[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WORKING WITH COMMUNITIES TO DISRUPT TERROR PLOTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION
SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 17, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-58
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mark E. Souder, Indiana
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Daniel E. Lungren, California
Columbia Mike Rogers, Alabama
Zoe Lofgren, California Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Henry Cuellar, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Laura Richardson, California Pete Olson, Texas
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Steve Austria, Ohio
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Eric J.J. Massa, New York
Dina Titus, Nevada
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
Jane Harman, California, Chair
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Al Green, Texas Mark E. Souder, Indiana
James A. Himes, Connecticut Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Vacancy Officio)
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex
Officio)
Michael Blinde, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Meghann Peterlin, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California, and Chair, Subcommittee on Intelligence,
Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment............. 1
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 4
WITNESSES
Panel I
Ms. Margo Schlanger, Officer for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Brett Hovington, Supervisory Special Agent, Head of Community
Relations Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Leroy Baca, Sheriff, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Mr. Omar Alomari, Community Engagement Officer, Ohio Department
of Safety, Homeland Security Division:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Panel II
Mr. Mohamed Elibiary, Co-founder, The Freedom and Justice
Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 46
Prepared Statement............................................. 48
Ms. Deborah A. Ramirez, Executive Director, Partnering for
Prevention and Community Safety Initiative, Northeastern
University School of Law:
Oral Statement................................................. 53
Prepared Statement............................................. 54
Mr. Clark Kent Ervin, Director, Aspen Institute Homeland Security
Program:
Oral Statement................................................. 62
Prepared Statement............................................. 64
WORKING WITH COMMUNITIES TO DISRUPT TERROR PLOTS
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Wednesday, March 17, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and
Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Jane Harman [Chair
of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Harman, Thompson, Carney, Clarke,
Richardson, Green, Himes, McCaul, Dent, and Souder.
Ms. Harman [presiding]. Good morning. The subcommittee
hearing will come to order.
We are meeting today to hear how Government, law
enforcement officials, community engagement advocates, and
academic experts are working with communities to counter
violent extremism. Today's hearing is entitled ``Working with
Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots.''
This subcommittee has been probing ways to prevent or
disrupt terror plots in the United States. Doing so requires
accurate, actionable, and timely intelligence. The best
intelligence, the best warning we may have about individuals
plotting an attack on our country, comes from people close to
them.
While there have been recent notable cases where families
and neighbors have provided important information, the Federal,
State, and local governments have to do more to build
relationships based on mutual trust and critical communities.
There are more and more examples of homegrown violent
extremism. Think Fort Dix or Fort Hood, the Somali youths from
Minnesota, Sharif Mobley, the U.S. citizen who tried to escape
custody in Yemen, or the recent arrest of ``Jihad Jane'' which
we learned about last week.
I have been warning for years that the next terror attack
on the United States could be carried out by a tiny blond-
haired, blue-eyed American female--no, not me. So the question
we are considering today is how to build better relationships.
There has been some good news. Last fall it was a Muslim
American advocacy group who alerted the FBI to five young men
from northern Virginia who had traveled to Pakistan with the
intention of fighting alongside the Taliban. It can't have been
easy for the families to turn their sons in, but they did.
Don't forget that the first real inkling we had about the
would-be Detroit bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, came from
his father.
We will hear from one of our witnesses that some in the
communities believe that the Government doesn't really want a
respectful relationship. It just wants those communities to
inform the FBI on their friends and neighbors. He will tell us
they feel like a suspect pool rather than trusted partners.
That is a perception that needs to be addressed, and I look
forward to hearing the views of our witness from the FBI on
that.
Local cops may be in a better position than the Feds to
forge real ties based on respect and mutual trust, and they
also are far more familiar with their communities and will
notice something strange.
After all, it was the Torrance, California police
department in my own district that figured out that a string of
gas station robberies was connected to a terror plot to target
military installations and religious sites just a few years
ago. Those folks are serving long sentences in jail.
From what I understand, there is no set of best practices
that tell homeland security or law enforcement officials how
they should and can engage with communities. A one-size-fits-
all approach may not work. We may need to tailor our efforts to
the communities involved and the missions of the agencies
reaching out to them.
To that end, my sheriff, L.A. County sheriff, Leroy Baca,
will testify today. He started the first Muslim American
Homeland Security Congress to give the community a chance to
discuss their concerns with law enforcement and to improve
cultural training for sheriff department staff. I would like to
know whether any elements of that program could be migrated to
the Federal and State level.
On the State level, there is an effort in Ohio to reach out
to Muslim American women that we need to hear about.
At the Federal level, DHS is hosting round tables and
discussions with communities across the country. It conducts
conference calls between Federal leaders and affected
communities after situations like the Fort Hood shooting and
the Detroit airliner bomber attempt.
Today's hearing follows one held in December to delve into
how people who seem like anyone else--those who are capable of
interacting socially with friends and colleagues and in many
ways are athletes and scholars--volunteer or can be recruited
to violent extremism.
We don't understand that well enough, and until we do, we
won't have the best strategies to keep our country and our
communities safe.
Let me conclude by observing that there has been a lot of
discussion about how best to combat terrorism. The loudest
voices say we have to treat it as a war. We all want the
country to be safe. But in my view, the bad guys win if we
shred our Constitution in the process.
Welcome to you all, and it is now my pleasure to yield 5
minutes for opening remarks to the Ranking Member, Mr. McCaul
of Texas.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Examples like Hasan, Zazi, and ``Jihad Jane,'' which no one
should ever confuse with you, Madam Chair, showed us homegrown
terrorism is, unfortunately, all too real in the United States.
Despite the efforts of our Federal, State, and local
authorities to reach out to religious and civic leaders in the
Muslim community, we do not seem to be making the headway
necessary to counter radicalization.
In fact, as the recent case of Zazi illustrates, working
with the local imam actually backfired on law enforcement when
he alerted Zazi that he was under Government surveillance.
The threat of al-Qaeda is not just emanating from a
training camp in Afghanistan anymore but from within our own
communities and hometowns across America.
Since September 11 we have come to understand that securing
the homeland requires law enforcement involvement at every
level of government and that every American has a role and
responsibility to help in this fight.
After both the massacre at Fort Hood just north of my
district by Hasan, and again recently with ``Jihad Jane'' from
Pennsylvania, we hear after-the-fact reports that classmates
and neighbors knew that there was a problem with these
individuals.
Working with our communities should be the first line of
defense to prevent the spread of radicalization and to help
protect us all from terrorist attacks. The criticism we often
hear of Government outreach is that they are just discussion
groups solely intended to listen to grievances or to just share
information.
Far less often, we hear about our efforts to create equal
partnerships between the Government and these communities.
Certainly, both information sharing and addressing legitimate
grievances, are vital.
However, I hope in your testimony today you also discuss
what your organizations are doing to help foster true
partnerships with equal accountability between these players.
We must be working together to identify and implement real
solutions to counter radical violent ideology and prevent
terrorism. I look forward to hearing from you about what your
solutions are.
We must also ensure a diversity of thought at the table.
For instance, who are we partnering and engaging with? Are we
strengthening our relationships with those moderate Muslims who
may already be doing their part, or are we primarily, if not
only, engaging with groups that have the loudest voices or
perhaps even extremist ties?
I hope that through this hearing we will understand which,
if any, groups may be underrepresented in each outreach effort.
I hope the witnesses will please give that some thought.
While our European counterparts have been dealing with the
threat of radicalization and violent extremism for some time
now, I think we can all agree that the problem is now in the
United States as well.
Western European nations are ahead of the United States, in
my judgment, in community outreach strategies and in disrupting
terror plots because they realize the importance of combating
radicalization, and they know they cannot arrest their way out
of the problem.
The success of our European allies in engaging local
religious, business, and community leaders has direct links to
reporting and disrupting terrorist attacks.
I hope that in your testimony today you will address not
only your efforts to understand and incorporate best practices
from around the world, and perhaps right in the United States,
but also how you have learned from failed programs or missteps.
Without an organized and concerted effort by Federal,
State, and local officials to directly confront the issues of
radicalization and the spread of violent extremism in our own
communities, we will be derelict in our duty of preventing
future terrorist attacks.
As the past year has shown us, domestic radicalization is a
very real threat in our National security. I look forward to
the testimony of the witnesses and to examining these--these
vital issues.
With that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
It is now my pleasure to recognize the Chairman of the full
committee, Mr. Thompson from Mississippi, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
This committee is very focused on ensuring that American
citizens can live their lives in safety and without fear.
Terrorists both international and domestic, both foreign-born
and homegrown, want nothing more than to shatter our security
and make us fearful.
Thanks to the work of our dedicated homeland security and
law enforcement professionals, with the guidance of this
administration and the careful oversight of this committee, we
can have confidence in our security.
As we have seen in just the past years, cases like Zazi,
Headley, and Rana, we can stop terrorist plots dead in their
tracks. Yet stopping terrorist plots is only one piece of
freeing our fellow Americans from fear.
Freedom from fear also means that people should not fear
their Government and, in particular, should not fear the
homeland security and law enforcement organizations that are
working to provide their security.
Community engagement efforts offer other ways of freeing us
from fear. For example, community engagement efforts can vary
widely. Many focus on helping communities understand homeland
security or law enforcement policies, practices, and methods.
Others help those who execute these policies and methods
interact respectfully with the communities with which they
deal.
Fostering this kind of understanding is a sure way to
develop--free communities from fear. It develops trust with law
enforcement, confidence that they are also being protected, and
a sense of participation and engagement.
Individuals should also be free from fear that they are
subject to homeland security or law enforcement scrutiny
because of the color of their skin or their religion.
We need look no further than the recent example of Colleen
LaRose, also known as ``Jihad Jane''--and it is not our Chair;
I agree with the comments of both the Chair and Ranking
Member--to know that terrorists cannot simply be identified by
gender, race, or national origin.
We have learned that lesson hard, that terrorists do not
fit the particular type. Terrorism does not always look the
same. Terrorists are not always the usual suspects.
Community engagement also helps free individuals from fear
because it creates a critical dialogue between our homeland
security and law enforcement agencies and individuals to help
protect and preserve civil rights and civil liberties.
For that reason, I am particularly pleased that Margo
Schlanger, the newly appointed DHS Office of Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties secretary, is here for her maiden Congressional
appearance to speak about her community engagement work.
I hope you and your colleagues on this panel today will
highlight how your agencies' community engagements work to free
our citizens from the fear that privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties play second fiddle to homeland security and law
enforcement efforts to root out terrorists.
Thank all the witnesses for appearing before us today, and
I look forward to your testimony.
Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that under
the committee rules opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
I now welcome our first panel of witnesses this morning and
our first witness, Ms. Schlanger, for her rookie appearance. I
didn't know that.
Let me introduce you all at once and then each of you will
summarize your testimony in 5 minutes.
Ms. Schlanger is the officer for civil rights and civil
liberties at the Department of Homeland Security, as the
Chairman said. She took this position on January 25 of this
year. Her office is responsible for supporting DHS' efforts to
secure the Nation from threats while preserving our freedoms
and equality under the law.
Prior to her appointment, Ms. Schlanger was a professor of
law at a number of universities, including Michigan, Washington
University, and Harvard. She served as a law clerk for Supreme
Court justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg from 1993 to 1995 and then
worked as a trial attorney in the U.S. Civil Rights Division of
the Department of Justice.
Our second witness, Mr. Hovington, is a 23-year veteran of
the FBI and currently serves as the unit chief of the Community
Relations Unit at the FBI's Office of Public Affairs. In this
position, he manages the community outreach program and
oversees outreach efforts conducted by all 56 FBI field
offices.
In addition, Mr. Hovington oversees the FBI Citizens'
Academy program, advises senior executives on community
outreach issues and represents the FBI at National functions
and initiatives related to outreach.
My sheriff, Lee Baca, began his law enforcement career when
he entered the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department in 1965,
before the rest of us were born, ultimately rising through the
ranks until he was elected sheriff in December 1998. He is now
serving his third term.
Sheriff Baca commands the largest sheriff's department in
the United States. He leads over 18,000 officers and
professional staff in the department which protects over 4
million people--very well, I might add. Sheriff Baca is also
the director of Homeland Security Mutual Aid for California
District 1.
In August 2007 Sheriff Baca established the Muslim
Community Affairs Unit to train the Muslim community on law
enforcement issues and to train the officers on Muslim
culture--important point. This is a two-way committee. A lot is
learned by the sheriff's department from the engagement with
this community.
Mr. Alomari, our fourth witness, is the community
engagement officer at the Ohio Department of Public Safety
Homeland Security Division. Under his direction Ohio has
initiated numerous programs to facilitate interaction with
large ethnic communities, including the growing Somali
population in Ohio.
Prior to serving in this position, Mr. Alomari worked as a
professor at several institutions of higher learning across
Ohio, including Ohio State, where he was a lecturer in Islam
and Middle Eastern cultures.
Without objection, your full statements will be inserted in
the record, but I would urge you to summarize in 5 minutes or
less, and you will hear my little gavel if you start to go
over. It is important for us to be able to ask you questions. I
think that is more useful for you and for the public that is
both sitting here and listening in to this hearing. There is an
enormous amount of interest in this hearing.
So I want to thank you again and recognize Ms. Schlanger
for 5 minutes.
Please turn on your microphone.
STATEMENT OF MARGO SCHLANGER, OFFICER FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Schlanger. Thank you. Sorry. It is a sign that I am a
rookie.
Chair Harman, Chairman Thompson, Ranking Member McCaul and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today as the Department of
Homeland Security's officer for civil rights and civil
liberties.
As you request, my testimony will be about DHS' engagement
with diverse ethnic and religious communities and I will focus
on my office's activities, although activities happen
throughout the Department. I will give particular attention to
the outreach and communication with American, Arab, Muslim,
Sikh, Somali, and South Asian communities.
Congress established my position, reporting directly to the
Secretary, to--and I am quoting from our statute--``ensure that
the protection of civil rights and civil liberties is
appropriately incorporated into Department programs and
activities and to review and assess information concerning
abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, and profiling on the
basis of race, ethnicity, or religion by employees or officials
of the Department.''
My testimony is basically to say that both of these
functions are improved by and even depend upon our engagement
with diverse communities. Our engagement efforts involve
encouraging all Americans in many ethnicities, religions, and
so on to take an active role in their Government, to ensure
that the Government is responsive to and protects the rights of
all Americans.
I want to be clear that this kind of engagement, soliciting
the views and explaining policies from communities seeking to
address complaints and grievances, is a basic part of good and
responsible Government.
I do believe that our activities contribute to the
Department's mission of countering violent extremism. But the
linkage is indirect. We can and should collaborate with
community leaders to address this shared problem. But
countering violent extremism isn't the main reason that we
engage these communities, and it is--it is not really the lens
through which we view the engagement.
The point of the engagement is the primary mission of
making sure that we communicate with and to and hear from these
kinds of communities, opening up channels of communication.
The Department continues to evaluate what other activities
it can undertake to counter violent extremism, and my office
plays a key role in that policy discussion.
The work that we do with American, Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and
South Asian communities is, therefore, part and parcel of a
much broader effort. But this particular engagement is
structured as follows.
We have community leader roundtables in eight cities around
the country, and we facilitate broad Government and community
representation at those round tables. This is a big category of
activities for my office. We convene about 30 of these meetings
each year.
The meetings provide opportunities for community leaders to
learn about significant Government policies, to raise specific
issues of concern, and it is in a format that promotes
accountability for answers. The Government participants will be
back again the following quarter.
For our engagement efforts to be sustainable, it is
important that the grievances be heard, and so we collect
inquiries and issues from the communities in advance, and we
make sure that we have the right people at the table to talk
about them. We bring back what we learn to Department
leadership.
We also run youth roundtables. There are fewer of these,
and they are not--they are less geographically based. It is a
newer initiative but a very important one in light of recent
trends in domestic radicalization and domestic violence. We
have some events related to this coming up next week, for
example, that are--that involve people--young people on
campuses in Chicago.
We also run something that was referred to earlier, a rapid
response communication network, which we call the Incident
Community Coordination Team. This is a conference call
mechanism to be able to quickly speak to community leaders
involving Federal officials and the community leaders in the
event of a situation where such contact might be productive.
The people we speak to are people who can contact and share
information with their communities and perhaps assist law
enforcement as things unfold.
We also promote hand-in-hand with the FBI, for whom--which
we are very grateful for, a prestigious law enforcement
internship called the National Security Internship for Arabic-
speaking college students and graduates so that they can come
and feel that there is a place for them in the FBI and in DHS.
That is a very successful--small but successful program.
There are millions of American Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, South
Asians living in thousands of towns and cities, so by necessity
Government engagement with these communities is going to have
to be local.
So we also facilitate and use--and build capacity for local
engagement. We look for information on best practices, and we
conduct live and video-based training across the country of
State and local law enforcement partners.
This covers both cultural competency relating to American
Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities and some--and a
developing piece of it, something that we hope to really do
more with, is a best practices approach to community
interaction and outreach. This kind of work is strongly
supported by the administration.
I see I am nearly out of time, so I will just say the one
thing that I am going to add to this mix, although I am going
to augment a few of them, is that we want to do frequent issue-
specific engagement efforts.
We had our first such event last week bringing together
religious leaders from many communities to talk about advanced
imaging. Thank you.
[The statement of Ms. Schlanger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Margo Schlanger
March 17, 2010
INTRODUCTION
Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today as the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) for
the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS). At your
request, my testimony will be about DHS's engagement with diverse
ethnic and religious communities, focusing on my office's activities
and giving particular attention to our outreach and communication with
American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, Somali, and South Asian communities. Other
offices within DHS--the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, the
Transportation Security Administration, the Office of Policy, and
others--have not only participated in CRCL's engagement activities but
also run their own events with these communities. But CRCL's program in
this area is the most extensive, and my testimony will emphasize CRCL's
activities.
Congress established my position, reporting directly to the
Secretary, to, among other things, ``assist the Secretary,
directorates, and offices of the Department to develop, implement, and
periodically review Department policies and procedures to ensure that
the protection of civil rights and civil liberties is appropriately
incorporated into Department programs and activities,'' and to ``review
and assess information concerning abuses of civil rights, civil
liberties, and profiling on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion,
by employees and officials of the Department.'' 6 U.S.C. 345(a). Both
of these functions are improved by--even depend upon--our engagement
with diverse communities.
Our engagement efforts involve encouraging all Americans to take an
active role in their Government, and ensuring that the Government is
responsive to and protects the rights of all Americans. I want to be
clear that engaging communities--soliciting their views, explaining our
policies, and seeking to address any complaints or grievances they may
have--is a basic part of good and responsible Government. Although our
activities do contribute to the Department's mission of countering
violent extremism; the linkage is indirect. Although we can and should
collaborate with community leaders to address this shared problem,
``countering violent extremism'' is neither the principal reason we
engage these communities nor the lens through which we view this
engagement. The Department continues to evaluate what other activities
it can engage in to counter violent extremism, and my office plays a
key role in that on-going policy discussion. I would also like to note
that my office has no operational role in disrupting terror plots, and
our engagement activities do not involve source development or
intelligence collection.
Since starting in my position at DHS on Jan, 25, 2010, I have led a
roundtable bringing together American Muslim, Arab, Sikh, Somali, and
South Asian leaders from around the country with officials from DHS and
the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), for a very enlightening
discussion about the threat posed to those communities by terrorist
attempts to recruit their members. The next day the Secretary's
Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) hosted a session, in which I
participated, with the same leaders about building a rapid response
information network to communicate with the community partners in the
event of an attack. Secretary Napolitano joined us for an hour-long
question-and-answer session and lent her public support to on-going
dialogue involving the Department's senior leadership. I also led the
DHS delegation to a bi-monthly National roundtable involving American
Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian leaders sponsored by the Department
of Justice (DOJ) and chaired local roundtables in Chicago and Detroit
involving community leaders and numerous Federal agencies. In addition,
I put together a session for Transportation Security Administration
officials and Jewish, Christian, and Muslim religious leaders to
discuss Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) scanning machines and
religious physical modesty prescriptions. I will also participate in
what is known as the Transatlantic Initiative, a bi-national exchange
involving British and American Pakistani and Muslim communities and
their governments; my office is the U.S. interagency lead on this
initiative.
Gatherings like these provide an excellent opportunity for
government officials and their agencies to learn about the concerns of
diverse communities. The community leaders we engage with likewise
learn useful information--for example, our Chicago meeting included
presentations on the privacy protections included as part of TSA's use
of AIT scanners and on CBP's ``Trusted Traveler'' program, which
facilitates expedited international travel for pre-approved, low-risk
travelers through dedicated lanes and kiosks.
This kind of work is strongly supported by the administration,
including DHS leadership. Secretary Napolitano has established open and
responsive Government as a top priority for DHS, and these efforts
align closely with that priority. As she explained in 2009, in written
testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, ``It is important to note that such engagement
with the many key groups with which CRCL holds dialogues--such as Arab
and Somali American communities, as well as Muslim and Sikh leaders--is
important in and of itself as a matter of civil rights protection and
smart, effective law enforcement. But by helping communities more fully
engage with their government, DHS is also preempting alienation and
creating buy-in to the broader shared responsibility of homeland
security.''
Our engagement efforts build crucial channels of communication,
both educating us about the concerns of communities affected by DHS
activities and giving those communities reliable information about
policies and procedures. They build trust by facilitating resolution of
legitimate grievances; they reinforce a sense of shared American
identity and community; and they demonstrate the collective ownership
of the homeland security project. I thank you for the opportunity to
share with you our extensive work in this area.
THE DHS OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) carries
out four key functions to integrate civil rights and civil liberties
into Department activities:
Advising Department leadership, personnel, and partners
about civil rights and civil liberties issues, ensuring respect
for civil rights and civil liberties in policy decisions and
implementation of those decisions.
Communicating with individuals and communities whose civil
rights and civil liberties may be affected by Department
activities, informing them about policies and avenues of
redress, and promoting appropriate attention within the
Department to their experiences and concerns.
Investigating and resolving civil rights and civil liberties
complaints filed by the public.
Leading the Department's equal employment opportunity
programs and promoting personnel diversity and merit system
principles.
ENGAGEMENT AND OUTREACH
CRCL devotes substantial effort to engage a variety of diverse
ethnic and religious communities. The work we do with American Arab,
Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities is part and parcel of a much
broader effort to ensure that all communities in this country are, and
feel, active participants in the homeland security effort. An example
is our engagement efforts related to DHS immigration and border
security policies. We hold quarterly meetings with a broad-based non-
governmental organization (NGO) coalition of National civil rights and
immigrant-rights organizations; have established an inter-agency
Immigrant Worker Roundtable to bring together DHS components, other
Federal agencies, and NGOs; and facilitate an immigration Incident
Coordination Call, which provides immigrant community leaders with
vital information about CBP and ICE enforcement posture during
emergencies. In the past it has been used only to prevent loss of life
by encouraging immigrant communities to evacuate dangerous areas during
hurricanes by alleviating undue fear of enforcement. We also
participate in engagement activities of other DHS components; over the
past several months, for example, my staff served as the designated
facilitators for extended stakeholder meetings about CBP's Southwest
Border activities. We carry out the same types of efforts in non-
immigration areas as well; for example participated in a workshop last
week for faith-based and community groups involved in disaster response
and recovery.
Engagement Activities with American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South
Asian Communities.--CRCL is far from the only DHS office that conducts
outreach efforts involving Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian
communities. To provide just a few examples, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), has held Naturalization Information
Sessions in these communities, and has published its guide ``Welcome to
the United States'' in 14 languages, including Arabic, Urdu, and
Somali; officials from the Office of Policy and the Office of
Intergovernmental Affairs have met repeatedly with members of these
communities as well.
But CRCL is the Office within DHS that conducts the most extensive
outreach efforts involving the many Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian
communities across the Nation. We structure these engagement efforts
with several types of regular events or programs: community leader
roundtables; youth roundtables; a rapid response communication network;
and promotion of a prestigious law enforcement internship for Arabic-
speaking college students and graduates.
CRCL's activities serve as a model for constructive engagement
between these communities and Government, and we strive to facilitate
and build capacity for further local engagement. Several other DHS
components, as well as States, regional fusion centers, and local
governments already also conduct outreach and engagement with these
communities--we have learned from each other's experiences and want to
encourage these efforts where they are not already occurring.
Of course, as with all outreach efforts, the Government must be
careful to choose constructive leaders to partner with, and, by the
same token, community members are careful to meet with Government
officials who they believe will be reliable partners responsive to
legitimate concerns.
Roundtables.--First, over the past 4 years, CRCL has established
regular roundtable meetings for community and Government leaders in
eight regions across the country: Detroit, Houston, Chicago, Boston,
Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Columbus (Ohio), and Washington, DC. In
addition, CRCL has developed relationships with Somali American leaders
in San Diego, Seattle, and Lewiston (Maine), and includes them in the
regular roundtables where possible and in bi-monthly community
conference calls. These locations have diverse Muslim, Arab, Sikh, and
Somali communities, and we have nurtured broad community participation.
These roundtable events include not just our office, but also DHS
components relevant to the issues placed on the agenda by our community
partners, most often U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
Government participation also includes U.S. Attorneys' Offices, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), State and local law enforcement,
and other Federal and local officials.
The roundtables cover a range of homeland security, civil rights,
and other areas. With the assistance of our Federal and local
Government partners, sessions have canvassed (in no particular order):
Rules governing remittances to foreign relatives; immigration and
naturalization policies; access to information about basic Government
services in different languages; roles and responsibilities of law
enforcement; detention of National security suspects; how Government
can work with communities to promote civic engagement; services for
newly-arrived refugees; crime prevention; how communities can work with
Government to counter violent extremism; protection of civil rights in
employment, voting, housing, and other areas; prosecution of hate
crimes; and border searches.
The meetings provide opportunities for community leaders to learn
about significant Government policies, as well as to raise specific
issues of concern in a format that emphasizes accountability for
answers--the Government participants will be back again the following
quarter. For our engagement efforts to be sustainable, it is important
that the grievances of these communities be heard by policy decision-
makers, so we collect inquiries and issues from the communities and
keep senior leadership apprised of the impact of DHS policy and
operations. In addition, at the Secretary's request, two DHS Assistant
Secretaries have personally attended a number of recent roundtables,
and they will attend others in the future.
Youth roundtables.--Young leaders and youth organizations offer
different perspectives than older community leaders. For this reason,
CRCL has hosted four ``Roundtables on Security and Liberty'' in
Washington, DC; Houston; and Los Angeles to connect with 150 young
leaders ages 18-25 from American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian
communities. These events offer opportunities for youth to share their
thoughts with senior DHS leadership and for Government officials to
learn from a population whose perspectives are invaluable to homeland
security efforts.
Incident Community Coordination Team.--Government contact with
Muslim, Arab, Sikh, Somali and South Asian community leaders in the
hours and days after an incident can be extraordinarily helpful,
because community leaders can calm tensions, share information with
their communities, and perhaps assist law enforcement. Accordingly, my
office has established the Incident Community Coordination Team (ICCT).
This conference call mechanism connects Federal officials with key
leaders in the event of a situation in which contact would be
productive. DHS participant components and offices include TSA, ICE,
CBP, USCIS, the Office of Public Affairs, and the Office of
Intelligence & Analysis. We are joined by the White House Office of
Public Engagement, the DOJ Civil Rights Division, the FBI, the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the Department of State, among
others. Community participants include representatives of National
organizations, community leaders from key cities, and religious and
cultural scholars.
Our ICCT has been used seven times since we established it in 2006,
and has been an effective device in several ways:
It allows participating agencies to get community leaders
the information they need in the aftermath of an incident. The
information shared--which is not classified or restricted--is
valuable because of its reliability and timeliness.
It gives community leaders a channel to speak to Federal
officials in a timely and effective way. They can share
reactions to Governmental policies or enforcement actions, and
provide information about hate crimes that should be
investigated, about the mood of communities in the aftermath of
a homeland security incident and, possibly, about how the
Government might improve its effectiveness in investigating the
incident.
It facilitates development of a common understanding about
the messages that Government and community leaders will send to
these communities, the country, and the world.
Most recently, the ICCT was convened after the Fort Hood incident
in November 2009, and after the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines
Flight No. 253 in December 2009. Representatives from DHS, the White
House, DOJ's Civil Rights Division, NCTC, Department of Defense,
Department of State, and the FBI provided briefings to community
leaders, giving them information they could share with their
communities. Community leaders had an opportunity to ask questions and
share reactions to the events.
National Security Internship Program.--In 2007, in partnership with
the FBI, my office established the National Security Internship Program
to bring Arabic-speaking college students to Washington, DC to intern
for a summer at DHS or the FBI, and concurrently improve their Arabic
language skills at the George Washington University. Successful interns
are encouraged to apply for permanent jobs at DHS or the FBI. This
program brings people with both language and cultural skills to
Government's policy, law enforcement, and intelligence offices. This
internship program is an important part of the partnership between
Government and the Arab American and Muslim American communities.
Facilitating Local Engagement
There are millions of American Arabs, Muslims, Sikhs, and South
Asians, living in thousands of towns and cities across the Nation. By
necessity, Governmental engagement with these communities will have to
be local.
CRCL conducts training for law enforcement personnel on cultural
competency relating to American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian
communities, Islam, and some Sikh religious practices. This kind of
training is a precondition for honest communication and trust between
officers and the communities they serve and protect. Topics include:
Misconceptions and stereotypes of Arab and Muslim cultures; diversity
within Arab and Muslim communities; effective policing without the use
of ethnic or racial profiling; and a best practices approach to
community interaction and outreach. Much of this training is provided
live, usually on-site, to Federal, State, and local law enforcement
officials around the country. But we have also produced a training DVD
that includes insights from four National and international experts--an
Assistant United States Attorney who is Muslim; a member of the
National Security Council who is Muslim; an internationally renowned
scholar of Islamic studies; and a civil rights attorney who advocates
on issues of concern to Arab-American and Muslim-American communities.
It is worth noting, in addition, that it is our community
partners--reliably informed by engagement activities about Government
policy and practices, and consistently empowered by those same
engagement activities to highlight for policymakers their experiences,
concerns, and grievances and to obtain reasonable responses--who bear
the responsibility to counter radical ideologies that subvert their
values and may pave a path for their young people towards violence.
Radical beliefs, after all, are protected by the Constitution. Our
proper sphere of concern and intervention is violence, not radicalism.
NEXT STEPS
I have a number of plans to augment my office's existing engagement
efforts in American Muslim, Arab, Sikh, and South Asian communities.
Over the next year, we plan to add cities for our regularly scheduled
roundtables. Conceptually, I have three strategic initiatives:
(1) Frequent issue-specific engagement efforts.--Issue-specific
engagement brings community leaders to the table who have
particular contributions to make on specific topics. Our first
issue-specific event is focused on AIT scanning technology and
religious modesty prescriptions.
(2) Promoting local engagement efforts.--As discussed in the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review released last month, the
DHS vision for homeland security is a homeland that is safe,
secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards, and
where American interests, aspirations, and way of life can
thrive. The American way of life prominently includes our
cherished civil rights and civil liberties. Even so, our
Department--and the Federal Government as a whole--cannot
possibly do all that needs to be done in this area of endeavor.
States and local governments are beginning to become active in
this area, and some are doing terrific work. We must promote
more local efforts, by modeling constructive engagement;
providing in-person and scalable training and training
materials; coordinating community-oriented activities; and
promulgating best practices. We need to ensure that our State,
local, and Tribal partners have the knowledge, methods, skills,
and resources to productively engage their communities.
(3) Youth engagement efforts.--Regardless of faith, race,
ethnicity, national origin, or gender, young people communicate
differently than older generations; they have vastly more
exposure to social media tools and real-time on-line
information and communication. And because it is youth who are
at the frontlines when it comes to terrorist recruitment, they
are perhaps the most vital audience for a message of inclusion,
esteem, and fair treatment. It is our job as a Department to
welcome young people in American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South
Asian communities to join our Nation's collective security
efforts; we must empower them to be connected rather than
alienated. We need to demonstrate to our youth that we value
their opinions and welcome their ideas, and we need to use a
variety of communications techniques to convey that message.
CONCLUSION
Frequent, responsive, and thoughtful engagement with diverse
communities is an imperative of effective government. Such engagement
gathers and shares information, builds trust, informs policy, and
enables prompt response to legitimate grievances and needs; it is the
right of Americans as the sovereign source of Governmental authority.
Engagement with American Muslim, Arab, Sikh, and South Asian
communities is one instantiation of that imperative, and a crucial
method of reinforcing the fundamental tenet that we are fellow citizens
facing a common threat.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify today. I welcome
your questions.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hovington.
STATEMENT OF BRETT HOVINGTON, SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT, HEAD
OF COMMUNITY RELATIONS UNIT, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Hovington. Good morning, Chair Harman, Ranking Member
McCaul and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
As chief of the Community Relations Unit at FBI's Office of
Public Affairs, I appreciate this opportunity to join my
colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security, the Los
Angeles Sheriff's Office, and the State of Ohio in discussing
this very important issue, particularly our efforts to build
trust and open a constructive dialogue with the American Arab,
Muslim, Sikh, Somali, and South Asian communities, to name a
few.
The FBI's Community Outreach Program works to enhance
public trust and confidence in the FBI, fostering open and
transparent dialogue.
Community engagement efforts that build trust help us to
open doors, facilitating the overall mission of the FBI in
keeping the communities and the homeland safe.
If people understand the FBI's mission and view the FBI as
cooperative and trustworthy, they are more likely to report a
crime, return a telephone call, or respond positively to being
approached by an FBI special agent.
As we see more instances of individuals in the United
States being radicalized to commit violent acts--and I repeat,
to commit violent acts--our efforts to build understanding and
trust become more critical than ever.
At the headquarters level, the FBI engages a variety of
Arab American and Muslim organizations. FBI leadership meets
with leaders of National groups and has found these
interactions to be mutually beneficial. We look to these
organizations to assist us in communication with their members
and constituents.
For example, before we implemented our new attorney general
guidelines for domestic operations last year, we briefed these
organizations on the changes and attempted to address their
concerns. Our intent was to provide them with information to
place the FBI's efforts in context when issues arose publicly.
At the local level, each of our 56 FBI field offices has a
community outreach program coordinated by a professional
community outreach specialist or a special agent community
outreach coordinator.
As we do at the National level, field offices identify and
develop relationships with community leaders and other
individuals who have influence in their communities and may be
helpful conduits of information for the communities that we are
obligated to protect and serve.
These leaders make up a network of contacts the field
office can reach quickly in the event there is a threat or
operational activity impacting that community.
This network of contacts is also helpful when the FBI needs
public assistance to support on-going investigations, to
address concerns about FBI activities reported in the news
media, or to provide additional details on information released
by the FBI such as crime statistics.
Field offices use various initiatives to develop and
maintain their liaison with community leaders and groups.
Thirty-eight of our field offices have established what we call
our Community Engagement Councils or Multi-Cultural Advisory
Councils that consult with field office leadership on areas of
interest or concerns in their communities.
Many field offices have held town-hall style meetings to
help foster dialogue with the broader community. FBI field
offices also partner with community outreach programs run by
State and local law enforcement agencies, which is very
critical to the success of engaging.
One of our key initiatives is the FBI Citizen Academy 8- to
10-week program that brings together community leaders to learn
about the FBI mission, jurisdiction, policies, and general
overall mission. All field offices conduct at least one Citizen
Academy per year, while some may conduct two or three. A strong
effort is made to attract a diverse group of participants to
these classes.
Another program is the Community Relations Executive
Seminar Training, or what we call our CREST. It is a shorter
version of our Citizen Academy program that is conducted at
locations in the community rather than at an FBI facility.
While not as in-depth as our Citizen Academies, these
programs provide a vehicle to reach out to communities where
trust in the Government or the FBI in particular needs to be
enhanced. Topics discussed vary according to the interests of
the group and often include civil rights, hate crimes, and
terrorism.
In the context of countering violent radicalization, a key
step is to develop relationships within the community based on
trust and to do so under non-stressful circumstances rather--
rather than in the aftermath of an incident. We have found
CREST to be an important first step in building that process.
The FBI also continues to adapt our established youth
programs to help us reach groups of young people, particularly
in the Muslim communities. Field offices sponsor teen academies
which are designed to introduce youth to the FBI. We also have
our Adopt-a-School/Junior Agent special program, which is
designed to introduce youth to the FBI and to encourage good
citizenship.
Our community partners have become a bridge to many who
have viewed the FBI with either contempt or fear. They now come
through the doors of the FBI and feel free to share their views
on sensitive issues.
While we realize we may not always agree at times, or we
must agree to disagree, our focus continues to be on the
fostering dialogue and keeping the conversation going.
I hope I conveyed the committee's--the FBI's strategy to
engage communities and the methods we use, and I thank again
the Chair and the Members of the committee for their interest
in this important issue. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Hovington follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brett Hovington
March 17, 2010
Good afternoon Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am happy to join with my
colleagues here from the Department of Homeland Security and the Los
Angeles Sheriff's Office.
As chief of the Community Relations Unit of the FBI's Office of
Public Affairs, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the FBI's
community outreach and engagement efforts, particularly our efforts to
build trust and open a constructive dialogue with American Arab,
Muslim, Sikh, Somali, and South Asian communities, to name but a few.
The primary purpose of the FBI's Community Outreach Program is
simple: To enhance public trust and confidence in the FBI by fostering
the FBI's relationship within various communities. The Community
Outreach Program supports the FBI's mission by educating members of the
public on how they can help protect themselves and their communities.
Our engagement efforts are designed to build trust in communities that
can assist in opening doors, facilitating the overall mission of the
FBI in keeping communities and the homeland safe. If the public
understands the FBI's mission and views the FBI as cooperative and
trustworthy, they are more likely to report a crime, return a telephone
call, or respond positively to being approached by a FBI Special Agent.
I have traveled to Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and many parts
of the United States studying the various engagement strategies of law
enforcement agencies. One common thread is the need to have better
dialogue not just with communities, but specifically with youth. Recent
situations involving young people leaving the United States to travel
abroad and engage in criminal and nefarious activities is one of the
concerns facing the United States today. Though violent radicalization
is a growing concern, the overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans we
encounter are loyal, law-abiding citizens.
If we want to stop future generations of youth from choosing the
wrong path and fighting against our country instead of for it, we must
commit to increasing our field-based scientific research on the violent
radicalization of youth. The only way we can effectively address this
issue is to fully understand it. Sociologists, political scientists,
and psychologists can all help us explore conflict between leaders,
community members, and youth.
As a Special Agent, I can attest that an individual's understanding
and perception of the FBI can make everything we do easier or harder.
As we see more instances of individuals in the United States being
radicalized to commit violent acts, our efforts to build understanding
and trust becomes more critical than ever.
OUTREACH AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
The FBI engages National and local organizations in the United
States that have public positions against terrorism and violent
radicalization to further a positive image of law enforcement. The FBI
has established contacts with a variety of National-level Arab-American
and Muslim organizations. FBI Director Mueller meets with leaders of
these groups and has found these interactions to be mutually
beneficial. We look to these organizations to assist us in
communicating with their members and constituents. For example, to
provide an understanding of the FBI's investigative parameters prior to
implementation of the new Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic
Operations, we offered these organizations briefings and attempted to
address concerns raised by the groups. Out intent was to provide them
with information to place the FBI's efforts in context when issues
arose publicly.
Outreach Efforts at the Local Level
Each of our 56 field offices has a Community Outreach Program
coordinated by a professional Community Outreach Specialist or Special
Agent Community Outreach Coordinator. Our Community Outreach Program
has several elements: Building relationships with community leaders;
reaching out to youth and the broader community; and partnering with
various community organizations and other law enforcement outreach
efforts. As we do at the National level, field offices identify and
develop relationships with community leaders and other individuals who
have influence in their communities and may be helpful conduits of
information to the community at large.
These leaders make up a network of contacts the field office can
reach out to on short notice to deliver a message to their community in
the event there is a threat or operational activity impacting that
community. This network of contacts is also helpful when the FBI needs
public assistance to support an on-going investigation, to address
concerns about FBI activities reported in the news media, or to provide
additional details on information released by the FBI, such as crime
statistics. For example:
In Detroit, the executive management, including the Special
Agent in Charge, attends regular meetings in the Muslim
communities. They also have individuals from the Muslim
Community who participate in the Multi-Cultural Advisory
Councils, FBI Citizens' Academies, and the FBI Teen Academy.
In the fall of 2009, the Assistant Director of the New York
Office met with 40 Muslim community leaders to address the
issues and concerns of the community following operational
activities in the investigation of Najibullah Zazi. This kind
of dialogue has become part of our set operations plan.
Field offices use various initiatives to develop and maintain their
liaison with community leaders and groups. Thirty-eight of our field
offices have established Community Engagement Councils or Multi-
Cultural Advisory Councils that consult with field office leadership on
areas of interest or concern in the community.
Another key initiative is the Citizens' Academy. This effort is an
8- to 10-week program that brings together community leaders to learn
about the FBI's mission, jurisdiction, policies, and general
operations. All field offices conduct at least one Citizens' Academy
per year, while some may conduct multiple sessions. A strong effort is
made to attract a diversity of members that represent the surrounding
communities to these classes.
After a member of the Turkish-American community graduated from the
Knoxville office's Citizens' Academy in 2009, the partnership
blossomed, and now the Turkish community will be hosting a session of
this year's Citizens' Academy. They will also be participating during
the next Youth Academy, which will include students from 25 different
high schools.
Another program used to foster relationships within various
communities is the Community Relations Executive Seminar Training or
CREST. While not as in-depth as Citizen Academies, this program
provides a vehicle to reach out to communities where trust in the
Government or the FBI in particular needs to be enhanced. Topics
addressed in a CREST session vary according to the interests of the
group, discussing such areas as civil rights, hate crimes, or
terrorism.
The effectiveness of the CREST program is that it is often the
starting point for bridging the gaps of trust that may exist between
the FBI and a given community. In the context of countering violent
radicalization, a key step is to develop relationships within the
community based on trust and to do so under non-stressful circumstances
rather than in the aftermath of an incident. CREST is a first step in
that building process.
In addition to the Citizens' Academy and CREST programs, many field
offices have held town-hall style meetings to help foster dialogue with
the broader community. Some examples of the communities the FBI has
engaged in this way are:
The Atlanta office held a town hall meeting for the Muslim
community at the Hamza Center in Alpharetta, Georgia.
The Buffalo office partnered with the Muslim Public Affairs
Council of Western New York to host a town hall meeting with
the Special Agent in Charge and an Assistant U.S. Attorney
present.
The New Haven office held town hall meetings with the
Pakistani-American Public Affairs Committee (PAKPAC).
The San Antonio office participated in an open forum for a
group of refugees from Somalia, Tanzania and Iran, expressing
encouragement to those in attendance that local/Federal
agencies were available to assist with any concerns or issues.
FBI field offices also partner with community outreach programs run
by State and local law enforcement agencies. Since 2006, the Dallas FBI
office and Arlington Police have held joint quarterly meetings with
leaders of the Muslim Community in Tarrant County. The meetings are a
collaborative effort of the FBI and Arlington Police to engage the
Muslim community leadership.
Both the Citizens' Academy and CREST graduates--along with our
local law enforcement partners--are the foundation of a community
support network that works as a force multiplier for us. By working
through this local foundation, we are able to model a more traditional
community policing effort to combat violent radicalization and
terrorism.
SPECIALIZED COMMUNITY OUTREACH TEAM (SCOT)
In November 2008, the Community Relations Unit established a
Specialized Community Outreach Team. The team, comprised of Special
Agents, Analysts, Community Outreach Specialists, and personnel with
language or other specialized skills, assists field offices with
establishing new contacts in key communities. The pilot program focused
on establishing contacts in the Somali-American communities of Denver,
Columbus, Minneapolis, San Diego, Seattle, and Washington, DC. These
cities were selected because they were identified as the largest
Somali-American communities in the United States. The intent of this
new engagement strategy is to use the best practices in community
outreach and tailor them to assist in efforts to engage communities
that are particularly insular or where barriers of fear or suspicion of
law enforcement exist. In the pilot program field offices were helped
to develop relationships with organizations and individuals in the
Somali community who are well-positioned to fill outreach gaps and
assist in developing a more positive dialogue with the community.
OUTREACH TO YOUTH
The FBI continues to adapt our established youth programs to help
us reach new groups of young people, particularly in Muslim
communities. Field offices sponsor teen academies which are designed to
introduce youth to the FBI. We also have the Adopt-a-School/Junior
Special Agent program, which is designed to introduce youth to the FBI
and to encourage good citizenship. Here are just a few examples:
As a part of the FBI Adopt-a-School Program, the Phoenix
office hosted a Jr. Special Agent Program at the Arizona
Cultural Academy, an Islamic private school. A series of topics
presented for the youth were: Making Good Decisions, Peer
Pressure, Internet Safety, Violence Prevention, Self-Esteem,
and Teasing and Rumors.
The New York office participated in a Pakistani Youth Group
event held by the Council of People's Organization (COPO) in
Brooklyn.
Agents from the San Antonio office delivered an internet
safety presentation to 300 middle school students at a
predominately Turkish run school, Harmony Science Academy.
Agents from the Atlanta office participated in Career Day at
Dar-Un-Noor School, which is also a part of the Al Farooq
Masijid, the largest mosque in Atlanta, Georgia.
RECOGNIZING OUR PARTNERS
Our community partners have become a bridge to many who viewed the
FBI with either contempt or fear. They now come through the doors of
the FBI and feel free to share their views on sensitive issues. We
commend our friends for their efforts, and we commend the leaders of
minority and ethnic communities who have also become friends with the
FBI and who are building similar relationships for their communities.
While we realize we are going to have disagreements with these same
communities, we are talking. Sparking that dialogue is essential. The
leadership of the American Muslim community is working vigorously on
many levels to emphasize that American Muslims are Americans. The
opportunity to cooperate with the FBI and other authorities can ensure
the safety and security of communities and the United States.
One way we can formally recognize the FBI's partners across the
country is through the Director's Community Leadership Award. In 2009,
four recipients of this award were Muslim leaders. 2008 Muslim
Recipients included: Yahya Hendi, Bilal Eksili, Dafer Mohammed Dakhil,
and Mohammed Moinuddin. This year's recipients include five Muslim
leaders, including: Dr. Saeed Fahia, Josefina Salma Ahmed, Bilah A.
Khaleeq, and Mohamed Abdul-Azeez. The fifth recipient, Nawar Shora from
the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, provided training to
community outreach personnel from all 56 field offices at our annual
training conference last year. This year's recipients will be coming to
FBI headquarters this week to be formally recognized by FBI Director
Robert Mueller for their outstanding contributions to public safety.
CONCLUSION
In my remarks I hope I conveyed to the committee the FBI's strategy
to engage communities, counter violent radicalization and the methods
we use. The process requires building trust within the community,
followed by creating strong and open partnerships. Achieving these
elements we can then seek to positively influence change in the
community and alter the path towards violent radicalization.
I thank the Chairman and the Members of the committee for their
interest in this important issue affecting our Nation and look forward
to answering your questions.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
Sheriff Baca.
STATEMENT OF LEROY BACA, SHERIFF, LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT
Sheriff Baca. Thank you. Thank you and good morning. It is
a delight to be here with all of you.
Simply this: Without Muslim Americans locally, Nationally,
and internationally, we are not winning any war against terror.
Our testimony is designed to bring forth that strong message
to--to not only Members of this committee but also members of
this entire Nation.
Simply, local and international relationships are the
strongest tools in the war against terror. Information that is
relationship-derived is more reliable than information that is
twice- or more removed from the original source.
When the Christmas day terrorist Abdulmutallab's father
reported his son's extremism, intelligence doesn't get any
better than this. My point is where billions of people who--in
the world are aligned in cooperation with police against
terrorism, terrorists will be defeated.
I have four points. I would like to briefly discuss them
with you. The first, as you have heard through my colleague to
the right from the FBI, public-trust policing is the goal not
only for Muslim Americans but the vast, diverse societies
throughout the United States.
To maintain a safe and free society of terrorist attacks,
police need to establish public-trust policing techniques that
lead to appropriate channels of communication and participation
by the public. This brochure I provided you will describe
extensively what this means.
But moreover, we have to reach to the point where people
are advising police as opposed to police merely advising
people. The sheriff's department has ethnic advisory councils
that are European, South Asian, Asian, Middle Eastern, Russian,
and particularly Iranian and Muslims from various nations which
include Pakistan, Jordan, the Gulf states, Turkey, and
Azerbaijan.
My second point is Muslim Americans are clearly against
terrorism. To further the effort of public safety, Muslim
American leaders within Los Angeles County formed a nonprofit
organization called the Muslim American Homeland Security
Congress.
I provided you with a brochure that describes what this
organization does and what its educational input is on these
various issues of relationship building and public safety.
This organization was formed by the leaders of Muslim
groups covering 70 mosques. The Shura Council, for example, of
Los Angeles has 70 mosques within their environment. The leader
of that council was part of the forming of this organization
that I have alluded to.
The Council of American Islamic Relations, CAIR, also led
in this effort. Muslim Public Affairs Council. The Council of
Pakistani Affairs. The Iranian American Muslim Association of
North America participated in this. Various local mosques and
Islamic centers were involved.
The organization is an educational organization with a two-
way road for public safety. As a result, significant activities
are engaged in with this organization. I might also say that
the sheriff's department--I want to introduce Sergeant Michael
Abdeen.
If you could just stand for a moment.
He is the outreach Muslim American who goes out with his
team of five other Muslim Americans in uniform, prays in
mosques, engages with children and young teenagers and parents,
and helps parents solve problems that are not necessarily
related to a terrorist threat. How do we survive in the common
issues of young people getting involved with drugs and other
things that are detrimental to their growth? The key here is
that we have to have interactive relationships, not only
relationships based on professional reasons.
The next point is professional international police
diplomacy. I have been all over this world in the Muslim
countries, trying to build a greater sense of appreciation and
relationship for their strategies, and to point, this document
here will explain it thoroughly to you.
Countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Jordan,
Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, all the Gulf states, and we hosted
a conference in Beverly Hills last Thursday of all the Gulf
states police chiefs, major European police chiefs, the police
chiefs of Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal, along with Mexico
City, Tijuana, and Singapore.
This is significant. Law enforcement in America needs to
collaborate with our counterparts outside of our Nation. Cities
like Los Angeles and New York, which are the capitals, pretty
much, of the diversity of all the Nation's countries, are part
of this effort.
The last point, which is No. 4, is interfaith respect.
Americans of faith will help when asked. The question of
peaceful human coexistence worldwide cannot be fully answered
without including the good will of all faiths towards one
another.
At this time in our history, with billions of dollars being
spent on the war against terror, our Nation should ask all
Americans of faith to join with President Obama's example and
be the instrument of good will to Muslims throughout the world.
There is my belief that the average American has the
potential to be our best ambassador of good will, but we all
have to go forward in our various elected jobs and our official
positions in Government to set the example and communicate with
mosques worldwide, within our Nation as well, and go to these
places and participate in some of the activities they engage
in.
Extremists are what they are. But they will not survive or
thrive in a world that is not indifferent. Los Angeles County
is not indifferent to the assets and virtues of the Muslim
American communities locally and those that are worldwide.
Finally, I would like to thank Janet Napolitano, the
Homeland Security Secretary, for her effort as well in trying
to reach out and build a better relationship with Muslim
Americans.
Thank you.
[The statement of Sheriff Baca follows:]
Prepared Statement of Leroy Baca
March 17, 2010
On September 13, 2001, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department,
fearing a backlash against Muslim-Americans, convened a meeting led by
then-Governor Gray Davis and Mayor James Hahn, Supervisor Zev
Yaroslavsky and I, in addition to the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department's Interfaith Council.
Our core message was to not involve religious assumptions regarding
the attacks on America during 9/11. We succeeded in keeping 11,000,000
people intact without violence. Minor verbal abuse acts, however, were
documented by deputies and police.
Since then, the Sheriff's Department has worked daily with diverse
Muslim-American communities in Los Angeles County. This testimony of
our efforts is a model that could be helpful as our Nation continues to
prevent future terrorism at home and abroad.
Local and international relationships are the strongest tools in
the war against terror. Information that is relationship-derived is
more reliable than information twice- or more removed from the original
source. When the Christmas day terrorist Abdulmutallab's father
reported his son's extremism, intelligence doesn't get any better than
this. Where the billions of people of the world are aligned in
cooperation with police against terrorism, the terrorists will be
defeated.
Because we need relationships with Muslim communities to better
protect all citizens, Americans, particularly elected officials, should
not claim Islam supports terrorism. This is counter-productive to
trust. It plays into the terrorist strategy that the West is against
Islam. Moreover, the millions of Iranians who are objecting to the
apparent fraudulent election in Iran, and the undemocratic behavior of
its supreme religious leader(s), are not abandoning Islam as they
embrace fair democracy for their country.
Law enforcement alone, however, cannot generate the appropriate
intelligence and response to terrorist cells without the cooperation
and support of all citizens, especially the Muslim-American community.
Moreover, in America, we are obligated to protect all citizens and
their respective religions. To effectively detect and manage
extremists, police need to have the trust and understanding of Muslim
communities who live within and outside the United States, especially
those who have experienced terrorist attacks within their homelands.
Simply, police need public participation. To accomplish public
participation, certain strategies, such as public-trust policing, need
to be in place everywhere in our Nation.
PUBLIC-TRUST POLICING
To maintain a safe society free of terrorist attacks, police need
to establish public-trust policing techniques that lead to appropriate
channels of communication and participation with the public. Los
Angeles County has aggressively embarked upon a public-trust policing
program since 9/11. Relationships with all faiths are important to
achieve interfaith harmony. Los Angeles County has many interfaith
efforts. The Sheriff's Department developed an Interfaith Advisory
Council consisting of more than 300 rabbis, priests, imams, ministers,
monks and faith leaders of all religions. In addition, the Sheriff's
Department also developed a Muslim Community Affairs unit, the first of
its kind in the Nation, staffed by Muslim-American deputy sheriffs.
Moreover, the Sheriff's Department has ethnic advisory councils
that are European, South Asian, Asian, Middle Eastern, Russian, and
particularly Iranian and Muslims from various nations including
Pakistan, Jordan, the Gulf States, Turkey, and Azerbaijan.
MUSLIM-AMERICANS ARE CLEARLY AGAINST TERRORISM
To further the effort of public safety, Muslim-American leaders
within Los Angeles County formed a non-profit organization, the Muslim-
American Homeland Security Congress (MAHSC). Islamic organizations that
contributed to this effort are the Islamic Shura Council which is an
umbrella organization covering 70 mosques within Southern California;
the Council of American-Islamic Relations (CAIR); the Muslim Public
Affairs Council (MPAC); the Council of Pakistan-American Affairs
(COPAA); Iranian-American Muslim Association of North America (IMAN);
and various local mosques and Islamic centers.
The MAHSC organization works closely with the Muslim Community
Affairs Unit which consists of Arabic-speaking deputy sheriffs and key
leaders of the Sheriff's Department. Together, we engage in community
forums and participate in events to discuss their concerns with law
enforcement. Some of the other functions of the Muslim Community
Affairs unit include attending community events and functions, conduct
facility tours to familiarize them with the Sheriff's Department
functions, and train Sheriff's Department staff on cultural diversity
issues relating to the Muslim American population.
PROFESSIONAL INTERNATIONAL POLICE DIPLOMACY
Los Angeles County Police agencies are building strong
relationships with the police of Muslim, European, Asian, Central
American, and Canadian countries.
One major reality in the fight against terrorism is that Muslim
communities are in the best position to discover extremist activities
within the United States, as well as all countries where Muslims
reside, worldwide. The trust-based relationships police develop with
their respective communities will more often than not lead to the early
detection of extremism.
To further validate the strategy of international public police co-
dependence, the Sheriff's Department has embarked upon international
police diplomacy efforts. The countries of focus, to date, are
Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Israel, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, all
Gulf States, Mexico, all Central American states, China, Taiwan, South
Korea, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Russia, The Netherlands, Canada,
Morocco, Singapore, Armenia, and Great Britain.
Simply, Los Angeles County, like the City of New York, is a capital
of all the world's nationalities by heritage or birth. This resource of
humanity is an asset in discovering extremist behavior.
INTERFAITH RESPECT
Americans of faith will help when asked. The question of peaceful
human co-existence, worldwide, cannot be fully answered without
including the goodwill of all faiths to one another. At this time in
our history, with billions of dollars being spent on a war against
terror, our Nation should ask that all Americans follow President
Obama's example and be the instrument of goodwill to Muslims throughout
the world.
It is my belief that the average American has the potential to be
our best ambassador of goodwill. However, Senators, Members of
Congress, Governors, mayors, boards of supervisors, sheriffs, police
chiefs, scholars, scientists, and laborers and their leaders must set
the example with a desire to visit mosques and communicate with
Muslims, worldwide, in the quest of better understanding Islam.
Extremists are what they are, but they cannot thrive or survive in a
world that is not indifferent.
Los Angeles County is not indifferent to the assets and virtues of
the Muslim communities, locally and worldwide.
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL (HSAC)
As a member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, I would like
to commend Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano
on her initiative on countering violent extremism. I dedicate myself
and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department to work with DHS to
develop a program similar to that of the Sheriff Department's Muslim
community outreach program on a National level.
Attachment 1.--Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Core Values
As a Leader in the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, I commit
myself to honorably perform my duties with respect for the dignity of
all people, integrity to do right and fight wrongs, wisdom to apply
common sense and fairness in all I do and courage to stand against
racism, sexism, anti-semitism, homophobia and bigotry in all its forms.
Attachment 2.--Letter
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Sheriff Baca.
Mr. Alomari.
STATEMENT OF OMAR ALOMARI, COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT OFFICER, OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY, HOMELAND SECURITY DIVISION
Mr. Alomari. Madam Chair, Honorable Ranking Member, thank
you for inviting me today. It is really indeed an honor to be
before you here.
The Ohio Homeland Security established an office in 2005
solely dedicated to community engagement. From the beginning,
the office wasn't established as a community intelligence
program, and for sure it wasn't meant to be an information-
gathering office.
It is a program that aims at establishing a long-term
relationship with citizens and residents of Ohio for the
purpose of building proactive and strong communities,
integrated, confident, and open, to reject extremism and
violent ideologies that breed terrorism.
Community engagement broadened the debate on how as a
society we can respond to terrorism, at the same time enable
first responders to be approachable, increases the public
understanding of the Government's efforts to counter violent
extremism.
However, it has a broader perspective. It gives the public
the opportunity to voice issues of interest and concerns that
inspire citizens to make a difference and, most importantly, it
humanizes law enforcement to the community and humanizes the
community to law enforcement.
This is a cultural capital that benefits all sides. Our
work has been focused in three areas. One, building relations
with civic, women, youth, and religious organizations.
Consequently, we have been building regular town hall
meetings--holding regular town hall meetings with organizations
representing all groups.
We have formed advisory councils, imams' councils, youth
councils, and women councils. We work in tandem with these
communities to invite representatives from private and public
sectors to address all issues of concern and mutual questions.
The second thing, we do research, publish, and put
informational and educational material and literature to the
communities and first responders. We produced a series of
cultural guides--the one that I am holding in my hand here--and
we are in the process of printing and posting two more cultural
guides, one on Hispanic and Latino cultures, and one on
American culture.
We thought that a lot of communities' recent residents and
refugees lack a lot of information on American culture and
system, and we are writing to inform and educate the public as
well.
The third area we focus on is we offer training workshops,
classes, and seminars on culture competency. Our office
developed a comprehensive culture competency training program
for law enforcement and other first responder agencies. We just
completed training 3,000 Ohio State highway patrolmen, and we
are working with different law enforcement agencies to do that.
We have so many demands for the year 2010. The success or
failure of our work is measured by the response we have been
getting with law enforcement and the communities. For the most
part, it has been extremely positive.
I just want to emphasize that community engagement is not
the answer or the solution to every security problem. It does
not replace police work. However, it complements and enhances
it, provides a new and effective tool for law enforcement to do
their job effectively.
In the last 8 years, security has become globalized and
thus it requires a new look. It requires comprehensive view and
multidimensional approach that is based on collaborative and
cooperative efforts with law--between law enforcement and the
communities.
But there are a number of problems that we face to do our
job effectively. One, there is a conceptual flaw regarding the
quality of information the Government has been getting on
cultures, religions, and the legacy of those communities. Most
of the information we have been getting comes from media
personalities and thus the quality of information been
compromised. That definitely would affect decision-making.
Second, culture information some law enforcement have been
getting from agencies who really offer training in this area in
the aftermath of 9/11--not based on research or facts but
rather sensationalized and commercialized information. The
training contradicts, in a way, what my office, our office,
offer to law enforcement in Ohio.
The third one is lack of financial support. Culture
engagement is a new field for law enforcement, but we need more
Government support to expand the work.
I am a one-person office for the entire State of Ohio. My
office would not have succeeded without the great support we
have been getting from DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Office and the other officials, of course, in the State of
Ohio.
Thank you so much.
[The statement of Mr. Alomari follows:]
Prepared Statement of Omar Alomari
March 17, 2010
BACKGROUND
Global terrorism had reached American shores in the early 1990's
when terrorists attempted to destroy the World Trade Center. Having
failed in their first attempt, they tried again and succeeded in 2001
when on 9/11 terrorism claimed the lives of almost 3,000 innocent
American citizens. Since then terrorism has become part of American
lexicon. As the threat continues and as new realities arise, various
steps should be taken to ensure the safety and security of citizens and
the homeland. In the fight against terrorism the goal is to tackle the
factors that contribute to extremism and radicalism which might lead to
violence and terrorism.
Minimizing the factors that contribute to radicalization of
vulnerable individuals requires collaborative efforts between first
responders, law enforcement, and citizen groups of all cultural
backgrounds. Collaboration should be extensive and inclusive of all
citizens utilizing consultation, participation, and recommendations. A
frank and open debate should take place over extremism, violent
extremism, and the role everyone has to play in fighting this war on
one hand, and reducing the contributing factors to violent extremism on
the other. Moreover, a conducive and empowering environment should be
established for the purpose of achieving these goals.
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT OFFICE
OHIO HOMELAND SECURITY
The Community Engagement office was born in 2005 out of a need to
establish an outreach program to the whole community with a special
focus to engage and consult with the Arab and Muslims communities
because of the role they can play in the fight against terrorism and
the violent ideologies that breed violence. The Ohio Department of
Public Safety/Division of Homeland Security recognized the need to
develop regular lines of communication for the purpose of engaging all
communities to help achieve its mission.
Primary Objective
To reach out, coordinate, and engage the diverse communities
throughout the State of Ohio in the mission of Ohio Homeland Security
and on matters of importance and concerns to both sides for the purpose
of keeping Ohio and her citizens safe and secure.
OHIO HOMELAND COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT OFFICE MODEL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Primary Goal.............................. Establish trust and
legitimacy between the law
enforcement and the
communities.
Emphasis.................................. Multilevel trust, genuine
relationship between first
responders and communities;
empowering citizens to
share information.
Approach.................................. Holding regular town hall
meetings; open dialogue;
advisory councils; imams'
councils; participation in
cultural events.
Community Engagement...................... Increase cultural awareness;
education; media campaigns;
forums; active liaisons.
Law Enforcement........................... Increase in cultural
competency, increase of
communities' trust in first
responders; form
partnership with citizens.
Community input in preventing As trust with first
radicalization, and violent extremism. responders increases,
communities will invest in
their security and the
security the entire State.
Desired Outcome........................... Communities' feel confident
and comfortable in helping
first responders in the
fight against terrorism.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Long-term Goals
1. Form advising councils that represent our communities to help
build a society based on mutual respect, understanding, and
cooperation.
2. Engage the community to become part of Homeland Security mission
of [sic]
3. Prevention, protection, response, and recovery of acts of
terrorism.
4. Present terrorism awareness programs to the community through
public speaking, workshops, and training and by engaging
schools and workplaces in both public and private sectors.
5. Encourage State-wide cooperation and build partnerships within
the community and citizen groups.
6. Participate in celebration and cultural events observed by our
diverse citizens and groups.
7. Nurture a relationship of mutual respect between the community
and First Responders/Homeland Security.
8. Hold regular meeting with the members of the community.
9. Establish a task force representing community-based
organizations that include leadership of the largest spectrum
of society.
10. Work as a bridge to promote harmony, cooperation,
understanding, and mutual respect among different religious and
cultural organization in the State of Ohio.
11. Counter issues of stereotypes and profiling of communities like
the Arabs, Muslims, and Somalis.
12. Establish direct lines of communications with the leaders of
the diverse groups.
13. Create a working relationship with all mediums of communication
to provide accurate information regarding cultural competence.
14. Offer training workshops to public employees regarding
diversity, cultural competence, and community engagement.
15. Create a public speaking program that presents issues relate to
the goals of the office.
16. Research, write, post, publish, and make available to first
responders literature on religious and cultural issues relate
to communities.
Action Plan
1. Identify and list all cultural and religious organizations to
work with.
2. Identify and list leadership within these organizations.
3. Identify important members of these communities in private and
public sectors.
4. Choose contact persons with the necessary background for
successful contacts.
5. Contacts should be personal and slow in order to build trust in
mission and establish communication and working relationship.
6. Engage the leadership in as many meetings as possible to keep
lines of communication open. Meetings' agendas should establish
major and specific matters that are important to both
Government and communities.
7. Explain the mission of the office and the role they play in
working with homeland security.
8. Elicit their input, cooperation, and consultation in OHS work.
9. Coordinate and plan with community organizations to hold town
hall meetings in which the largest possible number of
communities attends to address their issues and concerns and
OHS issues and concerns. Meetings should include
representatives of various Governmental agencies and any agency
of relevance or importance to both sides.
10. Formalize these councils in appointments and media
announcements.
11. Councils should be divided into work groups to address issues
of interest.
12. Councils should select members among them as contact persons
with 24 hours contact access.
13. Attend meetings and cultural events celebrated by the
communities.
14. Work closely with the communities to counter profiling and
stereotyping.
15. Enable the communities to represent themselves and make their
voice heard when and where it's needed.
YOUTH LIAISON
General goals.--To engage the youth in a multitude of programs and
activities for the purpose of preventing violence and terrorism by
promoting good citizens less vulnerable to extremism and fanaticism.
The following are some steps Ohio Homeland Security is taking to help
in achieving this goal. They focus on citizenry, service, and
leadership:
1. Engage Muslim youth in civic duties and provide them with a
sense of belonging to the larger community.
2. Provide the youth with a voice in expressing and discussing
their issues and concerns.
3. Provide support through coordinating with other youth and
service organizations to address issues not addressed by faith-
based organizations.
4. Establish leadership initiative to empower and activate
youngsters in political and cultural life. This initiative can
be achieved through organizing training programs and by
eliciting consultation of specialists in this field.
5. Create awareness of good citizenry with focus on rights and
duties to confirm the concepts of ``natural rights,'' societal
obligation, and social contract.
6. Engage the Arab/Muslim American communities in working with
youth.
7. Engage the youth in discussing and debating ideologies of
cultural and religious extremism with focus on alternative
views and ramification of each possibility. OHS should develop
literature to serve this purpose. Literature should include
among other things mainstream Islam and its universal appeal.
8. Establish a list of printed and digital sources with easy and
open access to serve the youth on a wider range of issues.
9. Establish a hotline for youth as an empowering tool of
communication and participation.
10. Provide educational and informational materials published by a
various educational organizations on youth in schools and
detention centers.
11. Engage the youth in anti-drug campaigns and anti-gang
activities.
WOMEN LIAISON
General Goals.--In the workplace and in popular culture, Arab/
Muslim American women seem to be either misrepresented or under-
represented. While women organizations can't be labeled as homogenous
or monolithic, we recognize the importance of working with these groups
for the important role they play in society and especially the
youngsters. Their role as parents is very important in education and
preparing good citizenry. We feel the need to empower women to be
active participant in issues like health, employment, harassment,
discrimination, racism, misogyny, domestic violence, and religious
issues in a free format.
Action Plan
1. Encourage women to participate in civic duties and public
service. OHLS should coordinate with workplace in public and
private sector to address sensitivity to faith-based
employment.
2. Create women task force comprising of members of professional
women in both public and private sectors. This task force would
work as an example of success to the general population and as
a role model for Arab/Muslim American women.
3. Support established women organizations and solicit their
participation in achieving Ohio Homeland Security's mission.
4. Affirm equal opportunity employment for women of faith
especially when Islamic attire or prayer creates issues in the
workplace.
5. Steer the establishment of issues-based women organizations to
attract the participation of Muslim/Arab American women so a
network of women's voices is heard.
6. Encourage intellectual and cultural participation for women.
Ohio Homeland Security helps in providing women a podium for
public speaking, writing, and publishing.
7. Work with Arab and Islamic organizations to provide educational
research on political, cultural, and religious issues. OHS
should create a dynamic forum to continuously engage women to
debate and discuss their issues.
8. Create a manual detailing Muslim and Arab women past and present
contributions to world cultures and civilizations.
9. Coordinate between Arab/Muslim women organizations and local,
National, and international women organizations for the purpose
of increasing the cooperation and connection with women
everywhere.
10. Work with the popular media to enable women to express their
views and debate their issues in public forums.
11. Create various printed and digital resources to inform,
communicate, and educate women on family, health, and maternal
issues.
12. Facilitate societal awareness and help for women and families
who face social, cultural, or personal issues with no recourse.
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS AND LEADERSHIP LIAISON
General Goals.--Recognizing the importance of communication and
information, OHS works tirelessly to connect with and activate the
Arab/Muslim communities throughout the State of Ohio to work closely
with first responders to protect these communities in specific and the
State of Ohio in general by creating effective security measures to
prepare for and prevent terrorism. In the aftermath of 9/11, Arab and
Muslim Americans came under scrutiny in the media, consequently, these
communities became isolated, secluded, disconnected. Contacts with Arab
and Muslim Americans were minimized. Working with community
organizations and their leadership should re-connect Arab and Muslim
Americans with society on one hand, and with first responders on the
other. OHS will help in countering profiling, stereotyping,
misconception, false information, and coordinate in providing accurate
information on the cultures of these communities.
The following steps are being used to achieve these goals:
Action Plan
1. Establish continuous lines of communication with the leadership
of Arab/Muslim American organizations.
2. Develop a list of contacts with the community for the purpose of
disseminating information as needed.
3. Hold periodical and open town hall meeting to enable members of
these communities and the law enforcement to ask and answer
questions of concern to both sides.
4. Form advisory councils with members representing the A/M
communities in all cities of Ohio. These councils should advise
and recommend to OHLS on matters of importance.
5. Work with communities in providing the correct knowledge of
Islam and the Arabic culture by initiating educational
programs, seminars, workshops, and public speaking on these
issues.
6. Advise and recommend to the school systems in Ohio on curriculum
and information regarding both the religion and the cultures of
the Middle East and other cultures.
7. Encourage the communities to play an active in popular culture
as members of diverse communities with rights, duties, and
roles to play in American society.
8. Work hard to minimize discrimination against Arab/Muslim
Americans in all sectors including employment.
9. Generate an interfaith dialogue among the willing to develop
mutual respect, awareness, and understanding of all faiths.
This should be part of a general plan to promote harmony among
all communities including minorities and majority and how can
they relate to each other. Mosques should be encouraged to
extend themselves to the community through open house tours and
dialogues.
10. Engage the Arab/Muslim communities in frank and productive
discussion on extremism and fanaticism.
11. Develop a public campaign for the purpose of affirming the
cultural inclusiveness and the right of every American citizen
to ``belong'' to our society.
12. Bridge the gap between Arab/Muslim American organizations and
other organizations by steering cooperation and close working
relationship between the diverse communities.
LAW ENFORCEMENT LIAISON
OHS recognizes that Arab and Muslim American groups have great
interest in a safer Ohio with proven support for a pluralistic society.
Enabling first responders in Ohio to use all sources available to
fight, prevent, and prepare for acts of terrorism, OHS should establish
a dynamic connection with the diverse communities including Arab and
Muslim Americans. The following steps are being used to achieve these
goals:
1. Familiarize the Arab/Muslim communities with law enforcement
work, mission, rights, and duties. Exchange of tours and face-
to-face meetings between the two sides should ``humanize'' the
other and thus minimize misconception, stereotyping, and
profiling. The image of law enforcement in the Middle East is
very negative and many immigrants still have the same views
even though they live in the United States.
2. Develop cultural and religious awareness seminars and workshops
to empower law enforcement with the correct information on do's
and taboos in world cultures.
3. Coordinate with the law enforcement to develop informational
public events as needed in which representatives of all
agencies can educate the public and answer questions on law
enforcement.
4. Develop and distribute educational materials to all law
enforcement agencies to help as a source on working with and
interacting with Arab and Muslim Americans.
5. Coordinate with law enforcement to maintain a balance between
the fight against terrorism and the preservation of civil
liberties.
6. Collaborate with colleges and universities to develop courses on
homeland security and certification to law officers throughout
the State of Ohio.
7. Coordinate town hall meetings to enable law enforcement to be
part of panels to communicate issues and concerns to the Arab/
Muslim American communities.
8. Work as a liaison between the local mosques and law enforcement
agencies for the purpose of working with the mosques and
soliciting the help of imams in the fight against terrorism.
9. Engage the American/Muslim groups and illicit their
participation and recommendation in the ways to fight
terrorism.
10. Work with law enforcement and the media to counter negative
stereotypes of these communities.
highlights of the work achieved by the community engagement office at
OHIO HOMELAND SECURITY
1. Built a strong relationship with Arab, Muslim, and Somali,
Hispanic, Latino, and Asian communities among others. This
relationship is manifested in regular contacts, dialogue, and
exchange of ideas.
2. Formed Somali Imams' Advisory Group that opened the mosque to
our office and enabled us to engage the imams and the
congregants in regular discussion of issues of interest and
concern to both parties.
3. Connected and still connecting first responders with critical
communities by involving them in our efforts. First responders'
representatives are always present in our town hall meetings
offering presentations and engage in a dialogue with members of
the communities.
4. Conduct cultural competence training to first responders,
schools, and groups in public and private sectors. Our office
just completed training 3,000 members of the Ohio State Highway
Patrol. The same training was conducted for Police, Sheriffs,
Terrorism Liaison Officers, Fusion Centers, and public and
private schools. There is 100% increase in the number of
workshops requested for the year 2010.
5. Researched, published, and posted cultural guides on Arab,
Muslim, and Somali cultures as a cultural reference to first
responders and the public. Two more guides are in print at the
present time, one on American culture and another one on
Hispanic/Latino cultures. Both will be published and posted on
our website: www.homelandsecurity.ohio.gov.
6. Developed a good working relationship with Somali youth in Ohio.
A Somali youth forum is planned this year to tackle issues of
radicalization, violence, drugs, and gangs among members of the
``lost generation'' in Central Ohio.
7. Held first interfaith conference for faith-based organizations
in the State of Ohio to generate dialogue and mutual
understanding among people of all religious and spiritual
background.
BENEFITS OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT
1. Humanize law enforcement to the public and humanizes the public
to first responders.
2. Enable law enforcement to explain their work and role in the
critical work. It also dispels a lot of misconceptions about
law enforcement and other first responders. It demystifies and
makes them approachable to the public.
3. Inform the public on the Government's efforts to
counterterrorism.
4. Allow the public to have an input in the debate.
5. Empower communities to present their own issues without relying
on commercialized or sensationalized media information.
6. Create an environment conducive to good citizenry; treats
citizens on equal footing and empowers communities to invest
heavily in their efforts to keep their communities safe and
secure.
BENEFITS OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT TO FIRST RESPONDERS AND THE COMMUNITY
1. Effective tool for law enforcement to connect with various
communities, especially Arab/Muslim Americans and Somalis.
2. Gives law enforcement a direct access to accurate and unfiltered
information on the culture of the groups they serve away from
the images established in the popular culture.
3. Provides law enforcement and the communities an opportunity to
establish regular dialogue on issues of mutual interest.
4. Empowers the communities to invest time, effort, and resources
in security matters.
5. Enables the Government to bring on-board communities who
sometime feel excluded from the process or treated as
outsiders.
6. Allows the communities to have an input in decision-making, and
partnering with first responders on critical issues like
security.
7. Creates trust and confidence among the citizens to work closely
with first responders.
VALUE OF COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT EFFORTS
Community engagement doesn't replace the traditional law
enforcement work. It complements and enhances it. It's another tool
available to help advance their work. Investigative intelligence is
still a very effective way to battle terrorism. However, communities
that feel alienated or marginalized will be resentful and estranged
from their citizenry. Proactive and engaging relationship with first
responders will help build strong communities integrated, confident,
open, and resistant to extremism and radicalism. What community
engagement brings is trust-building and mutual respect between the
communities and the first responders. It allows the Government to
create an environment conducive to good citizenry and gives them a
voice in the fight against terrorism.
SOME MAJOR GAPS IN OUR CURRENT EFFORTS AND WAYS TO IMPROVE THEM
1. There are two conceptual flaws that affect our work: One flaw is
the information we acquired on different communities like
Arabs, Muslims, and their cultures. A good deal of the
information came not from academic sources or reputable
research but rather from media personalities who for a
multitude of reasons commercialized and sensationalized these
cultures. Inaccurate knowledge and misconceptions created
mistrust and resentment to the Government's efforts to work
effectively with these communities. The other flaw is the
notion that there are no moderate Arabs or Muslims to trust or
to work with. Our experience shows otherwise. We have built
cooperation and collaboration with numerous Somali and other
Muslim communities throughout the State of Ohio. These flaws
can hinder the work or the direction the Government seeks to
fight terrorism and the ideologies that breed violence. We need
to have another look and seek accurate information on the
issues from independent sources, we also need to work with
these communities and consider them part of the solution by
empowering them to come on board and help us in this fight.
After all, these communities can exert tremendous influence in
their neighborhoods, and affect the debate on extremism and
violent ideologies.
2. We need to develop cultural competency training for first
responders. One major problem we face in our work in Ohio is
the conflicting and confusing information first responders are
getting from agencies that surfaced the last 8 years. These
agencies present unreliable and un-researched information on
Arab and Muslim cultures through training workshops offered to
Government agencies. Many of these workshops contradict most of
what our office offer to law enforcement.
3. We need to broaden our approach at this critical time in this
continuous war to include community engagement as an effective
tool for the Government to utilize all the resources available
including communities' efforts. Also, we need to learn from the
experience of other countries targeted by terrorism. Countries
like England made tremendous advances in its anti-terrorism
campaign by reaching out and engaging communities like British
Muslim citizens.
4. We need to allocate financial recourses to enable law
enforcement to work with their respective communities. Ohio is
still the only State in the Nation that developed an office
solely dedicated to engaging and connecting with the
communities. To succeed in these efforts, first we need to
invest in this work, and second, we need to financially support
and sustain it.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
Thank you to all the witnesses for staying within the 5-
minute limit. It is now time for committee questions, and you
can see we have quite robust attendance, so we will stick
strictly to our own 5-minute limit.
I will begin by yielding myself 5 minutes.
It won't surprise anyone on this committee or at the
witness table or in the audience that this subcommittee has
been criticized and is again criticized today for the way we
put on these hearings.
We try very hard, I would just say to all of you, to have a
diverse witness panel--we have a panel following you; I think
you all know this--and to be careful that we are reflecting the
many diverse views that exist in our country.
One of the criticisms today says that the committee is
seeking input from a narrow viewpoint, one that is sympathetic
to Islamist extremist organizations here in America.
Well, I will state my own view. That is not my own view. I
am not sympathetic to extremist organizations in America. I am
very sympathetic to strategies of outreach that do two things,
No. 1, build public trust, and No. 2, get that public to come
forward and help us find bad elements in communities.
Those bad elements will harm us. I am not sympathetic to
the bad elements. But I think without building public trust, as
Sheriff Baca said, we are not going to find the keys to
preventing and disrupting plots against us.
Does anyone disagree with that?
Sheriff Baca. No.
Mr. Hovington. No, fully agree.
Mr. Alomari. All agree.
Ms. Harman. All agree. Okay.
The second point I would make is that as the witnesses in
prior hearings have said, extreme views are protected by our
Constitution. We are not talking about extreme views. We are
not talking about so-called radicals either on the left or the
right of the spectrum.
We are talking about people who intend to engage in violent
behavior. Behavior is not protected--violent behavior--by our
Constitution. Only the possession of extreme views is protected
under our First Amendment.
So I am not seeking politically correct language, but I am
trying to articulate, perhaps inarticulately, my view that we
are talking about violent behavior. Does anyone disagree with
that?
Mr. Hovington. No.
Sheriff Baca. No.
Ms. Harman. Okay. So Let me ask you about the effectiveness
of what you are doing. You all have described what you are
doing.
Could each of you tell me, just quickly, going down the
row--give me an example of something you have prevented by the
strategies that you are using, if you can do that, or something
you have intercepted by the strategies that you are using?
Let's start at the left.
Ms. Schlanger. My office is a civil rights office, and we
are not in the business of developing sources and leads. What
we think of ourselves as contributing to this--and I think we
have been effective at that--is building an infrastructure of
communication where we are building trust.
So I am not going to be able to give you--if there has been
leads that have come out of our engagement efforts, they don't
come to me, and I can't--I can't tell you about them.
What I can tell you is that we bring a lot of people
together who didn't know each other before, and they do a lot
of talking to each other that didn't happen before. That
happens in all of the communities that we go in. It is what we
are about.
Ms. Harman. Is it fair to say that that talking to each
other leads to the building of trust, which leads to the
ability to come forward----
Ms. Schlanger. I----
Ms. Harman [continuing]. To you or others, perhaps more at
the local level?
Ms. Schlanger. Yes. I think it is fair to say that. I want
to say also that we--what we try to do is demonstrate the fact
that we are collaborative actors in the homeland security
enterprise. So that is a really important thing for us.
We care about those concerns that get expressed. We bring
them back, because we are, in fact, collaborating to protect
America.
Ms. Harman. Let me just stress the last thing and then go
down the line. We are all trying to protect America. This is
not just a feel-good exercise. This is an exercise in
protecting America.
Mr. Hovington.
Mr. Hovington. Yes, with respect to what the FBI has done--
with respect to what the FBI has done, we have established a
community outreach team comprised of special agents, analysts,
community outreach specialists, and personnel with language and
other specialized skills to really reach out and understand how
to engage the communities, because the vast communities that we
engage with have various dynamics that you have to really
understand and be able to relate to.
Ms. Harman. But the question is: Have you been effective?
Has someone come forward? Have you prevented some harm to
America?
Mr. Hovington. Right. What this specialized team did was
actually go out, meet with the Somali American community, and
the incident that I am talking about--there was an inaugural
threat--that we were able to reach back into the community
because we built these relationships within the community.
We were able to make a phone call, put together a group of
individuals from within the community, and ask for their
assistance and advise them of what some of our efforts were
doing, from an investigative standpoint.
Ms. Harman. Thank you. As I recall, that threat, which many
of us were briefed on at the time, turned out not to be
credible after the fact, but certainly there was real
information to believe that something might have happened. Is
that correct?
Mr. Hovington. That is correct.
Ms. Harman. Sheriff Baca.
Sheriff Baca. Well, first of all, thank you for the
question. There is a confidentiality part in the answer to any
of these questions, when you say, ``Well, what specifically
have you ferreted out and how did you do this?''
Ms. Harman. Well, you could describe it generally.
Sheriff Baca. Okay. What we essentially believe--and this
is really important to hear--intelligence gathering in itself
on a domestic level is still an emerging reality. It is not
something that has made its case entirely, and I don't think
the theories of intelligence are clear enough, even on the
Federal level, vis-a-vis the local level.
Having said that the Joint Regional Intelligence Center
that we have is proactive. The LAPD and Sheriff's department
have counterterrorism units. We are ferreting out a lot of
different cases. We have had over 450 cases that have evolved
from sources within the community.
I don't want to attribute them to any one aspect of the
society.
Ms. Harman. Okay.
Sheriff Baca. But I will say this, that the theories of
information gathering versus intelligence gathering is
predicated on how well you have a relationship with potential
sources. That is part of this testimony here, that we believe
that a safe Muslim society is a participatory Muslim society.
Through the participation, I can assure you that the
channels of--like the father of Abdulmutallab--are going to
happen, and they have happened. The problem is we are not going
to sit here and tell you where, when, and how.
Ms. Harman. I appreciate that.
I have run over my time, so I don't mean to be rude.
Mr. Alomari----
Mr. Alomari. Yes, Madam----
Ms. Harman [continuing]. Very briefly?
Mr. Alomari. Yes, Madam Chair, there is a couple things I
could say. Although I said that our office really is not
information-gathering or intelligence-gathering, nonetheless
homeland security work obviously is to connect the communities
with first responders and law enforcement.
One of the things we did very effectively is really to
build a strong relationship with the mosques. Now we have been
holding regular town hall meetings with the imams and the
mosque, and we connect them with law enforcement. As a result
of that, there is this collaborative and cooperative effort.
The second thing, really, we are focusing on the Somali
youth in Ohio based on what happened in Minnesota. We really
inspired the community, really, to work with us and tackle the
issues as a preventive measure, and there is a lot of programs
we are really working with----
Ms. Harman. Thank you. Thank you very much.
I apologize to my colleagues for running over my time.
I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The National Intelligence Estimate came out with a report
stating that the most effective weapon we have in the war on
terror is the moderate Muslim. I think that is true both
overseas and here in the United States.
Before I ran for Congress, I was chief of the
counterterrorism section in the U.S. Attorney's Office in
Texas, and that was not too long after 9/11. Part of our
strategy was to reach out to the Muslim community and talk to
them.
What I would like to know--and working with the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces--what I would like to know from--
particularly from the--Agent Hovington and Ms. Schlanger, and
the sheriff as well, what connection do you have at all with
the Joint Terrorism Task Forces today?
Mr. Hovington. There is a separation between--within the
FBI--our operational side of the house and our community
engagement side of the house. But we still have to have a
working relationship, because our engagement efforts have to
really focus on the overall mission of the FBI.
It is important where we have operations on the ground and
we are impacting the community--the transparency that is needed
and the relationships that is needed that go back into a
community or to explain to the community from an education and
awareness standpoint what our mission is, and that is very
important.
So we do work with our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, in
particular in our field offices, but there is a separation. I
just want to make sure that that is clear as well.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. Following up on the Chair's question,
have you--any of you had a lead come out through community
outreach which was then forwarded to the JTTFs for a potential
investigation?
Sheriff Baca. Yes. Yes, the Joint Regional Intelligence
Center that was set up by Chief Bratton and myself is an all-
source fusion center where we have representatives from
airports, sea ports, key targeted areas, and Government, and in
that organization an FBI agent is the head.
Also, the Joint Terrorism Task Force question--I have
deputized and Federalized deputies in that task force, as does
the Los Angeles Police Department, and in the Joint Regional
Intelligence Center, which is the field side of what we are
doing below JTTF, we have a secret unit in there that literally
has JTTF people hooking into the Federal sourcing.
So the key is if anyone were to describe what we do in Los
Angeles with cooperation, we, I think, are the epitome of
Federal and local cooperation with all agencies.
Mr. McCaul. Well, Sheriff, it sounds like you don't have
that sort of wall separation that, say, the bureau and----
Sheriff Baca. Not at all.
Mr. McCaul [continuing]. The agencies have.
Sheriff Baca. It is phenomenal that the----
Mr. McCaul. Yes.
Sheriff Baca [continuing]. FBI sent tremendous directors
historically to L.A.'s office, and I can say that they don't
hold anything back.
Mr. McCaul. I think that is--and I think that is a good
model.
The question the Chair asked as well, an example of a
terror plot that has been thwarted through community outreach--
you mentioned the inauguration. Are there any other specific
terror plots that have been disrupted?
Mr. Hovington. Not that I could discuss at this time.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. No, I will take--perhaps in another forum
we could discuss that.
There were several warning signs in the Hasan case, and I
will--with the limited time I have--which occurred just north
of my district at Fort Hood, whether it was talking to the
radical cleric in Yemen, whether it was business cards saying
he is a soldier of Allah, whether it was his allegiances to the
Koran, not the Constitution.
His colleagues and his classmates saw a sort of
radicalization process taking place, and yet it seems that this
was never reported. I think if we are talking about community
outreach or getting people to speak up--I mean, there were a
lot of flags along the way in the Hasan case where this
potentially could have been prevented or disrupted.
Unfortunately, that didn't happen.
Can anyone on the panel take on the question of, you know,
how can we prevent something like that in the future and get
people that know this radical behavior--get them to step up and
talk to law enforcement about that?
Sheriff Baca. Let me say an example. In one of the mosques
in Los Angeles, right after 9/11, myself and other officials
were in the mosque, and I was reading a Koran, and a young man
walked up to me, and he looked at me, and he says, ``You are
forbidden to touch the Koran.'' I said, ``Well, since I can't
touch the Koran by your standard, why don't you open up the
cover?'' In it was the imam of the mosque writing this message
to me about the Koran.
I said, ``You know, it is guys like you that are jerks that
are causing the bad reputation for people who come here to
pray. You ought to be ashamed of yourself.'' He walked out of
there.
Now, the key to stopping radicalism is you have to confront
it, even if it manifests itself in just a simple little act
like this. You know, the concept of intervention and prevention
is not that they bought all the tools of the terrorist act but
that you challenge their thinking at the point when the
thinking was emerging.
That is not quantified in intelligence reports. I have
always said, and I have said it to the administration, the
Obama administration, don't just tell in intelligence reports
what the threats are, tell us what the resources are around the
threat that we could rely on instead of throwing cops into the
fray or military into the fray.
We have to come up with a more sophisticated response, and
direct confrontation and revelation is the best.
The other is the Lodi case, where the FBI sprung the
Pakistani father and son that went to Pakistan, got
radicalized, came back to Lodi, a farming community, and they
just blew the lid on these guys.
The biggest fear that terrorists have is to reveal that
they are leaning in that direction. Once that happens, they are
dead to the cause. I think a lot of that is not discussed in
some of the literature.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Sheriff.
I yield back.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I agree,
this is an excellent panel.
Ms. Schlanger, one of the challenges your predecessors had
to deal with is somehow making your office more than an
afterthought. I trust you have been empowered by the Secretary
to be part of the entire engagement of DHS before policies are
developed and not have to react after they have been
implemented.
Ms. Schlanger. Chairman Thompson, I thank you for the
support of our office.
Yes, I feel very much supported by the Secretary to be
where I need to be and my staff as well, since I am only one
person--for us to be where we need to be and do what we need to
do to make sure that the Department carries out its statutory
mission of securing the Nation without diminishing the civil
rights and civil liberties of Americans.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. The other question for our other
three witnesses is to not just limit this notion of terrorism
to the Muslim community. I am a southerner. We have a number of
homegrown terrorists in my neck of the woods. Most of them are
called Klansmen.
I want to make sure that when we look at this whole issue
of terrorism that we look at it in its totality and not just
focus on a particular group of individuals in this country.
What I would like to have is each representative kind of give
me the broader view of your operation with respect to this
whole notion of homegrown terrorism.
Ms. Schlanger. We are very much interested in engaging with
all of the communities that have concerns and issues with DHS
activities and with domestic--with the--with the homeland
security policies as they go forward. That is the way we focus
our engagement activities.
We try very hard to be a resource and available to talk to
any of those communities that have those kinds of interests.
Now, we don't do work with the Klan. We don't do work with
any terrorist organization. That is not what our engagement
activities are about. I know you know that. I just want to say
it.
We work with the community leaders who can be our partners
in collaborating against that kind of thing, rather than trying
to engage with people who have crossed over the line into
violent extremism and persuade them to change their ways. That
is just not what my office does.
But we work hard with communities of all ethnicities,
races, religions, to try to deal with their concerns about
homeland security policy.
Mr. Hovington. It is very important to make sure that we
engage with a number of different communities, because
terrorism really is just fear, and that fear comes in different
shapes, forms, and fashion depending on what environment that
you are--that you are looking at.
So whether you are talking about gang activity, whether you
are talking about Klan activity, the bottom line--it is
terrorism. That is one of the things I--we do at the FBI. We
take a look at the various communities.
I would say it is a customized outreach program. What I
mean by that is we have 56 FBI field offices that serve, again,
across this country, and they have to tailor their outreach
efforts based on the demographics of the area of
responsibilities that they serve. That is the only effective
way to do engagement, because there is not one shoe fits all.
So it takes into consideration exactly, Chairman Thompson,
what you said about being from the South. Our southern offices
have to take a look at what is terrorism and what is considered
terrorism in the South or in a urban city.
Sheriff Baca. I think your question is an important
question. I think that those of us in law enforcement are
required to uphold the highest standards of our Constitution
and our Bill of Rights, civil rights and human rights.
In the sheriff's core values, and everyone remembers it by
heart, we are against all forms of racism, sexism, anti-
Semitism, homophobia, and bigotry in all its forms. This is not
a thing where we can allow any sympathies that deal in the
extreme either way.
Really, just harmony is one of the key elements of what we
are trying to achieve, as well as interethnic and interracial
harmony in Los Angeles. Because we are every nation there in
this population, we are trying to set the bar higher to assure
civil rights are respected.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Alomari. From the beginning, Congressman, we really
realized that terrorism is terrorism regardless of the
terrorist, regardless who is the victim. That is really what we
carried in our mission at Ohio Homeland Security.
Not only that, we went one step further. In working with
the fusion center or the FBI or other first responders, we
really--in their outreach efforts, in their presentations, we
work with them closely just to include all the groups.
In our culture competency training program--and I will be
more than happy to share it with you--really we have a whole
section really dedicated to all groups that really espouse all
these views.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There are three votes on the floor and 8--almost 9 minutes
left on the first vote. But most people have not yet voted, so
we will keep this going for a while.
I would just observe one thing in response to this. I think
we would all agree that outreach to communities needs to be
diverse, and I applaud you all for diverse outreach.
But it is also certainly accurate to say that much of the
recent--many of the recent arrests and the attempts at acts on
our homeland have come from Muslims. That doesn't mean that the
Muslim community is a problem, but it does mean that some
members of the Muslim community are a problem and are potential
terrorists. I am not shying away from saying that. I just want
to be clear personally.
Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
I may be in a slightly unique position on the panel.
Somehow I have four primary opponents who think I am too
liberal, one of whom is a----
Mr. Thompson. If the gentleman will yield, I will be a
witness that you are not.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Souder [continuing]. One of the----
Ms. Harman. I was going to agree with them.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Souder. One of them is a former KKK white supremacist
activist who has declared. I also have a--my campaign--longtime
campaign chairman, Zohrab Tazian, is Armenian and has faced, as
an Arab American, discrimination. It is not that I don't
understand the basic premise that my--I believe that without
contacts with the more moderate community we will not know
who--I don't know who is in the mosque who is--who is radical.
I believe that is the case.
Now, here is where we really drill down. Are Hamas and
Hezbollah terrorist organizations? Because almost all--or a
high percentage of Middle Eastern countries have their stated
goal as the destruction of Israel. Hamas and Hezbollah are huge
organizations that are devoted to that.
It is not just about whether somebody is a terrorist. It is
also whether they fund terrorists. It is whether they are
aiding and abetting and encouraging people to go become
terrorists.
We then move into a very difficult question of protected
speech. Clearly, while there is protected speech, at some point
in this debate there is a substantial difference between
protected speech and Government officials going to fundraisers
for organizations that do speech that is radical.
Sheriff Baca, you have been 10 times to the fundraisers for
the Council on American Islamic Relations, which even the FBI
has separated themselves from.
Sheriff Baca. I will be there 10 more times----
Mr. Souder. They have been cited by one FBI agent at least
as a front for Hamas. The question is: At what point do you
start giving legitimacy to organizations that fund Hamas?
Now, in the Ohio Department of Homeland Security, that
organization is one of seven listed who have either had ties to
the Muslim Brotherhood or have been--used extremist rhetoric.
In your brochure, you specifically list the Hamas positions
on the occupation of--Israel's occupation and oppression of
Palestinians. You cite U.S. support for Israel. You cite the
U.S. invasion and occupation of Muslim lands and support for
oppressive regimes as arguments why people develop radicalism.
But by putting those down without the counter arguments
that you, in fact, then start to fuel whether our tax dollars
and a lot of people's tax dollars are, in fact, giving
credibility to these organizations by listing them, by listing
their arguments--that you, in effect, undermine moderate
Muslims who stand up against those organizations.
I would like to hear both of your explanations.
Sheriff Baca. Well, I would like to see the brochure. I
think your accusation is not only false----
Mr. Souder. That wasn't yours. That was Ohio's.
Sheriff Baca. Well, you said it was mine----
Mr. Souder. No, no. I said you went to 10 fundraisers, and
I said----
Sheriff Baca. No, but you just said----
Mr. Souder. No, I did not. I said----
Sheriff Baca. I heard you.
Mr. Souder [continuing]. The Ohio Department of----
Sheriff Baca. Sir----
Mr. Souder [continuing]. Homeland Security.
Sheriff Baca [continuing]. Dialogue here, I heard what you
said. Now, I am an elected official, too, okay?
Mr. Souder. The tape will show I said Ohio Department of
Homeland Security did a brochure.
Sheriff Baca. Well, who are you attacking, me or him?
Mr. Souder. Both.
Sheriff Baca. Well, sir, let me say this.
Mr. Souder. For different reasons.
Sheriff Baca. I understand your fears better than you
probably do. I have been in public office for 12 years and I
have been in law enforcement for 45. I object to your
characterization of me.
Attacking people personally in public office is what--the
very thing that helps spur radicalism, because it defeats the
strategies that you weren't listening to earlier because you
didn't come on time.
Mr. Souder. I was here at the very beginning, sir.
Sheriff Baca. All right. Well, then you heard what I said.
Listen to what I say, and if you don't like it, then we can
talk about it. But don't falsely accuse me of supporting--I
have been to Israel more times than perhaps you have, so----
Mr. Souder. I asked you: ``Did you go to 10 fundraisers?''
and you said, ``Yes.''
Sheriff Baca. Let me tell you what I want to tell you,
since you told me what you want to tell me. I am not afraid of
what you are saying. I have been to Israel more times than you
have. I was in Gaza when the incursion into the Gaza activity
that the Israelis got into--I was there.
Mr. Souder. Reclaiming my time----
Sheriff Baca. Where were you----
Mr. Souder. It is my time.
Sheriff Baca. Where were you----
Mr. Souder. It is my time, not your time.
Sheriff Baca [continuing]. Support Israel----
Mr. Souder. Madam Chair----
Ms. Harman. Yes.
Mr. Souder [continuing]. It is my time.
Ms. Harman. Mr. Souder, I----
Sheriff Baca. Where were you----
Ms. Harman. Excuse me. I would like the witness to have a
chance to respond, and then I will give you extra time----
Mr. Souder. Okay.
Ms. Harman [continuing]. To respond to him.
Sheriff Baca. Where were you when Israel needed an ally in
local law enforcement? I was there. The security of Israel has
always been at the forefront of my thinking. For you to
associate me somehow through some circuitous attack on CAIR is
not only inappropriate, it is un-American.
I served in the United States Marine Corps. I put my life
on the line for people to do what you just did to me. But I am
not going to let you do that here. My record is clear. CAIR is
not a terrorist-supporting organization. That is my experience.
That is my interaction.
If you want to promote that, you are on your own.
Ms. Harman. Let me let the Ohio witness respond to the
comments about his brochure, and we do have a vote on following
that. Mr. Souder, if you would like to say something briefly,
that is fine, and then we will recess for the three votes.
Mr. Alomari. Yes, I really would like to see the brochures
in front of me, because I really don't think that--there was a
lot of inaccuracies that were stated here.
But I just want to say that in our brochures when we said--
we're trying to explain, as a matter of fact, so many things of
what they say, and we are very careful to say they cite these
reasons as to. There was no way that we mention Hamas, as a
matter of fact, in these brochures you alluded to, Congressman.
But we wrote about radicalism. We wrote about radical
Muslim groups, and we explain that. So we definitely feel that
we are balanced in presenting both issues. Under no
circumstances we are sympathizers to any group.
Ms. Harman. Let me suggest, Mr. Souder, that you provide
that brochure for the record so that we can all see it.
Mr. Souder. I would be happy to provide the brochure.*
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* The information has been retained in committee files.
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Ms. Harman. Would you like to respond?
Mr. Souder. Yes. I made a very precise--and by the way,
when a Member is questioning, it is his time, not the witness's
time. They already had their chance, and they need to
understand that.
Now, No. 1, I did not try to tie Mr. Baca, Sheriff Baca, to
anything other than attending 10 fundraisers. Clearly, we
disagree on CAIR.
I do not question your patriotism. I do not question your
goal here. I question the strategy of going to an organization
that we disagree about. I was not trying to circuitously tie
you to Ohio.
In Ohio, I did not say that you don't mention that these
were the arguments that fuel radicalism. My question was much
more precise and much more nuanced, and that is when you state
what reasons they have without countering in the same brochure
the counter arguments, you fuel and use the funds and power of
a Government to basically give legitimacy to what are, in fact,
the positions of Hamas, whether you said it or not.
It is a nuanced argument. I think it is an important
argument because what we have seen Europe do--and what we are
concerned about the United States--in such a desperation to try
to get legitimate information to basically throw Israel under
the bus and--and start to not understand that Hamas and
Hezbollah are increasingly connecting to other organizations.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Souder.
We will recess for the duration of the votes.
I would just like to say, as the Chair of this
subcommittee, that it is my intention to be respectful to all
the Members on this panel but also to be respectful to all the
witnesses. Questioning is intended to engage you in a dialogue,
speaking for me, and I would hope we could keep it in that--in
that vein.
These are tough issues. We all understand that. We are
under lots of criticism all the time from outsiders who think
we don't do these hearings right. But it is certainly my
intention to have balanced hearings and air the tough issues.
To the Members, we are going to try to put on a hearing
about the internet and its role in fomenting violent extremist
behavior. That is very controversial, but we are going to try
to tackle it because it is out there and it is necessary.
Thank you. The Ranking Member just said good. So everybody
take a deep breath. We will be back for more questions. I thank
you again for your participation.
[Recess.]
Ms. Harman. We will now recess--reconvene the hearing.
Thank you all. Apologies for the House schedule.
Mr. Dent is now--of Pennsylvania is now recognized for 5
minutes of questions.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks for conducting
this hearing.
Last week I, along with the rest of the world, was informed
that the FBI was holding a Caucasian American woman since
October on four felony counts, including conspiracy to kill in
a foreign country and providing material support to terrorists.
As you know, the woman I am referring to is Colleen LaRose, a/
k/a ``Jihad Jane.''
I was even more shocked when I learned that she actually
lived just a few blocks from my district office on Main Street
in the quaint front-porch town of Pennsburg. That is a really
lovely community--Norman Rockwell, wonderful place. That is
where ``Jihad Jane'' is from, Pennsburg.
In fact, my sister lives right in that area, close by,
Pennsburg mail address. Never would I have imagined that
homegrown terrorism was lurking literally in my family's
backyard.
Let me state for the record that I am grateful for the
tremendous job done by the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force in
Philadelphia, as well as the invested residents in the
surrounding community.
I had the opportunity for a further briefing during my
visit to the JTTF last Friday, and I certainly want to thank
the FBI for making that opportunity available to me.
Ms. LaRose was picked up largely because concerned citizens
saw a YouTube video she posted on the internet and reported it
to authorities. You know, once again, it was--a concerned,
alert citizenry was our best defense in a situation like this.
I also learned that--we all learned that another woman,
Jamie Ramirez, a blond Caucasian mother from Colorado, was
arrested in Ireland in connection with the ``Jihad Jane'' plot.
She, too, was essentially radicalized over the internet,
converted to Islam, and began posting messages on her Facebook
profile page.
So my questions are really simple. You know, No. 1, how
does this happen? How do we stop it? I mean, that is really the
issue. How do we balance the overwhelming desire to have a--a
free and open internet against the threat of radicalization and
homegrown terrorism? So I would like each of you to maybe
comment on that.
I think we all recognize the internet is a tool that is
being used by terrorists to communicate, to recruit, to plan,
to plot, to prepare, to train, and to--and to execute terror
plots. So I would be curious to hear your comments.
Mr. Hovington. Thank you. That is a major challenge for us.
Again, the internet being a very open environment--and of
course, a lot of it falling over from universities that operate
in that type of open environment.
It is a challenge to identify a lone wolf, and that is one
of the biggest challenge that we face, and almost, I would say
next to impossible without the help of communities and citizens
that stand up and identify individuals.
I think that is why it is also very important, in some of
the earlier conversations that we had--is to emphasize
community engagement is really about engaging ordinary people.
It is about taking our 56 FBI field offices that have community
outreach programs and making sure that they are reaching at the
grassroots level.
National type organizations are great. They are contacts
that we should maintain contact with to receive information or
if--anything that they report from the constituents that they
have.
But I think effective outreach has to really go to the
arena of individuals identifying and being able to pick up the
phone and calling the FBI or calling the State or local
municipalities to report something that they just feel
uncomfortable with.
That is only going to come through building meaningful
partnerships and relationships that are built on transparency
and understanding.
Sheriff Baca. Yes, it is a very important question. I think
that, you know, our Joint Regional Intelligence Center and
other intelligence-gathering mechanisms--we are surfing the net
all the time.
The question about this woman--you know, the
characterization of what a terrorist is is something that we
really need to spend a little more time on. My point of this--
there are screwballs everywhere and that there are people who
are attracted to something for reasons that are almost
inexplicable.
Every faith has had these kinds of people, including those
that want to be a part of something they believe is a faith
effort. It is very important in terms of just how we discuss
the issues of fighting terrorism to not drag a religion into
the acts of what human beings do.
Religion has its own purpose and terrorism is not one of
them. This woman somehow got into this mindset but clearly, I
see it like the medical doctor at Fort Hood. He is a screwball.
You know, he lost his brains. I don't think that anyone would
disagree with that, that human minds are fragile.
So we surf the net. We have a decision to make whether you
want to keep the chatter going or cut it off. What is amazing
about technology, since America is a forefront leader on it, is
that the servers for all these internets are coming out of our
Nation. If we want to shut them off, all we have to do is call
the company and say, ``By the way, you have got an issue
here,'' and they will--they will cut them off.
But the question is: Should we cut it off? Then what do you
do with it once you know that it is a possible threat?
Mr. Alomari. Thank you, Congressman. I think this is a
really wonderful question. I really think that the internet is
one of the most dangerous tools, obviously, to recruit people.
But I think it is clear that many of these websites that we
see, obviously, they promulgate different views which attracts
a lot of folks.
One thing is missing in the picture, in my estimate, which
I mentioned earlier should be part of a comprehensive view, you
know, to the issue of terrorism, and that is really to empower
Muslim communities to counter the ideas and ideologies that we
see on the internet, at least all these unanswered ideologies
that we see on the internet.
They often are unanswered. In Ohio, for instance, we really
have a couple of meetings in which we discussed, for instance,
the recent fatwa issued by Sheikh ul-Qadri who really condemned
suicide bombing and violence and terrorism.
I think the Government should do a better job, really, to
connect with a lot of Muslim leaders and organizations to help
us really in this fight. There is a conceptual flaw that there
are no moderate Muslims there, and I really believe that there
are many of them.
Ms. Schlanger. I don't know if--since the time is out if
you want to hear from me or not.
Ms. Harman. We would be happy to hear from you.
Ms. Schlanger. Thank you, Madam Chair. One of the things
that we work very hard to do is cultural competency training
for local and State law enforcement. I think the reason that
that belongs in this mix is because it allows--an appropriately
trained law enforcement agent can distinguish between what is
concerning and what is not.
So we try to be a part of that mix. But I want to agree
that it is--it is our community partners who can be reliably
informed by engagement efforts and empowered by them who really
bear the responsibility to counter radical ideology, because as
the Chair started us off saying, the Government has a business
with violence, not with non--not with nonviolent radicalism.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Dent.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Clarke for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank you for
such a--such a very interesting hearing today.
I am from New York, and so all of what has been stated here
today really resonates with me. We are challenged in New York
City with having such a very dense and diverse population, and
how we communicate as New Yorkers to be able to uncover those
amongst us who may seek to do us harm is always a challenge.
We have been fortunate that a number of community and
civic-minded individuals have stepped up to the cause. Comes to
mind a woman named Ms. Devorah Halberstam, and I don't know if
any of you have heard of her, but in 1994 her son was killed in
a--an attack, a terrorist attack, on the Brooklyn Bridge.
Ever since his death, she committed her life--and has been
honored by New York's FBI and will be honored here in
Washington, so much so that she was able to have a law passed
in New York State addressing comprehensive gun control laws for
the State of New York.
That is the type of activism that, unfortunately, an
incident brings about but I think begins to open up the
community to more dialogue around how we want to communicate
with each other and find those who may be homegrown and
disillusioned amongst us, as well as identify strangers in our
midst, which is very hard in a place like New York, which is a
gateway for individuals who are seeking to come to the United
States to make it their home.
So my question for all of you are--is, you know, how can
community groups and individuals engage local law enforcement
in a consistent manner on their concerns without being seen as
undermining their own communities from which they come?
We have ethnic conclaves in New York, and no one wants to
be seen as someone who either comes up with false accusations
but also wants to be able to share information. What tools or
what would you say the best way for individuals or community
organizations to go about doing so?
We have such an organization called the Council of People's
Organizations in Brooklyn which basically educates local Muslim
American community leaders and clergy. But what would you say
are some of the other tools that you have seen that are
effective?
Sheriff Baca. May I answer that? In the testimony that I
provided as well as in this brochure--and I hope you have one--
--
Ms. Clarke. Yes, I do.
Sheriff Baca [continuing]. Public trust is what we are
talking about. The concepts of public trust are such that you
really need to work on the aspect of participation, not just
going to lectures and meetings. Participation means the police
have to learn to take advice. Advice can come from various
councils, such as the one you have described.
But in Los Angeles, we have Middle Eastern advisory
councils. We have Iranian--that are made up of Iranians,
Pakistanis, Armenians, Lebanese, people from the various ethnic
and racial groups, including an interfaith council, and the
objective, of course, is to exchange ideas and issues and fears
and problems.
A lot of people from the ethnic communities have fear of
the police, and the first thing we have to do is knock that
down. That won't be done unless the police represent the
highest standards of America's laws.
I mentioned earlier in my testimony it is the Constitution,
the Bill of Rights, civil rights and human rights. Police that
engage people in that vein of human rights and civil rights, as
well as Bill of Rights and the Constitutional guarantees--then
the public trusts them.
So the concept of how to engage are multiple faceted
concepts. But it is religion, ethnic, language, as well as
racial. Thank you.
Mr. Alomari. May I? I would like to echo what Sheriff Baca
said, but I would like to go one step further by saying that
one of the approaches that really worked for us in Ohio is the
fact that we did--do not work in the communities only when
there is a problem or an issue.
It really is based on a genuine relationship that we built.
It is dynamic. It is proactive, engaging, and really covers
multitude of issues. We are really listening to the issues and
concerns of the communities and we would like them to listen to
our concerns and issues.
It took us a long time to build trust because many of the
recent immigrants and refugees--they come from countries where
they distrust the Government and law enforcement. So it was a
really lengthy process for us, and we had to prove ourselves.
We succeeded by really giving them a voice.
One thing we found out right after our office was
established--we did a survey that we found out that there is a
semi-consensus in the community that they feel that they have
been treated and dealt with as outsiders.
Our program wants to bring them on board. They are
included. So we had an inclusive approach. So the issue here is
in our culture competency training we tell first responders we
really suggest to build relationship with the mosque, with the
organization, with the youth, with the women.
Go there, stop by, say hello. When there is celebration,
say congratulations. But do not really just stop there. A
multitude of issues have to be covered. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Ms. Clarke.
No other Members are--have returned, so I am going to
excuse this panel.
I just again want to observe that the discussion here,
while it focuses on better understanding of diverse
communities, is really intended to help all of us find those
few people amongst us who would--who intend to do harm to our
country.
One of the corollaries of that is by finding those people
within diverse communities we keep those communities safe,
because we remove the few people there who would intend harm to
all of us, including members in their own community.
So I just want to make sure we are focused on the intention
here. This is the Homeland Security Committee. This is the
Intelligence Subcommittee. It is certainly my view, as I stated
at the outset, that accurate, actionable, and timely
intelligence is the way we prevent and disrupt plots.
My view is that a very sensible tool in that effort is
building trust relationships with communities. I think you all
agree with that, and I want to thank you for you testimony and
hope that you will continue to work with us as we thread our
way through very, very difficult issues that raise
Constitutional concerns and that offer some real opportunities
for making real progress in the effort to protect the homeland.
Thank you very much. You are excused.
I would like to call the second panel.
Everybody ready? Thank you all and thank you for your
patience. The good news is that Congress is in recess for the
St. Patrick's Day lunch. Happy St. Patrick's Day, everybody.
But that means we will have an uninterrupted time to hear from
you and ask you our questions.
I now welcome our second panel of witnesses, Mr. Elibiary--
there he is--is president and CEO of the Freedom and Justice
Foundation, F&J. The foundation facilitates cooperation between
State and local law enforcement and the Texas Muslim community.
In 2005 Mr. Elibiary spearheaded the formation of the Texas
Islamic Council, made up of Muslim congregations, with over
100,000 members, and it is the largest Muslim community in
Texas.
Mr. Elibiary was a 2008 to 2009 fellow at the American
Muslim Civic Leadership Institute run jointly by the University
of Southern California and Georgetown University.
A National security expert, he has recently consulted with
the Global Engagement Group at NCTC in the--during the Obama
administration, is a contributor for counterterrorism issues to
national news organizations such as CNN and Fox.
Professor Ramirez teaches at Northwestern School of Law
where she lectures on criminal justice, community partnerships,
and law enforcement. She serves as the executive director of
the Partnering for Prevention and Community Safety Initiative,
PFP.
PFP fosters communication between law enforcement agencies
and the American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. Partnering
for Prevention has published best practices studies for
community engagement as well as case studies of select cities
in the United States and Great Britain.
Mr. Ervin--how are you, Clark?
Mr. Ervin. Good to see you.
Ms. Harman. Good to see you, too. I understand that someone
to my left had an old association with you. Is that true?
Mr. Ervin. That is exactly right.
Ms. Harman. I won't reveal what that might be.
Mr. Ervin is the director of the Aspen Institute's Homeland
Security Program. The Homeland Security Program works to
heighten public awareness of our Nation's continued
vulnerability to terrorism and to persuade the Nation to take
necessary steps to secure our homeland.
Prior to holding this position, Mr. Ervin served as the
first inspector general of the Department of Homeland Security,
and a very courageous person in that role. He also served
previously as inspector general in the Department of State.
In addition to his work for the institute, Mr. Ervin is an
on-air analyst and contributor for CNN, where his focus is on
homeland security, National security, and intelligence.
Without objection, your full statements will be inserted in
the record. I would ask you to summarize in 5 minutes or less.
Now I ask Mr. Elibiary to begin.
STATEMENT OF MOHAMED ELIBIARY, CO-FOUNDER, THE FREEDOM AND
JUSTICE FOUNDATION
Mr. Elibiary. Thank you very much, Honorable Chair Harman
and Ranking Member McCaul and the other Representatives who
will probably be joining us later.
Basically, my comments are going to focus on system
engineering challenges that have hampered our communities'
collaboration with law enforcement on advance counterterrorism
issues, like interdiction, busting up terror plots, and the
title of this hearing.
We feel that the issue of homegrown extremism plots is a
serious one, but we also caution that it is not a pandemic and
that we should advance reforms very carefully around this
issue.
First, I would like to say that our group feels very
strongly that securitizing the relationship between law
enforcement and American Muslim community would end up becoming
counterproductive and could actually replay some of the most
troublesome aspects of the 1960s and 1970s and today cause some
very devastating global consequences.
We have advocated for years that our homeland security
policies in the CVE, or combating violent extremism, sphere are
often counter-productive, as I mentioned, and feed into the
very alienation that they try to alleviate.
Two examples of this is that while the Government has
publicly claimed a desire for partnership with the mainstream
American Muslim community, law enforcement has been left only
offering the community a conduit to inform on community members
of concern.
Another example is that while not every radicalization
problem is a nail, our use of the FBI hammer certainly frames
all problems as nails in the eyes of many in the community.
The FBI has been doing a tremendous job, and I am not
ragging on them or anything, and myself, as the vice president
of the FBI alumni association for the Dallas and North Texas
region, can attest to the hard work that a lot of these men and
women have done over the years and continue to do to keep us
all safe.
There are, however, structural problems that we need to
explore if we want to see that higher level of cooperation I
mentioned earlier.
For example, low-hanging fruits--these are potential
recruits that arrive at this category various different ways,
to violent extremism movements. They are a security risk and
therefore cannot be left unmonitored by law enforcement,
especially the FBI.
When one explores the seemingly shrinking ``radicalization
process'', which I put in quotes, over the previous few years,
ending with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab being less than 6 months,
one can appreciate the pressures that the bureau must conduct
its work under.
There is a good deal of anecdotal evidence, however, that
some bureau field offices, in response to such pressures, have
elected to increase their surveillance of religious
institutions or places where this pool might be assumed to
congregate, as well as use the technique of agent provocateurs
fairly aggressively.
There are more subtle techniques that can be used to
neutralize such unacceptable security vulnerabilities, but they
do not lie within the FBI. I would strongly recommend that they
do not be created within the FBI.
Because this kind of work essentially is going to be--it
needs an iron fist inside of a velvet glove. As one who has
worked many a times with JTTF squads around not just Texas but
elsewhere, there is a--I am seeing that my time is running
down.
So basically, I will move on to my other points, but this
issue we can explore later, about where it has worked and where
currently some examples with the JTTFs are impossible for us to
pull off in the community.
I would like to also say that the issue of the moderate and
mainstream Muslims needs to be explored because that narrative
framing is often counterproductive in getting as many people
as--I mean, Sheriff Baca mentioned earlier to engage.
Our goal is countering violent extremism. The
counterideological work needs to be left up to the community.
We need to have more confidence in our democratic system and
its institutions to be able to withstand those challenges from
foreign ideologies.
All right. So in conclusion, what I would like to say is
that we have--we don't feel that the Government should adopt a
comprehensive countering violent extremism strategy or a
counter radicalization strategy, as it was called several years
ago.
But we do think that there needs to be a lot of micro
strategies that end up being coordinated, and we identify eight
different areas where those need to happen. The one critical
one that I think you guys are going to want to eventually delve
into is the interdiction issue, which--my time is up now, but
we can explore later. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Elibiary follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mohamed Elibiary
March 17, 2010
Honorable Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and other honorable
Representatives, it is truly an honor to testify before your committee
today at the invitation of Chairman Thompson. In my testimony before
you, I will attempt to share a mainstream community assessment, as well
as an assessment of the current ``systems engineering'' challenges
subverting more effective cooperation across the various agencies. In
closing, I hope to offer some practical suggestions as next steps for
this committee and Congress to examine. In summary, we feel this
hearing's topic is important, very timely, and part of safeguarding our
communities. We feel the issue of homegrown terrorism plots is a
serious one, but would caution that it is not a pandemic and we should
advance reforms cautiously.
INTRODUCTION
First let me start out by outlining that our group feels strongly
that ``securitizing'' the relationship between law enforcement and the
American Muslim community would be counter-productive and could
actually replay the most troublesome aspects of the 1960s and 1970s
with more devastating global consequences. I have advocated for years
that our homeland security policies in the countering violent extremism
(CVE) sphere are often counter-productive and feed into the very
alienation they try to alleviate.
For example, while the Government has publicly claimed a desire for
a ``partnership'' with the mainstream American Muslim community, law
enforcement has only offered the community a conduit to ``inform'' on
community members of concern. Another example is that while not every
radicalization problem is a nail, our use of the FBI hammer certainly
frames all problems as nails. The FBI has been doing a tremendous job,
and, as vice president of a non-profit associated with the Bureau, I
can attest to the hard work of those thousands of men and women keeping
us safe. There is however structural problems worth resolving if we
truly wish to see a higher level of cooperation between the Government
and communities in disrupting terror plots. Two examples are:
1. Low-hanging potential recruits for violent extremist/terrorism
movements are a security risk and therefore cannot be left
unmonitored by law enforcement, especially the FBI. When one
explores the seemingly shrinking ``radicalization process''
over the previous few years, ending with Umar Farouq
Abdulmuttalib less than 6 months ago, one can appreciate the
pressures the under which the Bureau must conduct its work.
There is a good deal of anecdotal evidence that some Bureau
field offices, in response to such pressures, elected to
increase their surveillance of religious institutions and
expand their use of more coercive techniques such as Agent
Provocateur Informants. More subtle techniques to identify and
neutralize such unacceptable security vulnerabilities as low
hanging potential violent extremism recruits are available, but
not within the FBI. While these subtle techniques are not being
utilized, the mainstream community is left bewildered,
confused, and distrustful of enhanced community collaboration
on CVE.
2. Either through a civil liberties office at DHS or a community
relations office at the FBI, grievance redress is a major
hurdle to community relationship-building on advanced CVE
efforts. During the recent January 20 meeting with the DHS
Secretary, mainstream community leadership clearly relayed the
grassroots sentiment that not a single category of community
grievances with DHS has ever been fully ``resolved.'' Unlike in
other Western nations such as the United Kingdom (UK), in the
United States, there are clear operational policy firewalls at
major law enforcement agencies and the community relations
conduits engaging with communities across the country. This
divide is not lost upon the communities whose assistance is
most needed to disrupt terror plots and simply feeds the
perception that these communities are to be ``managed'' as a
``suspect pool'' and not ``trusted'' as true ``partners.''
At the request of our Government I spent the past week in London,
at a conference and at U.S. Embassy meetings, analyzing the issue of
on-line youth radicalization and CVE. It would be a shame for us to not
heed the hard lessons learned by the U.K. Home Office, and others, in
terms of their outreach methods in their PREVENT Strategy, which is the
CVE portion of the U.K.'s Counter-Terrorism (CT) CONTEST Strategy.
In spending time with some U.K. Muslim leaders, visiting the London
Central Mosque and meeting with U.K. Think Tank Radicalization
Researchers, the message was clear across the board that Government
must first strive to ``do no harm'' and tread very softly. That is the
attitude we have consistently shared with various intelligence and law
enforcement agency officials, including a couple of years ago at the
National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)-sponsored working conference
with U.K. intelligence officials, subject matter experts, and select
community leaders on what Counter-Radicalization lessons the United
States can draw from the U.K. Prevent model. We reiterate this cautious
tone here today, but would like to remind the subcommittee that
Congress should not legislate a comprehensive U.S. CVE Strategy,
because that will surely ``securitize the relationship.'' However, by
doing so, we can improve many other issues by promoting the
establishment of ``coordinated micro-strategies.''
The U.S. Government deserves some credit for recognizing and moving
to address several CVE blind spots in the United States' current CT
strategy and the overarching National Security (NS) strategy.
Congressional authorization designated the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to be the lead department to counter ideologically-
driven violence and stems from the 9/11 Recommendations Reform Act of
2007 (HB1) and subsequent Presidential Executive Orders. While we
strongly advise against a Government-wide CVE Strategy, we feel that
DHS should establish its own CVE Strategy for a number of reasons.
1. Legally, DHS is currently mandated to, and has previously
attempted to, craft such a strategy unilaterally without public
disclosure and community input.
2. To align the various entities both within and outside DHS, such
as fusion centers, so they are on an effective,
constitutionally compliant course in this growing area of law
enforcement concern.
3. To develop the subject matter expertise on CVE sorely needed by
the Government on what works and what does not in the United
States.
4. Without an ``official'' CVE Strategy within DHS, the Department
is effectively executing a strategy that is unfocused and
counter-productive at times.
Our foundation, as outlined in the November 2009 Congressional
Research Service (CRS) Report on Terrorism Information Sharing via the
Nationwide Suspicious Activities Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI), has
been a leading proponent of adopting proven community-oriented policing
in the domestic CT sphere. We worked with the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence's (ODNI) Program Manager for the Information
Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) on multiple initiatives improving
information-sharing, analytical capacity, and community relations. Two
upcoming developments along these lines will be a definition of
``radicalization'' for the State and local law enforcement community as
well as the ``Building Communities of Trust Initiative'' best-practices
recommendations report, both expected to be released by April 2010.
HIGHLIGHTS OF RADICALIZATION DEFINITION
Defining ``radicalization'' for the law enforcement (LE)
community--ODNI's PM-ISE release at National Fusion Center Policy
Conference (February 2010) with full public release expected by April
2010.
William H. Webster, Chairman, Homeland Security Advisory
Council: ``tending or disposed to make extreme changes in
existing views, habits, institutions or conditions.''
Non-conformity to mainstream perspectives is protected by
the First Amendment and according to ISE SAR Functional
Standard Version 1.5, First Amendment-protected activities
should not be considered ``suspicious'' ``absent articulable
facts and circumstances that support the . . . suspicion that
the behavior observed is not innocent, but rather reasonably
indicative of criminal activity . . . ''.
Government communicating an assumption that violent
extremism views are supported by the minority community creates
a public perception that the minority community supports
violent extremism and undermines the relationship between the
community and law enforcement.
When First Amendment freedoms (speech and assembly) are
unconstitutionally used as grounds for launching investigative
actions, then effective ``counter-radicalization'' efforts are
undermined and the ability of violent extremists to target
society is actually made easier.
Effective and constitutionally compliant CVE policy recognizes that
there is a division of labor between the United States' Government
(USG) and the community. This healthy division of labor is explained by
the pie chart below where the Government acts when the ISE functional
standard metric is met and the community challenges the ideological
struggles associated with violent extremism independently.
DHS'S CVE POLICY FORMULATION EVOLUTION
ROADMAP FOR MOVING FORWARD
We believe that eight (8) different micro-strategies are needed by
the United States to effectively address the vulnerabilities recently
highlighted by homegrown violent extremism cases.
1. U.S. Violent Radicalization Interdiction Framework.--Currently,
there is a non-standardized ad-hoc protocol covering the point at which
the community's efforts end and the Government, primarily through law
enforcement, begins. For most communities the only option before them
is to call the FBI, which is often not the most effective method. In
researching this issue, including discussions with community leaders
and the FBI, CT investigators, as well as our foundation's experience
working on successful and unsuccessful violent radicalization
interdiction cases, we believe that such an effort will involve
multiple agencies and the coordination of multiple Congressional
committees.
In short, we lack in the United States, a program like the United
Kingdom's CHANNEL Project. This is an effort that needs to be an ``iron
fist inside a velvet glove,'' and as we previously shared with folks at
the NCTC, it requires a degree of interagency ``operational
coordination'' that no entity within the Government is currently
capable of performing. So we are recommending that both DHS and the
various Muslim mainstream groups around the country continue their
engagement efforts, but recognize that this issue will need to be
addressed sooner or later within DHS.
2. Law Enforcement Information Sharing.--As we shared in the CRS
Report referenced above and the three primary offices on this issue
(DHS, FBI and PM-ISE), we feel that there are some clearly identifiable
schisms in the system needing to be addressed. Since this issue is not
the focus of this hearing, we won't elaborate more here.
3. Interagency Strategic Communications Working Group.--The United
Kingdom's Home Office has a department specifically tasked with
coordinating the messaging between the various key agencies with a
direct impact on CVE work. In the United States, we need an inter-
agency coordinating entity that would put DOJ-FBI, DHS, the Department
of State, and other agencies' public affairs offices on a similar wave
length.
4. State-Level Law Enforcement Engagement Strategies.--Across the
country, the Federal Government has thus far failed State, local, and
Tribal law enforcement agencies in providing clear guidance on their
role in CVE and how best to execute that role using community-oriented
policing principles. Thankfully, in the near future, the ODNI's PM-ISE
office will be releasing such guidance to State and local law
enforcement and fusion centers in a report compiling the lessons
learned from the multi-city ``Building Communities of Trust
Initiative.''
5. Effective DHS & DOJ Redress Processes.--As mentioned earlier,
the lack of an effective redress process leaves a minority community
with one of three conclusions to draw: That the authorities don't care,
are incompetent or intentionally wish to humiliate the community. Any
of these conclusions are severely detrimental to building up the trust
needed to deepen community-law enforcement collaboration on advanced CT
efforts such as terror plot disruption.
6. Social Delinquency/Prevention/Integration Programs.--While these
programs do not directly impact the hard-core radicalized individuals
pursuing a terror plot, they are essential in creating a healthy eco-
system within communities and restraining the growth of violent
extremism movements. The United States has a long tradition of
immigrant integration through a multi-generational identity formulation
process. It is clear that today at least two factors are slowing down
this natural process. The first is that with the communications
revolution, old world connections and politics resonate within the
immigrant psyche longer. The second is that our country is currently
engaged militarily in multiple conflicts overseas with a direct threat
to the homeland consistently highlighted in the public discourse.
Both of these challenges will drive the multi-decade developed
American Muslim identity to expand its narrative within American Muslim
communities to include addressing geo-political conflicts across the
majority-Muslim regions globally. To achieve this, non-Muslim
communities and policymakers must support the expansion of the geo-
political public discourse space, especially within locations where the
Muslim identity group might congregate (ex. Mosques).
We should remember the resilient strength of our democracy and not
fear any public ideological discussion, because it is when such
discussions are shut down within brick and mortar locations that they
go underground on the internet. Organized communities cannot be
reasonably expected to disrupt the counter-ideological messaging of
violent extremism networks when these communities' patriotism will be
called into question. We have a long history in this country of
mitigating radical ideologies with various youth and immigrant
integration programs (ex. Boys Scouts/Girl Scouts, Big Brother/Big
Sister, etc.), and we can simply expand such programs to include the
current generational and cultural breakdown occurring within many
Muslim families.
7. U.S. Congress Engagement & Information Sharing.--The Executive
Branch's law enforcement agencies driving CVE policy should become more
engaged with the Legislative Branch and share an annual report not
highlighting its successes but the self-identified shortcomings in
working with communities to counter violent extremism. Such an
assessment, while politically sensitive, would aid Congress to focus on
the hurdles primarily hampering closer community collaboration to
disrupt terror plots.
8. U.S. Public's (Media, Academia, etc.) Engagement.--Congress
should work with DHS to fund competitive grant programs for academic
institutions to conduct fact-finding missions at the grassroots level
on improving community-law enforcement cooperation. Similarly, as with
the engagement of Congress (in No. 7), the Executive Branch's inter-
agency strategic communications coordination office (in No. 3) should
share their research with mass media trade associations and journalism
schools to create a ripple effects beyond the Government's reach. This
would not be ``guidance'' from the Government to the media, but simply
a window for the media, and by extension the public, into how our
violent extremism enemies capitalize on our messaging.
CONCLUSION
I'd like to thank the subcommittee once more for inviting me to
share our experiences in struggling to find the right formula to
advance community-law enforcement cooperation in the mutual goal of
disrupting terror plots. When we started years ago, we were quietly
advised that we were attempting to address an issue, homegrown violent
extremism, that doesn't really exist, or worse yet, was part of
President Bush's War on Islam. Though it was a slow slog in the
beginning, I feel fairly confident that the mainstream American Muslim
community assets are slowly shaking off deep-seated fears, stemming
from some post-9/11 law enforcement efforts, to mobilize with
confidence and address the challenges, and improving our country's
counter-terrorism architecture in the process. On a daily basis, I see
a network- and resource-rich community wanting to help make our law
enforcement agencies become more effective, but sadly, it is not so
easy to connect sometimes with the management of these agencies.
Disrupting terror plots is something both law enforcement and the
community have proven multiple times is achievable.
Lastly, I'd like to publicly commend the Council on American
Islamic Relations (CAIR) for being brave enough to step forward and
allow us to facilitate the cooperation with the FBI concerning the
recent disappearance case of 5 young men to Pakistan from Alexandria,
Virginia. CAIR, like numerous other community groups who've requested
us as a liaison between them and law enforcement on sensitive cases,
knew of our previous interdiction efforts with American Muslim youth.
To their credit, despite the overwhelming political assault they've
weathered since
9/11, they recognized that the community's interests are safeguarded
when community leaders act with an objective and nuanced understanding
of the law enforcement community. The same needs to be achieved from
within the law enforcement community if we are to truly advance from
our current ad-hoc state to one of ``operational coordination'' between
the two communities in disrupting terror plots.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ramirez.
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH A. RAMIREZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PARTNERING
FOR PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY SAFETY INITIATIVE, NORTHEASTERN
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Ms. Ramirez. Madam Chair, Members of the subcommittee,
thank you for giving me the time to testify this morning.
The best way to obtain community information needed to
thwart terrorism threats is by applying community policing
techniques to counter terrorism. Homegrown Muslim terrorists
are likely to reside in Muslim communities. Muslim terrorists
from abroad are likely to conceal themselves in those same
communities.
We are blessed in the United States with a Muslim
population that, with very few exceptions, is committed to
combating terrorism. But we failed to take advantage of this
blessing and to develop a systematic strategy to obtain and use
community information to thwart terrorism and to fight
extremism.
Our British counterparts, having learned the lessons of the
2005 bombings, have made enormous efforts to develop such a
systematic strategy, which they appropriately call a PREVENT
strategy.
To be blunt, they are miles ahead of the U.S. law
enforcement, whose efforts in this regard are local rather than
National. We can learn from the British example.
The benefits of such a strategy can and should be measured
in terrorist acts averted and lives spared. The British first
reaped the benefits of their strategy in April 2008, when
members of a U.K. mosque went to local law enforcement with
information about Isa Ibrahim, a student who planned to blow
himself up with a suicide vest.
He was arrested. He was convicted. This was the first time
that a tip from the Muslim community in the United Kingdom led
to a major terrorism arrest.
We tasted the fruits of our own community outreach efforts
in December 2009, when the Council on American Islamic
Relations, CAIR, put families in touch with the FBI to report
that their sons had left for Pakistan with the intent to join
the fight against America. This tip led to the arrest of the
young men in Pakistan and spared their lives as well as lives
of soldiers.
Because community information can thwart terrorist threats,
it is an essential tool to put in the counterterrorism tool
box. Yet in the United States today, the few community-law
enforcement partnerships focused on preventing terrorism, hate
crimes, and extremism are all operating independently of each
other, without any central coordination or collaborative
structure.
There are no National programs to provide the training,
protocols, tools, and research necessary to demonstrate to
other communities how to begin, nurture, sustain, and
strengthen these efforts.
Nor is there a central clearinghouse for information about
such efforts, which could be used to disseminate best
practices, promising practices, and lessons learned.
More fundamentally, we lack a National collaborative
infrastructure in which to organize these efforts. Some are
done by the sheriff's office, DHS, FBI. We need a single
unified structure.
How could we design a coordinated infrastructure for this
purpose? We would need the FBI's 56 field offices to meet on a
regular basis with community members to develop local
collaborative strategies for preventing terrorism, extremism,
and hate crimes.
In those meetings, bridges of trust and communication need
to be built. Specifically, we need them to create community
message centers staffed by agents trained to evaluate the
reliability and credibility of community information.
This means we have to train the community members about
what to be on the lookout for. We have to inform them about who
to call. We have to designate officers on how to evaluate
community information and create protocols for responding to
these kind of tips.
To make this work, we need a National training and resource
center to coordinate and support these efforts, and such a
center needs to be located in an academic environment that is
neutral and detached and can provide expertise to both law
enforcement and the community about how best to collaborate.
In closing, one may ask, ``Why should we do this?'' Because
if there were another attack, all of us would want to say we
did everything we could to prevent it. But if we fail in this
room to garner the political will to create this
infrastructure, we can't say that.
[The statement of Ms. Ramirez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deborah A. Ramirez
The best way to obtain the community information needed to thwart
terrorist threats is by applying community policing techniques to
counter-terrorism. Homegrown Muslim terrorists are likely to reside in
Muslim communities; Muslim terrorists from abroad are likely to attempt
to conceal themselves in these same communities. We are blessed in the
United States with a Muslim population that, with very few exceptions,
are committed to combating terrorism. Yet, we have failed to take
advantage of this blessing and develop a systematic strategy to obtain
and use community information to thwart terrorism and fight extremism.
Our British counterparts, after the painful lessons learned from the
London subway bombings in 2005, have made enormous efforts to develop
such a systematic strategy, which they aptly call their PREVENT
strategy. To be blunt, they are miles ahead of U.S. law enforcement,
whose efforts in this regard are local rather than National. We can
learn from the British example.
The benefits of such a strategy can be measured in terrorist acts
averted and lives spared. The British first reaped the benefits of
their strategy in April 2008, when members of a mosque in the United
Kingdom contacted local police and provided information about Isa
Ibrahim, a student who planned to blow himself up with a suicide vest.
Ibrahim was arrested and convicted. This was the first time a tip from
the Muslim community in Great Britain led to a major terrorism arrest.
We tasted the fruits of the efforts of our own community outreach
efforts in December 2009, when the Council on American Islamic
Relations (CAIR), put families in touch with the FBI to report that
their sons had left for Pakistan with the intent to join the fight
against America. This tip led to the arrest of the young men in
Pakistan, and probably spared both their lives as well as the lives of
U.S. and Pakistani soldiers. Because community information can thwart
terrorist threats, it is an essential tool to put into the
counterterrorism tool box.
Yet, in the United States today, the few community-law enforcement
partnerships that are focused on preventing terrorism, hate crimes, and
extremism operate independently of each other, without any central
coordination or collaborative structure. There are no National programs
to provide the training, protocols, tools, or research necessary to
demonstrate how to begin, nurture, and strengthen these community
efforts. Nor is there a central clearinghouse for information about
such efforts, which could disseminate promising practices, best
practices and lessons learned in the United States and abroad. More
fundamentally, we lack a National collaborative infrastructure in which
to organize these efforts. Some of these efforts are being made by
local police departments, others by DHS, still others by FBI field
offices. We need a single unified structure.
How could we design a coordinated National infrastructure to
support and nurture these efforts? We need each FBI field office with a
Muslim community to meet on a regular basis with community members to
develop local collaborative strategies for preventing terrorism,
extremism, and hate crimes. In these meetings, community and law
enforcement need to build bridges of trust and communication.
Specifically, we need each of these field offices to create community
message centers staffed by agents trained to evaluate the reliability
and credibility of community information. This means training community
members about what to look for, informing them as to whom to call,
designating trained law enforcement officers on how to evaluate
community information, and creating protocols for responding to
important community tips. To make this program work, we need a National
training and resource center to coordinate and support these efforts,
and we need such a center to be in partnership with a university and
located within a university setting.
WHY SHOULD WE DO THIS?
(1) Because we stand a greater chance of conducting rational, well-
reasoned, thoughtful counterterrorism, civil rights, and
counterintelligence investigations if we have long-standing, trusting
relationships with the community. Engagement with the community
provides law enforcement with valuable information and expertise that
may not otherwise be available.
(2) Because a lot of people out there are counting on us to get
this right.
(3) Because all of us in this room are men and women of good will
who have spent endless hours trying to prevent another attack. If there
were another attack on American soil, all of us would want to say that
we did EVERYTHING, EVERYTHING in our power to prevent it. But if we
fail to garner the political will to create this infrastructure, we
won't be able to say that.
Attachment 1.--The Partnering for Prevention & Community Safety
Initiative, ``Community Partnerships Thwart Terrorism'' by Deborah
Ramirez \1\ and Tara Lai Quinlan \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Professor Deborah A. Ramirez, Northeastern University School of
Law, Boston, Massachusetts, [email protected].
\2\ Tara Lai Quinlan, Director of Research, Partnering for
Prevention and Community Safety Initiative, [email protected].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MARCH 2010
As law enforcement officials across the globe contemplate ways to
prevent terrorist attacks, the gathering of relevant and effective
intelligence from reliable sources has become even more crucial to
counterterrorism work. One of the best tools to help stop domestic
terrorism in countries like the United States and Great Britain is for
counterterrorism officials to develop authentic trust relationships
with communities. When law enforcement works with the community to
establish trust on a variety of issues--from neighborhood blight, to
youth violence to police response times, community members are more
likely to come forward to report incidences of unusual behavior within
the community that they find suspicious or potentially dangerous. When
the community feels trust and support from law enforcement, community
members feel more comfortable acting as law enforcement's ``eyes and
ears'' in the community because they possess the knowledge of community
norms, and the ``linguistic, cultural, and analytical skills''\3\ to
assess community anomalies that law enforcement, as outside observers,
might not see. This paper explores some of the instances where
community members provided valuable tips to law enforcement officials
that helped thwart terrorist incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Debbie Ramirez & Tara Lai Quinlan, The Greater London
Experience: Essential Lessons Learned in Law Enforcement-Community
Partnerships and Terrorism Prevention, May 2008, 42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. BRITISH EFFORTS TO WORK COLLABORATIVELY WITH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES
After large-scale arrests were made in Britain after October 2000,
and very few of those individuals were convicted, Britain sought to
ensure that there was not a backlash against local Muslim
communities.\4\ Iqbal Sacranie, secretary-general of the Muslim Council
of Britain, met with MI5, the British intelligence agency, to pursue a
collaborative strategy between the Muslim community and the British
counterterrorism programs.\5\ Sacranie raised concerns over the
arrests, and stated that few of those arrested were charged with any
crime, while even fewer were eventually convicted of anything.\6\
Sacranie was concerned that the large numbers of arrests could
wrongfully lead the public to mistakenly view the Muslim community as a
whole as fanatical.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Michael Evans & Sean O'Neill, Muslim Leader Meets MI5 Chief to
Aid War on Terror, THE TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004 available at https://
www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-2-1079809-2,00.html.
\5\ Id.
\6\ Id.
\7\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sacranie emphasized that Muslims, like every other British
communities, wanted to ensure that there were no terrorist attacks on
British soil.\8\ He wrote members of every mosque in Britain requesting
that they use the utmost vigilance ``against any mischievous or
criminal elements from infiltrating the community and provoking any
unlawful activity.''\9\ Further, he urged the members of those mosques
to communicate with authorities and ensure cooperation to avoid the
common terrorist threat.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Id.
\9\ Id.
\10\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Nick Reilly (aka Mohammed Rasheed), Exeter
Nick Reilly (aka Mohammed Rasheed) is a Muslim convert who suffers
from Aperger's Syndrome and has a mental age of approximately 10.\11\
In May 2008, Reilly followed through with instructions he received from
Britain-based radicals he met with in internet cafes and chat room to
set off a nail bomb in Exeter.\12\ These radicals of Pakistani decent
advocated violence against Western nations for their continued support
of Israel.\13\ On May 22, 2008, Reilly went to Giraffe restaurant,
ordered a drink, and went to the bathroom to assemble his bomb.\14\ But
his bomb went off prematurely in the bathroom stall, and he was the
only person injured in the attempted attack.\15\ Counterterrorism
officials stated that extremists had taken advantage of Rasheed's low
IQ of 83 to groom him for terrorist activities.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Minette Marrin, Nicky Reilly, Muslim convert, jailed for 18
years for Exeter bomb attack, TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2009, http://
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article5619151.ece.
\12\ Id.
\13\ Id.
\14\ Id.
\15\ Id.
\16\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After the incident at Giraffe restaurant, police arrested three
men, and detained another who cooperated with the police, and searched
the Muslim Community Centre in Plymouth.\17\ In response to the search,
the Centre trustees issued a statement that ``[w]e are as shocked as
everyone by the recent events that have unfolded at Exeter and
Plymouth. We have been working in partnership with the police and
community to build the centre and we are now committed to assisting the
police with their inquiries.''\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Third Man Quizzed Over Explosion, BBC NEWS, May 28, 2008,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/devon/
7424769.stm.
\18\ Exeter Restaurant Bombing: Police Search Muslim Centre And
Home In Plymouth After Third Arrest, UK NEWS, SKY NEWS, May 29, 2008,
http://news.sky.com/skynews/Home/Sky-News-Archive/Article/
20080641317471.[sic].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A BBC investigation later revealed that police had received prior
warning of the Giraffe restaurant attack by a tip from a psychiatrist
who had evaluated Reilly.\19\ During a psychiatric evaluation, Reilly
had expressed a desire to study engineering to learn to make a
bomb.\20\ The psychiatrist relayed this information to the police, but
the police did not interview Reilly in response to the tip because they
felt that the remark was a ``one-off''.\21\ In a statement, the Devon
and Cornwall police they stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Police warned about Exeter bomber in 2003, BBC NEWS, Feb. 8
2010, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/devon/
8505209.stm (hereinafter BBC News Exeter).
\20\ Id.
\21\ Id.
``Systems such as the government's Prevent strategy, which have been
implemented since 2003, look at intelligence like this, but Reilly was
not a person of interest and gave no other cause for concern. As part
of Prevent, should there have been any further cause for concern, he
would have been part of a review process. From the information at that
time, there was no indication that Reilly was, or was likely to become,
capable of making a bomb. Although in hindsight we are always seeking
to learn as an organisation, we are confident we would not have dealt
differently with the information as we had it at the time.''\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ BBC News Exeter, supra note 35.
At least one source indicates that Reilly was under surveillance prior
to the attack, but the extent of Muslim community involvement remains
unclear.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See Face of the `nail bomber': Police were tailing Muslim
convert before restaurant attack, LONDON EVENING STANDARD, May 23,
2008, http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/article-23486974-face-of-the-
nail-bomber-police-were-tailing-muslim-convert-before-restaurant-
attack.do.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Isa Ibrahim, Bristol
In April 2008, student Isa Ibrahim was arrested for planning to
detonate a ``suicide vest.''\24\ Ibrahim had researched online how to
make explosives from household products, and had also done
reconnaissance at the Broadmead shopping centre in Bristol.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Jail for `Suicide Vest' Student, BBC News, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8155978.stm (Hereinafter BBC Suicide Vest).
\25\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Leading up to his arrest, Ibrahim had engaged in a series of
suspicious actions, but none of the third parties involved had alerted
authorities to his activities.\26\ When Ibrahim then talked about
suicide bombing with members of his mosque, they challenged him on his
views and alerted authorities.\27\ After also noticing cuts on
Ibrahim's hands, the members of the mosque contacted a local police
officer. \28\ Detective Chief Inspector Kevin Hazell, of Avon and
Somerset police, said: ``The calls to us came in when he showed some
people the injuries on his hands, including marks from shards of glass,
which he said were caused when a bottle blew up when he was mixing
chemicals.''\29\ Tipping off the authorities to Ibrahim's behavior was
a ``sensitive subject'' with members of the mosque, but they eventually
provided the police with Ibrahim's full name and photograph.\30\ Police
described the incident as a landmark ``because it was the first time a
tip-off from the Muslim community had led to a major anti-terrorism
arrest.''\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Duncan Gardham, Terrorist Andrew Ibrahim was turned in by the
Muslim community, TELEGRAPH TIMES ONLINE, July 18, 2009, available at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/5851168/Terrorist-Andrew-Ibrahim-was-
turned-in-by-the-Muslim-community.html. Prior to Ibrahim's arrest: he
asked a visiting lecturer what were ``the best'' biological agents for
killing people, but the university ultimately did not take action; he
bought up stocks of hydrogen peroxide from several Boots stores, but
staff disregarded their own regulations and did not contact the police;
at an electric shop he asked about a light bulb with the glass removed,
which is a key indicator of a detonator; and Ibrahim had even discussed
suicide bombing and the ingredients of his bomb with friends, but was
not taken seriously. Id.
\27\ Id.
\28\ Id.
\29\ Sean O'Neill, Teenager's plot to blow up town centre--Muslim
elders reported former public schoolboy to police, The Times London,
July 18, 2009, available at http://0-
infoweb.newsbank.com.ilsprod.lib.neu.edu/iw-search/we/InfoWeb.
\30\ Gardham, supra note 42. Initially, on April 14 the mosque only
provided police with Ibrahim's first name, but submitted his full name
2 days later. Id.
\31\ BBC Suicide Vest, supra note 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When Ibrahim's apartment was searched by police in April 2008,
officers found the highly explosive hexamethylene triperoxide diamine
(HMTD) in a biscuit tin in the refrigerator, a detonator underneath
Ibrahim's sink, and a vest on the bedroom door.\32\ The night before
his arrest, Ibrahim had even obtained shrapnel to add to the
explosives.\33\ Ibrahim was convicted in July 2009 of making explosives
with intent and preparing terrorist acts, and received a minimum
sentence of 10 years.\34\ Following the verdict, the Council of Bristol
Mosques released a statement that said, ``[w]e stress that at all times
we must behave honourably and as law-abiding citizens. We believe
strongly in community ties and community cohesion. Anything falling
below these standards is morally and socially unacceptable.''\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ O'Neill, supra note 45.
\33\ Id.
\34\ BBC Suicide Vest, supra note 39.
\35\ BBC Suicide Vest, supra note 39.
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II. UNITED STATES EXAMPLES
A. Missing Somali Youth in Minneapolis
Since the 1990s the population of Somalis living in the United
States has grown significantly, with the largest Somali-American
community located in Minneapolis, Minnesota.\36\ Beginning in late
2007, reports began to surface about young Somali-American men
traveling to Somalia ``to enlist in the Shabaab, an Islamist group
battling the country's government.''\37\ There are believed to have
been at least 20 departures by young men since 2007, which occurred in
at least two waves.\38\ The first wave began in late 2007, 6 months
after an Islamic group seized control of Somalia's capital,
Mogadishu.\39\ The men in the first wave were in their 20s to 30s, and
had all left the United States by the spring of 2008.\40\ Included in
the first wave were Shirwa Ahmed, believed to be the first suicide
bomber with U.S. citizenship, and Zakaria Maruf, a former gang
member.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Andrea Elliott, Joining the Fight in Somalia, N.Y. Times, July
12, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/07/12/
us/20090712-somalia-timeline.html (Hereinafter Elliott Graphic).
\37\ Andrea Elliott, Joining the Fight in Somalia, N.Y. Times, July
12, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/07/12/
us/20090712-somalia-timeline.html (Hereinafter Elliott Graphic).
\38\ Id.
\39\ Id.
\40\ Id.
\41\ Andrea Elliott, A Call to Jihad, Answered in America, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/
us/12somalis.html?pagewanted=all (Hereinafter Elliott Article).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zakaria Maruf was well known in the Muslim community in the Twin
Cities because he used to drive to and from Abubakar mosque, and some
young Somalis recorded Maruf's call to prayer as a cell phone
ringtone.\42\ During this period, Maruf began to reach out to young men
through listservs and conference calls ``arranged by a teenage boy who
distributed 800 numbers and passwords'' for people to listen in.\43\
Some of these young men ended up leaving the United States for Somalia
in the second wave.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Id.
\43\ Id.
\44\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This second wave was a younger group of men who had been more
successful in the United States.\45\ Most of the men had been raised in
the United States and had also performed well academically in high
school or college.\46\ Members in this group began dropping out of
school in August 2008 and November 2008.\47\ Notably some of the
departures in the second wave occurred after Shirwa Ahmed died as a
suicide bomber in October 2008.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Elliott Article, supra note 56. Elliott Graphic, supra note
52.
\46\ Id.
\47\ Id.
\48\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Community members took notice of the departures and became
concerned. Community member Abia Ali noticed that two boys that she
recognized from her mosque came into the travel agency where she worked
as an accountant to make travel plans.\49\ Ms. Ali was concerned that
the boys were planning on following Zakaria Maruf to Somalia, and
accordingly she warned the mosque leaders, who then alerted the boys'
parents.\50\ The mosque then summoned a meeting with the mosque's young
members, where imam Sheikh Abdirahman Sheikh Omar Ahmed, told the crowd
``All this talk of the movement must stop . . . Focus on your life
here. If you become a doctor or an engineer, you can help your country.
Over there you will be a dead body on the street.''\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Id.
\50\ Elliott Article, supra note 56.
\51\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After hearing about the young men leaving the country, Somali
parents began hiding their sons' passports.\52\ Some parents pleaded
with their departed sons to return home from abroad.\53\ For example,
Mohamoud Hassan's parents had been trying to convince him to return
back home after he already left, but he feared that he would spend his
time in Guantanomo.\54\ The conversations would be short with few
responses, but at some point they convinced Hassan to come back to the
United States and wired him $800.\55\ However, shortly thereafter,
someone phoned them to tell them that their son had been shot in the
head; some believe to prevent Hassan from working with the FBI.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Elliott Article, supra note 56.
\53\ Id.
\54\ Id.
\55\ Id.
\56\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Members of al Qaeda have reportedly been attempting to recruit
youths with U.S. or European passports because they could cross borders
more freely.\57\ Since the first wave of Somali youths left Minneapolis
in 2007, six recruits have been killed in Somalia (including Shirwa
Ahmed), and four defendants have entered guilty pleas.\58\ But
recruiting of United States citizens and nationals of Somali decent in
the United States continues, and is now believed to have broadened to
other States including Nevada and Georgia.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Id.
\58\ See Andrea Elliott, Charges Detail Road to Terror for 20 in
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009 at A1 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/
24/us/24terror.html (Hereinafter Elliott Charges).
\59\ See id. (noting that five young Somali men were stopped en
route to a wedding in San Diego from Nevada); see also Maggie, Lee,
After Minneapolis, FBI Eyes Atlanta's Somalis, NEW AGE MEDIA, June 24,
2009, available at http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/
view_article.html?article_id=0c35ffa6e64aac24f1d332f6b32e7d29 (last
visited Feb. 22, 2010) (noting that recruitment efforts have begun in
parts of Atlanta Georgia).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Washington, DC Area Students Go Missing in Pakistan
On December 7, 2009, five American students from the Washington, DC
area were arrested by Pakistani authorities.\60\ Pakistan authorities
had observed them for 2 days and then arrested the five men: David
Headley, an American of Pakistani descent; Umar Farooq, a Pakistani-
American; Aman Hasan Yemer, an Ethiopian-American; Waqar Hussain Khan,
a Pakistani-American; and Ahmed Abdullah Mimi, an Ethiopian-American
each holding a United States passport.\61\ The men had been staying in
a house in Sargodha, Pakistan owned by one of their uncles. When
authorities searched the house, they found jihadist literature, and
maps of cities and installations.\62\ Evidence in the investigation
suggests that some of the men wanted to fight U.S. soldiers in
Afghanistan.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ Zahid Hussain, Siobhan Gorman & Neil King Jr., Students Linked
to al-Qaeda, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 11, 2009 at A3.
\61\ Hussain, supra note 77.
\62\ Id.
\63\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Before arriving in Pakistan, the men had been in contact with
Pakistani militants with connections to al-Qaeda through internet chat
rooms and YouTube.\64\ The militants allegedly told them to come to
Pakistan where they could assist them in getting to Afghanistan to
fight jihad.\65\ One of the young men left behind an 11-minute video
that ``quoted Koranic verses, cited conflicts between Western and
Muslim nations and showed wartime footage.''\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Waqar Gillani & Jane Perlez, Pakistan Police Say 5 Detained
Americans Intended to Fight U.S. in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2009.
\65\ Id.
\66\ Jerry Markon, Pakistan Arrests 5 North Virginia Men, Probes
Possible Jihadist Ties, THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 10, 2009 http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/09/
AR2009120901884.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was the families of these five young men who initially reported
them missing, fearing that they had gone to Pakistan. The Council on
American-Islamic Relations put the families in touch with the FBI. The
parents showed the FBI and Muslim community leaders the 11-minute
video. The authorities conducted their investigation with extensive
help from the families, whose assistance included turning over the
men's writings and computer files.\67\ Around the same time, in
Sargodha a neighbor alerted Pakistani authorities after the uncle of
one of the men told the neighbor that his nephew and four friends had
voiced bad intentions.\68\ After the five men were reported missing in
the United States, the FBI contacted Pakistani officials and shortly
thereafter, the men were arrested.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ Id.
\68\ Hussain, supra note 77.
\69\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Christmas Day Bomber
On December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab boarded an airplane
from Nigeria (to Amsterdam) to Detroit with 80 grams of high explosive
chemicals strapped to his crotch.\70\ Abdulmutallab tried to blow up
the airplane as it was approaching Detroit, but his detonator failed
and instead his pants caught on fire and other passengers quickly
subdued him.\71\ The other passengers and crew members detained him
until the airplane landed.\72\ In January 2010, Abdulmutallab was
indicted on six counts, including one of attempted murder and one of
attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ Russell Goldman & Huma Khan, Timeline of Terror: Clues in
Bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's Past, Did officials miss important
clues in tracking down Nigerian before failed plot?, ABC NEWS, Dec. 30,
2009 available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/timeline-terror-clues-
bomber-umar-farouk-abdulmutallabs-past/story?id=9449255.
\71\ Id.
\72\ CNN, Source: Terror suspect's father tried to warn
authorities, CNN.COM, Dec. 27, 2009, available at http://www.cnn.com/
2009/CRIME/12/26/airline.attack/index.html.
\73\ United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 2:10-cr-20005 (Jan. 6,
2010) (Indictment). Copy of indictment available at http://
blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2010/01/the-abdulmutallab-
indictment-.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abdulmutallab was granted a multiple-year, multiple-entry tourist
visa at the U.S. Embassy in London in June 2008, which would last until
2010.\74\ Abdulmutallab was a student in the United Kingdom at the time
the United States granted him a visa, and after getting his visa, he
traveled to Houston.\75\ In May 2009, the United Kingdom denied
Abdulmutallab's application to renew his student visa because he listed
a non-existent college on his application.\76\ Later that year in
August of 2009, he went to Yemen to be trained by an al-Qaeda leader,
and was admitted into the country because he had a valid U.S. visa in
his passport.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ CNN, supra note 89.
\75\ CNN, supra note 89.
\76\ Goldman & Khan, supra note 87.
\77\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abdulmutallab's father, Alhaji Umaru Mutallab was a prominent
Nigerian banker and had become increasingly alarmed about his son's
political views.\78\ In November, 2009, Mutallab went to the U.S.
embassy in Nigeria after he received an alarming phone call from his
son stating that ``it would be their last contact and associates in
Yemen would then destroy his phone.''\79\ Mutallab feared that his son
was preparing for a suicide mission in Yemen, stating that he was
concerned about his son's ``radicalization and associations'' and that
he feared that Abdulmutallab went to Yemen to participate in ``some
kind of jihad.''\80\ Following the November 19, 2009 warning,
information about Abdulmutallab was given to the National Counter-
Terrorism Center, and he was also added to the watch-list of more than
half of a million individuals, or the Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment.\81\ However, officials believed that Mutallab had not
presented enough information to place Abdulmutallab's name on the
smaller Terrorist Screening Data Base, which includes a smaller no-fly
list.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ BBC News, Father alerted US about Nigerian plane bomb suspect,
BBC NEWS, Dec. 27 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8431470.stm
(Hereinafter BBC News Nigeria).
\79\ Goldman & Khan, supra note 87.
\80\ Dan Eggen, Karen DeYoung & Spencer S. Hsu, Plane suspect was
listed in terror database after father alerted U.S. officials, WASH.
POST, Dec. 27, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/12/25/AR2009122501355.html; Goldman & Khan, supra note 87;
CNN, supra note 89.
\81\ BBC News Nigeria, supra note 95.
\82\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Once Abdulmutallab was detained by other passengers, and the
airplane landed, he spoke freely to the FBI.\83\ However, after he had
surgery for his burns and was read his Miranda rights he ceased
cooperating with law enforcement officials.\84\ The FBI flew two
counterterrorism agents to Nigeria ``to gain an understanding of the
suspect'' and then located two of Abdulmutallab's family members.\85\
The relatives agreed to come back with the agents to the United States
to get Abdulmutallab to cooperate because they ``disagreed with his
efforts to blow up American targets.''\86\ After meeting with
Abdulmutallab for several days, the family members convinced him to
talk with the investigators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ Minette Marrin, Christmas Day bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
offering `useful intelligence' to FBI, TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 3, 2010,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/
article7013063.ece.
\84\ Id.
\85\ Jeff Zeleny & Charlie Savage, Official Says Terrorism Suspect
Is Cooperating, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010 at A11, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/us/03terror.html.
\86\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An official stated that ``The intelligence gained has been
disseminated throughout the intelligence community,'' and further that
``The best way to get [Abdulmutallab] to talk was working with his
family.''\87\ Officials confirm that Abdulmutallab has provided them
with information about people he met in Yemen.\88\ In addition, Robert
S. Mueller III told the Senate Intelligence Committee that Mr.
Abdulmutallab provided ``valuable intelligence'' but Mueller did not
elaborate further.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ Id.
\88\ Id.
\89\ Zeleny & Savage, supra note 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
D. ADAMS Mosque, Virginia
The All Dulles Areas Muslim Society (ADAMS) mosque developed a
relationship with the FBI in early 2002, when the FBI approached Imam
Mohamed Magid and several other imams about developing contacts with
the Washington-area Muslim community. As part of their process of
developing mutual trust, Imam Magid invited the FBI to the mosque on
multiple occasions for dialogues and questions from mosque members.
While the agents promised to be less heavy-handed in their
investigations and more culturally sensitive, the community agreed to
provide tips alerting FBI officials if they spotted anything unusual in
the community.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ Douglas Waller Sterling, An American Imam, Time Magazine,
November 14, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In one instance mosque members alerted Imam Magid to a new member
who acted unusually--dealing only in cash and listing the ADAMS mosque
as his mailing address. The next time Imam Magid saw the new member, he
spoke with him in his office while the FBI arrived to question him. In
the end it turned out that the man was going through a messy divorce
and had child support payments, and did not want to be located because
his wages would be garnished.\91\ This incident is just one of the
benefits that have flowed from the strong relationship between the
ADAMS mosque and the FBI's Washington, DC field office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. OTHER EXAMPLES
E. Mubin Shaikh, Toronto
Mubin Shaikh is a prominent Muslim leader in Canada. In 2006, it
was revealed that Shaikh worked with officials in Canada as an
informant to thwart a potential terrorist attack involving 17 terrorism
suspects.\92\ The 17 suspects were arrested after purchasing three tons
of ammonium nitrate.\93\ Police alleged that the men, ranging in age
from 15 to 43, were planning on blowing up buildings in Toronto and
then storming Canada's parliament.\94\ Shaikh told the Toronto
newspaper, ``I don't want Canadians to think that these [suspects] are
what Muslims are. I don't believe in violence here. I wanted to help,
and I'm as homegrown as it gets.''\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ Rebecca C. Dube, Leader Turned Informant Rattles Muslims,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 31, 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/
2006/0731/p06s01-woam.html.
\93\ Id.
\94\ Id.
\95\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shaikh had already worked with the police to help improve awareness
in the community; however, he first became involved with the accused
group after reading about one his friends being arrested.\96\ He
contacted the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and
informed them ``I have a solid foundation in Islam. I'm born and raised
here. Toronto is home. I understand what concerns [the police] have.
But as a Muslim, I understand what concerns Muslims have.''\97\ The
CSIS agreed to let Shaikh assist in the efforts to infiltrate this
group, but after they agreed, he also sought the counsel of a spiritual
advisor.\98\ ``I knew that throughout my work with the authorities, if
I was ever instructed to [entrap or set up the suspects], which I was
not, I would not [do it].''\99\ If he did, his spiritual advisor
threatened to accuse him of hypocrisy.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ Jackie Bennion, The Radical Informant, FRONTLINE, aired Jan.
30, 2007 on PBS, available at http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/
stories/canada602/shaikh.html.
\97\ Id.
\98\ Id.
\99\ Id.
\100\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shaikh's participation in thwarting the potential attack was
controversial with members in the Muslim community.\101\ Some in the
Muslim community stated that they have no issues with reporting
suspicious behavior to law enforcement officials; however, they draw
the line at Shaikh's level of involvement.\102\ Others argued that
instead of working with police, Shaikh instead should have utilized his
influence over the men to try to convince them to not go through with
the plot.\103\ However, Shaikh informed the Canadian Broadcast Company
that the suspects had already chosen their path, and that they needed
no outside influence from him.\104\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ Dube, supra note 9.
\102\ Id.
\103\ Id.
\104\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shaikh's involvement also raised some ethical issues regarding the
permissibility of utilizing prominent members of the community as
informants. Professor Natapoff of Loyola Law School states that
``There's a very corrosive effect in urban communities when the
government makes snitching a central law enforcement tool.''\105\ While
informants can be useful for criminal investigations, the use of
informants makes it easier to slide into ethically dangerous
situations.\106\ Where individuals like Shaikh help out the Government,
it is possible to erode trust between members within the community, and
further degrade the level of trust between the community and the
Government. This highlights an important concern for communities and
warrants further discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\105\ Id.
\106\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCLUSION
The best way to obtain the community information needed to thwart
terrorist threats is by applying community policing techniques to
counterterrorism. Homegrown Muslim terrorists are likely to reside in
Muslim communities; Muslim terrorists from abroad are likely to attempt
to conceal themselves in these same communities. We are blessed in the
United States with a Muslim population that, with very few exceptions,
are committed to combating terrorism. Yet, we have failed to take
advantage of this blessing and develop a systematic strategy to obtain
and use community information to thwart terrorism and fight extremism.
Specifically, we need each of the FBI field offices to create
community message centers staffed by agents trained to evaluate the
reliability and credibility of community information. This means
training community members about what to look for, informing them as to
whom to call, designating trained law enforcement officers on how to
evaluate community information, and creating protocols for responding
to important community tips. To make this program work, we need a
National training and resource center to coordinate and support these
efforts, and we need such a center to be in partnership with a
university and located within a university setting.
Attachment 2.--A Promising Practices Guide Executive Summary*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Available at www.ace.neu.edu/pfp.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
Mr. Ervin.
STATEMENT OF CLARK KENT ERVIN, DIRECTOR, ASPEN INSTITUTE
HOMELAND SECURITY PROGRAM
Mr. Ervin. Thank you, Madam Chair, Mr. McCaul, Ms. Clarke,
for having me here today to discuss this important topic.
My main point, and I think the whole point of the hearing,
is that the business of counterterrorism must be every
American's business, not just that of those privileged to serve
in Government.
Average Americans in every community must be the eyes and
ears of law enforcement officials and intelligence analysts. We
ordinary citizens must be Government's force multiplier. This
is especially true for Muslim-Americans, and I would like to
associate myself with Ms. Ramirez' comments.
The overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans, like all
Americans, are loyal and patriotic citizens more than willing
to do their part to protect and defend us all. If anything,
they are even more disposed to decry and condemn violent
extremists in their own community who would do this country
harm than we non-Muslims, precisely because those extremists
are in their community and they blacken the name of their
community and pervert their faith.
We must shine the spotlight of National attention on the
efforts of law enforcement authorities in New York City and Los
Angeles in particular--I am delighted that Sheriff Baca was
here--who embrace the racial/ethnic/religious diversity in
their communities and, as you said, use it to their advantage
by enlisting such minorities in their counterterrorism efforts.
NYPD and LAPD are effective terror fighters in large part
because their ranks include men and women who come from these
communities and know them best.
Further, these police organizations engage in constant
dialogue with these communities, hearing their concerns,
addressing their complaints, soliciting their advice and
counsel, and earning their trust and good will in the process.
So when differences arise, as they inevitably will, the
positive relationships that have been established over time
serve to keep disagreements in perspective and passions cool.
Such outreach can encourage--can encourage community
members to come forward and foil terror plots--and we have
heard examples of that, so I won't add to that further.
I would also like to commend an effort that we haven't
heard about to date this morning, and that is the effort of
NYPD to find out what the root causes of radicalization are.
I commend the 2007 report by their intelligence apparatus,
which identified a number of factors--lack of economic
opportunity, limited education, strained family ties, a sense
of impotence and alienation and grievance, a desire to be a
part of something bigger than themselves and that they consider
to be noble. All of this leads impressionable minds down the
path of terrorism.
Government, industry, schools, places of worship, and non-
profit organizations must work together to provide positive
alternatives--jobs and job training programs, constructive
social organizations, athletic programs and the like--to
counter lives of aimless--aimlessness and anomie. An idle mind
is truly the devil's workshop.
I would also like to underscore and agree with what else
has been said today about the fact that Muslims are not--that
not all Muslims are terrorists, and not all terrorists are
Muslims.
It is as if recent events conspired to prepare us very well
for today's hearing. The two recent cases of Colleen LaRose and
Jamie Pauline-Ramirez underscore the fact that even blond-
haired and blue-eyed females can be terrorists, as you yourself
said, Madam Chair.
If anyone can be a terrorist, then everyone can fight
terrorism. Whether it is the TSA Behavior Detection Officer
specifically trained to spot signs of terror intent at
airports; the New Jersey electronics store clerk who questions
video he is asked to duplicate showing men apparently training
for jihad and who brings that to the attention of authorities,
in the process foiling the Fort Dix plot; the beauty supply
owner noticing the same person repeatedly buying large
quantities, unusually large quantities, of hydrogen peroxide;
or the mail carrier going about his daily route and noticing
that the trees in front of a particular house have suddenly
turned white and wonders whether this might be the result of a
bomb production lab inside--anyone and everyone, inside
Government and out, can and must play a role in preventing
terror if we are to have any hope of preventing it more often
than not.
Thank you very much for having me, and I look forward very
much to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Ervin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Clark Kent Ervin
March 17, 2010
Thank you, Chair Harman, Ranking Member McCaul, and Members for
inviting me to testify today on the very important and timely topic,
``Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots.''
The recent spate of aborted terror plots, especially the Christmas
day bombing attempt, all serve to underscore the fact that terrorists
remain determined to strike the homeland again, and the odds of
preventing them from ever succeeding are low. To kill, injure, and
destroy, terrorists have to ``get it right'' only once, while those in
the business of counterterrorism must ``get it right'' 24/7. My main
point today, and I think the point of this whole hearing, is that the
business of counterterrorism must be every American's business, not
just that of those now privileged to serve in Government. Our country
is too big; and (commendably) too open and free, with too many tempting
targets, for us to think that Government officials alone can defend us
from this omnipresent, and, perhaps even existential, threat. Average
Americans in every community must be the eyes and ears of law
enforcement officials and intelligence analysts; we ordinary citizens
must be Government's force multiplier.
This is certainly true for Muslim-Americans. The overwhelming
majority of Muslim-Americans, like all Americans, are loyal and
patriotic citizens, more than willing to do their part to protect and
defend us all. If anything, they are even more disposed to decry and
condemn violent extremists in their own community who would do this
country harm than we non-Muslims are precisely because those extremists
are in their community and they blacken the name of their community and
pervert their faith. We must shine the spotlight of National attention
and cast the warm glow of approval on the efforts of, for example, law
enforcement authorities in New York City and Los Angeles who embrace
the racial/ethnic/religious diversity in their communities and use it
to their advantage by enlisting such minorities in their
counterterrorism efforts. NYPD and LAPD are effective terror fighters
in large part because their ranks include men and women who come from
these communities and know them best. These police organizations engage
in constant dialogue with these communities, hearing their concerns,
addressing their complaints, soliciting their advice and counsel, and
earning their trust and goodwill. When differences arise, as they
inevitably will, the positive relationships that have been established
over time serve to keep disagreements in perspective and passions cool.
To be commended, too, at the Federal level, are like efforts by the
National Counterterrorism Center; the Department of Homeland Security;
and the Homeland Security Advisory Council.
Such outreach can encourage community members to turn to the
authorities when they spot signs of radicalism in their midst and can
serve to foil terror plots before they go too far. We saw an example of
that recently when Somali parents in Northern Virginia, concerned about
the disappearance of their young sons, confided their fears of terror
ties to a Muslim organization, which then confided in the authorities,
ultimately resulting in the arrest of the young men in Pakistan before
they could carry out acts of terrorism. It is, needless to say, highly
unlikely, that the community would have turned to the authorities in
this instance had the relationship between the two beforehand been one
of mistrust and confrontation rather than trust and cooperation.
Also noteworthy and highly commendable is NYPD's effort--the 2007
report by two of its intelligence analysts, ``Radicalization in the
West: The Homegrown Threat''--to determine why and how people become
radicalized to the point of becoming terrorists. There must be
continual such efforts in communities across the country to identify
and to counteract the factors--lack of economic opportunity, limited
education; strained family ties; a sense of impotence, alienation, and
grievance; a desire to be a part of something big and noble--which lead
naive and impressionable minds down the path of terrorism. Government,
industry, schools, places of worship, and non-profit organizations must
work together to provide positive alternatives--jobs and job training,
constructive social organizations, athletic programs, and the like--to
lives of aimlessness and anomie. An idle mind is truly the devil's
workshop.
It is not just Muslims, of course, who should be alert for signs of
terrorism in their communities. All of us must be vigilant. First of
all, we must underscore the fact that, just as not all Muslims are
terrorists, so not all terrorists are Muslims. If by ``terrorists'' we
mean all those who terrorize, then certainly Joseph Stack, who flew a
small plane into an IRS building in Austin recently, and John Bedell,
who wounded two police officers at Pentagon more recently still, then
it should be clear to all now that terrorists come in all races,
ethnicities, and genders, and they can have all different kinds of
grievances. ``Terrorist'' is not a ``one size fits all'' term. And,
even those terrorists who at least claim to be Muslims can likewise
defy stereotypes, as the even more recent cases of the female, blond-
haired, and blue-eyed ``Jihad Jane,'' Coleen La Rue, and Jamie Pauline-
Ramirez highlight. Such cases help make the point that terrorist
stereotyping is not just politically incorrect; it is simply incorrect.
If anyone can be a terrorist, everyone can fight terrorism. Whether
it's the TSA Behavior Detection Officer specially trained to spot signs
of terror intent at airports; the New Jersey electronics store clerk
who questions video he is asked to duplicate showing men apparently
training for jihad and brings it to the attention of authorities,
foiling the Fort Dix plot; the beauty supply store owner noticing the
same person repeatedly buying unusually large quantities of hydrogen
peroxide; or the mail carrier going about his daily route and noticing
that the trees in front of a particular house have suddenly turned
white and wonders whether this might be the result of a bomb production
lab inside, anyone and everyone--inside Government and out--can and
must play a role in preventing terror if we are to have any hope of
doing so more often than not.
We cannot know for sure from the recent spate of incidents whether
terror plots are increasing in number and seriousness, but it is more
than reasonable to draw than inference. Since 9/11, both the Bush and
Obama Administrations have done a commendable job of killing and
capturing terrorists. But, the next, and even more important step--
stopping the terrorist production line at its source--remains very much
a work in progress. I am grateful for this opportunity to participate
in a hearing that, appropriately, is focused on exactly this.
Ms. Harman. Thank you very much.
It will now be time for questioning. We will each take 5
minutes, and I yield myself 5 minutes.
Mr. Elibiary, you used some words that got my attention.
Securitizing the relationship with minority communities or
disparate communities, you said, is counterproductive. Then you
said what you would hope we would do would be coordinate micro
strategies.
Let me just kind of go there. I don't think any of us is
trying to securitize relationships. I think we are trying to
build trust--and I am asking the panel to comment on this--with
law-abiding citizens who are members of diverse communities in
our country.
The point of that is we can learn a lot from that. We can
show respect to our fellow citizens. But we also can invite, in
appropriate circumstances, those communities, those parents,
those sisters and brothers to come forward and alert us to a
family member who might be a lone wolf terrorist or might be
associating with other terrorists.
We do have examples of that in recent time. Most of them
are in the Muslim community, as Mr. Ervin pointed out, but they
don't have to be limited there.
Does what I just described constitute, by your lights,
securitizing the relationship with those communities?
Mr. Elibiary. No, it does not, Madam Chair. The
securitizing the relationship is when--for this category of how
do you disrupt terror plots, the only conduit available
currently for the community to engage with is to offer a tip.
So there is only the law enforcement channel, and it is really
with the FBI. Even if it is offered to local law enforcement or
fusion centers, it is going to funnel back to the JTTF.
So in this particular case, there is--as I wrote in my
prepared remarks, the line between where the counterideological
work that the community would be engaging in and the
essentially predictive behavior that--standard that law
enforcement tries to uphold is--there is a gray area in
between, and that gray area, as well as while a youth, for
example, is going through their radicalization process, cannot
just be to connect with the FBI. Then that is a total
securitized relationship.
There is a gap there. It needs to be addressed. It should
be addressed outside of the bureau, outside of a law
enforcement agency.
Ms. Harman. Well, I think many people believe, as Sheriff
Baca obviously does, that local level policing is the first
line of contact, or even community organizations, which then
trust local level police, not the FBI, so I am not sure I agree
with you that there is this direct link between locals and the
FBI only.
But at any rate, to continue with this, there was a testy
exchange between Mr. Souder and Sheriff Baca. No one missed it.
It was about CAIR, the organization CAIR, which is--has been
controversial. I think no one would argue that. You are all
nodding your heads, so you agree.
I am asking you whether you think organizations like CAIR
do play a vital role and/or whether organizations like CAIR,
which may be linked to funding, or at least these are the
claims, terror organizations or terror activities should be cut
out somehow of the set of organizations that intersect
communities and those in communities who are trying to let us
know about improper behavior in those communities.
Mr. Ervin. Well, I will start, Madam Chair. I would say a
couple of things. I, too, was struck by Mr. Elibiary's use of
the term securitized--securitizing this whole subject.
I guess what I would say in response to that is I
completely agree with your response to that. I might add that
if law enforcement's only contact with the Muslim community is
focused on the discrete issue of terrorism, that is one thing.
That is why I stressed in my statement that not just law
enforcement but Government generally, and not just Government
but a whole range of institutions outside Government must also
work to do positive things with the community--jobs, economic
opportunity, positive alternative social organizations.
I could understand from the Muslim's community if they
perceive law enforcement as being solely focused on
counterterrorism that that would be perceived by some as
securitizing. I hope that that is helpful, what I have just
said there.
With regard to your specific question on CAIR, I would
distinguish between CAIR--I do distinguish between CAIR and
Hamas and Hezbollah. That was also mentioned. There is no
question in my mind that Hamas and Hezbollah are terrorist
organizations. CAIR is not.
There is no question but that it is a controversial
organization. There are people in that organization associated
with controversial views. You made the very important
distinction at the--at the beginning of the hearing that we are
not here to talk about views, however controversial. We are
talking about behavior.
CAIR certainly is an organization that is not engaged in,
and is opposed to, and has thwarted violent behavior. That is
here what--that is what we are here to talk about.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
My time has expired, and I want to be respectful of others.
Do you have a short comment, Ms. Ramirez?
Ms. Ramirez. Yes. My short comment is that I do not believe
CAIR is a terrorist organization, and I also think that it is
not an accident that families went to CAIR with information
that then went to the FBI. The community respects CAIR. It is a
large, well-respected grassroots organization.
Without CAIR at the table or by excluding or demonizing
CAIR as a terrorist organization, you exclude the grassroots
members of the community who have the information that is
necessary for thwarting counterterrorism.
The FBI does not consider CAIR to be a terrorist
organization. The FBI field offices regularly meet with CAIR.
There are individual members of CAIR who have been under
criminal investigation for criminal behavior. But that is
different than saying that the entire organization is a
terrorist organization.
Ms. Harman. Thank you.
I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Welcome to the panel. I wanted to add to Mr. Clark--Mr.
Ervin's resume the fact that he served as deputy attorney
general under Attorney General John Cornyn along with myself,
and it is great to see a former colleague here today, and----
Mr. Ervin. Thank you very much.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. Thanks for your service both in the
Department of Homeland Security and other aspects as well.
We heard testimony from the previous panel which I thought
was sort of interesting. The FBI and DHS seemed to indicate
that there is a wall of separation, and I don't like the use of
the term wall of separation after 9/11, between what they are
doing and what the Joint Terrorism Task Forces are doing.
We also heard that--when we asked them can you think of an
example of a terror plot that has been disrupted through
community outreach, the only example I heard was the
inauguration, which really turned out to be a non-issue. It
wasn't a threat, in--in fact.
Given that being the case, I am just questioning if we are
really approaching this in the right way. I understand we need
to have outreach to the community in a non-threatening way to
the Muslim community, but at the same time it can be very
valuable in terms of obtaining information and evidence related
to a potential terror plot and which we can disrupt.
Mr. Ervin, I know you just recently went out to the NCTC
center and actually talked to them on this very issue, so this
hearing is very timely, I think, for your testimony. I just,
you know, care if you comment on that point.
Mr. Ervin. Yes, Mr. McCaul. I am glad you gave me an
opportunity to do that. In the interest of time, I didn't talk
about that in my statement. But I want to commend, and I think
we all should, the efforts that the Federal Government--
specifically the National Counterterrorism Center, and even
more specifically Dan Sutherland, who heads the Countering
Violent Extremism Unit, if I can call it that, at NCTC, who
formerly, of course, was the first director of the Office of
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the Department of Homeland
Security.
Commendably, Director Leiter has made this issue,
countering violent extremism, a central focus of the National
Counterterrorism Center. The work, as we heard this morning, of
the--of Mr. Sutherland continues now at the Department of
Homeland Security. We heard that Secretary Napolitano has given
her full support to that office. I think that is commendable.
So I think that is tremendously important that the Federal
Government amplifies the efforts of the local community. That
is no substitute for the local community, because there is no
question but that the likelihood is that the interaction
between terrorists and the government is likeliest, of course,
to happen at the local level.
Mr. McCaul. What I was struck by--and thank you for that--
Sheriff Baca seemed to have a different approach than what the
FBI and DHS were talking about, and he does seem to be able to
fully integrate this community outreach, which I think he does
very well, in addition to the law enforcement side of--of the
house.
I think that may be a model, Madam Chair, we should--we
should look at on the Federal level.
Ms. Ramirez, appreciate your experience, particularly as an
assistant U.S. attorney, as I was at one point in my life, and
you mentioned a National training and resource center, and also
that the 56 FBI offices have more of a community coordinator.
I know that some of the offices do, but I assume from your
testimony that not all of them--and can you explain to me what
the center would do that you are proposing?
Ms. Ramirez. Okay. First of all, some of the--some of the
56 field offices do meet regularly with their community--Los
Angeles, Dearborn, Chicago are examples of that. But all of
these efforts are ad hoc and uncoordinated.
What would a National center do? Well, the way in which we
configured this was through briefings with the FBI. What the
FBI thought would be useful at the time or might be useful, or
at least what I think would be useful, is for the offices to be
trained with their community counterparts, so that instead of--
for example, many of the things that Sheriff Baca said--and I
think his efforts are laudatory and ought to be replicated.
But if we had a National center, he could come and talk to
law enforcement about how to coordinate the counterterrorism
and community outreach together. He has a lot of good ideas. He
has a lot of programs. But they are not shared in any National
forum, so that each one is operating independently of the
other.
The Dearborn model, which is headed up by the Department of
Homeland Security in Dearborn, Michigan, also has been in
existence since 2001 and has accumulated a lot of information
and experience which has no way of being transferred to other
areas.
Then there are many offices that don't meet at all with
their counterparts. As a former assistant U.S. attorney, one of
the things that seemed puzzling to me is that when we went to
Dearborn, for the first time I saw the hate crimes officers,
who have to go in the community and enforce hate crimes and
give training about hate crimes, were at the table with the
counterterrorism officers, because after 2001 the
counterterrorism agents were complaining that they were flying
blind in these communities.
They did not know the communities. They did not have a
context in which to put the information that they were
gathering from the community. The people who were doing hate
crimes were introducing them to the community. So you had these
two parallel tracks within the FBI that weren't talking to each
other.
What the center recommended is that they come together to
work with the community in parallel, and that does address, to
some extent, the securitization aspect, because they are not
there only to get information, but they are there to stand with
the community against hate crime and hate speech.
Mr. McCaul. Madam Chair, I think that is a--it is a very
interesting idea, and I would like to follow up if we can on
this--on this idea.
I see my time has expired. I don't know if we will have
another round of questions or not.
Ms. Harman. Well, why don't you take a few extra minutes?
That would be fine.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. That would be great.
Mr. Elibiary, first let me commend you for your work in my
home State of Texas and your outreach efforts in the Muslim
community. You mentioned also the JTTF component. Can you
comment or elaborate on that? I know your opening statement you
didn't have an opportunity.
Mr. Elibiary. Thank you very much. A couple of points, if
I--if you will allow me, in just a few seconds. I wanted to say
that the LAPD and the NYPD are exceptions to State and local
law enforcement.
As one who has advised the PMISC's office looking at
bridging these communities of trust issues and different parts
of the law enforcement hierarchy of the agencies, Federal,
State and local, the--most of your local law enforcement
agencies around the country do not really do CVE work, don't
really know what their role is. They don't do anything as well
as fusion centers but pass on the information to the JTTFs. So
my comments were not focusing on those exception ones.
The two examples that I gave of the securitizing, as I
heard it articulated from community members at the grassroots,
are the low-hanging fruit one as well as the firewall that I
can guarantee you and share with you offline which agencies and
where they exist, if you would like.
On CAIR, I would like to just share the comments that I
shared with Director Mueller at the FBI SIOC last year, early
last year, on this issue. This is our mainstream community
position on the issue, that CAIR is a community organization.
It was totally funded by the community. It is developed over
the years by the community and does community civil rights
work.
Now, the founders, leaders, any individuals having
association problems or have done anything criminal should be
indicted. But the organization should exist. The organization
should be left alone. We have a standard in this country for
criminal activity, and that is the standard we should uphold
for CAIR just like everybody else.
Now, last point is the philosophical spectrum in the Muslim
community. I think we need to engage with everybody according
to the metric that Chair Harman mentioned earlier, which is
violence. So as long as they--they understand and they oppose
that kind of activities, I really don't care what their
viewpoints are on anything.
I engage with all kinds of people, from the most
fundamentalist to the most progressive in our community,
because I have a goal, and it is to counter violent extremism,
and that is it.
Now, the JTTF--here is an example of--that we were not able
to help with. Most mosques around the country, because of the
post-9/11 magnifying glass that they are under in the media,
will not allow for any kind of controversial discourse to
happen in their facilities.
So therefore, if somebody steps forward and wants to kind
of develop their own study circle, so you have, like, an ad-hoc
spiritual sanctioner--that term is often thrown out there in
the analytical community--and they get a little group of five
or six folks sitting around them in a--in a little session,
what the mosque will do is they will go and say, ``You have to
sign up your little study sessions on a map,'' I mean, ``on a
calendar,'' and then slowly weed that group, not authorize it,
and those folks leave the facility where we can engage with
them, and they go to somebody's apartment.
So in this particular case that I am referencing, the
mosque leadership came to me and said, ``We have this issue.
This guy is kind of painting himself in this particular way and
he has gotten a few weak-minded individuals around him, and we
are concerned it could develop into something--some extremism,
and eventually lead into violence.''
I said, ``Okay.'' We connected with the field intelligence
group and the JTTF in the region, and so they had the
information of this individual and the people around him. Then
basically, the mosque kind of pushed them out.
The JTTF supervisor came to me and said, you know, ideally
now what should have happened is that the community and the FBI
would have worked together to find out where the weak link in
that circle would have been, that study circle, and then have
that individual engaged.
Then that individual can then raise the flag to the JTTF
when they start veering away from just the discussion of
extremist identity issues and religious discourse, and then we
would have a flag, an early warning system. But we currently do
not.
We couldn't help to create that mechanism because, like was
mentioned earlier, the level of cooperation between the
community and law enforcement is not up to this level yet.
Mr. McCaul. Perhaps that is why we haven't seen an example
of a plot thwarted from this community outreach. The Hasan case
was screaming, you know, with flags going up and yet no, you
know, action was taken, and----
Mr. Elibiary. I can give you an example of one that does--
it does not come through the community engagement--or the
community relations offices.
The tips that do come in concerning these issues that I am
aware of have all come in through the channel of either the FIG
or the JTTF, because there is a deep relationship that either
that supervisor or special agent had built up, so there is a
personal rapport.
It is very personality-centric between the two components
of the community leader and the FBI official. As I mentioned in
here, this is an ad-hoc system. We can do better----
Mr. McCaul. No, I think we can do better, and I think you
raise a very good point.
Last point--and I have to raise this because I want you to
explain this. I was in the Justice Department when the Holy
Land Foundation was indicted and prosecuted, and there was an
article in the Dallas Morning News that says Holy Land verdict
is another U.S. defeat.
I disagree with that, but I want to give you an opportunity
to explain that.
Mr. Elibiary. I appreciate that, Representative McCaul. I
have written plenty of op-eds and have yet to see an editor
allow me to publish the title that I put on my pieces. So I
have never picked a title for any of my op-eds anywhere,
including the one I just wrote for Fox News. So let me just put
that out there.
Now, here is my view on the Holy Land Foundation. The Holy
Land Foundation--and of course, I sat through both trials,
reviewed the evidence, engaged with the FBI investigators and,
of course, heard from the community side and the defendants and
everything.
We are using the Al Capone approach a lot of times in these
material support cases where we are trying to get people
prosecuted for one thing because of some other issue we have
with them.
Sometimes it is because of the lack of evidence that is
available to convict them directly, as well as we have in the
Holy Land Foundation trial lumped in a whole bunch of
unindicted co-conspirators and caused a great deal of damage to
community relations between law enforcement and the community.
So those two approaches, I think, are--like I mentioned in
my comments, you can achieve--we can achieve our end-goal using
much more subtle and Constitutionally-compliant or considered
fair approaches, because the community feels it is being
treated in a certain--to a certain standard that is different
than the rest of society, so--and then that is
counterproductive, and it is a defeat for us long-term as a
country to increased cooperation.
Mr. McCaul. Yes, thank you.
I thank the Madam Chair for being so generous with her
time.
Ms. Harman. Well, I thank you, Mr. McCaul. Your questions
were interesting.
To remind, the focus of this hearing is: How do we find
those few individuals in--who live amongst us who are intending
to commit acts of terror against us and prevent and disrupt
those plots? That is what we are focused on.
Although we may all have views of different organizations,
I did ask the question I asked about CAIR because it had come
up and I didn't think we had fully aired the situation. It is a
controversial organization, and there are many, including many
in Congress, who question its purposes.
I did hear your testimony that you think it is a valuable
community organization, but I also heard your testimony, two of
you, who said there may be individuals inside of CAIR who have
committed, possibly, criminal acts and should be prosecuted. So
I think that is--that is pretty straight up.
I just want to conclude this hearing by making a couple of
comments. First of all, your testimony is very careful and very
helpful, all of you. I was just looking through it again.
You know a lot about this subject--and you work in your
communities, especially Mr. Elibiary and Ms. Ramirez, and, Mr.
Ervin, you have a long experience with this, and you still work
on the same issues--and it will inform us. First point.
Second point, this whole issue is a minefield. It is a
minefield for you and it is surely a minefield for us. We are
frequent target practice from the left and the right and our
selection of witnesses and topics are regularly under fire.
Having said that, we are going to forge ahead. Our whole
subcommittee feels, I believe--I think I can speak for Mr.
McCaul who is very friendly to me today because I gave him so
much extra time--that we have to figure this out.
I often say that security and liberty are not a zero-sum
game. That is not my original idea. Ben Franklin said a
variation of that. We will either get more of both or less of
both. I want more of both. I want to find bad guys and have the
right approach to getting there, and I want to protect our
Constitution while we do it.
It seems to me if all we do is securitize this problem, and
round up bad guys, and shred our Constitution, we really
haven't protected the society that we love. So getting this
right is going to require all of us to take a little heat and
work very hard on a path forward. I think we have a lot of work
to do.
So I invite you to stay in touch with us. We are going to
have a hearing in the next month or so on the internet. We are
going to try to frame the issue carefully and have a balanced
set of witnesses. I promise you that we will be criticized for
the people we select, but we are still going to try to get this
right.
I just want to close with this. I said it at the beginning,
and you repeated it, Mr. Elibiary, so I know that you heard me,
and I hope others did, too. Our goal is not to censure radical
beliefs. A witness in a prior hearing quoted Barry Goldwater,
who said that extremism in the pursuit of liberty is no vice.
Barry Goldwater is right.
But if those radical beliefs are converted to an intent to
engage in violent behavior, we are going after that. That is
fair season. That is not protected by our Constitution. That
harms America's homeland security. That is our mandate, to
protect America's homeland from harm.
So stay tuned. Please think kindly on us, not just on St.
Patrick's Day but on every day, because we are forging a
difficult path, but so are you. Thank you very much for coming.
The hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]