    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 111-124]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                             FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

                                       ON

                 BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                               FEBRUARY 24, 2010

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13

                      U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    58-171                    WASHINGTON : 2010
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
    For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
    http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202�09512�091800, or 866�09512�091800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

                       HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                         One Hundred Eleventh Congress

                        IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
    JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina          HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
    SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas                  California
    GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi             ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
    NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii             MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
    SILVESTRE REYES, Texas               WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
    VIC SNYDER, Arkansas                 W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
    ADAM SMITH, Washington               J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
    LORETTA SANCHEZ, California          JEFF MILLER, Florida
    MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina        JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania        FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
    ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey           ROB BISHOP, Utah
    SUSAN A. DAVIS, California           MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
    JIM MARSHALL, Georgia                BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
    MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam          CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
    BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana              K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
    PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania      DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    HANK JOHNSON, Georgia                ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
    CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire     MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
    JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DUNCAN HUNTER, California
    DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa                 JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
    JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania             MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
    GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona          THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
    NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts          TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
    GLENN NYE, Virginia
    CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
    LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
    MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
    ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
    BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
    SCOTT MURPHY, New York
    WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York
    DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

                        Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
                      Will Ebbs, Professional Staff Member
                   Jenness Simler, Professional Staff Member
                         Liz Drummond, Staff Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2010

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Wednesday, February 24, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense
      Authorization Act--Budget Request from the Department of the
      Navy...........................................................     1

    Appendix:

    Wednesday, February 24, 2010.....................................    47
                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2010
      FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST
                        FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' A Representative From
      California, Ranking Member, Committee On Armed Services........     3
    Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Conway, Gen. James T., USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.......     8
    Mabus, Hon. Ray, Secretary of the Navy...........................     4
    Roughead, Adm. Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy...     6

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Conway, Gen. James T.........................................    99
        Mabus, Hon. Ray..............................................    55
        McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''..............................    53
        Roughead, Adm. Gary..........................................    75
        Skelton, Hon. Ike............................................    51

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Bartlett.................................................   121
        Mr. Skelton..................................................   121

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Akin.....................................................   126
        Mr. Hunter...................................................   131
        Mr. Lamborn..................................................   130
        Mrs. McMorris Rodgers........................................   130
        Mr. Thornberry...............................................   125
        Ms. Tsongas..................................................   125
        Mr. Wilson...................................................   128
      FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT--BUDGET REQUEST
                        FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                          Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 24, 2010.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
    of the committee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
            MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        The Chairman. Good morning. Today the House Armed Services
    Committee meets to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2010
    budget request for the United States Navy and Marine Corps.
        Appearing before the committee the Honorable Ray Mabus,
    Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval
    Operations [CNO]; and General James T. Conway, Commandant,
    United States Marine Corps.
        Now, Mr. Secretary, we note that this is your first time
    testifying before our full committee, and we welcome you--and
    Admiral Roughead.
        General Conway, thank you for your continued service, and
    thank you for the service of those that serve with you, and
    under you.
        Today the United States Navy has 194 ships under way. Of
    those 143 are deployed. These numbers equate to over 53,000
    sailors deployed in support of the Navy's missions worldwide.
    To support combat operations, the Navy has 15,600 individual
    augmentees deployed in the CENTCOM [United States Central
    Command] area of responsibility.
        The United States Marine Corps is almost 30,000 Marines
    deployed. A little over 15,000 Marines are on the ground in
    Afghanistan. Many of those are currently engaged in hostile
    combat in and around the town of Marjah in the Helmand
    Province.
        I am sure I speak for all members of our Committee when I
    say that our thoughts and prayers are with all the deployed
    sailors and Marines, with their families, and with particular
    concern for those Marines who are currently engaged in the
    combat operations.
        And I have said this before, but it bears repeating. Our
    sea services are this nation's fast response force. The Navy
    power base is maneuvered from the sea. Marine Corps is and
    should remain an amphibious assault force and a crisis aversion
    force.
        Current operations over the last seven years have stressed
    our Marine Corps, and fashioned them to more the medium-heavy
    ground combat force. And I am a bit concerned about that.
        We remain committed to provide our sailors and Marines with
    equipment they need to accomplish the task before them. There
    are challenges. The Navy must recapitalize the main battle
    fleet to numbers which can support the COCOM's [Unified
    Combatant Command's] requirements. The 30-year Shipbuilding
    Plan submitted with the budget request only partially
    accomplishes this task. I will repeat that, only partially
    accomplishes this task. From that plan it appears the costs
    associated with replacing the Ohio-class ballistic missile
    submarine is so high that efforts to restore numbers in the
    surface force and the attack submarine force may have to be
    sacrificed to pay for the national strategic deterrence mission
    of the ballistic missile submarine.
        Shipbuilding plans don't address the requirement of a 38-
    ship force of amphibious assault ships. At best the
    shipbuilding plan provides a force of amphibious ships in the
    low 30s. And it seems to me that might be an unacceptable risk.
    And I am sure that our Committee will carefully review this
    proposed Navy shipbuilding plan.
        I am very concerned about the looming strike fighter
    shortfall in Navy aviation. In short, I don't understand why
    the F/A-18 Strike Fighter program has not been extended. By any
    analysis, more Navy and Marine Corps fighters will be needed to
    meet validated inventory requirements by the middle of the
    decade. Delays in the Joint Strike Fighter Program only
    exacerbate the problem of a near-term strike fighter shortfall.
        The Navy and Marine Corps continue to be challenged in
    maintenance and recapitalization. I am pleased to see an
    increase in the Navy's request for operation and maintenance
    funds. I note that in Admiral Roughead's response to the
    ranking member's request for the Navy unfunded priority list,
    the CNO lists spare parts and deferred maintenance as his three
    most vital shortfalls.
        Year over year deferred maintenance seems to pile up. If we
    cannot seem to find the funding to maintain our ships and our
    planes and our equipment, I am deeply concerned about the
    additional cost of replacing them prior to the end of their
    expected life service.
        Deployments have always been a part and parcel to sea
    service. That happens every day. Sea services have always lived
    in a reality of deployment. Reset, retraining, redeployment.
    And I have been very concerned that the average Navy deployment
    cycle has gradually increased from a traditional 6-month
    deployment with an 18-month maintenance and retraining period
    to deployments averaging 8 months with comparable reduction in
    the maintenance and retraining period.
        The stress on the force, frankly, is increasing. I would
    like to address the relocation of the Marines from Okinawa. It
    is essential that we preserve the unique strategic relationship
    that exists between Japan and our country. At the same time it
    is imperative that we reduce our force structure in Okinawa and
    retain the strategic capabilities associated with the third
    Marine Expeditionary Force.
        While I understand the desire of the new government of
    Japan to review the current basing agreements, we need to move
    forward with the overall realignment that includes a
    replacement facility and the Guam relocation.
        In the end we need to ensure that the Marine Corps and the
    supporting communities are in a better position.
        We need to get this move right. We can't go back and undo a
    mistake.
        And now I turn to my good friend, the ranking member, the
    gentleman from California, Buck McKeon.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the
    Appendix on page 51.]

     STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
      FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, General Conway, good
    morning. Welcome.
        In particular, General, with your forthcoming retirement, I
    guess this is your last posture hearing. I am sure you have
    been looking forward to this with mixed emotion.
        We look forward to all of your testimony here today. And
    really appreciate your service and what you do for the country,
    and your leadership.
        The President's Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget for the
    Department of the Navy requests $179.1 billion for
    discretionary and war funding. According to the Defense
    Department, this represents an increase of $5.2 billion over
    fiscal year 2010 enacted levels.
        From what I gather in the press, the three of you deserve a
    significant amount of credit for your advocacy for Navy and
    Marine Corps personnel and programs.
        However, I am concerned that the Department's [of Defense]
    efforts to make balance a fixture in the QDR [Quadrennial
    Defense Review] and the out-year budget is shortsighted, and
    puts the Department on the wrong path for the next 20 years.
        While the QDR states that U.S. forces must be able to
    deter, defend against and defeat aggression in anti-access
    environments, neither the Department of the Navy's fiscal year
    2011 budget request, nor the long-term shipbuilding or aviation
    plans appear to make significant long-term investments in the
    capabilities that would be required to achieve that goal.
        We have previously received testimony that the QDR and the
    fiscal year 2011 budget proposed a number of new initiatives
    designed to provide robust capabilities for tomorrow's force,
    such as a new SSBN [Nuclear-Powered Submersible Ship with
    Ballistic Capability] submarine, the F-35 ballistic missile
    defense, the Virginia-class attack submarine.
        While I agree that investments in these areas are
    necessary, they are neither sufficient, nor do they tell the
    full story.
        For example, the decision to fund the new SSBN submarine
    from within the Navy's shipbuilding procurement account could
    decimate the shipbuilding program in the out-years because the
    new SSBN will cost at least $7 billion, or close to half of the
    Navy's recent ship construction budgets. The F-35 program
    continues to experience developmental delays that only
    exacerbate the Navy and Marine Corps' strike fighters'
    shortfall. Yet the QDR and the budget request do nothing to
    rectify this situation.
        We are building two Virginia-class attack subs per year
    starting in fiscal year 2011. Yet the shipbuilding plan we just
    received has our force falling to 39 by 2030, leaving our
    combatant commanders worse off than they are now.
        The proposed regional missile defense architecture relies
    on the Navy's surface combatants. Nevertheless, the
    shipbuilding plan proposes a smaller surface combatant fleet
    than the last plan did. I need not go on. I am hopeful that you
    can provide further insights for this committee to help us
    understand how the QDR and the fiscal year 2011 budget reflect
    a comprehensive approach to providing the capabilities the Navy
    and Marine Corps will need in the future.
        Lastly, the President has asked Congress to consider a
    major personnel policy change that could affect readiness.
    Therefore, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, I will be
    requesting your views on whether the current law prohibiting
    the service of openly gay men and women should be repealed, and
    on the suggestion that a moratorium on implementing current law
    be put into effect while the Department of Defense studies and
    reviews the issue.
        I am disappointed that the decision has been made not to
    let the service chiefs testify before the military personnel
    subcommittee's hearings on ``don't ask, don't tell.'' That
    decision limits the ability of members to fully understand and
    explore the concerns of the service chiefs about a repeal of
    current law. I would hope that we could continue that
    discussion.
        Once again, I thank you for being here today. I look
    forward to your testimony. I ask unanimous consent that my full
    opening statement be included in the record.
        The Chairman. Without objection it will be.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
    Appendix on page 53.]
        Mr. McKeon. I yield back my time.
        The Chairman. Thank you so much.
        Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours.

           STATEMENT OF HON. RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

         Secretary Mabus. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon, members
    of this committee, it is a real pleasure to be here today
    before the House Armed Services Committee. The CNO, the
    Commandant, and I are grateful for the commitment that the
    members of this committee have shown to our men and women in
    uniform in the Navy and the Marine Corps. We are exceptionally
    proud to be here today representing our sailors, Marines,
    civilians, and their families.
        The Navy and Marine Corps remain the most formidable
    expeditionary fighting force in the world, capable of global
    operations across the entire spectrum of warfare. Today, as the
    Chairman noted, 40 percent of our forces are deployed and over
    half the fleet is at sea.
        In Helmand province, Afghanistan, more than 15,000 Marines
    are engaged in major combat, counterinsurgency, and engagement
    operations, including the effort to clear the Taliban
    stronghold of Marjah.
        They are supported there by naval aircraft flying close air
    support from Eisenhower [USS Dwight D. Eisenhower], and from
    our forward-deployed expeditionary aviation assets. A total of
    more than 12,000 sailors are on the ground in Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and across the broader Middle East, and another
    9,000 sailors and Marines are embarked on our ships at sea.
        Off the coast of Africa, ships are protecting international
    commerce off Somalia, and ships are operating as partnership
    stations with our regional allies. Off the coast of South
    America more ships are stemming the flow of illegal narcotics
    into the United States. Our ballistic missile defense forces
    are ready to defend against any threat to international peace
    in Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific Rim.
        Our forward-deployed forces continue their role as a
    strategic buffer and deterrent against rogue regimes and
    potential competitors alike. And in Haiti, nine ships and 1,900
    Marines from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit continue to
    provide humanitarian aid, disaster relief and medical
    assistance.
        The Navy and Marine Corps are flexible, responsive, and
    everywhere the nation's interests are at stake. Our global
    presence reduces instability, deters aggression, and allows us
    to rapidly respond to any crisis that borders a sea. I believe
    that the President's fiscal year 2011 budget for the Department
    of the Navy is a carefully considered request that gives us the
    resources we need to conduct effective operations and to meet
    all the missions we have been assigned.
        Our shipbuilding and aviation requests concur with the
    findings of the QDR and its objectives of prevailing in today's
    wars, preventing conflict, preparing for future wars, and
    preserving the force.
        With this budget, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue
    to maintain the maritime superiority of our forces, sustain a
    strong American shipbuilding base, and ensure our capacity for
    rapid global response.
        Across the 5 years we have requested the funds to build an
    average of 10 ships a year, including one carrier, one big-deck
    amphib, 10 Virginia-class submarines, and 17 Littoral Combat
    Ships.
        We will leverage the technologies captured from the
    canceled CGX [Next Generation Cruiser] program, and truncated
    DDG-1000 [Zumwalt-Class Destroyer] program, into what will
    become the Flight III Burke-class DDGs. These technologies
    include SPY-3 [AN/SPY-3 radar] and the air and missile defense
    radar.
        Through the submitted shipbuilding plan, we will increase
    the size of our fleet to approximately 320 ships by 2024. In
    our shipbuilding program I believe we have made the most cost-
    effective decisions to achieve the most capable force. One that
    achieves equal flexibility to confront missions across the
    spectrum of conflict, from the technically complex, like
    ballistic missile defense and integrated air defense, to low-
    intensity humanitarian response and regional engagement.
        In aircraft procurement, we have requested just over 1,000
    aircraft across the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program],
    including both fixed and rotary wing. Over the next year, the
    Navy and Marine Corps will continue to move ahead with changes
    to our acquisition process in compliance with the Weapons
    System Acquisition Reform Act. We are aggressively developing
    our acquisition strategies to ensure that on-time and on-budget
    becomes standard for the Navy and Marine Corps.
        I am grateful for the support of this committee for the
    decision to recompete the LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] program
    when it failed to meet program standards. I can assure you that
    we will not hesitate to recompete or cancel other programs
    whenever substandard performance demands change.
        Change is also required to address the way in which the
    Navy and Marine Corps use and produce energy. Energy reform is
    an issue of national security, and it is essential to
    maintaining our strategic advantage, our warfighting readiness,
    and our tactical edge.
        By 2020, I have committed the Navy to generate half of all
    the energy we use from alternative sources. This is an
    ambitious goal. Nothing has ever been accomplished without
    taking some bold steps. Forty years ago I stood watch on the
    deck of the USS Little Rock as a very young junior officer.
    Today, I have the solemn privilege of standing watch on behalf
    of our Navy and Marine Corps in a time of war and national
    challenge.
        I am honored by the trust the President and the Congress
    have placed in me, and fully recognize the solemn obligation I
    have to those who defend us. I, along with the CNO and the
    Commandant, look forward to hearing your thoughts and answering
    your questions that you have concerning our budget requests,
    our programs, our policies. I also look forward to working
    closely with you as we move forward to sustain the Navy and
    Marine Corps as the most formidable expeditionary fighting
    force in the world.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Mabus can be found in
    the Appendix on page 55.]
        The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you, and we think you
    are off to a great start.
        Admiral Roughead, please.

         STATEMENT OF ADM. GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL
                         OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY

        Admiral Roughead. Thank you, sir. Chairman Skelton,
    Congressman McKeon, members of the committee, it is indeed my
    honor to before you again representing the more than 600,000
    sailors and Navy civilians.
        As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, 65,000 of them are
    deployed, 12,000 on land in the Central Command Area of
    Operations, and 56 percent of our fleet is underway, carrying
    out our maritime strategy, a prescient precursor to the 2010
    Quadrennial Defense Review.
        They are projecting power into Afghanistan, building
    partnerships in Africa, delivering relief in Haiti, silently
    patrolling under the sea in every ocean, and providing
    ballistic missile defense in the Arabian Gulf, Western Pacific,
    and Eastern Mediterranean, with pride and determination.
        They are even deployed on the first Littoral Combat Ship
    two years ahead of schedule. And in the first week of that
    ship's deployment, she seized over a quarter of a ton of
    cocaine in the Caribbean. As our sailors and Navy civilians who
    make all things possible, and thanks to your support, we made
    important progress in building tomorrow's Navy, remaining ready
    to fight today and supporting our sailors and Navy civilians
    and families last year.
        This year's budget submission will take us even further. As
    the high demand for our Navy continues apace, we have
    stabilized end strength and the tone of the force remains
    positive. We will continue to aggressively improve wellness
    programs and medical and social services for our wounded
    warriors. Indeed, for all who serve.
        For our fleet as a continuously deployed force, we must
    continue to reset in stride, conducting regular maintenance and
    training so that our ships and aircraft reach their expected
    service lives. This year's budget aligns our baseline budget
    for operations and maintenance accordingly, and reflects a
    significant shift away from supplemental funding. I strongly
    request your support for this important change.
        While we reset, we must also procure ships and aircraft to
    reach our procurement of more than 313 ships. Last year, we
    commissioned 9 ships, and over the next decade our plan
    procures an average of 10 ships per year, significant growth
    for the near term.
        For aviation, I remain committed to bringing new
    capabilities online, the Joint Strike Fighter and unmanned
    aircraft, and maintaining the readiness of our current Naval
    Air Force, all of which give our nation flexibility and
    response, unencumbered by overseas basing. Affordability for
    all our plans will remain fundamental to our decisions. The
    effectiveness of our unmanned systems, ships, and aircraft is a
    feature of the systems which connect them.
        Last year, I brought information capabilities and resources
    under a single Information Dominance Directorate within the
    Navy staff, and commissioned Fleet Cyber Command 10th Fleet,
    and I see the benefits of that change every day.
        I am proud of our Navy's accomplishments last year, and I
    am confident we can achieve even more with this year's budget
    submission. Our risk continues to trend toward significant, and
    achieving the right balance, within and across, my priorities
    remains critical to mitigating it. But I remain optimistic
    because of the outstanding sailors and Navy civilians and the
    spirit of our nation.
        We have seen more challenging times and emerged prosperous,
    secure, and free. I ask you to support our 2011 budget request,
    and thank you for all you do to make the United States Navy a
    global force for good, today and into the future.
        Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead can be found in
    the Appendix on page 75.]
        The Chairman. Admiral, thank you very, very much.
        General Conway, there is a lot of hard work left between
    now and the time we bid farewell to you. Carry on in the
    future. Thank you.

       STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC, COMMANDANT, U.S.
                              MARINE CORPS

        General Conway. Mr. Chairman, Congressman McKeon,
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to report to you on the posture of your Marine
    Corps. My pledge, as it has been over the years, is to provide
    you today a candid and honest assessment.
        Having recently returned from a trip to theatre, I am
    pleased to report to you on the magnificent performance of
    Marines and sailors in combat. If you count a full-year
    enlistment as a generation of Marines, we are now experiencing
    our third generation of great young patriots since our nation
    was provoked on 9/11.
        The first generation broke trail, leading the strikes into
    Afghanistan and Iraq. Our second generation quelled the once-
    volatile province of Anbar. Today there are less than 175
    Marines in Iraq, but our third generation has more than 15,000
    serving in Afghanistan.
        The Marines are fighting a skilled and determined enemy,
    but with the Afghan security forces, they are once again
    proving they are the strongest tribe in the Taliban stronghold
    of Helmand. Let me assure you from what SAR [Sergeant] Major
    and I have witnessed firsthand, the highest morale in the Corps
    resides in those units posted in Afghanistan.
        My written statement to the committee provides a snapshot
    of the Corps and describes our near-term focus, our long-term
    priorities, and our vision of the future. That vision matches
    closely the results of the Quadrennial Defense Review. The
    Secretary of Defense seeks to create a U.S. military more
    closely focused on hybrid threats, yet capable of responding to
    a major contingency. That combination essentially describes the
    Marine Corps that we have built today.
        A Corps that we call a two-fisted fighter, able to perform
    equally well in a counterinsurgency, or in a high-intensity
    combined arms fight. Our resource expenditures, moreover,
    reflect our dual or swing capacity. That is to say that 100
    percent of Marine Corps equipment can be used in a hybrid
    conflict or in a major fight.
        Equivalent procurement is indeed our primary concern as we
    look at the fiscal year 2011 budget and beyond. Our
    requirements for equipment density in Afghanistan, and our
    resolve to reestablish our maritime pre-positions quadrants,
    have driven equipment stocks to an all-time low in our
    operating forces at home station.
        The ability to properly train for a deployment, and
    certainly the ability to respond to an unexpected contingency
    is at significant risk, based on this increasing shortfall.
    Congress has promised to resource us for a reset in
    constitution, but increasingly, we cannot wait for the guns to
    fall silent in Afghanistan for such an effort to begin. We ask
    for your help in this critical area.
        Our military construction accounts in the fiscal year 2011
    budget and the FYDP are sufficient to help maintain the promise
    we have made to our Marines that they will have quality living
    spaces at home between deployments. One need only visit some of
    our major bases and stations to realize that we waited too long
    to begin this effort.
        Similarly, we believe that even in wartime we must continue
    a heavy emphasis on education of our officers and staff NCOs
    [Non Commissioned Officers]. A strong reservoir of strategic
    and operational thinkers is a must on sophisticated joint and
    combined battlefields. Therefore, a quality Marine Corps
    University with facilities to match our already world-class
    student body, faculty, and curriculum is a major priority. We
    trust we will receive your full support in our MILCON [Military
    Construction] investments that will repay huge dividends in the
    years to come.
        Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, I must admit my own
    surprise that our Corps of Marines and their families have
    remained so resilient over these nine years of conflict. They
    have been incredibly determined, loyal, and courageous in an
    effort to see these two wars to a successful close. Much of the
    credit goes to you in the Congress for providing them with the
    finest in equipment, warrior care, quality of life for our
    families, and compensation.
        The number one question in the minds of our troops is
    always: Is the country behind us? The members of Congress have
    answered that question in spades, both by your apportionment of
    the nation's precious resources, but also through personal
    efforts to visit troops in theatre, and those who are wounded
    at Bethesda and Walter Reed.
        As a result of all the above, and the natural tendency for
    Marines to stick around for a fight, our recruitment and
    retention are at all-time highs. I predict that for the second
    year in a row we will close out reenlistment opportunities for
    first-term and career force Marines at the halfway point of the
    fiscal year. Clearly, such a phenomenon would not be possible
    if Marines and their families were not happy in the service of
    their country.
        One day this long war with terrorists and Islamic
    extremists will be over. Your Marine Corps will cease being a
    second land army and gladly rejoin our Navy brothers aboard
    amphibious ships in order to project America's global presence,
    demonstrate American good will, and if need be, protect
    America's vital interests.
        Until that day comes, however, your Corps will continue, as
    we say, to do windows. That is, we will continue to take aboard
    the indomitable youth of America and make them Marines with the
    absolute conviction that as a result they will one day be
    better citizens. We will be trained and as equally prepared to
    rout Taliban fighters in Marjah as we are to feed beleaguered
    Haitians outside Port-au-Prince. With your continued support
    and that of our loyal countrymen, we will do whatever the
    nation asks us to do and do it exceedingly well.
        Thank you, sir, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Conway can be found in
    the Appendix on page 99.]
        The Chairman. General, thank you very much. I think that
    all of us, and I know I speak for all the members of the
    committee, when I say we are immensely proud of the young men
    and young women who wear your uniforms, we are immensely proud
    and thankful for their families and the reflection of the high
    state of morale of which you gentlemen spoke.
        I have been blessed to be in the Congress several years,
    and I remember very well President Ronald Reagan aiming for a
    600-ship Navy. That was a very worthy goal at the time. Today,
    we haven't even reached his halfway mark on that goal. We don't
    even have 300 ships out there.
        The oceans haven't gotten any smaller. Technology has
    gotten a lot better and one of the arguments is we don't need
    as many ships. Nevertheless, it is imperative that we have
    enough presence to make a difference, much less an ability to
    fight. How do you, Mr. Secretary, speed up your suggested
    building and numbers rate? We need to know.
        Secretary Mabus. Mr. Chairman, we have today, as you
    pointed out, 285 ships in our battle fleet and more than half
    of them are underway today. We are very cognizant of the fact
    that our force structure requirement of 2005 said that 313
    ships are a floor and it is a floor that both the CNO and I
    recognize and need to build to get to that level.
        We think that the 5-year shipbuilding plan and the longer
    30-year shipbuilding plan that we have submitted on this
    budget, which builds an average of 10 ships a year, 50 ships
    over this 5-year period, drives us toward that goal. By 2020,
    we will have reached the goal of more than 313 ships in the
    Navy.
        We think it is important to note as you did that these
    ships that we are building today are incredibly capable,
    incredibly technologically advanced and crewed by the best
    sailors and Marines that we have ever had, but at some point
    quantity becomes a quality all its own. And as you pointed out,
    the oceans haven't gotten any smaller and we do need to make
    sure that we are driving to increase the size of our fleet. And
    we believe that the budget that we have submitted to you and
    the shipbuilding plan that we have submitted to you do both of
    those things.
        The Chairman. One of the problems that we faced a few years
    ago and it was a surprise to my friend, Mr. Taylor, the
    Chairman of the Seapower Subcommittee, and as well to me, the
    retirement list of ships wasn't even made known to us
    officially. Of course, that was long before anyone sitting at
    the table here had any say on it.
        But a good part of it is the possibility of reviewing the
    retirement list and maybe we can get some more work out of some
    of these ships and help with the numbers. And as you have so
    correctly noted, quantity has a quality of its very own. I
    charge you with carefully deciding what ships should be with,
    should be on the retirement list.
        General, let me ask you the fact that so many Marines
    today, the whole generation of Marines actually, find
    themselves fighting as Army soldiers in a desert? What will
    that do to the Marine culture of future years?
        General Conway. Sir, as I said in the opening statement, we
    consider ourselves a multicapable force and therefore available
    to do whatever the nation would ask us to do. And, of course,
    as you note correctly, over the past 8 or 9 years, we have been
    asked to serve as a second land army alongside our brothers in
    the United States Army. Our gear has begun to, has accomplished
    the protection that is required and in the process has gotten
    heavier.
        We are a long way from salt sea air and our comfort zones
    as a naval force and yet, I would argue that we are doing it
    pretty well. That is not to say we want to continue to do it
    when the need is gone. We see the great value that we offer to
    the nation. We see our niche within the organization of the
    armed forces being just what you described in your opening
    statement and that is a naval force capable of extending
    America's presence and protecting our vital interests overseas.
        We have distinctly in our plans thought processes that will
    shed us of some of this heavier equipment, examine in detail
    what the amphibious lift, what the STRATCOM [United States
    Strategic Command] aviation lift would look like for rapid
    deployment and that is the Marine Corps we intend to be in the
    future.
        The Chairman. Admiral Roughead, what worries you the most
    as you sit there this morning?
        Admiral Roughead. What worries me the most, Mr. Chairman,
    as I look to the future as is insuring, as you pointed out in
    your statement, that as we get into what I consider to be the
    midterm of our shipbuilding plan that we have taken a good look
    at the costs associated with the replacement for the Ohio-class
    submarine and then the numbers of ships that were procured in
    significant numbers by class in the 80s as they reached the end
    of their service lives and the recapitalization that will be
    required for that.
        But that is beyond the scope of this budget that we have
    submitted, but as I look to the future and think about the
    issues my successors will deal with, that is what I think
    about.
        The Chairman. Can we take that decision on the new Ohio-
    class submarine down the road in favor of additional numbers of
    ships, other types of ships? Because you don't really need it
    until 10, 12, 15 years out.
        Admiral Roughead. No, sir. I think we have to be moving on
    that ship right now. The reason being is that that submarine
    will--the last submarine of the Ohio-class replacement--will
    come off of its last patrol in 2080. And the need to put in the
    types of systems and capabilities to take that ship out to that
    period of time requires significant thought and development and
    now is the time to start.
        It is absolutely consistent with where we have been with
    the Ohio class and I believe now is the time to be moving on
    that and I appreciate the support for that.
        The Chairman. You understand our concern about ship
    numbers, do you not?
        Admiral Roughead. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I deal with the
    demands that we have coming in on a daily basis and I do
    believe that what we have done in the last couple of years to
    get some direction and stability in what I consider to be a
    workhorse of the fleet, the Arleigh Burke class, getting that
    line restarted is absolutely critical to field any capabilities
    we need getting to the downselect on Littoral Combat Ship is
    going to allow us to build those in the most affordable way.
        So I believe that this program that we have put together
    addresses the numbers in the best way.
        The Chairman. Thank you so much. Mr. McKeon.
        Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Roughead and
    General Conway, in your personal view, should the current law
    prohibiting the service of openly gay men and women be repealed
    and what is your personal view with regard to the suggestion
    that a moratorium on implementing the current law be put into
    effect while the Department of Defense studies and reviews the
    issue taking place?
        Admiral Roughead. Mr. McKeon, my personal view is what is
    in the best interest of the United States Navy. And that is to
    go forward with the assessment that has been called for by the
    Secretary of Defense to allow us to assess the force that we
    have today. There are a lot of bits of information and surveys
    that have taken place, but there has never really been an
    assessment of the force that serves. And equally important to
    that force is the opinions of the families who support that
    force.
        That needs to be done because only with that information
    can we talk about the force that we have, not someone else's,
    not another country's--about the United States Navy in my case.
    So we need to proceed down that path. With regard to a
    moratorium, I believe that it would be extremely confusing to
    the force and I do not recommend that.
        Thank you.
        General Conway. Sir, our commander in chief has spoken and
    the Secretary of Defense has devised a way through a working
    group to examine the data, I think, in a way that has never
    been done and I support his efforts and we will contribute to
    that effort as it goes down range. However, I would encourage
    your work, mine and that of the working group to be focused on
    a central issue and that is the readiness of the armed forces
    of the United States to fight this nation's wars.
        That is what our armed forces are intended to do. That is
    what they have been built to do under the current construct and
    I would argue that we have done a pretty good job bringing that
    to pass. So my concern would be if somehow that central purpose
    and focus were to become secondary to the discussion because
    that is what your armed forces is all about.
        Mr. McKeon. And the moratorium?
        General Conway. Sir, in terms of the moratorium, I agree
    with the CNO. Our commanders out in the field are trying to
    execute the guidance to the absolute best of their abilities.
    There is an expression we have, keep it simple. I would
    encourage you either to change the law or not, but in the
    process half measures, I think, will only be confusing in the
    end.
        Mr. McKeon. Thanks very much. Admiral, as I alluded to in
    my opening statement, I remain concerned that the QDR's focus
    on today's wars is precluding the department from making the
    investments that are required for our long-term national
    security interests. Let me provide a specific example.
        The committee has been briefed that the far-term planning
    period in the long-range shipbuilding plan is characterized
    from 2031 to 2040. It is characterized by the emergence of a
    near-peer competitor. While one may debate whether a near-peer
    competitor could emerge sooner than that, it is reasonable to
    assume that the threat of a peer competitor, particularly one
    with significant anti-access capabilities, would increase the
    Navy's reliance on large surface combatants, attack and guided
    missile submarines and amphibious ships.
        Unfortunately, our force structure assumes the greatest
    risk in these exact platforms during this period. Large surface
    combatant force levels decrease from a high of 96 to a
    sustained low of 60 in the 60s and 70s. Attack submarines
    decrease from a high of 55 to 39 with sustained low levels in
    the low 40s during that period. Cruise missile submarines,
    which also provide significant capabilities for special forces,
    disappear entirely. Amphibious ships sustained lows in the--of
    29 and 30--10 percent below the limit of acceptable risk for
    these forces, and over 30 percent below the current
    requirement.
        In your professional assessment are you confident that this
    force could deter or defeat at low to moderate risk a near-peer
    competitor with access capability? And if not, please
    characterize the risk that you see to our national security?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. And
    as I look at the force that we have laid out--the force that
    exists today, and particularly the force that is addressed by
    the budget that is being submitted--I do believe that even
    though there is much talk and discussion about focusing on the
    wars that we are in--I will tell you that the United States
    Navy is all in, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, and in that
    critical area.
        But at the same time I think it is noteworthy that we have
    increased our submarine production to two submarines a year.
    And the Virginia class is out--deployed. It is a terrific
    submarine. We are moving forward, as I said, with the ballistic
    missile defense--or the ballistic missile submarine. The
    advances and the investments that we are making with regard to
    ballistic missile defense in our surface combatants is exactly
    the type of capability that we are going to need in integrated
    air and missile defense. Not just for ballistic missiles, but
    against the cruise missile threat.
        Taking some of the technologies that we will prove in the
    DDG-1000. Coupling that with the direction that we are going
    with our ballistic missile force, and the Arleigh Burke class,
    and in our cruisers, I believe we will then be able to better
    inform the next surface combatant that will address those
    challenges that are out there in the future.
        In aviation we have to get to the Joint Strike Fighter. It
    is an incredible capability. And in this budget, I am extremely
    pleased with what we have been able to do with unmanned
    systems. Particularly the demonstration that we are moving
    forward with the unmanned carrier airborne system. That is also
    going to inform us about that time period that you are talking
    about there. That is going to be extremely important to us. And
    we need to be able to continue that demonstration project.
        And in the area of cyber that is not so much hardware, but
    the reorganization that we have made this past year in the
    Navy, and the stand-up of the 10th fleet, allows us to get into
    that battle space if you will. And that battle space is going
    to become equally important as that which is kinetic.
        So I do believe that we are laying in the right types of
    capabilities that we are going to need for the future.
        Mr. McKeon. Thank you. Understanding that technological
    advances will benefit both our forces, and those of a potential
    peer competitor in the interim, would you be in a better
    position with those--with this proposed force structure than
    you are today if you had more cruisers, destroyers, and
    submarines in the force?
        Admiral Roughead. Mr. McKeon, we are ramping up our
    ballistic missile defense capability, not just in the building
    of the new DDG-51 restarts, but also going back in. And the
    beauty of the weapons system that we currently have is that it
    allows us to modify the current ships so that they are BMD
    [Ballistic Missile Defense]-capable. We are also adding to our
    missile inventory in that regard.
        With respect to submarines, we are meeting all of the
    critical requirements that the COCOMs have levied on us. And I
    see the benefit of what our submarines are doing every day
    around the world. I have the privilege of being debriefed by
    the young commanders as they come back in. And our submarine
    force is meeting the critical requirements of the COCOMs, and
    doing it exceedingly well.
        Mr. McKeon. Well, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I
    think the three of you have done an outstanding job, given the
    limits of the top line for the Navy and the Marines. I am just
    concerned that the top line isn't what we need. And so I think,
    as the Secretary said earlier to us, that our numbers look good
    for the few years ahead. But in the out-years it is a fantasy.
    Not you, Secretary, Secretary Gates.
        And I think that that is a concern that we all need to be
    really aware of. I think that there are probably areas where we
    can save money. But even in our best efforts, I think we are
    still not getting all that we need to protect us in--out into
    the future. So thank you again for all that you are doing, and
    I appreciate it.
        Yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
        Before I call Mr. Ortiz--Admiral, as we speak today, how
    many sailors do you have in either Iraq or Afghanistan doing
    Army type of work?
        Admiral Roughead. Right now, Mr. Chairman, we have 12,000
    sailors on the ground in Iraq and in Afghanistan. And around
    6,000 of them are doing things that are not necessarily within
    what we would consider our core or adaptive core capabilities.
        The Chairman. In other words, they are doing Army work?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. They are working as--in support
    of our ground forces. They are doing extraordinary work I might
    add. And we benefit from that experience as well. Because that
    time that they spend in the fight, on the ground with other
    services--when they come back into the Navy, they bring
    perspectives, they bring leadership experiences. And
    observations on ways of doing things that they otherwise
    wouldn't have.
        And I am also very pleased that they promote at a higher
    rate than those who have not had this experience.
        The Chairman. Thank you. And we now go to the 5-minute
    rule.
        Mr. Ortiz.
        Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, General Conway, I want
    to thank you all for the great service that you have given to
    our country. And thank you so much for joining us today. I just
    have a few questions for all of you on the subject of wind
    farms, and military readiness.
        My district in South Texas trains half of the Navy and
    Marine Corps pilots in the country. And you can imagine that I
    am so proud of these young men and women. And I want to make
    sure that I do everything within my power to provide them the
    best training facilities in the country.
        Now multiple wind farms have emerged in my district--and
    God knows we need all the energy we can get--in very close
    proximity to my two Naval air training bases. These wind farms
    are impacting the use of radar throughout the district, and
    forcing changes in training routes. And interfering with air
    defense radars. And this is what I hear.
        And I understand that this same issue is also impacting
    other Naval installations. My concern is not with the
    development of the wind farm energy. But rather the negative
    impact that these wind farms have on our military readiness.
    Now I wonder what is the Navy doing to ensure that these wind
    farms do not impact radar or military training?
        And I just want to know, because we have different
    agencies. And I see where some departments are granting grants
    for wind energy, solar energy. And I just wonder if the
    agencies are talking to one another to see that whatever they
    do does not impact on the training that we have. Not only in my
    facilities in South Texas, but in other facilities throughout
    where we conduct training.
        And maybe all of you can respond, and give me some insight
    to my question?
        Secretary Mabus. Thank you, sir. We are proud of
    Kingsville, and we do think that they train the best pilots in
    the world there. We are very aware of the wind farm issue
    around Kingsville. And of the other issues that may impact
    training from various directions with various other government
    agencies. And we are keeping a close eye on the wind farms
    around Kingsville. Thus far it is our belief that it, they have
    not interfered with the core training, the essential training
    that is necessary for the pilots.
        If proposals were made to construct wind farms that did, we
    would of course want to take some action to make sure that that
    did not happen. We work closely with other agencies to make
    sure that military readiness, national defense capabilities,
    are not impacted. And that they understand how our needs would
    be affected.
        Mr. Ortiz. General, would you like to add to----
        General Conway. Sir, we have several training aviation
    bases in Arizona, and California in addition to our training
    basis that we share with the Navy in Texas. And our concern
    actually is more with low-flying helicopters, and the potential
    danger that some of these wind farms could have if the pilots
    aren't well aware of their presence.
        And that is the sort of extraordinary effort that we are
    taking at this point to make sure that wind farms that we might
    put on our own bases--and we have some at the Marine Corps
    Logistics Base, Barstow. But others in the vicinity of some of
    our training bases are well noted on our aviation maps. And the
    pilots in low light or low-visibility conditions are certainly
    aware of their presence.
        Mr. Ortiz. Admiral.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We pay particular attention to
    all of our training space. Not just the air training space that
    affects the bases in Texas, but all around the country. And our
    local commanders pay particular attention to it. Here in
    Washington we do. And when we get a sense that there could be
    some encroachment, engage with the appropriate agencies, and
    communities. Because in many cases the communities are seeking
    this sort of development as well--to try to come to a solution
    that allows us to accommodate the important training needs that
    we have, and the needs of the communities. So we do pay very
    close attention to it.
        Mr. Ortiz. Again thank you so much for your service, and
    thank you for joining us today.
        Admiral Roughead. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Bartlett, please.
        Mr. Bartlett. Thank you all very much for your service.
        Admiral, I guess what you see depends on where you sit. My
    understanding is that the Navy is able to respond to little
    more than 40 percent of the requests of the combatant
    commanders for submarines. So I guess critical depends upon
    where you sit. I think that the new Chinese anti-ship missile
    may be a huge game changer. I see little recognition of that in
    the QDR, in the budget, or in your testimony today.
        Admiral, you mentioned that you were aggressively pursuing
    unmanned aircraft in the Navy. And yet we are not aggressively
    pursuing unmanned ships in the Navy. I know why. It is because
    we have too few ships. They are too valuable. We have people on
    ships not because we need them there to sail the ships, but
    because we need them there for damage control.
        We need to be moving to a very much larger Navy with very
    much smaller platforms so that we can move away from manned
    platforms. Half the cost of keeping the ships at sea as you
    know, sir, is the personnel. Which means if you get rid of half
    the personnel, you can have 50 percent more ships. If you get
    rid of all the personnel, you have 100 percent more ships.
        We are going to be attacked where we are the weakest. I
    know that during the Clinton years we largely waived EMP
    [Electromagnetic Pulse] hardening on most of our new platforms.
    To what extent are you EMP-hardened? How much fighting
    capability would remain if you had an EMP lay down of 100
    kilovolts per meter, which is but half of what the Russian
    generals told the EMP Commission the Soviets had developed, and
    the Russians had available?
        Admiral, I am very pleased to note your emphasis on--focus
    on energy. I hope that means that you are aggressively
    supporting the increased nuclearization of our major platforms.
    Seems to me kind of silly to have a carrier that is fueled for
    30 years, and it is supported by ships that are fueled for a
    few days.
        These are my observations, my comments, my questions. Could
    you respond? Thank you.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. The--first off on the meeting
    of the 40 percent of the requirements. As I mentioned, the
    meeting of the critical requirements as a former fleet
    commander--I was the one that had to fulfill those needs. And I
    am very comfortable with the fact that the critical
    requirements are being met for our submarine force.
        The survivability relative to electromagnetic pulses is--it
    is indeed a consideration and something that as we put our
    network architectures together is working through that
    survivability is very key to us. With regard to your specific
    question about the strength of the pulse and the effect on our
    systems, it--with that detail of question, Mr. Bartlett, I
    would like to be able to take that one for the record if I
    could and get back to you.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 121.]
        Admiral Roughead. As we look at ships of the future and
    what that force must be in previous testimony and in
    discussions, I have said I do not have an aversion to nuclear
    power, but I think that there are more factors involved than
    simply the cost of the fuel itself. It is the construction
    cost. It is the maintenance cost. It is the cost of the people.
    And I believe all of that needs to be taken into the equation
    as we look at alternative energy systems for our force of the
    future.
        With regard to the unmanned systems, the one area that I
    would also add where we are moving forward on is an underwater
    unmanned systems which I think are extraordinarily important to
    our future and which they themselves have some unique power
    requirements and we are working on that. But all of that is on
    my scope and I look forward to working on them in the coming
    months and years.
        Mr. Bartlett. You will address the other two questions in
    writing, my question about the Chinese anti-ship missile and
    why you still have people on ships?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. The one of the reasons that we
    have people on ships is that we have not gotten to the full
    automation that we need, but I think the LCS is a perfect
    example of what we are doing to bring people off of ships.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentlemen. The gentleman from
    Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.
        Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of
    you including my former governor and attorney general,
    Secretary Navy Mabus--Secretary of the Navy Mabus for being
    here. I thank all of you for what you do.
        General Conway, let me start by saying that today's
    Washington Post had a very disturbing photograph on the front
    of a mine resistant vehicle that had been attacked in
    Afghanistan. I would like to take the occasion to say that it
    is my hunch that had that been an up-armored Humvee [High
    Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle], every Marine in that
    vehicle probably would have died. It is my hunch that because
    of that vehicle, probably every Marine in that vehicle lived.
        And I want to commend your General Brogan for the job he
    has done in putting that program together on what seems to be
    now an afterthought, fairly short notice and the outstanding
    job he has done and I would hope that he would be properly
    recognized for that.
        Secretary Mabus, you had the distinction, if my memory is
    right, of being the youngest attorney general and the youngest
    governor in Mississippi. I want to give you a third distinction
    and that is the fleet only grew on your watch. The bleeding
    started about 1990 best of my knowledge. Last year for the
    first time, we actually grew the fleet. We went from 285, which
    is too small, to 287, which is too small, and the irony is that
    you and many other CNOs have come before this committee and
    said we need a 313-ship Navy, but your budget request would
    actually shrink about three ships. That is unacceptable.
        If administratively you can't get us towards 313, then we
    are going to have to do it legislatively. Now, one of the ways
    we can do this is we are going to commission 7 ships this year,
    but you are asking for permission to decommission 10. That
    doesn't get you there. That is going the wrong way. So I want
    to--I have had this conversation with our Chairman and I--and I
    just want to put you on notice as my friend and someone who I
    want to work with.
        Decommissioning 10 ships this year is unacceptable. It is
    going to be my intention with the support of our Chairman to
    introduce to have in this year's bill that we are going to have
    legislatively a three-to-two ratio. For every three ships that
    are commissioned by the Navy, you will be giving commissions to
    decommission two. That is going to get us finally on the right
    track towards 313. Again, if it's not done administratively we
    are going to have to do it legislatively.
        One of the proposals that Captain Ebbs has wisely asked the
    Navy to look into will be a SLEP [Selected Life Extension
    Program]-program certified fixed engine for your frigates--for
    about $3 billion, we can keep those approximately 25 frigates
    in the fleet for another 5 years. Now, that would be my first
    preference. If you have a better preference to grow the fleet,
    I want to hear your ideas, but I think that is certainly
    something we need to look into particularly for the missions
    you mentioned off of Latin America, for chasing pirates off of
    Somalia.
        That frigate is more than adequate. If we need to spend
    some money to get another 5 years out of those hulls, then
    let's do it and let's start planning on doing it.
        What I want you to look into now is, you know, we keep
    making mistakes. One of the concerns of the F-35, and I am
    totally in support of, the CNO's plan to get the F-35 into the
    fleet. The question that is being asked as far as the thermal
    footprint of the F-35, on the ships we are constructing today,
    are we planning ahead for the delivery of that vessel so that
    the thermal footprint as far as the backlash shield on the
    carrier and the deck, the large big deck amphibs--that this
    plane is going to fly off of, are we taking the steps today to
    build them to handle that thermal footprint for when that plane
    is delivered a few years in the future.
        Secretary Mabus. And to my friend, Gene Taylor, who I
    served with in other capacities, in terms of the last question
    that you asked, the thermal footprint, we are taking the steps
    both with the blast deflector on the carriers whether it will
    need to be strengthened at all, but if it does, that is a very
    straightforward fix for that blast deflector. We are beginning
    tests on the USS Wasp, a big deck amphib, in terms of the STOVL
    [Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing] version and the thermal
    footprint coming down from that for the Marine version.
        So yes, we are beginning to take steps to make sure that
    when the Joint Strike Fighter joins the fleet that the fleet is
    absolutely ready and capable of handling it.
        Mr. Taylor. Mr. Secretary, in the 8 seconds I have, take a
    look at the 10 ships you asked to decommission, narrow that
    down to two because we need to stop the bleeding this year.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentlemen. Gentleman from Missouri,
    Mr. Akin.
        Mr. Akin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all of
    you in the panel here this morning. I had a couple of quick
    questions. I hope they are quick. The first would be Admiral
    Roughead and also General Conway. We have had some trouble with
    welding and--particularly welding, I guess, on some LPDs
    [Amphibious Transport Dock Ships] and part of that it turns out
    is a workforce problem where we don't have enough welders
    sometimes with the timing of when we build ships.
        So my question is I understand that there could well be a
    serious workforce problem at the shipyards out in San Diego and
    we currently have three LPDs scheduled for 2011, 2013 and 2015.
    My first question is would you be open-minded at least if it
    saves money and if it averts some of that work--it puts the
    work in a more consistent way across the yard to consider 2011,
    2012 and 2013--excuse me, the MLPs [Marine Landing Platform].
    Did I say LPDs? The MLPs which were the Marine landing platform
    ships.
        If we were to consider 2011, 2012, 2013 as opposed to 2011,
    2013, 2015, are you open-minded to at least looking at that if
    it saves money?
        Admiral Roughead. Thank you for the question, sir, and I
    would say that the shipbuilding plan that we have in place is
    one that balances many factors to include how that money is
    spread over time and what the needs of the Navy are and the
    development of that. As you know, the MLP is also a new class
    of ship and acceleration there may not be possible. So I think
    as we look at that, we have to be very mindful and very careful
    of how that balance can be affected.
        Mr. Akin. Certainly. And obviously there is a lot of factor
    that goes into that. My second question is my understanding is
    that your intent is to meet the March 1st goal in terms of the
    Joint Strike Fighter situation to get the discount on buying F/
    A-18s at a lower price.
        First of all, is it correct that you do intend to file that
    paperwork on March 1 to allow us to get a discount on the price
    of the planes?
        Secretary Mabus. We received the letter of intent from the
    contractor on Monday. We know that the deadline is March 1st.
    We are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense who
    would have to make that notification to meet that--to meet that
    deadline.
        Mr. Akin. So the supplier did give us that 10 percent
    number that we had talked about then?
        Secretary Mabus. Yes.
        Mr. Akin. Okay. And so your intent then is to meet that
    deadline as far as you know?
        Secretary Mabus. As we are working hard to meet that
    deadline given the very limited time we have got to do it, and
    we are working very hard with the staff of the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense to do that.
        Mr. Akin. Good. Thank you. Third question is, and this is
    something that I have been beating this drum for a couple of
    years, and--but I am confused and I finally started to figure
    out why I am a little confused in this subject.
        In March of 2008, the department briefed the committee that
    the shortfall of fighters was 188. In January of 2009, we were
    told it was 243. In March of 2009, we were told the shortfall
    was 312. As if by magic 2 months later of 2009, we are told the
    shortfall was 146. The beginning of this month, the Secretary
    of Defense testified the shortfall was 100 aircraft. Last week,
    the committee was told the shortfall was 177. And then 5 days
    later, my staff was told the shortfall was 100.
        So that is why I have been a little confused about this. We
    have gotten some different numbers. None of the numbers said
    zero and all of them said we do have a fighter shortfall. So I
    guess my next question would be in order to deal with that
    problem, would you consider purchasing more aircraft? Is that
    at least one option on the table, yes or no?
        Admiral Roughead. Mr. Akin, we have been working the strike
    fighter management very, very carefully and particularly in the
    case of Navy, we have made some adjustments to squadrons. So we
    have been bringing our number down and we will continue to look
    at how we manage our strike fighter force into the future. It
    in no way should detract from the imperative to get to Joint
    Strike Fighter and the foremost in my mind is----
        Mr. Akin. Excuse me, sir. I--my clock has only got 5
    seconds.
        Admiral Roughead. Okay.
        Mr. Akin. So the quick question is would you consider
    purchasing additional aircraft as one possibility to deal with
    that problem?
        Admiral Roughead. My focus right now, sir, is on looking at
    the SLEP program for our A's and D's [F/A-18 A and D models].
    That is where I am going to be spending most of my time looking
    at.
        Mr. Akin. But you didn't answer my question.
        The Chairman. Admiral, would you like to answer his
    question so we can go onto the next one--questioner?
        Admiral Roughead. As we go into POM [Program Objective
    Memorandum] 12, sir, we are going to look at how to best manage
    the strike fighter fleet. We have some procurements of 18s [F/
    A-18s] laid into this budget, but I also believe it is
    important that we look at the other levers as well.
        The Chairman. Dr. Snyder, please.
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mabus, you
    talk about standing on the USS Little Rock and General Conway
    was born in Arkansas. Admiral Roughead, if you told me you ever
    served on the USS Razorback, which is a retired submarine
    sitting in the Arkansas River, my Arkansas trifecta will be
    complete. But General Conway, a quick question and you can give
    us a quick answer as you want.
        Are you satisfied that the rules of engagement in
    Afghanistan are satisfactory given the difficult challenge our
    men and women have there?
        General Conway. Yes, sir, I am. I ask that question every
    time I go which is about once every 4 months. My commanders are
    comfortable with it. We are pretty good at it and because it is
    who we are with our air ground team and they understand the
    rationale behind. So they support it.
        Dr. Snyder. Good. Thank you. Secretary Mabus, the topic has
    come up about ``don't ask, don't tell'' and I had a
    conversation yesterday with an officer who is currently serving
    on active duty who is a lesbian who says, ``Okay. We appreciate
    they are doing the study. How the hell am I going to be able to
    participate in that study?''
        How will somebody who is currently gay or lesbian serving
    in the military be able to share their views on the impact on
    readiness, anything else intel, without being outed under the
    current policy?
        Secretary Mabus. It is at least my understanding that as
    this study is being shaped by general counsel, the Department
    of Defense, Jay Johnson, and the head of the U.S. Army, Europe,
    General Ham, that they are going to try to have mechanisms for
    anonymous input so that there would not be the jeopardy of
    violating ``don't ask, don't tell'' to simply respond to the
    survey. As I said, it is early in the process of developing
    this survey. But when--but Jay Johnson, the General Counsel of
    Defense, said that they are trying to structure it in that way.
        Dr. Snyder. Yesterday I asked General Schwartz, and you may
    have heard about this. I assume, Secretary Mabus, that you and
    the Admiral and General are familiar with this split of
    authority we currently have between the circuits regarding
    ``don't ask, don't tell'' between the Witt case in the Ninth
    Circuit, and the Cook case in the First Circuit. And so when
    the question is asked, ``Should there be a moratorium?'' we
    have this--you all have a challenge that has been laid on you
    in the fact that the law has changed in the Ninth Circuit.
        How are you all currently responding to the fact that the
    Ninth Circuit has conferred Constitutional protections of what
    they are calling intermediate scrutiny under the due process
    requirements? How are you all responding to that in how do you
    process cases in the Ninth Circuit?
        Secretary Mabus. Again it is my understanding, Congressman,
    that we are--and we do understand the split of decisions
    between the two circuits right now. That we are proceeding to
    follow the law as written across the Navy and the Marine Corps
    as the--I believe that----
        Dr. Snyder. So you are going to ignore the Ninth Circuit
    opinion?
        Secretary Mabus. No, sir. But I believe that that opinion
    is being appealed.
        Dr. Snyder. No, it is not.
        Secretary Mabus. Try to recognize----
        Dr. Snyder. It is not being appealed.
        Secretary Mabus. Then I am incorrect.
        Dr. Snyder. It is not being appealed. And that is the
    challenge. I am not harassing you all about this. I think this
    is a--this is one of the problems we are going to have when we
    say we can study this for a year, and put this off.
        We have a--we now have people that have Constitutional
    protection in the Ninth Circuit at some level that we expect
    you to respond to. The problem is when the admiral sends them
    to Little Rock, or General Conway sends them to the East Coast,
    they lose that protection. And I am not sure how this gets
    worked out. I suggested yesterday one way to do it would be to
    make the venue for all these cases be in the Ninth Circuit.
    Then you have some consistency.
        But you--General Conway, I think you appropriately said
    there is some confusion. That there would be a moratorium. You
    already have confusion. There is already legal confusion that
    you all didn't bring on yourselves. It is being laid on you.
    But I think you are going to need to figure that out, and
    fairly quickly. Cause it is currently the law in the Ninth
    Circuit. And it is not being appealed.
        So I think this will be an ongoing discussion. By the way,
    the--recognizing the venue of the Ninth Circuit might deal with
    some of Senator Levin's concerns. I haven't talked to him about
    it. But it may be a way of getting at some of this transition.
        I wanted to ask have you all--the Andy Krepinevich Group
    put out this study called ``Why AirSea Battle?'' and talks
    about Iran, and China, and where we look at things going in the
    future. Admiral Roughead, have--are you familiar with that--his
    report?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I am. And it is being reflected
    in the air-sea battle that the Navy, the Air Force, and the
    Marine Corps--the air-sea battle study that we are conducting--
    --
        Dr. Snyder. Its currently undergoing?
        Admiral Roughead. Right. Right.
        Dr. Snyder. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Who is next? The gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
    Forbes.
        Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And General, and Mr. Secretary, and Admiral, we thank you
    for being here. You are all good men. And we appreciate your
    service to our country. But even good men can take positions
    some time that can be detrimental to I think the well-being of
    the country. And I was a little taken aback, Mr. Secretary, by
    your statement that the shipbuilding plan that was sent over is
    going to respond to the Chairman's concern about the number of
    ships that we have in the Navy.
        And I am concerned for two reasons. One is that the number
    of ships that we have in the Navy. And I am concerned for two
    reasons. One is that OMB [Office of Management and Budget]
    disagrees with your numbers. As you know they say it is on
    course to be at 270 ships as opposed to your projections. And
    when Secretary Gates sat exactly where you are sitting, he said
    that that shipbuilding plan was a ``fantasy.''
        When I look, Admiral Roughead, at your concern that what
    keeps you up at night is your worry about having the resources
    to have the ships that we need down the road. And then I look
    at your specific decision on Mayport, which is going to spend
    $1 billion with all the other needs we have. This is the
    strategic dispersal plan, which I understand is the basis upon
    which at least the chairman of the Joint Chiefs said was the
    basis upon his decision to think a carrier should be shifted to
    Mayport. Have you read this plan? The strategic dispersal plan?
        Admiral Roughead. There have been several strategic
    dispersal plans over the year, sir. And I don't know which one
    that----
        Mr. Forbes. This is the one that I understand was the one
    written by Admiral Robert Thomas. Have you ever read his
    strategic dispersal plan, which is the one that is always
    circulated as the basis for relocating the carriers?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. We are looking at strategic
    dispersal.
        Mr. Forbes. Have you read his plan?
        Admiral Roughead. I would have to look at that copy, sir,
    to see if I have seen it.
        Mr. Forbes. Have you ever read a copy by Admiral Thomas?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I mean, we work on strategic
    dispersal, and determining where the best places for the fleet
    should be.
        Mr. Forbes. Are you familiar with Admiral Thomas?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I am.
        Mr. Forbes. Do you have respect for Admiral Thomas, and his
    decisionmaking capabilities?
        Admiral Roughead. He is a very good officer. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Forbes. Have you ever asked him the risk assessment
    that he placed on anything happening that would necessitate a
    shift to Mayport?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. In fact Admiral Thomas works--
    worked for me. So when we were----
        Mr. Forbes. And did he tell you that that was a very slight
    risk?
        Admiral Roughead. The strategic dispersal plan is based on
    the consequences of what could happen in the Tidewater area
    should there be a manmade or natural disaster.
        Mr. Forbes. And it was a comparison specifically between
    that and Mayport. And did he ever tell you as he told me that
    the risk of that was very, very slight. In fact, less than 10
    percent.
        Admiral Roughead. And what risk is that, sir?
        Mr. Forbes. The risk that you would have a disaster that
    would create a problem that would have necessitated the move of
    the carrier to----
        Admiral Roughead. I think that we may be talking about two
    different types of risk--one natural, one manmade.
        Mr. Forbes. Let me focus, then, on the natural disaster
    risk.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Forbes. Because in that program it states that there is
    no advantage between Norfolk and Florida. And yet if you look,
    Florida since 1900 has had 225 hurricanes. Norfolk 7. If you
    look at that channel going out of Norfolk, it is a mile wide
    whereas in Florida only one carrier sunk there would stop all
    the ships in it.
        But this is what I want to get to. Recently you have
    submitted a list of unfunded priorities to Congress. These are
    requirements your commanders say they need to fulfill their
    mission. General Conway has submitted a similar list. There are
    some huge things in there. Engines that we can't do. Planes
    that we can't get. Ship maintenance that we can't get. The cost
    of moving that carrier to Mayport would cover every single one
    of the requirements unfunded on your list, and on General
    Conway's.
        So my question to you is this. Which is more important?
    Moving the carrier to Florida, or doing all the items on the
    unfunded priority list that you have submitted, and that
    General Conway has submitted? Second one is, how do you agree
    with Admiral Thomas' strategic dispersal plan, but disagree
    with his risk assessment? And then thirdly, how do you explain
    by any objective, legitimate analysis that there isn't a
    benefit to Norfolk over Jacksonville, or over Florida when you
    look at natural disaster situations?
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I will take the first one last,
    because I think you are comparing Norfolk to Florida. I think
    it is important as you look at storm tracks to compare Norfolk
    to the Jacksonville area. And they are very, very similar. In
    fact, as a--yes, sir?
        Mr. Forbes. Just ask you to look at the charts of the two.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I have looked at them many
    times. And Mayport fares quite well in that regard.
        The Chairman. Ms. Sanchez.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
    gentlemen, again for being before us. I have various areas I
    want to ask you about. Just for note, I received today a copy
    of the letter, Secretary, that you sent to my senator, Dianne
    Feinstein, with respect to our Marine Base, Camp Pendleton. And
    one of the problems that we have in Orange County, which is
    moving traffic. Oh, and of course the--we have this toll road
    that we are trying to figure out how to build, et cetera.
        So I would like to in the near future have a discussion
    with you. We don't have to do it here today--about this and
    what we might do to maybe still try to find a solution with you
    all.
        I just want to say that on ``don't ask, don't tell''--
    obviously; Mr. Snyder piggybacking on many of his remarks--is a
    big issue for us. And in California in particular being in that
    Ninth Circuit court. And just want to note that it is my
    understanding that, for example, out of all--I do a lot of work
    with our NATO allies, and out in the European theater as you--
    many of you know. And just would like to note that I believe in
    speaking to most of my colleagues from other parliaments out
    there, that only Turkey and the United States as members of
    NATO are the only ones who have limited policies, or an actual
    ban on having gays in the military.
        So I think it is incredibly important that we address this
    sooner than later. And the parliamentarians out there--our
    colleagues--said that the--when they--when some of them went to
    implement this the quicker they went with it, the easier it was
    to get to it. So just from that standpoint--and I have said
    this to Mrs. Davis, our personnel subcommittee chairwoman, that
    I would like to see this addressed this year rather than sit
    around waiting for some more dialogue.
        I want to talk a little bit to something really positive
    that we heard the other day from the Secretary when the
    Department of Defense took a very commendable step to ban the
    prohibition of women from serving on our Navy submarines. I
    think it is very forward-looking. I think it is time to do
    that. We still sometimes even have a discussion about whether
    women should be in the military on this committee. Thank God we
    haven't had to vote on that for the last 5 or 7 years.
        And we all know that one of the reasons is that there is so
    much talent in that 50 percent of potential work force. My
    question to you, Mr. Secretary, is--that I understand that this
    is just the beginning, and there is a lot of work to get
    through in order to make this happen. I would like you to
    address what are the challenges that you are going to foresee--
    that you foresee with respect to this. And how might this
    Congress help you to move forward that issue of doing that.
        And before you answer that, let me just pose another
    question out to our commandant. And then I will be quiet. And
    hopefully you guys can answer this. And that would be with
    respect--commandant to the U.S. Marines undertaking the
    operation Marjah there in Afghanistan in the last few days. I
    am interested to know the role that the Afghan national army
    played in that.
        How many of their troops were involved? And what you think
    the assessment is there? In particular, I think given to, and I
    believe it was General Petraeus who said, ``We might be at this
    at least for 12 to 18 months, and that may fly in the face of
    the 18-month limit that Mr. Obama discussed with respect to
    Afghanistan.'' So if, Mr. Secretary, you could answer that
    first question. And then, General, get your thoughts together
    to answer the other?
        Secretary Mabus. We learned a lot of lessons integrating
    female sailors onto our surface ships that we can apply to
    integrating women into the submarine fleet. For starters, the
    two platforms that women would be going to first. The SSBNs,
    and the SSGNs [Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile Submarines] don't
    require any modifications to their--to their hull structure--to
    their compartments or berthing or anything.
        The challenges that were faced, and faced very successfully
    when women were integrated onto our surface fleet were things
    like making sure that we had a critical mass of women on a ship
    so that women were not too small a group. To make sure that we
    had a senior--a more senior woman officer at first. A
    department head to be a mentor to the younger women coming in
    for their first tour at sea.
        And also to make sure that we reach out to the submarine
    force, and to the families to make sure that any concerns that
    they have are addressed. And we think that they will be. And
    that this will be a very successful integration.
        General Conway. Ma'am, with regard to the Afghan national
    army and police, roughly 4,000 is the answer in terms of
    numbers. They have a good fighting spirit. They are not nearly
    as sophisticated as we are at company and battalion level. But
    in terms of actual small unit tactics, they mix it up pretty
    good. We think that Marjah will be a contested area for as long
    as we are there, or until the Taliban pack it up. It is a drug
    center. It is an area where they have had a long-term presence.
    In some ways they have families there. So although we intend to
    secure the area and put the Afghan police in eventually to help
    control it, the nature of an insurgency is that they could well
    be back in small numbers attempting to contest the area. So I
    think General Petraeus is probably right.
        The Chairman. Before I call on the gentleman from South
    Carolina, General, where are we on Guam?
        General Conway. Sir, at this point I think it is fair to
    say that we are awaiting the determination of the Japanese
    government in terms of how they see their part of this. In the
    meantime, it is fair to say we continue to look at what Guam
    means. Again, you nailed it in your opening statement in terms
    of the strategic importance, we believe, of armed forces in the
    Pacific, and of course particularly Marines.
        One thing that has changed somewhat since the original
    agreements is that we have grown the force by some 27,000
    additional Marines, and 3,000 or 4,000 of those would be
    assigned to the Pacific. So we are trying to balance the
    numbers in our own thought process with regard to established
    agreements.
        So at this point, it is between governments and we very
    much await the next determination by the Japanese government in
    terms of how they think we should go forward.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Wilson.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I actually
    appreciate your bringing up Guam before we could begin, because
    I visited, and I know how strategically located it is. Also,
    the people of Guam should be appreciated. They are so
    patriotic. The highest percentage of National Guard membership
    of any state or territory of the United States is Guam. And
    what wonderful people.
        And General, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you for being
    here today. I was very grateful to grow up in Charleston, South
    Carolina. And I grew up in the shadow of the Navy base, and so
    I have a great appreciation of your service and Navy and Marine
    personnel, and we are grateful to have the Nuclear Power School
    in the community. It is a great opportunity for young people.
        I am honored now to represent Parris Island Marine Corps
    Station, Beaufort, Beaufort Naval Hospital. And then, I am
    particularly grateful I have a son, active duty Navy, and he is
    following in the tradition of his late grandfather and uncle,
    who were dedicated Marines.
        So Mr. Secretary, I am concerned about the current plans
    for wounded warrior support at the new Walter Reed National
    Military Medical Center when it opens at Bethesda in September,
    2011--it is, or 2011.
        It is not in the same level of support currently furnished
    by the Army at Walter Reed. Wounded warriors who move to the
    new medical center will experience a significant degradation of
    services and support and I believe that is unacceptable.
        As an example, I understand that there will be a shortfall
    of 150 barrack spaces when the new medical center opens for the
    wounded warriors who are currently in the warrior transition
    barracks at Walter Reed.
        What assurances can you give that all of the wounded
    warrior support now provided at Walter Reed, including first
    priority for barracks space on the Bethesda campus, will be
    available when the new medical center opens in September, 2011?
        Secretary Mabus. Congressman, there is no more important
    thing that we do than to care for those who have borne the
    burden of battle and who return as wounded warriors. All three
    of us on a very regular basis visit Bethesda, visit our wounded
    warriors that are returning.
        And we are very focused in the Department of the Navy, and
    I think it is fair to say in the Department of Defense, to
    making sure that as the transition occurs, as Walter Reed moves
    to the Bethesda campus, that no wounded warrior fall between
    the cracks. That there is no degradation of care. That there is
    absolutely world-class care, as you in Congress and we in the
    Department know that there have to be.
        You can be assured that our attention is focused very
    directly on this. And not just on putting Walter Reed and
    Bethesda together, but also on the myriad of other things that
    wounded warriors require from our Wounded Warrior Regiment with
    the Marines, our Safe Harbor Battalion with the Navy, with
    their non-medical care, with making sure that they are
    transitioned either back to the fleet, back to their Marine
    brethren, or into their community, is seamless.
        We are trying to work with the VA [Veteran's
    Administration] to make sure that there is no gap there. And
    finally, one thing that I am particularly proud of, we just did
    a wounded warrior hiring conference to make sure that as
    wounded warriors recover, and as they transition out back to
    the civilian workforce, that they have a job waiting for them
    when they get there.
        Mr. Wilson. And Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you on
    just what you have cited. And even if it took up all my time,
    the issue is that important. But particularly on barrack space,
    that needs to be addressed, so I hope that as you pursue the
    other issues relative to this and the wounded warrior program,
    I wish the American people could see what has been done on
    behalf of the young people who have lost arms, legs. It is
    extraordinary the efforts that have been made, and very
    heartwarming. But I am very, very concerned about the barracks
    space, so I hope that will be an emphasis that you have.
        Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir.
        General Conway. Sir, if I can complement the Secretary's
    answer for just a moment, and perhaps allay some of your
    concerns. We certainly need barracks space, especially for our
    Marines, and I would argue potentially sailors, who come for
    initial treatment for their families, for themselves, and for
    people who are assigned back to Bethesda for follow-on
    treatment.
        But our intent with our casualty care is as soon as
    possible, to get them out closer to home station, closer to
    their homes if it is a recovery period. And we do not want to
    have them at Walter Reed-Bethesda for any longer a period of
    time than is absolutely necessary. So I think that will
    mitigate some of your concern in this regard.
        Mr. Wilson. Excellent. Thank you very much.
        General Conway. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. The gentlelady from California, Mrs. Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and certainly
    Secretary Mabus, and Admiral Roughead, and General Conway,
    thank you so much for your extraordinary service to our
    country, and for worrying I think every day about the men and
    women who serve. I know you show a great deal of compassion for
    the mission that they are performing and how they are
    performing it.
        I wanted to actually ask several of the questions that have
    already been asked, but have sort of a brief follow-up to a few
    of those. On the MLP, I am wondering, once you have a better
    sense of how it is going to work together, if there is any
    opportunity to bring that schedule together so that there is
    more predictability on the part of those who are trying to
    build those for us? Is there any chance of trying to do that,
    rather than spreading it out once we get underway?
        Secretary Mabus. Well, as the CNO said, it is a new hull
    form----
        Mrs. Davis. I missed your response, but I wanted to follow
    up.
        Secretary Mabus [continuing]. And one of things that we
    looked at was the health of our industrial base. And trying to
    ensure that there was a base of work spread out over the 5
    years so that our shipbuilding yards would be able to maintain
    that critical workforce, that critical infrastructure that we
    need so much.
        And that was one of the factors, although not the
    determining factor, but one of the factors that went into
    putting those ships in 2011, 2013, and 2015.
        Mrs. Davis. Yes. I think they would probably suggest that
    it is better for them to bring them together in terms of their
    workforce, but perhaps that could be explored further at
    another time.
        And women on submarines, is there any role for Congress to
    play at this point? Is there anything that you need from us?
        Secretary Mabus. I think we are well along. The Secretary
    of Defense has done the notification to Congress that is
    required by law that we are beginning to proceed down the
    track. And I think that the support of Congress on this is
    crucial, but I think that we have all the levers that we need
    to move expeditiously to do this.
        Mrs. Davis. Okay. Nothing in the reauthorization language?
    You are set?
        Admiral Roughead. There is a 30-day wait period, ma'am, so
    any impediment to that would not be helpful. So----
        Mrs. Davis. All right. Thank you.
        Admiral Roughead. And it is a good plan, I can assure you
    of that. And the submarine force is prepared to execute.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you. I wanted to turn--very briefly, you
    may be aware there is a DOD-wide program called My Spouse
    Career Advancement Account that has recently been frozen. I
    know just from several weeks ago even speaking with many of the
    spouses, they count on this. I mean, this has really been so
    important to them.
        And could you enlighten us a little bit as to whether or
    not there is a possibility that, even though it has been frozen
    for now, that those spouses who are in the program can continue
    with their education? And do you think that there is, again, a
    role for Congress in weighing in on this right now?
        Secretary Mabus. After the question was asked yesterday,
    looked into this last evening. The information that I received,
    because this is a DOD-wide program, is that the site was frozen
    for software concerns for some other types of concerns on
    there. But that the people who were receiving the payments
    could expect to continue to receive those payments. That was
    the information I got, as I said, last night from DOD.
        Mrs. Davis. Oh, are you saying that people in the program
    will continue? What about just trying to apply now? Or is the
    program itself going to be discontinued for some time?
        Secretary Mabus. That is an answer I cannot give you. I
    don't know.
        General Conway. Ma'am, if I can help. I also researched it
    and it is my understanding that this is a temporary halt to the
    program, not a close-out of the program, pending the problems
    that the Secretary spoke of.
        Mrs. Davis. Okay. What might be important is communicating
    as best we can, obviously, to the number of people that are
    very concerned about this out in the community. And I think we
    all agree on, this is an important quality-of-life issue for
    our service men and women, and some way of clarifying that is
    very important right now.
        Secretary Mabus. The only thing I would like to add right
    now is that I completely agree with the importance of this
    program, with what you said.
        Mrs. Davis. Yes, thank you. The QDR points out the need to
    increase key enabling agents--assets, I am sorry--for the
    Special Operations Forces, including logistics, communications,
    intelligence, and other critical capabilities. And the Naval
    Special Warfare Command depends on the Navy, of course, for
    certain enablers.
        Yet at the same time that they are looking to the Navy for
    that, the Navy's end strength is coming down, as we know. And I
    am wanting to know whether there is an issue here in terms of
    being able to have out of that pool of specialists, some of our
    special warfare people that would be in the future?
        Admiral Roughead. As far as the Special Warfare, our SEALs
    [Navy Sea, Air and Land teams], we have a great plan there.
    There are many demands for people, and we are looking at how we
    can best resource that now.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
        And Mr. Conaway, the gentleman from Texas.
        Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief, thank you for
    being here. Mr. Secretary. Commandant, it is great to see you
    again.
        That was a great day in Fredericksburg, Texas, when you and
    your bride came down for the ribbon-cutting on the new wing of
    the Nimitz Museum. And with some training and hard work and
    dedication on his part, Mike Hagee might be able to MC
    something a little better than--next time.
        My issue is going to be a little bit more mundane. It is
    not nearly as glamorous as some of the other stuff, but it
    stretches across everything you do. And that is, the commitment
    by the three of you to audit the financial statements of the
    respective entities that you are responsible for.
        Mr. Secretary, you made the statement a while ago about
    bold steps required for the alternative energy. I appreciate
    the same bold steps for the Department of the Navy to be clean,
    unqualified, audited, financial statements and everything that
    entails. Internal controls, all the other systems that we have
    in place. And that the business transpiration agency has the
    dubious distinction of having responsibility but no authority
    to make things happen across a lot of lines.
        I want to brag on the Marine Corps. Commandant, you have
    said you will get it done, and I hope there is a way to hand
    off that same commitment to the 35th commandant of the Marine
    Corps, because it doesn't happen, period, without the three of
    you gentlemen saying make it happen.
        Now, I understand you got a zillion other things that might
    look more important, but the benefits are indisputable of being
    able to have good data, quick data. As I told the Air Force
    yesterday, if we ask you guys a question that stumps you, some
    person on the back bench will get into a panic mode to try to
    cobble together some answer out there with systems that may
    involve 50 different systems that are not integrated, they are
    not doing the things they do.
        So simple heading out, or at least an answer for the
    record, is that--is that commitment to get the Navy
    Department--Department of the Navy--audited, and the Marine
    Corps audited way up on your list of things that you need to
    get done?
        Secretary Mabus. Congressman, my first elected job was
    state auditor of Mississippi.
        Mr. Conaway. Oh, fantastic.
        Secretary Mabus. I understand the value of good audits in
    government. And I do want to echo what you said about the
    Marine Corps. We are way down the line on getting a fully
    auditable statement for the Marine Corps. And we are moving in
    that direction for the Navy.
        And in fact, we have got a Deputy Under Secretary of the
    Navy for Business Transformation that that is one of the prime
    jobs that that individual is accountable for. And I do check on
    that on a very regular basis.
        Mr. Conaway. Okay. CNO, I don't know if you have got a dog
    in that fight, but any push you could help to get the----
        Admiral Roughead. Absolutely, sir, because I think your
    comments are right on the money.
        Mr. Conaway. Okay.
        General Conway. Sir, you know the term ``wind dummy''? We
    have volunteered to be the wind dummy on this one with some
    trepidation, but it is absolutely the right thing to do and we
    are proceeding apace.
        Mr. Conaway. Well, thanks. I mean, if the good citizens of
    District 11 keep sending me up here, I want to keep niggling
    you guys about this because I do think it is important. So with
    that, Mr. Chairman, thank you all for your long service to our
    country. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentleman from Texas. Mr. Lamborn.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank
    you for being here, General Conway and Admiral Roughead. Thank
    you both for your service to our nation.
        I would like to turn my attention, if I could, to Ballistic
    Missile Defense issues right now. And as the long-range
    shipbuilding plan lays out, the President's new Phased,
    Adaptive Approach to providing missile defense to Europe will
    have a significant impact on the Navy's resources obviously in
    the years to come. How does the Navy plan to support its
    growing missile defense requirements while fulfilling its
    current missions including anti-ballistic missile ship defense?
        Admiral Roughead. The way that we will deploy it, sir, is
    in consonance with what the combatant commanders have
    requested. We have been performing the mission on the Western
    Pacific now for a few years and the demands have also been
    added into the Arabian Gulf and into the Mediterranean.
        So in our plan, we are taking the number of Ballistic
    Missile Defense ships in this FYDP from 21 to 38. We are
    increasing the number of missiles which is as important to be
    able to not have to be changing missiles around. But the fact
    that our ships are multimission ships allow them to do much
    more than missile defense and that is all managed by our Navy
    commanders in the regions where those ships are operating.
        So I am very, very pleased that not only are we building
    some more missile defense ships, but we are providing the back-
    fits and we are increasing the missile inventory. And we have
    also been spending quite a bit of effort and time and the
    coordination between commanders in different regions and I
    believe we have advanced our missile defense capability quite a
    bit.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, do you have anything
    to add?
        Secretary Mabus. Just to emphasize what the CNO said. These
    are very capable ships in a number of missions and while we are
    retrofitting and building new missile defense ships, we are not
    losing sight of the other duties that they perform. And also,
    that in this budget we have asked for funds to fit a good many
    of our existing destroyers and cruisers, DDGs [Guided Missile
    Destroyers] and CGs [Guided Missile Cruisers], with the Aegis
    BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] capability and in order to
    reach the end strength of those ships that we need to respond
    to all the demands.
        Mr. Lamborn. Let me ask that in a further point on anti-
    ballistic, anti-ship ballistic missiles. Have you had the
    opportunity to review the recent study on different
    possibilities for defending against anti-ship ballistic
    missiles? And as a following to that, what are the various
    technological and at what platform solutions to this challenge?
        Secretary Mabus. We are very focused on anti-ship ballistic
    and cruise missiles. And one of the things that the CNO has
    said earlier in his testimony is that we are looking at
    technologies from other ships, particularly the truncated DDG-
    1000, as we are going forward with the next generation of DDG-
    51s to get sensor systems, radar systems.
        In the new DDG-51s, the SPY-3, coming off the DDG-1000, the
    air and missile defense radar so that we get a full picture of
    the battle space of both from anti-air and anti-ballistic
    missile and anti-cruise missile ships and an integrated hull on
    each ship and in a group of ships for integrated air and
    missile defense.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. Admiral Roughead, on the DDG-1000,
    last year the administration decided to continue funding the
    DDG-1000 program for three ships. How is this program
    progressing and with regards to--with regards to both the hull
    and the mission systems equipment?
        Admiral Roughead. The program is progressing on track with
    regard to the development of the systems and also, it--the DDG-
    1000 is under construction. So the issue will be one of the
    Nunn-McCurdy breach as a result of the truncation and the
    departments working its way through the appropriate steps that
    have to be taken relative to that.
        Mr. Lamborn. On that, let me ask you. It is my
    understanding that the Navy is pursuing a fixed price contract
    for the second and third DDG-1000. Is this accurate and what
    does that mean for controlling overall program costs?
        Admiral Roughead. My hopes are is that it will maintain the
    cost where it needs to be and we are pursuing those contracts.
        Mr. Lamborn. A big firm fixed price?
        Admiral Roughead. I would like to get back to you on that
    one, sir.
        The Chairman. We have three votes. However, let's go as far
    as we can and we will break for those votes and then return.
    Mr. Wittman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
    General Conway, Admiral Roughead, thank you so much for joining
    us today. We appreciate your hard work and efforts. I wanted to
    direct a question to Admiral Roughead just as a follow-up from
    Congressman Forbes' question.
        In looking at the analysis that was done, the risk
    analysis, about placing a home port facility there in Mayport
    and we had talked earlier with the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, about how much of a quantifiable risk
    assessment was done and then looking at that in that being very
    spongy as far as the--as a hard number on the risks that we are
    trying to mitigate with putting a carrier down there and then
    with the unfunded programs list that is out now that has about
    $530 million of unfunded needs there on that list, what that
    leads me to is to follow up on his question.
        And that is obviously your decisions revolve around ranking
    where your needs are. And can you tell me in relation to the
    unfunded needs list, would you say the unfunded needs are
    ranked higher or lower than the need to mitigate a risk to
    place a home port facility there in Mayport?
        Admiral Roughead. Well, I would say, sir, that the fact
    that when we built our budget and took it to the levels where
    it was, and as you know, our budget is a balance of many
    different needs that we have, that when I made the proposal on
    this year's budget, that--what we funded with regard to O&M
    [Operations and Maintenance] and the risk that we were taking
    was where I thought it was prudent to be and included in the
    budget are the preliminary steps for the home port in Mayport.
        So given the fact that the steps needed to build the port
    in Mayport were in our budget and those are the unfunded
    programs. Then the Mayport project has a higher priority for
    me.
        Mr. Wittman. Okay. I am trying to get from you where in the
    scheme of things though if you--obviously there are limited
    resources there and I know that you have--and we are still
    trying to figure out exactly where it is some of the planning
    dollars that go into beginning the process there at the
    location in Mayport, but also the unfunded needs list, you
    know, has, obviously, shipbuilding needs there, weapons
    procurement, ship maintenance and all of those things concern
    us because there are needs out there.
        What I am trying to figure is that within the finite
    universe of resources, if we are talking about a billion
    dollars to upgrade the port there in Mayport versus the $530
    million in the unfunded needs list, would you say that the $1
    billion needed in the years to come, and again, looking at your
    unfunded needs was that goes out in the same future, would you
    say that the $1 billion necessary to build the facility at
    Mayport is a higher or lower priority than the $530 million on
    the unfunded needs list?
        Admiral Roughead. Well, first, sir, the Mayport is not a
    billion dollar project. It is not a billion dollar project. It
    is just slightly over half of that.
        Mr. Wittman. Okay.
        Admiral Roughead. But what Mayport is, it is not a new
    carrier port. Mayport has been an aircraft carrier port since
    1952 and that dispersion has given us some strategic
    flexibility on the East Coast. What we are doing is we are
    bringing that port as a carrier port to be able to service our
    carrier fleet which is now all nuclear. So for me, that
    strategic flexibility is important. That is why I made the
    recommendation to the Secretary to go forward with that and
    then that was affirmed. And so that money in the plan to
    enhance the carrier port of Mayport is a priority.
        Mr. Wittman. Sure. Well, in the decisionmaking, obviously
    you are looking at what risks you would be mitigating by having
    a duplicative facility there in Mayport. And I guess my
    question is with the lack of quantifiable risk assessment that
    is going on there, is that risk high enough to substantiate
    that being put in front of the--if you say $600 billion or $600
    million versus the $530 million of the unfunded needs, tell me
    is there still--do you believe is the risk still high enough
    for having to move a carrier there that you would put the
    Mayport facility before the unfunded?
        Admiral Roughead. Sir, I believe that the risk of having
    all of our eggs in one basket for our aircraft carriers in the
    Tidewater area, and I don't dispute the value of--but having
    all of our eggs in one basket there when we have not done that
    on the East Coast or on the West Coast is not in the best
    interest of the Navy or the nation.
        Mr. Wittman. Okay.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentlemen. We have time for one
    more member, the gentlelady from Guam, 5 minutes.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary and
    Admiral and General, thank you for your testimony.
        Mr. Secretary, I appreciated meeting with you recently to
    discuss the military buildup on Guam and working with my office
    and the government of Guam to make sure that we get this
    buildup done right as our Chairman, Mr. Skelton, has stated
    over and over again. However, there remains significant hurdles
    to the military buildup. The recent news that the Port of Guam
    was denied a Recovery Act Grant funding from the Department of
    Transportation was deeply disappointing. Simply put, without
    funding for the port, the buildup cannot occur.
        Mr. Secretary, while I appreciate your leadership in DOD to
    support the port's grant, we need to know what the Navy is
    doing to address Guam's civilian infrastructure needs. Is the
    Navy working with the Department of Interior, the White House
    and OMB to develop a strategy to address the funding of
    civilian infrastructure requirements?
        Yesterday, I was at a meeting from 1:00 to 5:00 p.m. with
    the Department of Interior and various federal agencies to
    discuss the buildup. We concluded with this, number one, we
    need a funding plan for this buildup. And secondly, we need one
    coordinator to handle this buildup so the DOD doesn't point to
    the various federal agencies for funding and the federal
    agencies go right back and say, ``Well, this is DOD's
    responsibility.'' We are caught in the middle.
        I think it is important to note the EPA [Environmental
    Protection Agency] and their comments on the draft EIS
    [Environmental Impact Statement] also stated that the lack of
    information on infrastructure funding is one major reason for
    their low scoring of the document. Also, many of the civilian
    impacts are exasperated by the 2014 completion date. When does
    the Department of Navy believe it can complete construction?
    Given the government of Japan's indecision, isn't this the
    right time to extend the timeline to reflect reality?
        Secretary Mabus. I enjoyed our meeting as well,
    Congresswoman, and as far as the grant to Apra Harbor, you
    know, from the Department of Transportation following the
    meeting and following my trip to Guam to look at Apra Harbor
    and other things, I met twice with the Secretary of
    Transportation to urge him to give that grant to Guam and to
    Apra Harbor to fulfill that.
        In the Department of the Navy and, I think, in the
    Department of Defense, we support a government-wide approach to
    the Guam buildup. It is a very important move for us as it is
    for the people of Guam to echo what General Conway said. The
    strategic value of Guam and of moving Marines to Guam is
    crucial. We have in terms of our processes elevated Guam inside
    the Department of the Navy with the Guam Executive Council
    which meets on a very regular basis to make sure the decisions
    move quickly.
        The Department of Defense has set up the Guam Oversight
    Council along with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to do the
    same thing. We do need, I believe, to make sure that there is a
    whole of government approach to this very important issue
    because it is crucial for the Navy, and the Marine Corps to--
    for the strategic dispersal of our forces, and for the buildup
    on Guam that we do this right as the Chairman----
        Ms. Bordallo. All right.
        Secretary Mabus [continuing]. Said in his statement.
        Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Secretary, my time is running out. But is
    there some way to recoup these funds for our port? Without the
    port development, the buildup just cannot continue.
        Secretary Mabus. My understanding is there may be other
    funds like this in the future that Guam can compete for. And
    once again, I will urge the Department of Transportation to
    fund that port in Guam, and to fund that particular grant that
    Guam has applied for, and I believe has made a very good case
    for.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. This is my greatest
    concern right now. We just had news of that a couple weeks ago,
    and it was a real blow to our people. Because you know, we had
    made plans for this. And as I said, if this doesn't go on--and,
    of course, the Japan decision also is important to us. But I
    would appreciate anything you could do to help us in this area.
        Secretary Mabus. Yes, Ma'am.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady.
        Mr. Secretary, is there any need or indication on where the
    Japanese government, is timewise?
        Ms. Bordallo. May.
        Secretary Mabus. In terms of their re-look at this issue,
    my understanding is that a decision is forthcoming by May.
        Ms. Bordallo. May.
        The Chairman. By May?
        Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. Okay. We will return. We have three votes. We
    will return and resume.
        [Recess.]
        The Chairman. Who is next? We will resume. And thank you,
    gentlemen, for waiting for us.
        Mr. Courtney, 5 minutes.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
    all the witnesses for their great testimony this morning. I
    also want to recognize that all three participated in a funeral
    last week at Westmont Presbyterian Church to say good-bye to
    just a great friend, and a great American, Jack Murtha.
        General Conway, I want to particularly publicly thank you
    for the tremendous eulogy. Powerful words that painted a
    picture that I just think the whole country really needed to
    hear about his contribution to the people who wear the uniform.
    So bravo. It was just a splendid job.
        And again I would just say that his presence is actually
    felt in this budget today. The advance procurement in 2007,
    which Chairman Skelton and Chairman Taylor, along with Mr.
    Murtha fought for to get a Congressional plus-up for the
    Virginia-class program today is bearing fruit with the two-a-
    year 2011 shipbuilding plan. And that would not have happened
    without his intervention.
        This place moves pretty fast in terms of, you know, the
    process resuming, you know, after some of the folks here leave,
    and pass on. But I think it is important again just to
    recognize for a moment the contribution he made to the Navy,
    and to this important program.
        Earlier, Mr. Chairman, asked Admiral Roughead the question
    about whether or not the SSBN program could maybe be sort of
    put off. Because it does present financial challenges down the
    road as you pointed out. And you responded. But I want to
    actually give you a chance to maybe expand a little bit in
    terms of why that is a priority for the country right now. You
    know, a question which I always ask you, because people ask why
    submarines, and again if you could maybe enlarge on your
    earlier answer I would appreciate it.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. Thank you. And now is the time
    to go forward with the replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic
    missile submarine. As I have looked at this, and studied it,
    and considered several of the options as to how best to go
    forward.
        Given the fact that we will be taking this class of
    submarine out to 2080, we have to ensure that the technology
    that we put into that ship, that its survivability, its
    reliability, its operational availability enable it to operate
    not just for that length of time, but in the environments where
    others are going to try to negate that advantage that we have
    with our ballistic missile submarine fleet.
        So now is the time to begin that process. Now is the time
    to work closely with our friends in the U.K. to ensure that we
    go forward, and bring that submarine in on time. If we delay, I
    think you rush, you suboptimize. And at the end of the day you
    very well could end up spending more money on it than you
    otherwise would if you didn't have a good, thoughtful design.
        Mr. Courtney. And this year's budget, again, there is money
    for the design aspect of it, which again is consistent with the
    procurement reform bill that we passed last year, which is to
    avoid design-build happening at the same time. But to really
    sort of think things through.
        I guess what I would want to ask just in terms of--you
    know, hopefully this is not wishful thinking. But I mean if we
    do think ahead, and use the best talent possible, and look at
    successful programs like Virginia class and other shipbuilding,
    I mean, do you think that there is a possibility that we could,
    you know, potentially get a point where the $6 billion to $7
    billion projected cost--I mean, we might be able to do a little
    better than that down the road.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. I think we should look at every
    way that we can legitimately take cost out, but yet maintain
    that capability that we are going to need for the next seven
    decades. So I will be relentless in looking for those
    opportunities. But I emphasize that it has to legitimately be
    taken out. It can't simply be well we will build it cheaper,
    and then you compromise on a lot of other things.
        But we owe it to you. We owe it to the taxpayer to make
    sure that every ship that we buy, that we are taking cost out
    of it in every possible way.
        Mr. Courtney. All right. Mr. Secretary, you wanted to
    comment at all on that?
        Secretary Mabus. One of the things we tried to do with the
    30-year shipbuilding plan was to be absolutely realistic in
    terms of what ships would cost. Realistic in terms historically
    of what Congress has appropriated for ships. But also to show
    the impact that putting the new SSBN in our core budget would
    have on the rest of the fleet. And to be realistic about that
    so that decisions could be made at the appropriate time in
    terms of how we fund our fleet, and how we fund this
    replacement.
        Mr. Courtney. All right. Thank you. I mean obviously this
    is going to be an issue for decades for committees like this.
    But I fully support the effort again to invest in, you know,
    the planning, and designing, because I think that will pay off
    long term.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. We have two members that haven't asked
    questions yet. But let me ask Admiral Roughead--I was at a
    shipbuilding port not too long ago. And I saw a ship being
    built for the United States Coast Guard. I think it is called
    the National Security Cutter. And I was just wondering why that
    particular ship that we don't have to redesign or reconfigure
    won't do for the Navy? I have seen no request for anything like
    it or for that particular ship itself.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir. And we have looked at a variety
    of options for the type of capabilities we need to meet our--
    the needs of the maritime strategy. And the Coast Guard and the
    National Security Cutter, that ship is optimized for their
    missions. And as we look at what we have to do, and as a Navy,
    and as a Navy that has to have versatility and agility built
    into our ships.
        Because I think it is important that our ships be able to
    provide for a range of missions, and not simply be focused on
    one. I would say maybe perhaps the exception to that is the
    ballistic missile submarine because of what its mission is.
        But we have to provide for a range of capabilities. For us,
    speed becomes important. And that led us to the LCS. I, since
    becoming CNO, I have looked at the speed requirements again,
    and I have reassured myself that we are in the right place. But
    what we are building now meets the requirements that we have to
    deliver the type of navy the nation needs to be able to operate
    in the places where we expect to have to operate in the future.
        The Chairman. May I ask, Admiral, for the record, ask some
    bright shipbuilder over the Navy Systems Command to give us the
    pros and cons of that particular ship, including the cost?
    Would you do that for our record?
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 121.]
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I will.
        The Chairman. No rush, 2 or 3 weeks, whatever.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I will do that.
        The Chairman. And it is easy to do, but that would--I
    really had to scratch my head when I saw that ship. You know,
    why can't we have the plans and we wouldn't have to start from
    scratch there.
        Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I will do that.
        The Chairman. Would you do that then? Thank you so much.
        Mr. Coffman.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
    again for your service to our country.
        General Conway, what do you see as the primary force
    protection challenges in Afghanistan right now? And does the
    Marine Corps have everything it needs in Afghanistan?
        General Conway. Yes, sir, I think it is fair to say that we
    do have everything that we need. That of course has been my
    number one priority since I have been in this job, is to make
    sure those troops, especially at the point of the spear, have
    everything they need.
        That said, we push industry for more. And by that, I am
    talking about personal protective equipment in particular that
    is more lightweight and would not be as burdensome as some of
    the pictures you have probably seen coming out of Marjah, 80 to
    100 pounds on the backs of some our Marines carrying their
    sustainment load and the things they need to work 24/7.
        We need a helmet that will stop 762 [7.62mm ammunition].
    Right now, the biggest threat in Marjah is not necessarily the
    IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] for our killed in action,
    it is the sniper that can take a long-range shot and can
    penetrate our protective equipment, particularly the helmet. So
    we continue to pound the table on that with hopes that one day
    we will have that piece of gear in hand.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you. General Conway, are you confident
    that the EFV [Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle] will provide
    adequate protection against IED threats? How has the program
    been modified to counter this threat?
        General Conway. Sir, it is an interesting question, because
    just in the last couple of days we have completed blast tests
    with the EFV as compared to an MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush
    Protected vehicle], an RG33, which is actually the mid-level
    CAT-2 MRAP. I was very pleasantly surprised at how well it
    progressed. I mean, about the same for underbody explosions,
    and for underwheel or undertrack explosions, but actually the
    EFV was markedly better against direct fire and indirect fire.
        I will get you a copy of that study. And by the way, I
    would asterisk it by saying, because the report did, this is
    before we apply modular armor that we would want to incorporate
    if we were in an IED-rich environment.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, General Conway. General Conway, was
    the decision to delay the EFV's low-rate production in fiscal
    year 2014 to 2015 based on technology development concerns, or
    was it budget-driven?
        General Conway. Congressman, I would say it was probably a
    combination of both. We have seven new vehicles that are paid
    for and are going to be arriving in the test beds throughout
    the spring and summer. There are some KPs--knowledge points--
    that we have to go through with those vehicles to determine
    what our full-rate production needs to be, to determine if they
    are going to be passed, the reliability concerns that they have
    had in the past.
        And I think in fairness, the Secretary of the Navy and the
    Secretary of Defense wanted us to have some of the answers to
    those issues before we got into a full rate of buy-in
    procurement.
        Mr. Coffman. General Conway, how do you plan to integrate
    the MATV [MRAP All Terrain Vehicle] and the MRAP vehicles into
    your current tactical wheeled vehicle fleet management program?
        General Conway. Well, sir, we see a future value in, again,
    the smallest of the MRAPs, the CAT-1s, and now the MATVs, which
    is in some ways a replacement for the up-armored Hummer. With
    regard to our combat engineers, our road clearance depths,
    perhaps some other small units. But as was answered earlier, in
    some ways it goes against two years, as a fast and relatively
    light expeditionary force.
        So we are going to preserve them, keep them available, so
    if we get into another static environment like this in the
    future, that we will have those vehicles available. But again,
    a small percentage of them will be incorporated I think into
    the TOE [Table of Equipment] of some of our support battalions.
        Mr. Coffman. General Conway, in looking at the shipbuilding
    plan, do you have any concerns about the forced entry
    requirement in terms of amphibious capability?
        General Conway. Sir, the CNO, under the observance of the
    Secretary of the Navy, have agreed that 38 is the requirement.
    We have said that we must be willing to accept risk down to
    about 33 ships. And if you look at the 30-year shipbuilding
    plan, it will sort of run highs and lows between that 30 and I
    think we get as high as 36 in the out-years.
        But we also need other parts of the fleet to be equally
    strong. You know, we want those surface craft out there that
    give us the force protection shield. We want the support of the
    aircraft carriers if we need their aviation strike capacity.
    And we want the subs out at distance screening the whole of the
    effort. So we need a strong and balanced fleet I think. More
    amphibs is always better, but we understand the fiscal
    pressures that we are dealing with today.
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
        It looks like our last questioner is the gentleman from
    Virginia, Mr. Nye.
        Mr. Nye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to
    thank you all for being here and for your service to our
    country.
        And I want to start by saying I just returned from a trip
    to Afghanistan, and I am particularly impressed with the
    continued dedication of our men and women in uniform out there.
    Not limited to, but particularly including the Marines and
    sailors who we may not expect to see in the desert, but often
    do. They are doing terrific work and I really appreciate what
    they are doing. I hope you will pass our thanks on to those
    folks. We know we have given them a tough mission.
        We have difficult decisions to make here as well, and I
    don't think anyone would suggest that any of you have an easy
    job. Just looking at an article from Inside the Navy recently,
    Secretary Mabus, you were quoted.
        ``Looking ahead at some of the potential future budget
    constraints that we might face in the coming years, having said
    expected future resource streams will severely constrain our
    choices, and that reducing Navy and Marine Corps programs to
    within available resources may require difficult and
    undesirable choices.''
        I couldn't agree with you more. It is a tough position that
    we are in, having to make some decisions in a constrained
    environment. You were also quoted as saying, ``We need to be
    prepared to rethink old assumptions and re-evaluate past
    practices.'' Again, I agree with that.
        We have to make tough decisions based on scarce resources.
    We have heard a number of issues raised by many members of this
    committee about how we are going to spend our resources and our
    military dollars. And of course, we would all like to make sure
    that they are spent in the most efficient and effective way
    possible.
        I will tell you, and I am sure it is going to be no
    surprise to you to hear me say that I was disappointed to see
    in the final QDR language a sentence recommending moving a
    carrier to Mayport, Florida, and investing a substantial amount
    of money in building that home port, which would be the fifth
    U.S. nuclear carrier home port.
        We have talked about it before, that is why I don't think
    you are going to be surprised to hear from me about it today.
    But I will tell you, I was disappointed in a number of things,
    and one was in what I see as a lack of transparency in the
    decisionmaking process that led up to that. I will give you a
    couple of examples of why that troubles me.
        And we talked with the Secretary and Admiral Mullen about
    it in the past couple of weeks. We heard from Secretary Gates
    that he essentially affirmed a statement that Senator Nelson
    said that he had told him about a little over 2 months prior to
    the QDR being issued that--and I want to make sure that I get
    the wording right--but he said I think that they had nothing to
    worry about.
        We saw some drafts of the QDR come out around December that
    suggested that the optimal solution would be a backup port in
    Mayport, rather than a full home port. And then, different
    language come out in the final version a few weeks later.
        I asked Admiral Mullen about it in his testimony, and he
    said essentially that it was a judgment call. We have asked
    over the past year for some more strategic analysis of the
    risks that we are trying to mitigate in Norfolk, and I am
    unsatisfied with the fact that I don't think we have really
    received that now.
        Under Secretary Flournoy said essentially they had been
    given two viable options to assess and choose between. Having a
    backup port or having a full fifth nuclear carrier home port in
    Mayport. And apparently, according to the QDR language, a
    decision was made to go with the one that costs a lot of money.
        Now, we can argue about the costs, somewhere between half a
    billion and a billion. We think it is going to be on the upper
    end of that. As I mentioned now, I was disappointed with the
    transparency of the process, or lack thereof.
        But I have asked for a GAO [Government Accountability
    Office] study to be conducted, which has started to lay out on
    the table all of the potential costs included in this type of
    decision, so we can make that tough decision about how we are
    going to allocate those defense dollars.
        But Admiral Roughead, I just wanted to ask you one
    question. Admiral Mullen said in his testimony when I asked him
    about this, about the strategic dispersal issue. And I think
    you used the words today, ``eggs in one basket kind of idea.''
        And I asked Admiral Mullen if that type of thinking or
    philosophy would apply to every military asset or base that we
    have got, not simply nuclear home port for carriers, but every
    other base, including SSBNs put in Georgia, and other things
    like strategic bombers.
        And he said essentially that, yes, it does apply to
    anything that we are going to have to evaluate like that. Would
    you agree with Admiral Mullen on that?
        Admiral Roughead. I would agree that we have to take a good
    look at where we have the redundancies that are important. And
    you cite the case of a strategic ballistic submarine. Their
    home port is in Georgia. But I can take that ship to Groton,
    Connecticut, and maintain it there. I can take that ship to
    Norfolk, Virginia, and maintain it there. So I have three
    options, even for ballistic missile submarines.
        The aircraft carrier on the east coast of the United States
    is the only ship that I have that I do not have another option
    to put into to do either routine or emergent maintenance.
        Mr. Nye. Another option on the East Coast, although there
    are three others on the West Coast, just to make sure we are
    clear on that.
        I think I am out of time. I will submit additional
    questions for the record. But I appreciate we are going to
    continue working going forward on this to find the right use of
    our defense dollars. And appreciate the work you have put into
    it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
        The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak.
        Mr. Sestak. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. You bet.
        Mr. Sestak. Mr. Secretary, CNO, I want to first thank you
    very much for how well you have handled that Petty Officer
    Roach case on accountability of some sailor that had been
    accused of being gay, later was discharged, and you held those
    accountable for their mistreatment. And I very much appreciate
    it. If anyone doesn't think that the service doesn't care about
    accountability, they should know what you both did. Thank you
    very much.
        But I do have a question, Mr. Secretary, and it may I
    understand from my staff had been asked before. As in that
    incident we had been asking someone to live a lie, to quote the
    Chairman. It had to do against the greatest ideals that we have
    in the service, that is, of integrity, which you stood up and
    followed.
        I personally don't understand the year it takes to study
    the implementation. We can ask the Marine Corps to fly in off
    of amphibs into Pakistan--or into Afghanistan--in 30 days and
    they can put the operation together and make it happen. This is
    something that has to do with our principles, our ideals.
        Why, except for your concern potentially about the legality
    of it, if really does take a year to implement, we cannot at
    least put out an executive order under stop-loss in order to
    prevent these good men and women, particularly in a time of war
    when we need them, from being discharged?
        Besides the legality question that the Defense Department
    may have, because there is obviously various opinion. If that
    was not something, would you be opposed to it, Mr. Secretary?
        Secretary Mabus. Congressman, the legality argument on that
    seems to me to be the primary one. And to an earlier question,
    the CNO said that the confusion that would be inherent in
    something like that I think is an important consideration.
        Mr. Sestak. But besides that, would you be opposed if it
    was determined to be legal?
        Secretary Mabus. I do think that--my understanding that the
    way the President, as our Commander in Chief, requested
    Congress to change the law, to repeal the law. But also, at the
    same time, he asked the Department of Defense to take a careful
    look at how to implement this law so that--how to implement it
    should Congress decide to change it so that it would be
    implemented in a very smooth, very professional, very
    consistent----
        Mr. Sestak. Only because of time then--and I don't mean to
    be rude interjecting--your support of then of that does take
    that long? But I mean you don't have an opinion then if the
    legality was turned out to be okay. You still feel it needs
    that type--that length of implementation?
        Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Sestak. A study? Thank you. I just was curious. I have
    seen the military do things so quickly, and so well. And just--
    it kind of passes me by. But I appreciate your comment.
        Commandant, the Army has testified over the past years, and
    the Chairman agreed with this last month that it cannot meet
    its other war plans elsewhere like 2057 for South Korea--
    because of Army readiness, and because of the lack of training
    in combined arms for example.
        Is the Marine Corps in a similar state? If so, and--because
    I have one last question for the CNO--and if so, how long would
    it take it to be back to where it could respond to that breadth
    of war plans that we have, because of Iraq.
        General Conway. Check. We are in the same place. We have
    been focused on counterinsurgency now for a number of years,
    and our forces are very good at that. But in the process we
    sacrifice sort of our combined arms kind of skill levels. We
    are encouraged that if we can stay below 20,000 in Afghanistan
    we are going to extend our home station time to about 14 months
    after a 7-month deployment.
        And we are going to use a chunk of that time to get back to
    combined arms. To get back to amphibious types of exercises
    with the Navy----
        Mr. Sestak. What length of time do you think it would take
    if you had to guess if we stay below 20,000?
        General Conway. Sir, I don't think it would be one for one.
    You know, we have been away from it now for six years or so. I
    don't think we will be back in six years. I think we have got
    to develop that expertise, and get it embedded. So I am
    guessing probably the better part of a decade----
        Mr. Sestak. Before we can meet the breadth of war plans
    again?
        General Conway. Well, we can meet the war plans now----
        Mr. Sestak. On a different timeline?
        General Conway. To be as good as we were in 2002 I think--
    --
        Mr. Sestak. Okay.
        General Conway [continuing]. Is probably going to take 8 to
    10 years.
        Mr. Sestak. And since I am a sophomore I have to be quick,
    because Mr. Skelton will cut me right off. But--very quickly.
    There has always been this question about 315 ships. Do you
    really think as we look at how technology--particularly
    knowledge is so important in warfare, that when using the long
    metric of numbers of ships as far as trying to determine our
    prowess in the future?
        Admiral Roughead. I do not believe we are wrong in looking
    at the numbers of ships. I think it is how we apply those
    ships, and the range of missions, and geographic areas where we
    are expected to be. And you do get to a numbers point as far as
    being in many places doing different things in large ocean
    areas. And that is where the number generates.
        I think there are many who say, you know, we are bigger
    than the next 13 Navies. But the fact of the matter is that our
    Navy really has existed not for a cataclysmic sea battle all
    the time. But rather for that presence, and the security, and
    the stability that it provides.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
        Before I call on Mr. Franks, I would urge and ask Mr.
    Secretary would you please provide the committee a copy of the
    ongoing force structure assessment when it is complete. We
    would certainly appreciate that----
        Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman [continuing]. Very, very much. I am sitting
    here thinking listening to your testimony how blessed we are to
    have leaders such as you heading the services that you do, and
    do so ably, and so well--people who wear the uniform and work
    for you--I hope that you will carry our appreciation back to
    them. And General Conway we wish you Godspeed. And we are going
    to work you hard between now and the time we say farewell to
    you. Admiral Roughead, thank you so much for your excellent
    testimony. And welcome Secretary Mabus. We expect a lot of hard
    work out of you.
        With that, Mr. Franks, and Mr. Taylor will assume the
    chair.
        Mr. Franks. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank all of you. Let me just echo the chairman's
    remarks related to your service. General Conway, I guess I
    would single you out here a little bit, you know? General
    MacArthur once said that, ``Old soldiers don't die, they just
    fade away.''
        And I know that Marines have a completely different
    perspective. Old Marines don't die. They just charge in a new
    direction. And I want you to know that we are very, very
    grateful for your service. We talk about freedom in this place,
    and we know that it is people like you that--that carry it with
    you everywhere you go. And you have given your life to the
    cause.
        And I want you to know that I believe my children, and the
    children of this country even though they may not remember
    everything about you will live in a safer place, and walking
    the light of liberty, because you were once commandant of the
    Marine Corps. And thank you very much.
        With that, Secretary Mabus, you know how politicians are?
    They have to hit other politicians. And I don't--do you think
    that you have a clear unimpeded latitude to speak in complete--
    in candor about the--in public about the short- and long-term
    resource needs of the Department of Navy?
        Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Franks. Okay. So I guess I have to--you know, I am
    stuck here. I have to ask given that the fleet is the smallest
    that it has been in several decades, and given the growing cost
    of shipbuilding we seem unlikely to reach Admiral Roughead's
    313-ship fleet any time soon? I mean, every year for the past
    15 years the shipbuilding accounts have been several billion
    dollars short of what is needed. And we primarily underestimate
    the cost of each new vessel. That kind of goes with it, I
    guess.
        We face a fighter gap based on of course the Navy testimony
    of upwards of 250 aircraft by 2018. And that is about one half
    of our carrier-based aircraft. And there is a widening gap in
    the Marine Corps reset funding that could approach $30 billion.
    I mean these are pretty short--serious shortfalls in my
    judgment.
        And of course on the threat side of the equation, the
    Chinese have launched 16 new submarines, and from 2005 and
    2007. And they have announced that they will design and build a
    new class of destroyers that are also working on--that they are
    also working on the first of likely several carriers. Which in
    my opinion is it seems that China has developed, and is
    enhancing its--area-denial capability based on their aggressive
    submarine acquisition program, and their acquisition of
    several--and development of several different anti-ship cruise
    missiles.
        And, I mean, they are just projecting power in a lot of
    different directions. And I think it seems that they are
    deliberately basing that on our assessed vulnerabilities. At
    least it appears to me that way. So my point is--and there is a
    question in here somewhere--the best means of assuring peace in
    the western Pacific in my judgment is maintaining a sufficient
    military power in the region to deter aggression. It is not a
    new concept.
        But the QDR was eerily silent on China. And based on your
    recent comments--and Australia--I mean, it sounds like we maybe
    have a different perspective of that concern. So with all that
    said, do you think and believe that the Navy is programming
    sufficient funds both in fiscal year 2011, and across the
    future years to fully address China's military expansion?
        Secretary Mabus. Yes, sir. I do. And to talk just very
    briefly about a few of the things that you said. We try to be
    very realistic in this budget, and in this 30-year shipbuilding
    plan about the cost of each of our vessels. Because frankly it
    doesn't do us any good to come in low, and then continually to
    ask for more money. If we are going to get the size of fleet
    that we need, we have to be realistic about what they are going
    to cost.
        We are also taking some pretty aggressive actions to drive
    down the cost of ships. The downselect of the OCS is the thing
    that springs to mind. In terms of our capability in the
    Pacific, and particularly the western Pacific, we are very
    mindful of what is happening. The Chinese capabilities and the
    things that they are doing--they haven't been nearly as
    transparent about as we would like. But we do understand the
    types of ships they are building. We understand the types of
    anti-access missiles, both ballistic missiles, and cruise
    missiles that they are fielding. And we understand what they
    are doing with their fleet.
        We have great confidence that the ships that we have today,
    and the ships that we are building for the future, and our
    total force concept will meet whatever challenge--and I won't
    just limit it to the Chinese. That whatever challenge we face
    in the Pacific, we feel that--that the fleet can meet it, and
    that the Navy and Marine Corps team will be there to hedge and
    deter in a very effective way.
        Mr. Franks. All right. Well, thank you all. And thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Taylor. [Presiding.] Yes. Thanks to the gentleman.
        The Chair will recognize the gentleman from South Carolina.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And General Conway, on possibly your last presentation here
    before the Armed Services Committee, I want to thank you for
    your service. And in the last year I have had the extraordinary
    opportunity to visit with your Marines at Camp Leatherneck. I
    was so impressed. And then a great honor that I cherish. My
    wife and I being the--reviewing at Parris Island in November.
    You should be so grateful for the young people that you are
    providing opportunity.
        And Admiral Roughead, I always want to thank you for your
    service at the Naval academy, and then commanding the USS Port
    Royal, which is named after a port in South Carolina. And thank
    you for your service, and hospitality.
        I yield, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Taylor. The Chair thanks the gentleman.
        And I would like to take this opportunity to thank all
    three of you gentlemen for your service to our nation.
    Commandant, we are going to miss you. I know you are going to
    do great things no matter what you do after uniform. But we
    certainly value every day that you have served us.
        Secretary Mabus, we are very, very, lucky that you gave up
    your private sector probably cushy job for this, but we--again,
    we are lucky to have you.
        And Admiral Roughead, we always value you as the only--I
    believe the only commander of both the Atlantic and the Pacific
    fleets to have served the United States Navy. A very rare, and
    well-deserved distinction.
        Secretary Mabus, before you leave I would like to hand
    deliver to you a letter that--from myself, Senator Cochran, and
    Senator Wicker. A similar letter was delivered to Northrop
    Grumman last week. And it basically says that the Congress has
    authorized and appropriated five ships--already authorized,
    already appropriated. And yet for whatever reason Northrop and
    the Navy have not come to terms--gotten those ships started.
        The admiral has made an excellent case that he needs a
    bigger fleet. The Congress has already responded to that--
    appropriating the money. We need to get going. And so I don't
    know if it is Northrop's delay. I don't know if it is the
    Navy's delay. But there is a delay that needs to be addressed
    that I am going to ask you to take a look at that.
        But again thank all of you for your service. And with that,
    this meeting is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
    ?

    =======================================================================

                                A P P E N D I X

                               February 24, 2010

    =======================================================================

    ?

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                               February 24, 2010

    =======================================================================

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.001

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.002

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.003

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.004

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.005

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.006

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.007

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.008

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.009

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.010

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.011

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.012

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.013

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.014

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.015

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.016

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.017

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.018

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.019

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.020

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.021

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.022

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.023

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.024

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.025

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.026

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.027

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.028

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.029

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.030

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.031

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.032

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.033

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.034

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.035

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.036

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.037

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.038

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.039

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.040

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.041

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.042

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.043

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.044

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.045

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.046

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.047

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.048

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.049

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.050

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.051

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.052

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.053

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.054

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.055

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.056

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.057

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.058

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.059

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.060

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.061

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.062

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.063

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.064

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.065

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.066

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.067

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8171.068

    ?

    =======================================================================

                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                               February 24, 2010

    =======================================================================

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON

        Admiral Roughead. The National Security Cutter (NSC) was designed
    to conduct an offshore patrol mission that is very different from Navy
    missions, and the NSC does not meet Navy requirements for speed, draft,
    survivability, and manpower requirements. The Navy is building the
    Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) to meet its Joint Staff-validated
    warfighting requirements. NSC would require significant and costly
    design changes to meet LCS capability requirements, which would likely
    result in the end cost of a modified NSC exceeding that of LCS. A more
    detailed comparison of LCS and NSC characteristics follows.
        In speed, LCS has a sprint speed of more than 40 knots; NSC sprint
    speed is 28 knots. In draft, LCS draft is approximately 13 feet to
    engage threats in the Littorals; the NSC draft is 22.5 feet,
    restricting its access in shallow waters. The inability of NSC to meet
    speed and draft requirements fundamentally limit the areas where the
    NSC can effectively operate. In survivability, LCS is built to Naval
    Vessel Rules and provides Level 1 survivability, which provides for
    shock hardening, protection against chemical, biological, radiological
    attack, and damage control/firefighting capability against destructive
    fires. NSC does not provide Level I survivability as it was not
    designed to operate in the same threat environment as LCS. In manpower
    requirements, LCS has a core crew of 40 personnel with 35 personnel
    comprising the mission package detachment and aviation detachment; the
    size of NSC crew is 110, 35 more than LCS at full mission capability.
    Additionally, LCS is designed to employ modular mission packages that
    address specific naval capability gaps in mine countermeasures, surface
    warfare, and anti-submarine warfare. NSC does not have the space or
    ability to employ these mission packages. [See page 37.]
                                     ______

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT

        Admiral Roughead. Navy expects all recent ship classes to survive a
    100 kilovolts per meter (kV/m) event with some degradation to mission
    possible. Regarding your specific question about remaining warfighting
    capability after an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) laydown of 100 kV/m,
    the answer is classified and I will provide it to you via separate
    correspondence. [See page 17.]
    ?

    =======================================================================

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                               February 24, 2010

    =======================================================================

                       QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS

        Ms. Tsongas. The FY10 NDAA contained language that mandated that no
    funds could be obligated by the Navy for construction or advanced
    procurement of surface combatants to be constructed after FY11 until
    multiple conditions had been met:* Submission of an acquisition
    strategy for surface combatants approved by USD AT&L and briefed to and
    approved by the JROC;* Verification by an independent review panel that
    the Navy considered numerous factors including modeling and simulation,
    operational availability, life cycle costs including manning, cost and
    schedule ramifications of accommodating new sensors and weapons to
    counter future threats; and* Conclusions of a joint review by SECNAV
    and Director MDA defining additional requirements for investment in
    Aegis BMD beyond the number of ships planned to be equipped for this
    mission in the FY 2010 budget submittal. Further, the FY10 NDAA
    required an update to the Navy's Open Architecture report to Congress
    upon submittal of the FY12 budget to reflect the Navy's combat systems
    acquisition plans for surface combatants. It also mandated submission
    of an update to the 2006 Naval Surface Fires Support report to Congress
    identifying capability shortfalls. Finally, the language directed the
    Navy to develop a plan to incorporate new technologies from DDG-1000
    and other surface combatant programs into ships constructed after 2011
    to avoid redundant development, implement open architecture and foster
    competition. To date, the Navy has not satisfied these requirements.
        The FY10 NDAA contained language that mandated that no funds could
    be obligated by the Navy for construction or advanced procurement of
    surface combatants to be constructed after FY11 until several
    conditions had been met, including verification by an independent
    review panel that the Navy considered numerous factors as part of
    establishing their shipbuilding plan and considered new technologies
    from more recent ship classes than the DDG-51.
        Such an independent assessment of needs and options seems
    particularly germane to our hearing today. Both the FY11 President's
    budget and 30-year shipbuilding plan you submitted this year is heavily
    based on DDG-51, one would assume this is a result of the
    aforementioned analyses, strategies and reviews. When would you expect
    the Navy to submit the results of this independent assessment that
    supports the plan you've submitted?
        Admiral Roughead. On February 6, 2010, the Secretary of the Navy
    submitted to the congressional defense committees a plan for
    implementing the language contained in Section 125 of Fiscal Year (FY)
    2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Public Law 111-84.
        In addition, the Navy has completed the following actions:
          Completed the development of the Technology Roadmap for
    Surface Combatants and Fleet Modernization February 2010 in accordance
    with Section 125(d) of the FY 2010 NDAA.
          The update to the Naval Surface Fire Support Report to
    Congress was delivered on March 11, 2010.
        As reported in the Navy's implementation plan report to Congress,
    an independent panel, jointly established by the Assistant Secretary of
    the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition (ASN(RD&A)) and the
    Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and
    Resources (OPNAV N8) reviewed the Navy's future guided missile
    destroyer hull and radar study of 2009. This independent panel was
    comprised of senior subject matter experts with extensive background in
    policy, acquisition, research and development, radar and ship design,
    combat systems integration, budget and cost analysis. Results of the
    Navy study, along with the independent review panel's report, have been
    briefed to the congressional defense committees' staff; members of the
    House Armed Services Committee received a brief on March 11, 2010. The
    full Navy study and independent review panel report will be provided
    this Spring.
                                     ______

                      QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY

        Mr. Thornberry. General Conway, you serve as the DOD Executive
    Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons. The 2009 Marine Corps S&T Strategic Plan
    identifies a number of capabilities required to address irregular
    warfare needs in the future including interim force capabilities. Yet
    the budget for these is stale at about $100 million per year and
    several promising programs aren't making their way from R&D into the
    field. What needs to happen to encourage wide-spread adoption of these
    capabilities across all services? Would legislation empowering your
    Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Office be useful to you? For example, does the
    office need to become a joint program office?
        General Conway. The DOD NLW Executive Agent has an ongoing
    independent assessment by the Center for Naval Analysis that is
    researching this question and that is nearing conclusion. Additional
    time is needed by the DOD NLWEA to review the CNA report, assess its
    findings and make a recommendation on the way forward.
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN

        Mr. Akin. I have been briefed that the Navy requires a 5-to-1 ratio
    of non-deployed to deployed ships in order to support its surface
    combatant mission. Given the added requirement for afloat BMD, how many
    more BMD-capable ships will the Navy need in order to support this
    mission without negatively impacting the safety and support of the
    Carrier Strike Group?
        Admiral Roughead. In conjunction with the Missile Defense Agency
    (MDA), we adjusted the Aegis BMD Program of Record (POR) to increase
    the total number of funded Aegis BMD-capable ships across the FYDP from
    21 to 38, of which 27 will be deployable in FY15. Increasing the
    inventory of Surface Combatants with BMD capability gives the Navy
    greater flexibility to meet Combatant Commander surge and contingency
    operations requirements, and to provide an organic BMD capability to
    our CSGs.
        Mr. Akin. In your testimony you mentioned using SLEP as a primary
    mitigation strategy for the Strike Fighter Shortfall problem, yet I
    have been briefed by the Navy that Fleet OPTEMPO is the primary
    limiting factor for how many jets can undergo SLEP per year. If the
    Navy has already optimized the number of jets it is able to SLEP
    annually, how will this measure be able to do in the future what it is
    apparently unable to do now?
        Admiral Roughead. According to the current planning schedule, the
    SLEP window of opportunity for F/A-18A-D does not occur until FY 2012,
    when modifications to our F/A-18A-D aircraft begin. The Navy is
    developing a FY 2012 budget request that will include SLEP
    requirements.
        SLEP is only one aspect of the Navy's TACAIR inventory management
    initiatives targeted at preserving the service life of our existing
    legacy strike fighter aircraft (F/A-18A-D). The Navy will reduce the
    number of aircraft available in our squadrons during non-deployed
    phases to the minimum required. Navy expeditionary squadrons and those
    supporting the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) will be reduced from 12
    aircraft to 10 aircraft per squadron on an as-required basis. These
    measures reduce the operational demand on legacy F/A-18s, making more
    aircraft available for induction into life extension events. The Navy
    is also evaluating depot level efficiency to maximize throughput and
    return legacy strike fighter aircraft to the Fleet. Collectively, these
    measures will extend the service life of the legacy aircraft and make
    the projected inventory decrease manageable. The management initiatives
    being implemented prudently balance operational risks and requirements
    today, while seeking to fulfill future projected capacity and
    capability requirements.
        Mr. Akin. The JSF continues to be plagued by delays. Most recently,
    it was reported that the IOC date for the Air Force will slide roughly
    two years to late CY 2015. In the past year the JSF completed only
    roughly 10% of its planned test flights. Given that the Navy has
    traditionally been the service with the most stringent OP/EVAL
    requirements prior to IOC, and given that the Navy is scheduled to
    receive the carrier variant of the JSF last, how will these delays
    effect the Navy's IOC date?
        Admiral Roughead. Based on the SECDEF approved F-35 program
    restructure and delivery of FY 2011 procured aircraft, the Navy F-35C
    IOC has been changed to 2016.
        The Navy IOC is based on three items: sufficient aircraft
    quantities, desired capability to conduct all Operational Requirements
    Document missions, and completion of operational test of delivered
    capability. The Navy's intent is to stand up squadrons as aircraft
    become available and declare IOC when sufficient capability is tested
    and delivered.
        Mr. Akin. Will the Navy accept an inordinate risk by abandoning its
    long-held standards for thorough test and evaluation in order to IOC
    the JSF in accordance with a predetermined timeframe, or will the Navy
    proceed with its customary diligence, thereby exacerbating the Strike
    Fighter Gap?
        Admiral Roughead. The Navy will not abandon its long-held
    standards. Based on the program and test schedule restructure and
    delivery of FY 2011 procured aircraft, the Navy F-35C IOC has been
    revised to be in 2016 based on three items: sufficient aircraft
    quantities; desired capability to conduct all Operational Requirements
    Document missions; and completion of operational test of delivered
    capability.
        F-35 test program risks will be mitigated through the continuation
    of a test program assessment and the support and advice of the OSD
    Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. An Integrated Test Review
    Team composed of experts in Developmental Test and Operational Test
    continues to mature test program plans to ensure program technical
    maturity is aligned with IOC dates; operational assessments are
    optimized; new opportunities for integrated test are matured; test
    schedule margins are realistic; and the proposed flow of technical data
    enables the planned operational test periods.
        To mitigate aircraft assets required during testing, the program is
    adding one carrier variant (CV) aircraft to the SDD program to expand
    developmental testing capacity; utilization of three Low Rate Initial
    Production (LRIP) aircraft in support of development testing; and
    addition of another software development/test capability.
        The Navy, in conjunction with OSD and the USAF, is pursuing every
    opportunity to increase efficiency of test and accelerate delivery of
    required capability to maximize our strike fighter inventory. We will
    stand up squadrons as aircraft become available and declare IOC when
    sufficient capability is tested and delivered.
        Mr. Akin. I have been briefed that the Marine Corps intends to IOC
    the JSF on time, regardless of where the F-35 stands with respect to
    test and evaluation. Given the overwhelming delays in test for the F-
    35, this could potentially require the Marine Corps to IOC a weapons
    system long before it is fully tested. Is it wise to take assets and
    resources away from our ongoing operational requirements in order to
    prematurely force the introduction of an aircraft that is not even
    optimized for the fight we are currently in today?
        General  Conway. The Marine Corps plans to IOC with a multi-mission
    capable Block 2B aircraft as described in the JSF Operational
    Requirements Document (ORD) CN-3. A USMC IOC is projected to be 2012
    for the F-35B which is based on operational requirements and the
    associated metrics that encompass capabilities, equipment, training,
    and support that will measure the progress of the program to meet the
    USMC requirements between now and December 2012 and enable the Marine
    Corps to ensure all the elements required for operational use of the F-
    35B are ready. An IOC declaration will be dependent upon meeting these
    requirements.
        No assets or resources are being taken away from operational
    requirements to IOC. The USMC transition to the F-35B is structured and
    scheduled to meet operational requirements throughout the process
    without degradation.
        Mr. Akin. Your Harrier squadrons currently have 16 aircraft each.
    One of the ``Management Levers'' the DoN has briefed to me as a means
    of mitigating Strike Fighter Shortfalls is to reduce the number of
    aircraft in expeditionary F/A-18 squadrons by 2. Yet, they have also
    informed me that this ``management lever'' is not possible given
    existing operational requirements. Knowing that the Marine Corps
    requires its existing number of jets in order to support its current
    share of sorties, it seems reasonable to assume that the Marine Corps
    likewise requires its existing compliment of Harriers as well. Will you
    be replacing Harrier Squadrons with an equivalent number of F-35's? If
    not, how will this impact current operational demand?
        Will the rate at which you plan to replace Harriers meet current
    operational requirements?
        General  Conway. The key enabler the AV-8B provides is the ability
    to deploy as part of a composite Air Combat Element (ACE) within the
    Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) as part of our basic Marine Air Ground
    Task Force maneuver element. An integrated Tactical Aviation capability
    at this level provides the ability to project, protect, and prosecute
    combat operations when and wherever required. The F-35B STOVL Joint
    Strike Fighter leverages off the AV-8B's proven legacy in this
    environment and adds the multi-mission capabilities of the F/A-18
    aircraft that will evolve our MEU's into far more superior force in
    readiness.
        We have seven standing MEU's and the requirement to continue this
    force in the future has been repeatedly vetted and validated. Replacing
    the AV-8B's with a similar number F-35B's is the plan to maintain the
    capabilities to meet our operational requirements. Our procurement
    plans support the transition of the Harrier squadrons with the
    Lightening II aircraft, same number of aircraft supporting the same
    number of MEU's with one noted addition. When a 6 aircraft Detachment
    deploys with the ACE as it does today with the Harrier, the remaining
    combat capability of the F-35B in the ten aircraft left behind has the
    same resident capabilities of our other fourteen 10 aircraft squadrons
    that are replacing the Hornets. With this construct of the F-35B
    squadrons, seven 16 aircraft squadrons and fourteen 10 aircraft
    squadrons, we take our tactical aviation capabilities into a common
    single type of aircraft with all the associated synergy and savings
    while increasing our MAGTF combat capabilities.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

        Mr. Wilson. Six amphibious ships will be decommissioned within the
    next three years, bringing the amphibious force to below 30. This
    brings the risk level to above what Navy and Marine Corps defines as
    the ``limit of acceptable risk.'' Understanding that the Navy plans to
    retain these vessels in the inactive fleet, rather than selling or
    dismantling them, what would be the cost of continuing to operate the
    vessels? What prevents the Navy from retaining these ships?
        Admiral Roughead. The cost of maintaining ships past their design
    life is difficult to forecast accurately; however, the table below
    provides Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) estimates absent specific ship
    studies to determine if extending the service lives of these ships
    through the FYDP is feasible.
        Navy retires ships from service when changes in mission or threat
    environment over the period of a ship's commissioned service, or
    deterioration in overall seaworthiness, make the ship no longer viable
    or cost-effective for future service. The LHA 1 Class does not meet the
    challenges of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) integration. The LPD 4 Class
    ships have reached or exceeded their expected service lives of 40
    years, and provide limited C5I capability to support USMC current and
    future missions.
        Our 30-year shipbuilding plan provides a projected battle force
    that balances the anticipated risk across the FYDP with the security
    uncertainties of the future to achieve the best balance of mission
    capabilities, resources, and requirements.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   Unfunded Costs FY11-15 ($ Millions/FY11 dollars)
                   Ship                    Date of      Age  in  ---------------------------------------------------
                                          Commission      FY15    Ops and Maint   Manpower*    Training**     Total
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    USS NASSAU LHA 4                    28-Jul-79....  36.......   289.........   439.......   55.........   783
    USS PELELIU LHA 5                   3-May-80.....  35.......   322.........   250.......   30.........   602
    USS CLEVELAND LPD 7                 21-Apr-67....  48.......    95.........   151.......   19.........   265
    USS DUBUQUE LPD 8                   1-Sep-67.....  48.......   149.........   151.......   19.........   319
    USS DENVER LPD 9                    26-Oct-68....  46.......   176.........    87.......   10.........   273
    USS PONCE LPD 15                    10-Jul-71....  44.......   146.........   120.......   14.........   280
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           TOTAL (FY11-15)                        1177.........  1198.......  147.........  2522
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * Manpower costs programmed in the year of decommissioning are \1/2\ of a full year requirement; reflects MPN/
      RPN/DHAN/R and OMN.
    ** Training reflects MPN/RPN/DHAN/R for Individuals Account for ships listed.
    All values are in $M (FY11).

        Mr. Wilson. With the projected fighter shortfall and the further
    sliding of the JSF, why is the Navy not planning on purchasing
    additional F/A-18EIF aircraft? Though the JSF will show significant
    stealth improvements over the E/F, the SuperHornet has significant
    improvements in signature improvements over the legacy Hornets. Do you
    believe that advances in air defense over the next several years will
    lead to such a tactical risk that it is worth taking the strategic risk
    of such a substantial force structure gap?
        Admiral Roughead. The F/A-18E/F is a highly capable aircraft
    designed to meet and defeat today's threats with growth potential for
    the future; however, it cannot replace the F-35C. I remain committed to
    the JSF program because of the advanced sensor, precision strike,
    firepower, and stealth capabilities JSF will bring to our Fleet. We are
    monitoring the JSF program closely and managing our existing strike
    fighter capacity to meet power projection demands until JSF is
    delivered. The management initiatives being implemented prudently
    balance operational risks and requirements today, while seeking to
    fulfill future projected capacity and capability requirements.
        Mr. Wilson. The increased operational tempo of the past six years
    has led to much talk about strategies for increasing dwell times for
    Marines. Many units have been operating on a less than one-to-one
    dwell-to-deployed time. This has led to a substantial lack of training
    time, and hindered readiness. Have you abandoned the two-to-one dwell-
    to-deployed ideal? What strategies are you pursuing to ensure that
    Marines will be properly trained for both their primary and contingency
    missions?
        General Conway.
          To date, almost 75 percent of the available Marines have
    deployed in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM,
    or other operational commitments around the globe.
          Individual Deployment Tempo. We measure individual
    deployment tempo on a two-year sliding scale--the number of days
    deployed out of the previous 730 days. In the last seven years, we have
    seen a twentyfold increase in the individual deployment tempo of
    Marines in the active component. In October 2002, the number of Marines
    who deployed for at least 120 consecutive days in a two-year period was
    4,845. As of January 2010, 100,760 Marines had deployed for at least
    120 consecutive days.
          Unit Operational Tempo. The metric we use to measure unit
    operational tempo is the ratio of ``deployment to dwell''--months
    deployed to months at home station. We limit the duration of
    deployments for units and individual Marines to no more than seven
    months for battalions and squadrons. Higher headquarters units deploy
    for one year.
          Our goal is to achieve a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio in
    the active component and a 1:5 ratio in the reserve component. Our
    reserve units are currently operating at a ratio that more closely
    approximates a ratio of 1:4, while many of our active component units,
    on average, are nearing the goal of 1:2 (see Table 1).

                                     Table 1. MAGTF Unit Deployment-to-Dwell Ratios
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         MAGTF Element                         Average Ratio (Months Deployed: Months Home Station)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Command Element                              1 : 1.43
                Ground Combat Element                        1 : 2.08
                Aviation Combat Element                      1 : 2.11
                Logistics Combat Element                     1 : 1.79
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Note: As of 18 Nov 2009. The subordinate units most frequently deployed are Intelligence Battalions, 1:1.01
      (Command Element); Infantry Battalions, 1:1.78 (Ground Combat Element); VMU Squadrons, 1:1.10, and Attack
      Helicopter Squadrons, 1:1.28 (Aviation Combat Element); and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Companies 1:1.30
      (Logistics Combat Element).

        Mr. Wilson. Sustained level of combat has led to a large gap
    between equipment the Marine Corps needs fixed or replaced and what has
    been fixed or replaced. Additionally the Maritime Prepositioning Ships'
    inventories have been greatly depleted. Do you have a proposed timeline
    for getting the Marine Corps back on track with the equipment they
    need? Is there a move to replenish the Maritime Prepositioning
    supplies?
        General  Conway.
        Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)
        Our Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons (MPSRONs) will be reset
    with the most capable equipment possible. We have begun loading them
    with capabilities that support lower spectrum operations while still
    maintaining the ability to generate Marine Expeditionary Brigades
    (MEBs) capable of conducting major combat operations. As we modernize,
    apply lessons learned, and reset our MPSRONs their readiness will
    fluctuate. However, our endstate is all three MPSRONs fully reset by
    2012 and Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N) reset
    within Marine Corps priorities as assets become available.
        The MPSRONs are currently rotating through Maritime Prepositioning
    Force Maintenance Cycle-9. MPSRON-1 completed MPF Maintenance Cycle-9
    in September 2008 and is currently at 83 percent of its full equipment
    set. As has been addressed in previous reports, equipment from MPSRON-1
    was required to outfit new units standing up in Fiscal Year 2007 and
    Fiscal Year 2008 as part of our end strength increase to 202,000. While
    the majority of combat systems are loaded, MPSRON-1 is short a portion
    of its motor transport, communications and bulk fuel/water storage
    capability. MPSRON-1 is expected to be fully reset at the completion of
    its next maintenance cycle in 2011.
        Equipment from MPSRON-2 was offloaded to support Operation IRAQI
    FREEDOM II. During its rotation through MPF Maintenance Cycle-9,
    between August 2008 and July 2009, the readiness of MPSRON-2 was
    substantially improved from 49 percent to its current readiness of 77
    percent. Upon integration of MPSRON-2's fifth ship, a Large, Medium
    Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ship in Jan 2011 and completion of its
    MPF Maintenance Cycle-10 rotation in fiscal year 2012, MPSRON-2 is
    expected to be fully reset.
        MPSRON-3 was reset to 100 percent of its equipment set during MPF
    Maintenance Cycle-8 in March 2007. MPSRON-3 is rotating through MPF
    Maintenance Cycle-9 and currently has three ships of equipment
    downloaded at Blount Island Command. Two of MPSRON-3's ships were
    employed in Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE in Haiti and provided the
    Marine Expeditionary Units and Naval Support Elements with the
    additional equipment and supplies necessary to support immediate
    relief. The goal is, upon completion of its MPF Maintenance Cycle-9 and
    backload of all vessels, in July 2010 MPSRON-3 will return to 100
    percent.
        Marine Corps Prepositioning Program: Norway
        The Marine Corps Prepositioning Program--Norway (MCPP-N) was used
    to source equipment in support of operations in Iraqi and Afghanistan,
    including the recent force increase. MCPP-N is routinely utilized to
    support theater security cooperation activities and exercises in the
    AFRICOM and EUCOM areas of responsibility. The Marine Corps continues
    to reset MCPP-N in accordance with our operational priorities while
    also exploring other locations for geographic prepositioning that will
    enable combat and theater security cooperation operations in support of
    forward deployed Naval Forces.
                                     ______

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. MCMORRIS RODGERS

        Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Like many, I am concerned about the lack of
    number of ships in the Navy. About 100 years ago, Great Britain was a
    world super power. It was also during this time that Great Britain
    dominated the sea. Are you concerned that if we don't make it a
    priority to build ships to maintain our sea dominance that this could
    weaken our country's super power standing?
        Admiral Roughead. As our security and prosperity are inextricably
    linked with those of other nations, a global Fleet is essential to
    deterring aggression, assuring our allies, building partnerships, and
    protecting our national interests. A Fleet of no less than 313 ships is
    necessary to meet those operational requirements. Our 30-Year
    shipbuilding plan grows the capacity of our Fleet to 320 ships by 2024,
    with the naval capabilities necessary to meet the challenges the nation
    faces over the next three decades of the 21st century. On balance, I
    believe the force structure represented by our 30-year shipbuilding
    plan maintains our ability to project power across the spectrum of
    challenges we are likely to face throughout the time period of the
    report, albeit with prudent risk where appropriate.
        Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. Wouldn't you agree that spouses relying on
    the Military Spouse Career Advancement Account (MyCAA) program to
    further their academic goals should have been notified prior to the
    temporary stay in order to make the necessary arrangements with their
    school?
        Admiral Roughead. I do agree that spouses should have been afforded
    additional notice in advance of such a significant change in program
    policies or procedures. The pause was necessitated by an unforeseen,
    unprecedented spike in enrollments, which not only pushed the program
    to its budget threshold, but also began to overwhelm the program's
    support systems. As a senior leader who recognizes the extraordinary
    role military spouses play in the lives and careers of our uniformed
    service members, I share the Department's deep regret in reaching the
    decision to temporarily suspend the program on such short notice.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN

        Mr. Lamborn. The Administration's Phased, Adaptive Approach to BMD
    drives BMD-capable ships to provide effects at three very different
    levels of war. First, they must provide theater effects for sea-base
    defense. They must also provide regional and cross-regional effects to
    areas like CENTCOM and/or PACOM. Finally they must be able to provide
    effects for homeland defense (global effects). This is a daunting task.
    Is the C3 (command, control, communications) architecture in place to
    enable BMD-capable ships to perform all of these functions? What
    initiatives are underway to connect the sensors and shooters to provide
    a layered missile defense that protects not only our forces abroad but
    the Homeland? Is there a cost to other missions when these ships are
    conducting their BMD mission? How would you quantify the risk based on
    this expanded tasking?
        Admiral Roughead. C3 (command, control, communications)
    architecture is in place to enable BMD-capable ships to perform all
    three levels of war. The Navy contributes to BMD as part of a Joint and
    coalition family of systems. As new capabilities are added, the
    existing Missile Defense Agency managed C3 architecture is updated to
    ensure interoperability and effectiveness. The key C3 interface between
    BMD ships and the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) is in place.
    In most Combatant Commands (COCOM), the capability exists but requires
    further upgrades and enhancements. The Navy is currently resourcing
    Maritime Operations Centers (MOC) with access to the Command and
    Control Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) applications to
    increase Command and Control connectivity with the Global BMDS. The
    Navy is addressing communication improvements to support seamless BMDS
    integration across Theater, Regional and Strategic Communications for
    BMD cueing and track management. A majority of this capability, such as
    Multi-TADIL-J, exists currently.
        Initiatives are being undertaken to connect the sensors and
    shooters in a layered missile defense that protects not only our forces
    abroad but also the Homeland. The spiral development of C2BMC includes
    continuous improvements which will enhance coordination across Navy,
    Joint and Coalition sensors, contributing to Homeland Defense and
    theater and regional missions.
        Mission prioritization is directed at the highest levels of the DOD
    and is based on Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements. Naval
    operations, to include maritime BMD, are led by Maritime Component
    Commanders at theater Maritime Operations Centers (MOC), and
    effectively employ multi-mission Surface Combatants with BMD capability
    to meet CCDR requirements. Regular CCDR sponsored exercises and test
    events are used to benchmark and improve coordination among commanders
    in theater, cross-regional, and Homeland defense operations. Navy has
    also added BMD scenarios to Fleet battle experiments and exercises to
    identify and test additional enhancements.
        The BMD mission does not represent an increase in overall risk, but
    rather a reduction in risk to our deployed forces and interests around
    the globe. That said, the Navy has a finite number of surface
    combatants to conduct numerous missions. Combatant Commanders balance
    theater level requirements, forces and risk in carrying out their
    missions, to include BMD.
        Mr. Lamborn. Our potential adversaries have shown the capability
    and willingness to deny our forces access to satellite communications
    either through the use of anti-satellite weapons or communications
    jamming. While anti-satellite technology is a very real threat, proven
    by China's January 2007 shoot down of one of their aging satellites,
    the technology to interfere with satellite communications is simple and
    readily available worldwide from any local Radio Shack store. What
    specific measures has the U.S. Navy taken to ensure that it can
    continue to provide missile defense in a satellite communications
    denied environment? I understand if this requires a classified
    response, but I encourage you to share what you can with this committee
    in both an unclassified and classified response.
        Admiral Roughead. The Navy currently has a number of mitigation
    techniques to counter jamming threats available for use in a Satellite
    Communications (SATCOM) degraded environment. Use of frequency hopping,
    agile spot beams, and spread spectrum techniques provide low
    probability of detection and intercept of our SATCOM. The Department of
    the Navy studies SATCOM degraded environment mitigations through our
    Range of Warfare Command and Control initiative, better preparing our
    forces to meet their operational requirements despite others' efforts
    to disrupt them. The Navy is capable of conducting its missions in this
    challenging environment, to include missile defense. Through these
    efforts, and in cooperation with the joint and interagency community on
    the development of other mitigations, like the Joint Aerial Layer
    Network, the Navy will be poised to operate in the most challenging
    electromagnetic environments now and in the years to come.
        If you desire further elaboration on the Navy's mitigation
    techniques and initiatives, I can provide a classified response or have
    my staff brief you on the issue in more detail.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER

        Mr. Hunter. Secretary Mabus, as you may know, in the FY10 NDAA
    report language was included regarding the Miramar Air Station Trap and
    Skeet range. The provision in the NDAA directs the ``Secretary to
    submit a report to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and
    the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives when
    the PA/SI is complete. The report should include a description of any
    mitigation measures needed and timeline to complete, and plans and
    timeline to reopen the range.'' It is my understanding that the PA/SI
    was completed in December 2009. Can you please tell me what the status
    is of your report to both the SASC and HASC as well as when it will be
    available for our review?
        Secretary Mabus. The Preliminary Assessment report is complete. The
    Site Inspection report was recently revised to reflect regulatory
    agency comments and was finalized March 18, 2010. Based on the results
    of these studies, the Report to Congress required by the House Report
    2647 of the FY10 NDAA is currently being prepared and will be provided
    to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees in the next 60 days.
    Copies of the Preliminary Assessment and the Site Inspection reports
    will also be made available to the Committees.
        Mr. Hunter.. General Conway, it is my understanding that the Marine
    Corps has developed a roll-on, roll-off technology that expands the
    capability of the KC-130J. The Harvest Hawk program will enable the KC-
    130J to fulfill multiple missions individually or simultaneously from
    refueling missions, including fire support missions and intelligence,
    surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. I am encouraged by the
    Marine Corps' work with Harvest Hawk and their plan to increase the
    capability of the KC-130J aircraft in order to take advantage of the
    extended endurance of the KC-130J. What is the status of the Harvest
    Hawk developmental effort and when do you expect to be able to field
    the capability?
        General  Conway. Harvest Hawk is currently in developmental test
    and is expected to deploy during the summer 2010.