- STATE PLANNING FOR OFFSHORE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT: STANDARDS FOR PREPAREDNESS (PART 3 OF 3)

[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

STATE PLANNING FOR
OFFSHORE ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT: STANDARDS
FOR PREPAREDNESS
(PART 3 OF 3)

=======================================================================

OVERSIGHT HEARING

before the

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INSULAR AFFAIRS,
OCEANS AND WILDLIFE

of the

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

Thursday, June 24, 2010

__________

Serial No. 111-60

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources

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COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES

NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Chairman
DOC HASTINGS, Washington, Ranking Republican Member

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan Don Young, Alaska
Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American Elton Gallegly, California
Samoa John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee
Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey Jeff Flake, Arizona
Grace F. Napolitano, California Henry E. Brown, Jr., South
Rush D. Holt, New Jersey Carolina
Raul M. Grijalva, Arizona Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Washington
Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam Louie Gohmert, Texas
Jim Costa, California Rob Bishop, Utah
Dan Boren, Oklahoma Bill Shuster, Pennsylvania
Gregorio Sablan, Northern Marianas Doug Lamborn, Colorado
Martin T. Heinrich, New Mexico Adrian Smith, Nebraska
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Robert J. Wittman, Virginia
George Miller, California Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts John Fleming, Louisiana
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mike Coffman, Colorado
Maurice D. Hinchey, New York Jason Chaffetz, Utah
Donna M. Christensen, Virgin Cynthia M. Lummis, Wyoming
Islands Tom McClintock, California
Diana DeGette, Colorado Bill Cassidy, Louisiana
Ron Kind, Wisconsin
Lois Capps, California
Jay Inslee, Washington
Joe Baca, California
Stephanie Herseth Sandlin, South
Dakota
John P. Sarbanes, Maryland
Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire
Niki Tsongas, Massachusetts
Frank Kratovil, Jr., Maryland
Pedro R. Pierluisi, Puerto Rico

James H. Zoia, Chief of Staff
Rick Healy, Chief Counsel
Todd Young, Republican Chief of Staff
Lisa Pittman, Republican Chief Counsel
------

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INSULAR AFFAIRS, OCEANS AND WILDLIFE

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam, Chairwoman
HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina, Ranking Republican Member

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan Don Young, Alaska
Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American Jeff Flake, Arizona
Samoa Doug Lamborn, Colorado
Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey Robert J. Wittman, Virginia
Gregorio Sablan, Northern Marianas John Fleming, Louisiana
Donna M. Christensen, Virgin Jason Chaffetz, Utah
Islands Bill Cassidy, Louisiana
Diana DeGette, Colorado Doc Hastings, Washington, ex
Ron Kind, Wisconsin officio
Lois Capps, California
Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire
Frank Kratovil, Jr., Maryland
Pedro R. Pierluisi, Puerto Rico
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico
Nick J. Rahall, II, West Virginia,
ex officio

------
CONTENTS

----------
Page

Hearing held on Thursday, June 24, 2010.......................... 1

Statement of Members:
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate in Congress from Guam 1
Prepared statement of.................................... 2
Cassidy, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Louisiana......................................... 3
Prepared statement of.................................... 4

Statement of Witnesses:
Barton, Manly, Supervisor, District 1, Jackson County Board
of Supervisors, Pascagoula, Mississippi.................... 20
Prepared statement of.................................... 22
Fletcher, Kristen M., Executive Director, Coastal States
Organization, Washington, D.C.............................. 10
Prepared statement of.................................... 12
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 16
Menashes, Matthew E., Executive Director, National Estuarine
Research Reserve Association, Washington, D.C.............. 23
Prepared statement of.................................... 25
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 33
Takahashi-Kelso, Dennis, Ph.D., Executive Vice President, The
Ocean Conservancy, Santa Cruz, California.................. 35
Prepared statement of.................................... 36
Walker, William W., Ph.D., Executive Director, Mississippi
Department of Marine Resources,............................ 6
Prepared statement of.................................... 7

Additional materials supplied:
National Estuarine Research Reserve Association, Supplemental
statement submitted for the record......................... 62

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON STATE PLANNING FOR OFFSHORE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT:
STANDARDS FOR PREPAREDNESS

----------

Thursday, June 24, 2010

U.S. House of Representatives

Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife

Committee on Natural Resources

Washington, D.C.

----------

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m. in
Room 1324, Longworth House Office Building, The Honorable
Madeleine Z. Bordallo [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee]
presiding.
Present: Representatives Bordallo, Christensen, Kind,
Capps, Wittman, Fleming and Cassidy.
Also Present: Representatives Herseth Sandlin and Cao.
Ms. Bordallo. Good morning, everyone. The oversight hearing
by the Subcommittee of Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife
will now come to order.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE TERRITORY OF GUAM

Ms. Bordallo. Today the Subcommittee holds its third
hearing on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. While the tragedy
continues for both Gulf communities and the environment, we
will look ahead and examine whether current planning efforts
and requirements under the law are sufficient to ensure a
coordinated and effective response to any future spills.
Yesterday, we were again reminded of the difficulties of
operating a mile below the sea surface when a remotely operated
vehicle accident suspended operations, and the cap was
temporarily removed, allowing much more oil to gush into the
Gulf--as it has been for the last nine weeks. Nearly 2,000
birds, sea turtles and mammals are known to have died as a
result of the spill, while hundreds or possibly thousands more
may never be accounted for, and by now we are all familiar with
the tragic degradation of the wetlands and beaches in
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and also Florida.
While the many hearings and investigations to date have
shown that the oversight and regulation of the offshore oil
industry is in clear need of reform, we must also look beyond
regulatory mechanisms and recognize that informed and thorough
preparedness is necessary for effective and coordinated
disaster response and to protect marine environments and
coastal communities from the effects of a spill.
Various response plans were in place before the Deepwater
Horizon incident, including offshore facility local and state
plans. In addition to this localized planning area, regional
and national contingency plans were mandated by the Oil
Pollution Act. Other planning statutes include the Coastal Zone
Management Act which requires states to include in their
Federally approved coastal management plans a process for
anticipating impacts resulting from offshore energy facilities,
and the Stafford Act which authorized the President to issue
major disaster declarations to enable Federal agencies to
provide assistance to state and local governments overwhelmed
by catastrophes.
Current response and recovery activities have adhered to
existing plans, but as the National Institute Commander Admiral
Thad Allen as noted, ``The unprecedented complexity and
magnitude of this disaster shows us those plans may not have
gone far enough.''
This spill is a wake up call. Its damages stretching from
coral reefs to coastal communities, and we must do our best to
prepare for a new worst-case scenario.
I want to thank all the witnesses for being here today, and
I look forward to hearing how to improve our preparedness for
oil spills amongst all levels of government.
Before I recognize the Acting Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee, I would like to ask for unanimous consent that
our colleague from Louisiana, Congressman Joseph Cao, be
allowed to join the Subcommittee on the dais for this hearing.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
And now at this time I would like to recognize Mr. Cassidy,
the Acting Ranking Member of the Subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Bordallo follows:]

Statement of The Honorable Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife

Today the Subcommittee holds its third hearing on the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. While the tragedy continues for both Gulf
communities and the environment, we will look ahead and examine whether
current planning efforts and requirements under the law are sufficient
to ensure a coordinated and effective response to future spills.
Yesterday we were again reminded of the difficulties of operating a
mile below the sea surface when a remotely operated vehicle accident
suspended operations and the cap was temporarily removed allowing much
more oil to gush into the Gulf as it has been for the last nine weeks.
Nearly 2,000 birds, sea turtles, and mammals are known to have died as
a result of the spill while hundreds or possibly thousands more may
never be accounted for, and by now we are all familiar with the tragic
degradation of wetlands and beaches in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
and Florida.
While the many hearings and investigations to date have shown that
the oversight and regulation of the offshore oil industry is in clear
need of reform, we must also look beyond regulatory mechanisms and
recognize that informed and thorough preparedness is necessary for
effective and coordinated disaster response, and to protect marine
environments and coastal communities from the effects of a spill.
Various response plans were in place before the Deepwater Horizon
incident, including offshore facility, local, and State plans. In
addition to this localized planning, area, regional, and national
Contingency Plans were mandated by the Oil Pollution Act. Other
planning statutes include the Coastal Zone Management Act, which
requires States to include in their Federally-approved Coastal
Management Plans, a process for anticipating impacts resulting from
offshore energy facilities, and the Stafford Act, which authorizes the
President to issue major disaster declarations to enable Federal
agencies to provide assistance to State and local governments
overwhelmed by catastrophes.
Current response and recovery activities have adhered to existing
plans, but as the National Incident Commander, Admiral Thad Allen, has
noted, the unprecedented complexity and magnitude of this disaster
shows us those plans may not have gone far enough. This spill is a
wake-up call, its damages stretching from coral reefs to coastal
communities, and we must do our best to prepare for a new worst case
scenario.
I thank all the witnesses for being here today and look forward to
hearing how to improve our preparedness for oil spills amongst all
levels of government.
______

STATEMENT OF THE HON. BILL CASSIDY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

Mr. Cassidy. Thank you, Madam Chair. I compliment you for
scheduling these series of oversight hearings on the Deepwater
Horizon incident. During the last two weeks, we have heard from
nearly 30 witnesses representing Federal, state, local
officials, university professors, conservation and
environmental groups, fishermen, tourism experts, and seafood
processors and, despite all we have learned, the fact remains
that the leak is not yet plugged, our coast not yet protected,
and claims for damages not being adequately processed and
funded by BP, and there are still many unanswered questions.
We need to get to the bottom of what happened to prevent it
from ever happening again. We need to know the facts. A
detailed account informed by understanding so that Congress and
the Administration can put in place new safety and enforcement
measures to make the United States the safest place in the
world to drill for the energy resources that power our economy.
Now, as much as I applaud your effort, Madam Chair, I am
concerned regarding President Obama's. This fact finding was
supposed to be the purpose of a national oil spill commission.
Instead the President has created a commission that doesn't
appear to be up to the challenge. Instead of appointing
independent experts with knowledge and expertise of deepwater
drilling, he has packed the commission with people who lack
expertise in the issues we are confronting.
For example, there are no petroleum engineers on this
commission, nor is there anyone with experience in deepwater
drilling.
My concern is that they do not have the members capable of
understanding what is needed to be understood. If you are going
to have a commission to figure out what went wrong in petroleum
engineering circumstances in deepwater drilling, you need
petroleum engineers and deepwater drillers. If we don't learn
from BP's mistakes and our government's failures, we will not
be able to implement reforms needed to prevent another spill,
and our energy future will be far less secure.
I will point out this is not the first time the President
has rejected science and professional expertise in responding.
He recently imposed a moratorium on deepwater drilling that was
denounced by his own hand-picked advisors at the National
Academy of Engineering. These experts stated that the
moratorium, and I quote, ``will not measurably reduce risk
further and it will have a lasting impact on our nation's
economy which may be greater than that of the oil spill.''
Now, as a physician and a medical school teacher, I tell my
students first do no harm, but the President's six-month
moratorium on deepwater exploration and production is doing
great harm to our regional economy. The jobs and the
livelihoods of thousands of workers and their families are at
risk every day this moratorium goes on. We must ensure the
safety of our offshore energy production, but there is no
scientific basis for this moratorium according to these
engineers.
This Administration was touted as one in which science
would trump politics. Just over a year ago President Obama
said, ``Under my Administration, the days of science taking a
back seat to ideology are over. To undermine scientific
integrity is to undermine our democracy. I want to be sure that
facts are driving scientific decisions and not the other way
around.''
In the case of the deepwater moratorium and the
appointments to the oil spill commission, the President has
apparently chosen politics over science.
Madam Chair, at stake is our entire way of life along the
Gulf Coast--our jobs, energy production, fisheries, wetlands
and our dynamic ecosystem, and beyond the Gulf at stake is the
ability of our nation to produce affordable energy to heat our
home, fuel or vehicles, and power the businesses that provide
jobs. In short, this is about America's resources, the
environment and jobs.
More than 30 percent of this nation's oil comes from the
Gulf of Mexico, and 80 percent of that from deepwater wells. As
a result of this moratorium, American job losses will range in
tens or even hundreds of thousands. Lost wages could be over
$330 million per month, and the amount of oil and gas
production from deepwater drilling in the Gulf is reduced by
193,000 barrels in the year 2011, and this is not just a six-
month moratorium.
If those mobile rigs leave the Gulf, they may be gone for
at least three to five years as they sign contracts to produce
in other sites around the world. By the way, these are
deepwater sites.
Because of this economic cost and the fact that the
moratorium will not increase safety, I introduced H.R. 5519,
the Gulf Coast Jobs Preservation Act. The twin goals of this
legislation are to terminate the moratorium and direct the
Secretary of the Interior to identify additional measures to
ensure the safety of deepwater drilling.
Madam Chair, our response to this disaster needs to be
guided by facts, not emotion, not political opportunism, but
truth. Let us stay focused on the evidence and figure out what
measures will ensure that the people, the economies, and the
ecosystems of the Gulf can thrive.
Madam Chair, thank you again for holding these hearings,
and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cassidy follows:]

Statement of The Honorable Bill Cassidy, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Louisiana

Madam Chairwoman, I want to compliment you for scheduling this
series of oversight hearings on the Deepwater Horizon incident. During
the past two weeks, we will have heard from nearly 30 witnesses
representing Federal, state, and local officials, university
professors, conservation and environmental groups, fishermen, tourism
experts, and seafood processors.
Despite all we have learned, the fact remains that the leak is not
yet plugged, our coasts are not yet protected, and claims for damages
are not being adequately processed and funded by BP. And there are
still many unanswered questions.
We must get to the bottom of what happened and prevent it from ever
happening again. We need to know the facts--a detailed account informed
by understanding--so Congress and the Administration can put in place
new safety and enforcement measures to make the United States the
safest place in the world to drill for the energy resources that power
our economy.
This fact-finding was supposed to be the purpose of a National Oil
Spill Commission. Instead, the President created a Commission that is
not up to the challenge. Instead of appointing independent experts with
knowledge and expertise of deepwater drilling, he packed the Commission
with people who lack expertise in the issues we're confronting.
There are no petroleum engineers on this Commission, nor is there
anyone with experience in deepwater drilling. My concern is that they
do not have the members capable of understanding what is needed to be
understood. If you're going to have a commission figure out what went
wrong in a petroleum engineering circumstance in deepwater drilling,
you need petroleum engineers and deepwater drillers.
If we don't learn from BP's mistakes and our government's failures,
we won't be able to implement reforms needed to prevent another spill,
and our energy future will be far less secure.
This is not the first time that the President has rejected science
and professional expertise in responding to the spill. He recently
imposed a moratorium on deepwater drilling that was denounced by his
own hand-picked advisers at the National Academy of Engineering. These
experts stated that the moratorium, and I quote,--``will not measurably
reduce risk further and it will have a lasting impact on the nation's
economy which may be greater than that of the oil spill''--unquote.
As a physician and a medical school teacher, I tell my students
``First, do no harm.'' The President's 6-month moratorium on deepwater
exploration and production is doing great harm to our regional economy.
The jobs and livelihoods of thousands of workers and their families are
at risk every day this moratorium goes on. We must ensure the safety of
our offshore energy production, but there is no scientific basis for
this moratorium.
This Administration was touted as one in which science would trump
politics. Just over a year ago, President Obama said quote--``Under my
Administration, the days of science taking a back seat to ideology are
over...To undermine scientific integrity is to undermine our
democracy...I want to be sure that facts are driving scientific
decisions, and not the other way around.''--unquote. In the case of the
deepwater moratorium and the appointments to the Oil Spill Commission,
the President has chosen politics over science.
Madam Chairwoman, at stake is our entire way of life along the Gulf
Coast--our jobs, our energy production, our fisheries, our wetlands,
and our dynamic Gulf ecosystem. And beyond the Gulf, at stake is the
ability of our nation to produce affordable energy to heat our homes,
fuel our vehicles, and power the businesses that provide jobs. In
short, this is about America's resources, the environment, and jobs.
More than 30 percent of this nation's oil comes from the Gulf of
Mexico, and 80 percent of that comes from deepwater wells. As a result
of this moratorium, American job losses will range in tens or even
hundreds of thousands, lost wages could be over $330 million dollars
per month, and the amount of oil and gas production from deepwater
drilling in the Gulf will be reduced by 193,000 barrels in 2011.
And this is not just a six month moratorium. If these mobile rigs
leave the Gulf, they will be gone for at least three to five years to
other sites around the world.
Because of these economic costs and the fact that the moratorium
will not increase safety, I introduced H. R. 5519, the Gulf Coast Jobs
Preservation Act. The twin goals of this legislation are to terminate
the moratorium and direct the Secretary of the Interior to identify
additional measures to ensure the safety of deepwater drilling.
Madam Chair, our response to this disaster needs to be guided by
facts--not emotion, not political opportunism, but truth. Let's stay
focused on the evidence and figure out what measures will ensure that
the people, the economies, and the ecosystems of the Gulf can thrive.
Madam Chair, thank you for again holding these hearings.
______

Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman for his opening
statement, the acting Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, and
I would now like to recognize our panel of witnesses that are
here to testify.
First, let me introduce Dr. William W. Walker, Chair, Gulf
of Mexico Alliance, and Executive Director, Mississippi
Department of Marine Resources. The second witness is Ms.
Kristen Fletcher, Executive Director of the Coastal States
Organizations; Mr. Manly Barton, District 1 Supervisor, Jackson
County Board of Supervisors; Mr. Matt Menashes, Executive
Director of the National Estuarine Research Reserve
Association; and Dr. Dennis Takahashi-Kelso, Executive Vice
President of The Ocean Conservancy.
We will begin with the testimony from Dr. William Walker.
I would like to mention to the witnesses that we do have a
timing process here. The red timing light that is right in
front of you on the table will indicate when five minutes have
passed, and your time has concluded. So we appreciate your
cooperation with keeping with the timing. Your full written
statement will be included in the record. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. WALKER, CHAIR, GULF OF MEXICO ALLIANCE,
BILOXI, MISSISSIPPI

Dr. Walker. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Within days of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, Mississippi
began putting together a plan to protect and, if necessary,
clean up coastal Mississippi following the explosion and
sinking of the Deepwater Horizon. This plan is consistent with
the area contingency plan as required by the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990. This plan is also consistent with Mississippi's
coastal program, a Federally approved coastal management plan
as required by the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.
Our first priority was protection of the critical marsh
habitat that serves as nursery ground and protective refuge for
Mississippi's juvenile shrimp, crab, and fish species.
Mississippi's plan to combat this oil spill has been provided
to you. The plan has several facets and triggers that, when
pulled, result in specific actions.
Our preference and first line of defense is to fight this
spill offshore at the site of the spill, far from Mississippi's
coastline.
Currently, while some relatively small patches of weathered
oil and sheen have reached our barrier islands and into the
Mississippi Sound, the vast majority of oil--crude and degraded
forms--remains offshore. The key to success here is closing off
or significantly reducing the introduction of new crude oil
into the water. If those efforts are successful, we should be
able to deal with most of the oil offshore.
With regard to other funding that might be applied to the
activities associated with this event, I am pleased that BP has
pledged $500 million to research, monitoring and restoration
efforts in the aftermath of this massive oil release. I feel
very strongly that a significant portion of these funds should
flow through the Gulf of Mexico Governors Alliance, a
partnership of the Governors of the five states which border
the Gulf of Mexico.
The Gulf of Mexico Alliance is a partnership initiated in
2004 by the States of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi
and Texas, with the goal of significantly increasing regional
collaboration to enhance the environmental and economic health
of the Gulf of Mexico. The alliance is a state-led Federally
supported partnership that works closely with a variety of
partners. The alliance is focused on planning, implementation,
and management at the regional level, and has identified six
priority issue areas that are significant to the Gulf of Mexico
region. These areas are: improved water quality for healthy
beaches and shell fish beds; habitat conservation and
restoration; environmental education; ecosystem integration and
assessment; producing nutrient input to coastal ecosystems; and
building more resilient coastal communities.
The alliance released its second action plan in June 2009.
This plan is aggressive and addresses some of the most
processing issues affecting the Gulf of Mexico region. The
second action plan has been provided to you as well.
The Gulf of Mexico region is continuing to demonstrate the
power of partnership, and other regions of the continental
United States are following our example. The Gulf Alliance is
working closely with the interagency task force established by
President Obama to develop a national plan for ocean governance
and coastal and marine special planning. The Gulf Alliance is
also working closely with the interagency working group
established by the President to assist with recovery and
restoration of Mississippi and Louisiana following Hurricane
Katrina in 2005.
The Gulf of Mexico Alliance is well positioned to play a
significant role in the current oil event in the Gulf. The Gulf
Alliance presently has teams of qualified people working
together in the Gulf now for almost nine years, and they are in
place to respond to the research, monitoring and remediation
needs brought on by the Deepwater Horizon explosion and
resulting continuing oil spill. BP has pledged $500 million to
fund a 10-year research program focused on assessing long-term
effect of this event. Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour, who
presently serves as the gubernatorial lead for the Gulf
Alliance, has made it clear to BP that his expectation is that
a significant portion of these funds in fact are placed with
the Gulf of Mexico Alliance.
To date, two other Governors have joined Governor Barbour
and the final two should pledge their support soon. Governor
Barbour also discussed his desires with President Obama during
the President's recent visit to Mississippi.
In closing, I ask for your consideration and support of
using the funds pledged by BP to leverage funding already
provided to the Gulf region by NOAA, U.S. EPA, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, Department of the Interior, USDA, and by
congressional action itself to allow the Gulf of Mexico
Alliance to continue to make improvements in the Gulf region
that will result in improving environmental health, the
economy, and the overall quality of life in the Gulf of Mexico
region. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Walker follows:]

Statement of William W. Walker, Ph.D., Executive Director,
Mississippi Department of Marine Resources

Within days of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, the Mississippi
Department of Marine Resources, the Mississippi Department of
Environmental Quality, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, and
Governor Haley Barbour began putting together a plan to protect and if
necessary clean up Coastal Mississippi following the explosion and
sinking of the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform and the resultant
release of crude oil into the waters of the Gulf of Mexico at a site
some 96 miles south southeast of Mississippi's coastline.
This Plan is consistent with the Area Contingency Plan (ACP)
developed by the Mobile Sector Area Committee (AC) as required by the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990. This Plan is also consistent with
Mississippi's Coastal Program, our federally (NOAA)-approved coastal
management plan which addresses energy facilities located in or which
may affect our coastal zone as required by the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972.
Regarding protecting Coastal Mississippi, MDMR and MDEQ decided
early on that our first priority was protection of the critical marsh
habitat that serves as nursery ground and protective refuge for
Mississippi's juvenile shrimp, crab, and fish species. These priority
areas were communicated to BP, and BP contractors have protected these
areas with boom material. Presently, the following areas are protected
with boom: Grand Bay, the Pascagoula River, Biloxi Bay, Bay St. Louis,
and the marshes west of Bayou Caddy. Additional marsh areas requested
by our cities and counties have also been boomed. On Monday of this
week we began installing a second layer of larger boom in all of these
areas to further fortify and protect our sensitive and critical habitat
and nursery areas. We have installed strategic test areas nearly two
miles of absorbent silt fencing designed to allow water but not oil to
pass supplement the booms. This fencing has worked well, and we have
asked BP to approve installation of 30 additional miles.
Mississippi's plan to combat this oil spill is attached. The Plan
has several facets and triggers that, when pulled, result in specific
actions. Our preference and first line of defense is to fight this
spill offshore, at the site of the spill. Our first trigger is pulled
when oil material is detected within 30 miles of our barrier islands,
some 45 miles offshore from our coastal beaches. This trigger was
pulled on May 31 when degraded oil and sheen was detected some 40 miles
south of Horn and Petit Bois Islands which are located 12 miles south
of Mississippi's coastline. Pulling this trigger resulted in BP
contractors deploying collection vessels to the location and removal of
all material related to the oil spill.
Our second trigger is activated when oil material is detected on
our barrier islands. This trigger was pulled on June 1 when balls or
patties degraded oil were reported onshore on Petit Bois Island.
Pulling this trigger resulted in BP contractors deploying personnel to
Petit Bois Island to pick up this material and place it in plastic bags
for analysis and landfill disposal.
Our third trigger is pulled when oil material is reported north of
our barrier islands in the Mississippi Sound. This trigger was pulled
on June 2 when weathered oil was reported north of Petit Bois Island,
and resulted in BP contractors sending vessels to the area to pick up
the material. All of these actions were executed in concert with the
plan and all were successful. The good news is that these events were
relative small portions of weathered oil material that had broken away
from the main body of the oil, which remains today some 70 or so miles
south of our barrier islands. Degraded oil south of Mobile Bay is only
25 to 30 miles away from our barrier islands, and BP contractors are
aggressively skimming that material. Should more significant amounts of
oil material enter the Mississippi Sound, we are prepared to skim it,
corral it with boom, and where feasible burn it to keep it from
reaching our mainland coast.
Our fourth trigger is pulled when oil material reaches our mainland
beaches and wetlands, and our fifth trigger is pulled when oil material
reaches our bays, rivers, and bayous. Thankfully, these final two
triggers have not been pulled, and we continue to work to ensure that
we will not have to trigger them. We are, however prepared to do so if
necessary.
So, our current situation is that while some relatively small
patches of weathered oil and sheen have reached our barrier islands and
into the Mississippi Sound, the vast majority of oil, crude and
degraded forms, remains offshore. This is in part due to favorable
weather conditions. Prevailing winds continue to move the oil away from
Mississippi. Current winds are pushing the oil to the east, away from
our shores. And, anticipated winds from the north will move the oil
farther south. Also, there is a tremendous level of activity going on
at the site of the spill to skim, burn, and siphon the oil to reduce
the amount of product on the surface of the water. And, the use of
dispersants, both sprayed from airplanes at the surface and injected
subsurface at the source of the emerging crude, is successfully
breaking the crude oil into hundreds and thousand of small droplets
with significantly increased surface area available to microorganisms
capable of biologically degrading or ``eating'' the oil. These
microorganisms are present in the Gulf because of natural oil seeps
that release about 250,000 barrels of oil annually into Gulf of Mexico
waters. These bacteria would not be there if not for the oil seepage,
and they are quite capable of metabolizing the oil, especially in
dispersed form.
Now a word about the subsurface ``oil plumes.'' Dispersants serve
to break crude oil into small particles of varying size and buoyancy.
When dispersed, these particles float in the water column and drift
with the prevailing current. As these particles drift in the current,
the bacteria naturally present in the environment metabolize the oil,
reducing it over time ultimately to carbon dioxide and water.
The key to success here is closing off or significantly reducing
the introduction of new crude oil into the water. If those efforts are
successful, we should be able to deal with most of the oil offshore. If
that is the case, Mississippi's short term effects should be minimal.
Even if we are successful in dealing with the oil offshore, questions
about long term effects remain. Long term effects on populations of
marine species whose larval forms are currently present in the area of
the spill are unknown and will take years to assess and monitor.
Fortunately, Mississippi has talented and qualified scientists who
stand at the ready to address these long term concerns and questions.
With regard to other funding that might be applied to the
activities associated with this event, I am pleased that BP has pledged
$500 million to research, monitoring, and restoration efforts in the
aftermath of this massive oil release. I feel very strongly that a
significant portion of these funds should flow through the Gulf of
Mexico Governors' Alliance, a partnership of the governors of the five
states which border the Gulf of Mexico. Contained within the membership
of the Gulf Alliance are academic institutions, state agencies, NGOs,
and others from all five Gulf states, as well as an outstanding group
of federal agencies. I will speak about the Gulf Alliance later in this
testimony and provide you with the Alliance's latest Action Plan. I
hope you will get a flavor of the overall focus and capability of the
Alliance and I hope you will agree that this is the proper mechanism
for designing and implementing the BP research, monitoring, and
restoration effort.
Let me close by once again stressing that BP has stepped forward as
the responsible party and said repeatedly and publically that they will
pay all costs associated with damage assessment, mitigation, and
compensation. BP has provided Mississippi with $50 million to reimburse
cities and counties for lost revenues, for the purchase of equipment
necessary to deal with the oil spill, and for other purposes. BP has
promised additional funds are available for these purposes if needed.
BP has paid $6 million in claims directly to Mississippi citizens and
businesses. They have denied no claims to date, although some continue
to be under investigation. BP has provided $15 million to Mississippi
to promote tourism, and have put 2000 Mississippians to work.
The Gulf of Mexico Alliance
The Gulf of Mexico Alliance is a partnership, initiated in 2004, by
the states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, with
the goal of significantly increasing regional collaboration to enhance
the environmental and economic health of the Gulf of Mexico. The
Alliance is a state led, federally supported partnership that works
closely with a variety of partners, including state agencies and
academic institutions, the Gulf of Mexico Foundation, the Northern Gulf
Institute, the Hart Research Institute, the Nature Conservancy, and the
six Mexican states.
The Alliance is focused on planning, implementation, and management
at the regional level and has identified six priority issues that are
significant to the Gulf of Mexico Region and that can be more
effectively addressed through collaboration at state, local, and
federal levels. Each issue area has a team of scientists and resource
managers working to establish priorities and plans to address the most
pressing issues. These issue areas are:
Improved Water Quality for Healthy Beaches and
Shellfish Beds
Habitat Conservation and Restoration
Environmental Education
Ecosystem Integration and Assessment
Reducing Nutrient Impacts to Coastal Ecosystems
Coastal Community Resilience
The five U.S. Gulf state governors released the 1st Governors'
Action Plan for Healthy and Resilient Coasts in March 2006. That first
plan challenged the new Alliance partnership to make tangible progress
over the next 36 months. Ninety-six specific deliverables were
contained in Action Plan I, and 96% of them were accomplished over the
3-year span of the Plan.
Building on the success of the first Plan, the Alliance released
the second Governors' Action Plan in June 2009. The 2nd Plan is longer
and more aggressive and addresses some of the most pressing issues
affecting the Gulf of Mexico Region. The 2nd Action Plan is provided as
a handout.
The Gulf of Mexico Region continuing to demonstrate the power of
partnership, and other regions of the continental United States is
following our example. This national trend of regional ocean
partnerships is exemplified by the West Coast Governors' Agreement on
Ocean Health, the Great Lakes Regional Collaboration, the Northeast
Regional Ocean Council, the Mid-Atlantic Regional Council on the Ocean,
the Governors' South Atlantic Alliance, and the Gulf Alliance. The Gulf
Alliance, along with the other U.S. Regional partnerships, is working
closely with the Interagency Task Force established by President Obama
to develop a national plan for ocean governance and coastal and marine
spatial planning. The Gulf Alliance is also working closely with the
Interagency Work Group established by the President to assist with the
recovery and restoration of Mississippi and Louisiana following
Hurricane Katrina in August 2005. With respect to Katrina, in January
2006 Congress directed the Mobile District of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to develop a comprehensive plan to restore Mississippi. At
the direction of Gov. Haley Barbour and in my position of co-lead of
the Gulf Alliance, I worked closely with the Mobile Corps District to
ensure that the developed plan, the Mississippi Coastal Improvements
Program (MSCIP), was directly aligned with the goals and objectives of
the Gulf Alliance. MSCIP is complete, it has been signed by the
Secretary of the Army, and it has been presented to Congress. The cost
to fully implement MSCIP is $1.2 billion, and you have funded Phase 1of
the plan at the level of $439 million focused on restoring our barrier
islands and our coastal wetland and wildlife nursery areas. For that I
say thank you and I ask that you continue your support of Mississippi's
recovery and restoration through MSCIP.
The Gulf of Mexico Alliance is well positioned to play a
significant role in the current oil event in the Gulf. The Gulf
Alliance presently has teams of qualified people working together in
the Gulf working on the projects outlined in Action Plan II. These
folks have been working together now for almost nine years, and they
are in place to respond to the research, monitoring, and remediation
needs brought on by the Deepwater Horizon explosion and resulting
continuing oil spill. BP has pledged $500 million dollars to fund 10-
year research program focused on assessing long-term effects of this
event, putting appropriate remediation and recovery actions in place,
and monitoring the recovery of the Gulf Region once the event is over.
Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour, who presently serves as
gubernatorial lead for the Gulf Alliance, has made it clear to BP that
his expectation is that a significant portion of those funds is, in
fact, placed with the Gulf of Mexico Alliance. To date, two other Gulf
governors have joined to support Gov. Barbour's request. The remaining
two should place their support. Gov. Barbour also discussed this
situation with President Obama during the President's recent visit to
Mississippi. Placing these funds with the Gulf Alliance will ensure
that an appropriate, comprehensive, and meaningful research plan is
developed, that the region's best and brightest minds are brought to
bear on this issue, that the research will be carried out by competent
individuals familiar with and working in the region, and that the
result will be that the region will be ultimately restored to
conditions better than before the event occurred on April 20, 2010.
I ask for your consideration and support of using the support
pledged by BP to leverage funding already provided to the region by
NOAA, USEPA, USACOE, DOI/MMS, USDA and by Congressional action, to
allow the Gulf of Mexico Alliance to continue to make improvements in
the Gulf Region that will continue to result in improving the
environmental health, the economy, and the overall quality of life in
the Gulf of Mexico Region.

www.gulfofmexicoalliance.org

Thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony today.
______

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Dr. Walker, for your insight on
planning efforts by the State of Mississippi and the Gulf of
Mexico Alliance.
Ms. Fletcher, welcome back to the Committee, and please
proceed with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF KRISTEN FLETCHER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COASTAL
STATES ORGANIZATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Ms. Fletcher. Thank you. Chairwoman Bordallo, Ranking
Member Cassidy, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee,
good morning. It is a pleasure to be with you today.
My name is Kristen Fletcher and I am Executive Director of
the Coastal States Organization known as CSO. CSO represents
the interests of the Governors of the 35 coastal states and
territories on coastal, ocean, and Great Lakes issues. Thank
you for the opportunity to testify.
While the Deepwater Horizon blowout was not deliberate, it
is our obligation to be deliberate in our response to it, to be
bold in putting in place the resources, authorities, and plans
to reduce the chances for such an environmental disaster in the
future. CSO appreciates the leadership of this Subcommittee in
ensuring state authority and capacity to address natural
resource needs. It is time to renew this commitment to coastal
states' ability to plan, prepare, and respond to impacts from
energy development.
My testimony will focus on consistency review under the
Coastal Zone Management Act, also known as the CZMA, and how
that works with the Oil Pollution Act to enable a more thorough
planning and response effort. Examples from two oil spill
affected states--Alaska and California--will show why these
efforts are so critical. I will conclude with recommendations
for Federal actions.
The Coastal Zone Management Act consistency review serves
as a valuable tool for states to review Federal activities that
impact the coastal zone. This authority is even more vital in
light of the spill's impacts on coastal resources in the Gulf
and potentially beyond. A Gulf of Mexico leak, releasing
thousands of barrel of oil per day that may reach the coast of
South Carolina within the summer, is a prime example of the
interconnectedness of coast and ocean ecosystems and the need
for state review. Alaska's consistency review of OCS
exploration provides opportunities to prepare for the unique
arctic conditions in that state. California's bill response
standards were developed during state consistency review of oil
and gas activities, and served as a foundation for California's
Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act.
States integrate CZMA authority with requirements under the
Oil Pollution Act. Alaska has used authority from both statutes
in planning for potential blowout. The initial Deepwater
Horizon flow estimates were 1,000 barrels per day but are now
exponentially greater.
In Alaska's review of Shell's Chukchi Sea Exploration Plan,
there was not sufficient data to determine historical flow
rates from the well in question, so the state required that
Shell be able to respond to higher volumes of flow if the
actual flow rate increased.
When a spill occurs in California, the state ensures that
all affected resources are included in the assessment of
natural resource damages. In the past, California has requested
assessments for public access impacts, beach closures, and
tourism loss, in addition to natural resource damages, such as
fishery closures and wildlife losses.
This integration of CZMA and Oil Pollution Act authority
enables a more thorough state, Federal, and private response.
However, because state capacity is limited, CSO recommends the
following Federal actions:
First, because the CZMA plays such a vital role in
preparing for coastal emergency, the fact that it has awaited
reauthorization for 10 years reveals a crack in the foundation
of state preparedness. CSO recommends that Congress reauthorize
the CZMA.
Second, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act currently
provides a 30-day window for the review of OCS exploration
plans. States cannot conduct an effective consistency review in
30 days. CSO recommends that Congress extend the review period
to allow states to conduct proper reviews.
Finally, most states do not have the capacity to implement
their own inspection program of offshore platforms and have
relied on MMS inspection reports. CSO recommends that Congress
provide funds for states to participate in the MMS inspections
to enable a more thorough and objective review.
The Deepwater Horizon spill has starkly illustrated the
research needs and planning for and responding to spills. CSO
recommends that Congress call for enhanced research, including
boom technology that enables better environmental protection
and evaluation of the impacts of dispersants on natural
resources. CSO also recommends that Congress provide NOAA the
resources to serve as an oil spill portal for dissemination of
key information and lessons learned. A model portal has been
created by the Gulf Sea Grant Programs that have identified
spill-related research needs to pursue through their Gulf-wide
research program.
In closing, as someone who is inspired by the sea and a
former resident of both Alabama and Mississippi, it is my honor
to testify on how to prevent and prepare for a spill like the
one affecting the people, marine life and ecosystem of the Gulf
Coast. Thank you again for your leadership on these issues. I
welcome any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Fletcher follows:]

Statement of Kristen M. Fletcher, Executive Director,
Coastal States Organization

Chairwoman Bordallo, Ranking Member Brown, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, my name is Kristen Fletcher and I am
Executive Director of the Coastal States Organization. For the last 40
years, CSO has represented the interests of the Governors of the 35
coastal states and territories in Washington, DC on legislative and
policy issues relating to the sound management of coastal, Great Lakes,
and ocean resources. Thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding
state preparedness for offshore energy development and response. Please
include my written testimony in the record.
CSO recognizes the consistent leadership of this subcommittee in
ensuring that states have the appropriate authorities and resources to
address natural resource needs, especially on the coast. There is no
more critical time than now to renew this commitment to coastal states'
ability to plan, prepare and respond to impacts from offshore energy
development. While the Deepwater Horizon blow-out was not deliberate,
it is our obligation as a nation to be deliberate in our response to
it, to be bold in looking ahead and putting in place the resources,
authorities and plans in order to reduce the chances for such an
environmental disaster in the future.
My testimony on behalf of the coastal state and territory governors
will focus first on state planning efforts and existing authorities,
especially consistency review under the Coastal Zone Management Act and
how the CZMA works with the Oil Pollution Act to present a more
thorough planning and response effort. Second, I will offer
recommendations for federal action to assist the states. Both of these
points will be placed in context by examples from Alaska and California
showing why these efforts are so critical to state preparedness.
I. Planning Efforts and Existing Authority
While each U.S. coastal state has different planning and response
authorities, consistency review under the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA) serves as a valuable tool among the nation's 34 states with
approved coastal programs. Throughout the history of the CZMA, one of
the greatest incentives for states to participate in the nation's
coastal management program is the ability to review federal activities
in and beyond state waters that have an impact on the coastal zone.
This review indicates whether the project is consistent with the
state's coastal program and policies. This authority has become even
more vital in light of the spill and its myriad impacts on state
coastal resources - in the Gulf and potentially beyond. A Gulf of
Mexico oil leak releasing thousands of barrels per day that may reach
to the Northeast U.S. within a few months is a prime example of the
interconnectedness of coastal and ocean ecosystems and the need for
state review even if potential impacts seem unlikely.
CZMA consistency can be employed in a proactive manner to review
plans developed by the federal government in preparation for incident
response. The coordination role of state CZMA consistency coordinators
is also a valuable tool in the development or updating of those plans.
State coastal programs, through their partnerships with NOAA, are
uniquely set up to facilitate the coordination of government agency
technical staff, elected officials, and other stakeholders in
preparation for disasters such as these as well as natural disasters.
This coordination identifies available resources and potential needs
for additional resources for adequate, timely responses to such
incidents.
For example, CZMA consistency is a critical part of State of Alaska
review of Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas project proposals.
Within Alaskan waters, the issuance of permits, certifications,
approvals, and authorizations of the Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation establishes consistency with the Alaska Coastal Management
Program for oil spill planning. In federally administered lands and the
OCS, state environmental statutes and regulations serve as the basis to
determine consistency of proposed oil and gas activities. The CZMA
consistency review process for OCS oil and gas exploration provides
public input opportunities in order to fine tune spill contingency
plans so that they incorporate appropriate Arctic conditions into
response scenarios, and adequately address logistical obstacles that
could affect response capabilities.
California's federal consistency authority, as authorized by the
CZMA and the federally certified California Coastal Management Program,
has been very important for requiring offshore oil and gas development
projects to provide for systems safety and oil spill prevention and
response measures. The oil spill equipment and response standards
developed during the California Coastal Commission's CZMA federal
consistency review and approval of the offshore oil and gas platforms
during the 1980s provided a foundation for the development of
California's Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response
Act of 1990 and the implementation of its statewide regulations and
programs. The Coastal Act Policy 30232 compliments it by requiring:
``Protection against the spillage of crude oil, gas, petroleum
products, or hazardous substances shall be provided in relation to any
development or transportation of such materials. Effective containment
and cleanup facilities and procedures shall be provided for accidental
spills that do occur.''
II. Case Studies for Preparedness: OPA and the CZMA
A. Statewide Efforts
Both Alaska and California provide excellent case studies of
coordination, capacity, and lessons learned and demonstrate the
assistance needed from the federal government in order to better
prepare for emergencies related to offshore energy development. Much of
the current federal and state law regarding spill response in Alaska is
based upon the State of Alaska's experience with the Exxon Valdez oil
spill. State and Federal response and preparedness planning is guided
by the National Contingency Plan and state law.
As the law that establishes the federal response and supports state
responses, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) requires the
development of Area Contingency Plans. In Alaska, this applies to four
main regions. State law divides Alaska into ten separate regions for
spill response planning, which addresses the OPA requirements through
the publication and regular update of the Unified Plan. In addition,
Alaska has developed a number of specific spill response tools to
supplement the information provided in the Unified Plan. The Department
of Natural Resources is the lead agency for coastal zone management
plans and regularly coordinates with state resources agencies, coastal
district management plan representatives, cities and boroughs, Native
organizations, federal agencies, regional citizen advisory councils,
and the public.
Oil spill drills and exercises provide valuable opportunities to
identify gaps in response readiness and capability. In a large spill
incident Alaska's State On-Scene Coordinator works closely with the
U.S. Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency as part of the
Unified Command. In incidents where an oil spill is located outside of
state waters, but poses an imminent threat to state waters, Alaska is
notified by the U.S. Coast Guard and the two agencies work closely to
identify priority protection sites by coordinating them with both state
and federal agencies. A prime example of the coordination efforts
between state and federal agencies can be seen in the CANUS North Joint
Pollution Contingency Plan exercises in the Beaufort Sea north of
Alaska which includes state and federal agencies as well as Canadian
agencies and regional stakeholders. These exercises are held regularly
to improve joint response capabilities.
The California Office of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) is
the State's lead Trustee agency for natural resource damage assessment
(NRDA) and restoration. OSPR uses the federal NOAA NRDA process and
calculations developed under OPA 90. OSPR confers with the other state
and local agencies within California - e.g., Coastal Commission, State
Parks, State Lands Commission, Native American Council, Counties and
Cities - to ensure that all resources that may have been impacted by an
oil spill have been included in the NRDA. This coordination works well
to ensure that CZMA resources issues are adequately addressed in the
NRDA process. For example, in a past spill, the Coastal Commission
requested the addition of assessments for public access impacts, beach
closures, and tourism loss in addition to the already identified NRDA
impacts for seafood industry loss, fishery closures, oiled bird and
wildlife losses. After the NRDA process has reached litigation or
settlement, then the monies go to restoration projects with the federal
and state trustee agencies. The Coastal Commission, pursuant to the
California Coastal Act and as the CZMA representative for California,
is often involved in the development and review/permitting of post-oil
spill restoration projects in the coastal zone.
One example of the critical interplay between OPA and the CZMA is
the review of flow rates from an offshore well. The initial Deepwater
Horizon incident flow rate estimates were 1,000 barrels per day,
subsequently increased to 5,000 barrels per day, and now appear to be
greater than 25,000 barrels per day, possibly as great as 60,000
barrels per day. In Alaska's consistency review of Shell's Chukchi Sea
Exploration Plan, there was not sufficient well data to determine
historical well flow rates, so the state made the following requirement
a condition for finding Shell's Exploration Plan and C-Plan consistent
with Alaska standards: ``If the actual flow rate of a well exceeds
5,500 barrels per day, and Shell is to continue drilling, the response
planning standard (RPS) volume must be increased for subsequent
exploration wells drilled to an RPS volume taking into account the
actual flow rate of the well.'' The CZMA consistency authority
complements the requirements under OPA, allowing for a more thorough
state, federal, and private response.
B. Building Local Capacity
The CZMA enables effective local response as well. The Local
Coastal Program component of California's statewide program gives added
strength to the review and oversight of the onshore facilities
supporting offshore oil and gas development. The County of Santa
Barbara has certified Local Coastal Program policies and ordinances
that mirror and expand upon the Coastal Act's policies for resource
protection and oil spill prevention and response. The County's coastal
development permits for the onshore facilities supporting offshore oil
and gas development have explicit conditions for frequent inspections,
operation manuals, safety systems requirements, and oil spill
prevention and response requirements. As an example, the County's
System Safety Program requires monthly inspections of the onshore
facilities, and has public meetings for the review of oil and gas
facility safety deficiencies. The County also reviews all changes to
the oil spill contingency/response plans for the platforms, and all
changes to response equipment configurations.
In Alaska, two Regional Citizen's Advisory Councils were created
under OPA 1990 and both are quite actively engaged and involved with
oil spill response planning efforts in Prince William Sound and Cook
Inlet. A new Advisory Council for the Arctic Ocean would presumably
benefit planning efforts for that region of Alaska. Good coordination
also exists in Alaska among state and federal agencies including the
U.S. Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Minerals
Management Service. For example, oil spill drills and table-top
exercises are routinely coordinated among the state and federal
agencies, plan holders and response action contractors to demonstrate
competency with the incident command system procedures, communications,
planning, logistics, operations, equipment maintenance and tactics.
III. Recommendations for Federal Action
Even though the CZMA and OPA provide adequate authorities for
planning and response, the effectiveness of these statutes is limited
by limited capacity and resources. CSO recommends that Congress
consider updates to these laws along with federal assistance in
research and implementation.
A. Legislative Actions and Appropriations
As the CZMA plays such a vital role in planning for management of
coastal resources and responses to environmental emergencies such as
the Deepwater Horizon Spill, the fact that it has been overdue for
reauthorization since 2000 shows a crack in the foundation for state
preparedness. With unanimous support from its members, CSO issued a
draft bill in 2008 which provides for more thorough planning at the
state level, regional collaboration, and management of renewable energy
development. While the existing CZMA provides enough flexibility for
states to develop effective responses to a spill, the need for
reauthorization is evident.
With respect to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, it currently
provides a 30-day window for the review and approval of OCS Exploration
Plans. It is impossible for the CZMA state agencies to conduct a
federal consistency review within a 30-day window. CSO recommends that
Congress extend the 30-day review period to allow for CZMA state
agencies to conduct federal consistency reviews.
Finally, most states do not have the funds or staff to implement
their own inspection program of the offshore oil and gas platforms, and
therefore have relied on reports from the MMS inspection of the federal
platforms. CSO recommends that Congress provide funds for CZMA state
agency and applicable local government agencies to participate in the
MMS inspections of the offshore oil and gas operations to enable a more
thorough and objective review.
B. Research and Information Dissemination
The Deepwater Horizon spill has starkly illustrated the research
needs in the planning and response for oil spills. For example,
conventional containment and exclusion booms begin to fail when
currents exceed \3/4\ knots. This limitation makes spill containment
and protection of environmentally sensitive areas difficult if not
impossible. Many states need a deployable boom that operates
effectively in complex, high-velocity currents and high waves that are
frequently encountered in coastal environments. CSO recommends that
Congress call for enhanced boom technology that can operate in high
currents and in high waves.
In light of the heavy dispersant use in the BP Deepwater Horizon
oil spill, states and their citizens have concerns about the potential
adverse effects of dispersants on the ocean's sensitive ecosystem,
especially the deep ocean. CSO recommends that Congress provide for the
evaluation of the impacts of dispersants on natural resources in the
water column, at depth, offshore, nearshore and along the coast and how
it affects different life stages of finfish and shellfish. Such an
evaluation should include impacts of dispersants on the persistence of
oil in ecosystems due to oil settling and being re-suspended.
Alaska has particular needs in this area as applied research
efforts are needed to establish and distribute information about the
current best available technology for oil spill response activities
under Arctic and sub-arctic conditions. Examples include technology for
tracking oil spills under ice, blowout prevention, toxicity and
effectiveness of dispersants in cold, marine waters, in-situ burning
and other response techniques during broken ice conditions, and
improved weather and storm prediction in Arctic waters. Grants could
assist communities with spill protection of subsistence resources and
with planning, coordination and communication efforts. Federal funding
could help the U.S. Coast Guard acquire Arctic-capable assets and could
help construct port facilities in Arctic Alaska, which would improve
response capabilities and simplify planning logistics.
Finally, CSO recommends that Congress provide NOAA the resources to
serve as a Portal for Dissemination of Lessons Learned from BP Oil
Spill. As a result of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Gulf of
Mexico Sea Grant Programs' website (http:/gulfseagrant.tamu.edu/
oilspill/GMRP_oil_spill_research.htm) has posted an addendum of
research topics that will be added to its Gulf of Mexico Research
Program. The research topics include ecosystem impacts, community
resilience, fisheries, restoration post-spill, tourism, ecosystem
services, impacts from dispersants, displaced people and workers,
seafood industry, etc. The lessons learned from this research will be
beneficial to the coastal states and territories for oil spill
preparedness, response, recovery and restoration. This portal could
provide a valuable mechanism for coastal states to review and offer
input and could be paired with funding for NOAA or the Gulf States Sea
Grant Programs to hold research and policy conferences for the
information dissemination to other coastal states and communities.
Closing
In closing, thank you again for your leadership on these issues and
for inviting me to testify today. The coastal states and territories
look forward to continued work with committee staff, nongovernmental
partners, federal agencies and others to ensure healthy oceans in the
future. I welcome any questions you may have.
______

Response to questions submitted for the record by Kristen M. Fletcher,
Executive Director, Coastal States Organization

We appreciate the opportunity to elaborate on testimony offered on
June 24 on regarding state preparedness for offshore energy development
and response and the leadership of the Subcommittee on these issues.
Questions from Chairwoman, Congresswoman Madeline Z. Bordallo (D-GU)
1. Under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, coastal States are
required to have included in their Federally-approved coastal
management plans, a planning process for energy facilities in
the coastal zone, including a process for anticipating the
management of the impacts resulting from such facilities. Have
these planning efforts been adequate to respond to an oil spill
of this size and complexity? Should the Federal government
provide additional technical or financial resources to assist
coastal States for oil spill planning, logistics, response, and
recovery?
Although states use their oil spill and coastal management planning
processes to prepare for a catastrophic spill like the complexity and
magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon, there is no level of response
equipment and emergency preparedness planning that is sufficient to
effectively prevent the devastating impacts to the natural, economic,
and social ecosystems that will occur from a catastrophic ongoing spill
like the BP Deepwater Horizon well-blowout.
CSO does encourage additional financial and technical resources
from the federal government to ensure state and federal preparedness.
CSO recommends that Congress provide funds for CZMA state agency and
applicable local government agencies to participate in the MMS
inspections of the offshore oil and gas operations to enable a more
thorough and objective review. CSO recommends that Congress call for
enhanced boom technology that can operate in high currents and in high
waves, provide for the evaluation of the impacts of dispersants on
natural resources in the water column, at depth, offshore, nearshore
and along the coast and how it affects different life stages of finfish
and shellfish. The Arctic has particular needs in this area as applied
research efforts are needed to establish and distribute information
about the current best available technology for oil spill response
activities under Arctic and sub-arctic conditions. Federal funding
could help the U.S. Coast Guard acquire Arctic-capable assets and data
which would improve response capabilities and simplify planning
logistics. Finally, CSO recommends that Congress provide NOAA the
resources to serve as a Portal for Dissemination of Lessons Learned
from BP Oil Spill. The lessons learned from this research will be
beneficial to the coastal states and territories for oil spill
preparedness, response, recovery and restoration.
2. Your testimony makes clear that the Coastal Zone Management Act and
the Oil Pollution Act are complimentary, but it is not clear
how State and Federal contingency planning processes are
coordinated with industry planning processes? How are these
integrated and where can improvements be made?
Alaska provides a good example of the integration. While the state
notes that there is always room for improvement in any government-led
coordination effort, Alaska generally has good coordination and
participation among various governments and stakeholder groups for
planning efforts under both OPA and CZMA. The Department of Natural
Resources is the lead agency for coastal zone management plans and
regularly coordinates with state resources agencies, coastal district
management plan representatives, cities and boroughs, Native
organizations, federal agencies, regional citizen advisory councils,
and the public. Two Regional Citizen's Advisory Councils (RCACs) were
created under OPA 1990 and both are quite actively engaged and involved
with oil spill response planning efforts in Prince William Sound and
Cook Inlet. Councils like this one provide good examples for future
improvements toward integrated processes.
Furthermore, the Oil Spill Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) requires
the development of Area Contingency Plans for four main regions in
Alaska. State law divides Alaska into ten separate regions for spill
response planning, which addresses the OPA requirements through the
publication and regular update of the Unified Plan. In addition, ADEC
has developed a number of specific spill response tools to supplement
the information provided in the Unified Plan including: Spill Tactics
for Alaska Responders; Alaska Incident Management System Guide for
Response to Oil and Hazardous Substance Releases; Permits Tool; Tundra
Treatment Guidelines; Local Response Agreements; Statewide Hazmat Team
Program; Geographic Response Strategies and Potential Place of Refuge
documents; and Memoranda of Understanding/Memoranda of Agreement
between federal and state agencies. These elements are integrated with
other state planning efforts including coastal zone management.
The California Area Committee process is another example of
integration and specifically incorporates industry. The process has
developed three regional Area Contingency Plans that cover the entire
coast of California and all of San Francisco Bay. The process appears
to be working well in California for improving oil spill emergency
response planning efforts, improving coordination among government,
non-government organizations, and industry, and for incorporating
lessons learned from past spills. The Area Committees have been
actively meeting since the mid 1990s. The Area Committees are co-
chaired by the California OSPR and US Coast Guard and include
representatives from industry, non-governmental organizations, and
local state and federal agencies. Each Area Committee is responsible
for working with State and local officials to pre-plan for joint
response efforts, including appropriate procedures for mechanical
recovery, dispersal, shoreline cleanup, protection of sensitive
environmental areas, and protection, rescue, and rehabilitation of
fisheries and wildlife. Federal legislation can provide incentives for
this type of collaboration and integrated planning.
Pursuant to California's OSPRA 1990 and OPA 90, California's OSPR
and the US Coast Guard have implemented a comprehensive oil spill
drills and exercise program in California. Coordination among federal,
state, local agencies, environmental groups, and industry during oil
spill emergency response is continually being refined and improved as a
result of the frequent regional and statewide oil spill drills.
Pursuant to the California's OSPRA 1990, California's OSPR also has
implemented a comprehensive equipment deployment drills and exercise
program that routinely has announced and unannounced drills to test the
response capability of the oil spill response organizations (``OSROs'')
and owner/operator of vessels and marine facilities (e.g. marine
terminals, platforms, processing facilities) operating in California).
These drills and exercises test the capability for fast on-water
containment and recovery by requiring the OSROs and company personnel
to deploy oil spill response vessels and equipment (e.g., booms and
skimmers) within California's oil spill response timeframes (e.g., 30
minutes, 60 minutes, 2 hours, 6 hours).
California uses the federal US Coast Guard Incident/Unified Command
System for oil spill response. The central Unified Command consists of
the California Office of Spill Prevention and Response as the lead
State On-Scene Commander representing California, the US Coast Guard as
the Federal On-Scene Commander, and the Responsible Party. In
California, under the ICS there is also the Multi-Agency Coordination
group that consists of the other affected state, federal, and local
agencies - including the California Coastal Commission, Marine
Sanctuaries, and local governments--that is supposed to have a direct
dotted line of communication to the Unified Command in order to get
their respective agency concerns addressed. After the 2007 Cosco Busan
spill - and after much discussion and negotiation from Local
Governments--Local Governments may now have a representative directly
in the Unified Command to have direct input on response strategies for
their local resources. Local Government may now also be tasked
deploying boom to protect their local resources and coordinating the
volunteer function. The adding of local government representatives to
this federal/state/industry structure is also a potential area for
improvement.
The coordination role of state CZMA consistency coordinators is
also a valuable tool in the development or updating of those plans.
State coastal programs, through their partnerships with NOAA, are
uniquely set up to facilitate the coordination of government agency
technical staff, elected officials, and other stakeholders in
preparation for disasters such as these as well as natural disasters.
This coordination identifies available resources and potential needs
for additional resources for adequate, timely responses to such
incidents. The CZMA consistency review process for OCS oil and gas
exploration provides public input opportunities in order to fine tune
spill contingency plans so that they incorporate appropriate local,
state or regional conditions into response scenarios, and adequately
address logistical obstacles that could affect response capabilities.
The continued support for coastal management programs and
reauthorization of the CZMA is vital.
Questions from Ranking Republican Member, Congressman Henry E. Brown,
Jr. (R-SC)
1. In your testimony, you state that the 30-day window for the review
and approval of OCS exploration plans is insufficient. Why is
it impossible for states to conduct a federal consistency
review in 30 days? How much time does a state need to review
these plans?
Given the complexity of the plans and the importance of a thorough
review, states have indicated the preference for at least 90 days or up
to 180 days to review the plans. This is consistent with review
requirements at the state and federal level for plans with similar
levels of complexity.
2. If the federal government is properly fulfilling its inspection
responsibilities, why do states have to have their own
inspection of offshore oil and gas platforms that are permitted
in federal offshore waters?
CSO supports the states serving as an active partner with the
federal agency in its inspections, rather than introducing a separate
inspection into the process. CSO's recommendation that Congress provide
funds for CZMA state agency and applicable local government agencies to
participate in the MMS inspections of the offshore oil and gas
operations will enable a more thorough and objective review, including
from those most familiar with the local conditions and resources.
3. Do states now inspect platforms on the federal OCS? Why should
states inspect federal projects in federal waters?
Because most states do not have the funds or staff to implement
their own inspection program of the offshore oil and gas platforms,
they have relied completely on reports from the MMS inspection of the
federal platforms. Consistent with the rationale in the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972, because activities in federal waters have
impacts in state waters, there is an inherent state interest in those
activities. The Deepwater Horizon spill is a keen example of those
unintended impacts.
4. In the current fiscal year, the Congress has appropriated $67
million to the 29 states and 5 territories with approved CZMA
programs. How much of this money is spent on consistency
reviews? Isn't the overwhelming majority of this money spent on
the administrative costs of implementing the program?
The amount of federal dollars spent on consistency reviews and
program administration will vary with each state and territory
depending on how those funds are leveraged. However, facts indicate
that the $67 million appropriated to the state grant program is money
that is leveraged well and spent on a diverse range of coastal and
ocean priorities nationwide.
While a 2:1 match is required, most states match at a higher rate
than that, giving the federal government even more for its money. For
example, in 2008, states leveraged their federal funding and state
match to secure an additional 25% of investment for habitat, water
quality, hazards, and public access projects.
In South Carolina in FY '09, over $2.4 million (55% of the total
program) was spent on coastal habitat conservation and restoration. In
New Hampshire in FY '09, over $630,000 (30% of the total funding) was
spent on community and other technical assistance including on-the-
ground coastal hazard mitigation. In Virginia in FY '09, just under $1
million (20% of the total program) was spent on coastal water quality
protection including education of municipal officials and enhanced
nutrient removal technologies.
Finally, compared to the ocean and coastal economy that this
program supports, the $67 million appropriation does not match the high
value that the coastal states provide to the nation. Considering the
three states noted above, South Carolina's Ocean Economy in 2000 was
$1.4 billion, New Hampshire's was over $500 million, and Virginia's was
$3.89 billion.
5. Does your organization support Governor Bobby Jindal's proposal to
build 24 barrier islands to protect 130 miles of Louisiana's
fragile marshlands and beaches?
CSO does not have a position on Governor Jindal's proposal but
continues to serve as a resource for the coastal state Governors when
appropriate.
6. Would you agree that it was a mistake to dump nearly 500,000
gallons of dispersant into the subsurface waters of the Gulf of
Mexico without really knowing the short-term or long-term
impacts of this action?
CSO does not have a position on the use of dispersants; however,
CSO recognizes that states and their citizens have concerns about the
potential adverse effects of dispersants and recommends that Congress
provide for the evaluation of the impacts of dispersants on natural
resources in the water column, at depth, offshore, nearshore and along
the coast and how it affects different life stages of finfish and
shellfish.
7. Does your organization support the Obama Administration's decision
to establish a 6-month moratorium on deepwater exploration in
the Gulf of Mexico? What is the rationale for this moratorium?
CSO does not have a position on the moratorium and cannot speak to
the Administration's rationale for the moratorium.
8. You mention the importance of lessons learned and state that
federal and state laws in Alaska are based on the State's
experience with the Exxon Valdez. Did any other state implement
changes to their spill response programs based on the Exxon
Valdez incident?
While states enacted oil spill legislation at different times, most
of the West Coast states (Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and California)
established significant oil spill laws and regulations in the early
90s, based on the Exxon Valdez oil spill as well as other incidents.
They now require oil spill contingency plans, drills, and Certificates
of Financial Responsibility, among other things, and those requirements
are directed at facilities, tank vessels, and non-tank vessels. The
West Coast states also joined with the West Coast Canadian Province of
British Columbia in 1989 to form the Pacific States/British Columbia
Oil Spill Task Force, which provides a forum for them to coordinate oil
spill policies and programs, and to work cooperatively on issues of
regional concern.
In California specifically, the Exxon Valdez inspired the
California Legislature to enact legislation in 1990 called the Lempert-
Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention and Response Act (Act), which
covers all aspects of marine oil spill prevention and response in
California. In 1991, the California Department of Fish and Game, Office
of Spill Prevention and Response (OSPR) was established with the
primary authority in California to direct prevention, removal,
abatement, response, containment, and cleanup efforts with regard to
all aspects of any oil spill in marine waters of the state. The Act
established a fee on oil imported into California to fund more than 200
employees dedicated to the prevention of, response to, and recover from
oil spills. OSPR is the most robust state level oil spill program in
the nation. In addition, following the Cosco Busan oil spill in the San
Francisco Bay in November 2007, a number of legislative bills and
regulations were enacted to improve oil spill prevention and response
in California. The resulting changes/additions included training of
local government officials in oil spill response and management; grants
to local governments to provide oil spill response equipment; fishery
closure protocols; requirements for an Independent Drill Monitor to
evaluate certain aspects of out-of-state oil spill drills, shortening
of response times for on-water recovery; and adding 2 hour containment
requirements for identified Oil Pollution Risk Areas in the San
Francisco Bay and Los Angeles/Long Beach Harbors.
9. You state that oil spill drills and exercises provide valuable
opportunities to identify gaps in response readiness and
capability. To your knowledge, how often do states conduct
these drills? If they were conducted in the Gulf of Mexico, did
any states find gaps in their response readiness and
capability?
California Department of Fish and Game, Office of Spill Prevention
and Response (OSPR) conducts over 100 drills a year that test the
response readiness of oil spill contingency plan holders. The drills
are planned ahead of time for maximum effect and test the plan holder's
response structure and its ability to deploy response equipment. OSPR
also conducts unannounced drills that put companies 'on the spot' and
test their ability to make the proper notifications as well as deploy
equipment within a set amount of time. OSPR also conducts annual drills
that test oil spill response organizations (OSRO) on their capabilities
of responding with equipment necessary to clean specific amounts of
spilled product, within required time limits. The OSROs must pass these
drills to operate in California. In addition, OSPR tests and evaluates
the readiness and effectiveness of oil spill response strategies that
protect designated environmentally sensitive resources along
California's coast through our Sensitive Site Strategy Exercise
Program. These defensive actions are tested by site-specific exercises,
which involve the mobilization of an OSRO in a designated area and its
deployment of protective and oil recovery equipment. As of the 2nd
quarter of 2010, OSPR has evaluated 71 sensitive site strategies as
contained within the California Area Contingency Plans.
Coordination among federal, state, local agencies, environmental
groups, and industry during oil spill emergency response is continually
being refined and improved as a result of the frequent regional and
statewide oil spill drills.
CSO cannot respond to the question regarding gaps in the readiness
of the Gulf of Mexico state, although it supports a thorough review of
the federal, state, and industry responses to the Deepwater Horizon
incident so that all agencies and states may glean important lessons.
10. You stated that the CZMA and OPA provide adequate authorities for
planning and response, but the statutes are limited by capacity
and resources. What capacity and resources are necessary for
full implementation of these laws?
The programs under each of these statutes can benefit from
increased federal funding. For example, the Coastal Zone Management Act
funding has been level for much of the last decade. Accounting for only
inflationary increases, the state grants line would be $88 million this
year; it remains at or around $66 million. With the emerging challenges
of sea level rise and other climate change impacts, the capacity to
respond both day-to-day and in the case of an emergency is eroded.
11. Is it your view that we were victims of our own success, that
since we had not had an oil spill of this magnitude that
necessary research on dispersant use, boom technology and
usage, among other spill response research went unfunded?
Since 2000, there have been no fewer than 6 accidents in the Gulf
of Mexico which released oil into the natural environment. Decisions
have been made to dedicate funds toward developing technology to drill
in deeper and deeper areas. Unfortunately, funds toward research on
dispersant use, boom technology and other spill response techniques
were not priorities and did not keep pace.
Notably, the California Coastal Commission has not found state-of-
the-art systems safety features and oil spill prevention and response
measures to be effective in preventing oil spills or effectively
containing and cleaning up oil spills to avoid adverse impacts to
California's coastal zone resources. Experience in California has
shown, and continues to show, that human error and mechanical failures
can cause oil spills in spite of the most advanced system safety
technologies and programs. Even small oil spills, if close to shore,
can have devastating impacts on shoreline resources, even with rapid
response using best state-of-the-art booms and skimmers. Despite its
approval of 13 offshore OCS oil and gas development platforms, in each
case the Coastal Commission explicitly found that the oil spill
response measures did not meet the second test of Coastal Act Policy
30232 which requires ``Effective containment and cleanup facilities and
procedures shall be provided for accidental spills that do occur.''
______

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Ms. Fletcher, for
explaining the state's role in oil spill contingency planning.
Now it is my pleasure to introduce Mr. Barton. You can
begin your testimony.

STATEMENT OF MANLY BARTON, SUPERVISOR, DISTRICT 1, JACKSON
COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, PASCAGOULA, MISSISSIPPI

Mr. Barton. Thank you. I am Manly Barton. I am a District 1
Supervisor at Jackson County, Mississippi, Board of
Supervisors.
First, I would like to thank the Committee members for
allowing us to be here today and have input into this very
important issue.
Living on the Gulf Coast all my life, I have experienced
many disasters, mainly hurricanes, and the response and
recovery period for each of these has been different. It is
difficult to look at our current situation today and not
compare the current disaster response to that of Hurricane
Katrina five years ago, and we are still dealing almost every
week with issues that are still not resolved.
Disaster response today is not the same as the response of
20 years ago. Hurricane Katrina was a good test of the new
National Incident Management System, or NIMS, administered by
the Department of Homeland Security. This provider provides a
framework for Federal, state, and local governments to work
together in responding to major disasters. The process worked
well after Hurricane Katrina, bringing the resources and the
skilled people we needed to our county.
In my opinion, the key to that process working as well as
it did was communication from all the partners in the process,
the Federal, state, and local. The local partners know their
needs and should and do play an important role in that NIMS
process.
Because of our location on the Gulf Coast, we have had many
disaster events. The planning that was in place at the time of
the Deepwater Horizon event has provided an effective initial
response. But as we move forward, these plans need to evolve to
meet the changing needs of our local communities, the state,
and the region. We need to continue to emphasize
communications, and these are common issues between what I will
call our normal natural disasters and this current Deepwater
Horizon event.
The framework of a NIMS's management at the unified command
level appears to be working very well. Our current unified
command overseas the response and recovery efforts in Alabama,
Florida, and Mississippi. That is a large, very diverse area to
effectively manage. We are talking about three different
states, three different coastlines. We believe the event has
localized enough to warrant the full development of the state
area commands. Those area commands could then coordinate their
respective response plans under the direction of the unified
command, and this would give us a better, or this would better
customize the response and recovery efforts to the particular
needs of each state, and would improve the communications down
to the local level.
As far as the technical and financial resources that the
Federal Government might help with, there were two specific
things that came to mind.
On the technical side, we need personnel on site at the
local level that are trained in oil spill response and
recovery. If not on site, at least made available to us on some
as-needed basis. For example, as an elected official, I have
people almost every day that are coming to me saying that they
have the latest product that will solve all of our problems.
They will stop the oil, clean up and protect our shoreline. And
we are not--we just don't have the expertise to make those
calls. We need somebody with some expertise that can help us
through those evaluation processes.
Second, most emergency operation centers on the Gulf Coast
were designed and built many years ago under a very different
disaster response model. Most would be considered functionally
obsolete today.
The NIMS' process requires a greater number of personnel
involved in the response and recovery effort and the technology
needed today is quite different. Hurricane Katrina and the
Deepwater Horizon event have made us painfully aware that we
need to upgrade our facilities to manage these emergencies
successfully. We knew this after Katrina, and we certainly know
this today.
For communities still recovering from Katrina, several
million dollars, perhaps as much as $8 million for a new or
upgraded emergency operation center, is difficult to fund. This
is something that would help our county, it would help many of
our neighbors along the Gulf Coast still struggling to recover
from Hurricane Katrina, responding to the current Deepwater
Horizon event, and contending with yet another hurricane
season. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barton follows:]

Statement of Manly Barton, Supervisor, District 1,
Jackson County Board of Supervisors, Pascagoula, Mississippi

Overview
We have been asked to provide a local government's perspective on
coastal State planning for offshore events. Three plans have been
identified that should be in place for Mississippi: (1) An Area
Contingency Plan (ACP) which includes coastal Mississippi and is
implemented in conjunction with the National Contingency Plan (NCP)
under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990; (2) an independent State
contingency plan which is implemented in coordination with the relevant
ACP and the NCP; and (3) a State plan in its coastal management plan
required under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972.
Dr. William W. Walker will address the Area Contingency Plan in his
report. We can confirm specific action BP has taken at the request of
Mississippi. BP has installed boom at critical habitats early on and
has recently installed absorbent silt fencing at test sites. BP has
further hired contractors to deploy collections vessels and to collect
and dispose of oil material found on the barrier islands. Finally,
Mississippi directed BP to address small incidents of oil material
which managed to bypass the barrier islands.
Being from a county on the Gulf Coast, we have been the dubious
recipient of years of experience in multi-jurisdictional disaster
events. Two issues are common in our responses to these events and are
relevant to the success of our response to the current Deepwater
Horizon event: (1) the ability to adjust plans to meet the changing
needs of the event and (2) effective communication. To that end, the
planning in place at the time of the event has provided an effective
initial response. We find as we move forward that these plans need to
evolve to meet the changing needs of our state and that communication
needs to be emphasized.
While we offer some observations on the effectiveness of
Mississippi's ACP, we center our comments on the coordination of that
planning effort through the NIMS framework. We thought our value to
this hearing would be in our ability to compare the NIMS management of
this event with the NIMS management during our Katrina response and
recovery efforts:
Responses
1. Adequacy of these planning efforts to respond to an oil spill of
this complexity and magnitude.
The framework of NIMS management at the Unified Command level
appears to be set-up satisfactorily. However, we believe the event has
localized enough to warrant the full development and implementation of
State Area Commands under the direction of the Unified Command. We
discuss that in more detail in Response 2. Also, the lines of
communication between the upper level and the lower level of the
command structure could be improved. For instance, we are involved in
several conference calls throughout the day with several different
levels of command and various agencies. Especially early on, the
information was inconsistent and, in some cases, inaccurate. For
instance, boom deployment location and length differed from conference
to conference.
Also, this disconnect is magnified by the fact that the local level
coastal facilities are not capable of handling something of the
magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon event. Events like Deepwater Horizon
and Katrina involve multiple local, State and federal agencies. It is
imperative that each local facility has the necessary amount of
personnel on site with the necessary skill sets to address the issues
specific to that local area. However, many of the local emergency
management agencies operate in outdated facilities which do not have
sufficient capacity or infrastructure to house the required personnel
(NIMS) during a long-term, large-scale event. Thus, communication is
hindered because decisions are made elsewhere and local level
responders have to rely on ``outside'' communications for updates and
directives. As a corollary, today's agencies take advantage of the
latest technology. Many of the local facilities were built decades ago
and are not equipped with compatible support systems.
2. The sufficiency of the coordination amongst these planning efforts
and between different levels of government.
Again, communication--and coordination--is enhanced when those with
decision-making authority and those who are experts in the relevant
fields are onsite at the local level. Many general or broad decisions
are made at the Unified Command level which necessitates some
discretion at the lower level. As noted above, it would be most
beneficial if personnel with training specific to the event (e.g., oil
shoreline cleanup) were available to assist with the local planning and
recovery efforts. Also, we have experienced an improvement in the
transfer of some information. But, room for improvement still exists.
First, a good system exists for submitting requests. But, getting
clear, timely responses to some of those requests have been difficult.
Second, the current unified command does not include a branch for local
input and our local facilities do not accommodate a fully functional
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) set-up.
Irrespective of the current system, it would be more effective at
this point if State Area Commands were fully developed. Our current
Unified Command oversees the response and recovery efforts in Florida,
Alabama and Mississippi. Today, it is too spread out to effectively
manage the overall recovery along those three states' coastlines. We
recommend that each of the three states have fully implemented Area
Commands that can coordinate its respective response plan under the
direction of the Unified Command. This will better customize the
response and recovery efforts to the particular needs of each state and
will improve communications down to the local level.
As to the coordination of funding, the current structure is better
than the structure in Katrina. The current decision-making funding
process has fewer levels of hierarchy. The FEMA Public Assistance (PA)
program necessarily involves the State as the Grantee and the local
government as the Sub-Grantee. The PA program also involves reviews by
State analysts and the Office of Inspector General. The State plays a
significant role in the current event (primarily through MDEQ and MDMR)
and other agencies are heavily involved. However, we observe more
efficient decision-making and a more efficient funding process in the
current event than in the Katrina event.
3. Additional technical or financial resources that might be provided
by the Federal Government to assist coastal States for oil
spill planning, logistics, response, and recovery.
Two resources discussed above would assist us in the oil spill
planning, logistics, response and recovery: (1) personnel on-site at
the local level who are trained in oil spill response and recovery; and
(2) modern emergency operations centers built to meet FEMA 361
construction standards which can handle today's technology and
personnel required to successfully and efficiently manage long-term,
large-scale events like hurricanes and oil spills.
______

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Barton, for
informing us about the oil spill planning efforts in Jackson
County.
Next, it is my pleasure to introduce Mr. Menashes.

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW MENASHES, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
ESTUARINE RESEARCH RESERVE ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Menashes. Thank you, Chairwoman Bordallo, and members
of the Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify on behalf of
the state agencies and academic institutions that operate the
nation's 27 national estuarine research reserves.
I am Matt Menashes, Executive Director of the National
Estuarine Research Reserve Association. NERRA is dedicated to
the protection, understanding, and science-based management of
our nation's estuaries and coasts.
As you know, the Research Reserve System was authorized in
1972 under the Coastal Zone Management Act. The program is a
unique partnership between NOAA and state agencies and
universities to protect lands and waters for long-term research
and education purposes. As part of the CZMA, reserves play a
strong role in providing the science needed to effectively
manage our estuaries.
The five reserves along the Gulf of Mexico make up nearly
45 percent of the total acreage of the reserve system. With
such a significant amount of the system located around the
Gulf, we are concerned about the long-term impacts of this
spill on natural resources in the reserves and beyond. We have
recently seen oil impacts to the Grand Bay Reserve in
Mississippi, which is in Mr. Barton's district, and we hope we
can avoid damages to the other reserves along the Gulf.
My comments today are intended to highlight what our people
are experiencing and how those experiences can inform planning
efforts. First, let me talk about preparedness planning.
We have identified two key areas where we believe attention
needs to be focused to ensure we are prepared in the future.
First, we need to prioritize training for responding to oil
spills higher than we have. Our reserve managers and staff have
struggled to figure out HAZMAT training requirements and the
damage assessment process. Agencies need to ensure that
sufficient personnel are trained in HAZMAT procedures to
expedite booming and recovery operations, and NOAA needs to
invest more effort in resources and to providing training on
NRDA sampling prior to a spill. We have the infrastructure to
help our partners develop these capacities.
Second, preparedness requires continual improvement in
governmental coordination. Our reserves must be integrated into
area contingency plans and county emergency operation commands
should know where our reserves are. There must be incentives
for ACPs and EOCs to integrate coastal protected areas into
their planning.
In the area of contingency planning, we know that the cost
of restoring marshes and mangroves is exorbitant. The Coast
Guard needs the best information to develop contingencies that
protect these critical habitats. We need to ensure high
resolution special data about critical reserve habitats is
provided to the Coast Guard, and that boom deployment
strategies reflect that data. This will reduce costs and
increase restoration success rates by minimizing damage to
critical resources.
Because reserves are managed by state institutions, we
don't have the ability to mobilize personnel of the Federal
Government like our colleagues in marine sanctuaries and
wildlife refuges. NOAA should work with the states to identify
ways to deploy adequate personnel to reserves in times of
emergency.
I would also like to point out that the CZMA requires that
NOAA give priority consideration to research that uses the
reserves. We hope to work with NOAA to ensure that the agency's
post-spill research plans use the reserves for baseline and
applied research.
With regard to damage assessment planning, we are concerned
that personnel limits and a lack of funding will have a
negative effect on our ability to fully assess the damages to
reserve resources. This will affect NOAA's and the state's
ability to recoup the total value of damages for those
resources.
It is also our understanding that the NRDA biological
monitoring protocols were not sufficient for this spill, and
that there were duplicative Federal reporting requirements.
NOAA and the states need to collaborate ahead of time to
establish effective biological monitoring protocols, and the
Federal agencies need to develop one database for reporting. We
also need to do a better job of integrating existing data sets
into the damage assessment process.
Our experience to this point shows that our use of baseline
data are not being used. And in consideration of the scale of
this event, it incumbent upon Federal programs to reconsider
their long-term monitoring priorities. Congress should require
the reserve system, and the Integrated Ocean Observing System
for that matter, to consider adding hydrocarbon testing to
their current monitoring protocols.
On restoration planning, we believe that the Gulf of Mexico
Alliance could be the coordinating body for state restoration
efforts in the Gulf. The alliance has the established networks
and relationships and the experience to ensure interstate
coordination is carried out effectively.
On the Federal side, NOAA should align its Gulf of Mexico
regional efforts to recover from this spill. NOAA needs
dedicated staff on the ground in the region bringing together
their assets, like the reserves, the sanctuaries' Sea Grant
Coastal Programs more to create efficiencies and avoid
duplication.
I would also like to reiterate Kristen Fletcher's point.
CZMA has been overdue for reauthorization for 10 years. We must
reauthorize the CZMA and improve the reserve system. We will
work with the Subcommittee to explore areas to improve the
legislation.
Chairwoman Bordallo, we wish to express our condolences to
the families of the Deepwater Horizon workers who lost their
lives, and acknowledge that the livelihoods and quality of life
of many in the Gulf region are in jeopardy. Our efforts to help
restore the environment will draw inspiration from the strength
of the families who lost loved ones and the resiliency of the
people of the Gulf region.
I will be happy to answer any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Menashes follows:]

Statement of Matthew E. Menashes, Executive Director,
National Estuarine Research Reserve Association

Thank you Chairwoman Bordallo, Ranking Member Brown, and Members of
the Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the state
agencies and academic institutions that operate the nation's 27
National Estuarine Research Reserves (reserves) about planning
standards for offshore energy development in the context of the oil
spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.
I am Matt Menashes, Executive Director of the National Estuarine
Research Reserve Association (NERRA). Our association was founded in
1987 by the state and academic institutions that operate the reserves.
NERRA is dedicated to the protection, understanding, and science-based
management of our nation's estuaries and coasts.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify, and on behalf of NERRA's
members, want to express our appreciation to the committee for focusing
this hearing on planning issues. While we know that Americans right now
really just want someone to stop the oil spill, the reality is that
what was needed, and what is still needed, is to have effective plans
in place before disasters like this happen. Planning is what we do in
order to reduce risks in the first place. Planning is what we need to
ensure effective response when something happens. Effective planning is
an obligation we owe to our communities so we can recover quickly when
disaster strikes. Planning is absolutely required in order for us to
execute our responsibility, and the trust we hold, to protect and
restore the environment.
As you know, the National Estuarine Research Reserve System
(reserve system) was authorized in 1972 under the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA). The program is a unique federal-state
partnership which brings the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) together with state agencies and universities to
protect lands and waters for long-term research and education purposes.
NOAA and reserve staffers collaborate to provide education, training,
and stewardship programs that ensure the protection of these wonderful
places while advancing our collective understanding of how estuaries
function. As part of the CZMA, the reserves play a strong role in
providing the science needed by coastal managers at the local, state,
and federal levels to effectively manage our estuarine and coastal
resources.
The five reserves in the Gulf of Mexico make up nearly 45 percent
of the total acreage of the reserve system. The Rookery Bay reserve in
Florida, designated in 1978, has over 110,000 acres. The Apalachicola
reserve in Florida, designated in 1979, has over 246,000 acres. The
Weeks Bay reserve in Alabama, designated in 1986, has just over 6500
acres. The Grand Bay reserve in Mississippi, designated in 1999, has
over 18,400 acres, and the newest reserve, Mission-Aransas in Texas,
designated in 2006, has over 186,000 acres. With such a significant
amount of the total system located in the Gulf of Mexico, we are
obviously concerned about the long-term impacts of this spill on
natural resources in the reserves and beyond.
Perhaps the best way to put our concerns into context is this;
staffs at our two Florida Gulf coast reserves have been working for
over 30 years to improve the condition of their estuaries. They conduct
research, educate citizens, and provide science-based information to
decision-makers at all levels of government. They work on some of the
most pressing long-term environmental questions in the Gulf region,
from freshwater requirements for Gulf coast oysters to restoration of
the Everglades. In just over 60 days, though, 30 years of effort could
be lost from one short-term event with highly destructive, long-term
consequences.
My comments today are intended to highlight what our people on the
ground in the Gulf of Mexico region are experiencing and how those
experiences can inform planning efforts so that we are more efficient,
and respond faster in a coordinated way, in response to future events.
I want to assure the committee that our members will continue to
work with their federal, state, and local partners to ensure that the
research we conduct, and the training and education we provide, are
integrated into preparedness and contingency plans at all levels of
government and across the country. I also want to let you know that we
recognize that what is happening in the Gulf now will most likely
change our program's emphasis in the Gulf of Mexico for years to come.
We will conduct careful assessments, we will secure the necessary
resources, we will do the research, and we will restore the reserves
while helping others in region restore the Gulf.
Our recommendations are included in this testimony and are
summarized at the end.
Preparedness Planning
Nobody was prepared for an incident of this magnitude, including
our members and their federal partners. While there were gaps in
planning and issues of coordination have arisen and will continue to
arise, our members are extremely grateful for the support they have
received from federal partners at NOAA, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG),
and the Department of the Interior in particular. In a time of crisis,
the level of professionalism that has been shown time and time again by
our federal partners is testimony to efforts undertaken at all levels
of government to improve coordination and efficiency. In particular,
our members in the Gulf and I want to commend our partners at NOAA's
Estuarine Reserves Division for their efforts to coordinate the
reserves' response to the spill.
We have identified two key areas where we believe attention needs
to be focused to ensure adequate preparedness planning is in place.
First, it is clear that we need to prioritize outreach and training for
responding to oil spills higher than we have. The severity of oil
spills in the coastal and marine environment requires us to rethink our
training priorities. This is particularly clear when weighing the
severity of spills against the short time periods during which oil
spills cause damage. The risks are too great not to prioritize oil
spill training.
A couple of recent examples speak to the reserves' abilities to
facilitate training and outreach. The Rookery Bay reserve in Florida
held a workshop with the USCG for over 70 organizations and agencies
working on the spill to facilitate increased coordination and training.
The Rookery Bay staff was able to pull the workshop together within 48
hours because of their connections to networks of coastal resource
managers in the state. In addition, our Weeks Bay, Alabama, and Grand
Bay, Mississippi, reserves collaborated with the Sea Grant institutions
in the region on outreach workshops for local communities. Our people
know the players and their communities, and can assist agencies at all
levels in training and outreach.
We need to think about opportunities for NOAA and the USCG to
provide training to local and state level officials, including senior
level officials, on larger scale events like this one. There are
planning lessons from Department of Defense-style ``all hands'' drills
that should become part of the way we do business in coastal
management, particularly as we look more and more at the ocean and our
coastal areas as ways to meet our energy needs.
Our experiences during this crisis highlight several areas where we
believe better coordination between federal agencies and our staff for
training can have a significant impact in the short-term:
1. Hazardous materials (hazmat) and hazardous waste operations
(hazwoper) training. It is clear that the availability of
trained hazmat and hazwoper workers has been an issue facing
incident commanders. While we recognize that all spill
responses are unique, some standardization will allow workers
to be better prepared. The states have been struggling to
figure out hazmat training requirements. It is my understanding
that there is a lot of misinformation about the requirements
for who needs training and for how long it has to be. It is
also my understanding that this information is changing on a
week-to-week or sometimes daily basis. Congress and the federal
agencies need to ensure that sufficient personnel are trained--
or available to provide training--on short notice in order to
quickly ramp-up booming and oil recovery operations. We have
the infrastructure to help our partners develop this capacity.
From classrooms and auditoriums to other site-based
infrastructure like storage areas and hazmat labs, many of our
facilities make ideal locations for this type of training.
Technical staff at the reserves already provide training
programs for coastal managers, local decision-makers, and the
public on a regular basis and can easily gear up for a focus on
hazardous materials. Strong networks of potential clients for
such training and excellent outreach capabilities exist at our
reserves. We believe Congress could require that NOAA and other
federal agencies take advantage of the investments already made
in the reserve system and quickly generate new capacity for
such training.
2. Natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) training. Nothing
delays governmental response more than the confusion that
results from a steep learning curve. As we have seen with this
spill, reserve staffers and agency managers were temporarily
hamstrung while they learned how the NRDA process worked. In
addition to basic, recurring training on how NRDA works, NOAA
needs to invest more effort and resources into providing
training on NRDA sampling before a spill occurs. With limited
resources and personnel, it is more efficient for such training
to be done before a spill occurs, so that in the thick of a
disaster, staff can be doing the assessments rather than
learning how to do the assessments. Standardization of basic
NRDA sampling protocols would allow sampling to begin
immediately after an incident. Each day of delay in assessing
resources puts information useful to the restitution process at
risk. I do want to point out that an excellent web-based
seminar, given each day, was developed by NOAA to guide
sampling teams through data entry formats, photo and global
positioning system (GPS) documentation. Due to the rapidity of
the response in the early days, however, some of our first
sampling crews were not able to participate in this training
prior to sampling.
3. Incident Command System (ICS) training. Many reserve
managers and staff have been deployed to the incident command
center. This training would be extremely valuable to explain
the incident command process and the role of each team member.
There is a free online course from FEMA that should be
recommended to all natural resource managers.
4. Shoreline Cleanup and Assessment Team (SCAT) protocol
training. While some of our reserves and states are now trained
for shoreline cleanup and assessment, we recognize that reserve
staff and other natural resource managers should be trained in
these protocols before a spill occurs.
Second, we believe preparedness requires continual improvements in
coordination between all levels of government. The people who work in
the reserve system understand the importance of maintaining
relationships with different levels and agencies of government. Our
unique model, the federal-state partnership with NOAA, requires us to
coordinate with the federal government on an almost daily basis. Our
role in our communities is to support local decision-making with
scientific information, and we work with our county government and town
councils regularly. We cannot, however, claim that we maintain
relationships with every federal and local official involved in
preparedness planning. For instance, Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) are
developed by the USCG in coordination with county-level Emergency
Operations Commands (EOCs). We are not confident that each of our
reserves is integrated into ACPs or known to county EOCs. We do not
believe that county level EOCs regularly engage with the resource
managers in coastal areas. There must be some type of incentive, or
mandate, for ACPs and EOCs to integrate coastal protected areas into
their planning efforts. While some of our reserves were involved to
varying degrees with ACP efforts, it has become obvious that many local
entities were not. This causes some local efforts to be fragmented.
Training and inter-governmental coordination are just two areas for
Congress to examine as we look to improve our preparedness planning. We
believe these are areas where small investments or minor policy changes
can lead to significant change in a short time frame.
Contingency Planning
What we have learned from this event is that even the best
processes and planning can sometimes marginalize good information.
While we fully support the centralized response planning model, we
recognize that the model has its limits. Plugging our people, our
program, and our data into this model can be difficult.
As an example we do not believe that our principal federal partner,
NOAA, is recognized for their expertise in some state-level contingency
plans. The reserves are a unique natural resource. While these sites
are owned and operated by the states and sometimes local governments in
a networked model, NOAA has significant natural resource trust
authority for reserve resources. If state plans do not account for
NOAA's role in the reserves, and if contingency plans for protecting
reserve resources are not well established, we believe both the federal
and state partners will be limited in successfully preventing injury to
reserve resources or in negotiating effective settlements with
responsible parties.
Contingency planning requires the ability to anticipate what could
happen and develop plans for multiple scenarios. It also requires the
ability to adapt to changing conditions on the ground. Primarily,
however, contingency planning requires excellent information. We now
recognize that reserve management and staff have not been sufficiently
plugged in to the USCG's ACPs.
As an example, reserves now generally have high resolution spatial
data about critical habitats that is a significant advancement over the
data we had just five or 10 years ago. We need to ensure this
information is provided to the USCG and that boom deployment strategies
reflect it. As the USCG makes decisions about where to deploy boom,
their highest priority must be on protecting fragile coastal wetlands
including marshes and mangroves. We don't think anyone will argue that
the cost of restoring marshes and mangroves is exorbitant, and that
such restoration is not often highly effective. By using booms to push
oil to less fragile areas, incident commanders can more effectively
deploy a limited number of skimmers and help ensure oil does not get
into sensitive areas in the first place. Having the best scientific
information available for contingency plans will reduce costs and
increase success rates for restoration.
NOAA and the state agencies that manage the reserves need to ensure
that the USCG regularly updates boom deployment strategies in ACPs
based on the latest scientific information about our reserve resources,
and also do so in consultation with local communities. We know, for
example, that our reserves in Florida were actively involved in
creating ACPs for the resources they manage. Staff identified and
mapped boom placement locations, sensitive resources, and oil recovery
locations. We cannot say with certainty, however, that all 27 reserves
have had this level of involvement in ACP development. We encourage the
USCG to be clearer with federal and state partners about the process
for updating ACPs. We encourage these agencies to consider an annual
updating process that reaches out to coastal resource managers in the
reserve system and other programs. We also request that the USCG engage
the right people in these tasks by working with existing networks of
coastal managers and marine protected area managers to deliver
information in a timely fashion. We believe there is an opportunity
through the reserve managing agencies and NOAA to regularly update
incident command centers regarding reserve resources to ensure that
effective planning is in place before a spill happens. We recommend
that NOAA develop guidelines for reserve managing agencies to
coordinate with the USCG. We also recommend that NOAA and the USCG
report to Congress their progress on this issue.
We believe county-level EOCs must be incentivized to engage with
the coastal management community on contingency planning. We don't
believe there is currently an effective mechanism to ensure this
happens. Oftentimes, EOCs do not have connections with the marine
protected area and coastal management networks. We believe our reserve
staff can assist county EOCs in building these relationships.
Earlier I noted that contingency planning requires the ability to
adapt to changing conditions. While we do have some concerns about
improved coordination with the USCG, we have found that they are
willing to make adjustments based on new information we develop and
provide. We would like to commend them on their flexibility during this
difficult time.
For short-term, highly destructive events, whether an oil spill or
a hurricane, we need federal policy to strengthen our ability to react
and protect the resources we have been entrusted with. As research
reserves, we also need the ability to study and understand what is
happening to our resources so that we can inform future scenarios and
planning. Our capacity is highly limited by the lack of immediate
access to contingency funds and staff. NOAA currently does not have the
ability to provide significant resources to reserves to undertake
contingency efforts for staffing, response, research, or restoration.
We believe that Congress should consider establishing a method for NOAA
to provide contingency funds and staffing to its state agency partners
who manage the reserves. Several examples are described below.
With regards to this spill, we are finding that some funding for
contingencies is available but that some of our financial needs are not
being met. While our reserves are getting what they need to conduct
NRDA hydrocarbon sampling, we believe there are funding gaps with
regard to biological inventory needs. NERRA has advocated for an
additional $2.5 million for wildlife assessments at the reserves. To
date we have not received this funding. We recognize that the federal
government or the states will ultimately be reimbursed by the
responsible party, yet without dedicated funding right now to conduct
the work we cannot even get these studies underway. This is
particularly exacerbated by state budget crises. We are concerned that
the damages assessed on the reserves will be undervalued if we do not
have the funding necessary to conduct the additional survey work
needed.
In addition, because these sites are managed by state governments,
or in some cases by state universities, we don't have the ability to
mobilize the personnel resources of the federal government like our
colleagues in the National Marine Sanctuaries or National Wildlife
Refuges. Reserves are among the few site-based programs within NOAA's
portfolio. The agency should work with states to deploy adequate
resources to these special places in time of emergency. We have no real
option for bringing in colleagues with experience in oil spills from
reserves in other states to assist in our efforts. There is also no
current option for NOAA to assign people to our reserves to assist
during events like this. We believe Congress should require NOAA to
develop the interagency personnel agreements that would allow the
agency to facilitate additional staffing for reserves facing large-
scale events. We need this type of procedure in place as part of our
contingency planning efforts.
Additionally, there are currently no resources available to our
reserves for research on the oil spill, nor when significant research
opportunities present themselves from other anomalous events. We
believe this is a significant problem for a network of sites
established specifically for research purposes. To give you an example,
after Hurricane Andrew in 1993, we were presented with an excellent
research opportunity to understand the impact of the storm on
mangroves. Yet we had an extremely difficult time accessing funding
following the event. Many research opportunities were lost that could
have advanced contingency planning for future storm events. While BP
has provided millions of dollars to academic research institutions in
the Gulf, and will provide more, there is no current funding for
research reserve staff to access for monitoring and impact research. I
would also like to point out that the CZMA requires that NOAA, in
conducting or supporting estuarine research, give priority
consideration to research that uses the reserve system. Even if no
direct funding is available to reserve staff to conduct research, we
believe the CZMA requires NOAA to prioritize the use of the five Gulf
coast reserves for research on this spill. We hope to work with NOAA to
ensure that the agency's post-spill research plan gives that priority
consideration to the reserves.
We believe there needs to be a way for NOAA to get resources to the
reserves for the important contingency and research work needed in the
face of dramatic events like a spill or a storm. We urge Congress to
consider establishing a contingency funding mechanism for the reserve
system.
Damage Assessment Planning
While the natural resource damage assessment process appears to be
advancing, there are some areas where we have concerns. Our concerns
should be considered in the context that this spill is, hopefully,
anomalous.
Twenty years of NRDA experience following the Exxon Valdez oil
spill has provided the states and NOAA with many of the tools to
effectively assess damages to marine and coastal resources. We support
a process of continual, iterative improvement so that we can generate
excellent information while finding program efficiencies. Right now we
do not have the luxury to change course in mid-spill. But there are
some initial lessons that we believe could help improve the process
later.
We must recognize that NOAA does not have enough personnel to
effectively manage a spill of this size. This is not a criticism of
NOAA; it is just the reality of federal spending priorities developed
over many years. Our people report that they have had little
interaction with NOAA's office that is responsible for damage
assessments. We are concerned that this will have a negative effect in
the future on NOAA's and the states' ability to recoup damages from the
responsible party for all reserve resources. Reserves are NOAA trust
resources and the agency has a responsibility to the states to ensure
that the settlement from this spill reflects the full extent of damages
to these resources. We believe NOAA should be prioritizing reserves for
additional attention and study.
We also must recognize that sampling is expensive. While it is
convenient to think that the responsible party will pay for sampling
and other assessments, the reality is that we cannot recover the lost
time, the program delays, and other direct and indirect costs
associated with shifting labor away from our principal activities to
NRDA sampling. These are costs we will never recover. Federal policy
needs to address the costs incurred by agencies during catastrophic
events as part of the restitution process.
Sampling is also highly complex. NRDA protocols were established
following the Exxon Valdez spill, but it is our understanding that they
have not been thoroughly updated in about 20 years. The protocols that
were originally provided for sampling were generally relevant to the
biogeography of the Gulf of Mexico, but some were not. For instance,
biological monitoring protocols were not sufficient for this spill. I
have been told that there were no approved protocols beyond benthic
invertebrate and tissue sampling. NOAA and the states need to
collaborate ahead of time to establish effective biological monitoring
protocols. We are concerned that the efforts now underway to refine
biological monitoring and sampling protocols were not done before the
spill happened; this should take place as part of the preparedness
process.
Conducting proper assessments requires good information on what
protocols to use, quick access to trained people and equipment, and
most importantly sufficient laboratory capacity. Immediately after the
spill, reserve managers and staff were asked whether they could quickly
begin NRDA sampling. At that time our people had no sampling kits, no
training, and were expecting oil to wash ashore within hours. We did
the best we could in these conditions. It is my understanding that
sampling protocols, though available on the web, were password
protected. Sampling protocols made their way into our people's hands
via email chains. As protocols changed, our people were left guessing
whether they had the latest information on how to do the work. If our
goal is to get people up and sampling in short time frames, sampling
protocols must be made widely available so that state and county
personnel can get the right information in a timely manner.
The lack of access to equipment also likely delayed sampling by a
few days. Luckily, weather patterns minimized oil washing ashore,
granting us sufficient time to get sampling underway.
Another concern is that some of the early sampling we conducted was
lost due to the lack of analysis capacity at laboratories. We know that
one of our reserves has had to resample some areas due to this problem.
The laboratory backlog has apparently eased, but plans should have been
in place to prepare laboratories much sooner. A network of third-party
labs that can be immediately engaged for damage assessment analyses
should be established.
Database management and quality assurance protocols should be
developed and should be in place on the first day of a spill. These
protocols should be designed and properly staffed for rapid
implementation and deployment. While the sampling is happening and is
now highly coordinated, we believe there are duplicative requirements
being placed on reserve staff by having to report monitoring and
sampling data to two different federal agencies through two different
reporting systems. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and NOAA
have different responsibilities for damages arising from the spill and
personnel are being asked to provide data through EPA's SCRIBE site and
to a NOAA FTP site. We should do our best to create efficiencies and
eliminate this additional burden on them, especially given the already
long hours that are being worked in response to the spill. We are
concerned that the agencies had coordinated on one data network and
that this might result in some data being in one location and not the
other. I have received recent information, though, that these issues
are being resolved.
We also need to do a better job of integrating existing data sets
into the damage assessment process. In a time of limited resources,
existing data, particularly data that is acquired in a consistent
manner over long-time periods, can and should be used in NRDA. Our
experience with the NRDA process to this point shows that years of
baseline data we have developed are not being used. Whether it is data
collected by the reserve system's long-term monitoring program or the
detailed spatial data we have collected, these data needs to be
integrated into damage assessments. This will require NOAA and the
states to develop a plan for using and sharing these data. It will also
require NOAA to update their ESI maps on a more frequent basis with
data collected by the reserves and others in the coastal management
community.
Finally, in consideration of the scale of this event, it is
incumbent upon programs to reconsider their long-term monitoring
priorities. While it may be hard for us to currently envision
hydrocarbon testing as a key protocol for the reserve system's long-
term monitoring program, or for the Integrated Ocean Observing System
(IOOS) network for that matter, we need to consider this as an option.
Congress should require both of these programs to consider adding
hydrocarbon testing to their current monitoring programs. By
establishing long-term trend data for hydrocarbons in the coastal and
marine environment through the reserve system and IOOS, we can help
reduce the burden on hydrocarbon sampling in the future. NOAA should be
required to weigh the costs of these additional sampling regimes
against the risks associated with major spills and the assessment
process. At minimum, however, we need to be better prepared to conduct
hydrocarbon testing in the event of a spill regardless of its
magnitude.
Restoration Planning
Restoring the Gulf will happen, but it will take many years. As we
prepare for what many are calling the largest environmental restoration
effort in history, we believe there are actions that can be taken now
to improve the ability of states and the federal government to ensure
restoration happens in a coordinated and efficient manner.
NOAA and the administration have spent significant time over the
past 18 months focused on regional ocean governance. We support this
effort and believe the Gulf of Mexico Alliance could be the
coordinating body for efforts in the Gulf. The alliance has the
established networks and relationships, and the experience to ensure
this process is carried out effectively. It will also provide the best
opportunity to highlight the value of regional ocean and coastal
governance, a direction that we support.
In support of regional governance, we now believe that NOAA should
realign its efforts for Gulf of Mexico regional issues with a primary
emphasis on spill recovery. We believe the agency needs a dedicated
staff, on the ground in the region, focused on bringing together NOAA
resources for the long-term recovery of the Gulf. This group needs to
bring together NOAA assets like the reserves, the National Marine
Sanctuaries, Sea Grant institutions, state coastal management programs,
the Coastal Services Center, the Restoration Center, the National
Weather Service, and more and focus on finding efficiencies and
avoiding duplication. They should be given direct access to the NOAA
administrator or a senior designee, have significant budgetary
authority, and a clear mandate to leverage all of NOAA's resources for
restoring the Gulf. The team should be focusing NOAA resources on
coordinated education and training, research and monitoring, and direct
restoration activities. It is our understanding that NOAA is currently
coordinating regional oil spill activities through a regional fisheries
service official. This will not work for Gulf recovery. Fisheries
service staffers have full-time, highly visible jobs to begin with. We
cannot expect them to take on this type of additional task. There needs
to be a dedicated leader with a dedicated regional staff.
We also believe that the federal interagency Estuary Restoration
Council, currently led by NOAA, should be charged with coordinating the
interagency restoration activities that will occur in the Gulf. The
council, established under the Estuary Restoration Act, can be a model
for interagency collaboration and coordination on restoration efforts.
We need to ensure that all habitat restoration projects are planned
to take into account the need to advance restoration science.
Restoration plans must include community input and outreach,
incorporate long-term monitoring, and many of the other principles
identified in the report Principles of Estuarine Habitat Restoration by
Restore America's Estuaries and the Coastal and Estuarine Research
Federation. Our research reserves can provide reference sites, long-
term monitoring protocols, and training for community leaders on
restoration activities.
Coastal Zone Management Act
The National Estuarine Research Reserve System is authorized under
Section 315 of the CZMA, which as you know, has been overdue for
reauthorization since 2000. NERRA believes this spill underscores the
importance of reauthorizing the Coastal Zone Management Act and
improving the reserve system. We will work with the Subcommittee to
explore areas to improve the legislation so that in the event of
another catastrophe, the reserve system is prepared.
Summary of our Recommendations
1. All levels of government need to place higher priority on
oil spill training. Our reserves can assist in providing
training through the Coastal Training Program and also provide
infrastructure for other trainers.
2. Federal policy should provide incentives for, or mandate,
ACPs and EOCs to integrate coastal protected areas into their
planning efforts.
3. NOAA should collaborate with the reserve managing
agencies/universities to develop guidelines for coordination
with the USCG. NOAA and the USCG report to Congress their
progress on this issue.
4. Congress should consider establishing a method for NOAA to
provide contingency funds and staffing to its state agency
partners who manage the reserves. Congress should require NOAA
to develop the interagency personnel agreements that would
allow the agency to facilitate additional staffing for reserves
facing events like this.
5. NOAA should prioritize reserves for additional attention
and study during and after oil spills by NOAA scientists and
other researchers.
6. Federal policy needs to address the costs incurred by
agencies during catastrophic events as part of the restitution
process.
7. NOAA and EPA should coordinate and use one data network
for NRDA sampling.
8. NOAA and the states must develop a plan for using and
sharing reserve baseline data prior to spill and during the
NRDA process. This will require NOAA to update ESI maps on a
more frequent basis with data collected by the reserves and
others in the coastal management community.
9. NOAA should be required to weigh the costs of additional
hydrocarbon sampling for existing long-term monitoring programs
against the risks associated with major spills and the costs of
the assessment process. At a minimum, we need to be better
prepared to conduct hydrocarbon testing in the event of a spill
regardless of its magnitude.
10. The Gulf of Mexico Alliance should play an active role for
Gulf restoration by coordinating state and local activities and
working with federal partners.
11. NOAA should develop a regional office for the Gulf of
Mexico charged with coordinating the agency's role and assets,
including the reserves, in the oil spill recovery and
restoration process.
12. The interagency Estuary Restoration Council should be
given a mandate to improve federal interagency coordination on
Gulf oil spill restoration.
13. Restoration plans must include community input and
outreach, incorporate long-term monitoring, and many of the
other principles identified in the report Principles of
Estuarine Habitat Restoration by Restore America's Estuaries
and the Coastal and Estuarine Research Federation.
14. The CZMA must be reauthorized. NERRA will work with the
Subcommittee to ensure that the reserve system is strengthened,
particularly in the area of preparedness and planning related
to large-scale incidents like this.
Finally, Chairwoman Bordallo, Ranking Member Brown, and Members of
the Subcommittee, on behalf of the more than 400 people who work at the
National Estuarine Research Reserves and our many not-for-profit
partners, we wish to express our condolences to the families of the
Deepwater Horizon workers who lost their lives in this incident. We
also want to recognize the impacts to the people of the Gulf region
whose livelihoods and quality of life are in jeopardy. Our efforts to
help restore the environment will draw inspiration from the strength of
the families who lost loved ones and the resiliency of the people of
the Gulf region. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
______

Response to questions submitted for the record by Matthew Menashes,
Executive Director, National Estuarine Research Reserve Association
(NERRA)

Questions from Chairwoman, Congresswoman Madeline Z. Bordallo (D-GU)
1. In addition to including reserve managers in an annual updating
process of the area contingency plans, what else could be
included in NOAA guidelines to ensure that reserve managers are
part of the planning process?
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) should
develop spill response guidelines for the National Estuarine Research
Reserve System (reserve system) that:
Provides an understanding of the role of both the
state and NOAA in spill response at a reserve, and outlining
how the state and NOAA will coordinate on damage assessments,
training, and restitution.
Ensure that each reserve has a spill response plan
that identifies priority or key land and water areas for
protection. This requires an understanding of estuarine
dynamics in each reserve and high-resolution maps, imagery and
information on land use/land cover.
Ensure reserve managers and selected staff members
receive Incident Command System (ICS) training on a regular
basis. This will help ensure that reserve personnel are aware
of response procedures and protocols for regional catastrophic
events.
Ensure reserve managers are included as members of
state-based or regional response teams.
Require NOAA to develop capacity within the reserve
system for Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
certified hazardous materials trainers who can be deployed in
the event of a catastrophe. This will also require NOAA to
provide the resources and personnel agreements to allow rapid
deployment.
Ensure US Coast Guard (USCG) Sector Commands have
updated information (e.g. boundary and habitat maps,
facilities, staffing and response capabilities) regarding
reserves within their regions, similar to information provided
for national parks, national wildlife refuges, and national
marine sanctuaries.
Facilitate regional networks of national estuarine
research reserves, national parks, national wildlife refuges,
and national marine sanctuaries to improve communication and
response during catastrophic incidents. These collaborative
networks can participate in regional response planning much
more effectively than each agency working alone.
2. In your testimony, you state that the NRDA process has not
incorporated long-term baseline data from the reserves. Can you
explain why that may be and why it is important to do so?
We believe there are two primary reasons for ensuring reserve long-
term data is incorporated into the natural resource damage assessment
(NRDA) process. First, we believe our long-term data can help ensure
that spill-affected reserves are fairly compensated for the value of
losses. Second, we believe our long-term data can also help to
establish baselines against which damages to nearby estuarine and
coastal areas can be judged and compensation set.
The Coastal Zone Management Act established the reserve system, in
part, to ensure that the nation protected biogeographically
representative estuaries. The protections required for estuaries to
gain reserve designation are intended to ensure the reserve is a stable
environment for long-term research purposes to improve our
understanding of estuarine functions. To support the role of reserves
in improving that understanding, the federal government and its state
partners have made key public investments in long-term baseline
monitoring. Reserves collect a wide range of data including physical,
chemical, and biological parameters designed to help define conditions
required to sustain the long-term ecological integrity of estuaries.
The data also increases our understanding of local anthropogenic
disturbances that can result in degradation of these ecosystems. The
results of reserve baseline monitoring efforts are primarily used by
local and state coastal managers and researchers to inform local
management and restoration actions. But they can also be used to
understand regional impacts in a large scale event such as the Gulf
spill.
The monitoring data we collect, plus much other detailed scientific
information about reserves, provides critical information for assessing
not only damages to reserve resources but also for understanding
damages to other estuarine resources in a region.
Long-term data collected by reserves generally is not incorporated
into NRDA efforts or planning. While there may be legal reasons, such
as establishing a clear chain of custody, to conduct new sampling as an
incident occurs, this should not obviate the use of the best available
scientific information about reserves. The baseline data we collect at
reserves is perhaps the nation's best source of long-term information
about trends in our estuarine environments.
NOAA's NRDA processes could be refined to ensure that reserve
science becomes an integral part of the damage assessment process. The
Gulf spill has illustrated that the NRDA process should plan for spills
that have a regional impact. Since we will never be able to afford
long-term hydrocarbon monitoring along the entire coast, strategic
investments in such sampling at reserves could provide valuable
information for comparative NRDA purposes. Sensors could be pre-
stationed at reserves and deployed when a spill happens, or could
possibly be permanently deployed to monitor long-term hydrocarbon
trends. In either case, NRDA protocols could then be developed to use
the hydrocarbon data from the reserves to establish baselines for
restitution and restoration.
While we are now learning that some reserve data was useful in the
NRDA process and protocol development, there is no comprehensive plan
for using reserve data. In addition, we are concerned that failing to
use the full suite of data available at reserves may result in not
having a full picture of the damage done to reserve resources, or
nearby estuaries, limiting what will be recovered in the restitution
process.
3. In your testimony, you advocate for reauthorization of the Coastal
Zone Management Act (CZMA). What specific recommendations is
your association making for a reauthorized CZMA? How will your
recommendations better prepare the reserves for an oil spill of
this size and complexity?
The Gulf spill has demonstrated that reserves can, and do, play
vital roles in responding to catastrophic events. We must, however,
increase the capacity of the reserves to support response planning and
implementation.
NERRA drafted a reauthorization bill (enclosed for your
information) earlier this year. Our draft includes sections that could
enhance the capacity of the reserves to support planning for and
response to catastrophic events. These include:
Development of regional networks of coastal and
marine protected areas (Sec. 11). These networks could provide
incentives for coastal states and federal agencies to work
collaboratively to support regional science, restoration,
training and education. These networks should participate in
area contingency planning and ICS training with the USCG, share
site specific data through direct participation on NRDA
planning teams, and facilitate HAZMAT training for reserve
personnel as needed. An effective investment in regional
planning includes establishing full-time regional coordinators
that do not have other full-time jobs.
Increase the capacity of the reserves' baseline
monitoring program (Sec. 5). We now believe this should include
sampling for hydrocarbons in water and sediments within regions
at risk of oil spills (i.e. local or large scale).
Increase the capacity of the reserves' training
programs (Sec. 6). Reserve coastal training programs should
have HAZMAT training capabilities, including OSHA certified
HAZMAT trainers on staff. These trainers would facilitate
training for federal, state, and local government agencies
involved in event response.
We will be happy to work with the subcommittee to further refine
these sections to ensure that the language addresses oil-spill
preparedness and planning.
In addition, we now recognize two additional areas we believe a
revised CZMA should address.
Establish a catastrophic event contingency fund for
reserves and state coastal management programs. This fund,
administered by NOAA, would provide necessary funding to
reserves and state coastal programs faced with immediate
response needs. This fund should cover the costs of meeting
demands for training, equipment and safety requirements,
regional coordination, and science-based monitoring. Funds not
used during a fiscal year should rollover to the next year.
Require reserves to incorporate better planning for
hazardous oil spills into their management plans. In addition,
each state coastal management program should incorporate better
oil spill planning that also includes coordination with any
reserves in the state.
______

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Menashes, for
explaining the role that the National Estuarine Research plan
in preparedness planning.
And now for our last witness this morning, Dr. Takahashi-
Kelso. You can begin your testimony.

STATEMENT OF DENNIS TAKAHASHI-KELSO, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT,
THE OCEAN CONSERVANCY, SANTA CRUZ, CALIFORNIA

Dr. Takahashi-Kelso. Thank you. Good morning, and thank you
for the invitation to participate in this hearing. I would like
to thank Chairwoman Bordallo, Ranking Member Cassidy, and other
members of the Subcommittee for the important work you are
undertaking in response to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster.
The hearings you are conducting and the legislative responses
you are considering are a vital part of ensuring that this
human and environmental tragedy is never repeated.
My name is Dennis Takahashi-Kelso, and I am the Executive
Vice President of The Ocean Conservancy. Just yesterday, I
walked the oiled beaches of the Florida Panhandle with Governor
Crist, and it was a haunted reminder of my time as Alaska
Commissioner of Environmental Conservation in the late 1980s.
Instead of a beach, I stood on the bridge of the Exxon Valdez
mere hours after the tanker ran aground on Bly Reef. For me,
that began two years of work and oversight on the spill and its
aftermath, including policy reform at the state and Federal
level.
As a precondition of the right to ship oil from the Valdez
Marine Terminal, Exxon was required by Alaska law to formulate
an oil spill contingency plan. The plan, which I approved for
the State of Alaska, required sufficient response capacity for
specific scenarios, included detailed maps and incorporated
knowledge from fishermen and other local experts. During the
real spill, however, Exxon failed to follow the approved plan.
At that time the state and Federal governments did not have
the authority to wrest control from Exxon. When the company's
initial response proved ineffective, state agency staff,
fishermen and other local volunteers took it upon themselves to
mount a separate spill response in the high priority areas
identified by the approved contingency plan.
My point in telling this story is that spill response plans
must not be just paper exercises. They are critical to
effective recovery. Had the contingency plan been followed the
response might have turned out very differently.
The question today is: How can we make sure adequate site-
specific planning with balanced input from state and Federal
governments is a valuable part of any future spill response?
The Valdez Exxon spill provided five clear lessons about how to
strengthen oil spill contingency planning.
First, to be effective planning must be linked to
immediately available equipment and personnel. Major spills
happen, and we must be ready for them. We need to increase
minimum response capacity, require that equipment be held on
site or at nearby depots, provide training for local teams, and
substantially increase funding for response efforts.
Second, we must plan for true worst-case scenarios. Prior
to the Exxon Valdez, the company resisted planning for a spill
in excess of 100,000 barrels, saying it was unnecessary. The
spill totaled more than twice that amount. The corner cutting
that preceded the BP blowout showed a profound unwillingness to
plan for a major spill.
Third, states should have a meaningful role in reviewing
and approving spill response plans. These plans should be
available for public review and input. Affected communities
should participate in the decisions about risks that impact
them.
Fourth, the Federal Government should establish regional
citizens advisory councils to perform watchdog research and
monitoring functions in areas that might be harmed by oil
spills.
My last point relates to my first. Major spills are a
certainty, even though the probability of any single event may
be low. In order to respond adequately, we need better baseline
scientific information. We must ensure state and Federal
agencies have the resources necessary to collect the data that
will provide a foundation for natural resource damage
assessments and the restoration steps to follow.
Let us not forget, however, that while planning for spills
is important, prevention is the real solution and, in the final
analysis, the tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico highlights, all too
poignantly, the need to reform how we manage our ocean and to
abandon our current piecemeal approach. We need multi-objective
planning that boosts interagency coordination and transparency
in the trade-offs we are making between oil and gas production
and other activities like fisheries, and we need to protect the
overall heath of the ocean.
The President's Ocean Policy Task Force has produced a
compelling blueprint for moving forward, and the Consolidated
Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, released in
discussion draft form this week, also includes many excellent
reforms. I look forward to working with the Committee as the
bill moves through markup.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Takahashi-Kelso follows:]

Statement of Dennis Takahashi-Kelso, Ph.D., Executive Vice President,
The Ocean Conservancy, Santa Cruz, California

Good morning, and thank you for the invitation to participate in
this hearing. My name is Dennis Takahashi-Kelso, and I am the Executive
Vice President of Ocean Conservancy. My career includes diverse roles
in natural resources management and environmental protection over
several decades, much of it in Alaska. As Alaska Commissioner of
Environmental Conservation when the tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground, I
was the governor's cabinet officer responsible for enforcing the
state's oil spill clean-up standards. For two years, I worked on the
spill and its aftermath, including policy reform, in both the Alaska
Legislature and in Congress.
What we are currently witnessing in the Gulf is a human and
environmental tragedy. I would like to thank your subcommittee,
Chairwoman Bordallo, for the important work you are undertaking in
response to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. The hearings you are
convening, and the legislative responses you are considering, are a
vital part of ensuring that a disaster of this magnitude is never
repeated.
This subcommittee has requested testimony on coastal state planning
for offshore energy development and whether current planning efforts
are adequate to ensure an effective, coordinated spill response. In
particular, you requested consideration of whether planning efforts are
adequate for large, complex spills, such as the BP Deepwater Horizon
disaster; whether these planning efforts are sufficiently well-
coordinated among governmental agencies and levels; and what resources
might improve oil spill planning, logistics, response, and recovery.
In addressing those questions, I will first discuss my own
experience in Alaska during and after the Exxon Valdez spill and review
some of the lessons learned from that disaster. The Exxon Valdez spill
underscored that it is essential for states to ensure adequate planning
for spill response, and I will discuss ways in which this planning and
response process can be improved. Finally, the BP Deepwater Horizon
disaster has made it even clearer that prevention is absolutely
critical. I will explain how the current ground rules governing oil and
gas development need comprehensive reassessment and revision, within a
context of improved ocean governance, and how those changes would
improve the ability of states to reduce the risks of major oil spills
and ensure better response preparedness.
Lessons learned from Exxon Valdez
When the Exxon Valdez grounded and ripped open in Alaska's Prince
William Sound, it spilled 11 million gallons of crude oil, about 20
percent of the tanker's cargo. As a precondition of shipping oil from
the Valdez Marine Terminal, state law required a site-specific oil
spill ``contingency plan,'' and Exxon's approved plan addressed a
hypothetical event that turned out to be of the same order of magnitude
as the actual spill. The plan laid out the response capacity required
of the shipper along with detailed maps, as well as other specific
information drawn from fishermen and other local experts. When the
spill occurred, however, Exxon's designated spill response agent,
Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, did not carry out the actions
described in the response plan. After about 24 hours, Exxon mobilized
its own spill response, but without many of the site-specific features
and other requirements of the state-approved plan. Under the applicable
law--prior to passage by Congress of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990--the
spiller had the right to maintain control over the spill response and
the US Coast Guard had only limited authority to displace the company's
control. Because the spill was in waters subject to federal
jurisdiction, the state was not in a position to direct Exxon to
implement the requirements of the approved plan. When Exxon had
difficulty carrying out an effective response during the first several
days of the spill, state agency staff, fishermen, and other local
volunteers, mobilized our own spill response that targeted high
priority areas identified by the approved oil spill contingency plan.
Ultimately, the spill oiled at least parts of more than 1200 miles
of shoreline--roughly equivalent to the distance from Massachusetts to
North Carolina--and resulted in closures of salmon and herring
fisheries, as well as economic losses to the tourism industry and other
severe community impacts. Although most intensive during the first
summer after the accident, the spill response extended over three
years; and the damage assessment and restoration efforts continued for
several more years. Now, 21 years later, recovery is well underway but
not yet complete.
Lessons learned from Exxon Valdez include:
Prevention must be paramount. Once a large amount of
oil is in the water, damage is inevitable and removal of the
spilled oil is difficult. Consequently, prevention must be our
top priority. To achieve prevention, statutory and regulatory
standards must be high, application and enforcement of those
standards by government agencies must be diligent, and
incentives must be aligned with prevention. In the case of oil
transport, states have some, but limited, authority; the
primary responsibility lies with the US Coast Guard. The Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 made substantial improvements in some
prevention measures, such as requirements for double-hulled
tankers. While tankers still pose a sizable threat, we need to
ensure oil spill response plans and states can both address
current threats and adapt as new technologies and techniques
pose different challenges and risks.
In a major spill, the spiller should not be in
control of the response. At the time of the Exxon Valdez spill,
the spiller had the legal right to direct and maintain control
of the spill response. As a result, Exxon could simply
substitute its judgment for that of government officials who
had first-hand knowledge of local conditions; there was no
effective recourse under the law as it then existed. The
federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990 improved the situation by
enabling the government to federalize spill response efforts,
direct the responsible party's spill response efforts, or
merely monitor the responsible party's spill response efforts.
The Natural Resource Damage Assessment and
Restoration phases are crucial. The assessment of natural
resources damage and associated injuries as articulated by the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 is not only a key element in
establishing the spiller's liability, but also in laying ground
for long-term restoration. In the Exxon Valdez spill, little
baseline information existed on which to assess damages. Even
in the Gulf of Mexico, the baseline is limited. It is essential
that studies begin immediately, even as the emergency response
is proceeding, in order to provide that key foundation for a
full assessment of injuries. The spiller should pay all costs
of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment, including the costs
of gathering and synthesizing baseline data; and it should not
fall upon the government agencies to ``front'' those costs from
their budgets, even if the expenditures are later reimbursed.
Restoration efforts will necessarily take years, and monitoring
should be ongoing for decades.
Policy changes following the Exxon Valdez spill
The Exxon Valdez spill spurred changes in both state and federal
legislation governing oil spill prevention, preparedness, and response
as they began to address some of the lessons learned from the spill.
During the year following the Exxon Valdez spill, the Alaska
Legislature began to strengthen the requirements for oil spill
contingency planning. In many ways, the new legislation was a model of
how a state can protect its citizens through better spill response
preparedness. These changes substantially increased minimum response
capacity, required equipment to be available on-site or in nearby
equipment depots, called for training of local response teams,
increased the size of the oil and hazardous substance response fund,
and made other significant improvements. The situation in Alaska
illustrates how important it is to have a stable triangle of
protection: state response and preparedness standards; federal
regulation of activities beyond state jurisdiction, for prevention and
response; and strong watchdog functions carried out by residents who
know the area and are exposed to the risks. In this way, the affected
public and the ocean ecosystems on which communities depend are more
likely to be protected than if they rely solely on state or federal
authorities.
The most important federal legislative change was passage of the
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), which introduced several critical
reforms, including technical standards, improved response planning,
funding for research and development, and liability and compensation
requirements. Under OPA 90's amendments to the Clean Water Act, the
federal government may respond to a spill event by ``federalizing'' the
spill and engaging directly in the cleanup, monitoring the responsible
party's cleanup efforts, or directing the responsible party in
implementation of the response. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1321(c)(1)(B). These
changes have made it more likely that the relevant contingency plans
would be properly carried out during a major spill. The state's role is
limited, however, because the federal government retains authority to
decide when cleanup is complete.
OPA 90 also expanded the role and breadth of the National
Contingency Plan (NCP) and linked the NCP to area and regional plans--a
multi-layered planning and response system intended to improve spill
preparedness and response effectiveness by combining the site-
specificity of plans formulated by Area Committees and states with the
consistency of the NCP and regional plans. OPA 90 also includes a
requirement for establishing procedures and standards for responding to
worst case oil spill scenarios. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1321(d)(2)(J).
While OPA 90 made several significant improvements and addressed
critical gaps in spill response plans, it did not resolve all the
issues related to exploration and development of oil and gas resources,
nor to planning for, response to, and remediation of spills. Three
problems undercut the effectiveness of this approach. First, the
adequacy of planning efforts and other legal requirements depends
substantially on the ability to mobilize and sustain an emergency
response. That is, the nested plans in the NCP array, no matter how
thoughtfully conceived, can be effective only if equipment and
personnel are deployed immediately in response. The actual location of
these resources, not the contractual arrangements to get them, is
crucial and may be a weak link. Second, a ``worst case'' is often
difficult to pursue when the key government agency-- Minerals
Management Service, in the case of offshore drilling--insists that the
risk is ``insignificant.'' In another example, Exxon resisted Alaska's
efforts to require contingency plan scenarios for spills in excess of
100,000 barrels; the company said that such a scenario was unnecessary
because its modeling indicated that a spill of that magnitude would
happen only once in 241 years. The Exxon Valdez spill exceeded 250,000
barrels. Achieving a meaningful ``worst case'' spill planning scenario
will always be difficult, and planning only for less severe spills will
leave residual risk that is not addressed. Third, for a state to be
effective, it needs to have the capacity to enforce its plan and
participate simultaneously in the Natural Resources Damage Assessment,
which must start almost as soon as the emergency response begins. This
level of engagement, immediate and long-term, is both expensive and
technically demanding. Few states have the staffing and technical
support to sustain it without external funding and other resources.
In the intervening decades, as both the complacency of the public
and the political influence of the oil and gas industry have grown,
these standards have been repealed or severely weakened. There are a
number of areas in which OPA 90 can and should be improved in order to
help coastal states address potential impacts of oil spills on their
shores.
Oil spill response plans must address spill events of very large
size, must be site-specific, and must be tailored to local conditions.
The federal government should provide both funding and logistical
assistance to states to ensure their plans include improved baseline
data to better understand potential impacts, a clearer role for public
review and better standards to ensure response plans can be fully
executed in the event of a spill.
Improved baseline data
Increased funding for science and response efforts is needed for
states to fully understand the potential impacts on the local ecosystem
from a large-scale spill and how best to respond to a spill given these
ecological conditions. Baseline scientific data are critical to ensure
that the response and clean up are appropriate, and are also an
important foundation for a Natural Resource Damage Assessment. This
information can and should guide the type of response efforts the
states should require in clean up plans. Annual funding is needed to
support a comprehensive program of research, monitoring, and
documentation of local and traditional knowledge. That work would
assess and monitor populations of principal species in the ecosystem
and the biological and physical factors that affect their abundance and
distribution; construct and maintain an updated quantitative food web
model; identify sensitive species and important ecological areas; and
enhance understanding of temporal and spatial variability within
ecosystems.
It may be possible to provide funding to fill these needs with
minor changes to OPA 90, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 2701, et seq. OPA 90 authorizes
certain uses of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, which holds revenue
from a per-barrel tax on oil production. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 2712. With
minor changes, OPA 90 could provide funds to the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or
other agencies to conduct the necessary science and to the US Coast
Guard to identify and implement the necessary precautions. It is
important to provide the public with access to data and other
information. Congress should guarantee public access to information
gathered after a spill and as part of the research and planning
process.
Strong Standards for Response
In the case of the Exxon Valdez spill, unlike the BP Deepwater
Horizon disaster, the size of the maximum possible spill was clear: it
could not exceed the total cargo carried by the vessel. As a result,
planning for a ``worst case'' spill was more straightforward. Although
a site-specific plan--as required by state law--was pre-approved and in
place, the failure to carry out the plan resulted in the loss of
valuable time and a less effective response. In order to be deployed
quickly, equipment and personnel must be either pre-positioned near
potential spill sites or quickly mobilized from nearby locations that
actually have those resources on site. Spill response plans, of which
Exxon's plan is an example, rely upon contracts with spill response
companies or regional consortia. Delays in mobilization of an effective
spill response may result from the lack of actual capacity in the area
of the spill. To be effective in an emergency, response capability must
be mobilized immediately, and if the response plan calls for
contractors to provide the equipment and workers for the response,
actual capacity needs to be demonstrated ahead of time. Equipment must
be based in the near vicinity of potential accidents, and trained teams
of responders must be available in-region to operate the equipment in
accordance with the pre-approved plan.
We need to ensure that companies have considered the worst case
scenario and have the resources and infrastructure to fully execute
their response plans. The plans may be very good, but they are
blueprints for response, not actual spill response capacity. Plans must
link with other providers of response equipment and personnel. The
amount of equipment and its location is crucial to whether the plans
can actually make a difference if a spill actually occurs.
Public Review and Participation
In addition, spill response plans, as part of exploration or
development plans, are intended to be available for public review--a
key way in which affected communities can participate in the decisions
about risks that affect them. States should develop a specific process
to ensure the public has access and input to the plan. Exploration and
development plans are generally approved ``conditionally,'' pending
development of a spill response plan subsequent to the approval. There
is no specific public review process for the plan. Consideration should
be given to developing such a process, or, more broadly, to avoiding
conditional approvals. Any public process around spill response plans
should also require that MMS respond to public comments, questions, and
input specifically, rather than simply issuing an approval with
standard, vague language stating that the agency concluded the plan met
statutory and regulatory requirements.
Lastly, the federal government should establish Regional Citizens'
Advisory Councils (RCAC) for regions that could be impacted by oil
spills. One area of OPA 90 that has proven to be particularly useful is
the establishment of RCACs specifically for terminal and tanker
oversight and monitoring in Alaska. Essentially, RCACs offer the
opportunity for local residents to perform a watchdog, research, and
monitoring function. Duties of the RCACs include providing advice and
recommendations on policies, permits, and regulations; monitoring
environmental impacts and operations and maintenance of facilities; and
reviewing adequacy of spill prevention and contingency plans. The RCACs
are also allowed to review scientific research and to conduct their own
studies. According to Boston College Law Professor Zygmunt Plater, an
expert in oil and gas regulatory policy, the original OPA 90 language
proposed RCACs for areas of oil and gas development outside of Alaska,
but this language was removed from the bill due to political pressure
from the oil and gas industry (National Public Radio interview, June
17, 2010). Establishing one or more RCACs in the Gulf of Mexico could
help Gulf states and local communities maintain ongoing oversight of
oil and gas operations in the Gulf. It would be important to ensure
that the membership of RCAC included persons who in a position to play
a watchdog role.
Policy Reforms to Focus on Prevention and Minimization of Risk
As we saw with the Exxon Valdez, where no more than 10 percent of
the spilled oil was actually cleaned up--and as we are now seeing with
the tragedy in the Gulf--prevention is far more effective than is
response. The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster demonstrates vividly that
our nation's approach to oil and gas activities on the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) is fundamentally flawed. In the case of oil and
gas drilling, the primary government authority lies with the Minerals
Management Service (MMS); and substantial changes to federal laws are
needed to establish new standards for its decisions. The standards and
procedures applicable to these government agencies must define
effective roles for the states to play in preventing spills. Beyond
changes to OPA 90, other regulatory reforms are needed to prevent or
address disasters like the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout. The federal
agency responsible for oil and gas activities on the OCS, the
Department of the Interior's MMS, has proved incapable of effective
planning, regulation, and oversight. Federal statutes governing oil and
gas activities on the OCS do too little to ensure that coastal and
ocean ecosystems--including living coastal and marine resources and
habitats--receive adequate protection. As Congress acts to develop a
legislative response to the events of this disaster, we urge you to act
on the following five priorities to reform OCS legislation.
Reform the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)
by adding substantive standards to adequately protect ocean
health and coastal economies. In planning and administering OCS
oil and gas activities, existing law requires MMS to balance
oil and gas development with protection of human, marine, and
coastal environments. In practice, however, MMS prioritizes
resource extraction, often at the expense of these other
concerns, as demonstrated by the current spill. Congress should
change the statute's mission to place a greater emphasis on
protecting ocean health. OCSLA should allow oil and gas
activities only when it is proven such activities pose minimal
environmental risk. In addition, Congress should add
substantive standards to OCSLA to ensure protection. For
example, before an area is opened to oil and gas leasing, there
must be a threshold level of baseline science to inform
decision-making. Similarly, OCS planning efforts must identify
and protect important ecological areas to minimize the
potential for environmental harm. Congress should prohibit the
sale of oil and gas leases in an area unless and until
operators have demonstrated their ability to respond
effectively to an oil spill in real-world conditions in that
area. Congress should also impose more rigorous standards to
ensure that OCS facilities are equipped with the best available
technology and safety equipment.
Fix the planning and leasing process to ensure robust
environmental review, enhance transparency, and allow for
community input. MMS must no longer be allowed to use the
segmented nature of the OCSLA process to avoid rigorous
analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and
other laws. OCSLA should be amended to impose specific
requirements for environmental analysis at each stage in the
process and require full, site-specific analyses of exploration
and production as early as possible. Planning and leasing
activities for oil and gas development need to proceed at
scales that allow for meaningful environmental review with
ample opportunity for community input and inclusion of local
and traditional knowledge. Congress should require five-year
leasing programs to be more precise in identifying the portions
of planning areas that will be open to oil and gas leasing by,
for example, placing an upper limit on the percentage of a
planning area that may be included in any one five-year leasing
program. Alternatively, Congress could require MMS to focus
individual lease sales on specific lease tracts, rather than
offering enormous portions of planning areas. In order to
facilitate more rigorous NEPA analysis, Congress should also
eliminate the 30-day deadline under which MMS must approve a
``submitted'' exploration plan. Furthermore, natural resource
and environmental agencies should have a greater role in
providing baseline science and influencing decision-making
about oil and gas activities off our coasts. In particular,
NOAA and Interior agencies, such as the US Fish and Wildlife
Service, should play key roles in deciding which areas will be
available for leasing, and in preparing environmental analyses
in support of oil and gas leasing decisions.
Restructure the agency responsibilities for oil and
gas planning, leasing, and oversight. MMS lacks the expertise
and institutional interest in broad ocean issues and has proven
to be unable to assess objectively and accurately the potential
risks of OCS drilling. Restructuring MMS should fully address
conflicts between the revenue generating, planning, and
environmental and safety enforcement responsibilities of the
agency. In addition, expert agencies beyond MMS, such as NOAA
and the US Fish and Wildlife Service, should have a much
greater role in decisions about OCS oil and gas activities and
preparation of environmental analyses surrounding them.
Hold oil companies and other responsible parties
accountable for paying for clean up and damages associated with
oil spills. The current $75 million cap on liability should be
removed in order to hold companies like BP responsible for
their actions and ensure that oil companies, not taxpayers, are
forced to clean up after their mistakes.
Direct funding from oil and gas activities to protect
and restore ocean and coastal resources, increase our ocean
knowledge, and develop our capacity to respond to and recover
from oil spills. Oil companies make billions of dollars while
putting our ocean ecosystems and coastal economies at risk. A
portion of the revenue from these activities should be
permanently available to protect, restore, and maintain our
ocean and coastal resources and be provided in such a way that
it does not incentivize new drilling activity. In addition, as
efforts over the last two months have demonstrated, our ability
to respond to oil spills and reduce environmental harm is
limited by the state of our ocean and coastal science and
technology. Additional resources should be provided to better
understand our coastal and marine environment and improve our
ability to safely and sustainably operate there. Last year this
committee held hearings on H.R. 3534 the Consolidated Land,
Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2009, which would
establish an Ocean Resources Conservation and Assistance Fund.
We strongly support the establishment of this type of permanent
funding for ocean conservation, science, and planning.
The Bigger Picture: Healthy Oceans Matter
More broadly, this disaster is only the most dramatic example of
the threats facing our ocean. Habitat destruction, ocean acidification,
marine debris and coastal runoff are among the many threats to the
health of ocean ecosystems. The tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico
highlights poignantly why healthy oceans matter - not only for fish and
marine wildlife, but for coastal economies that rely on healthy
fisheries and clean beaches. In addition to enacting specific reforms
to the statutes that govern oil and gas development, we must reform our
overall approach to managing our oceans.
In part, the threatened state of our ocean is due to the sector-by-
sector management of diverse uses. Sector-by-sector management has led
to serious conflicts among users. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon
disaster, a single-minded focus on natural resource extraction with
only cursory consideration of potential impacts to ecosystem health or
other ocean uses created conditions in which safety, environmental
reviews, preparation, safeguards, monitoring and oversight, and
response capabilities were all inadequate.
We rely on our ocean and coasts to provide much more than just oil
and gas. Decision-making based on a detailed review of only one sector,
or only one use, is insufficient. As we increasingly look to our oceans
to provide food, energy, transportation, and recreation, we need better
coordination and a more complete approach to planning and risk
management. We also need to prioritize ecosystem health, because we
cannot afford to lose the critical ecosystem services that only healthy
ecosystems provide. Many of these recommendations are incorporated in
the presidentially established Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force's
(IOPTF) draft recommendations on National Ocean Policy (NOP) and
coastal and marine spatial planning (CMSP).
A strong NOP that implements ecosystem-based management and
establishes protection, maintenance, and restoration of ocean and
coastal ecosystems as the foundation for federal management--if
mandatory and properly implemented--would protect ocean wildlife and
habitat from harmful development, reduce impacts on sensitive and
special areas, and help to build ecosystem resilience. It would also
help balance resource extraction and ecosystem protection, ensuring
careful consideration of the potential impacts of oil and gas
activities on the marine and coastal environment, other ocean uses, and
ecosystem health and resilience. Protecting important ecological areas
and limiting hazardous activities would safeguard wildlife populations,
promote healthier estuaries and watersheds, and reduce the likelihood
and cumulative impacts of catastrophes like the disaster in the Gulf of
Mexico.
Coastal and marine spatial planning, used to implement a strong
NOP, could provide several key benefits that could prevent the
conditions that led to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. CMSP would
facilitate interagency coordination and decision-making and would allow
other expert agencies to have increased input on, or authority over,
decisions about oil and gas activities. This process would result in a
foundation of baseline scientific data that facilitates science-based
management, help identify future use or management problems, and
promote smarter, more sustainable uses. Implementation of the IOPTF
recommendations would also provide for increased public input into
decision-making, including from local communities, other ocean users,
and non-governmental organizations.
Additionally, having in place a multi-objective plan and an
established agreement on management goals can help when emergencies
such as oil disasters or hurricanes occur. Preparing for and working to
prevent impacts from extreme weather events, commercial use and
development, or industrial disasters is an integral part of CMSP.
Better oversight and enforcement can help prevent disasters; better
planning, preparation, and coordination can help minimize the impacts
of those that do occur. While a national ocean policy using CMSP has
not yet been finalized, Congress can craft new legislation or amend
existing statutes in ways that would both set the stage for and align
with CMSP processes.
While none of these changes could guarantee that we will never have
another oil spill disaster, taken together they could ensure that we
will not have one of this magnitude and complexity before we have fully
understood and accounted for the risks involved.
______

Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Dr. Takahashi-Kelso, for
your valuable input on this subject matter, and I will now be
recognizing members of the Subcommittee for any questions that
they have to ask those that have testified, and I will begin
with myself. I have a couple of questions here for Dr. Walker.
BP has pledged $500 million to fund the Gulf of Mexico
research initiative. How much of this funding would the
alliance like to receive, and how would you prioritize it?
Dr. Walker. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Our Governor has been clear that he would like for the
alliance to receive as much of that as possible. About 25
million has been given out already to the States of Florida,
Mississippi and Louisiana. We would suggest that the bulk of
the remaining funds be provided to the Gulf Alliance so that
those funds can be controlled by the Governors of the states
that are most affected by this event.
What we would do is pull together a select group of
scientists from universities, from Federal agencies, from
NGO's, from the Coastal States Organization, from folks that
are knowledgeable about this and have been working in the Gulf
for years and years, ask them to help us develop the scope of
the research, remediation and restoration program that needs to
take place, and then help us determine the actual process of an
RFP or some other ways to actually select and provide support
to the teams of scientists that would actually do the work.
Ms. Bordallo. Another question, does the alliance's network
of scientists have the expertise and capacity to conduct
research to understand the fate and the impacts of the oil and
dispersants on the environment and the resource-dependent
industries?
Dr. Walker. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely we do. Many of the
research teams that are out in the Gulf even now looking at the
oil spill and the dispersed cloud of oil that is below the
surface are Mississippi scientists. They are from places like
the Stennis Space Center, LUMCON, and the southern South
Florida Research Institute, but we are not suggesting that no
expertise outside of the Gulf states would be sought. Certainly
there is expertise at many other places in this country of
outstanding scientific minds that we would certainly bring to
the table to respond to this situation. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good. Ms. Fletcher, you recommend that
Congress extend the 30-day review period to allow for CZMA
state agencies to conduct Federal consistency reviews. Now,
what would be an adequate review period and why? And should
this apply to all proposed actions or apply to just proposals
for offshore energy?
Ms. Fletcher. Thank you, Chairwoman.
The review period right now at 30 days is simply not
adequate. In reaching out to the states in preparation for this
testimony, many states weighed in at a six-month mark, that
that would give the states the ability to go through a
consistency review that would give them the information that
they need. Also, the tool of consistency is one that allows
communication both ways, and so there is communication back and
forth, and that is really what consistency is about.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, and I have one last question for
Mr. Barton. Do you think that the Jackson County emergency
operations command has fully engaged with the managers at the
Grand Bay National Estuarine Research Reserve with regard to
oil spill contingency planning, and has the environmental
information gathered by the Grand Bay Reserve as part of the
systemwide monitoring program been utilized for this purpose?
Mr. Barton. I am not sure that I know that total answer. I
know that there is communication that has been going on. They
have a great relationship between the folks at the Grand Bay
and our emergency operations folks, and so there is a good
relationship there. Exactly how much of that data is being
passed back and forth? I couldn't really answer that question.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Would there be any way that you
could get some information on that and provide it for the
Committee?
Mr. Barton. We actually have our emergency operations guy
here with us today, he is sitting behind me. He says the data
is being made available both ways.
Ms. Bordallo. Very good. Mr. Menashes, in your testimony,
you make recommendations for improved training for oil spills.
If there is one area where you would improve training right
now, where would that be? And is such training within the
mission and purposes of the National Estuarine Research Reserve
System?
Mr. Menashes. Thank you, Chairwoman.
Yes, the training is within our mission. This is also an
area where we are hoping to see as part of the reauthorization
of the Coastal Zone Management Act additional emphasis placed
on training within the reserve system. We believe the area
where we can provide the most immediate impact on oil spills is
within our DA training and working with our partners at NOAA
and the offices at the agency to develop tools for our people,
whether they be in the Gulf of Mexico or on the Atlantic or
Pacific coasts, to be able to gear up very quickly and provide
training where NOAA staff cannot because they are involved in
other activities. So we think NRDA training is probably an area
where we can provide quick impact.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, and now I would like to
recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Cassidy, our acting
Ranking Member of the Subcommittee.
Mr. Cassidy. Thanks to all the witnesses because I feel
like each of your comments illuminated my understanding.
Mr. Barton.
Mr. Barton. Yes.
Mr. Cassidy. This is obviously about--you mentioned
communication. I have found that the absence of communication
is the root of the fights in my marriage, so I can imagine that
it has a role here too. Clearly, the folks along coastal
Louisiana, the local officials have been frustrated about the
absence of coordination, the absence of a decision chain where
they could find one person that would say ``Yea'' or ``Nay'' to
a proposal. But it appears your experience is different. Can
you give me a sense of why that difference might be there?
Mr. Barton. Well, we have certainly had some frustrations
as we have worked our way through this ourselves. You know, as
I said earlier, we have had many hurricanes, the last one
certainly being Katrina, and working through that process we--
of course, working through the Stafford Act and there are some
specific things there, but the process actually worked fairly
well there in terms of the NIMS process and the command
process, incident command, unified command, and so forth. That
is not to say that communications was always real good from the
top to the bottom or the bottom to the top.
Now, the communications issue has been an issue with us
even through this event, and part of the problem has been
through no fault of any one specific person or group, it is
just that, as I said in my written testimony, the unified
command has a fairly large area that they are trying to
coordinate all the activities in, and so when it is that spread
out, and we are getting bits and pieces, for instance, if there
is oil coming up south of the islands, as it is today, we know
that there is a tripping point, we know there is a point at
which there is going to be a response.
The local folks though, the local elected officials, many
times may not know and may not hear exactly when something is
going to happen, so there is a little bit of a disconnect
there, and sometimes it takes longer to get specific things,
and that is why I say this communication is so important
because the local people, they expect the people they believe
they have elected to manage those things locally are supposed
to know the answer, and that is very difficult thing to get.
Mr. Cassidy. Well, there seems to be a disconnect between
the knowledge base, which I think is stronger among the locals,
and the power to deploy assets, which is Federal. Now obviously
communication, communication, communication. What would be a
specific example of how we could say, heck, like Billy
Nungesser, go to Plaquemines Parish. We saw oil going past a
rig. We called and said oil is going past a rig on Tuesday.
Thursday morning somebody was sent out there to look at the oil
going past the rig.
Mr. Barton. Right.
Mr. Cassidy. By that time it is approaching the beach. So
there seems to be a lag time. Is there anything more than----
Mr. Barton. The one thing I would say, in our particular
case, we had a lot of experience with hurricanes, and so a lot
of the people that are at the table have been at the table many
times. They all know each other. They have dealt with each
other.
Mr. Cassidy. So relationships.
Mr. Barton. There are a lot of good relationships there.
Mr. Cassidy. And that helps.
Mr. Barton. And if I have a question, I will pick up the
phone and call Bill Walker.
Mr. Cassidy. Right.
Mr. Barton. OK. I mean, if it is that important that I get
an answer right now, then that is what I would do, and so those
relationships are there.
Mr. Cassidy. So several of the folks have suggested that
there needs to be kind of an infrastructure of response, if you
will, but part of that infrastructure is to allow those kind of
informal relationships to allow an expeditious response, kind
of?
Mr. Barton. Yes.
Mr. Cassidy. And let me move on because I am about to lose
time.
Ms. Fletcher or Mr. Kelso, I am sorry, I cannot take a
crack at your middle name, I apologize.
Ms. Bordallo. Takahashi.
Mr. Cassidy. Takahashi, I apologize. It seems like
education. I mean, a spill of national significance exercises
should address this lack of coordination that both of you
decry. If it really works, then everything the two of you
suggested seems like it would be brought to bear. Does that
make sense?
Dr. Takahashi-Kelso. Thank you, Mr. Cassidy.
The structure that exists now does, in theory, build in
local knowledge and the relationships that will allow a spill
of national significance to have a response that is grounded in
real information, as Mr. Barton was just describing, and also
has the kind of command structure that allows a major spill to
have a response. So here is what I would suggest. I think this
is directly responsive to your point.
It is really important for the area committees at the local
level to have a spill response plan that builds into it those
plans that are specific to facilities; that is, you need
something that is really site-specific. The time to build in
local knowledge is right at the outset. And then the regional
response team and its regional plan, the national contingency
plan, you need to incorporate those, and the reason for that is
that when there is a spill you don't have time to invent that
piece. You have to have it ready to go, and assuming that it is
a spill of national significance, as in this case, then the
Coast Guard commander can implement directly the spill response
that already has that local and state input. So the
communication, the relationships, the on-the-ground content
need to be built in right from the outset.
The reason I emphasize that is the facility-specific plans
should have direct information about what is on site, what can
be mobilized within two hours, what takes half a day, what can
be there the next day. That kind of specificity you don't find
in the larger nested plans, and that is why you have to have it
at the beginning, and you have to have it built in so that the
national plan actually carries it out.
Mr. Cassidy. Ms. Fletcher, would you add anything?
Actually, can you hold because I am out of time, and the Madam
Chair is being very indulgent. I am sorry, go ahead.
Ms. Fletcher. I don't have a lot to add to that, but I
would agree that the information does have to go in at the
outset, and we have other authorities, and the Coastal Zone
Management Act is one of those that allows for the gathering of
that information and allows for both the states as well as the
communities to be putting in that information.
I think the other example is our Chair is actually here in
town this week from New Hampshire, and New Hampshire has been
doing these type of cooperative arrangements in terms of
bringing the industry, as well as the state agencies, together
and they actually have a Canadian input into that as well. So
there are opportunities there for some industry and state
cooperative arrangements that can help to develop those
relationships that Mr. Barton was discussing as well.
Mr. Cassidy. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the acting Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee, and now I would like to recognize the gentlelady
from California, Ms. Capps.
Ms. Capps. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for your
testimony, each of you.
It is clear that an oil spill of this volume, scale and
duration was never fully contemplated by state or regional
responders. The complexity and magnitude of this ongoing spill
has highlighted the need for extensive ocean observing network
that can be immediately activated in the event of a spill. This
ocean observing network, including satellites, buoys and
underwater gliders, should be coordinated at the state and
regional levels to provide pre-spill assessments and real time
forecasts that guide the work of responders. That is the
impression I am getting from you all as well.
Dr. Walker, this first question will be to you. I am
advocating for more money for the Integrated Ocean Observing
System--I guess it is called IOOS--and calling attention to the
utility of a fully operated ocean observing system throughout
the nation. Dr. Walker, do you feel that having a robust IUs or
an ocean observing system in place is important in situations
like this one in the Gulf for providing data on things like oil
concentration and transport with ocean currents?
Dr. Walker. Absolutely. We are working with the State of
Mississippi as well as the Gulf of Mexico Alliance is working
very hard with Dr. Nolans out of Texas that sort of chairs the
IOOS group. We have membership from all of the Gulf states are
involved with that group. They are active in the Gulf of Mexico
Alliance organization and activities, and they are a critical
part of our habitat integration and assessment team within the
Gulf Alliance.
So, any help you can provide to help provide support for
IOOS and the other IOOSs around the country would be greatly
appreciated. Thank you.
Ms. Capps. Thank you. I appreciate that you are
highlighting both the state's responsibility but also a
regional network that you have.
Ms. Fletcher, the Coastal States Organization is the topic
now. In your testimony, you suggest that states should review
and provide oversight of offshore oil and gas operations. This
makes sense. In California, the Coastal Commission has not had
the funds or the staff to implement its own inspection program
of offshore drilling. Therefore it relies on MMS inspections.
Can you provide the Subcommittee specific recommendations to
provide for state and local agency participation in such
inspections?
Again, I am honing in on the ability of local and even
state input but sometimes the funding is not there to have the
adequate staff.
Ms. Fletcher. Yes. We actually had a conversation with the
California Coastal Commission before testifying today, and they
indicated that was one of their greatest challenges. The
ability to rely on firsthand knowledge as opposed to the
Federal agency reports is going to be critical in bringing to
bear the state knowledge, the county's knowledge. They were
giving me examples of the expertise at the Santa Barbara County
level as a result of the oil spill that they deal with----
Ms. Capps. Yes.
Ms. Fletcher. So to be able to bring that kind of knowledge
into the forefront will also help that Federal report to be
more thorough. It can be more of a partner-created format, and
that report ultimately will be more effective.
Ms. Capps. Thank you. Now, Manly Barton, would you offer
your perspective? Do you have recommendations to provide for
local participation in inspections?
Mr. Barton. On the inspection side?
Ms. Capps. Or participation in general.
Mr. Barton. Well, participation in general, and that is one
of the reasons we talked about in this response in the NIMS
process. It kind of brings that back to the state level where
the local input, as has been mentioned here today, is very
important because they know what their needs are, they know
what is there.
Ms. Capps. Right.
Mr. Barton. They know how to protect what needs to be
protected, and that was one of the reasons we had indicated
that we would like to see that because we believe if it is
brought back to a state level, then the local community would
be more involved in the entire process.
Ms. Capps. Thank you. Dr. Kelso, in California following
the 2007 COSCO Busan spill, NOAA used data regarding currents
to create oil spill trajectories using real time conditions.
From your perspective as a scientist, why is it important to
provide Federal funding for the integration and continued
operation of IOOSs?
Dr. Takahashi-Kelso. Thank you. It is crucial that the
response be tailored as tightly as possible to what is actually
happening and what is going to happen in the near term and, for
that to be effective, it requires a fair amount of good science
ahead of time and the kind of modeling that predicts the
trajectory. That way you can move equipment and personnel into
place. You can do other data gathering that you are going to
need later in order to assess damage, and without it, without
the input, the science input and the good modeling to make the
trajectories realistic, you are simply going to be at the wrong
place at the wrong time. So I think it is absolutely essential.
There are several layers in which the information and
modeling can be improved, but I think the overall goal of doing
that is fundamental to improving our response capability.
Ms. Capps. So it is clear--I know I am out of time--the
Federal Government has a role, the regional coalitions or
alliances, the state has a clear role to play, but it all
depends on what the local knowledge has yielded as well, and I
had another question for Mr. Menashes.
Ms. Bordallo. We will have a second round.
Ms. Capps. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentlelady from California. I
would now like to recognize Mr. Wittman, the gentleman from
Virginia.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I would like
to thank the witnesses for joining us today.
Dr. Walker, let me begin with you. In your testimony, you
talk about Mississippi's effort in planning. It appears as
though the planning effort coincided with the area contingency
plan or the Mississippi Coastal Program, so there was some
coordination there in understanding at the state level.
Apparently that led to better decisionmaking between the state
and BP in coordination and, of course, that is the central
crux, I think, of a lot of concerns here is how do those pieces
of the decisionmaking come together. So I want to get your
thoughts on that and how you believe the Mississippi planning
efforts to protect the coastal zones came together based on
previous efforts, and then how that is put in place right now,
and how successful that is, and then I have a follow-up
question about some of the other areas of contingency, but if
you could give us your thoughts and ideas about that.
Dr. Walker. Thank you, Congressman.
We work with the Federal Government and with organizations
like Kristen's all the time in updating our coastal program so
that we can better understand and better plan for what kind of
energy type industries we want in our general area and where we
want them, and that has worked out very well. We review all of
the permit applications. We make recommendations for siting in
different places, and I think that is helpful.
In an after-the-fact sort of pulling together a plan, we
always think in terms of trying to pull together a good team.
After this event happened, we immediately opened up our
building in Biloxi, Mississippi. We brought in BP there in our
building; we brought in the Department of Environmental Quality
there in our building; and we brought in NOAA, the Coast Guard,
and the National Guard. So all of those folks are physically
located in our building.
Every morning we get together and talk about what happened
the day before, what needs to happen in the current day. And
these are not people who have to go four or five levels up in
their perspective organizations to get an answer to a question.
These are people who can say ``Yes'' or ``No,'' right then, on
the spot, with a fair level of confidence.
So I feel that, more than anything else, has helped us, I
think, be a little bit ahead in this process of dealing with
the aftermath of this event.
Mr. Wittman. Great. I think that is an important point,
that flattened hierarchy where you, as you said, where somebody
can make a decision now, there doesn't need to be another step
or another delay in that decisionmaking.
Let me ask this. As you look at the idea of contingency
planning, obviously you have laid out about how you make
decisions from day to day in addressing the threats from the
oil. How do you take that next step and then look at the
effects on the economy from that? And I speak specifically of
the seafood industry there and what the effects are going to be
there. And as you know that is many fold, not just on the areas
that have to be closed for shell fishing, but also the effects
on the processors, on the harvesters, and in the secondary
effects, their markets that they sell to, and the effects, you
know, extend all the way up to places like Virginia who our
processors buy seafood from Mississippi and now those markets
are interrupted. So the economic effects shutter throughout the
United States.
Can you give me a little more information about how
Mississippi looks at that and what you do as far as contingency
planning both on the effect on the industry there, and then how
you try to counteract that to make sure people are aware of not
only the safety of the seafood but how processors and
harvesters can be prepared for that?
Dr. Walker. Well, let me say first, Congressman, that if
you walk down the beaches of Mississippi now from the Louisiana
line to the Alabama line, you would see beaches that look today
just like they looked two years ago. And if you got in a boat
and went out to our barrier islands, you would see islands that
look just like they did five years ago. Some of them have small
amounts of tar balls on there but, other than that, the impact
to Mississippi has been minimal so far.
If you watch the national media, however, you would be
convinced that the Mississippi beaches are ankle-deep in oil,
and the effect of that has been disastrous, not only to our
state, but also the states that surround us--all of the states
in the Gulf. You have heard all of their Governors singing that
same song, including ours. And what that has done is keep the
tourists from coming to Mississippi. The charter boats don't
have charters anymore. The restaurant trade is down, product is
down and more expensive, so the economic damage to Mississippi
had been great.
What we have done to try to counter that is we have joined
with the Department of Environmental Quality and the
Mississippi Health Department to collect samples, to analyze
those samples, to provide the results of those analyses to the
public and show them that seafood in Mississippi is safe to
eat, that Mississippi is still open. We would like for you to
come down and visit.
We are developing a--we should have completed development
of a poster now that restaurants, seafood houses can place in
their windows saying that Department of Marine Resources,
Department of Environmental Quality and the Health Department
of the State of Mississippi have together declared that
Mississippi seafood is safe to eat.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Dr. Walker. I yield back my time,
Madam Chair.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman, and how I would like
to recognize the gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Ms.
Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for
the series of hearings that you have been holding on the oil
spill and its impact on the natural resources of the Gulf area,
and thank you to the witnesses for being here and for your
testimony and recommendations that you have made.
I understand that there have been a series of exercises
centered around a major spill in the Gulf as a subject of the
exercise over the last eight or so years, the last one perhaps
being a month or so before April.
Dr. Walker and Mr. Barton, do you have any knowledge of
that exercise? Was the alliance a participant in any way or any
of the state or local officials participating in an exercise in
the Gulf around March of this year?
Mr. Barton. No.
Dr. Walker. I will add to that just a bit to say that
scientists through the Gulf of Mexico Alliance process are in
the Gulf all the time. It just so happened by happenstance that
one of the scientific vessels that was supported by this
particular crew who was supported by NOAA, I believe, was
actually out there doing normal operations when the explosion
and the resulting fire occurred, so they were on scene, they
were able to capture data that would not have been available,
had they not been out there doing routine science. So that goes
on relatively commonly in the northern Gulf of Mexico, and the
State of Mississippi and the Gulf of Mexico Alliance is
intimately involved in those activities. Thank you.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you. Dr. Takahashi-Kelso, one of
the challenges of preparing any--I think you speak to this
somewhat in your testimony--preparing better managing and
especially preventing these kinds of incidences, that the
responsibilities are siloed in different agencies.
Can they be better coordinated, do you think, through
something like a fusion center where each agency has someone
there all the time, or do we need, as some people are
suggesting, a single entity, a new agency to oversee the oil
drilling, regulating, managing, preventing?
Dr. Takahashi-Kelso. Thank you; a very important question,
I think.
My view is that the response and the agency coordination
and communication can be accomplished in the existing incident
command structure, but I would begin that process far back.
That is, when Kristen Fletcher talked about the importance of
Coastal Zone Management Act, and building in a state role very
early in decisions about what kinds of activities are going to
take place and under what conditions, that is very important.
When a Federal agency like the Minerals Management Service
has authority to make decisions about moving forward with
activities like oil and gas development, it is crucial to have
the agencies manage other parts of the ecosystems, activities,
and resources which people make use of--fishing, tourism, other
kinds of important economic issues--and that those be built in
early and taken quite seriously.
We just have not done that very well at all. We have
segmented the decisions so that the units of analysis are so
small that they are meaningless, with respect to any serious
worst-case scenario. Even in the case of decisions about oil
and gas leasing, the Minerals Management Service has simply
written them off as insignificant risks and have not analyzed
them at all.
So, I think your point is a very important one, and we need
to build in those levels of coordination and take seriously the
science, the local knowledge, the inputs from states right at
the beginning when the decisions about the activities are made,
and then when the decisions about spill response preparedness.
There is not currently a provision in the Coastal Zone
Management Act that expressly recognizes the roles of states in
the contingency planning process. Section 307 consistency
determinations to recognize the role for the state in making
recommendations about consistency determinations with respect
to things like oil and gas leasing and facilities, but not
about contingency planning. I think that is an area that could
be strengthened and would help address the point that you
raise.
Mrs. Christensen. I guess my time is up. Thank you. Thank
you for your answers.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentlelady from the Virgin
Islands. I have a few more questions. Dr. Takahashi-Kelso, I
have a couple for you.
In your testimony, you mentioned the states' role in NRDA
process. How does the NRDA process intersect with the response
and the clean-up effort, and what are the key elements to
ensure long-term restoration and recovery?
Dr. Takahashi-Kelso. Thank you, Madam Chair.
The NRDA process is the Natural Resources Damage
Assessment, and that is a process required by Federal law that
includes not only the Federal agencies that have natural
resource management authority primarily in the Department of
the Interior and the Department of Commerce, NOAA, but also
state agencies that have similar responsibilities in their
areas of jurisdiction.
The Natural Resources Damage Assessment is crucial for two
things: First, it is the basis for an important part of the
liability that the spiller ultimately will bear, and the reason
for that, of course, is that resources, as well as the people
who depend upon them, have been hurt. When Mr. Wittman was
asking earlier about impacts on the seafood industry and the
supply chain there, he raised, I think, an important piece of
what the Natural Resources Damage Assessment actually
addresses, and under Federal law those impacts, including lost
profits, are properly part of the liability assessment. So, the
Natural Resources Damage Assessment does that as one piece of
its important mission.
The second piece, equally important and fundamental to the
long-term recovery from a spill, is that the science and the
gathering of information from other sources, not just
scientists, lays the groundwork for restoration, and the
restoration steps need to go on for years.
So the way I would lay it out, Madam Chair, is the
emergency response happens right away, and it is ongoing, at
least it is ongoing right now and will be for some time. In the
Exxon Valdez case, it took three years. Overlapping with that,
and essentially beginning immediately, there needs to be the
gathering of the science, the initiating of baseline work, the
start of longer term science that will not only help us
understand the impacts, but also lay the groundwork for
restoration. Then, overlapping with the Natural Resources
Damage Assessment, the restoration steps will begin before all
of that Natural Resources Damage Assessment work is completed.
Basically, running throughout, there should be a monitoring
element that continues well beyond the restoration phase as
well, to see how effective we have been.
Ms. Bordallo. Along the same lines, you testified that few
states have the staffing and the technical support to sustain
the level of engagement necessary to respond to the worst-case
scenarios, but that we must improve our ability to do so. Who
should be responsible for the cost of pre-training personnel
and prepositioning infrastructure to respond to future oil
spills?
Dr. Takahashi-Kelso. The costs of preparing for response in
particular areas should largely be borne by the industry that
is undertaking the activities that contain the risk, and I
would be happy to say more about that.
Clearly, in some areas there are multiple individual
businesses at work or corporations at work, but often the kind
of activity that is being undertaken, the source of the risk,
is in an industry sector and they should be responsible largely
for footing the bill for the preparations necessary to make
sure that safety is in place.
The Federal Government and the state governments, of
course, are appropriately paying the costs of their own agency
staff and the capacity to be involved effectively at the agency
level, but with respect to these particular plans and the
preparedness to be really effective in worst-case scenarios,
that cost should be borne by the industry.
Ms. Bordallo. So that is very clear then in your mind, and
so I guess we are on the right track here.
Dr. Takahashi-Kelso. Yes.
Ms. Bordallo. And although the Federal agencies are
assisting, we are being reimbursed by the industry.
Dr. Takahashi-Kelso. Exactly right. I would say that with
something like the Natural Resources Damage Assessment, it is
important for BP in this case to pay those costs up front, and
the reason is that otherwise the Federal and state agencies and
the independent scientists or university scientists who work
with them will simply not have the resources necessarily to do
what needs to be done at the beginning of that process. It is
not sufficient to take resources from your existing budget
because you just don't have enough to do that, even if it is
reimbursed later, so there is kind of a front-loading issue
that ought to be undertaken there.
There are also some clear examples that I would be happy to
identify for the Committee----
Ms. Bordallo. Very good.
Dr. Takahashi-Kelso.--in which both Federal and state funds
that came from industry serve as a pool in order to support
planning and preparation for potential spill response.
Ms. Bordallo. Good, if you would provide us with that we
would be grateful.
Ms. Fletcher, would your organization be supportive of
grants to states, through the Coastal Zone Management Act, to
increase planning for oil spill response?
Ms. Fletcher. Yes, Chairwoman, absolutely. The Coastal Zone
Management Act is actually a perfect statute for--it is already
set up for grants to states. It has been effectively managed.
CZMA will celebrate 40 years in 2012. Actually, in New
Hampshire, coastal zone program funds initially sponsored some
oil spill response activities. That led to the creation of the
cooperative, the agency/industry cooperative that I mentioned
earlier.
Ms. Bordallo. Yes.
Ms. Fletcher. So, again, that granting of capacity and
authority is already there, and I think the CZMA is a good
place to make that connection between what is going on with the
oil spill response as well as coastal management authority.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, and I have one follow up. Please
tell us about the Coastal Impact Assistance Program. Is the
program effectively managed by the Minerals Management Service,
and if not, what solutions does CSO propose to help the states
implement the program?
Ms. Fletcher. Well, the CIAP program is quite a valuable
resource for coastal states. It provides funding to support
activities that address the impacts of energy production within
coastal and marine areas. Since it was established in the
Energy Policy Act of 2005, $250 million in funding was intended
to be distributed to the energy-producing coastal states for
each fiscal year from 2007 to 2011. Unfortunately, to date, MMS
has distributed less than 20 percent of that funding due to a
complex in changing grants process.
So, we would recommend that there be some clear language
about spending those dollars; making sure that congressional
intent is carried through, and getting those dollars in the
hands of the states where that work can be done.
Ms. Bordallo. Excellent. Thank you. And now I would like to
recognize the Ranking Member Mr. Cassidy.
Mr. Cassidy. Another name I am going to have a difficult
time with although I shouldn't. Mr. Menashes?
Mr. Menashes. That is right.
Mr. Cassidy. Man, I was just like so into what you were
saying, I felt like I couldn't find a question because I am
totally in agreement. It has been part of my frustration, for
example, at LSU School of Fireman Training who have all that
HAZMAT training, but initially there was no ability to--the
people didn't have HAZMAT training. I am thinking, 80 miles up
the river, you have all these guys who do nothing but all day
teach people how to do HAZMAT, and I kind of gather from--just
as I review your testimony, it is just like having local
resources present on an as-needed basis, knowing that the folks
who are locally engaged are, if you will, most prepared. So
first let me just thank you for that testimony, and hopefully
you will be appointed as the next director of something or
other.
Something you said is a little different from what Dr.
Walker said, so I just want the two of you to kind of have a
knife fight. He mentioned, I think, very plausibly that the use
of dispersants will break up the oil. I have heard this from
other experts, allowing the microorganisms to destroy. You
suggest that it will take three to four years for the estuaries
to respond.
Now the Ixtoc spill, I am told, within three years the Gulf
just recovered. Now granted Ixtoc was not marshland as it is in
Louisiana. I gather marshlands and estuaries are more
vulnerable. Nonetheless, we have two different kinds of
scenarios on how this plays out. So could I ask you both to
comment upon your prognosis of how these estuaries and how the
Gulf will heal? This is not so much about your testimony
because I am in total agreement with it--I am going to ask my
staff to find something, some legislation we can come up with.
Mr. Menashes. I probably should defer to Dr. Walker's
expertise on how the estuaries will heal, but I think what I
can say is that, with marshes and mangroves in particular, the
risks to those resources are extremely high. So, our efforts at
this point need to be focused on moving oil away from those
resources and toward areas where it is going to be easier to
clean, and that is what is happening.
The Coast Guard is working with scientists and working with
natural resource managers in the Gulf to do exactly that, and
that is where we need to be focused right now.
For the long term restoration is obviously going to take
quite some time. For our program, for the Research Reserve
System I think what is important for us----
Mr. Cassidy. Why do you say--I am going to challenge you a
little bit.
Mr. Menashes. Sure.
Mr. Cassidy. Because someone came from NOAA, an acting
director of some sort, and he said he was cautiously optimistic
that recovery will take place sooner as opposed to later
because, again, the hope that the microorganisms would
disperse, it would be weathered. Even the folks from
Mississippi have told us that it was washing up as tar balls,
which are easily removed. So continue.
Mr. Menashes. Well, I think the risks for clean up in
marshes is that because of the fragility as we are in the
marshes themselves and working on the marsh restoration, we
have the impacts not only from the oil itself but from the
restoration recovery activities as well.
Mr. Cassidy. So the folks at LSU who have been studying
this forever say the restoration could do more damage than the
spill itself, and I guess that is why I continue to come back
to should there be this huge--I don't want to say they are
fatalistic, but they are denialistic, but rather they just are,
like, it may be benign neglect is the better policy because our
efforts may be more destructive than the original oil.
Mr. Menashes. I cannot comment on whether they will be more
destructive or not. What I can say is we need to study it
further, and that is what the Research Reserves are there for.
I think to work with Dr. Walker's department or folks from
NGO's like the Ocean Conservancy and our Research Reserves and
state and Federal partners are going to be able to address some
of these questions in the long term. We are going to be able to
take some of the information----
Mr. Cassidy. Let me interrupt you----
Mr. Menashes. Sure.
Mr. Cassidy.--because I am on my yellow light, and Dr.
Walker, any comments on what we have been speaking of?
Dr. Walker. Sure. Matt mentioned the reserve system in
Mississippi, and that reserve system is almost completely very
vulnerable pristine marsh areas. After Katrina, that area had
anything from houses to automobiles to whatever else washed up
in it, and we got the bulk of the material out of there, but
some of the biodegradable material that was in there, we made
the decision to leave it there and it was a good decision. That
stuff biologically degraded and the marshes came back in that
system in the next growing cycle, and after two growing cycles
you really couldn't tell that there ever had been an impact.
Similar to this oil spill, there was a rig that leaked, an
on-land rig that leaked a lot of oil into marsh areas in
Louisiana. Louisiana chose to burn those marshes, and those
marshes came back the very next year. So critical wetland
marshes are very resilient places.
Mr. Cassidy. So what I am also hearing from you, in the
spirit of this testimony, is that the local experience and
expertise is irreplaceable in understanding how to manage
damaged resources in that area.
Mr. Menashes. Absolutely. You know, we had proposals to
purchase large equipment to come in and dig up marsh that had
oil in it, and you know, there are a lot of different ways to
get oil out of places, but most of the time if this is
weathered oil, and I want to say something about dispersing in
just a minute, but if it is in fact weathered oil oftentimes it
is better to leave it where it is and let the natural
microflora take control of it.
With regard to dispersants, I would like to think of
dispersants in terms of a bar of soap that is floating in the
bathtub. If the bar of soap is intact, it is going to go away
but it is going to take a long time. But if you could break
that bar of soap into thousands of small pieces, it will go
away a lot quicker, and that is what dispersants are designed
to do, and that is what they are doing in this spill. The
dispersants that are injected subsea at the source of the leak
are breaking that oil into literally thousands of very small
pieces of oil surrounded by water. In that water is contained
natural microorganisms that are there because the Gulf floor
naturally seeps something like 250,000 barrels of oil a year.
Those organisms are capable of----
Mr. Cassidy. Now let me interrupt you, I am allowed to ask
one more question. Are the bacteria--now this has intrigued me.
When we are talking about 5,000 feet below sea level at 40
degrees Fahrenheit and great pressures, do the bacteria exist
there, and if they do not, how do they enter the water column?
Bacteria just don't appear. Are they just so diffuse throughout
the Gulf of Mexico that when hydrocarbon floats by, despite
entropy, they are going to nonetheless coincide?
Mr. Menashes. Well, first, not only microorganisms, but an
awful lot of sealife, is at the seafloor, and they are active.
They are different kinds of creatures as you can imagine. But
the bacteria that I am talking about are present at the
seafloor, and they are only present there because of the oil
seeps. They are there because food is there for them. They have
adapted to be able to utilize this crude material as a food
source. So they have the enzymes and the other materials that
they need to degrade this material. So what you want to do is
provide them as much surface area as they can to get at this
oil, so that is what dispersants do.
There has been a lot of concern about dispersants
themselves and where they are. From what I can tell from the
report that NOAA released yesterday, the area of dispersed oil
is pretty much all in the area of the spill, and the
dispersants are working as they should to break down the oil so
it can degrade faster.
The concentration of oily material in that plume below the
surface of the water is somewhere in the one to two part per
million level, which is relatively low.
Mr. Cassidy. OK, thank you very much for illuminating. I
yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman. I would like now to
recognize the gentlelady from California, Mrs. Capps.
Ms. Capps. Thank you again, Madam Chair.
I want to continue Mr. Cassidy's line of questioning and
pick up on something that you said, Ms. Fletcher, and all of
you seem to have supported, but I would like to get it on the
record. More local input, the question is this--and I will go
down the row--you can answer ``Yes'' or ``No.''
Do each of you think providing a local public forum for the
discussion of deficiencies found in inspections and recommended
solutions as well as preparing oil spill response is a good
idea? So Dr. Walker, I will start with you.
Dr. Walker. Yes, absolutely.
Ms. Capps. Good. It was your idea so I assume you would
agree.
Ms. Fletcher. Brilliant.
Ms. Capps. Brilliant. Yes.
Ms. Fletcher. And I do think that there is room for
creativity in terms of having a local forum, but also some
other mechanisms for the local information to get into the
system.
Mr. Barton. I certainly agree with that, and that was part
of my testimony. I would say that Dr. Walker and I actually
attended an open-house-type forum for local input just so
people could come, ask questions, and participate in the
process, put their ideas on the table, just this past week.
Ms. Capps. Yes.
Mr. Menashes. I think if there is anything we have learned
from having research reserves in local communities, it is that
local people care and provide excellent information. I think
our research reserves have been helping out with sea grant
institutions in the Gulf and putting on some of those public
forums, so yes, we would support that as well.
Dr. Takahashi-Kelso. And I agree. It is absolutely
essential. I would suggest that there is an appropriate role
both for the Federal Government and for state----
Ms. Capps. Yes.
Dr. Takahashi-Kelso.--and local government, and that you
need both of them operating together.
Ms. Capps. And so hopefully there will be some Federal
representation at one of these local public forums, and I bring
this up a little bit tongue-in-cheek because, as some of you
know, I represent Santa Barbara where we had a big spill in
1969, and for years our local community has been sort of
chomping at the bit to have a say because, as you just said,
Doctor, they care so much about their local community and what
happens to it, so thank you, all of you.
Dr. Menashes, I agree that this is it--I wanted to get to
you in the last round, but this has to do with the baseline
data which my researchers at UC-Santa Barbara tell me is so
critical. The collection of baseline data is critical to
preparing damage assessments. That is a given. But what other
benefits could we expect to see with better baseline data
collection?
And I am just thinking of this. We have such technology now
that we did not have before. I have a company in my district
that it is mainly geared--that do underwater observing, and it
kind of is a natural for our defense departments, and so that
is where they have gone, and they are ready to have these be
deployed in our coastal areas as well so that we would have in
place the structure for plugging something in so that you could
start this observing and you could collect this baseline data,
Mr. Menashes.
Mr. Menashes. Well, I think it is important to recognize
the difference between using the baseline data for the Natural
Resources Damage Protection process, which is currently going
on, and the long-term recovery and restoration efforts. I think
it is wise to look at the NRDA process and baseline data as
somewhat having long-term baseline data as part of the NRDA
process could be valuable, but it is more important to get
information very quickly before the spill hits the land.
Ms. Capps. Right.
Mr. Menashes. We have time series that are relatively
recent.
Ms. Capps. But it could start prior to that if you have----
Mr. Menashes. It could.
Ms. Capps.--invasive drilling or some other activity in the
area.
Mr. Menashes. And I think that is important, particularly
when it comes to looking at efficiencies for use of Federal
dollars. Our systemwide monitoring program, which has been in
place for about 15 years in the reserve system and is part of
the Integrated Ocean Observing System. If we were sampling for
hydrocarbons over the past 15 years, we could use that
information to show long-term trends in the Gulf or along any
of the coasts.
We don't have the resources to do hydrocarbon testing, let
alone some of the other testing and monitoring that we would
like to be doing in the long term; for instance, biological
monitoring or changes----
Ms. Capps. Maybe that is something we should look at. I
want to get to one more topic with your indulgence, Madam
Chair.
California has been a leader for the rest of the Nation, in
many respects, in the development of training and use of oiled
wildlife care volunteers during an oil spill response. Oil
spill birds have been the image that has come out of the Gulf
that has touched, I think, people more dramatically than
anything else, and if you have oil offshore, you have
situations that occur from time to time. So oiled bird response
is something that the volunteers have cared very much about in
our area.
California has also partnered with the National Marine
Sanctuaries to create a beach monitoring network that can be
activated in the event of an oil spill, and even in pre-spill
planning, and we have these sanctuaries now in very many of our
protected areas everywhere we have oceans.
My question, and I will put this to Mr. Menashes and Dr.
Kelso, but anyone can respond, begging the time. Do you have
any recommendations for the Subcommittee to better utilize, and
some language we might want to promote in terms of some
legislation, to better utilize volunteers' expertise for oiled
wildlife care and recovery?
Mr. Menashes. I will answer real quickly that it is
important in dealing with the oiled wildlife that we--as we
were talking about with Mr. Cassidy--that hazardous materials
training is in place for these folks. So from a legislative
standpoint----
Ms. Capps. Yes.
Mr. Menashes.--the first thing we need to make sure is----
Ms. Capps. That they are safe.
Mr. Menashes. That they are safe, and I will turn you over
to Dr. Kelso for anything additional.
Dr. Takahashi-Kelso. I will be quick. California has been a
leader and the center at the University of California--Davis,
is really a superb source of expertise.
I think the keys are to have a framework in which
volunteers can be useful, do some pre-training so that they are
a trained corps that is ready to go; make sure that they have
enough equipment to be effective; and also to build a network
among the different wildlife facilities, say along the West
Coast, not just in California. And I think that, regionally,
those wildlife facilities and experts can be more effective if,
prior to any spill, those relationships are established and the
depots of equipment and training are already in place.
Ms. Capps. Do mind if I ask Mr. Barton and Dr. Walker
because you represent different coastal areas. Does this seem
of value to you?
Dr. Walker. Well, in the State of Mississippi, we have an
Audubon Institute, we have a Wildlife Rehabilitation Institute
and we have an Institute on Marine Mammal Studies, and it
focuses on marine mammals and turtles. All of those places, if
they had funding, could train this workforce of volunteers that
Dennis was talking about and that you are referring to. So I
think it is an outstanding idea. We simply need to get
additional support to these folks so that they can provide this
critical training.
Mr. Barton. And there is a big part of our county set aside
for marine protection. We have the Audubon presence there, and
we have the National Grand Bay Estuarine Reserve there. We have
the Sandia National Laboratory, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service is there. So, we have a lot of expertise in the county
that would certainly help with this, and it would certainly be
something we would like to participate in. It would be very
important, and I think we have a lot of local expertise in
those areas.
Ms. Capps. I am over my time. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentlelady, and now I would like
to recognize Mr. Wittman, the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I want to go to Mr. Barton and get your perspective. I
thought it was interesting about your ideas about how this
affects localities, and having served on the Board of
Supervisors in Virginia for a number of years it is near and
dear to my heart about how localities have to deal with this,
and obviously this is not just an issue for you now, but down
the road.
You talk about there being not as much capacity in your
local coastal facilities to really be able to deal with this
particular spill. I would be interested to know how many people
are actually at those facilities and, if you were to look into
the future and ask what kind of capacity do we need in those
facilities for a spill such as we are experiencing now, what do
you think the future need would be to be properly prepared?
Then, I like your idea of this regionalism, these area
commands which are really what states are looking at, to make
sure resources are being leveraged in an immediate way.
Obviously, one county may not have it by itself but you could
leverage those regionally. So tell me what exists now. What do
you think a locality needs in the future, and how do you see
that being leveraged as far as these area commands are doing
regionally?
Mr. Barton. OK. Well, let me try to do that in two answers.
First, responding to the facilities themselves. As I said in
the written testimony and in my oral comments, most of the
facilities along the entire Gulf Coast--Louisiana, Alabama,
Mississippi, Florida, probably in Texas also--most of these
facilities were built a number of years ago when the responses
were just different. We had a different response model. We
didn't have near the people, and really, as I said earlier,
Katrina taught us a lot of lessons, but one of the things that
came in with Katrina was the current NIMS model, and that was
our first really broad experience with that, and it actually
was a pretty good model. I mean, it brought a lot of the right
people to the table, but it also brought a larger presence, and
it required that there be a Federal presence, that there be a
state presence, that there be a local presence, and then you
had these incident command teams and so forth.
So, when you got everybody together, you had all the right
people. We just didn't have any place big enough to put them,
and it was a large number of people over a fairly long period
of time, and so immediately after that storm, we started
looking at the future and said, if this is the future type of
response, then what do we need in place to be able to manage
those emergencies successfully locally? I mean, what do we need
in place?
Well, we went out and we looked at some other facilities
here and there, just a few, not very many that really are
designed with this process in mind. Actually the one in
Escambia County, Florida, is a real good one. It's just been
fairly recently built. And so we started looking at these
footprints and the footprint, I think, can be easily defined to
do everything you need to be able to do and do it locally, but
the problem you get into and the problem we are certainly in,
in most of the coastal regions that I know of, you know, it
might cost as little as maybe a couple hundred thousand dollars
up to maybe a million dollars to do maybe some upgrades or
something, but if you had to build a new facility, you might
spend $6-8 million.
Well, that is a pretty tough hill to climb for a lot of
local communities, and especially communities that, like where
we are, we are still within five years of the storm, I mean, we
are still rebuilding, you know, and we are not at a point right
now where we could borrow that kind of money to build that kind
of building. We know it is a priority, and it is on our list of
things to do, and one day hopefully the county will do that.
But then the second question, if you don't mind repeating
the second question.
Mr. Wittman. Sure. The second question is sort of extended
from what you are talking about, about those command centers.
How do you----
Mr. Barton. Oh, the command centers.
Mr. Wittman. Area commands.
Mr. Barton. What I was going to say, and I will do this as
quickly as I can, and I will go back to the Katrina model in
that sense. In that particular time, we had very similar to
where we are now. We had damage in Alabama, we had damage in
Mississippi, we had damage in Louisiana. But the way the area
commands were set up, they were really more set up by state,
and in that particular case it was under the Stafford Act,
which is slightly different, but the states kind of coordinated
the local communities and then it was up to a unified type
command structure.
And where that worked well, and without going into a lot of
details, but where you have got such a regional approach to
something like this, and if you have sat on a Board of
Supervisors you will know where I am headed here, many times,
you know, what I can do in Mississippi, or maybe turn that
around. Maybe something they can do in Mobile, Alabama, because
they have the statutory authority to do it, in Mississippi, I
may not have that statutory authority.
So, if that coordination is done through a state area
command, and if it is Dr. Bill Walker, he understands the
limitations that we may have that maybe somebody in Alabama
doesn't have or somebody in Florida doesn't have, and maybe
there are a lot of similarities, but when you cross the state
lines, there are always differences, and so in trying to pull
that area command back into a state level, in our opinion, it
would just make it work a lot better, and the relationships are
much closer at the state levels than they are across a regional
basis.
Mr. Wittman. If I can ask just one additional question.
Ms. Bordallo. All right.
Mr. Wittman. I just want to, Mr. Barton, get your
perspective. Obviously we are dealing with the here and now.
How do we respond to this? How do we make sure we deal with the
impacts of this? Give me your perspective on how you think we
best deal with it, and you have been through it with Katrina.
How do we best deal with the economic impacts of this event,
down the road, to make sure that those economies can rebound
from this?
Mr. Barton. That is a much more difficult question to
answer, and you know, I will be honest with you. We have kind
of worked our way through this trying to visualize what the
impacts are going to be. I mean, the impact could be for many,
many, many years, and property values go down, tax revenue goes
down, that is at the governmental level, and then the services
that you are trying to provide. Obviously, in this particular
case, local governments would not have the luxury, I don't
think, of raising taxes because you are raising taxes on people
whose economy has gone south. So, those things are going to be
problematic long term.
But then you get into the small businesses, and I will give
you a perfect example. I had someone in my office earlier this
week--a boat business--primarily saltwater boats. He is going
out of business. Eleven employees who have now lost their jobs.
So how do you frame something to make the owner of the
business whole, the eleven employees who no longer have a job,
and that business may never come back?
So, it kind of goes across a very broad spectrum of all of
our businesses are being hit. I think someone said awhile about
the seafood industry and the restaurants and those kinds of
things. Well, that is something you can quantify. I mean, you
can go back and say, well, how well did you do last year, how
well are you doing this year, and there is a delta, but it is
not always easy to measure what that is going to be or how long
the impact is going to last. But there is no question that it
is going to be a significant impact, and I think it is going to
impact us for quite sometime.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman. We do have votes in a
few minutes, so I would like to thank the panel for their
participation in the hearing this morning, and members of the
Subcommittee may have some additional questions for our
witness, and we will ask you to respond to these in writing. In
addition, the hearing record will be held open for 10 days for
anyone who would like to submit additional information for the
record.
If there is no further business before the Subcommittee,
the Chairwoman thanks the members for their participation here
this morning, and the Subcommittee now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]

Supplemental Written Statement of the
National Estuarine Research Reserve Association

Thank you Chairwoman Bordallo and Members of the Subcommittee for
the opportunity to provide this additional written statement on behalf
of the state agencies and academic institutions that operate the
nation's National Estuarine Research Reserves (reserves) about efforts
to improve standards for preparedness for offshore energy development.
As we noted in the written testimony we submitted earlier for this
hearing, the National Estuarine Research Reserve System (reserve
system) was authorized in 1972 under the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA). The program is a unique federal-state partnership which brings
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) together
with state agencies and universities to protect lands and waters for
long-term research and education purposes. NOAA and reserve staffers
collaborate to provide education, training, and stewardship programs
that ensure the protection of these wonderful places while advancing
our collective understanding of how estuaries function. As part of the
CZMA, the reserves also play a strong role in assisting coastal
managers in reaching out to the public on critical coastal issues.
We all know that the impact in the Gulf of Mexico is not just to
natural resources, but also to the people of the region. We want to
expand on our earlier comments by drawing some attention to the need to
better prepare to respond to--and support--citizens in the local
communities affected by oil spills.
Planners need to focus more effort on getting accurate, locally
specific information to communities and businesses about the true
impacts to natural resources, how commercial and recreational
activities are impacted, and what limitations communities and
businesses may face and for how long. As an example, Gulf coast reserve
staff hear repeatedly from residents in their communities that people
want to understand the characteristics of spilled oil and chemical
dispersants, and want to know what can be expected if people come into
contact with either. Because of the number of questions we are
receiving on this topic, we believe the public may not be getting
information in the most effective manner. Agencies can always do a
better job of communicating with the public. By addressing public
outreach needs in advance, contingency planners can ensure well-
established networks like the reserve system can be used to quickly
reach out to the public to relay critical information in times of
crisis. With our long tenure in many coastal communities, research
reserve staff members are trusted experts that are counted on to
provide timely and accurate information.
We also would like to encourage the committee to explore the
necessary social science research and related public outreach that
should be included in spill contingency plans. Contingency plans should
include ways to immediately begin the research and outreach necessary
to understand the impacts of a spill on people's lives and livelihood.
For instance, with the prevalence of fishing and tourism related
businesses along America's coasts, a common set of social science
research and public outreach programs focused on these areas could be
developed. Universities and other research institutions could be pre-
positioned to begin studies immediately after a spill to determine the
economic impacts to tourism or fishing businesses for example. Other
efforts could focus on ensuring that outreach materials are presented
to diverse communities with appropriate tools and language.
We believe there are many opportunities to strengthen planning to
address the social impacts of spills and other disasters. We appreciate
the opportunity to provide this supplemental statement to our original
testimony as a way to draw attention to some of these opportunities.