CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS,
INSURANCE, AND GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

APRIL 21, 2010

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services

Serial No. 111–125
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT

Wednesday, April 21, 2010

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS,
INSURANCE, AND GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ENTERPRISES,
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 2128, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Paul E. Kanjorski [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Members present: Representatives Kanjorski, Sherman, Hinojosa, Baca, Maloney, Bean, Perlmutter, Carson, Adler, Kilroy, Kosmas, Peters; Garrett, Castle, Manzullo, Hensarling, Campbell, and Jenkins.

Also present: Representative Ellison.

Chairman KANJORSKI. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises will come to order.

Pursuant to the committee rules, each side will have 15 minutes for opening statements. Without objection, all members’ opening statements will be made a part of the record.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Ellison, a member of the full Financial Services Committee, be allowed to participate in today’s subcommittee hearing and to offer an opening statement. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Good morning. Today, we meet to consider several thoughtful bills that seek by various means to correct the imbalance of power between investors and management. For far too long at too many public companies, corporate executives have had the upper hand.

The financial crisis revealed at times vividly and shockingly how all too frequently corporate management and boards failed to consider the long-term interests of their shareholders. As a result, innocent investors incurred monumental losses, even while corporate chieftains escaped the inferno unscathed, usually by golden parachute.

It is clear that the deck was stacked, especially when you consider that Wall Street bankers took home enormous paychecks while the taxpayers got stuck with the bill. We now need to chart a different course. Congress must act to democratize corporate governance rules so that investors have a greater say in the companies that they own.
First and foremost, we ought to provide shareholders with easier means of getting directors nominated. Also, we should act to improve transparency by requiring many institutional investment managers to disclose how they vote on shareholder proxies.

In the run-up to the crisis, excessive leverage and risk-taking became the norm on Wall Street. These decisions flew in the face of financial stability and lacked a fundamental level of good judgment. We can fix this problem by requiring public companies to form independent risk management committees with prescribed functions and duties.

While the ideas in each of the bills before us are well-intended, we also need to carefully examine each proposal. As for the appealing idea of separating the role of chairman from that of chief executive officer, we should explore how such a policy will affect small companies.

Requiring majority voting for uncontested directors also appears a worthy goal, but we must determine if it could produce inadvertent problems, especially if too few shareholders vote.

As part of last year's debates on the Wall Street Reform bill, our committee has already acted to improve corporate governance laws. As passed by the House, H.R. 4173 contained important provisions on proxy access and executive pay. It is my hope that the Senate will act with all deliberate speed on its reform legislation so that these important corporate governance reforms can become law.

In the meantime, we must advance the debate about how we can further enhance corporate governance through increased transparency, better executive accountability, and greater shareholder rights.

In this regard, I look forward to the testimony today and thank the witnesses for appearing.

I would also like to thank Congressman Peters, Congressman Ellison, and Congresswoman Kilroy for their hard work on these important policy matters.

The gentleman from New Jersey, our ranking member, Mr. Garrett, is recognized for 4 minutes.

Mr. GARRETT. I thank the chairman. I thank all the witnesses today. An angle that I have taken to consider the multitude of pieces of legislation and proposals put forward since the recent financial crisis is how do each one of these proposals actually address one of the underlying causes of the financial crisis?

So far, it has not been demonstrated to me convincingly that broadly speaking, the crisis was a result of corporate governance, a weakness in corporate governance, and more specifically, I remain to be convinced that the particular proposals put forward in Congressman Peters’ bill and the other related proposals would have either prevented the current crisis or would in fact be a net positive for corporations going forward.

Just as an aside, philosophically speaking, being the chairman and founder of the Congressional Constitution Caucus, I am really hesitant to over turn 150 years of precedent in which corporate governance has been decided at the State level.

I am also very weary of the Federal Government taking on new tasks not envisioned by our founding fathers, especially when the
States have shown they are basically perfectly capable to address these situations.

The proposals that are being marketed by the supporters as remedies to the financial crisis, I think we really do need to keep in mind that they would apply to all companies, all public companies, big and small, financial and non-financial as well.

Creating this one size-fits-all-mandate, for instance, with a proposal that mandates that every public company have a separate chairman and CEO, that is really not an appropriate so-called “solution” for many of the companies out there.

The thing about practical examples of that, some of the great business leaders in modern times, people like Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, Sam Walton, they have all held the same role at the same time and they have done pretty well at it. They created billions of dollars for shareholder values while also creating literally millions of jobs for this country.

Most companies, I think, are happy to provide a rationale for having the same person hold both positions, if that is what the particular board thinks is best for that company.

Again, no mandate that each and every company must separate the two roles is going to be an appropriate policy solution for every company. Besides, many of the proposals being put forth are already being adopted, I guess you could say, organically by many of the companies out there. In some cases, a resounding majority of the stockholders of the companies out there are taking these views.

We also need to remember that board members have a fiduciary duty to set corporate policy and make decisions based on creating long-term value for the firm, and with the recent corporate scandals now in the spotlight, pressures are on board members more than ever to do just that, and to do the right thing on behalf of the companies they serve.

Giving increased powers to certain shareholders in a corporate policymaking process on the other hand, while it may be well-intentioned, I am sure, could actually have the unintended consequences of serving interests of more short-term goals while also introducing other agendas not directly associated with the best interest of that particular company into its corporate governance decision-making process.

When you think about it, this would really be an ironic outcome indeed, since the focus would now be on short-term gains as often cited as a contributing cause of the recent financial crisis.

In addition to the proposals contained in this legislation under consideration today, there are other areas, such as the role played by proxy advisor services, as well as proposals to increase retail shareholder voting, and direct communication with shareholders. I will be interested to hear from the panel before us later on.

In conclusion, at a time when the number one priority of this Congress should be enacting policies that create jobs, I fear that many of the proposals put forth in the legislation under consideration at today’s hearing, as I said before, that I am sure are well intended, will have the unintended consequences of hurting the long-term ability of firms to do just that, create jobs, to thrive, either because of inappropriate one-size-fits-all policymaking or increased focus on short-term goals.
Finally, yet another increase in the Federal Government’s role in our economy, especially at the SEC, which has really yet to demonstrate that it can perform its primary role of protecting investors, also does not seem to be the best prescription for fixing our economy’s long-term health.

With all that being said, I look forward to hearing all the witnesses today.

Chairman Kanjorski. Thank you, Mr. Garrett. We will now hear from Mr. Peters from Michigan for 3 minutes.

Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairman Kanjorski, for holding today’s hearing to discuss legislation that I believe would be not only important to improve corporate governance but also lead to a more stable economy as well.

During the 111th Congress, this committee has held numerous hearings to investigate the causes of the collapse of the financial sector in the fall of 2008. While there were many contributing causes of the financial crisis, I believe that one significant cause was the failure of corporate governance of shareholders, including over 100 million Americans who own stock either in individual accounts or through a mutual fund, who have lost trillions of dollars in savings as a result.

However, corporate governance is an issue that affects the entire economy, not just the financial sector. While some of the most egregious examples of excessive risk-taking and compensation have been found on Wall Street, there are plenty of other examples in other companies as well.

I spent 22 years in the private sector and I believe the best and most effective regulation is self-regulation. That is why I believe we should empower shareholders, the company’s true owners, to hold corporate boards and management more accountable and help them better align their priorities with long-term value.

As Members of Congress, we are held accountable to our constituents through meaningful democratic elections. However, in many corporations, management slates run unopposed and large long-term shareholders lack the ability to nominate their own candidates. Even worse, these nominees are elected even if a majority of shareholders vote against them.

The current system of electing boards of directors, holding executives accountable and overseeing executive compensation is rigged against shareholders and in favor of management. The balance of power simply must change.

Last December, the House passed the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which contained a number of provisions that will improve corporate governance. For example, it will give shareholders a vote on corporate compensation packages, it has improved disclosure of performance targets, and also includes language that would give the SEC authority to implement its proxy access rules.

Soon, the Senate will be taking up comprehensive corporate governance reform legislation on its own. This legislation introduced by Senator Dodd contains a corporate governance title which includes many of the provisions which are in H.R. 2861, the Shareholder Empowerment Act.
We all agree that our corporations and boards need to focus on building long-term value for our shareholders. I introduced H.R. 2861 because I strongly believe that it is the shareholders themselves who should have the power to oversee large complex institutions and hold corporate boards and senior management accountable for their mistakes and mismanagement.

I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses, and I would like again to thank Chairman Kanjorski for holding this hearing today, and I look forward to working with him to enact meaningful, comprehensive corporate governance legislation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Kanjorski. Thank you very much, Mr. Peters. Now, we will hear from the gentleman from Delaware, Mr. Castle.

Mr. Castle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today’s hearing. Corporate governance is an important issue to me and to this committee. I appreciate the opportunity to review current proposals and hear from experts on the impact of altering existing corporate governance laws.

Some believe that corporate governance should be examined in response to the financial crisis, while others have expressed their intentions to add these sweeping changes onto a legislative response to a recent Supreme Court ruling on campaign finance.

I believe that regardless of the legislative vehicle being discussed to push these issues forward, we must be especially careful when considering proposals that intrude on the province of State laws without taking into account their long-established histories and leadership on corporate matters and their ability to quickly respond to emerging issues.

I understand that many of today’s witnesses will be commenting on Mr. Peters’ Shareholder Empowerment Act, which includes provisions to increase investor influence over corporate boards by allowing investors to dominate a candidate on the corporate proxy statement.

The Peters’ bill also deals with the issue of requiring directors to receive majority voting.

I am interested in learning from today’s witnesses their comments on the underlying concerns here that the proposed legislation is intending to respond to, and the efforts already under way to address some of these issues.

For example, States have already begun to respond to the proxy access concerns by clarifying the authority of companies and their shareholders to adopt proxy access and proxy reimbursement by-laws.

Similar changes are under consideration in the Model Business Corporation Act. Furthermore, shareholders already have the ability to place majority voting proposals on the proxy and 75 percent of boards now have some form of majority voting for directors.

I look forward to the testimony of today’s witnesses and I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Kanjorski. Thank you very much, Mr. Castle. We will now hear from the gentlelady from Ohio, Ms. Kilroy.

Ms. Kilroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on this issue and for the hearing this morning.
Today, we are taking a look at several proposals that will help strengthen corporate governance rules, an important undertaking, especially after what I learned yesterday at the hearing on Lehman Brothers.

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today, but I want to touch briefly on an exchange I had yesterday with Mr. Anton Valukas, the court-appointed examiner for the Lehman bankruptcy.

I asked Mr. Valukas whether Lehman’s board of directors had a responsibility to stop Lehman’s senior managers from ignoring their own risk management system to pursue reckless and dangerous risks. Mr. Valukas replied that the risk management process Lehman had in place was good, although it was exceeded some 30 times in a short period of time, and thus, under the business judgment rule, Lehman could go forward with their risky bets.

Mr. Valukas went on to say that it is the regulators’ responsibility to step in when management is making a decision that could have such dire consequences for the larger economy, and I agree, but a first line of defense should come from the risk management directors and the boards of directors of these companies, who should have asked the right questions, who could have stopped management from taking those excessive risks that threatened the company and as we witnessed, the economy on the whole.

For too long, the boards of these financial firms have rubber-stamped their managerial decisions and for too long, corporate governance rules have been skewed in a way to preserve the status quo, to prevent shareholders from having a greater voice in how companies do business.

The proposals we will discuss today could enhance transparency, increase shareholder power, improve management accountability, and enhance corporate governance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership on this important issue. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Ms. Kilroy. Now, we will hear from the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hensarling, for 4 minutes.

Mr. HENSAHLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Coming into this hearing, as I come into many other hearings, I recall the President’s Chief of Staff, Rahm Emanuel’s, infamous adage, “Never let a serious crisis go to waste; it allows you to do things that you could not previously do before.”

I see so many different ideas and pieces of legislation, some of which may be meritorious, all trying to be shoe-horned in on the idea that somehow this will prevent the next great economic crisis.

I have looked at the underlying causes. I respectfully disagree with the gentleman from Michigan. I am trying to figure out where the corporate governance issue is.

I believe there are some very legitimate corporate governance issues that we need to discuss as a society. Having said that, I am not exactly certain that the Federal Government is somehow uniquely qualified to mandate best practices for corporate governance.

I think occasionally, if we look at the record in the underlying causes of our financial debacle, frankly, it was a lot of Federal legislation and Federal regulators. Who was the one who came up
with the brainchild of having Government-Sponsored Enterprises, be able to privatize their profits, socialize their losses, and then give them affordable housing and tell them you have to loan money to people to buy homes who ultimately cannot afford to stay in those homes.

Maybe it was the bright people who came up with the idea that we ought to create an oligopoly in rating agencies. We know where that got us.

Maybe it was the fine regulators at OTS who could have stopped AIG but did not. They had the regulatory authority we learned yesterday. The SEC had full regulatory authority to have Lehman account for their Repo 105 transactions, they did not. The SEC could have stopped them. They could have had Lehman Brothers reserve more capital, and lower their leverage, but they did not do it. Maybe it was those Federal people who came up with those great ideas. Maybe it was the bank regulators who said if you will concentrate your statutory capital in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, all will be fine.

My point is as one who has spent a number of years in private enterprise and a number of years in government, I have not found that people in government are somehow uniquely smarter or more insightful than those in private business.

Again, I believe there may be some legitimate debates over certain aspects of these proposals. To think that at this time that number one, corporate governance issues are somehow at the heart or even a significant contributing factor to the economic crisis, I just have not seen the evidence. I have an open mind. I just do not have empty mind.

Second, to somehow think that the Federal Government is best positioned to make these decisions, particularly at a time when the Nation still has high unemployment, still a generational high, here is one more great uncertainty, one more great cost, one more great mandate to be thrown on the job creating sector in America, that perhaps maybe the Federal Government ought to let it do its business and get about creating jobs, which I think most of our constituents would agree, job number one ought to be creating jobs.

Instead, here is yet another Federal takeover. Here are more Federal mandates that are going to harm jobs. Again, if this was just restricted to Wall Street, I just question why is the proposal going to impact every single publicly held company in America?

Again, it is a huge overreach that could have devastating unintended consequences yet again on an economy that is struggling to create jobs.

I approach this particular proposal with a lot of skepticism. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Hensarling. Now, we will hear from Mr. Baca for 1 minute.

Mr. BACA. Thank you very much. I want to thank Chairman Kanjorski and Ranking Member Garrett for calling this hearing. I also want to thank all of the witnesses for being here today and offering your insights.

Finally, I want to commend Mr. Peters, Mr. Ellison, and Ms. Kilroy for their hard work on this issue.
The events of the past years demonstrate the flaws in corporate structure and its governance. Too often, decisions are made by a select few without paying any regard to the interests or views of the shareholders.

While the arguments of corporate efficiency is offered as a justification for the way things are done, I would point simply to September 2008 and its aftermath to show what this narrow-minded thinking can cause.

Corporate boards find themselves in the position and are unresponsive to shareholders’ demands. Even if the shareholders want to change the structure, proxy rules and the corporate election process are often too expensive to be able to accomplish anything.

Last year, the committee and this chamber took major steps to enact some of these changes, and hopefully these will be able to pass financial regulatory reform law soon.

During this hearing, I will be interested to hear the reforms we need with regard to proxy access and corporate accountability. I also am eager to talk about the increased diversity within the boardrooms, allowing for more accurate representation, not only of the shareholders, but the market in which these corporations operate.

I want them to look like what America looks like as well, and we do not see that.

Again, I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member for their leadership on this issue. It is about time that we had oversight and accountability, and if we did not have government intervention, then we would not be here right now if there was not too much greed.

I respect the gentleman’s comments. Yes, we do have higher unemployment, and we have had Federal mandates, but sometimes we need these Federal mandates to make sure there is accountability and oversight, and we are doing what is right for the American people.

Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Kanjorski. Thank you very much, Mr. Baca.

Mr. Ellison has not arrived yet, so we will try to reserve some of his time that can be expanded when he comes for questioning.

Now, we will go to the panel, and I want to thank you all for appearing before the subcommittee today. Without objection, your written statements will be made a part of the record. You will each be recognized for a 5-minute summary of your testimony.

First, we have the Honorable Steven D. Irwin, commissioner, Pennsylvania Securities Commission.

Mr. Irwin?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEVEN D. IRWIN, PENNSYLVANIA SECURITIES COMMISSIONER, AND CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL LEGISLATION COMMITTEE, NORTH AMERICAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION, INC. (NASAA)

Mr. Irwin. Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, and members of the subcommittee, the single most important task which confronts legislators and securities regulators is restoring public faith and confidence in American financial institutions.
Without a fair and honest landscape through which retail investors can work toward their financial goals, their activity will continue to suffer dramatic contractions.

The loss of public confidence can be seen from our up-close and personal experiences with many who have withdrawn from the securities market.

The Pennsylvania Securities Commission conducted nearly 500 investor education presentations to residents in 62 counties during the last 2 years alone. Attendees related that they are worried about a secure retirement or paying for a child's education. Many complain about their losses because of decreasing value of stocks, and others indicate fear of getting involved in the stock market altogether. Those who pulled out their money in order to not subject it to any more risk remain afraid to get back in.

Beyond anecdotal concerns, the data substantiate that investor distrust is an ongoing phenomenon. The 200 day moving average volume on the New York Stock Exchange now is 1.2 billion shares. It is down nearly 25 percent from a year ago.

As stock prices have risen over the past year, the lower volume of trading evidences that main street investors have largely stayed out of the market.

Investors have not lost confidence because of a single event, but because of serial market abuses, from mutual fund timing schemes and misrepresentations concerning auction rate securities to Madoff's and Stanford's ponzi schemes.

No one solution can restore investor faith and trust. However, this hearing builds on several significant steps already taken by this subcommittee and the full House in addressing the dangers to the U.S. economy.

Businesses have evolved from a world where decision-makers as owners of their enterprises were responsible to theirselves and felt a sense of duty to their communities. Growth of enterprises and involvement of public investors led to a separation of ownership from control. From that separation, emerged disagreement over what constitutes fair compensation for management.

Traditionally, government has not involved itself in the process whereby compensation is set. The present crisis has spotlighted a lack of input by shareholders into executive compensation in publicly held entities. Sadly, the line between fair and negotiated compensation and corporate looting and breach of fiduciary responsibility can be difficult to define.

It has been a struggle to infuse good governance measures. Officers frequently can control board selection with compliant directors' approving compensation packages that are designed by friendly independent consultants. Under this circumstance, conflicts of interest are ripe.

Executive compensation has long thirsted for objective scrutiny. It is a component of corporate governance that seems understandable to the less sophisticated retail investor for whom it serves as a barometer of internal restraints and effective stewardship.

A lead position in management does not bestow entitlement to hoard profits from shareowners. Growth and productivity demand, of course, an abundance of inducements for creativity and high level of performance.
At the same time, inducements must be tied to actual production of long-term value for shareholders, rather than to manipulation of financial results for the short-term.

In this regard, we applaud the SEC’s recent efforts to allow for greater shareholder access to information, particularly amendments to proxy rules that require disclosure of risks arising from compensation policies.

In 2007, State securities regulators adopted a resolution on disclosure concerning executive compensation and conflicts of interest underlying the process by which it is approved.

The person in the street sees salaries of corporate decision-makers steadily increased to a level viewed as obscene, while at the same time, the companies paying these salaries diminish in value.

Ultimately, the funds to pay managers come from the owners of the corporation, the shareholders. A dollar doled to the manager in the form of augmented salary, bonus or stock options is a dollar less in corporate assets.

The balance sheet should reflect the addition of a dollar or more of corporate value before it is paid.

The little power shareholders have to influence executive compensation lies now in their right to sell their shares. An effective counter weight must avail them legal strategies that will enable them to press the issue.

In order to have any material bearing, shareholders must have relevant and complete information. Sunlight is a renowned disinfectant, but disclosure cannot be the sole remedy.

Shareholders possessing the knowledge and skills to do so must undertake independent analysis and aggressively articulate their concerns. They cannot stick their heads in the sand and ignore compensation abuses.

Even with an evolution in corporate governance, financial regulatory reform will not regain the trust of Main Street unless Congress embraces extending fiduciary duty to all professionals who provide advice to investors.

Reform must prevent abuse of the process by which capital is raised by those more interested in soliciting funds than promoting legitimate enterprises.

Straightforward disqualification of repeat offenders of the rules of the game is a logical deterrent to such abuse.

In closing, the unique experiences of my fellow State securities regulators on the front lines of investor protection have provided the framework for my testimony this morning. We commit to continuing to work with the subcommittee to afford the investing public the needed security to return to our capital markets.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Commissioner Irwin can be found on page 300 of the appendix.]
STATEMENT OF GREGORY W. SMITH, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER AND GENERAL COUNSEL, COLORADO PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION

Mr. GREGORY SMITH. Thank you, Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, and members of the subcommittee. Good morning.

I am Greg Smith, chief operating officer and general counsel of the Colorado Public Employees’ Retirement Association. I am pleased to appear before you today on behalf of Colorado PERA and our membership of over 460,000 current and past public servants of our State.

Because Colorado is one of the first States to address the sustainability of its pension plan as a result of the 2008 crisis, each and every one of our members has sacrificed through reduced benefits, including our retirees.

We are responsible for investment over $34 billion in assets on behalf of our members for the exclusive purpose of providing retirement benefits.

Our obligation to pay benefits extends not only to today’s retirees but ultimately to those newly hired public servants who will work a 35-year career and then draw a monthly benefit for 20 or more years in retirement.

As a result, our investment time horizon extends over 50 years. We and our peers are the market’s long-term investors, and the protection of a marketplace that promotes the creation of shareholder value for the long-term is imperative to the success of our mission.

We should not be required to simply exercise the Wall Street walk and abandon our investment because management is undermining shareholder value or acting in their self-interest to the detriment of shareholders.

We should be entitled as the owners who have put our capital at risk to insist that management be held accountable. This is not an unreasonable expectation, and the mechanism to accomplish this accountability is improved corporate governance, beginning with the creation of alignment between shareholder interests and the board of directors.

As an owner of the Nation’s largest and most prominent corporations, our fund is strongly aligned with corporate America. We have every interest in its long-term success and profitability.

However, Colorado PERA firmly believes that the global financial crisis represents a massive failure of board oversight as well as regulation. Our members have paid a steep price for these failures.

Clearly, boards of directors failed to adequately understand, monitor, and oversee enterprise risk and corporate strategy. Far too many boards structured and approved executive compensation programs that motivated excessive risk-taking and yielded outsized rewards for short-term results.

These failures of board oversight are the most recent demonstration that too many boards are dominated by management and have lost sight of the obligation to shareholders.

We respectfully suggest that at its core, this is the result of the fact that shareholders effectively play no role in the selection of directors and have no ability to remove directors.
We are denied the basic tools that shareowners around the world, including countries with far less developed capital markets than ours, have long been provided. Rights such as requiring directors to be elected by a majority vote, giving investors an advisory vote on executive pay, and providing long-term owners modest vehicles to nominate directors on the company proxy card. Their absence significantly weakens the ability of shareowners to oversee corporate directors, their elected representatives, and hold them accountable.

Turning to the content of the House bills advancing corporate governance reforms, we strongly commend the House for affirming the SEC’s authority to provide proxy access in the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009.

In addition to that affirmation, the government’s improvements that Colorado PERA believes would have the greatest impact and therefore should be considered by the House include: requiring directors in contested elections to be elected by a majority of the votes cast; enhancing executive compensation disclosures; providing investors with an advisory vote on pay; ensuring compensation consultants provide independent advice; strengthening Federal clawback provisions for unearned pay, and requiring corporate boards to be chaired by an independent director.

As the House considers steps to enhance corporate governance and empower shareowners, Congress must remember that boards are the first line of defense against the risks and excesses that led to the global financial crisis.

Vigorous financial regulation on its own cannot solve many of the issues that contributed to the crisis. Regulators and investors must be given stronger market based tools to guarantee robust oversight and meaningful accountability of corporate managers and directors.

House Bill 2861 consists of all of these provisions that I have identified, and we strongly support the principles set forth in that bill.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear and we look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gregory Smith can be found on page 319 of the appendix.]

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith.

Next, we have Mr. Thomas F. Brier, deputy chief investment officer and director of corporate governance, Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement System.

Mr. Brier?

STATEMENT OF THOMAS F. BRIER, DEPUTY CHIEF INVESTMENT OFFICER AND DIRECTOR OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, PENNSYLVANIA STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM

Mr. BRIER. Good morning, Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting us to appear at the committee this morning.

Established in 1923, the Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement System is one of the oldest and largest pension funds in the United States. We have over 220,000 members, and over the past
10 years, have paid out approximately $18 billion in benefits to
d workers in Pennsylvania and retirees.

Like Colorado PERA and other pension funds, we are long-term
investors with significant passive investment strategies. As a re-
sult, we have been a long time proponent of good corporate govern-
ance.

One common element in the failure of Lehman Brothers, AIG,
Fannie Mae, and many other companies implicated in the financial
meltdown was that the boards of directors did not hold manage-
ment sufficiently accountable. They failed to control management’s
excessive risk-taking. They did not prevent compensation plans
from encouraging a “bet the ranch” mentality.

As famed investor Warren Buffett observed in his most recent
letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, “A board of directors of
a huge financial institution is derelict if it does not insist that its
CEO bear full responsibility for risk control.

“If he is incapable of handling that job, he should look for other
employment, and if he fails at it, with the government thereupon
required to step in with funds or guarantees, the financial con-
sequences for him and his board should be severe.”

After describing the half a trillion dollars that investors lost in
just these companies, Warren continued, “CEOs and in many cases,
directors, have long benefitted from oversized financial carrots;
some meaningful sticks now need to be part of their employment
picture as well.”

SERS, like many other long-term investors, believe that two fund-
damental corporate governance improvements could provide, in Mr.
Buffett’s words, “meaningful sticks,” necessary to improve the over-
sight of CEOs by corporate boards, and therefore significantly re-
ducing the likelihood of a repeat session like this.

There are two improvements that we think do the heavy lifting
going forward, and they are proxy access and majority voting.
First, proxy access. Federal proxy rules have historically prohibited
shareholders from placing names of their own director candidates
on public company proxy cards for consideration by their share-
holders.

As a result, incumbent directors who fail in their oversight re-
sponsibilities have little reason to change their behavior because it
is highly unlikely they can be replaced or even challenged by an
alternate board of candidates.

Fortunately, due to the extraordinary leadership of this sub-
committee and the full Committee on Financial Services, and the
SEC, proxy access will soon become a reality.

As you may recall, in June of 2009, the SEC issued a thoughtful
proposal providing for an uniform measured right for groups of sig-
nificant long-term investors to place a limited number of nominees
on the company proxy card.

After very careful consideration of input received in response to
two separate comment periods, the SEC appears poised now to pro-
vide a final uniform proxy access rule that we believe responds to
the demands of long-term investors.

Importantly, this subcommittee and the full Committee on Fi-
nancial Services had the foresight to include a provision in the
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that reaffirms
that the SEC has the unambiguous authority to issue their final proxy access rule.
We again commend the subcommittee for their leadership in pursuing this provision. We are pleased the provision is strongly supported by the Administration and is a critical element of regulatory reform.

The second corporate governance improvement we believe is necessary is the requirement that all public companies adopt a majority standard for director elections.

Currently, most companies elect directors in uncontested elections using a plurality standard, by which shareholders may vote for but cannot vote against a nominee. Shockingly, a derelict corporate director can still win re-election by simply receiving one vote under a plurality standard, a single vote. They could actually vote for themselves.

As a consequence, unseating poorly performing directors is virtually impossible. The Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009, one of the bills referenced in connection with this hearing, includes a provision that requires the Commission to direct the stock exchanges to prohibit the listing of any security of any issuer if the company does not adopt majority voting. We generally support that provision.

The benefits of requiring all publicly listed companies to adopt a majority vote standard are many. It would democratize the corporate electoral process and put real voting power in the hands of long-term investors, like SERS, and make boards more accountable to shareholders.

On behalf of SERS and the tens of thousands of employees who depend on us for their retirement security, we respectfully request your support for prompt adoption by all public companies of both proxy access and majority voting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to participate in this hearing. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brier can be found on page 53 of the appendix.]

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Brier.

Now, we will have Mr. Alexander M. Cutler, chairman and chief executive officer of Eaton Corporation. Mr. Cutler?

STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER M. CUTLER, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, EATON CORPORATION, ON BEHALF OF BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE

Mr. CUTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. Good morning. My name is Sandy Cutler, and I am chairman and CEO of Eaton Corporation. I am also chairman of the Business Roundtable Corporate Leadership Initiative.

I have been chairman and chief executive officer of Eaton for 10 years, and I serve on 2 other for-profit boards, as lead director on one of those boards, and it is from this experience that I speak to you this morning.

We at the Business Roundtable support an examination of both corporate governance and financial regulatory reform, but believe that each are important enough on their own merit to deserve sep-
arate consideration. Combining the two in the pending legislation permits public anger about the financial crisis to substitute for a fact-based examination of our corporate governance system.

Substantial changes have indeed occurred during the past decade in corporate governance. Companies have taken a number of voluntary actions; and State legislatures, the SEC, and the New York Stock Exchange have adopted a number of statutory and rule changes.

We are pleased that the Business Roundtable has been at the forefront of efforts to improve corporate governance through support of many of these initiatives.

Just this week, we are releasing our most recent list of principles of corporate governance. These changes have resulted in more independent boards and board committees; improved board practices; and the adoption of majority voting by a large number of companies.

As you know, the change in majority voting was facilitated by amendments to a Delaware corporate statute and the Model Business Corporation Act, which is followed by 30 States.

Other important changes have included the New York Stock Exchange prohibition of broker voting in uncontested director elections effective at shareholder meetings after January 1st of this year, and the SEC’s recent adoption of a number of disclosure enhancements that address several of the concerns in the proposed legislation, including those related to board leadership structure, risk management, and board oversight.

I would like to focus my comments today on proxy access, as we view it as an ill-conceived attempt to improve corporate governance. Indeed, rather than empower shareholders, we believe it would deprive them of important choices and have serious potential adverse consequences.

The proxy access provision of the Shareholder Empowerment Act would require the SEC to issue proxy access rules permitting shareholders owning as little as 1 percent of the company’s securities for at least 2 years to nominate director candidates in the company’s proxy materials.

Clearly, director accountability to shareholders is extremely important, but a federally-mandated proxy access right is not the most effective way to achieve this goal.

Moreover, a proxy access rule could exacerbate the short-term focus that is widely considered to be a contributing factor to the financial crisis.

The process of frequent election contests could cause directors to focus on structure and stock price rather than invest for the creation of long-term value. In addition, proxy access would permit shareholder activists with very limited stock holdings in the company to pursue special interest agendas to the detriment of the majority of the shareholders.

Even if special interest directors do not get elected, the company and its shareholders will have been forced to bear the costs and suffer the distraction of a time-consuming and expensive proxy contest.

Finally, a federally-mandated proxy access right would preclude companies and their shareholders from taking advantage of the re-
cent State proxy access enabling statutes to adopt customized proxy access procedures that suit their needs.

Today, contemporary boards of directors use a variety of tools and processes to see that qualified directors are presented to the shareholders for re-election.

They strategically review skill matrices of current directors. They carefully assess forward-looking skill requirements on the board, such as audit committee financial experts. They see if the relevant knowledge is present to provide guidance, counsel, and oversight.

They undertake vigorous evaluations of the board, its committees and individual directors, and they disclose to shareholders their criterion for board membership along with the qualifications and experience of nominated directors.

It is difficult to understand how an outside process conducted without board involvement, as proposed under a proxy access regime, will not fall short of this thoughtful and informed process.

Before closing, I want to mention three other issues related to proxy access that the proposed legislation does not address: concerns about the current shareholder communication system; the integrity of the proxy voting system; and the influence of the proxy advisory services. All of these have been addressed in more detail in my written testimony.

We are pleased that the SEC is beginning a study of these issues, but they need to be resolved before a proxy access regime is implemented.

In closing, let me emphasize that the Business Roundtable is committed to effective corporate governance practices. However, we must be careful not to impose one-size-fits-all solutions that undermine the ability of shareholders and their boards of directors to govern themselves effectively.

We stand ready to work with this committee, and I would be happy to answer any questions. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cutler can be found on page 64 of the appendix.]

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Cutler.

Now, we will hear from our next presenter, Mr. Brandon J. Rees, deputy director, AFL-CIO.

Mr. Rees?

STATEMENT OF BRANDON J. REES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INVESTMENT, AFL-CIO

Mr. Rees. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Corporate governance reform is absolutely needed in response to the financial crisis. Mandatory corporate governance rules benefit all publicly traded companies by enhancing investor confidence in our capital markets.

Stock market investors have just suffered the worse decade since the Great Depression. During the past 10 years, the S&P 500 companies’ stock prices have declined 24 percent. Needless to say, the retirement savings of America’s workers have been decimated.

At the beginning of this lost decade, shareholders suffered the corporate accounting scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and hundreds of other companies. More recently, we have been battered by the
collapse of Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and the resulting financial crisis.

Corporate governance failures are the primary cause of this lost decade for investors. We blame boards of directors for failing to focus management on the long-term, for failing to prevent malfeasance by executives, and for failing to properly manage risk.

Nowhere is the breakdown in corporate governance accountability more apparent than on the issue of executive compensation. CEO pay has never been higher than in the past decade. Last year, S&P 500 CEOs received $9.25 million on average. Executive pay is the mechanism by which CEOs have become captive to short-term market forces.

The collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers provides a dramatic example of what is wrong with executive pay. Between 2000 and 2008, the top 5 executives at Bear Stearns pocketed $1.4 billion in cash, bonuses, and equity sales. Lehman Brothers' executives took home $1 billion. Shareholders got nothing.

As is required in other countries, American companies should give their shareholders a say on pay. An annual vote on executive compensation would encourage boards to be more proactive in seeking out shareholders' views.

As a result, best practices in executive compensation would disseminate more quickly. Ultimately, it is the job of the board of directors to set fair executive pay packages, to prevent malfeasance, and to manage risk.

We believe that boards of directors have been too complaisant in their duties. Existing corporate governance mechanisms simply fail to adequately hold boards of directors accountable.

The election of directors is one of the fundamental rights of stockholders, but too often, withhold votes against director nominees are ignored. Last year, over 90 directors at 50 companies failed to receive majority support for their election. Every one of these directors was seated despite their shareholder opposition.

Replacing plurality voting with majority vote at director elections is valuable. However, majority voting alone cannot adequately reform the director election process.

Half of all publicly traded companies are incorporated in Delaware. Under Delaware's hold over rule, incumbent directors remain on the board even if they are not re-elected by majority vote.

To make director elections more meaningful, long-term shareholders need to have equal access to the proxy. Equal access to the proxy will set ground rules for shareholder democracy. It will limit the advantage of incumbents who now have unlimited access to the corporate treasury to finance their proxy solicitation.

Equal access to the proxy will open up boards of directors to divergent viewpoints. Debate should be welcomed in corporate boardrooms, not feared.

A director whose nomination depends on a backing of a long-term institutional investor and not his fellow directors can play that role. That is the goal of proxy access.

Now that the SEC is preparing to issue a proxy access rule, the opponents of reform have put forward the idea of voluntary proxy access. According to these so-called private ordering proposals, com-
panies should be able to opt in or to opt out of equal access to the proxy. There are two major problems with such proposals. First of all, companies have stacked the deck to prevent shareholders from adopting proxy access. Nearly half of all companies in the Russell 3000 Index restrict the ability of shareholders to amend company bylaws or they have dual class stock voting.

If proxy access is made voluntary, only those companies that already have good corporate governance will adopt proxy access. Those companies with entrenched boards will resist proxy access.

Secondly, allowing companies to opt out of proxy access sets a dangerous precedent. Proxy access is about the Federal regulation of proxy solicitations, not about State corporate laws, and for the past 75 years, our Federal proxy solicitation regulations have been mandatory.

Corporate governance reforms such as equal access to the proxy can be a potent tool to focus companies on sustainable value creation. For these reasons, director elections must be open to long-term investors through proxy access.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for considering my views.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rees can be found on page 312 of the appendix.]

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Rees.

Now, we will hear from Mr. Robert E. Smith, vice president, deputy general counsel, and assistant secretary, NiSource, on behalf of the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals. Mr. Smith? That is quite a title, Mr. Smith.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. SMITH, VICE PRESIDENT, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL, AND ASSISTANT CORPORATE SECRETARY, NISOURCE, INC., ON BEHALF OF THE SOCIETY OF CORPORATE SECRETARIES AND GOVERNANCE PROFESSIONALS

Mr. ROBERT SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As stated, my name is Bob Smith, and I am vice president, deputy general counsel, and assistant corporate secretary of NiSource. NiSource is an energy holding company whose subsidiaries engage in natural gas transmission, storage, and distribution, as well as electric generation, transmission, and distribution.

In my position at NiSource, I am responsible for the company’s corporate group, which provides legal advice on general corporate matters, finance matters, securities matters, governance matters, and similar subjects.

I also serve on the board of directors of the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals. The Society is a professional association founded in 1946 with over 3,100 members who serve more than 2,000 companies.

The Society’s members are responsible for supporting the work of the company’s boards of directors and their committees and the corporate governance and disclosure activities of the companies.

I am here today in my capacity as a director of the Society and I very much appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing and to provide input on behalf of our diverse membership, diverse across industry and diverse across market capitalization.
The Society strongly believes in and has consistently supported good governance practices, which include the right of shareholders to have an effective vote in the election process and the ability to recommend persons for nominations to the board of directors.

As potential governance legislation is contemplated, it is important that we recognize that we are currently in the midst of a corporate governance sea change.

Over the past decade, this sea change is blatantly evident through the many leading practices that have trended toward mainstream or widely accepted adoption by public companies. These changes in governance practices have generally been in the form of enhancements to shareholder involvement, shareholder input, or shareholder information.

It is important to note that these practices are empowering shareholders and have occurred without legislative involvement, as individual company shareholders have determined what is best and what is appropriate for their individual companies.

Examples of this organic shareholder empowered governance evolution includes development in such practices as majority voting, independence of directors, policies regarding independent compensation consultants, elimination of poison pills, declassification of board member terms, clawbacks and incentive compensation plans, separation of chairman and CEO, and stock ownership guidelines for directors and officers.

Adoption of governance policies addressing matters such as these clearly show that shareholders are having a voice in the governance of companies.

Of equal importance is the observation that not all companies or shareholders have deemed it appropriate to adopt policies addressing these matters.

This is the essence of true shareholder empowerment, the ability for shareholders to choose whether governance issues should be addressed and if so, how they should be addressed at their individual companies.

This is in fact the great irony behind the various pieces of legislation now being proposed as they intend to empower shareholders, but they actually force all shareholders to adopt specific provisions in an identical way, whether the shareholders want it or not.

This is why the Society hopes to ensure that the shareholder proposal process remains the vehicle for shareholder communication, for shareholder change, and for the promotion of shareholder choice, true shareholder choice, rather than forcing the hot reactionary issues of the day on all issuers and shareholders regardless of shareholder desire or need.

It is also important to make sure that any legislative reaction should protect shareholder value through avoiding the creation of potential mismatches of influence by short-term investors with the long-term growth and value creation strategies of public companies.

Looking at major provisions of the proposed legislation, I will just touch on a couple really quickly, majority voting, for instance. Without legislative regulatory requirements, the adoption of majority voting has been a significant trend.

In fact, according to a CalPERS release last month, as of September 2009, approximately 71 percent of S&P 500 companies and
50 percent of Russell 1000 companies had already adopted some form of policy for director resignations or majority vote.

This is a prime example of companies hearing shareholders’ concerns and addressing those concerns utilizing the current proxy proposal and communication structures.

To legislate majority voting when shareholders have in fact been empowered to address their concerns in this area is both unnecessary and would disempower the shareholders of companies that have determined that majority voting is not an issue they desire to address at their companies, by in fact voting against majority voting proposals.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss other issues that are in the legislation, but in conclusion, true shareholder empowerment allows all shareholders to choose what is best for their respective companies, not forcing shareholders to accept rigid schemes regardless of whether they want them or not.

Legislation should be thoughtfully enacted only where there is clear consensus and empirical evidence that change is needed and that such change would support the long-term interests of all shareholders.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robert Smith can be found on page 339 of the appendix.]

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith.

Finally, we will hear from Mr. James Allen, head of capital markets policy, CFA Institute.

Mr. Allen?

STATEMENT OF JAMES ALLEN, HEAD OF CAPITAL MARKETS POLICY, CFA INSTITUTE

Mr. ALLEN. Good morning. I want to thank Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, and all the members of the subcommittee for asking us to come speak to you today.

My name is Jim Allen, and I am head of capital markets policy at CFA Institute. For those of you who are unfamiliar with the CFA Institute, we are a nonprofit membership organization with more than 100,000 investment analysts, advisors, portfolio managers and other investment professionals throughout the world.

Our members are generally involved, therefore, in investing the savings and retirement funds from millions of Americans and others worldwide.

We are probably best known for administering the 3 year testing program that leads to the awarding of the chartered financial analyst or CFA credential. More than 5 years ago, as part of our education program, we incorporated corporate governance factors into those global exams, and more than 100,000 candidates throughout the world have been tested on these issues ever since.

At the CFA Institute, we have a fundamental belief that what is good for investors is good for financial markets in general. This view is inherent in our code of ethics and standards of professional conduct that applies to all of our members wherever they reside in the world, and it has also informed the positions we have advocated to regulators and legislators globally over the years.
We have long supported strong corporate governance structures under the belief founded in research that well-governed companies perform better over the long-term than those that are not well governed.

While we want to ensure shareowners have an effective voice, we also do not want to interfere unreasonably into corporate boards. This requires a finely tuned balance of interests and reasonable restraints on both investors and corporate issuers.

As noted in my written testimony, we believe that corporate governance failures on the part of financial institutions play an important but by no means exclusive role in the financial market paralysis that began in August of 2007.

Senior executives, board members, and regulators alike failed to appreciate the potential risks coming from large concentrations of high-risk loans funded through highly leveraged structures and unreliable wholesale funds.

I would like to note that many of the proposals made in these three bills deal with issues which we have long supported as needed to prevent these kinds of failures.

Two such provisions are legislative efforts for majority voting and greater proxy access for shareowners. We believe these two changes are the most critical and most needed to ensure that shareowners have the ability to hold their board members accountable.

Likewise, we support say on pay as a means of increasing board accountability. Nearly 81 percent of our members responding to an October survey said they support a non-binding vote on executive pay. This view is due in large part to how it has worked where it has been adopted.

Indeed, our members in the U.K. and Australia say such provisions increased board attention to investor perspectives and helped reduce the rate of increase in executive pay by half in the first year after adoption by U.K. companies.

We also believe that better and more relevant disclosures about executive pay will increase board accountability and have supported regulatory efforts in this regard.

Looking ahead, we are working with the Blue Ribbon Panel to develop a template to guide companies as they write their compensation discussions and analyses in the future.

Legislation to mandate chair independence, on the other hand, is something we do not support, as we are concerned that it may trade the knowledge and expertise of corporate insiders for a functional independent figure head. Rather, such matters are best left to boards and shareowners to decide.

When a CEO is also chair, we believe that independent board members should have the opportunity to appoint a lead director to chair meetings of independent directors and address issues involving potential conflicts with management.

Finally, we are uncomfortable with proposals to have the SEC certify every member of the board for each of the thousands of companies trading publicly. Such a monumental effort would divert valuable SEC resources from the Commission's existing mandate and could have undesirable effects on board membership.

Mr. Chairman, I ask consent that in the record, these documents relating to items on corporate governance that we have published
over the years be allowed to be entered into the record, and we also want to amend our written proposal to include the data from our member survey.

Chairman Kanjorski. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. Allen. I thank you for your time, and I am willing to answer any questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Allen can be found on page 49 of the appendix.]

Chairman Kanjorski. Thank you very much, Mr. Allen. Thanks to the entire panel. That was a lengthy panel, but certainly insightful.

As usual, we are going to pick on the minority. Mr. Cutler, I am looking at you.

[laughter]

Chairman Kanjorski. No. I am impressed. First of all, let me tell you, I have always been a proponent of the idea of self-regulation, and hopeful that any type of organization could rely on its own internal values to guide its actions.

I have seen, however, fundamental changes in the corporate structure and the ownership of the corporate structure, and by analogy, I would draw to the union movement. I am sure, as a capitalist, that gets your attention.

As you recall, about 3 or 4 decades ago, there was at least across the land a cry that unions had lost their democratic processes, and therefore, there was a denial of the democratic process to the average union member, and this Congress, after a hesitancy, and a rightful hesitancy, finally did enact the Landrum-Griffin Act.

The Landrum-Griffin Act could be criticized for some things, but clearly, it imposed upon the union movement democratic processes, that the members could be guaranteed they would have a right to meet at conventions. They would have a right to free speech. They would have a right to not be put upon for their actions or thoughts in regard to their union activities.

Now, we have come to corporate activity. Up until now, we granted the presumption that corporations, shareholders, owners, directors, and management could be relied upon to act responsibly, but I would call to your attention two things that have changed significantly.

Throughout the testimony, if you listened to the entire panel, they all talked about the shareholders. In so many instances, there are not any more single shareholders. These are conglomerations of agencies that represent pension funds of individual investors that are lumped together.

The managers of these funds really are interested in the return on investment and are not particularly disturbed by democratic or non-democratic activities of American corporations. They could really care less if the return is sufficient to pay the pension or whatever else is necessary in that fund.

There was a time in the 1929 crash that we could say look, it is your money, you can put it anywhere you want to, and if you want democratic processes, you can vote accordingly or take your money and get out of the corporation.

Today, if I am part of a pension fund, as in the House of Representatives, I think it is Fund C, that has the common stock fund,
I cannot vote my common stock. I do not even know who is voting it and I do not know what corporations they are putting it into.

The only thing I get to be told is once a year whether or not I have made an increase in value or a loss in value. Usually, I do not pay a lot of attention to it. Of course, I am not in that fund because of my role here at the committee.

You do give it attention at the end of the year if you get a 30 percent loss and suddenly you are asking the pertinent question, why did that happen? You may find out, as one witness described the Moody operation, when they made a presentation to the board of directors, they were inconsequential in terms of understanding what their role was, and just absent of all the suggested thought processes that you expect from responsible board members.

If you had listened to the testimony yesterday of some of the chief executive officers and others and members of the board of Lehman Brothers, it was a little bit startling.

We had a CEO who was paid a poor salary given today’s monies. I think in 2007, he only received $72 million. You could not expect him to pay a great deal of attention to his job or attention to whether he was working for the benefit of the shareholders or not.

He said he just did not know any of these things were happening. He was not aware they were doing repos, 105 repos. He was not aware of the fact that so many things were being done.

Now, what I have concluded is really we are at the Landrum-Griffin Act, if you will, with corporations. Are we going to impose here through government new standards, and granted, probably uniform standards as opposed to particularized rights of decision, how to run one single corporation over another?

Are we going to do that or are we going to ignore the fact that there are a large number of American people who are investors and owners directly or indirectly in American corporations who do not feel they are getting adequately represented, where huge bonuses can be paid of billions of dollars, and no shareholder payments or dividends are paid out.

We are not casting aspersions on your activities as a CEO. I am sure you are above and beyond any of those criticisms.

Obviously, there is a percentage of corporate leadership in America that has failed. This committee, it seems to me, is called upon to decide where are we going.

I have eaten up all 5 minutes. I am not going to get much of a chance to get an answer from you. I will try to pick it up in my next set of questions. I want to hear from my ranking member from New Jersey. I am sure he has the answer to some of my questions.

[laughter]

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. I can give you some answers. I want to thank the panel. I do appreciate the comments and the testimony here today. I share some of the concerns.

Mr. Smith, you laid them out, and the others did, too, but I think you laid out some of the concerns we have about some of these things.

Let me just throw out some things. One of the takeaways I get from this and the impression I get from a number of the panelists was that we are in this financial crisis situation and we can look
to corporate governance as being a root cause of it. I, as you heard in my opening testimony, have a question on that.

Let me go with this simple question. To the extent that business, Wall Street, was a cause of the problem, and of course, there is debate as to the extent of their cause and regulators being the other part of it, but to the extent that Wall Street was a cause of the problem, I note that the legislation that we are looking at would go much further than regulating with corporate governance Wall Street.

Ninety-eight or 99 percent of public companies are non-financial institutions. Answer this question, if we are trying to attack the problem, which is Wall Street, why are we also addressing the other 98 percent of the public companies with this legislation? Was I clear on that?

Mr. CUTLER. Could I make an attempt at that, and also the previous comments, and try to combine them?

Mr. GARRETT. No, go with mine.

Mr. CUTLER. These arguments, many of these arguments on the issues of corporate governance date back some 20 years. They have been around for quite a long time period.

I think what is very important to keep in mind at this point is we have come through a terrible financial crisis but there has been no evidence in any country that you can regulate the economic cycle.

I think we have to recognize there are cycles in economies. They are aggravated by different crises that have occurred around the world over time, but the heart of those is not corporate governance. It is the economic cycle.

There are abuses that occur around the world at different times, but I would say the solution that we are trying to solve for here is we have two fairly distinct events: one, an enormous issue of international financial regulatory reform and it is not just in the United States; and two, a number of the corporate governance proposals that are being proposed did not stop, although they are in place in other countries, they did not stop the economic cycle and the financial regulatory reform from occurring in those countries.

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. I only have 5 minutes.

Mr. Rees?

Mr. Rees. Yes, thank you. I would point out that it is not just Wall Street. For the past 10 years, the stock market, as measured by the S&P 500, has performed negatively. Investors lost money over 10 years. That is money that our pension funds depend on in order to pay for the retirement security of America’s working families.

Corporate governance was the root cause not just of the financial crisis, but the corporate accounting scandals, the stock option back dating scandals, a whole bevy of scandals over the past decade.

We have to remember that corporate governance failures drove those scandals.

Mr. GARRETT. If you are telling me that the funds you are invested with have done poorly over the last 10 years, then I would have a question on your investment advice with regard to those funds. Up until the crisis that we have had just now, I think the markets have done amazingly well, if you look over time.
The question that I have also is, do you find yourselves potentially in a conflicted situation here? I do agree with you on your point where you say we need to take a long-term look at these things.

You are in a conflicted role when you are looking for the long-term interests of the stockholders in these things versus the short-term interests of your membership. Is that not correct?

Mr. REES. Absolutely not. Our members depend on companies to invest for the long-term to create jobs, and I am shocked to hear that other members of this panel think that shareholders who own one percent of the stock of companies should not be able to nominate their own directors.

Mr. GARRETT. That was not my question, but thanks.

The question is, if you are out there trying to get jobs for your employees today, that may at certain times, I would think, run at cross purposes with the idea of increase in shareholder value over the long term.

What about where those jobs are located? That thought just pops into my head, when it comes to the issue of creating jobs, is it maybe better for shareholder value in certain circumstances, nothing that I encourage by any means, but in certain circumstances, maybe it would be better for those jobs not to be in the neighborhood of where your particular union is in your State, for State funds and what have you, or out of the country.

What happens then when it is an issue of local jobs versus long-term investment? Which side do you come down on, long-term shareholder value or the jobs for your union members?

Mr. REES. We come down on the side of long-term shareholders, because that is in the best interest of employees of those companies.

Mr. GARRETT. Even if those employees may no longer be here in the area of my State?

Mr. REES. We have a different view of how companies should be managed. We believe that it should be based on the long-term interests of the company and its stakeholders, including shareholders, and we are not getting that from the current system. We are not getting that.

We are getting “short-termism”, driven by excessive CEO pay and a focus on the short-term, not the long-term. That is why shareholders need to have a greater voice in corporate governance.

Mr. GARRETT. Do the membership of the unions have the same ability to have that interest and governance of the unions as far as executive pay and the other things we are looking for here in this legislation? Do they have that say?

Mr. REES. Yes. Our officers are directly elected by the membership of the organizations, unlike corporations where the CEOs are appointed by a board.

Mr. GARRETT. Is their compensation set by membership?

Mr. REES. It is fully disclosed.

Mr. GARRETT. I know. Does the membership get to vote on compensation? I do not know.

Mr. REES. Yes, they do.

Mr. GARRETT. In all instances, they vote on the compensation?
Mr. Rees. They vote on the compensation policies through the
democratic processes that the unions have established and are re-
quired to have under the Landrum-Griffin Act.
Mr. Garrett. Thanks.
Chairman Kanjorski. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter.
Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate my friend
from California letting me jump ahead. I have to get out of here.
Mr. Cutler, my questions are simpler. In your company—I am
not sure, what does your company do, Eaton?
Mr. Cutler. We are a diversified manufacturer of electrical
equipment, aerospace equipment, hydraulic equipment, and auto-
motive and truck equipment.
Mr. Perlmutter. How does your company go about choosing a
member of its board?
Mr. Cutler. Our board of directors' nominating committee and
governance committee does that work. As I mentioned before, they
put together skill matrices in terms of what the current skills on
the board are. They look at the strategic plan and the issues facing
the company as they see it over the next couple of years, and iden-
tify the skills that they then want to seek.
They use an outside consultant to do the initial interviewing, and
then they make the nomination and give it to the shareholders for
election.
Mr. Perlmutter. Do you or does your company require any kind
of knowledge on the part of your director, either before he is nomi-
nated or once he or she becomes a member on corporate govern-
ance? Is there any kind of education class?
How does your company go about making sure you have the best
directors, some of whom may have to stand up to you on a decision
or two that you want to make?
I think in my experience, sometimes boards really play a very
docile role.
Mr. Cutler. My experience in serving on three boards currently,
and acting as the lead director on one of them, is that is a view
which is quite dated. A mass of changes have occurred in this area.
I think if you simply look at what has happened to the tenure
of CEOs, and BRT is one subset, it is about 4 years right now. This
idea of entrenched management is a backward looking issue.
If you look at board turnover, you would find last year, and I be-
lieve the number was over 60 percent, of our boards had at least
one member turnover. I think it was just over 50, I would have to
confirm that number, for two members.
You are seeing turnover occurring on the boards. I can tell you
from my own experience, my own directors at our company have
no problem in not only standing up but taking very different views
than those of management. It is a very healthy exchange.
Mr. Perlmutter. Is there some kind of continuing education
component that you have with your directors?
Mr. Cutler. Yes, our policy is that our board does have a con-
tinuing education requirement through accredited education
courses outside of the company. We also twice a year conduct inter-
nal training on specific functional issues, and to come back to your
earlier question, part of the criterion that our board examines
when they look at a man or a woman as a potential candidate as a nominee for our board is not only their breadth of business experience, but have they served on boards, do they have governance experience, have they been around these issues?

Mr. Perlmutter. Thanks. I would like to ask the two Mr. Smith’s the same question: Mr. Smith of NiSource; and then my friend, Mr. Greg Smith, from Colorado.

Mr. Robert Smith. Thank you. I will speak on behalf of the Society members. The Society has noticed and we have seen as Mr. Cutler pointed out a big sea change in the governance arena, and the docile board connotation really does appear to be a thing of the past for most companies.

There could be some examples of outliers in that area, but there is a much more active board. This is seen through a move to independence, if you look at the number of independent directors on public companies, that number has increased dramatically over the last 10 years.

It comes as a result also even recently as a result of new disclosures that are being required. There are new disclosures that are being required by the SEC on executive compensation analysis. Is there excessive risk in the executive compensation plans of the company. It comes in the disclosure on risk management.

Mr. Perlmutter. Let me stop you for one second. Do you have a corporate governance kind of education policy or anything like that at your company?

Mr. Robert Smith. At our company, we do encourage the board members to obtain outside education.

Mr. Perlmutter. Greg Smith, please.

Mr. Gregory Smith. Thank you. We are always excited to hear when there are corporations, and we certainly acknowledge there are many corporations in corporate America who have adopted good policies and are taking up good practices.

Unfortunately, they are not all that way. We think what they have demonstrated, these ones that do have good accountability, that have good corporate governance, is that it works well, and in fact, it does not make the sky fall. It does not make management fail in its role. It does not tie the hands of corporate America.

In fact, it empowers both the corporations and their shareholders to advance toward greater shareholder value.

In our organization, we certainly have education for our trustees who are in a similar role, and in our management, we certainly are focused on the constant education toward better corporate governance and better responsibility and accountability to our stakeholders throughout the State of Colorado.

Mr. Perlmutter. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Kanjorski. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter. Now the gentleman from Delaware, Mr. Castle.

Mr. Castle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am concerned that the proposals that we are discussing here today and the legislation we are discussing today may exacerbate the problem of short-termism, and not mitigate it as all of you have indicated you would like to see happening.
Just some statistics we have picked up: annual stock trading turnover on the New York Stock Exchange was 36 percent in 1980; 88 percent in 2000; 118 percent in 2006; and 123 percent in 2007. This data, of course, suggests that trading speculating has replaced investing as the principal goal of stockholders or in other words, short-termism.

Since some of your operations own so many shares, your pension funds might be responsible at least in part for the staggering increase in turnover. For those who are involved in that, Mr. Greg Smith, Mr. Brier, and Mr. Rees, I would assume, do you know the average turnover of your investments? if you do not have the data available, I do not expect you necessarily would here, but could you supply that to us in writing after this hearing?

Do you have any comments on that, Mr. Rees?

Mr. Rees. Yes. I would be happy to get you that information. I can say that union-sponsored pension plans tend toward long-term strategies and are passive Index investors.

We agree that there is a short-termism problem on Wall Street and in the stock exchanges. We joined with the Business Roundtable to sign the Aspen Institute Principles for long-termism, to encourage long-term investors.

I would note that proxy access as currently contemplated by the SEC requires that shareholders to nominate directors must have held their shares for at least 1 year, and we have encouraged the SEC to consider a 2 year holding requirement.

Mr. CASTLE. Let me go to the others, so I can ask some other questions, if I may. Mr. Brier, do you have a response to that?

Mr. Brier. We would be delighted to supply that information for you also. We do get a large proportion of our exposure through the Index products, so we are permanent owners. We have our active management as well. We will be delighted to supply that.

We are also cognizant of the fact that short-term trading is a problem. We are looking to the SEC when they address this issue, and they had two open comment periods—

Mr. CASTLE. You are saying the problem is not something you have helped create; is that correct?

Mr. Brier. Pardon me?

Mr. CASTLE. The problem is not something that you, your operation, has helped create?

Mr. Brier. I would supply the information on trading, but we have a tranche of permanent capital that we have in Index funds. We cannot really sell those shares. We have a very active corporate governance and proxy voting policies and we publish that on the Web and we try to be best practices as fiduciaries. Because of that permanent tranche, we are long-term holders.

Mr. CASTLE. Okay. Mr. Greg Smith?

Mr. Gregory Smith. I will be happy to provide that information. I also am a co-chair on the Council of Institutional Investors, one of the largest accumulations of public pension plans, corporate pension plans, Taft-Hartley’s in the world.

Based on our examination of our membership, I would be extremely surprised if you found that pension plans are the source of short-termism.

Mr. CASTLE. You will try to get me the information?
Mr. GREGORY SMITH. Absolutely.
Mr. CASTLE. That would be great, if you could.
Let me ask Commissioner Irwin a question. For 150 years, we have had a State corporate law system that has allowed directors and shareholders to continually change the organic governance system for corporations.
Over the past several years, we have seen three-quarters of the S&P 500 companies adopt majority voting, ending staggered boards in a large number, separating CEO and chairman roles, all without government mandates.
If reforms are already happening at the organic level, why should we want to marginalize directors and shareholders and empower Washington bureaucrats?
The decade has seen the entrance of government into corporate governance and the corresponding fall of public companies in the United States and a rise in public companies around the rest of the world.
Are we legislating away our economic advantages to score short-term political gains? You are, of course, involved at the State level. I would be interested in your comments on that.
Mr. IRWIN. Certainly, Congressman Castle, it is a difficult question. I am not saying that—I believe that corporate governance issues were the cause of the crash and the melt down.
Clearly, some of the things that we are talking about will instill a much greater sense of security and trust that will bring people back, the retail investor on Main Street back, to the capital markets.
Mr. CASTLE. My question is, is this not happening anyway, so why do we need to do this as a Federal legislative mandate?
Mr. IRWIN. One reason, we have national exchanges, and you have heard from some members of the panel that they invest across an index, so everybody who is listed on an exchange is going to have investment of substantial assets from people investing without any control by them individually, but by their pension funds.
We ought to have a minimum level of expectations as to disclosure, as to such things as executive pay and other things, so that there is that kind of integrity and trust that will cause those investors to return.
Mr. CASTLE. Unfortunately, my time is up. I yield back.
Mr. IRWIN. Obviously, we are the States. We do not really advocate preemption. We believe that whatever the rule is, we have to ensure that the States have the right to enforce the rule, even if it is a Federal rule.
Mr. CASTLE. Thank you.
Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Castle. Now, we will hear from the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. SHERMAN. I would also like to respond to the gentleman from Delaware. We have just had this great catastrophe, and in the wake of that, everybody has gotten religion. Everybody has reform and board members are going to classes.
If we are lucky enough to go 10 years without a catastrophic crisis and scandal, all this will end. People will return to their old ways. That is why I think we have to institutionalize the lessons
of the last 2 years, rather than expect that this wave of caution is going to persist.

We have seen this after every bubble, everybody is really cautious a year or two after the bubble explodes.

State law has traditionally governed such issues as how long a term can a director have, do you have staggered terms, do you have cumulative voting, do you mandate cumulative voting?

What we have seen for the most part, and there are some exceptions to this, is a race to the bottom. Every State says ah, there may be franchise fees for us if we could just get those corporations to incorporate here, and then when they go bankrupt, we get to do the bankruptcy work, too.

The question is, should we at the Federal level establish a floor of minimum rights for minority shareholders that have to apply to all publicly held companies.

One of these issues is cumulative voting, a system where even if there is a group of shareholders that has 51 percent of the shares, they do not necessarily get 100 percent of the board seats. If there is a group that has 10 or 20 percent of the shares, they get a board seat.

Mr. Rees, should we as a matter of Federal law compel cumulative voting so that a minority of shareholders, not a tiny minority but a 10 or 20 percent minority, can get themselves at least one seat on the board?

Mr. Rees. The Federal Government, since the passage of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act, has set and regulated the proxy solicitation rules, and has clear authority to do that, and I believe can do things like proxy access through that authority.

Your question regarding cumulative voting, cumulative voting is another means to empower shareholders to have board representation. I think it is something that is worthy of consideration. I would think it would need to be done through stock exchange listing standards because these are national exchanges.

At this point, I think proxy access is the way that the Federal Government should set the ground rules for proxy solicitations.

Mr. Sherman. I think there is a tendency for all of us to just buy into the traditional division between State and Federal and that is the Federal Government controls the proxy statement, the States control the corporations code.

I am not sure that has worked all that well, certainly not over the last 2 years. It is the long-established tradition.

Mr. Rees, how would we see corporation behavior change if we did have the kinds of proxy access rules that you are advocating?

Mr. Rees. I strongly believe that just one independent thinker on a board of directors can have a profound effect on how well that board governs the corporation. I believe what is important is not the nominal independence of directors or the nominating committees that select those directors, but it is the independence and spirit and the process.

The process that proxy access would provide is for a director to be nominated, not dependent on the goodwill of his fellow directors, but by the backing of a large institutional investor. I believe that is a very healthy process that needs to be implemented.
Mr. SHERMAN. I think you just made the case for cumulative voting since you set forth the advantage of having a 10 or 20 percent group of shareholders able to elect that one independent director.

Mr. Irwin, I see you are the securities commissioner. I do not know if you are the corporations commissioner. How long a term of office can a director have if his corporation is clever enough to incorporate in the most lenient State? Any idea?

Mr. IRWIN. I am not the corporations director. I apologize. I cannot answer that question.

Mr. SHERMAN. I have seen 3 years, I have not seen longer. I have seen 3 years with staggered terms. That is usually thought to be a defense against minority shareholders, that and the absence of cumulative voting.

Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired. I hope we set minimum national standards for empowering minority shareholders. I yield back.

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Sherman. We will now hear from the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Hensarling.

Mr. HENSARLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I begin my questions, I would ask unanimous consent that testimony from the Center On Executive Compensation prepared for this hearing be entered into the record.

Chairman KANJORSKI. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HENSARLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think it was you, Mr. Brier, or several of you who used the phrase “excessive risk-taking” in describing investment strategies or business strategies of certain failed firms. That was you? Can you define “excessive risk-taking” versus risk-taking?

Mr. BRIER. I think American capitalism as a brand took a massive hit when the global financial system melted down and Lehman’s demise. I think that is a case study of the entire investment banking industry failing to recognize the counterparty risk that was within the system.

I think it is endemic to the entire financial services industry.

Mr. HENSARLING. What is the difference between risk-taking and excessive risk-taking?

Mr. BRIER. I would say an excessive risk is one that brings it to bankruptcy. I think it is clear that an excessive risk brought several—

Mr. HENSARLING. Is there a company that enters into Chapter 11 today that engaged in excessive risk-taking?

Mr. BRIER. I would say if they technically defaulted on their obligations, they failed to manage risk properly. There are market forces as well.

Mr. HENSARLING. I have seen statistics from either SBA or NFIB that approximately 80 percent of all small businesses fail within 3 years. Does that mean they engaged in excessive risk-taking because they failed?

Mr. BRIER. I think there are market forces in place. I think the concern here is the misalignment of executive compensation and risk-taking within the financial industry and other parts of the insurance industry.
I think there is a failure to recognize. AIG is a case study on this. They had an unit based in London because there was no oversight that was literally—

Mr. HENSARLING. Let’s talk about AIG for a moment here and some of these other firms. Again, the problem I am having here is trying to figure out—I am unacquainted with having a rate of return without having some risk attendant to it. It is when do we cross into that red area that says excessive risk-taking.

To some extent, I am concerned are we as policymakers on the road turning over this definition of “excessive risk-taking” ultimately to the Federal Government. Is that the road we are on?

If so, was it excessive risk-taking by Members of Congress and Federal regulators, again, to set up Government-Sponsored Enterprises to essentially create a monopoly in the secondary housing market, and then give them ever increasing affordable housing initiatives that have now cost taxpayers $130 billion, and it continues to rise.

Was it excessive risk-taking to have Federal bank regulators tell banks that they could concentrate their statutory capital in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac paper, that they thought it was riskless and it turned out to be the most risky asset they had.

The point I am making is I am not really sure there is a monopoly of wisdom here on exactly what is excessive risk-taking.

Let’s talk about executive compensation. It seems to be Wall Street firms failed. Executives made obscene compensation packages, therefore, we must regulate compensation packages.

There are a lot of obscene compensation packages out there. Again, I have an open mind, but I am looking for the evidence that of the Wall Street firms that did not fail, where is the distinction in the compensation packages?

I have seen a study submitted that came out of Ohio State University that says, “When we look at the subset of the 54 banks that received TARP funding in our dataset, we find there is no statistically significant difference in the relation between dollar equity incentives and returns in the sub-samples of TARP and non-TARP recipients.”

I have seen a paper from the American Enterprise Institute: “If bankers were being lured by their bank’s compensation systems and acquiring risky but lucrative assets, they should never have bought AAA bonds, which they did.”

I have a study coming out of George Mason University comparing the compensation of banks determined healthy enough to repay their TARP funds to compensation of banks likely to need additional injections of capital that reveals little difference in their executive compensation approaches.

At least the academic studies I have seen do not make the case for the nexus, and even if it did, we have again legislation before us to impact every single public company in America, for which I do not quite understand the rationale.

One quick last question for you, Mr. Rees, and your exchange with Mr. Garrett. Is there a Federal mandate that forces rank-and-file members to vote on the compensation of your union executives?

Mr. REES. There is not a say on pay mandate for union members to vote on executive compensation.
Mr. HENSARLING. Thank you.

Mr. REES. That being said, union executive compensation is not what helped cause the financial crisis and it is not what has caused 10 years of stock market underperformance that has damaged workers' retirement savings.

Mr. HENSARLING. The executive compensation at American Airlines, Dean Foods, and other large employers in Dallas, Texas did. Thank you.

Chairman KANJORSKI. The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Ellison, since you were unable to make your opening remarks, we will attach an additional 3 minutes to your 5 minutes. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this very important hearing. I really appreciate it.

Here is my statement which I will also submit. Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, and members of the Financial Services Committee, thank you for holding this important hearing on corporate governance.

Clearly, new financial regulations should focus on enhanced consumer protection, identification of systemic risks, and enforcement of rules by aggressive regulators, but we are here today to discuss another crucial element to our approach, corporate structural relationships among shareholders, officers, and directors that generate outcomes in areas such as profitability, risk creation, and compensation.

Corporate governance changes seek to beneficially alter the nature of the corporate behavior and therefore address potential causes of economic injustice at a root level.

The bill I introduced, H.R. 3272, makes several proposals designed to strengthen the rights of shareholders and mitigate corporate risks.

As a preliminary matter, I would also like to emphasize that jurisdictionally, the bill also affects companies that issue securities subject to Federal regulation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.

The first element of the bill is the requirement that the chairman of the board be independent and not serve as an executive officer. The goal with this provision is to reinstate the traditional divide between directors and officers, with the hope that the divide will promote increased board oversight and scrutiny of decisions of officers.

As we are all aware, many companies in recent years have fused the director and officer relationship, especially through the combined title of chairman of the board and chief executive officer. Separation of the chairman of the board from officers should promote independence.

Later on, I will ask members of the panel to offer their views on this topic.

The bill provides for the establishment of an independent risk management committee to oversee risk management policies and an independent compensation committee to oversee and review compensation practices.

Related to risk management, the bill also creates a position of risk officer to establish, evaluate, and enforce risk management
policies. I believe that a risk management committee and a compensation committee are crucial first steps that will force a company to approach these matters with the care, diligence, and scrutiny that they deserve.

The hope is that companies will realize that risks within the company have the potential when aggregated with other risks from other companies to create broad-based risks that can further impact the company itself.

Companies at the front line of business activities must be more vigilant about risks.

With regard to compensation, my hope is that compensation committees will think about compensation practices throughout an entire firm and not just for upper level executives. The simple fact that we speak about compensation in terms of executive compensation and not compensation for everyone else probably suggests that we have a serious problem.

As we are all acutely aware, upper level executives are paid at levels or orders of magnitude higher than average employees and the trend has become more asymmetrical over time.

While the government is not in the business of setting wages, a legal requirement such as a compensation committee should inject additional scrutiny into a review of compensation.

Additionally, in terms of compensation, the bill requires a non-binding shareholder vote to approve executive compensation when proxy solicitation rules require compensation disclosure.

This is simply one of the many proposals currently on the table related to shareholder review of compensation.

Shareholders, as the owners of companies, should have the right to ensure that their ownership stake is used to pay wages that promote the profitability of the company.

Executives should not be able to drive companies into the ground and walk away with millions. The shareholders, if given the opportunity to review compensation, would not allow this practice to continue.

Finally, H.R. 3272 provides that the SEC will study whether it should certify members of the board before they are able to join. Because some may view this as a drastic step, I would emphasize that this bill simply asks the SEC to conduct a study to determine the feasibility of such an approach.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, if I have any time left for a few questions, my first question is, I think certain members of our panel, I am not sure which ones, have recognized that there is a trend of separating the CEO from the chairperson of the board.

If you regard this trend as actually happening, why do you account for it and do you think it simply should be the policy for publicly traded companies?

Mr. ROBERT SMITH. Thank you. I believe in my opening remarks I did mention there is an observable trend currently in our membership towards the separation of CEO and chairman.

Having said that, and why that is occurring, I think it is occurring for the appropriate reasons, because as shareholders look at the individual policies and individual practices of their companies,
they are determining a need at that company for a separation of the chairman and CEO.

It comes through the proposal process. There is a dialogue that happens with the company. Then in the cases where a majority of the shareholders would then desire that, it is passed and implemented.

Having said that, we feel strongly that it should not be legislated because that disempowers the shareholders to have that dialogue and it disempowers the shareholders to have the choice as to whether or not that is the appropriate thing.

As for the example in Mr. Garrett’s opening remarks regarding Bill Gates, under the current Peters’ bill legislation, he would not be able to serve as the chairman of Microsoft, and it is incomprehensible how that would be in the shareholders’ best interest.

There are examples like that, new companies who are IPO’ing and coming out, and they have a CEO with a rich history of knowledge of the company and the industry, and to bring in someone with zero tenure and to have them then be the figurehead and the chairman of the company, it does not always make sense. Sometimes, it does. Sometimes, it does not. That is why we would recommend it not being legislated, but being a viable option.

Mr. Ellison. Any other views on this topic?

Mr. Cutler. Yes, I would just add that we agree with that position and really feel the SEC required disclosure on leadership structure last year is very appropriate and I think as you look at the proxies coming out in the 2010 season, you are seeing companies—the board—specifying what their leadership structure is and why they chose that structure. We think that is the appropriate level of disclosure on an annual basis.

Mr. Gregory Smith. It is disturbing to us in Colorado in our pension fund that for some reason, the successes that have occurred across the country in reforming corporate America to adopt appropriate governance standards has now become the shield for corporations who have not adopted these standards and have not taken these progressive steps to say, oh, look, it is happening already without us being told and forced to do it, and they are being allowed to hide behind the good members of our corporate community.

We would suggest that in fact what has happened is the corporations who recognize and acknowledge their obligations to shareholders have taken the appropriate steps and for that, we are thankful, but to suggest that therefore shields those who have not taken those actions from needing to or relieves the need for Federal legislation to impose appropriate tools for shareholders to enforce these principles, these core principles, it is just a travesty, and it needs to be looked through and not allowed to be successful in hiding these bad actors or these failures by other corporations.

Mr. Ellison. That point is well taken. Going back to Mr. Cutler’s point, the fact that some companies have taken the step, are you submitting to us that should somehow be evidence that the ones who have not taken it, that means they do not want it, there are not shareholders who would like to see that kind of action, but for some reason, are curtailed in some way?
Mr. CUTLER. I would just say very briefly that I think it is a little disingenuous, with due respect to my fellow panelists, to say people are hiding behind this. Many corporations have participated in advancing the feeling that there should be a leadership structure disclosure and the board should make that appropriate decision for what is right for that individual corporation in light of some of the factors that my fellow panelist, Mr. Smith, mentioned.

It may also be an issue in terms of evolution, in terms of either a new executive or an executive who has is to provide tutorage for one year.

Chairman KANJORSKI. The gentleman’s time has expired.

Mr. ELLISON. Thank you. I yield back the time I do not have.

[laughter]

Chairman KANJORSKI. The gentleman from California, Mr. Campbell.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I may be unique on this committee in that I strongly support proxy access. However, I strongly oppose this particular bill.

I would like to explore with the panel my concerns and see where you all fall. First of all, let me say that on the majority voting, I obviously support that. I think there is not a lot of controversy on that since about 50 percent of public companies have that now, and I think that is an important part, proxy access, for it to work.

I also think that if you have these things, proxy access and majority voting, then shareholders have mechanisms through which they can express their displeasure with a company short of selling the stock, and therefore, I believe you do not need all these other things like executive comp and the chief risk officer and the board certification, all that kind of stuff.

What I would like to focus on is the proxy access part. My first question is to those of you on the panel who support proxy access, my concern with this bill is that it allows the SEC to set the thresholds of proxy access, and they have indicated that 1 percent, 3 percent, and 5 percent roughly for large cap, mid-cap, and small cap companies, are the proper thresholds.

I believe those thresholds are too low and could result in a greater problem than not having proxy access for this reason: if a single shareholder or a group of shareholders who have a very narrow interest have access to the proxy to express that narrow interest, then that is not in the best interest of the shareholders generally.

I understand all the shareholders have to vote the director in. You could have shareholders that are a union, a supplier, a customer, or perhaps have an event coming up where although they are a long-term shareholder, they have a very short-term focus because they have a sale event that is imminent for some reason.

Any of those things, particularly in a small cap company, 5 percent share holding is not necessarily a big shareholder and is not necessarily a huge investment for a lot of particular institutional players.

For those of you who support proxy access, do you share my concern, do you believe that larger thresholds, 5, 10, and 20, something like that, so you have to have an amalgamation of shareholders that would have to not represent a narrow interest but
would still be not a huge percentage but something like 5, 10, and 20, which is what I support.

Whomever wishes to answer. Mr. Smith?

Mr. GREGORY SMITH. We have done significant work on that very issue because we are concerned about exactly what you raised. As a public pension fund, we certainly see the risks associated with giving people access to a proxy and the need to then be informed about who we are voting for on those director votes.

The realities of who owns shares and how many they own and how you get to these percentages is very important to understand.

What we did was do an examination of the top 10 public pension plans in the country and their holdings in a range of 10 different companies covering a spectrum of cap size.

In that study, what we determined was that there were on average .86 percent of the shares were held by the top 10 pension funds.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Combined?

Mr. GREGORY SMITH. Less than 1 percent combining all 10 of them, the 10 largest had less than 1 percent of the shares. The highest they had in any of the companies that we examined was 2.86 percent. That is all 10 of them combined. That is the biggest in the country, biggest in the world.

Mr. CAMPBELL. My time is wrapping up. I know Mr. Rees wants to say something. I will just ask my second question, which is for the opponents of proxy access. If thresholds are larger, does this soften your opposition or change your opposition to proxy access if there are larger thresholds?

Mr. Cutler?

Mr. CUTLER. If I could, unmentioned so far is the position of hedge funds in corporations, and they are a considerable multiple of that figure. Obviously, the pressure from hedge funds for short-term actions to lever up a company to take actions that are not in the long-term interest of the shareholders, we believe, or the employees or the customers, is considerable.

Higher thresholds would help, but our fundamental issue is that we believe it is an issue of State law, not Federal law.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Rees?

Mr. REES. I would make two points. One, that under the current proxy access rules, many boards of directors would not qualify because the directors themselves do not hold 1 percent of the shares outstanding to nominate directors.

My other point would be that under the current proxy solicitation rules, it is only hedge funds and takeover funds that are doing proxy fights today. There were 40 proxy fights last year which were dominated by short-term forces.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I agree with your 2 year threshold, absolutely, but still, you can have a long-term shareholder with a narrow or even short-term perspective if the threshold is too small.

I yield back. Thank you.

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Campbell. Now, we will hear from the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Bean.

Ms. BEAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a question for Mr. Cutler. First, about majority rule. It is my understanding that in the last couple of years, 63 companies held shareholder votes on
whether to institute a majority vote rule, which resulted in shareholders of 27 of those 63 companies voting against it. Other companies did choose to adopt it.

If the purpose of majority voting is to empower shareholders, what would be some of the reasons that nearly half of shareholders would vote against requiring it?

Mr. CUTLER. I personally cannot speak for what their specific reasons were. I think the trend is the important one here. We are seeing a very high number of companies adopting majority voting, and while we think that is a decision that shareholders should be making for their individual corporations, there are situations where the preponderance of shares may be held by very few shareholders in some firms, often because they are smaller, and that is why we do not think there should be a Federal rule requiring it across the spectrum of all companies.

Ms. BEAN. My second question for you is some have suggested that the risk of proxy access is that it would empower short-term holders, hedge funds, raiders, for example, to influence company decisions. Do you believe that could lead to more emphasis on short-term results as opposed to the creation of long-term shareholder value?

Mr. CUTLER. We do believe that proxy access with those pressures can exacerbate the pressures that are already out there, the short-termism, and do not come simply from this issue of corporate governance, but from the focus on short-term profits and short-term payouts of cash dividends, etc.

Ms. BEAN. Thank you. My next question is for Mr. Smith or Mr. Rees. If the majority of shareholders at a company did not want majority voting, is it your understanding the current proposal would reject that option for them?

Mr. REES. If I may, I believe that the proxy rules need to provide minimum standards for the election of directors. I believe that majority voting is one way to make director elections real accountability mechanisms.

To the extent that shareholders have not voted in favor of those proposals this year, I expect that in future years, we are going to increase demand, but more importantly, you have to remember that many companies due to dual class voting arrangements, due to the bylaw restrictions that prohibit shareholders or require super majority votes to change the bylaws, shareholders do not currently have the mechanisms to implement reforms like equal access to the proxy or majority vote director elections.

Ms. BEAN. Would the short answer be yes, their views should be rejected even if they vote against it?

Mr. REES. The short view is that shareholders need to have their votes on director elections respected and that is why we need majority voting.

Ms. BEAN. My next question is, there was an example that came up, and I forget who mentioned it, that Bill Gates obviously had been CEO and later chairman of the board, and you did not hear a lot of folks at Microsoft uncomfortable with that.

For those who think that this legislation, which would disallow that, is a good idea, can you explain why?
Mr. REES. With all due respect, most publicly traded company CEOs are no Bill Gates, and if they were Bill Gates, then I think there would be less of a concern about the fact that most companies in the United States have combined positions of chairman and CEO.

Mr. GREGORY SMITH. I would also suggest that had Mr. Gates had a separate chairman as opposed to his CEO role, he would have probably functioned quite well within that arrangement, and he would have communicated well with his board. He would have disclosed his management objectives and strategy, and he would have worked with the board chair, an independent chair, to come up with an agenda that gave the directors the opportunity to address that strategy.

Nothing would have tied Mr. Gates’ hands by having a separate chair of the board.

Mr. CUTLER. What you do run the risk of is legislating out talent, and that is a danger.

Ms. BEAN. I would agree with you. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Ms. Bean. Now, we will hear from the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Manzullo.

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cutler, my father-in-law worked for Cutler Hammer for years, and last year he sent you the 50th anniversary brochure. It occurred several years ago. You kindly gave him a call and talked for quite a bit of time with him, and I want to thank you for taking that time just to spend on one of your former employees. That is very commendable.

I have a big problem here. Is anybody proposing any legislation to determine when a corporation should incur a dividend or take that money and reinvest it into new structures or companies?

Does anybody see a problem with the Federal Government making that determination? Or should the Federal Government simply determine the salaries of everybody at every level of the corporation, does anybody have a problem with that?

I have a problem to the extent that the Federal Government that passes a health care bill that does not even know if its own Members of Congress are covered and has the chief spokesman going around the country saying nobody will lose their health insurance, that this august body is telling corporate America what is the best way to run your board of directors.

Somebody has to come in here and say, if we had passed the Proxy Voting Transparency Act, the Corporate Governance Reform Act, and the Shareholder Empowerment Act, that this sage, this independent director would sit on the board of every major corporation and be there to stop any type of default on the part of a corporation.

Can somebody answer that question?

Chairman KANJORSKI. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANZULLO. Sure.

Chairman KANJORSKI. You are asking some interesting questions. We are trying to establish policies here that could protect the American people, and since your side of the aisle just a short number of years ago suggested that all the Social Security funds of the
United States be invested in American corporations, then all the Social Security—

Mr. MANZULLO. Reclaiming my time, I am just making the statement that just because something goes wrong in the financial markets, or something goes wrong with the corporations, that Congress sitting here taking the position that putting someone independent—how do you determine who is independent?

What if a creditor gets on the board and he is independent or he is on the board of another company to which the corporation owes money and says well, you should do things in order to prefer creditors first?

I do not think you can get anybody who is truly independent. Several CEOs sit on other boards themselves. That is okay because you have collective wisdom. You have lots of years of people who have seen mistakes, made mistakes themselves, and wanted to make sure those do not occur again.

I just have a problem with every time something goes wrong, Congress sitting here trying to make these micro decisions. Does anyone want to comment on this?

Mr. Cutler?

Mr. CUTLER. I think as I mentioned before, the temptation coming out of any severe financial crisis like we just came through is the feeling that somehow it could have been prevented through different forms of corporate governance.

I, myself, feel that we came through obviously a very damaging recession. We go through cycles, and we have been through them before, and the focus of financial regulator reform is that which gets at the core of the issue which caused the liquidity crisis.

I personally have not seen evidence that the rest of the damage in the economy that came from that credit crunch came from poor corporate governance practices.

I think the enormous revolution that has been occurring since 2000 in corporate governance is a trend that we should continue to see play out, the independent committees, the improved boards, the independent selection of board members, the vigorous evaluation on an annual basis of board member performance. These are all very positive issues, coupled with the SEC’s new disclosures around leadership, around risk. These are important disclosures that are important for shareholders to have access to.

Mr. MANZULLO. When you look at what happened—you see in Mr. Paulson’s book where he encouraged $20 billion worth of sales of stock of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, knowing full well that there would be a default on it, and a lot of community banks got stuck with it.

The Federal Government’s role in trying to be independent and protect the shareholder is not exactly exemplary. Thank you.

Chairman KANJORSKI. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Carson.

Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This question is for Mr. Gregory Smith. Among your proposed executive compensation reforms, you recommend stronger clawback provisions in legislation.

There is currently language in Sarbanes-Oxley that allows for clawbacks due to executive misconduct. The definition of “misconduct” is really open to interpretation.
Please talk about specific improvements to the language that could be included in legislation.

Mr. GREGORY SMITH. The language that is contained in some of our policies related to clawbacks focus on whether those clawbacks would be related to misstatements of performance, misstatements of financials, the ability to claw back because in fact their performance had been misrepresented. I think that is really the core of our objectives from a legislative perspective.

We do not claim to be able to identify exactly what compensation should be able to be clawed back in every case. That is going to be a company by company determination, and I think it is important to recognize that in none of our reforms have we asked for legislation to set what compensation is going to be, set a formula for what compensation is going to be, or set a formula for what compensation can be clawed back.

What is really important is that we have the ability to do those clawbacks but even more importantly that the shareholders have a voice in the boardroom to make sure that happens, and frankly, that it be put in the contract at the outset with that CEO so that he knows it is going to be clawed back if is misperforms, he knows they are going to pull those dollars back if he does not accurately represent what the corporation has been doing and what the financial condition of the company is.

Mr. CARSON. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman KANJORSKI. Thank you very much, Mr. Carson. The gentlelady from Ohio, Ms. Kilroy.

Ms. KILROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Irwin, in your testimony you indicated that sunlight is the best disinfectant. Do you think then it would be a good thing to require all 13-S institutional investors to disclose how they vote their proxy, knowing how pension funds, unions, hedge funds vote, to add some transparency to the corporate election process?

Mr. IRWIN. My comments today have been as the Federal legislation chair for NASAA, the North American Securities Administrators, and our focus has been on executive compensation. No one is asking today or NASAA is not, and the States are not, asking that there be a Federal determination by the SEC or anyone else or a review of wages or compensation in corporate governance. Rather, we suggest that there be review and disclosure so that shareholders—they are the best regulator of public companies—have access to the complete information.

Ms. KILROY. I was simply asking whether institutional investors should be required to show how they voted their proxies when there was a proxy vote.

Mr. IRWIN. I do not have a position on that, Congresswoman.

Ms. KILROY. Thank you. Mr. Smith, your group, the Colorado Public Employees’ Retirement Association, I understand you have adopted a policy for your domestic proxy votes; is that correct?

Mr. GREGORY SMITH. Yes, we disclose our proxy votes on a monthly basis on our Web site.

Ms. KILROY. Do you think it would make sense to require this of all institutional investors over a certain size, say over $100 million?
Mr. Irwin. Obviously, my board of trustees believes that is an appropriate practice for public pension plans and it is one that we are proud to be a leader of.

Ms. Kilroy. Mr. Rees, does the AFL-CIO support increased transparency by disclosure of proxy voting?

Mr. Rees. Yes, we do. We disclose both our guidelines and our proxy votes, and we believe that all market participants, all institutional market participants, including hedge funds, investment managers, and mutual funds—mutual funds are currently required to disclose their votes—should be.

More importantly, we believe that companies need to implement those votes when adopted by shareholders, and that is why we believe governance reforms like majority vote in director elections are so important.

Ms. Kilroy. Thank you. Mr. Allen, CFA is the sponsor of an investor working group?

Mr. Allen. Yes.

Ms. Kilroy. Am I correct that the investor working group supports the central recommendation of the disclosure of proxy votes?

Mr. Allen. I believe that is correct. I cannot recall whether that was one of the provisions of the IWG report, but I do know that is something that the CFA Institute does support; yes. You are talking about the investment firms disclosing?

Ms. Kilroy. Disclosing how they vote; correct. Or unions or retirement funds.

Mr. Allen. The idea is the investors in those funds need to understand how their managers are voting those shares so they can determine whether or not they want to invest in it.

Ms. Kilroy. Thank you very much. Mr. Smith, some of the members have questioned whether there should be Federal regulation or we should have State-by-State determinations and State-by-State reforms.

How would that affect a large fund like yours if you had State reforms to deal with?

Mr. Gregory Smith. I have a two-part answer to that question, if I may. One is the burden placed upon us in understanding and getting a handle on 50 different States’ rules, it would be burdensome. It would impact our ability to be effective in our votes, and to carry out what we believe our fiduciary duty is, which is to vote those shares and participate in the proxy process.

The question, I think, is one that is extremely important and one that certainly Colorado PERA hopes to get improvement on through this process.

Ms. Kilroy. Thank you. Mr. Brier, you were asked earlier to define “excessive risk.” Do you think it is appropriate for corporations to set up a risk matrix and have a professional risk manager but then repeatedly, over 30 times in 2 years, exceed those risk limits, and in fact, when they are exceeded, just simply increase them and fail to have that risk manager report to that corporate board?

Mr. Brier. I think the most important answer to that question is that through a market-based solution of enabling investors to get access to majority voting and proxy access will enable them to get a voice in the boardroom. That voice in the boardroom will focus on long-term investors, like us, risk management.
I do agree it is an area that one of the difficulties that long-term investors have is removing directors. You can know that something is wrong. You can have derelict directors. You can know that risk management is not under control. You cannot remove them.

I think this market-based solution where long-term investors, long-term holders with a significant number of shares who get access to the proxy, who can use the proxy card of management who need to then go out and get a majority vote can get someone on the board to address this risk management issue.

Chairman KANJORSKI. The gentlelady’s time has expired. Mr. Peters?

Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the panelists. It has been a very interesting discussion and an important issue as well.

I want to briefly address some of my colleagues on the other side who have used some of the rhetoric that this is somehow the Federal Government interjecting itself in the management of companies, I just want to remind my colleagues that this is far from that.

In fact, it is about empowering the people who actually own these companies. I think we have forgotten who actually owns these companies, and that is the shareholders.

To me, that is about as pure of a capitalistic system as you can have, that you say the people who actually own capital actually have a say as to how that capital is managed, and hold those managers accountable to manage it and to increase shareholder wealth.

This is not about Federal Government takeover. It is not about the government mandating. It is about the people who actually own these companies.

I know shareholders are very diverse, including people who are in IRAs and 401(k)s and pension funds, who are investing their hard-earned dollars hoping that they have some sort of security in the future, and want to entrust that their managers actually have their interests in mind and not any of the short-term interests.

I want to just touch on a couple of general themes that I have heard through the debate and then one that I heard from most of the panelists, that there has been a sea change in how boards are starting to govern their companies, and they have been standing up to CEOs and have been more active, and at the same time we are also hearing that more boards are also adopting many of the practices that are in this bill and in the Shareholder Empowerment Act, which I have authored.

Those companies that are standing up to CEOs, are more enlightened, do understand that good governance also is correlated with good shareholder performance or good share performance, to me that seems as if it is pretty good objective evidence that what is in these bills as has been adopted voluntarily by companies, that have boards that are more active in overseeing and holding their management consistent, to me, that should be strong evidence that we should extend it to all companies because this is has proven good governance.

No one particular panelist, is that a fair assessment of why it makes sense for us to move in this direction, because we actually
have objective data from those companies that are doing it, that it does lead to better governance and better stock performance?

Mr. GREGORY SMITH. Certainly, the evidence that we see and are pleased to have had enough success to be able to generate that data.

Mr. CUTLER. I would say there are selective elements that you are seeing broadly adopted. I think getting into areas such as a regulated solution to board leadership, a regulated solution to risk management, a Federal, not a State-based proxy access system, and then as we have talked about on another occasion, the need to address the efficiency and accuracy of the voting process, are really important concepts.

Without that, we feel there are some additional problems with the proxy access proposal.

Mr. ROBERT SMITH. I would just add the movement towards good governance, there is a pervasive attitude to try to vilify current CEOs at companies, but my observation has actually been that CEOs within our membership organizations have been some of the proponents of these changes and of good governance.

There is a trend towards good governance and many of these same provisions are being implemented and do empower shareholders, but again, to legislate it so it is a one-size-fits-all on all companies, it seems to go beyond that, and it takes away from shareholders' ability to actually decide what is best for their company.

Mr. PETERS. I take a little different view, the fact that if shareholders should—every company should have the opportunity to make sure that the managers are caring for their interests and are looking out for their interests.

It should not be just those companies that happen to be led by a more enlightened CEO. We are hoping that shareholders from every company have those protections. That is certainly what is the goal of this legislation.

Mr. Cutler, we had a chance to meet earlier. I appreciate having that opportunity. You did bring up some concerns about the way elections could be hijacked.

If you would just briefly touch on that, and I would like to have some response from some of the other panelists if they are equally as concerned.

Mr. CUTLER. The elimination of broker vote, which our best data would indicate that about 15 percent of our average companies are owned on a retail basis, it has the prospect without improvements in the communication process today that assures accuracy of both the communication and voting process of reducing a number of votes that would be cast in an annual election.

That coupled with relatively low thresholds for majority vote and the ability to pool shares or borrow shares holds the prospect for consortiums of a group of voters coming together to advance a special interest conclusion.

We are also concerned about the potential for borrowed shares not being counted accurately, i.e., being double-counted potentially. That is why we are very pleased, as I mentioned in my testimony, that the SEC is looking at these issues.
The last issue is the very strong position of proxy advisory firms today. It is not a transparent process. There are some indeed conflicts in terms of understanding the vote, if you want to understand that from a company point of view, and that you end up paying a fee to get the information, and we think that consulting agreement is a conflict with the actual voting process, and the ability of 30 to 40 percent of the shares being controlled on an institutional vote by the recommendations—

Mr. Peters. I know my time is expiring. Could I just have a couple of responses from other folks as to their concerns? Mr. Rees or the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Smith?

Mr. Rees. Yes. We believe that we need to have minimum standards in corporate governance to protect investors. Otherwise, you will have a phenomenon where only those companies that have good corporate governance are adopting reforms, like separating the chairman and CEO, majority voting and proxy access, and those that are entrenched in unresponsive boards will be the ones that resist those reforms.

That is why we need minimum standards. Thank you.

Mr. Gregory Smith. I believe also that the borrowed shares issue is one that has been and is being dealt with by the SEC. It does not present a threat. The hedge fund risk or the claim that the raiders will use proxy access to disrupt companies, I think that is dealt with both by the thresholds required, and the testimony I provided regarding really where those volumes of shares could be developed, as well as the holding period.

I do not think there are raiders that want to wait around 2 years for their opportunity to get one board seat. It is just not a realistic threat.

Mr. Robert Smith. If I may, there are many opportunities where boards are faced with long-term capital investments that do not pan out in the short term, and if hedge funds and day traders and people who have access to corporate votes have the opportunity to get in and influence it, then that short-term time horizon can get in the way of those long-term objectives and change the strategy to an annual focus or something with a shorter time horizon than a strategic plan would have.

Mr. Gregory Smith. Ultimately, they would require a majority of the vote in order to accomplish that. We would still be protected.

Mr. Peters. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Kanjorski. Thank you very much, Mr. Peters. Thank you, Ms. Kilroy. The two of you have done really admirable work in this field of governance.

The subcommittee chairman wants to thank you. I know the chairman of the full committee wants to thank you. We are looking forward to further hearings on this subject. Thank you.

To the panel, we want to thank you for being here. I have one or two notes I have to make before we recess to dismiss you.

The Chair notes that some members may have additional questions for this panel, which they may wish to submit in writing. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 30 days for members to submit written questions to these witnesses and to place their responses in the record.
Before we adjourn, the following written statements will be made a part of the record of this hearing: Carl C. Icahn; Tom Gardner, on behalf of Motley Fool; the Investment Company Institute; and Susan F. Schultz, president, the board institute, Inc. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I have a letter which we all had received dated April 20, 2010, to you and Ranking Member Garrett from a series of entities in opposition to some of this legislation. I will not read them all: American Insurance Association; Americans for Tax Reform; Business Roundtable; the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, etc. I would ask that this be made with unanimous consent part of the record, if we may.

Chairman KANJORSKI. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Any other submissions for the record? We have completed everything?

[No response.]

Chairman KANJORSKI. I want to thank this panel. I hope we did not pick on anyone in particular, but I gained a lot of insight from you all. I am certain now we have more confusing time to spend to resolve this, but we will.

Thank you very much for your public service. We really do appreciate it.

Thank you and the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Good morning. Today we meet to consider several thoughtful bills that seek by various means to correct the imbalance of power between investors and management. For far too long at too many public companies, corporate executives have had the upper hand.

The financial crisis revealed, at times vividly and shockingly, how all too frequently corporate management and boards failed to consider the long-term interests of their shareholders. As a result, innocent investors incurred monumental losses, even while corporate chiefs escaped the inferno unscathed, usually by golden parachute.

It is clear that the decks were stacked, especially when you consider that Wall Street bankers took home enormous paychecks while the taxpayers got stuck with the bill. We now need to chart a different course. Congress must act to democratize corporate governance rules so that investors have a greater say in the companies that they own.

First and foremost, we ought to provide shareholders an easier means of getting directors nominated. Also, we should act to improve transparency by requiring more institutional investment managers to disclose how they vote on shareholder proxies.

In the run-up to the crisis, excessive leverage and risk-taking became the norm on Wall Street. These decisions flew in the face of financial stability and lacked a fundamental level of good judgment. We can fix this problem by requiring public companies to form independent risk-management committees with prescribed functions and duties.

While the ideas in each of the bills before us are well intended, we also need to carefully examine each proposal. As for the appealing idea of separating the role of chairman from that of chief executive officer, we should explore how such a policy will affect small companies. Requiring majority voting for uncontested directors also appears a worthy goal, but we must determine if it could produce inadvertent problems, especially if too few shareholders vote.

As part of last year’s debates on the Wall Street reform bill, our Committee has already acted to improve corporate governance laws. As passed by the House, H.R. 4173 contained important provisions on proxy access and executive pay. It is my hope that the Senate will act with all deliberate speed on its reform legislation so that these important corporate governance reforms can become law.

In the meantime, we must advance the debate about how we can further enhance corporate governance through increased transparency, better executive accountability, and greater shareholder rights. In this regard, I look forward to the testimony today and thank the witnesses for appearing. I would also like to thank Congressman Peters, Congressman Ellison and Congresswoman Kilroy for their hard work on these important policy matters.
United States House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government-Sponsored Enterprises

April 21, 2010

STATEMENT OF JAMES ALLEN, CFA
HEAD OF CAPITAL MARKETS POLICY AT CFA INSTITUTE

Introduction

Good morning. I want to thank Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, and all the members of the subcommittee for inviting me to come speak to you on behalf of CFA Institute. I am Jan Allen, Head of Capital Markets Policy at CFA Institute and I would like to use this opportunity to address some of the important provisions in the three bills the Subcommittee is considering.

Background on CFA Institute

For those of you not familiar with CFA Institute, we are a non-profit membership organization of more than 97,000 investment analysts, advisers, portfolio managers and other investment professionals. Our mission is to lead the investment profession globally by setting the highest standards of ethics, education, and professional excellence. CFA Institute is most widely recognized as the organization that administers the Chartered Financial Analyst examination program and awards the CFA designation, a designation held by more than 88,000 investment professionals in 137 countries. Since 2006, this program has included corporate governance studies as an integral part of the core curriculum that reaches more than 60,000 first-year exam takers every year.

With offices in Charlottesville, New York, London, Brussels, and Hong Kong, the Capital Markets Division of CFA Institute represents the views of investment professionals worldwide on issues affecting the practice of financial analysis and investment management, especially on issues that affect the efficiency and integrity of the global capital markets.

In keeping with our belief that what is good for the investor is good for financial markets in general, CFA Institute has long supported strong corporate governance measures that give shareholders an effective voice without unreasonably interfering with the corporate board room. This often requires a finely-tuned balance of interests and reasonable restraints on both investors and corporate issuers.

As an organization of professional investors who rely upon governance checks and balances to prevent and manage various conflicts of interest within companies, CFA Institute has conducted extensive research and produced many publications and position papers on a broad range of corporate governance issues. These include investor manuals on corporate governance, executive compensation, environmental, social and governance factors, and global shareowner rights.

In the interest of time, I’d like to provide our views and recommendations on a number of issues raised in the bills, in hopes that these will help inform this Subcommittee’s actions about professional investors’ views on the scope of corporate governance measures included in these bills.

Role of Governance Failures

In general, we believe that corporate governance failures on the part of financial institutions played an important, though by no means exclusive, role in the market crisis that began in August 2007. In
particular, neither the banks that developed large concentrations of high-risk loans funded through highly leveraged structures and unreliable wholesale funds, nor the boards that were overseeing managers who adopted these policies, fully appreciated the potential downsides that would come from these structures. At the same time, these banks were operating under regulatory supervision that both permitted and in some cases encouraged such strategies, creating a recipe for disaster.

With regard to the potential corporate governance remedies for these situations, the bills under consideration today cover a number of corporate governance issues, most of which we and our membership have long supported.

**Executive Compensation**

We strongly support the provision in all three bills being considered that would give shareholders a non-binding (or advisory) vote on executive compensation. These so-called “say-on-pay” provisions give shareholders the ability to voice their views about the compensation being awarded to senior executives. It also can serve to open a meaningful dialogue between shareholders and management. We hear from our members in Australia and the United Kingdom that these votes have focused board attention on securing investor approval prior to their votes. Consequently, boards have engaged major shareholders on the best manner in which to structure executive pay, which, in turn, has helped to reduce the rate of increase in senior management pay. 7

Likewise, we support greater transparency about both the metrics used to determine executive compensation and the actual pay awarded during a given fiscal year. In recent years, we have submitted letters to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on this very issue, arguing for greater disclosure of the performance targets that each company uses to gauge eligibility for variable compensation. Unfortunately, we have found companies less than forthright in their compensation disclosures, employing legal boilerplate language that may satisfy the letter of the law but falls short of the intent to offer meaningful insight into management incentives. To help improve this situation, we are developing a CD&A template that we hope to offer to the SEC as a way toward better compensation discussions and analyses.

With regard to special compensation arrangements for senior management related to removal without cause, including as a result of mergers or acquisitions, these matters are currently disclosed in proxy statements. We support prominent disclosure of such arrangements to inform shareholders generally as to the Board’s performance in fulfilling their stewardship responsibilities. We also support prominent disclosure of any special arrangements related to mergers or acquisitions that have not been previously negotiated so that shareholders may be fully informed about all relevant terms of any proposed transactions. This, we believe, will allow shareholders to make more informed votes on board nominees. However, because these arrangements are typically negotiated as part of employment contracts with management, it would be potentially cumbersome to require shareholder approval prospectively. So we would not support such a provision included into any final law.

Likewise, while we also support companies adopting and implementing “clawback” provisions that enable them to recoup compensation based on restated or fraudulent financial reporting, we believe such decisions are best left to a company’s shareholders rather than be part of a legislative, one-size-fits-all mandate.

**Majority Voting and Proxy Access**

The Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009 includes a number of measures which CFA Institute has long advocated and which we are eager to support. In particular, we believe that in uncontested elections, directors of listed companies should be elected by a majority, not a plurality (as currently required), of
shareowner votes. We believe that this will not only strengthen board accountability to shareowners, but we also believe it will provide investors with a meaningful way to choose their representatives and thus give them a true voice in director elections.

A second measure that we have felt strongly about and supported since the SEC first offered its proposal in 2003 is the right for shareowners to have access to companies’ proxy statements for the purpose of nominating candidates for director positions. Implementation of such a measure alone would confirm that shareowners have a meaningful voice (other than “voting with their feet”) as to the companies in which they own interests. We also believe it would send a strong message to company boards that shareowners will have the tools to hold them more accountable in the future. Furthermore, including such provisions into legislation would avoid much of the expensive litigation that has helped prevent SEC action on this issue in the past.

Chair Independence

We recognize that there has long been a call in some quarters for a requirement that the chairman of the board be independent from management—a proposal that appears in both the Corporate Governance Reform Act of 2009 and the Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009. In our Corporate Governance Manual, we encourage investors to determine the independence of the chair as an important factor in determining whether to invest in a company.

Nevertheless, we do not believe this requirement is necessary, and may instead lead to situations where form is valued over substance—where the knowledge and expertise of corporate “insiders” is traded for the functional “independent” figurehead. Instead, we believe it is up to the board of directors and shareowners to decide who should chair the board. In those cases where the board chooses the CEO as chair of the board, we take the position that the independent members of the board should appoint a “lead director” who takes on the responsibility for chairing separate meetings of independent directors and addresses issues that may involve conflicts with management. We also believe that the Board should make full disclosure to shareholders as to why the CEO was selected as Chair rather than appointing an independent director.

We believe this approach strikes an appropriate balance for ensuring the continued independence of the board deliberation and decision-making processes.

SEC Vetting of Board Members

Finally, we are not comfortable with the proposals that would have the SEC certify that every member of the board for each of the thousands of companies trading publicly in the United States has the requisite expertise and experience. Our concern is that such activities will divert valuable SEC resources and attention away from the Commission’s existing mandates.

Moreover, we are not convinced that the SEC possesses the expertise to determine what each individual company needs in terms of board member qualifications. We are further concerned that such a provision would lead companies and boards to nominate only those individuals who have already received approval by the Commission—typically incumbent directors—or those with specific types of expertise that have garnered SEC approval in other situations. Such a situation would limit the broadening of the pool of board members available to company boards, concentrate board room power among an elite, politically connected group of individuals, and lead to a herd mentality in the board room. We do not believe this is what American companies need right now.

Instead of an SEC vetting process, we encourage more thorough disclosure of board member expertise, especially at the committee level, so that shareowners can decide for themselves whether board members possess adequate expertise. To that end, we encourage a thorough description of board member expertise,
such as required for audit committee members, so that shareholders can better understand whether
nominees are qualified to discharge their duties in this increasingly complex boardroom environment.

Conclusion

Over time, researchers have found that companies with strong corporate governance structures have
regularly and significantly outperformed those with weak governance systems.11 As fiduciaries acting on
behalf of the owners of these companies, therefore, our members are particularly sensitive to the need for
strong corporate governance structures. This is why we have made corporate governance a focus of our
organization and for our curriculum.

Thank you for your time, and I am willing to answer any questions that you may have.

http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/cee/2008/2

Bridge found that growth in executive compensation in the United Kingdom declined to around 8 percent
after growing at twice that rate prior to the introduction of the nonbinding vote.

xi Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics (revised January 2009). The authors compared the investment
performance of some 1,500 U.S.-listed companies with a corporate governance index that the authors
constructed from 24 distinct governance rules. The authors found that portfolios of companies with strong
shareholder rights protections outperformed portfolios of companies with weaker protections by 8.5
percent per year. Also see Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell, “What Matters in Corporate
Governance,” Review of Financial Studies (February 2009).
Testimony of

Thomas F. Brier

Deputy Chief Investment Officer and Director of Corporate Governance

Pennsylvania State Employees' Retirement System

before the

Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises

Committee on Financial Services

U.S. House of Representatives

April 21, 2010

Corporate Governance and Shareholder Empowerment
Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Good morning. I am Tom Brier, Deputy Chief Investment Officer and Director of Corporate Governance for the Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement System (“SERS”). I am pleased to appear before you today on behalf of SERS.

Our testimony includes a brief overview of SERS, including how we participate in corporate governance and make investment decisions, and a discussion of our views on the following matters that you informed us were the basis, at least in part, for this important hearing:

- . . . how . . . inadequate corporate governance contributed to the 2008 financial meltdown.
- . . . the remedies currently available to shareholders dissatisfied with . . . performance at public companies.
- . . .
- . . . how corporate boards should be made more responsive to shareholder concerns.
- . . . how corporate governance standards differ among States and public companies.¹

Some Background on SERS

Established in 1923, SERS is one of the nation's oldest and largest statewide retirement plans for public employees and ranks among the top pension plans in the nation with net assets exceeding twenty-four billion dollars. Our members number more than 220,000, including more than 110,000 active employees and more than 109,000 retirees and other beneficiaries.

SERS mission is to provide retirement benefits and services to our members through sound administration and prudent investments. Over the past ten years, we have paid out approximately eighteen billion dollars in benefits and expenses.

We are a long-term investor largely as a result of our long-term obligations and investment horizon. Moreover, our significant passive investment strategies limit our ability to simply sell our shares when we are dissatisfied. As a result, corporate governance issues are of great interest to us and improving corporate governance is of great benefit to the tens of thousands of workers that rely on us for their retirement security.

SERS’ Participation in Corporate Governance Decisions
SERS has been a long–time proponent of good corporate governance, which serves to protect, preserve and grow the assets of the fund. As a shareowner of each of the stocks held in its portfolios, SERS’ board has developed, and periodically updates, a comprehensive set of corporate governance principles and detailed guidelines that govern the voting of the related proxies. These principles and guidelines focus on a broad range of issues including how SERS will vote on director nominees in uncontested elections and in proxy contests.

SERS’ votes its proxies in accordance with our guidelines. Both the SERS’ proxy policy and the actual proxy votes cast are published on the our website, www.sers.state.pa.us, so that all SERS’ constituents and interested parties can know our positions on these important issues.
Shareowner proxy voting rights are considered to be valuable assets of the fund. Attention to corporate governance promotes responsible business practices that serve as an integral component to a company’s long-term value creation. In instances where SERS’ guidelines are not dispositive on shareowner or management proposals, SERS’ Chief Investment Officer reviews and makes proxy voting recommendations that are consistent with the best interests of the fund and our fiduciary duties.

**SERS’ Investment Decision Making Process**

As indicated above, SERS’ takes a long-term strategic approach to its investment decision-making process. Annually, a comprehensive “Strategic Investment Plan” is developed jointly by SERS’ investment staff and its external consultants, with input from and subject to final approval of the eleven-member board. The plan is based on careful analysis of the long-term outlook for the capital markets and major qualitative and quantitative factors including the unique needs, preferences, objectives and constraints of SERS. This detailed investment plan manifests itself in the development of an asset allocation framework designed to achieve the ongoing commitment to diversification and provide guidance in the investment decision-making process including advancing investment strategies, the hiring and monitoring of external investment advisors, portfolio rebalancing and meeting cash needs.
How Inadequate Corporate Governance Contributed to the 2008 Financial Meltdown

It is widely acknowledged that the 2008 financial meltdown represented a massive failure of oversight.\(^2\) Too many CEOs pursued excessively risky strategies or investments that bankrupted their companies or weakened them financially for years to come.\(^3\) Boards of directors were often complacent, failing to challenge or rein in reckless senior executives who threw caution to the wind.\(^4\) And too many boards approved executive compensation plans that rewarded excessive risk taking.\(^5\)

More specifically, a common element in the failure of Lehman Brothers, AIG, Fannie Mae, and many other companies implicated in the 2008 financial meltdown,\(^6\) was that their boards of directors did not control excessive risk-taking, did not prevent compensation systems from encouraging a ‘bet the ranch’ mentality, and did not hold management sufficiently accountable.\(^7\)

As famed investor Warren Buffett observed in his most recent letter to the shareowners of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

> In my view a board of directors of a huge financial institution is derelict if it does not insist that its CEO bear full responsibility for risk control. If he’s incapable of handling that job, he should look for other employment. And if he fails at it — with the government thereupon required to step in with funds or guarantees — the financial consequences for him and his board should be severe.

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\(^3\) Id.

\(^4\) Id.; see also Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Neal Wolin, Remarks to the Council of Institutional Investors 4 (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/opinion/11wolin.html (noting that “irresponsible pay practices . . . led so many firms to act against the interests of their shareholders” [hereinafter Wolin Remarks]).

\(^5\) See Editorial, Who’s Not Sorry Now?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/opinion/11wolin.html (“The crisis was the result of irresponsibility and misjudgments by many people, including Mr. Prince and Mr. Rubin. Citi, under their leadership, epitomized the financial recklessness that ruined the economy.”).

It has not been shareholders who have botched the operations of some of our country’s largest financial institutions. Yet they have borne the burden, with 90% or more of the value of their holdings wiped out in most cases of failure. Collectively, they have lost more than $500 billion in just the four largest financial fiascos of the last two years. To say these owners have been “bailed-out” is to make a mockery of the term.

The CEOs and directors of the failed companies, however, have largely gone unscathed. Their fortunes may have been diminished by the disasters they oversaw, but they still live in grand style. It is the behavior of these CEOs and directors that needs to be changed: If their institutions and the country are harmed by their recklessness, they should pay a heavy price— one not reimbursable by the companies they’ve damaged nor by insurance. CEOs and, in many cases, directors have long benefited from oversized financial carrots; some meaningful sticks now need to be part of their employment picture as well.⁹

Accountability is critical to motivating people to do a better job in any organization or activity.⁹ An effective board of directors can help every business understand and control its risks, thereby encouraging safety and stability in our financial system and reducing the pressure of regulators, who will never be able to find every problem.¹⁰ Unfortunately, the inadequacies of existing corporate governance requirements and practices prevented (and continues to prevent) shareowners from holding boards accountable.

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¹⁰ Id.
Why Shareowners Do Not Currently Have Effective Remedies When Dissatisfied With Performance at Public Companies

The most fundamental right of investors is the right to nominate, elect, and remove directors.\(^{11}\)

At least two major roadblocks, however, prevent this fundamental right from being an effective remedy for shareowners dissatisfied with the performance of their public companies.\(^{12}\)

First, federal proxy rules have historically prohibited shareowners from placing the names of their own director candidates on public company proxy cards.\(^{13}\) Thus, long-term shareowners who may have wanted the ability to run their own candidate for a board seat as a means of making the current directors more accountable have only had the option of pursuing a full-blown election contest—a prohibitively expensive action for most public pension funds like SERS.\(^{14}\)

Second, relatively few U.S. public companies have adopted majority voting for director elections. Thus, most board elections have a predetermined result.\(^{15}\)

\(^{11}\) IWG Report, supra note 2, at 22.

\(^{12}\) Id. Other corporate governance improvements contained in H.R. 2861, the “Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009,” H.R. 3272, the “Corporate Governance Reform Act of 2009,” or H.R. 3351, the “Proxy Voting Transparency Act of 2009,” referenced in Pennsylvania State Employees’ Retirement System 2009 U.S. proxy voting policy guidelines include: independence of chairman of the board; shareowner advisory vote on executive compensation; clawback provisions; and severance pay.

\(^{13}\) Id.

\(^{14}\) Id.

\(^{15}\) Id.
More specifically, most companies elect directors in uncontested elections using a plurality standard, by which shareowners may vote for, but cannot vote against, a nominee. If they oppose a particular nominee, they may only withhold their vote. As a consequence, a nominee only needs one “for” vote to be elected and, therefore, potentially unseating a director and imposing some accountability becomes virtually impossible.

How Corporate Boards Should Be Made More Responsive to Shareowner Concerns

As indicated, the most fundamental right of investors is the right to nominate, elect, and remove directors. As also indicated, two roadblocks to the exercise of that right must be promptly removed to make corporate boards more responsive to shareowner concerns.

Fortunately, due to the extraordinary leadership of this Subcommittee, the full Committee on Financial Services, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission or SEC”), the first roadblock—the inability for shareowners to place director nominees on the company’s proxy card—will likely soon be lifted. As you are aware, in June 2009, the Commission issued a thoughtful proposal providing for a uniform measured right for significant long-term investors to place a limited number of nominees for director on the company’s proxy card. After careful consideration of the input received in response to two separate comment periods for the proposal, the SEC appears poised to soon issue a final uniform proxy access rule that we believe, like the proposal, will be responsive to the needs of long-term investors like SERS.

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16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 23.
To ensure that the implementation of the SEC’s pending final rule will not face unnecessary, costly and time-consuming litigation brought by opponents of the rule, this Subcommittee and the full Committee on Financial Services had the foresight to include a provision in the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act that reaffirms that the SEC has unambiguous authority to issue their final rule permitting shareholder access to the proxy.\(^{20}\) We again commend the Subcommittee for their leadership in pursuing this provision. We are also pleased that the provision is strongly supported by the Administration.\(^{21}\)

The remaining roadblock to making boards more responsive to shareholder concerns is the continued existence of plurality voting for the election of directors in uncontested elections. As indicated, the accountability of directors at most U.S. public companies is severely weakened by the fact that shareholders do not have a meaningful vote in director elections.

Under most state laws, including Delaware, the default standard for uncontested elections is a plurality vote, which means that a director is elected even if a majority of the shares are withheld from the nominee. We, and many other long-term investors, believe that a plurality standard for the uncontested election of directors is unfair, fosters a lack of responsiveness to shareholder needs, and, thus, should be promptly replaced by a majority vote standard.\(^{22}\)

\(^{21}\) See, e.g., Wolin Remarks, supra note 5, at 4.
\(^{22}\) See, e.g., The Council of Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance Policies, § 2.2 Director Elections (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.cii.org/userFiles/file/council%20policies/CII%20Corp%20Gov%20Policies%20Full%20and%20Current%204-13-10.pdf (“Directors in uncontested elections should be elected by a majority of the votes cast”).
In recent years, many public companies, including more than two-thirds of the S&P 500, have indicated that they agree with SERS and other investors on this point, and have voluntarily adopted majority voting standards. At most public companies, however, plurality voting still inexplicably remains the rule, despite the unequivocal message from investors in support of majority voting.

We note that the Shareowner Empowerment Act of 2009, that was referenced in the letter provided to us in connection with this hearing, includes a provision that would require the Commission to “direct the national securities exchanges and national securities associations to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer” if the company does not have majority voting for the uncontested election of directors. We generally support that provision. The benefits of removing this roadblock by requiring publicly listed companies to adopt a majority voting standard are many. It would democratize the corporate electoral process; put real voting power in the hands of long-term investors like SERS; and, most importantly, make boards more accountable to shareholders.26

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24 Letter from Paul E. Kanjorski, supra note 1, at 1.
26 See IIGW Report, supra note 2, at 22.
How Corporate Governance Standards Differ Among States and Public Companies

While we are not experts on the corporate governance standards of all States and public companies, there clearly are differences in corporate governance standards among those parties. Moreover, those differences and the long standing patchwork of state and federal corporate governance standards in the U.S. have generally served SERS and its beneficiaries well. When, however, the differences and patchwork of corporate governance standards present roadblocks to long-term investors' fundamental right to nominate, elect, and remove directors, and when the effect of those roadblocks contributes to one of the most devastating financial crises in U.S. history, we believe the time has come for the prompt enactment of uniform rules for proxy access and majority voting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for inviting me to participate at this hearing. I look forward to the opportunity to respond to any questions.
Corporate Governance and Shareholder Empowerment

Hearing before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises

April 21, 2010

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Chairman & CEO, Eaton Corporation
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Written Testimony and
Comments for the Record

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Introduction

Business Roundtable www.businessroundtable.org is an association of chief executive officers of leading U.S. companies with more than $6 trillion in annual revenues and more than 12 million employees. Member companies comprise nearly a third of the total value of the U.S. stock markets and pay more than 60% of all corporate income taxes paid to the federal government. Annually, they return $167 billion in dividends to shareholders and the economy. Business Roundtable companies give more than $7 billion a year in combined charitable contributions, representing nearly 60% of total corporate giving. They are technology innovation leaders, with $111 billion in annual research and development spending – nearly half of the total private R&D spending in the United States.

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in this hearing on “Corporate Governance and Shareholder Empowerment” and to discuss the Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009, the Corporate Governance Reform Act of 2009 and the Proxy Voting Transparency Act of 2009. Because the three bills contain many similar provisions, this written testimony discusses the provisions of the bills on an issue by issue basis.

Business Roundtable has long been at the forefront of efforts to improve corporate governance. We have been issuing “best practices” statements in this area for three decades, including Principles of Corporate Governance (November 2005), which we currently are revising to reflect recent developments in corporate governance,
The Nominating Process and Corporate Governance Committees: Principles and Commentary (April 2004), Guidelines for Shareholder-Director Communications (May 2005), and Executive Compensation: Principles and Commentary (January 2007). More recently, Business Roundtable was a signatory to Long-Term Value Creation: Guiding Principles for Corporations and Investors, also known as The Aspen Principles, a set of principles drafted in response to concerns about the corrosiveness that short-term pressures exert on companies. The signatories to The Aspen Principles are a group of business organizations, institutional investors and labor unions, including the AFL-CIO, Council of Institutional Investors and TIAA-CREF, who are committed to encouraging and implementing best corporate governance practices and long-term management and value-creation strategies. In addition, Business Roundtable recently published its Principles for Responding to the Financial Markets Crisis (2009).

At the outset, we must respectfully take issue with the premise that corporate governance was a significant cause of the current financial crisis. It likely stemmed from a variety of complex financial factors, including major failures of a regulatory system, over-leveraged financial markets and a real estate bubble. But even experts

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1 See Lawrence Mitchell, Protect Industry from Predatory Speculators, Financial Times, July 8, 2009. Professor Mitchell, a George Washington University law professor, argues that it is “hyperbolic” to suggest that inattentive boards had anything significant to do with the current recession.

disagree about the origins of the crisis. Notably, with the support of Business Roundtable, Congress established the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission which is investigating the causes of the crisis.

Changes to the financial regulatory and corporate governance systems in the United States represent two enormously complex yet distinct subjects. By combining an examination of the two, public anger surrounding the financial crisis becomes a substitute for a fact-based examination of our corporate governance system. In fact, a legitimate concern is that some provisions in the proposed legislation, such as proxy access, could exacerbate factors that many believe contributed to the crisis, such as the emphasis on short-term gains at the expense of long-term, sustainable growth. Thus, we must be cautious that in our zeal to address the financial crisis, we remain focused on the actual causes of the crisis and do not jeopardize companies' ability to create the jobs, products, services and benefits that improve the economic well-being of all Americans by enacting unnecessary corporate governance reforms.

Moreover, mandating federal corporate governance requirements is inconsistent with the traditional enabling approach of state corporate law, as noted in a recent article on the risks to private enterprise from federal preemption of state corporate law

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4 See Lawrence Mitchell, Protect Industry from Predatory Speculators, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 8, 2009.
Corporate governance involves the relationships between shareholders, the board and management of a company, and it traditionally has been governed by state law. The proposed legislation seeks to impose federal requirements that would deprive shareholders and companies of the ability to take advantage of the enabling nature of state corporate law to tailor their company’s governance practices to the company’s specific characteristics at a given point in time.

We also must consider the sweeping transformation in the corporate governance landscape in the past decade through a combination of legislation, rulemaking by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the securities markets, best practices documents issued by organizations like Business Roundtable and the National Association of Corporate Directors, and voluntary action by companies. The SEC has adopted rules designed to provide that shareholders receive the information they need to make informed voting decisions, including rules requiring that companies provide shareholders with additional information on executive compensation and corporate governance practices. Similarly, state corporate law has been responsive to developments in corporate governance, most recently with respect to majority voting for directors, proxy access and proxy contest reimbursement. Finally, companies have taken a number of steps to improve their corporate governance practices, as illustrated by statistics cited later in this testimony.

For these reasons and the reasons discussed below, Business Roundtable believes that several provisions of the proposed legislation are inappropriate responses
to the financial crisis and could exacerbate the focus on short-term gains at the expense of long-term, sustainable growth. Moreover, several of the provisions of the bills are otherwise problematic and out of date. Even if Congress proceeds with considering aspects of the bills, there are a number of ways in which they can be improved as well as several other issues that need to be addressed.

**Proxy Access**

One of the most problematic provisions in the proposed legislation is the provision in the Shareholder Empowerment Act that would require the SEC to issue proxy access rules that would permit shareholders owning as little as 1% of a company’s securities for at least two years to nominate director candidates for inclusion in the company’s proxy materials. Business Roundtable believes that director accountability to shareholders is extremely important but that federal rules on proxy access are not the most effective way to achieve this goal and could result in significant adverse consequences. As we have noted in our comment letter on the SEC’s proposed proxy access rules in August 2009 (attached as Exhibit II), a proxy access rule could exacerbate the short-term focus that is widely considered to be a contributing factor to the financial crisis. The prospect of frequent election contests could cause directors to focus on short-term stock price rather than invest for the creation of long-term value. This already is evident in the practices of some hedge funds, which have encouraged companies where they invest to engage in practices that increase immediate financial
returns to shareholders, but may be harmful to longer-term growth, such as demanding overleveraging, increased dividends and reduced capital expenses.

Proxy access also could lead to the election of “special interest” directors, who may promote their own interests or those of the shareholders nominating them at the expense of the interests of other shareholders or the company as a whole. For example, if a union-nominated or other special interest director candidate obtains a seat on a corporate board, the board could become divided and dysfunctional, thus weakening the company and impeding its long-term growth. Even if their “special interest” directors are not elected, the company and its shareholders will have been forced to bear the costs and suffer the distraction of a time-consuming and expensive proxy contest.

In view of the substantial cost and disruption and other serious consequences that would result from proxy access, we believe a 1% threshold ownership requirement for nominating shareholders is particularly inappropriate. In this regard, a federal proxy access mandate would result in expensive, highly contentious, and distracting proxy contests. At a time when American business is responding to the financial crisis, we question the wisdom of undertaking actions that will distract management and board attention, invite disruption in the boardroom and discourage directors from serving on boards.

Contemporary boards of directors use a variety of tools and processes to see that qualified directors are presented to shareholders for election. They strategically
review skills matrixes of current directors, carefully assess forward-looking skills requirements on the board considering specialized needs, such as audit committee financial experts, see that the relevant knowledge is present to provide guidance, counsel and oversight and undertake evaluations of the board and its committees. They then disclose to shareholders their criteria for board membership along with the qualifications and experience of the nominated directors. A federally mandated proxy access regime cannot substitute for this carefully crafted qualification, assessment and skills prioritization process. Furthermore, shareholders who disagree with decisions made by a board of directors elected pursuant to this process can use the mechanisms afforded them under the existing framework by voting against directors or “voting with their feet” by selling their shares. Shareholders also can make their views known through nominating their own director candidates and engaging in election contests. Many companies also provide means for shareholders to communicate with the board about various matters, including recommendations for director candidates and the director election process in general.

Despite these concerns about a federally mandated proxy access regime, Business Roundtable believes that shareholders and companies should be able to consider recent state proxy access enabling statutes and to implement proxy access provisions that are adapted to the distinct characteristics and needs of the individual company or, alternatively, to determine that proxy access is unnecessary or inappropriate at their company. Thus, we support proposed revisions to SEC Rule 14a-8 to allow shareholders to offer customized proxy access proposals with the modifications
discussed in our comment letter on the SEC’s proposed proxy access rules. In 2009, the Delaware legislature adopted amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law that expressly permit companies to adopt bylaw provisions allowing shareholders to include director nominees in company proxy materials and provide for the reimbursement of expenses incurred by shareholders in connection with proxy contests.\(^5\) In addition, the American Bar Association recently adopted amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act similar to those enacted in Delaware.\(^6\) The Shareholder Empowerment Act would instead create a federal mandate that would deprive shareholders and their companies from exercising their rights under state law to determine whether or not, and to what degree, they wish to permit shareholders to include director nominees in company proxy materials.

**Separation of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer**

Both the Shareholder Empowerment Act and the Corporate Governance Reform Act would require that the chairman of the board of directors be an independent director. Business Roundtable recognizes the importance of independent board leadership, as reflected in our Principles of Corporate Governance, but a single method of providing that leadership is not appropriate for all companies at all times.

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\(^5\) Delaware General Corporation Law §§ 112 and 113 (2009).

Thus, while some companies have separated the positions of chairman of the board and chief executive officer, and at some of these companies the chairman is independent, others have voluntarily established lead independent or presiding director positions. These lead or presiding directors generally are responsible for approving the agenda for board meetings, as well as the information to be provided for the meeting, calling and chairing executive sessions of the board and performing other functions. Recent studies indicate that companies have been implementing changes to their board leadership structures to enhance board independence. According to the RiskMetrics Group 2010 Board Practices survey, from 2003 to 2009, the number of S&P 1,500 companies with separate chairmen of the board increased from 30% to 43%. In addition, a 2007 Business Roundtable survey of member companies indicated that 91% of member companies have an independent chairman or an independent lead or presiding director, up from 55% in 2003. Finally, according to the 2008 Spencer Stuart Board Index, by mid-2008, 95% of S&P 500 companies had a lead or presiding director, up from 36% in 2003.

Companies need the ability to adapt their leadership structures to their individual circumstances depending on the needs of the company at any particular time in its evolution. For example, a company may determine that separating the roles of chairman and chief executive officer will weaken its ability to develop and implement its strategy and that combining the roles would provide the most efficient and effective leadership model. On the other hand, during the transition to a new chief executive officer, some companies may determine it is appropriate to have a separate chairman to
allow the new chief executive officer to focus primarily on management responsibilities. This illustrates the need for, and advantages of, being able to determine the approach to independent board leadership that will work most effectively for them at different points in time. Our Principles of Corporate Governance reflect this concept that a company’s board leadership structure should not be static, but rather should be considered as part of the succession planning process in light of the company’s facts and circumstances.

Shareholders today are being provided with more information about their companies’ board leadership structures. While many companies have addressed this issue in their corporate governance principles for quite some time, the SEC recently required companies to provide disclosure to shareholders about board leadership.\(^7\) Specifically, companies are required to discuss whether they combine or separate the positions of chairman and chief executive officer and describe why their leadership structure is appropriate for the company. As a result of these new disclosures, shareholders now have more information to assess whether their company’s leadership structure is appropriate. Shareholders also have the ability to use the SEC’s shareholder proposal process under Rule 14a-8 to seek a particular leadership structure at the

companies in which they invest. Indeed, RiskMetrics statistics indicate that in 2009 companies held votes on 39 independent chairman shareholder proposals.⁸

Mandating a board leadership structure for the more than 10,000 public companies, regardless of their size, organizational structure, location, business, industry or shareholder base, simply will not work. Dictating a particular board leadership structure could seriously impact companies’ ability to operate effectively, thereby jeopardizing job creation and the creation of shareholder value.

Say on Pay

All three proposed bills would require companies to hold an annual shareholder advisory vote to approve the compensation of executives, as disclosed in the proxy statement. While Business Roundtable supports choice for shareholders, including the choice to hold an advisory vote on compensation, we are concerned with a one-size-fits all approach to a say on pay requirement that is applicable to all public companies.

The SEC’s shareholder proposal process under Rule 14a-8 affords shareholders the ability to request that companies implement say on pay. In this regard, since 2007, shareholder proposals requesting that companies provide for an advisory vote on executive compensation have become increasingly popular. According to RiskMetrics

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statistics, in 2009 companies held votes on 79 shareholder proposals seeking an advisory vote on executive compensation.\footnote{Id.}

Moreover, some companies already have adopted advisory votes in response to shareholder proposals or voluntarily, but in ways they consider most meaningful for their shareholders and most beneficial for the particular company. For example, several companies, including Pfizer Inc. and Colgate-Palmolive Co., have opted for biennial advisory votes, and others like Microsoft Corp. have opted for triennial advisory votes. These alternative approaches are more appropriate for many companies because they are more consistent with the time horizon of many companies' compensation programs.

\textbf{Broker Discretionary Voting in Uncontested Director Elections}

The Shareholder Empowerment Act would prevent brokers from voting securities on an uncontested director election without specific instructions from the beneficial owner of those securities. However, this provision is unnecessary as broker discretionary voting in uncontested director elections was eliminated for all shareholder meetings held after January 1, 2010 under a New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") rule change approved by the SEC in July 2009. Because the NYSE rule applies to brokers, the amendment applies not only to companies listed on the NYSE, but also to companies listed on other exchanges such as NASDAQ or NYSE Amex.
Majority Voting

The Shareholder Empowerment Act would require majority voting in uncontested director elections and require companies to adopt director resignation policies relating to director elections. A federal mandate applicable to all public companies is not warranted in this area.

A number of states have adopted legislation to clarify or ease the adoption of some form of majority voting in director elections. For example, Delaware amended its corporate law to provide that, if shareholders approve a bylaw amendment providing for a majority vote standard in the election of directors, a company’s board of directors may not amend or repeal the shareholder-approved bylaw.\(^\text{10}\) Other states have also amended their corporations statutes to address majority voting as well, including California, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Utah and others.\(^\text{11}\) In addition, the American Bar Association approved amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act permitting a company’s board or shareholders to adopt majority voting in director elections through bylaw amendments rather than through a more cumbersome process.\(^\text{12}\)

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\(^{10}\) Delaware General Corporation Law § 216.


\(^{12}\) Model Business Corporation Act § 10.22.
These enabling statutes have facilitated the rapid response of companies and their shareholders to the majority voting movement, which began in 2004 when several labor unions and other shareholder groups began to advocate that companies adopt a majority voting standard in uncontested director elections in order to improve directors’ accountability to shareholders. Companies and shareholders alike recognized the merits of a majority voting standard, and this corporate governance enhancement was swiftly adopted by many companies. Research indicates that, as of late 2008, more than 70% of S&P 500 companies had adopted a form of majority voting, up from less than 20% in 2006, and mid- and small-cap companies increasingly are adopting majority voting as well.

Nevertheless, while majority voting is appropriate for many companies, there are circumstances at some companies that make plurality voting a better alternative; for example, at companies where shares are held by only a few large shareholders. Further, voluntary company action, combined with the SEC’s shareholder proposal process under Rule 14a-8, has proven to be an effective means for shareholders to seek to implement majority voting. Once again, this should be an issue for shareholder choice.

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Performance Target Disclosure

The Shareholder Empowerment Act would require disclosure of “specific performance targets that are used by issuers to determine a senior executive officer’s eligibility for bonuses, equity and incentive compensation.” This provision is largely duplicative of SEC rules that already require the disclosure of performance targets in the Compensation and Discussion Analysis of a company’s proxy statement, unless this disclosure involves confidential trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information that, if disclosed, would result in competitive harm. The standard to establish that disclosure of performance targets would cause competitive harm to the company is a strict one, as the SEC staff has emphasized in comment letters to companies seeking revisions to their filings. Accordingly, the performance target disclosure requirement in the Shareholder Empowerment Act is not necessary.

Independent Compensation Consultants

The Shareholder Empowerment Act would require that any compensation advisor engaged by a company be independent of the company and its executives and

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15 The instructions to Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K provide that the standard for determining whether disclosure would cause competitive harm is the same standard that would apply when a company requests confidential treatment pursuant to Rule 406 under the Securities Act of 1933 and Rule 24b-2 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), each of which incorporates the criteria for non-disclosure under section 552(b)(4) under the Freedom of Information Act. Section 552(b)(4) provides an exemption from disclosure for matters that are “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.”
directors. New SEC disclosure rules require companies to disclose additional information about the fees paid to their compensation consultants and affiliates of the compensation consultant when such consultant provides other non-compensation related services to the company. This additional disclosure requirement informs shareholders of any possible conflicts of interest and encourages companies to establish practices to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest. Business Roundtable believes that requiring compensation consultant independence is unnecessary as shareholders now have information about services provided by compensation consultants and can express their views if they have concerns. Moreover, as a result of the focus on the issue of compensation consultant conflicts of interest, a number of boards have reviewed, and others are reviewing, their practices with regard to the services provided by compensation consultants, and some executive compensation consultants are breaking away from full service consulting firms. Accordingly, legislation in this area is unnecessary.

**Severance Agreements Tied to Performance and Advisory Vote on Golden Parachute Compensation**

The Shareholder Empowerment Act would prevent companies from entering into agreements providing for severance payments to executives who are terminated for poor performance, and the Proxy Voting Transparency Act would require a separate shareholder advisory vote on “golden parachute compensation” (i.e., any compensation, whether present, deferred or contingent, based on or related to a merger, acquisition or

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16 See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 7.
sale of assets). The advisory vote on executive compensation proposal included in both the Shareholder Empowerment Act and the Proxy Voting Transparency Act and discussed above affords shareholders an advisory vote on all compensation discussed in the company’s proxy statement. In this regard, current SEC rules require extensive disclosure about potential termination payments to executives, including any severance or “golden parachute” arrangements. Thus, shareholders already have information about agreements providing for potential severance payments to executives and would have the ability to express their approval or disapproval of such agreements through the say on pay vote. Given this mechanism for shareholder feedback, a separate prohibition or vote on termination payments is unnecessary.

Independent Risk and Compensation Committees

The Corporate Governance Reform Act appears to require that risk management at public companies be overseen by an independent board committee or the full board. Such a requirement is unnecessary since under both NYSE listing standards17 and state corporate law,18 boards of directors already have the responsibility for overseeing risk management. Most recently, the SEC has adopted rules requiring disclosure of the

17 See NYSE Listed Company Manual, Rule 303A.07(c)(iii)(D). The NYSE listing standards require that the audit committee “discuss policies with respect to risk assessment and risk management.” The commentary to the listing standards states that the audit committee “is not required to be the sole body responsible for risk assessment and management, but . . . must discuss guidelines and policies to govern the process by which risk assessment and management is undertaken.”

board’s role in risk oversight. While some boards currently address risk through their audit committees, other boards have placed responsibility for some aspects of risk oversight to other board committees while still others address risk at the full board level. Our 2010 Principles of Corporate Governance will emphasize the importance of the board of directors taking a proactive role in overseeing the company’s risk assessment and risk management processes.

The Corporate Governance Reform Act also appears to require that a company’s compensation practices and structure be overseen by an independent board committee or the full board. This provision also is unnecessary as both NYSE and NASDAQ listing standards require independent oversight of compensation decisions. Moreover, due to SEC rules and the Internal Revenue Code, other companies also have compensation decisions made by committees composed of independent directors. According to the RiskMetrics 2010 Board Practices survey, the compensation committees of S&P 500 companies maintained a 99% independence level in 2009, up from 94% in 2003.

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19 See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 7.

20 For example, environmental risks may be overseen by the environment, health and safety committee and compensation-related risks may be overseen by the compensation committee.

21 See NYSE Listed Company Manual, Rule 303A.05(c); NASDAQ Marketplace Rules, Rule 5605(d).

22 See Exchange Act Rule 16b-3; Internal Revenue Code § 162(m).
Chief Risk Officer

The Corporate Governance Reform Act would require companies to appoint a chief risk officer. As reflected in our Principles of Corporate Governance, management plays an important role in identifying and managing the risks that a company undertakes in the course of carrying out its business as well as the company’s overall risk profile. Nevertheless, companies take a variety of approaches in implementing a management-level risk management structure that is appropriate for the needs of the particular company. For example, many companies in the financial services industry have a chief risk officer, while at companies in other industries the chief risk management role may be held by a different individual or responsibility for risk management may be shared by several individuals. The types of risks companies face vary tremendously according to a variety of factors, including a company’s industry, size and business. Consequently, companies must be able to tailor their risk management structure to their business and their overall management structure.

Clawback Policies

The Shareholder Empowerment Act would require company boards or board committees to develop a policy for reviewing any “unearned bonus payments, incentive payments or equity payments that were awarded to executive officers owing to fraud, financial results that require restatement, or some other cause,” for the purpose of recovering or cancelling any unearned payments. The SEC already has the authority
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to recoup certain cash and equity incentive compensation paid to the chief executive officer and chief financial officer in the event of an accounting restatement as a result of misconduct. In addition, many companies have voluntarily adopted clawback policies with broader coverage. According to a 2009 Equilar study, 72.9% of Fortune 100 companies have publicly disclosed that they maintain a clawback policy, up significantly from 17.6% in 2006.23 Companies with existing clawback policies also are modifying them to expand their coverage.24 In adopting clawback policies companies recognize, as any legislation should, the importance of giving some discretion to a company’s board of directors in administering the policy to address the myriad circumstances that may occur.

**Director Certification**

The Corporate Governance Reform Act would require the SEC to conduct a study on the feasibility of requiring, and the logistics of implementing, a certification process under which director candidates would be required to obtain certification by the SEC. The SEC’s primary role is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation. The SEC does not have any particular expertise in evaluating the background and experience of individuals to determine

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whether they are qualified to serve as directors. Instead, the SEC recently adopted rules requiring expanded disclosure of the skills and experience of each director nominee that led to the conclusion that the nominee is qualified to serve as a director of the company.\textsuperscript{25} As a result of these new disclosures, shareholders now have more information on which to make a judgment with respect to director nominees. Many private organizations provide director education and training and some, such as the National Association of Corporate Directors, provide a certification program for directors. This is not an appropriate role for the federal government.

Other Related Issues That Should Be Considered

Before adopting legislation that would make sweeping corporate governance changes, it is important to consider a number of related areas. For example, concerns about the current shareholder communications system, the integrity of the proxy voting system and the influence of the proxy advisory services have been raised by many groups in recent years, including the Business Roundtable and the Council of Institutional Investors. We are pleased that SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has indicated that the Commission is beginning its study of these issues, but they must be resolved prior to or at least in conjunction with the implementation of some of the changes in the proposed legislation.

\textsuperscript{25} See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, supra note 7.
Fixing the Shareholder Communications System

The shareholder communications system in the United States is complex and integrated, involving companies, directors, shareholders, proxy solicitors, proxy voting services and others. Rules administered by the SEC make it difficult and expensive for companies to communicate with the beneficial owners of their securities held in street name, as described by the Shareholder Communications Coalition, of which Business Roundtable is a member (see Exhibit III), and in a recent white paper commissioned by the Council of Institutional Investors (attached as Exhibit IV).

Problems with the current shareholder communications system need to be resolved before the adoption of corporate governance legislation as certain provisions will increase the need for companies to communicate with their shareholders. More frequent proxy contests brought about by proxy access would result in additional communications between companies and their shareholders in order to solicit support for candidates. Proxy access would add to the already-increasing need for companies to communicate with their shareholders, which has resulted from greater activism by institutional shareholders, the prevalence of majority voting and the elimination of broker discretionary voting in uncontested director elections.

While companies have been increasing their engagement efforts through meetings with their large shareholders to discuss governance issues, as well as using
surveys, blogs, webcasts and other forms of electronic communication, the current shareholder communications system stands in the way of these efforts.

Voting Integrity

It is also critical that concerns related to the integrity of the current proxy voting system be addressed. Numerous commentators have noted that the proxy voting system in the United States is antiquated, byzantine and inadequate.26 Complexities in the proxy voting system can lead to problems such as empty-voting (voting with no economic interest due to hedging or derivatives) and over-voting (in the case of loaned shares), which raise concerns regarding the integrity of the proxy voting process.27 An increase in the frequency of contested elections, which would likely stem from any federal proxy access mandate, will place additional demands on an already over-burdened and ill-functioning system. Accordingly, it is important that such issues be considered before any federal proxy access right is mandated.


Undue Influence of Proxy Advisory Services

The role of proxy advisory services and the processes used by these firms in generating voting recommendations and making voting decisions needs to be addressed, including considerations of increased regulatory oversight and transparency. Current laws impose fiduciary responsibilities on investment advisors, investment companies, and most retirement and pension plans in voting their proxies. Because many institutional investors and their third-party investment managers do not have sufficient staff to review and vote on proxy items, they outsource their voting decisions to proxy advisory firms, which frequently apply a one-size-fits-all approach to their voting recommendations. Widespread use of proxy advisory services by institutional investors has resulted in proxy advisory firms having a significant impact on shareholder voting and corporate governance. As noted earlier, a federal proxy access mandate will increase the frequency of director election contests, and, accordingly, increase the influence of proxy advisory firms.

Despite their significant influence, proxy advisory firms remain largely unregulated and provide limited and varied transparency about their methodologies and decision-making processes. Consideration should be given to more robust oversight of proxy advisory services by the SEC, including conflict of interest disclosure, standards for professional and ethical conduct and disclosure of the methodology used by proxy advisory firms. Moreover, consideration should be given to the oversight by
institutional investors with respect to any delegation, either expressly or implicitly, of their voting rights to a proxy advisory firm.

Conclusion

Business Roundtable is committed to corporate governance practices that enable U.S. companies to compete globally, create jobs and generate long-term economic growth. We believe in corporate boards and management holding themselves to high standards of accountability and making changes in their governance practices as necessary and appropriate, taking into account the circumstances and shareholder wishes at individual companies. We are concerned that the proposed legislation would take these choices away from companies and their shareholders and endanger the engine of economic growth that is the American corporation.
The Risks to Private Enterprise from Federal Preemption of State Corporate Law

Peter Atkins, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, 2009/12/18 09:27 Eastern Standard Time

Editor's Note: Peter Atkins is a Partner for Corporate and Securities Law Matters at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. This post is based on a Skadden client memorandum, and follows up on matters raised by Mr. Atkins in this post on the Forum regarding his article entitled Raising the Bar.

The current multi-pronged effort for U.S. federal preemption of state corporate law, particularly in the area of corporate governance, is largely predicated on the view that it is necessary to forestall excessive risk-taking in the private sector. However, the federal preemption "cure" is a carrier of its own systemic disease. Before imposing this "cure," it is essential to make a responsible assessment of its need and consequences.

State Regulation of Public Business Corporations: A Cornerstone of Capitalism

The modern U.S. economic system — variously called capitalism, free enterprise or private enterprise — is centered around the publicly traded business corporation organized under state law. It is the principal vehicle for gathering non-government capital, investing it and managing the businesses in which it is invested. Historically, the governance of these companies has been regulated by their states of incorporation, with limited exceptions. And, in general, the state law-based corporate governance model has been very respectful — indeed protective — of the core concepts of the U.S. private enterprise system: freedom, capital raising, risk-taking, experimentation, innovation and value maximization. The model recognizes that publicly
traded business corporations, as key enablers of the U.S. capitalist system, should be regulated in a manner which permits these core private enterprise concepts to operate with minimal interference.

The Price of Free Enterprise Is Eternal Vigilance

Economic systems can crash and burn — as we recently almost witnessed. Fortunately, the mechanisms in place and those that were quickly added permitted a rescue operation that averted the abyss.

However, economic systems also can die due to changes imposed on them and the vitality-sapping effects of such changes over time. The U.S. private enterprise system has worked remarkably well for more than 200 years. The fundamental productivity, creativity, adaptability, growth capacity, power and global leadership of our economic system cannot be denied. Like all systems, however, America’s free enterprise economy faces the constant danger of systemic erosion due to (1) the failure of vigilance in continuing to recognize its importance and what makes it tick and (2) the desire to “improve” the system without identifying and carefully weighing the downside to the system of the improvements. Systemic erosion is a creeping phenomenon, without red flags flashing danger signals. Moreover, such erosion is susceptible to acceleration when systemic speed bumps occur (as is inevitable) and, in response, a heightened sense of the need for repair takes over (augmented, often, by political and special group agendas).

The Current Danger Zone

The U.S. appears to be in that danger zone right now. However, before examining that zone in greater detail, it needs to be noted that the thrust of this article is not a rant against government intervention in economic matters. The U.S. free enterprise system has never been perfectly free, nor should it be. Clearly there is a role for government regulation and oversight. And times of crisis can point out areas where a larger role is appropriate on a temporary basis and, in some cases, longer term.

That said, today’s reality is not about the need for federal preemption of corporate governance regulation under state law. Yet, here is what seems to be happening. In the aftermath of the financial system crisis of 2008, the publicly traded business corporation has come under siege by the federal government. The main assertion is that the near collapse of the financial system was the product of excessive risk-taking by corporate America, permitted by lax directorial oversight and incentivized by excessive compensation practices. The proposed cure is federal preemption of corporate governance by enacting in Washington a raft of uniform federal “good governance” requirements for U.S. publicly traded business corporations. What seems to be missing is adequate identification and a true appreciation of the near and longer term adverse effects that could flow from these requirements.
It is not difficult to ask many questions that need to be answered before federal preemption is implemented — and the answers to these questions should have a direct bearing on whether any steps are taken in that direction and, if so, which ones. These questions include:

- Did U.S. public company boards and businesspersons really cause the financial crisis of 2008? What about all of the companies that were not part of the financial sector — were their directors and executives even involved? And what about the failure to regulate the financial markets in order to guard against “excessive risk” — was that a failure of private enterprise or of the federal government, including existing oversight agencies?
- Is there any demonstrable correlation between any of the proposed federally-imposed corporate governance “fixes” and reining in “excessive risk-taking” — or even, for that matter, producing significantly better governance for all public companies? [1] Even if so, is such improvement necessary to avoid material systemic risk to the U.S. free enterprise system?
- In the absence of a clear showing that it will result in the avoidance of material systemic harm, what is the justification for federal government preemption of corporate governance under state law?
- Have the proposed “fixes” been individually critiqued for the possibility of causing harm to the private enterprise system? If so, what is the assessment? For example, what is the potential negative effect of the increased empowerment of shareholders vis-à-vis directors on the need for risk-taking by directors as an essential element of capitalism and on the willingness of directors to serve on public company boards?

The Need for and Meaning of Responsible Assessment

The basic message is this: In assessing the need for and nature of governmental intervention to effect reforms today in our economic system, the federal government (both the executive and legislative branch) has a special duty to act responsibly. Acting responsibly should mean at least the following:

- Understanding — and placing a high priority on — the critical importance of the U.S. private enterprise system to America and all of its people.
- Understanding — and guarding against unnecessary damage to — the core concepts on which the U.S. private enterprise system rests: freedom, capital raising, risk-taking, experimentation, innovation and value maximization over time.
- Requiring (except for emergency actions in a time of crisis, which clearly is not present now) that every act of government intervention intended to affect the existing U.S. economic system undergo a rigorous economic impact assessment.
- Applying in such assessments a principle of restraint in the form of a presumption against intervention unless it is shown:
  - (a) that the harm to be mitigated by the intervention is systemic and substantial,
(b) by credible evidence, that the intended mitigation is very likely to be achieved, and
(c) that the adverse effects, if any, of the intervention are not likely to have as great or greater systemic impact than the benefit to be obtained by the intervention.

A Final Word

The message from Washington to corporate America appears to be: “You have a responsibility to stay alert, make informed decisions and not put at risk the system on which we all rely.” If there was ever a time when Washington — the White House, the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Securities and Exchange Commission and other federal agencies — should heed its own advice, it is right now in relation to the attack by Washington on a cornerstone of capitalism, state regulation of public business corporations. And when Washington considers applying its medicinal powers to “cure” systemic ills, it should pay close attention to the medical aphorism, “First, do no harm.”

Endnote:

[1] These proposed “fixes” were summarized in Raising the Bar as follows:

- greater empowerment of shareholders vis-à-vis directors (e.g., mandatory majority voting in the election of directors, requiring shareholder access to company proxy statements in the election of directors, eliminating classified boards, granting shareholders the right to call special meetings, requiring cumulative voting and mandating annual “say-on-pay” votes by shareholders);
- increased public disclosure about directors (e.g., regarding their experience, qualifications attributes and skills), about pay practices (e.g., disclosure of specific performance targets for incentive compensation, and disclosure regarding compensation paid to the lowest and highest paid employees and related matters) and about risk-taking (e.g., discussion and analysis of risk-related overall compensation policies and practices for employees generally, if the risks arising from those policies and practices may have a material affect on the company, and disclosing the relationship of a company’s overall compensation practices to risk management);
- mandating certain board structural requirements (e.g., that every board have a risk committee, and that every board separate the board chair and CEO positions, and that the chair be independent); and
- mandating certain specific pay practices (e.g., barring severance agreements for executives terminated for poor performance, requiring that executives hold equity awards until retirement, and requiring companies to develop and disclose claw-back policies).
August 17, 2009

Ms. Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549-1090

Re: File No. S7-10-09
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations

Dear Ms. Murphy:

This letter is submitted on behalf of Business Roundtable, an association of chief executive officers of leading U.S. companies with more than $5 trillion in annual revenues and nearly 10 million employees. We appreciate the opportunity to once again provide our views on Commission rulemaking to require companies to include shareholder nominees for director in company proxy materials under certain circumstances. Due to the importance with which we view these proposals and the significant number of questions raised in the Commission’s proposing release, we provide below general comments on the proposals and submit more detailed comments in an attachment to this letter. Our detailed comments reflect the results of surveys of our members. To facilitate the Commission’s review of our comments, the subheadings in the attachment include references to the question numbers in the proposing release.

Business Roundtable has long been at the forefront of efforts to improve corporate governance. We have been issuing “best practices” statements in this area for three decades, including Principles of Corporate Governance (November 2005), The Nominating Process and Corporate Governance Committees: Principles and Commentary (April 2004), Guidelines for Shareholder-Director Communications (May 2005), and Executive Compensation: Principles and Commentary (January 2007). All of these best
practices statements have been driven by one principle: to guide corporate
governance practices and further U.S. companies' ability to create jobs,
products and services for the economic well-being of all Americans. We also
strongly supported enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the
Commission's implementing rules and the revisions to the corporate
governance listing standards of the securities markets. And our member
companies, as well as other publicly-traded companies, voluntarily have
adopted numerous corporate governance enhancements over the past several
years, including majority voting in uncontested director elections. Recently,
we published our principles for addressing the current economic crisis and
avoiding future crises. In sum, we share the Commission's belief that
corporate boards and management must hold themselves to high standards of
corporate governance and that steps must be taken to see that an appropriate
regulatory framework is established to forestall another economic crisis.

As the Commission is well aware, this is the third time in the past six
years that it has issued proposed rules addressing the ability of shareholders
to include their director nominees in company proxy materials, so-called
"proxy access." Commentators raised substantial concerns about prior
proposals, and the Commission determined each time not to move forward.
Now, the Commission has proposed its most expansive approach to proxy
access, stating that the proposals are warranted "in light of one of the most
serious economic crises of the past century." We must take issue with this
proposition as the Commission has been debating the issue of proxy access for
decades. Even if there is some nexus to the economic crisis, the proposed
proxy access regime will, in the words of Commissioner Casey, "be imposed
not only [on] the country's largest banks and Wall Street firms, but also on
thousands of other large and small public companies across the country."
Most troubling is the fact that the Commission's proposals may well
exacerbate one of the agreed-upon causes of the crisis—the emphasis on
short-term gains at the expense of long-term, sustainable growth.

Further, while the Commission indicates that proposed Rule 14a-11 is
intended to remove impediments to shareholders exercising their state law
rights, it would instead create a federal mandate that would deprive
shareholders and their companies from exercising their rights under state law
to vary the terms of any proxy access procedure. This "one size fits all" federal
mandate does not facilitate shareholder rights but instead supplants the
shareholder choice that is provided under state law. State law, as evidenced
by the recent amendments to Delaware law addressing proxy access and
proxy reimbursement (which are described in our detailed comments),
provides shareholders and boards of directors with the opportunity to deal effectively with the myriad of different circumstances applicable to their companies in designing a proxy access and/or proxy reimbursement regime. This enabling approach of state law has worked well in recent years as hundreds of companies have amended their bylaws to adopt a majority voting standard in uncontested director elections voluntarily and in response to votes on shareholder proposals. We believe that a similar approach is warranted here, rather than have the Commission impose a “one size fits all” federal mandate.

In addition, proposed Rule 14a-11 and related proposals, referred to in our detailed comments as the “Proposed Election Contest Rules,” would result in expensive, highly contentious, and distracting proxy contests. At a time when American business is responding to “one of the most serious economic crises in the past century,” we question the wisdom of undertaking actions that will distract management and board attention, invite disruption in the boardroom and discourage directors from serving. The prospect of having to run for election in a highly charged, political atmosphere and serve on a board with “special interest” directors is sure to deter the very qualified and experienced individuals we want to serve as members of corporate boards. This is especially true given the Commission’s recent approval of amendments to New York Stock Exchange Rule 452, which will eliminate broker discretionary voting in director elections at shareholder meetings held after January 1, 2010.

We also believe that the Commission has grossly underestimated the staff resources necessary to administer the procedure to be created under proposed Rule 14a-11 at a time when the Commission is seeking, and being given, greater responsibilities to oversee the nation’s capital markets. It also has underestimated the resources that companies will have to expend under the Proposed Election Contest Rules as described in our more detailed comments. Finally, the Commission has not addressed the fact that proposed Rule 14a-11 will increase the influence of unregulated proxy advisory services, which frequently apply a “one size fits all” approach to their recommendations.

Given the substantial problems presented by proposed Rule 14a-11, the Commission’s questionable authority to enact it, and other infirmities in the rulemaking process, we believe that a far better alternative would be for the Commission to defer any action on proposed Rule 14a-11 and instead adopt revised amendments to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to permit shareholders to include proxy access shareholder proposals in company proxy materials. While in 2007 we did not support the Commission’s proposal to amend
Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to permit such shareholder proposals, we believe that recent state law developments and the addition of certain disclosure provisions to the Commission’s current proposals warrant a different position today. As noted above, several states (including Delaware) have amended, or are in the process of considering amendments to, their corporate laws to permit boards and shareholders to adopt bylaw amendments addressing the ability of shareholders to have their director nominees included in company proxy materials and providing for reimbursement of expenses in proxy contests. Moreover, we note that one of our primary concerns about the Commission’s 2007 proposal was that it would have permitted shareholders to include their nominees in company proxy materials without the attendant disclosures mandated by the Commission’s rules governing proxy contests. In contrast, the current proposals include disclosure requirements when a shareholder nominee is included in a company’s proxy materials pursuant to state law or a company’s governing documents.

If the Commission were nevertheless to proceed with adopting proposed Rule 14a-11 despite the serious problems identified above, our detailed comments set forth significant modifications that, if not included, would make the rule particularly problematic. Most importantly, any final rule should not preempt the proxy access procedures established or authorized by state law or a company’s governing documents. Accordingly, proposed Rule 14a-11 should not apply where a company’s shareholders or board have adopted a proxy access or proxy reimbursement bylaw or where a company is incorporated in a state whose law includes a proxy access right or the right to reimbursement of expenses that shareholders incur in connection with proxy contests. In addition, companies should be exempt from proposed Rule 14a-11 if they have adopted majority voting in uncontested director elections because majority voting increases shareholder influence and results in greater board accountability, thereby making proxy access unnecessary. Any final rule also must contain: (1) triggers such that proposed Rule 14a-11 would only be applicable when certain events have occurred indicating that greater director accountability is necessary at a particular company; and (2) revised thresholds that satisfy the Commission’s objective of limiting the proposed rules to “holders of a significant, long-term interest.” Such measures are necessary to ameliorate the significant cost and disruption that will result from proposed Rule 14a-11. In addition, we suggest limiting the number of directors that can be nominated under proposed Rule 14a-11. Our detailed comments contain a number of other recommendations that we believe should be implemented if the Commission moves forward with proposed Rule 14a-11, a course of action which we strenuously oppose. Importantly, we recommend that there be at least a one-year transition
period before the effective date of any rule creating a federal proxy access mandate.

In conclusion, we believe that a federal proxy access right is unnecessary, has serious adverse consequences, and is beyond the Commission’s authority to adopt. Most importantly, it has the potential to exacerbate one of the causes—short-termism—of the very economic crisis that the Commission says it seeks to address in its proposed rules. Instead, the Commission should adopt revised amendments to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to provide shareholders and boards of directors the opportunity to develop company-specific approaches to proxy access. In addition, it should adopt proposed Rule 14a-19 to provide shareholders with essential disclosures if a shareholder nomination is included in a company’s proxy materials pursuant to state law or the company’s governing documents.

Thank you for considering our comments. We would be happy to discuss our concerns or any other matters that you believe would be helpful. Please contact Larry Burton, Executive Director of Business Roundtable, at (202) 872-1260.

Sincerely,

Alexander M. Cutler
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Eaton Corporation
Chair, Corporate Leadership Initiative, Business Roundtable

Enclosures

cc: The Honorable Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman
    The Honorable Kathleen L. Casey, Commissioner
    The Honorable Elisse B. Walter, Commissioner
    The Honorable Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner
    The Honorable Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner
    Ms. Meredith B. Cross, Director, Division of Corporation Finance
    Mr. David M. Becker, General Counsel and Senior Policy Director
    Ms. Kayla J. Gillan, Senior Advisor to the Chairman
Detailed Comments
of
Business Roundtable
on
the Proposed Election Contest Rules and
the Proposed Amendment to the Shareholder Proposal Rules
of the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
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DETAILED COMMENTS OF BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE PROPOSED ELECTION CONTEST RULES AND THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL RULES

These comments are divided into four sections. Section I demonstrates why proposed Rule 14a-11 and certain related proposed rule amendments (the “Proposed Election Contest Rules”) are not necessary, would have serious adverse consequences and are beyond the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission” or “SEC”) to adopt. Section II discusses why the Commission should consider a revised amendment to Rule 14a-8 as an alternative to the Proposed Election Contest Rules. Section III discusses the substantial revisions that would be necessary if the Commission nevertheless determines to adopt the Proposed Election Contest Rules. Section IV demonstrates that this rulemaking, particularly as it relates to the Proposed Election Contest Rules, is substantively and procedurally flawed in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and numerous other requirements applicable to agency rulemaking. We do not address in these comments the applicability of the rules proposed by the Commission to investment companies. References in the headings are to the numbered requests for comment in the Commission’s proposing release (the “Proposing Release”).\(^1\) Attached also is an economic analysis prepared by NERA Economic Consulting and Professor Jonathan Macey demonstrating that the Proposed Election Contest Rules would impose substantial costs on all public companies, impair their efficiency and competitiveness, and further undermine the attractiveness of U.S. equity markets, while, at best, amounting to only modest savings for shareholders engaging in proxy contests at a handful of companies.\(^2\)

I. The Proposed Election Contest Rules

A. The Proposed Election Contest Rules Are Not Necessary [A.1.]

A significant regulatory change should be adopted only in response to a significant need for regulation. Yet, the Commission has issued proposals that would bring about a sweeping transformation of the director election process without an adequate explanation of why they are necessary. At the outset, the Commission’s assertion that the Proposed Election Contest Rules are a necessary response to the current economic crisis has no basis in fact. Moreover, state legislatures are already addressing the issue of proxy access. Further, the dramatic corporate governance reforms of the past six years, such as the widespread adoption of majority voting in uncontested director elections, obviate the need for the Proposed Election

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2. See NERA Economic Consulting (Elaine Buckberg, Ph.D., Senior Vice President) & Jonathan Macey (Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance & Securities Law, Yale Law School), Report on Effects of Proposed SEC Rule 14a-11 on Efficiency, Competitiveness and Capital Formation (Aug. 17, 2009) [attached as an exhibit].
Contest Rules. In addition, the traditional proxy contest (the cost of which has been reduced as a result of the Commission’s “notice and access” rules and will not be further reduced significantly by the Proposed Election Contest Rules) provides shareholders with a viable alternative means to affect membership on corporate boards. Finally, shareholders have the ability to bring about change in board composition through other avenues, such as the Commission’s shareholder proposal process and “vote no” campaigns, a further indication that the Proposed Election Contest Rules are unnecessary.

1. The Economic Crisis Does Not Necessitate The Adoption Of The Proposed Election Contest Rules [A.7.]

The premise upon which the Commission’s proposals rest is deeply flawed. As its principal justification for the proposals, the Commission cites the current economic crisis and draws the sweeping conclusion that a loss of investor confidence resulting from the crisis necessitates the adoption of the Proposed Election Contest Rules. However, the purported link between the Proposed Election Contest Rules and the economic crisis is unsubstantiated. The crisis likely stemmed from a variety of complex financial factors, and even experts disagree about its origins. Notably, Congress recently established the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission to investigate the causes of the crisis. Given that the roots of the crisis are still being debated and explored, the Commission’s attempt to establish a causal relationship between proxy access and the crisis is premature. In fact, the Proposed Election Contest Rules could exacerbate factors that may have contributed to the crisis, such as the emphasis on short-term gains at the expense of long-term, sustainable growth. As explained in Section I.B.1 below, the Proposed Election Contest Rules will increase the focus on short-termism.

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3 See Lawrence Mitchell, Protect Industry from Predatory Speculators, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 8, 2009. Professor Mitchell, a George Washington University law professor, argues that it is “hyperbolic” to suggest that inattentive boards had anything significant to do with the current recession.


6 See Mitchell, supra note 3.
The Proposed Election Contest Rules also will apply to almost all public companies—not only to those financial institutions that may have played a key role in the crisis—thus further undermining the assertion that the proposals are a necessary response to the economic crisis.\(^7\) In addition, the Commission has proposed similar proxy access rules twice before in the past six years, which suggests that the economic crisis does not provide a justification for the Proposed Election Contest Rules.\(^8\)

Nor does the Commission explain how the Proposed Election Contest Rules will increase investor confidence. Rather, the Proposed Election Contest Rules could easily harm investor confidence.\(^9\) As detailed in Section I.B below, numerous serious consequences, such as the enhanced influence of proxy advisory firms, the difficulty of satisfying board composition requirements and the possible election of “special interest” directors, could occur if the Commission adopts the Proposed Election Contest Rules. These deleterious effects may actually diminish investor confidence, thus frustrating the Commission’s stated objective for proposing the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

2. **State Law Developments Regarding Proxy Access Render The Proposed Election Contest Rules Unnecessary [A.2., A.12.]**

State corporate law is not static but, rather, adjusts to changing circumstances. Over the past several years, state corporate law has adapted to address new corporate governance issues. This recent activity at the state level makes it clear that Commission action to address proxy access is unnecessary.\(^10\)

In 2009, the Delaware legislature adopted amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law that took effect August 1 that expressly permit companies to adopt bylaw

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10 See also infra Section III.A.
provisions allowing shareholders to include director nominees in company proxy materials, and provide for the reimbursement of expenses incurred by shareholders in connection with proxy contests. New Section 112 of the Delaware General Corporation Law permits a company to amend its bylaws to provide that shareholders may include director nominees in the company’s proxy materials “to the extent and subject to such procedures or conditions as may be provided in the bylaws.” Among other things, these procedures or conditions may include:

- minimum record or beneficial ownership thresholds, including a definition of “beneficial ownership” that addresses options or other rights related to stock ownership;
- minimum requirements on duration of stock ownership;
- requirements governing the submission of background information about the nominee and the nominating shareholder(s);
- parameters governing the number of directors that shareholders can nominate under the proxy access bylaw and shareholders’ ability to make repeat nominations;
- restrictions on a shareholder’s ability to nominate directors if the shareholder has acquired a specified percentage of the company’s voting stock within a certain time period prior to the election of directors;
- a requirement that shareholders indemnify the company for losses arising from any false or misleading information submitted in connection with a nomination; and
- “[a]ny other lawful condition.”

These criteria, as Commissioner Casey observed, are “the exact same matters” that the Proposed Election Contest Rules address. Indeed, the Proposed Election Contest Rules incorporate a number of the elements that appear in Section 112 of the Delaware General Corporation Law. Consistent with the Delaware General Corporation Law and the charters of

15 Commissioner Casey, Statement at Open Meeting (May 20, 2009), supra note 7.
nearly all companies, both shareholders and the board of directors can adopt a proxy access bylaw authorized by Section 112. Further, new Section 113 of the Delaware General Corporation Law permits shareholders and boards to adopt bylaws providing for the reimbursement of expenses incurred by shareholders in connection with a proxy contest.

In addition, the American Bar Association is considering amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act similar to those recently enacted in Delaware. Likewise, the Corporations Committee of the Business Law Section of the State Bar of California currently is evaluating the Commission’s Proposed Election Contest Rules and whether to recommend making changes to California’s Corporations Code to provide some form of mechanism for shareholders to access company proxy materials. Finally, we note that the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act, which took effect July 1, 2007, enables shareholders of companies subject to the statute to nominate directors for inclusion in company proxy materials if they have beneficially owned more than 5% of the company’s shares for at least two years.

3. **Sweeping Corporate Governance Reforms Obviate The Need For The Proposed Election Contest Rules [A.2.]**

The corporate governance landscape has undergone sweeping changes since the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, thus rendering the Proposed Election Contest Rules unnecessary. A combination of state and federal legislation, rulemaking by the Commission and the securities markets, and voluntary action by companies has resulted in dramatic reforms to corporate governance in the past six years. A number of these reforms, described below, have directly affected the director election process and obviate the need for the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

Majority Voting and Annual Elections. As the Proposing Release acknowledges, the past six years have witnessed the growth of a significant movement by large companies toward a

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16 Section 109(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law vests the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws in a company’s shareholders and permits companies to confer this power on the board of directors in their certificates of incorporation. 8 Del. Code Ann. § 109(a) (2009).


majority voting standard in uncontested director elections. Historically, companies have generally elected directors using a plurality voting standard. Under this standard, a candidate will be elected regardless of the number of “withheld” votes he or she receives, as long as the candidate receives one affirmative vote. Under a majority voting regime, a candidate must receive a majority of votes cast in order to be elected. Majority voting thus increases shareholder influence and encourages greater board accountability.

Both state legislatures and companies have responded positively to the majority voting movement. A number of states, including Delaware, have adopted legislation to clarify or ease the adoption of some form of majority voting in director elections. In addition, the American Bar Association’s Committee on Corporate Laws similarly amended the Model Business Corporation Act to facilitate majority voting standards. As is generally the case with state corporation laws, these majority voting provisions have been drafted as “enabling” statutes, rather than as “mandatory” statutes. Enabling statutes permit companies and their shareholders to tailor the internal organization of a company to account for the company’s individual characteristics. Where a company’s board of directors or its shareholders determine that a particular governance structure—such as a majority voting regime—is appropriate, enabling statutes permit, but do not mandate, its adoption.

These enabling statutes have facilitated the rapid response of companies and their shareholders to the majority voting movement, which began in 2004 when several labor unions and other shareholder groups began to advocate that companies adopt a majority voting standard in uncontested director elections in order to improve directors’ accountability to shareholders. Companies and shareholders alike recognized the merits of a majority voting


See Joseph A. Grundfest, Stanford Law School, Roundtable Discussions Regarding the Federal Proxy Rules and State Corporation Law (May 7, 2007) ("May 7th Roundtable"), at 201 (noting the prevalence of majority voting among S&P 500 companies and stating that majority voting is acting "very powerfully . . . to increase shareholder influence").

See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 708.5 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0728 (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-24 (West 2009); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 614 (McKinney 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.55 (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-1023 (West 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-669 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.10.205 (West 2009).

See MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, §§ 8.07, 10.22 (2008).

standard, and this corporate governance enhancement was swiftly adopted by many companies. A 2008 Business Roundtable survey of member companies indicated that 75% of companies have voluntarily adopted some form of majority voting for directors.\textsuperscript{25} Other research indicates that, as of late 2008, more than 70% of S&P 500 companies had adopted a form of majority voting, up from less than 20% in 2006,\textsuperscript{26} and mid- and small-cap companies increasingly are adopting majority voting as well.\textsuperscript{27}

In addition, a growing number of companies have moved to annual director elections. According to the RiskMetrics Group 2009 Board Practices survey, 64% of S&P 500 companies held annual director elections in 2008 as compared to only 44% in 2004.\textsuperscript{28} Likewise, the number of S&P 1,500 companies with classified boards had decreased to 50% in 2008 from 61% in 2004.\textsuperscript{29}

\textit{Board Independence}. Public companies have taken a number of steps to enhance board independence in the past several years. First, there has been a significant increase in the number of independent directors serving on boards. A 2008 Business Roundtable survey of member companies indicated that 90% of our member companies' boards are at least 80% independent.\textsuperscript{30} According to the RiskMetrics Group 2009 Board Practices survey, average board independence at S&P 1,500 companies increased from 69% in 2003 to 78% in 2008.\textsuperscript{31} According to the same study, in 2008, 85% of S&P 1,500 companies, and 91% of S&P 500 companies, had boards that were at least two-thirds independent.\textsuperscript{32}

\begin{itemize}
\item RiskMetrics Group, Board Practices: The Structure of Boards of Directors at S&P 1,500 Companies, at 9 (2009).
\item \textit{Id.}
\item Business Roundtable Corporate Governance Survey Trends (Dec. 2008), \textit{supra} note 25.
\item RiskMetrics Group, Board Practices, \textit{supra} note 28, at 11.
\item \textit{Id.} at 12.
\end{itemize}
In addition, directors increasingly meet in regular “executive sessions” outside the presence of management and 75% of our member companies hold executive sessions at every regular board meeting, compared to 55% in 2003. Moreover, the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) listing standards require a non-management director to preside over these executive sessions and require companies to disclose in their proxy materials how interested parties may communicate directly with the presiding director or the non-management directors as a group.

Companies also have made changes to their board leadership structures to enhance board independence. First, there has been a steady increase in the number of companies that have appointed a separate chairman of the board. According to the RiskMetrics Group 2009 Board Practices survey, from 2003 to 2008, the number of S&P 1,500 companies with separate chairmen of the board increased from 30% to 46%. Second, many companies without an independent chair have appointed a lead or presiding director. A 2007 Business Roundtable survey of member companies indicated that 91% of companies have an independent chairman or an independent lead or presiding director, up from 55% in 2003. According to the 2008 Spencer Stuart Board Index, 95% of surveyed S&P 500 companies had a lead or presiding director by mid-2008, up from 36% in 2003. Lead directors’ duties are often similar to those of an independent chairman and may include: presiding at all meetings of the board at which the chairman is not present, including executive sessions of the independent directors; serving as liaison between the chairman and independent directors; reviewing or advising on information sent to the board; reviewing or advising on meeting agendas for the board; reviewing or advising on meeting schedules to assure that there is sufficient time for discussion of all agenda items; having authority to call meetings of the independent directors; being available for consultation and direct communication with major shareholders; and providing interim leadership in the event of an emergency succession situation. Many companies provide information about their board leadership structures in their corporate governance guidelines, their proxy statements, or both, and the Commission recently has proposed to require proxy statement disclosure about a company’s leadership structure and why that structure is appropriate for the company.

Finally, various organizations are focusing on voluntary steps that companies can take to enhance independent board leadership. In the spring of 2009, the National Association of Corporate Directors, with the support of Business Roundtable, issued the Key Agreed Principles to Strengthen Corporate Governance for U.S. Publicly Traded Companies. One “key agreed principle” states that boards should have independent leadership, either through an

33 Id. at 22.
independent chairman or a lead/presiding director, as determined by the independent directors. The principles further recommend that boards evaluate their independent leadership annually. In March 2009, the Chairman’s Forum, an organization of non-executive chairmen of U.S. and Canadian public companies, issued a policy briefing calling on companies to appoint an independent chairman upon the succession of any combined chairman/chief executive officer. The policy briefing recognizes, however, that particular circumstances may warrant a different leadership structure and recommends, in these instances, that companies explain to shareholders why combining the positions of chairman and chief executive officer represents a superior approach.

Communications with Shareholders. Many companies provide means for shareholders to communicate with the board about various matters, including recommendations for director candidates and the director election process in general. In this regard, in 2003 the Commission adopted rules requiring enhanced disclosure about companies’ procedures for shareholder communication with the board and for shareholders’ recommendations of director candidates. In addition, companies listed on the NYSE must have publicized mechanisms for interested parties, including shareholders, to make their concerns known to the company’s non-management directors. The Commission’s 2008 rules regarding electronic shareholder forums also provided additional mechanisms for communications between the board and shareholders. According to a 2008 Spencer Stuart survey, board members or members of


39 See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.03.

management of nearly 45% of surveyed S&P 500 companies reached out to shareholders proactively.41

**Other Changes.** In addition, the following data from our member companies illustrates the additional changes in corporate governance that have taken place over the past several years:

- 76% of chief executive officers serve on no more than one other board, and 36% do not serve on any other boards;
- 92% of compensation committees meet in executive session, and 75% meet in executive session at every meeting; and
- the average tenure of a Business Roundtable chief executive officer is down to just five years, demonstrating effective board oversight of management.42

As the discussion above indicates, the corporate governance landscape has undergone a sea change over the past six years and continues to evolve. Significantly, many of these corporate governance transformations have occurred as a result of voluntary reforms implemented by companies and their shareholders under the auspices of enabling state corporate law provisions, rather than through legislative or regulatory fiat.

4. **Sufficient Means For The Nomination Of Shareholder Director Candidates Already Exist [A.2.]**

Currently, shareholders already have a viable avenue for the nomination of director candidates: the proxy contest, in which shareholders seek the election of director candidates by soliciting their own proxies.43 We note that recent years have seen an increase in the

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43 We also note that shareholders can recommend director candidates to a board’s nominating/governance committee. According to a July 2009 survey of Business Roundtable member companies (the “July 2009 Survey”), 100% of responding companies consider such recommendations, and 97% apply the same standards and qualifications to board nominees and shareholder-recommended nominees. The July 2009 Survey was sent to Business Roundtable member companies to gauge their views and opinions regarding the Proposed Election Contest Rules, and 67 companies responded to the Survey.
number of proxy contests. Moreover, short slate proxy contests, in which dissidents seek board representation but not full board control, are far from futile; most short slate proxy contests in recent years have been successful. According to a recent study conducted by the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute, during a four-year period, short slate proxy contest dissidents were able to gain representation at approximately 75% of the companies they targeted. Significantly, in the majority of these cases, dissidents found it unnecessary to pursue the contest to a shareholder vote; instead, they gained board seats through settlement agreements with the target companies.

Further, we respectfully disagree with the Commission’s assertion that the Proposed Election Contest Rules are necessary to address the high cost of proxy contests. Significantly, the Proposed Election Contest Rules will not eliminate some of the most significant costs associated with waging a proxy contest: the cost of legal counsel, proxy solicitors, public relations firms, other advisors, and other proxy solicitation costs, such as advertising. Due to potential liability under the current federal securities laws, legal counsel must be consulted with respect to the required disclosures and solicitation issues that arise in a proxy contest, and additional legal fees arise in connection with litigation. These legal fees will still need to be incurred under the Proposed Election Contest Rules. Nominating shareholders will need to prepare the disclosures required by new Schedule 14N and are likely to need additional legal counseling just as in a traditional proxy contest. Moreover, in a traditional proxy contest, dissidents typically engage other types of advisors, in addition to legal counsel, such as proxy solicitors and public relations experts. The Proposed Election Contest Rules will not reduce the cost of such advisors and other proxy solicitation costs, and instead will address primarily the issues of printing and mailing costs, which have already been addressed by the Commission’s “notice and access” rules permitting the electronic delivery of proxy materials in lieu of the delivery of paper proxy materials. To be sure, the availability of “notice and access” reduces the cost of printing and distributing proxy materials, which benefits shareholders that

46 Id. at 4, 13 (noting that 76% of dissidents gaining representation were able to do so through settlement).
48 Id. at 476.
nominate director candidates in a traditional proxy contest.\(^{50}\) However, like the Proposed Election Contest Rules, the “notice and access” rules do not reduce many of the other costs associated with a proxy contest.

5. Shareholders Already Have The Power To Effect Change In Board Composition Through Other Means [A.2., A.8.]

Finally, shareholders already have significant power to bring about change in the composition of the company’s board through other means—most notably through the shareholder proposal process and “vote no” campaigns against the company’s director nominees.

Both binding and precatory shareholder proposals can effect change in board composition. Importantly, shareholder proposals afford shareholders with a choice regarding the governance issues that they wish to raise for consideration by other shareholders. For example, after shareholders approved by a majority of votes cast a binding bylaw amendment requiring an independent chair for the company’s board this year, the chief executive officer of Bank of America stepped down as chairman of the board.\(^{51}\) In addition, precatory shareholder proposals frequently prompt company boards and management to discuss corporate governance issues, including director elections, with shareholder proponents.\(^{52}\) Precatory shareholder proposals receiving shareholder support may thus encourage companies to adopt governance policies affecting the election of directors. For example, we note that an advisory vote on executive compensation has been implemented at a number of companies where shareholder proposals on this topic received substantial votes.\(^{53}\)


\(^{51}\) See Dan Fitzpatrick & Marshall Eckblad, Lewis Ousted as BofA Chairman, Wall St. J., Apr. 30, 2009, at A1. In contrast, similar proposals were voted down at other companies, including CVS Caremark Corp., Ashford Hospitality Trust Inc., Wells Fargo & Co. and Exxon Mobil Corp.


\(^{53}\) As of August 1, 2009, RiskMetrics reports that 82 proposals requesting an advisory vote on executive compensation have been voted on or are pending for 2009 annual meetings. See RiskMetrics Group, Inc. 2009 Proxy Season Scorecard (Aug. 1, 2009), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/knowledge/proxy_season_scorecard_2009. At least 25 companies have agreed to hold an advisory vote voluntarily or in response to such a...
In addition, the proliferation of “vote no” campaigns in recent years has provided shareholders with another method for effecting change in board composition. In these low-cost, often well-organized campaigns, shareholder activists encourage other shareholders to withhold votes from, or vote against, certain directors, with such aims as pressuring a company to make corporate governance changes or forcing a director to step down. Although “vote no” campaigns do not have a legally binding effect where the targeted company uses a plurality voting regime in an uncontested election, evidence indicates that such campaigns are nonetheless successful in producing corporate governance reform.\textsuperscript{54} Moreover, at companies that have adopted majority voting in director elections, “vote no” campaigns have an even greater impact, as they may result in the removal of directors who do not receive a majority of affirmative votes.

Shareholder proposals and shareholder-sponsored campaigns against directors provide an opportunity for shareholders to address governance issues on a company-by-company basis. Much like the state law enabling statutes regarding majority voting and proxy access described above, shareholder proposals and shareholder “vote no” campaigns allow shareholders to address their concerns at a particular company. Accordingly, in view of shareholders’ already-significant influence over the composition of a company’s board through other avenues, the Proposed Election Contest Rules are unnecessary.

B. The Proposed Election Contest Rules Will Have Serious Adverse Consequences

Besides being unnecessary for the reasons set forth above, the Proposed Election Contest Rules will have harmful consequences that the Commission has failed adequately to consider and address.\textsuperscript{55} We and other commentators have warned the Commission of these consequences in connection with its previous rulemakings addressing this topic.\textsuperscript{56} Widespread


\footnote{\textsuperscript{55} See also infra Section IV.A. for a detailed analysis regarding how the Proposed Election Contest Rules will reduce efficiency, stifle competition and deter capital formation.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{56} See, \textit{e.g.}, Letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC File Nos. S7-16-07 and S7-17-07 (Oct. 2, 2007); Letter from Business Roundtable to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC File Nos. S7-16-07 and S7-17-07 (Oct. 1, 2007); Division of Corporation Finance, Supplemental Summary of Comments Received on or After February}
shareholder access to company proxy materials will promote short-termism at the expense of long-term value creation and encourage the election of “special interest” directors. The Proposed Election Contest Rules also will enhance the influence of proxy advisory firms. The addition of shareholder-nominated directors to a corporate board, moreover, could frustrate a company’s ability to satisfy the myriad requirements applicable to the composition of corporate boards. Meanwhile, the increased likelihood of divisive and time-consuming annual election contests could deter qualified directors from serving on public company boards of directors. Finally, serious questions have been raised about the ability of the current proxy voting system to handle the increasing number of proxy contests that would result from the implementation of the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

1. The Proposed Election Contest Rules Will Promote Short-Termism And Encourage The Election Of “Special Interest” Directors [A.4., D.13.]

We are concerned that the Proposed Election Contest Rules will promote an unhealthy emphasis on short-termism at the expense of long-term value creation. Business Roundtable is a signatory to Long-Term Value Creation: Guiding Principles for Corporations and Investors, also known as the Aspen Principles, a set of principles drafted in response to concerns about excessive short-term pressures in the capital markets. The signatories to the Aspen Principles are a group of business organizations, institutional investors and labor unions, including the AFL-CIO, Council of Institutional Investors and TIAA-CREF, which are committed to encouraging and implementing corporate governance best practices and long-term management and value-creation strategies. As the Aspen Principles recognize, short-termism "constrains the ability of business to... create valuable goods and services, invest in innovation, take risks, and develop human capital." To combat the negative repercussions of short-termism, the Aspen Principles recommend that companies and investors should, among other things, make an effort to de-emphasize short-term financial metrics, such as quarterly earnings per share. We note that the Aspen Principles are particularly critical at this juncture, given that, as discussed

[Footnote continued from previous page]


above, an emphasis on short-term gains at the expense of long-term, sustainable growth is often identified as a contributor to the current financial crisis.

Yet, the Proposed Election Contest Rules may exacerbate short-termism. In particular, we are concerned that the threat of a director election contest could place unnecessary pressure on a company to improve short-term financial performance, in the interest of appeasing its shareholders at the price of capital expenditures, for example.\textsuperscript{58} In addition, we are concerned that the Proposed Election Contest Rules will increase the influence of hedge funds, which may use proxy access to advance their own short-term interests and investment strategies.\textsuperscript{59} These funds are likely to support policies that increase short-term gains in stock prices, such as stock repurchases, asset sales, increased reliance on debt and distribution of cash on hand.\textsuperscript{60} If the Proposed Election Contest Rules are adopted, hedge funds could use a director nomination as leverage in pressuring a company to make decisions to promote such short-term gains.

Other aspects of the Proposed Election Contest Rules also will encourage short-termism and inhibit long-term value creation. Notably, the Proposed Election Contest Rules do not require shareholder nominators to retain stock in the company after the director election.\textsuperscript{61} Thus, investors oriented towards short-term gains could simply withdraw their investments from the company after their objectives had been achieved through the use of the Proposed Election Contest Rules.\textsuperscript{62} Similarly, we are concerned that the low ownership and holding period thresholds proposed by the Commission may also encourage the submission of nominations by shareholders with a short-term focus. Contrary to the Commission’s

\textsuperscript{58} Several respondents to our July 2009 Survey expressed concern that the Proposed Election Contest Rules will increase the emphasis on short-termism. One respondent specifically remarked that the rules would “pressure management to emphasize short term results over creating long term value.”

\textsuperscript{59} According to Professor Iman Anabtawi, hedge funds generally are not concerned with the long-term success of the companies in which they invest. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 561, 579 (2006).

\textsuperscript{60} See id. at 564, 582 (describing aggressive efforts of hedge fund investors to influence the board of directors of MCI to sell the company to Qwest Communications, rather than Verizon Communications, in order to maximize short-term shareholder gains).

\textsuperscript{61} See infra Section III.D.2.

\textsuperscript{62} See Mitchell, supra note 3 (noting that the Proposed Election Contest Rules “create[] incentives for institutions to strong-arm management to increase share prices and then sell out as soon as they are done, regardless of the long-term effects on the business”).
assertion, the current low thresholds do not limit proxy access to only those shareholders with a "significant, long-term interest" in a company, as described further in Section III.D.1 below.

In addition, the Proposed Election Contest Rules could lead to the election of "special interest" directors, who may promote their own interests or those of the shareholders nominating them at the expense of the interests of other shareholders or the company as a whole, and the Proposed Election Contest Rules may also hinder long-term value creation. For example, the Proposed Election Contest Rules may be used as a "bargaining chip" by union-controlled pension funds, many of which are active and influential institutional investors. Unions previously have used the shareholder proposal process to obtain results in "corporate campaigns" against companies. With the Proposed Election Contest Rules, a union could more easily use the threat of board representation as leverage in bargaining with the company. Moreover, if a union-nominated or other special interest director candidate obtains a seat on a corporate board, the board could become divided and dysfunctional, thus weakening the company and impeding its long-term growth. Regardless of whether a shareholder nominee is ultimately elected, the cost and disturbances of a contest initiated by shareholders nominating special interest candidates with no fiduciary duties to other shareholders will undermine the board's ability to act in the best interests of shareholders.

As discussed further in Section III.E.1 below, we are concerned that, unlike the proxy access rules proposed by the Commission in 2003 (the "2003 Proposal"), the Proposed Election Contest Rules do not restrict certain relationships between nominees and nominating

63 See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,035.
65 We also note that state employee pension funds often are overseen by elected officials, who may use the Proposed Election Contest Rules to advance political objectives. See id. (observing that "public employee pension funds are especially vulnerable to being used as a vehicle for advancing political or social goals unrelated to shareholder interests").
shareholders that are designed to help address the issue of “special interest” and “single issue” directors. Such restrictions are of particular importance because a nominating shareholder, unlike a member of a board’s nominating/governance committee, is not bound by a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. Without the constraints of this fiduciary duty, nominating shareholders may be more likely to nominate “special interest” or “single issue” candidates. While restrictions on relationships between nominees and nominating shareholders would not wholly eliminate the potential harm posed by such directors, the absence of any such restrictions only increases the likelihood that such directors would be elected and pursue their narrow interests at the expense of other shareholders and the long-term growth of the company.


Numerous legal standards are applicable to the composition of corporate boards, and the addition of shareholder-nominated directors to a company’s board will complicate the board’s ability to satisfy these requirements. For example, NYSE Listed Company Manual requires that a company’s audit committee have at least three independent director members, all of whom must be financially literate.\(^6^7\) The Commission’s rules require disclosure as to whether at least one member of a company’s audit committee is an “audit committee financial expert.”\(^6^8\) In addition, all audit committee members must satisfy the heightened independence standards in the Commission’s Rule 10A-3.\(^6^9\) Similar requirements also apply to a company’s compensation committee. The NYSE Listed Company Manual requires that the compensation committee consist entirely of independent directors.\(^7^0\) Moreover, in order to qualify for the exemption under the Commission’s Rule 16b-3, equity awards must be approved by a committee composed solely of “non-employee directors,”\(^7^1\) and under Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, in order for executive compensation to be deductible, it must be approved by a committee of “outside directors.”\(^7^2\) If a shareholder-nominated director does not possess some or all of the above-described qualifications, and displaces a company-nominated director who does satisfy these requirements, the company may not be in compliance with the applicable legal requirements following the election.

\(^6^7\) See NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 303A.07.

\(^6^8\) See Regulation S-K, Item 401(d)(5).

\(^6^9\) See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (2009).

\(^7^0\) See NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 303A.05.

\(^7^1\) 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (2009).

Moreover, many boards of directors have established additional board and committee membership requirements for their directors and director nominees. Some boards have adopted more rigorous independence standards than those required by the securities markets (for example, some companies apply the heightened audit committee standards of the NYSE to all board members). Boards also have established independence standards that address a director’s affiliation with nonprofit organizations receiving contributions from the company, as well as other requirements for directors, such as mandatory retirement ages and limitations on the number of other boards on which a director may serve. Companies in certain industries also are subject to board composition requirements. For example, for companies in the gaming industry, directors must undergo a subjective “suitability” review by state gaming regulators. Similarly, defense contractors may require board members to possess security clearances. Shareholder-nominated directors may not have the necessary qualifications.

In addition, in the past several years, boards and nominating/governance committees have become increasingly focused and deliberate in assessing board composition and seeking director candidates who possess specific expertise that they believe their boards should have. In identifying potential candidates, many nominating/governance committees now routinely engage in a process that involves assessing the skills and expertise that are already represented on the board and identifying additional qualifications that are necessary or desirable. Nominating/governance committees can then conduct targeted efforts to identify and recruit individuals who have those qualifications. Moreover, nominating/governance committees often seek director candidates with experience specific to the industries in which their companies operate. As one respondent to our July 2009 Survey explained:

Our Nominating and Governance Committee actively searches for qualified candidates with deep expertise in areas relevant to the nature of our business operations and industry . . . . In our industry . . . deep, relevant business experience is crucial to an ability to function as a contributing director who can serve to the benefit of shareholders.

Similarly, we note that in the wake of the current financial crisis, financial institutions have sought directors with extensive financial and regulatory experience. In a recent rulemaking

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73 See, e.g., Nevada Gaming Commission and State Gaming Control Board Reg. 16.415 (requiring a “finding of suitability” for certain directors of gaming companies).

74 See, e.g., Northrop Grumman Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 12 (Apr. 17, 2009) (noting that “[e]ach [director] candidate must be willing to submit to the background check necessary for obtaining a top secret clearance, which is a requirement for continued Board membership”).

75 See, e.g., Robin Sidel, Citi Taps Directors With Fix-It Expertise, Wall St. J., July 25, 2009, at B1 (noting that Citigroup, Inc. recently appointed “three directors with résumés that

[Footnote continued on next page]
proposal, the Commission itself has pointed to the necessity of finding board members with particular skill sets and qualifications:

As recent market events have demonstrated, the capacity to assess risk and respond to complex financial and operational challenges can be important attributes for directors of public companies. Moreover, developments such as the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and corporate-governance related listing standards of the major stock exchanges also have brought about significant changes in the structure and composition of corporate boards, such as requiring directors to have particular knowledge in areas such as finance and accounting.  

Yet, according to the Proposing Release, a shareholder-nominated director candidate would not be required to comply with a board’s membership requirements or other qualifications and criteria, even if these are contained in the company’s governing documents. Accordingly, there can be no assurance that the shareholders nominated under the Proposed Election Contest Rules would meet membership requirements established by a company’s board of directors or possess the skills and qualifications that have been identified by the board as necessary for a director to have. We respectfully contend that a company’s board and nominating/governance committee are best suited to determine the skills and qualities desirable in new directors in order to maximize the board’s effectiveness, and the Proposed Election Contest Rules will stymie these efforts.

3. Frequent, Time-Consuming And Politicized Director Elections Will Deter Qualified Directors From Serving On Boards Of Directors [A.4.]

The Proposed Election Contest Rules will increase the frequency of contested elections and divert corporate resources to address such elections. Faced with the prospect of divisive, time-consuming and politicized annual election contests, qualified independent directors may be reluctant to serve on corporate boards. As noted above, the past six years have seen dramatic changes in the corporate governance landscape, and the cumulative effect of these reforms and directors’ increased exposure to personal liability has made it more

[Footnote continued from previous page]

reflect experience in turning around troubled financial institutions and a deep understanding of regulatory issues”).


difficult for companies to recruit and retain qualified directors.\footnote{See Press Release, Grant Thornton, 65% of Senior Financial Officers of Public Companies Say It’s Harder Today to Recruit Directors, Citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Increased Director Liability (Aug. 26, 2005).} In response to our July 2009 Survey, one company remarked:

The directors have expressed general concern about the effect of the rule and the [Commission’s] increasingly activist shareholder stance. One director has advised us that, partly as a result of this new climate, he would like to retire from the Board rather than stand for reelection at our next annual meeting.

Moreover, the costs and disruption that will result from election contests under the Proposed Election Contest Rules will likely deter directors from serving on boards. As another July 2009 Survey respondent noted, “[o]ur directors have indicated that they will be disinclined to serve if every election is a contested election.” The Proposed Election Contest Rules will only exacerbate these director recruitment and retention issues. If qualified director candidates are deterred from serving, the quality of corporate boards could suffer.\footnote{The Commission acknowledges in the Proposing Release that the Proposed Election Contest Rules could result in “lower quality boards.” 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,075.}

4. The Proposed Election Contest Rules Will Increase The Influence Of Proxy Advisory Firms [B.8., A.4.]

With the adoption of the Proposed Election Contest Rules, the frequency of director election contests will increase dramatically, and so too will the influence of proxy advisory firms. Such firms, which develop proxy voting recommendations for institutional investors, have significant influence over the voting decisions of institutional investors that rely on the firms’ voting guidelines.\footnote{See Burton Rothberg & Ned Regan, A Seat at the Corporate Governance Table, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2003, at A22. As the authors explain, “ISS [now RiskMetrics] is a leading proxy-voting consultant and has its own set of voting guidelines, which virtually all [mutual] funds use as a reference. Some [funds] went so far as to strictly adhere to the ISS guidelines.”} In our July 2009 Survey, the respondents reported that 15.0% of their institutional investors follow the proxy voting guidelines of RiskMetrics Group, Inc. (“RiskMetrics”) without deviation, while 27.4% of their institutional investors follow the RiskMetrics guidelines but are willing to change their votes based on dialogue with the company. In addition, the respondents reported that 6% of their institutional investors

\footnote{See Burton Rothberg & Ned Regan, A Seat at the Corporate Governance Table, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2003, at A22. As the authors explain, “ISS [now RiskMetrics] is a leading proxy-voting consultant and has its own set of voting guidelines, which virtually all [mutual] funds use as a reference. Some [funds] went so far as to strictly adhere to the ISS guidelines.”}
followed the proxy voting guidelines of Glass, Lewis & Co. without deviation, while 9.1% of their institutional investors follow the Glass, Lewis & Co. guidelines but are willing to change their votes based on dialogue with the company. Respondents to our July 2009 Survey also provided numerous specific examples of the influence of proxy advisory firms on the proxy voting decisions of institutional investors. Survey respondents remarked:

- “[C]ertain institutions have indicated to us in the solicitation process that they completely outsource the proxy voting decision-making process to [RiskMetrics] or [Glass, Lewis & Co.] and are not willing to meet with, or discuss proxy voting issues with us.”

- “We have seen institutions follow a rigid application of policy on a proxy voting matter without regard to a company’s performance, overall good governance practices or other information relevant to the proxy voting matter. We were told—we agree with you and note your good record but it would take an act of god to change the vote.”

- “When we contacted our institutional investors, several of them admitted to us that they ‘outsource’ (their term) their voting decisions to RiskMetrics and therefore would not discuss any proxy voting issues with us.”

- “Of [our institutional shareholders] who follow [RiskMetrics] or [Glass, Lewis & Co.] lockstep, a number will not speak or meet with us or don’t have staff to do so.”

- “Of [our] top 50 shareholders, most (45%) state that they follow their own in-house guidelines, but consult with proxy advisors [RiskMetrics] and Glass Lewis, or both. However, most in-house voting guidelines are very close to [RiskMetrics’] published policies. Thus, the institutional shareholders typically vote in a manner consistent with [RiskMetrics’] recommendations.

- “On certain issues (e.g., stock plans, director votes and certain shareholder proposals) the voting recommendations of RiskMetrics determine the outcome. In these instances, shareholder will has been replaced to a significant degree by the policies and views of a single organization that has no ownership interest in our company. RiskMetrics’ growing influence has made it increasingly difficult to influence shareholders through direct communication and engagement.” (emphasis added).

These examples and statistics indicate that proxy advisory firms exert a strong influence on the proxy voting decisions of institutional investors, and, further, that some institutional investors are unwilling to deviate from the recommendations of such firms, even in light of a company’s individual circumstances. If institutional investors rely heavily on the recommendations of proxy advisory firms in election contests, the Proposed Election Contest Rules will not function in the manner intended by the Commission. The Commission has stated that it seeks to
“structure the proxy rules to better facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights to nominate and elect directors.”\textsuperscript{81} Yet, if the Commission adopts the Proposed Election Contest Rules, election contest results will reflect the recommendations of proxy advisory firms, rather than the will of the shareholders.

In addition, the increased influence of proxy advisory firms is troubling for a number of other reasons. As Commissioner Casey stated at the Commission’s July 1, 2009 open meeting, proxy advisory firms have no economic interest in the companies for which they issue voting recommendations.\textsuperscript{82} Moreover, conflicts of interest may be present at certain firms that both create voting guidelines for institutional investors and advise the companies to which these voting guidelines are applied.\textsuperscript{83} Similarly, a recent report published by the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance at the Yale School of Management emphasized the need to address certain issues, such as conflicts of interest, with respect to the voting recommendations of proxy advisory firms.\textsuperscript{84} The Millstein Center report recommended the adoption of a professional code of ethics for the proxy voting and governance advisory industry. Also recognizing the problems posed by proxy advisory firms, the NYSE Proxy Working Group report recommended that the Commission study the increasing role and influence of such firms.\textsuperscript{85} Finally, we note that other recent regulatory changes, such as the amendments to NYSE Rule 452, are likely to elevate further the influence of proxy advisory firms.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{81} 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,027 (emphasis added).


\textsuperscript{83} See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., A Little Industry with a Lot of Sway on Proxy Votes, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2006.


\textsuperscript{86} See Commissioner Casey, Open Meeting (July 1, 2009), supra note 82 (observing that “[i]t is also virtually certain that this rule change [to NYSE Rule 452] will significantly increase the power and influence of the proxy advisory firms that make voting recommendations to... institutional shareholders.”).
5. The Proposed Election Contest Rules Will Exacerbate Voting Integrity Issues [A.A.]

As discussed above, the Proposed Election Contest Rules will result in an increased number of director election contests, which raises concerns regarding the integrity of the proxy voting process. Numerous commentators have noted that the proxy voting system in the United States is antiquated, byzantine and inadequate, and various Commission officials have acknowledged the flaws of the system on several occasions. An increase in the frequency of contested elections will place additional demands on an already over-burdened and ill-functioning system. Yet, the Proposing Release does not address how the current proxy voting system will be able to handle the increase in election contests.

The deficiencies of the current proxy voting system stem, in part, from the manner in which securities are held in the United States. Most investors hold their shares in “street name” through intermediaries, such as broker-dealers and banks. In turn, the securities held by broker-dealers and banks are deposited with the Depository Trust Corporation (the “DTC”), which holds the securities in “fungible bulk.” Intermediaries own a pro-rata share in the securities held by the DTC, and investors own an interest in their brokers’ pro-rata share. A separate entity, the National Securities Clearing Corporation (the “NSCC”), clears and settles securities transactions between brokers and the DTC. However, if a broker fails to deliver securities owed in the course of a transaction, the NSCC’s system of allocation may result in an over- or under-representation of the number of shares that should be properly credited to a

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89 SEC Briefing Paper, supra note 88.
broker’s DTC account. Such discrepancies may result in over-voting. Over-voting also can occur when a broker-dealer loans an investor’s shares. Standard lending contracts allocate shares’ voting rights to the borrower; however, if share records are not reconciled and beneficial owners are not notified of the transfer, both the original investor and the borrower may ultimately vote the same shares in a corporate election. When over-voting occurs, broker-dealers sometimes reduce the number of votes proportionately, which may result in the counting of ineligible votes at the expense of eligible votes. Such errors will take on greater significance as the number of contested elections increases, as inaccurate proxy voting caused by over-voting, for example, could alter the results in close elections.

Other issues plague the current proxy voting system. The structure of the proxy voting system is complex, and the “dizzying array of intermediaries standing between the beneficial owner and the issuer” may result in lost or miscast votes. The complexity of the proxy voting system also hinders communications between companies and their shareholders, as discussed in further detail in Section III.1 below. Further, commentators have expressed concern that hedge funds are increasingly using share lending, and the concomitant voting rights that are transferred with borrowed shares, to advance their economic interests. While we recognize that the Commission has indicated it will consider some of these voting integrity issues later this year, they must be addressed and resolved before the Commission increases the prevalence of director election contests through the adoption of the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

C. The Proposed Election Contest Rules Exceed The Commission’s Statutory Authority [B.1.]

A fundamental question the Commission should ask before regulating in a particular area is whether Congress has delegated authority to do so. In the Proposing Release, the Commission relies on Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)

90 SEC Briefing Paper, supra note 88; see also Wilcox, supra note 87 (describing lax record-keeping practices in the proxy voting system).
91 SEC Briefing Paper, supra note 88.
94 Voting Integrity, supra note 84, at 11.
95 See Nathan, supra note 87, at 5.
as the primary basis for the Proposed Election Contest Rules. The Commission also relies summarily on various other provisions of the Exchange Act.

We cannot agree that either Section 14(a) or any of the other cited provisions supplies the necessary authority. For its part, "[t]he 1934 Act cannot be read 'more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably permit,'" as the Supreme Court explained in Chiarella v. United States in rejecting an argument to extend insider trading liability. More recently, in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, the Court observed, "[t]he issue . . . is not whether imposing private civil liability on aiders and abettors is good policy but whether aiding and abetting is covered by the statute." Put differently, "[t]he rule-making power granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law." Rather, it is 'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.' . . . The scope of the rule cannot exceed the power granted by Congress." Thus, for example, in American Bankers Association v. SEC, the District of Columbia Circuit invalidated a rule of the Commission that it found had redefined improperly the term "bank" in the Exchange Act: "The SEC cannot use its definitional authority to expand its own jurisdiction and to invade the jurisdiction" of others, the court explained, particularly where the agency interpretation is in

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101 Id. at 472-73 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976) (alterations in original)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that agency authority will not be implied when it is not expressly authorized by statute. See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000) ("[W]e are confident that Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion."); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (finding it "highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of whether an industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency discretion").
direct conflict with the language of the Exchange Act.\textsuperscript{102} Moreover, absent a basis in statutory text, the federal securities laws do not apply to conduct "already governed by functioning and effective state-law guarantees."\textsuperscript{103}

In her statement on May 20, 2009, Commissioner Casey voiced concern about the legal basis for the Proposed Election Contest Rules, noting that "[t]he Commission’s authority to enact these rules is subject to significant doubt."\textsuperscript{104} Concerns about the Commission’s authority predate the recent Proposing Release. For example the July 15, 2003 Commission staff report (the “2003 Staff Report”) noted that “some commenters . . . questioned the Commission’s authority to adopt shareholder access rules under Exchange Act Section 14(a).”\textsuperscript{105} Apparently in response to these comments, the 2003 Staff Report expressly raised the issue of the Commission’s statutory authority: "Is a shareholder access rule consistent with Congressional intent regarding Exchange Act Section 14(a)?"\textsuperscript{106} The Proposing Release here does not repeat that question, but it should have done so, and we believe the answer remains no.

1. The Proposed Election Contest Rules Extend Beyond Procedural Regulation Of Proxy Communication And Thus Exceed The Commission’s Section 14(a) Authority [8.1.]

Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act makes it "unlawful for any person . . . in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe . . . to solicit . . . any proxy."\textsuperscript{107} Thus, as the Supreme Court has explained, Section 14(a) "authorizes the [Commission] to adopt rules for the solicitation of proxies, and prohibits their violation."\textsuperscript{108}

Section 14(a) expressly limits the Commission’s rulemaking authority to proxy solicitation. As such, it limits the Commission’s authority to regulating the disclosures made, and the procedures followed, in connection with proxy solicitations. The statute and rules thereunder "prevent management or others from obtaining authorization for corporate action

\textsuperscript{102} 804 F.2d 739, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1986).


\textsuperscript{104} Commissioner Casey, Statement at Open Meeting (May 20, 2009), supra note 7.

\textsuperscript{105} Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance, Staff Report: Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and Election of Directors, at 6 (July 15, 2003).

\textsuperscript{106} Id. at 16.


by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation."\(^{109}\) While Section 14(a)
empowers the Commission to ensure that shareholders receive full and accurate disclosure in
connection with proposed corporate action, it has never been construed—by the courts or by
the Commission itself—to allow the Commission to regulate corporate action directly. "In fact,
although § 14(a) broadly bars use of the mails (and other means) 'to solicit . . . any proxy' in
correlation of Commission rules and regulations, it is not seriously disputed that Congress's
central concern was with disclosure."\(^{110}\)

The distinction between disclosure (and corresponding procedural) requirements and
direct regulation of corporate governance is critical, as the District of Columbia Circuit has made
clear in invalidating a previous rulemaking where the Commission overstepped its authority. In
Business Roundtable v. SEC, the challenge was to Rule 19c-4, which barred self-regulatory
organizations from listing stock of a company taking any "corporate action, with the effect of
nullifying, restricting or disparately reducing the per share voting rights" of existing common
shareholders.\(^{111}\) The court held that the rule was beyond the Commission's authority because it
"directly" controlled "the substantive allocation of powers among classes of
shareholders."\(^{112}\)

In the Business Roundtable litigation, "[t]he Commission support[ed] Rule 19c-4 as
advancing the purposes of . . . § 14's grant of power to regulate the proxy process."\(^{113}\) The
court explained that "the Exchange Act cannot be understood to include regulation of an issue
that is so far beyond matters of disclosure (such as are regulated under § 14 of the Act) . . . and
that is concededly a part of corporate governance traditionally left to the states."\(^{114}\) In
reaching that conclusion—and ultimately invalidating the rule—the court considered and
rejected a number of arguments that the Commission relies on in the Proposing Release here.

\(^{109}\) J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964); see also, e.g., SEC v. Kalvex, Inc., 425 F.
Supp. 310, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act was enacted by the Congress to ensure that full and fair disclosure would be made to stockholders whose
proxies are being solicited so that an informed and meaningful consideration of the
alternatives can be made.").

\(^{110}\) Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing Borak, 377 U.S. at
431) (alterations in original). See also id. ("Proxy solicitations are, after all, only
communications with potential absentee voters.").


\(^{112}\) 905 F.2d at 407.

\(^{113}\) Id. at 410.

\(^{114}\) Id. at 408.
The Commission argued in the Business Roundtable case that Rule 19c-4 advanced the statutory purpose of promoting “fair corporate suffrage.” It makes the same contention in the Proposing Release: “Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act stemmed from a Congressional belief that “[f]air corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity security bought on a public exchange.”

As the District of Columbia Circuit has explained, the means by which Congress authorized the Commission to advance “corporate suffrage”—i.e., oversight of the proxy solicitation process—limits the scope of the Commission’s regulations to disclosure and concomitant procedures:

While the House Report indeed speaks of fair corporate suffrage, it also plainly identifies Congress’s target—the solicitation of proxies by well informed insiders “without fairly informing the stockholders of the purposes for which the proxies are to be used.” The Senate Report contains no vague language about “corporate suffrage,” but rather explains the purpose of the proxy protections as ensuring that stockholders have “adequate knowledge” about the “financial condition of the corporation . . . [and] the major questions of policy, which are decided at stockholders’ meetings.” Finally, both reports agree on the power that the proxy sections gave the Commission—“power to control the conditions under which proxies may be solicited.”

Thus, Section 14(a) does not authorize the Commission to regulate “corporate suffrage” in the abstract. Rather, the Commission is authorized to ensure the adequacy of disclosures made in the proxy process to ensure that shareholder votes are meaningful. As the Supreme Court has explained, Section 14(a) was “intended to promote the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders by ensuring that proxies would be solicited with explanation to the stockholder of the real nature of the questions for which authority to cast his vote is sought.” It was not intended to allow the Commission to dictate the subjects that proxy

115 Id. at 410.
117 905 F.2d at 410 (internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).
solicitations would address. The "[s]ubstance of corporate voting rights was left to the
states." \(^{120}\)

Furthermore, in the Business Roundtable case, the Commission attempted to rely on its
authority to "protect investors and the public interest." \(^{121}\) The Commission takes the same
approach in the Proposing Release. \(^{122}\) As the District of Columbia Circuit explained, however,
"a vague 'public interest' standard cannot be interpreted without some confining principle." \(^{123}\)
In this rulemaking, the statute itself provides the confining principle: the Commission's rules
must relate to proxy solicitation. It follows "as a matter of necessity from the nature of
proxies" that "proxy regulation bears almost exclusively on disclosure." \(^{124}\) The Commission
thus is authorized to regulate proxy disclosures, including concomitant procedures, to protect
investors and further the public interest, but its authorization extends no further. \(^{125}\)

The Proposed Election Contest Rules cross the line separating permissible procedural
regulation of proxy communication from impermissible substantive regulation of corporate
governance. The justification for the Proposed Election Contest Rules uses procedural
terms. \(^{126}\) Yet the Proposed Election Contest Rules would create a federal substantive right,
empowering nominating shareholders to compel a company to include their director
nominations in the company's proxy materials.

Indeed, we believe Commissioner Casey was correct in reasoning that the substantive as
opposed to procedural character of the Proposed Election Contest Rules is confirmed by the
extent of overlap between the detailed provisions of the Proposed Election Contest Rules and

\(^{119}\) Section 14(a) was not created "to regulate the stockholders' choices." Business
Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411.

\(^{120}\) Stephen Bainbridge, Professor, University of California—Los Angeles, May 7th Roundtable,
at 57.

\(^{121}\) Id. at 412 (internal quotations omitted).

\(^{122}\) 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,025 & n.26 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)).

\(^{123}\) 905 F.2d at 414.

\(^{124}\) Id. at 410.

\(^{125}\) More recent cases likewise have emphasized the importance of adherence to limits on
statutory authority. See, e.g., Fin. Planning Ass'n v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481, 488 (D.C. Cir.
2007); Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

\(^{126}\) See, e.g., 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,078 (describing Proposed Election Contest Rules as seeking to
"remove impediments to shareholders' ability to participate meaningfully in the
nomination and election of directors").
recent state law initiatives on point. (Displacement of state law is, of course, an independent problem with the Proposed Election Contest Rules, as we explain below.) In particular, Commissioner Casey recognized that the Proposed Election Contest Rules spell out "the conditions under which a company will be obligated to provide proxy access"; "the eligibility requirements for nominees and proponents of nominees, such as minimum share ownership and holding period requirements"; and "the required procedures for proponents seeking proxy access." Commissioner Casey found that the similarity between those proposed requirements and recent statutory amendments in Delaware and North Dakota addressing those same details "strongly suggests that" the Proposed Election Contest Rules "[are] not merely ‘procedural,’ but rather go[ ] to the heart of the policy considerations properly left to state legislatures or, where legislatures so provide, to the companies and their shareholders."\(^{127}\)

Put another way, the Proposed Election Contest Rules reinvent the concept of the company "proxy" that is contained though not defined in Section 14(a) itself. The proxy process functions, to be sure, as a means of communicating with shareholders. But fundamentally and primarily, a proxy card is "an authority given by the holder of the stock who has the right to vote it to another to exercise his voting rights."\(^{129}\) To "give one's proxy" to another is to give that person control of one's vote. A proxy solicitation is by definition a request that a shareholder authorize another to vote his shares a certain way,\(^{130}\) and a proxy contest, accordingly, is a contest in which rival groups compete to see who will receive

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127 Commissioner Casey, Statement at Open Meeting (May 20, 2009), supra note 7.
128 Id.
129 18A AM. JUR. 2d Corporations § 1069 (1985); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (7th ed. 1999) (defining proxy as: "1. One who is authorized to act as a substitute for another, esp., in corporate law, a person who is authorized to vote another's stock shares. 2. The grant of authority by which a person is so authorized. 3. The document granting this authority"); MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 941 (10th ed. 1996) (defining proxy as: "1a. the agency, function, or office of a deputy who acts as a substitute for another; 2a. authority or power to act for another; 2b. a document giving such authority . . . ; 3. a person authorized to act for another").
130 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2009) ("It shall be unlawful . . . to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization. . . .") (emphases added); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (2009) (defining "proxy" as including "every proxy, consent or authorization within the meaning of section 14(a) of the Act") (emphasis added). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1214 (7th ed. 1999) (defining proxy solicitation as "a request that a corporate shareholder authorize another person to cast the shareholder's vote at a corporate meeting").
shareholders’ proxies to be able to vote those proxies as they see fit.\textsuperscript{131} In soliciting a proxy, so long as the company has properly explained to the shareholder “the real nature of the questions for which authority to cast his vote is sought,” the Congressional objective for federal oversight of proxy communications is met.\textsuperscript{132}

A company’s proxy materials are property of the company. The Proposed Election Contest Rules carve out a slice of that property and reserve it for use by shareholders that have no fiduciary duty to the company and shareholders, whether or not the company’s board otherwise would deem it appropriate to solicit shareholder proxies on the matter. When a shareholder nominating a candidate uses the company’s proxy to put forth the candidate to compete for a board seat against a candidate nominated by the company’s board of directors in the exercise of their fiduciary duties, the shareholder is in effect using the company’s resources to fund an attack on the company—so the company’s proxy no longer belongs to the company. In soliciting what the Commission calls “proxies” a company would in fact be soliciting authority to vote on a nominee that the company would not seek authorization to vote for, so that the company proxy solicitation would no longer be a request that the shareholder authorize the company to vote on matters over which it has determined to seek proxy authority. The Commission of course cannot redefine “proxy” to mean something it does not, much less—as in this instance—something that is the opposite of its plain and intended meaning.

That the Commission cannot convert proxies to binding general “ballots” is evident in the structure of the Exchange Act, as well as in the plain meaning of the statutory terms. The Exchange Act already recognizes a mechanism for shareholders to seek votes against companies’ nominees for director—by soliciting their own proxies accompanied by their own proxy statement.\textsuperscript{133} To force companies to “solicit” binding votes against themselves is so fundamentally at odds with that process that it would violate the Exchange Act and improperly intrude on matters that Congress left to regulation by the states.\textsuperscript{134}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{131} A proxy contest is “a dispute between groups attempting to retain or gain control of the board of directors of a company by using the proxy device to gather sufficient voting support.” 6 William Meade Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 2052.80 (2009).

\textsuperscript{132} Mills, 396 U.S. at 381 (internal quotations omitted).

\textsuperscript{133} See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 et seq. (2009).

\textsuperscript{134} In this sense the Proposed Election Contest Rules go farther than Rule 14a-8, which does not use the proxy to force a company to “solicit” votes on a matter that conflicts with the company’s own solicitation. Rule 14a-8 uses the proxy to serve a communicative function—to allow shareholder voting on a matter that another shareholder has stated it intends to introduce at a shareholder meeting. However, even Rule 14a-8 contains an exception when a proposal “directly conflicts with one of the company’s own proposals to [Footnote continued on next page]
In short, the Proposed Election Contest Rules regulate substance, not mere procedure, and thus fall outside the authority conferred by Section 14(a).

2. Section 14(a) Does Not License The Commission To Displace State Legislative Choices Regarding Internal Corporate Affairs [B.1.]

A Commission regulation requiring companies to include shareholder nominations for director in companies' proxy materials interferes in the internal affairs of companies by redrawing the boundary between shareholder and board authority. Such interference would be contrary to the basic principle that, as the Supreme Court stated in *Santa Fe Industries v. Green*, "corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporations."135 Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the internal affairs doctrine applies with particular force where shareholder voting rights are concerned: "No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders."136

The Court confirmed that understanding as recently as last year in *Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.*137 The Court reasoned that its "precedents counseled against th[e] extension" of the "implied cause of action" under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act to reach beyond the "realm of financing business" (a realm subject to the federal securities laws) into the "realm of ordinary business operations," which is "governed, for the most part, by state law."138 The Court concluded that, absent a basis for doing so in the text of the Exchange Act, it would not presume that the Exchange Act applies to conduct "already governed by functioning and effective state-law guarantees."139

Nothing in the Exchange Act purports to authorize the Commission to regulate the nomination and election of corporate directors. There is no textual basis for taking the

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be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(9) (2009). The Proposed Election Contest Rules step over the line between using the proxy to force a contest, and using it to bind in precisely the manner of a general binding “ballot.”

135 430 U.S. at 479 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).


138 *Id.* at 770-71.

139 *Id.*
Exchange Act as an authorization to create a federal substantive right to nominate and elect directors using company proxy materials, and the nomination and election system for corporate governance is "already governed by functioning and effective state-law guarantees." \textsuperscript{140} 

The legislative history of the Exchange Act confirms that the statute does not silently provide such authorization. That history indicates that Congress’s intent was not "to regiment business in any way." \textsuperscript{141} Representative Rayburn, one of the sponsors of the Exchange Act, expanded on this point on the floor:

[There seems to be a fear running around that the Government is going to regiment business. If any gentleman on the floor of this House during the consideration of this bill . . . can demonstrate to the membership of this committee on either side of the House that there is regimentation of business in this bill, we are willing to take it out.] \textsuperscript{142} 

The 1934 Senate Report similarly notes that the bill "furnish[ed] no justification" for a concern that the Commission would have the "power to interfere in the management of corporations." \textsuperscript{143} Indeed, the House deleted as unnecessary a provision that would have explicitly stated that the Commission could not "interfere with the management of the affairs of an issuer." \textsuperscript{144} Clearly, requiring companies to include shareholder nominees in their proxy materials would be "interference" with corporate governance, as set forth at greater length below. As the District of Columbia Circuit noted in similar circumstances, "[w]ith its step beyond control of voting procedure and into the distribution of voting power, the Commission would assume an authority that the Exchange Act’s proponents disclaimed any intent to grant." \textsuperscript{145} That is not allowed.

The reason that the Exchange Act does not authorize the Commission to "regiment business" is that corporate governance involves internal allocation of authority within a company that has traditionally and, for the most part, exclusively, been reserved to the

\textsuperscript{140} Id.

\textsuperscript{141} 1934 House Report at 3.

\textsuperscript{142} 78 Cong. Rec. 7697. The statements of Representative Rayburn are particularly instructive because he was one of the sponsors of the Exchange Act. See, e.g., N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982).

\textsuperscript{143} S. REP. No. 73-792, at 10 (1934) ("1934 Senate Report").

\textsuperscript{144} Id. at 35.

\textsuperscript{145} Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411.
states.\textsuperscript{146} State corporate law governs the director nomination and election process.\textsuperscript{147} The Proposed Election Contest Rules certainly would supplant state law in this regard, creating a novel federal framework regulating director elections in state-chartered corporations. Again, as the District of Columbia Circuit has explained in analogous circumstances, “the SEC’s assertion of authority directly invades the ‘firmly established’ state jurisdiction over corporate governance and shareholder voting.”\textsuperscript{148}

In his statement on May 20, 2009 regarding the Proposed Election Contest Rules, Commissioner Paredes summarized the controlling principle: “[S]tate corporate law determines the powers, rights, and duties of corporate actors and constituencies. The federalism balance has been struck with state corporate law governing internal corporate affairs.”\textsuperscript{149} As Commissioners Paredes and Casey recognized, the Proposed Election Contest Rules do not adhere to that principle.

To be sure, the Proposing Release contains language indicating that the Commission views its proposals as enhancing enforcement of shareholders’ state-law rights. Thus, the Proposing Release states that one of the rationales for the Proposed Election Contest Rules is that the Commission “believe[s] that parts of the federal proxy process may unintentionally frustrate voting rights arising under state law, and thereby fail to provide fair corporate suffrage.”\textsuperscript{150} However, the Proposed Election Contest Rules actually disenfranchise shareholders by removing rights that they possess under state law. As we explain below in Section III.A, the Proposed Election Contest Rules eliminate shareholders’ rights to decide whether to adopt proxy access, and how to implement proxy access if they choose to adopt it. Because no evidence substantiates the “unintentional[ly] frustrat[ion]” notion, it does not rationally support the rule.\textsuperscript{151} And even if that were a demonstrated problem, we believe the

\textsuperscript{146} See Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 479.

\textsuperscript{147} See, e.g., 8 DEL CODE ANN. §§ 141, 211, 214 (2009) (governing nomination and election of directors).

\textsuperscript{148} Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413 (quoting CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 89).


\textsuperscript{150} 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,027.

\textsuperscript{151} See, e.g., Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 468 F.3d 831, 839-45 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (vacating and remanding FERC order purportedly justified by record evidence of abuse warranting restraints on regulated-entity conduct, where record “provided zero evidence of actual abuse” by regulated entities subject to that order).
Proposed Election Contest Rules' response is far out of reasonable proportion to that problem by interfering with state policy in at least three ways.

First, the Proposed Election Contest Rules create shareholder nominating rights where none exist. The Proposed Election Contest Rules would “require companies to include shareholder nominees for director in the companies’ proxy materials . . . unless state law or [companies'] governing documents prohibit[]” such nominations.\(^\text{152}\) As the preamble acknowledges, no state currently has such a prohibition.\(^\text{153}\) That is, one indicator that the Proposed Election Contest Rules would disrupt state policy choices is that states would have to act affirmatively to deactivate the right the Proposed Election Contest Rules would create.

Second, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would establish a new allocation of rights between boards of companies, which owe fiduciary duties to shareholders, and minority shareholders that are not bound by such duties—an allocation that is properly left for the states, not the Commission.

Third, as Commissioners Casey and Paredes pointed out in declining to support the Proposed Election Contest Rules, recent developments demonstrate that, as states continue to play their traditional role in regulating corporate internal affairs, they have been “innovative and responsive” to shareholder sentiment regarding the proper scope of director nomination rights.\(^\text{154}\) In particular, developments in the laws of Delaware and North Dakota and in the Model Business Corporation Act are persuasive evidence that the Proposed Election Contest Rules would improperly interfere with evolving state law.

While the Proposing Release asserts an interest in enforcing state-law rights, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would actually override the policy choices of states such as Delaware and North Dakota, requiring companies to include shareholder nominations in corporate proxy materials on terms and under conditions different from those contained in or allowed under the recently adopted laws.\(^\text{155}\) Indeed, the only situation in which the Proposed

\(^{152}\) 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,031.

\(^{153}\) Id. at 29,031 n.99.

\(^{154}\) Commissioner Casey, Statement at Open Meeting (May 20, 2009), supra note 7; see also Commissioner Paredes, Statement at Open Meeting (May 20, 2009), supra note 149.

\(^{155}\) See Joseph A. Grundfest, Internal Contradictions in the SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules 3 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ. Working Paper No. 60, 2009) (“Nothing in state law sets a minimum standard for proxy access, defines the contours of any proxy access proposal that must be considered by the shareholders, or prohibits a majority of the shareholders from amending a proxy access standard to make it more

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Election Contest Rules would not apply is when the incorporating state has affirmatively prohibited shareholders from nominating director candidates.\textsuperscript{156} In addition, the Proposed Election Contest Rules interfere with state law governing the fiduciary obligations that the board owes to shareholders. The Proposed Election Contest Rules would countermand a board’s determination that a particular shareholder nomination should not go forward because it would not be in the best interests of the company and the shareholders at large, which the board is obligated to protect under state-law fiduciary duties. The Proposed Election Contest Rules thus would disrupt the existing balance between shareholders and directors maintained by state law, because state law does not permit shareholders to elect to supplant directors’ fiduciary duties, as a recent case makes clear. In \textit{CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan}, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that it has recognized a “prohibition . . . derived from Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law], against contractual arrangements that commit the board of directors to a course of action that would preclude them from fully discharging their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.”\textsuperscript{157} On that basis, the court invalidated a proposed bylaw that would have “commit[ted] the corporation to reimburse the election expenses of shareholders whose candidates are successfully elected” and left the directors no flexibility to determine that their fiduciary duties foreclosed them from awarding reimbursement in a particular instance.\textsuperscript{158} The Proposed Election Contest Rules similarly strip directors of the fiduciary function that, under Delaware law, they must retain.

The Proposed Election Contest Rules leave no room for the exercise of the board’s fiduciary duties with respect to shareholder nominations. Such nominations will now be put forth and financed by the company, which curtails the board’s ability to carry out its fiduciary responsibilities. That, again, is an improper intrusion into state law’s domain.

\textit{In Sante Fe Industries}, the Supreme Court rejected an interpretation of the Exchange Act that would impose liability under Rule 10b-5 for “a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation.”\textsuperscript{159} In the Court’s judgment, there was sufficient reason to reject the proffered interpretation where it was an “extension of the federal securities laws”

\footnote{\footnotesize{[Footnote continued from previous page] Stringent while forbidding the same majority to make it more relaxed.]}, \textit{available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1438308.}}

\textsuperscript{156} \textit{See} proposed Rule 14a-11(a)(1) (74 Fed. Reg. at 29,082).
\textsuperscript{157} 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008).
\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Id.} at 237.
\textsuperscript{159} 430 U.S. at 478.
that "would overlap and possibly interfere with state corporate law."\textsuperscript{160} In this instance, the overlap and intrusion on matters traditionally left to the states are not merely "possible," they are clear and practically acknowledged by the Commission. For these reasons, the Proposed Election Contest Rules exceed the Commission’s authority and should not be adopted.


Apart from Section 14(a), the Commission identifies Sections 3(b), 13, 15, 23(a), and 36 of the Exchange Act as providing a legal basis for the Proposed Election Contest Rules, as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act.\textsuperscript{161} As we explain below, those provisions should not be relied on to sustain the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

**a. Section 3(b) Of The Exchange Act [B.1.]**

Section 3(b) vests the Commission with the authority to define certain terms used in the Exchange Act.\textsuperscript{162} This Section does not confer on the Commission any authority to require that shareholders be permitted to include their nominees in company proxy materials. Indeed, the legislative record makes no mention of Section 3(b) other than to say that it gives the Commission the "power to define accounting, technical, and trade terms."\textsuperscript{163} This is clearly not the type of broad authority that would support the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

**b. Section 13 Of The Exchange Act [B.1.]**

Section 13, entitled “Periodical and Other Reports,” has been adjudged to be procedural in nature: “[Section 13’s purpose is] to insure that investors receive adequate periodic reports concerning the operation and financial condition of corporations.”\textsuperscript{164} This is particularly

\textsuperscript{160} Id. at 478-79 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{161} 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,078.

\textsuperscript{162} 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (2009) ("The Commission . . . shall have power by rules and regulations to define technical, trade, accounting, and other terms used in this title, consistently with the provisions and purposes of this title."). However, any exercise of such authority may not conflict with other provisions of the Exchange Act. See American Bankers, 804 F.2d at 754-55.

\textsuperscript{163} 1934 House Report at 18.

\textsuperscript{164} Kovel, 425 F. Supp. at 316. See also Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2001) (Section 13 authorizes SEC to “require issuers to file annual and other periodic reports—with the emphasis on periodic rather than continuous. Section 13 and the implementing regulations contemplate that these reports will be snapshots of the
evident with respect to Section 13(a), which concerns periodic reporting and disclosure requirements for public companies. The other provisions of Section 13 also do not vest the Commission with authority to create shareholder rights to nominate directors using company proxy materials. For example, Section 13(b) includes books-and-records and internal accounting controls provisions added by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. Other subsections of Section 13 added over time include: (i) Sections 13(d) and 13(g), which establish filing requirements of certain beneficial ownership reports upon the acquisition of a certain percentage of a company’s equity securities; (ii) Section 13(e), which imposes restrictions on certain stock repurchases by companies; (iii) Section 13(f), which requires institutional investment managers to file certain reports on their holdings and transactions in registered equity securities; and (iv) Sections 13(l), (j), (k) and (l), which, respectively, require that public company financial statements reflect all material correcting adjustments, vest the Commission with authority to adopt rules regarding disclosure of material off-balance sheet transactions, prohibit personal loans to executives, and require timely disclosure of material changes in a company’s financial condition or company operations as specified by Commission rulemaking.

Section 13 thus remains concerned with issues wholly unrelated to requiring public companies to allow shareholders’ director nominees to be placed in the companies’ proxy materials. The section does not vest the Commission with the authority to promulgate the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

c. Section 15 Of The Exchange Act [8.1.]

Section 15 addresses the registration and regulation of brokers and dealers and includes filing requirements for certain public companies, limitations on penny stock transactions, and

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169 15 U.S.C. § 78m(i)–(l) (2009). These sections were added in 2002 as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
restrictions on rulemaking regarding certain hybrid products.\textsuperscript{170} Moreover, Section 15 authorizes the Commission to prescribe rules that address the requirements for the registration and conduct of brokers and dealers.\textsuperscript{171} Section 15 also requires certain public companies to file supplementary and periodic information, documents, and reports\textsuperscript{172} and requires certain disclosures with respect to transactions in penny stocks.\textsuperscript{173} The section, however, does not even remotely address proxy matters or the nomination of director candidates.

d. \textbf{Section 23(a) Of The Exchange Act [8.1.]} 

Section 23(a) vests the Commission with the “power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this title for which it is responsible or for the execution of the functions vested in it by this title.”\textsuperscript{174} This language clearly limits the Commission’s authority to making rules that “implement the provisions of this title . . . or for the execution of the functions vested in them by this title.”\textsuperscript{175} There is no provision in the Exchange Act requiring companies to include shareholder nominees in company proxy materials, and indeed, as stated above, Congress never contemplated such interference into corporate governance to be encompassed within the Exchange Act.\textsuperscript{176} As the Proposed Election Contest Rules do not implement any section in the Exchange Act, they cannot be properly authorized under Section 23(a). This section, therefore, does not authorize the Commission to promulgate the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

e. \textbf{Section 36 Of The Exchange Act [8.1.]} 

Section 36 vests the Commission with authority to exempt certain companies from Commission rules and requirements. This section was not enacted in the original Exchange Act, but was added by amendment in 1996.\textsuperscript{177} Section 36 has two subparts. Subsection (a)

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\textsuperscript{170} 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2009). Section 15(d) also addresses reporting requirements, which, for the same reasons discussed in connection with Section 13, would not provide the Commission with authority to promulgate the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

\textsuperscript{171} See id. § 780(b)(1).

\textsuperscript{172} See id. § 780(d).

\textsuperscript{173} See id. § 780(g).

\textsuperscript{174} 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (2009). Section 23 also exempts from liability any entity that acted in good faith pursuant to a rule that was later amended or judged to be invalid. See id.

\textsuperscript{175} Id.

\textsuperscript{176} See, e.g., 1934 Senate Report at 10; 1934 House Report at 3.

\textsuperscript{177} Pub. L. 104-290, Title I, § 105(b), 110 Stat. 3416, 3424 (Oct. 11, 1996).
\end{flushleft}
authorizes the Commission to exempt any person or securities from any provision in the Exchange Act "to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors" and to promulgate procedures for such exemptions. The legislative history of this section makes clear that Section 36 allows the Commission to exempt people and securities from Commission rules, not to adopt regulations imposing affirmative obligations on companies. There is nothing either in the Exchange Act or in the legislative history that would permit the Commission to promulgate a rule requiring companies to include shareholder nominees in company proxy materials. Like the other statutory provisions cited in the Proposing Release, Section 36 thus provides no support for the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

f. Section 19(c) Of The Exchange Act And The Sarbanes-Oxley Act

We believe that the Commission was correct in not identifying either Section 19(c) of the Exchange Act or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as authorizing the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

We note that Question B.23 of the Proposing Release asks whether the Commission should "consider rulemaking under Section 19(c) of the Exchange Act to amend the listing standards of registered exchanges to require that shareholders have access to the company's proxy materials to nominate directors under the requirements and procedures described in connection with proposed Rule 14a-11, to reflect, for example, changes the Sarbanes-Oxley Act made to director and independence requirements, among other matters."

It is true that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act expressly authorizes the Commission to make rules affecting some aspects of corporate governance, including directing national securities exchanges and associations to require "independent" audit committees, but the statute nowhere addresses the question of director nominations. Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act serves to confirm that, in the absence of express congressional authorization, the Commission lacks statutory authority to regulate corporate governance.

179 Id. at § 78mm(b).
As for Section 19(c), it is obvious from the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable that the Commission cannot use that provision’s authority to make rules for registered exchanges as a means to impose requirements that the Commission otherwise lacks authority to impose under other parts of the Exchange Act.\(^{183}\) Accordingly, the Commission should not consider further rulemaking under Section 19(c) as a means for imposing the requirements set forth in the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

4. The Proposed Election Contest Rules Raise Serious Constitutional Concerns [B.1.]

The Constitution’s First Amendment secures freedom of speech and its Fifth Amendment prohibits deprivations of property without the payment of just compensation. Adoption of the Proposed Election Contest Rules as drafted would violate those constitutional provisions. It is evident from their text and context that Section 14(a) and the other statutory provisions cited do not confer authority to adopt the Proposed Election Contest Rules. At a minimum, however, to the extent any of those statutes are unclear on the question, they should be construed not to confer such authority so as to avoid the need to decide grave constitutional questions, under the canon of constitutional avoidance. That canon “is a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.”\(^{184}\)

a. First Amendment Concerns [B.1.]

It is a “fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment[] that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”\(^{185}\) The right to free speech forecloses a government agency from requiring that a speaker convey a particular message against the speaker’s will, regardless of whether the speaker is an individual or a legal entity such as a corporation. Put simply, the First Amendment protects businesses from being compelled by the government to speak.\(^{186}\)

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\(^{183}\) 905 F.2d at 410.


The Proposed Election Contest Rules are inconsistent with that teaching, because the Commission proposes to deprive companies of their "autonomy to choose the content" of their proxy materials, instead demanding that the corporate proxy materials include shareholder nominations. The content of a company's proxy materials, distributed to its shareholders in advance of a shareholder meeting and seeking shareholder approval of corporate actions—including in connection with director elections—goes to the very heart of corporate governance and policymaking.187

The First Amendment secures a company's right to use that corporate property to advance a message concerning director elections approved by the company's chief policymaking body—namely, the board of directors, which is charged with a fiduciary duty to safeguard the best interests of the company (and thus the shareholders at large). Absent the most compelling circumstances the government cannot require companies to "use their private property as a 'mobile billboard,'" whether "for the [government]'s ideological message," or for the message of a third person favored by the government, such as the selected class of shareholders that would be entitled to place nominations in the company's proxy materials under the Proposed Election Contest Rules.188

Compounding the compelled speech problem here is the lack of content neutrality in the Proposed Election Contest Rules. The reasoning of a plurality of the Supreme Court in the 1986 case Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utility Commission is instructive.189 In that case, the state regulatory agency order that the Court invalidated had required that a utility enclose in its customer billing envelope the message of a third party, specifically selected for inclusion

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(invalidating state agency order requiring privately-owned utility to allow third party's message in utility's billing envelope).

187 The Supreme Court has made clear that “speech need not be characterized as political before it receives First Amendment protection.” United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 413 (2001). Nevertheless, we note that by analogy to communications in connection with a campaign for political office, statements made by the board in corporate proxy materials are properly classified as political speech—and burdens on political speech are subject to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658 (1990). Indeed, if the Commission is correct that the shareholder's right to vote in corporate elections is analogous to the voter's right to vote in an election for public office (74 Fed. Reg. at 29,027 n.47), then the Commission has conceded that corporate statements in connection with director elections are analogous to political speech.


189 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
because the third party “disagree[d] with [the corporation’s] views.” The third party “[a]ccess” to the billing envelope was “limited to persons or groups . . . who disagree with [the utility’s] views . . . and who oppose [the utility] in” certain proceedings before the agency. The plurality concluded that the agency’s access requirement impermissibly burdened the utility’s “right to be free from government restrictions that abridge its own rights in order to ‘enhance the relative voice’ of its opponents.” Forcing the utility “to assist in disseminating the [third party’s] message . . . necessarily burden[ed] the expression of the disfavored speaker”—namely, the utility.

The PG&E plurality’s rationale is readily applicable to a First Amendment analysis of the Proposed Election Contest Rules. When the board of directors includes a nominee for director in the company’s proxy materials, the board on behalf of the company as a whole is expressing the company’s view that the nominee should be elected. By mandating that the company also include the nominations of certain shareholders, the Commission proposes to abridge the company’s right “in order to enhance the relative voice” of the shareholders with opposing views, thereby “burden[ing] the expression of the disfavored speaker”—the company itself, as represented by the board of directors.

To be sure, in responding to the dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens, the PG&E plurality issued some dicta suggesting that its own reasoning could not be extended beyond the state public utility regulation context. Analogy to the Commission’s Rule 14a-8 for shareholder proposals was “inappropriate,” the plurality remarked, because “[m]anagement has no interest in corporate property except such interest as derives from the shareholders,” and because “[r]ules that define how corporations govern themselves do not limit the range of information that the corporation may contribute to the public debate.” Yet the plurality’s discussion of those two points is incorrect. On the first point, the plurality overlooked the fiduciary role of the board of directors, which, as we have emphasized, is an obligation under state law to see that corporate assets are used in the best interests of the company, and thus all of the shareholders—not merely the interests of a vocal minority that may seek to use the proxy

190 Id. at 13.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 14.
193 Id. at 15. Concurring in the judgment, Justice Marshall provided the fifth vote for invalidation of the challenged order, but on grounds distinct from those of the plurality. Justice Marshall was concerned with the fact that the State has “taken from [the company] the right to deny access to its property—its billing envelope—to a group that wishes to use that envelope for expressive purposes.” Id. at 22.
194 Id. at 15 n.10.
materials to convey their own message. On the second point, the PG&E plurality overlooked
not only the established understanding that companies act through their boards rather than
through insurgent shareholders, but also that companies file their proxy materials with the
Commission for public disclosure—thereby making the company's proxy materials a means for
communication with the equities markets, news media and the public at large. As a result, the
plurality's observations in dicta distinguishing Rule 14a-8 from the agency order at issue in
PG&E would not persuade contemporary courts that the Proposed Election Contest Rules are
valid under the First Amendment.

Furthermore, even if company proxy materials were not viewed as corporate property
subject to the board of directors' oversight, the Supreme Court's precedents governing
compelled subsidization of speech would apply. "First Amendment values are at serious risk if
the government can compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special
subsidies for speech on the side that it favors." 195 When an insurgent shareholder uses the
company proxy materials rather than independently-prepared and distributed materials to
advocate for a nomination of a candidate in opposition to the company's nominee, the
remaining shareholders are effectively forced to subsidize the insurgent shareholder's speech
because the government favors that speech. Although the First Amendment tolerates
situations where the "mandated participation in an advertising program with a particular
message" is "the logical concomitant of a valid scheme of economic regulation," 196 that narrow
exception would not apply here. As we have explained above, a subsidized right to nominate
directors using corporate proxy materials, rather than independent materials, is not a "logical
concomitant" of the procedurally-focused disclosure regime that the federal securities laws
have established.

b. Fifth Amendment Concerns [B.1.]

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that "private property" shall not "be
taken for public use, without just compensation." Regulatory takings arise from the
consequences of government regulatory actions that affect private property. Here, because a
company's proxy materials are the private property of the company, the Proposed Election
Contest Rules Implicate the clause. The Proposing Release does not explain how the
Commission's commandeering of corporate proxy materials is consistent with the limitations on
the government's takings power. 197

195 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411.
196 Id. at 412 (distinguishing Gluckman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997)).
(2002).
149

II. The Proposed Amendment To The Shareholder Proposal Rules

A. The Commission Should Not Adopt Proposed Rule 14a-11 And Should Instead Adopt A Modified Version Of Its Proposed Amendment To Rule 14a-8(i)(8)
[A.10., A.11., I.1., I.2., I.4.]

We believe that rather than adopting the Proposed Election Contest Rules, the Commission should adopt a modified version of its proposed amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to permit shareholders to propose amendments to a company’s bylaws to facilitate proxy access without the constraints set forth in the Proposed Election Contest Rules and revise its other rules to accommodate these amendments. In contrast with a federally mandated proxy access regime, as proposed in Rule 14a-11, permitting shareholders to propose amendments to a company’s bylaws to facilitate proxy access would allow shareholders to take advantage of the opportunity that state law affords to tailor a system of proxy access to the needs of the individual company. For example, as discussed in further detail in Section I.A.2 above, recent amendments to Delaware law expressly permit companies to adopt bylaws that require the company to include shareholder nominees for director in the company’s proxy materials and provide for the reimbursement of expenses incurred by shareholders in connection with the solicitation of proxies for the election of directors.

The Commission’s Proposed Election Contest Rules would effectively deprive shareholders and companies of the ability to fully take advantage of the flexibility that state law provides and would impede their ability under state law to adopt a proxy access and/or proxy reimbursement regime that suits the unique circumstances of the company at any particular point in the company’s evolution. In contrast, the proposed amendment to Rule 14a-8

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198 We note that at the Commission’s May 20, 2009 open meeting, Commissioner Paredes suggested an alternative under which Rule 14a-8(i)(8) would be amended to permit proxy access shareholder proposals only if the law of the company’s state of incorporation expressly authorizes a company to have a proxy access provision in its governing documents. See Commissioner Paredes, Statement at Open Meeting (May 20, 2009), supra note 149. This alternative would eliminate the need for the Commission to decide complicated issues of state law regarding whether a Rule 14a-8 proxy access shareholder proposal is permissible under state law. Several participants in the Commission’s 2007 Proxy Process Roundtables supported relieving the Commission of the responsibility of deciding state law issues. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware Court of Chancery, Transcript of Roundtable on Proposals of Shareholders May 25, 2007, at 127 (“May 25th Roundtable”); Joseph A. Grundfest, Stanford Law School, May 25th Roundtable, at 101. We would be supportive of such an alternative.

199 Importantly, in a comment letter to the Proposed Election Contest Rules submitted on July 24, 2009, the Delaware State Bar Association expressed similar views, stating that “a
would enable shareholders and companies to implement proxy access provisions that are adapted to the distinct characteristics and needs of the individual company. Thus, allowing proxy access shareholder proposals facilitates shareholder choice or private ordering, thereby giving better effect to investors’ state law rights than the federally mandated “one size fits all” approach the Commission proposes to impose under Rule 14a-11.

While in 2007, we did not support the Commission’s proposal to allow shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(8) that would amend a company’s bylaws to permit proxy access (the “2007 Proposal”), we believe that recent state law developments as well as certain differences between the Commission’s 2007 Proposal and the current proposal make a modified version of the proposed Rule 14a-8(i)(8) amendment a realistic alternative to the Proposed Election Contest Rules. As discussed above, several states, including Delaware, have amended or are in the process of amending their corporate laws to explicitly permit companies and shareholders to adopt bylaw amendments addressing the ability of shareholders to have their director nominees included in company proxy materials and providing for reimbursement of expenses in proxy contests. In addition, one of our primary concerns with respect to the Commission’s 2007 Proposal was that it would have allowed shareholders to place their nominees in a company’s proxy materials without the attendant disclosures mandated by Commission rules governing contested solicitations. As stated in our 2007 comment letter, these rules serve the fundamental goal of providing shareholders with full and accurate disclosure so they have an opportunity to make informed decisions in voting for directors. The concerns we noted with respect to the lack of a disclosure requirement in the Commission’s

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governing contested solicitations.


201 See Section I.A.2 supra for a more detailed discussion of the actions that are being taken by state governments to facilitate proxy access.

2007 Proposal generally have been allayed by the disclosure regime for shareholder nominees that the Commission has established under proposed Rule 14a-19.\textsuperscript{203}

Thus, in light of state law amendments permitting companies and shareholders to adopt proxy access and proxy reimbursement bylaws and in light of the proposed disclosure requirements for shareholder nominees, we support, as an alternative to the Proposed Election Contest Rules, the proposed amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) that would permit shareholders to amend, or request an amendment to, a company’s bylaws regarding nomination procedures or disclosures related to shareholder nominations of directors, with the changes outlined below.\textsuperscript{204}


If the Commission were to adopt the Proposed Election Contest Rules, we believe that shareholders should be permitted to propose amendments to a company’s bylaws that would increase or decrease the requirements of the Proposed Election Contest Rules and/or provide for proxy reimbursement in lieu of a proxy access regime. Under the proposed amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8), shareholders would be permitted to propose amendments to a company’s bylaws to provide an additional means for including shareholder director nominees in company proxy materials, but would not be permitted to propose amendments that would have the effect of preventing a shareholder that meets the requirements of the Proposed Election Contest Rules from including its director nominees in the company’s proxy materials.\textsuperscript{205} In other words, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would act as a “floor” where, under Rule 14a-8(i)(8), shareholders could only seek to impose lower but not more stringent access requirements on nominating shareholders, even if a majority of the shareholders believe that more restrictive access requirements are in a company’s best interests.

We believe that there is no legitimate reason to allow shareholder proposals that would impose more lenient but not more restrictive access requirements on nominating shareholders. Rather, the Commission should let companies and their shareholders decide whether or not, and to what degree, they wish to permit shareholders to include their director nominees in

\textsuperscript{203} However, we believe that modifications to the disclosure regime are needed, as discussed further in Sections II.D and III.G infra.

\textsuperscript{204} While we support the adoption of a modified version of the Commission’s proposal to amend Rule 14a-8(i)(8), we believe the Commission needs to address the Commission staff’s increasingly narrow application of the “substantially implemented” standard in Rule 14a-8(i)(10), as we believe the rigid application of this standard is inappropriate, particularly in the context of proxy access.

\textsuperscript{205} See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,056 n.255.
company proxy materials. For example, if a company’s shareholders wish to impose ownership thresholds higher than those in the Proposed Election Contest Rules for nominating shareholders, the Commission should not prevent them from doing so. Similarly, shareholders should be allowed to submit proposals that would have the effect of lowering the thresholds in the Proposed Election Contest Rules, or providing for a proxy reimbursement system in lieu of proxy access. This approach would allow flexibility for shareholders to tailor bylaws relating to nomination procedures to a company’s specific characteristics at any given point in time.

Prescribing a default proxy access standard that companies and shareholders cannot change is inconsistent with the traditional enabling approach of state corporate law, which permits companies and their shareholders to tailor a company’s internal organization to account for its individual characteristics. Allowing companies and their shareholders to develop their own approaches to dealing with shareholder nominations that are adapted to the unique qualities of the company is in keeping with this enabling philosophy. State law recognizes that there is significant value in allowing individual companies to design their own approaches to proxy access, as reflected in the recent Delaware law amendments, which do not mandate, or even prescribe default parameters for, proxy access or proxy reimbursement bylaws. Likewise, the amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) should recognize that shareholders and companies may determine that a more restrictive proxy access system is appropriate for a given company, or that a proxy reimbursement system would provide a better alternative. For example, a proxy access system that is appropriate for a small primarily family-owned company may not be the right approach for a Fortune 100 company whose shares are held primarily by large institutional investors. These views were supported by several participants at the Commission’s 2007 proxy process roundtables ("2007 Proxy Process Roundtables"). Consequently, we believe that

206 See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Stanford Law School, May 7th Roundtable, at 226 ("If you really believe in corporate democracy, then doesn’t it inevitably follow that we can look to the shareholders of the corporation and the corporation itself to set the rules by which it wants to govern access to the corporation’s own proxy? And even if you have two corporations, both of which are chartered in Delaware, their individual circumstances can differ in very, very dramatic ways and it could well be the case that the optimal rules of proxy access for one corporation are very different than the optimal rules of proxy for another and clearly different than a national standard set by the [Commission] . . . ."); Stephen P. Lamb, Delaware Court of Chancery, May 7th Roundtable, at 83 ("[T]he Commission is thinking about adopting or had been thinking about adopting this very complex ‘one size fits all’ system. It just seemed in great tension with the normal state laboratory sense of allowing corporation law and state corporation law to work those problems out."); John C. Coffee, Columbia Law School, May 7th Roundtable, at 66 ("I do think, however, the shareholders have great power to adopt by-laws addressing the shareholder nomination process . . . and there could be any number of by-laws in that area . . . . I do think when we are dealing with the basic issue of the nomination process and the voting process, that shareholder power to establish the rules of the game is part of an

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any final rule amending Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to allow shareholder proposals seeking to address a company’s nomination procedures should permit shareholders to propose procedures that would modify the requirements of the Proposed Election Contest Rules, if the Commission proceeds with adopting the Proposed Election Contest Rules.


We believe that the Commission should revise its proposal to amend Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to increase the ownership threshold for shareholders submitting proxy access shareholder proposals. As proposed, shareholders submitting proxy access shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8(i)(8) would be subject to the same ownership thresholds as shareholders submitting any other type of shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8. We believe that this system fails to take into account some important differences between proxy access shareholder proposals and other types of Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals. If approved by the shareholders, proxy access shareholder proposals would result in amendments to a company’s bylaws in an area of fundamental significance to the company—director elections. Moreover, a system of proxy access will create significant costs and burdens for companies and their shareholders, as well as the Commission and its staff, as discussed in further detail in Section III.H below. Thus, these

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enabling system of corporate law.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware Court of Chancery, May 7th Roundtable, at 79 (“If a binding by-law shareholder proposal relates to the actual system of elections, let the state courts determine that. That will allow stockholders to have innovation and actually elegantly get[s] the Commission out of the middle of this, which is you are facilitating change of the electoral process, responsiveness to stockholders, without a single solution to myriad circumstances.”).

Although our comments relate specifically to the proposed amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) about which the Commission has solicited comment, we believe that the Commission should raise the ownership threshold for all Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals. As we discussed in our comment letter relating to the Commission’s 2007 Proposal, the Commission should consider increasing the ownership threshold for Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals due to the significant time, effort and other resources spent by companies and their shareholders, and the Commission and its staff, on proposals that often are of widespread interest to a company’s shareholders. See Letter from Business Roundtable to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC File No. S7-16-07 and S7-17-07, at 13-14 (Oct. 1, 2007). For example, our July 2009 Survey revealed that companies spend an estimated 47 hours and incur associated costs of $47,784 in preparing and submitting a single no-action request to the Commission, and that they spend an estimated 20 hours and incur associated costs of $18,982 in printing and mailing one shareholder proposal in their proxy materials.
costs and burdens necessitate a substantial increase in the threshold for shareholder proposals regarding shareholder nomination procedures or disclosures.

Under current Commission rules, a shareholder is eligible to submit a Rule 14a-8 proposal if the shareholder has continuously held at least $2,000 in market value, or 1%, of the company’s shares for at least one year. The Commission has not adjusted this threshold since 1998, when it raised the threshold from $1,000 to the current $2,000 eligibility threshold. Even at that time, many commentators expressed the view that this small increase would do little to reduce the significant time and resources expended by companies and the Commission in dealing with Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals. Over ten years later, this increase has been rendered relatively meaningless given increased investments by shareholders.

As several participants in the 2007 Proxy Process Roundtables noted, this low eligibility threshold subjects companies to the “tyranny of the 100 share shareholder.” Essentially, a shareholder holding a de minimis investment has the ability to use the company’s resources (and by extension, the resources of all the company’s shareholders) to put forth his or her agenda. Every year, companies spend significant time and financial resources responding to shareholder proposals, negotiating with proponents, and deciding whether to adopt proposals, include them in their proxy materials or attempt to exclude them by submitting no-action requests to the Commission. In turn, the Commission staff must respond in a short time frame to each no-action request that it receives from a company. The time and expense associated with Rule 14a-8 proposals relating to shareholder nominations and disclosures is likely to consume additional company, shareholder and Commission resources since these issues are of such a high degree of importance and complexity. Consequently, the proposed

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211 See supra note 207.

212 See infra Section III.H for a more detailed discussion of the Commission resources required to process no-action requests.
amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) that would require companies to include such proposals in their proxy materials necessitates a significant increase from the current $2,000 eligibility threshold in order to justify the burden and cost on companies, shareholders and the Commission. Thus, we urge the Commission to increase the eligibility threshold to at least 1% of a company’s outstanding shares for proxy access shareholder proposals.

D. The Commission Should Amend And Clarify Schedule 14N [A.10., l.11., l.12.]

We agree with the Commission’s proposal to require nominating shareholders or groups to file a Schedule 14N, containing the information required by Rule 14a-19, to notify a company of their intent to submit a nominee for inclusion in the company’s proxy materials pursuant to an applicable state law provision or the company’s governing documents. Such a requirement will provide that shareholders receive full and accurate disclosure so they have an opportunity to make informed decisions in voting for directors. However, as discussed in more detail in Section III.G below, we believe that the disclosure could be improved by adding to Schedule 14N the requirement that the nominating shareholder or group include a description of any material transaction of the shareholder or group with the company or any of its affiliates that occurred during the 12 months prior to the formation of any plans or proposals, or during the pendency of any proposal or nomination. In addition, we believe that amendments to Schedule 14N are needed to clarify certain provisions relating to material changes to the information provided in a shareholder’s originally-filed Schedule 14N, as discussed further in Section III.G below.

III. If The Commission Nevertheless Adopts The Proposed Election Contest Rules, Extensive Revisions Are Necessary [A.6.]


We strongly oppose the Proposed Election Contest Rules because they would preempt state law, setting forth in a federal regulation the substance of a shareholder’s right to access a company’s proxy materials, despite decisions made by the company or its shareholders. Rather than facilitating rights that shareholders have under state corporate law, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would create a new, federal right, going against a 200-year history of state primacy in the regulation of substantive corporate law. To avoid this result and preserve shareholder choice, we believe that, if the Commission adopts the Proposed Election Contest Rules, they should not apply where a company’s shareholders or board have adopted a proxy access bylaw or a proxy reimbursement bylaw, or where a company is incorporated in a state whose law includes a proxy access right or the right to reimbursement of expenses that shareholders incur in connection with proxy contests.
The Proposing Release states that “[i]n identifying the rights that the proxy process should protect, the Commission has sought to take as a touchstone the rights of shareholders under state corporate law.” However, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would preempt, rather than protect, state law rights. The Proposed Election Contest Rules would impose a proxy access regime on almost all public companies. They would require these companies to include shareholder nominees for director in their proxy materials in circumstances where, among other things, a shareholder has met various specified substantive criteria. If the Commission adopts the Proposed Election Contest Rules as proposed, shareholders and boards could implement additional methods for shareholders to include nominees in company proxy materials, but they could not adopt thresholds or other requirements that would prevent a shareholder from nominating directors if the shareholder has otherwise satisfied the criteria in the Proposed Election Contest Rules. In this respect, the Proposed Election Contest Rules plainly would preempt state law, a result that is inadvisable and inappropriate for the reasons discussed below.

Historically, state corporations statutes have been the primary source of corporate law, establishing and facilitating organizing principles in the area of corporate governance. As discussed in Section I.A.3 above, state corporate law is often described as “enabling” because it generally gives corporations flexibility to structure their operations in a manner appropriate to the conduct of their business. In fact, the Commission recognizes “the traditional role of the states in regulating corporate governance” in the Proposing Release. The Proposed Election Contest Rules would subvert this role by creating a federal right in an area—director nominations and elections—that traditionally has been the province of state corporate law. In proposing the Proposed Election Contest Rules, the Commission has made substantive determinations about the criteria that shareholders must satisfy in order to include a nominee for director in the company proxy materials. These criteria, as Commissioner Casey observed,

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214 As noted in the Proposing Release, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would apply to all companies that are subject to the proxy rules under the Exchange Act, except companies subject to the rules solely because they have registered a class of debt securities under Section 12 of the Exchange Act. The Proposed Election Contest Rules would not apply to foreign private issuers, as they are exempt from the proxy rules. 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,032 n.104.
216 Id. at 29,025.
217 See, e.g., CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 89 (“No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders.”).
"strongly suggest[] that the rule is not merely 'procedural,' but rather goes to the heart of the policy considerations properly left to state legislatures or, where legislatures so provide, to the companies and their shareholders."}\(^{218}\)

In this respect, the Proposed Election Contest Rules embody an approach that is fundamentally inconsistent with a long tradition of addressing corporate governance matters at the state level through private ordering by shareholders, boards and companies acting within the framework established by state corporate law. By its very nature, state corporate law permits shareholders and companies to adopt individualized approaches to corporate governance, fostering innovation and minimizing regulatory burdens. State corporate law also offers the advantage of being able to respond in a timely manner as corporate governance practices evolve. This is reflected in the recent action of the Delaware legislature in amending the Delaware General Corporation Law to address proxy access and reimbursement bylaws (discussed above in Section I.A.2) as well as action at the state level to facilitate majority voting in director elections (discussed above in Section I.A.3). These are only a few of the reasons why state law has played a predominant, and highly successful, role in regulating corporate governance matters.

Moreover, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would contravene the policy of the Obama Administration on federal preemption of state law, as set forth in a May 2009 Presidential Memorandum articulating the Administration’s position on this subject. This memorandum states that it is the “general policy of [the] Administration that preemption of State law by executive departments and agencies should be undertaken only with full consideration of the legitimate prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient legal basis for preemption.”\(^{219}\) That legal basis is utterly absent here, and the Proposed Election Contest Rules completely disregard the "legitimate prerogatives of the States" to address corporate governance matters through their corporations statutes, as they have done for several hundred years.

In addition, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would substitute the Commission’s judgment about what constitutes the “right” approach to proxy access for that of shareholders, boards and state legislatures. The Commission indicates throughout the Proposing Release that it seeks to empower shareholders and facilitate their rights by removing impediments to their ability to nominate and elect directors.\(^{220}\) In fact, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would have the opposite effect: disenfranchising shareholders by taking away rights that they have under state law. Specifically, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would eliminate the right to

\(^{218}\) Commissioner Casey, Statement at Open Meeting (May 20, 2009), supra note 7.


decide whether to adopt proxy access in the first instance and, if a company chooses to adopt it, the right to decide how to implement it. A company's shareholders or its board reasonably could conclude, based on the company's circumstances and a thoughtful weighing of the costs and benefits, that proxy access is not necessary or is not in the best interests of the company and its shareholders. For example, shareholders or the board might conclude that a better approach is to provide shareholders with the right to reimbursement of expenses incurred in connection with proxy contests, something that recent amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law now explicitly permit through the adoption of reimbursement bylaws.221 If shareholders or the board decide to provide for a proxy access right, they reasonably could make the judgment that it is appropriate to apply thresholds and other criteria different from those in the Proposed Election Contest Rules.222 In fact, recent amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law, discussed above in Section I.A.2, authorizing the adoption of proxy access bylaws contemplate that shareholders and boards will make choices about a number of the criteria addressed in the Proposed Election Contest Rules. As Commissioner Casey noted, the criteria in the Proposed Election Contest Rules are "the exact same matters included in a non-exclusive list, under the Delaware amendments, that may be addressed in a proxy access bylaw"223 if a company's shareholders or its board choose to adopt one.

The Commission itself acknowledges the possibility that shareholders and boards could make different choices than those embodied in the Proposed Election Contest Rules, pointing out in the Proposing Release that "a company could choose to provide a right for shareholders to have their nominees disclosed in the company's proxy materials regardless of share ownership,"224 and that proxy access provisions that a company includes in its bylaws:

may not limit the number of board seats for which a shareholder or group could nominate candidates or include a requirement that the nominating shareholder


222 See Joseph A. Grundfest, Internal Contradictions in the SEC's Proposed Proxy Access Rules (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ. Working Paper No. 60, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1438308. Professor Grundfest notes that the Proposed Election Contest Rules contain an inherent contradiction: "A fundamental premise of every proxy access proposal is that the majority of shareholders are sufficiently intelligent and responsible that they can be relied upon to nominate and elect directors other than the nominees proposed by an incumbent board . . . . But the Proposed [Election Contest] Rules prohibit the identical shareholder majority from establishing a proxy access regime, or from amending the Proposed [Election Contest] Rules to establish more stringent access standards." Id. at 2.

223 Commissioner Casey, Statement at Open Meeting (May 20, 2009), supra note 7.

224 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,031; see also id. at 29,056.
or group lack intent to change the control of the issuer or to gain more than a limited number of seats on the board (as is the case under proposed Rule 14a-11).225

However, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would only permit shareholders and boards to make their own choices where these choices result in a proxy access right that is more expansive than what the Commission has proposed. In this respect, the Proposed Election Contest Rules establish a “floor” of minimum substantive requirements that will apply to shareholders and companies across the board even if they disagree with the requirements and would have adopted different proxy access criteria if given the choice.

Thus, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would impose a federal “one size fits all” mandate on almost every public company—whether it is a Fortune 50 company, a newly public company or a small company with a significant shareholder—requiring that all follow the same practices with respect to the Proposed Election Contest Rules. However, shareholders and boards need to be able to make choices about a range of issues in implementing proxy access, including such matters as:

- whether to require that shareholders nominating a director candidate own a minimum amount of the company’s stock and, if so, what that amount should be;

- whether to address swaps and other forms of derivative positions for purposes of calculating shareholders’ stock ownership, something that the Proposed Election Contest Rules do not address;

- whether to impose minimum requirements on the duration of a nominating shareholder’s stock ownership and, if so, what those requirements should be—for example, a company could specify that a shareholder must hold its stock through the shareholders’ meeting, for a specified period (such as a year) thereafter, or for the duration of the nominee’s membership on the board;

- how to address other issues that can arise under a company’s capital structure or governing documents, such as when companies have multiple classes of voting shares or classified boards;

- how to address shareholders seeking to pool their holdings in order to meet applicable ownership thresholds and jointly nominate a director, including such questions as whether to impose a limit on the number of shareholders that can act together for this purpose and whether the shareholders individually should also

225 Id. at 29,060.
have to satisfy any applicable requirements relating to minimum periods of continuous ownership,

- whether to limit the number of director candidates that shareholders can nominate under a company’s proxy access bylaw and, if so, what the limit should be;

- how to determine which nominees to include in a company’s proxy materials where the company receives multiple nominees;

- what, if any, future limits to place on the nomination rights of a shareholder whose nominee is not elected to the board or does not receive a minimum number of votes; and

- how to address the independence of shareholder-nominated directors, and whether to permit relationships between nominating shareholders and their nominees.

The Proposed Election Contest Rules would prohibit shareholders and boards from making choices about matters such as those listed above. This, in turn, would prevent them from establishing the optimum corporate governance structure for their companies and deprive them of flexibility in deciding on the practices that will enable them to govern their businesses most effectively. This is not in the best interests of shareholders, boards or companies. By contrast, as discussed above in Section II, revising Rule 14a-8 to permit the adoption, through the shareholder proposal process, of proxy access or proxy reimbursement bylaws, would enable shareholders to implement proxy access if they choose to do so, and give them flexibility to make choices about how to do it. It also would enable shareholders to provide for reimbursement of expenses incurred in proxy contests if they believe this is a better alternative to proxy access. 226 This approach is far superior to the Proposed Election Contest Rules from the standpoint of providing shareholder choice, and, unlike the Proposed Election Contest Rules, it does not disregard the long tradition of private ordering within the framework established by state corporate law.

As noted above in Section I.A.2, recent state corporate law developments—most notably the adoption of new Delaware General Corporation Law Sections 112 and 113—have directly addressed the issue of proxy access and proxy reimbursement. 227 Moreover,

226 See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, Shareholder Election Reform and Delaware Corporate Regulation, 26 DELAWARE LAWYER 18, 18 (2008) (noting the cost of waging a proxy contest is problematic and arguing that “[t]he simplest solution . . . is to provide some sort of reimbursement of reasonable expenses to challengers in non-control directorial election challenges”).

227 See also N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-02(8) & 10-35-08 (2009) (allowing shareholders of companies subject to the North Dakota Publicly Traded Companies Act to nominate

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companies already have begun to take voluntary action to address proxy access-related issues. These actions reflect the wide range of choices available to shareholders and companies seeking to structure a proxy access right. As early as 2003, Apria Healthcare Group Inc. adopted a policy allowing shareholders that beneficially owned at least 5% of the company’s common stock for two years or more to nominate up to two directors. Where the company received more than two nominations, the policy gave priority to those shareholders owning the greatest number of shares, a sorting mechanism that differs from the “first-in” approach that the Proposed Election Contest Rules would mandate.

In 2007, Converse Technology, Inc. became what is believed to be the first company to adopt a proxy access bylaw. The Converse bylaw permits shareholders that have beneficially owned at least 5% of the company’s common stock for at least two years to nominate one director. If a shareholder’s nominee does not receive at least 25% of the votes cast with respect to the nominee’s election at the company’s annual meeting, the bylaw precludes the shareholder from submitting additional nominees for four years from the date of the annual meeting. RiskMetrics has adopted a proxy access bylaw that permits shareholders that have beneficially owned at least 4% of the company’s common stock for at least two years to nominate directors. Like the Converse bylaw, RiskMetrics’ proxy access bylaw precludes a shareholder from nominating directors for four years if the shareholder’s nominee fails to receive at least 25% of the votes cast. Neither Converse nor RiskMetrics places a ceiling on the number of shareholder nominees who can appear in their proxy materials in connection with any given meeting, unlike the Proposed Election Contest Rules, which impose a limit of one nominee or a number representing 25% of the company’s board, whichever is greater. In addition to voluntary action on the part of companies, and in anticipation of more companies taking action to address proxy access, the American Bar Association and other organizations...

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228 Apria Healthcare Group Inc., Policy Regarding Alternative Director Nominations by Stockholders, Exhibit A to Definitive Proxy Statement for 2003 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (Schedule 14A) (June 11, 2003). According to the disclosure in Apria’s proxy statement, the policy was “intended to facilitate the ability of stockholders to choose freely among competing candidates who may be proposed by stockholders who have a significant, long-term, interest in Apria’s success.” Id. at 4.


230 RiskMetrics Group, Inc., Second Amended and Restated Bylaws of RiskMetrics Group, Inc. § 2.7, Exhibit 3.2 to Amendment No. 3 to Form S-1 (Form S-1/A) (Jan. 8, 2008).
have begun publishing model proxy access bylaws that provide sample language and outline alternatives for companies to consider in crafting an access bylaw.\textsuperscript{231}

The historical predominance of state corporate law in regulating corporate governance, the importance of providing shareholder choice, and the need for flexibility, all make clear that proxy access is most appropriately addressed through private ordering by shareholders, boards and companies, rather than through a federal, “one size fits all” mandate. Accordingly, we strongly oppose the Proposed Election Contest Rules, and, as discussed in more detail above in Section II, we believe that amending Rule 14a-8 to facilitate the adoption of proxy access or reimbursement bylaws by shareholders that wish to implement them is a far better approach. However, if the Commission decides to move forward, the Proposed Election Contest Rules should not apply where a company has a proxy access or reimbursement bylaw.\textsuperscript{232} Furthermore, the Proposed Election Contest Rules should be inapplicable regardless of whether the company's shareholders or its board approved the bylaw. The Commission should defer to the shareholders' choice, or the reasoned business judgment of the company's board, as the case may be. For this reason, where state law permits a company to adopt a proxy access or reimbursement bylaw and it has done so, the Proposed Election Contest Rules should not preempt state law and the Proposed Election Contest Rules should be inapplicable. For similar reasons, the Proposed Election Contest Rules should not apply to companies incorporated in a state whose legislature has made the judgment to include a mandatory proxy access right, or a mandatory proxy reimbursement right, in the state's corporations statute.\textsuperscript{233}


\textsuperscript{232} Further, as we explain in Section III.N infra, we believe at least a one-year transition period is necessary to provide companies with an opportunity to consider amendments to their bylaws in light of the amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law concerning proxy access and proxy reimbursement.

B. The Proposed Election Contest Rules Should Apply Only Where There Is Objective Evidence Of A Need For Greater Director Accountability [A.8., B.13., B.14.]

Given the discussion above regarding the substantial costs and adverse consequences of the Proposed Election Contest Rules, we believe that any federal proxy access mandate imposed by the Commission should apply only where there is objective evidence of need for greater director accountability (a “triggering event”). Below we describe possible triggering events that demonstrate such a need—specifically when a director fails to receive a majority of votes cast and either does not resign or the board does not accept the director’s offer to resign and where a shareholder proposal receives a majority of votes cast and the company fails to respond to the proposal. We do not believe that the triggering events listed in the Proposing Release or the triggering events in the 2003 Proposal are appropriate, as they do not necessarily evidence the need for greater director accountability. Finally, if the Commission adopts the Proposed Election Contest Rules and conditions their applicability on one or more triggering events, the Commission should clarify that the triggering events apply only at the next shareholders’ meeting.

1. The Proposed Election Contest Rules Should Apply Only If Certain Triggering Events Occur [B.13.]

The Commission recognized the value of triggering events in the 2003 Proposal, where the Commission stated that triggering events create a “structure [that] addresses best the concerns of some commenters regarding the potential adverse impact of such a nomination procedure on public companies.”234 The Commission added that “the nomination procedure triggering events should be tied closely to evidence of ineffectiveness or security holder

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234 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,790. For concerns, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC Shareholder Access Proposal 15-16 (UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 03-22, Nov. 14, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=470121 (discussing such adverse impacts); Commissioner Paredes, Remarks, supra note 9 (noting that the Proposed Election Contest Rules may erode investor confidence); Bill Mostyn, Deputy General Counsel and Corporate Secretary of Bank of America, May 25th Roundtable (describing how small shareholders may consume resources of the company for issues not of general interest); David Hirschmann, President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, May 25th Roundtable (describing board decisions to incur significant costs to fight shareholder proposals); Letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC File Nos. S7-16-07 and S7-17-07 (Oct. 2, 2007) (detailing the cost and disruption to companies).
dissatisfaction with a company’s proxy process.” 235 However, the Commission now proposes rules that would impose proxy access on almost all public companies, regardless of the existing rights that shareholders have to promote director accountability. The Proposing Release indicates that the Commission’s decision not to include triggering events “reflects [the Commission’s] concern that the federal proxy rules may be impeding the exercise of shareholders’ ability under state law to nominate directors at all companies, not just those with demonstrated governance issues.” 236 Yet, the Commission has not given any consideration to the significant costs that a “one size fits all” rule will impose on those companies where the Proposed Election Contest Rules are not needed.

2. Events That Trigger The Proposed Election Contest Rules Should Be Limited To Those That Indicate A Need For Greater Director Accountability [B.13., B.14., B.15., B.17.]

We believe that the triggering events proposed below serve as the best indicators of situations in which there may be a need for greater director accountability.

a. A Director Nominee Does Not Receive A Majority Of Votes Cast And Continues To Serve On The Board

We recommend that the Proposed Election Contest Rules apply where a board-nominated director nominee does not receive support from a majority of votes cast in an uncontested election and that nominee continues to serve on the board. If a company has plurality voting, the director nominee would need to receive more votes “for” than “withhold” votes. If this did not occur, under state law the nominee would still be elected. However, we believe that the Proposed Election Contest Rules should then apply if the director continued to serve on the board (for example, unless the director either resigned or the board accepted the director’s offer to resign). If a company has majority voting, the director nominee would need to receive more votes “for” than “against” votes. If this did not occur, under state law the nominee would not be elected. However, under most state laws, in this situation an incumbent director remains on the board as a “holdover” director until the director resigns or a successor is elected or appointed. 237 Thus, as with plurality voting, we believe that the Proposed Election Contest Rules should then apply if the director continued to serve on the board.

We recognize that there may be instances where a director’s decision not to resign or a board’s decision not to accept the director’s offer to resign is in the best interests of the company. However, if the Commission proceeds with the Proposed Election Contest Rules, we

236 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,033.
237 See, e.g., 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 141(b) (2009).
note that a director’s continued service on the board may indicate the need for greater shareholder involvement and thus the availability of the Proposed Election Contest Rules. 238

b. A Shareholder Proposal Receives A Majority Vote And The Board Does Not Respond

We also suggest that the Proposed Election Contest Rules apply where a shareholder proposal submitted under Commission Rule 14a-8 is supported by a majority vote (as determined in a company’s governing documents) and the board does not respond to the proposal within six months and publicly disclose its response. In considering the actions that would trigger the Proposed Election Contest Rules when a shareholder proposal receives a majority vote, the Commission should focus on those companies that fail to respond to a majority-approved shareholder proposal, rather than using the “substantially implemented” standard in Rule 14a-8, as interpreted by the Commission’s staff. 239 The board must be given flexibility in implementation of the approved proposal since, for example, a board’s fiduciary duties may require it to implement the proposal in a manner different from that presented by the proposal. Such a decision by the board in the exercise of its fiduciary duties should not subject the company to the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

3. Once Triggered, The Proposed Election Contest Rules Should Be In Effect For A Limited Time [8.16.]

If the Commission adopts the Proposed Election Contest Rules and limits their application following certain triggering events, as we recommend, the Commission should clarify that the Proposed Election Contest Rules will then apply only at the next shareholder meeting. This limitation balances the purported need for greater director accountability with the need of the board and company to concentrate on operating the business and maximizing shareholder returns without the distraction of constant election contests.

238 We note that in 2003, the Commission proposed triggering proxy access when a board-nominated director nominee receives “withhold” votes from more than 35% of the votes cast. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,789. We do not believe this triggering event should be considered because it incorrectly assumes that a 35% withheld vote for a director nominee necessarily indicates the need for greater director accountability when, in fact, the director may be strongly supported by the other 65% of shareholders. Moreover, the fact that a director receives a minority of “withhold” votes (or “against” votes, if the company has adopted majority voting) does not demonstrate that the directors are not accountable to shareholders. On the contrary, it is evidence that the company’s proxy process is working: the majority of shares did vote for the director, and he or she was elected to the board.

The Commission should exempt from any Proposed Election Contest Rules companies whose governing documents provide shareholders with alternative means to achieve greater director accountability. We believe that shareholders at those companies should not bear the costs of the Proposed Election Contest Rules when the proxy processes are sufficient. In addition to exempting companies with a proxy access or reimbursement bylaw (as discussed in Section III.A above), we believe that such an exemption should apply to companies that have adopted majority voting in uncontested director elections.

As discussed in Section I.A.3. above, historically, companies generally have elected directors using a plurality voting standard. Under this standard, a candidate will be elected as long as the candidate receives one affirmative vote. Under a majority voting regime, a candidate must receive a majority of votes cast in order to be elected. In response to investor concerns about director accountability, many companies have adopted a majority vote standard in uncontested director elections. Majority voting increases shareholder influence and encourages greater board accountability and, as a result, we believe that the Proposed Election Contest Rules are unnecessary at companies with majority voting in uncontested director elections. Accordingly, companies with such a provision should be exempted from the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

Under the Proposed Election Contest Rules, any shareholder or group of shareholders beneficially owning—individually or in the aggregate—the requisite number of the company’s voting securities for at least one year would be permitted to nominate one or more director candidates in the company’s proxy materials. As proposed, such requisite number is equal to 1%, 3% or 5% of the company’s voting securities, tiered according to the size of the company. As discussed below, we believe given the disruption, costs, and other serious consequences presented by individual shareholder nominees in company proxy materials, the ownership thresholds should be raised to 5% for all companies and the holding period extended to two years in order to meet the Commission’s objective of limiting the Proposed Election Contest Rules to “holders of a significant, long-term interest.” Moreover, a nominating shareholder’s ability to nominate candidates in successive years should be linked to the success of the shareholder’s candidate(s) in previous elections.

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241 See supra Section I.B.

In view of the substantial cost and disruption and other serious consequences that would result from the Proposed Election Contest Rules, we agree with the Commission that there should be a threshold ownership requirement for nominating shareholders if the Proposed Election Contest Rules are adopted. However, the proposed thresholds fail to ensure “that only holders of a significant, long-term interest in a company”243 are able to rely on the Proposed Election Contest Rules and, thus, are far too low. We believe the threshold for individual shareholders should be raised to 5% for all companies. In addition, we believe that if the Commission is determined to allow shareholders to aggregate their shares, the Commission should impose a heightened ownership requirement of 10% on groups of shareholders. Further, we believe that a 13D “beneficial ownership” standard, which can be satisfied by merely being delegated or sharing voting or investment control over shares with no real economic interest in a company, is an insufficient standard and that the Commission should require nominating shareholders to have a net long economic and direct beneficial ownership position (in the form of being the “ultimate” beneficial owner with full voting and investment power) during the entire requisite holding period.

When a board nominates a slate of director candidates, the directors’ fiduciary duties require that they act in the best interests of the company and all of its shareholders. Accordingly, a board that receives a shareholder nominee through the Proposed Election Contest Rules would be required to consider whether the board’s own nominees would better oversee the business and affairs of the company and better satisfy applicable expertise standards (e.g., the Commission’s “audit committee financial expert” rules244 and NYSE and NASDAQ financial literacy/expertise requirements245). If so, the board’s fiduciary duties would require it to act to support its candidates and to counter the shareholder nominee.246 As discussed in Section III.H below, this is likely to result in substantial costs, which will be borne by the company and all of its shareholders. The holders of just 1% or 3% of a company’s voting

243  Id.
244  See Regulation S-K, Item 407(d)(5).
245  See NYSE Listed Company Manual, Commentary to § 303A.07(a);
NASDAQ Rule 5605(c)(2)(A).
shares lack a sufficient stake in the company to warrant imposing such costs on all shareholders.\footnote{247}

In an attempt to support its proposed ownership thresholds, the Commission relies heavily on the high percentage of companies that have at least one shareholder meeting the relevant threshold.\footnote{248} However, the Commission provides no basis for the proposition that every company should have at least one shareholder eligible in its own right to nominate a director under the Proposed Election Contest Rules. Further, we believe the Commission should focus on shareholders with a significant, long-term interest in a company, as it claims to be the objective, instead of trying to ensure that each company has a shareholder eligible to nominate a director. For these reasons, in the case of an \textit{individual} shareholder, we believe the Proposed Election Contest Rules should only be available if the shareholder beneficially owns at least 5\% of the company’s shares.\footnote{249}

The ownership thresholds in the Proposing Release are even more troubling given the ease with which shareholders could band together to reach the respective thresholds, particularly with the availability of the Internet and social media as a way for shareholders to communicate. For example, in 2007, a shareholder of Yahoo! was able to leverage an Internet blog and a number of videos posted on YouTube into a coalition of 100 shareholders that gathered a 33\% “against” vote for one of the company’s directors.\footnote{250} Likewise, the proposed ownership thresholds could result in a very large number of shareholders nominating candidates to be included in company proxy materials, given the almost infinite number of combinations of shareholders owning even one-quarter of 1\% of a company’s shares. In this regard, the Commission errs in relying on data concerning the number of shareholders that \textit{individually} could satisfy the thresholds to conclude that the proposed thresholds are

\footnote{247} This is confirmed by analogy to settings other than the federal securities laws. For example, the National Labor Relations Board will generally not even consider a labor organization’s petition for recognition as a representative of a company’s employees for collective bargaining unless at least 30\% of the company’s employees designate the organization for that purpose. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (2009).

\footnote{248} See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,036.

\footnote{249} In addition, a 5\% ownership threshold is consistent with the 5\% ownership threshold in the Commission’s rules requiring a shareholder or group of shareholders to file a Schedule 13D.

appropriate for shareholders **aggregating** their shares.\textsuperscript{251} Further, the Commission’s data ignores the concentration of ownership of the largest companies in the United States. For example, at the 50 largest companies, the top 10 shareholders hold, on average, 27% of the outstanding shares;\textsuperscript{252} meaning that the Commission could raise its highest proposed threshold fivefold and shareholders would likely still have access to the proxy materials of the country’s largest companies.\textsuperscript{253}

As a result, we believe that if the Commission is determined to allow shareholders to aggregate their shares, the Commission should at least impose a heightened ownership requirement due to the increasing ease with which shareholders can unite. In such cases, we believe that it would be more appropriate to limit the Proposed Election Contest Rules to groups of shareholders that beneficially own at least 10% of a company’s voting securities. This threshold would be more of an indication that a significant percentage of shareholders are willing to bear the costs of a contested election.

2. **The Need For A Meaningful Holding Period** [C.2., C.14., C.16., C.17.]

Given the Commission’s expressed desire to limit the right to use the Proposed Election Contest Rules to “holders of a significant, long-term interest,”\textsuperscript{254} a one-year holding period, as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{251} See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,035-36.
  \item \textsuperscript{252} See NERA Economic Consulting, Top 50 Companies by Market Capitalization: Percentage of Shares Outstanding Held by Top 5 and 10 Institutions (using data from FactSet Research Systems, Inc., Bloomberg, L.P. and SEC filings, as of March 31, 2009) (attached as an exhibit).
  \item \textsuperscript{253} In this regard, we disagree with certain comments of the Council of Institutional Investors (“CII”) in its August 4, 2009 letter to the Commission. In answer to question C.1. of the Proposing Release, CII asserts that “the ten largest public pension funds in a sample of five accelerated filers and five non-accelerated filers indicates that if a group of the ten largest holders were to aggregate shares, they would not be able to meet a five percent threshold and would be unlikely to meet even a three percent threshold.” Letter from CII to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC File No. S7-10-09, at 28 (Aug. 4, 2009). We note that it is inappropriate to consider the holdings of only a small sub-set of institutional investors—public pension funds—in analyzing the Commission’s proposed ownership threshold, since according to CII, public and union pension funds hold less than 10% of U.S. securities, in contrast to the more than 60% held by all institutional owners. Id. at 27-28. We do not understand why the Commission should disregard the holdings of these other institutional investors in determining the proper ownership thresholds.
  \item \textsuperscript{254} See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,035.
\end{itemize}
proposed, is far too short. We agree that shareholders should be required to demonstrate a commitment to a company and its business prior to being entitled to nominate director candidates for inclusion in the company’s proxy materials. Thus, we believe that a minimum holding period of at least two years is appropriate, as was proposed in the 2003 Proposal.\textsuperscript{255} Any shorter holding period would allow shareholders with a short-term focus to nominate directors who, if elected, would be responsible for dealing with a company’s long-term issues.

In addition, we believe that a two-year holding period that continues through the date of the annual meeting is insufficient and consideration should be given to extending it through the service of any elected shareholder-nominated director. The Proposed Election Contest Rules would require that nominating shareholders intend to hold their securities through the date of the relevant annual or special meeting.\textsuperscript{256} Although the Commission also proposes a disclosure requirement under which a nominating shareholder or group would state their intent with respect to continued ownership of their shares after the election, the Proposed Election Contest Rules are unclear as to what this would require.\textsuperscript{257} The disclosure would likely consist of boilerplate language, and it would not prevent shareholders from selling their holdings in a company following an election. Moreover, permitting shareholders to liquidate their holdings in the company immediately upon election of a director candidate that they have nominated would impose no consequences on shareholders that nominate “special interest” directors. Thus, we believe that nominating shareholders, as part of their initial notice requirement, should be required to represent their intent to continue to satisfy the requisite ownership threshold for the duration of their nominees’ service on the board, or at least through the term for which they have nominated the director.

3. Limit The Right To Nominate Candidates In Successive Years [C.18., D.16.]

If the Commission moves forward with the Proposed Election Contest Rules, a shareholder’s right to nominate director candidates in successive years should be linked to the success of the shareholder’s candidates in previous elections. If a company’s shareholders have determined that they do not support the shareholder’s candidate, it would be inappropriate to require all of the company’s shareholders to again bear the cost of either that shareholder submitting a nominee or that nominee seeking a seat on the board. A shareholder whose nominee fails to receive significant support (e.g., at least 25\% of the shares outstanding in an election in one year) should not be permitted to use the Proposed Election Contest Rules for the subsequent two years, as that shareholder has not demonstrated sufficient support to elect its candidates to the board. Likewise, in such instances where a shareholder nominee receives

\textsuperscript{255} See 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,794.

\textsuperscript{256} See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,037.

\textsuperscript{257} See id.
minimal support, that nominee should not be eligible to be nominated as a candidate for the company’s board of directors for the following two years.

4. Require Attendance At The Shareholders’ Meeting [C.4.]

We believe that the Proposed Election Contest Rules should require that a nominating shareholder, or a representative who is qualified under state law to nominate a candidate on such shareholder’s behalf, attend the company’s annual meeting and nominate any director candidates in person. Given that the Commission has indicated that it is seeking to have the “the proxy rules . . . function[,] as nearly as possible, as a replacement for an actual in-person meeting of shareholders,”250 it seems appropriate that the nominating shareholder should be required to attend the meeting to make the nomination. In analogous circumstances, a shareholder, or a qualified shareholder representative, is required to attend the company’s annual meeting; under Rule 14a-8(h), proponents of a shareholder proposal or their representatives must attend the annual meeting to present shareholder proposals. We do not understand why the Commission did not include a similar requirement in the Proposed Election Contest Rules. Similar to Rule 14a-8(h)(3), if the nominating shareholder or a qualified representative of that shareholder fails without good cause to appear and nominate the candidate, the company should be permitted to exclude from its proxy materials in the following two years all nominees submitted by that shareholder or any shareholders included in a group of shareholders that fails to comply with this requirement.

E. The Commission Should Adopt Other Meaningful Eligibility Requirements For Shareholder Nominees


The Proposed Election Contest Rules fail to address the concern that shareholders would nominate affiliated “special interest” or “single issue” directors who advance the relatively narrow agendas of the shareholders that nominated them. The Commission’s 2003 Proposal, in recognition of this concern, included a limitation on relationships between a nominating shareholder or group of shareholders and their director nominee or nominees.259 Specifically, the 2003 Proposal prohibited shareholders from nominating: (i) if the shareholder was a natural person, the shareholder or an immediate family member, (ii) if the shareholder was an entity, an employee during the then-current or immediately preceding calendar year, (iii) anyone accepting consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fees from the nominating shareholder, (iv) an officer or director (or a person fulfilling similar functions) of the nominating shareholder, and (v) a nominee who controls the nominating shareholder or is an interested

258 See id. at 29,025.
259 See 68 Fed. Reg. at 60,796.
person (as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940) of such shareholder. In the Proposing Release, the Commission asserts that "such limitations may not be appropriate or necessary" because, if elected, a director is subject to state law fiduciary duties owed to the company. However, we do not believe that state law fiduciary duties will adequately resolve the issue of "special interest" or "single issue" directors nor can there be any assurance that the shareholder-nominated director would act in accordance with his or her fiduciary duties. Therefore, we believe that the Commission should limit the relationships between a nominating shareholder or group and their director nominee or nominees by imposing the same restrictions as in the 2003 Proposal.

In addition, we support requiring nominating shareholders to represent that neither the nominee nor the nominating shareholder (nor any member of the nominating shareholder group, if applicable) has a direct or indirect agreement with the company regarding the nomination. We also agree that, if the Commission adopts the Proposed Election Contest Rules, the Commission should expressly permit negotiations and other communications between the nominating shareholder and the company regarding shareholder nominees. Such an exception would permit companies to respond to nominating shareholder concerns and, possibly, prevent the costly and divisive proxy contests that would result from inclusion of a shareholder nominee in the company’s proxy materials.


We agree that a company should not be required to include in its proxy materials a shareholder nominee whose candidacy or, if elected, board membership would violate controlling state law, federal law or the rules of a national securities exchange or national securities association. However, the Proposed Election Contest Rules should go further and permit a company to exclude a shareholder nominee if the nominee fails to meet the eligibility requirements set forth in the company’s governing documents, including its requirements with respect to director independence and qualifications.

261 See id.
262 See id. at 29,040.
263 The Proposed Election Contest Rules do not clarify what is meant by "governing documents." We use the term "governing documents" to refer to a company’s certificate of incorporation, bylaws, corporate governance guidelines, and board committee charters.
Under the Proposed Election Contest Rules, a company is not permitted to exclude a shareholder nominee on the grounds that the nominee fails to meet the standards in the company’s governing documents that are more restrictive or expansive than those proposed by the Commission (i.e., the objective independence standards of the exchanges).\(^{264}\) However, this approach is inconsistent with state law, which typically permits a company to establish qualification standards for its directors in its governing documents.\(^{265}\) Likewise, the Proposed Election Contest Rules are inconsistent with the Commission’s recently proposed proxy disclosure amendments, which require additional disclosure with respect to the particular experience, qualifications, attributes, and skills of each director and nominee. The focus of such proposed amendments is on the quality and experience of directors and nominees, “[r]egardless of who has nominated the director.”\(^{266}\) Finally, under Delaware law, the qualifications of each director are crucial, since in litigation the conduct of each director is examined individually, as opposed to scrutinizing the board of directors as a whole.\(^{267}\)

Moreover, many companies have implemented eligibility and enhanced independence requirements for their board members to ensure that they maintain high-quality boards. For example, as discussed in Section I.B.2 above, some companies have adopted more rigorous independence standards for all their independent directors than imposed by exchange rules, such as applying the heightened standards for audit committee members to all independent directors, as well as mandatory retirement ages, and limitations on the number of other boards on which a director may serve. Likewise, some companies have established independence standards limiting a director’s affiliation with nonprofit organizations receiving contributions from the company. Finally, certain industries, such as defense contracting and gaming, impose additional requirements on the directors of companies in those industries.\(^{268}\) We strongly believe that all of a company’s directors and director nominees, including shareholder nominees, should be subject to these eligibility requirements.

Finally, as mentioned above, we agree that a company should be able to exclude a nominee whose candidacy or, if elected, board membership would violate controlling state law, federal law or the rules of a national securities exchange or national securities association. Absent such a requirement, a shareholder could nominate a director candidate who is

\(^{264}\) See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,040 n.152.

\(^{265}\) See, e.g., 8 Del. Code Ann. § 141(b) ("The certificate of incorporation or bylaws may prescribe other qualifications for directors.").

\(^{266}\) See 74 Fed. Reg. at 35,083.

\(^{267}\) See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005).

\(^{268}\) See supra Section I.B.2.
employed by the company’s competitor, potentially causing the company to violate Section 8 of the Clayton Act of 1914.269


Although we agree with the Commission’s determination that shareholder nominees must meet the objective independence standards of a national securities exchange (e.g., the NYSE or NASDAQ) or national securities association,270 we believe strongly that nominees also should be required to meet the subjective independence standards of the NYSE271 or NASDAQ272 (requiring a board determination that the nominee has no material relationship that would impair independence). In this regard, we believe that a shareholder nominee should be required to complete the same questionnaires and provide the same information as a company’s other directors so that the board can make a determination with respect to the eligibility and independence of the shareholder nominee.

As stated in the commentary to the NYSE independence requirements, “[i]t is not possible to anticipate, or explicitly to provide for, all circumstances that might signal potential conflicts of interest, or that might bear on the materiality of a director’s relationship to a listed company.”273 Therefore, “it is best that boards making ‘independence’ determinations broadly consider all relevant facts and circumstances.”274

In addition, the board’s subjective independence determination provides material information to shareholders. Both the NYSE and NASDAQ require a majority of a company’s board to be independent,275 and Item 407 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of relationships that the board considered in making independence determinations.276 Moreover, both exchanges require all of a company’s audit committee members (and compensation and

269 See 15 U.S.C. § 19. Under Section 8, no person is permitted to serve simultaneously as a director of competing corporations such that the elimination of competition by agreement between the corporations would constitute a violation of the antitrust laws.
271 See NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 303A.02(a).
272 See NASDAQ Rule 5605(a)(2).
273 See NYSE Listed Company Manual, Commentary to § 303A.02(a).
274 Id.
275 See NYSE Listed Company Manual, § 303A.01; NASDAQ Rule 5605(b)(1).
276 Regulation S-K, Item 407(a).
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governance committee members, in the case of the NYSE) to meet the subjective independence requirements. Whether a shareholder’s nominee will qualify as an independent director and be eligible to serve on these various committees is material information that a company’s shareholders should have when voting for nominees for director.277

Until now, the Commission has long supported the requirement of a subjective board determination of independence. For example, the Commission previously stated “that requiring boards to make an affirmative determination of independence, and to disclose these determinations, will increase the accountability of boards to shareholders and give shareholders the ability to evaluate the quality of a board’s independence and its independence determinations.”278 We believe that the Commission’s rationale should apply equally to shareholder nominees under the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

F. The Commission Must Revise The Scope Of The Proposed Election Contest Rules

1. Further Limitation On The Number Of Shareholder Nominees [E.1., E.2., E.5., E.7., E.8.]

The Commission has proposed to require a company to include in its proxy materials one shareholder nominee or the number of nominees that represents 25% of the company’s board of directors, whichever is greater.279 We believe that one shareholder nominee should be the limit, regardless of the size of the board. The election of just one shareholder-nominated candidate could lead to a fragmented board that is unable to function effectively. Permitting dissident shareholders to include more than one nominee in company proxy materials would only exacerbate these problems. The Commission itself concedes in the Proposing Release that changes in board membership have “the potential to be disruptive to the board.”280 The scope of the disruption is reflected in the results of our July 2009 Survey, in which companies responding had an average of 11.5 directors, meaning that many surveyed companies would be required to include multiple nominees in their proxy materials.

We agree with the proposal that an incumbent director who was elected as a shareholder nominee pursuant to the Proposed Election Contest Rules should count against the

277 See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (“An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”).


279 See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,043.

280 See id.
maximum number of shareholder nominees discussed above. Any other approach would allow 
nominating shareholders to gain more than a limited number of seats on the board by 
repeatedly nominating additional candidates for director, thus adding to the problems caused 
by dissident directors and undermining the Commission’s goal of preventing shareholders from 
using the Proposed Election Contest Rules “as a means to effect a change in control of a 
company.” For these same reasons, incumbent directors nominated by shareholders 
outside the Proposed Election Contest Rules also should be counted against the maximum 
number of shareholder nominees. For example, directors nominated by shareholders pursuant 
to applicable state law or a company’s governing documents also should be deemed 
“shareholder nominees” for purposes of the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

In addition, we think the Commission should clarify whether an incumbent director 
loses his or her status as a “shareholder nominee” if the nominee subsequently is nominated by 
the company. Otherwise, there would be a strong incentive for companies not to nominate 
directors who were previously nominated by shareholders since they could otherwise end up 
with a board having a majority of members nominated by shareholders.

Likewise, the Commission needs to address the status of an individual that a company 
agrees to nominate as a board/company nominee, but only after a shareholder or group of 
shareholders provides notice to the company of their intent to nominate the individual. 
Specifically, the Commission should clarify that such a nomination does not constitute an 
agreement between the shareholder or the nominee and the company, and thus, the nominee 
would still be treated as a “shareholder nominee” for purposes of the Proposed Election 
Contest Rules.


The Commission’s proposal for addressing situations in which the number of nominees 
exceeds the number of permitted nominees also should be revised. The Proposed Election 
Contest Rules require companies to include in their proxy materials the nominee(s) of the first 
nominating shareholder or group from which it receives timely notice of intent to nominate a 
director. However, this first-in-time approach is an arbitrary basis on which to select 
nominees. First, a first-in-time approach ignores the qualifications of the nominees and their 
ability to represent the concerns of the shareholders, seemingly undercutting the purpose of 
the Proposed Election Contest Rules. Second, because such an approach bears no relation to 
the length of time or amount of a shareholder’s ownership of company securities, it ignores the 
Commission’s stated purpose of providing proxy access only to those shareholders with a 
“significant, long-term interest.” Finally, because the Proposed Election Contest Rules do not 
include an outside date for a shareholder to submit a nomination where the company’s bylaws

\[281\] See id.

\[282\] See id. at 29,044.
do not specify a deadline, shareholders will be incentivized to rush their nominations. As a result, shareholder nominees may be determined a year or more in advance of the director elections for which they are nominated without regard to whether a particular candidate is best positioned to advance the purposes of the Proposed Election Contest Rules. We recommend instead that, in the event that more nominees are submitted than permitted, the shareholder holding the company’s shares for the longest period of time be permitted to nominate a candidate. This approach is consistent with the Commission’s stated goal of making the Proposed Election Contest Rules available to shareholders with a long-term interest.

3. Exclusion Of Proxy Access Nominees During A Proxy Contest [C.24., General 1]

Finally, we believe that the Proposed Election Contest Rules should not apply when shareholders are conducting a traditional proxy contest at a company. In this situation, the Proposed Election Contest Rules are simply not necessary, as the company’s shareholders are already “effectively exercis[ing] their rights under state law to nominate and elect directors.”

Further, the inclusion of shareholders in a company’s proxy materials under the Proposed Election Contest Rules during an ongoing proxy contest is likely to result in shareholder confusion, as shareholder nominees would appear in both the company’s proxy materials and the dissidents’ proxy materials. Moreover, if exclusion were not permitted in these circumstances, shareholder nominees elected under the Proposed Election Contest Rules, in combination with those elected pursuant to the proxy contest, could result in a change in control. In this regard, the election of both directors nominated in a proxy contest and directors nominated pursuant to the Proposed Election Contest Rules could result in a board composed of a majority of shareholder-nominated directors. Such a result would be contrary to the stated purpose of the Proposed Election Contest Rules—to facilitate the inclusion of shareholder nominees on a company’s proxy materials “so long as the shareholders are not seeking to change the control of the issuer or to gain more than a limited number of seats on the board.”


Under the Proposed Election Contest Rules, a shareholder intending to submit a nominee must provide notice to the company by the date specified by the company’s advance notice bylaw provision, or where no such provision is in place, no later than 120 calendar days before the date that the company mailed its proxy materials for the prior year’s annual meeting. However, linking the deadline for shareholder notice to a company’s advance

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283 Id. at 29,026.
284 Id. at 29,031.
285 See id. at 29,045.
notice bylaw creates an unworkable timeline. This is because the typical deadline for providing notice under a company’s advance notice bylaw is between 90 and 120 days prior to the company’s annual meeting. At the same time, the Proposed Election Contest Rules require a company to provide any notice of its intent to exclude a nominee to the Commission at least 80 days before the company files its proxy statement, which typically is done 30 to 45 days prior to the meeting. Thus, under the Proposed Election Contest Rules, it is likely that the company will be required to challenge a shareholder nominee’s inclusion in its proxy materials before it ever receives notice of such shareholder nomination.

Moreover, companies cannot resolve this problem by amending their advance notice bylaw deadlines to coincide with the date their proxy materials are first released. In this regard, a Delaware court has invalidated at least one company’s advance notice bylaw containing a deadline that was tied to the filing of the company’s proxy materials. As a result, we suggest that the Commission not use the deadlines in a company’s advanced notice bylaw to determine the deadline for shareholder notice under the Proposed Election Contest Rules. Instead, the Commission should create an independent deadline for the shareholder notice under the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

Even if the Commission divorces the shareholder notice deadline from the deadlines in a company’s advance notice bylaw, the default deadline of 120 calendar days before a company mails its proxy materials is far too short. It fails to allow sufficient time for companies to resolve any eligibility issues presented by potential nominees, including resolution through the Commission staff no-action process, possible appeals to the Commission, and possible litigation. In light of these concerns, we recommend that, at a minimum, shareholders should be required to provide notice to a company of their intention to submit a nominee at least 150 days before the date that the company mailed its proxy materials for the prior year’s annual meeting.

G. The Commission Should Improve Schedule 14N And Other Disclosure Requirements [F.1., F.14., F.19.]

We agree with the Commission’s determination that nominating shareholders or groups of shareholders should be required to file Schedule 14N to notify a company of their intent to submit a nominee for inclusion in the company’s proxy materials. One of our primary concerns with the Commission’s 2007 Proposal, as noted above, was that it would have permitted shareholders to include their nominees in company proxy materials without the attendant disclosures mandated by the Commission’s rules governing proxy contests. In contrast, the Proposed Election Contest Rules include disclosure requirements that will provide shareholders with important information about shareholder nominees that will assist them in making

286 See, e.g., JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 344 (Del. Ch. 2008).
informed voting decisions. However, we believe that minor revisions to the proposed requirements are appropriate.

1. Additional Disclosure In Schedule 14N [F.2., F.3., F.20.]

We believe that the disclosure could be improved by adding to Schedule 14N one of the disclosure requirements that was proposed in the 2007 Proposal that is not included in the Proposed Election Contest Rules: a description of any material transaction of the nominating shareholder with the company or any of its affiliates that occurred during the 12 months prior to the formation of any plans or proposals to nominate a candidate, or during the pendency of any proposal to nominate someone or any nomination. Shareholders should be aware of any material business relationship or potential conflict of interest of the shareholder nominee arising from a transaction with the company in the previous 12 months in order to make an informed voting decision.


We agree with the proposed requirement that Schedule 14N be amended promptly for any material change to the facts set forth in the originally filed Schedule 14N. However, the Commission should either expressly state that “promptly” means within two business days, or should clarify that the requirement should be interpreted in a similar manner to the “promptly” standard of Rule 13d-2(a), which generally is thought to be within two business days.

The Commission also should clarify what actions are required if the information provided by the nominating shareholder or group changes materially after the proxy statement is mailed to shareholders. An express provision should be included stating that a company is not required to amend its proxy statement and redistribute materials to shareholders if the information to be amended is solely that provided by the nominating shareholder or group. Rather, the nominating shareholder or group should be required to amend its Schedule 14N promptly and also notify shareholders, at its own expense, of the material change. For example, Item 7(a) of Schedule 14A requires the disclosure of material legal proceedings to which a director nominee is a party. If a shareholder nominee is convicted of securities fraud after the proxy statement has been mailed, the nominating shareholder or group should have the obligation to notify the shareholders of such a legal proceeding.

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As stated earlier in Section III.D.2, we believe that the nominating shareholder or group should be required to hold its shares for the term its nominees remain on the board. However, if the nominee is not elected to the board, we agree that the nominating shareholder or group should be required to file a final amendment to Schedule 14N within 10 days of the final results of an election disclosing the nominating shareholder’s or group’s intention with regard to continued ownership of their shares. We believe this will be important information to other shareholders as to whether the outcome of the election altered the intent of the shareholder and will assist other shareholders in evaluating whether the nominating shareholder or group acquired the shares solely for the purpose of nominating a director.

3. Distinctly Identify A Company’s Statements From Those Made By Nominating Shareholders [General 1]

Should the Commission adopt the Proposed Election Contest Rules, it is imperative that shareholders be able to easily distinguish between a company’s statements and those made by nominating shareholders in the company’s proxy statement. To that end, the Proposed Election Contest Rules should be clarified to provide that companies may indicate in their proxy materials that: (i) the relevant statements were provided by the nominating shareholder, not the company; (ii) the company has no responsibility or liability for the statements; and (iii) the nominating shareholder has sole responsibility and liability for the statements.290 A number of comments on the 2003 Proposal suggested the inclusion of such a provision.291 Companies also should be able to set the shareholder statements apart from their own materials by using different fonts, colors, graphics or other visual devices.292 The use of such measures would make proxy statements containing shareholder nominees clearer and less confusing to shareholders.

290 See infra Section III.I for further discussion of the liability issue.


292 Currently, the Proposing Release states that “the company could identify any shareholder nominees as such and recommend how shareholders should vote for, against, or withhold votes on those nominees and management nominees on the form of proxy.” 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,049. However, there is no language included in the proposed rule itself which would permit such a distinction.
H. **The Proposed Company/Commission Staff Process Will Not Work And Will Require Inordinate Staff Resources** [G.12., G.17., G.18., G.19., PRA 1]

In order to address issues related to whether a shareholder nominee must be included in a company’s proxy materials, the Commission has proposed to create a procedure modeled on the procedure under Rule 14a-8 governing shareholder proposals. For the reasons set forth below, we believe that the proposed process will not work and will require inordinate staff resources.\(^{293}\)

The Commission is proposing to create a procedure by which companies would notify the Commission when they intend not to include a shareholder nominee in their proxy materials.\(^{294}\) Under this procedure, a company could seek no-action assurance from the staff with respect to its determination to exclude a shareholder nominee from its proxy materials. We believe that the Commission has underestimated significantly the cost to companies of challenging shareholder nominees under this proposed procedure. For purposes of calculating

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\(^{293}\) The Commission and others have questioned the adequacy of the Commission’s resources. For example, a report issued by the Commission’s Office of Inspector General concluded that Commission delays in reviewing Bear Stearns’ 2006 annual report on Form 10-K deprived investors of “material information [that would have helped investors] make well-informed investment decisions . . . [and] could have been potentially beneficial to dispel the rumors that led to Bear Stearns’ collapse.” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Office of Inspector General, SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The Consolidated Supervised Entity Program, 44-46 (Sept. 25, 2008), available at [http://www.sec-oig.gov/](http://www.sec-oig.gov/); Scott Cohn, Audit Report Blasts SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns, CNBC (Sept. 26, 2008), available at [http://www.cnbc.com/id/26905494](http://www.cnbc.com/id/26905494). See also Wouter Klijn, SEC Stripped of Staff Before Crisis: Regulator Still Under-Funded, Chairman Says, InvestorDaily (July 16, 2009) (discussing Chairman Schapiro’s remarks before the International Corporate Governance Network conference in which she stated that the Commission needs more staff members in order to properly fulfill its responsibilities); Senator Jack Reed, Remarks Before the Council of Institutional Investors, A Blueprint for Reforming our Regulatory Framework (Jan. 27, 2009) (“Because of limited resources, the SEC examines only about 10% of broker-dealers in a given year. This is hardly enough to keep bad actors in check and discover problems.”). Moreover, the Commission recently endorsed the Obama Administration’s financial regulatory reform proposals, which would give the Commission significant new responsibilities and further burden the Commission’s already taxed resources. See SEC Commissioner Mary L. Schapiro, Testimony Before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services, Regulatory Perspectives on the Obama Administration’s Financial Regulatory Reform Proposals (July 22, 2009), available at [http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/tst072209mls.htm](http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/tst072209mls.htm).

\(^{294}\) See proposed Rule 14a-11(f)(7)-(14); 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,050.
Paper Reduction Act burden estimates, the Commission assumes that the cost to companies of submitting a no-action request seeking to exclude a shareholder nominee from a company’s proxy materials is “comparable to preparing a no-action request to exclude a proposal under Rule 14a-8.” However, unlike many shareholder proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8, most of which are non-binding and many of which address issues tangential to the company’s business, the composition of a company’s board of directors and the election of the board’s nominees are issues of fundamental importance to a company. As discussed elsewhere in this comment letter, once a board has determined to nominate a slate of directors that it believes is best suited to govern the company on behalf of its shareholders, the board will expend significant resources to scrutinize and challenge shareholder nominees and to elect its own nominees. Thus, comparing the cost of challenging a Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal with the cost of challenging a shareholder nominee fails to account for this difference. A more relevant analogy would be the costs companies expend in short-date proxy contests, which far exceed the costs considered by the Commission relating to shareholder proposals.

Moreover, although the Proposing Release concedes that “companies may expend more resources on efforts to defeat the election of shareholder nominees,” it erroneously contends that “boards generally would be cautious in expending resources to defeat shareholder nominees insofar as incumbent board members generally are interested in the outcome of elections and in the corporation’s policy in connection with opposing shareholder nominees.” Contrary to this statement, pursuant to the board’s fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the company and all its shareholders, a board is likely to expend significant resources to defeat shareholder nominees whom the board believes are unqualified or less qualified to serve on the company’s board than the board’s nominees. Accordingly, the cost to companies of challenging shareholder nominations is likely to be significantly higher than the Commission estimates. Adding to these substantial costs is the likelihood that, in order to comply with the timelines imposed by the Proposed Election Contest Rules, companies may have to submit multiple no-action requests if they receive multiple shareholder nominations.


296 Even if we were to assume that the cost of challenging a Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal is comparable to the cost of challenging a Rule 14a-11 shareholder nomination, the figures cited in the Proposing Release are from 2003, and thus, are outdated. See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,065 n.311. Consequently, the cost estimates the Commission relies on in the Proposing Release are unreliable. See infra Section IV.B; see also supra Section II.C (noting that our July 2009 Survey revealed that companies spend an estimated 47 hours and incur associated costs of $47,784 in preparing and submitting a single no-action request to the Commission, and that they spend an estimated 20 hours and incur associated costs of $18,982 in printing and mailing one shareholder proposal in their proxy materials).

297 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,075.
because companies will not be certain which nominee(s) they ultimately will be required to include in their proxy materials.

There also is likely to be substantial litigation relating to Commission or staff determinations under the new procedures given the significance of these determinations. This litigation is likely to be brought by both companies and nominating shareholders that have received unfavorable staff determinations with respect to shareholder nominations. Companies already have shown a willingness to file lawsuits seeking to exclude shareholder proposals to amend the company’s bylaws to allow shareholders to nominate directors and have their nominees included on the company’s ballot. \(^{298}\) If shareholders are given the right to have their nominees included in the company’s proxy materials, as they would be under the Proposed Election Contest Rules, companies will be even more inclined to sue to exclude such shareholder nominees from their proxy materials, and the resulting litigation is likely to consume considerable resources of the company and the nominating shareholder as well as the Commission itself, whose responses to no-action requests will be challenged.

Despite these expected Commission costs, the Proposing Release does not even discuss the impact the Proposed Election Contest Rules will have on the Commission itself. In the Proposing Release, the Commission estimates that 4,163 reporting companies (other than registered investment companies) are likely to have at least one shareholder that is eligible to submit a nominee for director, and that 208 (or 5\%) of these companies will receive shareholder nominations. \(^{299}\) The Commission further estimates, without any supporting evidence, that approximately 42 (or 20\%) of reporting companies (other than registered investment companies) that receive a shareholder nomination would seek to exclude the nominee from their proxy materials via a no-action letter from the Commission staff. \(^{300}\) As the Commission would have it, less than half of companies receiving a shareholder nomination would seek to challenge that nomination. We believe that the Commission has grossly underestimated the efforts companies will undertake to see that the director nominees selected by their boards, as opposed to shareholder nominees, are elected to the board. As such, we believe that the vast majority of companies receiving shareholder nominations will seek to exclude those shareholder nominees from their proxy materials pursuant to the Commission’s no-action letter process. In this regard, while some of the grounds for seeking exclusion are objective (i.e., shareholdings), others (e.g., whether the representation in the nominating shareholder’s notice to the company is false or misleading) are more subjective and will invite no-action requests.


\(^{299}\) See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,063-64.

\(^{300}\) See id. at 29,065.
This, in turn, would consume a considerable amount of time and effort on the part of Commission staff in processing no-action requests—an area where the Commission already devotes an “inordinate amount of resources” in connection with shareholder proposals.303 Each year, the Commission expends significant resources reviewing the hundreds of no-action requests it receives under Rule 14a-8.302 We understand that for the 2009 proxy season, the Commission assigned a 22-member task force to review no-action requests submitted under Rule 14a-8.303 In a speech before the American Bar Association in August 2008, then-Director of the Commission’s Division of Corporation Finance (the “Division”), John W. White, outlined the Commission’s process for reviewing and analyzing Rule 14a-8 no-action requests.304 Mr. White explained that in addition to “analyz[ing] each of the bases for exclusion that a company asserts, as well as any arguments that the shareholder chooses to make in response,” the Commission staff also “conducts independent research, including reviewing prior no-action letters and Commission releases.”305 Mr. White noted as well that “each no-action request is subject to multiple levels of review” and that “many no-action requests are reviewed by four attorneys.”306 Any reconsideration request is reviewed by a senior staff member of the

301 HowardStock, SEC Receives Record Requests to Bar Shareholder Proposals From Proxies, INVESTOR RELATIONS BUSINESS, Apr. 21, 2003. Commissioner Atkins, in a speech to the Council of Institutional Investors, stated that he would “like to see us address whether there are means of removing—or more realistically reducing—the need of SEC staffers acting as referees in the shareholder proposal process.” Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, Remarks Before the Council of Institutional Investors (Mar. 27, 2003).

302 A tally of the no-action letters publicly available on the Commission’s website shows that in 2008, the Commission staff issued 404 no-action letters, and by July 16, 2009 had already issued 324 no-action letters for 2009, with another six no-action requests pending.


305 Id.

306 Id.
Finally, if a shareholder or a company requests that the Division seek the
Commission’s views on a matter, the Division must consider the request and determine
whether to recommend that the Commission consider the matter. As Mr. White’s remarks
illustrate, the Commission’s process for reviewing Rule 14a-8 no-action requests is extensive,
time-consuming and labor-intensive. Consequently, before adopting any procedure that
contemplates staff involvement in reviewing shareholder nominations under the Proposed
Election Contest Rules, it is critical that the Commission evaluate the additional burden such
review will place on its resources.

Even if the volume of no-action requests under the Proposed Election Contest Rules is
lower than for Rule 14a-8 no-action requests, the issues presented by no-action requests under
the Proposed Election Contest Rules are likely to be much more complex than those associated
with Rule 14a-8, requiring subjective, nuanced determinations (for example, with respect to
determining whether a nominee’s candidacy would violate state law), which will inevitably
be more time-consuming for the staff. Moreover, due to the importance of director elections,
both companies and nominating shareholders are likely to submit requests for reconsideration
by the staff and requests for review by the Commission when they receive an unfavorable no-
action letter, which will further increase the burden on the Commission and staff. As a result,
given the proposed timing requirements of the Proposed Election Contest Rules, the staff may
be left with insufficient time to adequately review no-action requests under the Proposed
Election Contest Rules, as discussed in more detail elsewhere in this comment letter.

Finally, in setting up the proposed process, the Commission is placing itself in a position
of having to be the arbiter of state law issues. For example, companies would not be required
to include shareholder nominees whose candidacy or board membership would violate state
law or the company’s governing documents. Accordingly, the Commission staff often would
be called upon to determine whether a nominee is qualified to serve on a company’s board
under the company’s charter or bylaws, which may involve complex state law judgments. As
noted by several participants in the Commission’s 2007 Proxy Process Roundtables, it is not
appropriate for the Commission to resolve issues of state law; rather, such issues should be
considered by the state courts. For example, Professor Joseph Grundfest of Stanford Law

307 Id.
308 Id.
309 See proposed Rule 14a-11(a)(2).
310 See supra Section III.F.4.
311 See proposed Rule 14a-11(a)(2).
312 We recognize that the Commission is permitted to certify issues of state law to the
Delaware Supreme Court under a procedure available under the Delaware Constitution.

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School stated: “[T]o the extent that there are questions of state law rights of access . . . aren’t the state courts the appropriate venue for the resolution of those issues? I don’t know that I want people in the Division of Corporation Finance wearing Justice Strine’s robes and opining on matters of Delaware law.”

I. The Commission Must Revise The Proposed Liability Standards [L.1.]

In the Proposing Release, the Commission proposes several rules related to liability for statements made by a nominating shareholder or nominating shareholder group. We agree with the Commission’s proposed amendments to Rule 14a-9 to make nominating shareholders liable for any materially false or misleading statements provided to the company and then included in the company’s proxy materials, whether made pursuant to Rule 14a-11, an applicable state law provision, or a company’s governing documents. However, because companies are acting as a mere conduit for the shareholders’ materials, we disagree with the liability standard proposed in Rule 14a-11(e) and in the note to Rule 14a-19, which would make a company liable for including such statements in its proxy materials if the company “knows or has reason to know that the information is false or misleading.” Companies will have no involvement in the preparation of the information submitted by shareholders and, with respect to proposed Rule 14a-11, can only exclude such information from their proxy materials if the Commission staff concurs that a nominating shareholder did not satisfy the eligibility or procedural requirements of Rule 14a-11. Accordingly, we believe that the Commission

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See Del. Const. art. IV, § 11(8). However, this procedure is available “only where there exist important and urgent reasons for an immediate determination by [the Delaware Supreme Court] of the questions certified.” See Del. Sup. Ct. R. 41(b). Moreover, it is not practical for the Commission to use this procedure to address the myriad of state law issues likely to arise under the Proposed Election Contest Rules on a regular basis.

Joseph A. Grundfest, Stanford Law School, May 25th Roundtable, at 101. Professor Grundfest’s comment echoed the sentiments of other participants in the 2007 Proxy Process Roundtables. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Fordham University School of Law, May 7th Roundtable, at 92-93 (“We talk about the fact that we don’t want shareholders to micro-manage the company. I think we also don’t want the Commission to try to micro-manage the voting process. Why don’t we want that? Because it is a delicate balance between how much power shareholders should have vis-à-vis directors and management . . . . The courts and the state legislatures are really in an ideal position to weigh that balance. The Delaware Courts have traditionally done this in a very incremental way.”). See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,082.

See id. at 29,084 (Rule 14a-18) and 29,087 (Rule 14a-19).

See id. at 29,084.
should provide that a company is not responsible for the statements submitted by shareholders, similar to the standard in Rule 14a-8(i).

We believe that it is inappropriate to hold a company to the “knows or has reason to know” standard when it is acting as a mere conduit in including a nominating shareholder’s information in its proxy materials. Moreover, such a liability standard is inconsistent with the standards imposed by the Commission in analogous situations.\footnote{In similar circumstances courts recognize that companies should not be held liable for third party statements absent significant involvement in preparing such statements. For example, courts generally do not hold companies liable for misstatements made by stock analysts absent a company’s substantial involvement in the preparation of the analysts’ reports or explicit endorsement of those reports. See, e.g., Raab v. Gen. Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 288-89 (4th Cir. 1993); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 163 (2d Cir. 1980).} For example, Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 provides that companies must include shareholder proposals in their proxy materials in certain circumstances.\footnote{17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(2) (2009).} However, Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(i)(2) explicitly states: “the company is not responsible for the contents of [the shareholder proponent’s] proposal or supporting statement.”\footnote{Id. In other areas of the federal securities laws where the Commission has imposed a “reason to know” standard, the circumstances are distinguishable from the Proposed Election Contest Rules. For example, Item 403 of Regulation S-K permits a company to rely on beneficial ownership information set forth in Schedules 13D/G when including the information in the company’s proxy materials “unless the registrant knows or has reason to believe that such information is not complete or accurate or that a statement or amendment should have been filed and was not.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.403 (2009). That situation is not analogous to shareholder nominees included in company proxy materials because Item 403 is limited to beneficial ownership of the company’s shares, which the company has some knowledge of, while the disclosures required under proposed Rule 14a-18 and proposed Rule 14a-19 are more expansive. In other instances, the company is the actor, unlike in the Proposed Election Contest Rules. Exchange Act Rule 10, for} Rule 14a-7 also permits a shareholder to request that the company send copies of its own proxy materials to shareholders in certain situations where a company intends to solicit proxies from shareholders.\footnote{Id. In other areas of the federal securities laws where the Commission has imposed a “reason to know” standard, the circumstances are distinguishable from the Proposed Election Contest Rules. For example, Item 403 of Regulation S-K permits a company to rely on beneficial ownership information set forth in Schedules 13D/G when including the information in the company’s proxy materials “unless the registrant knows or has reason to believe that such information is not complete or accurate or that a statement or amendment should have been filed and was not.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.403 (2009). That situation is not analogous to shareholder nominees included in company proxy materials because Item 403 is limited to beneficial ownership of the company’s shares, which the company has some knowledge of, while the disclosures required under proposed Rule 14a-18 and proposed Rule 14a-19 are more expansive. In other instances, the company is the actor, unlike in the Proposed Election Contest Rules. Exchange Act Rule 10, for} In this regard, we note that the Commission’s 2003 Proposal proposed the

\footnote{17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(2) (2009).}

\footnote{Id. In other areas of the federal securities laws where the Commission has imposed a “reason to know” standard, the circumstances are distinguishable from the Proposed Election Contest Rules. For example, Item 403 of Regulation S-K permits a company to rely on beneficial ownership information set forth in Schedules 13D/G when including the information in the company’s proxy materials “unless the registrant knows or has reason to believe that such information is not complete or accurate or that a statement or amendment should have been filed and was not.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.403 (2009). That situation is not analogous to shareholder nominees included in company proxy materials because Item 403 is limited to beneficial ownership of the company’s shares, which the company has some knowledge of, while the disclosures required under proposed Rule 14a-18 and proposed Rule 14a-19 are more expansive. In other instances, the company is the actor, unlike in the Proposed Election Contest Rules. Exchange Act Rule 10, for}
following standard: “The registrant is not responsible for any information in the notice from the nominating security holder or nominating security holder group pursuant to paragraph [c] of this section or otherwise provided by the nominating security holder or nominating security holder group.” Commentators on the 2003 Proposal supported this standard. The Commission now has proposed to deviate from this standard without explaining the reasons for doing so.

The established liability standard for third party statements included in company proxy materials also is appropriate from a policy perspective. Increased liability would place a significant burden on companies to investigate each and every shareholder statement and to determine what various individuals in the company “know” about the various statements made by a nominating shareholder or nominating shareholder group or could be read to require a search of public records. Furthermore, potential directors faced with such liability may be reluctant to serve on public company boards. For these reasons, courts have long recognized that it makes little sense to hold directors accountable for information that is outside the realm

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example, provides that management’s responsibility to promptly disclose material facts regarding the company’s financial condition “may extend to situations where management knows or has reason to know that its previously disclosed projections no longer have a reasonable basis.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3)(iii) (2009). Exchange Act Rule 10b-18 provides an issuer with a safe harbor from anti-manipulation provisions for certain repurchases of blocks of stock unless the company knows or has reason to know the block was accumulated for the purpose of resale to the company or knows or has reason to know that it was sold short to the company. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18(a)(5) (2009). Both rules apply where the company is the actor—be it with respect to the company’s financial condition or when repurchasing its own shares—and not merely as a conduit for a third party.


of their duties. But without further guidance from the Commission as to the diligence necessary with regard to shareholder statements, companies would face significant uncertainty in implementing any new rules. Such uncertainty breeds inefficiency and would encourage frivolous litigation.

For these reasons, we urge that the Commission amend the Proposed Election Contest Rules to state that a company is not responsible for the statements submitted by a nominating shareholder or nominating shareholder group and included in a company’s proxy statement.

J. The Proposed Schedule 13D Exemption Is Inappropriate, And The Commission’s Criteria Governing Schedule 13G Eligibility Should Remain Intact

We oppose the proposed amendments to Rule 13d-1 that would allow a nominating shareholder or group relying on the Proposed Election Contest Rules to remain eligible to report their beneficial ownership on Schedule 13G, rather than Schedule 13D. Shareholders or groups of shareholders seeking to nominate up to 25% of a company’s directors are by definition not passive investors and should be required to report their holdings, plans, proposals, intentions and other interests on Schedule 13D. Moreover, the proposal to classify

324 For example, “[k]nowledge or recklessness is required for a finding of scienter under § 10(b)” of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), in order to hold a director liable for making material misrepresentations to the public. Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, outside directors with little knowledge of a company’s inner workings are generally held to a lower standard of accountability for statements made in corporate disclosures than directors who participate in day-to-day corporate activities. See, e.g., In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., 34 F. Supp. 2d 935, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1999); Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (Hand, J.) (noting that to require an outside director to independently verify all statements in a company circular not known to him would be to charge him “with detailed supervision of the business, which, consistently carried out, would have taken most of his time. If a director must go so far as that, there will be no directors.”).


326 The Commission states in the Proposing Release that “[c]entral to Schedule 13G eligibility is that the shareholder be a passive investor that has acquired the securities without the purpose, or the effect, of changing or influencing control of the company.” 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,059.
such shareholders or groups as passive investors is inconsistent with the Commission’s long-standing position on the subject.\textsuperscript{327}

Eligibility for passive investors to report on Schedule 13G was premised on investors not seeking to influence a company’s board of directors or management. Therefore, the proposed amendments allowing shareholders or groups to nominate up to 25% of a company’s board while remaining on Schedule 13G contradicts the original purpose and rationale for the extension of Schedule 13G eligibility to passive investors. Even the Commission acknowledges in the Proposing Release that shareholder nominations under the Proposed Election Contest Rules are potentially contrary to passive investor status. Specifically, in footnote 281, the Commission notes that “if a nominating shareholder is the nominee, and is successful in being elected to the board of a company, the shareholder would most likely be ineligible to continue filing on Schedule 13G because of its ability as a director to directly or indirectly influence the management and policies of the company.”\textsuperscript{328} In addition, the certification that the Commission has proposed requiring nominating shareholders to provide under Schedule 14N differs from the standards required for shareholders to qualify as passive investors who are eligible to file on Schedule 13G because nominating shareholders would not be required to certify on Schedule 14N that shares were not acquired for the purpose of influencing the control of the issuer, which seems to reflect the Commission’s tacit recognition that nominating shareholders may be seeking to influence control over companies.

We believe the Schedule 13D disclosure requirements provide much needed information to investors and the company regarding any plans, arrangements or understandings that may exist between group members and present a much better picture of the persons making such nominations, including their aggregate beneficial ownership, their plans for their securities holdings and other activities they intend to undertake when seeking to change up to one quarter of the board. Schedule 13D requires disclosure of derivatives and similar instruments and contracts relating to the subject securities. This information is critical to a complete understanding of a shareholder’s or group’s economic interest in and motivations with respect to the company. Schedule 14N and the related proposed rules (e.g., Rules 14a-18 and 14a-19) do not adequately cover important disclosure items set forth in

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{327} In the 1989 release that first proposed Schedule 13G eligibility for passive investors, the Commission observed that the “beneficial ownership reporting scheme is intended to inform the marketplace of acquisitions of a company’s securities that could affect control. . . . The reduced number of Schedule 13D filings [resulting from the introduction of the passive investor category for 13G eligibility] would allow the marketplace, as well as the staff of the Commission, to focus more quickly on acquisitions involving a potential change in control.” Reporting of Beneficial Ownership in Publicly-Held Companies, SEC Release No. 34-26598, 54 Fed. Reg. 10,552, 10,555 (Mar. 6, 1989).

\textsuperscript{328} 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,060.
\end{footnotesize}
Schedule 13D. For example, disclosure of the source and amount of funds (Item 3 of Schedule 13D) and disclosure of the purpose of the transaction (Item 4 of Schedule 13D) are not addressed at all by Schedule 14N while disclosure of a shareholder's contracts, arrangements, understandings or relationships with respect to the securities of the company (Item 6 of Schedule 13D) is inadequately addressed.329 Absent full 13D-level disclosure, nominating shareholders or groups could potentially obtain significant representation on a company’s board without providing the advance notice and other disclosure that Schedule 13D was intended by Congress to provide both to the company and its shareholders.

The Schedule 13D disclosure requirements are not overly burdensome, are well understood by all participants in the financial markets, fulfill a legitimate purpose and have served the investing public well for nearly 40 years. In addition, the prompt amendment requirements applicable to 13D reporting persons provide a critical safeguard.330 In contrast, under current rules, certain qualified institutional investors and passive investors are subjected to a lower standard, only having to amend their Schedule 13Gs within 45 days after the end of each calendar year to report any changes.331

We also note that there is a distinct possibility that a nominating shareholder or group may initially take the position (and certify) that its nominations are not being made for the purpose or with the effect of changing control of a company, but it may later turn out, or at least appear, that such nomination was done for exactly that purpose. Once elected, directors nominated by a shareholder or group could very well engage in any number of activities that are designed to change or influence control of the company (e.g., lobby other board members to sell the company to a competitor or seek to remove other company-nominated directors in the hopes of carrying out a pre-planned strategy). We believe that such activities would in most cases lead to expensive and time-consuming litigation between the company, the nominating shareholder or group and the directors on the specific issue of exactly whether, where and how those initiatives or plans were first formed. If it were later discovered during the course of litigation that the nominating shareholder or group had such plans from the

329 Schedule 14N incorporates Item 5(b)(1)(viii) of Schedule 14A by reference, which appears to be narrower than Item 6 of Schedule 13D.

330 Rule 13d-2 requires that "if any material change occurs in the facts set forth in the Schedule 13D required by [Rule 13d-1(a)], including, but not limited to, any material increase or decrease in the percentage of the class beneficially owned, the person or persons who were required to file the statement shall promptly file or cause to be filed with the Commission an amendment disclosing that change." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2 (2009).

331 Id. In certain circumstances, they need to report during the year if and when they cross 10% or if they increase or decrease their beneficial ownership by more than 5%.
outset, then the validity of the election of the shareholder’s or group’s nominees would be called into question.

Likewise, a nominating shareholder or group could later change its intent and become a control-oriented rather than passive shareholder following the election of its director nominees. In that situation, it is unclear how such a change in intent might impact the validity of their election. At that point it would be too late to require the heightened disclosure on Schedule 13D (as opposed to Schedule 13G) or proposed Schedule 14N. For example, Perry Corporation recently ran afoul of the Section 13(d) reporting requirements when it tried to influence the outcome of a merger vote by acquiring a large block of Mylan, Inc. stock but failed to report the acquisition within ten days on Schedule 13D.332

The academic community also has noted that shareholders that seek to control or influence a company’s management often have interests that diverge from the interests of passive shareholders. In a 2005 paper, Professor Stephen Bainbridge noted that “private benefits” can disproportionately flow to activist shareholders.333 Professor Bainbridge cites the example of union pension funds using “shareholder proposals to obtain employee benefits they couldn’t get through bargaining.”334 Professor Roberta Romano also identifies the same problem, writing that:

It is quite probable that private benefits accrue to some investors from sponsoring at least some shareholder proposals. . . . Examples of potential benefits which would be disproportionately of interest to proposal sponsors are progress on labor rights desired by union fund managers and enhanced political reputations for public pension fund managers, as well as advancements in personal employment.335

Given the risks of divergent interests held by activist shareholders and those investors that are truly passive, it is vitally important that the Schedule 13D disclosure regime be retained intact and applied to shareholders or groups formed to nominate directors under the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

334 Id. at 16.

If adopted, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would add a new exemption to the proxy solicitation rules “for communications made in connection with . . . [the Proposed Election Contest Rules] that are limited in content and filed with the Commission” on the date of first use. This rule would supplement existing Rule 14a-2(b)(2), which provides an exemption for solicitations “other than on behalf of the registrant” of up to ten shareholders. We believe that it is inappropriate to provide shareholders with a greater ability to communicate with fellow shareholders than is otherwise available to companies, particularly in an election contest where both the company’s and the shareholder’s nominees are included in the same proxy materials.

In *J.I. Case Co. v. Barok*, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he purpose of § 14(a) is to prevent management or others from obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation.” Section 14(a) was intended to “control the conditions under which proxies may be solicited with a view to preventing the recurrence of abuses which . . . [had] frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders.” Accordingly, if the exception in Rule 14a-2(b)(2) allowing shareholders to communicate and solicit proxies from up to ten other shareholders does not interfere with the “free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders,” then a similar right should be made available to companies.

L. The Shareholder Communications System Must Be Improved Before The Commission Adopts The Proposed Election Contest Rules [General 1]

The Proposed Election Contest Rules would revise the proxy rules in a manner that implicates the entire proxy voting system. The current shareholder communications system is complex and integrated, involving companies, directors, shareholders, proxy solicitors, proxy voting services and others. We are concerned that the Commission has not considered adequately the impact the Proposed Election Contest Rules would have on the proxy process as a whole. As such, the Commission should not adopt these rules without contemporaneously improving the mechanics for communicating with beneficial owners of shares held in “nominee” or “street” name (meaning those shares held of record in the names of brokers, banks or other intermediaries). The Commission itself has acknowledged the need to review the shareholder communications system. For example, on July 1, 2009, Chairman Mary Schapiro stated at an open meeting that “there are . . . areas of shareholder communication

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336 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,054.
and voting that the Commission will be studying carefully this year.\textsuperscript{339} At the same meeting, Commissioner Elisse Walter noted that the Commission needed to take a "more in depth look into . . . 'proxy plumbing' issues like shareholder communications (or, the 'NOBO/OBO' distinction) as well as over and empty voting."\textsuperscript{340} We applaud the Commission for its recognition that the shareholder communications system needs improvement, but we urge the Commission to complete its review and implement improvements before adopting the Proposed Election Contest Rules, which will increase the frequency of proxy contests and the resultant need for communications with shareholders.\textsuperscript{341}

1. **Deficiencies In The Current Shareholder Communications System**

[General 1]

The Commission's existing shareholder communications rules (set forth in Exchange Act Rules 14b-1,\textsuperscript{342} 14b-2,\textsuperscript{343} and 14a-13\textsuperscript{344}) make it difficult and expensive for companies to communicate with the beneficial owners of their securities held in street name. A study conducted in 1997 found that approximately 70% to 80% of all outstanding public company shares were held in street name.\textsuperscript{345} Companies may only communicate with the beneficial owners of these shares by going through the brokers and banks ("nominees") that are registered as the owners of the securities. Many of these nominees contract with agents,


\textsuperscript{341} As discussed in Section I.B.5 supra, there are a number of deficiencies in the proxy voting system itself which present voting integrity issues. These problems would also be exacerbated by the increase in proxy contests that would result under the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

\textsuperscript{342} 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1 (2009).

\textsuperscript{343} 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-2 (2009).

\textsuperscript{344} 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13 (2009).

primarily Broadridge Financial Services, Inc. ("Broadridge")\textsuperscript{346} to perform shareholder communications and proxy services.\textsuperscript{347}

Historically, only nominees or their agents were able to contact directly the beneficial owners of securities held in street name.\textsuperscript{348} In an effort to provide companies with the ability to communicate directly with these beneficial owners for at least some purposes, the Commission adopted rules in 1983, which went into effect in 1986, requiring nominees and their agents to provide companies with lists of “non-objecting beneficial owners” (or “NOBOs”) that did not object to having their names and addresses supplied to companies.\textsuperscript{349} Objecting beneficial owners (or “OBOs”) still may be contacted directly only by nominees or their agents. It is estimated that OBOs represent approximately 75% of shares held in street name.\textsuperscript{350}

Even companies’ ability to communicate with NOBOs (those that do not object to having their names and addresses supplied to companies) is limited. Under current rules, only nominees (not the company) have voting authority for the beneficial owners of the securities held in street name.\textsuperscript{351} Accordingly, only nominees or their agents may mail proxy voting materials to these owners; companies may only use NOBO lists to mail their annual reports and for supplemental materials.\textsuperscript{352} (As just noted, the rules provide companies with no ability to communicate directly with OBOs.)

In addition to being difficult, the process of communicating with the beneficial owners of shares held in street name is very costly. Not only must a company go through nominees

\textsuperscript{346} Broadridge was formerly known as ADP Brokerage Services Group ("ADP"), before it was spun-off by Automatic Data Processing, Inc. in 2007.

\textsuperscript{347} See supra note 345.


\textsuperscript{350} Based on information provided by ADP representatives at meetings of the Proxy Voting Review Committee held on August 29, 2001 and October 17, 2001. See also Report and Recommendations of the Proxy Working Group to the New York Stock Exchange, at 11 (June 5, 2006) ("Proxy Working Group Report").


and agents to disseminate its proxy materials, but it also must pay fees to those nominees and agents for assembling lists of NOBOs. Currently, the fee paid by public companies per NOBO consists of a $0.065 fee paid to nominees and an additional fee paid to agents of nominees (typically Broadridge).\textsuperscript{353} Broadridge’s fee is based on a sliding scale, wherein the per-NOBO fee depends on the size of the NOBO list (the per-NOBO fees are: $0.165 for 1,000 to 10,000 NOBOs; $0.115 for 10,001 to 100,000 NOBOs; or $0.105 for 100,001 or more NOBOs).\textsuperscript{354}

The shareholder communications process described above is cumbersome, circuitous and often prohibitively expensive. As noted above, the current framework for distinguishing between NOBOs and OBOs and requiring companies to seek and pay for NOBO lists was developed in the early 1980s. Over the ensuing quarter-century, street-name holdings have become increasingly prevalent,\textsuperscript{355} further restricting companies’ ability to communicate with the owners of these shares. Furthermore, the current system does not take full advantage of the tremendous technological advances that have been made since the 1980s.

2. Shareholder Communications Should Be Improved Now [8.8., General 1]

As discussed in Section III.H above, a board’s fiduciary duties to the company and its shareholders likely will require that the board seek to defeat shareholder nominees whom it believes are unqualified or less qualified to serve on the company’s board than the board’s nominees. As in a traditional or short-slate proxy contest, this would result in additional communications between the company and its shareholders in order to solicit support for board-nominated candidates. As such, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would add to the already-increased need for companies to communicate with all of their shareholders, which has resulted from increasing activism by institutional shareholders, the prevalence of majority voting and recent amendments to NYSE Rule 452 eliminating the ability of brokers to vote uninstructed shares held in street name under the “10-day rule” in uncontested director elections.

In this regard, we note that the Proposed Election Contest Rules represent one of several rulemakings by the Commission and the NYSE since 2003 dealing with individual elements of the proxy process in a piecemeal fashion, including the 2003 and 2007 Proposals,

\textsuperscript{353} See NYSE Rule 451, Supplementary Material .92.

\textsuperscript{354} See Broadridge Fee Schedule (2008). We note that these fees have increased substantially from $0.10, $0.05 and $0.04 at the time of our comment letter on the Commission’s 2003 Proposal. See ADP Fee Schedule (Mar. 2003).

\textsuperscript{355} See SEC Release No. 34-38406, 62 Fed. Reg. at 13,923 (noting that “stockholdings continue to migrate from registered to street or nominee ownership”).
the “notice and access” rules and the amendments to NYSE Rule 452. At each step along the way, Business Roundtable and other commentators have urged the Commission to revisit its rules relating to the shareholder communications system and cautioned against the perils of dealing with selected components of the proxy process without considering collateral impacts on other elements of the proxy system, including shareholder communications. In April 2004, Business Roundtable filed a Petition for Rulemaking urging the Commission to revise its rules to improve the shareholder communications system. Business Roundtable’s efforts have been widely supported, including by companies, trade associations and securities industry participants. Supporters have included the Shareholder Communications Coalition, which has repeatedly urged the Commission to address the deficiencies in the current communications system. Indeed, the need to address the shareholder communications system has been recognized by the Commission on a number of occasions, and was highlighted by the NYSE Proxy Working Group in its recommendations regarding Rule 452.


358 We note that the Shareholder Communications Coalition consists of Business Roundtable, the National Association of Corporate Directors, the National Investor Relations Institute, the Securities Transfer Association and the Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals.

359 See, e.g., Letter from John J. Castellani, President, Business Roundtable, Louis M. Thompson, Jr., President & CEO, National Investor Relations Institute, Charles V. Rossi, President, Securities Transfer Association and David W. Smith, President, Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals, to Alan L. Beller, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC File No. 4-493 (Jul. 29, 2005).

360 Chairman Cox remarked in 2007 as follows: “Between 70 and 80 percent of all public company shares are now held in street name. As a result, companies don’t know a significant percentage of their shareholder base. They have difficulty in identifying their beneficial owners, and they have to rely on a complex web of intermediaries to communicate with these beneficial owners and conduct proxy solicitations.” Transcript of [Footnote continued on next page]
The Commission has already begun work to reexamine the proxy system as a whole, including issuing the 2003 Staff Report and holding several roundtables in 2004 and 2007. As recently as July 14, 2009, Chairman Schapiro noted that "later this year, we will undertake a comprehensive review of other potential improvements to the proxy voting system." In addition, the Proxy Working Group formed by the NYSE engaged in an extensive study of the shareholder communications system and recommended that the system be improved in light of the increasing importance of shareholder communications. In its 2006 report to the NYSE, the Proxy Working Group made the following recommendation:

Given the potential impact that eliminating broker voting of uninstructed shares in director elections would have on issuers, particularly as a result of the trend towards "majority voting" for directors, the Working Group believes that there is a significant need for more effective communications between issuers and shareholders. The Working Group recognizes that various groups have urged the SEC to review its existing shareholder communication rules to make it easier for issuers to communicate with beneficial owners, and believes that the NYSE should support a review by the SEC of these rules.

Footnote continued from previous page:

the Roundtable Discussion on Proxy Voting Mechanics, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (May 24, 2007). John W. White, then the Director of the Commission’s Division of Corporation Finance, remarked that a number of issues have been "swept up in the policy debate" regarding proxy access and need to be addressed soon, including the NOBO/OBO rules and "company communications with shareholders." See John W. White, Don’t Throw Out the Baby with the Bathwater, Keynote Address at the ABA Section of Business Law Fall Meeting (Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch112108ww.htm.

See, e.g., Proxy Working Group Report, at 4-5 (recommending that the NYSE support efforts to improve the ability of issuers to communicate with beneficial owners); Letter from Larry W. Sonsini, Chairman, Proxy Working Group, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC File No. SR-NYSE-2006-92, at 3 (Mar. 25, 2009) (reiterating the recommendation of the Proxy Working Group and its sub-committee focused on shareholder communications that the Commission "review its existing shareholder communications rules to make it easier for issuers to communicate with beneficial owners").


Proxy Working Group Report, at 4-5.
The Proxy Working Group’s concerns were echoed at the Commission’s July 1, 2009 open meeting approving amendments to NYSE Rule 452. In opposing these amendments, Commissioner Casey noted,

I believe that we are doing investors a tremendous disservice by approving this amendment without closely analyzing the effects this action is likely to have and determining what other changes to the proxy voting process should be adopted concurrently with this rule change. . . . I am disappointed that we were not able to take a more holistic approach before moving forward with approving the amendments to Rule 452 today. Therefore, I am unable to support it.364

Commissioner Paredes also opposed the amendments and included the following in his remarks:

The Commission should evaluate the elimination of the broker vote as part of a broader reconsideration of the proxy process. Broker discretionary voting in director elections is just one piece of a proxy system made up of numerous interconnected parts that must work together. Changing one component but not others may have unintended and counterproductive consequences.365

While Chairman Schapiro and Commissioner Walter voted in favor of the NYSE Rule 452 amendments, they nonetheless noted the need to review the proxy system as a whole.366

We support the efforts by the Commission and the NYSE to evaluate the current communications system. We also appreciate that the need to address the problems identified in our 2004 rulemaking petition finally has been recognized by the Commission. Nonetheless, we are concerned that the Commission has again proposed significant changes to an individual, critical element of the proxy process without addressing the shareholder communications system. As a result, we reiterate our position that it is incumbent upon the Commission to address the deficiencies in its rules relating to shareholder communications prior to, or concurrently with, any adoption of the Proposed Election Contest Rules or similar rules.

M. The Commission Should Revise The Proposed Amendments To Rule 14a-4 [G.4.]

We strongly oppose the Commission’s proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4, which would require that when one or more shareholder nominees are included in a company’s proxy materials, the company’s proxy card may not include a mechanism for shareholders to vote “for

364 Commissioner Casey, Statement at Open Meeting (July 1, 2009), supra note 82.
365 Commissioner Paredes, Statement at Open Meeting (July 1, 2009), supra note 88.
366 See Chairman Schapiro, Statement at Open Meeting (July 1, 2009), supra note 339; Commissioner Walter, Statement at Open Meeting (July 1, 2009), supra note 340.
the company nominees as a group, but would instead require that each nominee be voted on separately.”

The proposed amendments are contrary to current rules, which provide that a proxy card may contain a box for shareholders to check in order to vote for or withhold voting authority from the company’s director nominees as a group, and likely will lead to investor confusion. In this regard, the proposed amendments are inconsistent with investor expectations and voting protocols that have been in place since the Commission amended Rule 14a-4(b)(2) to allow voting for a company’s director nominees as a group almost 30 years ago. In addition, because the new form of proxy card will list more director nominees than open board seats, it may result in over-voting, under-voting and other voting errors.

By making shareholder voting more burdensome on shareholders, the proposed amendments may actually have the unintended effect of discouraging shareholder participation in director elections. As we have witnessed already with respect to the Commission’s “notice and access” rules, changes in proxy voting procedures can negatively impact the participation of retail investors in the electoral process. The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 will only exacerbate the difficulties for retail investors.

At a minimum, if the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 are adopted, the Commission should explicitly provide for a mechanism in the rule that would allow companies to clearly differentiate between the company’s nominees and shareholder nominees. Companies should be permitted to separately list groups of directors in a distinctive order and include additional clarifying or explanatory text on their proxy cards, rather than be required to intermix the names of company and shareholder nominees (for example, through an alphabetical listing of director nominees). This concept should be included in any final rule that is adopted.

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370 Currently, the Proposing Release states that “the company could identify any shareholder nominees as such and recommend how shareholders should vote for, against, or withhold votes on those nominees and management nominees on the form of proxy.” 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,049. However, there is no language included in the proposed rule itself that would permit such a distinction.
N. A Sufficient Transition Period Is Required [B.22.]

Although the Proposing Release does not discuss an anticipated effective date for any proxy access rules that the Commission determines to adopt, certain Commissioners have suggested that final proxy access rules should be in place in time for the 2010 proxy season. For the reasons discussed below, we strongly believe that at least a one-year transition period is necessary before the effective date of any rules creating a federal proxy access mandate.

The Proposed Election Contest Rules will bring about a sea change in the director election process, creating the potential for far more election contests. The Proposed Election Contest Rules set up an elaborate process for shareholders and companies, and indeed the Commission and its staff. We do not believe that any of the affected parties would have sufficient time to be ready for the new regime by the 2010 proxy season even if final rules were adopted this fall. Moreover, as we have noted elsewhere in this letter, we believe that extensive changes in the Proposed Election Contest Rules are necessary, and we anticipate that other commenters will have similar views. Thus, it could be much later this fall before the Commission is able to take action on the Proposed Election Contest Rules. Since the Commission has been studying the issue of proxy access for more than 70 years, we do not believe that it must act precipitously in order to have rules in place for the 2010 proxy season.

Companies will need substantial time to consider whether amendments to their governing documents will be necessary following any adoption of the Proposed Election Contest Rules. Moreover, some companies are in the early stages of considering whether to amend their governing documents in light of the amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law concerning proxy access and proxy reimbursement that became effective on August 1, 2009.\textsuperscript{371} Companies will need to determine how the Commission’s new rules interact with their existing governing documents and the new legislation, make recommendations to the board and have the board consider any revisions.

Moreover, as discussed above in Section III.H, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would place significant additional responsibilities on the Commission’s staff at a time when the Commission’s resources are being taxed. Devoting the necessary resources to administer the anticipated dispute resolution process will likely divert the Commission’s staff from other important projects. In addition, as the Commission is well aware, disputes relating to proxy materials are particularly time-sensitive as they relate to companies’ annual meetings that are scheduled months in advance. The staff does an admirable job in meeting company deadlines with respect to Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposals, but, as discussed earlier, disputes relating to shareholder nominations in company proxy materials are likely to be far more contentious and time-consuming.

\textsuperscript{371} See supra Sections I.A.2 and III.A.
A one-year transition period also is appropriate if the Commission conurs with our view that the Proposed Election Contest Rules should apply only following one or more triggering events. Any potential triggering events may relate to matters voted on at a company’s last shareholders’ meeting, and we believe that there should be at least one shareholders’ meeting after adoption but before implementation of any federal proxy access mandate.

IV. The Proposed Election Contest Rules Are Flawed In Other Significant Respects

A. The Proposed Election Contest Rules Will Reduce Efficiency, Stifle Competition And Deter Capital Formation [ECCF] 1

Section 3(f) of the Exchange Act requires the Commission to determine whether a rulemaking will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation (“ECCF”). Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act also prohibits any rulemaking that would impose a burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act.

To fulfill those responsibilities, the Commission must produce a reasoned evaluation of costs and ramifications of new regulation: “[A]n estimate” of costs, the District of Columbia Circuit has explained:

would be pertinent to [the Commission’s] assessment of the effect the condition would have upon efficiency and competition, if not upon capital formation. . . . Uncertainty may limit what the Commission can do, but it does not excuse the Commission from its statutory obligation to do what it can to apprise itself—and hence the public and Congress—of the economic consequences of a proposed regulation before it decides whether to adopt the measure. 373

The superficial discussion of ECCF in the Proposing Release 374 indicates that the Commission is dramatically underestimating the harmful “economic consequences” of the Proposed Election Contest Rules. As we explain below—and as we will describe in addressing cost-benefit analysis in Section IV.B below—the Proposed Election Contest Rules will sharply increase the number of proxy contests for director elections each year, raising costs along several dimensions and thereby deterring companies from tapping the public markets. The result will be the imposition of an undue burden on capital formation, one that will provide few significant offsetting benefits to the vast majority of investors.

372 See supra Section III.B.

373 Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Chamber of Commerce II”).

In particular, the Proposed Election Contest Rules will (i) disrupt board decision making, (ii) empower certain institutional shareholders with interests different from those of the shareholders at large to interfere with the company’s corporate governance, (iii) drive companies to avoid public offerings, (iv) impede companies seeking to recruit and retain qualified directors, and (v) increase litigation costs for companies and directors both in federal and state courts.

It bears emphasis that the Commission’s failure to address those aspects of ECCF in the Proposing Release meaningfully constrains the Commission’s manner of addressing them later in this rulemaking. Under the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), an agency cannot develop a rule using secret data, which means that “the most critical factual material that is used to support the agency’s position” must be “made public in the proceeding and exposed to refutation.”375 The “information that must be revealed for public evaluation” includes “the technical studies and data upon which the agency relies.”376 Consequently, the Commission is foreclosed from “extensive reliance upon extra-record materials in arriving at its cost estimates” concerning the Proposed Election Contest Rules, unless it provides “further opportunity for comment” on those materials and the Commission’s analysis of them.377 If, in other words, the Commission decides to adopt the Proposed Election Contest Rules, and it relies on new data to support its ECCF analysis, then the Commission should re-open the comment period so as to avoid possible violation of the requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).

1. Interference With Efficient And Informed Board Decision Making

The Proposed Election Contest Rules will predictably increase the number of contested director elections and thereby interfere with the board’s ability to oversee the company’s business operations effectively. In theory shareholders would only nominate and elect qualified directors (which shareholders may do under applicable state law, but then they must prepare and distribute their own proxy materials). But in practice there is a significant probability that many shareholder nominees will not be qualified. By shifting the cost of proxy material printing and distribution from nominators onto companies (and, thus, the

375 Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 900 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("Chamber of Commerce II").
376 Id. at 899 (internal quotation marks omitted).
377 Id. at 901. In Chamber of Commerce II, the D.C. Circuit went on to hold that 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) required the Commission to “reopen the record” for public comment where the Commission supported cost estimates with “an extra-record summary of extra-record survey data that, although characterized as ‘a widely used survey,’ was not the sort, apparently, relied upon by the Commission during the normal course of its official business.” Id. at 904-05, 909.
shareholders at large), the Proposed Election Contest Rules would reduce the incentives for nominators to put forward properly-vetted and fully-qualified candidates for director.

Because the presence of unqualified directors would reduce the effectiveness of board deliberations, directors and management will be required to invest substantial energy—that is, valuable time and money—to prevent the election of such unqualified directors. Consequently, such proxy contest elections would consume director resources, reducing the resources available to oversee corporate operations and carry out other legal obligations (including, of course, important fiduciary duties under state law and significant obligations under federal laws such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). It is not merely that “boards may devote less time to fulfilling their other responsibilities as a result” of more frequent proxy contests, as the Commission asserts; rather, such a result is a virtual certainty. As one company has previously explained to the Commission: “Election contests are not only expensive and time consuming but they are also extremely disruptive and divert the attention and energy of a company’s board and management away from the governance and management of the corporation.”

To be sure, the cost-benefit analysis contained in the Proposing Release acknowledges, in one paragraph, the existence of a related cost—the “disruptions or polarization in boardroom dynamics” that would occur upon election of an insurgent nominee, and that this “may delay or impair the board’s decision-making process.” The Commission is correct that such “impairment in the decision-making process could constitute an indirect economic cost to shareholder value.” But that is only one aspect of the harm the Proposed Election Contest Rules would cause to board decision making, and if the Commission does not broaden its view to more fully appreciate the significant additional energy boards will have to invest in fending off unqualified nominees, the Commission will not adequately understand the “economic consequences of [the] proposed regulation.”

The Commission appears already to have concluded that concerns about unqualified nominees are not warranted “to the extent that shareholders understand that experience and competence are important director qualifications.” The Commission has not pointed to

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378 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,078 (emphasis added).
381 Id.
382 Chamber of Commerce I, 412 F.3d at 144.
383 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,075 (emphasis added).
empirical or anecdotal evidence that shareholders tend to nominate qualified candidates. Nor is there evidence to support the Commission’s apparent belief that qualified candidates would find election contests attractive.\footnote{See id. at 29,078 (speculating that increased number of election contests would have equivocal effect in that it “might encourage or discourage qualified candidates from running”) (emphasis added).} Indeed, the more complex and technologically driven the nature of a company’s business operations, the more crucial it is for directors to have the specialized knowledge necessary to oversee those operations effectively, and the more likely it is that a shareholder—inhomously less familiar than is the board with the nuances of the company’s business—will nominate a less qualified candidate than the board itself will select.\footnote{Recent empirical research confirms that when outside directors, who almost by definition lack pre-existing familiarity with company operations, are added to their boards, companies whose operations are more difficult to master (that is, whose information costs are high) benefit less than do companies whose operations are easier to master (those whose information costs are low). See Ran Duchin et al., When Are Outside Directors Effective? 32 (USC Marshall School of Business Research Paper No. MKT 02.09, 2009) (finding evidence for the proposition that “outsiders are less effective when it is difficult for them to understand the firm’s business”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1026488.} Given the undeniable importance of high-technology firms to the national economy, the Commission must take particular care not to adopt proxy rules that would disproportionately disrupt corporate governance at such human-capital-intensive firms. The Proposed Election Contest Rules appear to be exactly such undesirable rules.

A distracted board cannot efficiently and effectively fulfill its function. Public companies with distracted boards would be at a disadvantage to private companies, thereby reducing public companies’ competitiveness. Companies choosing between capital structures would seek to minimize those disruptions by avoiding public markets—thereby dampening capital formation.

2. Exploitation Of Director Nominations By Self-Interested Shareholders

Because of the disruptive effects just described, a shareholder’s threat to the company to commence a contested election under the Proposed Election Contest Rules would become a powerful weapon to be deployed against the board. The rule therefore would strengthen the position of shareholders with parochial interests while weakening the position of the board—whose members, unlike those shareholders, are under a fiduciary obligation to act in the best interests of the company and all shareholders. The Proposing Release underestimates the economic consequences of such insurgents’ exploitation of the Proposed Election Contest Rules.
To be sure, the Commission has noted the risk that “the nomination procedure” can be “used by shareholders to promote an agenda that conflicts with other shareholders’ interests.” 386 But the risk runs deeper than the Proposing Release appears to recognize.

The Proposing Release appears to misunderstand the effects of strengthening shareholder voting rights today, when “shareholder democracy or primacy has often come to be little more than code for what amounts to a subsidy for public pension and union funds and for other ‘normal’ institutional investors unwilling or unable to pay their own way with director election campaigns of their own.” 387 The Proposed Election Contest Rules will help institutional investors, not the individual shareholders Congress intended the Commission to protect.

The institutional shareholders of special concern fall into two general categories: (i) union-affiliated and other large pension funds; and (ii) hedge funds. The risk that such institutional shareholders will exploit the nomination mechanism in the Proposed Election Contest Rules to achieve ends not in the interests of shareholders at large is significant. That risk could drive firms away from the public markets, raising serious ECCF concerns.

*Union-Affiliated Pension Funds.* As Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. of the Delaware Court of Chancery has noted, among institutional investors, “[t]hose . . . most inclined to be activist investors are associated with state governments and labor unions, and often appear to be driven by concerns other than a desire to increase the economic performance of the companies in which they invest.” 388

In particular, empirical research confirms that union-affiliated funds are the most aggressive users of the Commission’s existing mechanisms for requiring companies to circulate shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8. For example, union pension funds submitted 295 out of 699 shareholder proposals received by U.S. public companies in 2006, more than any other investor group. 389 Such union pension funds frequently vote in director elections to achieve labor relations objectives rather than to maximize shareholder value. 390

386 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,075.

[Footnote continued on next page]
Given that history, we believe that union-affiliated funds will use the Proposed Election Contest Rules as a bargaining chip, whether in collective bargaining negotiations or in other labor-relations contexts, rather than as a proper means of exercising shareholder “voting rights arising under state law.” As proposed, Rule 14a-11 would not merely strengthen the “tyranny of the 100 share shareholder with a deep ideological commitment to a particular issue,” but also expand the tools unions can use against companies that raise capital in the public markets.

Whether labor unions actually will succeed in raising wages or lowering the workload of their members by using the Proposed Election Contest Rules as leverage against company boards is, of course, irrelevant. Instead, to cause firms to steer clear of the public markets, all that is necessary is for boards to conclude, as they might reasonably do, that the rule would create the potential for labor unions to achieve such gains. Such public market avoidance would reduce rather than increase efficiency and capital formation. Yet the Proposing Release gives no indication that the Commission has included an assessment of the effects that the Proposed Election Contest Rules would have on the balance of power between companies and union-affiliated funds. The Commission must take this important aspect of the problem into account if it is to satisfy the statutory mandate of assessing the ECCF criteria.

**Hedge Funds.** The Proposed Election Contest Rules also stand to become a strategic tool for hedge funds to seek to pressure a company’s board to engage in certain transactions.

Hedge funds pose a particular problem because, as is now well known, in addition to holding voting common stock that would entitle them to use the subsidized nomination procedure in the Proposed Election Contest Rules, they also may hold other securities that in effect allow them to profit if the company fails instead of succeeds. Votes and economic interests today are frequently disconnected because of “modern financial innovation.” The emergence of equity swaps and other over-the-counter (OTC) equity derivatives, the growth of lightly regulated hedge funds, related growth in the share lending market, and other factors now permit decoupling of voting rights from economic interest to occur quickly, at low cost, on

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390 See Agrawal, supra note 389, at 2-6.

391 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,027.

392 John C. Coffee, Professor, Columbia Law School, May 7th Roundtable, at 44.

a large scale, and often hidden from view.\textsuperscript{394} Because of that decoupling, a hedge fund may seek to exercise its voting power in a manner unmoored from—and possibly adverse to—the economic interests of other shareholders. Such “voterholders with a negative economic interest” render obsolete the “usual assumption that shareholders have a common interest in increasing firm value.”\textsuperscript{395}

A recent case, \textit{CSX Corporation v. The Children’s Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP}, illustrates that allegations have arisen concerning manipulation of derivatives by insurgent hedge funds to influence corporate transactions while circumventing reporting requirements of the federal securities laws.\textsuperscript{396} The Commission is already familiar with that case, having participated as an amicus. In \textit{CSX}, the District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that two hedge funds used so-called “total return” equity swaps to increase their economic interests in a company whose board they had targeted in a proxy contest, but failed to meet the disclosure requirements of Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, as implemented in Rule 13d-3(a), which requires shareholders that beneficially own more than five percent of a company’s shares to disclose such holding.\textsuperscript{397} Among other things, the court found that one of the hedge funds “exerted pressure” on the target company, “a pressure that was enhanced by the lack of complete information” about the hedge fund’s swap position.\textsuperscript{398}

As the \textit{CSX} case teaches, hedge funds that hold various novel financial instruments have incentives to behave strategically in proxy contests in a manner that may put them at odds with other shareholders. In addition, hedge funds such as those at issue in \textit{CSX} often coordinate their efforts against boards of directors, thereby increasing their influence out of proportion to their share ownership. The availability of the Proposed Election Contest Rules raises the prospect that such a “wolf pack” will use the nomination mechanism (whether in one year or over a period of time to gradually transfer control) to further strategic ends—all at the expense of the shareholders at large.\textsuperscript{399}


\textsuperscript{397} 562 F. Supp. 2d at 516, 518.

\textsuperscript{398} Id. at 549.

\textsuperscript{399} The “wolf pack” problem is not solved by the existence of disclosure requirements for shareholder “groups” because courts have in some cases construed those requirements in

[Footnote continued on next page]
The Commission must not only take that possibility of abuse into account where, as here, it proposes to amend the proxy rules, but it also must recognize the impact that the risk of such abuse would have on ECCF.

3. Discouragement Of Public Offerings

By increasing the costs of obtaining capital, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would establish yet another barrier between entrepreneurs and the public markets. The easier it is for dissident shareholders to commence bitter proxy contests for board seats, the more concerned entrepreneurs will be about distracted boards and aggressive institutional shareholders, which would discourage entrepreneurs from seeking financing in the public markets. Instead of going public, entrepreneurs would tend to favor private and offshore markets as sources of capital.

But those alternatives have well-known disadvantages, and shunting businesses towards them will tend to increase inefficiency and dampen capital formation. Turning to offshore markets has obvious logistical burdens, not the least of which is the need to learn and comply with applicable foreign law. Even within U.S. borders, private placements under the Commission’s Rule 144A have distinct disadvantages compared to public financing. For example, it has long been understood that companies conducting a private placement bear the burden of an “illiquidity discount, which generally . . . attaches to restricted (unregistered) securities.” 400 That is, because restricted securities must be held for a specified period of time (six months under Rule 144 as currently in force) before they can be resold, companies issuing such securities must pay investors a premium to compensate for the lack of liquidity when compared to publicly traded (registered) securities. 401 Moreover, securities may be sold in Rule 144A private placements only to a narrow subset of investors. 402

Furthermore, it would make no sense to consider in isolation the effects of the Proposed Election Contest Rules on company choice between private and public financing.


401 See id.; see generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2009).

402 See, e.g., Report of the Advisory Committee on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Process, supra note 400, at 18 (noting that public offering is more advantageous than Rule 144A offering because latter is limited to a “prescribed class of qualified institutional buyers”).
Instead, the Commission must recognize that any such effects would compound the effects of pre-existing regulatory burdens that make public markets less desirable. Indeed, there already is empirical evidence that the burdens imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act are causing U.S. firms to avoid going public, particularly innovative ones in high-technology fields that need to take risks.\footnote{See Leonce Bargeron et al., \textit{Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Risk-Taking} 25 (Working Paper 2008) (finding empirical evidence that U.S. initial public offerings have declined compared to those in the United Kingdom after SOX became law, particularly among firms in industries with high levels of research-and-development investment), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104963.} The additional regulatory costs created by the Proposed Election Contest Rules would only make matters worse, boding ill for capital formation—all in the midst of an ongoing economic crisis whose effects continue to linger.

The Commission’s obligation to consider economic consequences also calls for inquiry into whether adoption of the Proposed Election Contest Rules would tend to deter foreign firms from entering the U.S. public markets. The nonpartisan Committee on Capital Markets Regulation already has documented a sharp preference by foreign companies for Rule 144A private placements over public offerings in the U.S.\footnote{See Committee on Capital Markets Regulation Completes Survey Regarding the Use by Foreign Issuers of the Private Rule 144A Equity Market [Feb. 13, 2009] ("Increased use by foreign issuers of the private Rule 144A equity market is evident in both the initial IPO decision and the overall amount of equity raised by foreign issuers in the Rule 144A market relative to U.S. public markets."), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/09-Feb-13_Summary_of_Rule_144A_survey.pdf.} A large fraction of the foreign companies that completed Rule 144A offerings in 2007 identified Sarbanes-Oxley Act burdens, the cost of compliance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, and the risk of securities fraud class actions as among the principal reasons for avoiding U.S. public equity markets.\footnote{Id.} The Proposed Election Contest Rules would add yet another reason to that list, because expensive and potentially embittering or divisive proxy contests could well come to be seen as a major disadvantage of tapping U.S. public markets.\footnote{Firms from Continental Europe, for example, may find the Proposed Election Contest Rules particularly extravagant and burdensome, because in some countries in Continental Europe, unlike under the Proposed Election Contest Rules (and, indeed, Rule 14a-8 as currently structured with respect to shareholder proposals), “the solicitation of proxies at the firm’s expense is prohibited, so the production and distribution costs of the solicitation request are borne by the activist.” Peter Cziraki et al., \textit{Shareholder Activism Through Proxy Proposals: The European Perspective} 13 [TILEC Discussion Paper].}
By making private and offshore markets more attractive than U.S. public markets, the Proposed Election Contest Rules will hinder rather than promote capital formation. Against that reality, the Proposing Release offers only the unsubstantiated assertion that the proposals may benefit capital formation because they “may help to increase investor confidence during this time of uncertainty in our markets.” But this abstract investor-confidence rationale cannot conceivably outweigh the concrete harms we have described here.

4. Hampering Of Director Recruitment And Retention

As explained, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would deter qualified individuals from serving as directors by increasing the frequency of contested elections and raising the risk that directors will suffer damage to their reputation in the course of such contests. That would lower the quality of directors overall, thereby reducing the efficiency of board oversight of corporate operations. It also would reduce the competitiveness of public companies when compared to private firms. Given a choice, talented director candidates will tend to prefer seats on the boards of private firms over public ones so as to avoid the potential bitterness of contested elections. Thus, the Commission’s superficial remark in its cost-benefit analysis that contested elections “could discourage qualified board members from running” apparently fails to grasp the consequences for ECCF of such interference with director recruiting and retention.

5. Increased Litigation Costs

The Proposing Release attempts to address the problem of litigation that could result from shareholder use of the nominating mechanism in the Proposed Election Contest Rules, but much more must be done to “make clear the company’s responsibilities when it includes [nominating information provided by a shareholder under the Proposed Election Contest Rules] in its proxy materials.” Unclear liability rules unquestionably harm ECCF, especially given the

[Footnote continued from previous page]

408 See supra Section I.B.3.
409 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,075.
410 Id. at 29,062, Question L.3.
long history in the United States of aggressive and abusive filings of class action suits against companies, alleging violations of the federal securities laws.411

The Proposing Release notes that under proposed Rule 14a-11(e), a company would not be liable for misrepresentations or omissions in the nominating shareholder’s information that is “then repeated by the company in its proxy statement, except where the company knows or has reason to know that the information is false or misleading.”412 The Proposing Release provides no guidance to companies that would enable them to determine whether their procedures for reviewing and verifying information contained in nominating statements would meet this requirement. Where, as here, the Commission creates a new liability rule, the Commission bears a special responsibility to spell out what regulated entities must do to avoid violating that rule. The vague and amorphous “knew or should have known” phrase is not enough to give the necessary guidance. As explained above in Section III.1, we recommend that the Commission amend the liability standard in the Proposed Election Contest Rules.

Moreover, even a company that takes a “gold plated” approach to vetting nominating shareholder statements would face a risk of significant legal costs in the event that other shareholders find a misstatement or omission in the nominating material and seek to hold the company liable for that misstatement. The point is not that such legal claims would ultimately be successful, but rather that the mere fact of being sued and possibly subject to costly discovery will deter companies from seeking out the public markets so as to avoid being subject to the Proposed Election Contest Rules, thus harming efficiency and capital formation.

Indeed, given that the courts have inferred a private right of action under Rule 14a-9 for material misstatements and omissions from proxy materials,413 the Commission’s creation of new rules for proxy solicitation such as the Proposed Election Contest Rules will foreseeably lead to claims by private plaintiffs that companies are liable to them for violations of the new rules. Although we believe such claims would be entirely invalid given the absence of any indication in the text of the Exchange Act that Congress conferred a right of action for violations of rules such as Rule 14a-8 or the Proposed Election Contest Rules, the uncertainty on that point could require years of costly litigation to resolve.

The many uncertainties in the liability scheme under federal law will thus add to the pre-existing fear of securities fraud class actions that keeps many companies from entering the


public markets. The Proposed Election Contest Rules would thus tend to make the public markets less popular, and thereby inhibit capital formation.

B. The Commission Has Underestimated The Costs And Burdens Of The Proposed Election Contest Rules, Which Do Not Outweigh Any Purported Benefits [PRA 1, CBA 1, CBA 3, CBA 6]

In addition to the requirements of Section 3(f) of the Exchange Act, described above in Section IV.A, the Paperwork Reduction Act and Regulatory Flexibility Act require that the Commission undertake a thorough and accurate analysis of the costs that the Proposed Election Contest Rules would impose on regulated entities and the economy as a whole. The APA, for its part, requires that this economic analysis be reasonable and substantiated, and that the conclusions that the Commission draws from the economic analysis have a reasoned, rational basis in the data the Commission gathers. Guidelines issued by the Commission further require that the data used in such regulatory analysis be “accurate, reliable and unbiased,” that it be carefully reviewed by subject matter experts and appropriate levels of management, and that there be “adequate disclosure about underlying data sources, quantitative methods of analysis and assumptions used, to facilitate reproducibility of the information, according to commonly accepted scientific, financial or statistical standards, by qualified third parties.”\(^{414}\) Here, however, the Commission’s estimates of the Proposed Election Contest Rules’ costs and burdens are inadequate and far too low. Moreover, the costs that will be imposed by the Proposed Election Contest Rules far outweigh any purported benefits espoused by the Commission.

First, we note that the Commission has underestimated the hours and cost burden valuations in its Paperwork Reduction Act analysis. In particular, we note the Commission has estimated that, if a company determines that it will include a shareholder nominee, a company would be subject to the following time burdens: (i) five hours per notice for the company’s preparation of a written notice to the nominating shareholder or group; (ii) five hours per nominee for the company’s inclusion in its proxy materials of the name of, and other disclosures concerning, a person or persons nominated by a shareholder or shareholder group; and (iii) 20 hours per nominee for the company’s own statement regarding the shareholder nominee or nominees.\(^{415}\) However, in our July 2009 Survey, our member companies reported that for each shareholder nominee the above-listed preparations would require a total of an average of 99 hours of company personnel and director time—a far greater time burden than the 30-hour estimate provided by the Commission. Further, the Commission, using an estimate


\(^{415}\) 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,064.
of $400 per hour of services for outside professionals, maintains that the total cost for outside professional services in connection with the above-listed preparations would be $12,000. In contrast, our July 2009 Survey reported that the average total cost for such outside services for the above-listed items would be $1,159,073 per company for each shareholder nominee. We note, moreover, that the Commission’s use of a $400 per hour estimate for professional services is wholly inadequate. Additionally, according to our July 2009 Survey, if a company opposes a proxy access nominee, it will incur an average of 302 hours of company personnel and director time.

In addition, the Commission’s cost-benefit analysis discussion is inadequate. The Commission anticipates that the Proposed Election Contest Rules will result in three costs: (i) potential adverse effects on company and board performance; (ii) potential complexity of the proxy process; and (iii) preparing the required disclosures, printing and mailing, and the costs of additional solicitations. However, as our extensive comments above indicate, the Proposed Election Contest Rules will impose numerous other costs. First, we note that the Commission has completely failed to consider that the Proposed Election Contest Rules will promote short-termism at the expense of long-term value creation. In addition, the Commission has not addressed the many voting integrity issues that plague the current proxy voting system, which the Proposed Election Contest Rules will only exacerbate. Finally, as Section IV.A above explains, the Proposed Election Contest Rules will reduce efficiency, stifle competition and deter capital formation in a number of ways. Given the Commission’s failure to consider these additional costs, the Commission’s rulemaking is severely flawed.

We further believe that any ostensible “benefits” do not outweigh the myriad costs associated with the Proposed Election Contest Rules. First, the Commission asserts that the Proposed Election Contest Rules will result in a reduction in costs related to shareholder nominations, when compared to the cost of a traditional proxy contest. However, as we note above in Section I.A.4, and as the Commission itself acknowledges, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would not alleviate a majority of the costs associated with a proxy contest. The Proposed Election Contest Rules will not reduce the costs of legal counsel, proxy solicitors,

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416 **Id.** at 29,062 n.299.
417 **Id.** at 29,074.
418 See supra Section I.B.1.
419 See supra Sections I.B.5 and III.L.
420 See, e.g., **Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.**, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (stating that an agency rule is arbitrary and capricious where an agency has “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem”).
421 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,073.
public relations advisors and advertising. According to the Commission’s own statistics, the average cost of a proxy contest to a soliciting shareholder is $368,000, and the Proposed Election Contest Rules would result in a mere $18,000 in estimated savings—less than 5% of the total cost of a traditional proxy contest. Further, the Commission maintains that the Proposed Election Contest Rules will result in improved board and company performance. As we have argued above, however, the Proposed Election Contest Rules will likely have the opposite effect, as they will: (i) promote short-termism at the expense of long-term value creation; (ii) encourage the election of “special interest” directors; (iii) increase the influence of proxy advisory firms; and (iv) deter qualified directors from serving on corporate boards. Finally, the Commission contends that the proposed Rule 14a-8(i)(8) amendments “may facilitate shareholders and companies working together to tailor companies’ governing documents to suit the specific interests of the company and its shareholders.” We strongly disagree. The proposed Rule 14a-8(i)(8) amendments would permit shareholders only to impose more lenient but not more restrictive proxy access requirements on nominating shareholders, even if a majority of a company’s shareholders desired more restrictive access requirements. As such, the Commission’s assertion that the proposed Rule 14a-8(i)(8) amendments will allow a company and its shareholders to “tailor” a company’s governing documents is disingenuous.

C. The Commission Has Given The Public Insufficient Time To Comment On The Proposed Election Contest Rules, With The Consequence That The Commission Has Insufficient Information To Engage In Informed Rulemaking

The Commission has allowed interested parties only 60 days to review the Proposed Election Contest Rules and supporting data, to gather and review additional information pertaining to the Proposed Election Contest Rules, and to submit that information—which the Commission itself has asked for in innumerable parts of the Proposing Release—together with comments intended to inform and enhance the agency’s exercise of its decision making responsibilities. Business Roundtable and several other groups expressed these concerns to the Commission in a letter dated June 30, 2009, which requested that the comment period be extended by at least 30 days. That request was denied.

The short 60-day comment period was inadequate for interested parties to comprehensively review, comment on, and provide all information requested in, the Proposing Release. As Commissioner Walter noted, the Proposing Release contains a “myriad of

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422 Id.
423 See supra Sections I.B.1, 3-4.
425 See supra Section II.B.
426 The points made in the June 30, 2009 letter are incorporated herein by reference.
questions” for commenters to consider. Chairman Shapiro “urge[d] all commenters to respond to the questions thoroughly” and noted the Commission would take all comments very seriously. Yet, the abbreviated 60-day period did not provide sufficient opportunity for the many companies, organizations and other stakeholders that would be impacted by the Proposed Election Contest Rules to adequately assess and provide thoughtful commentary on the many significant, complex issues raised in the Proposing Release, including the more than 500 questions and requests for data and information.

As the Proposing Release indicates, the Commission previously has considered amendments to the proxy rules and regulations addressing proxy access in 1942, 1977, 1980, 1992, 2003 and 2007. Each of these considerations, including the Proposed Election Contest Rules, have raised questions regarding the Commission’s authority, the relative roles of the states and federal government in establishing shareholder rights and delineating the responsibilities of shareholders and boards of directors, and the impact of the proposals on corporate governance. This illustrates not only the significance of the issues raised by the Proposed Election Contest Rules, but also the substantial record the public had to review and consider before submitting comments on the Proposed Election Contest Rules. In fact, the Proposing Release extensively cites the 2003 rulemaking record.

Consideration of issues raised by the Proposed Election Contest Rules, as well as their mechanics, is difficult. The complexity of the Proposed Election Contest Rules and requests for comment are demonstrated by the fact that the Commission approved the Proposed Election Contest Rules at an open meeting on May 20, 2009, but the Proposed Election Contest Rules were not issued and then published in the Federal Register until June 18, 2009—almost one month after the Commission’s open meeting.

The 60-day comment period also was insufficient given that the Commission’s requests for comments, data and information in the Proposing Release necessitated considerable effort by commenters. For example, the Commission requested comments on proposed eligibility thresholds and possible triggering events, the mechanics of proposed Rule 14a-11 and how often shareholders satisfying the Rule 14a-11 thresholds would invoke the rule, as well as quantitative data on the benefits and costs of enhanced shareholder access to company proxy materials and the costs to companies if Rule 14a-8(i)(8) were amended as proposed.

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Further, the Proposing Release does not include important data or provide a detailed analysis of many issues implicated by the Proposed Election Contest Rules. Instead, the Commission has shifted the burden of data collection and analysis to the public in many respects. For example, in order to determine some of the costs of adopting the Proposed Election Contest Rules, the Commission explicitly relied on survey data collected by the American Society of Corporate Secretaries and submitted in a comment letter on the Commission’s 2003 Proposal.\textsuperscript{429} In order to update this data, commenters needed to once again engage in detailed survey research. Similarly, the Proposing Release contains extensive references to the analysis and commentary submitted in response to the 2003 Proposal but does not address how this analysis and commentary has been affected by the sea change in corporate governance that has occurred in the last six years.

Given the complexity of the Proposed Election Contest Rules and the hundreds of questions asked by the Commission in the Proposing Release, the 60-day comment period is inadequate under the APA\textsuperscript{430} and does not provide an opportunity for thorough, well-informed rulemaking in this important area. The 60-day comment period has not afforded interested parties enough time to consider and respond meaningfully to all of the questions posed by the Commission.\textsuperscript{431}

The APA requires the Commission to provide notice of a proposed rulemaking “adequate to afford interested parties a reasonable opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process.”\textsuperscript{432} The notice of a proposed rulemaking is not sufficient where it does not “afford[] interested parties a reasonable opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process.”\textsuperscript{433} Moreover, the length of a comment period must enable “interested parties to comment meaningfully.”\textsuperscript{434} This requirement is designed “both (1) to reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected parties after governmental authority has been delegated

\textsuperscript{429} See 74 Fed. Reg. at 29,065 n.311.
\textsuperscript{430} See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2009).
\textsuperscript{431} See, e.g., Estate of Smith v. Bowen, 656 F. Supp. 1093, 1097-99 (D. Colo. 1987) (finding a 60-day comment period to be inadequate where interested parties did not have enough time to consider and comment on the details of a proposed rule).
\textsuperscript{432} MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.3d 1136, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 765, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
\textsuperscript{433} Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{434} Florida Power, 846 F.2d at 771; see also Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 51735, 51740 (Oct. 4, 1993) (requiring agencies to “afford the public a meaningful opportunity to comment on any proposed regulation”).
to unrepresentative agencies'; and [2] to assure that the 'agency will have before it the facts and information relevant to a particular administrative problem.' These principles are compromised where, as here, a comment period is too short to permit interested parties to provide meaningful comment and to supply the extensive information the agency itself has requested. The Commission, as a consequence, has fallen short of its obligation to engage in thorough, well-informed rulemaking, thereby transgressing the APA, Executive Order 12,866, and principles of sound public administration.

V. Conclusion

Adoption of the Proposed Election Contest Rules is unnecessary, would have serious adverse consequences, and is beyond the Commission's authority. The Proposed Election Contest Rules also have the potential to exacerbate one of the causes of the very economic crisis that the Commission says it seeks to address in the Proposed Election Contest Rules: the emphasis on short-term gains at the expense of long-term, sustainable growth. Moreover, the Proposed Election Contest Rules do not achieve the Commission's stated objective of removing impediments to shareholders exercising their state law rights, as the proposed "one size fits all" federal proxy access mandate would deprive shareholders and boards of directors of the choices that state law provides. Thus, Business Roundtable, which strongly supported enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the other recent corporate governance reforms, respectfully submits that the Commission should not proceed with adopting the Proposed Election Contest Rules. We believe that a far better alternative would be for the Commission to defer any action on the Proposed Election Contest Rules and instead adopt a revised amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to permit shareholders to include proxy access shareholder proposals in company proxy statements. In addition, the Commission should adopt proposed Rule 14a-19 to provide shareholders with essential disclosures if a shareholder nomination is included in a company's proxy materials pursuant to state law or the company's governing documents.

435 MCI, 57 F.3d at 1141 (quoting National Ass'n of Home Health Agencies v. Schweiker, 690 F.2d 932, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).

436 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 434.
August 17, 2009

**Report on Effects of Proposed SEC Rule 14a-11 on Efficiency, Competitiveness and Capital Formation**

In Support of Comments by Business Roundtable

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*The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of NERA Economic Consulting or any other NERA consultant.*
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I. Introduction

In this Report, we address the substantial costs in terms of efficiency, competitiveness and capital formation that would result if the SEC’s Proposed Election Contest Rules ("Proposal") were adopted. The SEC’s Proposal would, at best, amount to modest savings for shareholders at a handful of companies, while imposing substantial costs on all public companies. If implemented, the Proposal would impose substantial efficiency costs on public companies, impair their competitiveness, and further undermine the attractiveness of U.S. equity markets.

Although Section 3(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that the SEC consider the effect of certain proposed rules on efficiency, competition and capital formation and Section 23(a) of the statute prohibits any rulemaking that would unnecessarily or inappropriately burden competition, we find that the SEC has not considered or adequately recognized a number of costs associated with its proposal. Key risks of the Proposal include the following:

- Ensuing shareholder nominations will lead to less qualified boards of directors that do not achieve the experience and skill mix required to meet the challenges facing companies today.
- Board members will be selected whose interests diverge from the goal of maximization of shareholder value.
- The Proposal would impose an additional disincentive for U.S. companies to go public, further undermining the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets.
- Deterring companies from public listing in the U.S. also increases the cost of capital for U.S. companies, thereby impeding capital formation and undermining those companies’ competitiveness.

The Proposed Election Contest Rules would not only fail to achieve the predicted benefits, but would also impose a costly solution where there is little, if any, extant problem, at the risk of undermining shareholder wealth maximization. This report will discuss the available empirical and social science evidence on this topic. Our analysis of this evidence leads us to conclude that the proposed rules risk undermining, rather than improving, board quality and composition and are likely to undermine the ability of boards of directors to serve the interests of shareholders. Available measures and easily attainable alternatives effectively and affordably address the goal of disciplining weak management and revitalizing ineffective boards of directors. In sum, the Proposed Election Contest Rules fail to meet the standard that a new regulation should be introduced only if its benefits exceed its costs, and at minimum cost.

\[1\] 15 U.S.C. Section 78c(f); 15 U.S.C. Section 78w(a)(2).

\[2\] This standard has been advocated in the recent reports of the Committee on Capital Markets, “The Global Financial Crisis: A Plan for Regulatory Reform” (p. ES-4) and Congressional Oversight Panel, “Special Report on Regulatory Reform,” January 2009 (p. 3).
II. Available measures effectively and affordably discipline weak management and boards

Shareholders already possess means to address problems with management and boards of directors. In its obligation to determine whether the Proposal would unnecessarily burden competition, the Commission must make a convincing case that these measures are not adequate. In fact, however, shareholders’ tools for addressing dissatisfaction with management and boards have proved powerful, and empirical evidence demonstrates that they are effective in disciplining managers.

A. The market provides multiple means of management discipline

There is a broad consensus that a robust market is the most effective mechanism for monitoring and disciplining corporate management and for providing incentives to officers and directors of public companies to maximize firm value. Market participants reward or censure management by buying or selling shares, thereby increasing or reducing the share price and value of a company.

Investors can and do express dissatisfaction with boards by selling shares or taking short positions. The inherent nature of hedge funds is to take strategic positions. Other institutional investors keep, overall, the majority of their funds in actively managed strategies. Such investors are likely to reduce their holdings in poorly performing companies through the actively managed portfolios that comprise the lion’s share of stock holdings. Such decisions will be made for them by their active asset managers, who are generally evaluated on performance.

Empirical research bears out the theoretical insight that managers are replaced when a company’s stock performance is poor. Numerous finance studies find that CEOs and other top managers of companies whose stock performance is weak measured relative to market returns are far more likely to be replaced than managers of companies with solid share performance. Warner et al. (1988) find 50% higher turnover of top managers in the lowest decile of firms (ranked by stock returns), versus 8.6% in the highest decile of firms based on a random sample.

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4 In 2006, defined benefit, defined contribution and non-profits invested approximately two-thirds of their assets in actively managed strategies (68.8, 64.3 and 71.3%, respectively), while public pension plans kept 47.3% in actively managed strategies. Kenneth R. French, “Presidential Address: The Cost of Active Investing,” Journal of Finance (2008), vol. LXIII, no. 4, pp. 1537-1573.
of 269 firms listed on New York and American Stock Exchange from 1963 through 1978. 6 Similarly, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) find top managers are 2.5 times more likely to turn over at firms in the lowest decile (ranked by stock returns) than in the highest decline, using a sample of 249 firms from 1978 through 1980. 7

Takeovers also serve to change management. 8 Research by Davis and Stout (1992) finds that the probability that underperforming managers will be replaced is very high:

Between 1980 and 1990, 144 members of the 1980 Fortune 500 (29 percent) were subject to at least one takeover or buyout attempt. While most of these attempts (77) were hostile—publicly resisted by management—the vast majority ultimately led to a change in control, including 59 of the hostile bids and 125 bids overall. 9

In 10 years, mergers and takeovers resulted in management turnovers in roughly one-third of the largest industrial corporations in the U.S. 10

B. Managers associated with wrongdoing are ousted

Advocates of more contested elections seem to overlook that the market is already disciplining managers. For example, Bebchuk (2007) has suggested that more contested elections would be desirable to rid companies of managers that have made accounting mistakes. 11 In fact, however, Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008) find that 93% of all individuals associated with SEC and

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10 Id.
Department of Justice enforcement actions relating to financial misrepresentation from 1978-2006 lost their jobs by the end of the enforcement period, 62% were fired.17

Boards also have the ability to discipline management, and board independence has steadily increased in recent years. Among companies in the S&P 1500, the overall proportion of independent directors increased from 69% in 2003 to 78% in 2008. In 2008, 85% of S&P 1500 companies had boards that were at least two thirds independent.18 Section I.A.3. of Business Roundtable’s Comment details numerous other improvements in corporate governance in recent years.

C. Contested director elections are often effective, but their low frequency suggests that they are rarely needed

The low frequency of proxy contests and activist campaigns, along with the frequent success of company/board slates against dissidents, suggest that shareholder dissatisfaction with outside directors is rare and that finding superior substitutes for incumbents is more difficult than generally is assumed. In 2008, there were a record 50 contested elections of outside directors.14 However, this constitutes only 0.08% of all U.S. public companies.15 Moreover, company/board director candidates won in 49.6% of contested elections during 2003-08, indicating that shareholders’ actual dissatisfaction with management candidates—and preference for the available alternatives—is appreciably lower than the rate of proxy contests.16

Nonetheless, contesting director elections has proved to be an actively used and viable approach for shareholders to gain representation. Shareholders have contested an increasing number of director elections and gained either seats or concessions in an increasing percentage of those elections. As shown in Figure 1, the number of proxy contests over director seats has risen dramatically since 2005. Over 2003-08, of contests carried to completion or settlement, shareholders have won seats in 29.0% of contests and obtained settlements, presumably with concessions, in an additional 21.4% of contests.17 In addition, many proxy contests—and many potential contests—are resolved without a vote through negotiations between dissatisfied shareholders and incumbent management.

15 FactSet Research Systems, Inc. reports a total of 5,707 U.S. companies traded on major U.S. exchanges in March 2009.
16 Calculation using data from Georgeson Shareholder, “2008 Annual Corporate Governance Review,” p. 46. Includes only contests that carried to election or settlement; excludes contests categorized as Pending, None, Withdraw, No Result or Postponed.
17 Calculation using data from Georgeson Shareholder, “2008 Annual Corporate Governance Review,” p. 46. Includes only contests that carried to election or settlement; excludes contests categorized as Pending, None, Withdraw, No Result or Postponed.
D. Contesting elections is not expensive and dissidents’ costs can be mitigated without changing the election rules

Although the primary goal of the Proposed Election Contest Rules seems to be to reduce the shareholder cost of putting forth outside director candidates, currently, proxy contests are relatively inexpensive to shareholders. Automatic Data Processing reported that, based on proxy statements filed by outsiders engaged in proxy solicitations during 2003–2005, the average cost of a contest was $368,000; based on their data, the median cost was $150,000 and 25% of contests cost $70,000 or less.\(^{(18)}\)

1. The SEC proposal would reduce the cost of contesting elections by only 5%

Furthermore, the Commission itself estimates that savings due to being able to put a nominee on the company’s ballot would only be the average $18,000 cost due to printing and postage, or 5% of the average cost.\(^{(19)}\) This amount is truly trivial in relation to the value of the minimum stakes required to nominate a director candidate. On average, among firms with market capitalization of


greater than $700 million, it is equivalent to 0.13% of the value of a 1% holding. Put another way, the holder of a 1% stake in this category of firms, on average, gains or loses $18,000 as a result of a $0.02 change in the stock’s price; it gains or loses $368,000 as a result of a $0.41 change in share price.20

Although the SEC states that nominating shareholders may achieve additional savings by spending less, or nothing at all, on public relations, advertising or proxy solicitors, current rules do not force shareholders to incur these expenditures. The low cost of many contests indicates that many activist shareholders already expend little beyond printing and postage costs.21

2. Investors can further mitigate costs of proxy contests by collaborating

Proxy contest costs can be mitigated if shared by multiple institutional investors who jointly back the proxy contest, as has occurred in a number of past instances. According to the IRRC Institute, between 2005 and 2008, there were 23 proxy contests that resulted in hybrid boards in which multiple hedge funds were identified as dissidents in SEC filings.22 This represents 17% of the 133 proxy contests in the same period.23 Prominent examples of collaboration include the following:

A. A group including Carl Icahn and FANA Partners LLC threatened to launch a proxy fight to name directors to the board of Kerr-McGee Corp. The contest never took place, and the dissident group agreed to cease proxy solicitation activities after Kerr-McGee initiated a $4 billion stock buyback.24

B. Hedge funds the Children’s Investment Fund (TCI) and 3G Capital Partners engaged CSX Corporation in a proxy contest in 2008, and successfully elected four dissident directors to the board, including Christopher Hohn, the managing partner of TCI.25

C. Three hedge funds and a mutual fund, organized by ZelnickMedia Corporation, effected a change in control of the board of directors of Take Two Interactive Software, Inc. at an annual meeting.26

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20 Based on an analysis of all U.S. domiciled companies with market capitalization greater than $700 million traded publicly on major U.S. exchanges. Data are from FactSet Research Systems, Inc.
23 Georgecon Shareholder, “2008 Annual Corporate Governance Review,” p. 46. The 133 proxy contests reported between 2005 and 2008 do not include contests that were not directly related to the election of directors.
3. Costs could also be reduced by increased reliance on electronic distribution of proxy materials

An alternative to the current proposal would be to reduce further the printing and postage costs of proxy contests through increased reliance on the Internet to distribute proxy materials. Under an SEC Rule effective January 1, 2008, issuers—as well as shareholders seeking to solicit proxies from other shareholders—may select the so-called “notice only” option for the delivery of proxy materials, in which proxy materials are posted on the internet, accompanied by a notice of the posting mailed to shareholders. Issuers must respond to shareholders’ requests for paper copies of all materials, including permanent requests.

The Internet has already been used extensively and successfully by issuers as a complement to mail notices and vote solicitations: proxy materials that may be posted online include notices of shareholder meetings, proxy statements, consent solicitations, proxy cards, information statements, annual reports to security holders, additional soliciting materials and amendments to any of the foregoing. If any proxy materials are to be furnished online, then all soliciting materials must be furnished on the same website no later than the day such materials are first sent to shareholders or made available to the public.27 The SEC estimated that issuers and others spent $962.4 million in printing and mailing fees to distribute proxy materials during the 2006 proxy season.28 The SEC’s Notice and Access model has been used in 1,965 distributions between July 2007 and May 2009 resulting in estimated savings of $377 million on printing and postage. Savings in the eleven month period from July 1, 2008 to May 31, 2009 alone were $234 million, equivalent to annual savings of $255 million.29

As to access, Internet penetration rates are currently high. As of April 2009, the Pew Internet and American Life Project reported that 79% of American adults use the internet and at least 94% of adults with household income greater than $50,000 use the Internet.30 In addition, 63% of American adults have broadband access at home, and at least 80% of adults with household income greater than $50,000 have broadband access at home.31

III. Efficiency Costs

A. The Proposal would inefficiently allocate benefits and costs of proxy contests

The Proposal assumes that Rule 14a-11 will significantly reduce the costs of election contests, and that this will benefit shareholders. Both premises are mistaken. To be sure, the Proposal will facilitate a certain type of contest in which activist shareholders place nominees on the

27 SEC Release No. 34-56135, p. 11
28 Id., p. 38.
company proxy with no serious intent of campaigning for their election, but nonetheless impose significant costs on fellow shareholders. However, institutional investors that do have a serious intent to propose and elect alternate candidates will not realize significant cost savings from the Proposal. The Proposal will therefore impose unnecessary costs on fellow shareholders and will be less efficient than available alternatives.

1. Reducing costs to minimal levels will lead to excessive nominations

Under the Proposal, companies would be required to incur the cost of placing shareholder nominees in proxy materials. The proposed rule offers a benefit to the particular subgroup of shareholders who succeed in placing their chosen candidate on a company’s board—a closely aligned board member and (presumably) improved information access—yet they will bear only a fraction of the costs. Effectively, companies will subsidize shareholders’ costs of nominating directors. It is a well-known result in economic theory that when the marginal social cost of an activity exceeds its marginal private cost, as is the case with any subsidy, more of that activity will take place. In the case of the proposed SEC rule, the marginal social cost of a shareholder nominating a director is higher than the marginal private cost because the costs of the contested election are borne in part by the issuer, rather than the nominating shareholder. This subsidy will inevitably increase the number of director nominations by shareholders.

As explained below, even if the company bears the costs of printing and postage under the Proposal, a pragmatic shareholder determined to get its candidate elected is likely to expend resources to improve its candidate’s odds of being elected. (Those resources are far from prohibitive.) However, under the SEC’s proposal, eligible shareholders would be able to nominate a candidate for a corporate board without campaigning for his election. The only cost would be that of identifying a candidate, and if the candidate is affiliated with the nominating shareholder, such as a partner of a hedge fund, these costs would be truly trivial. Any additional expenditures on advertising, public relations, legal fees or proxy solicitations would be optional. Although the likelihood of successful election will not be high in the absence of a concerted campaign, management and the incumbent board cannot assume the success of their chosen candidate and therefore will be compelled by their fiduciary responsibilities to expend great resources ensuring the candidate’s defeat. (Ironically, precisely because such board candidates may be of the lowest quality, due to the proponent’s low search efforts to identify a nominee, management and the incumbent board may feel compelled to devote extra efforts to assure the candidate’s defeat.) Such low-cost candidacies—which involve low costs for the proponent but high costs for fellow shareholders—are particularly likely to be used by shareholders who wish to use the costs and risks to the company as leverage to obtain concessions on unrelated matters.

2. Requiring negotiation first is another superior alternative

The Proposed Election Contest Rules implicitly assume that a company and the shareholders seeking to nominate a director cannot reach a negotiated settlement. This is false: 76% of 2005

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- 2008 proxy contests that produced hybrid boards did so through engagement. Another less costly alternative would be to require activist investors who want to place people on corporate boards to recommend candidates to the company's nominating committee. Many companies already have a process in place for shareholders to do this. This would mean that only if a candidate is rejected inappropriately would there be the necessity and expense of having an election.

B. Shareholder nominees will impair quality of boards

The Commission’s Proposal rests on the premise that facilitating the election of dissident directors is largely an unadulterated good. For multiple reasons, that premise is mistaken.

1. Companies with dissident board members substantially underperform compared to their peers.

Several empirical studies establish that when dissident directors win board seats, those firms underperform peers by 19 to 40% over the two years following the proxy contest. These findings are highly relevant to any cost-benefit analysis of the SEC Proposal because this data strongly suggests that directors who win seats pursuant to the new rule will in fact weaken, rather than strengthen, share prices in U.S. public companies. Thus, implementation of the rule likely will hurt U.S. shareholders and undermine the ability of U.S. companies to raise capital. 12

Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1993) find a negative and statistically significant cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of -18.3%, relative to all companies of similar size trading on the NYSE and AMEX, in the 24 months following proxy contests at 97 firms from 1968 to 1987. This negative return, relative to a company’s peers, is driven by cases where dissidents gain control of board seats: when dissidents gain at least one board seat, the 24-month CAR is -32.6%, and when dissidents gain the majority of a board’s seats, this figure is -40.8%. Negative and statistically significant CARs are also found for 12- and 36-month periods for companies when at least one dissident joins the board. 13 In cases where dissidents do not gain any board seats, the CAR is small (-1.7%) and statistically insignificant. 14

Borstad and Zvirblis (1992) study proxy contests from July 1962 to January 1978; when dissidents win, they find a negative and statistically significant CAR of -22.8% for the 24 months following the resolution of the contest. 15 Looking at 185 threatened proxy contests at NYSE- and AMEX-listed firms between 1977 and 1988, Fleming (1995) similarly finds negative and statistically significant returns of -19.4% in the 24 months

13 Where dissidents gain one or more board seat, the returns are -17.2% in the 12 months post-announcement and -36.2% for the 36 months post-announcement, both statistically significant at the 5% level. Where dissidents gain control, the 12 and 36 month returns are -22.0% and -40.9%, respectively.
15 CARs for proxy contests when dissidents win and there is no subsequent takeover. Returns are also negative over 12 and 36 month periods, but are statistically insignificant. Lisa Borstad and Thomas Zvirblis, “The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy Contests: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance,” Financial Management, Autumn 1992, p. 28.
following the announcement of a contested election for the 27 firms where dissidents win board seats.37,38

The Commission will have to come to terms with this substantial literature when determining the Proposal’s effects on efficiency, competition and capital formation.

2. Board skill composition will be adversely affected

One of the most significant risks presented by the Proposal is that shareholder nominees will impede companies from achieving the skill and experience balances they need for their boards to function effectively. Unlike activist shareholders, whose interest is gaining board seats for like-minded people, in this age of specialization, boards of directors are required to determine the unique attributes and strengths of a company’s existing management team and incumbent board members. Boards take these characteristics into consideration when nominating board candidates in order to insure a balanced and effective board that can respond to all of the challenges that the company might face after the election. Examples of critical expertise needs would be the minimum three independent board members with financial literacy required to staff the audit committees of NYSE-listed companies,39 risk management expertise to serve on the risk management committee of a financial firm, marketing expertise, experience in international trade, or mergers and acquisitions or technology to serve on the boards of technology and non-technology companies. Whereas companies consider the entire board composition in selecting board nominees, shareholders often will lack the knowledge or the capacity to do this. Moreover, unlike boards of directors, activist shareholders, who owe no duties to anybody but themselves, may select nominees with vastly different objectives and agendas than other shareholders. In particular, activists will recruit nominees likely to support the nominating activist shareholder’s particular, issue-specific agenda. This is likely to lead to numerous acute problems as a practical matter. For example, if a company’s financially-literate nominee lost to a shareholder nominee, the company might be unable to staff its audit committee. If a nominee with a particular skill set were replaced by an activist’s nominee, the company might not be as successful in achieving its objectives as it might otherwise have been.

Ultimately it will fall to voting shareholders to select the candidates with the experience needed to fill out the board. Yet, academic studies have recognized that shareholders have little incentive to carefully weigh their proxy contest choices and, as a result, inferior candidates may win. Shareholders who only own a small stake in the company will experience little wealth effect


38 Although other studies have found positive relative returns in companies with hybrid boards, those findings have not been statistically significant. See J. Harold Mulherin and Annette B. Poulsen, “Proxy contests and corporate change: implications for shareholder wealth,” Journal of Financial Economics 47 (1998), pp. 279-313; IRRC Institute, “Effectiveness of Hybrid Boards,” May 2009.

39 NYSE Listed Company Manual, Section 303A.07.

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even if the outcome of the contest affects shareholder value and will consider it unlikely that their few votes will affect the outcome of the contest.\textsuperscript{40}

For these reasons, it is unrealistic to expect that voting shareholders will effectively assess and weigh the skill and experience mix of the current board and the skills of proposed board candidates, the skills needed on the board (including technical requirements such as audit committee membership, technology or industry expertise), and incorporate that understanding into their voting.

3. Shareholders will nominate candidates to advance agendas at odds with shareholder value

An underlying, and unrealistic, assumption of the SEC’s proposal is that shareholders will nominate qualified board candidates who will work collegially (or at least effectively) and contribute positively to management and shareholder value. In fact, institutional shareholders’ incentives to put forth their own director candidate are not necessarily aligned with improving corporate governance, management or shareholder value. As such, they may not be aligned with the incentives of individual shareholders, nor with other types of institutional shareholders. The shareholders most likely to nominate director candidates are those who are most commonly activist: hedge funds, union benefit plans and public pension plans, all of which have a history of using proxy fights to pursue agendas other than shareholder value. If nominating a candidate has minimal cost, it is likely that they will put forth candidates at every election.\textsuperscript{41}

Most companies with market capitalization of $75 million or more have multiple union and hedge fund shareholders. Approximately 36% of companies with market capitalization of $700 million or more have at least one hedge fund shareholder with a qualifying stake. Approximately 8% of such companies have at least one qualifying union-related or public pension fund shareholder, although this is likely an understatement as union holdings may be filed under their hired asset managers and may hold the same stock through multiple managers.\textsuperscript{42}

Whatever the defects of the current system, current boards of directors are obligated to nominate directors who they believe will act in the best interests of the company and its shareholders to maximize long-term value creation. Investors, however, will not be obligated to do so—and may have incentives to do otherwise based on their particular agenda.


\textsuperscript{41} Mutual fund and other asset managers frequently follow proxy advisory services, such as the RiskMetrics Group and Glass Lewis & Co., to satisfy their legal obligation to vote on behalf of their investors in an informed manner. Leo E. Strine, Jr., “Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America,” 119 Harvard Law Review (2006), p. 1765. If the Proposed Election Contest Rules are put in place, such proxy advisory services will have enhanced power. It is at least possible that they would expand their services to recommending director candidates for qualifying shareholders to nominate, either individually or jointly.

\textsuperscript{42} For companies with market capitalization of at least $700 million, a shareholder with a qualifying stake must have held at least a 1% stake at every quarter-end over the year from March 31, 2008 to March 31, 2009.

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a. Hedge Funds

Hedge funds have possible perverse incentives as they may have a qualifying stake in the company yet have other positions, including derivative positions, which could cause them to profit if the company stock falls in value. In the case of CSX Corporation v. Children's Investment Fund Management (UK) LLP, the Children's Investment Fund was long up to 8.8% of CSX stock via total return swaps. However, a hedge fund could equally well establish a qualifying long position in common stock, yet be net short the company via a larger position in total return swaps. For example, a hedge fund could have a qualifying 1% stake in a company with market capitalization of $700 million or more yet a short position equivalent to 2% via total return swaps for a net short exposure of 1% of market capitalization. Such a fund would have an incentive to put forth director candidates who would disrupt the board and pressure the company to take measures that would undermine shareholder value. The Commission's proposal includes no incentives or enforcement mechanism to prevent hedge funds from nominating directors intended to undermine share value such that they may profit via net short positions, nor even any means to determine the total position of shareholders with qualifying common equity stakes.

b. Union and public employee benefit plans

Union benefit plans have used elections to advance labor agendas, sponsoring, for example, withhold votes for board chairs to punish them for not granting concessions in ongoing collective bargaining. Agrawal (2008) finds that "AFL-CIO affiliated shareholders vote against directors partly to support union worker interests rather than increase shareholder value alone." Examining the split of the AFL-CIO in 2005, Agrawal found that AFL-CIO funds were statistically significantly more likely to support director nominees at a corporation after the AFL-CIO ceased to represent that company's workers. Furthermore, AFL-CIO funds are statistically more significantly likely to vote against directors at firms with greater frequencies of conflict between labor and management.

Public employee benefit plans have exhibited similar activism, sometimes joining forces, as in the 2004 challenge to Safeway management. In March 2004, five California public employee pension funds collaborated to launch a "vote no" campaign against three Safeway directors including Chairman/CEO Stephen Burd. The effort was concurrent with a major strike by Safeway employees in Southern California. In May, prior to board elections taking place, Safeway agreed to replace three directors, but retained Mr. Burd.

45 Id.
4. The Proposal’s first-come, first-served rule will fail to select the best-qualified shareholder nominee

The SEC’s proposed requirement that companies use a first-come, first-served process to place director candidates on the ballot, if multiple eligible shareholders submit director nominees, could place the least qualified of numerous shareholder nominees on the ballot and, ultimately, on the board. Whereas the SEC has focused on the percentage of companies with at least one eligible shareholder, or with a pair of shareholders who would be jointly eligible, it is important to recognize that many companies have five, ten or more eligible shareholders. This sets up a potential competition (or race) among shareholders to name their own nominee. If there is little cost to naming one’s own candidate, it will be rational for eligible shareholders to nominate a candidate or candidates who are best aligned with their own, possibly narrow interests.

There is every reason to expect a race for eligible shareholders to get their nominees in, especially for larger companies. As of March 31, 2009, we find that companies with market capitalization of $700 million or more have a median of 10.5 shareholders eligible to nominate directors, based on a 50 company sample using the dual criteria of a 1% minimum stake held for at least one year.47 Figure 2 shows the distribution of the number of eligible shareholders based on a 50-firm sample. Considering the possibility of smaller shareholders cooperating to put forth nominations based on their aggregate holdings, the number of potential nominations rises even higher. Companies with market capitalization of $700 million or more have a median of seven shareholders with stakes of at least 0.5% but less than 1%, based on the same 50 firm sample.

47 50 firms were randomly sampled from the set of all U.S. domiciled companies with market capitalization greater than $700 million traded publicly on major U.S. exchanges, obtained from FactSet Research Systems, Inc.
If the first-come, first-served rule takes the form of a company opening nominations at a fixed time, it will be little different than attempting to be the first caller to a radio station to win a prize. Effectively, it would be random or at least not substantive: the first email to arrive at 9 a.m. on a particular date or the first of messengers sent to queue at company offices in the wee hours of the date in question.

The number of shareholder nominees would be limited to no more than one or the number that represents 25% of the company’s board of directors, whichever is greater.44 Allowing the first-in shareholder to nominate up to the maximum nominees, where that exceeds one, would only exacerbate the problem.

While eligible shareholders could in principle resolve the race to nominate by coordinating to select a single candidate, it is not apparent that different types of institutional shareholders with different objectives would be able to agree on a candidate. As noted, institutional shareholders fall into diverse categories including hedge funds and union and public pension funds. Past examples of cooperation have generally involved similar shareholders, although there have been

44 It is not clear how the SEC would propose to resolve a situation where 25% of the board exceeds the number of independent directors up for election. Consider, for example, a 20 person board with 40% independent directors (8) and half of those elected each year (4 directors) or 20%.

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instances of collaboration by different types of shareholders such as the case of Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., in which a mutual fund collaborated with three hedge funds.  

5. **Higher share ownership thresholds for nomination would mitigate incentive problems and negative effects on board quality**

The SEC could better align the incentives of qualifying shareholders with other shareholders by setting higher ownership thresholds. By allowing nominations only by larger stakeholders, it would reduce the odds that shareholders would make nominations to advance agendas contrary to shareholder wealth maximization, as any negative impact on share price would be more costly to the nominating shareholder. This would be effective with shareholders with long positions, including union benefit and public pension plans. It would also make it more costly for any hedge fund to establish a qualifying stake and a net short position, then use the qualifying stake to try to bring about a fall in the company's stock price.

Large companies have a number of shareholders that can meet higher thresholds. Of the top 50 companies by market capitalization, on average, the top five shareholders jointly have an 18.4% stake (average of 3.68% each) and the top 10 jointly a 26.7% stake (average of 2.67% each). (See Appendix Exhibit 1.)

C. The Proposal does not distinguish between the issues associated with expressing disapproval of an incumbent director and the issues associated with identifying, nominating, legitimating, and electing an outside insurgent director

It is important to recognize the vast difference between the relatively straightforward issues involved when shareholders simply express their disapproval of existing directors and the vastly more complex issues involved in identifying, recruiting, nominating, legitimating, and electing a new director or slate of directors. Voting against or withholding votes from, or otherwise expressing disapproval of, an incumbent director presents few analytical problems. Replacing directors involves the extremely challenging problem of identifying and recruiting replacement directors whom the majority of shareholders will be familiar with, much less trust. It may be the case that commentators such as Bebchuk are correct when they assert that directors should be voted out of office more often than they are. A default rule requiring some form of majority voting, would accomplish this result.

But the SEC's proposal goes well beyond simply enhancing the ability of shareholders to express their dissatisfaction with one or more incumbent directors. The SEC's proposal envisions contested elections, which will require not merely the expression of dissatisfaction with an incumbent, but the identification, recruitment, legitimization, nomination and election of entirely

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50 For example, in March 2004, Michael Eisner was stripped of his post as chairman of Disney Corporation when forty-three percent of Disney shareholders withheld their votes from the embattled Disney chair, resulting in a decision by the Disney board to split the posts of board chair and CEO. See Michael McCarthy, Disney Strips Chairmanship from Eisner, USA Today, Mar. 4, 2004, at B1.
new candidate-directors. The SEC ignores two problems with the process of nominating and electing new directors, rather than merely expressing dissatisfaction with incumbent board members. First, the SEC provides no explanation for how outside challengers to incumbent boards are to be identified and recruited. Second, even if such directors can be identified and recruited, the SEC provides no guidance on the crucial question of how outside challengers for board positions will be able to send a credible signal to shareholders and other corporate constituencies that they will be faithful corporate stewards, much less that they will be able to outperform a company’s incumbent directors.

As for the recruitment problem, it is not easy to find able, experienced, and competent people who are eager to become directors of public companies. In the political context, democracies have a highly developed system in which two or more political parties recruit, screen, and legitimize potential nominees for political office. There is no analogous process for corporate elections, and it is not obvious how one could be created. Rival board candidates compete along vectors such as competence, experience, and integrity, as well as along vectors such as ideology, interest-group identification, and loyalty. As such, it is far from clear what, if any, signaling function might be played by rival parties who nominate candidates in corporate elections.

The role of corporate director is both more time consuming and more risky than ever before. Presumably adoption of the SEC’s proposal would not change this trend. We further presume that the SEC would not wish for directors to be less accountable, either to regulators and shareholders, than they currently are. Even at present, a significant number, perhaps as many as half of all prospects, decline offers to serve on boards, even when such offers are made by the companies, not by insurgents.51 The SEC’s proposal appears to assume away the acute problems of identifying, recruiting, and performing due diligence for potential challengers to incumbent directors.

Moreover, even to the extent that outside shareholder activists are able to locate challengers for board incumbents, it is far from clear how to make such challengers credible candidates for office. Corporate elections are plagued by a variety of collective action and signaling problems. Challengers in proxy contests have a difficult time signaling credibly to shareholders that they are seeking to displace the incumbent directors because they are better managers, rather than for more nefarious reasons.

Bebchuk (2007) generally recognizes the existence of these sorts of problems when he writes that:

[S]hareholders cannot infer from a rival team’s mounting a challenge that the rival directors would perform better. To begin with, even a rival team that believes it will perform better may be acting out of hubris. Furthermore, and very important, a rival’s decision to mount a challenge does not even imply that the rival itself

---

believes it will perform better. After all, a challenge could be motivated instead
by a desire to obtain the private benefits associated with control.\footnote{51}

The SEC’s Proposal will exacerbate, not mitigate, the credibility problems facing challengers.
Rational shareholders will understand that if the SEC’s reimbursement proposal is implemented,
challengers will internalize an even smaller share of the costs of mounting a proxy contest for
control, but will internalize the same benefits. This, in turn, will provide less-qualified, lower-
probability candidates with greater incentives to run, particularly since those candidates with the
lowest opportunity costs to their time and effort will benefit most by the prospect of having the
company bear part of their election expenses.

D. Companies will incur additional efficiency costs to evaluate shareholder-
nominated candidates

If shareholder nominees are included on the ballot in many elections, which we believe to be a
likely outcome, companies will incur the costs now associated with a proxy contest far more
frequently than they do now, when less than 1% of elections involve proxy battles.\footnote{52} The
Commission’s assertion that companies will be able to vet outside candidates in only 20 hours is
unrealistic.\footnote{53} A survey of Business Roundtable companies estimates that the inclusion of a
shareholder nominee will cost a company approximately $1,160,000 for the services of outside
professionals, as well as approximately 300 hours of company personnel and director time.\footnote{54}

As mentioned above, shareholders will not have the same obligation as current directors to
nominate directors who will maximize shareholder value, and may have incentives to nominate
directors who will pursue agendas contrary to shareholder value. This risk imposes an obligation
on companies to do thorough due diligence on shareholder nominees and, in the exercise of their
fiduciary responsibilities, to vigorously oppose candidates whom they consider less qualified
than the board nominee. The SEC’s proposal not only fails to adequately account for the cost
resulting from vetting and opposing candidates, but it also fails to account for the costs
associated with litigation against new directors for acting in ways contrary to the company’s
interests.

In addition to the disruption to management and boards of contested elections and the associated
costs to the company, additional disruptions may come from qualifying shareholders’ ability to
use the threat of nomination to extract concessions or private benefits from management.
Indeed, this likely will be among the most frequent uses of the power: A meeting with
management or board representatives in which the institutional investor communicates that if
certain things are not done (e.g., a labor dispute resolved, or a contract with a union company

\footnote{52} See J.II.B.4 for calculation of less than 1%.
\footnote{53} SEC Release No. 33-9046, p. 97.
\footnote{54} Business Roundtable, “Detailed Comments of Business Roundtable on the Proposed Election Contest Rules and
the Proposed Amendment to the Shareholder Proposal Rules of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,”
August 17, 2009, p. 110.
signed, then they will run an alternative candidate (at shareholder expense). Management will have to consider the relative cost of fulfilling the shareholder demand versus the costs of opposing the alternative candidate. Because qualifying shareholders can nominate board candidates at very little cost, any qualifying shareholder will be able to make a credible threat of nominating.

IV. The Proposal will render U.S. equity markets less competitive with foreign markets

Although the SEC states that the Proposed Election Contest Rules will improve the competitiveness of U.S. companies by improving corporate governance practices relative to other leading markets, it ignores detrimental effects on the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets. As has been widely discussed since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, the market share and competitiveness of U.S. capital markets have deteriorated markedly since the 1980s.

Holding constant the current merits of listing in the U.S. and overseas, the Proposed Election Contest Rules would be an added negative for U.S. markets. Even if other countries currently have similar rules for director nominations, this is an incremental cost to listing in the U.S. To the extent that it slows growth of U.S. equity markets relative to foreign markets, it will reduce the relative liquidity of U.S. markets, making them yet less competitive. Ironically, because the Proposal would apply only to companies subject to the proxy rules, it would be a greater deterrent to listing in the U.S. for American companies than for foreign companies.

A. U.S. equity market competitiveness has already been impaired by high regulatory costs.

By any measure, the U.S. share of equity listings has declined substantially in recent years. The 2006 report of the Interim Committee on Capital Markets stated, “[T]he United States is losing its leading competitive position compared to stock markets and financial markets abroad. … [C]ertainly one important factor contributing to this trend is the growth of U.S. regulatory compliance costs and liability risks compared to other developed and respected market centers.”

U.S. share of IPOs done outside a firm’s home country (measured by value of IPOs) decreased from 50% in 2000 to 3% in 2005; measured by number of IPOs, the U.S. share fell from 37% in 2000 to 10% in 2005. In a 2009 update, Committee Chairman Hal S. Scott stated,

> While the latest results must be cautiously interpreted in light of the global recession, the competitiveness of U.S. public equity markets appears to continue to decline.

---

In dollar terms, the U.S. share of global IPOs fell from a 1996-2006 average of 28.7% to 6.9% in 2007 and 1.9% in 2008.\textsuperscript{59} As shown in Figure 4 below, the U.S. share of IPOs (in number) declined from 36.9% in 1999 to 10.7% in 2008.

\textbf{Figure 3}

\begin{center}
\textbf{U.S. and International IPOs}
\textbf{1999 through 2009}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure3}
\end{center}

\textbf{Notes and Sources:}
Data obtained from Bloomberg, L.P.

Other measures point to a similar, if not more severe, loss of market share:

- In 2006, nine of the 10 largest IPOs were done outside the U.S.; in 2005, the proportion is a more striking 24 of the top 25.\textsuperscript{60} In both 2007 and 2008, none of the top 20 IPOs worldwide were done in the U.S.\textsuperscript{61}

- A recent study of companies cross-listed in the U.S. and their home market found that the proportion of volume has reversed; whereas in the 1980s the majority of volume was traded in the U.S., by the 1990s, the preponderance of the volume had shifted to the home markets as the liquidity advantage of U.S. markets declined.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{59} Id.

\textsuperscript{60} Id.


B. Private placement and private equity financing have grown at the expense of the public equity market

U.S. and foreign firms are increasingly relying on alternative markets to raise capital in the U.S., another sign that the balance between the public equity market and its alternatives is shifting in favor of the latter. One factor may be that companies find the increased regulatory burden of public ownership in the U.S. already outweighs any financing cost or liquidity advantage of public listing. The Proposal will add yet another cost to this equation. On balance, a shift from public to private equity markets deprives individual investors of the opportunity to invest.

Private placements have grown to account for approximately 90% of the volume of capital raised in the U.S. by foreign companies in 2005, versus 50% in 1995. This signals foreign companies’ preference to avoid the regulatory requirements associated with public listing. Rule 144A private placements allow foreign companies to raise funds from large institutional investors without subjecting themselves to most aspects of U.S. securities regulation, including avoiding all disclosure requirements, Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404 requirements, and liability provisions of the Securities Act of 1933. 63

An increasing number of publicly-traded U.S. firms have opted to leave the equity markets and revert to private ownership, as shown in Figure 5. Despite the decline in 2008 associated with the credit crisis, the 2008 level remains higher than the number in 2004 or 2005.

63 Id., p.5
Figure 4

Leveraged Buyouts of North American Target Companies
2004 through 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes and Sources
Data are from Capital IQ's Monthly Market Observations, January 2009, p. 47. Figure is based on transaction announce dates and includes both closed and pending transactions as well as those without transaction values.

V. The Proposal will undermine competitiveness and capital formation at the company level

The Proposed Election Contest Rules will undermine the competitiveness of U.S. companies by burdening publicly-traded companies with the efficiency costs discussed above and, in doing so, effectively raise the cost of capital for U.S. companies. First and foremost, as discussed above, companies with dissident directors underperform their peers by 10 to 40% in the two years after the contested election. By facilitating contested elections, the Proposal is bound to result in more dissidents winning board seats.

Moreover, because the Proposal would make it more expensive to operate as a public company, public equity issuance would become relatively less attractive as a form of financing. To the extent that yet-unlisted companies choose to instead raise capital via debt or private placements, this may raise their cost of capital and impair their competitiveness. By the same token, the Proposal would make it more attractive, at the margin, to take public companies private.

In addition to the added costs of going public, the Proposal will introduce non-financial deterrents to going public that may cause company founders to prefer to keep their companies privately held. Company founders who wish to maintain their executive positions will factor in an increased risk of loss of control via shareholder-nominated directors, who may run for the
board in order to change management. By the same token, founders who wish to continue to focus on their company’s business will face the increased distraction of public ownership not only from increased regulatory burdens, but potential management and board distraction from dealing with contested director elections. An even greater fear will be that dissident directors will be more easily able to gain seats, be detrimental to boardroom dynamics, cause management and board efficiency losses and harm the company’s returns.

By discouraging companies from participating in public equity markets, the Proposal will also discourage capital formation. Because an illiquidity premium is built into the price of debt and private equity placements, companies cannot raise as much money issuing these securities as publicly-traded stock. Public equity markets are widely considered to be the most efficient markets, in terms of stock prices reflecting all available information. Debt markets are less liquid, with transactions in corporate debt securities often infrequent; they are less likely to be efficient in that, without transactions, prices cannot immediately react to news. Markets for 144A securities are yet less liquid, with no public information on prices. The Proposal will nonetheless drive firms away from the public equity markets toward the more costly debt and private placement markets.

VI. The benefits predicted by the SEC will be at best small, and possibly prove to be costly rather than beneficial

For the Proposed Election Contest Rules to overcome the many costs laid out above, the benefits would need to be substantial. Yet the three benefits predicted by the SEC range from small to simply implausible:

(1) The SEC predicts a reduction in the cost to shareholders of soliciting votes in support of a nominated candidate for election to the board of directors. However, the SEC itself estimates that savings at only $18,000, or 2% of the estimated $1,160,000 in costs that a company would incur due to having a shareholder nominee on the ballot. 64, 65

(2) The SEC cites improved disclosure of shareholder-nominated candidates as enhancing transparency and facilitating better informed voting decisions. 66 While transparency is always a positive, we note that even the SEC does not attempt to quantify this benefit.

(3) The SEC conjectures that board performance may be improved, either by incumbent directors working harder to retain their seats or because shareholder nominees may improve board or corporate performance. However, this report has presented substantial evidence that the Proposal is likely to impair board and company performance. Contested elections will distract boards from other company business. Insurgent victories may result


in boards without the right skill and experience mix. Indeed, as discussed above, a number of studies show that dissident board representation has a negative impact on company returns.

VII. Conclusion

Our accounting of the costs of the Proposed Election Contest Rules in terms of effects on efficiency, competitiveness and capital formation reveals that the costs of this Rule, if adopted, will be substantially higher than acknowledged by the SEC. These costs overwhelm the few benefits posited by the SEC, some of which will be small and others of which are simply not credible.

In order to obtain modest savings for large, activist shareholders at the less than 1% of companies that face proxy fights or negotiations over board representation in any given year, the SEC would increase dramatically the frequency of contested elections. The SEC restricted its analysis to the number of companies with one or more shareholders eligible to nominate a director candidate. We note, however, that companies with market capitalization of $700 million or more have a median of 10 eligible shareholders. Moreover, more than one-third of these shareholders fall into the traditionally activist categories of hedge funds, union benefit or public pension funds. These companies will face frequent shareholder director nominations, as well as the specter of inefficient “races” among shareholders in order to win a place on the ballot, because only the shareholder who is first to make a nomination will gain a ballot spot.

Efficiency costs ignored by the SEC include the excessive nominations that would result from a subsidized option, significant negative effects on board quality, and the substantial costs that companies and shareholders will incur in dealing with the nomination and election of board candidates with special interest agendas and goals inconsistent with the traditional goal of maximizing shareholder value. We also believe that the SEC underestimates the costs that companies will face in vetting shareholder-nominated candidates because they do not appreciate the cardinal importance to companies of properly and thoroughly vetting board nominees.

The SEC also ignores the detrimental effects of the Proposal on the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets, by ignoring the fact that subsidized proxy contests add yet another negative factor to U.S. companies’ decisions about whether to go public and to foreign companies’ decisions about whether to list in the U.S. or overseas.

Finally, the Proposal risks undermining the competitiveness of U.S. companies. To the extent that U.S. companies are even further discouraged from going public than they are at present, and public companies are incentivized to go private, the Rule will raise their cost of capital, render them less competitive in global markets, and discourage capital formation.
### APPENDIX TABLE 1

**Top 50 Companies by Market Capitalization:**  
Percentage of Shares Outstanding Held by Top 5 and 10 Institutions  
March 31, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>% Of Shares Outstanding Held by Institutional Investors</th>
<th>Top 5</th>
<th>Top 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Exxon Mobil Corp.</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Wal-Mart Stores Inc.</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Microsoft Corp.</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AT&amp;T Inc.</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Johnson &amp; Johnson</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Procter &amp; Gamble Co.</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>22.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Chevron Corp.</td>
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<td>24.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Berkshire Hathaway Inc.</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>International Business Machines Corp.</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>21.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Google Inc.</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>General Electric Co.</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Coca-Cola Co.</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>30.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>JPMorgan Chase &amp; Co.</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Apple Inc.</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>27.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Pfizer Inc.</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>23.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Cisco Systems Inc.</td>
<td>17.6</td>
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<td>PepsiCo Inc.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Intel Corp.</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>26.7</td>
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<td>Oracle Corp.</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Abbott Laboratories</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>23.1</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Philip Morris International Inc.</td>
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<td>QUALCOMM Inc.</td>
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<td>Wells Fargo &amp; Co.</td>
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<td>McDonald's Corp.</td>
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<td>31.0</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>ConocoPhillips</td>
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<td>28.0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Weyerh.</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
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<td>Merck &amp; Co. Inc.</td>
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<td>33.4</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>Amgen Inc.</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>United Parcel Service Inc.</td>
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<td>24.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Schinberger Ltd.</td>
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<td>33.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Occidental Petroleum Corp.</td>
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<td>32.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Bank of America Corp.</td>
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<td>21.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>Monsanto Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>United Technologies Corp.</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NERA Economic Consulting
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Top 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CVS Caremark Corp.</td>
<td>17.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Comcast Corp.</td>
<td>17.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kraft Foods Inc.</td>
<td>22.2</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Eli Lilly &amp; Co.</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Schering-Plough Corp.</td>
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<td>Home Depot Inc.</td>
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<td>Altria Group Inc.</td>
<td>16.5</td>
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<td>Average</td>
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Notes and Sources:
COALITION VIEWS ON SHAREHOLDER COMMUNICATIONS

The time has come for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the existing shareholder communications system, which is cumbersome, circuitous, and overly expensive. New regulatory requirements and increasing shareholder activism have elevated the need for public companies to communicate more effectively with their shareholders. Moreover, advances in technology not only provide the opportunity for enhanced communication and efficiency in the proxy process, but also facilitate the decoupling of shareholder voting rights from shareholder economic interests. These developments must be addressed to protect the integrity of our corporate governance system.

The "Street Name" System

More than 75 percent of all public companies' shares are held in "street name," meaning that the actual shareholders are primarily brokers, banks, and other financial institutions. These third-party intermediaries hold a company's shares on behalf of their clients, the individual beneficial owners. Under state corporation laws, only the shareholder of record is provided the right to vote, as the "legal" owner of the shares. The voting rights of these third-party record holders are not passed on via proxy to their customers; instead, these financial intermediaries retain the right to vote the shares. Under SEC and stock exchange rules, brokers and banks or their agents deliver proxy materials to beneficial owners and request voting instructions. If voting instructions are not returned, brokers may vote on "routine" matters, where instructions have not been received 10 days before the meeting.

The "street name" system of share ownership was developed to enable securities transactions to be processed and cleared more efficiently. However, the shareholder voting process has been permitted to evolve in piecemeal fashion over many years. The current system is a complicated and multi-layered process routed primarily through financial intermediaries that are not the economic owners of corporate shares. The involvement of these third-party intermediaries increases the complexity and cost of processing proxy materials and tabulating votes. It also makes it more difficult for companies to communicate with the beneficial owners of their shares.

The Barriers between Public Companies and Their Beneficial Owners

As noted above, a resulting complication of street name registration is that public companies do not know the retail investors who are the beneficial owners of their shares.


Under rules adopted in the mid-1980’s, brokers and banks are permitted to classify beneficial owners as either Non-Objecting Beneficial Owners (“NOBOs”) or Objecting Beneficial Owners (“OBOs”), based on indications by the beneficial owners at that time or account opening. Public companies are not able to communicate directly with their OBO beneficial owners and communication with even NOBOs is expensive and not permitted with respect to proxy materials. Thus, the proxy process is oriented more to the efficiency interests of brokers and banks than to encouraging effective and efficient communication between companies and their shareholders.

The Lack of Competition in Proxy Processing Services

The overwhelming majority of brokers and banks have contracted out the processes of distributing proxy materials and tabulating votes to one company, Broadridge Financial Solutions. Brokers and banks accomplish this by transferring their proxy voting authority to Broadridge, which then mails proxy statements and voting instruction forms to beneficial owners. Broadridge does not transmit actual “proxies” to beneficial owners; instead it requests voting instructions from beneficial owners, while retaining the legal right to vote the shares. Pursuant to SEC and New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) rules, companies are required to pay for the “reasonable expenses” of transmitting proxy materials at rates set by the NYSE. In other words, companies are required to pay for this service, even though they have no choice as to the service provider, nor any ability to negotiate fees with the service provider.

Share Lending Practices, Decoupling of Ownership and Proxy Voting Integrity

The problems with the current proxy voting system are exacerbated by share lending practices that may cause an “over vote,” i.e., the receipt of more voting instructions than are in a financial institution’s position, or other reconciliation problems in counting shares. Brokers and other financial institutions use different methodologies to address share reconciliation and tabulation issues. The result is that some shares may be voted multiple times and others not at all. What shares are counted and how they are counted need to be based on a uniform methodology that ensures accuracy, fairness, and democratic principles. Share lending agreements also generally assign voting rights to the borrower of the shares, causing a circumstance in which the person voting the shares may have little or no economic interest in the company. This so-called “empty voting” problem, in which investors have greater voting than economic ownership, arises from the ability of investors to use swaps and other equity derivatives to decouple voting rights from economic interests. And, under current SEC disclosure rules, investors often are able to avoid public disclosure of their enhanced voting power.

The Role of Proxy Advisory Services

A final problem with the shareholder communications system involves the role of proxy advisory services. These advisory services are able to wield enormous influence in corporate elections, but they are not subject to any disclosures or oversight with respect to their ability to control the outcome of a vote. Some advisory services also have an
inherent conflict of interest in the voting process because they also provide related consulting services, such as corporate governance ratings, corporate governance advice, and other research services, in addition to providing voting recommendations on shareholder proposals submitted by their clients.

Recommendations for Reform

Communications between companies and their shareholders are an essential component of corporate governance. With increasing shareholder activism and focus on the proxy voting process, public companies need to be able to quickly, efficiently, and cost-effectively communicate with all of their shareholders, including beneficial owners of their securities held in “street” or nominee name. In addition, enhanced disclosure of ownership interests is necessary to address the decoupling of voting and economic interests.

The proxy voting process in use today was created prior to recent advances in computer technology, including the modernization of the stock transfer system and the creation of the Internet. A reformed shareholder communications system should make use of these advances to facilitate more efficient communications between companies and their beneficial owners.

For all the reasons noted above, the SEC should initiate a comprehensive evaluation of the shareholder communications process. This evaluation should include the following principles and recommendations:

1. Direct Communications with Individual Investors. The SEC should eliminate the NOBO/OBO distinction thereby giving companies access to contact information for all of their beneficial owners and permit companies to communicate with them directly. Any improvements to companies’ ability to identify and communicate with their shareholders should also be available to shareholders wishing to communicate with other shareholders.

2. Voting By Retail Investors. The SEC should examine how to protect the vote of the retail investor, particularly in the case of unvoted shares. Institutional investors generally vote 100% of the time, in response to their legal responsibilities and facilitated by electronic systems. They also are aided, as noted above, by proxy advisory services. Retail investors have no similar voting facilitators or proxy advisory services, and, in fact, often have no motivation to vote their shares. Among the alternatives that the SEC should consider to protect the interests of retail investors are: (a) pass through of voting rights directly to beneficial owners; (b) proportional voting; and (c) client directed voting.

3. Competition among Proxy Service Providers. Brokers, banks, and other intermediaries should not stand in the way of direct communications between companies and the beneficial owners of their securities. Companies should have the ability to determine the distributors of their communications, and should not be forced to pay for
the costs of a system in which the fees and the service providers are determined by third parties.

4. **Proxy Voting Integrity.** The SEC should consider additional steps to ensure that the proxy voting system is transparent and verifiable. In this regard, the SEC should examine its ownership disclosure requirements and consider requiring disclosure of both voting and economic ownership along with both positive and negative economic ownership.

5. **Proxy Advisory Services.** The SEC should review the role of proxy advisory services and the procedures used by these firms in generating recommendations.
The OBO/NOBO Distinction in Beneficial Ownership:
Implications for Shareowner Communications and Voting

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This white paper was commissioned by the Council of Institutional Investors to educate its members, policymakers and the general public about the OBO/NOBO distinction in beneficial ownership and the implications for investors of potential changes to that system. The views and opinions expressed in the paper do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of Council members, board of directors or staff.
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Executive Summary

Recent developments increase the likelihood of more meaningful, and contested, shareholder votes and the importance of shareholder communications. Shareholder voting and communications depend on both state and federal law. State law focuses on record ownership (i.e., the holder, whether or not the ultimate shareholder, shown on a company's books), whereas federal law reflects the interests of beneficial owners (i.e., the ultimate shareholders) in voting and receiving disclosure.

Under Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules, companies may communicate with beneficial owners through broker or bank intermediaries. Intermediaries are prohibited from disclosing to a company the identity of beneficial owners who object to the disclosure (objecting beneficial owners or OBOs), and the company cannot contact OBOs directly. The company may contact directly shareholders who do not object (non-objecting beneficial owners or NOBOs), but SEC rules nonetheless require that proxy materials be forwarded to them by the intermediaries. The OBO/NOBO distinction impedes company communications with beneficial owners and communications among shareholders. Some market participants have proposed changes to this framework. The interests of the key players vary:

- Companies tend to favor the elimination of the OBO/NOBO distinction. They argue that, if shareholders can participate more directly in board elections through proxy access or other means, companies should be able to contact them directly. They also argue that a direct communication framework would increase shareholder participation and reduce costs.

- Shareowners are often said to have a privacy interest that is served by the current framework, but a 2006 survey casts doubt on this assertion. It is also unclear which information shareholders wish to keep private and from whom. Some may wish to keep their holdings or trading strategies confidential, while others seek to avoid unwanted solicitations.

- Shareowners seek to have an impeded ability to communicate among the shareholder community. Shareowners also seek a level playing field with companies — to have equal access to lists of shareholders and to have their solicitation costs reimbursed as are those of management.

- Brokers and banks have several interests — maintaining the confidentiality of customer lists, preserving tax income derived from forwarding proxy materials, and preserving stock loan revenues, which could be at risk in a direct communications framework that allows greater transparency to customers about stock loan practices.

- Broadridge Financial Solutions has essentially the sole agent for intermediaries and companies and has an interest in preserving the fee income and cost reimbursements it receives under the current framework.

The SEC is likely to be cautious in speaking to change the current framework in significant ways, at least in the near term. Defining the objective is critical to developing a proposal. If the goal is to increase the ability of shareholders and companies to communicate directly, a number of incremental steps may be taken to address the OBO/NOBO distinction and facilitate direct distribution of proxy materials, without discarding the current distribution platform. Such an approach could lead to meaningful improvements, without seriously affecting the interests of many of the participants in the current framework, and we believe it has a greater chance of widespread support than more radical alternatives.
A more ambitious goal to ensure more reliable voting seems difficult to achieve without a direct communications framework with cascading executed proxies. This approach would, however, almost certainly be more contentious, since it would implicate complex strategic, cost, logistical and other considerations of critical importance to key players. Its practical benefits are also uncertain because they are likely to be limited to a minority of contested elections in which an end-to-end audit of the vote is critical to a reliable outcome. We also believe that this approach requires more detailed analysis by the various affected constituencies to obtain a clearer picture of the logistical changes, costs and potential disruptions it could entail.

On balance, we believe that the immediate interest of shareholders and companies in better communications would be better and more effectively served with an incremental approach that promotes less reliance on — or eliminates altogether — the in-person distinction and otherwise increases the potential for direct communications.
Introduction

A shareholder's right to vote on matters as allowed under state or federal law, stock exchange rules or otherwise is a key right. Shareholder voting has also become an increasingly important element in the consideration of public company corporate governance. Recent developments have highlighted the nature and quality of the communication process and its impact on shareholder voting and governance. These developments include adoption by a number of public companies, especially large companies, of majority voting in uncontested director elections, the amendment of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Rule 423 to prohibit broker discretionary voting in uncontested director elections and the increased influence of activist shareholders and proxy advisory firms. The confluence of these developments has heightened the likelihood of more meaningful, and contested, shareholder votes and accentuated the importance of shareholder communications in the context of voting and governance.

Issues of shareholder voting and communications depend on both state and federal law. State law focuses on record ownership (i.e., the holder shown on a company's books, whether or not the ultimate shareholder) because of administrative ease and certainty. Federal law, on the other hand, emphasizes regulation of communications by public companies for shareholder meetings and other matters, as federal regulators are more concerned with the interests of beneficial owners (i.e., the ultimate owners) in voting and receiving related disclosure. The record owner may also be the beneficial owner of the shares, but for shares held with financial institutions, the link between record and beneficial owners is not simple. A complex chain of intermediaries often separates the record owner from the beneficial owner.

Companies typically do not know the identities of all beneficial owners of their shares, nor do beneficial owners know the identities of other beneficial owners generally. The information resides largely in the intermediaries. This information disconnect limits the ability of companies to communicate with their beneficial owners and of beneficial owners to communicate directly with each other.

While state law governs the rights of record owners, the SEC has focused on rules related to communications between companies and their owners, and among owners themselves. To address the gap between record and beneficial ownership, the SEC has created a framework in which companies primarily communicate with beneficial owners through broker or bank intermediaries. The framework requires brokers and banks to disclose to a company the identity of only those beneficial owners who do not object to such disclosure. Those who object are known as "objecting beneficial owners" (OBOS) under the SEC's rules. The company cannot contact OBOS directly. The company may, however, have direct contact with shareholders who have designated themselves "non-objecting beneficial owners" (NOBOs), owners who do not object to having their identity known to the issuing company. However, while companies may communicate directly with NOBOs, SEC rules require that proxies and proxy materials nonetheless be forwarded by broker and bank intermediaries, not by companies.
SECTION I

This paper provides a brief introduction to the ODRMOBO system, its history, the consequences of its operation and possible alternative approaches or reforms. It is organized as follows:

- Section II describes the system of custodial stock ownership, the current communication framework and the practical application of the ODRMOBO distinction;
- Section III provides a brief history of shareholder communications reforms, including the enactment of ODRMOBO rules;
- Section IV highlights the consequences of the current framework;
- Section V describes the interests investors have in the current framework;
- Section VI discusses the interests that various other stakeholders have in the current framework;
- Section VII describes potential alternative approaches and reforms; and
- Section VIII offers recommendations with respect to reforms.
Custodial Ownership and the Current Communication Framework

Custodial Ownership: The Source of the OBO/NOB0 Distinction

In the United States, few ultimate beneficial owners are holders of record. Instead, a chain of custodial ownership, which can be complex and operates through multiple levels, separates the record and beneficial owners. Under custodial ownership, a broker or bank intermediary holds legal title to shares on behalf of the beneficial owner, who retains full economic ownership. Often the beneficial owner will establish a custodial relationship through a nominee account, under which a nominee, often a partnership, holds legal title to the shares. "Street name" refers to the form of nominee name brokers use to hold shares on behalf of the ultimate beneficial owners. An estimated 70-80 percent of publicly-traded shares are held in street or nominee name according to the most recent data from 1997. The custodian, in turn, hold the shares in accounts with The Depository Trust Company (DTC), the only central depository institution in the United States. DTC (or its nominee, Cede & Co.) is registered in a company's books and records as the record holder. DTC is thus the holder of record of a substantial majority of publicly-traded shares in the United States.

The current shareowner communication framework applicable to proxy solicitations addresses the difference between record and beneficial owners primarily by requiring a company to forward proxy materials to the broker or bank intermediaries, which must in turn forward them to beneficial owners, whether they are OBOs or NOBOs.

The framework does permit some direct communications between a company and its beneficial owners. For example, companies may mail their annual reports directly to NOBOs, although in practice this does not occur since the annual report must accompany or precede the proxy statement (which as noted above must be sent by the intermediary).

A company also might choose to confirm with NOBOs that the relevant intermediary had in fact forwarded proxy materials as required or encourage NOBOs to vote. To enable direct communication, brokers and banks must provide companies with a list of NOBOs upon request at any time. Most brokers and banks delegate this responsibility to an agent, in almost all cases Brookridge Financial Services Inc. (Brookridge), the leading provider of U.S. outsourcing services regarding communications, document management and processing in connection with the proxy procedure.

Brookridge provides a single list of all NROs to the company in a standardized format. The NOBO list includes the name, address and securities position for each NOBO. Because Brookridge does not disclose the identity of a NOBO's broker or bank intermediary, relying on Brookridge to provide the NOBO list allows brokers and banks to preserve the confidentiality of their customer lists from each other and from the company.

The company cannot communicate directly with OBOs, so all communications with OBOs must be made through the relevant intermediary. Over 75 percent of customers holding shares in street name are OBOs and 52-60 percent of the shares of publicly-held companies in the United States are therefore held by OBOs. In effect, the identity of the ultimate beneficial owner of more than half of all shares of publicly-traded companies is behind a curtain.
How Shareowner Communications and Proxy Voting Work

The DTC/NSCC rules are only one component of the shareowner communication framework, which are summarized below. Additional details are provided in Annex A, which highlights the differences in the framework as it applies to brokers, on the one hand, and banks, on the other.

The distribution of proxy materials to a beneficial owner is a two-stage process as described below.

1. In the first stage, the company gathers information about the number of beneficial owners in what is itself a multi-step process. This stage is illustrated in the attached Figure 1 (for brokers) and Figure 2 (for banks) in Annex B. The process by which a company obtains a NOBO list is illustrated in Figure 3 in Annex B.

2. The company requests from DTC a list of its participants (i.e., financial and other institutions with accounts at DTC) that hold company shares, to which DTC must respond “promptly.”

3. Upon receipt of the list, the company sends a “search card” to those institutions — the broker and bank intermediaries — at least 20 business days prior to the record date (i.e., the date as of which one must be a shareowner of record on the company’s books to vote at a shareowner meeting), requesting the quantity of proxy materials and annual reports each requires for further distribution to beneficial owners.

4. Brokers (or Broadridge as their agent) must respond to the company’s inquiry no later than seven business days after receipt of the search card.

5. Banks must respond to a search card inquiry in two ways. Because there are often several layers of “respondent banks” (i.e., smaller bank custodians which deposit shares on behalf of beneficial owners with large bank intermediaries) between a DTC bank participant and the beneficial owner, banks must tell the company, within one business day, the names of respondent banks holding shares of the company through them. The company then sends a search card to the identified respondent banks within one business day. Those respondent banks must respond in turn within one business day with the names of their respondent banks holding shares of the company through them, and this respondent bank process continues through however many layers of respondent banks exist that hold shares of the company. All banks, including both the initial banks to whom the search card inquiry was sent and all respondent banks, must also respond no later than seven business days after their receipt of the search card regarding the quantity of proxy materials needed for distribution to beneficial owners.

6. If a company wishes to communicate directly with NOBOs, it needs the NOBO list, which includes the name, address, and securities positions of each NOBO. A company may request a NOBO list from broker or bank intermediaries at any time. The company requests a list of all NOBO holders as of a date it specifies. Often this date is the record date, but it can be any date the company specifies. The intermediaries must be given at least five business days to compile such lists.

7. Broker and bank intermediaries must compile the NOBO lists as of the date requested by the company and must transmit to the company the NOBO list no later than five days after the date specified by the company. Intermediaries generally respond through their agent Broadridge, which delivers a single standardized list of NOBOs to the company.
In the second stage, the company forwards its proxy materials to the broker and bank intermediaries for further distribution. 31

- In the case of proxy materials, the broker or bank (or, more typically, Broadridge) must forward the materials. 34

The broker or bank (or Broadridge) must also forward the annual report, although it is excused from sending it to NDBOs if the company has indicated that it will do so directly. 35

One important difference between distribution of proxy materials and voting rights is that, under state law, only the holder of record has the right to vote. 36 As a result, the company cannot send a proxy card and proxy materials directly to each beneficial owner, but must provide the proxy card to the record holder. To delegate voting authority under state law to the beneficial owner, first, as the record holder of shares held in street name, DTC executes an "omnibus" proxy in favor of all brokers and banks who hold the company’s shares through DTC’s facilities. 37 It thereby authorizes each broker or bank to act as DTC’s proxy and to vote the shares to the extent of the broker or bank’s position in the company’s securities held with DTC. 38 The executed omnibus proxy is sent to the company accompanied by a list that shows the number of shares each broker or bank holding through DTC may vote pursuant to the omnibus proxy. 39

In turn, after being vested with voting authority, the brokers and banks have two options to facilitate voting by the ultimate owners of shares. The first, rarely used option is for a bank or broker (or Broadridge) to send an executed proxy to the beneficial owner, leaving the voting provisions of the proxy card blank and fully delegating voting authority to the beneficial owner. The beneficial owner then completes the proxy card and mails it to the company directly. The second option, which is used in the vast majority of cases, is for the intermediary to request voting instructions from the beneficial owner. 40 In the typical case, Broadridge sends the requests for voting instructions on behalf of the broker and bank intermediaries. The beneficial owners return instructions as to how the proxies should be voted to Broadridge, which then tabulates the voting instructions received and fills out a proxy for each intermediary broker or bank for which it acts as agent, aggregating the voting instructions received from beneficial owners holding through that intermediary. 41

Broadridge’s process for aggregating and verifying voting instructions is not one that a company itself may verify. 42

Finally, the bank or broker (or Broadridge) sends the proxies to the tabulator (i.e., the entity retained by the company to count votes), which is often the transfer agent (i.e., the agent the company hires to transfer its securities, as well as maintain a list of the shareholders of record), for final verification and tabulation. The tabulator verifies that the number of shares voted equals (or is less than) the number held by each DTC participant. The proxy voting process is illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5 in Appendix B.

Some pension funds and other institutional investors rely on proxy advisory firms to respond to requests for voting instructions (or proxies), adding another layer of complexity. RiskMetrics Group, one of the leading proxy advisory firms, advertises a range of voting services: “We receive your proxy ballots, work with your custodian banks, execute votes on your behalf, maintain vote records...” 43 Although institutional investors typically retain ultimate voting authority in their arrangements with proxy advisory firms, some institutional investors may delegate their voting authority as well. 44

The company pays broker intermediaries and Broadridge for the services they provide (including preparing NOBO and OBO lists, providing lists to Broadridge (and in the case of NOBOs to the company), costs of mailing and other actual costs) at rates fixed by the NYSE. 45 The fee schedule is also typically followed for services rendered by bank intermediaries. 46 For example, the company pays fees for NOBO lists (e.g., a broker may charge $0.005 per NOBO name).
History of the Shareowner Communication Framework

The shareowner communication framework, including the OBO/NOBO distinction, was developed in the mid-1960s. The framework represented a compromise purportedly designed to address two goals: (i) improved corporate governance through increased communication between companies and their ultimate owners, as management would be more accountable if beneficial owners were given more of a say in corporate voting; and (ii) a Congressional mandate to immobilize stock certificates (i.e., to eliminate transfers of physical stock certificates), and realize centralized clearing for securities transactions. While the SEC wanted to improve communication between companies and their shareowners, it regarded the reliability of proxy distribution and securities clearing as paramount. The result was a layered approach to communications that impeded direct communications. This section highlights key changes in the evolution of the current framework. Further details are provided in Appendix C.

The Decision to Immobilize Stock Certificates

One key development leading to the prevalence of street name ownership that set the stage for the OBO/NOBO distinction was the paperwork costs during the bear market of the late 1960s. Stock exchanges experienced unprecedented trading volume during that period, and brokers and banks were unable to process the transaction volume on a timely basis. The need to handle and deliver paper security certificates for many transactions and the lack of a centralized clearance and settlement system significantly exacerbated the problem. Citing the absence of nationwide clearance and settlement as the cause of the problem, Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to add Section 17A, which requires clearing agencies to register with the SEC and directed the SEC to implement rules to immobilize share certificates.

Congress also directed the SEC to study “street name” registration; a practice some institutional investors had engaged in since at least the 1930s. While approximately 10 percent of the shares of public companies was held in street name accounts in 1937, that percentage had increased to 30 percent by the mid-1970s. The purpose of the study was to determine whether street name registration was consistent with a system of “prompt and accurate” clearance of securities transactions, as well as whether steps could be taken to facilitate company and shareowner communications while simultaneously maintaining effective clearing systems.

The SEC’s review of beneficial ownership resulted in the 1976 Street Name Study, which found that street name holding facilitated clearance and settlement of securities transactions and noted its importance to the operation of securities depositories. Increased use of securities depositories was thus an essential prerequisite to immobilization of share certificates. By affirming street name registration as essential for effective securities transaction clearance and settlement, the study paved the way for increased use of the practice. The Street Name Study also recommended against changes to the existing shareowner communication framework. Finding that it "functioned reasonably well," its shareowners generally received communications in a timely manner whether holding shares directly with the company or through an intermediary."
History of the 1980's Communication Rules

The SEC soon revised the communications framework. The stated objective of the Congressional and SEC actions of the late-1970s and 1980s was to better integrate beneficial owners into the communication framework, thereby potentially promoting more informed votes about corporate matters. As noted in the House Report for the Shareholder Communications Act of 1985:

Informed shareholders are critical to the effective functioning of U.S. companies and to the confidence in the capital market as a whole. When an investor purchases common stock in a corporation, that individual also obtains the ability to participate in making certain major decisions affecting that corporation. Fundamental to this concept is the ability of the corporation to communicate with its shareholders. 44

While the reforms of the 1980s were an improvement as compared with the prior system of shareholder communications, the framework instituted was circuitous and complex.

In 1977, the SEC initiated a "corporate governance proceeding," a review of corporate governance generally, including shareholder communications and shareholder participation in corporate elections. 45 The review lasted three years and resulted in the 1980 "Staff Report." 46 The impetus for the renewed review of corporate governance, including shareholder communications, was a variety of events in the mid-to-late 1970s that cast doubt on the adequacy of processes to ensure corporate accountability. 47 The Staff Report noted that shareholders elect a board of directors to direct or oversee a company’s management on their behalf. 48 In principle, the periodic election of directors holds the board accountable for pursuing the best interests of shareholders. However, the foreign bribery scandals of the mid-1970s, which ultimately led to the adoption of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in which hundreds of companies disclosed illegal or questionable payments to foreign officials, 49 as well as disclosures regarding the collapse of several major companies and corporate non-compliance with environmental and other laws 50 called into question the efficacy of the election process to promote the goal of corporate accountability.

The focus of the Staff Report differed from that of the Street Name Study. While the Street Name Study focused on whether street name ownership facilitated securities trading without the need for transfer of physical stock certificates, 51 the Staff Report addressed the impact of beneficial ownership and the prevailing shareholder communications regime on corporate governance.

A key recommendation in the Staff Report was that the SEC create an advisory committee to develop a system for companies to identify beneficial owners and establish a uniform proxy material distribution system. 52 In 1981, the SEC convened the Advisory Committee on Shareholder Communications to study the then-existing framework. 53 After an extensive review, the Advisory Committee recommended several changes, many of which are a part of the current framework. 54

The Advisory Committee recommended limited direct communications between companies and their shareholders. The framework recommended by the Advisory Committee authorized direct communications for annual reports, but not for proxies, and introduced the concept of NOBO lists. In 1983, the SEC adopted rules reflecting the Advisory Committee’s recommendations. Direct communications by companies with beneficial owners were therefore not permitted for the delivery of proxy cards or materials. Since then, companies have not been able to send proxy materials or cards directly to beneficial owners, even NOBOs.
It is noteworthy that the Advisory Committee also considered a more comprehensive direct communication framework that would have allowed companies to send proxy materials directly to NQBOs, but ultimately rejected this approach. One concern was that companies would receive non-standardized NOBO lists and would be unable to process the lists to send proxy materials in a timely manner. More fundamentally, the Advisory Committee concluded — and the SEC agreed — that any additional benefits from direct communication were outweighed by the uncertainty of both the costs and effectiveness of any alternative system. Instead, the Advisory Committee and the SEC concluded that problems with the communication framework could be sufficiently remedied through the incremental reforms that were adopted. As reflected in the summary of the rules in Annex C, a clear albeit unarticulated consequence of the system that was adopted was to preclude the possibility of direct communication with NQBOs, who were of course not even identified to companies.

The SEC’s rules implementing the Advisory Committee’s proposals became effective in January 1996. Implementation was delayed so brokers and companies could work out who would bear the costs of implementation and what costs companies would reimburse going forward. Prior to effectiveness, the SEC approved a provision allowing brokers to delegate to an agent their obligations to respond to company requests for information about shareholders. The Advisory Committee also recommended legislation giving the SEC regulatory authority over bank nominees, which were then and still are intermediaries for the majority of the shares held by beneficial owners. After receiving a legislative proposal from the SEC, in 1995 Congress passed the Shareholder Communications Act, which amended the Exchange Act (Section 14(b)) to give the SEC authority to regulate bank intermediaries with respect to shareholder communications. The SEC adopted Rule 14b-2 almost immediately thereafter, which imposed obligations on banks comparable to those applicable to brokers.
Consequences of the OBO/NOBO Distinction

The most important consequences of the OBO/NOBO distinction are that it further impedes a company’s direct communications with shareowners and direct communications among shareowners. Either the company must forward solicitation materials through intermediaries for a fee, as is true for OBOs, or rely on lists compiled by intermediaries and incur “per-name” fees, in the case of NOBOs. This expensive and time-consuming process may deter companies from communicating with shareowners more than the minimum required by law. Similar impediments exist with respect to communications among shareowners, including in connection with contested matters that also involve the use of the current framework.

Shareholder communications are particularly critical in the solicitation of proxies. The solicitation process is aimed not only at informing shareowners about matters subject to a vote, but also at encouraging them to vote, and generally to vote a particular way. Companies have a clear interest in persuading shareowners to vote and to vote in the manner they recommend, including where applicable for the slate of directors they recommend. Companies also have a further interest in at least some cases in participation by shareowners. For example, the company must obtain a quorum to conduct business at a meeting. Even where a quorum exists, the voting standard may be rigorous (e.g., supermajority provisions require the affirmative vote of a majority of the outstanding shares) and necessitate frequent communications to assure a favorable vote. Shareowners who are engaged in soliciting proxies or otherwise encouraging voting have an equally strong interest in effective communications to gain support for their objectives, whether promoting their own director nominees, opposing others’ director nominees, or supporting or opposing shareowner or other proposals.

Recent developments in corporate governance will place more pressure on voting outcomes and increase the need for both companies and shareowners to have an effective and reliable framework for communications. These developments include the following:

- increase in proxy contests, including short slate proxy contests;
- rise of “vote-no” campaigns;
- amended NYSE Rule 452; starting January 1, 2010, it prohibits brokers from using their discretion to vote uninstructed customer shares in uncontested director elections;
- adoption, mostly by big companies, of majority voting in uncontested director elections;
- widespread use of shareowner proposals to effect governance and other changes;
- Delaware General Corporation Law and Model Business Corporation Act amendments to clarify the permissibility of bylaw changes to affect proxy access or reimbursement of shareowner proxy contests; and
- the SEC’s proposals to implement “proxy access” rules to permit shareowner access to the company’s proxy statement.
SECTION V

Interests of Investors in the
OBO/NOBO System and Modifications

Investors are a diverse group that includes individuals, company, union and public sector pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds and insurance companies, among many others. While on any given matter their interests may diverge, in the context of the shareholder communications framework, they generally share two core interests — privacy and a level playing field with companies regarding communications with other shareholders in connection with proxy solicitations and other matters.

Privacy

Privacy is an interest often cited as important to investors. Indeed, the OBO/NOBO distinction was driven in significant part by this interest, and a policy decision on the part of the SEC that investors wishing to preserve anonymity should be allowed to do so. Recent data casts doubt, however, on the importance of privacy as a motivation for retaining the current framework. A survey undertaken in 2006 on behalf of the NYSE Proxy Working Group revealed that only 36 percent of retail customers would choose to be OBOS if they understood the consequences, with the percentage declining to 14 percent if a $5 annual fee were charged to maintain OBO status, and to 5 percent if the annual fee were $50.18

Within the overall context of a privacy interest, it is also unclear which information investors may wish to keep private and from whom. Smaller retail investors simply might not want their information disclosed to avoid being bombarded with mailings, phone calls and possibly electronic communications in connection with proxy solicitations.

Some investors may also want to keep their investments private from other investors. Any shareholder can request a NOBO list. Under Delaware corporate law, a shareholder may request a stock list at any time, and the company must deliver it so long as the shareholder can show it intends to use the information for a "proper purpose." The stock list includes the NOBO list if the company has obtained such a list. A company need not provide a NOBO list if it has not requested one for its own use, however. An investor may be concerned that activist shareholders with access to other investor names may use the information either to expose the investor’s investment in a controversial company as a tactic to promote an agenda or toindle shareholders with unwanted communications. While the “use” limitation provides some protection against these concerns, the potential for abuse may be sufficient to drive this rationale for maintaining anonymity.

Investors may favor anonymity to keep their holdings or trading strategies confidential from companies, other investors, marking generally, regulators and others, a goal that may be of particular actual or perceived competitive importance to investors such as hedge funds. While the federal securities laws require disclosure when an investor acquires beneficial ownership of over 5 percent of a class of voting equity securities, investors may still desire to maintain privacy or to control any public or private disclosure with respect to smaller positions. Some have raised the concern that companies might "blacklist" if the companies could have access to a list of all beneficial owners at any time. Some investors may have an interest in maintaining privacy to shield potentially controversial trading practices or ownership strategies from scrutiny.19
Access to NOBO Lists and the Ease of Shareowner Communications

One concern for investors is the ease of communicating with other shareowners. Both the cost and speed of such communications are important. Under the current SEC proxy rules, if a shareowner wants to communicate with other shareowners in connection with a proxy solicitation, the company must either: (i) provide the requesting shareowner the list of record and beneficial owners; or (ii) mail the shareowner’s communications, at the shareowner’s cost. The company may delegate such responsibilities to an agent, typically Broadridge. Many shareowners have found that relying on Broadridge to mail communications with respect to proxy solicitations to be cost effective and sufficiently fast to suit their purposes. Even if a company decides to send a requesting shareowner the list of record and beneficial owners, the shareowner can still contract with Broadridge to distribute such communications, and hence can still take advantage of any cost savings or efficiencies Broadridge provides.

Even if a company opts to mail a shareowner’s communications, a shareowner may still likely gain access to NOBO and shareowner lists through state law means. Under Delaware law, for example, a company must deliver a shareowner list, including the NOBO list if the company has requested it, to a shareowner (including the beneficial owner) so long as the latter can show that it intends to use the information for a “proper purpose.” It is clear that “proper purpose” includes communication with other shareowners about the company, whether or not in connection with a proxy solicitation. If the company refuses to provide the list or fails to respond within five business days after the demand is made, the shareowner may seek an order to compel delivery from the Delaware Court of Chancery. In such a case, after the shareowner has established its status and shown that it has made a proper demand, the company bears the burden of establishing that the request was for an improper purpose. Given the weight of precedent, which favors shareowners seeking to communicate with each other as noted above, anecdotal evidence suggests that companies rarely challenge demands for shareowner lists.

Competing with the Company — The “Battle of the Coffer”

The current general restriction on a shareholder’s access to corporate funds to finance its solicitation and other communications efforts may affect some investors’ views of changing the ORGN/NOBO system to foster direct communications by companies and shareowners with beneficial owners. One consequence of the elimination of ORGN/NOBO status would be the potential for more frequent communications between a company and its shareowners. The recent evolution of governance practices and related rules would be likely to drive this trend. Shareowners have a similar interest, but while they should have the same access to the shareholder lists as the company, they must pay for communications (and other solicitation costs) while incumbent managers have access to corporate funds to conduct solicitations.

Incumbent directors and managers typically may be reimbursed for expenses related to proxy contests, regardless of the outcome, so long as the expenses are reasonable and related to deciding a matter of principle or policy. Shareowners involved in a proxy contest, on the other hand, must pay their own expenses, including the cost of communications. A board may authorize reimbursement of such expenses but, as a practical matter, reimbursement is only likely where the shareowner has been successful in electing a majority of the board or in reaching an agreement with the company.
A recent Delaware case illustrated the board's ultimate authority over a decision to reimburse and the limits shareholders may place on the board's ability to fulfill its fiduciary duties in that regard. In CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan,** the Delaware Supreme Court held that a proposed shareholder bylaw that would require the board to reimburse a shareholder's reasonable expenses when the shareholder sought to elect less than 50 percent of the board (i.e., a short slate) and succeeded in electing at least one director was invalid on its face because it could require reimbursement of a shareholder's expenses in circumstances that would force the board to violate its fiduciary duties. In response to CA, Inc. in April 2009, the Delaware General Assembly adopted Delaware General Corporation Law Section 113 to clarify that a bylaw to allow reimbursement of shareholders' expenses is permissible.** In the absence of a bylaw or if a challenging shareholder failed to meet the conditions of the bylaw, the CA, Inc. result would continue to apply in maintaining the discretion of the board with respect to reimbursing shareholder expenses. (The extent to which a bylaw could limit the ability of a board to exercise its fiduciary duties is unclear.)
Interests of Various Other Stakeholders

Companies

Companies tend to favor more comprehensive shareholder communications reform proposals. In April 2004, the Business Roundtable (BRT) filed a Request for Rulemaking with the SEC, urging revision of the shareholder communications rules and proposing a direct communications framework. In response to SEC proposals regarding proxy access, the BRT had comment letters in both 2003 and 2009, again urging revision of the current framework to allow direct communications.

Other industry groups reflecting company, management and director interests, such as the Shareholder Communications Coalition, have supported the BRT’s reform proposals, and it is a fair assumption that the BRT’s position reflects the public company perspective (or at least the perspective of large public companies) more generally.

In advancing a direct communications framework, companies have two key objectives:

- **Direct Communications.** Companies have asserted their strong interest in direct communications as a matter of symmetry — if shareholders are able to participate more directly in board elections through proxy access or other means, companies should be able to contact them directly as well. The practical arguments are two-fold. First, given the rise in the number of meaningful and contested voting matters, companies have a more urgent need to communicate with shareholders. Second, as the BRT has argued, if proxy access is adopted and opposition candidates appear on the company’s proxy card, the board would have a fiduciary duty to take actions it considered necessary or appropriate to promote the nominees best suited for the job, including additional communications with beneficial owners. In those cases, companies may have an interest in communications with shareholders beyond what are today the customary proxy materials, for example to promote the company slate or to “get out the vote.”

- **Costs of Communications.** Companies (or, more precisely, their shareholders) bear the costs of forwarding proxies at levels set by the NYSE, and the potential for direct communications could reduce those costs. Companies have complained that under the current system, the other participants (including Broadridge as agent, banks and brokers) have no incentive to reduce costs, since their expenses are fully reimbursed.

Broker-Dealers and Bank Intermediaries

Broker and bank intermediaries tend to favor the status quo with respect to shareholder communications. When the BRT proposed reforms in 2004, the Securities Industry Association (a broker-dealer trade association that since merged with the Bond Market Association to form the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, or SIFMA), strongly opposed the proposal. The stated reason for opposition was that the current framework had proven to be reliable and did not warrant comprehensive overhaul.
In taking this position, the interests of brokers and banks appear to include the following:

- **Competitive Interest in Confidentiality of Customer Lists.** Because Broadridge does not disclose the identity of a NOBO’s broker or bank intermediary in the NOBO list, under the current framework, delegating authority to Broadridge to compile NOBO lists allows brokers and banks to maintain the confidentiality of their customer lists.

- **Preservation of Fee Income From Forwarding Communications.** The prospect of eliminating or reducing the role of intermediaries would reduce the fee income they earn both for forwarding proxy materials and for providing NOBO lists.

- **Preservation of Stock Loan Revenues.** Direct communications could affect the securities lending market. A customer with a margin account agrees that the broker may lend its customer’s shares, but at least retail customers (and potentially some institutional customers) are typically not entitled to any fees the broker earns from stock loan transactions and are almost always unaware that their shares are on loan. The current practice is for brokers to lend securities from an unidentified pool of shares, not specifying which particular customer’s shares are on loan. With a direct communications framework, however, if the broker were also required to execute a proxy in favor of the specific holder entitled to vote each share, the broker would need to identify which particular customer’s shares were on loan (and to whom). As a result, there might be pressure from retail and institutional customers on brokers to curtail lending activity, identify if a share stock loan fees are.

While brokers and banks have their own interests to advance, their interests may also to some degree reflect those of the beneficial owners who are their customers. Beneficial owners are not a homogenous group, however, and they may have diverging interests with respect to the current system and reform. The distribution of investor types across intermediaries is not random. Brokers tend to have hedge funds and retail investors as customers, while banks act more typically as custodians for mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, endowments and trusts. As the interests of these groups diverge, so may the expressed interests of their respective intermediaries.

**Broadridge**

Broadridge has a strong interest in preserving the current framework, since it is essentially the sole central agent providing “investor communications, document management and proxy processing services” in the United States. Indeed, its current business model is driven by the current framework under which it both earns agency fees and is reimbursed for its other costs.
Possible Reform of the OBO/NOBO Regime

Approaches to reform of the current OBO/NOBO framework range from minor incremental changes to a comprehensive overhaul. Any reform must advance the goal of operational reliability — or at least not impair the reliability of the current framework. One important question of course is the degree of reliability of the current framework, which is the subject of some debate. There is no systematically gathered information regarding reliability. Broadridge and intermediaries express the view that reliability is high. There is some anecdotal evidence of breakdowns in reliability, including NYSE examination results and the 2008 under-reporting by Broadridge of withheld votes for certain directors of Yahoo.

Customer preferences

Customers do not express an overwhelming preference to be OBOs. In the NYSE Proxy Working Group survey, 64 percent of retail customers responded they would prefer to be NOBOs, when asked of the consequences of the OBO/NOBO distinction, with the percentage preferring NOBO status increasing on the imposition of fees to maintain OBO status. Based on this data, NOBO status would seem to be the preferred default preference among customers, and any incremental reform could require intermediaries to set NOBO as the default in customer account documentation and even mandate a system of more informed and affirmative election of OBO status. If the data from the Proxy Working Group is an accurate reflection of investors generally, the percentage of shares held by OBOs likely would be reduced significantly. This reform would not, however, address a company’s ability to send proxies directly to beneficial owners, nor the costs associated with the current framework.

Such an approach would be in line with the SEC’s original intentions in implementing the OBO/NOBO distinction. The rules require brokers and banks to disclose the information of all beneficial owners “who have not objected to disclosure of such information.” This language suggests that the SEC explicitly intended the standard to be one of non-objection, not one of affirmative permission to release information.

Cost of Maintaining OBO Status

Under the current framework, companies must pay brokers or banks and their agents for distributing proxies and NOBO lists. A company must not only pay the actual distribution costs, but also is charged an additional fee for these services, costs that are ultimately borne by shareholders. If a shareholder’s OBO status makes a company’s communications more expensive, other shareholders in fact subsidize that cost.

An alternative would be to impose the cost of OBO status more directly on OBOs themselves. This approach could be implemented in a variety of ways. One option would be to charge a fee to any customer who wanted to be an OBO, similar to the fee payable for an unlimited landline telephone number. Another option, which addresses the cost question but leaves open the other issues that could be addressed by more far-reaching reform, would be to abolish the OBO/NOBO distinction and require any customer seeking privacy to open a nominee account to maintain confidentiality. Opening and maintaining a nominee account has fees beyond those charged for a typical brokerage account. Under either option, a shareholder’s privacy interest is respected, but at the shareholder’s expense.
Direct Communications

A more comprehensive approach to reform would entail a movement to a direct communication framework. This approach would combine the elimination of the OBGO/NOGO distinction with the elimination of all mandatory communications through broker and bank intermediaries and Broadridge. These intermediaries and Broadridge could still play a role, albeit a different one. The BRT presented one such approach in its 2004 request for rulemaking. This reform approach is illustrated in Figure 6.4 in Appendix B. Another direct communication reform approach, proposed by the Altman Group, is described in endnote 117, infra.

The BRT proposal relies on two key changes — the elimination of the OBGO/NOGO distinction and SEC rulemaking to authorize companies to mail all proxy materials directly to beneficial owners. Under this approach, a cascading series of executed proxies would form the basis of the shareholder vote. First, OTC would execute an omnibus proxy in favor of its participant broker and bank intermediaries, thereby enabling the participants to vote the number of shares on deposit as of the record date, as if they did now. Next, in contrast to the current framework, intermediaries would execute an omnibus proxy enabling those customers holding shares through the intermediaries to vote, and so forth down the chain of ownership until the proxies reached beneficial owners. As the end result of this series of omnibus proxies, each beneficial owner would receive a proxy card that it had full authority to vote, which it would complete and return directly to the company.

Under the BRT proposal, brokers and banks would still maintain a list of the names, addresses and securities positions of beneficial owners, and Broadridge might still be engaged to create a standardized, integrated list that compiled this information for all beneficial owners. Broadridge’s involvement could thus continue to make it possible for bank and broker intermediaries to maintain the confidentiality of their separate customer lists. This list would provide the company with information as to who was entitled to vote those shares for verification purposes and would be available to both the company and shareholders (presumably for a fee payable by the requesting party). Beneficial owners would return their proxies directly to the company (or the tabulator acting on the company’s behalf), instead of forwarding voting instructions to the intermediaries or Broadridge. Importantly, both companies and shareholders could also communicate directly with shareholders to solicit proxies, seek support for their positions and “get out the vote.”

The BRT proposal would likely increase the degree of transparency of beneficial ownership to companies and shareholders, while preserving the flexibility of beneficial owners to shield their identities through the use of nominee accounts. Given the costs associated with nominee accounts and shareholders’ stated preference not to pay an annual fee to maintain their privacy, the likely result of a direct communication framework is that only a minority of shareholders would use nominee accounts and thereby shield their identities from companies. The proposal creates uncertainty with respect to costs and also raises a concern that the system will not operate as effectively as the current framework, which essentially relies on the centralization of information distribution through Broadridge. The BRT proposal also raises the concerns described above that, because of the expense to shareholders unless there is company reimbursement, the greater advantages of direct communication on contested matters accrue to companies.

The potential costs associated with implementing a new framework could be a significant obstacle to reform. In the case of the 1982 reforms, huge disparities in cost estimates, as well as uncertainty about ongoing cost savings, were an important reason the Advisory Committee did not recommend direct communications. Even implementing the current framework required a one-year delay to allow brokers and companies to allocate start-up costs and resolve fee and expense reimbursement issues.
Today, brokers and banks have in place procedures that could facilitate direct communications, particularly Rockridge's standardized beneficial owner list. However, any changes to the framework would doubtless entail start-up costs, the level of which is somewhat uncertain given the availability of electronic delivery and voting options.

The reliability of a direct communications framework is also not likely to be accepted as incontrovertible fact, notably by intermediaries. When the BPI proposed direct communications in 2004, the Securities Industry Association (now SIFMA) opposed the proposal, noting the efficiency, reliability and accuracy of the existing framework and the years of development and investment required to achieve those standards.10 Similar arguments persuaded the SEC not to adopt direct communications in 1992. The switch to a new delivery system would entail some degree of execution risk as companies assumed the responsibility of delivering proxy materials. Given the SEC's longstanding concern about fairness towards retail investors,14 a particular concern would be whether companies could assure timely delivery to that segment of investors. Any proposal for direct communications would have to add this concern with specificity. The fact that the infrastructure that supposedly ensures reliable communications is in place and could be adapted to a direct communications system, coupled with huge advances in technology since the 1990s, suggests that reliability concerns may be addressed in an objective manner.

The following table summarizes the reform proposals discussed above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NOBO Status</th>
<th>Fee to Maintain NOBO Status</th>
<th>Business Roundtable Proposal</th>
<th>Alston Group Proposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Keep NOBO/NOBO distinction</td>
<td>Investor must pay a fee to be an OBO</td>
<td>Eliminate NOBO/NOBO distinction</td>
<td>Replace NOBO/NOBO distinction with &quot;ABO&quot; status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require NOBO to be set as &quot;default&quot; in broker customer account documentation</td>
<td>Investors may retain privacy if they choose, but for a fee</td>
<td>Access to list of beneficial owners at any time</td>
<td>Access to &quot;ABO&quot; list permitted only for annual and special meetings, limited number of other circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investors may retain privacy if they choose at no cost to them</td>
<td>Direct communication only to NOBOs</td>
<td>Investor may still use nominee account to maintain privacy</td>
<td>Mandatory disclosure of all beneficial owners, including those whose shares held in nominee accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct communication only to NOBOs</td>
<td>Proxy materials still must be distributed through intermediaries</td>
<td>Direct communication to all beneficial owners</td>
<td>Direct communication to all beneficial owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proxy materials still need not be distributed through intermediaries</td>
<td>No change to costs of distributing communications and proxy materials</td>
<td>Proxy materials must be delivered directly to beneficial owners, returned directly to company (or tabulator)</td>
<td>Does not take position on whether proxy materials should be sent directly to beneficial owners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No change to costs of distributing communications and proxy materials</td>
<td></td>
<td>Costs of distributing communications and proxy materials potentially lower</td>
<td>Costs of distributing communications and proxy materials potentially lower</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Recommendations

The compelling and competing interests we describe above are likely to make the SEC cautious in seeking to change the communications framework in significant ways, at least in the near term. These interests will also likely present issues that would probably constrain, or at least delay, the SEC's ability to achieve significant changes if it decides to try. Further, the caution that we would expect from the SEC will be particularly marked on the subject of proposed changes that could face strong opposition from the perspective of cost or reliability. That said, some change is all but inevitable given the emerging consensus that the limitations of the current framework are increasingly unworkable in an era of rising investor activism and more meaningful shareholder voting.

Defining the objective is critical to developing a proposal. If the goal is to increase the ability of shareholders and companies to communicate directly, a number of incremental steps may be taken individually or together, without discarding the current platform. Such an approach could enhance communications without seriously affecting the interests of many of the participants in the current framework.

A more ambitious goal to ensure not only improved communications, but also more reliable voting seems difficult to achieve without a more radical solution that is (or approaches) a pure direct communications framework with cascading executed proxies. Implementing such an approach would, however, almost certainly be more contentious, since it would implicate complex strategic, cost, logistical, and other considerations of critical importance to key players. In addition, while the SEC is likely to pursue investor education initiatives in light of the continuing large retail shareholder base, the elimination of uninstructed broker voting and falling retail investor participation, the SEC might well conclude that such efforts would have to be more substantial and changes take longer, if it pursued a more radical change in proxy mechanics. Moreover, the SEC could conclude that facilitating direct communication is more in line with its disclosure mandate than improving the reliability of voting and facilitating end-to-end audit trails for shareholder votes. On balance, we believe that an incremental approach that promotes greater transparency around shareholder lists and more opportunity for direct communications by shareholders and companies alike has a greater chance of widespread support than more radical alternatives.

A first step could be to address the CB/NOBO distinction, preferably by eliminating it. This discrete change would likely increase the number of shareholders with whom other shareholders and companies could communicate directly in some ways, while preserving the logistical apparatus now used to compile shareholder lists and distribute communications. This step could itself, if desired, have a phased implementation starting with a mandate to make NOBO the default status for customer accounts, with full disclosure about the consequences of selecting CB status. Election of CB status could be coupled with a charge to delay the costs of maintaining a platform to support CB status. Eventually, the CB/NOBO distinction could be eliminated, with customers able to preserve their anonymity through nominee accounts at their own expense. We do not believe that proposals that eliminate the possibility of anonymity altogether are workable, at least in the near term, since they do not accommodate the strong privacy interests of many retail and institutional investors.
A second step could be to relax restrictions on the ability of companies and shareholders to distribute proxy materials and solicit proxies directly and to streamline the process for both companies and shareholders to obtain shareholder lists. We would not recommend that this step be achieved through eliminating the intermediary-agent platform altogether, since to do so could raise concerns about the reliability of communications and would likely face significant opposition from some players where business model depends at least in part on aspects of the current framework. Instead, this step could be achieved in a less intrusive way through regulatory changes that would permit direct distribution and solicitation, but maintain the intermediary-agency platform as an alternative. Even in a world where direct communications are fully permissible, we believe that companies will continue to use agents for purposes of compiling shareholder lists and particularly document distribution given the advantages of large scale fulfillment in terms of cost and reliability. Similarly, we believe shareholders will continue to use the agent platform for document distribution in at least some circumstances, even as the ability to communicate directly will provide advantages in other circumstances.

Preserving the role of intermediaries in this approach would continue to accommodate customer and intermediary preferences for anonymity. Likewise, preserving a “neutral” agent as the centralized repository of shareholder lists may also provide comfort to shareholders who, we understand, find the current system for requesting shareholder lists from Broadridge (or another agent) to be relatively easy and responsive.

A full direct communications framework, in which companies control the shareholder lists, but all parties have easy access to the list and may communicate directly with each other, could also ultimately be workable. The desirability of this approach would depend on whether it would protect shareholders from the risk that companies prevent or limit access to the shareholder list. If shareholders in fact have ready access to shareholder lists under existing state law, the utility of this additional step is uncertain. Even in the case of a direct communications framework, we would recommend that the framework continue to permit reliance on fulfillment services provided by Broadridge and other agents. We would note that, although not central to our analysis, taking steps to permit and facilitate direct communications by shareholders and companies alike could lead to a more competitive environment around intermediaries and agents’ services, including increasing pressures for competitively negotiated (and possibly lower) fees.

Other reforms would be needed to achieve reliable end-to-end audit trails, such as the cascading series of executed proxies from DTC to the beneficial owner resulting in the beneficial owner having exclusive authority to vote. The proxies returned would bear the names of the beneficial owners, allowing the tabulator to compare the votes with the list of all beneficial owners on file with the company. Without this reform, Broadridge would still verify and tabulate the majority of votes, as most beneficial owners would still return their voting instructions to Broadridge. Companies would have to rely on Broadridge to ensure that only those shareholders entitled to vote do so, as is the case under the current system. Without access to Broadridge’s procedures and results in aggregating votes, companies cannot effectively audit Broadridge’s verification process, and could not do so even if they knew who all of their beneficial owners were.

Whether the practical benefits of coupling a direct communications framework with cascading executed proxies would outweigh the costs is uncertain. The benefits are likely to be limited to a minority of contested elections in which an end-to-end audit of the vote is critical to a reliable outcome. It may be worthwhile to have more data, particularly about director elections in the wake of the elimination of unstructured broker voting in uncontested director elections and other recent developments and the practice that emerges if the SEC adopts a proxy access regime, before moving to this more comprehensive type of solution. We also believe that this approach requires more detailed analysis by the various affected constituencies to obtain a clearer picture of the logistical changes, costs and potential disruptions it could entail.
SECTION VIII.

Given the time required for that exercise, we believe that the immediate interest of shareholders and companies in better communications would be better and more effectively served with the incremental approach that promotes less reliance on — or eliminates altogether — the OBÜ/OBÖO distinction and otherwise increases the potential for direct communications.

The SEC has indicated that it will address the OBÖO/OBÖO issue and ask whether the distinction is needed in a concept release to be drafted in the coming months. Each of the potential reform proposals raises issues for particular groups of stakeholders. The interplay of these stakeholder interests will influence the direction of any reforms. Moreover, in considering any reform proposal with respect to shareholder communications, it is important to keep in mind the emphasis the SEC has placed historically on reliability of proxy delivery. Even where the SEC agrees with the conceptual underpinnings of a particular proposal, the details of implementation will receive significant scrutiny involving both practical and political issues.
Operation of the OBO/NOBO Rules

The following summarizes the operation of the shareholder communication rules for broker and bank intermediaries. While the process is similar for those intermediaries, differences remain, largely attributable to the more limited scope of the SEC’s authority over banks.

In both cases, communicating with beneficial owners requires that the company determine how many beneficial owners hold its securities and details of NOBOs and distribute proxy materials. While all proxy cards and proxy statements must be distributed through the broker or bank intermediaries, annual reports and other communications may be sent to NOBOs directly. All communications with OBOs occur through the intermediaries.

Broker Intermediaries

Company contacts broker for information regarding beneficial owners. After a company receives information from DTC about participants that hold its shares held in street names, it sends a “search card” to the broker nominee holders in which it seeks information relevant to the proxy distribution process, including the number of proxy cards, proxy solicitation materials, annual reports or other materials it must print. A company must send such a search card when soliciting proxies, seeking consents in lieu of a meeting or mailing information statements. In the search card, the company must indicate whether it intends to distribute the annual report directly to beneficial owners, as it is permitted to do under Rule 14a-15(c). The initial search card inquiry must be made at least 20 business days prior to the record date or, if impracticable, a shorter period as far in advance of the record date as practicable.

Broker responds to company’s request for information. Brokers must respond to the company’s inquiry within seven business days of receipt of the search card. The broker must indicate: (i) the approximate number of its customers who are beneficial owners; (ii) the number of OBOs; and (iii) the identity of any agent designated to fulfill the broker’s Rule 14b-16(b)(2) obligations. Almost all broker custodians delegate their Rule 14b-16(b)(2) obligations to Broadridge Financial Solutions (Broadridge).

Broker provides company with NOBO list. If requested, the broker (or its agent) must provide the company with the names, addresses and securities positions of NOBOs. The list need not identify the broker with which each NOBO holds its shares. Instead, one benefit of delegating responsibility for the NOBO list to Broadridge is the broker’s ability to keep such data private. The NOBO list must be transmitted to the company no later than five business days after the record date.

Company sends proxies and other information materials to broker for distribution. The company must provide each broker intermediary with enough proxy materials to enable the broker to comply with its distribution obligations. The company must send proxy cards and proxy solicitation materials through the broker or its agent, but it may send the annual report or other information materials directly to NOBOs. Effective in 2007, the broker must send a “Notice of Internet Availability of Proxy Materials” to beneficial owners if the company is relying on the e-proxy rules.
Broker forwards proxy and other information materials to beneficial owners. The broker must forward proxy and other information materials to beneficial owners no later than five business days after receiving them (other than the annual report in the case of NOBOs, if the company has indicated its intention to send that document directly). Generally, brokers delegate the forwarding of proxy materials to an agent, and almost all use Broadridge for this purpose. The company must reimburse Broadridge's distribution expenses, and the NYSE and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) have established applicable fee schedules. Because voting depends on record ownership, the broker (as the holder of record for voting purposes) must either (i) provide the beneficial owner with an executed proxy card or (ii) request voting instructions. Generally, brokers choose the latter option.

Proxies are forwarded to the company. If a broker requests voting instructions from beneficial owners, it typically delegates the task of collecting and forwarding completed proxies to its agent, Broadridge. If a broker forwards an executed proxy to a beneficial owner, that beneficial owner could return a completed proxy to the company directly.

Bank Intermediaries

Company seeks information regarding beneficial owners from bank intermediary. After receiving information about banks, it sends a search card to bank intermediaries seeking information from the bank. As described above, the information-gathering process is more complex in the case of banks because many smaller bank custodians hold shares for beneficial owners through custodial accounts at larger banks (e.g., Bank of New York Mellon, JP Morgan, State Street or Citigroup). The larger banks only have records of the holdings on the smaller "respondent banks," not of the ultimate beneficial owners. Sometimes there can be three or four tiers of respondent banks. A bank intermediary must identify all its respondent banks and return the completed search card to the company. Within one business day of receipt of the company's search card, the bank intermediary must identify all its respondent banks, the company must send the same search card inquiry to the respondent banks. The respondent banks provide the same response obligations as the original bank intermediaries.

Bank responds more generally to company's request for information. Like brokers, a bank has seven business days to respond. A bank intermediary must provide the approximate number of beneficial owners who hold shares directly with the bank, the number of NOBOs, and the identity of any agent acting on behalf of the bank in providing NOBO lists. A bank intermediary may delegate its responsibility to respond to an agent, which is typically Broadridge.

Bank provides company with NOBO list. Upon request, banks (or their agent) must provide NOBO lists no later than five business days after the date specified by the company but no later than Dec. 28, 1996. For accounts opened on or before Dec. 28, 1996, the disclosure is only required if a customer affirmatively consents.

Company sends proxy materials to bank intermediaries. The company has the same responsibility to forward proxy and other information materials to bank intermediaries as it has for brokers and other intermediaries.
Bank forwards proxies to beneficial owners. As in the case of brokers, banks either forward an executed proxy to the beneficial owners or request voting instructions. As with brokers, most banks use voting instructions. Proxy materials must be forwarded no later than five business days after receipt. Banks may use agents to distribute voting materials and collect votes. Banks (or their agents) may be reimbursed for their expenses and typically follow the rates set by the NYSE. For respondent bank holders, banks execute an omnibus proxy in favor of the respondent banks within five business days after the record date. Respondent banks in turn execute the omnibus proxy in favor of the next layer of respondent banks, and so forth. The final layer of respondent banks follows the same procedure for acquiring the proxies of the beneficial owners (generally using voting instructions) as set out above.
Diagrams of Shareowner Communications and Proxy Voting

Figure 1. Shareowner Communications: Broker Intermediary

1. Request to DTC for list of participants
2. DTC "promptly" responds
3. Search card inquiry to company
4. Intermediary delegates response obligation to agent
   - Brokerage Fund
   - Hedge Fund
5. Broadridge responds
Figure 2. Shareowner Communications: Bank Intermediary
Figure 3. Shareowner Communications: NOBO Lists

1. Company, Inc. requests NOBO list
2. Intermediaries delegate response obligations to agent.
3. Broadridge sends single NOBO list
Figure 4. Proxy Voting: Part One
Figure 5. Proxy Voting: Part Two

1. Broadridge receives voting instructions and sends aggregated proxy to tabulator.
2. Beneficial owner returns voting instructions.
3. Intermediaries return executed proxies for any shares held directly.
4. Intermediaries return executed proxies for any shares held directly.
5. Tabulator sends results of proxy voting to company.
6. Company, Inc.
7. Depository Trust Company
8. Bank Intermediary
9. Broker Intermediary
10. Mutual Fund
11. Pension Fund
12. Hedge Fund
13. Brokerage Fund
14. Tabulator
Figure 6. Proxy Voting: BRT Proposal

1. Omnibus proxy in favor of intermediary
2. Omnibus proxy in favor of beneficial owner
3. Beneficial owner returns completed proxy to tabulator
4. Tabulator sends results of proxy voting to company
Shareowner Communication Framework

Exchange Act Section 14(b)¹

Section 14(b) makes it unlawful for a broker-dealer or bank intermediary to give or refrain from giving a proxy or other information statement in a manner that violates SEC rules and grants the SEC regulatory authority with respect to communications involving the company, broker and bank intermediaries and beneficial owners.

Section 14(b) was enacted as part of the passage of the Exchange Act in 1934.² With the aim of addressing the concern that brokers were voting customer shares without first consulting them. The SEC did not use its rulemaking authority under this section due to questions about the scope of its authority, particularly whether it could force broker-dealers to distribute proxies.³ Congress amended Section 14(b) in 1964 to clarify that the SEC could regulate brokers in this regard and require them to distribute proxy materials.⁴

The Shareholder Communications Act of 1995 extended the SEC’s rulemaking authority with respect to proxy distribution to cover bank intermediaries.⁵ Bank regulatory authorities had authority, but refused to implement rules with respect to shareowner communications, despite SEC requests to do so.⁶ The 1995 amendments distinguished between the SEC’s authority to require banks to produce lists of beneficial owners depending on whether a customer’s account with the bank was (i) opened on or before Dec. 28, 1965, or (ii) opened after Dec. 28, 1965. For the latter, the SEC had the same authority as it had for brokers (i.e., it could require disclosure of a NODO list). For the former, it could only require disclosure of the beneficial owners for customers who affirmatively consented to such disclosure. This was a compromise to address banks’ concern about existing customer expectations of privacy.⁷

In 1999, Section 14(b) was amended to extend the proxy forwarding requirements to securities issued by investment companies covered by the Investment Company Act of 1940.⁸

Exchange Act Rule 14a-13⁹

Rule 14a-13 outlines a company’s obligations with respect to shareowner communications, particularly proxy solicitations, including its responsibilities to gather information from broker and bank intermediaries⁴⁰ and to forward sufficient quantities of proxy materials to permit distribution by intermediaries to beneficial owners.¹⁰ The rule permits direct communication between the company and NODOs in the limited forms of the annual report.¹¹

Rule 14a-13 was adopted in January 1986¹² and consolidated prior regulatory provisions. Concurrently with the adoption of Rule 14a-2, Rule 14a-13 was amended to reflect the incorporation of banks into the communications system as regulated by the SEC.¹³ In 1992, Rule 14a-13 was amended to cover investment company securities.¹⁴
Exchange Act Rule 14b-1

Rule 14b-1 outlines broker obligations to respond to information requests from companies about shares held in street name and requires brokers to forward proxy materials to beneficial owners. Rule 14b-1(b)(3) requires brokers to provide NROD lists.

Rule 14b-1 was adopted in 1977, but did not take its current form until the 1983 amendments. The SEC proposed amended Rule 14b-1 in December 1982, with a view to facilitating communications between companies and beneficial owners, allowing direct communication in some cases. In part to retain the existing framework, which it found workable and facilitated the immobilization of share certificates, the SEC adopted a system that incorporated direct communications with NRODs into a general system of communication with beneficial owners through intermediaries.

The proposed rules were scheduled to become effective on Jan. 1, 1985, but effectiveness was deferred for one year to Jan. 1, 1986 to address broker concerns, particularly about cost. During the deferral, the SEC approved a provision allowing brokers to delegate their forwarding obligations to an agent and set time periods for brokers to respond to companies' information requests. In 1992, the SEC amended Rule 14b-1 to impose on brokers comparable information and proxy-forwarding requirements with respect to registered investment companies. In 2007, the SEC added subsections (d) and (e) to address distribution requirements for companies using the e-proxy rules.

Exchange Act Rule 14b-2

Rule 14b-2 extends the communication obligations of broker intermediaries to banks and generally imposes the same requirements. Differences exist that reflect the more limited scope of the SEC's regulatory authority. See Annex A for the differences in the two approaches.

Rule 14b-2 was adopted in November 1986 and became effective July 1, 1987. As in the case of Rule 14b-1, the SEC amended Rule 14b-2 in 1992 to impose on banks comparable information and proxy-forwarding requirements with respect to registered investment companies and, in 2007, to reflect adoption of the e-proxy rules.

Exchange Act Section 14(c)

Section 14(c) requires a company that is not seeking proxies, consents or other authorizations from its shareholders to forward to all record holders information statements containing information substantially equivalent to the information which would be required to be transmitted if a solicitation were made. Companies must comply with SEC rules in distributing information.

Congress adopted Section 14(c) as part of the 1984 amendments to the Exchange Act with a view to allowing the SEC to regulate the distribution of information statements. The SEC was concerned that some companies were avoiding the proxy disclosure rules by choosing not to solicit proxies.
Exchange Act Rule 14c-713

Rule 14c-7 regulates a company's obligations with respect to shareholder communications and generally mirrors Rule 14a-13, but relates to materials that are "substantially similar" to those distributed with a proxy card, but that a company might distribute when not soliciting proxies.

Rule 14c-7 was first adopted in January 1996, consolidating all of a company's obligations with respect to the distribution of information statements into one rule.14 Rule 14c-7 was amended concurrently with the adoption of Rule 14a-2 to reflect the integration of bank intermediaries into the shareholder communications system.15

Exchange Act Rule 17a-3(a)(9)16

Rule 17a-3(a)(9) facilitates the shareholder communication system by requiring members of national securities exchanges and registered broker-dealers to keep records of the names and addresses of customers who hold cash or margin accounts. The intermediary must also record OEDMOSO status. The rule only applies to broker intermediaries, as the SEC does not have authority with respect to the banks and records of banks.

Exchange Act Rule 17Ad-817

Enacted in 1979, Rule 17Ad-8 also facilitates the shareholder communication system by requiring registered clearing agencies to furnish a company with a position listing on request.18 The Depository Trust Company (DTC) is the sole U.S. depository institution and the holder of record for shares immobilized with it, including shares held in street name through its participants. In particular, the rule allows a company to determine which broker and bank intermediaries that are DTC participants hold shares in street or nominee name.
Endnotes

Sections I – VIII


2 See Loss et al., supra note 1, at 684.


6 Id. § 240.14a-15(c). Brokers typically forward the proxies using first class mail. See Brown, supra note 1, at 761-62. A company choosing to forward the annual report directly also would have to use first class mail to ensure it met the requirement of preceding the proxy. As a result, the company likely would not realize cost savings if it chooses to forward the annual report directly.


8 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-10(b)(3)(i) (brokers); id. § 240.14b-2(b)(4)(vii)(B) (banks)

9 Because Broadridge is the agent for essentially all intermediaries in the proxy process described herein, we refer to the intermediaries’ agent as Broadridge in this memorandum.


11 As noted, the standard for disclosure under the OBOMD400 regime is that one must affirmatively object to disclosure for the broker to withhold a beneficial owner’s information from the company. See Facilitating Shareholder Communications, SEC Release No. 34-19399, 1982 Transfer Binder Fed. Sec. L. Reps. (CCH) ¶ 80,397 at 10 (Dec. 10, 1982) (SEC 1982 Release). However, in the case of bank intermediaries, the standard of consent differs between customer accounts opened on or before December 29, 1986 (the effective date on which the standard of consent in respect of accounts held at banks intermediaries was modified), and those opened after. For the former, the customer must affirmatively consent to such disclosure, as opposed to simply not objecting. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-2(b)(4)(vii)(A). Please refer to Annex A for more details.


14 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14A-10(a).

15 See id. § 240.14A-10(a)(1), id. § 240.14A-10(a)(3). If the 20 days proves impracticable, the company must act as many days before the record date as is practicable. id. § 240.14A-10(a)(3). Note that in Delaware, the record date must be no more than 60 days but not less than 60 days prior to the meeting date. Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 213 (2009).

16 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-10(a)(1).
ENDNOTES

17 Id. § 240.14b-2(b)(1)(ii). Under SEC Rules, “respondent bank” is defined as “any bank, association or other entity that exercises fiduciary powers which holds securities on behalf of beneficial owners and deposits such securities for safekeeping with another bank, association or other entity that exercised fiduciary powers.” Id. § 240.14b-1(k).
18 Id. § 240.14b-10(a)(2).
19 Id. § 240.14b-2(b)(1)(i).
20 Id. § 240.14b-10(a)(2).
21 Id. § 240.14b-10(b)(3)(iii) (brokers); Id. § 240.14b-10(b)(3)(iv) (banks).
22 Id. § 240.14b-10(b)(3)(iv) (brokers) (“no later than five business days after the record date or other date specified by the registrant”), Id. § 240.14b-10(b)(3)(iv) (banks) (“no later than five business days after the date specified by the registrant”).
23 Id. § 240.14b-10(a)(4).
24 See id. § 240.14b-10 (rule requiring brokers to forward a company’s communications), id. § 240.14b-2(b)(3)(iii) (rule requiring bank intermediaries to forward a company’s communications).
25 See id. § 14a-10(e) (companies may forward annual report directly to NObO5); Id. § 240.14b-10(b)(3)(iv) (brokers need not forward annual report to NObO5 if company indicates its intention to do so), Id. § 240.14b-10(b)(3)(iv) (banks need not forward annual report to NObO5 if company indicates its intention to do so).
27 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1247.
30 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-10(b)(3) (for brokers), id. § 240.14b-2(b)(3)(iv) (for banks).
31 See Balch et al., supra note 29, at § 10.7. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1247.
32 Concerns have been raised about whether Fiduciary always properly accounts for involved votes and how it adjusts internally for overvoting. See id. at 1253-54. It appears that the inability to audit Fiduciary’s verification process may be a function of state law. Under Delaware law, for example, election inspectors are limited in what they may examine to determine the validity of proxies, and in particular may only go beyond the proxy card in the limited circumstance of overvoting in cases of nominee holders. Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 231(d) (2009) (“In determining the validity and counting of proxies and ballots, the inspectors shall be limited to an examination of the proxies, any envelopes submitted with those proxies, any information provided in accordance with § 231(e) or § 231(g)(2) of this title, or any information provided pursuant to § 231(i)(3)(B)(iv) or (v) of this title. Ballots and the requisite books and records of the corporation, except that the inspectors may consider other reliable information for the limited purpose of reconciling proxies and ballots submitted by or on behalf of banks, brokers, their nominees or similar persons which represent more votes than the holder of a proxy is authorized by the record owner to cast or more votes than the stockholder holds of record (emphasis added.”).
34 See, e.g., Egan-Jones Proxy Services, About Our Services, http://www.egan-jones.com/services.asp (“Egan-Jones offers automated voting services for a small additional fee to eliminate the hassle and expense of handling this increasingly important aspect of the investment process. Plus, clients retain the ability to over-ride Egan-Jones recommendations if desired.”). Egan-Jones is another prominent proxy adviser in the U.S. market.
See NYSE Inc., Rule 465 Supplementary Material, FINRA Inc., Rule 2260 Interpretive Material. NYSE Rule 465 specifies reasonable reimbursement rates members may charge companies, both listed and unlisted, for forwarding communications. Given that all broker intermediaries are members of NYSE, as is Breanridge, the NYSE fee schedule is the applicable one in almost all cases.

Reimbursement of an amount no greater than that brokers are permitted to charge for reimbursement is deemed a reasonable amount. See NYSE Inc., Rule 465 Supplementary Material, FINRA Inc., Rule 2260 Interpretive Material for approved fee schedules.

See Brown, supra note 1, at 715.

23. Id. Under the old system of trading, shareholders held physical stock certificates registered with the issuer. To execute a trade, these certificates would be delivered to the transfer agent after sale and endorsed to the buyer of the stock. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1377.

See Brown, supra note 1, at 720.


35. Id. § 78q-1(e)

36. Of course, in most cases today, the record holder is OTC. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.

37. See Brown, supra note 1, at 693.

38. See id. at 721.

39. See Street Name Study, supra note 28.

40. Id. at 3.

41. Id. at 42. The SEC found that 11 days prior to meetings, similar numbers of record and street name holders received proxies. Id. at 17. The SEC also found that companies with the highest percentage of street name ownership had the highest percentage of voting participation. Id. at 21.


43. See SEC Staff Report on Corporate Accountability, Division of Corporate Finance 7 (1980) (Staff Report).

44. Id.

45. See id.

46. See, e.g., id. at 544. State corporate law in most, if not all, states provides that the board of directors manages the affairs of the corporation on the shareholders’ behalf. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 141(a) (2009).

47. See Brown, supra note 1, at 715–16.


49. See Street Name Study, supra note 28, at 2.

50. See Staff Report, supra note 49, at 974-75.

51. See Brown, supra note 1, at 716.

52. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 7, at 25-29.


54. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 7, at 55, 58-60.

55. See id. at 68.

56. See id. at 68-69. The issue of non-standardized lists is of course solvable, for example, Breanridge currently provides a standardized NQ80 list to companies.
ENDNOTES

46 See id. at 69.
48 See id.
49 See id.
50 See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 7, at 79-31.
51 See Brown, supra note 1, at 743.
54 In Delaware, quorum is a majority as a default, but can be set as low as one-third in the charter. Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 116 (2001).
55 See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 7, at 68; SEC 1992 Releases, supra note 11, at 10.
56 See PWG Report, supra note 12, at ex. 9 at 3, 21.
60 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13(b)(4) (requiring companies to only use the list for “corporate communications”); Shamrock Associates v. Texas American Energy Corp., 517 A.2d 658 (Del. Ch. 1986) (applying restrictions on companies with respect to use of NOBO lists to dissenting shareholders using the same lists).
61 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1.
63 See Brown, supra note 1, at 766-67.
64 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (2005).
65 See Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 230 (2009). See also Model Bus. Corp. Act § 1602 (2005). The shareholder’s request is a written demand made under oath that also provides evidence of beneficial ownership if the shareholder is not the record owner.
66 See Marathon Petroleum L.P. v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 101, *30, *37 (Del. Ch. 2014) (communication with other stockholders “to effectuate a change in management policies” held to be a proper purpose); Conservative Caucus Research, Analysis & Educ. Foundation, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., 525 A.2d 569, 571 (Del. Ch. 1987) (communication with other stockholders regardless the economic risks of a company’s business activity in Angola and a resolution that was proposed to be submitted in connection with an annual meeting held to be a proper purpose); Weiss v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., C.A. No. 8548 (Del. Ch. May 22, 1986) (communication with other stockholders to encourage them to dissent from a merger and seek appraisal held to be a proper purpose).
Under Delaware law, a “proper purpose” is defined as “a purpose reasonably related to such person’s interest as a stockholder.” See Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 202(c).

38
ENDNOTES

See id. at 1273.

See id. at 1240.

See id. at 1230.


See id., et al., supra note 29, at ¶ 13.15.4; Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1254.

See PWS Report, supra note 17, at ex. 5 at 3.

Currently, between 70-90 percent of mutual funds are OBOs. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.

If customers acted in line with their stated preferences in the PWS survey and investors generally shared similar preferences to retail investors, that would mean that only 36 percent of customers would be OBOs, or half the current number.


See NYSE Inc., Rule 460 Supplementary Material (list of fees that brokers and their agents may charge for provision of various services related to the proxy and communication distribution process). Banks typically follow the NYSE rules when determining the fees to charge.

Given the retail customer response to an annual fee for privacy as noted previously, see supra note 79 and accompanying text, it seems unlikely that many retail holders would choose to invest via nominees accounts under such a system.

See BRT Proposal, supra note 13. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1271-72 for a summary. The BRT proposal is just one approach to a system of direct communications. Alternatives have been presented, many of which differ in minor respects from BRT’s proposal. See, e.g., SEC Letter, supra note 95. As one example, the Natman Group has proposed a system under which companies have access to the information of all beneficial owners (ABOs), but may only request the “ABO” list a limited number of times a year. This proposal contemplates a variety of alterations to the system of distributing proxy materials. See The Natman Group, supra note 79, at 12-13.

See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3(a)(9) (requiring brokers to maintain records regarding information about the beneficial owners of an company’s shares).

The BRT proposal does not specify who would pay what fees under their communications framework and also does not state the specific requirements a shareholder must meet in order to be able to be the beneficiary of soliciting support for a proxy proposal. However, in the latter case, likely the standard would be similar as that under state law currently. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.

See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 7, at 68.


See SIA Letter, supra note 96.


In the absence of legislation, the option to elect OBO status would presumably be retained for customer accounts maintained by banks and opened on or before Dec. 28, 1985. See infra Appendix C, note 7 and accompanying text.
128 While not directly germane to the communications framework, we note that the current large shareholder reporting threshold under Exchange Act Section 13 (beneficial ownership individually or as a part of a group of 5 percent or more of a company’s voting securities) is probably too high. Both companies and other shareholders have a legitimate interest in knowing the identities of large investors, and for many companies that threshold is probably 3 percent or even 1 percent. It is noteworthy that the SEC incorporated lower ownership thresholds (1 percent for large accelerated filers and 3 percent for accelerated filers) among the conditions for shareholder nominations of directors in its most recent proxy access proposal. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, SEC Release Nos. 33-9046; 34-60089, IC-28705 (June 10, 2009).

See supra note 82 and accompanying text.

129 A single list is also an important step towards end-to-end audits of shareholder votes. Otherwise, votes from record holders who are also beneficial owners can be directly audited, but the number of votes of shares held in street name may only be compared against the number of shares held by record holders. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 4, at 1253.

See id. at 1259-60.

See Schapiro Speech, supra note 118, at 7.

Reliability of the proxy distribution system continues to be an emphasis of the SEC. See id.

ANNEX A

2. Id. § 240.14a-10(a)(1)(i).
3. See id.
4. See id. § 240.14a-7(a)(3).
5. See id. § 240.14a-7(a)(1)(i)(A). For distribution of an information statement not in connection with a proxy, see id. § 240.14a-7(a)(1)(i)(A).
6. Id. § 240.14a-7(a)(3).
7. Id. § 240.14a-7(a)(3)(i). A company also may be allowed a short period if a securities exchange allows.
8. Id. § 240.14a-10(a)(3)(i).
9. Id. § 240.14a-10(b)(1).
10. This requirement is only applicable if the company has indicated under id. § 240.14a-10(a)(1)(i)(A) or id. § 240.14a-7(a)(1)(i)(A) that it will distribute the annual report to NDCs.
11. Id. § 240.14a-10(b)(1). A broker may inform a company in advance to forward such communications to its appointed agent.
12. Broadridge used to be ADP Brokerage Services Group before it was spun off by ADP in 2007.
14. Id. § 240.14b-1(b)(3)(x). The company may also specify a date other than the record date. See id.
15. Id. § 240.14a-10(a)(4).
16. Id. § 240.14a-13(c), id. § 14a-7(c).
17. Id. § 240.14b-1(b)(3).
18. Id. § 240.14b-1(b)(3)
19. Id. § 240.14a-10(b)(3).
ENDNOTES

See NYSE, Inc., Rule 465 Supplementary Material and FINRA Inc., Rule 2260 Interpretive Material for approved fee schedules.

17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-10(b)(2).

Id. § 240.14b-10(b)(1)(ii). See also id. § 240.14b-7(a)(1)(ii) (forwarding information statements when not soliciting proxies).

"Respondent bank" is defined at id. § 240.14a-16(a).

Id. § 240.14b-10(b)(1)(ii).

Id. § 240.14b-10(b)(1)(ii).

Id. § 240.14b-7(a)(1)(ii). This requirement is only applicable if the company has indicated under id. § 240.14a-16(a)(1)(ii) that it will distribute the annual report to beneficial owners who do not object. Note that the relevant standard for consent depends on whether a customer account was opened on or before or after Dec. 28, 1996. For accounts opened on or before Dec. 28, 1996, the bank should indicate how many beneficial owners have affirmatively consented to disclosure of their names, addresses, and securities positions; id. § 240.14b-2(1)(ii)(I)(III)(A). For those accounts opened after Dec. 28, 1996, the relevant standard is customers who have not objected to disclosure of their information. Id. § 240.14b-2(1)(ii)(II)(III)(C).

Id. § 240.14b-2(1)(ii)(II)(II).

Id. § 240.14b-2(1)(ii)(II)(II).

Id. § 240.14b-2(1)(ii)(II)(II).

Id. § 240.14b-2(1)(ii)(II)(II).

Id. § 240.14b-2(1)(ii)(II).

See id. § 240.14b-20(a)(3).

Id. § 240.14b-20(a)(3).

ANNEX C


See id. at 711.


Section 12(a) of the Exchange Act did require bank regulatory agencies to issue "substantially similar regulations to those governing bank subsidiaries", but did not require them to issue such regulations to issuers generally. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(b) (1982), Section (a) was not one of the covered sections, however.

See Brown, supra note 3, at 744.


Id. § 240.14a-13(a)(1).
11. Id. § 240.14a-13(x)(4).
12. Id. § 240.14a-13(c).
17. Id.
20. See Brown, supra note 3, at 735-36.
31. Id.
32. Id. supra note 3, at 712.
34. See SEC 1985 Release, supra note 13.
37. Id. § 240.17a-8.
38. Id. § 240.17a-8(d).
Selected Resources

   a. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (2009) (Section 14(b))
   b. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (Section 14(c))

2. Rules under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
   b. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13
   c. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1
   d. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-2
   e. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-1
   f. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14b-7
   g. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3(a)(19)
   h. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-8


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300

Testimony of Steven D. Irwin

Pennsylvania Securities Commissioner and
Chairman, Federal Legislation Committee

North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.

Before the

House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises

“Corporate Governance and Shareholder Empowerment”

April 21, 2010
Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Steve Irwin, Pennsylvania Securities Commissioner and Chairman of NASAA’s Federal Legislation Committee. State securities regulators are pleased that many of our proactive policy recommendations to better protect investors and restore confidence in our financial markets are now being debated as part of the broader regulatory reform agenda. Today, I would like to highlight the suggestions that we believe are most vital to sound corporate governance policy.

The securities administrators in your states are responsible for enforcing state securities laws, the licensing of firms and investment professionals, registering certain securities offerings, examining broker-dealers and investment advisers, pursuing cases of suspected investment fraud, and providing investor education programs and materials to your constituents. Ten of my colleagues are appointed by state Secretaries of State, five fall under the jurisdiction of their states’ Attorneys General, some are appointed by their Governors and Cabinet officials, and others, like me, work for independent commissions or boards. As a result of our geographic proximity, we are the first line of defense for Main Street investors and for us, enforcement is a top priority. While the recent financial crisis was the result of many failures, I am very proud to say that a failure of state securities regulation was not one of them.

Were I to specify the single most important task which confronts legislators and securities regulators, it would be the need to restore public faith and confidence in American financial institutions whether we speak of securities, banking or insurance products and services. Without belief that investors will be afforded fair and honest mechanisms to carry out their financial goals, these activities will continue to suffer, as they have already suffered, dramatic contractions. The impact of the loss of public confidence can be seen in two ways: First, in terms of daily experience we know that investors have withdrawn from participation in the securities market. In my own agency, the Pennsylvania Securities Commission, our employees have the opportunity to

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1 The oldest international organization devoted to investor protection, the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., was organized in 1919. Its membership consists of the securities administrators in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Canada, Mexico and Puerto Rico. NASAA is the voice of securities agencies responsible for grass-roots investor protection and efficient capital formation.
participate in a state-sponsored deferred compensation program. Many have elected to withdraw investments in stock funds in order to seek safe haven in more conservative investments including a money market fund. Others have simply ceased to participate in the deferred compensation program.

The Pennsylvania Securities Commission sponsors a very active investor education program. From 2008 to the present, the Pennsylvania investor education program made 486 presentations to a large population of residents situated in 62 counties. Ranging from the most heavily populated to the most sparsely populated, the audience was diverse and included but was not limited to teachers, students, retirees, working adults, senior citizens and small business owners.

Often, the Pennsylvanians who attend these programs speak of their worries about a secure retirement or paying for a child’s education. Their worries stem from the financial insecurity resulting from the meltdown including issues related to unemployment. Many complain about their losses because of the decreasing value of stocks and others indicated their fear of getting involved in the stock market altogether. Those who still have money invested pulled it out in order to not subject it to any more risk and were afraid to ‘get back in.’ Some have kept their money in the market in the hope of riding it out and recouping their loss value.

Unfortunately, the staff of the Pennsylvania Securities Commission often finds investors who sell when the market is down or only buy when the market is at its peak. They have a lack of knowledge of how the market works and may not understand that they must take their time horizon into consideration when making investment decisions. Some people think the scam artists triggered the meltdown and complain that “Madoff poisoned the market.” The Madoff scandal appears to have paralyzed a lot of people when it comes to investing. Some quotes from senior citizens attending educational programs include the following:

“You don’t want to know what I think.” (Tell me.) "All of this should have been stopped long ago...the scams, Madoff, all these other companies doing whatever they wanted with other people’s money or investing it however they wanted. There was no control. Something needs to be done to protect people...it should have been done yesterday...but they’re doing stuff now to protect people so that is better
than nothing but it should have been done yesterday." (female retiree-
had to take an early retirement and doesn't have skills at this stage to re-
enter workforce)

"I don't have thousands and thousands to invest to make thousands and
thousands now...oh well, I'm trying to do what I can. You know, we're
the little people. We don't have a lot of money...I had to retire early but
I'm trying to be careful in terms of where I put my money....I just don't
know where to put it where it will be safe."

"I am definitely staying on the sidelines...definitely...cause if I invest
now I'll expect/want things to recover overnight." (working adult, male)

"People have to watch out with their banks 'cause a lot now also offer
investments but they don't tell you that the investment part is a separate
part of the bank. They trust the bank teller and then they think they can
trust the investment person at the bank. People need to realize that those
investment people at the bank are separate from the people behind the
counters." (working adult, state employee, male)

"It's scary. You saw what happened. People invested with these brokers
they trusted for years and years and then it turns out it was a scam and
now they have nothing." (male retiree)

"I think a lot of seniors are still being ripped off because they think they
can get back in now and recover all of their losses OVERNIGHT and
that's not going to happen. But someone tells them they can get them
good returns right now and they believe it." (working adult, male)

Second, it has become clear that investor distrust in the markets is an ongoing
phenomenon. The March 19, 2010 issue of Business Week contained an article entitled
“Small Investors Remain Wary After 69% U.S. Stock Bounce.” Despite the year-long
stock market rally they note that “polls of individual investors show persistent levels of
skepticism about the outlook for stocks” and this assessment is concurred in by securities
professionals. While institutional investment managers have been returning to the
market, the small investor is clearly cynical.

From a statistical standpoint, it’s clear that there continues to be a lack of public
faith and confidence in our markets. The 200-day moving average volume on the New
York Stock Exchange is now at 1.2 billion shares, down nearly 25 percent from a year
ago. As stock prices have risen over the past year, the lower volume of trading reflects
the fact that Main Street investors have largely stayed out of the market.
Investors have not lost confidence because of a single issue; they have lost confidence because over and over again they have seen market abuses which, in the final analysis, target their savings whether invested in the market by themselves or through other modalities such as pensions, money market or mutual funds administered through institutions.

Here are some of the sources of investor cynicism:

1. Enron taught investors that they could not trust the numbers contained in financial reports. As one sophisticated Pennsylvania investor said, “If I cannot trust the numbers, I do not want to play in the game.”

2. The market timing scandals demonstrated that investor savings in mutual funds were not safe from unscrupulous schemes to skim profits to which the investors were entitled in order to increase the profits of participating hedge funds.

3. The auction rate securities scandal taught that even when they invested in products that were touted as being “as safe and as liquid as a money market fund” they were being lied to because the products were anything but liquid. The products were really illiquid and might tie funds up for 30 to 40 years.

4. As they realized that their pension plans were increasingly invested in extremely complex and non-transparent products, it became apparent that unanticipated risk was to be found in the safest of savings mechanisms.

5. Investors, including institutional investors, had come to a belief that they could rely on the assessments of investment products by credit rating agencies only to learn that the highest ratings were often attached to the most risky products in return for fees paid to the agencies engaged in a competitive race to lower standards to achieve business.

6. Even money market investments came to be seen as less secure until ultimately backed up by federal deposit insurance in the same fashion as bank deposits.
7. As the full impact of AIG’s activities in undertaking to engage in SWAPs on outrageously risky collateral default obligations became clear, the American public began to fear that speculative conduct had reached down to endanger the value of even their life and home insurance policies. This was not the case because these insurance products had long been regulated by state insurance regulators who assiduously sought to make sure that these policies were issued by companies that had adequate reserves to back their contractual undertakings.

8. If one needed a scandal to crystallize market danger, it is to be seen in the Madoff matter and the spate of similar Ponzi schemes which touted performance coupled with safety to lure generally conservative investors to their financial doom.

This is by no means an exhaustive catalog of the market abuses perceived by investors. The abusive conduct has spawned a veritable industry of books and publications describing the financial abuses, and not a week goes by but that the daily newspapers do not recount newly discovered schemes, all of which repeatedly say to investors “Abandon hope, all ye who enter here.”

No one solution can restore investor faith and confidence; however, today’s hearing is an important step in addressing the dangers to the American economy.

Today we look at one piece of the puzzle, the loss of investor confidence due to perceived failures of adequate corporate governance.

I grew up in a world where businesses, and they were mostly what we regard as small businessmen, took their roles in the community very seriously. They provided goods, products and services to consumers. In so doing, they also created employment for their neighbors and thus filled the rice bowls of their employees’ families. They provided benefits to employees and sometimes their families, such as health care, and they assisted their employees in providing for their retirement through pensions.

Pensions were administered by experts so that the employee did not have to bear the burden of making daily investment decisions. In fulfilling their roles, these entrepreneurs made a good living for themselves, their families and, successful in accumulating surplus,
were able to invest themselves and pass wealth to later generations or endow charitable endeavors as part of their estates. In closely held corporations, these decision makers were responsible to themselves and to their sense of duty to their communities because they were the owners of the enterprise.

Growth of the enterprise and involvement of public investors led to a separation of enterprise ownership from control. The managers provided expertise, but with the separation there was also a conflict of interest, particularly between management and ownership, over the subject of what constitutes fair compensation for management. Traditionally government has not involved itself in the process whereby management compensation is set, but the present crisis has highlighted the fact that in publicly held corporations, there was a lack of effective input by shareholders concerning managerial compensation. It is difficult to define the line between fair and negotiated compensation and corporate looting in breach of fiduciary responsibility.

Corporate governance has largely been a matter for state corporation law, which has viewed the matter of executive compensation as one for the discretion of boards of directors who are supposed to exercise that discretion in light of their fiduciary duty to investors. Historically state laws rightly recognized the danger of attempting to prescribe detailed standards for executive compensation. While state corporation laws vary somewhat from state to state, this is the cardinal principle which all follow. Individual small investors have little or no power to influence the exercise of this discretion under state laws.

We deal today with the questions, “Should there be limits? Are there already limits posed by ethical, legal and economic constraints? How should compensation be structured? What goals should properly be fostered through compensation packages?”

Clearly, individuals who bring to a company imagination and organization skills upon which the company’s success or failure is dependent, ought to be compensated for their time and their talents. We well recognize that unique sports and entertainment stars have a limited time span during which they can earn by the use of their skills. The same is true of business executives.
In less complex economic times, smaller enterprises clearly recognized that the executive team responsible for continued success was entitled to reap rewards beyond the norm in return for their efforts and by definition the availability of such rewards depended upon successful performance. Separation of corporate decision making from corporate ownership muddied the picture. Public ownership meant increased organizational complexity and a concomitant increase of dependence on individuals possessed of high management skills. The problem in part arises from the fact that when corporate ownership resides in essentially passive public investors, control over corporate decision makers decreases to the point of nonexistence. In most instances, shareholders are no longer individuals who are taking a close interest in the affairs of the company but pension funds, mutual funds and even hedge funds which have at all times a variety of investment options. If they are not satisfied with current returns, they sell and move on thereby providing little long-term oversight of management or direct incentive for improvement of performance.

It has been a struggle to infuse mechanisms into corporate governance to provide responsible management oversight. Management is frequently able to control board selection to provide compliant members with compensation packages that are most often constructed or reviewed by friendly “independent” consultants under circumstances rife with conflicts of interest including selection of the consultant, approval of the consultant’s compensation and continuing financial relationships by consultants with the corporation and members of management. In short, those interested in issues of corporate governance have long recognized a lack of effective oversight in the area of compensation.

In the most egregious cases managers have sometimes treated public corporations as their private “piggy banks” to the detriment of shareholders. Dennis Kozlowski of Tyco and the Rigas family of Adelphia illustrate that the law has always imposed limitations, including criminal penalties, on managers’ ability to loot corporate assets. The recent problem has been that the limitations only kick in under the most egregious circumstances. Moreover, there has come to be a sense of managerial entitlement amounting to “it’s alright to take as much as I can, for as long as I can, if I can.”
With regard to individual corporate entities, we have to make clear that a position in management does not represent an entitlement to steal from the corporate owners, the shareholders. We must assure adequate incentive for creative management while at the same time tying that incentive to actual production of long-term value for shareholders, rather than manipulation to achieve short-term financial results.

State laws governing the formation and management of corporations should be applied and interpreted in such a manner to facilitate sound corporate growth. This is good for business and investors. As we have seen time and time again in the corporate world, decisions made to reap short-term returns often result in long-term disasters. I would submit that effective enforcement of state laws designed to facilitate sound management decisions and long-term growth are good for business and for investors.

We applaud the SEC’s recent efforts to allow for greater shareholder access to information, particularly amendments to proxy disclosure rules that require disclosure of risks arising from compensation policies and practices. However, such disclosure is required only if the risks arising from the practices are reasonably likely to have a material adverse effect on the registrant. We believe that all shareholders deserve this disclosure, regardless of the perceived “risk” arising from these practices.

Likewise, we endorse the SEC’s recent approval of the New York Stock Exchange’s rule to eliminate broker discretionary voting in director elections.

I would be remiss were I to overlook the efforts of states securities regulators, through NASAA, which on October 3, 2007 adopted a resolution on disclosure concerning executive compensation and underlying conflicts of interest in the process by which it is recommended or approved. This resolution is attached as Exhibit A.

The person in the street sees salaries of corporate decision makers constantly increasing to a level viewed as obscene, while at the same time the corporations being managed are decreasing in value, losing money, failing in competition and eliminating productive jobs. It is not an easy piece of the economic puzzle to understand or to apologize for.
Executive compensation should provide incentive for corporate success. That does not mean success defined by manipulation of accounting concepts to provide a short-term picture of success that lacks long-term substance.

Compensation standards should also recognize that the ultimate source of funds to pay managers is the owners of the corporation, the shareholders. A dollar paid to the manager is a dollar decrease in the value of corporate assets and the balance sheet should reflect a dollar or more of corporate value added in return for the payment.

The standards have evolved through decisions rendered in cases where management simply went too far in treating the assets of shareholders, particularly public shareholders, as their own piggy banks. These had little effect on the day to day practices of corporate management which diverted substantial assets from investors to themselves by means of compensation packages that included stock options that would significantly dilute shareholder ownership. In the guise of objective evaluation of executive compensation, instances where the corporation engaged captive consultants to rubber stamp management objectives have been all too frequent. Moreover, boards of directors, including independent directors, were chosen not to be truly independent, but to place their imprimatur on executive compensation packages.

Although individual small shareholders have little power to influence executive compensation, except by selling their shares, institutional investors acting in concert, have the potential to provide a significant counterbalance to the compensation demands of management. Clearly, in order to affect such a counterbalance, shareholders must and should have access to full and accurate information concerning management compensation. Sunlight is one of the most effective forms of disinfectant, but disclosure cannot be the sole remedy. An effective counterweight must incorporate legal mechanisms by which these issues can be raised and decided by shareholders having a real interest in the outcome.

This solution requires that those shareholders who are possessed of the means of providing independent analysis actually do so and aggressively articulate their concerns,
rather than simply stick their heads in the sand and ignore compensation abuses when they occur.

As I stated initially, the abuse of corporate compensation programs is only one of the many courses of conduct which are perceived to be outrageous by individual investors who are participating either directly or indirectly in the securities market.

All three of the bills which are the subject matter of this hearing attempt to address these issues.

Financial regulatory reform should also embrace extension of the concept of fiduciary duty to all financial professionals who provide advice to investors. Moreover, it must prevent abuse of the process by which capital is raised by those more interested in soliciting funds than promoting legitimate enterprises; establishing disqualifications for repeat offenders of this process is a logical and effective deterrent to such abuse.

In closing, the unique experiences of state securities regulators on the front lines of investor protection have provided the framework for my testimony. NASAA and its members are committed to continuing to work with the Committee as the nation’s financial services regulatory regime undergoes the important changes that are necessary to enhance Main Street investor protection, which state securities regulators have provided for nearly 100 years.
Exhibit A

SBS-POLICY, NASAA-REPORTS §7056 NASAA RESOLUTION ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Adopted October 3, 2007

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NASAA RESOLUTION ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

Adopted October 3, 2007

WHEREAS the North American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA") is the oldest international member organization devoted to investor protection. Its membership consists of the securities administrators of the 50 US States, the provinces and territories of Canada, Mexico, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the US Virgin islands;

WHEREAS the role of state securities regulators continues to grow in importance as increasing numbers of Americans rely on the securities markets to prepare for their financial futures, including planning for retirement and paying for college educations;

WHEREAS each state securities administrator shares the common goal of protecting citizens from investment fraud and abuse;

WHEREAS the disclosures of material facts and circumstances as a condition to registering securities helps protect investors from fraud and abuse by providing them more information upon which to make their investing decisions;

WHEREAS certain facts surrounding executive compensation and the use of compensation consultants can be material;

BE IT RESOLVED that NASAA encourages the disclosure of executive compensation such as the following in a public offering:

A. The issuer's current executive compensation plan, including the amount and kind of compensation paid to each executive;

B. The process by which executive compensation is set, including who determines the amount and type of compensation, whether a compensation consultant is used, and when and how the amount of compensation can be changed;

C. Any potential conflicts of interest between who sets, approves, or advises on the amount of executive compensation, and who receives the compensation; and

D. Bylaw provisions governing the shareholders' ability to review and approve or reject changes in the issuer's executive compensation plan, including increases in the amount of executive compensation.

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Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, and members of the Subcommittee, my name is Brandon Rees and I am the Deputy Director of the Office of Investment for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations ("AFL-CIO"). Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the need for corporate governance reform in the wake of the recent financial crisis.

The AFL-CIO is the largest federation of trade unions in the United States with 11.5 million members. The AFL-CIO Office of Investment provides research and assistance in support of corporate governance initiatives by union members' pension funds. Our goal is to enhance the retirement security of union members and workers generally by encouraging greater corporate accountability.

America’s workers are major shareholders of publicly traded companies through their retirement savings. Corporate, public, and union sponsored pension plans altogether hold approximately $7.5 trillion in assets for their beneficiaries. Union sponsored plans make up $480 billion of this total amount.\(^1\) By way of comparison, the total market capitalization of the US stock markets is about $15 trillion.\(^2\)

Union members’ retirement plans are uniquely suited to long-term, patient capital investing. First of all, union members have greater retirement assets compared to other workers. 86 percent of union workers participate in pension plans versus 51 percent of nonunion workers. More importantly, 77 percent of union workers participate in defined-benefit pension plans, compared with just 20 percent of nonunion workers.

Defined benefit pension plans provide a lifetime annuity stream of retirement income to plan participants. These funds are centrally managed by boards of trustees and investment professionals. Many of these assets are invested passively in the stock market.

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through index funds such as the S&P 500 Index or total market funds. They are invested over long time horizons to cover the average life expectancy of plan participants.

Because many union sponsored pension plans are long-term index fund investors, they do not have the traditional exit strategy of selling their shares in underperforming companies – the so called “Wall Street walk.” Selling shares also leaves money on the table that could be realized by improving company performance. This leaves corporate governance as a primary means for pension plans to add value to their portfolio.

Stock market investors have just suffered the worst decade since the Great Depression. During this lost decade between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2009, stock prices declined 24 percent as measured by the S&P 500 Index. If you include dividends, the total return of the S&P 500 Index actually performed worse during the past ten years than during the 1930s.

At the beginning of America’s lost decade, shareholders suffered the corporate accounting scandals at Enron, Worldcom and hundreds of other companies. More recently, shareholders have been battered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns and the resulting financial crisis. While stock markets recovered in 2009 from the worst of these losses, the average shareholder lost money during the past ten years.

Needless to say, workers’ retirement savings were decimated by the 2008 financial crisis. According to the employee benefits consulting firm Towers Watson, U.S. pension assets fell 21 percent during 2008. Although U.S. pension assets increased 12.2 percent in 2009 with the stock market recovery, the compound annual growth rate of pension assets for the entire decade was only 2.6 percent.3

Those workers who are lucky to have defined benefit pension plans have suffered. Pension plan accountants assume that stock market returns will be in line with historical averages. Ten years of stock market underperformance has devastated these assumptions. As a result, many defined benefit pension funds are underfunded, subject to benefit freezes and increased contribution requirements by employees and employers.

Workers who only have access to defined contribution plans are in worse shape. According to the Employee Benefit Research Institute, during the financial crisis the median 401(k) account balance fell from $88,000 in 2007 to under $44,000 in 2008.4 While stock markets recovered ground in 2009, 27 percent of workers today have less than $1,000 in retirement savings and 34 percent of workers have less than $25,000.5

There are many reasons why Americans do not have enough money for retirement, including increased longevity, stagnant wages, the substitution of defined benefit pension plans for less generous 401(k) plans, and tax policies that only encourage the rich to save. However, poor stock market performance over the past decade has cheated a generation of American workers who have saved for their retirement.

Corporate governance failures are the primary cause this lost decade for investors. We blame the short-term approach that many CEOs have taken to manage quarterly earnings to keep Wall Street happy rather than making long-term sustainable investments. And we blame boards of directors for failing to focus management on the long term, failing to prevent malfeasance by executives, and failing to properly manage risk.

Nowhere is the breakdown in corporate accountability more apparent than on the issue of executive compensation. Executive compensation is the mechanism by which CEOs have become captive to short-term market forces. It is the incentive structure that guides executive decision making. These compensation incentives motivate executives to choose between long-term strategies that create value or short-term approaches.

While stock market investors have suffered the worst decade since the Great Depression, publicly traded company CEOs have received the fattest paychecks in history. The average S&P 500 Index company CEO earned 42 times the average worker’s pay in 1980. In 1990 the ratio was 107 to 1. In 2000, CEO pay peaked at over 500 times the average worker pay, only to fall back to around 300 to 1.

The collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers provides a dramatic example of what is wrong with executive compensation. Between 2000 and 2008, the top five executives at Bear Stearns pocketed $1.4 billion in cash bonuses and equity sales. Lehman Brothers executives took home $1 billion. Short-term executive compensation incentivized excessive risk-taking even as long-term shareholders got nothing.

Stock option compensation encouraged excessive risk taking and short-termism. Stock option grants promised executives all the benefit of share price increases with none of the risk of share price declines. This asymmetric payout structure encouraged a shoot-for-the-moon mentality. And it allowed executives to profit from share price volatility by exercising their stock options based on short-term stock price fluctuations.

The AFL-CIO has called on companies to adopt compensation policies that better align executives’ interests with the interests of long-term shareholders. We believe CEOs should receive performance-vesting restricted stock instead of stock options. We also

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believe that executives should be required to hold a substantial percentage of these equity awards for a lockup period after the performance requirements have been met.

Ultimately, it is the job of the board of directors to set fair executive pay packages, to properly supervise company executives, and to manage the company in the interests of shareholders. But we believe that boards of directors have been too complacent in their duties. For this reason, long-term shareholders must be empowered through corporate governance reform to hold boards of directors more accountable.

Existing corporate governance mechanisms have failed to give long-term shareholders an adequate voice in boardrooms. The election of directors is one of the fundamental rights of stockholders. But too often, withheld votes against director nominees are ignored. In 2009, over 90 directors at 50 companies failed to receive majority support. None of these directors has been required to step down.

The AFL-CIO strongly supports the corporate governance reforms encompassed by H.R. 2861, the Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009; H.R. 3272, the Corporate Governance Reform Act of 2009; and H.R. 3351, the Proxy Voting Transparency Act of 2009. These mandatory corporate governance rules will benefit all publicly traded companies by enhancing investor confidence in our capital markets.

Investors are increasingly concerned with executive compensation including the overall size of CEO pay packages and whether executive pay incentives are aligned with the interests of shareholders. To address this issue, all publicly traded companies should give their shareholders a “say-on-pay” by requiring a non-binding vote on executive compensation packages at each annual meeting of stockholders.

An annual advisory vote would provide boards of directors with useful information about whether shareholders approve of how their company pays its senior executives. This say-on-pay vote would encourage boards of directors to be more proactive in seeking out shareholders’ views regarding executive compensation matters. Best practices in executive compensation would disseminate more quickly.

The United Kingdom, Australia, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have adopted statutes requiring shareholder votes on executive compensation. Two dozen U.S. companies have voluntarily agreed to conduct say-on-pay annual votes. And more than 300 financial companies who received assistance from the Troubled Asset Relief Program have been required to hold say-on-pay votes.

The AFL-CIO also supports requiring that an independent director serve as board chair as is common in other countries. The designation of a lead independent director or

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a presiding independent director is not an adequate substitution for an independent board chair. When the CEO serves as board chair, this arrangement may hinder the ability of the board of directors to provide the CEO with objective feedback and guidance.

Furthermore, the AFL-CIO believes that corporate directors should be elected by a majority vote standard. Under a majority vote standard, directors must receive a majority of the votes cast to be elected. A majority vote standard provides shareholders with a more meaningful role in director elections because new nominees would have to receive a majority of votes cast to be elected.

Today’s plurality vote director election system reduces the importance of director elections as a mechanism for holding boards accountable. Under the plurality vote standard, a nominee for the board can be elected with as little as a single affirmative vote, even if a substantial majority of the votes cast are “withheld” from the nominee. For this reason, plurality voting should only be used in contested director elections.

While replacing the plurality vote standard with majority vote director elections is valuable, majority voting alone cannot adequately reform the director election process. Majority voting for directors is hobbled by the Delaware holdover rule that entitles incumbent directors to remain on the board. Under the holdover rule, shareholders must affirmatively vote to recall an incumbent director or the director must resign.\(^\text{10}\)

Under the current proxy rules, contested director elections are extraordinarily rare because they are so expensive. There were 39 proxy contests in 2009 out of more than 4000 public traded companies.\(^\text{11}\) Because running a proxy solicitation can be very expensive, the vast majority of dissident director nominees are put forward as part of hostile takeovers or by hedge fund activists that can take concentrated stakes.

To make director elections more meaningful, the AFL-CIO strongly supports giving long-term shareholders equal access to the proxy as currently under consideration by the Securities and Exchange Commission. Equal access to the proxy will set ground rules for shareholder democracy and limit the advantage of incumbents who have unlimited access to the corporate treasury to finance their proxy solicitation.

Before the adoption of new stock exchange listing standards in 2003, publicly traded companies did not need to have independent nominating committees.\(^\text{12}\) Still today, it is no secret that company CEOs influence the selection of directors for nomination on management proxy cards. More importantly, continued board service depends on being viewed as a team player by incumbent directors.

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\(^{10}\) According to the Delaware Division of Corporations, more than half of all publicly traded corporations are incorporated in Delaware. DCGL § 141(h) provides that “Each director shall hold office until such director’s successor is elected and qualified or until such director’s earlier resignation or removal.”


Equal access to the proxy will open up boards to new and divergent viewpoints. This is not an issue of directors being nominally independent according to a definition of director independence; it is an issue of how directors are selected for board service. Long-term shareholders, who are the owners of the company, should have the right to nominate director candidates to appear on the company’s proxy.

Just one truly independent thinker on a board of directors can have a profound impact. Good directors question management and critically evaluate their performance. Debate and dissent should be welcomed in corporate boardrooms, not feared. A director whose nomination depends on the backing of a long term institutional investor and not his fellow directors can play that role. That is the goal of proxy access.

Now that Securities and Exchange Commission approval of proxy access appears likely, the opponents of mandatory proxy access have put forward the idea of voluntary proxy access. According to these so-called “private ordering” proposals, companies and their shareholders should be able to opt in or opt out of giving shareholders equal access to the proxy.¹³ There are two major problems with such proposals.

First, private ordering is simply not a feasible means for shareholders at many companies to express their views on the desirability of proxy access. Those companies that already have good corporate governance will be the ones likely to adopt proxy access. Those companies with entrenched and unresponsive boards will be the companies whose incumbent managers successfully resist proxy access.

Nearly half of all companies in the Russell 3000 Index restrict the ability of shareholders to amend company bylaws or otherwise disenfranchise shareholders. 7.5 percent of companies have dual class stock voting, 4 percent of companies do not allow shareholders to amend bylaws, and another 39 percent of companies require a supermajority vote requirement for bylaw amendments.¹⁴

Secondly, allowing companies to opt out of proxy access sets a dangerous securities regulation precedent. State law governs the rights of shareholders to nominate and elect directors. Proxy access is about the federal regulation of proxy solicitations, not state corporate laws. And for the past 75 years, our federal securities regulations have set mandatory requirements for conducting proxy solicitations.

We need to remember what company annual shareholder meetings looked like before the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Shareholders were asked to give blanket authority to vote shares for undisclosed directors and for any other matter


that may arise at annual meetings. These proxies often included the ratification of past acts by the board without even disclosing to shareholders what had been done.\textsuperscript{15}

Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 halted these abuses by requiring that management give shareholders full information in the proxy statement about what matters were to be voted on. Under Section 14(a), the Securities and Exchange Commission has the power to regulate the conditions that proxies may be solicited in order to protect investors' interests.\textsuperscript{16}

Corporate governance reforms such as equal access to the proxy can be a potent tool to focus companies on long-term, sustainable strategies. We need directors that are willing to focus on long-term value creation and not the short-term pressures of Wall Street. By empowering long-term shareholders, proxy access can revitalize corporate governance as a more democratic process.

The business decisions that today's boards of directors and CEOs make will impact shareholder value for decades to come. These decisions will also determine whether companies provide good jobs, make high quality products, and protect the environment. For these reasons, America's workers believe that director elections must be opened to long-term investors through proxy access.


Testimony of

Gregory W. Smith

Chief Operating Officer and General Counsel

Colorado Public Employees’ Retirement Association

before the

Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises

of the

United States House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services

Wednesday, April 21, 2010

“Corporate Governance and Shareholder Empowerment”

Full Text of Written Statement
Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett, and Members of the Subcommittee:

Good morning. I am Gregory W. Smith, Chief Operating Office and General Counsel of the Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association ("CoPERA"). I am pleased to appear before you today on behalf of CoPERA.

My testimony includes a brief overview of CoPERA and its investment approach followed by a discussion of our views on several bills related to corporate governance the Congress has under consideration. My remarks will also cover the following issues that you informed me were the basis for this important and timely hearing:

- Whether—and if so, how—inadequate corporate governance contributed to the global financial crisis;
- Remedies currently available to shareowners dissatisfied with management performance at public companies; and
- How corporate boards should be made more responsive to shareowner concerns.
About CoPERA

With over $34 billion under management, CoPERA is responsible for investing and safeguarding assets used to fund retirement benefits for over 460,000 employees of Colorado state government, public schools, universities and colleges, and many cities and local government districts. Due to the fund’s far investment horizon and heavy commitment to passive investment strategies, CoPERA is naturally a long-term, patient investor.

Because CoPERA’s passive strategies restrict our fund from exercising the “Wall Street walk” and fully eliminating our holdings when we are dissatisfied, corporate governance issues are of great interest to our members. CoPERA believes good corporate governance practices are essential to maximize and protect shareowner value and interests.

CoPERA primarily participates in corporate governance decisions by voting its proxies. We firmly believe that the right to vote our shares of stock is, in itself, an asset of the fund, and therefore our responsibility as fiduciaries to manage our members’ assets includes proxy voting. Accordingly we have developed and actively maintain a written proxy voting policy covering a variety of corporate governance issues.\(^1\) All proxy issues are reviewed by CoPERA staff on a case-by-case basis and then voted according to the policy’s guidelines. CoPERA also participates in corporate governance decisions and company engagement as an active member of the Council of Institutional Investors.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) For more information about the Council, please visit [www.cii.org](http://www.cii.org).
With over 50 percent of our portfolio invested in domestic stocks and bonds, CoPERA is deeply committed to U.S. capital markets. As an owner of the Nation's largest and most prominent corporations, our fund is strongly aligned with corporate America—we have every interest in its long-term success and profitability. CoPERA believes that market discipline and accountability are hallmarks of a vibrant and healthy capitalist system. These values must begin in the boardroom with strong corporate governance.

**Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis**

CoPERA firmly believes that the global financial crisis represents a massive failure of board oversight as well as regulation. CoPERA's members have paid a steep price for these failures. Not only have they suffered billions of dollars in investments losses, they have also lost confidence in the integrity of our markets and in the effectiveness of board oversight of corporate management.

Clearly boards of directors failed to adequately understand, monitor and oversee enterprise risk. In a special February 2010 report, for example, the *Economist* recently noted this failure of boards as an important takeaway of the financial crisis: "Another lesson [of the crisis] is that boards matter too. Directors' lack of engagement or expertise played a big part in some of the worst slip-ups... Too few boards defined the parameters of risk oversight."

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The role of inadequate corporate governance in the meltdown is well recognized. Representing the governments of 30 developed nations across the world including the United States, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development concluded in February 2009, “The financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed to failures and weaknesses in corporate governance arrangements.”

Some corporate boards failed to include directors with the necessary blend of independence, competencies and experiences to adequately oversee management and corporate strategy. And far too many boards structured and approved executive compensation programs that motivated excessive risk taking and yielded outsized rewards—with little to no downside risk—for short-term results.

As the costly fallout of such poor board oversight became clear, however, investors were left with few effective tools to hold directors accountable. In 2007, for example, a concerned institutional investor at Lehman Brothers was left with no recourse when the fund’s shareowner proposal requesting greater disclosure of Lehman’s mortgage risk exposure was excluded from a shareowner vote. This lack of meaningful, investor-driven market discipline only serves to encourage board mismanagement and complacency. There should accordingly be no doubt that the failure of board oversight and inadequate corporate governance were significant contributors to the global financial crisis.

5 E-mail from Jeffrey A. Welikson, Vice President and Corporate Secretary, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. to the Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission regarding a shareholder proposal submitted to Lehman by the Central Laborers Pension Fund. 17 Dec. 2007, www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfprovisions/14a-8/2008/lehmanbrothersholdings920508-14a8.pdf.
Remedies for Dissatisfied Shareowners

Few meaningful remedies are available to shareowners dissatisfied with management and board performance at U.S. public companies. As the financial crisis demonstrates and the blue-ribbon Investors Working Group notes, current rules and regulations failed investors, particular in the area of director elections:

[Shareowners currently have few ways to hold directors’ feet to the fire. The primary role of shareowners is to elect and remove directors, but major roadblocks bar the way. Federal proxy rules prohibit shareowners from placing the names of their own director candidates on proxy cards. Shareowners who want to run their own candidates for board seats must mount costly full-blown election contests. Another wrinkle in the proxy voting system is that relatively few U.S. companies have adopted majority voting for directors. Most elect directors using the plurality standard, by which shareowners may vote for, but not against, a nominee. If they oppose a particular nominee, they may only withhold their votes. As a consequence, a nominee only needs one “for” vote to be elected and unseating a director is virtually impossible.]

Some boards are dominated by the CEO, who plays the key role in selecting and nominating directors. All-independent nominating committees ostensibly address this concern, but problems persist. Some companies do not have nominating committees, others refuse to accept shareowner nominations for directors, and institutional investors’ sense is that shareowner-suggested candidates—whether or not submitted to all-independent nominating committees—are rarely given serious consideration.

Shareowners can now only ensure that their candidates get full consideration by launching an expensive and complicated proxy fight—an unworkable alternative for most investors, particularly fiduciaries such as CoPERA who must determine whether the very significant costs of a proxy contest are in the best interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. While companies can freely tap company coffers to fund their campaigns for board-recommended candidates, shareowners must spend their own money to finance their efforts. And companies often erect various obstacles, including expensive litigation, to thwart investors running proxy fights for board seats.

Today shareowners around the world—including in countries with far less developed capital markets than the U.S.—enjoy basic rights that shareowners of American companies are denied. Rights such as requiring directors to be elected by majority vote, giving owners advisory votes on executive pay, and providing owners modest vehicles to access management proxy cards to nominate directors are noticeably absent in much of corporate America. Their absence weakens the ability of shareowners to oversee corporate directors—their elected representatives—and hold directors accountable.
The U.S. has long been recognized as a leader when it comes to investor protection, market transparency and oversight. But America has seriously fallen short when it comes to corporate governance issues. CoPERA believes that corporate governance enhancements are a long overdue and essential component of the bold reforms required to restore confidence in the integrity of the U.S. capital markets.

**Enhancing Board Responsiveness and Accountability**

A number of key corporate governance reforms including many of those featured in several bills the Congress has under consideration are essential to providing meaningful investor oversight of management and boards, and restoring investor confidence in our markets. Such measures—in particular proxy access and majority voting—would address many of the failures of board oversight that contributed to the financial crisis, and more importantly, empower shareowners to anticipate and address unforeseen future risks. These measures, rather than facilitating investors seeking short-term gains, are consistent with enhancing long-term shareowner value.
The financial benefits of greater board oversight are well documented. According to Professor Lucian Bebchuk of Harvard Law School, “There is a substantial body of empirical evidence that is consistent with the view that making boards more accountable by invigorating corporate elections increases shareholder value.” Professor Bebchuk also reports that there is considerable evidence that “reducing incumbent directors’ insulation from removal” leads to better corporate management, and that increased insulation conversely leads to poor performance.  

Proxy Access

I am happy to report that through the work of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”), the House, and the Senate Banking Committee, perhaps the most powerful corporate governance reform is well on its way to finalization. Nearly 70 years have passed since the SEC first considered whether shareholders should be able to include director candidates on management’s proxy card, commonly known as “proxy access.” This reform, which has been studied and considered on and off for decades, is long overdue. Its adoption would be one of the most significant and important investor reforms by any regulatory or legislative body in decades.

8 Id.
CoPERA believes reasonable access to company proxy cards for long-term shareholders would address some of the various problems with director elections. We believe such access would substantially contribute to the health of the U.S. corporate governance model and U.S. corporations by making boards more responsive to shareholders, more thoughtful about whom they nominate to serve as directors and more vigilant about their oversight responsibilities.

Only a uniform, federal proxy access rule can truly remedy the deeply flawed director election process and empower investors to hold boards accountable, however. From a practical standpoint, leaving proxy access to Delaware and other states could result in a hodge-podge of standards that would differ from company to company and from state to state. This would be burdensome, costly and unnecessarily complex for investors, particularly those like CoPERA with diversified portfolios of thousands of companies incorporated in multiple states.

A state by state approach is furthermore fundamentally inconsistent with the notion that a minimum level of access to the proxy is needed to level the electoral playing field and give substance to investors’ fundamental right to nominate directors. Proxy access at its core is a disclosure matter most appropriately handled by the SEC, which since its creation has been responsible for setting uniform proxy statement disclosure standards. Leaving proxy access to the states would be thus be a radical departure from 75 years of investor protection that ultimately would be harmful to the investing public. CoPERA therefore strongly support’s the Commission’s proposed proxy access rule and we applaud the SEC for its leadership on this important issue.9

9 CoPERA’s August 2009 comment letter regarding the SEC’s proxy access proposal Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (File No. S7-10-09) is available at www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-09/s71009-268.pdf
We also commend the House for affirming the SEC’s authority in this area in the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009 (H.R. 4173). While CoPERA believes the SEC already has the authority to approve an access standard, others disagree, and the Commission is likely to face unnecessary, costly and time-consuming litigation in response to a proxy access rule, delaying implementation of this much needed reform. By affirming the SEC’s authority to promulgate rules allowing shareholders to place their nominees for director on the corporate proxy card, the House has already taken a decisive and historic step toward meaningful corporate governance reform. With strong recent endorsements from both the Department of the Treasury and the White House, we fully expect similar proxy access affirmation language approved by the Senate Banking Committee to pass the entire Senate as part of its broad regulatory overhaul.

With the SEC’s authority to issue a proxy access rule no longer a matter of legal debate, the governance improvements that CoPERA believes would have the greatest impact and, therefore, should be considered by the House include:

- **Majority Voting for Directors**: Directors in uncontested elections should be elected by a majority of the votes cast.

- **Executive Compensation Reforms**: Recommended reforms include enhanced disclosure requirements, an advisory shareholder vote on executive pay, independent compensation advisers, and stronger clawback provisions.

- **Independent Board Chair**: Corporate boards should be chaired by an independent director.
Majority Voting for Directors

Directors are the cornerstone of the U.S. corporate governance model. And while the primary powers of shareowners—aside from buying and selling their shares—are to elect and remove directors, U.S. shareowners have few tools to exercise these critical and most basic rights. CoPERA believes the accountability of directors at most U.S. companies is weakened by the fact that shareowners do not have a meaningful vote in director elections. Under most state laws the default standard for uncontested director elections is a plurality vote, which means that a director is elected in an uncontested situation even if a majority of the shares are withheld from the nominee.

CoPERA believes that a plurality standard for the election of directors is inherently unfair and undemocratic and that a majority vote standard is the appropriate one. The concept of majority voting is difficult to contest—especially in this country. And today majority voting is endorsed by all types of governance experts, including law firms advising companies and corporate boards.

Majority voting makes directors more accountable to shareowners by giving meaning to the vote for directors and eliminating the current “rubber stamp” process. The benefits of this change are many: it democratizes the corporate electoral process; it puts real voting power in hands of investors; and it results in minimal disruption to corporate affairs. Majority voting simply makes boards representative of shareowners.
The corporate law community has taken some small steps toward majority voting. In 2006 the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws approved amendments to the Model Business Corporation Act to accommodate majority voting for directors, and lawmakers in Delaware, where most U.S. companies are incorporated, amended the state's corporation law to facilitate majority voting in director elections. But in both cases they stopped short of switching the default standard from plurality to majority.

Majority voting for directors is not an alien concept. It is standard practice in the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other European nations, and it is also in place at some U.S. companies. Since 2006 some companies have volunteered to adopt majority voting standards, but in many cases they have only done so when pressured by shareowners forced to spend tremendous amounts of time and money on company-by-company campaigns to advance majority voting.

To date larger companies have been receptive to adopting majority voting standards. Plurality voting is the standard at less than a third of the companies in the S&P 500. However, plurality voting is still very common among the smaller companies included in the Russell 1000 and 3000 indices. Over half (54.5 percent) of the companies in the Russell 1000, and nearly three-quarters (74.9 percent) of the companies in the Russell 3000, still use a straight plurality voting standard for director elections.10 The international and U.S. experience indicates that majority voting is not harmful to the markets and does not result in dramatic and frequent changes to corporate boards.

Plurality voting is a fundamental flaw in the U.S. corporate governance system. It is time to move the default standard to majority voting. Given the failure by the states, particularly Delaware, to take the lead on this reform, CoPERA believes the time has come for the U.S. Congress to legislate this important and very basic shareowner right.

Executive Compensation Reforms

As a long-term investor with a significant stake in the U.S. capital markets, CoPERA has a vested interest in ensuring that U.S. companies attract, retain and motivate the highest-performing employees and executives. We are supportive of paying top executives well for superior performance.

However, the financial crisis has offered yet more examples of how investors are harmed when poorly structured executive pay packages waste shareowners’ money, excessively dilute their ownership in portfolio companies and create inappropriate incentives that reward poor performance or even damage a company’s long-term performance. Inappropriate pay packages may also suggest a failure in the boardroom, since it is the job of the board of directors and the compensation committee to ensure that executive compensation programs are effective, reasonable and rational with respect to critical factors such as company performance and industry considerations.
Beyond ensuring that corporate boards can be held accountable for their executive pay decisions through majority voting and access mechanisms, CoPERA believes executive compensation issues are best addressed by requiring companies to provide full, plain English disclosure of key quantitative and qualitative elements of executive pay; by giving shareowners meaningful oversight of executive pay via non-binding votes on compensation; by ensuring boards receive independent compensation advice; and by requiring disgorgement of ill-gotten gains pocketed by executives.

- Enhanced Disclosures: Of primary concern to CoPERA is full and clear disclosure of executive pay. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis noted, “sunlight is the best disinfectant.” Transparency of executive pay enables shareowners to evaluate the performance of the compensation committee and board in setting executive pay, to assess pay-for-performance links and to optimize their role of overseeing executive compensation through such means as proxy voting. CoPERA is accordingly very supportive of the SEC’s new rules enhancing the disclosure of executive compensation. Nevertheless, we believe the disclosure regime in the U.S. would be substantially improved if companies would have to disclose the quantitative measures used to determine incentive pay. Such disclosure—which could be provided at the time the measures are established or at a future date, such as when the performance related to the award is measured—would eliminate a major impediment to the market’s ability to analyze and understand executive compensation programs and to appropriately respond.
• *Advisory Vote on Compensation:* CoPERA believes an annual, advisory shareowner vote on executive compensation would efficiently and effectively provide boards with useful information about whether investors view the company’s compensation practices to be in shareowners’ best interests. Nonbinding shareowner votes on pay would serve as a direct referendum on the decisions of the compensation committee and would offer a more targeted way to signal shareowner discontent than withholding votes from committee members. They might also induce compensation committees to be more careful about doling out rich rewards, to avoid the embarrassment of shareowner rejection at the ballot box. In addition, compensation committees looking to actively rein in executive compensation could use the results of advisory shareowner votes to stand up to excessively demanding officers or compensation consultants. Of note, to ensure meaningful voting results, federal legislation should mandate that annual advisory votes on compensation are a “non-routine” matter for purposes of New York Stock Exchange Rule 452.

• *Independent Compensation Advisers:* Compensation consultants play a key role in the pay-setting process. The advice provided by these consultants may be biased as a result of conflicts of interest. Most firms that provide compensation consulting services also provide other kinds of services, such as benefits administration, human resources consulting and actuarial services. Conflicts of interest contribute to a ratcheting up effect for executive pay and should thus be minimized and disclosed.
• Stronger Clawback Provisions: CoPERA believes a tough clawback policy is an essential element of a meaningful “pay for performance” philosophy. If executives are rewarded for “hitting their numbers” – and it turns out that they failed to do so – they should not profit. While Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act gave additional authority to the SEC to recoup bonuses or other incentive-based compensation in certain circumstances, some observers have suggested this language is too narrow and perhaps unworkable. CoPERA recommends that Congress consider ways to cover cases where performance-based compensation may be “unearned” in retrospect but not meet the high standard of “resulting from misconduct” required by Section 304.

Independent Board Chair

The issue of whether the chair and CEO roles should be separated has long been debated in the U.S., where the roles are combined at most publicly traded companies. Interest in the issue renewed in recent years in the wake of Enron and other corporate scandals and, most recently, in response to the financial crisis.
The U.S. approach to the issue differs from other countries, particularly the U.K. and other European countries which have comply-or-disclose requirements regarding the separation of the roles and/or recommend it via nationally recognized best practices. According to the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance and Performance at the Yale School of Management:

Up until the early 2000s, the percentage of the S&P 500 companies with combined roles remained barely unchanged in the previous 15 years, at 80%. Today, approximately 36% of S&P 500 companies have separate chairs and CEOs; this is up from 22% in 2002. However, only 17% of S&P 1500 firms have chairs that can be qualified as independent and the incidence of independent chairs is concentrated on small and mid-cap firms. This is in sharp contrast to the landscape of other countries.11

At the heart of the issue is whether the leadership of the board should differ from the leadership of the company. Clearly the roles are different, with management responsible for running the company and the board charged with overseeing management. The chair of the board is responsible for, among other things, presiding over and setting agendas for board meetings. The most significant concern over combining the roles is that strong CEOs could exert a dominant influence on the board and the board’s agenda and thus weaken the board’s oversight of management.


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The Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise discussed the issue in its post-Enron corporate governance report. The Commission suggested three approaches—including naming an independent chair—for ensuring the appropriate balance of power between board and CEO functions, and it recommended that “each corporation give careful consideration, based on its particular circumstances, to separating the offices of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer.”

As described in our proxy voting guidelines, CoPERA believes a Board that has separate positions for Chief Executive Officer and Chairman appropriately reflects the differences in the roles, “promotes greater management accountability, helps create a board atmosphere of independent leadership, and allows for an unbiased evaluation of the performance of the Chief Executive Officer by the Board.”

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13 Id.
Conclusion

As the House considers steps to enhance corporate governance and empower shareowners, Congress must remember that boards are the first line of defense against the risks and excesses that led to the global financial crisis. Vigorous financial regulation on its own cannot solve many of the issues that contributed to the crisis. In order to restore market confidence and ensure that such a crisis never happens again, regulators and investors must be given stronger market-based tools necessary to guarantee robust oversight and meaningful accountability of corporate managers and directors. As a result, CoPERA believes corporate governance improvements are a critical component of the needed package of reforms.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for inviting me to participate at this hearing. I look forward to the opportunity to respond to any questions.
Written Testimony

Robert E. Smith

Vice President, Deputy General Counsel & Assistant Secretary
NiSource Inc.

Member of the Board of Directors
The Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals

Representing – The Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals

April 21, 2010

Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Committee on Financial Services
U.S. House of Representatives

“Corporate Governance and Shareholder Empowerment”
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“Corporate Governance and Shareholder Empowerment”

Written Testimony of Robert E. Smith – Member of the Board of Directors of the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals

Introduction

My name is Robert E. Smith and I am currently Vice President, Deputy General Counsel & Assistant Secretary for NiSource Inc. NiSource Inc., based in Merrillville, Indiana, is a Fortune 500 energy holding company whose subsidiaries are engaged in natural gas transmission, storage and distribution, as well as electric generation, transmission and distribution. NiSource operating companies deliver energy to approximately 3.8 million customers located within a corridor that runs from the Gulf Coast through the Midwest to New England. NiSource is one of the nation’s largest natural gas distribution companies, as measured by number of customers, delivering natural gas to over 3.3 million customers in seven states and operating approximately 58,000 miles of pipeline. NiSource’s Gas Transmission and Storage Operations subsidiaries own and operate nearly 15,000 miles of interstate pipelines and operate one of the nation’s largest underground natural gas storage systems. Through its subsidiary Northern Indiana, NiSource generates, transmits and distributes electricity to approximately 457,000 customers in 20 counties in northern Indiana and engages in wholesale and transmission transactions. NiSource focuses its business strategy on its core, rate-regulated asset-based businesses.

I am also a member of the Board of the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals (the “Society”), a professional association, founded in 1946, with over 3,100 members who serve more than 2,000 companies. Our members are responsible for supporting the work of corporate boards of directors and their committees and the executive management of their companies on corporate governance and disclosure. At our companies we seek to develop corporate governance policies and practices that support our boards in the important work and that serve the interests of long term stockholders. Our members generally are responsible for their companies’ compliance with the securities laws and regulations, corporate law, and stock exchange listing requirements. The majority of Society members are attorneys, although our members also include accountants and other non-attorney governance professionals.
I have previously practiced corporate law and governance law in the in-house legal departments of two other Fortune 500 companies, Progress Energy, Inc. and Mirant Corporation. As an in-house corporate attorney, I have been exposed to a variety of governance initiatives, shareholder proposals and corporate transactions, and have had the opportunity to observe first-hand the effects of the significant corporate governance enhancements that have occurred in corporate board rooms through-out the past decade.

I am here testifying today on behalf of the Society.

**Background**

When assessing potential additional corporate regulation, it is important consider the significant governance developments that have occurred over the last decade. These developments are easily seen -- the growth of majority voting for directors and the use of executive compensation structures premised on the long-term health of the company are just two examples -- and evidence a fundamental shift in the nature of public company management and board engagement of, and responsiveness to, shareholders.

Significantly, these changes did not come about due to an external mandate; rather, they occurred through the efforts of shareholders and management to choose the governance structure that best created the opportunity for board/shareholder interaction and sustainable, long-term growth. The Society has long supported these developments and strongly supports efforts to continue to expand the ability of shareholders and management to create company-specific approaches to corporate governance that reflect the interests of long-term shareholders and best fit the unique characteristics of their company. It is important to remember that corporate governance is “constitutional law” for corporations. Therefore, when Congress acts, it should do so thoughtfully on clear consensus and strong empirical evidence that changes are needed, while keeping in mind the states’ role as laboratories for democracy, particularly with respect to corporate law.

It is in this context that I address each of the major governance provisions of the various legislative initiatives below.

**Majority Vote**

*Shareholder Engagement Has Resulted in Majority Vote Adoption*

Companies are increasingly willing to engage with their shareholders in discussions on a variety of corporate governance issues. There are numerous examples of areas where companies and their shareholders have engaged in a dialog in order to enhance the governance processes at the company. However, the best example of this type of shareholder engagement is the recent trend in changing companies’ by-laws and other governing documents to allow for majority voting of directors in uncontested elections. The plurality vote standard was universal just a few years ago; however, in response to shareholders, particularly labor funds and state pension funds, companies have adopted majority vote provisions with director resignation policies designed to give boards appropriate latitude if a director fails to be elected. In fact, according to a March 15,
2010 press release issued by California Public Employees' Retirement System, as of September 2009, approximately 71% of S&P 500 companies and 50% of Russell 1000 companies had adopted some form of policy for director resignations or majority vote standards for director elections. The majority vote provisions and director resignation policies now in place at a strong majority of the S&P 500 companies are very similar to the provisions set forth in the Peters Bill. We hold this out as an example of a very significant governance change effected through the existing shareholder proposal process that required neither new legislation nor Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") rulemaking. Rather, shareholders at each company have had an opportunity to evaluate and submit, as they deem appropriate, resolutions enacting majority voting provisions. For this reason, a federal law on majority voting is unnecessary.

Proxy Access

Proxy Access Should Balance the Interests of All Shareholders

The Society strongly believes in – and has consistently supported – good corporate governance practices, which include the right of shareholders to have an effective vote in the election process and the ability to recommend persons for nomination to the board of directors. We want to ensure that the proxy access process is fair to ALL shareholders, not those who hold 1% and who may have short-term interests. We believe that any proxy access process should appropriately balance the interests of all shareholders of a company and, at the same time, not unnecessarily use corporate resources or distract management attention.

Potential for Disruption at Companies if Short-Term Shareholders Use Access to Further Their Agenda

A 1% proxy access law will make it much easier for certain activist hedge funds to influence companies to adopt strategies that are not in the long-term interest of stockholders. While not all hedge funds are the same, many hedge funds seek to direct the operations of a company with a view to short-term profitability or otherwise to the detriment of the long-term interest of companies and their shareholders. For example, short-term shareholder activists pressure companies to adopt increases in share buy-back programs or declare special dividends, often resulting in a downgrade of the company's credit ratings. Such hedge funds currently use proxy contests, or the threat of proxy contests, to effect these results. The proxy access rule will make it significantly easier and cheaper for these hedge funds to target companies, which will likely increase the number of companies that they target.

Based on recent data from Bloomberg using a conservative view of the definition of "hedge fund," the current hedge fund ownership of the S&P 500 is as follows:\footnote{1}{Statistics based on public institutional ownership data for July - September 2009, via Bloomberg L.P.}

- Average hedge fund ownership 7.15%
• Number of companies with hedge fund ownership at or above 5% 273
• Number of companies with hedge fund ownership at or above 10% 104

This data shows that even at ownership thresholds of 5%, a substantial percentage of large-cap companies could be subject to more frequent contested elections at the burden of the long-term shareholders. Moreover, given their relatively smaller capitalization, small and mid-cap companies would be particularly vulnerable to an activist hedge fund with a narrow agenda.

Companies and their long-term shareholders bear significant costs when a company faces a potential election contest from a sophisticated, activist hedge fund. These costs include (i) the expense associated with the direct legal, proxy solicitation, public relations, and investment banking fees, (ii) the loss of shareholder value due to harm to reputation among the public and investors; and, perhaps most importantly, (iii) even greater opportunity costs due to the time and attention that a contest waged by a sophisticated hedge fund can divert from a board pursuing important strategic and operational opportunities. To avoid these potential costs and disruption, proxy access should occur only at those companies where shareholders have determined that proxy access is a necessary and appropriate component of the director election process applying thresholds that are suitable for that company.

Proxy Access Via the Existing Shareholder Proposal Process

In furtherance of the principle of shareholder choice for all shareholders, the Society has supported the amendment of SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to permit shareholders to propose proxy access bylaws at a company via the well-established shareholder proposal process. I note that, given the particular facts and circumstances of a company, the proxy access procedures proposed by shareholders are likely to be different from company to company. In light of this, a federally mandated rule that all public companies be subject to the same process – with identical ownership thresholds, holding requirements, and procedural requirements, among other things – does not seem appropriate, and certainly does not seem to be in the best interests of all shareholders.

The factors contributing to the large diversity of public companies include differences in numbers of shares publicly outstanding, classes of capital stock with differing voting rights, varying levels of retail versus institutional shareholdings, various capital structures, differing board structures (e.g., staggered boards, or required representation on the board pursuant to a shareholders’ agreement or financing arrangement), and different advance notice bylaw provisions. In determining an appropriate shareholder access procedure for a company, consideration of the individual facts and circumstances of the company must be taken into account.

For this reason, companies and shareholders should be able to determine the shareholder proxy access procedure that works best for them (including whether, in lieu of such process, proxy reimbursement would work better for their company and its shareholders). This is true “shareholder empowerment,” rather than forcing all shareholders to adopt the
same rigid governance template regardless of whether the shareholders want it or not. True shareholder choice and empowerment has worked well in other situations, such as majority voting in the election of directors. If shareholders have the right to elect their directors (or determine to vote against, or withhold their vote), surely the same shareholders have the right to determine the appropriate manner and process by which such director-nominees are brought before them for their consideration. Because it is appropriate for shareholders to make choices about the procedures they deem appropriate to permit proxy access, they should be able to choose a form of proxy access that is different than one mandated by Congress or the SEC.

In sum, if proxy access is approved, the Society believes that it should, at a minimum, allow companies and their shareholders to “opt out” in favor of their own access scheme, and have significantly higher ownership thresholds. Please see the attached letters submitted by the Society, SEC File No. S7-10-09, Release No. 34-61161, Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, dated August 13, 2009 and January 19, 2010, respectively, each of which is attached hereto.

**Independent Chair**

**CEO/Chair Structure Should Not Be Mandated**

The independent chair requirement as proposed in the Peters Bill would prevent shareholders from determining what is needed at their company at any specific time. As discussed above, each company is different in a variety of ways. As a result, for some an independent chair may be appropriate, for some a separate chair and CEO may be the preferred approach, and others may find a lead or presiding director is a better governance approach. This determination may depend on whether or not the company is a newly public company, a company in transition, or a well-performing company. The Peters Bill would require all companies, first, second or later generation, to have a board Chair that has not previously served as an executive officer of the issuer. This provision would not allow a founding CEO to remain as Chair. It also would not allow a board to choose a senior executive as Chair. As an example, it would require that Bill Gates step down as Chair of the Microsoft Board of Directors because he has been an executive officer of the company. Preventing some of our country’s most successful business people from continuing to lead their companies would seem to be bad policy that could discourage young, entrepreneurial companies from accessing public capital markets, discourage founders from continued active involvement with their companies and would disadvantage shareholders who are buying ownership in a company based on a particular individual’s leadership and vision, only to have such leadership deemed inappropriate by law. Such companies often have founding CEOs that are the largest shareholders.

For established companies, the Peters Bill would force unnecessary uncertainty into the succession planning process. For example it would make it unlawful for an exiting CEO to remain as Chairman even for a limited time period to ensure a smooth transition to the company’s new CEO. This would be true even if the transition methodology was determined through an exemplary CEO succession plan.
SEC-Required Disclosure of a Company’s Leadership Satisfies Shareholder Needs

It should be noted that the SEC has recently addressed the issue of separation of the chief executive officer and board chair by requiring disclosure of a company’s leadership structure, rather than mandating a particular scheme. This approach is consistent with the empowerment of shareholders as transparent disclosure allows shareholders to determine what is appropriate for their company and then suggest changes if the deem such changes necessary. The SEC’s recently enacted a new disclosure requirement to Item 407 of Regulation S-K and a corresponding amendment to Item 7 of Schedule 14A requires disclosure of the company’s leadership structure and the reasons the company’s board believes that structure is best for the company. The Society supported these proposed amendments and acknowledged the Commission’s comment that they were not intended to influence a company’s decision regarding its board leadership structure. The Society strongly believes that each company should determine for itself whether it is appropriate to separate the CEO and Chair roles and whether or not to have a lead or presiding director. While some view the separation of these roles as optimal, I am aware of no empirical evidence demonstrating that companies with a particular structure consistently have better performance than companies with other structures. Please see also the comment letter filed by the Society in response to SEC File Reference No. S7-13-09, Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements, dated September 15, 2010, which is attached hereto.

Say-on-Pay Votes

Advisory “Say-on-Pay” Votes Should be Subject to Shareholder Choice

Variations of the say-on-pay concept have been included in proposed legislation, shareholder proposals and management initiatives, for several years. We believe that careful study should be made of the alternatives to determine the approach that would best serve each company and its shareholders. The Peters Bill would mandate say on pay annually, but some companies have engaged with their shareholders and have learned that this approach may not be what the shareholders actually desire. In fact, at many companies where an annual say on pay has been proposed, a majority of the votes cast were against it. Discussions with shareholders have led several large-cap companies to conclude that a multi-year cycle was optimal for say-on-pay votes.

Legislating an annual say-on-pay scheme is not necessary for the following reasons:

- Compensation programs are generally designed to induce and reward performance over a multi-year period. Say-on-pay votes should occur over a similar timeframe or there will necessarily be a mismatch between achievement of corporate strategy and pursuing annual results.
- A multi-year cycle would provide investors sufficient time to evaluate the effectiveness of both short- and long-term compensation strategies and related business outcomes.
Many large shareholders rely on proxy advisory firms, which evaluate the compensation programs of over 12,000 U.S. public companies, for vote recommendations. Holding say-on-pay votes on a multi-year cycle would help proxy advisory firms provide more detailed and thorough analyses and recommendations.

Most compensation programs can’t be changed overnight. A non-annual approach gives the board and the compensation committee sufficient time to thoughtfully respond to shareholders’ sentiments and implement any necessary policy changes.

Pre-existing board requirements to seek shareholder approval of employee stock plans and other compensation-related matters already give a company’s shareholders an opportunity to provide feedback even where say-on-pay votes do not occur.

IRS Rule 162(m) requires that, in many cases, shareholder adoption of incentive plans be obtained every five years in order to maintain deductibility of the incentive payments.

Majority voting, coupled with a declassified board, means that every director is up for election every year. This includes all members of the compensation committee. If shareholders are dissatisfied with the compensation structure or alignment as implemented by the compensation committee, then the shareholders at majority vote companies have a direct and effective means of effecting change.

Other Examples of Shareholder Engagement

In the last decade, companies and their boards have engaged more and more frequently with their shareholders. Boards are increasingly more responsive to shareholder concerns, as best evidenced by the implementation of majority voting standards. In addition, Society members have been involved in dialog and change on the following topics, without a legislative mandate to do so:

- elimination of supermajority voting provisions;
- shareholder right to call special meetings;
- political contributions disclosure;
- product ingredient safety review disclosure;
- water usage reports;
- sustainability reports;
- retention of independent compensation consultants;
- implementation of stock ownership guidelines for directors and officers;
- strengthening the definition of lead independent director;
- implementation and enhancement of recoupment of incentive compensation “clawback” policies;
- participation in investor/corporate working groups to discuss say-on-pay and executive compensation;
- agreement to limit supplemental executive retirement plan contributions to a multiple of base pay rather than include all incentive pay;
- elimination of other compensation practices, such as perquisites; and
- amendment of compensation plans.
Conclusion

Significant governance developments have occurred, and boards have become increasingly responsive to shareholders in recent years. True shareholder empowerment allows all shareholders to choose what is best for their respective companies. Legislation should be thoughtfully enacted only where there is clear consensus and empirical evidence that change is needed and that such change would support the long-term interests of all shareholders.

Respectfully Submitted

Robert E. Smith
August 13, 2009

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20549
Attention: Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary
Via e-mail: rule-comments@sec.gov

Re: File No. S7-10-09 (Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations)

Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals appreciates the opportunity to respond to the request for comments made by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) in its proposed rule entitled “Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations” (the “Proposed Rules”).

The Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals is a professional association, founded in 1946, with over 3,100 members who serve more than 2,500 companies. Our members are responsible for supporting the work of corporate boards of directors and their committees and the executive management of their companies regarding corporate governance and disclosure. Our members are generally responsible for their companies’ compliance with the securities laws and regulations, corporate law, and stock exchange listing requirements. The majority of Society members are attorneys, although our members also include accountants and other non-attorney governance professionals.

We strongly believe in – and have consistently supported – good corporate governance practices, which include the right of shareholders to have an effective vote in the election process and the ability to recommend persons for nomination to the board of directors. The comments below on proposed Rule 14a-11 and the proposed amendment to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) are intended to ensure that the proxy access process is fair to all shareholders. Proxy access is not – and we do not view it as – a matter of “corporations versus shareholders”; rather, we believe in the proxy access process, but believe both corporations and shareholders must be mindful that any proxy access process should appropriately balance the interests of all shareholders of a corporation and, at the same time, not unnecessarily use corporate resources or distract management attention.

In furtherance of these principles, we support amending Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to permit shareholders to propose proxy access bylaws for their respective companies. We note that, given the particular facts and circumstances of a company, the proxy access procedures proposed by shareholders are likely to be different from company to company. In light of this, we believe a federally mandated rule that all public companies be subject to the same process – with identical ownership thresholds, holding requirements, and procedural requirements, among other things – is not be appropriate, and certainly not be in the best interests of all shareholders. Accordingly, we do not support adoption of proposed Rule 14a-11 as currently proposed. If proposed Rule
14a-11 is adopted, it should, at a minimum, be modified to permit companies and their shareholders to “opt out” and, in addition, its eligibility thresholds, nominee’s independence and disclosure requirements, and notice and other procedural requirements, likewise should be modified, as further discussed below.

**Private Ordering Should Be Permitted**

We note that most companies are willing to engage with their shareholders in discussions of corporate governance issues, including potential nominees for director. In fact, many companies actively reach out to their largest shareholders to engage them in discussions regarding corporate governance. Many public companies also have procedures in place for shareholders to submit recommendations for director nominations to the board of directors or nominating committee. But, when it comes to an issue such as nominating persons for the board of directors of a company, a single mandated procedure, even one that is thoughtfully proposed, may not be appropriate for all public companies. The large diversity of public companies include differences in numbers of shares publicly outstanding, classes of capital stock with differing voting rights, varying levels of retail versus institutional shareholdings, various capital structures, differing board structures (e.g., staggered boards, or required representation on the board pursuant to a shareholders’ agreement or financing arrangement), and different advance notice bylaw provisions. In determining an appropriate shareholder access procedure for a company, consideration of the individual facts and circumstances of the company must be taken into account.

For this reason, we believe companies and shareholders should be able to determine the shareholder proxy access procedure that works best for them (including whether, in lieu of such process, proxy reimbursement would work better for their company and its shareholders). This “private ordering” by companies and shareholders has worked well in other situations, such as majority voting in the election of directors. In addition, we believe the concept of private ordering is consistent with the deference due a company’s shareholders; if shareholders have the right to elect their directors (or determine to vote against, or withhold their vote), surely the same shareholders have the right to determine the appropriate manner and process by which such director-nominees are brought before them for their consideration. Because it is appropriate for shareholders to make choices about the procedures they deem appropriate to permit proxy access, they should be able to choose a form of proxy access that is different than the one mandated by proposed Rule 14a-11.

Nevertheless, we are also mindful that the Commission is concerned that a company-proposed shareholder access bylaw could create undue complexity to, and cause delay in, a shareholder’s right to nominate directors and have those nominees included in the company’s proxy materials. In order to balance more appropriately these concerns, we recommend that if proposed Rule 14a-11 is adopted, companies and their shareholders be permitted to “opt out” of proposed Rule 14a-11 by adopting and implementing their own form of proxy access, as discussed under “Proposed Rule 14a-11, Section II” below.

In furtherance of our recommendations, we also believe that shareholders should have the full range of options available to them regarding the nature of proxy access at their companies, and, as such, the requirement to include proposals under the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-8(i)(8)
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should not be limited only to those proposals that would not conflict with proposed Rule 14a-11. We believe shareholders should be permitted to suggest the type of shareholder proxy access that is appropriate to their company—regardless of whether that level is more or less restrictive than under proposed Rule 14a-11. Accordingly, we believe that the Commission should provide in its final rules that a shareholder proposal submitted under Rule 14a-8(i)(8) should not be limited as currently proposed.

Given our belief that private ordering is the most appropriate and, therefore, the preferable route by which to provide proxy access for shareholders, we strongly recommend companies and their shareholders be afforded some period of time to adopt their own form of proxy access and/or proxy reimbursement. Accordingly, we suggest proposed Rule 14a-11, if adopted, first apply to companies that have not "opted out" through a shareholder-approved process by the time of their regular annual shareholders meeting in the year following the Commission’s adoption of proposed Rule 14a-11. In this way, private ordering would be encouraged, and companies and their shareholders could determine for themselves the most appropriate approach to proxy access in light of the particular facts and circumstances of their company.

Proposed Rule 14a-11

If the Commission nonetheless does adopt proposed Rule 14a-11, we request that it consider the following additional modifications. As noted above, these modifications are intended to: (i) make proposed Rule 14a-11 work in a more efficient and effective manner; and (ii) better balance the benefit to shareholders in being able to participate more fully in the nomination and election process and the cost and potential disruption to companies and their other shareholders as a result of such process.

I. Eligibility to Use Rule 14a-11. Proposed Rule 14a-11 provides that shareholders who beneficially own 1% (for large accelerated filers) or 3% (for accelerated filers) of a company’s securities for one year may nominate a director and have their nominee included in the company’s proxy materials. For the reasons set forth below, we believe these thresholds are too low.

A. Ownership Threshold. Shareholder proposals, of all types, have a financial impact on all shareholders, as they generally require substantial attention and resources of a company, including its in-house legal and investor relations staff, outside securities and state-law counsel, senior management, and the board of directors. Proxy access goes well beyond other shareholder proposals as it inevitably entails a proxy contest which, in general, will be more time-consuming, expensive and disruptive to management and the board of directors than other types of shareholder proposals. As such, we believe, the Commission should set the minimum threshold at a level that ensures that the nominating shareholder or group (hereinafter, referred to as the "nominating shareholder") have a substantial economic interest in the company.

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1 On average, the BRT Survey (as defined herein), found that if a company does have to include a proxy nominee, it would cost approximately $1.3 million, including nearly $75,000 or 78 hours in company personnel time, nearly $23,000 or 21 hours in director time, and nearly $12 million in outside counsel, proxy solicitor, and printing and mailing costs.
(i) **Nominating Shareholder Must Own 5% and a Group Must Own 10%**. We believe that the appropriate threshold should be the beneficial ownership of 5% of the company’s securities that are entitled to be voted on the election of directors at a meeting of shareholders for single nominating shareholders, and should be 10% where a group of shareholders are nominating the director. The 5% and 10% thresholds are intended to be responsive to the Commission’s concerns of ensuring the thresholds are not so high as to impose undue impediments to proxy access, while being sensitive to the real costs that such proposals impose on a company and its shareholders. In the United Kingdom, shareholders must own at least 5% of the company’s securities (or be part of a group of at least 100 shareholders) in order to submit a nominee for inclusion in the company’s proxy materials.

The proposed thresholds of 1% for large accelerated filers and 3% for accelerated filers are simply too low. The Commission itself noted that nearly all large accelerated and accelerated filers have two or more shareholders that meet that threshold. Thresholds at the 1% or 3% level would mean companies could have multiple nominating shareholders, without taking into consideration any aggregation at all and, when shareholders aggregate into groups, the numbers of potential nominating shareholders could expand significantly. Further, as we have seen in “just vote no” campaigns, the Internet and social media sites make it very easy for shareholders to communicate with other shareholders, and the Proposed Rules include an exemption from the proxy rules for communications made in connection with forming a group of nominating shareholders so long as they are limited in content and filed with the Commission. As a result, we believe that it will not be difficult for shareholders to communicate their intent to use proposed Rule 14a-11 and aggregate their holdings.

For these reasons, we believe the thresholds need to be raised and believe a 5% threshold for a single nominating shareholder and a 10% threshold for a group of nominating shareholders provide the appropriate balance between permitting shareholders who have a substantial economic interest in the company to utilize proxy access, on one hand, and limiting the potential cost and disruption to companies and their shareholders, on the other. In a proxy access survey recently conducted by the Business Roundtable and the Society to gauge CEO and company views and opinions regarding the Proposed Rules (the “BRT Survey”), roughly 36% of the survey participants stated that the appropriate ownership eligibility threshold (based on outstanding shares) for nominating shareholders should be 5%, while 25% favored a threshold of 10%, and 22% favored a threshold in the range of 15-25%.

(ii) **Shareholders may not be Members of More than One Nominating Group**. We support the right of shareholders to aggregate their holdings for the purpose of nominating a director. However, we believe a shareholder should not be permitted to be a member of more than one nominating group. In the absence of such a prohibition, shareholders could form multiple groups, claiming that so long as the identity of each group was not precisely identical each group was a different proponent. We believe the proposed modification is consistent with the basic and fundamental construct of Rule 14a-8(c) that a shareholder may submit no more than one proposal to a company for a particular shareholders’ meeting. In addition, we believe

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2 Of roughly 151 member CEOs on the Business Roundtable, 70 participated in the BRT Survey. Roughly 10% of Roundtable companies are not directly affected by this issue (e.g., privately held, not regulated by the Commission, etc.) and these companies did not participate. Therefore, more than half of the Business Roundtable companies potentially affected by this issue participated in the survey.
our proposed restriction would help prevent abuse of proposed Rule 14a-11, while at the same time, not imposing undue burdens upon shareholders who support a particular nominee.

B. Holding Period Requirements.

(i) Nominating Shareholders Must have Held their Shares for Two Years. In seeking to balance shareholders’ ability to participate more fully in the nomination and election process against the potential cost and disruption to companies subject to the proposed new rule, the Commission is proposing that only holders of a significant, long-term interest in a company be able to rely on proposed Rule 14a-11 to have disclosure about their nominees for director included in a company’s proxy materials. We support the Commission’s position, and believe that long-term shareholders are more likely to have interests that are aligned with other shareholders and are more likely to take a long-term view of the company and its operations.

We do not share the Commission’s view, however, that shareholders who have held their shares for only one year are long-term shareholders. We believe that the nominating shareholder should be required to have beneficially owned the securities that are used for purpose of determining the ownership threshold for at least two years as of the date of the shareholder notice on Schedule 14N. In the case of a nominating group, each member of the group should have held the securities for at least two years as of the date of the shareholder notice on Schedule 14N. In addition, when the Commission in 2003 proposed a two-year minimum holding period as a requirement for proxy access, “the majority of commentators that addressed the topic support[ed] the proposed holding period.” (see, the Proposed Rules at p. 51). In the BRT Survey, 54% of the survey participants stated that the minimum holding period should be two years, while 30% thought it should be three years or longer.

(ii) Beneficial Ownership Should be Defined as Ownership of the Actual Securities. We believe that the concept of beneficial ownership for purposes of proposed Rule 14a-11 needs to be clearly specified. Given the prevalence of derivatives in the equity markets and the ability to de-couple economic interest from voting rights, we believe proposed Rule 14a-11 should require possession of the full voting interest in the securities and should specify that the nominating shareholder have a net long beneficial ownership position during the entire two-year holding period for the purpose of submitting a nominee. The nominating shareholder should also be required to produce evidence from its broker-dealer or custodian that the continuous net long beneficial ownership requirement has been met. We do not believe that the record holder is in a position to make this certification and, thus, proposed Schedule 14N should be revised accordingly.

(iii) Nominating Shareholders Must Hold Shares through the Date of the Shareholders’ Meeting. We believe that the nominating shareholder should be required to continue to hold the amount of securities necessary to meet the ownership thresholds through the date of the shareholders’ meeting. A nominating shareholder’s intent not to sell existing at the time of a Schedule 14N means little, if the nominating shareholder can change its mind and sell sufficient shares to fall below the nominating threshold during the period between the filing of the Schedule 14N and the shareholders’ meeting. We believe that the nominating shareholder, if requested by the company, should be required to produce evidence from its broker-dealer or custodian certifying that its net long beneficial ownership position meets the requirements
through the date that is within 5 days of the shareholders’ meeting to ensure its continued eligibility to nominate a director. If any nominating shareholder does not remain eligible, the company should be permitted to withdraw such nominating shareholder’s nominee from consideration for election at the shareholders’ meeting. In this way, both companies and their shareholders are ensured that the nominating shareholder has, as the Commission has suggested, the appropriate commitment to the nominee and the election process.

C. Resubmission Threshold. In 2003, the Commission solicited comment on whether a proxy access rule should include a provision that would deny eligibility for any nominating shareholder that has previously had a nominee included in the company’s proxy materials and where such nominee did not receive a sufficient percentage of votes. We believe that proposed Rule 14a-11 should similarly include a “resubmission threshold.” If the nominating shareholder’s nominee fails to receive 25% of the vote at the meeting at which such nominee’s nomination is being voted upon, the nominating shareholder (and, if applicable, all of the members of the nominating group) should be prohibited from submitting another nominee for a period of two years. We believe this is appropriate, as that nominating shareholder would not have demonstrated sufficient support from other shareholders to indicate that it would in the following year be successful in having its nominee elected to the board and thereby justify repeated use of the company’s proxy materials. In addition, the nominee should not be eligible for nomination for a similar two-year period. The purpose of these proposed resubmission thresholds is two-fold: first, it would be inappropriate to require the company to again expend the significant resources involved in including the nominee in its proxy materials where the nominee did not garner significant support from the shareholders of the company; and, second, this would provide an opportunity for other shareholders to submit nominations for consideration. The need for a resubmission threshold under Rule 14a-11 is more critical in this context than under Rule 14a-8 because the economic costs of a proxy contest are so much higher. The resubmission threshold would also ensure that other shareholders would be given a chance to suggest nominees who may be more satisfactory to the company’s shareholders and who therefore might garner a larger vote.

D. Nominating Shareholders must Certify that they are not seeking to Change Control of the Company. We agree with the Commission that only shareholders who are not intending to seek or affect control of the company should be eligible to use proposed Rule 14a-11. However, a nominating shareholder’s intent is subjective and is subject to change. Further, a controlling influence over a board of directors may be obtained without a shareholder having the ability to influence an actual majority of the board members. We therefore believe that, to ensure the Proposed Rules are used as intended by the Commission, it is necessary to add the following additional objective safeguards.

(i) Nominating Shareholders May Only Submit One Nominee. Each nominating shareholder should only be permitted to nominate only one director, rather than up to 25% of the board of directors as proposed. We believe that the right to nominate a director is very different from nominating a “bloc” of directors through the company’s proxy materials. We believe the control opportunities of being permitted to nominate a “bloc” of directors through proxy access are serious, and should be prevented. We note that most contests for “control” of a company today do not involve a change in the majority of the membership of a board of directors. Dissident shareholders often seek to influence or affect the company’s business and
operations by the nomination of “short slates”, which are a “bloc” of directors consisting of less than a majority of the board membership. Therefore, we believe that shareholders who intend to nominate a bloc of directors should be required to conduct a traditional proxy contest pursuant to Regulation 14A. We also believe that by limiting each nominating shareholder to one nominee, it is more likely that multiple nominating shareholders may have the opportunity to nominate members for election to the board of directors. In the BRT Survey, 61% of the survey participants stated that the nominating shareholder should only be able to nominate one director.

(ii) **Proxy Access Shareholder Nominees May Not Constitute More than 15% of the Board.** While we agree with the Commission that using a fixed percentage will promote ease of use and alleviate concerns that a company may increase its board size in an effort to reduce the effect of a shareholder nominee elected to the board, we believe that having shareholder-nominated directors constituting 25% of the board of a company is too high a percentage. As noted above, we believe that 25% represents a significant portion of the board, and can have a strong influence on control of the company. Having as many as up to 25% of the directors of the board nominated by persons who may not share the board’s overall philosophy or approach with respect to the management of the company may also result in a less cohesive board – a result that is not in the interests of all shareholders generally. As a result, we propose that the maximum number of directors nominated by shareholders constitute no more than 15% of a board.

(iii) **Proxy Access Shareholder Nominees Are Not Permitted if There is a Traditional Proxy Contest.** Shareholders should not be permitted to nominate directors pursuant to proposed Rule 14a-11 if a company becomes subject to a traditional proxy contest (including a short slate proxy contest) in that same year. To permit otherwise would mean that proposed Rule 14a-11 could have the effect of changing control of the company. When a company is facing shareholder-nominated directors from multiple sources, the combination of shareholder nominations (including those nominated pursuant to proposed Rule 14a-11) could result in a change of a majority of the company’s board of directors. In light of the recent Amarin Pharmaceuticals no-action letter issued by the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance (letter to Eastbourne Capital LLC dated March 30, 2009, and letter to Icahn Associates Corp. dated March 30, 2009) and the Commission’s proposed amendment to Rule 14a-4(d)(4), as set forth in “Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements” (Proposing Release No. 33-9052, dated July 10, 2009), a traditional dissident shareholder could “round out” its short slate proxy card by including proxy access shareholder nominees. Moreover, we believe that proposed Rule 14a-11 would not bar the dissident from actively soliciting for the proxy access shareholder nominees. Since a basic premise of proposed Rule 14a-11 is that it not be used in connection with a threatened or actual change of control, we believe it is appropriate not to permit the use of proposed Rule 14a-11 in situations involving a potential change of control. Further, the fact that there are differing groups of shareholders who are simultaneously proposing different directors for presumably different purposes (i.e., control and non-control) could lead to substantial confusion for other shareholders. Accordingly, at any time a company’s board receives notice that an insurgent is planning to wage a proxy contest, the company should be permitted to exclude any proxy access candidates from the company’s proxy materials (and, if the proxy materials have already been distributed, to issue supplemental proxy materials eliminating the proxy access nominees from the company’s materials).
(iv) **Nominee must be Independent of the Nominating Shareholder.** As we explain in more detail below, we also believe that to help assure that proposed Rule 14a-11 is not used as part of a control contest, the final rule should provide that to be eligible for proxy access the nominee must be independent from the nominating shareholder.

II. **Companies Should be Permitted to “Opt-Out” of Proposed Rule 14a-11.** As noted above, we recommend that companies and their shareholders be permitted to “opt out” of proposed Rule 14a-11 by adopting and implementing their own form of proxy access. Under our suggested approach, a company could propose a proxy access procedure to its shareholders, or shareholders could propose a proxy access procedure pursuant to the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-8. In either case, if such proxy access proposal receives the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares of stock present in person or by proxy and entitled to vote on the proposal, the proxy access proposal would apply in place of proposed Rule 14a-11. In this regard, we would note that it would be possible for shareholders to vote affirmatively that they don’t want proxy access, or they could vote on procedures that would provide a level of proxy access that is more or less restrictive than under proposed Rule 14a-11, and they would be free to make that decision. We believe that requiring shareholder approval of a board’s proposed proxy access procedures should alleviate concerns that boards might attempt to overreach in proposing such procedures, as shareholders would refuse to ratify such board proposed proxy access procedures. We do, however, believe that in the interests of “workability”, boards be given the right to adopt or amend existing proxy access procedures, subject in every case to ratification by shareholders at the next annual meeting. In this way, boards could address issues and problems arising between annual meetings to preserve and enhance effective corporate governance—but would always be subject to the requirement of shareholder approval for their actions. We believe this approach appropriately balances the Commission’s concern of ensuring proxy access is available to shareholders of public companies1 who desire it, while encouraging private ordering and enabling companies and their shareholders to make appropriate choices as to the form of proxy access best suited to their individual company.

III. **Nominee Requirements.**

A. **The Nominee Must be Independent of the Nominating Shareholder.** We believe it is very important that proposed Rule 14a-11 provide that the nominee be independent of the nominating shareholder. Specifically, we recommend that proposed Rule 14a-11 provide that the nominee may not be (i) a nominating shareholder, (ii) a member of the immediate family of any nominating shareholder, or (iii) a partner, officer, director or employee of a nominating shareholder or any of its affiliates. There are several reasons that this limitation is appropriate. First, we believe it is consistent with the intended purpose of proposed Rule 14a-11 that it not be used to effect control of a company. By ensuring that the nominee is independent of the

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1 We believe that proposed Rule 14a-11 should provide an exception for, and not be applicable to, controlled companies. For this purpose, the Commission should consider the definition of “controlled company” adopted by the New York Stock Exchange in its Section 303A Corporate Governance Rules: a “controlled company” is a company of which “more than 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, a group or another company.” NASDAQ has a similar rule. We believe that this is appropriate as it will minimize costs to the company for shareholder nominations that have no chance of success since an individual, a group or another company has majority voting control of the company.
nominating shareholder, it is less likely that proposed Rule 14a-11 will be used by those shareholders who are seeking to control the company. Second, the independence requirement will make it more likely that the shareholder nominee will discharge his or her director’s fiduciary duties to all shareholders and not be unduly obligated to represent or be influenced by the interests of the nominating shareholder. Third, it will help ensure the confidentiality of board meetings by reducing or eliminating the pressure or employment requirement that the proxy access director share otherwise confidential board information with the nominating shareholder. We note that in 2003, the Commission proposed a limitation on relationships between a nominating shareholder and the director nominee in response to concerns about the possibility of “special interest” or “single issue” directors that would advance the interests of the nominating shareholder over the interests of shareholders as a group. We believe the requirement that the nominee be independent of the nominating shareholder will not impose an undue burden on the nominating shareholder and will help ensure the proper functioning of the board.

B. The Nominee Must Meet Valid Bylaw Qualifications and Director Guidelines.

The Proposed Rules require a representation that, to the knowledge of the nominating shareholder, the nominee meets the objective criteria for independence set forth in the rules of the relevant national securities exchange or national securities association. However, most state laws permit companies to establish qualifications for directors in their bylaws. Many companies have adopted such additional non-discriminatory director qualifications in their bylaws. Some companies in regulated industries, such as broadcast, maritime shipping and aviation, have imposed U.S. citizenship requirements for their directors. Other regulated industries, such as gaming or defense, may require their directors to meet specific licensing or national security requirements. Similarly, for depository institutions, there may be director interlock prohibitions. Many of these bylaw provisions are different from and, in some cases more stringent than, the objective criteria of the applicable securities exchange or association. We believe that such non-discriminatory director qualifications set forth in a company’s governing documents are valid as a matter of state law with respect to all directors. We therefore believe it is appropriate that such eligibility standards be applicable to all shareholder nominees. We also believe that the shareholder nominee, once elected to the board, should be required to comply with a company’s non-discriminatory board service guidelines, such as mandatory retirement age, share ownership requirements and the maximum number of other boards and board committees on which directors may serve.

Once elected to the board, a shareholder-nominated director has the same fiduciary obligations to the company’s shareholders as any other director; and, as noted above, we see no basis for any distinction among directors with respect to valid, non-discriminatory board director qualifications or service guidelines. There should not be different standards for company-nominated and proxy access directors. We therefore recommend the Commission make these principles clear in the final rules.

C. The Nominee Must Complete a Company’s Standard Directors’ and Officers’ Questionnaire.

As noted above, we believe it is important for a shareholder nominee to meet the company’s non-discriminatory director qualification and service requirements. Accordingly, we believe that proxy access shareholder nominees should be required, at the request of the company, to complete the company’s standard “director and officer questionnaire” prior to the printing and mailing of the proxy statement. The questionnaire would provide the company with
information to help the company determine if the nominee is independent based upon the stock exchange rules and the company’s own corporate governance guidelines. This is the same purpose for which companies collect information each year from their current directors, and thus would not impose upon the shareholder nominee any obligations that are not imposed on the company’s board-nominated directors. If, based on the information provided in the questionnaire, the board determines that the nominee does not meet the applicable stock exchange’s independence standards or the company’s own corporate governance guidelines, we believe it would be important, and appropriate, for the company to notify shareholders of that fact in the proxy statement. While the lack of independence may not be a disqualifying factor for board service, it is important for shareholders to know how many of their directors are independent and whether they can serve on the audit, compensation or nominating committee. Independence will also affect the governance quotients that companies receive from board evaluation services (such as RiskMetrics) and the voting recommendations that are made by RiskMetrics and others. Finally, a board’s determination that the proxy access candidate lacks independence may also inform the nominating committee and full board at the time it finalizes the board slate of directors of the balance of independent and non-independent directors and the company’s compliance posture with respect to the independence requirements under stock exchange listing rules and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.

D. Nominees that Count Against the Proxy Access Director “Cap”

(i) Proxy Access Shareholder Nominee status continues even if endorsed by the Board. Under proposed Rule 14a-11, a nominating shareholder is required to represent that no relationships or agreements exist between the nominee and the company and its management, and between the nominating shareholder and the company and its management. If any such agreement exists, the nominee would not count towards the maximum number of nominees that could be nominated pursuant to proposed Rule 14a-11. We believe that, at any time prior to the shareholders’ meeting, the board decides to endorse the nominating shareholder’s nominee and include the nominee on the board’s slate, the nominee should nevertheless continue to be treated as a proxy access shareholder nominee for purposes of determining the maximum number of proxy access shareholder nominees to be included in the company’s proxy materials for that year. This will help facilitate discussions between boards and nominating shareholders, as a board may be more likely to come to an accommodation concerning a nominating shareholder’s nominee knowing that, if it were to do so, it would not need to then begin the process of negotiating all over with yet another nominating shareholder because the “endorsed” nominee will not count towards the cap on proxy access shareholder nominees. If proposed Rule 14a-11 is adopted as currently proposed, we believe it is likely to have a chilling effect on desirable negotiations between nominating shareholders and boards or nominating committees regarding shareholder nominees.

(ii) Proxy Access Shareholder Nominee status continues for Three Years following Election to the Board. The Proposed Rules do not adequately address the situation where management includes in its slate a director who was elected as a shareholder nominee at the previous meeting. We believe that, as drafted, the Proposed Rules may incentivize the nominating committee or the board to re-nominate the director in order to avoid that person becoming a “management” director and thereby allowing another nominee to be put forth by shareholders under proposed Rule 14a-11. Therefore, we believe that proposed Rule 14a-11
should be revised to provide that any company nominee that was initially elected as a
shareholder nominee shall reduce the number of nominees that may be nominated pursuant to
proposed Rule 14a-11(d)(1) for a period of an additional two years; provided that such director is
nominated by the nominating committee or the board in each such additional year. Imposing a
three-year status as a proxy access director would also have the merit of replicating the practical
effect of the proxy access cap at companies with staggered boards, where proxy access directors
are elected for three-year terms and retain their status as such for purposes of the proxy access
cap under proposed Rule 14a-11. After such three-year period, such director would cease to
have the status of a proxy access director for purposes of the cap and his or her re-nomination
would not reduce the number of nominees that may be nominated pursuant to proposed Rule
14a-11(d)(1).

IV. Notice, Disclosure and Procedural Requirements

A. Largest Shareholders Should Be Allowed to Nominate: Window Period. Pursuant
to proposed Rule 14a-11, the nominating shareholder that first provides notice to the company
will be permitted to include its nominee in the company’s proxy materials. However, proposed
Rule 14a-11 does not specify the earliest date that a nominating shareholder can file a notice on
Schedule 14N. We believe that, as proposed, Rule 14a-11 could have the unintended
consequence of resulting in a race by shareholders to be the first to provide their notice to the
company. That is because, as soon as a company completes its annual meeting, a nominating
shareholder could file a notice on Schedule 14N for the next annual meeting. This dynamic
could discourage potential nominating shareholders from engaging in constructive dialogue with
the board in an effort to achieve its objectives without a proxy access election contest. This
dynamic would also create burdens for boards and companies, as they could potentially be in the
position of having to address shareholder nominations throughout the year. We therefore
recommend that the Commission, in its final rules, provide for a specific window within which
nominating shareholders can make a nomination pursuant to proposed Rule 14a-11 (e.g., no
earlier than 150 calendar days and no later than 120 calendar days before the date that the
company mailed its proxy materials for the prior year’s annual meeting).

In addition, we believe that where there is more than one eligible nominating shareholder,
the nominating shareholder with the largest holdings should be entitled to include its nominee in
the company’s proxy materials. This approach would ensure that those nominating shareholders
with the greatest economic interest in the company would have the right to have their nominees
included in the company’s proxy materials. The interests of such shareholders are more likely to
be aligned with the interests of the other shareholders. This approach would be consistent with
the Commission’s approach in its 2003 proposal. As the Commission noted in the Proposed
Rules, the persons that commented on that approach in 2003, while limited, did not generally
object to such a standard. In the Proposed Rules, the Commission suggests that a first-in
approach might be better as a holdings-based approach might be difficult for companies to
administer because it would lack certainty. We believe, however, that if there is a window
period, as we have suggested, companies will have a date certain by which all nominations must
be received, and will at the end of the window period be able to determine which nominating
shareholders have the largest stock holdings based on their Schedule 14N filings.
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We suggest that, for uniformity of application, the percentage ownership of a nominating shareholder both for purposes of the requisite percentage threshold and for purposes of determining the size order of shareholders be determined based on their Schedule 14N filings.

B. **Deadline for Submitting a Nominee under Proposed Rule 14a-11; Excluding a Shareholder Director Nominee that Does Not Comply with the Requirements of Proposed Rule 14a-11**

(i) **Deadline for submitting a Nominee pursuant to Proposed Rule 14a-11 should be the same as the Deadline for submitting a Proposal pursuant to Rule 14a-8(d).** Many companies have advance notice bylaws that permit shareholders to submit their nominees for director as late as 60-90 calendar days prior to the anniversary date of the previous years’ annual meeting. Under proposed Rule 14a-11, a notice on Schedule 14N of an intent to require a company to include a nominating shareholder’s nominee in the company’s proxy materials must be filed by the date specified in the company’s advance notice provisions, or, where no such provision is in place, no later than 120 calendar days before the date that the company mailed its proxy materials for the prior year’s annual meeting (which would typically be 150 to 165 days prior to the annual meeting). The procedure outlined in the Proposed Rules by which a company would seek a no-action letter from the staff of the Commission in order to exclude a shareholder nominee under proposed Rule 14a-11 could take as much as 120 days. Thus, for companies with standard advance notice bylaws that permit shareholders to submit their nominees for directors as late as 60 or 90 calendar days prior to the shareholders’ meeting, the no-action procedure could not be accommodated within the available time.

If a company attempts to amend its advance notice bylaw to take into account the required time to comply with the proposed Rule 14a-11 no-action procedures, increasing the minimum notice period might well be held invalid under Delaware law (and perhaps the laws of many other states), on the grounds that the period is unreasonably long and would have the effect of unduly constraining shareholders’ right to nominate directors. To resolve the almost certain conflict between standard advance notice bylaws and the no-action letter dispute resolution process, we recommend that the Commission, in its final rules, provide that the deadline for submitting a nominee pursuant to proposed Rule 14a-11 be the same as the deadline for submitting a proposal pursuant to Rule 14a-8(d), which does not include a reference to other time periods provided in advance notice bylaws.

(ii) **No Substitute Proxy Access Shareholder Nominees.** If a shareholder nominee is excluded by a company following the receipt of a no-action letter from the staff of the Commission pursuant to proposed Rule 14a-11 or the nominating shareholder withdraws its nominee as a result of the procedure for determining eligibility specified in proposed Rule 14a-11(f), we believe the company should not be required to include a substitute proxy access shareholder nominee in its proxy materials, as the company would not have sufficient time to seek to exclude such new nominee if such new nominee fails to meet the requirements set forth in proposed Rule 14a-11.

(iii) **Effects of Disqualifying Event.** If a disqualifying event occurs after the company’s proxy materials have been disseminated, the company should be able to issue
supplemental proxy materials and new proxy cards that remove the disqualified nominee, and the company should be entitled to disregard any votes cast for the disqualified nominee.

C. Additional Required Disclosures. We support the Commission’s efforts to provide transparency and facilitate shareholders’ ability to make informed decisions on shareholder nominees. While we appreciate that the currently proposed Schedule 14N is intended to provide disclosures regarding the nominating shareholder and the nominee, we believe there is additional information that is important and material to shareholders in making a determination as to whether to vote for a proxy access shareholder nominee. We recommend that the Commission require the following additional disclosure in the Schedule 14N:

- a description of (1) any material transaction between the nominating shareholder or any of its affiliates and the company or any of its affiliates within the 12 months prior to the filing of the Schedule 14N, and (2) any discussion regarding the nomination between the shareholder and a proxy advisory firm;
- any holdings of more than 5% of the securities of any competitor of the company (i.e., any enterprise with the same SIC code);
- any meetings or contacts, including direct or indirect communication by the shareholder, with the management or directors of the company that occurred during the 12-month period, other than with respect to the proposed nomination;
- the items required by Item 4 of Schedule 13D regarding the purpose or plans of the nominating shareholder in respect of the nomination (nominating shareholders that beneficially own 5% or more of a subject class of securities should have the option of disclosing this information on their Schedule 13D, as discussed below)4;
- a description of any contracts, arrangements, understandings or relationships (legal or otherwise) between the nominating shareholder or any of its affiliates and any other person with respect to any securities of the company; and
- if adopted, the same information that a company would be required to disclose in its proxy statement regarding its nominees for director pursuant to the Commission’s proposed new rules set forth in “Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements” (Proposing Release No. 33-9052, dated July 10, 2009).

4The items to be disclosed are a description of any plans or proposals which the nominating shareholder or group may have which relate to or would result in: (i) the acquisition by any person of additional securities of the company, or the disposition of securities of the company; (ii) an extraordinary corporate transaction, such as a merger, reorganization or liquidation, involving the company or any of its subsidiaries; (iii) a sale or transfer of a material amount of assets of the company or any of its subsidiaries; (iv) other than as a result of the election of the nominating shareholder’s or group’s nominee, any change in the present board of directors or management of the company, including any plans or proposals to change the number or terms of directors or to fill any existing vacancies on the board; (v) any material change in the present capitalization or dividend policy of the company; (vi) any other material change in the company’s business or corporate structure, including but not limited to, if the company is a registered closed-end investment company, any plans or proposals to make any changes in its investment policy for which a vote is required by Section 13 of the Investment Company Act of 1940; (vii) changes in the company’s charter, bylaws or instruments corresponding thereto or other actions which may impede the acquisition of control of the company by any person; (viii) causing a class of securities of the company to be delisted from a national securities exchange or to cease to be authorized to be quoted in an inter-dealer quotation system of a registered national securities association; (ix) a class of equity securities of the company becoming eligible for termination of registration pursuant to Section 12(g)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; or (x) any action similar to any of those enumerated above.
We believe these additional disclosures are needed from all nominating shareholders. Absent these disclosures, a nominating shareholder could obtain significant representation and influence on a company’s board of directors without the other shareholders having information regarding the nominating shareholder’s plans and purposes that is necessary and appropriate to make an informed decision.

D. The Proposed Exemption from Schedule 13D is Not Appropriate. We disagree with the Commission’s view that the nomination of one or more directors pursuant to proposed Rule 14a-11, soliciting activities in connection with such a nomination, or the election of such a nominee as a director under proposed Rule 14a-11, should not result in a 5% or greater nominating shareholder losing its eligibility to file on Schedule 13G. The Commission states that “[c]entral to Schedule 13G eligibility is that the shareholder be a passive investor that has acquired the securities without the purpose, or the effect, of changing or influencing control of the company” (see, the Proposed Rules at 136). We believe that any nomination of a director by a nominating shareholder pursuant to proposed Rule 14a-11 is for the purpose or will have the effect of influencing control of the company and that the nominating shareholder is, therefore, by definition, not a passive investor. The Commission acknowledges in the Proposed Rules that “if a nominating shareholder is the nominee, and is successful in being elected to the board of a company, the shareholder would most likely be ineligible to continue filing on Schedule 13G because of its ability as a director to directly or indirectly influence the management and policies of the company.” (see, the Proposed Rules at 137). It is inconsistent for the Commission to suggest that a nominating shareholder’s formation of a group, nomination of a director, and nomination and soliciting activities are not also for the purposes of influencing a company’s board of directors or management. Therefore, a nominating shareholder should be required to report its holdings, plans, proposals, intentions and other interests either as part of the Schedule 14N or on a Schedule 13D. We believe that the additional disclosure required by Schedule 13D is both necessary and appropriate, and should not be unduly burdensome on nominating shareholders.

E. Universal Proxy Card. We are concerned that there is a significant possibility of shareholder confusion in any election in which a shareholder nominee is included in the company’s proxy materials. We also believe that shareholders may be confused by the use of a universal proxy card, which will contain the names of both the company’s nominees and shareholder’s nominees. For instance, shareholders, relying on common practice, may execute a blank proxy card without checking the boxes for any of the nominees, which we believe would, under the Proposed Rules, result in an invalid proxy card. This could have the unintended consequences of a company failing to obtain a quorum for the shareholders meeting in addition to disenfranchising these shareholders. Also, certain shareholders may mistakenly check all boxes, including the boxes for both the company’s nominees and the proxy access shareholder’s nominees, with uncertain results. Finally, shareholders may not check boxes equating to a full slate of nominees.

To address any confusion that would result from the use of a universal proxy card, we recommend requiring a clear delineation in the proxy statement and in the proxy card of the company slate and the shareholder nominees. In addition, there should be included on the face of the proxy card in bold letters the following statement: “In order to vote for a shareholder nominee, you must check the box for that nominee and strike a candidate from the company slate.”
slate.” We believe that this disclosure will minimize the risk that a shareholder will either vote for all nominees or vote for only a partial slate, which will partially disenfranchise the shareholder with respect to such shareholder’s vote on the full slate of directors.

Proposed Rule 14a-11 would also prohibit the grant of authority to vote for the company’s nominees as a group on a proxy card if the proxy card includes a shareholder’s nominee, and we are concerned that this will further complicate the proxy voting process. Boards and nominating committees put considerable effort into selecting the company’s complete slate of nominees, taking into account the expertise, experience and independence of the board as a whole. Shareholders should be permitted to vote for the company’s nominees as a group if they so desire. For this reason, we recommend that the Commission revise the Proposed Rules to provide that any proxy that includes shareholder nominees that is voted in blank (that is, without checking the boxes for the nominees) continue to be deemed to be a vote for the entire board-nominated slate.

F. Liability of the Company. We believe that given the time constraints of proposed Rule 14a-11, the company’s nominating committee will be unable to thoroughly vet a shareholder nominee for inclusion in the company’s proxy materials. Even if the nominee provides a director’s and officer’s questionnaire as discussed above, it often takes several months for large companies with multiple operations and locations to vet a nominee and the nominee’s family members to determine whether the nominee meets the independence standards of the company.

The Proposed Rules indicate that the company would have liability if it “knows or has reason to know that the information is false or misleading.” We believe that this is inappropriate, as the company does not have sufficient time to investigate the statements made by the nominating shareholder and the nominee, and it also does not necessarily have the means to determine whether the statements are false or misleading. Furthermore, even if the company had reason to believe, for example, based on information received in the questionnaire that the information provided by the nominating shareholder or group or the nominee is false or misleading, the company does not have the right under proposed Rule 14a-11 to exclude the information from the proxy statement.

Pursuant to existing Rule 14a-8(l), a company is not responsible for shareholder proposals or supporting statements. We also note that the Commission’s 2003 proxy access proposal provided that the company had no liability for the statements of the nominating shareholder or group. The purpose of proposed Rule 14a-11 is to provide “access” — a means by which shareholders may use the company’s proxy materials to facilitate their nomination of directors. This purpose is not undermined by providing that the company has no liability for the nominating shareholder’s statements that the company is required to include in its proxy materials. To the extent that the “knows or has reason to know” language contained in proposed Rule 14a-11(e) and 14a-19 suggests that companies have some duty to investigate or otherwise confirm the accuracy of the information provided by the nominating shareholder or group, we believe this is an inappropriate shifting of liability to companies for statements made by nominating shareholders or their nominees. There is no compelling reason why a company should have any liability for a nominating shareholder’s or nominee’s statements.
For the foregoing reasons, we believe a company should be entitled to explicitly state in the proxy statement that “the company takes no responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the information supplied to it by the nominating shareholder or group or the nominee for director.”

Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8

We support the adoption of the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) that would permit shareholders to make proposals regarding the election of directors. We believe that the use of amended Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to allow shareholders to propose and adopt procedures for access to the company’s proxy materials is an appropriate way for companies and their shareholders to determine a proxy access procedure that is tailored for the particular circumstances of the company.

A. Private Ordering/Conflict with Proposed Rule 14a-11. As we discussed above, we believe that shareholders should have the full range of options available to them regarding the nature of proxy access at their companies, and, as such, the requirement to include proposals under the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-8(i)(8) should not be limited only to those proposals that would not conflict with proposed Rule 14a-11.

B. Treatment of Incremental Changes to Proxy Access Procedures as “Substantially Implemented”. If a company is subject to proposed Rule 14a-11 or, if as we have suggested, has “opted out” of the Rule 14a-11 proxy access procedure, it would be inappropriately disruptive to require a company thereafter to include in its proxy materials shareholder proposals that seek only incremental changes to that procedure. Such incremental changes would subject companies to annual uncertainty as to the specific nature of their director-election process. Accordingly, the Commission should provide clear guidance regarding the application of the “substantially implemented” standard should appropriately balance a company’s proxy access procedure against the potential disruption of a yearly shareholder access proposal. We would therefore propose that, unless the Rule 14a-8(i)(8) shareholder access proposal is designed to materially amend the company’s current procedure, the proposal should be properly excludable.

C. Cap on Number of Nominees. We believe that the Commission should specifically permit companies to exclude from their proxy materials any shareholder proposal that would create a proxy access procedure that could result in the election of shareholder nominees to more than a majority of a company’s board of directors. We believe this is consistent with the Commission’s intended goal that proxy access through a company’s proxy materials should not be used by shareholders who are seeking control of a company.

D. Ownership Requirements. A proxy access proposal could have a significant impact on a company. We believe that the existing $2,000 standard fails to require an interest in the company that is commensurate with this potential impact. As such, the ownership of a shareholder that may require the company to include such a proposal should be significantly beyond the ownership standard for other proposals under Rule 14a-8. We believe that the ownership standard for a proxy access proposal under the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-
8(i)(8) should be at least 1% of the company’s voting stock. While this ownership threshold is higher than for other proposals under Rule 14a-8, it is lower than the proposed ownership threshold under proposed Rule 14a-11 in recognition that the shareholder is proposing a proxy access procedure, rather than nominating a particular person as a director-nominee.

E. Disclosures required for a Nomination pursuant to an Applicable State Law Provision or a Company’s Governing Documents. For the reasons discussed above under “Rule 14a-11, Section IV.C”, we believe that the disclosure required for a proxy access nomination pursuant to an applicable state law provision or a company’s governing documents should include all of the disclosures that would be required for a nomination under proposed Rule 14a-11.

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We appreciate the opportunity to comment on these important proposals and would be happy to provide you with further information to the extent you would find it useful.

Respectfully submitted,

The Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals

By: Neila B. Radin
Chair, Securities Law Committee

cc: Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman
Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner
Kathleen L. Casey, Commissioner
Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner
Elisse B. Walter, Commissioner
Meredith B. Cross, Director, Division of Corporation Finance
David M. Becker, General Counsel
January 19, 2010

Re: File No. S7-10-09
Release No. 34-61161
Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations

Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549

Dear Ms. Murphy:

In Commission Release No. 34-61161, the Commission re-opened the comment period with regard to its proposals to amend the federal proxy rules set forth in its Release No. 34-60089 (the “proxy access proposal”). The Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals (the “Society”), a professional association, founded in 1946, with over 3,100 members who serve more than 2,000 companies, appreciates the opportunity to respond to the Commission’s request for additional comments with regard to this proposal.

We are providing this letter to the Commission for two purposes: 1) to submit data on the share ownership of S&P 500 companies by hedge funds and to elaborate on why some of these funds are likely to benefit disproportionately from the proposed rule to the detriment of other stockholders, and 2) to provide survey data from our membership regarding the likely use of an opt-out procedure and to underscore the Society’s support for an opt-out provision that would allow shareholders and companies to determine the best proxy access procedure given each company’s unique facts and circumstances.

1. Hedge Fund Ownership Data

We are concerned that the proposed rule will make it much easier for certain activist hedge funds to influence companies to adopt strategies that are not in the long-term interest of stockholders. While not all hedge funds are the same, many hedge funds seek to direct the operations of a company with a view to short-term profitability or otherwise to the detriment of the long-term interest of companies and their shareholders. Typically, such “activist” hedge funds and private equity funds “push for changes the activists believe will boost the stock’s value in the short-term.” See “Short Term Shareholder Activists Degrade Creditworthiness of Rated Companies,” Moody’s Investors Service: Global Credit Research (June 2007) (the “Moody’s Report”). For example, as the Moody’s Report notes, short-term shareholder activists pressure companies to adopt increases in share buy-back programs or declare special dividends, often resulting in a downgrade of the company’s credit ratings. Such hedge funds currently use proxy contests, or the threat of proxy contests, to effect these changes. The proxy access rule will make it significantly easier and cheaper for them to target companies, which will likely increase the number of companies that they target.

Based on data from Bloomberg using a conservative view of the definition of “hedge fund,” the current hedge fund ownership of the S&P 500 is as follows:
• Average hedge fund ownership
  7.15%
• Number of companies with hedge fund ownership at or above 5% 273
• Number of companies with hedge fund ownership at or above 10% 104

These data show that even at ownership thresholds of 5%, a substantial percentage of large cap companies could be subject to more frequent contested elections at a significantly lower cost. Moreover, given their relatively smaller capitalization, small and mid-cap companies would be particularly vulnerable to an activist hedge fund with a narrow agenda.

The potential unintended consequences that could flow from the proposed rule are not necessarily cured by the safeguard of a company having in place even the most diligent board of directors. Companies and their ongoing shareholders bear significant costs when a company faces a potential election cost from a sophisticated, activist hedge fund. These costs include (i) potentially millions of dollars in direct legal, proxy solicitation, public relations, and investment banking fees, (ii) the loss of shareholder value due to harm to reputation among the public and investors; and, perhaps most importantly, (iii) even greater opportunity costs due to the time and attention that a contest waged by a sophisticated hedge fund can divert from a board pursuing important strategic and operational opportunities. A board of directors, acting in the faithful exercise of its fiduciary duties, could very reasonably conclude that it would be in the company’s best interest to accede to some or all of the demands of a hedge fund (even if agreeing to those demands cause a substantial loss of shareholder value), rather than face potentially greater ‘lost’ value that could occur due to a contested election as a result of proxy access.  

Further, these are costs are likely to be asymmetrical as between a large company and a sophisticated, activist hedge fund. A company may face much greater direct and opportunity costs than a hedge fund that is geared up for conducting a director election contest as part of its

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1 Statistics based on public institutional ownership data for July - September 2009, via Bloomberg LP.
2 For example, in the fall of 2003, the investment firm Thomas H. Lee Partners (“THL”) purchased Simmons Bedding Company. A year later, in December 2004, Simmons issued debt to repay THL a special dividend of $117 million. By November 2009, the company filed for bankruptcy as a result of debt incurred for the THL acquisition and the special dividends to THL. In total, THL recouped its initial investment and made an additional $77 million in profit in the form of special dividends and fees. See “Profits for Buyout Firms as Company Debt Scarred,” New York Times (Oct. 5, 2009). Similarly, William Ackman, the founder of Pershing Square Capital Management LP, recently pressed Target Corp. to implement a real estate lease-back program and launched a proxy contest when Target’s management rejected the proposal. At the time of the proxy contest, Pershing Square Capital Management LP held 7.8%, and had held between 7.8% and 9.7% for at least eighteen months preceding the proxy contest. If the proxy access rule as proposed was in effect at the time of the proxy contest, William Ackman could have used the rule to pressure Target to make changes to its board of directors – even though shareholders in this case ultimately rejected the board slate put forth by Ackman. See “New Law Gives Shareholders More Power,” BusinessWeek (July 30, 2009). Similarly, Pershing Square Capital Management LP was able to pressure McDonald’s Corp. to sell 1,500 company-owned restaurants and buy back $1 billion in stock while owning 4% of the company. See “Attack of the Hungry Hedge Funds,” BusinessWeek (Feb. 20, 2006). Recently, Genzyme Corp. named a director to its board after pressure from Relational Investors LLC, despite the hedge fund owning only 2.6% of Genzyme. See “Genzyme Names Director After Hedge Fund Pressure,” The Wall Street Journal (Dec. 10, 2009). Each of these activist funds would have fit within the ownership threshold as proposed in the proxy access rule, and could have used the rule as an additional means to pressure the company.
ongoing strategy and that has a relatively small investment in a company. The proposed proxy
access rule simply tilts the scale further in favor of activist hedge funds.

Nor are these concerns effectively addressed through the proposed stock ownership and
holding requirements. The Moody’s Report explains that shareholder activists often hold their
shares for up to 24 months, increasing their ownership stakes over time. At most, the
requirements in proposed Rule 14a-11 may simply require hedge funds to hold their positions
slightly longer, or align themselves with additional like-minded activists, before striking. They
would do nothing to discourage the hedge funds from pursuing short-term strategies when they
decide to threaten a contest. Nor would they lessen the losses that may occur at any company
that is targeted by an activist hedge fund.

Thus, proposed Rule 14a-11 could subject an inappropriately large number of public
companies to significant additional pressure by short-term investors seeking immediate or near-
term actions that are not necessarily in the long-term interests of all shareholders. Proxy access
thereby gives one more tool to those who do not need it, to potential the detriment of
shareholders at large.

II. An Opt-out Should Be Available to Companies and their Shareholders

As we said in our earlier letter, the Society strongly believes that companies and their
shareholders should have the ability to develop and implement a proxy access approach that is
tailored to the particular company’s existing state law, classes of stock, board size and structure.
An opt-out from proposed Rule 14a-11 would allow shareholder choice (aka “private ordering”) on
whether or not a proxy access right is desirable at a company, and if so, under what
circumstances and with what process. Moreover, a survey conducted by the Society of its
member companies shows that, if available, a large majority—approximately two-thirds—would
seek to implement an opt-out from the proposed rule.

Some institutions have argued that private ordering would be burdensome, costly and
complex for shareholders, particularly those institutions with portfolios of thousands of
companies. This argument misses the point for several reasons. First, other than some activist
investors who have a particular agenda that they seek to impose broadly on companies, most
responsible, long-term institutional stockholders are unlikely to propose director candidates at
large numbers of companies at once. Therefore, it would not be too burdensome for the investor
to understand the access process at a particular company at which it seeks to nominate a director.
Indeed, this should be a small part of the information one would need to understand about a
company before recommending a candidate.

Furthermore, if a shareholder did intend to nominate many directors at many companies,
this would be yet another unintended and unwelcome consequence of Rule 14a-11 and individual
“privately ordered” shareholder approved schemes would help deter such investors from
launching campaigns at many companies at once. Finally, the argument against opt-outs fails to
take into account that, it is quite likely that a few different basic models of proxy access would
emerge through private ordering. Some degree of standardization is likely to come about
through a dialogue over time between major stockholders and companies, as well as through the...
standards set by proxy advisory firms. This was the case in the closely aligned area of majority-vote standards, where a few basic approaches have emerged. For these reasons, the argument against the complexity of opt-outs not only fails, but also supports the proposition that an opt-out should be available under any mandatory federal scheme.

We thank you for the opportunity to submit this additional comment letter.

Respectfully submitted,

[Signature]

The Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals

cc: Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman
    Kathleen L. Casey, Commissioner
    Luis Aguilar, Commissioner
    Troy A. Pareles, Commissioner
    Elisse B. Walter, Commissioner
    Meredith B. Cross, Director, Division of Corporation Finance
September 15, 2009

File Reference No. S7-13-09
Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements
Release No. 33-9052

Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, NE
Washington, DC 20549-1090

Dear Ms. Murphy:

The Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals appreciates the opportunity to respond to the request for comments made by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) in its proposed rule entitled “Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation Enhancements” (the “Proposed Rules”).

The Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals is a professional association, founded in 1946, with over 3,100 members who serve more than 2,500 companies. Our members are responsible for supporting the work of corporate boards of directors and their committees and the executive management of their companies on corporate governance and disclosure. Our members are generally responsible for their companies’ compliance with the securities laws and regulations, corporate law, and stock exchange listing requirements. The majority of Society members are attorneys, although our members also include accountants and other non-attorney governance professionals.

I. Introduction

We support the Commission’s goal of providing enhanced disclosure to shareholders in the proxy statement. We note, however, that more disclosure is not necessarily better disclosure. We are also concerned that the Proposed Rules will result in an increase in both the length and complexity of proxy statements. And, as proxy statements get longer, we believe that there is a very real risk that retail investors will not read them. Therefore, we believe that the Commission should take a principles-based approach that focuses on whether the additional information that is being required would be meaningful to shareholders in determining how to vote or whether the information is merely incremental or general information. Our recommendations and comments, which are set forth below, are based on this principles-based approach. In addition, the Commission should permit companies to refer to other documents to the extent the requested information is disclosed elsewhere (e.g., Form 10-K or company website). As described below, some of the disclosure requested in the Proposed Rules is already disclosed in other publicly
filed documents. In addition, in certain instances, we believe that it would be better for investors to have disclosure of some of the requested information on company websites rather than in the proxy statement itself.

II. **Enhanced Compensation Disclosure**

*The CD&A Should Not Be Expanded to Include Employees Generally*

The proposed amendments to Regulation S-K Item 402(b), Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A), would require a company to discuss and analyze its broader compensation policies and overall compensation practices for employees generally, if risks arising from those compensation policies or practices “may” have a material effect on the company. For the reasons described below, we do not believe that it would be appropriate to expand the scope of the CD&A beyond the named executive officers (NEOs) to include disclosure of the company’s compensation policies and practices for employees generally. Expanding the CD&A to employees generally would represent a fundamental shift: as Instruction 1 to Item 402 states, “The purpose of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis is to provide investors material information that is necessary to an understanding of the registrant’s compensation policies and decisions regarding the named executive officers.” Instruction 2 continues “The Compensation Discussion and Analysis should be of the information contained in the tables and otherwise disclosed pursuant to this Item.” We believe that shareholders would be ill-served by including disclosures of a registrant’s overall compensation program for employees as it relates to risk management in the CD&A. Such disclosure would likely be general in nature and therefore not meaningful to investors. Such disclosures also would not necessarily relate to the NEO information contained in the Summary Compensation Tables, and as such could be confusing because the discussion would be presented out of context. The proposed inclusion of material risk disclosure in the discussion of NEO compensation instead of in a company’s other risk-related disclosures would mean that shareholders would have to consult two different disclosure documents in order to obtain a full understanding of a company’s risks. Moreover, this disclosure would add length and complexity to the proxy statement, which could make it more difficult for shareholders to understand a company’s explanation of the policies and decisions relating to the compensation of the NEOs. We are also concerned that if the disclosures resulting from the Proposed Rules were to be focused on a specific company group or function, the requested information would likely require the disclosure of confidential information which could result in competitive harm. For example, it might be necessary for a company to disclose the specific business strategies and associated compensation levels and mix.

*Risk Disclosure is Already Required. Appropriately, in the MD&A*

We believe that there are other existing disclosure requirements that would provide more meaningful information about the effect of the registrant’s compensation policies on its risk profile and risk management. We believe that if a company has risks arising from its compensation policies or practices that may have a material effect on the company, then the company is already required to disclose those risks in its risk factor disclosures, in the management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations (MD&A), and quantitative and qualitative disclosures about market risks. Disclosures relating to overall
compensation programs and policies as they relate to risk management would not be meaningful if isolated from the company’s overall risk disclosure, and therefore, are more appropriately discussed in the context of the company’s overall risk disclosure in the annual 10-K and quarterly 10-Q filings. If the purpose of the Proposed Rules is to encourage disclosure of the relationship of a company’s overall compensation policies and practices and risk taking, we believe that a more meaningful approach would be for the Commission to remind companies of their obligation to disclose such material risks in their risk factor disclosure, MD&A or in quantitative and qualitative disclosures about market risks, rather than in expanding the existing required compensation disclosure.

*The Standard for Disclosure Should be “ Likely” Rather Than “ May”*

If, however, the Commission nevertheless elects to adopt the proposed amendment to the CD&A, we believe that the Commission should replace the words “may have a material effect” with “is likely to have a material effect” in Item 402(b)(2). The instructions to the CD&A currently provide a materiality standard for the disclosures. Thus, Instruction 1 to Item 402(b) provides that the purpose of CD&A is to “provide to investors material information that is necessary to an understanding of the registrant’s compensation policies, while Instruction 2 to CD&A provides that CD&A should “focus on the material principles underlying the registrant’s executive compensation policies and decisions.” We are concerned that the proposed wording would expand the scope of CD&A to include discussion of items that “may” have a material effect. We believe that a “likely to have a material effect” standard would provide investors with meaningful disclosure and not speculation about items that are unlikely to occur.

III. **Summary Compensation Table and Director Compensation Table**

*We Support the Reporting of Stock and Option Awards at Aggregate Grant Date Fair Value under FAS 123R*

The Proposed Rules would amend the Summary Compensation Table and Director Compensation Table to require companies to report stock and option awards at their aggregate grant date fair value computed in accordance with FAS 123R. We support this change. The aggregate grant date fair value is generally used by compensation committees in determining the amount of stock and options to award, whereas the current disclosure requirement confusingly focuses on accounting considerations that may have no bearing on compensation decisions. For example, awards that vest over time are disclosed over the vesting period rather than in the year of the grant, unless the executive was retirement eligible, in which case they are reported in the year of the grant. Thus, two executives might receive the same amount of stock or option awards, but have different values reported under the current requirements because one is retirement-eligible and the other is not.

In supporting this change, we recommend the following three modifications/additions:

- **Awards Granted for Prior Fiscal Year Performance Should be Included.** The Summary Compensation Table and Director Compensation Table should be further amended to enable companies to report stock and option awards granted for services with respect to the relevant
fiscal year, even if the awards were granted after fiscal year-end. It is the practice of many companies to award incentive compensation in the first three months of the fiscal year based on performance metrics met for the prior fiscal year. This information is more relevant to shareholders as it will provide the best picture of an executive’s total compensation for services in a given fiscal year. Matching the awards granted to the time frame in which the performance is measured will also eliminate confusion, and we believe this approach would be consistent with the way that compensation committees view and analyze information when making compensation decisions. This approach would also be consistent with the reporting of amounts earned under non-equity incentive plans. To avoid any risk of abuse, we recommend that this approach be limited to awards granted in the first three months after the fiscal year end with respect to services performed in the applicable fiscal year or performance periods that ended during the fiscal year.

Companies Should Not Be Required to Recompute Values for Previous Years. The Proposal asks for comment on whether companies should be required to present recomputed disclosure for each preceding fiscal year to show the full grant date fair values. We do not believe that requiring recomputation is necessary or appropriate. The summary compensation table data showing the amounts for the preceding two fiscal years has already been disclosed to investors and requiring that companies now present different (recomputed) amounts for those previous years would serve only to confuse investors. Instead, companies can clearly indicate by footnote or other disclosure that the equity values shown for the most recent fiscal year are based on full grant date fair values in accordance with the new rules, and that the equity values shown for the previous fiscal year were based on amounts recognized for financial reporting purposes in accordance with the previous rules.

Calculation of Grant date Fair Value in accordance with FAS 123R. We recommend that in its final rule release, the SEC include a clarification regarding equity valuation as discussed below, that we believe is necessary because previous guidance issued by the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance appears to be inconsistent with the proposed rules. The SEC’s current proposal would require companies to include in the Summary Compensation Table and Director Compensation Table the “aggregate grant date fair value computed in accordance with FAS 123R.” Calculating this value for performance-based equity awards (e.g., performance share units) is more complicated than for other equity grants. Performance-based awards often have a “target” level, as well as a “threshold” level (lower than target) and a “maximum” level (higher than target). For such awards, FAS 123R requires that the company consider which is the “most probable” scenario.

For example, if the company determines that the “maximum” level is not the most probable outcome, then the company would not use the maximum amount to determine the grant date fair value under FAS 123R. Instead, if the company determined that at the time of grant, the “target” level was the most probable outcome, then the company would use the target level to determine the initial fair market value (i.e., the value at the time of grant).

Our concern arises because the Division of Corporation Finance suggested in guidance issued earlier this year that under FAS 123R a company would be required to use the “maximum” level for purposes of determining the initial grant date fair value under FAS 123R, without regard to
whether the maximum level was determined by the company to be the most probable. Specifically, the "Compliance & Disclosure Interpretations: Regulation S-K" (C&DI) contain the following question and answer:

"Question 120.05 (Grants of Plan-Based Awards Table)

Question: An incentive performance plan will pay out at different levels depending upon the actual performance results over the relevant performance period. Is the grant date fair value reportable in column (f) of the table determined based on threshold, target or maximum performance?

Answer: The grant date fair value reportable in column (f) is determined based on maximum performance, so that investors can see the maximum grant date fair value numbers that were authorized in granting the award. [May 29, 2009]"

This guidance directly conflicts with FAS 123R, which requires that if a company determines that target performance (not maximum performance) is most probable, then the company must use target performance to determine the initial grant date fair value. We acknowledge that this guidance was given in the context of the Grants of Plan-Based Awards Table. However, under the Proposed Rules, the full grant date fair value of awards would be required to be disclosed in the Summary Compensation Table rather than the Grant of Plan-Based Awards Table. Therefore, we are concerned that the guidance will be considered relevant when companies are determining the initial grant date fair value for purposes of reporting equity awards in the Summary Compensation Table and Director Compensation Table. This is significant because these amounts would now be included in the "Total" compensation columns. If companies are required to value performance-based equity awards at "maximum," this will mislead investors about the intention of the compensation committees when the awards were approved.

In sum, we request that if the Commission adopts this proposal, it include a clarification in the narrative discussion acknowledging that for performance-based equity grants, the grant date fair value computed in accordance with FAS 123R should take into consideration, among other things, the probability that certain performance levels will be achieved. Alternatively, or in addition, the Commission could direct the staff of the Division of Corporation Finance to remove this specific C&DI.

IV. Enhanced Director and Nominee Disclosure

We Support Additional Disclosure of Board Memberships and Legal Proceedings

We support the proposed amendment of Item 401 of Regulation S-K to expand the disclosure requirements regarding the past directorships held by directors and nominees and the time frame for disclosure of legal proceedings involving directors, nominees and executive officers. We also support expanded disclosure regarding a director’s or nominee’s experience, qualifications and education beyond the brief biographical information that is currently required.

Disclosure of “Attributes and Skills” is Not Meaningful as They are Intangible Qualities
However, we believe that it is not appropriate to require disclosure of “attributes and skills” as it would be very difficult to describe in a meaningful way the intangible qualities that many good directors possess. It goes without saying that the best directors are those with good critical thinking skills, the ability and willingness to ask questions, and the courage to challenge management when necessary. In addition, many directors possess the same attributes, which could result in companies providing the same disclosure for multiple directors, which would not be meaningful. Further, a well-assembled board consists of a diverse collection of individuals who have a variety of complementary skills, and focusing on an individual director’s attributes and skills fails to take this into account.

We Do Not Support Disclosure That Would “Pigeon-Hole” a Director or Committee Member

Moreover, we note that board composition is an art rather than a science, and companies typically look at directors as a group with complementary skills at any given time. Thus we do not support any disclosure that would “pigeon hole” a particular director or indicate that he or she fills a certain “slot”. For the same reason, we also do not believe that it is appropriate to require disclosure of specific experience, qualifications or skills that qualify a person to serve as a member of a particular committee. Other than having a least one member of the board with “financial expertise” satisfying the requirements for the audit committee, companies generally do not select—and should not be encouraged by disclosure rules to select—individuals to serve on the board based on what committee they will serve on. In fact, many companies will rotate directors among several committee positions during their tenure on the board.

Last, we believe that companies should be required to disclose the requested information in their proxy statements only when the director is first nominated. Given our concerns stated at the outset about more disclosure not necessarily being better, requiring disclosure of the nominee’s background once will help to keep the length of the proxy more manageable.

V. New Disclosures about Company Leadership Structure and the Board’s Role in the Risk Management Process

We Support Additional Disclosure of a Company’s Leadership Structure

The Proposed Rules would add a new disclosure requirement to Item 407 of Regulation S-K and a corresponding amendment to Item 7 of Schedule 14A that would require disclosure of the company’s leadership structure and why the company believes it is the best structure for it at the time of the filing. We support these proposed amendments to Item 407 and we acknowledge the Commission’s comment that they are not intended to influence a company’s decision regarding its board leadership structure. We strongly believe that each company must determine for itself whether it is appropriate to separate the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer roles and whether or not to have a lead or presiding director. We note that while some proxy advisory firms view the separation of these roles as optimal, we are aware of no empirical evidence demonstrating that companies with a particular structure consistently have better performance than companies with other structures.
We Support Additional Disclosure with respect to the Board's Role in Risk Management

The Commission also proposes to require additional disclosure in proxy and information statements about the board's (or board committee's) role in the company's risk management process. We read this to mean the board's role in risk management oversight, as is noted in the questions posed for comment. We do not oppose this proposal, and we note that companies that received TARP funds are currently required to disclose information about their risk management process. Finally, we believe that the Commission should provide in its final rule that if the required disclosure is included in another document (such as the MD&A of the Form 10-K), the company may include a reference to that document rather than repeating the information in its proxy statement.

VI. New Disclosure Regarding Compensation Consultants

Disclosure of Fees Should Only Be Required for Consultants Advising on Executive Compensation

The proposed additions to Regulation S-K Item 407(e)(3)(iii) would require disclosure of fees paid to compensation consultants when they play any role in determining or recommending the amount or form of executive and director compensation, if they also provide any other services to the company. It would also require disclosure regarding the nature and extent of all additional services such consultant provides. The proposing release (at page 40) expresses a concern that the provision of additional services by a compensation consultant “may create the appearance, or risk, of a conflict of interest that may call into question the objectivity of the consultant’s executive pay recommendations.” While we acknowledge this concern, we believe that these disclosure requirements should only apply to compensation consultants directly engaged by the compensation committee to provide advice on executive compensation. Under our approach, a company would not be required to include any disclosure regarding consultants who only provide data or information about compensation programs in particular industries, or for companies of a specific size, etc., as these consultants would not be providing advice or recommendations regarding executive compensation. Similarly, where a compensation consultant is retained by management and does not provide advice to the compensation committee, we do not believe that the concerns expressed in the proposing release would call for disclosure of additional services provided by, and fees paid to, such consultant. We also believe that it would be appropriate for the Commission to establish a disclosure threshold based on the amount of the fees for the non-executive compensation related services, such as $120,000 per year, which is analogous to the disclosure threshold under Regulation S-K Item 404 for related person transactions.

VII. Reporting Voting Results on Form 8-K

Disclosure of Voting Results Should be Allowed on Websites

The Proposed Rules would transfer the requirement to disclose the vote results of any matter submitted to shareholders from Form 10-Q and Form 10-K to Form 8-K, in order to make them more timely. We generally support such a change; however, we believe that companies should
be permitted to post their voting results on their website within the required time period in lieu of filing a Form 8-K. This is consistent with the SEC’s stated goal “to encourage the continued development of company Web sites as a significant vehicle for dissemination to investors of important company information.” We note that the Proposed Rules would carve out an exception for contested director elections and we believe this should apply to any proposal where the outcome has not been definitively determined within four business days of the meeting. Accordingly, under our recommendation, a company would be required to furnish (either on its website or Form 8-K) preliminary results on contested elections and proposals that are “too close to call” within four business days of the meeting and final results within four business days after the results become final.

Assuming companies are permitted to furnish preliminary results for contested elections and on proposals that are “too close to call” (as we recommend), then an amendment to General Instruction I.A.3(b) of Form S-3 to add an exception to the S-3 eligibility requirements for reporting voting results would not be necessary.

VIII. Proxy Solicitation Process

Rule 14a-2(b) provides an exemption from the proxy rules for any solicitation by any person who does not, at any time during such solicitation, seek the power to act as proxy for a security holder and does not furnish or otherwise request, or act on behalf of a person who furnishes or requests, a form of revocation, abstention, consent or authorization.

The Rule 14a-2(b) Exemption Should Be Maintained and Third Parties Must Publicly File Solicitation Materials

The proposed amendment to Rule 14a-2(b) provides that a person who supplies a shareholder with a blank, unmarked copy of a management proxy card and requests the shareholder to return the proxy card directly to management does not, by doing so, lose the exemption from the proxy rules under Rule 14a-2(b) for solicitations. Rather than adopting the proposed amendment, we urge the Commission to retain the existing requirements pursuant to which third parties that wish to engage in soliciting activities, including the distribution of copies of the company’s proxy card, must publicly file their soliciting materials. We are concerned that allowing third parties to engage in soliciting activities and send a form of revocation without providing the shareholders with the information required under the federal securities laws will deprive those shareholders of information they need in deciding whether to revoke their proxy, including information about the identity and economic interests of the person providing the proxy and information about the effect of executing such subsequent proxy.

The Commission’s proposed amendment is inconsistent with the Second Circuit’s decision in MONY Group, Inc. v. Highfields Capital Mgmt. L.P., 368 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2004). In MONY, the Second Circuit recognized that providing a blank copy of management’s proxy was a potentially abusive practice and held that in the case of a proxy vote to authorize a proposed merger under Delaware law, a duplicate of management’s proxy card, when included in a

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mailing opposing a proposed merger, was a form of revocation under the rule. We agree with the Second Circuit and we believe that it is disingenuous to suggest that a person is not furnishing a form of revocation when that person provides a shareholder with a unmarked copy of management’s proxy in connection with a “just vote no” campaign, knowing that the execution of the blank proxy will revoke a prior proxy. In fact, the Second Circuit in MONY noted that the only “goal in sending out the duplicate proxy cards must be to encourage shareholders who have already voted for the merger to revoke their votes.” We also note that the Commission’s April 1993 interpretation of Rule 14a-2(b) acknowledged that providing a shareholder with a blank management’s proxy card could have the effect of a revocation of an earlier dated proxy submitted by the same shareholder.

In addition, we also believe that Rule 14a-6(g) should be expanded to require all persons that rely on Rule 14a-2(b)(1), not just those who beneficially own more than $5 million in market value of securities of the class that is the subject of the solicitation, to furnish a Notice of Exempt Solicitation to the Commission pursuant to Rule 14a-103. This would give the Commission an opportunity to comment on the soliciting materials and give the public information regarding the identity and economic interest of the people involved in a “just vote no” campaign, as well as provide notice to the company that a solicitation is taking place.

Rule 14a-4(d) Should Not Allow Soliciting Persons to “Round Out” a Short Slate with Management Nominees

The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(d) would codify an existing no-action position (Application of Rule 14a-4(d)(4) to Solicitation for Proposed Minority Slates of Carl Icahn and Eastbourne Capital L.L.C.) that a soliciting person can round out its short slate with nominees named in a non-management proxy statement in the same manner as already permitted by the rule for a soliciting person to round out its short slate with nominees named in management’s proxy statement. As we believe that different shareholder groups may form stealth 13(d) groups, we agree with the Commission’s requirements that soliciting persons intending to “round out” their short slate with a company’s or another persons’ nominees be permitted to do so only so long as such soliciting person: (1) does not form a group with the other persons as determined under Section 13(d)(3) and in Regulation 13D-G; (2) is not a participant in the other persons’ solicitation; and (3) includes a representation in its proxy statement that it has not agreed and will not agree to act, directly or indirectly, as a group or otherwise engage in any activities that would be deemed to cause the formation of a group as determined under Section 13(d)(3) and in Regulation 13D-G. However, for the reasons set forth in the Society’s letter to the Commission regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, the Commission should not permit a shareholder to “round out” its short-slate with directors nominated pursuant to proposed Rule 14a-11 (if adopted) or pursuant to a proxy access by-law provision.

IX. Other Requests for Comment

Finally, the Commission states that it is exploring other ways in which it could improve proxy disclosures, and proposes some possible reforms at the end of the Release (the “Possible Reforms”). While we support the Commission’s efforts to improve disclosure, we do not believe that it should pursue the Possible Reforms at this time for the following reason: as we have
noted above, proxy statements are becoming longer and more complex each year, and we are concerned that the time will come that they will be so complex that shareholders will stop reading them. We believe that these concerns will be exacerbated to the extent that the Commission’s rule proposals result in additional required information that provides only incremental changes to the overall disclosure.

Thus, we believe that the Commission, in exploring ways to improve proxy disclosure, should take a principles-based approach that focuses on whether the additional information that is being considered would be meaningful to shareholders in determining how to vote or whether the information is merely incremental or general information. In this regard, we believe that the Commission should ensure that the proxy statement should not become an amalgam of discrete disclosures in response to “issues du jour”.

We note the following examples of such additional disclosure and our views on such disclosure:

- Requiring the Compensation Committee Report to be “filed” would not be meaningful for shareholders in deciding whether to vote for directors, as the company’s certifying officers already have liability for the contents of the CD&A;

- Expanding the CD&A to cover all executive officers (not just the named executive officers) would not be meaningful for shareholders because shareholders have been, and will continue to be able to, evaluate directors based in part on the compensation policies and practices in place for the NEOs, and the proposed expansion of the CD&A would only increase the compensation disclosure without providing much in the way of additional meaningful disclosure regarding the compensation committee’s policies and procedures;

- Requiring disclosure of performance targets regardless of the potential competitive effect on a company may result in adverse consequences to a company that would outweigh any meaningful information such disclosure would provide shareholders in deciding whether to vote for directors;

- Requiring disclosure regarding whether a member of the compensation committee has expertise in compensation matters could have the unintended consequence of creating an implication that any directors on the committee that lacked such “expertise” were not qualified to serve. As described above, directors have broad knowledge and experience and use that to make judgments on a variety of issues affecting a company, including its compensation practices. Therefore, a member of a compensation committee that lacks such “expertise” may nevertheless add a tremendous amount of value to compensation decisions; and

- Requiring disclosure of whether the amounts of executive compensation reflect any considerations of internal pay equity would not be meaningful for shareholders in deciding whether to vote for directors as this disclosure is just one small element of the compensation analysis. Companies and their compensation committees are already required to address the material elements of their compensation program and the material
factors underlying their compensation policies and decisions, which may include internal pay equity.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on these important proposals and would be happy to provide you with further information to the extent you would find it useful.

Respectfully submitted,

The Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals

By:

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Statement of the Investment Company Institute
Hearing on "Corporate Governance and Shareholder Empowerment"
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
Committee on Financial Services
United States House of Representatives
April 21, 2010

I. Introduction

The Investment Company Institute appreciates the opportunity to submit its views on four issues addressed in one or more of the bills being considered by the Subcommittee: proxy access; broker discretionary voting; disclosure of proxy votes; and mandatory independent board chairs.

ICI is the national association of U.S. investment companies. ICI members have total assets of nearly $12 trillion and serve almost 90 million shareholders. Our members include mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and business development companies (BDCs), which in this statement we refer to collectively as "investment companies" or "funds."

In addition to their role as the investment vehicle of choice for millions of Americans, investment companies have been among the largest investors in the domestic financial markets for much of the past 15 years and held a significant portion of the outstanding shares of U.S.-issued stocks, bonds, and money market securities at year-end 2009. Indeed, investment companies as a whole were one of the largest groups of investors in U.S. companies, holding 28 percent of their outstanding stock at year-end 2009.

Based on their dual roles as major investors in securities of public companies acting as fiduciaries on behalf of millions of individual investors, and issuers of securities with their own shareholders and boards of directors, investment companies offer a valuable perspective on the subject matter of today's hearing.

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1 H.R. 2861, the "Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009;" H.R. 3372, the "Corporate Governance Reform Act of 2009;" and H.R. 3351, the "Proxy Voting Transparency Act of 2009."
3 Id.
II. Shareholder Access to Company Proxy Materials

Section 2 of H.R. 2861 directs the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to require, by rule, that issuers permit their shareholders to vote on candidates for the board of directors who have been nominated by shareholders who, in the aggregate, have owned at least one percent of the company's voting securities for at least two years. The practice of permitting shareholders to nominate directors on a company's proxy statement is commonly referred to as "shareholder access to company proxy materials" or "proxy access."

H.R. 2861's proxy access provisions encompass all issuers which, as a technical matter, includes investment companies. It is by no means clear, however, that investment companies raise the policy concern the bill's sponsors are seeking to address. Indeed, while the SEC has developed a vast administrative record related to proxy access requirements for public operating companies through its consideration of this issue multiple times over the years, nowhere has it been established that proxy access requirements are necessary or appropriate for investment companies or, if so, what form they should take.

Below we provide our views on the application of proxy access requirements to investment companies, followed by our views on proxy access requirements for public operating companies.

A. Application of Proxy Access Requirements to Investment Companies

ICI is concerned that applying proxy access requirements indiscriminately to all issuers, including investment companies—as Section 2 of H.R. 2861 in its current form would do—fails to take into account the significant differences in governance models between public operating companies and investment companies. In particular, most funds today are part of complexes comprised of multiple funds that share the same investment adviser and other key service providers. As a result, significant efficiencies are realized when a single or relatively small number of boards oversee all of the funds. Boards of these funds generally are organized according to one of two models—a "unitary" board consisting of one group of directors who serve on the board of every fund in the complex, or "cluster" boards consisting of two or more separate boards of directors within the complex that each oversees a different group of funds. Clusters typically are organized according to investment objective or investment sector, or result from a merger of complexes that were initially organized by different management companies.

The benefits of unitary and cluster boards include enhanced board efficiency and greater board knowledge of the many aspects of fund operations that are complex-wide in nature. For example, fund directors are required to establish standards for the valuation of portfolio securities and review compliance procedures. The standards that govern directors' determinations in these areas apply to all funds in the same complex, and consistency among funds greatly enhances both board efficiency and shareholder protection, as there is less likelihood for compliance errors if all funds within the complex
operate under consistent procedures. For these and other reasons, director oversight of multiple funds within a complex has served shareholders well.4

Requiring funds to include shareholder-nominated directors on their proxy statements would risk disrupting this efficient and effective corporate governance mechanism, and should not be done without considerable forethought, a clear demonstration of the need to make this change, and appropriate tailoring of the requirements to the unique characteristics of investment companies. If a fund complex consists of multiple registered investment companies with a unitary or cluster board, and a shareholder in one of the registered funds nominate a director who is elected, the complex will have two equally undesirable alternatives. It may abandon its unitary or cluster board structure, thus losing the important benefits discussed above. Alternatively, it may continue to hold joint board meetings, but have to prepare separate or redacted materials for the one director (who, unlike the board’s other members, would not be a fiduciary to the other funds overseen by the rest of the directors), and incur the disruption of having that director excuse himself at various times during the meeting to preserve the confidentiality of information pertaining to the other funds. Either way, fund shareholders will bear the associated additional costs.

Investment company shareholders enjoy special protections that also must be taken into account in considering the need for, and formulating, any proxy access requirements for investment companies. Unlike investors in operating companies, shareholders of investment companies are guaranteed the right to participate in key decisions. For example, investment companies are prohibited from borrowing money, issuing senior securities, underwriting securities issued by other persons, purchasing or selling real estate or commodities, or making loans to other persons, except in accordance with the policy established in the fund’s registration statement, without first obtaining shareholder approval.5

As the Subcommittee is aware, the SEC recently published for public comment a proposal that would provide shareholders with the ability to nominate directors on a company’s proxy statement.6 Like H.R. 2861, the SEC’s rule proposal would apply to all issuers, including investment companies. Due to the differences between investment companies and operating companies discussed above, the

6 See SEC Release Nos. 33-9046; 34-60089; and IC-28765 (June 10, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 29024 (June 18, 2009); and SEC Release Nos. 33-9886; 34-61161; and IC-29069 (December 14, 2009), 74 Fed. Reg. 67144 (December 18, 2009) (re-opening the comment period).
lack of empirical analysis of the impact of the proposal on investment companies, and the absence of any demonstrated need for proxy access requirements in the investment company context, ICI has urged the SEC not to apply its current proposal to investment companies. Instead, we have called for the SEC to consider first whether a proxy access proposal should apply to investment companies at all, and only if so, how it could craft a new proposal better suited to the unique attributes of investment companies.

Similarly, we cannot support the proxy access provisions of H.R. 2861 in their current form—in no small part because they would extend specific, blanket requirements to investment companies, even though the work necessary to establish a sound policy basis for doing so has not been done. Should Congress instead pursue legislation confirming the SEC’s authority to adopt proxy access requirements, we recommend that such legislation also require the SEC to take into account relevant differences between operating companies and investment companies in applying any final proxy access rules to investment companies.

B. Application of Proxy Access Requirements to Public Operating Companies

In contrast to the lack of analysis with respect to investment companies, there has been considerable public debate over the application of proxy access requirements to public operating companies. ICI has been an active participant in this debate. The topic has been a polarizing one. In contrast to others who may fall clearly on one side of the debate or the other, ICI members have one foot in each camp. As noted above, funds are significant shareholders of public companies. They also are public companies with their own shareholders and boards of directors. As a result, they fully appreciate the importance of effective corporate governance and also are cognizant of the need to avoid undue interference with a company’s directors and officers who are responsible for its management. ICI believes there is a need to carefully balance these interests when addressing shareholder access to company proxy materials in the public operating company context.

When we testified before the full Committee on Financial Services in 2007, we provided our views on then-pending SEC proposed rule amendments that would have permitted shareholders to include in company proxy materials their proposals for bylaw amendments regarding the procedures for

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7 We note that Section 7222 of H.R. 4173, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, passed by the U.S. House of Representatives on December 31, 2009, and Section 972 of S. 3217, the Restoring American Financial Stability Act, passed by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on March 22, 2010, address proxy access in this manner.

nominating directors. 10 We stated then, and continue to believe now, that the interests of investors will be served by allowing shareholders, under certain circumstances, to have their proposals for bylaw amendments concerning procedures for nominating directors included in a company’s proxy statement. Permitting companies and their shareholders to work together to tailor companies’ governing documents to suit the specific interests of the company and its shareholders has the benefit of accommodating recent state law developments, 11 and allowing firms to craft their own proxy access regime. It also would relieve the federal government of having to draw arbitrary lines to establish eligibility requirements.

We oppose at this time, however, the creation of a federally mandated requirement that would force all public companies, at their expense, to allow shareholders to nominate directors on a company’s proxy statement, as would be provided by H.R. 2861. We would not object to Congress confirming the SEC’s authority to adopt rules requiring proxy access (as the current versions of financial services reform legislation pending in the House and Senate would do). We believe that the SEC should be given the latitude to determine the exact contours of rules regarding whether, how, and in what circumstances shareholders will be permitted to nominate directors. 12 The SEC staff has been diligently analyzing hundreds of comment letters and meeting with interested persons in an effort to develop final rules that balance the twin goals of protecting investors and not placing undue costs on the companies to which the rules will apply. 13 Investors would be best served if Congress permits the SEC to complete its deliberative process, even if the ultimate result does not correspond exactly to Section 2 of H.R. 2861.

For example, the SEC’s recent proposal would establish the criteria a shareholder would have to meet to nominate directors on a company’s proxy statement. 14 H.R. 2861 would establish different

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10 See 2007 ICI Testimony.

11 See, e.g., Section 112 of Delaware General Corporation Law (permitting a Delaware corporation to adopt a bylaw provision that specifies the circumstances under which shareholders would have access to the corporation’s proxy materials to nominate directors).

12 As we recommended above, however, the SEC should be required to take into account relevant differences between operating companies and investment companies in exercising this authority.

13 See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Mary Schapiro, Speech by SEC Chairman: Address to the Practicing Law Institute’s 41st Annual Institute on Securities Regulation (November 4, 2009) (stating that the SEC has received more than 500 written comments and expressing Chairman Schapiro’s belief that the final product resulting from the rulemaking process will be better as a result of the comment process), available on the SEC’s website at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch110409md.htm.

14 ICI has consistently emphasized the critical importance of applying strict eligibility criteria under any proxy access regime in an effort to reasonably ensure that the interests of shareholders who propose bylaw amendments relating to director nominations and of shareholders who nominate company directors (in each case, on the company’s proxy statement) are aligned with the interests of other long-term shareholders. In the 2009 ICI Comment Letter, ICI recommended that if the SEC determined to go forward with a requirement to permit shareholders to nominate directors on a company’s proxy statement, such nominating shareholders should be subject to: (i) a significant ownership threshold of at least ten percent of a company’s securities; and (ii) a holding period that provides assurance that the shareholders are committed to the long
criteria for the same purpose. In addition, H.R. 2861 and the SEC proposal place different limits on the number of permissible shareholder nominees.\textsuperscript{15} Comment letters on the SEC’s proposal expressed a variety of views on these (and many other) issues. Directing a specific outcome, as H.R. 2861 does, runs a significant risk of losing benefits that can be achieved through a studied evaluation of a robust public dialogue and eliminating important flexibility for the SEC to tailor requirements as may be warranted in different circumstances.

III. Elimination of Broker Voting on Uncontested Elections of Investment Company Directors

Section 2 of H.R. 2861 directs the SEC to prohibit, by rule, the practice of brokers voting securities they hold on behalf of customers in uncontested director elections, in the absence of voting instructions from the customer. This practice is commonly referred to as “discretionary broker voting.” Section 2 would apply to director elections held by all issuers, which would include investment companies.

This provision appears to be intended, in part, to codify a recent change to New York Stock Exchange Rule 452 that generally would prohibit broker discretionary voting for the uncontested election of directors. That rule change, however, expressly excepted registered investment companies, permitting brokers to continue to vote such shares—a result that was reached through an extensive deliberative process.\textsuperscript{16} The decision to exempt registered investment companies was based on the premise that “the unique regulatory scheme governing registered investment companies made such companies sufficiently different from operating companies” and that “they are subject to regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940, which also regulates shareholder participation in key

term mission of the company, such as two years. In suggesting a ten percent threshold, ICI noted that a higher threshold would encourage shareholders to come together to effect change, better assuring that the company’s proxy machinery would be used to advance the common interests of many shareholders in addressing legitimate concerns about the management and operation of the company. While we recommend that Congress refrain altogether from establishing specific eligibility criteria for proxy access by statute, we would especially oppose adoption of the one percent ownership threshold in H.R. 2861. We believe such a low threshold is inadequate to protect long-term shareholders against potentially detrimental actions by shareholders that do not hold a significant stake in the company.

\textsuperscript{15} The 2009 ICI Comment Letter recommended, in the event that the SEC pursued its shareholder access proposal, permitting no more than one shareholder nominee. We pointed out that given the novelty of permitting shareholders to have their director nominees included in a company’s proxy statement, it is appropriate to limit the number of nominees to one. This approach also would diminish the chances that a well-functioning, dedicated board will be disrupted by shareholder-nominated directors pursuing narrow interests not shared by other shareholders.

\textsuperscript{16} The NYSE filed a proposal with the Commission in October 2006 that would have eliminated broker discretionary voting with respect to directors of all issuers, including registered investment companies. In response to information submitted by ICI and others concerning the difficulties funds would face if broker discretionary voting were eliminated for fund director elections, however, the NYSE filed an amended proposal with the Commission in 2007. The amended proposal prohibited discretionary broker voting for the election of directors for all issuers except registered investment companies. In 2009, the SEC approved the NYSE proposal. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 60215 (July 1, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/newyse/2009-34-60215.pdf.
decisions." Consideration also was given to the heightened problems that registered investment companies have in achieving quorums because of their disproportionately large retail shareholder base and because the vast majority of fund shares are held through intermediaries (primarily brokers and banks).

The drafters of Section 2 of H.R. 2861 may not have intended to override the NYSE’s exception for registered investment companies, but that is exactly what Section 2 would do. This would be an extremely costly and unnecessary change for investment companies and their shareholders. Eliminating discretionary broker voting for fund directors undoubtedly would create significant difficulties for funds in achieving quorums and getting directors elected. Our members report significant difficulties in achieving quorums and getting matters approved when brokers are not permitted to vote. Frequently it is necessary for funds to engage soliciting firms and conduct multiple mailings to obtain quorums, and funds still often must adjourn meetings due to inadequate voting response. As a result, the costs of proxy solicitations when brokers are not permitted to vote are significant—costs ultimately borne by shareholders.

These concerns are supported by data. Based on an analysis of 986 shareholder meetings held by investment companies, ICI published a report that found that eliminating discretionary broker voting would have a disproportionate impact on funds and would create significant difficulties for funds because, among other things, they have a far higher proportion of retail shareholders than most operating companies (and retail shareholders are less likely than institutional shareholders to vote their proxies). As a result, the report concluded that funds will have significant difficulties achieving quorums and electing directors if broker voting is eliminated and, in turn, that the proposal would significantly increase costs for funds as they conduct multiple solicitations to try to achieve quorums.\footnote{Investment Company Institute, Costs of Eliminating Discretionary Broker Voting on Uncontested Elections of Investment Company Directors [December 18, 2006], available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/wbr_broker_voting.pdf. ICI report reflected data as of year-end 2005, but more current data remain consistent, according to additional ICI research performed in 2009.}

While we believe that shareholder voting for directors is an important component of a strong corporate governance structure, prohibiting discretionary broker voting in the context of funds simply is not justified given the costs. It will not increase fund shareholder voting or empower fund shareholders. In fact, we are not aware of any fund shareholders who have voiced dissatisfaction with the current proxy voting process as it relates to the uncontested election of directors. Nor do we believe that the current process entails any detrimental effects on funds or fund governance. Because these elections are uncontested, the same directors, in virtually every case, will be elected whether or not funds and their shareholders bear the additional costs.

For these reasons, ICI strongly recommends that Section 2 of H.R. 2861 be revised to retain discretionary broker voting with respect to funds.

\footnote{Id. at p. 8.}
IV. Proxy Vote Disclosure

H.R. 3351 contains a provision that would require every institutional investment manager to disclose, at least annually, all of its proxy votes. We strongly support this provision.

Since 2004, funds—alone among all institutional investors—have been required to publicly disclose their proxy votes.19 As a result of this unique disclosure requirement, in 2008 ICI was able to conduct the broadest study of funds’ proxy votes ever undertaken, covering more than 3.5 million proxy votes cast by 160 of the largest fund families in 2007.20 That research indicates, among other things, that: (1) funds devote substantial resources to proxy voting; (2) funds vote proxies in accordance with their board-approved guidelines; (3) funds do not reflexively vote “with management,” as some critics claim, but rather make nuanced judgments in determining how to vote on both management and shareholder proposals; and (4) fund voting patterns are often broadly consistent with vote recommendations of proxy advisory firms, although here also our research shows that funds do not reflexively adopt the recommendations of proxy advisors. We are currently in the process of updating the study to cover proxy votes cast by funds over the three year period 2007 to 2009. This update should help begin to establish whether there are any apparent trends in how funds vote.

Unless current law changes, however, one aspect of fund proxy voting that will remain undocumented is how fund votes compare with those of other institutional investors. At present, such a comparison is not possible because other institutional investors are not required to disclose their proxy votes. H.R. 3351 would expand the transparency currently provided by funds to all institutional investors.

We have long advocated for such a provision.21 In the aggregate, institutional investors other than funds hold approximately thirty-five percent of outstanding U.S. equity securities. Requiring these investors to disclose proxy votes would significantly enhance the quality of the debate concerning how the corporate franchise is used. This is particularly true in the context of the types of “say on pay” and “golden parachute” proposals that are contained in H.R. 3351 and the other bills considered by the Subcommittee today, where the public disclosure of advisory votes would maximize their influence over management.

19 See Rule 30e-1 under the Investment Company Act.
We are not alone in calling for increased transparency about the proxy votes of other institutional investors. As early as 2003, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank questioned the appropriateness of a proxy voting disclosure requirement specific to funds.\(^\text{21}\) The late Senator Edward M. Kennedy commissioned a 2004 GAO study that concluded, among other things, that workers and retirees would benefit from increased transparency in proxy voting by pension plans.\(^\text{22}\) More recently, a number of notable commentators have supported the notion, including the Investors’ Working Group, an independent task force sponsored by the CFA Institute and Council of Institutional Investors and chaired by former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt and William Donaldson.\(^\text{23}\) The AFL-CIO has also strongly supported increased transparency in proxy voting by all capital market participants,\(^\text{24}\) and voluntarily discloses its proxy votes and proxy voting policies even though it is not legally required to do so.

Versions of the provision in H.R. 3351 have found support in Congress. Most recently, the House passed H.R. 4173.\(^\text{25}\) Section 202 of that Act includes proxy vote disclosure for all institutional investors, but only with respect to the “say on pay” and “golden parachute” provisions that are contained in that Act. While we supported the proxy vote disclosure provision in H.R. 4173, we prefer the version in H.R. 3351 as it would cover all proxy votes cast by institutional investors.

In its consideration of the corporate governance bills today, we urge the Subcommittee to support the provision in H.R. 3351 that would extend proxy vote disclosure to all institutional investors. Proxy vote disclosure achieves important public policy purposes, and should not be limited solely to funds.

V. **Mandatory Independent Board Chair**

H.R. 2861 and H.R. 3272 essentially would require every issuer to have an independent board chair. We oppose these provisions. ICI is not aware of any substantial or reliable evidence of proven


\(^{25}\) See supra, n.8.
benefits that would justify imposing such a requirement on all public companies. Instead, we believe the selection of an appropriate person to serve as board chair rightfully is, and should continue to be, a decision made by the directors themselves. This is particularly true in the case of investment company boards of directors, which are robustly independent.

The Investment Company Act requires that at least 40 percent of the directors on a fund board be “independent.” Under SEC rules, virtually all funds are required to have at least a majority of directors who are not “interested persons,” as defined in the Act. In practice, the proportion of independent directors is significantly higher throughout the industry. In nearly 90 percent of fund complexes, 75 percent or more of fund directors are independent.\(^{27}\) In addition, although there is no legal requirement for a fund board to have an independent chair or independent lead director, nearly 84 percent of fund boards do.\(^{28}\) Moreover, the Investment Company Act requires many key decisions—including approval of the fund’s advisory contract—to be approved by a majority of the independent directors.

Notably, the SEC in the past sought to mandate that fund boards have an independent chair, adopting rule amendments to that effect in 2004.\(^{29}\) In response to legal challenges, however, the amendments were struck down twice by a federal appeals court.\(^{30}\) The court’s decisions did not address the merits of an independent chair requirement for investment companies. Rather, the court found deficiencies in the SEC’s rulemaking process. Still, it is telling that the amendments never took effect.

Seeking to bolster the administrative record in support of the rule amendments, the SEC in 2007 published for comment two studies prepared by its Office of Economic Analysis (OEA).\(^{31}\) In our view, neither OEA study provided any compelling evidence that independent chairs enhance shareholder protections or shareholder value, either in the investment company context or in the case of operating companies.\(^{32}\) One of the studies suggested that the optimal board structure may vary from


\(^{28}\) Id. at 11.

\(^{29}\) SEC Release No. IC-26520 (July 27, 2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 46378 (Aug. 2, 2004). The amendments also would have required virtually all funds to be composed of at least 75 percent independent directors.

\(^{30}\) Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

\(^{31}\) See SEC Release No. IC-27600 (December 15, 2006), 71 Fed. Reg. 76648 (December 21, 2006). One study (the “Literature Review”) provides a summary of recent academic research related to mutual fund governance. The other study (the “Power Study”) discusses the strength of the statistical tests used in many of the academic papers cited in the Literature Review.

firm to firm. Thus, the studies failed to provide an empirical basis for the independent chair requirement and instead called the imposition of such a requirement into serious question. We are not aware of any more recent academic or other studies that would alter this view.

The SEC took no further action in this area until last year, when it adopted new requirements for all issuers, including investment companies, to disclose information about their board leadership structure and why the company believes its structure is the most appropriate for that company. The SEC stated that "[i]n proposing this requirement, we noted that different leadership structures may be suitable for different companies depending on factors such as the size of a company, the nature of a company's business, or internal control considerations, among other things." We agree. Additional required transparency concerning board leadership structures may encourage some companies to focus more intently on the effectiveness of their particular leadership structure and should make it easier for investors who consider this information important to make informed investment and proxy voting decisions. Given the lack of empirical evidence that having an independent chair correlates directly with better outcomes for shareholders, the SEC's disclosure approach is far preferable to forcing a uniform leadership structure on all companies, as H.R. 2861 and H.R. 3272 would do.

VI. Conclusion

On behalf of ICI's members and the millions of individual shareholders they serve, we very much appreciate the opportunity to share ICI's views with you. We look forward to working with the Subcommittee on these important issues.

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34 Id. at 39-40.
April 20, 2010

Statement by Carl C. Icahn before the U.S. House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets.

Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett and honorable Members of the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on HR 2861, the Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009.

The goals of this proposed legislation are worthy and if enacted, would be an important advancement for shareholder rights in this country, a cause that I have long espoused. In my view, however, the bill does not go far enough.

The need for substantive financial reform was made palpably clear with the financial meltdown of 2008, when many of our largest financial institutions stumbled badly or failed outright, forcing disaster relief efforts that included an unprecedented, multi-trillion dollar Wall Street bailout by the U.S. Treasury and other agencies.

In my view, while many boards have acted responsibly, much of the blame for this crisis rests squarely with the boards of directors of these institutions, whose job it is to ensure a company’s financial stability and to rein in reckless management practices that threaten the organization’s primary purpose, which is to generate value for its owners, the stockholders.
It is blatantly apparent that these boards failed to properly oversee these managements as they racked up billions of dollars in debt to accumulate and trade vast troves of risky securities and derivatives that were ‘priced to perfection,’ as though the underlying assets would never decline in value or default.

Many securities were apparently structured and lucratively sold by bankers with an “IBG” attitude, an insider acronym for “I’ll be gone” when they blow up.

And blow up they did in bets that proved catastrophic for banks, brokerages, insurance companies and others, crippling the global financial system and leading to millions of foreclosures, mass layoffs and the current mega-recession from which we’re just now recovering.

It baffles me that there have been no successful prosecutions for these outrageous failures of corporate governance that cost this nation so dearly from Wall Street to Main Street. These failures weren’t acts of God, but acts of commission and omission by those who should have known better.

What is clear is that the need for accountability and reform has never been greater. To paraphrase Machiavelli, “we must never let a serious crisis go to waste.”

In my view, this reform should start with empowering shareholders to elect boards who are competent, objective and more independent from management – not beholden to them for their lucrative sinecures and prone to approve any
management decision however flawed. The power in any organization should rest with the shareholders and the board, not with managements, who are after all employees charged with managing the business.

The Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009 would authorize the Securities and Exchange Commission to institute on a federal level many corporate governance rules that I have long advocated. I supported many of these measures when they were enacted into law by the State of North Dakota in 2007 with the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act, which I believe is a substantial advancement of shareholder rights in this country.

These include the right of substantial shareholders to propose nominees to corporate boards; to force companies to split the role of chairman and chief executive and to make the chairman independent; to block brokers from voting shares without authorization from the beneficial holder; to require clawbacks of executive compensation for errant management acts; to make compensation consultants independent and beholden only to boards; to require a nominee to win a majority or plurality of votes for election to a board; along with other important measures.

The bill, however, leaves out provisions that would further strengthen shareholder rights. These include measures that would restrict the use of ‘poison pill’ anti-takeover bylaws; eliminate ‘staggered’ or classified boards; allow for shareholder reimbursement for successful proxy battles; and allow shareholders greater rights to call special meetings, particularly for merger propositions; and to give
shareholders the right to vote to incorporate a company in a more shareholder-friendly jurisdiction.

A provision to restrict or eliminate poison pills is especially crucial in this legislation. Poison pills, which allow management to issue a flood of new shares to thwart a hostile takeover, are basically management protection devices that act as barriers to free enterprise, which is a fundamental cornerstone to our economy.

This perfectly legal anti-takeover provision gives managements the unilateral right to block a takeover that shareholders may favor. Even more egregious, shareholders in these situations often do not even get the right to vote on such transactions. This is akin to a property manager - a paid employee of the landlord - telling the landlord he can't sell his property to whomever he wishes. How can this be of any benefit to an economy that creates wealth via free exchange of goods and services? Why should paid management employees have the right to tell owners to whom they can sell? This is anti-competitive and wrong.

At a time when the livelihoods and well-being of all Americans is tied to the health of the economy, there is no more important work for Congress to do but to ensure that business is run fairly for the benefit of all its stakeholders - not simply to benefit managements who act primarily in their own self-interest.

As Calvin Coolidge once said, "The business of America is business." It is time to push back against the plethora of management-centric rules that undermine the foundations of
business that has led to the greatest wealth machine in history, the United States economy.

Thank you for the opportunity to submit written testimony before the Subcommittee and I welcome any written questions or comments from Committee Members.

Mr. Icahn is chairman of Icahn Enterprises LP, a diversified holding company engaged in businesses including investment management, automotive, metals, real estate, home fashion, railcar, gaming, home fashion and food/packaging.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to offer testimony for the public record.

The Motley Fool has a long history of advocacy on behalf of the 63 million American shareholders of public companies. We are a private corporation based in Alexandria, Va., just across the Potomac River from Washington. But we note that we are not an industry or consumer advocacy group, nor are we a political action committee. In fact, we have engaged in legislative or regulatory debate only under two conditions. The first is when we have been asked to provide our expertise, including our service on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Committee to Improve Financial Regulation, or our testimony on the need for greater transparency in mutual fund fees and on the collapse of Enron.

The second is when we have believed the rights of individual investors are at stake, as we did when we publicly pushed for the passage of Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000. Arthur Levitt, then the Chairman of the SEC, publicly credited The Motley Fool with helping ensure the passage of Regulation FD, marking one of our company’s proudest moments.

The Motley Fool views poor corporate governance—regardless of its source—as a drag upon our collective prosperity. There is a natural, inevitable tension between the interests of company managements and their outside shareholders. Our interest lies in promoting regulatory and legal regimes that both allow and incent boards of directors to assure that company managements make decisions that optimize the benefit to their shareholders, the owners of their businesses.

We believe that shareholders will benefit most where there is a healthy balance of power between shareholders and management, overseen by the boards. At present, executives at American public corporations can all too often alter this balance of power to their benefit, and to the detriment of long-term shareholders, through their influence over the constitution of corporate boards of directors. Often, management has virtually no checks on its practical ability to appoint the board which then oversees it, which we believe falls woefully short of the ideals of checks and balances upon which our country was founded, and upon which the corporate entity relies. Aspects of this legislation promise to restore some of that balance.

We’d like to address four prevalent corporate governance practices that we feel have failed to serve the long-term individual investor.

First, too many CEOs nominate directors whom they know will be unconditionally gracious in return for the social and monetary benefits of boardmanship. Despite the reforms of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the world of corporate boards, quite frankly, remains a clubby alliance of mutual back-scratching and groupthink, rather than serving its intended goal of democratic shareholder representation.
The lack of a mandated majority voting structure in uncontested elections is largely to blame for this. Under so-called plurality systems, uncontested directors can keep their seats so long as they receive one vote.

As of late 2009, a record 93 board members failed to receive 50% of votes cast by shareholders during that fiscal year. Yet even in the face of broad shareholder opposition, not one of those 93 directors tendered his or her resignation. As Notre Dame Law School professor Julian Velasco put it, “Incumbent directors are virtually immune to the effects of a shareholder vote. In most cases, it seems misleading to claim that there is any election or right to vote at all.”

And let’s not forget that 93 is a very small number. Either shareholders were ecstatic with corporate leadership during the year in which boards’ profound abdication of responsibility was so publicly laid bare, or the balance of power is skewed so far in management’s favor that shareholders are stymied from electing their own representatives. We think the latter.

This practice of suppressing shareholders’ voices must end, which is why The Motley Fool supports requiring that all uncontested directors receive majority votes to retain their board seats. In a corporate governance system riddled with flaws, this, we feel, should be priority number 1.

Second, there’s never just one cockroach in the kitchen, and shareholders sometimes attempt to remove multiple board members. Yet roughly half of companies traded on major U.S. stock exchanges have erected another barrier to shareholders’ reprieve—so-called staggered boards.

When staggered boards are in place, a majority of shareholders looking to replace directors must overcome enormous institutional constraints. Removing a set of poorly performing directors may take multiple elections and several years, assuming it can be done at all. In cases of incompetent or corrupt leadership, staggered boards ingrain the status quo.

Some have hailed supposed benefits of the staggered-board system, including its ability to stave off hostile takeovers. Yet if majority votes are required in director elections, as mentioned above, we should question whether the deal is truly hostile. By far the most significant implication of staggered boards is prolonged tenures for directors of whom a majority of shareholders may disapprove. To this point, there are verified economic drawbacks of the staggered-board system. A Harvard University study found that “staggered boards are associated with a lower firm value” that is “economically meaningful.”

Third, we applaud the SEC’s recent ruling to allow the NYSE to end discretionary broker voting in director elections—whereby brokers vote the proxies of their clients without written instruction. The practice has led overwhelmingly to brokers rubber-stamping management’s recommendations. Because a substantial majority of shares are held by brokers on behalf of their beneficial owners, discretionary voting in many cases renders elections moot. We hope to see such a ban enacted into law in the case of director elections and, as a general principle, on other matters of importance.

Lastly, the issue of proxy access in director nominations must be addressed. When management handpicks board nominees, even through the apparent veil of an “independent” nominating
committee, it muddies the intended role of corporate directors. A determined CEO can simply repeatedly renominate the same gracious director. Moreover, as Warren Buffett said at last year’s Berkshire Hathaway press conference, a lot of directors love the job for the money and sociability, so they aren’t going to do anything that gets them kicked off that board or not invited to another board. The average “independent” Lehman director was paid more than $360,000 in 2007—a sum that would ingratiate any director to those with the power to hire and fire. Without the ability to nominate their own candidates to company proxies, shareholders don’t have a reasonable alternative to the CEO’s personal priorities.

That’s why we strongly feel that shareholders must be given a legitimate and practical chance to nominate directors.

While The Motley Fool strongly advocates on behalf of the individual investor, blanket shareholder empowerment per se is not what we’re after. As the financial crisis made plain, investors often have a short-term investment horizon that can be just as damaging as an entrenched status quo. We believe that empowering long-term shareholders will lead to healthy business practices that are beneficial to all stakeholders, including employees, customers, and even the wider economy.

Therefore, investors with proven long-term time horizons and much at stake should be given priority in nominating directors. Doing so would address the reasonable concern than increased shareholder participation in corporate affairs could cause greater short-term pressures on management and boards. The proposed two-year minimum share holding period would help to ensure that alternatives to management’s candidates are vetted by shareholders with the company’s best long-term interest at heart.

In the end, these changes to corporate governance are about fairness and oversight. They’re about whether a company’s owners should be able to elect their own representatives and, by extension, the managers they are hiring to operate their companies, or whether a few senior executives should have the power to select their own supervisors, their own compensation committees, and their own rules, and run others’ companies however they see fit.

I appreciate the opportunity to submit public testimony to the Subcommittee, and would be happy to answer any questions from either the Members or their staff.

Signed,
Tom Gardner, CEO, The Motley Fool Holdings, Inc.

On behalf of himself and:
William H. Mann, Motley Fool Asset Management, LLC
Ilan Moscovitz, The Motley Fool
Morgan Housel, The Motley Fool
Anand Chokkavelu, The Motley Fool
April 20, 2010

The Honorable Paul Kanjorski
Chairman
Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government
Sponsored Enterprises
Committee on Financial Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Scott Garrett
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government
Sponsored Enterprises
Committee on Financial Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Kanjorski and Ranking Member Garrett:

The undersigned organizations and institutions represent hundreds of thousands of businesses, small and large, from all sectors of the economy employing tens of millions of Americans, as well as non-profit public policy groups interested in fostering entrepreneurship and shareholder return for retail investors.

Our organizations strongly support legislative and regulatory reform that will protect investors, improve the effectiveness of financial regulators, and assist capital formation. Legislation that adheres to these goals is an important response to the financial crisis and necessary to spur real economic growth and the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises hearing on “Corporate Governance and Shareholder Empowerment” is a welcome part of that process. However, we oppose the legislation that is being considered during the hearing: H.R. 2861, the “Shareholder Empowerment Act,” sponsored by Rep. Peters; H.R. 3272, the “Corporate Governance Reform Act,” sponsored by Rep. Ellison; and H.R. 3351, the “Proxy Voting Transparency Act,” sponsored by Rep. Kilroy, in their current forms because they do not further these objectives.

There is no evidence that the issues addressed by these bills were responsible for the financial crisis. Moreover, we believe that their enactment will lead to serious unforeseen (and unforeseeable) consequences that will inhibit job creation, endanger the ongoing economic recovery, and prevent the American economy from reaching its full potential.

First, various academic analyses of the financial crisis have found that it was not caused, in whole or in part, as a result of the failure of existing corporate governance structures, 1 and that many of the reforms currently under consideration, such as proxy access, may destroy or seriously erode shareholder wealth. 2

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Second, we believe that the enactment of statutory provisions mandating a federal right to proxy access and an advisory vote on executive compensation ("say on pay"), mandating leadership structures, disenfranchising retail shareholders and requiring majority voting in uncontested director elections would:

- Federalize corporate law, thereby creating a "one-size-fits-all" approach to the resolution of these issues that will deprive the American economy of diversity and innovation, impose an unwarranted burden on mid-sized and smaller companies, outlaw legitimate and successful business practices, marginalize the state corporate law expertise that has been developed over decades and is better suited to address these issues, and undermine ongoing reforms undertaken by the State of Delaware and the "Model Business Corporation Act," which impacts 30 states;

- Threaten shareholder wealth creation and preservation by placing an excessive focus on short-term actions and results as management becomes increasingly distracted from its long-term business objectives by annual proxy contests;

- Unleash an onslaught of activists trying to manipulate the proxy process to force corporate decisions that adversely impact shareholders as a whole in order to further their parochial social or political agenda; and

- Saddle the Securities and Exchange Commission with significant additional responsibilities at a time when it is struggling to perform its existing mission critical goal of protecting investors.

Thank you for your consideration of our views. We would be pleased to discuss these views further with you and your staffs, and to provide what we believe are more effective and expedient alternatives for addressing these matters.

Sincerely,

American Insurance Association
Americans for Tax Reform
Business Roundtable
Center On Executive Compensation
Competitive Enterprise Institute
Financial Services Roundtable
National Association of Manufacturers
National Association of Wholesale-Distributors
National Investor Relations Institute
Property Casualty Insurers Association of America
Retail Industry Leaders Association
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Cc: The Members of the House Committee on Financial Services
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT

Hearing Before the House Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises

April 21, 2010

Statement Submitted for the Record
Chairman Kanjorski, Ranking Member Garrett and Members of the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises:

The Center On Executive Compensation is pleased to submit testimony on H.R. 2861, H.R. 3272 and H.R. 3361, and its perspective on best practices in executive compensation, corporate governance and shareholder engagement. The Center supports a board-centric approach to executive compensation and corporate governance because the board is in the best position to make reasoned determinations based on its in-depth knowledge of the company’s operations, competitive environment and strategy. For this reason, the Center generally opposes legislative mandates that would undermine the Board’s ability to make reasoned determinations, such as say on pay and rigid clawback requirements. However, we support clearer, simpler disclosure that enables shareholders to better understand the Board’s rationale in making pay decisions and have been promoting changes designed to help foster greater understanding and engagement.

As you may know, the Center On Executive Compensation is a research and advocacy organization that seeks to provide a principles-based approach to executive compensation policy from the perspective of the senior human resource officers of leading companies. The Center is a division of HR Policy Association and represents companies from a broad cross section of industries. Because the senior human resource officers play a unique role in supporting the compensation committee chair and the overall compensation setting process, we believe that our Subscribers’ views can be particularly helpful in understanding how executive compensation plans are constructed and executed across industry generally.

I. Say on Pay

All three bills before the Subcommittee today would mandate an annual nonbinding vote on the compensation for the named executive officers of a company. The Center opposes such a vote because investors do not want it, it would have a significant detrimental effect on the board’s ability to make carefully tailored pay decisions, and there are other alternatives that engage shareholders in more meaningful ways. The Center opposes say on pay for the following reasons:

- Say on Pay is clearly unnecessary because there is not vast support from shareholders seeking to encourage companies to adopt a nonbinding vote. A majority of shareholders, when given an opportunity to support say on pay through a nonbinding resolutions, rejected it 70 percent of the time in 2009.
- The current system is working. Virtually any shareholder can file a resolution seeking companies to offer say on pay, and where the resolution garners more the fifty percent shareholder support, over 60 percent of companies have agreed to implement an annual vote.
• Say on pay votes for TARP firms in 2009 – which were mandated by the financial bailout law – averaged 88 percent. Even the support for pay at companies such as AIG exceeded 90 percent. There are more effective engagement tools, especially filing shareholder resolutions on particular aspects of pay.

• Say on pay would undermine the authority of the Board of Directors under the U.S. system of corporate governance. The Board has a fiduciary duty to represent the interest of all shareholders in managing the company and setting appropriate executive compensation packages. Setting executive compensation involves linking executive incentives to the company’s business strategy, which in many cases includes the use of confidential information that is only available to the Board. As the Washington Post editorialized, “boards of directors, fearing bad publicity, will shape compensation policy to the anticipated opinions of shareholders, who may be greedy for short-term profits themselves – or insufficiently informed about the finer points of retaining talent . . . . If you like the way California governs by referendum, you’ll love say on pay.”

• Even though nonbinding, the existence of a shareholder vote is likely to cause Boards to change pay arrangements to conform to shareholder expectations. This result would significantly weaken the pay for performance link companies strive to achieve in their compensation programs.

• Proponents of mandated say on pay in the U.S. point to the experience in the United Kingdom (UK), which has had a mandated annual vote since 2002. Yet, according to academic research, pay in the UK has actually continued to increase, not decrease as many U.S. proponents claim it will.

• A mandated annual vote on pay would enhance the clout of the proxy advisory services, which conduct research and often vote the proxies on the shareholders’ behalf. Many institutional investors will not take the time to evaluate the executive compensation policies of the publicly held companies in their portfolios; instead, they will defer to the proxy advisory services’ recommendations.

In sum, say on pay is counterproductive to our system of governance. Expanding the concept to include votes on rank-and-file pay or all executive pay will only further expand disclosures and make pay information even more difficult to understand. The Center urges rejection of a say on pay mandate and instead hopes for focus on clearer disclosure of the pay for performance link.

II. Clearer Disclosure of Executive Pay and Performance Is A Better Solution Than a Mandated Vote on Pay

The Center believes that a more effective approach than say on pay is to provide shareholders with a clearer perspective on the link between pay and performance, enabling them to better understand the rationale behind their pay programs. The Center’s “Pay for Performance at a Glance” approach, which seeks to create this clarity in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis in the proxy, is an attempt to achieve this clarity.
Currently, the Summary Compensation Table in the proxy statement includes a total number that mixes current actual compensation with accounting estimates of future potential long-term incentive compensation (stock and stock options). Attempting to correlate this total with past performance represents a mismatch of the period over which performance is analyzed and the time period over which future contingent compensation may be earned (typically three years or more). It would distort the pay for performance relationship and provide inaccurate and misleading information to shareholders. For these reasons, the Center believes that in analyzing the pay for performance link, actual pay realized should be compared to performance over the same period and that future potential pay should be compared to the performance required to earn it.

The Center’s disclosure involves two summary disclosures at the beginning of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis that compare actual pay realized in a year to the company’s and executive’s actual performance and also more clearly describes how future potential pay is linked to future performance, thus enabling investors to make more reasoned decisions in investing in a company or in voting for directors.

- The first table shows what the CEO actually received in the current year: salary, annual incentive, and long-term incentives paid out and the performance results that generated the compensation. In the case of long-term incentive payouts, gains on stock options exercised and restricted shares that vested during the year, the table shows awards that were earned over multiple years but realized in the reporting year.

- The second table discloses the accounting estimates of restricted stock, stock options, performance shares and long-term incentive plan payouts and the performance that must be achieved for the executive to earn the estimated payments. This approach separates future potential pay from actual pay, thereby allowing investors to assess whether the compensation committee’s determination of future pay appears to be a reasonable approach to linking compensation to the creation of shareholder value.

The Center believes that this would summarize information on pay and results in the reporting year in one place and thus make it easier for shareholders to understand whether compensation is linked to performance. We would be happy to provide the committee with further information about the proposal at its convenience.

III. Mandating a Cookie Cutter Clawback Policy is Not a Corporate Governance Best Practice

The Center supports company adoption of clawback policies tailored to their companies, but it does not support a one-size-fits all clawback approach. According to Equilar Inc., 73 percent of the Fortune 100 disclosed a clawback policy in 2009, and anecdotal evidence from Center Subscribers confirms the widespread adoption of such policies.
Legislation mandating the SEC to draft clawback requirements for the securities exchanges currently creates a one-size-fits-all approach. In practice, clawback policies help to mitigate risk and reinforce pay for performance, but only if the Board or its compensation committee is given sufficient discretion to evaluate and enforce the policy in the best interests of shareholders.

- Clawbacks have different implications for companies depending upon how incentive plans are structured. For annual or long-term incentive plans based solely on financial metrics and paid in cash or in stock, the amount to clawed back would be the difference in compensation generated between the original and restated financials. The situation becomes more complex when plans provide for compensation based on qualitative performance or allow for committee discretion, which is common. In those cases, the compensation committee would need to revisit its pay decisions in determining which amounts should be clawed back.

- Clawback policies are best crafted by the Board, acting through the compensation committee, and tailored to the company, rather than mandated under federal law. If clawbacks are to be legislated, the legislation should explicitly state that the Board has the authority to determine, in its judgment, how a clawback is executed and when doing so may not be practical, feasible or in the best interests of the company. For example, the compensation committee may decide that it is easier to enforce a clawback policy by limiting the amounts granted under the next year’s incentive programs, which avoids thorny tax issues, rather than having executives write a check.

- Because of the complexity of compensation determinations, the compensation committee should be able to determine when the costs of recovering incentive compensation from a former officer (e.g., through litigation) will exceed the benefit or deterrent effect from doing so.

In sum, the Center supports clawbacks of incentive amounts in the event of a financial restatement as a way of reinforcing a pay for performance orientation and deterring fraudulent or legal manipulation of results to increase compensation. However, it should be at the discretion of the Board to design the recoupment policy that best aligns with the company’s governance and incentive structure, not a matter of legislative or regulatory fiat.

**Performance Target Disclosure**

H.R. 2861 would require the SEC to promulgate rules within a year of enactment mandating additional disclosure of performance targets. The legislation directs the Commission to require companies to formally submit a request for confidential treatment for SEC approval, describe past experiences with similar target levels, disclose “inconsistencies” between compensation targets and targets set in other contexts (such as financial reporting) or disclose targets after the target levels would no longer cause competitive harm.

As a practical matter, many companies already disclose targets after the performance period closes and competitive harm is no longer a factor. When practicable, such
retrospective disclosure of the prior year’s targets gives shareholders a sense of how pay and performance are linked without divulging secrets.

Yet disclosure is not possible in some cases. Even after the performance period, disclosure of this information may affect the ability to compete in new or established markets, retain key employees, or develop new business relationships. Where the SEC has insisted on target disclosure in these cases, companies have opted to change their performance targets to be less closely aligned to performance to avoid the competitive harm. This is neither sensible nor desirable. In addition, the legislation’s requirement that companies formally submit competitive harm requests would swamp and already overburdened Division of Corporation Finance staff and result in gridlock at the SEC. The SEC staff has announced that, starting in 2010, it will require companies to amend their proxy filings if it finds the company improperly failed to disclose performance targets. The SEC is already performing the function sought by the legislation.

In sum, the Center opposes a legislative mandate of performance target disclosure and remains extremely concerned about excessive disclosure undermining the use of confidential targets designed to incentive achievement of company-specific goals.

Conclusion

The Center appreciates the opportunity to provide its views on these extremely important policy matters. We look forward to working with you on legislation that reinforces the role of the Board in promoting sound compensation strategies.

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United States House of Representatives


We would like to supplement the written testimony of James C. Allen, CFA, with the following results of a survey of CFA Institute members conducted between 29 October 2009 and 11 November 2009:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should shareholders have “say on pay” -- a proxy vote on executive pay packages?</th>
<th>Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't care</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Respondents: 2315
Did Not Answer: 2
United States House of Representatives


We would like to supplement the written testimony of James C. Allen, CFA, to consider the issue of mandating a risk committee for all publicly traded companies in the United States, as proposed in HR 3272.

Specifically, these provisions would require each company to have a chief risk officer to establish, evaluate, and enforce risk management, to report directly to the risk management committee, and, by implication, to establish a risk management committee. It also would require that each member of the risk management committee be independent, and that the risk management committee review periodically the issuer's risk management policies.

While we see a risk management as an important safeguard for many companies, particularly diversified financial institutions involved with a wide variety of complex derivative instruments, we do not support a blanket requirement for all listed companies to have such committees. Such a requirement might prove unnecessary for some firms, depending on the nature of their business models, customers, financing sources, size, and other factors.
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations

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Sent via Fax

The Honorable Michael N. Castle
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Castle:

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify at the April 21, 2010 Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises hearing entitled "Corporate Governance and Shareholder Empowerment." During the April 21, 2010 hearing, you requested that I provide the Subcommittee with the turnover of the AFL-CIO's investments in writing after the hearing.

The AFL-CIO holds shares of stock through two separate funds, the AFL-CIO Staff Retirement Plan and the AFL-CIO Reserve Fund. The stock portfolio turnover of the AFL-CIO Staff Retirement Plan was 28 percent based on the weighted average of its equity managers as of year end 2009. The stock portfolio turnover for the AFL-CIO Reserve Fund was 22 percent in 2009. I greatly appreciate the Subcommittee’s attention to improving our nation’s corporate governance and empowering long-term shareholders. Please contact me if I can provide you with any additional information.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Hraisos J. Rees
Deputy Director, Office of Investment

cc: The Honorable Paul E. Kanjorski, Chairman
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises

The Honorable Scott Garrett, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises