CHINA’S FAR WEST: CONDITIONS IN XINJIANG
ONE YEAR AFTER DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTS

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BEFORE THE
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MONDAY, JULY 19, 2010

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE
COMMISSION ON CHINA,
Washington, DC.

The roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in room 628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Charlotte Oldham-Moore, Staff Director, presiding.

Also present: Kara Abramson, Advocacy Director.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHARLOTTE OLDHAM-MOORE,
STAFF DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Good afternoon. I’m Charlotte Oldham-Moore. I’m Staff Director at the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. You are here today at the fifth roundtable of the year for the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC).

We have one panelist, Ms. Shirley Kan, on her way to the hearing room. Unfortunately, we have another panelist who got snagged in Minneapolis in a flight slowdown and had to return home. So, unfortunately, Ms. McLaughlin will not be joining us. But we have present here today Dr. Stanley Toops and Dr. Sophie Richardson.

At this CECC roundtable panelists will examine conditions in the far western region of Xinjiang one year after demonstrations and rioting occurred there. Events in July 2009 exposed long-standing tensions in the region and Uyghurs’ grievances toward government policies that threatened their basic rights. Authorities pledged, in 2010, to improve economic conditions in Xinjiang and appointed a new Party secretary for the region.

The questions that will be examined at today’s roundtable are: How will these new developments shape Xinjiang’s future? Is the government effectively addressing Uyghur grievances? How have government controls over the free flow of information affected our understanding of events in the region?

Before I turn to the panelists, I want to make a couple of brief announcements. First, we have a wonderful group of people in our audience today, but I certainly want to give particular attention to Ms. Rebiya Kadeer. Many of you know Ms. Rebiya Kadeer. She is head of the Uyghur American Association, and also head of the World Uyghur Congress. She is joined by many of her associates; some of you may have met them.
Ms. Kan? Great. So glad you could make it. I am also joined by Kara Abramson, our Senior Analyst on Uyghur issues, as well as religion and minority concerns, at the Commission. Many of you know Ms. Abramson’s work. She does outstanding analytic pieces for the Commission, and she is with us here today.

I am going to turn to introduce our panel. Then after the panelists give their statements, we will turn to the audience, you, for questioning of the panelists.

Our panel of witnesses, as I mentioned, will examine the current conditions in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region one year after demonstrations and rioting took place in the capital city of Urumqi.

To help us understand these developments, we have three distinguished witnesses who will speak today. First, Ms. Shirley Kan, a Specialist in Asian Security, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division at the Congressional Research Service. For those of you who cover Asia for the Congress, you know Shirley’s work very well. She is really just an outstanding resource for Members of Congress and their staffs.

Next, we have Dr. Stanley Toops. He is Associate Professor in the Department of Geography and International Studies Program at Miami University. Dr. Toops will address demographic and economic developments in Xinjiang. Finally, Dr. Sophie Richardson will speak. She is the Asia Advocacy Director at Human Rights Watch. Dr. Richardson will discuss disappearances in the aftermath of the July demonstrations and riots, which, as all of you know, took the lives of many Han Chinese, as well as Uyghur citizens of China, a very tragic event for the country. She will discuss other recent human rights events in the region as well.

So I am going to turn it over to you, Ms. Kan. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF SHIRLEY A. KAN, SPECIALIST IN ASIAN SECURITY AFFAIRS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE, AND TRADE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Ms. Kan. Thank you. I’m going to briefly go over the political and security implications of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) response in the past year to the unrest in Xinjiang in July 2009.

The Communist Party of China (CPC) changed leaders in Xinjiang, convened the first Xinjiang Work Conference, and expanded security forces. These developments have added complexity because the PRC regime tends to target Uyghurs with a tinge of “terrorism.” What are the implications for the PRC’s approach to internal security and for the United States?

First, the CPC changed leadership, both civilian and military leaders in Xinjiang. In September 2009, the CPC replaced the Secretary of the Communist Party of Urumqi. Then the Party Secretary of Xinjiang since 1995 was expected to be replaced also, but the top rulers apparently waited because Wang Lequan is also a Politburo member and they could not appear to bow to dissent.

In April, General Secretary Hu Jintao convened a Politburo meeting on Xinjiang and removed Wang Lequan, putting him under Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang as his deputy in the Politics and Law Commission.

Wang appears to be the only member of the Politburo to be demoted. Assigned as the new Xinjiang Party Secretary was Zhang
Chunxian, formerly the Party Secretary of Hunan Province, where he reportedly paid attention to public opinion. Before that, Zhang was a professional bureaucrat as the Minister of Transportation, but he is still an outsider to Xinjiang and a Han.

Zhang continued the call on the military forces to crack down on the “Three Evil Forces,” which is a PRC term that conflates religion, ethnicity, and fighting into one threat. In June, the leadership replaced the Political Commissars of the Production and Construction Corps and the People’s Liberation Army’s [PLA] Xinjiang Military District.

Second, the CPC leaders convened a Xinjiang Work Conference. Like the Tibet Work Conferences, with the fifth one held in January, there was the first Xinjiang Work Conference in May. All nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee attended both the Tibet Work Conference in January and the Xinjiang Work Conference in May. While it appears that General Secretary Hu has the lead on the Tibet Work Conference and fourth-ranked Jia Qinglin has the lead on the Taiwan Work Conference, ninth-ranked Zhou Yongkang has taken the lead on Xinjiang. With Zhou as the Chairman of the Politics and Law Commission, the indication is that security has the priority in Xinjiang rather than economic development.

Ironically, this fact was brought home on the first anniversary of last July’s unrest. Even an effort to showcase a supposed return to business as usual at the famous international bazaar in Urumqi saw Uyghur vendors selling scarves and such alongside armed police with guns, batons, and shields. I am sure that is just great for business and tourism.

Third, the CPC leaders expanded security. They transferred 5,000 elite special police from around China from last July until this April, and recruited 5,000 special police from within Xinjiang, starting in February. In March, the paramilitary People’s Armed Police [PAP] added a new elite, rapid-reaction unit, as what they themselves call a “fist” in Urumqi.

PAP units have trained in the use of helicopters for armed assaults on people on the ground and trained special operation units for armed raids, even into residences. The PAP set up rapid-reaction units in other cities as well.

In the military, the PLA, there has been at least one army aviation unit with helicopters that appears to have the mission of rapid reaction and long-distance deployment. They also have increased spending on security in 2010. Just this year, security spending increased by 88 percent, to $423 million.

The police have been installing 60,000 security cameras in the city of Urumqi alone, and that is to be completed by the end of this year. They take pictures of all drivers and passengers in every vehicle near that famous bazaar I mentioned earlier.

In conclusion, what are some implications for internal security? The PRC’s new approach appears to be comprehensive, involving economic, security, military, religious, legal, energy, diplomatic, propaganda, transportation, and local policies—that is, the governments of other localities in China.

The impact on Uyghurs and Hans appears to be mixed. There is now top-level attention from the top leadership which would en-
courage economic development, but that raises the political cost of any unrest and the incentive to take harsh, or even preemptive, measures to crack down in the name of “stability.”

On the plus side, there has been recognition that the root of the unrest last July was internal problems, not external forces as the officials had charged. Second, there was the implicit admission that the local leaders were part of the problem, even a Politburo member.

Externally, the PRC regime has allowed foreign reporters, both last July as well as for this first anniversary. The PRC also allowed for the first time some foreign monitoring, including the first visit to Xinjiang by the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC] in June. OIC’s Secretary General visited Xinjiang, including Kashgar, and called for attention not only to the economy, but also cultural concerns.

Improved crisis control could provide more accurate and objective information for restraint in the use of force. There could be more economic benefits, including use of the region’s own energy resources. There could be greater respect for the culture and religion of Uyghurs. The Work Conference I mentioned could be regularized to continue to assess problems as well as progress.

On the negative side, if there is another protest, the beefed-up security forces are likely again to overreact to unrest. There is likely greater use of intelligence, including using informants in their own communities, and monitoring of people’s everyday lives: through emails, phone calls, cameras.

Even with the implicit admission of an internal and economic problem, there is no change to the rhetorical use of the tinge of “terrorism” through attacks on the so-called “Three Evil Forces.” There is no indication that there are reversals in the flows of Uyghurs, particularly women, out of Xinjiang to work where they face discrimination, and of greater numbers of Hans into Xinjiang.

As can be seen in the ethnic or cultural grievances around the world, including in the United States, economic determinants alone are not sufficient to address perceived wrongs. Moreover, the PRC’s economic policies and increased transportation could actually result in even greater numbers of Hans going to Xinjiang. Based on the PRC’s policy to force Uyghurs to learn the Mandarin language, there is implicit admission that economic benefits are biased toward those who use Mandarin, especially the Hans. There is also the implicit dismissal of the Uyghur language, but actually their Turkic-based language historically has helped with trade ties to central Asia and Europe.

In short, there does not appear to be a fundamental change in the PRC’s approach of the Hans controlling the Uyghurs: assimilation, not autonomy as promised even in the name of the so-called “Xinjiang Autonomous Region.”

What are some implications for the United States? Consideration of whether to work with the PLA in Xinjiang in support of U.S. military operations in central Asia requires a great deal of caution. There are acute tensions, crackdowns are likely, and communication is even more tightly controlled.

Second, the PRC’s claim that the Uyghur-linked terrorism is the greatest threat to China is not credible. There could be a different
problem for Americans and other foreigners, especially businesses, of greater discontent and lawlessness throughout China. Let us look at just reported bombs on buses in 2010 so far. In February, there was an explosion on a bus in Yunnan Province that killed the bomber himself and injured 11. Earlier this month, an explosion on a bus in Jiangsu Province killed 24 people and injured 19. Then, over months, attackers terrorized innocent children in schools in at least five incidents. The PRC did not call the suspects “terrorists” or “suicide bombers.”

As President Obama said at the U.S.-PRC Strategic and Economic Dialogue last July, “Religion and culture of all peoples must be respected and protected” and “all people should be free to speak their minds.” He said, “That includes ethnic and religious minorities in China . . . ”

Thank you.


Now we have Dr. Stanley Toops, please.

STATEMENT OF STANLEY W. TOOPS, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PROGRAM, MIAMI UNIVERSITY

Mr. Toops. Thank you very much.

I am a geographer, an academic, and I study demography and development. I’ve been going to Xinjiang on and off for the past 25 years, as I found it a very interesting place to look at for demography and development, as that is what the bulk of my research has been upon.

I will talk about two things. One is essentially looking at the development issues as transpired or the policies with the Xinjiang Work Forum—or the Xinjiang Work Conference, I’ve seen it both ways—and then the other part is to look at the demographic components of Xinjiang and think a little bit about the possible impacts of the policies derived in the Xinjiang Work Conference.

Xinjiang is, of course, the largest territorial unit within China, about one-sixth of China’s total area, so it’s actually quite large. There’s a population of 21 million, a large population, but compared to, say, Sichuan, not so much.

When you look at it, also, you realize that while the population in total is kind of sparsely populated for China, given the climate and the physiography within Xinjiang, actually 20 million is a large population; there is just not enough water for everybody eventually.

Xinjiang, as a part of China, has been involved in the Western Development Program, which developed in 1999 to address regional inequities faced by China’s western regions. Eastern China had already gone through development programs, so in some ways the current policies with the Xinjiang Work Forum really expand upon the Western Development Program.

When you take a look at development in Xinjiang, you realize that prior to the advent of, say, the People’s Republic of China, you can see economic activities in herding, oasis agriculture, trade, but certainly in the modern era, the latter part of the 20th century with oil exploration and oil development, that production has been very important in Xinjiang’s development overall. So, oil, textiles,
agri-business. Given the size of Xinjiang, the transportation construction development—road, air and rail—has also been fairly important when you take a look at it.

Many of the transportation linkages on the rail side of things were very much concentrated around Urumqi, and that connects then by rail on to Beijing. That was built in the 1960s. It was not until the 1990s that that rail link then continued on to Kazakhstan, the former Soviet Union. The rail goes to the south, by 1999, all the way to Kashgar.

So this rail system is very important, just taking a look at the economic development of the area overall. I mean, part of the rationale for having the rail into the south is because the south is also where you start to find oil in the Tarim Basin in southern Xinjiang. There had already been oil discoveries in northern Xinjiang and Karamai, so the rail linkage and pipelines are also important for that area, but I think the rail connections into southern Xinjiang then connect both in terms of development, as well as the demographics.

On the agricultural side of things, the state created the Xinjiang Production Construction Corps [XPCC], or the Bingtuan, that is, it’s an army [bing] corps [tuan]. In English, it’s just translated as “corps,” but it’s an army corps composed of demobilized units from the PLA, and also Guomindang soldiers in the area, and some other local soldiers.

These state farms kind of ran out in the 1960s at the end of the Cultural Revolution, but then they were brought back as a way to maintain development, but also stability and control. So you have got circumstances in Xinjiang with the oil, and then with the state farm system, the Production Construction Corps, that are different from other parts of China. Of course, in the eastern coastal areas there is oil, but you do not really have these kinds of state farms in other parts of China now. All those have gone by the wayside.

The development program, through the People’s Republic of China, ended up restructuring, reorienting the development landscape, whereas before you had traditional centers in Kashgar, Turpan, and Gulja—that is, Ili—now, of course, it’s much more concentrated around Urumqi, and then the oil centers, such as in Karamai.

So we have that kind of economic distinction here, so that now with the rail connections in northern Xinjiang, that is the area that has been developed mostly and has higher levels of income or per capita GDP. Southern Xinjiang does not. The economy there is mostly focused on agriculture, and with some small amounts of industry. But with the oil production in the Tarim, in the southern part of the region, you will probably see things increase there.

So with oil, we see the impact in northern Xinjiang and Karamai, and then processing in Urumqi. We see the beginnings of economic development in the south as far as oil, but this oil does not necessarily contribute to the economic development for local people. It goes into the regional kind of overall character, but not necessarily translated into the local area. Many of the oil crews are from, say, eastern China, so they are not really involved in development of the local landscape.
So if we take a look at the Xinjiang Work Conference, the new policies that Dr. Kan spoke about, there are several different aspects. One is the regional component. So what is going on now? The policy as it has developed is that, say, Beijing will be responsible or help the Hotan area. Shenzhen will help the Kashgar area.

So you have all of these coastal provinces that are targeting or are going to be linked up as maybe sister cities or sister prefectures with various parts of Xinjiang. It seems that the southern area is actually getting the attention to have more economic development in the south. However, when you start taking a look at the types of projects, it seems that most of it is geared toward infrastructure and not necessarily development of human capital.

Then you see, for example, that Shenzhen, which is next to Hong Kong and specializes in the export markets, is going to work with Kashgar. That is a completely different situation. Kashgar's neighbors are Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan, in contrast to, say, Xinjiang's neighbor being Hong Kong. It is a much different kind of circumstance.

So, looking at that, you see the infrastructure development issue, then also this kind of regional development issue. In terms of demography, much of the central areas around Urumqi, you have a larger percentage of Han population compared with the south, where you have more of the Uyghur population. According to the government statistics, of the 21 million, Uyghurs are about 46 percent; the Han, 39 percent; and Kazakhs, 7 percent. That does not count, of course, the floating population into the area, or military, which would be a much smaller number.

Han migration has come into the area and has followed mostly and matches up fairly well with urban and transportation linkages. So with the rail linkages into Urumqi, and we see, of course, Urumqi is now 80, 90 percent Han population, Uyghur a much smaller percentage, and then even I think with the rail connection going to Kashgar, whereas Kashgar in the past has been 90 percent and more Uyghur, we expect to see that there will be more Han population coming into the area.

The migrants have come from Sichuan in particular, also Hunan and Gansu. Gansu, of course, is a neighboring province, so you would expect that. Sichuan is a little farther away, but there seems to be a kind of a connection through perhaps the Bingtuan, the Xinjiang Production Construction Corps, or others.

So we see that the population here is young and ethnically diverse. There are a number of recent migrants, perhaps up to 10 percent of the population according to the 2000 census, and we will see what the 2010 census shows.

So probably with the projects continuing, we will see a larger percentage of workers moving into Xinjiang from other parts of China, and most of these migrants will be Han. We will see a population shift, certainly in the north that has already occurred, so then it will be, to how much of an extent will that occur in southern Xinjiang?

I think with the construction of the railroad system and then this new plan with the Xinjiang Work Conference, Xinjiang Work Forum, that would probably entail some transfer of personnel and not just money into the area, coming from the east coast, people
with special skills and other types of skilled labor. That would probably increase the relative percentage of Han in southern Xinjiang as well.

So, in that case then southern Xinjiang would probably become more like northern Xinjiang. So there is a very strong kind of regional component to my analysis and taking a look at the sorts of changes that we are expecting.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Toops appears in the appendix.]

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you, Dr. Toops. We very much appreciate it.

Now, Dr. Sophie Richardson. She is, as I mentioned, Advocacy Director for Human Rights Watch [HRW] in Asia.

**STATEMENT OF SOPHIE RICHARDSON, ASIA ADVOCACY DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH**

Ms. Richardson. Thanks very much for inviting me to be with you this afternoon. It should go without saying, but I will repeat it here, that we are big fans of the CECC’s work.

I am going to try to get quickly through a couple of topics, starting with a report that we released in October 2009, in which we examined the aftermath of the July 2009 protests in Xinjiang, which according to the Chinese Government, killed at least 197 people. While it is clearly the Chinese Government’s duty to uphold public order, thoroughly investigate incidents of violence, and punish perpetrators in accordance with the law, our research indicates that instead of launching an impartial investigation in accordance with international and domestic standards, Chinese law enforcement agencies have instead carried out a massive campaign of unlawful arrests in the Uyghur areas of Urumqi, many of which resulted in the disappearances of detainees.

This report documents the enforced disappearances of at least 43 Uyghur men and teenaged boys—the youngest was 13—who were detained by Chinese security forces in the wake of the protests. It is worth clarifying that enforced disappearances are some of the most alarming kinds of abuses that we deal with, so it is worth explaining what exactly we mean by this term.

An enforced disappearance occurs when state authorities—state authorities, not random people, but state authorities—detain a person and then refuse to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or the person’s whereabouts. This is highly problematic because it places the person outside the protection of the law and increases the likelihood of other abuses, such as torture and extra-judicial execution. Given the Chinese Government’s already appalling track record particularly with respect to torture of detainees, this takes on particular significance in Xinjiang.

To date, the Chinese Government has failed to respond to all the inquiries made about these arrests; perhaps there is somebody here with us this afternoon from the Embassy, if you would care to explain that to us. We included in a copy of this report, which is standard operating procedure for us, a letter we sent to the Chinese Government in advance of publication asking a series of questions about number of detainees, the ethnic breakdown of them, what people were being charged with, where they were being held.
Not only did we not get a response after the report was released on October 22, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson was asked about the report. He replied that he “didn’t know on what grounds we based our assertions” and said that HRW had “fabricated rumors to attack China on many occasions.”

The severe and ongoing limitations on access to Xinjiang complicate what we can know about what has happened since that time. One of the journalists who recently traveled there reported having been stopped seven times by Public Security Bureau personnel on her first day, and she later suggested to us that that was actually the best day of her visit.

We have not yet begun to conduct new investigations, but it is our understanding that the problem remains as serious now as it was then. Another journalist who was in Urumqi last month quoted a 33-year-old Uyghur resident of Urumqi as saying, “Every single family on this block is missing someone.”

One of the issues I was asked to touch on today has to do with violations of due process that have compromised the possibility of fair trials for defendants. It is worth pointing out that these are all problems that are pervasive throughout China, where the judicial system is highly politicized.

The first problem has to do with restrictions on legal representation, including the fact that judicial authorities in Urumqi and Beijing, on July 11—so just a few days after the protest started—effectively warned lawyers against accepting cases related to these protests.

At the same time, partners of law firms were told to “positively accept monitoring and guidance from legal authorities and lawyers’ associations,” meaning, let the Party decide how these cases should be handled, not the law. Multiple examples of the over-politicization of the judiciary here would point to the president of the Xinjiang High People’s Court, a memo dated July 16, 2009, saying that the Xinjiang judicial authorities to hear these particular cases have been “selected politically qualified personnel drawn from the entire region,” so again, not really much of an interest there in upholding the law.

Third, I would point to the failure to publicly publish notification of the trials. This is a clear violation of China’s own criminal procedure laws. Then, fourth, the failure to hold genuinely open trials, which is also mandated by law in China. The same July 11 warning that placed certain limitations on lawyers also prohibited them from talking to the media or discussing these issues online.

In the past, we know that authorities have arbitrarily restricted people’s ability to actually be in the courtroom, and instead essentially packed the room with court personnel and civil servants. And while we do not know who was actually present at these trials, we know who was not. That includes members of the foreign press, diplomatic representatives, family members, or other associates of the people being tried.

Very little information is available about the trials that have taken place to date. We, and others, are aware of the announcement made by Nur Bekri in March 2010 that 198 people have been tried, but that is really about it. We have no reason to believe why these trials should be any better than any of the ones that preceded them in either Xinjiang or in any other part of the country.
We do not know all that much about the sentences that people have been given. We know that reeducation through labor has been a very common penalty applied in the past, which has the additional effect of keeping people from talking to their family members or appealing their charges, and it is a way also of circumscribing criminal investigations.

With the appointment of Zhang Chunxian, who has sort of been offered up as the warm and fuzzy alternative to Wang Lequan, the questions are, will his leadership really result in any sort of policy changes? Will it be better, will it be worse? He seems—it is a relatively recent development, but from our perspective—he seems to be trying to bring a new style of governance to the region.

He appears to be trying to be popular, which is setting the bar kind of low. By the time Wang Lequan finished, he had not only alienated Uyghurs, but he had alienated a significant chunk of the Han population by not being tough enough on Uyghurs. So, there is really no place to go but up.

He seems to be trying to administer the province along more sort of normal lines rather than as a special security problem. He is engaged in a flurry of activities, including talking publicly about the importance of opening up the Internet and trying to be sort of more visible. We will see whether this turns out to be a good thing or bad thing.

From our perspective, there also appears to be a little bit more of an acknowledgement of the socioeconomic roots of ethnic disenfranchisement and possibly—possibly—an attempt to reach out to a new generation of Uyghur graduates that is conversant in both cultures, but this really could go either way. This could be a very concerted effort. We have seen similar efforts elsewhere in the country to co-opt this generation rather than actually give it real autonomy.

In retrospect, it looks like the July protests finally prompted Beijing to allow some discussion over issues that were previously politically taboo, contrary to Tibet where the united front has really blocked the way for policy adjustments. Beijing has acted with uncharacteristic speed and determination in the case of Xinjiang. The $64,000 question, of course, is whether this will be enough and whether this will be a good thing, and the jury is really out on that.

Fundamentally, some of the policy changes or adjustments that we have seen in the last few months are ones of magnitude, not of direction. The simple take-away here is that Uyghurs are still excluded from the decisions about the future of their homeland. They are no more empowered to participate in those discussions now than they were at the time of the protests. Discussions about autonomy are absent from the political discourse, and there is no discussion of the issues that top the list of Uyghur discontent, including discrimination, Han in-migration, and ever more invasive curbs on language, culture, and religious expression.

I would couple with that some particularly aggressive externally oriented policies we have seen from the Chinese Government about Uyghurs, not least incredible pressure from the Chinese Government on Cambodia and a couple of other central Asian governments to force back to China Uyghurs who were seeking asylum,
and also a whole new level, I think, in the campaign to essentially paint all Uyghurs worldwide as terrorists.

At the end of the day, this is a pretty volatile mix. The chief source of Uyghur alienation is a perception that they are becoming strangers in their own land, and without any sort of stake in the place’s future, I think people may wind up behaving very differently regardless of what the policies actually are.

I want to touch very quickly on some of the recommendations that we have made, particularly to the Chinese Government: That it end the practice of enforced disappearances; that it release accurate information on all those detained, released, and formally arrested in the aftermath of the protests; that it release all of those against whom no charges have been brought—that is a pretty novel concept; ensure that peaceful religious observation and practice are not equated with, or incur liability from, state security forces; and end the criminalization of the advocacy for Uyghur autonomy.

Quickly, on the recommendations that we have made to the U.S. Government and to other members of the international community, ensure that your own policies regarding terrorism and counterterrorism do not exacerbate problems in Xinjiang. The threat of terrorism cannot be used to justify the repression of a particular ethnic minority, and I am not entirely confident that the U.S. Government is really following through on this. It is a very important part of the debate.

The United States and others should extend full and active support to an international investigation into the Urumqi events under the auspices of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The United States should continue to press the Chinese Government for accountability.

The United States should offer asylum to Uyghurs under threat of being returned to China. Every U.S. Ambassador worldwide: if you have Uyghurs and if they are under some sort of threat of being sent back to China, don’t mess around. Open the door, let them into the Embassy, bring them here. It is no more complicated than that.

Then last but not least, reject the idea that any discussion of the human rights in Xinjiang, Tibet, or any other part of the PRC constitutes a violation of the “core interests” articulated by the People’s Republic. This is a term that is nothing more than the PRC saying we don’t want to talk about this, and if anything should direct the U.S. Government’s human rights agenda in China, it is precisely that which the Chinese Government labels as a core interest.

Thank you.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you, Sophie. It’s always a pleasure having you here.

Now we are going to open it up to our audience.

So, the first question will come from Kara Abramson, and then we’ll turn to the audience. You can project if you know you’re good at vocalizing. Stand up and just project. If you know you need a little electronic help, we have a microphone up here.

Kara is going to start us off.

Ms. ABRAMSON. Thank you. And thanks to all of the panelists for your testimony today.
I’d like to ask a question about the Xinjiang Work Forum which took place in May. My question is, are these new initiatives likely to be successfully implemented? The scope is large. It’s a really ambitious program. Some aspects of it, on paper anyway, could be potentially positive, and other aspects, clearly less so.

We have seen plenty of cases of Chinese Government projects that have fallen flat on implementation, and the Work Forum has set some very ambitious targets: 2015 to meet basic goals, 2020 to have an all-around “healthy society” in Xinjiang.

Already we have seen criticism of existing counterpart programs in Xinjiang, where cities and localities on the eastern seaboard of China provide assistance to Xinjiang. These programs already have been in place in Xinjiang for 13 years, I think. We have seen criticism that, to date, they have not been that effective. So in terms of the current Xinjiang Work Forum, how successful is the government going to be in implementing various objectives? Is there the will and the resources to make it different this time?

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Any panelist who wants to take this question, please? You want to, Stan? Great.

Mr. TOOPS. I think that the Xinjiang Work Forum or Xinjiang Work Conference is interesting in that, in part, it seems to be modeled on previous conferences and work forums in Tibet. So it is kind of taking a Tibet model—and that has been very successful of course [winks]—to take a look at that in Xinjiang.

The other kind of component is that it is having various provinces involved, and to what extent will the provinces feel that, yes, we support the central government, therefore we are also going to support the activities going on in Xinjiang. So it depends on the kind of attitudes for the various east coast provinces.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Can you talk about that in some detail? What that means is east coast provinces have to fund, send their money, to Xinjiang. Isn’t that right?

Mr. TOOPS. Well, in some cases it is more money or technology or experts, or some sort of assistance. So it’s kind of like overseas development assistance, but it’s situated within China. So, it’s like an internal development program, in a way. In the United States, in different parts, you have various kinds of policies for poverty-stricken areas and those kinds of things.

But it’s to have it that somehow one province is going to take responsibility for what is happening in a prefecture of a city in Xinjiang, which is a kind of an interesting pairing to take a look at. I think that is where the difficulty, at least in terms of the logistics, might be. But maybe then it would involve these various provinces, and it’s not just a central government kind of program.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Good. Okay. Yes? Then we’ll go to the audience.

Ms. RICHARDSON. I would just tack on two quick points, one of which is that the Tibet model hasn’t necessarily worked all that well in Tibet. I mean, the Chinese Government can spend as much money as it wants, but this is not a problem fundamentally that you can spend your way out of.

And while I can’t speak nearly as well as the other panelists can to whether the Chinese Government can follow through on sort of the hard data—spending, education, those sorts of things—the idea
that by 2015 they will have established a harmonious society in Xinjiang is reasonably laughable, as long as the population itself does not get to have a part in that conversation.

One of the things that concerns me, actually, about the goals set out by the Work Forum is that the narrative that the central government has given out, and that I think a lot, particularly, of the urban Han population has bought into, is that the central government has pumped enormous resources into this region and into Tibet, and look at these ungrateful minorities. Look at what they turned around and did to us, right?

And as we’re seeing the economy slow down in a couple of different parts of the country, it really concerns me that if they continue to pump a lot of money into Xinjiang, the stakes are going to be that much higher to deliver on some kind of security, but it shouldn’t necessarily be confused with a kind of stability.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Great. Thank you.

Let’s go to the audience. The gentleman with the blue shirt?

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. This question is for Sophie Richardson. Even though the Chinese police forces are in some way [inaudible] are there any indications that these abducted civilians are being forced into a form of human trafficking?

Ms. RICHARDSON. We have no information that would enable me to answer that question. None. Sorry.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Anybody else want to take that on? No. Okay, to another question. Mr. Pillsbury?

Mr. PILLSBURY. Michael Pillsbury—I have a question about the Uyghurs outside of China [inaudible] Han in some of the regions [inaudible] as well. I’m trying to understand the difference between the world reaction to Tibet over the last 20 or 30 years and contrasted to Uyghurs in the sense of asking this question: What would it take to have the same level of concern about the Uyghurs as the world has about Tibet? Now, I can think of some more specific sub-questions. It seems to me the Tibetans have a long history of involving Western governments.

If you look at various memoirs, even in the 1950s they were already making contact [inaudible] they have the Dalai Lama as a religious figure. They have a government in exile. They have a parliament they elect people to. They seem to have a set of organizations around the world with names like the International Campaign for Tibet. So my specific question is, is there anything like that for the Uyghurs now, and what would it take to have that sort of thing [inaudible] much worse level of oppression [inaudible] in Xinjiang before that will ever happen. Then [inaudible] Muslim world should be more concerned about Xinjiang than they are. So my general question is, what is the level of concern by governments on the outside of Xinjiang for Uyghurs in Xinjiang?

Ms. KAN. Because I work at CRS, I really cannot get into any policy recommendations. But I would just note, in answer to your question directed at me, that there has been increased attention by foreign governments, including the U.S. Government, to Uyghurs because of what has happened since 2001. There’s been more attention than ever.

If we think back to the 1990s and the unrest and crackdowns and manhunts that took place in the 1990s, very few Americans ac-
tually knew about what was going on. We had groups like Amnesty International that tried to show the spotlight when a lot of people didn’t understand.

So actually the Uyghurs have seen an increase in attention, international attention, and an increase in governmental support, no less by the President of the United States himself. President Bush met not once, but twice, with Rebiya Kadeer, the leader of the democratic organization for the Uyghurs.

Second, the Uyghurs also have seen increased legitimacy around the world, legitimacy provided not only right here in the Congress, but also as I mentioned by the White House itself and by the increased attention of a lot of groups, like the National Endowment for Democracy, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International. So, there’s been increased attention at the official level and increased legitimacy as compared with the Tibetans.

For those who have worked in Congress for many years, we can remember days when we would talk about the PRC and Tibet, and that would be the end of it. Today, it is different. It would be the PRC, people in Tibet, and people in East Turkistan, or Xinjiang. Now, we see people talking about the Tibetans and the Uyghurs in the same sentence. So, that is also a change.

Also, in 2002, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor himself went to Xinjiang. We have not seen that repeated, but it’s possible. It is also possible that our current President could meet with Uyghur leaders. But that has been the trend over several years.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you, Shirley.

Sophie, did you want to comment? You don’t need to, but if you want to. Okay.

Ms. RICHARDSON. I would associate myself with everything that Charlotte and Shirley have just said, although would toss out the clarification that this White House doesn’t seem to have gotten around to receiving Mrs. Kadeer yet. At the same time, this administration could undo one of the Bush Administration’s mistakes and think really carefully about whether there even is an organization called ETIM and whether it deserves to be on the terrorist watch list.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. What is ETIM? No acronyms.

Ms. RICHARDSON. The East Turkistan Independence Movement, which is an organization the Chinese Government insists exists and is a terrorist organization. Many other knowledgeable people dispute that claim.

And one of the huge obstacles the Uyghur community globally has been combating over the last 10 years is that really sort of one of the first gestures of attention to Xinjiang, at least in recent memory, was either Gitmo, where you saw a lot of perfectly innocent Uyghurs getting locked up and labeled, in effect, by the U.S. Government as terrorists, and then followed by the somewhat schizophrenic position that the Uyghurs who were let go had to be resettled someplace other than China because they have a legitimate fear of persecution if they were sent home.

But putting ETIM on that list at the Chinese Government’s request really contributed, I think, to a perception worldwide that Uyghurs, you know they’re Chinese, but they’re Muslim, but we’re
not really sure who they are, and it all sounds a little dodgy. I mean, there's a fair amount of just ignorance and racism at work here, coupled with shortcomings or oversights in U.S. or European policy. I think it's a problem that this is not just a question of how the United States or Europe has responded. I think it's also that the global Muslim community has not stood up really on behalf of the Uyghurs.

To the extent that there was anything positive in the fallout from the protests last year, it was that you saw a little bit of flag flying from Muslim communities in Turkey and in Indonesia, which showed a little bit of solidarity, but you don't see the big organizations speaking out about the persecution of Uyghurs.

But to answer your approximate question very quickly, yes, there is a World Uyghur Congress. Some of the people who are sitting behind you can explain that to you. There are a number of NGOs that do research and advocacy work, but they simply do not have the global footprint or recognition that the Tibetans have had.

Ms. Oldham-Moore. Yes, sir. I'm sorry. Did you want to say something, Kara? Okay. Yes, sir?

Mr. Van der Wees. Hi. My name is Gerrit van der Wees. I work for the Formosan Association for Public Affairs in Washington, DC. I have a question on the linkage between East Turkistan and Taiwan. In a sense, it's a followup from Mike Pillsbury's question.

Last year, Mrs. Kadeer was blocked from entering Taiwan [inaudible] and the showing of her movie. Just last Friday, one of her associates was also blocked by the present government [inaudible] human rights and democracy, and there's really a very [inaudible] notion of justice and democracy in Taiwan. The Government in Taiwan is increasingly leaning toward the PRC [inaudible].

So my question is, connecting the dots here, that Tibet [inaudible] Taiwan, can we look at this in a holistic fashion because the PRC Government is trying to [inaudible] one-by-one and then focus on the next one. [Inaudible.]

Ms. Oldham-Moore. Thank you for your question, because we hear, again and again, core interests: Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang. These are our core interests, stay out. So, thank you for your question.

Does anybody want to respond? Ms. Kan?

Ms. Kan. There was concern last year, when Taiwan's Minister of Interior baselessly branded Rebiya Kadeer as a “terrorist” and denied her a visa, apparently when she didn't even apply for one. Now we see that her daughter is there for a screening of “Ten Conditions of Love.” There are reports that Kadeer, again, was not welcomed.

This policy repeated again this year is likely to increase concerns about Taiwan's Government, because its approach is at odds with that of the United States, Japan, and other countries. It does not make any sense, because that implies somehow the United States is harboring a “terrorist” right here in Washington with an office practically across from the White House. President Bush would not have met with such a person, so it does not make any sense, and it will increase concerns. Thank you.
Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Do you want to say anything, Lisa? Okay. No? Okay. It's outside our mandate, so I'm not going to speak to that, but it's a very provocative and interesting point.

Yes, sir? Please.

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. Just a more general question. Is there any evidence of foreign organizations or countries aggravating the situation?

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. That's a very good question. I don't know. Do you mean on the ground in Xinjiang?

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. Mostly on the ground.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Anybody want to take that, or take a pass?

Ms. RICHARDSON. I need to know a little bit more what you mean by “aggravating.”

AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. Such as supplying any form of terrorist action or simply [inaudible] for reasons of their own.

Ms. RICHARDSON. Well, if you're talking about something like selling weapons to some sort of Uyghur separatist groups, I don't think I can help you very much on that.

Again, I would point to governments who have taken rhetorical or political positions that have helped make it easier for the Chinese Government to paint Uyghurs as terrorists, but there are a number of academics, and certainly people in the security community, who do follow these sorts of things and I'd be happy to point you to some of their work.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. I have a question, if one of you would like to take it real fast. There was a tremendous amount of Uyghur-on-Han violence. During that very dark, hot summer last July in Xinjiang, there was a lot of Uyghur-on-Han violence, and there was also a great deal of Han-on-Uyghur violence. Both groups suffered tremendous harm.

If you could flesh out for me or explain and fill in for me a little bit, what were the Han grievances? What are the Han grievances or beefs with the Uyghur community? Maybe Dr. Toops could share with us what your understanding is of resentments or grievances the Han may have about the current situation in Xinjiang.

Mr. TOOPS. I think there are different kinds of things. One, is to look at the violence in July last year. Then there was a response from some members of the Han community to attack members of the Uyghur community within Urumqi, but that was as much saying that the state somehow was not doing enough to protect them. This was also, along with the cost, to have the leadership, the Party leadership, change within Xinjiang, and now that has, so in some ways you can look at it in that kind of context.

In another kind of context, it is more a view about, say, kind of affirmative action policies in Xinjiang, if you're Uyghur, if you get a score, you get added points to maybe go to college or something like that. Of course, the college exams are in Chinese, so it's not like you get that much points to compensate overall. But somehow a feeling that there's some sort of a sense of entitlement.

But I think it works the other way as well, where some Uyghurs would feel that the Han have a sense of entitlement within their region, and to call it the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region when it is not so autonomous is very problematic. So I think it
works on different levels. The part about the violence, that’s unfortunate no matter who is involved there.

But the other kind of feelings about, somehow in Xinjiang, many people feel they are a minority, that Han in Xinjiang feel they are a minority, that it’s not a situation where the Han are the dominant in the demography of the area. Then for Uyghurs, Kazakhs, or others, they also feel that they’re a minority. So, everybody has a little bit of that, so I think that’s a broader kind of construct rather than talking about, say, the issues of the violence.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. That’s extremely helpful, thank you.

Yes, sir?

Mr. FOX. Hi. My name is Henry Fox. I’m an intern here on the Hill. I think it’s significant that we’re actually discussing this in this room—the Indian Affairs Committee room—which has a lot of pictures in this area about autonomy and its history in this country. It’s relevant that the [inaudible] national lacrosse team did not get access to England to get to the [inaudible] tournament. There are a lot of issues [inaudible] political assassinations. So given that we have issues within our country and we have one of the most represented democracies in the world, what would an ideal situation for autonomy be for this group in China?

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. That’s excellent. Do you want to take that, Kara? Shirley, do you want to take it? Kara, you should reply, too.

Ms. KAN. Well, I think this might not be the time to inject Hawaiian sovereignty into the discussion. Anyway, that’s another story. We don’t want to get sidetracked into something very much alive, even here, with Hawaiian sovereignty. But there is a question of autonomy.

One possible way is to basically call it like it is. I mean, I think it’s questionable when reporters, researchers, or people who should know better continue to use the term “Xinjiang [Uyghur] Autonomous Region” without pointing out that there is no autonomy and that’s just an Orwellian term to use. That’s one thing, to recognize that there is no autonomy, just like in Tibet.

The second thing is that I think there have been some calls for dialogue. I think some people have mentioned about looking at the Tibet experience—I don’t want to say model, but let’s say experience. There is a record to go by, and the United States has supported dialogue. So is there some way to look at that experience? I’ll stop there.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. That’s great.

Ms. RICHARDSON. I would just add onto that that, like a lot of Chinese laws, the autonomy law is pretty good on paper. I would strongly urge you to go and read it and understand exactly what it spells out as not just possible, but what actually ought to be happening and contrast it to the reality. I mean, what the government has on paper already committed to is not bad. The problem is, there is absolutely no followthrough on it.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. I think the CECC, in its reports and recommendations, previous, has said implementation of Chinese laws on autonomy would be a huge step forward. Chinese laws on the books on autonomy and how that is structured are not bad. If those laws were actually fully implemented, it would be a significant step forward.
Ma'am?

Ms. Hopkins. Hi. I'm Lisa Hopkins and I work at the Army. I would like to ask, how does information flow or not flow out of Xinjiang, and how is it that we know that we understand the situation on the ground?

Ms. Oldham-Moore. Lisa, you may know more than we do on that question. Does anybody have anything to say on that? Lisa, do you want to comment on that? I'll take your name out of the transcript.

Ms. Hopkins. [Inaudible.]


Ms. Kan. As I mentioned in my remarks, I think it's been encouraging that foreign reporters were allowed into Xinjiang, both last July as well as this year. That really contrasts with the lack of foreign reporting. I think, in Lhasa in 2008. During the riots in 2008, there was only one foreign reporter who just happened to be there. He was a British reporter, and he was able to get out some very good information.

Then someone else earlier mentioned about the harassment. So even when reporters are going in from Japan, from the United States, from Hong Kong, from other places, they face severe harassment. They have been beaten up, where it has required diplomatic protests.

So with these kinds of things, there would be a question of whether the U.S. Government follows up on such harassment, would seek to get greater assurances against these kinds of physical as well as other kinds of harassments against foreign reporters, and would continue to encourage a good trend, to give some credit where credit is due, when there are foreign reporters who have been allowed in.

Second, American diplomats. We do not have a consulate there—we have one in Chengdu, but there would be a question of whether American diplomats would be able to travel. Now, significantly, I have not seen our ambassador go out there. So, I mean, how many times can you go to Shanghai? [Laughter.]

Ms. Oldham-Moore. No. But it's a very good point you raise.

Ms. Richardson. In a perfect world, we are able to actually send researchers openly to the country that they're working on, and in a perfect world we're able to have conversations directly with a variety of the actors who are involved in whatever the kind of problem is, hence the letter here to the government.

With a country that is incredibly hostile to, among others, international human rights organizations, obviously you've got to play things a little bit differently. We try to talk to as many people as we can, particularly people who we suspect might tell us something other than what we expect to hear. We try to talk to lots of different communities geographically and we try to consult with as many other people who have looked at the same situation to see if the information somehow significantly differs.

In a case like this where you're talking about an unbelievably tense security environment, a lot of restrictions on movement, enormous restrictions on the people that you're trying to talk to, and then you superimpose on top of that a seven-, eight-, nine-month-
long blackout on all communications, which we haven’t really talked about much——
Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes. Which is the Internet shutting down, basically.
Ms. RICHARDSON. Internet, cell phones, SMS capabilities. Lots of forms of communication to the entire region just shut down made it that much more difficult.
If I’m remembering correctly, this report involves interviewing people in 11 different countries. Well, we’ll leave it at that.
Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes, please?
Ms. KAN. And since we are here in Congress, it’s very important that there is another option to consider, which would be the visits by staff and Members—and there’s someone in the room now, talk about giving credit where credit is due—whereby staff have gone and reported on their visits to Urumqi and what was happening on the ground. And that kind of thing can also be important for getting information as well as showing international attention and monitoring. Thank you.
Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes, please?
Ms. RICHARDSON. Can I just make a quick recommendation to the Commission, if it is within your mandate? I think actually it would be incredibly helpful if somebody kept and publicized a roster of who is asked to go and when, and whether they got turned down, because I’m aware of various staff members who have asked to go, I’m aware of people in the Embassy in Beijing who have asked to go. Just because they get turned down doesn’t mean that we should acknowledge their efforts, but it can be very hard to know even who has made the effort, and when.
Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. There is an amendment floating around in Congress that would mandate reporting on visa and permit requests by U.S. academics, and U.S. Government officials, including Congressional and State Department staff, to visit China or specific regions like Tibet and Xinjiang. The amendment would require that our government report on the known number of those requests, and the number of visa and region-specific denials the Chinese Government imposed. Many Members of Congress continue to be alarmed by the number of China academic experts who are denied visas, because the Chinese Government is displeased by their research topics. Also, they are alarmed by the number of U.S. Government officials and staff who are not permitted to travel to China. This is the case despite the large numbers of Chinese academics and Chinese officials who travel to the United States without facing significant obstacles in entry.
Yes, ma’am? Please.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT. Hi. Thank you for doing this. [Inaudible] from the [inaudible] we’ve reported pretty extensively on this, but I always wondered what we’re leaving out. I know that [inaudible] on this last week [inaudible] on the anniversary of the demonstrations and riots. I’m just kind of wondering, is there any information that [inaudible] but is there anything big that we’re not reporting? [Inaudible.]
Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. That’s a great question. Let’s go, girls and boy. Now’s your chance.
Ms. RICHARDSON. I’m happy to tell you what’s at the top of my list, which is really detailed information, pretty granular stuff, about the number of death sentences that have been handed down and carried out.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Dr. Toops, is there something you think should receive greater coverage in the mainstream media?

Mr. TOOPS. I think a lot of times elements of the mainstream media, they might have some experts that speak Chinese and they know something about China, but very few would speak Uyghur or Tibetan or something like that. So then they have to go through third parties as translators, and sometimes these things just don’t translate very well.

So a long-term analysis, at least from an academic perspective, is really lacking in terms of looking at what’s coming out of the media. So, it’s rather to try to understand the kind of social contacts that are going on in Xinjiang. There was some mention here made about Hawaii. It was like, well, there are lots of issues in the United States. Of course, that’s not the purview of this Commission, but in some ways they’re similar, and in other ways, not. At the same time, there have been riots in the streets in different parts of the United States. So, I have to kind of take it into overall context.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes.

Ms. KAN. I guess I will just say two things, briefly. One would be, from the perspective—I know you’re writing for a Japanese newspaper, but I think this does not pertain only to U.S. security interests, this would also pertain to a lot of the security interests of Japan and the countries around the world. We are very concerned about the ability to stabilize the situation in central Asia in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Stability requires a comprehensive multilateral, multinational approach involving the resources and attention of many countries, and Japan has contributed significantly to our efforts.

The Uyghurs in Xinjiang are very well-positioned to provide the links to play a greater role in the economic development and the greater stability of central Asia. They have the linguistic links. They have the historical links. They have the trade ties. They may even have family ties. They can play a much greater role, and it does not necessarily require people to be forced into learning Mandarin or something like that. So there are contributions that perhaps we may be missing, or we could encourage, or we have not seen in terms of economic and humanitarian people-to-people links.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Great.

Mr. Halpin?

Mr. HALPIN. Yes. I was going to comment about this question about access. An issue for [inaudible] and I think when I made my famous ill-fated trip to Xinjiang—what we were talking about, it led to a reaction where there was the rounding up and actually detention and abuse of Mrs. Kadeer’s children. But we were very fortunate to be [inaudible] there was one Fulbright scholar who was actually there, and we did get to meet her and have a very good discussion.

I would just say there’s nothing like striped pants on the ground, as opposed to boots on the ground. In Mr. Lantos’ act, he called for
us to try to negotiate a consulate in Lhasa, and the same could be said for Urumqi or other places in western China. We see this with Shenyang and the Korean border and refugee issues.

As restricted as UNHCR is in Beijing, as restricted as we are, we've had some great information come out of that consulate in Shenyang by [inaudible] at least the general proximity of the Korean Autonomous Prefecture. There's always been officers in Shenyang who really contributed a lot to our understanding. So I think we know the Chinese, they're great horse traders. They still want, I guess, Atlanta, Boston——

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. And Hawaii. They want Hawaii.

Mr. HALPIN. Yes. Atlanta, Boston, and Honolulu. Right. I guess we've got the American Presence Post, open up that APP, that old Condoleezza Rice idea of the one-person post. But another one person and another city on the east coast of China does not meet the national interest of the United States.

So I guess in response, I guess it has to be legislatively—and it can't even be as nice as Mr. Lantos was, suggesting to the State Department or to, whether it's the Bush Administration or the Obama Administration, that you would have consulates, but to say on reciprocity, there will now be no Chinese consulate in Boston, or Honolulu, or Atlanta until we have consulates in these western areas of China.

They are supposedly wanting to expand trade, the “Go West, Young Man” movement to develop these areas, and they are going to be more internationalized. We had an issue where there was an arrest in Tibet of American citizens. As tourists, we have consular issues. I guess you just have to legislatively say, if you want Boston, we want—if you want Honolulu, we want Urumqi. Make it very clear as a reciprocity issue.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thank you. Thanks.

Ms. KAN. I'd just add one thing.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes.

Ms. KAN. Outside of government, there are, of course, a lot of universities and academics doing a lot of research. One of the problems that we hear about over the years is some sort of a blacklist that would be kept on certain academics. So the question then for our side is: What are these universities doing about it? Are they standing up to it, are they holding their own united front, or are they appeasing at the expense of intellectual freedom and academic pursuits?

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. That is a very excellent question. Somebody want to take this on? Do you want to respond, anybody? Okay. Amy?

Ms. Reger. I'm Amy Reger from the Uyghur Human Rights Project. I think one of the things we're trying to stay concerned about is the [inaudible] acknowledge, certainly on the part of the Chinese Government, but also on the part of the international community, that there was use of live fire by the state last year—and there has been [inaudible] on the aftermath and repression of Uyghurs, such as [inaudible] excellent Human Rights Watch [inaudible] this last December.

There has been, in my opinion [inaudible] to Uyghur accounts of violence committed by the state against Uyghurs, and we certainly
appreciate the [inaudible] in response to the questions about information, it is certainly very difficult for us to get information about [inaudible] information that we have gotten from interviews of Uyghurs who were in Urumqi on July 5 and afterward, and also that Amnesty International has gotten from Uyghurs [inaudible] accounts [inaudible] against Uyghurs [inaudible] more international attention [inaudible] but if I can ask another question, I just wanted to remark on Dr. Toops’ comment about the perceived perception of Uyghurs having special privileges. I think that’s a really good observation.

I recently [inaudible] that was written by [inaudible] I’m not sure if they were from Beijing or if they were from [inaudible] but they also remarked on these, what they perceived to be special Uyghur privileges, such as the lower requirements to get into university or the allowance of Uyghurs to have more children. I just wondered if you could speak more about whether you think now [inaudible] government policies [inaudible] perceived privileges or if perhaps there might be an implication of [inaudible].

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Okay. Thank you. I think I got the second part of the question, which was Han perceptions of special privileges for Uyghurs. Do you guys want to speak to that again? No, I guess not. Amy, we got it. I think we can have a further conversation up here. Okay? Thanks.

Does anybody else have a question, a quick question before we close down? One last question. Come on. How about the man in the uniform? No? No? We all want to hear from you. Anna Brettell.

Ms. BRETTELL. You started talking about the news blackout in Xinjiang, but could you tell us a little more about the scope and timing of the blackout? What has happened recently, is the Twitter site working? Do people across the province have access to the Internet?

Ms. RICHARDSON. Twitter?

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. I can answer that question: No.

Ms. RICHARDSON. I’m showing my age. But the question about the media blackout, the Chinese Government revised its playbook, I think, in responding to these protests, clearly by looking back at what, from its perspective, had gone wrong in Tibet. From its perspective, one of the problems became not letting the media in itself. I mean, this is just a total no-brainer, if you know journalists. If you don’t let them in to report, not letting them in to report becomes the story.

So the response in Xinjiang was to let them in, but to try to control the story. The other piece of the puzzle was essentially to shut down really all means of communicating with the outside world. It became very difficult for, I think it was about nine months, to have any kind of email exchange, any sort of electronic communications. Again, I don’t want to give Zhang Chunxian any credit before he’s actually earned it, but he was the one who said, shortly after being appointed to this new position, “There can’t be an open Xinjiang without an open Internet.”

Now, that’s a very nice idea. We’ll see if his idea of an open Internet is consistent with what people who are accustomed to a genuinely open Internet would think of or whether he’s talking
about what the Chinese Government thinks of as an open Internet, which is still not nearly what we would all like it to be. The ability to report on and get information in and out is still very difficult. Getting people in and out, getting stories in and out, getting information corroborated can be very difficult. That’s ongoing.

Twitter, as I understand it, over the last couple of weeks, has kind of come and gone. We’ve done a little bit of Tweeting with some of our friends; sometimes it’s worked, sometimes it hasn’t. But as I understand it, there are a couple of different potential technological explanations for that.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Okay. Thank you.

And Kara Abramson will wrap up.

Ms. ABRAMSON. Great. Actually, may I wrap up with one question?

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Yes.

Ms. ABRAMSON. Do we have time? Great. I will take advantage of having the microphone and do that.

One issue that we haven’t touched on today is the Chinese Government project to demolish and reconstruct the old city of Kashgar. I would be interested in hearing the panelists’ perspectives on why this is being done. Dr. Toops, you’ve looked at Silk Road tourism. The old city of Kashgar is a huge tourist site, so on one level we have to ask, isn’t the Chinese Government shooting itself in the foot by getting rid of this excellent tourist attraction? I’d like to hear from all of the panelists, or whoever would like to address this. Why this is taking place and what’s the logic behind it?

Mr. TOOPS. The stated logic behind the destruction of those old buildings is that they are old and that it’s unsafe and it’s not up to standards for housing, and to have a more developed society you need to have better housing. So the older style housing, which may be only a few stories, it may be earthen, and those are being demolished. People have opportunities to move into newer apartments that are on the outside of town, so a little bit further away from work, so not everybody takes advantage of that. You get some fiscal compensation, but not that much.

In some ways it’s analogous to what’s gone on in other parts of China, in Beijing or other areas, where some older kinds of buildings have been demolished and then brought in with the new one. What’s happening, though, in Kashgar in this context, is that the newer buildings are then being populated by people who are not from Kashgar, but are maybe from other areas, and so it’s also connected with a population shift, I think. As far as the tourism kind of aspect of it, yes, there’s certainly a lot of tourists that went to see the old city of Kashgar.

But the concession to get in there, the concession was granted to the Xinjiang Production Construction Corps because they have a lot of skills in managing things, so you’re paying the Production Construction Corps ticket entry fee, but it doesn’t really go to the local neighborhood. So there’s an issue kind of at the cultural level, and then of course there’s the economic components.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Thanks.

Shirley, do you want to speak to this?
Ms. KAN. Well, I just find it interesting, as I mentioned earlier, that the Secretary General of the OIC just was allowed into Xinjiang last month and he was able to visit Kashgar. So one question is whether this policy to demolish the Uyghurs' cultural center will still continue, given that the Muslim world is watching what happens.

Second, it's not just a question of demolishing the old cultural center in Kashgar. There have been reports that the PRC authorities were seeking to demolish the Rebiya Kadeer building right in Urumqi, the famous landmark in Urumqi right down the road from the two famous international bazaars. What would happen to the Uyghur women trying to eke out a living and other things around that landmark?

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. What is the Rebiya Kadeer building?

Ms. KAN. It is a very tall, commercial-looking building right in the middle of Urumqi, just down the road from the two major international bazaars. There have been questions about what would happen to them, possibly in retaliation. A lot of women make their living out of that building.

Ms. OLDHAM-MOORE. Great. Thank you.

Ms. RICHARDSON. I'll just add on that the stated logic is, new modern housing, won't that be nice for everybody, that should go a long way toward addressing some of the grievances that the local population has. From our perspective, not only are there problems like this rampant across China, and there's an obvious lack of compensation and consultation—I mean, under Chinese law people have the right to say, no, I don't want to move, and only be moved if the circumstances are shown, through a legal proceeding, to be extraordinary and necessary, which obviously we don't think really happens all that often.

But I think to do this, even if you left out the cultural dimension and the fact that the parts of Kashgar that got razed have been designated by the World Heritage Organization as important monuments, I think it's a pretty potent way for a centralized government to say to people, we will remake this place the way we want it to be. We do not care what you want, we do not care what your history is, we do not care what you think, we will make it our way and you will like it or you will lump it. I think that's a pretty ill-informed policy, particularly in a region that's already as restive as it is.

Ms. ABRAMSON. Great. We've reached our time limit. I'd like to thank all of our panelists for their testimony today, and everyone here for coming. We will have a transcript of this roundtable on our Web site, www.cecc.gov. We will also have the written testimony of Kathleen McLaughlin, the journalist who has reported from Xinjiang who was unable to join us here today, so please visit our Web site. We look forward to seeing you at future events. Thank you. [Applause.]

[The prepared statement of Ms. McLaughlin appears in the appendix.]

[The joint statement of Senator Dorgan and Representative Levin appears in the appendix.]

[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the roundtable was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
Thank you for the opportunity to present these remarks to you today. I am an Associate Professor of Geography and International Studies at Miami University. I have been conducting research on demographic and development issues in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of northwest China for 25 years. My remarks will focus on two facets concerning the policies outlined in the May 2010 Xinjiang Work Forum in China. The first is to situate the policies of the Xinjiang Work Forum within the general trends of China’s development efforts in Xinjiang. I will discuss how economic development varies in different parts of Xinjiang depending on local inputs of agriculture, industry and transportation access. I will examine the Xinjiang Work Forum and see how the stated goals of the Work Forum will impact the different areas of Xinjiang. The second is to examine the demographic components of Xinjiang. I will be talking about the distribution of population in Xinjiang. One focus is on the changing ethnic composition of Xinjiang in terms of Han, Uyghur, Kazakh and others. Another element to consider is migration within the region as well as the Han migration to Xinjiang. I will examine recent demographic trends.

What is now the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) has been labeled a variety of names. This Inner Asian area is composed of the Tarim Basin, the Turpan Basin, the Dzungarian Basin, and the Ili Valley. This area is known as Eastern Turkistan to distinguish it from Western Turkistan, the former Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the largest of China’s political units, covers an area of 1,650,000 square kilometers, one-sixth of China’s total area, three times the size of France. Xinjiang now has a population of 21 million. Located in the northwest of China, Xinjiang is bounded on the northeast by Mongolia, on the west by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and on the south by Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Xinjiang’s eastern borders front Gansu, Qinghai, and Tibet (Figure 1).

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

China started the Western Development Program in 1999 to address some of the regional inequities faced by China’s western regions in comparison to the more developed eastern portions of China. China’s development programs are addressed to the needs of its various regions. The current policies outlined by the Xinjiang Work Forum expand on the Western Development Program.

Developmental change occurs in Xinjiang based on the dynamism of the region. Xinjiang is made up of different localities that vary in character and responses to government policies. The traditional economic landscapes of this Silk Road region were herding, oasis agriculture, and trade. On top of that the state has added the modern including distribution (road, rail, air), as well as production (oil, textiles, agri-business) and consumption (urban and rural).

The state’s project of developing Xinjiang restructured the economic landscape. Transportation linkages lead to Urumqi and thence to Beijing in a hierarchical centralized fashion. Traditional economic centers such as Kashgar, Turpan, and Gulja are superseded by Urumqi’s industries based petrochemical and textiles. Oil found in the north at Karamay (black oil in Uyghur) and the current oil exploration in the Tarim has added to Xinjiang’s economic value to China. Oasis agriculture by the Uyghurs and animal herding by the Kazakhs were superseded by commercial agriculture on state farms. The state created the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) out of demobilized elements of the People’s Liberation Army in the 1950s to run the state farms. The XPCC still runs these state farms and has branched out into industry as well. In terms of consumption, Urumqi has been the focus of the economy with people paying high prices, earning not so high wages and living in high rises. In rural areas in the south farther from the markets, people still live in poverty. Border trade was nonexistent in the 1960s, limited in the 1970s, and grew in the 1980s–1990s.

China embarked on a “develop the west” campaign in 1999. Policies in the 1980s focused on developing the eastern coast while the western interior should prepare for future development. After the coastal development strategy of Deng Xiaoping,
the PRC began to turn its attention to rural poverty much of which was located in the interior. In June 1999, Sec. Jiang Zemin formally opened the western development strategy at CCP and government meetings. This policy elaborates on Deng Xiaoping's coastal program by turning to regional inequalities in the west.

Reasons for the new “develop the west” campaign focus on reducing regional inequality. In the 1990s, the interior regions began to be discontent with the siphoning off of resources, human and natural, to coastal development. Lack of economic growth in the west meant underdevelopment—in turn leading to social instabilities.

For western regions that have areas characterized by poverty and a larger percentage of minority population in the ethnic makeup, there is a potential for political instability as well as social instability. So the basic formula of development leading to stability is one that is followed in China.

Under the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the PRC commanded a great restructuring of the area. That restructuring occurred through many different programs. Their focus has been an orientation of Xinjiang to Beijing. Historically, Xinjiang’s centers of power and activity were in Kashgar, Turpan and Gulja. In modern Xinjiang under the PRC, the centralizing force of the state has meant that Urumqi has become the dominant center in terms of productions, administration, culture, population, and power. For Xinjiang this has meant a re-orientation to Beijing and loosening of the status of Kashgar, Turpan, and Gulja in a hierarchy of power. This re-orientation to China has created a geography of development. The reconstruction of the development landscape has meant the distribution of productive forces and their concentration in central Xinjiang. As migrants from other portions of China move to Xinjiang, a new development landscape is created which means further directional shift—toward Beijing.

Agriculturally, the hallmark of Xinjiang’s development has been the Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). Large amounts of central investments and subsidies were directed to rebuilding the land. At the same time central funds and demobilized troops contributed to the consolidation of central control. Animal husbandry has continued growth but the production policies during the collectivization period hindered the pastoralists. Most disastrous was the formation of agro-herding complexes that plowed up rangelands for grain. Xinjiang has the capacity to be a great meat producer for China. Production gains in agriculture must be understood in the context of reversals in animal husbandry.

Production in industry and agriculture as well as the tertiary sector inscribes an activity region of Xinjiang and smaller sets of regions within Xinjiang. Regions of cultural identification in Xinjiang are constituted through relations between and within ethnic groups. The region is the medium for social interaction; the relationships that link together institutions and people shape that region. Northern Xinjiang has most of the industry and commerce. Substantial numbers of Han and Uygur along with Kazakh reside here. The focus of the north is found in the industrial municipalities of Urumqi, Karamay, and Shihezi—this is the modern day core of Xinjiang’s economy populated mostly by Han. In contrast Southern Xinjiang is more rural, with an agricultural economy. Much of the population in the south is Uygur, Kashgar in the south is mostly Uygur; however there are more Han in the cities now especially in Korla and Aksu.

As the region modernized most of the industrial advancements took place in the core Xinjiang area of Urumqi, Karamay, and Shihezi. The economy is focused on this area. Urumqi was connected to the rest of China by railroad in the 1960s and by 1990 to Kazakhstan. Urumqi and Karamay have the largest values in industrial production. Urumqi is well diversified in industrial output including heavy industry, petrochemicals and textiles. Karamay’s industry derives mostly from oil production, besides crude oil and gas production, processing also occurs here. Karamay is connected by pipeline to Urumqi. Districts in the south, such as Aksu and Kashgar, produce mostly for local use (cement, fertilizer, food processing). The railroad was extended to Kashgar in 1999. Processing of the Tarim oil adds to the GDP of Korla in Bayangol; otherwise industrial GDP in southern Xinjiang is not large.

Karamay leads in per capita GDP, because of its oil processing and relatively low population. Urumqi has approximately double the average for Xinjiang. Other leaders include Bayangol, Turpan, and Shihezi. The low points in this economic landscape are Hotan, Kizilsu and Kashgar, all in the south and far from the economic heart of Xinjiang. Urumqi is the major economic center. The traditional centers of Kashgar and Ili fall short, while the traditional center of Turpan has made a bit of a comeback because of oil.

All in all the impact of oil (Karamay, Urumqi and even Bayangol and Turpan) is clear. Refining all of the oil in the XUAR would add to the GDP. For the south having more refineries in Bayangol, Aksu or Turpan would boost local GDP. Urumqi’s refineries take most of the Tarim and Turpan oil. Most of the oil crews
are from Northeastern China, for example Daqing. Thus the oil migrants add their labor force to the local areas.

What is the nature of the development landscape in Xinjiang? Production is up as is GDP per capita. However these two measures show only part of the picture. Much of the rise in GDP is due to the processing extractive products; there is an over reliance on oil to describe a rosy scenario. Much of labor force is still in the agricultural sector. Many basic needs have been met. The difficulty comes with seeing the regional differentiation. There is an underdeveloped south compared with developed north. The historical economic centers of Turpan, Kashgar and Gulja have been superseded by the new modernized economic centers of Urumqi, Shihezi, Karamay, and Korla.

To develop southern Xinjiang along the lines of northern Xinjiang would require significant amounts of capital investment. The “develop the west” campaign would seem on the surface to bring new investment to Xinjiang, but most of that capital and labor flows will be directed to northern rather than southern Xinjiang.

The new policies outlined by the Xinjiang Work Forum have a more detailed plan for Xinjiang’s development prospects. Representatives from the various coastal provinces met with counterparts in Xinjiang earlier this year before the Work Forum to start the planning for these projects. One key aspect is the regional component. Attention is paid to southern Xinjiang. There is also an interesting pairing up of provinces on the east coast with the prefectures of Xinjiang.

**Beijing Municipality—No.14 Division (XPCC), Hotan Prefecture—7.26 billion yuan ($1.06 billion) over the next five years for housing and protected agriculture**

**Guangdong Province—Tumushuke City of the XPCC’s No.3 Division, Kashgar Prefecture—9.6 billion yuan ($1.41 billion) over the next five years for infrastructure construction and public services**

**Shenzhen—Kashgar City and Taskorgan County—supply of financing, technologies, talent and management expertise**

**Jiangsu Province—No.4 Division and No.7 Division of the XPCC, Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture—people’s livelihoods, education, vocational training and oil pipeline projects**

**Shanghai Municipality—Kashgar Prefecture—earthquake-resistant housing projects, vocational training and agriculture facilities**

**Shandong Province—Kashgar Prefecture—earthquake-resistant housing projects and safe drinking water projects**

**Zhejiang Province—Ala’er City of the No.1 Division of the XPCC, Aksu Prefecture—a total investment of 16.7 billion yuan ($2.45 billion) over the next 10 years in industries, modern agriculture and social welfare**

**Liaoning Province—Tacheng Prefecture—180 million yuan ($26.36 million) as disaster relief for residents affected by the blizzard in 2009, job training and modern agriculture**

**Henan Province—Hami Prefecture and No.13 Division of the XPCC—orchards, protected agriculture and reconstruction of dilapidated houses**

**Hebei Province—No.2 Division of the XPCC and Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture—an investment 1.8 billion yuan ($263.62 million) in agricultural technologies, housing, employment and education over the next five years**

**Shanxi Province—Wujiaqu City of the XPCC’s No.6 Division, Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture—coal mining, education and reconstruction in shanty areas**

**Fujian Province—Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture—investments in the textile industry, social welfare and rural infrastructure**

**Hunan Province—Turpan Prefecture—affordable housing programs and coal mining**

**Jilin Province—Altay Prefecture—flood prevention projects and people’s livelihoods**

**Tianjin Municipality—Hotan Prefecture—fruit processing and construction of railways and roads**

**Heilongjiang Province—No.10 Division of the XPCC and Altay Prefecture—mining, education and job training**

**Jiangxi Province—Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture—an investment of 2.07 billion yuan ($303.16 million) in infrastructure, education and people’s livelihoods**

**Jilin Province—Altay Prefecture—flood prevention projects and people’s livelihoods**


Southern Xinjiang then will have connections with Beijing, Guangdong, Shenzhen, Shanghai, Shandong, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Tianjin. This direct pairing may be useful, yet there are some problems. Take for example Kashgar’s pairing with...
Shenzhen. Shenzhen is a special economic zone administered separately from Guangdong province. Shenzhen has special economic rules compared with the rest of Guangdong. Shenzhen specializes in the factories for the global export market. Shenzhen is to supply financing, technologies, talent and management expertise. While the financing of projects in Kashgar may be useful, talent and technology will not go very far in Kashgar. Shenzhen’s economic success has depended on its neighbor Hong Kong for investment and expertise. Kashgar’s nearest neighbors are Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan in contrast. There is of course an overseas community of people from Xinjiang that is Uyghur and Han in other countries. Perhaps their expertise and skills could be tapped into. This artificial pairing of East Coast—Xinjiang partners would need to go beyond sister city pairing to be beneficial.

Another interesting part of the plan is that Divisions of the XPCC are also partners. This reflects the economic reality of the Xinjiang—the XPCC forms a major part of Xinjiang’s economy. It functions as a separate company. The Xinjiang Production Construction Corps XPCC (Shengchuan Jianshe Bingtuan) was established in 1954. The Corps as the other state farm systems was dissolved after the Cultural Revolution in 1975 but was reinstated by 1981. The Corps is still organized along military lines; indeed, the Chinese name Bingtuan identifies the XPCC as an Army Corps. The XPCC has developed a vast state farm system as well as factories, hotels, and cities. The Corps utilizes migrant Han labor as well as prison labor. The Corps receives substantial support from the state and has been a major element of state control in Xinjiang. In the 50 years of the Corps’ existence, it has become a twin to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region government, both twins cast large shadows. Fifty years have past but the Corps numbers 2.5 million people making it the largest state organization after the People’s Liberation Army in China. So the plan provides for east coast provinces to support a Centrally administered entity—the XPCC.

The types of programs are also of interest. Much of the projects are for material infrastructure. These include housing, agriculture, pipelines, mining, fruit processing, textiles, and modern industries. There are some projects on education and “people’s livelihood” which deal more with the human infrastructure. Investment in human infrastructure will have a more beneficial impact than more road construction in the region. The coordination of all these projects will be quite difficult particularly since the experts form the east coast may not be very familiar with local conditions in Xinjiang.

One of the focuses should be on education and literacy for southern Xinjiang. Investment in human as well as natural resources is a key to sustained development. Education though needs to be followed by employment. Education without employment is a short ticket to disastrous development. Another issue is that of language. Would Xinjiang be able to follow a path of bilingualism? Can a Uyghur get ahead in society without also being fluent in Chinese? Can a Han get ahead in society without being fluent in Uyghur? Given the current answers to these questions (probably no and definitely yes) the language of instruction is critical for Xinjiang. The universities in Xinjiang have moved from a bilingual (Chinese and Uyghur) to a monolingual system (only Chinese). This changed has continued in the Xinjiang educational system with ramifications on down through primary school.

DEMOGRAPHIC LANDSCAPE

The demographic landscape of Xinjiang has undergone changes as well. There has been an influx of Han migrants thus changing the ethnic composition of the region. The migrations were regionally selective as well thus changing the distribution of population. Xinjiang ethnic diversity forms a basis for regionalization. With a variety of ethnic groups living in the area, all of their experiences and traditions can be brought to bear on any issue. An understanding of the distribution of the ethnic groups provides clues to the cultural landscape of the area.

Of the 30 different ethnic groups in Xinjiang, 13 have made Xinjiang their home. The 13 are Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Tatar, Xibo, Manchu, Mongol, Daur, Han, Hui, Tajik, and Russian. They represent different language groups, religions, and customs. Within Xinjiang’s 2008 population of 21.3 million, Uyghur account for 46 percent, Han 39 percent, Kazakh 7 percent, and the rest 8 percent. Within the cities one may see a great variety of ethnic groups, but most of the minority groups live on the periphery. A definite Central Asian component is the population base in the region, particularly outside of the capital Urumqi.

Han migration has filled in many corners of Xinjiang. Much of the migration has focused on the major lines of transport, Urumqi south to Korla, Urumqi west to Shihezi. Kashgar and Gulja have maintained their general ethnic composition. The central portion of Xinjiang has continued to grow with Han migration. In the future,
though, Xinjiang sees a problem with water supply, especially in Urumqi. Xinjiang is large but not all of its land can be settled.

When considering the level of development, one also needs to consider the ethnic composition of the population. Xinjiang is about 40 percent Han. There are higher percentages of Han in the northern corridor in Urumqi, Shihezi and Karamay. The south is mostly Uyghur in contrast. An interesting observation, though, is the relative increase in the Han population in the south. Kizilsu, Kashgar and Aksu have the most relative change in the numbers of Han. Much of this new population is urban, so the effect is even stronger in Kashgar City, Artush City and Aksu City. Modern population settlement and migration patterns have followed the railway. This increase in Han population is probably due to the new railway extended to Kashgar in 1999.

Han populations match up well with urban and transportation linkages, roads and railroads; migrants tend to follow transportation lines. Xinjiang has distinctive nationality concentrations. The cities as well have distinctive ethnic neighborhoods, for example, Uyghur in Urumqi, or Hui in Turpan. Uyghurs live in the south, which is the poorest area. Han live in the wealthier urban corridor of the north.

The 2000 census like the 1990 included questions on migration. Respondents were asked if they were registered in other localities. In Xinjiang, over 1.4 million people (7.64 percent) indicated they were registered elsewhere; I assume most of these were Han or Hui, most likely not Turkic minorities. Not all migration data from the census has been released. The registrants came from all over China, primarily from the Southwest, North, and Northwest. Major sources for the registrants are Sichuan, Henan, and Gansu. The Sichuan migrants (over 400,000) are well known in Xinjiang, witness the large number of Sichuan restaurants. Sichuanese have been coming to Xinjiang since the 1950s. There are many registrants who have come to Xinjiang from the Three Gorges area. The Henan people coming to Xinjiang are Yellow River people. There are many ties from the north China Plain to Xinjiang going back to the 1950s. The Gansu people are true north westerners who have moved along the Hexi corridor into Xinjiang. These migrants are working in industry and agriculture, in oil and in cotton, in households and in government, as cadres and as maids. Like any immigrant group they are seeking a better life, in this case primarily economic life. Xinjiang is a very different place from Sichuan or Henan, not so different from Gansu. Migrants are aided and recruited. There are centers in Urumqi, Korla and other major cities to facilitate the flow of the migrants for jobs and housing. Or recruiters, whose original home is in Sichuan, go back to Sichuan to bring labor to Urumqi. Since there is a surplus of labor in Sichuan, since the people speak the same dialect, since jobs are scarce in Sichuan and the population is large, why not go to Xinjiang for a time to make some money?

What is the nature of the demographic landscape in Xinjiang? The population is concentrated in two segments, Northern Xinjiang and Southern Xinjiang. In both cases the roads and now railroads linking the settlements have proved to be the major paths for migration. The population has a male/female ratio comparable with the rest of China, the Uyghur have a lower male/female ratio than the Han. Xinjiang’s age profile is younger than other parts of China; southern Xinjiang is particularly milk (minzu / millet) the Uyghurs are still in the south and the Kazakh are in the north. The Han are migrating in a steady stream into the central area and following paths of migration to the other urban centers. Major sources of migrants are from Sichuan, Henan, and Gansu.

What direction does this young, ethnically diverse population with large numbers of migrants take? If the border were open to cross border migration, some Kazakhs might move to Kazakhstan or Uyghurs to Central Asia. But there is no Uyghur land across the border. Indeed if the border were open there might well be many Han in Kazakhstan and Central Asia rather than the few who are there now. South to Pakistan, north to Russia and Mongolia does not seem readily possible, although the local connections to these neighboring countries are strong. Given economic tendencies Han migrants are looking not to Xinjiang but to Shanghai, Hong Kong, Beijing, and further afield to US, Canada, Australia or Europe. 50–60 million Han live outside of the country as huaqiao overseas Chinese.

Looking across the border to Kazakhstan, one sees a similar situation a young ethnic diverse population, with a large number of migrants from Russia rather than China. Of course, since 1990 the political situation is now quite different.

Xinjiang’s demographics show a population that is getting older little by little and more urban. The demographic trends also show a population that is becoming less ethnically diverse with more migrants. That is the future of Xinjiang’s demography.

Xinjiang has certainly prospered materially. I first studied in Urumqi in 1985; since then cell phones, cable TV, computers, and 20-story buildings are commonplace. There has been a technological growth. Transportation improvements air, rail,
and highways connect the region together, focusing on Urumqi. Now all taxicabs in Urumqi have Global Positioning Systems. Han hold many of the technological and jobs in Xinjiang. A higher percentage of Uyghurs have advanced education than in the past, but to get a good job is not so easy in Xinjiang, to do so one needs connections or \textit{guanxi}. Tapping onto the network of connections one relies on government, university, family, kith and kin. Connections for Han are more forthcoming than for Uyghur. Of course a well-connected highly educated Uyghur has more chance than a poor Han peasant from Hunan. A well-qualified individual has a better chance among his or her own ethnic group. Han migrants have contributed greatly to the economic development of the region but not necessarily to the local inhabitants of Xinjiang. Those who have worked in technical fields training local Uyghur and Kazakh population have also contributed to the social development of the region and its inhabitants.

The plans for development in Xinjiang place a great deal of emphasis on physical infrastructure (roads and railways). For example, World Bank loans were previously used to build the highway between Urumqi and Turpan, between Kuitun and Sayram Lake. In contrast the Tarim Basin Project is aimed at poor farmers in the south. China also has a World Bank Project aimed at education among indigenous peoples in Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou. This is a good example of a project that could be adapted to southern Xinjiang.

The new policies outlined by the Xinjiang Work Forum will also have a considerable impact on the local demography. Often times with work projects in China, the skilled workers move into the areas. So many of the jobs in the new infrastructure projects would go to people with experience in those fields. This would entail more people migrating from eastern China to Xinjiang. And since the projects would go deep into southern Xinjiang, there will be more migration of Han into the traditionally Uyghur populated areas of southern Xinjiang. Usually the supervisors and foremen at job sites would be Han and prefer have a work force that operates in the Chinese language. So it is more difficult for a Uyghur to get hired in this formal sector of the economy. This Xinjiang development program could lead into an east-west population transfer across China.

The resultant impact of the development program on the demographic character of Xinjiang lies in two areas: the combination of ethnicity and migration. The development program will entail a movement of population from the east. Prior migrations from the east have been directly organized by the center. The major migration of Han into the region occurred during the 1950s. Many soldiers as well as peasants and urban dwellers settled in the region. In some cases, demobilized soldiers formed the new Production and Construction Corps. Oftentimes this settlement extended into land that was used for pastureland, converting it to agricultural purposes. Or new patches of “desert” were converted by tapping into the local aquifer (such land could only be used for a few years before nature would reclaim it). Many from as far as Shanghai came, as well as Sichuan and Hunan, in addition to the traditional flow of migrants from Gansu and Shaanxi. Migration slowed in the 1970s as the political situation stabilized.

In the 1990s a new element began to appear—the floating population. China has about 100 million people that can be classified as floating population. We do not know how many there are in Xinjiang. These could also be described as temporary or circular migrants, in that they do not move permanently but could constitute an extra 10 percent of any urban population. In Urumqi, the temporary migrants can be seen at the train station, emerging from the 3–4 day journey. There is a large enclave of the temporary migrants living near the train station. Downtown, there is an office for the temporary residents where they can line up jobs and get housing. A stroll by this area and a discussion with the migrants shows that many of them are looking for construction or other skilled labor jobs. The better skilled can command 2000 yuan per month. Similar facilities are available in Korla and Aksu. So there is a provision for the temporary migrants even though a permanent move may not be in the future for them. Many would only plan to stay a while to try their luck in the city. This new development program would bring more formal migrants as well as floating population into Xinjiang. Most of the migrants had been heading toward the central areas of Urumqi and Shihezi. Now there will be more migrants headed toward Kashgar and southern Xinjiang. The vast majority of these migrants will be Han. Thus the cultural character of southern Xinjiang will change from one predominantly Uyghur to one with a larger Han component.

Finally, what are the prospects for population growth? Population growth continues in Xinjiang, as does the migration to the region from other parts of China. If anything, the migration seems to be increasing in recent years, particularly with the addition of the floating population. This migration will ensure a larger percentage of Han in the region. The focus for the Han population will continue to be north-
ern and central Xinjiang around Urumqi. With the completion of the railway to Kashgar, migration flows into southern Xinjiang will continue. Already the Han proportion of the population in southern Xinjiang has begun to increase. The only real limit to population growth in the region is access to water not access to land. The state has decided to tap into local aquifers and is using that water for agricultural expansion, oil production, construction and industry and residential use. In the oases of southern Xinjiang, overexploitation of water points to a serious ecological disaster in the making.
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN E. MCLAUGHLIN, CHINA CORRESPONDENT FOR BNA, INC., AND FREELANCE JOURNALIST

JULY 19, 2010

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, and thanks very much to the CECC for inviting me to take part in this important discussion. As a journalist and not a scholar, I'd like to focus primarily on the difficulties journalists face in reporting on Xinjiang, and how the strict barriers to reporting on the region have left the international media with a general lack of facts and understanding about what is happening there.

When deadly riots erupted in Urumqi last summer, foreign correspondents in China expected the same kind of scenario we had encountered the year earlier when violent riots hit Tibet. Most of us believed that Xinjiang would be blocked off to reporters and the outward flow of information tightly controlled.

So it was a pleasant surprise to find that the capital of Xinjiang was relatively open to foreign correspondents. Though Chinese media were not allowed free access to the region, foreign reporters flocked to Urumqi, where dozens of them found they had relatively open access to the city.

There were some problems, some hassles with police (including one incident in which reporters were beaten up), but given the violent and potentially dangerous situation, reporting conditions in Urumqi were far less difficult or complicated than most had expected. I personally did not go to Urumqi but was told by several colleagues who did that they moved about with relative ease, and that a government-established press center with a dedicated Internet line was quite helpful in their work. The region’s Internet was shut down, so journalists were scrambling to file stories and communicate.

A few months after the riots, Chinese officials acknowledged that they had made a deliberate, top-level decision to open the Xinjiang capital to foreign journalists, saying that they believed it was in China’s best interest to let open reporting prevail and allow the facts to come out. In many cases, the facts did emerge from Urumqi. Foreign journalists were able to talk with both Han Chinese and Uighurs who were involved in the riots, and detailed accounts emerged from Urumqi.

But the entirety of Xinjiang was far from transparent. Kashgar, the political and cultural heart of Xinjiang, was largely shut off to foreign journalists and remains so to this day. Reporters have been turned away at the airport upon landing in Kashgar, followed and warned by police and ordered to leave the city. In my own case, I travelled to Kashgar at the end of last year and managed to escape police notice for nearly a week. That ended on my last night in town, however, when I had to check into a hotel on my own passport, which contains a journalist visa. The manager did what is required in all of China and notified police that a foreign journalist had checked into his hotel. Within 30 minutes, five officers were knocking on my door, demanding to know why I was in Kashgar and when I would be leaving. One officer took my passport and checked me in for the first departing flight back to Urumqi.

And even though was able to stay in Kashgar for several days before being noticed, reporting was extremely difficult because locals did not want to be interviewed. I was told there were clear directives that residents should not be speaking with foreign journalists and that all local tour guides had been issued guidelines to report journalists to the local police. This has been borne out by the experience of other journalists who have tried to work in Kashgar over the past year. It’s a marked turnabout from conditions before the riots, when Kashgar was relatively open to reporters and locals talks with journalists without extreme fear of reprisals. That’s no longer the case.

As a result, the flow of information from Kashgar and other parts of Xinjiang has been barely a trickle. This should perhaps not be a surprise. After all, the root of the riots likely started in Kashgar, though we still don’t know exactly what or how things transpired.

The initial spark for the riots was ignited at a toy factory in Guangdong Province in late June, when what has been described as either a fight or an attack left at least two Uighurs dead at the hands of Han Chinese coworkers. After several days and no arrests in the Shaoquan toy factory murders, it seems that Uighurs began organizing protests which later escalated into the July 5 riots in Urumqi.

As I mentioned earlier, I didn’t go to Urumqi during the riots or their immediate aftermath. Instead, I travelled to Shaoquan to try to find out what had happened
at the toy factory. What I found was that hundreds of Uighur workers (most from Shufu, a suburb of Kashgar) who many say had been pressured to move to Guangzhou under the government’s outward migration push, were sequestered off from the rest of the factory, the bosses said for their own safety. Residents, businesses owners and factory workers around the giant toy factory had been told not to speak to journalists, but many did. Still, despite the chatter, what emerged was a picture as clear as mud. There was a clear atmosphere of ethnic tension between Uighurs and Han Chinese in the factory town in the aftermath of the murders, but it was far less clear what tensions led to the incident. Wide disagreement remains to this day over what sparked the brawl and how many people were killed.

Uighurs I spoke with in a nearby factory town said they were forced through economic pressures to leave Kashgar and work in Guangdong. They said their friends in Shaoguan were under tight controls and directed not to speak of the incident. They had very real concerns for their safety and that of their families.

To this day, essential facts remain unknown about what happened last summer, and what caused Urumqi to devolve into China’s deadliest ethnic riots in decades. What led to the riots, how they were organized, and what happened to those involved are all questions that have not been satisfactorily answered. China has earned credit for allowing free flow of information during the Xinjiang riots, but the flow was not free enough to answer imperative questions.

In a recent survey of our correspondent members, the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China found that most journalists who responded believe government restrictions make it impossible to do balanced and accurate reporting on Xinjiang. Travel restrictions and intensive pressure on sources are major barriers. Even though Xinjiang is ostensibly open to foreign journalists, correspondents liken it to Tibet—the only part of China where journalists are still required to get prior government permission to visit. Correspondents reported being harassed and monitored while working in Xinjiang in recent years, particularly in Kashgar and other non-Urumqi locations during and after the riots. The pressure seems to have ramped up even higher around the one-year anniversary of the riots earlier this month.

Reported one correspondent who travelled to Xinjiang last year: “We were followed and forced to leave Kashgar by the police. Some people were too scared to talk to us.”

Too often in Xinjiang, this seems to be the case. Sources face very real repercussions for speaking to journalists, which has become an effective tool for containing information. Without the ability to investigate the facts or talk to people who live there, we may never know the real story of the Xinjiang riots and so many other things about life and politics there.

Thanks very much for your attention and I look forward to the discussion.

STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN AND COCHAIRMAN: XINJIANG—ONE YEAR AFTER DEMONSTRATIONS AND RIOTING

JULY 9, 2010

We are deeply concerned by human rights conditions in Xinjiang, one year after demonstrations and rioting in the region. Events that started on July 5, 2009 resulted in injury and death to Han and Uyghur citizens alike. Repressive policies in the region have continued, and, in some cases, have intensified.

In the aftermath of last year’s violence, the government tightly restricted the free flow of information, and curbed Internet access for 10 months. Authorities intensified security campaigns and conducted large scale sweeps and raids. Security forces detained some Uyghurs, primarily men and boys, whose whereabouts still remain unknown. We are alarmed by reports that trials have been marred by violations of Chinese law and international standards for due process.

We are concerned by reported curbs on independent legal defense and a general lack of transparency in trials. Conditions in the region today remain tense. The Internet is back up, but a number of Uyghur Web sites remain shuttered. And throughout the last year, the government issued regulations to restrict free speech. As we noted immediately after last year’s tragic events, we urge the Chinese government, when addressing events in Xinjiang, to abide by its domestic and international commitments to protect citizen’s fundamental rights and to promote the rule of law, and we urge the Chinese government to address the longstanding grievances of the Uyghur people, especially those related to official suppression of Uyghurs’ independent expressions of ethnic, cultural, and religious identity.