    [House Hearing, 111 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 111-79]

                          ADDRESSING A NEW GENERATION

                           OF THREATS FROM WEAPONS OF

                          MASS DESTRUCTION: DEPARTMENT

                           OF ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION

                          PROGRAMS AND THE DEPARTMENT

                             OF DEFENSE COOPERATIVE

                            THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                 FULL COMMITTEE

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 JULY 15, 2009

                     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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                       HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                         One Hundred Eleventh Congress

                        IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman
    JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina          HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON,
    SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas                  California
    GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi             ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
    NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii             MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
    SILVESTRE REYES, Texas               WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
    VIC SNYDER, Arkansas                 W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
    ADAM SMITH, Washington               J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
    LORETTA SANCHEZ, California          JEFF MILLER, Florida
    MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina        JOE WILSON, South Carolina
    ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania        FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
    ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey           ROB BISHOP, Utah
    SUSAN A. DAVIS, California           MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
    JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island      JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
    RICK LARSEN, Washington              MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
    JIM COOPER, Tennessee                TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
    JIM MARSHALL, Georgia                BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
    MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam          CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
    BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana              K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
    PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania      DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
    HANK JOHNSON, Georgia                ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
    CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire     MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma
    JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut            DUNCAN HUNTER, California
    DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa                 JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana
    JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania             MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
    GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona          THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida
    NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts          TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
    GLENN NYE, Virginia
    CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
    LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
    MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    FRANK M. KRATOVIL, Jr., Maryland
    ERIC J.J. MASSA, New York
    BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama
    SCOTT MURPHY, New York
    DAN BOREN, Oklahoma
                        Erin C. Conaton, Staff Director
                    Julie Unmacht, Professional Staff Member
                  Aileen Alexander, Professional Staff Member
                        Caterina Dutto, Staff Assistant

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                         CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                      2009

                                                                       Page

    Hearing:

    Wednesday, July 15, 2009, Addressing a New Generation of Threats
      from Weapons of Mass Destruction: Department of Energy
      Nonproliferation Programs and the Department of Defense
      Cooperative Threat Reduction Program...........................     1

    Appendix:

    Wednesday, July 15, 2009.........................................    31
                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 2009
          ADDRESSING A NEW GENERATION OF THREATS FROM WEAPONS OF MASS
      DESTRUCTION: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS AND THE
           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM
                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
      California, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services........     3
    Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman,
      Committee on Armed Services....................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Under Secretary for Nuclear Security,
      Department of Energy, and Administrator, National Nuclear
      Security Administration........................................     5
    Nacht, Dr. Michael L., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global
      Strategic Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
      Policy, U.S. Department of Defense.............................     7

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P....................................    35
        Nacht, Dr. Michael L.........................................    45

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Massa....................................................    53
          ADDRESSING A NEW GENERATION OF THREATS FROM WEAPONS OF MASS
      DESTRUCTION: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS AND THE
           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                              Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 15, 2009.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman
    of the committee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
            MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        The Chairman. Good morning. Let me start by officially
    welcoming our colleague, Representative Buck McKeon, from
    California for his honest-to-goodness first hearing as a
    ranking member of this committee. He got off to a great start
    during our markup. And here we are at our first hearing, so we
    would like to officially welcome him in the first of many
    hearings that we will work together.
        We welcome our witnesses, Honorable Thomas D'Agostino,
    Under Secretary for Nuclear Security with the Department of
    Energy and the Department's Administrator for National Nuclear
    Security Administration; Dr. Michael Nacht, Assistant Secretary
    of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs with the Department of
    Defense.
        And we welcome both of you for being with us. This is a
    highly important hearing, and we look forward to your
    testimony.
        The risks associated with the proliferation of weapons of
    mass destruction, particularly the risk that such weapons can
    fall into terrorists' hands, are some of the gravest threats
    facing our country. Since the end of the Cold War, the world
    has experienced a new era of proliferation. In the last eight
    years alone, North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon, expanded
    its nuclear arsenal and proliferated weapons of mass
    destruction, technology, and expertise to Iran and to Syria.
        Iran has rapidly developed capabilities that may enable it
    to build nuclear weapons.
        A far-reaching nuclear proliferation network run by Dr.
    A.Q. Khan of Pakistan was uncovered and dismantled.
        Nuclear arms rivalries have intensified in Asia and the
    Middle East.
        Changes in civil nuclear power programs have challenged the
    nonproliferation regime. The spread of biotechnology has
    increased the availability of technologies for sinister
    purposes. Dangerous chemical, nuclear, radiological and
    biological materials have remained poorly secured. At the same
    time, terrorist networks around the globe have taken a deep
    interest in obtaining and using these materials.
        The Department of Energy nonproliferation programs and the
    Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
    undertake critical work to address the serious weapons of mass
    destruction threats facing our country today and must be a top
    national security priority. Unfortunately during the past eight
    years these programs have suffered from a lack of effective
    policy guidance and leadership as well as programmatic and
    funding constraints. The 9/11 Commission gave the U.S. a grade
    D on average to prevent weapons of mass destruction
    proliferation and terrorism, and emphasized that Congress
    should provide the resources needed for these efforts as
    quickly as possible.
        This committee has taken a number of important steps to
    address the 9/11 Commission's concern and move weapons of mass
    destruction nonproliferation and threat programs in the right
    direction over the last two years. The committee has also urged
    a strong national commitment to reinvigorate these programs and
    ensure that they are a top national security priority going
    forward. I am pleased that the President has now made that
    commitment and has already undertaken an ambitious effort to
    ensure that the U.S. does whatever we can do to reduce the risk
    that weapons of mass destruction and related material could
    ever fall into terrorist hands. This includes an international
    effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the
    world within four years, and an effort to expand U.S.
    cooperation with Russia and pursue new partnerships to lock
    down sensitive material.
        When the House passed the National Defense Authorization
    Act for Fiscal Year 2010 this committee provided the President
    with additional funding, new authorities and other tools to
    further the President's goals and objectives in this area. This
    includes a $403 million funding increase for Department of
    Energy nonproliferation programs and a $30 million funding
    increase for the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat
    Reduction Program.
        Gentlemen, we look forward to hearing about the good work
    that your departments are doing. And under the new
    administration, we hope you will address the new generation of
    weapons of mass destruction threats facing our country. We are
    especially eager to hear about opportunities that exist to get
    a jump start on the President's initiatives.
        I would like to remind our members and remind our witnesses
    that, directly following the end of this hearing, we will move
    to Rayburn 2337 for a follow-on classified briefing for members
    only.
        Before I begin, we turn to my good friend, the ranking
    member, the gentleman from California, Mr. Buck McKeon, for any
    comments that he may wish to make.
        Mr. McKeon.

     STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE
      FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's
    hearing on addressing a new generation of threats from weapons
    of mass destruction, with a particular focus on efforts under
    way in the Department of Energy's nonproliferation programs and
    the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction
    Program. I would also like to welcome our witnesses, Thomas
    D'Agostino, the Undersecretary for Nuclear Security at the
    Department of Energy, and Administrator of the National Nuclear
    Security Administration; and Dr. Michael Nacht, the Assistant
    Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning. We look
    forward to your testimony. As the Chairman said, since this is
    my first full committee hearing as ranking member, I wanted to
    take a brief moment and express my sincere enthusiasm and
    commitment to work with Chairman Skelton and our members on
    both sides of the aisle to ensure that America's men and women
    in uniform have the direction, tools and resources they need to
    succeed and that our defense policies meet the evolving
    security demands facing our nation.
        Today we are focused on the next generation of weapons of
    mass destruction (WMD) threats. I think it is fair to say that
    many would agree that we live in a complex security environment
    that includes nuclear-capable states, nations determined to be
    nuclear powers, and terrorists who seek nuclear materials and
    know-how. If we look to the latest headlines in the news, we
    will find a defiant North Korea which ignores the international
    community with its nuclear tests, multiple ballistic missile
    launches and proliferation of WMD technology and expertise; a
    calculating Iranian regime that is determined to develop its
    capabilities to build nuclear weapons; and Al Qaeda and their
    affiliates who seek to undermine the Pakistani government, a
    nation with a nuclear weapons program.
        It is how we approach this WMD threat where we may have
    some disagreements. From my perspective, we need a balanced and
    effective toolkit filled with unilateral and multilateral tools
    of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and military
    preparedness, including missile defense and emergency response.
        Today we are focused on one set of tools at our disposal--
    defense nonproliferation programs managed by the Department of
    Energy and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program managed by
    the Department of Defense.
        Gentlemen, I look forward to hearing your individual
    assessments of the major proliferation challenges facing the
    United States and the international community and how your
    respective organizations prioritize to meet these challenges.
        I am also interested in learning your thoughts on U.S.-
    Russia nonproliferation cooperation. As you know, earlier this
    month President Obama met with Russian President Dmitry
    Medvedev, and in a joint statement, both nations confirmed
    their commitment to strengthen cooperation to prevent the
    proliferation of nuclear weapons and stop acts of terrorism.
    Based on this renewed commitment, what will be the impact, if
    anything, on your existing programs with Russia and in terms of
    cost-sharing?
        At this time, I would also like to raise two concerns.
    First, while I recognize that addressing the WMD proliferation
    threat is in U.S. national security interests, our success
    depends on our partnerships with Russia and other nations. I am
    concerned that the United States often gets stuck paying the
    bills, especially for those nations who have the financial
    means to contribute. Let me emphasize that a partnership is not
    a one-way street; it is not an assistance program, and it is
    not effortless.
        Please describe how you are working with other nations to
    ensure they take the proliferation threat seriously and how
    they are contributing, both in terms of capital and financial--
    political and financial capital, to address our shared
    proliferation interests.
        Second, in the recently passed National Defense
    Authorization Act, both the National Nuclear Security
    Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Defense (DOD)
    received funding above the President's budget request for their
    nonproliferation programs. While I support the bill that we
    passed, I am concerned that the additional $402.6 million
    provided to the NNSA came without a formal request from the
    Administrator or Secretary of Energy and was based on a vague
    commitment made during President Obama's April 5th speech in
    Prague where he outlined his vision, ``to secure all vulnerable
    nuclear material around the world within the next four years.''
    My concern is that we are funding programs before the
    President's rhetoric has translated into an integrated
    interagency strategy or plan that has been shared with
    Congress.
        As further evidence of my concerns, neither our colleagues
    on the Senate Armed Services Committee nor the House
    appropriators provided additional funding for NNSA's defense
    nonproliferation programs. In addition, both of these
    committees also reduced funding for an NNSA program to disable
    and dismantle North Korea's nuclear program next year. North
    Korea's rejection of the Six-Party talks and recent provocative
    actions are strong indicators that the international community
    will be in a stalemate with North Korea for the foreseeable
    future.
        Considering these circumstances, Republicans would rather
    see this funding and additional increases designated by the
    committee for these programs be shifted to other priorities,
    such as missile defense, given the current threat.
        Before closing, I want to reiterate that our
    nonproliferation programs are essential to U.S. national
    security interests, especially our efforts to keep nuclear
    materials out of the hands of terrorists.
        Gentlemen, I look forward to your testimony and a candid
    discussion that follows and thank you for being here.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
        Our old friend, the Honorable Tom D'Agostino, we will call
    on you first, sir.

    STATEMENT OF THE HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
      NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND ADMINISTRATOR,
                NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Secretary D'Agostino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Skelton, Ranking Member McKeon, members of the
    committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
    today to discuss NNSA's vital role in supporting the
    administration's efforts to address weapons of mass destruction
    threats.
        Mr. Chairman, under your leadership the committee has been
    a strong supporter of NNSA's nonproliferation activities.
        The Chairman. Excuse me, would you move the microphone just
    a little closer? We are going to have this room renovated, and
    it is going to be a lot easier for witnesses as well as the
    committee to hear witnesses some six months from now.
        But, right now, we will have to do with what we have. So
    please proceed. Thank you.
        Secretary D'Agostino. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        The committee's assistance will become even more critical
    as the NNSA seeks to expand and accelerate efforts, consistent
    with the President's nuclear security strategy. The
    nonproliferation activities that I will address today are a
    subset Department of Energy's overall capabilities to address
    the weapons of mass destruction threat. These activities
    complement the Department's other recognized nonproliferation,
    arms control and counterterrorism capabilities. However, my
    remarks today focus on our first and second line of defense
    activities to prevent the spread of weapons of mass
    destruction, of materials and of technology.
        The President made clear in his April speech in Prague in
    joint statements with our Russian partners and elsewhere that
    nuclear weapons remain a fundamental issue facing the
    international community in the 21st century. He has stated that
    the most immediate and extreme threat to global security is the
    potential acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists. To
    address this threat, the President has outlined an ambitious
    strategy: deal with the nuclear arsenals, halt the
    proliferation of weapons to additional states, and prevent
    terrorists from acquiring weapons or the materials to build
    them.
        I have had the opportunity to speak to members of this
    committee on the important work that the NNSA has done and the
    enterprise carries out to ensure that the United States'
    nuclear weapon stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable to
    deter any adversary and to provide the appropriate defensive
    umbrella to our allies.
        While I am speaking today about a major separate component
    of the NNSA, the nonproliferation component of our national
    security mission relies upon similar scientific and technical
    expertise. It is that scientific and technical nuclear
    expertise, combined with our proven track record on
    implementing programs both domestically and abroad, that makes
    the NNSA defense nonproliferation program a leader in
    nonproliferation activities around the world.
        The NNSA nuclear security programs provide an important
    means to achieve a number of President Obama's objectives. His
    April Prague speech provides a priority list of areas in which
    NNSA will focus future nuclear security activities. Chief among
    those is the President's call to secure all vulnerable nuclear
    materials around the world in four years, expand our
    cooperation with Russia, and pursue new partnerships to lock
    down these sensitive materials.
        This is an urgent and ambitious goal. However, it is one
    that we stand prepared to support. Our work scope includes a
    priority-based assessment of activities required to address
    security concerns at specific sites worldwide. NNSA will
    undertake the following actions to expand nuclear security
    cooperation with Russia and other key partners; secure nuclear
    material at the most vulnerable sites worldwide; remove and
    eliminate weapons-useable nuclear materials where possible;
    strengthen international security standards, practices and
    international safeguards; improve international capabilities to
    detect and intercept smuggling of nuclear materials; and to
    prevent terrorists and proliferators from poaching on the
    international market in the dual use of nuclear-weapons-related
    equipment and technologies.
        To start addressing the four-year time line to secure
    vulnerable material, some existing NNSA activities will be
    accelerated, including our Material Protection Control and
    Accounting Program, our Global Threat Reduction Initiative and
    our Nonproliferation and International Security programs. Other
    aspects of the present agenda will require new or expanded
    efforts, but in short, we have our to-do lists.
        This NNSA plan of work alone will not accomplish all of the
    President's nuclear security objectives. Under the leadership
    of the White House, we will work closely with the Department of
    State, Department of Defense, Homeland Security and others in
    achieving these goals. The joint statement on nuclear
    cooperation issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in Russia
    just last week, as well as the March 2010 Global Nuclear
    Security Summit, announced at the G8 summit in L'Aquila, Italy,
    likewise will provide a solid foundation for work with our
    international partners.
        In closing, as the Administrator of the NNSA I am very
    proud of the work and accomplishments of the nonproliferation
    program that we have. For the sake of not taking up too much of
    the committee's time today, I have not covered our other
    numerous activities and accomplishments in my oral statement.
    However, I have included the details of our nonproliferation
    programs and the achievements in the written testimony. You
    have my assurance that, as we continue on our important work to
    achieve the President's nonproliferation goals, while closely
    working with our interagency partners, NNSA will do its best to
    make the world a safer place. Mr. Chairman and members of the
    committee thank you very much, and that concludes my remarks.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary D'Agostino can be
    found in the Appendix on page 35.]
        The Chairman. Without objection, the written testimony of
    the witnesses will be included in the record.
        Dr. Nacht, please. We welcome you.

       STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL L. NACHT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
       DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE UNDER
      SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Dr. Nacht. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, have
    submitted written testimony for the record.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the Armed Services Committee, I
    am very pleased to appear before you today to discuss these
    terrible threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and
    explain how the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat
    Reduction Program plays an important role in the overall U.S.
    strategy to mitigate these threats.
        We all know that weapons of mass destruction pose a
    tremendous threat to our nation, our interests and even our way
    of life, and the Department of Defense is seized with this
    challenge, and we are determined to ensure that we develop and
    maintain the plans, strategies, capabilities and programs
    necessary to prevent WMD proliferation wherever possible.
        The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy has identified
    four strategic priorities that provide our Department with the
    mechanism for examining WMD challenges. These four priorities
    are: Increasing barriers to WMD proliferation and use;
    identifying and mitigating emerging WMD threats; developing an
    integrated, layered WMD defense; and managing WMD threats
    emanating from failing or fragile states or from ungoverned
    spaces.
        These priorities provide a valuable framework to support
    the President's ambitious nuclear security agenda from his
    Prague speech. Within DOD, these priorities are shaping our
    efforts to address WMD related issues in the Quadrennial
    Defense Review, the QDR, which is currently under way. The QDR
    provides an unparalleled opportunity to communicate the
    importance of WMD issues to the broader defense community.
        Let me briefly offer the committee a report on our current
    and future Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) activities. And
    before I begin, I do want to thank the committee for its
    continued strong support for the Cooperative Threat Reduction
    Program and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
    Year 2010, and we take this as a vote of confidence in the
    Department's efforts thus far to implement the CTR Program.
        Mr. Chairman I know you and your colleagues are well
    acquainted with the history and activities of the Program. I
    just want to bring you up to date briefly on the status of some
    current projects, some recent achievements, and then some new
    initiatives.
        CTR today is in a period of transition from a nuclear-
    centric effort focused on the former Soviet Union to a more
    expansive effort to respond to WMD threats throughout the
    world. CTR continues to oversee the destruction of strategic
    weapons delivery systems and associated infrastructure in
    accordance with all relevant stock provisions and agreements.
    Security systems at 24 nuclear weapon storage sites in Russia
    have been upgraded in partnership with the Department of
    Energy, with the final upgrades completed in late 2008 last
    year. DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE) are now
    coordinating closely to give the Russian military the means to
    sustain operational readiness into the future.
        On March 5th of this year, the first chemical munitions
    were destroyed in the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons destruction
    facility. By 2012, the facility will destroy the chemical
    weapon stockpile at the nearby Planovy military base, which
    contains approximately one-seventh of Russia's chemical
    arsenal. In Azerbaijan, CTR is helping the Coast Guard
    interdict WMD smuggling in the Caspian Sea, and we are
    installing a comprehensive surveillance system that will cover
    the major shipping lanes in the Caspian.
        And by the way, Congressman McKeon, I can cite some
    specific cost-sharing examples here perhaps after I finish my
    testimony. The Biological Threat Reduction Program, the BTRP,
    continues its work to consolidate and secure pathogen
    collections, develop a capability for disease detection,
    diagnostics and reporting and enhancing strategic research
    partnerships.
        We have negotiated an implementing agreement with Armenia
    which is pending signature. There is construction of the
    Central Reference Laboratory in Tbilisi, Georgia, which is on
    track to be completed this year. And at the request of the
    Georgian government, CTR was working to make the lab a joint
    disease surveillance and research center. These are ongoing
    activities today.
        What about the future? First, we must continue to have a
    strong CTR presence in Russia, as the President attempts to
    reset our relationship with Russia, where the CTR Program
    should be a central part of that resetting process. CTR is
    working with an interagency forum to meet the President's goal
    of nuclear lockdown within four years, as Administrator
    D'Agostino has already discussed.
        This group is currently assessing known locations of
    nuclear material to determine the best way forward. This
    initiative is a high priority for the President, and CTR looks
    forward to assisting in this effort. In addition, the CTR
    Program is bracing for a wide range of emerging WMD threats
    beyond the former Soviet Union.
        A recent National Academy of Sciences study recommended
    that CTR expand geographically and evolve in form and function
    to confront emerging WMD threats. In conjunction with an
    interagency committee on bioengagement, CTR has identified four
    countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kenya and Uganda, as
    potential partners in future bioengagement efforts.
        A National Research Council report on the Biological Threat
    Reduction Program noted that countries that lack the
    infrastructure necessary to detect, diagnose, and protect
    disease outbreaks are at a greater risk of succumbing to a
    bioterror attack. Dual-use technologies, materials and
    expertise flow freely across international borders. Dangerous
    pathogens exist in nature and can be weaponized without special
    equipment or advanced technical skills.
        So the increasing threat of animal-to-human transfer of
    pathogens underscores the importance of reporting on animal
    disease outbreaks as well as human. To meet this threat, the
    Biological Threat Reduction Program has built facilities, such
    as the Joint U.S.-Georgia Disease Surveillance and Research
    Center, that will have the unique capability of conducting
    research in both human and animal especially dangerous
    pathogens.
        BTRP will continue to grow and evolve as CTR shifts from a
    nuclear focus to a more expansive vision for threat-reduction
    efforts.
        Let me conclude my remarks by endorsing the new legal
    authorities this committee has included in the National Defense
    Authorization Act (NDAA). I wish to emphasize to the committee
    that DOD understands the sensitivities associated with the use
    of these authorities, and we will only utilize them within the
    guidelines set forth in the legislation.
        So, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would say CTR is one
    piece of an overarching national strategy to counter WMD. We
    have made significant progress over the history of the Program,
    but we have more to do across the growing spectrum of WMD
    threats. The Department of Defense looks forward to continued
    close coordination with Congress and its interagency partners
    as we seek to address the threats posed by WMD. And I welcome
    your questions and look forward to a productive discussion.
    Again, thank you for giving me this opportunity.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Nacht can be found in the
    Appendix on page 45.]
        The Chairman. Doctor, thank you very much.
        Let me ask each of you, in your considered opinion, what is
    the greatest existing or emerging threat posed by the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction?
        Go ahead, please.
        Secretary D'Agostino. Why don't I start, Mr. Chairman?
        In my view, obviously, it is a complicated question. I
    don't want to point to a particular region in the world, but I
    would like to answer it in the following way. This is all about
    the material. Preventing terrorists, nonstate actors, rogue
    states from having the kind of material that can prove to be
    dangerous; fissile material and, in some cases, certain types
    of radiological material, can cause also panic, if you will,
    but may not have that destructive power that fissile material
    may have.
        Our priorities are to look at both areas, but it is all
    about the material. So we have a program working with the
    Defense Department that integrates the whole material spectrum
    problem. Looking to secure material where it exists around the
    world is a key part of it, and reducing the number of locations
    of the material, eliminating material, trying to get rid of
    that fissile material that has no energy value, if you will,
    and converting material from highly-enriched uranium to low-
    enriched uranium; detecting material as it moves around the
    world, having a specific program to focus on material
    detection; and then ultimately stop adding to the material
    problem with programs and ideas, such as the Fissile Material
    Cutoff Treaty and reopening it to discussion internationally to
    get those pieces together.
        So the threats come down to the material. It is kind of
    like that old real estate add, which is location, location,
    location. I think it is material, material, material. Obviously
    technology and policies are a big part of that. But that is how
    I like to think about this problem sir.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Dr. Nacht.
        Dr. Nacht. Of course, President Obama to some degree
    answered that question in Prague when he said the most
    immediate and extreme threat to global security is a nuclear
    weapon in the hands of terrorists. Within the Department of
    Defense, we are very much emphasizing that it is most
    expeditious to stop the proliferation of WMD at its source,
    because once it gets out into a transportation network, it is
    much harder to interdict.
        Let me give you several examples of how we are trying to do
    this. In cooperation with the Department of Energy, we, last
    year, finished physical protection upgrades at every Russian
    nuclear weapon storage site for which U.S. assistance has been
    requested to enhance the security of those sites and make it
    less feasible for material to be stolen.
        Currently, the two departments continue to work closely
    with the Russian ministry of defense to develop a cadre of
    military personnel capable of operating, maintaining and
    repairing those security systems far into the future. In an
    effort to address the insider threat, which is really central
    to stopping the flow of material from the source, we work
    closely with the Russian--the three agencies. The Ministry of
    Defense (MOD) in Russia and DOD and DOE are involved in further
    developing MOD personnel reliability programs intended to
    ensure that personnel with access to nuclear weapons are fit
    for duty.
        The DOD and MOD together have developed and installed an
    automated system to inventory and to track the location and
    condition of Russia's nuclear weapons. We also continue to
    support the transport of nuclear warheads from operational
    locations to dismantlement facilities and to consolidate its
    secure storage. So we remain engaged with the Russian
    Federation on multiple fronts, including eliminating strategic
    nuclear arms and their delivery vehicles.
        Of course, nuclear weapons are not the only form of WMD
    that pose such a threat, even in the hands of terrorists. So as
    I mentioned in the past already, the first processing building
    at Shchuch'ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility began to
    destroy agents in March of this year. A second processing
    building will be completed by the end of this year. So
    interdicting and stopping the proliferation of the weapons at
    its source is our primary approach to this problem.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
        Mr. McKeon.
        Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, in following up on my opening remarks, there has
    been a great deal of attention focused on the President's goal
    of securing all vulnerable nuclear material worldwide in four
    years. Again, it is my understanding that, at this time,
    neither the Department of Energy nor the Department of Defense
    nor this Congress has seen a formal strategy, plan or timeline
    to meet this goal. Would you please tell us when should the
    Congress expect to receive such a formal strategy or plan?
        Secretary D'Agostino. I will start, sir, and then shift
    over. What we have done at the Department of Energy, and we are
    very familiar with the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and
    work closely with Dr. Nacht and his team, is we looked at our
    program, which is structured as I mentioned earlier around
    securing material, addressing that and being able to detect
    movement of items across the world, frankly; and looked at
    accelerating those elements of our program, trying to push the
    end dates, some of which are out in the 2016 to 2018 time
    frame, and moving them closer within the next four-year period.
        So the scope of work that we have laid out we don't have an
    approved plan. My team, headed by Mr. Baker, has put together a
    draft plan. I have asked him to put together a draft plan, but
    that draft plan is not approved yet by me. It is, frankly, we
    are negotiating both internally within the Department and in
    the interagency process.
        However, in the meantime, I don't need to have a final
    approved plan to know what work I have in front of me because I
    have a good sense of it. And so we are looking at recalibrating
    the internals of our program to address what we think are the
    most vulnerable and most important areas to address first.
        And then the interagency process, as you have described in
    your opening remarks, are exactly where ultimately I would like
    to see this go. This is not just about the NNSA or this is not
    just about the Department of Defense and the NNSA solving,
    addressing this problem. This is about the whole federal
    government and, quite frankly, all of our international
    partners who are part of this solution. It will take a little
    bit of time to get to the point, and unfortunately, I can't
    give you a date, but it will take a bit of time to sort out all
    those pieces. But in the meantime, I think Dr. Nacht and I know
    about our work that we have cut out in front of us, and we want
    to accelerate those pieces that we can, particularly with our
    Global Threat Reduction Initiative in the National Nuclear
    Security Administration, as well as with our Material
    Protection and Accounting Program that we have. Those two
    pieces coupled with the right policy and safeguards framework
    will ultimately get us a lot closer to where we need to be four
    years from now.
        Dr. Nacht. Let me follow on with some remarks from the
    Defense Department's perspective. As Dr. D'Agostino has said,
    the staffs of several of the agencies involved in this work are
    collaborating and developing an overall strategy, which is in
    progress. There are several parts to this process that I can
    cite. First, we are defining and scoping the problem in terms
    of the definitions and thresholds for vulnerable materials.
    What is it we really are looking for? What is included in our
    effort to lockdown? And what is excluded? We are refining and
    prioritizing the list of key facilities and sources of
    vulnerable materials worldwide.
        We are defining where the problem is best addressed, to
    expanding and accelerating existing programs, and where new
    activities and programs will be required, to include an
    evaluation of roles and missions of the major departments in
    the federal government. And I believe that we could be able to
    return to you in September and provide a more detailed report
    on the proposed way forward.
        Mr. McKeon. So you are expecting by September to give us
    the plan?
        Dr. Nacht. I am optimistic that we will have something to
    report to you in September. The NNSA, of course, is overseeing
    this. They are taking the lead on it in terms of coordination,
    and we are all on the job on this. We know how critically
    important it is. It is not only something that has been
    restated by President Obama; it was now endorsed at the G8
    summit in L'Aquila, so it is becoming a global initiative. So
    we know it is a very high priority.
        Mr. McKeon. Will the four years start when the President
    gave his speech or in September when you give us an update or a
    draft of a plan?
        And Mr. D'Agostino, you said it would take some time. Would
    you be able to report back in September?
        Secretary D'Agostino. I think what we would be able to--we
    have an element of our plan, we have our work scope identified,
    and the key will be making sure that our priorities are not
    just within the Department of Energy, but are consistent with
    the rest of the federal government, quite frankly, and having
    those things line up and mesh up nicely.
        I believe we will have a plan that I am comfortable with.
    As you obviously know, sir, we are in the process of defining
    our fiscal year 2011 and outyear program in details. I have a
    personal desire, and I know Dr. Nacht does as well, to make
    sure that things get settled as quickly as possible on this
    plan because it helps inform the kind of program I will
    ultimately submit to the White House and negotiate to get into
    the President's budget next January.
        So I think I will have enough information from a draft
    standpoint. I don't know if it will be ready for Congress yet,
    but quite frankly, I am pushing very hard, and I know Dr. Nacht
    is pushing very hard, to get this thing done. We understand
    that this is a focal point, and we understand that this is the
    thing that is going to help us shape the details of our
    program. And whether more money needs to be put in category A
    versus category B and where the priorities are, we are right on
    top of that because it is important to get this done.
        Mr. McKeon. Is the President asking both of you to--is this
    just something that sounded like a good thing to do, or is he
    really serious and he wants this done in four years from the
    time he gave the speech, and you are working on it and you will
    have the plan back September or January? I think the Congress
    is very interested in seeing that and then monitoring it
    because I think we all agree that that is something that should
    be done, and four years is a good time to have it done. So is
    this something that he is pushing you on, that he wants this
    plan and the date started from when he gave the speech?
        Secretary D'Agostino. The President is quite serious about
    this plan, sir. I haven't talked to him personally about it,
    but I have talked--my contacts at the National Security Council
    are very clear that we are going to put together a plan, we are
    going to work the details of it. I don't know when, quote-
    unquote, the official start date might be. My view is the
    President said he wants the plan done within four years. I know
    the date he said. I think it is April 4th. And I am working to
    that end.
        Mr. McKeon. Thank you very much.
        The Chairman. I think we are running out of time. We will
    run and vote in just a minute. But I have one request following
    up on Mr. McKeon. You will, the minute the plan is fully ready,
    communicate it to this committee, am I correct?
        Dr. Nacht. Yes, of course. As soon as the plan is fully
    ready, we will communicate this to the committee. And there may
    be ways we can brief you off line or in closed session on the
    progress.
        The Chairman. Of course, the sooner the better. A briefing
    would be excellent. But we would like to have the full plan. I
    am sure we would consider a full hearing on that issue the
    minute that it is given to us. We will return after the vote,
    and Ms. Sanchez will be the lead questioner. We will be
    adjourned until we come back.
        [Recess.]
        The Chairman. The hearing will resume. The gentlelady from
    California, Ms. Sanchez.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, gentlemen, for being before us today.
        I have sat on this subcommittee that deals with these
    issues now for I think 11 of the 13 years that I have been in
    the Congress. And there are really two issues that worry me
    today, and I continue to try to understand and get my hands
    around it. So I will start with the first.
        The START treaty will expire December 5th of this year. And
    I know that your agency is the one that deals with giving the
    technical information about numbers and capabilities and
    delivery systems, et cetera. So my question is--it is my
    personal opinion that it is very difficult to reach a
    renegotiation and then extension treaty by December 5th. So my
    question to you would be, what is it that we as Congress can do
    to ensure that we meet this December 5th, that we get something
    that we meet this December 5th deadline, because I think it is
    very, very critical? It exposes us to a new arms race, if you
    will, if we don't do something about this.
        Dr. Nacht. Well, Congresswoman, obviously, you are aware
    that there have been very intensive negotiations.
        Ms. Sanchez. I have been to Russia several times.
        Dr. Nacht. Right. And Rose Gottemoeller from the State
    Department chairs our negotiating team. They are actually
    leaving again next week for the first round of negotiations
    post-summit. I think the calendar is daunting, as you suggest.
    We are making every effort, and the Russians have been told
    this, and they are fully aware of this, that we don't want to
    go through a process of extending the treaty.
        We want a new treaty that will be completed by the time the
    START treaty expires. Now, then, we think probably it is
    unlikely that the treaty will be completed and the ratification
    process will be completed by the time the treaty expires, the
    START treaty. So we would seek an extension from the Congress
    to continue the treaty while the ratification process goes
    forward. But we are hopeful, very hopeful, that a treaty will
    be reached, an agreement will be reached on a new treaty before
    December 5th. We will submit it to the Senate and to relevant
    House committees as well, but for consent for ratification,
    which will then take place. Senator Lugar has stated publicly
    it might take four months. So sometime before the spring of
    2010, we would hope to have a new agreement.
        Now, the summit, as you know from the joint understanding,
    did reflect a lot of hard bargaining that has already taken
    place. We have an agreed range of operationally deployed
    strategic nuclear weapons of 1,500 to 1,675. We have an agreed
    range of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles 500 to 1,100. Each
    side has argued for one side or the other. At least we have now
    bounded the problem, and I think we can see our way through to
    an agreement on both those characteristics of the forces which
    are critically important.
        There are other elements of the treaty as well and
    definitional issues that have to be resolved, so there is a lot
    of hard negotiating ahead. But I think our readout of the
    summit was that the Russians, although they are challenging to
    work with, want an agreement. Actually, their nuclear delivery
    vehicle programs are lagging ours by quite a lot numerically.
    Just the atrophying of their systems; they are putting more
    weapons on fuel delivery vehicles, which actually is quite
    destabilizing. We would prefer to have single-warhead weapons
    on delivery vehicles so it is not seen as a first-strike
    weapon. So this suggests to me--I mean, there are other issues.
    There is a missile defense issue in Europe.
        Ms. Sanchez. Yes, I know about that also.
        Dr. Nacht. So I don't want to in any way sugarcoat it. It
    is not going to be simple. But I think this is an important
    next step.
        We had the London meeting between President Medvedev and
    the President in April. We had the Moscow summit last week. I
    think it is promising--I spent a lot of time negotiating it
    with the Russians in the past, in the 1990s--that we will have
    a treaty before the START treaty expires.
        Ms. Sanchez. Let me stop you right there because I have a
    second question. I am very concerned--my number one priority
    has always been the concern over Iran getting nuclear weapons.
    What do you think the Congress can do? I think it is not just
    an ability for them to get the ability to send missiles off,
    but their ability to put it in the hands of somebody who might
    walk it into our country or into another ally's country. What
    should the Congress be doing?
        The Chairman. Doctor, answer the question, please, and then
    we will go to the next witness.
        Dr. Nacht. Well, this is a large subject. Obviously
    stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or transmitting
    them to others is obviously a top national security priority
    for the President. We have had this recent--now where Iran is
    going through sort of our people domestically.
        One of our issues is, we are seeking to impose an effective
    sanctions regime on Iran, so that they will find it in their
    interest to come to the table. But it is not easy to do.
    Germany alone exports $6 billion worth of goods and equipment
    to Iran. A lot of our European allies are deep negotiating
    commercial partners with Iran.
        Ms. Sanchez. We have been working with them through the
    dialogues that we have in the Congress.
        Dr. Nacht. The Chinese buy a lot of oil from Iran. So
    whether you are looking for a U.N. Security Council resolution,
    if you are looking for a multi-party sanctions regime, we are
    talking to the people who are selling the Iranians a lot of
    high-priced systems. So anything the Congress can do, frankly,
    to shore up our ability to enforce a sanctions regime we think
    would be very valuable.
        Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
        Mr. Bartlett--but before I call Mr. Bartlett, let me again
    reiterate, gentlemen, we would appreciate continued briefings
    on the progress on the four-year plan. And when it is
    finalized, at the earliest moment, please, communicate it to
    this committee because we wish to follow through at that time.
        Mr. Bartlett.
        Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
        Several years ago, I spent three days in North Korea. They
    may be evil; they are not stupid. They know, and I suspect the
    same is true of Iran, they know that if they launched a missile
    from their soil, nuclear tipped, that the consequences of that
    would be that we would vaporize their country.
        Gentlemen, they are just not going to do that. I have no
    idea why we are watching to see when they get a missile which
    could reach us from their soil. They are not going to launch a
    missile from their soil toward us. If they launch a missile
    toward us, it will be from the sea. And if it is nuclear-
    tipped, the most probable use of that weapon is going to be to
    produce an extra atmospheric electromagnetic pulse (EMP) lay
    down. Their weapon and their missile is unlikely to have much
    precision. If they miss their target by 100 miles for extra
    atmospheric detonation, it really won't matter, will it? The
    most probable place the weapon is going to be launched from is
    the sea. And the most probable use of the weapon is going to be
    an EMP attack. Why am I not seeing any meaningful preparation
    to protect us against either one of these?
        Dr. Nacht. Well, let me just take a piece of what you have
    said. When the North Koreans started testing these missiles,
    most recently after they tested a nuclear device, Secretary
    Gates ordered redeployment of missile defense systems, the
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and an Aegis
    system, to protect the Hawaiian islands. We are working on----
        Mr. Bartlett. Sir, if I might interrupt. That is because we
    thought they were going to launch from their soil, and the
    current missile would only reach Hawaii; it wouldn't reach our
    mainland. I am saying, sir, that they are not going to launch
    from their soil. They may be evil; they are not stupid. They
    are not going to launch from their soil. They are going to
    launch from the sea, which means that all up and down both of
    our coasts, we are vulnerable. Why am I not seeing any
    meaningful preparation to protect us against that? And if they
    do launch there, sir, the most probable use of that weapon--it
    is in all of their open literature and all of their war games--
    and if a nonstate actor had it, that it is absolutely what they
    are going to do, it is going to be an extra atmospheric
    detonation-producing EMP. I am not seeing any meaningful
    preparation to prepare for that attack either. Why am I not
    seeing any preparation for either of these two, which is the
    most probable way the missile is going to be used and the most
    probable way the nuclear weapon is going to be detonated?
        Dr. Nacht. With respect to possible EMP attacks on the
    United States, there is work being done which we could discuss
    in another venue. With respect to a sea-based system, there are
    no current platforms or delivery vehicles available to the
    North Koreans to launch an attack on the U.S. homeland from
    sea.
        Mr. Bartlett. Sir, that just isn't true because any tramp
    steamer and a Scud launcher, which they can buy for $100,000,
    can launch a missile to an apogee of 180 miles. That is
    perfectly adequate, sir, for an EMP attack which would
    devastate all of New England. They do have platforms. Any tramp
    steamer and a Scud launcher is an adequate platform.
        Dr. Nacht. Congressman, of course, you are aware, take the
    recent following of the Korean ship from the North Korean port
    toward Burma that turned around just recently; we have
    excellent surveillance of all North Korean naval vessels.
        Mr. Bartlett. Sir, there are thousands of commercial ships
    out there. And if a canvas is over it, you cannot tell whether
    it is a stack of bananas or a missile launcher on the deck. We
    can't see through the thinnest covering on the deck. There is
    no way, in today's world, that we could detect whether that
    cargo on the deck is a launcher or Caterpillar tractors.
        Dr. Nacht. I think, Congressman, you raise some good
    points, and I think we can continue this perhaps with members
    from the Defense Intelligence Agency and others in a closed
    session and I'd be happy to go into more detail on exactly your
    concerns.
        Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, sir.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Marshall, please.
        Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I second, third and fourth what my colleague Mr. Bartlett
    had to say. This is so obvious. One of the reasons why I agreed
    to co-chair the Missile Defense Caucus; we are not adequately
    prepared to deal with rogue missiles. And a rogue missile
    launched the way Mr. Bartlett described would just be
    absolutely devastating to the United States, would
    significantly weaken the United States. It would, obviously, be
    in the interest of all of our adversaries to do that. And the
    possible consequences, the human consequences, within the
    United States are just too horrible to even contemplate. And so
    I look forward to closed session discussions of this problem
    and what we are doing about this problem.
        CTR and the evolution of CTR, Mr. Nacht, if you had
    additional funds available to you, what would you be doing with
    those funds? How would you modify the Program, improve the
    Program, expand the Program, those sorts of things? I
    understand we have moved significantly away--well, not away
    from--but we have broadened the scope of our inquiry beyond
    nuclear to bioterrorism, chemical, et cetera. And if you could
    describe what you would do with additional resources, that
    would be helpful.
        Dr. Nacht. Well, you raised one point immediately. We are
    moving substantially into the bioterrorism threat space, and we
    are still at the early stages. It is not easy to collaborate
    with other countries on this, although we have made some
    progress. A lot of the systems we are talking about are dual-
    use systems. They can be used for perfectly legitimate
    commercial research activities. We could really scope out a
    broader effort to try to develop something that might begin to
    move down the road toward a lockdown of pathogens even though
    it would be even more ambitious than the nuclear lockdown.
        Mr. Marshall. When you say it is not easy to coordinate
    with other countries on this particular subject, is it because
    of lack of resources or there is just lack of interest on their
    part to cooperate with us?
        Dr. Nacht. I would say it is a mix. You know, if we speak
    to some governments, they find that we are being excessively
    intrusive on what they are doing in certain areas, or they deny
    that there is any malevolent intent or any military
    application. Sometimes we can't prove that. We don't have the
    intelligence to know definitively.
        So we need collaboration that sometimes comes actually from
    a broader framework. Take for example the case of Georgia.
    Georgia was invaded by Russia last summer. Georgia has all
    kinds of security concerns. We have signed an agreement that
    basically pledges to maintain their security. They are very
    keen on collaborating with us, even though it is a very
    sensitive matter dealing with their Russian neighbors on all of
    this. So there we have a substantial new program for a
    biological laboratory in Georgia.
        But other countries don't have that sense of security needs
    or concerns. They don't think they are a transit point for
    bioterrorism, and they are just more reticent. Now, sometimes
    funds can help. If we say, we will put a downpayment down on
    this activity or we will pay the majority share in the first
    tranche, they might be more interested. So I think additional
    funds could help. But we have been very careful not to go to
    the committee or the Congress for request of funds that we know
    we can't use effectively.
        And, you know, you have been generous enough to support
    beyond our request. So, you know, we have not submitted--we
    don't have a list, really, of unfunded priorities that we have
    in our pocket that we could go to. It is unusual, unlike a lot
    of other areas. But if you are urging us to do it, we could
    develop it.
        Mr. Marshall. That would be great, if you would develop it.
    We may not fund it, but it would be nice to know what
    additional steps--where would you go from where you are right
    now.
        Dr. Nacht. Sir, we will follow up on that with NNSA.
        Mr. Marshall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Thornberry, please.
        Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. D'Agostino, I appreciate what you and your colleagues
    at NNSA have done over the years on nonproliferation. I have
    thought that if the federal government were going to waste
    money in one area that that would probably be the area to waste
    it in, because any chance of reducing slightly the odds of a
    terrorist getting a weapon of mass destruction would be worth a
    lot. But, at the same time, we want to make sure our money is
    spent smartly and effectively.
        Secretary D'Agostino. Right. Right.
        Mr. Thornberry. And I have some concerns that a lot of this
    is moving so quickly that we have the risk of throwing money at
    problems and not spending it as smartly and as effectively as
    we might--could.
        For example, it seems to me that the clearest, easiest
    program to defend is Material Protection, Control, and
    Accounting (MPC&A), where we put greater security around
    nuclear fissile materials. But the question is, how much is
    enough? How much do we keep upgrading, for example, Russian
    facilities when they are spending a tremendous amount of money
    to upgrade their own military and it is becoming much more
    effective over time?
        And what I really want to get to is, do you have an
    objective standard of metrics that can help evaluate where
    different facilities are, partly as a way to know where to put
    the money, but partly as a way to know whether we are making
    progress or not?
        Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Thornberry, thanks very much for
    the question.
        The answer to that is, yes, we do have an objective set of
    metrics. The nonproliferation program is driven, in fact, by
    metrics.
        With respect to MPC&A or even our Global Threat Reduction
    Initiative, we have a very clearly laid out scope of work that
    goes out into the future. Much of this work, as you know, takes
    some time to do. I mean, you have to start with usually
    country-to-country negotiations, and in each country it is
    unique and different.
        But in the end, we know how many facilities we have said we
    were going to work on in Russia. We have laid out that scope.
    We know how many buildings we said we want to secure in Russia.
    We know how many ports and land transfer crossings we have in
    Russia and around the world that we plan on doing. And we are
    literally working our way through that menu. And so, at any
    given point in time, we know how well we are doing, are we
    getting a B-plus or an A-minus or a C or what have you.
        Mr. Thornberry. And can you say that this facility in
    Russia and this other facility in wherever, Bulgaria, meet
    category III security standards, for example? I mean, is there
    a standard set by which you can measure across the different
    countries where security is relative to perfect security, which
    doesn't exist?
        Secretary D'Agostino. Yes, sir. We use the International
    Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Circular 225, Rev. 4, which is an
    international security guidelines that go off and help guide
    our program. We make sure that those facilities meet that bare
    minimum set of security standards. And we work our way through
    that list.
        So it is very much metric-based. At any given point in
    time, for example, we have 73 out of 123 sites that we said we
    are going to finish off in Russia are actually done; 73 are
    completed----
        Mr. Thornberry. And you have walked away from them?
        Secretary D'Agostino. We have sustainability agreements.
    This is the key point, though, and I think you are absolutely
    right, is making sure we have a transition plan with Rosatom,
    for example, which is one of our major partners in Russia. We
    have a transition plan in place to work that off. Right now
    they pick up 40 percent of the load on maintainability, and the
    plan is to get them off of the U.S. approach out into the next
    few years. The Ministry of Defense, which we work closely with
    the Defense Department, has already agreed that they are taking
    care of 100 percent of the security upgrades that we have
    jointly worked on.
        So I am very much in the mind of making sure that this is
    not the gift that keeps on giving, if you will. This is
    something where we expect a partnership relationship. And,
    frankly, I am quite pleased with the partnership relationship.
        I will give you one more example, the Federal Customs
    Service in Russia, for example. Right now, with them we are
    working on putting security upgrades at 370 land border
    crossings, with the agreement right off the bat that they do 50
    percent of the work, we do 50 percent of the work. And on the
    50 percent of the work that we do, they are picking up the
    maintenance costs on those facilities bit by bit, so that over
    the next three years they will have 100 percent of the
    maintainability on that covered.
        Now, of course, we are going to watch them to make sure
    they follow through on that--that is my own parochial
    interest--but I think it is happening.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
        Dr. Snyder.
        Dr. Snyder. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I was late because of
    the Veterans Committee. If Mr. Thornberry would like another
    five minutes, I will yield my time to him. He is one of the
    experts and zealous advocates. If he only has five minutes of
    information, then he is done--I will let you have my time.
        Okay. Well, I am just going to pass.
        Mr. Thornberry. Well, all right.
        Dr. Snyder. There he goes.
        Mack has been a leader in this program. There were
    political threats to this program 10, 12, 13 years ago, and
    Mack lead action both in this committee and on the floor of the
    House because of the importance of these programs. And I want
    to recognize him.
        The Chairman. The gentleman is recognized for another five
    minutes.
        Mr. Thornberry. I appreciate the gentleman from Arkansas.
    He and I have traveled together with some of your folks and
    seen some of this, particularly in the early days, which,
    again, seems to me to be eminently defensible. I am worried,
    though, again, that, as we move ahead, that it continues to be
    eminently defensible.
        And let me just pursue a little bit--you were talking about
    Russia, and you talk about Russia a lot in your statement, and
    the partnership we have with Russia. You talk in your statement
    that Russia is bringing back some civilian fuel that it has
    produced from neighboring countries. Other than that example,
    is Russia doing anything for anybody else other than itself?
        Secretary D'Agostino. Well, we work with Russia on the
    Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which talks
    about the training and export control and making sure--since we
    obviously have the majority of the material and the warheads,
    we have a certain obligation, we feel a significant obligation
    in that manner, to essentially get the whole world up to a
    certain level of standards with respect to nuclear
    counterterrorism.
        Essentially, we work obviously very closely with
    repatriating material, as you have described. Russia is very
    keen and has been very helpful with us, kind of with some other
    states that I would rather talk about in closed session. I
    would be happy to do that in closed session because of the
    sensitivity of the discussion.
        But also they have--because of our partnership with Russia,
    other nations have watched this, and we have agreement with our
    second line of defense activities where this isn't just a
    matter of the United States going over to some foreign port and
    saying, ``We will take care of everything; we are going to
    install this equipment.'' We typically provide the equipment
    and the know-how on the operations, but those other countries
    pick up the rest of the work, which is significant. It is not
    only the installation, but the operations and the maintenance
    of that stuff.
        So we are--I am very confident overall with our
    partnerships.
        Mr. Thornberry. Well, I appreciate it.
        And I appreciate, again, Dr. Snyder yielding.
        I would just say, to keep bipartisan support, it will be
    very important for the administration to make sure we are not
    just funding Russian military modernization and that they do
    not only what they say they are with their own materials and
    facilities, but they are genuinely helpful, whether it is
    public or not, are genuinely helpful in getting better control
    of materials in other places.
        Secretary D'Agostino. Thank you.
        Mr. Thornberry. So, with that feedback, I appreciate the
    gentlemen. Yield back to the gentleman from Arkansas.
        The Chairman. Mr. Heinrich, please.
        Mr. Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Gentlemen, what do you see as the role of the Congress in
    motivating our allies and partners, countries like Germany, to
    pursue a more effective sanctions regime with Iran?
        Dr. Nacht. This is a tough nut. And it has been an issue
    that has been addressed at least going back to the early
    Clinton years, so we are talking about at least a 15-year-old
    problem here.
        The fact of the matter is that there are many lucrative
    commercial arrangements between private entities in a number of
    ally countries with Iran whose behavior has not been altered by
    any government persuasion by their host government, by their
    own government.
        What the U.S. can do in that regard, you know, we have
    tried various forms of consultation and negotiation and
    dissuasion, but so far I would say we have, you know, mixed
    results, very mixed results.
        I don't know if some more draconian legislation coming out
    of the Congress would actually be helpful, because there are so
    many dimensions to our relationships with the European
    partners, with the Chinese, that, you know, we can go--it is a
    very important matter, but if we go overboard in this area, we
    may pay a price in another area.
        So I think this is an area under review. We are struggling
    with it, and we are looking for--it is a very tailored
    approach. You can't have an overall sanctions policy, I think,
    because the situations are so different. I mean, to alter
    Chinese behavior about acquisition of oil resources from Iran
    is one whole problem. Dealing with heavy machinery from Siemens
    in Germany to Iran is a different problem. Dealing with the
    Russians on their nuclear technology is still a third problem.
    So we have not derived an umbrella approach to this problem,
    but we are open to ideas. It is critically important.
        Obviously, as long as Iran believes and knows that they are
    not really being hurt very much economically--and their economy
    is not in good shape, as we all know--then it gives them less
    of an incentive to alter their behavior or to sit down and talk
    with us in a meaningful way about their nuclear program.
        Mr. Heinrich. To shift gears a little bit, we saw with the
    outbreak of H1N1 in Mexico that we have places right in our own
    backyard where there is no effective surveillance and reporting
    detection when it comes to both animal and then animal-to-human
    pathogens.
        Where do you see the most acute needs for more effective
    detection and reporting as sort of a first line to prevent both
    bioterror outbreaks and also to manage natural animal-to-human
    pathogens that can have huge public health ramifications as
    well?
        Dr. Nacht. That is a very important subject and could be
    very, very important this fall. It is a little outside of my
    particular lane. There is an Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    Homeland Security, Paul Stockton, who works these issues in
    close consultation with the Department of Homeland Security and
    with Health and Human Services (HHS). And that is really----
        Mr. Heinrich. I guess, what do you see as the relationship
    between early detection and reporting and how that can maybe
    help both with natural outbreaks but also having a surveillance
    system in place that potentially can be helpful in bioterror
    attacks as well?
        Dr. Nacht. I mean, obviously, the earlier we can detect the
    outbreak and the better surveillance systems we have in place,
    the more likely we will be prepared to deal with these matters.
        I think that we are looking very carefully at division of
    labor on exactly what kind of systems and what should we
    request from the Congress, what should be deployed, who is in
    the information loop. Because, as you know, I mean, take the
    catastrophe of 9/11, how many different governmental and other
    players are involved? If this became a major outbreak in the
    fall, I mean, it would be a national emergency.
        So it is a large subject. It is a subject that is under
    interagency review currently.
        Mr. Heinrich. Okay.
        I yield back, Mr. Chair.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
        Before I call on Mr. Turner, Dr. Nacht, let me follow
    through on the discussion you had with Mr. Thornberry a few
    moments ago.
        He asked about the Department of Energy cost-saving with
    Russia on nonproliferation activities, and we received several
    examples of such cost-sharing. But are you able to give us
    examples of such cost-sharing for the Department of Defense
    Cooperative Threat Reduction programs?
        Dr. Nacht. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I can cite a few examples.
        In Azerbaijan, the government there is paying the cost of
    the Cooperative Threat Reduction bio facility that has been
    established there.
        Of course, all of our Cooperative Threat Reduction partners
    provide land for facilities. They provide in-kind services,
    such as security forces to protect the facilities. Russia is
    actually paying a portion of the cost for the dismantlement of
    their ballistic missile submarines, which is a CTR program.
        And our friends in Canada and Britain have contributed
    financially to the nerve agent elimination plant in Russia. So
    they are helping to pay for the elimination of a plant in
    Russia that we are helping with the Russians to eliminate, but
    it is British and Canadian funding that is supporting that.
        So there is a mix of different cost-sharing arrangements
    across the many different programs under CTR in the defense
    area.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I appreciate both of you gentlemen being here. I have a
    great deal of respect for Mr. D'Agostino. And, Mr. Nacht, you
    have an incredible record of service to your country and
    substantively on these issues. And I have a topic that perhaps
    the two of you might be able to help me with.
        I am very concerned about North Korea's nuclear weapons
    programs. I certainly respect Mr. Bartlett's issue that he had
    raised of alternative ways that they might attack us, but at
    the same time we have the evidence of their full pursuit of a
    nuclear weapons program and a very aggressive missile program
    that appears to be, I believe and I think others and perhaps
    you believe, is a direct threat to the national security of our
    country.
        In the budget that was put forth by the President, he
    requested funding for the disablement and dismantlement of
    North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Now, during our
    committee's markup, I noted that the request for the
    disablement and dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons
    program totaled $80 million. That was the President's budget
    request, $80 million.
        At the same time, the President requested a cut of $120
    million in missile defense funding that would have completed
    part of the missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska. So we are
    setting aside $80 million for the disablement and dismantlement
    of North Korea's nuclear weapon program, and we are eliminating
    $120 million to finish a missile defense field that was two-
    thirds of the way complete in Fort Greely, Alaska.
        I offered an amendment that was defeated to offset that, to
    take the $80 million for North Korea and offset it on the $120
    million that we were losing to actually defend ourselves.
        Now, while I support nonproliferation programs and I
    certainly support the dismantlement and the disablement of
    North Korea's nuclear program, I am highly skeptical that Kim
    Jong-il will return to the negotiation table and allow either
    the United States or the International Atomic Energy Agency to
    disable and dismantle North Korea's nuclear program.
        It is my understanding that Secretary of State Clinton
    expressed similar pessimism in April, when she told a Senate
    committee that North Korea's return to the six-party talks was
    ``implausible, if not impossible.''
        So I believe that those funds could be better spent. I fear
    that we are going to get to the end of the year and that $80
    million is still going to be sitting there.
        You only have to look at North Korea's recent actions. The
    Six-Party talks have come to a complete halt. North Korea
    conducted another nuclear test. North Korea ejected U.S.
    International inspectors. North Korea reversed most of the
    initial disablement work that was under way. North Korea has
    repeatedly tested cruise and ballistic missiles, to include an
    intercontinental ballistic missile which threatens our
    homeland.
        It appears that many senior officials within the Obama
    administration are coming to the realization that the Six-Party
    and diplomatic engagement with Kim Jong-il are ineffective.
    According to the Los Angeles (LA) Times, they have all but lost
    hope that North Korea will cooperate, and some are arguing that
    it is time for a new approach. Others agree with my assessment.
        And so, gentlemen, you have a great deal of expertise in
    this, and I was wondering what your thoughts were, if you
    thought that this year, that the $80 million designated in
    NNSA's budget to verify, disable, and dismantle North Korea's
    nuclear program, has any likelihood of being used.
        Secretary D'Agostino. Thank you, sir, for the question.
        The direct answer to your question, whether it has any
    likelihood of being useful, I think is dealt with--and I will
    also offer some comments on North Korea, if I could.
        And I think, yes, there is an element of the work that we
    were planning on doing--North Korea kind of being the lead
    horse in the race, if you will--for working on equipment,
    tools, and technologies that we think are important for the
    United States to have at the ready to deploy, kind of,
    anywhere, frankly, to work on disabling and dismantling nuclear
    weapons programs or nuclear material programs around the world.
        As Dr. Nacht stated earlier, and I completely agree, that
    we have looked at--the best place to solve security problems is
    where the material is or as close as possible to the source.
    The further away you get from the problem makes it a much
    harder. The security problem becomes much more difficult; it is
    harder to detect the material.
        And so, we feel--and particularly as the budget was
    developed in February, we were, of course, in the middle of
    engaging directly. But a significant portion of that $80
    million was not North Korea-specific but was nuclear security-
    specific. It is the equipment, the tools, the technology for us
    to be able to determine how far a nation-state has gone; buying
    the containers, if you will, some of the long-lead material
    that we would ultimately use to repatriate, whether it is North
    Korean material or whether it is material from another country,
    and bring it back to a secure location.
        So there is a tremendous amount of what I would call dual
    country capability--in fact, more than dual. These are the
    things that we would have done around the world. But that is my
    sense of the situation. I will defer my thoughts on missile
    defense.
        Dr. Nacht. Yes. Let me first say a word about the missile
    defense budget situation. Obviously, it is controversial in
    some elements of the Congress.
        Secretary Gates went through a very thorough review and
    analysis of missile defense needs, including detailed studies
    done by the Missile Defense Agency that went right through
    review with the combatant commanders and the joint staff and
    the chairman and the vice chairman. And the leadership agreed
    unanimously that 30 ground base interceptors, 26 based in Fort
    Greely and four in Vandenberg Air Force Base, was sufficient
    for the next period to deal with projected North Korean threats
    based upon our best intelligence of the evolving North Korean
    threat. And it is actually not just against the North Korean
    threat, but against some other potential threats too.
        So, at the moment, the Defense Department is not seeking
    additional funds beyond what we have requested there.
        On the money for the North Koreans, I think Administrator
    D'Agostino has answered fully. I would just say, of course
    North Korea is going through some sort of succession process
    currently. We don't know if it is going to take three months or
    three years. By all accounts, the leader is very ill. The son
    who he has anointed is of uncertain stature, 26 years old. And
    it may well be that a number of activities of the North in
    escalating, kind of, aggressive behavior in recent months, is
    as much for domestic consumption as it is for international
    activities.
        They are an opaque society, as you know. The quality of our
    information about them is not zero, but it is limited. And we
    are actually developing scenarios--we have developed scenarios
    for future North Korean situations in which these funds could
    be used more effectively should those scenarios materialize.
        The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
        Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your testimony here
    today and for the work that you do to keep our nation safe.
        Particularly, Mr. D'Agostino, I want to thank you for your
    time yesterday. I enjoyed our conversation when we met
    yesterday. And I want to thank you again, of course, for your
    testimony today.
        Let me begin with the new loose nuke threat, nuke material
    threat. Obviously, the threat of a loose nuke falling into the
    hands of terrorists is a threat not just to the U.S. but,
    clearly, to every nation.
        What I would like to ask is, how much more does the NNSA
    need to secure--and this is from a program perspective--need to
    secure and reduce all known nuclear weapons, as well as
    unsecured weapons-grade nuclear material, around the world? And
    what are the remaining costs of this effort? And what is also
    being done to expand cooperation with partner nations to
    address this shared risk?
        You know, in the context of your answer, if you can talk
    about the successes that we have had, but most especially what
    is left undone. I am particularly concerned if you can give
    some insight into what you are doing to protect us from the
    insider threat.
        Secretary D'Agostino. Certainly, sir. The insider threat
    piece may be best dealt with in closed session. And if we don't
    have time, I could come up to your office, sir, and talk to you
    about it there, as well.
        Mr. Langevin. That is fine.
        Secretary D'Agostino. There is a lot more work to be done,
    actually, on the materials and weapons side. We have,
    obviously, this Global Threat Reduction Initiative program you
    have heard about and you have analyzed, which is to convert or
    shut down 200 reactors around the world that use highly
    enriched uranium, remove essentially 4,600 kilograms of
    material by 2016, and protect close to 4,000 buildings.
        We are down the track on each one of those lines of work,
    but we are not completed and we are not finished down the
    track. We are only 32 percent of the way there on our reactor
    conversion work. We are looking at accelerating up as much as
    possible what we think are the most vulnerable ones. We are
    about 50 percent of the way there on removing and getting into
    secure sites the highly enriched uranium and plutonium that
    exists around the world to get to that 4,600 total. And we are
    only about 15 percent of the way down on securing the number of
    buildings that we have around the world.
        Now, let me be fair here and clear. Not all of these sites
    have fissile material, particularly in the buildings area. Most
    of the buildings have radiologic material, sources and things
    like that that could be used for a radioactive dirty device--
    still not good, but not as bad of a problem, obviously, with
    fissile material.
        In our Material Protection, Control, and Accountability
    Program, we have slightly better numbers with respect to
    completion of the work that we have to do. About 60 percent of
    our sites that we think are in the work scope are done; 87
    percent of the buildings. And only about 40 percent of the
    Megaports work that we have to detect material is done.
        So it is pretty significant. We think it is going to take a
    concerted effort--we know it will take a concerted effort,
    obviously, to complete all of the work. But what we are working
    on right now is the costing plan and the program plan, to pull
    all of this together.
        I think your other question dealt with partner nations,
    what are other nations doing, kind of, with respect to these
    programs. And it really depends on the particular program. We
    have agreements in place, ready to execute, for example,
    additional work in Mexico, in the Ukraine, in Kazakhstan. Many
    of those states have agreed to pay up front for a significant
    portion of that work. And, obviously, our approach in all of
    these cases for Megaports, for example, is to have the nation-
    states operate and maintain those facilities. We check on them,
    but we have them do that.
        Mr. Langevin. How many other countries are actually
    cooperating with us in this effort and actually contributing
    dollars to the effort?
        Secretary D'Agostino. I will have to get you specifics as
    a--I would like to take the specifics as a lookup.
        But if I can offer you some perspective and offer the
    committee some perspective, we operate with over 100 countries
    around the world. In most cases, to do the significant work
    that we have to do, we sign memorandums of agreement with those
    nations where we define the type of a cost-share agreement.
        Overall, we look along the process--the general principle
    is we come up and kick-start, get the work started, and provide
    the equipment and technology and know-how. We have them pick up
    the work from there and carry it forward. And then we check and
    offer assistance.
        So I will get you the details off the record, sir.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I see my time has expired, but I
    would like to talk about the insider threat issue when we get
    into closed session.
        Secretary D'Agostino. Certainly. I would be glad to.
        The Chairman. Who is next? Mr. Franks, please.
        Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
        You know, I guess I first want to commend the points of Dr.
    Bartlett and Mr. Marshall even though they are no longer here.
    I do think that their points are salient. And I am looking
    forward to hearing more of your response in a different venue,
    as you say.
        Let me just say that I believe EMP potentially to be the
    most effective asymmetric weapon in the hands of almost anyone
    that could have them. I also agree that the departments that
    you represent are wise in focusing on the source to try to do
    those things to prevent the material from ever becoming
    available to anyone. And I was especially appreciative of Dr.
    Nacht's comments related to Iran being such a priority in that
    regard.
        Let me just say something that is very obvious to both of
    you. I say it primarily for the record, and sometimes restating
    the obvious is important. I believe missile defense, an
    effective missile defense, especially in the area related to
    Iran, even the European site, to be something that is capable
    of devaluing the entire nuclear program in Iran's plan. And I
    believe that--you know, it is going to be hard to deter them in
    any circumstance, but if we have whatever efforts we are making
    that are coupled with at least the notion that any leverage
    they might gain is ameliorated by our missile defense
    capabilities, I think that is vitally important. And I hope it
    is something that we don't overlook. It is not just about
    stopping a missile; it is about stopping the proliferation.
    Missile defense is probably one of our most important
    components in preventing proliferation.
        With that said, let me shift gears here and ask you, Mr.
    D'Agostino, in your testimony, page 2, you say that North
    Korea's continued defiance of the international community
    through its WMD-related missile and nuclear activities makes
    clear the urgency of today's global nuclear threats.
        So I guess I am hoping you can explain to the committee how
    you surmise that North Korea's defiance--and, incidentally, I
    agree with you--but explain it to us how North Korea's defiance
    drives a global nuclear threat.
        Secretary D'Agostino. I look at this as an example, real-
    time, that is dynamic. And I think this is the piece that we
    just have a very clear example of--when the President's budget
    for 2010 was coming to its final days of closure and we were
    doing the negotiation in writing and making sure the numbers
    were right and the words were right and, more importantly, the
    strategy is right, we were in a different situation, and it
    changes quite quickly.
        So my sense is this is a dynamic problem. It is a problem
    that is a lot faster than the budget process that we have on
    the executive branch. Obviously, it outpaces everything. So, to
    me, that drives a sense of urgency to get on top of the problem
    as quickly as possible, to put the resources on the problems as
    quickly as possible. It is very significant, but it is
    something that we can't shy away from. And, obviously, we are
    not. With the committee's support, excellent support, we have
    been in a position to do that.
        The one thing I might add is that, with the committee's
    support as well, it has made it possible for us to receive
    resources from other countries. Other countries see it the same
    way as we do. Canada and United Kingdom, South Korea, Japan,
    other nations have actually contributed their resources toward
    our problems in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative. I think
    that is an excellent testimony to the programs that you
    support, as well as to this urgency piece that comes forth.
        Mr. Franks. Thank you.
        Given the parameters, the sensitivities that you have to
    deal with here, I do think that, as Mr. Langevin mentioned,
    again, the greatest challenge that we face, at least short
    term, is some type of nuke device in the hands of terrorists.
    Because it is not so much that they are so much better at
    delivering it, but I am convinced that their mindset of
    actually using it is really unquestionable. And I think that is
    what makes it so dangerous.
        It is likely that if they do gain some type of nuclear
    yield weapon, it probably won't be a large weapon. It will
    probably be a smaller weapon which may not be as effective for
    EMP, and they may just want to try to bring it into the United
    States.
        So my question to you, Dr. D'Agostino, and certainly, Dr.
    Nacht, if you are inclined to respond as well, is: Help the
    committee understand, within the parameters that you can in
    this venue, what mechanisms do we have, either at the ports--
    and you mentioned in your Second Line of Defense a lot about
    the ports--within the ports and the border crossings, what do
    we have here, whose responsibility is it to be making sure that
    we screen for nuclear devices coming into this country.
        Secretary D'Agostino. Department of Homeland Security has
    primary responsibility. We provide technical support and backup
    with our radiation detectors, as well as we have--we also take
    care, with the Department of Homeland Security, we have our
    Megaports program to make sure that we have detectors up and
    operating in 100 of the largest seaports around the world,
    which send the materials, send goods here in the United States.
        So that is a short answer. I am not sure how much time I
    can keep talking. But from that standpoint, our job is to make
    sure to finish the work on Megaports initiative, which is
    significant, as well as to support the Department of Homeland
    Security in its Secure Freight Initiative, which has a
    responsibility for looking at all the material that comes in
    here domestically.
        Dr. Nacht. And the Department of Defense's role is to work
    with NORTHCOM also in consultation with DHS so that, as
    horrible as it sounds, if a weapon is detonated, that a second
    weapon is not detonated, so that one weapon would be horrific,
    but more than one would be much worse. So not to have some sort
    of ad hoc approach to dealing with the perpetrators but having
    as comprehensive a plan as possible to stop them from doing any
    more damage than they have done.
        Mr. Franks. Thank you gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Let me say that we are supposed to have votes
    shortly which will take about 45 minutes. Let's get as many
    questioners as we possibly can and observe the 5-minute rule.
    After the votes on the floor, we will adjourn here to 2327 for
    the classified hearings, and those that have not had the
    opportunity to ask questions in the order they would have asked
    here will be recognized at that moment in 2337 to continue on
    the classified basis. With that understanding, Mr. Kissell, we
    will squeeze in as many as we can before the votes come.
        Mr. Kissell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        A couple of quick questions, thank you, gentlemen, for
    coming today. We had a hearing--I think it might have been
    January the 22nd, earlier this year, when former Senator Graham
    and his Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction testified
    before us. And one of the conclusions they drew and presented
    to us was that they predicted there would be a weapons of mass
    destruction attack upon the United States I think in the next
    three, four, years. And the opportunity to stop it was there,
    but actually, we were losing ground in terms of being able to
    stop it. In other words, we weren't making up that deficit
    towards being able to keep this from happening.
        In your opinions, what is that opportunity now, is that a
    growing situation or a lessening situation that we would have
    that attack?
        Secretary D'Agostino. I will start and turn it over to my
    colleague. I typically am not a big fan of putting time frames,
    because I don't want to promote anybody from trying to beat the
    odds or not. What I think my focus frankly is--I think we are
    getting better, but only because what we are seeing is an
    increased sense of urgency. I think the increased sense of
    urgency is properly placed by the administration.
        I think it is well understood in my organization, which is
    more of a technical organization than necessarily establishing
    the policy, if you will, but the key is that we recognize, we
    understand the devastating impacts of material getting out. I
    am speaking mostly on the nuclear side, which is my expertise,
    and what we are trying to focus on is, do more. And I am
    looking internally at the program to see, am I properly
    prioritized?
        But I am also communicating externally with my colleagues
    at the National Security Council to make sure they recognize
    that. I think what we have got from the administration which I
    represent is this renewed sense of urgency, this idea of
    securing material within a certain period of time; the idea of
    working internationally and establishing the right type of
    international frameworks; the idea of making sure that the
    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is properly supported
    and we have the next generation of scientists and technicians
    ready to work. Because as energy increases, as the nuclear
    power becomes more ubiquitous, we want to make sure we design
    in the safeguards into those systems so that we don't cause
    ourselves problems out in the out years 5 or 10 years from now.
    So, from a technology standpoint, I think the urgency is there,
    and the light is on the problem; it is up to us to go out and
    go execute, frankly.
        Dr. Nacht. Congressman, I note that the language of the
    Commission was that a weapon of mass destruction will be used
    in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of
    2013. So that is what, three and a half years now. I don't
    know, I am a little--point predictions are sometimes a little
    hard to justify. Clearly, we have a major problem here. I think
    the combination of the activities Administrator D'Agostino and
    myself talk about and the President's commitment suggests that
    we are looking at this problem globally, nuclear, as well as
    biological. We have renewed resources in the intelligence
    community to track, as best we can, terrorist activities. And I
    would say we are trying to get that curve to turn around,
    plateau and then drop off, but we are in a full court press now
    in this administration on this problem.
        Mr. Kissell. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Coffman, let's see if we can squeeze two
    questioners in between now and the time we have to go vote.
    There will be five votes, and it will take approximately 45
    minutes. We will reconvene and the questioners will be in the
    same order as if you were here in 2337. So let's get there as
    soon as the five votes are over.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It was mentioned, concern about Iran and their development
    of nuclear weapons, and it was also mentioned about sanctions,
    effectiveness of sanctions against Iran by the United States in
    the international community. I believe there was legislation in
    the House and Senate that has been introduced that would in
    fact impose further sanctions on Iran. I wonder if one of you
    could speak or both of you could speak to the effectiveness of
    that legislation or sanctions that you would envision
    specifically that would be effective in terms of getting Iran
    to back off of its development of nuclear weapons.
        Dr. Nacht. There is little I can say about that at this
    time. We could provide you with more detailed information and
    perhaps in another setting with additional colleagues who work
    this problem more specifically.
        Mr. Coffman. Well, thank you very much.
        I would really appreciate any information you could provide
    on that issue. If, in fact, sanctions would help in deterring
    Iran from attaining nuclear weapons, then we need to do
    everything we can to promote those sanctions at the earliest
    possible time in order, again, to deter them from moving
    forward. Now, I wonder if you at all would speak to--if you
    were to say what is the number one threat facing the United
    States, is it bioterrorism, is it a dirty bomb or is it an
    ICBM, a nuclear weapon launched from a rogue nation?
        Dr. Nacht. Again, the President answered that question by
    saying it would be a terrorist attack with nuclear weapons. I
    think the core difference between the terrorist or even the
    suicide bomber, obviously, and the nation state is that they
    are very difficult, if not impossible, to deter. You can't
    dissuade them. You can try to prevent them, but they don't have
    anything to lose because they know they are on an exalted
    mission, and they are going to a better reward after the
    detonation. So whether it is biological attack or a nuclear
    attack by terrorists, I think it is now an absolutely top
    priority for us to try to deal with.
        We have varying degrees of judgment about our ability to
    deter other states, but I think many of us believe that even
    Iran and North Korea are deterrable from using these weapons
    because they have a tremendous amount to lose once they use
    them. In fact, their entire societies are at risk, whereas the
    terrorist does not have that incentive.
        Mr. Coffman. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
    time.
        The Chairman. Ms. Tsongas, please.
        Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
        I would like to ask a question about Pakistan and reference
    the same report that Congressman Kissell referred to on the
    Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
    Proliferation. That report--their report describes Pakistan as
    the focus point of WMD and terrorism. I just wondered if you
    could reflect on that your own thoughts and how we as a
    country, particularly given the destabilized situation in
    Pakistan today, how we can exercise influence over Pakistan to
    secure their weapons and deal with the threat among--in their
    midst.
        Secretary D'Agostino. I would be glad to start off on the
    answer. We absolutely agree; working with Pakistan, probably
    working with Pakistan makes a lot of sense. In fact, Pakistan
    has--we do work with Pakistan, with the Department of Homeland
    Security on Secure Freight Initiative in putting radiation
    detectors in their ports. One port is done, Karachi is the
    second port. We are negotiating that type of work. We have
    export controls experts who are in the process of working with
    Pakistan on training them on what to look for with respect to
    what comes into the country and goes out of the country.
        Pakistan has legislation in place as a nation to establish
    this type of capability and maintain it. They have developed
    their own list of materials and advanced their list of
    materials on things that they are looking for. We also, from
    the standpoint of their programs, we know that Pakistan,
    obviously, some of the details I would rather go into in a
    closed session. But what I can say about the military is they
    are a very highly professional group. They are well trained.
    They understand the problem and the work they have cut out
    before them and in fact the work the rest of the world has cut
    out for them, and they take these issues very seriously.
        We do work closely in many areas, as I said, with their
    port security, export control work, and we have actually seen
    things taking place in country which signifies they have taken
    that seriously. Other details I will address later in closed
    session.
        Dr. Nacht. I would just add that collaboration of the
    Pakistani government with the United States is a sensitive
    matter in Pakistan. So what we do with them is best discussed
    elsewhere.
        Ms. Tsongas. I yield back, given the time constraints.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. We will adjourn to 2337. Mr. Spratt will be
    the next questioner. We will see you in half an hour, 45
    minutes.
        [Whereupon, at 12:08 p.m., the committee was adjourned to
    reconvene in closed session.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                 July 15, 2009

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 July 15, 2009

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 July 15, 2009

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                        QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MASSA

        Mr. Massa. Based on the success of the dismantling of the Libyan
    nuclear weapons program of the 1990s, are there any lessons learned
    from that effort that can be applied in respect to Iran and North
    Korea?
        Dr. Nacht. The important lesson learned was that the USG was able
    to move quickly in response to the Libyan decision to dismantle their
    WMD program. The proposed ``not-withstanding authority'' legislation,
    Section 1305 of the House 2010 National Defense Authorization Bill,
    will permit additional flexibility should Iran or North Korea agree to
    dismantle their WMD programs.