    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

       NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                      SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFORMATION POLICY,
                         CENSUS, AND NATIONAL ARCHIVES

                                     of the

                             COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
                             AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JULY 30, 2009

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 111-70

                                   __________

    Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

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                  COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

                       EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman
    PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania      DARRELL E. ISSA, California
    CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York         DAN BURTON, Indiana
    ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland         JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
    DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio             JOHN L. MICA, Florida
    JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts       MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
    WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri              JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
    DIANE E. WATSON, California          MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts      LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
    GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia         BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
    MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois               JIM JORDAN, Ohio
    MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio                   JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
    ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of   JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
        Columbia                         JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
    PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island     AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois             ------ ------
    CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
    HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
    PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
    CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
    PETER WELCH, Vermont
    BILL FOSTER, Illinois
    JACKIE SPEIER, California
    STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio
    ------ ------

                          Ron Stroman, Staff Director
                    Michael McCarthy, Deputy Staff Director
                          Carla Hultberg, Chief Clerk
                      Larry Brady, Minority Staff Director

       Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census, and National Archives

                       WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri, Chairman
    PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania      PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
    CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York         LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
    ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of   JOHN L. MICA, Florida
        Columbia                         JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
    DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio
    DIANE E. WATSON, California
                         Darryl Piggee, Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on July 30, 2009....................................     1
    Statement of:
        Thomas, Adrienne C., Acting Archivist of the United States,
          National Archives and Records Administration, accompanied
          by Gary M. Stern, General Counsel, the National Archives
          and Records Administration, and Sharon Thibodeau, Deputy
          Assistant Archivist for Records Services; and Paul
          Brachfeld, Inspector General, National Archives and Records
          Administration.............................................     6
            Brachfeld, Paul..........................................    18
            Thomas, Adrienne C.......................................     6
    Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
        Brachfeld, Paul, Inspector General, National Archives and
          Records Administration, prepared statement of..............    21
        Clay, Hon. Wm. Lacy, a Representative in Congress from the
          State of Missouri, prepared statement of...................     3
        McHenry, Hon. Patrick T., a Representative in Congress from
          the State of North Carolina, prepared statement of.........    29
        Thomas, Adrienne C., Acting Archivist of the United States,
          National Archives and Records Administration, prepared
          statement of...............................................     9

       NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JULY 30, 2009

                      House of Representatives,
       Subcommittee on Information Policy, Census, and
                                     National Archives,
                  Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m. in
    room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Wm. Lacy Clay
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Clay, McHenry, and Norton.
        Staff present: Darryl Piggee, staff director/counsel; Frank
    Davis, professional staff member; Jean Gosa, clerk; Charisma
    Williams, staff assistant; Charles Phillips, minority chief
    counsel for policy; Adam Fromm, minority chief clerk and Member
    liaison; Howard Denis, minority senior counsel; and Chapin Fay
    and Jonathan Skladany, minority counsels.
        Mr. Clay. The Information Policy, Census, and National
    Archives Subcommittee will now come to order.
        Good afternoon and welcome to today's hearing entitled,
    ``National Archives and Records Administration Organizational
    Issues.''
        Without objection, the Chair and ranking member will have 5
    minutes to make opening statements, followed by opening
    statements not to exceed 3 minutes by any other Member who
    seeks recognition.
        Without objection, Members and witnesses may have 5
    legislative days to submit a written statement or extraneous
    materials for the record.
        The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the loss of an
    external hard drive containing data from the Executive Office
    of the Clinton administration. We will hear from the Acting
    Archivist, Adrienne Thomas, and the NARA Inspector General,
    Paul Brachfeld, and we hope to get real insight into how the
    security breach occurred and what steps have been taken, and
    what steps should be taken to tighten security at NARA
    facilities.
        The missing hard drive, which is a backup copy, contained
    the entire computer files of 113 White House employees. Their
    entire computer files were downloaded and stored on a hard
    drive and later transferred to the backup hard drive that is
    now missing.
        Classified documents and personally identifiable
    information of former Clinton administration staff and visitors
    to the White House are now exposed.
        Before we continue with this hearing, let us be very clear
    that the subcommittee has no intention of interfering or
    impeding the investigations currently being conducted by the
    NARA Inspector General, the Secret Service, or the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation. We urge everyone's cooperation with
    these investigations and I thank all of our witnesses for
    appearing today and look forward to their testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Wm. Lacy Clay follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8132.001

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8132.002

        Mr. Clay. Now, we are on a tight schedule today, so what I
    am going to do is, normally we would yield to the ranking
    member, who is not here yet. When he gets here, he will be
    allowed an opening statement, but I will swear the witnesses
    in. I will introduce you and swear you in, and hopefully by the
    end a minority Member will be here.
        Let me first introduce the panel. We will hear first from
    Ms. Adrienne Thomas, Acting Archivist of the U.S. National
    Archives and Records Administration. Ms. Thomas is currently
    the Acting Archivist of the United States. Prior to her
    appointment as Acting Archivist in December 2008, Ms. Thomas
    served as the Deputy Archivist of the United States.
        Ms. Thomas has been with the National Archives for 38
    years, beginning as an Archivist Trainee in the Office of
    Presidential Libraries, and subsequently holding a number of
    policy and administrative roles.
        Ms. Thomas will be accompanied by Mr. Gary M. Stern,
    General Counsel for the National Archives and Records
    Administration.
        Welcome to both of you.
        Our next witness will be Mr. Paul Brachfeld, Inspector
    General, National Archives and Records Administration. Mr.
    Brachfeld serves as the IG of NARA and as the IG for NARA, he
    oversees the conduct and execution of all audits,
    investigations and inspection for the agency, in compliance
    with provisions of the Inspector General Act of 1978 as
    amended.
        Mr. Brachfeld's entire career has been devoted to
    investigative activities since graduating from the University
    of Maryland College Park in 1979. Go Terps. And today, he
    brings 10 years of experience as the NARA Inspector General and
    30 years of exceptional service to the U.S. Government.
    Currently at NARA, Mr. Brachfeld's tenure has included the
    recovery of hundreds of stolen archival holdings and related
    successful prosecutions of identified subjects. And we look
    forward to his testimony.
        I want to welcome all of you to our hearing today, and it
    is the policy of the Oversight and Government Reform Committee
    to swear in all witnesses before they testify.
        Would all of you please stand and raise your right hands?
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Clay. You may be seated. Thank you.
        Let the record reflect that the witnesses answered in the
    affirmative, and each of you will have 5 minutes to make
    opening statements. Your complete written testimony will be
    included in the hearing record. The yellow light will indicate
    that it is time to sum up. The red light will indicate that
    your time has expired.
        Ms. Thomas, you may begin your opening statement.

       STATEMENTS OF ADRIENNE C. THOMAS, ACTING ARCHIVIST OF THE
     UNITED STATES, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION,
      ACCOMPANIED BY GARY M. STERN, GENERAL COUNSEL, THE NATIONAL
      ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, AND SHARON THIBODEAU,
       DEPUTY ASSISTANT ARCHIVIST FOR RECORDS SERVICES; AND PAUL
      BRACHFELD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS
                             ADMINISTRATION

                    STATEMENT OF ADRIENNE C. THOMAS

        Ms. Thomas. Thank you, Chairman Clay and members of the
    subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss a recent
    security incident that is a serious breach of the trust placed
    in the National Archives to protect our Nation's records.
        NARA learned in late March that an external computer hard
    drive containing copies of Clinton Administrative Executive
    Office of the President records was missing from the electronic
    records processing room. As the Acting Archivist, and as
    someone who has devoted my entire 39-year career to the
    National Archives, I am deeply angered that a NARA employee or
    contractor may have intentionally removed this item.
        With me today are NARA's General Counsel and Senior Agency
    Official for Privacy, Gary Stern, and Sharon Thibodeau, Deputy
    Assistant Archivist for Records Services.
        The loss of the hard drive occurred while NARA was
    conducting preservation processing of electronic media received
    from the Executive Office of the President [EOP], at the end of
    the Clinton administration. Tapes containing snapshots of the
    contents of the working drives of EOP employees were copied by
    a contractor to new media to prevent deterioration.
        On September 18, 2008, two My Book hard drives created by
    the contractor were delivered to NARA. The hard drives were
    labeled master No. 2 and backup No. 2. The two hard drives were
    taken to suite 5300 at the National Archives in College Park
    and placed on a shelf in the unclassified electronic records
    processing room within the suite. At the time, approximately 85
    NARA employees and contractors had badges that opened the three
    doors to the office area of the suite. Individuals with badge
    access to suite 5300 also had access to the electronic records
    processing room for unclassified records.
        On October 30th, the work of verifying the records on the
    hard drive was assigned to an information technology
    specialist. Work was performed only on the master No. 2 hard
    drive, not the backup No. 2, which would later be missing.
        On February 5, 2009, the IT specialist placed the master
    No. 2 hard drive into its original manufacturer's box and noted
    that the backup No. 2 hard drive was in a similar adjacent box.
    The two boxes remained on a shelf in the processing room and no
    additional work was done on the hard drive until March 24,
    2009, when the IT specialist discovered that the box that had
    contained backup No. 2 hard drive was empty. The master No. 2
    hard drive was still in its box.
        An immediate division-wide search was initiated. On April
    2, 2009, the Inspector General, General Counsel and I were
    informed of the loss. While the Office of the Inspector General
    continues its investigation, there are currently no facts to
    determine whether the drive was stolen or misplaced and no
    suspect has been identified. NARA has offered a reward of up to
    $50,000 for information that leads to the recovery of the
    missing hard drive.
        NARA staff reviewed the master No. 2 hard drive and
    discovered that it contained numerous files containing personal
    names and Social Security numbers. In addition, NARA also found
    a small number of files that contained markings indicating they
    may contain classified information. While information from the
    EOP provided at the time of transfer indicated that the hard
    drives did not contain classified data, we believe EOP
    employees must have accidentally or improperly stored some
    classified information on their unclassified computers.
        We are compiling a list of those individuals who may have
    had their personal information compromised and a credit
    monitoring contractor is notifying these individuals as they
    are identified. To date, approximately 15,750 notification
    letters have been mailed. NARA is offering each individual 1
    year of free credit monitoring services and fraud protection.
    To date, 796 individuals have signed up for the credit
    monitoring services. Because of the extremely large volume of
    data on the drive, over 8.7 million individual files, we do not
    yet know the total number of individuals whose privacy has been
    affected.
        NARA has taken steps to improve internal security in our
    Electronic Records Division. First, we have added separate bad
    access controls to the doors opening the processing rooms in
    suite 5300. There are now only entrances to the processing room
    and only individuals with badges programmed to open these doors
    may enter the processing room. All others must sign the log and
    be accompanied by an authorized person while in the room.
        Second, we conducted an audit of all electronic media
    containing personally identifiable information and moved it to
    a separate locked block of shelving within a locked stack area
    accessible only to authorized employees.
        Finally, all NARA staff are required to complete training
    on how to handle sensitive information, including the new
    security procedures.
        The Office of Records Services is also conducting
    unannounced inspections of all records branches and divisions
    on a periodic basis, and supervisors are required to do
    periodic walk-through inspections during the day.
        When the investigation of this incident by NARA's Office of
    Inspector General and Secret Service is completed, I can assure
    you that we will act on the results with swift and appropriate
    disciplinary actions if it is determined that any NARA
    employees were responsible for removing the hard drive or
    failed to adhere to proper records handling procedures.
        The National Archives is a public trust and the 3,000 women
    and men who work at NARA's 44 facilities across the country
    take their job and that trust very seriously. Every day, our
    staff performs work that is vital to our democracy by
    preserving and safeguarding the more than 9 billion records
    that make up the National Archives of the United States.
        At the same time, we must balance safeguarding the records
    with providing the people of this country access to those
    records. As with any endeavor that relies on the work of human
    beings, our work, despite our best efforts and intentions, is
    subject to error. However, the loss of even one record or
    breach, even one individual's personal information is
    unacceptable. And I assure you that NARA will continue to
    improve our security procedures and ensure that all staff is
    inculcated with the importance of following these procedures.
        Given the seriousness with which we take this loss, I am
    thankful for the opportunity to testify and I will try to
    answer any questions that you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Thomas follows:]

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        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8132.010

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8132.011

        Mr. Clay. Thank you so much, Ms. Thomas.
        Mr. Brachfeld, you are up next.

                      STATEMENT OF PAUL BRACHFELD

        Mr. Brachfeld. Mr. Chairman and members of the
    subcommittee, I thank you for offering me the opportunity to
    testify today. I have been called before the subcommittee to
    provide testimony on the circumstances surrounding an external
    computer hard drive missing from the National Archives and
    Records Administration which contained a vast amount of
    material from the Clinton administration, including
    Presidential Record Act [PRA], material.
        The Presidential Record Act of 1978 governs the official
    records of the President and Vice President created or received
    after January 20, 1981. The PRA changed the legal ownership of
    the official records of the President from private to public
    and established a new statutory structure under which
    Presidents must manage their records.
        I trust that in reaction to the loss of a hard drive, new
    policies, procedures and processes will be defined and
    implemented at NARA, and certainly my office will evaluate
    these actions, provide guidance and appropriate independent and
    skilled oversight.
        However, our focus now is on the criminal investigation of
    the disappearance of the hard drive capable of holding two
    terabytes of our government's information, and which my
    forensic investigator informs me was essentially filled with
    data.
        At the outset, I must say I am not able to talk about all
    aspects of the investigation at this time. This is an ongoing
    criminal investigation which may have elements affecting
    national security. Therefore, I know that the Chair and members
    of this distinguished committee would not wish me to provide
    any information that could potentially damage the
    investigation's integrity or potential success.
        Currently, we are working with the assistance of the U.S.
    Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to more
    precisely identify the content of the hard drive. However, an
    initial cursory review identified that thousands of examples of
    personally identifiable information [P.I.] data, reside on the
    hard drive. We reported this to NARA management officials and
    they have hired a contractor to further analyze this P.I.
    aspect and provide breach notification per OMB requirements.
        I should also note that at my request, the Special Agent in
    charge of the Secret Service Washington Field Office generously
    made their 24/7 hotline operation available to us in order to
    support the investigation and potential recovery of the missing
    drive.
        In response to our suggestion, NARA has established a
    reward of up to $50,000 for information leading to the
    successful recovery of the missing hard drive. No productive
    leads have resulted to date from this action.
        The subcommittee has asked about the security in place at
    NARA at the time the hard drive went missing and after the hard
    drive went missing. The direct answer is that the controls in
    place were inadequate and what controls were in there were
    readily bypassed and obviously compromised on an ongoing and
    dynamic basis. Quite simply, this was an accident waiting to
    happen and now it has.
        As a direct result of these failures in controls, my
    office's capacity to investigate this incident has been
    severely compromised. The loss went unnoticed potentially for
    months. Conservatively speaking, at least 150 people had access
    to the area, and even rudimentary access controls such as badge
    or sign-in logs were not maintained or could be readily
    bypassed.
        While the drive was kept in an area ostensibly secured by a
    proximity card-reading lock, in practice this system failed.
    People could simply piggyback by going through the door when
    other persons opened it, and even worse, doors which should
    have been secured were propped open for ventilation purposes.
        It was also reported to my investigators that the
    processing area in which the hard drive went missing was used
    as a conduit or shortcut to the rest rooms. Therefore, it can
    be argued that the security for this area was no greater than
    the general security for the building as a whole.
        The loss of this hard drive holding PRA materials is not
    the only concern I have in this investigation. Many in the pool
    of potential subjects of this criminal investigation have
    access to the processing area where this drive disappeared, as
    well as more traditional storage or stack areas. Therefore, I
    cannot say with any confidence that data stored in these areas
    was not compromised. This includes the records of the 9/11
    Commission, the Warren Commission, as well as large quantities
    of other national security holdings.
        In a benign case where proper controls were in place and a
    subject hard drive was lost or ruinously disposed of, one might
    take comfort that other data was not compromised. The facts
    dictate that I am afforded no such comfort. If the drive was
    deliberately removed, the person or persons could have just as
    readily removed other holdings or copied information onto other
    mediums.
        I am also deeply concerned about how NARA generally treated
    the category of Presidential data like that which was on the
    missing hard drive. Specifically, when the data was copied from
    original Executive Office of the President [EOP] computer tapes
    to modern hard drives, the copying was done by contractors
    offsite without any security requirements. NARA had a fixed
    price delivery order for the duplication of 1,428 such EOP
    computer tapes to external hard drives to include the missing
    hard drive.
        A small business was provided complete custody and control
    over the housing content of the EOP material. Amazingly, this
    contractor was one in a series of like contracts in which NARA
    was silent in addressing any security requirements for the
    tapes or the information which they held. In fact, the
    contractor made absolutely no mention of the sensitivity of
    these records, nor included a nondisclosure agreement.
        When handling and processing groups of PRA material, I
    would think it essential to institute appropriate measures for
    security over transport and processing of these records offsite
    by contractors. However, no such measures were identified. In
    this specific case, the tapes were sent offsite to a small
    storefront operation in New Jersey. The existing security at
    this location was rudimentary and clearly inadequate to protect
    and limit inappropriate access to PRA material.
        In a June 18, 2009 letter, Senator Charles E. Grassley
    asked the Acting Archivist of the United States: ``Do you
    recognize NARA is a national security agency?'' She stated,
    ``No. NARA is not a national security agency by any shared
    means of that term within the executive branch for which we are
    aware. NARA does not make nor does it implement national
    security policy. NARA's only relationship to national security
    is our responsibility for ensuring that those security
    classified records that come into our custody from other
    agencies are stored, protected and handled following the rules
    for which all agencies that handle classified records must
    adhere.''
        I would submit that NARA has in this and other recent cases
    breached that relationship. While by some technical standards,
    NARA may not meet the traditional definition of a formal
    national security agency, the information and records we hold
    are vital to our Nation's security.
        What I will say specific to the loss of this hard drive is
    that the American people deserve better security and
    accountability than NARA has provided them. I can assure you
    that through our audits and investigations, management
    consultations and briefings, we will work to help NARA
    strengthen its internal control and security mechanism.
        While some corrective measures have, and I trust more will
    be taken, it is analogous to closing the barn door after the
    horse has left. The event has passed and damage done, the
    extent to which I cannot quantify for you today.
        I thank you for the opportunity to testify and am available
    to take questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Brachfeld follows:]

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        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8132.017

        Mr. Clay. Thank you very much, Mr. Brachfeld.
        We have been joined by two additional Members. I will yield
    to Mr. McHenry for his opening statement.
        Mr. McHenry. I thank the chairman.
        Ms. Thomas, thank you for agreeing to join us today, this
    time, for the hearing.
        The topic today is, of course, the National Archives and
    Records Administration organizational issues, but I think that
    is sort of diminishing the import of this. And organizational
    issues I think is putting it lightly, the scope or the
    magnitude of the problem that we are facing.
        The National Archives is an agency with an extremely
    important function. It serves as the keeper of our Nation's
    valuable records, preserves government and historical records
    that include copies of acts of Congress, Presidential
    proclamations and Federal regulations. While the Archives
    maintains public access to some documents, other records
    contain highly sensitive data.
        Mr. Brachfeld, thank you for touching on the national
    security component in your testimony.
        And these must be secured to ensure our national security
    and shield personally identifiable information as well. The
    effectiveness of the Archives as protector of the records under
    its control is key to preserving our history and maintaining
    accountability in our government.
        The Archives conducts truly invaluable work, very important
    work, obviously, yet they are an agency that the public doesn't
    often hear much about. Unfortunately, they have been getting
    quite a lot of press lately, all of which or most of which
    seems to be negative. In May, the National Archives Inspector
    General, Mr. Brachfeld, notified Congress that an external hard
    drive containing national security information had gone missing
    from the agency's College Park facility sometime between
    October 2008 and March 2009, when its absence was first
    noticed.
        That drive contained one terabyte of information, and what
    we have come to know is that Clinton presidency records, the
    equivalent of which are millions of books full of information,
    as Mr. Brachfeld has previously put it. The missing data,
    including more than 100,000 Social Security numbers, the
    personal contact information of Presidential administration
    officials, the entire computer files of 113 former White House
    employees, Secret Service and White House operating procedures,
    and other highly sensitive information.
        Disturbingly, the missing hard drive was stored in an
    easily identifiable package, as Ms. Thomas testified to today,
    in a workspace that the Archives has already admitted was
    unsecured, unattended, and accessible to personnel without
    clearance. Even now, it is still not known whether the hard
    drive was misplaced, lost or stolen, or even when it actually
    went missing.
        It is my hope that the National Archives management would
    immediately react to what has been called a catastrophic loss
    by tightening security and accessibility at their College Park
    facility, particularly in the area which the hard drive was
    removed.
        However, when a bipartisan group of Oversight Committee
    staff visited the campus on July 17th, they observed many of
    the same deficiencies in security measures and left with the
    impression that a motivated criminal would be able to remove
    sensitive material with little to no resistance.
        Now, this is a bipartisan assessment. There wasn't much of
    an effort on the part of National Archives staff to even make
    it appear that substantive changes had been made to secure the
    location. To be fair, the pattern of material mismanagement of
    the National Archives precedes Ms. Thomas by quite a few years.
    We are still remembering Clinton administration official
    National Security Adviser Sandy Berger caught walking out of
    the Archives with his pants stuffed, or actually rather socks,
    stuffed full with classified uninventoried documents.
        There are many more alarming cases of negligence at the
    Archives, yet none as egregious as the disappearance of the
    hard drive. These include the disappearance of $6 million worth
    of taxpayer-funded equipment over the periods of 2002 to 2006,
    the disposal of countless original records from the Bureau of
    Indian Affairs with the Archives trash, and the disappearance
    of 55,000 pages of CIA and other Federal agency records right
    off the shelf in 2006.
        There is a prevalent culture of carelessness at the
    National Archives and it must be replaced with meticulous
    accounting for all materials, paper and electronic, and
    stringent security measures that restrict access of
    unauthorized employees to areas where confidential data is
    kept.
        On Tuesday, President Obama announced he had selected his
    nominee as Archivist to replace Ms. Thomas, David Ferriero.
    Quite frankly, I believe this announcement couldn't come soon
    enough. Mr. Ferriero has certainly had a lot of experience
    managing mass quantities of paper and electronic documents and
    other information in his tenure as director of Research
    Libraries at the New York Public Library, and I look forward to
    hearing about his qualifications and his plans for the National
    Archives at his Senate confirmation hearing, whenever the
    Senate really gets around to doing their job.
        And I thank the witnesses for appearing here today, and
    look forward to the testimony and explanation of how the hard
    drive full of sensitive information was lost or stolen.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Patrick T. McHenry
    follows:]

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        Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. McHenry.
        We will now go into the questioning stage of this hearing,
    and I will start it off with Ms. Norton for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I see why you called this hearing. It is a virtually
    mandatory hearing in light of the circumstances and the buildup
    of the security issues.
        Let me make sure what we are talking about, because as I
    looked at the testimony, I think it is Mr. Brachfeld's
    testimony, I tore it out, which says the hard drive contained
    examples of personally identifiable information.
        You know, the word secure information has been thrown
    around in the last several years so loosely. I am trying to
    understand what was on the hard drive. What does it mean by
    personally identifiable information?
        Mr. Brachfeld. Is that question directed at me, ma'am?
        Ms. Norton. Yes, Mr. Brachfeld, that is fine.
        Mr. Brachfeld. There is a technical definition for PII. For
    purposes of this hearing, what I will define is that OMB
    defines PII material to include Social Security numbers and
    like material that could be used to damage a person's security,
    banking, for identity theft, along those lines. It could be
    names, addresses, associates, that kind of information.
        As this information was a compilation from the Clinton
    administration, it was a compilation, it has information that
    was resided on individual computers, and thus there is
    information that meets that definition that resided on the hard
    drive that is missing.
        So again, it was a compilation of material.
        Ms. Norton. Have all of the parties whose information was
    compromised been so informed?
        Mr. Brachfeld. I will yield to the Acting Archivist.
        Ms. Thomas. We are in the process of identifying the
    individuals that need to be notified of the breach.
        Ms. Norton. When did the breach occur?
        Ms. Thomas. I am sorry?
        Ms. Norton. When did the breach occur? When was it noted?
        Ms. Thomas. At the end of March, actually on April 2nd it
    was reported to me, to Mr. Brachfeld, and to Mr. Stern that the
    hard drive had been lost.
        Ms. Norton. Considering the nature of information and that
    this is the month of almost August, are you saying that most of
    these parties have not been so notified?
        Ms. Thomas. We don't at this point know how many people's
    names and Social Security numbers are on the hard drive.
        Ms. Norton. Why do you not know that information?
        Ms. Thomas. There are 8.7 million individual files on this
    hard drive, and we have a contractor at this time trying to
    extract all of the data that they can to come up with the lists
    to go through----
        Ms. Norton. Is that contractor, like this one, off the
    premises? This is another contracting out matter where people
    who apparently should not have been handling secure information
    were doing so. Now, where is this contractor located and why
    couldn't this be done on the premises so the hard drive would
    not have had, why did the hard drive have to leave the
    premises, I suppose is my question.
        Mr. Brachfeld.
        Mr. Brachfeld. Let me answer your last question. The
    process of copying the information from White House tapes or
    what were White House EOP employees' tapes to the hard drive
    was done offsite and that is what I testified regarding. That
    was done offsite up in New Jersey, and that is where I have
    raised significant security issues.
        The second part of your interest, which is on now
    attempting to mine and identify those individuals whose PII may
    have been compromised, that is under a separate contract which
    is being administered by the Archives.
        The reason it is taking so exceptionally long is this is
    probably, as far as I know through my 30-year career, this is
    probably the greatest challenge in trying to identify----
        Ms. Norton. You are having to reconstruct essentially what
    was on the hard drive with nothing to go on?
        Mr. Brachfeld. What my investigators are trying to do and
    are now yielding the PII element to the contractor, what we are
    attempting to do is to use the latest forensic investigative
    software available. This is not normal data that sits in one
    standard language or one standard format.
        If you think about every record that you have ever captured
    over your career in different languages and different spread
    sheets and different formats, all being compressed into one
    entity. That is what has happened. It is not readily mineable
    and definable as one would think.
        Ms. Norton. So nobody's been notified as of now?
        Mr. Brachfeld. I yield.
        Ms. Thomas. We have sent I believe it is 15,000, somewhere
    between 15,000 and 16,000 letters have gone out to notify
    people of the breach of their information.
        Ms. Norton. Do you have any idea how long it will take
    before all of the parties have been notified? What kind of harm
    could be done in the meantime?
        Ms. Thomas. I think it is going to take several months. I
    think one of the things that this has made perfectly clear to
    us, it is very difficult to get the information off the hard
    drive. There are many different----
        Ms. Norton. So you think that in terms of a nefarious act,
    someone trying to use the data, that would not be very easy to
    do?
        Ms. Thomas. Given that we have a contractor that was
    suggested to us by the National Security Agency as somebody
    that they had worked with, who they thought was the best in the
    field to try and do this, I do indeed believe that it is going
    to be difficult for anybody to extract this information from
    the hard drive.
        Ms. Norton. Well, Mr. Brachfeld, you said a criminal
    investigation is going on. Is there any possibility other than
    this being stolen that you would regard as a credible
    possibility? I mean, could it have been mislaid? If it had been
    mislaid, where would that have been, since there were only two
    places it should be, either the Archives or with the
    contractor?
        Mr. Brachfeld. I cannot dismiss any aspect as to whether or
    not it is missing, somebody took it for purposes of benign
    intent, just to use it for their own medium, or the worst case
    scenario, that it was taken for more nefarious purposes. That
    is a potential.
        I also want to state that people with the correct
    technologies and tools can mine this data. We have a contractor
    now that is trying to, my investigation is focusing on how it
    happened and what the impact of the loss is, and if we can find
    the subject.
        I am also looking at what classified material resided on
    that hard drive and other sensitive information. I am no longer
    involved in looking at the PII content. That has now been
    yielded to the contractor working for the National Archives.
        What I can say is, again, people with the capacity to read
    this data, the tools, can do it. My investigators, my forensic
    auditor could in fact pull up PII information fairly readily.
    Now, to find the tremendous quantity to issue PII letters, as
    the agency is doing, that is another subject. But certainly,
    somebody with, if they had that intent, and if in fact it
    really is out there and somebody is using it for that purpose,
    certainly they could pull P.I. information off of that drive.
        Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask to the extent
    that there is a discovery of criminal use of this information
    that the chairman of this subcommittee be informed immediately?
    I don't know what people could do to protect themselves, but I
    think the worse thing to happen in a circumstance like this is
    not to even know that out there in the stratosphere and perhaps
    in the hands of thieves is all your personal information.
        And if it is discovered, it seems to me at such point it is
    discovered, if you are at 20,000 of 8 million or whatever, it
    seems to me that this committee should be informed at that
    point.
        Mr. Clay. Oh, for certain that will be made part of this
    official hearing record.
        Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Clay. Thank you for the question.
        Mr. McHenry, are you ready?
        Mr. McHenry. Yes.
        Ms. Thomas, how long have you been Acting Archivist?
        Ms. Thomas. Since mid-December 2008.
        Mr. McHenry. Since mid-December.
        Mr. Chairman, I am not familiar with most administration
    officials testifying with counsel at the desk. It seems to me a
    bit telling about the situation we are in, about how sensitive
    this is. But you know, Ms. Thomas, I know this predates you. I
    mean, this doesn't necessarily simply fall at your feet. So I
    mean, how long have you been with the Archives?
        Ms. Thomas. Thirty-nine years.
        Mr. McHenry. Thirty-nine years, full career. So you know,
    there have been studies on job satisfaction within the Federal
    Government. And I think it was American University's Best
    Places to Work in the Federal Government 2009, American
    University's Institute for the Study of Public Policy. Are you
    familiar with the study?
        Ms. Thomas. Yes.
        Mr. McHenry. Yes. It was telling to me, based on our
    Oversight Committee, to see where National Archives and Records
    Administration ranks. It is extraordinarily low in terms of job
    satisfaction within the Federal Government. It is actually, I
    think the second to last of all the institutions they studied.
        Do you think there is a linkage between job satisfaction--
    well actually, let's start here. What do you attribute the low
    job satisfaction assessment to?
        Ms. Thomas. Well, we did some further analysis of what the
    different rankings were in the different parts of the National
    Archives. And the truth of the matter is that most of the very
    low rankings came from our regional facilities. And we have,
    for example, in our Federal Records Centers, which are fairly
    low paid occupations, they are not exactly intellectually
    stimulating.
        It is people moving boxes in and out and so forth. There is
    not a whole lot of promotion potential within the Records
    Center system, and a great deal of the very low scores in terms
    of job satisfaction came from those regional activities.
        If you look at the National Archives in the Washington
    area, we rank at at least the same average as most other
    agencies or a little higher. So the regional scores basically
    bring the agency score down to the level that is reported in
    that study.
        Mr. McHenry. OK. OK. Do you think that there is any
    linkages between dissatisfaction and disappearance of records
    or theft of records?
        Ms. Thomas. I think there could be, but the averages for
    the people who are working with archival records are much
    higher and they are not low. The Records Center records, of
    course, are agency records, temporary records, not archival
    records. So the incidents that have occurred over the past
    several decades have occurred in archival records.
        Mr. McHenry. OK.
        Ms. Thomas. So I am not sure that the linkage is there.
        Mr. McHenry. In terms of your testimony, you said that this
    drive with one terabyte of information was kept in its original
    package. Is that true?
        Ms. Thomas. Yes, that is correct.
        Mr. McHenry. OK. Is that standard procedure within your
    division of government to put these objects back in their
    original box?
        Ms. Thomas. In most cases, information----
        Mr. McHenry. If you don't have a policy, then that is fine,
    then if you will just state that.
        Ms. Thomas. I don't know. I can provide that for the
    record. I don't know the answer.
        Mr. McHenry. Yes, if you could, that would be good.
        Ms. Thomas. Sure.
        Mr. McHenry. It seems somewhat bizarre to me to have such
    important information, and this is not really judging the
    information. You know, but having it lost to history is a major
    concern and being able to piece this back together on what
    the----
        Ms. Thomas. Well, the information is not lost because this
    was a backup tape. It is a copy.
        Mr. McHenry. OK. Where was the original kept? Wasn't it all
    in the same desk?
        Ms. Thomas. The originals are the tapes that were delivered
    from the EOP at the end of the Clinton administration. Those
    tapes were backed up onto these hard drives, one of which was a
    master hard drive and one which is a copy hard drive.
        Mr. McHenry. And they were next to each other?
        Ms. Thomas. Yes, but the tapes were stored in the locked
    staff area, the original records.
        Mr. McHenry. OK. Is there a procedure for having a master,
    the original and the backup, the two drives, is there a process
    to keep them separate? If you have the backup and the main
    drive, right? Same information, is there any policy you have
    within the Archives to keep them in separate locations?
        Ms. Thomas. Not while they are being processed, and that is
    what was happening at the time that the hard drives were there.
        Mr. McHenry. Is it not true that the reason why we don't
    know if it is October or March is because they have been
    sitting on someone's desk the whole time and they were not
    being processed? They were left out untouched.
        Ms. Thomas. I think it is unclear how long they were left
    untouched.
        Mr. McHenry. OK, which tells me you don't have any policies
    or procedures on how this works.
        Mr. Brachfeld, are there policies and procedures on paper
    within the Archives about how to handle two copies of the same
    data?
        Mr. Brachfeld. I will answer your question by getting
    specific in this matter. In this case, I should note that
    drives that were not used new were maintained in a locked area.
    Whereas the drives that were in process and therefore holding
    the kind of data and quality of data we talked about today were
    left in an unlocked, exposed area, put back in the original
    box.
        So to me, it seemed curious and bothersome, troublesome
    that clean tapes are locked up for security, but tapes that
    have documentation were left in an open area.
        As far as policy and procedures, I guess more specifically,
    that is what we are investigating. Right now, my focus is
    investigating a potentially criminal act. We have time and we
    will look at audit issues. We will look at new internal
    controls. I can simply say, as I said in my testimony, it would
    seem that internal controls were not the focus in this area.
        Mr. McHenry. Well, thank you for your testimony. My time is
    up, but it seems to me that the basic Archives procedure was
    the equivalent of putting your car keys and your backup car key
    on the same key chain. It seemed that it was very basic
    procedure that was not instituted, nor was there a culture of
    following those procedures to ensure that you have two pieces
    of data--right?--kept separately, both secure so that therefore
    you have in this new technology age that we have, with
    diminishing documents from the early 1990's as that technology
    is getting older, that you would actually have those policies
    and procedures.
        So, you know, to the larger issue here is making sure this
    doesn't happen again for any administration or any document.
        And with that, I yield back.
        Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. McHenry.
        It begs the question of the backup system, that there be a
    fool-proof backup system. Let me ask both witnesses, do you
    know anything about hundreds of thousands of veterans' PII that
    has been compromised when the National Archives sent
    unencrypted hard drives to a vendor in return for replacement
    of hard drives? And if you do, what has been done to inform
    veterans that their information has been compromised? Either
    one.
        Mr. Brachfeld. I will answer that by saying we are in the
    process, as I stated in my last semiannual report, of
    conducting an investigation specific to that matter. At this
    time, I do not have information to the extent that I could
    respond fully to that question.
        We do believe an event occurred. The question is, what is
    the nature of the event and what are the implications? We are
    currently investigating that matter.
        There have also been other issues related to and have been
    reported in a management letter, related to St. Louis and the
    military veterans records in terms of other PII policy and
    procedures that have been violated that also potentially
    compromises veterans' information. And again, that is an issue
    which I cannot discuss in a public forum because should that
    information be made available publicly, it could be damaging.
        So I respectfully cannot--I don't think you would want me
    to discuss this in this public forum.
        Mr. Clay. OK. Well, I will go to my next witness, and ask
    Ms. Thomas, can you shed any light on it? Are you aware of it?
        Ms. Thomas. I am unfamiliar with an incident relating to
    veterans' records and a hard drive and missing records. I just
    don't have any information on that.
        Mr. Clay. OK. All right. Ms. Thomas, in June 2006, the
    Information Security Oversight Office inspected the information
    security controls of NARA's Washington National Records Center.
    ISOO found that due to inadequate records management, hundreds
    of boxes of classified materials could not be readily located.
        It is my understanding that since the ISOO inspection, NARA
    has taken steps to improve security at the Washington National
    Records Center. What is the status of those missing boxes and
    what has NARA done to improve the management of classified and
    other materials at the Washington National Records Center?
        Ms. Thomas. There are two vaults at the Washington National
    Records Center. One contains top secret SCI and R.D. material,
    and the second vault contains secret and confidential
    information.
        The Washington National Records Center has almost four
    million cubic feet of records. Of those, 333,000 are
    classified, either at the top secret SCI or secret or
    confidential.
        The controls, the ISOO made recommendations, 22 different
    recommendations for how to improve security at the Washington
    National Records Center. At this stage, I believe all of them
    have been implemented. An Information Security Program Manager
    has been hired. A Vault Manager has been hired. Resources have
    been thrown into the Records Center to do a complete inventory
    of both vaults.
        They started on the top secret and the SCI one. And they
    completed that inventory. Initially, they found 1,400 boxes
    that were not where they were supposed to be. They then did a
    complete check and got that number down to, I believe, 125
    boxes of material that is not apparently on the shelves at the
    Washington National Records Center.
        These records are owned by the agencies. They are not NARA
    records. They are not archival records. They are often called
    back by the agencies. And often what has happened in the past
    is that an agency calls back records and they either keep them,
    because they are their records and they have that right, and/or
    they will send them back some months or years later in another
    accession so that the number changes in terms of how you
    identify the records, and they get shelved as a new accession,
    and they contain boxes from the old accession.
        So there certainly was a record keeping issue that needed
    to be straightened out so we could keep better control over
    what went back to the agency, whether they were permanently
    withdrawn and kept in the agency, or whether or not they were
    returned to the Washington National Records Center.
        We are now, for the 125 boxes that are still not accounted
    for, we have contacted six different agencies whose records
    these are and asked them if they could check and find out if
    perhaps they have a record of whether or not they borrowed back
    these records. I believe there was something from the Energy
    Department just in the past few weeks that said, oh yes, they
    have 15 of the boxes that they have been able to account for.
        So we are still working the process to find out where the
    records are, and a similar inventory of the secret and
    confidential vault is underway. And we will go through the same
    process of completing the inventory, determining to the best we
    can where the records are, and whether or not they have been
    loaned back to the agencies or permanently withdrawn by the
    agencies.
        Mr. Clay. OK. And thank you for your response.
        Mr. McHenry's second round of questioning.
        Mr. McHenry. Certainly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Now, you found out about this security breach, or the
    disappearance of the drive April 2nd, you said. Is that
    correct?
        Ms. Thomas. Yes. That is when I was informed.
        Mr. McHenry. OK.
        Ms. Thomas. All three of us were informed. Gary is here
    because he is the Privacy Officer for the agency and has
    responsibility for PII.
        Mr. McHenry. So what have you done to address this so it
    doesn't happen again?
        Ms. Thomas. The Office of Record Services for Washington
    did a complete review of procedures, and has implemented much
    more stringent procedures to make sure that it doesn't happen
    again. Some of them I went through in my testimony, and they
    are in more detail in my longer testimony that is submitted for
    the record.
        Mr. McHenry. Yes.
        Ms. Thomas. They have put card readers on doors where
    before you could go into the office area and then go into the
    processing area. The card reader on the office door would, in
    essence, get you into the office area and into the processing
    office. Now, the processing space has another layer of
    security, and so you have different card reader access for
    those doors.
        They are doing spot inspections. The supervisors and
    managers are going through the space to make sure that the
    procedures that we put in place are being adhered to.
        We intend to do more training for people so that they truly
    get the message that this is a basic part of their job is
    protecting the records that they are working with. And that is
    a balancing act between providing access for research purposes
    and securing the items, but securing the items is a critical,
    critical part of their job.
        Mr. McHenry. Certainly. Now, are you familiar with the
    Inspector General's audits from between October 2007 and March
    2008? Are you familiar with the audits that the Inspector
    General's office issued?
        Ms. Thomas. Well, I see the audits, yes.
        Mr. McHenry. OK. Because at that point, it was pointed out
    in that audit that the Archives was, ``not accounting for
    artifacts in a timely manner.'' That was one. And two, among
    other things, artifacts were ``not maintained in appropriate
    space.''
        So the audit there expressed some of the same failings that
    resulted in the disappearance of this data. Did you have any
    actions you took off that audit from----
        Ms. Thomas. Well, I think that audit referred to the museum
    items, the artifacts in Presidential libraries.
        Mr. McHenry. Yes.
        Ms. Thomas. And Presidential libraries had started an
    inventory process. It was at various stages in the different
    libraries. We indeed poured more resources into completing the
    inventories, and they are underway. Some of them have been
    completed. Some of the problems that existed in the older
    libraries will not exist for the Bush Library or any library
    going forward because there will be a computer system that
    tracks every artifact as it arrives in the White House, and
    then that system is provided to us so that we will have a
    complete list to start out with.
        The record keeping in the White House Gift Office wasn't as
    complete in the past, and it was not consistent, if I can give
    you an example. A tea set, is that one item or is that a teapot
    and four cups? And is there a tray? Is that seven items? You
    know, there was no consistency in how they dealt with it.
        Mr. McHenry. But within one division of the Archives, when
    you have issues like, you know, not having information secured
    in appropriate space, does that raise questions for the overall
    system? Do you look at overall systems within the Archives? Or
    is that just one division and therefore isn't applicable to
    anywhere else?
        Ms. Thomas. For the issue with the hard drive, we are going
    to undertake a complete review. The Office of Records Services
    in Washington has already started.
        Mr. McHenry. I thought you said they have already done
    that.
        Ms. Thomas. I am sorry?
        Mr. McHenry. I thought you said, in my last question, that
    they had already done a complete review.
        Ms. Thomas. They did it for the Electronic Records
    Division. They are branching out to all of their records
    holding units and, as you said, looking at it more holistically
    across the agency, as opposed to just in one division. So we
    are looking at all security procedures and whether or not they
    are sufficient, whether they need to be improved.
        We certainly have decided that we need to improve our
    training and that we need training at a lot of different
    levels. For example, I am proposing that we will train every
    employee that comes to the National Archives as part of their
    orientation, whether they are a budget analyst or whatever, to
    make them understand what the mission of the agency is and that
    everybody has a responsibility to make sure that records are
    protected.
        Mr. McHenry. Thank you. Thank you. Very good answer. Thank
    you.
        Mr. Clay. Ms. Thomas, regarding the notices that were sent
    out to the 16,000, roughly, people, were there any problems
    with the notices? I have received reports that recipients of
    those notices thought that they were scams.
        Ms. Thomas. We did have some questions come in. We had a
    hotline set up for any questions that anybody did have. And we
    also had an email box where they could contact us. And yes, the
    most frequently asked question that came to us was: Is this a
    scam? Is this somebody who is, you know, Prince so and so from
    somewhere who is, you know, trying to get hold of my personal
    information and drain my bank account or something?
        So we have answered those questions.
        Gary, if you have anything to add to that?
        Mr. Clay. Mr. Stern.
        Mr. Stern. I can try. Yes.
        The letters were sent out by our contractor providing the
    credit monitoring services as well. And so while it is on NARA
    letterhead, it was put in an envelop that looks more like the
    kind of envelope you get from, you know, a bank or something
    else.
        Mr. Clay. A solicitation?
        Mr. Stern. Exactly. So I think some people thought, weren't
    sure, is this really from the National Archives or is this just
    some company just trying to, you know, solicit my business. And
    so we assured those people that it really was from us. We
    referred them to our Web site and we put up an updated notice
    to say we have sent these letters out and they are legitimate,
    and we are informing you of this potential breach and offering
    this service.
        So there was some confusion that we just hadn't occurred to
    us that would result by sending out the letters in that format.
        Mr. Clay. I see.
        Any recommendations, Mr. Brachfeld?
        Mr. Brachfeld. Specific to that question?
        Mr. Clay. Yes.
        Mr. Brachfeld. I am pretty much apart from that process.
    Again, my duty is to do the investigations. We reviewed the
    language in the breach notification letter just as a courtesy
    and the language in the breach notification seemed to be
    appropriate.
        As far as the contractor, the mailing, that is completely
    outside of my domain.
        Mr. Clay. So there was really two mailings. Did you re-mail
    the notices or no?
        Ms. Thomas. No, no, no. But there was an email box set up
    and in the letter that notified people of the breach, they were
    provided with the email address. They were provided with a
    hotline number that they could call. And they were notified
    that they could look at our Web site for further information,
    so that if they had any questions about the breach
    notification, they could contact us in several different ways.
        Mr. Clay. Ms. Thomas, regarding the copying of Executive
    Office computer tapes onto this hard drive, why were security
    requirements not built into the contract documents with your
    vendor?
        Ms. Thomas. Well, the contractor that did the work on the
    latest batch of copying, because there were five different
    contracts, I believe, for various stages of copying of this
    material, was a GSA schedule contract with the routine, I will
    say routine, because they were, clauses about protection of
    government information, government products that were provided
    to the contractor.
        In hindsight, our people should have included some
    additional security requirement clauses in the contract and
    that will certainly be a part of any contract going forward.
        Mr. Clay. OK.
        Mr. Brachfeld, any comment on that?
        Mr. Brachfeld. I have pretty much all the documentation
    related to this contract and what is clearly missing is any,
    any mention of security as even a consideration within the body
    of any of the solicitation.
        The company that received the tapes did not even respond in
    terms of their having any security arrangements in place.
    Again, there was no clause for nondisclosure of information, as
    should be customary in such a contractual relationship,
    contractual document.
        Basically, it just shouldn't have happened, and I think the
    Archives will learn from that.
        Mr. Clay. This sounds pretty sloppy as far as how we handle
    sensitive information.
        Mr. Brachfeld. We visited the site and it is not the
    contractor's fault, per se, because the contractor was doing a
    duplication service. They were honoring the terms of the
    contract. But if you went to the contractor site, as my agents
    did, along with other law enforcement you would have seen a
    basic storefront operation with security clearly not the focus.
    You would see that the tapes were kept in a room where doors
    were propped open also.
        I have actually images of this and it will be in my
    investigative report when it is finalized, or I could present
    them to you subsequent to this hearing. It was not the
    environment that one would expect you would keep something of
    even minimal importance, much less the quality and quantity of
    data that we have discussed today.
        Mr. Clay. You can certainly share whatever information you
    can with this subcommittee, so that we can get a clear picture
    of it.
        Mr. Brachfeld. I will do that.
        Mr. Clay. I will stop there and let Mr. McHenry have the
    last question.
        Mr. McHenry. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for having this
    hearing. I think it is important that we get the right policies
    and procedures in place. And this is not necessarily an
    adversarial thing, I am just perplexed at how something so
    basic could disappear. You know, these hard drives in my
    experience aren't cheap to get anyway. They are not cheap
    objects to have lying around, much less with no information,
    much less with sensitive information on it.
        And so it seems to me that even so much as actually taking
    that hard drive, instead of leaving it out, putting it in a
    locked desk drawer would have been a world apart from what
    happened, or as near as we can tell, happened with the minimal
    amount of information that is actually known right now.
        And as the IG still has the investigation going on, and I
    would love to have any information as you produce it that you
    are able to share with us, we would certainly appreciate it.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for having this hearing and thank
    you for your leadership.
        Mr. Clay. Thank you, too, Mr. McHenry.
        Since there are no further questions, that concludes this
    hearing.
        The committee is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]