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                        REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL
                      AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
                             HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PLAN

    =======================================================================

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                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 26, 2010

                                   __________

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                      COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

                     HON. BART GORDON, Tennessee, Chairman
    JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois          RALPH M. HALL, Texas
    EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas         F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER JR.,
    LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California              Wisconsin
    DAVID WU, Oregon                     LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas
    BRIAN BAIRD, Washington              DANA ROHRABACHER, California
    BRAD MILLER, North Carolina          ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
    DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois            VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan
    GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona          FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma
    DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland           JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois
    MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio                W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
    BEN R. LUJAN, New Mexico             RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas
    PAUL D. TONKO, New York              BOB INGLIS, South Carolina
    STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey        MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas
    JIM MATHESON, Utah                   MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida
    LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee             BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California
    BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky               ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska
    RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri              PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia
    BARON P. HILL, Indiana               PETE OLSON, Texas
    HARRY E. MITCHELL, Arizona
    CHARLES A. WILSON, Ohio
    KATHLEEN DAHLKEMPER, Pennsylvania
    ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    SUZANNE M. KOSMAS, Florida
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    VACANCY

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  May 26, 2010

                                                                       Page
    Hearing Charter..................................................     2

                               Opening Statements

    Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Chairman, Committee on
      Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives..........    27
        Written Statement............................................    29

    Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Minority Ranking
      Member, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
      Representatives................................................    39
        Written Statement............................................    41

    Prepared Statement by Representative Gabrielle Giffords, Member,
      Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
      Representatives................................................    53

    Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member,
      Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
      Representatives................................................    54

                                    Panel I:

    Mr. Charles F. Bolden, Jr., Administrator, National Aeronautics
      and Space Administration
        Oral Statement...............................................    42
        Written Statement............................................    45
        Biography....................................................    52

    Discussion
      Feasibility of New Budget......................................    55
      Funding a Crew Rescue Vehicle..................................    56
      Glenn Research Center..........................................    58
      Maintaining the International Space Station....................    59
      The Search for Extra-Terrestrial Life..........................    60
      Fixing Constellation...........................................    61
      Solid Rocket Industry and Workforce............................    62
      Savings From Ares Cancellation.................................    62
      Cost of a Crew Rescue Vehicle..................................    63
      Continuing Work on Constellation...............................    64
      Presidential Visit to the Johnson Space Center.................    66
      NASA's Primary Mission.........................................    67
      Space Communications Networks Service Contract.................    68
      Space Tourism..................................................    68
      Modifying Constellation........................................    69
      Termination Liability..........................................    70
      Abdicating Leadership in Space.................................    71
      Safety Regulations for Commercial Spaceflight..................    71
      Promoting STEM Fields Through NASA.............................    73
      Asteroid Mission...............................................    74
      Timeline for Human Rated Commercial Launch Vehicles............    75
      Constellation Variations.......................................    76
      Potential Commercial Crew Providers............................    76
      Infrastructure Costs...........................................    76
      Extending the Shuttle Program..................................    77
      Maintaining Space Workforce....................................    78
      Safety Record of Commercial Providers..........................    79
      Timeline for Commercial Access to LEO..........................    79
      Ceding U.S. Preeminence........................................    81
      Constellation Program Director Reassignment....................    81
      Benefits of New Budget.........................................    82
      Termination Liability..........................................    82
      Cost Estimates for Ares Program................................    84

                                   Panel II:

    Mr. Neil Armstrong, Commander, Apollo 11
        Oral Statement...............................................    85
        Written Statement............................................    87

    Captain Eugene A. Cernan, USN (Ret.), Commander, Apollo 17
        Oral Statement...............................................    89
        Written Statement............................................    92

    Mr. A. Thomas Young, Lockheed Martin (Ret.)
        Oral Statement...............................................    96
        Written Statement............................................    98

    Discussion
      Durability of Private Sector Approach..........................   100
      Return to the Moon.............................................   102
      Constellation Lite.............................................   102
      Space Shuttle Extension........................................   103
      NASA Priorities................................................   104
      NASA Technical Capacity........................................   105
      Value of Return to Moon........................................   108
      Workforce Morale...............................................   109
      Viability of the President's Plan..............................   111
      Impact of the Augustine Report.................................   111
      Maintaining American Leadership in Space.......................   112
      Investing in Engine Development................................   113
      More on Maintaining American Leadership in Space...............   114
      Impact on National Security....................................   115
      Astronaut Safety Concerns......................................   116
      Technical Share of the Constellation Program...................   118

     REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
                             HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PLAN

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MAY 26, 2010

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Science and Technology,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in Room
    2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bart Gordon
    [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
                                hearing charter

                      COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

                         U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        Review of the Proposed National

                      Aeronautics and Space Administration

                             Human Spaceflight Plan

                                  may 26, 2010
                                10 a.m.-12 p.m.

                       2318 rayburn house office building

    I. Purpose

        On May 26, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. the Committee on Science and
    Technology will hold a hearing on the proposed National Aeronautics and
    Space Administration (NASA) Human Spaceflight Plan. The purpose of the
    hearing is to continue the examination of the proposed NASA human
    spaceflight plan and to review issues related to the budget, cost,
    schedule and potential impacts of the plan.
        The hearing will 1) examine the administration's proposed goals,
    strategies and plans for NASA's human spaceflight and exploration
    programs, including the revisions announced by the president on April
    15, 2010; 2) the assumptions, basis, feasibility and sustainability of
    those plans within the FY 2011 budget plan and outyear funding plan; 3)
    the key challenges and risks involved in implementing the proposed
    change of course for NASA; and 4) what outstanding questions and issues
    need to be addressed, and what information is needed as Congress
    considers the proposed future direction for NASA's human spaceflight
    and exploration programs.

    II. Scheduled Witnesses

    Panel I:

    Mr. Charles F. Bolden, Jr.
    Administrator
    National Aeronautics and Space Administration

    Panel II:

    Mr. Neil A. Armstrong
    Commander, Apollo 11

    Captain Eugene A. Cernan,
    USN (ret.) Commander, Apollo 17

    Mr. A. Thomas Young
    Lockheed Martin (ret.)

        Dr. John P. Holdren, Director of the Office of Science and
    Technology Policy, was invited to testify by the Committee but was
    unavailable due to another commitment.

    III. Background and Issues

    Background
        Congress has been presented with the administration's proposal to
    make drastic changes to the United States human spaceflight and
    exploration program that has been authorized and funded by successive
    Congresses since 2005. Key components of the new plan presented by the
    president in February and later modified in the president's April 15th
    speech at the Kennedy Space Center include the following:

              The International Space Station (ISS) will be
            extended at least through 2020;

              An ISS crew rescue vehicle (potentially but not
            necessarily based on the Orion crew exploration vehicle design)
            will be developed and flying ``within the next few years'';

              There will be a human mission to an asteroid by 2025;

              Astronauts will orbit Mars by the mid-2030s;

              By 2015, NASA will have either finalized the design
            of a Heavy Lift Vehicle (HLV) and be ready to start building
            [per the president's April 15th speech], have done some design
            work on an HLV concept [per the OSTP Director's public
            statements], or have ``defined'' a Heavy Lift architecture [per
            NASA statements to staff]; NASA will also have either developed
            or started development of a new liquid hydrocarbon engine and
            have carried out fundamental research on heavy lift propulsion,
            and will have done all of the above for $3.1 billion over the
            five-year period;

              NASA will support/fund the development of multiple
            [3-4, according to NASA] commercial crew transport services by
            2016 at a total cost to NASA of $6 billion; and

              NASA will invest $7.8 billion in Flagship Technology
            Demonstrations, $3 billion in Robotic Precursor mission, and
            $4.9 billion on Space Technology over the next few years.

        Mr. Norman Augustine, who chaired last year's Review of U.S. Human
    Spaceflight Plans Committee, has testified that the administration's
    proposed plan is closest to his panel's Option 5B--one of the
    ``flexible path'' options. According to the Augustine committee report,
    Option 5B ``employs an EELV-heritage commercial heavy-lift launcher and
    assumes a different (and significantly reduced) role for NASA . . .
    [and] would also entail substantial reductions in the NASA workforce
    and closure of facilities to obtain the expected cost reductions.''
        In announcing its proposals, the administration indicated that a
    new human spaceflight plan was needed because the exploration program
    of record was ``unexecutable'' under the projected budgets.
        In the four months since the administration's proposed plan was
    announced, a number of significant issues have been raised that still
    have not been satisfactorily addressed by administration witnesses. A
    number of those issues are discussed in the following section.

    Issues

    1.  No credible basis has been provided to date to support the claim
    that NASA can successfully execute the proposed plan within the FY 2011
    and assumed outyear budget profile.

        One of the most significant findings of last year's Augustine
    committee was that ``Human exploration beyond low Earth orbit is not
    viable under the FY 2010 budget guideline.'' Following the same
    methodology used by the Aerospace Corporation, staff of the Science and
    Technology Committee analyzed the FY 2011 budget request using the same
    budget categories used in the Aerospace analysis for the Augustine
    committee, namely, Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS),
    Exploration, Kennedy Space Center (KSC) modernization, and exploration-
    related technology. The staff analysis determined that the funding
    available for human spaceflight/exploration technology in the proposed
    FY 2011 budget plan is essentially the same as was available in the
    ``not viable'' FY 2010 budget guidance over the years FY 2010-2015. In
    addition, if one compares the FY 2011 budget plan and outyear funding
    profile with that of the Augustine committee's ``Less Constrained''
    budget, it turns out the budget for the administration's proposed plan
    through 2025 [the date of the asteroid mission] is $47 billion lower
    than the amount the Augustine committee determined would be needed to
    make any of its exploration options viable over that same period.
    Figure 1 below illustrates the mismatch between the Augustine
    committee's budget and both the ``not viable'' FY 2010 budget guidance
    and the proposed FY 2011 budget plan. [A spreadsheet comparing the
    various budgets is included in Appendix A].

        The addition of an ISS crew rescue development program without a
    corresponding increase in the NASA budget would appear to further
    weaken the credibility of any assertion that the proposed plan is
    executable. In staff briefings, NASA personnel indicated that a
    preliminary estimate of the cost of developing a crew rescue vehicle is
    on the order of $5-7 billion. Since the administration has stated the
    goal of flying the crew rescue vehicle ``within the next few years,''
    it is reasonable to assume that several years of operations would also
    have to be budgeted for within the FY 2011-FY 2015 budget. Given the
    likely need to procure and fly two vehicles per year to the ISS, each
    on an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), the annual operating
    cost could be estimated at $1+ billion. Thus, the total cost over the
    five year period of the crew rescue vehicle development/operations
    program could approach $10 billion. That is equivalent to a $1-2
    billion per year unfunded lien on the NASA budget. To put that
    shortfall into context, if one zeroed the FY 2011 funding for the
    Exploration Technology Demonstrations program, the Robotic Precursor
    program, and the KSC 21st Century Space Launch Complex initiative, it
    would only cover $1.2 billion of the potential shortfall. To cover a $2
    billion shortfall, one would also have to eliminate the increased
    funding for Earth Science, Aeronautics, and Space Technology. To date,
    NASA has not identified the planned offsets for the cost of the crew
    rescue vehicle.

    2.  Lack of credible analysis or data and ensuing uncertainties
    contribute to increased risk of higher costs and longer delays than
    estimated and increased risk of unavailability of services.

        One of the central elements of the administration's plan is a
    proposal to rely on as-yet-to-be-developed ``commercial crew''
    transport services to low Earth orbit and the ISS.
        The administration's plan assumes that it will support the
    development and demonstration of up to 3-4 commercial crew systems at a
    cost of $6 billion over the five-year period FY 2011-2015. [That
    funding is in addition to funding for launch infrastructure to
    facilitate commercial launches that is proposed as part of the ``21st
    Century Space Launch Complex'' initiative.] However, the basis of the
    $6 billion estimate has not been provided to Congress, despite repeated
    requests. In addition, the administration has been unable to provide
    the percentage of private sector cost sharing assumed in its $6 billion
    budget estimate. There are several grounds for questioning the
    credibility of the administration's estimate. The Aerospace
    Corporation, in its response to questions submitted by Space and
    Aeronautics Subcommittee Chairwoman Giffords, provided its independent
    analysis of the range of potential costs to develop a single crewed
    capsule/launch abort system of varying degrees of complexity/crew-
    carrying capacity. A chart provided by Aerospace that summarizes the
    analysis is included in Appendix A. For the presently envisioned 2-4
    passenger commercial crew vehicles, the Aerospace analysis would
    suggest that the burden of proof needs to be put on the administration
    to demonstrate why the cost to the government has not been
    underestimated by at least a factor of two or more, even accounting for
    benefits to be accrued by following as yet unspecified ``commercial
    practices'' while still ensuring safety standards are met. The $6
    billion estimate is further called into question by NASA's preliminary
    estimate of the cost to develop a single ``simple'' crew rescue
    vehicle, with the crew rescue vehicle development cost estimate being
    essentially the same as what the administration estimates could fund
    the development of up to 3-4 different commercial crew transport
    vehicles with launch abort systems.
        In its report, the Augustine committee concluded that: ``While
    there are many potential benefits of commercial services that transport
    crew to low Earth orbit, there are simply too many risks at the present
    time not to have a viable fallback option for risk mitigation.''
    However, the administration's proposed plan does not include any
    government backup option. In the absence of a government alternative,
    NASA would presumably have no choice but to cover any increased cost if
    it is to preserve its access to the low Earth orbit. Administrator
    Bolden, in testimony before Congress said ``I have to look at the
    possibility that the commercial sector may have difficulty, and we will
    do everything in my power to facilitate their success.''
        In the absence of a significant non-NASA, truly commercial market,
    NASA would have to assume responsibility for ensuring the continued
    viability of at least two commercial companies [unless the government
    is willing to accept the existence of a commercial monopoly determining
    its crewed access to space]. However the existence of any significant
    non-NASA market has not been independently validated. Given that, it is
    instructive to note that at a recent Federal Aviation Administration
    Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee meeting,
    Administrator Bolden noted that destinations other than the ISS would
    be needed for the commercial providers in order to keep ISS commercial
    crew costs down, and that NASA might have to invest in creating them:
    `` `We need a destination in low Earth orbit to which we can go',
    Bolden said `So that means that NASA and the commercial enterprises
    need to partner, maybe with DoD, maybe with the intelligence community.
    I don't know who. But we need to partner with a lot of people to
    develop a second orbital network of structures or something that act as
    a destination for people who want to make this commercial industry
    viable.' '' [Aerospace Daily, 5/20/10]. In addition, in an
    aviationweek.com article dated May 21, 2010, it was stated that
    ``company reps agreed that even with a second destination . . . it will
    be hard to sustain a commercial market with the two annual ISS flights
    envisioned. `A market like that is probably not enough to sustain
    competition,' says George Sowers, vice president for business
    development at ULA [United Launch Alliance]. It could sustain two
    providers, if NASA's willing to pay extra to have two. It's kind of
    like EELV all over again.' ''
        Thus, if one accepts the administration's assumption that
    commercial crew providers can be ready to provide operational crew
    transfer services to the ISS in 2016--a schedule estimate that has not
    been independently validated and was made without even first having
    determined what acquisition approach will be followed--all the would-be
    commercial providers can assume in terms of a NASA market is that they
    may split a total of 10 trips to the ISS before the end of the planned
    extension of the ISS in 2020. It is reasonable to assume that in the
    absence of other markets, those providers will expect NASA to assume
    the great majority of the risk and cost--whatever that cost might turn
    out to be.

    3.  Lack of detail and continued changes call into question the
    stability and sustainability of the proposed plan

        A series of changes to the proposed plan raises questions about the
    stability of the plan and whether further changes will be forthcoming.
    The budget justification was provided to Congress one month after the
    FY 2011 budget release; few details were provided to support the
    magnitude of the changes being proposed.
        On April 15, 2010, the president announced changes to the plan-a
    major one being the addition of a crew rescue vehicle to the human
    spaceflight portfolio-and one that represents a significant new
    requirement being levied on the FY 2011 NASA budget guideline. There
    were no details on what the change would entail, how it would be
    funded, and what the impact to other programs would be. In that same
    speech, the president announced that he was committed to ``finalizing a
    [heavy lift] rocket design no later than 2015 and then begin to build
    it.'' Yet, in subsequent discussions with NASA, Committee staff were
    told that primary emphasis was on the development of an engine for the
    first stage of a heavy launch vehicle and just the ``definition of a
    heavy lift architecture'' by 2015. Finally, the president added an
    explicit goal of carrying out the first human mission to a near-Earth
    asteroid by 2025.
        With respect to the crew rescue vehicle program, Administrator
    Bolden said in his prepared statement for the April 22, 2010 hearing by
    Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and
    Related Agencies: ``Accommodating this effort within NASA's budget will
    change the amounts requested for the programs described below
    [technology development and demonstrations; heavy-lift and propulsion
    research and development; robotic exploration precursor]. An update to
    the NASA FY 2011 budget justification will be provided as soon as
    possible, but in the next few weeks.''
        On May 12, 2010, Administrator Bolden testified at a Senate
    Commerce, Science, and Transportation hearing that ``NASA expects to
    submit a revised FY 2011 budget request to Congress in the near future
    that will identify funding requirements for the restructured Orion crew
    capsule''.
        Given the number and significance of the changes being made to the
    initial proposed plan, the lack of details on the scope of programs and
    how they might change to support the addition of a crew rescue vehicle,
    the variations in the administration's description of how heavy lift
    development will proceed, and the lack of an updated budget request
    that reflects the changes, it may be difficult for Congress to have
    confidence in the stability of the plan that it is being asked to
    support.

    4.  Proposed long-term exploration strategy lacks clarity and
    consistency

        The Constellation Program was designed and congressionally-
    authorized with a stepping-stone approach in mind ``to ensure that
    activities in its lunar exploration program shall be designed and
    implemented in a manner that gives strong consideration to how those
    activities might also help meet the requirements offuture activities
    beyond the Moon'' and a range of future destinations ``to expand human
    and robotic presence into the solar system, including the exploration
    and utilization of the Moon, near Earth asteroids, Lagrangian points,
    and eventually Mars and its moons.'' [P.L. 110-422]
        However, in presenting his proposed new plan on April 15th, the
    president stated that with respect to the Moon, ``the simple fact is,
    we have been there before. There is a lot more of space to explore . .
    ..'' He announced that the U.S. would send humans to an asteroid by
    2025, followed by a human mission to orbit Mars by the mid 2030s.
        Subsequent to that announcement, NASA continues to include the Moon
    as a destination but with no timetable, indicating a lunar landing
    would not occur until some time after the asteroid mission.
    Administrator Bolden's May 12 prepared statement for the Senate
    Commerce Committee noted that ``under the new plan, we will . . . build
    a technological foundation for sustainable, beyond-LEO exploration,
    with more capable expeditions in lunar space, and human missions to
    near-Earth asteroids, the Moon, Lagrangian points, and, ultimately,
    Mars.'' In addition, Administrator Bolden's prepared statement for the
    May 12 Senate hearing noted that the Exploration Robotic Precursors
    program would involve ``a lunar lander by 2015'' and the Enabling
    Technology Development and Demonstration program would involve
    activities ``that will lead to ground and flight demonstrations in
    lunar volatiles.'' It is not clear whether the Moon is or is not a
    significant part of the exploration strategy, and if so, what the
    purpose of lunar exploration would be under the president's plan. If
    the Moon is not a near-term part of the exploration strategy, it is not
    apparent why programs to send landers to the Moon and demonstrations in
    lunar volatiles would be needed within the next five years.
        Without a consistent outline of the logical progression for deep
    space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit authorized in law, how the
    knowledge from each mission would build on one another, and when a
    heavy-lift vehicle and crew capsule would be available to support deep
    space exploration, it is difficult for Congress to have a clear
    understanding of the plan it is being asked to support.

    Implications for Congressional Consideration of the FY 2011 NASA Budget
            Request
        Given the drastic changes being proposed by the administration,
    including cancellation of the current Constellation Program, the burden
    of proof has to rest with the administration to first demonstrate that
    its proposed plan is executable. That burden of proof includes
    providing compelling evidence that:

            1)  The proposed plan is executable within projected budgets;

            2)  The elements of the plan are sufficiently well defined and
            analyzed such that the risks of higher than estimated costs and
            schedule delays are minimized;

            3)  The plan is well thought-out and stable and has taken
            account of potential impacts on other sectors; and

            4)  The proposed long-term exploration strategy is clear and
            consistent.

        If that burden of proof is met, Congress will still need to
    determine whether or not the measures proposed are in the best interest
    of the Nation and of the nation's human spaceflight program. However,
    if the administration is unable to provide Congress with the confidence
    that its proposed plan is executable, Congress will then need to take
    steps to develop an alternative that is executable.
        Appendix A of this hearing charter contains additional background
    on the questions and decisions for Congress that are raised by the
    administration's proposed plan.

    Appendix A

                    Background: The Questions and Decisions

                   for Congress on Human Spaceflight and the

                             Proposed New Strategy

    1.  What Are the Priorities of the Goals and Objectives of the New
    Strategy That Congress is Being Asked to Support?

        Various statements in the FY 2011 budget request and speeches by
    NASA and other officials state a range of goals and objectives making
    it difficult to discern the priorities of the goals being proposed for
    the U.S. human spaceflight program.

              The NASA Administrator's message in the NASA FY 2011
            budget request stated ``As we invest in the most cutting-edge
            research and technology to enable human exploration beyond
            Earth, we will also work to cultivate an expanded space
            exploration industry through a commercial crew program that
            seeks to spur competition and innovation in American industry,
            ultimately resulting in commercial human spaceflight services.
            Once established, these services will not only allow astronauts
            to travel to the International Space Station, they will
            ultimately open space travel to many more people across the
            globe.''

              In his April 15, 2010 remarks at Kennedy Space
            Center, the president stated: ``Our goal is the capacity for
            people to work and learn, operate and live safely beyond the
            Earth for extended periods of time, ultimately in ways that are
            more sustainable and even indefinite.'' He also said: ``Early
            in the next decade, a set of crewed flights will test and prove
            the systems required for exploration beyond low-Earth orbit.
            And by 2025, we expect new spacecraft designed for long
            journeys to allow us to begin the first-ever crewed missions
            beyond the moon into deep space. We'll start by sending
            astronauts to an asteroid for the first time in history.''

        While various goals are being presented as part of the
    administration's proposed human spaceflight program, the realities of
    fiscal constraints within the U.S. government budget require that
    Congress understands the priorities for those goals. If the
    administration's goal is to send humans beyond low-Earth orbit,
    including to a near-Earth asteroid, as a starting point, by 2025, then
    a set of decisions must be made to support that goal. If the goal is to
    stimulate a space tourism and exploration industry, then certain
    questions must be asked and decisions must be made about the
    government's role in enabling the development of a new industry, and
    the advantages and disadvantages to the government and the taxpayer
    must be considered.

    2.  Should the Constellation Program be Canceled?

        The Constellation Program consists of the Ares I crew launch
    vehicle and Orion crew exploration vehicle, the Ares V heavy-lift
    launch vehicle, associated ground systems and lunar systems.
    Constellation is the architecture established to deliver Americans to
    the ISS and later to the Moon and other destinations in the solar
    system following the retirement of the Space Shuttle. The FY 2009
    budget request for NASA stated that Constellation's Orion vehicle was
    also intended to serve as a back-up for commercial services being
    fostered to service the ISS: ``It [Orion] will be capable offerrying up
    to six astronauts (plus additional cargo) to and from the International
    Space Station if commercial transport services are unavailable.''
    Constellation was authorized in both the NASA Authorization Act of 2005
    [P.L. 109-155] and the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 [P.L. 110-422].
        NASA provided the Committee the following status information for
    the Constellation Program, as of May 2010:

    ``The following are some of the Orion Project's key achievements:

              The Orion PDR [Preliminary Design Review] was
            conducted during the summer of 2009, and completed in August
            2009. The PDR was an extensive review of Orion's detailed
            subsystems and integrated systems designs to date. The PDR
            board unanimously recommended proceeding with detailed designs
            toward Critical Design Review (CDR) in February 2011.

              In 2009, NASA conducted preliminary capsule recovery
            tests at both the Navy's Carderock facility in Maryland and in
            the ocean near Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida. Using a
            mockup of the Orion capsule, these Post-landing Orion Recover
            Tests involved search and rescue teams simulating stabilization
            and recovery of the Orion capsule in a variety of sea state
            conditions. Results were intended to lead to design features
            for both the spacecraft and recovery equipment, as well as
            contributing to development of the final recovery procedures.

              Fabrication of the Orion Ground Test Article crew
            module is progressing at the Michoud Assembly Facility in
            Louisiana. Completion is estimated for the fall of 2010,
            followed by completion of the service module and launch abort
            system ground test article, currently scheduled for 2011. NASA
            is using a friction stir welding technique on this ground test
            article, and is hoping to demonstrate the longest continuous
            friction stir weld ever attempted.

              NASA performed its first developmental flight test of
            the Orion Launch Abort System (LAS) at the White Sands Missile
            Range, New Mexico. The Pad Abort-1 test, successfully conducted
            May 6, 2010, was the first integrated firing of all three
            motors in a real flight environment. Orion's Launch Abort
            System (LAS) includes three newly designed solid rocket motors:
            1) abort motor, 2) jettison motor, and 3) attitude control
            motor. Each motor contributes substantially to the state of the
            art in solid rocket propulsion technology. All of these motors
            have been successfully demonstrated in full-scale static
            firings on the ground individually.

              Orion project successfully conducted a Software PDR.

              The Orion project successfully completed a formal
            Integrated Baseline Review to assess the adequacy of the
            integrated project baseline (cost, schedule, risk, and
            technical) following the system PDR.

    The following are some of the Ares I Project's key achievements.

              Having completed its PDR in 2008, the Ares I Project
            is now working toward its CDR, which is scheduled for September
            2011.

              In September 2009, NASA and ATK conducted the first
            successful test of the Ares I's five-segment development motor
            in Promontory, Utah. Beyond validating the basic performance
            characteristics of the stage, the test has enhanced modeling
            and understanding of key attributes that have historically been
            very difficult to predict analytically such as erosive burning,
            thrust oscillations and thrust tail off. The next static test,
            DM-2, is currently scheduled for September 2010.

              In October 2009, the Ares I-X test flight took place
            at Kennedy Space Center in Florida. Data from more than 700 on-
            board sensors showed that the vehicle was effectively
            controlled and stable in flight. Thrust oscillation frequencies
            and magnitude data from the Ares I-X flight also were
            consistent with measurements from recent Shuttle flights that
            were instrumented, leading us to conclude that the oscillation
            vibration on the Ares I would be within the bounds that the
            Ares I is currently being designed to. In the end, this test
            flight provided tremendous insight into the aerodynamic,
            acoustic, structural, vibration and thermal forces that Ares I
            would be expected to experience.

              J-2X Test Hardware Status: Having passed its CDR in
            2008, development and verification testing at the component and
            subsystem level continues. Current planning includes a fully
            assembled engine, minus the full nozzle extension, to be
            available the end of calendar year 2010, followed by receipt of
            an additional developmental engine in 2011. Static fire testing
            for engines is currently slated to begin in the February-March
            2011 time frame.

    The following are some of the recent infrastructure achievements for
    the Constellation Program:

              The Operations and Checkout building at KSC was
            completed in January 2009, marking activation of High Bay
            Facility. When outfitted, the O&C will support final assembly
            of the Orion spacecraft.

              The final 600-foot Lightning Protection Tower at
            KSC's Pad B was completed in February 2009. This was where the
            Ares I-X test flight launched from in October 2009.

              Workers at KSC topped out the tenth and final segment
            of the new mobile launcher (ML) after it was lifted by crane
            and lowered onto the ninth segment in January 2010. When
            completed, the tower will be 345 feet tall and have multiple
            platforms for personnel access. Its base was made lighter than
            Space Shuttle mobile launcher platforms so the crawler-
            transporter can pick up the heavier load of the tower and a
            taller rocket.

              A-3 Test Stand at Stennis Space Center in
            Mississippi. Construction of the long duration altitude test
            stand for the J-2X engine is nearly 75 percent complete. When
            completed in 2013, the A-3 facility will provide a unique
            critical capability to simulate environments at greater than
            100,000 ft altitude necessary to demonstrate altitude starting
            and perform full-duration hot-fire testing.

              Space Environmental Test Facility (SET) at Glenn
            Research Center's Plum Brook Station in Ohio: Construction
            started in 2007 and is about 75 percent complete. SET is
            planned for conducting qualification testing of the fully
            integrated Orion spacecraft, including vibration, acoustics,
            and EMI testing.

              Fabrication of the Orion Crew Module mockup for
            Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory testing and training events. These
            events are targeted at both the in-space EVA aspects on the
            outside of the vehicle as well as for internal cabin mobility
            within a simulated space gravity environment.

              Fabrication of a partial gravity testing and training
            facility (Advanced Reduced Gravity Off-Load System). This
            facility allows for simulations of a non-Earth surface gravity
            environment (lunar, Mars, etc) for both shirt-sleeve and
            spacesuit testing and training.

        As of May 2010, NASA reported that it had spent a total of $10.3
    billion on Constellation.
        In addition, the Constellation Program has contributed a number of
    new technology developments and innovations. A partial list was
    provided by Mr. Douglas Cook, NASA Associate Administrator for the
    Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, at a March 24, 2010 hearing of
    the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee on ``Proposed Changes to NASA's
    Exploration Programs: What's Known, What's Not, and What are the Issues
    for Congress?'':

              ``Automated rendezvous and docking is one that we are
            working on the Orion. In the upper stage we are making further
            progress on the technology offriction stir welding. We are
            working on composite structures. We have made some advances in
            lightning protection on space vehicles, advanced batteries. We
            are using solar arrays on the spacecraft. We are making
            advances in guidance, navigation, and control and other avionic
            software that will be possible. We have actually . . . advanced
            development work out at Ames . . . in . . . advanced thermal
            protection systems for spacecraft. We are working on closed
            life support, and we . . . are actually charting some new
            territory in modeling of the environments and characteristics
            of the spacecraft during launch and entry through new modeling
            techniques and software.''

        The FY 2011 budget proposes to cancel Constellation and includes
    $1.9 billion in FY 2011 and $600 million in FY 2012 to fund:

              Termination and liability for existing contracts
            (including severance pay);

              Closeout costs of content and property disposition;

              Costs to render safe facilities no longer in use,
            mothballed, or targeted for demolition;

              Potential environmental remediation of agency direct
            and support contractor facilities no longer in use; and

              Coverage for transitional civil servants as new
            programs are being initiated.

        The April 15, 2010 speech by the president proposed restructuring
    the Orion crew capsule that was an element of the Constellation Program
    to focus on providing crew escape capability for the International
    Space Station by means of an ``Orion Lite''. A Fact Sheet issued by the
    Office of Science and Technology Policy described the rationale for the
    scaled-down Orion as ``providing stand-by emergency escape capabilities
    for astronauts on the Space Station. We will be able to launch this
    vehicle within the next few years, creating an American crew escape
    capability that will increase the safety of our crews on the Space
    Station, reduce our dependence on foreign providers, and simplify
    requirements for other commercial crew providers.'' According to the
    revised plan, this effort will also ``help establish a technological
    foundation for future exploration spacecraft needed for human missions
    beyond low Earth orbit.'' Last week, NASA officials informed Committee
    staff that NASA is in discussions with OMB and OSTP on several options
    for pursuing a crew rescue vehicle. Those options include 1)
    restructuring Orion to be developed as a crew rescue vehicle, and 2)
    initiating a competition that would be open to new concepts for a crew
    rescue vehicle. A decision to pursue the latter option would
    necessitate canceling the Orion contract and incurring contract
    termination costs, while also starting a new contract competition and
    development program.

    Congressional Direction on Limitations on the Use of FY 2010
            Appropriations
        In the Statement of Managers accompanying the FY 2010 Consolidated
    Appropriations Act, ``The conferees note that the Constellation program
    is the program for which funds have been authorized and appropriated
    over the last four years, and upon which the pending budget request is
    based. Accordingly, it is premature for the conferees to advocate or
    initiate significant changes to the current program absent a bona fide
    proposal from the Administration and subsequent assessment,
    consideration and enactment by Congress.'' The Statement of Managers
    also states that ``Funds are not provided herein to initiate any new
    program, project or activity, not otherwise contemplated within the
    budget request and approved by Congress, consistent with section 505 of
    this Act, unless otherwise approved by the Congress in a subsequent
    appropriations Act. Funds are also not provided herein to cancel,
    terminate or significantly modify contracts related to the spacecraft
    architecture of the current program, unless such changes or
    modifications have been considered in subsequent appropriations Acts.''
    Similar language was included in the Act itself. According to NASA, the
    Constellation Program is currently proceeding per the enacted FY 2010
    appropriation.
        According to NASA, all work that is currently under contract for
    Constellation will continue. The Administrator has instructed the
    Constellation Program to refrain from initiating new work not currently
    under contract, and also to refrain from expanding the scope of any
    work that currently is under contract. As of March 11, 2010, NASA had
    canceled five planned procurements, including planned studies: the
    Exploration Ground Launch Services (EGLS) solicitation at the Kennedy
    Space Center (KSC); the Vehicle Assembly Building High Bay modification
    solicitation at KSC; the Water Basin construction solicitation at the
    Langley Research Center; the Altair Conceptual Design Contracts
    solicitation at the Johnson Space Center; and the Ares V heavy-lift
    design trades solicitation at the Marshall Space Flight Center.
        In testimony to the Committee on Science and Technology on February
    25, 2010, Administrator Bolden stated that: ``in . . . a letter that I
    sent recently to 27 members of the House who questioned what we were
    doing with the Constellation Program . . . I told them . . . we were in
    compliance with the direction of the 2010 Appropriations Act and that I
    have directed no cancellations or terminations and that we intended to
    comply with the law.''
        Members of Congress have continued to express concern over NASA's
    actions regarding the legislative direction in the FY 2010
    Appropriations for NASA. In a May 10, 2010 letter to the Director of
    the Office of Management and Budget, Senator Barbara Mikulski, chair of
    the Senate Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies
    Appropriations Subcommittee that funds NASA wrote:

              ``I am advised that NASA has undertaken a series of
            steps to direct industry to retain certain funds made available
            in fiscal year 2010 to cover prospective termination costs so
            as not to potentially violate the terms of the Antideficiency
            Act (31 U.S.C. 1341). I am deeply troubled by this approach as
            it effectively seeks to terminate Constellation activities in
            apparent violation of the terms of the Omnibus provision.''

              In addition, Senator Mikulski wrote: ``I urge you, in
            conjunction with the Vice President and the President's Chief
            of Staff to immediately devise a path forward to avoid
            cancelling contracts in fiscal year 2010 and to avoid invoking
            termination liability set asides from existing contract dollars
            and activities on the Constellation Program.''

              ``I further urgently request that you review NASA's
            budgeting practices regarding termination liability to
            articulate a clear and appropriate standard to deal fairly with
            industry, provide a schedule to implement this standard and
            identify the fiscal reserves required to effectively comply
            with this standard.''

        Senator Richard Shelby, ranking member of the Commerce, Justice,
    Science and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee, took the step
    of co-signing a provision to H.R. 4899, the Supplemental Appropriations
    Act, 2010:

              ``Provided further, That notwithstanding any other
            provision of law or regulation, funds made available for
            Constellation in fiscal year 2010 for `National Aeronautics and
            Space Administration Exploration' and from previous
            appropriations for `National Aeronautics and Space
            Administration Exploration' shall be available to fund
            continued performance of Constellation contracts, and
            performance of such Constellation contracts may not be
            terminated for convenience by the National Aeronautics and
            Space Administration in fiscal year 2010.''

        At issue is the appearance that NASA's actions on Constellation
    contracts may not be following directions in law and the implications
    that those actions have for progress on the Constellation Program--the
    current program of record that has been authorized by Congress and for
    which Congress has appropriated FY 2010 funds for implementation.

    Justification and Analytical Basis for Cancellation

              In a September 15, 2009 hearing on the results of the
            Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee, Chairman
            Gordon asked of the Review's Chair, Mr. Norman Augustine, ``we
            do have a program that has been authorized we have spent
            billions of dollars on . . . . So are you prepared to say that
            one or all of the other options are substantially better than
            Constellation and worth having a major turn now?''

                      Mr. Augustine responded ``I think it would be our
                    view just what you said, that there should be a
                    compelling reason to change an existing program, and we
                    believe that the existing program, given adequate
                    funds, is executable and would carry out its
                    objectives.''

              In the Committee's February 25, 2010 hearing on
            NASA's Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request, Chairman Gordon noted:
            ``the justification from moving from Constellation to a
            different approach is expense, and so if we-if it is not going
            to be less expensive, then there has to be a better explanation
            [of] . . . why this move.''

              Since the FY 2011 budget release, additional details
            on the justification for the proposal to cancel rather than
            modify or restructure the Constellation program have not been
            provided. In addition, the actual cost to terminate the program
            is still not known.

              To understand the factual analysis that informed the
            Augustine committee, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics
            Chairwoman, Gabrielle Giffords sent a series of questions to
            the Aerospace Corporation, which was tasked to support the
            Augustine committee in its review. Regarding a full assessment
            of Constellation cost and schedule, Aerospace stated
            ``Aerospace did not perform a traditional parametric or grass-
            roots Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) for the Constellation
            Program or its major elements . . . . Aerospace was tasked to
            perform a high-level schedule assessment of Constellation.''

    Issues Related to the Proposal to Include a Crew Rescue Vehicle
        In addition, in light of the change on April 15th that now includes
    a crew rescue vehicle (which could involve restructuring the Orion
    vehicle), the Congress will need to understand a number of issues
    including: what that vehicle will be, the acquisition approach that
    NASA will follow (restructuring the Orion contract or pursuing a new
    vehicle competition and development program), how NASA plans to address
    the cost and schedule for the rescue vehicle, the impacts of those
    costs on other NASA programs, and the plan and timeline for moving
    forward with a deep space crew exploration capsule.

    Issues Related to Proposal to Include a Crew Rescue Vehicle

              What are the details of a crew rescue vehicle,
            including how many crew it will accommodate and how will the
            program be modified to meet the proposed timeline of ``the next
            few years''?

              What, if any, supporting infrastructure is needed for
            a crew rescue vehicle and what will it cost?

              What are the timeline and plans for deciding on and
            developing a crew capsule to explore destinations beyond low-
            Earth orbit and what costs are assumed for that development?

              What are the implications of the decision on a crew
            rescue vehicle on the civil servant and contractor workforce,
            as well as on the space industrial base?

              If the addition of a NASA funded crew rescue vehicle
            has reduced the capabilities that commercial crew systems will
            have to provide, will the $6 billion commercial crew budget be
            reduced accordingly? If not, why not?

        To date, NASA has not provided this information to Congress.

              In his prepared statement for the April 22, 2010
            Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
            Science, and Related Agencies, NASA Administrator Bolden said:
            ``Accommodating this effort within NASA's budget will change
            the amounts requested for the programs described below
            [technology development and demonstration; heavy-lift and
            propulsion research and development; robotic exploration
            precursor]. An update to the NASA budget justification will be
            provided as soon as possible, but in the next few weeks.''

              On May 12, 2010, Administrator Bolden testified at a
            Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation hearing that
            ``NASA expects to submit a revised FY 2011 budget request to
            Congress in the near future that will identify funding
            requirements for the restructured Orion crew capsule.'' In
            addition, Mr. Bolden stated during the hearing that the Orion
            variant will launch on an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
            (EELV), however there are no details on what the EELV would
            cost, whether design changes would be required, when the
            vehicle could be available and how it would be funded within
            the FY 2011 budget plan for NASA.

              Prior to the April 15, 2010 announcement about Orion,
            Administrator Bolden was quoted in a March 30, 2010 article in
            Aviation Week and Space Technology as expressing his interest
            in a ``common crew capsule'' during a Senate Appropriations
            Hearing held on March 23, 2010. ``For his part, Bolden says he
            favors development of a `common crew module' that could fly on
            several different commercial launch vehicles.'' According to
            the article Mr. Bolden also stated: ``I would like to help the
            commercial entities design a single crew module, because it's
            good for us to train,'' he says. ``You don't have to train
            crews for multiple crew modules, and that can be used
            interchangeably on any launch vehicle.'' It is not clear
            whether NASA has discussed this option with potential
            commercial crew providers, whether they have any interest in
            such an approach, and whether it is consistent with a
            ``commercial'' approach to crew transfer.

    3.  Is the Proposed ISS Extension Program Funded and Organized to
    Accommodate the Extension?

        The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 [P.L. 110-422] states that ``The
    Administrator shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the
    International Space Station remains a viable and productive facility
    capable of potential United States utilization through at least 2020.''
        The NASA FY 2011 budget request includes the proposal to extend use
    of the ISS beyond 2016, likely through 2020 or beyond, in order to
    utilize the orbiting facility as a basic research facility and a test
    bed for exploration technology development and demonstrations. NASA is
    requesting $2.78 billion in its proposed FY 2011 budget to support
    these efforts and to initiate activities to increase ISS functionality.
    Under the revised April 15th plan there are no changes to extension of
    the ISS, however the revised plan restructures Orion to ``provide
    stand-by emergency escape capabilities for the Space Station.'' There
    are several issues on the research and contingency plans to support
    enhanced utilization and an extension of the ISS that have yet to be
    defined.

    Issues That Need to Be Addressed on ISS Extension

              The proposed FY 2011 budget plan does not make clear
            how much of the increase will be used to support enhanced ISS
            utilization. Although the budget proposes $50 million a year
            for ISS research as part of the budget for ISS operations,
            there are no details on what the budget would support. NASA has
            indicated to Committee staff that the content of the ISS
            research budget has not yet been defined.

              In addition, the budget request does not identify the
            proposed budget for microgravity research as mandated in
            Section 204 of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 [P.L. 109-
            155]: ``Beginning with fiscal year 2006, the Administrator
            shall allocate at least 15 percent of the funds budgeted for
            ISS research to ground-based, free flyer, and ISS life and
            microgravity science research that is not directly related to
            supporting the human exploration program.'' Congress will need
            to understand the extent to which the budget request will
            support congressionally-mandated research and enhanced
            utilization of the ISS.

              Multiple users and stakeholders are discussed with
            respect to ISS utilization, including universities and basic
            researchers, NASA mission programs, commercial and private
            entities as well as other Federal agencies that are partners in
            the ISS National Laboratory. In his prepared statement to the
            Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in a
            hearing on U.S. Human Spaceflight held on May 12, 2010,
            Administrator Bolden stated that ``NASA will initiate an
            independent organization, as recommended by the Augustine
            Committee and the National Research Council that will support
            the space station research community.'' Congress will need
            further details to understand how the priorities for
            utilization resources will be established among these users and
            stakeholders, the roles and responsibilities of this proposed
            independent organization and how it will be selected and
            funded.

              The NASA Authorization Act of 2008 directed NASA to
            develop a contingency plan for cargo transportation to and from
            the ISS should the commercial cargo services be delayed,
            unavailable for extended periods, or experience a failure.
            NASA's ``Logistics Contingency Plan for the International Space
            Station'' transmitted to the Committee in response to the 2008
            Authorization direction does not provide a clear contingency
            plan. The report stated that: ``Cargo vehicles require 2-3
            years of lead time for production and processing, and
            international partner vehicles have a production schedule based
            on current predicted needs. There is no plan to have additional
            vehicles in production to cover for delays in commercial cargo
            services. However, actual cargo manifesting can be adjusted
            closer to the planned flight dates. Therefore, the primary
            contingency plan is to closely monitor on-orbit systems and
            cargo demands and adjust as needed. This may include not having
            to fly spares as soon as currently predicted, or reducing
            utilization to meet an emerging need.''

        While the proposed FY 2011 budget plan includes an extension of the
    ISS to 2020, Congress continues to lack several details and plans that
    are needed to ensure that the infrastructure, plans, and resources
    would be in place to support the ISS extension and utilization.

    4.  Should Congress Support the Proposal to Develop and then Rely on
    Commercial Cargo and Crew Capability as the Nation's Access to Low
    Earth Orbit?

        The proposed plan in the FY 2011 budget does not include a U.S.
    government capability to launch American astronauts and to deliver
    cargo to the ISS. NASA plans to rely on commercially provided cargo
    transportation services for ISS resupply starting in the 2011 timeframe
    using its Commercial Resupply Services (CRS) contract. NASA is
    currently funding two partners in the Commercial Orbital Transportation
    Services (COTS) Program to develop and demonstrate commercial cargo
    delivery capability to the ISS--Space Exploration Technologies
    Corporation and Orbital Sciences Corporation.
        When the Space Shuttle is retired, NASA anticipates that crew
    access to the ISS will be provided by acquiring seats on Russian Soyuz
    spacecraft until the 2016 timeframe.
        Under the president's proposal, the agency plans to cease using
    Soyuz spacecraft at that time and anticipates using commercially-
    provided crew transport services instead. Funding in FY 2011 for ISS
    cargo/crew is about $857 million; a total of $5.77 billion is projected
    for the period of FY 2011 through FY 2015. The FY 2011 budget requests
    an additional $312 million--a 62% increase in the cost of the COTS
    program--to expedite ISS cargo development and to help ensure mission
    success. According to NASA's budget justification, ``The Commercial
    Crew Program will provide $6 billion over the next five years to
    support the development of commercial crew transportation providers to
    whom NASA could competitively award a crew transportation services
    contract . . .'' The revised April 15th plan makes no changes to the
    plan to rely on the use of commercial services to deliver cargo and
    crew to and from the ISS, although in adding a crew rescue vehicle, the
    revised April 15th plan eliminates the crew rescue requirement for
    potential commercial crew providers.

    Does Congress Have the Analytical Basis to Support a Decision on
            Commercial Crew?
        In her opening statement for the March 24, 2010 Subcommittee on
    Space and Aeronautics hearing on NASA's human spaceflight programs,
    Chairwoman Giffords summarized the status of a series of issues
    examined at a series of Committee and subcommittee hearings held:

    ``The clock is ticking. It is now almost two months since the
    Administration's FY 2011 budget request for NASA was submitted to
    Congress, and there are still too many unanswered questions surrounding
    it.''

    ``In place of good explanations and solid rationales for such sweeping
    and frankly puzzling changes, we have been given a combination of
    unpersuasive arguments and `we're working on the details' responses.

    For instance, the commercial crew proposal is lacking all of the basic
    information that a would-be investor would demand before committing
    funds to a project. For example:

              What's the proposed cost to the government to develop
            these systems?

              How much, if any, of the development cost will be
            shared by the companies?

              How much will it cost NASA to buy these services?

              What else will NASA have to provide to make--and
            keep--the companies' operations viable?

              When can we credibly expect these services to be
            operationally available and will they meet our expectation of
            what is safe enough?

              What recourse will NASA have if the companies fail to
            meet safety standards, cost, schedule and performance?

              Finally, is there any significant non-NASA market for
            these services; is it a viable one; and is it one we should use
            scarce tax dollars to promote?''

        It is now two months after the March hearing, the Committee still
    lacks critical details and information about the plan.

              It is unclear what the government is buying for the
            proposed $6 billion to foster the development of commercial
            crew capability--a capsule, a launch vehicle, or both? The FY
            2011 budget request states that ``Unlike the COTS program,
            which exclusively funded entirely new and integrated systems
            (launch vehicles plus capsules), this program will also be open
            to a broad range of commercial proposals including, but not
            limited to: human-rating existing launch vehicles, developing
            spacecraft for delivering crew to the ISS that can be launched
            on multiple launch vehicles, or developing new high-reliability
            rocket systems.''

              NASA has provided no information as to whether the $6
            billion requested is the government's total share needed to
            complete the proposed commercial crew demonstrations or whether
            additional government support would be required for developing
            commercial crew capability. This information is purportedly to
            be informed by responses to a Request for Information, which
            was released on May 21, 2010.

                      However, this issue takes on greater significance in
                    light of comments reported in a recent issue of Space
                    News by the director of business development for United
                    Launch Alliance (ULA), one of the potential commercial
                    crew transport providers. The April 5, 2010 article
                    says that ``As NASA devises its strategy for fostering
                    development of a commercial successor to the space
                    shuttle, the Nation's primary rocket builder is
                    cautioning the agency not to count on industry for a
                    substantial upfront investment in an endeavor rife with
                    uncertainty.''

              In response to Chairwoman Giffords' request noted
            earlier, the Aerospace Corporation stated that it was given the
            cost to assume in its affordability analyses for developing
            multiple commercial crew systems; it did not independently
            develop that cost.

              Details on the basis for the budget estimate of $6
            billion for developing commercial crew capability are still
            needed.

                      The Augustine committee report estimated the DDT&E
                    cost to NASA would be $3 billion and would involve two
                    commercial competitors and a government-provided
                    rocket. The Aerospace Corporation's responses to
                    Chairwoman Giffords stated that: ``Aerospace did not
                    independently develop the basis for the $3B initial
                    estimate. The Committee did not ask Aerospace to
                    independently verb the $3 billion figure. In fact, no
                    verification could be performed given the Committee's
                    statement that this dollar amount was simply NASA's
                    portion of the total cost.'' The Aerospace responses
                    also noted that ``The Committee's final estimate of the
                    cost of the program to NASA was approximately $5
                    billion. It was assumed that additional private
                    investment funding would be required to complete the
                    DDT&E.''

                      NASA officials told Committee staff that NASA plans
                    to use the $6 billion to support developing commercial
                    crew capability in 3-4 companies.

                      The Aerospace Corporation's responses to Chairwoman
                    Giffords further indicate the approximate cost estimate
                    proposed by the Augustine committee is consistent with
                    the historical cost of developing a single crew
                    transportation system to carry 1-2 crew (Figure A.1).
                    However, Aerospace's analysis suggests that for a crew
                    of 4, development costs for a crew capsule and a launch
                    abort system could be substantially higher. When adding
                    a launch vehicle, the costs could increase even more.
                    Aerospace notes that ``Gemini is the closest historical
                    program to the commercial crew capsule. While we have
                    chosen to plot development cost vs. crew size, the
                    complexity of the system is a function of human-rating
                    requirements, destination and capability.''

                      Indeed, the data plotted in the Aerospace responses
                    give serious grounds for concern that the Augustine
                    committee's assumed cost estimate may understate the
                    actual costs of developing commercial crew by at least
                    a factor of two or more, especially when the additional
                    cost of providing a ``suitable version of an existing
                    booster,'' e.g., human-rating an EELV, is added--
                    something that Aerospace has independently estimated
                    could cost up to an additional $11 billion, depending
                    on the capsule/launch abort system chosen, if ground
                    infrastructure costs are included. It goes without
                    saying that given NASA's constrained budget, the impact
                    of any such cost growth in the proposed commercial crew
                    program would have to be absorbed by NASA's other
                    programs.

                      Given the lack of independent analysis provided to
                    Congress to justify the $6 billion estimate and the
                    Aerospace Corporation's own analysis of potential
                    commercial crew development costs, the credibility of
                    NASA's proposal remains to be demonstrated.

              In addition to the development cost, NASA has
            provided no independently derived estimates of the potential
            cost of procuring crew transportation services. According to
            the Aerospace Corporation, ``The Committee provided the
            commercial crew transportation assumptions that assumed a price
            of $200M FY 09 per flight at a rate of 2 flights per year.
            Using a historical cost growth factor for operational systems,
            Aerospace increased the cost per flight to $250M FY09. The
            Committee did not define the crew capacity of the commercial
            crew vehicle. Based on the 2 Gemini-class crew module discussed
            above . . . . the cost per seat would be on the order of $125M
            FY09 but would vary with crew size.''

              The timeline for the availability of commercial crew
            is also in question. The Aerospace Corporation did not
            independently develop or verify the 2016 estimate for the
            availability of the commercial crew capability. In fact,
            Aerospace was told to assume a date of 2016 for when a
            commercial capability would become available. Aerospace said
            that ``The Committee provided the schedule estimate for the
            commercial crew scenario as an input assumption, which was then
            used for the subsequent affordability analyses.'' Aerospace
            also said that it ``has not performed any analysis or
            assessment of the length of time it would take to develop,
            demonstrate, and contract for an operational commercial crew
            transport service.''

              Information on when the government will need to
            contract for crew services to meet an anticipated commercial
            crew timeframe and the cost of crew services is needed to
            evaluate the government's complete plan and cost for getting
            American astronauts to the ISS on commercial vehicles.

                      Aerospace raised questions related to the
                    acquisition steps the government would need to follow
                    to develop and procure commercial crew transport
                    services--steps which Aerospace stated ``typically take
                    on the order of many months,'' but the Augustine
                    committee did not request any analysis of the impact of
                    those steps on the cost or schedule for commercial
                    crew--and there is no indication that the impact of
                    those steps was considered when the Administration's
                    plan was formulated. Indeed, Aerospace said in response
                    to one of Chairwoman Giffords' questions that ``This is
                    a critical question. While we raised these questions in
                    the development of our work for the Committee, we were
                    not tasked to develop this analysis. Subsequent to the
                    release of the Committee Report, we have met with the
                    NASA Administrator and key staff to discuss these
                    issues. To our knowledge, NASA is currently evaluating
                    these steps. Based on Aerospace's prior experiences on
                    a wide range of government acquisition activities, the
                    acquisition-related steps are numerous, and include
                    such steps as described in the Question 4 above. These
                    steps typically take on the order of many months.''

              Details on how development of a crew rescue vehicle
            for the ISS would ``simplify requirements for other commercial
            crew providers'' need to be understood in terms of, for
            example, any changes in the potential cost and schedule
            estimate for developing commercial crew capability. For
            example, will the simplification involve a consequent reduction
            in the $6 billion allocated for developing commercial crew
            capability?

              Details on which sector--government or commercial--
            would fund the needed supporting infrastructure, including
            mission control, have not been provided.

                      In addition, details about programs that would
                    support the commercial crew capability and a commercial
                    space market are also needed. For example, the proposed
                    FY 2011 budget also requests $428.6 million in FY 2011
                    and $1.9 billion over five years for a 21st Century
                    Space Launch Complex, in part to attract new customers,
                    including potential commercial crew companies, to the
                    Florida space range. NASA has not provided the
                    requirements for the proposed complex, a detailed plan
                    for the initiative, or a rationale for the funding
                    requested. In addition, the administration has not
                    provided a break-out of how the money would be spent.
                    The requirements for the proposed Complex will be
                    derived from a Request for Information that NASA plans
                    to issue in the near term, according to NASA officials
                    who briefed Committee staff on the status of planning
                    for the Complex. Although NASA officials indicate that
                    detailed planning for the proposed Complex would
                    involve interaction with the U.S. Air Force, which
                    operates the Cape Canaveral Air Station, the Air Force
                    is currently in the process of analyzing its launch
                    enterprise strategy for which it has requested $51
                    million in FY 2011 for launch modernization at Cape
                    Canaveral and Vandenberg--a funding level that is
                    almost an order-of-magnitude less than is being
                    proposed just for the Cape in NASA's FY 2011 budget
                    request. Without details on the requirements for the
                    Space Launch Complex, a detailed plan, a rationale for
                    the level of funds requested and further information on
                    how the money would be spent, it will be difficult for
                    Congress to evaluate the credibility or urgency of the
                    21st Century Space Launch Complex initiative.

        Another policy issue to be addressed in considering the proposal to
    turn U.S. astronaut transportation over to the private sector is the
    extent of the government's role in supporting and sustaining a
    ``commercial'' market.
        In his opening statement at the Committee's February 25, 2010
    hearing on NASA's Fiscal Year Budget Request, Chairman Gordon posed the
    following questions:

              ``Do you have concrete evidence that you can provide
            us that shows that there will be sufficient non-NASA commercial
            crew transport markets to keep these companies viable, or is
            NASA going to be on the hook to do whatever it takes to keep
            them in business since NASA will have no other means of getting
            into orbit?'' ``That is, will NASA's actions make these
            companies ``too important to fail'' despite the lack of any
            significant existing markets for their proposed services--with
            all of the implications for the American taxpayer inherent in
            that phrase?''

                      In response, Administrator Bolden stated: that
                    ``unfortunately, it is not--we at NASA have not done
                    any market surveys nor have . . . I offered to do that
                    or asked to do it, so I am depending upon surveys and
                    information that has come from the industry
                    themselves.''

        According to an unofficial transcript of a hearing that reviewed
    NASA's human spaceflight plans held by the Senate Committee on
    Commerce, Science, and Transportation on May 12, 2010, NASA
    Administrator Bolden stated:

              ``I have always said, I will do everything in my
            power to facilitate the success of the commercial entities in
            access to low-Earth orbit. I have to have that.'' He also said,
            ``You know, I have to look at the possibility that the
            commercial sector may have difficulty, and we will do
            everything in my power to facilitate their success.''

              Captain Eugene Cernan testified at that same hearing
            that Mr. Bolden discussed with him his concern about when
            commercial crew capability might become available, had said
            that NASA might have to subsidize them, and that ``it may be a
            bailout like GM and Chrysler; as a matter of fact, it may be
            the largest bailout in history,'' according to the unofficial
            transcript of the hearing.

    Does Congress Have the Facts and Analysis to Have Confidence in the
            Safety of Proposed Commercial Crew Services?
        The Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics examined several issues
    related to safety and human spaceflight in its December 2009 hearing,
    ``Ensuring the Safety of Human Space Flight.'' The hearing made clear
    that establishing and enforcing safety standards for the transport of
    crew on commercially provided orbital crew transportation services is
    in many ways uncharted territory. A process has yet to be advanced by
    the government on how the ``airworthiness'' of commercial spaceflight
    vehicles used to transport government passengers will be ``certified.''
    Several issues need to be addressed in order for Congress to have the
    data and analysis of how safety will be ensured in proposed commercial
    human spaceflight systems.
        In her opening statement at that hearing, Chairwoman Giffords said:

              ``As several of the witnesses at today's hearing will
            testify, the Constellation program strove to respond to the
            recommendations of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in
            the design of Ares and Orion.

              The result is a system that is calculated to be
            significantly safer than the Space Shuttle, and 2 to 3 times
            safer than the alternative approaches considered by NASA.

              Given that, I think the burden of proof has to be put
            on those who would deviate from Constellation program to
            demonstrate that their alternative crew transportation systems
            will be at least as safe, if not safer than the Ares/Orion
            system.''

        Addressing the latter issue that Chairwoman Giffords raised
    involves several questions and issues:

              What will be required to verify commercial providers'
            compliance with future government-developed safety standards
            for human spaceflight?

              Commercial companies are currently developing launch
            systems that would potentially be used to carry crew. What are
            the implications of implementing safety standards after a
            vehicle has been designed and developed?

              What is needed to develop and implement new safety
            processes, testing and verification procedures?

              What is involved in establishing a new regulatory
            regime for certification?

              What training and familiarization with non-NASA
            crewed spacecraft and launch vehicles would astronauts flying
            on such non-NASA spacecraft and launch vehicles need in order
            to deal with off-nominal conditions, contingency operations and
            emergencies?

              What contingencies would be in place should
            commercial crew providers experience delays, failures, or be
            unavailable for an extended period of time?

              How will any differences in safety risk among
            potential crew transportation systems be addressed, even if
            those systems meet safety standards?

        Mr. John Marshall, a member of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
    who testified at the hearing made a comment in his prepared statement:
    ``there is no cookie-cutter approach to safety in space.'' Mr. Marshall
    articulated in his prepared statement several challenges that need to
    be addressed in ensuring the safety of NASA astronauts on commercial
    crew transportation providers to low-Earth orbit:

                      ``Establishing detailed safety requirements that
                    NASA deems essential to safe flight. These must be in a
                    clear and enforceable form that can be placed on
                    contract(s) and tested for compliance.

                       . . . establishing minimum acceptable safety levels
                    to guide system designs and set the baseline for both
                    NASA and their contractors as to what is `safe enough'
                    is critical.

                      Even with clear safety requirements and levels, much
                    of the inherent safety of complex systems like
                    spacecraft depends upon the design choices and
                    decisions where risks are weighed against performance,
                    costs, and of course, schedules. An open and effective
                    system has been developed within NASA to accomplish
                    this. A similar process needs to be institutionalized
                    by any commercial provider as well, whereby all
                    potential hazards are properly vetted by both
                    government and contractors. This will not be easy and
                    may require more than the `hands off' approach
                    envisions by some.

                      Establishing disciplined program and process-related
                    checks and balances so that NASA can verify that the
                    contractor has evidence of compliance with the launch
                    vehicle design requirements in the as-built vehicle and
                    successful completion of the activities necessary to
                    demonstrate mission readiness.''

        In discussions about safety, there have been repeated references to
    NASA's oversight of safety for any commercial crew system. Accordingly,
    in testimony to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
    Transportation's May 12, 2010 hearing on the future of U.S. human
    spaceflight, Dr. John Holdren, Director of the Office of Science and
    Technology Policy said, ``Safety will remain under the oversight of
    NASA. This gentleman on my left was in charge of safety for the
    Astronaut Corps when he was an astronaut. He knows how important that
    is. While Charlie Bolden is Administrator of NASA, there's going to be
    no shortfall in the oversight of the private sector in delivering
    astronauts to Earth orbit in terms of safety. I just wanted to make
    that one point because it has come up from time to time.'' What
    ``oversight'' means in terms of NASA's role and the costs to accomplish
    the oversight have not been discussed and needs to be understood.

    5.  Should Congress Support NASA's Advanced Technology Initiatives?

        According to NASA, the agency's Exploration Systems Mission
    Directorate (ESMD) will manage activities aimed at advancing
    technologies needed to expand human exploration opportunities, reduce
    mission costs, and contribute NASA innovation to broader national
    challenges and applications, will be funded in and managed by ESMD.
    ESMD's Exploration Technology and Demonstrations activities are
    proposed to be funded at $652.4 million in FY 2011; a total of $7.82
    billion is projected for the period of FY 2011 through FY 2015 to
    develop and carry out flagship technology projects.
        ESMD will also lead research and development (R&D) activities
    related to space launch propulsion technologies. The agency proposes in
    its budget justification that this propulsion R&D effort include
    development of a U.S. first-stage hydrocarbon engine for potential use
    in future heavy lift (and other) launch systems, as well as basic
    research in areas such as new propellants, advanced propulsion
    materials manufacturing techniques, combustion processes and engine
    health monitoring. The proposed FY 2011 funding level for heavy lift
    and propulsion technology is $559 million; a total of $3.1 billion is
    projected for the period of FY 2011 through FY 2015. The April 15th
    plan included a decision date for a heavy lift vehicle by 2015. The
    issues related to heavy lift are described in a later section of the
    charter.
        In addition, the FY 2011 budget request proposes a program of
    robotic precursor missions to send spacecraft to ``to candidate
    destinations for human exploration such as the Moon, Mars and its
    moons, Lagrange points, and nearby asteroids to scout targets for
    future human activities, and identify hazards and resources that will
    determine the future course of expanding human civilization into
    space.'' The FY 2011 budget plan proposes an investment of $125 million
    in FY 2011 and a total of about $3 billion for FY 2011- 2015 on the
    robotic precursor program. The revised April 15th plan makes no changes
    to the proposed robotic precursor mission program.

    Issues Related to Advanced Technology Initiatives

              In his testimony to the Senate Commerce, Science and
            Transportation Committee hearing on May 12, 2010, Administrator
            Bolden provided a list of the initial technology development
            projects that will be pursued as part of the advanced
            technology programs as well as list of the dates by which those
            projects will be completed. His prepared statement, however,
            cautions that the initial plans may change: ``Please note these
            are preliminary ESMD plans that may need to be modified
            following finalization of Agency plans regarding the
            restructuring of the Orion crew capsule.''

              A recently released pre-publication version of a
            report by the National Academies, Capabilities for the Future.
            An Assessment of NASA Laboratories for Basic Research stated
            that ``The fundamental research community at NASA has been
            severely impacted by the budget reductions that are responsible
            for this decrease in laboratory capabilities, and as a result
            NASA's ability to support even NASA's future goals is in
            serious jeopardy.'' The study found that ``Over 80 percent of
            NASA facilities are more than 40 years old and need significant
            maintenance and upgrades to preserve safety and continuity of
            operations for critical missions.'' The report further stated
            that ``Deferred maintenance grew from $1.77 billion to $2.46
            billion from 2004 to 2009, presenting a staggering repair and
            maintenance bill for the future.'' In addition, ``The equipment
            and facilities at NASA's fundamental research laboratories are
            inferior to those . . . at comparable laboratories at DOE, at
            top-tier universities, and at many corporate research
            institutions.'' The president's budget request does not appear
            to contain specific funds to deal with the facilities issues
            raised in the National Academies report.

              In his prepared statement to the Subcommittee on
            Space and Aeronautics' hearing held on March 24, 2010, Mr. A.
            Thomas Young, Lockheed Martin (ret.), stated: ``The technology
            program identified in the proposed budget lacks definition and
            focus.''

        Congress needs the details on the basis and justification for the
    funding levels proposed for the technology programs, an understanding
    of the priorities for the programs and how they relate to the overall
    strategy and the implications of the need to fund a crew rescue vehicle
    on the technology initiatives. To date, this information has not been
    provided.

    6.  Should Congress Support the Plan to Make a Decision on a Heavy-Lift
    Vehicle by 2015?

        The Constellation Program includes the Ares V cargo launch vehicle
    which, according to the FY 2010 budget request for NASA, ``is designed
    to provide the heavy-lift capability for the Constellation
    architecture. The vehicle consists of a 6-engine core stage, two five-
    and-half segment solid rocket boosters, and an Earth departure stage
    (EDS) powered by a restartable J-2X engine. The EDS serves as the
    vehicle's second stage, and is key to injecting the lunar lander and
    EDS stack into the low Earth orbit staging for rendezvous and dock with
    Orion. After the EDS performs the trans-lunar injection burn for the
    lander and Orion, it will be jettisoned.''
        The proposed human spaceflight plan does not include development of
    a heavy-lift vehicle. Instead the plan focuses on research and
    development in heavy-lift capabilities that would inform a decision on
    a launch vehicle. This is a point of departure from the Augustine
    committee report--often referenced as a key input into the proposed new
    plan--which included the importance of a heavy-lift launch vehicle
    among its principal findings. Mr. Augustine noted in testimony to the
    Senate Committee on Science, Transportation, and Commerce on May 12,
    2010 that a key difference between the Augustine committee's Option 5B
    and the administration's plan is that: ``One is that our option went
    ahead with the development of the heavy-lift launch vehicle right away,
    rather than wait up to 5 years.''
        To demonstrate a concrete timetable and commitment for expanding
    human exploration further into space, the president announced in his
    April 15, 2010 remarks that, in addition to investing in heavy-lift
    technologies, NASA would ``finalize a rocket design no later than 2015
    and then begin to build it. That's at least two years earlier than
    previously planned . . . .'' The Office of Science and Technology Fact
    Sheet on the president's April 15th address stated that ``This new
    rocket would eventually lift future deep-space spacecraft to enable
    humans to expand our reach toward Mars and the rest of the Solar
    System. This new rocket would take advantage of the new technology
    investments proposed in the budget--primarily a $3.1 billion investment
    over five years on heavy-lift R&D.'' That Fact Sheet calls out
    ``development of a U.S. first-stage hydrocarbon engine for potential
    use in future heavy lift (and other) launch systems.''
        While the date of 2015 has been proposed as a decision point on the
    heavy-lift vehicle, it is not clear what that decision point means.

              In his prepared statement for the May 12, 2010 Senate
            Commerce, Science and Transportation hearing on U.S. human
            spaceflight plans, Dr. John Holdren, director of the Office of
            Science and Technology Policy, stated: ``The President also
            directed in his speech that NASA be in a position to select a
            heavy-lift rocket design by no later than 2015 for its future
            mission beyond Earth's orbit.'' Dr. Holdren's statement went on
            to say that ``It is currently anticipated that this decision
            would set the general configuration of the vehicle, as well as
            target performance levels and other attributes. A more detailed
            and mature design for this vehicle likely would need to be
            completed following this initial decision, as part of a
            subsequent development effort.''

              In his prepared statement for the Senate hearing, Mr.
            Bolden said, ``the President specifically recognized the need
            for a heavy lift launch capability to carry humans beyond LEO
            by requiring a decision a vehicle design no later than 2015.
            Such a decision would include setting performance goals,
            identifying lift capability and selecting the general vehicle
            design--work that will ultimately lay the path for launching a
            spacecraft for crewed missions into deep space.''

        By 2015, will NASA be in the position of building a vehicle, having
    completed most of the design and development process, or will NASA be
    in the position of just having defined which type of vehicle to design
    and develop? What is the return on the $3.1 billion investment that
    Congress is being asked to support? These potentially different
    decision milestones in 2015 will have significant implications for the
    timeline of developing a heavy-lift vehicle to support exploration
    beyond low-Earth orbit and to achieve the administration's goal of
    human travel to a near-Earth asteroid by 2025.

    What Additional Information Does the Congress Need Regarding the
            Proposed Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle?
        NASA's May 2010 Request for Information on ``Heavy Lift Launch
    System and Propulsion Technology'' requests that industry ``Provide
    information regarding your potential launch or space transportation
    architectures (expendable, reusable, or a hybrid system) that could
    meet multiple customer needs (e.g., NASA, DoD, and Commercial).'' The
    Request for Information raises a number of questions: What is NASA's
    strategy for developing heavy-lift capability? Will DOD co-fund the
    development? Will the system be designed to meet multiple agency
    requirements, and if so, what are the advantages and disadvantages to
    this approach? How does the involvement of other agencies and the
    commercial sector affect the timeline and process for moving forward on
    a heavy-lift architecture?
        In addition, according to NASA's planning timeline, NASA would fund
    development leading to a hydrocarbon engine demonstration that would
    occur in the 2015 timeframe; an operational hydrocarbon engine would be
    available in the early 2020s. NASA has not provided a rationale for
    completing an engine development program in parallel with developing a
    heavy-lift launch architecture that may or may not use that engine.
    Important questions remain regarding how an engine research and
    development program will proceed and when a heavy-lift vehicle would be
    available to support crewed missions beyond low-Earth orbit. NASA has
    explained that prior to sending a crewed mission to an asteroid in
    2025, several crewed precursor flights would be needed including
    cislunar and circumlunar missions. Without supporting details to
    establish when the required spacecraft, heavy lift vehicle and other
    required systems will be in place, the timeline for achieving a human
    mission to an asteroid must remain uncertain.
        Congress needs to understand:

              When will a heavy-lift vehicle need to be ready,
            including an operational new engine if one is used, in order to
            support initial circumlunar and cislunar missions in
            preparation for a crewed mission to an asteroid in 2025? Is
            NASA's plan viable?

              What are the estimated costs of developing a new
            engine and how do they compare to the anticipated long-term
            cost savings for that engine? How does it compare to the cost
            of pursuing evolvable heavy lift capabilities using the
            Constellation architecture approach?

              When will a crew exploration vehicle for travel
            beyond low-Earth orbit need to be ready to support initial
            circumlunar and cislunar missions proposed to take place prior
            to 2025? When does a decision on that vehicle and subsequent
            development need to take place to support that timeline? Is
            NASA's plan viable?

              Will the success or failure of heavy lift research
            and development and other advanced technologies, such as in-
            space refueling, dictate where and when human exploration
            missions can be conducted?

              Will the heavy lift vehicle be a government or
            commercially provided system?

    7.  To What Extent Can the Plan that Congress is Being Asked to Support
    Be Executed Within the Proposed Budget?

        Among its principal conclusions the Augustine Committee found that:

              The current U.S. human spaceflight program is on an
            ``unsustainable trajectory,''

              ``Human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit is not
            viable under the FY 2010 budget guideline,'' and

              ``Meaningful human exploration is possible under a
            less-constrained budget, increasing annual expenditures by
            approximately $3 billion in real purchasing power above the FY
            2010 guidance.''

        The goal of a sustainable human spaceflight program is stated as a
    recurring theme of the FY 2011 budget request: ``The Exploration
    Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) will lead the Nation on a course of
    discovery and innovation that will provide the technologies,
    capabilities and infrastructure required for sustainable, affordable
    human presence in space.'' Following the president's remarks on
    revisions to his proposed human spaceflight strategy, Presidential
    Science Advisor, Dr. John Holdren characterized the president's new
    plan as ``more flexible, more practical, more productive, and more
    affordable, but also more visionary'' than the existing plan.
        According to Mr. Augustine, who spoke at the April 15th Kennedy
    Space Center event, the overall portfolio of the proposed plan is
    ``very close to'' the Augustine committee's proposed option 5B. As
    described in the Augustine committee report, option 5B ``employs an
    EELV-heritage commercial heavy-lift launcher and assumes a different
    (and significantly reduced) role for NASA. It has an advantage of
    potentially lower operational costs, but requires significant
    restructuring of NASA . . . . The choice between NASA and EELV heritage
    is driven by potentially lower development and operations cost
    (favoring EELV-heritage systems) is driven by potentially lower
    development and operations cost (favoring the EELV-heritage systems)
    vs. continuity of NASA's system design, development and mission
    assurance knowledge and experience, which would provide higher
    probability of successful and predictable developments (favoring NASA
    systems). EEL V-heritage launch systems, due to their lower payload
    performance, would require significantly greater launch and mission
    complexity to achieve the same total mass in orbit. The EELV option
    would also entail substantial reductions in the NASA workforce and
    closure offacilities necessary to obtain the expected cost
    reductions.''
        It is worth noting that DOD is reported to be developing plans for
    replacing its existing EELVs due to escalating costs of the EELV
    program. Furthermore, in the near term, DOD has expressed concern about
    the impact producing a human-rated EELV might have on the Air Force. In
    a recent interview in Defense News, the Air Force's Deputy
    Undersecretary for Space Programs said:
        ``If some commercial company or companies want to use the EELV for
    human access to the space station, we'd have to look very closely at
    changes to the rockets' design in order to accommodate people. And any
    of those changes we'd have to manage very closely so that they don't
    ripple in to the Air Force design, which has been very successful with
    31 successes out of 31 attempts. My view is, if it works, don't fix
    it.''
        When it analyzed the integrated options described in its report,
    including option 5B, the Augustine committee used two budget scenarios:
    the FY 2010 budget request for human spaceflight, as directed within
    the Augustine committee's charter, and a ``less-constrained planning
    budget'' that increased ``from the FY 2010 budget number to a sum $3
    billion higher in 2014, and then rose at an expected inflation rate of
    2.4 percent thereafter''.
        Table 1, below, shows the year by year budget figures projected for
    the Augustine committee's less constrained scenario, the FY 2010 budget
    request, extended with inflation (as prepared by the Aerospace
    Corporation for the Augustine committee), and the FY 2011 budget
    request, also extended with inflation. The budget figures for the
    Augustine committee's less constrained scenario and the FY 2010 budget
    request include the Space Shuttle, ISS, total Exploration budgets, and
    Exploration infrastructure sustainment at KSC. The FY 2011 budget
    column includes the same elements, the 21st Century Launch Complex and
    half of the Space Technology Program (minus the Innovative Partnership
    Program budget), with the assumption that half of Space Technology
    investments will be devoted to Science. What becomes clear from Table 1
    is the growing gap between what the Augustine committee found was
    necessary for ``meaningful human exploration'' and what is requested
    within the FY 2010 and FY 2011 budgets for NASA's human spaceflight
    programs and exploration technology development as one looks at the
    outyear budget totals. While the overall FY 2011 NASA budget includes a
    $6 billion increase over five years above the FY 2010 budget, Table 1
    shows a significant gap between the Augustine committee's less
    constrained scenario and the FY 2010 and FY 2011 budget projections for
    human spaceflight/ technology programs. Under the administration's FY
    2011 budget request, the new strategy proposed for human spaceflight,
    while similar to the Augustine committee's Option 5B, would be funded
    at a level that falls almost $11 billion below the Augustine
    committee's projected resource need for that content within the first
    five years (from FY 2010-FY 2015) of implementation. That gap grows to
    $27 billion over ten years and by FY 2025, the FY 2011 budget guidance
    falls $47 billion short of what the Augustine committee determined
    would be necessary for a meaningful exploration program.
        As part of its conclusions, the Augustine committee found that
    there was no ``reasonable exploration program (e.g., with different
    heavy-lift vehicles, or a different exploration destination) [that]
    would fit within the FY 2010 budget guidance.'' In addition, in the
    chapter on ``Concluding Observations'' the Augustine committee states
    that ``Perhaps the greatest contributor to risk in the space program,
    both human and financial, is seeking to accomplish extraordinarily
    difficult tasks with resources inconsistent with the demands on those
    tasks.'' Mr. Augustine echoed this guidance in his testimony on May 12,
    2010 to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
    ``The most important request I would make to this Committee on behalf
    of my colleagues on the Human Space Flight Committee was that whatever
    program is approved, that its goals match the budget. Otherwise, I
    think we'll all be back here ten years from now having this same
    discussion.'' The comparisons shown in Table 1 do not provide grounds
    for confidence that the proposed FY 11 strategy is sustainable,
    affordable and matched to the resources requested for it.

    8.  What Will Be the Impacts to the Human Spaceflight Workforce and
    Industrial Base Under the Proposed Human Spaceflight Strategy?

        The retirement of the Space Shuttle and the proposed direction for
    NASA will have major implications for the U.S. aerospace workforce and
    space industrial base. In conceiving the Constellation Program, NASA
    integrated measures to facilitate the transition of the Space Shuttle
    workforce to Constellation; the industrial base was also considered. In
    implementing Constellation, NASA had established a bridge so that a
    number of Shuttle and Space Station employees could devote a portion of
    their time to developing experience and skills that are relevant to the
    Constellation Program and that will facilitate their eventual
    transition to Constellation.
        The proposed new direction for NASA's human spaceflight programs
    raises new issues and questions about the critical skills and knowledge
    of human spaceflight operations that will need to be sustained over
    time, the ability to attract new talent to the aerospace workforce and
    the potential state of the U.S. space industrial base. In particular,
    what are the critical workforce skills and industrial capabilities that
    need to be preserved as national assets, and what are the most
    effective ways to preserve those assets? What would any significant
    cutback or change in direction from the current Constellation Program
    mean for the aerospace workforce and space industrial base? These
    issues and questions were examined in a Committee on Science and
    Technology hearing on December 10, 2009 on Decisions on the Future
    Direction and Funding for NASA. What Will They Mean for the U.S.
    Aerospace Workforce and Industrial Base?
        As Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics Chairwoman Giffords stated
    in her opening remarks:

              ``Make no mistake about it. The decisions we
            collectively make about the future of our space program will
            have a lasting impact on our workforce, our industrial base,
            and our standing in the world.

              As a result, I want our witnesses to give us their
            views on what we need to consider when making those decisions
            so that the outcome will inspire our best and brightest to
            pursue careers in aerospace-careers that will be vital to our
            future competitiveness, national security, and quality of
            life.''

        Witnesses at that hearing commented on the link between the NASA
    workforce and industrial base and national security, how long-term
    experience affects the success of human spaceflight and the need for
    continued, engaging participation in inspiring programs to maintain and
    pass on that experience to the next generation.
        Mr. A. Thomas Young, Lockheed Martin (ret.) stated:

              ``. . . spaceflight is not a typical technological
            activity. Because of the special characteristics of spaceflight
            . . . a workforce is required that has the culture and
            capabilities aligned with these characteristics. A workforce
            with the necessary intellectual strengths and possibly even
            more important, the experience and longevity to establish the
            sensitivity as to what is required for spaceflight success.
            Today in government, universities and industry we have such a
            workforce. It has evolved over decades of extraordinary
            successes and tragic failures . . . . It is truly a national
            treasure. Without a challenging and meaningful space program,
            this national capability will atrophy.''

        Ms. Marion Blakey, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
    Aerospace Industries Association stated:

              ``NASA is linked to the health of our industrial base
            . . . . we must also view these jobs as a national resource
            critical to our nation's technological capability and our
            national security. Aerospace talent lost to other industries
            may be unrecoverable; new workers may take years to train.
            Additionally, if we lose certain facilities that manufacture
            high-tech technologies, it may take years and additional
            resources to bring them back.''

              ``this decision [on human spaceflight], has a genuine
            impact on our national security because you must remember that
            some of these particularly smaller companies with unique
            capabilities and technologies . . . in fact also support that
            fragile national security supply chain.''

        Dr. Richard Aubrecht, Moog Inc. stated:

              ``The people that we had that did the Space Shuttle
            and did the Apollo program, they are about to retire, and the
            thing we are looking for the Constellation to be is the
            transition to the next generation of people and to do the
            mentoring . . . It goes from person to person. It is not in the
            drawings.''

        Although the administration has proposed a number of steps to
    address workforce issues, the following section illustrates the
    immature status of some of those proposals and an overall lack of
    clarity to date on how the workforce initiatives will work in an
    integrated fashion.

    How Many New Jobs Will the Proposed Human Spaceflight Plan Create?
        The president's revised plan for NASA ``leads to more than 2,500
    additional jobs in Florida's Kennedy Space Center area by 2012'' and
    ``Jumpstarts a new commercial space transportation industry to provide
    safe and efficient crew and cargo transportation to the Space Station .
    . . projected to create over 10,000 jobs nationally,'' according to the
    OSTP Fact Sheet.
        In addition, ``the Administration is launching a $40 million,
    multi-agency initiative to help the Space Coast transform its economy
    and prepare its workers for the opportunities of tomorrow,'' according
    to an OSTP Fact Sheet on Florida's Space Workers and the New Approach
    to Human Spaceflight. Accordingly, in his remarks at the Kennedy Space
    Center on April 15th, the president proposed ``a $40 million
    initiative--led by a high-level team from the White House, NASA, and
    other agencies--to develop a plan for regional economic growth and job
    creation.'' He directed the plan to be delivered to him by August 15,
    2010. In his prepared statement for the May 12, 2010 Senate Commerce,
    Science and Transportation Committee hearing on NASA's human
    spaceflight plans, Mr. Bolden stated that ``The $40 million for this
    initiative will be taken from the funds requested for Constellation
    transition in the original FY 2011 Presidential budget request.''
        On May 3, 2010, The White House established a Task Force on Space
    Industry Workforce and Economic Development ``to develop, in
    collaboration with local stakeholders, an interagency action plan to
    facilitate economic development strategies and plans along the Space
    Coast and to provide training and other opportunities for affected
    aerospace workers so they are equipped to contribute to new
    developments in America's space program and related industries. The
    Secretary of Commerce and the Administrator of NASA shall serve as Co-
    Chairs of the Task Force.'' The program ``shall be implemented
    consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of
    appropriations.''
        As part of its functions, the Task Force is directed to ``provide
    leadership and coordination of Federal Government resources to
    facilitate workforce and economic development opportunities for
    aerospace communities and workers affected by new developments in
    America's space exploration program.'' In addition, the Task Force is
    directed to develop a plan that, among other things, ``recommends how
    best to invest $40 million in transition assistance funding to ensure
    robust workforce and economic development in those communities within
    Florida affected by transitions in America's space exploration
    program''. No similar initiatives or funds have been announced for
    other regions affected by the cancellation of Constellation.
        NASA has not provided details on the rationale for the estimated
    jobs to be created, the types of jobs that will be created, and the
    extent to which the new jobs at the Kennedy Space Center will help
    offset the workforce decline that will follow the Space Shuttle
    retirement. An April 13, 2010 New York Times article notes that a
    senior administration official pointed to a study conducted by the
    Tauri Group, a consulting firm, and financed by the Commercial
    Spaceflight Federation, as the source of the estimated 10,000 jobs to
    be created by the commercial space transportation industry. It is not
    clear whether NASA or the administration has independently verified
    this estimate as part of its projected level of jobs to be created
    through commercial crew and cargo programs.
        In addition, the proposed new strategy--specifically the
    cancellation of the Constellation Program--reportedly could have
    significant implications for the health of the solid rocket motor
    industrial base, which also supports ballistic missile programs. At a
    February 25, 2010 Committee on Science and Technology hearing on
    ``NASA's Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Request and Issues,'' the Committee
    requested that the Administrator provide details on the extent to which
    NASA consulted the Department of Defense on the FY 2011 budget plan and
    the implications it will have on the industrial base and with whom in
    the Defense Department NASA consulted. NASA has not yet provided those
    details.

    Questions and Information Needed to Inform Congress' Decision

              To what extent do the projected commercial-sector
            jobs preserve the critical U.S. knowledge base of human
            spaceflight operations?

              What types of jobs would the new positions involve
            and at what skill levels? To what extent would those
            commercial-sector jobs help mitigate the projected job losses
            to be experienced by the retirement of the Space Shuttle and
            the proposed cancellation of the Constellation program?

              What assumptions, if any, have been made about the
            geographical locations of the projected new commercial-sector
            jobs?

              Is the Space Industry and Workforce Economic
            Development initiative expected to require funding beyond FY
            2011, and if so how much?

              Which agency(ies) will be in charge of implementing
            this plan?
        Chairman Gordon. This meeting will come to order, and good
    morning, everyone.
        As our first order of business, I want to remind everyone
    that given the importance of the subject of this hearing, it
    should come as no surprise that we have gotten some interest
    from members outside of this Committee, and it is the intent of
    us to try to accommodate them the best we can in terms of space
    and time. I also want to remind everyone that the non-Committee
    members will only be recognized after all the Committee members
    have an opportunity to be recognized, and if necessary, they
    may have to put their statements in the record. So without
    objection, Mr. Posey, Mr. Bishop and Dr. Griffith will be
    permitted to join us on the dais for this hearing.
        Now I would like to yield to Mr. Rohrabacher for a
    recognition.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I would like to take this opportunity to point out in our
    audience today we have with us Apollo astronaut Rusty
    Schweickart, and Rusty flew in Apollo 9. Rusty, could you stand
    up and say hello to us? Thank you.
        Rusty flew in Apollo 9, testing critical procedures and
    systems which enabled the future success of Apollo programs. He
    is today chairman of the board of the B-612 Foundation, a
    nonprofit foundation that champions the development and testing
    of spacecraft concepts that are designed to protect the Earth
    from near-Earth objects and asteroid impacts. Thank you very
    much for being with us today.
        And Mr. Chairman, I have a statement by Mr. Schweickart
    that I would like to submit for the record.
        [Information follows prepared statement of Chairman
    Gordon.]
        Chairman Gordon. With no objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Gordon. When the fiscal year 2011 NASA budget
    request was released almost four months ago, it contained major
    changes to the NASA program that had been authorized and funded
    by Congress over the past five years. Among those changes, the
    Administration's request proposed canceling the Constellation-
    based exploration program on the grounds that it was
    unexecutable under foreseeable budgets. In contrast, the
    proposed new budget for NASA was described as a budget that
    puts NASA on a sustainable path for space exploration.
        Since that time, this Committee as well as other committees
    of the Congress, have been trying to get the information we
    need to make informed decisions about the Administration's plan
    as we prepare for authorization and appropriations actions.
    When we had Administrator Bolden before us in February, there
    was precious little information and analysis that NASA could
    provide us in support of that budget request. When Chairman
    Giffords had NASA testify in March on the proposed new plan for
    human spaceflight, the outcome was the same: more new questions
    than answers.
        Then on April 15, the president announced revisions to his
    NASA plan, adding a new crew rescue vehicle development
    program, a human mission to the near-Earth asteroid by 2025,
    and a decision by 2015 on the development of a new heavy lift
    launch vehicle, in essence, directing NASA to pursue a program
    very similar to one of the options proposed by the Augustine
    Committee.
        There are legitimate debates that members can have
    concerning the choices made in the President's plan about which
    destinations to pursue, the appropriate role of the commercial
    sector, and what type of technology program makes the most
    sense. Yet those debates ultimately won't matter unless the
    Administration's plan actually is doable under the
    Administration's proposed budget. It does no good to cancel a
    program that the Administration characterizes as unexecutable
    if the program is simply replaced with a new plan that can't be
    executed either.
        That is the issue before us today, and Administrator
    Bolden, to be blunt, the burden of proof is on your shoulders
    to make the case that you have an executable program. So what
    we need to hear from you, and let me cite three specific
    issues. As you know, one of the most significant findings of
    the Augustine Committee was, and I quote, ``Human exploration
    beyond low-Earth orbit is not viable under the FY 2010 budget
    guideline.''
        We have now taken a close look at your proposed human
    spaceflight plan and technology development budget plan, and
    this is what we have found. Your budget for human spaceflight
    and technology provides about the same amount of funding
    through fiscal year 2015 as the not viable fiscal year 2010
    budget guidance. Equally importantly, your budget guidance
    program through 2025, the date of your proposed first human
    mission to an asteroid, is $40 or 50 billion lower than the
    amount the Augustine panel determined would be needed to
    implement any of its exploration options.
        Second, in his April 15th speech, the President directed
    NASA to develop a new crew rescue vehicle for the ISS that
    would be flying within the next few years, but he didn't add
    any money to your budget to do it. And I understand that NASA's
    preliminary estimate indicates that it could cost $5 to $10
    billion to develop such a vehicle, and that the number doesn't
    include the annual cost to launch it and to operate the vehicle
    once it is operational. That is not to argue that we shouldn't
    be developing a spacecraft that can provide the basis for
    exploration beyond low-Earth orbit. One clearly will be needed.
    But it is another troubling indication that the plan that has
    been sent over to Congress has a great many loose ends and
    unexamined assumptions.
        Third, the fiscal year 2011 budget plan assumes that
    multiple commercial crew systems can be developed over the next
    five years for a total cost of $6 billion. However, analysis
    done by the Aerospace Corporation and even NASA's own estimate
    for the development cost of a simple crew rescue vehicle argue
    that the proposed commercial crew development budget is likely
    to be low by a factor of two or more.
        The burden of proof has to be on you and the White House to
    justify the cost estimate, and so far we have not seen any hard
    analysis from the Administration that would give us confidence
    that it can be done for the amount budgeted. Given your
    statement that you will do what is needed to make the
    commercial providers succeed, the consequences of such an
    underestimation could be devastating to the rest of NASA's
    programs.
        We all share the goals of inspiring and innovating and
    exploring. Let me be clear: I have no interest in having to
    have another Augustine Committee in five years. Your task today
    is to convince this Committee that this is truly well thought
    out, responsible budget with an executable plan.
        Before turning to Ranking Member Hall for his opening
    remarks, I want to note for the record that the Committee also
    invited OSTP Director Holdren to testify at this hearing, but
    Dr. Holdren was unavailable due to travel plans.
        In addition, I want to inform members that I plan to insert
    into the record for this hearing several items that were
    submitted to the Committee, including a statement by Dr. Buzz
    Aldrin, a letter from Dr. Russell Schweickart, a letter from
    the Planetary Society, a joint statement by several space
    organizations, and a letter from Governor Bill Richardson of
    New Mexico.
        [The prepared statement of Chairman Gordon follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Chairman Bart Gordon

        Good morning. When the Fiscal Year 2011 NASA budget request was
    released almost four months ago, it contained major changes to the NASA
    program that had been authorized and funded by Congress over the past
    five years. Among those changes, the Administration's request proposed
    canceling the Constellation-based exploration program on the grounds
    that it was ``unexecutable'' under foreseeable budgets.
        In contrast, the proposed new budget for NASA was described as a
    budget that puts NASA on a ``sustainable path'' for space exploration.
        Since that time, this Committee, as well as other Committees of the
    Congress, have been trying to get the information we need to make
    informed decisions about the Administration's plan as we prepare for
    authorization and appropriations actions. When we had Administrator
    Bolden before us in February, there was precious little information and
    analysis that NASA could provide us in support of the budget request,
    and what was provided raised more questions than it answered. When
    Chair Giffords had NASA testify in March on the proposed new plan for
    human space flight, the outcome was the same--more new questions than
    answers.
        Then on April 15th, the president announced revisions to his NASA
    plan, adding a new crew rescue vehicle development program, a human
    mission to a Near Earth asteroid by 2025, and a decision by 2015 on
    development of a new Heavy Lift launch vehicle--in essence, directing
    NASA to pursue a program very similar to one of the options proposed by
    the Augustine Committee.
        There are legitimate debates that Members can have concerning the
    choices made in the president's plan about which destinations to
    pursue, the appropriate role of the commercial sector, and what type of
    technology program makes the most sense. Yet those debates ultimately
    won't matter unless the Administration's plan actually is doable under
    the Administration's proposed budget--that it actually is
    ``executable'' and truly puts NASA on a ``sustainable path''. It does
    no good to cancel a program that the Administration characterizes as
    ``unexecutable'', if that program is simply replaced with a new plan
    that can't be executed either.
        That's the issue before us today, and Administrator Bolden, to be
    blunt, the burden of proof is on your shoulders to make the case that
    you have an executable program.
        So what do we need to hear from you? Let me cite three specific
    issues:
        As you know, one of the most significant findings of the Augustine
    Committee was that ``Human exploration beyond low Earth orbit is not
    viable under the FY 2010 budget guideline.''
        We've now taken a close look at your proposed human space flight
    and technology development budget plan, and this is what we've found:
        Your budget for human space flight and technology provides about
    the same amount of funding through FY 2015 as the ``not viable'' FY
    2010 budget guidance.
        Equally importantly, your budget guidance through 2025--the date of
    your proposed first human mission to an asteroid--is $40 to 50 billion
    lower than the amount the Augustine panel determined would be needed to
    implement any of its exploration options.
        Second, in his April 15th speech, the president directed NASA to
    develop a new crew rescue vehicle for the ISS that would ``be flying
    within the next few years''--but he didn't add any money to your budget
    to do it.
        I understand that NASA's preliminary estimates indicate that it
    could cost $5 to $7 billion to develop such a vehicle, and that number
    doesn't include the annual cost to launch it and rotate the vehicles
    once it is operational. That's a big unfunded mandate to absorb in your
    budget over the next five years--you'll need to take a billion to two
    billion dollars per year from elsewhere in your budget over the next
    five years to cover it.
        To put the budgetary impact of that into perspective, if you
    eliminated all of the FY 11 funding for the Exploration Technology
    Demonstration program, the Robotic Precursors program, and the KSC 21st
    Century Space Launch initiative, you will have only covered $1.2
    billion of the shortfall. If the annual shortfall over the next five
    years is closer to $2 billion, you would also need to eliminate the FY
    11 increases for Space Technology, Aeronautics, and Earth Science.
        That's not to argue that we shouldn't be developing a spacecraft
    that can provide the basis for exploration beyond low Earth orbit. One
    clearly will be needed. But it's another troubling indication that the
    plan that has been sent over to Congress has a great many loose ends
    and unexamined assumptions that call its credibility into question.
        Third, the FY 2011 budget plan assumes that multiple commercial
    crew systems can be developed over the next five years for a total cost
    of $6 billion. However, analyses done by the Aerospace Corporation and
    even NASA's own estimates for the development cost of a simple crew
    rescue vehicle argue that the proposed commercial crew development
    budget is likely to be low by a factor of two or more.
        The burden of proof has to be on you and the White House to justify
    that cost estimate, and so far we have not seen any hard analysis from
    the Administration that would give us confidence that it can be done
    for the amount budgeted. Given your statements that you will do what is
    needed to make the commercial providers succeed, the consequences of
    such an underestimate could be devastating to the rest of NASA's
    programs.
        We all share the goals of inspiring and innovating and exploring.
    Let me be clear. I have no interest in having to have another Augustine
    committee in five years. Your task today is to convince this Committee
    that this is truly a well-thought out, responsibly budgeted, executable
    plan.
        Before turning to Ranking Member Hall for his opening remarks, I
    want to note for the record that the Committee also invited OSTP
    Director Holdren to testify at this hearing, but Dr. Holdren was
    unavailable due to travel plans.
        In addition, I want to inform Members that I plan to insert into
    the record of this hearing several items that were submitted to the
    Committee, including:

              A statement by Dr. Buzz Aldrin;

              A letter from Dr. Russell Schweickart;

              A letter from the Planetary Society;

              A Joint Statement by several space organizations;

              And a letter from Governor Bill Richardson of NM.

        With that, I now recognize Ranking Member Hall for an opening
    statement.

        [The information follows:]

        Chairman Gordon. With that, I now recognize Ranking Member
    Hall for an opening statement.
        Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing
    on a very important topic of NASA's human spaceflight program,
    and I can't help but point out or reiterate that this room
    today holds in addition to Rusty that was just introduced and
    our first witness holds some of the really true heroes of all
    time and we are honored to have you here, and I hope my
    questions and my thrust is without acrimony but with great
    appreciation to each one of you.
        I also want to thank you for assembling such a great panel,
    Mr. Chairman. I certainly welcome Administrator Bolden and I
    hope he can answer some of the many questions we have about the
    President's proposal, and we had the opportunity to talk with
    him yesterday. His time has always been available, and I am
    very appreciative of that.
        I am also pleased to see two space heroes with us today,
    Neil Armstrong and Gene Cernan. These men are legendary
    astronauts and explorers who laid the whole foundation for our
    Nation's space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, and I am
    honored that they have agreed to share their knowledge and
    their commitment and their passion with us today. I want to
    thank Tom Young for once again agreeing to testify before this
    Committee and sharing his knowledge and years of experience
    working with the government acquisition process.
        It has now been nearly four months since the Administration
    proposed radical changes to NASA's human spaceflight and
    exploration programs. From the very beginning, it was clear
    that NASA's proposal lacked the sufficient detail that Congress
    would need to determine whether it was a credible plan, yet in
    spite of our best efforts to obtain more information from NASA,
    this situation has not improved. Indeed, the President's trip
    to the Kennedy Space Center on April 15th only added to the
    confusion as he laid out more aspirational goals but provided
    no clear idea of how they fit together or how the experts
    expect to ever pay for all these new ventures.
        As such, I still have many basic concerns about our ability
    to access and use the International Space Station after the
    shuttle is retired. I remain concerned about the gap in the
    U.S. access to space, and I want to ensure that we can
    effectively use the enormous research capabilities of the
    International Space Station. In examining the President's plan,
    I still do not see a viable way to minimize the gap and provide
    for very exciting research on the International Space Station.
    The President's most recent decision to send an unmanned
    lifeboat to the space station at a potential cost of $5 billion
    to $7 billion does absolutely nothing to solve this problem and
    largely duplicates existing services provided by the Russians.
        Although we have already spent nearly $10 billion on the
    Constellation system and supported by Democrats and Republicans
    alike on this Committee and in this Congress that has achieved
    significant milestones and is well on its way to provided
    continued U.S. access to space, the Administration's continued
    decisions to cancel Constellation has further stalled
    development and jeopardizes our undisputed leadership in space.
        As I have said many times before, I am concerned with the
    proposed commercial crew direction of the Administration. While
    I have long supported the development of commercial cargo
    operations, I believe it is prudent that we first test cargo
    capabilities before risking the lives of our astronauts on
    newly developed systems. I have not seen credible data to
    suggest that there is a viable market for commercial crew
    carriers, and in the absence of that data, I fear that we might
    be setting ourselves up for failure if and when the markets do
    not materialize. Anyone can claim to be able to take over
    commercial crews, and I have read a good bit of the ideas of
    another space hero and a very dear friend of mine, Buzz Aldrin,
    who supports commercial crew, but I am still looking for
    concrete data that they can finish what they start and will not
    be coming back to the government for additional money if they
    take over.
        Finally, in examining options beyond low-Earth orbit, I am
    unclear when we might see the development of a heavy lift
    system or whether NASA still considers the moon as a logical
    destination. We have been told that a new ``game changing''
    technology development program will provide capabilities for
    accessing the far reaches of space but we have very few
    specifics on mission goals and direction. I hope Administrator
    Bolden has some of the answers that have been lacking up to
    now.
        In the absence of a defensible, credible plan, I and many
    of our members continue to support the Constellation program as
    currently authorized and appropriated by successive Congresses.
    GAO will continue investigating whether NASA is improperly
    withholding funds and improperly applying the Antideficiency
    Act as a means of slowing Constellation work. I believe that
    Congress has been clear that it supports the unhindered
    continuation of Constellation until it authorizes an
    alternative program.
        Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you over the
    next several weeks as the Committee begins to reauthorize NASA,
    and we can no longer wait for NASA to provide justification for
    its radical changes. Time is absolutely running out.
        I want to wish you, Mr. Chairman, the very best and I want
    to thank you and express my gratitude to you for your undying
    efforts to preserve the right thing for us to do, and we all
    look forward to continuing. I look forward to today's
    testimony.
        I yield back my time, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Representative Ralph M. Hall

        Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today on the
    important topic of NASA's human space flight program.
        I also want to thank you for assembling such an extraordinary panel
    of witnesses today. I want to welcome NASA Administrator Bolden, and I
    hope that he can answer some of the many questions that we have about
    the President's proposal.
        I am also pleased to see two space heroes with us today, Neil
    Armstrong and Gene Cernan. Both men are legendary astronauts and
    explorers who laid the foundation for our nation's space exploration
    beyond low Earth orbit. I am honored that they have agreed to share
    their knowledge, their commitment, and their passion with us today. I
    also want to thank Tom Young for once again agreeing to testify before
    this committee and share his knowledge and years of experience working
    with the government acquisition process.
        It has now been nearly four months since the administration
    proposed radical changes to NASA's human space flight and exploration
    programs. From the very beginning it was clear that NASA's proposal
    lacked the sufficient detail that Congress would need to determine
    whether it was a credible plan. Yet, in spite of our best efforts to
    obtain more information from NASA this situation has not improved.
    Indeed, the President's trip to the Kennedy Space Center on April 15th
    only added to the confusion as he laid out more aspirational goals, but
    provided no clear idea of how they fit together or how he expects to
    pay for these new ventures.
        As such, I still have many basic concerns about our ability to
    access and use the International Space Station after the Shuttle is
    retired. I remain concerned about the ``gap'' in U.S. access to space,
    and I want to ensure that we can effectively use the enormous research
    capabilities of the International Space Station. In examining the
    President's plan, I still do not see a viable way to minimize the
    ``gap'' and provide for exciting research on the ISS.
        The President's most recent decision to send an unmanned
    ``lifeboat'' to the Space Station at a potential cost of $5-7 billion
    does nothing to solve this problem and largely duplicates existing
    services provided by the Russians. Although we have already spent
    nearly $10 billion on the Constellation system that has achieved
    significant milestones and is well on its way to providing continued
    U.S. access to space, the Administration's decision to cancel
    Constellation has further stalled development and jeopardized our
    undisputed leadership in space.
        As I have said many times before, I am concerned with the proposed
    commercial crew direction of this Administration. While I have long
    supported the development of commercial cargo operations, I believe
    that it is prudent that we first test cargo capabilities before risking
    the lives
        of our astronauts on newly developed systems. I also have not seen
    credible data to suggest that there is a viable market for commercial
    crew carriers, and in the absence of that data I fear that we might be
    setting ourselves up failure if, or when, the markets do not
    materialize. Anyone can claim to be able to take over commercial crew,
    and I have read the good ideas of another space hero, Buzz Aldrin who
    supports commercial crew, but I am still looking for concrete data that
    they can finish what they start, and will not be coming back to the
    government for additional money if they take over.
        Finally, in examining options beyond low Earth orbit, I am unclear
    when we might see the development of a heavy lift system, or whether
    NASA still considers the Moon as a logical destination. We have been
    told that a new ``game-changing'' technology development program will
    provide capabilities for accessing the far reaches of space, but we
    have very few specifics on mission, goals, and direction. I hope
    Administrator Bolden has some of the answers that have been lacking up
    to now.
        In the absence of a defensible, credible plan, I and many of our
    members continue to support the Constellation program as currently
    authorized and appropriated by successive Congresses. GAO will continue
    investigating whether NASA is improperly withholding funds, and
    improperly applying the Anti-Deficiency Act as a means of slowing
    Constellation work. I believe that Congress has been clear that it
    supports the unhindered continuation of Constellation until it
    authorizes an alternative program.
        Mr. Chairman I look forward to working with you over the next
    several weeks as the Committee begins to reauthorize NASA, and we can
    no longer wait for NASA to provide justifications for its radical
    changes. Time is running out.
        I look forward to today's testimony, and I yield back my time.

        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Hall. You are a good
    partner.
        Our first witness is Mr. Charles F. Bolden, Jr., who is the
    Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration, and Gen. Bolden, you have served your country
    with distinction in and out of uniform. We are glad you could
    be with us today, and I know you can breathe a better sigh of
    relief that the shuttle landed safely this morning.
    Congratulations for that. And so you may proceed.

     STATEMENTS OF CHARLES F. BOLDEN, JR., ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
                  AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. Bolden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I want to thank
    you all for the opportunity to appear here today to discuss
    additional information about the President's fiscal year 2011
    budget request for NASA. Following the President's important
    speech at the NASA Kennedy Space Center in Florida, I also want
    to comment about the outcome of that.
        NASA is grateful for the support and guidance received from
    this Committee through the years and looks forward to working
    with you to implement the President's bold new direction for
    our agency. Given that you have my detailed written statement,
    I will try to keep my remarks brief this morning so that I
    leave time for your questions.
        First, I would like to acknowledge the incredible
    contributions of my two astronaut colleagues on the next panel.
    Both Neil and Gene, the first and last humans to set foot on
    the moon, have dedicated their lives to the challenging and
    often-unforgiving pursuit of space exploration and in doing so
    have improved the quality of life in America and inspired the
    next generation of explorations. They continue to contribute by
    remaining engaged and providing their remarks on today's
    important topic of the future of human space exploration. I
    appreciate their thoughts, and we talk often. It was very
    beneficial to have had the opportunity to discuss their
    concerns and to present them with a thorough brief on our plans
    for America's future in human spaceflight several weeks ago.
        However, reasonable people can disagree and so I must
    respectfully disagree with some of their concerns and their
    opinions. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request is
    good for NASA because it sets the agency on a sustainable path
    that is tightly linked to our Nation's interests. During his
    visit to the Kennedy Space Center, the President articulated a
    strong commitment to NASA's mission and the future of human
    spaceflight exploration. As we prepare to end the shuttle era,
    and we took an important step this morning when we successfully
    bought Atlantis home safely with her crew, we all should
    acknowledge its critical importance as a very productive step
    along America's path of becoming the preeminent space-faring
    Nation.
        As my predecessor, Mike Griffin, has written in a draft
    tribute to the space shuttle, and I quote, ``It was an enormous
    leap in human progress. The shuttle wasn't perfect, and we will
    make more such leaps as we are trying to do through our budget
    in 2011.'' That is my part, my insert. ``But none of them will
    be perfect either.'' The programs on which we will embark under
    the guidance provided by President Obama in our proposed fiscal
    2011 budget and his speech at the Kennedy Space Center of April
    15th of this year will be our new leaps in human progress and
    they won't be perfect, but we must all understand and be
    incredibly proud that we have an opportunity to create an
    option for our children and grandchildren to live in a new and
    richer era of exploration. If we can agree to accept the
    promise that comes with the President's fiscal year 2011 budget
    proposal, we will be creating the future that we all wanted to
    see in the eras now passed.
        The President has laid out the goals and strategies for
    this new vision which includes a sequence of deep-space
    destinations for human missions progressing step by step
    beginning with crewed flight tests early next decade of
    vehicles capable of supporting exploration beyond low-Earth
    orbit, a human mission to an asteroid by 2025 and a human
    mission to orbit Mars and return safely to Earth by the 2030s.
        With respect to the role of heavy lift in the future human
    spaceflight architecture, the fiscal 2011 budget request
    includes funds for NASA to conduct the important R&D and
    analysis necessary to make an informed decision on a heavy-lift
    vehicle no later than 2015. On May 3rd, we issued a request for
    information seeking general information regarding potential
    launch or space transportation architectures that will be used
    for planning and acquisition strategy development for the
    current heavy-lift planning activities. And on May 19th, we
    issued a draft broad agency announcement that will expand on
    the previous NASA technical assessments, address fiscal 2010
    planned activities and also contribute to our future plans.
        We have also made progress in developing a plan that
    supports the development of commercial crew transportation
    providers. On May 21st, we issued a request for information to
    seek industry feedback to help us plan the overall strategy for
    the development and demonstration of a commercial crew
    transportation capability and to receive comments on NASA's
    commercial human rating plan. The RFIs and BAAs are all
    preliminary planning activities for the President's fiscal year
    2011 proposal regarding future human spaceflight efforts, and
    we appreciate that the Government Accountability Office's
    opinion issued on this past Monday confirming that NASA had not
    violated the exploration appropriations restriction on the use
    of funding to create or initiate new program or project
    activity.
        Regarding our plans for a restructured Orion, the President
    directed that NASA build on the good work already completed on
    the Orion crew capsule and focus the efforts to provide a
    simpler and more efficient design, initially for crew emergency
    escape from the space station, evolving in future years to be
    the advanced spacecraft used in our deep-space missions. This
    approach will preserve a number of critical high-tech-industry
    jobs in key disciplines needed for our future deep-space
    exploration program. We have put together a formulation team
    including headquarters and center personnel to develop a
    baseline approach that meets these requirements balanced with
    the other priorities proposed in the President's fiscal 2011
    budget request. The team will report to me next week on how
    best to meet these requirements.
        And finally, on the subject of workforce transition
    initiatives, the President committed to providing $40 million
    to aid Florida's Space Coast. The men and women who work in the
    Space Coast aerospace industry are some of the most talented
    and highly trained in the Nation. It is critical that their
    skills are tapped as we transform our country and grow the
    country's space exploration efforts. On May 3rd, the President
    established a taskforce to develop in collaboration with local
    stakeholders an interagency action plan to facilitate economic
    development strategies along the Space Coast and to provide
    training and other opportunities for affected aerospace
    workers. The taskforce, which I co-chair with Secretary of
    Commerce Gary Locke, will also explore future workforce and
    economic development activities that could be undertaken for
    affected aerospace communities in other States as appropriate.
        NASA expects to submit a revised 2011 budget request to the
    Congress in the very near future that will identify funding
    requirements for the restructured Orion crew capsule as well as
    funding requirements for workforce transition.
        Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, Americans and people worldwide
    have turned to NASA for inspiration throughout our history. Our
    work gives people an opportunity to imagine what is barely
    possible, and we at NASA get to turn these dreams into real
    achievements for all humankind. This budget gives NASA a
    roadmap to even more historic achievements as it spurs
    innovation, employs Americans in fulfilling jobs and engages
    people around the world as we enter an exciting new era in
    space.
        Thank you very much for your continued support and that of
    this Committee. I look forward to responding to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Bolden follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Charles Bolden, Jr.

        Chairman Gordon and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
    opportunity to appear today to discuss additional information about the
    President's FY 2011 budget request for NASA, following the President's
    important speech at the NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in Florida.
    NASA is grateful for the support and guidance received from this
    Committee through the years and looks forward to working with you to
    implement the President's bold new direction for the Agency.
        The President's FY 2011 budget request is good for NASA because it
    sets the Agency on a sustainable path that is tightly linked to our
    Nation's interests. The President recognizes that what is truly needed
    for beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) exploration are game-changing
    technologies; making the fundamental investments that will provide the
    foundation for the next half-century of American leadership in space
    exploration. In doing so, the President has put forward what I believe
    to be the most authentically visionary policy for human space
    exploration that we have had since President Kennedy challenged NASA to
    send humans to the Moon and return them safely back to Earth. At the
    same time, under the new plan, we will ensure continuous American
    presence in space on the International Space Station (ISS) throughout
    this entire decade and likely beyond, re-establish a robust and
    competitive American launch industry, launch more robotic probes into
    our solar system as precursors for human activity, invest in a new
    heavy lift research and development (R&D) program, and build a
    technological foundation for sustainable, beyond-LEO exploration, with
    more capable expeditions in lunar space, and human missions to near-
    Earth asteroids, the Moon, Lagrange points, and, ultimately, Mars. NASA
    will embark on these transformative initiatives by partnering with the
    best in industry, academia and other government agencies, as well as
    with our international partners.
        At the request of the Committee, today I will provide additional
    details about pending revisions to the President's FY 2011 budget
    request for NASA. I will discuss NASA's progress in developing plans
    for the new exploration initiatives included in the FY 2011 budget
    request, including initial planned program assignments for major
    programs by Center. Additionally, my testimony will provide additional
    detail about three significant updates that were announced by the
    President when he visited KSC on April 15, 2010. NASA is working
    expeditiously to provide specific budgetary details to reflect these
    updates and we will share them with this Committee and other
    Congressional stakeholders as soon as we are able.

    President Obama Visits KSC

        During his visit to KSC, the President articulated a strong
    commitment to NASA's mission and future U.S. human space exploration.
    The President also outlined an ambitious effort to foster the
    development of ground-breaking technologies; increase the number,
    scope, and pace of manned and unmanned space missions; make human
    spaceflight safer and more efficient; and help create thousands of new
    jobs. The President directed that NASA proceed to develop a crew rescue
    vehicle based on the Orion space-capsule to support emergency crew
    return requirements on the ISS, and providing a technological
    foundation for systems that can later take us beyond Earth's orbit. In
    addition to investing in transformative heavy-lift technologies, the
    President has called on NASA to select a basic rocket design, no later
    than 2015, and then begin to build it. The President also said that
    after decades of neglect, we will increase investment--right away--in
    other groundbreaking technologies that are designed to enable
    astronauts to reach space sooner and more often, to travel farther and
    faster for less cost, and to live and work in space for longer periods
    of time more safely. And, the President laid out the goals and
    strategies in this new vision for NASA. Fundamentally, the exploration
    of space will be a sequence of deep-space destinations for human
    missions matched to growing capabilities, progressing step-by-step,
    beginning with crewed flight tests--perhaps a circumlunar mission--
    early next decade of vehicles capable of supporting exploration beyond
    LEO, a human mission to an asteroid by 2025, and a human mission to
    orbit Mars and return safely to Earth by the 2030s. Finally, the
    President committed to providing $40 million for workforce transition
    initiatives to aid Florida's Space Coast, and I have been appointed to
    co-Chair--along with Department of Commerce Secretary, Gary Locke--a
    task force to develop a strategy for assisting the workforce
    transition.
        NASA expects to submit a revised FY 2011 budget request to the
    Congress in the near future that will identify funding requirements for
    the restructured Orion crew capsule as well as funding requirements and
    authorization for workforce transition for Florida and potentially
    other locations.

    Restructuring the Orion Crew Capsule

        Per the President's direction, we are going to build on the good
    work already completed on the Orion crew capsule and focus the effort
    to provide a simpler and more efficient design that would provide crew
    emergency escape from the ISS and serve as part of the technical
    foundation for advanced spacecraft to be used in future deep space
    missions. This approach also will preserve a number of critical high-
    tech industry jobs in key disciplines needed for our future deep space
    exploration program.
        We have put together a formulation team including Headquarters and
    Center personnel to develop a baseline approach that meets these
    requirements, balanced with the other priorities proposed in the
    President's FY 2011 budget request. This team will report to me next
    week on how best to meet these requirements.
        I have directed the team to align this work so that it complements,
    and does not compete with, our commercial crew development effort. This
    should also reduce the pressure on the commercial crew service
    providers as the restructured Orion module serves to fulfill the
    important safety requirement of emergency escape for astronauts on the
    ISS. I have also directed the formulation team to focus on innovative
    approaches to oversight, and believe that we can significantly reduce
    oversight requirements based on lessons learned in previous focused
    development flight programs. We must accomplish this activity more
    efficiently and effectively to maintain a healthy funding balance
    across our exploration priorities. This will be done without reducing
    our commitment to safety for our NASA crews. The crew rescue mission
    has many fewer requirements than the deep space mission, providing
    design flexibility and reducing the system's lifecycle cost. Finally,
    the team must identify how this activity will align with the
    development efforts proposed in the Flagship Demonstration program as
    well as our other technology efforts so that investments in these
    programs can be leveraged to the greatest extent possible.
        The funding for this restructuring will come from within NASA's
    top-line request released in February. The out year funding
    requirements will be refined as part of the President's FY 2012 budget
    submission.

    Heavy-Lift Technologies

        During his visit to KSC, the President specifically recognized the
    need for a heavy lift launch capability to carry humans beyond LEO by
    requiring a decision on a vehicle design no later than 2015. Such a
    decision would include setting performance goals, identifying lift
    capability and selecting the general vehicle design--work that will
    ultimately lay the path for launching a spacecraft for crewed missions
    into deep space.
        The FY 2011 budget request includes funds for NASA to conduct the
    important R&D and analysis necessary to make an informed decision on a
    heavy-lift vehicle no later than 2015. A primary focus of this effort
    will be to conduct research and development on a U.S. first-stage
    hydrocarbon engine for potential use in heavy lift and other launch
    systems, as well as basic research in areas such as new propellants,
    advanced propulsion materials manufacturing techniques, combustion
    processes, propellant storage and control, and engine health
    monitoring. Additionally, NASA will initiate development and testing of
    in-space engines. Areas of focus could include a liquid oxygen/methane
    engine and lower-cost liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen engines. This work
    will build on NASA's recent R&D experience in this area, and the test
    articles will be viewed as a potential prototype for a subsequent
    operational engine that would be re-startable and capable of high
    acceleration and reliability. These technologies will increase our
    heavy-lift and other space propulsion capabilities and is intended to
    significantly lower costs--with the clear goal of taking us farther and
    faster into space consistent with safety and mission success criteria.
    In support of this initiative, NASA will explore cooperative efforts
    with the Department of Defense and also develop a competitive process
    for allocating a small portion of these funds to universities and other
    non-governmental organizations. This research effort along with many of
    our new technology initiatives will be coordinated with the broader
    Agency technology initiative led by NASA's new Chief Technologist.
        On May 3, 2010, NASA issued a Request for Information (RFI) seeking
    general information regarding potential launch or space transportation
    architectures (expendable, reusable, or a hybrid system) that could be
    utilized by multiple customers (e.g., NASA, commercial and other
    Government agencies). The RFI solicits information regarding propulsion
    system characteristics; technology challenges for propulsion systems;
    as well as innovative methods to manage a heavy-lift development
    program to include effective and affordable business practices. The RFI
    is open to the broad space community, including commercial, other
    Government agencies and academia. Information obtained from the RFI
    will be used for planning and acquisition-strategy development for
    current heavy-lift planning activities, funded in the FY 2010
    Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 111-117). Related to the RFI, on
    May 19, 2010, NASA posted a draft Broad Area Announcement (BAA). This
    draft BAA is soliciting proposals for a Heavy Lift and Propulsion
    Technology Trade study and seeks industry input on technical solutions
    in support of heavy lift system concepts studies. This draft BAA
    requests offerors to expand upon the previous NASA technical
    assessments and a final BAA solicitation will incorporate information
    obtained via the RFI as well as inputs from the upcoming Exploration
    workshop. These concept studies will include architecture assessments
    of a variety of potential heavy lift launch vehicles and in-space
    vehicle architectures employing various propulsion combinations and how
    they can be deployed to meet multiple mission objectives. Please note,
    the BAA is addressing FY 2010 planned activities which may also
    contribute to future plans and activities.

    Assistance for the Florida Space Coast

        The men and women who work in the Space Coast's aerospace industry
    are some of the most talented and highly trained in the nation. It is
    critical that their skills are tapped as we transform and grow the
    country's space exploration efforts. The 2004 decision to end the
    Shuttle means that approximately 6,000 jobs need to be transitioned
    into the new space strategy and related industries. Recognizing the
    concerns of our dedicated Shuttle workforce as they conclude this
    remarkable program and look forward to transitioning to new work, the
    President has announced a $40 million initiative to develop a plan for
    regional economic growth and job creation for the Florida Space Coast.
    On May 3, 2010, the President issued a Memorandum directing the
    establishment of the Task Force on Space Industry Workforce and
    Economic Development. The task force is charged with developing, in
    collaboration with local stakeholders, an interagency action plan to
    facilitate economic development strategies and plans along the Space
    Coast and to provide training and other opportunities for affected
    aerospace workers so they are equipped to contribute to new
    developments in America's space program and related industries. They
    will also explore future workforce and economic development activities
    that could be undertaken for affected aerospace communities in other
    States, as appropriate. The Secretary of Commerce and I will serve as
    Co-Chairs. Other team members will include: the Secretary of Defense;
    the Secretary of Labor; the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development;
    the Secretary of Transportation; the Secretary of Education, the Chair
    of the Council of Economic Advisors; the Director of the Office of
    Management and Budget; the Administrator of the Small Business
    Administration; the Director of National Intelligence; the Director of
    the Office of Science and Technology Policy; the Director of the
    National Economic Council; and the heads of other Executive agencies,
    as needed. As directed, the team will report its recommendations to the
    President by August 15. The $40 million for this initiative will be
    taken from the funds requested for Constellation transition in the
    original FY 2011 Presidential budget request.
        This interagency group's recommendations will build on the
    Administration's ongoing efforts in the KSC region. The Department of
    Labor is already planning a pilot program to better assist the region's
    workers, including those highly-skilled workers who work in the
    aerospace industry, through efforts to establish one-stop local
    transition centers for affected workers where they can receive
    coordinated local, state, and Federal workforce assistance tied to
    economic development efforts; and the designation of a single Federal
    point-of-contact for affected areas.
        To further facilitate these efforts, the Department of Commerce's
    Economic Development Administration (EDA) is prepared to support a
    comprehensive economic adjustment strategy for the Kennedy Space Center
    economic region. With funding provided through NASA, the EDA will
    provide both financial and technical assistance to start implementing
    those plans and promote economic development in the region through such
    activities as infrastructure upgrades and improvements, entrepreneurial
    networks, and skill-training facilities and equipment. The exact mix of
    activities will depend on the recommendations and request of local
    entities across the region.
        In addition, on April 30, 2010, the Department of Labor announced a
    $1.2 million grant to assist approximately 200 workers affected by
    layoffs at ATK Launch systems in Corinne, Utah, in connection with the
    transition of the Space Shuttle and Constellation programs.

    NASA Prepares to Implement the FY 2011 Budget Request

        Pursuant to the President's proposed new course, NASA has initiated
    planning activities to be able to effectively and efficiently implement
    these new activities in a timely manner upon Congressional enactment of
    the FY 2011 budget. In April, NASA outlined for the Committee the
    Agency's planned major program assignments across the Agency's Centers
    for new or extended activities proposed as part of the President's FY
    2011 budget request. These planned assignments build on the deep
    knowledge and expertise that NASA has built up over five decades,
    recognize the wealth of experience, commitment, and expertise resident
    at the NASA Centers, and expand upon the strengths at each Center.
        I wish to emphasize that establishment of program offices and
    initiation of effort in support of new or extended activities for this
    proposed new work is contingent upon Congressional approval of the
    President's FY 2011 request for these activities. These planned program
    assignments will enable NASA to engage workforce at the Agency's
    Centers in formulation activities for the array of program initiatives
    in Science, Aeronautics, Space Technology, Exploration, and Space
    Operations reflected in the President's FY 2011 request. While we will
    be developing details on the specific numbers of employees at our
    Centers that will be assigned to new program offices and activities,
    these planned assignments are intended to provide the Committee
    additional detail regarding the depth and scope of the President's FY
    2011 proposed budget plan.
        Planned major program assignments for elements contained in the FY
    2011 budget, by Center, follow:

              Johnson Space Center, Texas

                      Exploration/Flagship Technology Demonstrations,
                    Manager

                      Exploration/Commercial Crew Development, Deputy
                    Program Manager

                      Exploration/Commercial Cargo Development, Manager

                      Exploration/Human Research, Manager

                      ISS, Manager

              Kennedy Space Center, Florida

                      Exploration/Commercial Crew Development, Manager

                      Space Operations/21st Century Launch Complex,
                    Manager

                      Exploration/Flagship Technology Demonstrations,
                    Deputy Program Manager

                      Space Shuttle/Completion of Manifest, Manager

              Marshall Space Flight Center, Alabama

                      Exploration/Heavy Lift and Propulsion R&D, Manager

                      Exploration/Robotic Precursor Program, Manager

                      Space Technology/Crosscutting Capability
                    Demonstrations/Technology Demonstration Missions,
                    Manager

                      Space Technology/Centennial Challenges Program,
                    Manager

              Stennis Space Center, Mississippi

                      Exploration/Heavy Lift and Propulsion R&D, First
                    Stage and Upper Stage Rocket Testing

                      Exploration/Commercial Crew Development, Engine
                    Testing for Commercial Vehicles

              Glenn Research Center, Ohio

                      Exploration/Exploration Technology Development and
                    Demonstration, Manager

                      Space Technology/Early Stage Innovation/Research
                    Grants

                      Aeronautics Research/Integrated Systems Research
                    Program and Aviation Safety Program, support

              Langley Research Center, Virginia

                      Space Technology/Game Changing Technology/Game
                    Changing Development, Manager

                      Climate Initiative: SAGE III; CLARREO (managed
                    jointly with Goddard); Venture Class

                      Aeronautics Research/Integrated Systems Research
                    Program and Aviation Safety Program, support

              Dryden Flight Research Center, California

                      Space Technology/Crosscutting Capability
                    Demonstrations/Flight Opportunities, Manager

                      Aeronautics Research/Integrated Systems Research
                    Program and Aviation Safety Program, support

              Ames Research Center, California

                      Exploration/Precursor Robotic Missions/Exploration
                    Scouts, Manager

                      Space Technology/Game Changing Technology/Small
                    Satellite Subsystem Technologies, Manager

                      Space Technology/Crosscutting Capability
                    Demonstrations/Edison Small Satellite Demonstrations,
                    Manager

                      Aeronautics Research/Integrated Systems Research
                    Program and Aviation Safety Program, support

              Goddard Space Flight Center, Maryland

                      Joint Polar Satellite System (restructuring NPOESS),
                    procurement structure modeled after past successful
                    programs

                      Climate Initiative: ICESat-2; CLARREO (managed
                    jointly with Langley); DESDynI (managed jointly with
                    Jet Propulsion Laboratory); Earth Systematic Missions
                    Program.

              Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California

                      Climate Initiative: SMAP; DESDynI (managed jointly
                    with Goddard); GRACE, OCO-2.

        Following the release of the FY 2011 budget request, NASA
    established study teams within the Exploration Systems Mission
    Directorate (ESMD) to ensure we understand the steps (and the
    implications of those steps) that would need to be taken for an orderly
    transition of the Constellation Program and to plan for the
    implementation of the new initiatives in the Exploration program. The
    work undertaken by these teams is a necessary part of that planning.
    Following is a brief summary of the additional details developed for
    each initiative, as ``point of departure'' plans to support FY 201 1
    budget implementation, once the budget is approved. Please note these
    are preliminary ESMD plans that may need to be modified following
    finalization of Agency plans regarding the restructuring of the Orion
    crew capsule.

              Flagship Technology Demonstrations: The next
            generation of capabilities key to sustainably exploring deep
            space will be demonstrated through four proposed missions:
            advanced space propulsion in 2014, in-space propellant and fuel
            transfer in 2015, light weight/inflatable modules in 2016, and
            aero-assist in 2017. Autonomous operations and advanced life
            support capabilities will also be tested on these missions.
            Detailed definition of each mission's content is currently
            under way.

              Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology: Planned
            technology investments will lead to a demonstration of an in-
            space engine in 2015, development of a First Stage propulsion
            system by 2020, and maturing other foundational propulsion
            technologies to support a heavy lift vehicle decision in the
            2015 timeframe. NASA's efforts will be primarily focused on a
            LOX/RP first stage and either a LOX/methane or LOX/hydrogen in-
            space engine. Additional research will be dedicated to analysis
            and trades regarding fuel types, performance requirements, and
            vehicle architectures.

              Exploration Robotic Precursors: A series of annual
            exploration robotic precursor missions is being planned,
            beginning with launch of a Near-Earth-Orbit (NEO) mission in
            2014, followed by a lunar lander in 2015, and two Mars missions
            in 2016 and 2018, respectively. In addition, smaller robotic
            scout missions will be launched every 12-18 months to support
            reconnaissance, evaluate hazards, and develop systems and
            operations in support of future human exploration.

              Enabling Technology Development and Demonstration:
            Enabling technology will advance fundamental technologies in 10
            portfolio areas that will lead to ground and flight
            demonstrations in lunar volatiles, high power electric
            propulsion, autonomous precision landing, human exploration
            tele-robotics, fission power systems, and other areas. The
            flight demonstrations will be done as part of flagship
            demonstrations, robotic precursor missions, or utilizing the
            ISS, ground tests and analogs.

              Human Research: Through research and technology
            development, the goal of the Human Research Program is to
            reduce the highest risks to crew health and performance for
            space exploration missions. Increased investments will be made
            in the fields of biomedical technology, space radiation
            research, and behavioral health research. There are also plans
            to make increased use of the ISS facilities.

              Commercial Crew: NASA is continuing to define plans
            to expedite and improve the robustness of ISS crew and cargo
            delivery. In addition, NASA is developing a plan that supports
            the development of commercial crew transportation providers to
            whom NASA could competitively award crew transportation
            services. Solicitations for Commercial Crew Transportation
            (CCT) development will provide opportunities for both
            established and traditional aerospace companies as well as
            emerging entrepreneurial companies. Related to this activity,
            on May 21, NASA released a Request for Information to seek
            industry feedback to help the Agency plan the overall strategy
            for the development and demonstration of a CCT capability and
            to receive comments on the Commercial Human-Rating Plan that
            has been drafted as part of this initiative.

              Constellation Transition: The team is leveraging
            expertise from across the Agency to develop a rapid and cost
            effective ramp-down plan that will free the resources required
            for new programs. As part of the early characterization and
            integrated planning effort, this team has initiated a broad
            survey of current workforce, contracts, facilities, property,
            security, knowledge capture, information technology, and other
            government agency interface issues to determine what
            infrastructure and hardware could be used by the new programs
            and projects. The transition plan will outline three phases as
            part of an action plan for initial deliverables: Near-term
            actions, transitioning of Constellation elements, and
            transition of assets/resources to new Exploration focus areas
            and other NASA programs, where appropriate.

        NASA is taking prudent steps to plan for the new initiatives
    included in the FY 2011 budget request, including Requests for
    Information (RFI), workshops, and preliminary studies. NASA is eager to
    receive external input from industry, academia, and other partners, and
    is accomplishing this via a series of RFIs and industry workshops
    conducted this spring and into the summer. Doing so will ensure that
    NASA receives important feedback from our space partners before it
    begins to finalize its implementation plans for the new technology
    demonstrations and human spaceflight systems development activities
    that will be supported by the FY 2011 budget, once approved by
    Congress. During CY 2010, NASA plans to issue a series of program
    formulation documents seeking input from the broader space community.
    The following are tentative timeframes for these activities:

              Flagship Technology Demonstrations: RFI issued May
            17, 2010.

              Heavy Lift and Propulsion Technology: RFI issued May
            3, 2010; Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) posted on May 19.

              Exploration Robotic Precursor Missions: RFI issued
            May 21, 2010.

              Enabling Technology Development: RFI issued May 7,
            2010; BAA in June/July.

              Human Research Program: BAA in July.

              Commercial Crew Transportation: RFI issued May 21,
            2010.

        The first major public discussions about NASA's FY 2011 planned
    activities are occurring at a two-day Exploration Enterprise Workshop,
    which started yesterday and will conclude today in Galveston, Texas.
    The workshop is bringing together a broad community of stakeholders
    from industry, academia, and the Federal Government to engage in
    discussions related to strategy building, development, and the
    implementation of the new plans for human and robotic exploration in
    space.
        The workshop is focusing on the President's FY 11 budget request
    for NASA Exploration. The Agency has completed the initial phase of
    planning for the new technology and robotic programs and is providing
    insight into progress to date. The objectives of the workshop are to:

              Describe and discuss the activities planned for
            inclusion in the new programs

              Discuss NASA Center proposed Program assignments

              Solicit feedback, ideas and suggestions from
            interested parties

              Prepare for the next steps once the new programs are
            implemented

        In addition, NASA has also established study teams to plan for the
    implementation of the new initiatives related to the ISS Augmentation,
    21st Century Space Complex and Space Technology. Additional information
    on these planning efforts as well as planned RFIs, workshops, and
    preliminary studies are outlined below.

              ISS Augmentation: The ISS program is reviewing
            functionality enhancements that will make the space station
            more capable and efficient, including: upgraded environmental
            systems and communications, techniques for saving space and
            improving the use of pressurized volume, tools for optimizing
            flight- and ground-crew time, upgrading and expanding payload
            operations, enhancing EVA and robotics use on Station, and
            reducing the complexity of international interfaces.

                      NASA will initiate an independent organization, as
                    recommended by the Augustine Committee and the National
                    Research Council that will support the space station
                    research community.

              21st Century Space Launch Complex: NASA has developed
            a list of potential project ideas with preliminary estimates to
            be used as one potential source of solutions to customer needs
            as they are identified. These initial focus areas will be
            adjusted as customer needs are better understood: 1) Expanding
            capabilities to support commercial launch providers; 2)
            Environmental remediation; 3) Enhancing payload processing
            capabilities; and, 4) Supporting the modernization of the
            launch range capabilities.

                      In late May, NASA will release an RFI to get a
                    first-hand understanding of investments that would be
                    most useful in support of launch and related activities
                    in order to help the Agency prioritize near-term
                    projects.

              Space Technology: NASA's Space Technology initiative
            under the Office of the Chief Technologist (OCT) will develop
            and demonstrate advanced space systems concepts and
            technologies enabling new approaches to enhance NASA's current
            mission set and enable future missions. Planning teams continue
            to make significant progress: an internal technology governance
            plan has been approved; an Agency-level technology road mapping
            activity is planned to begin in July; and, approved technology
            program plans for Early Stage Innovation, Game Changing
            Technology, and Crosscutting Capability Demonstrations will be
            completed by the end of June.

                      NASA will issue a Crosscutting Capability
                    Demonstrations RFI in June 2010. Game Changing
                    Technology Industry Day will occur in late June 2010.
                    Early Stage Innovation NASA Research Announcements
                    (NRA's) are targeted for late June 2010. An RFI
                    soliciting potential topics for the proposed Space
                    Technology Graduate Fellowship program has been
                    released to the NASA Centers and Federal Research
                    Laboratories.

        Finally, NASA has established the Human Exploration Framework Team
    (HEFT) to serve as a crossAgency planning activity. The team is being
    led by the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate and staffed with
    technical leaders from across NASA Centers. The team is focused on
    developing and reviewing the integrated set of requirements and
    technologies required for future human spaceflight missions to many
    destinations, including Mars. As part of its broad integration charter,
    HEFT will develop implementation recommendations on the performance and
    pacing requirements for the technologies needed for future human
    exploration missions using ``design reference missions,'' or DRMs.
    These DRMs will be the basis for validating capabilities and missions
    for 5-, 10-, and 15-year horizons, with milestones including crewed
    missions beyond the Moon into deep space by 2025, sending astronauts to
    an asteroid, and eventually landing on Mars. NASA expects to have
    initial products from the HEFT team this summer.

    Extension and Enhanced Use of the International Space Station

        A key element of America's future in space is the ISS that is due
    to be completed this year. As of May 2009, the ISS is able to support a
    six-person permanent crew. The three major science labs aboard ISS were
    completed in 2009 with the delivery of the Exposed Facility of the
    Japanese Kibo module. And last week, Space Shuttle Atlantis delivered
    science experiments and a new Russian laboratory to the ISS, continuing
    the transition from assembly to continuous scientific research through
    the end of the decade. The Russian-built Mini Research Module-1, also
    known as Rassvet (dawn in Russian), will host a variety of
    biotechnology, biological science, fluid physics and educational
    research experiments. Rassvet was attached to the bottom port of the
    ISS's Zarya module on May 18.
        The ISS represents a unique research capability which the United
    States and its partner nations can use to conduct a wide variety of
    research in biology, chemistry, physics and engineering fields that
    will help us better understand how to keep astronauts healthy and
    productive on long-duration space missions. If Congress approves the FY
    2011 budget request, NASA will be able to fully utilize the ISS and
    increase its capabilities through upgrades to both ground support and
    onboard systems. Importantly, this budget extends operations of the
    ISS, likely to 2020 or beyond.
        ISS research is anticipated to have terrestrial applications in
    areas such as biotechnology, bioengineering, medicine and therapeutic
    treatment. The FY 2011 budget request for ISS reflects increased
    funding to support the ISS as a National Laboratory in which this
    latter type of research can be conducted. NASA has two MOUs with other
    U.S. government agencies, and five agreements with non-government
    organizations to conduct research aboard the ISS. NASA intends to
    continue to expand the community of National Laboratory users of the
    ISS.
        ISS can also play a key role in the technology demonstrations and
    engineering research associated with exploration. Propellant storage
    and transfer, life support systems, and inflatable technology can all
    benefit by using the unique research capabilities of ISS. In addition
    to supporting a variety of research and development efforts, the ISS
    will serve as an incubator for the growth of the low-Earth orbit space
    economy.
        As a tool for expanding knowledge of the world around us; advancing
    technology; serving as an impetus for the development of the commercial
    space sector; demonstrating the feasibility of a complex, long-term,
    international effort; providing critical data regarding human long
    duration spaceflight; and, perhaps most importantly, inspiring the next
    generation to pursue careers in science, technology, engineering, and
    mathematics, the ISS is without equal.

    Conclusion

        Americans and people worldwide have turned to NASA for inspiration
    throughout our history--our work gives people an opportunity to imagine
    what is barely possible, and we at NASA get to turn those dreams into
    real achievements for all humankind. This budget gives NASA a roadmap
    to even more historic achievements as it spurs innovation, employs
    Americans in fulfilling jobs, and engages people around the world as we
    enter an exciting new era in space. NASA looks forward to working with
    the Committee on implementation of the FY 2011 budget request.
        Chairman Gordon, thank you for your support and that of this
    Committee. I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or the
    other Members of the Committee may have.

                       Biography for Charles Bolden, Jr.

        Nominated by President Barack Obama and confirmed by the U.S.
    Senate, retired Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Charles Frank Bolden, Jr., began
    his duties as the twelfth Administrator of the National Aeronautics and
    Space Administration on July 17, 2009. As Administrator, he leads the
    NASA team and manages its resources to advance the agency's missions
    and goals.
        Bolden's confirmation marks the beginning of his second stint with
    the nation's space agency. His 34-year career with the Marine Corps
    included 14 years as a member of NASA's Astronaut Office. After joining
    the office in 1980, he traveled to orbit four times aboard the space
    shuttle between 1986 and 1994, commanding two of the missions. His
    flights included deployment of the Hubble Space Telescope and the first
    joint U.S.-Russian shuttle mission, which featured a cosmonaut as a
    member of his crew. Prior to Bolden's nomination for the NASA
    Administrator's job, he was employed as the Chief Executive Officer of
    JACKandPANTHER LLC, a small business enterprise providing leadership,
    military and aerospace consulting, and motivational speaking.
        A resident of Houston, Bolden was born Aug. 19, 1946, in Columbia,
    S.C. He graduated from C. A. Johnson High School in 1964 and received
    an appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy. Bolden earned a bachelor of
    science degree in electrical science in 1968 and was commissioned as a
    second lieutenant in the Marine Corps. After completing flight training
    in 1970, he became a naval aviator. Bolden flew more than 100 combat
    missions in North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, while
    stationed in Namphong, Thailand, from 1972-1973.
        After returning to the U.S., Bolden served in a variety of
    positions in the Marine Corps in California and earned a master of
    science degree in systems management from the University of Southern
    California in 1977. Following graduation, he was assigned to the Naval
    Test Pilot School at Patuxent River, Md., and completed his training in
    1979. While working at the Naval Air Test Center's Systems Engineering
    and Strike Aircraft Test Directorates, he tested a variety of ground
    attack aircraft until his selection as an astronaut candidate in 1980.
        Bolden's NASA astronaut career included technical assignments as
    the Astronaut Office Safety Officer; Technical Assistant to the
    director of Flight Crew Operations; Special Assistant to the Director
    of the Johnson Space Center; Chief of the Safety Division at Johnson
    (overseeing safety efforts for the return to flight after the 1986
    Challenger accident); lead astronaut for vehicle test and checkout at
    the Kennedy Space Center; and Assistant Deputy Administrator at NASA
    Headquarters. After his final space shuttle flight in 1994, he left the
    agency to return to active duty the operating forces in the Marine
    Corps as the Deputy Commandant of Midshipmen at the U.S. Naval Academy.
        Bolden was assigned as the Deputy Commanding General of the 1st
    Marine Expeditionary Force in the Pacific in 1997. During the first
    half of 1998, he served as Commanding General of the 1st Marine
    Expeditionary Force Forward in support of Operation Desert Thunder in
    Kuwait. Bolden was promoted to his final rank of major general in July
    1998 and named Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces in Japan. He later
    served as the Commanding General of the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing at
    Marine Corps Air Station Miramar in San Diego, Calif., from 2000 until
    2002, before retiring from the Marine Corps in 2003. Bolden's many
    military decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal and the
    Distinguished Flying Cross. He was inducted into the U.S. Astronaut
    Hall of Fame in May 2006.
        Bolden is married to the former Alexis (Jackie) Walker of Columbia,
    S.C. The couple has two children: Anthony Che, a lieutenant colonel in
    the Marine Corps who is married to the former Penelope McDougal of
    Sydney, Australia, and Kelly Michelle, a medical doctor now serving a
    fellowship in plastic surgery.

        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Administrator Bolden.
        If there are members who wish to submit additional opening
    statements, your statement will be added to the record at this
    time.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Giffords follows:]

            Prepared Statement of Representative Gabrielle Giffords

        Today's hearing is one of the most important that this Committee
    will hold this year. We will be deliberating on the future of America's
    human spaceflight program, and in essence we will be deliberating about
    the future of this great country. The stakes are that high.
        As Chair of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, I have been
    working since last year to hold hearings and to conduct oversight to
    illuminate the issues that need to be considered if we are to craft a
    human exploration program that can be successful and worth undertaking.
        There were a number of themes that recurred throughout all of those
    hearings and oversight activities: the need for budgets that are
    adequate for the tasks to be undertaken--you can't do meaningful
    exploration ``on the cheap''; the need to sustain a commitment and not
    keep constantly changing direction or goals; the need to keep safety
    paramount and not assume that it will be maintained without diligent
    effort and hard work; and the need to examine the broader national and
    international context when contemplating any changes to programs.
        I had hoped that the Administration's FY 2011 budget request would
    reflect those themes. Unfortunately, it does not. Not only does the
    Administration's plan not provide a budget plan that would help redress
    the balance between what NASA is asked to do and what it has been
    provided to date, but it has all the hallmarks of an ill-conceived
    mishmash of buzzwords about innovation and inspiration, assumptions
    based on hope rather than data, and an apparent desire to discard all
    of the work carried out by the previous Administration.
        We are now seeing the consequences of that approach. Nearly four
    months after the initial rollout of the budget and after an addendum by
    the president on April 15th, Congress still is unable to get answers to
    basic questions about the proposed plan. Even something as basic as
    asking how the Administration intends to pay for the crew rescue
    vehicle development program that was added to NASA's budget without any
    additional funding is beyond their capacity to answer.
        In that case, I think the reason for their unwillingness to answer
    is clear: the needed funding will have to come out of the ``technology
    and innovation'' initiatives that they touted as hallmarks of their new
    approach. In short, those new investments that were to compensate
    Centers for the loss of their work on Constellation are illusory and
    always were. I will not dwell on the other contradictions and
    shortcomings of the plan in these brief remarks--I believe that the
    distinguished witnesses we have here today will be able to articulate
    them quite clearly on their own.
        What I do want to emphasize is that we are now at the point where
    the lack of a credible plan from the Administration means that Congress
    is going to have consider alternative options that will provide a
    productive path forward for our human space flight program. We may not
    be able to correct for all the past underfunding in a single
    authorization or appropriation bill, nor can we negate the past actions
    that will lead us to a ``gap'' in crewed access to space after the
    Shuttle is retired. Yet we can make a start, and at a minimum, we can
    start by heeding the wisdom contained in the classic dictum: ``first do
    no harm''. I believe that we would do irreparable harm to our nation's
    human space flight program if we were to adopt the Administration's
    proposals. I intend to work to ensure that we take a better path.

        [The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Representative Jerry F. Costello

        Good Morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding today's hearing
    to receive testimony on the National Aeronautics and Space
    Administration (NASA) human spaceflight plan proposed in the
    President's Fiscal Year 2011 budget.
        The President's budget is a general departure from the NASA
    Authorization Act of 2008 passed by Congress and signed into law. It
    proposes major changes to NASA's human spaceflight program, including a
    shift to commercial crew vehicles, a termination of the Constellation
    Program, and the elimination of the moon as the next destination for
    NASA's astronauts. In the past three months, these plans and goals
    rapidly have changed and developed, but I am concerned there has been
    limited communication between Congress and the administration to
    address concerns with the budget and ensure these changes will maintain
    our leadership in human spaceflight for generations to come.
        First, the end of Constellation will result in the loss of tens of
    thousands of jobs at NASA and the companies with whom NASA has
    contracted out work. With the budget's strong investment in commercial
    human spaceflight over government-operated programs, there is a chance
    these jobs could disappear all together. However, according to NASA,
    commercial crew vehicles will create tens of thousands of jobs and
    through new, commercial contracts many of these workers will return to
    their jobs. I would like to hear from our witnesses what impact they
    believe a shift to commercial crew vehicles will have on the aerospace
    workforce.
        Second, on April 15, 2010, the President announced several changes
    to his initial FY 11 budget, including identifying destinations for
    human spaceflight by 2025 and reinstating NASA's investment in the
    design and possible construction of a Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle.
    However, no additional funding was provided for NASA to achieve these
    new goals. In fact, the proposed budget and the outyear projections
    fall short of the Augustine Commission's recommended budget increases
    to achieve meaningful developments in human spaceflight. I am
    interested in hearing how the President's new goals and the underlying
    FY 11 human spaceflight plans may fall within the proposed $19 billion
    budget. If the plans will require additional funding or offsets, what
    steps will NASA take to ensure it stays on schedule and within the
    budget for these new plans.
        Third, the President's budget makes major investments in research
    and development within NASA. I strongly support these efforts to
    develop cutting-edge technology and expand NASA's discoveries beyond
    space to address everyday national challenges. However, a recent report
    from the National Research Council found that NASA's laboratories and
    flight centers were inadequate and could fail to perform the research
    tasks presented by the FY 11 budget. I would like to hear from
    Administrator Bolden what plans are in place or proposed to address
    these inadequacies and ensure NASA can carry out its research mission.
        Finally, Congress and the administration must have an open dialogue
    to hear determine all aspects of NASA's proposed budget. Without these
    clear lines of communication, we cannot make an informed decision about
    the direction NASA should take with the future of human spaceflight.
        Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

        Chairman Gordon. We will now start our questions, and the
    Chair yields to himself for the first question.
        Administrator Bolden, you have heard the concerns I raised
    in my opening statement, a budget that falls below what the
    Augustine Committee said would be needed for a viable program,
    the addition of an unfunded crew rescue vehicle program that
    will put additional stress on the budget, and the lack of
    someone would call credible cost estimates from the commercial
    crew initiative that could wind up adding even more stress. Any
    one of these would be a warning flag, but we have three here,
    and so make me feel better that this budget will accomplish the
    mission that you have set forth.

                           Feasibility of New Budget

        Mr. Bolden. Mr. Chairman, very simply, what this budget
    does, is it provides funding for research and development,
    rejuvenation of those activities, whether it is on college and
    university campuses or whether in industry itself. It also
    provides us with a way to increase the amount that we
    contribute to technology development that will be absolutely
    necessary if we are going to go beyond low-Earth orbit. What
    makes this budget different and what makes our program, our
    evolving different from the past is that we are going to take
    incremental steps to leave low-Earth orbit. It is absolutely
    necessary that I facilitate the success of commercial entities
    to continue to get me to low-Earth orbit because I need the
    International Space Station over the coming ten years and
    hopefully beyond because that plays an important role in the
    development of the technologies that will be required to get us
    beyond low-Earth orbit. Very simply, the steps are
    International Space Station, moon and asteroids and eventually
    to Mars in the 2030s.
        In terms of technology development, new engine technology,
    new structures technology, composites that give us lighter-
    weight vehicles that require less stress to leave the gravity
    well of Earth that will take us to eventually a heavy-lift
    launch vehicle by the 2020s, in-space propulsion development
    that will get us beyond low-Earth orbit. And then finally, the
    Crew Rescue Vehicle development that the President has
    authorized me to do that will lead to the development of a
    deep-space exploration crew module. Crew Rescue Vehicle, while
    maybe not the ideal thing that we would all like, it gives me a
    phase-zero vehicle that I can use as the technological
    foundation for building the crew module that I need to get
    humans beyond low-Earth orbit.
        Chairman Gordon. Are you satisfied that the budget you have
    presented us will fund the crew rescue vehicle including all
    the other things that you have done and that--so you are
    satisfied where you are now?
        Mr. Bolden. Mr. Chairman, I am satisfied in one respect. I
    am cognizant of the difficulty of the fiscal environment in
    which we all live, and as you and I have said, as a responsible
    steward of the taxpayers' funds, I understand that I will have
    to find offsets that will enable us to speed up the development
    of a heavy-lift launch vehicle.

                         Funding a Crew Rescue Vehicle

        Chairman Gordon. Do you want to suggest some of those
    today?
        Mr. Bolden. Sir, I can tell you things that I am not going
    to take off the table, and you and I have discussed this.
    Aeronautics and science, they are not available for offsets.
        Chairman Gordon. But what does that leave?
        Mr. Bolden. It leaves commercial crew and it leaves some of
    my technology development, and I actually think that with
    prudent planning, we can plan what we need to take out of the
    funds that are available for--that the President has set aside
    for commercial crew and we can take some of the funds that I
    would like to spend up front for technology development, put
    money into those things that I absolutely have to have for
    heavy-lift launch vehicle.
        Chairman Gordon. And when do you plan to present to us--we
    would like to help you with an authorization but we have to see
    your plan, we have to see your numbers before we can do that.
    And we would like for them to add up.
        Mr. Bolden. And I assure you, Mr. Chairman, they will add
    up. The amount for the crew return vehicle, we actually have
    refined that and I think it is going to end up being about $4.5
    billion, so I am going to have to find a place within
    commercial crew and technology development where I can----
        Chairman Gordon. When do you expect to present that to us?
        Mr. Bolden. Mr. Chairman, I am hoping to refine my numbers
    by next week and I will get them to you as soon as I can, as I
    promised yesterday. I do not want to give you a date certain
    and disappoint you and me.
        Chairman Gordon. Well, again, I don't want to belabor this.
    As I have said before and I said to you, part of the problem,
    we are in this situation because the Constellation quite
    frankly for the last several years wasn't funded properly, and
    kept kicking those bills down the road. You inherited them. And
    so I do not want to start that process over again of just
    kicking it down the road until your successor or you have to
    then really bite the bullet and then we say, you know, we have
    wasted these additional dollars. We have been through this with
    National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite
    System, we have been through this with the older Constellation
    program. So I won't belabor. I look forward to getting that
    from you and having a constructive discussion about it, and I
    yield to the ranking member, Mr. Hall.
        Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
        I don't mind belaboring it a little bit, and Charlie, you
    know my respect for you, but when I hear going to find
    something or maybe next week, you need to be a little more--you
    know, senior NASA program officials in an on-the-record meeting
    with Committee staff stated that the cost of developing an
    Orion-style crew rescue vehicle would be on the order of $5
    billion to $7 billion, and we discussed that figure yesterday.
    You were kind enough to talk to us and give us that
    information. But word from NASA's fiscal year 2011 budget, you
    plan to pay for the capability. Will it come from within the
    exploration program budget or will the science and aeronautics
    research directorates be taxed as well? And as a follow-up
    question, does NASA hope to have the--when do they hope to have
    the crew rescue vehicle ready for use as an emergency lifeboat
    on the International Space Station?
        Mr. Bolden. Representative Hall, my hope is to have the
    first version of Orion available by 2013 to 2015. It is a
    challenge but I think we can do that. The one thing that I can
    promise you and everybody on this Committee is that when we do
    bring you our budget numbers, you will not see bumps above the
    curve. Nineteen billion is my budget for this coming year, and
    what I do not want to do, as Chairman Gordon has said, I don't
    want to bring you an unexecutable budget and I will not bring
    you an unexecutable budget, so everything will be below the
    curve, and I can do that. My people can do that and we are
    going to do it. I admit, we are late. We started out late. But
    we are trying to catch up.
        I hate to quote--well, I don't hate to quote it, but I love
    quoting my predecessor, Mike Griffin. I read something that he
    wrote in a book that we are dedicating to the shuttle when he
    was talking about how, you know, you make decisions. He said,
    ``Late is ugly until you launch. Wrong is ugly forever.'' And
    so I do not want to give you something that is wrong and I
    won't give you something that is wrong. I do apologize for it
    being late but it is going to be right so that we don't--you
    know, because we are going to have to live with it.
        Mr. Hall. The crew rescue vehicle, that fund, the $5
    billion to $7 billion, is not to be mixed nor funding the
    escape system. That is correct, isn't it?
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, one of the ways that we are going
    to reduce the cost on what is called the crew rescue vehicle--
    and I will be honest, I don't like that term. I wish we hadn't
    used it, but we did. The crew rescue vehicle initially, the
    phase-zero vehicle to which I refer, will not be rated for
    ascent for humans. We will take it to orbit without people in
    it, dock it to the International Space Station and so it takes
    away the requirement for a launch abort system, which is a----
        Mr. Hall. That answers a different question. Actually the
    crew escape system is not to be funded by this $5 to $7
    billion, is it?
        Mr. Bolden. Oh, I am sorry. You are correct, sir.
        Mr. Hall. And you say that you are going to be working and
    you are going to watch it, but as you watch it, you watch it
    with no people in it. It gives us little access, I think, to
    getting back to the success of the old days.
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, we will have no people in it when
    it goes to orbit because that would increase the cost up front
    to human-rated for----
        Mr. Hall. Who would pay that cost?
        Mr. Bolden. I am sorry, sir?
        Mr. Hall. Who would pay that cost up front?
        Mr. Bolden. There will be no upfront cost for human rating
    because we are not going to do that initially. The phase-zero
    vehicle will not be human rated for ascent. It will be human
    rated for--it will comply with our visiting vehicle
    requirements in order to be docked to the International Space
    Station for a period of anywhere from six months to a year, and
    then it will be human rated for descent, entry and landing, so
    that is part of the incremental steps that I talk about.
        Mr. Hall. I have some more questions but I am about to run
    out of my time to even say I am about to run out of my time,
    but lack of a fallback option if the commercial crew fails is
    something that really concerns me, that anybody can take over
    something but we need some assurance that you are not just
    going to take it over but you are going to complete it, and if
    they fall down or falter they are not going to turn back and
    hand us a broken pattern to try to fill out where if we stay
    with where we are going and what Republicans and Democrats
    alike have voted for for the last five or six or seven years,
    it seems that would be the most likely and the best way to
    solve and keep our international partners, keep that great
    workforce that we have got in place right now that we are going
    to lose. I know you put all that into the computer. Maybe I
    will get to talk to you about it a little more. Thank you,
    Charlie.
        Mr. Bolden. Thank you very much.
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I suspect you are
    going to have a chance to talk to him a lot more about that and
    other things.
        Ms. Fudge is recognized.

                             Glenn Research Center

        Ms. Fudge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Administrator Bolden. It is nice to see you again. As you know,
    I represent northeast Ohio.
        Mr. Bolden. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Fudge. Which is home to NASA Glenn.
        Mr. Bolden. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Fudge. So of course, one of my main priorities is what
    is going to happen with NASA Glenn.
        Mr. Bolden. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Fudge. I feel that in much of the discussion around the
    future of human space exploration, research centers like Glenn
    have not received the same kind of consideration as other NASA
    centers. While I understand that spaceflight centers will be
    significantly impacted by the plan, the truth is that funding
    for research and technology development has been decreasing for
    years. Glenn Research Center has needs that should be addressed
    also and I will work obviously with the Ohio delegation to
    ensure that those needs are communicated to and understood by
    your administration.
        With regard to the new plan, on the surface it looks as
    though there will be some large or significant role for NASA
    Glenn, given Glenn's expertise in aeronautics and space
    research. However, I am concerned that as the plan changes, and
    it has since we started talking about it, Glenn and other
    research centers stand to lose the funding dedicated for
    technology and development. These concerns are already being
    validated as you stated in April that the revised plan to
    develop an ISS emergency return module would change the amounts
    requested for exploration technology programs. Now, how much do
    you see that these programs are going to be cut and what will
    be the impact on NASA Glenn? And further, should we be
    expecting more announcements of initiatives that will cut
    funding for technology development?
        Mr. Bolden. Congresswoman, as I mentioned before, the
    amount that I would spend on or that I would dedicated to
    technology development will probably go down by some amount but
    I just want to refer people to the latest Aviation Week and
    Space Technology because I want to make sure that NASA stays in
    trade magazines like this, and there is quite a bit about
    NASA's contribution to clean aviation and aeronautic
    development, and we are going to do more of that and that is
    why I told the chairman that one of the things that is not
    eligible to messed with, if I want to use that term, is
    aeronautics. We have an incredible facility in Plum Brook at
    Glenn that has the capability of bringing in large spaceflight.
    Orion, any of the commercial entities can bring them there.
    Foreign partners can bring large spaceflight there. We have got
    to get out and do some work, though, to let people know that we
    have these facilities, that we are credible when we have
    discussions about aeronautics, and we lost some of our
    credibility as we stopped spending money in research and
    development, and I want to restore credibility and respect to
    NASA and the aeronautics community. So as I have said to you
    and the Ohio delegation before, that is something that I
    promise and I am not backing down on that.
        Ms. Fudge. Secondly, what do you see as the role for NASA
    Glenn and other centers in working with the commercial space
    transportation industry to accomplish NASA's human spaceflight
    objectives?
        Mr. Bolden. Unless we work with the commercial entities and
    the commercial entities work with us, then everybody's worst
    fears will be realized. This is a partnership. The tighter we
    can make the partnership between NASA and the commercial
    entities, just as we have done on the International Space
    Station, it is a model for the way that I would love to see our
    NASA commercial partnership. We depend on each other. We can't
    survive without each other, and that is the way I want the NASA
    commercial partnership to be. They need us and we need them. We
    have facilities that they can use to buy down risk on their
    vehicles. These are development programs, and they can do it
    alone, so we are here to help them and we are going to do that,
    and we are going to put demands on them because there are
    certain criteria that they are going to have to meet. They are
    going to have to meet human rating standards. They are going to
    have to comply with safety standards. And so those things will
    not change. I am not putting a human being in a commercial
    spaceflight that does not meet the standards that we would do
    with a NASA vehicle.
        Ms. Fudge. Thank you, Administrator Bolden. I am warming a
    bit to the plan but I certainly am going to wait until I see
    the budget and hopefully answer some of the questions that have
    been asked today. Again, I thank you for being here.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Bolden. Thank you, ma'am.
        Chairman Gordon. Mr. Smith is recognized.

                  Maintaining the International Space Station

        Mr. Smith of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Bolden, the current shuttle manifest was developed at a
    time where the prior Administration had established 2015 as a
    termination date for the International Space Station. Given
    that the Administration has now proposed extending its life
    through 2020, which I think is a good idea, what additional
    needs will the ISS have in terms of spare parts, cargo and
    crew, and how will those needs be met with Russian, European or
    U.S. commercial vehicles.
        Mr. Bolden. Sir, the biggest need for International Space
    Station post this last flight when we put the last big module,
    the Russian module, is for piece parts, small parts. One of the
    obligations or one of the requirements of the commercial
    entities is that they be able to carry 40 metric tons to orbit.
    We have a capability of delivering 85 percent of the volume--
    not the volume but the up mass that we had on shuttle with both
    HGV, the Japanese carrier, and ATV, the European carrier. They
    were both demonstrated and performed flawlessly in the past
    year. So, you know, we won't have a shuttle to take huge pieces
    and parts up but there is no requirement for that. We have
    sufficiently outfitted the station that we can service it
    with----
        Mr. Smith of Texas. Let me ask you a related question, and
    that is, what will the Russian crew services cost and aren't
    they going to be a lot more expensive now than they were
    before, and I think that is in part because the Russians will
    have a captive market if the shuttle is retired as planned.
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, we just----
        Mr. Smith of Texas. Aren't they going to corner the market
    and therefore the cost will be greater?
        Mr. Bolden. They will not have a corner on the market, and
    that is what I am trying to ensure for all of us. When we have
    commercial vehicles available, and I hope to have more than one
    carrier, contrary to what everybody thinks, if we stuck with
    the Constellation program, we would be down to one way to get
    to orbit with the Russians as a backup. When I am successful in
    facilitating the success of the commercial entities, we hope to
    have a minimum of two commercial carriers backed up by the
    Russians so we will have three ways to get people to orbit,
    which is one more than we would have had with the Constellation
    program and one more than we have today.

                     The Search for Extra-Terrestrial Life

        Mr. Smith of Texas. Mr. Bolden, the last question on a very
    different subject. What efforts is NASA making to detect life,
    perhaps sentient life, elsewhere in the universe and how
    important do you think that is?
        Mr. Bolden. That is critical. I am glad you asked that.
    NASA has a number of missions that are flying right now that
    are looking for Earth-like planets around other suns, the
    millions of suns in the universe as we know it. WISE [Wide-
    Field Infrared Survey Explorer]--I forget what the acronym
    stands for--is an infrared imaging satellite that we just put
    on orbit the end of last year. It is imaging the entire
    universe as we know it and help us identify things like
    asteroids, Earth-like planets and the like. So we are making a
    serious effort to find out if there is other life out there.
        Mr. Smith of Texas. Any new proposed efforts that you are
    planning to suggest in the next couple of years?
        Mr. Bolden. Let me get back to you, Congressman Smith. I am
    certain there are, and my science friends are going to be angry
    that I can't tell you right away but I know there are.
        Mr. Smith of Texas. And there are some nodding heads behind
    you saying yes as well, so I will look forward to that.
        Mr. Bolden. They taught me to say I don't know.
        Mr. Smith of Texas. Thank you.
        Mr. Bolden. I don't know, but I will----
        Mr. Smith of Texas. I will look forward to hearing back
    from you in that regard.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
        And Mr. Matheson is recognized for five minutes.

                              Fixing Constellation

        Mr. Matheson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Bolden, thanks for coming today.
        Mr. Bolden. Thank you.
        Mr. Matheson. Given the many unanswered questions of the
    proposed fiscal year 2011 NASA plan, it seems to me that we
    ought to be careful about writing off all the hard work and
    investment made in the Constellation program, so what I would
    like to hear from you is, have you tasked your NASA team to
    take a close look at the Constellation program to see what
    changes, what streamlining, what alternative approaches to
    doing business could be taken to lower the cost and speed the
    development of the Ares and Orion and get us started on a
    heavy-lift launch vehicle sooner? Have you had folks tasked to
    look at that issue?
        Mr. Bolden. So we have a number of tiger teams that we have
    discussed in many panels in testimony before that are looking
    at identifying the nuggets in the Constellation program that we
    want to keep for programs going ahead. We have a group that is
    looking at insight and oversight, how do we streamline the
    amount of oversight that we exercise as we bring the commercial
    entities on board because they will come. Even with the
    Constellation program, we will be bringing commercial entities
    on board. That was started by my predecessor. I didn't--
    President Obama and I didn't start that. This has been on the
    books for some time, just not very well funded. So we are
    looking at ways to decrease the amount that it costs us for
    oversight without losing emphasis on safety.
        Mr. Matheson. Maybe I will ask the question a different
    way, though. It sounds like the decision was made not to move
    ahead with this program, and I am suggesting, have we really
    looked at if there are ways to continue the program under a
    more cost-effective manner?
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, the decision has not been made not
    to move ahead with this program. I am prohibited by law from
    taking that step. The President and I think the proper thing to
    do, the prudent thing to do is stop work on Constellation in
    2011, take the nuggets from it and proceed with a more viable
    program, but right now we continue to work with all deliberate
    speed on perfecting what we have in Constellation. You know, we
    will do all we can until the end of this fiscal year.
        Mr. Matheson. I just appreciate a concerted effort to make
    sure we examine all the options before we dismiss something
    that has had a lot of effort put into it.
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, you may remember that two weeks
    ago we conducted an incredibly successful test that was called
    PA-1, Pad Abort 1. That was on a launch abort system for Orion
    in the Constellation program, and I thought, we all thought
    that was essential to get that test behind us because we think
    that is going to be valuable no matter what we go with.

                      Solid Rocket Industry and Workforce

        Mr. Matheson. Let me ask you another question. What do you
    think is going to happen to the unique workforce that our
    Nation's defense programs rely upon for the future needs in the
    solid rocket motor industry if the proposed cancellation of the
    Ares program is upheld?
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, the leadership in the intelligence
    community, the leadership in the Department of Defense and I
    are working diligently together now to identify what the
    Nation's need is in terms of solid propellant. We are unique.
    NASA is unique in requiring large, segmented, solid rocket
    motors that right now mostly, I think most of the production is
    done in a facility called Baucus in Utah. That industry cannot,
    I think, afford the infrastructure that it currently has and we
    are working with them to try to entice them to make business
    decisions that will get that under control because I have not
    given up, you know, on the need for solid fuel yet. There is an
    incredible workforce there, an incredibly talented workforce
    that we cannot afford to lose so the intelligence community,
    DOD and NASA are working to try to find a way to transition
    from where we were grossly overcapitalized up until now to a
    more viable market there.
        Mr. Matheson. Well, I appreciate your acknowledgment of the
    talented workforce that is there. It is also one that is
    diminishing as we speak in terms of layoffs, and I would just
    ask that as all these items are put on the table, we should
    recognize that this workforce capability is not something that
    once it goes away you can just recreate instantaneously. Once
    it goes away, it will take years to put that back together
    again, and I think that that is an important criterion that
    ought to be front and center as you look at these decisions. I
    appreciate you coming today. Thank you so much.
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Matheson. And whatever the
    final decisions are, we need certainty so that that workforce
    will know what they are going to be doing or not doing.
        Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized for five minutes.

                         Savings From Ares Cancellation

        Mr. Rohrabacher. General, could you tell us how much money
    was saved that would have been expended for the Constellation
    Ares project had it not been canceled over a number of years?
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, we have not saved any money
    because we continue to spend on the fiscal 2010 budget profile
    so the savings will come in fiscal 2011 and beyond if we are
    able to craft a budget that is agreeable to this Congress and
    the President. So we are still on the same funding profile with
    the Constellation program as we always have been.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. So the cancellation of the Ares rocket was
    not--I mean, I understand we spent almost $10 billion there.
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, I have not canceled it. We have
    come to the point that we are still planning and looking at
    future tests for an Ares I rocket. I can't stop that. We did
    Ares I-X as a demonstration as we had promised, we would do it
    again. It was incredibly successful. My dilemma, to be quite
    honest, is, I am obligated to proceed with a program that I
    really think we need to stop in order to be able to fund the
    types of programs that are needed to take us into the 21st
    century and continue our leadership.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Then let us approach this question in a
    different way then. If you were able to stop that program,
    which I was under the impression you were in the process of
    doing----
        Mr. Bolden. I can't do that.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Thank you for clarifying that
    for me. How much money are we talking about saving? And when we
    say saving, I am not talking about--we are talking about money
    that will be spent in other aerospace endeavors, not things
    that will take away from these jobs and America's capability
    but will add to it in a different place. How much money are we
    talking?
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, let me get back to you because
    that is a much more complicated question than I am prepared to
    answer, and it is not simplistic. You know, when I talk about
    composite tanks and different propulsion systems, I think they
    represent a cost savings between what we now have with
    Constellation and what we would have with a new program with a
    different heavy-lift launch vehicle, a modified Orion. So I
    will get back to you.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. We are talking about considerable amounts
    of money. We are talking about----
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, I don't like to use superlatives.
    I know there is a cost savings but let me get back to you.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. I am looking forward to that.
        Mr. Chairman, when people are trying to spend money to do
    everything, they end up not being able to get anything done,
    and one thing I have noticed since I have been in Congress is
    this inability of Congress to prioritize, just total inability
    to prioritize, and when someone does, at that point they are
    always focused on saying well, we are eliminating something
    rather than realizing that the funds for that are now being
    used in other endeavors that could be very justifiable.

                         Cost of a Crew Rescue Vehicle

        Let me ask you in detail while I have the time here. The
    crew return vehicle, what is going to be the total cost for
    that?
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. The crew rescue vehicle.
        Mr. Bolden. I will get you the entire numbers. The cost up
    front we estimate is $4.5 billion over five years, but let me
    get you----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. So almost $5 billion over five years, and
    then on top of that operational costs, and that will permit us
    to have a rescue system, a lifeboat at the station for how many
    years?
        Mr. Bolden. I have to get back to you on that also. That is
    an operational--that is an issue of operational concept. I
    would like to get out of that business as quick as possible and
    get the commercial entities to assume that responsibility.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me get to the point because I only
    have a few seconds left. The money that would be spent for us
    developing that is $5 billion minimum, it looks like, how much
    would it cost us to rent that capability or to hire that
    capability from the Russians and thus freeing that money for us
    to use in other aerospace endeavors?
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, that is one thing I can give you
    per seat, and it is cheaper. Right now, approximately, and this
    is a rough approximation, $50 million to $57 million per seat
    with the Russians. That includes training, transportation,
    everything. So we all need to understand that cheap is not what
    we are looking for. We are looking for domestic capability,
    and----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, it seems to me that if we are
    developing a domestic capability at the cost of $5 billion that
    we could actually be doing for considerably cheaper. That means
    we are denying other aerospace projects that amount of money in
    order to have a crew rescue vehicle on the space station, which
    we know in a few years is going to be obsolete and we are going
    to fly away from that and it will be part of history. Maybe we
    should be, instead of investing those billions of dollars in
    something that will be history within a short time, maybe we
    should be investing in future-oriented technology that will
    make us competitive with the Russians in the future, in fact,
    more competitive than anybody else, rather than depending on
    the Russians in the future as well because we have managed to
    spend all of our money in the past.
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. I don't mean
    to cut you off but we have a lot of witnesses and we are going
    to try to stick with our five minutes or, you know, shortly
    thereafter.
        Ms. Giffords, the chair of our Space and Aeronautics
    Subcommittee, is recognized for five minutes.

                        Continuing Work on Constellation

        Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member
    Hall. Welcome back to our Committee, General Bolden.
        You earlier referenced the successful launch of that abort
    system test flight, and this was truly a significant milestone
    for the Constellation program to develop the systems that are
    going to take us back safely to the International Space System
    and beyond low-Earth orbit. It is a real testimonial to the
    success of NASA and our contractor team, who made it an
    incredible success. This was a three-year development. It cost
    approximately $220 million, again, a credible first step in
    ensuring the safety of future spacecraft crews, and it was
    really clear after the Challenger accident that in order to
    safely carry the crew, we had to be able to present an escape
    system that would not harm them during ascent, and again, this
    was an important requirement that was a critical part of the
    design for Orion and for Ares I and the inclusion of the launch
    abort system is projected to really make this the safest
    combination to get back to the ISS and beyond.
        I would like to actually show a short video clip if that,
    if we could cue that up, because about 3 weeks ago, and I am
    not sure all the members actually saw this, but NASA and its
    team of contractors showed us how it is done. So let us take a
    look here.
        [Video playback.]
        The Pad Abort-1, as NASA called it, was the first
    successful U.S.-designed abort system since Apollo, incredible
    feat, and congratulations to you and your team. But even before
    the test, Popular Science magazine honored the launch abort
    system with a Best of What Is New Award for 2009 in the
    aviation and space category, and as you just said, General
    Bolden, you said this was an incredibly successful program and
    you thought it was essential, a valuable tool to wherever we
    go. Sadly, that hard work and that dedication have not been
    rewarded. Space News reported on the eve of the test that one
    of the contractors warned its subcontractors supporting
    development of this that funding for the effort would cease as
    of April 30th.
        Administrator, Bolden, you and I both know that actions are
    being taken to make it hard for the team to accomplish their
    work during the remainder of this year. It is not a mystery to
    this Committee and to all of the industry folks out there. All
    of this is happening despite the efforts of Congress and us
    saying that work on Constellation needs to continue, and based
    on the lack of Congressional support for the President's
    proposed plan, I think it is clear that we are going to need
    the capabilities that we are developing under the Constellation
    program like this Pad Abort system in the future. I don't have
    a lot of time to spend talking about legal interpretations of
    termination liabilities and other issues. However, it is very
    clear that there is a lot of uncertainty within your agency and
    in the contractor community about what is going to be done to
    Constellation this year. There are a lot of rumors floating
    around about termination of high-ranking members of your
    administration that are working to really execute the will of
    the Congress. So I would like to--and I only have a minute
    left--but just a couple of yes-no answers to some simple,
    direct questions.
        Administrator Bolden, will you give this Committee your
    assurance that you will take all feasible measures to ensure
    that NASA makes as much progress as possible on Constellation
    in the remainder of the fiscal year 2010 and will you direct
    your workforce to do the same?
        Mr. Bolden. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Giffords. Will you direct your Constellation Orion
    workforce to give highest priority to carrying out activities
    that maximize progress on the Orion crew exploration vehicle
    program and not divert efforts in the fiscal year 2010 to the
    yet-approved crew rescue vehicle program?
        Mr. Bolden. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Giffords. And finally, will you ensure that your
    workforce complies with the intent of Congress that work
    continues on Constellation until such time as the Congress
    decides otherwise and that work on all aspects of the
    Constellation program over the past five years shall take
    precedence over the activities and the programs proposed by the
    President in his fiscal year 2011 request that may wind up
    never been approved by the United States Congress?
        Mr. Bolden. Yes, ma'am, and that is the direction I have
    given as late as last week. That was essential the guidance I
    provided to the Constellation program was to do those things
    that you just mentioned.
        Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Administrator, and thank you,
    Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Gordon. Mr. Olson, the ranking member of the Space
    and Aeronautics Subcommittee, is recognized for five minutes.
        Mr. Olson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
    Administrator, for coming to testify today and thank you for
    your service to our Nation. Thanks again for your phone call
    yesterday. I greatly appreciate that. Please keep that up,
    because that is one of the things I think was lacking when this
    budget was rolled out, and I would like to sort of follow up on
    my chairwoman, some of her comments.
        In your opening statement, you referenced this week's GAO
    report on the use of study teams to develop plans for the
    President's fiscal year 2011 budget, and GAO documented
    thousands of hours devoted by NASA employees planning to
    implement the President's budget. I would like to caution you
    that this report was just the first response in ongoing GAO
    investigation. A full report is slated to be delivered this
    summer and will focus more on the more important question of
    NASA's compliance with budget impoundment laws. The report from
    this week clearly states that the agency, and I quote, ``must
    be mindful of the appropriations provision on canceling or
    altering contracts in the current program.'' I would like to
    reiterate that with you as well.
        And following up on my chairwoman's comments, I mean the
    Pad Abort was an incredibly successful launching test but there
    were rumors, if you recall, back in January and February that
    NASA was looking to cancel that. Again, NASA does not have that
    authority with the appropriations language. The President and
    the Administration have a voice in this process but they don't
    have the ultimate say. We, the United States Congress, has
    that, and I just again caution you not to read too much into
    that GAO report. We will get more details later on.

                 Presidential Visit to the Johnson Space Center

        One question for you, and you live back in the District as
    well, and one question----
        Mr. Bolden. Not very much.
        Mr. Olson. I am similar to you. I am here today and I would
    much rather be back home with my family, but what we are doing
    here is important. But one question I get asked a lot, and I
    would like you to help me answer it, is when is the President
    going to come to the Johnson Space Center and see the home of
    human spaceflight? When is he going to give us some time? I
    mean, I know he went down to Florida and made the speech there
    and he took a tour of one of the commercial operators and gave
    them a half an hour. When is he going to come down and give us
    a couple of hours just to see what incredible things are being
    done there at Houston and what is at stake with some of the
    implications of the budget he has proposed?
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, I am working on that, and
    unfortunately, I can't give you a date certain but I am hoping
    he will let my granddaughters come and meet him before he goes
    to the Johnson Space Center since they are going to be here in
    about a month.
        Mr. Olson. Anything you can do to get him down there,
    because again, I get asked that all the time. People don't
    understand why he won't come down and see us in Texas or the
    home of human spaceflight. I mean, we had a great mission, as
    you know, with Atlantis today. I was a little sad seeing her
    land, knowing that that is probably the last time that she is
    going to roll out and is going to become a museum piece.

                             NASA's Primary Mission

        One other question just sort of philosophical for you that
    is kind of on my mind. You know, NASA does many, many things,
    human exploration, robotic exploration, research development,
    technology development, climate monitoring, you know,
    aerospace, aeronautics, but we have a limited budget and we
    struggle, and that is the struggle we are facing today with
    what has happened here with the Constellation program. We
    haven't given you the resources you need to do what we have
    asked you to do as a Nation. But as the administrator, if you
    could pick one thing, one thing for NASA, what do you think
    their primary mission focus should be? Should it be human
    spaceflight exploration, robotic exploration, research and
    development? I know it is a tough question but I just kind of
    want to see what your thoughts are on that.
        Mr. Bolden. It is a pretty easy question for me because
    they are all intertwined. You can't--human exploration without
    research and development is unexecutable. Research and
    development without a human exploration program trying to pull
    that technology is useless, and that is really the--the debate
    we are having and the difficulty in my bringing you what I need
    to bring you is, it is really complex trying to determine--you
    know, human spaceflight is critical. We cannot do it without
    research and development and development of new technologies as
    Congressman Rohrabacher said. We tried that and it doesn't
    work. I don't have anything in NASA--we do STEM. We do science,
    technology, engineering and math whether people like it or not,
    and I know that is an educational term but education is also
    critical in what we do because if I am not allowed to do
    education and expend money and resources, people on that, I am
    going to have nobody that I can take from a college campus who
    is an engineer, so I would love to be able to tell you all that
    it is very simplistic. What I love about my job is, it is very
    complex, complicated and nuanced, and that represents an
    incredible challenge. The President is a person who does
    nuance, and I haven't seen one like that in a while and it is
    fun to sit and talk to somebody who understands that the world
    is nuanced, it is not black and white.
        Mr. Olson. Thank you, General, for that answer. I am
    running out of time here. I would just like to sum up that I
    think if you ask the American public what does NASA do, they
    would see those astronauts in those blue flight suits down the
    hall earlier today and they do human spaceflight, and that
    should be our priority.
        Mr. Bolden. Mr. Schweickart.
        Mr. Olson. Rusty Schweickart. We have got Neil Armstrong,
    Gene Cernan. I mean, that is what the American public thinks
    about when you say NASA.
        Mr. Bolden. I agree.
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Olson.
        And Mr. Miller, the chairman of the I&O Committee is
    recognized.

                 Space Communications Networks Service Contract

        Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my first question
    has to do with the work of the I&O Committee. We understand
    that NASA is on the verge of awarding the acquisitions contract
    for the space communications networking, SCNS, contract. It
    will be the third effort. The first two, there were complaints
    to GAO and the GAO found that there were organizational
    conflicts of interest that infected the award process and set
    the awards aside. We understand that in the early summer, and
    Monday is Memorial Day, NASA will try for a third time. Our
    subcommittee has been looking at the award of the contract, the
    contract acquisition process. They have interviewed 30 people.
    They have reviewed 20 boxes of documents. They will shortly
    issue a staff report that I understand will be very critical of
    NASA's failure to understand the importance of dealing with
    conflicts of interest rather than just something to kind of get
    through a process and make sure it doesn't get set aside, that
    there is actually a purpose behind the organizational conflict
    of interest. Since you are apparently on the verge, NASA is
    apparently on the verge of awarding the contract for the third
    time, we are apparently on the verge of issuing a staff report
    examining the contract, will you hold off on awarding the
    contract until you see the result of our staff committee
    report?
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, as much as it pains me to say, I
    will have to get back to you on that because I am familiar with
    about what you speak but not familiar enough to give you an
    intelligent answer, so I will get back to you.
        Mr. Miller. If you could do it quickly because----
        Mr. Bolden. I will do it quickly, sir. I can get back to
    you this afternoon. I just don't--I don't have the information
    before me. Somebody just slipped me a note, but I always get in
    trouble when I read notes and I don't know what----
        Mr. Miller. I will look forward to your call.

                                 Space Tourism

        Second, some part of the justification for commercial crews
    is that NASA would not be the only customer. It would make
    possible spaceflight for others, and I have got to say, the
    idea of taking a vacation of going to space does sound
    massively cool. But it also strikes me as probably pretty
    pricey, and Chairman Gordon asked back in February if you had
    done any kind of market survey to determine just exactly what
    the market was for space tourism, and your answer was that NASA
    had not but that there had been private industry surveys, and
    we found one. Futron Corporation estimated back in 2002-2003
    that the cost would be $20 billion to go. They seem to assume
    that----
        Mr. Bolden. Million.
        Mr. Miller. Million to go.
        Mr. Bolden. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Miller. And they estimated then that there might be 23
    people who would go on Soyuz flights at that price. They now
    estimate that the price might come down. If it did come down to
    $5 million per ticket, that might make it possible for people
    with net worth as low as $50 million to go by 2021. There is
    other information that $5 million per ticket is wildly
    optimistic, that it is probably going to say in the--probably
    an absolute or more likely price tag or ticket price would be
    $50 million. What part of the justification for commercial
    crews is space tourism? How much of the $6 billion, $7 billion
    a year we are spending for five years is directed at what is
    going to strike a lot of Americans as something that is beyond,
    probably will always be beyond their reach?
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, none of our effort is directed at
    space tourism. Our effort is directed at a commercially
    available option to get to low-Earth orbit. What is important
    to me is to be able to get scientists and investigators from
    Earth to the International Space System. You know, that is--I
    know that we need to be able to get people there. If there is a
    commercial availability to get them there, then we can increase
    the numbers of people who can do research on the International
    Space System as an example. There are other examples that
    people can cite of hopes for other facilities in low-Earth
    orbit, you know, where a commercial entity to get them there
    would be very good.
        Mr. Miller. I am sorry. Say that again.
        Mr. Bolden. There are other examples that people can cite
    for you if you talk to a company like Bigelow, for example, who
    have inflatable structures. They have a couple that have been
    on orbit for some time now surviving with nobody in them but
    still surviving as a demonstration. There are entities out
    there who have a need for a way to get to space, and that is
    the commercial entity that I want to facilitate the success
    for.
        Mr. Miller. Not space tourism?
        Mr. Bolden. Space tourism is fine, but that is someone
    else's business model. That is not a NASA--that is not
    something that is in my purview. I think that is great.
        Mr. Miller. My time is expired.
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Miller.
        And Mr. Sensenbrenner is recognized for five minutes.

                            Modifying Constellation

        Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you very much.
        General Bolden, welcome. Let me say I am a little disturbed
    at the President's budget submission, and 49 years ago when I
    was still a high school student, I remember seeing President
    Kennedy on TV giving an inspirational speech which united
    Americans and talked about putting a man on the moon. And the
    President's speech at the Kennedy Space Center I think is a U-
    turn from what President Kennedy had to say to us, and
    certainly has deflated the hopes of a lot of people in terms of
    America keeping its edge in space technology.
        Now, so far we have spent $10.3 billion on the
    Constellation program, and I guess if it is terminated that is
    $10.3 billion wasted or spent on something that was a dead end.
    Has NASA or the Administration given any consideration to
    modifying the program if they determine it to be too expensive
    rather than stopping it altogether?
        Mr. Bolden. You are referring to the Constellation program?
        Mr. Sensenbrenner. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Bolden. Sir, we are not looking at a way to modify the
    Constellation program because we feel that the amount of money
    that would be required to bring that program up to a point
    where it is viable is more than the Nation can afford.

                             Termination Liability

        Mr. Sensenbrenner. Okay. What termination liability does
    the Federal Government have if the Congress approves the
    President's recommendation? How much money?
        Mr. Bolden. The termination liability is a requirement on
    the part--that is a requirement that is laid on the contractor
    as a part of the contract, and we recently went through a lot
    of deliberation on that back and forth with attorneys, but the
    termination liability is something that is a responsibility of
    the individual contract.
        Mr. Sensenbrenner. Now, how is that? If the determination
    to terminate the program is made by the Federal Government,
    that seems to be a pretty bad contract.
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, I am not an attorney and I do not
    know why we introduced that type of clause into contracts but
    it is in most of our NASA contracts----
        Mr. Sensenbrenner. Well, I am an attorney, with all due
    respect, and if all of a sudden if the Administration and the
    Congress agree to terminate the Constellation program and the
    contractors end up holding the bag, how do you ever expect them
    to sign another contract with NASA?
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, what most businesses do from my
    very limited experience on the outside serving on corporate
    boards is that the board with the management structure of the
    company makes a risk decision that okay, we are going to go
    into this business because we are not sure that our client, our
    customer is reliable, we are going to hold back some money just
    in case he finks on us, and people who work with the U.S.
    government unfortunately are very accustomed to that.
        Mr. Sensenbrenner. Does NASA want to get a reputation of
    finking on contractors and big programs?
        Mr. Bolden. Mr. Chairman, we do not want to get that
    reputation but I would be lying to you if I didn't say we
    haven't. Everyone sitting in this room can line up, you know,
    we can line that wall up with NASA programs that have been
    canceled and it comes with changes of Administration, it comes
    with changes of mind. One of the problems that we have
    philosophically as a people is we can't see beyond a four-year
    horizon, and all of you sitting in this room are having a very
    difficult time seeing beyond a two-year horizon, which comes
    down to a one-year horizon when you have to run, and I don't--
    --

                         Abdicating Leadership in Space

        Mr. Sensenbrenner. Sir, with all due respect, this
    Committee on a bipartisan basis has written and passed into law
    multiyear NASA authorization bills, which are much beyond a
    two-year horizon minus whatever part of our two-year terms has
    already elapsed. Now, I will be very honest with you, sir, this
    is a U-turn and I think that there are a lot of people who
    still have the vision of President Kennedy who think that the
    United States is abdicating its leadership in manned
    spaceflight as a result of the U-turn and they are really
    puzzled when they see the Administration asking for $23 billion
    to keep laid-off teachers on the payroll but they don't have
    enough money to follow the $10.3 billion that we have already
    spent in building the Constellation program. If you want to
    look at the future, I would suggest that if it is too
    expensive, let us modify it, because I have a real bad time
    justifying to my constituents that well, we spent over $10
    billion of your money and we decided we can't get anything out
    of it. And I am not going to do that, and I think that if the
    President and his NASA administrator want to do that, you are
    going to have a tough time convincing the American people you
    are right.
        My time is up. Thank you.
        Chairman Gordon. Do you want to give a quick reply?
        Mr. Bolden. A quick reply would be to say, I don't consider
    it a U-turn, I consider it, there are many ways to get where we
    all want to go. We all want to get to Mars. Constellation would
    not have gotten us there. The President's new program will get
    us there. It will take us--we will go in incremental steps
    where we were trying to go in one big chunk before and we
    just--we are not going to get there.
        Chairman Gordon. And Ms. Woolsey is recognized for five
    minutes.

                 Safety Regulations for Commercial Spaceflight

        Ms. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Administrator Bolden, hello. Thank you for being here.
        Mr. Bolden. Thank you.
        Ms. Woolsey. You said a couple of things that made me stop
    and sit up more than once today. One is, you have said in
    response to questions on different issues they won't be
    perfect. And then we talked about commercial crews and
    commercial vehicles. So boom, I started thinking, well, the
    safety of the crews, the safety of the workers, the safety of
    human flight being commercial and not under NASA as we know it,
    and as the chairwoman of the Workforce Protection Subcommittee
    in Labor, I really want to know how we are going to make sure
    that we have safety regulations for these commercial flights.
    We just keep experiencing private industry taking risks,
    cutting corners, having shortcuts, cost savings, timing and
    then what we have got? With this, we are particularly
    vulnerable, we get people up there in space. So what are you
    thinking in that regard for NASA?
        Mr. Bolden. Congresswoman, we are modifying, we are looking
    at the way that we exercise our oversight over the work that is
    done by the contractors. I think I spend too much time and
    effort and money on that oversight today, and that is a
    contributor to the increased cost of programs. I don't need to
    have 20 NASA people overseeing 20 contractors to ensure safety.
    I can do that in a much more streamlined manner. I would--going
    back to the video that Congresswoman Giffords showed, I am glad
    she showed it because I would remind those--I would remind some
    and I would inform others that the integration contractor for
    everything you saw was Orbital, a company out of Dulles,
    Virginia, and it happens to be the same Orbital that is one of
    the top producers. They are a reputable aerospace company that
    has produced very successful products in the past, and as I
    have said to other people, I refuse to accept the contention
    that an American company cannot do what the Russians do through
    Energia. I refuse to accept the fact or the belief that we
    can't help our American manufacturers produce an incredibly
    safe vehicle to get humans from Earth to low-Earth orbit and
    then beyond. Boeing is going to be working on--they worked on
    the International Space Station. They will be working on the
    low-Earth orbit vehicle, but Boeing is also probably going to
    be involved in the NASA production of a beyond-LEO vehicle. It
    is the same company, the same people, and I just cannot accept
    the fact that they will be less capable because they are making
    money running a commercial entity than they are going to be
    working for me taking people beyond low-Earth orbit.
        Ms. Woolsey. But working for you, NASA, is responsible for
    the oversight.
        Mr. Bolden. I am responsible no matter whether I procure
    their services by buying the vehicle or by leasing the vehicle.
    The only difference is the acquisition strategy. I am not
    relinquishing my responsibility for guaranteeing safety of crew
    and cargo just because I lease the vehicle. When I lease the
    vehicle, it belongs to me. You know, is it like going to a
    little airport on the way to Annapolis, and I don't own the
    airplane--I don't fly--but my friends don't own the airplane.
    They lease it and they go fly, but they are responsible for
    that airplane while they are flying it. That is the way I am
    going to be when I fly astronauts and cargo on a commercial
    entity. I lease it; I own it for the time being. The difference
    is, I don't have to pay the overhead, I don't have to pay the
    infrastructure, so there is--going back Congressman
    Rohrabacher's point, I reduce the amount of money that the
    taxpayer has to pay because the taxpayer is not strapped with
    infrastructure and operational costs when I am not flying that
    vehicle. It is $2 billion a year if I don't even launch the
    space shuttle. We can't afford that.
        Ms. Woolsey. So you will have the same safety procedures
    and processes----
        Mr. Bolden. Yes, ma'am. I will have the same effect when it
    comes to safety and oversight. What will be different, I can
    promise you, I will not have the same number of people, for
    example. I will not have the same number of boards at the
    Johnson Space Center that has to meet before we give a go to
    fly a vehicle. When I was in the space program, we had a
    program requirements control board and a CCB--I forget what
    they stand for. When I go to the Johnson Space Center today,
    they have grown to 10, 12, I don't know how many boards, and I
    have still got to get to the top for the decision to launch. I
    don't need all that.
        Ms. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gordon. Dr. Bartlett is recognized for five
    minutes.

                       Promoting STEM Fields Through NASA

        Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
        I want to ask you about your commitment to what I think is
    the most important contribution that NASA can make, and I need
    to put this in context. As the school physiologist at the
    school of aviation medicine in Pensacola, Florida, in the late
    1950s, I was involved in the first suborbital primate flight,
    monkey Baker and monkey Able. Monkey Able was killed by the
    Army when they gave a general anesthetic to take the electrodes
    out. We didn't do that to our monkey Baker in Pensacola, so she
    was kind of a star for a long time. There were seven astronauts
    at that time, the first seven, and NASA had no facilities. So
    they were using military facilities. They came to Pensacola to
    use the human centrifuge and the slow rotation room and they
    came to the naval yard in Philadelphia where I had temporary
    additional duty to use the altitude chamber. Dino Mensanelli,
    obviously of Italian descent, was the director of that and they
    were testing one day, and I have heard Dino tell this story a
    number of times. He thought it was very funny. They were
    testing a pressure suit and it was making a noise. The air part
    was making a noise. And he asked the astronaut, I forget which
    one it was, what it sounded like, and he said well, if you will
    excuse me, it sounds like waff, waff, waff. And I heard Dino
    tell that story many times. What happened then, I was much
    older than Sensenbrenner and I was already working as a
    scientist in a career when he was in high school, but I
    remember that speech of the President, and I remember the
    enormous contribution that that made to our country in terms of
    capturing the imagination of our people and inspiring our young
    people to go into careers in science, math and engineering.
        Today we are the world's premier military power, and I
    think that is largely due to what NASA did during that slightly
    less than a decade that we spent putting a man on the moon
    because it really did capture the imagination of our people and
    inspired our young people to go into these careers, because I
    remember a cartoon, a bucktoothed, freckled-face kid and he
    said, you know, six months ago I couldn't even engineer and now
    I are one. Everybody wanted to go into science, math and
    engineering, and I think that our preeminence today in defense
    is largely due to that.
        Today we face a huge challenge, as you know, sir. This year
    the Chinese will graduate seven times as many engineers as we
    graduate. India will graduate three times as many engineers as
    we graduate. The best and brightest of the kids in our country
    are going into what I tell them are potentially destructive
    pursuits, if you will excuse me, that are wanting more and more
    to become lawyers and political scientists. Don't you think we
    have enough of both of those? We desperately need, sir,
    something that captures the imagination of our people and
    inspires our young people to go into science, math and
    engineering or we will not retain our premier position as the
    best, most powerful military force in the world, and to say
    nothing of technology and leading in that area. What is NASA
    going to do that is going to capture the imagination of our
    people and inspire our young people to go into these technical
    careers? Because, sir, I think that is the most important
    contribution that NASA can make. What are you going to do that
    is really sexy and catches on?
        Mr. Bolden. We are going to continue to do some of the work
    that we have been doing and expand it even more through some of
    the--again, I will have to go back to my educational
    initiatives. This summer, through a program called the Summer
    of Innovation, for example, we are going to allow--working with
    the Massachusetts Space Grant Consortium, we are going to allow
    middle-school kids to write programs that will allow three
    spheres on the International Space System to maneuver around
    inside the station, do intricate maneuvers that we need to be
    able to do if we are going to be able to rendezvous with a
    refueling base in space or something. That work is being done
    right now by doctoral students and post-docs at MIT. But this
    is something that they decided they wanted to take all the way
    down to the middle-school level. There is a program that is not
    a NASA program called First Robotics but NASA supports that
    with 312 teams that we provide mentors for. The Nation doesn't
    pay a dime for that. That is time that our engineers and
    scientists dedicate because they think it is important. And
    First Robotics, if you have not seen it, it is absolutely
    incredible, and that inspires the imagination of kids.
        There are kids--there are more stories from First Robotics
    about former gang leaders who had their lives turned around
    because they got involved in First Robotics, so I am not going
    to tell those stories because the chairman would shoot me for
    taking all that time, but I would recommend that we all take a
    look at some of the things that have been done through NASA,
    through the National Science Foundation, through other
    organizations that do inspire kids. You know, they don't need
    to see somebody go to the moon, it is helpful, but they all
    realize they can't go to the moon.
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Administrator.
        I just want to suggest that Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Cernan and
    Mr. Young are waiting on our second panel. Everyone certainly
    has the right for their full time, and we are going to continue
    to go forward, but if you don't feel like you need your full
    five minutes. don't feel like you have to take it, and Mr.
    Bolden, you can also, if you have got your message across, you
    can go to the next one also.
        So now, Mrs. Dahlkemper, I don't mean to put you under the
    spotlight here but you are our next speaker and I recognize you
    for five minutes.

                                Asteroid Mission

        Mrs. Dahlkemper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will try to
    be very quick.
        Thank you, General Bolden, for being with us, and I have
    been to some of those First Robotics competitions and they are
    exciting and really do inspire me as well as certainly the
    students.
        I just have a quick question. As the President announced a
    plan for a manned flight to an asteroid, that captures my
    imagination actually, and so I just would like you to maybe
    tell me what we have available to us right now to attain that
    goal. Are we starting from scratch on that? Just give me a
    little bit of background on this.
        Mr. Bolden. I can give you a quick example. The jet
    propulsion lab and the Johnson Space Center, the Glenn Space
    Research Center and Marshall, those centers are presently
    talking about an early visit to an asteroid using a lot of off-
    the-shelf technology, electric engines that we call Hall
    Thrusters that will enable us to rendezvous with an asteroid
    perhaps as quickly as 2016 just as a demonstrator. It is a
    robotic precursor, not a human mission, but it gives us an
    opportunity to demonstrate that we do in fact know how to
    rendezvous with this thing that is orbiting the Sun. That is
    what makes asteroids so challenging. They are not--you know, we
    have ephemeral data on other stuff but we don't on asteroids.
        Mrs. Dahlkemper. So this is unmanned?
        Mr. Bolden. This is unmanned.
        Mrs. Dahlkemper. And when would you expect that we would be
    able to get manned?
        Mr. Bolden. I promised the President that if I get my act
    together, we will do it in 2025, and I think we can do that.
        Mrs. Dahlkemper. And that is pretty exciting. I am anxious
    to see that move forward. So I will end there and yield back.
        Mr. Bolden. When a kid sees----
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mrs. Dahlkemper.
        Mr. Bolden. --a rendezvous with an asteroid in 2016, let me
    tell you, they are going to be excited.
        Chairman Gordon. And Mr. Smith is recognized for five
    minutes.

              Timeline for Human Rated Commercial Launch Vehicles

        Mr. Smith of Nebraska. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
    Administrator. If you would lay out NASA's schedule for
    developing and finalizing a set of human rating requirements
    for commercial crew companies, and once requirements are
    established, how long do you anticipate it would take a company
    to design, develop and flight-test and certify a capsule and
    launch system?
        Mr. Bolden. Let me get back to you, because we have laid
    that schedule out and I will get back to you with what it is
    because we have a request for information on the street, and I
    talked about it in my opening remarks and we released it
    sometime this month, asking for commercial entities to look at
    our draft human rating requirements. Most of the commercial
    entities have told us that if you put an RFP on the street and
    we win, we think we can have a vehicle that is human rated in a
    three-year period of time from the time that the award is made.
    That is what they say. I am one who takes one at their word
    until they demonstrate otherwise.
        Mr. Smith of Nebraska. Can you give me a rough time on
    that?
        Mr. Bolden. Twenty fifteen, 2016 time frame is what we are
    looking at right now on our schedule.
        Mr. Smith of Nebraska. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Smith.
        And Lt. Governor Garamendi is recognized for five minutes.

                            Constellation Variations

        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        By now you have probably figured out this Committee is not
    with you.
        Mr. Bolden. Yes, sir, I understand.
        Mr. Garamendi. And I am curious about several things that
    you have said. I am going to do this quickly. You said that you
    are not looking at Constellation Lite, that is, a revamping of
    the Constellation program. Is that correct?
        Mr. Bolden. That is correct, sir.
        Mr. Garamendi. Do you have any authorization to look at any
    other program besides Constellation?
        Mr. Bolden. In the 2010 budget, I don't have any
    authorization to look at anything, and that is why I am not
    looking at any modification or termination or anything on
    Constellation. We are working the existing program of record,
    Constellation----
        Mr. Garamendi. But yet your testimony here indicated
    substantial looking at other options.
        Mr. Bolden. I am doing planning for the President's 2011
    budget proposal which I feel is prudent to do.
        Mr. Garamendi. I will leave it to our lawyers to parse that
    out.
        Mr. Bolden. Yes, sir. They are doing that.

                      Potential Commercial Crew Providers

        Mr. Garamendi. I am sure they are, and they should. You
    mentioned earlier on the commercialization several companies.
    Could you explicitly tell us what companies you are looking at
    to do the commercial operations that are you are planning for
    next budget?
        Mr. Bolden. Sir, I don't have any companies that I can say
    I am looking at. I can tell you companies that I know are
    thinking about entering the----
        Mr. Garamendi. Who are they?
        Mr. Bolden. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, perhaps ATK Orbital,
    SpaceX, Bigelow.
        Mr. Garamendi. You mentioned a couple of Japanese and
    European companies that might be interested in this.
        Mr. Bolden. We are not--they are not eligible to compete as
    a prime contractor. They can be involved as a sub to an
    American firm under our present laws.

                              Infrastructure Costs

        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. You also indicated that the
    private companies would not be burdened with overhead,
    operational costs, continuing operations and the like.
        Mr. Bolden. Sir, I did not. That is exactly opposite from
    what I said. I said I will no longer be burdened with the
    infrastructure costs, the overhead and everything else. Private
    companies will incur whatever overhead they normally incur for
    doing business.
        Mr. Garamendi. And you don't think you will have to pay for
    that?
        Mr. Bolden. We will pay something, as anybody does when
    they buy a service. There is always--the airlines charge me
    extra because they are inefficient.
        Mr. Garamendi. They are private, aren't they?
        Mr. Bolden. And that is what we are talking about. I am
    talking about purchasing a service from a public or private
    company that wants to compete to provide that service in terms
    of cargo to orbit and humans to low-Earth orbit.
        Mr. Garamendi. And if you think you are not going to pay
    for their inefficiencies, you are mistaken.
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, I did not say I would not do that.
    That will be figured in--I am certain they will figure it in to
    their price.
        Mr. Garamendi. I am sorry. I don't want to be too
    argumentative here but it seems to me----
        Mr. Bolden. I am not arguing. I agree with you.
        Mr. Garamendi. I am, and I don't want to do that. Just
    finally, I think you are making a serious error in not looking
    at Constellation Lite. I think you are obligated to do so. I
    think you are making a big mistake in not looking at how that
    might be modified to achieve the goals that you and the
    President are stating, and to simply push it aside and not move
    forward with a significant modification or useful modification
    to meet the requirements of manned spaceflight, whether done by
    contractors or leasing the equipment. So I will let it go at
    that. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, if you could get a relief from the
    2010 Joint Appropriations Act that would allow me to----
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Bolden. We have covered
    that topic a few times.
        Dr. Ehlers is recognized.
        Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is my judgment that
    all the older and wiser people on this panel have already
    spoken and said everything I would say, so if you don't object,
    I will reserve my spot for the next panel.
        Chairman Gordon. You demonstrate your wisdom right there.
        Ms. Kosmas is recognized for five minutes.

                         Extending the Shuttle Program

        Ms. Kosmas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, Administrator Bolden, for being here. I do think
    it is appropriate to mention that we actually had a successful
    and flawless return of Atlantis this morning at 8:48 a.m. and I
    think it is a great opportunity for us to congratulate both the
    crew and the workforce once again for the great work done by
    those folks.
        I have a number of different questions. I am going to try
    to be as brief as I can. I want to talk to you a little bit
    about a comment that you made that said it is important for us
    to get scientists to the International Space Station. You also
    talked about spares and payloads. I want to make a comment. It
    is my understanding that NASA has completed all the
    requirements suggested by the Columbia Accident Investigation
    Board and then some, and that recertification of the orbiters
    for flights beyond 2010 is essential done. I believe that you
    would agree that NASA's implementation of the Columbia Accident
    Investigation Board recommendations on shuttle and human
    spaceflight has been successful and that the shuttle's current
    safety record and the efforts by the shuttle team ensure that
    all safety risks are addressed for each flight.
        Mr. Bolden. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Kosmas. So would you then agree that flying beyond 2010
    into 2011 and perhaps into 2012 is not a safety issue but
    rather a cost issue?
        Mr. Bolden. Congresswoman, it is not a safety issue. There
    are still safety considerations but it is not a safety concern.
        Ms. Kosmas. There would be safety issues with any----
        Mr. Bolden. There are safety issues with--any time I put a
    human in a vehicle----
        Ms. Kosmas. So if it is not a--I am sorry to interrupt you.
    If it is not a safety issue but a cost issue, and the reason I
    bring it up is, I believe that manifesting the Launch on Need
    mission, the STS-135, would provide a more manageable draw-down
    and may help to retain the skills that we need for a future
    program and it would also be extremely useful in our ability to
    deliver spares to the space station and to bring down parts
    that we could conduct engineering analyses on, and I am asking
    whether you would agree that this would be helpful to us since
    we have no other American vehicle----
        Mr. Bolden. I agree that that may be helpful.
        Ms. Kosmas. --to get there. And for the record, do you see
    any technical or logistical roadblocks to flying the space
    shuttle twice a year through 2012?
        Mr. Bolden. Yes, ma'am. There is----
        Ms. Kosmas. Besides the cost factor.
        Mr. Bolden. No, no, no. There is a significant logistics
    issue, and once I fly the Launch on the Need vehicle, then the
    closest I can fly another vehicle is two years after that
    because I don't have tank sets that are prepared. So there
    would be a two-year gap between----
        Ms. Kosmas. So you suggest that that is a technical or
    logistical roadblock?
        Mr. Bolden. It is a logistical roadblock.
        Ms. Kosmas. All right. As was stated by my colleague, I
    don't want to be argumentative either, but I do believe that we
    have the ability to make something happen if we have the
    decision in place to make it happen.

                          Maintaining Space Workforce

        I want to go on to another question, which has to do with
    the workforce. In my area, as you know, Kennedy Space Center,
    the President was there, which we appreciated and he stated in
    his speech that the Administration's proposal would mean 2,500
    more jobs than under the program of record for my community at
    the Space Coast in Florida, and despite repeated requests, we
    have not received any further and specific information related
    to the workforce and the skills that would be required that
    would be helpful to me at the Space Coast to properly plan for
    the transition, not me but me and the folks I am working with
    in the area to plan for transition. I know that there are
    efforts in the works to try to work with the Administration at
    the Cabinet level to implement the $40 million workforce and
    economic development initiative proposed by the President but
    again, we don't have any details as to the specifics of the
    jobs that are intended to be created and therefore we have no
    way to match skills with that workforce that we so desperately
    want to retain. Do you have any details on the transition
    strategy that would help me to look at that workforce
    transition?
        Mr. Bolden. Congresswoman, at this point I don't. As I sat
    down, we were having the third meeting of the taskforce or a
    sub piece of it, and the types of information that you want
    will probably not be available before mid-July when the
    taskforce starts to look at the draft report that we are going
    to give to the President.
        Ms. Kosmas. Okay. Thank you. Do you plan to relocate DOD or
    other Federal projects to Florida? Are you looking at
    opportunities to do that?
        Mr. Bolden. No, ma'am, and I don't think Secretary Gates
    would appreciate my intervening in his responsibility. I
    understand what you are saying.
        Ms. Kosmas. As part of the transition, however, working
    with----
        Mr. Bolden. In fact, DOD--every secretariat has
    representation on the task force that is being chaired by
    Secretary Locke and me, so we are looking across the board
    trying to see what we can do for the Space Coast.

                     Safety Record of Commercial Providers

        Ms. Kosmas. Okay. I think my time is about to expire, but I
    just wanted to ask you one question and it has to do with your
    reliance emphasis on commercial. We know that Falcon-9 is
    getting ready to undergo its first test launch, and of course
    we wish it success. There is a great deal of pressure on it.
    However, we should also remember that ULA has been flying
    reliably and safely from Florida 40 launches in 40 months. Do
    you agree that this represents a solid record upon which we
    could build a commercial capability for access to low-Earth
    orbit for crew and cargo from both a cost and schedule
    standpoint?
        Mr. Bolden. I agree that it represents a potential source
    of provision of commercial access to low-Earth orbit.
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Bolden, and Mr. Wu is
    recognized.

                     Timeline for Commercial Access to LEO

        Mr. Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Administrator Bolden, I heard you say in answer to Mr.
    Smith's question that you expect the new vehicle to be flying
    three years after it is put out to bid.
        Mr. Bolden. I made the statement that what the commercial
    providers have said to me is that once they get a contract,
    they will have a vehicle that can comply with the human rating
    standards and be ready to fly in three years. That is a--I just
    related a statement.
        Mr. Wu. Right, right, and that is a very, very important
    distinction, and I want to focus on that for a second. What is
    your confidence level that what they have said is accurate or
    true?
        Mr. Bolden. Based on the fact that I told the President
    that I can do the same thing with an Orion vehicle that I would
    have ready three years from now, I think my confidence in their
    ability to do that is pretty good.
        Mr. Wu. And what is your basis for that belief?
        Mr. Bolden. The basis for my belief is confidence in my
    workforce and confidence in the leadership of NASA that has
    worked this issue and has given me a draft timeline and
    schedule.
        Mr. Wu. Now, that is an existing workforce. Do the private
    companies which may bid have similar workforces in place today?
        Mr. Bolden. Every private entity that may bid, to my
    knowledge, has a viable, existing workforce, whether it is
    Boeing or SpaceX.
        Mr. Wu. Which can match NASA's?
        Mr. Bolden. My workforce is the commercial industry. That
    is my workforce.
        Mr. Wu. So do you----
        Mr. Bolden. I mean, I have 18,000 civil servants in NASA
    and hundreds of thousands of employees for whom I am
    responsible but I don't write their check. They work for
    Boeing, Lockheed, ATK, Orbital, Sierra Nevada, all these
    companies that say they can continue to do what they have been
    doing for us for 50 years. I am just asking them to do it and
    not make me buy the vehicle, let me lease it from them. It is a
    different in--I just have to go back. It is a difference in
    acquisition strategy that I want to try. Is it risky? Yes.
        Mr. Wu. So it is the same workforce that will transpose
    over, if you will, to whichever private bidder ultimately wins
    the contract. If that is the case, how does the Administration
    make the case that this will be done for less money or any less
    money that Orion could be done?
        Mr. Bolden. Because the private entities or the commercial
    entities are telling me that they have learned through the
    years ways to be more efficient in their operations. They have
    in place programs like LEAN and 6 Sigma and other kinds of
    programs that have proven to be effective in bringing down
    cost. That is the way they make money.
        Mr. Wu. Now, I am a little confused and maybe I didn't
    properly track the prior conversation about potential
    inefficiencies in the private sector. Can you reconcile that
    for me?
        Mr. Bolden. My comment about inefficiencies in the private
    sector? Congressman, I would have to go back and review what I
    said. I don't recall saying that. Everything has inefficiencies
    in it. We are trying to drive those inefficiencies by programs
    like LEAN, you know, 6 Sigma and other programs. So you may be
    referring to where I said is it going to be perfect, no,
    because we don't know how to do that yet.
        Mr. Wu. Very good. Thank you very much, Mr. Bolden. I
    appreciate it. I yield back the balance of my time.
        Chairman Gordon. Mr. Davis is recognized.

                            Ceding U.S. Preeminence

        Mr. Davis. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I have a
    brief comment, and then I will yield to Ms. Giffords.
        Thirty years ago, we endeavored, I think in, not in
    political visionary, but in the ideological politics, it has
    given us a debt increase of $1 trillion dollars, over $12
    trillion today. I look at the Gulf of Mexico, and I, it makes
    me feel like I live in a Third World country, when we cannot
    stop oil from oozing out into the Gulf.
        John Kennedy said we will send a man to the Moon and return
    him safely by the end of this decade. We had a decade to plan
    to go to the Moon, and we came back. I want to know your plans,
    you don't have to answer my question, I want to know the plans
    of NASA. How are we going to have a manned vehicle that will
    guarantee America will not be in a Third World category in
    space flight? That is all I am asking, and I will support the
    program.
        I yield to Ms. Giffords.

                  Constellation Program Director Reassignment

        Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Davis, Mr. Chair,
    Administrator Bolden.
        Recently, we just received word that the Constellation
    program manager was removed from his position. Is that correct?
        Mr. Bolden. That is probably correct, ma'am.
        Ms. Giffords. Well, you would know. It is a pretty
    important position.
        Mr. Bolden. Well, I did not, it was not an action that I
    took or directed. It would be an action that would be taken by
    the Exploration Mission Directorate head, Doug Cooke, and the
    Johnson Space Center Director, Mike Coats. I have been in
    consultation with them about that, but, and my understanding
    was that they were going to get together with him this morning.
        Ms. Giffords. Mr. Bolden, my concern is, you know,
    particularly considering the news that we had last week, that
    the Program Manager was actually working hard to try to make
    the program work, given the constraints of the budget. But
    again, from where we sit, you know, his work to restructure and
    potentially save the parts of Constellation that need to be
    saved. By removing him from his position, I think it, again, it
    demonstrates to us that the question I asked you earlier,
    whether or not you would give this committee your assurance
    that you were doing everything that you can, as the NASA
    Administrator, to make progress with Constellation for the
    remainder of the fiscal year 2010, when the Constellation
    manager is removed from his position, it frankly makes me
    personally very dubious that that is, in fact, happening.
        So, you know, I am just, I am wondering, you know, again,
    the assurance that you can give to us in the United States
    Congress, that you are actually carrying this out, and whether
    or not the program will carry forward, and whether or not you
    were planning on replacing him with someone who is competent,
    and replacing him with someone expeditiously.
        Mr. Bolden. We would replace him with someone who is
    incredibly competent. I don't think I have anyone in the, you
    know, in the hierarchy of the Constellation Program or
    anywhere, that is not competent and has my confidence. And Jeff
    Hanley is not leaving NASA. Jeff Hanley is moving up to become
    the Deputy Director of the Johnson Space Center for Strategic
    Studies and Strategic Plans. He is an incredibly talented
    individual, and you know, Jeff and I have spoken for quite some
    time, since I became the NASA Administrator, about his future.
        Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Bolden. And----
        Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, because
    we have this very complex program, that demands a tremendous
    amount of oversight and management, again, it is of great
    concern to us that you take the manager out of his position and
    reassign him to another position. And I just want to let you
    know that I am very concerned by that.
        Chairman Gordon. Mr. Hill is recognized.
        Mr. Hill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Bolden,
    for being here.
        I think by and large, most of us, or a lot of us believe
    that the image of NASA has been a success program. I mean, our
    second panel today is going to be, consist of men who have
    walked on the Moon. That is pretty impressive. And so, in the
    last, you know, 50 years or so, we have been very proud of the
    American efforts in outer space. And it has become a very
    patriotic thing.

                             Benefits of New Budget

        Now, you mentioned a few minutes ago that what you are
    wanting to do is risky. And of course, there is no risk, there
    is no rewards. Convince us, because I think a lot of us are
    skeptical. Even as we have listened to your testimony today,
    that the rewards to be derived because of this risky thing that
    you are talking about doing, can you tell us what those rewards
    are going to be?
        Mr. Bolden. Sir, it is going to be maintenance of American
    preeminence in space, continuance of our leadership as the
    acknowledged leader in human space flight and exploration.
        Mr. Hill. Well, I guess that is an answer. Perhaps a little
    bit simplistic. Why do you believe that we cannot do that under
    the present program?
        Mr. Bolden. Because it is unaffordable.
        Mr. Hill. And what you are wanting to do is affordable.
        Mr. Bolden. As I promised the chairman, I am going to bring
    him a budget and a program that will fit under a $19 billion
    budget for 2011, or I won't bring him a program. And I am going
    to bring that to him, to this committee.
        Mr. Hill. Okay. Thank you.
        Chairman Gordon. And Ms. Edwards is recognized.
        Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
    your testimony, Administrator Bolden.

                             Termination Liability

        I just want to go back to the termination liability, and I
    know we have been over this, but a couple of things really just
    don't make sense to me. One is that the, these letters were
    asking for termination costs were sent, basically seven, eight
    months into the fiscal year. And that would mean about three
    quarters of the budget had been spent for that year, and so,
    you put the contractors in a position of being almost three
    quarters into a fiscal year, and then having to make
    adjustments to accommodate having to preserve the termination
    liability costs within their current contracts.
        How again is that fair to them, and didn't they have the
    benefit of a bargain at the outset, if that was going to be the
    requirement at the beginning of the year, to know that, so that
    they could accommodate their personnel and other costs
    accordingly? What I worry about is, so, for example, at one
    company, there is a young professional who is going to lose
    from the Constellation Program, is a 25 year old aerospace
    engineer, a graduate from the University of Michigan,
    transferred across the country to work on the program a year
    ago. And made the transfer, because he wanted to work on
    vehicles that would carry humans into low Earth orbit. Another
    young professional, a young Hispanic woman, a graduate from the
    University of Texas, degree in mechanical engineering,
    supported the program for two years, and she is assessing
    requirements and supporting development of test articles.
        These people and their capacity will be lost, because the
    only way for the contractors to whom you have sent these
    letters, the only choice that they have, really, is to let
    people go, because for them to eat the costs of, you know, a
    couple of hundred million dollars, on the off chance that
    somehow, they are going to end up competing successfully in
    commercial competition, and retain their talented workforce, I
    just think that is too much to expect of these contractors.
        We are going to lose these people. We are not going to lose
    them for a year or two years, or whatever it is down the line,
    when the competition finally comes into being and hiring
    starts. We will lose them permanently, because they will be off
    doing something else, someplace else. They may be in some other
    international space program, working, because they can't find
    that kind of work here. And so, or in some other sector of the
    industry entirely.
        And so, my concern is that it seems to me that you are
    operating really, one, outside of your authority. I mean, this
    Congress could not have been clearer in saying to the
    Administration, all breaks, hold, while we figure this out
    together. And the Administration, it seems to me, is going its
    own direction, irrespective of what the United States Congress
    wants, and that is just not acceptable.
        I want to add into the record a letter from Senator
    Mikulski to Peter Orzag, asking specifically about this,
    expecting a response, my understanding is by May 25. This
    committee deserves a response as well, because I think that the
    burden that you have now placed on your contractors is
    tremendous and cannot be met reasonably without, you know, at a
    time when we are actually struggling to create jobs in this
    country, and we are sending out these termination liability
    letters that inevitably result in the loss of highly skilled
    workers, a workforce that is completely demoralized. I mean, I
    am demoralized just looking at it.
        And I don't think that is really acceptable for the
    Administration that says that it cares about science and
    technology and research in the Twenty First Century. And if we
    are going to say to these young people like I described, sorry
    folks, go find something else to do for a couple of years,
    while we just figure it out, we will lose them. We will lose
    talent. This workforce will lose talent, and the United States
    will lose its preeminence, and I think that, I know I, for one,
    on this committee, don't intend to stand for it.
        And so, I look forward to a response from the
    Administration to Senator Mikulski's letter about these
    terminations, and I fully expect that NASA is going to comply
    with the law, and with the direction from this Congress to stop
    it. And I don't know that it can be said in any other plain
    language than that.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Ms. Edwards. And as our second
    panel starts to move along, Mr. Bishop, if you have one quick
    question, we will let you go for it.

                        Cost Estimates for Ares Program

        Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
    courtesy, and even the ranking member, your fairness in this
    process. I appreciate that. I had just a couple of quick
    questions from----
        Chairman Gordon. You got one quick question here. And we
    got to get on to the next panel, sorry.
        Mr. Bishop. Okay. Let me go with the one quick question
    from General Bolden. And we have got to quit meeting like this,
    but there is only one way that is going to happen.
        There is almost an urban legend coming out of NASA and from
    press clippings as to the cost of the Ares rocket. You have
    received a letter from one of your fellow travelers, Charlie
    Precourt, that challenges that number, saying the actual cost
    is about half of what you are talking about, and subsequent
    flights would be in the range of $60 million.
        The question I have is, have you seen that letter, a
    response to it, and also, were you, when you came up with your
    calculations, realizing that in the Defense Authorization bill,
    the language will state that defense officials have estimated
    that the cost of propulsion systems could increase 40 to 100
    percent because of infrastructure costs currently shared by the
    Department of Defense and NASA, and they would be passed on to
    the Department of Defense.
        Finally, the committee believes that the health and long-
    term viability of the solid rocket motor industrial base is a
    government-wide challenge. Am I correct on the assumption that
    the potential cost to Defense by the change in the program that
    NASA is recommending was not part of the original cost
    estimates for what Ares, Ares I or Ares V would be?
        So, have you seen the letter?
        Mr. Bolden. I think I have seen the letter to which you
    refer, from Charlie Precourt.
        Mr. Bishop. Has there been a response to his analysis?
        Mr. Bolden. I don't, I would have to find out, sir. I don't
    think we have responded to his letter yet. But I will----
        Mr. Bishop. Was cost to the Defense system that will be
    shared by taxpayers part of the original analysis of costs for
    running Ares?
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, I will have to get back to you on
    that. I don't know the answer to that.
        Mr. Bishop. Can I help if I give you the answer?
        Mr. Bolden. You can.
        Mr. Bishop. No. All right.
        And with that, I do appreciate it. Some time, I just want
    to talk to you about this guy. This is the face of the people,
    who is celebrating his one week firing from this process, and I
    hope that at some time, I can tell him that the loss of his job
    was because either the government was going to save money, or
    come up with a program that was safer for astronauts, or it was
    in the public good, or the exigencies of the struggle, not
    simply because we decided to pick winners or losers within the
    free market system.
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.
        Mr. Bishop. I appreciate it.
        Chairman Gordon. And Mr. Bolden, thank you for your last
    two hours. We have enjoyed being with you. I hope you have
    enjoyed being with us.
        Mr. Bolden. Congressman, I have. I appreciate it. I
    appreciate the opportunity to address this committee and hear
    your concerns.
        Chairman Gordon. Well, you are going to get another
    opportunity.
        Mr. Bolden. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Gordon. And you are excused. And we will move now
    to our second panel.
        Mr. Bolden. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Gordon. Our second panel has arrived, and I thank
    you for your patience. And I am sure you have had an
    opportunity to hear the earlier.
        So, at this time, I will introduce our witnesses. First of
    all is Mr. Neil Armstrong, who really needs no introduction to
    anyone in this room. Was the commander of the Apollo 11
    mission, and was the first person ever to set foot on the Moon.
    He also has a distinction, a distinguished career as an
    engineer, test pilot, professor, and is Vice President, or Vice
    Chairman of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
    Challenger accident.
        Next is Captain Eugene Cernan, who was the commander of
    Apollo 17 mission, and the last person to visit the Moon,
    almost 38 years ago--was it 38 years ago?--in 1972. He had a
    distinguished career at NASA, and also has had a significant
    leadership experience in the commercial sector.
        And finally, Mr. A. Thomas Young, who was the Executive
    Vice President of Lockheed Martin corporation, former President
    of Martin Marietta. Mr. Young has provided significant service
    to the Nation over the years, by leading independent reviews of
    major civil and military space programs, including most
    recently, the NPOESS Program. What a mess that was. We could
    do, if we could have that money back, we could do all these
    things.
        He has been an invaluable resource for this committee, and
    we look forward to hearing his testimony today.
        So welcome, and Mr. Armstrong, you may proceed.

           STATEMENTS OF NEIL ARMSTRONG, COMMANDER, APOLLO 11

        Mr. Armstrong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members. I very
    much appreciate your invitation to allow me to present my
    assessments of the new NASA plan based on the President's 2011
    budget submittal.
        If one of the goals of government is to motivate its
    citizenry, and to be the best it can be, few government
    agencies will surpass NASA in that function. I have met
    countless now middle-aged adults who credit NASA's human space
    programs for inspiring them to study hard in order to master
    and excel in their chosen field. And they are not just in
    aerospace, but in education, and astronomy, and computer
    science, and engineering, and medicine.
        Some question why America should return to the Moon. After
    all, they say, we have already been there. I find that
    mystifying. It is as if 16th century monarchs proclaimed that
    we need not go to the New World. We have already been there. Or
    if President Thomas Jefferson announced in 1808 that Americans
    not need, need not go west of the Mississippi, because Lewis
    and Clark have already been there.
        Americans have visited and examined six locations on Luna,
    varying in size from a suburban lot to a small township. That
    leaves more than 14 million square miles yet to be explored.
    And there is much to be learned on Luna. Learning to survive in
    the lunar environment, investigating many science
    opportunities, determining the practicality of extracting
    helium-3 from the lunar regolith, prospecting for platinum
    group metals, meeting challenges not yet identified.
        The lunar vicinity is an exceptional location to learn
    about traveling to different, difficult, distant places.
    Largely removed from Earth gravity and Earth's magnetosphere,
    it provides many of the challenges of flying far from Earth.
    But communication delays with Earth are less than two seconds,
    permitting mission control on Earth to play an important and
    timely role in flight operations.
        In the case of severe emergencies, such as Jim Lovell's
    Apollo 13, Earth is only three days travel time away. The long
    communication delays to destinations beyond the Moon may
    mandate new techniques and procedures for spacecraft
    operations. Mission control cannot provide a Mars crew their
    normal helpful advice if the landing trajectory is nine minutes
    long, but the time delay of radar, communications, and
    telemetry back to Earth is 19 minutes.
        Flight experience at lunar distance can provide valuable
    insights into practical solutions for handling such challenges.
    I am persuaded that a return to the Moon would be a most
    productive path to expanding the human presence in the Solar
    System.
        Mr. Chairman, you asked that I present my priorities for
    the human space program, and I suggest that first, we maintain
    American leadership. Second, we guarantee American access to
    space. And third, we continue to explore the Solar System.
    Leadership, access, exploration. Those are my priorities.
        The issue facing this meeting has produced substantial
    turmoil among space advocates, so many normally knowledgeable
    people were completely astounded by the President's proposal.
    Had the announcement been preceded by a more typical review,
    analysis, and discussion among the executive branch, the
    agency, this Congress, and all the other interested and
    knowledgeable parties, no Member of this Committee would have
    been surprised by the announcement of a new plan.
        In this case, a normally collegial sector of society was
    split in many fragments. Some focused on contracts and money,
    some on workforce and jobs, some on technical choices. All
    because a few planners, with little or no space operations
    experience, attempted an end-run on the normal planning
    process. And it has been painful to watch.
        Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope that the Members of this
    Committee, and all others involved in this process, will work
    openly together to provide a plan which will be the best choice
    for our country.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Armstrong follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of Neil Armstrong

        Mr. Chairman and Members, I appreciate your invitation to present
    my assessments on the new NASA plan based on the President's 2011
    Budget Submittal.
        I am, admittedly, an aerospace enthusiast, having spent 17 years at
    NASA and its predecessor agency, NACA, prior to joining a university
    faculty to teach aerospace engineering. I was a member of the National
    Commission on Space and Vice Chairman of the Presidential Commission on
    the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. I finished my active career in a
    company manufacturing a wide variety of highly engineered aerospace
    products and, more recently, served on the NASA Advisory Council. I
    still get excited about great new ideas.
        If one of the goals of government is to motivate its citizenry to
    `be the best that they can be', few government agencies will surpass
    NASA in that function. I have met countless now middle aged adults who
    credit NASA's human space programs for inspiring them to study hard in
    order to master and excel in their chosen field. And they are not just
    in aerospace, but in education, astronomy, computer science, medicine,
    and engineering.
        The motivating quality of NASA programs and people is, I believe,
    due to its success in achieving leadership status in space travel and
    exploration, and to its enduring tenacity in exploring the frontiers of
    the cosmos. That is one reason why maintaining that leadership position
    is so important to our country. But it is certainly not the only
    reason. Success in expanding our understanding of the universe that
    surrounds us, and sharing that information with others around the
    globe, engenders respect and admiration from people and governments
    around the world. Discoveries and developments at technology's edge
    produce new theories, new products, new systems, and ultimately, new
    ways of living. Who, at the time of Sputnik, would have suspected that,
    two generations later, golfers would be determining their distance to
    the flagstick using a Satellite based GPS? Or that we could measure the
    rate at which the moon is moving away from Earth (currently about 1.5
    inches/year)?
        Management gurus have written endless analyses of push versus pull
    strategies. The applications are ubiquitous: marketing, advertising,
    manufacturing, development, etc. The new NASA plan includes technology
    push funding for research and the hope of `breakthroughs' to hasten our
    success in developing craft to carry humans to distant cosmic
    destinations. Some have compared this approach to that of the National
    Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), the predecessor of NASA,
    whose only work was research and only product was reports. Some have
    assumed that NACA was completely a technology push agency.
        As one of the small and ever diminishing number of NACA alumni, I
    can confirm that NACA did, in fact, conduct some technology push
    projects, such as the NACA airfoil series, the NACA engine cowl and
    supersonic boundary layer heat transfer. On the other hand, most
    research efforts were `pull' projects, identified by the aeronautical
    industry and the military as problems that required solutions, and NACA
    help was requested. Examples are stability requirements for aircraft at
    supersonic speeds, understanding and solutions for transonic `tuck',
    pitch-up, and roll coupling, practical variable sweep wings, and
    supersonic drogue chute development.
        That work was exciting and fascinating. It was, day by day, perhaps
    the most genuinely satisfying work of my life. But it was not
    motivating to the general public. Rarely was the general public even
    aware of the remarkable research work that was going on in the NACA
    laboratories and flight tests. My experience in both pull and push
    operations leads me to conclude that pull research attached to an
    operational space exploration program would be substantially more
    likely to produce usable results in a timely manner.
        Project selection and budgeting in the new NASA plan appears to
    have been heavily dependent on the observations and options presented
    in Seeking a Human Spaceflight Program Worthy of a Great Nation (HSP),
    familiarly known as the Augustine Committee report. It is interesting
    to review the constraints under which the Augustine Committee operated,
    and the effects that those constraints imposed on their findings.
        The committee was ``asked to provide two options that fit within
    the 2010 budget profile'' (HSP p. 15). The two options selected were
    the ``Constellation Program of record'' and the ``ISS and Lunar
    Exploration''. The funding available for Constellation under the 2010
    Presidential Budget Submittal was more than $1.5 billion per year below
    the 2009 Budget and about $3 billion per year below the original
    funding plan based on the Exploration Systems Architecture Study The
    Committee quite properly concluded that the program would be delayed
    and cost more and Ares and Orion would be too late to serve the
    International Space Station, scheduled for termination in 2015. They
    found that ``human exploration beyond low Earth orbit is not viable
    under the FY 2010 budget guideline'' (HSP p. 96).
        It is improper to conclude that Constellation was beyond help.
    Constellation managers believe they would have been in reasonable shape
    had NASA been provided the funding of the 2009 President's Budget
    Submittal or even the 2011 Budget. Indeed, Mr. Augustine in his
    testimony to this committee last September said: ``. . . we believe
    that the existing program, given adequate funds, is executable and
    would carry out its objectives.''
        In determining the reasonableness of competing concepts to be
    compared, the Aerospace Corporation (Aerospace) was engaged by the
    Augustine Committee to provide estimates on cost and schedule. Your
    Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, thoughtfully, saw fit to ask
    Aerospace to provide details of that process.
        Aerospace projected the development costs for a 4 person commercial
    spacecraft with launch abort system at 12 billion 2009 dollars plus $8
    billion for the launch rocket. Similarly, costs for a 6 person
    spacecraft would be $17 billion (spacecraft + LAS) plus $10 billion
    (launcher) respectively. The Committee assumed NASA would contribute 3
    billion dollars to this project, which Aerospace, using historical
    growth and other factors, raised to 5 billion dollars (HSF, p. 70). The
    contribution remaining for the commercial provider is a very
    substantial investment and, if accurate, raises questions about the
    ability and willingness of a public or private company to accept that
    financial risk. Aerospace stated their assumption was that three
    competitors would bid and two would be selected. They further assumed
    that NASA would need two flights per year to the ISS. A reasonable
    business case supporting this proposal is elusive.
        Some question why America should return to the moon. ``After all'',
    they say, ``we have already been there.'' I find that mystifying. It
    would be as if 16th century monarchs proclaimed that ``we need not go
    to the New World, we have already been there.'' Or as if President
    Thomas Jefferson announced in 1808 that Americans ``need not go west of
    the Mississippi, the Lewis and Clark expedition has already been
    there.''
        Americans have visited and examined 6 locations on Luna, varying in
    size from a suburban lot to a small township. That leaves more than 14
    million square miles yet to explore. There is much to be learned on
    Luna, learning to survive in the lunar environment, investigating many
    science opportunities, determining the practicality of extracting
    Helium 3 from the lunar regolith, prospecting for palladium group
    metals, and meeting challenges not yet identified.
        The lunar vicinity is an exceptional location to learn about
    traveling to more distant places. Largely removed from Earth gravity,
    and Earth's magnetosphere, it provides many of the challenges of flying
    far from Earth. But communication delays with Earth are less than 2
    seconds permitting Mission Control on Earth to play an important and
    timely role in flight operations. In the case of a severe emergency,
    such as Jim Lovell's Apollo 13, Earth is only 3 days travel time away.
        Learning how to fly to, and remain at, Earth-Moon Lagrangian points
    would be a superb precursor to flying to and remaining at, the much
    farther distant Earth-Sun Lagrangian points.
        And flying to further away destinations from lunar orbit or Lunar
    Lagrangian points could have substantial advantages in flight time and/
    or propellant requirements as compared with departures from Earth
    orbit. And flying in the lunar vicinity would typically provide lower
    radiation exposures than those expected in interplanetary flight.
        The long communication delays to destinations beyond the moon
    mandate new techniques and procedures for spacecraft operations.
    Mission Control cannot provide a Mars crew their normal helpful advice
    if the landing trajectory is 9 minutes long but the time delay of the
    radar, communication and telemetry back to Earth is 19 minutes. Flight
    experience at lunar distance can provide valuable insights into
    practical solutions for handling such challenges. I am persuaded that a
    return to the moon would be the most productive path to expanding the
    human presence in the Solar System.
        Mr. Chairman, you asked that I present my priorities for the human
    space program. I suggest that:

            1)  We maintain American leadership

            2)  We guarantee American access

            3)  We continue to explore the Solar System

        Leadership, access, and exploration are my priorities.
        This issue facing this meeting has produced substantial turmoil
    among space advocates. So many normally knowledgeable people were
    completely astounded by the President's proposal. Had the announcement
    been preceded by the typical review, analysis and discussion among the
    Executive branch, the agency, the congress, and all the other
    interested and knowledgeable parties, no Member of this Committee would
    have been surprised by the announcement of a new plan.
        In this case, a normally collegial sector of society was split in
    many fragments, some focused on contracts and money, some on work force
    and jobs, some on technical choices. All because a few planners, with
    little or no space operations experience, attempted an end run on the
    normal process. It has been painful to watch.
        Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope the members of this Committee, and
    all the others involved in this process, will work openly together to
    provide a plan which will be the best choice for our country.

        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Armstrong, and I hope you
    will be a part of that with us, as we have this transparency.
        Mr. Armstrong. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Gordon. Mr. Cernan is recognized. You want to hit
    your microphone.

    STATEMENTS OF CAPTAIN EUGENE A. CERNAN, USN (RET.), COMMANDER,
                               APOLLO 17

        Captain Cernan. Excuse me. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also
    sincerely appreciate the opportunity to express my personal
    views concerning the Administration's ``game changing proposal
    for the future of America's role in human exploration of
    space.''
        In my written testimony, I have gone into significant
    detail in what I consider the most critical aspects of the
    President's proposal, so in the interest of time, I will focus
    primarily on those items that you had put in the invitation to
    be here today.
        Several weeks ago, we became aware of the Administration's
    plan for our Nation's role in the future of space exploration.
    Neil Armstrong, Jim Lovell, and myself felt compelled to voice
    our concern, and did so in an opinion paper signed by the three
    of us. We spent a great deal of time writing and refining our
    document, choosing our words very, very carefully. Words such
    as ``devastating,'' ``slide to mediocrity,'' and ``third-rate
    stature,'' so that the intent of our message would neither be
    misinterpreted nor our deep concern about the future direction
    of human space flight as outlined in the President's proposal,
    be misunderstood.
        We particularly wanted to avoid any political overtones,
    because since its beginning, America's role in space has
    traditionally transcended political and partisan differences.
    We have recently heard a lot of eloquent verbiage about
    exploration of space, landing on an asteroid, circling Mars,
    and at some time in the future, perhaps even landing on the Red
    Planet.
        There is talk about a decision yet to come of building a
    large booster, which might ultimately take us almost anywhere
    we want to go in the far reaches of the universe. There are,
    however, no details, no specific challenge, and no commitment
    as to where or, specifically, when this exploration might come
    to pass.
        And when one comes to examine the details of the 2011
    budget proposal, nowhere, nowhere can be found, not one penny,
    allocated to support space exploration. Yes, there has been
    much rhetoric about transformative technology, heavy lift
    propulsion research, robotic precursor missions, as well as
    other worthwhile endeavors in their own right. Yet nowhere do
    we find any mention of human exploration of space, and nowhere
    do we find a commitment in dollars to support this all
    important endeavor.
        We, Neil Armstrong, Jim Lovell, and myself, have come to
    the unanimous conclusion that this budget proposal presents no
    challenges, has no focus, and is, in fact, a blueprint for a
    mission to nowhere. In this proposal budget, we find several
    billions of dollars allocated and allotted to developing
    commercial human access to low Earth orbit, based upon the
    assumption, the sole assumptions and claims by those competing
    for this exclusive contract, who say they can achieve this goal
    in a little bit more than three years, and do it for something
    less than $5 billion.
        Even the Administration has shown some concern over these
    claims, by admitting a willingness, if necessary, to subsidize
    commercial, the commercial enterprise, until it ultimately,
    whenever that may be, becomes successful, calculated by some to
    be as long as a decade or more, with costs raising by at least
    a factor of three.
        This assumes they have the capability in hand to design, to
    build, to flight-test and develop, a man-rated, man-rated
    spacecraft and booster architecture meeting the stringent
    requirements for safety, along with the infrastructure that is
    required for such a venture.
        While I strongly support the goals and ideals of commercial
    access to space, the folks who proposed such a limited
    architecture do not yet know what they don't know, and that can
    lead to dangerous and costly consequences.
        Based upon my own personal background and experience, I
    submit to this committee and to the Congress of the United
    States, and I do support the view that it will take the private
    sector as long as ten years to access low Earth orbit safely
    and cost-effectively. A prominent Russian academician is quoted
    as saying: In order to bring a craft to the standard of quality
    and safety for piloted flight, the United States will be
    dependent upon Russia at least until 2020. Such a commercial
    venture, should such a commercial venture run into
    insurmountable technical problems, business venture concerns,
    or God forbid, a catastrophic failure, it would leave the
    United States without a fallback program, unable to access even
    low Earth orbit for some indeterminate time in the future.
        And without an extension of the Space Shuttle on the front
    end and viable access to low Earth orbit on the far end, the
    gap, as we call it, the period when America would be grounded,
    could extend indefinitely.
        The sole reliance on the commercial sector, without a
    concurrent or backup approach, could very well lead to the
    abandonment of our $100 billion Space Station, $100 billion and
    25 year investment in the Space Station, a default on our
    commitments to our international partners, and will ultimately
    close the, cost the American taxpayer billions of unallocated
    dollars, and surely lengthen the gap from Shuttle retirement
    until the day we can once again access low Earth orbit, leaving
    us hostage to foreign powers.
        Is this one of the potential grand challenges of the 21st
    century? The United States, through NASA, has spent half a
    century learning what we didn't know, finding answers to
    questions we weren't smart enough to ask at the time,
    developing technology that was needed to meet a challenge, to
    get the job done.
        We came from Alan Shepard's flight in 1961 to the Shuttle
    and Space Station today, with a side trip or two to the Moon
    along the way. The evolution of this learning process was not
    without its costs, not just in dollars, but in the lives of our
    friends and colleagues. It took the courage, the effort, the
    dedication, and the self-sacrifice of thousands of Americans to
    bring us this far this quickly. And although we paid dearly for
    our mistakes, it is a testimonial to their commitment, and to
    American ingenuity, that everyone who went to the Moon came
    home.
        Therein is a lesson we cannot afford to ignore. Mr.
    Chairman, is this the NASA we want to transform? Constellation
    is an architecture that, over a five year period, has gone
    through several detailed reviews, and has been vetted by every
    government agency from the OMB to the DoD, and certainly by
    NASA, by every agency that has an ownership interest in a
    technical scientific budget, or other benefit to be derived
    from human space exploration.
        In additional, an arsenal of the best engineers and
    scientists that you have to offer, Mr. Young, and management
    experts in the aerospace community added their knowledge and
    expertise to the review of the proposed Constellation
    architecture before it ever even was considered to be worthy of
    moving forward.
        Constellation follows the von Braun model of the evolution
    of the Saturn V. We are in the development of the Ares V, or
    excuse me, we are in the development of the Ares I, is the
    embryo for the development of the heavy lift Ares V. The shared
    DNA, with commonality of critical components throughout, leads
    to greater cost effectiveness, a higher degree of confidence
    and safety, and provides the first elements of a heavy lift
    booster now.
        It is not unlike the Boeing family of jetliners, where the
    technology built into the 787 evolved from that of the 707.
    Embedded in the Constellation architecture is a culture of a
    long range building block that can not only service the ISS,
    extend the life of the Hubble, meet other national security
    priorities in low Earth orbit, but additionally, can carry us
    back to the Moon and on to Mars.
        In doing so, it makes use of existing hardware and
    facilities, while developing new technologies with a purpose,
    with a direction. Exploration is what drives technology
    innovation, not the reverse. It is unknown how much time and
    thought was put into the existing budget for 2011, or by whom
    the proposal was generated, but it is common knowledge that
    very few, if any of those government agencies referred to above
    were asked to participate. Nor, significant note, was the DoD
    or the engineering management expertise that exists throughout
    NASA today, with no transparency, no transparency, one can only
    conclude that this proposal was most likely formulated in haste
    by a very few within the Offices of Management and Budget, or
    the Science and Technology Policy, with alleged involvement of
    the NASA Deputy Administrator and, by his own admission, with
    little or no support input from the NASA Administrator himself.
        Neither did NASA Center Directors, nor senior NASA
    management throughout the agency, nor program managers have any
    input. If that is, indeed, the case, the originators quite
    likely were promoting their own agenda, rather than that of
    NASA and America's commitment to human space exploration. And
    effectively leads NASA to becoming nothing more than a research
    facility.
        My personal belief is that this proposal, Mr. Chairman, is
    a travesty, which flows against the grain of over 200 years of
    our history, and today, against the will of the majority of
    Americans. The space program has never been an entitlement. It
    is an investment. It is an investment in the future, an
    investment in technology, in jobs, in international respect, in
    geopolitical leadership, and perhaps most importantly, which
    has been stated here very well by Neil, perhaps most
    importantly, the inspiration and the education of our youth.
        Those best and brightest minds at NASA and throughout the
    multitudes of the private contractors, large and small, did not
    join the team to design windmills or to redesign gas pedals,
    but to live their dreams of once again taking us where no man
    has gone before.
        If this budget proposal becomes the law of the land, these
    technicians, these engineers, scientists, and a generation
    removed from Apollo, yet re-inspired by the prospect of going
    back to the Moon and onto Mars, will be gone. Where, I don't
    know, but they will be gone.
        In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, history has shown that
    America's human space flight program has, for over half a
    century, risen above, excuse me, above partisan differences.
    From Eisenhower to Kennedy, to the present day, the challenges
    and accomplishments of the past were those of a Nation, never a
    political party, nor of any individual agenda.
        Those flags which fly today on the surface of the Moon are
    not blue flags and are not red flags. They are American flags.
    We are at a crossroad. If we abdicate our leadership in space
    today, not only is human space flight and space exploration at
    risk, but I believe the future of our country is at risk, and
    thus, the future of our children and our grandchildren, as
    well.
        Now is the time, Mr. Chairman, for wiser heads, in the
    Congress of the United States, to prevail. Now is the time to
    overrule this Administration's pledge to mediocrity. Now is the
    time to be bold, to be innovative and wise in how we invest in
    the future of America. Now is the time to reestablish our
    Nation's commitment to excellence.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Members of this Committee,
    for allowing me to share my concern and my passion for the
    future of this country.
        [The prepared statement of Captain Cernan follows:]

                      Prepared Statement of Eugene Cernan

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity today to
    express my personal views concerning The Administration's ``game-
    changing'' proposal for the future of America's role in Human
    Exploration in Space.
        Some weeks ago when we became aware of The Administration's plan
    for our nation's role in the future of space exploration, Neil
    Armstrong, Jim Lovell and I felt compelled to voice our concern and did
    so in an opinion paper signed by the three of us. We spent a great deal
    of time writing and refining our document, choosing our words very
    carefully, words such as ``devastating'', ``slide to mediocrity'', and
    ``third rate stature'', so that the intent of our message would neither
    be misinterpreted nor would our deep concern about the future direction
    of human space flight as outlined in the President's proposal be
    misunderstood. We particularly wanted to avoid any political overtones
    because the support of America's role in space since its beginning has
    traditionally transcended partisan politics.
        It was determined after the Columbia accident that NASA should
    return to its core values, focusing its resources once again on space
    exploration while continuing its space exploitation through the Space
    Shuttle support of the International Space Station (ISS) and other
    national priorities of Low Earth Orbit (LEO). The Congress supported
    such a focus with a near-unanimous bipartisan approval in both the 2005
    and 2008 NASA Authorization Acts.
        We have recently heard a lot of eloquent verbage about the
    exploration of space--landing on an asteroid, circling Mars, and at
    some time in the future perhaps landing on the Red Planet. There is
    talk about a decision yet to come of building a large booster which
    might ultimately take us almost anywhere we want to go into the far
    reaches of the universe. There are, however, no details, no specific
    challenge, and no commitment as to where or specifically when this
    exploration might come to pass. My personal definition of space
    exploration, in contrast to exploitation, is ``going where no man has
    gone before, doing what has never been done before, doing what others
    couldn't do, wouldn't do, or perhaps were afraid to do.''
        And, when one examines details of the FY 2011 budget proposal,
    nowhere is there to be found one penny allocated to support space
    exploration. Yes, there has been much rhetoric on transformative
    technology, heavy lift propulsion research, robotic precursor missions,
    significant investment in commercial crew and cargo capabilities,
    pursuit of cross-cutting space technology capabilities, climate change
    research, aeronautics R&D, and education initiatives, all worthwhile
    endeavors in their own right. Yet nowhere do we find any mention of the
    Human Exploration of Space and nowhere do we find a commitment in
    dollars to support this all important national endeavor. We (Armstrong,
    Lovell and I) have come to the unanimous conclusion that this budget
    proposal presents no challenges, has no focus, and in fact is a
    blueprint for a mission to ``nowhere.''
        In this proposed budget we find several billions of dollars
    allotted to developing commercial human access to low Earth orbit,
    based upon the assumptions and claims by those competing for this
    exclusive contract who say that they can achieve this goal in little
    more than three years, and that it can be done for something less than
    5 billion dollars. Even The Administration has shown some concern over
    these claims by admitting a willingness to subsidize the commercial
    enterprise until it ultimately becomes successful, calculated by some
    to be as long as a decade or more with costs rising by a factor of
    three. (These are the same entrepreneurs who are well over a year late
    delivering the first unmanned cargo to LEO.) This assumes they have the
    capability in hand to design, build, flight test, and develop a man-
    rated spacecraft and booster architecture meeting the stringent
    requirements for safety along with the infrastructure required for such
    a venture. Infrastructure such as redesigning the requirements of
    mission control, developing and supporting training simulators, writing
    technical manuals for ground and crew training including all onboard
    procedures, developing the synergy between a worldwide tracking network
    and the uniqueness of a newly designed space vehicle along with an
    emergency recovery force standing by to handle this new space
    architecture. These are only a few of the development and support
    requirements necessary to put any new manned system into space.
    Although I strongly support the goals and ideals of commercial access
    to space, the folks who propose such a limited architecture ``do not
    yet know what they don't know'', and that can lead to dangerous and
    costly consequences. There are a myriad of technical challenges in
    their future yet to be overcome, perhaps of greatest importance are
    safety considerations which cannot be, nor will be, compromised as well
    as a business plan and investors that will have to be satisfied. For
    example, it took over a year and a half of review and redesign of the
    Apollo I hatch prior to ever getting Apollo 7 off the ground, before
    operational and safety requirements were fully satisfied.
        Based upon my background and experience, I submit to this Committee
    and do support the view that it will take the private sector as long as
    ten years to access LEO safely and cost-effectively. A prominent
    Russian academician is quoted as saying in order to bring a craft to
    the standard of quality and safety for piloted flight, the United
    States will be dependent on Russia until at least 2020. The Aerospace
    Corporation, although directed not to examine the data submitted on
    cost and schedule by the commercial sector, estimates an initial cost
    of 10-12 billion dollars, plus the added cost of modifications required
    to launch vehicle ground systems. Should such a commercial venture run
    into insurmountable technical problems, business venture concerns, or--
    God forbid--a catastrophic failure, it would leave the United States
    without a fallback program, unable to access even low Earth orbit for
    some indeterminate time in the future. Without an extension of the
    Shuttle on the front end and viable access to LEO on the far end, ``the
    gap'', or the period of time when America is grounded, could very well
    be extended indefinitely.
        The sole reliance on the commercial sector without a concurrent or
    back-up approach could very well lead to the abandonment of our 100
    billion dollar, 25 year investment in the ISS, default on our
    commitments to international partners, and will ultimately cost the
    American taxpayer billions of unallocated dollars and surely lengthen
    ``the gap'' from Shuttle retirement until the day we can once again
    access low Earth orbit leaving our nation hostage to foreign powers.
    Moreover, for a variety of reasons, a ``Going Out of Business'' sign
    hanging on the door is always a possibility in any high dollar-high
    risk investment. Is this one of our ``Potential Grand Challenges'' of
    the 21st century?
        The United States, through NASA, has spent a half-century learning
    what we didn't know, finding answers to questions we weren't smart
    enough to ask at the time, developing technology that was needed to
    meet the challenge and get the job done. We came from Alan Shepard's
    flight in 1961 to the Shuttle and Space Station today with a side trip
    or two to the moon along the way. The evolution of this learning
    process was not without its cost--not just in dollars, but also in the
    lives of our friends and colleagues. It took the courage, effort,
    dedication and self-sacrifice of thousands of Americans who allowed us
    to come this far this quickly. And, although we paid dearly for our
    mistakes, it is a testimonial to their commitment and American
    ingenuity that everyone who went to the moon came home. Therein is a
    lesson we cannot afford to ignore. Is this the NASA we want to
    transform?
        Additionally, The President's proposal suggests we develop ``game-
    changing'' technology for the future. The technology we enjoy today, 40
    years after Apollo, is technology that evolved from a purpose, from the
    acceptance of a challenge and from a commitment to a goal. It was
    technology with a focus, with a mission. To simply put the best and the
    brightest in a room and tell them to develop breakthrough technology
    that could or might or may be useful in the future is a naive
    proposition. Exploration drives technology innovation--not the reverse.
        Also in the proposal is the possibility that maybe, at some time,
    perhaps as far down the road as 2015, the United States might decide to
    develop a heavy lift booster. This is a very vague proposition, one
    that will likely never be funded to fruition. Coincidentally,
    Constellation has a heavy lift booster, Ares V, not only on the drawing
    boards but in component test today. Do we need a decision in 2015 for
    one already made today?
        A late addition to the Administration's proposal, and one very
    obviously not well thought out, was a provision to build an ``Orion
    Lite'' spacecraft as a rescue vehicle on the ISS. Although we have
    never had need for a rescue vehicle, we have today under contract with
    Russia two Soyuz continuously stationed on the ISS capable of carrying
    as many as six people to safety should the need arise, with a provision
    for a third Soyuz were the crew complement ever to increase to as many
    as nine--which is highly unlikely. An ``Orion Lite'', before it is
    qualified to transport human beings to safety from the ISS, certainly
    would have to be man-rated. To man-rate a spacecraft and its ride into
    orbit requires a great deal more than following a list of safety
    requirements and protocol instructions included in its development. The
    ``Orion Lite'' would have to go through an extensive development, test
    and evaluation phase before being qualified to carry humans. It sounds
    very similar to what the existing Ares I/Orion development proposal is
    all about and would most likely cost as much, and require the same
    amount of time to bring it to man-rated flight status, yet leave us
    with half the capability of a full up Orion.
        Constellation itself is an architecture that over a five-year
    period has gone through several detailed reviews and has been vetted by
    every government agency from the OMB to the DOD, and certainly by
    NASA--by every agency that has an ownership interest in any technical,
    scientific, budget or benefit to be derived from Human Space
    Exploration. In addition, an arsenal of the best engineers, scientists
    and management experts in America's aerospace community added their
    knowledge and expertise to the review of the proposed Constellation
    architecture before it ever became an official program worthy of
    consideration. Constellation follows the Von Braun model in the
    evolution of the Saturn V, wherein the development of the Ares I is the
    embryo for the development of the heavy-lift Ares V. This shared DNA,
    with commonality of critical components throughout, leads to greater
    cost effectiveness, a higher degree of confidence and safety, and
    provides the first elements of a heavy lift booster. It is not unlike
    the Boeing family of jetliners wherein the technology built into the
    787 evolved from that of the original 707.
        Embedded in the Constellation architecture is the culture of a
    long-range building block that cannot only service the ISS, extend the
    life of the Hubble, meet other national priorities in LEO, but
    additionally can carry us back to the moon and on to Mars. In doing so,
    it makes use of existing hardware and facilities while developing new
    technologies with a purpose. Appropriately under the law, both Houses
    of the Congress of the United States with overwhelmingly bipartisan
    support, approved and agreed that Constellation should go forward.
        In contrast to the five-year review of the overall Constellation
    architecture plus the carefully monitored program development, the
    Augustine Committee was required to provide their report in 90 days.
    The report contained several suggestions and alternatives to
    Constellation, few of which were included in the FY 2011 budget, but
    ultimately the Committee came to the conclusion that Constellation's
    architecture had been well managed and is indeed executable, providing
    it has the appropriate funding that had been denied for several years.
    Important to note is that the Committee was directed to base their
    conclusions and recommendations not on the FY 2009 budget, but rather
    on the FY 2010 budget from which tens of billions of dollars had
    already been removed between 2010 and 2020. Additionally, their
    conclusions were based upon a 2015, not 2020, life span for the ISS and
    did not take into account ongoing requirements for access to LEO at
    other inclinations. Naturally, the Augustine Committee concluded that
    Constellation was not doable within the constraints of The
    Administration's mandated guidelines and budget restrictions. Under
    these constraints, one might have expected the conclusions to be
    predetermined. More importantly, however, the funding proposed for FY
    2011, if prudently administered, is more than adequate to continue the
    development of Constellation.
        It is unknown how much time and thought was put into the existing
    budget proposal for FY 2011, or by whom this proposal was generated,
    but it is common knowledge that few if any of those government agencies
    referred to above were asked to participate, nor, of significant note,
    was the DOD or the engineering or management expertise that exists
    throughout NASA today. With no transparency, one can only conclude that
    this proposal was most likely formulated in haste by a very few within
    the Offices of Management and Budget (OMB) and Science and Technology
    Policy (OSTP), with the alleged involvement of the NASA Deputy
    Administrator, and by his own admission, with little or no input from
    the NASA Administrator himself Neither did NASA's Center Directors, nor
    senior NASA management throughout the agency, nor program managers have
    any input. If that is indeed the case, the originators quite likely
    were promoting their own agenda rather than that of NASA and America's
    commitment to Human Space Exploration as directed by Congress in the
    Authorization Bills of 2005 and 2008.
        With the submission of FY 2011 budget, The Administration and the
    originators of this proposal were either misinformed or showing extreme
    naivete, or I can only conclude, are willing to take accountability for
    a calculated plan to dismantle America's leadership in the world of
    Human Space Exploration resulting in NASA becoming nothing more than a
    research facility. In either case, I believe this proposal is a
    travesty which flows against the grain of over 200 years of our history
    and, today, against the will of the majority of Americans.
        The space program has never been an entitlement, it's an investment
    in the future--an investment in technology, jobs, international respect
    and geo-political leadership, and perhaps most importantly in the
    inspiration and education of our youth. Those best and brightest minds
    at NASA and throughout the multitudes of private contractors, large and
    small, did not join the team to design windmills or redesign gas
    pedals, but to live their dreams of once again taking us where no man
    has gone before. If this budget proposal becomes the law of the land,
    these technicians, engineers, scientists, a generation removed from
    Apollo, yet re-inspired by the prospect of going back to the moon and
    on to Mars, will be gone--where I don't know--but gone.
        America's human space flight program has for a half century risen
    above partisan differences from Eisenhower to Kennedy to the present
    day. The challenges and accomplishments of the past were those of a
    nation--never of a political party or of any individual agenda. Those
    flags that fly on the moon today are neither blue flags nor are they
    red flags--they are American Flags. We are at a cross road. If we
    abdicate our leadership in space today, not only is human spaceflight
    and space exploration at risk, but I believe the future of this country
    and thus the future of our children and grandchildren as well. Now is
    the time for wiser heads in the Congress of the United States to
    prevail. Now is the time to overrule this Administration's pledge to
    mediocrity. Now is the time to be bold, innovative and wise in how we
    invest in the future of America. Now is the time to re-establish our
    nation's commitment to excellence.
        Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee for this
    opportunity to share my concern and passion for that which means most--
    the future of our country!

    Sincerely, and with respect,

    Eugene A. Cernan
    Commander, Apollo XVII

        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Captain. I think you are ready
    to suit up again. Mr. Young, you are recognized.

         STATEMENTS OF A. THOMAS YOUNG, LOCKHEED MARTIN (RET.)

        Mr. Young. Chairman Gordon, Mr. Hall, and Committee
    members, I am pleased to have the opportunity to present my
    views on the proposed United States human space flight program.
        My judgment is that implementation of the proposed human
    space flight program will be devastating to NASA, human space
    flight, and the United States space program. For five decades,
    the United States robotic and human exploration program had
    remarkable successes that have filled our books of knowledge,
    explored new worlds, enhanced our international reputation, and
    given pride and inspiration to our fellow Americans.
        We have also had disappointing failures. We have developed
    a mission success methodology that maximizes the probability of
    success, a methodology that has evolved over the life of the
    space program, and continues to improve with the experience
    gained with the execution of each new project.
        A hallmark of the methodology is the recognition that space
    flight is a one strike and you are out business. Thousands of
    individuals can do everything perfectly, and one human error
    can result in mission catastrophe. While minimizing human
    errors is certainly an objective, human errors cannot be
    totally eliminated. The challenge is to prevent a human error
    from becoming a mission failure. Experience has shown that this
    is accomplished by test as you fly, and fly as you test, in
    combination with independent review and analysis, appropriate
    technical and management debate, and experienced leadership.
    For five decades, we have invested billions of dollars and the
    expertise of our best and brightest in NASA and industry, to
    evolve our current mission success methodology.
        NASA has the continuity of human space expertise that is
    unique in our country and competitive with the best that exists
    globally. Our space industry is second to none in the ability
    to implement complex projects. It is the marriage of NASA's
    continuity of expertise with the implementation capability of
    industry that results in our proven mission success
    methodology, which maximizes the probability of success.
        The Space Shuttle and International Space Station are
    products of this methodology. The Air Force and the Aerospace
    Corporation, in combination with their industrial partners,
    used this methodology to produce the highly successful EELV.
    NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory uses this methodology in
    implementing the Challenge and Planetary Exploration Program.
    And I might add that the video that you saw earlier is a
    product of this methodology being applied in the success that
    was demonstrated in the video.
        A fundamental flaw in the proposed human space flight
    program is a commercial crew initiative which abandons the
    proven methodology I have described. NASA's role is reduced to
    defining safety requirements and general oversight. An argument
    for pursuing this new human space flight approach is that the
    proven methodology is too expensive.
        The same rationale caused the Air Force and NASA to try
    similar approaches in the 1990s. The Air Force implemented a
    program called acquisition reform. System responsibility for
    national security space programs was ceded to industry. And Air
    Force and NRO project managers were told to step back, not to
    interfere, and let industry have total responsibility.
    Additionally, the Air Force and NRO essentially eliminated
    their systems engineering capabilities, since the
    responsibility would reside with industry.
        The results were devastating, and the adverse impact is
    still with us today. Good project managers and program
    management personnel left, and an exceptional systems
    engineering capability was eliminated. Projects were a
    disaster, and the approach was judged by all to be a total
    failure.
        Problems were not isolated to one project or to one
    company. The impact was systemic. As an example, Future Imagery
    Architecture, managed by Boeing, was canceled after the
    expenditure of about $10 billion. SIBRS High [Space-based
    Infrared System High], managed by Lockheed Martin, has been
    referred to as ``a case study in how not to execute a space
    program.'' National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
    Satellite System, managed by Northrop-Grumman, is a story that
    is still evolving.
        On average, programs implemented using this approach
    resulted in half the intended program for twice the cost, and
    they were six years late, on average. NASA implemented a
    similar approach, called faster, better, cheaper. Mars '98 is
    the most significant example of this approach. Mars '98 was a
    total failure, with the loss of an orbiter, a lander, and two
    probes. The orbiter, managed by Lockheed Martin under contract
    to JPL, failed because of a confusion between metric and
    English units. This confusion resulted in errors large enough,
    during Mars orbit insertion, to cause the spacecraft to enter
    the atmosphere and be destroyed.
        These same errors were prevalent during midcourse
    corrections implemented on the trip from Earth to Mars without
    a cause being determined. Had the JPL institutional navigation
    capability been applied to understand these midcourse errors, I
    believe they most likely would have found the cause, and
    implemented corrections to prevent the failure. They were
    excluded from the management of Mars '98 because of the give
    the contractor the responsibility concept. This is an example
    of how NASA's continuity of expertise could have been applied
    to an important and challenging project.
        I cannot conceive that the United States will abandon a
    methodology developed over decades, with enormous human and
    financial investment, for a concept that has been tried in the
    1990s, resulting in massive failure. Why would we put NASA
    human space flight at such risk by employing an unproven
    commercial crew concept?
        Commercial crew is a risk too high. It is not a responsible
    course, and it should not be approved. Continuation of the
    international space program is an area of apparent consensus. A
    launch vehicle and crew capsule for transportation to and from
    the Space Station are required. I believe the most appropriate
    option is Ares I and Orion.
        NASA should be directed to develop a plan for transporting
    humans to and from Earth orbit. Ares I and Orion elements of
    Constellation should not be canceled. The results of the NASA
    plan development may suggest changes to Constellation. A
    disappointing truth in the proposed NASA Fiscal Year 2011
    budget, in my opinion, is not adequate to support a credible,
    implementable Space Station program and a credible,
    implementable beyond Earth orbit exploration program. A
    credible Space Station program without commercial crew needs to
    be defined. An exploration program with a heavy lift launch
    capability and exploration capsule, a focused technology
    program, and an exploration concept with destinations and dates
    also needs to be determined.
        Cost estimates, with substantive, independent systems
    engineering, and end to end cost estimating need to be
    developed. Timely completion of these proposed actions is
    necessary to allow resolution of current human space flight
    uncertainties. Only then can credible decisions be made as to
    the future of human space flight.
        In summary, do not approve commercial crew. Continue the
    Ares I and Orion programs. And do the necessary in depth
    analysis and study that was absent from the proposed Fiscal
    Year 2011 budget, to define the human exploration program
    worthy of a great Nation. Only then can the value of the
    program be judged against credible plans and budget.
        Above all else, do not approve a human space flight program
    without adequate resources to assure success. We have traveled
    that road too many times with the same unsuccessful result.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]

                     Prepared Statement of A. Thomas Young

        Chairman Gordon, Mr. Hall and Committee members, I am pleased to
    have the opportunity to present my views on the proposed U.S. human
    spaceflight program.
        My judgment is that implementation of the proposed human
    spaceflight program will be devastating to NASA, human spaceflight and
    the U.S. space program. For five decades the U.S. robotic and human
    spaceflight programs have had remarkable successes that have filled our
    books of knowledge, explored new worlds, enhanced our international
    reputation and given pride and inspiration to our fellow Americans. We
    have also had disappointing failures.
        We have developed a mission success methodology that maximizes the
    probability of success, a methodology that has evolved over the life of
    the space program and continues to improve with the experience gained
    with the execution of each new project. A hallmark of the methodology
    is the recognition that spaceflight is a ``one-strike-and-you-are-out''
    business. Thousands of individuals can do everything perfectly and one
    human error can result in a mission catastrophe. While minimizing human
    errors is certainly an objective, human errors cannot be totally
    eliminated. The challenge is to prevent a human error from causing a
    mission failure. Experience has shown this is accomplished by test-as-
    you-fly and flying-as-you-test in combination with independent review
    and analysis, appropate technical and management debate and experienced
    leadership. For five decades we have invested billions of dollars and
    the expertise of our best and brightest in NASA and industry to evolve
    our current mission success methodology. NASA has the continuity of
    human spaceflight expertise that is unique in our country and
    competitive with the best that exists globally. Our space industry is
    second to none in the ability to implement complex projects. It is the
    marriage of NASA's continuity of expertise with the implementation
    capability of industry that results in our proven mission success
    methodology which maximizes the probability of success. Space Shuttle
    and International Space Station are products of this methodology. The
    Air Force and the Aerospace Corporation in combination with their
    industrial partners use this methodology to produce the highly
    successful EELV. NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory uses this methodology
    in implementing the challenging planetary exploration program.
        A fundamental flaw in the proposed human spaceflight program is a
    commercial crew initiative which abandons the proven methodology I have
    described. NASA's role is reduced to defining safety requirements and
    general oversight. An argument for pursuing this new human spaceflight
    approach is that the proven methodology is too expensive.
        This same rationale caused the Air Force and NASA to try similar
    approaches in the 1990s.The Air force implemented a program called
    ``Acquisition Reform.'' System responsibility for national security
    space programs was ceded to industry. Air Force and NRO project
    managers were told to step back, not to interfere and to let industry
    have total responsibility. Additionally, the Air Force and NRO
    essentially eliminated their systems engineering capabilities since the
    responsibility would reside with industry.
        The results were devastating and the adverse impact is still with
    us today. Good project managers and project management personnel left
    and an exceptional systems engineering capability was eliminated.
    Projects were a disaster and the approach was judged by all to be a
    total failure.
        Problems were not isolated to one project or to one company, the
    impact was systemic. As examples, FIA managed by Boeing was cancelled
    after the expenditure of about 10B$. SIBRS High, managed by Lockheed
    Martin, has been referred to as ``a case study in how not to execute a
    space program.'' NPOESS, managed by Northrop-Grumman, is a story that
    is still evolving. On average, programs implemented using this approach
    resulted in half the intended program for twice the cost and six were
    years late. NASA implemented a similar approach called ``Faster-Better-
    Cheaper.'' Mars '98 is the most significant example of this approach.
    Mars '98 was a total failure with the loss of an orbiter, lander and
    two probes. The orbiter managed by Lockheed Martin, under contract to
    JPL, failed because of confusion between metric and English units. This
    confusion resulted in errors large enough during Mars orbit insertion
    to cause the spacecraft to enter the atmosphere and be destroyed. These
    same errors were prevalent during midcourse corrections implemented on
    the trip from Earth to Mars without a cause being determined. Had the
    JPL institutional navigation capability been applied to understand
    these midcourse errors, I believe they most likely would have found the
    cause and implemented corrections to prevent the failure. They were
    excluded from the management of Mars '98 because of the ``give the
    contractor the responsibility'' concept. This is an example of how
    NASA's continuity of expertise could have been applied to an important
    and challenging project.
        I cannot conceive that the U.S. will abandon a methodology
    developed over decades with enormous human and financial investment for
    a concept that when tried in the 1990s resulted in massive failure. Why
    would we put NASA human spaceflight at such risk by employing an
    unproven commercial crew concept?
        Commercial crew is a risk too high, not a responsible course and
    should not be approved.
        Continuation of the International Space Station is an area of
    apparent consensus. A launch vehicle and crew capsule for
    transportation to and from the Space Station are required. I believe
    the most appropriate option is Ares 1 and Orion. NASA should be
    directed to develop a plan for transporting humans to and from Earth
    orbit. The Ares 1 and Orion elements of Constellation should not be
    cancelled. The results of the NASA plan development may suggest changes
    to Constellation.
        A disappointing truth is the proposed NASA FY 2011 budget, in my
    opinion, is not adequate to support a credible, implementable Space
    Station Program and a credible, implementable beyond-Earth-orbit
    exploration program.
        A credible Space Station program, without commercial crew, needs to
    be defined. An exploration program with a heavy lift launch capability,
    an exploration capsule, a focused technology program and an exploration
    concept with destinations and dates also needs to be determined. Cost
    estimates, with substantive independent systems engineering and
    independent cost assessment, need to be developed. Timely completion of
    these proposed actions is necessary to allow resolution of current
    human spaceflight uncertainties. Only then can credible decisions be
    made as to the future of human spaceflight.
        In summary, do not approve commercial crew, continue the Ares 1 and
    Orion programs and do the necessary in depth analysis and study that
    was absent from the proposed FY 2011 budget to define the human
    exploration program worthy of a great nation. Only then can the value
    of the program be judged against credible plans and budget. Above all
    else, do not approve a human spaceflight program without adequate
    resources to assure success. We have traveled that road too many times
    with the same unsuccessful result.

        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Young, for your usual
    bluntness. You got to the point there.
        I know that this panel, and I am sorry you had to wait so
    long to come forth. I know you have some back end commitments,
    so we will be limited. So, I am going to yield my time to Mr.
    Wu.

                     Durability of Private Sector Approach

        Mr. Wu. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I very much
    appreciate that.
        We have a number of Members of this Committee who represent
    districts that have a lot of space activity, and quite frankly,
    they may be more knowledgeable than I, and they have a lot of
    questions to ask.
        Oregon has very little, if any space activity. I think that
    is a shame. My interest, my very strong interest in this topic
    is driven by my concern for the future of technology in this
    Nation, and the future of American leadership.
        My prior questions to Administrator Bolden brought forth
    some answers that the infrastructure currently used by NASA,
    the employees and so on, would be substantially transferred to
    the new effort, and I am concerned about whether that would be
    true or not, but for purposes of this question, if that is to
    occur, I have some, there is a significant doubt about what,
    where the cost savings would come from. Why would it be cheaper
    in the private sector?
        Now, I have been in this town long enough to kind of see a
    political process, or a policy process play out, which is you
    have program number one, it runs into tough territory, whether
    for timing or cost purposes, so you cancel program number one,
    and you kick the can down the road, by saying we are going to
    start program number two, in this case, kick it to the private
    sector. And if, indeed, there are not cost savings to be had, I
    am concerned that a future Administration and a future Congress
    would be faced with the prospect of either canceling human
    space flight by Americans or paying the same kind of cost
    increases, or maybe larger, because it is further on down the
    line.
        I would like to ask all three of you to comment on that
    concern about this potentially being a cancellation of American
    space flight in a two step process.
        Mr. Armstrong. Congressman Wu, I think that is an excellent
    point.
        There is always difficulty when programs are extended, and
    the motivation and the intensity and the passion for the
    project disintegrates with time, and they become, at the time
    they exceed their budget by substantial amounts, and then the
    budgets are cut, then usually, the programs are redefined into
    a less aggressive program, and perhaps eventually into an R&D
    program, and then, each step along the way, they are more
    subject to cancellation. So, it is kind of a self-fulfilling
    prophecy that such activities are swimming upstream.
        Mr. Wu. Mr. Armstrong, thank you. I have never been told by
    the first man to walk on the Moon that I have made an excellent
    point. Thank you. Captain Cernan.
        Chairman Gordon. You might not be again, either, David.
        Mr. Wu. I will take that one. Captain.
        Captain Cernan. My feeling, in support of what Tom Young,
    and I know what Neil believes, in support of the Constellation
    program, is we should take it in steps and bounds, leading
    ultimately to what I am a guru on, is space exploration. That
    is where I want to go. I want to see us go to Mars.
        But I think we first have to look at our problems today,
    and I think if we take a good, hard look, and review what Ares
    I, Constellation itself, and re-review it, perhaps, and figure
    out, can we really get airborne in 2015 or '16 or '17, and pick
    it. We know we can perform, and we know what funds we are going
    to have available. Hopefully, they will still be available. And
    say we can produce a program in 2015. We won't have to start,
    or 2016, we will have something that will access Earth orbit.
        Of course, we have a problem in the front end, as I said,
    and that is Shuttle. Quite frankly, I happen to be one of those
    believers who said how can we terminate the most phenomenal,
    capable flying machine the world has ever seen, that we have
    ever designed, built, and flown, and it is just getting into
    its state of maturity, being able to do the job well, and
    obviously, extremely safely at this point in time, from what we
    have learned. How could we terminate that? We ought to extend
    into that period of time that we think Constellation will come
    on board, and take Shuttle out to 2015, if that is what is
    necessary.
        Now, I don't have control of the funds, Mr. Chairman, so
    you know, I know there is a problem there. But to keep us in
    the space game, to keep us in the air, if you will, and then
    along the way, we can decide where we go from there with space
    exploration, the evolution of Ares V as it comes from the
    success of Ares I. And it is not, to me, it is not so important
    when we get there, but what is important is that we have, for
    future generations, a commitment. The direction we take is far
    more important, to me, than when we get there.
        Chairman Gordon. Mr. Wu's time has expired, but Mr. Young,
    did you want to add something?
        Mr. Young. Yeah, I would like just to add a little bit.
        First off, this is a people-intensive industry, enterprise,
    and if we save money in a particular area, you can only save
    money by eliminating people. I mean, that is where it comes
    from. And if, in our commercial crew focus, we fundamentally
    save the money that is talked about, we will eliminate NASA
    workforce, as well as some industry workforce. That workforce
    will never come back. You know, that will be gone forever.
        So, there are a lot of consequences that need to be
    carefully thought about, as your question suggests, and I would
    offer that.
        My only other comment is, early in my life, a previous NASA
    Administrator actually said to me: ``Be cautious. That green
    grass sometimes is poison ivy.''
        Chairman Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Young. Mr. Hall is
    recognized.

                               Return to the Moon

        Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, I won't take a lot of time. I am
    glad Lewis and Clark didn't stop at the Mississippi. Glad they
    went on to El Paso. I guess I am glad they went to Phoenix and
    maybe to well, I don't know about seeing the Pacific shore.
    That was on November 15, 1805, and my kids think I remember
    that day. But we wouldn't have had Rohrabacher if they hadn't
    gone on to the oceanside, though, so we have got a lot to be
    thankful for.
        I have one brief question here, and first, my opening
    statement, I adopt what all three of these gentlemen have said,
    every sentence, every dash, and every quote. It is the greatest
    testimony I have heard in the 30 years I have been up here, and
    I thank you for it.
        I want to ask, if I might, from Mr. Armstrong. During the,
    his appearance at the Kennedy Space Center, I am sure you heard
    that, or have observed it. The President discounted the idea of
    going back to the Moon, and instead, spoke about going to other
    destinations, but from your perspective, if the goal is to take
    a stepping stone approach to deep space, as both of you, as
    each of you have alluded to, is the Moon a nice to have, or a
    need to have?
        Mr. Armstrong. It is both. It is both, sir. It is hard to
    explain that there are good reasons to return the Moon, from a
    variety of perspectives. And it is a wonderful place to learn
    the elements of deep space, space flight with. It is a
    relatively safe and convenient place that uses, is able to use
    the best of the technologies we have developed over the last
    four or five decades, and I think that it should, indeed, be
    included in our plans for deep space exploration.
        Mr. Hall. Mr. Cernan, do you agree to that? Don't you? You
    have----
        Captain Cernan. Yes, sir. I adamantly agree with it, and
    there is a whole host of other good reasons we don't have time
    to talk about here today.
        Mr. Hall. Well, like the Administrator, you can send me a
    copy of those, can't you? I thank all three of you. I yield
    back my time, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Gordon. Governor Garamendi is recognized for five
    minutes.

                               Constellation Lite

        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much. Captain Cernan, you
    talked about Ares I, a progressive program. I would like you to
    expand on that. In the testimony we heard earlier from the
    administrator, he said no, he is not even going to think about
    Constellation Lite, or some sort of a progressive program, but
    I would like to have you to expand on your vision on how that
    might proceed so that the administrator might be informed about
    the potential possibilities.
        Captain Cernan. Well as I understand it, the entire
    Constellation was programmed with the idea that it could be
    built upon, step by step, ultimately reaching for the Moon. The
    initial requirement was to get into Earth orbit. Initial
    requirement was to service the space station. Initial
    requirement was to have American access, not dependent upon
    foreign powers to get us back up there, as quickly as humanly
    can. Orion was developed not as, you know, this Orion Lite is a
    whole different ballgame, and that would cost just as much
    money and take as much time, I am sure, as a full up Orion. But
    Orion was designed to evolve from the same vehicle. You
    reconfigure the interior and so forth, the navigation system,
    what was required to mature into a deep space vehicle from--one
    that could go into low Earth orbit. The Ares I was designed,
    and has been tested--the component testing on the Ares I, the
    solids that have already been tested on the first Ares I test
    flight, are part of the Ares V. The J-2X engine, by the way, is
    an upgrade, as best I understand it, from the J-2 that we used
    to go to the Moon. So it--we know what kind of hardware we are
    dealing with. We know what kind of facilities we got. The
    facilities that are being--already being set up on Pad B down
    at Kennedy are facilities that can support Orion and be--
    correction, Ares I and be upgraded to support the larger Ares V
    vehicle. So it is a--there is an inherent culture in
    Constellation to take us from Earth orbit to the Moon, or to
    asteroids, or to Mars, or to anywhere we want to go.

                            Space Shuttle Extension

        Mr. Garamendi. I thank you for that. I assume that the men
    and women that are working for the administrator understand, or
    heard what you said. If not, I am sure they will get a tape of
    that. Secondly, you talked about the interim period before the
    Constellation Ares program is capable of delivering supplies to
    the Space Station. I think that really needs to be explored and
    expanded. I couldn't agree with you more, with regard to the
    shuttles and their longevity. Your use of the maturing is a
    valuable word, I think, for most of us here who have reached
    that point. If you could expand on that just a bit in the two
    minutes that I have left?
        Captain Cernan. Mature means you know a lot more than you
    used to know, I guess, and that is--we know----
        Mr. Garamendi. You are wiser about those things----
        Captain Cernan. You know, we have been through some tragic
    catastrophes with Shuttle. We have learned something. As I
    said, we spent 50 years learning that which we didn't even--
    weren't even smart enough to ask the questions about. But it--
    the shuttle was designed for 100 flights, with a factor of--
    safety factor of four. And I don't know the exact number on the
    shuttle vehicles--the three shuttle vehicles left, but I know
    it is down in the 20s and 30s right now. So we have a fleet--we
    have the only real capability to get into Earth orbit. And
    compared to the Soviets and what the Chinese are putting in
    orbit, they don't hold a candle to what the shuttle can do. And
    why in the world do we want to just quit? Not only--if we had
    something sitting on the pad ready to take its place, that is
    one thing, but we don't. We are abdicating our role in space.
    We are abdicating our capability to go to the space station by
    not being able to get there. And commercial space is not going
    to get there I mean, I--give me ten years, and I want to see
    them mature, and then they can take over the program, but not
    until then. And I am not going to be around. What I am worried
    about is what happens in the near future. So I think we have
    got to close that gap with the shuttle, and the only way--it is
    just not extending the shuttle. We have got to--it is, you
    know, just not stretching out the flights. We have got to get
    some more shuttle flights. We have got to keep this thing
    flying--2015. Pick out a date. Pick out a date when you think
    Ares is going to be ready to take over.
        Mr. Garamendi. Captain, thank you very much for your
    knowledge and your passion, and I think Mr. Young would agree
    with at least part of what you said, if not all of what you
    said about--wait a minute, commercial has a history also, and
    not a good one. Thank you very much.
        Captain Cernan. Thank you, sir.
        Chairman Gordon. Dr. Ehlers is recognized for five minutes.

                                NASA Priorities

        Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    gentlemen, for being here. I listen with extreme interest
    because of the many times we have had hearings, we have rarely
    had people who had the conviction that you had, and also the
    background that you had. I might add that I am a scientist. I
    was horrified to be reminded once again about the error with
    the metric system and the English system. I tried to introduce
    a bill immediately after that happened to require the metric
    system on everything that NASA did. I was promised by the then
    administrator of NASA that if I would withdraw the bill he
    would take care of it, and, of course, didn't. So we are very
    slow to learn. That is just a side issue at this point. What I
    am really interested in is your--the reference made, repeated
    by each of you, is the need for exploration. And I happen to
    agree with that, as a scientist. We have much more to explore.
    I am not--it is not quite clear to me why--how we are to pick
    the topics to be explored. Clearly the moon is still of
    interest. Mars is of even greater interest, but extremely
    difficult, unless we find enough volunteers who want to make a
    one way trip. But the difficulty of landing, replenishing the
    fuel supply and coming back is very formidable. I am not saying
    it is impossible, but very formidable. But what--I guess I am
    most interested in the process. You know, I have never been
    involved in an experiment where we didn't know precisely ahead
    of time how we were going to proceed, what we were searching
    for, what we were exploring for. It is not that we didn't find
    surprises along the way, but you really have to decide very
    clearly ahead of time what you are trying to achieve. And that,
    to me, is what has been lacking here, and I appreciate, Mr.
    Armstrong, your delineation of why it is important to go to the
    moon. It is sad to say that that is the first time I really
    heard a good explanation from the hearing table about that
    point. So--I--it, you know, maybe one answer is to have a
    president who is a scientist. That would probably help. But--
    and I am not applying for the job, although I am in the process
    of trying to renew my pilot's license, so maybe I can work on
    the other end. The--what are we really trying to achieve, and--
    I--can you give me any clarification, any one of you? What are
    we trying to explore? What are we trying to achieve? What do we
    hope to get out of it? And I recognize you can't predict these
    things in advance, but I wonder if you could just quickly each
    run through what you would say in response to that question if
    the president called you in and asked you.
        Mr. Armstrong. Thank you. First, exploration is the
    principle ingredient in the charter of NASA.
        Mr. Ehlers. Yeah.
        Mr. Armstrong. Because I was--I remember because I was one
    of the few people around that was in NASA on its first day
    after the Act was passed. And as I said in responding to the
    Chairman's question, my priorities were leadership first,
    access second, and third, exploration. Leadership, I think, is
    critically important because it affects our nation, and--in so
    many ways. It affects the viewpoint of others--other citizens
    and other countries around the world about our country in a
    very meaningful way. I would just give one example, if I might?
    We were--Gene, Jim Lovell and myself were in a Mideast trip a
    couple of months ago, thanking the troops for their service,
    and while at Incirlik Base in Turkey, near the Syrian border,
    the State Department requested that we go over and visit a
    local university named Cukurova, the third largest university
    in Turkey, one that had continued to have been requesting
    information on NASA's space program but never had been able to
    get a speaker. So we were in the area, and they shanghaied us
    into that job. Unfortunately, the timing was imperfect. Two
    days before that resolution on the genocide matter of Turkey of
    a century ago was passed, and the day before we arrived, the
    Turkish ambassador was recalled to Turkey, and so now we are
    going into a big presentation with all the press looking at us,
    expecting us to explain this international crisis, from their
    point of view. As it happened, our welcome was remarkable.
    There were probably four or five times as many people came to
    hear our presentation than they had seats in the auditorium.
    They set up loudspeakers outside so they could hear. They gave
    us a marvelous welcome, warm reception, and asked a lot of
    questions, so rigorously that the journalists there never could
    ask--have the opportunity to ask their questions about the
    international disagreement. I would just point out that--by way
    of explaining, from the point of view of a foreign national,
    this--what we do in space seems to be far more important to
    them that it is--than matters about international differences.
    It just illustrates the importance of leadership. My second
    point was access, and, of course, we can't do anything in space
    without access. That is why the second point was what it was.
    And third was exploration, because our business is getting out
    to the boundaries of human knowledge and finding out new things
    which will inspire people to believe that the human race can do
    more than it is now doing, and they can do it better. And it
    will be important--it--not only to our own citizens, but to
    people around the world, and for that reason I pick exploration
    without saying specifically what, and in what order.
    Exploration, by nature, is what we should be doing.
        Chairman Gordon. Dr. Ehlers's time has expired, and Ms.
    Edwards is recognized.

                            NASA Technical Capacity

        Ms. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    gentlemen. It is so wonderful to see you here today. I mean,
    you, both in your testimony and in your life's work, just
    really continue to inspire me, and I think inspire this nation,
    and really are the best reflection of why it is that we make an
    investment in space. Not for what we know today, but what we
    might know tomorrow. I was just thinking back that--I know when
    I was in grade school, watching that black and white
    television, I thought then that a geek with glasses, horrible
    eyesight, that I could actually be an astronaut. Never
    happened, but I do think it speaks to the role that the agency
    and the work that goes on has played in inspiring young people
    to do all kinds of things that really don't have any--may not
    have anything to do with space. I wanted to focus particularly
    on a part of your testimony, Mr. Young, in which you say it is
    the marriage of NASA's continuity of expertise with the
    implementation capability of industry that results in our
    proven mission success methodology, which maximizes the
    probability of success. And the reason is because my
    recollection in my work at Goddard Space Flight Center is that,
    as skilled and capable engineers, systems engineers, software
    engineers, hardware engineers, internal to NASA, there were
    partners in--on the private sector side. And it was because of
    that kind of relationship and partnership and expertise
    internal to NASA that enabled, I think, our work to proceed in
    a much more professional and scientific way. And so I wonder if
    you would comment about what it means to NASA's internal
    capacity and expertise when you shunt the bulk--all--virtually
    all of the human space flight capacity to the commercial
    sector? Because, in my view, NASA's always worked alongside
    private industry, the question is what kind of relationship has
    there been between the agency and its contractor community with
    that internal expertise? And so I wonder if you would comment
    about what that will mean on--in the long run to NASA's
    internal technical and scientific capacity?
        Mr. Young. That is really a very thoughtful question. Let
    me comment. As you describe, we really have learned how to do
    these things. Not without risk, and not without an occasional
    failure, but we basically know how to do them. And we do them
    by integrating just an extraordinary capability, both in the
    government, or NASA, side and the--and in the industry side. If
    we decide what we are going to do is cede all of this
    responsibility basically to industry--and this is not a--
    industry. It is just that they don't have the--what I call
    continuity of expertise capability that I am describing in
    NASA. What will happen, in my view, is the good people in NASA,
    and there really are good people, they are not going to be
    satisfied with sitting in the back of the room and not, you
    know, asking questions, or not participating. NASA's a value
    added organization. When I was a young engineer, it is why I
    went, because I could contribute when--it--was my belief. So
    good people are not going to go do that, they are going to go
    look for other opportunities. The one thing that I really
    underline is good people always have a choice. I mean, they
    always have an opportunity choice, so good people will go to
    other organizations. That will kind of be the beginning of what
    I would say will be the atrophy--atrophying of the NASA
    workforce. I think that what will happen, if I take Gene
    Cernan's scenario, which I personally subscribe to, I don't
    know exactly, when, but we will find out what I believe to be
    the deficiencies in the commercial crew somewhere downstream.
    They will manifest themselves either in some development
    failures, significant cost growth, significant delays, industry
    not willing to continue to invest, but they are in our future.
    Then, when we turn around for this workforce that you are
    talking about to bail us out, using that term, they won't be
    there. These good people will be off, I don't know doing
    exactly what, but they--you--this is not a capability that can
    respond to an off/on switch. I mean, we built this with a lot
    of investment, and so there are a lot of ramifications of the
    decisions that is facing you all, but one of which is the
    quality of this workforce as we go forward. And I don't think
    there is any question in my mind that, you know, if implemented
    as proposed, the workforce will atrophy to the point that we
    will not have the ability to come to the rescue when the rescue
    is called for.
        Ms. Edwards. Thank you, gentlemen. And I know we don't have
    time for it now, but at some point it well be helpful for you
    all also to reflect on the lessons learned, as I recall them,
    from both Challenger and Columbia, with regard to NASA's
    internal capability of providing the kind of oversight that is
    needed to head off catastrophes like that. Thank you.
        Chairman Gordon. Gentlelady's time has expired, and Mr.
    Rohrabacher is recognized for five minutes. Before Mr.
    Rohrabacher, let me say that I am being called to another
    committee, and I guess--I think Chairlady Giffords, who is the
    chairman of the space--are you able to----
        Ms. Giffords. Mr. Chair, I just have to leave in 30
    minutes, so if the meeting is going to go over, we should have
    someone else carry the meeting.
        Chairman Gordon. Okay. I think 30 minutes should--our
    friends on this panel have got to leave before that time
    anyway. So, with that, Mr.--and let me thank you very much. I
    know that you came here today not because it is fun, but
    because it was--you felt it was a part of your mission, and
    thank you for your--again, for your contribution, and for your
    patriotism.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman, before you leave, just one
    point I would like to make before you leave, because it
    concerns this hearing. This has been a great panel, and it has
    been a great hearing, but it is not--and--it has not been a
    balanced hearing. We have not received both sides of this issue
    at all from this presentation, and I would hope that before we
    go to an authorization that we would have a panel presented to
    us that could give both sides of the issue. And I am not
    complaining about their position at all, I am just saying there
    is another side--Rusty Schweickart was there.
        Chairman Gordon. Uh-huh.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Buzz Aldrin, other people who are expert
    in this area, and they have not been given their chance to
    present an alternate point of view. And I would hope, before we
    go to an authorization, that we could at least have----
        Chairman Gordon. If the gentleman would yield, first of
    all, Mr. Bolden took two hours of--putting forth, you know, an
    opposition, or a different position. John Holdren was invited
    to enhance that. Unfortunately, he was not able to come. But
    you can be well assured that we are not one hearing away from
    an authorization.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right.
        Chairman Gordon. And there will be additional time. I
    talked to Governor Richardson yesterday. He would like to come
    also and----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Good.
        Chairman Gordon. So we wouldn't--there will be
    transparency, there will be balance, and that is what it is
    going to take to get a good bipartisan authorization. That is
    what we want to do.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.
        Chairman Gordon. I didn't say unanimous, but at least--I
    would like to see that, though.

                            Value of Return to Moon

        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you
    very much, and I will proceed now with my five minutes. It
    seems to me that what we have here are three major issues, and
    that--one is the viability of depending on commercial space
    companies versus government employees in providing access and
    transportation related to space. Another question is going back
    to the moon, whether or not that is worth the price that we
    will pay, and the funding of other space projects that will be
    de-funded because we no longer have the money for those space
    projects. And number three, what about the Constellation and
    the Ares rocket system? Was that system worth the price, and
    was that a right decision to move forward--or the
    administration's thinking about moving forward to cancel that.
    First of all, just one note. I certainly do not believe that
    keeping around a NASA workforce because it will disappear if a
    commercial company is given a contract is right thinking. I
    will have to suggest that people go to those private companies,
    and those private companies are developing workforces of their
    own. And I think that quite often the private sector has been
    able to do things in our history that government employees have
    not been able to do. I would--I will study up the history of
    NPOESS. I do not necessarily believe that all of the problems
    at NPOESS were caused by the private companies, namely Northrop
    Grumman. I cannot--I will go back and look at that to see if
    that was the genesis of the problems with NPOESS, instead of--
    versus changing demands and goals by the government
    bureaucracies that were overseeing and micromanaging the NPOESS
    project. So I will take a look and see if you have got a point
    there, Mr. Young. And you are more of an expert on this than I
    am, you have spent more time at it, but I would like to look at
    that particular assertion a little closer. And that especially
    is magnified when I realize that what we are talking about here
    is, you know, not relying on private companies and moving
    forward with spending billions of dollars on a crew rescue
    vehicle, but it seems to me billions of dollars for a crew
    rescue vehicle that will be in place just prior to the space
    station being retired, spending billions of dollars when we
    could cut that cost dramatically by--and using those dollars
    elsewhere, and contract with the Russians in the meantime.
    Isn't--there are billions of dollars that we don't have for our
    space program. So when we have those kinds of decisions being
    made, it gives me a little bit more faith in the private sector
    to be rational, and commercial companies, rather than just
    government employees who don't have to prioritize about
    spending. So let us get to the first issue, returning to the
    moon in terms of--as a use of our--a better use of our space
    dollars. Mr. Cernan, let me ask you about that. Would not--and
    by the way, I am not opposed to going back to the moon. I think
    that we need to look at it and really study this to see if this
    is the wisest use of our money. But it will cost a lot of money
    for us to go back to the moon. Would it not be better, if we
    were aiming to deep space and Mars, to use that money
    developing, for example, a space refueling system that would
    permit us to refuel our rockets in space, and then go on to
    further exploration?
        Captain Cernan. Sir, when you go back far enough, when
    President Kennedy said, we are going to go to the moon, 50
    years ago, he was asking us to do the impossible. He was asking
    us to do what couldn't be done. Now, going to Mars today is not
    necessarily impossible, but it is one gigantic leap for
    mankind, if I may use Neil's words, beyond going to the moon.
    And there are so many ramifications with--about going that far
    for that long that we have no hint about, and the--the moon is
    a natural satellite. It--is it thereby coincidence--it is
    there. It is a useful tool for us to demonstrate our
    capabilities to, you know, you can go into the scientific side
    of it, put up telescopes and so forth. We can demonstrate our
    capabilities to able to go deeper into space, plus we can go,
    you know, is there water on the moon, and where did it come
    from?
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
        Captain Cernan. South Pole, Helium 3.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. And getting to the moon, now, does this
    require . . .
        Ms. Giffords. [Presiding] Mr. Rohrabacher, I just want to
    also----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Yeah.
        Ms. Giffords. --just let you know that we--because we are
    running out of time, and all members----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Right.
        Ms. Giffords. --haven't had a chance to speak yet, and I
    hate to cut you----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. And--no, you are absolutely correct.
    There are many questions we should have. Thank you so much, and
    I really admire our panel, all of our panel, including Mr.
    Young.
        Ms. Giffords. Mr. Young?
        Mr. Young. Yeah, if I could--if--after that, I have got to
    say something. No, in all comments--the comment that we are
    talking about commercial companies versus the government is,
    with all due respect, is kind of missing the whole point we are
    trying to make. It is not commercial versus government. It is
    commercial versus a team of government and commercial. Second
    item is I did chair the NPOESS review, and I would be delighted
    to come by and tell you more about what we found, if you would
    like to----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.

                                Workforce Morale

        Ms. Giffords. Thank you. Gentlemen, again, welcome. We are
    very honored to have the three of you before our committee
    today. I believe that you saw the video of the pad abort
    demonstration flight that I played during the first panel. And,
    again, it was extraordinarily successful, and a real test to
    the engineering--the capability of this country. All of you
    have decades of experience in very demanding aerospace
    undertakings, and I just--in continuity with the comments made
    by Mr. Rohrabacher, I would like to talk about the importance
    of program continuity and stability, since the three of you
    have tremendous experience in this area. What did it really
    take to make these successful flights possible? As you know,
    Congress has directed NASA to continue to work on
    Constellation. We heard that from Administrator Bolden himself
    this morning. Yet, at the same time, the workforce is being
    told that the--by the agency that Constellation is dead. So can
    you talk specifically, the three of you, about the morale and
    the motivation and what happens to the workforce when you hear
    those conflicting messages? And I would like to start with you,
    Mr. Armstrong.
        Mr. Armstrong. Thank you, Madam Chairman. My information in
    this subject is largely anecdotal. I have received e-mails from
    a variety of sources within NASA and different NASA centers
    talking about the problems that the uncertainty of current
    planning confirmation has engendered among the workforce there.
    And my sense from the number of such reports are universally on
    the side that morale has been degraded substantially, and
    indeed people are looking for jobs outside the NASA centers. I
    had the pleasure of talking with the recent shuttle crew this
    morning, and we asked them that question, and they seemed to
    think morale was reasonably good in the area. They--there are
    possibilities, from their perspective, in the months ahead
    where--that they could train to be on the space station, ISS,
    or they could go into some other managerial positions in NASA,
    or, if they were military, they could go back to the military.
    That probably is not the best choices they would like to have
    for their future, but I would yield to others who have maybe
    more definite information than I have available.
        Ms. Giffords. Thank you. Mr. Cernan?
        Captain Cernan. Well, I think they were being too kind if
    they said the morale is good. You know, you talk about the
    astronaut corps, and these guys are all--these are young men
    and young women. They are scientists, they are engineers. They
    are just not pilots. They are just not young men and women
    running around in blue suits. They get down and dirty with
    the--with Mr. Young's engineers out there, and helping design,
    develop, test 24/7 the spacecraft that they are eventually
    going to fly. And, you know, I asked a lady who works for NASA,
    who is an engineer, whose husband happens to be an astronaut. I
    said, you know, he just came back here a few months ago, and is
    he still on flight status? And she said, what flight status?
    You know, where does he go? Where does this young talent, the
    best of the best, where do they go and what do they do? So it
    is hard for me to--I put myself in their place, and, you know,
    I was sorted in a way after Apollo 17. We were going to wait
    five years for the shuttle to become operational. And I said--
    well, I was fortunate. I had flown three times. I had done my
    thing, and I wasn't sure I wanted to wait five years, so I went
    somewhere else. And you are going to find all those non-
    astronauts, all those engineers, all those technicians and
    support people, how can they not? I know Kennedy--the morale at
    Kennedy's not very good right now, and I can tell you Johnson
    is not much better. They are out looking to get ahead of the
    job hunting game, because if this proposal goes forward, they
    are out of business. They are out--at least they are out of the
    kind of work they would want to be into.
        Ms. Giffords. Mr. Young?
        Mr. Young. I think the comments you have heard really are
    right on. I will take a little different perspective. I have
    had the privilege of leading some large organizations, both
    within NASA and within the industry. The fundamental challenge
    of somebody leading such a large organization is providing,
    one, stability, and two, an honest appraisal of the situation
    to a workforce. People--and, you know, mostly it has been
    associated with technology, space, national security
    activities. People don't look at that as a, you know, a five
    day a week, eight hour a day job. You know, it is remarkable
    what people will do, but they need to have an understanding.
    They need to have stability, and most of all they need to have
    challenging work, where what they do makes a difference. When
    you are in a job where what you do makes a difference, there is
    no limit as to what you apply. But if you are in a job where
    what you do might have no benefit tomorrow, such as a program
    being cancelled, or you might not have a job tomorrow, that is
    when the time around the water fountain becomes the dominant
    time. So I can't overemphasize how important--I think the video
    that you showed, you know, probably is a demonstration of that.
    Probably--I mentioned it earlier, but I didn't really come
    back, knowing a little bit about how that came to be, that was
    the best of NASA and best of industry working together to make
    what happened in there successful.

                       Viability of the President's Plan

        Ms. Giffords. Just a quick follow up, just a yes or no
    answer from the three of you. I know that you have had a chance
    to testify in the Senate, and you have had a chance to hear our
    panel earlier asking questions to Administrator Bolden. At this
    point, do you believe that the President's plan as proposed is
    executable? Mr. Young?
        Mr. Young. No.
        Ms. Giffords. Mr. Cernan?
        Captain Cernan. Absolutely no, and--extremely----
        Ms. Giffords. Yeah. And Mr. Armstrong?
        Mr. Armstrong. If the question is would they be able to
    spend the money, my----
        Ms. Giffords. Your microphone, sir.
        Mr. Armstrong. If the question is would they be able to
    spend the money, the answer is yes. If the question is, could
    they receive value from it, I would say highly unlikely.
        Ms. Giffords. Thank you, gentlemen. Next up we are going to
    hear Mr. Olson, Ranking Member Olson.

                         Impact of the Augustine Report

        Mr. Olson. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you Mr.
    Armstrong, Captain Cernan, Mr. Young, for coming here today,
    for giving us your expertise, and most importantly, for your
    service to our great nation. Again, we thank you very much. My
    first question is for Mr. Armstrong. I know, Mr. Armstrong, you
    have been--had some concerns about how the Augustine report has
    been utilized by the administration, and for those who believe
    that the Augustine report is--as the basis for calling the
    Constellation program unexecutable, I kind of want to get your
    thoughts on that, because I don't believe it is, and I want to
    get your thoughts.
        Mr. Armstrong. Thank you. I remember hearing that
    unexecutable very early, and so I looked at--I couldn't find it
    in any of my dictionaries, so I just tried to guess what it
    might mean, and--it mean no execute. That could be it can't be
    performed, or it could mean it can't be killed. I don't know
    which--it seems to me, in studying the report--which--and I
    think the report was a very good one, considering the fact that
    they had a small number of members on the committee, admittedly
    assisted by NASA people and others, and a very short time to
    judge new programs, which were largely undefined, against the--
    what they called the program of record, I think. And that is--
    was developed over--as this committee knows well, over a long
    time period of money--many years, with hundreds or thousands of
    people looking at it. So it is a very difficult for--job for
    them. The second part, that they were obliged to look at the
    program of record as limited by the 2010 budget, which was
    substantially below the 2009 budget, and indeed significantly
    below the 2011 budget. My expectation is, had the ground rules
    been different, they--their findings would have been different.
    So--they had a built-in barrier toward making a--what I would
    call an equitable judgment. Having said that, I do think they
    did a credible job with the report, and it is well written.

                    Maintaining American Leadership in Space

        Mr. Olson. Thank you very much--my former boss, Phil
    Graham, might agree with you, with your deducting of non-
    executable as something you can't kill. He believed that the
    hardest thing to kill in the world is a government program once
    it gets enacted into law. So thank you for your answers.
    Captain Cernan, real simple for you. Given where we are, what
    would you do going forward to keep us on that path and maintain
    our leadership in human space flight and keep our exploration
    capabilities the greatest in the world?
        Captain Cernan. Well, very quickly, I think I alluded to
    that in answer to an earlier question. I would find out what
    the real capability of getting Ares--the real timeframe for
    getting Ares, Orion--full up Orion into Earth orbit is, and I
    am just making an assumption it is 2015. And I would fill that
    gap with the shuttle for all the reasons I mentioned earlier.
    The gap is going to be so significant to us if we don't close
    it, and we need to close it from both the front end and the
    back end. And the only thing on the front end is what we have
    got flying today, which is the shuttle. What we have got on the
    back end, that can do it as quickly or quicker than anything
    else, is Ares I, Orion. And during that period of time, as Ares
    I evolves into a heavy lift booster, we can then decide and
    make plans for space exploration to follow. Now, if that means
    we can do a fly-by to an asteroid or a fly-by of the moon, why,
    we are then moving forward step by step to develop Altair a
    lunar landing capability, that is fine. But what I said
    earlier, we need to say from this point on is that is the
    destination. That is where we are going. Whether we get there
    in 2020, 2018, 2028, I don't care. And for all those kids out
    there, we--they need to know what their future has for store
    for them, in terms of, you know, let me just say this. Space
    and aviation has been a romance for over 100 years, and that is
    why we are here today, and that is why a lot of people perhaps
    are on this committee. And the legacy of the Wright Brothers is
    not the--we can higher, faster and further than anyone else has
    ever flown in the world before, but the legacy is the dreams
    that they inspired in the hearts of all of those who followed
    in their footsteps. And that is what I'm talking about when we
    need to provide a destination, a plan, a future for these young
    kids out there. My grandkids--I am selfish. I am concerned
    about them.
        Mr. Olson. Thank you very much, and I yield back the
    balance of my time. Thank you.
        Ms. Giffords. Ms. Kosmas.

                        Investing in Engine Development

        Ms. Kosmas. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thank you all for
    being here. I represent the Kennedy Space Center, so obviously
    my concerns with regard to the workforce and the gap that you
    just described are great, but I would like to start by thanking
    you for what you all do. You exemplify and articulate, I think,
    the imagination, the inspiration, the innovation, the
    expertise, that we all want to maintain, and we want to ensure
    that America's future rests on that kind of inspiration. And so
    I thank you for your service, and also for being here today,
    and to describe to us your positions on these issues in a way
    that is very clear, and gives us a great deal of food for
    thought going forward. I had a couple of specific questions.
    Captain Cernan, first of all, your answer to the previous
    question was interesting to me, specifically because you talked
    about filling the gap with the shuttle, and I had a
    conversation earlier with Administrator Bolden about the
    feasibility of that. And while he accepted that the additional
    one flight was doable, he was not quite as clear on whether he
    thought additional flights to fill the gap could be done.
    Essentially he agreed that the shuttle is safe, that the re-
    certification has been done, and that it is safe, but
    logistics, as he called it, were the difficulty. I think we can
    work around that, perhaps, if it is decided that the shuttle
    would be the vehicle, since it is the vehicle we have now that
    would give us the access to the International Space Station for
    payloads, for spare parts, and also, obviously, for crew, and
    the only vehicle that we have at the moment that will do that.
    So I appreciate your suggestion there very much. I wanted to
    ask a question about--to all of you about the President's
    proposal, as it calls for a significant investment in
    technology, specifically for the development of a heavy lift
    vehicle. And I guess the question begins with this, are any of
    you aware of a substantial technology gap or technical issue
    that warrants our spending this large investment, or do we
    already have this technology available to us? And the--to
    compound that question, NASA's RFI for heavy lift launch system
    and propulsion technology states that affordability--this is a
    quote ``affordability and load development and recurring costs
    are some of the guiding principles.'' And so I am asking what
    are the tradeoffs of investing in engine development to achieve
    lower costs versus saving time by using or modifying existing
    engines? That would be open to all of you. Mr. Armstrong?
        Mr. Armstrong. Thank you. We know an awful lot about rocket
    engines. I have flown on 13 different kinds. We know what the
    specific impulse is for almost any combination of propellants.
    We know what expansion ratios do. We know what material costs
    of case--and weights of material cases for liquid and solid
    rockets, and that doesn't mean there won't be advances, but--
    because there will, and what--with additional research.
    Nonetheless, we know pretty well right now how to build a big
    rocket, or a middle sized rocket, or a little rocket, and we
    know what the tradeoffs are for different component
    configurations that we can choose from. So while I think there
    are small increments to be gained by additional research in
    rocketry, my guess is that we can today build a pretty decent
    rocket in almost any size range that you designate. So I
    suspect that the decisions that were made as a result of the--
    choosing the Constellation program, which largely were based on
    schedule and affordability, would not be changed much by more
    research. We might find that certain other combinations have
    slight advantages and disadvantages, but I don't think there
    would be any game changing kinds of decisions from that.
        Ms. Kosmas. Mr. Young, did you want to comment?
        Mr. Young. Yeah, I would.
        Ms. Kosmas. Thank you.
        Mr. Young. I think, first off, NASA does need a focused
    space technology program, so my comment doesn't need to be--
    answer that. But the only prerequisite we need to get in--heavy
    enough launch vehicle is funding. I mean, we have the ability
    today to proceed with a heavy lift launch capability. We will
    probably develop some technology work as we go along in the
    implement of the program, but getting on with it is not being
    paced, in my view, by our ability to do it or our need for
    technology. It is only paced by funding.
        Ms. Kosmas. Could you answer the question as to what kind
    of funding it would take to accelerate that?
        Mr. Young. I don't know that I can really answer your
    question. You know, what I would really like to say in response
    to that is that--that is why we have a NASA, and NASA has
    extraordinary capability to answer, you know, questions like
    that, if they are given the opportunity to do so. So I would,
    you know, I personally would be quite comfortable with NASA
    being given the assignment of what resources would it take to
    do a heavy lift, and how soon can we really get on with it?
        Ms. Kosmas. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. Giffords. Thank you, Ms. Kosmas. Mr. McCaul?

                More on Maintaining American Leadership in Space

        Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to thank the
    distinguished panel. Mr. Armstrong, I must say, it is a real
    honor to be in your presence here today. I think we were
    talking before, 1,000 years from now, no one in this room will
    be remembered, no one in this town will be remembered, except
    for you. And that is--it is a great honor. On the wall behind
    me it says, ``Where there is no vision, the people perish.''
    President Kennedy, I think, had that vision, and it landed you
    on the moon. I am concerned that this President doesn't have
    that vision in his decision to cut the Constellation program. I
    was compelled by your testimony that the priorities are
    American leadership in space, access to space, and exploration,
    and I agree with you on that, and also your comments that you
    were astounded by the President's proposal and that it was
    painful to watch. And then, finally, in response to the
    question, can the President's plan be executed, we had a no,
    no, and a highly unlikely. That is very powerful. I mean, you
    are the experts. And the morale is another issue, but my
    question is, by cutting the Constellation program, what damage
    will that do to our superiority in space, to our national
    security? And the idea that we can somehow hand this off to
    commercial space flight, which maybe down the road could
    happen, my concern is that the handoff, it is not an
    appropriate handoff. They can't pick up the ball and run with
    it right now. And my concern is what is going to happen is we
    are going to have a gap in our superiority in space, and we are
    going to lose to the Chinese and the Russians. And so, with
    that, Mr. Armstrong, can you give me your thoughts on that?
        Mr. Armstrong. Thank you, sir. I certainly agree that if,
    for the next decade, we have no access to space, we will be
    viewed by people around the world as being has-been, and that--
    I would find that extremely uncomfortable with the enormous
    investment in resources and people's time over the past half
    century that we have expended in order to gain the position of
    leadership that we have enjoyed in recent years.
        Mr. McCaul. Gentlemen, you----
        Captain Cernan. May I add something very quick to that? If
    we are viewed by other nations, other people around the world,
    as being willing to give--to abdicate our leadership in space,
    what else do they believe we are willing to dismantle without
    reason?
        Mr. McCaul. That is very powerful, and I couldn't agree
    with you more. Mr. Young, do you have a response?
        Mr. Young. The only comment I would make is I think the
    reason all three of us advocate Ares I, Orion, the elements of
    Constellation, is that it is our view that, given where we are
    today, it is the best way to get an assured access to low Earth
    orbit. I mean, it is the fundamental underlying view for why we
    are advocates of that solution.

                          Impact on National Security

        Mr. McCaul. Captain Cernan, if I could just follow up? You
    had responded, what else would they be willing to give up?
    This--the backdrop to the space program has always been
    national security as well, and that is one of my main concerns
    with this decision by the President. Can you comment on that?
        Captain Cernan. I am sorry?
        Mr. McCaul. In--what impact will this have on our national
    security?
        Captain Cernan. Oh, I think it will have significant
    effect. We won't have for some--well, you know, if the
    shuttle--if we give up on the shuttle today--the shuttle
    doesn't just service the space station. It is an asset for
    national security. We can access any--probably almost anywhere
    in lower Earth orbit we need to be to do anything we want to
    do. Repair, recover, replace satellites. We can--scientific
    missions, like the Hubble. I think it affects our international
    security because we don't have access. We don't have the
    capability to be there when we need to be there. We are
    hostage--literally hostages, I say, to other nations. And it
    also implies, subjectively, that we no longer care. We no
    longer--we, you know, something happens in some other place in
    the world, don't worry about it, they don't care. They are not
    going to come to our rescue. They are not going to protect
    freedom around the world, which is something, I guess, for the
    last 200 and some odd years we have been destined to do. So
    there is--there are subjective reasons, as well as a physical
    capability to access a plateau that--it, you know, above the
    Earth, you know, to do things that could never have been done
    there before, from a national security point of view.
        Ms. Kosmas. Thank you, Mr. McCaul.
        Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Kosmas. Gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. McCaul. Thank you for your testimony.
        Ms. Kosmas. Mr. Grayson, you are recognized.

                           Astronaut Safety Concerns

        Mr. Grayson. Thank you. I want to thank you very much for
    the inspiration that you gave to me when I was younger. I want
    to thank you for inviting me to re-think what is capable for
    human beings to do. And I want to thank you both for what you
    have done not just for me, but for millions of people just like
    me. So, thank you. One of the pleasant parts of this job is the
    chance to meet people like you and to give you my thanks. I
    remember your mission. I remember your mission. I do remember a
    mission in between that didn't go as well, and I wanted to ask
    you a little bit about that. I told the NASA Administrator
    recently that my sense is that if a commercial enterprise, in
    running the space program at the time of Apollo 13, then all of
    those hundreds of engineers, mechanics and other astronauts who
    worked so hard to make sure the three men returned to Earth
    safely would have been replaced by one 20-year-old in a
    Grateful Dead t-shirt working on a laptop. I am concerned that
    replacing NASA at the head of the manned space program with
    some TBD commercial enterprise will, in fact, dramatically
    compromise the safety of the astronauts, and I would like you
    all to address that point, staring with Mr. Young.
        Mr. Young. The two gentlemen to my right are the most
    qualified to say that. I think it would go even well beyond
    that. I think it would jeopardize the safety of the United
    States human space flight program.
        Mr. Grayson. Because one failure would have such dramatic
    repercussions?
        Mr. Young. Well, yeah, but, see, my definition of failure
    is--it could be a flight failure, or it could be just a massive
    overrun, or it could be just a massive schedule delay, which we
    have seen a few of, or it could be the failure to be able to
    complete a program, which we have also seen. So I think failure
    can be any of those, you know, of those circumstances. And so
    either one of those, I think, would have just a devastating
    impact on not only NASA, but the United States human space--
    United States space program.
        Mr. Grayson. Captain Cernan?
        Captain Cernan. Many years ago I worked on Apollo--we
    learned about the Russian program we never knew, and sometimes
    it is as important to know what they didn't know as much as
    what we didn't know. And the Russian cosmonauts would play
    volleyball and swim and had requirements to stay physically in
    shape and do a little homework on the physics and geometry of
    the world, and they would send them down to Baikonur and open
    up a hatch and put them in and off they would go. I said
    earlier, and I don't want to spend too much--we lived, 24/7,
    from the day we got involved with our spacecraft, whether it
    was Gemini program, Apollo or whatever it is, we lived, we
    owned, we knew the people who were building it. They dedicated
    their lives to putting the screws in the heat shield so that it
    wouldn't come apart when we re-entered the Earth. This is the
    kind of culture we grew up and we lived in. Now, if it went to
    the commercial sector, as an astronaut, I have got to believe
    we would have to--we would have to recreate that culture, or I
    am not getting in it. I mean, I didn't go to the moon not to
    come home. I mean, I planned to come home all along, but I knew
    I was coming home, because of those people, and because of the
    culture that we worked within at NASA.
        Mr. Grayson. And last, but for sure not least, Mr.
    Armstrong.
        Mr. Armstrong. I included in my written testimony some
    comments regarding commercial--first, I say I am very much in
    favor of the commercial activity and their--and I am very
    hopeful that they will have the progress that they hoped for.
    Nevertheless, they face a very difficult business case. It is--
    the market is extremely thin, and they--the investor
    contribution to that project is going to be--must be
    substantially larger than the government contribution, by their
    business plan, and that business plan looks highly suspect. I
    recall recently reading an article by Brewster Shaw, former
    astronaut and now working a responsible position in space for
    Boeing, and he was trying to explain to the readers the
    difficulty he faced in convincing his boss to--that that was a
    good business to get--there is a good enough chance for that to
    be a business success that they should get in it. He said, it
    will be a hard sell, but, he said, I am hopeful. And it is
    going to be equally difficult for any other commercial space
    provider to make that case to their investors without the
    developed market. And I think that is a serious impediment that
    they just--we need to recognize, and they need to overcome. And
    I hope they can, and I hope that market develops, but right now
    it is very difficult to see that it will.
        Mr. Grayson. Thank you.
        Ms. Kosmas. Thank you.
        Mr. Grayson. Pleasure and an honor----
        Mr. Young. Could I just----
        Mr. Grayson. --meet you all.
        Mr. Young. Could I just add briefly to that?
        Ms. Kosmas. Okay. Yes.
        Mr. Young. Neil's comments and Gene's reminded me of this,
    but the, you know, there are extra steps that make these things
    successful. When Apollo was being developed, I was actually at
    NASA's Langley Research Center, and I was working on a program
    called Viking, where we land a couple spacecraft on Mars.
    Langley actually built something that looked like a big saw
    bench that a 1/6 G simulator. You could fly--flights at 1/6 G,
    equivalent to the moon. And I used to drive home late at night
    and ride by when the lights went on, and Neil Armstrong was in
    there flying that test vehicle, practicing for going to the
    moon. They are kind of--they are the extra things that make
    these things happen, Langley building that facility, you know,
    Neil coming up from JSC to fly it, the industry people being
    evolved. You know, it is just an example, but you reminded me
    of it. That is the kind of partnership that makes these things
    happen. You don't write that in a safety requirements document.
    You probably would never write in there, if you are not doing
    anything on Friday night, why don't you come up and fly the 1/6
    G simulator? So they are the--it is no special ingredients.
    That is why this business, which is a one strike and you are
    out business, has been as successful as it has been. Thank you.
        Ms. Kosmas. Thank you very much. Mr. Griffith, recognized
    for five minutes.

                  Technical Share of the Constellation Program

        Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate you all
    being here. I am from Marshall Space Flight, Huntsville,
    Alabama, retired physician who take care of many of the
    pioneers there, and I can say that, without a doubt, even in
    their most ill moments, their culture, manned space flight
    culture, always came through. And I think the culture, and
    seeing the Saturn, seeing and talking to people who hand
    soldered and who put it together and who gave their lives for
    it, when I hear someone say that these individuals can find a
    job somewhere else, this was never a job. This was a calling,
    and so we see that over and over again, those of us who were
    involved in communities with the space flight. The thing that I
    am concerned about, as the discussions are framed, is--I keep
    hearing budget, and I don't think we are talking about money
    here. I think we are talking about commitment. I think if
    America can do a $787 billion stimulus, bail out AIG, and other
    things that we have done in the last 18 months, and we can't
    find $12 billion to finish Ares I, our heavy lift vehicle, Ares
    V, which will eventually be the very soul of America to the
    rest of the world, is a lack of commitment, and it is alluring
    of the President's suggestion on April the 15th that we were
    not in competition globally for space and exploration and
    science, I think was a misstatement, either through naivete, or
    he is ill informed. We are, in fact, in a competition. And when
    I hear Mr. Augustine say over and over again all Ares--all the
    Constellation project needs is money, I believe he is right.
    And I don't think it is a budgetary concept. I think it is a
    commitment concept that we have not made, that we need to make,
    and I think that is why the Obama administration is running
    into a stone wall here. So I have listened to the comments, and
    I think my only question to you is do you agree with Mr.
    Augustine, that our technology is there, that our Ares I, our
    Ares V solutions are sound, and that, if we were--had committed
    the proper funding to it, we would not be having this
    discussion?
        Mr. Armstrong. I believe that to be true, sir.
        Mr. Griffith. Thank you.
        Captain Cernan. Yeah, I don't think there is a flaw in the
    program, except lack of funding.
        Mr. Griffith. Thank you.
        Mr. Young. There is no one I respect more than Norm
    Augustine, and I agree with that. There is also data that
    provides additional support and information, and for Ares I and
    for Orion we have completed preliminary design reviews, you
    know, that--the assessments that I have read, and have heard
    people actually testifying about, is, from a technical
    standpoint, this program has proceeded in a very successful
    manner. So I think that--I have not heard anyone who has said
    there is any issue with Ares I, Orion, other than insufficient
    funding to meet schedules.
        Mr. Griffith. Thanks. My other question would be that--it
    would appear to me that, with the successful completion of the
    Constellation project, that our ability to commercialize space
    would be--would have much more potential. It would be much
    safer, it would be much quicker, than the way--the suggestions
    are that we are going to put something out for competitive
    bids. We put out the tanker project for--in 2001. We don't have
    a tanker yet. We are not refueling anything. We put space out,
    which is a national security issue, for competitive bids, we
    are basically saying to China and Russia, we are walking off
    the court, the game is yours. And so I concur in that, and I
    appreciate so much you all being here. The soul of my district
    is--are the rocket scientists, so thank you so much.
        Mr. Young. If I might comment, we actually have an endeavor
    to pursue the commercialization of space, and that is
    commercial cargo, as you are well aware. And while I think
    commercial cargo is not without risk, it is an opportunity to
    grow and to demonstrate a capability. And on the other hand, if
    the unfortunate happens and it is not successful, in my view,
    it fails soft. There is other ways to do it. Commercial crew
    fails hard, and that is the fundamental difference. I guess the
    other comment I would make also is--and maybe I am not the
    right person to do this, but having spent a little bit of time
    in industry, we should not set up this commercial endeavor to
    fail. Don't make the bar so high. You know, have a responsible
    bar that can be achieved, and if achieved, then there is an
    opportunity to raise the bar. But don't try on the first jump,
    you know, to set a world's record.
        Mr. Griffith. Thanks.
        Ms. Kosmas. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Griffith.
    Before we bring the hearing to a close, I want----
        Ms. Woolsey. Wait a minute.
        Ms. Kosmas. I am sorry.
        Ms. Woolsey. I asked to be on the--back on the list quite a
    while ago.
        Ms. Kosmas. Oh, I beg your pardon. I am sorry. The Chair--
    --
        Ms. Woolsey. Okay.
        Ms. Kosmas. The Chair recognizes Representative Woolsey.
        Ms. Woolsey. Thank you. I stepped out of--I was the second
    person, and I thought, no, I am just going to listen. But, you
    know, your testimony brought up so many memories, and I am the
    perfect clean-up batter, besides our Chairwoman here. Commander
    Armstrong, my kids were, all four of them, four, six, seven and
    eight when you took that step on the moon, and we sat there
    spellbound, our entire family. It is a day that I can still
    remember the colors of their t-shirts. I mean, that--it is one
    of those days. I remember that one of my sons had a loose
    tooth. I mean, we don't forget that. And my career was wrapped
    totally around the technology that came from the space
    movement. I was part of a startup telecom company. So it was
    very clear to me that--and we all knew that that company would
    not have been able to spin off from Bell Labs without the
    science from the space industry. So I have been questioning,
    while we have been sitting here, why I--and my--well, there
    aren't enough of us here to--but my colleagues will tell you, I
    have been very nonplussed about the space program, and I am on
    this committee, and blah, blah, blah. That is because I see so
    many needs in this country and in this world that I--but there
    is another because. I never ever thought the space industry
    would not be vital in our country. I took it for granted, and I
    had to go do other things that I thought were important also,
    until it became clear to me that our leadership is willing to
    let other nations send--transport our astronauts out--into
    space. And all of my competitive juices just got going. It was,
    like, no way. We are not going to pay another country and
    depend on them to take care of what we need in the United
    States of America. So you have reminded me today of exactly how
    important the space industry has been, because you have been so
    important in the past. You are important today, and you will be
    important in our future. So your stories, your message, has to
    get out there. We will help you. You will help us. You really
    will. This has been a very important day, and when it woke me
    up, I realized we have got a lot of people in this country that
    think our space industry is there, it is solid, it will be
    there forever, we don't have to worry about it. So now we have
    got to remind people that we have got decisions to make, and we
    want to make the right ones. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Kosmas. Thank you, Ms. Woolsey. Before we bring the
    hearing to a close now, I want to thank our witnesses. I think
    you have been properly thanked by many of the members, but I
    personally would like to thank you as well for testifying
    before the committee today. And, for the record, the record
    will remain open for two weeks for additional statements from
    the members and for answers to any follow-up questions the
    committee may ask of the witnesses. So the witnesses are now
    excused, and the hearing is now adjourned. Thank you very much.
        [Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]