[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ARE FEDERAL AND POSTAL EMPLOYEES SAFE AT WORK?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FEDERAL WORKFORCE,
POSTAL SERVICE, AND THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA
of the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 16, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-69
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania DARRELL E. ISSA, California
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio JOHN L. MICA, Florida
JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
DIANE E. WATSON, California JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JIM COOPER, Tennessee LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio JIM JORDAN, Ohio
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
Columbia JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois AARON SCHOCK, Illinois
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
PETER WELCH, Vermont
BILL FOSTER, Illinois
JACKIE SPEIER, California
STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio
JUDY CHU, California
Ron Stroman, Staff Director
Michael McCarthy, Deputy Staff Director
Carla Hultberg, Chief Clerk
Larry Brady, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service, and the District of
Columbia
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts, Chairman
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
Columbia ANH ``JOSPEH'' CAO, Louisiana
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
William Miles, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 16, 2010................................... 1
Statement of:
Goldstein, Mark, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S.
Government Accountability Office; Steven Miller, Deputy
Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, Internal Revenue
Service; Sue Armstrong, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Office of Infrastructure Protection and Gary Schenkel,
Director, Federal Protective Service, National Protection
and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security; and Guy Cottrell, Deputy Chief Postal Inspector,
U.S. Postal Inspection Service............................. 17
Armstrong, Sue........................................... 39
Cottrell, Guy............................................ 51
Goldstein, Mark.......................................... 17
Miller, Steven........................................... 34
Schenkel, Gary........................................... 40
Kelley, Colleen, national president, National Treasury
Employees Union; Jon Adler, national president, Federal Law
Enforcement Officers Association; and David Wright,
president, Local 918, American Federation of Government
Employees.................................................. 70
Adler, Jon............................................... 79
Kelley, Colleen.......................................... 70
Wright, David............................................ 86
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Adler, Jon, national president, Federal Law Enforcement
Officers Association, prepared statement of................ 82
Armstrong, Sue, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of
Infrastructure Protection and Gary Schenkel, Director,
Federal Protective Service, National Protection and
Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
prepared statement of...................................... 42
Chaffetz, Hon. Jason, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Utah, prepared statement of....................... 10
Connolly, Hon. Gerald E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, prepared statement of............... 15
Cottrell, Guy, Deputy Chief Postal Inspector, U.S. Postal
Inspection Service, prepared statement of.................. 53
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 107
Goldstein, Mark, Director, Physical Infrastructure, U.S.
Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of.... 19
Kelley, Colleen, national president, National Treasury
Employees Union, prepared statement of..................... 72
Lynch, Hon. Stephen F., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Massachusetts:
Prepared statement of.................................... 8
Prepared statement of Mr. Thompson and a DOD employee.... 2
Miller, Steven, Deputy Commissioner for Services and
Enforcement, Internal Revenue Service, prepared statement
of......................................................... 36
Wright, David, president, Local 918, American Federation of
Government Employees, prepared statement of................ 88
ARE FEDERAL AND POSTAL EMPLOYEES SAFE AT WORK?
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TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2010
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Federal Workforce, Postal Service,
and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m. in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Lynch, Norton, Cummings, Connolly,
and Chaffetz.
Staff present: William Miles, staff director; Jill
Crissman, professional staff; Rob Sidman, detailee; Dan
Zeidman, deputy clerk/legislative assistant; Howard Denis,
minority senior counsel; and Alex Cooper, minority professional
staff member.
Mr. Lynch. Good afternoon. The Subcommittee on the Federal
Workforce, Postal Service, and District of Columbia hearing
will now come to order. I apologize for the brief delay. We
have a lot going on here today. Members will be coming in and
leaving periodically. Unfortunately, we seem to schedule
everything at the same time here in light of the work that
needs to be done.
I want to welcome my friend and ranking member, Mr.
Chaffetz from Utah, and members of the subcommittee hearing,
witnesses, and all those in attendance.
In light of the recent attacks and violent outbursts
against Federal workers and facilities, I have called today's
hearing to examine Federal and Postal employee workplace
security.
The Chair, ranking member, and the subcommittee members
will each have 5 minutes to make opening statements, and all
Members will have 3 days to submit statements for the record.
I would also like to ask unanimous consent that the
testimony of Congressman Benny Thompson, who is our chairman of
the Committee on Homeland Security, and that of a DOD employee,
be submitted for the record.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Thompson and the DOD
employee follow:]
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Mr. Lynch. Ladies and gentlemen, in recent weeks we have
witnessed several brutal attacks and violent outbursts against
Federal workers and facilities, which is why I have called
today's hearing. Tragically, in 2010, alone, a U.S. court
security officer in Las Vegas, and an IRS manager in Austin,
TX, have lost their lives, while several law enforcement
personnel, including a deputy U.S. Marshall and members of the
Pentagon Force Protection Agency, have been injured in the line
of duty.
Given the rise of anti-Government feeling, as notably
reported in the Southern Poverty Law Center's 2009 Report
entitled, ``The Second Wave,'' I believe that, as chairman of
the subcommittee, I have a duty to examine how well positioned
Federal agencies and the Postal Service are for similar events.
Today's hearing will also allow us to discuss what agencies
are doing to provide comprehensive training and guidance to
employees on how to respond to such threats and scenarios. It
is one thing to hear about agencies wrestling with how to
afford purchasing expensive security countermeasures, but it is
quite a different matter to listen to Federal employees recount
the lack of emergency preparedness of a particular office. It
may be that an emergency plan exists, but if the individual
workers aren't familiar with it and are not even practicing any
type of evacuation drills, then what type of outcome can we
expect if and when disaster strikes.
An important item to note here is that the Federal and
Postal employees warrant our respect. For some to look at the
violence directed against IRS employees and to try to justify
that deliberate intent to murder other human beings is simply
inexcusable and unacceptable. Our Nation's public servants
deserve nothing less than our full support, and to know that
all of us, from the President to Congress, are grateful for
their work and assistance in helping us govern our Nation.
More importantly, our Federal employees need to know that
we will do everything possible to keep them safe while they are
at the workplace and away from their families.
Today's hearing will provide us with the opportunity to
hear from the IRS and its employee representatives concerning
both the immediate and long-term impact of the February 18th
attack in Austin. Additionally, we will hear from the
Department of Homeland Security about its ongoing activities in
the Federal building security area, as well as from the U.S.
Postal Service's Inspection Service.
It is my hope that the testimony and feedback we receive
from today's witnesses will provide the subcommittee with
precise guidance and direction.
Again, I thank each of you for being with us this afternoon
and I look forward to your participation.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen F. Lynch follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. I now yield 5 minutes to our ranking member, Mr.
Chaffetz.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this important hearing. I appreciate all of those
witnesses that have come to testify today.
Needless to say, we want to make sure that every Federal
employee and the public who is engaging with the Federal
Government at all times is as safe as possible. People should
deserve and expect to work in a safe environment. We need to
constantly evaluate the standards and procedures, so I think
this hearing is particularly appropriate at this time. I look
forward to hearing the discussion.
For those very few but important men and women who have
been on the wrong end of this violence, our hearts, thoughts,
and prayers go out to those people.
We need to continue to strive to improve and make the
workplace as safe as we can, but also accessible, at the same
time.
I look forward to this hearing. I thank, again, the
chairman for holding it and yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Jason Chaffetz follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
I would now like to yield 5 minutes to Ms. Eleanor Holmes
Norton, the Congresswoman from the District of Columbia, who
has also been at the forefront of this issue, because of the
number of Federal facilities in her District, for a long, long
time.
Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am especially
appreciative that you have called this hearing so soon after
the attacks in Austin and right here in the National Capital
Region, first with the IRS in Austin, and here in this region
at the Pentagon.
Mr. Chairman, in post-9/11 America there has to be a
renewed appreciation for Federal workers and the kind of
hammering of civil servants stopped. They recognize how
important was the work of those who are spread across our
Government. It is very disturbing to see the uptick in attacks
on Federal employees once again.
Mr. Chairman, during the last 10 years or so, the Federal
Protective Service was literally drained of employees, and it
got so bad that we asked and the Appropriations Committee
mandated that a certain floor of Federal Protective Service
guards and officers be retained. There was the notion that all
you needed was security guards, you didn't even need a Federal
Protective Service, even though that is the oldest of the
police forces in the Federal Government. It was very
disconcerting.
Mr. Chairman, I chair a subcommittee with jurisdiction over
Federal construction and leasing, and have some jurisdiction
over the Federal Protective Service in that regard, and I am a
member of the Homeland Security Committee, and if I may say so,
Mr. Chairman, the so-called Interagency Security Committee is
something of a joke. This is a committee that is supposed to
sit and coordinate security for Federal buildings, sites, and
employees.
But to show you just how ineffective is the protection of
Federal workers, take a building like the new Transportation,
not so old, maybe about 5 years old, the new Transportation
Department. That is not a high security building. Mr. Chairman,
when my staff, with their congressional tags on, have gone to
that building, they can't get in there. Somebody in the agency
has to stop her work and come down in order for them to enter
the premises, even though these people have the credentials of
the U.S. Capitol on them.
That is what you have at one end, in a building that we do
not think Al Qaeda is much looking for. At the other end, we
have more sensible security in some other parts of the
Government. How could this be? The reason it is this way, Mr.
Chairman, is that security gets decided on the premises. No
matter what they tell you, it is some GS-9 somewhere who sits
with a committee and decides who will come into this agency or
not, and the rest of it.
And if it goes up to the Secretary and the Secretary says,
that is fine with me, well then even staff from the Capitol
can't get in. If it is someone who has a more even sense of
security and what it means, maybe they will. But I can tell you
this, Mr. Chairman: I have seen security in buildings that I
think Al Qaeda would be far more interested in entering that do
not have the security of the Transportation Department.
We have had hearings ourselves on it. I would like very
much for my subcommittee, for the Homeland Security Committee,
and you, Mr. Chairman, to get together so that we can, in a
concerted way, make the Federal Government protect Federal
employees by having one standard that is minimal and then
tailor it to other parts of the Government which may require
more or less.
Again, I very much appreciate the respect you show for the
safety of Federal employees by holding such a prompt hearing
here this afternoon.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. Certainly we are looking for best
practices to be adopted.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Connolly, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. I thank you, Chairman Lynch, and thanks so
much for holding this very important hearing.
Last year we have witnessed a rise in violent rhetoric by
extremist groups in America; therefore, we must consider not
only those infrastructure improvements to protect Federal
employees, to protection Federal employees from terrorism, but
also the manner in which we may exercise justification of
violence from public discourse.
Less than 1 month ago, Andrew Joseph Stack intentionally
crashed his small plane into a Federal building in Austin, TX
that included offices of the Internal Revenue Service filled
with Federal employees. This terrorist attack killed Vernon
Hunter, a Federal employee who previously served two terms
overseas in the Armed Forces.
Incredibly, some political figures offered a tacit defense
of that terrorist attack. One such individual was recorded as
saying, ``I think if we had abolished the IRS back when I first
advocated it, he wouldn't have had a target for his airplane.''
Previously, he told the Conservative Political Action
Conference that he empathized with the terrorist who flew his
plane into the Federal building in Austin. This defense of
terrorism is remarkable, because under this logic the victims
of terrorism bear the responsibility of the terrorist attack.
This implicit figure's reprehensible defense of terrorism
is consistent with the disturbing trend of violent, anti-
government extremism we have seen in our country all too often.
According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, the slaughter
engineered by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, men steeped in
the conspiracy theories and white hot fury of the American
radical right, marked the opening shot on a new kind of
domestic political extremism, a revolutionary ideology whose
practitioners do not hesitate to carry out attacks directed at
entirely innocent victims, people selected essentially at
random, to make a political point.
Since 1995, there have been over 75 violent attacks by
domestic terrorists like Timothy McVeigh and Andrew Joseph
Stack, including the 1996 bombing at the Atlanta Olympics by
anti-abortion fanatic Eric Rudolph and the 2009 murder of a
guard at the Holocaust Museum by anti-Semite James von Brunn.
It would be reprehensible enough for anyone to endorse violence
generally, but even worse is endorsement of violence in
response to non-violent policies with which one might disagree,
such as the terrorist attack against the IRS to express tax
grievances.
Terrorism can never be condoned. Violence against Federal
workers and installations is never acceptable. Those who, for
cheap political pandering, find themselves justifying it most
assuredly have the blood of its innocent victims, like Vernon
Hunter, on their hands.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Gerald E. Connolly
follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. I thank the gentleman.
The committee will now hear testimony from today's
witnesses. It is the standard policy of this committee that all
witnesses who are to offer testimony shall be sworn. Could I
ask you to all stand and raise your right hands?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Lynch. Let the record indicate that all the witnesses
have each answered in the affirmative.
What I will do is I will offer a brief introduction of each
of our witnesses, and then we will afford each an opportunity
to testify for 5 minutes.
First of all, Mr. Mark Goldstein is the Director of
Physical Infrastructure Issues at the U.S. Government
Accountability Office. Mr. Goldstein is responsible for the
Government Accountability Office work in the areas of
Government property and telecommunications, and has held other
public sector positions, serving as deputy director and chief
of staff to the District of Columbia Financial Control Board,
and as a senior staff member of the U.S. Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs. Mr. Goldstein is also an elected fellow
of the National Academy of Public Administration.
Mr. Steven Miller is Deputy Commissioner for Services and
Enforcement, providing direction and oversight for all major
decisions affecting the four taxpayer-focused Internal Revenue
Service divisions: wage and investment, large and mid-sized
business, all business, self-employed and tax-exempt and
government entities. He is also responsible for the IRS
Criminal Investigation Division, which investigates income tax
evasion, the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility, which
administers the laws governing the practice of tax
professionals before the IRS, and the IRS whistleblower office,
which receives information on tax cheating.
Ms. Sue Armstrong was named the Acting Deputy Assistant
Secretary in September 2009 of the Office of Infrastructure
Protection, a division of the National Protection and Programs
Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security. In this
capacity, she supports the Assistant Secretary in leading the
coordinated national effort to reduce the risk to the Nation's
critical infrastructure and key resources posed by acts of
terrorism, and increasing the Nation's preparedness and rapid
recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other
emergency.
Mr. Gary W. Schenkel was appointed Director of the Federal
Protective Service, a Division of the National Protection and
Programs Directorate at the Department of Homeland Security, in
March 2007. A retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel, Schenkel
has significant leadership and experience in a wide range of
arenas, including organizational transformation efforts,
security planning for public facilities, logistical planning
and execution, and business administration.
Mr. Guy Cottrell joined the Postal Service in 1987 as a
letter carrier in New Orleans, LA. In 2008 Mr. Cottrell was
asked to come to National Headquarters to lend his expertise
and leadership to the Chief Postal Inspector's role as Chief
Security Officer of the Postal Service as Inspector in Charge
of the Secretary and Crime Prevention Communications Group. In
2009, Mr. Cottrell was selected as Deputy Chief Inspector,
Headquarters Operation, with oversight of all Postal Service
national security programs.
Welcome to all of our witnesses.
Mr. Goldstein, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
Let me just explain that box in the middle of the table
will show green while your time is proceeding. It will show
yellow when it is time to wrap up, and then red when you should
probably stop offering testimony.
Mr. Goldstein.
STATEMENTS OF MARK GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; STEVEN
MILLER, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR SERVICES AND ENFORCEMENT,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE; SUE ARMSTRONG, ACTING DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND
GARY SCHENKEL, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE, NATIONAL
PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; AND GUY COTTRELL, DEPUTY CHIEF POSTAL
INSPECTOR, U.S. POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE
STATEMENT OF MARK GOLDSTEIN
Mr. Goldstein. Good afternoon, and thank you for the
opportunity to discuss GAO's recent work on the Federal
Protective Service and its efforts to protect Federal
facilities. Recent events, including last month's attack on
Internal Revenue Service offices in Texas and the January 2010
shooting in the lobby of a Nevada Federal courthouse
demonstrate the continued vulnerability of Federal facilities
and the safety of Federal employees who occupy them. These
events also highlight the continued challenges involved in
protecting Federal real property and reiterate the importance
of the Protective Service's efforts to protect the over 1
million Government employees and members of the public who work
in and visit the nearly 9,000 Federal facilities.
This testimony is based on past GAO reports and testimonies
and discusses challenges FPS faces in protecting Federal
facilities and tenant agencies' perspectives of FPS's services.
To perform this work, GAO visited a number of Federal
facilities, surveyed tenant agencies, analyzed documents,
interviewed officials from Federal agencies and contract guard
companies.
Over the past 5 years, we have reported that FPS faces a
number of operational challenges protecting Federal facilities,
including the following: First, FPS' ability to manage risk
across Federal facilities and implement security
countermeasures is limited. FPS assesses risk and recommends
countermeasures to the General Services Administration and
their tenant agencies; however, decisions to implement these
countermeasures are frequently made by GSA and tenant agencies
who have, at times, been unwilling to fund the countermeasures.
Additionally, FPS takes a building-by-building approach to
risk management, rather than taking a more comprehensive
strategic approach in assessing risks among all buildings in
GSA's inventory and recommending countermeasure priorities to
GSA and tenant agencies.
Second, FPS has experienced difficulty ensuring that it has
a sufficient staff, and its inspector-based work force approach
raises questions about protection of Federal facilities.
While FPS is currently operating at its congressionally
mandated staffing level of no fewer than 1,200 full-time
employees, the agency has experienced difficulty determining
its optimal staffing level to protect Federal facilities.
Additionally, until recently FPS' staff was steadily declining,
and as a result critical law enforcement services have been
reduced or eliminated.
Third, FPS does not fully ensure that its contract security
guards have the training and certifications required to be
deployed to a Federal facility. We found that FPS guards had
not received adequate training to conduct their
responsibilities. Specifically, some guards were not provided
building-specific training, such as what actions to take during
a building emergency or evacuation. This lack of training may
have contributed to several incidents where guards neglected
assigned responsibilities.
Fourth, GSA has not been satisfied with FPS' performance,
and some tenant agencies are unclear on FPS' role in protecting
Federal facilities. According to GSA, FPS has not been
responsive and timely in providing security assessments for new
leases. About one-third of FPS' customers could not comment on
FPS' level of communication on various topics, including
security assessments, a response that suggests a division of
roles and responsibilities between FPS and its customer is
unclear. Some 82 percent did not use FPS for primary law
enforcement response.
FPS is taking steps to better protect Federal facilities.
For example, FPS is developing a new risk assessment program
and it has recently focused on improving oversight of its
contract guard program.
While GAO is not making any new recommendations in this
testimony, we note that FPS has not completed many related
corrective actions to our previous reports. We look forward to
continued progress from DHS in the near future.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy
to answer questions you and the subcommittee may have. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldstein follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Goldstein.
Mr. Miller, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for an
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN MILLER
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member
Chaffetz, and Congresswoman Norton. Thanks for the opportunity
to testify on IRS workplace safety and security, particularly
in the wake of the senseless attack last month on the IRS
building in Austin, TX, that took the life of Vernon Hunter.
We are dedicated to ensuring safety and the well-being of
our 100,000 employees, no matter what their job is nor where
they are located. The IRS work force is our most valuable
resource, and no violent act is going to deter us from doing
our jobs with dignity and respect for the American public.
At the IRS security is managed by our Office of Physical
Security and Emergency Preparedness, which manages at a
national level, ensuring we have consistent implementation of
security policies and procedures. For 2010, we will spend just
over $100 million on security at IRS offices. There are over
700 such facilities.
As required under an Executive order, we utilize the
Interagency Security Committee [ISC] standards, to determine
what security to provide at a given facility. Depending upon
the applicable security level under the standards, we will
provide a variety of security tools, including highly visible
guards and K-9s, explosive and intrusion detection systems.
We also employ access control systems such as turnstiles,
card key access, proximity cards, and lock and key control
systems. Physical barriers include bollards, crash fencing,
barriers, planters, and pop-up barriers. Screening measures
focus on magnetometers, hand-held wands, and x-ray machines. We
also have a detailed incident reporting system that is
available and up and running 24/7, 365 days of the year that
reports and tracks on these incidents.
Mr. Chairman, the IRS employs a combination of strategies
to plan, implement, and evaluate our security processes, and we
promote security and awareness for all IRS employees. Our
employees, in fact, are our partners in ensuring security,
workplace safety and security.
In this regard, we conduct periodic evacuation drills and
shelter and place exercises which heighten employee emergency
readiness. If you watched any of the coverage in Austin, you
saw that among the things that went right down there--and some
things did, in fact, go right, Mr. Chairman--our drills proved
their worth. People did get out of the building on a timely
basis and we lost only one life.
We also issue recurring communications regarding security
and safety to reinforce processes and to raise awareness,
including annual security awareness fairs that are held across
the country, and we maintain an IRS internet Web site that
provides updated information on IRS physical security and
emergency preparedness programs.
From what I know today, Mr. Chairman, it is unlikely that
there is anything we could have done to prevent the attack in
Austin. Nonetheless, following that attack we took a series of
immediate steps to enhance our security posture both in Austin
and across the country while we assess our long-term security
needs and whether they have changed over time. This increased
vigilance includes 24/7 guard service in all 11 IRS Austin
offices. There is also additional security at IRS facilities
across the country, including additional guard service at this
time.
In conclusion, this area remains a top concern for the IRS,
and we will be taking a hard look at what we can do in both the
short and long term to ensure the safety of our folks. Nothing
is more important to Treasury Secretary Geithner, Commissioner
Shulman, nor myself.
Thanks. I will be happy to take any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Miller.
Ms. Armstrong, you are now welcome to offer testimony for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF SUE ARMSTRONG
Ms. Armstrong. Thank you, Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member
Chaffetz, and Congresswoman. It is a pleasure to appear before
you today to discuss the work of the Interagency Security
Committee. The Interagency Security Committee was created as a
direct result of the Oklahoma City bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal Building in 1995, the worst domestic-based
terrorist attack in U.S. history.
The mission of the Interagency Security Committee is to
develop standards, policies, and best practices for enhancing
the quality and effectiveness of physical security in and the
protection of the over 300,000 non-military Federal facilities
in the United States. The Department of Homeland Security's
Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection chairs the
Interagency Security Committee, which is composed of senior
executives from 45 member departments and agencies that
contribute to the publication of innovative products to
increase the security of Federal facilities, to protect Federal
employees and the visiting public.
For example, in March 2008 the Interagency Security
Committee developed and published the facility security level
determinations for Federal facilities, which defines criteria
and processes facilities should use to determine their
facilities security level. In June 2009, per recommendation
from the Government Accountability Office, the Interagency
Security Committee developed the use of physical security
performance measures, the first Federal policy guidance on
performance measures for physical security programs and testing
procedures.
In addition, the Interagency Security Committee is
currently in the final stages of a comprehensive, multi-year
effort to integrate 15 years of standards, lessons learned, and
countermeasures for threats to federally owned and leased
facilities. These documents will comprise the most
comprehensive standards for Federal facilities created to date.
The Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection also
oversees the work of the Office of Infrastructure Protection,
which conducts vulnerability assessments on the Government
facilities sector. These assessments identify security gaps and
provide the foundation for risk-based implementation of
protective programs. The Office of Infrastructure Protection
also distributes the infrastructure protection report series,
which provides protection information tailored to address
issues faced by Federal buildings such as large Government
office buildings and Federal courthouses, and my colleague from
the Federal Protective Service will describe the department's
role in protecting these facilities in greater detail.
I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee on
this important issue and I look forward to answering any
questions you might have.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Mr. Schenkel, you are welcome to offer testimony for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF GARY SCHENKEL
Mr. Schenkel. Thank you, Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member
Chaffetz, Congresswoman Norton. It is a pleasure to appear
before you today to discuss the actions of the Federal
Protective Service as the Federal Protective Service undertakes
to ensure the safety and security of Federal Government
buildings.
The Federal Protective Service performs fixed post access
control screening functions, roving patrols at 9,000 General
Services Administration owned and leased facilities. In fiscal
year 2009 the Federal Protective Service responded to 35,812
calls for service, including 1,242 protests and organized
disturbances, made 1,646 arrests, conducted 1,115 criminal
investigations, processed 272 weapons violations, and prevented
the introduction of 661,724 prohibited items into Federal
facilities, all with the significant assistance of our contract
guards known as protective security officers.
FPS was transferred at the start of the fiscal year to the
National Protection and Programs Directorate, a component
within DHS whose core mission is national resiliency that
ranges from physical infrastructure protection to
cybersecurity. While we are focused on ensuring a smooth
transition of the organization, we believe this new structure
will better position us within the department to receive the
necessary support and meet our critical responsibilities moving
forward.
Primary among the Federal Protective Service's core mission
requirements is the facility security assessment. The facility
security assessment identifies existing and potential threats
to Federal facilities and their occupants. The Federal
Protective Service takes an all-hazards approach to facilities
security assessment and evaluates the risk against possible
mitigation measures built into our new risk assessment and
management program. Those mitigating countermeasures are then
presented to each facility's security committee, with
recommendations on which countermeasures should be implemented,
including the development of an occupant emergency plan.
The Federal Protective Service systematically measures the
effectiveness of our countermeasures through a variety of
systematic progress, such as annual countermeasure
effectiveness inventories, scheduled guard post and guard
vendor inspections, and one of our most visible means,
Operation Shield.
Operation Shield conducts unannounced inspections to
measure the effectiveness of contract guards in detecting the
presence of unauthorized persons, potentially disruptive or
dangerous activities in or around Federal facilities, and the
guards' ability to prevent the introduction of prohibitive
items or harmful substances into those facilities.
Operation Shield also serves as a visible, proactive, and
random measure that may be used as a deterrent to disrupt the
planning of terrorist activities.
In addition, the Federal Protective Service routinely
provides security awareness training for employees which
includes presentations on how to avoid becoming a victim of
theft or violence, and we have also developed active shooter
training, explaining what employees should do when faced with a
violent situation and how to respond when law enforcement
arrives.
FPS has taken several actions and initiatives to address
major areas identified by the Government Accountability Office,
including human capital management, finance, guard contract
oversight. FPS continues to develop additional information
collection and analysis tools.
FPS addressed the current GAO report regarding contract
guard oversight and lapses in screening procedures by
determining the cause of the lapses and recommending measures
to prevent reoccurrence: increasing the frequency of guard
posts and performance of protection security officers formerly
referred to as contract security officers; requiring additional
training in magnetometer and x-ray, including contract
modification requiring the viewing of an FPS-produced training
video that addresses screening for improvised explosive
devices; ensuring that all protective security officers are
compliant with certifications and qualifications, as stated in
contract, by incorporating the certification system into our
risk assessment management program or RAMP; developing and
initiating a 16-hour magnetometer x-ray training program
provided to protective security officers by Federal Protective
Service inspectors titled the National Weapons Detection
Program, which has begun in January 2010.
As a result of the covert testing working group, FPS
developed covert testing program which enhanced and
complemented the ongoing efforts to improve oversight and
improve the attentiveness and professionalism of the protective
security officer. This current program further achieves FPS'
strategic goals of effectively and efficiently securing Federal
facilities and keeping their occupants safe.
These are just some of the many ways the Federal Protective
Service contributes to the safety and security of Federal
buildings and their occupants.
I look forward to the opportunity to answer any questions
you may have, and I thank you and the committee for holding
this important hearing.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Armstrong and Mr. Schenkel
follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Schenkel.
Mr. Cottrell, welcome. You are now recognized for 5 minutes
for an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF GUY COTTRELL
Mr. Cottrell. Good afternoon, Chairman Lynch, Congressman
Chaffetz, and Congresswoman Norton. My name is Guy Cottrell,
Deputy Chief Inspector for the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.
I am pleased to be here with you today to discuss safety and
security practices at the Postal Service.
While I am a postal inspector, please note that in today's
testimony I am providing information that reflects security
strategies across many different functions within the Postal
Service.
I will begin with the Inspection Service. Our mission is to
protect the Postal Service and its employees, secure the
Nation's mail system, and ensure public trust in the mail.
Postal inspectors are Federal law enforcement officers who
carry firearms, make arrests, and serve Federal search warrants
and subpoenas. There are approximately 1,400 postal inspectors
nationwide and abroad who enforce more than 200 Federal laws
involving the use of the U.S. mail and the postal system. The
Inspection Service maintains a security force staffed by
roughly 650 uniformed postal police officers who are assigned
to critical postal facilities across the country. The officers
provide perimeter security, escort high-value mail shipments,
and perform essential protective functions.
The Postal Service has a number of ways we provide security
for our employees and buildings. The Postal Service has a
cross-functional program to comprehensively review a building's
security. Program helps postmasters and installation heads
achieve and maintain compliance with policies governing all
aspects of security. The review includes comprehensive onsite
observations, document reviews, and interviews of facility
personnel. At the conclusion of each assessment, a plan is
developed to address any issues identified in that review.
Emphasizing the key role that each employee plays in each
other's safety is one of our prime strategies. Special emphasis
has been placed on developing employee communications safety
materials. For example, each week at facilities nationwide,
managers are required to give safety stand-up talks. Simple
tips to employees such as reporting the condition of fences or
public access to the workroom floor all contribute to employee
safety.
We will shortly begin an educational campaign aimed
specifically at our letter carriers.
A major component of the Postal Service's workplace
violence prevention program is the district threat assessment
team. Threat assessment teams use cross-functional team
approaches to assess threatening situations and to develop risk
abatement plans to minimize the potential risk of future
violence.
The Postal Service has established an agency-wide
continuity program. The continuity program deals with issues
that arise prior to, during, and after an event relative
outstanding the employee's safety and welfare. This program is
tested and exercised on an annual basis.
Our plan calls for the notification of all employees of a
facility that an event has occurred and where each employee is
to report. We have a toll-free number for all Postal Service
employees to use in the event of an emergency to receive
information about facility closings and operating status.
We are updating the computer program which will identify
critical postal facilities in the path of approaching storms,
provide floodplain modeling, and real-time storm updates, as
well as estimate anticipated impacts on postal assets.
The Inspection Service routinely works with other local and
Federal law enforcement agencies. We also participate in
training exercises. This ensures that postal employees,
equipment, and procedures are ready to manage an emergency
without interrupting operations.
The Inspection Service conducts and evaluates training on
procedures for emergency management personnel and other
essential staff. This promotes preparedness, improves response
capabilities, assures that all systems are appropriate, and
determines the effectiveness of our command, control, and
communications processes.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify about some of the
Postal Service's initiatives on safety and security. I would be
pleased to answer any questions this subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cottrell follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Cottrell.
I now yield myself 5 minutes.
Director Goldstein, I had an opportunity to read your
report from I think it was June 2009 where you did an
assessment of the Federal Protective Service, and it was very,
very helpful. I am not sure if it was a fair point in time to
take a snapshot, however.
I know that up until 2007 the Federal Protective Service
was in the process of scaling down, downsizing. And then
Congress, in 2008, said stop downsizing, start hiring. We came
in with a minimum staffing requirement of, I think, 1,400. So
then FPS had to reverse what they were doing and start hiring,
which they were not prepared to do, and that is when you took
the snapshot, so there is some difficulty here transitioning
from one function to the other, one policy to the other.
I am just wondering if you have had a more recent
opportunity to do that analysis. I know you had folks, or
perhaps you, yourself, went to various facilities and did this
assessment. You talked to customers. You talked to a lot of
people. I thought the report was fairly comprehensive in terms
of the number of districts that you had reached out to, but is
there a more recent assessment that you have made in terms of
the readiness of the Federal Protective Service and its ability
to meet Congress' more recent mandate?
Mr. Goldstein. Mr. Chairman, we have done a number of
approaches over the years. In 2008, we issued a report which
was sort of our more recent baseline report which, again, to
reveal a lot of the issues that were coming about as a result
of the downsizing that the agency was undergoing.
As you mentioned, since then a floor has been placed at
1,250 individuals, about 950 of whom must be law enforcement
officers.
We have done additional work since that time. We issued a
report on human capital planning at the Federal Protective
Service. We did testimony, preliminary findings, which you are
referring to from last summer in which we did a variety of
things, including some penetration testing of Federal
buildings, as well as looking at the contract guard program.
We will shortly issue a final report looking at those
issues to a number of committees of Congress that requested
that work. So we are continuing to do work on the agency, and
there are some additional reports that Congress has requested
that we also do, including taking a look at the transition into
NPPD, as well as taking a look at RAMP and whether RAMP will be
a successful program in helping the agency.
So we have continuing work on the way.
Mr. Lynch. One of the problems that I have in assessing
system-wide Federal security is that, for example, here on
Capitol Hill, the legislative branch, we have the Capitol
Police. We sort of have our own security system that we
operate, as does the Federal court system. They sort of have
the marshals inside the building, they have FPS outside. We
have the Capitol Police. It is really sort of organic. DOD does
their own thing, and so it is tough to take one measurement.
Is there a study or review that you are undertaking now
that would help me with that, or are you just responding as
requested from these different committees?
Mr. Goldstein. Most of our time up until now we have
focused on the Federal Protective Service because of the GSA
properties, but we have received recent requests from the House
Homeland Security Committee to examine just what you are
suggesting, which is more broadly taking a look at how security
of Federal property across the entire spectrum is managed, who
is responsible for it, how it interacts, how they coordinate,
what kind of challenges they face. So we will be getting that
work soon, sir.
Mr. Lynch. All right. I guess what I am asking, Are there
gaps in what we are requesting in order to get a good sense of
what is going on and what the entire picture is here in the
Federal Government?
Mr. Goldstein. We have recently received a number of
requests from House Homeland Security which I think fills a lot
of those gaps, but I will be happy to take a look at what we do
have in that we are supposed to work on and talk with your
staff about some of those gaps. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lynch. That would be helpful. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Goldstein.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Chaffetz, our ranking member,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goldstein, if we could start, you used the word
confusion when you are talking about the interaction with local
law enforcement responding to situations in Federal buildings.
Can you expand on that just a little bit more, because there
are multiple jurisdictions that often would respond to some
sort of incident, but explain to us a little bit more what you
meant by confusion that was out there.
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir. I would be happy to.
Several years ago in 2008, when we began discussions with
the Federal Protective Service on their relationships with
local police, at that time they explained to us that as they
were decreasing the size of FPS they would be relying more on
local law enforcement and entering into memorandums of
understanding with local law enforcement around the country to
assist them in times of emergency.
Over time, they realized that those MOUs probably would not
be sustainable because many local law enforcement entities have
enough of their own problems going on and would not wish to
enter into such agreements, and that ultimately is what they
found.
What they told us at the time is that they were continuing,
however, to develop relationships with local law enforcement
and that they had sort of more informal and ad hoc
relationships to help them in times of emergency, and that I
suspect is true. We often see local law enforcement responding
to the scene when situations occur.
However, what has concerned us is we have done interviews
in the course of our audit work in which we have spoken to
precinct commanders, for instance, in a major metropolitan area
literally within sight of level four Federal buildings, major
level four buildings, who had no idea of when the last time
they saw an FPS officer was, what kind of relationship existed
with that building a block or two blocks away, and what their
responsibility would be in an occurrence.
Mr. Chaffetz. Let's do that. My guess is, my sense based on
what the chairman was also asking, this is something we would
like to explore further and learn a lot more about.
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir. We would be happy to explore that
with the staff.
Mr. Chaffetz. That would be great.
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. Can you help me, particularly Mr. Schenkel,
understand, at least over the last 24 to 36 months, 2 to 3
years, what is the trend and the number of people that are
working and helping to secure?
Mr. Schenkel. It has been very positive. When we got the
relief as a result of the 2008 omnibus bill, we were able to
hire an additional 150 FPS inspectors. In addition to that, we
were able to revamp the training curriculum at the physical
security training program, our in-house academy down at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.
Mr. Chaffetz. Again, I am sorry to cut you off. I have only
got just 5 minutes and I want to touch on two other subjects.
If you could provide us on the committee some additional
details as to where that staffing is going for both the
physical infrastructure and some of the other issues, that
would be great.
And then if you could also, you mentioned the confiscation
of 600,000-plus prohibited items?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, sir.
Mr. Chaffetz. I would love to see what is on that list and
if there is a detail as to how many knives or how many this or
that.
Mr. Chairman, I am concerned about this, not only in these
facilities but also at airports, as well. I think we need to
look at what are we going to do about it. Is there enough of a
deterrent, if you will, to try to get or bring these items in?
I am sure a lot of these happen accidentally, but we are not
talking about oversized shampoos here, is my guess. My guess is
we are talking about something that is a little bit more
nefarious in its nature.
I recognize the demand on the security personnel to have to
be right all of the time, but I worry that these numbers are so
huge. And I have heard similar things at the TSA, as well, so I
would like to explore that and get additional information about
that as we move forward, because that is just not acceptable to
have so many prohibited items trying to be pushed and moved
through the system. Obviously, there is room for error along
the way.
My time is concluding here, so I yield back the balance of
my time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Eleanor
Holmes Norton for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schenkel, you are perhaps, I am sure--I should not even
say perhaps--aware of Mr. Goldstein's testimony some months
back where the GAO used testers who were able to smuggle bomb
parts into, I think it was perhaps as many as 10 Federal
facilities, take them into a men's room, and, if necessary,
assemble them. Can you tell this subcommittee today that has
been corrected, since it is at least a year old, I think, that
testimony was offered?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am. We have taken dramatic steps as a
result of that. We have taken a number of steps as a result of
the penetration test that the GAO conducted, to include we
initiated a gap analysis to identify where those problems came
from. We revamped the x-ray magnetometer training. We have
initiated the national weapons detection program, which is an
additional 16 hours of magnetometer and x-ray training for all
of our protective security officers.
We have also instituted the Covert Testing Working Group,
which I mentioned in my initial testimony, where our individual
criminal investigators, with a standardized uniform policy and
a standardized uniform testing kit.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Schenkel, we have a call into my office
from someone who called himself a Federal Protective Services
employee who said to us that the FPS plans to eliminate its
HAZMAT program. Of course, these are the programs that monitor
dangerous packages and provide training for such monitoring. Is
the FPS planning to eliminate its HAZMAT program?
Mr. Schenkel. No, ma'am, it is not.
Ms. Norton. Is it still the case that we have a
proliferation of guards who remain stationary and cannot leave
their posts, even to assist a Federal Protective Service
officer?
Mr. Schenkel. It depends on the building and the
responsibilities of that post.
Ms. Norton. Who decides that, Mr. Schenkel?
Mr. Schenkel. It is a combination of the facilities
security committee that writes the post orders and the
relationships----
Ms. Norton. The facility security committee within each
building?
Mr. Schenkel. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. That is my problem, Mr. Schenkel. You know, if
you are very highly qualified employee at HHS, you don't know a
hill of beans about security. The delegation of so much of
security to internal committees almost guarantees that what Mr.
Goldstein found will happen.
Mr. Schenkel, we know and there has been testimony that
these guards not only can't leave their posts; they believe if
they do leave their posts, even to engage in a chase on their
own or assisting an FPS officer, they may face liability. Is
that the case? Have they been told that if you leave your post,
somebody is coming in with a gun, he runs, should the guard,
not the FPS officer--you have a proliferation of guards, not
FPS officers--should that guard run after that person who is
trying to run away with a gun or with whatever he has in his
hand?
Mr. Schenkel. That is an identified training gap that we
take on the responsibility for. We have to ensure that those
guards are aware that they are not on their own personal
liability when those----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, what is so scary about testimony
after testimony is this has been the case ever since guards
have been used. This is not the case, Mr. Goldstein. I mean,
this could have been corrected many years ago, but this policy
of not leaving your post has been the policy all along, has it
not, Mr. Goldstein?
Mr. Goldstein. That is my understanding, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. How is it that, with the Congress having said
you should have no fewer than 1,200 officers, Mr. Goldstein
reports that the FPS officers are on something called reduced
hours? Why would they be on reduced hours?
Mr. Schenkel. I am not aware of that, ma'am. If anything,
they are on extended hours.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Goldstein, you say in your testimony, you
report reduced hours. That is where I got it from.
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, ma'am. What we are referring to is
during the period of time certainly that the Federal Protective
Service was reducing its personnel, its officers, the law
enforcement security officers and the remaining patrol
officers, FPS made a decision that in most places there would
not be weekend hours, there would not be hours that----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Schenkel, if there are Federal employees in
a building during weekend hours, is there Federal Protective
Service there during those hours?
Mr. Schenkel. It depends on the location, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. And, again, who decides that, Mr. Schenkel?
Mr. Schenkel. It is a combination of the needs of the
facilities, if they are isolated facilities, and/or of the
region of they are in a regional facility. There is 24/7
covered here in----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Schenkel, isn't it true that the internal
committee is who basically is making these decisions, not your
officers?
Mr. Schenkel. In some cases, but not in all cases.
Ms. Norton. I think this is a very serious proposition, Mr.
Chairman, that security is in the hands of civilians who happen
to be sitting on these committees and who, given the power, is
going to use it as they see fit. Is that not the case, Mr.
Goldstein?
Mr. Goldstein. We have found a number of weaknesses with
the building security committees, now called facilities
security committees. They are made up of representatives from
the tenant agencies. Usually the largest tenant agency in the
individual building serves as the Chair.
I have attended a number of these meetings over the years,
just to see how they operate, and, while I think they are well
intentioned, and they certainly should have an advisory role,
we have been concerned that you have a very balkanized,
fragmented approach to the security of GSA's portfolio when
every building gets to make significant decisions about how
security is managed, as opposed to FPS being allowed to do a
portfolio-wide approach that is based on risk management
principles.
Ms. Norton. You know, as competent and dedicated as, for
that matter, a Member of Congress may be who is my colleague, I
don't want a Member of Congress deciding security for entry
into this building.
Mr. Chairman, may I just say finally in closing that the
time has come, I think, for the committees who have been
concerned about this to mandate that security be in the hands
of trained security officials, and I would like very much to
work with you, the ranking member, and to ask the members of
the Homeland Security Committee and the Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, which also has some jurisdiction over
FPS employees, to all get together. Maybe if we gang up on this
problem we can get better security for Federal employees.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. I think that is a great suggestion
about a joint effort, maybe joint hearings going forward. That
is a great idea.
The Chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Schenkel, you talked about the Federal Protective
Service conducting sort of fixed-post and roving patrols of
Federal facilities. Are there other things preventively that
the Federal Government can or should do, the FPS in particular,
to try to anticipate and/or prevent possible terrorist attacks?
Mr. Schenkel. Sir, FPS takes an integrated approach that we
actually start using international and national intelligence
resources. We have access to that through our regional
intelligence agents. They provide a threat picture, a threat
analysis, if you will, of each facility. That is coupled with
local law enforcement and we get the predictions and threat
analysis also from them and take that approach even further.
We employ certain countermeasures that could be cameras,
intrusion detection systems. Obviously, our most visible
countermeasure is the armed contract protective security
officer, and certainly our most professional and most
proficient is our armed Federal Protective Service law
enforcement security officer.
Mr. Connolly. You make reference to the MOUs with local law
enforcement, but Mr. Goldstein, if I understood your testimony,
you raised some concerns about the sustainability of those
MOUs, given the already heavy burdens borne by local law
enforcement. Are those MOUs, with all the good intentions of
the world, something we can count on to help protect our
Federal employees?
Mr. Goldstein. It is my understanding that, because of the
difficultly arising from gaining commitments out of local law
enforcement, that there are few, if any, MOUs that are actually
in place, and that I think Mr. Schenkel can tell you that
generally what they strive to do is create relationships with
local law enforcement in some of the major metropolitan cities
where risks are higher. But, again, we found some concerns,
even in places where they had done that, that, while they have
tried to do that, the communication and interaction necessary
to ensure collaboration wasn't always in place.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Schenkel, did you want to comment on
that?
Mr. Schenkel. Mr. Goldstein is correct. It is difficult to
get an MOU with a metropolitan law enforcement agency. Having
come from one myself, I understand that difficultly because of
the liability issues. However, we have not had a single
instance in FPS, at least during my tenure, that we have had
any difficultly in coordinating or occupying a facility when
there is a threat. We have normally developed a command and
control situation where FPS will take command and control of
the situation of a Federal facility when local law enforcement
responds.
Mr. Connolly. Are the rules of engagement fairly clear
between the FPS and the local law enforcement agencies? I can
think of some events right here in the national capital region
where the lines of authority become an issue in terms of whose
turf are you on and whose the primary responsibility for X, Y,
and Z in terms of security. I won't name what, but it can
sometimes be an issue. Is that an issue sometimes for the FPS?
Mr. Schenkel. That will continue to be an issue wherever
any law enforcement or two units operate together; however, in
our case, because 80 percent of our facilities are leased
facilities, there is an obligation by local law enforcement to
respond just as a local fire department is required to respond,
and we coordinate those activities either through Federal
Protective Service officers on the ground or through our mega
centers, our communication and dispatch centers that all 9,000
of our buildings are tied in to.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Miller, in your testimony you indicated
that there really was not much we could have done to prevent
the attack in Austin, if I understood your testimony.
Mr. Miller. I believe that is right, sir.
Mr. Connolly. I assume you meant by that physically once
someone decided to take his airplane and flying into the
building, there just wasn't much we could do.
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. You were talking about the physical ability
to restrain that individual once he got in his airplane?
Mr. Miller. That is what I was speaking of, sir.
Mr. Connolly. But are there other things--you heard me in
my opening statement. One of the concerns I have is that there
are some people in the media and even in political life who
have, presumably unwittingly, nonetheless empowered some people
who might be on the edge emotionally anyhow, to think it is OK,
if it is a Federal agency you don't like, to fly an airplane
into a building. Are there things outside of the physical
challenge once someone decides to do something we can or should
be doing or anticipating to try to ameliorate or mitigate any
possibility of such attacks?
Mr. Miller. I would think, Congressman, that there are
others at this table and otherwise that would be better.
Obviously, there is tracking of intelligence and Internet catch
and all of that. That sort of isn't within the IRS' purview,
and I think we would look to other experts for that sort of
explanation and help.
Mr. Connolly. I know my time is up, Mr. Chairman. If I
might ask if there is anyone else at the table who wanted to
respond to that.
[No response.]
Mr. Lynch. No takers.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. All right. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
First of all, Mr. Miller, my condolences for the loss of
life.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Lynch. I know Vernon Hunter was a Vietnam veteran, two
tours of duty, very close to retirement, so there is a human
dimension here that sometimes gets lost in all of this.
Let me ask you, Ms. Armstrong and Mr. Miller, after the
incident in Austin, as Mr. Connolly pointed out and you
confirmed, there was a certain unforseeability, this was so
bizarre, I understand the evacuation and the post-attack
procedures seemingly went very well. Were there any changes
that you adopted, Mr. Miller, in terms of the way you are doing
business at the IRS within some of your facilities? Was there a
reassessment that you did following that event?
And, Ms. Armstrong, I understand that the Interagency
Security part of this, its function is to make sure best
practices are adopted across agencies.
Mr. Miller, is there anything that you did or the IRS did
in response?
And Ms. Armstrong, was any of that translated across agency
lines?
Mr. Miller. Sir, I can speak to the IRS, Mr. Chairman. What
we did almost immediately was increase the amount of security
at all of our facilities until we were certain, during the
weekend and a little later than that, because this happened
late in the week on a Thursday, until we were sure that this
was not a series of, the first of a series.
We then have continued additional guard service and
additional security awareness and security at all the
facilities, especially in Austin, but across the country, as
well.
We are in the process of doing what you are suggesting,
which is reassessing exactly where we are today, what is the
general threat level with respect to IRS facilities, and do we
have in place the processes and security we need to ensure the
safety of our folks.
Ms. Armstrong. Yes, sir. In terms of the actual incident in
Austin, itself, as the Office of Infrastructure Protection we
monitor all such incidents as they relate to Government
facilities or a whole host of different types of issues that
impact critical infrastructure, so we monitored the incident,
reported again to the point of is this a series of attacks, up
to the national operations center and our Secretary.
In terms of the Interagency Security Committee, this
incident and other recent incidents are certainly part of the
ongoing dialog that the committee is having about how it gets
to the final stages of a couple of years of work to put
together a ground-breaking compendium of standards for physical
security at Federal buildings.
The Congresswoman mentioned the facilities security
committee. That is actually the third piece of our work, the
first two pieces being the physical security criteria for
Federal buildings and then a design basis threat piece so that
31 different types of threat can be considered as a facility
considers countermeasures.
What we are hoping to do with the facilities security
committee is take 15 years worth of lessons learned on what is
not working in terms of Federal Security Committee composition,
training, and guidance, and have the Federal Protective Service
and GSA co-chair the working group that looks at the whole
issue of Federal Security Committees, how they work, what
guidance they need, what training they need, and who needs to
be on them to make effective security decisions at Federal
buildings.
Mr. Lynch. OK. Let me just followup on that. I understand
that the Interagency Security Committee is sort of a
facilitator across agency lines, and I know it is responsible
for coordinating security in all the non-DOD executive branch
agencies, which is fairly expansive. You are talking millions
of employees.
Ms. Armstrong. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lynch. And I also understand that you have one
employee, one staff person, the ISC, that handles all of that.
Now, at one point there was only one employee to do all of
that. Have you increased staffing to get this thing done in
light of the threat that is out there?
Ms. Armstrong. Yes, sir. As you know, the Interagency
Security Committee chair came to the Office of Infrastructure
Protection in fiscal year 2008, and since then we have been
resourcing it out of hide, if you will. We do have one Federal
employee and a team of contractors who do the staff work of the
ISC. But the ISC is a 45-member interagency body, and other
Federal agencies provide subject matter expertise, personnel,
brain power, and do the actual work of the committee. So we
coordinate, but the whole interagency contributes in terms of
resources.
Mr. Lynch. OK. I am just interested in seeing that properly
resources. If there is a weak link in this chain, it is
probably that, so it is tough enough with so many players here.
You definitely need somebody coordinating all that. For now we
will leave it to the agencies to properly resource that, but we
will keep an eye on it.
I now recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz, for
5 minutes.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
First, Mr. Chairman, if I could, with all due respect to
Mr. Connolly, I could use some help with the clarification in
both the opening statement and in the questioning as to the
source of where potentially some of this terrorism and acts of
violence are coming from.
Mr. Lynch. You are not allowed to ask other Members
questions. We brought in five witnesses here, and you can ask
them. I guess that is why we have the witnesses here. So if you
want to sort of probe that with the witnesses, because I think
Mr. Connolly was asking folks or citing that. So if you want to
ask the witnesses about that, that would certainly be relevant.
Mr. Chaffetz. I appreciate it.
Mr. Lynch. And I understand the sensitivity here, and I
have tried not to impugn or imply any particular source. I am
actually working from the side of protecting the Federal
employees within those facilities, and not working from the
point of the folks that might be motivated to do something like
this.
Mr. Chaffetz. Coming into this hearing, that wasn't my
intention, either. It is just the idea of the suggestion that
there was any Member of this body that would suggest or condone
or even encourage somebody, I just wanted to make sure that he
had that opportunity to help clarify. But we will move on here.
There was a suggestion in David Wright, who is the
President of the Federal Protective Service Union, in his
comments that the Federal Protective Service having been
``slashed to the point of ineffectiveness.'' I wanted to give
the FPS an opportunity to kind of respond to that assertion
that it had been slashed to the point of ineffectiveness. Would
you care to comment?
Mr. Schenkel. I can't agree entirely with President Wright
in regards to that. What I can say is that we had to refocus
our protection mission, based on the available resources that
we had. We got involved in some things through mission creep,
as I would call it, that got us distracted from the facilities
that we were charged to protect. Consequently, we had to revamp
our strategic plan and focus on the protection of the
facilities. It is a challenge. It is a constant maneuvering of
resources that we have that are available. As the threat
changes, we have to keep maneuvering those limited resources
where possible.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thanks. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton for 5
minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Armstrong, as you can see, the Interagency Security
Committee bugs me. And I do want to make it clear that when Mr.
Schenkel talks about the gap--and I think he is candid in
reporting a gap--the gap should be labeled for what it is. It
is a gap between burdensome and unnecessary security on the one
hand and lax security on the other.
The example that I offered before at the Department of
Transportation--and let me tell you how this plays out. This is
a fairly new facility. It is located along N Street Southeast.
There are 20 million tourists and visitors who come to the
District of Columbia. If you go along that street, we are just
filling it out with the kinds of shops that you might expect
and will be there over the years.
Imagine yourself as a visitor to our city and you say,
well, there is a Federal building, Johnny. We can go to the
bathroom there. And I am telling you that because an
interagency committee has some kind of hubris of self-
importance, that taxpayer who paid for that building cannot
enter that building because somebody has decided--and we
understand that the center of authority is in this committee--
that a taxpayer can't get into that building unless the
taxpayer knows a staff person who can come down and give the OK
for the person to enter the building. Do you consider that
appropriate, that kind of entry requirement for ordinary, law-
abiding citizens to be appropriate?
Ms. Armstrong. Well, I think the key there is what is the
agency, what is the----
Ms. Norton. I am giving you an example and I would like you
to answer my example, not depending on the agency. I have given
you a low security agency and I am asking you whether you
consider it appropriate that a taxpayer with a child, or
without a child, cannot get into that building to use the
facility or, for that matter, to go to the cafeteria. Do you
consider that appropriate?
Ms. Armstrong. Well, I think it is appropriate to have
security practices and procedures in place that would prevent
the unauthorized entry of an unauthorized person into a Federal
facility.
Ms. Norton. And you don't consider the taxpayer I am
talking about an unauthorized person, would you?
Ms. Armstrong. Well, I don't know the actual person that
you are talking about.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, this is what I mean. I have given
you a hypothetical. You refuse to give me an answer to my
hypothetical. Ordinary citizen with a child, should that
ordinary citizen be able to enter the Department of
Transportation building in order for the child to use the
facilities? Yes or no?
Ms. Armstrong. I would have to say no, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. For what reason, Ms. Armstrong?
Ms. Armstrong. For purposes of protecting the employees at
that building.
Ms. Norton. In which way would this taxpayer be considered
a risk to the employees in that building?
Ms. Armstrong. Well, if he were the ex-husband of a woman
that he had abused and is using a ruse to try to get past
security to get to her, then security----
Ms. Norton. You see, Mr. Chairman, what I mean. Meanwhile,
if this is the way you do security, Ms. Armstrong, I don't want
you in charge of my security. I want somebody who, as Mr.
Goldstein said, has taken a risk assessment and has decided is
there a risk that a parent entering the building poses, a
security threat, or is there a more serious risk.
Let me ask you, Mr. Schenkel, particularly in light of that
answer, according to Mr. Goldstein's testimony--and I am
reading--in 2008, FPS transitioned to an inspector--understand
FPS, oldest Federal police force in the United States--the FPS
transitioned to an inspector-based work force--this is page 6--
eliminating the police position, and is relying primarily on
FPS inspectors for both law enforcement and physical security
activities, which has hampered its ability to protect Federal
officials. In essence, this testimony from Mr. Goldstein says
that the Federal Protective Service is no longer a police
force, it is an inspector-based work force.
Since 2008, have you right-sided the agency so that the
Federal Protective Service is today a police force and not an
inspector-based force?
Mr. Schenkel. The inspectors are police officers.
Ms. Norton. I understand exactly that. These are people who
were patrolling before, who were looking for people like the
bomb makers that Mr. Goldstein said, who were looking to
prevent criminal activity. They were switched to a new position
called an inspector position. My question to you is: have you
switched any of these inspectors back to patrolling buildings
and to being police officers, as they always were before this
transition?
Mr. Schenkel. In some regions the inspectors do take the
active patrol.
Ms. Norton. What is your intent? Is your intent that the
Federal Protective Service do engage in these patrols and not
be an inspector-oriented-based work force as it had become?
Mr. Schenkel. It is a matter of resources, ma'am. We had to
get the facilities----
Ms. Norton. If it is a matter of resources, why aren't the
resources put on the police part of the protective service as
opposed to the inspector part of the protective service?
Mr. Schenkel. Because 80 percent of our facilities are
protected by local and State law enforcement agencies, and with
the resources that we have available----
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. That is just not
true. Local police forces do not protect Federal facilities. I
just want to say for the record, Mr. Schenkel, that is untrue.
The D.C. Police Department will not, in fact, protect Federal--
and there has already been testimony here they all think they
have liability. Let me tell you what else, Mr. Schenkel: they
all have a lot to do protecting their own cities. So for you to
sit here and say we depend upon the D.C. police force and the
Fairfax police force to protect Federal facilities is quite an
outrage.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. I thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we
want to get on to some other witnesses, as well. I just have
one question.
Ms. Armstrong, what does the Interagency Security Committee
do to preempt or prevent violence against Federal facilities?
Is it all on the physical structural side of hardening
facilities, or do we get into other kinds of strategies in the
preemption and prevention?
Ms. Armstrong. We do get into the prevention area and we,
in fact, have a working group on workplace violence working on
issuing a compendium of best practices.
Mr. Connolly. And presumably you are also plugged into some
kind of stream of intelligence in terms of possible known
threats or purported threats?
Ms. Armstrong. Yes, sir. We use the Homeland Infrastructure
Threat and Risk Analysis Center [HITRAC], which is part of the
Office of Infrastructure Protection and the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis at DHS, to help with the design basis
threat that we will be issuing soon.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Ms. Armstrong. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. Cottrell, this sort of gets to Ms. Eleanor Holmes
Norton's issue. You have a situation where, with the Postal
Service, the public is actually invited into the building, not
for the bulk mail facilities but the regular post offices, even
the large GMF facility at South Station. They have a big
section there where they invite the public in, obviously. How
do you handle that balance between maintaining security as you
need to, taking in packages from the public, as well, and yet
maintaining the security for your personnel?
Mr. Cottrell. It is a challenge, Mr. Chairman, but to
balance being a retail facility as well as a Government
facility and protect employees, we rely on training--training
our supervisors and employees how to recognize and react to
potentially violent encounters.
We don't experience many breaches of security into the back
rooms of facilities, but, as you stated, we do have several,
well, we have thousands of retail facilities where sometimes
unhappy customers can come in and attack or assault our
employees. So it is really an awareness training of what to
watch for and making sure our employees know who to contact and
the steps to take if such an incident does occur to try to de-
escalate or report an incident.
Mr. Lynch. I also know that there is, at some level, some
coordination between the U.S. Postal Service and DHS. I was
involved with the installation of some of the new technology
that was put in place after the anthrax attacks here at the
Brentwood facility and elsewhere, I think in New York, but how
has that coordination worked out? Was that a one-time event or
is that something that is ongoing?
Mr. Cottrell. It is ongoing. We participate in the ISC, the
Interagency Security Committee, and, truthfully, the anthrax
attacks, really. The Postal Service learned a lot of valuable
lessons about liaisoning with other Federal, State, and local
agencies so that folks know what to do. That is part of our
annual training is to work and liaison with these other
agencies.
Mr. Lynch. OK. You know, we have one more panel to come up
here. I think all of you know we didn't have much time to put
this hearing together. I appreciate the thoroughness of your
written testimony.
I will leave the record open so if some Members who were in
another hearing, I know Budget Committee is meeting right now,
as well, and some of our Members are on that committee. But I
want to thank you for your willingness to come before Congress
and to offer your suggestions to possible solutions. We will be
working on this going forward, probably in coordination with
the Committee on Homeland Security, Mr. Thompson, so you may
receive some requests in writing for testimony, further
testimony, and to answer further questions.
Thank you for your testimony here today, and I wish you a
good day.
All right. Panel two. First of all, let me welcome you to
this hearing. I appreciate your willingness to come before this
subcommittee with your testimony. What I will do is I will read
a brief introduction of our witnesses, and then we will open it
up for questions after you are sworn.
Colleen Kelley is the president of the National Treasury
Employees Union, the Nation's largest independent Federal
sector Union, representing employees in 31 different Government
agencies. Ms. Kelley, a former IRS revenue agent, was first
elected to the Union's top post in August 1999.
Jon Adler has been the national president of the Federal
Law Enforcement Officers Association since November 2008. He
began his career in law enforcement in 1991 and has served as
Federal criminal investigator since 1994. His experience
includes working a wide variety of investigations and enforcing
most of the Federal criminal statutes.
Mr. David Wright is the president of the American
Federation of Government Employees, Local 918, the National
Federal Protective Service Union. Mr. Wright is also a veteran
Federal Protective Service Officer and Inspector for over 20
years.
It is the custom within this committee to ask all those who
are to offer testimony to be sworn, so may I please ask you to
rise and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Lynch. Let the record reflect that each of the
witnesses has answered in the affirmative.
Ms. Kelley, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for an
opening statement.
STATEMENTS OF COLLEEN KELLEY, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION; JON ADLER, NATIONAL PRESIDENT,
FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS ASSOCIATION; AND DAVID WRIGHT,
PRESIDENT, LOCAL 918, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES
STATEMENT OF COLLEEN KELLEY
Ms. Kelley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Chaffetz, and members of the committee. I am very pleased to be
here on behalf of NTEU to discuss Federal employee workplace
safety and security issues.
As you know, on Thursday, February 18th, in what
authorities believe was an intentional suicide attack, a pilot
with a perceived grudge against the Government, in general, and
the IRS, in particular, crashed his small plane into a building
housing almost 200 IRS employees and NTEU members in Austin,
TX.
As has been noted, the attack took the life of Vernon
Hunter, a 27-year IRS employee, a beloved husband, father,
grandfather, and U.S. veteran. Vernon's wife, Valerie, works
for the IRS, as well, and was also in the Echelon building when
the plane hit. They both have been long-time NTEU members, and
I share in the sorrow that this tragic loss has caused for
their family and for so many others.
I know many of you saw pictures on TV of the Austin IRS
building engulfed in flames and probably wondered, as I did,
how so many people were able to escape, but I am guessing that
many thought about it for a brief time and understandably moved
on to other things. I think hearing what went on immediately
after the attack may help to increase the urgency of preventing
this from happening again and ensuring that employees know what
to do if it does.
Treasury Secretary Geithner, IRS Commissioner Shulman, and
I visited with the affected employees shortly after the attack
and we heard incredible stories of terror and heroism that I
would like to share with you.
Upon impact, the burning fuel from the plane quickly filled
the air with black smoke, making it impossible for many in the
building to see anything, yet employees near exits delayed
their own escape so others could follow their voices and find
their way out. Employees who were outside the building went
back in to help evacuate disabled employees who worked in the
mail room. An IRS employee with a disability told her co-worker
to leave her on the fourth floor because she could not walk
down the stairs. He insisted she climb on his back, saying he
had carried soldiers that way when he was in the service. He
carried her on his back down the four flights to safety.
Andrew Jackson and Morgan Johnson and four others were
trapped on the second floor of the building, unable to get to
the exit because of the smoke, flames, heat, and debris. They
crawled on their hands and knees, breathing through clothing
they had dampened with water, looking for a way out. Morgan
shouted through a broken window and got the attention of Robin
DeHaven, who was an employee of a glass company who was
miraculously passing by with a 20-foot ladder on his truck.
Robin, who was later dubbed Robin Hood by those that he
rescued, stopped and he tried to reach the trapped employees,
but the ladder could not reach to the window that had already
been broken. Andrew remembered a 4-foot metal crowbar that was
used for property seizures that was kept in the office. After a
few attempts and several gashes to his hand and his wrist,
Andrew and the others succeeded in breaking a window through
which they could get out and reach the ladder, clearing the
glass and helping each other down Robin DeHaven's ladder to
safety.
Mr. Chairman, I have included in my written testimony
several detailed suggestions on improving safety and security
for the Federal work force, including increased staffing and
training for the Federal Protective Service. NTEU is also
requesting that the IRS undertake and include employees in a
comprehensive review of safety and security measures at all of
its facilities around the country, many of which have no guard
or armed presence at all. And we want to make sure that IRS
employees have access to any information on taxpayers who may
pose a threat to their safety as they perform their duties.
But I would also like to urge this committee to take the
lead not just on the issue of physical safety, but on the issue
of holding public officials to a responsible level of discourse
when it comes to the Federal Government and those who work for
it. I have to say that I was shocked to hear comments from
elected officials that expressed empathy for the man
responsible for the horrific attack in Austin that took the
life of a wonderful patriotic American who was carrying out the
laws that this Congress writes.
I am not asking for limitations on free speech rights, but
I am asking for members of this committee and this Congress to
forcefully denounce this kind of irresponsible rhetoric before
it contributes to more misguided violence against Federal
workers who are just doing their jobs.
Mr. Chairman, I know that you and other members of this
committee have spoken out forcefully on this issue, and I very
much appreciate that. I also appreciate the strong statement of
support from President Obama. And NTEU appreciates the fact
that the House passed a bipartisan resolution authored by
Congressman Doggett of Texas supported by members of this
subcommittee with you, Mr. Chairman, as an original coauthor,
condemning the attack in Austin. I thank you for that and I
thank you for holding this important hearing. I hope it will
encourage others to join in these efforts, and I would be happy
to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Kelley follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Mr. Adler, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JON ADLER
Mr. Adler. Thank you. Chairman Lynch, Ranking Member
Chaffetz, and distinguished members of the committee, on behalf
of the 26,000 membership of the Federal Law Enforcement
Officers Association, I thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today.
My name is Jon Adler and I am the National President of
FLEOA. I am proud to represent Federal law enforcement officers
from over 65 different agencies, including FPS, IRS criminal
investigation, Treasury IG, Postal Inspection, and Secret
Service. My statement includes specific comments from members
from these agencies, as well as others.
In the course of my 19 years in Federal law enforcement, I
served as a first responder at Ground Zero on September 11,
2001, and in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina hit. From
these two catastrophic events, I witnessed the devastation
terrorism and acts of nature can have on the safety and
security in a Government workplace. From these horrific events,
there was a lot to be learned. It is our collective
responsibility to apply this knowledge and not let it rest like
an old gun trapped in an unworn holster.
We can learn a lot from the feedback I received from
seasoned law enforcement officers employed by a diverse group
of agencies. Their comments reflect both the employee and
protective perspective. Here are some examples: Regarding GSA,
GSA had a program they called first impressions where they
attempted to blend security screening into the aesthetics of
the building. This pushed back the security screening from the
immediate area of the entry to the facility into the building
lobby. The Israeli security procedure is to identify the threat
before it reaches and enters the protected facility. All new
security screening stations need to be constructed and existing
ones retrofitted with the protection of the security officers
in mind.
Regarding IRS, IRS employees work in GSA-owned or leased
space which FPS has statutory authority to protect, which
includes uniformed law enforcement response and criminal
investigations. IRS agencies do not pass any information along
to FPS regarding persons who have threatened an IRS facility or
employee. Their withholding of threat information puts the
facilities, their employees, and any citizen in the facility at
risk. IRS has not prepared their special agents for responding
to situations such as what happened in Vegas or Austin.
Frankly, with all the training IRS employees receive, it is
shameful that IRS has not implemented a workable plan to
respond to incidents like the one in Austin. I believe it is
time for IRS criminal investigation to create a program or
training course that addresses terrorist type attacks against
IRS. The fact that IRS is unwilling to refer to violent tax
evaders as tax protesters shows their lack of commitment to
workplace threats.
Regarding the Postal Service, I watched automatic lawn
sprinkling equipment installed while denied request for less
than $5,000 worth of security improvements in the same
facility. I have witnessed longstanding security specifications
minimized or outright eliminated for perimeter facing,
investigative observation, robbery countermeasures, vehicle
breaking countermeasures, etc., where, if the Inspection
Service is even consulted, the decision is pre-ordained to
lower or eliminate the existing standards. There are post
offices in desperate need of bullet-resistant screen lines but
go unfunded due to their cost.
Regarding courthouse and probation, there are six judicial
districts where the chief judges will not allow qualified
probation and pretrial officers to be armed and defend
themselves in the work force. It is mind boggling that we have
officers go through 40 hours of firearms training and not be
allowed to carry a firearm. It is not uncommon for offenders
and their associates to loiter outside public buildings before
or after meetings or interviews with officers, and this poses a
risk for the officers, the workers, and the community.
Several Federal courthouses have no security presence after
hours on weekends or holidays. Employees' only protection is
their access card and their PIN. It is a total joke. The bottom
line is, without a security presence the officers and their
employees are vulnerable to an attack.
FLEOA member recommendations include: FPS is available to
assist in GSA-owned and leased space with occupant emergency
planning and exercises and active planning and awareness
training, which I believe Director Schenkel hit on.
The Secret Service uses a continuity of operations plan in
all of its offices to address emergency response, evacuation
routes, relocation, and contact information. Each office is
equipped with emergency equipment, and every employee is given
a co-op card with pertinent emergency information. Other
agencies may benefit from adopting all or some of this system.
Each agency should run unannounced security tests aimed at
improving layers of protection and not punishing those who
don't succeed.
Set up an interagency task force with experienced law
enforcement officers to address building and equipment
vulnerabilities, threat assessment, and response protocols,
threat information sharing, and human capital needs.
Agency heads should provide Congress with a list of their
security needs to ensure funding for appropriate staffing
levels, training, and functional security equipment. In turn,
each agency head must commit to spending funds for specific
security needs, with the expectation of enhanced security
measures, the general Government employee audience must embrace
the implementation of new technology such as the advanced
imaging technology now being used by TSA.
In closing, I will offer that the best playbook or
operational plan accomplishes nothing when it is layered with
dust. All agencies should practice emergency response protocols
and periodically test their defense systems. With the
appropriate level of funding, agency staffing, equipment, and
training needs will be met. It is imperative that the agency
have the means to take proactive measures to improve workplace
security and emergency response capabilities.
We all need to claim ownership of this challenge, and we
all need to commit to its success.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Adler follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Adler.
Mr. Wright, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID WRIGHT
Mr. Wright. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Chaffetz, and
members of the subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, as president of the
FPS Union, it has never given me pleasure to bring attention to
this crisis. Indeed, I have dedicated the last 24 years of my
life trying to make this agency the best law enforcement
Homeland Security agency in the country, but when our members
see every day how serious the problems are, I am obligated to
speak out.
Over the past 2 years, the Federal Protective Service has
been investigated, analyzed, and studied. The GAO has performed
six studies since 2008 addressing different aspects of FPS, and
all concluded that the agency is rife with serious problems,
each of which is impairing the ability of FPS to perform its
critical homeland security mission. Taken together, the GAO
analyses paint a portrait of an essentially dysfunctional
agency.
The mission of the FPS is to protect approximately 9,000
high, medium and low-security Federal buildings and properties
around the country. These buildings include everything from
Social Security offices, Federal courthouses, Federal
congressional offices, and agency headquarters. Hundreds of
thousands of Federal employees work in these buildings, and
millions of Americans visit every day.
Time and again, Federal buildings and employees have been
demonstrated to be targets. Recent events in Washington, DC,
Austin, Las Vegas, and even Kansas City serve as a wake-up call
to both the administration and Congress that the time for
discussion, studies, years of reports that highlight the same
failures has ended. Action is required now, and not after the
next major terrorist attack.
Regarding manpower, in the period following the terrorist
attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma
City, it was determined that the minimum number of FPS
personnel necessary to perform its mission was 1,480. Since the
Department of Homeland Security was stood up in 2003, the FPS
has seen its total number of inspector and police officer
positions drop from 1,017 in 2003 to 830 at the beginning of
2010, an 18.4 percent reduction.
Over the same period, U.S. Parks Service increased its
security personnel by 45.5 percent. The Veterans Health
Administration increased its security personnel over 35.9
percent. Even within DHS, security personnel increased over the
7-year period of 230.5 percent. The result of this resource
starvation is that FPS security services have been slashed to
the point of ineffectiveness. No longer do FPS police officers
operate on a 24-hour patrol basis, even when responsible for
protecting level four high-security facilities. No longer does
the agency have the personnel necessary to adequately oversee
private guards due to a lack of manpower.
All of this has occurred in a post-9/11 environment that
has made anti-terrorism efforts the highest of priorities in
the White House and Congress. As a result of the extremely
limited resources provided to FPS, the agency has been in
disarray, leaving employees in certain of their jobs, contract
guards, routinely unsupervised, and managers operating fiefdoms
free of any central control of direction.
Mr. Chairman, I believe we are on borrowed time when it
comes to this very large gap in our national homeland security
safety net.
Contract guard issues, every day Federal protective
officers put their lives on the line to accomplish their
critical homeland security mission, to make sure facilities are
protected and contract guards are correctly trained and
proficient in their duties. Despite these efforts, FPS does not
have sufficient staff to accomplish these vital tasks.
One glaring example is the monitoring and training of
contract guards. In 2001, there were 5,000 contract guards and
FPS was authorized over 1,450 personnel. By 2009, there were
15,000 contract guards, but FPS was authorized only 1,225 total
personnel. A threefold increase in guards coupled with a 16
percent cut in FPS staff is a recipe for failure.
No one should have been surprised to discover shortfalls in
contract guard management, performance, and ability to detect
weapons and explosives. Clearly, OMB should have increased the
resources for monitoring rather than imposing a cut.
In conclusion, I would like to thank the members of the
committee for holding this hearing. I hope that it will serve
as the beginning of a process that will lead to comprehensive
FPS reform legislation this year. I know that Senator Lieberman
has announced his intention to introduce such legislation soon,
and we urge the House to do so, as well.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wright follows:]
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Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Wright.
I now yield myself 5 minutes.
President Kelley, you had an opportunity to go to the IRS
facility in Austin. You had a chance to talk to the employees.
First of all, my condolences to your organization for that
loss.
Ms. Kelley. Thank you.
Mr. Lynch. What were the suggestions, recommendations,
urgings that you heard there in terms of trying to address that
situation on the ground? Were there any concrete
recommendations that came out of at least a preliminary
investigation?
Ms. Kelley. In the immediate aftermath, Mr. Chairman, there
really have not been. The focus has been more on what happened
that day and how so many were able to get out successfully. For
example, when we were there and met with the employees, they
thanked their co-worker who had been responsible for fire
drills. And everybody knows whoever runs the fire drills,
somebody is always trying to hide to not have to actually
practice. And they made it a point of thanking her, because
they knew what to do that day.
So there really has been more thought to now getting them
situated. They just returned to work last Monday in other
buildings until there is a new replacement building for them to
move to.
So now the conversations are more leaning toward what can
be done, you know, what are they concerned about, what should
we pay attention to for the future, especially in the new site
that they will be moving to. So as that develops, we will be
working very closely with the IRS in an effort to put plans in
place that make those suggestions reality.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
We are sort of doing an informal assessment across the
board for IRS facilities, and I notice that there are--and I am
not sure which level. I know you have different levels of
sensitivity and security that are required. But I did notice
that there were about 275 facilities that had no protection
whatsoever, not even security guards.
I am just curious, you know, each of you, what your
thoughts are on that. I think that might be a function of this
1,250 minimum staffing requirement, that you just don't have
enough folks. I know there is also an additional 15,000 private
security guards that are hired as contractors to do some of
the, I guess, basic security outside the building, that type of
thing. Your thoughts on the manning requirement and also the
status of having at least 275 IRS facilities that don't have
any security whatsoever.
Ms. Kelley. I will say for my part that employees would say
there are too many IRS facilities without some guard presence.
I am sure that Mr. Wright knows better than I the number that
have FPS presence. Most of them that I am aware of, some of the
larger buildings have FPS, but the majority of them have
contract guards rather than FPS.
Like I said, this is an issue for employees. Many of them
believe their facility and the situation that they are in
warrants a guard. It comes down to resources. It is an issue we
are always debating the IRS with over the money, because there
is a cost attached to it, definitely. But it is an issue that
has been long a point of disagreement between us over how much
is needed.
Obviously, as someone had asked before, the Austin attack
was not going to be prevented by having guards or FPS there,
but it highlights, when things like that happen it makes you
think about the things that can be controlled and the need for
a focus and a recognition that there need to be resources to
adequately protect these buildings.
Mr. Lynch. Mr. Adler, same question.
Mr. Adler. Yes. I agree. Colleen is exactly right. It is a
resource issue. And in this instance, it is a matter of
response. If you don't have a physical presence, if you put 2
people on a playing field to go against an 11 with a full
bench, as well, you can't play. You are at a tremendous
disadvantage and people are at risk.
So what do you do? I think one of the disputes, I represent
IRS special agents as well as TIG, or Treasury IG special
agents, and they have a little ongoing dispute as to who
responds to certain situations. So if you don't have perimeter
or building security but in certain instances you may have
special agents in there, well, guess what, they are responsible
and they own it and they need to be trained to respond. They
can't have any doubt. You can't play who is in charge when it
hits the fan.
One of the issues that needs to get addressed and needs to
be resolved is who claims ownership and what training is in
play to respond.
Colleen is absolutely right: we are not concerned, well, we
can't prevent a plane. That is beyond our Superman and
Superwoman abilities. You can't prevent a plane from flying
into a building. But what happens in a situation like what
happened in the Las Vegas courthouse, only now it is an IRS
facility? And instead of one elderly person with mental issues
coming in with a shotgun, you have more highly skilled, trained
terrorists coming in with assault weapons? Well, what do we do?
We should have an answer. We can't make this up when it
happens. We need to get it done and planned for now.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
Mr. Wright.
Mr. Wright. Yes, sir, this kind of delves back into the ISC
and the facilities security committees. The ISC is not
codified. They are not the authority. They come up with
recommendations, and once those recommendations reach the field
it is up to an FPS inspector, when we are dealing with our
buildings, our properties that we are responsible for, it is up
to that inspector to take those recommendations, make those
recommendations to the facilities security committee, which is
mainly staffed by lay personnel. Very rare that you get a good
security-wise person on those committees.
So what happens, the reason you would have a number of
properties, IRS properties that have no security personnel
onsite is the recommendations have likely been made, they have
been presented to the Facility Security Committee. That
committee has to weigh that recommendation against their yearly
budget, usually their operating budget. Sometimes they have
security funds, sometimes they don't. Generally, these things
get voted down. There is no authority at this time to mandate
any building in any sector of the Government to provide
security.
I know of a case now of a very major Federal building where
a GSA type is the head of the Security Committee and you would
be very surprised how lacking that is. I would be glad to tell
you about it behind closed doors, because it just does not
happen.
Mr. Lynch. All right. Thank you very much.
I now yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, Mr. Chaffetz.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Ms. Kelley, there are many great acts of heroism that
happened in Texas, and for that we are eternally grateful and
thankful. I am sure we will never hear all of the stories of
people who reacted the right way at the right time and woke up
that morning and had no idea that was going to happen, so for
that we are so grateful, and obviously saddened for the loss of
anybody who should never have had to go through that, nor
should their family. It is just absolutely and totally
inexcusable.
It is still early, but, based on what you have known or
have seen or have heard, at least at this point, what is it in
Texas that could have or should have happened that maybe didn't
happen, because the results were in many ways miraculous, but
at the same time there is always things you want to learn and
share and grow from. So can you give us a little insight as to
that perspective?
Ms. Kelley. No. Again, the focus has been on whether it was
the luck or just everyone acting together, just the pulling
together. I mean, I really have not heard of anything that day
someone said I wish this or I wish that. And the IRS has been
very, very responsive and very, very understanding. They have
been wonderfully supportive to these employees since the
attack.
So, like I said, in looking forward I will tell you when
the Austin attack happened, even though it was an airplane, IRS
employees from around the country felt very, very vulnerable
because what they realized was it could have been their
building. If the anger was at the IRS, it could have been any
IRS building. And it reminded them of things that maybe are
more within the control, whether it is about the need for armed
guards, whether it is about lighting that isn't working in
parking lots, whether it is about cipher locks not working or
fire alarms not properly working in the building, things that
you identify and you pursue and then something else happens and
you kind of lose sight of it. So events like this bring all
that back into focus.
But really I have talked to many of these employees and to
our local chapter president there, and they have not identified
anything that went wrong that day. I mean, it really was a
miracle. It was one life too many, but it was a miracle that
there were not more.
Mr. Chaffetz. And point well taken. I guess we should
always continue to probe and understand and look at all the
different scenarios, so I would obviously concur with that
thought and hope that we continue to expand that.
I guess, Mr. Chairman, one of the points I guess I would
take away from that is we should also highlight everything that
went right. You can never plan for everything. There is no end
to the creativity of these nuts who want to create terror, but
at the same time there are a lot of things that went well, and
I think we should also highlight and explore and note those, as
well.
And perhaps, Mr. Adler or Mr. Wright, you can help me
understand where your perception of the FPS, but also the
difference between the contractors, if you will, as opposed to
those. And help me understand the difference in where you see
the fundamental flaws. Either one.
Mr. Adler. And you are referring, just to clarify, to the
FPS inspector versus the contract uniform?
Mr. Chaffetz. Yes. The specific concerns about contracting
that out. I have real concerns about doing that.
Mr. Adler. Just from my perspective--and I am going to
defer to Mr. Wright--but just, again, by way of background and
training, the inspectors go through a different process. The
contracting system obviously involves a private company which
doesn't place the same emphasis on what it would take to become
an inspector, whether it is going through the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center or certain agency-specific training
modules. So certainly we place more reliance, if you will, on
the inspector, the Federal uniform component within FPS.
Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Wright.
Mr. Wright. The Federal Protective Service inspectors and
police officers go through the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center. Nowadays we are up to 24 or 26 weeks of training. The
contract security guards are private guards. They have
commitments to their companies.
The other thing that needs to be stated in regards to these
private guards is they get their authority basically State to
State or more likely city to city. There is no Federal
authority for a private guard. So in Kansas City, MO, where I
come from, the Kansas City Police Department and the St. Louis
Police Department have pretty good private watchmen
commissions, and they do give the authority to arrest.
Fifty miles up the road in St. Joseph, MO, the first
requirement to get a commission there in St. Joseph is that
they have a commission in Kansas City. Then 60 miles to the
east in Chillicothe, MO, the way you get a commission license
is to show your St. Joseph license.
So this goes city to city, building to building, region to
region. There just is no common sense there, and that is why
one of our recommendations is let's get Federal security guards
or Federal police officers, much like you have here at Capitol
Police, give these individuals the authority, give them the
training, and let them do their job.
That being said, this is not to denigrate any of our
contract guards. We have a lot of great veterans coming back
and they are being picked up by these private companies, and no
denigration at all to those troops, either.
Mr. Chaffetz. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Eleanor Holmes Norton for 5
minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My condolences, particularly to you, Ms. Kelley, and my
thanks to you and to Mr. Adler and Mr. Wright for your service
to the United States.
Mr. Wright, I find your charts amazing.
Mr. Wright. Yes.
Ms. Norton. The charts at the rear of your testimony that
rather much point up, I think, the difficulties that we are
having with security for Federal employees.
You point to what you call the exponential growth of
security and law enforcement staff in virtually every agency
except the Federal Protective Service, including a Government-
wide growth for the last seven or so years of 56.5 percent,
whereas FPS, alone, shows negative growth of 18.4 percent.
Mr. Wright. Correct.
Ms. Norton. Now, you cite some of these agencies. Doesn't
this show that with this huge growth, that first these agencies
know they are living post-9/11, so if they can't get it from
FPS aren't we in effect forcing outsourcing to whatever
contract guards they choose, without any relationship to any
central security authority of the U.S. Government?
Mr. Wright. Yes. Just this year, alone, I have heard of
agencies coming forward and proposing to hire their own 083
police officers, and actually Social Security is probably the
best security-minded agency out there that are our clients, but
they have looked into hiring their own 083 police force.
Ms. Norton. So what we have here, Mr. Chairman, I think, is
agencies deciding that, since FPS has been shrinking, since the
Federal Government has not been requiring Government-wide
security, since we have outsourcing authority, let's set up
multiple police forces replicating what the FPS is supposed to
do Government-wide, without any central connection to minimum
standards for these almost always contract guards and not
people who are, as one of you has testified, police officers
who go to be trained at the same place where our best police
officers in the Federal Government go.
So what we are talking about, I want to just get in the
record, multiple police forces popping up, agency by agency, at
the agency's discretion, just leaving the whole idea of a
Government-wide Federal police force out there to flounder. Is
that not the case?
Mr. Wright. Much of that, Ms. Norton, is the way that FPS
is funded. We are funded through a security fee of charges per
square foot. At this point it is up to $0.66 a square foot.
What happens is these agencies see all this money flowing to
FPS.
Ms. Norton. So how do they pay for the outsourced police
forces that they set up without any expertise of their own?
Mr. Wright. I don't know.
Ms. Norton. See, here you have FPS saying you have to have
it per square foot, and they say, OK, since nobody is
compelling me to use them, who cares about those standards?
Let's just hire our own independent police force and make our
own standards.
How anybody can tell me that is going to protect the IRS or
any other agency, I don't know, but I think it important to
note that we are not here talking about what FPS does or
shouldn't do; we are talking about the existence of auxiliary
police forces, or I should say alternative police forces in
agencies where at will they can decide who they are, what their
standards are, with virtually no Federal oversight through the
FPS or, for that matter, through the Department of Homeland
Security.
What's the relationship, Mr. Adler or Mr. Wright, of the
FPS to the local police forces of a particular city or county?
Mr. Adler. It varies. I think Director Schenkel hit on it.
But in my experience what I have seen, there can be a
commonality, there can be a camaraderie, but ultimately most
local law enforcement, first of all, they are not allowed to
carry within a Federal facility. Most of them aren't familiar
with the layout. So if you rang the alarm and they came, they
might find the front door but they may not be familiar with the
layout.
I think the role of local law enforcement, to put it in
proper perspective, is really to arrive on the scene quickly to
provide perimeter security, crowd control, but really it is
incumbent upon the police officers, the law enforcement
components within the building working for the agencies to
respond and prevent the situation from going from bad to worse.
Ms. Norton. And I think that is important for the record,
Mr. Chairman, since Mr. Schenkel said they depend on local
police forces. The notion that busy police forces should do
anything but what they would do anyway if there was something
on the outside of the business is very disconcerting to hear.
Mr. Chairman, if I could just conclude by noting that in
Mr. Wright's testimony--and ask him if he knows what these
cities are--he says that at a minimum--it is under FPS
structural problems--at a minimum, around-the-clock protection
by Federal law enforcement officers should be provided in the
18 to 22 cities with the greatest concentration of employees--
meaning Federal employees--and facilities.
I think you say that 24-hour service is only provided in
two cities. What are those cities?
Mr. Wright. Can I approach that off the record? I am not
sure it is appropriate to say in a public setting.
Ms. Norton. Yes. Could you make sure that the chairman
understands that?
Mr. Wright. Yes. I think you will be very surprised as to
who doesn't have it.
Ms. Norton. Yes. Make sure the chairman gets that in camera
so we can understand that. I just think that we know what
those--almost anybody could guess what those 18 cities, 18 of
22 cities with the greatest concentration are, and everybody
would know that those are the cities that we regard as most
targeted, and what your testimony here today has informed us is
that we have to get on the stick.
What happened to IRS with extraordinary sadness from all of
us was a kamikaze event of the kind that perhaps no police
force of any kind could have deterred, but it certainly ought
to be a shot across our so-called bow to remember that this is
not the kind of attacks we should be expecting, especially in
IRS offices.
I work very closely with the IRS here. I have found IRS
employees to be among the most collegial, the most customer
oriented employees in the U.S. Government. But if you are out
here in this recession paying taxes, lost your job, house gone,
and you can't find anybody else to be mad at, there is always
your local IRS employee, and we have a duty to protect these
employees every day of the week that they are on duty.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Connolly, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Kelley, welcome. I am sorry I was stuck up here the
other day, and I thank you for your kind introduction in my
absence. In your prepared statement you made reference to the
fact that you were shocked at some statements by certain public
officials after the tragedy in Austin. Would you elaborate?
Ms. Kelley. There was a Member of the House of
Representatives who--I don't have the quotes in front of me, so
I would not want to misquote. I am sure most have seen them in
the press, and I would be glad to provide them. And when I
issued statements, and also to a Member of the Senate, and when
I issued statements expressing shock and disappointment and
looking for an apology, they were not forthcoming. Those
apologies have never been forthcoming.
I think that it is outrageous that anyone would make
statements like those that have been made, much less someone,
you know, anyone in a public position that should be supporting
Federal employees who are just trying to do their jobs.
Mr. Connolly. If you want to provide more for the record?
Ms. Kelley. I will be glad to do that.
Mr. Connolly. It would be welcome. Thank you.
Mr. Adler, could you elaborate a little bit? You spoke
fast, and although I am originally from Boston, I have lived in
the south so long now I have trouble sometimes following a fast
presentation, but you were making a point between the
difference between, if I understood your testimony, GSA's first
screen versus, say, the Israeli approach to security. Could you
just elaborate on that a little bit?
Mr. Wright. Yes. We have been addressing this in the TSA
venue, as well. The concept of taking proactive steps in the
law enforcement security arena, to not simply sit back and
become reactionary, become a duck in a barrel, if you will, and
pray the barrel is durable enough to withstand the attack, be
proactive, but, of course, it is very convenient for me to come
here and say we should be proactive. You need resources to
accomplish that. You need human beings in uniforms with
training and capability and authority to do it.
Out of respect to Director Schenkel, he is making do with
what he has, whether it is setting MOUs with local law
enforcement or anyone else. Ideally, we would have enough. You
know, we are talking about whether we have police officers or
inspectors. I would like all of the above. I would love to have
police officers at every law enforcement or Federal Government
facility, but that would enable us to take a more proactive
approach, to have the proper equipment like cameras and so
forth so we can monitor the area, have the plain clothes
contingent out there who know and are trained in behavioral
actions and just things, little indicators we can pick up.
I know firsthand FPS does an excellent job of that at 26
Federal Plaza in New York. That is the sort of thing that we do
want to have happen but, once again, the starting point is
having the resources to engage in that type of proactive
investigative security law enforcement activities.
Mr. Connolly. Although, as Mr. Miller of the other panel
indicated, all of that, if we did everything you just said, it
still would not have prevented the terrorist attack in Austin.
Mr. Adler. Correct. There are two aspects we are talking
about here for this hearing. One is prevention, the other is
response. We have to concede. Colleen mentioned the plane
coming into the building. We concede that. Then we are defined
how we respond. So, taking it from initially, the Israeli
approach will minimize the prevention side of things, but, and
as we all know, human error will occur. Something will get in,
whether it is an active shooter or an explosive device. The
question then is: what are we trained and capable of doing in
response? That was the other side of what I was trying to
present.
Mr. Connolly. All right. Thank you. In your testimony you
also said, if I heard you correctly, that the IRS puts both the
public and its own employees at risk. What were you referring
to?
Mr. Adler. I was referring to quotations that were sent to
me. I received a lot of emails. I requested input. I have 65
agencies we represent. Each one has an agency representative.
So when the email goes out, they have input. What that was
reflecting was I think it is a lot of frustration among my CID
special agent members who are concerned that they want to
passionately get involved, they listen to what Colleen
describes, and they feel as if they have to make it up at game
time.
You can't wing it; you have to plan for it and you have to
step up and recognize IRS is always going to be a threatened
component by virtue of what they do, so you have to commit
resources to training the special agents who are there, who are
the first responders, to make sure they are not going to make
it up when it happens, to make sure they don't have to rely
upon somebody who takes the initiative and heroic ability to
help in a fire drill or put someone on their back. They should
plan, and that will minimize, or actually it will increase
their effectiveness in responding to one of these types of
attacks.
Mr. Connolly. And in what little time I have left, Mr.
Wright, you talked about the FPS being dysfunctional, citing
some studies that would say that. If you have a series of
recommendations, I would welcome seeing them. One quick
question: do you have a view about the relative merits between,
say, a Federal guard, Federal employee, versus contract
security?
Mr. Wright. As stated earlier, private guards have
basically a mish-mash of authority across the United States.
Every city, every State is different. The benefits to having a
Federal guard, our more likely recommendation is Federal police
officers like you have here at the Capitol, they are FLETC
trained and they have that Federal authority to immediately
stop and detain threats or take action against individuals that
enter the property.
What we see now--and I will be glad to share later on the
record--a major city where it has been documented--now, I have
always had the anecdotal evidence over the years that private
guards are afraid to put their hands on anyone. We have
documented cases of individuals running from FPS police
officers and guards standing by. And just here in the last
couple of days I received some very disturbing information
where it has been absolutely documented in our operation shield
efforts across the country that these guards are witnessing
threats or witnessing our attempts to penetrate. We are
witnessing these guards say, I can't do anything. I have to
stop. If I see something on that x-ray screen that looks
threatening, I am not going to stop that individual, I am going
to call FPS or in some cases I am going to call the company
first. So that is a problem. Federal officers would have that
authority right here, right now, stop that individual, take him
down, and do what has to be done. You have a lot of private
officers out there that are afraid for their own liability.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
I want to thank the members of the panel for your
willingness to come before the Congress and offer your
suggestions and offer your testimony.
I am going to leave the record open for 3 days for those
Members who are on other committees and haven't had an
opportunity to ask questions, but other than that we appreciate
your testimony here today and we bid you good day.
[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings and
additional information submitted for the hearing record
follow:]
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