizational Climate Survey: JIATF-South surpassed the national average in every category (13 of 13).
insecurity, terrorism, illicit trafficking, and illegal migration, while also increasing partner nation ability to support peacekeeping, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations. The fruit of these labors can be seen in the overwhelmingly positive and unified response in Haiti.

**PANAMAX, UNITAS and FUERZAS COMANDO**: Building confidence, capability, and cooperation within our AOR is essential to confronting today’s security challenges. Our exercise Fuerzas Aliadas (Allied Forces) PANAMAX has matured over the last seven years and has become one of our flagship programs as well as the world’s largest multinational and multi-agency training exercise. PANAMAX focuses on improving the hemisphere's ability to provide air, sea and land forces to assist the government of Panama in its excellent work of securing the Panama Canal and defending it from traditional and non-traditional threats. The exercise began in 2003 as a limited naval exercise with just three participating nations: Panama, Chile and the U.S. Due to past successes and efforts to expand partnerships, the exercise has grown to include a roster of more than 20 nations, several U.S. Government departments and agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and multiple military branches of service.

Another large-scale exercise we support that emphasizes such cooperation and integration is UNITAS, which trains participating forces to ensure maximum interoperability in future coalition operations. We hosted the 50th iteration and celebration in Jacksonville in May 2009. Seven thousand international sailors and mariners participated, including personnel from Canada and Germany, making it the longest running multinational maritime training exercise in the world.

Shortly afterward, U.S. Southern Command hosted Counter Terrorism Exercise Fuerzas Commando in Brazil in 2009. This unique exercise consisting of 21 partner nations involved a
competition in counterterrorism (CT) skills by the elite CT units in the region as well as bringing together civilian counterterrorism leadership from each of the countries to exchange ideas on training and complementary evolutions. Exercises like PANAMAX, UNITAS and FUERZAS COMANDO provide excellent forums for military-to-military relationship building and I thank Congress for providing the flexibility in my Combatant Commander Exercise Engagement funds that allow us to execute these kinds of exercises, as well as the funds designed to assist the participation of the developing countries within our AOR.

**Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief:** While our programs and initiatives focus primarily on security, increasingly our approach has broadened to support stability efforts as part of a larger national path to true partnering and engagement in the Western Hemisphere. A key element of these efforts is a variety of humanitarian goodwill activities that directly help those in need while providing needed training to our team. These engagement missions range from planned events such as the construction and/or refurbishment of wells, schools, community centers and medical facilities to rapid response missions in the wake of disasters.

In 2009, as part of our annual operation Continuing Promise, *USNS COMFORT* returned to our waters with the mission to bring short-term modern medical care, provide preventive medicine engagement, and conduct long-term medical training and education. With over 100,000 patient encounters, 1600 surgeries performed, 135,000 pharmacies dispensed, 13,000 animals treated and 37,000 students trained, we were able to engage on a scale previously unimaginable just four years ago. In 2010, through Continuing Promise in combination with our Medical Readiness and Dental Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs and DENTRETEs, respectively), we hope to surpass the ‘1 million patient treatments’ mark since the inception of this program.
The impact of Continuing Promise on the Host Nations has been greater than just numbers, however; the types of procedures performed and training conducted speak to the long-term positive effects on society and citizen security as our joint, combined and integrated crews focused on hysterectomies, thyroids, cataract removals, and education on disease prevention. The impact has been more than just the USNS COMFORT, as well. On the engineering side for example, Construction Battalions (Seabees) personnel repaired and improved five hospitals and clinics; provided refurbishments to seven schools; and renovated one baseball field. Additionally, in direct support of existing USAID projects, USNS COMFORT personnel assisted in a laboratory completion in the Dominican Republic and assisted in dock repairs in Panama that buttressed a USAID eco-tourism project.

Access to health care is a critical component of security and stability and the COMFORT’s mission is only one of many medical outreach efforts. As mentioned previously, U.S. Southern Command also sponsors MEDRETEs and DENTRETEs, consisting of military medical teams that treat over a quarter of a million patients annually in the region, focusing primarily on needy rural, isolated populations. These unique training exercises have had tremendous impact inland throughout the AOR over 75 separate locations—changing lives, providing alternative perceptions, and spreading goodwill through quality donated medical assistance. In 2009, 89 MEDRETEs were conducted in 18 countries, treating over 220,000 patients, performing almost 1,200 surgeries and inoculating and treating more than 31,000 animals. More than just a medical deployment, these humanitarian assistance missions have also provided dental care to approximately 50,000 patients, conducted medical training for almost 60,000 host nation students and medical providers, and sponsored over 40 construction and restoration projects at local schools and health care facilities. These visits also extended
veterinarian services throughout their journeys, treating and vaccinating thousands of animals, which constitute the livelihood of many families.

Throughout the year, U.S. Southern Command’s Humanitarian Assistance Program augments traditional military-to-civilian engagement activities in order to increase our partner nations’ ability to respond independently to natural and man-made disasters. New Horizons (Andean Ridge) and Beyond the Horizons (Caribbean and Central Americas) are a series of joint and combined humanitarian assistance exercises that U.S. Southern Command conducts with Latin American and Caribbean nations to provide readiness training for U.S. Engineer, Medical, and Combat Service Support units, but also provide great benefit to the host nation. Each exercise lasts several months and usually takes place in remote areas. We strive to combine these efforts with those of host nation doctors and civic personnel. Our programs help local populations who can benefit from completed projects such as schools, clinics, community centers, orphanages, emergency operations centers, disaster response warehouses, wells, and potable water systems. In 2009, we conducted these exercises in six countries in the AOR, supporting the renovation, construction and repair on 12 schools, two community centers, four health clinics, three water wells, two sports complexes, two road repairs, and one pedestrian bridge, in addition to providing critical training programs for first responders, disaster managers, firefighters, and disaster warehouse managers.

These examples of our consistent and enduring engagement throughout the region further advance our strategic messaging and help build confidence, capability, and goodwill in numerous countries in the region, bring renewed hope to those enduring hardship and challenging conditions, and serve as a visible and lasting counterweight to anti-U.S. messaging. The cumulative effects of our humanitarian assistance missions have directly and indirectly touched
and bettered the lives of several hundred thousand throughout our shared home, as well as laying the foundation for relationships and experience that pays large dividends when the United States responds to a humanitarian crisis in the region…as we did and are still doing in Haiti.

Haiti—Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE

On January 12th, the nation of Haiti experienced a 7.0 magnitude earthquake with an epicenter located approximately ten miles WSW of its capital city, Port au Prince. The size and destructive capability of this temblor was made even worse by several contributing factors, namely: the earthquake was relatively shallow, making the shockwaves much more pronounced; the capital city was overcrowded and over-developed with construction standards inconsistently applied and loosely enforced; and, much of Haiti was still recovering from a string of three hurricanes and one tropical storm that struck during a 23-day period in the summer of 2008. It had been almost 150 years since an earthquake of this magnitude had struck Haiti and the devastation was tremendous. Latest UN estimates indicate over 222,517 people were killed, 300,000 injured, and 1.2 million displaced by the earthquake and the 59 subsequent aftershocks. Thirteen of the fifteen government ministry buildings were completely destroyed. Between 40-50 percent of all buildings sustained significant damage in Port au Prince and surrounding villages, with some suffering as much as 80 percent damage as in Leogane. The airport control tower was rendered inoplicable and more than half the seaport was left in ruins. Later that night, the President of Haiti declared a national state of emergency and in doing so, requested the United States assist in providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief aid. The United States Ambassador to Haiti responded by issuing a disaster declaration, confirming the situation warranted U.S. Government assistance.
The US response was swift and comprised of federal, state, military and civilian agencies and units. There were several DOD and USG assets already in the vicinity of Haiti. Just before dawn the next morning, 13 January, the USCG Cutter FORWARD arrived off the coast of Haiti, established a liaison with the Haitian Coast Guard facility at Killick to conduct damage assessments, set up critical command and control procedures, and began providing humanitarian assistance, helping the most seriously wounded, and evacuating injured American citizens. Shortly thereafter, two USCG C-130 aircraft also arrived to support US relief efforts.

At 1020 that morning, President Obama expressed “the deep condolences and declared the unwavering support of the American people” and ordered a “swift, coordinated and aggressive effort to save lives” with USAID designated as the Lead Federal Agency. During the course of the day, an Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH) assessment team landed in Port au Prince to survey the airport while elements of the First Special Operations Wing arrived to reopen Port au Prince International Airport. A US Navy P-3 aircraft from the Cooperative Security Location of Comalapa, El Salvador, conducted the first US aerial reconnaissance of the area affected by the earthquake. DOD officials ordered the aircraft carrier USS CARL VINSON and USS BATAAN Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (22nd MEU) embarked to make best speed to Haiti. The first US urban search and rescue team, a 72-member unit from Fairfax County, Virginia, arrived in Haiti before even 24 hours had elapsed.

Later that day U.S. Southern Command deployed two planeloads of personnel from our Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (SJFHQ) element, an organic, free-standing, deployable joint military headquarters, which included experts in the field of engineering, operational planners, communications specialists, medicine, interagency coordination, and a command and control group. They arrived and began coordinating with the US Embassy in Port au Prince, as well as
United Nations and other international personnel who were leading the initial recovery efforts. In addition, this core team began conducting assessments of damage and determining areas where the unique capabilities of the military could rapidly be brought to bear in support of the Government of Haiti.

On 14 January, the size and scope of DOD’s response grew as more forces flowed to the assistance and relief effort. Four more USCG Cutters and the USS HIGGINS arrived off shore. Throughout the day, P-3s continued aerial reconnaissance. An engineering assessment team arrived and determined the pier and wharf at Port au Prince port were inoperable for movement of bulk stores. Later that night, the Secretary of Defense ordered the USS NASSAU ARG with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (24th MEU) embarked, the XVIII Airborne Corps, 2nd Brigade Combat Team 82nd Airborne Division, and the hospital ship USNS COMFORT to deploy to Haiti. As elements of these assets and others arrived over the course of the next 4 days, they formed the core of DOD’s overall contribution to the massive humanitarian assistance mission—providing unique capabilities and an initial surge capacity in what became our primary lines of operation: security, critical engineering, medical and logistics. To organize the response of the military forces, we established Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H) under the command of my Deputy, Lieutenant General Keen, who was already on the ground in Haiti for previously scheduled meetings.

The mission of JTF-H was to conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) in support of U.S. Government efforts in Haiti, in order to mitigate near term human suffering and accelerate recovery. We would not have been able to perform this mission to the level of success we have achieved if not for the more than 500 augmentees we requested and received from every other geographic combatant command, U.S. Special Operations
Command, U.S. Transportation Command, the Services, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The General and Flag Officers, Action Officers and civilian personnel we received were immediately value-added and were instrumental in helping us develop well-coordinated planning efforts that translated into unity of effort on the ground. These personnel were also distributed to JTF-H in the form of planning staffs, the Joint Information Center (JIC), assessment teams, Joint Center Operational Analysis (JCOA) teams, and many other teams. The men and women of these contributing units have performed magnificently and been the very embodiment of teamwork and jointness across the Department of Defense. They have been outstanding representatives of your military with their professionalism, sense of urgency, focus and compassion. They continue to make all of us extremely proud.

**Security:** Apart from isolated looting incidents, small-scale crime and demonstrations which parallel the security environment prior to the earthquake, the situation in Haiti remains relatively calm. US military personnel are engaged primarily with safeguarding humanitarian supplies and distribution networks in support of MINUSTAH, who has maintained a peacekeeping presence since 2004, comprised of primarily Latin American military forces under Brazilian leadership. They have been working with the Haitian government to provide security and build the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Our JTF Commander and the Brazilian MINUSTAH Commander have had an outstanding personal and professional relationship. This has permeated all levels of interaction and engagement between the two forces, alleviating many of the potential frictions that could arise from two parallel military command structures operating in the same vicinity. A division of labor was established whereby JTF-H military forces would provide local security for humanitarian assistance missions, while MINUSTAH and the HNP maintained overall responsibility for security in the country. To
underscore the scope of responsibility, on 19 January, the UN Security Council authorized the expansion of MINUSTAH’s force size by 2,000 military and 1,500 police personnel.

**Critical Engineering:** Initial assessment teams determined that although there was no physical damage to the airport runway, taxiway and field operations, the field was unusable because of no power and structural damage to the control tower. Similarly, a team of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers assessed the entire sea port at Port au Prince was unusable for large vessels, with buildings, cranes and piers damaged, and debris and containers in the water. The roads remained largely impassable except by motorcycle and foot traffic. Communication services in Haiti were severely degraded, with the power grid, radio, landline and cellular telephone services working sporadically in pockets.

Assessments and emergency repairs continued throughout Haiti, but the primary focus of initial effort was the seaport in Port Au Prince. Haiti has other port facilities throughout the country, but due to proximity to the most affected areas and the depth of water, Port au Prince was critical to the relief efforts. The North pier was completely destroyed and the South pier, missing 700 feet, was determined to be non-operational. To address this requirement, USTRANSCOM immediately deployed Joint Task Force Port Opening (JTF-PO), a unit capable of port command and control and operations, followed closely by service contributions in the form of Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS). The JLOTS capability consisted of boats, literage, cranes and crane ships allowing for rapid cargo offload at other locations within the harbor, thus overcoming the logistical hurdles caused by damage. USTRANSCOM also contracted with marine engineering experts from Crowley Marine to begin installation of a combination of barges and cranes that would eventually restore operational capability to the port. Utilizing this combination of JLOTS and commercial capability, the seaport capacity exceeded
pre-quake offload capacity by 22 January and steadily increased as additional over-the-shore assets arrived.

The current container per day capacity, based only on the in-place commercial capability, exceeds demand, thus enabling the GOH, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and USAID to manage flow based on the requirements on the ground while also enabling Haitian commercial capabilities to resume. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid Appropriation (OHDACA) funded repairs to the South Pier are underway, as are contracted removal of a gantry crane and other debris which had fouled the port during the earthquake. In addition, US military engineer teams continue to assess critical infrastructure, including port facilities and piers, airfields, roads, bridges, water wells and electrical grids to determine how best to assist repair and restore these essential needs. Future U.S. Southern Command-sponsored MEDRETEs, New Horizons and Beyond the Horizons medical, construction and engineering exercises will provide a consistent and continuing assistance to the Haitian people as part of our larger Theater Security Cooperation program.

Medical: The magnitude of the catastrophe necessitated the rapid deployment of military assets with sufficient medical capability to help alleviate suffering and save lives in the wake of the disaster. U.S. Southern Command responded by requesting the deployment of needed medical capability to Haiti. The USS CARL VINSON arrived on 15 January; the USS BATAAN and JTF-B Forward Surgical Team (FST) on 18 January; the USNS COMFORT on 20 January; and, the 24th Medical Group Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS) on 24 January. USNS COMFORT arrived on station just six days after the initial mobilization order; she and her nearly 1000 medical personnel—including medical and surgical teams from Project Hope, Operation Smile, Red Cross translators and support personnel, and medical schools around the U.S.—
joined other DOD assets already on station to provide an immediate surge triage capability and 1400-plus bed capacity to help cope with the enormity of the task. We are fortunate to have worked with many of these professionals previously; they had come together to provide humanitarian assistance and preventative medical treatment and training as part of our annual Continuing Promise which visited Haiti in the summer of 2009 and will return to the many countries of the AOR during the summer of 2010. As of 28 February, DOD personnel were directly responsible for performing 964 total surgeries and treating 9,985 patients.

The GOH Ministry of Health initial priorities outlined to JTF-H were medical supplies and emergency/trauma medical care. Numerous field hospitals were established by international partners including Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, France, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Russia, Spain and Turkey, in addition to the six Haitian hospitals that remained operational and another nine that were partially operational. Combined afloat and ashore medical professionals provided medical evacuation and care to thousands of injured Haitians daily and conducted hundreds of complex surgical procedures as part of the concerted international effort. The Program on Essential Medicine and Supplies (PROMESS) warehouse continues to be a key institution in post-earthquake Haiti. US military medical logistics experts assisted in the initial setup and organization of PROMESS, which has now become a nerve center for distribution of supplies to healthcare facilities throughout Port au prince.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) supported USAID in its coordination of the US medical and public health response and later activated the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) to facilitate the transfer of non-US citizens to medical facilities in the United States. As of 28 February, 189 Haitian citizens in need of higher levels of care have been transferred via US military aircraft to healthcare facilities within the United
States. Despite initial fears, there was no indication of widespread communicable diseases and no report to indicate an imminent epidemic. Public health experts from the HHS Centers for Disease Control and Prevention continue to monitor health conditions related to water safety, food supply, shelter conditions and other health threats in order to prioritize immediate interventions aimed at preventing major health-related crises. The capability of off-shore medical treatment by our surface assets has largely been assumed by the GoH, UN and NGO expertise on the ground and we anticipate being able to release these assets in the near future.

**Logistics:** Joint Task Force-Haiti, in support of the lead federal agency, USAID, focused on expanding and securing aid distribution networks to speed delivery of relief supplies to the Haitian people. With the port damaged, the only means of initially flowing relief supplies *in*—and evacuating US citizens and eligible family members, orphans and medical patients *out*—was through the Port au Prince airport. Although the control tower was destroyed, the runway was intact. We therefore immediately requested specialized capabilities to rapidly open the airport to receive relief supplies, equipment, personnel, and forces. This included the combat controllers of the 720th Special Operations Group who were on the ground within 26 hours of the earthquake, providing critical Air Traffic Control capabilities as well as directing ramp operations. From zero inbound traffic hours after the quake, these battlefield Airmen had the airport back operating at 60 flights per day within 72 hours, approximately triple the normal capacity before the earthquake. These specialists worked all-day, all-night and in all weather conditions...and they did all this without any radar. The special operators were followed closely by aviation elements from USTRANSCOM as part of their JTF-PO deployment. To meet the tremendous demand, we also worked with the government of the Dominican Republic and opened additional
air and sea ports of entry within their territory and contracted commercial carriers to move
supplies and equipment overland from these airfields into Haiti.

Working with Haitian aviation administration officials, JTF-H personnel established the
Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center which constructed a phone, then web-based, system
for flight slot allocation scheduling. This greatly increased our scheduling efficiency and
tracking effectiveness, quickly bringing the airfield to a 120-140 flights per day average. The
total number of flights eventually began a steady decline at the airport as demand decreased and
efforts to reopen the seaport steadily progressed to eventually exceeding pre-quake delivery
capacity. Today the majority of flights are being controlled by Haitian air traffic controllers. On
18 February, we safely and successfully evacuated the last of 16,412 US citizens and eligible
family members, perhaps the largest ever peacetime single evacuation of US citizens.
Beginning 19 February, commercial air service from American Airlines resumed with 3 daily
flights between Haiti and the U.S. and twice a week Air France flights between Paris and Haiti.
The return of service is a positive indicator of stability and signals to the international
community that the situation is normalizing.

In addition to airlift assistance, elements of JTF-Haiti continue delivering supplies,
equipment, and personnel. As of 26 February, DOD has distributed 2,292,431 meals and
2,615,888 bottles of water, in addition to assisting in expanding and securing aid distribution
networks to speed delivery of relief supplies to the Haitian people. The demand for JTF
assistance in the distribution of supplies has dropped significantly as the capacity of the UN,
USAID, and NGOs has increased. Our personnel continue to coordinate with USAID and
OCHA to define areas in which US military support is required.
Under the leadership of the GoH, the WFP began a targeted and systematic food distribution effort using predetermined distribution locations. In consultation with the GoH and interested stakeholders, 16 different sites around the capital were identified to serve as fixed distribution points, instead of attempting to deliver to different settlements throughout the city. US military forces from the 82nd Airborne Division and the 22nd and 24th MEUs worked closely with MINUSTAH forces and Haitian National Police personnel to ensure locations, routes and distribution of aid was calm, orderly and without incident. In total, the program provided humanitarian assistance (in quantities of 15-day rations) to approximately 9,000 families per site, per day. The initial 14-day operation was a large success in establishing a sustainable and predictable food distribution program that reached over 2.9 million Haitians, exceeding their original goal by almost 1 million people. WFP’s Food Surge seven-day Phase 1B concluded on 20 February with an estimated 19,000 families reached. The WFP estimates that the Port-au-Prince area consumes 16-20 metric tons of rice per month. Through the combined efforts of the UN, USAID, 8 NGOs, and US forces, the surge was able to provide approximately 2/3 of the rice needed in the Port-au-Prince area for the past 30 days. The WFP began their current phase of operations on 6 March and has stated no US military presence or other support was needed, as MINUSTAH and HNP personnel would be utilized exclusively.

**Overall Assessment:** It has been two months since the earthquake and signs of recovery are emerging. The massive outpouring of international relief efforts, with strong support from Latin America and Caribbean countries, has not only sped up the recovery but also enabled the building of a better Haiti. The overall security situation remains stable and continues to improve, with only sporadic incidents of small-scale violence occurring. MINUSTAH forces, in conjunction with a revitalized Haitian National Police force, have a presence throughout the
country with specific emphasis on historical hot spots like Cite Soleil and other areas in and around Port au Prince.

Consistent and predictive aid distribution remains the single-most important factor in maintaining the relatively calm security situation. The immediate needs of food and water have been replaced by the more enduring stability requirements of adequate shelter and proper sanitation, particularly as the rainy season approaches. Infrastructure repairs have begun and are primarily being carried out by civilian engineering experts under contract, like the arrangement between Crowley Marine and the National Port Authority (APN). Beginning 25 February, Crowley brought their own temporary barge, placed it in the inner harbor, and then the following day the M/V CROWLEY SHIPPER delivered 50 foot sections to be used as ramps. On 27 February, APN Blue—the Crowley temporary next to the north pier of Port au Prince achieved initial operational capability (IOC) for the first time since the earthquake. As a result of such relief efforts, airport and seaport commerce are returning to pre-earthquake or higher levels of business. From all sources, there are no indications an external mass migration is imminent.

Our original mission assigned to us was conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) in support of U.S. Government efforts in Haiti, in order to mitigate near term human suffering and accelerate recovery. As we near achievement of that mission, I am taking a broader look at how we will support the larger USG and UN through more traditional security cooperation means to sustain security and stability. Although we have made great strides, coordinated planning and on-going communications toward unity of effort remains a challenging task; these are critical enablers to ensuring the conditions are right for our transition. The Armed Forces will continue to execute the mission in support of USAID and the international community in providing humanitarian aid and disaster relief. We do not intend to
leave a large military footprint, but we will continue to plan for and remain prepared to respond
with a range of options to contingency situations, such as another natural disaster, which may
necessitate a return to Haiti in the future.

When the appropriate conditions are met, we will effectively transition our relief efforts
to other USG agencies, the UN, and NGOs, thereby demonstrating the ability to conduct an
effective transfer of responsibility to civilian authority. The culture of cooperation, openness and
transparency we have developed; the relationships we have built; and, the emphasis U.S.
Southern Command has placed on partnering in the past few years have all paid a particularly
high return on investment in Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, the largest humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief mission ever conducted in this region. Haiti may serve as a rare
unifying event, not only for the agencies and departments of the U.S. Government, but also for
the nations of this region—at the end of the day, we are all here for one reason: the people of
Haiti.

Finally, I offer one personal observation: I have now made 5 different trips to Haiti—one
before the earthquake and four since—and on each occasion, I continue to be amazed by the
strength, courage and resiliency of the Haitian people. Their collective character is evident
throughout this tragedy. This is a powerful display of stoic determination—accepting and
enduring the reality of the present, while foreseeing, believing in and taking the first basic steps
to ensure, the promise of a better future. The citizens of Haiti have shown themselves to be a
proud, strong and persevering people.

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Illegal trafficking, associated criminal activity, gangs, terrorist financing and recruitment, natural disasters—none of these recognize national sovereignty or stop at a nation’s border. These challenges to collective security, stability and prosperity cannot be overcome by any one nation alone; they require transnational solutions. They cannot be overcome by the military alone; they require a truly integrated interagency, non-governmental organization and even private sector approach.

To that end, U.S. Southern Command works not only to build partner capability and capacity, but also to build strategically important cooperative security relationships throughout the region. Among the military and security forces in the region, we focus on helping to build greater capability and capacity, as well as striving to improve our collective ability to plan, direct, and operate. Within the interagency community, we endeavor to enhance cooperation while advocating for our partner’s greater capability and capacity at every opportunity. Finally, with the private sector, business community, and non-governmental organizations, we seek to leverage their skills and expertise to greatly improve our combined impact and effect.

Supporting Interagency Partners: While remaining fully ready for combat operations, diplomacy dominates so much of what we do, and development is a mandatory requisite feature of true, long-term stability and prosperity. We support our interagency partners who have the lead in addressing the significant illicit trafficking and crime challenges in the region. To that end, we support initiatives to increase the pool of resources available to our partner agencies who are the leads and experts in these arenas. As we engage and support the lead efforts of the State Department, USAID, DHS, Justice, and others in the field, we also lend our advocacy for increased resources for these agencies to more effectively deal with the endemic problems in the
region, improve the capabilities of partner nations’ police and law enforcement agencies, and strengthen judicial systems and institutions.

**Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR):** U.S. Southern Command has a continuous requirement for persistent ISR, defined as having the right asset able to observe and understand what is going on, especially in denied areas. Whether conducting CN/CT operations or large-scale foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, we need fast, flexible and properly vetted information that then becomes actionable intelligence and helps us pinpoint the locations where our forces and resources can do the most good—and with sufficient time to get them there. However, this requires improved imagery intelligence, wide area coverage, sensor integration, signals intelligence, moving target indicators, layered ISR architecture and management tools, biometrics, counterintelligence and human collectors. The combined products create a common operating picture that can and needs to be shared with our partners and allies whenever possible. This requires, then, more relevant fusion technologies that allow all-source synthesis, distributed dissemination, collaborative planning, and multiple-node sensor resource management. We continue to work with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and industry for innovative solutions to address additional ISR sources to gain improved situational awareness.

Throughout Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, ISR assets have been an invaluable resource. UAVs and other assets have provided outstanding situational awareness and early warning indicators in areas of potential violence, determining status of critical infrastructure, assessing gathering crowds, analyzing internally displaced person (IDP) camps, determining traffic ability of lines of communication, and security at WFP distribution points. ISR assets have had a positive impact on decision making by enabling the efficient use of scarce resources.
In particular, the information provided has assisted in placing only the necessary number of USAID and NGO workers at distribution sites, scheduling the movement of supplies and personnel along the most efficient routes, and when and where to deploy security forces.

We conduct varied and diverse detection and monitoring (D&M) operations that require a high state of readiness and a joint effort to link multi-intelligence collectors targeted against strategic, operational and tactical requirements. Expanding the melding of organic and national collection resources will improve operations and fulfill the ongoing requirement for continuous and persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). This effort requires the appropriate awareness systems, namely: unmanned aerial craft with rapid response and good transit and loiter capability; remote light detection and ranging for foliage penetration; high-speed, unmanned surface vessels for detection and identification to support maritime domain awareness; commercial satellite sensors with the ability to detect ‘go-fast’ boats; next generation ‘over the horizon’ (OTH) radars; non-electro-optical imagery that enables change detection; and, novel applications of existing technology to facilitate cross-domain awareness.

**Continued Commitment to Colombia:** One of the most dramatic examples of U.S. Southern Command working to build partner nation capability and capacity in our AOR can be found in our enduring engagement through providing training, logistical, and technical support to the military and security forces of Colombia. Colombia is a strategic ally, an important friend, and a crucial anchor for security and stability in the region. Unfortunately, they are also the world’s predominant source of cocaine and home to the narco-terrorist group the FARC.

Over the last eight years, the Colombians have done a magnificent job of reclaiming their nation from both right-wing and left-wing illegal armed groups. Through its own military and whole-of-government efforts, and a steady stream of resources and support from the U.S.,
Colombia has made great strides towards building security and stability. Today, the approval rating of the democratically elected government led by President Uribe is just under 70 percent. The approval rating of the FARC, on the other hand, is less than two percent. Despite this dwindling public support, the FARC still maintains approximately 8,500 fighters in the field, down from approximately 18,000. They remain kidnappers, torturers, murderers and drug dealers. This is essentially their ‘business model’ and they are unfortunately and definitively still in business.

The government’s and military’s efforts against the FARC have also significantly impacted drug cartels, as Colombia has extradited more than 900 drug traffickers to the United States. Although cocaine production is still a critical concern, interdiction and seizures of cocaine headed to the U.S. and to other destinations in the region and abroad, have more than doubled in the last ten years. This increase indicates improved state control, successful government strategies, and overall better interagency and international coordination and collaboration. These efforts have helped contribute to the fastest sustained economic growth in a decade—greater than five percent annually from 2006-2008, providing a sense of positive momentum for the entire country.

We must now capitalize on the successes achieved thus far to ensure Colombia remains a long-term strategic regional and global partner. Continued US commitment and support for the Colombian Armed Forces’ campaign to defeat the FARC, as well as for Colombian interagency efforts to bring governance and economic opportunity to areas recaptured from the FARC, is essential. This support can come in many forms but should entail continued training and development of key capabilities we are seeing showcased in their cooperation with Mexico and deployment to Haiti, and human rights programs to continue the significant improvements in
human rights by the Armed Forces in recent years. With US help, a stable and secure Colombia is achievable in the near term as they emerge as a strategic partner, positive exporter of security and democratic model for the region, directly increasing the security of all citizens of the Americas.

**Countering Illicit Trafficking:** The November 2009 Central American and Caribbean Chiefs of Mission Conference held at our headquarters in Miami highlighted the need for a regional, synergistic whole-of-many-governments approach to counter illicit trafficking. Just as the successes of the governments of Peru and Bolivia in reducing coca cultivation in their countries during the 1980s and early 1990s caused a shift in cultivation and production to Colombia, we are concerned that current eradication and interdiction successes in Colombia are causing a corresponding increase in Peruvian and Bolivian cultivation. For example, according to the most recent crop estimate from the U.S. government, potential cocaine production in Colombia dropped 39 percent between 2007 and 2008. The potential production of pure cocaine fell from an estimated 485 metric tons in 2007 to 295 metric tons in 2008. Further, the area under cultivation dropped 29 percent during the same time frame while Peruvian cultivation increased by fourteen percent and Bolivian cultivation by eight percent in the same time period. Furthermore, from 2000-2008, Peru’s total area under illicit coca cultivation increased by 30 percent, while Bolivia’s has nearly doubled.

Similarly, as President Calderón takes the fight to illicit trafficking organizations in Mexico, Central America is experiencing an increase in activity as traffickers are squeezed between Colombia and Mexico. This movement is exacerbated by successes of aerial and maritime interdiction efforts, which are pushing traffickers to favor land routes through the Central American isthmus. As traffickers and their support networks relocate to Central America,
they also bring with them the associated ills of government corruption, crime, and gang activity which undermine good governance and threaten public security.

As a result of the discussions during the Chiefs of Mission Conference, we are working with the Intelligence Community to produce an analysis of the larger, regional and global illicit trafficking enterprise, looking at networks, routes and organizations throughout the entire region, as opposed to just one or two countries. The construct we are using encompasses the production, acquisition, storage and/or transfer of illicit drugs; illegal arms trafficking; money laundering; human trafficking and smuggling of special interest aliens; WMD and WMD precursors; and, all of their supporting activities.

This analysis will help the Department of State and the interagency community to coordinate an integrated approach to counter illicit trafficking and associated activities in the Western Hemisphere. The Department of State already has several excellent sub-regional strategies to address this challenge such as Beyond Merida, the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI). U.S. Southern Command performs Theater Security Cooperation activities that are in support of Merida Initiative and Caribbean security initiative efforts, and help to build partner nation military capability and capacity in Central America and the Caribbean. Lessons learned from US support to Colombia show the importance of an integrated and unified overarching strategy to address insecurity and instability caused by the combined ills of illicit trafficking.

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Conclusion

During my nine months of leading the outstanding men and women of U.S. Southern Command, I have been fortunate to work closely with our civilian and military leaders, as well as with our partners to the south, to improve the security and stability of our region. Together we are continuing the great work of those who have gone before us and building upon the foundation of their efforts in seeking multinational, “whole of government” and in some cases “whole of society” approaches to create a secure and stable environment that set the conditions for long-term prosperity for the Americas.

This region plays a critical role in the security and prosperity of the United States. Despite some challenges, I believe that through the sharing of ideas, economic interdependence, cultural understanding and harnessing innovation, we can strengthen existing ties of friendship to build an integrated approach to partnering that will ensure U.S. Southern Command is a welcomed military partner of choice in this hemisphere. There are many opportunities ahead to improve hemispheric security cooperation. We will continue to pursue multinational, multi-agency and public-private partnerships to confront the challenges and embrace the opportunities of the Americas. We will continue to dedicate the majority of our resources to building and complementing the security capabilities of our partners while encouraging an environment of cooperation among the nations in the region. We will continue to defend the United States, foster regional security, and be an enduring partner to help enhance regional hemispheric security and stability. The mutual benefits of these partnering efforts are profound.

Ultimately, our success in pursuit of these objectives depends upon our military and civilian personnel and their families, as well as those men and women serving with us from our partner agencies. I thank you again for your continued interest in, dedication to and support of
the men and women of U.S. Southern Command and their families—they are volunteers and patriots, and I am humbled to lead them and serve with them every day.

DOUGLAS M. FRASER

General, U.S. Air Force

General Fraser has commanded operational units across the U.S. Air Force, including the 12th Fighter Squadron at Kadena Air Base, Japan, the 366th Operations Group at Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho and the 3rd Wing at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska from 2000-2002.

Following his time at the 3rd Wing, he commanded the Space Warfare Center at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado and four distinct commands while serving his second time in Alaska, including Alaskan Command, the Alaskan North American Defense Region, Joint Task Force Alaska, and Eleventh Air Force at Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska.

General Fraser’s staff assignments include Aide to the 12th Air Force Commander, action officer for Air Force’s Directorate of Programs and Resources, the Air Force Chief of Staff’s Action Group, and analysis assistant in the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements. He also served as the Director of the Chief of Staff’s Air Force Operations Group from 1996-1997, as the Executive Assistant to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command from 1999-2000, and was the Director of Air and Space Operations for Air Force Space Command from 2003-2005.

General Fraser’s operational flying assignments include Bitburg Air Base, Germany; Luke Air Force Base, Arizona; Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico; Kadena Air Base, Japan; Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho; and Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. He is a command pilot with more than 2,800 flying hours, primarily in the F-15A/B/C/D, the F-15E and the F-16.

General Fraser graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1975 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science. He earned a Masters Degree in Political Science from Auburn University in 1987. He is also a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, National War College, and the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course.

His decorations include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters and the Legion of Merit.
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

MARCH 18, 2010
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON

General Fraser. The interaction between “habeas counsel” and GTMO detainees is governed by a series of protective orders issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, which has jurisdiction. The first such order was issued by Judge Joyce Hens Green on November 5, 2004. The order has been modified somewhat over the following years but remains essentially unchanged regarding habeas attorneys and GTMO. [See page 12.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS

General Fraser. Congresswoman Davis, on January 19, 2007, the Secretary of Defense directed that a program be established to recognize members who are required to mobilize or deploy with a frequency beyond established rotation policy goals. In response to that direction, the Under Secretary of Defense provided policy direction on April 18, 2007, to establish a new category of administrative absence entitled “Post-Deployment/Mobilization Respite Absence.” This category of administrative absence was incorporated into the next scheduled DOD Instruction 1327.6, “Leave and Liberty Procedures.” This new program compensates or incentivizes individuals in both the active and Reserve components who are required to mobilize or deploy early or often, or to extend beyond the established rotation policy goals. [See page 21.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 18, 2010
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ

Mr. ORTIZ. In response to Chairman Skelton’s question about the impact of wind turbines on radar systems, you mentioned that there are a number of sites in the United States that have raised concern for NORTHCOM. Would you please elaborate on these specific sites and what you are doing to mitigate these concerns? As far as collaboration between the various federal departments, are there any steps you feel that Congress can take to aid the interagency coordination?

General RENUART. The specific sites are along the U.S. Southwest border and consist of both ground-based radars and Tethered Aerostat Radar Systems. NORAD’s Air Defense and Air Sovereignty missions along with USNORTHCOM’s Defense Support to Civil Authorities mission all have been impacted by both the nature of the environment along that border and man-made interference such as wind turbines.

These affects are becoming more prevalent across the nation and in this case have created several areas where our ability to see air traffic along the border is degraded. Specifically, our radar at Oilton, TX has several wind energy projects that currently exist and others have been proposed within the radar’s line-of-sight. This radar provides my command and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) invaluable situational awareness, but should the development of wind energy continue in that area, the Oilton radar’s capability will become less and less useful. DHS has partnered with NORAD and USNORTHCOM to find mitigation strategies in hopes that radars and wind turbines can coexist in the same areas.

Currently, the Department of Defense (DOD) is a small part of a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) process that was originally designed to review obstructions in and around airports. While NORAD and USNORTHCOM have a review responsibility as part of the FAA Part 77, Obstruction Evaluation Review/Airport and Airspace Analysis process, neither the Commands nor the FAA have sufficient authority to stop or prevent degradation to existing radars or other DOD resources as result of commercial ventures across the United States. Additionally, the current process lacks the ability to categorize the risks posed by commercial development along training routes, airport corridors, sea corridors, and in line-of-sight of existing surveillance radars.

A possible solution may be legislation creating an interagency regulatory process to assess and mitigate the impact of wind turbine ventures on air navigation safety and national security. The governing body needs to include both interagency and business partners to help promote alternative solutions while limiting the impact of development on training routes, airports arrival and departure routes, ranges, sea lanes and surveillance radars.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCMORRIS RODGERS

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. General Fraser, what do you consider to be the greatest challenge within the USSOUTHCOM Area of Focus and does the Command have the necessary resources and personnel to accomplish its mission? Relatedly, I am concerned with Iran’s intentions in the region. With Iran strengthening its ties to Latin America, including opening nearly a dozen new embassies in the region and expanding trade relationships with countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, and other left-wing governments, what is USSOUTHCOM’s response with regards to Iran’s spreading influence, and what would be the Command’s role, if any, in this emerging security challenge? Thank you for your time, General Fraser.

General FRASER. The confluence of money, power and the ability to breach the integrity of national borders makes the illicit trafficking problem a significant security challenge for nations throughout the Americas. Border insecurity, increased violence, public fear, corruption, weakening support for democratic institutions, and heavily burdened local, county and state agencies are the by-products of this illegitimate and criminal activity, which is estimated to cost legitimate economies more than $245 billion annually.

Yes. Our funding is sufficient to enable us to both execute our Theater Campaign Plan and maintain us on the path to meet the strategic objectives outlined in our
Command Strategy. With the current force level provided, USSOUTHCOM must prioritize deployments of personnel and equipment, but is able to meet goals for stated interdiction rates for counterdrug operations and build Partner Nation capabilities to respond to security challenges.

In regards to Iran, we are closely monitoring the increased diplomatic and economic efforts in the region.

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. General Renuart, I have attached a letter dated March 2, 2010, from Ambassador Charles Ray to Lieutenant General P.K. Keen, Deputy Commander of United States Southern Command. In the letter, Ambassador Ray describes the creation and use of the first ever personnel recovery center authorized under the Chief of Mission during Ambassador Ray’s post as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs. It is my understanding that this program has helped in aiding United States Southern Command in preventing and responding to search and rescue and humanitarian type of operations in South America. Given the extremely volatile situation in Mexico, what do you think about replicating the program within the United States Northern Command? How applicable is the Rescue Coordination Center in Colombia, and in light of the increased violence, we are confident that those tenets will apply to Mexico?

We recognize that the key to success in developing a coordinated interagency Personnel Recovery Program in Mexico is the ability to understand how the variables in Personnel Recovery differ from Colombia to Mexico. Some of these variables include: in-country U.S. Government resources; level of host nation support and cooperation; and host nation recovery capability and capacity. Based on this understanding, we can then apply those principles to the unique circumstances of the situation in Mexico.

Of course, this effort must be coordinated with all U.S. Government stakeholders, and to the greatest degree practicable, with Mexico as we develop an effective program with reciprocal benefit to both of our governments. Key to this effort will be coordination between USNORTHCOM and the Department of State personnel recovery office. Our initial challenge will be to construct a framework which effectively combines Title 10 and Title 22 authorities (as articulated in the Lugar Report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations) for the development and management of a Personnel Recovery Program under the authority of the Chief of Mission.

We constantly strive to improve our relations with Mexico, and implementing a Personnel Recovery and Disaster Response Center would pay dividends to our relationship.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

Mr. LAMBORN. General Renuart, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is expected to have a lifetime of 20 years. How many flight tests do you believe are necessary per year to ensure the long-term reliability of the GMD system over its 20-year lifetime?

General RENUART. At this time, it’s unclear to me how many GBI flight tests are needed to ensure the long-term reliability of the GMD system. There are a variety of factors that need to be evaluated in determining the number of required missiles to flight test each year in order to assess the reliability rate of the fielded missiles. For example: the total number of missiles in the inventory, expected life of the missiles, differences between missile types (for instance, there are three basic types of Tomahawk missiles and each has a different number of test requirements per year), subcomponent testing for the rocket/motor, guidance system, attitude control system, warhead, fusing system, etc., and any possible problem areas identified through dud missiles or other failures not previously detected or anticipated.

Additionally, cost is a major factor when determining the feasibility to execute the required number of tests. The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) assistance is required to identify the applicable factors for the GBIs and the engineering analysis to determine the required number to test each year.

Typically, the Services conduct reliability testing of operational missile systems. There are lessons we can learn from other missile systems that are already well into
production like the Air Force and Navy fleet of ballistic missiles, the Patriot and Standard Missiles (SM) used for air threats, or Tomahawk missiles used in Strike Warfare. The Navy tests on average 35 Standard Missile 2 variants per year and 11 Tomahawks of all types per year. These tests are done to assess the ability of these missiles to meet reliability numbers as defined in their Operational Requirements Documents (ORD). Although our missile requirements are not defined in an ORD, we can use the same type of considerations the Services used to define the right number to test each year.

To attain a comprehensive evaluation of the (actual) operational reliability of our fleet of GBIs, we require a testing program that includes the random selection and firing of GBIs without any additional refurbishment ["as-is"], except for the addition of a telemetry package to assist with post-test analysis. There are numerous lessons that can be learned from this approach as the full effect of integrated flight dynamics would be assessed.

In preparation for spiral development flight tests, there is certainly value in fully inspecting the test missiles and replacing worn or suspect parts before test firing them, with a full evaluation of the suspect components in a bench-top environment. Combining the approaches of as-is and repaired missile testing provides the warfighter with a better assessment of the true potential of the remaining GBIs in their silos to perform as required.

Mr. LAMBORN. General Renuart, with the Administration’s policy shift to a new Phased, Adaptive Approach for Europe, there is an outstanding question as to the future of the 2-stage ground-based interceptor (GBI) that was planned for Poland. The 2-stage GBI is more mature than the SM–3 Block 2A and Block 2B interceptors that don’t yet exist. A) General, do you believe we should continue to develop and test the 2-stage ground-based interceptor (for example, as a hedge against a possible Iranian break-out)? B) Has NORTHCOM studied options for deploying a 2-stage GBI in the United States to give another layer of defense to our homeland? C) Do you believe there should be a competition or clear criteria established for a downselect between the 2-stage GBI and the SM–3 Block 2A and Block 2B interceptors which are planned to provide defense of Europe and the U.S. in the new Phased, Adaptive Approach? Right now, it would appear that the Department has put all its proverbial “eggs” in the SM–3 Block 2A and Block 2B “basket.”

General RENUART.

A. Yes, if the Iranian long-range missile threat develops more quickly than the current National Intelligence Estimate projections, then the deployment of 2-stage GBI missiles would provide a flexible approach in responding to this increased threat, a hedge as you stated. Under the auspices of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), USNORTHCOM has developed hedge plans within the phases of the Phased, Adaptive Approach to enable us to respond in time to counter an emerging threat, should the SM–3 development not meet our capability requirements or if the threat develops more quickly than we currently understand. The BMDR clearly states that further enhancements to our BMDS capabilities must be based on proven technology. A mix of 2- and 3-stage interceptors falls in line with this guidance and provides proven technology to protect the homeland in the near and far term.

B. Yes, our previous analysis identified that a 2-stage/3-stage mix of interceptor capabilities enhances our ability to defend the homeland. Under the guidance in the BMDR, we are continuing to evaluate and determine the right mixture(s) in order to enhance our ability to defend the homeland. The emerging capabilities discussed in the BMDR for the European Phased, Adaptive Approach (EPAA) certainly apply to defense of the homeland, and we are continuing to analyze all of those capabilities through our own efforts.

C. It is our understanding that an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) was conducted by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) that included the 2-stage GBI and the SM3 missile and the down select process indicated the SM3 was best suited for the EPAA. We would have to defer this issue to MDA to provide the analysis and details that went into both the AoA and down select decision.