[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TURKEY'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-TURKISH
RELATIONS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 28, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-113
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California, Chairman
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
Samoa DAN BURTON, Indiana
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey ELTON GALLEGLY, California
BRAD SHERMAN, California DANA ROHRABACHER, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
BILL DELAHUNT, Massachusetts EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RON PAUL, Texas
DIANE E. WATSON, California JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri MIKE PENCE, Indiana
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey JOE WILSON, South Carolina
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL E. McMAHON, New York J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, CONNIE MACK, Florida
FloridaAs of 5/6/ JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
10 deg. MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee TED POE, Texas
GENE GREEN, Texas BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
LYNN WOOLSEY, California GUS BILIRAKIS, Florida
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
BARBARA LEE, California
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
BRAD MILLER, North Carolina
DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
JIM COSTA, California
KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota
GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona
RON KLEIN, Florida
Richard J. Kessler, Staff Director
Yleem Poblete, Republican Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Ross Wilson, Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia
Center, The Atlantic Council (Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
and Azerbaijan)................................................ 14
Michael Rubin, Ph.D., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise
Institute...................................................... 21
Ian Lesser, Ph.D., Senior Transatlantic Fellow, The German
Marshall Fund of the United States............................. 28
Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D., Director, Turkish Research Program, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy...................... 37
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Prepared statement.................................... 4
The Honorable Ross Wilson: Prepared statement.................... 17
Michael Rubin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 23
Ian Lesser, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............................ 31
Soner Cagaptay, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 41
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 74
Hearing minutes.................................................. 75
The Honorable Mike Pence, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Indiana: Prepared statement........................... 77
The Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, a Representative in Congress
from American Samoa, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia, the
Pacific and the Global Environment: Prepared statement......... 79
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 82
TURKEY'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY DIRECTION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-TURKISH
RELATIONS
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 28, 2010
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Berman. The committee will come to order. In a
moment, I am going to recognize myself and the ranking member
for up to 7 minutes each for purposes of making an opening
statement. I will then recognize the chairman and ranking
member of the Europe Subcommittee, if they wish, for 3 minutes
each to make opening remarks. All other members will then have
the opportunity to make 1-minute opening statements if they
wish to do so. Without objection, members may also place
written statements in the record.
The purpose of this hearing is to gain insight into the
changes in the foreign-policy direction of our long-time ally
Turkey. Now the sixteenth-largest economy in the world, Turkey
is a complex country, endowed by geography with circumstances
that connect it to developments in at least a half-dozen
regions and sub-regions.
Turkish foreign policy is also complex. Turkey is an
important ally to the United States in NATO and now
particularly so in Afghanistan, where it has 1,700 troops,
heads the Kabul Regional Command, and makes other important
contributions. Turkey is also a critical transit point for
provisions for our troops in Iraq.
But it is Turkey's recent and worrisome policy turns
regarding Iran, Israel, and the Palestinians, and the larger
implications of those policies, that are likely to form the
basis for much of today's discussion.
One State Department official recently put it this way:
``There is a lot of questioning going on about Turkey's
orientation and its ongoing commitment to strategic partnership
with the United States.''
I am among those that have such concerns, and that is why
we are holding the first full committee hearing devoted
exclusively to Turkey within my memory.
For some people, concerns about Turkey's direction first
came to the fore almost immediately in November 2002, when the
religiously-oriented AK Party won a powerful parliamentary
majority. For others it was in March 2003, when the Turkish
Parliament voted down the U.S. request to allow the U.S. Fourth
Infantry Division to cross Turkish territory as part of the
Iraq war.
I was not in either of those groups. After the AK Party was
elected, I was encouraged by their focus on internal reform and
the European Union, as well as by the hopeful prospect that AK
would be a model for a moderate Islam that would inspire others
throughout the Islamic world. I have also been encouraged by
what has, at times, been a foreign policy less rigid and less
nationalistic than traditional Turkish policy.
But for me the evidence of a negative foreign-policy shift
by the AK Party government has been clear at least since
February 2006, when Turkey invited Hamas leader Khaled Mashal
for a visit. Until then, Turkey had seemed as solidly anti-
terrorist as any country in the world. At the time, the Turks
indicated they merely hoped to moderate Hamas, but now, with
the passage of well over 4 years of regular contacts between
Hamas and Turkey, it is clear that Hamas has not changed at
all--but Turkey has. And the contacts continue more intensively
than ever.
The intensity of Prime Minister Erdogan's anger at Israel
became clear for all to see at Davos in February 2009. Since
that time Turkey's growing closeness with Iran has added, for
many of us, a new dimension of outrage and concern.
Concerns about Turkey hit a new peak with the flotilla
incident, the apparent ties of some AK Party and the Hamas-
associated non-governmental organization IHH, and the Turkish
vote against U.N. Security Council resolution 1929, the
historic sanctions resolution aimed at curbing Iran's nuclear
program. Earlier this week Turkey's Finance Minister asserted
that his nation would boost trade with Iran, while ignoring all
non-U.N. sanctions. That is an upsetting position when Russia
takes it, but it is appalling when it comes from an ally.
All of these developments raise many questions.
Is Turkey moving away from the West? Or is it merely taking
independent positions regarding the Palestinians and Iran,
however objectionable to us, while otherwise remaining
committed to the Western alliance?
Is the AK Party government seeking a greater leadership
role in the Middle East, and, if so, what does that mean?
What is the AK Party's vision for Turkey? Is it committed
to democracy? To European Union membership?
And how crucial is Turkey to us as an ally? How important
is the United States to Turkey's interest? How does Turkey view
its alliance with the United States?
Certain points are beyond dispute: First, Turkey is indeed
seeking to enhance its standing in the Middle East--some say,
it is seeking to leave the Middle East--and it is using
criticism of Israel and backing for Hamas to support that bid.
Second, Turkish contacts with Hamas are deeply offensive.
They undermine the pro-peace Palestinian Authority and
therefore they ultimately undermine prospects for peace. And,
although we can't compel Turkey to view Hamas as a terrorist
group--Prime Minister Erdogan has labeled it a ``resistance''
group--we should expect Ankara to at least respect the
terrorism list of an important ally, namely, the United States.
This is particularly true when the United States is
actively aiding Turkey in its fight against the Kurdish
separatist terrorist group known as PKK. The U.S. has been
providing Turkey real-time, ``actionable'' intelligence against
the PKK since December 2007 in response to a direct appeal from
Prime Minister Erdogan.
Third, it is critical that Turkey acknowledge the genocide
committed by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian people
during World War I. That is why this committee has repeatedly
passed measures recognizing the genocide and calling on the
President to do likewise. I believe the Turks, once they come
to terms with their past, will discover that they have relieved
themselves and their children of an immense moral burden.
Fourth, we also want to see more movement on the Cyprus
issue. We want to make sure that the new Turkish Cypriot
leader, who has always opposed a solution, negotiates in the
spirit of the U.N. resolutions and inter-communal agreements
that require a solution. It is time for Turkey to draw down its
absurdly high troop level in northern Cyprus. And Turkey should
cease settling Turkish citizens in northern Cyprus. Northern
Cyprus is not sovereign Turkish territory.
Fifth, we want to see true press freedom in Turkey. Press
intimidation has no place in democracies.
We also want full freedom for religious minorities in
Turkey. It is time for Turkey to recognize the ecumenical
nature of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and it is certainly
time for Turkey to allow its Greek Orthodox citizens to reopen
the Halki Seminary.
Not all of these problems began with AK Party control of
government. But the AK Party government has brought to the fore
new issues of concern. I am eager to hear our witnesses' views
as to just how concerned we should be, what course Turkey is
likely to take in the future, and what, if anything, our
Government should be doing differently in its policy toward
Turkey.
Let me now turn to the ranking member, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
for any opening remarks that she might like to make.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Berman follows:]
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for this
hearing. Since the days of the Truman Doctrine in the late
1940s, the United States and Turkey have had a strong
relationship that has served both countries' interests. This is
not to say that there have not been serious disagreements. We
have long called on Turkey to end its illegal occupation of the
northern portion of the Cyprus and to implement more
appropriate policies toward the Greek Orthodox ecumenical
patriarchate in Istanbul. Still there continue to be areas in
which our two countries reap significant benefits from this
relationship. Although the Soviet Union is long gone as a NATO
ally, Turkey still has U.S. guarantee of support if it is
threatened militarily.
As part of NATO, Turkey has the opportunity to participate
with the United States and other member states in the area of
missile defense. As Turkey's ally, the United States, in turn
is allowed to use Turkey's Incirlik Air Base to support the
military operations that we have in Afghanistan, and has
Turkey's active support in that operation. Both countries also
actively cooperate with each other in fighting extremism, and
that is extremely important both because our nations have been
targets of horrible attacks and continue to face a threat of
future very serious attacks.
The U.S. and Turkey are significant partners in trade and
commerce which is obviously an important fact in this kind of
increasing global economic uncertainty. This hearing today
however reflects a fact that we may be at a turning point in
U.S.-Turkish relations. The policy disagreements that have
emerged in recent years pose serious challenges to the
bilateral relationship. These include Turkey's opposition to
the sanctions on Iran that have been sought by the United
States and its other NATO allies in Europe. Turkey's move
instead to rapidly increase its commercial relations with Iran.
I note this in regard that just this week it, was reported that
Turkey and Iran have signed a new agreement on natural gas
pipeline from Iran to Turkey in defiance of U.S.-led efforts to
cut off energy investment development and trade with Iran.
The Turkish Government's provocation in supporting the May
31st violation of the naval blockade on shipments to the Hamas-
controlled Gaza strip. Turkish authorities then encouraged
efforts at the United Nations to demonize and condemn our
democratic ally, Israel. And that current Turkish Government
verbal attacks on Israel and the Turkish Government support for
Hamas, which is designated by the United States as a terrorist
organization.
No country has a foreign policy that is completely divorced
from its domestic political affairs, and Turkey's ongoing
internal changes and their impact on its foreign policy are no
exception to that rule. The relationship between Turkey's
internal developments and its foreign policy is, in fact, a
subject of debate that makes this hearing today very timely.
Everyone seems to agree that this is not your grandfather's
Turkey anymore.
But the fundamental question for Turkey's future foreign
policy is how great a change in Turkey's internal political
government--governance, and social and cultural practices does
the current Turkish Government intend to seek. The majority
justice and development are AK Party and Turkey is clearly an
Islamic party. What is being debated is how far will it try to
go in breaking down the separation of state and religion that
has been the hallmark of Turkish governance since the Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk ended the Islamic caliphate in Turkey in the
1920s.
The ability of the Turkish military, a bastion of
secularism to fend off the rise of dedicated Islamists, within
its officer core, appears to be weakening. The manner in which
the current Turkish Government has conducted its investigation
into an alleged military plot to insight a coup has reportedly
involved questionable tactics, including extensive wiretapping,
alleged illegalities and the collection of evidence and lengthy
indictments. There have been serious allegations of pressure by
the current government on media organizations that do not
support its policies.
The government proposed constitutional reforms, if adopted,
would appear to greatly increase its control over the Turkish
judiciary, another traditional bastion of secularism. In fact,
some observers say that the Turkish Prime Minister may be
following the pattern of the current Russian Prime Minister in
the past decade. That is steadily putting in place the building
blocks for an authoritarian regime that would perpetuate the
AKP's hold on power. Is the AKP government seeking to be a more
active party in Middle Eastern affairs? A more Islamic voice in
world affairs, a stronger voice in global economic affairs in
the G-20 group of nations, or a partner with Russia, China,
India and Brazil in the so-called BRIC group.
Ultimately, we need to ask, what does this mean for U.S.-
Turkish relationships? In our committee's hearing on trans-
Atlantic security in March, I noticed some concern over the
positions of several leading NATO allies in Europe in dealing
with Russia's aggression and corruption in contributing to the
NATO operations in Afghanistan, in sharing with the United
States the cost of fighting Islamic militants and maintaining
global security. I said at that time Europe remains important
to the United States, but our calls for support must not go
unheeded. I suggest that that applies to our relationship with
Turkey today as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this timely hearing.
Chairman Berman. Thank you very much, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And
now I am pleased to recognize the chair of the Europe
Subcommittee of our committee, the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We hear a lot these
days about Turkey's so-called drift. Drift from the West, drift
from democracy, drift from secularism. But that is not
surprising because there are multiple agendas at play in the
world today. Some raise fears about the so-called Islamist
influences. They speak of losing Turkey as if Turkey were about
to spawn a new Calafat and destroy the Christian West. How
absurd. The fact is that the United States and Turkey have
cultivated a long-term, solid relationship, that has been
critical in support of American national interests, as well as
Turkey's. That relationship is persevered and has been
sustained in war. They fought at our side during the Korean
War. During the Cold War, they were NATO's southeastern flank
against the former Soviet Union, and now they are playing a
critical role in Afghanistan. And it continues in peace with
efforts on both sides to increase the commercial relationship
between the United States and Turkey.
And importantly, it serves as a countervailing force to
Iran in this volatile region. Absent Turkey, Iran would be a
hegemon in a region where the United States has vital national
interest. The alliance will persist because it is in our
interest and it is also in Turkey's interest. Of course, there
are changes ongoing in Turkey and in its relationship with its
neighbors. But today's Turkey remains essentially as it was in
the days of Ataturk, a secular Nation with a Muslim majority.
What is changing is that Turkey's becoming more democratic.
Let's not forget that the Turkish military regularly overthrew
and manipulated elected governments. The most recent coup was
less than 13 years ago. Under the current government, Turkey
has brought more civilian control over the military and
increased the participation of its citizens in the democratic
processes. This government has made significant efforts to
bring Turkey in line with the democratic standards of the
European Union. So if you have a problem with changes in
Turkey, while maybe you have a problem with democracy and the
democratic processes.
I noted that one of today's witnesses suggests that we
encourage the political opposition in Turkey, presumably we
should choose sides. Well, we tried that in Latin America and
it didn't work very well. I suggest that we let the Turks
decide what is in their best interest. It will work to our
advantage in the long term. Ironically Turkey's--I would ask
the chair to indulge me for another minute.
Chairman Berman. Without objection, the gentleman is
recognized for 1 additional minute.
Mr. Delahunt. Ironically Turkey's democratic improvements
come at a time when the EU is divided over Turkey's accession.
I agree with Secretary Gates who believes that this is one of
the factors driving Turkey to expand its diplomatic and
economic ties else somewhere. Just yesterday, the new
conservative British Prime Minister, David Cameron, said that
while advocating, he was advocating for full Turkish membership
in the EU. Here is what he had to say, some people seem to
oppose Turkey joining the European block because they willfully
misunderstand Islam. Simple fact, the alliance between America
and Turkey has served our national interest for over 60 years,
let's not delude ourselves, we need Turkey and Turkey needs us,
and with that, I yield back.
Chairman Berman. The gentleman has yielded back his time.
And do any members wish to make opening statements? The
gentleman from New York--oh.
Mr. Royce. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. No.
Mr. Royce. I will just----
Chairman Berman. No, the gentleman from California is
recognized in place of the other person from California for 3
minutes.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The reason I think I
will make a few remarks here is because for those of us who are
concerned about Turkey, I think we should recognize some of the
recent events that have really called into question the
intentions of the Turkish Government, and not to do so, I
think, would be a mistake. I think for us to remain silent on
the issue of dissidents in Iran pushing for democracy and there
has been no outcry from the Turkish Government in order to try
to show solidarity in any way with democracy in Iran with an
election which was undermined. To me, this is hard to equate
with the thought that what we are seeing in Turkey is more
democracy. I don't think that is necessarily true.
When we see the Turkish Government show solidarity with
Islamist states like Sudan, for those of us who have worked on
the Sudan problem, it is hard to figure out why the ruling
party in Turkey would embrace that position while it takes
shots at more moderate secular governments like Egypt, Jordan
and Tunisia. I remember a piece in The Wall Street Journal
entitled ``Turkey's Decline Into Madness.'' It may be
overstated, but it points out all the conspiracy theories
bouncing around within the ruling party in Turkey. Our own
Ambassador to Turkey had to bring in the Turkish media to
explain that the tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004 was not
caused by the United States setting off a nuclear blast under
the sea. Is the government in Turkey really trying to put these
rumors to bed or are they feeding these rumors, and why do they
do so?
I spoke a little bit about the embrace of the position of
Sudan in states like that. On the other hand, the Turkish
Government refers to some of the actions of Israel as being
driven by a terrorist state. This does not show balance or an
attempt to help resolve problems in the regions.
Chairman Berman. Does the gentleman--recognized for 1
additional minute.
Mr. Royce. I appreciate that.
On top of that, relations with Armenia and Greece are very
frayed. If Turkey wanted to resolve some of these problems, it
could put forth their best effort and move its foreign policy
forward, but there is no rapprochement there that I see.
Turkey's blockade of Armenia remains intact. You still have
40,000 of its soldiers embedded in Cyprus.
Clearly they could work out some kind of an arrangement
where they could take a lot of those soldiers back into Turkey.
And yet you have these policies that create plenty of problems
for Turkey. And for us not to point these out and not try to
encourage Turkey to take positions, which I think are in the
long-term interests of peace and stability in that region,
would be a mistake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from New York, the chairman of the Middle East and
South Asia Subcommittee. For purposes of our committee's
jurisdiction, Turkey is in Europe. You are recognized for 1
minutes deg..
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Turkey's foreign
policy over the past few months has been a considerable
disappointment. Turkey's vote against U.N. sanctions on Iran,
demagoguery over the Gaza flotilla, and President Erdogan's
embrace of the dictator from Syria and Iran and the terrorists
from Hamas are all deplorable and grossly irresponsible. But I
can understand Turkey wants good relations with its neighbors
and hopes to play some sort of a mediating role.
On Monday, however, the Financial Times quoted Turkey's
Finance Minister as saying with regards to Iran, ``[t]he
facilitation of trade that is not prohibited under U.N.
resolution should and will continue,'' he said. I want to be
blunt, preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is an
absolutely vital U.S. national security interest, and any
effort to undermine, undercut or circumvent or bypass U.S. or
other international sanctions against Iran will have grave
consequences for our bilateral relations, no exception, no
excuses. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, is recognized for 1
minute.
Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this very
important and timely hearing. The Turkish Government's foreign
policy raises serious human rights concerns regarding Cyprus;
its military occupies and promotes illegal migration into the
northern part of the island where it destroys churches.
Regarding Armenia Ankara has a policy of aggressive genocide
denial. Ethnic Kurds are subject to assimilation pressures and
the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Halki Seminary as well as
Syrian Orthodox monasteries are under relentless pressure.
Now the Turkish Government further realigning its foreign
policy toward Iran. It has become openly hostile to Israel,
broadcasting anti-Semitic programming on state-sponsored
television. Prime Minister Erdogan's statements just recently
in June professing ``understanding'' for those who compare the
Star of David to the swastika was deeply troubling, and
hopefully did not represent further deterioration of his view
and his country's view toward Israel. And we are very--I am
very--concerned as he is pursuing closer ties to Hamas. Again,
I look forward to comments from our witnesses.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. For
purposes of these 1-minute statements, we go in seniority
order, and for the purposes of 5-minute question periods we go
based on when members arrive, and therefore I recognize the
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for 1 minute.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. I think this is a very
timely hearing. I have been one who has been very critical of
Turkey's occupation of northern Cyprus, I do believe that they
should bring their troops out of Cyprus, although things have
eased there, it is far from a settlement. So I agree that
Turkey certainly needs to reveal its Cyprus policies. There is
no question that Turkey is starting to flex its muscles. You
may recall the Ottoman Empire controlled half of the known
world at one time. I think Turkey is starting to reemerge as a
power. We need to remind ourselves that they are very good
friends of the United States, and we need to ensure that we
continue to have that friendship; however, we do need to work
on them to understand and the Sudan situation. Although, each
Egypt also is not very supportive of south Sudan, so I think we
need to work there too. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Flake. Do you seek recognition?
Mr. Flake. No.
Chairman Berman. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mack, is
recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Mack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, we keep
hearing about the relationship with Turkey and the United
States and how important it is, but I need to remind people of
the current actions and the recent actions Turkey has taken,
whether it is in support of Hamas, opposition to sanctions with
Iran and the role it played in the flotilla. These things we
can't ignore, we just can't decide that we are going to
continue to support a country that is working against our own
interests. And I--you know, I can't help but to think only in
Washington can you look at a series of actions like this and
turn around and say, oh, but we can try to work through these.
I would say this to Turkey. The relationship with Turkey is
hanging by a thread. If Turkey wants to have a relationship
with the United States, then Turkey needs to change the course
in which it is heading.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. And
the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires is recognized for 1
minute.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Start, thank you very
much for holding today's hearing over U.S.-Turkey relation.
Chairman Berman. You are welcome.
Mr. Sires. During its nearly century of existence, the
Republic of Turkey and the United States have had their ups and
downs, but in recent years, Turkey has proven to be an
important strategic partner to our country as a NATO ally
contributing to operations in Afghanistan and serving as an
important bridge between Europe and the Middle East.
However, I believe in recent foreign policy decisions made
by the Turks such as voting against the U.N.'s sanctions on
Iran are rightfully called for us to address the direction of
our relation. While I do not think we should overlook the
severity of these actions, I believe there must be--that we
must approach the issue in such a way that will not isolate
Turkey, our critical ally in the region. As we have seen,
Turkey is more capable of acting independently on the world
stage--okay, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
Chairman Berman. Finish the sentence.
Mr. Sires. Critical relations between Turkey and the United
States, but I am very concerned, I was going to get into
Cyprus, but forget it.
Chairman Berman. The gentleman from New York, Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Turkey and historical
allies realigning its foreign policy goals, expanding trade
relationships and redefining a strictly secular identity to
domestic reform. These are, of course, seemingly positive moves
for Turkey's economy, populace and future. As a matter of fact,
these moves were accepted and even encouraged by Western
allies. But today we find that one ambitious goal after another
is moving at an unexpectedly rapid, even unsteady pace. And
perhaps what is even more perplexing is that even Turks within
Turkey can identify multiple discrepancies in the policies of
Prime Minister Erdogan and his government.
After years of surprises, I believe that next year's
elections will be revealing to the United States, to Israel and
the West as to Turkey's new direction. In the meantime, I hope
that Turkish officials pay greater attention to messaging.
Furthermore, assurances that any gains made in the Middle East
will not be exchanged with traditional alliances would be
welcome. And finally, Turkey will only prosper further if
encouraged to solve disputes closer to home first, like Cyprus.
I look forward to our distinguished witnesses' assessments and
yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. And
the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, is recognized for 1
minute.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me add my accolades to you for having
a timely and instructive hearing along with the ranking member.
I have always said that this foreign affairs committee has
taken its responsibility to the highest level. We are engaged
in the foreign policy definition of the United States. Turkey
has been an enormously strong ally of this Nation, and
particularly as a Muslim country. We are concerned, though, as
a sovereign Nation the detour that Turkey has begun to take.
And I think it is important in this hearing to recognize
that our mutual interests are interrelated. Strong Muslim, a
democratic nation with a Nation as the United States is that
believes in humanitarian involvement. We want to solve some of
the problems that Turkey considers problems. We want them to be
a good neighbor in the region, and I believe that we can have
this common ground and common good if we look at each other
with mutual respect and continued interest in our working
relationship. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Miller. Do you seek
recognition? No. The gentleman from Georgia Mr. Scott is
recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, this is indeed a timely
hearing and I think it is very important that we set the
conversation on its proper axis from the very beginning. Number
one, Turkey is an important ally to the United States, its role
in Afghanistan, the role is plays on the war on terror, they
have troops over in Afghanistan, they allow us to fly over,
supply our troops is very important. Thirdly, their work in
terms of making sure that they have pipelines that will
eventually be able to get energy into Europe without being
dependent on Russia. However, the people of Turkey and the
leadership of Turkey are going to have to face a serious
question at some point, and this is when it comes to Iran and
Israel and the United States. The course they are headed on is
a face-to-face showdown with the question whose side are you
on. Iran cannot and must not have nuclear weapons, and
hopefully the people of Turkey will reassess that. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, is recognized.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All I want to say is,
I think Turkey has been a great ally of the United States, we
have NATO bases there and we need to keep that relationship
strong. And at the same time, we need to make sure that we
support Israel which has been one of the stalwarts and one of
our best friends in the Middle East for a long, long time. That
is why I had an opportunity to talk to the leaders from Israel
and the Turkish Ambassador, and I urged them to take the time
to sit down and try to work out their differences, especially
because of the problem that occurred in the Mediterranean.
But we support and really care about Israel and the
stability of that country. We don't want to see weapons going
into Hamas through the Mediterranean. And at the same time, we
want to make sure that our relationship with Turkey remains
strong. So I would hope some kind of rapprochement can be
worked out, so that our good friends, Israel and Turkey, can
come to an agreeable solution so that we don't have further
problems in the Middle East, and we want to be sure weapons
stay out of Hamas' hands.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from California, Mr. Costa.
Mr. Costa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the ranking
member for--everyone has acknowledged a timely hearing. I am
looking forward to hearing the witnesses this morning as to the
current status of our relations with Turkey. It truly has been
noted by the various comments. We are talking about two sides
of the coin here today, the one side, of course, being the
reliable strong ally and NATO partner where we have done
actions over the years, I think with some success, a
relationship that I think we both support. On the other hand,
concerns with the involvement in Cyprus, for me, the inability
to resolve the situation with Armenia, their lack of
willingness to allow us to participate on the northern border
of Iraq and the previous involvement, the blockade in Hamas,
the U.N. sanctions and their limited willingness to portray
Iran for the nuclear threat that it is I think causes us all
concern. This moving eastward, the problems with less secular
governing is something that I want to hear the witness talk
about this morning.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Does anyone else seek recognition? The gentleman from Texas,
Mr. Green, is recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding a hearing
today, I want to welcome our panel. For decades the Republic of
Turkey has been one of the Nation's strongest and most
important allies and friends. Strategically located between
Europe and the Middle East, Russia, Turkey has been a linchpin
with many of our Nation's foreign policy initiatives going back
to the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's entrance into the NATO in
1952.
More recently, Turkey has been very helpful on fronts of
U.S. policy, including its assistance with Iraq's transition
including its improved relations with the Kurdish regional
government, and Turkey has been helpful in Afghanistan
contributing troops, the allied forces and allowing resupplying
and deployment through their country. Turkey has been a great
friend of Israel; Turkey was the first Muslim majority country
to recognize the state of Israel in 1949. Over the past 2
decades, Israel has been a major supplier of arms to Turkey.
Until very recently, Israel and Turkey's militaries worked
closely together, best shown through their numerous joint
military exercises. Mr. Chairman, I have some concern about--my
concern today at this hearing hopefully will learn that you can
be friends with your neighbors whether they are Jewish,
Christian or Muslim, and hopefully Turkey do well with that, I
would like my full statement placed in the record. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. Full statements will be included in the
record. The time of the gentleman has expired, and now we will
hear from our witnesses. Our first witness will be Ross Wilson.
Ambassador Wilson is the director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia
Center at the Atlantic Council of the United States. He
completed nearly three decades in the U.S. Foreign Service in
December 2008. Serving as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey from 2005
to 2008 and Azerbaijan from 2000 to 2003. In previous
assignments, he served at the U.S. Embassies in Moscow and
Prague and was American Consul-General in Melbourne, Australia.
Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute, senior lecturer at the Naval Post
Graduate School Center for Civil-Military Relations, lecturer
on national security studies at Johns Hopkins University, and a
senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly. Between 2002 and
2004, he worked as a staff advisor on Iran and Iraq at the
Pentagon. Dr. Rubin currently provides academic instruction on
regional issues, including Turkey, for senior U.S. Army and
Marine officers deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, and also
lectures on Iran, Israel, and North Korea in supplementary
classes to the U.S. intelligence community.
Ian Lesser is senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German
Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington where he heads
GMF's work on the Mediterranean, Turkish, and wider Atlantic
security issues. Prior to joining GMF, Dr. Lesser was a public
policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars and vice president and director of studies at the
Pacific Council on International Policy. A frequent commentator
for international media, he has written extensively on
international security issues. Dr. Lesser is also a former
official in the State Department's Policy Planning Bureau.
Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and director of the
Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy. He has written extensively on U.S.-Turkish
relations, Turkish domestic politics, Turkish identity, and
Turkish nationalism, publishing both in scholarly journals and
major international print media.
Dr. Cagaptay has guest-taught at several major
universities, including Princeton, and currently teaches the
Area Studies course on Turkey for our Turkey-bound diplomats at
the Foreign Service Institute.
We are very pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses.
Ambassador Wilson, why don't you start off? All of your
statements will be included in their entirety in the record,
and if you care to summarize them, we look forward to hearing
from you and then engaging with you.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROSS WILSON, DIRECTOR, DINU PATRICIU
EURASIA CENTER, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL (FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO
TURKEY AND AZERBAIJAN)
Ambassador Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the honor
of being included in this hearing today. I have had the honor
of testifying before your counterpart committee in the Senate
being with the Senate House Armed Services Committee with the
Congressional CSE Commission under Mr. Smith, and it is a
pleasure to be here under your leadership today.
I am also honored to be part of this panel. Ian Lesser, and
Soner Cagaptay are, I think two of our country's leading
experts on Turkey. Michael Rubin is a scholar who has also
written extensively on the Middle East and Turkish issues. I am
very new to their world of think tanks, having joined The
Atlantic Council just a few months ago. What I hope I add there
and can add here is little bit of the practitioner's
perspective based, as you noted, on 30 years service as an
American diplomat, including the last 3 as American Ambassador
to Turkey in 2005 to 2008.
When I arrived in Turkey, our relations were poor. My
Embassy, my U.S. Government colleagues pushed a number of
initiatives and efforts to work through some tough issues. Iraq
was the most important that--to us given that it was the source
of our biggest problems in Turkey and given the stakes for our
country in Iraq. We made it, we transformed it into a source of
agreement rather than disagreement. At least with the
government and Turkey became an important and positive employer
in Iraq as a result.
Iran was also a poor picture. On arrival, I was struck by
three things, how limited our information sharing was on Turkey
with Iran's nuclear program, how little we engaged with them on
what to do about it and how much Washington complained about
Turkey's lack of support. That didn't strike me as much of a
strategy. And instead, we engaged in detailed, high level
intelligence exchanges, consulted extensively on what to do,
and got strong Turkish support for the approach taken by the
United States and the other permanent members of Security
Council especially in the years 2006 and 2007.
On the Middle East, we got a dialogue going despite some
ups and downs, and you noted some of them. We were kept fully
informed on the mediation efforts with Syria and Israel. We
managed our way through the 2006 Hezbollah war. Turkey helped
with the evacuation of American citizens from Beirut. It joined
the United Nations. It joined the Uniti deg.ed Nations
interim force in Lebanon, the first deployment of Turkish
forces to the Middle East since the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire.
The caucuses were a bigger problem. I know that you, Mr.
Chairman, others on this committee and many Americans have
strong views about the Turkey Armenia peace and about history
that has not entirely been accommodated. I share some of those
views. For that reason, I thought it was very significant in
2007 when Turkey and Armenia themselves initiated discussions
about normalizing their relations and opening the border.
As you are aware, that process now has stalled. If it moves
forward before long, it can still help to build the confidence
that is necessary to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh problem
between Turkey--between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and to help
Turks and Armenians deal more effectively with their past,
their present, and their future in a forthright manner, and I
hope Congress can support that effort.
Mr. Chairman, I have a longer statement that goes over
these and other issues, I would like to see that entered into
the record. Let just make 5 points.
First, I think it is important not to over interpret recent
events. I would not quibble with any of the negative images
that you and that other members of this committee have
highlighted. There have always been, as I think a couple
members noted, ups and downs in U.S.-Turkish relations. Those
who think they remember the halcyon days when everything with
Turkey was easy and fine should probably reread their history.
Turks have their own history, and I think we need to bear that
in mind too. The idea that U.S.-Turkish relations is in great
difficulty or is at a great turning point, frankly I don't
agree with.
Second, I think it is important to fill out what is
sometimes a simplistic picture about Turkey. Despite harsh
rhetoric, Turkey does support Israel's right to exist, it
supports the goal of two democratic states living side and side
in peace and security, and it supports negotiations to bring
that about. On a wide range of other issues around Turkish
periphery, in Afghanistan, and the Balkans and regarding
terrorism, energy and other issues, Turkey's policies and its
work remain consistent with the goals and objections of the
United States. We should not lose sight of that.
Third, on Iran, Turkish leaders seem almost desperate to me
to keep negotiations going because they fear a headlong rush to
war, that their people will not support and that they believe
will inflame the region in highly unpredictable ways.
Stated another way, I believe that Iran is one issue on
which are we must have the support of Turkey probably for our
diplomacy to succeed, definitely if it does not. Figuring out
how to restore our unity on this matter is, I think, one of our
most important tasks. The dire political defense and security
implications of Iran's efforts under almost any likely scenario
demand no less.
Fourth, Turkey's very success over the last several decades
has had important consequences that, generally speaking, are a
good thing. As others have noted, it has prospered, it has a
vibrant urban middle class and its people no longer want their
country to be a bystander or the object of others diplomacy,
they want to see their country act, they expect their
government to do so. This is new and in this new environment we
will have to have more effective ways of engaging public
opinion and Turkish opinion shapers. Having had some experience
at this, I can assure you it will not be easy, but in the long
run, it will be better for our interests.
Finally, I will repeat an exchange had I with a senior
military officer who asked me recently with some exasperation
what in the world are we going to do with Turkey? My answer to
him was that we have no choice but to work with it and work
with it and work with it. It is hard, it is frustrating and it
is messy. I know that U.S. officials, including President Obama
just a month ago with Prime Minister Erdogan in Toronto, has
made this a priority including with some very direct words.
These efforts will have to continue, we will have a strategic
partnership, we will have a problematic partnership. I think it
is going to continue to be one of our most important time
consuming relationships over the next couple of years and I am
sure this committee will be discussing it regularly. Thank you
very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador
Wilson.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]
Chairman Berman. Dr. Rubin.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RUBIN, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Rubin. Chairman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-Lehtinen,
honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I
have gone into detail about how Turkey has changed my written
testimony, but for the sake of time, let me highlight just
three points. The AKP government has reoriented Turkey toward
more extreme elements in the Middle East. Turkey's change is
not reactive but deliberate. The AKP has made changes which
will be difficult to reverse, even under new Turkish
leadership. And for too long American officials have embraced
Turkey as they wished it to be, rather than calibrate policy to
what Turkey has become. The alliance with Turkey has become an
article of faith.
Despite growing evidence, Turkey is neither a reliable ally
nor a force always for moderation. Trusting Turkey is not the
basis of sound foreign policy. None of this means that the
United States should dispense with its partnership. Turkey
remains a member of NATO and conducts some heavy lifting in
Afghan. Still, the U.S. Government should consider several
issues relative to its future relationship with Turkey.
Precisely because the F-35 will be the fighter the U.S. Air
Force will most depend on to maintain air superiority in the
coming decades. The decision to sell F-35s to Turkey whose
future foreign policy orientation is in question, should be
reviewed by appropriate Defense Department elements to assess
possible loss of critical technology to states of concern.
Congress should mandate that review, specify that it be
completed within the year, and then make it available to
appropriate committees.
Second, while Incirlik remains a key regional base,
Ankara's enthusiasm to seek unrelated concessions and to
micromanage missions flown from Incirlik, suggests a lack of
ideological affinity on some security concerns. It is a
strategic malpractice not to advance contingency plans for the
day when Turkey no longer allows the U.S. Air Force to us
Incirlik or seeks to extract too high a price. The United
States should develop contingency plans in NATO member Romania
or develop another plan B.
Third, while the United States welcomes Turkish involvement
in the fight to stabilize Afghanistan, the current Turkish
Government has not done enough to stop Turkish Jihadists from
traveling to Afghanistan to fight for the wrong side, nor has
it ceased providing safe havens to catch militants.
Fourth, the United States should continue to support
Turkey's fight against Kurdish terrorism, but simultaneously
must pressure Ankara to acknowledge that its willingness to
legitimize foreign terrorist groups based on the AKP's
ideological affinity, hampers Turkey's own fight against
terrorism, and could ultimately undercut Turkey's territorial
integrity.
Lastly, the Armenian genocide issue remains a hot button
issue. Within the scholarly community, there is not consensus.
While genocide study scholars say that the Ottomans committed
deliberate genocide against Armenians, many Middle East
scholars and military historians do not quite go that far.
Congress should not silence debate among historians, rather, it
should seek to facilitate it and demand that Turkey make its
Ottoman archives open to all scholars, regardless of ethnicity
or perspective, and also advocate that Armenia open its
archives in the same manner.
Thank you for your attention, I look forward to any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rubin follows:]
Chairman Berman. Dr. Lesser.
STATEMENT OF IAN LESSER, PH.D., SENIOR TRANSATLANTIC FELLOW,
THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Lesser. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Chairman,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me to share some perspectives on Turkey's evolving foreign
policy and its implications for the United States and U.S.
policy. With your permission, I will offer a brief summary of
my remarks. I would also like to note that these remarks are my
own views, not those of the German Marshall Fund of the United
States.
Let me make just three points to you. First, I believe that
these changes--and we have heard about some of these dimensions
already--these changes in Turkey foreign policy are durable,
they are the products of significant forces in Turkish society,
particularly the affinities and concerns of Turkey's political
leadership today and the rise of public opinion which counts in
Turkish foreign policy today. All are playing a role. They have
all played a role in where Turkey is going and they played a
role in the flotilla crisis, and also Turkey's no vote on U.N.
sanctions.
There is an important commercial dimension to this activism
which I think we should recall. It is fueled by impressive
economic growth in Turkey on the order of 7 percent annually,
11 percent in the last quarter, in the midst of a global
economic crisis. This has fueled the confidence of the country
and the political leadership, but it also is important to note
that a lot of the growth in Turkey's economy, the investment,
the new export markets, are not in traditional Western places,
they are in the Middle East, they are in Eurasia. So to reverse
a famous formulation, I think this is a case of ``the flag
following trade.''
Second, I think there is no doubt Turkey's current
leadership is much more comfortable than its predecessors in
conducting an active diplomacy across the Arab and Muslim
world. Turkish public opinion, which does count today,
increasingly reflects this. GMF's Trans-Atlantic Trends project
is an annual survey of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic.
The data for this year, which will be formalized in September,
found the percentage of those in Turkey who say on
international matters, Turkey should act in closest cooperation
with the countries of the Middle East roughly doubled this
year; roughly doubled this year since last year.
But I would stress to you that this attention to the Middle
East and Turkish policy is not the only element in a changing
Turkey. Increasingly AKP leaders and their foreign policy
advisors talk in terms strongly reminiscent of other emerging
economic and political actors, including India. South Africa,
Indonesia, Brazil. There is this non aligned aspect to Turkish
policy, even as Turkey remains a NATO member, obviously, but
also a conservative actor in its views about NATO strategy.
Third, these changes which we are discussing will be very
consequential for U.S. interests across a wide area; from
European security, to relations with Russia, from energy
geopolitics to missile defense. And they are also going to have
an effect on our interests in relation to key issues in the
Middle East, including Iran and the Middle East peace process.
Let me just underscore, though, that this new look in
Turkish foreign policy is a mix of positive and negative
elements. Some of the negative elements have been mentioned.
Let me just mention on the positive side from our interest
perspective, Turkey appears to be committed to the
consolidation of detente with Greece, which is very important;
stability in the Aegean, which is very important; a
multilateral policy in the Balkans, which is very important to
us and has been mentioned. It has contributed to operations in
Afghanistan and has quietly allowed us to use Incirlik airbase
for very extensive airlift operations to support our coalition
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Less positively, there has clearly been a decline in the
weight of the trans-Atlantic flywheel, if I can put it that
way, that is consequential for our interests. And particularly
in the Middle East, although we share some basic interests and
stability, we are clearly not on the same page when it comes to
some key questions, including Iran and peace process diplomacy.
Let me stress that Turkey itself has a very strong interest
in preventing the emergence of a nuclear Iran, or even a
nuclear-izing Iran, or a nuclear-ready Iran. This would have
very negative consequences for Turkish security. That said, the
AKP government clearly has a different view of how to deal with
this problem. Against this background, it was not surprising
that Turkey voted ``no'' on the U.N. Security Council
resolution on sanctions on Iran.
Again, on the Gaza flotilla incident, I think this
underscores another shift in Turkish perceptions. My own view
is that the strategic relationship between Turkey and Israel
was the product of very distinctive circumstances in the 1990s,
including a shared interest in the containment of Syria and
Iran, and a public opinion that didn't count very much in those
days, and was not very positive about Israel. All those
conditions have changed.
I think in some respect, these changes in Turkish-Israeli
relations were inevitable, but clearly when it comes to the
question of whether Hamas is a legitimate interlocutor, the
peace process and other issues, we are simply not going to be
on the same page.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by noting some specific
implications for U.S. policy. First, let me just support very
strongly something that Ambassador Wilson said earlier. There
really was no golden age in U.S.-Turkish relations, this has
always been a tough relationship to manage, and will continue
to be so. As I look ahead, I think we will see a relationship
that is much more ala carte, if I can put it that way, than
automatic, but there are some things that we can do, and things
that we can avoid doing. First, I think with Ankara on Iran, we
need to shift the debate from the political to defense
requirements. I mean, Turkey has an interest in preventing the
emergence of an deg. nuclear Iran.
As we look toward the NATO summit in November in Lisbon, I
think we need to secure Turkish cooperation for the next steps
in a ballistic missile defense architecture, which will cover
them among others.
Second, we need to rethink and possibly reinforce our
cooperation in fighting the PKK and its bases of operation
across the border in Iraq. We may even need to adjust to a
situation in which PKK terrorism is not the only problem Turkey
is facing in this quarter. The Kurdish issue is the biggest
public policy challenge Turkey faces today, and it is
developing a very troubling urban terrorism dimension. This is
something I think we will be called upon to respond to, and
will be a key test for the relationship in the future. It will
affect our intelligence sharing and other things.
Finally, a last point. The U.S. remains a very critical
stakeholder in Turkey's European Union candidacy. I think it is
far too simple to blame a lack of progress in Turkey's
candidacy for Ankara's growing interest in the Middle East. But
if Turkey's candidacy proves hollow, this could well interrupt
or reverse Turkey's convergence with the West, further
complicating an already complicated relationship with the
United States.
This has been the big project for Turkey and Europe, and
Turkey in the West, and without it I think there is a
heightened risk of Turkey's strategic decoupling from the
trans-Atlantic community. And a lot of things, a lot of issues
we would like to resolve, whether Cyprus, rapprochement with
Armenia, closer NATO-EU cooperation, all will depend on
progress in that area. So I think it is very, very important
that our support for that process, Turkey's EU candidacy, is
not diminished or weakened by the recent and very real
differences with Ankara over the Middle East. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lesser follows:]
Chairman Berman. Thank you, Dr. Lesser.
Dr. Cagaptay.
STATEMENT OF SONER CAGAPTAY, PH.D., DIRECTOR, TURKISH RESEARCH
PROGRAM, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Cagaptay. Congressman Berman, Ranking Member Ros-
Lehtinen, and honorable members of the committee, thank you for
inviting me to testify at this very important hearing today. I
will present here a summary of my prepared remarks.
Much has been said earlier in this town in the last few
years about how Washington is losing Turkey and Turkey is
drifting away from the West. Today I would like to provide an
alternative analysis, and also come up with some suggestions
for what that means for U.S. policy.
So let's take a different view, and the view should be in
2002 when the AKP came to power, the party promised to make
Turkey a country fitting EU accession, a liberal democracy that
is suitable for EU accession. To this end, the AKP would
jettison Turkey's traditional role as the voice of the West in
the region, instead making Turkey a center country, a regional
power that can talk to the West and all of the Middle Eastern
states at the same time.
Has this happened? The answer is no. Turkey has become
neither more liberal as a democracy nor has it become a truly
central power in the region that can talk to the West and the
regional countries at the same time.
Here is what happened, and I will finish that up with some
suggestions. When it came to power in 2002, the AKP promoted,
at first, close ties with the West, although at the same time
it openly bashed the United States and other Western countries.
Some people looked at this and dismissed the rhetoric as
domestic politicking; others did not. Now that rhetoric has
shaped the minds of many Turks. Over 90 percent of the Turks do
not read or write languages other than Turkish, so they see the
world as reported to them and debated by their government.
Rhetoric matters.
In fact, I would say anti-Western rhetoric has been the
periscope of the AKP's foreign policy thinking, a vision that
does not consider Turkey a member of the transatlantic
community.
After reining in domestic checks and balances, for
instance, slapping politically motivated fines on media, using
wiretaps to intimidate its opponents, the AKP now feels
comfortable in power, and this is why the party's foreign
policy follows its previous anti-Western rhetoric. In other
words, what happens in Ankara and Istanbul does not stay in
Ankara and Istanbul. As the AKP has become more emboldened at
home, it has felt freer to follow the foreign policy that it
always desired.
Now, there is good news. We have to start with the Turkish
contribution to the United States on Iraq and Afghanistan.
Without Turkey, operations in both places would be very
difficult.
Also good news on Cyprus. The AKP government aggressively
pushed for a settlement of the Cyprus conflict, but that failed
when the Greek Cypriots voted no.
There is also a bunch of bad news. One of them is on the EU
accession front. Turkey's EU accession is not in the making. I
am a strong supporter of this process, and I think it is time
for me to admit that that process is not moving ahead, not so
much because of the EU objections but predominantly because the
AKP does not share the dream of the liberal western Turkey.
Despite its branding as a pro-Western political force when
it came to power in 2002, the AKP never had a strategic view of
EU accession; rather, it had a tactical view of this process,
where it viewed accession to shed its Islamist image, gain
legitimacy in Western capitals, and curb the power of the
secular military. Having thus made itself palatable for Brussel
bureaucrats and liberal Turks alike, in 2005, just as Turkey
was supposed to start implementing hard reform towards
accession talks, the AKP dropped the EU process.
In a public demonstration of its lack of interest in
Europe, the AKP declared 2005 the ``Africa Year.'' Now, if I
was getting into the European Union, I would declare the decade
the ``decade of Europe,'' to focus my energies on that.
As a result, Turkey's reform process did not stop; it
deteriorated. As the government resorted to jailing critical
journalists under the pretext that they were planning a coup,
Turkey dropped 20 spots in the Reporters Without Borders Press
Freedom Index in 2008. Moreover, the government has used plot
allegations, most infamously in the so-called Ergenekon case,
to target its political opponents in the media, military, and
academia.
The AKP has especially gone after independent media,
slapping media groups that are critical of its policies with
politically motivated tax fines. Under the AKP, I would say
Turkey has become more like Russia than Europe in terms of
government-media relations.
Has Turkey become more democratic under the AKP? Turkey did
not become a democracy in 2002. Turkey was a democracy, has
been a democracy since 1946. In fact, it has had more
democratic transitions of government than some West European
countries, such as Spain. The question is, Has Turkey become
more of a liberal democracy under the AKP? The answer is no.
Not in terms of media freedoms, not in terms of Internet
freedoms, and not in terms of gender equality.
Allow me, Mr. Chairman, now to turn to the Middle East for
at the same time the AKP dropped the EU process, it engrossed
itself in regional conflicts in the Middle East, and this is
where I think the problem lies. There is an incongruity between
the idea that Turkey can get involved in all conflicts in the
Middle East and the party's alleged commitment to EU accession.
When everything is a priority, nothing is; and no country has
ever gotten into the EU without making membership a tough
domestic and foreign policy priority. The AKP has instead made
a 180-degree turn in Turkey's Middle East policy, moving closer
to Iran and its proxies, Syria and Sudan, cooling off toward
Israel.
This was followed with the recent flotilla incident where
ties with Israel hit an all-time low after the unfortunate
incident in which the Israelis killed nine Turkish citizens. I
would say this very sad act will not be forgotten in the
Turkish national psyche for a long time.
Problems have continued. On the other hand, I think because
the AKP's foreign policy is guided--not because of religious
sympathies, and there is often confusion on this in this town;
this is not a party guided by Islam, it is a party guided by
Islamism, an ideological view of the world. Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his government believe that Samuel
Huntington was right; that there is a clash of civilizations,
except they are on the other side of the Islamists and not with
the West.
Therefore, since 2002, the AKP has routinely taken steps
that conflict with U.S. policy. Many distinguished members of
the panel have mentioned that, as well as many members of the
distinguished committee. And I think, suffice it to say, that
the AKP has damaged many of the anchors that tie Turkey to the
United States and to the West, from energy and pipeline
politics to EU accession, to Turkey's traditionally pro-Western
foreign policy toward the Middle East.
Mr. Chairman, there is very little Washington can do to
change the AKP's foreign policy outlook. It is what it is. But
we can at least start by recognizing the following: In 2002, a
lot of people celebrated the idea that the AKP would be a
tribune of the West to the Muslim world. Now it appears that
the AKP is a tribune of a politically charged and, by fiat,
anti-Western Muslim world to the United States. So it is really
the other way around.
Allowing such an Islamist view as a catalyst into Middle
East conflicts has produced and will continue to produce
negative results. Because the AKP sees a clash of civilizations
everywhere it looks, it cannot be an impartial mediator.
For example, when the AKP was allowed to inject itself
between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, or the United
States and Iran, it quickly became an ombudsman for the
Islamist side, rising in their defense. What is more, after 8
years of dominant and increasingly authoritarian AKP rule at
home--and remember, what happens in Istanbul and Ankara does
not stay there--many Turks now see the world through the
Islamist eyes of a civilizational clash. It is very
unfortunate.
As a result, I would say the AKP foreign policy vision of
making Turkey a center country which bridges the East and West,
that can talk to Israelis and Palestinians, garners the trust
of both Iran and the West, has failed as well as Turkey's
ambitions to become more of a liberal democracy.
In order to contain the AKP Islamist influence, I would say
not only in Turkey, but in the region, the West must deny the
AKP, first, the influence and the prestige which comes with
being promoted as a regional mediator.
There is a way forward, Mr. Chairman. Turkey remains a
multiparty democracy, and only one-third of Turkey's population
supports the AKP. Since the opposition Republican Peoples
Party, CHP, elected a new, charismatic social democrat leader,
Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the AKP has been sliding in the polls. As a
result, the party has been using foreign policy more and more
as a punching bag, creating vehement anti-Western rhetoric to
boost its popularity. The elections are in Turkey next year. I
would expect that the AKP will continue to use populist, anti-
Western foreign policy and rhetoric to boost its standing in
the run-up to those elections.
This suggests that the United States must develop a nuanced
policy toward Turkey because Turkey itself is a nuanced
country. It is the only Muslim country that is part of the
West; and the question is, how do you scale back the AKP's
policies while developing a real defense against its influence,
and that would go through engaging the Turks?
The alternative, a policy that targets the whole of Turkey,
such as by passing the Armenian resolution or blocking military
sales or other resolutions that would be seen as critical,
would only push the Turks into the Islamists' arms, fulfilling
the AKP's objective.
In fact, what to do with Turkey first begs the question of
what not to do with Turkey. In light of the AKP's campaign of
rallying Turkish public opinion behind its anti-Western foreign
policy, I would say the cardinal rule of the new era is simple:
Do not offend the Turks. In other words, do no harm to Turkey.
Then it is time to signal to the AKP that its anti-Western
policies have a cost. To this end, Washington should deny the
AKP political access. This will cost the party prestige that
matters greatly in Turkish politics. So far, the AKP has been
invited to Washington even as it transgresses U.S. policy in
multiple areas, creating the impression that either Washington
approves of its policies or considers the party indispensable
to U.S. foreign policy. That is why a new thinking on access is
to be considered.
Mr. Chairman, a final part of this new U.S. policy is
engaging the Turks. This can be done through initiatives that
target the media, NGOs, political parties and business lobbies.
It requires close contact between U.S. officials and these
various institutions.
This policy should also build around a major charm
offensive by the United States Government in hopes of winning
over the hearts and minds of individual Turks. This is the only
way Turkey stays with the United States. Washington should
consider launching massive exchange programs for journalists,
scholars, rising politicians, opinion makers, and students, as
well as increase its public diplomacy presence in Turkey, all
the while confronting the AKP's policies and speaking up to
ensure continued liberal democracy in Turkey. This can be done
by focusing on press and Internet freedoms and continued gender
equality, two sine qua nons of the future of Turkish democracy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for
giving me the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cagaptay follows:]
Chairman Berman. Thank you all very much. The presentations
were very interesting and somewhat different from one another,
the Ambassador's and the three doctors'.
I yield myself 5 minutes to begin the questioning period.
Several of you said that Turkish public opinion matters
these days in the formation of Turkish foreign policy. Sort of
the unstated implication of that was that some of current
foreign policy is driven by what presumably a majority, a large
majority of the Turkish people want the government to be doing
on these issues. At least, well, certainly one of you seems to
reject that view and say it is the other way around: The
party's foreign policy goals have managed to persuade the
Turkish people to provide that support. Thinking specifically
of the opinion toward the United States, with the ups and downs
of the relationship, by and large, it has been a pretty close
alliance in many areas over the many years since the end of
World War II and the establishment of NATO.
Why is Turkish public opinion--if you measure it, it looks
like Turkey's public is perhaps one of the most anti-American
of any of the countries of the world. I used to have this
formulation that sometimes where the people disliked us the
most, it was because we were the closest to the government and
they were projecting on us their own hostilities toward their
own government.
I am not sure that is the conclusion in this context. But I
am curious, if you can elaborate more on your view on the
relationship of public opinion to the current Turkish foreign
policy direction and the standing of the United States there.
At least Dr. Cagaptay actually raised that issue at the end of
his comments as something that we could affect by addressing it
very directly.
Ambassador Wilson. My colleagues are looking at me, so I
will start. Here is the way I looked at it when I was in
Turkey. Obviously, this was a very vexing and complicated
subject and one that troubled me. I think when I arrived in the
United States, one of the organizations used a thermometer to
measure positive, warm-versus-cold feelings toward the United
States. And the United States was around 8 degrees, which is
getting pretty close to zero. And that obviously isn't a
positive thing and it is not something that an ambassador wants
to see.
After having served there for awhile, I came to the
conclusion that anti-Americanism, although I am not sure that
is quite the right word, is very, very broad and is very, very
shallow. And it has primarily, in my opinion, to do with
specific objections to specific policies that either the United
States has or is believed to have, in part because of wild,
crazy, and idiotic things that one of the members referred to
that appear in the Turkish press.
So on the one hand, you have this sort of 8 degrees, or I
think when I left we had improved it to 12, so it is a 50
percent improvement, but you also have Turkey, a country that
sends more students to the United States to study, more of its
young people to the United States to study than any other
country in Europe.
It is a country whose young people and large segments of
the rest of the population look to the United States. It is
where they vacation. It is where they send their children to
school. It is where they would like to do business, although
they have had difficulty accessing the American market.
They are not sending their children to Iranian schools, and
they are not sending their children to Palestinian schools.
That Western aspiration that Turkey has had for 80 years, and
even before that, and I think a desire and interest in closer
ties to the United States remains there, there are serious
public objections to a range of policies. Ninety percent of
Turks opposed the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and at least as
high a percentage oppose our continued presence there now. That
is baggage; and there are a number of other elements as well.
Chairman Berman. I hate to do it, but I have to cut myself
off.
I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, Ms.
Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Excellent
testimony, gentlemen.
I want to focus on Israel-Turkey and Greece-Turkey
relations.
The Greek Orthodox Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul is
facing an existential threat as a result of restrictive
policies imposed by the Turkish Government. Gentlemen, what do
you think is the likelihood that the AKP government will revise
those restrictive policies?
On Israel, it has been reported that the Turkish Government
was itself directly involved with the IHH in the mission to
smuggle goods into the Hamas-controlled Gaza strip. That was in
clear defiance of the naval blockade. Israel rightly defended
itself against this provocative and dangerous act, given the
IHH ties to violent Islamic militants, and the possibility of
weapons being smuggled through this flotilla to Hamas.
So, Dr. Rubin--I know you have touched on this, and I
believe this Turkey-supported act is unacceptable--what do you
think was the motivation by the Turkish Government? What did
Turkey seek to accomplish? Should Israel be concerned that
Turkey may be adopting a more direct confrontational approach
to Israel that could make the Jewish state a target of a
Turkish-sponsored attack?
The first question to all, and then the Israel question to
Dr. Rubin. And we will start with the others.
Mr. Lesser. Thank you very much. If you allow me to make a
point about the public opinion issue that was raised earlier--
and the thermometer, by the way, was the GMF, this poll that I
mentioned earlier on transatlantic trends, and it is very
striking; it was very low.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. But you can answer the
chairman's question another time?
Mr. Lesser. I will come back to it.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I would like to know about the relations
with Greece and Israel.
Mr. Lesser. On Greece and Turkey, I think you raise a very
important point. I think there are unresolved issues in this
relationship between Greece and Turkey which should have been
resolved long ago. And you mentioned one of them, and it is a
very important one.
I was encouraged to think that this Turkish Government
would move forward on the Halki Seminary issue and other
things. I am now rather uncertain. I hope that does happen. I
think what is important from our interest point of view, a
decade ago the risk of an actual military clash between Greece
and Turkey in the Aegean was something that we had to worry
about on a daily basis. That is really not true anymore. We
have unresolved political disputes, but both countries are
devoted to tolerance.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Lesser. And I think that is meaningful.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Cagaptay. Thank you.
In Greece, I would say Turkish-Greek relationships are
better than they have been in a very long time; although
problems remain, that is primarily because both countries now
perceive threats from different places. The countries do have
to get over some of their differences such as the cultural
rights of the Greek minority in Turkey and the Turkish minority
in Greece, but I would say that is really not a flaring point.
If I could make a point on Turkish-Israeli ties, I think
that is more crucial for our debate today. It appears to me
that having a civilizational view of the world, the AKP
government regards the Arab-Israeli conflict from the
perspective of Hamas versus Israel and not Palestinian versus
Israel. That guides the party's policies, which means the AKP
has indexed Israel policy to Israel's Hamas policy. So that is
really bad news for Turkish-Israeli ties in the midterm,
although a lot of people, including able Turkish diplomats, are
trying really hard to save that relationship and bring it to
where it was. It is going to pick it up and bring it back to
where it was.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Dr. Rubin.
Mr. Rubin. With regard to Greece, we see a pattern that has
emerged elsewhere on other Turkish issues where there is a
rhetoric of progress but no willingness to make substantive
decisions behind the scenes.
With regard to the Israel issue--and this also relates to
the chairman's question--there is a chicken-and-egg situation;
incitement does matter. It matters in Turkey; it matters in
Palestine; it matters in Iran; and it matters in Pakistan. To
cite public polling and so forth and not recognize the impact
of a constant barrage of government statements is somewhat
ridiculous, all the more so when the Turkish Government has
made it the forefront of their strategy in absorbing--taking
over newspapers and very much reducing the freedom of the
press. This is one thing which we very much need to pay
attention to if we are going to reverse the rhetoric--the
incitement, which leads to Turkish public opinion being what it
is.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has
expired.
Chairman Berman. We will have a second round for the
unanswered part of members' questions.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much.
The chairman properly noted in the opening remarks part of
the hearing that for purposes of the committee, Turkey was in
Europe. The immediate policy ramification of that was that I
got 1 minute instead of 3 minutes for jurisdictional purposes.
But I think that goes to part of the crux of the issue and the
dilemma in which we find ourselves. Where is Turkey? Who is
Turkey? Turkey seems to have this benefit as we saw at times as
being in both worlds. ``Bi'' means both. Sometimes people who
are bi have to make choices, not always. And sometimes you
think being bi means being both so you can have the best of all
worlds, if that be the case. But as is the case with people who
are, say, biracial, they often have to make a choice of who
they are for societal purposes. And as my kids would say, you
hang with those with whom you are more comfortable.
Turkey is bi. It is bicontinental. And for purposes of,
shall we say, military association, we recognized them as a
brother in arms and welcomed them into NATO. But for purposes
of joining my European family, you got to be kidding, you ain't
marrying my sister, and they were rejected.
So you hang with whom you are more comfortable. I mean, it
is okay to have a foot in both worlds, but if suddenly you
realize that each of your feet are on different banana peels
and they start moving in different directions, you have got a
problem. I think that Turkey's identification problem and our
relating to it are part of the problem, not the entire problem,
but certainly a part of a very complicated formulation.
I would like to get Turkey back. I think they are important
for any number of a host of critical reasons. We took great
bragging rights on having Turkey as part of the West, and it
seems like the dynamic is readily changing. And part, of
course, is due to a change in leadership and its
predisposition, I would suppose, but the population seems to be
following that direction more than enthusiastically, and that
is rather troublesome.
Part of the way to get it back, I guess, is in our hands.
What can we do to get Turkey back? How do we make it part of
our world without the demand that it completely reject the
other world, and, at the same time, insisting on key policy
issues that it does not go to the dark side?
Mr. Cagaptay. Thank you, Congressman Ackerman. You have
given us a lot of food for thought. Turkey has two identities.
Let me ask a question: What is it that makes Turkey special?
A lot of people will say because it is a Muslim country.
No. There are 57 other Muslim countries. What makes Turkey
special is it is a Muslim country with a Western overlay. It is
a liberal democracy, a NATO ally, has good ties with Israel and
the United States, and wants to get into the European Union.
All of that is what makes Turkey special, not its religion,
because there are so many other countries that share that
religion, but not its political values.
Under the AKP, it is those political values that have come
under strain, from EU accession to ties with Israel to strong
ties with the United States. So a message to get across to the
Turkish Government would be what makes Turkey special for
members of the United States Government and the Congress is not
its religion; we don't care. It is its political values that we
care. This is what distinguishes Turkey, its Western overlay.
So how do we get Turkey back? Emphasize its NATO membership
and EU accession as key elements of Turkey's new foreign policy
direction.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Smith. I would like to direct my question to Ambassador
Wilson. I would love to hear from all of you, but there is not
enough time.
Religious freedom is a universally recognized human right
enshrined in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
Turkey ratified that in 2003. Article 18 couldn't be clearer on
the religious freedom issue; yet the Turkish Government
systematically suppresses both the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and
especially His Holiness Bartholomew, and has forcibly closed
the Halki Seminary. Has the United States, and especially the
Human Rights Council, done enough to reverse this religious
discrimination?
Secondly, it has been said by George Santayana that those
who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. Prime
Minister Erdogan's government's denial of the Armenian genocide
has been compounded by its denial of the genocide in Darfur.
When the ICC indicted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who
was scheduled to attend an OIC conference in Istanbul late last
year, the Turkish Prime Minister said no Muslim could
perpetrate a genocide. What does that say about his judgment?
And, thirdly, very quickly, Natan Sharansky gave a famous
speech at the OSCE on anti-Semitism. He said anyone can
disagree with the Knesset, anybody can disagree with the
government policies of Israel, but the line is crossed when any
one of the three Ds--demonization, delegitimization, or where
the double standard is applied. Based on what I would think is
a rising tide--and I would appreciate your thoughts on this--is
there a rising tide of anti-Semitism by the government in
Ankara and by the state media?
Ambassador Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
Just to answer your questions briefly in reverse order,
Turks that I talk to generally do not talk about a rising tide
of anti-Semitism. In the last meeting I had with members of the
Istanbul Jewish community, people were quite emphatic that
conditions are better now than they have been for a very long
time in Turkey. There are problems and they are serious
problems, but I think that is noteworthy.
Second, your comments about Turkish policy with respect to
Sudan and comments that the Prime Minister has made, I can't
try to defend any of that or explain any of that. I thought it
was important when Erdogan went to, I think it was an AU or
Arab League meeting in Khartoum, probably in 2006. He was the
one and only person in that group who went to Darfur, who met
with people. He delivered a couple of plane loads of
assistance, and Turkey has continued to do that. Those are good
things and we should be happy about them, even as we recognize
some of the other problems.
Mr. Smith. What does that say about his judgment? When we
look at any leader anywhere in the world, obviously truth-
telling has to be a mainstay of that administration or that
leadership. What does it say about it?
Ambassador Wilson. I can't really account for that, Mr.
Smith. I wish I could.
On the issues related to the Ecumenical Patriarch, has the
United States and have other Western countries done enough? If
you judge by the results, and I think your question answers
itself, no. The situation remains difficult in some respects.
Not as bad as it might have been a couple of years ago. I think
the government very recently announced actions to confer
citizenship on all of the members of the Synod, which addresses
an issue of the eventual election of a successor to Bartholomew
when he should pass from the scene. That is a positive. It is
not a good enough story.
Mr. Rubin. Before I ever wrote my first article on Turkey,
I went out from Iraq through Turkey, and some Turks mentioned
to me that my name was in the Turkish newspaper as a Jewish
enemy of Islam. It was in the newspaper Yeni Safak, a newspaper
that has been endorsed by Prime Minister Erdogan. There was a
constant stream of incitement when I met with the Jewish
community, not just the leaders but Jewish community activists
and so forth, at various trips. People, they don't perhaps
share the opinion that the Ambassador just left.
And I should also note, lastly, that in 2005, ``Mein
Kampf'' became a best seller in Turkey. Part of it was because
it was cheap. It was subsidized. The Turkish Government never
tried to see whom it was subsidized by.
And the last thing is that anti-Semitism and the anti-
Americanism have come part and parcel. We have seen this in the
``Valley of the Wolves,'' a film, a vile film that was endorsed
by the Prime Minister's wife.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from New York, Mr. McMahon.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Cagaptay, could you give us a snapshot or maybe even a
little more detailed snapshot of the local political climate in
Turkey, some handicapping on the outcome of next year's
elections, and more detail, as you mentioned in your testimony,
more detail how the foreign policy of the current
administration plays into those elections? Sort of give us the
``all politics is local'' review.
Mr. Cagaptay. Thank you, Congressman.
Obviously, like in all countries, in Turkey foreign policy
matters in domestic politics. But like in all countries, it is
really domestic politics that determines the outcome of the
elections.
Until recently I would say there were two problems of
Turkish politics: An increasingly authoritarian ruling party
that goes after checks and balances, media freedom, gender
equality, independent courts; and an ineffective opposition on
the other hand. So you had two problems.
The second problem now looks like it is being alleviated.
The opposition has elected a new, charismatic leader and it is
rising in the polls. One poll even shows the opposition party
catching up with the AKP and passing it for the first time in 8
years. And so no wonder that before and after the flotilla
incident, and since then, the AKP has been using vehement anti-
Israeli rhetoric to create hysteria, which I think it will use
in the run-up to the election.
So I would say for the next year, unfortunately, although
we don't want to see that, we will probably witness strong
anti-Western, anti-European, anti-American and anti-Israeli
rhetoric coming from the government in an effort to turn
politics at home, where it is more competitive now, into a ball
game where they can bring foreign policy in with the hope that
it will help them.
Mr. McMahon. Thank you.
I was just thinking, I don't know if has ever happened
before, where a leader of a democracy would try to use foreign
policy to generate support at home and rally patriotic
sentiments for the homeland toward outlying enemies. I guess
that has never happened before.
Anyway, Dr. Lesser, you mentioned some polling numbers and
that you saw an increase in some anti-American or anti-
American, anti-Israeli sentiment. You said there was a doubling
of the numbers. Can you tell us what those actual numbers were?
Mr. Lesser. We will release the full data in September, but
just roughly, as a preliminary analysis, that was referring to
a question where we asked Turks who they would like to work
most closely with in international affairs, and we give them a
range, the United States, Europe, Middle Eastern neighbors,
Russia, et cetera. The number for the Middle East, which I know
is of a concern to us here, roughly doubled since last year.
So, last year, if I have that correct, it was about 10
percent said we should work most closely with the Middle East
on international affairs. This year it was around 20 percent.
I could give you my view, why I think that is. I think the
political rhetoric, the fact that a lot of the key developments
going on around Turkey have been in that region, it is in the
news and everybody is focused on it. There are a lot of
different explanations, but those are the numbers.
Mr. McMahon. What are the numbers for those who wanted to
keep working with the Americans on the foreign policy of the
West?
Mr. Lesser. Those are also fairly high. If you look across
a lot of these different potential partnerships, it is pretty
well distributed. It is not as if we are very low down.
Although when you come to ask the kind of thermometer-like
questions of ``Who do you like out there in the world?,'' we
have not done well. Last year when we did the survey, there was
a tremendous Obama bounce across Europe. As you went east,
until you got to Turkey, this bounce got lower and lower and
lower. And I am afraid to say in Turkey it is essentially
nonexistent.
Mr. McMahon. I look forward to the release of those
numbers. I may have to add that into that basket of questions
to be answered later, but it seems that the administration has
gotten way too cozy with Ahmadinejad and the Iranian regime.
What is Turkey doing to keep asylum for those who fled the
purges after the revolution, and are they working in any way to
persecute those who violated human rights in Iran?
Mr. Lesser. Turkey for many, many years had a large number
of emigre Iranians living inside the country. Some of them are
there for political reasons, some of them are there for
economic reasons, and some of them are simply tourists. Of
course, it is a visa-free regime now that has been put in
place. I don't have the precise number, but there are very
large numbers of Iranians who have been living in Turkey for
some time. Some number are refugees. There is also a lot of
commercial activism--and this is an important point for our
policy discussion. One of the problems is that we have had a
very security-heavy relationship with Turkey. A lot of the
focus these days for Turkey is commercial. We don't play very
much in that game, but countries like Syria and Iraq and Iran
do.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mack.
Mr. Mack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like to
thank the witnesses, the panel, for being here today and giving
us their insight.
I would like to start off again by saying, reminding people
of the actions that Turkey has taken with the support of Hamas,
with the opposition to the sanctions with Iran, and their role
in the flotilla. I don't know how anybody on this committee can
overlook those things. I don't know how anybody on the panel
can overlook those things. I don't know how any American can
overlook those things. And I certainly don't see how anyone who
believes that freedom is the core of all human progress can
overlook those actions.
A minute ago we heard a question: What can we do to get
Turkey back? Give me a break. We need a paradigm shift in this
committee, in this discussion. We are the United States of
America. We are the land of the free and the home of the brave.
I believe it is time that the administration take a firm stance
on the side of freedom. President Obama's Middle East diplomacy
has gone from weak to dangerous. He has taken our relationship
with Israel for granted, and his administration has chosen to
hedge its bets with countries not aligned with the United
States' principles of freedom and our interests. In a desperate
attempt to reach out to the Muslim world, he has turned his
back on one of our Nation's most trusted allies. Still,
Turkey's flippant behavior has not changed.
Under the Obama administration, our allies have distanced
themselves, and our allies have become further entrenched. We
cannot continue on this path. Our success lies in our ability
to preserve and fight for our freedom and our principles.
Countries like Israel have proven that they are truly allies in
an unstable Middle East. Turkey's actions, with what I have
mentioned earlier, are not forgivable.
If Turkey wants the support of the United States to get
into the EU, then it needs to stand on the side of freedom; and
for us to support Turkey without them changing their position
is a mistake.
So my question to you is: What does Turkey have to do to
get America back? That should be the question that we ask in
the United States Congress. I look forward to your answers.
Mr. Rubin. I tend to agree with the Representative from
Florida. If I may say, we should then implement is a whole host
of Plan B strategies. Turkey has become over confident in its
relationship to us. It believes it is more important to us than
it actually is. This doesn't mean we should necessarily
dispense with partnerships, but if we make alternate
arrangements with, for example, air support through Romania and
elsewhere, at the very least, even if we do keep our presence
in Incirlik Air Base, it makes Turkey all the less able to
pursue the slash-and-burn negotiation strategy which it has.
I would also second your cry, if I may, for moral clarity.
And this is something that we should hold President Erdogan
accountable for. The United States tends to not like to engage
in bullhorn diplomacy, but there is no reason why we can't call
a toad a toad, and, when it comes to some of Prime Minister
Erdogan's more noxious statements, to call him on that, to call
the Turkish Ambassador in the United States on that, and use
the full force of our diplomacy for U.S. interests and for the
interests of our allies.
Mr. Mack. Thank you.
Mr. Cagaptay. If I may, Congressman, what can Turkey do to
get the United States back? I would say, the chairman mentioned
earlier for the purpose of this committee, Turkey is in Europe.
Turkey should go back to Europe where it belongs. Both in its
domestic politics, the AKP government should be called to
judgment on respecting media freedoms. If Turkish media is
free, Turkey remains a democracy and it is okay.
And second, it should go back to Europe in its foreign
policy. We have to take Turkey out of the Middle East to take
the Middle East out of Turkey. That means Turkey's involvement
in Middle East conflicts is not good for Turkey and it is not
good for the United States, because the AKP government is not
an impartial mediator and has failed in producing outcomes.
On Iran or Israeli peace, I would say to bring Turkey back
to Europe in domestic policy and foreign policy.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Miller, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Like Mr. Mack, I think the United States should be on the
side of freedom. But if freedom means democracy and governments
reflect the will of their people, that may be part of our
problem in Turkey right now. One of the worst parts of
democracy is that sometimes elections lead to unpalatable
consequences for us, and that may be what we are dealing with
in Turkey now. Certainly within our own country, support for
secular institutions and separation of church and State waxes
and wanes, and it is unrealistic to think that it will not in
other parts of the world as well. Certainly throughout the
Muslim world, there has been more support for Islamic policies
and away from secular policies. So it is not surprising that is
affecting Turkey to some extent as well.
There is, in September, a package of constitutional changes
on the ballot. The government describes those changes as
necessary to meet some of the qualifications for admission to
the EU. They include increasing government control over what
have traditionally been autonomous institutions: The judiciary
and the military. Philosophically we may support an autonomous
judiciary, but it certainly is not consistent with American
political philosophy to support an autonomous military. In
fact, we have traditionally seen autonomous military power, for
instance, in Pakistan, as entirely an unwholesome influence.
But we probably have benefited from the autonomy of the Turkish
military. They seem to be more pro-Western and they seem to be
more pro-secular. They have worked closely with Israel's
military when probably the people of Turkey are less
sympathetic to Israel than their military.
Do you believe that this package of constitutional changes
will go through? Do you believe that the stated reason for
those changes is the real reason; and what do you think the
effect will be, particularly the effect of less autonomy for
the military? Dr. Cagaptay, Dr. Lesser?
Mr. Lesser. Just briefly, I do think this question of
civil-military relations is absolutely critical for us here.
Many of the things we have been discussing would not have
happened under the old setup, the old regime. So the change,
the shift, is very, very important. I think in September the
vote on the referendum, on the constitutional package, is
probably likely to go the way the AKP government would like,
but it will be a very important test and a harbinger of how a
general election in Turkey might go in the future.
One final point. I think we need to be aware that with
these changes in civil-military relations, who are we now
dealing with when it comes to security and defense issues in
Turkey? It is not so simple anymore, and they simply don't have
that vibrant debate that we would like to see on things like
the consequences of a ``nuclear-izing'' Iran. So we may be able
to do some things to encourage a more vibrant debate about
this.
Mr. Cagaptay. Thank you, Congressman. I would say the
question about Turkey is not that Turkey is becoming more
democratic and we have to bear the consequences; Turkey has
been a democracy since 1946. The question is: Is the AKP a
democratic force?
A democratic force is not one that comes to power
democratically; it is one that respects democracy after it
comes to power, including checks and balances. Just as the
party has gone after media, taken ownership of a lot of media
in the hands of its supporters, which is creating incitement--
and Dr. Rubin noted that--but also the constitutional amendment
package which is coming up for a vote is a mixed bag. It has a
lot of good things such as gender equality which I would vote
for, but also a lot of things that would allow the government
to eliminate checks and balances, such as appoint most of the
members of the high courts without a confirmation process or
other checks and balances. This is a government that already
controls the Parliament, the executive branch, and the
legislative, and it would give it the third branch of
government. After that it is going for control of the media,
the fourth estate. That is not good news for the future of a
democracy.
So the question is: Is this a party that respects democracy
after it comes to power democratically? And I think this is how
we should frame it.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I have so little time I will
yield it back.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. I
recognize, out of order, for a moment, the ranking member.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to
let the witnesses know that our side of the aisle has a special
conference right now in the Cannon Caucus Room; and that is why
so few, but the brave, are here. Our brothers and sisters are
somewhere else.
Chairman Berman. How can Turkey get them back?
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me put
forward a word of caution here that as we make this assessment
of Turkey, let us be careful not to rush to judgment.
Secondly, if we are going to measure Turkey, let's make
sure that we measure them correctly. With that in mind, Mr.
Ambassador, let me ask you your assessment of Turkey's
assistance in the war on terror? How would you evaluate that?
Ambassador Wilson. Let me begin by expanding my answer a
little bit beyond your question. I think as we assess Turkey,
we also need to assess the many ways in which we need its help.
On very practical issues where Americans are dying today in
Afghanistan and Iraq, we need that help. It is critical to the
U.S. national interest. And it is also critical to the national
interest that we get Turkey's help on the problem of Iran's
nuclear weapons efforts.
So as I said in my prepared remarks, getting them back on
board, getting them back, not in line, but together with us
ought to be a big priority.
War on terrorism issues is certainly a central part of what
I was doing while I was in Ankara. Turkey has been extremely
helpful on a range of--frankly, very sensitive on al-Qaeda-
related issues. It has been very helpful on a number of other
terrorism matters concerning Iraq.
Dr. Lesser noted earlier our work with Turkey--I think it
was Dr. Lesser--on PKK. We have few partners who are closer
with us and more effective with us on these issues.
Mr. Scott. Thank you very much.
Now let me ask each of you to respond to this. Throughout
the ages and the centuries, even going back to ancient times in
the Middle East, they have often asked the question: Is there
no balm in Gilead? Gilead is a land on the east side of the
Jordan that produced a particular kind of plant that had
extraordinary healing power, and I think that is what we ought
to talk about a bit here, and I ask your assessment.
Do you feel that we have healing power? Is there no balm
there now that could heal this wound that has ruptured between
our two most foremost allies in the region, Israel and Turkey?
Could each of you briefly respond to that? Is there balm? Can
we do it? What must be done to heal this wound? That is what
has to be done.
Mr. Rubin.
Mr. Rubin. I would say we can't heal until we diagnose and
come to agreement on the diagnosis and recognize reality.
Mr. Lesser. I think there has been a very natural
recalibration. By healing, if we have in mind something that
existed between Turkey and Israel 10 years ago, probably there
isn't a route back to that. The question is, How far does this
deterioration go, and where will it stop.
I think it needn't go that far, and a lot of this is about
the political messaging between both countries, because there
still is a core of strategic interest there, and cooperation on
many things. Israel and Turkey are cooperating to this day on
the PKK in northern Iraq, just as we are.
Mr. Scott. So you believe there is balm?
Mr. Lesser. I believe there is balm, but it is balm within
reason.
Mr. Cagaptay. This is a very important question because the
good ties between Turkey and Israel are not just good ties but
is something that makes Turkey unique by adding this Western
overlay and making it unique among all Muslim nations, together
with its NATO membership, liberal democracy, EU accession, good
ties with the United States. So the fact that it is becoming
undone, it is quite worrisome, because it means something
special about Turkey is disappearing.
So is there a balm? I would say because the AKP
government's world view has indexed Turkish-Israeli ties to
Israel's Hamas policy, and because that is not changing anytime
soon, unfortunately in the short term there is no quick fix to
this.
Perhaps Turkish diplomats are working really hard to save
the relationship. Perhaps we will witness that it won't
deteriorate any further, but if it is where it is, for the near
future, I would say we should be content with the hope that
long term, other Turks who see the world differently decide to
build a different relationship, or back on the same
relationship of the past with Israel. But short term, I think
this government will stay on track with this idea of Israel
versus Hamas and Turkey versus Israel.
Ambassador Wilson. Very briefly, I think time heals a lot
of wounds. This particular one will require some time.
Second, it was very important that Israeli Minister Ben-
Eliezer met with the Turkish Foreign Minister, I think 2 or 3
weeks ago. It ignited a little bit of controversy in Israel,
but it was the right thing. That is why that step was taken.
Third, Ambassador Tan, the Turkish Ambassador here, just
came from Israel. Israel has fewer better friends in the
Turkish system. I think he can be helpful, too.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The chairman of the Europe Subcommittee, Mr. Delahunt, is
recognized.
Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is interesting to note that since the flotilla
incident, trade has increased between Israel and Jordan,
according to media reports, by some 40 percent over the
previous year. Forty percent. And that the sale of the
aircraft, the Heron, was actually consummated post the flotilla
incident. I would suggest that those particular examples state
something about the relationship. I think both sides know that
they need each other. Much as I said in my opening remarks, we
need the Turks, they need us.
But I want to get to the polling data for just a moment. I
understand the polling data. I chair the Oversight Subcommittee
of this particular committee, and we did a whole bunch of
hearings in terms of the image of the United States. I think it
is important to note that we weren't doing very well anywhere.
It wasn't just Turkey. We weren't doing well with the Brits. We
weren't doing well with the French. We weren't even doing well
with the Irish.
Now, I think it is important to provide context here. I am
not happy with the fact that there is overwhelming sentiment in
Turkey regarding the United States. We can do a lot, and I even
think that some of the remarks and some of the notes or the
insights, rather, recommendations as far as public diplomacy,
yes, they exist. I visited Turkey recently, and they want to
come here and do business. They are doing business in Tel Aviv
right now.
But the issue I really want to address is, and let me
address this to Ambassador Wilson, do you view this shift in
Turkey foreign policy as pragmatism, nationalism; or as Dr.
Cagaptay indicates, generated by the ideology of Islamism?
And can you give us your definition, Ambassador, of
Islamism? Is this some nefarious plot that is going on all over
the world? I think it is important that we start to be precise
about what we mean because multiple interpretations can be
drawn.
Ambassador Wilson. I am not sure that I would want to try
to define a term that I didn't use. I think that one important
thing to remember is that there are a large number of countries
with large or overwhelming majority of Muslim populations. They
are all different. They all pursue different goals and they
pursue them in different ways. And the idea that there is
something out there, I think is misleading, and will take U.S.
policy in the wrong direction.
To your question, the origins of Turkish foreign policy and
changes that we see today, is it pragmatism, is it nationalism
or is it ideology; my answer would be yes. All of those things
are going on, and there are probably some other things going
on.
Mr. Delahunt. So it is really not a black-and-white
situation, it is much more nuanced than what some might
indicate?
Ambassador Wilson. Yes, sir. That is exactly what I
believe. There are a number of things going on that motivate
the government. It has to do with public opinion and it has to
do with pragmatism. It has to do with the pushback from Europe
and it has to do with economic opportunities. There are a
complex of things there. I don't think that they are seen as
intentionally taking Turkey away from NATO and away from a
close relationship with the United States, but rather adding
things to Turkey's international tool bag.
Mr. Delahunt. I found it interesting, and I think Dr. Rubin
in fact has written about this, dating back to that March 2003
denial of American deployment through Turkey. Ironically it was
Erdogan, the Prime Minister, that seemed to be advocating to
allow America to transit Turkey into northern Iraq; am I
correct on that, Ambassador Wilson?
Chairman Berman. The gentleman's time has expired. Can you
answer with a ``yes'' or ``no''?
Ambassador Wilson. I can't answer it with a ``yes'' or
``no.'' Erdogan was not Prime Minister at that time. The Prime
Minister at that time, yes, advocated for approval of that
measure.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The ranking member of the Middle East and South Asia
Subcommittee, Mr. Burton, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Chairman, I want to apologize. I had
another committee hearing and they were having votes and so I
had to run back and forth, so I apologize for not being here.
I think one of the things that should be asked is: What
should the Obama administration do to engage Turkey and the
administration over there to reestablish a closer relationship?
I am very concerned that we see Turkey moving maybe closer to
countries like Iran, which is a real threat to the entire
stability of the Middle East and the administration. And the
Secretary of State, it seems to me, should be doing everything
that they can to make sure that our NATO ally, Turkey, stays
close to the West as much as possible. So what should they be
doing in your opinions, and any one of you can answer this, to
stabilize and solidify our relationship.
Mr. Lesser. If I may, Congressman, I think that this is a
very important question and has a very practical side to it
which we should be pursuing. I think the Turks, for all of
their engagement with Iran, which troubles us, also at the end
of the day view Iran as a troubling strategic competitor in the
long term. And they do worry about a nuclear Iran. What are we
going to do about it in NATO terms, what are we going to do
about it in terms of ballistic missile defense architecture?
All of these things that matter very keenly to us matter very
keenly to the Turks.
I think that, instead, we move beyond the sanctions issue.
The Turks are never going to like sanctions, for a lot of
reasons. There are things that we can be doing together in the
defense realm which would build a lot of confidence, and show
that we are dealing with the issue in a way that makes sense
for both of our interests, as a very practical suggestion.
Thank you.
Mr. Cagaptay. If I may, Congressman, as well thank you for
your question. I would say Turkey's AKP government's foreign
policy involvement to become a mediator in Middle East
conflicts has not produced positive results for Turkey, because
the country has not become a regional power, as suggested by
the AKP, nor has it produced positive results for the United
States. The AKP appears to be a tribune to the Islamist world
view to the West. And I would say the Obama administration
should take Turkey from the Middle East and put it back in
Europe, which is where it belongs both in terms of its foreign
policy orientation and liberal democracy. That would mean
making EU accession the key driver of U.S.-Turkish
relationship, together with Turkey's NATO commitment. Turkey is
a NATO ally; we don't ask for them anything that we don't ask
from other allies. And I think that is only fair that their
commitment should not be withering away.
Mr. Burton. Anybody else? Yes, sir.
Ambassador Wilson. Congressman, I would echo what my
colleagues have said, but in a slightly different way. I think
the Obama administration should engage very, very vigorously
with the Turks with the problem of Iran and what we are going
to do about it.
Some of the ideas put forward here in terms of talking
about this as a defense and security issue as opposed to a
political issue I think is one useful avenue to explore. The
administration should continue to talk very intensively about
Iraq: What are our plans there; how do we see things
developing; what kind of a role Turkey can play.
Likewise on Afghanistan and, I would add, likewise on the
Middle East. Turkey is a Middle Eastern country. To pretend
otherwise is misleading and geographically incorrect. So having
some of those intense conversations and extended discussions I
think is extremely important.
Last part. Tough words are needed when tough words are
deserved. And where we see problems, we should talk about them.
Primarily we should talk about them in private. There are times
and places and ways in which we do this in public as well.
Mr. Burton. Just one real quick question and it relates to
the Mediterranean problem when the ships came in, the Turkish
ships came in, and the Israelis, because they were concerned
about weapons getting into Hamas, were checking on that
flotilla.
We are big supporters, all of us, of Israel. It is our big
ally over there. We want to make sure they remain strong and
free. What should we do to try to ameliorate the situation that
exists currently between Turkey and Israel? What can be done
with the United States trying to help put a little oil in the
water, pardon the expression--bad choice of words, I guess, but
you understand what I mean.
Mr. Rubin. One thing which we should do is enforce the idea
that terrorism and what is a terrorist group is not an ala
carte proposition; that Turkey cannot simply legitimize certain
groups and expect other groups to be delegitimized. Terrorism
is a problem to all democracies and we should work with Turkey
for a common definition. Hamas is a terrorist group; so is the
PKK.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Sires, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I listened--I listened to the statement that the foreign
policy of Turkey is really based on the opinion of the Turkish
people. And I was just wondering if the projection that the
Turkish people want of Turkey--through my eyes, I see Turkey as
the bully in the corner, especially when it comes to Cyprus,
when it comes to Armenia, and when it comes to even Greece at
times, now even Israel.
This cavalier attitude also--I thought I heard them say
that they are not really interested, they don't really care if
they get in the European Union or not. Is this the projection
that the people of Turkey want the government to project in the
world? Can anybody--I just think they are kind of bullish.
I went to Cyprus, they got 43,000 troops in Cyprus. Do they
have to go on a mountain and put a Turkish flag the size of
this building on that mountain just to show the people of
Cyprus like who is boss? I mean, that is what I mean by the
bullish attitude of Turkey. Can anybody----
Mr. Lesser. If I could make a comment on that, I think when
you ask Turks today whether they still support being a member
of the European Union, a majority still say yes. That number
has been going down, but a majority still say yes.
If you ask on the issues, for example, one of the ones you
mention on Cyprus, whether Turkey--whether they are willing to
pay a cost to resolve that--they say no. Eventually those are
not reconcilable things. If Turkey is going to become a member
of the European Union it is going to have to solve those
problems.
I think this is where political leadership comes in, and
political rhetoric comes in. I think a lot of what you are
seeing today is simply because public opinion is being
reinforced in its view that Turkey has ``other fish to fry,''
if I can put it that way, and that the European Union is not as
important a project as it used to be. I hope we can change
that.
Mr. Cagaptay. I would continue, Congressman, along the
point that most Turks want EU accession. When opinion-polled,
they are asked why they want the process. They say, and I
agree, that it is good for Turkey because it will make Turkey
more of a liberal democracy and more prosperous and finally
they can go to Paris on their honeymoons without visas. It
kills the romance when you have to wait on line.
But on top of it, I think Turkey's support for EU remains
strong. The Cyprus issue, though, is a highly emotional issue
for both people on the island. It really depends on who you ask
where history starts. Turkish Cypriots will tell you about the
sixties when they were persecuted by Greek Cypriot militia, and
Greek Cypriots will tell you about the 1974 war when Turkey
landed on the island to end hostilities. And I think the
unification of the island will be the best thing, together with
EU accession for Cyprus and Turkey; but that failed in 2004
when Greek Cypriots voted against that plan despite the fact
the Turkish Government and the Turk Cypriots supported it. So
that was a missed opportunity. We may not have that again in
the future, unfortunately.
Mr. Sires. Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Wilson. I am not sure that there is a lot that I
can add to what has already been said. I hadn't thought about
the analogy, bully in the corner. I am not sure I agree with
it, although I think I understand where you are coming from.
On Cyprus, which I didn't particularly address in my
remarks, my impression certainly in the time I was there was
that Turkey was fully supportive of the U.N. negotiating
process. It remained very interested in the Annon plan
proposals that had been rejected by the Greek Cypriots in 2004;
deeply, deeply frustrated about an inability to figure out how
to move things forward; frustration that I certainly shared,
and I believe the State Department, U.S. Government as a whole,
shared in moving this thing forward.
Since then, things have moved forward a little bit in terms
of a new U.N. process. But at least there I am not sure that I
would be comfortable talking about Turkey's throwing its weight
around trying to change things. The status quo, although no one
likes it, has served a certain purpose and Turkey is not
certainly one of those that is trying particularly to change
it.
Mr. Sires. Dr. Rubin.
Mr. Rubin. Two very quick points. Turkey's narrative is one
of foreign powers victimizing them, and historically there is
some merit to their argument, although there are two sides. The
more important issue is with regard to this Turkish concept of
neo-Ottomanism. Turkey believes that surrounding countries have
a much different--much more positive opinion of Turkey
historically than they actually do.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Costa, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. A lot of
questions, little time.
Dr. Rubin, I want to--maybe I did not hear your testimony
correctly, but I thought you said the issue of the Armenian
genocide was in question. I think there is pretty overwhelming
historical consensus that it actually occurred, although that
is still a debate within Turkey and among some other scholars,
I guess.
Since that is obviously a focus of the issue of Armenian
and Turkish relations, what do you think it will take, since
the 2009 protocols have been signed, to get that relationship
to a stage where they can have the kind of exchanges and
country-to-country relations that we would like to see them
have.
Mr. Rubin. There has been progress between Turkey and
Armenia on a whole host of issues. Much of that has been
because of a very quiet diplomacy and the quiet diplomacy tends
to be more fruitful.
With regard to the other issue, it would also be good to
have some real reconciliation, which, as I said in my
testimony, would involve both sides opening their archives
completely, regardless of what they deem to be the ethnicity or
political perspective of the historian.
Mr. Costa. Dr. Lesser, Dr. Cagaptay, do you agree that this
quiet diplomacy is making progress on the 2009 protocol?
Mr. Lesser. I would agree that this is certainly the route
that it would have to go. I think we are dealing--you heard
this in so many comments today--with a mood of heightened
nationalism, not only in Turkey but in the region, and it makes
it difficult to do these big projects, like the historic
rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia.
My answer to the question of what is necessary to get it
moving again is really a significant recommitment by the
political leadership in Turkey, but also on both sides I would
say, to that rapprochement, without it necessarily being linked
to other things. It just complicates matters--it is valid and
worth doing in its own right, or it is not. I think it is. I
just have to say that.
Mr. Costa. Is this the Turkish Government that could do
that, like Nixon going to China?
Mr. Lesser. Turkey is in a position--Turkey is a very, very
powerful actor in the region, and so for Turkey to take that
step, as it did at one point, is very significant. To recommit
to it would be important.
Mr. Costa. I have got other questions.
Ambassador Wilson, when I was last in Turkey and seeing the
new government come into power, we--I think there is consensus
among all of you that the relationship with us and Turkey has
always had its ups and downs, but the secular role of the
military seems to now come into question.
And what are the internal issues that are taking place, in
your view, within Turkey that is causing this change?
Ambassador Wilson. That is causing which change?
Mr. Costa. Between the secular-military role that has
traditionally played with in Turkey and the government.
Ambassador Wilson. Well, clearly one of the important sets
of reforms that Turkey had to undertake to make a credible bid
to join the European Union was adjusting civil-military
relations and really putting the Turkish military in sort of
the lane that is normal for I think most Western democracies,
where the military works on security and defense matters and
has a limited role, if any role at all, in other domestic
affairs. The military--that is one point.
I think, second, at least my perception and certainly what
people talked about in Turkey while I was there was a
significant diminution in the military's role, in the kind of
respect that was accorded to the military. That was quite
different from what I heard even in 2005, to say nothing of
what Turks tell you looking back to the last decade or the
period before that.
I think the military interventions have created part of
that situation. The military's intervention in 2007 I think
was, generally speaking----
Mr. Costa. Before my time expires, the situation with Iran
and them obtaining nuclear weapons--I mean, where does Turkey
see this different than we do? I mean, they state openly that
they don't want to see them obtain nuclear weapons, but they
obviously see it differently.
Ambassador Wilson. Turkey does not want Iran--in my
opinion, Turkey does not want Iran to become a nuclear power.
There are rivals in the region. They fear the dangers that will
produce, and they fear all of the implications that means for
the region. They are deeply fearful of war and of conflict, and
view the possible acquisition of an Iranian nuclear weapon--
which they don't entirely believe--the legacy of faulty Iraq
weapons of mass destruction intelligence affects this here--the
possibility of a possible Iranian weapon is not as threatening
to them as the prospects of war.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, is recognized.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Again, this is again an important hearing, and I would
like, to Ambassador and to Dr. Cagaptay--forgive me, Doctor; I
will focus on doctor, but thank you.
Let me focus in on some of the issues mentioned by my
colleagues and that I am very interested in. First of all, I
would like to think of the relationship between the United
States in particular and Turkey as a two-way street. I think we
get off kilter if we believe, or if Turkey believes, that we
are getting more than we are giving. And we had a pretty good
relationship, pre-political changes, and every nation has a
right to elect the person of their choice.
But, Ambassador, let's start with you. What role would the
United States play in fixing this schism now between Turkey and
Israel, which is a key element in terms of where we are as
Western allies? And I say that because we advocated for Turkey
to be in NATO. It is not all about they have an air base and
they are helping us in Iraq. We hope to be out of Iraq in the
next couple of months. And so we hope they will be helping us
generally keep peace around the world.
The other point that I think is enormously important is,
what is the next steps of our relationship? The British Prime
Minister, part of Western allies, just rooted for Turkey to be
part of the EU. They are getting benefits. And I consider
Turkey a friend, but I don't want to be a friend with my hat in
hand as if I am begging. In fact, I hate that kind of foreign
policy, period. We either work together as equals, we respect
the fact that we have individual foreign policies, but we don't
try to strangle each other and get mad at every drop of the
hat.
So, Ambassador, if you would answer that question and also
Doctor, if you would answer that question, I would appreciate
it.
Ambassador Wilson. Sure. Thank you very much,
Congresswoman.
On Turkey-Israel, I think the administration has already
taken some steps to try to ease the tension by facilitating a
return of the Turks who were on board these ships, or the Mavi
Marmara, back to Turkey, and, I think just in the last few
days, to facilitate the return of the ships themselves or at
least the Turkish ship back to Turkey. I have also read----
Ms. Jackson Lee. You know, this is an important point that
sort of gets lost and it is an important point that Israel is
negotiating. But go right ahead.
Ambassador Wilson. I read in the papers that we also helped
to facilitate this meeting between Foreign Minister Davutoglu
and Israeli Minister Ben Eliezer.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So we need to be engaged.
Ambassador Wilson. We need to be engaged and help them put
this issue behind them. There are issues, fundamental issues,
that Dr. Rubin raised that do need to be addressed and
considered, certainly, as we figure out how to go forward. The
practical matter.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If you can go quickly to our next steps--
because I want the doctor to be able to respond--the next steps
of our relationship between Turkey and the United States.
Ambassador Wilson. As I think I have suggested earlier, I
think what is extremely important is for us to engage on the
substantive issues and the substantive problems that we have,
the substantive problems we have with Turkey and the priority
international issues where we need Turkish help and support.
You are absolutely right; foreign policy is a two-way street,
it is a give and take. We need Turkish assistance in a variety
of ways, and we get it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. And they need ours.
Ambassador Wilson. Turkey needs our assistance in a variety
of ways, and they get it as well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Doctor, if you would, two-way street.
Mr. Cagaptay. Thank you, Congresswoman. Put this together
across the view that they need us as much as we need them. It
is a two-way street. And that hasn't really gotten across, I
would say, because every time the AKP government transgressed
U.S. policy, inviting Hamas, defending Sudanese genocide,
establishing contacts with Hezbollah, defending Iran's nukes,
it got away with it. And it got the perception, therefore, that
it is so indispensable that it can continue.
That is why this hearing is so important, as well as
rethinking U.S. policy to say, how do we get across the message
that all of these things are not acceptable, but we still keep
Turkey as an ally? And I think that would require a tough talk,
as Ambassador Wilson mentioned, an honest conversation; but
also a pushback on these certain issues, where having witnessed
over and over in the last 8 years that AKP's involvement in the
Middle Eastern conflicts does not help Turkey or the United
States--doesn't get them out of Middle East conflicts--and the
role of a mediator, which obviously has not produced results
then, I think, bear the consequences. So take Turkey back out
of the Middle East in order to take the Middle East out of
Turkey.
Ms. Jackson Lee. My final words in concluding, let it be
clear to all of the Turkish people listening, we are your
friend. But let us be a friend of equality and let us move
forward together on behalf of the Turkish people and the people
of the United States of America. And I say that to my friends
who are Turkish-Americans as well.
Thank you and I yield back.
Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize for being late, and maybe this question was
already asked, but I think it is worth repeating.
For the entire panel, while many EU countries fear Turkey
is turning its back on Europe and question Turkey's respect for
Europe's democratic culture and Christian heritage, can you
discuss whether you believe Turkey understands the concerns in
light of how they treat the religious and ethnic minorities in
Turkey and northern Cyprus? And are they truly committed to
making the necessary reforms to alleviate these fears and show
greater respect for the rights of these communities?
Moreover, in light of this question, as the EU Foreign
Affairs Chief makes her first visit to Turkey amidst a
crumbling bid for membership, can you discuss how realistic
Turkey's membership in the EU really is? Thank you.
Mr. Lesser. Well, thank you.
I think this is a critical question for a number of
different reasons, in part because we have a very, very strong
stake in Turkey's continued convergence with Europe, sector by
sector, whether it is foreign policy or the economy or it is
human rights. I think if Turkey is off of that path, all of
those things will be much tougher to do.
I used to be optimistic about this. I am somewhat less so
today, because if I look at the way the debate is going in
Turkey, and the way the debate is going in Europe, there is
increasing ambivalence on all sides. And I am afraid we may,
unfortunately, without a lot of effort, wind up with something
that looks like ``privileged partnership,'' as the German
Government and the French have been talking about, rather than
something that looks like full membership.
Final point. I think it is very important that the Turkey
that 10 or 15 years from now could join Europe is not going to
be the same Turkey. It is not going to be the same Europe
either. We have to take that into account when we think about
this problem.
Mr. Rubin. I would just add that I was once very, very
outspoken in favor of Turkey's European Union bid, but I don't
think it is, anymore, realistic. If anything, some of the
events of the last few years will play to the opponents in
Europe who are afraid of Turkey for political or religious
reasons.
And as to the British Prime Minister's recent comments, a
lot of those comments we hear from Britain and other states are
positioning, knowing--the fact that they are made so
outspokenly is more a factor of knowing they will never have to
pay the consequences for it because Turkey will never join the
European Union.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
I have one more question, if I may. The U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom has listed Turkey on its watch
list for the past 2 years. In its April 2010 report, they
documented the persecution of minority religions in Turkey,
including Christians whose churches are not granted legal
status. Both the Greek and Armenian churches are prevented from
training clergy, as you know, in Turkey.
When will religious tolerance and freedom become a reality
in Turkey, in your opinion? For the entire panel.
Mr. Rubin. Shortly before Saudi Arabia gets religious
freedom.
Mr. Cagaptay. I am more optimistic than Dr. Rubin, and this
why I would say the eye has to stay on the ball on EU
accession. If you honestly want Turkey's record as a liberal
democracy to improve, you have to make Turkey's EU accession as
a strategic goal.
Mr. Bilirakis. Anybody else?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. The gentleman has yielded back.
The gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. Berkley, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Ms. Berkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for putting together this remarkable panel. As usual, your
leadership of this committee is astonishing to behold.
Chairman Berman. 7 minutes. Well, 5.
Ms. Berkley. Gentlemen, thank you very much. I don't know
when I have enjoyed or learned more from a panel than this one,
and I appreciate the information. What I would like to do,
since I wasn't here for opening statements, let me make a brief
opening statement so you know where I am coming from, and then
I have some really amazing questions to ask that you will be
delighted to answer.
Over the last few years we have seen Turkey turn sharply
away from the Western world and carry favor with the Iranians
and Hamas, both of whom seek the destruction of our ally,
Israel. They voted against the most recent U.N. sanctions
against Iran, when even China and Russia, not exactly our NATO
allies, voted for them. And Lebanon occupied by Hezbollah,
Iran's proxy, abstained.
In May they sent a flotilla to Gaza to break Israel's self-
defensive blockade of Hamas, creating an international
incident, and, as far as I am concerned, directly caused the
death of nine people that were participating in the flotilla.
Add that to the refusal to acknowledge Armenian genocide, the
continuous and ever more lethal incursions into neighboring
Kurdistan, the treatment of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, and
the extraordinary gall of criticizing Israel for occupying the
Gaza, when they themselves have occupied Cyprus for 36 years.
It is becoming increasingly evident to me that we need to
take a hard look at our relationship with Turkey, reassess
whether it is in our continuing national security interest to
continue it; whether they in fact have our interest in mind,
and whether or not they can continue to be thought of as truly
reliable allies.
I think you can assess from my statement where I am coming
from.
These are my questions that I would like to ask. One is
about EU membership. I chair the Transatlantic Dialogue which
is Congress' ongoing relationship with the European Union
Parliament. The EU has a set of criteria that has to be met
before any country, including Turkey, becomes a member of the
EU.
Do you think that is humanly possible, as long as Turkey
continues to occupy Cyprus? Whoever would like to answer.
Mr. Lesser. Well, the answer to your last question is no,
it is not possible. You know, this is not a negotiation for
membership in the European Union that Turkey is conducting.
They are joining a club, and one of the rules of the club is
that you have to recognize all the members. And this is not
going to change. So a settlement of the Cyprus problem has to
be there.
But let's remember this is a 10- or 15-year problem for
Turkey at best; a lot can happen. But the point you make is
absolutely valid. Without progress on that issue, it is just
not going to happen.
Ms. Berkley. Okay. Another question--this is a very
sensitive, ticklish one, and I am hesitant to even bring it up
publicly--a number of my constituents during the flotilla
crisis came over to me and they said, well, Turkey is getting
signals from the United States that the United States' and
Israel's relationship isn't what it once was; that the
administration is trying to distance itself from Israel; and
consequently there would be no price to pay for Turkey's, I
guess, initiating this crisis.
Do you think that has any validity whatsoever? Because I
don't know what to tell my constituents that approach me with
that, that Turkey kind of felt empowered to do that because
they didn't think that the United States would stand by its
most reliable ally, Israel.
Mr. Rubin. We should recognize there is an intrinsic value
in and of itself to alliances and standing by friends. However,
I would defer to what some of my co-panelists have said; that
the flotilla wasn't an item in isolation; it followed, for
example, a whole trajectory that began with Prime Minister
Erdogan's embrace of Khaled Mashal, the most militant, not just
Hamas leader, but the most militant Hamas leader at the time,
as well as his embrace of Bashal Asad at a very sensitive time
during the revolution.
Mr. Cagaptay. If I may, Congresswoman, and this would also
allow me to clarify an earlier comment about what Islamism is.
I know Congressman Delahunt has left, but he will get a copy of
our remarks.
To me the flotilla incident is part of the----
Chairman Berman. I am sorry. I'm going to have to interrupt
you. The time has expired.
Ms. Berkley. That 7 minutes promised didn't mean anything?
Chairman Berman. No, that was just a gesture. I took that
away really quickly.
Ms. Berkley. Oh. Thank you, gentlemen, very much.
Chairman Berman. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly,
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, again, welcome
to the panel.
You know, listening to some of the rhetoric here, one might
forget that this is an important relationship at stake between
the United States and Turkey irrespective of what problems
there may be. No relationship is problem free. Some of those
problems are serious and some are irritants.
Mr. Ambassador, you were the Ambassador to Turkey. Is there
a strategic nature to the relationship between Turkey and the
United States?
Ambassador Wilson. Yes, sir, I believe that there is. I
think that is appreciated in Washington. I believe it is
appreciated in Ankara by Turkish officials, certainly, in the
Foreign Ministry, in the military and in the government.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Ambassador, do we have a military base in
Turkey?
Ambassador Wilson. Yes. Well, we have a presence at
Incirlik Air Base and also a smaller presence in Izmir.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Ambassador, are there Turkish troops in
Afghanistan next to American troops?
Ambassador Wilson. Yes, sir. Approximately 1,700 at
present.
Mr. Connolly. Is that a new phenomenon? Turkey has never
done that before, has it?
Ambassador Wilson. Turkey has been present in Afghanistan--
--
Mr. Connolly. No, no, no. I am asking a different question.
Has Turkey ever placed troops in other conflicts in which the
United States found itself?
Ambassador Wilson. Yes, sir. Of course, Korea.
Mr. Connolly. Korea. How many years ago was that?
Ambassador Wilson. 55.
Mr. Connolly. Is Turkey a member of NATO?
Ambassador Wilson. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Was that pretty important during the Cold War
to the United States' strategic interest?
Ambassador Wilson. Yes, it was.
Mr. Connolly. Does Turkey share one of the largest borders
with Iran? That is to say, if you look at bordering states,
isn't Turkey's largest single border with Iran?
Ambassador Wilson. I would expect that Iraq probably has
the longest border. But it is a significant border, yes.
Mr. Connolly. A very significant border. So they are
neighbors.
Ambassador Wilson. Yes, they are.
Mr. Connolly. So, for example, if there were military
incursion, God forbid, involving Iran, Turkey would
necessarily, given its proximity to Iran, somehow be--it
certainly would not be unaffected?
Ambassador Wilson. Turkey would certainly be on the front
lines.
Mr. Connolly. So it might be reasonable to expect Turkey
has its own point of view about that relationship and what
ought to be done about it, even taking into account your point
that they certainly do not want Iran to become a nuclear power?
Ambassador Wilson. Correct.
Mr. Connolly. Is Turkey a flourishing democracy?
Ambassador Wilson. Turkey is a democracy; like many
countries, it is a developing one.
Mr. Connolly. Competitive party situation from an electoral
point of view?
Ambassador Wilson. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Historically, has Turkey had a strategic
relationship or what could be viewed as a positive
relationship, if not a strategic, within with the state of
Israel?
Ambassador Wilson. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Has it played any kind of role behind the
scenes, or more prominently, in trying to possibly affect the
peace process since the founding of the State of Israel?
Ambassador Wilson. With respect to the peace process, I
don't have personal knowledge. I know that Turkey tried to be
helpful in securing the release of Corporal Shalit and on some
other detainee or hostage issues.
Mr. Connolly. Historically, has Turkey had diplomatic
relationships with the State of Israel?
Ambassador Wilson. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Has it recognized the right of the State of
Israel to exist within peaceful borders?
Ambassador Wilson. Yes, it does.
Mr. Connolly. Moving forward, does Turkey still wish to
become a member of the European Union?
Ambassador Wilson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. Is it in the United States' interest that
that happen?
Ambassador Wilson. I believe it is.
Mr. Connolly. When you were an ambassador, what were your
instructions from the State Department with respect to that
issue?
Ambassador Wilson. To encourage the Turkish authorities to
take all the steps that they needed to, to make a credible bid
for EU accession and to encourage the EU governments through
their representatives in Ankara to work with Turkey toward that
end.
Mr. Connolly. Turkey is a Muslim majority population
overwhelmingly; is that correct?
Ambassador Wilson. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. Is there another model in the Muslim world of
a secular democratic form of government?
Ambassador Wilson. There is no other country in the Muslim
majority world that has a secular democracy.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. Indonesia might want to disagree.
Mr. Rubin. So would Mali, which is ranked above Turkey by
Freedom House.
Chairman Berman. Mali can't have as many people as Turkey.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, since I have 12 seconds, Mali
and Indonesia, the modern State of Turkey was founded how many
years ago Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador Wilson. About 85.
Mr. Connolly. By Ataturk.
Ambassador Wilson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. How long have the democracies in Indonesia
and Mali been in operation?
Ambassador Wilson. I can't speak to Mali.
Mr. Connolly. Or the secular--I guess I am particularly
interested in the secular aspect.
Ambassador Wilson. Can't speak to Mali. Indonesia's current
politics I think date somewhere from the late 1980s.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Chairman Berman. Time of the gentleman has expired.
And the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutch, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
assembling this panel.
I wanted to circle back, Ambassador, to a comment you made
about--if I understood correctly--the Turks are more concerned
about a possible war with Iran, the nuclear weapons with Iran.
And I would like to expand a broader discussion of those
relations with Iran and the ultimate goal of the Turkish
Government.
How important are the relations? And in light of the
broader geopolitical issues surrounding Iran and its quest for
nuclear weapons, Turkey having voted against the Security
Council resolution because of its relationship with Iran,
raises other concerns.
If you could speak--and I actually throw this open to the
panel--if you could speak some to the broader implications of
that relationship and whether it is merely an attempt to
continue to have a safe border; whether there is some greater
concern that others might have when Ahmadinejad--given the
relationship with Ahmadinejad and others. If you could speak to
that relationship, and I then I have a follow-up with the
relationship with Mashal and Hamas.
Ambassador Wilson. I think one important thing is Turkey
borders on Iran. They are neighbors. They have to cooperate
with Iran in a way that a lot of others do not. Turkey regards
Iran as a problematic country; they have been rivals in the
region for hundreds of years.
They are, I think, concerned about rising Iranian influence
in the region which they believe is largely driven by the
United States' invasion of Iraq and the events that followed,
as well as by the ongoing stalemate between Israel and the
Palestinians. They regard that influence and Iranian action as
counter to their interest. I think there is a dynamic there
that is probably generally underestimated.
As I said earlier, I think their priority with respect to
the nuclear issue has obviously been somewhat more tilted to
the negotiations track than to anything else. Public opinion
plays a factor there. It is a fact that the legacy of the Iraq
weapons of mass destruction intelligence failures have an
effect in Turkey, both on the public, and also in the military
and across the board among Turkey's elite; great doubt about
the accuracy of Western information here. That is a problem
that one has to work on.
But it leads Turks I think largely to conclude that they
fear the consequences of war, which looks to them like the
obvious alternative to the possible Iranian acquisition of
nuclear weapons. They fear that former a lot more, and they are
determined to turn over every leaf, obviously going somewhat
beyond where American policy would like for them to go, to turn
over a leaf to try to make that not happen.
On the Security Council vote----
Mr. Deutch. If I may. I just want to follow up on the
legacy of weapons of mass destruction argument in Iraq and
why--I want to understand the relevancy of that with respect to
Iran, given the knowledge that we have about the Iranian
nuclear program. Why is that the relative comparison? And I
would open this up to others in the panel who might have
thoughts.
Ambassador Wilson. I am interpreting Turkish thinking and
what Turks tell me. But almost to a man, in officialdom and
outside of officialdom, they believe that the intelligence or
the information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was
exaggerated and turned out not to be entirely be
deg.true.
Mr. Deutch. Dr. Rubin.
Mr. Rubin. Yes. With regard to the WMD issue, that is
partly a failing of U.S. public diplomacy, because the
information coming with regard to Iran is a result of IAEA
inspections and Iran declarations, rather than super secret
intelligence.
With regard to Turkey and Iran, Turkey cooperates with Iran
with far more enthusiasm than any other of Iran's neighbors.
And lastly, with the exception of Iraq--lastly, Ahmadinijad
doesn't stand with the Iranian people. He was one--Erdogan was
one of the first leaders to recognize Ahmadinijad's reelection
back in June 2009 at a time when Ahmadinijad was massacring the
Iranian people. It seems that Erdogan is more pro-Islamic
Republic of Iran than he is pro-Iran.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you. I yield back Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Berman. All time of all people has expired, and I
am going to resist the irresistible urge--well, at the behest
of the ranking member, I would just like to raise one issue and
if anybody--it is not really a question, it is more of a
response to something you just said, Ambassador.
It is hard--I met the Foreign Minister of Turkey several
times. This is a very bright and sophisticated guy. I don't
know what the people of Turkey think, but I don't--I can't buy
that the leadership of Turkey is hugely skeptical of what
Iran's intentions are in the wake of Qom, in the wake of how
they pulled back from the October 1st deal, in the wake of the
IAEA findings and reports, all far more extensive and manifest
than was Iraq in the early part of this decade.
This isn't a U.S. play; this is a pretty internationally
accepted thing. So I just wanted to--all kinds of reasons, and
legitimate ones, they may not like our approach and all that
stuff. But I don't buy that they don't think there is a basis
for the conclusion Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon.
All right, I guess I had the last word, unless somebody
else wants it. Thank you all. This has really been a very
interesting panel.
All of you, nothing about my last comment should diminish
my appreciation for your testimony and all of your testimonies.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.
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Pence statement deg.
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Faleomavaega statement deg.
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Connolly statement deg.
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