AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: RESOURCING THE CIVILIAN SURGE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

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AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
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AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: RESOURCING THE CIVILIAN SURGE

TUESDAY, MAY 19, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Maloney, Van Hollen, Welch, Foster, Quigley, Flake, Duncan, and Jordan.

Staff present: Catherine Ribeiro, communications director; Mari ana Osorio, legislative director; Ken Cummings and Aaron Wasserman, legislative assistants; Anne Bodine, Brendan Culley, Steven Gale, fellows; Andy Wright, staff director; Elliot Gillerman, clerk; Dan Blankenburg, minority director of outreach and senior advisor; Adam Fromm, minority chief clerk and Member liaison; Dan Blankenburg, minority director of outreach and senior advisor; Tom Alexander, minority senior counsel; and Glenn Sanders, minority Defense fellow.

Mr. TIERNEY. Good morning. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs' hearing entitled, “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Resourcing the Civilian Surge,” will come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements.

Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that formal written testimony from Dr. Patrick Cronin of National Defense University be accepted for the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cronin follows:]
Afghanistan and Pakistan:  
Three Strategic Principles for Resourcing the Civilian Surge

Dr. Patrick M. Cronin

U.S. House of Representatives  
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform  
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

15 May 2009

This written testimony is intended to provoke strategic thinking as we seek to close the gap between our military operations and our civilian-led support for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Our Armed Forces are mobilized for action, but our civilian departments and agencies, for a multitude of reasons, are lagging far behind. As a consequence, we are preparing a predominantly military campaign plan without adequately resourcing the diplomatic and economic framework into which it must be nested; as a result, we risk missing the opportunity to create the best chance of transforming a region on the brink of widespread war into a region of sustainable stability. Most immediately, our civilian surge ought to be guided by three principles which can be adapted from military strategy: population-centered development; developmental centers of gravity; and unity of effort. In addition, our short-term actions should be tied to our own long-term institution building to strengthen our civilian capacity to work in fragile states. But first let me tie these reforms to the gravity of the challenge.

The High Stakes at Risk

The high stakes at risk in Afghanistan and Pakistan deserve our urgent debate. In Afghanistan, civilian casualties are on the ascent, and unless trends are reversed the fragile state may again fail. Meanwhile, burgeoning unrest within Pakistan endangers the entire region. While the Pakistani state remains strong, it is at grave risk from the proliferation of violent extremism. The mounting conflict in Afghanistan has expanded the “Talibanization” of parts of Pakistan’s historically autonomous tribal areas on the border, and attempts to check extremism risk creating more extremism, both on the border and deeper into Pakistan as the fighting around Swat has demonstrated. In addition, terrorists using “ungoverned” spaces within Pakistan, as in the attacks on Mumbai, threaten to trigger a war between Pakistan and neighboring India, two nuclear powers with a long record of conflict and distrust. The alarming prospect, however remote, of a Pakistani nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorists, places a premium on assiduously working with the Pakistani government to prevent such scenarios from ever becoming serious possibilities. The Administration is attempting to do
this, but it is mentioned here to underscore the importance of the region. Finally, there is a window of opportunity for coalescing national and international support that may well close within the next two years if the present strategic course cannot show a path towards greater stability. For all of these reasons, this is urgent business.

Most Americans seem to realize that we neglect these countries at our peril, and yet fashioning an effective, sustainable strategy remains elusive. The work of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform is pivotal: any strategy that under-invests in the crucial work of diplomats, development specialists, economic and financial advisors, and other civilians is myopic and unwinnable. To be sure, we may well fail even with the best-laid plans and plentiful resources; more than a few strategists believe that it is quixotic to seek quick fixes in such a complex region with such diverse cultures and profoundly fragile governance. As Anthony Cordesman has pointed out, there is little or no empirical evidence of successful “armed nation-building.” But the decision to put forward America’s best effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been made and based on a compelling rationale. Our security objectives, both immediate and long-term, hinge on preventing Afghanistan from failing back into the hands a regime that gives al Qaeda sanctuary and protecting our key partner Pakistan from mounting extremist violence. As President Barack Obama said during his summit meeting with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, all three countries share a common goal “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their ability to operate in either country in the future.” Failure to secure these minimalist goals would severely compromise U.S. national security and jeopardize the stability of an entire region—the consequences of which would be impossible to place in terms of dollar value.

Taking the First Steps

The new Administration has taken important steps in the right direction. First, the Obama Administration is to be commended for focusing anew on these priority countries. It does so even while necessarily seeking to manage other and myriad challenges both at home and around the globe. The Administration has placed Afghanistan and Pakistan atop its foreign policy agenda; created an outstanding, high-level team of civilian and military professionals to plan and help implement a new strategy in which the alignment of ends and means is given serious thought; vigorously engaged Afghans and Pakistanis in the process; and begun the arduous process of working to erect a strong foundation of regional and international support.

But urgency is not a strategy and a strategy that cannot be fully implemented cannot succeed. Our present ‘strategy’ remains largely a military-led campaign plan, not because our leadership is at fault but because they have not yet succeeded in creating the civilian means necessary to complement the military
instrument of policy. In grappling with insurgency, terrorism, and political violence, our civilian response will be equally important to our military response. Because the use of military force only makes sense when serving larger political objectives, surging or significantly scaling up diplomatic, developmental, economic, and governmental support for each of these two countries is essential to any concerted strategy that seeks to better match ends and means.

Avoiding ‘Business as Usual’

If the civilian surge is to come closer to matching our military investments, then we will have to avoid ‘business as usual.’ Senior Administration officials recognize that our efforts to date have not succeeded. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton has noted that despite tremendous expenditures of money in Afghanistan in particular, progress on the ground has been sparse and “heartbreaking.” Indeed, unless we attempt a completely different business model for our fragile-state diplomacy and development, then we will fail no matter how much money Congress approves.

Three fundamental strategic principles should guide our efforts as we try to narrow the gap by surging our civilian capacity. The first principle builds on the developmental best practice of ownership and mirrors the Counterinsurgency principle of focusing on the welfare of the population. Just as it is the security and welfare of the people of the country, rather than the number of adversaries killed, that is at the heart of COIN operations, so, too, developmental assistance to a fragile state like Afghanistan or a partner like Pakistan must be owned by the Afghans and Pakistanis at the national, provincial and local level. The second principle is also derived from military strategy and might be reduced to this: focus on developmental “centers of gravity” with catalytic interventions. We cannot accomplish everything, and in fragile states more may well be less. Third is the related but overarching principle of unity of effort, both with respect to U.S. activities but also those of other outside actors and the donor community.

In addition to hewing to these three principles, there will also have to be long-term institution building and a cultural shift within our civilian agencies and across the interagency to bring about a greater capacity for whole-of-government responses to complex contingencies. In order to have a better governmental capability for dealing with fragile states “in the round,” there are a number of choices decision-makers in both the Executive and Legislative Branches of government will face, as they seek to align our short-term actions to our own long-term institution building.

Principle One: Population-Centered Development

The principle of ensuring that our assistance helps the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan has two essential levels. At the highest level, our assistance must support Afghan and Pakistani requirements and decisions; without their
commitment, there can be no sustainable implementation. Afghans and Pakistanis own the problems and the solutions. Recognizing this reality is the first step towards crafting a realistic strategy that might be sustainable over the long run. Local ownership means moving from a leading to a supporting role faster than we have been comfortable doing in the past. We should never think that our money and commitment can be anything but instruments of support for Afghans and Pakistanis; it is not a matter of putting an Afghan or Pakistani ‘face’ on our assistance, but rather ownership and legitimacy necessarily rest with the local population.

Second, at the subnational level—provincial, district, and village—our assistance has to reach the people for whom it is intended. The best way to do this is to help build local capacity rather than for outsiders to drop assistance on the local population. USAID needs to enhance its capacity for working at the provincial and district level and balance these capabilities with its reliance on capital-intensive development. Because of past under-investment and other constraints, USAID often has to manage contracts from a distance. But oversight, engagement, and capacity building must take place at a more tactical and local level because of the political importance of each and every project in a COIN operation.

At the same time, we must not short-change the ‘enablers’ that are essential as we place increasing numbers of civilians at the local area: namely, security, transportation, and communications are three expensive and usually overlooked constraints on enhancing civilian capacity in the countryside of a fragile state. When sending our civilians into harm’s way, let us make sure that they have not only the equipment to ensure their safety, but also the state-of-the-art communications equipment to work effectively. Properly vetted civilians also need regular access to a classified system, given the sensitive nature of much of their work in fragile states.

In Pakistan, one can distinguish between efforts to stabilize border areas from the larger task of demonstrating to most Pakistanis that America is committed to their prosperity and welfare, and not simply a short-term transactional relationship in which Pakistan fights terrorists and insurgents to assist us with Afghanistan.

Finally, administering grants to the people will require authorities that are flexible, like those for OTI programs, rather than those intended to be slow, long-term development projects in relatively stable countries. USAID’s historic exception to sluggish assistance has been housed in the relatively modest Office of Transition Initiatives, which was created as a political tool using contracts and assistance to meet political objectives. In an ideal world there should be a combination of OTI’s flexibility tied to development objectives of “big AID.” The Defense Department’s 1206 authorities provide the kind of flexibility needed, but such authorities must reside in the civilian agencies and not just DoD. Some
money will not be well spent, even in a peaceful environment; one can be certain there will be problems in a combat zone and fragile stage with rampant corruption and illegal narcotics’ trade. To limit the damage, USAID should be forced to invest in both better knowledge management to track everything it possibly can from the ground, and interventions should be made with the full knowledge of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, or another appropriate independent, third-party, to help understand why difficult investments were made in the first place—not later when issues of corruption might arise.

**Principle Two: Developmental Centers of Gravity**

The best way of relating assistance more closely to Afghan priorities across the gamut of international donor efforts is to focus on catalytic interventions that simultaneously bolster the capacity of the country in question. Anyone who has worked in development knows the complexity and interrelatedness of multiple sectors. Even so, when attempting to stabilize a fragile state, there must be focal points to the interventions if they are to have any chance of keeping pace with the conflict on the ground. Clare Lockhart, Dawn Liberi, Jeremy Pam have crafted a development, economic, and governmental strategy for Afghanistan that would have three focal points:

- **Public finance, especially the budget**: public finance at all levels is a linchpin of public governance, at both the national and subnational levels. For instance, money allocated to Afghan priorities, flowing from Afghan systems, to the Afghan people will support reasonably effective governance and create greater government legitimacy. Government legitimacy is a crucial question in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

- **Key sector roadmaps**: the United States can work with other donors to help Afghans and Pakistanis design effective programs through which their institutions can address their priorities (i.e., programs worth receiving money). For example, in Afghanistan, programs in agriculture, education, health, electricity, and justice and improve governance at the national and local level, help with the delivery of basic services, and once again reinforce legitimacy of the state.

- **Catalytic approach to private sector driven growth and jobs**: working closely with the Afghan and Pakistani governments and other stakeholders, the U.S. and other donors can identify local business ventures, then use U.S. and international support and other instruments to help overcome hurdles and scale up. For instance, one catalytic investment in Afghanistan can come in the form of generating jobs for Afghans, which in turn can bring in more revenue for the state, and which can once again support government legitimacy.
Principle Three: Unity of Effort

We must align, to the maximum degree practicable, U.S. and international efforts with the priorities of each country. At present, there are about 75,000 development activities underway in Afghanistan, but they are not focused and the vast majority of them are not locally owned. The lack of alignment between donor efforts and country priorities and institutions remains one of the fundamental problems in civilian assistance in overseas contingencies. For instance, SIGIR’s “Hard Lessons” final report highlights that programs should be geared to indigenous priorities and needs. The buy-in of the host country is essential to reconstruction’s eventual success. Yet many of our efforts in Iraq are focused on large projects and often with little or Iraqi participation. As that landmark report documented, “Detailed joint planning with Iraqi officials—perhaps the most important prerequisite for success after security—only gradually improved over time.”

We need to use budgets as unifying tools. A strategy of focusing on host country budgets can improve this alignment and strengthen governance and delivery of essential services. A December 2008 report of the United States Institute of Peace, “Evaluating Iraq’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams While Drawdown Looms,” highlights this important point. As that report observes, budget execution enables provincial governments and central government ministries to build governmental capacity to provide basic services. As essential services improve, the report also notes, it creates a virtuous cycle that helps to undergird and nurture sustainable development. PRT efforts account for much of the successful improvement in infrastructure, economic development and basic services in Iraq over the past two years.

Similar results can be attributed to a focus on budget execution at the national level. For instance, in 2007 the capital budget execution rate for Iraq was more than double the rate in 2006. In June 2008, the U.S. Embassy formed the Public Finance Management Group, chaired by the Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq and comprising all U.S. personnel involved in addressing budget execution. Following the money—and helping to erect the indigenous institutions of a fragile state to do so—can reap dividends that make development sustainable.

To ensure better unity of effort on the part of U.S. civilians in fragile states, but also better team work between our civil-military enterprises, we need far more training and education to prepare civilians. Civilian training and education lags far behind that of the Defense Department, even while both need to find ways to create a larger cadre of national security professionals who can operate together for stability operations and construction. The President’s FY 2010 Budget requests $323.3 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative to build our capacity for reconstruction and stabilization efforts, including a Civilian Response Corps. These are excellent steps and they deserve our steadfast
support. In the interim, hopefully we can also move smartly to better prepare all civilians and military personnel preparing to deploy to Afghanistan for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); this training can build on the recent initiatives taken by the Foreign Service Institute, working with the National Defense University.

**Our Long-Term, Institution-Building Challenge**

Despite our can-do attitude within governmental ranks, our civilian agencies are ill-prepared for large-scale action in fragile states. There are four major challenges to consider as we contemplate reforms that will help lift our civilian capacities for grappling with states in conflict or emerging from conflict. The first is to make the conscious decision and investment in a single center of excellence—and I believe that should be the United States Agency for International Development—in which to put our expertise not simply for traditional development but for a shared appreciation of fragile-state development. At present USAID is heavily weighted to development outside of conflict zones, even though much of its budget is spent on fragile states and post-conflict recovery. The slivers of culture that appreciate this work, such as in the Office of Transition Initiatives, needs to become put on par with the culture of development in more stable areas. The attached Appendix 1 suggests what might be done.

A second challenge is better linking the division of labor between the State Department, which must provide the overall policy guidance and top-level decision-making, to USAID and our developmental efforts. Strengthening State Department control but also understanding of these complex issues, both in Washington, D.C. and in the field, is an essential step to ensuring greater unity of effort from our government.

A third challenge is providing a civilian-led strategy for our military campaign planners and for all the civilian agencies and departments that can contribute to development. The creation of a Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan has provided exactly the kind of central platform needed in the short term. Obviously support of the President and the White House generally is crucial for ensuring that such interagency leaders have sufficient authority to make difficult decisions.

Fourth and finally, Congress has to join the long-term discussion with this and future administrations over how to find an acceptable balance between prudent stewardship of public money and the agility, speed and risk which is needed to deal with stabilizing fragile states. One way to square this circle is to make full use of Special Inspectors. For instance, bringing Major General, USMC (Ret.) Arnold Fields, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, into the planning process, well before money is actually spent, may be the best way to provide independent, third-party scrutiny that can help ensure that monies are spent effectively under the extenuating circumstances of the facts on the ground,
bearing in mind that ultimately it is the Afghans and Pakistanis who must be in
control.3

1 See President Obama’s remarks from May 6, 2009 available on the White House
webpage at www.whitehouse.gov.
2 See SIGIR’s Hard Lessons final report
3 These and other ideas for revamping our foreign assistance to deal with stability
operations in general are expanded upon in Appendix 1, which is a chapter I had
the privilege of co-authoring with career USAID Foreign Service Officer Dr. Steve
Brent.

Appendix 1

This chapter appears in Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations, edited by
Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, DC: National Defense
University, 2009).

STRENGTHENING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Patrick Cronin and R. Stephen Brent4

Introduction

The United States must strengthen its civilian capacity to deliver foreign
assistance. Whether one examines stabilization and reconstruction missions or
long-term economic development efforts, the present condition of U.S. programs
is failing to meet expectations. Preceding chapters have addressed civil-military
issues and options for strengthening civilian agency support for stabilization and
post-conflict operations. This chapter will examine the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), which will be a key agency in implementing
future changes. It will also consider other functions of development assistance,
including support for health and education, economic growth, and conflict
prevention.

The George W. Bush Administration raised the profile of development,
conceptually elevating its stature by ranking it along side defense and diplomacy,
coining the phrase “the three D’s”. But concept is not the same as practice, and
recent experience, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, has exposed glaring
deficiencies in the ability of the United States to deliver non-military aid to
contested and war-torn zones. Redressing these shortcomings, particularly in an
environment of fiscal austerity, will not be easy; success will require not only
resources but also high-level political leadership, innovation, and strategic
patience.
To be sure, the Bush Administration’s legacy of bolstering development assistance is better than it is generally credited. It increased aid to Africa and established two major new assistance programs: the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). The new Administration, however, will have to go well beyond these initiatives if it is to rejuvenate America’s “soft power,” bring coherence to badly fragmented foreign assistance programs, and achieve a heightened capacity for delivering reconstruction assistance. Additional personnel and skills will have to be accompanied by reorganization, new authorities, expanded training, a dedicated cadre of policy planners, galvanized country teams, and improved civil-military cooperation. This chapter examines two options for future aid organization, one of which is to form a new United States Agency for Reconstruction and Development (USADR).

Section 1. History of U.S. Foreign Assistance

Early U.S. Development Programs

To understand how the United States found itself with the limited foreign assistance capacity that it has today, as well as to underscore the potential influence a robust foreign assistance capacity can deliver, it is necessary to recall early U.S. development programs. The field of development hardly existed prior to the Second World War. After the war the United States led the ambitious and successful Marshall Plan (a recovery program rather than a development program) and gave economic assistance to a number of countries. But it was only in the late 1950s that people began to think seriously about concerted efforts to help poor countries advance. President Kennedy was a student of the new ideas and had a particular interest in Africa. He believed that the United States could do well by doing good—that American aid to poor countries could be a powerful tool in the geopolitical competition with the Soviet Union. When President Kennedy established USAID in 1961, he put the United States in the vanguard of international development.

Kennedy tasked USAID with leading expanded development efforts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (the Alliance for Progress). Large American aid helped Korea and Taiwan launch their successful growth and export pushes in the 1960s (and would later help Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia do the same). Similar programs in Latin America were less successful—mainly due to less hospitable local environments (bad economic policies, elite politics, and weak private sectors). USAID had in short order become second to none, the world’s gold standard with respect to development assistance.

The growing American war effort in Vietnam created a need to deliver state-building assistance in harm’s way. USAID expanded dramatically to meet the new demands. By the late 1960s there were thousands of USAID officers in
Vietnam, working hand-in-hand with the American military to support pacification and development. Integrated military and civilian teams looked a lot like today’s “provincial reconstruction teams” in Iraq and Afghanistan, except that they included vastly more USAID officers than the relatively small numbers in the field today.

In 1973 Congressional and public disillusionment with the war and disappointment with the lack of economic progress in Latin America and Africa led Congress to mandate significant changes in American aid. USAID staff levels were reduced and USAID was directed to focus on poverty reduction and “basic human needs” such as health and education (rather than economic growth). To implement the new approach, Congress earmarked foreign assistance budgets, narrowly legislating the specific purposes for which money could be used. Health program funding increased because it could be seen as immediately helping impoverished people, could be measured with considerable precision, and could produce results even where economies and governments were weak.

The end of the Cold War brought another reassessment of American aid. Because of the strategic importance of post-Communist transitions, the State Department took the lead in formulating aid policies toward the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while USAID and other U.S. agencies implemented assistance programs. Aid to other regions declined, as did State Department and USAID staff levels (even as the total number of overseas posts grew). The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was folded into the State Department and there was strong Congressional pressure on USAID to follow suit. With program demands expanding and in-country staffs shrinking, USAID had to find ways to “do more with less.” USAID moved away from its earlier model of large professional staffs leading programs and working directly in ministries to relying more on contractors and grantees. At the same time as USAID was cutting back on personnel, other governmental departments and agencies were expanding their international programs. While the Department of Justice, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of Health and Human Services, among others, tapped new areas of American expertise, the proliferation of governmental actors posed serious coordination challenges in Washington and the field.

The Bush Legacy

The Bush legacy in foreign assistance comprises four major initiatives that the new administration will have to consider as a starting point for further reform: two costly aid programs (one for health and one for economic development), a re-emphasis on building some post-conflict reconstruction and state-building capacity, and a reconsolidation of policy authority in the State Department.
By the time the George W. Bush Administration entered office, USAID had become a shell of its former self. It had approximately 1,000 Foreign Service Officers and a total workforce of 2,200 direct-hires in Washington and the field (compared to a workforce of about 12,000 at the height of the Vietnam War). As part of its reassessment of U.S. foreign policy after 9/11, the Administration decided to strengthen aid programs.

It launched two major new development initiatives: PEPFAR (to address the growing crisis of HIV/AIDS) and the Millennium Challenge Account (to provide more development assistance countries to those demonstrating the greatest readiness to help themselves).\(^2\) The latter program targeted a limited number of countries selected by their good performance on a set of development indicators, awarding them large grants for fully-funded multi-year programs or Compacts designed by the countries to improve growth and reduce poverty. Both were to be run by independent organizations—PEPFAR by the Global AIDS Coordinator based in the State Department and the Millennium Challenge Account by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a new public corporation with an interagency Board of Directors.

Both of these initiatives responded to legitimate needs and received Congressional support. The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief has been especially popular and recently received a substantial budget increase that is supposed to continue for the next five years. The Millennium Challenge Account has addressed a shortcoming in American aid that dates back to 1973: the lack of support for economic growth. Development advocates in Congress and the public like aid to the social sectors (and humanitarian assistance) because its results are visible and can be more readily explained to constituents. However, large social programs without accompanying economic growth are not sustainable and cannot raise income levels. For that, economic growth is vital (if hard to attain). Millennium Challenge Account programs try to address this dilemma by focusing growth support on countries with the best development conditions. It stakes out new terrain with its concepts of country-designed growth programs and non-earmarked multi-year funds. In so doing, it seeks to help recipient nations grow their economy and their middle class.

However, both the AIDS and economic programs have limitations. PEPFAR funding levels have been set with little regard for the ability of recipient countries to absorb and manage large influxes of directed health-care funds or for their implications for other U.S. assistance priorities. The Millennium Challenge Account received lower funding in the last two years as Congress expressed concerns about the failure to spend money in Compact accounts, which have been plagued by a slow disbursement rate like so many other development programs. Slow disbursements are not necessarily the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s fault, because large infrastructure investments emphasized in many Compacts take time. Unrealistic expectations of how quickly countries should see the
benefits of aid are making it hard for the MCC to sustain support for its business model, which envisions fully funding five-year Compacts at the outset rather than providing incremental funding as with USAID projects.

The AIDS Relief and Millennium programs also hamper coordination and coherence of U.S. development efforts. U.S. development assistance is now provided by three separate entities: two special purpose organizations (PEPFAR and MCC) and USAID (which is responsible for almost everything else). This division of labor has created stove-piping in Washington and confusion in the field. For example, both the Millennium Challenge Corporation and USAID have field missions in developing countries, prompting uncertainty about who “speaks for the United States on development.”

A third priority of the Bush Administration had been to expand the civilian capacity to support stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the past decade the question of enlarging U.S. state-building capabilities has moved tortuously through four phases: 1) initial disregard of State Department and USAID plans for post-conflict reconstruction based on a desire to leave nation building to others; 2) recognition that reconstruction was important but an excessive reliance on Defense-managed infrastructure investments (especially in Iraq) and with little thought given to operations, maintenance and capacity building; 3) broadening of priorities to include local government, social, and economic development programs and a reluctant expansion of the Department of Defense roles in stabilization to make up for constrained capacity constraints within USAID and other civilian agencies; and 4) recent calls by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates for State and USAID to be given more money and people to cope with the social and economic dimensions of conflict and fragile states. USAID has been given funds to begin expanding its ranks—the goal of USAID’s Development Leadership Initiative is to double the number of USAID Foreign Service Officers by 2012 (see chart). Although the Bush Administration created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the State Department (S/CRS) in 2004 to strengthen civilian capacity for conflict prevention and management, the absence of serious funding and authority severely limited the initial effectiveness of this innovation.

A fourth key initiative that is part of the Bush legacy in foreign assistance deals with the overall structure and management of aid programs. In 2006 the Bush Administration sought to improve aid coordination by creating a new position of Director for Foreign Assistance (DFA) in the State Department with the rank of Deputy Secretary and giving the USAID Administrator this role as a second management responsibility. The creation of a Director has improved budget coordination between State and USAID, but has not been able to ensure coordination among the AIDS Relief, Millennium and USAID programs, or with domestic agency programs.
Section 2. Six Challenges

Strengthening the capacity of the United States in foreign assistance—both for stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction as well as for poverty reduction and economic growth—will require the new Administration to go well beyond the four initiatives that are part of the Bush legacy. Not only will the challenge of coherence across foreign assistance programs need to be reviewed, but so will the need to expand and reform existing organizations and their authorities. Six critical challenges include improving integration and program coherence, enlarging the capacity for stabilization and reconstruction efforts, strengthening conflict prevention, promoting economic growth, strengthening institution building, and leveraging U.S. programs internationally.

Integration and Program Coherence

If the United States is to restore development assistance to once again being a major instrument of national security policy, it will have to begin with the question of who's in charge. Thus, the first challenge is to for the White House to revisit the debate as to how to minimize the stove-piping of American development programs and to find new, more integrated ways of planning and delivering foreign assistance both in wartime and in peacetime.

As has been noted, the United States presently has three major development programs: USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the President Emergency Program for AIDS Relief; while they may operate with coordination, few would contend that they achieve a unity of effort that might make them more strategic and effective. Both the real and perceived disunity, furthermore, cause America to "punch below its weight" and receive less recognition for its contributions to the developing world than it deserves.

The problem is far from just a Washington bureaucratic turf war. One of the lessons of the last fifty years is that implementation in the field is more important for aid effectiveness than strategies or directives issued from donor capitals. This has led to a growing trend among donor agencies to strengthen field offices and delegate more authority to them. In the past, the United States led in this area because of the strength of USAID field missions. Much maligned in Washington, USAID was often seen in developing countries as the most capable, informed, and responsive of all aid agencies. However, this American advantage has been undermined by the proliferation of American aid programs and the mission creep of Washington micromanagement from both the Executive and Legislative Branches of government. This is not to excuse USAID from all culpability, but until one realigns the major aid missions—as well as a larger new effort for post-conflict reconstruction—then it will be difficult for a new administration to achieve a high degree of fidelity when it comes to implementing priorities overseas. It was Mark Twain who wrote, "Put all your eggs in one basket, and
then watch that basket.” Today, there is a felt need for U.S. foreign assistance programs to be placed under a more powerful single authority in order to be able to look across the seams of different programs and increase the chances of achieving national objectives.

**Stabilization and Reconstruction**

The current approach to strengthening civilian capacity for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction is to establish a cadre of officials drawn from various U.S. departments and agencies (especially Defense, State, and USAID) who can deploy to crisis zones on short notice, supported by a large reserve corps of specialists outside the government who can be called up for duty in crisis zones. Program and crisis planning is to be led by the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). Other chapters in this book call for larger quick response and reserve corps, based on expectations that future conflict demands may be numerous and last many years.

The scale of future stabilization capacity is a basic policy judgment for the next administration. We believe that numerous stabilization operations may be less likely than more prolonged interventions. But no matter what decisions are made on these issues, civilian capacity clearly has to expand. That may be done by the proposed combination of USG agency and reserve corps capacity or that capacity plus continued reliance on the contract organizations that have carried much of the weight in Iraq and Afghanistan.

How would these people and organizations be managed? We believe this will require much stronger management and implementation oversight capacity in USAID. Early experiences in Iraq revealed the danger of believing that American civilians with little experience in overseas operations can step into chaotic situations and lead effective stabilization and reconstruction programs. Stabilization has to be led by teams of professionals who specialize in that work, train for it, and develop plans and doctrines for expeditionary operations in the same way that the military plans for crisis interventions. We believe these functions would best be led by new offices within USAID that build on the existing structures of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), Office of Military Affairs (OMA), and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), but are substantially larger than current structures. The new offices would recognize that stabilization requires different skills, operational routines, and culture than long-term development. It would hire new staff and set up its organizational processes around this different set of demands. The new offices would form a distinct cone within USAID with its own budget lines and procurement rules (allowing fast and flexible contracting, authorities to pay contractors to maintain ready capacity, etc.). These offices would develop close ties with DOD (including joint planning with the Unified Combatant Commands) and work with other USG agencies that have relevant expertise.
If the next Administration chooses to take nation building seriously, these functions could amount to a “new side” of USAID (complementing the existing elements that are focused on long-term development). Some might argue that this new set of functions should become a separate component, possibly tied to State. We believe that would be a mistake, because 1) stabilization operations have to eventually transition to longer-term development; 2) USAID can work with both State and DOD (both of which have important roles in stabilization); and 3) we need greater unity of effort in development activities, not less (see challenge one).

**Conflict Prevention**

A third challenge for the new administration is trying to get ahead of the curve by placing greater emphasis on preventing conflicts in the first instance. While Afghanistan and Iraq have focused public attention on the challenges of post-conflict stabilization, they both reinforce the short-term, crisis management mentality of Washington’s approach to global affairs. If the United States is to broaden its tools for crisis management, then surely conflict prevention must be part of that. It will not be easy. There are no sure-fire methods for preventing conflict and the United States hardly enjoys sufficient power to prevent every conflict even if it knew how. But recent research by Paul Collier and others has highlighted the importance of three key elements of a conflict prevention strategy.

- **Strengthening conflict mediation and peace enforcement.** Because the United States cannot and in many cases should not take the leading role in mediation and peace-making efforts on the ground, the United States will have to find ways to strengthen international and regional bodies--most of which admittedly tend to lack political will or enforcement capacity, or both. This should include strengthening the military capacity of UN or regional peace-keepers and expanding their mission from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement.

- **Increasing support for economic growth.** It may seem obvious, but it is surprising how little international assistance to countries emerging from conflict is focused on creating sustainable economic growth. Not surprisingly, Collier finds a high correlation between economic stagnation and political instability, and he argues that one of the best ways to reduce conflicts is to help countries improve their growth. This is especially important for countries that have experienced a recent cessation in hostilities. They have high risks of lapsing back into conflict within a decade, but that risk can be reduced if they make economic reforms and receive aid for growth support.
• **Pressing oil-producing and resource-rich countries to improve transparency.** Collier finds that poor countries that are rich in oil, diamonds, or other mineral wealth are prone to authoritarian rule, corruption, and instability (fueled by fights for control of the proceeds of mineral wealth). He wants oil-consuming nations to force oil companies and oil-producing countries to accept new norms of payment and budget transparency in order to reduce theft and abuses and to focus oil proceeds more on development. Now that global recession is reducing global demand for oil, it may be more possible to begin to address these problems. Moreover, America’s concern about energy security is compatible with the need to improve the governance and stability of those developing world countries fueling the U.S. and global economy.

**Growth Promotion**

As noted above, the Millennium Challenge Account has promised a game-changing conceptual approach to America’s bargain with the developing world by holding out the prospect of lasting poverty reduction through growth. Developing countries demonstrating good performance are offered a chance to design a serious investment to complement other interventions to support growth. However, if the Millennium Challenge Account works in theory, it has thus far been less successful in practice. The following three factors help to account for the limited effectiveness of the Millennium Challenge Account:

• **An overly narrow interpretation of economic growth.** The MCA emphasizes specific investments evaluated with an “investor banker” point of view. The assumption is that the overall system is in good enough shape that good individual investments can spur growth. However, few low-income countries are in that situation. Most have multiple public and private sector shortcomings that keep private investment and social returns low. Asian experience suggests that these short-comings can only be addressed through locally led reforms and investments.

• **An overly optimistic belief in rapid economic transformation.** The MCA assumes that countries know how to promote business development and exports and can graduate from aid in 5-10 years. Neither is the case. Most low-income countries have little idea how to strengthen their private sectors or improve exports. They need technical assistance to develop and implement sound growth initiatives. Even with such help, it is unrealistic to hope that they will quickly improve their economic performance and graduate from aid. That will take decades in the best of worlds.

• **A misinterpretation of the historical record of successful development.** The successful growth experiences of fast-growing countries in Asia do not support the idea that growth follows from “good performance” on policy and
institutional indicators. Korea and Taiwan would not have scored well on the MCA indicators in the early stages of their growth pushes and China would not score well today. Asian fast growers did not “reform first and let businesses develop naturally” (the Washington Consensus prescription). Rather they intervened actively to promote business development and low-wage manufactured exports. Local political commitment to business development was more important than economic orthodoxy. Low-income MCA countries will have a hard time expanding their manufactured exports today because of the dominance of Asian producers. They may be able to do better on other aspects of growth promotion, but that will depend on local leadership and evolutionary changes that builds business capacity along the way. The best measure of “good performance” is not current rankings on development indicators but how well countries perform over time on business development and non-traditional exports.

Institution Building

USAID needs to enhance its capacity to help developing countries strengthen their institutions, especially their budgeting, financial management, and procurement functions. The Agency used to do a lot of this work, but it has been another casualty of the downsizing of the USAID Foreign Service. The need for institution building is higher than ever, influenced by the desires of many donors to use budget support, the need of the MCC for government capacity to implement Compacts, and the demands of the PEPFAR program for local capacity in health. In Iraq, limitations on the capacities of ministries to program the proceeds from oil wealth are posing major constraints on the pace of transition. In Afghanistan, the next stage of stabilization and reconstruction will depend heavily on strengthening the institutions of the central and provincial governments (complementing the focus on PRTs).

We do not have agreed principles for effective institution building, but much can be done by USAID teams on the ground with the ability to adapt to local situations. However, this function cannot be contracted out—it has too many elements that are “inherently governmental.” USAID needs expanded Foreign Service personnel and overseas missions to do this work, which should include placement of Foreign Service officers within government ministries (done in the past, but not in recent years). It will not be feasible to seriously pursue institution building everywhere—choices will have to be made on which countries it is most vital to focus on. However, such activities would be highly desirable in Afghanistan, Iraq, and most MCA Compact countries. USAID would also have to be given non-earmarked funds for this purpose as well as freedom from excessive demands for “results indicators” (hard to measure in this field).

Leveraging International Cooperation
Regardless of whether the new Administration aims for more effective reconstruction or development programs, no single improvement is more important than the need to forge greater international cooperation. The American debate on development assistance has been surprisingly parochial, given that we are living in an increasingly globalized world. We are not on the cusp of returning to the world of half a century ago, when the United States was a foreign assistance superpower. In contrast to the national security arena, when it comes to development assistance the United States is not even *primus inter pares* but instead one actor among many. Other major players are the European Commission, the World Bank, the UN specialized agencies, and other bilateral donors, plus huge private donors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. U.S. reform proposals have paid little attention to how they would fit into the overall mix of global programs, whether on development or reconstruction. In a recent speech in Boston, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for concerted international efforts on global warming, energy, poverty, and post-conflict reconstruction—inviting the United States to join an international coalition to address these shared concerns. A new administration sharing these priorities should begin by determining how to better leverage international cooperation.

**Section 3. Aid Reform**

**A New Department**

The most prominent proposals for aid reform focus on the first of these challenges (program coherence). They argue that the U.S. is suffering from major incoherence in its development activities that is creating dysfunctions in Washington and inefficiencies in the field. They also argue that no one designed this system by choice; it rather evolved over time as the consequence of many uncoordinated decisions. To address these problems, many development advocates want the U.S. to follow the British approach of creating a new Cabinet-level development department that has authority over all development activities. This would allow development to take its rightful place as a fully empowered third “D” and bring the unity of command and budget that are needed for effective operations overseas.3

This proposal has considerable appeal, especially in raising the priority of development and strengthening unity of command. The current fractionalization of aid programs can be compared (on a much smaller scale) to the problems that used to exist in the defense establishment when unbridled independence among the Services impeded effective joint operations. In the defense field, centralized control and program cohesion were strengthened in three steps: 1) the creation of the Department of Defense and the appointment of a Secretary in the aftermath of World War II; 2) the strengthening of the powers of the Office of Secretary of Defense, powers which Secretary McNamara put in place during the Kennedy
Administration, including by using systems analysis and the budget process to control procurement decisions and force planning; and 3) the Goldwater-Nichols legislated changes to strengthen jointness and create powerful operational Unified Commands. Today the Defense Department has elaborate planning and budget processes to try to achieve program coherence, which work well given the massive size of defense programs, budgets, and forces.

While sometimes the parallels from Defense reform may be inappropriate for the non-military departments of the U.S. government, the experience of DoD is still relevant. It suggests that an analogous process in development might take decades to reach full force, but could be jump-started by the first step of creating a Cabinet-level—or at least a more powerful and integrated—department with a high-powered staff. As in the case of Defense, the staff would have to be attuned to the national security thinking of the administration and work closely with National Security Council staff. They would also have to write a national strategy for development similar to DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review—or fully contribute to a national security strategy that works across defense, foreign relations, and development issues. The benefits of such innovations would be substantial: greater priority on the most important issues and programs; better balancing of short- and long-term objectives; more coherent budget choices; and better program integration and coordination in the field.

However, securing support in Congress and the Executive Branch for such a radical change (requiring new legislation, new budget accounts, and major reorganization of Executive Branch structures) would be politically difficult and costly. The new administration may not wish to bear those costs, especially given the present economic and financial outlook.

On the other hand, major reforms and increases in American development aid will require a dramatic repackaging and sustained, high-level political leadership. Indeed, there is at least in policy communities a broad consensus that reform is needed and that continuing the status quo is undesirable. Bipartisan support should rally behind a well articulated plan to strengthen foreign assistance for both contested state building and reconstruction and long-term development assistance. The main aim should be to achieve greater unity of effort if not command across the government.

While various proposals exist, we focus on two major organizational options for restructuring foreign assistance in the United States. The first would emphasize the need to shore up weak capacities within existing structures, shifting greater authority and funding to USAID, but basically preserving development assistance as its core mission. The second would go further by creating a new agency in which both state-building and post-conflict reconstruction and development assistance would become the twin pillars of a powerful agency, still under State
Department overall foreign policy direction, but capable of implementing the array of responses likely to be needed in the developing world in decades to come.

Option 1: A Stronger United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

This option would maintain today's three-program structure comprising USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation and the President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief. However, it would especially seek to strengthen USAID, which has been left to atrophy, by providing greater funding, more personnel, and a wider role in coordinating overseas implementation. While some enhancement of USAID's limited capacity for state-building could be undertaken, this option would be predicated in part on an assumption that Afghanistan and Iraq were more anomalous than they were bellwethers of future requirements. Instead, this option would seek to restore America's "soft power" by bolstering USAID as a lead agency, providing more development assistance and restoring a higher caliber of development assistance expertise and central coordination in the field than currently exists. It would be most attractive if the next administration wanted to strengthen country assistance programs without major legislative or organizational changes. The administration would have to convince Congress and other U.S. agencies to agree to two changes: 1) a substantially larger USAID personnel budget and permission to bring qualified experts into senior positions from outside the government; and 2) strengthening the roles of USAID Mission Directors in controlling development activities overseas. If these changes were made, this option would allow the following improvements:

- The Director for Foreign Assistance would shift from State to USAID and be given authority to coordinate the Millennium Challenge Account and PEPFAR programs and track all other U.S. programs impinging on development (including DoD, public diplomacy, and domestic agency programs). The State Department activities and managers of three Bureaus--International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; and Population, Refugees and Migration--would shift from State to USAID.
- Senior USAID officials would be better able to play major roles in Washington policy processes.
- USAID Mission Directors would become Development Counselors with authority to coordinate programmatic activities at the country level across all three major development assistance programs. Domestic agencies with international programs would have to get clearance from Development Counselors to work in country.
- USAID would expand its number of technical experts in fields such as economic growth, private sector development, infrastructure, and rule of law. It would replace some functions that contractors now perform with
direct-hire personnel—e.g., working as senior advisors in government ministries.

• USAID would be allowed flexibility to create a “float” of officers above the number required to permanent positions, to enable USAID to respond to emergency demands and to provide training (e.g., the most promising foreign service officers selected for executive leadership—FS-1’s—would regularly attend the National Defense University).

• The Director for Foreign Assistance would create a new independent Office of Evaluation that reports to the Administrator. This office would evaluate all three major development programs.

**Option 2: A United States Agency for Development and Reconstruction (USADR)**

In this option a single development agency could be created at the Cabinet or sub-Cabinet level. However, in this option state-building and reconstruction missions would be elevated on a par with development assistance, and the agency might therefore assume a new name to reflect both its dual missions and its new authority. At the same time, to ensure that it was indeed the foreign assistance implementation agency of the United States, it would be given chief budget authority over all foreign assistance activities—obviously still under the overall administration guidance from the White House (especially the Office of Management and Budget) and the State Department (which would remain the lead in foreign affairs policy overall).

The Millennium Challenge Corporation and the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief would continue as separate operating agencies, but they would not have their own independent budgets; the Administration would request their funds in a unified development budget overseen by one set of authorizing committees and appropriations subcommittees. Foreign assistance programs for U.S. domestic agencies would continue to appear within the budgets of those agencies, but would have to be approved by the development agency. Congress would retain the authority to promulgate program guidance, but earmarks would be kept to a bare minimum. The development agency would build its program budgets more from the bottom up, with field Missions and Development Counselors (see Option 1) playing stronger roles. The USAID Inspector General would have audit authority over all foreign assistance programs.

The rationale for this option is that “budget is policy.” If you do not have control of the budget, you do not have control of policy or programs. With independent budgets, agencies develop their own objectives, their own support structures on Capitol Hill, and their own interest groups. That tends to happen even with formal budget controls (as Secretary McNamara learned in the 1960s). But without the budget tool, there is no hope for coherent resource allocation. This option would require new legislation.
The challenges for the future are not just to improve program coherence, but also to strengthen conflict prevention, growth support, stabilization, and international cooperation. We believe these objectives can be advanced through a stronger USAID, but especially through a single development agency reconfigured to place missions on a more equal footing with development assistance. The stronger USAID or new USADR would work hand in glove with the Departments of State and Defense, while it would retain sufficient strength to preserve development assistance programs from becoming overwhelmed by short-term security goals.

Under either option, several additional steps can be taken, including:

- USAID/USADR should develop a new component of its staff and operations focused on stabilization and reconstruction, including coordination with the Department of Defense, Combatant Commands, and the State Department on contingency planning and expeditionary implementation. All aspects of program management (personnel, contracting, operational doctrines, and organizational culture) should be optimized for the special demands of stabilization support. This component should be large enough to meet the demands for leading and coordinating civilian capacity for the full range of planning contingencies. It would be far larger under a new USADR than a bolstered USAID.

- Formally designating conflict prevention as a goal of U.S. diplomatic, security, and development policies. The United States should strengthen its engagement with the UN and regional bodies to support conflict mediation and peace-enforcement. AFRICOM and other Combatant Commands should help national and UN forces improve their logistics, equipment, and training and should advise peace-enforcement forces on contingency planning. The U.S. should work with Britain to build G-7 support for the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative and other agreements to incentivize good management of mineral wealth. USADR and State should be given more resources for rule of law, local government, and institution building.

- Integrating the resources presently in the Millennium Challenge Account and USAID to offer better support for long-term economic growth initiatives in leading-edge countries. The Millennium Challenge Corporation could continue to select its Compact-eligible countries based on quantitative indicators, but more attention could be paid to qualitative judgments of who among the best-scoring countries is demonstrating the strongest political commitment to self-led reforms and sound business development policies. USAID/USADR could help countries develop sound business development strategies that can be incorporated in country proposals to the MCC. These proposals may focus on specific investments to be funded by the MCC but should include broader national changes to improve the conditions for
business development and exports. The best-performing countries should be eligible for multiple Compacts that can overlap and be renewed. The MCC and its Board of Directors could be the judge of the most promising proposals (the “judging” function should be separated from the advice function provided by USAID), but proposals should not be forced into textbook norms (local leadership of change is more important than strict orthodoxy). In Compact countries, the MCC and USAID/USADR could work together to oversee program implementation and help the government and private sector build their capacities. For Compact countries with strong development potential, USAID should provide long-term help on institutions building, especially in financial planning and management. If host governments can improve their fiduciary capacity to levels required to meet U.S. standards of accountability, the MCC could allow them to include budget support in their Compact proposals.

- USAID/USADR could work with the Departments of State and Defense to strengthen its cooperation with multilateral and bilateral development agencies. The United States needs more coordination of its policies toward the developing world across U.S. agencies and between the United States and other actors and governments involved in reconstruction and development. One way to improve both types of coordination would be to establish a new statutory body of senior career officials from State, USAID/USADR, Treasury, and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (similar to the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to provide advice to Cabinet Secretaries and the White House on U.S. policy on poverty, trade, energy, global warming, and conflict management.² That should be combined with more active engagement in G-7 diplomacy.

**Building USAID**

Critics may object that USAID does not have the capacity to play these ambitious roles. Some skepticism is warranted; after all, even if all goes well, these reforms will take years to implement. But the question is not whether one has faith in USAID as it is today, but how can the United States best strengthen its capacity in development assistance to meet the likely demands of the future? We believe that institution is USAID (or a stronger development agency that subsumes USAID) for the following reasons.

- Running development programs overseas require operational and management skills and strong familiarity with local conditions. USAID has those capabilities. They have been weakened by staff cuts but can be re-built. State also has knowledge of local conditions, but lacks an operational and management culture. State is a policy, diplomatic, and reporting organization. Its officers are selected for analytic and representational skills. USAID officers are chosen and rewarded for management skills. They are specialists in the art of implementing development programs in the difficult
and often chaotic conditions of poor countries. While in some cases they tend to focus on bureaucratic minutia, the best members of the USAID Foreign Service have more in common culturally with the best military officers in DoD (who also have a management culture) than with their fellow Foreign Service Officers in State.

- USAID is not good at interagency coordination, but these weaknesses could be compensated for by changes in USAID or the creation of USADR. USAID has long been a "junior partner" in the interagency game, limited by its specialized role, uneven support at senior levels of the national security apparatus, and narrow political base on Capitol Hill. Over the years USAID has developed a culture of trying to "fly below the radar"—keeping its head down and trying to minimize outside intrusions on its programs. These problems are not easily solved, but could be improved if USAID or USADR were given more staff with the bureaucratic skills and political savvy to operate at senior levels in interagency processes. Such people could come from the ranks of Agency political appointees, Agency senior career staff, and State Department detailees. In addition, the new Administration could appoint a new Deputy National Security Advisor for Development in the White House to oversee policy development and implementation.

USAID or USADR would be the best placed organization to ensure that US development activities complement each other and fit local conditions. The involvement of U.S. domestic agencies in foreign assistance activities has to be managed better. Most such programs focus on one sector or one discipline within a sector (e.g., agriculture or police training). You can’t run a coherent assistance program with 10-20 different activities directed from 8,000 miles away.

Conclusions and Findings

Creating an interagency ethos built around defense, diplomacy and development requires, *inter alia*, strengthening our capacity for development and state-building, as well as improving our unity of effort (if not also unity of command) over foreign assistance programs. To meet the demands of American national security, development and conflict management require increased resources and organizational changes. The Bush Administration has made several important improvements—raising aid levels, actively addressing the HIV/AIDS crisis, and establishing an innovative program to promote economic growth (the Millennium Challenge Account). However, the jury is still out on the final success of other Administration efforts such as the creation of an integrated aid system through the establishment of the Director for U.S. Foreign Assistance, or the launching of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to provide adequate civilian capacity for stabilization and state building in contested zones and post-conflict reconstruction.
There are sound arguments to be made for a Cabinet-level development department, not least to help elevate economic and development assistance as a priority and to create better unity of effort. The same principle that insisted that we created a strong Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Combatant Commanders, as well as a new, joint culture across the Military Services—even while preserving individual Service culture and expertise—could well be applied to our foreign assistance and development programs.

Whether or not a Cabinet-level development department is appropriate or feasible, two basic attributes—greater effectiveness and greater integration and unity of effort—deserve bipartisan support in the new administration. One alternative would be to strengthen policy and budget control by an empowered USAID. A weaker version of that approach would leave budgets separate but seek to increase policy coherence through a strong policy staff in USAID and OMB leverage on the budget. A stronger version would integrate the budgets for the main development programs (USAID, PEPFAR, and MCC) and require domestic USG agencies to have their foreign assistance activities approved by USAID. However, the second version would require legislative action.

Regardless of how program coherence is addressed, the next Administration needs to strengthen civilian capacity for stabilization and reconstruction. A key missing ingredient is structured contingency planning, training, and doctrine development for expeditionary activities. That should be led by an expanded cadre of stabilization specialists in USAID that works closely with the Combatant Commanders. The U.S. also needs to strengthen its efforts to: 1) prevent conflict (including more support for peace enforcement); 2) promote economic growth in good-performing low-income countries (building on the Millennium Challenge Account but adding other elements); and 3) work cooperatively with international development partners.
Mr. Tierney. And I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee will be allowed to submit a written statement for the record.

Without objection, so ordered.

I want to thank all of our panel for being here with us this morning. Today, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs will explore the civilian surge component of the President's new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The President has said that a campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets and bombs alone. As such, a critical part of the administration's new strategy for the region is to significantly increase civilian staffing.

The plan to surge upwards of 500 civilians over a short time horizon into the Afghanistan and Pakistan centers enters uncharted waters for civilian agencies such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

The last time economists, city managers, agronomists, law advisers, and accountants were recruited and deployed en masse to a combat theater goes back at least four decades, in the U.S. support for pacification programs during the Vietnam War era.

This hearing examines what we have learned from more recent civilian deployments in post-conflict states like Iraq and failed states like Sudan. We have gathered this experienced panel of administration officials to share with us their plans to recruit, train, and deploy this new cadre of civilians. We are counting on them to ensure that the best-trained staff will be deployed to today's most challenging foreign theater, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

As a subcommittee with interagency jurisdiction, we are especially interested in the extent of collaborative planning among the civilian agencies to support a whole-of-government approach to reconstruction and development. The subcommittee is also keenly interested in how the civilian agencies are coordinating with the Department of Defense on predeployment training so we are using existing resources and not reinventing courses, curricula, and other educational materials for our civilian surge recruits.

Some observers of recruitment programs have said that finding additional qualified civilians has been hampered by the ongoing heavy demand in Iraq for civilian and military construction experts. In their view, those not working in Iraq are already in Afghanistan. As such, there a risk that new applicants responding to today's personnel recruitment ads will not have the requisite skills and/or the overseas experience to hit the ground running. If this is accurate, civilians recruited for the surge will need considerable training and country familiarization before deploying if they are to be effective upon arrival. A scarcity of qualified civilians has led to numerous media reports suggesting that the Department of Defense, rather than the civilian agencies, is likely to fill most of the billets.

Another issue that surge civilians will face in country is how well they are integrated within and coordinated with the military. Many surge recruits will likely be assigned to provincial reconstruction teams led by military officers. The PRTs will likely have a total of
three or four diplomacy, reconstruction, and aid development subject matter experts from USAID, the Department of State, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Justice.

The surge civilians working for ministries in Kabul or the provinces will also need to coordinate with the military to avoid duplication of effort and to strengthen local capabilities.

While the military has worked hard to establish and implement a unified military command, it seems desirable to have an analogous, unified civilian command; and, ultimately, both commands will need to be fully integrated to achieve long-lasting positive results.

Frankly, the call for a civilian surge in Afghanistan is not new. In late 2008, predating the new Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul requested a major increase in government civilians in such areas as governance, rule of law, development, and diplomacy to be deployed in provincial and district levels. Regrettably, we are told that this request was not fulfilled.

The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization created in 2004 was chartered to lead U.S. efforts to respond to crisis in failing, failed, and post-conflict situations like the present one in Afghanistan. It is not clear to me what role SCRS can or will play in Afghanistan and Pakistan in this critical moment. We hope to have that addressed this morning.

I am pleased to have with us today administrative officials from the State Department, USAID, USDA, and the Department of Defense. We want to know how you are planning to staff the Afghanistan-Pakistan civilian surge in regard to recruitment, training, deployment, and retention. We want to know what lessons you have learned in Iraq and elsewhere in terms of utilizing civilians in complex operations.

Additionally, the subcommittee would like to hear how to best expand and institutionalize a ready-to-deploy civilian work force that keeps in step with increasing security challenges for weak and failed states. I look forward to hearing how each of your agencies intends to translate the President’s strategy into operational reality.

With that, I defer to Mr. Flake for his opening comments.

Mr. Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don’t have much to add. I think the chairman said it very well. We are looking to see some detail and to see how you plan to implement it. I think all of us recognize the need for this kind of civilian surge. It is just we don’t have many details about how it is going to be carried out and, obviously, as the chairman mentioned, to see what lessons have been learned in Iraq and already in Afghanistan.

I think those of us who have traveled to Afghanistan have seen the need for better coordination with the military counterparts and the civilians that are there, and I am anxious to here how you plan to do that.

With that, thank you all. I look forward to the testimony.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Flake.

The subcommittee will now receive testimony from the witnesses before us today. Let me introduce them briefly, if I might.
Mr. Paul W. Jones currently serves as the Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. A member of the Senior Foreign Service, Mr. Jones previously served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassies in the Philippines and in Macedonia. Mr. Jones has also served as Director of the Executive Secretariat Staff, supporting the Secretary of State, and Director of the Office of South Central Europe responsible for U.S. policy in the Balkans. Mr. Jones holds a BA from Cornell University, an MPA from the University of Virginia, and an MA from the Naval War College. Welcome, Mr. Jones.

Mr. David Sedney currently serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. Most recently, Mr. Sedney was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and prior to that served as Deputy Chief of Mission to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. After reopening the U.S. Embassy in Kabul in 2002, Mr. Sedney served there as Deputy Chief of Mission, a post that he again served in from 2003 to 2004. He later served as Director for Afghanistan at the National Security Council. Mr. Sedney holds a BA from Princeton University and a JD from Suffolk University Law School, a good school, I might add.

Mr. James Bever currently serves as Director of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force at the U.S. Agency for International Development where he oversees more than $4 billion in U.S. assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan. A member of the Senior Foreign Service, Mr. Bever previously served as Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Middle East, providing leadership for $2.5 billion in U.S. assistance to the Middle East and North Africa. Mr. Bever holds a BA from Cornell University and an MS from George-town University.

Mr. Michael Michener currently serves as the Administrator for the Foreign Agricultural Service at the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Prior to that, he served as a Senior Democracy and Governance Adviser and lead Planning Officer for the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Mr. Michener also previously worked for the State Department as the lead Iraq Policy Officer for Democracy and Human Rights Assistance Programs. Mr. Michener holds a BA from the University of Maryland.

Ambassador John E. Herbst currently serves as the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the U.S. Department of State. A member of the Senior Foreign Service, Ambassador Herbst previously served as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine and Uzbekistan and has held other postings in Jerusalem, Moscow and Riyadh. Ambassador Herbst holds a BS from Georgetown University, a Master of Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Tufts University.

I want to thank all of you for making yourselves available today. It is the practice of this subcommittee to have members of a panel sworn in before you testify. I ask you to please stand and raise your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. Tierney. You may be seated. The record will reflect that all the members of the panel answered in the affirmative.
Your written comments, which you were kind enough to submit in advance to the panel, will already be on record and accepted as that. We ask you to please give us a statement of 5 minutes or less, if you can, and from that we will ask some questions and proceed accordingly.

Mr. Jones, if you would be kind enough to begin.


STATEMENT OF PAUL JONES

Mr. JONES. Thank you so much, Chairman Tierney and Ranking Member Flake, distinguished members of the subcommittee, for inviting me here today. It is a real privilege to appear before you.

Ambassador Holbrooke and his interagency team are committed to working closely with Congress as we implement a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we appreciate the deep interest and support among the members of this subcommittee. Congressional support for the President’s strategy and the resources needed to implement it are critical to our success, and we look forward to continuing this fruitful dialog.

I am here today to discuss the significant civilian increase, particularly for Afghanistan, that the President announced in late March. At that time he noted that, “to advance security, opportunity, and justice—not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the provinces—we need agricultural specialists, educators, engineers, and lawyers.”

We are working with 10 other U.S. departments and agencies to identify and deploy civilian personnel to work alongside not only U.S. military personnel but also our Afghan and international partners. This civilian increase is one of several significant elements of the administration’s new strategy, and it underscores our conviction that achieving counterinsurgency objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan will require enhanced civilian-military coordination at all levels.

You have the details of the plan in my written statement, but let me highlight just a couple of key components.

U.S. civilians will help build Afghan government capacity in the most dangerous, insurgent-afflicted parts of the country and will
also expand programs to create jobs and build local economies. The U.S. Embassy and U.S. forces Afghanistan, in coordination with the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, determined that approximately 420 more U.S. civilian specialists were needed in specific locations between July 2009, and March 2010, to work closely with our military to focus on the hold-and-build phases in contested parts of the country.

The new personnel also have a multiplier effect as they hire additional Afghan staff and expand NGO partnerships. A joint U.S. Embassy-U.S. forces Afghanistan team is constantly reevaluating the civilian increase; and if more civilian capacity is required, we will provide it.

We adopted a whole-of-government approach to meet the civilian requirements. Experts from the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture constitute the core of the civilian teams that will deploy outside Kabul to the provinces and districts with our military. Personnel from the State Department’s Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization are helping to integrate civilian and military activities, and we expect they will also fill some civilian increase priorities in the field.

Despite the risks of deploying to an active conflict zone, I am pleased to report that there has been a tremendous response to the call to duty. As a result, we are on track and on schedule to staff the entire civilian increase with highly qualified State, USAID, and USDA permanent and temporary hire personnel in the field. A new service recognition package will provide those serving in Afghanistan with the same benefits as those serving in Iraq.

Many applicants have prior experience in Afghanistan or Iraq and are eager once again to serve on the front lines. If staffing gaps develop, we will immediately turn to other hiring streams, including the Department of Defense’s Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, and, if needed, examine the possibility of utilizing military reservists in civilian attire and under chief of mission authority.

To ensure the civilians are fully prepared, we are upgrading an integrated civilian-military training program that all civilians will attend. To ensure that civilians are well led and coordinated, we are upgrading our leadership at Embassy Kabul and in the field. Four U.S. Ambassadors will lead civilian efforts at our Embassy in Kabul and coordinate directly with our military.

To illustrate how the civilian increase will work, let me give as an example just one Afghan province. In Helmand Province in the south, where significant new U.S. military personnel will deploy, we currently have one State Department representative, one USAID development expert, and three Afghan staff on the British-led provisional reconstruction team located in the capital.

The civilian increase will add 11 additional State Department representatives, four USAID development experts, one USDA agricultural specialist, and six Afghan staff. They will work with the new military units to establish three new district support teams.

At the same time, USAID’s implementing partner staff will increase from approximately 30 to 35 international personnel and from approximately 400 to 450 Afghan specialists working for NGO’s which are funded by U.S. Government development projects.
This influx of additional United States and Afghan civilian personnel will add significantly to our ability to build local Afghan government capacity and oversee assistance projects while teaming up with military colleagues to stabilize this conflicted province. We know from experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that lack of security can inhibit civilian effectiveness by limiting the ability of civilians to travel outside of military bases. We very much welcome General Petraeus' strong commitment to ensure maximum freedom of movement for civilians, and we will work closely with his team to make that operational.

Civilian field presence is, of course, not simply a U.S. job. Our coalition partners are playing an important role. Some, like Canada and the United Kingdom, have had significant civilian field presence in southern Afghanistan for some time. We encourage our partners to augment their civilian field footprint and are actively coordinating in Kabul with the help of the United Nations.

Significantly, I might add that subject was explored among the special representatives that just met in Istanbul. Ambassador Holbrooke and his colleagues were talking about the very subject yesterday.

Significantly, the Afghan government recently presented a plan for some 650 international and Afghan technical experts. We are discussing actively with the Afghans and our partners how much of that need is being met by planned civilian increases and what more may need to be done.

Finally, I would like to cite the important work of the Special Inspector for Afghanistan Reconstruction [SIGAR]. Ambassador Holbrooke and his team strongly support the role of General Fields in closely monitoring the disbursement of assistance. The Afghan government has specifically asked SIGAR to advance its own anti-corruption efforts.

SIGAR is Congress' representative on the ground, and we would like to see them deployed in every province. We value SIGAR and respect their independence. To the extent that Congress is willing to expand its mandate and responsibilities, Ambassador Holbrooke has made clear we would very strongly support that.

Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
STATEMENT BY
PAUL W. JONES
DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND
PAKISTAN AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
HOUSE OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
MAY 19, 2009

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Flake, and Distinguished Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me here today. I welcome this opportunity to provide an overview of plans to significantly increase the U.S. Government civilian presence in Afghanistan. This increase is one key element of the new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan that the President announced in March. At the time, he noted that “to advance security, opportunity, and justice – not just in Kabul, but from the bottom up in the provinces – we need agricultural specialists and educators; engineers and lawyers.” Today I will provide an update on the status of our efforts to deploy these civilian experts, discuss their activities in the context of our broader strategy to defeat Al Qaeda and its allies in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and also discuss the expected impact of the civilian increase.

The President ordered a substantial increase in the number of civilian experts in Afghanistan because the nexus between a weak government struggling with the corrosive effects of corruption, limited growth in key economic sectors such as agriculture, and the insurgency is clear. The United States, together with the United Nations and our international partners, is committed to helping the Afghan government serve its people and develop a licit economy.

This plan for increasing civilian personnel in Afghanistan, which was most recently reaffirmed during a May 2 civilian-military coordination session led by the President’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Holbrooke, and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General
Petraeus, is comprehensive in scope, aims to get civilians on the ground soon and in large numbers, and is shaped by several guiding principles.

First, increased civilian presence at Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and other military platforms will ensure an integrated approach to countering the insurgency and extend the reach of the Afghan government. Specialists in public administration, rule of law, agriculture, municipal development, conflict mediation, and other critical areas will build and support Afghan capacity to govern their own country and will complement the efforts of the military to “clear, hold, and build” contested areas of the country, particularly in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Civilians will work alongside military counterparts at the Division, Task Force, provincial, and district level to maximize civilian input into decisions and provide greater focus on governance and development in remote, marginalized parts of the country.

Second, the required number of civilians to accomplish this mission will be determined by our Embassy and military leadership in Kabul, in close consultation with Washington. The U.S. Embassy and U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) completed an assessment of the number and mix of civilian personnel and determined that approximately 400 additional civilians were needed to fill critical positions in the field and Kabul between July 2009 and March 2010, bringing the total number of U.S. direct-hire civilians under Chief of Mission authority to just under 1,000.

I note that this number does not include the hundreds of civilian experts contracted by the implementing partners of U.S. programs or the hundreds of Afghan staff who serve as “force multipliers.” In other words, additional U.S. civilian personnel represent the core of a much larger civilian presence. We are currently hiring, training, and deploying the new personnel. Special Representative Ambassador Holbrooke and General Petraeus have asked the Embassy, under the new leadership of Ambassador Eikenberry, and USFOR-A to take yet another look at the civilian requirements to see if additional civilian personnel are needed. For example, the U.S. Embassy has recently identified the need for additional agricultural specialists from the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and we are working on ways to resource this requirement. The proposed civilian increase depends upon the funding requested in the FY 2009 supplemental, currently being
considered by Congress, along with recurring costs that have been requested in the Administrations’ FY 2010 budget. We are grateful for the Congressional support we have received thus far for the Administration’s budget and supplemental appropriations requests and encourage their swift passage.

A third principal shaping the planned civilian increase was that it should be a “whole of government” increase – including experts from a variety of U.S. departments and agencies.” All relevant U.S. agencies have been called on to support this effort. In the field, 270 positions will be located at PRTs and other military platforms, drawing from personnel at four agencies: the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, USDA, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. Roughly 150 positions in Kabul will be staffed by 10 agencies, including the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security, the Treasury Department, and others.

Fourth, the civilian deployments will track closely the deployment of additional U.S. military forces. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul and USFOR-A identified 56 priority positions to be filled in June and July, in advance of the August 20 Afghan elections and shortly after the arrival of new military units. The 56 personnel will represent a nearly 50 percent increase in current civilian staffing outside of Kabul. They will pilot new civil-military District Support Teams and strengthen civilian presence on provincial and regional civil-military teams. The balance of the additional personnel will arrive in phases between August 2009 and March 2010, and will double current civilian staffing, depending on the funding provided in the FY 2009 supplemental and the FY 2010 budget. Civilian deployments have been coordinated with the arrival of military units, but the planned phased approach also allows time for necessary “clearing operations” by new military units, ensures we hire and adequately train the right people, and allows us to integrate civilians into completely new roles and positions. More broadly, the civilian increase is dependent on military progress in the “clear” and “hold” phases of the counterinsurgency effort; to be effective, our additional staff will need to be able to move and do their work beyond the wire of military installations.

Finally, the U.S. civilian increase will be integrated with an impressive proposal developed by the Government of Afghanistan outlining additional technical
assistance, as well as the civilian increase plans of international organizations, our partners, and of our Allies. Specifically, the Afghan government in late April presented a request for 650 additional Afghan and international civilian specialists, and the U.S. Embassy and other missions are conducting a thorough assessment of the gaps and overlaps between the Afghan proposal and international plans for civilian increase. The UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) is taking an appropriate leadership role in the effort. Expanding the civilian presence is one area in the counter-insurgency effort where we are counting on greater involvement from the international community. The United States cannot nor should it meet all the civilian requirements.

We are on track to staff the positions on the timeline determined jointly by the U.S. Embassy and USFOR-A. U.S. departments and agencies will be using multiple, simultaneous recruitment streams to hire the most qualified personnel as fast as possible. Positions posted to USAJobs and the State Department’s website have been met with enthusiastic responses by individuals with impressive resumes and many with prior Afghanistan experience. The agencies and the Embassy are culling through the applications to ensure the right fit for each position. The candidate pool includes the State Department’s Foreign and Civil Service, USAID’s Foreign and Civil Service, State and USAID’s temporary direct hires, and other agencies. Department of Defense (DoD) civilians will also be deployed if gaps in the civilian deployment levels or schedule are identified, and if necessary, military reservists in civilian attire – and under Chief of Mission authority – will be considered. Critical to the State Department’s efforts to staff these positions quickly is senior leadership commitment: we have received explicit instructions that any bottlenecks in the hiring process be raised to the attention of Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Jack Lew.

Civilians will be deployed to the field quickly, but not without proper, tailored training. The State Department’s Foreign Service Institute offers interagency personnel an Afghanistan Familiarization course and a PRT course. Additionally, all civilian personnel are currently required to take State’s Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course. Equally important, my office is leading an interagency effort to explore the development of a one-week civil-military training and exercises program for all civilians who will be working closely with the military in Kabul.
and the field. The better equipped our civilians are for their challenging assignments, the faster they will be able to achieve visible effects.

The Embassy and U.S. military, supported by the State Department and CENTCOM, are taking the necessary steps to support this dramatic increase in civilian personnel. These measures include expanding the Embassy’s senior leadership with three additional ambassadors who will oversee the civilian increase, developing with our allies and partners a comprehensive integrated civil-military plan to guide civilian and military activities in and outside of Kabul, standing up – with Ambassador Herbst and his team’s assistance – the Integrated Civil Military Action Group (ICMAG) to further integrate civilian and military efforts, establishing unified civilian command and control, and expanding the lodging and office facilities of the Embassy and military platforms to accommodate the larger staff. General Petraeus has committed to ensuring the maximum freedom of movement for civilians in the field; greater mobility translates into greater effectiveness.

The civilian effort in Afghanistan, much like the military effort, has been under-resourced for years, and the civilians will be working with Afghans officials and private citizens of varying degrees of capacity and professional experience, so we cannot expect a turnaround overnight. However, we should begin to see the benefits of a more robust civilian presence – i.e., greater Afghan capacity to govern their own country; more rapid infusion of financial resources in the local economy as a result of greater civilian oversight; faster job creation in the provinces and rural areas; increased productivity and improved marketing in agricultural and other sectors; reduced opportunities for corruption – in the short term. The key measure of impact will be that the Afghan population perceives its government to be legitimate and effective at delivering basic services and security and that people believe stability is best achieved by turning away from the Taliban.

The civilian ramp-up will be accompanied by an increase in financial and development assistance, and we recognize the inherently higher risks of waste, fraud, and abuse of financial resources. The Special Representative and his team ardently support the role of retired Marine Corps Major General Arnold Fields, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), in closely monitoring the disbursement of assistance. In fact, you may already know that the
Afghan government has specifically asked SIGAR to help in its anti-corruption efforts. Congress created SIGAR to independently audit the use of the funds and we would like to see them in every province. We value SIGAR and respect and support their mission, and Ambassador Holbrooke has voiced his support for expanding their mandate and responsibilities.

The significant increase in the number of civilian experts in Afghanistan is essential to strengthening the Afghan government, extending its reach, boosting activity in key economic sectors, and defeating the insurgency. We have a plan for rapidly expanding the civilian presence throughout Afghanistan, particularly in the part of the country where the insurgency is the most intense, and the U.S. agencies, led by the State Department and with the strong support and backing of Secretary Clinton, are working closely with our military to execute this plan. As we deploy more civilians, if additional civilian requirements are identified, we will adjust our plan accordingly, in close consultation with Congress and our military colleagues.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to share with you our plan for increasing civilian experts in Afghanistan. I look forward to any comments or questions you may have.
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Jones. We appreciate your testimony.

Mr. Sedney.

STATEMENT OF DAVID S. SEDNEY

Mr. SEDNEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you and the members of the committee for this opportunity to testify. I can confirm that this is the first time that I have appeared before Congress to a fellow Suffolk University alumni.

The appearance here with my interagency colleagues is, I think, a very accurate reflection of exactly what my colleague Mr. Jones said about the interagency approach here. The Department of Defense in this civilian effort is playing very much a supporting role.

As you know, the strategic review that the President ordered and that the administration carried out came to the conclusion—after extensive consultation, I might stress, with our allies and friends and looking at the experiences not just in Afghanistan but also in Iraq—of the importance of a need for expanded civilian presence.

We are currently implementing, as Mr. Jones said, a request for over 400. General Petraeus has made very clear he has pledged that we will—the Department of Defense, CENTCOM, the U.S. forces on the ground—provide the necessary support for additional civilians, to include the security issue that Mr. Jones mentioned as well as other areas of support that are necessary. If there are additional personnel beyond the current request, we will be prepared to support those as well.

And it hasn’t happened yet, but if the State Department were to ask us for additional help, as Mr. Jones said, the Department is prepared to respond. That request hasn’t happened yet, but if it does happen, we are prepared to respond.

On May 11th, Secretary Gates signed a memorandum directing the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel Readiness to identify civilian employees capable of deploying in Afghanistan in support of U.S. Government initiatives. This initiative is to identify potential candidates if a request is made.

But I want to again say we are supporting the State Department, as the Defense Department is not in the lead. There is no plan for the Department of Defense to take over this activity. We are in support of the Department of State.

The planning to integrate the civilian-military effort that you mentioned in your statement, Mr. Chairman, is very much under way. The Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group at the Embassy and the interagency team, which includes the U.S. Forces Afghanistan as an integral part, is coordinating our lines of effort in this area.

We are, of course, continually reviewing how to do this better, how to make sure that we are able to carry out the requirements of the President’s policy. We will not get everything right at the beginning, I am sure. We will have to review how things are going, and if there are areas where we need to make improvements, we will. But I will say, given the level of interagency cooperation here, the level of interagency attention to this, I am very optimistic that we will be able to succeed.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I am ready for any questions you may have later.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sedney follows:]
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENCE FOR CENTRAL ASIA, DAVID SEDNEY
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Resourcing the Civilian surge

Chairman, Members of the Committee; thank you for the opportunity to appear today with my interagency colleagues.

As you know, the President’s strategic review of Afghanistan and Pakistan recommended a dramatic increase in U.S. and international civilian efforts in Afghanistan. Beyond our own analysis this conclusion was based on extensive consultation with our allies, partners, and friends, and particularly with the United Nations. The challenge is to ensure that we integrate this increased civilian effort with military efforts.

The Department of State, USAID, USDA and other civilian agencies are currently implementing a civilian increase of more than 400 personnel to be in place throughout Afghanistan by March 2010.

DoD is working closely with our interagency partners to ensure that civilians deploying into theater will be integrated into our military effort and have the military support they need. In February 2009, for instance, CENTCOM pledged to support additional civilians with security, lodging, work space, and mobility as may be required. DoD also is discussing with the State Department whether or not additional civilian personnel may be

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required beyond those already identified. Should a need arise for more civilian experts, DoD stands ready to support our State Department colleagues as needed. We have the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW), for example, to quickly provide such civilian expertise.

In his May 11 memorandum, Secretary Gates directed USD (Personnel and Readiness) to "identify civilian employees capable of deploying to Afghanistan in support of U.S. government initiatives.\"

The memorandum is intended only to identify personnel in anticipation of Department of State requests.

The Civilian Expeditionary Workforce personnel and former employees are pre-identified and can respond within 90 days to support DoD and State-led operations.

Planning is under way to ensure civilians arriving in country will be integrated with the military units on the ground. The Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group, ICMAG, located in Embassy Kabul, formed in November 2008 as an interagency team to improve USG-wide coordination along all lines of effort has the lead in this effort. However, as many of our additional military forces will be deploying to the south of Afghanistan, outside the U.S.-led area of operations, a key challenge will be to integrate expanded civilian efforts with our partners from the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, and elsewhere.

We already are working closely with these key partners to synchronize our efforts with theirs in a way that will be mutually reinforcing.

Thank you again. I look forward to your questions.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. Bever.

STATEMENT OF JAMES A. BEVER

Mr. BEVER. Thank you very much, Chairman Tierney and Ranking Member Flake and other members of the committee.

I would like to start, if I could, with a short little story of the time when David Sedney and I served together in Afghanistan 5 to 6 years ago. We had the task of rebuilding the Kabul-Kandahar highway through an extremely dangerous part of Afghanistan at the time. This was in Zabul Province in the southeast.

We were invited to lunch with the Governor at the time in Zabul Province. He was later assassinated, sadly. But at the end of this lunch, which was with tribal leaders, as I was leaving with my convoy, one of the large Pashtun tribal leaders came up to me and pulled my arm and reached out and pointed to my watch and said, remember one thing. You Americans have all the watches. Taliban have all the time.

That made a very lasting impression on me. It was in fact an epiphany in my own career. Because I was eligible to retire at that time; and I thought, no, this struggle is too important for all of us. This is a long struggle and one that requires input on the development side as well to help evolve people’s minds and attitudes.

As a result, here we are a number of years later. USAID still takes Afghanistan and Pakistan extremely seriously. We take the staffing up of our involvement very seriously. We have cooperated very actively with the members here at this table, interagency, and at the National Security Council. We look forward to a new partnership with Michael Michener and the Foreign Agriculture Service at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and we have formed a whole-of-agency task force at USAID since Thanksgiving to oversee a combined Afghanistan-Pakistan effort within AID. We meet at the assistant administrator level every week with our acting administrator to review staffing progress, the progress on buildings, security, and everything else we need.

Second, continued needs. We have the continued need for support for incentives to allow our people to be the most effective on the ground and to stay even longer at post, because, as you know, most assignments are 1 year in duration.

We need secure and timely mobility on the ground and in the air in Afghanistan, especially in cooperation with our PRTs, our military, and State colleagues.

We need the closest of coordination with U.S. military, NATO, ISAF military, and with State Department. We have that, and we are continuing to work on that through coordination mechanisms which we can talk about later. That goes all the way from training to implementation and planning.

We need closer cooperation with our fellow donors, not just UNAMA but especially, I think, the bilateral donors such as the Dutch, the British, and the Canadians that operate in the south in Helmand, in Oruzgan, and in Kandahar Provinces. And, we have begun in earnest discussions with them about how to coordinate better at all levels of our organizations in all these countries.
We need more resourceful monitoring mechanisms on the ground, creative, flexible, and trustworthy; not only foreign service nationals but also other additional third-party mechanisms and technologically creative mechanisms to oversee what we are doing.

On oversight, we value, as Paul Jones just said, having the continued partnership of the Inspector General for USAID, the Government Accountability Office, and the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction, General Fields, in Afghanistan, in particular in the latter case. What we do urge is that all of them work in close synchrony and harmony in sequencing the time of their audit and their investigation work to get the job done to protect our people's money. We can't be at all places at all times, and our inspectors general and others are very good at assisting us in this, but we have to be careful that our already strained staff are not overwhelmed as a result.

In that regard, I would like to just say that we have worked very closely with Stuart Bowen and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. We have invited Stuart Bowen, Ginger, his deputy, General Fields, the Government Accountability Office, our IG, and others to meet with our task force at USAID. They have done that together. They have done it individually.

We have required reading of this book to everyone we are sending out to Afghanistan and Pakistan. One of the lessons in here, for example, has to do with lessons learned from Iraq—Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience—is the importance of listening at the local level and developing from the bottom up. That is the new approach for us in Afghanistan.

I will close by saying two things. One is, we appreciate Congress' continuing support for USAID's development leadership initiative. This is our initiative to double the number of USAID Foreign Service Officers over the next couple of years, so that when David Sedney and I sit down again together 5 or 6 years from now, we will have more USAID officers available to serve in these kinds of places, whatever situation we are in 5 or 6 years from now.

On that, I would like to introduce three Americans behind me who are currently serving or are about to go out to theater.

One is James Berscheit. If you could stand up, James. He is executive officer, currently serving in Kabul. He has been there almost a year. He hails from Minnesota.

The other is Brian Kurtz. If you could stand, Brian. Brian is an example of a Foreign Service Officer, recently retired, who has agreed to re-up, come back and serve us, deploying out to Afghanistan in one of the PRTs. He is Chappaqua, NY.

And Gene Gibson, who is a democracy governance officer currently serving in Islamabad for about 7 months, hails from Florida. We are very proud of these officers.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bever follows:]
Statement of James A. Bever  
Director, Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force  
U.S. Agency for International Development  
Before The  
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform  
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs  

“Afghanistan and Pakistan: Resourcing the Civilian Surge.”  
Tuesday, May 19, 2009

Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Flake, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. I am pleased to have the opportunity to participate in this timely forum and to describe to you the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) plans to increase our civilian presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, USAID plays an important role in the Administration’s new, comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan by providing vital economic, development, and humanitarian assistance to the people in these two countries. Our current effort to add staff in both countries is essential to advance critical development goals that support the new strategy.

Today, I would like to detail USAID’s plan for resourcing the influx of civilian talent and experience to critical assignments in each country – from USAID’s mission offices in Kabul and Islamabad to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) throughout Afghanistan and our FATA office in Peshawar, Pakistan. I will also describe how we will continue to integrate our work with other agencies, including the military, in order to achieve optimal results through our coordinated efforts.

USAID’s Plan for Resourcing an Increased Presence

USAID’s staffing plan reflects the resources that will be required to help implement the Administration’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, which definitively links U.S. policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan together in order to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country.”
USAID’s additional staff will be stepping into assignments in a dangerous part of the world. We fully recognize the special challenges this situation presents, in terms of attracting and retaining qualified candidates, ensuring a safe and secure environment, and preparing new hires for the rigors of their assignments. Nevertheless, the civilians we are sending to these challenging positions are qualified individuals with extensive experience for their positions.

In Afghanistan, USAID has pledged to provide an additional 150 American staff. Of these, 45 will be located in Kabul, with the remainder deployed to directly support PRTs and expand reach into the district and provincial level. This will bring our total staffing level to the authorized level of 721 personnel in-country, including U.S. citizens and locally employed staff. The President’s FY 2009 supplemental request includes $100 million in Operating Expense (OE) funding to resource this staffing surge. We must fill these positions quickly with strong candidates to correspond with the new wave of 17,000 U.S. troops arriving in Afghanistan.

In Pakistan, USAID’s program has grown from a $200 million dollar a year cash transfer in Fiscal Year 2002 to an over $1 billion dollar request in Fiscal Year 2010. To meet the demands of such a large program, USAID’s approved U.S. and Foreign Service National staffing ceiling in Pakistan increased twice in the past year: once in July 2008 from 114 to 162 and again in January 2009, from 162 to the new level of 243. The President’s FY 2009 supplemental request includes the support costs of these additional staff. Parallel to recruiting for these positions, we are pursuing the construction of additional office buildings to address space constraints.

We are well on our way to fulfilling our civilian staffing goals in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Additionally, I would also like to note that we are working to increase the numbers of locally employed staff. Serving at great personal risk to themselves and their families, these individuals provide critical support to our ongoing activities and serve as the institutional memory of USAID’s Missions in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

USAID’s overall staffing plans for Afghanistan and Pakistan are supported with a combination of Economic Support Funds (ESF) and OE funds enacted in the Fiscal Year 2009 Omnibus and requested in the President’s the FY 2009 Supplemental.

Attracting and Recruiting Skilled Personnel
Mr. Chairman, we take the need for additional USAID staff in Afghanistan and Pakistan extremely seriously. This is why our plan for increasing civilian staff levels includes a variety of provisions to encourage service in these countries. We have announced to our entire Agency headquarters staff as well as all USAID missions worldwide that we are prepared to break or curtail assignments to allow current USAID foreign and civil service staff to serve in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

We have also put forward a wide array of incentives in our 2010 budget that we believe will help us attract the best candidates to these difficult assignments. These incentives include “priority consideration” for onward assignments, danger and hardship pay, leave for R&R (rest and recuperation), and a regional rest break. USAID also supports our employees in these difficult assignments by providing a hotline for assistance with problems ranging from mental health to financial troubles. In Afghanistan USAID employs an ombudsperson who can assist staff with issues regarding their service.

For positions that cannot be filled internally, we are taking a proactive approach to advertising open positions in order to attract and hire personnel with appropriate skill sets and experience. We have placed open and continuous job announcements on the FedBizOpps and USAJOBS websites for Personal Services Contractors and Foreign Service Limited employees. We recruit former Peace Corps Volunteers and former military -- especially civil affairs specialists -- through their formal and informal publications and associations. Finally, we are reaching out to our Foreign Service and Civil Service retirees through alumni networks. The FY 2010 budget includes annuity waiver authority to help with the recruitment of our retirees to fill positions in these critical countries.

Thus far, in Afghanistan, we have been successful at identifying many American staff who have relevant experience and are familiar with Afghan culture and language. Fully 85 percent of our current PRT staff have had prior professional experience in Afghanistan or elsewhere in the Muslim world. Ten percent of our field program officers are proficient in an Afghan language.

Over the long term, USAID is aggressively increasing the capacity of its Foreign Service Officer corps (FSOs) through the Development Leadership Initiative (DLI). The FY 2009 enacted Omnibus included 300 new FSOs
under this initiative and the President’s FY 2010 request includes an additional 350 Foreign Service positions through the DL1. A limited number of these new officers are already sufficiently experienced with USAID to take on the challenges of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and several have done so already; the remainder, by taking positions in other countries, will free up other, more seasoned officers to serve in these priority countries. In addition, new staff hired under the DL1 will acquire the necessary training and experience over the next several years to assume these more challenging assignments in the future.

Concurrent with USAID’s internal staffing increase, the Agency has a great force multiplier in the thousands of U.S. and other expatriate and local employees of our implementing partners and grantees in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These men and women, at great personal risk, provide a great service to USAID and to the multitude of ministries and non-governmental organizations with which they work.

**Retention of Qualified Staff**

Our plan for increasing USAID’s presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan acknowledges that retaining qualified staff in difficult, stressful, and dangerous work environments can be a challenge. Over the years in Afghanistan, however, we have had limited success in recruiting tandem couples and in identifying Eligible Family Member (EFM) positions at post. We have also implemented provisions allowing USAID employees transferring to Afghanistan from an overseas post to keep their families at that post, minimizing disruptive moves. Thus far, this latter measure has contributed to a high rate of extension: nearly 75 percent of employees in Afghan PRTs elect to extend their assignments at least an additional six months. In addition, the FY 2010 budget includes language allowing the Agency to provide incentive pay for retention of staff in these countries.

Also under discussion is the development of support hubs in nearby countries, where certain staff may be able to be based. Ultimately, families of staff working in Afghanistan and Pakistan may be encouraged to reside in one of these hubs, which would be just a short flight away from post, and would create additional incentives for officers to serve two year tours. This model was followed during the Vietnam War.

**Pre-Deployment Training for New Employees**
As we carry out our plan to expand our USAID workforce in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is important for new staff, especially staff newly hired to the USG, to receive common pre-deployment training. All USAID employees assigned to Afghanistan and Pakistan are required to attend the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Counter Threat (FACT) course. From this training, employees are better positioned to anticipate and address security threats. New hires also participate in a one-week Afghanistan Familiarization Orientation Course. Finally, USAID direct hire employees must also complete the Serving Abroad for Families and Employees (S.A.F.E.) course, which includes relevant elements of two Department of State courses, the “Security Overseas Seminar (SOS)” and “Working in a U.S. Embassy.”

A key lesson we learned from our experience in Iraq was the importance of joint training and orientation programs for PRT staff in order to provide the best possible preparation for new PRT employees so they can be effective members of their PRT teams from the first day of deployment. Consequently, if USAID staff assignments for Afghan PRTs coincide with certain military unit deployments, these staff have participated in the military’s three-week predeployment training, which is offered at Camp Atterbury in Edinburgh, Indiana. In addition, upon arrival in Afghanistan, our PRT staff and some Kabul-based staff from our technical support offices, are placed in the “COIN Academy,” a one-week joint training program involving the U.S., Coalition, and Afghan militaries, NGOs, and others that emphasizes best practices in counterinsurgency. Finally, USAID staff assigned to PRTs also participate in Afghanistan PRT Orientation, a newly designed course delivered at the Foreign Service Institute, which focuses on sub-national governance in Afghanistan.

Interagency Coordination

The successful execution of USAID’s plan to increase its presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan will require seamless coordination with not only the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, but also our military colleagues to find security and mobility solutions that allow civilian and military personnel to carry out their missions. On that note, I would like to thank our Defense Department colleagues for the military’s expert assistance thus far, and for their active support for increased civilian deployments throughout the country.
Areas for greater coordination with the military include: (1) integration of military and civilian missions where appropriate; (2) some re-prioritization of current activities; and (3) the allocation of additional security/mobility assets. USAID is working closely with our military and State Department colleagues to determine additional staff protection requirements and availability, and what will be necessary to allow civilians to effectively do their jobs, especially in highly kinetic environments such as Regional Commands South and East.

We support and are active participants in the civilian-military planning process facilitated by the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, with the help of S/CRS, through the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group (ICMAG), which is integrating civil and military campaign plans for the country in order to facilitate the creation of a national plan that is focused on counter-insurgency.

Finally, I would like to point out that the increase in civilian staffing in Afghanistan is happening throughout the USG. Our colleagues with the Departments of State, Health and Human Services, Agriculture, Treasury, Justice and others have identified the need for increased civilian presence to support their respective missions in Afghanistan and are currently working to fill those positions. We have good collaboration among such civilian agencies. We are particularly engaged with the office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, under Ambassador Holbrooke’s leadership. In addition, we look forward to working with our Inspector General, the Government Accountability Office, and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, as appropriate.

I hope that this brief description of USAID’s plan to increase our civilian staffing in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been helpful. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Mr. TIERNEY. You should be, Mr. Bever.

I want to thank you for bringing these officers with you here today and just to briefly address the three of you.

We all understand and appreciate your service and how critical and important it is, every bit as much as the men and women in uniform with armor, with helmets, with guns, with things that you don't have. I think the American public sometimes doesn't hear about the risks that you take, the separation from family and just how involved your commitment is.

So I know I speak for all of my fellow panelists up here. We thank you, we pay tribute to what do, and it is greatly appreciated. Thank you.

Mr. Michener.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL MICHENER

Mr. MICHENER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today.

Agriculture plays a critical role in the economy and lives of the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. With the agricultural expertise we bring, USDA is committed to supporting President Obama's efforts to increase governmental effectiveness and enhance economic capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Agriculture will play a pivotal role in implementing the President's counterinsurgency strategy, and USDA is prepared to significantly increase the number of highly skilled agricultural experts serving on provincial reconstruction teams and working at regional and national levels in Afghanistan.

I recently traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan at the behest of Special Representative Holbrooke to explore additional ways USDA can contribute to this effort.

Since 2003, over 50 USDA volunteers have served in Afghanistan. USDA PRT members offer expertise in agricultural extension and education, crop production, plant protection, animal health and livestock management, agricultural marketing, irrigation, and natural resources management. They build the capacity of provincial level host country nationals to enable them to manage their own agricultural reconstruction and development. Working at the Ministries of Agriculture and Education, they strengthen the effectiveness the government.

I would like to provide two examples of the work carried out by USDA experts serving on PRTs in Afghanistan.

A Farm Service Agency employee from Nevada worked with his Afghan counterparts to install six windmill-powered water pumps. These pumps revitalized a centuries-old irrigation system in the south of Afghanistan that now provides water to livestock, vegetable crops, and fruit trees, replacing the poppies which thrive in dry rocky soil.

Another USDA employee from the Natural Resources Conservation Service in Maryland worked with his Afghan counterparts to rebuild the nation's only functioning soil testing laboratory at the Agricultural University at Nangarhar Province.

Our advisers display a great deal of satisfaction in their work. Nearly all have helped to recruit other employees to serve on PRTs. Over a dozen USDA advisers have volunteered for extended or ad-
ditional tours. There remains a high amount of interest and enthusiasm in the Department, as we receive about four applications for each vacancy on a PRT.

The Department stands behind those who volunteer. We provide incentives and benefits based on those provided by the U.S. Department of State and USAID. PRT advisers undergo 3 weeks of predeployment training at the U.S. Army’s Camp Adaberry in Indiana. This training covers medical combat lifesaving, force protection, military-civilian coordination, mentoring and partnering with the government of Afghanistan and general simulation exercises.

USDA also provides a Washington-based orientation for new advisers. Our lessons learned are reflected in standard operating procedures and PRT handbooks that employees use throughout their service. The new advisers also undergo an intensive orientation program upon arrival in Afghanistan. Our program managers in Washington are in frequent contact with the advisers to help with technical issues, provide support with adjustment issues, or just to let them know that their sacrifices and hard work are appreciated.

During service, the USDA advisers receive medical care through the State Department medical program or from the Department of Defense, depending upon location, timing, and the critical nature of the need. We facilitate communication with the families of the advisers and provide evacuation in case of critical family emergencies.

A USDA PRT liaison based in U.S. Embassy in Kabul provides overall management of the program in country. The liaison works closely with counterparts in other civilian and military agencies and ensures smooth interagency coordination for planning and program operations.

After serving in PRTs, employees return to their home agencies and the position they held prior to their assignments.

In addition to PRT experts, USDA advisers have provided technical assistance to Afghanistan’s Ministries of Agriculture and Higher Education. Their efforts include providing oversight for about $16 million under our Food for Progress program that was used to construct provincial agricultural extension offices and teaching laboratories in Kabul University.

During the recent trilateral meetings, USDA made three commitments to further support our counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We committed to form working groups in the areas of food security, trade corridors, and water management and watershed rehabilitation. We also committed to increase our Food for Progress programs for both countries. Finally, we committed to expand the training under our Cochran Fellowship, Borlaug Fellowship and Faculty Exchange Programs.

USDA is prepared to provide a sustained level of skilled and highly motivated experts in PRTs and in government ministries in Afghanistan. Congressional support for the administration’s budget and supplemental appropriations is critical to ensure that we can effectively stand up the civilian side of the counterinsurgency strategy.

Thank you for allowing me to testify today. I look forward to any questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Michener follows:]
STATEMENT BY MICHAEL V. MICHENER
ADMINISTRATOR, FOREIGN AGRICULTURAL SERVICE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, DC
TUESDAY, MAY 19, 2009

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to come before you today to discuss the role of the U.S. Department of Agriculture in the Administration’s strategic efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Background

USDA is committed to supporting President Obama’s efforts to increasing government effectiveness and enhancing economic capacity in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We recognize the critical role that agriculture plays in the economy and lives of the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we look forward to participating in the President’s strategy for the region.

Since 2003, over 50 USDA employees have volunteered to serve as advisors on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and to Ministries in Afghanistan. These employees provide critical advice, guidance, and training to local employees of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) and Provincial and District-level government officials, which strengthen the effectiveness of the government at the provincial and district levels and increases economic opportunities for Afghans who may otherwise join the insurgency. They provide guidance to PRT commanders on projects that directly impact the lives of Afghan farmers and improve economic growth and job creation in the region.

To implement the President’s strategy, USDA is prepared to significantly increase the number of highly-skilled agricultural advisors serving on PRTs subject to availability of resources.

USDA PRT members offer subject-matter expertise in areas such as agricultural extension and education, crop production, plant protection, animal health and livestock management, agricultural marketing, irrigation, and natural resources management. They build the capacity of provincial level host country nationals to enable them to manage their own agriculture reconstruction and development according to their needs and ideas.

I would like to provide two examples of the kind of work carried out by our USDA advisors serving on PRTs in Afghanistan. I think that these examples illustrate the kinds of unique and relevant skills that our employees bring to the challenges of reconstruction and development and support for our counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan.

A USDA employee from the Farm Service Agency in Nevada worked with his Afghan counterparts to design and install six windmill-powered water pumps in the south of Afghanistan. These pumps revitalized a centuries-old irrigation system that now
provides water to farmers for livestock, vegetable crops and fruit trees, replacing the poppies which thrive in dry, rocky soil. Another USDA employee from the Natural Resources Conservation Service in Maryland worked with his Afghan counterparts to rebuild, equip, and operate the nation’s only functioning soil testing laboratory at the Agricultural University in Nangarhar Province.

These are only two examples of the work carried out by USDA advisors in Afghanistan. The important point is that our advisors work to build the capacity of their Afghan counterparts while implementing projects that provide direct and immediate benefits to the people of Afghanistan. Many of our advisors find a great deal of satisfaction in the work. After they return to their home agencies, nearly all have helped to recruit other employees to serve on PRTs. Over a dozen USDA advisors have either volunteered to serve extended tours or have returned to Afghanistan for second or third tours. Six of these employees have also served as advisors in Iraq. There remains a high amount of interest and enthusiasm in the Department, as we receive about four applications for each vacancy on a PRT in Afghanistan.

Since 2003, USDA has developed systems for recruiting, selecting, training, deploying and supporting PRT advisors. The Department stands behind those who volunteer for these one-year assignments, and provides incentives and benefits packages based on those provided by the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other agencies and departments. Newly selected advisors undergo three weeks of pre-deployment training at the U.S. Army’s Camp Atterbury in Indiana. Previously, training was held at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. This training covers medical combat life-saving, force protection, military – civilian coordination, mentoring and partnering with the Government of Afghanistan, and general simulation exercises. USDA also provides a Washington-based orientation program for new advisors as part of the pre-deployment training. We have developed standard operating procedures and PRT handbooks that employees use throughout their service. The new advisors also undergo an intensive orientation program upon arrival in Afghanistan.

During their year of service, USDA provides continuing support to our employees. All PRT advisors have access to a web-based portal to obtain timely and relevant technical information from other advisors, from specialists throughout the Department, and from faculty at the land-grant colleges and universities. We also bring together all of the advisors periodically for in-service training. Our program managers in Washington are in frequent contact with the advisors to help with technical issues, provide support with adjustment issues, or just to let them know that their sacrifices and hard work are appreciated. During service, the USDA advisors receive medical care through the State Department medical program or from the Department of Defense, depending on the location, timing, and the critical nature of the need. We facilitate communication with the families of the advisors, and provide evacuation in case of critical family emergencies.

A USDA PRT liaison based in the U.S. Embassy in Kabul provides overall management of the program in country. The liaison works closely with counterparts in other civilian and military agencies and ensures smooth interagency coordination for planning and program operations. PRT success is dependent upon coordinated interagency
cooperation both in the field and in Washington. USDA staff in Washington meets regularly with counterparts here to coordinate efforts and share lessons learned.

After service, USDA provides official recognition to our employees for their contributions to our reconstruction, development and counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. Employees return to their home agencies, to the position they held prior to their assignment in Afghanistan. USDA holds an annual “lessons learned” event in which most of the returned advisors participate, and we have incorporated these lessons to make continued improvements to the program. USDA helps identify resources to help returned advisors, their families, and supervisors deal with readjustment or other issues.

In addition to PRT advisors, USDA has provided both long-term resident advisors and short-term technical assistance to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Higher Education’s Colleges of Agriculture and Colleges of Veterinary Sciences. These ministry advisors provided technical assistance to their Afghan counterparts in the Ministries and colleges, and provided oversight for about $16 million under Food for Progress that was used to construct provincial agricultural extension offices and teaching laboratories at Kabul University. Additionally, USDA continues to provide food aid resources. In Afghanistan, since 2006, we have provided $25 million under McGovern-Dole to feed about 70,000 primary school students in Badghis and Ghor Provinces. Under USDA’s Faculty Exchange Program, six faculties from Kabul University’s College of Agriculture have been trained here in the U.S., including two faculty members that are here this year. Through USDA’s Norman Borlaug International Agricultural Science and Technology Fellows Program, we expect to train 120 agricultural researchers from Afghanistan during the next two years. In Pakistan, since 2006, USDA has provided about $35 million under the McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program that feeds more than 30,000 female students.

During the recent trilateral meetings, USDA made three commitments to further support our counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan through government capacity building to enhance economic growth. We committed to form and support a Secretariat and three working groups in the areas of Food Security, Trade Corridors, and Water Management and Watershed Rehabilitation. We also committed to increase our Food for Progress programs for both countries, to generate additional funds to be used for projects such as construction of new agricultural extension offices to help the governments extend programs into the provinces. Finally, we committed to expand the numbers of training programs for Pakistan and Afghanistan through our Cochran Fellowship, Borlaug Fellowship, and Faculty Exchange Programs. USDA is working to identify the additional resources required to support these priority efforts.

We believe that USDA has developed the systems necessary to continue to provide a sustained level of skilled and highly motivated employees to serve as advisors on PRTs or in government ministries in Afghanistan. USDA is prepared to significantly increase the number of PRT advisors, ministry advisors, and other support that we can deliver to meeting this critical challenge to U.S. national security. Congressional support for the Administration’s budget and supplemental appropriations request is critical to ensure we can effectively stand up the civilian side of the counter-insurgency strategy, and have in
place the capabilities required to “hold” and “build” economic opportunities and governance after our men and women in uniform provide security for the population.

I want to thank you for allowing me to share with you some of the information about our programs, challenges, and accomplishments in Afghanistan and plans for meeting new commitments to both Afghanistan and Pakistan. I look forward to any comments or questions you may have. Thank you.
Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much. I couldn't help but keep watching you. You looked over at that light like you thought the floor was going to go out beneath you if it got to red.

Mr. Michener. This is my first time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

You are recognized, sir.

STATEMENT OF JOHN HERBST

Mr. HERBST. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Flake, members of the subcommittee, thanks for the opportunity to testify.

In today's tightly interconnected world, there is a growing challenge posed by failed or failing states and ungoverned spaces. Such areas can become breeding grounds for terrorism, weapons proliferation, narco-trafficking, and piracy.

Afghanistan is the subject at hand, but it is not the only country whose instability may affect our national interests. The steps to successfully meet this challenge on the civilian side are not unlike how the military prepares. We need to build the necessary human capacity, we need to develop planning and management systems, we need to train our experts and equip them with the necessary skills for the situations they will encounter, we need to develop teams, and we need to repeatedly exercise those teams to make sure they are ready for the challenge at hand.

At the center of this preparation is development of a whole-of-government civilian response capability, the Civilian Response Corps [CRC].

As we conceive it, the CRC is to be composed of three components: an active component of 250 full-time first responders from across eight civilian Federal departments and agencies; a standby component of 2,000 across those same eight agencies; and a 2,000 member reserve component drawn from the private sector, State, and local government.

To date, $140 million has been appropriated to establish, train, and equip a 250-member active component and a 1,000-member standby component. The first funds, $65 million, came to us about 7 months ago. The remaining funds, $75 million, were appropriated 2 months ago in the omnibus bill. In the 2010 budget, President Obama has requested for the civilian stabilization issue $323 million to allow all three of the CRC components to be realized as intended and needed.

My office, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization [SCRS], operates under the Reconstruction and Stabilization Management Act of 2008, which calls on the civilian elements of the Federal Government to work together to promote the security of the United States to improve coordination, planning, and implementation. The job of SCRS is to support the Secretary of State, leading the way on dealing with reconstruction and stabilization crises.

The Civilian Stabilization Initiative is the critical first step to ensure that we have the right people with the right skills at the right time. However, making sure that these experts are doing the right things on the ground according to one strategic plan with full syn-
chronization between civilians and military continues to be the most complex and challenging task for SCRS.

But the benefits of undertaking this challenge are worthwhile, as demonstrated by SCRS's thus far still limited work in Afghanistan. Over 30 of our initial first responders and planners that make up our new expeditionary capability have served in Afghanistan in the last 2 years; and they have piloted a range of new platforms, plans, and integration efforts that will now set the stage for a successful civilian increase.

Here are a few highlights of our work to date in Afghanistan: Our civilian responders pioneered the design and management of the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group, the ICMAG, at Embassy Kabul which is at the forefront of civilian-military integration in Kabul, ensuring that the civilian and military are planning together and assessing and acting together at all levels of the mission.

We have also developed a planning system now in use by all of the American PRTs in our new military and civilian elements across Afghanistan to ensure that civilian-military plans are put together and executed properly. Thanks to these efforts, there are now plans for similar operations at each American PRT and at Regional Command East.

We have also developed pre-deployment training for civilian and military personnel deploying to Afghanistan so they can work as a team once they hit the ground in Afghanistan.

We have initiated the first civilian teams at U.S. taskforces that will now be the platform for the upcoming civilian increase.

We have developed a new integrated performance measurement system for sub-national levels, which is currently being piloted.

And we have developed new ideas such as the model for district teams that would operate under provincial reconstruction teams.

Under Ambassador Holbrooke's direction, we have put together and are leading the interagency Afghan Election Support Team to provide assistance to Embassy Kabul as it prepares for the upcoming Presidential and provincial council elections.

Additional details on all of these items are in my prepared statement.

With the funds that have been appropriated to date, we have hired and identified 338 members of the Civilian Response Corps; and we began last week to train those first members. By the summer, we should be in a position to deploy our first members to Afghanistan as part of the ramp-up. By the fall, we should be in a position to deploy dozens of CRC members to Afghanistan or other places.

As Afghanistan so clearly demonstrates, failing states and ungoverned spaces can quickly spawn threats to the security of our Nation, its citizens, and our interests and those of our allies and partners.

Building the U.S. planning and operations capacity embodied in the Civilian Stabilization Initiative and the Civilian Response Corps will ensure that we are prepared in the future for the challenges that are coming our way. In the end, this effort will depend on a strong, effective U.S. civilian response capacity. With this, we
will ultimately spend less money and lose fewer lives in dealing with the challenge of failed and failing states.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Herbst follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT

AMBASSADOR JOHN E. HERBST
COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

MAY 19, 2009
INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Flake, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today and speak about the significant progress in the stand-up of the Active and Standby components of the Civilian Response Corps, and about the great work the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has done and is doing in Afghanistan.

First some background. S/CRS was established within State Department in 2004, to develop a whole-of-Government civilian response capability based on the lessons learned from reconstruction missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The commitment to build this civilian capacity was shared by the previous Administration, most notably when former President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) in 2005. This directive recognized the challenges in the area of stabilization and reconstruction, and called on both civilian and military elements of the federal Government to promote the security of the United States through improved coordination, planning, and implementation. NSPD-44 made the Secretary of State responsible for integrating U.S. efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct these reconstruction and stabilization activities, and called on the Secretaries of State and Defense to harmonize civilian and military efforts so that civilians are planning and operating with the military before and during the start up of any operation. Under NSPD-44, S/CRS built a modest pilot Civilian Response Corps within State Department.

Today, 5 years later, we continue to face a shifting, dynamic and demanding world that will test our national capabilities, constantly requiring new approaches, new coalitions, and the best practices we can learn and impart to our men and women working in the field. As a nation we must have tools that are highly flexible and capable in a range of situations. The steps to successfully meeting this challenge on the civilian side are not unlike how the military prepares as well: build the necessary human capacity, develop planning and management systems, train these experts in the necessary skills and in the situations they will likely encounter, and repeatedly exercise with partners until our people are ready. At the center of this preparation is the effort to strengthen the partnership within the U.S. Government between civilians and the military, so that as these threats evolve, and possibly rise to the level of military engagement, we have the relationships and systems in place to respond effectively.

Congress responded to this need when in October 2008, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008, (Title XVI of P.L. 110-417) was passed, which formally authorized a Civilian Response Corps composed of three components: Active, Standby and Reserve, and reaffirmed the State Department’s lead role in the development of a civilian response capability across eight Departments/agencies of the Federal Government. In addition to State and USAID, the Departments of Homeland Security, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture are part of the Civilian Response Corps. A description of each of the three components of the Civilian Response Corps follows:

The Active component is comprised of members who are full-time U.S. Government employees of Federal departments whose specific job is to train for, prepare, and staff reconstruction and stabilization operations. They provide the U.S. Government with a ready source of expeditionary capabilities. They are part of a whole-of-government U.S. structure focused on
critical initial interagency functions such as assessment, planning, coordination, management, logistical, applying sector expertise and resource mobilization for response and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization operations.

The Standby component is comprised of existing full-time U.S. Government employees who may or may not have current positions related to reconstruction and stabilization operations. However, they have specialized subject matter expertise useful in reconstruction and stabilization operations and have committed to being available for deployment within 30 days. When activated, they provide critical reinforcement and follow-up for the Active component, as well as additional pertinent skills and expertise.

The Reserve component is comprised of state and local Government, and private sector citizens who have committed to being available for call-up to serve as U.S. Government intermittent employees in support of reconstruction and stabilization operations. They provide a pool of qualified, pre-trained, and ready civilian professionals with specialized expertise and skills either absent in the federal workforce, or present in insufficient numbers for a robust response.

Active and Standby component members will bring expeditionary, whole-of-Government capabilities, unique sectoral expertise, and functional knowledge of their Department’s capabilities to support reconstruction and stabilization operations. Reserve component members can be utilized for a range of reconstruction and stabilization activities, but will focus on field-based, sector specific needs, such as: Developing, managing, and supporting technical programs; conducting technical assistance; and coordinating donors, multilateral organizations, non-Governmental organizations, and the private sector to implement a comprehensive approach to technical assistance.

Congress provided initial funding in the amount of $65M ($40M for State and $25M for USAID) under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-252) that is being used to support the stand-up of a 100 person Active component and a 500 person Standby component. Funding could not be used to support the Reserve component.

Additional funding in the amount of $75M for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative (CSI) was appropriated by Congress in the Department of State, Foreign Ops and related Programs Appropriation Act, 2009 (Div. H, P.L. 111-11) in two accounts: One at State ($45M) and one at USAID ($30M) to continue the stand-up and expansion of the Active and Standby components. This funding will allow us to begin recruiting up to an additional 150 Active personnel for a total of 250, and expand recruitment of the Standby component beyond the current 500 persons. Again, funding was not made available for the Reserve component.

The President’s FY2010 Budget Request includes $323.3 million under the Civilian Stabilization Initiative for State. If these funds are appropriated, we will be able to fully realize a trained, equipped and deployable Civilian Response Corps consisting of a 250 person Active component, a 2,000 person Standby component, and a 2,000 person Reserve component.

However, even with the generous support of the Congress, it still takes time to build a civilian response capability. What we are doing is, in a word, revolutionary. Not since the Goldwater-Nichols Act (P.L. 99-433) has the U.S. Government undertaken to reshape the U.S.
Government’s capacity to project smart power in order to address failed and failing states on such a scale. And no revolution happens overnight. In fact, funds were not available to S/CRS to begin an expanded stand-up of the Active and Standby component until September 2008, so we are only seven months into the effort. Goldwater-Nichols took seven years.

To date, there are 23 Active component members. Another 18 applicants have been offered positions and will be on-board shortly, for a total of 41. All agencies are on target to meet their hiring goals, resulting in a fully trained, equipped and ready to deploy 100 member CRC-A by October 1, 2009. In addition, there are now 311 federal employees across the interagency that have joined the Standby component and 150 will be trained and ready to deploy by October. Under the funding provided for FY09, agencies are actively working to hire additional Civilian Response Corps members to exceed these goals by the second quarter of fiscal year 2010.

Accomplishments in Afghanistan

Already, S/CRS has contributed and is contributing to the Afghanistan effort in a major way. Over 30 of the initial “first responders” and planners that make up our new expeditionary capability have served in Afghanistan in the last two years—piloting a range of new platforms, plans and integration efforts that will now set the stage for a successful civilian increase. We look at successful civilian readiness and deployment as a system and, as a result, my staff and responders are engaged at all levels of the mission: in pre-deployment training, in logistics and mission support, in the Integrated Civilian-Military Action Group (ICMAG) in Kabul which integrated civilian and military activities across all our efforts, at new Civilian-Military Brigade teams and down at the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) where our officers are helping to develop the model for new District teams—-to take our efforts to the local level. We continue to bring 5 years of best practices and civilian-military doctrine to this effort to set our new civilians in the field, and the larger mission, for immediate success. A few highlights of our work in support of USG efforts in Afghanistan follow:

1. Our civilian responders pioneered the design and management of the ICMAG which is at the forefront of civil-military integration in Kabul—ensuring that civilians and military are planning, assessing and acting together at all levels of the mission.
2. We developed a planning system now in use by PRTs and our new military and civilian elements across Afghanistan to ensure civilian-military plans and execution.
3. We developed joint pre-deployment training for civilian and military personnel deploying to Afghanistan so that they can hit the ground as a team—ready to engage in the COIN effort together.
4. We initiated the first augmented civilian teams at U.S. Taskforces that will now be the platform for the civilian increase.
5. We developed a new, integrated performance measurement system for sub-national levels, which is currently being piloted.

S/CRS involvement in Afghanistan began in 2007, when it was recognized that work within the U.S. Government was fragmented, disjointed and lacked appropriate mechanisms/methods to ensure the best of a whole of government approach. Individual agencies produced their own strategies and operational plans, sometimes conflicting in nature or substance, and at other times
overlapping resulting in excessive cost and undue competition. These disparate efforts undermined much needed understanding of a common operating picture that would allow development of concrete actions and problem solving towards common end states -- not only between the military and their civilian partners, but between civilian actors as well.

S/CRS responded by undertaking the first integrated civilian-military planning process. Starting at the Provincial level, the S/CRS team helped each of the 12 U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) develop a shared interagency situational analysis, an overarching objective for their province, lines of operation and engagement, identification of key resource requirements, and measures of effectiveness. These plans represented the first time PRTs had ever conducted integrated analysis, planning and problem solving, and while not without pains, the process engendered a common view on how to best use assets of the U.S. Government to achieve end objectives.

With the process beginning to take hold, S/CRS returned in the summer of 2008 to develop an entire system of Integrated Guidance for Regional command East with full participation from Kabul, Bagram and each of the provincial teams in RC-East. This culminated in the RC-East Integrated Guidance and 10 Provincial plans on how the USG and coalition partners would support the Government of Afghanistan.

By October 2008, the Embassy and US Forces recognized that they needed a standing effort to ensure integration, civilian-military planning and the ability to quickly react across the USG to changing conditions in the COIN fight. By November of 2008, Embassy Kabul requested that the team formally be established as a specialized cell. Named the Integrated Civil Military Action Group (ICMAG), it consisted of members from USAID, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A), SCRS, and Combined Security Transition Forces – Afghanistan (CSTCA). This team serves as the “joint planning team” or Secretariat for an Executive Working Group (EWG) of the USG civilian and military mission in Afghanistan made up of the Deputy Ambassador and all the Deputy Commanders of USFOR-A, RC-East, RC-South and CSTC-A.

The ICMAG has since been recognized as the “go-to” problem-solver for the range of issues that must be tackled across the interagency; in particular for bridging the civilian-military divide. It has grown to include nine full-time members from State, USAID, Regional Command - East and USFOR-A, two part-time staff (from State and USFOR-A) as well as two temporary S/CRS planners. The ICMAG works to ensure that the entire USG focuses on local effects, able to determine how to assist the Government of Afghanistan where the fight is: from valley to valley across a varied and complex country.

The ICMAG has now completed the first update of the RC-East plans to include Provincial plans for non-U.S. lead PRTs as the teams in the field prepare to meet the challenges of elections, unrest in Pakistan, and an intense fighting season. The ICMAG is working to ensure that the teams in the field get integrated, rapid and effective guidance throughout this period – and so will be piloting a new system of regional assessment. With this system the USG will be able to tell one story, province by province, of what is going well and where changes need to be made. For the first time, those civilian and military representatives in the field will jointly report on
progress on a quarterly basis to their principals, providing a dynamic forum for senior leadership to measure success and make course changes as needed.

With the anticipated increase in U.S. presence, the ICMAG has expanded its mandate to work on U.S. civilian and military integration in Regional Command – South (RC South). The ICMAG deployed senior interagency planners to work with RC-South headquarters and the RC-South civilian-military cell to ensure that new U.S. actors are able to participate fully with the 16 Coalition partners in RC-South to plan together; to target US resources where most effective across the region through regional strategies; and to ensure that new civilian and military teams are structured and prepared to fully engage with critical U.K., Canadian and Dutch counterparts. For the first time U.S. elements will be integrating planning and operating together with the UK, Canada, Dutch, Australians and Romanians in RC-South. At the crux of this is development of a “nexus” strategy for counter-narcotics; alternative livelihood; insurgency and corruption; and the completion of the U.S. Government action plan for the South.

Making civilian-military integration work and ensuring that our civilians and military in the field can react quickly to changing opportunities and risks, the ICMAG and our responders in the field are constantly working to solve problems. For example, this has included working on facilitating the “border access” challenge of moving the new military support requirements through two choked and vulnerable crossing points in the East and South with partners in Kabul and Pakistan; focusing down on districts in a holistic manner- for police and rule of law training, capacity building and assistance; developing an “oasis of stability” in the establishment of Nangarhar Inc.; and identifying how to target US efforts on the nexus between counter-narcotics, illicit finance and corruption.

Measuring progress in Afghanistan has been a much debated topic of late. Prior to 2008, a significant amount of data was collected, but it was not systematized against integrated plans, nor standardized over time or geographic areas. A number of gaps and/or overlaps ensued. The new strategic review of Afghanistan has created an opportunity for improvements. The ICMAG provides the needed structure and processes for measuring progress. The ICMAG and a Washington reachback group is now supporting the design of key effects and output metrics against the new strategic review; standardizing metrics where possible for regular and systematic comparisons over time and physical space; defining new collection tools and methods that allow objective analysis while easing the burden on field staff; developing an integrated assessment tool and chain to create a feedback and accountability loop; and creating a definitive link to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) through relations with key Ministries for buy-in, capacity building and ultimately Afghan-led data collection.

S/CRS responders are also playing a key role in the upcoming Afghanistan elections. At the request of the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, S/CRS is leading an interagency Afghanistan Election Support Team to provide assistance and expertise to Embassy Kabul as it prepares for the upcoming Presidential and Provincial Council elections. On behalf of S/CRS, Ambassador Tim Carney will lead a team of eleven experts from State, USAID and Defense to work with the Afghan government, the United Nations, donor countries, and non-governmental organizations with the goal of ensuring that Afghanistan’s Presidential election in August 2009, will be conducted effectively, fairly, and credibly. The team will remain in country through the end of a second round of elections, if needed.
The ICMAG also received a strong call from civilian and military teams in RC-East that civilian-military guidance on elections was urgently needed. In response, the ICMAG has worked closely with the Elections Coordination Group at Embassy Kabul to prepare civilian-military elections guidance to all U.S. Government elements in the field that outlines what needs to be done to set the stage for successful elections. The dissemination of this topical common guidance down both the U.S. military (USFOR-A and ISAF) and civilian chains of command is the first of its kind, setting a potential precedent for other key areas where military and civilians in the field must act in concert.

S/CRS is also involved in Afghanistan-related training activities. For example, in 2007, S/CRS began working on integrated civilian-military training for PRTs deploying to Afghanistan. Key partners in this effort have been State, Embassy Kabul, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), USAID, Department of Agriculture, and the 189th Military Training Brigade. This training has followed the 9-month PRT military deployment cycle, and the fourth iteration is currently scheduled for June 2009 at Camp Atterbury, Indiana. In 2008-2009, the PRT training was expanded to include increased training for civilian personnel at the FSI, that compliments the full civilian-military training and can also be used for non-PRT personnel deploying to Afghanistan.

Conclusion

As proven in Afghanistan prior to September 2001, failed states and ungoverned territories create conditions where threats to our nation can and do emerge. The nature of these threats, their complexity and lethality are constantly evolving. Just as the Defense Department develops its capacity to meet these threats militarily across a range of complex scenarios, we must continue our intensive efforts on the civilian side to strengthen our capacity to lead going forward, particularly in missions where an early civilian effort may avoid military intervention entirely. We must continue the work of appropriately balancing the nation’s ability to undertake sustained, large-scale reconstruction and stabilization missions across all the entirety of the Executive Branch. Civilians must increase their capacity to effectively engage. This is true not only because most of the critical reconstruction and stabilization tasks are civilian in nature and require a civilian lead, but also due to the burden this places on our armed forces.

Building the U.S. civilian planning and operations capacity embodied in the Civilian Response Corps as funded under the Civilian Stabilization Initiative will ensure that we are able to deal with crises without having to invoke U.S. military power and to partner with the military when necessary for the challenges that lie ahead and. In the end, the effort we make – and the expenses we incur – to develop a strong, rapid U.S. civilian response capability will reduce the cost we ultimately pay, both in dollars and in lives, to manage the national security dangers arising from failed and destabilized states.

I am extremely proud of the work that the staff of S/CRS has accomplished with the ICMAG, with training for PRTs, for the elections, and to stand-up the Civilian Response Corps. And as time goes on and we are able to fully realize the Civilian Response Corps for Afghanistan and for other national security threats, I firmly believe that the U.S. will be stronger and the people of
the world safer from the threats of instability and the chaos of conflict and post-conflict. It is then that the revolution will be complete.

Thank you.

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Mr. Tierney. Well, thank you. Thank all of you for your testimony. I think it has been a good platform for us to start some questions on that.

I will begin the 5 minute questioning session, if I might.

One general question for each of you: Have you all brought in the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction into the planning stages on this? Has his office been brought in along with any other inspector generals so they know in advance exactly what it is you are planning so they can set up their structure to better oversee this throughout?

Mr. Bever, you addressed that a little bit in your remarks.

Mr. Jones, if I start left to right, can you give us any information you have on that?

Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Indeed, we meet frequently with General Field and his team, both in Washington and in the field; and I think he is completely aware of our civilian increase plans. I am personally not so familiar with how his team and ours have synched up on that, but his team is a growing presence in Kabul and in Afghanistan, and we are very supportive of that.

Mr. Tierney. Good thank you.

Mr. Sedney.

Mr. Sedney. Mr. Chairman, as I said, we are in support on this, so we have had direct contact with the Inspector General on this issue.

Mr. Tierney. Mr. Bever, you can reiterate what you said earlier, I suppose.

Mr. Bever. In terms of our own Inspector General for USAID, the Deputy Inspector General of the agency sits on our Afghan-Pakistan Task Force that meets every Friday morning at 10 a.m., sir. So he is there all the time, and we welcome his presence as our "in-house physician," if you will.

In Pakistan and Afghanistan, we look forward to our IG residing there as well, in presence. That is a good lesson learned from Iraq, sir, that concurrent audit are needed.

As for the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, we have met with General Fields and his staff three times here in Washington, had him meet our Acting Administrator, and our people in Kabul meet regularly with his staff.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you.

Mr. Michener.

Mr. Michener. Mr. Chairman, our planning for the increase in USDA personnel in Afghanistan is just now getting under way, so we have not yet been in touch to coordinate with the Special Inspector General. But we will be.

Mr. Tierney. You do intend to do that.

Mr. Michener. We do intend to do that.

Mr. Tierney. We appreciate that. Thank you.

Ambassador.

Mr. Herbst. We have been in touch with the Inspector General.

Mr. Tierney. Ambassador, while I have you for a second, do you have any numbers where you anticipate on moving through your program and out into the field on an annual basis now that you have some resources finally allocated to you? I know you are just
ramping up. Probably this year is when you first started going in the last couple of months. Do you have a plan of how many you expect to pass through the program and be available for deployment on a periodic basis?

Mr. HERBST. Yes. We anticipate that by the fall we will have over 150—actually, 250 members of the Civilian Response Corps not just hired but trained and equipped and ready to go. By the end of the first quarter of next year, by March 31st, we would expect all 600 of the CRC that we were building with the money we received last fall to be ready for deployment.

Beyond that, we received additional appropriations a couple of months ago. We would expect within by early or mid-2011 to have the 1,250 members that we are planning to put together with the money that has been appropriated thus far ready for deployment purposes.

Mr. TIERNEY. To the extent that we may be fortunate enough to not have all the active people deployed at any given time, is there a plan for utilization of their services other than in the field to keep them active?

Mr. HERBST. We anticipate they will train extensively even after they come back from missions. Part of what we have to do is not just find the right people with the right skills but to form them as teams depending upon circumstances. So creating those teams will be an important part of what we do even after folks deploy.

But it is also true they may be available for what I call conflict prevention, stabilization work before a country gets out of hand. There are, as I think you know, anywhere from 30 to 50 countries which are in the failed or failing state category. So, unfortunately, there is a great deal of work for people with these skills to do. So I expect they will be deployed quite regularly.

But it is also true, in order to keep our costs down, we are keeping the numbers of active component relatively small compared to the others, so that when we are passed these large engagements we don’t have lots of people sitting around.

Mr. TIERNEY. To scale down. Thank you.

Mr. Jones, can you give me a current estimation when it is you will fill all of the billets in the so-called surge? And when I say “fill,” I mean not with the Department of Defense people but with in-house USAID, State, Department of Justice or Ag people?

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Our team in Kabul identified a first tranche of 56 critical slots that they wanted filled in June and July. Some of those personnel are already arriving, particularly several from USAID. We have hired virtually all of them at this stage. There are a couple left that were still back and forth with our Embassy deciding on candidates, and they are all in training to go through training of various types, which is actually several weeks of training, the package that we give them. So we expect to have all 56 in place in that timeframe.

The balance of the 420 will deploy in phases throughout the next months, with the final ones arriving no later than March is our plan. We feel confident we can fulfill that plan, because, as I said, we have no hesitation to turning to the other streams of hiring if we find some difficulties.
Mr. Tierney. I have more questioning on that, but my time is up.

Mr. Flake, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Flake. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jones, is there a status of forces agreement in Afghanistan at the current time? That was a problem in Iraq. Contractors didn’t know if they were immune to charges or whatever else. What do we have to ensure that we won’t have those problems in Afghanistan?

Mr. Jones. I am sorry. Your question is the question of contractors?

Mr. Flake. Is there a status of forces agreement in place in Afghanistan at the current time that clarifies the role of civilian personnel, contractors?

Mr. Jones. Civilian personnel. I would have to take that question.

I don’t know, David, if you know the answer to that. I have some general ideas, but I don’t want to speak out of turn.

Mr. Flake. Anybody? Mr. Sedney.

Mr. Sedney. We do have an outstanding status of forces agreement that we signed with the Afghans. I will have to get back to you on the date. I think it was 2003.

Mr. Flake. If you could speak up just a little?

Mr. Sedney. We do have an outstanding status of forces agreement that we signed—which we agreed to with an exchange of diplomatic notes in 2004, I believe. But the status of civilians under that status of forces agreement I am not clear on, and we would have to get back to you.

Mr. Flake. If you could do that, that would be of interest.

Mr. Sedney. I certainly will.

Mr. Flake. Mr. Jones, what type of deployment are we talking about here? How long will these civilians be in theater?

Mr. Jones. The civilians that we are assigning, we took a policy decision that we are looking for the civilians to stay a minimum of 1 year. Some seek to extend, and that would be fine. But each one will be deployed for 1 year.

We actually call this a civilian increase because we don’t have a plan to decrease. So that is why we avoid the term “surge,” because it gives the impression this is just for a few months. Actually, we plan to continue this deployment and fill those slots after 1 year.

Mr. Flake. I am still a little unclear. Mr. Sedney, maybe you can clear it up in terms of where all of these civilians are going to come from. I know some are currently full time at USAID, will they simply be reassigned. Others, are we talking about contractors that will be hired in country that will make up some of this force?

Mr. Jones. Actually—thank you, Congressman Flake. Let me clarify that.

We have special hiring authorities at the Department of State and at USAID to hire U.S. direct-hire employees on a temporary basis. So we will use a mix of, in the case of U.S. Department of State, regular U.S. Foreign Service Officers plus individuals that have particular skills we are hiring temporarily. And we are advertising that on USA Jobs and hire them under what is called 3161 authority.
Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Michener, obviously, we see the need with regard to shifting economies. In Helmand Province where a lot of the work is going to be done, obviously, that is where a lot of the poppy production has moved to. What percentage of this 500 do you expect to be deployed in agriculture or as agriculture experts? I know you probably want more than you are going to get, but what do we expect? And from the others as well, the composition of this. How many are going to be legal affairs or democracy building, agriculture? Give me some sense, if you could, of how this breakdown is going to be.

Mr. MICHENER. I can speak to USDA’s portion of agricultural experts, which is roughly 10 percent of the number right now. But at the 421 number being floated, it is my understanding that is a living document that is being revisited. That number could increase, depending on need.

I also want to stress USDA is not the sole source of agricultural expertise. There would be USAID agricultural experts as well.

Mr. FLAKE. That is surprising. That is a little smaller than I thought it would be in terms of the agricultural experts.

Mr. Bever, do you want to comment?

Mr. BEVER. I just want to add we are entering into a partnership with the U.S. Department of Agriculture to make sure that both the public sector government functions of the agricultural sector are adequately covered along with the private sector business end of the equation and the infrastructure requirements as well.

We already have some agricultural officers in country. We will be adding at least another 16 or more specifically agricultural officers out of the 150. We also have breakouts for the numbers of engineers and the numbers of governance officers to work at local government levels and private sector officers, as well as what we call general development officers, who also can cover agriculture because they have had some background in that area.

As the situation evolves, we will bring even more on board if we find that is what is particularly required. We will concentrate in the south and east in this regard.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Foster, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FOSTER. Thank you.

Could any of you say something about the age distribution of the civilians being deployed for this effort? Is that easy to characterize one way or another? Are these a bunch of starry eyed kids coming out of college? Are they a bunch of retired people? Is there any easy way to characterize that?

Mr. TIERNEY. Where would you put yourself in that crowd?

Mr. FOSTER. I don’t know. I have retired from two careers so far. Thank you, Congressman.

If I could just begin with that, I have personally reviewed all of the resumes of those we are hiring in this first tranche, and I didn’t really focus on age. But the experience was quite remarkable. I think in fact in this first tranche virtually all of the candidates, at least that are being hired by the State Department through this temporary hiring authority or Foreign Service Officers, were already well-known to our Embassy colleagues in Kabul because they had been in Afghanistan before in some capacity.
A couple of—and really a range of different backgrounds and experience, from former military, some former academics who had clearly done research in Afghanistan before—and then people who had been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. So I doubt any were young, and certainly all were very experienced.

Mr. Foster. How does the size and scope of this effort compare to what NGO's might be attempting in the area? Are NGO's viewed as a force multiplier or an annoyance by the people that are having to deal with them? And are we doing everything we can to make maximum use of them?

Mr. Bever. Sir, I can just respond to that, and I can also follow on Mr. Jones' comments about the caliber of people we are bringing on board.

They are very carefully scrutinized. We have a very careful selection process by teams of people at USAID headquarters and the mission who look at who these people are and check their references.

They are generally quite seasoned people. Even if they are retired, they might still be a little starry eyed, but they are not wet behind the ears. Most of them are what we would call battle-hardened, meaning they have worked in civil strife settings or country development settings in their own profession.

In terms of NGO's, we see a great opportunity to increase and deepen and expand our involvement with nongovernmental organizations. There is a caution there. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan, there is a caution in hitting the right balance. Because both of the host governments are concerned about how much attention we strengthen the government functions at all levels as well as the nongovernment functions. So getting that balance right is going to be a matter of dialog.

But the NGO's, Pakistan, and Afghanistan NGO's are certainly very active already and certainly willing to step up to the plate. We have to check to make sure they are accountable and that they use the money which is given as gifts to them of our people's money in the way they are intended to be used.

But with that, they have the access on the ground that is needed and the insight, so we will use them even more.

Mr. Foster. Do you share any of your support or training with the NGO personnel?

Mr. Bever. When a grantee asks for it or we think it is appropriate, we will provide them certain kinds of training, particularly if they are here on the U.S. side and haven't had experience inside Afghanistan or Pakistan.

But in terms of inside the country for local NGO groups, we often will have our controllers or contract officers or technical people as part of the grant strengthen their ability to function effectively. So not only do they help us get the work done, but they are stronger as a result of it a few years later.

Mr. Foster. Are there Blackwater-type private security contractors used anywhere in this effort?

Mr. Jones. There are private security companies in Afghanistan, and it is a subject of considerable scrutiny both from our government and the government of Afghanistan. We would love to not
have to rely on private security companies, but we really don't have that option in some of the areas where we have to work.

What we are looking to do, as I indicated in consultation with General Petraeus, is to work as closely as we can with our military to secure the civilians or the areas in which the civilians are working in order to minimize any reliance we have to have on private security contracts.

Mr. Foster. Do you have any feeling for the percentage of the military support that you get that comes from private contractors versus actual armed services personnel?

Mr. Jones. For the percentage, I am sorry——

Mr. Foster. You said in some areas there was not an alternative. But what is the overall effort? Is it 50 percent supported by private contractors? Or 10 percent? Do you have any idea——

Mr. Jones. I am not sure I can put a percentage down. It is very small in the field. For a couple of very specific projects we hire private security because our military forces are not in that region where we have to have people. But it is minimal in the field.

In Kabul, where our military is not deployed in the same manner, we have more reliance on private security contracts. But, as I say, our goal is to minimize that.

Mr. Foster. And then for actual construction projects, are there private contractors involved in that?

Mr. Jones. For construction of——

Mr. Foster. When you are, I don't know, actually building something specific, is that typically done through a private contractor, or how is that sort of stuff handled?

Mr. Bever. On the construction work and buildings and so on, both State and USAID use private construction companies, both United States and local, and third countries, sometimes, as subcontractors when there is international competitive bidding.

In the case of security subcontractors for the assistance program, some of our U.S. firms and their subcontractors and, in certain cases, even our NGO's, USPVO's have in the past or currently do use some security people in order to keep them safe, both statically and when they are on the move.

This is particularly important in the infrastructure area, which is where we've had the most of our casualties, particularly in Afghanistan, but even in Pakistan with CHF and the murder of Stephen Vance and his driver. Some of our entities in Pakistan that work under the assistance program are beginning to meet with our Diplomatic Security colleagues and us to figure out what kind of potential protection they might need as situations warrant.

Thank you.

Mr. Foster. Thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you.

With unanimous consent, we would like to offer Mr. Quigley the opportunity to ask some questions. He is looking to be on the committee; the House just hasn't acted yet.

Sir, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. Quigley. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the panel.
Specifically, as it relates to the security of the civilians—and you have started to touch on this—but with an increase in civilians, there is an increase in risk and exposure. What is the general plan as you enter this next phase for protecting these civilians, as, you might say, a whole new ball game here? And how does it change our plans with private security?

Mr. JONES. The civilians in the field, deployed in the field, will be deploying out of—they will be based on military platforms either in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams or the district support teams.

What we have discussed—and there has been great receptivity from our CENTCOM and our U.S. forces components—is prioritizing civilian-led missions. That is, where the civilians—at each of these military platforms, there will be one designated senior civilian who will integrate directly with the commander and propose, prioritize missions that they need to do to get their job done, to get out and meet with local officials and travel in the region.

And there is great receptivity for our military counterparts in prioritize in providing security. So that is our priority, to take that approach, to rely on the cooperation of our U.S. military and not to be hiring private security.

Mr. QUIGLEY. So these additional civilians will be in military platforms, and you don’t imagine having to hire additional private security at all?

Mr. JONES. That is our intention, that is right. Now, as for the civilians, there is also a civilian increase at our Embassy in Kabul, which will obviously be provided security by our Diplomatic Security and our own security personnel.

Mr. QUIGLEY. I yield back.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you want to add something to that?

Mr. SEDNEY. If I could add, on the issue of security contractors, the Department of Defense does employ security contractors for some functions in Afghanistan, as it does in Iraq. Currently, according to the first quarter 2009 census, the Department of Defense has 3,651 host-country nationals. In other words, these are Afghans who DOD or DOD contractors or DOD subcontractors hire to provide security for various contracts that the Department of Defense carries out.

There are also 23 third-country nationals and 15 U.S. coalition nationals who are employed by the Department of Defense as security contractors in Afghanistan.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, we probably don’t have to go into great detail about the testimony that we have had on this subcommittee and the full committee about some pretty questionable activity and conduct of some of our paid private contractors, particularly in the security area. There were a number of hearings and, I think, a number of reports done. We have to really make a determination of what is inherently governmental and what isn’t.

So are there any plans that either Mr. Sedney or Mr. Jones are aware of to increase the amount of security in the State Department, their own security personnel—there is a division that you have for that—or Marines or other military personnel so that, at some point in the not-too-distant future, we will have all of those
inherently governmental security aspects done by people on the U.S. payroll? Or is there nothing happening in that area?

Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A significant portion of the increase from the State Department side in Kabul is actually an increase in security personnel. I don’t have the number right in front of me, but that is a significant focus, in order to help our people get out without reliance on other security.

Mr. Tierney. In-house security people?

Mr. Jones. Yes, in-house security.

Mr. Tierney. OK.

Mr. Sedney.

Mr. Sedney. At the current time, I am not aware of any plans to add additional security contractors for the purpose of enabling the civilians out into the field.

Mr. Tierney. I guess my question was not hiring more civilian contractors, but hiring fewer of them. We have people stationed all over the world here; we have a thousand military bases around the world. It seems striking to me that we can’t have enough trained Marines and military people to take over that responsibility so that we are dealing with the Afghan population on our terms.

As General Petraeus has said, you know, it makes a lot more sense to have the sensitivity of our personnel in there doing it, as opposed to a hired gun whose job is just to get people from A to B and, they are not overly concerned about how they did it.

Mr. Sedney. I am familiar that there has been a long series of exchanges about this. The point I would make about the numbers that I mentioned is these are Afghan nationals who are security contractors for those who are providing primarily for contractors, subcontractors, and sub-subcontractors of the Department of Defense.

So they are not involved in the security surge, and I don’t know of any plans for the security surge to have an increase in those amounts. But I will go back and check, taking acknowledgement of your concern, sir.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you.

Mr. Jones, are you the person that is in charge of this thing writ large? I mean, are you the one that is going to know how many United States and allied civilians are out there, how they are coordinating their activity, who is doing what, how many people are stationed with PRTs or other provincial district places, monitoring the progress of this, monitoring how Ambassador Herbst is doing, putting people through the pipeline, whether you are going to meet the goals and the numbers that you need or look elsewhere? Is that your job?

Mr. Jones. Well, let me—with a lot of help, say yes. But if I could just describe a little bit about the structure.

Our Deputy Secretary of State, Jack Lew, is personally engaged on this issue and has told us that any bottlenecks, any trouble that we have in filling these positions go directly to him for his adjudication, to make sure that they are opened up. And he is in direct contact frequently with Under Secretary Michele Flournoy and other senior members of the administration. So we have that element.
Another element that is very important is at our Embassy in Kabul, we have, as I mentioned, four Ambassadors. One Ambassador, Tony Wayne, will be arriving shortly. He is responsible for ensuring all of our interagency assistance is coordinated, especially out in the field.

And then Ambassador Joe Mussomeli is responsible for ensuring our interagency management is coordinated and making sure that the flow of these people is coherent and demand-driven out to the field and that they are supplied, as well.

Mr. TIERNEY. So it is Mr. Lew, then you, and then those four fellows that you were just talking about.

Mr. JONES. We have a whole team, actually, sir. There are a lot more of us.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, no, but I am just saying, basically, this committee will want to know who to come back to. We don’t want to drag everybody back in if we don’t have to, but we want to go right to the source of people who know the answers on this and be responsible for it. So I am looking at the right office right here?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you on that.

Mr. Bever, one of the questions we keep having in some of the more delicate areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well, is we put more resources in, sizable amounts of money for redevelopment and construction. On that basis, how are we going to be accountable for that money? In a lot of those areas, we can’t really safely send in some of our civilians to do that kind of accountability work, to assess how the progress is going and whether the work is actually being completed or not. What are your plans in some of those areas?

Mr. BEVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is an excellent question, and it is a continuing challenge for us—I want to be straight with you on this—especially in those highly dangerous areas.

As we increase the number of our direct-hire officers and as we get the assistance we need from either our Diplomatic Security RSO, regional security officer, at post, and/or from the U.S. military in the case of Afghanistan, also to be able to get our people out, we will have more of our officers out there to sort of kick the tires and make sure things are going right.

But we also have, in both places, independent monitors. We hire other firms and other groups to keep eyes and ears and brains——

Mr. TIERNEY. So, contractors?

Mr. BEVER. Either contractors or sometimes their cooperative agreement grantee partners, who have the ability to move around the area without attracting attention.

Mr. TIERNEY. And how do you assess their reliability and their honesty in that situation?

Mr. BEVER. Pretty high. Not completely, 100 percent foolproof. Sometimes they miss things, either because of the timing of when they have done a visit on a construction project or something or other phenomena like that in very hard-to-reach places.

We also use our foreign service nationals, which are an extremely valuable asset to our American people in these countries.

Mr. TIERNEY. But even there—I mean, I really respect the difficulty you are having here. We were in Pakistan, and even some
of the foreign nationals have a difficult time getting up into the areas that we are doing this work.

Mr. BEVER. Right. Right.

Mr. TIERNEY. So is there a backup plan on that?

Mr. BEVER. Well, we also invite concurrent audit by our inspector general, who then in turn hires local auditing firms, who in turn use Pashtuns, for example, to get up into the areas. But in the case of FATA, Northwest Frontier, you have to be from those areas to be credible and to be able to get around safely.

So it is a challenge. We keep working at it. In the case of Afghanistan, we have certain other means which we also like to employ. For example, when U.S. military travels around, we sometimes ask them to give us feedback, especially if it is in a combat area, to give us feedback on how things are going. We don’t have those capabilities, of course, in Pakistan.

But we are very mindful of this, sir. And we are looking for technological assets which could help us, as well.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Flake, do you have any additional questions?

Mr. FLAKE. Just a few.

Ambassador Herbst, the PRTs, many of them are obviously run by our NATO allies. They have different rules of engagement, mission limitations. How are we going to—and I know, from previous testimony and from visits that many of us have taken in the area, there isn’t very good coordination. There is a striking lack of coordination, it seems.

How is that going to change? What will this do, having a lot more civilians there, what will it do to change the dynamic that we have seen, where it is difficult to mesh our efforts with theirs?

And would you agree with that assessment, by the way?

Mr. HERBST. I am not sure that I am the right person to answer your question, because, while we are doing things in the field in Afghanistan, and we believe coordination is very important, and we have also had some contact, a little bit of contact, with other PRTs, we don't have any formal responsibility for it. I don't know if one of our other panelists would want to take a crack at that question.

Mr. FLAKE. Would someone else on the panel like to answer that?

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Congressman Flake.

Obviously, coordination is a major challenge, and particularly when we are dealing with multiple countries in multiple different, sort of, structures and models of field presence, Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

Two things. Let me—one, we have begun in Kabul fairly recently, over the last several weeks, an interaction hosted by the United Nations to coordinate better the civilian deployments outside of Kabul, and particularly focused, as a point of entry, the Afghan Government’s request for 650 technical advisors from the international and Afghan community. That was a good entry point for us to open up that discussion and have it take place much more frankly. And with our increased capacity in Kabul, we think we will be better able to coordinate those discussions there.

I also want to point out, in the very important area in RC South, the coordination actually has been better than elsewhere in the
country and has been planned and coordinated from the beginning. And that is where a lot of our new forces will be flowing into. We are very actively engaged with the Canadians, for example—the Canadians have coordination conferences here that we attend—in order to make sure that we are linked up. What we want to move to is areas where we actually train together in greater quantities than we do now.

But there are—you know, you identify an important issue. We are at work on it. It is getting a little better, and it is particularly more effective in the south, where we are very focused.

Mr. Flake. OK, thanks.

One additional question. Mr. Sedney, is there any type of—I know it is different depending on which province you are in or the area, but how much more of a burden is this going to place on our military there?

I know with PRTs and depending on the area they are in, it requires a lot, in terms of escorts, in terms of simply being able to carry out their activities, to have the type of military backup that is often required.

Is there any kind of formula that we have that each new civilian will require this much? Should we worry about that? And is the increase in our military presence going to account for that?

First, is there any kind of formula that we know of?

Mr. Sedney. Congressman Flake, I don't know of any formula, but I will check and make sure, because I don't know everything.

Mr. Flake. I know it will be rough.

Mr. Sedney. But my understanding is that the planning for the integration of civilians into the military effort is done based on the situation in the area. So it is different whether it is in a less or more permissive environment. And in Afghanistan, from, say, the Panjshir province in the north down to the provinces in the south, situations are very different.

In terms of will it put additional stress on the force, yes, it will, but it is a stress that we welcome, because in order to carry out the effective counterinsurgency effort, we know we need this joint civil-military effort.

We have right now ongoing, as a result of the President’s new strategy, a combined civil-military planning effort going on out in Kabul between Ambassador Eikenberry and General McKiernan. It is a very intense look at how we integrate the civilians and the military and to do that effectively.

And I would add, along with what my colleague Mr. Bever said, this is going to be a dynamic process where we are going to continue to be evaluating that. Once the field has developed the integrated civil-military plan, I think we will be in a better position to answer your questions about the factors that go into the decisions to deploy civilians in particular areas.

Mr. Flake. Thank you.

Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Flake.

Let me leave you with one question for homework, if I might. I think probably we don’t want to bring you back after votes, so we don’t want to make you come back on that. But I think it is something that will be helpful to this committee.
President Karzai has recently complained about the current model of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. He basically thinks that they are inadvertently forming parallel provincial governments, and he has great concern about bleeding off of the impact of the central government.

The former State Department counternarcotics advisor, Ambassador Tom Schweich, has also echoed those sentiments. He called on the United States to replace the PRT model with a model focused on decentralized developmental councils.

Now, my question would be, how could we reform the PRT model—or should we reform it? If we should, how should we, to make each team more responsive to the central government but, at the same time, making them responsive, as they should be, to the local government, and doing all of that without risking any corruption in the PRT system?

So I will leave that to each of you gentlemen, if you will think on that. We can supply it to you in writing, as well, on that and ask that you get back to us on that to see if we are planning to do anything. It could be the simple answer, you think everything is fine the way it is. Or you could put some merit to those objectives that are being raised and how we ought to address those.

I want to thank all of you for your valuable testimony here today. It really is helpful to us in our oversight responsibilities. We will be working with the inspectors general and your offices in the future on this. Obviously, everybody wants this to be a successful effort, and we wish you well in your jobs and your responsibilities.

And, again, the three gentlemen that were working with USAID that we were introduced to earlier, again, we want to thank you for your service and hope you take it back to your colleagues in the field how much their work is respected and appreciated.

Thank you. Meeting adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:19 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]