[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OCEAN SCIENCE AND DATA
LIMITS IN A TIME OF CRISIS:
DO NOAA AND THE FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE (FWS) HAVE
THE RESOURCES TO RESPOND?
(PART 2 OF 3)
=======================================================================
OVERSIGHT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INSULAR AFFAIRS,
OCEANS AND WILDLIFE
of the
COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-57
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
or
Committee address: http://resourcescommittee.house.gov
----------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
56-978 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES
NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia, Chairman
DOC HASTINGS, Washington, Ranking Republican Member
Dale E. Kildee, Michigan Don Young, Alaska
Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American Elton Gallegly, California
Samoa John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee
Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey Jeff Flake, Arizona
Grace F. Napolitano, California Henry E. Brown, Jr., South
Rush D. Holt, New Jersey Carolina
Raul M. Grijalva, Arizona Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Washington
Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam Louie Gohmert, Texas
Jim Costa, California Rob Bishop, Utah
Dan Boren, Oklahoma Bill Shuster, Pennsylvania
Gregorio Sablan, Northern Marianas Doug Lamborn, Colorado
Martin T. Heinrich, New Mexico Adrian Smith, Nebraska
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Robert J. Wittman, Virginia
George Miller, California Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts John Fleming, Louisiana
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Mike Coffman, Colorado
Maurice D. Hinchey, New York Jason Chaffetz, Utah
Donna M. Christensen, Virgin Cynthia M. Lummis, Wyoming
Islands Tom McClintock, California
Diana DeGette, Colorado Bill Cassidy, Louisiana
Ron Kind, Wisconsin
Lois Capps, California
Jay Inslee, Washington
Joe Baca, California
Stephanie Herseth Sandlin, South
Dakota
John P. Sarbanes, Maryland
Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire
Niki Tsongas, Massachusetts
Frank Kratovil, Jr., Maryland
Pedro R. Pierluisi, Puerto Rico
James H. Zoia, Chief of Staff
Rick Healy, Chief Counsel
Todd Young, Republican Chief of Staff
Lisa Pittman, Republican Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INSULAR AFFAIRS, OCEANS AND WILDLIFE
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam, Chairwoman
HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina, Ranking Republican Member
Dale E. Kildee, Michigan Don Young, Alaska
Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American Jeff Flake, Arizona
Samoa Doug Lamborn, Colorado
Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey Robert J. Wittman, Virginia
Gregorio Sablan, Northern Marianas John Fleming, Louisiana
Donna M. Christensen, Virgin Jason Chaffetz, Utah
Islands Bill Cassidy, Louisiana
Diana DeGette, Colorado Doc Hastings, Washington, ex
Ron Kind, Wisconsin officio
Lois Capps, California
Carol Shea-Porter, New Hampshire
Frank Kratovil, Jr., Maryland
Pedro R. Pierluisi, Puerto Rico
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico
Nick J. Rahall, II, West Virginia,
ex officio
------
CONTENTS
----------
Page
Hearing held on Tuesday, June 15, 2010........................... 1
Statement of Members:
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate in Congress from Guam 1
Prepared statement of.................................... 2
Cassidy, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Louisiana......................................... 2
Statement of Witnesses:
Coddington, Jonathan A., Ph.D., Associate Director of
Research and Collections, National Museum of Natural
History, Smithsonian Institution........................... 30
Prepared statement of.................................... 32
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 36
D'Elia, Christopher F., Ph.D., Professor and Dean, School of
the Coast and Environment, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana..................................... 96
Prepared statement of.................................... 98
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 103
Fingas, Merv, Ph.D., Committee on Oil in the Sea, National
Research Council........................................... 37
Prepared statement of.................................... 38
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 47
Kennedy, David M., Acting Assistant Administrator, National
Ocean Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce................ 5
Prepared statement of.................................... 7
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 12
Lee, Valerie Ann, Senior Vice President, Environment
International Government Ltd., Seattle, Washington......... 84
Prepared statement of.................................... 85
McNutt, Marcia K., Ph.D., Director, U.S. Geological Survey,
U.S. Department of the Interior............................ 22
Prepared statement of.................................... 24
Reddy, Christopher M., Ph.D., Associate Scientist, Director,
Coastal Ocean Institute, Woods Hole Oceanographic
Institution, Woods Hole, Massachusetts..................... 68
Prepared statement of.................................... 70
Reed, Denise J., Ph.D., Interim Director, Pontchartrain
Institute for Environmental Sciences, and Professor,
Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, University
of New Orleans, New Orleans, Louisiana..................... 91
Prepared statement of.................................... 93
Weisberg, Robert H., Ph.D., Distinguished University
Professor, Professor of Physical Oceanography, College of
Marine Science, University of South Florida, St.
Petersburg, Florida........................................ 73
Prepared statement of.................................... 74
Response to questions submitted for the record........... 80
Additional materials supplied:
Brown, William Y., President, Natural Science Collections
Alliance, Letter submitted for the record.................. 118
Tjeerdema, Ronald S., Ph.D., Professor and Chair, Diplomate,
American Board of Toxicology, University of California,
Davis, Letter submitted for the record..................... 119
OVERSIGHT HEARING ON OCEAN SCIENCE AND DATA LIMITS IN A TIME OF CRISIS:
DO NOAA AND THE FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE (FWS) HAVE THE RESOURCES TO
RESPOND? (PART 2 OF 3)
----------
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife
Committee on Natural Resources
Washington, D.C.
----------
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m. in
Room 1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Madeleine Z.
Bordallo presiding.
Present: Representatives Bordallo, Kildee, Sablan, Shea-
Porter, Wittman, Fleming, and Cassidy.
Also present: Representative Bilirakis
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MADELINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE TERRITORY OF GUAM
Ms. Bordallo. Good morning, everyone. The oversight hearing
by the Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans, and Wildlife
will now come to order.
Today, day 57 of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the
Subcommittee continues its inquiry into the largest
environmental disaster in United States history. Last week, we
heard from distinguished panelists about the short- and the
long-term impacts of the oil spill on trust resources,
including fisheries, birds and other wildlife, marine mammals,
tribal resources, protected fish and wildlife habitat, beaches,
our coasts, and other natural areas. It was abundantly clear
from that hearing that the communities that depend on these
resources, from fishermen and hunters to the tourism industry,
will be reeling from the impacts of this oil spill for decades.
Today's hearing will investigate both what we know and what
we do not know about the environment to guide the oil spill
response and recovery activities in the Gulf of Mexico.
Clearly, there is so much that we do not know because of the
unprecedented scale and complexity of this oil spill. But some
of these unknowns can be eliminated through transparent access
to data and information, and adequate deployment of assets to
measure and monitor the spill.
We need to know how much oil has spilled and continues to
spill into the Gulf. We need to know the fate of this oil and
dispersant at the surface and in the water column. We need to
collect and integrate baseline environmental data to properly
assess natural resource damages.
This information is critical to our response and recovery
activities because what gets measured gets managed. Sadly,
there is so much that will not be managed because of the gaps
and the limits in our understanding of the complex estuary,
coastal, and marine environments in the Gulf. We have made such
limited investments in coastal science programs and ocean
observation systems that it has proven difficult to provide
timely and accurate scientific information to target response
activities and to assess damages to natural resources.
Whether we know enough to mitigate the impacts of this oil
spill, to properly compensate the public for damages to natural
resources and to prevent catastrophic oil spills in the future,
remains to be seen. But we must strive to make the public whole
and to take every protection to never let a disaster like this
happen again.
I want to thank this morning all of the witnesses for being
here during this very challenging and busy time, and I look
forward to hearing your testimony. At this time, I would like
to recognize Mr. Cassidy, the Acting Ranking Republican Member
of this Subcommittee, for any statement that he may have.
[The prepared statement of Chairwoman Bordallo follows:]
Statement of The Honorable Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife
Today, Day 57 of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the Subcommittee
continues its inquiry into the largest environmental disaster in U.S.
history. Last week we heard from distinguished panelists about the
short and long-term impacts of the oil spill on trust resources,
including fisheries, birds and other wildlife, marine mammals, tribal
resources, protected fish and wildlife habitat, beaches, our coasts,
and other natural areas. It was abundantly clear from that hearing that
the communities that depend on these resources, from fishermen and
hunters to the tourism industry, will be reeling from the impacts of
this oil spill for decades.
Today's hearing will investigate both what we know and what we do
not know about the environment to guide the oil spill response and
recovery activities in the Gulf of Mexico. Clearly, there is so much
that we do not know because of the unprecedented scale and complexity
of this oil spill, but some of these unknowns can be illuminated
through transparent access to data and information and adequate
deployment of assets to measure and monitor the spill.
We need to know how much oil has spilled and continues to spill
into the Gulf. We need to know the trajectory and fate of this oil and
dispersant at the surface and in the water column. We need to collect
and integrate baseline environmental data to properly assess natural
resource damages. This information is critical to our response and
recovery activities because what gets measured gets managed.
Sadly, there is so much that will not be managed because of the
gaps and limits in our understanding of the complex estuarine, coastal,
and marine environments in the Gulf. We have made such limited
investments in coastal science programs and ocean observation systems
that it has proven difficult to provide timely and accurate scientific
information to target response activities and to assess damages to
natural resources.
Whether we know enough to mitigate the impacts of this oil spill,
to properly compensate the public for damages to natural resources, and
to prevent catastrophic oil spills in the future remains to be seen,
but we must strive to make the public whole and to take every
precaution to never let a disaster like this happen again.
I thank all the witnesses for being here today during this very
challenging and busy time, and look forward to hearing your testimony.
______
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BILL CASSIDY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA
Mr. Cassidy. Thank you, Madame Chair. I appreciate your
scheduling this hearing on the resources and knowledge
available to the Federal Government, especially NOAA and the
Fish and Wildlife Service, in responding to the Deepwater
Horizon spill.
It has been 57 days since the Deepwater Horizon exploded
and sank some 42 miles off the coast of Louisiana. It is an
ongoing disaster for the Gulf Coast region, its economy and
environment, and the millions who live there, and it is a
tragedy cut in stone for those who have lost loved ones.
Particularly, it is an ongoing tragedy for those whose jobs are
dependent upon the Gulf of Mexico, and a new tragedy is the
President's moratorium on offshore drilling, which will
effectively destroy the livelihoods of tens of thousands of
Louisianians who rely upon well-paying jobs to support their
family.
At previous hearings, I have referred to the National
Academy of Sciences' report, ``Oil in the Sea III.'' This
report was released in 2003 and had many recommendations to
Federal agencies regarding natural and man-made releases of oil
and the research necessary to understand their effects.
However, there are many recommendations in this report and
other reports, such as the 2004 ``Spill of National
Significance'' report, which have not been acted upon by these
agencies.
At last week's Subcommittee hearing, concerns were raised
about the use of dispersants. Well, there seems to be some
understanding of the impact of dispersants' use on the water
surface, but there are concerns about the short- and long-term
impact of their use within the water column. We also do not
have much information on how oil degrades in the ultra-deep and
deep waters, as well as in sensitive marine areas.
Some of our witnesses today will discuss this and tell us
where the science is limited. It is apparent that we do not
have the knowledge necessary to address a spill this size. It
is a disappointment that the Environmental Protection Agency,
which was invited and has issued permits allowing the use of
subsurface dispersants, apparently felt this hearing was not
worth their time.
At today's hearing, we will examine what information was
available to the Federal Government prior to this spill. Did
each agency have adequate baseline data available for the Gulf
of Mexico region to understand the impacts of the oil? In an
area where oil and gas exploration occurs daily, it would seem
essential to have this information, but a lot of Federal
efforts following the spill, particularly the responses of NOAA
and EPA, have been to create baseline data from scratch rather
than acting upon an existing set of knowledge and preparations.
And why haven't we learned from the previous spills? I have
asked in this Committee on numerous occasions about the 1979
Ixtoc drilling accident in the Gulf of Mexico. How has it
informed us? Why can't we do what the Norwegians did when they
actually studied the effects of oil in the deepwater? Lake
Barre was an oil spill in the Louisiana marshes. None of my
witnesses, so far, have been able to tell us how clean-ups in
that area could inform our clean-ups in this area. I look
forward to these panels, and I am confident that you will be
able to.
Why are outside researchers and even private citizens able
to tell the Federal Government things long before the Federal
Government is able to come to the same conclusion? For
instance, why are researchers able to tell from watching BP's
spill cam over the Internet that more oil was being discharged
than was being estimated? And then the Federal Government had
to create a new committee before it could tell us that these
researchers were right. And why have we not tested dispersant
use in deepwater? What information is available in sensitive
coastal areas?
Did the Administration react quickly enough to protect
these areas? Do we know how these coastal wetlands will respond
and how long it will take them to recover? How can we be more
innovative in our approach in dealing with disasters like this,
including reducing the Federal red tape that seems to hamstring
our efforts at creating new approaches?
There are a great many outstanding scientists working at
our universities, and especially in my state and other states
affected by the spill, who should be consulted to understand
these issues and find solutions. Instead, I have heard from
academic professionals, in Louisiana and elsewhere, that they
are not being offered the opportunity to engage with the
Federal Government and share their wide-ranging expertise, and
that even after the spill they have had little opportunity to
provide input. And I have also been told by some researchers
that they are being intimidated by BP to not go into the
marshes, to publish their scientific findings, and if they do,
they will risk legal action.
The Federal Government should be actively seeking the input
of the academic community and ensuring that the data collected
is published so we can learn from this devastating event.
Madame Chair, I look forward to hearing from our
distinguished witnesses, who will give us their unique
perspective on the impacts of this oil spill disaster.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman from Louisiana for his
opening statement. And I would now like to recognize our first
panel of witnesses to testify. Before we do that, I would like
to ask those that are standing in the back, you can take the
chairs up here on the lower dais if you would like to be
seated. This may be a lengthy hearing, and I don't know that
you can be able to stand through it all. Please feel welcome to
sit here.
Our witnesses this morning on panel one include Mr. David
Kennedy, the Acting Assistant Administrator, National Ocean
Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; Dr.
Marcia McNutt, Director, U.S. Geological Survey; Dr. Jonathan
A. Coddington, Associate Director for Research and Collections,
National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian Institution;
and Dr. Merv Fingas, Committee on Oil in the Sea, National
Research Council.
I would like to thank all of you for being here today. And
as we begin, I would note that the red timing light on the
table will indicate when your five minutes have passed and your
time has concluded. We would very much appreciate your
cooperation in complying with these limits. But be assured,
ladies and gentlemen, that your full written statement will be
submitted for the hearing record.
And now, Mr. Kennedy, welcome back to our Subcommittee, and
thank you for being here today. Please begin your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAVID KENNEDY, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL OCEAN SERVICE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Kennedy. Good morning. Thank you, Chairwoman Bordallo
and members of the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify
on the critical role of ocean observations and data in this
time of crisis and areas for future emphasis. My name is David
Kennedy, Acting Assistant Administrator, Ocean Service Coastal
Zone Management, for NOAA. I have been deeply involved in this
spill and many before.
But before I move on--I want to discuss NOAA's efforts. I
would like first to express my condolences to the families of
the 11 people who lost their lives in the explosion and sinking
of the Deepwater Horizon platform.
The entire agency is deeply concerned about the immediate
and long-term environmental, economic, and social impacts to
the Gulf Coast and the Nation as a whole from this spill. NOAA
is fully mobilized and working tirelessly to lessen impacts on
the Gulf Coast, and will continue to do so until the spill is
controlled, oil is cleaned up, natural resource injuries are
assessed, and restoration is complete.
Today, I am going to focus my comments on the importance of
ocean observations in the Gulf of Mexico and future areas for
enhancing oil spill response. Unfortunately, this oil spill is
a grave reminder that spills of national significance can
occur, despite the safeguards and improvements that have been
put into place since the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of
1990. If a spill does occur, responders must be equipped with
the appropriate tools and information, and effective response
based on solid science and smart decision-making resources,
environmental and socioeconomic impacts, as well as clean-up
costs.
I am going to talk just briefly about surface observations,
and then I will go to subsurface. One of NOAA's roles during
the oil spill is to provide scientific information to the
Federal on-scene coordinator. One of the products NOAA provides
are spill trajectories. Real-time data on currents, tides, and
winds, as well as sustained observations and physical and
chemical parameters of the whole water column are important in
driving the models that inform our understanding of the likely
path of the spilled oil. The usefulness of NOAA's trajectory
model depends in part on the accuracy of the input data.
Observational data play a critical role in ensuring the
most accurate trajectory forecast is provided. These forecasts
ensure that local communities have advanced warning of
potential impacts, and as a result that plans can be put in
place to protect sensitive natural resources. For modeling the
surface movement of oil, ocean observations such as high
frequency radar play a critical role. High frequency radar is
delivered near real-time surface current data
24/7, covering thousands of square miles simultaneously.
Surface currents of the ocean are key inputs to the models that
generate estimates of the extent and trajectory of an oil
spill.
In the Gulf of Mexico, this information is provided from
the Gulf of Mexico Coastal Ocean Observing System, GCOOS, and
the Southeast Coastal Ocean Observing Regional Association,
SECOORA. These regional associations are part of the U.S.
Integrated Ocean Observing System, or IOOS, a Federal,
regional, and private sector partnership working to enhance our
ability to collect, deliver, and use ocean information.
Because we cannot predict where a spill will occur, data
delivery from high frequency radar is envisioned to be part of
a seamless national system that will ensure information 24/7.
As IOOS generates more data from technological advances like
high frequency radar, the prediction of oil's location will be
improved by pulling these observations into NOAA's trajectory
models.
Subsurface observations. As the Deepwater Horizon oil spill
is demonstrating, our nation's existing capacity to deliver an
accurate depiction of subsurface movement is limited. Although
there is some capacity across the Federal and non-Federal
oceanography community, ocean currents, oil density, and
behavior in oil droplet size are all significant contributors
to whether oil rises to the ocean surface or remains below the
surface.
The subsurface concentration of dissolved oil or oil
droplets is of significant concern in understanding how
fisheries, marine mammals, and other species in the water
column will be affected. The broad oceanographic community has
responded in remarkable fashion and made available the best of
their expertise and technology to better inform our
understanding of the subsurface movement of oil.
However, to detect the presence of subsurface oil and
estimate its movements beneath the surface, one needs a suite
of observing assets combined with three-dimensional ocean
circulation models. While ship surveys have been the
conventional method for observing three-dimensional fields of
temperature, salinity, and other properties, such as
chlorophyll and nutrients, this method is slow and costly. A
combination of profiling floats, moored buoys with profiling
sensors, and gliders have the capability to deliver the
information with the temporal and spatial parameters needed.
In addition to enhancing observations in the Gulf of Mexico
to produce more robust trajectory models of surface and
subsurface oil, additional research, enhanced response
capability, and improved tools and technological innovation by
the public or private sector would greatly improve our ability
to respond to the level expected by the nation.
To mitigate environmental effects of future spills,
responders must be equipped with sufficient capacity and
capabilities to address the challenge. If another large spill
were to occur simultaneously in another location elsewhere in
the United States, NOAA would have difficulty responding to its
complete ability. Strong science is critical to effective
decision-making to minimize the ecological and economic impacts
from, and mitigate the effects of, oil spills on coastal and
marine resources in the associated communities.
Existing research has resulted in the advance of some
response technologies. More can be done, however, to strengthen
our nation's response capability, and continued development of
tools and strategies can only increase the effectiveness of oil
spills.
In closing, I assure you that NOAA will not relent in our
efforts to protect the livelihoods of affected Gulf Coast
residents and mitigate the environmental impacts of this spill.
Thank you for allowing me the time. Thanks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kennedy follows:]
Statement of David M. Kennedy, Acting Assistant Administrator, National
Ocean Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce
Thank you, Chairwoman Bordallo and Members of the Subcommittee, for
the opportunity to testify on the Department of Commerce's National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) role in the response to
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
My name is David Kennedy and I am the Acting Assistant
Administrator for Ocean Services and Coastal Zone Management at NOAA. I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss the critical roles NOAA serves
during oil spills and the importance of our contributions to protect
and restore the natural resources, communities, and economies affected
by this tragic event. Before I move on to discuss NOAA's efforts, I
would first like to express my condolences to the families of the
eleven people who lost their lives in the explosion and sinking of the
Deepwater Horizon platform.
NOAA's mission is to understand and predict changes in the Earth's
environment and conserve and manage coastal and marine resources to
meet our Nation's economic, social, and environmental needs. NOAA is
also a natural resource trustee and is one of the federal agencies
responsible for protecting, assessing, and restoring the public's
coastal natural resources when they are impacted by oil spills,
hazardous substance releases, and impacts from vessel groundings on
corals and seagrass beds. As such, the entire agency is deeply
concerned about the immediate and long-term environmental, economic,
and social impacts to the Gulf Coast and the Nation as a whole from
this spill. NOAA is fully mobilized and working tirelessly to lessen
impacts on the Gulf Coast and will continue to do so until the spill is
controlled, oil is cleaned up, natural resource injuries are assessed,
and restoration is complete.
My testimony today will discuss NOAA's role in the Deepwater
Horizon response and natural resource damage assessment process,
observations related to the Gulf of Mexico, and future activities to
improve response and resource assessment efforts.
NOAA'S RESPONSE AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT EFFORTS
NOAA has three critical roles mandated by the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 and the National Contingency Plan:
1. During the emergency response, NOAA serves as a conduit for
scientific information to the Federal On-Scene Coordinator.
NOAA provides trajectory predictions for spilled oil, conducts
overflight observations of oil on water, identifies highly
valued or sensitive environmental areas, and conducts shoreline
surveys to determine clean-up priorities.
2. As a natural resource trustee, NOAA conducts a joint
Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) with co-trustees to
assess and restore natural resources injured by the oil spill.
NRDA also assesses the lost uses of those resources, such as
recreational fishing, canoeing, and swimming, with the goal of
implementing restoration projects to address these injuries.
3. Finally, NOAA represents the Department of Commerce in
spill response decision-making activities through the National
Response Team.
NOAA's experts have been assisting with the response to the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill from the beginning, providing coordinated
scientific services when and where they are needed most. Support from
NOAA has not stopped since the first requests for information by the
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). Over the past eight weeks, NOAA has provided
scientific support, both on-scene and through our headquarters and
regional offices. NOAA's support includes daily trajectories of the
spilled oil, weather data to support short- and long-range forecasts,
and hourly localized `spot' forecasts to determine the use of weather-
dependent mitigation techniques such as oil burns and chemical
dispersant applications. We develop custom navigation products and
updated charts to help keep mariners out of oiled areas. NOAA uses
satellite imagery and real-time observational data on the tides and
currents to predict and verify oil spill location and movement. To
ensure the safety of fishermen and consumer seafood safety, NOAA has
closed oil-impacted areas to commercial fishing. NOAA scientists are in
the spill area taking water and seafood samples to determine which
areas are safe for commercial fishing. NOAA will reopen these areas
only if it is assured that fish products within the closed area meet
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standards for public health and
wholesomeness. To that end, NOAA, in conjunction with FDA, is
continuing to refine a reopening protocol based on both chemical and
sensory analysis of seafood within the closed area. In addition, NOAA's
marine animal health experts are providing expertise and assistance
with stranded sea turtles and marine mammals.
To facilitate on-the-ground understanding of the spill's impacts,
NOAA is awarding grants for rapid response projects to monitor the
impacts of the oil spill on Louisiana's coastal marshes and fishery
species through the Sea Grant Program. To support the local communities
as they deal with the economic, social, and environmental impacts of
the spill, the Gulf Coast Sea Grant Programs are hosting a series of
open forums across the Gulf where citizens have the opportunity to
interact with industry, government, and university representatives. In
addition, NOAA helped organized volunteer beach clean-ups to remove
pre-spill debris from state beaches, which eliminates obstacles and
improves access, thereby helping to facilitate the identification and
cleanup of oil along the shoreline.
With multiple agencies supporting a diverse array of research
projects in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico, it is important to coordinate research activities to ensure the
best use of limited resources. NOAA's Gulf Coast Sea Grant Programs are
developing a website to serve as a central database listing ongoing
research activities and identifying funding opportunities for oil-spill
related research, whether conducted by government, academic, or
privately-supported scientists. The database's intent is to provide a
single, comprehensive view of research activities in the Gulf that are
being undertaken in connection with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and
to foster coordination of these efforts.
At the onset of this oil spill, NOAA quickly mobilized staff from
its Damage Assessment Remediation and Restoration Program to begin
coordinating with federal and state co-trustees and the responsible
parties to collect a variety of data that are critical to help inform
the NRDA process. NOAA is coordinating the NRDA effort with the
Department of the Interior (another federal co-trustee), as well as co-
trustees in five states and representatives for at least one
responsible party, BP.
While it is still too early in the process to know what the full
scope of the damage assessment will be, NOAA and co-trustees continue
to collect data in the Gulf and across the five states. These data will
be used to determine what natural resources have been injured and what
human uses have been lost due to the spill. Several technical working
groups comprising NOAA, federal and state co-trustees, and
representatives from one responsible party (BP) are gathering existing
scientific information and developing and implementing baseline (pre-
spill impact) and post-impact field studies for multiple resource
categories. Hundreds of miles of coastal shoreline were surveyed by air
and samples were taken to determine baseline conditions prior to the
oil hitting land, to identify where the oil has made landfall to
support clean-up activities. Resources being assessed include fish and
shellfish, bottom-dwelling plant and animal life, birds, marine
mammals, turtles, and sensitive habitats such as wetlands, submerged
aquatic vegetation or seagrasses, beaches, mudflats, bottom sediments,
deep and shallow corals, chemosynthetic organisms, and the water
column. Some of these resources may be included within National
Estuarine Research Reserves and National Marine Sanctuaries. In
addition, NOAA and co-trustee field teams are determining how human
uses, including cultural uses, and natural resource services are being
impacted.
Needless to say, for both the response and the NRDA, offices
throughout NOAA are mobilized and hundreds of NOAA personnel are
dedicating themselves to assist with this unprecedented effort.
ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE FUTURE RESPONSE AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT EFFORTS
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill is a grave reminder that spills of
national significance can occur despite the safeguards and improvements
that have been put into place since the passage of Oil Pollution Act of
1990. Although the best option is to prevent oil spills, the risk of
oil spills remains a concern given the offshore and onshore oil
infrastructure, pipes, and vessels that move huge volumes of oil
through our waterways. If a spill does occur, responders must be
equipped with the appropriate tools and information. An effective
response, based on solid science and smart decision making reduces
environmental and socioeconomic impacts, as well as clean-up costs.
Research and development and technological innovation by the public or
private sector in the following areas would greatly enhance the tools
and technologies available in the event of a spill.
Surface Observations
Real-time data on currents, tides, and winds, as well as sustained
observations of physical and chemical parameters of the whole water
column, are important in driving the models that inform our
understanding of the likely trajectory of the spilled oil. The
usefulness of NOAA's trajectory model depends in part on the accuracy
of its input data. Observational data play a critical role in ensuring
the most accurate trajectory forecast is provided. These forecasts
ensure that local communities have advance warning of potential impacts
and, as a result, that plans can be put in place to protect sensitive
natural resources. Government, academic, and commercial entities are
working together to provide the data needed to support these
forecasting efforts. For example, several ocean current models are
contributing to the trajectory analysis for the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill, including those from NOAA, the Navy, the Department of the
Interior's Minerals Management Service, the State of Texas, and
academic partners. These models use satellite analysis, real-time and
near real-time ocean observations, and long-term data.
For modeling the surface movement of oil, ocean observations such
as the high-frequency radar play a critical role. High-frequency radars
deliver near real-time surface current data 24/7, covering thousands of
square miles simultaneously. Surface currents of the ocean are key
inputs to the models that generate estimates of the extent and
trajectory of an oil spill. This information is provided from the Gulf
of Mexico Coastal Ocean Observing System (GCOOS) and the Southeast
Coastal Ocean Observing Regional Association (SECOORA). These regional
associations are part of the U.S. Integrated Ocean Observing System
(IOOS), a federal, regional, and private-sector partnership working to
enhance our ability to collect, deliver, and use ocean information.
GCOOS and SECOORA each have three high-frequency radars that are
contributing valuable information to the spill response. These radars
are part of a national network high-frequency radar data delivery
system funded and managed by the NOAA IOOS Program. Because we cannot
predict where a spill will occur, data delivery from high-frequency
radars is envisioned to be part of a seamless national system that will
ensure information 24/7. As the Integrated Ocean Observing System
generates more data from technological advances like high frequency
radar, the prediction of oil location can be improved by pulling these
observations into trajectory models in real time.
Efforts led by NOAA since 2007 to increase the coordination and
interaction of various ocean observing centers of expertise into a
cohesive community under the framework of the U.S. IOOS has built
strong collaborative relationships across the community. As a result,
the community has been able to quickly exchange information, identify
assets and establish means of working together to meet the challenge
the Nation faces with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
In addition to in-situ sensors, data collected by space-based
synthetic aperture radar can be used to produce high-resolution images
of the Earth's lands and oceans and can also be used in all types of
weather, as it can ``see through'' clouds and darkness. Current use of
NOAA-generated experimental products suggests that data from space-
based synthetic aperture radar can assist in detecting and refining the
areal extent of oil, which would provide valuable information to help
determine where response efforts and resources should be deployed.
Subsurface Observations
As the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is demonstrating, our Nation's
existing capacity to deliver an accurate depiction of subsurface
movement is limited; although, there is some capacity across the
federal and non-federal oceanography community. Ocean currents, oil
density and behavior, and oil droplet size are all significant
contributors to whether oil rises to the ocean surface or remains below
the surface. The subsurface concentration of dissolved oil or oil
droplets is of significant concern to understanding how fisheries,
marine mammals, and other species in the water column will be affected.
To address these concerns, the federal response team established a
formal Subsurface Monitoring Branch. In addition, the broad
oceanographic community has responded in remarkable fashion and made
available the best of their expertise and technology. In addition,
federal agencies such as NOAA, U.S. Naval Oceanographic Office, and
Environmental Protection Agency are all contributing capabilities to
better inform our understanding of the subsurface movement of oil.
The emerging advancement in modeling three-dimensionally can
greatly enhance response operations and mitigation efficacy. This year,
NOAA started an effort to begin to enhance three-dimensional models,
which will improve our ability to predict the movement of oil at depth
and allow us to direct precious resources to validate the models'
trajectory.
To detect the presence of subsurface oil and estimate its movement
beneath the surface, one needs a suite of observing assets combined
with three-dimensional ocean circulation models. In addition to the
high-frequency radars to monitor the surface currents, one needs high-
resolution circulation models informed by three-dimensional fields of
temperature and salinity. While ship surveys have been the conventional
method for observing three-dimensional fields of temperature, salinity,
and other properties, such as chlorophyll and nutrients, this method is
slow and costly. Three-dimensional circulation models require synoptic
measurements at sufficient time intervals to adequately capture the
changing conditions in the water column. A combination of profiling
floats, moored buoys with profiling sensors, and gliders have the
capability to deliver the information at the temporal and spatial
parameters needed.
NOAA is currently involved in several sampling cruises to better
characterize what is in the water column. A number of gliders,
autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV), and other existing technologies
are being applied in new ways, such as through the use of multi-beam
echo sounders and fisheries echo sounders to help map the potential
locations of oil that might be present in the water column.
Current hydrographic surveys carry out sustained observations of
the whole water column in the Gulf of Mexico, Florida Bay, and the
Florida Keys, and will be extended if the oil or dispersant spreads
through the Strait of Florida and into the Gulf Stream. These surveys,
along with satellite observations and numerical models, allow
monitoring of currents and features responsible for the transport of
oil and dispersants.
Whether provided by new technologies, or through re-examining the
capabilities of current technologies, information on the locations of
spilled oil is of significant benefit in spill response, such as the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Timely understanding of the location of
the spilled oil allows responders to position their activities and
better utilize limited resources to maximize our contributions to
protect and restore the resources, communities, and economies affected
by this tragic event.
Activities to Improve Future Response and Resource Assessment Efforts
Response capacity and capabilities
To mitigate environmental effects of future spills,
responders must be equipped with sufficient capacity
and capabilities to address the challenge. NOAA's
Office of Response and Restoration is fully engaged in
responding to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Although
unlikely, if another large spill were to occur
simultaneously in another location elsewhere in the
United States, NOAA would have difficulty responding to
its complete ability.
Expertise-- A diverse team of experts in
analytical chemistry, environmental chemistry, biology,
oceanography, natural resource damage assessment,
administrative functions, and information management
helps NOAA plan and prepare activities between spills,
including training, development of area plans and
response protocols, drafting and reviewing response job
aids, and coordinating with regional responders.
Training-- Response training and exercises are
essential to maintaining capabilities. Continuous
training, improvement of our capabilities, maintenance
of our capacity, and investments in high-priority,
response-related research and development efforts help
to ensure that the Nation's response to these events
remains effective. Training and coordination with other
federal, state, and local agencies with response and
restoration responsibilities is critical to success in
mitigating effects of future spills.
Response tools and technologies
The continued development of tools and strategies can
only increase the effectiveness of oil spill response.
Specific activities that would increase response
effectiveness include:
Natural Resource Protection Tools -
Environmental Sensitivity Index (ESI) database and map
products provide information that helps reduce the
environmental, economic, and social impacts from oil
and hazardous substance spills. ESI maps include
critical information on biological resources (such as
birds, shellfish beds, and endangered species),
sensitive shorelines (such as marshes, tidal flats, and
marine sanctuaries), and human-use resources (such as
public beaches, parks, and drinking water intakes).
Spill responders use NOAA's ESI maps--and maps prepared
by other federal and state trustees, including the
Department of the Interior (DOI)--as tools to identify
priority areas to protect from the spreading oil,
develop cleanup strategies to minimize impacts to the
environment and coastal communities, and reduce overall
cleanup costs. NOAA's goal is to update ESI maps
approximately every ten years so that responders have
the most accurate information; other agencies update
their maps according to their needs and schedules.
Data Management Tools for Decision Making - The
key to effective emergency response is efficiently
integrating current science, information technology,
and real-time observational data into response decision
making. NOAA has developed the Emergency Response
Management Application (ERMA), a web-based information
management application, to facilitate preparedness and
response and restoration decision making for oil spills
and for other coastal hazards. ERMA integrates real-
time observations (e.g., NOAA National Buoy Data Center
data, weather data, shoreline data, vessel traffic
information, etc.) with archived data sources (e.g.,
NOAA's National Oceanographic Data Center's historical
data) in an easy to use, Google-based format to aid in
evaluating resources at risk, visualizing oil
trajectories, and planning rapid tactical response
operations, injury assessments, and habitat
restoration. Having access to retrospective data is
critical to bringing value to real-time observational
data being collected. NOAA is working with DOI and
state trustees to assure that data management tools can
be integrated.
NOAA is currently using the Gulf of Mexico ERMA for the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill response to help manage the
common operational picture for all command posts. The
Gulf of Mexico ERMA is updated daily to provide a
dynamic and automated tool allowing for greater access,
more layers of data, and high-resolution photography.
ERMA allows users to navigate through different layers
of information to reveal actual data and magnify areas
of geographic interest - ultimately improving decision
making. For example, ERMA could provide a picture of
diverse shoreline development (e.g., industry,
residential, protected habitats, tourist/recreational
use), information on routine shipments of oil and
chemicals through the Gulf, and the proximity of
wildlife management areas and conservation easements.
In addition to the Gulf of Mexico, ERMA is operational
in the U.S. Caribbean and New England.
Recently NOAA has worked with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to integrate their developing
Information, Planning, and Conservation decision
support system into ERMA. The result is the ability to
transfer information allowing users to seamlessly move
between the systems to obtain information about Fish
and Wildlife Service trust resources and recommended
best management practices. This system integration will
result in users only having to visit one location to
obtain information regarding both agencies' trust
resources. The ability to obtain natural resource
information in as few places as possible is vital to
effective emergency response efforts
Research
Strong science is critical to effective decision making to minimize
the ecological and economic impacts from, and mitigate the effects of,
oil spills on coastal and marine resources and associated communities.
Existing research has resulted in the advancement of some response
technologies. More can be done, however, to strengthen our Nation's
response capabilities.
Long-Term Effects on Species and Habitats--
Spilled oil can remain on the shoreline and in wetlands
and other environments for years. More than twenty
years later, there is still oil in the sediments of
Prince William Sound from the Exxon Valdez spill.
Continued research is needed to improve our
understanding of the long-term effects of oil on
sensitive and economically important species and
habitats. Research is also needed to determine the
effects of oil and dispersants that are suspended in
the water column on mid-water and pelagic species, as
well as on deep-water corals, chemosynthetic
communities (animal communities living in the deep sea
on dissolved gases), and benthic habitats. Such studies
can provide valuable information on the sensitivity
and/or resilience of these deepwater communities and
can inform response actions and assessment work.
Research to Improve Tools for Assessment and
Restoration--As our understanding of complex ecosystems
evolves, it is important that we continually update and
refine our techniques to assess and restore injured
natural resources. For example, research and tools to
better assess and quantify natural resource services--
such as water filtration and capture, flood protection,
carbon sequestration, recreation, and education--across
a range of habitat types, can help ensure that the
public is fully compensated and that the environment is
fully restored.
Research on behavior of surface and subsurface
plumes--The transport of chemical and biological
substances, and dilution and transformation thereof is
key to determining the concentrations that living
marine resources will encounter. This, in turn,
determines whether environmental impact will be
significant or not. Research and development on
observing systems and predictive models capable of
characterizing plumes will provide much needed
capability.
Air Quality Impacts--In addition to its marine
responsibilities, NOAA is also responsible for
predicting the air-quality impacts from oil and
hazardous substance spills in cooperation with the
Environmental Protection Agency. The characteristics of
pollution released from large areas of burning oil and
the widespread evaporation of oil are significantly
different from routine atmospheric-dispersion
scenarios. Research and development of improved tools
to estimate the characteristics of compounds entering
the atmosphere, and integration of those tools with
NOAA's existing atmospheric modeling capabilities,
would significantly improve NOAA's ability to predict
smoke and chemical concentrations in the atmosphere
resulting from such incidents.
Oil in Arctic Environments--Continued
acceleration of sea-ice decline in the Arctic Ocean as
a consequence of global warming may lead to increased
Arctic maritime transportation and energy exploration
that in turn may increase the potential for oil spills
occurring in the Arctic. Recent studies, such as the
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme's Oil and
Gas Assessment, place emphasis on improving our
understanding of how oil will behave in icy
environments or when it sinks below the surface.
Acquiring a basic understanding of the current
environmental conditions is important for conducting
injury assessments and developing restoration
strategies. Research is needed to better understand the
challenges of spill response in Arctic waters and the
most effective tools and techniques to utilize in such
environments. There is also a need to identify site-
specific protocols for assessing injuries to the
unique, high-value habitats found in the Arctic
Human Dimensions--Research is needed on how to
incorporate impacted communities into the preparedness
and response processes to help address the human
dimensions of spills. Such research would consider
social issues, community effects, risk communication
methods, and valuation of natural resources.
Transparency and communications can be improved to
share information with impacted communities on how and
why decisions are made and the breadth of response and
NRDA activities that have been and will be undertaken
for the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
CONCLUSION
I would like to assure you that NOAA will not relent in our efforts
to protect the livelihoods of affected Gulf Coast residents and
mitigate the environmental impacts of this spill. In the wake of such
an event, we are reminded of the fragility of our coastal ecosystems
and the dependence of coastal economies on the health and prosperity of
our seas. Thank you for allowing me to testify on NOAA's response,
damage assessment efforts, collaboration with other trustees, and areas
for future research. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
______
Response to questions submitted for the record by David Kennedy, Acting
Assistant Administrator, National Ocean Service, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Questions from Chairwoman Madeline Z. Bordallo (D-GU)
1. What is the status of efforts to map the underwater plumes?
NOAA, federal partners, academics, and others in the research
community have mobilized to research and quantify the location and
concentration of subsurface oil from the spill. Since the beginning of
May, NOAA has been conducting and coordinating sampling of the sub-
surface region around the Deepwater Horizon well-head and beyond to
characterize the presence of subsurface oil. The sub-surface research
involves the use of sonar, UV instruments called fluorometers, which
can detect the presence of oil and other biological compounds, and
collection of water samples from discrete depths using a series of
bottles that can be closed around a discrete water sample.
NOAA ships Gordon Gunter and Thomas Jefferson have both conducted
missions to collect water samples from areas near the wellhead, as well
as further from the wellhead and in the coastal zone. Water samples
from many of these missions are still being analyzed and additional
missions are in progress or being planned to continue the comprehensive
effort to define the presence of oil below the surface and understand
its impacts.
Water samples taken by researchers on the R/V Weatherbird II have
also been analyzed for the presence of subsurface oil. The samples from
the R/V Weatherbird II confirmed low concentrations of surface oil from
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill 40 nautical miles northeast of the
wellhead. Additionally, hydrocarbons were found in samples 45 nautical
miles northeast of the wellhead--at the surface, at 50 meters, and at
400 meters--however, the concentrations were too low to confirm the
source.
In accordance with the National Incident Command (NIC) and
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requirements for the use of
subsurface dispersants, BP contracted ships, R/V Brooks McCall and the
Ocean Veritas, have been collecting water samples in the area close to
the wellhead. NOAA, EPA, and the White House Office of Science and
Technology Policy (OSTP) released a summary report about the subsea
monitoring in the vicinity of the Deepwater Horizon wellhead conducted
from the R/V Brooks McCall from May 8 - 25, 2010. The report confirmed
the existence of a previously discovered cloud of diffuse oil at depths
of 3,300 to 4,600 feet near the wellhead. Preliminary findings indicate
that total petroleum hydrocarbon concentrations at these depths are in
concentrations of about 1-2 parts per million. Analysis shows this
cloud is most concentrated near the source of the leak and decreases
with distance from the wellhead. Beyond six miles from the wellhead,
concentrations of this cloud drop to levels that are not detectable.
Decreased droplet size is consistent with chemically dispersed oil.
Dissolved oxygen levels in the water column are largely what are
expected compared with historical data.
The Unified Command has established an inter-agency Joint Analysis
Group to aggregate and analyze all the relevant data from the many
subsurface oil missions in order to develop a comprehensive picture of
the situation. This group is made up of federal scientists from NOAA,
EPA, and OSTP.
2. What can NOAA do better to ensure a coordinated, effective, and
transparent data collection and research process to better
understand and respond to the spill? Are NOAA and other Federal
agencies utilizing the data coordination and management
framework which was developed as required under the National
Integrated Coastal and Ocean Observation System Act?
We believe transparency is important and NOAA is working to share
data with the public and scientists. We recognize the public's interest
in the federal government's response to this crisis, and we are
committed to providing answers with clarity and transparency. NOAA has
launched a federal website meant to provide data and information --
http://www.geoplatform.gov/gulfresponse/ -- a central online location
for detailed near real-time information about the response as well as
data collection associated with the Natural Resource Damage Assessment.
While access to and transparency of data to inform decision making is
critical, it is also important that data be provided with appropriate
quality assurance and context.
NOAA is providing up-to-date information on its numerous ongoing
science missions related to this historic spill at the following
website: http://www.noaa.gov/sciencemissions/bpoilspill.html. In
addition, NOAA--as a participating member in the Joint Analysis Group
(JAG), an interagency panel created to coordinate information about
subsurface sampling related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill--has
posted on its website a recently released JAG review of the R/V Brooks
McCall mission to examine subsurface dispersant use concentrations and
distribution of oil (http://www.noaa.gov/sciencemissions/PDFs/
JAG_Report_1_BrooksMcCall_
Final_June20.pdf).
The data management and communications system envisioned in the
Integrated Coastal and Ocean Observation System (ICOOS) Act of 2009 has
not been fully implemented. NOAA continues to work to build and sustain
this system and NOAA has made incremental progress on this front by
engaging the data management community to develop web services that
assist with data access and distribution, and continuing to apply this
data architecture to meet user needs. Through initial efforts aimed at
demonstrating the value of interoperable data, NOAA has built a solid
foundation from which to further advance national availability and
efficient access to ocean and coastal data.
3. NOAA and the Fish and Wildlife Service are preparing Natural
Resource Damage Assessments required under the Oil Pollution
Act, in coordination with the States and BP. Neither agency has
provided much information on its processes or the information
it has gathered to this point. Why does NOAA appear to not be
conducting its NRDA process in a transparent manner that
incorporates public input and continuously updates the public
as new information is gathered? Are the agencies limited under
law from revealing information?
NOAA and co-trustees (Department of the Interior and states of TX,
LA, MS, AL, and FL) are collecting data across the Gulf of Mexico that
will be useful to determine what natural resources have been injured
and what human uses have been lost due to the oil spill. Several
technical working groups composed of state and federal natural resource
trustees and representatives from BP are gathering historical
information and developing and implementing baseline (pre-spill) and
post-impact field studies for multiple resource categories. Resources
being assessed include fish and shellfish, bottom dwelling biota,
birds, marine mammals, turtles, and sensitive habitats such as
wetlands, submerged aquatic vegetation, beaches, mudflats, deep and
shallow corals, and the water column, including bottom sediments. NOAA
and the co-trustees are also collecting and reviewing relevant water
column, shoreline, wildlife and other data being collected as part of
the response and by other entities.
We recognize the public's interest in the federal government's
response to this crisis, and we are committed to providing answers with
clarity and transparency. NOAA has launched a federal website meant to
provide data and information with clarity and transparency --http://
www.geoplatform.gov/gulfresponse/-- a central online location for
detailed near real-time information about the response as well as data
collection associated with the Natural Resource Damage Assessment.
NOAA is also providing up-to-date information on the numerous
ongoing science missions related to this historic spill at the
following website: http://www.noaa.gov/sciencemissions/bpoilspill.html.
For example, NOAA--as a participating member in the Joint Analysis
Group (JAG), an interagency panel created to coordinate information
about subsurface sampling related to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill--
has posted on its website a recently released JAG review of the R/V
Brooks McCall mission to examine subsurface dispersant use
concentrations and distribution of oil (http://www.noaa.gov/
sciencemissions/PDFs/JAG_Report_1_BrooksMcCall_Final_June20.pdf).
4. Under the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, coastal States are
required to have included in their Federally-approved coastal
management plans, a planning process for energy facilities in
the coastal zone, including a process for anticipating the
management of the impacts resulting from such facilities.
a. Have these planning efforts been adequate to respond to an oil
spill of this scale and complexity? How can they be improved?
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) energy planning process
requirement was met by states many years ago and these plans are likely
not adequate to respond to oil spills. Some states have amended their
CZMA programs over the years to update energy-related enforceable
policies, but these too are likely not adequate to respond to major oil
spills. State agencies do participate in the development of Area
Contingency Plans (ACP) under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. State CZMA
energy plans could be improved by re-evaluating what the plans should
include and how the plans should apply to and be coordinated with the
ACP process and other federal and state oil spill response activities.
In addition, CZMA Sec. 315(e)(3)(c) makes an allowance for state
National Estuarine Research Reserve System (NERRS) agencies to receive
Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) funding without match but
there is no analogous requirement for the development of response plans
for either the state coastal management energy planning process or for
NERRS. Therefore, another improvement would be greater integration of
NERRS NRDA activities into state coastal management response planning.
b. Should the Federal government provide additional technical or
financial resources to assist coastal States for oil spill
planning, logistics, response, and recovery?
Response planning and coordination is accomplished at the federal
level through the U.S. National Response Team (NRT), an interagency
group responsible for three major activities related to managing
responses: (1) information distribution; (2) emergency planning; and
(3) emergency training. The NRT also supports the Regional Response
Teams. There are thirteen Regional Response Teams (RRTs) in the U.S.,
each representing a particular geographic region (including the
Caribbean and the Pacific Basin). RRTs are composed of representatives
from field offices of the federal agencies that make up the National
Response Team, including NOAA, U.S. Coast Guard, and the Environmental
Protection Agency, as well as state representatives. The Deepwater
Horizon oil spill has highlighted the longstanding need for more
comprehensive preparedness strategies, training programs, and oil spill
research and development. A strong state and federal partnership under
the RRTs would help to ensure that federal and state agencies are
exchanging information to plan for emergencies and conducting the
proper training to prepare for future events.
It is also important to note that a coastal community's ability to
prepare for and withstand impacts of an event like the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill can be critical to the efficacy of long-term
ecological and socio-economic recovery efforts. NOAA stands ready to
work directly with the States and fishing communities if and when there
are Congressional appropriations to address the disasters as determined
by the Secretary in April.
Questions from Ranking Republican Member Henry Brown, Jr. (R-SC)
1. Can you provide the Committee with a breakout on how NOAA used
appropriated $6.6 million funds for the line item NOAA ocean
observation systems?
The FY 2010 appropriation includes $21 million total for IOOS
activities. This includes $14.5 million to develop the regional
component of IOOS (IOOS - Regional Observations) through competitively
awarded grants and cooperative agreements. The $6.5 million was
appropriated to guide development of the national network (NOAA IOOS,
also referred to as U.S. IOOS). U.S. IOOS is a national integrated
system of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes observing systems to address
regional and national needs for ocean information, gather specific data
on key coastal, ocean, and Great Lakes variables, and to ensure timely
and sustained dissemination and availability of these data. As a
collaboration of existing national and regional entities working
together, IOOS will improve coordination of observation strategies and
systems, identify gaps in the Nation's ocean observing capacity, and
facilitate the exchange of information to help decision makers address
pressing policy issues. As the lead federal agency for implementing
IOOS, NOAA is developing the national partnership of 17 federal
partners, 11 Regional Associations and Regional Coastal Ocean Observing
Systems, and a validation and verification testing capability with a
shared responsibility for the design, operation, and improvement of
both the national and regional network of observations linking marine
data in a compatible and easy-to use manner by the wide variety of U.S.
IOOS customers.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In FY 2010, Congress appropriated funding to be used for:
$2.85 million for U.S. IOOS Data Management and
Communications
$2.54 million for IOOS Program Operations and
Management
$0.73 million for Regional and External Affairs
$0.44 million for IOOS Technical Support Contracts
2. You mentioned at the hearing that there was a budget anomaly with
regard to the ocean observation line item. Specifically, that
the budget was stable even though the budget document showed a
decline. Can you provide further information to clarify your
comments?
To clarify, from a funding perspective, regional observing
capacities were developed primarily with congressionally directed
funding until FY 2007. With the omnibus appropriation in FY 2007, NOAA
initiated a competitive funding process and funded each of the 11
Regional Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS) partners. Beginning
with the FY 2008 President's Request, funding was requested for
Regional Observations and for national capacities, like data
management, that benefit the entire system. The FY 2008 President's
Request included $11.5 million for Regional Observations and $2.5
million for data management and national capacities. The FY 2009
President's Request for these two elements included $14.5 million and
$6.5 million, respectively, and has remained stable at about these
amounts, with small increases for adjustments to base. The FY 2011
President's Request increases support across NOAA's programs for ocean
observations with an additional $10 million to develop ocean sensor
technology, $3 million for Arctic Watch, $4.8 million for the Global
Ocean Observing System, and $20 million in the form of grants to
support regional ocean partnerships and coastal and marine spatial
plans. Advancing the collection and integration of coastal data is
central to developing well-informed and comprehensive coastal and
marine spatial plans.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
3. It seems as if a lot of NOAA's efforts early after the spill
were to gather base-line data on water quality, seafood
quality, and the status natural resources. Why was so much
effort necessary to gather this data? Was there no base-line
data available for the region?
NOAA and co-trustees have collected and continue to collect data in
the Gulf and across the five states. These data will be used to
determine what natural resources have been injured and what human uses
have been lost due to the spill. Several technical working groups
comprising NOAA, federal and state co-trustees, and representatives
from one responsible party (BP) are gathering existing scientific
information and developing and implementing baseline (pre-spill impact)
and post-impact field studies for multiple resource categories.
Hundreds of miles of coastal shoreline were surveyed by air and samples
were taken to determine baseline conditions prior to the oil hitting
land, and to identify where the oil has made landfall to support clean-
up activities. Resources being assessed include fish and shellfish,
bottom-dwelling plant and animal life, birds, marine mammals, turtles,
and sensitive habitats such as wetlands, submerged aquatic vegetation
or seagrasses, beaches, mudflats, bottom sediments, deep and shallow
corals, chemosynthetic organisms, and the water column. Some of these
resources may be included within National Estuarine Research Reserves
and National Marine Sanctuaries. In addition, NOAA and co-trustee field
teams are determining how human uses, including cultural uses, and
natural resource services are being impacted.
NOAA has historical base-line data sets on water quality,
fisheries, and other resources in the Gulf of Mexico such as fisheries
assemblages, water quality data and sediment data from long-term
monitoring sites, and satellite and hydrographic survey data. Another
baseline data set is collaborative research between NOAA and the
Department of the Interior (DOI), collected over the past several years
and focused on locating and characterizing deep water communities along
the West Florida Shelf and the northern Gulf of Mexico shelf break.
This information is being used to understand how these habitats are
being affected by the Deepwater Horizon spill. Given the spatial extent
of this spill and the biological diversity of the Gulf of Mexico, NOAA
is working closely with other federal agencies and academic partners to
gather existing historical base-line information and pre- and post-
spill data for the Natural Resource Damage Assessment.
4. Is there any base-line data available on the Gulf's deepwater
ecology to understand the impact, if any, of the subsurface
dispersants used for the Deepwater Horizon spill?
Prior to the spill, NOAA, in collaboration with the Department of
the Interior (DOI), had an on-going study that began in 2008 at deep
Lophelia coral sites (approximately 300-500m deep and 30 miles north of
the spill site) in the Gulf. This study, entitled Lophelia II, produced
invaluable baseline data, ranging from photos and videos of the coral
ecosystem to sediment samples and water quality properties.
Elsewhere in the Gulf, studies from selected mesophotic coral
ecosystems, low light environment around 100 meters deep, and deep
chemosynthetic ecosystems, including tube worms and mussels that grow
on methane seeps, have been conducted within the last decade. Overall,
the geographic coverage of baseline studies is patchy.
With the available baseline data, NOAA and other agencies,
including DOI, developed a natural resource damage assessment work plan
to visit selected sites using a NOAA research vessel equipped with a
remotely operated vehicle to determine the current coral conditions and
compare with pre-spill data.
5. How many grants has NOAA awarded to monitor the impact of the oil
spill on Louisiana's coastal marshes? What is the cost of those
grants and who are the recipients of this Sea Grant money?
NOAA Sea Grant awarded a total of $100,000 to Louisiana Sea Grant
to be invested in rapid response research projects. Louisiana Sea Grant
set aside $50,000 from the 2010-2012 Omnibus Grant (Program Development
funds), and that amount was supplemented with an additional $50,000
from an incident special rapid response grant made available by NOAA
Sea Grant to each of the four Gulf Coast Sea Grant Programs (TX, LA,
MS-AL, and FL).
The funds are supporting ten research projects in Louisiana, as
follows:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
6. What type of outside help has the agency asked for to respond
to the oil spill? Has the agency released any funding for
scientists to get involved with answering questions regarding
the impact of the oil on the Gulf of Mexico environment?
The lives of Gulf of Mexico coastal residents have been disrupted
and many have lost jobs and income. Additional adverse effects are
likely to include the threat of widespread damage to the ecosystem and
the fisheries. The Gulf Coast Sea Grant Programs, with the full support
of the remaining 28 members of the Sea Grant Network, are working to
serve their communities and constituents. Given NOAA Sea Grant's place-
based infrastructure and long-term relationships with coastal
stakeholders, NOAA is working with a broad array of stakeholders
including fishermen and the seafood industry. All four Gulf programs
are currently working with affected residents to help them deal with
loss of jobs, income, and the uncertainty about what lies ahead.
NOAA Sea Grant has released an additional $200,000 to the four Gulf
Coast Sea Grant programs to support time-sensitive, state-specific or
regional research, extension and communications projects. Louisiana Sea
Grant used its $50,000 for rapid response scientific research (see
reply to Question 5 above), while Florida Sea Grant immediately
invested $34,000 of its $50,000 to conduct similar pre-impact studies.
The $16,000 Florida balance will be used to fund additional research
and/or extension and communication efforts related to the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. The Texas and Mississippi-Alabama Sea Grant programs
have used $50,000 each for outreach and education projects ranging from
public community forums to seafood sensory training programs.
NOAA, federal partners, academics, and others in the research
community have mobilized to research and quantify the location and
concentration of subsurface oil from the spill. NOAA ships Gordon
Gunter, Thomas Jefferson, Nancy Foster, Delaware II, and Pisces have
conducted and continue to conduct missions to collect water samples
from areas near the wellhead, as well as further from the wellhead and
in the coastal zone. Water samples from many of these missions are
still being analyzed and additional missions are in progress or being
planned to continue the comprehensive effort to define the presence of
oil below the surface and understand its impacts.
In addition, NOAA continues to work with the Department of the
Interior to prepare for an expedition in the Gulf to locate, map, and
investigate deep water habitats. NOAA also worked with partners from
our Cooperative Institute for Ocean Exploration, Research, and
Technology (which includes the Harbor Branch Oceanographic Institute,
Florida Atlantic University, and the University of North Carolina
Wilmington) to secure the services of the R/V Seward Johnson and
Johnson Sea-Link submersible to conduct habitat investigations. NOAA
has worked with the Cooperative Institute for Ocean Exploration,
Research, and Technology and partners at the National Institute for
Undersea Science and Technology to redirect previously funded projects
to focus on spill-related issues.
7. Has NOAA used any of its contractors to collect air quality or
hydrographic survey data? If not, why?
Yes. NOAA used some contractors to aid its work in collecting air
quality survey data. Two examples are:
Contract staff participated in NOAA's efforts in
modeling local and regional air quality impacts from the spill
to determine impacts of evaporative and pyrogenic emissions on
regional air quality and to assess the spill's impact on
regional levels of atmospheric mercury.
In early June, NOAA diverted its WP-3D flying
laboratory from California to the Gulf of Mexico. Several
contract staff participated in this study. This research
aircraft flew two missions over the Gulf in close proximity and
downwind from the spill site on June 8 and 10 to characterize
the air quality in the region. The data collected, and NOAA's
interpretations, are being shared with the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) who have responsibility for assessing
impacts from the oil spill on the workers in the Gulf and the
public ashore.
NOAA is working with Professor Donald Blake from the University of
California-Irvine to collect additional air samples on the surface near
the spill site to help characterize the impacts on air quality. These
samples are being collected on the NOAA ship R/V Thomas Jefferson,
which is operating near the spill site. The samples will be analyzed,
with National Science Foundation funding, for atmospheric hydrocarbon
concentrations at Professor Blake's laboratory in California. NOAA will
work with EPA and OSHA on the interpretation of these data as they are
received.
NOAA has not conducted any hydrographic surveys as part of the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill response efforts. The Navy did conduct a
side scan sonar survey to ensure a new anchorage at the Mississippi
River entrance was safe for maritime traffic. As part of the Navy
survey, NOAA contracted with C&C Technologies to provide magnetometer
equipment and operators for the survey.
8. You mention that regional Gulf of Mexico and Southeast Coastal
ocean observing systems each have 3 high-frequency radars that
are providing valuable information on the spill. What specific
information are they providing?
High frequency (HF) radars provide surface current velocity data
over hundreds of square kilometers on an hourly basis and with spatial
resolutions that vary from about 1 to 6 km. These data are extremely
valuable because oil at the surface is moved by the ocean surface
currents and winds. HF radar is the only instrument that can provide
these large-scale maps of currents with this level of temporal and
spatial resolution. Some satellite-borne altimeters can provide ocean
currents but those measurements only capture a portion of the ocean
current (the geostrophic component), not the complete surface current
and only at much coarser spatial (large gaps between overflights) and
temporal resolutions (days apart). During the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill, the HF radar data has been successfully used continuously by
NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration in their models that predict
the flow of the surface oil.
9. Are the regional ocean observation systems providing all of the
necessary data to respond to the spill or has the agency
determined that there is data not currently collected that
should be included in the regional collection systems?
Within the region covered by the Gulf of Mexico regional ocean
observing system, there are no high frequency (HF) radars located west
of the Mississippi Delta. Hence, no surface current velocity data maps
can be made available for oil spill trajectory forecasts for most of
the coast of Louisiana and none of the Texas coast. Those regions have
to rely on forecasts based on data from buoys. For several years in the
past, HF radars had been successfully deployed and operated along the
Texas coast by Texas A&M University as an oil spill research activity
sponsored by the State of Texas General Land Office (TGLO), but were
removed at Texas A&M's discretion when TGLO discontinued funding
support for those activities. The Gulf of Mexico Coastal Ocean
Observing System has been focusing its limited resources on data
management services in order to provide access to existing data sources
in the Gulf of Mexico and improving data integration and access
capabilities consistent with national Integrated Ocean Observing System
(IOOS) data management priorities.
In the Southeast regional ocean observing system, there are
significant gaps in HF radar coverage as well, especially along the
east coast of Florida and along most of the South Carolina and North
Carolina coasts. Historically, funding for HF radar systems has been a
leveraged capacity, where the initial acquisition and deployment was
funded by states or academic research grants. With the Regional IOOS
funds, most regions have prioritized maintenance of existing HF radar
capacity rather than expanding the network beyond sustainable levels by
acquiring new radars to fill gaps.
Underwater gliders using onboard instrumentation to assist with
detecting the presence of oil below the sea surface have been deployed
by several organizations during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. These
gliders cover large areas providing three-dimensional surveys of the
ocean water column. While they are not a complete substitute for
shipboard measurements, the gliders contribute valuable, low-cost
datasets of temperature, salinity, and currents that are used to
develop a more complete picture of the subsurface spill effects. Most
of the gliders being used to assess the Deepwater Horizon oil spill are
not owned by the regional observing systems in the spill region but,
instead, were loaned by partners within other regional observing
systems (Mid-Atlantic region, Northwest region, Southern California
region) and the U.S. Navy. Only four of the ten gliders deployed are
owned by Gulf of Mexico and Southeast regional partners.
The Unified Command has employed a variety of observing assets such
as remotely sensed imagery, airborne imagery, existing buoy and gauges,
ships, and autonomous vehicles. Many of these assets were brought in
from outside the Gulf of Mexico and do not permanently exist within the
region. Because we cannot predict where a spill will occur, data
delivery from high frequency radars is envisioned to be part of a
seamless national system that will ensure information 24/7. As the
Integrated Ocean Observing System generates more data from
technological advances like HF radar, the prediction of oil location
can be improved by pulling these observations into trajectory models in
real time.
10. Has NOAA organized any volunteer beach clean-ups of tar balls?
What type of protective clothing are you providing to
volunteers?
Beach cleanups of tar balls are being coordinated by the Unified
Command and by trained workers. NOAA is not coordinating cleanups of
oiled coastline. However, the Weeks Bay National Estuarine Research
Reserve in Alabama did organize several pre-oil impact beach cleanups
to remove marine debris prior to fouling in an effort to ease cleanup
post-impact.
11. On Page 3, you note that: ``If a spill does occur, responders must
be equipped with the appropriate tools and information''. It is
now Day 57 since the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon; can
anyone legitimately say that responders were adequately
prepared prior to the spill? Why were they so ill-prepared?
The data management and communications system envisioned in the
Integrated Coastal and Ocean Observation System (ICOOS) Act of 2009 has
not been fully implemented. NOAA continues to work to build and sustain
this system and NOAA has made incremental progress on this front by
engaging the data management community to develop web services that
assist with data access and distribution, and continuing to apply this
data architecture to meet user needs.
A spill of the scale of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill comes with
high environmental and financial consequences. Continued use of
science, through a robust research and development program, can improve
the effectiveness of spill response efforts, habitat restoration, and
mitigate of effects.
It is important to ensure that robust research and development
efforts continue between spills so additional tools and greater
understanding can be developed before the next spill. Applying the
latest science and continuing research and development can improve our
response decisions, thereby reducing the severity of oil spill injuries
to our Nation's economy and environment.
12. What has been NOAA's position on Governor Bobby Jindal's proposal
to build temporary berms to protect wetlands? Do you support or
oppose efforts to increase the number of approved berms?
NOAA works closely with the state of Louisiana and the federal
agencies responsible for reviewing and approving proposals to minimize
the effects of oil on natural resources. As part of that process, the
state and federal resource agencies provided suggestions and
recommendations on the merits of the proposed measures. Unlike the
barrier island berm projects approved for six segments in eastern and
southern Louisiana, the proposal to build three berms in western
Louisiana was determined to be very likely to create more problems than
would be solved. Because of higher tidal energy, it is unlikely the
berms proposed for construction in the Isles Dernieres would provide
significant protection for wetlands from oiling; at the same time,
adverse effects to the ecosystem would likely result from the moving
and placement of sand on those three islands. Other unintended
consequences of the project would likely have led to increased erosion
of existing barrier islands and induced breaching of barrier islands in
places where they are especially vulnerable to currents and over-wash.
NOAA has long been supportive of the restoration of Louisiana's coastal
ecosystem, particularly barrier islands, and believes that barrier
islands are a critical component of a long-term restoration strategy.
13. Why is our nation's existing capacity to deliver an accurate
depiction of subsurface movement limited? Is it a lack of
resources or expertise?
From its inception, NOAA has been largely tasked with providing
detailed information about weather, fisheries, and oceanography. The
subsurface plume most notably associated with the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill is at greater than 1000m, well below the depths that are of
significant interest for weather prediction, hurricane forecasts, and
fisheries research. However, NOAA has emphasized the need for complete
three-dimensional data collection to improve subsurface oil modeling
and to increase deep ocean observations.
As the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is demonstrating, there is a
need to enhance three-dimensional models to better understand how oil
behaves and disperses within the water column when released at deep
depths. This is an emerging advancement in modeling that can greatly
enhance response operations and mitigation efficacy. The FY 2010
President's Budget included $1.4 million for NOAA's Office of Response
and Restoration to develop tools and techniques related to response and
natural resource damage assessment with a strong focus on building and
maintaining state-of-the-art three-dimensional models to predict
contaminant movement in the environment. As this is the first year
funding has been provided for these specific activities, implementation
is currently underway.
14. What lessons did NOAA learn from the Ixtoc I deepwater oil spill
in 1979 and the explosion of the Mega Borg off the coast of
Galveston, Texas in 1990?
The Ixtoc I and the Mega Borg were both large oil spills in the
Gulf of Mexico. The Ixtoc was a wellhead blowout that resulted in the
release of 145 million gallons of oil. The Mega Borg was a release of
approximately 5 million gallons from a vessel.
Partly in response to these events, NOAA established a dedicated
office to focus on such environmental disasters. As a component of
NOAA, the Office of Response and Restoration can draw upon a
significant range of expertise today, compared to 20 and 40 years ago.
The current response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill has drawn
expertise from all NOAA line offices and the agency is fully mobilized.
The response to Ixtoc I was limited and took months compared to a full
mobilization of NOAA resources within a matter of weeks.
15. How much research has NOAA conducted on the use of dispersants on
spilled oil in subsurface conditions? Has NOAA funded any
University research on the use of dispersants?
Research on the effectiveness and effects of dispersants and
dispersed oil have been underway for more than three decades but
important gaps still exist. Much of what we have learned from both
research and real world experience is presented in detail in the 2005
National Research Council (NRC) book Oil Spill Dispersants: Efficacy
and Effects. The NRC identified gaps in our knowledge. These gaps were
narrowed by research and development activities carried out through
projects conducted by the Coastal Response Research Center (CRRC) at
the University of New Hampshire, state and federal agencies, and other
academic institutions. NOAA provided funds for the CRRC, a successful
joint partnership established in FY 2004 between the University of New
Hampshire and NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration, from FY 2004-
FY 2007. NOAA and CRRC examined the toxicity and long-term effects of
dispersants and dispersed oil on sensitive marine life.
16. Has NOAA voiced any objections or concerns with regard to the fact
that we know virtually nothing about the short-term or long-
term impacts of dispersants on your trust resources?
When an oil spill occurs, there are no good outcomes. Once oil has
spilled, responders use a variety of oil spill countermeasures to
reduce the adverse effects of spilled oil on the environment. The goal
of the Unified Command is to minimize the environmental damage and
speed recovery of injured resources. The overall response strategy to
accomplish this goal is to maximize recovery and removal of the oil
being released while minimizing any additional damage that might be
caused by the response itself. This philosophy involves making
difficult decisions, often seeking the best way forward among imperfect
options.
The use of dispersants is an environmental trade-off between
impacts within the water column, on the sea surface (birds, mammals,
and turtles in slicks), and on the shore. For the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill, the Unified Command's response posture has been to fight the
spill offshore and reduce the amount of oil that comes ashore, using a
variety of countermeasures including subsurface recovery, booming,
skimming, burning, and dispersants. Dispersants have reduced the amount
of oil impacting the shorelines.
Dispersants are applied directly to the spilled oil in order to
remove it from the water surface by dispersing it into the upper layer
of the water column. Once applied at the surface, dispersants help
break up the oil into tiny droplets (20-100 microns across; a micron is
the size of the cross section of a hair) which mix into the upper layer
of the ocean. Dispersed oil does not sink; rather it forms a ``plume''
or ``cloud'' of oil droplets just below the water surface. The
dispersed oil mixes vertically and horizontally into the water column
and is diluted. Bacteria and other microscopic organisms then act to
degrade the oil within the droplets more quickly than if the oil had
not been chemically dispersed. Smaller oil droplets have larger
relative surface area, which allows for higher than normal rates of
biodegradation or dissolution of the oil droplet. It should be noted
that oil spilled from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill is also naturally
dispersing into the water column due to the physical agitation of the
wind, waves, and vessel operations.
17. Which agency is responsible for making the call that Corexit 9500
and not a more benign dispersant would be extensively used in
the Gulf?
The United States Coast Guard, as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator
in the Gulf spill response, in consultation with EPA, DOI, NOAA, and
the State of Louisiana, authorized BP to apply dispersants on the water
surface to mitigate the shoreline impacts on fisheries, nurseries,
wetlands and other sensitive environments. Under the National
Contingency Plan (NCP), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is
responsible for maintaining the NCP Product Schedule, the approved the
list of dispersants and other chemicals and products that can be used
in an oil spill response; Corexit 9500 was on the list of approved
dispersants prior to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
18. Do you agree with the statement of Ms. Lee that NOAA has ``Never
collected a systematic and thorough compendium of known toxic
effects for the various species? Why is this the case?
NOAA's responsibilities in the coastal and ocean environment are
articulated through a number of laws. NOAA does not have a specific
mandate to collect ``a systematic and thorough compendium of known
toxic effects for various species.''
However, NOAA has directly conducted or sponsored numerous
systematic, long-term monitoring studies thoroughly analyzing the toxic
effects of contaminants, such as spilled petroleum, on endemic coastal
and marine species in the Gulf of Mexico. For example, since 1986, the
NOAA Mussel Watch program has managed the longest running estuarine and
coastal pollutant monitoring effort conducted in the United States,
including more than 100 sites from Texas to South Florida. At each
site, more than 140 chemical contaminants, chosen through consultation
with experts and scientists from academia and government, are measured
and have served as a baseline for hundreds of scientific journal
articles and technical reports since the program's inception. In
response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, three teams of NOAA
scientists and partners were mobilized to the Gulf to collect oyster,
sediment, and water samples in advance of oiling in coastal Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida; thus, providing valuable pre-spill
contaminant data and continuing the unbroken quarter-century record of
the status and trends of chemical contaminants in the Gulf of Mexico.
Given the spatial extent of this spill and the biological diversity
of the Gulf of Mexico, NOAA is working closely with other federal
agencies and academic partners to gather existing historical base-line
information and pre- and post-spill data for the Natural Resource
Damage Assessment.
______
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy, for your insight on
NOAA's response capacity and capabilities. Dr. McNutt, please
proceed with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MARCIA McNUTT, PH.D., DIRECTOR,
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
Dr. McNutt. Good morning, Chairwoman Bordallo and members
of the Subcommittee. I am Marcia McNutt, Director of the U.S.
Geological Survey and Science Advisor to the Secretary of the
Interior. Today, I am joined by Jeff Underwood, who is sitting
directly behind me, Acting Director of the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service.
Before I begin, I would also like to extend my sympathies
to the families of those who lost their lives in the explosion
and the sinking of the Deepwater Horizon, to those who are
injured, and to those whose way of life has been changed for
years to come, as my life has also changed since this tragedy
began to unfold, as I have been consumed 17 hours a day, 7 days
a week in my work schedule, focused on this tragedy.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
importance of data and analysis about the complex estuarine,
coastal, and marine environments of the Gulf. Accurate
scientific information is essential for effectively targeting
response activities and for assessing damage to the natural
resources in the aftermath of this oil spill. The greatest
challenge in characterizing the fate and transport of
contamination resulting from the flow of oil and gas from the
Deepwater Horizon site lies in a combination of factors: the
volume of the oil; the expanse of air, sea, and land into which
it flows; and the biodiversity of the ecosystems that it is
impacting.
The first step is to document the amount of oil and create
an improved mass balance of the various natural and
anthropogenic sinks in the deep sea and at the ocean surface as
a function of time since the spill began. Next, we must
understand the physical processes that control the movement of
contaminants from the open ocean into the coastal zone. Oil and
oil dispersant mixtures will be a source of contamination to
coastlines and the seafloor for a long time, and will be
transported long distances by surface and subsurface currents.
A complete understanding of the preexisting condition of
the water, sediment, and biota is vital to any scientific
investigation of the effects of an oil spill on the
environment. The USGS science centers in the Gulf region have
coordinated efforts to sample material from coastal wetlands,
DOI lands onshore, and the barrier islands most likely to be
impacted. The long-term impact of the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill on the northern Gulf and other coastal systems will
depend on how the oil and oil degradation products are
incorporated and cycled among the various components of the
coastal system.
A wide range of data and analyses will be needed over the
coming months and years, including chemical signatures of oil
and dispersant; estimates of volume of oil released; visual and
meteorological records of surface conditions and the surface
slick; landfall data, including dates, locations, estimated
volumes, and characteristics of the oil and tar.
The department's natural resource damage assessment and
restoration program allows DOI agencies with trust
responsibilities to document injury to natural resources as a
result of oil spills or hazardous substances releases, assess
damages, and restore those injured resources. Currently, USGS
scientists are providing scientific support to DOI and NOAA
programs on more than a dozen technical workgroups,
investigating topics that range from aerial imagery to
deepwater corals to data management to terrestrial and aquatic
species.
While current USGS efforts are focused on response to the
oil spill, USGS managers and scientists are also planning for
future research needs associated with the spill. The team,
which includes personnel from Fish and Wildlife Service, the
National Parks Service, and MMS, is developing a long-term
science plan designed to address the research needs as we move
from an immediate response to a more mature response phase of
this event and into recovery.
Lessons learned from the Exxon Valdez oil spill suggest
that a long-term--on the order of decades--multi-level
ecosystem perspective will be essential. Therefore, we
recommend that studies include investigations at the landscape
level, as well as those that are localized and include process-
based research. Impacts of the oil spill to communities and
ecosystems will be far-reaching and long-term throughout the
Gulf of Mexico, where many coastal communities depend on
ecosystem services for their livelihood, quality of life, and
protection from natural hazards.
Information on these impacts on economic activities,
demographics, ecosystem services, as well as options for
adaptation, resilience planning, are needed to help communities
try to regain pre-spill productivity and social well-being.
In conclusion, the impacts of disasters such as this must
be considered in the time frame not of weeks and months, but of
years to decades. Oil can remain toxic in the environment over
the long-term, and its chronic harmful effects will impact the
interconnected systems and communities of living things,
including people, throughout the Gulf region. The USGS will
continue to work closely with other Department of the Interior
and other Federal and state agencies, as well as the private
sector, in response to this spill.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I am
pleased to answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. McNutt follows:]
Statement of Marcia K. McNutt, Director,
U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Department of the Interior
Good morning, Chairwoman Bordallo and Members of the Subcommittee.
I am Marcia McNutt, Director of the U.S. Geological Survey and Science
Advisor to the Secretary of the Interior. The Department of the
Interior and its bureaus have responsibility for a spectrum of natural
resources in the Gulf that may be impacted by the oil spill, including
35 National Wildlife Refuges and 10 National Park units, migratory
birds, and threatened and endangered species, such as manatees, and sea
turtles.
Before I begin, I would like to extend my sympathies to the
families of those who lost their lives in the explosion and sinking of
the Deepwater Horizon, to those who were injured, and to those whose
way of life has been changed for years to come.
The impacts of a disaster such as this must be considered in the
time frame of not weeks and months, but of years to decades. Oil can
remain toxic in the environment over long periods, and it has chronic
harmful effects that will impact the interconnected systems and
communities of living things--including people--throughout the Gulf
region for many years.
The USGS is home to a breadth of multidisciplinary science
expertise, an extensive, national, on-the-ground presence, and a wealth
of biologic, geologic, geographic, and hydrologic monitoring
capabilities and existing data, in scales ranging from microscopic to
global. Long-term monitoring capabilities have positioned the USGS to
understand changes in the environment - from water quality to ecosystem
structure and function to land cover. This broad capacity, combined
with a presence in all 50 States and Puerto Rico, enables the USGS to
bring science immediately to bear not only on natural hazards such as
earthquakes, floods, and volcanoes but also on environmental hazards.
For more than a century, the USGS has been on point in response to
natural disasters; this experience and expertise have uniquely prepared
the USGS for dealing efficiently and effectively with the challenge
that lies before us today and the challenges that will face our Nation
in the weeks, years, and decades to come.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the importance of data and
analysis about the complex estuarine, coastal, and marine environments
of the Gulf. This kind of scientific information is essential for
effectively targeting response activities, such as determining the
volume of the spill as well as providing information useful for
mapping. The USGS will work closely with other DOI agencies, such as
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Park Service
(NPS), as well as National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), the states, and affected tribes to provide scientific
information necessary to conduct damage assessment and restoration
activities.
EXISTING DATA GAPS
The greatest challenge in characterizing the fate and transport of
contamination resulting from the flow of oil and gas from the Deepwater
Horizon drilling site lies in a combination of factors: the volume of
oil, the expanse of sea, air and land into which it flows, and the
biodiversity of the ecosystems that it is impacting.
The first step is to document and understand the physical processes
that control the movement of contaminants from the open ocean into the
coastal zone. Both surface and submerged oil and oil-dispersant
mixtures will be a source of contamination to coastlines and the sea
floor for a prolonged period of time and may be transported long
distances by surface and subsurface currents. The goals of dispersing
oil are to make oil more readily processed by organisms that can break
it down and to enhance dilution to reduce the toxicity of oil. In order
to understand the long-term extent and impact, predictions are needed
to determine where and when new coastal and sea exposures are expected.
Remobilization of stranded oil or surfacing of submerged oil may occur
during hurricanes; forecast models of storm impacts and oil transport
will be needed to identify the worst case scenarios and help prioritize
cleanup and protection efforts.
The coastal zone is a dynamic system at the land/sea interface. The
individual components of the system - including the continental shelf,
deep and shallow coral reefs, barrier islands, beaches, bays,
estuaries, and marshes - are interconnected and influence each other.
The barrier islands of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama are an
especially dynamic component of the coastal zone in the northern Gulf
of Mexico and are critical to the health and function of the entire
system. The barrier islands provide a defense against waves, currents,
and storm surge for estuaries and wetlands. They also contain important
habitat types, such as beach, dune, barrier flats, back-barrier saline
marsh, and intertidal flats that are used by a variety of plants and
animals including migratory birds. The physical presence of the barrier
islands and locations of inlets influence salinity of waters behind
them and, in combination with associated wetlands, help maintain water
quality. The components of the coastal system are constantly changing
due to the movement of sediment (deposition and erosion) driven by
action of winds, currents, waves, and storms. Comparative shoreline
studies by the USGS and others of the Louisiana coast over the past
century show high rates of retreat, land loss and movement of barrier
islands at widely different rates, resulting in 13 feet or more of
shoreline retreat per year. In the past decade, a number of devastating
hurricanes have severely damaged the barrier islands of the northern
Gulf, further reducing their effectiveness in mitigating the impacts of
storm surge, waves, and, now, oil spills to the mainland.
The long-term impact of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill on the
northern Gulf and other coastal systems will depend on how the oil and
oil degradation products are incorporated and cycled among the various
components of the coastal system. A wide range of data and analyses
will be needed in the short-term as well as the coming months and years
to fully understand the extent and trajectory of the oil from the
spill:
Detailed characterization of the extent,
concentrations, and chemical signatures of source oil and
dispersant;
Information on migratory birds and other fish and
wildlife that might enter an oiled area; this information may
be used to help deter species away from oiled areas as well as
to prioritize clean up actions;
Detailed organic component analysis of samples taken
across a range of locations and time frames, to develop
compound-specific information about dispersal, dissolution into
water-soluble forms, settlement onto sediments or surface
soils, and eventual degradation by microbes;
Data for describing attenuation and biodegradation/
mineralization/photo-oxidation of the oil over time and space;
Better accounting for the oil in space and time in
the subsurface;
Visual and meteorological records of surface
conditions and the surface slick; and
Landfall data--dates, locations, estimated volumes/
mass, and characteristics of the oil and tar.
Using a variety of techniques, a group of federal scientists,
independent experts, and representatives from universities around the
country are participating in the Flow Rate Technical Group (Group) to
estimate the volume of oil resulting from the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill. We are continuing to analyze data and refine the estimates
including an evaluation of the flow rate after the riser was cut.
The USGS and other Federal agencies are providing support to the
NOAA, which has the primary responsibility for mapping the extent and
trajectories of oceanic oil plumes. For example, NOAA and MMS are
working together to drop sensors to map the extent of oil plumes. The
USGS is collecting baseline data along the coastline, developing maps
that show NOAA projections of spill trajectory with respect to DOI
lands, and developing models that depict how local tidal and current
conditions will interact with seafloor bathymetry to carry oil over
barrier islands. We have worked with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) to provide a combination of satellite and
airborne imagery to assist NOAA in forecasting the trajectory of the
oil and to document oil impacts on the coastal and nearshore ecosystem
and are collecting satellite imagery to assess the impact on coastal
wetlands.
PRE- AND POST-IMPACT SPILL DATA
Important to any scientific investigation of the effects of an oil
spill on the environment is a complete understanding of the pre-
existing condition, or baseline condition, of the water, sediment, and
biota prior to landfall of the spill. For the most part, the data
needed after the spill will be the same as the baseline data collected
pre-spill, so that changes related to oil spill or oil spill mitigation
efforts can be quantified and characterized by how these relate to the
baseline condition.
USGS Science Centers in Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and
Florida have coordinated efforts to sample water and bottom material
from coastal wetlands, DOI lands onshore, and the barrier islands most
likely to be impacted now that the oil has come ashore. The USGS has
documented current conditions at these sites and the existence of any
historic oil present, including ``fingerprints'' of existing oil,
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), oil and grease, trace metals,
volatile organic compounds, surfactants, dissolved organic carbon (DOC)
characterization, bacterial populations capable of digesting oils,
nutrients, and bottom-dwelling invertebrates. Scientists are monitoring
radio-tagged manatees for deviations from normal behavior in priority
areas on the Gulf Coast of Florida. Aerial surveys of mangroves and
wetlands along the Gulf coast of Florida are being conducted to
differentiate between damage from the January 2010 freeze and any
potential impact from the oil spill. Aerial surveys and sub-bottom
profiling of sea grass beds along the Louisiana coast to document
current pre-spill conditions were completed during May 2010.
Trust species are a major focus of DOI management agencies and
include threatened and endangered species, as well as migratory birds
such as waterfowl, wading birds, shorebirds, and neotropical songbirds.
The Department's Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration
(NRDAR) Program allows DOI agencies, such as the FWS and NPS, with
trust responsibilities to document injury to natural resources as a
result of oil spills or hazardous substances releases, assess damages,
and restore those injured resources. The USGS provides information and
science support to FWS, NPS and other federal agencies to assist them
in all phases of the NRDAR process. Currently, USGS scientists are
providing scientific support to the DOI NRDAR Program and NOAA Damage
Assessment, Remediation, and Restoration Program (DARRP) with regard to
the Deepwater Horizon incident on more than a dozen technical work
groups, investigating topics that range from aerial imagery to
deepwater corals to data management to terrestrial and aquatic species.
While current USGS efforts are focused on response in the aftermath
of the oil spill, USGS managers and scientists are also planning for
future research needs associated with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
A longer-term Science Planning Team was launched in early May 2010. The
team, which includes personnel from the FWS, the NPS, and the MMS
representing their bureaus' science and resource management needs, is
developing a long-term science plan designed to address the research
needs as we move from an immediate response to a more mature response
phase of this event and into recovery. The team has identified priority
baseline data that should be collected; a few examples are briefly
described below:
Mapping and resource characterization. Habitat maps
are lacking for many of the estuaries, sea grass beds, coral
reefs and salt marshes in parks and refuges that will be
directly or indirectly affected by the oil spill, and their
plant and animal communities are poorly understood or
quantified, all of which hinders the NPS and FWS from
responding. Scientifically valid habitat maps and information
on extent, abundance and distribution of marine habitats and
species are needed. The barrier island systems in the northern
Gulf (especially MS, LA) are very dynamic, and some are on the
verge of disappearing. The USGS has joined with the U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service's National Wetlands Inventory program to
produce wetland maps that highlight resource-rich areas that
are protected by federal, state, or non-governmental agencies
to aid in prioritizing response efforts. While the USGS has
collected good post-Katrina bathymetry, shoreline, and
geomorphology data on the Louisiana and Mississippi barrier
islands, but additional island surface and marine habitat data
are still needed to complete updated maps.
Surveys and assessments. Specific resources of
interest include submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV); near-shore
and marsh vegetation and associated invertebrate and vertebrate
communities; near-shore fish; shorebirds with emphasis on
roosting/nesting areas; sea-turtle nesting areas; shallow-water
coral reefs; deep-water coral communities; water quality; and
sediment. A portion of the water quality and sediment
monitoring stations should be targeted at SAV beds and shallow
and deep coral communities.
Surveys to document the occurrence of oil and oil-
related materials. The surveys should include sediment and pore
water sampling, seafloor and shoreline imaging with both
geophysical and optical techniques, and oil detection LIDAR.
The results will be used to map the occurrence and amount of
oil and oil-related materials.
Surveys at berm and borrow sites. In addition to
physical characteristics, the surveys will need to include
water column and sediment measurements to determine if oil-
related or previously sequestered harmful materials have been
resuspended and reintroduced to the system. The berms will
decrease the tidal flows, on which the coastal marshes depend;
surveys should also document the effects on the marshes of
reduced tidal flow.
Sources and sinks of oil and oil-related materials will vary
through time and will be affected both by natural processes and oil
spill mitigation activities. Repeated surveys of the coastal zone will
need to be performed to determine changes in the physical systems and
document changes in the character and distribution of oil and oil-
related materials. The repeated surveys will be used to develop
``change maps'' that will track the migration of oil and oil-related
products in the systems. Repeat surveys to track movement of sand in
areas of borrow and oil-protective berms will need to be done
frequently because analysis of the berm construction plan suggests that
the artificial structures could be unstable.
Processes involved in transmitting oil and oil degradation products
through the coastal system will need to be monitored. Analyses of
sediment and pore water samples taken during repeat surveys can be used
to investigate the processes responsible for mobilizing, transmitting,
and degrading oil within different components of the coastal system and
to document how the presence of oil and its degradation products affect
the structure and function of these ecosystems. These analyses also
will provide information on interaction of oil and the degradation of
oil with other processes such as development of hypoxia and
mobilization of toxic metals in different components of the coastal
system.
Wildlife Resources and Coastal Ecosystem Impact Recovery
DOI will need to understand the impacts of the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill on wildlife and coastal ecosystems in the Gulf of Mexico and
track their recovery. Lessons learned from the Exxon Valdez oil spill
suggest that a long-term (on the order of decades), multi-level,
ecosystem perspective will be essential. Therefore, we recommend that
studies include investigations at the landscape level as well as those
that are localized and include process-based research. The studies
should include habitat monitoring, characterization, and mapping using
ground-based data collection, and remote sensing systems. Trust
species, including migratory birds, manatees, and sea turtles, which
are of concern to the public and resource managers in the DOI, should
be emphasized. In addition, the effects of the oil spill on ecosystem
structure and function, especially in relation to the health of coastal
ecosystems, need to be monitored to measure the impacts to the natural
resources of the Gulf.
At the ecosystem level, studies will be needed to
determine how oil and dispersants will impact multi-
level pathways in coastal ecosystems, from the nearshore to
coastal wetlands;
understand the influence of oil and dispersant
exposure on the resilience of coastal ecosystems;
determine extent and degree of damage to coastal
ecosystems; and
use assessments of coastal habitat impacts to model
long-term recovery and support the development of remediation/
restoration plans.
At the population level, research should focus on
impacts to wildlife populations and estimated
recovery times;
effects of the oil spill on distributions of marine
fauna and wildlife populations;
impact of sand berms on coastal wetlands and wildlife
habitat;
the efficacy of other remediation methods such as
fire or low-pressure hydro-cleaning in wetlands; and
habitat management techniques to restore, enhance or
establish conditions necessary to establish or maintain native
plant and animal communities.
At the species level, monitoring and analysis will be needed to
determine
sub-lethal effects of oil and dispersant on marine,
aquatic and terrestrial organisms;
impacts of burial and later ingestion of oil and
dispersants on wildlife health, life history, and behavior;
effects of oil and dispersants on marine, aquatic,
wetland and terrestrial plants; and
effects of disturbed conditions on plant community
structure and function.
These studies will help to inform the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service's developing Information, Planning, and Conservation (IPaC)
decision support system, which the FWS is currently attempting to
secure the needed resources to deploy for the Gulf spill response
activities. This system is designed to aid in streamlining emergency
section 7 consultation while improving efforts to conserve trust
resources, assess impacts to species conservation, and identify
appropriate mitigation activities for the NRDAR process. This system is
currently being integrated with NOAA's Environmental Response
Management Application (ERMA) to allow users to seamlessly move between
the two systems to obtain information about FWS trust resources and
recommended best management practices. This system integration results
in users only having to visit one location to obtain information
regarding both agencies' trust resources.
Socio-economic Issues and Ecosystem Services
Impacts of the oil spill to both communities and ecosystems will be
far-reaching and long-term throughout the Gulf of Mexico, where many
coastal communities depend on ecosystem services for their livelihoods,
quality of life, and protection from natural hazards. Information on
these impacts on economic activities, demographics and ecosystem
services, as well as options for adaptation and resilience planning,
are needed to help communities try to regain pre-spill productivity and
social well-being. Restoring economic activity and quality of life is
best achieved through an adaptive management framework: a structured,
iterative process of optimal decision making in the face of
uncertainty, with an aim of reducing uncertainty over time via system
monitoring. In this framework, science will inform resource managers of
specific options for restoration, and consequently the restoration
effort will guide the science that needs to be done.
Research on the socio-economic impacts of the oil spill is
important to comprehensively assess the impacts of the oil spill on
coastal communities, by comparing the social, economic and demographic
changes that have occurred as a result of the oil spill as well as the
social and economic impacts of restoration activities. A comprehensive
geographic analysis of the socio-economic impacts of the oil spill to
communities in the Gulf would include:
Characterization of pre-spill socioeconomic
conditions in coastal communities across the Gulf to set the
baseline;
Assessment of current community exposure to hurricane
storm-surge hazards relative to areas containing significant
oil residue, providing decision makers with an idea of where
post-hurricane clean-up would be complicated by oil residue in
flood waters;
Characterization of socio-economic conditions in
coastal communities one year after the initial oil spill, to
assess the immediate impacts of the oil spill;
Trend and regression analyses of demographic shifts
in coastal populations and business distributions;
Community-based workshops in communities identified
as hot-spots of significant socio-economic change after the oil
spill, identifying system-level consequences of the spill to
local community structure and function; and
Models to evaluate the economic impacts of various
restoration plans, including the number of jobs created within
various economic sectors. Outcomes should include application
of these models to inform decision-making.
Ecosystem services are the multitude of resources and processes
that are supplied by natural ecosystems to humans, enabling our
continued existence and our complex social systems. A science-based
Gulf restoration strategy requires examining the value of all ecosystem
products and services that have been impacted by the oil spill,
including: provisioning services such as food and water; regulating
services such as water purification and storm protection; and cultural
services such as recreation, and aesthetics. Individual livelihoods and
community viability will depend on the success of long-term efforts to
restore natural ecosystem functions, native species, and natural
structure (e.g., channels, islands, and shoreline). Quantifying and
valuating ecosystem services will provide information that is critical
in assessing tradeoffs and the consequences of alternative restoration
actions. Their valuation will link directly to effective adaptive
management restoration methodologies promoting conservation efforts,
sustainable economic development and community resilience. Specific
components of a comprehensive ecosystem services assessment include:
Developing assessments of the value derived from, and
risks to, Gulf coastal ecosystems, in order to better
understand the risks of off-shore petroleum development;
Identifying degraded and missing ecosystem services
and prioritizing restoration efforts toward missing or impaired
functions;
Developing integrated models linking biological,
hydrological, and physical data with ecosystem services;
Delineating the social values derived from ecosystem
services, thus prioritizing areas for restoration, including
understanding the impacts of the oil spill on commercial,
recreational, and subsistence fishermen;
Combining valuation maps with hazard probabilities to
characterize the risks associated with oil spills from existing
and future oil development; and
Modeling the probability of oil from any given well
encountering various marine and coastal ecosystems.
OTHER ISSUES
Transport, fate, and potential impacts of oil and dispersants
The use of chemical dispersants has added to the challenge of
understanding the fate and transport of oil (along with the dispersant)
in the Gulf of Mexico region. Chemical dispersants have converted the
oil into microscopic water-soluble droplets, facilitating their
movement away from the surface oil slick and into the water column to
the seafloor. This procedure results in potential impacts not only to
surface and shore biota but also to the vast ecosystems that reside
beneath the surface of the Gulf of Mexico. To understand these impacts,
the USGS will address the fate and transport of not only oil and
dispersant but also the mixture of oil and dispersant to determine
their impact on coastal and marine ecosystems, such as wetlands,
estuaries, reef communities, beaches, and the associated species that
reside in these critical habitats.
Deep-water coral sampling
The USGS, in collaboration with the MMS, NOAA, and other agencies,
has been conducting research on a variety of deep-sea and outer shelf
habitats in the Gulf of Mexico for more than a decade. The
comprehensive data archive, diverse skills, and technical capabilities
of this group are ideal for investigating the impacts of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill on deep-water coral ecosystems in the Gulf of Mexico.
The September 2010 research cruise, part of the USGS DISCOVRE
(Diversity, Systematics, and Connectivity of Vulnerable Reef
Ecosystems) expedition and scheduled prior to the spill, would be the
basis for short- and long-term studies that would begin with the
collection of sediment and bacterial community samples. Samples such as
these would allow for a comparison of the pre-spill habitat to the
post-spill habitat to measure the effect of contaminants on these deep-
water coral ecosystems.
Use of Sand Berm/Barrier
The State of Louisiana requested emergency authorization on May 11,
2010, to perform spill mitigation work on the Chandeleur Islands and
also on all the barrier islands from Grand Terre Island eastward to
Sandy Point to enhance the capability of the islands to reduce the
movement of oil from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill to the marshes.
The proposed action, building a barrier berm (essentially an artificial
island fronting the existing barriers and inlets) seaward of the
existing barrier islands and inlets, ``restores'' the protective
function of the islands but does not alter the islands themselves.
Building a barrier berm to protect the mainland wetlands from oil is a
new strategy and depends on the timeliness of construction to be
successful. Because of the scope of this strategy, there are concerns
about the availability of sufficient sand resources, the impacts of
depleting these resources and the possible negative effects to existing
ecosystems. Prioritizing areas to be bermed, focusing on those areas
that are most vulnerable and/or where construction can most rapidly be
completed may increase chances for success.
The USGS recommends long-term monitoring of the berm to determine
its performance and possible impacts on or benefits to the surrounding
environment. Repeated surveys to update bathymetry, topography, sea bed
characteristics and sea-bed images, along with sediment sampling,
should be done to document changes through time. The observations and
analyses will provide data needed to identify movement of oil and oil-
degradation through the system, determine impacts, and identify the
processes involved. For example, monitoring changes in barrier
topography, and bathymetry along with analyses of sediment cores and
oil-residue changes will show linkages between oil mobilization and
sedimentary processes. Monitoring turbidity and salinity within the
back-barrier environment will provide information on estuarine health.
CONCLUSION
The USGS will continue to work closely with other Department of the
Interior and other Federal and State agencies as well as the private
sector in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. The USGS
Environmental Incident Science Team is leading the effort to develop a
plan to identify the Department's long-term research needs in the
aftermath of this disaster. As we move from response to recovery, the
DOI Bureaus will provide our best efforts to inform and guide
decisions. I want to thank the Subcommittee for its support for USGS
science. Without your recognition of the importance of USGS long-term
monitoring and data collection, the USGS would not have the tools,
data, and information that have allowed our rapid response to this
crisis, and our Nation would not have the science necessary to begin
its recovery from this tragedy.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I will
be pleased to answer any questions that you may have.
______
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Dr. McNutt, for describing what we
know and what we do not know about the oil spill. Dr.
Coddington, please begin your testimony.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN A. CODDINGTON, PH.D., ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
FOR RESEARCH AND COLLECTIONS, NATIONAL MUSEUM OF NATURAL
HISTORY, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION
Dr. Coddington. Thank you, Chairwoman Bordallo and members
of the Subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify today. I am
the Associate Director of Research and Collections at the
National Museum of Natural History at the Smithsonian
Institution. I, too, would like to extend my sympathies to
those who lost their lives and those who lost their livelihoods
due to this disaster.
Our collections at the Smithsonian are among the largest in
the world. We have approximately 126 million specimens. That is
about 94 percent of everything that the Smithsonian has. About
one-third of those collections are marine. Scientific
collections are a vital part of the national scientific
infrastructure. Time and again, they prove their worth by
answering important questions and solving important problems.
To give you one recent example, U.S. Airways flight 1549
collided with birds and crash landed in the Hudson River. It
was our DNA and our specimens that identified the birds as
Canada geese. It is important to know which birds cause
accidents.
We are also often involved with the early detection of
invasive species when they invade the United States, and we
also support threat assessments to our Armed Forces by
developing profiles of disease vectors specific to regions
where they are fighting or stationed, for example, in both Iraq
and Afghanistan today.
As another final example, climate change is predicted to be
especially detectable at the North and the South Poles. For the
last many years, we have been collaborating with the U.S.
Antarctic program to develop the largest and best collections
of the biota of the Antarctic available today. We are ready to
provide baseline data for scientific studies to measure climate
change, just as we can provide baseline data today on the Gulf
of Mexico's pre-spill environment.
As others have pointed out, this is the worst man-made
ecological disaster in U.S. history. Its impact and extent at
this moment are only estimates, not known facts. All of the
stakeholders in this event will benefit from facts, and
therefore solid information on the pre-spill environment is
important. For the last 30 years, we have collaborated with the
MMS, which is the Minerals Management Service, to archive their
collections from their environmental studies program.
Most of these collections focused on the Gulf because that
was where most drilling occurred. I would like to emphasize how
unusual it is and how lucky we are to have these quantitative
collections. Because of the cost of ship time and the
difficulty of the work, marine surveys are extremely expensive,
especially at great depths. In total, these collections amount
to more than 330,000 samples. Of these, more than 93,000 are
from the Gulf of Mexico. They were collected at over 500 depths
at over 1,000 different locations.
However, about a third of the relevant collections have not
been catalogued and been made publicly available to science.
The map on display you can see here gives you some idea of the
geographic coverage. The red dots are the collections from the
MMS quantitative samples. Each one of those red dots is a place
that may have yielded hundreds of species and thousands of
specimens. The yellow dots represent the regular Smithsonian
marine collections.
I brought two examples with me today just to show you what
these things are like. This large specimen here is a giant
isopod collected at about 500 meters in depth. They get almost
three feet long. They are creatures of the deep. I also have, I
hope, circulating among you in a plastic box specimens of
corals. Those corals are keystone species because they create
the environment on which other organisms depend. These make
deepwater reefs, which can be hundreds of meters high, hundreds
of meters wide, and even miles long.
Most of the specimens we have, of course, are not this
spectacular, but these are the most extensive collections of
marine organisms from the U.S. continental shelves.
In summary, these Smithsonian collections are now a unique
and irreplaceable resource to characterize the Gulf pre-spill
environment. However, until we know exactly what questions are
going to be asked, I can't say exactly how these collections
will help us to answer these questions, but they are likely to
be critical in many contexts. Research and assessment of
impacts will go on for decades, and most of that will need pre-
spill data.
However, I would also say that getting more pre-spill data
is important. We don't have much time left to gather data of
that sort. We should also make sure that we are gathering and
archiving baseline data and information from whenever oil and
gas exploration is going on on the outer continental shelf. All
stakeholders benefit from the facts. This is relatively cheap
and easy to do. And I would also like to emphasize that about a
third of the MMS collections and other Smithsonian collections,
which would be scientifically valuable for pre-spill
environments, are not yet fully worked up, catalogued, and
publicly available for science. Finishing that now is a high
priority for us.
Finally, thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I
look forward to answering any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Coddington follows:]
Statement of Dr. Jonathan Coddington,
Associate Director of Research and Collections
Thank you Chairwoman Bordallo and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee for the opportunity to provide testimony today. My name is
Jonathan Coddington. I am the Associate Director of Research and
Collections at the National Museum of Natural History, Smithsonian
Institution. I have a PhD in Invertebrate Zoology and have published
frequently on design and analysis of biological inventories and
inventory design theory. As Associate Director I oversee about 90
scientists and 240 technical staff at the National Museum of Natural
History in Washington, D.C., at the Museum Support Center in Suitland,
Maryland, and at the Smithsonian Marine Station at Fort Pierce,
Florida. Collectively we care for an estimated 126 million specimens,
approximately 94% of all Smithsonian collections. About one third of
our collections and staff focus on the marine realm.
Introduction:
The National Museum of Natural History (NMNH, previously the US
National Museum, in part) has, since its beginning, been linked to the
collection activities of the U.S. Government. The 1846 legislation that
created the Smithsonian Institution identified the U.S. National Museum
as the repository for natural history specimens belonging to the United
States, ``All collections of rocks, minerals, soils, fossils, and
objects of natural history, archaeology, and ethnology, made by the
National Ocean Survey, the United States Geological Survey, or by any
other parties for the Government of the United States, when no longer
needed for investigations in progress shall be deposited in the
National Museum'' (20 U.S.C. Sec. 59). In fact, it was research in the
marine environment, the 1838-1842 U.S. Exploring Expedition that made
clear the national need for such a repository. The role of the
Smithsonian as the primary repository for federally funded collections
has been repeatedly affirmed by Congress by legislation in 1879, 1965,
1970, and 1991.
Scientific collections are an essential and irreplaceable component
of the national scientific infrastructure, as documented in the 2009
report of the Interagency Working Group on Scientific Collections
(OSTP, 2009). Speaking just for the Smithsonian, we collaborate with
the Federal Aviation Administration, the U.S. Air Force, and the U.S.
Navy to identify birds involved in over 5,000 collisions with airplanes
annually. Last summer, a number of Canada geese famously forced US
Airways Flight 1549 to land in the Hudson River, luckily with no loss
of life. Knowing the species of bird in each collision allows humans,
as far as possible, to design systems to minimize collisions. We
collaborate with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) by
hosting 40 USDA entomology staff at NMNH because the collections are
critical to their mission of protecting U.S. Agriculture. When the
citrus leaf miner invaded the U.S. in 1993, the NMNH collections
contained the only identified material in the country. Our scientists
rapidly identified the pest, which enabled targeted control programs
throughout citrus agriculture regions. Smithsonian collections also
played a crucial role in the identification and control of many other
invasive species, for example, the veined rapa whelk that damages
Chesapeake oyster populations, or the Asian longhorned beetle, on track
to cause billions of dollars of damage to urban trees. Our unique
database on volcanic eruptions is the international standard for basic
science in this area, supporting plans to mitigate threats to human
life near volcanoes, as well as threats to aviation. We also support
our armed forces by hosting the Walter Reed Biosystematics Unit, a
component of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research. Mosquitoes, in
particular, spread some of the most deadly and debilitating diseases,
and NMNH therefore supports the largest and most comprehensive mosquito
collection in the world. Another recent example is Hyalomma ticks,
which are particularly common and diverse in Iraq. They transmit viral
hemorrhagic fevers. Luckily, we have the world's best reference
collection of Hyalomma ticks. Wherever our soldiers are, the ability to
rapidly identify disease vectors in their environment is crucial to
mitigating risk. Our collections have been used repeatedly to answer
basic and historical questions regarding many diseases: Lyme disease,
influenza, and hemorrhagic fevers, to name a few.
In the near future our collections may play crucial roles in two
areas: climate change and ocean acidification. Since 1963 we have
archived the results of environmental monitoring in the Antarctic, a
partnership with the U.S. Antarctic Program (USAP). Climate models
predict that the climate change may be particularly evident at the
North and South Poles. The density and scope of our historical
collections can provide the ``before'' to climate change's ``after.''
Ocean acidification, itself caused by climate change, threatens
keystone species--reef builders--of many marine ecosystems. Clams and
corals, for example, record growth rates in their skeletons. Those
growth rates depend on the availability of calcium carbonate, and that
depends on ocean acidification. Growth rates as reflected in the
skeletons of marine organisms are an important record of environmental
change.
Regarding the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, knowing what the
conditions were like before the event is essential. The Smithsonian is
committed to long-term studies of ecosystems and biodiversity, and the
data and collections that have resulted can play a crucial role in
situations such as that posed by the gulf oil spill. For example, in
1986 more than 50,000 barrels of oil impacted the coast of Panama,
including the habitats adjacent to the Galeta Marine Laboratory of the
Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute. Because the Smithsonian had
already studied this site for many years, the Minerals Management
Service (MMS) chose the Smithsonian to assess the impact of the spill.
This study was one of the first to clearly document the long term
effects of oil on soft bottom marine habitats such as are found along
the U.S. Gulf Coast. Collections documenting this study (see below) are
archived at NMNH. Throughout history, scientific collections have
helped to resolve the issues of the day.
My testimony today focuses on the assistance the National Museum of
Natural History can provide to a coordinated national response to the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. This spill already has been described by
many experts as the worst man-made ecological disaster in U.S. history.
The extent of the ecological impact, its geographic extent, and
possibilities for remediation at this point are only estimates, not
known facts. Given the likely economic impacts of the spill and future
costs, the accuracy of before and after comparisons are important.
Assembling an accurate and detailed description of the Gulf of Mexico
marine ecosystem as it existed prior to the spill is the chief topic I
will address today.
NMNH Collections, MMS, and the Gulf of Mexico:
Since 1979, NMNH has collaborated with the Environmental Division
of the Minerals Management Service to archive the collections generated
by their Environmental Studies Program. The Minerals Management Service
(MMS) has been conducting intensive environmental studies on the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) for more than 30 years to support information
needs for managing oil and gas development on the continental shelf and
slope. Through its initial design, and during the first four years of
program activity, the MMS Environmental Studies Program established
baseline environmental conditions based on a large number of
biological, chemical, and physical parameters. With these baseline
conditions, future monitoring studies during and after development
would, presumably, have allowed an assessment of the long-term effects
of development. After a review and recommendations from the National
Academy of Sciences, this program design was revised in 1978.
Subsequently, a new program of directed studies has provided data to
inform critical decisions before they are required. These baseline
surveys took place from 1974 to 1978, and the Smithsonian has all or
most of the specimens they generated in our collections. Specimens from
numerous additional MMS-directed studies are also in our collections.
Data from these studies, including site and collecting event specific
physico-chemical, oceanographic, sedimentary and biodiversity data are
available in the various technical reports prepared by program
contractors. These reports, available on-line at the MMS Environmental
Studies Program Information System, (https://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/
espis/espisfront.asp), provide information that document not only the
biodiversity of these sites, but the population characteristics and
environmental conditions at the time the samples were collected. For
the Gulf of Mexico alone, from 1974-2010, this site provides 109
``baseline'' reports, 252 ``biology'' reports, 86 ``fate & effects''
reports, and 340 ``technical summaries.'' The availability of this
extensive supporting data in conjunction with the specimens themselves
makes these collections an irreplaceable research resource for
comparative studies on the invertebrate biodiversity (animals without
backbones) of the Gulf of Mexico.
These specimens represent one of the most extensive collections of
marine organisms from U.S. continental shelves and slopes, in terms of
geographic coverage, sampling density (spatial and temporal), number of
phyla represented, and associated data collected concomitantly (other
organisms, chemical, hydrographic, geologic). The MMS therefore
established a system for the archiving of, and access to, these
specimens. Through a series of contracts, MMS has partnered with the
Smithsonian's NMNH-Department of Invertebrate Zoology (in its role as
the repository for federally-funded collections) to ensure the long
term maintenance of and access to invertebrates collected during these
studies. The MMS Environmental Studies Program deserves praise for the
foresight and initiative shown in conducting and preserving the
results, especially the collections, from these surveys.
Details of MMS surveys as represented in NMNH Collections:
NMNH to date has received material from 21 continental shelf, slope
and canyon surveys as well as two special oil spill surveys. These are:
the Atlantic Slope and Rise Program (ASLAR); George's Bank Benthic
Infauna Monitoring Program (BIMP); Central Atlantic Benchmark Program
(CABP); California Monitoring Program (CAMP); Central and Northern
California Reconnaissance Program (CARP); the Canyon and Slope Process
Study (CASPS); Central Gulf Platform Study (CGPS); Gulf of Mexico
Chemosynthetic Communities (CHEMO); Deep Gulf Shipwrecks of World War
II (Deep Wrecks); Northern Gulf of Mexico Continental Shelf Habitats
and Benthic Ecology (DGoMB); the special Ixtoc oil spill survey in the
Gulf of Mexico (IXTOC); the South Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf Area
Living Marine Resources Study (LMRS); Gulf Of Mexico Hard Bottom
Communities (Lophelia); Mississippi, Alabama, Florida Benchmark Program
(MAFLA); Mississippi-Alabama Marine Ecosystem Program (MAMES);
Mississippi/Alabama Pinnacle Trend Ecosystem Monitoring Program
(MAPTEM); the New England Environmental Benchmark Program (NEEB); the
Northern Gulf of Mexico Continental Slope Study (NGOMCS); the special
Panama Oil Spill Study (POSP); the South Atlantic Benchmark Program
(SABP); the Southern California Baseline Study (SOCAL); the Southwest
Florida Shelf Ecosystems Study (SOFLA); and the South Texas Outer
Continental Shelf Program (STOCS). In addition to the biological
material, more than 200 color slides of animals in situ were received
from the MAPTEM program.
During the 30+-year tenure of the contracts between MMS and the
Smithsonian, more than 337,012 lots of sorted and identified material
and 20,000 lots of unprocessed samples or mixed taxa have been
received. ``Lot'' means a single jar or vial of specimens that have
identical collecting data. One lot may comprise one or dozens or
thousands of specimens. Therefore lot statistics always underestimate
the actual number of specimens involved. Of this number more than
93,000 lots originated from studies in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and more
than 18,000 lots originated from the studies following the oil spill in
Panama. In that case, Smithsonian marine scientists also led a
scientific study (funded by MMS, see above) of the ecological
consequences of the oil. It remains a benchmark study in the field.
In the aggregate these collections document at least 4,000 species
of marine invertebrates from 602 families from 22 phyla. Recent
scientific publications document that the Gulf as a whole contains
roughly 15,000 species, with perhaps another 3,000 species still
undiscovered. These represent everything from ecological keystone
species to economically important species to potentially threatened or
endangered species. ``Keystone'' species are those on which most of the
rest of the ecosystem depends. The North Atlantic cold water coral
(Lophelia pertusa (Linnaeus, 1758) is a keystone species because it is
one of the most important deep water reef-builders, and thus
fundamental to deep marine ecosystems. It occurs within 20 or so miles
of the Deepwater Horizon well-head, as documented by trawl samples from
1984 and direct observation from submersibles during MMS-funded studies
between 2004 and as recently as September of last year. Economically
important species are the focus of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Agency's National Marine Fisheries Service. Examples are the three
commercially important Gulf shrimp species (pink and brown shrimps,
Farfantepenaeus duorarum and F. aztecus, and the white shrimp,
Litopenaeus setiferus), all of which are well-represented in NMNH
collections. Endangered or ``at risk'' species include several
populations of genetically distinct bottlenose dolphins, and the
Florida manatee, which is particularly vulnerable to oil fouling of the
plants on which they feed. Finally, many of the species collected
through these surveys were entirely new: between 300 and 400 new
species were described based on these collections and many more await
description.
As many as six persons have been employed at any one time on the
joint Smithsonian-MMS project with responsibilities for inventorying
the material as it was received, cataloging the identified specimens,
sorting and identifying additional specimens from unprocessed lots, and
other curatorial tasks necessary to meet NMNH curatorial standards.
However, approximately one third of MMS collections deposited at the
Smithsonian need further work in order to optimally support research
related to the oil spill.
Importance of Collections:
To give the committee some idea of the importance of these
collections, my staff recently estimated that fully 58% of publicly
available specimen-based records from the Gulf of Mexico represent
Smithsonian collections. I would like to emphasize that many marine
research institutions around the Gulf and elsewhere will play key roles
in assessing damage and measuring remediation and recovery in the years
ahead. The Smithsonian is ready to collaborate and support that work in
any way it can. It is also likely that many scientists and institutions
have data or collections that are not publically available (i.e.
accessible via on-line databases) that are highly relevant to the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill. However, the massive size and quality of
the MMS survey collections at the Smithsonian will surely continue to
be an important resource.
These collections, therefore, represent a unique and now
irreplaceable resource to describe quantitatively the pre-spill Gulf of
Mexico ecosystem. The depth range of these collections is enormous,
ranging from five to nearly 3,000 meters (nearly two miles). From the
label data I calculated that specimens were accessed at 459 distinct
depths. The deep collections are especially valuable because survey
work at such depths is extremely expensive and limited. Given the depth
of the Deepwater Horizon well-head, data on abyssal communities are
especially important. A Gulf-wide MMS-funded deepwater study listed
above as DGoMB was recently published and includes a number of these
deep stations very near the spill site in its database. The total
number of distinct geographic points sampled is roughly 1,000. In
short, by the standards of biological sampling in general, and
especially considering the rarity of deep-water samples, these
collections are truly impressive.
Distinct Roles of Smithsonian and MMS:
The Smithsonian role in this partnership has been the archiving of
the collections that support these technical studies, the improvement
of the scientific quality of the collections as resources permitted,
and making them publicly available in digital form through our website.
MMS conducted the surveys, received reports from the scientists and
contractors involved, and is therefore the final authority on data and
analyses extracted from the collections. The Smithsonian enhances the
value of the collections by meticulously creating digital records for
each sample of specimens, including precise georeferenced locality data
and other important ecological aspects. Few other museums have the
resources to create so many records of such high quality. The quality
and quantity of digitally available data will make these collections in
particular extremely valuable to scientists seeking information on the
pre-spill ecosystem.
Future Work:
Ideally, the scientists that will carry out inventories and surveys
of the post-spill environment will want exactly comparable pre-spill
surveys, using the same methods, and designed for the same analytical
protocols. There is one ongoing MMS and NOAA-funded study of deep
corals in the vicinity that is ideally suited to this task. We cannot
say at this time to what extent the 1974-1978 baseline surveys, and
most surveys since then, fulfill these stringent requirements. While
such surveys may be in retrospect imperfect, or imperfectly archived in
some ways, they certainly provide one of the most comprehensive
available resources on biodiversity and abundance data prior to the
spill. Even if the background raw data are not available, it is
possible that such data could be regenerated directly from NMNH
collections. Although it is already obvious that NMNH collections have
had, and will have, an important role to play in describing the pre-
spill ecosystem, we must wait until post-spill questions are more
precisely formulated before we can assess their role more specifically.
In addition to the more than 333,000 lots of invertebrates
originating from MMS studies in the Gulf of Mexico, the NMNH
Invertebrate Zoology collections also include 39,000 lots of
invertebrates that have been at least partially inventoried (have a
corresponding record in our catalog database). Of the 39,000 lots
represented in our database, the majority were collected between 1951-
2010. Our collection also includes an estimated 75,000-120,000 lots
that have not been inventoried at all. We have, however, completed an
initial digitization assessment in which collections have been
prioritized for improvements in curation. In order to make these high-
priority collections available to researchers we would need to
inventory and digitize them. Direct digitization is the most efficient
way to make the information widely available. Although these
collections are not as extensively documented as the MMS specimens,
many were collected from shallow near-shore and in-shore areas, and are
an important source of comparative material from Gulf of Mexico
locations not sampled by the MMS programs.
Recommendations:
1. The MMS baseline surveys in the 1970's, and special applied
project studies conducted thereafter, are now a unique and
irreplaceable resource to provide factual and objective data on
the Gulf of Mexico pre-spill environment.
2. Precise assessment of the ability of these collections and
associated data to support quantitative comparisons of pre- and
post-spill conditions will require additional work, contingent
on the exact questions to be answered.
3. Survey work in the Gulf region in advance of oil damage has
commenced already, but it needs to be well-organized and
quantitative. We have a short window of time to increase our
baseline knowledge of these ecosystems before damage occurs.
4. Post-spill ecological research would be enhanced by working
up and making publicly available Gulf of Mexico pre-spill
collections that are not yet publicly available.
5. Gathering baseline ecological data (similar to the MMS
Environmental Program) is a proactive and precautionary step
wherever offshore drilling may take place. The Gulf of Mexico
MMS baseline surveys were refocused in 1978, yet today, 32
years later, they are suddenly of national importance and
significance. All stakeholders benefit from objective and
factual information. Advances since then in the ability to
archive and exploit such data now make such activities both
economical and routine.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look forward
to answering any questions you may have.
______
Response to questions submitted for the record by Jonathan Coddington,
Associate Director for Research and Collections, National Museum of
Natural History, Smithsonian Institution
Questions from Chairwoman Madeline Z. Bordallo (D-GU)
1. How well known is the biodiversity in the Gulf of Mexico? Are there
still new species to discover?
The Gulf of Mexico is one of the best known marine regions in the
world. The recent encyclopedia of biota from the Gulf (Gulf of Mexico:
Origins, Waters, and Biota. Volume 1. Biodiversity, 2009, eds. Felder
and Camp) lists 15,419 species from the Gulf, but also implies that
only 80% of the biodiversity is known. Thus, one might expect to find
another 5000 new, as yet undescribed species of nematodes, polychaetes,
copepods and amphipods from the Gulf, especially from the deepest
waters. Indeed, species are being described, on average, every week, if
not on a daily basis from this body of water.
New species, especially from poorly studied invertebrate groups,
have been, and continue to be described from the Department of
Interior's Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement (BOEMRE) programmatic collections maintained at the NMNH.
2. Have steps been taken to begin to integrate information from the
collection into the necessary baseline data for the natural
resource damage assessment process?
Yes, to date more than 57,000 lots of invertebrates from 12
distinct Gulf of Mexico research programs funded by BOEMRE have been
accessioned into the collections of the National Museum of Natural
History (NMNH) and cataloged. Each of these 57,000 lots is represented
by an electronic record in a web-accessible database at http://
collections.nmnh.si.edu/emuwebizweb/pages/nmnh/iz/Query.php. These
specimen records are also accessible through the Ocean Biogeographic
Information System, at http://www.iobis.org/. NMNH collections were
used to create an interactive context sensitive Google Earth map that
shows the species collected at each BOEMRE Gulf of Mexico locality.
This map was provided to BOEMRE and is available for download at http:/
/www.invertebrates.si.edu/mms/files.htm.
The Smithsonian continues to work to increase the publicly
available data about these collections, as reported quarterly to
BOEMRE. NMNH-generated data is regularly integrated into data used by
scientists performing research for the BOEMRE.
Does the Smithsonian Institution need additional resources to
complete this work?
As explained elsewhere in my responses to questions, NMNH's Gulf of
Mexico invertebrate collection baseline data are used by many
stakeholders for their particular purposes. Normally, collection
processing is an ongoing background activity. Our usual priority is
collections that can be processed and put on-line quickly, or high-
value research materials. The remaining collections have been
prioritized to emphasize, first, those specimens that are well-
identified but need cataloguing, and second, those that still need to
be sorted and identified. The Gulf of Mexico collections that still
need to be processed require sorting and physical preparation,
cataloging and describing, and data capture and geo-referencing. BOEMRE
and NMNH will plan to continue working together to develop and build
this valuable resource.
Questions from Ranking Republican Member Henry Brown, Jr. (R-SC)
1. Dr. Coddington, you mentioned that your baseline surveys in the
1970's are ``Now a unique and irreplaceable resource''. What
are some of the conclusions of those surveys? Has this data
been provided to appropriate federal agencies? If yes, how has
it been used?
The baseline surveys to which you refer were conducted by the
BOEMRE, not the Smithsonian. The design, implementation, and analysis
of the survey were the responsibility of BOEMRE. However, the
collections produced were transferred gradually to the Smithsonian, and
thus are still available for further research. The Smithsonian and NOAA
have also conducted surveys, although not as extensive as BOEMRE.
The recently published 500+ page book on the Gulf of Mexico edited
by Felder and Camp (2009) is an excellent example of the results of
surveys. Fifteen Smithsonian scientists contributed, reviewing various
groups of organisms and providing lists of species that occur in the
Gulf. The surveys are why we know that about 15,500 known marine
species live in the Gulf and about 10% live nowhere else. It also
identifies introduced and invasive species. Collections, keys,
checklists and analyses that depend on them are the fundamental basis
of knowledge on the pre-spill Gulf environment.
Our data and analyses are freely available to everyone, including
federal agencies, universities, independent research laboratories, and
the general public at http://collections.nmnh.si.edu/emuwebizweb/pages/
nmnh/iz/Query.php. The data are used by the Depts. of Interior,
Commerce, Defense and others whenever their work requires environmental
knowledge. For example, one specific way the coral records have been
used is to document NOAA's ``The State of Deep Coral Ecosystems of the
United States: 2007'', a comprehensive analysis of all corals by
geographic region that occur off the U.S. and territories. Without our
records and publications, this kind of compilation would not have been
possible.
2. How much money has the Smithsonian Institution spent on its Gulf of
Mexico surveys? How many staff do you currently have assigned
to the Gulf?
Since 1979, the Smithsonian has received more than $5 million from
BOEMRE to maintain, manage, and database Gulf of Mexico collections.
From other sources, including federal appropriations to the Smithsonian
for scientific research, at least another $2 million has been expended
since 1979. Currently, we have two full time and one part time employee
assigned to work on our BOEMRE collections. These positions are funded
through a contract from BOEMRE.
3. On page 6, you stress that ``we have a short window of time to
increase our baseline knowledge of these ecosystems before
damage occurs.'' What type of baseline information was
available before the spill?
Over many decades scientists have conducted ecological and
biological surveys, including the various BOEMRE Gulf of Mexico
surveys, in the Gulf of Mexico. These studies document important
biological processes, for example, reproductive success, dispersal, and
establishment of diverse species (see references in Felder and Camp,
2009). These biological processes will likely be affected by the oil
spill. There is also a significant body of research on invasive
species, commercially important species, and long term ecological
change. However, now we are dealing with one specific oil-spill, at a
particular place, being dispersed by particular currents at a
particular time of year. We should move quickly to survey habitats
likely to be impacted by this particular event.
______
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Dr. Coddington, for informing us
about the valuable collection and resources at the Smithsonian
that can help address recovery activities. And next, we will
hear from Dr. Fingas.
STATEMENT OF MERV FINGAS, PH.D.,
COMMITTEE ON OIL IN THE SEA,
Dr. Fingas. Good morning, Chairwoman Bordallo and
Subcommittee members. Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
First, I would like to reintroduce the National Academy of
Sciences, who have conducted some recent studies that are quite
relevant to the Gulf oil spill. The academy has regularly
conducted studies of several facets of oil spills in the past
30 years. These are technically carried out by independent,
unbiased scientists who are involved in the field and have
specific expertise to bear on the topic at hand. I will
highlight two such studies. The first study is ``Oil in the Sea
III,'' which is already highlighted by Mr. Cassidy, this study
here.
This study focused on two facets of oil spills, first
estimating the amount of oil discharged into the sea from
various sources, and second, to assess the fate and effects of
that oil in the environment. A number of recommendations were
made in that report, probably the most important being the
importance of obtaining real data sets from real spills, such
as the current Gulf spill.
The second study is a study of oil spill dispersants, which
was published in 2005-2006. Oil spill dispersants are
surfactant mixtures along with solvents, which are intended to
enhance the production of small droplets in the water column.
There are many issues with oil spill dispersants which are
covered in this book, including the fact that dispersants
ultimately break down and the oil rises to the surface again,
the toxicity of such dispersants, and the effectiveness of
products.
Again, a number of recommendations are made on the study
and use of dispersants in this report. Again, I should
emphasize the importance of one recommendation, being that of
obtaining real data sets such as in the current spill.
Finally, I have made a number of comments on initiating
research programs. I have been involved my whole life in
developing and carrying out research programs, and felt it
necessary to share some of these lessons. I am pleased to be
here, and will answer any questions that you may have. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Fingas follows:]
Statement of Merv Fingas, Private Individual, Edmonton, Alberta
Foreword: This is the personal testimony of Merv Fingas, a private
individual from Canada. I have extensive background as an oil spill
researcher and have participated in several NAS committees. I will
describe briefly some NAS studies, one on oil-in-the-sea and one on oil
spill dispersants. I had extensive involvement in these studies
especially the oil-in-the-sea study. Further, I will give some of my
impressions of where R&D emphasis should be placed.
1 Introduction--Oil Spills
Major oil spills can attract the attention of the public and the
media. In past years, this attention had created a global awareness of
the risks of oil spills and the damage they do to the environment. In
recent years, major spill incidents are fewer in number however the
recent Gulf spill may increase these spill numbers back to the previous
high levels. The public becomes aware of very major spills, but
generally is unaware that spills are a daily fact of life. Oil spills
are a frequent occurrence, particularly because of the heavy use of oil
and petroleum products in our daily lives.
Spill statistics are collected by a number of agencies around the
world. Unfortunately these are sometimes not as accurate as they could
be. They can sometimes be misleading to compare oil spill statistics,
however, because different methods are used to collect the data. In
general, statistics on oil spills are difficult to obtain and any data
set should be viewed with caution. The spill volume or amount is the
most difficult to determine or estimate. For example, in the case of a
vessel accident, the exact volume in a given compartment may be known
before the accident, but the remaining oil may have been transferred to
other ships immediately after the accident. Some spill accident data
banks do not include the amounts burned, if and when that occurs,
whereas others include all the oil lost by whatever means. Sometimes
the exact character or physical properties of the oil lost are not
known and this leads to different estimations of the amount lost. Spill
data are often collected for purposes other than future improvement of
spill response. Further, reporting procedures vary in different
jurisdictions and organizations, such as government or private
companies. The number of spills reported also depends on the minimum
size or volume of the spill. In Canada for example, there are about 12
such reportable oil spills every day, of which only about one is
spilled into navigable waters. These 12 spills amount to about 40 tons
of oil or petroleum product. In the United States, there are estimated
to be about 25 spills per day into navigable waters and an estimated 75
spills on land.
The public often has the misconception that oil spills from tankers
are the primary source of oil pollution in the marine environment.
While it is true that some of the large spills are from tankers, it
must be recognized that these spills still make up less than about 5%
of all oil pollution entering the sea. The sheer volume of oil spilled
from tankers and the high profile given these incidents in the media
have contributed to this misconception. In fact, as stated earlier,
half of the oil spilled in the seas is the runoff of oil and fuel from
land-based sources rather than from accidental spills.
In conclusion, it is important to study spill incidents from the
past to learn how the oil affected the environment, what cleanup
techniques worked and what improvements can be made, and to identify
the gaps in technology.
3 The Oil-in-the Sea Study by the National Academy of Sciences--2003
(Note: this is my paraphrase of a NAS summary but all opinions are
mine. NAS report recommendations are given in quotes.)
Oil in the Sea III is the third report from the National Academies
on oil spill sources and fates, the last of which was published in
1985. Since the date of the last report, several governmental and
private agencies have created databases with more information on
petroleum releases and their impact on the environment. This 2003
report proposes a clearer methodology for estimating petroleum inputs
to the sea and makes recommendations for further monitoring and
assessment that will help policymakers prioritize next steps for
prevention and response.
Sources of Oil in the Sea
Petroleum inputs into North American and worldwide marine waters
were computed for four major sources - natural seeps and releases that
occur during the extraction, transportation, and consumption of
petroleum. The last three include all significant sources of
anthropogenic petroleum pollution. This summary highlights the major
findings about each major source.
Natural Seeps of Petroleum
Natural seeps occur when crude oil seeps from geologic strata under
the sea floor into the water. Seeps are often used to identify
potential economic reserves of petroleum. They contribute the highest
amount of petroleum to the marine environment, accounting for 45
percent of the total estimated annual load to the world's oceans and 60
percent of the estimated total load to North American waters. The
presence of these seeps, though entirely natural, significantly alters
the nature of the local marine ecosystems around them. Seeps serve as
natural sites for understanding adaptive responses of organisms over
generations of oil exposure. The report recommends that programs be
implemented to understand the fate of petroleum from natural seeps and
ecological responses to them.
Author's Comment--Few, if any studies on natural seeps have been
carried out since the NAS study.
Extraction of Petroleum
World oil production continues to rise, from 8.5 million tonnes (1
tonne equals about 294 gallons) in 1985 to 11.7 million tonnes in 2000.
In that same time, the number of offshore oil and gas platforms rose
from a few thousand to approximately 8,300 fixed or floating offshore
platforms. Historically, oil and gas exploration and production of
petroleum have represented a significant source of spills. The second
largest marine spill in the world was a blowout that released 476,000
tonnes of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico in 1979. The current Gulf
blowout may soon approach this level of significance. The amount of oil
transported over the sea continues to rise. Since 1985, the Middle
East's exports of oil to the United States have almost tripled, and
exports to the rest of the world have doubled. While the devastating
impact of spills has been well-publicized with images of oil-covered
shores and wildlife, releases from the transport of petroleum now
amount to less than 4 percent of the total in North American waters and
less than 13 percent worldwide. The four major sources of petroleum
discharges in the transportation sector include pipeline spills, tank
vessel spills, operational discharges from cargo washings, and coastal
facilities spills. Transportation-related spills are down for several
reasons. The enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 placed
increased liability on responsible parties, and other regulations
required the phase out of older vessels and the implementation of new
technology and safety procedures. By 1999, approximately two-thirds of
the tankers operating worldwide had either double-hulls or segregated
tank arrangements - a vast improvement over older single hull ships.
Operational discharges from cargo washing are now illegal in North
America, a law that is rigorously enforced. However, there still
remains a risk of spills in regions with less stringent safety
procedures practices. The report recommends that federal agencies
expand efforts to work with ship owners domestically and
internationally to more fully enforce effective international
regulatory standards that have contributed to the decline in oil
spills. In the United States, nearly 23,000 miles of pipeline are used
to transport petroleum. In some regions, much of this infrastructure is
more than 30 years old, and unless steps are taken to address the
problem, the likelihood of a spill from this source is expected to
increase. The report recommends that federal agencies continue to work
with state environmental agencies and industry to evaluate the threat
posed by aging pipelines and to take steps to minimize the potential
for a significant spill.
Author's Comment--The first recommendation on improving discharges has
certainly improved in North America. Both Canada and U.S.A.
have increased surveillance efforts and enforcement efforts.
This is resulting in decreased dumping.
The second recommendation relates to the aging pipeline
infrastructure. Although some effort has been undertaken an accelerated
effort is required.
Consumption of Petroleum
From 1985 to 2000, global oil consumption increased from 9.3 to
11.7 million tonnes per day, an increase of more than 25 percent.
Releases that occur during the consumption of petroleum, whether by
individual car and boat owners, marine vessels, or airplanes,
contribute the vast majority of petroleum as a result of human
activity. Land-based activities contribute to polluted rivers and
streams, which eventually empty to the sea. Consumption related inputs
contribute one-third of the total load of petroleum to the sea and
represent 85 percent of the anthropogenic load to North American marine
waters and 70 percent worldwide. Land-based inputs are highest near
urbanized areas and refinery production. More than half of the land-
based inputs in North America are estimated to flow to the near shore
waters between Maine and Virginia, a region with many urbanized areas
and also many sensitive coastal estuaries. In North American marine
waters, land runoff combined with marine boating and use of jet skis
account for 22 percent of total petroleum inputs and 64 percent of
inputs from human activity.
The threat of pollution from urban areas is expected to rise.
Current trends indicate that by the year 2010, 60 percent of the U.S.
population will live along the coast. Worldwide, two-thirds of the
urban centers with populations of 2.5 million or more are near coastal
areas. In 1990, heightened awareness of the large number and design
inefficiencies of two-stroke engines commonly used in recreational
vehicles led the U.S. EPA to begin regulating the ``nonroad engine''
population under the authority of the Clean Air Act. The marine
industry responded by developing cleaner engines in the late 1990s, but
the report recommends that federal agencies continue efforts to
encourage the phase-out of the older inefficient two-stroke engines and
establish a coordinated enforcement policy.
Author's Comment--The recommendation that the old-style inefficient 2-
stroke engine be increasing phased out has been partially
carried out. Since the report, there have been many
improvements in the efficiency of 2-stroke engines and many of
these have been replaced.
Significant Cross-Cutting Issues
Studies completed in the last 20 years confirm that no spill is
entirely benign. Further, there is no correlation between the size of a
release and its impact. The effects of a petroleum release are a
complex function of the rate of release, the nature of the petroleum,
and the local physical and biological character of the exposed
ecosystem. Some petroleum components are more toxic than others.
Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) are known to be among the more
toxic components of petroleum, and their initial concentration is an
important factor in the impact of a given release. Growing evidence
suggests that toxic compounds such as PAH in crude oil or refined
products at very low concentrations can have adverse effects on biota.
This suggests that PAH from chronic sources may be of greater concern
than was thought 10 or 15 years ago and that effects of petroleum
spills may last longer than expected. The report recommends that
federal agencies take several actions to better understand the behavior
and effects of petroleum hydrocarbon releases.
These actions include:
Studying the fate and hydrodynamic transport of
petroleum in the sea.
Author's Comment--This recommendation has not been addressed
significantly, perhaps because of poor economic times.
Developing and implementing a rapid response system
to collect in situ information about spill behavior and
impacts.
Author's Comment--This recommendation has not been addressed
significantly.
Significantly enhancing research efforts to more
fully understand the risk posed to humans and the marine
environment by chronic release of petroleum, especially the
cumulative effects of petroleum-related toxic compounds such as
PAH.
Author's Comment--This recommendation has not been addressed
significantly.
Continuing research on effects of releases on wild
populations, including a program to assess ecosystems in areas
known to be at risk from spills or other releases of petroleum.
Author's Comment--This recommendation has not been addressed
significantly.
The oil in the sea report also summarized the overall behavior of a
sub-sea blowout. The following two boxes summarize this behavior.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Jet Phase: The speed of the oil and natural gas being expelled
from the pressurized, confined space of the pipeline to the open ocean
makes the oil form droplets and the gas form bubbles.
Plume Phase: The momentum of these tiny droplets and bubbles drags
significant volumes of sea water upward into the water column, forming
a plume. In deeper water, so much water is incorporated into the plume
that eventually, the oil-natural gas-water mix is no longer buoyant,
and the plume will stop rising, suspended in the water column at the
terminal layer. If heavier components sink out of the suspension, the
plume may reform and begin to rise again past that terminal layer in a
process known as ``peeling''.
Post-terminal Phase: Once the plume reaches the final terminal
layer, the rise of the oil-gas-hydrates is driven purely by the
buoyancy of the individual droplets and bubbles.
Once the oil reaches the surface, it tends to form a surface slick
thinner than that seen during a typical shallow-water release, in part
due to the diffusion and dispersal of oil droplets as they rise, and in
part due to the layers of oil arriving at the surface at different
stages. Much, if not all, of the gas associated with the oil be
dissolved into the water column. Natural gas released at depths below
300 meters can form hydrates, a mix of natural gas and water similar to
ice. Hydrates are dense, so if they form it is likely that the buoyancy
of the plume would be greatly reduced, increasing the time that it
takes for the oil and gas to reach the surface.
From: Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates, and Effects, National
Research Council, 2003.
4 The Oil Spill Dispersants by the National Academy of Sciences--2006
(Note: this is my paraphrase of a NAS summary but all opinions are
mine. Direct recommendations are given in quotes.)
Oil spill chemical dispersants are surfactant mixtures along with
solvents which are intended to enhance the production of small oil
droplets in the water. This is similar to the use of surfactants in
oil-based or Italian salad dressings. There are many issues with oil
spill dispersants including: the fact that the dispersions ultimately
break down the oil rises; the toxicity of such dispersions and the
effectiveness of products. These issues are covered in the main report.
The major recommendations in the report are:
1. ``Decisions to use dispersants involve trade-offs. Oil
dispersants break up slicks, enhancing the amount of oil that
physically mixes into the water column and reducing the
potential that a slick will contaminate shoreline habitats or
come into contact with birds, marine mammals, or other
organisms in coastal ecosystems. At the same time, using
dispersants increases the exposure of water column and sea
floor life to spilled oil.''
2. ``The window of opportunity for using dispersants is early,
typically within hours to 1 or 2 days after an oil spill. After
that, natural ``weathering'' of an oil slick on the surface of
the sea, caused by impacts such as the heat from the sun or
buffeting by waves, makes oil more difficult to disperse.
Therefore, failure to make a timely decision regarding
dispersant use can be a decision not to use dispersants.''
3. ``Better information is needed to determine the length of
the window of opportunity and the effectiveness of dispersant
application for different oil types and environmental
conditions. Given the potential impacts that dispersed oil may
have on water-column and seafloor biota and habitats,
thoughtful analyses are required so that decision makers can
understand the potential impacts of a spill with and without
dispersant application. A focused series of studies is needed
to provide the information needed for an effective response to
oil spills of all types and in various environments using both
laboratory research and, in the event of a spill, field
research in areas treated with dispersants.''
Author's Comment--This recommendation has not been addressed
significantly. Dispersant use in the Gulf has largely ignored
any of the above considerations.
4. ``More accurate methods of predicting the behavior of
dispersed oil are needed to better predict the amount of oil
that will mix into the water column. Limitations of current
methods for predicting concentrations of dispersed oil in the
water column include inaccurate representation of the natural
physical processes involved in dispersal. Improved
representations will allow.''
Author's Comment--This recommendation has not been addressed. Further,
the significant issue of the re-surfacing of oil after
dispersion has not been addressed.
8. ``Exposure to the air, the heat of the sun, and the
turbulence of the waves can ``weather'' oil on the surface of
the water, creating an emulsion; but no wave-tank or laboratory
studies have investigated how dispersants would work on an oil
and water emulsion. Studies are needed to investigate the
chemical treatment of weathered oil emulsions.''
Author's Comment--This recommendation has not been addressed. Further,
the researchers have not addressed the technical definition of
emulsions.
5. ``The recent introduction of safer chemical dispersants
means that the toxicity of dispersed oil now typically results
primarily from compounds within the oil itself. It is known
that breaking up oil slicks into smaller droplets exposes more
of the toxic compounds in oil, such as polynuclear aromatic
hydrocarbons (PAH), but in general the mechanisms of toxicity
are poorly understood. With a better understanding of the
toxicity of dispersed oil to marine organisms, data can be
generated on toxic levels and thresholds for use by decision
makers.''
Author's Comment--This recommendation has not been addressed.
6. ``The factors controlling the biological and physical
processes which determine the ultimate fate of dispersed oil
are poorly understood. Dispersed oil could accumulate in more
stagnant areas, or could be consumed by plankton in the water
column and enter the food chain. More detailed information on
weathering rates and on the ultimate fate of dispersed oil are
needed.''
Author's Comment--This recommendation has not been addressed.
7. ``Data from field studies on the concentration and behavior
of dispersed oil are needed to validate models and provide
real-world data to improve knowledge of oil fate and effects.
Detailed plans should be developed, including the pre-
positioning of equipment and human resources, for rapid
deployment of a monitoring effort for dispersant applications
in the event of a spill so that the consequences can be
recorded.''
Author's Comment--This recommendation has not been addressed.
5 Spill Research
Spill research is an important facet to develop capability to deal
with oil spills. Many of the current capabilities to deal with oil
derive from research programs. Research programs/projects may be
divided into 12 general areas:
a) Recovery--This includes physical recovery methods such as
skimmers, booms, and sorbents. While there was extensive
development in this area in the 1970's, there has been little
research other than commercial activity in this area. Since
physical recovery is the prime recovery method suggested by
several governments, this area should receive much more
attention.
b) Treatment--This includes chemical treatment such
dispersants, solidifiers, surface washing agents,
biodegradation agents, etc. It is felt that far too much effort
has been put into this area compared to the other areas
resulting in generally disappointing outcomes. The agents have
never performed as hoped and have consumed great amounts of
resources that could have otherwise been devoted to other
priority areas.
c) Arctic spills--This includes countermeasures in special
areas such as the Arctic and the tropics. Performing a variety
of countermeasures and understanding spill behavior in special
areas such as the Arctic and tropics, requires special efforts
and special studies. Similar to recovery projects, extensive
efforts had been carried out in the late 1970's and early
1980's, but funding stalled out quickly and little work has
been done since.
d) Burning--In-situ burning has been use sparsely in the past
20 years. Several studies have examined emissions and other
factors. Some work has been carried out on other facets such as
ignition and the use of fire-resistant booms. Only a moderate
amount of work would be needed in the future.
e) Fate--The fate of oil includes long-term behavior and
effects. This area has mostly been studied by post-assessment
of spills. Problems with this include the lack of good starting
data and the inability to measure critical parameters--
especially at the start. Good experimental studies of this are
very few. Since this is a very important area for assessing the
long-term effects of oil spills on the environment, priority
resourcing is suggested.
f) Behavior--The behavior of oil includes processes such as
evaporation, emulsification, dissolution, dispersion, and many
others such as plume rise and behavior during sub-sea blowouts.
While evaporation and emulsification are now reasonably
understood, there remains a large gap in knowledge of the other
behaviors. These are fundamental studies and thus in-depth
academic/research study is required. It is suggested that this
is also an area where more research is required.
g) Effects--this includes the toxicological effects of oil on
various biota and ecosystems. It is indeed a broad area. Much
of the work in the past has consisted of acute toxicity testing
on typical test organisms. Much more work is needed on
specialized toxicity testing such as genotoxicity, endocrine
disrupting capacity, and studies of sub-lethal effects. Long-
term studies are particularly insufficient. This area is felt
to be a priority for the future.
h) Analysis--This includes the development, improvement and
testing of chemical and in some cases, biological test methods
for oil. This area has received little attention in the past.
Further, several groups are still using nonstandard and in some
cases, inappropriate methods, in their work. Some research
efforts are needed in this area.
i) Remote Sensing--This includes the detection, tracking and
remote sensing of oil spills. In the past this area had
received moderate funding in the 1970's and early 1980's, after
which resources fell off. More efforts in this important area
are needed.
j) Modeling--Modeling includes the prediction of oil location
and state in the future as well as backtracking, evaluating
environmental damage and predicting sub-sea rise and behavior.
Modeling inputs are highly depending on information gathered in
other categories such as behavior, fate and effects. This area
had some funding in the past and is suggested to receive
similar funding in the future.
k) Risk Analysis and Planning--This is a broad category
including such studies as various forms of risk analysis,
contingency planning, management analysis, etc. It is suggested
that this area receive similar funding in the future, with
emphasis on developing new methods.
l) In-Situ Remediation--This includes studies of
bioremediation and natural attenuation. This area has received
some funding in the past. It is suggested that similar funding
should be placed in the future.
My own summary assessment of these research areas appears in the
attached table along with assessments of project costs, durations, and
input from the private sector.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
6 Issues in Spill Research
There are a number of issues in spill research for which I wish to
present my views.
A) Highly Variable Funding Researchers in oil spills have, in the
past, received highly variable funding. This is largely due to
management perception about the priority of this area. A funding cycle
typically goes up to high levels after a major spill such as the recent
Gulf spill. Then two years later, `other priorities' siphon off funding
and soon the researchers are scrambling just to keep the labs
operating. It is more typical that the research unit is then closed.
New units are then opened after the next big spill. This type of
cycling obviously does not lead to productive research, rather it is a
waste of resources. It would be much better to fund the programs at a
moderate level of funding for at least 10 years. It requires 2 years to
have a new researcher become familiar with the oil spill field and 5
years to become fully productive. Many funding cycles do not enable new
researchers to become productive in the field.
To illustrate the variability of funding the following two charts
show my own research funding over more than 25 years. This is the
funding given to the group by their own government agency. These
figures show the high variability in resources over time. During this
time the mandate and expectations of the program were about the same.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
B) Impartial `Research' An issue that does arise in the oil
spill field is that of `biased studies'. There are cases, particularly
in chemical oil dispersants, where there are results completely
contrary to those from similar studies. One of the problems is that
proponents, often oil companies, have funding some of the studies.
While this in itself is actually good, there are too many cases in
which the `opposing' points of view are funded by persons or groups
having an interest in the matter. Rules might be established such as in
the pharmaceutical industry, to ensure studies are conducted in a
conflict-of-interest-free environment.
C) Re-Invention Because research is often started and stopped with
the various funding cycles, there is much re-invention occurring. The
start of many research groups is often marked by starting projects
which had already been done in the past. Often 3 years are wasted in
this type of re-invention. This is usually due to poor communication,
lack of proper literature review (topics that will also be covered) and
sometimes due to regional or local pride.
D) Literature The literature on oil spills and oil spill research
is not used by some researchers. The reasons for this are not apparent.
Currently most important literature is indexed on the searching program
SCOPUS, to which can be accessed in almost all libraries or institutes
in the world. Further SCOPUS also accesses important conferences on oil
spills such as AMOP and IOSC. A personal story illustrates the issue.
The author of this was recently present at a spill conference in Europe
and presented a paper in an oil spill behavior session. Upon reading
the proceedings it was noted that all of the other four authors had no
references newer than 1982! These were more than 20 years old and many
significant findings had been made in the meantime. Needless to say,
all four of these presentations and papers were irrelevant.
E) Scientific Communication There are few communication fora for
scientists--especially on an international basis. There are the annual
AMOP seminars in Canada, the annual Environment Canada Research
meetings and after that tri-annual conferences in USA, Europe and South
East Asia. This has also created somewhat of a problem in that often
communication occurs in only one of these three world areas and little
communication sometimes occurs between scientists in the three world
areas. Unfortunately many scientists, especially those from state or
local organizations, are unable to attend these fora. Sometimes
researchers never have the opportunity to meet their counterparts in
other parts of the world or country in their lifetimes. Collaborative
research is a good way to improve communication. It must be recognized
that researchers need to directly communicate with each other and to
attend the usual conferences and meetings as well as to engage in
collaborative research.
F) Myths and Re-evaluation A number of myths have been developed
regarding oil spills, and because of the many communication issues
noted above, these myths persist to this day. Examples of these
include: that dispersing oil improves biodegradation, that pour point
is solidification point, etc. The opposite of these is true. It is
important that new researchers to the field consult with experts long
in the field to begin their work on a solid footing. It is important to
avoid re-invention, but at the same time it is important to ensure that
essential information is re-evaluated before proceeding.
G) Transient Research Because the funding for research is
transient, often research institutes come and go within 5 to 8 year
periods. This causes several problems. First there is a massive loss of
resources with much output. Second, the new research institutes often
draw away resources from older existing institutes. Thus, there is a
net loss in research.
H) Good Field Data For most projects there is a strong need for
good, reliable field data. `Real' spill data would be particularly
good. Plans have been developed for data collection, but never
implemented. Collection of such field data was also a recommendation of
both of the NAS studies noted above. Because of response priorities,
research data is rarely collected during actual spills. This data would
be priceless for future work. Further, access to good, qualified data
should be given to any researcher with a legitimate need.
______
Response to questions submitted for the record by Merv Fingas,
Committee on Oil in the Sea, National Research Council
Questions from Chairwoman Madeline Z. Bordallo (D-GU)
1. Given the scale and complexity of this oil spill and the
unprecedented volumes of dispersant that have been used, do you
think any of the recommendations in the 2003 and 2006 National
Research Council reports should be reviewed or reevaluated
based on these events?
Fingas response--I believe that the recommendations in the report
are largely valid. Unfortunately, most of the recommendations were not
followed. I believe both the report and some of the actions in the Gulf
spill should be re-evaluated after the spill is over.
2. The 2003 report by the National Research Council predicted that the
oil in a deepwater blowout could break into fine droplets,
forming plumes of oil mixed with water that would not quickly
rise to the surface. Why then are we apparently unprepared to
manage the current situation?
Fingas response--Unfortunately the oil will still rise to the
surface, albeit in 1 or more days. Thus the dispersants really do not
make an overall difference in a situation such as the Gulf spill where
the currents largely keep both the surface and sub-surface oil in the
same general area. Over one week about the same amount of oil is in the
near surface area in the Gulf, irrespective of the amount of
dispersants used.
3. Can you explain why studying the ``fate'' and ``effects'' of an oil
spill should be given priority in future efforts?
Fingas response--The fate and effects of oil spills are important
in that we need to understand these in the context of oil spill
countermeasures as well as for environmental purposes. The fate and
effect of dispersed oil, as an example, is very important in deciding
whether to use dispersants or not. In some cases the long term fate and
effects of an oil will make a very large difference to decision-making
on spill countermeasures at the time of the spill.
4. The 2006 report by the National Research Council recommended the
development of detailed plans, including pre-positioning assets
for rapid deployment of a monitoring effort for dispersant
application in the event of a spill. How could such a plan have
changed efforts to respond to this oil spill? Should such
planning, training and prepositioning and deployment of assets
and equipment be required as a precondition to any new offshore
oil and gas permits for drilling in OCS regions previously held
under moratoria?
Fingas Response: There was little pre-positioning in the Gulf spill
case. Several monitoring efforts were carried out, however for short
periods of time. Because of the vastness of the area and the large
amount of oil, it was impossible to truly assess effectiveness over a
longer period of time, a day for example. Future planning should
primarily focus on developing a strong scientific plan to measure
dispersant effectiveness over at least a 12 to 24 hour time span.
However, rather than strengthen monitoring plans, I suggest the use of
dispersants be re-evaluated. In my opinion, there is no scientific
evidence that dispersants contributed to improving the situation in the
Gulf of Mexico.
Questions from Ranking Republican Member Henry Brown, Jr. (R-SC)
1. Dr. Fingas, you mentioned that: ``Oil spills created a global
awareness of the risks of oil spills and the damage they do to
the environment''. If that is true, why do you believe that
most of the recommendations contained in your 2003 Oil in the
Sea Report have been ignored?
Fingas response: I believe that the recommendations in the 2003
report were largely ignored because of the lack of funding and also
because of a significant turnover in staff in the last decade. Many of
the researchers and oil spill staff in governments and industry have
changed in the past decade. Most organizations reduced staffing during
this time period, thus existing and new staff had too many priorities
to deal with. Examples of that also occurred in my own organization
where during this same decade we saw a reduction in funding of over
half, both in staff and in direct funding.
2. Could you update the Subcommittee on the top five sources of oil
being spilled into our seas?
Fingas response: The major sources according the NAS 2003 report
are:
a) Seeps--These account for about 57% of the estimated 2003
discharge. It must be stressed that seeps discharge oil slowly
over a large area, an area that has long since been acclimated
to deal with oil.
b) The second largest discharge is the release by consumers of
petroleum hydrocarbons. This includes direct discharges into
waters and land runoff. This is estimated to account for 32% of
the discharge into the sea.
c) The third largest source is the discharge at sea through
spills, such as tanker accidents and operational discharges.
These spills are believed to account for about 12% of spills.
d) The fourth largest source of spillage was estimated to be
associated with extraction processes such as discharges from
offshore drilling platforms. This was estimated to account for
3 percent of oil releases.
There was no fifth source defined as the sources were grouped
according to the above categories.
3. Based on your assessment of the causes of oil spills, as a matter
of public policy are we better off encouraging greater imports
of oil transported on tankers or offshore energy development?
Fingas response: I still believe that offshore energy development
should be the focus. AS a cause of spills the Gulf oil spill is a very
rare event.
4. What is the status of the National Academy of Sciences efforts to
update its 2003 Report?
Fingas response: The National Research Council (the operating arm
of the National Academy of Sciences) does not have independent
resources to undertake studies or update reports. Studies are funded
through federal agencies in response to requests from Congress, through
a direct request from federal or state agencies, or, in some cases,
private foundations. The Ocean Studies Board, the lead unit of the
National Research Council on the Oil in the Sea report, would certainly
consider a request to update the 2003 report. I cannot speak for the
Academy, but in my opinion, priorities for updating the 2003 report
include: the sharing of scientific information at this time, re-
evaluation of all previous reports, and examination of the many gap
areas. Examples of gap areas include the development of good data sets
on real spills for further studies, studies of other countermeasures
such as physical recovery and burning and longer-term studies of fate
and effects.
5. How much oil is naturally seeping near the Santa Barbara spill in
California? How does this compare with the actual amount
spilled in 1969? How is this oil being removed from the coastal
environment?
Fingas response: The amount of oil seeping naturally near Coal Oil
Point (near Santa Barbara) is estimated to be 100 to 150 barrels per
day. The oil well blowout near Santa Barbara released an estimated
80,000 to 100,000 barrels of oil over a 6-day period. This amounts to
about 1000 times the oil released in one day by the adjacent seep.
It might also be noted that the Coal Oil Seeps release a large
amount of petroleum gases as well (methane and other gases like
propane), which are not counted in the liquid discharge rates.
The oil released from the Coal Oil Seeps are dealt with (by nature)
in several ways: evaporation, tar ball formation, oil mat formation,
plant coating and by biodegradation and consumption. Some of the oil
leaves the seep area as slicks or in tar balls. There are many tar
balls along the nearby shorelines. Some of these are manually removed
by locals.
6. You make a comment that: ``Using dispersants increase the exposure
of the water column and sea floor life to spilled oil.'' Can
you expand on why this is a problem and if it would be a better
option to not using dispersants?
Fingas response: Increasing exposure to oil increases the toxicity
and the uptake of oil by organisms. Previous experience and data show
that the use of dispersants will sometimes increase the exposure of oil
to marine organisms such that toxicity is the result.
The use of dispersants in near shore (water depth of less than 50
to 100 feet) is not a good option as toxicity is often the result.
7. If the best time to use dispersants is 1 or 2 days after an oil
spill, is it appropriate to still be using them on Day 57?
Fingas response: Using dispersants after 1 or 2 days is futile and
will not result in significant effectiveness. It is not appropriate to
use dispersants on oil on Day 57, given that this oil has been out
there--or is this fresh oil? The issue is how long has the target oil
been out in the environment.
8. What is the impact of using Corexit as a subsurface dispersant on
marine life in the water column?
Fingas response: This is relatively unknown as it has not been
studied. The first approximation is that it would be similar to surface
studies, but this may not be correct.
9. Would you have recommended the use of dispersants in this spill?
Why or why not?
Fingas response: In the Gulf spill situation, I would not have
recommended the use of dispersants because the surface and subsurface
oil do not move much, thus negating any benefits from using dispersion
techniques. Dispersed oil re-surfaces after time (1/2 day to 2 days)
thus if the sub-surface and surface oils remain in the same area, there
is no benefit. Further, a sub-surface release results in highly
weathered and often emulsified oil, on the surface. Dispersants are not
effective on such weathered or emulsified oils.
10. Why do you believe federal agencies were unable to learn any
lessons from the Exxon Valdez spill, the Ixtoc I spill or more
recent tanker spills?
Fingas response: I believe that the previous spill experiences were
largely ignored because of the lack of funding and also because of a
significant turnover in staff in the last decade. Many of the
researchers and oil spill staff in governments and industry have
changed in the past decade. Most organizations reduced staffing during
this time period, thus existing and new staff had too many priorities
to deal with. Further, there was little education on past spill lessons
for a variety of other reasons. Many people believed that 'new'
techniques and procedures negated the value of prior experiences.
______
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Dr. Fingas, for your
expertise and your recommendations. And we do have questions
for all of the panelists, and I will begin with myself. David
Kennedy from NOAA, this incident has exposed the liabilities of
not having in place an integrated ocean observation capability
in the Gulf, which has been pared back substantially over the
past two years due to the cuts in the NOAA budget. Fortunately,
NOAA has recently found funds to redeploy some of the assets,
such as high frequency radar and gliders, to bolster ocean
observations and improve our ability to forecast and project
the movement of the spill.
Can you please, Mr. Kennedy, update the Subcommittee on
what NOAA has done to restore ocean observation assets in the
Gulf?
Mr. Kennedy. As I stated in my testimony, those
observations are essential to us being able to provide some of
the products and services. Everything we would like to do in
observations in this country we haven't been able to do,
obviously. Funding is limited, and you always have to make
decisions. We have as a result of this spill been able to bring
many, many other assets that we didn't have funded, or haven't
been able to acquire the funding for, to the scene, and
actually execute everything from, as you suggest, gliders to
some additional HF radar ships that are all on the water that
wouldn't otherwise have been, AUVs. The list goes on and on.
There is a partnership with the community in the Gulf,
including Department of Defense, to bring those other assets to
bear in this crisis. The funding for all of those types of
things either is funding that has been diverted from other
places or funding directly in support of the incident command,
the unified command. So, that is the Coast Guard and so on.
So, we have provided a whole suite of new observational
tools, but they come from communities where that was not
standard practice and things that we were able to fund. So, we
have the tools there, but it is because of the crisis, and we
could always use more.
Ms. Bordallo. Mr. Kennedy, how long does NOAA intend to
maintain these assets?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, certainly for the extent of the crisis
now. And so as we look at there being oil into whenever the
additional wells are drilled and the well release is stopped,
we will keep those assets in place, and the probably beyond
because there will be oil in the water and need to continue to
track it for some time after the well has stopped. So,
certainly into the fall, but we don't have the long-term
funding stream to keep all those assets in place.
Ms. Bordallo. So, until the fall. Is that what----
Mr. Kennedy. Certainly into the fall. It depends on how
many times we have interruptions in the drilling process over
the course of the summer, but we are thinking September,
October, at a minimum.
Ms. Bordallo. So, for the Subcommittee records, do you
agree that the Federal Government and BP's understanding of the
spill, and response to it, could have been far more efficient
and cost-effective had a regional, integrated, ocean
observation system been up and running?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, we had a system up and running. But what
I am suggesting is that we have additional assets that we have
had to bring on beyond what the Integrated Ocean Observing
System had available to it.
Ms. Bordallo. So, the system that you had up and running
wasn't adequate?
Mr. Kennedy. It was not comprehensive. We have a budget
that is a national budget, and we have to very carefully look
at how those assets are deployed nationally, so we could always
do more than we have done, and you have heard about all the
things we have put in place.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. I have a couple of other questions
for you. As you know, NOAA's Office of Response and Restoration
has been severely underfunded for the past several years, and
as a result had to initiate a stringent workforce restructuring
plan to downsize operations. Do you feel that this downsizing
impaired NOAA's ability to respond to the Deepwater Horizon
spill? And what additional skill sets does NOAA need to restore
the capabilities?
Mr. Kennedy. Over the last several years, yes, we have seen
decreases in that budget, and as a result have had to right-
size, if you will, that organization. And as a result, we lost
contractors and Federal employees to get to that location, or
at least transferred Federal employees to other places. Our
feeling, for some time, has been that capacity, if it were
stretched by a very significant spill or two events at once,
could certainly compromise our ability to respond nationally,
and this crisis has certainly shown that those limited
resources have made it difficult for us to do everything we
would like to do.
That having been said, we have managed within NOAA to bring
back retirees, some retired as long as 10 years, and tap other
sources within NOAA, taking them away from their primary
missions, to supplement the activities that the Office of
Response and Restoration is responsible for on-scene and
operationally. So, I believe we have been able to be creative,
but if we hadn't done that, our capacity is somewhat limited,
and we can do more.
Ms. Bordallo. When did you bring back these former
employees? Was that just for this spill, or were there on----
Mr. Kennedy. No. Just for this spill, as our
responsibilities increased. And as you have heard, command post
and area command and an incident command, and one in Mobile,
and so on and so forth, across the country. Every place there
is a Coast Guard, NOAA needs to be there to provide the
operational scientific support. And so as our responsibilities
and the complexity of the issues increased, we started looking
for other people to bring in, and we probably have as many as
10, 12 retirees back, but as a result of working for us
directly on this spill.
Ms. Bordallo. Now has this under-funding limited NOAA's
ability to aggressively pursue the creation of a new oil spill?
Mr. Kennedy. Of a new----
Ms. Bordallo. Trajectory models.
Mr. Kennedy. We have been working on a three-dimensional
model. That has been one of the things that we felt, as we have
looked at the deeper and deeper exploration, needed to be in
place, and we have invested where we could. Obviously, if we
had more resources, we could have moved that along quicker. We
have been doing the best we can with the resources we have,
though, to look at new models that we think are absolutely
essential as we get into these kind of complex issues.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Kennedy. I now
recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Cassidy.
Mr. Cassidy. Mr. Kennedy, we have had all of these people
speak, and I have had the opportunity of going to my university
in my home town, LSU, which has done a lot of this work. And I
see Dr. DePortier has a microbe that they used, I think, in the
Lake Barre spill that had been chewing up bacteria in that
spill, and they felt like it has proven efficacy. So far, it
has not been considered for this marshland spill. It makes me
think that all of our responses are ad hoc. It is not like, OK,
if there is a spill in a marshland area, this is how we do it.
Rather, it is kind of like, oh, my gosh, let us bring the ship
back from Africa. Let us try and hire a couple of boats that
don't belong to us. Let us marshal resources, and let us figure
out how we do this going along.
Now, is that a fair or unfair perception I have?
Mr. Kennedy. I think every spill is unique, no question
about it. And as a result, you have to be adaptive. Every spill
is different, and you have to be adaptive.
Mr. Cassidy. But, nonetheless, physics and biology are
principles which apply in all situations. If there is a
marshland spill in Lake Barre or Lake Peigneur, and we know
that there is a certain marshland there, which granted there
are issues peculiar to that, it seems like there are lessons
that can be applied.
Mr. Kennedy. The rest of my answer was that having been
said, there is a significant amount of research that has been
done for marsh cleanup, for instance. We have an international
oil spill conference every two years, been doing that for 30,
40 years, something like that. We went back just recently, as a
result in part of listening to some of your questions in
previous hearings, and I think dug up 70-some specific
presentations at the last several oil spill conferences that
looked at marsh cleanup, and either research or direct
experience from cleanups, and how they came out, and lessons
learned.
So, we have many experts on the ground working directly on
this spill that have either been involved in that research,
been involved in a hundred spills in their careers, that have a
lot of expertise on marshes.
Mr. Cassidy. So, let me ask you again just because I
haven't spoken to him directly, but I saw a press report.
Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
Mr. Cassidy. Dr. DePortier, who again was involved, I
think, in Exxon Valdez, but also, I gather, in coastal
Louisiana. He has got this bacteria that he says chews it up.
We lay it out now; it is gone by--or at least mitigated by
Christmas. And yet somehow he feels like he can't get a hearing
on that.
Mr. Kennedy. So, there has been a lot of work done on that
bacteria. I am not specifically referring to the one you are--
--
Mr. Cassidy. Yes.
Mr. Kennedy.--addressing, but in general. And so we have a
lot of experience with that kind of approach. I was at the
Exxon Valdez and involved in the science there. I worked to
look at some of those types of applications. What we have been
saying pretty clearly to those--and I get calls daily, many of
them being from folks that have some sort of a microbe-eating
or an oil-eating microbe--our experience is that if you have a
controlled environment, like a lake, that the application of
those microbes may do some good. But when you have an open
ocean environment, the one thing that we have research on is
very clear, is that the microbial activity quadruple--oh, much
more than that, that the microbial activity, those microbes
that are eating the oil, just exponentially expand, and you
have a natural environment where those microbes are actually
very, very aggressively at work. And to apply another type of
thing to what Mother Nature is doing a great job, in an
uncontrolled environment, where you don't know where it is
going to be next.
Mr. Cassidy. Now, let me interrupt you because this is very
good. Thank you for the interchange. When you say Mother Nature
is doing a great job, it suggests you have a measure of
optimism about how Mother Nature is currently dealing with the
oil in the marshes.
Mr. Kennedy. I do have a measure of optimism, quite
frankly, and that comes from a lot of years of my own
experience and the type of oil that we currently have at that
marsh. That oil is highly degraded. The very, very toxic ends
that are of the greatest concern to us in a marsh are missing
by the time it gets to shore. That having been said, are there
issues? There most certainly are issues, and they have to be
addressed. But there are a number of techniques for cleaning
marsh that we have been recommending that I think may be used.
And quite frankly, one of those is to leave it alone because if
you get in there and start messing around with it, you may make
it worse than it is already going to be.
Mr. Cassidy. Now, let me ask you two more things, if I may.
I was told--and again, I have learned in this job to say what I
have been told, not what I know--that about a year or two ago,
that NOAA was approached. It was recommended by academics that
you purchase an ROV to begin to do research in the ultra-deep
and the deep, and NOAA said, no, we don't need to do that. Now
is that true or not true, or no money, or what?
Mr. Kennedy. I don't have firsthand knowledge of that. I
know that in NOAA we have been discussing ROVs and their
application for some time. We certainly have been using private
enterprise to do some of that. But I may have somebody on the
panel that can help me. I can't specifically answer. I would be
happy to get back to you.
Mr. Cassidy. Dr. McNutt is raising her hand.
Mr. Kennedy. She is writing me a note, and I would just
prefer she speak, if she has the right----
Dr. McNutt. NOAA is commissioning, through their ocean
exploration program, an ROV for their flagship, the Okeanos
Explorer, and that ROV is coming online.
Mr. Cassidy. Is that in reaction to this, or was that a
plan?
Dr. McNutt. No, no. That is a plan that has long been----
Mr. Cassidy. Got you. Last, just because I am out of time,
not that I don't have more questions, you mentioned that there
are a lack of dollars, and I look at your budget for your--I
don't have the acronym. Ocean Observations Regional
Observations program, your Fiscal Year 2010 enacted budget is
27 million. Your Fiscal Year 2011 present request is 14.6
million. It seems like you are saying that you don't have
enough money, but you are cutting your budget, which requires,
I guess, a note of explanation.
Mr. Kennedy. Well, I would like to submit something
specifically, but it is my understanding there is an anomaly in
those numbers you have that the budget is stable. It hasn't
increased, but that the budget over the last two or three years
has been pretty much stable. So, there is an anomaly in there,
and I can't give you the exact reason for that, but I would be
happy to get back to you.
Mr. Cassidy. Yes, because it looks like your request is
down 12 million relative to last year.
Mr. Kennedy. There is an anomaly in there, but I have been
told by the IUS people that there hasn't been--they
specifically tell me that there has not been a decrease, but
there is an anomaly in there that I can't address you.
Mr. Cassidy. I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the Ranking Member. I have one
question before I recognize the next member of the Committee.
Last week, I was in Guam, which is my home district, and I
boarded the NOAA research ship out there. I understand it is
equipped with the latest scientific--would this ship be of any
use in something like this? I was very impressed with what they
can do.
Mr. Kennedy. Possibly. You should know that we have a
number of vessels throughout the Nation stationed in different
places, and over the last couple of months, a number of the
missions of vessels that are more directly in and around the
Gulf area have been repurposed and now are on sometimes their
second and third mission, specifically supporting the oil spill
response.
What we have tried to do is understand that the whole
agency shouldn't grind to a halt to do this, that we have many,
many other very compelling responsibilities. And to the extent
that we can we haven't tried to bring the whole fleet back from
the world to do this. If we felt like we could either contract
with academic institutions or use our ships more closely to the
scene--and that is what has happened. And so those ships that
are far, far away, we are trying to let continue to do their
very, very important missions where they are.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, I know, Mr. Kennedy, you have
approximately 10, is it, NOAA vessels. But this is supposed to
have the very latest scientific equipment on board, and they
are over there in the Marianas Trench area. So, I just
wondered. I mean, that is a deep area.
Mr. Kennedy. I am not familiar with the specific vessel,
but I think the technology that you may be referring to is
actually on a vessel that is in the theater in the Gulf now and
doing similar work. And I think it has to do with some of our
surveying and charting side of the house.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, thank you. I would like now to
recognize the gentleman from CNMI, Mr. Sablan.
Mr. Sablan. Thank you very much, Madame Chair, and thank
you for leadership on all these important issues facing us
today, not just the spill, but on every day with wildlife. I
believe that whenever oil touches water, we have lost the
fight. But also lives have been lost in this disaster.
Livelihoods have been disrupted. And, of course, living
organisms may be affected for a very, very long time. I also
think that the response by Federal agencies have been
inadequate.
I am very happy that our President is down there for the
fourth time, and that he is going to be addressing the Nation
tonight. And I hope he could start kicking some behinds, not
just for the private sector, but with Federal agencies. I
really believe that the response there has actually been no
response. We have been reacting to some of these things. And,
of course, again today, you know, we are saying that if we had
the resources, if we had more money, we would have been able to
respond. But this is something I hear every time there is a
major event in the nation, if we had more money, and we never
seem to have enough money going anywhere.
But again, I am not blaming anyone at the table today. Some
of you have done really good jobs, too. But, Dr. McNutt, your
testimony, you mentioned that the U.S. Geological Survey's
presence is in all of the 50 states and Puerto Rico. What about
the territories? You know, there are other places. We have
American Samoa, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern
Marianas, which right now has three active volcanoes that are
always spewing something up there.
We had people actually on one of the islands just right
next to the volcano, and it erupted because there is no way for
them to tell that it was going to erupt. There was ground
shaking, and then the next thing we know, they erupted, and
those places don't even have radios. And other Federal agencies
send people up there. I mean, I am not talking about a couple
of people at this time. There were over two dozen people up
there doing surveys for eventually for something we have
absolutely no--what happened? Is it more money?
Dr. McNutt. Well, we have a volcano hazards program. And
the truth is that volcano hazards and volcano eruptions are one
of the hazards that is forecastable with instrumentation in
place.
Mr. Sablan. Exactly.
Dr. McNutt. And in this particular case, we are working
through our funding to make sure that volcanos that are viewed
to be in imminent danger or forecast to be in populated areas
are indeed monitored. And I don't know in the case of these
particular volcanos whether they were being monitored. I do
know that there have been a number of wonderful examples of
volcano warnings that were put out in a timely fashion. And for
the record, we can get back to you on this particular one, as
to whether--where it is on the schedule to be instrumented, and
whether it will be or not. But----
Mr. Sablan. Thank you. And actually, you know, these are
uninhabited islands, and I fly over them all the time, going to
catching a flight, trying to get to the East here back.
Airplanes fly over these islands.
Dr. McNutt. Yes.
Mr. Sablan. And that is the last thing we need, is for one
of these volcanos to explode and hit an airplane. Then we would
be hearing if we had more money. And we are here for a
different reason.
Dr. McNutt. Yes. The truth is that our focus has been on
inhabited islands, and through a program that we had in
conjunction with the FAA, we did have funding for the aircraft
safety.
Mr. Sablan. But I am just bringing this up, and thank you.
But no. Thank you for all of the things that you have done.
NOAA has been a good partner in the islands. And USGS, too, has
done some good for us. Madame Chair, I thank you, and I yield
back my time.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman from CNMI, and now I
would like to recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman and members of
the panel. Thank you so much for joining us today. I want to
begin with Mr. Kennedy and Dr. McNutt. I was interested in your
comments about this idea of lack of resources, and that
resources were directed in other areas outside of research
toward the effective oil spills and, specifically, in these
deepwater areas. I am wondering that in the decision making
process, it seems to me that there were some decisions about
priorities, some decisions about risk.
I would be interested for you to tell us then if this
scenario, understanding a deepwater spill, understanding the
effects on the environment in these areas, under this sort of
condition, what took a higher priority in funding outside of
understanding a spill? What directed both of your agencies to
say, you know, we are not going to put any more resources to
understand what a catastrophic spill may look like in a
deepwater area, Gulf area, or otherwise. But we are going to
make a decision to direct the resources elsewhere.
Tell me, what else out there is a bigger risk? What took
priority over understanding the full scope of what a spill like
this would create for the Gulf region?
Mr. Kennedy. That is a tough question. However, again, I
don't want to overplay the years of being involved in oil
spills, but I have been involved for a long time, 25-30 years.
And historically, what you see is a cycle. That is exactly
where we are now. This cycle over the course of the majority of
my career was about five years. You would have a major event,
then a number of other things would come up. The event was
over, you didn't have anything new, you lost the publicity you
had, whatever the issues of the day were. And certainly, there
are many that I can think of that have been pressing and
concerning us, including climate change, of course, but a
variety of other things that you could list as priorities.
But with the passage of the Oil Pollution Act, an extended
period of time beyond the five years, to where, you know, a
major spill is considered 100,000 gallons or more, we haven't
had that many major spills since the Exxon Valdez, and
certainly nothing that even begins to approach the Exxon
Valdez. And so there is a very difficult challenge in any
organization. And when you think of all of the challenges in,
say, for instance, NOAA, as an agency, oil spill response is
one of 100, 200, 300. And to compete when there is some of that
lack of urgency, and the Oil Pollution Act seems to be
extremely effective, you have a difficulty. And so it is not
that we haven't continued to plug along. We have. And that is
why we have some of the expertise we have today. That is why we
have trajectory models that have been quite effective. That is
why we have a damage assessment program that has been out there
since the inception of this spill, with our other Federal and
state partners.
So, it is not like we haven't been there. But I think it is
a fact of life that when you don't have a major event, it is a
hard time to convince people that it is the most pressing thing
until you have the next one.
Mr. Wittman. Dr. McNutt?
Dr. McNutt. Yes. The USGS has a very vigorous hazards
program that is quite distinguished in its work in earthquake
hazards, volcano hazards, flood hazards, fire hazards. And we
can't get through a year, a season, without making major
headlines for the lives we saved and the property we have saved
through the forecasting and the hazard reduction through those
programs. And the good work through those groups and the
industries that back them, through their efforts, by saying,
you are helping through your collaborative work with the
industries to show where hazards are great by working with the
industry to make buildings better, by making highways safer,
showing people where to build, showing how to work in the
wildland fire-urban interface, and work to make that zone
safer, et cetera, how to help people who are in flood districts
understand how to mitigate their flood risk, et cetera, whereas
when we look at the oil problem, we have the industry telling
us over and over again there is no problem. You don't need to
worry about this. Ships are safer. Platforms are safer.
Drilling is safer. We have everyone telling us that there is no
problem. And whereas in all of these other areas, the industry
is working hand-in-glove with the USGS to help us identify
those hazards and reduce the hazards, and every season we find
the risk happening and the hazards. We work to reduce the
hazard and make the American people safer.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman. I would say in
this case, though, that what the industry was telling you
obviously was wrong.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman. And now I would like
to recognize one of more senior members of our Subcommittee,
the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Kildee.
Mr. Kildee. Thank you, Madame Chair. First of all, I would
like to commend the witnesses. Collectively and individually, I
admire you for what you are doing. Knowledge is power, and very
often we have little or no idea where that knowledge may lead
us or how that knowledge may be used. But we must constantly
pursue that knowledge. And I have been here in Congress now for
34 years, 12 years in the State Legislature, and every year you
will have someone offering an amendment, amending a bill,
cutting out this research. Very often it is the reproductive
life of some species, and say this is a silly waste of taxpayer
money. But we have to be aware. As a matter of fact, one famous
senator, Senator Proxmire was someone for whom I had high
regard, but not in this area.
He used to award the Golden Fleece award, and would offer
amendments to cut research. But research is extremely
important. And what you do very often, you may not know where
that may lead or how that may be useful. But just research
itself and the funding of research is very important. So, I
commend you for what you do. We want to make sure we don't have
any intellectual Luddites in the area of research or in the
area of lawmaking.
So, something that you may have started, or one of your
partners may have started, years ago in research leads on to
more and more. And the more we know about the earth, the planet
earth, and that around it, what it is made up of, what its
various living organisms can do, the more that can help us in
addressing problems.
So, I just wanted to make a statement that I have great
admiration for those of you who really have dedicated yourself
to that area of our search for knowledge. And I thank you very
much. Thank you, Madame Chair.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
Kildee, and I would like to now recognize Carol Shea-Porter,
the gentlelady from New Hampshire.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you very much. Mr. Kennedy, I
listened with great interest. You said you had about 25 years
experience. Am I correct in that? And how long have you worked
for NOAA?
Mr. Kennedy. About 21 years.
Ms. Shea-Porter. OK. So, let me just read a little bit of
your testimony again. Let me tell you where I am going with
this. I appreciate the fact that everybody is working so hard
on this. I appreciate the fact that everybody worked so hard
after Valdez. I appreciate the work we always do afterwards.
But I need to know, my constituents need to know, Americans
need to know, why we are always on the job afterwards. What
happened between Valdez and now? What was NOAA doing? What were
these conversations about? Why, why could we be in this mess
right now?
The more we learn about this, the more disgraceful it is.
When you are saying don't worry, don't worry, the oil company
is in charge, this is of great concern because I thought NOAA
was in charge of our coastline and protecting our assets. I
thought other Federal agencies were in charge. I thought the
MMS was supposed to be in charge.
So, I am trying to look back because otherwise we are going
to sit here again. I don't know if it will be a year, five
years, ten years. We will be sitting here again, and we will be
talking about my personal favorite phrase, ``lessons learned,''
whatever that means, lessons learned. So, please let me ask you
a couple of questions. First of all, you said that NOAA is a
natural resource trustee, and it is responsible for protecting,
assessing, and restoring.
Well, if it is a natural resource trustee, and you said
that you were at hearings--I don't know if NOAA held them or
you just attended international oil spill conferences. What did
you talk about? Did anybody ever say--let me add this. Did
anybody say--like when my boy was ten years old, he and his
friends would get together in a room and imagine the worst
thing that could happen. Did you ever talk about the worst
thing that could happen?
Mr. Kennedy. I think we did. And let me just back up and
say that at the time of the Exxon Valdez spill, we heard the
same sort of indignation in hearings that I was involved with
then. That really resulted in the Oil Pollution Act. The Oil
Pollution Act has a title, a research title, Section 7.
Meetings were held across all of the Federal, state, and local
academia to talk about what that plan should look like, a
research plan. It was developed. We can go back and show you
that plan.
For the most part, the investment that would be required to
follow through with that, from lessons learned, never occurred,
as far as I know. Did NOAA and a few others go out and try and
do what we could with the resources that we had? We have done
long-term studies as a result of the Exxon Valdez, not only
looking at cleanup methodologies that worked and didn't work.
During that spill, we actually got Federal, state, and local
entities to allow us to leave some areas unclean so that we
could go back and look.
So, we have done a variety of things, including, as we saw
more and more dollars dry up across the rest of the Federal
agency and industry. There was something called the Marine
Spill Response Corporation developed by industry after Exxon
Valdez. This was a nationwide effort, $60 to $70 million a year
in research and development to look at these kinds of things.
That lasted for three or four years, then it dried up. We
looked at the American Petroleum Institute that had money for
research. It went away.
So what happened, at least in NOAA's case, is we developed
a partnership with the University of New Hampshire and
developed a small research----
Ms. Shea-Porter. I know. And they didn't get money. They
haven't received money since 2007 for their----
Mr. Kennedy. Correct.
Ms. Shea-Porter.--for their coastal cleanup.
Mr. Kennedy. Correct.
Ms. Shea-Porter. So, let me pull us back into focus again.
You said it went away. Under which Administration? And was
there any protest? It is not good enough to say the money went
away. I feel that if you knew and feared this, and others in
your job and in these agencies feared that this could happen, I
think the response should have been a lot larger than it was. I
hear your frustration, and I am glad that you did reports. But
I think if the average American had known--and I think it is
the job of Federal agencies to be those bulldogs for us--and
had stood up there and said, hey, guess what, they are putting
leases out there; we have no idea what to do. And we just
thought that the American public needs to know that. There
needed to be a very, very public challenge.
What we are uncovering right now is astounding, absolutely
astounding. And I am just wondering if the agencies, the
Federal agencies that were involved in protecting and
assessing, were ever invited to the table to talk to the oil
industry when we had a previous Administration developing oil
policy? Were Federal agencies involved, or was this all just
the oil company making their own decisions, running everything,
and telling agencies like yours that, don't worry, we have it
under control, because if we don't get more aggressive, and if
we don't take on the role of guardian, then we will fall victim
to this again and again and again.
So, when you have that oil spill conference, was that a
central topic, that this could happen, and were there Federal
agencies there saying, we don't know what to do? We have had
several hearings now, and the general consensus is that we
didn't know enough of what we were doing. We didn't know the
impact on the oil. We don't know if this would actually have a
blowout. We wouldn't know how to stop it. It is unbelievable
what we didn't know. And I talk about the arrogance of moving
forward when we don't know this. And now here we are.
So, at the international oil spill conference, can you tell
me who attended?
Mr. Kennedy. It was a cross-section of everybody, from
industry to all the Federal agencies to state and academia. It
represents anyone that has an interest or an investment or
academic research.
Ms. Shea-Porter. OK. So, in the very basic, simple terms,
did any of you walk up to any of the guys in the oil industry
and say, hey, do you know how to cap a well?
Mr. Kennedy. I don't recall asking that specific question,
but it is a forum to get people together to say what is the
state of the state and what else needs to be done.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Yes, but here is the question, OK? You may
talk about oil spills, but did anybody with the oil companies
sitting right next to you, right--you are all there together.
Did anybody say, does anybody know what to do if we have a
problem like this in the Gulf? Was did you ever have a tabletop
model exercise?
Mr. Kennedy. I cannot recall that. Does that mean it didn't
exist or didn't get asked that way? Maybe. But I certainly
wasn't involved in that, and I can't recall it.
Ms. Shea-Porter. This seems to me to be the very first
question when you start talking about oil spills, not what do
we do and how will we do the science, but how do we prevent it.
And so far, I am bitterly disappointed that I haven't heard
anybody say that we stood up to the oil companies and said, you
know what, I don't think you guys know what you are doing yet.
Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentlelady from New Hampshire. We
have a second round of questions here that have been asked, and
I do have a few myself. Dr. McNutt, I have a question for you.
This has to do with flow rates. Recognizing that future
estimates of natural resource damages will depend on the total
estimated volume of oil released, do you think it would have
been important to do this at the outset of the spill?
Dr. McNutt. Ultimately, we will absolutely need to know
what the flow rate is. I think response is very much an all-
hands-on-deck, everyone doing the maximum they can, and that
from what I understand, the ultimate response--or the ultimate
damage recovery will not be determined until very far down the
road, when we actually believe we can calculate what the damage
to the environment has been. And we will probably have a very
good handle on what the flow rate is at that point because it
will have been captured, so it won't be based on looking at
video or other calculations, which will probably always have
uncertainty associated with it.
So, we have to know sooner or later. It is going to all be
captured at some point. We will have a very accurate record at
that point.
Ms. Bordallo. The second question. It is my understanding
that scientists from Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute were
ready to take flow measurements, but the project was put on
hold during deployment of the containment dome. And BP did not
contact these scientists again. If the ability to take these
measurements was immediately available, why didn't the Federal
Government ensure that these flow measurements were taken right
then and there?
Dr. McNutt. Woods Hole did get two deployments in the field
with their sonar equipment to calculate flow rate, one prior to
the cutting of the riser and another post-cutting of the riser.
Their deployment post-cutting of the riser was with their high
powered sonar, not with also the acoustic Doppler current
profiler because their contractor had run out of time.
Ms. Bordallo. OK. For the record, Doctor, I would like to
just maybe repeat that question. In other words, did BP not
contact these scientists again? Yes or no.
Dr. McNutt. I am not sure about BP. I was working through
the Coast Guard, who had actually contracted with Woods Hole to
do the work, and the communication with the Coast Guard and
Woods Hole on the timing of it was very good, and they got in
the field, and everything went well.
Ms. Bordallo. So, in other words, it wasn't completed, in
your opinion, because this is what we have on our record.
Dr. McNutt. The work was completed. There were delays
simply because of problems cutting the riser so that Woods Hole
wasn't able to get all of the measurements they wanted just
because it took more time to cut the riser off than had
originally been planned.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Are flow measurements being taken
on the oil leaking from the lower marine riser package cap?
Dr. McNutt. Differential pressure readings are being taken
that will help determine the flow, and we will find those
measurements useful.
Ms. Bordallo. So, the answer is yes.
Dr. McNutt. Yes.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. Dr. Coddington, your testimony
stated that approximately one-third of MMS collections at the
Smithsonian need further work to evaluate the effects of the
spill. What additional steps could be taken to enhance the
value of these collections?
Dr. Coddington. Well, these are collections that come to
us. What MMS does is to contract with various contractors to do
the work, and in that contract it stipulates that the
collections will come to the Smithsonian. They come to us in
whatever shape they are. In order for us to make them maximally
valuable for science, we need to catalogue the collections, we
need to make sure that all of the--it is called meta data,
which are all of the physiographic, all the oceanographic, all
of the chemical data that is associated with those specimens--
is attached to each one of those specimens. And there are
thousands of those left to go.
Ms. Bordallo. Where does the funding for this come from?
Dr. Coddington. For the last 30 years, it has come through
an interagency transfer through the Minerals Management Service
to the Smithsonian, at a relatively----
Ms. Bordallo. So MMS then, yes.
Dr. Coddington.--moderate level, yes.
Ms. Bordallo. What resources would it take to make all
relevant collections publicly available?
Dr. Coddington. We have been working on a budget for that.
I think it would be $9 million in two years.
Ms. Bordallo. In two years, how long. So, that answers that
question. All right. Thank you. I would like now to turn over
the next set of questions to our Ranking Member, Mr. Cassidy.
Mr. Cassidy. Mr. Fingas, is it Doctor or Mister?
Dr. Fingas. Doctor.
Mr. Cassidy. I see that you were on the oil dispersant task
force way back then. Has there been any research that you know
of or that you can inform us of, of the use of dispersants in
the ultra-deep?
Dr. Fingas. Not that I know of. There has been almost no
research, either through coordinated committees such as the
National Academy of Sciences, or by various agencies to study
such. And perhaps the reason for that is simply that it has not
really been attempted before, at least not to my knowledge
anyhow.
Mr. Cassidy. So, I scanned--the staff was nice enough to
get me the executive summary--the conference you referenced. As
I scanned it, you did have specific recommendations as to
research going forward, but the use of dispersants kind of at
the mud line, if you will, was not envisioned. I am just
curious; I don't know. It was not envisioned, or it was not
felt--you see where I am going with that.
Dr. Fingas. That is right. It wasn't envisioned at that
time.
Mr. Cassidy. And not envisioned just because people had
serious reservations about it, or just because they just didn't
imagine its need?
Dr. Fingas. I think for both reasons. I wasn't directly a
part of that committee. I was a reviewer and contributor, but
during part of this discussion, my recollection is that both
issues came up.
Mr. Cassidy. And do you have concerns about using
dispersant at the mud line in the ultra-deep?
Dr. Fingas. Yes, I do.
Mr. Cassidy. Can you elaborate?
Dr. Fingas. I am most concerned because the ability to
measure their effectiveness is extremely limited because if
they do enter the oil at that depth, the rise time to the
surface is in the order of weeks and months perhaps, which
means that you would never know if they worked or didn't work.
Mr. Cassidy. Now let me ask you, Ed Overton--when I
discussed this with him--he clearly was conflicted--at least I
interpreted a conflict within his soul because he says, you
have to break the stuff up. And if you don't have a lot of wave
action, you are going to use a heck of a lot more dispersant on
the surface. I am not speaking for him, but my impression was
that he accepted the tension. He wasn't sure how he landed on
the side of the tension, but what would be your opinion-- you
know, how many barrels are forming chocolate mousse on the
surface, or just what are your thoughts about that?
Dr. Fingas. Well, for a deep sea release, I think the major
problem right now is that we really don't understand enough
about it and enough about any emulsion formation. It does
appear that the emulsions are actually formed underneath. So,
with or without dispersant----
Mr. Cassidy. Now, that is different from the oil plume of
which we have been speaking because I gather the oil plume is
actually very dispersed hydrocarbons measured only in parts per
million. Do you feel as if there is a chocolate mousse beneath
the surface?
Dr. Fingas. Oh, absolutely. I mean, we have seen photos of
it. And during the Ixtoc spill, we also saw that chocolate
mousse was formed along with regular oil droplets.
Mr. Cassidy. So, is there chocolate mousse under--I just
missed that. Is there chocolate mousse beneath the surface in
this particular spill, documented?
Dr. Fingas. As I understand--and perhaps you might redirect
that question.
Mr. Cassidy. Let me kick it over to Kennedy, if you don't
mind.
Mr. Kennedy. I think you are right in characterizing the
majority of the plume as microscopic droplets, and primarily
parts per billion, not million. There are some parts per
million, but primarily a lot of the results we are seeing are
billions, not millions. The mousse is more of a surface event,
and we certainly don't believe that below the immediate
surface--now, you know, a meter or two or three, in that range,
there could be mousse formations, but at depths we don't
think----
Mr. Cassidy. Let me ask you. It seems like just in a very
fortunate way, we have a living lab right now. And clearly,
what we don't have is a lot of research on these events. Are
you currently letting prospective studies on these effects to
academic--frankly, coming from Louisiana, I want my
universities involved because I know they will still be
involved in 10 years and haven't moved on to whatever the next
crisis is. So, have you involved academic in a prospective,
well-funded study to look at these effects, and two, have you
looked at the ones along the coastal region to specifically go
with?
Mr. Kennedy. As you probably know, Ed Overton has been a
contractor for my organization for some time. I was just on a
panel with him, the state of the coast in Baton Rouge, last
Friday. And we have them actively involved in doing the
analysis of the samples that are being collected. We do have a
variety of different academic institutions out there, working
for and with us.
Mr. Cassidy. But prospective studies?
Mr. Kennedy. Correct. I am sorry.
Mr. Cassidy. Prospective studies.
Mr. Kennedy. Prospective studies, we had a science summit
two weeks ago to look at these very types of issues to develop
some longer term studies. They have not been funded.
Mr. Cassidy. But let me ask. It really seems as if, if the
dispersant is being released at the mud line, and we hear from
the guy that was on the panel that, well, we had concerns about
it back at the panel, now is the time to study that. Do you
follow what I am saying?
Mr. Kennedy. I absolutely do. And certainly, the first step
in studying that is to adequately sample and do all the other
variety of things, whether it is----
Mr. Cassidy. But in a peer-reviewed study, you would still
have to have some sort--I mean, ideally, right now, on
parallel, you are not only doing samples at baseline, but you
are also coming up with the study criteria, what is my
hypothesis, et cetera, so that as soon as you got your
baseline, boom, you have let in an RFP, and you have somebody
out there bidding on it.
Mr. Kennedy. And if that particular--what you just
described is already completely played out, I don't know. But
are we thinking about it? We absolutely are. And are we doing
the background work right now in terms of sampling, you know,
in a series of concentric circles around the spill and looking
at the subsurface plume so that we have the background data
that could lead to that research, we are doing that.
Mr. Cassidy. I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman, and would like to
recognize the gentlelady from New Hampshire, Mrs. Carol Shea-
Porter.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Thank you. As a natural resource trustee
organization protecting our coastline, I have to ask a couple
more questions about this. You know, children go and take
collecting plastic bottles very seriously, and Americans of all
ages have worked very, very hard in conservation. And the
betrayal that they are experiencing right now, knowing that
agencies, Federal agencies and other agencies that were charged
with protecting the coastline, in some way stood at least
passively, instead of as activists, watching what was happening
in the Gulf. This is very painful. This is extremely painful
for all of us.
So, did you have any authority or any voice or any
opportunity to comment on the drilling in the Gulf, lease
applications, these kinds of drill designs, anything? Was your
agency ever consulted?
Mr. Kennedy. Are you directing this at me, NOAA?
Ms. Shea-Porter. Yes.
Mr. Kennedy. We are consulted. We don't have any final
authority. We have no Yes/No vote whatsoever. But in the
process of looking at leases, we have the opportunity to talk
about our trust resources and concerns we may or may not have.
So, we comment, but that is it. We comment.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Do you know if you commented on this
particular well or any like this?
Mr. Kennedy. I think we may have, but I would like to get
back to you for the record on that.
Ms. Shea-Porter. I would like to know.
Mr. Kennedy. Yes.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Can you think of any other wells that you
may have commented on? Have you personally ever written a
statement or expressed concern that the oil companies were
going too quickly and they didn't have the safety procedures,
and that they might not be able to cap?
Mr. Kennedy. No, I have not.
Ms. Shea-Porter. Did you ever worry about it?
Mr. Kennedy. I think in the course of understanding how
things are, we always worry about an event. We know that
anything is possible. You look at the probabilities, but
certainly we have always been concerned about major issues,
yes.
Ms. Shea-Porter. OK. So, you have been concerned about
major issues. Such as this? In your worst case scenario, could
you imagine this?
Mr. Kennedy. Quite frankly, no. I did not think of this
one, at least for this duration. I have been involved in other
blowout situations. I was involved in the Ixtoc spill for a
bit. So, I mean, we know that these things can happen, but----
Ms. Shea-Porter. When you were commenting on the various
wells, did you ever discuss the possibility? I mean, if you had
a voice--now you said you didn't have authority, but you had a
voice and an opportunity to comment on this kind of drilling in
the Gulf.
Mr. Kennedy. My agency has the opportunity to do that. It
is primarily through Endangered Species, Magnuson-Stevens,
Marine Mammal Protection Act. None of those things are my
expertise or my particular organization. But the organization
does have an opportunity to comment, yes.
Ms. Shea-Porter. OK. Where I am going with this is that I
don't know if NOAA expressed concern, reservation. I am trying
to figure out how active your organization was because you are
charged with protecting the coastal environment. And clearly,
what we are talking about now shows an utter lack of attention
to the risks here, on the part of many agencies, I might add.
And I think that all of us have had a very sad and ugly wake-up
call here about what we are doing.
But did anybody, anybody say to BP, you know, this doesn't
look so good; what if? Is that your agency's job to comment
like that?
Mr. Kennedy. Our agency's job is to comment to MMS in
particular when they are looking at leases and to provide our
input and/or our concerns. We have expressed concerns about a
variety of issues over some time. I know it has been brought up
in some of these hearings. But again, it is not me specifically
that can address that.
Ms. Shea-Porter. OK. I would appreciate if you would get
back to me then very much. Thank you. And then I just have one
last question. Was your agency ever consulted, Dr. McNutt?
Dr. McNutt. The USGS is a science agency, so we have no
management and no policy no opportunity to say yes, no, up and
down on anything. So, no, we would not have been consulted on
this. But let me take this moment to give you a little bit of
perspective on this particular situation, simply because having
been in this job now for about six months, I think in a case
like this hindsight is 20/20. And from the standpoint of the
USGS, until April 20th, let me tell you what my life was like.
I came into this job in November, and for the first two
months, it was pretty quiet. Then I had Haiti, Chile, 8.8
earthquake. I had Asian Carp invading the Great Lakes. I had a
California water crisis that looked like it was going to put
the sixth largest economy in the world on its knees. I also had
Eyjafjallajokull that was closing down the most populated air
route in the world, and that was still spewing out ash when
this well blew up.
So, to say that was this on the USGS radar screen,
absolutely not. But, you know, we were dealing with five crises
in my first six months on the job.
Ms. Shea-Porter. And let me say, I first offer my sympathy,
and second, we certainly understand from this perspective, too,
because that is our world. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentlelady from New Hampshire. I
would like to recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Fleming.
Mr. Fleming. Thank you, Madame Chairman. And I want to tell
the panelists today that I appreciate your being here. I know
that these hearings are going on and on and on about a very
important issue, and I appreciate your willingness to come time
after time to answer very tough questions.
I would like to start with you, Mr. Kennedy, with regard to
NOAA. What is NOAA's position on Governor Bobby Jindal's
proposal to build temporary berms to protect the wetlands?
Mr. Kennedy. We have been involved. There has been, as you
are well aware, an interagency discussion and comment period
throughout the debate. We have been involved. We have expressed
concerns as these berms are built--how that may affect
circulation, what it may do to some of our trust resources. But
in the end, we have not registered an objection that obviously
stopped anything.
Mr. Fleming. Who has been the final sort of--apart from the
President himself, but what agency would be the final authority
to give the--I guess the certificate or permission? Is that
EPA, the Corps of Engineers? Who has the final say on that?
Mr. Kennedy. I believe it is the Corps of Engineers, but I
am not the expert there. I mean, obviously, the Coast Guard has
been at the forefront of that table to make the ultimate
decision. I think you are right, Dr. McNutt. I think it was a
tiered thing, the Corps of Engineers, but ultimately, you are
right, the Coast Guard, I believe. But I am not the expert.
Mr. Fleming. Do we have a final and complete decision on
all of the requests? I know some have been allowed, but I think
there may be others that have not. Anything on that?
Mr. Kennedy. I am not the authority there. So, I think the
Coast Guard would be the place to ask that.
Mr. Fleming. OK. What lessons did NOAA learn from the Ixtoc
deepwater oil spill in 1979 and the explosion of the Mega Borg
off the coast of Galveston, Texas in 1990?
Mr. Kennedy. I think probably a variety of things, but
certainly in those two instances, a weathered oil versus a
fresh oil have different impacts. When you have oil that comes
ashore on sandy beaches, as opposed to getting through inlets
and back into the marshes, you have a much better opportunity
to attack the oil and clean it up with less impact than if you
let it get into the inner marshes. So, those are a couple.
There are others. One, transport of oil over a long, long
distance, and the weathering process that takes place,
certainly with the Ixtoc. That came from the Bay of Campeche,
and that is hundreds--if not thousands--of miles, and so on and
so forth. So, issues like that, I think.
But if you can isolate the oil on the sandy beaches before
it gets into the back bays and marshes, that is the right thing
to do. I think we also had an issue with oil coming ashore,
then accreting, gathering sediment and forming tar mats at the
base of some of those beaches. We certainly have been looking
very carefully at that as a possibility in this spill and have
been----
Mr. Fleming. OK. Let me follow through on that.
Mr. Kennedy. Sure.
Mr. Fleming. I appreciate those answers. So, what you are
saying is early response, and then certainly blocking the flow
of oil onto the beaches or into the marshes. It has been
reported that the Netherlands made available all sorts of
devices that could have been very effective within three days
of the spill, and yet they were not allowed in. And also again
the berms would have done just the things that you are talking
about.
So, it seems like even though we have the information from
that one in 1990 for certain--but it doesn't sound like we
implemented any of the knowledge that we learned from it.
Mr. Kennedy. Well, I think we have. And in almost every
instance--and I talked earlier about the complexity and the
uniqueness of each spill. You always have that. So, you have to
weigh your options. But I think when you look at what has gone
on here, we have tried to take advantage of some of those
things. There are always trade-offs. And so I am not at all
familiar with the Netherlands advice that you are referring to.
I have many, many people on the ground in Louisiana and
elsewhere. Maybe that have. But we have tried very, very hard
to evaluate other options. And as you know, there are phone
numbers and committees that are trying to look through those.
So, I am not familiar with the Netherlands, but beyond
that, I think each decision of what we do or don't do is based
on a lot of the experience that we bring to the table, and then
we are always weighing those options and the trade-offs
associated with it. So, to some extent, I think we have been
using that information.
Mr. Fleming. I can certainly ask more. Let me follow up, if
you don't mind, with just one maybe half question, and that is,
what did we learn about dispersants in those previous
disasters? Because it seems that dispersants are controversial.
And, you know, we are concerned in Louisiana that the
dispersants may actually do more harm than good over the long
term. So, what have we learned about that that we can apply in
this situation?
Mr. Kennedy. Well, I think this segues nicely to this idea
of trade-offs. I think over a lot of years of research and
discussion--and this includes all of the regional response
teams, which I am sure you are familiar with, that include all
of the state agencies right at the table as we make decisions.
We had pre-approval as a result of a lot of what we learned of
dispersants in the Gulf, and we had that because of this trade-
off issue. And what we have determined from a lot of the
research we have done is, if you can keep oil broken down and
off the surface, it will biodegrade much better than if you let
that oil come ashore.
Once the oil is ashore, you have a much more significant,
serious problem that is much harder to deal with, and
biologically, socially, socioeconomically it can be a bigger
problem. So, if you can disperse at sea at appropriate depths--
there are a whole bunch of caveats that go into this--that is
the trade-off that actually was accepted by all of the
responsible parties in the Gulf some time ago. I think we stand
by that, although we are continually looking. When you get the
numbers of dispersants that have been applied, now up into the
hundreds of thousands of gallons, we have grave concern about
that, and we actually had a small conference in Baton Rouge a
couple of weeks ago to get some of the best experts in the
world together to say, OK, with this much dispersants and this
much oil in the water column, should we reassess the trade-off.
And the answer from that discussion was, I think, that they
thought we were still in a trade-off position that was
appropriate to continue to disperse.
So, we are looking very carefully at it.
Mr. Fleming. Thank you. And thank you, Madame Chairman.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman, and I wish to thank
the witnesses on our first panel for their testimony today. And
we will now call up the second panel of witnesses. Thank you
very much, ladies and gentlemen.
[Pause]
Ms. Bordallo. The witnesses on the next panel will be,
first, Dr. Chris Reddy, Associate Scientist and Director of the
Coastal Ocean Institute, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution;
Dr. Robert H. Weisberg, Professor, College of Marine Science,
University of South Florida; the third witness, Ms. Valerie Ann
Lee, Senior Vice President, Environment International
Government, Limited; the fourth, Dr. Denise J. Reed, Interim
Director, the Pontchartrain Institute for Environmental
Sciences, and Professor, Department of Earth and Environmental
Sciences, University of New Orleans; and Dr. Christopher
D'Elia, Professor and Dean, School of the Coast and
Environment, Louisiana State University.
I would like to greet and welcome our second panel of
witnesses, and again note that the red timing light on the
table will indicate when five minutes have passed and your time
has concluded. We would appreciate your cooperation in
complying with these limits. But I want to assure all our
witnesses that your full written statement will be submitted
for the hearing record.
Dr. Reddy, thank you for being here today, and you may
begin.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS REDDY, PH.D., ASSOCIATE SCIENTIST AND
DIRECTOR, COASTAL OCEAN INSTITUTE, WOODS HOLE, MASSACHUSETTS
Dr. Reddy. Thank you and good morning, Chairwoman Bordallo,
Ranking Member Cassidy, and members of the Subcommittee. My
name is Chris Reddy, and I am a scientist at Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution. I have studied, or am currently
studying, numerous oil spills, including one that still exists
from a 1969 spill, and I am currently active with the BP spill,
and in a few hours, I am going to hop on a plane to go on a 12-
day research cruise funded by the National Science Foundation
to study subsurface plumes, and bringing along scientists from
NOAA, EPA, the Coast Guard, and BP.
Last year, on the 20th anniversary of the Exxon Valdez
accident, I wrote an editorial in the Boston Globe about how
this country had successfully avoided a major oil spill since
that iconic event. I argued then and I continue to believe that
this country is one of the most experienced and effective in
responding to spills.
About 10 days after the BP spill, I wrote another editorial
in the Boston Globe, and I said, quote, ``As military planners
know well, learning lessons from past wars doesn't necessarily
help you fight a different kind of enemy.'' Numerous factors,
some unpredictable, such as weather, and some never encountered
before, will come into play. And as this spill keeps on going,
success in combating it will require an unprecedented stamina
on the part of both personnel and equipment.
I concluded that if the Exxon Valdez was Pearl Harbor, a
wake-up call for modern day oil spills and how to respond to
them, then the BP oil spill would be more like the siege of
Stalingrad. We are in for a long, exhausting, demanding process
of observation, cleanup, and assessment. We need to bring all
resources we can to the table. Unfortunately, one of our best
resources, academic science, has had a diminishing role in oil
spill research in the past two decades.
Following the Exxon Valdez spill and other spills, the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, referred to as OPA '90, was passed. This
legislation provided a wide framework for diminishing the
chances of spills and how to assess damages and restore the
environment after a spill. The number of spill has
significantly decreased. With the passage of OPA, the approach
to damage assessment and restoration has become a well-defined
process with legal and economic consequences. NOAA, other
Federal scientists, consultants, and contractors now do most of
the work. Independent scientists from academia, who have the
capacity to pursue the outstanding, unanswered questions about
oil and its interactions with the environment, are less often
participants in spill science. And I have called this the
industrialization of oil spill science.
My advice about how to move forward immediately and in the
future, NOAA and other agencies should receive continued
support to monitor and observe the Gulf. Time is invaluable.
For example, knowledge about where the oil is, and how it is
exchanging, is key to understanding processes acting on the
oil, and also estimating damages to wildlife exposed to oil. It
is paramount that a massive, organized, and sustained effort be
directed at researching areas impacted in the Gulf of Mexico.
And perhaps one way to think about this is that you might want
to think about this oil spill as a crime scene. We want to
collect all of the evidence, perhaps in a crime scene, before
there is a rain or any other type of event.
I can't underscore the importance of getting such data. It
would be unfortunate in the next several years, when scientists
begin to develop a comprehensive view of the spill, that they
lament the absence of key data that could have been obtained
but was not because of a lack of funds, lack of access, and a
lack of political will.
Academia is equipped to conduct some of the science, but
needs direction. I have attended meetings with scientists both
at the EPA here in D.C. and down at LSU, where there have been
many recommendations. The National Science Foundation has
commendably provided support to my colleagues via the rapid
proposal, and these funds have contributed already.
Nevertheless, I believe there could be better coordination
between what the academic research is doing and all that needs
to be done. I recommend the following actions to be taken
forward. I would allow NOAA and other key agencies to triage
research, moving to the top of the list what is most pressing
and communicate it broadly, clearly, and effectively to the
academic community. It is NOAA and the other Federal agencies
that are best suited to provide such guidance. They have the
experience, and they have responded to all of the oil spills
that haven't been on CNN over the last 200 years--200; since
the Valdez spill.
And I would have this agency--then I would appoint a panel
of science advisors through the UNH Research Center, and key
science stakeholders, and they should use a very rapid way to
reduce paperwork and get some of this research going very
quickly. And I would encourage traditional studies, but also to
push toward more advanced techniques.
In summary, NOAA and other responders have been handed an
enormous challenge and need all available support. Time is
precious. Academia, which has played a minor role in responding
to oil spills over the past several decades, should be
reengaged with direction from Federal experts who are most
knowledgeable about the most pressing problems. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Reddy follows:]
Statement of Christopher M. Reddy, Ph.D.,
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The views expressed here are my own.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Salutation
Good morning Chairwoman Bordallo, Ranking Member Brown, and members
of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak today about
the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. My name is Christopher Reddy, and I am
a marine chemist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Woods
Hole, MA, principally investigating marine pollution. I have published
>85 peer-reviewed scientific journal articles and several book chapters
on the chemistry of oil and how it interacts with the natural
environment and related subjects. I have studied or am currently
studying the aftermaths of oil spills that occurred in 1969, 1974,
1996, 2003, and two in 2007 as well as natural oil seeps off the coast
of Santa Barbara, CA, and more recently the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill. I am leaving in a few hours to participate in a National Science
Foundation (NSF)-funded 12-day research cruise to quantify and
characterize oil in the water column below the sea surface in the Gulf
of Mexico.
Introduction
Last year on the 20th anniversary of the Exxon Valdez accident, I
wrote an editorial in the Boston Globe about how this country has
successfully avoided and managed oil spills since that iconic spill. I
argued then, and continue to believe, that this country is one of the
most experienced and effective in responding to spills. Responders have
worked on countless spills that have not made CNN, participated in
drills, attended workshops, and published peer-reviewed manuscripts on
oil spills.
Several weeks after the Deepwater Horizon spill, as the situation
was appearing dire, I wrote another editorial in the Boston Globe:
. . .as military planners know well, learning lessons from past
wars doesn't necessarily help you fight a different kind of
enemy. Numerous factors, some unpredictable such as weather and
some never encountered before, will come into play. And as this
spill keeps on going, success in combating it may require
unprecedented stamina on the part of both personnel and
equipment.
I concluded that if the Exxon Valdez were Pearl Harbor, a wake-up
call for modern day oil spills and how to respond to them, then the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill could be more like the Siege of Stalingrad.
The latter has occurred.
We are in for a long, exhausting, demanding process of observation,
clean-up, and assessment, and we need to bring to bear all the
resources we can. Unfortunately, one of our best resources--academic
science--has had a diminishing role in oil spill research in the past
two decades. I would like to give you a little history of how that
happened and what it means in terms of limiting our response to this
spill, and suggest ways to get the academic science community more
involved.
Impacts of Oil Pollution Act of 1990 on academic science
Following the Exxon Valdez spill and other spills, the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) was passed. This legislation provides a
wide framework for diminishing the chances of spills, and how to assess
damages and restore the environment after a spill. The devastating
impacts of the Exxon Valdez spill and lessons learned from it, along
with the provisions of OPA90, have led to significantly decreased
numbers of spills. For example, prior to the Deep Horizon spill, the
annual number of oil spills greater than 5,000 gallons documented by
the Coast Guard between 1991 to 2004 decreased from 55 to 14, with none
over 1 million gallons.
In addition, there has been a growing trend that the spillers are
freighters, such as the Cosco Busan, which struck the San Francisco -
Oakland Bay Bridge in 2007, and not high-volume tankers like the Exxon
Valdez. The responses to these relatively smaller spills by Coast
Guard, NOAA, other government agencies, and representatives from the
responsible parties have been swift and organized. But the overall role
of academia in these spills has been significantly reduced in the last
twenty years.
With the passage of OPA 90, the approach to damage assessment and
restoration has become a well-defined process with legal and economic
consequences, and Federal scientists, consultants, and contractors now
doing most of this work.
Independent scientists from academia - who have the capacity to
pursue the outstanding unanswered questions about oil and its
interactions with the environment--are less often participants in spill
science. I have called this the ``industrialization of oil spill
science.''
The limited number of spills and the protocols necessary to follow
OPA90 have diminished academia's role in oil spill science. This has
reduced the entry of young scientists into oil spill science and has
suspended progress on the science used after most spills. The
introduction of newer and advanced techniques, developed in other
fields of science that may be applied to oil spills, has been sluggish.
Financial support for the study of oil spills has dwindled. The Coastal
Response Research Center (CRRC) at the University of New Hampshire has
done admirable work in distributing sparse existing funds, yet no new
funds were distributed in 2010.
Oil spill science has taken a back seat to other priorities such as
homeland security and climate change science. It also has been a slow
victim of its own success: why continue funding research when the
number of spills was declining? It isn't until a whole new problem, of
unprecedented scale, hits the headlines that we see that we have only a
small Phillips screwdriver, when we need a high-power toolkit.
To underscore the dearth of academics in oil spill science,
consider the following recommendation from the National Research
Council's Oil in the Sea III, which summarized our knowledge of oil's
inputs and fates as well as effects on the ocean (2003):
Federal agencies, especially NOAA, MMS, the U.S. Coast Guard,
and the USGS should work with industry to develop and support a
systematic and sustained research effort to further basic
science understanding of the processes that govern the fate and
transport of petroleum hydrocarbons released into the marine
environment from a variety of sources (not just spills).
Of course, it would be expected that the effort to ``further basic
science understanding'' would involve academia but it is not explicitly
stated. It is the research efforts of independent scientists that can
help advance oil spill science where students, time, lab space, and
equipment are available.
Comments on NOAA
In the past two months, NOAA and many other Federal agencies have
faced enormous challenges responding to this disaster. They have
performed admirably with the resources available to them.
I also commend the efforts of the CRRC in organizing a two-day
meeting at Louisiana State University on May 26 and 27, 2010 that
involved more than 50 experts from academia, the Federal government,
Environment Canada, industry, and non-governmental organizations and
resulted in ``Deepwater Horizon Dispersant Use Meeting Report.'' This
report recommended that dispersant usage was worthwhile. I agree with
the finding on using dispersants in the surface ocean and reserve my
views on injecting dispersants near the wellhead until more data become
available.
Research on oil in the surface water and pre-assessment studies
began quickly after the spill. Efforts to study deepwater plumes were
delayed because of limited amounts of assets in the theater, but now
have become a major objective. And for the first time that I know of,
NOAA has been transparent about available data and their activities
during the response phase of a spill. For example during the planning
of my upcoming cruise, I have relied heavily on data posted on NOAA
websites.
Last year, I participated in a workshop hosted by the CRRC at the
University of New Hampshire (UNH) titled, ``Research & Development
Priorities: Oil Spill Workshop.'' (The CRRC was established as a
partnership between NOAA, through the Office of Response and
Restoration (OR&R), and the UNH). At that time, CRRC was co-directed by
Professor Nancy Kinner (UNH) and Dr. Lisa Mertens (NOAA). This meeting
was a productive three-day effort addressing eight broad ranging
topics. The attendees were leaders in oil spill science from state
agencies, including the Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinator, consulting
groups, NOAA, Coast Guard, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
international scientists, non-profits, and academia. Many of these
participants are now playing key roles in the Gulf of Mexico. The final
report is available on the Internet.
Several points with respect to this meeting and its final report:
(i) NOAA was actively preparing for future oil spills and working with
a broad spectrum of stakeholders, (ii) I do not recall any discussions
on deepwater spills, even though the workshop was forward thinking with
respect to spills in the Arctic and those from biofuels, and (iii) Of
the 50 attending the meeting, nine were from academia with four from
the University of New Hampshire. Hence, only five participants, or 10%
of the participants, were from US academia outside of UNH. (There were
seven international attendees).
How to move forward immediately and in the future
NOAA and other agencies should receive continued support to monitor
and observe the Gulf of Mexico following the Deepwater Horizon
disaster. Time is invaluable. Every day the oil content and composition
are changing and moving in the surface and subsurface, and eventually
once the leak is stopped, the oil will diffuse and weather to levels
where it can no longer be accurately measured. Knowledge about where
the oil is and how it changed is key to understanding processes acting
on the oil and also estimating damages to wildlife exposed to oil. It
is paramount that a massive, organized, and sustained effort be
directed at researching areas impacted in the Gulf of Mexico.
It would be unfortunate if, in the next several years when
scientists begin to develop a comprehensive view of the spill, they
lament the absence of key data that could have been obtained but was
not because of lack of funds, lack of access, or lack of political
will.
Academia is equipped to conduct some of this key science but needs
direction. I have received countless phone calls and emails from
colleagues asking how they can contribute, but often I do not have
answers. The National Science Foundation has commendably provided
support via its RAPID proposal system to some scientists, and these
funds have already contributed significantly to understanding this
spill. Nevertheless, I believe there could be better coordination
between what the academic research community is doing and all that
needs to be done.
To enhance coordination, I recommend the following actions be taken
immediately:
1. Allow NOAA and other key agencies to triage research,
moving to the top of the list that which is most pressing and
communicate it broadly, clearly, and effectively to the
academic community. It is NOAA and other federal agencies that
are best suited to provide such guidance. They have the
experience and they are most aware of what is needed.
2. Appoint a panel of academic science advisors, via the CRRC,
to liaise directly with key Federal stakeholders to fund
research. They should use the NSF RAPID style proposal system,
which reduces the paperwork and can be approved in days.
Overall, means to provide clear pathways for submission and
feedbacks must be aggressively sought.
3. Encourage traditional studies but also push towards more
advanced techniques. For example, analytical techniques used to
analyze oil have not changed much in nearly decades despite new
methods available that are used in petroleum geochemistry.
4. Assure academics that their contributions are their own and
can be published by them. (The lack of publication, especially
to untenured scientists, can be a major roadblock for engaging
them.)
5. Academia needs information or instruction about OPA90 and
damage assessments. Academic scientists must recognize those
strict protocols for custody of samples and the robustness of
their techniques. What would be otherwise fine for a peer-
reviewed manuscript may not pass the requirements of legal
proceedings.
6. I recognize that the EPA and likely NOAA will set up
scientific advisory boards regarding this spill. They are
certainly necessary but the time needed to vet nominees and
arrange these boards is too long. So, what I propose would be
in addition to these long-term advisory boards.
Academia wants to contribute and has tremendous knowledge that
needs to be directed toward the most pressing issues. NOAA and other
Federal experts should have a process in place for providing the
leadership to academia on how to proceed during this national disaster.
As an academic, I may not appreciate the nuances for such a quick and
directed effort, but we must move fast.
In summary, NOAA and other responders have been handed an enormous
challenge and need all available support. Time is precious. Academia,
which has played a minor role in responding to oil spills over the past
several decades, should be re-engaged with direction from Federal
experts who are most knowledgeable about the most pressing problems.
Thank you for your time today.
______
Ms. Bordallo. I thank you very much, Dr. Reddy, for your
thoughtful input on how to enhance coordination between the
Federal Government and the academic community. Dr. Weisberg, I
look forward to your testimony. You may now proceed.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT H. WEISBERG, PH.D., PROFESSOR, COLLEGE OF
MARINE SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, ST. PETERSBURG,
FLORIDA
Dr. Weisberg. Thank you, honorable representatives. My name
is Robert Weisberg, from the University of South Florida, and I
have been involved from day one with tracking oil at the
surface and also performing subsurface tracking of where oil
might be going there. It is my privilege to be here with you
today to address the question whether the agencies have the
resources to respond. My answer is no, and I will attempt to
explain why and also to give a pathway forward.
When describing the workings of the ocean, the operant word
is connectivity. Connectivity by the ocean is what gives rise
to Earth's climate, and it is also what gives rise to the
Earth's ecology. Without a firm grasp of ocean connectivity,
phrases like ``ecologically based management'' and ``marine
spatial planning'' are less than meaningful. The ocean
circulation is fundamental to that connectivity.
The Loop Current, Florida current, Gulf Stream system
provides the connection between the Gulf of Mexico and the
southeast U.S. It is a deepwater current system, and deepwater
currents cannot easily extend onto the continental shelf. Thus,
the continental shelf circulation differs from the deep ocean
circulation, and this results in mechanisms of connectivity
that are distinctly different for the continental shelf. The
coastal ocean also includes the estuaries, arguably the most
productive and fragile of the ocean environments.
So, my point of these preliminary discussions is that we
are dealing with very complex systems, each related through
common physics, but each unique in how the governing physics
organize to provide the connectivity within and between each
region. This is not a simple problem. It does not have unique,
simple answers. And that explains why NOAA and the Fish and
Wildlife Service do not have all the resources to respond to
the present crisis, and why the sub-questions have less than
satisfactory answers.
So, what do we do immediately, and into the future?
Immediately, we must marshal all of the talent and resources
that exist to deal with the environmental crisis at hand, and
this requires full partnerships between the agencies, the
academics, and the private sector. The academic community has
an essential role in bolstering the resources available to NOAA
and the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the agencies, I would
contend, cannot do this by themselves.
Data gaps abound, and my written testimony provides
specific examples, which I will not repeat here. The fact is we
do not really understand natural workings of our coastal ocean
and estuarine systems well enough because these have not been
studied in a truly system-wide, multi-disciplinary manner. We
are now posed with a fully three-dimensional, time-dependent
sampling problem that must take into account the various
connections that exist between the deep ocean, the coastal
ocean, and the estuaries. This is not business as usual. We
must systematically sample our coastal ocean and begin to
describe the space-time evolution of critical water properties
and sentinel species to assess whether or not post-spill
impacts will be occurring and where.
So, what is the pathway forward? The concept of an
Integrated Ocean Observing System, IOOS, was advanced by
Ocean.US in 2002. This concept remains valid today. Despite the
ICOOS Act passed in 2009, which authorized IOOS within NOAA,
the activity languages with little tangible support, and there
is more concern for the concept of data management than for the
actual implementation of coastal ocean observations and models.
And without those observations and models, frankly there is
little need to manage data.
It is time to implement the IOOS with funding levels
sufficient to serve the regions and the nation, and with
emphases on observations and models. IOOS must be approached in
a comprehensive, systems-wide, multi-disciplinary manner.
Regardless of whether the topic is an oil spill, fisheries,
harmful algae, the same systems-wide approach is necessary. In
other words, to understand our fisheries, we must understand
all of the connections across space, time, and trophic levels.
To describe and predict the present oil spill and its effect on
the environment, we must do the same.
This is a large task, and an evolving one, requiring
nurturing and sustenance. There is no point in engaging if
there is no commitment to sustain the efforts. There is a
compelling need for familiarity and commitment to one's locale.
Local scientists must be involved. Is the effort worth the
cost? Our approach to the questions addressed today would be
much different if we had eyes in place. So, the answer is
certainly yes.
Moreover, I can testify today from personal experience that
the only reason my USF Ocean Circulation Group was able to
respond to the crisis as we did is because we had resources in
place from previous COOS activities, supplemented by small,
competitive research grants. So, with some trepidation, I am
also here today to tell you that not all earmarks are bad.
In summary, the unprecedented Deepwater Horizon oil spill
shed an unwanted light on the environmental stewardship of our
nation's oceans. An immediate response is required, followed by
a staged implementation of an RCOOS concept akin to what was
advanced by Ocean.US.
I thank you for the invitation to speak, and for your
attention.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Weisberg follows:]
Statement of Robert H. Weisberg, Distinguished University Professor,
Professor of Physical Oceanography, College of Marine Science,
University of South Florida, St. Petersburg, Florida
Honorable Representatives on the Subcommittee on Insular Affairs,
Oceans, and Wildlife, Committee on Natural Resources, U.S. House of
Representatives; staff and associates, it is my privilege to be here
with you today to address the question posed on ``Ocean Science and
Data Limits in a Time of Crisis: Do NOAA and the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) have the Resources to Respond? My succinct and candid
reply is that they do not, and I will aim my testimony toward
explaining why and offering a solution. I am not intimating that these
agencies are not excellent in many respects. Instead, I believe that
the resources are presently inadequate. Moreover, this is not a
situation that can be remedied overnight. Scientific inquiry takes
time, and while we must deal with an unprecedented crisis immediately,
we must also lay the groundwork for the future.
In developing my case for improving environmental stewardship I
will also address the sub-questions that were posed:
1) Are there existing gaps in observation data needed to
predict the extent and trajectory of the oil spill, including
information about plume formation and ocean currents?
2) What is the adequacy of pre- and post-impact spill data
needed for conducting natural resource damage assessments?
3) What additional data are required to understand the impact
of the oil spill on the marine environment?
Not all of these questions are within my expertise as a physical
oceanographer, one who studies the physics of the ocean circulation, as
contrasted with the living marine resources. Nevertheless, I will
endeavor to provide my perspective on how the natural system that we
call the ocean must be approached.
When describing the workings of the ocean in the context of the
Earth system, one word immediately comes to mind: connectivity. Ocean
connectivity controls the heat fluxes to the atmosphere and from the
tropics to high latitudes, thereby determining the Earth's climate.
Ocean connectivity unites nutrients (at depth) with light (at the
surface), fueling primary productivity and thence all higher trophic
level interactions, thereby determining the Earth's ecology. In fact,
it can be stated that without a firm grasp of ocean connectivity,
concepts like Ecologically-Based-Management and Marine-Spatial-Planning
are less than meaningful. The ocean circulation is fundamental to the
ocean connectivity.
For the Gulf of Mexico and the southeastern United States, the
primary conveyance of mass, momentum, heat and other water properties
is the Loop Current-Florida Current-Gulf Stream system. The Loop
Current flows into the Gulf of Mexico through the Yucatan Strait, loops
around inside the Gulf of Mexico and exits through the Florida Straits
as the Florida Current. After rounding the bend near Miami and
continuing up the United States east coast it is called the Gulf
Stream. It is really one current system, which is always present and
with remarkably little variation in total transport. All that really
varies is the northward extent into the Gulf of Mexico, i.e., where it
makes its loop. Generally, the Loop Current undergoes a cycle, whereby
it extends ever farther into the Gulf of Mexico before a piece of it
breaks free as a clockwise circulating eddy, that drifts westward and
dissipates, while the main body of the Loop Current retreats back to
the south. This cycle of eddy shedding occurs roughly every eight to 16
months, but with details that are hardly predictable. Before completely
detaching and drifting westward, such eddies can reattach to the Loop
Current, after which it is possible for the Loop Current to extend all
the way to the Deep Horizon well head. The Loop Current is presently in
such a state of eddy shedding. This is why we have not yet seen large
quantities of oil transported to the Florida Straits and up the east
coast, but this may still happen depending on the evolution of the Loop
Current and its shed eddy over the next several weeks to months.
The Loop Current-Florida Current-Gulf Stream system is only one
aspect of the circulation that we must be concerned with. It is a deep
water current system in that it is constrained by mass and momentum
conservation to stay in deep water. Shallow water regions, which I
refer to as the coastal oceans of the United States, are where society
literally meets the sea. It is within the coastal oceans where maritime
commerce takes place, where commercial and recreational fisheries are
situated, where environmental concerns, such as harmful algal blooms
and over-fishing, abound, and where fossil fuels and alternative energy
sources are potentially located. We define the coastal ocean as the
region between the shoreline and the shelf break, and we refer to this
region as the continental shelf, the relatively shallow water region
adjacent to the continent extending seaward to the point where the
water depth drops precipitously to the abyss. The region of precipitous
drop-off is called the continental slope, and the Deep Horizon well
head is situated on the continental slope in the northern Gulf of
Mexico.
Deep ocean currents cannot extend onto the continental shelf unless
the continental shelf is very narrow. Such is the case at the tip of
the Mississippi River Delta, the head of DeSoto Canyon (offshore of
Pensacola, Florida) and offshore of Miami, Florida, where the Gulf
Stream can at times be almost a stone's throw from the beach. In
contrast with these narrow shelf regions the West Florida Continental
Shelf (WFS) tends to be very broad (roughly 100 nautical miles) and
gently sloping, effectively decoupling the Loop Current from the
nearshore. Thus the continental shelf circulation differs from the
deep-ocean circulation, and this results in the mechanisms of
connectivity also being different for the continental shelf.
The coastal ocean also includes the estuaries, the transition
regions between the rivers and the ocean, where density contrasts
between fresh and salt water play a major role in the circulation and
hence connectivity between the rivers, the estuaries, and the
continental shelf. The estuaries are also arguably the most productive
and fragile of the ocean environments.
The point of these preliminary discussions is that we are dealing
with very complex systems, each related through common physics, but
each unique in how the governing physics organize to provide the
connectivity within and between each region. Thus describing,
understanding and predicting the behaviors of these natural systems are
not simple problems with unique, simple answers, and that explains why
NOAA and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) do not have all of the
resources to respond to the present crisis and why the sub-questions
have less than satisfactory answers, and that is just within my own
field of expertise, let alone the much broader range of subject matter
of concern to this subcommittee.
So what are we to do, immediately and into the future? Immediately
we must marshal all of the talent and resource that exists to deal with
the environmental crisis at hand. This requires full partnerships
between the agencies, the academics, and the private sector,
recognizing, of course, that chain of command is of paramount
importance. The agencies have organized, and I cannot speak to that. I
can at least speak to some of the actions of the academic community,
which are being of help in this crisis, and I can also speak to the
future of how we can improve our ability to describe, understand and
predict the ocean system and thereby become better environmental
stewards.
Three particular actions at my own institution, the University of
South Florida (USF), warrant mention. These include: 1) oil spill
tracking tools that were implemented almost immediately after the Deep
Horizon drilling platform sank on April 22, 2010, 2) shipboard surveys
of both surface and subsurface hydrocarbons, and 3) deployments of
gliders, drifters and profilers to help with sampling. For oil spill
tracking we utilized existing numerical circulation models, our own at
USF initially, plus several others added later on to produce an
ensemble prediction with five different models. These are all re-
initialized for surface oil location through the analysis of satellite
images and then run forward in time to produce forecasts 3.5 days into
the future. The forecast interval is determined by the availability of
forecast winds (from NOAA/NCEP). Forecasting more than 3.5 days into
the future is of little utility because of the errors inherent to
weather prediction. Along with surface trajectories we also implemented
the tracking of subsurface trajectories using the same USF numerical
circulation model. Not knowing at what depth subsurface hydrocarbons
might be located a priori, we chose to consider nine different depths
ranging between 1400m and 50m. Virtual particles were released at these
depths beginning on April 20, 2010 and then continually ever since, and
the movements of these virtual particles were, and continue to be,
tracked three-dimensionally using the model's velocity field. All of
these model predictions and satellite analyses are available on the
internet at http://ocgweb.marine.usf.edu and http://
optics.marine.usf.edu/events/GOM_rigfire and have been since late
April, they are provided to federal and state officials and they are in
use as part of the overall forecast system. The subsurface trajectory
forecasts were also instrumental in guiding the R/V Weatherbird II to
sites where subsurface hydrocarbons were identified. We are also using
these models and other observations to help guide the sampling by a
combination of gliders, profilers and satellite tracked surface
drifters. In fact, presently, the USF surface drifters along with some
from the United States Coast Guard (that we helped to deploy) are the
ones documenting the evolution of the Loop Current and its shed eddy
(these drifter tracks are also posted on the above referenced web
site).
Obviously, USF is not the only academic institution to respond.
Notable for Florida are activities by the University of Miami (UM) and
the Florida State University (FSU). Additionally, the State of Florida
University System's Chancellor Frank Brogan facilitated an Academic Oil
Spill Task Force situated at FSU to help coordinate and serve materials
by all of the academics in the State of Florida from a central location
(http://oilspill.fsu.edu). This Academic Oil Spill Task Force,
introduced by Chancellor Brogan, briefed the Florida Congressional
delegation in Washington DC on May 26, 2010, and its activities
continue to be of service in this time of crisis. Other Gulf States
have similarly responded, and we are now seeing a convergence of
academic resources from states around the nation. My point is that the
academic community, in general, has much to offer in bolstering the
resources available to NOAA and the Fish and Wildlife Service.
Nevertheless, data gaps abound. Let's first consider data needed to
predict the extent and trajectory of the oil spill, including
information about plume formation and ocean currents. Predicting into
the future requires that we have the best re-initialization data for
the present. At USF (and for academics elsewhere) we are limited to
what we can glean from satellite image analyses, but these are
generally incomplete due to cloudiness and other limitations to
interpretation. Satellite data could be supplemented by other means of
ground truth; however, such information is not readily disseminated.
One immediate recommendation is that an accessible, easy to use set of
surface oil location data be made available on a daily basis for use in
surface trajectory modeling. This will result in more accurate model
predictions. The subsurface problem is even more acute because now, 52
days in to spill, we have precious little information on subsurface
hydrocarbon location, concentrations, fractionation and decay. There
has simply been a dearth of sampling and an even more limited
dissemination of results. Being that the scientific method is
predicated on observations, these are critical. Similarly, even
observations on the ocean currents are sparse. At a time when the
evolution of the Loop Current and its shed eddy are determinant to
whether or not oil will be entrained and transported to the Florida
Straits and then up the east coast, there has been a seemingly lack of
concern on the part of some who have even dismissed this as a factor
until recently. As stated previously the USF surface drifters were
among the first to be deployed in such a way as to outline the Loop
Current path at this time of crisis. Additional satellite tracked
drifters, systematically deployed, are needed. Similarly several
organizations regularly post analyses of satellite altimetry used to
estimate surface currents via the geostrophic approximation. There
should be an effort to better organize and disseminate these satellite
altimetry analyses and also to improve upon some that up until now may
even have been misleading. Satellite altimetry is critical to constrain
ocean circulation models via data assimilation (for instance, a reason
why the Navy Global HYCOM has been so useful throughout this crisis is
that it is well-contrained by satellite altimetry). Unlike the surface,
there are very few observations being made subsurface for the Loop
Current. With the HYCOM Consortium leading the data assimilation
effort, data assimilative models of the Loop Current would benefit from
additional, systematically deployed AXBTs (Aircraft deployed expendable
bathythermographs).
While the previous paragraph dealt with surface spill location data
in general and the deep-ocean currents, recall from my introductory
remarks on connectivity that we must also be concerned with the
continental shelf and the estuaries. Oil is now stretching along the
northern Gulf of Mexico shoreline eastward to the northwest Florida
beaches as well as westward along the Louisiana coastline. It has
already damaged Louisiana wetlands and estuaries, and it is about to do
so in Florida. There are very few measurement locations for ocean
currents in the coastal ocean, especially for Florida, and there is
also a dearth of well-tested and implemented models capable of
predicting the interactions that occur between the coastal ocean and
the estuaries. These data and model gaps will become increasingly acute
as oil continues to impact an ever larger coastal ocean domain. It is
not that such observing and modeling tools do not exist. Instead, there
has been (over decades in some instances) a lack of commitment on the
part of both state and federal agencies to implement and sustain their
application and improvement. This may, in part, be a consequence of too
many agencies having separate purview on too many related aspects of
the coastal ocean and estuaries without adequate coordination between
them. We need to facilitate the implementation of appropriate coastal
ocean and estuarine models to deal with the ever expanding domain of
the spilled oil. We must then commit to sustaining and improving these
into the future.
Along with the deep-ocean, coastal ocean and estuary circulation
inadequacies there are inadequacies for assessing spill impacts on
natural resources. Whereas mappings may exist for many of the coastal
ocean and estuary natural resources, it may be difficult to assess
spill impacts without adequate knowledge on what the natural
variability of these resources may be. Granted, catastrophic
destruction or collapse will be assessable, but other longer-term or
less obvious degradation may not be. Frankly, we do not really
understand the natural workings of our coastal ocean and estuarine
systems well enough because these have not been studied in a truly
systems-wide, multidisciplinary manner. As an example, fisheries are
generally studied as fisheries; harmful algal blooms are generally
studied as harmful algal blooms; yet, the two are linked, along with
intermediate trophic levels, and these linkages can result in trophic
cascades affecting all forms of living marine resources.
As regards additional data that are required to understand the
impact of the oil spill on the marine environment, this is almost an
insurmountable task. I must assume that the state agencies have
sufficient data bases to describe what existed pre-spill (although I
might question whether or not the natural variability is adequately
established). The question then becomes, what will be the impacts and
how will these evolve. The first thing that we must recognize is that
this is not simply a matter of going to the usual stations and making
the usual measurements, whatever these may be. I must again recall my
comments about connectivity. From whence will a threat arrive? Will it
be from a large massive invasion of surface oil that will cause obvious
damage, or will it be more subtle through the delivery of subsurface
contaminants with less immediately obvious damage? For instance, the
region of the shelf break is where major reef fish communities exist,
such as the gag grouper, known to spawn there. Will these communities
and their progeny be impacted by subsurface hydrocarbons upwelled
across the shelf break? If fish larvae make their way to the near shore
via the bottom Ekman layer, as studies (in preparation) suggest, then
will they be damaged en route if subsurface hydrocarbons make it onto
the continental shelf? We are now posed with a fully three-dimensional,
time dependent sampling problem that must take into account the various
connectivities that exist between the deep-ocean, the coastal ocean and
the estuaries. This is not business as usual. We must systematically
sample our coastal ocean and begin describing the space-time evolution
of critical water properties and sentinel species to assess whether or
not post-spill impacts will be occurring and where.
What might be the pathway forward? The concept of an Integrated
Ocean Observing System (IOOS) was advanced through the actions of the
now disbanded Ocean.US, an interagency planning office established in
2000. Following numerous and broad reaching planning workshops and town
hall meetings a document was published on May 23, 2002 putting forth a
justification and a plan consisting of both global and coastal
components to IOOS. The United States coastal component to IOOS was
envisioned to have a federal network, referred to as the national
backbone, augmented by Regional Coastal Ocean Observing Systems
(RCOOS). Each RCOOS was to be organized through a Regional Association
(RA), and there were to be 11 such RAs forming a National Federation of
Regional Associations (NFRA). The May 23, 2002 IOOS pamphlet suggested
a funding ramp up to 500M per year in support of IOOS, of which 138M
would initiate the activity with an initial 50M going to the RAs. On
September 20, 2004 the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy endorsed the
IOOS concept in their (An Ocean Blueprint) report and recognized that
500M was too small a ramp up - they recommended 750M per year. Whereas
the concept remains valid the progress to implementation is at a stand
still.
For the first half decade of the RCOOS process, through around
2005, the United States did organize into RAs and Coastal Ocean
Observing System (COOS) assets were implemented, largely through
federal earmarks. Beginning in 2005 the academic community at the
request of the Consortium for Ocean Leadership agreed to eschew
earmarks and look instead to NOAA as the lead agency for IOOS through
competitive research grants, and that remains the situation through
today. Unfortunately, new money has not materialized, and the funding
levels for the RCOOS have diminished to the extent where many of the
coastal ocean observing resources that were in place in 2005 are no
longer available. Despite the ICOOS Act passed in 2009, which
authorized IOOS as a program within NOAA, the activity languishes with
little tangible support. Moreover, it is my impression that there may
be more concern for the concept of data management than for the actual
implementation of additional coastal ocean observations and models,
without which there is little data to manage. While many within the
agencies, academia and private sector may disagree on the details, it
is time to implement the RCOOS with funding levels sufficient to serve
the regions and the nation and with emphases on observations and
models.
Details are always stumbling blocks, but these can be surmounted if
we approach the problem in a comprehensive, systems-wide,
multidisciplinary manner. The underlying concept is that of coastal
ocean state variable estimation. By this I mean all properties
pertaining to the coastal ocean, including sea level, velocity,
temperature salinity, nutrients, plankton, fish, and surface
meteorology; in other words, all variables that pertain to and hence
comprise coastal ocean and estuary ecology. After all, coastal ocean
ecology is not biology; it is the entire suite of processes that
determine coastal ocean state variables. These same principles apply to
all of the societal relevant coastal ocean problems espoused in the May
23, 2002 Ocean.US report. They also pertain to the present Deep Horizon
oil spill crisis. Regardless of whether the topic is an oil spill,
fisheries, harmful algae, search and rescue, etc, the same systems-wide
approach is necessary, albeit with subsets highlighted. In other words,
to understand our fisheries we must understand all of the connections
across space, time and trophic levels. To describe and predict the
present oil spill and its effects on the environment we must do
similarly. The scientific approach to all of these problems is similar
and inter-related.
Coastal ocean state variable estimation requires both observations
and models. Observations alone are insufficient because the sampling
problem is so enormous - there can never be enough data. Models are
therefore required to extend the observations with proper dynamical
(and for living resources, proper biological) constraints. However,
models alone are less than useful, owing to the need for, and the
uncertainties in, model initial and boundary conditions and
parameterizations. Thus any coastal ocean observing system must
coordinate between observations and models, with the goal of formally
linking the two elements through data assimilation. It is a large task,
and an evolving one, requiring nurturing and sustenance. There is no
point in engaging if there is no commitment to sustain the efforts.
Additionally, it must be recognized that there is no single
observing sensor or sensor delivery system that is adequate. Required
are arrays of fixed moorings for time series of water column variables
and surface meteorology, HF-radar for surface current mapping, gliders
and profilers for water column variable mapping, conventional shipboard
surveys, satellite imagery with both passive and active sensors,
satellite tracked surface drifters for specific applications (as
presently being used), and other sensors/sensor delivery systems to
fill specific gaps or deal with specific local requirements. Emphasized
again are sustained observations. For instance, the ocean circulation
varies on times scales from diurnal to interannual. It is therefore
impossible to define long term mean circulations, or the seasonal
variations about the means, without years of sustained observations.
The same can be said of biological variables, as alluded to earlier in
my statement about separating natural variability from what may be oil
spill related.
Similar can be said of models. No single model is adequate to cover
all ocean processes. Deep-ocean models generally require larger domains
than coastal ocean models (e.g., the Global HYCOM), but this comes at
the expense of resolution. Higher resolution coastal ocean models
require connection with deep ocean models, which can be accomplished
through nesting (e.g., the WFS model nesting ROMS in HYCOM). Estuarine
models require connection with coastal ocean models often through
multiple inlets, necessitating unstructured grids and even the facility
to flood and dry land. There is no single modeling solution, nor should
there be because, given inherent errors, an ensemble of models is a
reasonable approach.
Finally, and consistent with the RA/RCOOS concept, there is a
compelling need for familiarity and commitment to one's locale. Harmful
algal blooms provide a case in point. Not all ``red tides'' are the
same so how one would model Alexandrium in New England is different
from Karenia in Florida, two dinoflagellates that make their livings
and manifest their toxins in entirely different ways. Processes such as
these are just too complex to generalize.
Is the effort worth the cost? Our approach to the questions
addressed today would be much different if we had the RCOOS in place so
the answer is certainly yes. Moreover, I can testify today from
personal experience that the only reason my USF Ocean Circulation Group
was able to respond to the crisis, as we did, is because we had
resources in place from previous COOS activities, supplemented by many
small, competitive research grants. So with some trepidation, I am also
here today to tell you that not all earmarks are bad.
The total costs are not insignificant. The original Ocean.US
number, especially that for the RCOOS, is woefully small; the U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy number was an improvement, but still too
small. Recently, in a N.Y. Times interview, I used a figure of 1B, and
depending on how that would be distributed nationally between the RAs
and the agencies, that to could be inadequate. In view of a recent
estimate of 138B for the ocean-dependent economy in the United States
(in normal times), provided to the Council of Environmental Quality by
members of Congress, a less than 1% investment on describing,
understanding and predicting ocean behaviors does not seen
unreasonable. After all, there are individual corporate CEO salaries
that have exceeded 100M, and ExxonMobil profits alone have exceeded
40B. Previous BP profits were another 22B. In contrast, a 1B investment
in the coastal oceans of the United States does not seem unreasonable.
Not only will it provide the knowledge needed to be better
environmental stewards, it will help train the next generation of
scientists, employ a highly skilled work force, and support the small
(mostly United States) businesses that make the sophisticated
instruments and instrument delivery systems that are required for
implementation.
The discussions on IOOS, RA, RCOOS, and COOS are a pathway forward,
but needed right now is an immediate and accelerated response to the
Deep Horizon oil spill. Priority must go to the Gulf of Mexico and
Southeastern United States regions while moving toward enabling the
entire NFRA concept for the nation as a whole. The crisis now is in the
Gulf of Mexico, but the future requires a build-up for the entire
nation.
In summary, the unprecedented, Deep Horizon oil spill shed an
unwanted light on the environmental stewardship of our nation's oceans
extending out beyond the EEZ. An immediate response is required
followed by a staged implementation of an RCOOS concept akin to what
was advanced by Ocean.US. The immediate response, in addition to the
outstanding efforts already in place by the agencies under the unified
command, must be directed at the Gulf of Mexico and Southeastern United
States, and these should entail individuals and institutions who have
demonstrated performance in response to the crisis. Observations in
support of oil spill trajectory modeling, both surface and subsurface
are essential. Scoping out the nature of a potential subsurface threat,
as quickly as possible, is necessary for contingency planning and
possible mitigation. Similarly, with oil now approaching new shorelines
in addition to those already marred along coastal Louisiana, we must
have improved observing and modeling tools in place to plan for the
potential invasion of our estuaries by oil. It is not just a matter of
taking stock of natural resources to potentially be lost, but
understanding how these natural systems work so that maybe more of our
natural resource can be spared damage or destruction.
My intention was not to be critical of the agencies, collectively
or individually, instead to highlight certain data and model
deficiencies as requested and to advance a pathway forward. The
response by our agencies has been excellent, so has the response by
many outside of the agencies. We must marshal all of our resources if
we are to minimize the effects of this tragic occurrence.
I thank you for your invitation to speak and for you attention. I
also thank everyone in the federal, state and local agencies, the
private sector and the academic institutions who are working tirelessly
to assist.
______
Response to questions submitted for the record by Robert Weisberg,
Professor, College of Marine Science, University of South Florida
Questions from Chairwoman, Congresswoman Madeline Z. Bordallo (D-GU)
1. What are existing and new data-gathering assets that will be
required to improve oil spill forecasting? Are these types of
assets readily deployable? Would most of these assets be
included in the architecture for most regional integrated ocean
observation systems? Should they be included?
Answer:
I must begin my answer by stating that it is the fully three-
dimensional ocean circulation that determines where oil will go. Even
the surface currents themselves are determined by fully three-
dimensional processes. Hence to successfully track oil either at the
surface or at depth we must have sufficient information on the three-
dimensional ocean circulation. No individual sensor (current meter,
drifter, HF-radar, etc.) or sensor delivery system (moored buoy,
glider/profiler, etc.) is sufficient. Needed is a mixture of such
sensors and systems, either for this Deepwater Horizon oil spill
presently of for IOOS going forward. Different approaches to these
measurements are also needed in deep, versus shallow water.
In deep water we have been successful in modeling the Loop Current
and its eddies as more data are assimilated into existing ocean
circulation models. Specifically, sea surface height estimates from
satellite altimetry, combined with internal temperature and salinity
data obtained by airplane-deployed expendable bathythermographs (AXBT)
and glider surveys have been of great importance, and these should be
continued. The most reliable models in deep water (in my opinion) have
been those run by the Navy (particularly the Global and Gulf of Mexico
HYCOM), as these seem to have the best data assimilation. Other
regional models nested into these (such as the WFS model run by my
group) benefit from the data being assimilated into the larger scale,
primarily deep ocean, models. Thus it is critical that these data
assimilative larger scale ocean models remain assessable by all other
researchers (as they are presently) so that we can also provide the
best regional (coastal ocean) circulation products.
The coastal ocean presents its own set of requirements. Here we
must account for the interactions between the deep ocean and the
coastal ocean and between the coastal ocean and the estuaries. As with
the deep ocean, observations and models must be coordinated because
there can never be enough observations and models without observations
are less than useful. Best results are obtained when these two
activities are coordinated. Beginning with how the coastal ocean
circulation is forced, we must have sufficient observations on coastal
ocean winds, and this necessitates buoys deployed judiciously across
the continental shelf, with surface meteorological sensors (winds and
heat fluxes), in-water current sensors such as acoustic Doppler current
profilers (ADCP), and in-water temperature and salinity sensors. These
buoys must span the dynamically distinct regions of the continental
shelf, including: 1) the outer shelf, defined as an internal Rossby
radius from the shelf break, where deep ocean currents directly impact
the shelf circulation, 2) the inner shelf, defined the region of
interacting (through divergence) surface and bottom frictional (Ekman)
layers, 3) near-shore, the region embedded within the inner shelf that
is further modified by low salinity waters of estuarine origin, and 4)
the mid-shelf for those continental shelves that may be wide enough
[like the West Florida Shelf (WFS)] to distinguish inner from out shelf
regions.
Complementing moored buoys are HF-radars that map surface currents
and a combination of profiling floats and gliders that map the internal
temperature and salinity fields, all over areas larger than individual
moored buoys. This ensemble of observing tools (moored buoys, HF-radar
and profilers/gliders) form the nucleus of what is needed in a
sustained fashion for the Deepwater horizon oil spill and for IOOS.
Additionally, satellite tracked surface drifters are very useful, but
only if these are repeatedly deployed, as we are presently doing on the
WFS.
It is noted above that my attention is mainly on sensors for winds,
currents, temperature, and salinity. Of course there is a need for
biologically oriented sensors (chlorophyll fluorescence, light,
nutrients, etc), but these sensors are still either developmental or
suffer from fouling when deployed over long intervals. Every effort
should also be made to include such sensors on buoys and profilers/
gliders in ways that are feasible, and further developmental activities
should be promoted. Certain measures of light may be capable of
identifying subsurface hydrocarbons and once calibrated against actual
in situ measurements these can become very effective tools for
identifying subsurface hydrocarbons when deployed on moorings,
profilers and gliders.
Lastly we cannot lose sight of satellite sensors for sea surface
height, sea surface temperature and color. NASA or NOAA supplied, there
must be sufficient funding for data acquisition, interpretation, and
for new algorithm development, all of which are essential for both the
deep ocean (as already stated) and the coastal ocean.
2. Predictive models are generated at multiple scales and resolutions,
yet all of our attention has been focused on the open Gulf. How
can we better integrate oceanic, estuarine, and coastal models
into tools, which we can use to respond to oil spills? Should
specific attention be given to encourage the development of
innovative new technologies to detect, contain, characterize,
model and respond to oil spills?
Answer:
My answer is certainly yes. In the same way that no individual
sensor or sensor delivery system is sufficient, no single model is
either. To model the coastal ocean, we must consider the interactions
with both the deep ocean and the estuaries, and this requires models
with different resolutions. For instance, a deep ocean model that may
work very well with resolutions of a few kilometers cannot function as
well across the inner shelf and estuaries where resolutions down to
perhaps 10m to 100m are necessary to include the conveyances of mass
(and oil) across inlets and embayments. These higher resolution models
exist and are being used by academic scientists, but they generally
remain in a research and development mode. This work must be encouraged
if we are to advance the state of the art and provide necessary tools
for environmental stewardship.
3. How are the Agencies, academia, and industry working together to
share data? What have been the best practices? What is needed
now to address this spill and to prepare for the next spill?
Answer:
Whereas I am loath to be negative, the answer (based on my recent
experience) is cooperation remains poor. For instance, beginning on May
8 I began making formal requests for oil location information to
reinitialize oil spill trajectory forecast models for the purpose of
improving upon their accuracy. These requests were very specific and
through around 7/8 they remained totally unfulfilled. This was despite
assistance by my Congressman. I got the impression that the UC would
prefer that people like me just go away. I would if I did not feel that
I had something to offer in this time of crisis. There are excellent
examples of some individuals in the agencies who are reaching out. The
Coast Guard, for example, has shared their surface drifter data. NOAA
Hazmat has effectively interacted, NAVY models are made available, but
other than these (and I'm sure other) good examples, both the federal
and state agencies remain largely insular, and this is a major
disappointment. I did just receive acknowledgement of my request by the
lead of the NOAA modeling group who will begin sending me flight
information available to him; however, he is also without a unified
product as I requested. It appears that no one in the Unified Command
is driven to produce such a product, one that I continue to maintain
would be very helpful to all trying to forecast where oil may go.
Moreover, the sustained cloudiness over the past couple of weeks
accentuates the need for such a unified oil location product. Why else
are we spending so much public money on so many disparate groups
gathering disparate data if these data are not being merged into one
useful product? I now see that the email distribution lists for these
disparate data are enormous. Of all these people, cannot one subset be
tasked with providing a unified product? It was particularly troubling
to me in a recent conversation with a Coast Guardsman to learn of just
how much time is spent ferrying dignitaries and reporters on
overflights, versus sharing necessary data in a convenient, usable
form.
As regards the possibility for oil beneath the surface I see
virtually no sharing of information other than what several academic
researchers found. I do not even know if NOAA has planned a systematic,
repeated set of surveys to identify subsurface hydrocarbons and to map
their evolution.
Addressing the spill now requires better information on the
locations of oil both at the surface and at depth. How the Loop Current
will behave over time will determine the threat to the Florida Keys and
the Southeastern U.S., and monitoring this will require systematic
deployments of satellite tracked surface drifters along with a
continuation of AXBT drops. Whereas the Navy is not making their glider
information readily available (at least as far as I know) they are
using these for assimilation in models (and the model outputs are
available) so those activities all continue to be very positive and
necessary contributions. Additional data are required within the
coastal ocean, and these needs are addressed in answer to question 1
above.
Longer term we need to implement the Coastal Ocean Observing
Systems, as conceived by IOOS, but I contend that unless true
partnerships are forged between the agencies, the academics and the
private sector then the potential for these systems to be of long-term
societal benefit will not be realized. By true partnerships I mean a
significant portion of the funds being distributed outside of the
agencies and in particular to the academic institutions geared toward
the research and development necessary to describe, understand, and
predict the workings of the coastal ocean. Without such mandate I fear
that bureaucracies will grow at the expense of either advancing
knowledge or improving environmental stewardship. Based on my entire
career experience, I can emphatically state that the agencies cannot do
this alone, nor should they attempt to.
Best practices as I presently see are those engaged by some
referenced above. I can access several (Navy, NOAA, academic) models
from open servers, NOAA/NCEP wind fields are readily available, the
Coast Guard SAR group provides surface drifter data on a daily basis,
satellite images remain readily available for many important variables.
In essence, the more open access that there is for observations and
models, especially at a time of crisis, when proprietary needs (duly
recognized and appreciated) must take a back seat (within reason), the
better off we all are in responding to the crisis
Questions from Congresswoman Lois Capps (D-CA)
1. This tragedy demonstrates the value of having a sustained ocean
observing system - like buoys, HF radar, and satellites -
running and sending data. Dr. Weisberg, you use instruments
such as these to run your model simulations, which predict how
oil will be transported by winds and ocean currents. At what
capacity, would you say, is our system of ocean observing in
the Gulf of Mexico?
Answer:
Interestingly, whereas a vast majority of offshore oil production
occurs in the Gulf of Mexico and the President's (pre-oil spill) push
for further exploration focused on the Gulf of Mexico and the
southeastern U.S., these are the two regions of the contiguous United
States that have the least developed coastal ocean observing systems
assets. Why such a mismatch exists between environmental monitoring
needs and resources is a mystery. Could it be that the Gulf of Mexico
and the southeastern U.S. suffers from too much bureaucracy and not
enough action. For instance, for years we have been treated to glossy
brochures from the Gulf of Mexico Alliance and other such groups, but
without any delivery of resources to put words into action. And when
actions do occur they seem to be more political than substantive.
Immediate attention should be given to adding coastal ocean
observing system capacity to the Gulf of Mexico and to the Southeastern
U.S. In doing this we must identify what presently exists and build
upon these extant resources in a systematic way, recognizing that there
are individuals and groups with demonstrated performance that already
provide a basis upon which to build. There is nothing wrong with a
tried and true system of advancing knowledge through publication in
refereed professional journals. IOOS, in my opinion, deviated from this
practice when it put too much emphasis in ``stakeholder'' plebiscites.
Interactions between ``stakeholders'' and providers, while obviously
important, should not be allowed to stifle practicing the scientific
method for advancing knowledge, without which ``stakeholders'' will
never be properly served.
2. Would you say there is a fairly complete system of instruments? Or
are there gaps in coverage that need to be addressed?
Answer:
My answer is no. However, there are nuclei for coastal ocean
observing systems throughout the Gulf of Mexico and the southeastern
U.S., which can be systematically added to for the purpose of filling
data gaps. For instance, legacy programs from an era of previous
earmarks and competitive research programs advanced observing system
assets off 1) the Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama coastlines
under the aegis of the Gulf of Mexico Coastal Ocean Observing System
(GCOOS) and 2) the Florida, Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina
coastlines under the aegis of the Southeastern Coastal Ocean Observing
Regional Association (SECOORA). While GCOOS and SECOORA overlap, it is
important to note that SECOORA was designed in recognition of the
connectivity between the eastern Gulf of Mexico and the Southeastern
U.S. that is provided by the Loop Current--Florida Current--Gulf Stream
system, and this connectivity trumped considerations based on static
regional geography alone. Connectivity is of paramount importance to
any discussion of ecologically-based-management or marine spatial
planning, without which these phrases are lacking in scientific
meaning. For instance, while definitions may have been made for so-
called large marine ecosystems, these ecosystems are not independent of
one another. We should not allow definitions to stand in the way of
scientific inquiry and the advancement of knowledge.
A strong basis, therefore, does exist for coastal ocean observing
system activities in the Gulf of Mexico and the Southeastern U.S. that
can be readily built upon. Shoring up support for these and then
incrementally adding moorings, HF-radar, profilers and gliders, plus
other assets as spoken about in my earlier answers to questions
provides a pathway forward.
I will reiterate that the pathway forward must recognize the
requirement for true partnerships as mentioned earlier. The agencies
(federal, state or local) cannot do this alone. In fact, I contend that
the lack of true partnering has been a major impediment to achieving
coastal ocean observing system implementation.
3. What would you like to have in place in the Gulf region so that you
and your colleagues could have the information needed to
respond?
Answer:
For the coastal ocean, the implementation of coastal ocean
observing systems as envisioned by IOOS and as presently organized
under GCOOS and SECOORA. The basic observational set would include
moorings for surface winds (and heat flux), water column currents and
temperature and salinity, plus other variables pertinent to biology (as
evolving sensors technologies permit); hf-radar for surface currents;
profilers and gliders for 3-D water property structures; satellite
tracked surface drifters; and a limited number of wave gauges. These
would be in additional to elements from the national backbone of
coastal tide gauges and NDBC weather buoys, plus satellite sensors.
For the deep ocean a suite of measurements for assimilation into
large scale ocean circulation models (satellite altimetry, satellite
SST, deep ocean glider temperature and salinity data and air deployed
XCTDs).
In general, a set of nested circulation models for representing the
deep ocean, coastal ocean and the coastal ocean, estuary interactions;
wave models, and the evolution of ecological models are also needed.
Ecological models, however, must explicitly include the fully three-
dimensional ocean circulation because by uniting nutrients with light
and distributing water properties the ocean circulation underpins
ecology.
The above components are necessary in response to the present
crisis and equally important for environment stewardship going forward.
Additionally, for the present crisis, we still require information on
hydrocarbon locations both at the surface and at depth and information
on the rate of decay/consumption of oil by weathering and biological
processes.
______
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Dr. Weisberg, for your valuable
input on the need for full implementation of an integrated
ocean observation system. I would like now to recognize Ms.
Lee. Please begin your testimony.
STATEMENT OF VALERIE ANN LEE, PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENTAL
INTERNATIONAL LTD., SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Mr. Cassidy, Acting
Ranking Member of the Committee, and other members of the
Committee. My name is Valerie Lee. I am the Senior Vice
President of Environment International Government, Limited.
EIGov is a service-disabled, veteran-owned small business. We
specialize in environmental consulting, and the controlling
service-disabled veterans are former Navy officers, one of whom
is seated behind me to my right, Mr. Jack Burke. He served in
Vietnam as a swift boat captain, and was decorated. He and the
other owners of the firm support me in our testimony today.
Collectively, we share a deep respect for the oceans and
the marine environment, and with members of the Subcommittee
and the people of the Gulf Coast, we would like to assist in
any way we can in terms of providing advice, not only to
conduct research, but with a point, to actually achieve
restoration and some measure of making the public whole. It is
with great pleasure that I answer the Committee's questions as
to data gaps and what we can do about them.
My background is law, science, and engineering. I have
written a book along with others, The Natural Resource Damage
Assessment Handbook, a legal and technical analysis. So, my
perspective is a bit different from the others here seated with
me today. I am practical. I have worked with teams of experts
for many years, including well-regarded scientists like those
seated to my right and to my left. Our speciality is working
with inter-disciplinary teams in dealing with intractable
problems that involve incredibly large data sets, like we have
today.
With that as a backdrop, I would like to address the
Committee's questions as to whether or not we have sufficient
data, and what we can do about it, especially in the subsurface
environment. The short answer is no, we don't have sufficient
data. The needs are substantial. There are major gaps. The
reason why we have substantial needs is not for lack of
interest. In part, it is a reflection of us all and what we
don't see and what we can't touch, what we can't feel
immediately sometimes is not measured, or I should say, not
given the kind of importance that we would like it to have.
In addition, there have been financial limitations. When we
look at the current spill, we are looking at the size of an
economic and environmental disaster that we have never seen
before. We are talking about billions and billions of dollars
of damages if we were to place an economic value on that which
is priceless, the Gulf; priceless, the lives of the people who
are lost. And we express our condolences to the families.
We are off the page. We are out of the book. We are
learning on the job. We are building a fire truck in the middle
of a fire. So, what can we do? Is there a lack of hope? The
answer is, I believe, there is hope, and it is through science.
So, what would we do? First, marshal the science, as the
folks beside me have mentioned, or will mention. And also, we
need to spend some money. Whose money? That is for the Congress
to decide. I would argue that there were environmental impact
statements done by the oil industry all over the Gulf that
could have collected essential data to meaningful and
reasonably understand potential technical impacts, and that was
not done.
If I look at the size of the price tag for meaningful
injury assessment, as it is called in the business, and the
development of a restoration plan, which is really what this is
about, we are looking at over a billion dollars, easily. We are
looking at the kinds of things which are developing three-
dimensional models. It is collecting water samples. Right now,
we do not have the vessels in place and the real-time
monitoring data to track plumes. We have to collect samples
from the subsurface, bring them above, and then send them to
the shore for analysis.
People sitting in a boat, the scientists, don't know where
the plume is. They can't react in real time to really measure
where it is. And, yes, I do believe there are subsurface
plumes. The subsurface plumes were documented in a test spill
that was done off of Norway in 1999. In addition to having real
time information and vessels, the bottom line is that we need
to do transects of the area, and we need to collect information
in a way that we have never done before and with a thoroughness
that we never have.
In short, my recommendation would be to activate the Navy
and to get a group within the international community to bring
to bear the vessels that we need, the technologies that we
need, and we need to get at it quickly. And I have other
recommendations, including studies related to toxicity, in my
testimony, but I will submit that for the record, and happy to
answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Lee follows:]
Statement of Valerie Ann Lee, Environment International Government Ltd.
Good morning Chairwoman Bordallo and Ranking Member, Mr. Brown, and
members of the Committee. My name is Valerie Lee. I am the Sr. Vice
President of Environment International Government Ltd (EIGov). EIGov is
a service-disabled veteran-owned small business (SDVOSB) environmental
consulting firm. The controlling service-disabled veterans are former
Navy officers, one of whom is a decorated, combat-tested Vietnam
Veteran Swift Boat Captain, Jack Burke, seated behind me. Mr. Burke and
I first met professionally in 1986 many years ago working together as
government attorneys on a very large oil spill in San Francisco Bay
that resulted in one of the most successful injury assessments and
restoration efforts still to this day. I am also the President of
Environment International Ltd., a woman-owned sister company to EIGov.
Our focus at these companies is an interdisciplinary approach to
science and law to address matters just like the Deep Water Horizon oil
spill. We are group of cross-disciplinary trained experts - lawyers who
are also scientists and engineers, economists who are also
environmental engineers and the like.
We share a deep respect for the oceans and the marine environment
with the members of this Subcommittee and the people of the Gulf Coast
and we have a great love of science and law. The Principals of EIGov
who have served our country and have a commitment to duty, honor and
service are pleased to support me in my testimony today.
The Subcommittee has asked that I address:
1) The existing gaps in observation data needed to predict the
extent and trajectory of the oil spill, including information
about subsurface plumes;
2) The adequacy of pre- and post-impact spill data needed for
conducting natural resource damages assessments;
3) Additional data required to understand the impact of the
oil spill on the marine environment; and
4) Other information relevant to the Subcommittee's work and
appropriate assessment of injury.
Before addressing these issues, I would like to provide the
educational and experiential base that helps inform my answers to these
questions.
I received my undergraduate degree in biology from Bates College in
Maine, a masters in civil engineering from the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, where my focus was on water resources and my law degree
from the Yale Law School. I am the primary author of the only treatise
in existence on natural resource damage assessment, the Natural
Resource Damage Assessment Handbook: A Legal and Technical Analysis,
published by the Environmental Law Institute in Washington, D.C. This
treatise is used by the government agencies and others to train NOAA
personnel, US Fish and Wildlife personnel in natural resource damage
assessment.
I have worked on natural resource damage matters in all years since
1986. I have provided advice to private parties and also all levels of
government on natural resource damage assessment matters. I have
assembled teams of experts from multiple disciplines on cutting edge
science issues to identify information that should be collected to
assess injury, analyze the data, and frame approaches that will restore
it and value injury. We have dealt with some of the largest data sets
in the world to address consider natural resource injuries from
pollution and have worked on more than one what is called ``mega-site''
where potential injuries are spread across hundreds and hundreds of
square miles and injuries are hidden from view in the subsurface
environment - such volumes are huge. These subsurface environments have
not been the deep ocean; they have been groundwater plumes, because
quite frankly the world has never dealt with a deep water spill and
injuries beginning a mile beneath the ocean surface.
I have conducted neutral reviews of oil spill contingency planning
and response after Exxon Valdez and provided advice in connection with
improvements that could have been made to integrate natural resource
injury assessment with oil spill response.
I am expert in the law associated with natural resource damage
assessment. While at the Department of Justice, working with Jack Burke
our CEO, I filed some of the first natural resource damage lawsuits on
behalf of the United States. I am fully aware of the law under the Oil
Pollution Act, the Clean Water Act and other statutes that are relevant
to the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.
With that as a backdrop, I would like to address the Subcommittee's
questions on data to consider subsurface potential impacts, the data
gaps and needs to conduct natural resource damage assessments, and the
data to understand the impact of the Deep Horizon Oil Spill on the
marine environment. I would also like to contribute insights on the
current structure and procedures that are in place to respond to oil
spills and conduct natural resource damage assessment.
The short answers to the Subcommittee's questions are that the
resource needs are substantial and immediate. The data gaps are large.
The amount of resources that have been brought to bear to consider the
impacts of the oil spill in the marine environment, especially the
subsurface environment are inadequate to the task at hand. The reason
for this is not for lack of interest on the part of the agencies, NOAA
and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; it is for lack of technical and
human resources. The paucity of data is created by financial
constraints. It also derives from the human frailty of us all, whether
we are members of the public, work for government, or are employed by
the private sector. Humans are not well suited to understand the
importance of what they cannot see and feel within their personal
spheres, even if the threats are large and real. The world beneath the
surface of the ocean is beyond our view. Its importance has not been
recognized in the way that it should have been by all of us.
For these reasons, we are behind the curve in scientific knowledge
of the ocean ecosystems and the species that live there and support our
economy. The agencies tasked with studying natural resource injuries
and restoring injuries when they happen do not have procedures and
integrated approaches to address subsurface spills involving the deep-
sea environment. We are playing catch-up. We are building a fire truck
in the middle of the fire to respond. The civilian federal agencies
responding don't have the resources they need to assess injury and
mitigate and restore injuries to the Gulf.
The Deep Horizon Oil Incident - an explosion that caused
substantial loss of life and we send our condolences to those families
for their loss - an explosion that has resulting in an ongoing spill of
a growing spatial and volumetric magnitude that is hard to fathom,
causing injury to our marine ecosystem and to entire coastal economy of
a major part of the United States. Measured by environmental injury and
economic losses, that we in the trade call lost human uses, this is the
largest natural resource damage case that this country has ever seen
and I hope the world will not see one again. Damages are in the
billions.
We are off-page and out of the book. With an ongoing spill of this
size and severity, the law fails us as a mechanism for truly meaningful
reparation for the sea, the marine ecosystem and the species that are a
part of it, and the Gulf Coast economy supported by it. The law cannot
achieve full compensation to make the public truly whole; a wise
economist once said that in the free market system that which is
priceless cannot be provided. The fundamentals of science are the only
real means to achieve an outcome for this spill and to ensure that
others do not ever place our regional economies and ecosystems
supported by them in danger.
As the Subcommittee has asked me to do, it is right to begin with
data needs, data gaps, and how we fill them. Despite the spill's
enormity and complexity, the fundamentals of science and logic guide us
to an understanding necessary to build toward some type of restoration
necessary for a healthy, vibrant Gulf Coast economy and a place where
we and our children want to live, work and recreate.
To conduct an injury assessment for this spill and to develop
information to help us restore at least some part of the natural
resources on which the vibrant Gulf Coast economy depends, we need to
assess the following.
The transport and fate of the oil in the subsurface
and surface regimes.
The concentration of the contaminants in the
subsurface from the oil being released over very large
volumetric/spatial scales - currently one third of the gulf is
closed to fishing.
The toxicity of these contaminants delivered to
organisms in the subsurface, e.g., fisheries, phyto- and zoo-
plankton etc. and the toxicity at the surface to myriad species
of the Gulf Coast ecosystem.
An understanding of the physical effects of oil that
can cause injury, such as breeding failure, or death.
The location of species and whether or not they have
been exposed to the contamination; the species of concern are
not just the macro-charismatic ones, they are those at the
bottom of the food chain that are not easily viewed, phyto-
plankton, zoo-plankton and others. They are the ones that are
exposed to toxicants at 3,000 feet and below as well as those
higher in the water column.
The consequences of ecosystem chaos precipitated by
organisms ``feeding'' off the oil plumes and, thereby, likely
to deplete oxygen in major regions of the subsurface.
Information on injuries that have already occurred to
mammals, birds and fish that are evidenced through bodies, not
seen on the surface, but lying far below on the sea floor.
We have considered the cost to accomplish this work. Our estimate
of the cost of an assessment to perform the foregoing might be
surprising for some. It is at least a billion dollars. The reason why
the number is so large is that it relates to the difficulty, expense,
and time required to collect data with the current techniques in the
deep-sea environment. Is it also driven by the enormity of the surface
scale of known injury and the huge volumetric scale of the subsurface
potential impacts that must be studied. We are limited in our ability
to study such impacts. Among other things, there is:
A rather rudimentary understanding of the deep sea
and subsurface ecosystem as compared to the surface;
A paucity of high resolution data on currents in the
Gulf at different depths from 5,000 feet to the surface; this
information is required to run numerical models that could
offer mathematical predictions as to where the oil would go and
also help us understand its transformation;
A lack of a developed 3-dimensional (3-D)
mathematical model that can be used to predict the transport
and diffusion of oil spewing out of the deep, even with the
collection of data above. Moreover, it may require the use of
super computers to run such models;
A lack of proven effective instruments for real-time
measurement of contamination from oil in the subsurface,
especially at depth;
A lack of understanding of where the plumes are at
depth and with what organisms the oil and dissolved phase toxic
compounds from it are coming in contact;
The effects of the oil and its constituents that have
dissolved in water on organisms living in the subsurface;
The cost of operating submersible vessels and surface
vessels in sufficient numbers to allow collection of empirical
data in sufficient quantity in subsurface space to be able to
create information on currents, location of plumes, contaminant
concentration, and exposures to organisms.
Given that we are behind on the knowledge and technology curve,
this information base must be created for this spill to assess injury
and to build toward at least a partial restoration of natural resource
injuries. Many say that this is not possible; however, I believe with
the right team of experts and appropriate amount of resources devoted
to the issue we have hope for identification and restoration of
injuries from this spill and we will create an information base for the
next spill, if and when such an unfortunate event occurs. I explain in
greater detail latter in my testimony a practical approach to restoring
injury to this vibrant ecosystem and the lives, businesses and economy
supported by it. Restoration of the Gulf truly is a matter our economic
health as a nation and in our interest in the defense of the nation. We
have to begin planning for and implementing restoration now.
The Gulf is dotted with rigs, some operating at thousands of feet
below the surface; it would seem that the Congress may want to consider
the costs of these assessments as properly assigned to the companies
operating in the Gulf. Indeed, much of this work should have been done
to prepare realistic and technically sound environmental impact
statements and it was not done. Instead, the government and the
industry relied on the silver bullet of the ``blowout preventer.'' In
the case of the Deep Water Horizon, this silver bullet missed its mark.
The Nation now understands the importance of the Gulf; its
importance to the organisms who support us and our economy; its
importance to our children and their future. We now understand that we
should have spent more financial resources on ``inner space,'' the deep
ocean, especially if we are to site hazardous activities like drilling
that cannot be controlled and contained if the first line of defense
goes awry. Appropriate risk management is to collect this information
now, to ensure that we are prepared for a possible future failure. What
follows are specifics of what we suggest as approaches to fill data
gaps and meaningfully assess injuries. It also offers some possible
improvements in government procedures in the aftermath of oil spills to
ensure that we do not bring our economy to its knees as a result of
spills.
1. Identification of subsurface plumes and contaminant concentrations;
resource and data needs.
The only study we could find on consideration of a deep-sea spill
was performed by the Minerals Management Service, ironically, in
conjunction with BP and oil industry participants. I have attached
these documents to my written testimony. With minuscule quantities of
oil in that test release study by comparison to what we have with the
Deep Horizon Oil Spill, the results suggested that we would find what
we are seeing in the Deep Water Horizon spill. Plumes were created
subsurface and the oil did not rise to the surface in a direct path.
Napthalene, a constituent of oil that is highly toxic, was dissolved in
water and delivered at depth to resources in the contaminant's path.
This is but one of the toxic compounds in oil.
Existing current data in the Gulf is neither of the spatial
resolution nor of the type that we need for accurate mathematical
modeling plumes of the fate and transport of oil released at depths.
Further, at depths below approximately 1500 feet there is no light, the
environment is very cold, and the pressure is extremely high. Oil and
gas at depth acts and is transformed in ways different from at the
surface. We saw a dramatic illustration of this with the hydration
problem that made the Top Hat solution to stop the spill of oil
useless.
NOAA's numerical fate and transport models are excellent, but they
were designed to predict fate and transport of plumes at the surface.
Thus, using a model the existing numerical fate and transport models to
predict where the plumes are from the Deep Horizon will go and in what
concentration organisms will be dosed with toxicants is not as reliable
as we would like. Given that people's lives and livelihoods in the Gulf
Coast depends on science providing reliable guidance for the fate and
transport and injury assessment, we must take a different approach than
reliance on numeric fate and transport models.
The government must collect empirical data. The government must
collect sufficient samples over large spatial scales (more than once)
to be to able to rely on statistics to help us understand the magnitude
and environmental severity of the plumes impact and the ecosystem chaos
that they spawn by creating a food source for organisms that may
deplete the oxygen in major areas of ocean. Vessels and equipment can
be used to collect real time, physical information on currents,
temperature and the like. Similarly, we need to collect water samples
and determine whether oil contamination is present.
I would like to underscore that governments often give short shrift
to statistics because they do not understand the discipline, but data
collection and application of statistics to abstract conclusions for
larger scale regimes and are our best hope for the identification of
plumes and the assessment of injuries from the Deep Horizon spill.
We are challenged in two ways with the collection of empirical
data, even with well-designed sampling studies and effective use of
statistics.
First, based on an exhaustive review of research vessels (surface
and subsurface), NOAA, which operates vessels frequently in partnership
with universities, does not have enough marine assets/vessels to
perform the kind of broad-scale, organized study required. NOAA has on
the order of a total of a dozen surface and subsurface major vessels
combined in the Gulf area at the present time, with three or four large
vessels having already collected some data. This size of the fleet in
Gulf, even including vessels primarily operated by Universities is not
big enough to collect data over the spatial and volumetric scale that
encompass a third of the Gulf. Thus, Congress should work with the
President, including units of the Navy, to consider how this fleet
could be augmented quickly to collect data. The type of data collected
should include high resolution, spatially targeted data on currents at
various depths.
Second, assuming we augment the NOAA research/study fleet, we have
additional technical challenges. Technologies that we should have for
reliable real-time chemical concentration data collection at depth do
not exist. The industry and the government is in the position of
``making do'' with technologies developed for other data objectives,
such as, temperature and opacity (physical measurements) rather than
chemical concentrations of the constituents of petroleum products to
identify the existence of contamination in the subsurface that
encompass enormous volumes (3-D spaces). Fluorimetry is a technique,
that have received limited use for the detection of ``oil'' and it may
not be effective. In addition, it cannot be used to provide information
on contaminant concentrations, such as of naphthalene, in water. To
consider contaminant concentrations gas chromatographs and mass
spectrometers must be used. These are big instruments that are in the
lab and not field measuring techniques.
As a result, NOAA has largely relied on using samplers lowered from
a surface vessel to depth to collecting water samples. Such samples are
raised to the surface on board ship. The ship needs to steam to port
and then provide the samples to laboratories which will then take days
to be analyzed. The net effect of this method is that investigators do
not know whether or not they are taking samples in the plume and, if
so, do not have feedback to enable them to measure the vertical and
horizontal extent of it while they are on location to sample. They
cannot find its boundaries. Thus, our ability to locate subsurface
plumes and contamination is substantially compromised. The
investigators are flying the plane without instruments and guessing
which way they should go and whether they have found the airstrip on
which to land, so to speak.
We would recommend that a significant effort be launched
immediately to support surface vessels with the helicopter pickup and
delivery of oil samples and set up shore-side laboratories to process
samples as quickly as possible.
These are our principal recommendations for the identification of
the plumes from the Deep Horizon that do exist at depth and to better
understand the subsurface of the fate and transport of oil.
2. Data needs to assess injuries to natural resources: species and
resources.
Scientists will usually say that there is not the kind of
``baseline'' data that they need to be confident in the assessment of
natural resource injuries from oil spills. The Gulf Deep Horizon is
this problem on steroids. By comparison to resources that we see on the
surface, there is much less known about resources in the subsurface
environment, especially resources of the deep-sea environment.
First, to assess injury we need to know species distribution and
whether or not there has been exposure to oil. Second, we need to
understand how species- fish, plankton, mammals, crustaceans etc. and
their various life forms--living at various depths in a water column
that is a mile deep are affected by petroleum products. If we are
looking at injury from a population perspective, we need to know
numbers.
When decisions were made to move ahead with deep drilling, we
collectively did not do the job that we should have. Further, the
reality is that there is never perfect data. So to assess injury, we
need to fill this gap, not completely, but with reasonable information
to allow us to make decisions that will help restore what we can from
the spill and protect our fisheries and other resources that are the
keystone of the Gulf's economy and way of life. Our recommendations are
as follows.
First, gridded transects of the area of likely plume activity and
underneath the surface contamination should be conducted. Transects
should be accomplished with submersibles just like those conducted with
planes in overflights to identify species composition and distribution.
We recommend that real-time videography be used. Both remote
submersibles and those manned by scientists can be used. Transects
should be designed to systematically cover the area at various depths.
Second, just as we do a beached bird survey and walk a beach to
identify dead birds and allow statistical analysis and estimation of
the total number of birds killed, so to we should follow a similar
protocol in the areas of the worst contamination. Such transects should
follow the bottom and, obviously must use lights at depths below 1500
feet.
Third, we need to immediately synthesize available information on
toxicity to a variety of species. As strange as this may seem, NOAA and
the US FWS have never collected a systematic and thorough compendium of
known toxic effects for the various species. For years, this has been a
data need for the entire natural resource damage programs of both
agencies AND it is essential for this spill.
Fourth, after a quick review of existing information, the
governments should launch shore-side toxicity studies for keystone
species. It is without question that even with a scientific literature
review, we have substantial data gaps. Illustrative of this is that the
most information that I am aware of on the impacts of oil spills and
petroleum products on fishery resources is on salmonids and there is by
comparison very little information on other species. This also has been
a data need for many years and its time has come with the potential
collapse of the fishing industry in the Gulf.
3. Other recommendations to improve Natural Resource Damage Assessment
in the marine environment and the Deep Water Horizon Spill
a. Applied Science and technology focused on restoration of the Gulf
ecosystem, economy and way of life
The people of the Gulf Coast and the Nation and its economies have
been supported by a vibrant Gulf ecosystem. The spill threatens this
ecosystem. As I have described, the need for scientific and technical
information is great in connection with the assessment of injury from
the spill and NRDA. However, as we fill these gaps, our focus should be
on applied science and technical development. Data collection, science
and technology are merely the means to understand what action we must
undertake to make the ecosystem and the people supported by it whole.
It is the most important of applications.
Restoration planning and assessment must begin now even as we begin
to assess the injury from the spill. One builds on the other. It is our
hope for the Gulf and the lives that have been wracked by the Deep
Horizon Well spill.
The United States must launch an effort of scientific integration
and coordination of a scale that we have never seen before. We need to
select and organize distinct subgroups of scientists in teams to
quickly and efficiently assess critical habitat and species injuries.
We must determine the critical habitat and injuries to species that are
keystones of the Gulf Coast's biological environment and industries in
the Gulf. These industries include commercial and recreational fishing,
tourism, underwater diving, and bird and wildlife watching, amongst
others. The government must combine science, policy and public input on
an unprecedented scale.
We must move in the face of less than perfect information to begin
to mitigate and injury to achieve environmental, economic, and social
restoration. There should be an emphasis on using small businesses in
restoration planning and implementation as small business to foster
rapid economic restoration.
We are fighting to save the Gulf's ecosystem and our ways of life
that depend on it. This should be our highest priority apart stopping
the spill and this fight led by scientists will last for years to come.
b. Better integration of NRDA to oil spill response.
We have a long history of oil spill response in the United States.
The Coast Guard and others have done an excellent job. If there was a
failing on the PREP exercises, experts who participate in them indicate
that they are not aware of any deep-sea drill scenarios. This should
change if we intend to continue to have deep-sea rigs.
Second, human safety and stopping the spill are the primary
objectives, especially in the early days of the spill. The Incident
Command System is focused nearly exclusively on this. Moreover, the
Coast Guard culture is properly one of working with the Responsible
Parties. NRDA is seen by some in the Coast Guard as punitive.
The Deep Water Horizon necessitates a reconsideration of this
practice and way of dealing. We suggest that the Administration
consider revisiting the procedures and protocols because with the Deep
Horizon we have learned that a spill of this magnitude can threaten the
regional economy and dramatically affect peoples' lives. It is a
dramatic illustration of how humans really are interconnected to the
natural resources--the health of the natural resources is more than an
``environmental issue,'' it is important to the economy and even our
national security. Different policies probably would have meant that
the resources required to investigate and mitigate impacts could have
been activated sooner. Arguably, it might not have made a difference.
But it is worthy of consideration by the Administration whether or not
there should be a parallel emphasis in Incident Command System on NRDA.
c. NOAA and US FWS are not well equipped to deal with NRDA in the
subsurface environment.
In over 20 years of working with oil spills, I am not aware of NOAA
or US FWS focusing on the potential of a spill like this in the
subsurface environment for NRDA. Further, the resources of the two
agencies are too limited to address a situation of this magnitude. They
are using contractor support, but both agencies are focusing more on
the resources that we see on the shore or on the sea surface. Moreover,
in the case of the US FWS, the staff is exceedingly small. This is not
to say that staffs should be increased because to truly be ready for
all types of possible injury and associated assessment methods would
require employing a significant percentage of the experienced
biological scientists in the U.S. We recommend that NOAA and the US FWS
develop an established network of experts identified within the United
States to draw on for matters like these.
Thank you for your time. I look forward to any questions you might
have.
______
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much for your comments on the
natural resource damage assessment process, Ms. Lee. And I
would now like to recognize Dr. Reed to testify.
STATEMENT OF DENISE J. REED, PH.D., INTERIM DIRECTOR,
PONTCHARTRAIN INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES, AND
PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF EARTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES,
UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA
Dr. Reed. Thank you, Madame Chair, distinguished members of
the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss with
you today how we are going to respond to the Deepwater Horizon
oil spill and what role science and data collection can play.
This crisis highlights the importance and vulnerability of
coastal systems, and that is where I am going to focus my
remarks today. In Louisiana, this is a coast which was already
in trouble, a coast which I have studied for almost 25 years, a
coast which we understand well, and which we think can be
restored, even in the face of current events.
I would like to touch on five things this morning. One of
the specific challenges for assessing the damages associated
with the current oil spill will be separating out the effects
of the oil spill from the long-term changes that were already
going on at the coast. And for Louisiana, anyway, we will need
to predict how the future of this coastal ecosystem has been
changed by the oiling and by the dispersants, and by any other
response efforts. We know that if some unsure response efforts
are not conducted carefully, they can cause more damage than
the oil on the surface.
I recommend specific investments in predicting the future
of these impacted coastal ecosystems so that we can separate
out the effects of the Deepwater Horizon from the ongoing
ecosystem restoration. The system will be in worse shape in the
future. The question is how much of that can be attributed to
the oil.
My second point, the concept that oil is easier to clean up
in sandy environments compared to muddy wetlands is well
accepted. We have already heard that this morning. This
premise, while accepted premise, has led to calls for action at
the outer shoreline to reinforce the sandy perimeter of the
Louisiana coast and to limit the tidal passes. Sand berms,
rocks, barges have all been proposed. How well these measures
will work remains to be seen. Hard structures like rocks are
not a natural feature on the Louisiana shoreline, and our
history has shown that rocks and breakwaters disrupt the
natural sand movement and prevent natural healing, which can
occur on our barrier islands after storm events.
We must be wary of causing long-term harm to the system
with our emergency response measures, especially where the harm
can be avoided or where it likely outweighs the effects that it
could have in terms of our ability to contain the oil, the
tradeoff that has already been discussed.
I recommend increased efforts to specifically track the
performance and effects of response measures in the coastal
area to allow the implementation of additional measures, if
necessary, if the ones that we have are failing, and to make
sure that we assess the total impact of the event here. We must
not be complacent. We must monitor, and we must try not to do
more harm than the oil.
Oil will move into the estuary. All agree that containment
and removal in open water is far preferable than letting the
oil get into the wetlands. However, there are thousands of
potential destinations that oil could get to. Those on the
ground trying to respond can more effectively mobilize and
deploy the booms and skimmers that they have if they have
better information on the potential paths of oil movement
within these complex and shallow bay systems. University
researchers are already using their existing computer models to
produce maps for local authorities of the surface and mid-depth
currents within the estuary to aid the local people on the
ground in preparing for where the oil might move.
The actual movement of the oil on any particular day is
going to depend on local wind and tide conditions, but these
kinds of tools have been very helpful to them in thinking about
where it might go. I recommend increased utilization of
predictive models of shallow water movement to inform the on-
the-ground response on the coast. Water movement in shallow
basins is rarely predicted by models, which focus on the entire
Gulf of Mexico. It will answer only one part of the coastal
ecosystem. In the open water areas, both in the bay bottoms and
the water columns--and I am talking about the shallow water
areas behind the barrier islands now, not the open Gulf. In
those areas, oil, even in low concentrations, can be having an
effect which is much less obvious than the coating of beaches
or wildlife or marsh grass. What happens in the open water is
crucial to the food web and to many of the species that we
value as commercially and recreationally important.
A typical fish life cycle starts with eggs, goes to larvae,
goes to juveniles, and eventually to adults. These different
stages show major changes in their physiology, behavior, where
they live, where they hang out, what they eat, and in their
susceptibility to oil, with the early life stages being much
more sensitive.
I recommend an increased emphasis on measuring and
understanding the effects in open, inshore waters of low
concentrations of oil, especially on lower parts of the food
chain and the early life history stages of these commercially
important species. We have to measure what we cannot easily
see.
And last, the unprecedented extent of this event has led to
a massive data collection effort using a variety of sensors and
data collection techniques. Making these data available to
interested scientists and stakeholders would increase
understanding of the ever-changing effects and allow a wider
range of experts, including university scientists like myself
and the others assembled here, to communicate with the public
on the effects of this oil.
I recommend increased access to agency-collected data
through an easily accessible data management system. The new
GeoPlatform, which was released yesterday, is a good start. We
can see the maps. We can see where the oil has been, where it
isn't. But we need to see the actual data and work with that,
too. It is going to take all of us to understand this thing.
I speak on behalf of many when I say that university
researchers are ready to help and apply the tools and knowledge
that we have to support this emergency. Thank you, Madame Chair
and members of the Committee. This concludes my remarks. I will
be happy to take questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Reed follows:]
Statement of Dr. Denise J. Reed, Professor, Department of Earth and
Environmental Sciences, Interim Director, Pontchartrain Institute for
Environmental Sciences, University of New Orleans
Madam Chair and Distinguished Members of the Committee:
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you the need to
respond to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the role that science
and data collection can play in that effort. This crisis highlights the
importance and vulnerability of our coastal ecosystems. I will focus on
the existing status of scientific understanding of coastal change, how
that can be leveraged to respond to the spill and where gaps in data
and understanding are currently limiting our ability to respond. I will
also identify several areas where the extent and character of our
coastal system make the long-term tracking of the impact of the spill
more challenging that may be immediately apparent. More specifically I
recommend:
Investments in predicting change in the impacted coastal
ecosystems to enable the impacts of Deepwater Horizon to be separated
from ongoing ecosystem degradation.
Specifically track the performance and effects of
response measures on the coastal ecosystem to allow the implementation
of additional measures if necessary, and to assess the total impact of
the event.
Utilization and refinement where necessary of predictive
models of water movements within the estuary to inform mobilization of
response techniques.
Focus on measuring and understanding the effects in open
inshore waters of low concentrations of oil, especially on lower
trophic levels and early life stages of commercially important species.
Increasing access to agency collected data through a data
management system, thus allowing university researchers to better
leverage existing funding sources and develop necessary understanding
for assessment of impacts.
My expertise has been developed through my training as a coastal
geomorphologist at the University of Cambridge, specializing in the
dynamics of coastal wetlands, and almost twenty five years of research
on coastal marshes and barrier islands in Louisiana. I have authored
scholarly publications on coastal wetland response to sea-level rise,
and the effects of hydrologic change on marsh sustainability. I have
also worked actively in restoration planning in Louisiana since the
early 1990's including `Coast 2050' in 1998, the Louisiana Coastal Area
Study of 2004, the State Master Plan for coastal protection and
restoration of 2007, and now the 2012 update of that Master Plan where
we must consider the effects of this crisis on our long term goals for
the coast. In addition, in recent years I have conducted research on
coastal wetland restoration and participated in restoration planning in
the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, San Francisco Bay and Puget Sound. I
live in Terrebonne Parish, Louisiana in the small town on Montegut.
As a Professor at the University of New Orleans my research on
coastal ecosystems is currently funded by a number of federal agencies
including the US Fish and Wildlife Service, NOAA and the US Army Corps
of Engineers. The thoughts and opinions expressed here are my own and
do not represent the views of the University or any of these agencies.
Putting the Effects of the Spill in Context of Current Change on the
Louisiana Coast
Coastal wetland loss in Louisiana is occurring at a rapid pace and
wetland sustainability has become an issue of paramount importance even
before the Deepwater Horizon event. The processes involved with coastal
land loss and their interactions operate on a range of spatial and
temporal scales. Essentially, most agree that coastal land loss and the
massive degradation of the coastal ecosystem can be attributed to two
types of factors - natural and human induced. This is a very dynamic
landscape with riverine floods, sea-level rise, natural land
subsidence, and storms from the Gulf leading to patterns of land
building and decay on time scales from days to millennia. The constant
adjustment among these natural factors produced a coastal ecosystem
which sustained itself for thousands of years - constantly changing but
productive. This balance has been disturbed by multiple human
influences on the landscape, such as the construction of levees on the
Mississippi River, the internal disruption of hydrology associated with
the construction of canals for various purposes, and the introduction
of an exotic herbivore, the nutria. Ecosystem degradation is the result
of these and other factors interacting to produce complex patterns of
stress to the ecosystem, ultimately resulting in land loss.
We understand these processes well and this science has been the
foundation of our restoration plans for many years. The challenge for
the assessment and restoration of the damages caused by the current oil
spill will be separating out the effects of the spill from the long-
term changes already going on. While the goal of the ultimate Deepwater
Horizon restoration program will be to `to speed the recovery of
injured resources and compensate for their loss or impairment from the
time of injury to recover', identifying this injury from the others to
which this system is already being subjected will be challenging. It
will require federal agencies to work in partnership with coastal
scientists to develop and apply predictive models of ecosystem
dynamics. We must identify how the trajectory of change of the coastal
ecosystem has been influenced by the oil itself and by the response
efforts, which if not conducted carefully in these sensitive
environments may cause more damage than the oil. It is essential to put
the effects of the oil spill in the context of existing coastal change.
Response at the Outer Shoreline
The concept that oil is easier to clean up in sandy environments
compared to muddy wetlands is well accepted. This premise has led to
calls for action at the outer shoreline to reinforce the sandy
perimeter of the coast. The effectiveness of these measures, including
a plan to build a long sand berm and close in tidal passes must be put
in the context of how these systems have evolved and how they change.
The outer coast of Louisiana consists of low-lying sandy barrier
with wide inlets, both deep and shallow. High rates of subsidence,
coupled with sea-level rise, are compounded by the effects of tropical
storms and hurricanes to produce a system of landward-migrating low
sandy barriers which frequently are overtopped. The configuration of
the islands and intervening inlets is not only controlled by waves and
storms acting on the outer shoreline. Ongoing conversion of back
barrier and interior wetlands to open water bays and lagoons increases
tidal prisms (the amount of water that enters and leaves the estuary
with every tidal cycle). Changes well behind the islands thus result in
an increase in the flow of water moving through tidal inlets between
the islands. Over time the continual increase in bay-tidal prism size
together with the landward migration of the barrier systems results in
an ever changing shoreline within which new tidal inlets are being
formed and existing inlets are subject to changes in cross-sectional
area (deepening and/or widening) and position.
Expectations of the performance of shoreline actions in containing
the spill and providing clean up opportunities must take into account
the potential for rapid changes at the barrier shoreline and the key
role of inlets between islands in allowing tidal flows into and out of
the estuary. Studies of just one area of the coast, Little Pass
Timbalier, before and after the 2005 hurricane season at in showed that
almost 13 million cubic yards of sediment was eroded from a 19 square
mile area and this without a direct hit from a hurricane. Over four
hundred yards of shoreface retreat was detected. While sand berms in
the nearshore, as currently planned, may provide opportunities for
cleanup in the near term, they may not last as long as the spill event.
Even a minor tropical storm could erode them.
There is broad agreement that limiting the number of pathways for
oil to enter the estuary would aid response. Currently the barrier
islands are separated by large inlets, those which convey the majority
of tidal flow and have formed over decades. In addition, there are many
small cuts or `low spots' on the islands which remain from the storms
of 2005 and 2008. For the most part such cuts heal over time and
natural sand transport fills them in. Accelerating this process to help
spill response is certainly a reasonable approach. Using rocks or other
unnatural structures for these closures may be necessary under these
emergency circumstances but these measures should be considered
temporary and be removed post-spill. Hard structures are not a natural
feature of the Louisiana shoreline and our history has shown that rocks
and breakwaters change patterns of sand movement disrupting the natural
adjustments and the healing which can occur after storm events. We must
be wary of causing long-term harm to the system with our emergency
response measures especially where that harm can be avoided or likely
outweighs the benefits of that aspect of the response.
As response measures are implemented at the shoreline it will be
essential to understand their effects on shoreline dynamics. Changes in
the coast resulting from the response itself could exacerbate ecosystem
degradation and make long-term restoration more difficult. Changes in
shoreline dynamics, the fate of any sand placed at the shoreline, and
the effect on tidal exchange can and should be monitoring during and
after the response effort.
Oil Movement into the Estuary
The barrier shoreline represents our outermost defense. But closing
the shoreline completely is not an option. Tidal passes must remain
open to allow for tidal exchange, the migration of organisms, and
provide natural flushing. Rather than closing inlets or restricting
their cross sections, efforts should be focused on how to contain the
oil passing through the inlet. The amount of water which flows through
the passes is not determined by the size of the pass. Rather it is
related to the tidal prism and the amount of open water landward of the
shoreline. Clearly the massive coastal land loss Louisiana has
experienced has increased the tidal prism. That water must move in an
out every day. If we make the tidal passes narrower in the hope of
`channeling' the oil and making containment easier the speed of water
flow through the passes will simply increase. Containing oil in fast
flowing waters is a challenge to our traditional clean up technologies
and effective techniques must be incorporated into any plan which
focuses on the outer shoreline.
Oil will move into the estuary. All agree that containment and
removal in open water is far preferable to allowing oil to enter the
wetlands. However, the complexity of the estuarine landscape means
there are thousands of miles of potential destinations for the oil. To
more effectively mobilize and deploy resources those on the ground
require the best information available on the potential paths of oil
movement.
Predictions of where the oil might go within the estuary require
tools which appreciate the complex hydrodynamics of these shallow
estuaries and the wetting and drying of wetlands each day with the
tide. Oceanographic models often fail to incorporate these details,
understandably so as they may not be important for understanding Gulf-
wide circulation. But within the estuary researchers have developed
tools which can support response. At the University of New Orleans
researchers are using existing three dimensional computer models to
estimate the trajectories of surface and subsurface tracers under
various combinations of wind and tidal conditions. They can produce
maps of the surface and mid-depth currents and directions for example
events to aid local emergency planners is preparing for where the oil
might move. The actual movement of oil on any day will depend upon
local wind and tide conditions and oil may not move in exactly the same
way as the water but these kinds of tools can help plan the response.
Real time predictions would require model refinement and additional
monitoring of tides and winds within the estuary. Such `data
assimilation' has been used in other estuaries to support emergency
response as well as restoration planning and operations. Modeling
approaches are available - investments in tool development, data
collection and inshore observing systems are necessary for state of the
art predictions of oil trajectories within shallow, complex estuarine
systems.
Fate and Effects within the Estuary
The potential effects of oiling on coastal wetlands are well
documented and the applicability of various clean up techniques,
including natural remediation, in different situations is relatively
well understood. The most important issue is to ensure that the clean
up approach is tailored to the local conditions - what works in a
wetland in one area may not be appropriate in others.
However, wetlands are only one part of the estuarine ecosystem. In
the open water areas, both on the bay bottoms and in the water column,
oil can be having an effect which is less obvious that the coating of
larger wildlife or marsh grasses. Open waters are a huge component of
the estuarine system and dominate the lower areas, adjacent to the
tidal passes and inlets through which the oil enters. The effect on
lower trophic levels, phytoplankton, algae and zooplankton, and how
these are propagated to higher trophic levels, e.g., fish, must be
evaluated not only through monitoring but by field studies of trophic
interaction. For any specific organism a life cycle approach is
important. This applies to all organisms, but is especially helpful
with organisms such as fish because individuals often show very
dramatic differences between their life stages. A typical fish life
cycle is eggs, yolk-sac larvae, larvae, juveniles, and adults. The
different stages can show major changes in their physiology, behavior,
diets, and habitats utilized - and in susceptibility to oil - with
early life stages being more sensitive.
Existing sampling schemes for routine monitoring of the ecosystem,
e.g., Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries need to be
supplemented to ensure they identify these smaller animals and that
they encompass the variety of habitats currently and potentially
impacted by the oil. In addition, synthesis efforts which refine
understanding of the resilience of these populations to effects of oil
must be used to guide assessment and subsequent restoration.
Data Accessibility and Management
The unprecedented extent of this event and its impact on a variety
of marine and coastal environments has resulted in a massive data
collection effort using a variety of sensors and data collection
techniques. Making these data available, where appropriate given their
use in the official assessment, to interested scientists and
stakeholders would increase understanding of the ever changing effects
and allow a wider range of experts, including university scientists
like myself, to communicate with the public on the effects of the
spill. To make such a varied array of data accessible requires a focus
on data management as well as collection.
Knowing what data is being collected already also allows
researchers to leverage available funding sources to focus on
additional sampling. The Natural Resource Damage Assessment process
calls for `reviewing scientific literature about the released substance
and its impact on trust resources to determine the extent and severity
of injury'. Establishing causality required understanding as well as
data and many excellent scientists are willing and able to contribute
and develop knowledge which can at least be used in future events.
Thank you Madam Chair and members of the Committee. This concludes
my testimony.
______
Ms. Bordallo. I thank you very much, Dr. Reed. And, Dr.
D'Elia, we will hear from you now.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER D'ELIA, PH.D., PROFESSOR AND DEAN,
SCHOOL OF THE COAST AND ENVIRONMENT, LOUISIANA STATE
UNIVERSITY, BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA
Dr. D'Elia. Madame Chair, Ranking Member Cassidy, and
members of the Subcommittee, my name is Chris D'Elia, and I am
a Professor and the Dean of the School of the Coast and
Environment at Louisiana State University. I welcome this
opportunity to be here with you today.
Federal research and monitoring assets are critically
important at this time of national crisis. The academic
community and private sector want to contribute more also.
Universities like LSU depend heavily on Federal funding to
undertake their research. Unfortunately, significant Federal
funding has been slow to materialize as this crisis evolves.
Here are some concerns.
Serious existing gaps exist in observational data needed to
predict the extent and trajectory of the oil spill. The
Integrated Ocean Observing System, IOOS, a Federal, regional,
and private sector partnership for collecting, delivering, and
using such information, needs more Federal funding. The Gulf of
Mexico has, until recently, had very poor coverage by high
frequency or HF radars that provide real-time data on the
direction and strength of surface currents. The NOAA IOOS
Office helped relocate three HF radar units to provide coverage
of a portion of the Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida
continental shelf, but the Louisiana coast, including the
Mississippi Delta region, still has no HF radar coverage. This
is unacceptable.
Large scale regional models are critical to understanding
Gulf circulation, but they are not particularly useful for
near-shore predictions of the fate of oil. LSU scientists have
excellent fine-scale, near-shore, and estuarine models that
need to be adapted and interfaced with regional scale
circulation models of the Gulf. This, of course, takes funding.
I would also like to comment briefly on the adequacy of
pre- and post-impact spill data needed for conducting natural
resource damage assessments. For many years, LSU has occupied
many research sites in the wetlands, coastal embayments and
estuaries along the Louisiana coast. Pre-impact data obtained
at these sites will be extremely useful for spill impact
assessment. We await being informed of a mechanism by which we
can apply for significant Federal funding for continued data
collection. It is nearly two months now since the spill began.
Our assessments are important for recovery of damages from
the spill. However, many scientists believe that important
information must also be obtained outside of this process. One
senior faculty member in my school expressed it as follows: I
haven't much time left in my career, and I would prefer not to
spend it in court. Others have told me that the legal burden
added by the process actually impedes good science and means
that state-of-the-art scientific approaches are not used. And I
think Dr. Reddy was implying that.
Most present research seems to be focused on offshore
concerns pertaining to the fate and effects of oil and
dispersants. These are important concerns, but we must not
forget that the Louisiana coastal environment is particularly
vulnerable and threatened. Louisiana's extensive wetlands
constitute approximately 40 percent of the national total, and
the state is second only to Alaska in terms of seafood
production. We must accelerate our efforts to understand the
impact of this dreadful spill on these living resources.
Louisiana is the focal point of the fertile fisheries
crescent that extends east and west into all or parts of
Mississippi and Texas. We do not know what the effect of oil
and dispersals will be on this food chain, as my colleague
sitting to the right mentioned.
I would offer the following recommendations. We need a
comprehensive spill science plan that includes the academic
community. We do not have one now. Federal agencies need better
ways to get emergency funding to researchers. As someone
mentioned, the National Science Foundation has rapid awards,
which have been extremely valuable, and NOAA also has a sea
grant program, which has program development awards.
Such emergency programs need more resources. As of June 11,
a search on www.grants.gov did not return any results for oil
spill. This seems remarkable to me. Communication with and
within the academic community should be enhanced. EPA
Administrator Jackson did come down to meet with us early on,
which we appreciated greatly. I recommend that more such
contact occurs with more communiques from agency leaders to
university leaders and scientists.
Ship time is difficult to find, schedule, and pay for.
Better coordination mechanisms would be very helpful. Human
impacts have received inadequate attention at the Federal
level. More attention needs to be paid to those. Finally, we
need new ways to finance sustained research and observation on
the inevitable conflicts between energy and environment. A
Federal Gulf oil trust should be established. Senator Landrieu
has recently introduced legislation to allow Gulf Coast states
to share the revenue from offshore oil and natural gas
drilling. I think that and other mechanisms should be
considered.
Thank you for your attention. I would be pleased to answer
any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. D'Elia follows:]
Statement of Dr. Christopher F. D'Elia, Ph.D., Professor and Dean,
School of the Coast and Environment, Louisiana State University
Chairwoman Bordallo and members of the Subcommittee, my name is
Christopher F. D'Elia, and I am a Professor and the Dean of the School
of the Coast and Environment at Louisiana State University. I welcome
this opportunity to be with you today to testify about the gaps and
limits in our understanding of the complex estuarine, coastal, and
marine environments of the Gulf, and especially, how limited
investments in coastal ocean science programs and ocean observation
systems affect capabilities for NOAA and other Federal agencies to
provide timely and accurate scientific information to target response
activities and to assess damages to natural resources.
You have asked me to provide my perspectives on the existing gaps
in observation data needed to predict the extent and trajectory of the
oil spill, including information about subsurface plumes; the adequacy
of pre- and post-impact spill data needed for conducting natural
resource damage assessments; and additional data required to understand
the impact of the oil spill on the marine environment.
Federal personnel and their research and monitoring assets are
critically important at this time of national crisis, and agencies like
the Coast Guard, NOAA, USGS, and EPA have been challenged by the
complexity and magnitude of this spill. Moreover, the Federal
Government plays a critical role in funding extramural research and
monitoring.
The academic community and private sector's potential contributions
to understanding an event as complex as this are enormous. Non-Federal
partners such as universities like LSU depend heavily on federal
funding to undertake their research and monitoring efforts.
Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons that funding, regardless of
source, has been slow to materialize as this crisis evolves. Before I
elaborate further on that, let me address the issues that you asked me
to comment on.
Existing Gaps in Observation Data Needed to Predict the Extent and
Trajectory of the Oil Spill
One of the greatest challenges faced is predicting the extent and
trajectory of the oil leaking from the seabed. Doing so requires
synoptic and real-time physical oceanographic and meteorological
information, in tandem with robust satellite observations and
simulation modeling. The Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS) is a
federal, regional, and private-sector partnership for collecting,
delivering, and using such information. IOOS provides essential data
and information needed for predicting the extent and trajectory of the
spill. IOOS is a prime example of the value added by academic and
private sector entities that receive support from Federal agencies. The
IOOS community, like many others, has been rallying to aid the response
effort. Despite the best efforts of all involved, there is still a
critical lack of actual data for the surface and subsurface conditions
in the Gulf that dictate the fate of the oil. A well-designed network
of sustained observations in real-time is critical to providing the
data needed for forecasts that guide the work of responders. Later,
these same data will provide critical baseline information that will be
an essential component during the restoration process.
Unfortunately, the Gulf of Mexico has, until recently, had very
poor coverage for measurements of currents and meteorological
conditions. For example, high frequency (HF) radars, which provide real
time data on the direction and strength of surface currents, are
unavailable in Louisiana coastal waters. In response to the spill
disaster, the University of Mississippi, with assistance from the NOAA
IOOS Office and Scripps Institution of Oceanography, recently re-
deployed 3 high-frequency radar (HF radar) units. However, these
systems provide coverage of only a portion of the Mississippi/Alabama/
Florida continental shelf. The Louisiana coast, including the
Mississippi Delta region, still has no HF radar coverage! This data gap
needs to be filled as soon as possible. The lack of this information is
jeopardizing the Louisiana oil containment efforts. Considering that
the port of South Louisiana (New Orleans/Baton Rouge) is the largest
bulk cargo port in the world and the Louisiana coast is the location of
the majority of drilling for oil and gas in the U.S., this expenditure
by the federal government is well justified and long overdue. With the
onset of hurricane season, a robust suite of HF radar systems is needed
especially in the region around the Mississippi delta. In addition, the
redeployed HR radar units along the Miss/Al/Fla coast should be made
permanent. There are also other technologies for measuring and
monitoring ocean conditions critical to understand the fate of the oil
that can and should be deployed.
At the request of the NOAA IOOS Office, SECOORA and GCOOS have been
working with their numerous partners in academia and industry on a
strategy for mapping and monitoring the subsurface plume and for
providing observations for the initialization, validation and
assimilation of the available circulation models. This provides the
Incident Command Center with one high-level strategy that represents
the input from multiple institutions and players.
Regional ocean circulation models operated by researchers at Texas
A&M and the University of South Florida are now accessed daily by the
Federal Incident Command Center. NRL and NOAA operate similar models
but as the experience of the National Weather Service in predicting
hurricanes has shown, ensemble modeling improves forecasts and
predictions. I understand that such ensemble models are in development.
Circulation models provide enhanced understanding of how currents, such
as the Loop Current and its eddies, winds, river plumes, and other
salinity patterns and temperature regimes will influence the fate of
the oil. More alternative models by different teams of investigators
would increase the robustness of plume forecasts.
While large-scale regional models are critical to understanding the
circulation of the Gulf, in deep water, these models are not
particularly useful for near-shore predictions of the fate of oil, such
as in Barataria Bay, Breton Sound or the numerous other estuaries along
the northern Gulf of Mexico coastline. Here, LSU scientists are able to
provide considerable expertise based on their long-term observations of
coastal processes and as well as their experience with near-shore and
estuarine models in these areas.
The northern Gulf communities deserve the best possible real-time
satellite images showing the location of oil especially in near-shore
regions. The satellite data are useful for indicating the presence of
oil. However, aerial overflights are also essential to resolve
adequately the details of oil thickness and identify coastal areas at
greatest risk. This information is currently not being provided to
local responders in a timely manner. According to BP, such coverage by
aerial surveys is too much of an expense! The government should demand
this information with daily updates. These data are essential in tandem
with real-time currents from the HF radar systems for predicting inner
shelf trajectories of oil that are currently and will continue to
impact our barrier islands and enter through tidal channels to
adversely affect Louisiana's environmentally sensitive shallow bays and
marshlands.
The Earth Scan Laboratory (ESL), the WAVCIS Program, and the
Coastal Studies Institute Field Support Group, all in the School of the
Coast and Environment at LSU, currently provide some of the data
essential to the real-time tracking of the oil from the BP-Deepwater
Horizon drilling accident allowing short-term predictions as to
trajectories of the oil in various sectors of our coast. The Earth Scan
Lab has three antennas which give it access to real-time satellite
coverage many times each day of the Gulf of Mexico using several
sensors (MODIS, GOES-East, AVHRR). These data have been used to reveal
the spatial extent of the oil, its motion, and the motion of the Loop
Current and its eddies. They are provided on the ESL web site in near
real-time (www.esl.lsu.edu) and archived at the ESL for time-series
studies. In addition, the ESL staff has been using radar (SAR) data
obtained daily from the University of Miami CSTARS lab, augmenting
capabilities for detecting oil across the Gulf. The satellite coverage
has been an essential component of the response to this spill. However,
the satellite data could be more useful with validation, which has been
almost impossible for LSU researchers to obtain.
The WAVCIS system provides real-time met-ocean data at eight
stations along the Louisiana coast. Coupling of remote sensing and
physical data into numerical coastal models could improve the
prediction of the path and fate of the oil. Each WAVCIS station
collects data on wind speed and direction, wave height and period, and
current speed and direction among other parameters. These data are
telemetered by satellite link back to a central processing station at
LSU and the data are made available in a web-based format in near real-
time. In addition, the WAVCIS program boasts a highly sophisticated
suite of hydrodynamic models that have proven very useful in tracking
and predicting future migration of the oil slick. In addition, WAVCIS
models are used to provide a series of predictions including an 84-hour
wave forecast and a 120-hour surface current forecast (see: http://
wavcis.csi.lsu.edu/forecasts/forecasts.asp?modelspec=currents).
With such sophisticated data-collection systems it is absolutely
essential to have high quality technical support during the current oil
spill period. Sustained Federal funding is necessary for us to continue
to provide essential services such as ESL and WAVCIS. Current Federal
appropriations do not provide sufficient resources for us to meet our
needs, and we are unaware of any Federal program that can provide
necessary support.
The Adequacy of Pre- and Post-Impact Spill Data Needed for Conducting
Natural Resource Damage Assessments (NRDA)
For many years, LSU has occupied numerous research sites in
wetlands, estuaries and embayments all along the Louisiana coast. For
example, the Shell/LSU Breton Sound Ecosystem Project of the Northern
Gulf Institute includes data collection from a variety of platforms and
sensors. The pre-impact data obtained at those sites will undoubtedly
be extremely useful for spill impact assessment for NRDA and to
understand the unexpected consequences, and for other purposes. We
emphasize that it is critical that our research at these sites continue
and be adapted to monitor conditions as the spill progresses, as clean
up efforts are undertaken, and throughout the ensuing recovery phase.
It is essential to understand the resilience of Louisiana's coastal
ecosystems to an event like the BP 2010 oil spill, because of the
critical role these ecosystems have in sustaining seafood harvests and
in providing essential habitat for wildlife. We are waiting to be
informed of a mechanism by which we can apply for significant Federal
funding to support our work, although we are told to expect
opportunities shortly. It is nearly two months now since the spill
began.
The NRDA assessments are obviously an important focus of the
Administration for the recovery of damages from the spill. However,
many scientists I have talked to express concern that important
information must also be obtained outside of the NRDA process. One
senior faculty member in my School expressed it as follows: ``I haven't
that much time left in my career, and I would prefer not to spend it in
court. I would rather be working in the field doing my research on
behalf of future generations.''
The baseline to measure change and impacts is slipping away with
each day and week that supplemental funds are absent, or that adaptive
and focused new initiatives are stalled. The environmental, social and
economic insults have come quickly (months), but the results will be
here for decades. If we are to truly learn from this disaster, then we
need to know much more about the pre-existing conditions and the
transition as the spill progresses. We cannot start this in December -
it needs to begin immediately.
Additional Data Required to Understand the Impact of the Oil Spill on
the Marine Environment
Most of the research, monitoring and modeling that is now being
conducted seems to be focused on offshore concerns pertaining to the
fate and effects of oil and dispersant. Considerable attention has been
paid to determining the location and magnitude of deep-sea plumes of
oil and dispersant. While these are important concerns, particularly
since dispersants have been used in unprecedented ways and amounts, we
must not forget that the Louisiana coastal environment is particularly
vulnerable and threatened. Since Louisiana's extensive wetlands
constitute approximately 40% of the national total, and the State is
second only to Alaska in terms of seafood production, we need to
accelerate our efforts to understand the impacts of this dreadful spill
on living resources from the continental shelf to coastal wetlands.
Louisiana is the focal point of the ``Fertile Fisheries Crescent''
that extends east and west into all or parts of Mississippi and Texas.
Important fishery species include: oysters, brown and white shrimp,
Gulf menhaden, blue crabs, king mackerel (offshore), red snapper,
amberjack, cobia, dolphin fish, grouper, tuna/swordfish (offshore),
spotted seatrout, and red drum. These species support economically
important commercial and recreational fisheries as well as the human
communities that depend on them in many ways - for employment, tourism,
marinas, charter boats, seafood industries, etc.
Additionally, the above species depend on the ``forage fishes''
near the base of food webs such as Gulf menhaden and bay anchovy. Loss
of these species would have serious implications for the entire food
web. At present, we have little firm information on the status of these
fish stocks vis-a-vis the oil spill.
Habitat concerns are also important and growing. Louisiana
estuaries provide spawning, nursery and rearing (grow out) habitat for
a huge array of estuarine-dependent species that migrate and spread to
populate coastal systems across the northern Gulf of Mexico.
Louisiana's most important fishery habitat asset is its expansive
coastal wetland system with an extensive marsh-edge shoreline that
provides foraging (feeding) and refuge (shelter) sites for the early
life history stages of commercial and sport fisheries and forage
species. The marsh edge is highly vulnerable to oiling and resulting
damage to its nursery function will form a bottleneck for the
recruitment of virtually all of our most important species into adult
populations. Up to 90% of our important species use our marshes and
estuaries at some point in their life cycles.
The open waters of the Gulf of Mexico are also important for many
estuarine-dependent species and for offshore species. Offshore food
webs are potentially affected by Deepwater Horizon plumes, but this has
yet to be studied. The Gulf of Mexico is the only spawning area for the
heavily depleted Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna and the Gulf is an area
of concentration of swordfish and marlin. While the densities of
organisms may be lower in open waters than in other habitats, this
translates into many numbers of organisms because of the volume of the
open water habitat.
Life histories of species found in affected waters must also be
considered. The longevity of a species relates to how risky its
reproduction is. Short-lived species can complete their life cycles in
1 to 3 years. Because they are dependent on good and bad spawning
years, their population sizes are quite variable from year to year.
These species are highly productive but the fisheries associated with
them are volatile as well, tracking good and bad years of spawning.
Thus, additional mortality from external sources could accentuate the
volatility.
Longer-lived species may not mature for five years or more and may
live for 20-50 years. When unexploited, they can withstand a run of
poor years of reproduction until conditions are right. However, long-
lived species are also vulnerable to fishery impacts and in the Gulf of
Mexico red snapper and a number of other long-lived species have been
depleted and are under heavy management regimes. Accordingly,
additional sources of mortality will dissipate the management benefits.
For these long-lived species, the effects of high mortality years or
low recruitment (due to oil) will leave a gap in the age structure of
their populations. So if we lose the next 3-5 or more years of
reproduction due to oil, there will be a long period of lowered egg
production as these impacted year-classes make their way through the
age-structure.
In extremis, large-scale recruitment failures could lead to long-
term and serious changes in coastal ecosystems. It is possible for a
``state change'' to occur, for example. What is now a highly productive
system in terms of fisheries and wildlife could become one dominated by
microbial processes that are less capable of sustaining fish and
shellfish species that coastal residents depend on in so many ways. I
can only speculate here about this prospect, but it must be considered.
Habitat damage in Louisiana is likely to have severe effects on the
reproductive success of both short- and long-lived species, but short-
lived species like brown, white shrimp, blue crabs, seatrout and forage
fishes (including bay anchovy and Gulf menhaden) are likely to suffer
immediate population declines that will affect fisheries and the entire
food web until estuaries and marshes recover from smothering and toxic
effects of the Deepwater Horizon event. I have heard several fisheries
scientists comment that herring have still not recovered in Prince
William Sound more than 20 years after the Exxon Valdez spill. Will
similar situations develop in the Fertile Fisheries Crescent?
We know that there are a number of possible exposure pathways that
must be researched and quantified. Direct exposure may occur when fish
swim through any concentration of dissolved or suspended petroleum
constituents. Gill breathing animals like fish exchange gases and
solutes with their environment across gill surface areas that appear
small but are actually large compared the entire surface area of their
bodies. Gill damage imperils respiration and gill uptake results in a
body load that may have lethal or sub-lethal effects. Sub-lethal
effects could seriously reduce a fish's viability or probability of
reproductive success. The mix of individual contaminants may be at low
concentrations and have only minor impacts, but the combined effects of
different petroleum constituents, dispersants, and other contaminants
may be more than additive (i.e., synergistic). The Deepwater Horizon
Event is clearly adding many kinds of contaminants to the environment.
Many scientists have urged that there be full disclosure of the
composition of chemical compounds and mixtures used in dispersing
spills such as Corexit 9500.
Fishes may suffer from indirect exposure that may also result from
ingestion of contaminant-exposed prey. Fishes feeding on contaminated
prey can accumulate an additional body load to that acquired from
direct exposure. Contamination of food webs is likely to change the
species composition of open water and estuarine fish communities.
Sensitive species will diminish in population size and reduce prey
availability to higher trophic levels. Thus, indirect effects of the
Deepwater Horizon event could be spreading though the food web in
unforeseen ways.
The timing of this event is troubling. Had it occurred during the
winter, one would have expected less potential impact. Unfortunately,
it has occurred during a season when many species are reproducing or
migrating, and during which primary productivity (photosynthesis) is
high. We do not know what if any, effects this spill will have on
fundamental ecosystem processes such as energy flow and nutrient
cycling. Fortunately, ongoing studies on these processes have been
conducted in this region for years, but sampling frequency and
geographic coverage should be increased markedly in spill-affected
areas.
Because oil is a mixture of organic compounds that are subject to
microbial processes such as respiration that consumes oxygen, there are
other implications as well. Susceptibility of shelf waters to hypoxia
is well known. Whether the added burden of the metabolism of the extra
organic material represented by oil and dispersants is going to
exacerbate hypoxia is unknown.
Other Considerations
Sitting on the sidelines and taking potshots at BP and Federal
agencies is now accepted practice by many. One can easily understand
why a mounting feeling of hopelessness has developed that leads to this
happening. I prefer instead to make some constructive suggestions here
about what might be done to improve our knowledge about the spill, its
fate, its effects, and the ability of the environment to assimilate
hydrocarbons and recover.
1. My foremost concern is that the academic research community
has the potential of making considerable contributions beyond
what it is now making. The biggest obstacle to this happening
is funding. One Federal agency we approached told us that BP
had funds for research, and we should check there first. In
Louisiana, tight State finances have left LSU with frozen
budgets and little flexibility to support research internally.
I have heard anecdotally from several faculty members that they
are taking a chance and charging some of their research
expenses to their own personal credit card accounts, hoping to
be eventually reimbursed. Federal agencies need to have better
mechanisms to get emergency funding to researchers. Only the
National Science Foundation seems to do this effectively via
RAPID awards, but even NSF's hands are tied because of
budgetary constraints as the end of the fiscal year approaches.
NOAA's Sea Grant program does have funding available for
``program development'' awards, but the amount of funding
available is woefully inadequate for the tasks at hand. As of
June 11, a search on www.grants.gov did not return any results
for ``oil spill.'' This seems remarkable to me.
2. Communication with the academic community should be
enhanced. EPA Administrator Jackson did come meet with LSU
faculty early on, which we greatly appreciated. It took nearly
a month after the spill before other Federal agency leaders
made a concerted joint effort to engage academic scientists and
engineers in the Gulf. On June 3, NOAA, NSF and USGS sent high-
level officials to participate in a meeting organized by the
Consortium for Ocean Leadership at the LSU Lod Cook Center.
This meeting was highly successful, very informative, and
helped the academic community understand better the challenges
faced by Federal agencies as they continue to confront the
spill and its impacts. I hope that other such meetings follow,
and that more frequent communiques with university research
leaders ensue. President Obama has appointed a team of
extremely talented scientists to lead many Federal agencies,
and they need all the support that can be provided from the
White House and us in academe.
3. Ship time is difficult to find. This is quite
understandable. Virtually all Federally supported research
vessels are presently being fully utilized. Ships are
expensive, and the only alternative to using Federally
supported ships would be to charter ships from the private
sector or abroad. It is not clear where the funding to do that
would come from. In any case, again better communication
mechanisms would help in making sure that if ships do become
available, or berths on scheduled cruises are open, the
appropriate opportunities can be conveyed to prospective users.
4. In my opinion, human health impacts (both in terms of
exposure from sea food, air quality from the ``controlled''
burns, as well as the health of the response workers) have
received inadequate attention at the Federal level. Again, I
have heard rumors that major announcements are on the way, but
with every day that passes, important baseline health data are
not collected.
5. In my view, it is time to consider new ways in which
sustained funding can be brought to bear with respect to
researching and monitoring the inevitable conflicts between
energy and environment. It appears that offshore drilling will
need to resume fairly soon, or the U.S. will be in an ever-
worsening economic crisis due to a shortage of liquid fuel and
an increasingly large balance of trade problem - something
noted very clearly by the U.S. Military's ``Joint Operating
Environment 2010'' report. In my view, there should be a
Federal Gulf Oil Trust established using federal oil and gas
royalties from the Gulf, and perhaps fuel taxes as well. Sen.
Mary Landrieu, D-La., has recently introduced legislation to
allow Gulf Coast states to share 37.5 percent of the revenue
from offshore oil and natural gas drilling. This is one
possible approach. Some of this revenue could be directed to
enhance research on oil drilling and production safety issues,
on the environmental effects of this drilling and production,
and on gaining a better understanding of Gulf of Mexico
environment. There are other possibilities as well. The Land
and Water Conservation Fund receives about $900 million from
revenues from offshore oil and gas development. However, those
funds are subject to Congressional Appropriation, which has
ranged from zero funding (FY00-02) to as high as $369 million
in 1979. This year's appropriation is just $38 million. The
LWCF program provides matching grants to States and local
governments for the acquisition and development of public
outdoor recreation areas and facilities, which is very
important. It would be great if the Land and Water Conservation
Fund Act could be amended so that some of those funds could
also be appropriated for coastal observing systems.
6. Directed federal funding should be provided to follow up on
the emergency funding, such as NOAA's Cooperative Institutes,
which many regard as highly successful models. Centers of
collaboration that bring together academic, government and even
industry scientists and engineers would foster better
communication and lead to better synthesis and integration of
our interdisciplinary knowledge.
Thank you for your attention. I would be pleased to answer your
questions.
______
Response to questions submitted for the record by Christopher D'Elia,
Professor and Dean, School of the Coast and Environment, Louisiana
State University
Questions from Chairwoman Madeline Z. Bordallo (D-GU)
1. How has the Federal government engaged with independent scientists
to enhance modeling of the oil spill and to improve pre-spill
and post-spill ecosystem assessments?
We are unaware if Federal scientists have engaged academic
scientists, but they have clearly engaged consulting companies to get
field and logistical support for data collection and analysis. We do
not know of any modeler affiliated with a university that was supported
by the Federal government outside the NRDA process to help with the oil
spill modeling. We have worked with NOAA/NGI to develop some research
questions related to oil spill modeling, although funding has yet to be
identified.
The focus has also been on fate of the oil and dispersants, and now
is moving towards ecosystem issues. However, there is no clearly
articulated Federal science plan that includes academic researchers and
takes advantage of their modeling expertise.
The academic community has the capability to make great
contributions to modeling the spill both in computational power and
understanding of oceanographic processes. The northern Gulf of Mexico
is graced with highly acclaimed academicians capable of hydrodynamic,
biological and ecological modeling, and this resource should be used
extensively.
______
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Dr. D'Elia, for your
comments and your recommendations. And I will now recognize
members, beginning with myself, for any questions that we may
wish to ask.
First, I would like to begin with you. And I do want to say
this of this panel. I appreciate your honesty. It has been very
refreshing. We know the problems. We have heard the problems,
and you admit to them. And so we will take it from there.
Dr. Reddy, following up with my question to Dr. McNutt
earlier, after the containment dome failed, did BP recontact
scientists from Woods Hole to take flow measurements, yes or
no?
Dr. Reddy. From my knowledge, no.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Also, Dr. Reddy, do flow
measurement technologies exist that can be used to estimate the
total spill volume from this oil spill?
Dr. Reddy. The technologies that have been used so far have
been modified from other previous knowledge, I believe. I do
not believe there is a known set-in-place technology that is
used for such questions. But that is a little bit outside my
expertise.
Ms. Bordallo. I see. Well, how quickly can these
measurements be made, and do you think these measurements could
have been made without interfering with response and recovery
activities?
Dr. Reddy. I believe the numbers that Dr. McNutt has put
together as part of her working group are pretty robust. They
include--what is particularly interesting from them is that
they have come from a variety of different angles, and they
seem to be all in the same ballpark. And the values that my
colleagues collected more recently on a vessel, on a BP vessel,
I think are particularly strong.
I would like to make one comment on these estimates. We are
never going to get a number that is 53.5 or anything like that.
My personal opinion is if we can nail down an estimate in the
ballpark of within a factor of two or a factor of three,
considering all of the other uncertainties that are in play
with this very large event, I think that would be a sound
number.
Ms. Bordallo. Why is it important to have an estimate of
the total volume of oil released into the environment?
Dr. Reddy. From a scientific perspective, we want to have a
mass balance. To take that out of scientific jargon, that is
essentially we want to balance our checkbook. We want to know
where all the oil went. We want to know what got biodegraded,
what evaporated, what may have gone into the sediments, what
have gone into the marshes. So, in a couple of years, when we
start to look at all of this data comprehensively with a team
of interdisciplinary scientists, we will want to start looking
closely where everything is, kind of have our own little, for
lack of a better term, boxes of where oil was, and we will
hopefully try to balance this checkbook. If we don't know how
much came out, then we may be missing something.
Ms. Bordallo. Dr. Weisberg, it is clear that the worst case
scenario for an oil spill is now much worse than previously
imagined. Can you suggest how the Federal Government and
scientists could better respond to events of this scale and
complexity?
Dr. Weisberg. Thank you. I will try to respond to that.
There was a comment made earlier that had we had enough
resources in place based on previous experience, then perhaps
we wouldn't be in the position we are in right now. And so I
think we have to respond with that in mind. There is an
immediate crisis right now that obviously requires being dealt
with. But we have to lay down for the future resources so that
we can deal with crises like this better into the future.
Ms. Bordallo. Ms. Lee, do we have enough economic and
social data to adequately assess the impacts of lost use and
access to natural resources?
Ms. Lee. We have sufficient--well, let me say this. We have
a substantial body of data. In terms of lost uses, the kinds of
things that you would be looking at is you would be looking at
bookings and what has been canceled. And what is different
about this spill, this is an area where we probably have more
information than we did in other spills, so it is one bright
light in terms of the assessment. Because people have booked
more on the Internet, it is easier to see a change from
baseline, if you will.
So, in terms of lost use, as far as things like recreation,
yes, we have better data than we have in prior spills. With
respect to things like lost uses for fishery resources and so
on, no, we don't because we need to know changes in populations
and have a sense of how it is going to affect the industries
over the longer term. And there it gets back to the scientific
data that people have been talking about, the experts here at
this table, which is to try to collect information so that we
can see a change.
A lot has been said about baseline. I take a slightly
different perspective on baseline. I believe you can show
injury without knowing exactly what was there before, and you
do that by virtue of showing where the oil is, what has been
exposed to the oil, and then considering toxicity. Now, we
definitely need more toxicity studies, but we also can collect
information that is out there in the literature and bring it
together. And that is where the scientific community is
incredibly important.
So, with respect to those lost human uses, we have a lot of
work to do.
Ms. Bordallo. I also have another question for you. You
state in your testimony, and I quote, ``The law cannot achieve
a compensation to make the public truly whole.'' Can you please
elaborate on this statement?
Ms. Lee. I believe that the damages are so huge on this,
were we to truly evaluate it, that there is probably not enough
money to actually pay for it. And also, there are certain
fundamentals that really can't be compensated with money.
Fundamentally, the question is can we restore the environment
and bring it back so that the fishermen can fish and lives can
be put back together. And the answer is the jury is still out
on that, no pun intended.
So, when I look at the law, I see that the most important
thing that we all could do, at least among us here at this
table, is to focus on the fundamentals of science, the focus on
the fundamentals of technical analysis, and put our energy in
tasks toward trying to get it better. The Justice Department
can attempt to address the injury in terms of economic value,
but I have been told by an economist once before that which is
priceless is valueless. And unfortunately, we are almost in
that situation.
I truly am worried about the Gulf. I am less worried about
how much money the government might collect. I am more worried
about can we direct our resources to the place it needs to be
to put back the lives of the people on the Gulf Coast, the
industry, and the ecosystem.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. We have a panel of scientists
here, all experts in their field. When they talk about it, and
you read about this oil spill, they say, well, the recovery
will be a decade, several decades, many decades. Can anybody
answer? I know we can't put a firm number on this, but will it
be many, many decades before all is at least partially normal?
Dr. Reddy. May I respond?
Ms. Bordallo. Yes.
Dr. Reddy. I believe, and I heard this morning somebody say
that recovery would be a very, very long time. It is my opinion
that any estimate at this point beyond what we see on the short
term and perhaps some estimates in terms of what we are seeing,
any type of quantifier is scientifically imprudent, and it
frustrates me to hear them do so. We will have a much better
perspective about the long-term impacts of this spill as data
comes along and where experts get to sit down from a variety of
different disciplines to get an idea and a perspective.
This is by no means giving BP a free pass at all. And then
we also have to put this in the context of scale. We often hear
people talk very, very long, long time, and they put it in the
context of the whole Gulf of Mexico. It is quite possible that
there will be impacts for a long time, but they may be in small
aspects of the ecosystem.
So, I would say at this time, let us slow down, let us
collect the data, let us be prudent, and in the pipeline we
will be able to have much more robust estimates.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Dr. Reddy. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. And now I would like to turn it over to the
Ranking Member, Mr. Cassidy.
Mr. Cassidy. Thank you all for your testimony. I just
whispered to staff that we are going to go on a bipartisan
basis to try and have some of that BP money that we are going
to put in escrow, fund proactive research that will be put out
on an NSF rapid response, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So,
thank you. You have informed me. And I am so confident. I
mention it here because I am so confident that Chairwoman
Bordallo will support that.
Also, Dr. Weisberg, I promise you that Dr. D'Elia also
believes in earmarks, and has also assured me that they can be
really good things, and so I have heard from my own
constituents.
I am a doctor. I am actually on faculty with LSU Medical
School. I am an academic. I know that oftentimes we as
researchers hold our data. We don't release it because we want
to make the big splash at the meeting. One thing Michael J. Fox
did, which I thought was very wise in health care, is when he
started his foundation to promote research into Parkinson's
disease, he demanded that it be released real time. It may be a
little dirty, it may not be quite where it should be, but it is
not going to be encumbered for three years while it is kind of
polished and goes to a meeting.
Now let me ask you, in your field, in your academia, is
data typically impounded? I have learned from Dr. D'Elia, from
his colleagues, that some of them have data on the Exxon Valdez
which has still not been released because of threat of court
order. Let me ask you, what solutions do we have so there can
be real-time release? If we are successful at getting money for
proactive research, credit yourself for putting the idea there.
But second, let me ask the whole panel, what do we do that we
know that that research has the maximal impact upon the ability
of the Gulf to heal itself. One, is it a problem in your area
of academia? And two, how do we address it? Dr. Weisberg?
Dr. Weisberg. Well, you know, I mentioned IOOS on several
occasions, and one of the hallmarks of IOOS is that the data be
open access.
Mr. Cassidy. And IOOS, what is an IOOS? I am sorry.
Dr. Weisberg. The Integrated Ocean Observing System that
was originally promoted by Ocean.US and endorsed by the U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy. And so, yes, we share your concern,
and that was a part of the IOOS concept, open-access data. My
experience so far with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill has been
whatever I have produced has gone out on the Internet, and has
gone in briefing Power Points to anybody that I thought could
use this, but my information flow has been a one-way street. I
have not gotten information back that I think is critical.
Mr. Cassidy. Back from whom?
Dr. Weisberg. From any of the agencies.
Mr. Cassidy. Now I heard earlier one of our speakers--I
think it was one of the women--mentioned that NOAA has been
putting stuff out, or maybe you, Dr. Reddy--that NOAA has been
putting out stuff real time. Let me ask you in the context of
that, continue, Dr. Weisberg.
Dr. Weisberg. Yes. So, one of the things that I have been
doing specifically is providing spill trajectories at the
surface and also attempting to do subsurface tracking, not
knowing where the oil may be. We use satellite imagery
interpretations of where the oil is to reinitialize on a daily
basis the location of the oil, without which these forecasts
are useless.
On a cloudy day, we have no satellite imagery. The unified
command, they have overflights; they have a lot of other access
to information on where the oil is, and yet there is not any
provision to provide that information to people like me. And so
one of my immediate suggestions in my written testimony is that
be provided immediately so that we, any of us, that are engaged
in spill trajectory forecasts can provide more accurate
products. That is one example.
Mr. Cassidy. Dr. Reed, you spoke of--I think it was you
that spoke of the GEO. Again, I am learning. So, I am not
asking you questions to challenge you. I am asking you
questions to learn. The GEO doesn't have this data in adequate
amount? Help me out here.
Dr. Reed. Yesterday, NOAA announced a website called
geoplatform.gov, where you can go and see a variety of data
related to this event. It includes images from NASA. It
includes the surveys on the ground from the SCAT teams about
where they have seen oil and where they haven't seen oil. It
includes information that is being put together in terms of
supporting the response. It is a geospatial platform. You go in
and you see maps, and you use different layers.
You can't actually access the data, though. You can see it,
but you can't actually have it and take it and put it in your
computer and analyze it in a different way, which is what
would--that would be a database that would----
Mr. Cassidy. Michael J. Fox would say put the data out
there so you can download the database and you can play with
it.
Dr. Reed. Yeah. And I understand that that is in process at
the moment. I had some discussions with NOAA on this, and I do
believe that is in process. But that really needs to be moved
out as quickly as possible so that we can do analysis. We can
assist with understanding what is going on. There is so much
going on that we can't just rely on the government scientists
to do everything. We have to be able to play our role, too. And
so making that data accessible is going to be important.
I do recognize, though, that some of the data that is being
collected is going to be kept aside as part of the official
assessment, and that may not be available. But there is a huge
amount of data collection out there that is guiding response,
as opposed to really establishing this legal baseline that we
could really use.
Mr. Cassidy. Are we going to have a second round? We are
going to have a second round of questions. I will yield back
and come back to a couple more.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman, and now I would like
to ask for unanimous consent that the gentleman from Florida,
Congressman Gus Bilirakis, be allowed to join us on the dais
for this hearing. And hearing no objections, so ordered. And I
would like to now recognize the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you so much, Madame Chair. I really
appreciate it, and I apologize for being late. Some of these
questions may have been asked, but I feel that they are
important. So, I would like to begin by again thanking the
panelists for your excellent, informative testimony, and a
special welcome to Dr. Weisberg from the University of South
Florida. While not directly from my district, Dr. Weisberg, in
conjunction with USF, an institution that I have long admired
and endeavored to assist, has been very helpful to me, in
particular, by coming to my office and personally briefing me,
as well as taking the time to consistently brief members of my
staff. Thank you, Doctor.
I thank you for sharing your knowledge and your expertise.
And really, this is the crux of my question, the sharing of
information. It is irrefutable that you alone at USF were the
first person, hours after the tragic explosion of the Deepwater
Horizon rig, to engage instruments you already had placed out
in the field. These are the same instruments that you had
deployed as far back as 1993 to help set up your numerical
calculation models. As I understand it, you have been prodding
NOAA and other government agencies for years to be better
prepared for scenarios just like the one we are facing today.
Since April 21st, 2010, you have shared your information
with government agencies. Has the government reciprocated by
sharing information that they have gathered? In your testimony,
you say that data gaps abound. You suggested that satellite
data could be supplemented by other means. And again, a quote,
``ground truth.'' But again, that information has not been
shared with me, with you, as I understand. That is
disconcerting to me.
Who is not sharing the data that can better assist you to
help fight this environmental and economic nightmare? What can
Congress do to compel the sharing of information and to make
sure that the new data exists? If you can answer that question,
I would appreciate it very much.
Dr. Weisberg. Thank you. That is a tough one to answer, but
I will, and I will try to be very candid, and we will see where
this goes. First of all, I was involved from day one. However,
I am sure I was not the only one, so let me just make it very
clear there have been a lot of people involved, and I am one of
them. And I happen to have an excellent staff and some
resources in place that allowed me to do that, and I am very
thankful for that.
However, my group has received absolutely no resources from
day one. So, we are doing this out of professional
responsibility. And I feel that if I am privileged enough to be
a professor at a university and to be engaged in what I do,
then I have a responsibility to respond as best I can. So, that
is what I did.
I have been frustrated from the beginning that the flow of
information has not been as good as I would like it to be. And
in particular, the reinitialization of these trajectory models
with actual oil locations. As I said, all I have available to
me are the analyses that my gifted colleagues can do at USF in
identifying in satellite images where oil may be. It is not an
easy task.
Nobody has asked my recommendations on where overflights
should go. There has been no discussion whatsoever between
anyone in my group as to how maybe we can assist better. And
therefore, I am frustrated that I think I can do a better job
of what I am doing if there was some information flow to me,
and that has not occurred 57 days into this tragedy. That is a
pretty strong statement, but I think it is important to make.
As far as other observations go, we have heard today about
high frequency radar. And I have made a point in my testimony
to say that there is no single instrument system that is
adequate. There is no single model that is adequate. This is a
complex problem. This is very broad. This is not a problem for
NOAA, not a problem for the EPA, not a problem for the MMS.
This is a universal problem, and we have to begin approaching
it in a more comprehensive manner. Otherwise, we are just not
going to understand how our systems work. And if we don't
understand how our systems work, we cannot project well into
the future as to what the results of this crisis might be.
So, we have to reevaluate how we do our science in the
coastal ocean for the betterment of society. I hope that at
least begins to answer your question.
Mr. Bilirakis. What if I help facilitate that information
flow with the united command in St. Petersburg. Would that be
helpful?
Dr. Weisberg. Yes, it would.
Mr. Bilirakis. Very good. Thank you. A couple more
questions, if I may, Madame Chair. In your testimony, Dr.
Weisberg, you say, and I quote, ``Scoping out the nature of a
potential subsurface threat as quickly as possible is necessary
for contingency planning and possible mitigation.'' Tell me why
that is important. We have heard all along that the unified
command, which includes BP, Coast Guard, NOAA, EPA, and
Interior, say that the flow rate of the oil coming out of the
wellhead is irrelevant because they are treating this as a
worst case scenario. Does the oil flow matter at this juncture,
and how should we be responding to the disaster? And other
members of the panel are welcome to join in as well. But first
you, Doctor.
Dr. Weisberg. Well, let me treat the last question first. I
think the flow rate does matter, if for no other reason than to
have been prepared with a surface vessel that can capture more
than 15,000 barrels per day. If they know it was 25,000 barrels
per day, then why didn't they have a surface vessel brought in
that could handle 25,000 barrels per day?
But getting back to subsurface oil, the ocean circulation
and the whole organization of ecology is a fully three-
dimensional problem. For example, as oil is now approaching
Florida, and it has started to hit northwest Florida beaches,
we know that the region of the continental shelf break where
the depth all of a sudden drops off into the abyss--we know
that that is a very sensitive region for all of our reef fish.
In fact, that is where the gag grouper live as adults, and that
is where they spawn. And so if there are contaminants in levels
high enough, with toxicity large enough to impact those
communities--and I don't know, but if there is, we need to know
about that because the worst thing we can do then is wipe out
the fundamental habitat of our reef fishes. And so just because
we don't see it, just because it is below the surface and we
don't see it, does not mean it is not a threat. It may even be
a worse threat than what we can see.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Other members of the panel, would
you like to address it? Does the flow matter?
Ms. Lee. Yes, I think it does. I mean, certainly the mass
matters, what is out there. And maybe the answer was in
relation to what they would do to clean it up, and there are
limited assets so that you can only clean up so much. But it
very much matters with respect to injury assessments. And I
would like to remind the Committee again about restoration. I
would like to submit that all is not completely lost, that it
isn't just about preparing for the next spill and having
research to count the organisms that have died.
I would like to suggest that if we are smart about
collecting the information--and let us not even call it
research. Let us call it appropriate technical response to the
spill. Let us analyze what is happening. Let us make some
reasonable conclusions, maybe not to the 95 percent degree of
certainty that scientists love, but to the degree of certainty
that we need as policymakers and people who are trying
desperately to make sure that we have a Gulf and a vibrant
economy in the near-term rather than decades out. So, I think
it does matter, and it matters for restoration.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, thank you.
Dr. D'Elia. Yeah. I would also like to comment. I think
flow absolutely does matter. We should understand it. It is
going to be important to know how much is out there because the
effects will be determined by how much is there. But it also
important to know how it is partitioned, where it goes. The
fate of the oil is extremely critical. If they are using
dispersants, it may send it in one direction. If they don't use
dispersants, it may send it in another direction.
So, all of these things are important. I think as Marcia
McNutt indicated in the previous panel, doing the mass balances
is an extremely critical activity that we need to undertake.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Madame Chair, thank you. I yield
back. There is another round. Is that correct?
Ms. Bordallo. Yes, there is.
Mr. Bilirakis. OK. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo. Dr. Reed, in collecting data about the
inventory and condition of natural resources as part of the
natural resources damage assessment, is it helpful to involve
local programs that may have extensive data and local knowledge
about impacted resources? And how do you involve these local or
state entities?
Dr. Reed. I think it is absolutely crucial, ma'am. One of
the points I wanted to make about the Louisiana coast and the
issue of a baseline is that it is constantly changing anyway.
If we were to go out and collect a large amount of data in
2010, that would really not give us a good idea about what it
was like in 2008 or what it would be like in 2012 because it is
constantly changing. And that is exactly why we need to not
just go out and look at what it is like now, but we need to
engage folks who have been tracking it over the last few
decades to show what path it was currently taking, where were
areas eroding already, how was the grass growing to begin with.
You know, was this a bad year; was this a good year?
And so really engaging those folks that have had studies on
the ground, particularly in the wetlands, in the barrier
systems, and the open bays, these complex environments where we
are not going to be able to go out and measure every little
piece of it. We need to bring those of us together who have
studied it for awhile and lay their data on the table. And I
think most people are willing to do that.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. And I agree with you. The
experience that these folks bring with them would be very, very
helpful. What kind of monitoring is needed to understand the
oil and dispersant impacts on important fish populations in the
Gulf of Mexico, and what would be needed to implement this kind
of monitoring?
Dr. D'Elia. I think it is both a research and monitoring
question. And we obviously want to do the fundamental toxicity
studies that one always does and take into account the
different life stages that fish are involved with, as Dr. Reed
suggested. So, that will be very, very important. But we also
need to understand, whenever you work with a pollutant, you
have to understand dose and exposure. And so trying to
understand what the dose is, referring to Mr. Bilirakis's
previous question, is going to be very, very important, and how
long that dose stays resident, how long the various life stages
of organisms are going to be affected.
We want to understand the ecosystem. We want to understand
trophic relationships. If we do something that causes a
catastrophic failure of the trophic dynamics, if you will, of
the coastal shelf, it could have a devastating effect that
could last for years. If we destroy the ability of fishes and
shellfish to recruit future generations, then we are going to
have a serious problem.
These questions are all up for grab. We need to be studying
them now. We need to be planning our studies now. We cannot
wait and hope that later on we can begin these things.
Ms. Bordallo. And, Dr. D'Elia, do you think that NOAA
should establish an emergency funding program similar to the
National Science Foundation's rapid awards for immediate
collection of ocean observation and environmental baseline data
in the event of an oil spill?
Dr. D'Elia. Absolutely, or in the event of another
catastrophic environmental concern that they might have. There
isn't a mechanism right now. As a former Sea Grant director, I
am always proud of what the Sea Grant program does. They have a
small pot of money, called program development money, that is
used for that purpose. But it is a very small pot of money. It
is limited to I think about $10,000 a shot. That is simply not
enough to do a substantial, credible amount of work.
The NSF rapid program goes up to $250,000, and is really a
much better approach. So, frankly, Sea Grant has been
underfunded for as long as I can remember, and it is an
extraordinarily important program.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. And I would like now to
call on the Ranking Member.
Mr. Cassidy. Drs. D'Elia and Reddy, BP has said they are
going to make everybody whole insofar as they can make people
whole. Let me ask the two of you, is it possible that BP could
do so if we don't have prospective, ongoing research as to the,
again, ongoing effects of this spill? Dr. Reddy?
Dr. Reddy. No.
Mr. Cassidy. Yes. I doesn't right, huh? I just want to get
that for the record because----
Dr. Reddy. Sorry. I am not being fresh. No.
Mr. Cassidy. Yes. Dr. D'Elia?
Dr. D'Elia. I would agree completely.
Mr. Cassidy. OK. Let me go on to the next one. Let me ask
the two of you to rate NOAA's response or any Federal agency's
involvement right now of academia, because you are obviously
doing some work with them, but in general, rate--we have
already heard from Weisberg. It is an F. Please rate what you
think, the Federal Government's response has been so far in
engaging you in these kind of prospective or----
Dr. Reddy. Engaging me directly? I have had the luxury to
speak to NOAA frequently. In fact, I am planning for this
cruise that I am leaving in a few hours for. I have looked at
the data that has been released quite quickly, and we have used
that to make our cruise plans upcoming. So, I consider the fact
that there has been a lot of transparent data recently. There
is a website for us to see where every vessel that is in the
theater is out there, and every research vessel now that is in
the theater has to update the data that has been out there in
terms of collection of data and some other raw data that we are
using as we speak.
Mr. Cassidy. So, Woods Hole has had a good experience.
Dr. Reddy. Myself, in interacting with NOAA and the EPA as
well in terms of recently planning our data, our cruise.
Dr. D'Elia. I would say that for both NOAA and the EPA, the
experiences are mixed, and that is because both agencies have
regulatory and operational responsibilities, and we tend in the
academic world to be much more oriented to research. And it is
always the case that if you have to regulate or do something
operational, like forecast the weather, you are going to make
those your highest priorities. So, as a result, NOAA and EPA
both tend to be agency-centric to a certain degree, and that is
partially the complexity of their mission.
It would be nice if we could have a way of partitioning out
the research that each agency does so that it is better
protected. Years ago in Congress, there was a proposal to
establish a National Institutes of the Environment to do
exactly that. But it went nowhere. So, that is a fundamental
challenge for NOAA, for EPA, and for the academic community.
Mr. Cassidy. Ms. Lee, again--Dr. Weisberg?
Dr. Weisberg. Yes. I would just like to just clarify one
point. I have not received any direct flow of information or
support from NOAA for this. However, I have interacted with a
limited number of NOAA scientists, and NOAA does acknowledge
the work that we are providing on their daily forecast. So, it
is not as if there has been no, you know, linkages. I just
wanted to clarify that, for the record. Thank you.
Mr. Cassidy. Ms. Lee----
Dr. D'Elia. I would agree with that also, Congressman.
Mr. Cassidy. Ms. Lee, again, I have been so struck by
somebody who worked on Exxon Valdez who says that his research
is still encumbered, however many years later, because of
litigation issues and subpoenaed, et cetera. When I spoke to
some of the researchers, they said when they went to the
marshes, they were confronted by somebody, they said from BP--I
have learned in this job to say what I have been told, not what
I know--that took kind of their name, where you are from; if
you have published anything, we are going to subpoena you sort
of thing, which is an intimidation for academic who just wants
to get along with their life.
So, that said, as the lawyer on the panel, what can we do
to allow folks like you to do your research without fear of
being intimidated by the legal process?
Ms. Lee. Well, that is a challenging question, and I think
the bottom line is that in some ways there needs to be a
parallel process. So, to the extent that one wants to get
compensation--and I believe there is clearly a case here that
is substantial--then one does need to recognize the limitations
of the law. The limitation that we are presented is it is an
adversarial process, and information can be used in ways--I
think it is inappropriate for somebody to be threatening
subpoenas.
Mr. Cassidy. And it may just have been that it was taken as
a threat and wasn't intended to be----
Ms. Lee. Correct.
Mr. Cassidy. But still.
Ms. Lee. However, I will share with you, I was working on a
matter in the State of Maine and had occasion to speak with
someone from the agencies, and the damage assessment team from
that agency actually was given the same story. They ignored it.
And I certainly have read within interest the statements made
by members of the press. Obviously, the beaches are public, and
people have access to beaches. There is a legitimate concern to
the extent that there is a hazardous situation, but at this
point we can't declare the entire Gulf Coast a hazardous waste
site.
Mr. Cassidy. I think I heard a kind of presentation of a
problem by you, but not a real solution. And I am a physician.
I typically don't like attorneys. But that said, is there a
solution to this?
Ms. Lee. Well, there is a solution. One is there needs to
be a transparent and public process; two, that there is a role
for the Department of Justice working on behalf of the United
States to prepare a case. Third, I do believe that the data
that was collected in Exxon Valdez, we should revisit that
issue. I am aware of actually, when I was at the Department of
Justice, which I was, experts who were working on Exxon Valdez
were actually literally to get rid of their notes by the
Criminal Division.
So, that is the kind of thing that there may be a basis for
it in law, but the bottom line is that that is not very helpful
for the larger public interest. And I am a different kind of
lawyer. I don't go out and sue folks. What I try to do is I try
to work with interdisciplinary teams. So, I don't fit neatly in
a box. I love science. I love law. I love interdisciplinary
approaches.
Mr. Cassidy. So, if you have a way--because sometimes the
Chair won't--Madame Chair is being very lenient with us. If you
have something to suggest working with these academics that
would allow Dr. Reed to do research without fear of being in
court when she should be teaching classes, that would be
wonderful if you could suggest that.
Ms. Lee. Well, I think that we need to have
interdisciplinary teams. I think we need to have transparent
information. And the bottom line is the data are the data. I
mean, one of the problems that you have with more junior
lawyers and less seasoned lawyers who don't understand
technical information is they are petrified that a scientist is
going to say something to hurt their case.
We have a larger public interest here. The truth is the
truth. The data are the data. And those working on behalf of
the Department of Justice and others need to take that into
account. And so were it up to me, I think greater transparency
is the watch word.
Mr. Cassidy. Dr. D'Elia.
Dr. D'Elia. Yeah, I would just comment. I think that the
Administration's strategy has very much been to favor the legal
adversarial process here. And I can understand the motivation
to do that, to try to recover as much damage money as possible.
But I think that the downside of that is that it slows down and
impedes the science that really should be done. And I think
sooner or later, the Federal Government is going to have to
make some investments in doing further research without regard
to whether they are going to be able to recover those damages.
Mr. Cassidy. Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman, and now I would like
to recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thanks so much, Madame Chair. I really
appreciate it. Dr. Weisberg, I would like to learn more about
the Loop Current. I hate to be particularly regional, but I am
from the Tampa Bay area, and I am especially concerned about
the oil spill, how it is going to affect us. Does the Loop
Current appear to be a natural barrier for the Tampa Bay area
as it relates to us being directly impacted by oil slicks,
sheen, or tar balls?
Dr. Weisberg. The Loop Current stays in deep water. And on
the west coast of Florida, the continental shelf is, let us
say, about 100 miles wide or wider. And so the west coast of
Florida is actually buffered by the extent of the continental
shelf. If oil gets entrained into the Loop Current, and it has
been, then it flows south. And presently, the Loop Current has
shed what we call an eddy, so the oil is actually staying in
that eddy--as opposed to continuing into the Florida straits
and up the East Coast. Under other situations, the oil could go
up the east coast of Florida, where the continental shelf is
very narrow, at least off of Miami, and that oil can come in
proximity to land.
So, the Loop Current is extremely important. Monitoring how
it evolves between now and several months from now, as long as
there is oil out there, is critical because that could be a
game changer. It can determine--the Loop Current could
conceivably go all the way to the wellhead. And if it does
that, then a lot of the oil that is up there is going to be
transported out of that region. And unfortunately, we can't
predict exactly how the Loop Current will behave.
Mr. Bilirakis. How will the weather affect--maybe a
hurricane, God forbid--how would that affect or alter your
trajectories regarding the Tampa Bay area, or for the Gulf
Coast, for that matter?
Dr. Weisberg. It is difficult to say exactly what a
hurricane will do because it depends from what direction that
hurricane may approach. So, for example, if a hurricane came
ashore somewhere in Georgia, the region of the oil spill would
have very strong winds blowing from west to east. That could
drive oil along the coast of Florida. If, on the other hand, a
hurricane came into the Gulf of Mexico from the south and
progressed westward, those winds would be blowing from east to
west. So, it is really impossible to state what the impact of a
hurricane would be without knowing about the actual properties
of that hurricane. But there certainly would be an impact. We
just can't really predict in advance.
Mr. Bilirakis. Other members of the panel, would you like
to respond to that question, or any question that I asked? Yes,
please.
Dr. Reed. Thank you. I would like to make some observations
about the wetland side of the equation. In Louisiana and in
Mississippi and Alabama, thus far, we have been very lucky, I
think, in that most of the oil is still out in the Gulf of
Mexico. I mean, it is not good that it is there, but it could
be a lot worse in the wetlands. And what you see when you see
these images on television is the oil is largely around the
edge of the marsh, and the marsh kind of catches it as it comes
in. And this is exactly what we saw in the Lake Barre spill a
number of years ago in Louisiana.
I think one of the things that I worry about is not a big
hurricane, but perhaps a small tropical storm that just lifts
the water level a couple of feet, and so that instead of the
grasses sticking out of the water at high tide, when the storm
comes in, the whole marsh is covered. Not a big enough storm
that we evacuate New Orleans or something like that, but the
kind of minor tropical storm that we get a lot in the Gulf of
Mexico that could just actually spread this oil much further
into the wetland environment.
We have oil in some of our wetlands already. We have been
lucky. It is mostly around the edge. But, you know, we are
getting into the season where we have events that just could
carry it a lot further. And that could make it a much more
widespread problem in the wetland environment than it is at the
moment.
Mr. Bilirakis. Anyone else? Yes, please.
Dr. D'Elia. Yeah. I would just like to comment. I think
Florida has been very fortunate by and large that the currents
have done what they have done and that the oil has stayed
offshore. I also own property in St. Petersburg, and I am a
courtesy professor at USF. And so I have a strong interest in
what goes on there as well. I think that the tourism industry
has been really dealt a hard blow by media reports that suggest
the situation is worse. And I would encourage people to get the
word out that Florida is still open for business, and there are
only certain areas of it that are under siege right now from
the oil.
Mr. Bilirakis. I promise I will do my best to get the word
out.
Mr. Cassidy. Will the gentleman yield for just----
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, please. Of course.
Mr. Cassidy. You must own a hotel.
[Laughter.]
Dr. D'Elia. No, no. I wish I did.
Mr. Bilirakis. I have one more question, if I may, Madame
Chair. Thank you. Dr. Weisberg, could you tell me a little bit
more about the Integrated Ocean Observing System? Has it been
useful in the past? Can it be useful in the future?
Dr. Weisberg. The answer is yes, it has been useful in the
past. It is actually useful right now. It could be much more
useful if we really begin to implement it. And so there is a
concept advanced in 2002 for this Integrated Ocean Observing
System that would be a full partnership between the agencies
and the academics and the private sector. And there was an
original ramp-up to $500 million that had been suggested in
2002. The President's Commission on Ocean Policy increased that
to $750 million. I have been using numbers more like a billion
myself.
Whether or not these dollars are adequate depends upon how
they are distributed. And so when I say partnership, I mean a
true partnership. The academics have an extremely important
role to play, as does the private sector and the agencies,
obviously. But R&D, research and development, is really a
purview of the academic community. Operations obviously is a
purview of the agencies. But we can't improve upon our
operations unless we have adequate R&D. And we can't improve
upon our environmental stewardship unless we really understand
how these systems work.
So, if you want to fix your car, you have to open a book
and see how the thing works, otherwise you can't fix your car.
We don't know well enough how our coastal oceans work. And so
that is going to be what IOOS can provide for us, that set of
observations and models and enough people thinking about this
massive problem that we can really start bringing closure to
our understanding of the workings of the deep ocean to coastal
ocean to estuaries.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Anyone else want to comment on
that?
Dr. D'Elia. Yeah. I just wanted to emphasize what Bob said.
I think he is absolutely right about distinguishing the
operational side from the need for R&D. We really can't make
progress until we do the necessary R&D, and that is going to be
continuing as circumstances change. We live in an environment
that has constant new challenges, and accordingly, we need to
always be up on our research. You never get to the stage where
you know enough to deal with everything. And I think that is
one real lesson that is going to emerge from this event.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Thank you, Madame Chair. Thank
you for allowing me to sit on the panel, and I yield back.
Ms. Bordallo. I thank the gentleman from Florida. I guess I
am going to ask the final question here before we close the
Subcommittee hearing. On behalf of my colleagues, I am sure
they are very anxious to hear the answer to this question. Can
anyone on the panel speak to the safety of seafood from the
Gulf, given what we do not know about the dose and the toxicity
of the oil and the dispersant? How will we know when our
seafood is or is not safe to eat? We are all anxious to know.
Can anybody answer that?
Dr. Reed. We have certainly in Louisiana very good programs
in place even before this event came through about seafood
safety. We have extensive monitoring of oyster beds. The state
Department of Health and Hospitals, in conjunction with the
state Department of Wildlife and Fisheries--this is the kind of
thing that is vital to us in Louisiana. We don't want a bad
reputation about our seafood, that we regularly close oyster
leases if there is a problem with any kind of microorganism or
anything like that. I think the approach in Louisiana is that
seafood safety, good seafood, tasty seafood, healthy seafood
that is not going to get you sick, that is our brand, if you
like. And so the state has very good programs in place at the
moment, and I am confident that they are only going to be
allowing to market seafood which is safe.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. That is a very good answer. Now we
can have our seafood lunch and dinners.
Dr. D'Elia. I can also comment on that. I would like to
just echo very strongly what Denise just said. And as a former
Sea Grant director, I know something about seafood and the
attention that is paid to having quality seafood. I was also in
this area as a Maryland Sea Grant director back when the
Pfiesteria crisis hit in the '90s, and I can tell you that the
worries about seafood in one very small geographic area caused
people to shun seafood in a much wider area, even when there
were no effects going on from Pfiesteria. And I am worried
about the same thing going on here. It is almost like the
tourism thing. If the oil doesn't reach the seafood, it is not
going to be a contamination problem. And the oil has not
reached a lot of the fisheries that we are now using to produce
seafood.
Obviously, the state agencies in all the states will be
monitoring this closely, as will FDA and NOAA and others who
are involved with this, and I am confident that they will be
very cautious.
Ms. Bordallo. Well, thank you. And that is good news. I
want to thank the second panel and all of the witnesses for
their participation in the hearing today. And I would like to
remind the members of the Subcommittee that they may have
additional questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to
respond to these in writing. In addition, the hearing record
will be held open for 10 days for anyone who would like to
submit additional information for the record.
So, if there is no further business before the
Subcommittee, the Chairwoman thanks the members for their
participation here this morning. And the Subcommittee now
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:57 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
[A letter submitted for the record by William Y. Brown,
President, Natural Science Collections Alliance, follows:]
June 18, 2010
The Honorable Madeleine Bordallo
Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife
United States House of Representatives
1324 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Re: Hearing on ``Ocean Science and Data Limits in a Time of Crisis''
Dear Ms. Chairwoman:
As President of the Natural Science Collections Alliance (NSC
Alliance), I thank you for recognizing the importance of biological
collections during the Subcommittee's recent hearing about science and
its role in understanding and responding to the problems associated
with the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
The NSC Alliance is a nonprofit association that supports natural
science collections, their human resources, the institutions that house
them, and their research activities for the benefit of science and
society. Our 100 institutional members are part of an international
community of museums, botanical gardens, herbariums, universities, and
other institutions that house natural science collections and utilize
them in research, exhibitions, academic and informal science education,
and outreach activities.
As you know, Dr. Jonathan Coddington, associate director of
research and collections at the National Museum of Natural History,
testified before your subcommittee about the importance of natural
history collections. As Dr. Coddington noted, the Smithsonian's
collections of marine biological specimens represent a unique and now
irreplaceable resource to describe quantitatively the pre-spill Gulf of
Mexico ecosystem. These collections document the biological diversity
of the region prior to the oil spill, and will contribute to
assessments of the spill's environmental impacts and will help to guide
ecological restoration efforts.
Scientific collections held by other institutions will also
contribute valuable scientific knowledge to the oil spill response. As
Dr. Coddington noted, an estimated 42 percent of publically available
biological specimens from the Gulf of Mexico are held by entities other
than the Smithsonian Institution. Numerous universities, museums, and
non-profit research centers hold biological specimens collected from
the region. These collections serve as vital sources of biological
information about the Gulf of Mexico and the southeastern United
States.
Our nation's natural history collections, whether held at a
national museum or in a university science department, contain genetic,
tissue, organism, and environmental samples that constitute a library
of Earth history. These specimens and associated data drive cutting
edge research on the significant challenges facing modern society.
Beyond informing oil spill response and restoration, these specimens
enable researchers to answer questions about the effects of climate
change, the spread of invasive species and pathogens, and the loss of
biological diversity and its effects on ecosystem function. In short,
natural history collection specimens and associated data enable
scientists and natural resource managers to develop the knowledge
required to inform environmental management.
Unfortunately, for too many years, the federal government has
failed to make an adequate or coordinated investment in natural science
collections. Thus, we often hear from curators about backlogs of
specimens that have yet to be identified or properly curated. There is
also a need to digitally capture and make available information about
key holdings. For these and other reasons, the NSC Alliance has
requested that the President promulgate an Executive Order establishing
a formalized interagency process for the preservation and use of the
nation's science collections, both federal and non-federal. Information
about the NSC Alliance proposed order is available on our Web site at
http://nscalliance.org/?p=139.
Once again, thank you for focusing attention on the importance of
science collections to responding to environmental and public health
crises. I would welcome an opportunity to discuss with you the
importance of a sustained and coordinated federal investment in the
nation's scientific collections. Please do not hesitate to contact me
at 215-299-1016 or [email protected], or Dr. Robert Gropp, Director of
Public Policy, at 202-628-1500 x 250 or [email protected].
Sincerely,
William Y. Brown
President
Natural Science Collections Alliance
______
[A letter submitted for the record by Ronald S. Tjeerdema,
Ph.D., Professor and Chair, Diplomate, American Board of
Toxicology, follows:]
June 23, 2010
The Honorable Madeleine Z. Bordallo
Subcommittee of Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife
Committee on Natural Resources
US House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
The Honorable Henry E. Brown, Jr.
Subcommittee of Insular Affairs, Oceans and Wildlife
Committee on Natural Resources
US House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Re: Data gaps in oil spill research
Dear Chairwoman Bordallo and Ranking Member Brown,
Thank you for the opportunity to contribute input regarding the
existing data gaps that may hinder the ability of Regional Response
Teams to respond to marine oil spills in the future (the subject of the
recent hearing on June 15, 2010). As a professor of environmental
toxicology, I have directed research on the environmental fate and
toxic actions of crude oil, dispersants and dispersed oil for almost 25
years (resulting in nearly 150 peer-reviewed publications and
proceedings abstracts). In light of the recent Deepwater Horizon
blowout, it has become apparent that there are a number of data gaps
that need to be addressed prior to the next spill event.
Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, interest in the fate
and effects of crude oil, dispersants and dispersed oil increased
dramatically - with a concurrent rise in research funding made
available by numerous federal and state agencies, as well as the oil
industry. However, over the past decade both interest in oil spills,
and research funding, dramatically declined; today there are few active
sources. Thus, many important areas have not been addressed, leading to
the data gaps that have become so apparent with the current Gulf of
Mexico oil spill.
In general, once an oil spill has occurred responders first
determine whether a formal response is necessary. If the spill is
limited in scale, and moving away from important shorelines and/or
resources, it may be sufficient to allow it to degrade naturally.
However, once the decision is made to formally respond, the means then
need to be identified. Common methods include removal (via booms/
skimming), burning, chemical dispersal and bioremediation. Often small
spills can be adequately dealt with via removal techniques, but for
larger spills usually a combination of methods is necessary. However,
technology has advanced little over the past decade, and for the most
part both short- and long-term environmental consequences remain
largely unknown.
Obviously, numerous data gaps exist. General research areas
requiring attention include:
1. Development of improved collection techniques. The current
generation of skimmers collects much more water than oil,
making them highly inefficient.
2. Design of more effective corralling systems. Booms
currently in use are only effective in calm seas, and without
efficient booms the effectiveness of skimming declines
dramatically.
3. Evaluation of currently available dispersants for
effectiveness using a wide variety of oil types, weathered
states and environmental conditions. Every oil spill is unique,
and the best decisions involving dispersant selection and use
depend on data specific for the oils and conditions unique to
each spill.
4. Short- and long-term fate of both naturally-dispersed and
chemically-dispersed oils under varying environmental
conditions should be characterized to determine the influence
of droplet size, persistence and potential formation of more
toxic products.
5. Both acute and chronic toxic effects should be
characterized for both naturally-dispersed and chemically-
dispersed oils using the sensitive life stages of marine,
estuarine and freshwater organisms likely to be impacted in the
future.
6. Development of more effective microbial systems for
bioremediation that are optimized for a variety of fresh and
weathered oils, their chemically-dispersed forms and various
environmental conditions. Ultimately nature degrades petroleum,
primarily through microbial degradation. However, advanced
bioremediation techniques possess the potential to enhance
degradation rates, leading to decreased environmental impacts.
7. The potential for development of ``dead zones'' from the
localized release of massive amounts of organic carbon, which
would potentially elevate biological oxygen demand (BOD),
should be assessed. Hydrocarbon degradation by microbes has the
potential to produce anoxic conditions, leading to toxic
impacts.
These are some of the main areas of need from my vantage point of
nearly a quarter century investigating the fate and impacts of oil and
dispersed oil. During that time, and with support from the California
Office of Spill Prevention & Response, my research team developed a
state-of-the-art oil spill research facility which provided much of the
data on both oil dispersant and dispersed oil toxicology that is
currently guiding responders in the Gulf of Mexico. However, research
funding has declined by over 90% during the past decade, which has
dramatically slowed our progress.
The good news is that our program and others are poised to address
the current data gaps if sufficient research funding can again be made
available. I would suggest support in the area of $25 million per year
be dedicated to the areas listed above, and recommend that it be
administered by agencies such as the National Science Foundation and
the US Environmental Protection Agency, as they are well equipped to
solicit targeted research proposals and organize the peer review
necessary to identify projects of the highest quality.
I hope I have been helpful, and please do not hesitate to contact
me if I can be of further assistance.
Best regards,
Ronald S. Tjeerdema, Ph.D.
Professor and Chair
Diplomate, American Board of Toxicology
Phone: 530-754-5192
FAX: 530-752-3394
Email: [email protected]