

[H.A.S.C. No. 111-138]

HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
**BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND, AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION
COMMAND**

HEARING HELD
MARCH 17, 2010



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2010

58-173

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, *Chairman*

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina	HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, California
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas	ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi	MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas	WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas	W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
ADAM SMITH, Washington	J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California	JEFF MILLER, Florida
MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina	JOE WILSON, South Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania	FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey	ROB BISHOP, Utah
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California	MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island	JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
RICK LARSEN, Washington	MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
JIM COOPER, Tennessee	TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia	BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam	CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana	K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania	DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia	ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire	MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut	DUNCAN HUNTER, California
DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa	JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania	MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona	THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts	TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
GLENN NYE, Virginia	
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine	
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina	
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico	
FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland	
BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama	
SCOTT MURPHY, New York	
WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York	
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma	

ERIN C. CONATON, *Staff Director*

MIKE CASEY, *Professional Staff Member*

ROGER ZAKHEIM, *Professional Staff Member*

CATERINA DUTTO, *Staff Assistant*

CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2010

	Page
HEARING:	
Wednesday, March 17, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act—Budget Requests from the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command	1
APPENDIX:	
Wednesday, March 17, 2010	47

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 17, 2010

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. “Buck,” a Representative from California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services	3
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services	1

WITNESSES

McNabb, Gen. Duncan J., USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command	12
Olson, Adm. Eric T., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command	10
Petraeus, Gen. David H., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command	5

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. “Buck”	54
McNabb, Gen. Duncan J.	133
Olson, Adm. Eric T.	115
Petraeus, Gen. David H.	58
Skelton, Hon. Ike	51

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

Mr. Conaway	157
Ms. Sanchez	157
Mr. Spratt	157
Mr. Taylor	157

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:

Mr. Brady	161
Mr. Ellsworth	162
Mrs. McMorris Rodgers	161

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUESTS FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 17, 2010.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning.

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony from the commanders of the United States Central Command [CENTCOM], the United States Special Operations Command [SOCOM], and the United States Transportation Command [TRANSCOM] on the posture of their respective commands.

I was just speaking with our new staff director, Paul Arcangeli, and I remarked to him, and he agreed with me, that we are truly blessed with outstanding military leaders today, and in front of us we have such outstanding leaders in our country: General David Petraeus, commander of the United States Central Command; Admiral Eric Olson, commander, United States Special Operations Command; and General Duncan McNabb, commander, United States Transportation Command. And we welcome you and thank you for being with us.

Your three commands face a series of interrelated and serious challenges in the immediate future. In Iraq, the United States is set to redeploy almost 50,000 troops and their equipment by the end of August. Originally, we expected this reduction to take place after the formation of a new Iraqi government to allow us to help ensure stability. The Iraqi elections, however, were delayed by months, so now our reduction in force levels will take place while the new government is being formed, a period that could see, we hope not, outbreaks of violence. This will stress all three commands.

General Petraeus, you and General Odierno will have to deal with the potential instability caused by the formation of the new government and the reduction of the United States force levels simultaneously.

Admiral Olson, your forces in-country will be faced with a reduction in support from the general purpose forces, and General

McNabb, TRANSCOM with CENTCOM, will be carrying out one of the largest moves in military personnel and equipment in decades.

To complicate matters, this reduction in force in Iraq, which is stressful enough on its own, is coming at the same time we are increasing force levels in Afghanistan. I have long supported increasing our commitment in the war in Afghanistan, but as you know, General McNabb, better than anyone, shipping 30,000 troops and their equipment into that country, while supporting the 68,000 troops already there, is extremely challenging. And the task faced by those troops, which include a substantial number of special operations forces, is in itself daunting.

As we discovered in the initial invasion of Afghanistan after September the 11th, 2001, pushing the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies out was the easy part. Building security forces and governments that can keep them out is much harder. I supported them and continue to support a fully-resourced counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan because I believe it is the only option likely to be successful.

But we should not kid ourselves that it will be easy or inexpensive. It will require the three of your commands—all three of you—to continue to cooperate closely.

Looking back, I believe that we made our job in Afghanistan harder because we got involved in Iraq. So the question for the future, General Petraeus, is when we have learned to do more than one thing at a time. We have a long list of tasks ahead. We need to keep our eye on Afghanistan without losing visibility of the future relationship we would like to build in the other country, Iraq.

We also need help in Yemen and other countries dealing with their allocated problems, and we must counter Iranian influence and attempts to develop the capability to build nuclear weaponry.

Can we succeed in all of these areas while still keeping our eye on Afghanistan?

Admiral Olson, you also have challenging tasks in the near-term. How do you plan to deal with your incredibly high tempo? My understanding is that 86 percent of your deployed force is deployed to the Central Command area of operations [AOR]. While CENTCOM is certainly the current focus of ongoing operations in the fight against Al Qaeda and its allies, we have to ask if this is making us vulnerable in other ways or in other places.

Are we missing out on opportunities with our special forces to partner with and train and mentor in other countries across the globe because of these high demands within the United States Central Command area?

General McNabb, your largest challenge seems to lie in the immediate future. I hope you can identify those for us today, including what tradeoffs may be required. Will meeting the demands in the Central Command lessen support for other combat and commands or our ability to respond to emergencies as they come to pass?

I also hope that you will discuss with us the results of the recently completed mobility capability requirements study and how we will meet the challenges identified in that particular study. We must be able to sustain the wars of today, while still making sure

that we are prepared for the threats of tomorrow, whatever they may be.

I have pointed out from time to time that since 1977, our country has been engaged in 12 conflicts through all those years, and we hope the future is not a repetition, but we must be prepared.

Thank you, each of you, for your fantastic service. We look forward to your testimony today.

I turn now to my good friend, the ranking member, the gentleman from California, Buck McKeon.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Today, we continue our series of posture hearings with commanders from U.S. CENTCOM, U.S. SOCOM and U.S. TRANSCOM. I would like to welcome General Petraeus, Admiral Olson, and General McNabb and thank each of you for your leadership, your service, and I second the comments of our chairman about the fortune that—our good fortune to have you here at this time.

Let me begin with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Four months ago, the president outlined a new strategy and recommitted the United States to defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Based on recommendations from the senior leadership, including you gentlemen, he authorized the deployment of 30,000 additional U.S. forces. A portion of those forces have arrived and others are preparing to deploy over the coming months.

Like most Republicans, I support the president's decision to surge in Afghanistan. I believe that with additional forces, combined with giving General McChrystal the time, space, and resources he needs, we can and will win this conflict. We must defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This means taking all necessary steps to ensure Al Qaeda does not have a sanctuary in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

General Petraeus, as you have stated publicly, Operation Moshtarak is just the initial operation of what will be a 12- to 18-month campaign. I believe that we have most of the inputs right in terms of the leadership, organization, and strategy for Afghanistan. I am not sure we have the level of resources exactly right yet.

I support the additional 30,000 U.S. forces and the civilian surge, but I question if it is enough and if the commanders on the ground have the flexibility to assess and ask for more, whether it be additional combat troops or certain enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR], medical evacuation [medevac], and force protection capabilities.

These enablers were already under-resourced prior to the surge. Today, I hope you will address this issue head-on and convince me that our commanders are not capped at 30,000.

Moving west in the CENTCOM AOR, I want to briefly comment on Iraq. While we continue to await the results of the March 7th national elections, one thing is clear. The new Iraqi government

may not form until roughly the same time that the U.S. combat forces exit Iraq. This certainly was not the original plan.

The seating of the government was to take place prior to substantial draw-down of our forces. Thus, I remain concerned that the security situation in Iraq is fragile, and fear that mixing two drivers of instability—the president’s redeployment timeline and the seating of the new Iraqi government—could pose a risk to our troops and their mission.

Two other challenges in the CENTCOM AOR that have come into focus of late are Yemen and Iran. While the Christmas Day bomber revealed to the American public the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, CENTCOM has been focused on Yemen for quite some time.

My formula for Yemen is simple: The U.S. should be in the business of helping Yemen secure its territory and fight AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula]. It should not be in the business of asking Yemen to take on more security challenges by taking into their country Gitmo detainees.

Finally, for the CENTCOM AOR, a word on Iran. While there may be disagreement as to whether Tehran seeks a nuclear weapon, it seems indisputable that they are on the cusp of obtaining the capability to build one. This should be a red line.

We hear a lot about diplomatic engagement and economic sanctions. Yet, Tehran’s behavior remains unchanged. It seems to me that Tehran poses a military threat that requires military planning. I would like our witnesses to comment on how the military is positioning itself to deal with the range of challenges posed by Iran.

Let me say a few words on SOCOM. SOCOM has been heavily engaged worldwide, but especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Admiral Olson, your forces will remain engaged long after the conventional forces draw down in those countries, making effective training, resourcing, and support for SOCOM all the more critical.

I am very concerned about how SOCOM, a command that often must rely on critical support and enablers from outside the command will sustain its operations in an effective manner when the conventional footprint withers.

Let me conclude by addressing TRANSCOM. General McNabb, I would like to congratulate TRANSCOM for their miraculous job in responding to the earthquake in Haiti. There is only so much we can plan for in this unpredictable world, and your organization has displayed an incredible amount of flexibility and responsiveness. Thank you for all that you have done.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that my entire statement be included in the—for the record, where I address other issues facing combatant commands testifying today.

Once again, I thank you all for being here and I look forward to your testimonies.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 54.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman, and your statement will be spread upon the record, without objection.

General Petraeus, we welcome you, and we ask you to proceed, please.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER,
U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND**

General PETRAEUS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on the situation in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.

And let me say that it is a privilege to do this with my close partners and friends Admiral Olson and General McNabb. We all do, indeed, as you have noted, work very closely together.

U.S. CENTCOM is, as members of this committee know very well, now in its ninth consecutive year of combat operations. It oversees the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq and the assistance to Pakistan, as well as a theater-wide campaign against Al Qaeda.

Today, I will briefly discuss our ongoing missions as well as some of the dynamics that shape activities in the CENTCOM AOR.

First, Afghanistan: As President Obama observed in announcing his new policy, it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan.

As he noted, these forces will provide the resources that we need to seize the initiative while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.

Clearly, the challenges in Afghanistan are considerable, but success there is, as General McChrystal has observed, both important and achievable.

Our goals in Afghanistan and in that region are clear. They are to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda and its extremist allies, and to set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of transnational extremist sanctuaries like the ones Al Qaeda enjoyed there prior to 9/11.

To accomplish this task, we are working with our ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] and Afghan partners to improve security for the Afghan people, to wrest the initiative from the Taliban and other insurgent elements, to develop the Afghan security forces, and to support establishment of Afghan governance that is seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people.

We spent much of the past year working, as Congressman McKeon noted, to get the inputs right in Afghanistan, establishing the structures and organizations needed to carry out a comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency [COIN] campaign, putting our best leaders in charge of those organizations, developing the right concepts to guide our operations, and providing the authorities and deploying the resources needed to achieve unity of effort and to implement the concepts that have been developed.

These resources include the forces deployed in 2009 and the 30,000 additional U.S. forces currently deploying, 9,000 more forces from partner nations, additional civilian experts, and funding to enable our operations, and the training and equipping of 100,000 Afghan security force members over the next year and a half.

With the inputs largely in place, we are now starting to see the first of the outputs. Indeed, the recent offensive in central Helmand

province represented the first operation of the overall civil-military campaign plan developed by ISAF and its civilian partners together with Afghan civilian and security force leaders.

Central to progress in Afghanistan will be developing the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF], an effort made possible by your sustained support of the Afghan Security Forces Fund [ASFF].

Expansion of Afghanistan's security forces is now under way in earnest in the wake of the Afghan and international community decision to authorize an additional 100,000 Afghan security force members between now and the fall of 2011.

This effort is facilitated considerably by the recent establishment of the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Training Mission-Afghanistan, led by Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell. And ISAF member nations are now working hard to field the additional trainers, mentors, partner elements, and transition teams to enable the considerably augmented partnering, training, and recruiting that are essential to the way ahead in this important arena.

The civil-military campaign on which we have embarked in Afghanistan will unfold over the next 18 months. And, as many of us have observed, the going is likely to get harder before it gets easier. 2010 will, in fact, be a difficult year—a year that will see progress in the reversal of the Taliban momentum in important areas, but also a year in which there will be tough fighting and periodic setbacks.

Pakistan: We have seen important change in Pakistan over the past year. During that time, the Pakistani people, political leaders, and clerics united in recognizing that the most pressing threat to their country's very existence was that posed by certain internal extremist groups, in particular, the Pakistani Taliban.

Pakistani citizens saw the Taliban's barbaric activities, indiscriminate violence and repressive practices in the North-West Frontier Province [NWFP] and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA], and they realized that the Taliban wanted to take Pakistan backward several centuries, not forward.

With the support of Pakistan's people and leaders, the Pakistani military has carried out impressive counterinsurgency operations over the past ten months. The army and the Frontier Corps have, during that time, cleared the Taliban from Swat district, which I visited three weeks ago, and from other areas of the North-West Frontier Province as well.

Now, they are holding, building, and beginning to transition in those areas.

We recognize the need for considerable assistance to Pakistan as they continue their operations, and we will continue to work with Congress in seeking ways to support Pakistan's military.

Our task, as Secretary Gates has observed, has to be to show that we are going to be a steadfast partner, that we are not going to do to Pakistan what we have done before, such as after Charlie Wilson's war, when we provided a substantial amount of assistance, and then left precipitously, leaving Pakistan to deal with a situation we had helped create.

It is, therefore, important that we provide a sustained, substantial commitment, and that is what we are endeavoring to do, with

your support. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill does that by providing \$1.5 billion per year for each of the next 5 years.

The provision of coalition support funding [CSF], foreign military financing [FMF], the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Fund [PCF] and other forms of security assistance provide further critical help for Pakistan's security forces.

Altogether, this funding and our assistance demonstrate America's desire to strengthen this important strategic partnership and help our Pakistani colleagues.

Iraq: In the three years since the conduct of the surge, security in Iraq has, of course, improved significantly. Numbers of attacks, violent civilian deaths and high-profile attacks are all down by well over 90 percent from their highs in 2006 and 2007.

With the improvements in security has also come progress in a variety of other areas. The conduct of the elections on 7 March, during which an impressive turnout of Iraqi voters defied Al Qaeda attempts to intimidate them, provided the latest example of Iraq's progress.

As always, however, the progress is still fragile and it could still be reversed. Iraq still faces innumerable challenges. And they will be evident during what will likely be a difficult process as the newly elected Council of Representatives selects the next prime minister, president, and speaker of the council, and seeks agreement on other key decisions as well.

Our task in Iraq is to continue to help the Iraqi security forces [ISF], in part through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund [ISFF] as we continue to draw down our forces in a responsible manner.

This task has been guided, of course, by the policy announced by President Obama about a year ago. Since that announcement, we have reduced our forces in Iraq by well over 30,000 to some 97,000. And we are on track to reduce that number to 50,000 by the end of August, at which time we will also complete a change in mission that marks that transition of our forces from a combat role to one of advising and assisting Iraqi security forces.

As we draw down our forces in Iraq and increase our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must not lose sight of other developments in the CENTCOM AOR. I want to highlight developments in two countries—Yemen and Iran.

In Yemen, we have seen an increase in the prominence of Al Qaeda, as it exploits the country's security, economic and social challenges. The threat to Yemen, to the region, and, indeed, to the U.S. homeland posed by what is now called Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP], has been demonstrated by suicide bombers trying to carry out attacks in Yemen's capital, by the attempt to assassinate the Assistant Minister of Interior of Saudi Arabia, and by the attempted bombing of the U.S. airliner on Christmas Day.

In fact, a number of us have been increasingly concerned over the past 2½ years by the developments we have observed in Yemen.

And last April, I approved a plan developed in concert with our ambassador in Yemen, U.S. intelligence agencies and the State Department to expand our assistance to key security elements in Yemen.

With Yemeni President Salih's approval, we began executing that plan last summer, and this helps strengthen the capabilities demonstrated by the Yemeni operations that were carried out against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in mid-December and that have been executed periodically since then.

And with your support, we are working toward expanded, sustained levels of assistance in Yemen.

Iran poses the major state-level threat to regional stability in the CENTCOM AOR. Despite numerous U.N. [United Nations] Security Council resolutions and extensive diplomatic efforts by the P-Five-plus-One [Permanent Five plus One] and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], the Iranian regime continues its nuclear program. Indeed, Iran is assessed by many analysts to be engaged in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, the advent of which would destabilize the region and likely spur a regional arms race.

The Iranian regime also continues to arm, fund, train, equip, and direct proxy extremist elements in Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza, and, to a lesser degree, in Afghanistan.

The Iranian regime's internal activities are also troubling, as its violent suppression of opposition groups and demonstrations in the wake of last year's hijacked elections has made a mockery of the human rights of the Iranian people and fomented further unrest.

These internal developments have also resulted in greater reliance than ever on Iran's security services to sustain the regime's grip on power.

Having discussed the developments in those countries, I would now like to explain the importance of two key enablers in our ongoing mission and to raise an additional issue.

The Commander's Emergency Response Program, or CERP, continues to be a vital tool for our commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Small CERP projects are often the most responsive and effective means to address a local community's needs, and where security is challenged, CERP often provides the only tool to address pressing requirements.

In the past year, we have taken a number of actions to ensure that we observe the original intent for CERP, and also to ensure adequate oversight for use of this important tool.

I have, for example, withheld approval for projects over \$1.0 million at my level, and there has been only one such project since late last September.

In the past year, we have asked the Army Audit Agency to conduct audits of the CERP programs in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have established guidelines for the number of projects each CERP team should oversee, and we have coordinated with the military services to ensure adequate training and preparation of those who will perform functions connected with CERP in theater, while we have also established procedures to reduce cash on the battlefield.

In the past year, CENTCOM has pursued several initiatives to improve our capabilities in the information domain, and we have coordinated closely with the State Department's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Judith McHale, in pursuing these actions.

This past year we made significant headway in improving our capability to counter adversary information operations, including es-

establishing a full-fledged Joint Information Operations [IO] Task Force in Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, we still have a long way to go and we desperately need to build the capabilities of a regional IO task force to complement the operations of the task force that has done such impressive work in Iraq and the one that is now beginning to do same in Afghanistan.

In the broader CENTCOM AOR, Operation Earnest Voice [OEV] is the critical program of record that resources our efforts to synchronize our IO activities to counter extremist ideology and propaganda and to ensure that credible voices in the region are heard.

OEV provides CENTCOM with direct communications capabilities to reach regional audiences through traditional media, as well as via website and regional public affairs blogging.

In each of these efforts, we follow the admonition we practiced in Iraq, that of trying to be first with the truth. Full and enduring funding of OEV and other DOD [Department of Defense] information operations will, in coordination with the State Department, enable us to do just that, and in so doing to communicate critical messages and to counter the propaganda of our adversaries.

Cyberspace has become an extension of the battlefield, and we cannot allow it to be uncontested enemy territory. Indeed, in the years ahead extremist activities in cyberspace will undoubtedly pose increasing threats to our military and our Nation as a whole.

DOD and other elements of our government are, of course, working to come to grips with this emerging threat. Clearly, this is an area in which we need to develop additional policies, build capabilities, and ensure adequate resources. I suspect, in fact, that legislation will be required over time as well.

Within DOD, the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command proposed by Secretary Gates represents an essential step in the right direction.

This initiative is very important because extremist elements are very active in cyberspace. They recruit there, they proselytize there, they coordinate attacks there, and they share tactics and techniques there.

We have to ask ourselves if this is something that we should allow to continue. And if not, then we have to determine how to prevent or disrupt it without impinging on free speech.

There are currently over 210,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen serving in the Central Command area of responsibility. Day after day on the ground, in the air and at sea these courageous and committed troopers perform difficult missions against tough enemies under the most challenging of conditions.

Together with our many civilian and coalition partners, they have constituted the central element in our effort to promote security, stability, and prosperity in the region.

These wonderful Americans and their fellow troopers stationed around the world constitute the most experienced, most capable military in our Nation's history. They and their families have made tremendous sacrifices, and nothing means more to these great Americans than the sense that those back home appreciate their service to our country.

In view of that, and on behalf of all those serving in the CENTCOM AOR, I want to take this opportunity to thank the American people for their extraordinary support of our men and women in uniform. And I also want to take this opportunity to thank the members of this committee and of Congress overall for your unwavering support and abiding concern for our troopers and their families.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus can be found in the Appendix on page 58.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, we thank you so much for your comments and your report today.

Admiral Olson, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF ADM. ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, sir. Good morning, Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, other distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear again before this body to highlight the posture of the United States Special Operations Command. And it is a pleasure to join my colleagues and friends, General Petraeus and General McNabb, this morning at this important hearing.

Your continued support and oversight of United States Special Operations Command and its assigned forces has ensured that our Nation has the broad special operations capabilities that it needs and expects.

With your permission, I will submit my written posture for the statement and open with a briefer set of remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be received, without objection.

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, sir.

Through United States Special Operations Command's service component commands—those being the Army Special Operations Command, the Air Force Special Operations Command, Naval Special Warfare Command, and the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command—United States Special Operations Command organizes, equips, trains, and provides fully capable special operations forces to serve under the operational control of regional combatant commanders around the world.

And as you noted, Chairman Skelton, by a wide margin, our force is heavily committed to supporting operations in the Central Command area of responsibility under the operational command of General Petraeus.

On an average day, though, over 12,000 members of the special operations forces are present in over 75 countries. They conduct a wide variety of activities, ranging from civil military operations like local infrastructure development in benign environments, to training counterpart units off and on the battlefields, to conducting counterterrorist operations under extremely demanding and sensitive conditions, and dozens of other activities in hundreds of locations.

The indirect and direct actions conducted by special operations forces are intended to support each other in contributing to environments where security and stability can be further developed and

sustained by local organizations and forces. In fact, nearly every mission performed by special operations forces is in support of an indigenous partner force.

As you know, special operations forces do what other military forces are not doctrinally organized, trained, or equipped to do. The powerful effects of special operations forces in the areas where they are properly employed are often recognized as game-changers, and our force operates very effectively in small numbers, in remote regions, often with a low profile and under austere conditions.

The deployment rate of special operations forces is high, and although the demand is outpacing the supply, I remain firm in limiting our requests for manpower growth to the range of three to five percent per year. And if approved, the president's fiscal year 2011 budget request would grow special operations forces personnel by about 4.5 percent.

The overall baseline budget would grow by about 5.7 percent, to just over \$6.3 billion, with most of the increase in the operations and maintenance accounts. And significantly, the overseas contingency operation [OCO] funds, those that cover the immediate costs of war, would increase by \$460.0 million compared to 2010, bringing that account to about \$3.5 billion, for a total fiscal year 2011 U.S. Special Operations Command budget of just over \$9.8 billion.

This is sufficient to cover our current level of special operations-peculiar activities, as long as we are able to depend on the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps for service-common items and support.

The budget and acquisition authorities held by the commander of Special Operations Command are similar to the military departments', although not on the same scale. They are essential to meeting the emergent needs of an innovative force with a unique mission set, and this applies equally to United States Special Operations Command's research and development [R&D] authorities, which enable rapid application of science and technology to meet urgent operational needs.

In my role as the commander responsible for the readiness of the special operations force, I give high priority to training and education programs, and to influencing where I can the career development of special operations personnel.

Along with the pure operational skills that enable success in very complex and demanding operational environments, language skills, and subregional expertise remain primary focus areas.

The special operations community, of course, includes the families of our servicemen and women. And caring for our injured and wounded and for the families of those killed in action is among our most solemn responsibilities.

We are proud of our many successes in returning wounded warriors to their teams and of our lifelong commitment to those who are unable to do so.

You and all Americans can be fiercely proud of the special operations forces. They are fit, focused, supremely capable, and incredibly courageous. They do have impact well beyond their relatively small numbers. And I am deeply honored by this opportunity to represent them to you today.

I stand ready for your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson can be found in the Appendix on page 115.]

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you very much. General McNabb, please.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. DUNCAN J. MCNABB, USAF,
COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**

General McNABB. Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon and distinguished members of the committee, it is my distinct privilege to be with you today.

I am especially honored to be here with General Petraeus and Admiral Olson, two of our Nation's greatest leaders and warriors and friends that I absolutely respect and admire.

Throughout 2009, the United States Transportation Command faced tremendous operational, logistic, and geopolitical challenges. And we asked for and received unparalleled performance from our global enterprise.

We are charged with synchronizing and delivering an unmatched strategic global transportation and distribution capability and producing logistic superiority for our Nation where and when needed by the combatant commanders we support. And we have done that.

Our total force partnership of active-duty, reserve components, civilian, contractor, and commercial industry colleagues answered every call and improved with every challenge.

It is our people who get it done. It is the 145,000 professionals working around the world, day in and day out, producing one of this Nation's greatest asymmetrical advantages and enabling combatant commanders such as General Petraeus and Admiral Olson to succeed anywhere in the world by providing them unmatched strategic life and end-to-end global distribution.

In support of CENTCOM and working with our ambassadors, the State Department and OSD [the Office of the Secretary of Defense], it was our logistics professionals, working hand-in-glove with General Petraeus and his staff, that created the northern distribution network to complement the southern supply lines coming from Pakistan.

In one year's time, through productive relationships with Northern Europe, Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, over 8,400 containers of cargo have moved by commercial air, ship, truck and railroads, and the amount continues to climb.

It is our joint assessment teams, requested by General Petraeus and General McChrystal, finding ways to increase the flow of supplies through existing air and surface hubs and establish new intermodal and inter-air sites like Shaikh-Isa Air Base in Bahrain and Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan.

It is our total force air crews dramatically increasing the amount of air drops to our war fighters in Afghanistan, finding innovative ways to deliver over 29 million pounds of supplies to forces in remote areas, getting our forces what they need, while also getting convoys off dangerous roads and saving lives.

Through the persistence of our people and working with CENTCOM and all of "Log Nation" [Logistics Nation], we are meeting the president's direction to surge forces to the OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] theater at the fastest possible pace on General

Pace's plan, while meeting the needs of all of our other war fighters.

Our pace was just as swift in Haiti. The earthquake created a chasm of isolation for the Haitian people. Our people spanned the divide to lift spirits and save lives.

Supporting General Fraser and U.S. SOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command], it was our air and sea port assessment teams and joint port opening units on the ground at Port-au-Prince within 48 hours after the earthquake, surveying the damage, and building the air and sea bridges of humanitarian supplies and personnel that helped save a country and its people.

It was our air crews, our maintainers, and aerial porters who flew over 2,000 sorties, moved 28,000 people, including 404 adoptees, and delivered almost 13,000 tons of critical supplies and material by air.

It was our medical crews, critical care teams and our global patient movement center which transported and helped save 341 critically injured Haitians by getting them to the care they needed to save life or limb.

It was our merchant mariners and our commercial and military partners that provided over 400,000 tons of life-saving cargo, over 2.7 million meals and over 5 million liters of water to Haitians in need. And we are not done yet.

It is this logistics team, working from home and abroad, that gives our combatant commanders and our Nation the unrivaled ability to move. Their actions serve as an example of our Nation's strength and an outward demonstration of our compassion and our hope.

I am extremely proud and amazed by the men and women of the United States Transportation Command. Chairman Skelton, your support and the support of this committee has been instrumental in providing the resources our team needs to win, and I thank you.

I am grateful to you and the committee for inviting me to appear before you today. I ask that my written statement be submitted for the record, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General McNabb can be found in the Appendix on page 133.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. And your statement will be spread upon the record without objection.

Thank each of you for your excellent testimony and your excellent service. We could not be prouder.

General Petraeus, when a Missourian I represent walks up to me and says, "How are you doing in Afghanistan," what should my answer be?

General PETRAEUS. I think you should say that we are beginning to make progress, having, as I mentioned, taken the bulk of last year to get the inputs right, to deploy substantial numbers of increased forces, get the right organizations, the right people, the right concepts.

And we are now seeing the first of the outputs. The operation in central Helmand province around Marjah and Nad Ali and so forth is the first of those outputs in what will be a campaign that stretches over the course of the next 12 to 18 months.

So I would say that you can say that we are beginning to make progress there.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you encouraged, General?

General PETRAEUS. I am, sir. Again, we worked very hard last year to get the pieces in place. Those pieces are now in place or deploying. In fact, Transportation Nation and Logistics Nation, two of the great tribes of the Department of Defense, have done extraordinary work. We are now about 10,000 of the 30,000 of this final deployment of forces ordered by the president.

And with those all in place, now we are starting to see the kind of progress that we need to make, indeed, to wrest the initiative from the Taliban, to support the development of Afghan security forces and then to help our partners as they develop governance that can be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Olson, what is your greatest challenge as you lead your forces?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, as we lead the forces, it is ensuring that they are in the right places doing the right things at the right times, given that the force needs to be optimized and we need to employ as efficiently, effectively, as possible.

And so it is continuous monitorship of what it is they are doing in support of our operational commander so that we can provide the best advice and counsel to those operational commanders regarding the use of the force.

In terms of equipping, sustaining, and training the force, our challenge is always ensuring that we are coordinating properly with each of the military services. For the major equipment items, it becomes then our responsibility to modify for the peculiar special operations missions and working with each of the services to ensure that the recruiting, the retention programs are satisfactory so that we can retain the great force that we have.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNabb, as you lead your command, what is your greatest challenge?

General MCNABB. Mr. Chairman, when you think about us coming out of Iraq, as you mentioned, going down to the 50,000 folks by 31 August, at the same time we are plussing up Afghanistan, having some disasters like in Haiti and in Chile, it is the synchronizing of all of the efforts to make sure that we support all of the combatant commanders and all of the needs that need to be done, which is what you mentioned, is how do we go about doing that?

Afghanistan is, in particular, a very tough place to get into, landlocked, highest mountains in the world surrounding, and some very interesting neighbors.

And we constantly strive to make sure that we create options and flexibility that allow us to deal with the unknown and give General Petraeus the options that he and General McChrystal need to make sure that our forces not only get in there but they have everything that they need to win.

So our big part is to make sure that we build those additional options because we know things will happen that we have got to be able to either catch up or bring something else as the conditions on the ground change.

And I just—one of my promises to General Petraeus is to make sure that he never has to worry that we will get the stuff in.

There is a lot of ways that we do that. We work not only on our military side but our commercial side. And we work very closely to make intermodal solutions that go from commercial to military and make sure that we match our resources with the state on the ground.

In the case of Afghanistan, there are some very tough airfields to get into, and we make sure that we match the right platforms to the right airfields so that we maximize throughput to get General Petraeus and keep on the timeline that he needs.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you, General.

Mr. McKeon.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I stated earlier, I am concerned that there may be a 30,000 troop cap for Afghanistan, and it is forcing difficult decisions to be made when it comes to fielding certain key enablers.

This cap becomes more disconcerting when you consider that some of our NATO allies will be withdrawing forces from southern Afghanistan in the coming year due to their internal domestic policies.

General Petraeus, what is the impact of the 30,000 troop cap on CENTCOM's currently validated joint urgent operational needs statements, as it pertains to force protection, medical evacuation, and other key enablers?

Has CENTCOM modified any validated JUONS [Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement] in order to stay below this cap?

How is CENTCOM working with General McChrystal to ensure that he has everything he needs to execute the mission?

And while you are thinking of your response, knowing that key enablers such as ISR, medevac, and force protection were under-resourced before the surge, would it have been more prudent to have excluded such key enablers from the 30,000 troop cap?

Why is it not in our best interest to ensure that our combat forces have all the necessary tools at their disposal?

General PETRAEUS. Well, obviously we want to make sure that our forces do, in fact, have all the necessary tools. And I think it is important to recall, Congressman, that we started at the end of 2008 with about 30,000, 31,000 U.S. forces on the ground. Through a combination of decisions, some that continued into 2009 from President Bush, and then early decisions made by President Obama, then the subsequent decision for the 30,000, we will have grown from that 30,000 to about 98,000 by the fall of this year.

So we have a very substantial increase, and we have worked very hard to make sure that in all of those forces—again, not just the 30,000, but starting all the way back in the spring, early 2009, that we included in those forces key elements, for example, medevac aircraft. We had, I think it was one medevac company, aero-medevac company on the ground at the start of that. We have gone to three, and we are going to add two more. So again, we are making sure that we have the forces that we need, the enablers, the critical enablers.

The only case in which I know of an operational need where we have modified that is in the case where we have used contractors in instances where we have high-demand, low-density elements, and we can thicken the force. Now, that is something we have done

across the board, but we have also done it in one area that I know of in the sense-and-warn device manning where we can do it with contractors rather than with military.

And as to the reassurance, if you will, at the end of this, first of all, we obviously should be good citizens and so forth and work within, again, I think the commitment that has been made. But the secretary of defense was very clear during the decision-making process to have some flex that was authorized for him. And indeed, he got that.

And as you probably know, it is a flex of some ten percent or so, and it is specifically for the areas that you have talked about. It is for the critical enablers, force protection, medevac, counter-improvised explosive device [IED], so that if an emerging need arises, that General McChrystal can come to me, I can go to the secretary with a request for force, and we don't have to do anything further with that. So I—we feel pretty comfortable with that situation.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you.

In your testimony, you state the inability of the Yemeni government to effectively secure and exercise control over all its territory offers AQAP a safe haven in which to plan, organize, and support terrorist operations. This network poses a direct threat to the U.S. homeland, as evidenced by recent plots, including the attempted bombing of a U.S. airliner on Christmas Day 2009.

As CENTCOM commander, would you oppose transferring Gitmo [US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay] detainees to places like Yemen, where the government is unable to secure and exercise control over its territories, and where Al Qaeda affiliates enjoy a safe haven?

General PETRAEUS. Congressman, it will always depend, I think, on the ability of the country actually to control that territory which is its correction facilities. And there has been, indeed, an effort to both encourage Yemen and to assist Yemen in the development of corrections facilities, keeping in mind that as you will recall some several years ago, there was an important prison break from Yemen in which a number of individuals who are now part of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula were released.

And I can assure you that the policymakers are very keenly attuned to that, and ensuring that there is not a risk as a result of that. And so that has been—in fact, I think that is why, among reasons, that there have not been detainees released to Yemen I think in quite some time, frankly.

Mr. MCKEON. So that is a yes, that you don't think that we should be releasing them to countries that really can't control the territory?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, it is not about controlling their territory. It is about controlling their prisons. And if they can't control a prison, then—but that is a different issue with Yemen than it is controlling their territory. There are clearly tribal areas that they don't control, but that doesn't mean that it is beyond their capability to control their detention facilities. In fact, as you saw in the press recently, there is an individual who was detained by them who is an Al Qaeda member, and attempted break, and in fact they prevented that from happening, so again—or retained him. So that is the critical determination, if you will.

Mr. MCKEON. And that is probably—I think that is—we are in agreement on that. I wouldn't expect necessarily to control their whole territory, but if they can't control the prisons or make sure that they can control the detainees that we return.

General PETRAEUS. That is the key. And that, I can tell you, having been on the periphery of these discussions, is very much a focus of the policymakers.

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you all for your testimony and for your superb service to our country.

As I understand it from a budgetary standpoint, this request for fiscal year 2011 includes \$113.0 billion for the security of Afghanistan, excluding Iraq. Out of that amount, \$14.2 billion will go to train and equip the Afghan national forces.

My question is, what is the optimum size? What force are we building towards? And after we draw down our forces, is it realistic to think that they can support forces of this magnitude without substantial subsidies from us and our allies? And what can we expect from our allies? Will they help shoulder the burden of maintaining these forces there for some time to come?

General Petraeus.

General PETRAEUS. Congressman, right now, we are building toward a target—a total of Afghan national security forces of army, police, border police, and some other categories, that is 305,600. The ultimate number is yet to be determined, and clearly we have to see both how the security situation develops, how the expansion of those forces develops because, indeed, this is very challenging to add 100,000 total between now and about 18 months from now. This is October 11, 305,000.

And sometime as we approach that period, again taking into account a lot of different factors, will be determined what the ultimate desirable end-strength is, and obviously cost is one of those factors, given that this is a country that doesn't have anywhere remotely near the resources of, say, Iraq, although the potential there is extraordinary in terms of its mineral wealth and some other blessings that it has, but they have to be extracted and gotten to market.

So that is what we are headed to right now. There is a keen recognition that, again, international donors, the U.S. will undoubtedly be prominent among them, will have to help sustain that force as we reduce our forces.

I would point out, though, that it is a lot cheaper to have a very substantial number of Afghan forces than it is to have a much smaller number of U.S. forces deployed in Afghanistan if you can get to the point where those Afghan forces can indeed transition and take tasks from our forces. So there is actually a fairly compelling business case for doing that, even recognizing that we will undoubtedly be the ones probably most helping to sustain them.

But I would note that there are some other very important partners, Japan foremost among them, who are providing substantial resources as well, and there are a lot of countries that have an interest in ensuring that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for transnational extremists.

Mr. SPRATT. Can you give us cost range? I couldn't agree with you more about having their forces as opposed to our forces being responsible for the security of their own country. But can you give us a likely cost range for that cost?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, if I could provide that for the record, again, just to make sure that we have that precise. But as we have gone through, for example, looking at how much it cost for this additional 30,000 forces, and then we have looked at how much we are going to spend for the 305,000 Afghan national security forces, again it is a heck of a lot cheaper to do them than to do a subset, a very much smaller number of U.S. forces, but we will get that for the record for you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 157.]

Mr. SPRATT. One last question, still on the budget. The president's budget post-2011 includes a plug—there is not an actual number, but there is a reservation of \$50.0 billion each year for the next 4 years after 2011. I know that that is just a plug. It is not a scientifically derived number or anything like that. But the president's budget, was that number included—takes the deficit from \$1.556 trillion down to \$706.0 billion in 4 years. We cut the deficit in half, which I think is a worthy goal.

But is it realistic to assume that in the out years, say 2013, 2014, we can have a supplemental cost for this engagement, this type of security commitment, down to \$50.0 billion?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think hard—frankly, quite hard to tell right now. We obviously are going to be down very, very substantially in Iraq. You know the policy to begin the transition of some tasks in July of 2011, and to begin what the president has termed a responsible—a beginning of a responsible drawdown of our forces. But trying to project out to that time I think would be hazardous right now.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service.

General Petraeus, I am increasingly asked a question for which I do not have a good answer. I hope that you can help. I know that yours is not to reason why; yours is but to do and die, but I hope that anyhow you can help me with an answer to this question.

The question starts out by noting this is—the war in Afghanistan is an enormously asymmetric war—an old artillery shell and a few dollars worth of electronics for the IED, and we spend billions of dollars, I think that the MRAP [mine resistant ambush protected vehicle] program alone was something like \$40.0 billion—probably the most asymmetric war in the history of the world.

And then the questioner goes on to note that even if we are successful in Afghanistan, where no one else has been successful—Alexander the Great failed, the British empire failed twice, the Soviet empire failed—and even if we are able to do what no one else has ever done, the questioner notes that we will have accomplished little because the bad guys will simply go into Pakistan.

And then, if we spend how many more billion dollars and how many more billion dollars and how many more dead kids over there, and clear them out of Pakistan, they will simply go to Yemen and Somalia.

And the question, you say we cannot provide them safe sanctuary. Why are we involved in this hugely asymmetric war where what we want to accomplish is not doable, because, even if we are successful there, they simply go across the border to Pakistan. How many more years? How many more billion dollars? How many more dead of our young people? If we drive them out of there, they go to Yemen and Somalia.

If we can't deny them safe sanctuary, why are we there, they ask me.

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, Congressman, with respect, I think that others have actually succeeded in Afghanistan. I think that if you go back and look at the record of British activities there, they did get defeated on occasion, but they also, then, would figure out a formula that would enable decades of peace, of an arrangement that allowed security and stability in that country.

Alexander the Great went so far as to marry an Afghan woman, I think, to solidify the agreement that ultimately allowed him to extricate his forces and to retain, again, achieve stability in his wake.

But, if I could, I think that the lesson of the fight against extremism—against transnational extremism, not a fight limited just to the Central Command area of responsibility, but certainly one that is concentrated there, is that you have to put pressure on the transnational extremists wherever they are, that you cannot do whack-a-mole.

I think you are correct to say that it is a substantial task, but if all we do is to deal with the challenges in Afghanistan and prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a sanctuary, as it was. Al Qaeda, of course, planned the 9/11 attacks in Kandahar when the Taliban was in charge of Afghanistan.

The initial training of the attackers was conducted in Al Qaeda training camps in eastern Afghanistan, before they went to Germany and then, ultimately, to U.S. flight schools.

So, yes, we have to succeed in that, but we, then, also have to help our Pakistani partners, noting that they are the ones doing the fighting on the ground, and to, through a sustained, substantial commitment for them, and a reassurance that we are going to be their strategic partners that helps and enables them to deal with this extremist threat that their people have come to see as the most pressing threat to their very existence, as they know it.

So, again, you have got to go—but, again, we also have to help Yemen. And we are doing that. Now, again, right now, Yemen is contributing enormously, obviously, in the effort. And that is something we have, again, got to sustain. We want to do it almost as a preventive counterinsurgency effort, rather than end up where we have to do a true counterinsurgency campaign.

But so that is how I would craft that, with respect, sir.

And it might be that my Special Operations comrade would have some thoughts on that as well, given that his forces are engaged in this worldwide.

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I would only add the point that—confirm that there are Special Operations forces engaged in some relatively low-level training relationships across many of the countries to which our adversaries may move when they are ultimately forced out of Afghanistan.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, all three of you, for your service to this great country and all the sacrifices you make to serve us. Thank you so much.

General Petraeus, and all three of you, I have a few questions for you on equipment needs in Afghanistan.

General Petraeus, Iraq and Afghanistan present two wholly different terrains and environments. Is the equipment in Iraq the right type of equipment to continue the fight in Afghanistan?

And not only am I worried about our equipment. What about the equipment from our coalition forces? Are they up to par to continue the mission? What do we do after we downsize in Iraq? Will we be able to use some of that equipment?

Maybe you can enlighten the committee on my question.

General PETRAEUS. Thanks, Congressman. It is a great question as well.

The fact is that some of the equipment we use in Iraq is fine for Afghanistan—some helicopters, certain of the vehicles and so forth—but some is not.

In particular, the MRAPs that were so important in providing protection for our forces in Iraq, many of them are too large—the different types are too large for the roads in Afghanistan, which are, obviously, much less developed than are the roads in Iraq.

And, in fact, that is why, of course, the Department came to you for the funding for the so-called M-ATV [MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle], the all-terrain MRAP vehicle. And, in fact, the requirement as it exists right now in Afghanistan is for some 14,500 MRAPs—the MRAP family of vehicles, 6,500 of those are the smaller of the original MRAPs and 8,000-plus are the new all-terrain vehicle MRAPs.

And, again, we are very appreciative of the rapid response by Congress and also by industry because they have expanded their production of the all-terrain MRAPs substantially.

So that is a case in which what worked in Iraq doesn't work in Afghanistan. And as we recognized that, rapidly we changed.

Now, the fact is that some of our coalition partners have adequate—again, to continue with MRAPs, have MRAP-like vehicles, vehicles with V-shaped hulls and good protection. Some do not.

And we are working to help relatively small numbers, frankly, and from the smaller countries, but we are working to help them also so that we can extend that force protection to them. And we have plans to do that, and we are proposing those to the secretary because he just returned from a NATO ministerial in which that was a key topic.

And then, are we able to transport some from Iraq to Afghanistan? Absolutely. We do a business case. We have a prioritization

for—first it goes to the units in Iraq if they need it. In some cases, it will go to Iraqi security forces if the business case is not such that it is cheaper to take it out of Iraq, refurbish it, say in Kuwait, fly or sail it over to Pakistan and then Afghanistan.

And, again, Transportation Command obviously plays an enormous role in all of this and has opened up a number of different routes, as General McNabb mentioned, in coordination with our State Department colleagues, with the logisticians from CENTCOM and so forth.

So that is also ongoing as well. And, again, there is a process that determines the prioritization, and there is a business calculation, literally, on whether it makes sense from a business perspective to transport it there or just have it made new here and transport it out there.

Mr. ORTIZ. And I just have one last question for General McNabb. I know that you move so much equipment, not only to Afghanistan but moving equipment back from Iraq. Do you have sufficient personnel and sufficient equipment to do your job, or do you need—what do you need that maybe we can help you with?

General MCNABB. Congressman, thanks for your question. It kind of goes along the lines of what I said at the beginning is the support of this committee has been huge on allowing us to adjust to the difference, for instance, not only in Iraq, but in Afghanistan.

Given Afghanistan's—the terrain in Afghanistan, give you the example of C-130E model, could carry 6,000 pounds around Afghanistan. An H model could carry 24,000 pounds. A J model could carry 40,000 pounds.

So the portion that you have been able to help us recapitalize our H models and make sure we get the J models set has really allowed us to have the flexibility to deal with moving stuff around that theater in support of General McChrystal and General Petraeus.

Defensive systems, obviously a very different kind of war, very dangerous. Given our crews, the defensive systems they can do. Many of you all, in fact I think all of you have flown in on our airplanes where you have done in-random approaches. Our crews have night vision goggles. They have the right cockpits. They have the right situation awareness to do that safely, things that I can't hardly believe that our young folks do.

And when I go fly with them—and every once in a while I do—those young captains will say, "Come on over here, son. Let me show you how we fly in this war." They are just tremendous.

But it is those kinds of things that allow us to modify our equipment and make sure that it is applicable.

Obviously, the C-17 has played huge in its ability to get into small airfields and take advantage of limited ramp space. And our job was to mix and match as we do that.

On the—and I will tell you, on the side, your—in fact yours and Congressman Taylor's and the whole committee's constant support of our sealift, both our U.S. flag fleet—they have done superbly in meeting the needs that we have had.

For the reset coming out of Iraq right now, they are taking care of all of that movement. I don't have to activate a vessel, because they have got this.

Merchant mariners are doing superbly. And they have been able to, over this eight years of war, really adjust the way they do things and the way we work with them to make sure that we can handle these surges.

The same thing on our U.S. air fleet. Their ability to handle the increased flow of folks. In many cases, we can't take the forces directly into, for instance, into Afghanistan. So we will take them to Manas, transload them onto C-17s and 130s, and take them in for that last portion. But they have been superb on stepping up to any challenges we had.

Both last year's surge and this year's surge, they said we have given them plenty of notice, and they make sure that they are ready to handle whatever we can give them. And we mix our commercial with our military to make sure that we are taking full advantage of both.

Obviously, it is much cheaper for us to use commercial where we can and add that strength to that U.S. flag. Both air and sea fleet has been superb. And your support of that has really made a big difference.

Mr. ORTIZ. Again, thank you for your service. We are proud of the work you have done. Thank you so much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank the gentleman.

There are three votes pending on the House floor. If our witnesses will indulge, we will go vote and return.

And the next witness should be Mr. Jones.

[Recess.]

Mrs. DAVIS. [Presiding.] We are going to resume again. I want to thank everyone for their patience.

Call on Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Madam Chairman, thank you very much.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here.

General Petraeus, in a March 14, 2010, article in *The Washington Post* entitled "At Afghanistan Outpost Marines Go Rogue or Leading the Fight Against Counterinsurgency," the question of where Marines are being deployed in Afghanistan and the counterinsurgency—excuse me—tactics that those Marines are employing appears to be a sticking point to the commanding general of United States forces in Afghanistan.

Aside from being played in the newspaper, which I am very disappointed that it was in the newspaper, this is obviously a point of contention in your headquarters. Could you please give us your views on this issue?

General PETRAEUS. Congressman, I think the Marines have been deployed to the right places for the right reasons and are carrying out admirable operations. It is as simple as that.

Mr. JONES. May I ask your opinion of the fact—you can't stop the press, that I realize, but may I ask you, would you had rather not seen this type of article in the newspaper?

General PETRAEUS. I would rather not have seen it, to be sure.

Mr. JONES. Okay. Thank you.

Now I have a second point that I want to bring to your attention, and that has to do with rules of engagement [ROE] or what is called tactical directives.

In *Marine Times* of November the 2nd of 2009, "Caution Killed My Son, Marine Families Blast Suicidal Tactics in Afghanistan." And then, in a later time, March 1 of 2010, "Left to Die, They Call for Help, Negligence"—"Negligent"—excuse me—"Army Leadership Refuse and Abandon Them on the Battlefield."

Last night I had a couple of hours of conversation with the father of this Marine who was killed, and his comment was to me that if we are going to, in this strategy that we are using—and I cannot judge, you are the professional, the three of you, and I respect you for being the professionals—but I am beginning to hear more and more concerns from parents.

I have Camp Lejeune in my district, Cherry Point Marine Air Station, a lot of retired Marines, and I am beginning to hear from these families that they do not understand why in certain situations that you are caught in a situation where you call for help and it doesn't come, or you call for helicopter cover where they have seen Taliban going into a cave, and then they are told when the helos get there that, "We cannot fire into the cave because we can't see them."

Would you say that these rules of engagement, that we are in a situation where maybe at some point in time it needs to be reconsidered, because I cannot continue to speak to a parent whose son was killed and they believe that the tactics was part of the reason that he was killed.

General PETRAEUS. Well, there are really two different issues, if I could separate them for you, Congressman.

Mr. JONES. Please.

General PETRAEUS. One is the speed of response. That is a totally different issue. And whether it is response by close air support, which I think was the case in this particular situation and was investigated and I think is still ongoing, and so I am not going to get into the specifics of it, but we are committed to responding to the needs of our troopers as rapidly as possible, whether it is with close air support [CAS], indirect fire, attack helicopters or medical evaluation.

And I personally track, we have metrics that we see on that. I actually take some of those to the Secretary of Defense, which gives you some sense of the scrutiny that he is giving to the issue. And by the way, one of these was on medical evacuation. That is what helped make the case for the additional medevac companies, which he very clearly recognized was needed and gave the order to provide, in fact.

So that is a separate issue. That has to be provided.

There is another issue, and that is the issue of the tactical directive issued first by General McKiernan and then refined by General McChrystal. This was issued because the loss of innocent civilian life in the course of military operations was threatening to undermine the very strategy, the very policy that we are endeavoring to carry out in Afghanistan.

And after an enormous amount of, again, very careful analysis and review and so forth, this directive was published.

Now, right up front in it, it says that no one is ever denied the right to self-defense, and nor will we ever hesitate if someone is pinned down by fire in responding to ensure that those troopers

never feel as if they are fighting with their hands tied behind their back.

Having said that, there are tactical situations in which, if you are not pinned down and decisively engaged and can break contact because you don't know precisely who is in the house from which there may be fire on you, where you hesitate in dropping a bomb or reconsider because there may be innocent civilians. And we have had a number of cases in which that has happened, and there are cases recently, in fact, again, and we have to reduce these cases. But we will not do it by risking the lives of our soldiers.

And so that is the balance that we have to strike. This is not uncommon to us. We went through this in Iraq as well. And there are cases where you literally back out of a fight rather than continue to prosecute it, long as you can do that, if you are not sure exactly who might be on the receiving end of a 500-pound bomb or attack helicopter, Hellfires, or something like that.

So that is what we are trying to achieve.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, General.

Thank the chairman.

Mrs. DAVIS. Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And, gentlemen, thank you for your service, your long years of service. And we so much appreciate you and your troops.

I have a question for each of you, if I can get them in, in my five minutes.

First of all, General Petraeus, one thing I want to say is one of your troops in the region is one of my employees, Army Reserve Captain Devon Cockrell is on his second mobilization. The first one was in 2003 and 2004 for 17 months, and this one he is getting toward the end of his second year. And as happens when you know somebody, they become the symbol for—

General PETRAEUS. Right.

Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. Your 220,000 troops. And we wish him and his wife and three little girls well, as we do all the troops and families that are under your command.

General Petraeus, I wanted to give you a chance to talk about two nations that are not in your area of concern, but relate to the operations both in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that is Turkey and Armenia. Turkey has been a long-term ally, Armenia is helping. Would you—any comments you might want to make on the strength of the relationship between Turkey and the United States, Armenia and the United States, and the significance of the efforts by the leadership of those countries—two protocols to normalize relationships between the two of them?

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, if you would convey my thanks as the combatant commander to the captain and to his family.

Second, the country with which I have worked most closely, noting again that it is obviously in the European Command [EUCOM] area of responsibility, but I worked with Turkey when I was the Multi-National Force–Iraq [MNF–I] commander, made several trips up there, have done that actually as the Central Command commander as well.

They have forces deployed in Afghanistan. In fact, they are operating with considerable skill, very impressive, in the Kabul district. In fact, that is their area of responsibility there.

I think General McNabb probably should talk about the importance of Incirlik and some of the different bases that we use there.

We have quite a close intelligence relationship with them. As you know, the PKK, an extremist organization which has caused loss of innocent civilian life, killed Turkish security force members and so forth, has operated from that mountainous region in the border between Iraq and Turkey, and so there has been a degree of collaboration there as well.

So overall—and then of course there is, understandably, Turkish involvement in a relationship with Iraq which, again, all of us sought to work together, as we did to promote the relationship of Iraq with its other neighbors as well. They have substantial investment. I think it is probably now in the order of \$10.0 billion in northern Iraq alone.

So, again, there were—there is a lot of intersection between the activities that we have pursued in Iraq and that we now have in the greater area of responsibility in Central Command overall.

And, again, I might ask General McNabb to talk about the basing and how important that is to us.

General MCNABB. Yes, Congressman, Incirlik is a really pivotal base for us, both for the resupply of Iraq and for the resupply of Afghanistan. In fact, it is in the neighborhood of 46 percent of our air sustainment goes through Incirlik. We have C-17s bedded down there, as well as some 135s. It is right along the route to Afghanistan. And Turkey has been tremendous in allowing us to use that base for the movement of cargo and refueling aircraft through there.

Dr. SNYDER. I am going to interrupt you, if I might.

General Petraeus, any comment about the protocols between Armenia and Turkey?

General PETRAEUS. It is not something that I—

Dr. SNYDER. All right.

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. I have any—

Dr. SNYDER. Admiral Olson, it is my understanding that we have 55 different bases or commands that have some kind of training course or school on special ops. Is it concerning that we have 55 different teaching institutions of some kind? Are we sure that everybody is learning the same thing or do we have problems with it having different courses, different course work, different doctrines? What is the status of that?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I would have to confirm the number 55 for you. That is the first time I have heard that number.

But in concept, each of our component commanders—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Special Operations commanders—assumes responsibility for training his force to a standard that meets his need. From our headquarters, we monitor that standard, we support what it is they are doing with their training bases.

There is a partnership with each of the services in terms of sharing training capabilities. We rely on big Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, for much of the readiness of our force.

And then we do Special Operations' peculiar training on top of that. But in concept, we—I—do not favor identical training for all elements of the force. I think it is essential in the spirit of jointness that each of our components train in the way that it best can, within its culture, within its leadership, within its peculiar equipment. Maritime equipment doesn't necessarily fit in a mountaineering kind of environment.

So there are very peculiar training needs that we need to be flexible enough to adjust to.

I am not defending the precise number of 55, but I think in concept we have got to understand that a breadth of training and great flexibility in how we provide it is important.

Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. General McNabb, I did not get to my C-130, but—

Mrs. DAVIS. No. We are going to have to go on.

Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your extraordinary service, and for the unbelievable, fantastic service of the forces under your commands.

General Petraeus, I want to kind of pick up, if I can, a little bit where Dr. Snyder was when he was talking about his staff or his constituent who was serving in—this week, in fact, tomorrow, my son leaves to go back under your command in Afghanistan, his third combat tour. And he is proud to do it, and I am proud of him.

But, thinking of him and all of our sons and daughters that are serving, particularly in your command, I want to make sure that they have everything that they need. And so, we are going to look at the budget and try to provide that.

We want to make sure they have every chance to succeed. And I am just a little bit reluctant to do this, but I am going to quote the same article that my friend, Mr. Jones, was quoting. The very last paragraph, General Nicholson is quoted as saying, "The clock is ticking. The drawdown will begin next year. We still have a lot to do, and we don't have a lot of time to do it."

And so I think the concern that I have and others have is that we don't want to be in the business of letting that clock push us to doing something we ought not to be doing or doing something too hastily. Could you just address that for just a minute?

General PETRAEUS. I could. I think, again, useful to paint the context that that derives from.

The president at West Point was sending two clear messages. One was a message of increased commitment—the additional troops, civilians, funding Afghan security force support. And then a message of urgency. And that is what July 2011 was connected to.

And that message was not just for domestic public opinion. That message was directed in some cases at leaders in the region, leaders in Kabul, leaders, perhaps, in uniform and so forth.

And, interestingly, that has had an effect. We do think that we see a lot greater engagement by certain leaders in certain activities there because there is an awareness that this is not going to go on forever.

Now, having said that, that speech was very carefully articulated to say that in 2011—July 2011—we will begin a process of transitioning, conditions-based, and begin a process of withdrawing in a responsible manner. And I think those are very key adjectives or adverbs, whatever it is there.

Mr. KLINE. And I agree. I just am a little bit concerned that in amongst our own forces, that if they are feeling an urgency—I mean, that is a big command responsibility that you and General McChrystal and others have to make sure that this is translated into the kind of operations we want to conduct.

General PETRAEUS. Right. And in the region, I might add, as well. Because we have made—we have worked hard to try to make sure that leaders in the region don't think that that is an indication that come July 2011, we are going to race for the exits and turn off the light. That is not going to be the case.

But it is very important to reassure some of those regional leaders as well, because if there was an expectation that we were going to do that, they would, obviously, act differently.

Mr. KLINE. Yes, thank you.

Mrs. DAVIS. Mister—

Mr. KLINE. I am sorry. I still have a minute and 34 seconds, I hope, Madam Chair.

I am going to try to get in one more quick question. And, again, I want to go back to you, General Petraeus, because we just had elections in Iraq. And the results were a little bit different than what I thought they might be. And we have had some rising influence of Muqtada al-Sadr and others.

Can you just—I have a minute and 13 seconds—can you address—

General PETRAEUS. I would be happy to.

First of all, the—I think the surprise is that you have running almost neck-and-neck right now, with 24 percent of the vote each, and still to be sorted out—it is only 80 percent or so has been counted—still to be sorted out how that translates into Council of Representative seats.

But you have Prime Minister Maliki and former Prime Minister Allawi. Maliki's coalition being predominantly Shia, but it has some cross-sectarian, not as religiously affiliated as the other major Shia coalition of which the Sadr movement is a part.

And that movement has only gotten about 17 percent. And the Sadr movement is one of the two major, but not necessarily, and there are several others in there as well.

So I am not completely sure I share the assessment that I saw in a news account today that this shows that the Sadr movement—the Sadr movement may be more prominent in that coalition, but that coalition, once again, as it did in January 2009 provincial elections, has not done that well in the overall national election.

So you have Prime Minister Maliki and then you have Prime Minister Allawi, a Shia, former prime minister, with—leading a largely Sunni but, again, cross-sectarian alliance and quite and avowedly secular alliance.

And then you have the Kurdish bloc with over 20-some percent as well, as I recall.

Now, that indicates some real interesting dynamics. Keep in mind that the individual parties that make up a coalition are not bound to stay with the coalition, too. So the—

Mr. KLINE. So we are in for some exciting times here.

General PETRAEUS. It is going to be quite interesting. I think there could be some—some high drama in the Iraqi political scene or in Iraqacy, as we call it.

Mr. KLINE. I hope it stays to peaceful drama.

I yield back.

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay, Mr. Kline, thank you.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

And thank all of you gentlemen for your service.

And particularly, since I have Admiral Olson and General Petraeus here, there has been a lot of talk of rules of engagement. On a recent visit down to Kandahar, like all of us get to do, I got to visit with some kids from home.

One was on his third deployment. Another one was on his second deployment. But what I found interesting is that both of them told me they thought they were going to make a career of the Army, but both of them told me they were getting out after this deployment, over frustration over the rules of engagement.

One of them, the guy on his third tour, had an observation that he felt like the rules of engagement were as strict in Afghanistan now as they were after four or five years in Iraq. Iraq, obviously, they choked them down as time went on.

General PETRAEUS. Right.

Mr. TAYLOR. And particularly he expressed absolutely no confidence in teaming with the Afghan police. He thought going on a search with them was just absolutely a waste of their time, did nothing but endanger their lives, and didn't accomplish much.

So, seeing as how, since the publishing of the book, "Lone Survivor," there has been a lot of talk over rules of engagement. I am just curious, do rules of engagement come solely from uniformed military personnel?

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely.

Mr. TAYLOR. No one—

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely.

Mr. TAYLOR. No one wearing civilian clothes is involved in making the rules of engagement?

General PETRAEUS. That is correct. Now, don't get me wrong. There is interface with Afghan leaders. I mean, that is one of the challenges that we have. Again, you have got to operate in the context where you are fighting, just as I had to with Prime Minister Maliki.

You know, there were times where I sat down and said, in a sense, will the traffic bear this operation tonight? And would—if it didn't, if my diplomatic wing man, the great Ryan Crocker, said no, then we would rethink that.

So, again, you do have to operate in the context. But these rules are absolutely developed by uniform ranks. I mean, that is how we do this.

There is a point at which they are approved, obviously, in the chain of command. But it is above my level. And they haven't

had—there has been no direction. This has been bottom-up, not top-down.

Mr. TAYLOR. I guess my follow-up question is has anyone in-theater been charged—or how often has it happened that someone has been charged with violating the rules of engagement?

General PETRAEUS. Let me answer that for the record, if I could? There are certainly cases in which disciplinary action has been taken. Now, whether you would say that that is a—because of a rule of action or because of some other form of lack of performance, I think would—is what we will need to determine.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 157.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay.

Admiral Olson, the case involving the three East Coast Navy SEALs [SEa, Air, Land Teams]. For the record, were the charges filed by the detainee? Were they filed by other uniformed military personnel? Were they filed by other Navy SEALs?

Again, there has been a lot of—you know, the folks on talk radio have obviously gotten people excited about this issue. I would welcome whatever you can tell us, given the circumstances, about the incident.

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. I am reluctant to talk about it. It is not in my area of responsibility. And it—although I can—

Mr. TAYLOR. I guess the first question is, who actually filed the charges? Do you know that?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I—

Mr. TAYLOR. Was it someone in uniform or was it the detainee?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I will take that for the record. I have received mixed information on that myself. I—

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 157.]

Mr. TAYLOR. General Petraeus, would you know, sir?

General PETRAEUS. I don't think it is—a detainee can't file charges the last I checked. I mean, anytime that—and we probably ought to go into a closed session and explain what is really happened on this case, because it is, A, an ongoing case—

Admiral OLSON. It is.

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. And, B, again, I think probably we ought to arrange for a briefing for you.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. General, for the record, since it, again, has been widely publicized, I guess the questions would be who actually filed the charges, uniformed or nonuniformed? Did the SEALs elect to go the court-martial route as opposed to nonjudicial punishment? That is my understanding, that it was their decision. And when are the cases pending?

And, again, I received, I have an extremely pro-military district and I get a heck of a lot of mail on this issue. And I would like to be able to give folks a decent answer.

But, again, thank all of you for what you are doing.

General McNabb, I am sorry I didn't bother you today. But I think I have done more than an adequate job of bothering you over the past couple years. And thank you for what you do to keep the troops supplied.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

First of all, General Petraeus, there has been certainly media reports and I think a relatively recent GAO [Government Accountability Office] report concerning problems in terms of financial management of—I think you mentioned the CERP money. I am not sure if that—there are categories above that, but—and just dealing with cash in Iraq.

And I wonder if you could respond to that in terms of—and be a little bit more specific as to what actions have occurred to tighten up that process.

And also, I wonder if you could also talk about should the United States—at what level should we be engaged at this time in terms of redevelopment in Iraq? Should the taxpayers be engaged? It seems like we are also still engaged in some infrastructure development in Iraq.

General PETRAEUS. Well, we are finishing up the infrastructure development that was funded by the original Iraq Reconstruction Act, and we continue to do small projects.

I think the average project that we do now in Iraq is somewhere in the tens of thousands of dollars range with CERP, just to give you an example how that has come down very steadily over the years. And as you know, we turned back a substantial amount of money from CERP last year, and we will likely do that again this year. And that is okay, because again that is an O&M [Operations and Maintenance] funding that the services can very much use.

And so we are not going to have an end-of-year spending drill or anything else like that. We are going to spend the taxpayer's dollars responsibly.

Now, with respect to should we continue, I think we should continue with some levels of funding in Iraq because I think we have continued substantial interests there, and we have invested an extraordinary amount to get to this point. And I think that continuing some level, but again at quite a substantially reduced level, is actually important to continue to help with the Iraqi security force development, as an example, which is key, of course, to us being able to go home and hand off the task to them. We have done that successfully so far. We need to continue to do that.

With respect to really just if you say a general category of management and so forth, there is no question but that our forces and contracting elements and other agencies have learned an extraordinary amount about this. Some of it the hard way, and some of that, indeed, is of course what was reported in the press the other day. But we have tried to be a learning organization.

Years ago, we instituted the Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan [JCC–I/A], and over time have done a substantial amount to provide better oversight, literally just more contractors, and again even now initiatives such as trying to literally reduce the amount of cash on the battlefield—try to go cashless, try to do electronic funds transfers and so forth where you can. And again, that has some challenges in places like Afghanistan, as you would appreciate.

To give you one item, if I could, the Army had no flag officers in the contracting ranks at all, I think it was two or three years ago—in fact, when we were trying to get a flag officer for the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, even though it had the predominance of the force. And as a result of its examination of how the contracting force had really eroded—atrophied in many respects—at a time when contracts were going like this, it has taken a number of different steps to get it going like that again. In fact, I think there are now three flag officers that are growing, and this will provide much better, again, leadership, management oversight and so forth.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. If you could respond to the committee in writing, I would really appreciate it, and address the issue of what—the nature of the projects that we are funding.

General PETRAEUS. I would be happy to do that.

Mr. COFFMAN. Because I do have a concern that the taxpayers of the United States should not be funding infrastructure development in Iraq today.

General PETRAEUS. Right.

Mr. COFFMAN. Having served in Iraq myself, I am well familiar with CERP projects and the need at the small unit level—

General PETRAEUS. Right.

Mr. COFFMAN [continuing]. Battalion and below to be engaged in those projects with the local population.

General PETRAEUS. Right.

Mr. COFFMAN. I have a final question for both of you, and that is, I have a concern that we have been—it seems that post-Vietnam, we went in with a light footprint, Angola, in Afghanistan initially, in supporting indigenous factions that shared our security concerns. And now with Iraq and Afghanistan, we are in a very heavy footprint. And I would hope going forward that we revert back to a light—a lighter footprint, relying on Special Operations Command for those issues where we are confronting non-state actors. If maybe you could respond to that.

General PETRAEUS. I would be happy to respond to it because I think a light footprint is a great solution where all you need is a light footprint. But the truth is that we tried a light footprint in Iraq and Afghanistan and, with respect, it didn't work. It was wrong.

We have been able to do a lighter footprint in some cases. I think the Philippines are a great example of that, touch wood, Yemen. There are some other areas where we have small numbers of forces, where we can almost do in a sense preventive counterinsurgency, if you will, rather than ending up in a full-blown counterinsurgency, with a whole-of-government's approach from the get-go.

And again, I think arguably in Kosovo that may have been, although you can interpret that different ways, but so again, I think this is a case of it is art not science, and I think you have to be careful. The penalty for going too light can be substantial. The penalty for going too heavy can be substantial. And that is why they pay folks to make tough decisions.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

I am sorry. Admiral Olson, did you want to respond?

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, ma'am.

Mrs. DAVIS. Time is up, but I am going to go ahead and let you—

Mr. COFFMAN. Madam Chairman, I show that I have a minute and five seconds left. Oh, I am going the other way.

[Laughter.]

Admiral OLSON. I would simply say that the small footprint and the way that Special Operations forces do this around the world in support of the regional combatant commanders. General Petraeus called it “preventive counterinsurgency.” We refer to it as moving ahead of the sound of guns in order to prevent that sound from occurring later.

But once the sound of guns has occurred, it is a whole different thing and you need to respond with what you need to respond with, and the operational commanders need to make that determination, as General Petraeus laid it out. But the small footprint is better before the fight starts.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And thank you again, gentlemen, for being before our committee.

Admiral Olson, I want to pick upon something that Mr. Skelton spoke about in his opening statement, and that is the whole issue of 86 percent of our special operations forces are in U.S. Central Command. It is the same percentage that you gave us last year, so I would like to know, can you provide a specific breakdown of where of the special operations forces between Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan? So that would be my first question.

Admiral OLSON. Congresswoman Sanchez, thank you. I would like to take that for the record for the sake of accuracy so that I do give you good numbers.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 157.]

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay.

Admiral OLSON. But I will tell you, it is roughly 10,000 people in the CENTCOM area of operations, and it is roughly 60–40 or 55–45 split, with now the slightly heavier portion in Afghanistan versus Iraq.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you.

And with the high percentage of SOFs in the U.S. Central Command, how is that affecting our operations elsewhere throughout the world? I mean, if you are drawing and you are pulling them all in one direction, what is that doing to the rest of the things that we are worried about out there?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, ma’am. Clearly, we are in fewer places with a smaller number of forces for shorter periods of time than we historically have, and that has impacted on our ability to establish some of the close relationships with counterparts in other regions. Along the way, our ability to speak some languages has atrophied because we are simply not there with the same intensity that either they want us there or we have been able to be there in the past.

Ms. SANCHEZ. And do you see the drawdown of the conventional forces coming out of Iraq over this year—do you see that as also a drawdown of our special forces who are sitting in Iraq? Or do you

see that even a greater extent of leaving the more leaner, faster-moving Arab-speaking type of people that you might have? Or do you see us pulling them out of Iraq and then sending them off to Afghanistan?

Admiral OLSON. Well, we are terming it a reemphasis in Afghanistan without a de-emphasis in Iraq, expecting our Special Operations force level in Iraq to remain about constant even as the general purpose force drawdown occurs.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you.

I would also like to discuss yesterday's *New York Times* article. In particular, General Petraeus, realizing that there are still ongoing investigations with respect to the Department and that some things are difficult to talk about, can you comment on the validity of yesterday's *New York Times* article?

General PETRAEUS. Which article are you referring to?

Ms. SANCHEZ. The one on the special forces and how they are coming under McChrystal's operational perspective because of problems with the higher casualty rate of civilians.

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. Yes. It is not because of that, and I am the one who directed the shift of operational control as well as what was tactical control to Com-U.S. Forces Afghanistan, as we also have done recently for U.S. Air Force provincial reconstruction teams [PRTs] and for U.S. Marine forces and for some other elements there as well—the Army forces having already been under his operational control as well as his tactical control.

Ms. SANCHEZ. So the article sort of insinuates that the reason that they are coming under McChrystal is because there have been high civilian casualties, and in particular they are from the special force—the special operating teams. Are you trying to tell me that because you ordered this, you really didn't order it on that basis? You ordered it more on the ability to have the skill-set needed in particular areas in Afghanistan?

General PETRAEUS. No, neither of those, Congresswoman. What I am—the reason it was done was to help General McChrystal achieve greater unity of effort among all of his forces. And again, that is why this applied to more than just Special Operations forces. It also included Marine forces, certain Air Force forces, and it already had included—we had earlier done the Army forces.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. If it is possible for the record or if it has to be more under more of a confidential situation, I would like to see a memo or whatever—

General PETRAEUS. It has nothing to do with classification.

Ms. SANCHEZ [continuing]. Under some of that movement and why it is happening.

General PETRAEUS. There is nothing classified about it. This is to achieve greater unity of effort. That is why I directed it. It is something that we discussed for a number of months way before this whatever incident, again, was referred to in that article. We have talked about it for years, candidly. It is something we discussed when I was in Iraq as well, and it is something that I also then took to the secretary before doing it.

Ms. SANCHEZ. And lastly, Admiral, I had asked you several weeks ago when we met what do you see in the future as some of the greatest threats and where we need to be placing our special

ops. Can you tell me if there is anything that is changed or anything that we should worry as a committee with respect to where our forces might be?

Admiral OLSON. From the Special Operations perspective and our responsibility to track violent extremist threat across the regional combatant commands of the world, our focus is on the under-governed, ungoverned regions of the world. It is the places where there are vast expanses, easy access, the ability to develop and project power from those regions.

Admiral OLSON. So that does include Yemen, as we see growth in an Al Qaeda presence there. It gives us concerns about Somalia and further west, particularly in the pan-Sahel trans-Saharan regions.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. FRANKS.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.

And, gentlemen, thank you. I always have a little commercial in the beginning that I know one doesn't reach the rank of admiral or four-star general without having a complete and total lifetime dedication to the cause of freedom. And I want you to know I just speak on behalf of a great deal of people suggesting how much we are honor and appreciate your grand service.

I would like, indulge me here, I would like to try to sort of express a concern and then I will change gears here at the end and ask a question, I promise.

One of the great concerns I have, as has been in the committee, is that Iran would achieve a nuclear weapons capability. Certainly agree with General Petraeus that that means that there would be an arms race in the Middle East and just a number of other things that I believe could wipe the table clean of other issues, given the potentiality of weapons falling into the hands of terrorists at some point in the future and all of the things that go with that.

And it is my concern that this Administration—not expressing anything on your part—but this Administration may have come to an unstated conclusion or position that Iran is going to gain nuclear capability and that our strategy should be to contain that when that happens. And I just feel like that is a fundamentally wrong conclusion to come to, that it means that we should do everything we possibly can to prevent Iran from gaining that capability, again, for some of the stated reasons that I mentioned.

And, General Petraeus, in the Senate Armed Services Committee, I think you made a general statement that you didn't think Iran would become a nuclear power or nuclear-armed nation in 2010. It so happens that I agree with you, and I just want to make sure that that doesn't represent a perspective on your part that we should be letting up in any way, and I don't think it does—give you certainly the opportunity to—

General PETRAEUS. Not at all. And, in fact—I mean, for anybody wants to get into the issue of Iran's path, if you will, its efforts in the nuclear arena, then I think very much you should ask for a closed session with the intelligence community to lay that out. But, I mean, that was just really to—

Mr. FRANKS. Sure.

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Just say that.

Now, I am not aware of such a conclusion as you talked about, by the way, to just—to allow—

Mr. FRANKS. No, I don't suggest you are. That is a conclusion on my part, that there is an unstated feeling on the part of this Administration that Iran will gain a nuclear capability, and I think that is a very dangerous conclusion to come to. And I wanted to make sure that I said ahead of time that I don't think that that reflects any perspective on any of your part, because perhaps you know better than anyone the implication of a nuclear Iran.

General PETRAEUS. And, again, I am not aware of a conclusion being made in the policy level either.

Mr. FRANKS. I understand. Yes, sir.

Well, again, I hope that to be true, because I feel like that there are calculations that are made in the world at this point that are beginning to take into consideration the potential, you know, hegemony that Iran would gain if they—if they were able to become a nuclear-armed nation.

So with that, I just wanted to express that concern. And I want to give anyone else a chance to do it, too.

Before I run out of time, I would like to go ahead and put one other question on the table and then you can deal with them en masse if you want to.

You have had a brilliant success in Marjah, and I think now that the plan—the general plan is to move forward in Kandahar with an even larger effort in Afghanistan, as I understand, and that there are at least some stated concerns that you may not have quite the number of forces that you believe is necessary to maintain peace in Marjah, that, you know, that to hold that territory is more—sometimes more personnel intensive than to take it. And I am concerned that, you know, our potential friends in the area might wonder if we are going to have the commitment to hold not only Marjah, but other areas that we secure. And do you have any concerns that you feel like this committee should be aware of?

General PETRAEUS. I do not.

One of the concepts when I talked about getting the right structures, people, concepts, and resources, one of the key concepts there is in counterinsurgency guidance, and it has to do with not clearing if you are not going to hold. We have tried that in the past. You know what the results are. Occasionally there is some reason to disrupt somebody, but you need to recognize all you are doing is disrupting and leaving.

In this case, there was a commitment to clear and to hold, and that commitment remains strong. And, I mean, this is why we are deploying still. We are about 10,000 of 30,000 in, and we have another 20,000 forces headed on the way in.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. [Presiding.] Thank the gentleman.

The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

And thank you, all of you, for being here, and especially for the leadership you have provided the country.

I wanted to follow up a little bit, well, with my colleague, and just the size of the request really that you have made in trying to move forward and provide a greater increase for the Afghan security forces.

I wonder if you could explain a little bit more—and perhaps you did this earlier, and I am sorry, I might not have been here—why you need the almost 50 percent increase in the levels appropriated for fiscal year 2010 and the \$11.6 billion for fiscal year 2011.

Is there a point at which—I think people are ask—I know, whether this is really a possibility, whether they have the ability, capacity to gear up in that way?

General PETRAEUS. Well, again, a critical important—critically important part of our overall effort involves developing host nation forces so that indeed we can, as the president has articulated, starting in July 2011, begin the process of transitioning some tasks, conditions-based, to Afghan security forces.

And a very substantial amount of analysis went into how many forces and so forth. The agreement at this point is for the expansion up of another roughly hundred thousand that will take them to about 305.6 thousand total soldiers, police, border police, and some other categories.

We think it is crucially important when you do the counterinsurgency math, if you will, everything we know about this tells us that those forces will be needed and that we need them to be as capable as we can possibly help them be. And that is the reason for that.

As I did mention earlier, when we can hand off tasks to them, it is obviously a lot cheaper to have a very substantial number of Afghan forces rather than to have even a smaller number of our forces. And, you know, you know the numbers that it took to deploy 30,000 additional forces—

Mrs. DAVIS. I think, General, what I am wondering, and I know I have been asked this quite a bit out in my district, is whether or not there is really a threshold and a point at which we feel that we are not actually being successful in the time frame that we actually field in order to see the changes that are required.

General PETRAEUS. Well, that is certainly not something that we see right now. Again, we do forthright, honest assessments. And what we saw in Marjah, for example, was a performance by Afghan forces that was, frankly, mixed. There were some quite good Afghan forces. There were some of our commanders who sing the praises of their Afghan counterparts. And then there were some others that were not as good. And there is no one singing those praises.

The same is true of various forms of local and national Afghan governance. This is why President Karzai, of course, announced his anti-corruption initiative, why he just relieved another governor and so forth.

So, again, this is hard—

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. This is tough. I understand. And I know that there was a report—

General PETRAEUS. And you went through it with us in Iraq as well, as I know you recall.

Mrs. DAVIS. There was a report as well recently that the police training isn't going as we would like, and it seems like—

General PETRAEUS. We are overhauling it.

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. Every time—

General PETRAEUS. We are overhauling the police training. We didn't have the concepts right—

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. I have been there and asked—

General PETRAEUS. No, we didn't have the concepts right.

Mrs. DAVIS. Still working on that. Okay.

General PETRAEUS. Again, that is—we have taken a year to get the right inputs, and among those is the concept for how we train the Afghan national security forces, the organization needed to do it. You know, we had—in Iraq we had a three-star, as you will recall.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes.

General PETRAEUS. In Afghanistan we had a two-star. It helps to have that additional structure, the additional—

Mrs. DAVIS. If I may turn, just quickly, to the recent *Washington Post* article on the fact that while some situations have improved for women in Afghanistan, there is a lot of concern about women being certainly on the—continuing to be on the margin. And the discussions with the Taliban have a great impact on the feeling that they would like very much to be able to be at the table, you know, in the sense of having more input.

Do you anticipate, do you see that as a possibility? What role, if any, do you think we should be playing?

General PETRAEUS. Well, I see Afghan women certainly as playing a role, albeit one that does vary depending on where you are in the country. And you have been there, you know that in the cities, there are certain cities where women are very evident, very obvious, and very much contributed and involved in all that goes on in society. But when you get into some of the more rural areas, where there is a more conservative form of religion that is practiced, that is not the norm.

And so, again, this is also certainly a mix. I have actually talked about this with President Karzai. He is actually quite proud of some of the accomplishments in this regard. And as I mentioned to you before the session, the Women's Day celebrations recently were really quite remarkable. I mean, you are absolutely correct that there is an enormous desire there in that half of the population that is female to contribute more to their country.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Wittman, please.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Petraeus, Admiral Olson, General McNabb, thank you for joining us today and thank you so much for your service to our Nation.

Wanted to begin with you, General Petraeus. We have read recently, as the election results come in from Iraq, about what is happening with the dynamic of those folks that are elected to serve, and it appears as though supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr are gaining some momentum, at least as those—

General PETRAEUS. I am not sure I would share that actually. As I mentioned a second ago, the two primary coalitions actually do not include the Sadrists. They are the Maliki coalition, 24 percent

of the vote, the former Prime Minister Allawi coalition. That is a very secular coalition. This is a—more secular than the coalition that is—that has the Sadrist as part of it.

They have only got, I think, it is somewhere, last count, around 17 percent of the votes, so they are decidedly behind and also behind the Kurdish coalition.

And they are one of only—they are only one of several parties in that particular coalition which has the Supreme Council of Hakim and then also the former Prime Minister Jaafari element, Chalabi, and some others.

They may be more prominent in that coalition. That may be correct. And that is the more—the least secular and perhaps arguably most connected to Iran coalition. But I wouldn't say that they are more prominent in Iraq as a whole, other than the discipline they showed as part of a party as part of that coalition.

Mr. WITTMAN. Well, in that context, what role, then, do you think, or what influence do you think, then, Muqtada al-Sadr has going forward, as the results of these elections come in, with the government that will be formed?

Do you think his role will be as it was, maybe, in the past?

It seems like he has been, you know, sort of, under the radar here, at least recently. And I didn't know if this election signaled a little bit different path?

General PETRAEUS. He has emerged. He has been more prominent. His party, his coalition did not do well in the January 2009. Again, that was that same coalition, and was largely defeated by Maliki's coalition in the January 2009 provincial elections.

Again, his is a loyal, in a sense disciplined element. There are still some militia remnants that are attached to it by other names. And he has a very prominent name, obviously. The Sadr name carries an enormous amount of weight in Iraq, in society and even in Iraqi politics.

So he is an important figure and he has been a bit more visible after the years of study and so forth that he has undertaken. And, really, it is going to—we will have to see whether or not his party breaks from this coalition and ends up going with one of the other two leading coalitions which likely will be the lead dog in this effort to form a coalition that can elect—get enough votes in the Council of Representatives to elect a prime minister and president and so forth.

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay, very good.

I want to shift gears, a little bit now, to Afghanistan and talk, a little bit, about where we are going to be in the future. Obviously, we know we have got a timeline for withdrawal. And of course that is based on looking at where we are in the efforts there in Afghanistan.

Let me ask this. You know, one of the elements of that, we know, in this counterinsurgency plan is making sure that the training of the Afghan national security forces is on track and that we are actually accomplishing the things that we need to, to make sure that they can maintain security, just as you said, once we go in and are able to establish that security.

Can you tell me, a little bit, about how that training program is evolving?

And are we really on the correct glide path to achieve an effective size for the national security force by 2012, which is, you know, on track with the time frame for withdrawal?

General PETRAEUS. I think it is probably too early to tell. There has been greater recruiting and retention in the army and now in the police as well. But that is really only the last couple of months, and that was the result of probably two factors.

One is a pay raise and some targeted bonuses and some other sensible actions, which—all of which, by the way, we tend to do as well.

And then the other is really a greater sense of ownership, we think, by Afghan leaders, in part because they recognize that there is a timeline. There is a date for the beginning of—not for the withdrawal but for the beginning of—a transition, for the beginning of a responsible withdrawal.

With respect to the overall programs, we have to increase the capacity for training substantially. NATO asked for the numbers of trainers that General McChrystal and General Caldwell and the NATO training mission in Afghanistan commander requested and got only half of those. So we are going to have to figure out where those other trainers are going to come from.

And also, General Caldwell has made some very sound changes, frankly very much in line with the kinds of learning that we did in Iraq over time, as well.

Just one example: you know, we should recruit, train, and then assign police, not recruit, assign, and then try to get them back to training. Again, that was a flawed approach, and we have got to—we have to take the time to do that. And there are also a host of other initiatives to increase the capacity and capability of the training and equipping effort and therefore translate into greater capacity and capability for the Afghan security.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, first, let me say hi to Colonel Seaton, back here. He was my—

General PETRAEUS. He is quite a—

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. Battalion C.O. [commanding officer], 1st Battalion, 11th Marines.

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Years ago.

Mr. HUNTER. So great to see you here. And good luck with them. Good luck with them. It is a long, hard slog.

[Laughter.]

And, you know, to all of you, thanks for your service.

General McNabb, as Dr. Carter was actually singing your big praises yesterday, talking about the way that we are increasing, getting the MRAPs over and a lot of the things we have done to make different lanes, kind of, come together to get stuff over there quicker, things that are needed really—that are very important right now.

So thanks for everything that you are doing.

The first thing that I would like to talk about is, one, just echoing Mr. Taylor's asking about the ROE because I understand what the tactical directive. And I understand, at the level that we are

at and that you all are at as four-stars, what you say and what you implement at your level and what gets executed by a captain or approved by a lieutenant colonel or major are two totally different things.

And talking to Navy SEALs, talking to different task forces in the Army who fall under both of you gentlemen sitting there, different task forces that I can't even talk about here, mention by name, they feel like there is a disconnect between what was supposed to happen with that tactical directive and what they are actually allowed to do, when it comes to night raids; when it comes to them getting air support; when it comes to—when I was in Afghanistan in 2007, if you got in—troops in contact, you owned all the air no matter what. It didn't matter if you were advancing or you were retreating; you owned all the air.

It isn't like that anymore. I mean, that—that is a fact, that that has changed. And it might not be written that way, but no—

General PETRAEUS. If troops in contact is declared, Congressman, they own the air.

Mr. HUNTER. No, but—right, I understand that they own it, but let me—

General PETRAEUS. It is very clear. Once a troop is in contact is declared, they own the air.

Mr. HUNTER. Right, but let me tell you. A company commander is not going to lose his job over dropping bombs and accidentally—accidentally killing civilians, and he is scared to drop those bombs.

That is what is happening right now. That is that disconnect between an O-3 level and a four-star general level, is that he is going to lose his job as a company commander if he drops those bombs.

I think that is the disconnect going on right now. He is allowed to have the air; he is told he has the air. Those troops have that support, but he knows, if he kills civilians, he is going to be immediately under investigation. And I think that is a disconnect. I am not even asking you about—

General PETRAEUS. We have always investigated killings of civilians, Congressman, in Iraq and Afghanistan. Any time you have anything like that happen, that is—

But we will underwrite—we will underwrite the actions of our tactical level commanders when they are in circumstances where they are decisively engaged and they must employ close air support or any form of indirect fire or attack helicopters or what have you.

Now, we have got to reinforce our efforts to make sure that everyone understands the intent of the tactical directive. And I will agree with you that—on that very much. One reason we have given OPCON [operational control] of all these different forces to General McChrystal is to ensure that there is absolute clarity on who it is that is in charge and who is indeed giving these orders.

So I agree with you in that sense. I think it is crucially important that, again, the intent of the tactical directive be understood, which, as I mentioned up front, there is never anyone who is denied the right of self-defense. And if they are in trouble, we are going to provide the forces to ensure they get out of trouble.

But there do have to be considerations where you are not in desperate trouble to make sure that, again, innocent civilians aren't

killed in the course of action—and I know you understand that, having served down-rank in that kind of situation.

Mr. HUNTER. I understand. I have one last question, a totally different thing. But just please be aware that there is a disconnect—

General PETRAEUS. I am, got it.

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. As a lieutenant compared to a four-star—

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely.

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. There is disconnect in the way that things are implemented, right?

The second one is, I was able to talk to General Paxton yesterday, Jay Paxton, and Dr. Carter. And I asked them this. Do we own any roads in Afghanistan?

When Operation ODIN [Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize] started in Iraq, about six months after that, when it came to IEDs going off, we could say that we owned some road. We could say, hey, we own 50 kilometers here. We know the enemy are not going to put in IEDs on these 50 roads because we are watching it persistently with a revisit rate of 2 hours, and we know that it takes longer than that to plant an IED; we own these roads.

There was no answer for that about Afghanistan. We don't know if we own any roads. So I am asking you, can we say that we own IED-free 20 kilometers in Afghanistan? Thirty kilometers?

General PETRAEUS. Well, I am sure there are stretches that—where we have that—you know, I was the commander in Iraq, of course.

Mr. HUNTER. Right.

General PETRAEUS. And I am not sure I would have said that we owned roads, per se, in the same fashion that you said that. Again, I spent four years there. And I think I would be careful how we characterized how we felt ownership of various roads.

And if you did not have an unblinking eye on a road, not a revisit rate of two hours, these guys could—they dropped it out of a vehicle, as you recall.

Mr. HUNTER. They also—

General PETRAEUS. So again—

Mr. HUNTER. They also dug them in with back hoes over a period of six hours, right?

General PETRAEUS. That is different. That is a deep bury. But, again, you could drop an IED, and these guys were very good at that.

So, again, I would just be very careful how we characterize that. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you—

General PETRAEUS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Let me ask, before I go to the next member, General McNabb, what percentage of the materiel is flown into either Iraq or Afghanistan by air?

General MCNABB. Mr. Chairman, we take in about 20 percent of the materiel by air into Afghanistan because it is landlocked. And we take all sensitive equipment, and anything that is high-value, we take in by air.

M-ATVs is a good example. We take that in by air because we have got to get it there to the troops as quickly as possible because lives are at risk.

The CHAIRMAN. The other 80 percent is under the maritime security program, by ship?

General MCNABB. Sir, it either comes in from the northern distribution network, which, as you mentioned, is by surface, by ship and then by train and rail and then by trucks, or it comes in by ships into Karachi and then comes up the Pakistan LOC [Line of Communication].

So about 50 percent up the Pak LOC, about 30 percent—25 percent to 30 percent—coming from the northern distribution network. And right now, we are in the middle of trying to get more to go up to the northern distribution network, the commercial-type stuff that we can take through there to free up room on the Pak LOC to bring up the military equipment for the surge.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you for your long, distinguished service to our country. We appreciate that.

Mr. CONAWAY. Iran has appeared to have—not just their nuclear weapons, but they appear to be adding to their arsenals and capabilities across a pretty broad spectrum.

Do you see that as a prelude to some sort of an offensive move that they might decide is in their best interest, assuming we make the sanctions tough enough where life in Iran gets really bad and the regime wants to try to use an offensive of some sort in order to distract its people? Are you concerned about that at all?

Well, I know you are concerned about it, but how concerned?

General PETRAEUS. Well, there is a number of things that we are concerned about with respect to Iran and a number of other countries in the region, as you know, Congressman.

But I—what I would—I don't think I would characterize it quite as broadly as say that they are getting a "offensive capability," in the sense that we would think of, of a conventional, say ground or air offensive.

The truth is their air forces are really not that good at all, in part because of sanctions. In fact, there are some very small countries in the Arabian Peninsula that have better air forces than does Iran, but their missile forces have been built up quite substantially. Their air defense forces have been built up.

There are a variety of asymmetric types of threats that they present, everything from suicide boats to the use of proxy elements.

So, in fact, I think, as a broad characterization, what they have been building is more of an asymmetric capability, rather than a conventional offensive capability, as we know it.

Mr. CONAWAY. I guess I was thinking about the cruise missile-like thing that they just—

General PETRAEUS. Yes. Again, that would be part of that category of missile threats that they have built up substantially and also have transferred some of that, of course, to Lebanese Hezbollah and to others in the region.

Mr. CONAWAY. Yes. Your testimony, General Petraeus, page 12, you talk about cross-cutting challenges to security and stability, list about 11 different deals. Are those in rank order of your concern? And, if not, what would be the—say the top three concerns that you have got in terms of this cross-cutting—

General PETRAEUS. In fact, let me just ask someone if—

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, the first one is “insufficient progress toward a comprehensive Middle East peace,” is the first.

General PETRAEUS. Yes. Again, I don’t know that I would rank order these as such—

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay.

General PETRAEUS. But that is certainly something that forms the strategic context in which we operate. Again, there is just a bunch of dynamics out there that we thought it would be useful for the members to know, that, again, shape this context within which we operate.

Mr. CONAWAY. Just for the record, would you—and for me to back and rank order those, as to where you think the—

General PETRAEUS. I would be happy to do it.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 157.]

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. Kind of all into the—

General PETRAEUS. Sure.

Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. Scheme?

A report out of Afghanistan, I think in January, by a General Flynn, talked about a distinction between a distinction between intelligence being used to target, which was very extensive and is working really well, fortunately, versus a broader intelligence array of information provided to our folks on the ground that would allow them to win the hearts and minds, for lack of a better phrase.

He cited a couple of good examples in there how it has worked—a couple of Marine units, I think, that have shown successes—dramatic drops in IEDs being planted, about real—almost as if the Afghans have taken on the—in their areas of operation—the role of protecting themselves.

Visit with us a little bit about how that might be extended across a broader area. Are you getting the intelligence that you need?

General PETRAEUS. Well, if I could, again, put this in context. When we conducted the strategic assessment part of taking command of Central Command, we did this, and got that back in a couple months.

And one of the revelations that came back—we had an awful lot of folks that had served a fair amount of time in Iraq, a number in the intelligence community. And they came back and said, “Boss, there is not anywhere near the same capability nor the same capacity nor depth of understanding that was developed in Iraq with respect to Afghanistan.”

And so, at local levels, and that is really what General Flynn is getting at. This is about the human terrain, understanding in a really granular fashion the dynamics of a particular village, valley, tribal area, and so forth.

And so, he is exactly right, and our assessment came back and said, “We have got to do a lot to help build this up.” And that—by the way, one of the initiatives was to send Major General Flynn

to Afghanistan to tackle some of this as the leader of the intelligence community there.

It was also forming the Af-Pak [Afghanistan-Pakistan] Center of Excellence at U.S. Central Command's Joint Intelligence Center. It is the Af-Pak Hands program that SOCOM-CENTCOM joint staff and those downrange participate in. And it is literally just beefing up, substantially, all of the different intelligence elements at the different levels.

And then, of course, just the sheer density of forces results. As he noted, there was a point about platoon leaders and others. That, in itself, gives you more knowledge, if you capture it, and part of the challenge is to capture this so we are not just refighting this year after year, as we rotate units and leaders.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, General. Appreciate your being here.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman from Texas.

Before I ask Mr. Wilson, General McNabb, let me ask you a very basic question. Would you discuss and tell us the route of the northern distribution network and also the route of any seagoing supplies to either Iraq or Afghanistan, please?

General MCNABB. Yes, sir. It is a network, and so there are a number of routes. Up in the north, it goes through Riga in Latvia. And it will come down through Russia to join up through Kazakhstan into Uzbekistan.

We also have a Caucasus route that goes through the Black Sea and goes through the port of Poti to Baku and then up to Aktau and, again, through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, joining that rail line to join up there.

Most recently, at General Petraeus' request, we actually have a linkup from Turkey up to that same line, going through the Caucasus, coming across. And, in fact, one of our carriers is—has volunteered that they would come in to one of the ports in Turkey and bring it up through Turkey, so that is another addition to the network.

And, most recently, we have got interest in coming in from Vladivostok, across Siberia, again coming down through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

To the Pak bloc, the Pakistan, it all comes through Karachi. Our carriers have done a superb job of, again, mixing and matching and making sure that they have lots of options, again, to support General Petraeus.

The good part there is there is competition between all of these routes, and actually it has brought prices down because it is a network. Because we don't want to depend on one, we basically have said it is a network. And what we have found is all those countries have said that it is in their interest to have peace and stability in Afghanistan, and they have been very helpful across the board.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Generals, Admiral, thank you for being here today. I particularly appreciate your service. I am the proud father of two sons who have served in Iraq—one Army, one Navy—and I just know of your leadership, and I am very, very grateful.

Additionally, I am very grateful my former National Guard unit, the 218th, a mechanized infantry brigade of the South Carolina National Guard, led by Major General Bob Livingston, served for a year in Afghanistan. And all of you were so helpful. And the people of South Carolina are so proud of their success in working with the people of Afghanistan.

And, General McNabb, I have to point out that we are a joint service family. My nephew has just completed his service in the Air Force in Iraq. And so, thank all of you.

Additionally, I want to thank you for coordinating our allies. I had breakfast this morning with the Defense Minister, Jaroslav Baska, of Slovakia. And the people of Slovakia are so proud of their service in Iraq and Afghanistan. And the Defense Minister was pointing out that they are adding to their commitment to ISAF.

And we appreciate countries, the new members of NATO, such as Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania.

As we are into the hearing today, something that I find interesting, the new media really has made it possible for the American people to know so much more about what is going on.

And, General Petraeus, a question was submitted via the HASC [House Armed Services Committee] Republican Facebook, from Jaysen—J-a-y-s-e-n of Los Angeles. And the question is, is the civilian surge in Afghanistan having the desired effect? And what additional civilian agency originations—USAID [United States Agency for International Development], State, Agriculture, Justice—are needed?

General PETRAEUS. Well, Congressman, Jaysen's asked a great question. The civilian surge, if you will, to parallel the military surge is certainly ongoing. I think it is—it has almost tripled the number of civilians that were there, again if you go back, say, to the end of 2008.

Each of the components that he has mentioned and a few others—State, AID, Agriculture, I would add DOJ [Department of Justice], FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], virtually all of the different elements engaged in the executive branch play a part in this.

And for what it is worth, I know that Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen and I have been among the biggest champions for actually beefing up those components of our executive branch because, of course, if they can't do it, then in many cases individuals in uniform end up doing it.

And that has been the case, as you know, because of reductions in AID and so forth. An area, by the way, in which we need to expand as well is this whole information operations area of public diplomacy, as State puts it. And that is something, as I mentioned in my opening statement, we are working very closely with the Under Secretary, Judith McHale, to do just that.

But the surge is ongoing. There is better partnership than I think any of us have ever seen, particularly in Regional Command-East [RC-East] of Afghanistan, where there is literally a civilian counterpart for the regional commander, Major General Scaparrotti, and, in fact, it is Dawn Liberi, a long time she was working for CENTCOM, in fact, phenomenal AID individual, and

then, all the way down at the brigade levels and so forth, as you work your way down.

That is crucial because, again, this is all about unity of effort. That is why we have had these changes in command-and-control arrangements as well. But on the civilian-to-military side, that is critical also.

And a final note on that, Ambassador Holbrooke and I, in fact, are going to chair a review of concept drill, back briefed to us from the respective civilian and military leadership of the U.S. elements in Afghanistan here in the course of the next month or so.

Mr. WILSON. Well, again, thank you so much.

And, General McNabb, I am happy to see you. But I particularly appreciate you brought Major Matt Dack with you. He was a military fellow in our office, and an extraordinary reflection on the competence and capabilities of the U.S. Air Force.

With regard to the tanker bid, do you see an opportunity for the KC-X to run an airlift or cargo capability?

General MCNABB. Sir, absolutely.

I mean, the new tanker is my number one acquisition priority. Whenever the committee asks what they could do, that is—I need those new tankers. And it is for a lot of reasons, but one of them is it is fuel over the fight, but it is multi-modal, multi-purpose capability that will allow us to have additional capability to move packs and cargo, especially with defensive systems going into places that right now we would be denied in the civil reserve air fleet.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from South Carolina.

Admiral Olson, the 1208 program—I know it is supposed to help you engage with partners in different parts of the globe. Can you describe for us the sort of activities you undertake for this program for the committee please?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, Chairman Skelton. In order to describe the specific actions themselves, we would have to go into closed session. But the category of actions that 1208s support are training and equipping surrogates and partners who are liable because of their enhanced capabilities to relieve American service members from having to perform certain operational activities. It is an authority that—that is, for which the United States—the Commander, United States Special Operations Command is the senior recommender in terms of how 1208 funds should be expended.

It is currently a temporary authority. It is currently at \$40.0 million per year, and that is an authority and not an appropriation. What it does is permit the Commander, Special Operations Command, to reprioritize from within his own O&M accounts to fund those activities.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Thank you very much for your testimony, for your fantastic work, and please go back to your commands knowing that you have our gratitude and our support.

[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 17, 2010

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 17, 2010

Opening Statement of Chairman Ike Skelton
Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from
U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and
U.S. Transportation Command
March 17, 2010

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony from the commanders of United States Central Command, United States Special Operations Command, and United States Transportation Command on the posture of their respective commands.

Our witnesses are: General David Petraeus, commander, U.S. Central Command; Admiral Eric Olson, commander, U.S. Special Operations Command; and General Duncan McNabb, commander, U.S. Transportation Command. Welcome, all of you.

Your three commands face a series of inter-related and serious challenges in the immediate future. In Iraq, the United States is set to redeploy almost 50,000 troops and their equipment by the end of August. Originally, we expected this reduction to take place after the formation of a new Iraqi government to allow us to help ensure stability. The Iraqi elections, however, were delayed by months, so now our reduction in force levels will take place while the new government is being formed, a period that could see outbreaks of violence.

This will stress all three commands. General Petraeus, you and General Odierno will have to deal with the potential instability caused by the formation of the new government and the reduction in U.S. force levels. Admiral Olson, your forces in country will be faced with a reduction in support from the general purpose forces. And General McNabb, TRANSCOM, with CENTCOM, will be carrying out one of the largest moves of military personnel and equipment in decades.

To complicate matters further, this reduction in forces in Iraq, which is stressful enough on its own, is coming at the same time we are increasing our force levels in Afghanistan. I have long supported increasing our commitment in our war in Afghanistan. But as you, General McNabb, know better than anyone, shipping thirty thousand troops and their equipment into that country while supporting the 68,000 troops already there, is extremely challenging.

And, the task faced by those troops, which includes a substantial number of Special Operations Forces, is itself daunting. As we discovered in the initial invasion of Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, pushing the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies out was the easy part. Building security forces and governments that can keep them out is much harder. I supported then and continue to support a fully-resourced counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan because I believe it's the only option likely to be successful. But, we should not kid ourselves that it will be easy or inexpensive. And, it will require the three of your commands to continue to cooperate closely.

Looking back, I believe that we made our job in Afghanistan harder because we got involved in Iraq. So the question for the future, General Petraeus, is whether we have learned to do more than one thing at a time. We have a long list of tasks ahead. We need to keep our eye on Afghanistan without losing visibility of the future relationship we would like to build with Iraq. We also need to help Yemen and other countries deal with their Al Qaeda problems, and we must counter Iranian influence and attempts to develop the capability to build nuclear weaponry. Can we succeed in all of this while still keeping our eye on Afghanistan?

Admiral Olson, you also have challenging tasks in the near term. How do you plan to deal with your incredibly high optempo? My understanding is that 86 percent of your deployed force is deployed to the CENTCOM area of operations. While CENTCOM is certainly the current focus of ongoing operations and the fight against Al Qaeda and its allies, we have to ask if this is making us vulnerable in other ways or in other places. Are we missing out on opportunities for our Special Operations Forces to partner with, train and mentor other important countries across the globe because of these high demands within U.S. Central Command?

General McNabb, your largest challenges seem to lie in the immediate future. I hope you can identify those for us today, including what tradeoffs may be required. Will meeting the demands in CENTCOM lessen support for other combatant commands or our ability to respond to other emergencies? I also hope that you will discuss with us the results of the recently completed Mobility Capability Requirements Study and how we will meet the challenges identified in that study. We must be able to sustain the wars of today while still making sure that we are prepared for the threats of tomorrow—whatever they may be.

Opening Statement of Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from
U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and
U.S. Transportation Command

March 17, 2010

Today, we continue our series of posture hearings with the commanders from U.S. CENTCOM, U.S. SOCOM and U.S. TRANSCOM. I would like to welcome General Petraeus, Admiral Olson and General McNabb and thank each of you for your leadership and service to our nation.

Your appearance also reminds us of the extraordinary military men and women who serve around the globe protecting American national interests. Please pass along my sincere gratitude to all of our service members and their families serving under your commands.

Let me begin with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Four months ago, the President reminded us why we are in Afghanistan. It was the epicenter of where Al Qaeda planned and launched the 9/11 attacks against innocent Americans. The President outlined a new strategy and recommitted the United States to defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Based on recommendations from his senior military leadership, including you gentlemen, he authorized the deployment of 30,000 additional U.S. forces. A portion of those forces have arrived and others are preparing to deploy over the coming months.

Like most Republicans, I support the President's decision to surge in Afghanistan. I believe that with additional forces—combined with giving General McChrystal the time, space and resources he needs—we can and will win this conflict. We do not have a choice. We must defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This means taking all necessary steps to ensure Al Qaeda does not have a sanctuary in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Last week we debated the Kucinich Resolution which would have required the withdrawal of all U.S. forces by the end of the year. In a resounding, bipartisan voice, this legislative body voted "no" to the resolution and sent a clear signal to our Afghan partners, allies, and brave military men and women.

General Petraeus, as you have stated publicly, Operation Moshtarak is 'just the initial operations of what will be a twelve- to eighteen-month campaign.' I agree that we have most of the 'inputs' right in terms of the leadership, organization, and strategy for Afghanistan. I am not sure we have the level of resources exactly right yet. I support the additional 30,000 U.S. forces and the civilian surge—but I question if it is enough and if the commanders on the ground have the flexibility to assess and ask for more—whether it be additional combat troops or certain enablers, such as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and force protection capabilities. These enablers were already underresourced prior to the surge. Today, I hope you will address this issue head-on and convince me that our commanders are not capped at 30,000.

I hope you will also share some of your insight in terms of what the American people should expect in the coming months as our forces move from Helmand into Kandahar.

We cannot talk about Afghanistan without looking at the region. In recent weeks, Pakistan has made some significant arrests including that of the number two Taliban commander, Abdul Baradar. This builds upon our Pakistani partners already increased military operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) along the border. Both the government and Pakistani people recognize that they face an ever-growing insurgency fueled by extremists and are beginning to see it as the most pressing existential threat to their country. As you know, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) has been an essential tool to improving the Pakistani military's capacity and capability to conduct such counterinsurgency operations. In fiscal year 2011, the State Department will not only provide the PCF but it will execute the program as well. I remain skeptical that the decision to move the PCF program out of the chain of command of the Defense Department was the correct one. From your perspective, do you foresee any issues with the transfer of PCF to the State Department? What will be the role of the Office of the Defense Representative for Pakistan's (ODRP) in carrying out train and equip programs under State's administration of PCF?

Moving west in the CENTCOM AOR, I want to briefly comment on Iraq. While we continue to await the results of the March 7th national elections, one thing is clear: the new Iraqi government may not form until roughly the same time that the U.S. combat forces exits Iraq. This certainly was not original plan—the seating of the government was to take place prior to substantial drawdown of our forces. Thus, I remain concerned that the security situation in Iraq is fragile and

fear that mixing two drivers of instability—the President’s redeployment timeline and the seating of the new Iraqi government—could pose a risk to our troops and their mission. General Petraeus, I hope you can address my concerns and reaffirm that our commanders have the flexibility they need in order to ensure hard fought gains are not put at risk.

Two other challenges in the CENTCOM AOR that have come into focus of late are Yemen and Iran. While the Christmas day bomber revealed to the American public the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), CENTCOM has been focused on Yemen for quite some time. My formula for Yemen is simple: we should be in the business of helping Yemen secure its territory and fight AQAP and we should not be in the business of asking Yemen to take on more security challenges by taking into their country GTMO detainees. AQAP already has a former GTMO detainee high in its ranks; the U.S. government should not provide the transportation for future AQAP recruits.

Finally, for the CENTCOM AOR, a word on Iran. Tehran continues to pose a serious national security challenge. The shadow of Tehran looms over Iraq, Afghanistan, the Levant, the Gulf and beyond. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps is a terrorist organization that is increasingly capable and effective; it controls their nuclear program and its Quds force is responsible for attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and fueling instability across the Middle East.

While there may be disagreement as to whether Tehran seeks a nuclear weapon, it seems indisputable they are on the cusp of obtaining the capability to build one. This should be a red line. We hear a lot about diplomatic engagement and economic sanctions, yet Tehran’s behavior remains unchanged. It seems to me that Tehran poses a military threat that requires military planning. I’d like our witnesses to comment on how the military is positioning itself to deal with the range of challenges posed by Iran.

Let me say a few words on SOCOM. Admiral Olson, thank you for joining us. SOCOM has been heavily engaged worldwide, but especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Your forces continue to do an outstanding job, and we are grateful for all that you do in keeping the homeland safe.

As we listen to your testimony and discuss how the command is postured to meet these current and future threats, we must recognize that SOCOM’s important role will not diminish in future. SOCOM bears a heavy burden. Your forces are deployed to a multitude of countries—both deterring potential threats through early

engagement and capacity building and, as in Iraq and Afghanistan, meeting the threat head-on by using a sophisticated combination of direct and indirect approaches. You provide the unconventional warriors our country needs in these trying and uncertain times.

The men and women under your command are at the forefront—the cutting edge—of military operations. Because of the central role the men and women under your command play in defeating extremism and protecting our nation and its citizens, we must ensure the command is well prepared and appropriately resourced for the future.

Given the high demand for your forces, operational tempo is a key issue, both for the troops on the battlefield and for the families at home. Additionally, your forces will remain engaged long after conventional forces draw down, making effective training, resourcing and support all the more critical. I am very concerned about how SOCOM, a command that often must rely on critical support and enablers from outside the command, will sustain its operations in an effective manner when the conventional footprint withers.

The men and women of SOCOM give their very best day in and day out. We seek to do our part by ensuring they have the best support, platforms, and resources possible so they can achieve success in the face of the most demanding and complex situations our military faces.

Again, I cannot thank you enough for your service and for the effort that your elite forces give each day. They deserve unwavering support and our utmost thanks for the work they do.

Let me conclude by addressing TRANSCOM. General McNabb, I would just like to take a brief moment to thank you and all the wonderful people assigned to TRANSCOM for the miraculous job you have done responding to the earthquake in Haiti while also supporting the high operational tempo driven by the surge in Afghanistan and the drawdown in Iraq. There is only so much we can plan for in this unpredictable world and your organization has displayed an incredible amount of flexibility and responsiveness. Thank you for all you have done.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS, U.S. ARMY

COMMANDER

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

THE POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

17 MAR 2010

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

I. Introduction

Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, and members of the committee, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) is now in its ninth consecutive year of major combat operations in an area of the world critical to the interests of the United States and our allies. With our national and international partners, CENTCOM promotes security cooperation among nations; responds to crises; deters or defeats state and non-state aggression; and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity. Typically, executing this mission and achieving U.S. national goals and objectives in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) involves more than just the traditional application of military power. In many cases, a whole of government approach is required, one that integrates all the tools available to international and interagency partners to defeat transnational groups that pose a threat to the United States or our partners; to secure host-nation populations; to conduct comprehensive counterinsurgency and security operations; to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); to help reform, and in some cases build, governmental and institutional capacity; and to promote economic development.

These are challenging missions, and the conditions and dynamics shaping the region's security environment are constantly evolving. In the past year, there have been several important developments in the AOR – some representing progress, others presenting challenges. These changes include increased operations by the Pakistani military against

groups that threaten the writ of governance in Pakistan, as well as continued improvements in the capabilities and self-reliance of the Iraqi Security Forces coupled with the degradation of the capabilities of militant groups in Iraq. We have also seen increased insurgent violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a general diminution of al-Qaeda in the region despite an increase in the prominence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen (AQAP), the emergence of significant domestic unrest and opposition in Iran accompanied by the regime's continued intransigence over its nuclear program and its support to militant proxies, an increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, and the continuing fallout from the global financial crisis.

The progress we have seen has not simply happened of its own accord. It is, to a great extent, the result of the work of U.S., partner, and coalition forces operating in the AOR over the past year. Since the delivery of last year's Posture Statement, CENTCOM has worked to implement national policies as well as the recommendations of the comprehensive strategic review we conducted last winter. We have begun the responsible drawdown of forces from Iraq, working to sustain the hard-won security gains achieved since the summer of 2007 and placing us on track to have 50,000 troops in Iraq after this August. We are implementing the President's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to include an increase in forces and non-military resources. Having put into place the proper organizations, people, and concepts for the civil-military campaign in Afghanistan, we are currently deploying additional resources to halt the downward spiral in security and expand the size and capabilities of the Afghan security forces. We have placed great pressure against al-Qaeda's networks and senior leadership, and we have

also made good strides in developing a Regional Security Architecture to address common security threats in the region. All the while, CENTCOM forces have continued to provide military support to major diplomatic initiatives in the region and to maintain a ready posture to respond to unforeseen crises.

Building on our past successes and achievements and responding to the region's dynamics, CENTCOM will focus on the following priority tasks in the coming year:

- Reversing the momentum of the insurgency in Afghanistan and training Afghan security forces to regain the initiative against militants and to increase public confidence in the government;
- Helping our Iraqi partners build on their progress while sustaining hard-won security gains, reducing U.S. forces in the country, and transitioning to a new mission of advising and assisting the Iraqi Security Forces;
- Maintaining persistent kinetic and non-kinetic pressure to degrade and counter transnational terrorist and militant organizations that threaten the security of the United States and our allies;
- Expanding our partnership with the Pakistani military, supporting its operations against militant groups, and assisting in the development of its counterinsurgency capabilities;
- Countering destabilizing Iranian activities and policies;
- Countering the proliferation of WMD and related material, technology, and expertise, while building the capacity and interoperability of our partners to prevent and, if necessary, respond to the use of WMD;

- Bolstering the military and security capabilities of our partner nations' security forces;
- Working with our partners to counter piracy, illegal narcotics trafficking, and arms smuggling;
- Bolstering oversight and ensuring responsible expenditure of U.S. funding; and
- Working with the U.S. military services to reduce the strain on our forces and the cost of our operations.

The intent of the remainder of this Posture Statement is to address these priorities and the broader, long term solutions they support by providing a more detailed overview of the AOR, a description of our strategic approach to defending and advancing our interests, assessments of the situation in each of the AOR's major sub-regions, and comments on the programs and systems that enable our operations.

II. Overview of the CENTCOM AOR

A. Nature of the AOR

The lands and waters of the CENTCOM AOR span several critical and distinct regions. It stretches across more than 4.6 million square miles and 20 countries in the Middle East and South and Central Asia and contains vital transportation and trade routes, including the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf, as well as

strategic maritime choke points at the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. The AOR encompasses the world's most energy-rich region, with the Arabian Gulf region and Central Asia together accounting for at least 64 percent of the world's known petroleum reserves, 34 percent of its crude oil production, and 46 percent of its known natural gas reserves.

Social, political, and economic conditions vary greatly throughout the region. The region is home to some of the world's wealthiest and poorest states, with annual per capita incomes ranging from \$800 to over \$100,000. Despite important pockets of affluence, many of the more than 530 million people living in the AOR suffer from inadequate governance, underdeveloped civil institutions, unsettling corruption, and high unemployment.

As a result of these contrasts and the proliferation of global communications and mass media, many people in the AOR are struggling to balance modern influences with traditional social and cultural authorities and to manage change at a pace that reinforces stability rather than erodes it. For the past century, the sub-regions of the AOR have been torn by conflict as new states and old societies have struggled to erect a new order in the wake of the collapse of traditional empires. These conflicts have intensified in the past three decades with the emergence of al-Qaeda and its Associated Movements, the specter of nuclear weapons, and enormous wealth derived from petroleum and illegal narcotics. Today we see stability in the AOR threatened by interstate tensions, the proliferation of

ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technology and expertise, ethno-sectarian violence, insurgencies and sub-state militias, as well as horrific acts of terrorism.

B. U.S. Interests and the Most Significant Threats to Them

Because of the CENTCOM AOR's geography, control of much of the world's energy reserves, and propensity for instability, the United States has substantial strategic interests in, and related to, the region. Chief among these are:

- the security of U.S. citizens and the U.S. homeland;
- regional stability;
- international access to strategic resources, critical infrastructure, and markets; and
- the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, responsible and effective governance, and broad-based economic growth and opportunity.

The most serious threats to these interests lie at the nexus of militant groups, hostile states, and WMD. Across the AOR, al-Qaeda and its Associated Movements are fueling insurgencies to reduce U.S. influence and to destabilize the existing political, social, and economic order. Meanwhile, some countries in the AOR play a dangerous game of allowing or accepting terrorist networks and facilitators to operate from or through their territory, believing that their own people and governments will be immune to their threat. Efforts to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems magnify the potential dangers of the marriage between some states and their militant proxies. Indeed, the acquisition of nuclear arms by hostile states or terrorist organizations would constitute a

grave threat to the United States, our allies, and the countries of the region and would likely spark a destabilizing arms race.

In the near term, the greatest potential for such a threat to arise is found in the instability in South Asia, the activities and policies of the Iranian regime, the situation in Iraq, and the growth of AQAP in Yemen.

- **Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.** The insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan constitute the most urgent problem set in the CENTCOM AOR. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the syndicate of militant groups operating in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan are engaging in an increasingly violent campaign against the people and governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both states face a serious threat from these groups, and though some of these organizations perpetrate acts of terrorism against local targets and others operate internationally, these groups have increasingly cooperative, even symbiotic, relationships. As a result, the control by any of these groups of major population centers or significant economic or financial resources would present an enormous challenge to security in the region and across the globe.
- **Iran's Destabilizing Activities and Policies.** The activities and policies of the Iranian regime constitute the major state-level threats to regional stability. Despite repeated International Atomic Energy Agency findings of Iranian violations of non-proliferation obligations, five United Nations Security Council

Resolutions, and extensive diplomatic efforts through the P5+1, the Iranian regime is assessed by many to be continuing its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, which would destabilize the region and likely spur a regional arms race. The Iranian regime employs surrogates and violent proxies to weaken competitor states, obstruct the Middle East Peace Process, and expand its regional influence. In particular, Iran uses proxy groups to train and equip militants in direct conflict with U.S. forces operating in the region, to frustrate efforts to stabilize Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza, and to interfere with the domestic politics in each. In the past, Syria has facilitated the Iranian regime's reach into the Levant and the Arab world by serving as the key link in an Iran-Syria-Hizballah-Hamas alliance. The Iranian regime's domestic activities are also troubling, as its recent violent suppression of opposition groups and popular protests has violated the human rights of the Iranian people and fomented further instability and unrest and increased the role of the security forces in the affairs of the state.

- **Situation in Iraq.** Security in Iraq has improved significantly since the peak of the sectarian violence in mid-2007, but the gains there remain fragile and reversible, though increasingly less so. In Iraq, a number of factors continue to pose serious risks to U.S. interests and have the potential to undermine regional stability, disrupt international access to strategic resources, and frustrate efforts to deny terrorist safe havens and support bases. Internally, fundamental issues such as the distribution of political power and resources remain to be settled. The Iraqi state is still developing, and numerous challenges confront its leaders and people,

including lingering ethnic and sectarian mistrust, tensions between political parties, strained governmental capacity to provide basic services, and the continued displacement of hundreds of thousands of individuals. Externally, Iraq's position with its neighbors is still in flux, with some playing a negative role in Iraq. All these issues will remain in play, in particular, during the ongoing formation of the new government following the Parliamentary elections earlier this month.

- **Instability in Yemen.** The inability of the Yemeni government to effectively secure and exercise control over all its territory offers AQAP a safe haven in which to plan, organize, and support terrorist operations. This network poses a direct threat to the U.S. homeland, as evidenced by recent plots, including the attempted bombing of a U.S. airliner on Christmas Day 2009. At the same time, the Yemeni state faces challenges from separatist movements in the South and a six-year conflict with Houthi rebels, which despite the cease-fire in February could reignite and again spill over into Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the influx of refugees from Africa, pervasive arms smuggling, a deteriorating economic situation, and piracy continue to challenge the capabilities of the Yemeni government.

C. Cross-cutting Challenges to Security and Stability

While this statement will describe in greater detail the dynamics and challenges in the sub-regions of the AOR, there are a number of cross-cutting issues that serve as major drivers of instability, inter-state tensions, and conflict. These factors can serve as root causes of instability or as obstacles to security.

- **Insufficient progress toward a comprehensive Middle East peace.** The enduring hostilities between Israel and some of its neighbors present distinct challenges to our ability to advance our interests in the AOR. Israeli-Palestinian tensions often flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations. The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism for Israel. Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits the strength and depth of U.S. partnerships with governments and peoples in the AOR and weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the Arab world. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda and other militant groups exploit that anger to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran influence in the Arab world through its clients, Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas.
- **Militant Islamist movements.** The CENTCOM AOR is home to militant Islamist movements that threaten states in the region, exploit local conflicts, and foster instability through acts of terrorism. The most significant of these is al-Qaeda, which, along with its Associated Movements, seeks to impose its

intolerant ideology on the people through indiscriminant violence and intimidation. Although cooperative counterterrorist activities in many different countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Pakistan, over the past few years have eroded the network's support and safe haven and degraded the network's capabilities in many ways, al-Qaeda continues to plan and conduct operations and recruit new fighters. It remains a serious and formidable threat.

- **Proliferation of WMD.** The AOR contains states and terrorist organizations that actively seek WMD capabilities and have previously proliferated WMD related material, technology, and expertise outside established international monitoring regimes. In addition, regional states are increasingly interested in the development of nuclear programs, which, if not properly managed, could lead to the proliferation of illicit nuclear material or a regional arms race.
- **Ungoverned, poorly governed, and alternatively governed spaces.** Weak civil and security institutions and the inability of certain governments in the region to exert full control over their territories are conditions that insurgent groups can exploit to create physical safe havens in which they can plan, train for, and launch operations or pursue narco-criminal activities. We have seen these groups develop, or attempt to develop, what might be termed sub-states, particularly in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories.

- **Significant sources of terrorist financing and facilitation.** The AOR remains a primary source of illicit funding and facilitation for global terrorist organizations and other militant groups. All this financing is transmitted through a variety of formal and informal networks, which include financial operatives and front companies throughout the region.
- **Piracy.** The lack of governance in Somalia has allowed piracy to grow off the coast and in the Horn of Africa threatening the flow of commerce through the region. Since the spike in piracy in 2008, we have worked in close cooperation with the international community to counter this trend by focusing on increasing international presence, encouraging the shipping industry to adopt best practices to defend against piracy, and establishing a sound international legal framework for resolving piracy cases. Despite some reduction in the number of successful pirate attacks in the region, piracy remains lucrative – increasingly so, as the ransom rates have nearly doubled over the previous year’s – and pirates continue to modify their area of operations and techniques to avoid coalition presence.
- **Ethnic, tribal, and sectarian rivalries.** Within certain countries, the politicization of ethnicity, tribal affiliation, and religious sect serves to disrupt the development of national civil institutions and social cohesion, at times to the point of violence. Between countries in the region, such rivalries can heighten political tension and serve as catalysts for conflict and insurgency.

- **Disputed territories and access to vital resources.** Unresolved issues of disputed territorial boundaries and disagreements over the sharing of vital resources, such as water, oil, and natural gas, serve as sources of tension and conflict between and within states in the region.
- **Criminal activities, such as weapons, narcotics, and human trafficking.** Weapons smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and associated criminal activities undermine security, spur corruption, and inhibit legitimate economic activity and good governance throughout the AOR. In particular, state-sponsored weapons trafficking in support of groups like Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad undermines regional security and the Middle East Peace Process.
- **Uneven economic development and lack of employment opportunities.** Despite substantial economic growth rates throughout much of the region over the past few years, significant segments of the population in the region remain economically disenfranchised, under-educated, and without sufficient opportunity. In addition many countries in the region face growing “youth bulges” that will strain their economies’ abilities to produce sufficient employment opportunities. The recent global economic downturn has heightened these problems. Without sustained, broad-based economic development, increased employment opportunities are unlikely given the growing proportions of young people relative to overall populations.

- **Lack of regional and global economic integration.** The AOR is characterized by low levels of trade and commerce among countries, which diminish prospects for long term economic growth, as well as opportunities to deepen interdependence through increased political, commercial, social, and cultural ties.

III. Regional Strategy

To help defend and advance our national interests, CENTCOM executes a strategy that promotes security and stability in our AOR. In cooperation with our partners and in concert with national policy, we work to deter aggression as well as eliminate the conditions that foment conflict. Given the complexities of the AOR and its many security challenges, we have adopted a strategy that consists of active engagement in the region as well as prudent preparation for contingencies. The following sections describe the highlights of this strategy by outlining the strategic vision we seek to achieve and the guiding principles and major activities that characterize our approach.

A. Strategic Vision.

The conditions needed for security, stability, and prosperity in the region constitute the strategic vision we are working toward and the ultimate goals of our activities. They reflect our desire to strengthen the international system, while promoting effective and

responsible governance and broad-based economic development throughout the region.

Specifically, we seek a region

- that is at peace with itself and its neighbors;
- that is focused on common security and cooperation;
- with stable governments that are responsive to the needs of their people;
- with patterns of economic development that advance people's well-being;
- where nuclear proliferation is not a threat and where nuclear energy use is verifiable and for peaceful purposes;
- with unhindered international access to strategic resources, critical infrastructure, and markets; and
- from which, and within which, groups such as al-Qaeda do not threaten the United States or our allies.

Working towards these objectives, in concert with the Department of State, is the most feasible and acceptable strategy for addressing the threats to our interests. To be sure, these objectives are broad and far-reaching, but they are nonetheless attainable.

B. Strategic Approach.

Achieving this vision and establishing these conditions necessarily requires changing – in some respects significantly changing – the security environment in the region, and as a result, our activities must be guided by the principle that our security solutions be comprehensive, cooperative, and enduring. This guidance recognizes that we must

simultaneously address security, political, and economic challenges in the region; that we cannot do this through military means alone or without the cooperation of our partners in the region and the broader international community; and that these changes must be long-lasting and, eventually, self-sustaining.

- **Comprehensive Solutions.** Because instability and insecurity in the AOR stem from a complex mix of security, political, and economic challenges, we must pursue comprehensive solutions to problems in the region. This requires us to apply whole of government approaches that fully integrate our military and non-military efforts and those of our partners. For example, to address the threat posed by insurgent groups we are dismantling their networks and leadership, often through the use of security forces, while also working to eliminate their sources of support by protecting populations from these groups, disrupting their financial networks and sources of financing, delegitimizing their methods and ideologies, and addressing legitimate grievances to win over reconcilable elements of the population. We constantly strive to understand the complexities of these challenges and tailor our approaches to the unique circumstances on the ground.
- **Cooperative Solutions.** Because the challenges in the region are often transnational ones and because no nation can protect itself from these threats without cooperation from others, we must pursue cooperative, multilateral solutions. We seek collective action and an atmosphere of broad inclusivity and partnership to attract the needed pool of resources and to leverage each country's

comparative advantages, from expertise and facilities to information and even geography. To achieve this cooperation, we focus on interests we share with other nations, work to build effective partnerships for pursuing those interests, and actively engage with the people, leaders, and security forces in the AOR. We pursue security initiatives that may start out as a series of bilateral partnerships, but we work to integrate them to achieve multilateral effects and to expand them to form future, genuinely multilateral arrangements. Moreover, we are helping our partner nations bolster their own capabilities.

- **Enduring Solutions.** Finally, because we want lasting conditions of security and prosperity, we must seek long term, enduring solutions to the challenges in the region. To this end, we work to address the root causes of instability rather than apply quick fixes to their symptoms. Also, to achieve the cooperation described above, we pursue strategic partnerships with the nations of the region rather than short term transactional relationships. Lastly, we strive to increase integration and interdependence in the region in many different areas – diplomatic, commercial, social, and cultural – under the belief that increased interaction is a positive-sum game that benefits all parties and reduces the incentives for conflict. All of our efforts require sustained commitments of our attention, energy, and, in some cases, resources.

Adhering to these principles in our strategic approach and in the execution of our operations places a premium on unity of effort at all levels and with all participants. At

the combatant command level, this means working with our interagency and international partners to develop joint action or campaign plans that establish appropriate missions and objectives for our subordinate elements, from major commands such as U.S. Forces–Iraq and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to our country-based offices of military cooperation. To effectively carry out these plans, we work carefully to coordinate our military elements with the corresponding State Department envoy or ambassador as well as our international and host nation partners.

C. Major Activities

In addition to our ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, our forces are engaged in numerous, wide-ranging endeavors designed to establish the conditions described above for security, stability, and prosperity in the region. Chief among these major activities are our efforts designed to do the following:

- Defeat al-Qaeda and its Associated Movements
- Deny sanctuaries and disrupt support for insurgent groups
- Counter proliferation of WMD and associated technology
- Deter and counter state-based aggression and proxy activities
- Support the peaceful resolution of long-standing interstate conflicts
- Build bilateral and multilateral security partnerships
- Develop partner nation security capacity
- Help nations protect their critical infrastructure and support infrastructure development

- Bolster at-risk states
- Respond to humanitarian crises, when called upon by our Ambassadors
- Counter arms smuggling
- Protect freedom of navigation

IV. Critical Sub-regions of the CENTCOM AOR

The complexity and uniqueness of local conditions in the CENTCOM AOR defy attempts to formulate an aggregated estimate of the situation that can address, with complete satisfaction, all of the pertinent issues. Thus, the best way to approach the challenges in the AOR is through a disaggregation of the problem set into six sub-regions, described as follows:

- Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (though India does not lie within the boundaries of the CENTCOM AOR)
- Iran
- Iraq
- The Arabian Peninsula, comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen
- Egypt and the Levant, comprised of Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan (as well as Israel and the Palestinian territories, which do not lie within the CENTCOM AOR)

- Central Asia, comprised of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan

A. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India

Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan poses the most urgent problem set in the CENTCOM AOR and requires complementary and integrated civil-military, whole of government approaches. The two countries are linked by tribal affiliations and a porous border that permits terrorists, insurgents, and criminals to move relatively freely to and from their safe havens. Indeed, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other insurgent groups operating from the border region are engaged in an increasingly violent campaign against Afghan and coalition Forces and the developing Afghan state. However, while it is important to note that the problem sets are related, the United States must forge a unique partnership with each country.

Afghanistan

The past year was marked by a shift in strategic focus in Afghanistan. Over the course of the conflict, the Afghan insurgency had expanded its strength and influence – particularly in the South and East – and 2009 levels of violence were significantly higher than those of 2008. The Taliban have been resilient, with their activities fueled by revenues from outside the region as well as from narcotics-trafficking, the freedom of movement they enjoy in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, ineffective

governance and services in parts of the country, as well as by contributions from other militant groups outside Afghanistan and Pakistan. To reverse this momentum and the downward spiral in security, we have embarked on a new 12-to-18-month civil-military campaign plan, and coalition forces and their Afghan partners are fighting to retake the initiative from the insurgency. The main goals of our strategy, announced by President Obama last December, include the following:

- reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military action,
- denying the Taliban access to and control of key population and production centers and lines of communication,
- disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and preventing al-Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan,
- degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF),
- increasing the size and capability of the ANSF and employing other local forces selectively to begin a conditions-based transition of security responsibility to the Afghan government by July 2011, and
- supporting U.S. government efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan government, particularly in key ministries.

To implement this strategy, we and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners have spent a great deal of effort putting into place the right organizations and command and control structures needed to carry out a comprehensive civil-military campaign. This includes the capabilities for targeting of insurgents' resources and

finances, detention operations, ministerial capacity building, border coordination, strategic communications, and the conduct of reconciliation efforts. This began by ensuring the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander was dual-hatted as both a NATO Commander and the commander of U.S. forces, which helped to reduce many of the organizational firewalls between ISAF and Operation Enduring Force elements. We created the ISAF Intermediate Joint Command (IJC), a three-star headquarters to oversee operational execution of the counterinsurgency campaign. We established a Joint Task Force to address detainee operations and help develop rule of law capacity within the Afghan government, from policing and incarceration to trials and convictions. We developed a Force Reintegration Cell within the ISAF headquarters to support the reintegration and reconciliation process at the national level. We established an interagency threat finance cell, an intelligence fusion cell, and a full-fledged Joint Information Operations Task Force to conduct strategic communications. We formed the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan and made several other command and control adjustments, such as the integration of mentoring teams under the IJC and its battle space commanders and the restructuring of Army brigades, to improve our ability to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. Lastly, we formed the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell on the Joint Staff and inaugurated the Afghanistan-Pakistan Intelligence Center of Excellence at CENTCOM to better organize our resources here at home. All of these organizations tie together and support the numerous activities taking place at the unit level across the country as our operations move forward over time, and to run them we have hand-selected some of nation's best civilian and military leaders, all of whom have been involved with counterinsurgency operations for quite some time.

Just as critical, we have strengthened our counterinsurgency approach and established a wide-spread understanding of the critical concepts guiding and governing our operations. First and foremost in this approach is a commitment to protecting and serving the people. This focus is captured in Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and General Stanley McChrystal's Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan, which directs our military and civilian components to take a residential approach and, in a culturally acceptable way, live among the people, understand their neighborhoods, and invest in relationships. General McChrystal has also published counterinsurgency guidance, has pushed to achieve greater unity of effort, has aggressively pursued the mission of partnering with the Afghan security forces, and has issued appropriate guidance on detention, reintegration, joint night raids, and tactical driving. All of these concepts are designed to secure the Afghan people, to reduce civilian casualties, and to build their trust in ISAF forces and the national government.

Critical to the organizations, leaders, and strategies we have put in place in Afghanistan are the resources needed to support them, in this case, 30,000 additional U.S. forces, additional civilians experts, and appropriate funding, each of which was announced by the President in December at West Point. Just as important are the additional commitments from other NATO and coalition partners totaling more than 9,000 troops. These resources are starting to flow into the country, and they will allow us to better expand the security presence in population centers and along major lines of

communication, to better hold areas cleared of insurgent groups, and to build a new level of Afghan governmental control.

As a part of this approach, we will also invigorate efforts to develop the capabilities of the ANSF, including the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Uniform Police, the Afghan Gendarmerie Force, the Afghan Border Police, specialized counternarcotics units, and other security forces. We recognize the fact that international forces must eventually transfer security responsibility to Afghan security forces. In January 2009, the ANSF numbered 156,000; today, there are over 206,000 assigned, but significant work remains in improving the quality of the Afghan force through enhanced partnering, training, and recruiting. General McChrystal has placed a premium on comprehensive partnering with the ANSF, an emphasis that is being demonstrated in the ongoing Operation Moshtarak, in which ISAF and ANSF operate at close to a one-to-one ratio. Of equal importance, ISAF and ANSF leaders worked together in partnership to plan all aspects of the operation, a signal of ANSF development that goes beyond the number of ANSF boots on the ground. A properly sized, trained, and equipped ANSF is a prerequisite for any eventual drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan, and through our support and the assistance of the Afghan Security Forces Fund, the ANSF will continue to expand so that they will be more able to meet their country's security needs.

In addition, we, along with our civilian colleagues, will bolster the capabilities and the legitimacy of the other elements of the Afghan government – an effort in which, in much of Afghanistan, we will be building, not rebuilding. We will do this through our

support to local government at the provincial and district levels, utilizing the new structure of civilian representatives at each level of our deployed military. These, along with the efforts of Provincial Reconstruction Teams and national level civil-military and ministerial capacity building teams are empowering Afghans to solve Afghan problems and promoting local reintegration where possible. Most recently, we are supporting governance and development efforts as part of ongoing operations in Helmand Province.

Another major component of our strategy is to disrupt narcotics trafficking, which provides significant funding to the Taliban insurgency. This drug money has been the “oxygen” in the air that allows these groups to operate. With the extension of authority granted to U.S. forces to conduct counter-narcotics operations, we are able to more closely work with the Afghan government to disrupt the illicit narcotics industry through interdiction of the narco-trafficking network. To complement this effort, we support and promote viable agricultural and economic alternatives and the requisite infrastructure to help Afghans bring licit products to market for sale and distribution.

Executing this strategy requires clear unity of effort at all levels and with all participants. Our senior commanders (and I) have worked with Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan; Ambassador Eikenberry, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan; Stefan di Mistura, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan; Ambassador Mark Sedwill, NATO’s new Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan; and the Afghan leadership to improve and synchronize the whole of government approach. Our security

efforts have been integrated into the broader plan to promote political and economic development. We have urged partner nations to continue the invaluable support they are providing and to seek additional support as required for mission accomplishment.

The changes in approach launched in 2009 and 2010 (e.g., greater military and civilian resources, enhanced unity of effort and partnering) can help turn the tide over time, but we must manage expectations as we continue the buildup in our forces. Progress will be incremental and difficult. In 2010, the Taliban and other insurgent groups will attempt to build on their previous momentum and create further instability in the Afghan provinces, particularly in the South and East. We will endeavor not only to prevent that but to wrest the initiative from the Taliban.

Pakistan

The possibility of significant instability in Pakistan poses a serious threat to regional and global security, in large part, because Pakistan remains a critical strategic foothold for al-Qaeda and is important to the organization's efforts to rally supporters worldwide. Although al-Qaeda senior leaders are under considerably more pressure in Pakistan than in previous years, the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) still serves as al-Qaeda's principal sanctuary. More important, these leaders continue to plan and inspire regional and transnational operations from the FATA, while maintaining the ability to function as a structured organization, and foreign fighters continue to travel to Pakistan for training and to join al-Qaeda. Additionally, Pakistan continues to face a serious

insurgency fueled by militants operating from the country's tribal areas with casualties from violent incidents in Pakistan, particularly bombings and suicide attacks having increased dramatically over the past year.

However, the people and leaders of Pakistan have increasingly grown to see these groups as serious threats, and the Pakistani security forces have stepped up operations against insurgents, showing impressive determination and skill. They have conducted operations in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the FATA on an unprecedented scale, successfully re-taking territory from the insurgent groups. Pakistan has sustained very tough losses in this effort, and it is clear that the country's leaders are keenly aware of the severity of the threat posed by these groups to the people and government.

We are working to forge a stronger partnership with Pakistan and to support its efforts in two ways. First, we aim to strengthen the military's capacity to target insurgent groups through the development of Pakistan's counterinsurgency capabilities. Second, we support Pakistan's governmental and economic development. Our efforts have helped as the Pakistani military has made progress in its counterinsurgency operations. The Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps have cleared many areas of militant groups. However, the hold and build phases of these operations and the subsequent transition to civil authority challenge the army and Pakistan's civil institutions. In fact, these institutions will be pressed by militant efforts to reassert control over the territory gained in 2009, risking a reversal of the past year's gains. The passage of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill,

the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, the \$11.3 billion International Monetary Fund grant, and other key initiatives temporarily pulled Pakistan back from the brink of an impending economic collapse a year ago and helped increase Pakistan's capacity for counterinsurgency operations. Continued support for these initiatives is critical to enabling the Pakistan to continue its fight and to expand the writ of governance.

Finally, we are working to reduce regional tensions to enable adequate focus on the existential threat of militant Islamist movements in Pakistan. Though Indo-Pakistani tensions have eased since 2008, they could easily reignite in 2010, particularly in the event of another significant terrorist attack in India. A major escalation in these tensions would almost certainly result in the immediate redeployment to the east of Pakistani forces currently deployed to confront militants in the West, risking forfeiture of gains in FATA and the NWFP. This suggests a need for India and Pakistan to continue discussions begun on February 25th in order to reduce the strategic tension and the risk of miscalculation between these nuclear states.

B. Iran

The Iranian regime is the primary state-level threat to stability in the region. Throughout much of the region, the regime pursues a dual-track foreign policy. Overtly, the Iranian government cooperates with regional states through bilateral arrangements to promote Iran as an economic, political, and military power. In parallel, the regime entrusts the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force to execute covert

aspects of its foreign policy using political influence, covert businesses, lethal and non-lethal aid, and training to militants supportive of the regime's agenda. The Qods Force is active throughout the region, and, in fact, controls Iranian foreign policy in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza and influences heavily in Afghanistan and the Gulf Region. Through Qods Force soft power initiatives and destabilizing activities, such as coercion and direct attacks, Iran is subverting democratic processes and intimidating the nascent governments of our partners. The regime continues to intervene in the Israeli-Palestinian situation through its support to Hamas and Lebanese Hizballah, and it remains in violation of six United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding its nuclear program and arms transfers.

Iran's nuclear program is a serious, destabilizing factor in the region and is widely believed to be a part of the regime's broader effort to expand its influence. Although the regime has stated the purpose of its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful, civilian use, Iranian officials have consistently failed to provide the assurances and transparency necessary for full international confidence. This includes failure to provide verification as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a signatory, and failure to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Additional Protocol, which would allow for more comprehensive inspections. The regime's obstinacy and obfuscation have forced Iran's neighbors and the international community to conclude the worst about the regime's intentions, as confirmed by the recent IAEA Board of Governors' near unanimous censure of Iran's recent disclosure of a secret nuclear facility near Qom. It appears that, at a minimum, Tehran is keeping open the

option to develop nuclear weapons. Iran continues to develop and improve its uranium enrichment infrastructure and is likely to use its gas centrifuges to produce fissile material for a weapon, should it make the political decision to do so. This pattern of conduct coupled with its rejection of international responsibilities is troubling, especially when viewed in the context that other regional states have recently announced their intentions to develop nuclear power programs. This behavior poses a clear challenge to international non-proliferation goals due to the possibility of such technologies being transferred to terrorist groups and the potential for a regional arms race, as other regional states may seek nuclear parity.

Domestically, the regime is taking dramatic steps to maintain power in reaction to the persistent civil unrest sparked by the apparent election manipulation leading to President Ahmadinejad's re-election in June 2009. The aftermath of the presidential election created a political rift among regime elites and further hardened certain leaders' views toward the U.S. and the West over alleged involvement in supporting a "soft revolution" in Iran. Tehran has deployed significant numbers of security forces, mainly comprised of Basij militia, to crack down on street protests and conduct mass arrests of protestors. The regime has also taken sweeping steps to control the information environment by slowing or shutting down the internet, telephone networks, and other forms of social media used by protestors to organize, execute, and publicize their efforts. The opposition movement, led by former regime insiders, poses the most serious political challenge to the regime since the advent of the Islamic Republic.

The Iranian regime has also attempted to thwart U.S. and international efforts to bring stability to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader region. In Afghanistan, the Iranian regime appears to have hedged its longstanding public support for the Karzai government by providing opportunistic support to the Taliban. In Iraq, however, the Iranian regime has embarked on a broad campaign led by the IRGC-Qods Force to influence Iraqi politics and support, through various means, parties loyal to Iran. The Qods Force also maintains its lethal support to Shia Iraqi militia groups, providing them with weapons, funding, and training. Additionally, al-Qaeda continues to use Iran as a key facilitation hub, where facilitators connect al-Qaeda's senior leadership to regional affiliates. And although Iranian authorities do periodically disrupt this network by detaining select al-Qaeda facilitators and operational planners, Tehran's policy in this regard is often unpredictable.

Pursuing our longstanding regional goals and improving key relationships within and outside the AOR help to limit the negative impact of Iran's policies. A credible U.S. effort on Arab-Israeli issues that provides regional governments and populations a way to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the disputes would undercut Iran's policy of militant "resistance," which the Iranian regime and insurgent groups have been free to exploit. Additionally, progress on the Israel-Syria peace track could disrupt Iran's lines of support to Hamas and Hizballah. Moreover, our development of a cooperative Regional Security Architecture, which includes a regional network of air and missile defense systems as well as hardening and protecting our partners' critical infrastructure, can help dissuade aggressive Iranian behavior. In all of these initiatives, our military

activities will continue to support our diplomatic efforts, and we will remain vigilant across a wide range of contingencies.

C. Iraq

Iraq made steady progress throughout 2009, a year that brought significant change in the security situation and in Iraqi politics. A broad backlash against the Islamist parties that have dominated the Iraqi government since 2005, along with the Iraqi people's increasing preference for emerging secular, nationalist parties and leaders, yielded a stunning result in January 2009's largely violence-free provincial elections and a peaceful transfer of power in every province that held an election. Various internal dynamics, however, have exacerbated the Arab-Kurd dispute over Kirkuk and other territories, and this issue now looms as the greatest potential Iraqi flashpoint.

The security situation in Iraq remained stable during the implementation of the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement, the handover of lead responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces, and the drawdown of U.S. forces from some 130,000 in March 2009 to 96,000 today. The level of violence generally remained at record lows following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities in June, demonstrating the Iraqi Security Forces' growing capability to handle security responsibilities independently. November witnessed the lowest number of civilian deaths since spring 2003, and December was the first month since the March 2003 invasion in which no U.S. forces died in combat in Iraq. A number of high-profile attacks in the second half of 2009 showed, nonetheless, that the Iraqis still

have much work to do in developing counterterrorism capabilities. While al-Qaeda in Iraq's (AQI) attempt to discredit and destabilize the government through massive bombings did not succeed, it did demonstrate AQI's resilience. At the same time, the Arab-Kurd dispute has lent new life to Ba'athist-related insurgent groups in northern Iraq, which have attempted to ignite a conflict along the Green Line. As we continue to draw down our forces in a responsible manner and comply with our commitments under the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, key to further improving the security situation and mitigating remaining risks will be continuing to help the Iraqi Security Forces and developing their capabilities through our advisory and security assistance programs and the Iraq Security Forces Fund.

This year will bring far-reaching developments in Iraqi politics and the U.S.-Iraq relationship. Just this month, Iraqis took to the polls and expressed their political will in parliamentary elections made possible by the security provided by the ISF. The significance of the elections was clearly evidenced by the strong voter turnout across the country and the political maneuvering – including the campaign by some Shi'a Islamists officials to ban a number of former Ba'athists and secularists from running – leading up to election day. The formation of the new national government following the election will shape the resolution of outstanding fundamental issues about the nature of the Iraqi state, including the Arab-Kurd question and the balance between central and provincial authority. As such, we expect Iraq's internal political landscape to continue to face evolutionary challenges. We will continue to work with the new Iraqi government to implement the Strategic Framework Agreement and strengthen our bilateral relationship.

D. The Arabian Peninsula

The Arabian Peninsula commands significant U.S. attention and focus because of its importance to our interests and its potential for insecurity. These Arab states on the Peninsula are the nations of the AOR most politically and commercially connected to the United States and Europe. They are more developed economically than any of their neighbors, collectively wield substantial defense forces, and are major providers of the world's energy resources. However, the Peninsula has, in the past, been a significant source of funding and manpower for terrorist groups and foreign fighters. Where governments face internal challenges, the situation is often aggravated and intensified by external factors, such as the Iranian regime's destabilizing behavior, instability in the Palestinian territories and southern Lebanon, political and security troubles in Iraq, and weapons proliferation.

Over the past few years, we have worked with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, as well as other partners in the region, to develop a Regional Security Architecture to address common security challenges. This architecture is made up of an array of major components including a Shared Early Warning system; an increasingly integrated air and missile defense network; and an extensive array of ground, maritime, aviation, and special operations exercises each designed to respond to different types of threats. All of these cooperative efforts are facilitated by the critical base, port, and training facilities provided by Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and others throughout the AOR.

This emerging but, nonetheless, significantly developed collection of partnerships improves our interoperability and our overall effectiveness in ongoing multi-lateral operations and security initiatives. The mechanisms and capabilities put in place to coordinate efforts in one area, such as piracy, smuggling, and littoral security, can often be employed to respond rapidly to crises in other areas. Moreover, progress made in generating cooperation on one set of issues can serve as an opening for engagement on other issues, thereby promoting greater interdependence in the region. Contributions of funding and forces by regional partners to our operations in Afghanistan evidence some of these positive spillover effects. Now that our Gulf partners have begun working closely to address common threats, the logical next step is to expand the model and encourage the integration of Iraq with our Gulf partners. Such a step would benefit the entire region.

Yemen stands out from its neighbors because of its underdeveloped governmental institutions and weak economy and because of its numerous security challenges, which include the Southern secessionist movement, the Houthi tribal rebellion, and the presence of AQAP. Yemen's strategic location facilitates AQAP's freedom of movement and allows it to threaten not only Yemen's neighbors but also the United States and Europe. In recent months we have seen several terrorist attacks attempted within and emanating from Yemen, the spillover of the Houthi rebellion into Saudi Arabia, the resurgence of Yemen's Southern secessionists, and the negative influence of al-Shabaab in Somalia. In view of these developments, we are working toward expanded, sustained, and predictable

efforts to help build Yemen's security, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorist capabilities, and we seek to nearly double U.S. security assistance to the country in the coming year.

E. Egypt and the Levant

The Levant and Egypt sub-region is the traditional political, social, and intellectual heart of the Arab world and is vital to security and stability in the CENTCOM AOR. Because of its history as a primary battleground between rival ideologies, the dynamics of this sub-region, particularly with regard to Israel, influence the internal and external politics of states outside the region as well. In addition, U.S. policy and actions in the Levant affect the strength of our relationships with partners in the AOR. As such, progress toward resolving the political disputes in the Levant, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict, is a major concern for CENTCOM. Through a significant expansion of our engagement program, capacity building efforts, training exercises, deployment of Navy vessels to the Red Sea, and information sharing, we are working with our partners in Egypt and the Levant to build the capabilities of legitimate security forces, defeat transnational and sub-state militant groups, combat the spread of WMD and related materials, and disrupt illegal arms smuggling. In addition, we will work to develop the mechanisms of security and confidence building to support efforts to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace.

Egypt remains a leading Arab state, a staunch U.S. ally, and a key actor in the Middle East Peace Process. In recent years, however, the Egyptian government has had to deal with serious economic challenges and an internal militant Islamist threat; as such, U.S. foreign aid has been a critical reinforcement to the Egyptian government. At the same time, concern over the possibility of the spillover of instability in Gaza has led Egypt to play a pivotal role in international efforts to address the situation there, to improve border security, and to interdict illicit arms shipments to Palestinian militants. In partnership with U.S. Africa Command, we are working with Egypt to combat militancy and smuggling across the Red Sea, Horn of Africa, Nile basin, and northern Africa.

Jordan continues to be a key partner in the region. The Kingdom's forces participate in many regional security initiatives and are at the forefront of police and military training for regional security forces. In addition to its regular participation in multilateral training exercises, Jordan promotes regional cooperation and builds our partner nations' security capacity through its recently opened King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center, Peace Operations Training Center, International Police Training Center, and Cooperative Management Center. We support these efforts, as they are critical to the continued development of legitimate security forces throughout the region, especially in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories and, as a consequence, will be important to the long term viability of the Middle East Peace Process.

In Lebanon, Hizballah's rearmament following its conflict with Israel in 2006, particularly its rocket and missile stocks, portends continued instability in the region.

Hizballah continues to undermine the authority of the legitimate Lebanese security forces, threaten Israel, and provide training and support to militant groups outside the country. Stabilizing Lebanon ultimately requires strengthening the capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces, fully implementing United Nations Security Council Resolutions, including 1559 and 1701, ending Iran's illegal support to Hizballah, and assisting the Lebanese government in developing a comprehensive national defense strategy through which the government can exercise its sovereignty, free of external intervention.

Last, despite continued support to Hizballah, interference in Lebanese internal politics, and accommodation of foreign fighter networks and facilitators operating from and through its territory, the Asad regime in Syria appears to be slowly seeking rapprochement with its neighbors and the United States.

F. Central Asia

Central Asia is a pivotal region on the Eurasian continent between Russia, China, Iran, and South Asia, has extensive natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons, and serves as a major transit route for regional and international commerce and for supplies supporting coalition efforts in Afghanistan. Ensuring stability in Central Asia requires abandoning the outdated, zero-sum paradigms of international politics associated with the so-called "Great Game," replacing them with broad partnerships to address common challenges such as terrorism, WMD proliferation, and illegal narcotics trafficking. There

are numerous opportunities in Central Asia for cooperation that can simultaneously advance the interests of the Central Asian States and their neighbors.

However, public and civic institutions in Central Asia are still developing in the aftermath of decades of Soviet rule, and they present challenges to our efforts to promote security, development, and cooperation. Although there is interdependence across a broad range of social, economic, and security matters, these nations have not yet fully established a productive regional *modus vivendi*. Overcoming these challenges requires incremental approaches that focus on the alleviation of near term needs, the establishment of better governance, the integration of markets for energy and other commercial activity, and grass-roots economic development.

Over the past two years, a primary focus of our engagement with the Central Asian States has been the development and expansion of our Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which supports coalition forces in Afghanistan. Through diligent work by the State Department and U.S. Transportation Command, we have improved the flexibility, efficiency, and reliability of our logistical support to our operations in Afghanistan by diversifying the routes, approaches, and contracts that comprise the logistical network. In 2010, we anticipate expanding our use of the NDN as additional routes and methods of delivery become available. In addition to improving our regional access and logistics capabilities, work on the NDN has significantly increased our contact with our regional partners and provided opportunities to engage on numerous common causes and to increase our commercial ties.

In addition to increasing our engagement with the Central Asian States through the NDN, we continue to help build the capabilities of indigenous security forces, as well as the mechanisms for regional cooperation. We provide training, equipment, and facilities for various army, national guard, and border security forces through our Building Partnership Capacity programs. In addition, we continue to work with national level organizations to facilitate dialogue on security and emergency response issues through numerous bilateral training exercises and initiatives such as our annual Chiefs of Defense Conferences and the multilateral Exercise Regional Cooperation.

V. Critical Mission Enablers

Success in our ongoing missions and achieving comprehensive, cooperative, and enduring solutions to our challenges in the AOR, all the while maintaining a credible, responsive contingency capacity, requires the support of several key mission enablers. The effects of these capabilities range from the tactical to the strategic, and CENTCOM fully supports their continuation, expansion, and improvement.

In requesting and employing these enablers, we recognize the critical importance of proper oversight to ensure their proper usage, particularly for funding authorities. In many cases, we have established control mechanisms that exceed those mandated by Congress, including numerous additional outside audits and command reviews. This

oversight helps us know whether these programs are being properly implemented and, equally important, whether these programs are effective.

A. Building Partnership Capacity

Our security cooperation and security assistance efforts are critical to improving security and stability in the region. They help strengthen our relationships and build the security and response capabilities of our partners in the AOR. Continued strong support for global train and equip resources; Coalition Support Funds; and the State Department's Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and counter-narcotics security assistance and reimbursement programs are essential to generating comprehensive and cooperative solutions to defeat insurgent groups. FMF and FMS remain our mainstay security assistance tools, but the International Military Education and Training program is also an important contributor to developing partner nation capabilities and enduring ties, particularly for the officers of nascent security forces and from Pakistan, with whom we must reestablish personal bonds and trust after years without substantive interaction. While these programs are reasonably successful in meeting needs in a peacetime environment, we support the reformation of the security assistance programs and processes described in this year's Quadrennial Defense Review to create new, more responsive, long term mechanisms for developing our partner nations' security capacity.

Additionally, in the face of enduring conflict in the region, we look to expanded special authorities and multi-year appropriations to quickly meet the emerging needs of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and Foreign Internal Defense/Security Force Assistance activities. Multi-year programs-of-record that provide training, equipment, and infrastructure for our partner nations' security forces enabled our successes in Iraq and are of prime importance if we are to achieve comparable progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These critical programs include the Iraq Security Forces Fund, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, and the Cooperative Defense Program.

B. Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)

CERP continues to be a vital counterinsurgency tool for our commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Small CERP projects can be the most efficient and effective means to address a local community's emergent needs, and where security is a challenge, it is often the only immediate means for addressing those needs. CERP spending is not intended to replace longer term development assistance administered by agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) but rather to complement and potentially serve as a catalyst for these projects. In Iraq as the security situation has improved and allowed USAID full access, CERP funding has been reduced commensurately. However, we fully support ongoing efforts to enhance U.S. humanitarian assistance programs in other parts of the CENTCOM AOR, particularly in Pakistan. In concert with the State Department, we also seek innovative mechanisms and

authorities to allow for greater cost-sharing and to create similar counterinsurgency tools for use by coalition and host nation partners. These tools should allow for a variety of funding sources, to include contributions from non-governmental organizations, international governmental organizations, and partner governments.

Critical to CERP is its proper oversight. We support the ongoing Department of Defense internal assessment of the program and its consideration of establishing a Department-wide CERP coordinator. We will continue to sponsor outside audits and to work with the Services to ensure proper pre-deployment training for CERP managers and contracting personnel.

C. Information Operations

Operation Earnest Voice (OEV) is the critical program of record we use to synchronize and oversee our Information Operations activities, to counter our adversaries' ideology and propaganda in the AOR, and to amplify credible voices in the region, all in close coordination with the Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy. OEV provides CENTCOM direct communication capabilities to a regional audience through traditional media as well as trans-regional websites and public affairs regional blogging. Strategic, long term effects are achieved through our supporting Building Partnership Capacity programs, humanitarian relief efforts, demining activities, Cooperative Defense Initiatives, and counterterrorist operations. The audience analysis and assessment component of OEV provides critical cultural understanding required to

connect with the region's population, tell us which techniques are effective over time and which are not, and gives us the long term ability to assess our success or failure in the war of ideas. Full and enduring funding of OEV and other Defense Department information operations efforts will best enable us to communicate our strategic messages and to counter those of our adversaries.

D. Force Protection and Countering Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs)

Initiatives focused on countering the threat of IEDs are of paramount importance to our operations in the AOR. IEDs continue to be the primary threat to our ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and efforts to expedite the acquisition and fielding of personal protective equipment, IED jammers, route clearance vehicles and equipment, and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles, which includes the MRAP All Terrain Vehicle, have saved countless lives. An urgent priority for us is the rapid fielding of MRAPs to support the increase in U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Because we expect IEDs to remain a key weapon in the arsenals of militants and insurgents for years to come, we urge continued support for the Joint IED Defeat Organization; the Services' baseline sustainment for the MRAP family of vehicles, base defense initiatives, and Counter-IED efforts; and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation funding and procurement of equipment to counter IED tactics and networks.

E. Intelligence

Detailed and timely tactical, operational, and strategic level intelligence collection and analysis remain vital to all aspects of our operations. While we continue to balance the allocation of our Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and to refine and optimize our procedures and existing architecture, changes in the operating environment and the expiration of old systems will require new, improved, or increased intelligence capabilities. We support the Department of Defense's planned growth in human intelligence and counterintelligence specialists, interrogators, and intelligence analysts, but we also have come to recognize the importance of non-traditional specialists such as threat finance analysts, human terrain teams, and document exploitation specialists. In addition, our requirements for signals intelligence geo-location capabilities, Ground Moving Target Indicator information, and aerial imagery from remotely piloted systems, including sea-based ISR, continue to grow. We also look to Operationally Responsive Space to temporarily fill the space-based reconnaissance gap to be created as several current systems reach the end of their operational lives. Finally, managing these capabilities and fully harvesting the information they provide requires innovative databases (such as the Combined Information Data Network Exchange system), applications, and communication systems.

F. Adaptable Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems

Continued operations across a dispersed AOR call for a robust, interoperable, high-volume theater C4 infrastructure. We are working to meet C4 requirements for current operations and to posture enduring theater C4 capabilities to meet post-conflict requirements as well as prepare for contingencies. Concurrently, we are working to expand our information sharing and to improve our partners' commercial and military C4 capabilities.

We aggressively seek greater bandwidth capacity to improve the reliability and diversity of our C4 networks. CENTCOM currently utilizes all available bandwidth to full capacity, but theater fiber networks are vulnerable to single points of failure in the global information grid. Military Satellite Communications capabilities are critical to theater operations, and the acceleration of transformational upgrades to these systems would reduce our reliance on commercial providers.

We are also pursuing the means to extend Joint Theater Expeditionary Command, Control, and Communications support and services to disadvantaged users throughout the AOR. Some of these means include our sponsorship of Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs). Under the JCTD Tactical Service Provider (TSP) program, we developed the capability to more effectively manage available bandwidth and provide coverage to frontline units. We continue to field and further develop the Distributed Tactical Communications System, which leverages new technologies to deliver reliable,

critical communications capabilities to the most remote users. Additional fielding and technology efforts include the Radio over Internet Protocol Routed Network and the Joint Airborne Communications System. Despite tremendous actions by the Department of Defense to help us overcome our communication and network challenges, to be more effective and efficient, we require a fully integrated space and terrestrial communications infrastructure that supports all joint and potential partner nation users.

G. Cyberspace Capabilities and Authorities

The openness of the global cyber commons exposes us to low risk, low cost threats from our adversaries. Our networks are constantly threatened by a range of actors from hackers to criminal organizations to state-sponsored saboteurs. This activity is aimed at retrieving sensitive information, exploiting our public domain information to gain an operational advantage, and disrupting our networks. In addition, our adversaries use the internet for command and control, recruiting, and fund raising.

To help address these challenges, we welcome the development and institutionalization of cyberspace capabilities to help us protect and operate within these critical systems. The formation of U.S. Cyber Command and other Defense Department-wide cyberspace activities will facilitate the fusion of intelligence, operations, and communications essential to our computer network operations. At the combatant command level, we have created our own Cyberspace Warfare Cell composed of

intelligence, operations, and communications personnel to synchronize our cyberspace activities and to integrate with national level efforts.

H. Joint and Multinational Logistics

The primary focus of our logistics efforts is the timely deployment, equipping, and sustainment of units engaged in combat operations. With our multinational and strategic national logistics partners, we continue to work toward an efficient and effective logistics architecture that supports our forces and operations and minimizes costs. Our logistics posture consists of pre-positioned inventories, air and sealift capabilities, and access to bases with critical infrastructure, all of which are key logistics components that support operational flexibility. To maintain this posture and our readiness, we must quickly reconstitute our Army and Marine Corps pre-positioned stocks and properly reset returning forces. Moreover, this logistics posture enables the increase in forces in Afghanistan while simultaneously supporting the drawdown of forces from Iraq, both of which remain on track to meet the President's timelines.

The Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan continues to support CENTCOM, USF-I, and USFOR-A by providing responsive contracting of supplies, services, and construction, and lays the groundwork for the capacity building efforts within Iraqi and Afghan ministries. As a result, in Fiscal Year 2009, the Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan executed over 33,000 contract actions and obligated a total of \$5.4 billion. Over 36 percent of this funding went to Iraqi and

Afghan firms. CENTCOM is transitioning the Joint Contracting Command to a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, an initiative that will enhance management and synchronize contracting across a greater portion of the AOR. We continue to improve contractor oversight through other initiatives such as increasing the in-theater presence of Contracting Officer Representatives and Quality Assurance Representatives, early identification and training of these representatives for deploying units, and mandating the use of automated Letters of Authorization for contractors.

In an effort to lessen our reliance on the ground supply lines through Pakistan, we are moving an increasing amount of non-military supplies into Afghanistan via an air and surface intermodal NDN, which transits through the Central Asian States. We have also established routes to transport military equipment from Iraq through Turkey merging with the NDN for onward movement to Afghanistan. Continued expansion of the NDN and additional host nation access remain logistics priorities as we shift more sustainment from the routes through Pakistan to the NDN and optimize the Pakistan routes for units and equipment supporting the increase in forces in Afghanistan. Our relationships with the Central Asian States continue to improve as a result of our NDN efforts, and this is supported by legislation that allows us to expand our partnerships by locally purchasing supplies for forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region.

I. Overseas Basing and Theater Posture

CENTCOM's overseas basing strategy and its associated overseas Military Construction projects are developing the infrastructure necessary for the conduct of ongoing operations, as well as supporting global access, projection, sustainment, and protection of our combined forces in the AOR. Fully functional Forward Operating Sites and Cooperative Security Locations are essential to our ability to conduct the full spectrum of military operations, engage with and enable partner nations, and act promptly and decisively. Pre-positioned stocks and reset equipment provide critical support to this strategy but require reconstitution and modernization after having been partially expended to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Even with generous Overseas Contingency Operations budgets, military construction timelines are too slow to respond to changes in a combat environment. Major events such as the approval of the Strategic Partnership Agreement with Iraq and the recent decision to send additional forces to Afghanistan show how rapidly basing requirements can change. Expanded Contingency Construction Authorities made available across the entire CENTCOM AOR can serve as partial, interim solutions because they push construction decision-making authority to our engaged commanders in the field. Also, increasing the Operations and Maintenance construction threshold for minor construction in support of combat operations across the AOR would increase the ability of our commanders to quickly meet mission requirements and fully support and protect our deployed forces.

J. Adaptive Requirements, Acquisition, and Technology Processes

The technical community writ-large has responded exceptionally well over the past few years to the needs of our warfighters in the CENTCOM AOR. While the Services, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have responded to our calls for assistance, the Joint IED Defeat Organization, the Rapid Equipping Force, and Army Material Command's Fielded Assistance in Science and Technology programs have been particularly helpful in ensuring that our troopers receive the best, most advanced equipment and tools to make them effective and to keep them safe during the execution of their missions. In addition, several organizations under OSD-Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and OSD-Defense Research and Engineering, in cooperation with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, have been instrumental in the discovery, rapid development, and early fielding of critical operational capabilities, such as more capable ISR systems, human terrain mapping and analytical tools, and improved ballistic protection for MRAPs. Last, the Quick Reaction Test Program has helped us use existing technologies in new and more efficient ways.

The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) has proven important to addressing non-counter-IED rapid acquisition needs for our operations, and we will continue to use the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) process to support our warfighters. However, because the JUON process requires execution year reprogramming by the Services, we found in the past that the Rapid Acquisition Fund (RAF) was a useful JRAC tool for

supporting immediate needs. When the authority existed, the JRAC used the RAF to field capabilities such as radio systems used for Afghanistan-Pakistan cross-border communications, which were procured in less than four months from the initial identification of the need. The JRAC has also used RAF funding to initiate the fielding of critical biometrics equipment until the JUON process could further source the program, significantly reducing the time required to deploy the technology. Reinstating RAF funding and using it as a complement to the JUON process would allow CENTCOM to more quickly resolve warfighter needs.

K. Personnel

Having appropriately trained personnel in sufficient quantities for our commands and Joint Task Forces (JTFs) is critical to accomplishing our assigned missions and achieving our theater objectives. The CENTCOM headquarters has been satisfactorily manned through temporary augmentation but may require additional permanent manpower for enduring mission sets as well as mechanisms for quickly generating temporary manpower for contingency operations. Within our JTFs and deployed units, there continue to be shortfalls in many low-density, high-demand occupational specialties and enabling force structures. Most notably, critical shortages of intelligence specialists, counterintelligence and human intelligence collectors, interrogators, document exploitation specialists, detainee operations specialists, engineers, and military police continue to degrade mission effectiveness. As operations continue in Afghanistan, we see a critical need for increased public affairs and information operations personnel to improve our strategic

communications capabilities. Moreover, as we complete our combat mission in Iraq, we will require non-traditional enabling capabilities such as leaders to augment newly formed advisory assistance units, personnel to follow money trails in support of our threat finance cells, and an increased number of multi-functional logisticians to man critical logistics units. At the same time, we support a significant expansion of the U.S. government's vital, deployable civilian capacity, particularly in the State Department and USAID.

Quality of life, family support, and retention programs remain important to our operations in the AOR. The Rest and Recuperation program continues to be a success, having served over 875,000 since its inception in September 2003. We also continue to depend heavily on entitlement programs such as Combat Zone Tax Relief, Imminent Danger Pay, and Special Leave Accrual to support our deployed service members.

VI. Conclusion

There are currently over 220,000 Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen serving in the CENTCOM AOR and soldiering magnificently against tough enemies during challenging operations in punishing terrain and extreme weather. Together with our many civilian and coalition partners, they have been the central element to the security, stability, and prosperity we have increasingly promoted throughout the region. They will be the key to achieving further progress in Afghanistan,

Iraq, and Pakistan and other locations where serious work is being done. These wonderful Americans and their fellow troopers around the world constitute the most experienced, most capable military in our Nation's history. They and their families have made great sacrifices since 9/11, and nothing means more to these great Americans than the sense that those back home appreciate their service and sacrifice.

All those in CENTCOM thank the American people for their extraordinary support of our military men and women and their families. And we thank the members of Congress for their unwavering support and abiding concern for our troopers and their families as well.

General David H. Petraeus, Commander, United States Central Command



General David H. Petraeus assumed command of the United States Central Command in October 2008, after serving for over 19 months as the Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq. Prior to his tour as MNF-I Commander, he commanded the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. Before that assignment, he was the first commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, which he led from June 2004 to September 2005, and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, which he commanded from October 2004 to September 2005. That deployment to Iraq

followed his command of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), during which he led the “Screaming Eagles” in combat throughout the first year of Operation Freedom. His command of the 101st followed a year deployed on Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia, where he was the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations of the NATO Stabilization Force and the Deputy Commander of the US Joint Interagency Counter-Terrorism Task Force-Bosnia. Prior to his tour in Bosnia, he spent two years at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, serving first as the Assistant Division Commander for Operations of the 82nd Airborne Division and then as the Chief of Staff of XVIII Airborne Corps.

General Petraeus was commissioned in the Infantry upon graduation from the United States Military Academy in 1974. He has held leadership positions in airborne, mechanized, and air assault infantry units in Europe and the United States, including command of a battalion in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and a brigade in the 82nd Airborne Division. In addition, he has held a number of staff assignments: Aide to the Chief of Staff of the Army; battalion, brigade, and division operations officer; Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander - Europe; Chief of Operations of the United Nations Force in Haiti; and Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Petraeus was the General George C. Marshall Award winner as the top graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Class of 1983. He subsequently earned MPA and Ph.D. degrees in international relations from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and he later served as an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the US Military Academy. He also completed a fellowship at Georgetown University.

Awards and decorations earned by General Petraeus include two awards of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, two awards of the Distinguished Service Medal, two awards of the Defense Superior Service Medal, four awards of the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal for valor, the State Department Distinguished Service Award, the NATO Meritorious Service Medal, the Gold Award of the Iraqi Order of the Date Palm, the French Légion d’Honneur, and the National Defense Cross of the Czech Republic. He is a Master Parachutist and Air Assault and Ranger qualified. He has also earned the Combat Action Badge and French, British, and German Jump Wings. In 2005 he was recognized by the U.S. News and World Report as one of America’s 25 Best Leaders, and in 2007 he was named by Time magazine as one of the 100 most influential leaders of the year and one of four runners-up for Time Person of the Year. Most recently, he was selected by Foreign Policy magazine as one of the world’s top 100 public intellectuals and by Esquire magazine as one of the 75 Most Influential People of the 21st Century.

ADMIRAL ERIC T. OLSON
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to update you on the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). It is an honor to do so for the third time as Commander.

Over two decades ago, Congress directed the establishment of a headquarters dedicated to "prepare special operations forces to carry out assigned missions" in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders. Since then, the forces and the missions have expanded and changed in response to very dynamic global conditions and threats.

In this 'new normal' in which our forces operate, emerging security challenges to our nation come evermore from agile and elusive adversary networks versus traditional, uniformed military formations. Therefore, the value of adaptive special operations forces is at least as much in their mindset as in their skill set.

US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) respond to the sound of guns with a combination of speed, discipline, and tenacity. They also apply their knowledge and experience well ahead of the sound of the guns to prevent violence from erupting whenever and wherever possible. These are warriors who can act swiftly with precision and lethality, yet

remain simultaneously capable of building long-term relationships and trust with international partners.

Resourcing: Force and Mission

On an average day, in excess of 12,000 Special Operations Forces (SOF) and SOF support personnel are deployed in more than 75 countries across the globe. An invaluable ingredient is our reserve element, about 14 percent of SOF's total manpower.

Currently, 86 percent of deployed SOF are in U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)'s area of responsibility under the operational control of General Petraeus. The rest of the deployed force - along with over 3,000 members permanently stationed in Europe and the Pacific - are serving the other Geographic Combatant Commanders.

To support special operators and their capabilities, the President's proposed budget request for FY 2011 is about \$6.3 billion in baseline and \$3.5 billion in Overseas Contingency Operations funding. Managing these funds is my responsibility.

Along with USSOCOM's Major Force Program (MFP)-11 funding - one intended to fund SOF-peculiar requirements - the Command is heavily dependent on each of the Military Services for key enablers to special operations. Within our organic structure - both to provide sufficient speed of response and a degree of reliable sustainability - USSOCOM is growing organic combat service and service support assets for special operations forces, to include: communications, information support specialists, forensic analysts, military working dog teams,

intelligence experts, and more. The FY 2011 budget proposes a total manpower increase of 2,700 people across the Force, a 4.6% growth from the previous fiscal year.

Working closely with Joint Force Commanders, senior Department of Defense (DoD) leaders, and Congress, USSOCOM also develops SOF-specific doctrine, and advises on policy and legislation supporting these activities.

USSOCOM is tasked to synchronize planning for global operations against terrorist networks. The 7500 series of Concept Plans (CONPLANS), crafted at USSOCOM and approved by the Secretary of Defense, continue to function as both the framework for planning within DoD and a supporting mechanism within the interagency environment for combating global terror networks. The plans are supported by regional plans formulated by each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders specific to threats within their areas of responsibility.

In our role, USSOCOM receives, analyzes and prioritizes these regional plans, and makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff on force and resource allocations. We also serve as an extension of the Joint Staff in coordinating SOF programs and operations with our interagency partners.

The authority most often referred to as 'Section 1208' - unique to USSOCOM since 2005 - is a key tool for our widely dispersed and often isolated special operations forces around the world. This

authority enables USSOF to train and equip indigenous forces, both regular and irregular, and to enable them to support ongoing counterterrorism operations. Indigenous forces - while serving a leading role and supported by USSOF - provide essential access to locations, populations, and information otherwise inaccessible. Support to indigenous forces through Section 1208 reprioritization of funding has resulted in many successful counterterrorist operations.

Strategy: Direct and Indirect Approaches

CONPLAN 7500 calls for the use of both a direct and indirect approach to fighting terrorist networks. The direct approach to violent extremists consists of USSOF efforts that disrupt terrorist organizations by capturing, killing, and interdicting extremist networks and resources, thereby preventing them from harming us in the near term. These actions include denial of access and use of weapons of mass destruction.

The direct approach is urgent, necessary, and largely kinetic. In the last year, USSOF - deployed in support of geographic combatant commanders - inflicted substantial losses against the leadership and operational capacity of Al Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates. These effects - while significant in the short term - are not by themselves decisive.

The enduring results come from indirect approaches - those in which we enable partners to combat extremist organizations themselves by contributing to their capabilities through advising, training, and

- when authorized and funded - equipping. This includes efforts to deter active and tacit support for violent extremist organizations in areas where the existing government is either unwilling or unable to remove terrorist sanctuaries.

Central to USSOCOM's contribution are our career, multi-dimensional operators, individuals adept in defense, diplomacy, and development. SOF operators are often locally grounded in their areas of responsibility, diplomatically astute, and experts in specialized tactical skills. It is demanding work.

The number of individuals both eager and qualified to serve as SOF operators is limited. Overall, SOF personnel growth continues to be managed at about 3 percent annually, a strategy intended to retain the best while adding additional manpower only as it can be recruited, trained, absorbed and deployed.

Still, direct and indirect approaches must be carefully balanced. While the direct approach is often necessary and has immediate impact, it essentially creates time for the indirect approach to achieve lasting outcomes through other means.

Security Force Assistance (SFA) remains a highlight of USSOF indirect action. SFA is a collaboration engine for the Command to include: security cooperation, security assistance, foreign internal defense, internal defense and development, and security sector reform.

SFA enhances the military capabilities and capacities of our allies and partners via training, advising, assistance, and - as authorized - equipping and supporting foreign military and security

forces. "Build[ing] the security capacity of partner states" is directly referenced within the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as one of six key missions.

The paradigm of national sovereignty is challenged by the trends of crime, migration, extremism, and the competition for resources which drive populations and provoke conflict. Recognizing this, the Command's engagement efforts through the 'Sovereign Challenge' Program continue as a unique method of establishing relationships with senior military leaders from around the world. The program - in collaboration with the U.S. Department of State - aims to provide venues in which robust dialog about threats to sovereignty can take place. In this indirect and mutually beneficial approach to military relationships, long-term success is measured by other countries actions in their own and the region's security interests.

Global Synchronization

As previously stated, U.S. Special Operations Command is designated as the command responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations against terrorist networks. In this ongoing Global Synchronization Process, USSOCOM coordinates with other Combatant Commanders, the Services, and - as directed - appropriate U.S. government agencies and international partners to deter, disrupt and defeat terrorism across the globe. Regular meetings, video teleconferences, and 'community of interest' forums facilitate planning, promote situational awareness, and enhance synergy within

the overall war on terror effort. The Command's Global Synchronization Workshops - now five years old - unite hundreds of planners from across the Global Synchronization Process Community.

Enablers: Mobility

While attention is first given to operators conducting missions around the globe, these individuals are supported by a set of essential mobility capabilities that allow USSOF to move, influence the environment, share information, and strike when necessary. In challenging settings and situations, success can depend upon these capabilities. For example, in Haiti's Operation Unified Response this mobility allowed USSOF to open a closed and damaged airfield to enable relief efforts. This was accomplished within 26 hours of the earthquake, and 28 minutes of being on the ground. SOF personnel subsequently assisted with medical and humanitarian assistance to include rescue of trapped citizens, injury treatment, and continuous broadcasting of relief locations and protocols.

I've paid particular attention to mobility enabling capabilities, making them a focal point of the USSOCOM Strategic Plan. This importance is echoed by the Secretary of Defense in the 2010 QDR, calling to "increase key enabling assets for special operations forces."

For the Special Operator, mobility enhancements mean a variety of improved strategic and tactical capabilities. These provide, for example, quick strike capabilities regardless of terrain. In

cooperation with the Army, we will grow USSOCOM's helicopter fleet by eight MH-47 Chinooks by FY 2015. We are also nearing fielding completion of upgraded MH-47G and new MH-60M helicopters, improvements that provide USSOF with modernized helicopters specifically adapted to SOF-peculiar requirements like aerial refueling, advanced night operations, and terrain-hugging flight profiles.

Growth is also evident in the Tilt/Hybrid Wing Aircraft Programs. The CV-22 Osprey offers high-speed, long-range insertion and extraction of SOF. SOCOM currently has 12 CV-22's, growing to 50 by FY 2016.

In their first combat deployment, six CV-22s logged over 600 flight hours, performing 45 direct action assault force missions and 100+ combat service support missions in the process. A recent national contingency mission used three of these aircraft for combat search and rescue, personnel recovery, and quick reaction force support.

Our goal is to accelerate delivery of CV-22's to better support the forces requiring them. We are looking to add five more CV-22s in the coming year.

The C-130 - in several variants - remains the workhorse of the USSOF, fixed-wing mobility fleet. C-130's provide USSOF with important tactical lift and precision fire for our ground and maritime forces. Ongoing efforts to recapitalize the oldest of these airframes are a current top priority for Air Force Special Operations Command, our air component.

Finally, the Non-Standard Aviation Program supports Theater Special Operations Command mobility requirements worldwide. This program includes short takeoff and landing, light and medium, intra-theater aircraft. The FY 2011 budget request includes funds to procure nine additional light and medium aircraft plus associated spares and repair parts.

On land, a new Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All Terrain Vehicle will increase ground mobility for USSOF. The new model - funded through the Joint Program Office - provides improved safety, visibility, control and storage.

In the maritime environment, USSOCOM remains committed to developing undersea submersible platforms that will provide assured, clandestine access to denied and politically sensitive areas while enabling persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) in support of high-priority SOF requirements. The Advanced SEAL Delivery System Program (ASDS) - one well-supported by Congress - delivered these operational capabilities until it suffered a significant lithium-ion battery fire.

As noted in last year's FY 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, the Office of the Secretary of Defense is coordinating with the Director of National Intelligence to assess the feasibility of establishing a cost-sharing agreement for ASDS follow-on capabilities. If approved, these capabilities are expected to capitalize on improved battery technologies, ones recommended to the Navy by the investigation panel reviewing the ASDS lithium-ion battery fire. The FY

2011 budget request includes funds to conduct research and development on the Joint Multi-mission Submersible which will provide these capabilities.

Enablers: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

These efforts are complemented by planned upgrades to SOF's Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) portfolio. ISR remains an invaluable asset, most notably in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. The ISR program is not about platforms; it is about complete systems including the people who operate them.

Proposed plans - contained within a Joint Staff-approved capabilities document and seconded by the Secretary of Defense within the 2010 QDR ("expanding manned and unmanned systems for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance") entail expansion of the Program's inventory to include both manned and unmanned systems. These systems will be supported by Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination capabilities, and robust communication architecture. Airborne ISR remains complemented by maritime capabilities.

Enablers: Information Sharing

Effective use of ISR, however, can only occur on communications systems and networks designed to handle the large amounts of information developed. Our evolving mission sets form a difficult and increasingly expensive information sharing reality, with data residing on, and transiting through, a variety of systems under varying security criteria.

Recognizing this problem, USSOCOM is moving toward a globally responsive network capable of cross-domain data sharing. USSOCOM's SOF Information Environment, or SIE, is our portion of DoD's Global Information Grid. The SIE is a SOF information technology enterprise that will offer permissions-based, single sign-on access to SOF resources from anywhere on the globe.

Enablers: Science and Technology

USSOCOM's modernization, research and development and acquisition enabling processes are interconnected to ensure needed technological agility. The Command's Rapid Exploitation of Innovative Technology (REITS) Program provides USSOCOM with the ability to identify, assess and exploit emerging technologies for SOF-peculiar applications.

REITS funds are assisting in the development of next generation software and antenna design for 'on-the-move,' mounted and dismounted geo-location technology. This new capability will conform to both current tactical vehicles and radio frequency systems, while providing organic, small unit find, fix and finish capabilities within a single tactical ground asset.

Enablers: Agile Acquisition Processes

Rapid fielding of the Dragon Spear Precision Strike Platform (PSP) is an example of the benefits of an acquisition process designed for flexibility and agility. This system benefits from the Combat

Missions Needs Statement (C-MNS) process which quickly addresses critical capability gaps that put missions or lives at risk. Funding execution responsibilities for C-MNS reside with the Joint Acquisition Task Force, meaning faster operational implementation.

By design, PSP is a modular, scalable weapons system, one flexible enough for many platforms and configurations. Four Dragon Spear systems are currently being fielded. Ongoing MC-130W Dragon Spear improvements include upgrades to its sensors, a Standoff Precision Guided Munitions system and supporting 30mm gun, a sensor operator console, and communication equipment and flight deck hardware.

USSOF MC-130 console reconfigurations enable aircrews to operate more efficiently and effectively. Improved infrared warning systems result in better threat detection. Updated line-of-sight antennae produce more communications capacity with improved reliability. All are modernization initiatives designed to cost-effectively optimize current USSOF aircraft.

Enablers: Education

The unique nature of special operations enables us to focus people on specific regions more so than other forces can. This ensures we are doing the best we can with what we have.

USSOCOM - partnered with the Services - is intensifying its efforts in training and personnel management to create opportunities for our personnel to truly build productive and enduring relationships with our partners. DoD Directive 5100.1 aims to address many of these issues by enhancing USSOCOM's ability to influence management of our assigned manpower.

Our culture and language programs are supplemented with increased attention to interagency collaboration and information sharing, with specific emphasis on sub-regional and micro-regional knowledge.

I've directed USSOF schools to pay more attention to curricula dedicated to advanced language skills and regional expertise. Specifically, we will ensure better alignment of language skills, career management, and incentives within our force.

To prepare USSOF for the challenges ahead, we're prioritizing career development toward areas best suited for irregular environments with emphasis on specialized versus generalized operator performance. This entails building creative, adaptive and flexible leaders at every level of the enlisted and officer ranks.

USSOCOM's Lessons Learned Program supplements these efforts with vital, in the field knowledge. This program emphasizes analysis and information sharing relevant to the SOF Community, one that now includes research, development, technology and experimentation activities.

Care Coalition

We cannot sustain combat effectiveness without the enduring support of our families. Our operators are asked to do a great many things to protect our nation, and all of them place additional demands on those who are closest to us. Continuing care for our wounded or injured operators - and for the families of those who have been seriously injured or killed - is among our most solemn responsibilities. The 2010 QDR highlights the importance of such programs: "caring for our wounded warriors is our highest priority, and we will work to provide them top-quality care that reflects their service and sacrifice."

USSOCOM's Care Coalition currently supports over 2,800 wounded SOF operators by matching medical needs with available providers. The goal of this clearinghouse - via advocacy, education, treatment, recovery, and rehabilitation - is to increase the likelihood of returning to duty and/or succeeding in post-military service. Additional efforts include proactive programs by USSOCOM to identify, treat and prevent mental health care problems before they arise.

Along with its USSOCOM headquarters-based staff, eleven hospital liaisons help extend Care Coalition's reach across the country and globe. These efforts are also supplemented by support from over 70 partner organizations.

When supporting our wounded, ill and/or injured and their families, our job is never done. We still need to improve synchronization among the various government agencies supporting these individuals, also refine legislation to fund them.

Your support is essential. Over the past couple of years alone, SOF operators benefited from legislation that introduced a cognitive rehabilitation pilot program, pay and allowance continuation for wounded operators, care giver training and compensation, expansion of invitational travel orders for families of wounded, traumatic serviceman group life insurance, and memorial service support to our surviving families.

Looking Forward

The three priorities on which special operations forces need to focus - mission, people and equipment - are enduring. Through direct action, we deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist threats across the globe. In tandem, indirect action creates and sustains environments to empower longer term success.

As we remain prepared for urgent, bold and decisive action, we recognize that it is high-quality, low-profile, long-term engagement that fosters trust and enables essential partnerships. In this regard, we should measure success by how well we have prepared others to face their security challenges, not by what we do for them.

We also recognize that as we look forward, success increasingly depends upon the larger combination of defense, diplomacy, and development activities. In relaying his sentiments on the Afghanistan conflict, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mullen indicated that "winning is not solely the responsibility of the U.S. Military." "Success," he said, "will come by and only through a concerted effort

by other agencies and partners." We applaud policy and funding that provide other agencies the capabilities to contribute to this effort.

As always, USSOCOM and USSOF - with your continued support - will answer the needs of operational commanders. Technology areas seen as vital to short and long term intervention will continue as focus areas for USSOCOM research and development. Key enabling mechanisms across all terrains will yield the most effective, strategic and tactical implementation of our forces.

USSOCOM will emphasize even more precise methods for gathering, analyzing, processing and sharing of information and intelligence about these domains. We will continue to engender existing relationships with interagency partners while exploring opportunities to further improve them. Our technology investments will permit us to better locate, tag and track threats before they strike.

Sufficient infrastructure is essential to supporting our operators, and many of our existing facilities are in need of expansion or upgrade. The military construction program proposed for FY 2011 will help to improve this situation. Much-needed construction and modernization on 19 different projects at nine different installations will sustain SOF operations support, operational communications, aircraft maintenance and capabilities, and intelligence functions.

The contributions of this force amaze me every day. While relatively small in number, their dramatic, positive impact is of the greatest magnitude. They remain the world's most precise and lethal

counterterrorism force, and the most effective special operations trainers, advisors and combat partners. It is a profound honor to be associated with this extraordinarily capable and uniquely innovative force and to represent them before this committee.

Our successes are only possible because of this Committee's active advocacy for the Command and its mission. Speaking on behalf of the entire Community, your visits to the theater and to troops in recovery are deeply appreciated. Your support of the President's budget will enable special operations to continue to meet our great nation's highest expectations. Again, thank you.



United States Navy Biography

Admiral Eric T. Olson Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command

Admiral Eric T. Olson is the eighth commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. USSOCOM ensures the readiness of joint special operations forces and, as directed, conducts operations worldwide.

A native of Tacoma, Wash., Olson graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1973 and qualified as a Naval Special Warfare (SEAL) officer in 1974. He has served operationally in an Underwater Demolition Team, SEAL Team, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team, Special Boat Squadron, and at the Naval Special Warfare Development Group. He has commanded at every level.

Olson has participated in several conflicts and contingency operations, and has served as a SEAL instructor, strategy and tactics development officer and joint special operations staff officer. His overseas assignments include service as a United Nations military observer in Israel and Egypt, and as Navy Programs officer in Tunisia. He served on the Navy staff as assistant deputy chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations).

Olson earned a Master of Arts degree in National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and studied at the Defense Language Institute. He is a Joint Specialty officer and Political-Military Affairs sub-specialist with emphasis on Africa and the Middle East. His awards include the Distinguished Service Medal and Silver Star.



Statement of

General Duncan J. McNabb, USAF

Commander, United States Transportation Command



Before the House Armed Services Committee

On the State of the Command

March 17, 2010

INTRODUCING THE UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**Mission/Organization**

Chairman Skelton, Representative McKeon, and members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to testify today. I appreciate the strong and unwavering support of this committee to our Nation's defense, to the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and to our military men and women and DOD civilians that serve so faithfully. Equally important is your tremendous support to our families.

One of our greatest asymmetric advantages over any adversary is our nation's strategic ability to move—it is a crown jewel in our National Strategy and gives us our true global reach. It is my honor to represent USTRANSCOM and the over 145,000 men and women that maintain this advantage. USTRANSCOM is a unique partnership of active duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian, contractor and commercial partners. Together we are an unrivaled, global team operating an integrated, networked end-to-end defense distribution system, providing logistics superiority when and where needed. At home or abroad, USTRANSCOM fosters trust and confidence by delivering combat power through that logistics network. Our components, Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC) and Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) provide tremendous capabilities that we merge into multi-modal solutions to deliver effective support to the combatant commands at the best value to the nation.

As a supporting combatant command, we execute military and commercial transportation, terminal management, aerial refueling and global patient movement for the Defense Transportation System across the full range of military and humanitarian operations. Additionally, as the Distribution Process Owner (DPO), we lead a collaborative effort with the

Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) to increase the precision, velocity, reliability, efficiency and visibility of our distribution network and the DOD supply chain.

SUPPORTING GLOBAL OPERATIONS

USTRANSCOM's components, Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC) and Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) provide tremendous capabilities that we merge into intermodal solutions to maximize efficiency and best support the combatant commands. In 2009, the components moved staggering quantities to all parts of the globe. AMC and our commercial partners airlifted more than 2 million passengers and 750,000 tons of cargo, while our aging tanker fleet delivered 230 million gallons of fuel to U.S. and coalition aircraft. Equally impressive, MSC shipped 2.3 million square feet and SDDC moved 3 million tons of cargo worldwide. Finally, to support global DOD requirements, MSC's point-to-point tankers delivered 1.78 billion gallons of fuel.

Support to USCENTCOM

Over the past year, in direct support of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) force flow, we deployed and redeployed 36 Brigade Combat Teams, 34,000 Air Expeditionary Forces, 8 Security Force packages, and moved Marine Expeditionary, Stryker and Combat Aviation Brigades to support the Afghan elections.

Given President Obama's decision to increase forces in Afghanistan, USTRANSCOM is working with USCENTCOM to meet theater force flow and sustainment requirements while optimizing the logistics flow through major en route air, sea and surface hubs. In partnership with our Service components and commercial partners, we are meeting the President's intent to surge forces into theater at the fastest possible pace, moving more than 5,000 of the additional 30,000 troops into Afghanistan as of the end of February. We are on target to move the remaining 25,000 personnel through the summer. Additionally, we are actively engaged to

responsibly drawdown the force in Iraq, flowing materiel to Afghanistan and the United States as required.

A top priority for USTRANSCOM in support of operations in Afghanistan is maturing the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). Established in 2008 in partnership with USCENTCOM, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), Department of State (DOS) and DOD; the NDN is a key strategic alternative to the congested Pakistan ground lines of communication (PAKGLOC). Since March 2009, over 8,100 containers of non-lethal cargo moved by commercial air, ship, truck and rail through routes across Northern Europe, Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus. In 2010, the volume and velocity on the NDN will increase as we exercise local purchase options with NDN countries and further expand our logistics processes across the network.

Given the dangers to the troops in Afghanistan, we are ensuring warfighters receive the latest advances in vehicle protection. To that end, we delivered over 2,600 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles and more than 20,000 short tons of vehicle armor kits. Additionally, we have delivered 1,105 MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles (M-ATV) since production began in October 2009.

Mountainous terrain, high threat and poor infrastructure make airdrop a vital part of our support to USCENTCOM. Since 2006, we have more than tripled airdrop deliveries, using C-17s, C-130s and other contract aircraft to deliver over 29 million pounds in 2009. In addition to conventional drops, we employed the Joint Precision Airdrop System and the Improved Container Delivery System to deliver over 3 million pounds of cargo to warfighters operating in extremely challenging terrain. These systems improved accuracy by 60 percent and allow drops from higher altitudes, mitigating threats our aircrews encounter at lower altitudes. Finally, we

are testing Low Cost Low Altitude airdrop and other delivery systems to improve accuracy and lower costs—innovations to get critical supplies to forces in remote areas—on time, on target.

Another high priority to ensure the continued delivery of critical supplies is addressing the threat of piracy faced by our commercial partners. Military Sealift Command has led a successful effort with interagency, industry, international organizations and nations in the region to share information and best practices, thereby reducing the vulnerability of U.S. flagged vessels transiting high risk waters in and around the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean.

Support to Other Combatant Commands

In USSOUTHCOM, we provided civilian airlift support to Honduras during their period of political turmoil and provided airlift support for President Obama's participation in the Summit of the Americas. We also conducted detainee movement operations from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, while our defense couriers transported attorney-client material in support of high value detainee litigation. We also exercised our Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore capability, perfecting the ability to unload equipment from ships at anchor without the benefit of fixed deep draft ports. As the year drew to a close, this would prove a lifesaving capability as the world joined together in a "unified response" to the devastation in Haiti.

The recent events in Haiti highlight USTRANSCOM's ability to rapidly deliver humanitarian assistance to those in desperate need. Immediately after the earthquake, USTRANSCOM alerted our Joint Task Force Port Opening units and began developing relief plans. Within 48 hours, we deployed an assessment team to the air and sea ports at Port-au-Prince to survey the damage and began coordinating the air and sea bridge of humanitarian supplies and personnel. USTRANSCOM's personnel, including two Joint Task Force Port Opening units (airport and seaport), deployed to assist in moving the critical supplies needed to ease the suffering. The response of our commercial partners was equally impressive. Within

days of the earthquake, our commercial partners were surveying the seaport to establish over-the-shore operations and moving container ships, vehicle carrying vessels and lighterage to Haiti.

Within the first fifteen days after the earthquake, USTRANSCOM and our commercial partners airlifted 9,529 tons of goods and 6,387 relief personnel into Haiti, and evacuated 11,588 individuals from Haiti. This included the urgent deployment of the 2^d Brigade Combat Team of the 82^d Airborne Division—one of their largest and fastest movements since the Vietnam Conflict. We also airdropped over 125 tons of food and water to remote locations. As of the end of February 2010, mobility air forces had flown 3,713 sorties, lifting 17,902 tons of cargo and 27,324 passengers.

Furthermore, despite near catastrophic damage to the port, USTRANSCOM commercial and military vessels delivered 387,857 tons of cargo into Haiti, including 1,590 containers of humanitarian assistance/disaster supplies, vehicles and additional break-bulk relief cargo.

All told, as of March 1, 2010, USTRANSCOM provided 405,759 tons of lifesaving cargo, more than 2.5 million meals and over 5 million liters of water to Haitians in need.

USTRANSCOM aeromedical teams also deployed to Port-au-Prince Airport immediately after the earthquake. Working closely with other federal and state agencies, USTRANSCOM moved 318 injured earthquake victims on 30 aeromedical evacuation flights. Additionally, we transported over 400 adoptees on military and commercial aircraft.

We remained quite active in USEUCOM's AOR as well. USTRANSCOM rotated over 3,800 U.S. forces into the AOR to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Kosovo security presence in the Balkans. Additionally, we provided strategic lift for five major exercises to enhance USEUCOM and NATO readiness.

We supported U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) by rotating over 800 U.S. forces and nearly 300 tons of cargo into the Horn of Africa as part of Operation ENDURING

FREEDOM (OEF). We also moved 950 U.S. forces for AFRICAN LION, USAFRICOM's largest combined exercise used to build partnerships with key African nations.

In USPACOM, a priority was providing humanitarian assistance and disaster response in the wake of the devastating tsunami in American Samoa and the earthquakes in Indonesia. In support of the National Science Foundation's Operation DEEP FREEZE, we airlifted over 6,300 tons of cargo and 3,250 passengers and sealifted nearly 5.7 million gallons of fuel and 7.5 million pounds of cargo into McMurdo Station, Antarctica. We also were at work in the Philippines, transporting more than 2,000 passengers, 2,300 tons and 63,000 square feet of cargo for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM—Philippines.

Working closely with U.S. Strategic Command, we are countering cyber threats to our enterprise networks. Our reliance on unclassified military and commercial information systems for our transportation and logistics mission makes this a constant challenge as independent and state-supported cyber criminals become more sophisticated in their incursion attempts.

Finally, at home, USTRANSCOM aided U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, providing command and control and port opening capabilities to help reduce loss of life and property during the Red River flood that submerged parts of North Dakota. Additionally, we continue to provide deployment support for USNORTHCOM's Consequence Management Response Force.

Support to Other Nations – Building Distribution Partnerships

USTRANSCOM depends on close partnerships with nations across the globe to successfully conduct our mission. The Security Assistance Program focuses the DOD on military-to-military partnerships, yet USTRANSCOM is building partnerships with foreign governments and foreign private organizations as well.

The authority to make very modest investments has netted great logistical advantages. For example, the NDN-- a relatively small diplomatic effort – has allowed relationships with Central Asian and Caucasus states to grow ‘exponentially’. By sharing less than \$20K of computer equipment with one of our partners, the diplomatic note paperwork process for transit approvals was reduced by one third, resulting in an increased velocity for the cargo supporting the warfighter, and estimated cost avoidance in the millions of dollars (shortening the leadtime for delivery reduces the quantities required to fill the pipeline).

In order to secure a critical northern overflight route into Afghanistan, in FY09 USTRANSCOM secured \$1.7M in Department of Defense discretionary funding to address air traffic control shortfalls with a key partner nation, substantially increasing air traffic control capacity to support the increased OPTEMPO in Afghanistan.

The ability to engage non-military stakeholders and build global distribution partnerships gives us the necessary flexibility to provide the best possible support to our warfighters.

Support for the Warfighter

One of our most critical missions is moving injured warfighters from the battlefield to world-class medical treatment facilities. In 2009, we transported over 8,460 patients from the USCENTCOM AOR and over 15,120 patients globally—saving lives with rapid response. Our unique ability to provide medical care while moving patients out of harm’s way and into the hands of medical specialists is second to none. We are currently maturing our Joint Patient Movement Expeditionary System, a deployable, scalable version of our current patient movement system, which will give us even greater capability to get wounded warriors to critical care as quickly as possible.

Our support to the warfighter also includes improving quality of life at home. With over 300,000 personnel and their families and 2 billion pounds of household goods moving each year,

we are committed to making family moves much simpler through the Defense Personal Property Program (DP3). Concentrated on best value procurement standards and a streamlined claims process, this program is aimed at providing the best move experience for our families. The Defense Personal Property System (DPS) program is a key element to DP3, and USTRANSCOM is striving to make this a world class tool for warfighter. We began worldwide rollout of DPS in February 2009 and are working closely with the Services to steadily increase its functionality and performance.

Improving Global Joint Sourcing Solutions

As the DPO, USTRANSCOM is responsible for improving the precision and velocity of DOD's supply chain. To enable our experts to more closely collaborate, we have undertaken an effort to co-locate them in a fused operations center. USTRANSCOM is only months away from the ribbon-cutting of this new facility, a result of a 2005 Base Realignment and Closure initiative. When completed, the "campus at Scott Air Force Base" will include two of our three Service components and a Fusion Center, which will house air, land and sea experts working together on the same operations floor. The Fusion Center will be co-located with the Joint Intelligence Operations Center – Transportation to firmly link operations and intelligence—improving mission execution by identifying and assessing threats to our intermodal operations at seaports, airfields and surface networks worldwide.

One of our most important process improvement and information technology initiatives over the coming decade is Agile Transportation for the 21st Century (AT21). AT21 will allow our customers to connect to the enterprise from across the globe and closely collaborate with the Fusion Center on deployment and distribution solutions. AT21 will automate current manpower-intensive processes to enable operators to reformulate plans quickly and dynamically, explore various time and cost options, or adjust to changing global circumstances. This system will

provide users with real-time deployment and distribution information and visibility from one end of the supply chain to the other—factory to foxhole. Ultimately, AT21 will expedite decision making, ensuring troops and materiel are delivered on time and at best value to the nation.

The ability to deliver and execute world class logistics solutions depends on having forces sized and postured correctly to support every AOR. USTRANSCOM's Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center (JDPAC) provides the analytical talent needed to make those joint mobility, deployment and distribution determinations. Combining analysts from AMC, MSC and SDDC, the JDPAC is rapidly becoming DOD's deployment and distribution analytical center of excellence. Its first major undertaking was partnering with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation team to co-lead the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16). This extensive study indicated that the programmed mobility force structure is sufficient to meet the national defense strategy. JDPAC has also aided USCENTCOM by computer modeling the development and expansion of the NDN into Afghanistan and analyzing ways to expand air and surface distribution capacity. These efforts shaped the decisions to support force increases in Afghanistan and the drawdown in Iraq.

Maintaining Air Mobility Readiness

Rapid global mobility is critical to USTRANSCOM's quick reaction capability to meet the needs of the joint force and we need to continue recapitalizing our air mobility force. The ability to extend the range and persistence of almost all other joint force aircraft through air refueling is a distinct asymmetric advantage for our nation—we need to maintain this advantage. Replacing the KC-135 with the KC-X remains my number one recapitalization priority. In addition, KC-135 sustainment and modernizing our aging KC-10 fleet is a necessity as well. To keep the KC-135 and KC-10 a viable asset through 2040 and allow the fleet to operate in the global airspace environment, we must continue to update these aircraft.

Strategic airlift is a critical national capability and requires a flexible, capable fleet of inter-theater airlift aircraft. The C-17 has proven its worth over the past 8 years in Operations IRAQ FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Its strategic reach and agility in the tactical role have made it an irreplaceable asset.

Complementing the C-17, the outsized and oversized cargo capability provided by the C-5 is essential to meeting our global mobility requirements.

Modernizing the C-5 through the Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program (RERP) is absolutely critical to improve the mission capability of this airplane. Again, we agree with Air Force efforts to manage the airlift fleet mix through C-5 retirements as necessary to meet our national strategy.

The DOD also requires safe and agile intra-theater airlift and the C-130 continues to be the workhorse of our mobility force operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other regions around the world. Fielding the C-27J during the coming year, along with acquisition of the C-130J and modernization of legacy aircraft through the C-130 AMP will ensure the continued viability of our intra-theater fleet.

As the Air Force brings the first C-27Js on line in FY10, we are confident this new intra-theater asset will provide significant mission-critical/time-sensitive airlift capability in direct support of our joint partners. Its ability to serve in the general and direct support roles will maximize the utility for the warfighter.

To provide command and control of our warfighters, senior leaders continue to need access to our fleet of Operational Support Airlift (OSA) and Distinguished Visitor (DV) aircraft. To enable a worldwide view of the DOD OSA and executive aircraft fleets, USTRANSCOM remains a strong stakeholder in the development of a common movement management system with the Navy, Army, Air Force and Marine Corps. This common system will improve visibility

of the worldwide OSA fleet, greatly enhance tracking of senior DOD and U.S. Government leaders, resulting in improved scheduling efficiencies, and maximize fleet utilization.

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a national asset that provides commercial aircraft to augment our organic fleet to ensure USTRANSCOM can rapidly project and sustain forces. With our industry partners, we are moving forward on Congressional mandates to improve predictability of DOD commercial charter requirements and incentivize carriers to use modern aircraft to fulfill peacetime CRAF missions, all while simultaneously working to strengthen carrier participation. By adjusting how we forecast fixed mission requirements, we doubled the FY10 contract from \$300 million in FY09 to over \$600 million. In FY11, we plan to use, for the first time, the guaranteed minimum business authorities granted by Congress to further increase the annual contract purchase amount and to prepare for the eventual return to pre-9/11 business levels. Finally, we are working with our commercial partners to incentivize modernization to capitalize on the fuel efficiency of newer aircraft.

To encourage modernization, we enacted rate adjustments for modern aircraft in the FY10 contract and examined the benefits of using Boeing 747-400 freighters on nonstop routes from the U.S. to Afghanistan in our Extended Range Cargo Channel test. We are also examining pallet weight, pallet dimensions and our aerial port processes to fully leverage the modern assets our CRAF carriers may provide. Additionally, AMC instituted concurrent servicing and ground turn times to maximize use of our CRAF partners' assets by keeping them in the air.

Maintaining Sealift Readiness

Like airlift, cost effective commercial ocean transportation is vital. As one of the largest single shippers of ocean cargo worldwide, DOD spends approximately \$1.85 billion annually on commercial transportation through Universal Services Contracts. We acquire these intermodal services by capitalizing on our commercial carriers' established infrastructures and trade routes.

USTRANSCOM also partners with the U.S. commercial sealift industry and the Department of Transportation through programs like the Maritime Security Program (MSP), Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement and Voluntary Tanker Agreement. These partnerships give us critical access to U.S. commercial capability while ensuring the availability of a viable U.S. flag maritime industry and U.S. citizen mariner pool in times of national emergency.

We also work closely with the Defense Logistics Agency's Defense Energy Support Center to meet DOD's fuel requirements. In October 2010, MSC will take delivery of the first of two U.S. built product tankers under time charter arrangements. The new tankers will replace the current T-5 fleet as it reaches the end of its 25-year service life.

Additionally, we look forward to the acquisition of the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). The JHSV promises to bridge the gap between low-speed, heavy sealift and high-speed light airlift, providing flexible and efficient transportation and distribution options for the combatant commanders across vast expanses of their AORs.

Finally, I urge continued congressional support of the National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) and the MSP. Full funding of NDSF is necessary to maintain the Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off (LMSR) vessels in reduced operating status (ROS) 4 and the majority of the Ready Reserve Force in ROS 5—assets critical for our ability to surge when required. Support of the MSP, in addition to supporting a U.S. flag commercial fleet, is critical to maintaining the U.S. merchant mariner base which provides the manpower needed for surge operations.

Maintaining Infrastructure Readiness

A high priority for USTRANSCOM is to preserve and expand the number of en route locations that have airlift, sealift and surface capability all "inside the fence." Intermodal "crown jewels" in our system like Rota, Spain, Diego Garcia and Souda Bay, Greece are key to global force projection. Camp Lemonier, Djibouti is another critical airlift en route location which

holds promise as a future intermodal jewel with the recently completed seaport just to the North. The use of these locations increases supply chain velocity, allowing decreased delivery times and reduced costs. For example, we used a sealift/airlift multi-modal solution for the 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team's deployment from Fort Lewis Washington to Afghanistan. Transiting by ship to Diego Garcia then transitioning to aircraft, we moved more than 3,800 troops and 900 pieces of unit equipment 38 days more quickly than if we had executed the entire deployment using only aircraft. This multi-modal solution also saved taxpayers over \$100 million. In 2009, USTRANSCOM, in coordination with the other combatant commands, recommended funding be allotted for a control tower replacement at Rota and a modernized air freight terminal at Andersen AFB, Guam. These projects will directly enhance distribution efficiency and effectiveness at these key DOD intermodal nodes.

In addition to preserving and expanding global access, we continue to optimize infrastructure in the continental United States (CONUS) and our territories. Using the 2008 Port Look study, SDDC in collaboration with members of the National Port Readiness Network designated three new strategic seaports—Charleston Naval Weapons Station, SC, the Port of Port Arthur, TX and the commercial Port of Guam. Adding these ports will provide the flexibility to meet current and future deployment requirements in the U.S. and the Western Pacific region.

LEADING THE JDDE TRANSFORMATION

Improving the DOD Supply Chain

USTRANSCOM and our JDDE partners are driving tangible improvements in the DOD supply chain by developing new tools and processes that allow us to monitor the flow—knowing what is in the pipeline, where it is and how fast it is moving. For example, as DOD's lead proponent for radio frequency identification and related automatic identification technology, we continue to expand use of these technologies to gain exquisite visibility into the supply chain.

The data this technology provides has proven invaluable in reducing pilferage and monitoring delivery performance on the PAKGLOC into Afghanistan. Our industry partners and Services are expanding their use on the NDN from the north as well.

Another extremely useful tool is the Integrated Distribution Lanes (IDL) model. This model breaks up the complex supply chain into measurable and controllable route segments along which we monitor the movement of people and cargo. Armed with actionable data, USTRANSCOM, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Services gain performance visibility “inside the pipe.” This enables us to eliminate bottlenecks and chokepoints in the supply chain and identify intermodal transportation options to reduce costs.

In 2009, as part of our DPO Strategic Opportunities, we successfully launched three improvement initiatives. First, we improved on-time delivery performance to customers in USPACOM by up to 28 percent by synchronizing distribution processes between agencies at hand-off points—we essentially removed “dead time” from the supply chain for USPACOM commodities. We plan to apply these principles to USCENTCOM in the near future.

Second, we created a new Surface Route Plan that helps us determine whether routing surface cargo directly to the customer or using consolidation centers is more cost efficient and has a better chance of meeting the required delivery date. By using this planning tool to identify consolidation opportunities, we have increased the use of more cost-effective 40-foot containers (vice 20-foot containers) to maximize utilization of the containers and reduce overall cargo hold time in CONUS. We anticipate these improvements will reduce over-ocean shipping costs by \$8 million per year and increase cargo velocity by up to 25 percent.

Third, we implemented a new service at the Travis AFB aerial port when there is not enough cargo available to justify a full plane charter. This less-than-planeload (LPL) option allows the aerial port to switch to other contract vehicles to best meet shipping requirements and

required delivery dates at reasonable cost. We are in the initial stages of incorporating commercial less-than-planeload service into our portfolio of services provided by aerial ports at select locations when we cannot fully use an entire aircraft. This service provides another option for matching cargo demand with shipping capacity and will provide USTRANSCOM additional flexibility to meet the warfighter's needs.

One of USTRANSCOM's efficiency improvement efforts is the Defense Transportation Coordination Initiative, implemented to transform CONUS freight movement from a disparate locally managed process to a more integrated, enterprise level program. In partnership with the DLA and the Services, the program's performance goals for on-time pickup and delivery, minimal damage, claims, small business participation and cost savings/avoidance are all on track. We have activated over 70 sites across the U.S.—that number is growing, as is the gross cost savings, which is approaching \$93.6 million—a 30.4 percent gross freight cost avoidance.

Improved visibility across the DOD supply chain is dependent on maturing the enterprise information technology portfolio. Since being designated as the DPO in 2003, USTRANSCOM has been streamlining information technology systems, eliminating those where it makes sense, converging others, and creating a capabilities-based, web-enabled, enterprise level portfolio of services. Our goal is to standardize common distribution processes and information exchanges while allowing the Services the flexibility to be unique where required.

Developing expeditionary capabilities also enhances our ability to provide quick response to needs in any AOR. In 2009, SDDC took control of the Army's Rapid Port Opening Elements from U.S. Forces Command. These elements support TRANSCOM's Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF-PO)—an on-call, jointly trained, worldwide deployable team which enables the rapid opening of ports. This new command and control arrangement allows us to tailor port opening teams for both air and seaports and rapidly deploy them to meet COCOM requirements.

Looking Ahead

Looking ahead, USTRANSCOM will continue to support irregular warfare against a global enemy with the challenges of widely dispersed operations, diminishing overseas access, and unsecured supply lines of communication. We will do so in partnership with our joint, inter-agency and coalition partners using a highly integrated network of commercial and military capability.

To support those future operations, we are continuously exploring ways to support the future force. Our Afghanistan operations emphasize the need to operate and sustain our troops in all environments, including those with limited access and significant infrastructure challenges. Through our Deployment and Distribution Enterprise Technology Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Program, we leverage emerging technologies to meet these and other challenges. For example, in partnership with the U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Marine Corps, we achieved promising results using the A160T Hummingbird unmanned aircraft to test delivery of cargo to sustain the warfighter in austere and urban environments.

We are also working on the next generation of guidance, navigation and control systems for the Joint Precision Airdrop System, a combat-proven tool which has given us outstanding results in the high terrain of Afghanistan. These upgrades will improve airdrop accuracy and expand ability to resupply our forces in remote and isolated areas.

Finally, USTRANSCOM and the Navy are in final stages of demonstrating a new crane system that allows the transfer of 20-foot containers between vessels in heavy seas. When fully developed, these cranes will provide a means to sustain the joint force from the sea in locations without fixed port infrastructure. These representative RDT&E investments may greatly improve the precision and velocity of the DOD supply chain. We appreciate the congressional

support for our RDT&E program—it delivers cost-effective, life-saving distribution and logistics innovations to the warfighter.

Fiscal Stewardship

USTRANSCOM is ever mindful of costs, and we constantly seek cost efficiencies through improvements to how we deliver support to the warfighters. Since 2003, we and our enterprise partners have avoided over \$3.2 billion in costs through transformational distribution initiatives, improving supply alignment, and optimizing strategic air and surface processes—all while simultaneously improving end-to-end velocity and delivery effectiveness.

Additionally, as the DOD's largest consumer of hydrocarbons, we continue to pursue alternative fuels. AMC made significant progress in 2009—the C-17 and C-5 are now fully certified for unrestricted use of coal-based or natural gas-based synthetic fuel blends. Additionally, the C-130J and KC-135 completed testing and await their certification. Efforts are underway between AMC and the Federal Aviation Administration to certify the remaining AMC aircraft types. We see certification in biofuels as one more step toward a long term effort to significantly reduce reliance on petroleum products.

FINAL THOUGHTS

USTRANSCOM's mission is to get our warfighters to the fight, to sustain them in the fight and to get them home when the mission is complete, while doing so effectively and efficiently. We are also mindful that our capability to help those in need brings them hope, serves as a message of our nation's strength and demonstrates directly the American people's compassion. I am extremely proud of the men and women of the United States Transportation Command. Together with our partners across the globe, we operate a unique enterprise that saves lives every day and allows our warfighters to win. This unrivaled team will continue to mature and transform the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise to enhance its logistics

capabilities, focus its resources, and deliver superior support to our warfighter, our nation and all those in need. USTRANSCOM has earned the trust of those we support, and as each new challenge arises, we will always, always deliver. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for your committee's continued superb support for USTRANSCOM and for your steadfast commitment to the members of our Armed Forces.



General Duncan J. McNabb
Commander, U.S. Transportation Command



Gen. Duncan J. McNabb is Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.

General McNabb graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1974. A command pilot, he has amassed more than 5,400 flying hours in transport and rotary wing aircraft. He has held command and staff positions at squadron, group, wing, major command and Department of Defense levels. During operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, General McNabb commanded the 41st Military Airlift Squadron, which earned Military Airlift Command's Airlift Squadron of the Year in 1990. The general commanded the 89th Operations Group, overseeing the air transportation of our nation's leaders, including the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. He then served as Commander of the 62nd Airlift Wing. The wing's performance in 1996 earned the Riverside Trophy as the 15th Air Force's outstanding wing. He also commanded the Tanker Airlift Control Center and Air Mobility Command.



General McNabb's staff assignments have been a variety of planning, programming and logistical duties. These include serving as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs on the Air Staff and Chairman of the Air Force Board having oversight of all Air Force programs. He also served as the Director for Logistics on the Joint Staff where he was responsible for operational logistics and strategic mobility support to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Prior to his current assignment, he was Vice Chief of Staff.

EDUCATION

1974 Bachelor of Science degree, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.
 1977 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
 1983 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence
 1984 Master of Science degree in international relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles
 1993 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
 1994 Air War College, by correspondence
 1995 Program for Senior Officials in National Security, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 1998 Executive Program for General Officers of the Russian Federation and the United States, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
 2000 National Security Decision-Making Seminar, Center for Strategic Education, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. June 1974 - May 1975, student, undergraduate navigator training, Mather AFB, Calif.
2. August 1975 - April 1978, instructor navigator, 14th Military Airlift Squadron, Norton AFB, Calif.
3. April 1978 - April 1979, airlift director, 63rd Military Airlift Wing, Norton AFB, Calif.
4. April 1979 - April 1980, student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz.
5. August 1980 - August 1983, instructor pilot and chief pilot, 14th Military Airlift Squadron, Norton AFB, Calif.
6. August 1983 - July 1984, general's aide, Air Force Inspection and Safety Center, Norton AFB, Calif.
7. July 1984 - June 1986, Chief, Plans Integration Branch, Headquarters MAC, Scott AFB, Ill.
8. June 1986 - June 1988, aide to the Commander, U.S. Transportation Command and MAC, Scott AFB, Ill.
9. June 1988 - November 1990, chief pilot, later, operations officer, 17th Military Airlift Squadron, Charleston AFB, S.C.
10. November 1990 - January 1992, Commander, 41st Military Airlift Squadron, Charleston AFB, S.C.
11. January 1992 - August 1992, Deputy Group Commander, 437th Operations Group, Charleston AFB, S.C.
12. August 1992 - June 1993, student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
13. July 1993 - June 1995, Chief, Logistics Readiness Center, the Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
14. July 1995 - July 1996, Commander, 89th Operations Group, Andrews AFB, Md.
15. July 1996 - July 1997, Commander, 62nd Airlift Wing, McChord AFB, Wash.
16. August 1997 - June 1999, Commander, Tanker Airlift Control Center, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
17. June 1999 - December 1999, Deputy Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
18. December 1999 - April 2002, Director of Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
19. April 2002 - July 2004, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
20. August 2004 - October 2005, Director for Logistics, the Joint Staff, Washington, D.C.
21. October 2005 - September 2007, Commander, Headquarters Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
22. September 2007 - September 2008, Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
23. September 2008 - present, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott AFB, Ill.

FLIGHT INFORMATION

Rating: Command pilot, navigator

Flight hours: More than 5,400

Aircraft flown: T-37, T-38, C-141, C-17, C-21, C-20 and UH-1H

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Defense Distinguished Service Medal

Distinguished Service Medal

Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Air Force Achievement Medal
Combat Readiness Medal with oak leaf cluster
National Defense Service Medal with two bronze stars
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Southwest Asia Service Medal with two bronze stars
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal
NATO Medal (Former Republic of Yugoslavia)
Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
Kuwait Liberation Medal (Government of Kuwait)

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS

Commander's Trophy, Undergraduate Pilot Training, Air Training Command
Orville Wright Award for outstanding UPT graduate, Order of Daedalians
Order of the Sword, AMC

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION

Second Lieutenant June 5, 1974
First Lieutenant June 5, 1976
Captain June 5, 1978
Major Oct. 1, 1985
Lieutenant Colonel June 1, 1989
Colonel Jan. 1, 1993
Brigadier General July 27, 1998
Major General Feb. 26, 2001
Lieutenant General April 19, 2002
General Dec. 1, 2005

(Current as of September 2008)

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

MARCH 17, 2010

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SPRATT

General PETRAEUS. The annual programmed cost to maintain the Afghan National Security Forces at 305,600 is approximately 6.2 billion dollars. Our aspirational goal of the Afghan National Security Forces at a combined strength, which includes both the Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army, of 400,000 troops has an annual programmed cost of approximately 10.3 billion dollars. [See page 18.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

General PETRAEUS. First it should be noted that the tactical directive issued by General McChrystal, which is what I think we are really talking about, is command guidance and not a change to the Rules of Engagement. As such, no U.S. service-members have been charged for violating the tactical directive. The tactical directive was never intended as a punitive measure but rather as a positive measure to focus commanders and troopers on protecting the Afghan people. It's not a punitive order and was never intended to be. The tactical directive has been an effective means of reducing civilian casualties, which is not only a moral imperative but also a key to accomplishing our mission. [See page 29.]

Admiral OLSON. All three Navy SEALs belonged to SEAL Team 10 located in Little Creek, VA. At the time of the incident, they were augmenting SEAL Team 7 who was on deployment in Iraq and fell under the jurisdiction of Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT).

The three SEALs were offered non-judicial punishment; they all refused non-judicial punishment and they all demanded trial by court-martial. It was only after the SEALs demanded trial by court-martial that the Commander, SOCCENT referred special courts-martial charges. Commander, SOCCENT is the Convening Authority for all three trials. In all three cases, the accuser (the person who "brings" the charges under the provisions of the Uniformed Code of Military Justice) was a member of our uniformed forces.

Region Legal Service Office Mid-Atlantic (located in Norfolk, VA) is providing the Military Trial Counsels/Prosecutors.

Naval Legal Service Office Mid-Atlantic (located in Norfolk, VA) is providing detailed Military Defense Counsels. Additionally, all three of the accused have retained their own civilian defense attorneys at no expense to the government.

Trial dates:

U.S. v. Keefe 19–21 Apr 10 (Iraq)

U.S. v. Huertas 23–26 Apr 10 (Iraq)

U.S. v. McCabe 3 May 10 (Norfolk) [See page 29.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ

Admiral OLSON. As of 26 MAR 2010, the percent of total SOF deployed in CENTCOM AOR was 84.76%. The breakdown for Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan are as follows:

AFG: 5,834

IZ: 4,544

PAK: 139 [See page 32.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY

General PETRAEUS. My written posture statement lists categories of cross-cutting issues that are major drivers of instability, inter-state tensions, and conflict in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). These factors can serve as root causes of instability or as obstacles to security. They help describe the strategic context of the region.

These categories are not listed in order of priority, nor should they be thought of in this way. Because local conditions across the AOR are complex and unique,

it is more relevant to the prioritization of our efforts to analyze and compare specific issues within a category of issues than simply to compare the broad categories. Regarding the issue of disputed territories, for instance, competing claims by several Central Asian countries to parts of the Fergana Valley, though important, do not serve as a catalyst for conflict nearly as much as the competing claims over Kashmir by Pakistan and India do. In addition, because these factors present greater challenges to security wherever they are found in combination, it is more relevant to analyze the major systems of conflict throughout the AOR, such as in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Yemen, than to analyze specific cross-cutting issues. As such, we assess the situation in the AOR by disaggregating the problem set into sub-regional systems. This general framework allows for the greatest specificity and rigor in analyzing the threats to U.S. interests and delineating our priorities.

The posture statement clearly lists and describes our priorities in the section immediately preceding the description of the cross-cutting issues. Specifically, it is our assessment at CENTCOM that the most serious threats to U.S. interests lay at the nexus of militant groups, hostile states, and weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, we believe that the greatest potential for these threats is found in the instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the activities and policies of the Iranian regime, the situation in Iraq, and the growth of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen. Reinforcing these points, the statement goes on to describe the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan as the most urgent problem set in the CENTCOM AOR and the activities and policies of the Iranian regime as the major state-level threats to regional stability. The challenges associated with these sub-regional systems are our priorities at CENTCOM, and we devote the overwhelming majority of our resources and energy to addressing them. [See page 43.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 17, 2010

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BRADY

Mr. BRADY. A recent news report stated that SOF units in Afghanistan were being moved under Gen McChrystal's purview and control due to civilian casualty numbers that exceeded those of other units. Who were they previously reporting to? Wouldn't their reporting to a chain other than that lead by the overall commander lead to a divergence of effort and effect? My concern is not to witch-hunt the SOF units or their judgment, but when so much of the success depends on a continuity of focus providing a better alternative than the Taliban, how can we not have unity of purpose and command for all of our forces on the ground? There is certainly a great deal of strain on the SOF units, and has been since 9/11. We have made great strides in increasing the numbers of operators to alleviate this pressure. Another step we can take is to shed some of the missions to the Army's more streamlined Brigade Combat Teams. What missions can you see the regular Army/Armed Forces taking, like indigenous troop training, theater security cooperation, etc?

Admiral OLSON. General McChrystal's new policy was a natural outgrowth of his plans as the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Commander to unify his command. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployed to Afghanistan have always operated under the tactical control of the senior U.S. Commander in Afghanistan, currently USFOR-A Commander (GEN McChrystal). All U.S. forces deployed to the USCENCOM Area of Operation had been under the operational control of the U.S. Central Command's Special Operations Component or Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT). This recent change gives operational control of all U.S. Marine and select SOF operating in Afghanistan to USFOR-A Commander. Operational control gives the commander greater authority and unity of effort among all his forces under his command.

We have been working closely with Joint Staff to ensure the appropriate force is selected to support the mission. We routinely validate force requests from Combatant Commands to determine whether General Purpose Forces (GPF) or special operators are needed to support the mission. Yes, there are missions that conventional forces could assist/perform entirely. These missions include those involving basic skills training and those that do not require specialized training, language/cultural skills or special equipment. A number of these missions can and are conducted by GPF, some of these missions include: Training, Information Operations, and Reconnaissance. Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions which encompass several host nation building activities are also conducted by both GPF and SOF. Increasing SFA capabilities within the Services will significantly help in reducing the current demand on our special operations forces.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCMORRIS RODGERS

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. General McNabb, as you know, I proudly represent Fairchild Air Force Base, the tanker hub of the west. With the springtime offensive in Afghanistan, the redeployment from Iraq, and the humanitarian relief efforts around the world expanding to include Haiti and Chile, what does the future of the tanker taskings look like in the short and long term?

General MCNABB. Fairchild Air Force Base continues to provide world-wide air refueling in support of myriad operations, including Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), Homeland Defense, and U.S. Pacific Command requirements, to name a few. In support of OEF, Fairchild flew 357 tanker sorties in CY 2009 and 58 sorties in the first quarter of CY 2010. Given the surge of combat forces in Afghanistan, the potential exists for increased tanker tasking.

In addition to Central Command operations, Fairchild also provides support for multiple operations in the Pacific theater. U.S. Pacific Command covers a vast geographical area of responsibility that requires extensive air refueling capability for mission success. In CY 2009, Fairchild flew 157 missions delivering over 3 million pounds of fuel in support of U.S. Pacific Command. That support increased in the first quarter of CY 2010 as 57 sorties delivered over 1 million pounds of fuel.

Fairchild is a major player in the Homeland Defense mission, too. Fairchild tankers flew 17 Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) sorties in CY 2009 and 42 sorties in the

first quarter of CY 2010, providing a total of 3,433,600 pounds of fuel to support the mission of securing the skies above the Vancouver Olympic Games. With the exception of the air refueling requirements supporting the Vancouver Olympics, during January to March 2010, I anticipate the 2010 ONE requirement to mirror requirements for 2009.

Priority 1 and 2 missions remain a key component in Fairchild's air refueling mission. Priority 1 and 2 missions are categorized as Presidential mission support, operational and strategic mission support. Fairchild aircrews flew 802 Priority 1 and 2 tanker sorties in CY 2009 and the first quarter of CY 2010, moving over 24 million pounds of fuel.

Because of the constant requirement for their services, the continuing high level of operations, and Fairchild's rock-solid reliability, Fairchild's mission will remain vital to U.S. Transportation Command for both the short term and long term. Please convey my sincere thanks and appreciation to your constituents at Fairchild Air Force Base.

The overall mission of the KC-135 will also continue to be vital to U.S. strategic policy as a force extender, for both the short and long term. Please bear in mind that replacement of our aging tanker fleet remains my number one acquisition priority. Worldwide, KC-135 Priority 1 and 2 missions delivered over 284 million pounds of fuel and flew 8,476 sorties in CY 2009. The first quarter of CY 2010 shows the KC-135 is close to those worldwide numbers with 1,855 sorties delivering over 54 million pounds of fuel. These U.S. Air Force tankers support all of our military services, as well as providing air refueling support to our international partners. They are a potent symbol of America's ability to reach out anywhere, at any time.

Mrs. McMORRIS RODGERS. How has the delayed KC-X acquisition process impacted your ability to perform your missions?

General McNABB. While we are meeting current operational requirements in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom, we are doing so at a higher mobilization rate of Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG) KC-135s due to aircraft availability and reliability rates. Furthermore, decreasing aircraft availability in the KC-135 fleet impacts our ability to meet full war plan requirements. This impact will likely increase if the fielding of the KC-X continues to slip. As with any aging airframe, there is also an increasing risk of having an unknown structural issue that could impact the entire KC-135 fleet.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ELLSWORTH

Mr. ELLSWORTH. In his recent report to Congress on the deployment of non-lethal weapons, the Secretary of Defense indicated that each Service is providing escalation of force tools and capabilities training to its forces prior to their deployment. Unfortunately, the report offered no information on types of escalation of force equipment warfighters are being trained for, the duration of that training, or assessments of how these tools are being used in theater. Can you please provide for the record, information on the types of non-lethal weapons/escalation of force tools on which each service is training, the hours committed to that training, and an assessment of how those tools are being deployed by each service branch in Afghanistan and Iraq?

General PETRAEUS. The specific types of non-lethal weapons/escalation of force tools, training, and detailed assessment of their deployment are best answered by the Services as they are the force providers responsible for providing trained and equipped forces to meet Combatant Command requirements. In the USCENTCOM AOR, Air Force, Army and Marines employ non-lethal weapons/tools at Entry Control Points (ECP), around Forward Operating Bases (FOB), and at air bases. Marines and Army additionally employ non-lethal weapons and tools during convoy operations, and at deliberate or hasty checkpoints. All Services use non-lethal weapons/tools for dismounted patrols, crowd control, general protection, and for Detention Operations.

These non-lethal weapons/tools include visual aids such as orange safety vests and cones, portable and hand-held high-intensity light sets, red flashing lights, traffic paddles, pen flares, and DOD-approved green dazzling lasers. They also include acoustic hailing devices with phaselator/voice translators, and several types of non-lethal munitions to include 12 gauge, 40MM, and compressed air paintball marking rounds. We generally assess that non-lethal weapons/tools are effectively deployed to and employed by most units and troops, and the number of troops employing them is increasing with each unit rotation. However; there is a requirement for con-

tinued development and training of these weapons/tools to improve their effectiveness and reliability.

