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THE 2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

HEARING
BEFORE THE
FULL COMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

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THE 2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The Chairman. Good morning. Let me welcome you to the House Armed Services Committee hearing on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Before we start, and before I begin my opening statement, I just learned that we are to have five votes rather soon, and I hope the witnesses will understand while we are gone, we shall return because this is a very, very important hearing and we really want to know what you have to say.

So we will plow right on. Hopefully, I can make an opening statement, Mr. McKeon can make his opening statement and see how far along we go from there. Witnesses: Honorable Michèle Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Vice Admiral Stephen Stanley, Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, that is the J8, The Joint Staff; the Honorable Christine Fox, Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation for the Department.

And we want to welcome our witnesses. And let me say this is also, in essence, a continuation of the hearing we held yesterday with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The release of the report of the Quadrennial Defense Review is always a noteworthy event in defense circles and particularly so here on our committee.

In my view, the remarkable thing about the President’s budget we received yesterday on the QDR is the deep commitment they reflect on the part of this Administration to preserving the national security of our country. At a time of tremendous economic difficulty, unprecedented deficits, spending freezes in the other parts of the budget the QDR demonstrates a clear need for, and the Department’s budget reflects, real growth in defense spending this year and into the foreseeable future. Now, while we will have our disagreements about some of the details I strongly support the Administration’s decision to request these increases. Congress has a constitutional responsibility to provide oversight of and funds for the Nation’s Armed Forces. The congressional mandate of QDR directs the Secretary to conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization
plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy in the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years. Thus, the QDR outlines the Secretary of Defense’s thinking on that wide range of topics and provides a sort of blueprint on how he sees the Department moving forward to meet future security challenges.

It is important for Congress to understand what the Secretary sees as our top national priorities, why, and the measures required to deal with them. Then we can make sure the required resources are available. But as Congress develops the policy positions and makes funding decisions it is quite natural that the legislative branch’s determination of national security priorities may differ from those set forth by the executive branch. The framers of the Constitution designed it that way. And if we are going to make different choices, both in terms of policy and in terms of funding, it is incumbent upon us to understand the implications of the available options.

The QDR, this hearing, is important as anything in that part of the process, although the primary consumer of the report of the QDR is Congress, that is why the reporting elements are in the law. I understand it has to be written for a wide variety of audiences: the interagency, the international community, the defense industry, academia, just to name a few, and therefore it is not surprising that it fully pleases none of them, never has, never will. Having said all of that overall I find the 2010 QDR to be a solid product and superior to the last several iterations that we have had, and I compliment those who worked on it. And I commend you for your hard work on focusing and linking strategy to resources which clearly lays out four priority objectives of the defense strategy and six key mission areas that require enhancement if that strategy is to succeed.

That is clear strategic direction for our Nation’s military to not only win today’s conflicts but to be prepared for tomorrow’s threats as well. The QDR recognizes that we must continue to be ready to counter more than one threat at a time but acknowledges that there are a variety of scenarios beyond major regional contingencies that our military is likely to face. That is a good step because the potential threats are complex. Still, the way the QDR seems to treat the force-sizing construct is to advocate for a force that is capable of being all things to all contingencies. It is tough to determine what the priority is, what the most likely risk we face may be, and what may be the most dangerous. It seems that the QDR makes no significant changes to major pieces of our current force. This makes our task that much more difficult, because although the QDR should not be budget-constrained, the plain fact is that resources are not unlimited. Ultimately, Congress will need to make prudent tradeoffs to meet fiscal realities while buying down strategic risk. To do so, we need to know where our current and projected force structure is inadequate. The QDR should help us understand the consequences of those tradeoffs. And my first reading indicates that perhaps it comes up a bit short there.

I am pleased to see that for the first time, this QDR elevates the health of the force to a strategic priority. It rightly emphasizes the
need to address the strains placed on our men and women in uniform as well as their families. It pays continued attention to military compensation, health care, warrior care, as well as family support services. But I am concerned that beyond casual mention of a need of greater culture and language training, it does not pay enough attention to the operational needs of our muddy boot warriors.

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made it clear that the superiority of individuals and small units engaged in close combat is essential if the United States is going to win these sort of wars. These are most effective weapons. However, when the QDR goes on at length about the need to develop high and technological capabilities, there is no comparable discussion about the need to develop a small arms and other individual equipment to preserve the superiority let alone the development of innovative means to ensure that these small units are fully trained. You know, that is a shame because that is really the best way to take care of our people.

Now, let me turn the microphone over to my friend, the ranking member from California, Buck McKeon.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" McKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I ask that my full statement be submitted for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. McKeon. Thank you. And I join you in welcoming our witnesses here today. I thank you for being here this morning. We look forward to hearing your testimony. For some time now Secretary Gates has been pushing for balance in the Defense Department in an effort to focus the program on prevailing in the conflicts of today. In the Secretary's introduction to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, he writes that his efforts to rebalance the Department in 2010 continued in the 2011 budget and were institutionalized in this QDR in the out-year budget plan. For some time now, Secretary Gates has been pushing for balance in the Defense Department in an effort to focus the Pentagon on prevailing in the conflicts of today.

While we commend the Department for its laser focus on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe efforts to make balance a fixture in the QDR and the out-year budget is shortsighted and puts the Department on the wrong path for the next 20 years. Choosing to win in Iraq and Afghanistan should not mean our country must also choose to assume additional risk in the conventional national defense challenges of today and tomorrow. Last April we received a glimpse of the cost of balance when the Secretary announced over $50.0 billion in cuts to defense programs.

This year the impact is more subtle but I fear more severe. As I told the Secretary yesterday, in my view, the QDR understates the requirements to deter and defeat challenges from state actors, and it overestimates the capabilities of the force the Department would build. This QDR does an excellent job of delineating the
threat posed by those with anti-access capabilities, notably China, but does little to address the risk resulting from the gaps in funding, capability, and force structure.

As a result we find an out-year defense plan and QDR that basically reinforced the status quo despite serious threats to our current capability. Thus, this QDR provides a force structure that is built for the years we are in today when the purpose of the review is exactly the opposite: to prepare for the likely conflicts of tomorrow. One must ask what is new here. If this is really a vision for the defense program for the next 20 years as the statute requires then why does the QDR lay out a force structure for the next five years not to mention one that looks a lot like today’s force. The QDR is supposed to shape the Department for 2029, not describe the Pentagon in 2009. My concerns revolve primarily around one of the QDR’s key mission areas: deter and defeat aggregation in anti-access environments.

In my view this is the mission area which should have driven the growth and size and capability of our air and naval forces, yet we cannot evaluate whether the QDR has the right force structure for this critical mission area because it offers no clear force-planning construct and abandons the two war strategy. Oddly, the QDR seems to suggest that while this threat grows we can make do with less than we previously thought. For example, the last stated Air Force requirement for fighters was 2,200, but the QDR now reflects a need for approximately 1,500 combat-coded fighters with no mention of aircraft required for training and test activities.

Likewise, the budget does not appear to take any steps to mitigate the similar fighter shortfall in the Army and Marine Corps. Another example of inadequate force structure is in the area of missile defense where there is no indication that the Navy has increased the requirement or funding for large surface combatants to support its increasing role in the ballistic missile defense [BMD] mission. This requirement was established in 2006, at which time there was no BMD mission for these vessels.

Our fighter and ship shortfall are the most obvious examples where this budget and QDR fail to reflect the strategy that looks beyond today’s conflicts and considers the very real emerging threats of tomorrow. I have more questions and concerns regarding the QDR that I will address during the Q&A [question and answer] session. Once again, thank you for being here today, I look forward to your testimony. I yield back Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you Mr. McKeon. Madam Secretary, is it my understanding that each of the witnesses are to testify or just you?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, we have submitted a joint statement for the record, but we would each like to make an opening statement if that is in line with your thinking, but it is your call, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But would it be an opening statement by one or three?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Of three, if that is—.

The CHAIRMAN. You bet. We will start with you however. You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary FLOURNOY. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Representative McKeon and members of the committee. It is a pleasure to appear again before you today to speak about the Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Our efforts in this QDR really have revolved around the imperative to reaffirm our commitment to the health of America’s all-volunteer force, to rebalance our programs and capabilities to fight both the wars that we are in today and also prepare for future contingencies and to reform how and what we buy. With the QDR report released and our written statement submitted for the record, I would just like to spend a few minutes to highlight some of the key points.

First, this QDR advances a strategic framework for the Department that focuses on priority objectives that are critical for the Nation. First, prevail in today’s wars, places like Afghanistan, Iraq, the broader war against Al Qaeda, prevent and deter conflicts, prepare to defeat adversaries and prevail in a wide range of future contingencies, and preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force. These four priority objectives are both timely and enduring. They capture the essence of what the Department must do to protect and advance American interests, and they constitute the key priorities that drive how we think about the overall size and shape of America’s Armed Forces.

Second, QDR analysis strongly supports our conclusion that the United States requires a portfolio of military capabilities that provide maximum versatility across the broadest possible and plausible spectrum of conflict. The changes directed under the QDR enhance the agility of the force, particularly through an increased emphasis on key enabling capabilities. By enabling capabilities, I mean the kind of support forces that seldom get the attention they deserve but have been in quite short supply for today’s wars and will remain critical for the future. Examples include things like helicopters, UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], platforms for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR], electronic warfare capabilities, communications networks, and enhanced cyberspace defenses.

Third, this QDR provides the Department with an approach to force planning that is appropriate for the world we face, not the world we would prefer to face. Today our forces are simultaneously operating in Afghanistan, Iraq, Haiti, and elsewhere around the world. We need to ensure that our policy and our planning paradigms ensure agility rather than reinforce rigidity. As we have seen all too often, the wars we fight often bear little resemblance to the canonical conventional contingencies that had tended to dominate our defense planning. We have come to learn at great cost that America’s current and future adversaries will not conform to conventional ways of war, but will more likely use a mix of often asymmetric approaches and try to bypass our strength.

The defense strategy articulated in this QDR reflects the reality that U.S. forces must be capable of conducting multiple, simultaneous, often long-duration operations across a wide range of challenges. This includes prevailing in two large-scale conflicts against
regional aggressors, but it also takes into account other scenarios, such as conducting large-scale stability operations, defeating highly capable adversaries employing cyber and space capabilities, extending support to civil authorities in response to a catastrophic event in the United States, among others. This range of plausible challenges is why the Secretary has focused on the need for a broad portfolio of capabilities that are versatile across the range of conflict.

Fourth, our people. Our people are the most precious of our military resources. While I am constantly impressed by their professionalism, their morale, their effectiveness in the field, there are indications that worry us after these long years of wars, from post-traumatic stress [PTSD] to increased rates of divorce and suicide. For too long, the health of the all-volunteer force has been under-emphasized in our defense planning. This QDR has elevated the need to preserve and enhance the force as a core component of our policy, our planning, and our force management.

The QDR, in the fiscal year 2011 budget, proposed a series of new programs and investments to shore up the health of the all-volunteer force and the families who are making significant sacrifices on their behalf.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, it is clear to us, and I know it is clear to all of you as members of this committee, that the Department of Defense [DOD] needs to further reform how it does business. This QDR explores several critical institutional issues that the Secretary has identified as priorities: reforming security assistance to build partnership capacity; institutionalizing our rapid acquisition capability; strengthening our industrial base; reforming U.S. export control systems; and crafting more strategic approach to climate and energy issues.

These issues are critical to how the Department prepares and executes national strategy. For eight years we have asked our men and women in the front lines to innovate and adapt under fire, and they have done so. The QDR argues the Department of Defense as a whole must do the same.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe that the congressional requirement to the Department to submit a QDR actually helps us and the Nation successfully adapt to a post-Cold War world. And though we will continue to refine how best to rebalance our Armed Forces and reform our Department for complex challenges both today and tomorrow, I believe the QDR has been an important institutional mechanism to facilitate much-needed change. But as you know, there is no such thing as a risk-free defense strategy.

I know I speak on behalf of the Secretary and the Department when I ask for your continued leadership and the leadership of this committee to help ensure that we prevail in today’s wars while also preparing for the next generation of challenges and enable us to protect and advance America’s interest in a complex world. Thank you very much.

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy, Admiral Stanley, and Ms. Fox can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. We have nine minutes yet on this vote. One 15-, four 5-minute votes, and probably another 15-minute vote, so our witnesses are going do have to bear with us.
So let's move ahead, and then we will get to Ms. Fox. Go ahead, and then we will break. Admiral.

**STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. P. STEPHEN STANLEY, USN, DIRECTOR FOR FORCE STRUCTURE, RESOURCES, AND ASSESSMENT, J8, THE JOINT STAFF**

Admiral Stanley, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this committee, thank you very much for your time and the opportunity to amplify the testimony of Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. But more than that, I would like to thank you for the strong support your committee provides to our men and women in uniform. Your recent approval of our reprogramming request to support operations in Haiti is just one of countless examples of the support that you give our men and women in uniform every day, and I just want to thank you for them.

Now, back to the QDR. I believe the 2010 QDR sets the Department on a new path, a path that requires significant effort, effort that is ongoing but not yet complete. The QDR focuses not just on winning today's fight, but also in the complex and uncertain future security landscape and potential conflicts the United States and our partners are most likely to face in the future. The QDR directly addresses Chairman Mullen's top three priorities. First, winning today's fight. Second, balancing global strategic risk. And third, preserving and enhancing the health of the force. Now, let me amplify on the specific priorities.

First, the QDR appropriately supports our mission to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda globally and particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Through investment and critical enablers such as rotary wing, ISR, and special operation forces that have experienced persistent shortfalls over the years, winning the fight requires changing our capability mix and we are doing it.

Second, the second priority, balancing global risk in today's complex security environment, requires a ready and agile force with sufficient capacity and capability across the range of military operations (ROMO). The QDR recognizes the importance of developing capabilities to address future antiaccess and anti—and area-denial threats. Additionally, the QDR focuses on regional forward-based and rotational engagement with partners to set conditions that not only preclude conflict but establish the security environments that undercut extremism. Although we retain the capability and capacity to act decisively when appropriate we prefer to partner and work with others in major operations. Our forward-stationed and rotational joint forces will ensure the ability to both sustain forward engagement and rapidly project forces and power globally to defeat future adversaries or as in Haiti rapidly respond to international crisis.

His third priority, preserving and maintaining the health of the force, begins with taking care of our people. Our men and women in the Armed Forces are America's greatest strategic asset. The QDR advocates important initiatives to enhance warrior and survivor care, reinforcing the urgency to improve research and treatment for a broad range of injuries, especially traumatic brain injury and post-traumatic stress. Additionally, the QDR prioritizes
reducing stress on the force through family support initiatives and an appropriate focus on properly resetting the force.

Overall, I believe the QDR provides an accurate depiction of the future national security requirement. Our challenge as a Nation will be properly to resource it. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Stanley, Secretary Flournoy, and Ms. Fox can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

The CHAIRMAN. I think because of the time, Ms. Fox, we will postpone your testimony until when we come back. But we do have these several votes so please bear with us and when we resume we will ask you for your statement, then we will go into the questions for the members. So we will stand in recess until we return, hopefully very soon.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will resume.

Ms. Fox, you are on.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINE H. FOX, DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ms. Fox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Skelton, Congressman McKeon, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today.

As you heard a few minutes ago, the QDR concluded that we must balance resources and risk across four major objectives. Today I will briefly tell you how our defense program supports these priority objectives.

The first is to prevail. To achieve our objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan, our military leaders need help to address persistent shortfalls. We are expanding our Special Operations force by increasing the capacity of gunships, increasing intelligence capabilities, adding personnel to the Special Operations Command, and adding civil affairs and psychological operations personnel. We are making significant investments in enabling capabilities such as helicopters, unmanned multi-mission aircraft, and EA–18G electronic warfare aircraft.

The QDR points out the critical need for cultural and language training. We have added funding to develop and expand programs, particularly those focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The next objective is to prevent or deter conflict by helping to build the security capacity of our partners while remaining strong ourselves. The program adds funding for the Global Train and Equip Authority. We added $1.5 billion to curb the threat of weapons of mass destruction [WMD] and improve homeland defenses. We directly address the very real threats in the cyberspace domain by funding the rapid creation of Cyber Command.

Prepare: We need to be prepared for a wide range of contingencies, including the modern, high-tech capabilities being developed by other nations. To be prepared for this broad spectrum of potential contingencies, we need flexible, adaptable, highly capable forces.

By now you have heard of our efforts to significantly restructure and stabilize the Joint Strike Fighter [JSF] program. This program
is vital to our ability to keep pace with worldwide technological advancements. CAPE [Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation] played a significant role in the program's restructuring. In accordance with the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act, CAPE led the independent cost analysis that informed the in-depth review of that program. The budget submission fully funds JSF to the CAPE cost estimate.

The budget submission reflects our commitment to modernizing all Army Brigade Combat Teams [BCTs], and it supports development of a new ground combat vehicle. It invests in shipbuilding, procuring 10 ships in fiscal year 2011. Our shipbuilding program is described in detail in the 30-year Shipbuilding Plan.

We added resources to expand the long-range global strike portfolio, including a potential future bomber, and we robustly funded a dependable missile defense system that moves toward a regional defense strategy.

And preserve: Our fourth major objective is to preserve and enhance our all-volunteer force. We have made significant improvements to our health care system and benefits. Within five years we will have secure data exchange and Web access for DOD, Veterans Affairs, and third-party health care providers. And we added funding for a variety of family support programs, including a significant effort to modernize our DOD schools.

Of course another objective of the Department is reform. Earlier I mentioned the JSF program restructuring and the role of CAPE in accordance with the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act. CAPE's analysis informed other significant decisions reflected in this budget submission such as the decision to shut down C-17 production.

I believe that this program, a program that I have only briefly sketched for you, fully supports the goals of the Quadrennial Defense Review. It is focused on the needs of the warfighter today and tomorrow. It is a program built on realism informed by independent analyses.

Again, I thank the committee for this opportunity to speak with you today and for your continued support.

[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Fox, Secretary Flournoy, and Admiral Stanley can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

It appears to me that Admiral Stanley and Ms. Fox are making their maiden voyage here before our committee. We welcome you and hope we will welcome you back many times.

Doesn't it seem to be a stretch, Madam Secretary, for our military to be designated to do all things, whether it be a major force on force in the one end and a guerrilla insurgency fighting on the other?

Secretary Flournoy. Mr. Skelton, the force-sizing and shaping construct we developed in the QDR is a reflection of the complex security environment that we face even now with Iraq, Afghanistan, a war against Al Qaeda in many countries, the relief operation in Haiti, and it is also a reflection of what we anticipate that security environment will look like in the future. We have not abandoned the two MTW or two major theater war construct. We have gone beyond it.
So we certainly looked at and tested the force against the classic two major theater wars because we think that is still an important standard, but we didn’t think it was sufficient. So we looked at other cases; for example, being able to conduct a large stability operation, conduct a major theater war, and provide adequate support to the homeland at the same time. We looked at another case that involved a major stability operation, a medium-sized counterinsurgency operation, long-duration deterrence in another theater, and extended homeland support.

So the point is we need to test the force to make sure that we have explored the full range of possibilities in the future, and we draw greater insight as to the different kinds of stresses on the force that we may experience. That has positioned us to better invest in the capabilities, the capacity, and the versatility that we will need for the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Don’t you think you need a much larger Army and a much larger Marine Corps to do all that you envision? Combat skills are perishable, I am told. And to train someone up to do—to be a first-class fighter in a guerrilla-type warfare and then to transfer that person, that squad, that platoon, that company into a major force-on-force where tanks and artillery are used extensively, wouldn’t you have an awful hard time transitioning that soldier or Marine, that ground fighter?

Admiral STANLEY. Mr. Chairman, the way I would respond is the joint force needs to have these capabilities. Each portion of the force does not require them. Obviously we emphasize certain capabilities in different portions of force. We don’t expect our ground forces to be able to operate ships at sea as an example. Our Special Operations forces are very well-skilled.

One of the challenges we face is learning from the lessons that we have gained during the current conflict, which makes us really the best counterinsurgency force in the world. How do we then incorporate those into our doctrine so that we maintain those skills and at the same time not move our capabilities away from the ability to deal with one or two regional aggressors?

The CHAIRMAN. What are they teaching in the war colleges?

Admiral STANLEY. Sir, it is a combination. We are starting to get these lessons into the war colleges. Specifically I can’t address it, but I would recommend that each one of the services discuss that. There are initiatives to make this part of our educational curriculum.

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, could I add a point if I may? One of the reasons we put such emphasis on eventually getting to a more sustainable dwell time, deployment-to-dwell-time ratio, is not only to reduce stress on members of the service and their families but to increase the time at home for a broader range of training, to be able to reacquire some of the more perishable skill sets that may be lost, you know, in time deployed on a particular operation. So that is one of the driving factors towards getting to a more sustainable rotation.

The CHAIRMAN. Has there been a study or an analysis of the size of the Army or Marines to fully contemplate doing what we are doing today plus a major force-on-force conflict?
Admiral Stanley. You are touching on what I consider one of the significant shifts in this QDR, and Secretary Flournoy has already addressed it, but the idea of we didn’t just pick a timeframe just beyond the Future Years Defense Plan [FYDP], line up two major aggressors or pick a couple of scenarios and plan for the capabilities required for those scenarios. We now recognize that what we need to do in this uncertain future is to plan in a temporal aspect. So we plan for today and tomorrow across this whole spectrum of capabilities.

The Chairman. That doesn’t really answer the question I put to you.

Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. This does concern me a great deal. I cited yesterday when the Secretary and Admiral Mullen were testifying the 12 military contingencies we had since 1977 in this country, none of which were anticipated, none of them, and over the next 30-plus years, I hope we don’t have any. But as sure as God made little green apples, there will be some out there that we don’t anticipate, and that is why I am concerned about the size, the education, the training, and the readiness to do all these things.

Admiral.

Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir. I think your concern is well founded, and I won’t tell you that there is no risk there.

The Chairman. I don’t want to be in a position ten years from now to say, hey, Admiral Stanley, I told you so.

Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir. The specific answer to your question is yes, we have done a study. The scenario cases that we picked—and again there are three scenario cases that we tested the force against; so instead of just building for a capability level, we tested the force against three different visions of the future. That emphasizes the flexibility of the force that we require. The size of the ground forces was part of that, and the size of the force tested satisfactorily against those three different scenario cases.

The Chairman. Ms. Fox, your testimony is to the effect that we are looking to the future. However, I do notice a substantial cut in research and development [R&D]. I think the figure you gave us is about a ten percent cut in research and development. Is that not the seed corn for future conflicts?

Ms. Fox. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have the exact cut numbers with me today, so I can’t comment on the number. But I can tell you that R&D absolutely follows procurement. So at times when we are investing a lot in R&D, we are looking at new systems and sometimes then it goes down as we start to transition to procurement. When you look out I think that you will see that R&D is a major part. For example, in the aviation plan that we submitted, there is a significant investment in R&D.

Admiral Stanley. Mr. Chairman, could I just comment on that? Your seed corn comment deals with, in my mind, science and technology. And actually this budget request increases the investment we are making in science and technology, which is a subset of R&D. The actual R&D reductions that you are talking about is principally one program, Joint Strike Fighter. Even though Joint Strike Fighter got additional investment in R&D over what was planned, there was a program reduction associated with the
planned program. So there is both an increase to our Joint Strike Fighter and a reduction.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. McKeon.

Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In following up on what the chairman was addressing, would one of those scenarios, one of those three scenarios maybe include having the present forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and maybe having a major incursion or blowup in Korea? How would we handle that?

Secretary FLOURNOY. We did look at that kind of scenario. And while I don't want to get into classified details in this setting, what I can say to you is that in many of those cases we found that a lot of the U.S. contribution would be heavy air and naval intensive, and there was certainly adequate flex in our forces to provide that assistance to allies on the ground who were engaged.

Mr. McKeon. Okay. Are we——

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt?

Secretary FLOURNOY. We would be happy to come brief you in a classified setting on the detailed scenario analysis that underscores——

The CHAIRMAN. If you will yield for just a moment——

Mr. McKeon. You bet.

The CHAIRMAN. It sounds like you are not going to put boots on the ground but rely on the Navy and Air Force in such situations. Is that the case?

Admiral STANLEY. Again we did three cases. Each case had different combinations of scenarios in it. So it is not three scenarios. It is three separate scenario cases that include multiple scenarios. Was Korea a part of it? Yes. OK, do we put boots on the ground in Korea? Yes. The forces that——

Mr. McKeon. More than we have there right now?

Admiral STANLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. McKeon. Where would they come from?

Admiral STANLEY. It is from——so the question is when is the operation actually conducted? We plan on the reduction of Iraq forces——

Mr. McKeon. Well, I guess the question I have, Mr. Chairman, is say this happened tomorrow.

Admiral STANLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. McKeon. We still have the forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Are we going to start loading them on planes and——? I mean if this happened, and again I understand not wanting to talk in details here, but the overall concept I think that the chairman first addressed is we have been concerned about moving—giving the troops adequate time at home and we are not to that point yet. So it means we are already stretched pretty thin. And then to say we could have two scenarios at the same time going on and we would be able to match, I just think—I would like to see that in a closed session——

Admiral STANLEY. I want to be clear. In the near term the demand on the force is such that there is significant stress so——

Mr. McKeon. And significant risk.

Admiral STANLEY. Yes, sir. Another operation in the near-term the size of a Korea would require the Nation to mobilize, okay? It
would take away our ability to rotate the forces, even as little as we are now, one to one. Would we still prevail? Yes. Would there be increased losses? Yes.

Mr. McKeon. Okay. If we could follow that up in a classified, I would really like to do that.

Let me get to another point. The QDR highlights three areas of operational risk: One, enabling capabilities; two, the building of partnership capacity; and three, securing DOD systems in cyberspace.

Are there any other areas of operational risk?

Secretary Flournoy. Those are the primary areas that we identified, sir. And what we are referring to there is that if we fail to make the recommended investments in these areas we would be as a result accepting higher levels of risk. There are other kinds of risk that the QDR talks about, institutional force management and future challenges, but those were the primary three operational risks we identified.

Mr. McKeon. Do our forward-deployed forces face operational risk in anti-access environments, in the air and the sea?

Secretary Flournoy. We believe there are significant challenges in the anti-access domain. And part of what we did, we had a group within the QDR that focused on that, and we have recommended a number of targeted investments that you will find in the budget towards bolstering U.S. capabilities to deal in that environment. We are investing in long-range strike capabilities, developing a joint air-sea battle concept, developing underwater unmanned vehicles and capabilities, investing in the robustness of C4ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], space, cyberspace, and so forth. And each of those you can find in the budget, and I am sure Ms. Fox could speak to those in more detail if you are interested.

Mr. McKeon. I see that we are cutting back the Air Force; we are not growing the Navy sufficiently, I don't see, to meet these risks. And so I just have some real concerns there in this area.

One other point, Mr. Chairman. The force structure outlined in the QDR through 2015 is very similar to the force structure of the current force. Could you please highlight the most significant changes that would carry us out in the future?

Secretary Flournoy. I think again the force structure details some changes in platform numbers, and so forth, and we are making substantial investments in new platforms, everything from the F–35. We are on a path to eventually invest in a new bomber once our study is complete. New SSBN, new UAVs, underwater warfare capability ships, Army combat vehicles, and so forth. But I would highlight what is even more important than the platforms is the investment in the new technologies and capabilities that are going on those platforms. Aegis is a great example. There is the ship, which is a platform, but what is really making the difference is things like ballistic missile defense system that we are putting on, the radar, the ISR, and so forth. So a lot of this QDR is investing not only in the platforms, but really ensuring that we have the most cutting edge capabilities on those platforms to enhance their capability and enable us to really operate in fundamentally new ways.
Mr. McKeon. So cutting back the number of planes, cutting back the number of ships is offset by putting new technology on the ships and planes that we have?

Secretary Flournoy. That is not exactly what I said. I would like to ask both the Admiral or Dr. Fox to jump in here because they have done most of the force structure analysis.

Admiral Stanley. So the 30-year shipbuilding plan actually provides for growth in the Navy over the size of the Navy we have today.

Mr. McKeon. Thirty-year?

Admiral Stanley. Thirty-year shipbuilding plan, and that actually happens across the FYDP. There is some growth in the size of the Navy.

Mr. McKeon. I think the Secretary said yesterday that he felt pretty good about the very, very near future, and when you get five years out, he said he felt pretty good, and then longer than that is fantasy. I believe that was his quote.

Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir. Clearly who knows what the affordability is going to be out in that timeframe or what our capability requirements will be. It is a projection, and I won’t give it any more credit than that. In the FYDP timeframe, the five-year period that you referred to, there is some growth in the size of the Navy. There is also some reduction in the number of combat coded aircraft in the Air Force, as you have discussed. We are shifting the focus over to the unmanned platforms such as the Predator and Reaper, which give us an attack capability we haven’t had in the past. It is also one that has proven very critical to the ongoing operations. So we think it is a good and prudent investment. So the size of the force, considering that new addition, is slightly smaller but it is not significant.

Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Admiral, when we do we get to the 331-ship Navy?

Admiral Stanley. Three hundred and thirteen is the Navy’s current plan, and it is out far beyond the FYDP, sir.

The Chairman. Say that again?

Admiral Stanley. Three hundred and thirteen I believe is the——

The Chairman. Three hundred and thirteen, yes, sir.

Admiral Stanley [continuing]. Current plan and it is beyond the FYDP.

Ms. Fox. Sir, if I could add, actually in the plan it has achieved about in 2020, so 2020, which is not in the fantasy land of the 30-year plan and it is more in the——

The Chairman. For a lot of us, it is fantasy land.

Ms. Fox. Yes, sir. Well, I understand. But we get to about 300 ships across the FYDP, and we are able to sustain that for a while. It is challenging in the mid-term with the SSBN, but it is in the plan, you will see.

The Chairman. Okay.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you so much for joining us today, and I know it has taken time to prepare for this report today. But my question is that the
QDR states that continued relationships with the European Command are integral to our Nation's security. Additionally, now that AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] has been established as a separate combatant command, partnership with key African nations would be the foundation of our success in Africa.

With this in mind, what manpower and funding is needed in these two areas to ensure that these strategic partnerships would be successful? And the reason I ask that, when you were testifying, you said that one of the things that we need to do is to protect our people. We need to tie that to see what we are doing because one of the weakest points that we have has been in gathering human intelligence. Are we providing enough schools, linguistic schools, and trying to nourish those areas to the point where we would be in a position to be able to get human intelligence? And maybe you can elaborate a little on that today.

Secretary FLOURNOY. Let me just speak to underscore the importance of the topic and then turn to my colleagues to fill in some of the manning and programmatic details. We do believe, the Secretary believes, that building the capacity of partner states in places like Europe and very much in Africa is a critical element of protecting U.S. interests. The more we build partner capacity, the more they can operate alongside us when we have common interests under threat, the more they can deal with their own security environment in their neighborhood. We are investing in the ability of the force, not only Special Operations who have traditionally had these missions, but the capability of the general purpose force to really partake in that partner capacity building, particularly through language and culture training, also through a sort of “train the trainer” concept even within the general purpose forces.

But I would like to offer it to—I don’t know—Christine to address.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

Ms. FOX. Sir, we did take language and culture training very seriously in this program in support of the QDR. We have added significant funding to allow us to, for example, increase the Afghanistan-Pakistan—what is called the Hands Program, which is a language and training program that looks at immersion language training, and it ties careers to that region. We do expect that program to be broadened beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan, as we can. We have also done things like make a plan that by fiscal year 2015 the Special Operations, everything will be out of OCO [overseas contingency operations] and into the base because we see that as an enduring need. These language programs also we see as base kinds of funding issues because of the enduring importance.

Admiral STANLEY. Sir, the other thing I would offer is the size of the Africa command staff is around 1,200. If I remember correctly, we have fully staffed it. It is manned for that. We expect that to continue to evolve as the mission is better defined. And I would also highlight that it is not just the size of Africa Command that is important here, it is the forces that Africa Command has available to execute its mission. So the forces are allocated to Africa Command to execute its mission. And in the near-term, because of the stress on the force that we have today, there won’t be many forces for Africa Command. As we are able to come out of Iraq, con-
duct the responsible drawdown we have talked about, that will free up forces. It will help us execute this vision for Africa.

Mr. Ortiz. So you do feel very comfortable that what you have included in the QDR you are comfortable with it, that it will do the job, protect our people, by getting the intelligence and do what we have to do?

Secretary Flournoy. Yes. This is an area of focus and investment. I think the capability and the capacity is going to improve over time. Obviously, a lot of it lies outside of the Department of Defense and includes the broader intelligence community, but that has very much been a focus.

Mr. Ortiz. My time is up. Thank you so much.

The Chairman. Mr. Thornberry, please.

Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Flournoy, you have followed all of the QDRs since the first one, and you know that often there are at least two criticisms of QDRs. Number one is it is budget driven, not threat driven, not related to strategy; it is more of a justification for what the Administration was planning to do anyway rather than setting a new course. Same criticism you often hear is it is not really a 20-year focus document as the statute requires. And I have read a number of criticisms about this QDR that follows along the same line. I guess my question is, is the statute unrealistic in what it is asking a Department of Defense to do? I mean, can we ever have a four-year strategy document that is based on strategy and threats, not constrained by budgets? Can we ever look out 20 years in a document that has to get the approval all around that gigantic building? Is it unrealistic to expect what the law says?

Secretary Flournoy. I don't think it is unrealistic. But what I would say is that the art of strategy is really matching ends, ways, and means. And so what I like to say is the QDRs, this QDR, is strategy-driven and resource-informed, meaning it is not just a laundry list, a wish list of everything we would like to do if we were totally unconstrained, it is a very clear direction on strategy and guidance, but then it is informed by resources to frame the decisions that we need to make as a country, the tradeoffs that we need to make as a country, given that we don't have unlimited resources for national security. We did—we weren't constrained by that in the sense that we looked at lots of alternatives that would increase top line, that would shift resources, and so forth. And so the tradeoffs of the choices of the QDR were informed by resources but not overly constrained by them.

In terms of the longer-term perspective, our scenarios did look out into the future. 2016 was one snapshot. 2028 was another. And we pulled those insights forward to really focus on refining the plans for the FYDP. That said once you get beyond the FYDP in terms of the actual—you certainly need to get beyond the FYDP for capability investment. Trying to map out 30 years of force structure is extremely difficult given that the world will change, your capability opportunities will change, lots of things will change. So the vision is very clear in the near- to mid-term and it is more aspirational in the long-term.

Mr. Thornberry. I am thinking of the Chairman's questions about the appropriate size of the various services, and it does seem
to me that it makes it more difficult for us to do our job and make those tradeoffs about what we are willing to accept more risk for, less risk for when you already build the budget constraints into the beginning of the QDR.

So you don’t even know what you would like to have to deal with those contingencies, you already make those tradeoffs. And so we are kind of in a position of take it or leave, you know, this thing that you put in front of us. And again, my idea, my conception is a strategy/threat-informed document, and then through the political process in the yearly appropriation authorization bills we may help with the President of course with the Administration, make those tradeoffs.

Secretary FLOURNOY. If I could, again, I don’t think we built in the constraints in the front end. And I think once we have a chance to brief you on the analysis, what we did is we, when we translated the strategy into program and budget we made some choices and tradeoffs. But one of the things briefing you on the analysis will do is make that transparent to you, and you all can decide whether you agree with the tradeoffs that we made or whether you would make them differently. We hope we will make a compelling enough case to convince you that we made them the right way.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me ask related to that, there has been a fair amount of talk about the internal red team by General Madison and Andy Marshall. Did they produce documents or product? And if so, can we see those?

Secretary FLOURNOY. They did produce a couple of memos to the Secretary that were very much discussed and used in the process. I will have to check on availability in terms of whether they are treated as predecisional documents or not. But let me get the question to that and come back to you, sir. We would certainly like to share as much as we possibly can.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I think that would be helpful. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Taylor, the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of you for being here. Admiral, I am going to direct my remarks at you, to you. People often ask me what is the downside of term limits and I answer, well, it takes a while to figure out when someone is spitting in your ear and telling you it is raining, particularly if they got a lot of gold on their sleeve. And for quite a few years, I think that people sitting in that chair have been spitting in my ear telling me it is raining when it comes to getting a 313-ship Navy, including this year. This year’s budget request, I think we are in about 286 ships, about.

Since Vern Clark, he was saying we needed at least 320. And Admiral Mullen said a very minimum of 313, the number you quoted. And now you are saying we are not going to fix this for possibly two presidencies. You asked for nine ships to be put in this year’s budget be constructed. We are going to commission nine ships. But you have also asked to decommission nine ships. The net result of that is zero for this year. It is not getting any better.

And so there are several ways to address that. Number one, if those frigates are good enough to give to another nation, why aren’t they good enough to keep in the fleet for a few more years. Particu-
larly for a mission like piracy off of Somalia or keeping the small boats away from our ships as they transit off of Iran, I would think they would be ideally suited.

So why does it make sense to take a ship that is good enough to give to an ally and retire it today if we need bodies out in the sea? The second thing, you know, if a petty officer third-class can figure out that we have a vulnerability in the Pacific to having our eight oilers sunk in a first-move strike. If the oilers don’t sail, then the destroyers and the cruisers don’t sail, because they have to refuel every three to five days. If the destroyers and the cruisers don’t sail, then the carrier can’t sail alone. Where are you addressing that in the QDR? That is a vulnerability that I guarantee Admiral Wu is aware of, a petty officer third-class is aware of, so why aren’t we addressing it. That is a conventional threat again that you don’t mention whatsoever, and it needs to be addressed. And I very much agree with Secretary Mabus’s desire to minimize the dependence on foreign oil. But he does so by just using biofuels. You have still got that threat; you have still got to deliver that biofuel. And I think the Seapower Subcommittee, whether it is Chairman Bartlett or myself, has made it abundantly clear that whenever possible, we want to minimize that threat by putting nuclear power on those ships. I don’t see any effort on the part of the Navy to do that.

So the third thing is I just had a quick conversation with our chairman and I just want to put a shot across your bow. Expect language from this committee that says for every surface combatant you want to retire, you had best have two new ones in the budget because if you won’t do what is a logical thing to do on your own, then it is going to take a congressional mandate to do it. So I would like to hear you respond on that please.

Admiral STANLEY. Sir, the first issue really is a broad issue obviously. And first off, I am going to encourage you to address this with the Navy. They will be able to give you a much more definitive answer. You specifically talked about the retirement of the FFGs, and was that the right thing, given that we are below a 313-ship Navy. What I would say is that the FFGs don’t have the capability that we want in this flexible force that we are looking for. You specifically spoke about their capability being sufficient for specific operations like pirate operations and such. And that is certainly valid. But what we are looking for is a force that is just flexible across a wide range of contingencies that would be more applicable to our vision for the Littoral Combat Ship [LCS]. The size of the force really sets the rotational forward presence posture that we can have. To keep the same number of ships forward with a smaller force requires the same thing that the Army is doing right now, less time in dwell, okay. So there is a risk there. If we are able to have a larger force, afford a larger force, there is less risk, so I don’t argue the point.

As far as how are we going to protect the force, this gets into the Navy’s plan for sea shield. That is some of the capabilities we are trying to add to the platforms that are going to be part of the battle group to help protect, you specifically highlighted oilers. As far as your point on nuclear power, nuclear power is very important to us. It is also very expensive. It is an upfront decision versus a long-
term investment. So additional nuclear power is good, it is a very flexible power source for our fleet but it is expensive, sir, and I understand your push from the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. This needs a lot more thought, Admiral, and I think we are going to do it on this side if it is not going to be done on your side. Randy Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Madam Secretary, good to see you. And you mentioned that we did not have unlimited resources and the Chairman mentioned something wisely said that this is about prudent tradeoffs in resources. I am sure all three of you would agree with that. Also you would agree that in part you are here to help us make those prudent tradeoffs in terms of resources. Well, some facts that we have had over the recent hearings are you have just heard from our shipbuilding plan we are probably a $2.0 billion to $4.0 billion shortfall annually.

OMB [Office of Management and Budget] says that currently, based on the track run, we are probably looking at about 270 ships in the Navy. We know the Chinese now have 290 ships. We know we have got a $3.0 billion shortfall on the maintenance needs at our shipyards if we are to maintain our ships. If we can’t maintain them, we can’t get to the goals that we have. We know from testimony we had yesterday we have got an $18.0 billion shortfall on our F-18 strike fighters. But assume that is too high. Let’s take a third of that and just say $6.0 billion.

The other thing we know that China has gone ahead of us now on the number of ships in their Navy. They have increased their military spending again by 14.9 percent, they have got 128 acts of cyber aggression per minute tied to Chinese Internet sites, they have destroyed a PRC [People’s Republic of China] weather satellite, they are developing kinetic and directed energy weapons for ASAT [anti-satellite] purposes, and they account for 93 percent of the global supply of rare elements used in technologies, in particular guidance systems for missiles, and yet the White House National Security Council [NSC] that works with you in developing the QDR downgraded China to a priority two level for intelligence against the protest over intelligence chiefs because of an allocation of resources. Now, the reason I ask you that is because yesterday Admiral Mullen also talked about moving a carrier to Mayport, Florida, and he based it on the strategic dispersal plan. And in the strategic dispersal plan it was based on three things. First of all, the possibility of an accident. Well, for an accident like that to occur we are talking about a one mile by 60-foot high debris pattern. Just isn’t going to happen.

The second thing was natural disasters. And if we could put up on the screen this plan. That is a site and a chart of hurricanes hitting Hampton Roads, which could be a natural disaster. Now if you would put up chart two. That is a site of them hitting Mayport, and it is a huge difference between the two of them, so it is not a natural disaster.

So the third thing is a nuclear attack that could happen. But if that risk there is for a nuclear attack, I am far more concerned about the 1.7 million people living in Hampton Roads than I am with the carrier, and maybe we should be allocating dollars and cents to beefing up our sensors in a preventive attack there.
So my question for you, now, Madam Secretary, allocate for us if we have those limited resources, if I have got that shortfall that I am looking at in shipbuilding, in maintenance needs, in our strike fighters, and I can’t do the intelligence needs that I need for China, and then I am talking about as much as $1.0 billion to Mayport, allocate for me the priority between those items if we have limited dollars or do we just do, as the Chairman, I will tell you he did yesterday, he just punt it. And basically when you punt it, it means it is just raw political power as opposed to an analysis of what we do. How would you allocate those priorities of spending needs in the items that I have just listed for you?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I would come at this by saying, first and foremost, that we have taken into account the military investments of a number of countries, including China. And in the QDR we have put a real emphasis on ensuring that we have the capabilities we will need in the future to operate effectively on the global commons in anti-access environments. And so you will see very clear investments in long range strike capabilities, in subsurface warfare, in resiliency of our basing infrastructure, in space assets, in cyber assets——

Mr. FORBES. My point is that we have shortfalls in these areas. How would you allocate the resources in a priority one, two, three, four, five between the ones that I have just listed to you, which we all agree are shortfalls?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I think the prioritization relative across the capabilities is laid out in great detail in this report.

Mr. FORBES. Madam Secretary, that is why you are here. I am asking you if you can lay it out for me in these priorities that I have given to you, or do we just simply say we are not going to do that, we are going to leave it to raw power and how that happens. What are those priorities between the shortfalls that I have given to you if we can come up with an extra couple of billion dollars?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Again, I wouldn’t do it platform by platform, I would do it by capability to deal with specific risks and challenges, and that is the analysis that we have done. Again, a lot of that gets into very classified arenas. I would like to come back and brief you on exactly those tradeoffs and how we have made them. But it is best done with the scenarios and discussions of specific countries and challenges.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here. Madam Secretary, on page 71 of your report you talk about the interagency process. I am just going to read this paragraph. “Finally, the Department of Defense will continue to advocate for an improved interagency strategic planning process that makes optimal use of all national instruments of statecraft. The complexity of 21st century conflicts demands that the U.S. Government significantly improve interagency comprehensive assessments, analysis, planning, and execution for whole-of-government operations, including systems to monitor and evaluate those operations in order to advance U.S. national interests. One solution is to allocate additional resources across the government and fully implement the na-
tional security professional (NSP) program to improve cross-agency training, education and professional experience opportunities. This will help foster a common approach to strategic and operational planning and implementation, improving prospects for success in future contingencies.” That is a paragraph from your report on page 71. Mr. Thornberry made mention of this, the QDR being a statute requirement for the Department of Defense.

Perhaps this will come from your think tank experience and your experience now after one year on the job. And my only question is, you can have the remainder of my time to talk about it, would we better help our country rather than have a Quadrennial Defense Review to have a Quadrennial National Security Review that required all the agencies of government to put their heads together and present us with a document that got into this balancing of resources and strategy that involved all of the agencies? And you can take the remainder of my time to discuss it.

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, thank you very much. This is a topic near and dear to my heart. I actually think we need both. I think it would be very helpful to have a mandate to do a Quadrennial National Security Review and also a QDR. Absent that requirement I would say this Administration has sort of taken upon itself to conduct the national security strategy review, which is almost complete, the QDR, the QDDR, which is the Diplomacy and Development Review that State is conducting, a QHSR, which is the homeland security review, an intelligence review and a number of other space and nuclear, cyber and so forth.

We have done those in parallel, and we have done those, even though we are not required to do so, in a highly interagency fashion. I think this QDR had much more interagency transparency and participation and input than any of its predecessors. And the value of that is that when it comes time to putting forward departmental budgets we are actually getting a lot more synergy across departments and starting to get a more comprehensive and balanced approach. One of the things you will hear Secretary Gates consistently advocate for is greater investment in our civilian partner agencies, particularly the State Department and USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], to build up their professional cadre, to build up their expeditionary capability so that they can operate more effectively alongside the U.S. military when it is deployed to defend our interest overseas.

Dr. SNYDER. If we were to do a statutory requirement for a Quadrennial National Security Review, it sounds to me like what you all have done is you have got reports from the stovepipes. You say you thought it would be helpful. What would you suggest we put in such a requirement?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, the reporting requirements are in stovepipes, that is true. But what we have tried to do is put together a process that is forced integration. So for example, when you see assumptions about homeland security in the QDR, they will match the planning assumptions that are in the QHSR that comes out of the Department of Homeland Security. But a statutory requirement would sort of formalize what we have been de facto working towards in our process, which is greater integration across agency programs and budgets.
Dr. Snyder. My result was a document that would have more than one paragraph on interagency.

Secretary Flournoy. I think the challenge would be how would Congress receive and deal with that given the cross-jurisdictional nature of a lot of the results that would come out of a review like that.

Dr. Snyder. I am sure the quality of the report would be so good that we would receive it well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Bishop.

Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Secretary, last October, I joined a letter with my colleagues to the Secretary of Defense urging that he take steps to preserve the Minuteman III industrial base with regard to the sustainment of Minuteman III system through the year 2030, which is, as you know, the program of record within the Air Force. You replied on behalf of the Secretary, and I have the letter that was back in November you sent me. And in your reply, you indicated that the Department of Defense would be in consultation with the Departments of State and Energy and undertaking a Nuclear Posture Review and this review would address that issue, which is supposed to come out later on this spring I understand.

I was comforted to know at least the Departments of State and Energy were consulting with Defense on this vital issue. My question is what about NASA [National Aeronautics and Space Administration]. To your knowledge—I asked the Secretary yesterday and he had no knowledge of any consultation. But to your knowledge has the Department of Defense consulted with NASA or vice versa, has NASA consulted with the Department of Defense on the 2011 budget impacts on the defense industrial base with regard to the large-scale solid rocket motor [SRM] production.

Secretary Flournoy. Sir, I believe those consultations have happened in the context of both the development of the national space policy and the space posture review which is going on in parallel with the——

Mr. Bishop. On what level are those discussions held?

Secretary Flournoy. I think at working level so far. The Space Posture Review is a little bit behind the QDR. It is going to be released in June. The Nuclear Posture Review is a little farther ahead. That will come out March 1st.

Mr. Bishop. That is a good thing to hear. But I also have in here the part of the solid rocket motor capabilities report to Congress that was last June. And in that in the executive summary on page 47 it says delays in the NASA Ares program would have a significant negative impact on the large solid rocket motor prime contractors industrial base and on some of the SRM subtier base, specifically material suppliers. So the key phrase was “significant negative impact.”

So the question is this report said a delay in NASA’s Ares program would have a significant negative impact. What would the cancellation of the Ares program have if the Administration’s recommendation goes through as part of the NASA budget. If a delay is a significant negative impact on solid rocket motor industrial base, what is an outright cancellation going to do to the solid rocket industrial base?
Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, I will have to get back to you with an answer on that. I do not have an answer off the top of my head, but I am happy to do that.

Mr. BISHOP. Will the Nuclear Posture Review you mentioned in reply to the letter and you just talked about address the impacts on the industrial base?

Secretary FLOURNOY. I am sorry, could you repeat the question?

Mr. BISHOP. The review that you are talking about having the posture review that you mentioned earlier, will this address NASA's impact on the solid rocket motor industrial base?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes, this issue will be addressed in the NPR, and it will probably be also mentioned in the Space Posture Review.

Mr. BISHOP. I appreciate that very much. That is very important to me. And once again, if a delay is a significant impact, a cancellation has got to be a little bit more than a significant impact.

Secretary FLOURNOY. Yes, sir.

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I yield back Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for the report and for your testimony. It would be very helpful to me, and I think the committee to hear just a sort of one, two, three, four list of ways in which we are changing course from the prior QDR, the prior plan. I imagine you could do that somewhat off the top of your heads. You know, to me, at least since you are so familiar with this you could say to me at least I think the most significant changes are one, two, three. But it would be very helpful to us if you could maybe prepare a spreadsheet that details the ways in which we are changing directions in this new QDR compared to where we were.

The committee has a good sense, you know, year to year, of where we are headed and what the major trends are, and what we need to do in our planning to anticipate the, you know meeting the future needs of defense. And so since we know where we are it would be very helpful if you just sort of told us how this changes things. Madam Secretary.

Secretary FLOURNOY. We are happy to come back to you with a written response. But I will just speak from my perspective. I think there are several things. One is the emphasis that has been placed on institutionalizing lessons-learned from the last eight years of experience and ensuring that we actually invest in the kinds of enabling capabilities that give the force real agility both today and in the future. That emphasis on agility and enablers is really very different. Second, to the extent that we look across the full range of conflict and into the future, the emphasis on asymmetric approaches, the kinds of warfare that are sort of outside of the canonical conventional paradigm but that we think are much more likely to define the future operating environment, the QDR's emphasis on that is different.

The third thing I would cite is elevating the emphasis on taking care of our people, not just—it is something that every QDR says, but to actually make it a strategic imperative and a strategic objective in our strategy and to put program and budget behind that,
I think that is very new. I will invite the Admiral and Dr. Fox to also offer their answers.

Admiral Stanley. I would reemphasize something I said earlier, which is the idea of the recognition in the priority of temporal planning in our capabilities development. What we need for a time period beyond the FYDP is different than what we need today. That is a huge change, and it quite honestly excites me, and I think it is the right thing for our Nation to be pursuing. The second thing I would emphasize is the recognition of the importance of what I would call Phase Zero and Phase One operations, our peacetime operations, rotational presence, partner capacity building, those types of operations. A small investment here can prevent the wartime requirement in the future. So I think that is a huge shift.

Mr. Marshall. If I can quickly interrupt. This is a consistent theme with me trying to encourage as many dollars as possible to be in our defense budget, accomplishing those kinds of objectives, because we just politically cannot defend them when they are in State and elsewhere. Unless they are described as, you know, those kinds of investors are being described as developing our security, furthering our security interest, they are just not fundable in the long-term. Too easy to attack.

Admiral Stanley. Yes, sir. And the last thing that I would emphasize is the idea of the rotational requirement and how important it is for us to be out there not just in the Navy, but across all of the services engaging with our allies and partners in building those security—that is it, sir.

Ms. Fox. Sir, I would only reemphasize the importance of the enablers as emphasized in the QDR and in the program, whether it is unmanned aircraft or ISR, electronic warfare or language and authorities as you were just describing. I think all of those enablers have been identified in the current wars that we are in as being vital and we anticipate that they will be vital in the long-term. The other very important emphasis of the QDR is the need for flexible adaptable forces because the future is so uncertain, as many of you identify.

Mr. Marshall. If I could, in just the last couple of—if in coming back to us with something in writing you could prioritize these. You know, here are the biggest changes to the smallest changes and cover them in some detail, here is where we were, here is what we are changing, and maybe add this is why we think these changes are terribly important. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Coffman.

Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, just a comment. I want to express a concern about the continuation of a policy from the last Administration that seems to rely on nation-building as a principal tool for achieving America’s national security objectives. And Mr. Chairman, I think you raised a point about whether or not counterinsurgency warfare has a detrimental effect on our conventional war fighting capabilities. As someone who fought, was a combat leader in the first Gulf War, but also served in the war in Iraq in 2005 and 2006, I want to tell you it definitely does have an eroding effect on the conventional combat capabilities of our ground forces in their inability to exercise their combined arms capacities, and I think that that is a very significant thing.
I want to ask a question in concern about the United States Marine Corps and the future and that, whether or not the United States Marine Corps is just going to be a second land army or whether or not in your view in this QDR is there a significant emphasis on amphibious warfare, is there enough emphasis or a significant emphasis on forced entry capability, and I wonder if you can address that, as well as what in your mind, I have a concern that there is not enough emphasis on this, what will happen in terms of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle [EFV] and in terms of platforms such as our amphib Navy, and I wonder if you can address that?

Admiral STANLEY. Yes, sir. First off, does the QDR emphasize amphibious warfare, and does this budget support it. I think the answer to that is yes, that there is clear agreement that we will require forced entry capability for the Nation for the future and continues to invest in that. The question really gets at how much is required, and that is much harder.

And you know, we look at the different scenarios and how they stack up to try to determine what the size of that capability needs to be. I can tell you that the professional military advice of the commandant is that the Marine Corps is too heavy. We have to win today's war, he is not trying to say that, but as that completes he wants to restore the mobility and the rapid deployability of the Marine Corps has been just a core ethic. EFV plays into that. The program was delayed a year, as I am sure you are aware. That was viewed as a prudent risk reduction effort, not as a shift away from EFV. So my sense is amphibious warfare is here with us, it will continue to be a supporter, and EFV will be a part of it.

Mr. COFFMAN. As well as forced entry capability?

Admiral STANLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. COFFMAN. Very well. I just want to echo from my first statement that I believe that we can influence the affairs in a given region, a failed nation-state, by using our special operations capability as opposed to using our conventional warfare capability, and I hope that that is something that is seriously looked at. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from Guam, Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for your testimonies today. I want to ask a few questions as the QDR relates to the military buildup on Guam. And I note, that the QDR states that DOD plans to turn Guam into a hub for security activities in the region. I believe that this is a smart strategic move on behalf of DOD. However, I would like to get more details on just exactly what does this mean.

Does the DOD envision security above and beyond what is already currently outlined in the DEIS [Draft Environmental Impact Statement]. I am interested in learning about the sequence of events for the military buildup on Guam given the DOD’s evolution of engagement with the government of Guam—or the government of Japan by giving them flexibility to relook at the international agreement. The community has serious concerns about the EIS, and I think one of the key ways to mitigate these concerns is to extend the buildup timeline so that we can fix major issues in the
EIS and also give Japan time to implement their end of the bargain. Is this something that you would consider, and if not, why not?

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think in the QDR we reaffirmed the plans that are in place for Guam consistent with the realignment agreement that we have reached with the government of Japan. I think that given the change of administrations there, we are very much interested in reaffirmation of their commitment from their side. And as we get that we will be refining the implementation details. I will also say that the QDR has recognized the importance not only of Guam but the western Pacific more broadly. And one of the follow-on studies that is being done is to really look at how do we expand both our training opportunities and our bilateral and multilateral partnerships in that region with Guam as a real hub for that, but looking at other areas as well in terms of increasing our opportunities for training and for partnership.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. I have a couple more questions, so I want to get through with this. Additionally, I note that the QDR states finally the United States seeks to develop additional opportunities for joint and combined training in the Pacific area that respond to the need for readiness. Can you elaborate on this finding in the QDR? What opportunities for training are envisioned for the western Pacific? There is a section 2837 of fiscal year 2010 NDAA that requires a report to Congress on training and readiness requirements. Will this report address specific training needs for the Marines in the western Pacific while following the tenets of the QDR?

Secretary FLOURNOY. We are looking at the training requirements first and foremost for the Marines that we will be putting on Guam but also for the other naval and air forces that are there. And again, this is part of a holistic review of our posture with a particular emphasis on the western Pacific, and we will be reporting back to you on those results in the coming year.

Ms. BORDALLO. Good. And my final question, I would like to further clarify an answer that I got from Secretary Gates yesterday about long-range strike capabilities, specifically the development of the Next Generation Bomber. What is the timeline for conducting and completing this study which is outlined in the 30-year aviation plan?

Secretary FLOURNOY. I would like to defer that to Dr. Fox.

Ms. FoX. Thank you. The study is ongoing now and we expect to have results in time to start to inform our activities for Palm 12. This is going to be part of a family of capabilities that we are going to be looking at and so we will be moving out on that very smartly.

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. All right. Thank you everyone, and I yield back the rest of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And Madam Secretary, and Ms. Fox, I guess my concern and question will be more in your area of expertise. I very much appreciate Admiral Mullen yesterday, and Madam Secretary, you today talking about your concern of family and troops and family and suicides, divorces. I have Camp Lejeune in the district I represent, and we do a tre-
mendous amount of work. I have one young man who served in the Marine Corps that is averaging about almost 10 to 15 new cases every month of families who are in a bad situation from PTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder] to TBI [Traumatic Brain Injury]. I hope as we go through this process of reviewing the QDR, and I would like you and Ms. Fox to tell me, are we really prepared for what is coming.

I had the opportunity, as any member would, you yourself, to read the book, The $3 Trillion War by Joe Stiglitz realizing that after they leave the military, they go into a veteran health care system. That is not what this is all about. But the numbers that I believe are growing as our men and women are coming back from Afghanistan and Iraq, Admiral Mullen said yesterday, five, six, seven deployments, and as long as we are the deployments are going to be seven, eight and nine and they come back with the families. One problem I have seen that concerns me and it is not really the military’s fault, but we are not able to certainly recruit graduates of psychiatry schools to go into the military, so we are having to contract with other sources. In this report as we go into it, do you feel, and I know you do feel that you have done the very best job you can, but are we at a point that we are being realistic with the stress on the serviceperson and the stress on the family.

And let me give you one example, then I want you to respond. This committee is probably tired of hearing me say this, but it is a story that I will never forget. In 2007, National Reading Day we were home for Easter, and I was able to read to the kids at Johnson Elementary School at Camp Lejeune. And as I closed, I let the kids ask me questions. The last one I said this is my last question. And he looked at me and said my daddy is not dead yet. That is out of the mouth of a six-year-old child, my daddy is not dead yet. Please, in the minute and a half that is left, tell me that we are doing what has to be done, what needs to be done, or we need to do more. Thank you.

Secretary Flournoy. Sir, Secretary of Defense Gates is personally seized with this set of issues. I think every time he visits troops and families he comes back with a new list of we have got to do better at X, Y and Z, and I have seen it every time. I think one of the things we have done is intensify the partnership between the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs [VA] because it is really going to take that team effort to deal with the full range of challenges. It is a significant area of leadership, focus, and attention and I think investment in the QDR. It is going to go way beyond the QDR and continue to require that attention. But let me just turn it over to Dr. Fox to give you some of the programmatic details.

Mr. Jones. Thank you.

Ms. Fox. Sir, we have increased the unified medical budget to over $50.0 billion and in this budget. And in that over 1,000 additional civilian full-time equivalents have been added for Wounded Warrior programs such as the ones that are necessary to treat the issues that you are concerned with, as are we of course.

As Secretary Flournoy already talked, the electronic records and information sharing that should help facilitate the transition from the Defense Department to VA and to third-party health care as
well. We are looking at families very carefully and we have $8.8 billion in the budget for family programs. A noninsignificant effort, this year was to identify that our DOD schools needed to be increased, and so we will be refurbishing 103 of those schools by 2015. And we are in the OCO adding forces, 22,000 for the Army, and OCO that started last year continues this year, also 4,400 additional forces funded out of the OCO funds for Navy because of their individual augmentees. And this is designed to start to relieve a little of the stress on the force. The issue is, as the Secretary said, it is very, very important to the Department.

Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman thank you for the time.

The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Nye, the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. Nye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our panelists for being here today. A number of members of this committee today have expressed concerns about our force structure and how to best go forward. In fact, Admiral Stanley, you said today that a 313-ship Navy is far beyond the FYDP. In a time when we are facing major shortfalls and key defense programs such as shipbuilding and ship maintenance accounts and interestingly enough, coming just four years after a background which the Navy was unable to close many of the installations that it had recommended closing. I was disappointed to note that there is a sentence in the QDR that calls for homeporting an East Coast-based nuclear aircraft carrier in Mayport, which, of course, we know it would require building a fifth nuclear carrier homeport in the United States, even at a time when our carrier fleet is about to be reduced to its lowest level in decades.

We saw a December 3rd draft of the QDR that suggested that providing an alternative port to dock an East Coast aircraft carrier to mitigate the risk of a manmade or natural disaster was sensible, and then a few weeks later, we saw the final QDR recommended that instead of an alternative port, actually a homeport for an East Coast carrier be established at Mayport.

So my question, Madam Secretary, is, it appears that the specific homeporting recommendation changed significantly from the December draft that we saw. And what I am curious to know is can you explain the evolution in that recommendation from one that seemed to have all the strategic benefit at minimal cost to one that seems to have presented substantial costs around $1.0 billion by many calculations and operational challenges with minimal additional strategic benefits. Can you talk about the process by which that changed?

Secretary Flournoy. Sure, I am happy to, sir. Secretary Gates has testified multiple times previously that he has been troubled about the risk to the carrier fleet from either a disaster or a catastrophic terrorist attack against Norfolk given not only the concentration of the fleet there, but the very unique nuclear support infrastructure there. So as part of the QDR, we were directed to look at a couple of options. We looked at two principal courses of action. One was to execute the move to Mayport and actually homeport the carrier there, another was to maintain Norfolk as the exclusive homeport and simply have an alternative port.
Analysis was done on both of those, and the analysis concluded that the strategic benefit of dispersing the aircraft carrier fleet and the nuclear maintenance facilities across the East Coast, that the benefits of that would outweigh the cost. The truth is we have always had, certainly on the west coast and on the East Coast, multiple carrier homeports. What has changed is going from a mix of nuclear conventional to a nuclear-only fleet.

And so now we have a single point of vulnerability that we need to address. We believe that given the incredible investment in the carrier fleet and how strategic an asset that is that this is a, you know, this is a reasonable insurance policy to safeguard the strategic value of that asset.

Mr. NYE. Let me just in following up on something that Mr. Forbes raised in his questions, Admiral Mullen, in his testimony yesterday essentially said that the risk analysis done to support that decision was a judgment call and that the idea of strategic dispersal applying to East Coast carriers also applies equally to many other assets, for instance, our East Coast nuclear missile submarines. What I would like to know is if you agree with his assessment on that and whether the DOD currently has plans to disperse all those other assets, and can you comment on how the decision making process works to decide how you prioritize the need to disperse those various assets?

Secretary FLOURNOY. I think that we have not looked as closely at the other assets. That may be work that we will need to do in the future.

Mr. NYE. Just one last question. Again, following up on Mr. Forbes' question on the prioritizing. And you said in your testimony that the Secretary, together with Admiral Mullen, has taken action to direct resources away from lower priority programs and activities so that more pressing needs could be addressed, and I don't think anyone would argue with that. But can you tell me which are the lower priority programs that just missed the cut to be included in the QDR?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, I think the Secretary has been very clear on several that didn't make the cut. C-17s being one given that we have every mobility study that the Department has conducted in recent years, says that we have more than enough of those particular planes. And if you go through the cancellation, program cancellation list, that gives you a sense of where we decided that we could afford not to pursue additional capability.

Mr. NYE. My time is expired. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here today. Secretary Flournoy, I am pleased to see that the QDR recognizes that caring for our wounded, ill, and injured military members is the highest priority. The QDR includes plans to improve the treatment of our wounded warriors in several ways, including providing world-class care and management, benefit delivery and standardization of services across the military departments. However, I am concerned that the current plans for the wounded warrior support at the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center when it opens at Bethesda in September 2011, is not at the same level of support currently furnished by the Army
at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Wounded warriors who move to the new medical center will experience a significant degradation of services and support. This is unacceptable. What assurances can you give me and military families that all of the wounded warrior support now provided at Walter Reed including barrack space at Bethesda campus will be available when the new medical center opens in September 2011?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, this is outside my area of personal responsibility, but again, this is an area that I know that the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary are working very hard. We are closing Walter Reed because of a previous BRAC [base closure and realignment] decision, and there is a lot of attention to ensure that as we consolidate capability at Bethesda, that we meet not only today's wounded warrior needs, but those of the future. And again, all I can do is assure you that this has gotten very high-level and consistent attention and will continue to do so in the future.

Mr. WILSON. And please extend to the Secretary and anyone else that there is significant concern about the relocation expansion, and this is just so crucial as military families. For each of you, the QDR speaks of a comprehensive review for the role of Reserve and [National] Guard forces. The past 8 years have highlighted the unique way in which the Guard and Reserve forces can augment the active force especially in unique skill sets. However, due to their commitment to the overseas fight, the historical role of the National Guard as our Nation's strategic reserve has waned.

Given the first of the six key mission areas to the QDR is defend the United States and support civilian authorities at home, how will the Guard meet its historical role? Do you foresee efforts to grow the Guard and Reserve with regard to military construction [MILCON] and equipment?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sir, what I will say is that we are looking at trying to reduce the OPTEMPO [operational tempo] of the reserve component along with the total force and to sort of get them back to a more normal rotation schedule. We are also going to undertake a study this coming year of the roles of Guard and Reserve. In the meantime, what we have tried to do is really make targeted investment, improving their ability to respond to any kind of homeland contingencies, in particular, the establishment of homeland response forces that will be aligned with each of the ten FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] regions and increase the responsiveness to some kind of catastrophic disaster.

I think the Army is also paying significant attention to the equipment issues you raised and replenishing those stocks as units return from overseas deployments.

Mr. WILSON. And that would include movement of equipment from theater back to the United States?

Secretary FLOURNOY. Eventually yes. I don't know if the Admiral has more to add there.

Admiral STANLEY. Yes, the simple answer is yes, we are going to move the equipment back and refurbish it as part of the reset that we envision. The other thing I would add is this discussion on the Guard and Reserve is what should be the balance between a rotational Guard and Reserve and a strategic reserve that you brought up. And the Guard believes very strongly that they want to con-
continue the rotational role that they have been part of for the last eight years, so we are trying to figure out the balance there.

Mr. Wilson. And when you say the Guard wants to, as a 31-year veteran of the Guard, I know Guard members are very proud of their service and very grateful for the opportunity to serve overseas, but we always have to keep in mind, particularly in my region, the consequences of a hurricane, possibly an ice storm, and the Guard has just served with such distinction. And so again, I appreciate very much what you are doing on behalf of the Guard and Reserve, and Guard and Reserve families are very grateful. I yield the balance of my time.

The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The witnesses, Madam Secretary, I understand turn to pumpkins right at one o'clock. It looks like we are going to come out even because we have just two more questioners, and we will get on with it and again, you don't have to turn to a pumpkin. Mr. Heinrich.

Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Flournoy, the issue of energy independence remains critically important, and in fact, I think the QDR acknowledges this and states, “climate change and energy are two key issues that will play a significant role in shaping the future of the security environment.” Although they produce distinct types of challenges, climate change, energy security, and economic stability are inextricably linked. I believe that the Department of Energy [DOE] and our national labs offer unique capabilities that can help address this major challenge. And in particular a strategic partnership between the Departments of Energy and Defense could be extremely beneficial to the security of our Nation and our Armed Forces.

I wanted to ask you if you could provide me a little bit of an update on the efforts of the Department of Defense and the DOE, the efforts that they are taking to organize a collaborative energy security strategy and what you might see as some of the obstacles along the way.

Secretary Flournoy. Thank you, and I will invite Dr. Fox to comment as well. This QDR was really different at congressional behest in addressing energy and climate issues up front as strategic concerns, both in terms of how they will affect the operating environment for the military of the future, but also because DOD is such a large energy consumer. And this gets to your question. We are having extensive interaction with the Department of Energy. We have actually created a new position for someone who will focus on a very serious person in the Pentagon, senior civilian, who will work with the services focused on operational energy concerns, and we are waiting for her to be confirmed. But I believe she will be the sort of focal point for that partnership to really use the fact that DOD has such a large market share, if you will, in the energy domain to drive further innovation in terms of alternative fuels, in terms of efficiencies, and so forth. But I don't know if there are some additional programmatic details you want to add.

Ms. Fox. I can only add that the Department really is very focused on this and are working hard this year in studies to look at vulnerability of DOD bases, for example, to climate change outcomes. We are looking hard at the use of renewable energy in planes and ships, and we are also looking at ways to become more
energy efficient across the Department to reduce costs, and all of that will be benefitted by this partnership with the Department of Energy.

Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Dr. Fox. Secretary Flournoy, shifting gears a little bit, the battles in Iraq and Afghanistan have yielded tremendous insights in how to effectively wage counterinsurgency operations. And as a result, the Air Force has identified the need for a light attack armed reconnaissance aircraft. And I wanted to ask you sort of where in the procurement process that is today, and have you at all explored the idea of potentially using the Air National Guard as an option for a future bed-down of those potential aircraft.

Secretary Flournoy. I am going to defer to my operational and programmatic colleagues here on that one.

Admiral Stanley. The light attack aircraft is envisioned to be something that our military can use to better engage with a lot of the strategic partners that want to build security relationships with something that they can afford, they can use, be easier for us to train and equip them. So that is the genesis of the idea. The idea has not matured much beyond that, and certainly not to the point of being bed-down in specific areas.

Mr. Heinrich. I just say that I look forward to learning more about what the Air Force has in mind and how to best leverage the potential there. And with that I would yield back the rest of my time, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Wittman, wrap it up.

Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all so much for joining us today. I wanted to talk a little bit about shipbuilding. I know the budget has 15 point—or $15.7 billion in there for shipbuilding. The 30-year shipbuilding plan houses 313 ships. The current level of funding, 9 ships a year over 30 years, 270 ships. If you start to break that down, what you are looking at is over a five-year period, eight of those are joint high-speed vessels. If you then look at those, they are small surface combatants, we are building 42 battle force ships. Then 17 of those are LCS ships, a little less expensive. So without the JHVSs and LCSs, we are only building 24 battle force ships in the last 5 years, and we are leaving the more expensive large surface combatants to fund in the future. On top of that, it looks like we are going towards a 275-ship Navy rather than a 313 ship Navy. On top of that, too, we are adding a BMD focus into this.

My concern is now we are providing a BMD mission to the Ticonderoga-class and the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. And those destroyers are only going to be fit for meeting a short-range missile defense not a long-range missile defense. So if we are making those BMD decisions in an already challenged environment with shipbuilding and putting that additional mission set out there for our surface combatants, and if we are making BMD a priority, then we need to know what the COCOMs’ [combatant commands’] requirements are and how we can answer those requirements either for the current forces on a new procurement, and I really don’t see the answer for that in this budget. There is lacking some specificity there. And it is also concerning too that we are not defending against that long-range threat but only the near-range threat,
those threats like we would see with Iran. Can you tell me what the President’s plan is to address our BMD mission, and that is from either a new procurement point of view, or how our current forces will answer the increased mission load, and also if you can tell me when developing the future years defense plan, what consideration was given to the impact on our core ship building industrial base? Specifically, why are we pushing funding on the more expensive ships out in future years and doing the less expensive ships here? It seems like to me a lot of different decisions that are going to create tremendous pressure on our BMD capability and our shipbuilding needs and our budgets.

Secretary Flournoy. I will take on the broader BMD question, and then I will leave the shipbuilding issues to Dr. Fox and perhaps the Admiral wants to chime in. On BMD, on the Ballistic Missile Defense Review [BMDR], I guess I would say we are doing two things: We are certainly sustaining and strengthening the ability to defend the homeland against limited attack, so that is not going away. In fact, we are continuing to invest in that. But what we are really beefing up as a new area of focus is regional ballistic missile defense. And part of that is going to be initially ship-borne, but eventually much of that will migrate onto land-based SM–3 [Standard Missile–3] systems.

And so the naval component is critical but it is one component of a broader system that also envisions a number of land-based systems. I think one of the things we are doing now is scrubbing the impacts of that on both the buys of future SM–3s, particularly as we get beyond the first variant, but also on how this will affect the overall sort of operational concept for BMD related naval assets. But let me turn it over to Dr. Fox, and then perhaps the Admiral will chime in.

Ms. Fox. Well, as you characterize we did put $15.7 billion in an account this year. And it does have the split that you refer to which is consistent in our view with the QDR strategy. There is an increased emphasis, you are absolutely right, on some of the smaller ships like JHSV because it does help enable that part of the strategy that Secretary Flournoy has outlined to you. But that doesn’t mean we are walking away from the higher-end capabilities. We are going to be building two Virginia-class submarines a year across the FYDP. There is no more period even within the FYDP where we will go to one, it is two straight across. We will have two DDG–51 destroyers.

We are upgrading them and looking at the improvement in the improved DDG. We are sustaining the carrier build. So I feel that we are doing both. We are trying to meet that broad spectrum of capabilities that we have been talking about. You asked about the industrial base. The industrial base along the Gulf Coast is going to be stressed a little by the shipbuilding plan due to the amphibious changes, and that might force a consolidation, but that will let you have more opportunity to talk to the Navy about that but that is absolutely true.

The other thing about the industrial base I would just like to add is in the years where we are building the SSBNs there could be some pressure on the combatants.
The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. We came out right on time for you, and we appreciate your testimony, your hard work, your answering our questions. And some of them, I realize were very difficult and that you don’t have the answers to everything, but I think you did remarkably well. Keep doing well and we will ask you of course to come back. And Ms. Fox and Admiral Stanley, thank you for your initial testimony here. And Secretary Flournoy, you are always so good to be with us, and thank you for your wisdom.

Secretary FLOURNOY. Thank you very much, sir.

[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

February 4, 2010
Opening Statement of Chairman Ike Skelton

Hearing on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review

February 4, 2010


“Welcome, ladies and gentlemen. This is, in many ways, a continuation of the hearing we held yesterday with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The release of the report of the Quadrennial Defense Review is always a noteworthy event in defense circles, and particularly so here in the Armed Services Committee.

“In my view, the remarkable thing about both the President’s budget we received yesterday, and the QDR is the deep commitment they reflect on the part of the Obama Administration to preserving the national security of the United States. At a time of tremendous economic difficulty, unprecedented deficits, and spending freezes in other parts of the budget, the QDR demonstrates the clear need for—and the Department’s budget reflects—real growth in defense spending, this year, and into the foreseeable future. While we will have our disagreements about some of the details, I strongly support the Administration’s decision to request these increases for defense.

“Congress has a constitutional responsibility to provide oversight of, and funds for the nation’s armed forces. The Congressionally mandated QDR directs the Secretary to conduct a ‘comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the defense program and policies of the United States with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a defense program for the next 20 years.’

(39)
“Thus, the QDR outlines the Secretary of Defense’s thinking on that wide range of topics, and provides a sort of blueprint on how he sees the Department moving forward to meet future security challenges. It is important for Congress to understand what the Secretary sees as our top national security priorities, why, and the measures required to deal with them. Then, we can make sure the required resources are available.

“But, as Congress develops policy positions and makes funding decisions, it is quite natural that the Legislative Branch’s determination of national security priorities may differ from those set forth by the Executive Branch. The framers of the Constitution designed it that way. And, if we are going to make different choices, both in terms of policy and in funding, it is incumbent upon us to understand the implications of the available options. The QDR—and this hearing—is an important part of that process.

“Although the primary consumer of the report of the QDR is Congress—that’s why the reporting elements are in the law—I understand that it has to be written for a wide variety of audiences: the interagency, the international community, the defense industry, academia, just to name a few. And therefore it is not surprising that it fully pleases none of them. Never has. Never will.

“Having said that, overall, I find the 2010 QDR to be a solid product, and superior to the last several iterations we’ve seen. I commend you for your hard work and for your focus on linking strategy to resources. It clearly lays out four priority objectives of a defense strategy, and six key mission areas that require enhancement if that strategy is to succeed.

“That is clear strategic direction for our nation’s military to not only win today’s conflicts, but to be prepared for tomorrow’s threats, as well. The QDR recognizes that we must continue to be ready to counter more than one threat at a time, but it acknowledges that there are a variety of scenarios beyond ‘major regional contingencies’ that our military is likely to face. That’s a good step, because the potential threats are complex.

“Still, the way the QDR seems to treat the force sizing construct is to advocate for a force that is capable of being all things in all contingencies. It is tough to determine what the priority is, what the most likely risk we will face may be, and
what may be the most dangerous. And, it seems that the QDR makes no significant changes to major pieces of our current force.

"This makes our task that much more difficult, because although the QDR should not be budget-constrained, the plain fact is that resources are not unlimited. Ultimately Congress will need to make prudent trade-offs to meet fiscal realities while buying down strategic risk. To do so, we need to know where our current and projected force structure is inadequate. The QDR should help us understand the consequences of those trade-offs, and my first reading indicates that perhaps it comes up short there.

"I am very pleased to see that, for the first time, this QDR elevates the health of the force to a strategic priority. It rightly emphasizes the need to address the strains placed on our men and women in uniform, as well as their families.

"It pays continued attention to military compensation, health care, and warrior care, as well as family support services. But, I am concerned that, beyond casual mention of the need for greater cultural and language training, it does not pay enough attention to the operational needs of our ‘muddy-boot warriors.’ The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made clear that the superiority of individuals and small units engaged in close combat is essential if the United States is going to win these sorts of wars. These are our most effective weapon systems.

"However, where the QDR goes on at length about the need to develop high-end technological capabilities, there is no comparable discussion about the need to develop the small arms and other individual equipment to preserve this superiority, let alone the development of innovative means to insure that these small units are fully trained. That’s a shame, because that’s really the best way to take care of our people.

"Now, let me turn it over to my good friend the Ranking Member Buck McKeon, the Gentleman from California.”
JOINT STATEMENT TO HASC ON 2010 QDR

Chairman Skelton, Representative McKeon, and members of the Committee. We appreciate the opportunity to discuss DoD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. Over the last year, the Department has worked to develop a process and a final product that meets the high expectations of the leadership of both the Department and Congress. We have been ably assisted along the way by our many interactions with Committee members and staff, and we look forward to a continued strong partnership.

From the outset, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates took ownership of the QDR. Together with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, the process benefitted from a close civilian-military partnership, and we believe the 2010 QDR has helped further rebalance and reform the Department in favor of prevailing in today’s wars and preparing for a range of plausible future challenges.

There is no doubt that America remains a nation at war. The Secretary and the Chairman have together ensured that current conflicts are placed at the top of our policy, program, and budgeting priorities, ensuring that those fighting America’s wars and their families—on the battlefield, in the hospital, or on the home front—receive the support they need and deserve. The QDR report reflects this unsurpassable priority.

Complex environment

The QDR places our wartime priorities in a broad strategic context, arguing that the international system will continue to be reshaped by rising powers, the problems of proliferation, highly uneven rates of economic and social development, climate change, rising demand for resources, rapid urbanization, and other trends that can spark conflict or increase the frequency and severity of state failure. The speed of globalization continues to make it easier for a wider range of state and non-state actors to acquire sophisticated technology that in the last century would have been available to only a few.

These shifts in the strategic environment carry implications for how our armed forces will operate in the world. America’s continued dominance in large-scale force-on-force warfare provides powerful incentives for adversaries to employ strategies and tactics designed to offset our strengths. In Afghanistan and Iraq, we have seen how the proliferation of technology has enabled smart adversaries to develop and employ effective methods to target U.S. and allied troops as well as the civilian population. More broadly, many future adversaries are likely to possess sophisticated capabilities designed to contest or deny command of the air, sea, space, and cyberspace.

Given this complex environment, both Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen feel strongly that the United States requires a broad portfolio of military capabilities with maximum
versatility across the broadest plausible spectrum of conflict. The QDR attempts to further institutionalize their shared vision.

**Defense strategy**

The need to promote and defend America's interests in a complex world requires a defense strategy that conveys a clear sense of priority while being agile enough to evolve and adapt over time. The QDR advances a strategic framework and argues that the Department of Defense must balance resources and risk among four priority objectives:

First, **prevail in today's wars.** The point of departure for our strategy is the imperative to prevail in today's wars. In Afghanistan, this requires the additional troops the President has authorized—more than 50,000 since taking office—and a wide range of key enabling capabilities, including fixed and rotary-wing lift and unmanned aerial systems. In the war against Al Qaeda and its allies, this requires continued attention to quality and quantity of our special operations forces, the effectiveness of our international intelligence and military partnerships, and our global network of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. As we continue the responsible drawdown of forces in Iraq, prevailing in this context requires further developing an approach to security assistance that better enables both U.S. military and civilian personnel to build security capacity, promote effective governance, and further place our strategic relationship with Iraq on a sustainable long-term trajectory.

Second, our defense strategy focuses on enhancing the ways in which U.S. forces help **prevent and deter conflict.** Doing so requires maintaining land, air, and naval forces capable of prevailing in limited and large-scale conflicts in anti-access environments. These forces must be enabled by space and cyberspace capabilities, and enhanced through ballistic missile defense and counter-WMD capabilities. America's deterrence also rests on a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. Credibly underwriting U.S. defense commitments requires tailored approaches to deterrence—approaches that integrate all elements of national power, rest on a network of strong regional alliances, and build new partnerships to address shared challenges.

Third, we must **prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies.** We've come to learn at great cost that America's current and future adversaries will not conform to conventional ways of war. If we are to truly prepare to defeat 21st century adversaries and meet other challenges, then we must include counter-WMD, support to humanitarian relief, counterinsurgency, stability, counterterrorism, and cyberspace operations more fully in our planning processes. And we must also recognize that future adversaries are likely to employ a mix of approaches and capabilities if and when they choose to oppose the United States, our allies, or our partners.

Fourth, we must **preserve and enhance America's all-volunteer force**—our most precious military resource. These long years of war have significantly strained our military personnel and their families. And while the morale and effectiveness of those in the field remains high, there are indicators that worry us—from post-traumatic stress, to
increased rates of divorce and suicide. For too long the health of the all-volunteer force has been an underemphasized priority in our defense planning. This QDR has striven to include the need to preserve and enhance the force as a core component of our policy, planning, and force management considerations. The Department’s senior civilian and military leadership remain committed to being good stewards of the All-Volunteer Force.

Together these four priority objectives are at once timely and enduring. They capture the essence of what the Department must do to protect and advance American interests, and they constitute the key priorities that drive how we think about the overall size and shape of America’s armed forces.

Rebalancing the force

The QDR matched particular capability improvements to these objectives by evaluating alternative future forces against a diverse set of scenarios, which depicted a wide range of plausible challenges that might call for a response by U.S. military forces. The Department also assessed lessons learned from ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Collectively, these assessments helped inform decisions affecting capabilities in six key mission areas:

- Defend the United States and support civil authorities at home;
- Succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations;
- Build the security capacity of partner states;
- Deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments;
- Prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction; and
- Operate effectively in cyberspace.

In each key mission area the QDR recommends capability-enhancements that are also detailed in the FY 2011 budget submission to Congress. The QDR report outlines most of the enhancements in detail, but in general the evolution directed under the QDR can be broadly characterized by the following trends:

- U.S. ground forces will remain capable of full-spectrum operations, with continued focus on capabilities to conduct effective and sustained counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorist operations alone and in concert with partners.
- U.S. naval forces will continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations, even as they add capabilities and capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies. The rapid growth in sea- and land-based ballistic missile defense capabilities will help meet the needs of combatant commanders as well as our key allies.
- U.S. air forces will become more survivable as large numbers of fifth-generation fighters join the force. Land-based and carrier-based aircraft will require greater average range, flexibility and versatility in order to deter and defeat adversaries that are fielding more potent anti-access capabilities. We will also enhance our air forces’ contributions to security force assistance operations by fielding more aircraft that are well suited to training and advising partner air forces.
• We will continue to increase the capacity of special operations forces and will enhance their capabilities through the growth of organic enablers and key support assets in the general purpose forces.
• The capabilities, flexibility, and robustness of U.S. forces across the board will be improved by fielding more and better enabling systems, including ISR, electronic attack, communications networks, more resilient base infrastructure, and enhanced cyber defenses.

**Strengthening Our Relationships**

Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere fundamentally depend on substantial and sustained contributions both from a range of traditional treaty allies with whom we share long histories of common courage and sacrifice, but also with new partners with whom we share common interests and a desire for regional security.

America must increasingly integrate its efforts with others to help protect shared interests and promote prosperity and security. The QDR argues that we need to focus more on crafting an approach to our regional defense postures that emphasizes tailoring our mix of forward stationed and routinely deployed personnel and capabilities to be responsive to the unique regional security environment. Such efforts include improving resiliency in our base infrastructure, pursuing more opportunities for joint and combined training, and crafting ways to further support multilateral efforts to assure access to the global commons.

The QDR also acknowledges the need to increase interagency cooperation in our contingency planning and operations. In this regard, the QDR continues the Department’s advocacy for improved expeditionary civilian capacity and greater cooperation in all facets of national security planning.

**Taking Care of Our People**

The QDR advocates important initiatives for improving the health of the force. These initiatives will enhance warrior and survivor care and provide a single electronic medical record for our service members throughout their lives. The QDR reinforces the urgency to increase research and treatment for a broad range of injuries, especially the signature wounds of Post Traumatic Stress and Traumatic Brain Injuries. Increased rates of combat stress, substance abuse and suicide, point to a force that is under a high degree of pressure from repeated long deployments and limited time at home.

Reducing deployment time and increasing time at home, as appropriate for each component, are important for reintegrating our service members returning from a combat environment to routine activities at home. Though the force has remained incredibly resilient over the course of eight years of war, we must prioritize programs that sustain resiliency of service members and their families such as: child care facilities, quality education for children, 24/7 family support assistance, outreach to Guard and Reserve members and their families, and referrals for non-medical counseling. By emphasizing
the emotional, social, spiritual and family aspects of fitness, these health-of-the-force investments will pay dividends in national security today and well into the future.

Reforming How We Do Business

The QDR explores in detail several critical institutional issues that the Department’s leadership have identified as priorities—reforming security assistance, institutionalizing our rapid acquisition capability, strengthening the industrial base, reforming the U.S. export control system, and crafting a more strategic approach to climate and energy issues.

The attention paid to these issues in the QDR reflects the Department’s deepened understanding of the importance of those capabilities, authorities, and practices that enable institutional agility. For eight years we’ve asked that our men and women on the front lines innovate and adapt under fire. They’ve done so. The QDR argues that the Department of Defense as a whole must do the same. We look forward to working with other departments and agencies and with Congress on these and other important cross-cutting issues.

Assessing and Managing Risk

As this Committee knows all too well, defense strategy is more than simply articulating a framework and recommending ways to spend resources—real strategy requires making real choices. There is no such thing as a risk-free defense strategy—the challenge is to move beyond the question of whether to take risk, and determine how to manage risk over time in a way that favors success in today’s wars, and enables our forces to prepare for potential future challenges.

Early in the QDR and in the course of the process of completing DoD’s budget submission for FY 2010, the Secretary—together with Admiral Mullen—took action to direct resources away from lower-priority programs and activities so that more pressing needs could be addressed, both within that budget and in the years that follow it. Those decisions included ending production of the F-22 fighter, restructuring the procurement of the DDG-1000 destroyer and the Army’s Future Combat Systems programs, deferring production of new maritime prepositioning ships, stretching out the procurement of a new class of aircraft carrier, and substantially reducing the Air Force’s older fourth-generation fighter aircraft.

In addition to these steps, DoD is proposing in its budget submission for FY 2011 to conclude production of the C-17 airlift aircraft, having completed procurement of those aircraft. DoD has also decided to delay the command ship replacement (LCC) program and to extend the life of existing command ships, cancel the CG(X) cruiser, and terminate the Net Enabled Command and Control program. Those actions, among others, have enabled the Department to redirect resources into the high-priority mission areas outlined above.
These choices may not be popular, but in our view they are necessary in order to enable the Department to redirect resources into those high-priority areas described in the QDR—addressing capability gaps that are critical to better enable success in today’s wars while also better preparing for tomorrow’s challenges.

**Beyond the QDR**

Mr. Chairman, the QDR report and the preceding months of deliberation served two purposes: first, to establish the Department’s key priority objectives, providing strategic context and recommendations on key capability development and investment priorities; and second, to communicate the Secretary’s intent for the next several years of the Department’s work. The QDR serves as a capstone institutional document, shaping how the Department of Defense will support America’s military personnel today, while building the policy and programmatic foundation that will enable the next generation to protect the American people and advance their interests. In this way, we believe that the 2010 QDR will serve to further rebalance and reform the Department of Defense to meet the challenges of a complex world.
Michèle Flournoy was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on February 9, 2009. She serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.

Prior to her confirmation, Ms. Flournoy was appointed President of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in January 2007. Before co-founding CNAS, she was a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she worked on a broad range of defense policy and international security issues.

Ms. Flournoy previously served as a distinguished research professor at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU), where she founded and led the university’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) working group, which was chartered by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop intellectual capital in preparation for the Department of Defense’s 2001 QDR.

Prior to joining NDU, Ms. Flournoy was dual-hatted as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy. In that capacity, she oversaw three Policy offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense: Strategy, Requirements, Plans and Counterproliferation; and Russia, Ukraine and Eurasian Affairs.

Ms. Flournoy was awarded the Secretary of Defense Medal for Outstanding Public Service in 1996, the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service in 1998 and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Distinguished Civilian Service Award in 2000. She is a former member of the Defense Policy Board and the Defense Science Board Task Force on Transformation.

Ms. Flournoy earned a bachelor’s degree in social studies from Harvard University and a master’s degree in international relations from Balliol College, Oxford University, where she was a Newton-Talbot scholar.
Vice Admiral Stephen Stanley  
Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, J8

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Originally from Doylestown, Ohio, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1975 with a Bachelor of Science degree in Ocean Engineering.

After nuclear power and submarine training, he served his junior officer tour in USS Andrew Jackson (SSBN 619G), his department head tour in Submarine NR-1 as Engineer Officer, and his Executive Officer tour in USS William H Bates (SSN 680).

Command assignments include USS Richard B Russell (SSN 687) and Commander, Submarine Development Squadron Five.

Following selection to flag rank, he has twice been assigned as Commander, Submarine Group Eight; Commander, Submarine Force Sixth Fleet (CTF 69); Commander, Submarines Allied Naval Forces South; and Commander, Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine Force (CTF 164). During the second assignment, he performed additional duties as the Director, Navy Europe Plans and Operations Center for the combined staff of Navy Europe and Sixth Fleet.

Although his early shore assignments were in submarine support positions -- first as the Radiological Controls Officer for Commander, Submarine Forces Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and later as the Program Branch Head for the Director of Naval Intelligence (OP-923) in Washington, DC -- all subsequent shore assignments have been in financial management positions. During two different periods, he completed four financial management assignments. These positions include: Division Head for Total Force Programming/Manpower (N122); Head of Program Planning and Development Branch (N801); Chief of the Program and Budget Analysis Division (J8 PBAD); and Deputy Director, Submarine Warfare Division (N77B). Most recently, he completed an assignment on the staff of Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command as Deputy Chief of Staff for Capabilities and Resource Integration (N8) from January 2005 through November 2006. While assigned to U.S. Fleet Forces Command, he assumed additional duties as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operational Readiness and Training (N4/N7).

Vice Admiral Stanley is currently the Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J8).

He is authorized to wear the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal and the Legion of Merit in addition to several other personal and unit awards.
Christine H. Fox
Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation

Christine H. Fox was appointed Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation on 3 November, 2009. Formerly, she served as the President of the Center for Naval Analyses, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), that pioneered the field of operations analysis in support of the U.S. Navy during World War II. As President, Center for Naval Analyses, she also served as the scientific analyst to the Chief of Naval Operations. Prior to her appointment as President, Ms. Fox was the Vice President and Director, of CNA’s Operations Evaluation Group (OEG), responsible for approximately 40 field representatives based around the world and 45 Washington-based analysts whose analytical focus is on helping operational commanders execute their missions.

Ms. Fox joined CNA in 1981 as an analyst in the Air Warfare Division, and throughout her career, has held positions of successive responsibility in the company. She has been a project director, program director, and team leader of several groups that concentrated on studies of Navy and Marine Corps operations, tactics, and capabilities. She also served as a department director, responsible for hiring and training approximately 50 analysts and field representatives working on issues related to air warfare. During her tenure as a program director, she managed the CNA Sea Power Forum, an annual meeting of top defense officials, media representatives, and military analysts to discuss and debate current military events. As a research manager, Ms. Fox was responsible for overseeing CNA’s analysis of real-world operations, including the operations in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, the operation in Afghanistan in response to the September 11 attacks, and the operation in Iraq in early 2003. Early in her career, Ms. Fox was CNA’s field representative to Fighter Airborne Early Warning Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Tactical Training Group, Pacific, and Commander, Third Fleet.

From 2003-2004, Ms. Fox served as a member of NASA’s Return to Flight Task Group under the leadership of Tom Stafford and Dick Covey. Ms. Fox was tapped to serve on this Task Group chartered by NASA’s Administrator to certify to him that NASA has met the Return to Flight recommendations made by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

Ms. Fox was a member of the Advisory Board of the Applied Physics Laboratory, University of Washington from 2007 until 2009.

Ms. Fox holds an M.S. in Applied Mathematics, George Mason University, and a B.S. in Mathematics, George Mason University.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

February 4, 2010
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES

Mr. Reyes. The Army budget request contains funds to continue expanding infrastructure at Ft. Bliss and other installations. The QDR states that four Army brigades will remain in Europe until a future decision is made on force structure needs in Europe pending the undergoing global defense posture review. When will the Department of Defense announce a final decision on European force structure?

Secretary Flournoy. The Department will announce any decision on force structure of U.S. forces in Europe following an assessment of U.S. posture and capabilities, which will be informed by the NATO Strategic Concept review expected in Fall 2010. Any changes to our defense posture will be informed by, and occur only after, close consultations with our allies, partners and Congress.

Mr. Reyes. The Army budget request contains funds to continue expanding infrastructure at Ft. Bliss and other installations. The QDR states that four Army brigades will remain in Europe until a future decision is made on force structure needs in Europe pending the undergoing global defense posture review. When will the Department of Defense announce a final decision on European force structure?

Admiral Stanley. OSD is leading an effort to review our global posture, and as part of this effort is working closely with Geographic Combatant Commanders. European Command will weigh in to help determine the most appropriate force structure for Europe based on U.S. requirements and the needs of our partners and allies in the region. I expect the timing of this decision will be paced by the information uncovered in the study as well as by NATO's decisions about its strategic concept, which are not expected until the end of 2010.

Mr. Reyes. Has the DOD considered maintaining a presence in Europe by rotating brigades to Europe from U.S. home bases?

Secretary Flournoy. During the QDR, the concept of rotating U.S. forces to Europe instead of stationing forces forward was considered. It is important to note that maintaining a rotational presence forward on a long-term basis requires approximately three times the number of personnel as would be required to station forces forward – due to the need to generate forces for deployment, to maintain the “boots-on-the-ground to dwell” ratio, and to achieve training readiness prior to rotational deployment. The Department continues to examine U.S. global force posture, including both rotational and forward-stationing solutions.

Mr. Reyes. Has the DOD considered maintaining a presence in Europe by rotating brigades to Europe from U.S. home bases?

Admiral Stanley. Yes. However, the final decision about the size and type of U.S. presence in Europe will be made based on the requirements of U.S. defense strategy. This decision will weigh the advantages of being able to build relationships through permanently basing forces in Europe against the flexibility offered by rotational forces as well as the associated costs of the options. The analysis will also address NATO's decisions about its strategic concept, which are not expected until the end of 2010, and will be scoped to include an assessment of our European defense posture.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ

Ms. Sanchez. The 2006 QDR highlighted the need to expand the WMD “Response Dimension” including an emphasis on WMD elimination operations that locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy a state or non-state actor’s WMD capabilities and programs in a hostile or uncertain environment. The 2006 QDR also highlighted the need to organize, train, and equip joint forces for this increasingly important mission. Can you describe the progress that has been made to-date in this area since the 2006 QDR? And since the new 2010 QDR places equal emphasis on countering WMD and preventing proliferation, what gaps still exist and how will 2010 QDR priorities address these gaps?

Secretary Flournoy. Since the 2006 QDR, important progress has been made to expand and enhance WMD elimination capabilities. In 2007, the United States Strategic Command created the Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE) within the Army's 20th Support Command in Aberdeen, Maryland. The JECE is tasked
with forming a deployable Joint Task Force–Elimination (JTF–E) to respond to WMD-related incidents and is responsible for providing the manpower, joint expertise, and knowledge required for the JTF–E to execute its mission successfully in non-permissive and semi-permissive environments. The JTF–E concept has proven its effectiveness in numerous training evolutions, particularly in U.S. Forces Korea exercises.

To build upon the success of the JECE and address remaining capability shortfalls, the 2010 QDR report directed the establishment of a standing Joint Task Force–Elimination Headquarters to provide additional capacity and capability to plan, train, and execute WMD-elimination operations across a variety of scenarios and areas of operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is leading a coordinated effort with the Services and the Combatant Commands to develop options for the command and control structure and force composition and manpower levels of a standing JTF–E Headquarters, including the possible incorporation of WMD exploitation, intelligence, and coordination cells.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Secretary, you will recall that the NDAA for FY2010 required the Department to prepare and submit a report and recommendations on the organization, manning, and management of the U.S. Special Operations Command. We look forward to reviewing this report and your recommendations in the coming weeks. Since the 2010 QDR places a Department-wide emphasis on “taking care of our people,” can you address how this applies to our Special Operations Forces in terms of recruitment, retention, and the management of op tempo? Will your forthcoming report address these issues and provide actionable recommendations?

Secretary FLUHRNERT. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) places significant emphasis on taking care of its people and works in close collaboration with the Military Departments on all matters that affect special operations personnel. USSOCOM understands that the backbone of the organization is not equipment or facilities, but it is the talented and dedicated men and women who sacrifice on a daily basis that form its fundamental strength.

Concerning recruitment, USSOCOM, in coordination with the Military Departments, has maintained the very highest standards for recruiting from civilian society as well as for accessions from the general purpose forces (GPF). USSOCOM considers outstanding individuals as a result of meaningful and challenging career opportunities within the special operations field, as well as an institutional culture that places great value on leadership and personal development.

Although successful recruitment is necessary for USSOCOM’s effectiveness in fulfilling its mission, it is not sufficient; retention is equally important. USSOCOM has undertaken a number of initiatives to retain its most talented personnel including the implementation of far-reaching monetary incentive programs, such as a critical skills retention bonus, obligating the service member to additional years of service. This incentive program has been highly successful in retaining experienced and highly trained specialists when the training investment is at its highest and the operator is at his or her most effective. Another incentive to retain senior operators is assignment incentive pay. This program offers a monthly stipend to encourage our most experienced personnel to maintain their service in a SOF specialty. Another incentive offered is a higher level of special duty assignment pay to attract service members to a duty assignment characterized by extremely demanding duties. Enlisted operators who enter the Warrant Officer corps are offered a bonus for extending and continuing their SOF service in positions that demand additional training and leadership skills.

An important component related to retention is operational tempo. As you are well aware, the past nine years have been very demanding for our military as a whole, and in particular for our special operations forces. USSOCOM is working hard to improve the deployment-to-dwell ratio for its personnel. As an example, USSOCOM is working with the Military Departments to increase GPF Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) that provide dedicated or direct support to deployed SOF. Concurrently and with the full support of the Military Departments, USSOCOM is also significantly growing its own organic CS and CSS force structure in accordance with the QDR. When the effects of these initiatives are realized, a considerable burden will be lifted from USSOCOM CS and CSS forces, resulting in deployment to dwell ratios closer in line with Department goals.

The forthcoming Report on Special Operations Command Organization, Manning, and Management, as required by Section 933 of the NDAA for FY2010, will not directly address issues relating to the discussion above as it focuses specifically on the eleven elements required by Section 933, but it does provide a number of actionable recommendations for greater efficiency and effectiveness within USSOCOM that will enable us to meet the needs of our special operations forces.
Ms. SANCHEZ. The 2010 QDR directs the establishment of a standing Joint Task Force Elimination Headquarters that will plan, train, and execute WMD-elimination operations. Can you outline the role of SOF within this Joint Task Force and can you describe how USSOCOM will fit into this proposed framework, both operationally and administratively?

Admiral STANLEY. We are currently studying the precise architecture of the Joint Task Force–WMD Elimination (JTF–E). Although the use of Special Operations Forces in some WMD-elimination missions will be critical, the alignment of SOF with respect to the JTF is part of the ongoing study. Thus, command relationships between JTF–E headquarters and the Combatant Commanders have not been determined.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

Mr. WILSON. The QDR speaks of a comprehensive review for the role of Reserve and Guard forces, including evaluating the ideal Active/Reserve mix for current and future operations. The past eight years have highlighted the unique way in which the Guard and Reserve forces can augment the active force, especially in unique skill sets. However, due to their commitment to the overseas fight, the historical role of the National Guard as the Nation’s strategic reserve has waned. Given that the first of the six key mission areas of the QDR is “Defend the United States and support civilian authorities at home” how will the Guard return to its historical role? How will their training and equipment change to reflect their need to focus on the domestic defense?

Secretary FLOURNOY. In recent years, policy debates have focused on whether the National Guard should be an operational reserve or a strategic reserve. In the Department’s view, these roles are not mutually exclusive. The National Guard still provides strategic depth for the Nation, but the National Guard also serves as part of an operational force. In fact, the Department could not implement the National Defense Strategy without drawing on the National Guard and Reserve as part of the operational force.

The Department appreciates the dual role of the National Guard in serving the States and the Department of Defense in protecting our Nation and its citizens. We continue to pursue ways to balance these dual roles and to ensure a more sustainable deployment tempo for the National Guard and Reserves. Using long-range scheduling for predictability and individual volunteerism for flexibility, the Air National Guard has reached a nearly five-to-one dwell-to-deployed ratio, with the Army National Guard close behind, approaching four-to-one. As Secretary Gates observed in February 2009, our goal for the Army National Guard is a dwell-to-deployed ratio of five to one.

To support efforts to balance the overseas and domestic missions of the National Guard, the Department of Defense invests billions in training and equipping the National Guard. Over the last three years, the Department has committed nearly $16 billion total for Army National Guard and Air National Guard procurement. The on-hand rate for the National Guard—which averages 70% historically—has improved from just under 40% in 2006 to nearly 80% by the end of FY09. The Department’s objective is to reach roughly 90% by FY15.

The National Guard already plays a critical role in domestic operations—both homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities. As noted in the QDR report, the Department is evolving its approach to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management forces and will be restructuring existing National Guard forces to support the creation of a Homeland Response Force (HRF) in each of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency regions. These ten HRFSs will provide a regional response capability with enhanced lifesaving capabilities and reduced response times; focus on planning, training, and exercising; and forge strong links between the Federal level and State and local authorities. These forces will receive specialized CBRNE training and equipment, and will focus exclusively on domestic operations for an extended period during the normal force generation rotation cycle.

Mr. WILSON. The QDR speaks of a comprehensive review for the role of Reserve and Guard forces, including evaluating the ideal Active/Reserve mix for current and future operations. The past eight years have highlighted the unique way in which the Guard and Reserve forces can augment the active force, especially in unique skill sets. However, due to their commitment to the overseas fight, the historical role of the Natural Guard as the Nation’s strategic reserve has waned. Given that the first of the six key mission areas of the QDR is “Defend the United States and support civilian authorities at home” how will the Guard return to its historical
role? How will their training and equipment change to reflect their need to focus on the domestic defense?

Admiral STANLEY. The National Guard continues to maintain its role in Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), homeland defense, and consequence management while supporting the operational mission requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. There are ongoing studies to find the optimal balance between an operational force and a strategic reserve within the Reserve Component and the National Guard in particular, which will inform their training and equipping requirements.

Mr. WILSON. The QDR speaks of a comprehensive review for the role of Reserve and Guard forces, including evaluating the ideal Active/Reserve mix for current and future missions. The past eight years have highlighted the unique way in which the Guard and Reserve forces can augment the active force, especially in unique skill sets. However, due to their commitment to the overseas fight, the historical role of the Natural Guard as the Nation’s strategic reserve has waned. Given that the first of the six key mission areas of the QDR is “Defend the United States and support civilian authorities at home” how will the Guard return to its historical role? How will their training and equipment change to reflect their need to focus on the domestic defense?

Ms. FOX. The question of whether the National Guard should be an operational or a strategic reserve is an extremely important one. There are ongoing studies seeking optimal ways to balance these dual roles and to ensure a more sustainable deployment tempo for the National Guard. In the Department’s view, these roles are not mutually exclusive. The National Guard provides strategic depth for the Nation and augments the operational force. In fact, the U.S. military forces cannot satisfy all of today’s demands without them.

The National Guard already plays a critical role in domestic operations—both homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities. As noted in the QDR report, the Department is evolving its approach to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management forces and will be restructuring existing National Guard forces to support the creation of a Homeland Response Force (HRF) in each of the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency regions. These ten HRFs will provide a regional response capability with enhanced lifesaving capabilities and reduced response times; focus on planning, training, and exercising; and forge strong links between the Federal level and State and local authorities. These forces will receive specialized CBRNE training and equipment, and will focus exclusively on domestic operations for an extended period during the normal force generation rotation cycle.

Mr. WILSON. Concurrent with fighting two major wars, the U.S. military had been involved in many humanitarian operations resultant from unforeseen disasters, including the earthquake in Haiti, Hurricane Katrina, and the tsunami in Southeast Asia. While the QDR nods to the fact that the military must be prepared for contingency operations, it falls short in outlining how this is possible without continuing to overtax the force while engaged in multi-theater operations. What importance is the Department placing on the possibility of contingency operations? And, how can we ensure that our military remains always prepared to face those events which are impossible to predict?

Secretary FLOURNOY. The analysis that underpinned the QDR report examined the force’s ability to face a multitude of individual scenarios, just as the force has historically performed a multitude of concurrent missions. These scenarios combined large-scale contingencies, a variety of smaller-scale episodic events, and routine operations that U.S. forces historically perform. Several natural disaster scenarios were included, and they were treated the same as other episodic scenarios in that they made up the foundational activities underlying all sets of scenarios. In this way, we were able to ensure these types of missions are accounted for in determining the impact on and capabilities of the force.

Mr. WILSON. Concurrent with fighting two major wars, the U.S. military had been involved in many humanitarian operations resultant from unforeseen disasters, including the earthquake in Haiti, Hurricane Katrina, and the tsunami in Southeast Asia. While the QDR nods to the fact that the military must be prepared for contingency operations, it falls short in outlining how this is possible without continuing to overtax the force while engaged in multi-theater operations. What importance is the Department placing on the possibility of contingency operations? And, how can we ensure that our military remains always prepared to face those events which are impossible to predict?

Admiral STANLEY. Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have clearly strained our Armed Forces. Until there is significant reduction of our force commitments to these contingencies, that strain will continue. We work hard to ensure
forces we deploy overseas are fully ready for their assigned mission – and they are. The Department regularly assesses its ability to respond to crises, although we cannot predict with much accuracy which situations the Department will actually face. However, as we experienced with Haiti and other recent natural disasters, we do have sufficient capability and capacity in the non-deployed force to effectively respond to contingency operations.

Mr. WILSON. Concurrent with fighting two major wars, the U.S. military had been involved in many humanitarian operations resultant from unforeseen disasters, including the earthquake in Haiti, Hurricane Katrina, and the tsunami in Southeast Asia. While the QDR nods to the fact that the military must be prepared for contingency operations, it falls short in outlining how this is possible without continuing to overtax the force while engaged in multi-theater operations. What importance is the Department placing on the possibility of contingency operations? And, how can we ensure that our military remains always prepared to face those events which are impossible to predict?

Ms. FLOURNOY. We account for these types of demands in our force structure planning. There are numerous, classified “Steady State Security Posture” events set abroad and within the United States that represent the demands of humanitarian assistance operations. The “QDR Strategic Environment” was based on a context of many of these types of day-to-day events and was a component of in the QDR analysis.

Sadly, DOD has many opportunities to provide humanitarian assistance globally. Our military forces have the capabilities necessary to enter an environment where the normal operations of governing have been disrupted and support stabilizing activities such as establishing communications, providing medical assistance, conducting logistical operations and contributing to security. These skills are consistent with preparing for domestic and overseas operations.

Mr. WILSON. Senior leadership in the DOD has made the starting point on “Don’t Ask-Don’t Tell” how to implement a repeal of current law, rather than whether the law should be repealed. This has introduced undue command influence into the debate. I fear that everyone below the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the military now knows that expression of opinions that would argue for not changing the policy could be subject to sanction. And if not sanction, then the senior leadership’s views that the law should be repealed will have a chilling effect on the objectivity of the input a comprehensive study might seek. How would you envision that, given these public positions, Congress can obtain the unbiased, objective input from military personnel of all ranks? Would you support military personnel testifying before Congress on this issue?

Secretary FLouroNoy. As you know, on February 2, 2010, Secretary Gates announced the formation of a Department of Defense Working Group to assess the implications of a repeal of 10 U.S.C. § 654, should that occur, and develop an implementation plan for any new statutory mandate.

The Working Group is firmly committed to soliciting the views of a wide array of individuals from the different services, including, as the Secretary has directed, military families. Over the course of the next eight months members of the Working Group will meet with a wide array of individuals of all services, rank, age and assignment, officers and enlisted, to seek their advice, opinions and concerns regarding a repeal and how it should be implemented. Likewise, the Working Group will seek to hear from the many responsible voices of those individuals and groups with diverse views on this important matter.

The two co-chairs of the Working Group, Department of Defense General Counsel Jeh Johnson and Army General Carter Ham, are asking all members of the Working Group to be neutral and objective in conducting this assessment. The Department of Defense is mindful that this is an emotional subject, the topic of intense debate, and that almost everyone familiar with the issue has an opinion about it. Mr. Johnson and General Ham are committed to leading this Working Group in an objective and thorough manner, and will provide the Secretary with their best assessment of the impact of repeal, regardless of what that may be, to permit the Secretary to determine, as he said in his testimony, how best to prepare for implementation of a Congressional repeal.

The Department of Defense is also committed to engaging with Members of Congress throughout this process. The Department of Defense will work closely with Congress to provide appropriate witnesses as necessary for testimony on this issue and expects that the Department’s witnesses will answer all questions, including questions regarding their personal opinions, fully and truthfully.

Mr. WILSON. Senior leadership in the DOD has made the starting point on “Don’t Ask-Don’t Tell” how to implement a repeal of current law, rather than whether the law should be repealed. This has introduced undue command influence into the debate. I fear that everyone below the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs in the military now knows that expression of opinions that would argue for not changing the policy could be subject to sanction. And if not sanction, then the senior leadership's views that the law should be repealed will have a chilling effect on the objectivity of the input a comprehensive study might seek. How would you envision that, given these public positions, Congress can obtain the unbiased, objective input from military personnel of all ranks? Would you support military personnel testifying before Congress on this issue?

Admiral STANLEY. To better understand the dynamic of this issue to the current force, the Secretary of Defense has established a high-level working group to undertake a comprehensive review of repealing the current law. This review will include participation from service members across a range of age, rank, and warfare communities, including families, and reach out across the force to develop insights and recommendations. The results of this study will inform our senior leaders and help shape their advice. As evidenced by the testimony given by the Service Chiefs after the statements made by Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen, I do not believe there has been undue influence.

Mr. WILSON. Senior leadership in the DOD has made the starting point on “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” how to implement a repeal of current law, rather than whether the law should be repealed. This has introduced undue command influence into the debate. I fear that everyone below the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the military now knows that expression of opinions that would argue for not changing the policy could be subject to sanction. And if not sanction, then the senior leadership’s views that the law should be repealed will have a chilling effect on the objectivity of the input a comprehensive study might seek. How would you envision that, given these public positions, Congress can obtain the unbiased, objective input from military personnel of all ranks? Would you support military personnel testifying before Congress on this issue?

Ms. FOX. At least at this point, the repeal of 10 U.S.C. § 654 is not a programmatic issue and, for that reason, I do not have the specific knowledge or responsibilities necessary to speak authoritatively about it. I understand that the Department is carefully considering the implications of repealing this law and is treating the issue with the diligence it is due. Should anyone from CAPE be called to testify, I will not place undue command influence or sanctions on them.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRADY

Mr. BRADY. One part of the QDR talks about the destabilizing impact of climate change and the importance of energy security. I’m interested in the impact of climate change on the threat landscape, as discussed in the QDR. Specifically, it says that weak nations are least likely to be able to respond to the natural disasters caused by climate change, that it is destabilizing fragile nations and increasing poverty. This is an important point, because weak and failed states are the best safe havens and breeding grounds that terrorists have. Can you talk about that connection between climate change and terrorism and how the Department of Defense plans on addressing it?

Secretary FLOURNOY. The 2008 National Intelligence Assessment of the Impacts of Climate Change, conducted by the National Intelligence Council (NIC), concluded that climate change will have significant geopolitical effects around the world and will contribute to a host of problems, including poverty, environmental degradation, and the weakening of national governments. Climate change will contribute to food and water shortages, increase the spread of disease, and may help spur mass migration, although the causes of migration are complex and usually difficult to attribute to a single factor. The NIC assessment warned that the storms, droughts, and food shortages that might result from a warming planet in coming decades could create numerous relief emergencies. Thus, we assess that climate change is a stress that has the potential to accelerate state failure in some cases, and may also lead to the spread of insurgency as weak governments fail to cope with its effects. We have already seen Al Qaeda seize on climate change as another grievance against the West, and attempt to use it to stir up resentment against the United States and other developed countries.

The Department of Defense works closely with other U.S. Departments and agencies in addressing these concerns, focusing on building the security capacity of partner states, a key mission highlighted in this year’s QDR report. We recognize that in some nations, the military is the only institution with the capacity to respond to a large-scale natural disaster. Working closely with interagency partners, DOD has undertaken environmental security cooperation initiatives with foreign mili-
taries that represent a non-threatening way of building trust and developing response capacity.

Mr. Brady. The QDR spends a significant amount of time talking about the threat posed to our defense infrastructure by climate change. Coastal installations, especially, are vulnerable to the rising sea levels and increasingly strong storms that scientists say climate change is producing. Given the billions we have invested in this critical security infrastructure, can you talk about the Department’s plan for dealing with this and other impacts of climate change in the QDR’s 20-year time-frame?

Secretary Flournoy. DOD is working and will continue to work to assess, adapt to, and mitigate the effects of climate change. Domestically, the Department will leverage the initial efforts of the Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP), a joint effort among DOD, the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency, to develop climate change impact and installation vulnerability assessment tools. We are concerned not only about effects on physical structures, but also broader effects on testing, training, and readiness activities, and the challenge of sustainable land and ecosystem-based management. The Department will need to build further on this foundation in order to develop a long-term approach to address climate impact on DOD’s infrastructure.

Mr. Brady. The strategy we’re discussing is obviously strongly focused on asymmetrical threats and nontraditional enemies. One part of the QDR addressed something which most people may not realize—that climate change is making these threats worse. It says that climate change is accelerating instability and destabilizing areas, especially fragile governments with droughts, famines, floods, and in mass migrations. These sound like exactly the kind of things that cause states to fail—and those failed states are usually the safe havens of terrorist groups. Can you please explain the connection between climate change, failed states, and terrorism in the context of preparing for wars against asymmetric threats?

Secretary Flournoy. The 2008 National Intelligence Assessment of the Impacts of Climate Change, conducted by the National Intelligence Council (NIC), concluded that climate change will have significant geopolitical effects around the world and will contribute to a host of problems, including poverty, environmental degradation, and the weakening of national governments. Climate change will contribute to food and water shortages, increase the spread of disease, and may help spur mass migration, although the causes of migration are complex and usually difficult to attribute to a single factor. The NIC assessment warned that the storms, droughts, and food shortages that might result from a warming planet in coming decades could create numerous relief emergencies. Thus, we assess that climate change is a stress that has the potential to accelerate state failure in some cases, and may also lead to the spread of insurgency as weak governments fail to cope with its effects. We have already seen Al Qaeda seize on climate change as another grievance against the West, and attempt to use it to stir up resentment against the United States and other developed countries.

Climate change is just one stress factor in a complex strategic environment. The integrated use of diplomacy, development, and defense can build the capacity of partner nations to maintain and promote stability in order to prevent conflict. The U.S. Armed Forces will continue to develop capabilities necessary to help create a secure environment in fragile states in support of local authorities and, if necessary, to support civil authorities in providing essential government services, restoring emergency infrastructure, and supplying humanitarian relief in response to natural disasters, such as those that may be caused by climate change.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS

Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank the witnesses for being here today and for their many months of hard work on the QDR. One area of this review that I disagree with is what I think is an incompatible evaluation of the future of manned fighter aircraft. This is an area that Congressman LoBiondo and I have worked on for several years and this review confirms what I think we have suspected. That a fighter gap exists and it has grown by 536 aircraft from two years ago. Yesterday’s statements from Secretary Gates cast significant doubt on the Department’s commitment to addressing this shortfall. The 162d Fighter Wing in Tucson is the Nation’s largest Air Guard Fighter unit and they are flying some of our Nation’s oldest fighter jets. Under the future force structure plans in this review, our fighter gap will continue to grow and the 162d will be right in the crosshairs. While 5th generation aircraft like the Joint Strike Fighter will surely be more capable than their predecessors, we MUST acknowledge that there is an important qual-
ity to quantity. Ultimately, the 162d in Tucson and dozens of other units around the country are responsible for the security of our homeland and they must have aircraft on the ramp to carry out that mission. According to the Air Force’s supporting documents, shortages are “likely” between 2017 and 2024 and these retirements are NOT offset by procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter. We need a smart and immediate solution to this problem. One area where I believe we are making leaps and bounds forward is on reforming our energy portfolio. As you know, the Department’s energy usage has been one of my key areas of focus. I have been working hand in hand with the Services and my colleagues on the Committee to set key performance goals for reductions in petroleum usage and increases in efficiency that will save lives on the battlefield and money in budget. This is the first time that energy issues have been included in this review as a key component for future strategic planning. Over the last eight years, we have learned a great deal about the strategic significance of a secure energy supply. During the invasion in 2003, Marine Corps ground forces used 90% of its energy on transporting and protecting the other 10% they used for operations. That’s just one example of how the Department’s energy appetite has put servicemembers between the enemy and the energy supply. For the first time, this review takes into account these untold costs of energy supply lines in troops diverted, money spent and lives lost. While this is the first major strategic document to cover this subject area, the services have already leaned far forward in making energy a focus of their modernization plans. Battlefield renewable and spray foam technology have reduced consumption by as much as 75%. At home, drastic increases in the use of renewable, responsible energy have reduced its offset installation usage. At Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in my District, we recently held a ribbon cutting for the largest solar powered community in the country with more than 80,000 solar panels that will provide 75% of the neighborhood’s energy requirements. These are inherently smart, good things that I fully support. As I mentioned, I have been a strong proponent of reforming DOD’s energy usage. Over the last year, I have been working aggressively with the Committee and the Services on developing an overarching master plan for DOD’s energy portfolio. 1. Can you talk a little bit about the specific areas where you envision DOD moving forward on both operational energy and installation energy? 2. Does this year’s budget demonstrate a significant enough investment in growing the renewable energy portfolio within DOD to match up with what you have included in the QDR? 3. Are Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) a fruitful endeavor for the future or do you see them waning over the long haul? 4. In 20 years, what accomplishments and milestones should we have met in order to achieve the strategic goals outlined in the review?

Secretary FLOURNOY. 1. The confirmation of the Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs will be a key step in moving forward on operational energy challenges. We look forward to the arrival of the Director, when confirmed, and the focus that senior leader will bring to the kinds of operational energy issues you have highlighted. The Department will be implementing the Energy Key Performance Parameter as well as the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel in the requirements and acquisition processes, respectively. The Department will begin to develop the rules governing each, to give context for setting and understanding the values of each and their relative importance compared to all of the traditional factors in the acquisition tradespace. Two significant studies to help provide this context and develop this set of rules will be completed this Spring. In addition to the technology investments and demonstration programs underway, the Department will realize significant reductions in its demand for delivered energy in the battlespace.

The Department is investing more to improve the energy profile of fixed installations. Financing for these investments has come from annually appropriated funds, including military construction, operation and maintenance, and the Energy Conservation Investment Program (ECIP). The Department has used third-party financing through Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) and Utilities Energy Service Contracts (UESCs). The Department is also pursuing other innovative financing mechanisms, such as Enhanced Use Leases (EULs) and Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs). The Department’s basic investment strategy is twofold: 1) reduce the demand for traditional energy through conservation and energy efficiency; and 2) increase the supply of renewable and other alternative energy sources. Investments that curb demand are the most cost-effective way to improve an installation’s energy profile.

2. In addition to being well situated to support energy conservation and efficiency projects, DOD installations can be used as test beds for next generation technologies coming out of laboratories in industry, universities, and the Department of Energy. The Department’s built infrastructure is unique for its size and variety, reflecting the diversity of building types and climates throughout the United States. For a
wide range of energy technologies, the Department can play a crucial role by filling
the gap between research and deployment. For technologies that prove effective, the
Department can go on to serve as an early customer, thereby helping create a mar-
ket. This will allow the Department to leverage both the cost savings and technology
advances that private sector involvement will yield. The Department is pursuing the
energy test bed approach on a small scale through the Environmental Security
Technology Certification Program (ESTCP). We hope to expand it, working closely
with the Department of Energy and other agencies and organizations. The FY11
budget is only the first step toward implementing the QDR, a foundation document
that will guide development of future budgets as well. This means we will be mak-
ing additional investments in Program Objective Memorandum–12 and beyond as
the renewable energy and smart grid technology matures. Demonstrations being
performed under the Net Zero Joint Concept Technology Demonstration, and the
Marine Corps EXFOB (Example Forward Operating Base), are focused efforts to in-
troduce renewables and smart grid technologies, in conjunction with existing gen-
eration sources. These are methodical, prudent efforts to create the right mix of re-
liable technologies that will help take convoys off the road and make U.S. forces more secure.

3. The Department has made wide use of third-party financed energy conservation
projects accomplished through vehicles such as Energy Savings Performance Con-
tracts (ESPCs) and Utility Energy Services Contracts (UESCs), which allow the De-
partment to use industry funding to pay for new energy-related equipment to reduce
life cycle costs of facilities and pay it back from the accrued energy savings. ESPCs
and UESCs typically generate 15–20% of all facility energy annual savings that the
Department realizes. Use of ESPC and UESC for 2009 reached an award value of
$258 million. DOD annual energy savings from these contracts are expected to reach
nearly 1.2 billion BTUs, which, although significant, represent slightly more than
one-half of one percent (0.5%) of DOD’s annual consumption. From 2003–2009,
third-party financed energy contract awards totaled $1.74B. The Department can
build on this progress by increasing the use of third-party financed contracts, ena-
bling more cost-effective, long-term facilities operation and maintenance with no up-
front costs. Third-party financed contracts are a valuable tool in our “energy tool
box” towards reduced energy demand. The Department is very happy with energy
savings performance contracts as they are valuable financing tools and contracts de-
signed to make ESPCs as practical and cost-effective as possible for Federal agen-
cies. The Department is continuing annual energy auditing to identify and establish
facilities’ energy requirements. ESPC contract vehicles will be utilized to bring solu-
tions for many of those requirements and assist the Department towards annual en-
ergy intensity reductions. The Department appreciates the continued support
Congress has provided to third-party energy financing contracts.

4. It is as difficult to predict where the Department’s energy profile will be in 20
years as it would be to make such a prediction for the United States as a whole.
One strong indicator of success in 20 years will be whether or not energy, and its
related factors of unrefueled range and logistics tail mitigation, are as significant
considerations as the more mainstream factors of lethality, speed, and crew protec-
tion in designing U.S. forces’ equipment. Some of the significant milestones for the
Department, looking out over the next 20 years, are the maturation and full imple-
mentation of the Energy Efficiency KPP and the development of a methodology for
determining the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel applicable across all Military Depart-
ments. Another key milestone will be integration of energy considerations, at the
tactical, operational, and strategic level, into our analytic agenda. We need to do
that in order to develop the analytic capital to support incorporating energy consid-
erations in the tradespace when we make next generation weapon system decisions.

Ms. GIFFORDS. Under current projections, there continues to be a gap in the Air
National Guard, even under the most optimistic projections. In the next 7 years, the
Air Guard will lose 80% of its fighter aircraft to attrition and close 13 Fighter Wings
unless the Department acts now. Last year we were promised a plan for recapital-
izing the Air National Guard’s fighter fleet but neither the budget nor the QDR ap-
pear to contain one. 1. What is the long-term strategic plan for maintaining the
fighter expertise in the Air Guard? 2. The timeline for JSF and the timeline for air-
craft retirements leave a multi-year gap. How does the Department plan to fill that
gap with the required number of manned fighter aircraft and under the current re-
alties of the F–35 program? 3. We were also promised a comprehensive report on
the Air Sovereignty Alert mission. What is the Department’s long-term plan for
resourcing ASA? 4. In determining the overall force structure for Air Force fighters
laid out in this report, what criteria did the Department use to arrive at its final
number set? 5. Did the Department make any determinations on apportioning capa-
bilities and missions between the Active and Reserve components? 6. Assuming that
Reserve Component forces are less costly, as they normally have been, is the Department prepared to adjust the total top line number of fighter based on cost savings that could be realized by apportioning more aircraft to the Guard and Reserve?

Secretary FLOURNOY. The Air Reserve Component made up of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, and the Active Duty Air Force are full partners in the Air Force’s Total Force concept, providing critical capabilities for the Joint Warfighter across the full spectrum of conflict. Today the Air Reserve Component flies some of the newest and also some of the oldest fighter aircraft in the Air Force inventory. The FY10 budget retired 257 of the Air Force’s oldest fighter aircraft and recapitalized a number of Air Reserve Component units with newer and more capable 4th generation fighters from the active inventory. In FY11, F–22s will be delivered to the combined Active and Reserve Component wing in Honolulu, Hawaii. Similar F–22 wings already exist at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, and Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska. As the F–35 is delivered to both the Active and Reserve Components, additional 4th generation aircraft will become available to recapitalize older Air Reserve Component fighters.

The 30-year Aviation Plan, which DOD has provided to Congress, provides the Department’s current long-term plan for fighter forces. In addition to this, there are currently a number of congressional reports addressing Air Reserve Component fighter force structure that are being staffed within the Department. I expect that these reports will be complete within the next few months.

The FY11 President’s Budget reflects a complete review of Air Force fighter requirements. These requirements were developed based on a thorough examination of the current and future strategic environment. The Department determined that there were minimal impacts on Air Reserve Component Homeland Defense missions, other flying missions, and overall pilot and maintenance capability.

During the past two decades, the Air Reserve Component has borne a significant portion of the burden imposed by forward deployed operations. The Air Reserve Component’s ability to provide forces at a reduced operating cost is directly tied to the Active Component’s on-going investment in the Air Force-wide equipment, modernization, and training pipeline. Historically, the ratio between Active and Air Reserve Component aircraft has not exceeded a 60/40 mix. If the Air Reserve Component grows beyond 40% of the total Air Force, sustainability and potential cost benefits diminish. At the end of FY11, the percentage of Air Reserve Component combat-coded fighter aircraft is projected to be 42% of the total combat-coded fighter force.

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**QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS**

Ms. TSONGAS. The QDR highlights the Department of Defense’s efforts to rebalance U.S. military capabilities to emphasize flexibility of the force, with increased focus on “enabling” systems. The focus on enabling systems, such as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Programs, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), electronic attack systems, and enhanced cyber defensive and offensive capabilities, will significantly enhance the ability of U.S. forces to protect and advance National Interests. These new enabling technologies not only contribute to our ability to execute full-spectrum operations, but also greatly enhance force protection. Developing unmanned, remotely operated, or electronic capabilities is, I believe, important to our National Defense. But I also believe that developing policies of employment are equally important. As DOD develops more and more capabilities to act remotely, how are you ensuring that these capabilities are being employed lawfully? Is there a joint doctrine for employment of UAVs or is each service responsible for developing their own? How does DOD ensure that nation-state sovereignty or international laws are not violated as U.S. forces employ remotely operated systems—both for ISR missions and bombing missions?

Secretary FLOURNOY. The Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) establishes joint guidance, considerations, and concepts for optimum UAS employment across the range of military operations. Additionally, specific UAS employment considerations are addressed in more detail in the areas of command and control (C2), interoperability, airspace management, and coalition participation.

Lawful operation of any military capability, manned or unmanned, in international or sovereign airspace, rests primarily with our combatant commanders who employ force as necessary to meet mission requirements in accordance with orders and guidance approved by the Secretary of Defense, including Rules of Engagement (ROE) that comply with applicable requirements of U.S. and international law. UAVs are operated under ROE lawful orders, guidance, and ROE—both for manned and unmanned military platforms. Although strikes may be conducted using UAVs, those strikes are under the control of the UAV’s remote human operator.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NYE

Mr. Nye. Under Secretary Flournoy, as you might expect, I was quite disappointed to see that the QDR included the recommendation that the Nation invest upwards of $1 billion to establish a redundant East Coast homeport for nuclear carriers. Coming just 4 years after a 2005 BRAC round in which the Navy was unable to close as many installations as it had recommend, the QDR suggests that it makes sense for the Navy to build a fifth nuclear carrier homeport in the United States, even as the carrier fleet is reduced to its lowest level in decades. Secretary Flournoy, I would appreciate hearing your perspectives on why such an investment makes sense in an era of unprecedented federal deficits, a national debt of about $14 trillion, major shortfalls in key defense programs such as shipbuilding and maintenance accounts, and signs that various acquisition programs that are critical to our Nation’s military capabilities—such as the F–35—are experiencing substantial cost increases that could devour enormous portions of future military budgets.

Secretary Flournoy. Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers are one of this Nation’s most valuable strategic assets. Whereas in the Pacific they are based at three locations, in the Atlantic these assets and their associated nuclear maintenance facilities are currently homeported at a single location. In the QDR, the Department concluded that the strategic benefit of dispersing aircraft carriers and nuclear maintenance facilities across the East Coast outweighs the costs to upgrade Mayport. The decision to homeport, and not just create an alternate East Coast port, provides the additional nuclear maintenance facility necessary to reduce the risk to our being able to sustain our East Coast carrier fleet from any large magnitude event, such as a terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster. The cost of this effort is expected to be approximately $500 million and will take about eight years. It is the Department’s view that this investment in risk mitigation is prudent, representing approximately 10% of the cost of a single carrier, or about 1% of the value of the carrier fleet.

Mr. Nye. I would appreciate hearing about the evolution of the QDR homeporting recommendation. According to a December 3 draft version of the document that was widely circulated by the media, the recommendation at that time was to “provide an alternative port to dock East Coast aircraft carriers to mitigate the risk of a manmade or natural disaster.” That recommendation appears to suggest making the minimal investments necessary to build alternative docking capacity, but to hold back from spending hundreds of millions of dollars more in investments necessary to maintain carriers at Mayport, or from incurring the many operational inefficiencies that will result in nuclear workforce, carrier airwing transport, and support ship movements that would result from homeporting a carrier in Mayport. I am also aware of a late December draft of the QDR that recommended homeporting a carrier in Mayport, but did not include the investment into maintenance facilities. And then, of course, the final QDR recommends homeporting and maintenance facilities at Mayport—and the Navy FYDP includes more than $200 million for those purposes, an amount that does not even reflect the complete costs of the effort. So, it appears that the homeporting recommendation changed greatly from early December—can you explain this evolution from a recommendation that had all of the strategic benefits at a fraction of the cost and operational challenges into one that presents substantial operational and financial costs but minimal strategic benefits?

Secretary Flournoy. The QDR went through numerous drafts and revisions over many months before it was officially released in February. All versions prior to the February release were staff drafts only. From June through August 2009, the QDR Global Posture Issue Team, which included senior officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Department of Navy, analyzed the issue. In the fall, Secretary Gates and senior Departmental leadership reviewed and approved the QDR recommendation to support homeporting a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in Mayport, Florida. The rationale supporting this decision rests on strategic dispersal and the security of our Atlantic carrier fleet in the event of a terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster.

Mr. Nye. In your testimony you stated “the Secretary—together with Admiral Mullen—took action to direct resources away from lower-priority programs and activities so that more pressing needs could be addressed. Can you direct me tell me what lower priority programs just missed the cut to be included in QDR? Your Direct Quote from testimony: “Early in the QDR and in the course of the process of completing DOD’s budget submission for FY 2010, the Secretary—together with Admiral Mullen—took action to direct resources away from lower-priority programs and activities so that more pressing needs could be addressed, both within that budget and in the years that follow it.”
Secretary FLOURNOY. To support increases in needed capabilities, the Department’s leadership identified areas where the Department could assume increased risk and take reductions. For example, reductions were taken in the Future Combat Systems, F–22, and Presidential helicopter programs. The Secretary also terminated under-performing programs, including DIMHRS and the Net Enabled Command and Control program. Finally, DOD proposes to conclude production of the C–17 aircraft, having completed the planned procurement of those aircraft.

Mr. NYE. Yesterday, Admiral Mullen testified that the idea of strategic dispersal that applies to East Coast carriers also applies to other singularly based assets including, for example, submarines equipped with nuclear weapons at Kings Bay or long range bombers. Do you agree with this assessment? Then would it be accurate to say that the DOD will look to disperse other grouped assets or singularly placed infrastructure?

Secretary FLOURNOY. I agree that strategic dispersal is an important concept to protect the Nation’s strategic assets. The Military Departments continuously assess risks to the force, consistent with their Title 10 responsibilities, and take risk mitigation measures, such as strategic dispersal, when appropriate. The QDR Report makes clear that in key regions, U.S. forces will need to have access to networks of bases and supporting infrastructures that are more resilient than today's in the face of attacks by a variety of means. Redundancy and dispersal concepts are critical concepts we are exploring in our ongoing global posture review.

The decision to homeport, and not just create an alternate East Coast port, provides the additional nuclear maintenance facility necessary to reduce the risk to our East Coast carrier fleet from any large magnitude event, such as a terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster.

Strategically dispersing carrier homeports on the East Coast provides a more equivalent risk reduction to that afforded the Pacific carrier fleet, which is strategically dispersed to homeports in Washington, California, and Japan.

The analysis on East Coast carriers led to the conclusion that the strategic benefit of dispersing aircraft carriers and nuclear maintenance facilities along the East Coast outweighs the costs to upgrade Mayport. A similar cost-benefit analysis would be applied in any future decisions to disperse key assets strategically.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL

Mr. KISSELL. The QDR outlines the need to “Succeed in Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism.” Within the models and scenarios you used to plan for military operations other than two simultaneous conventional wars, did your calculations address our need to surge in both Iraq and Afghanistan? Is the force able to sustain two major counterinsurgency operations as we see today while fighting other scenarios you used during your war games prior to publishing the 2010 QDR? Additionally, we have repeatedly heard about a need to increase the number of civilians involved in the counterinsurgency effort. We know that civilians are training the police, incorporating supply systems, partnering with government officials, and working in the industrial sector. These are just a few examples of the areas civilians are contributing, but as we know, our war fighters are also performing many of the same duties in some degree. Often, our young sergeants, lieutenants, and captains are serving in roles far beyond their scope of understanding in an effort to get the job done. I am impressed with their efforts and applaud their versatility; however, we need more to allow our war fighters to focus on security operations. In the Succeed in Counterinsurgency, Stability, and Counterterrorism section of the QDR you include one sentence acknowledging the use of civilians. The sentence states, “The Department is also exploring ways to better integrate civil affairs functions with complementary stability operations activities, such as those of Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Human Terrain Teams deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

What steps are being taken now, so that in the future we are not asking our young combat officers and non-commissioned officers to secure areas as well as serve partner with government officials, supervise the repair of water treatment plants, and determine if a contractor is building a school or a bridge to specifications. If you are using Afghanistan and Iraq to model future counterinsurgencies and if the lessons from both theaters should be adopted into doctrine, are you emphasizing a robust partnership between the Department of Defense and the Department of State? Please explain the Department’s exploration into ways to better integrate. I would like to remain aware of your efforts and any final decisions that are made.

Secretary FLOURNOY. The Iraq and Afghanistan surge and post-surge periods were accounted for in the analysis. The QDR report describes two broad periods, near- to mid-term, taking into account continuing combat activities in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan; and the mid- to long-term, which takes into account the decrease in combat activities in and drawdown of forces from Iraq. It is in this second period that multiple combat operations beyond the current counterinsurgency operations were analyzed, recognizing the current demand on U.S. forces.

DOD recognizes that whole-of-government approaches are fundamental to the success of counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns. Secretary Gates has voiced strong support for building the capacity of civilian capabilities within the U.S. Government. Consistent with this guidance, the “Strengthening Interagency Partnerships” section of the QDR Report notes that, “the Department will continue to work with the leadership of civilian agencies to support the agencies’ growth and their operations in the field, so that the appropriate military and civilian resources are put forth to meet the demands of current contingencies.” To that end, the Department included interagency partners in its QDR team that looked at capabilities required for COIN missions. Similarly, the Department is providing support to the ongoing Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development and Homeland Security Reviews underway at the Departments of State and Homeland Security, respectively.